Values and IPT: theoretical integration and empirical interactions

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Identity and values are important driving forces in human lives. Identity Process Theory (IPT; Breakwell, 1986, 2001b) and the Schwartz Value Theory (Schwartz, 1992) focus on distinct but related aspects of the self and have some overlapping propositions particularly with regards to human motivation. Hence, it is surprising that there has been no attempt so far to integrate them theoretically or empirically. This chapter provides the first attempt to address this gap in the literature. After presenting key elements of both theories, the chapter provides a theoretical integration that addresses the links between identity motives and outcomes and provides an empirical examination of the role of personal values as moderators of such links. Finally, we address identity and value change.

IDENTITY PROCESS THEORY

Identity Process Theory (IPT; Breakwell, 1986, 1992, 2001a, 2001b, 2010; Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010; Vignoles et al., 2006) elucidates the socio-psychological processes underlying identity construction and change. It specifies (i) the necessary requirements of a positive identity, (ii) the ways individuals cope with threats to identity, and (iii) what motivates individuals and groups to defend their sense of self. IPT proposes that the structure of identity should be conceptualised in terms of content and evaluation dimensions. The content dimension of identity consists of a unique constellation of identities derived from social experience. These identities can include group memberships (e.g., British), individual

traits (e.g., smart) and physical aspects (e.g., tall). The evaluation dimension of an identity refers to the person's sense of how good or bad this identity is.

Identity processes

Two universal processes regulate the identity structure: (i) the assimilation-accommodation process, and (ii) the evaluation process. *Assimilation-accommodation* refers to the assimilation of new information and new identities into the identity structure (e.g., 'I am gay'). This sometimes requires accommodation and adjustment of existing components of the identity structure (e.g., 'If I am gay, can I still consider myself a Muslim?'). The *evaluation* process refers to the process of evaluating how good or bad the identity is (e.g., 'I am not happy that I am gay.'). Both individual (e.g., personal goals) and social (e.g., norms) factors play a role in the evaluation process.

Identity motives

Breakwell (1986, 1992) identified four identity motives which she sees as guiding these universal processes. These motives are desirable end-states for identity. They include (i) continuity across time and situation *(continuity)*; (ii) uniqueness or distinctiveness from others *(distinctiveness)*; (iii) confidence and control of one's life *(self-efficacy)* and (iv) a sense of personal worth or social value *(self-esteem)*. Extending IPT, Vignoles and colleagues (Vignoles et al., 2002; Vignoles et al., 2006) proposed two additional identity motives, namely (v) *belonging*—maintaining feelings of closeness to and acceptance by other people, and (vi) *meaning*—finding significance and purpose in one's life. More recently, Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010) introduced a (vii) *psychological coherence* motive—establishing feelings of compatibility among one's (inter-connected) identities. IPT suggests that identity is threatened whenever the social context frustrates the satisfaction of any of the identity motives. Individuals utilize coping strategies to minimise the threat. For instance, a Muslim man who feels sexually attracted to other men may perceive his Muslim and gay identities as incompatible, thereby threatening psychological coherence. In order to cope with the threat, he may *deny* both to himself and to others that he is gay (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010).

Social Representation, Social Change and Identity Processes

IPT integrates the intrapsychic, interpersonal and intergroup levels of human interdependence. This is especially evident in IPT's explicit recognition of the role of social representations in the psychosocial processes that underlie identity construction (Breakwell,

2001b; Moscovici, 1988). For Breakwell (1986, p. 55), a "social representation is essentially a construction of reality" that enables individuals to interpret the social world and to render it meaningful. Social representations emerge through interpersonal and intergroup communication and shape the content and evaluation dimensions of identity (Breakwell, 2001b).

Furthermore, the social representational aspect of IPT enables understanding both personal and social change, because individual and public understandings of specific phenomena fluctuate in accordance with contexts. For instance, the historical representation of homosexuality as a criminal and sinful act versus the contemporary representation of homosexuality as a 'normal' sexual orientation leads to distinct social and psychological responses. The contemporary representation leads to greater willingness to 'come out' because it is less threatening for self-esteem and may no longer be seen as jeopardising one's sense of belonging in relevant social circles (Jaspal & Siraj, 2011). Hence, changes in social representations are vital for understanding identity processes.

The theory hypothesises that the impact of social change on identity is contingent on three main factors. First, the impact is greater the more personally relevant the social change. Thus, the Arab Spring in the Middle East doubtless impacted identity continuity more for Egyptians and Tunisians than for citizens of Russia, for example. Second, social changes vary in their demands for revising the content and evaluation of particular identities. The 'Black is Beautiful' campaign in the USA brought about a re-evaluation of the meaning of being Black for black people, transforming it into a source of self-esteem rather than a threat (Ward & Braun, 1972). Third, it is important to consider how people themselves evaluate the change. In rural India, probably due to different implications for self-esteem, lower caste group members might evaluate the state-endorsed dismantlement of the caste system as a positive social change, while higher caste group members are generally said to evaluate this negatively (Jodhka, 2004; Ram, 2004).

Social change can radically change the meaning of identities as it can reshape the social representation of a stimulus or social position. For example, social change to the status of a group could transform an identity once experienced as threatening to one's self-esteem into one that enhances it. It thereby impacts the motivations for the self-efficacy, self-esteem, continuity and other identity motives associated with particular identities. In this way, social change affects the degree of centrality of individuals' different identities.

Identity Motives and Perceived Centrality

According to IPT, the identity structure consists of multiple, inter-connected identities which vary in *perceived centrality*. Centrality of an identity includes three dimensions: (i) the importance of the identity; (ii) the affective evaluation of the identity (i.e., the degree to which one is happy about having it); and (iii) the enactment of the identity in everyday actions and interpersonal encounters. Vignoles (in press) suggests that enactment of an identity differs from the more cognitive evaluative components (importance and affect). He notes that one can consider an identity to be important and can be happy with it but still refrain from enacting it publicly due to normative pressures or other reasons.

Vignoles, Chryssochoou and Breakwell (2002) suggest that identities that best satisfy the identity motives are perceived as most central to the identity structure. Thus, the more a given identity is perceived by the individual as a source of self-esteem, self-efficacy, distinctiveness, meaning, continuity, belonging and psychological coherence, the more central it will be in the individual's identity structure. This suggestion has received considerable empirical support (Vignoles et a., 2002; Vignoles et al., 2006).

Breakwell (2010) suggests that the relative significance of identity motives in affecting identity outcomes may be culturally specific. Social representations are specific to particular social contexts and, thus, it is likely that different motives will be more or less important in particular cultural contexts. For instance, in a study of national and ethnic identity management among British South Asians (Jaspal, 2011), the importance of the ethnic identity was predicted by the continuity and distinctiveness motives but not by the self-efficacy motive. Hence, centrality does not necessarily depend on the extent to which a given identity satisfies *all* of the identity motives. Rather, it may be necessary to identify the motives that are more important individually or culturally and are hence more likely to enhance a person's identity and psychological well-being.

This chapter presents a novel approach to the relationship between identity motives and the centrality of the identities that satisfy these motives. It examines a possible individual-difference dimension to IPT. It tests the hypothesis that individuals' *value priorities* moderate the relationship between satisfying identity motives and the centrality of the identity. We suggest that the importance of the different identity motives depends on individuals' personal values. If the centrality of an identity depends on satisfying an identity motive that an individual considers important due to her values, and that motive is jeopardised, the identity will be threatened. If, due to her values, she does not consider an identity motive important, jeopardising that motive may not translate into identity threat. By testing hypotheses based on this idea, we hope to reveal why identities differ in centrality.

This can contribute to debates regarding 'core' identities and multiple identification (Deaux, 1993; Hofmann, 1988; Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2010).

THE SCHWARTZ VALUE THEORY

To test our suggestion we draw on the Schwartz value theory (1992). It defines basic values as broad life goals that serve as guiding principles in people's lives (e.g., achievement, tradition). Values are relatively stable. They underlie and are expressed in people's evaluations, attitudes, behaviours and specific goals. They therefore have an overarching effect on people's lives.

Schwartz (1992) defined ten distinct broad values, organized in the quasi-circumplex structure portrayed in Figure 1. This structure has been validated empirically in 75 countries around the world (Schwartz, 2011). Values that are adjacent in the circle express compatible motivations and have positive empirical correlations (Schwartz, 1992). For example, conformity values express the motivation to fulfil others' expectations. Adjacent in the circle are security values that express the motivation to maintain safety of one's self, one's personal relationships, and one's society. These two motivations share an emphasis on maintaining order and harmony that makes them motivationally compatible and positively correlated. In contrast, values that emanate from opposite sides of the centre express conflicting motivations and have negative empirical correlations. For example, self-direction values express the motivation for independent thought and action, a motivation that conflicts with the motivation to fulfil others' expectations that underlies conformity values. Hence, these two values are conceptually opposed and negatively correlated.

Why are adjacent values correlated positively whereas values from opposite sides of the centre are not? Schwartz (1992) explains this by drawing on the implications that values have for evaluations and behaviours. Values that express compatible motivations lead to similar evaluations and similar behaviours. For example, the adjacent values of conformity and security are likely to induce negative evaluations of change and to promote normative and conservative behaviour. Values that emanate from opposite sides of the circle express conflicting motivations and lead to opposing effects on evaluations and behaviours. Thus, in contrast to the negative evaluation of change and normative behaviours that conformity values induce, self-direction values are likely to induce positive evaluations of change and may lead to non-normative behaviour. Not only is it psychologically inconsistent to pursue motivationally opposed values in a single behaviour or evaluation, but it is both practically difficult and socially inappropriate. It is more pleasant and easier to act in a motivationally

consistent manner that expresses compatible values. Most people therefore hold value priorities that correspond to the circular empirical structure of associations among values in Figure 1. When comparing people to one another, we find that people tend to attribute similar relative levels of importance to adjacent values in the circle and different relative levels of importance to opposing values.

The circle of values can be further divided into four higher order types of values that are ordered as two bi-polar dimensions (see Figure 1). Conformity, security and tradition values are grouped as *conservation values*. They express a motivation to maintain a stable, harmonious status quo in relationships, in one's surroundings and life and in society. Conservation values conflict motivationally with stimulation, self-direction and, usually, hedonism values that are grouped as *openness to change* values. These values express a motivation for change, variety and challenge in ideas or actions. The second bi-polar dimension contrasts *self-enhancement* values (power, achievement and, sometimes, hedonism) with *self-transcendence* values (benevolence and universalism). The former express a motivation to enhance one's self, even at the expense of others; the latter express a motivation to promote the well-being of others and of the natural world.[1]

Value Change

A review by Bardi and Goodwin (2011) indicates that values are relatively stable and resistant to change. Values can be seen as core schemas. What people perceive in situations, what they remember, and how they behave are all influenced by their core schemas. Ample research (reviewed in Cooper & Shallice, 2006; Janoff-Bulman, 1989) demonstrates that people pay less attention to peripheral schemas than to core schemas, so new values that may be salient in the environment may not enter awareness. All these processes lead to and reinforce the stability of important values and other core schemas. Therefore, a stable state is the default for values: Values start to change only if some exogenous event initiates a process of value change. Even if an event initiates value change, however, the dominance of core schemas sets many factors in motion that can block the change before it reaches completion. Nonetheless, values do change sometimes.

Bardi and Goodwin (2011) suggest that values change through two main routes, an automatic route and an effortful route. In the automatic route, an external event activates new values (e.g., messages of a newly elected government activate conservative values; immigrating to a country in a more individualistic culture activates individualistic values; a

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[1] For additional factors that account for the structure of relations among values, see Schwartz (2006).

baby's cries activate parents' kindness values). Because these values are activated automatically and repeatedly, the person may not be aware that this is happening and may therefore not generate counter-arguments to oppose change. Every time the value is activated, the relevant schema is strengthened until it becomes a core schema, thereby creating value change.

In the effortful route, events make a new value sufficiently salient to draw people's active attention and thought. This happens, for example, when a new group overtly discusses a value, when the government introduces a controversial new policy with clear value implications, or when people are subjected to direct persuasion attempts. If, after consciously thinking about and re-evaluating the value, people are convinced that the value is more (or less) important than they previously thought, then the importance of that value starts to change. And if such re-evaluation is stimulated repeatedly, long-term value change occurs.

Changes in specific values reflect their embeddedness in larger cognitive/affective structures such as people's systems of values and beliefs. Thus, an increase in the importance of one value is accompanied by increases in compatible values (adjacent values in the circle) and decreases in conflicting values (values that emanate from the opposite side of the circle). Both longitudinal studies (Bardi et al., 2009) and a laboratory experiment (Maio et al., 2009) have shown this. Moreover, when beliefs change, values may change to maintain compatibility with those beliefs. A study of migrants' adjustment to a new country (Goodwin, Polek, & Bardi, in press) found that prior values predicted a changes in beliefs toward more value-compatible beliefs and that prior beliefs predicted value change toward more belief-compatible values . We next integrate IPT with the Schwartz value theory in order to advance the understanding and utility of both theories.

IPT AND VALUES: THEORETICAL INTEGRATION AND SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

Values Add an Individual-Difference Dimension to IPT

IPT identifies the processes that all individuals experience in defining and defending their identities, moderated by culture and context. In contrast, the theory of basic values is used to identify differences among individuals in the priority they attribute to motivationally distinct values. Hence, the theory of basic values can add an individual-difference dimension to understanding identity processes and thereby enrich IPT. Because value priorities affect perceptions, social representations and evaluations, it is plausible that values also affect the relations between identity motives (e.g., continuity) and identity outcomes (e.g., identity

evaluation) and relations among people's identity motives (e.g., continuity and distinctiveness). We next specify our expectations for effects of values on identity processes and then assess them empirically.

Values, continuity, and evaluation. Individuals who give high priority to conservation values tend to give low priority to openness to change values. They attribute importance to preserving the status quo in their world, they respect and try to maintain traditions, and they try to avoid new ideas and experiences. Therefore, they should consider especially important those identities that provide them with a sense of continuity with the past that promises to stretch into the future. They may also feel happier with such identities. Hence, we expect the value dimension of conservation vs. openness to change to moderate the link between the perceived continuity of an identity and the evaluation of that identity.

Values, distinctiveness, and evaluation. If conservation values enhance the impact of continuity on the evaluation of identities, we might expect openness to change values to enhance the impact of the distinctiveness motive on the evaluation of identities. Openness to change values encourage the pursuit of novel experiences and original and creative ideas and actions that may make one distinctive. Hence, those who value openness to change might evaluate identities that provide a sense of distinctiveness as especially important. However, two aspects of distinctiveness raise problems for this prediction.

First, one's individual identities are not the only potential sources of a sense of distinctiveness. Rather, the group identities one derives from affiliating with different groups can also provide a sense of distinctiveness, if the group is viewed as having unique qualities, i.e., as distinctive (Vignoles et al., 2000). Many identities (e.g., psychologist, dancer, lawyer) can be experienced both as individual difference attributes and as group affiliation attributes. When thinking about such identities, people may seek to satisfy their distinctiveness motive through focusing on either group or individual distinctiveness or both. Second, different types of distinctiveness may interact differently with openness vs. conservation values. Vignoles et al. (2000) proposed and found three types of distinctiveness motives, being different, being separate, or being in a distinctive (typically high) social position. They found that the motivation to be different is more prevalent in cultures that emphasize openness to change versus conservation values, whereas the motivation to hold a distinctive social position is more prevalent in cultures that emphasize conservation versus openness values. These complexities may prevent a simple moderation of distinctiveness effects by values. Finally, the distinctiveness motive can also be seen as a basic epistemic need, as without knowing what one is *not* it is hard to understand what one *is* (e.g., understanding 'kind' is impossible

without understanding what is 'cruel') (Vignoles et al., 2000; Vignoles, 2011). Although we offer no prediction for how openness to change versus conservation values may affect the relation between the distinctiveness motive and identity evaluation, we assess the possibility of such a moderation effect.

Values, distinctiveness and belonging. As noted above, the distinctiveness motive can find expression through one's individual uniqueness or through the uniqueness of groups to which one belongs. One can have a distinctive individual identity and/or a distinctive group identity. Individuals' value priorities may influence the extent to which people identify with the groups to which they belong. Those who give high priority to conservation values (versus openness) probably tend to think of themselves in terms of group affiliations (Cohen & Shamai, 2010; Meyer, Stanley, Herscovitch, & Topolnytsky, 2002). Hence, they may identify more strongly with their membership groups (see evidence in Roccas, Schwartz, & Amit, 2010, regarding national identification). We therefore hypothesise that individuals who attribute more importance to conservation values are more likely to draw their sense of identity distinctiveness from their group belonging. Hence, the conservation vs. openness value dimension should moderate the link between distinctiveness and belonging. For those who value conservation, the distinctiveness of an identity should be associated with deriving a sense of belonging from the identity.

Values, belonging and evaluation. As noted, people who value conservation vs. openness identify more with groups, presumably because belonging enables them to feel more socially grounded and secure (Roccas, et. al, 2010). This implies that the sense of belonging that a group identity provides is more important to people who value conservation. Hence, for those who value conservation, their group belonging should relate more strongly to their evaluation of their group identity. We therefore predict that the conservation vs. openness value dimension moderates the relation between the sense of belonging an identity provides and the evaluation of that identity.

Conformity values, belonging, self-efficacy and identity enactment. In addition to the evaluation of an identity, Vignoles (in press) suggest that identity enactment is another important outcome of identity motives. Identity enactment refers to displaying the identity through behaviour. Vignoles proposed and found that the more an identity satisfies identity motives, the more people tend to enact that identity in public. He further proposed that the identity motives of self-efficacy and belonging are particularly important determinants of the extent to which people enact their identities in public. This is because feeling capable (as in

self-efficacy) facilitates identity enactment, and feeling accepted by others (as in the belonging motive) reduces fear that the enacted identity will be censured.

We suggest that conformity values moderate the relations of identity enactment to self-efficacy and belonging. Of the ten basic values, conformity values seem most relevant to the decision of whether or not to enact an identity in public. This is because conformity values express the motivation to fulfil others' expectations and to avoid confrontations (Schwartz, 1992). Thus, conformity values are especially important guides for public behaviour. For those who value conformity highly, the motivation to enact an identity in public should depend especially strongly on the extent to which that identity will provide a sense of competence (self-efficacy) and a sense of acceptance (belonging). We therefore hypothesise that conformity values moderate the association of identity enactment with self-efficacy and belonging.

Empirical Investigation

To test our hypotheses we used a varied sample of 156 adults (42% men, ages 18 to 79, $M = 35.19$, $SD = 15.32$). Participants first completed the most recent version of the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS), in which each of 57 values is followed by a short definition (e.g., 'FAMILY SECURITY (safety for loved ones)' measures security values) (Schwartz, Sagiv & Boehnke, 2000). Participants rated the importance of each value as a guiding principle in their lives on a scale from -1 (opposed to my principles) to 7 (of supreme importance). 3-8 value items measure each of the broad values (security, conformity, etc.). We computed the value dimension of conservation vs. openness to change values by subtracting the mean rating of the self-direction and stimulation values from the mean rating of the conformity, security, and tradition values.

Participants then completed the IMQ (Vignoles et al., 2006) which asks them to list eight of their identities and to provide, for each, a rating of nine identity outcomes and motives: importance of the identity, happiness with the identity, how much they show it in public, how much the identity gives them a sense that their life is meaningful, how much the identity provides them with a sense of belonging, self esteem, continuity, distinctiveness, and self-efficacy. The answer scale ranged from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely) (Vignoles et al., 2006).

The study design entailed a nested data structure with two distinct levels of analysis: Level-1 was the repeated within-person measurement of identity outcomes and motives.

Level-2 was the between-person measurement of the ten basic values.[2] Following Vignoles (2004), we used multilevel regression modelling. This modelled variance simultaneously on the two levels, thereby providing more accurate and reliable estimates of the nested data structure (Hox, 1995). Following the relevant advice in the literature, prior to all analyses, we centred each level-1 variable around individual's own means (see Vignoles, 2004) and centred values around both individual's means (see Schwartz, 1992) and the sample mean (as required in analysing interactions between continuous variables, see Aiken & West, 1991).

Table 1 reports the Pearson correlations between the level-1 identity outcomes and motives. Note that the significance values in the table reflect the multilevel data structure and may therefore be misleading. Nevertheless, the correlations provide an overall sense of the relations among the identity motives and outcomes. As expected by IPT and found previously (Vignoles, 2004; Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, et al., 2006), the correlations among all the identity motives and outcomes are positive and moderate to high. This pattern may be due to the fact that and all nine constructs relate to the self and people are likely to see themselves as internally consistent. Moreover, there may be a general positivity factor for identities that may colour all of these outcomes and motives. However, such a 'hallo effect' is only partial. Had it been strong, we would not have obtained the results presented below.

Our hypotheses focus on interactions between values (level-2) and identity motives (level-1). Thus, we expect that the beta slopes in the level-1 regressions of identity outcomes (e.g., centrality, happiness) on identity motives (e.g., continuity) will differ across individuals, depending on the priority they give to particular values (level-2). We therefore estimate cross-level interactions by computing *random effects models* that allow beta slopes to vary across different levels of the level-2 variable (Snijders & Bosker, 1999). To aid in interpreting effects, we follow the common procedure of plotting the results of the cross-level interactions graphically. The graphs display low (below -1 SD), average (between -1 and +1 SD) and high (above +1 SD) values of the level-2 moderator associated with each of the simple slopes of level-1 predictors and dependent variables.[3]

Values, continuity, and evaluation. As expected, the conservation vs. openness to change value dimension moderated the relations of continuity with evaluation, both for the

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[2] We did not adopt a traditional multiple regression approach because that would ignore the clustering of identity outcomes and motives within individuals and lead to an under-estimation of error variance and an increased probability of Type I errors.

[3] Regression lines depicted on Figures 2, 3 and 4 only aid the graphing effects. Interpretation of graphs that show cross-level interactions differs from interpretation of graphs that show interactions in multivariate regression. No inferential tests apply here to test the significance of the simple slopes (Snijders & Bosker, 1999).

evaluation component of importance and for the component of happiness with the identity (Table 2 models 1and 2), but it did not moderate the relation of continuity with identity enactment. The top panel of Figure 2 shows the moderation in predicting the importance of the identity. Specifically, it shows that, for those who value conservation (vs. openness), the more an identity provides them with a sense of continuity, the more important that identity is to them. In contrast, for those who tend to attribute little importance to conservation (vs. openness) values , the extent to which an identity provides them with a sense of continuity matters little for the importance of the identity. The interaction graph for the affective evaluation of the identity is very similar.[4]

Although the meaning that an identity provides is seen as an identity motive rather than an outcome of identity motives (e.g., Vignoles, in press), we believe it is also logical to view the meaning of an identity as an outcome. This is because the satisfaction of an identity motive can also lead to the perception of the identity as providing meaning (see Vignoles, in press, with regard to continuity and meaning), particularly if it helps people to fulfil their values. Specifically, with regard to continuity and the values of conservation vs. openness, we would expect that the more an identity provides people who value conservation (vs. openness) with a sense of continuity, the more they would see the identity as providing them with meaning. However we do not expect this to be the case for those who attribute little importance to conservation (vs. openness) values . This moderation effect was indeed significant in the expected direction (model 3 in Table 2). Its graph (not shown) was similar to the one shown for importance. Thus, the more people tend to value conservation (vs. openness), the greater the positive association between the continuity that an identity provides and its perceived meaningfulness.

Values, distinctiveness, and evaluation. Conservation vs. openness values did not moderate the relation between distinctiveness and identity evaluation. This converges with Becker et al.'s (in press) findings from adolescents in 19 countries around the world.

Values, distinctiveness, and belonging. Conservation vs. openness moderated the link between distinctiveness and belonging (see model 4 in Table 2). The bottom panel of Figure 2 shows that, as expected, distinctiveness and belonging correlated positively among individuals who tend to value conservation (vs. openness). In contrast, these identity motives were not correlated among those who tend not to value conservation vs. openness. This provides indirect support for the idea that people who value conservation (vs. openness) tend

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[4] All graphs are available from the authors

to think about themselves in terms of group affiliations and to pursue their distinctiveness motive through the groups to which they belong. Similarly, Vignoles et al (2006) found a stronger positive correlation between these identity motives among church-goers, who are likely to value conservation highly (see Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), compared to school-leavers.

Values, belonging, and evaluation. We expected the conservation vs. openness value dimension to moderate the relation between the sense of belonging that an identity provides and the evaluation of that identity. We examined this moderation effect for two aspects of evaluation, the importance of the identity and happiness with it. Neither was significant. However, one component of conservation values, namely conformity values, did moderate the relation between the belonging an identity provides and both aspects of its evaluation, importance and happiness (Table 2, models 8 and 9, respectively). The top panel of Figure 3 shows that the greater the sense of belonging that an identity provided the more important that identity was for people who attribute high or medium importance to conformity values. In contrast, the sense of belonging an identity provides did not predict the importance of the identity among those who give low importance to conformity values. The bottom panel of Figure 3 reveals a similar pattern of interaction for happiness with the identity. In this case, however, a greater sense of belonging derived from an identity was associated with greater happiness with the identity for everyone, but the effect was stronger among those who value conformity highly.

Conformity values, belonging, and meaning. In line with our view of meaning as an identity outcome, we examined whether conformity values moderated the links between the sense of belonging and the sense of meaning an identity provides for individuals. We postulated that an identity that provides a sense of belonging to people who value conformity should also provide them with a sense of meaning, because belonging is particularly important to them. This moderation effect was indeed significant and in the expected direction (model 10 in Table 2). Specifically, for everyone, a greater sense of belonging derived from an identity was associated with attaching greater meaning to that identity, but this effect was stronger among those who value conformity highly. This is similar to the moderation of the association between belonging and happiness noted above.

Conformity values, belonging, self-efficacy and identity enactment. As expected, conformity values moderated the association of self-efficacy and of belonging with identity enactment (Figure 4, models 7 and 11, respectively). The top panel of Figure 4 shows that the positive relation between the sense of belonging that an identity provides and enactment of

that identity is stronger the more a person values conformity. Conformity values had a similar moderating effect on relations between self-efficacy and identity enactment (Figure 4, middle panel). Vignoles (in press) proposed a general link between satisfaction of *all* identity motives and enacting identities in public. We therefore tested whether conformity values also moderated relations between the other identity motives and identity enactment. We found that conformity values had similar moderation effects for both the self-esteem and the meaning motives, and the interactions showed a similar shape (models 5 and 6 in Table 2, respectively). Thus, we can now add an individual differences perspective to Vignoles' (in press) general proposal that the more an identity satisfies identity motives, the more people tend to show this identity in public. Our findings suggest that, the more people value conformity, the closer the link between the degree to which an identity satisfies various identity motives and the tendency to display that identity in public.

Confirmation of the moderation effects of conformity led us to assess whether the other conservation values, security and tradition, also had such moderation effects. Security values exhibited similar moderation effects on the associations of both belonging and continuity with identity enactment (Table 2, models 13 and 12 respectively, and the bottom panel of Figure 4 for continuity). Both the belonging and continuity motives may be particularly important for people who value security highly, because belonging and continuity can provide a sense of being protected and safe in a predictable world. We note, however, that security values had the same moderation effect on the positive link between the identity motive of meaning and identity enactment (model 14 in Table 2). Tradition values exhibited no moderation effects. Close examination of the patterns of moderation effects could be a topic for future research.

In sum, we found that personal values moderated links between identity motives and outcomes, suggesting that, although there is universality in links between identity motives and outcomes, there are also individual-differences. Specifically, for individuals who highly value conservation (vs. openness to change) values, feeling that an identity provides them with continuity is particularly important in the evaluation of an identity, and for these people distinctiveness is more closely associated with belonging. Furthermore, for individuals who value conformity (one component of conservation values), satisfying the motives of self-esteem, meaning, and self-efficacy is particularly associated with their tendency to show the identity in public. Finally, for people who value conformity, there is a closer association between satisfying the motive of belonging and all aspects of identity evaluation. This

suggests that one size does not fit all: values determine which identity motives are more associated with identity outcomes.

Value and Identity Change

Stability and change are of key importance to the understanding of identities and values. Some of the suggestions and findings from value theory and research could inform IPT and stimulate new research, as we explicate next.

Forces for stability. Bardi and Goodwin (2011) suggested that basic values are embedded in core schemas. This is probably true for identities as well. Hence, as Bardi and Goodwin (2011) suggest with regard to values, core identities may be stable by default, due to the forces that cause stability in core schema reviewed above. That is, for identities to change, something in the environment must change. And indeed, IPT links identity changes with social change (Breakwell, 2001a).

The process of change. As values are embedded in core schemas, any change in values occurs through change to the relevant core schema (Bardi & Goodwin, 2011). Similarly, IPT suggests that identity change involves change to knowledge structures, reflecting the assimilation-accommodation process (Breakwell, 1986). Values and compatible identities are probably associated with the same schema. This implies that they may change together as part of the same process and/or that a change in one may induce a compatible change in the other (see supporting evidence with regard to values and compatible beliefs in Goodwin et al., in press). Future research can examine whether this holds with regard to values and compatible identities.

IPT suggests that social changes may lead to changes in the centrality of identities. The process by which this could occur can be adapted from Bardi and Goodwin's (2011) suggestions regarding the automatic and effortful routes to value change. Specifically, social change can activate particular values automatically and/or through conscious discussion. For example, messages in the media regarding the threat of Islamic terrorism may automatically activate the identities of 'Muslim' and 'British' in British-Muslims. This activation may lead to an automatic threat to satisfying the motive of self-esteem in of the Muslim identity, because of the negative discourse in the media regarding Muslims. This, in turn, could lead to a reduction in the centrality of Muslim identity. However, the same messages are likely to enter awareness and may cause conscious thought about them. A British-Muslim person may disagree with these messages and feel alienated with Britain. This feeling of alienation is likely to reduce satisfaction of the motive of belonging that the British identity provides and therefore lead to a reduction in the centrality of the British identity.

Finally, our empirical research reported above suggests a 'values pathway' through which social change may induce identity change. We found that conservation values moderate the links between various identity motives and outcomes. For example, the importance people attribute to conservation values affects the extent to which the sense of continuity that an identity provides influences the evaluation of that identity. If social change leads to an increase or decrease in the importance of conservation values, it is also likely to affect the links between the identity motives and outcomes that these values moderate. To illustrate, consider the sense of continuity that a religious identity can provide. If social change induces increased importance of conservation values, the continuity motive should become more influential and people should experience their religious identities as more important and central and they should be happier with them.

This values pathway could have large-scale ramifications in a society if there is a mass shift in the importance of conservation values which affects the influence of the continuity motive. If conservation values and, consequently, the continuity motive become more important, people's identity as adherents of a religion would become more central for them. The role of religious institutions in society might then increase, and people might demand changes in government family policies. A decrease in the importance of conservation values and, consequently, of the continuity motive, might have opposite effects. It might weaken religious institutions and lead to more liberal family policies.

Conclusions and Future Directions

This chapter provided an integration of IPT with the Schwartz (1992) value theory, adding an individual-difference perspective to IPT and demonstrating its importance empirically, as well as integrating ideas and empirical findings regarding change of identities and values. Our empirical data demonstrated that individual differences in personal values moderate the links between identity motives and identity outcomes, thereby revealing that these links are not the same for everyone. Our hypotheses and findings were focused on conservation values, which express the motivation to maintain stability and thereby to protect the individual from threat. This fits with IPT's focus on identity threat. It suggests that individuals may differ in the level of identity threat that social changes can elicit due to value-based individual differences in the importance of satisfying certain identity motives. For instance, those individuals who value conservation (and therefore see identities that provide them with

feelings of continuity as more important) may be adversely affected if they cease to perceive a sense of continuity, leading to identity threat (Breakwell, 1986).

Future theory and research could expand the contribution of values to IPT by addressing values as determinants of contents of identities that would allow the person to fulfil his or her values (see also Roccas et. al, 2010). This is consistent with IPT's recognition that individuals have agency in constructing their identities. Future research could also investigate some of the suggestions put forward regarding value change in the area of identities.

In conclusion, this chapter makes progress in bridging the individual and social levels of cognition. We hope that, by presenting an individual-difference dimension to IPT, we have been able to establish linkage between some of the central tenets of IPT and values theory. This should encourage both IPT and values researchers to consider the theoretical and empirical benefits of further integrating these theories in their work and of acknowledging their respective contributions to understanding the self, change and human motivation.

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Table 1

Zero-Order Correlations Between Ratings of Identity Outcomes and Motives (N= 1248) on Level-1

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Importance	1	.						
2. Happiness	.46**	1						
3. Showing	.33**	.28**	1					
4. Meaning	.44**	.60**	.28**	1				
5. Belong	.37**	.50**	.33**	.59**	1			
6. Self Esteem	.41**	.69**	.34**	.61**	.58**	1		
7. Continuity	.31**	.30**	.20**	.39**	.36**	.32**	1	
8.Ddistinctivness	.31**	.29**	.23**	.29**	.22**	.32**	.28**	1
9. Self Efficacy	.32**	.52**	.26**	.47**	.41**	.58**	.31**	.32**

Level of significance: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.001$

Table 2

Estimated Standardised Regression Weights in Multilevel Regression in which Identity Motives and Outcomes (level-1) were nested within Participants (level-2: n=1248). Method: Random Slopes.

Level 2 moderator (Value)	Tested models *(Predictor → Dependant)*	*Model number*	Regression estimates			Loglikelihood Value (*df* =10)	Variance of dependant variable	Residual variance in dependent variable (level 2)
			Value *β*	Identity Motive *β*	Value × Identity Motive *β*			
Conservation (vs. openness)	Continuity → Importance	*1*	-.06*	.08	.05*	-1679.117	1.00	0.03
	Continuity → Happiness	*2*	.05	-.04	.06*	-1811.538	1.24	0.07
	Continuity → Meaning	*3*	-.07*	-.01	.09*	-1944.578	1.70	0.08
	Distinctiveness → Belonging	*4*	-.12**	.08	.09*	-1979.998	1.55	0.05
Conformity	Self esteem → Showing	*5*	-.10*	.14**	.12*	-1750.819	1.70	0.02
	Meaning →Showing	*6*	-.15**	.34*	.15**	-1745.073	1.70	0.03
	Self efficacy → Showing	*7*	-.07*	.24*	.12**	-1777.867	1.70	0.02
	Belonging → Importance	*8*	-.08*	.13	.08*	-1638.196	1.00	0.02
	Belonging → Happiness	*9*	-.02	.22 *	.09*	-1675.441	1.24	0.00
	Belonging → Meaning	*10*	-.03	.06	.10*	-1786.488	1.70	0.02
	Belonging →Showing	*11*	-.06	.15*	.10*	-1755.654	1.14	0.01
Security	Continuity → Showing	*12*	-.06	.25**	.10**	-1801.330	1.14	0.01

Belonging → Showing	*13*	-.03	.15**	.09*	-1756.887	1.14	0.01
Meaning→ Showing	*14*	-.05	.30**	0.10*	-1749.33	1.14	0.04

Significance levels: * *p* <0.05, ***p* <0.001.

Figure 1. Ten motivationally distinct values and their circular motivational structure (Adopted from Schwartz, in press)

**Model 1: Continuity predicting centrality**

Model 4: Distinctiveness predicting belonging

Figure 2

**Moderation effect of conservation (vs. openness)**

**Model 8: Belonging predicting centrality**

**Model 9: Belonging predicting happiness**

Figure 3. Moderation effect of conformity

Model 11: Belonging predicting enactment

Model 7: Self efficacy predicting enactment

Average security (between +1 and -1 SD)

Low security (below +1 SD)

Model 12: Continuity predicting enactment

Figure 4. Moderation effects in predicting identity enactment