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**A STUDY OF ABUSE AND VIOLENCE AGAINST SMALL  
BUSINESSES**

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**A thesis submitted in the partial fulfillment of the requirements of The Nottingham  
Trent University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**September 2000**

# **A Study of Abuse and Violence against Small Businesses.**

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## **Abstract.**

Little previous research has considered abuse and violence within the context of small businesses. The research that has been conducted has identified that some retail sector businesses experience high rates of abuse and violence, and often incidents are related to crime types such as shop theft. However, no previous studies have considered rates of abuse and violence against retail, manufacturing, service and wholesale business sectors or how incidents are triggered in any detail. The aim of this study is to examine abuse and violence across these business sectors and to establish why some business types experience high rates of incidents. This is done in three stages. First, it is considered how contexts conducive to abuse and violence are generated within the business environment. Here, a theoretical framework is developed which hypothesises that a number of business types will possess 'lifestyle' characteristics that generate these contexts. Second, it is considered how incidents are triggered within businesses. Here it is hypothesised that incidents are triggered when either customers or members of staff violate the norms of business transaction. Third, it is considered how the processes of incidents generate a final result of abuse or violence. It is hypothesised here that incidents will consist of a number of escalating and de-escalating events. Incidents with the most serious results are likely to consist of a number of escalating events, whereas incidents with less serious results are more likely to consist of a number of de-escalating events. These hypotheses are tested by utilising quantitative data from two survey sweeps of interviews with over 800 businesses and qualitative interviews with 20 victims of abuse/violence. Three broad conclusions can be made from this research. First, some businesses have lifestyle characteristics that generate contexts conducive to abuse and violence. Second, we can identify how incidents are triggered in a number of contexts and third, we can identify how the final result of an incident is generated by observing the processes of verbal and physical interaction between victims, offenders and any third parties present during an incident.



## Introduction.

Owning or working in a small business can be a dangerous occupation. The 1998 British Crime Survey reported that there were 1.2million incidents of violence at work in England and Wales in 1997 (Mirrlees-Black et al, 1998), and the 1994 Commercial Victimization Survey (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995) reported that there were assaults in 15% of retail and 5% of manufacturing businesses over a 12 month period. In recent years there has been growing concern about the risks of abuse and violence for staff in the workplace. This has often been brought to the attention of the general public by media reporting of incidents. Newspaper and television reports have highlighted acts of intimidation and violence against employees within both large national chain stores and small corner shops. Whilst newspaper and television reports tend to focus upon the most extreme cases of intimidation and violence within businesses, there has also been a growth in academic studies highlighting the risks to businesses on both a national and local level. <sup>1</sup>

Media reporting of abuse and violence within the business environment has tended to focus upon robbery in businesses such as banks, building societies and jewellers, and violence in (or around) nightclubs and pubs. Local newspapers report crimes against businesses that vary in levels of seriousness, whereas most national papers only report incidents where businesses lose large sums of money or those that lead to fatalities. For example, headlines such as 'Gunman walks away from shop after fatally wounding manager' (Guardian, 11.1.94) and 'Police hunt two men after shopkeeper is shot dead' (Guardian, 12.3.97) are not uncommon.

During recent years media attention has increasingly focused upon the small shop as a setting for racially motivated intimidation and violence. These reports emphasise the intimidation that some Asian shopkeepers often have to face and how this intimidation generates fear. One example reported how two Asian shopowners in Hackney, London become so worried after murders in a local post office and off-licence, that one bought a Bull Terrier dog to protect the premises whilst another kept

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<sup>1</sup> For example, a national Commercial Victimization Survey was conducted in 1994 (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995). A number of localised studies have also considered the rates of abuse and violence against staff (see chapter one for a review of these studies).

a sword behind the counter in case of attack (Guardian, 1.8.90). The media have also reported numerous other stories of intimidation of shopkeepers from gangs of youths in high crime areas. For example, shopkeepers in Catford, London reported that they had been subjected to long term intimidation from local youths who would 'intimidate customers, ransack and steal' (Guardian, 24.12.96).

Stories of this nature are not only found in London. There have also been reports of serious racially motivated intimidation and violence against shopkeepers across the UK. Most stories here are of extreme intimidation. Off-licence owner Mal Hussein became the focus of national media attention after he was subjected to years of racially motivated violence, threats and intimidation at his shop on a Lancaster estate (Guardian 31.3.99). Another shopkeeper on a problem estate in Derby had his entire house and businesses boarded-up after repeated racial attacks against the premises (Guardian, 6.7.94). In some cases, racially motivated intimidation can have more serious consequences. In 1994 a 61 year -old Asian shopkeeper was put into intensive care after a racially motivated attack in Neath, South Wales (Guardian, 3.12.94), and in Leicester, an Asian shopkeeper died of a heart attack after continued harassment from teenagers in 1995 (Leicester Mercury, 6.10.95).

These stories highlight the risks involved in running a small business. For many victims of intimidation the affect is to increase the fear of crime and to make shopkeepers more vigilant. In some extreme cases, intimidation will result in death. In addition to the obvious human consequences of intimidation and violence, becoming a victim can also have serious financial consequences for the business. Many shopkeepers that become victims of attacks have to protect their premises against criminal damage and vandalism. This includes putting up shutters and grilles to protect windows. As a consequence, this gives the impression that the business attracts crime and trouble and may discourage potential buyers. In the case of Mal Hussein, he has tried to sell the shop since 1991 though 'its fortress- like appearance has not helped to attract buyers' (Guardian, 31.3.99).

Despite the fact that these extreme forms of intimidation, violence and racial abuse against business employees can become national news, there has only been limited academic interest in the subject. A few studies have considered racially motivated

abuse and alcohol related violence around business outlets such as off-licences, pubs and nightclubs (see Ekblom & Simon, 1988; Ramsey, 1989). In addition to this there have been a growth of national studies concerning crime against businesses. Since 1992, the British Retail Consortium has published annual reports of crime against retail premises. In 1994 the first national Commercial Victimization Survey of crimes against retail and manufacturing premises was conducted, and in 1999 the first Scottish Business Crime Survey considered crimes against all businesses types. Despite this growing interest in crimes against businesses, little previous research has conducted a systematic study of the types of businesses that become victims of abuse and violence and how these incidents are triggered.

The aim of this study is to redress the gap in the research. It will concentrate upon incidents between outsiders and employees within the workplace, focusing upon incidents against small businesses within the Belgrave and West End areas of Leicester, England. The retail, service, manufacturing and wholesale business sectors are all covered in the analysis and data are drawn from two large quantitative datasets, and qualitative interviews with victims.

The thesis begins with a review of the previous research that has been conducted within the area of abuse and violence against businesses. Here, it is highlighted how the research in this area is limited, though a growing number of national and local studies have published statistics on the rates of abuse and violence against businesses. Chapter two outlines how theories of victimisation can help us to understand abuse and violence against businesses. Particular attention is paid to 'routine activity theory' and the 'lifestyle theory of personal victimisation'. It is considered if these theories offer an adequate theoretical framework for understanding abuse and violence within the business environment. Chapter three begins to develop a theoretical framework for understanding abuse and violence. This draws upon routine activity theory, lifestyle theory and previous studies on the situational contexts of violence as an aid to understanding the incident processes. This chapter develops a 'lifestyle theory of business victimisation' by considering the contexts in which abuse and violence are likely to occur and how incidents are triggered. This theory has two main conjectures. First, it postulates that businesses become victims of abuse and violence because they have a specific set of lifestyle attributes that are conducive to victimisation. Second,

the final outcomes of incidents of abuse and violence will be dependent upon a number of processes generated by victims and offenders within the incident. Here, the theoretical framework is developed into a set of conjectures that try to understand the contexts, triggers and processes of incidents.

Chapter four outlines how the theoretical conjectures will be tested. To develop an understanding of the contexts of abuse and violence specific use is made of two large quantitative datasets. To understand the triggers and processes at work within incidents data are used from qualitative interviews with victims of abuse and violence. Chapters five and six test the theoretical conjectures. These chapters consider each conjecture and if specific 'lifestyle' characteristics of businesses can be used as reliable predictors of abuse and violence. Chapter five focuses upon the contexts of abuse and violence and chapter six the triggers and processes of incidents. Finally, it is considered if we can develop a lifestyle theory of business victimisation. This will assess if we can develop a clear theoretical framework identifying key factors within businesses that can predict risk of abuse and violence. The final chapter will also consider futures options for research in this area.

## Chapter One.

### Abuse and Violence against Businesses: A Review of the Previous Research.

#### Introduction

There has been a lack of study by academics and practitioners considering crimes against business. This is not to say that no such research has been conducted but one could argue that business crime has not secured proper or even adequate attention from either criminologist or government in the UK (Burrows, 1996; 1997). British criminologists have not been alone in neglecting the workplace (Hibberd and Shapland, 1993) as little research on crimes against businesses or victimisation within the workplace has been conducted abroad. The International Crime against Business survey (van Dijk & Terlouw, 1995) indicates that crime against business is becoming recognised as a problem in many countries and as a result a more proactive approach is being taken in preventing crimes against business.<sup>2</sup> This is particularly evident in the USA, South Africa, and the UK. In the USA National Crime Victimization surveys have published statistics on rates of crimes against business since the 1970's (Skogan, 1990a), and in South Africa commercial crime surveys have been conducted (see Naude, 1995). In the UK there have been national and local surveys of crime against businesses (that are reviewed below), and in addition to this, organisations such the Retail Crime Initiative<sup>3</sup> and the Retail Action Group<sup>4</sup> have been proactive in highlighting the problem of crimes against business.

Despite a growing interest in the area of crimes against business, little research has considered abuse and violence against business. Again, this is not to say that no research has been conducted in the area, though few studies have considered the causes and consequences of abuse and violence in the business environment. This

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<sup>2</sup> The International Crime against Business survey published rates of crime against retail businesses in nine countries. These countries were Hungary, Czech Republic, Netherlands, Germany, UK, Australia, France, Switzerland and Italy.

<sup>3</sup> The Retail Crime Initiative is part of the British Retail Consortium. It was established in 1993 to collect data from retailers about their experiences of crime.

<sup>4</sup> The Retail Action Group was established in 1993 to advise the National Board for Crime Prevention on crime in the retail environment.



chapter will highlight the research that has been conducted.<sup>5</sup> However, to place this research into context, it is also necessary to review the research considering crimes against business in general and why there has been a lack of research in this area.

These issues will be considered in four stages. First, this chapter will assess why there has been a lack of research in the UK exploring crimes against businesses. Secondly, there will be a brief overview of the previous research considering crimes against business. Thirdly, the previous research addressing the problem of abuse and violence against business will be reviewed and finally, it will be outlined why a more detailed and thorough examination of abuse and violence within the context of businesses is required.

### **Why has there been a lack of research considering crimes against business?**

Whilst it is acknowledged that there has been lack of study by criminologists regarding the subject of crimes against business, it would be incorrect to say that there is a complete dearth in the literature. A number of institutions including the Home Office, the British Retail Consortium, the Police Foundation and Crime Concern have published data on rates of crime against business. In addition to this, a number of academic institutions have also conducted research within this area, the most notable being the Scarman Centre at Leicester University.<sup>6</sup>

Despite the growing interest from a number of institutions in crimes against business, there are a number of reasons why the subject area has not secured the same interest as other areas of Victimology (such as crimes against households or individuals). The first major reason relates to the relatively recent development of Victimology as a subject of serious criminological research. Victimology is a relatively young discipline that is still in the early stages of its development. A large proportion of the research in this area has developed due to the policy and funding of the Home Office which has tended to focus upon individuals and households as victims of crime, rather than businesses. Therefore, the growth of interest in the victims of crime focused upon volume crime (such as car crime and household burglary). For example, a common focus of research for the Home Office has been domestic burglary (See

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<sup>5</sup> This will be done in the context of the United Kingdom as this is where the data sample for the thesis is based.

<sup>6</sup> Formally the Centre for the Study of Public Order.

Forrester et al, 1990; Anderson et al, 1995; Budd, 1999a) and car crime (Webb & Laycock, 1992; Tilley, 1993a; Anderson et al, 1994). The Home Office has also published a number papers considering crimes against businesses. For example, publications have considered shop theft (Ekblom, 1986), burglary (Laycock, 1985), robbery (Ekblom, 1987) though these publications tend not to be as common as those cited above.

The major reason why business crime has not been the subject of more research is because the Home Office has tended to direct their interests towards crimes that have the largest impact upon the general public. These are crimes that incur relatively high costs for individuals and generate a high level of fear or anxiety. This would explain why particular attention has been paid to residential burglary and car crime. According to British Crime Survey statistics, car crime makes up 21% and domestic burglary 10% of all crime in England and Wales (Mirrlees-Black et al, 1998). Both of these crime types have high reporting rates, they can incur high costs, and both may also lead to an increased fear of crime with domestic burglary often having particularly unpleasant emotional affects on victims.

Crimes against business may also have serious consequences though Shapland and Vagg (1988) suggest that it has been assumed in many academic circles that crime against business is not as serious as crime against the individual, therefore the problems that business suffer have not adequately been taken into account. However, crime prevention efforts may have been targeted towards individuals and households because they are victims of a far greater proportion of overall crime than businesses. There are far more households and individuals than businesses and therefore these groups constitute far higher proportion of potential targets. Therefore, attempts to prevent crimes against households and individuals are likely to have a greater impact on overall crime figures, costs of crime and the fear of crime.

In relation to the above point, it has often been perceived that all businesses are successful and affluent, and can protect themselves from crime (Burrows, 1997). Many think of businesses as large companies with a turnover of millions of pounds per year who can either control crime or budget for its consequences. The reality is that 94% of UK businesses are small businesses employing less than ten people (Burrows, 1997). Many of these are economically marginal and research is beginning

to show that many of these smaller businesses are not able to survive the cost of crimes such as burglary (see Wood et al, 1996).

Crimes against businesses have also not been comprehensively addressed because of the inadequacies of police recording systems in identifying businesses as victims. Police recording systems cannot easily identify crimes that have occurred against businesses as they are not recorded in categories which clearly identifies a business as a victim. For example, a burglary against a house is recorded as 'residential burglary dwelling', whereas a burglary against a business would be recorded as 'burglary other'. This category also records burglaries against other buildings such as schools and garden sheds (therefore the exact number of business premises victimised cannot be identified). A similar problem is found when considering violence. This crime is recorded as 'violence against the person' and records all violence in the same category regardless of where the incident occurred (thus making it difficult again to identify the number of crimes that occur in the business premises). Therefore, the way the police record crimes against businesses helps to hide the true extent of crime problems and gives the impression that businesses are not highly victimised.

So far, a number of reasons for the lack of research considering crimes against business have been outlined. The relatively recent development of an interest in the victims of crime has meant crime against business has only recently become the subject of study. It is also true to say that a number of other groups such as individuals or households have been viewed as a more urgent subject of research. However, the study of crime against business has not been helped by apathy amongst academics towards the subject area and police recording systems that have been unable to identify the true extent of crime against businesses. Despite this, there has been a growing amount of research within this area. Some of the key research is reviewed below.

### **The Study of Crimes against Business in the United Kingdom.**

Most of the previous research addressing crimes against business has emerged from three major sources. These are the Home Office, the British Retail Consortium<sup>7</sup> and

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<sup>7</sup> This is part of the Retail Crime Initiative which covers 90% of UK retail outlets.

academic institutions such as the Scarman Centre at Leicester University.<sup>8</sup> The Home Office research has considered a number of aspects of business crime such as burglary (Laycock, 1985; Tilley, 1993b), shop theft (Ekblom, 1986), robbery, (Ekblom, 1987; Austin, 1988), crime and racial harassment against Asian-run small shops (Ekblom & Simon, 1988) and fraud (Levi, 1988; Levi et al, 1991). Since 1992, the British Retail Consortium has published six national surveys of retail crime. There have also been edited collections published by academics in the area. The most notable contributions here are the Crime at Work studies from the Scarman Centre at Leicester University (Gill, 1994; Gill, 1998a) and Clarke and Felson's collection of papers on business crime (see Clarke & Felson, 1997).

A number of victimisation surveys have now been conducted that measure rates of crime against businesses. These surveys can be broken down into a number of categories. These include international, national and local studies considering a number of crime types against business (see table 1.1). Both international and national studies have considered the rates of victimisation against businesses for all crime types whereas localised studies have usually concentrated upon a specific crime type against business. Finally, there have also been a number of studies conducted that have given advice on a specific area of prevention such as credit card fraud (Levi et al, 1991) and violence against staff (Poyner & Warne, 1988).

The first (and only, to date) International Crimes against Business survey (Van Dijk & Terlouw, 1995) compared the results of victimisation surveys completed by retail premises across nine countries including Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Switzerland and Italy. The survey addressed various crime types such as burglary, vandalism and robbery over a 12-month recall period. It was found that 'theft by persons' was the most common crime type with the highest prevalence rate in Hungary (83%) and the lowest in Italy (44.5%). The second most common crime was burglary (with rates ranging from 40% in the Czech Republic to 14.4% in Italy) except in France and Italy where fraud by outsiders was the second most common crime. The least common crimes were theft of company vehicles, fraud by personnel and corruption.

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<sup>8</sup> The author is not suggesting that these are the only institutions to conduct research in this area. Others such as Crime Concern, the Police Foundation and local authorities have conducted surveys, though not all of this has been published.

The International Crimes against Business survey shows that retail businesses across a number of countries have high rates of crimes such as theft by persons and burglary. Several national studies in the UK have also shown that businesses have particularly high rates of victimisation for certain crime types. A number of national studies have considered crimes against business. The most detailed studies have been published by the British Retail Consortium in their 'Retail Crime Costs' surveys (Burrows & Speed, 1994; Speed et al, 1995; Brookes & Cross, 1996; Wells & Dryer, 1997; Wells & Dryer, 1998 & unauthored, 1999), and the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995). Both the British Retail Consortium (BRC) surveys and the Commercial Victimisation survey (CVS) have published crime rates for businesses across a number of offence types including burglary, criminal damage, robbery, fraud, violence and abuse. The BRC surveys consider crime against retail outlets and the CVS considers crime against both retail and manufacturing premises.

The BRC surveys were all 'head office' surveys. Here, retailers were contacted through local chambers of commerce. In the case of businesses with more than one outlet the headquarters of the business would be contacted and data collected through postal questionnaires. A total sample of over 54,000 outlets of businesses was achieved in 1992/93, 52,000 in 1993/94, 52,000 in 1994/95, 48,000 in 1995/6, 44,500 in 1996/97 and 44,730 in 1997/1998.<sup>9</sup> Each sample of the BRC survey represents around 10% of retailers in the United Kingdom.

The BRC surveys also assess the risk rates within the retail sector for burglary and robbery. Here, chemists, grocers and petrol retailers had the highest risk of a completed burglary in 1997/98. All of these categories could expect to be victim of around 30 completed burglaries per 100 stores over a 12-month period. Off-licences, other non-food retailers and petrol retailers were most likely to be victims of a robbery. Each category here was victim of around 10 completed robberies per 100 stores in one year.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> These are financial years, April to April

<sup>10</sup> It should be noted here that these patterns are remarkably similar to previous years.



**Table 1.1: Key research considering rates of victimisation against business on the International, National and local level for all crime types.**

<p><u>International</u></p> <p>International Crimes Against Business Survey (Van Dijk &amp; Terlouw, 1995). Study of crimes against businesses in nine countries.</p>
<p><u>National (UK)</u></p> <p>'Retail Crime Costs'. Six reports by the British Retail Consortium on crime against retail premises (Burrows &amp; Speed, 1994; Speed et al, 1995; Brookes &amp; Cross, 1996; Wells &amp; Dryer, 1997; Wells &amp; Dryer, 1998 &amp; unauthored, 1999).</p> <p>1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey (Mirrlees-Black &amp; Ross, 1995). Home Office study of crime against retail and manufacturing premises.</p> <p>1996 Forum of Private Business survey (Gill, 1998b). A study of over 2,000 questionnaires completed by Forum of private business members.</p> <p>The 1999 Scottish Business Crime Survey (Burrows et al, 1999). First survey of crime against business premises in Scotland</p>
<p><u>Local</u></p> <p>Small Business and Crime Initiative Surveys (Wood et al. 1996; Tilley &amp; Hopkins, 1998). Two surveys of crime against businesses with a sample size of over 800 business premises in Leicester.</p> <p>Safer Cities project. Evaluation by Tilley (1993) of the impact of Safer Cities initiatives on crime against businesses.</p> <p>Camden Three Streets Project (Hopkins &amp; Tilley, 1998). A study of crime against 87 business premises on three London streets.</p> <p>Crime On Industrial Estates (Johnson et al, 1994). A study of over 400 premises on industrial estates.</p>

The BRC surveys are designed to collate data on the extent and cost of crime, and to encourage local crime prevention strategies. The surveys report on the number of incidents and the costs of crime such as burglary, robbery and shop theft and they assess crime risks by business type (such as grocery store or off-licence).

Table 1.2 outlines some of the main findings of the 1997/1998 'Retail Crime Costs' survey. The six reports conducted so far have consistently shown that the highest

number of incidents against retail premises are for shop theft. In 1998 there were 3.79 million incidents reported (compared with 4.28 million incidents in 1997). In comparison, a high number of incidents of violence, criminal damage and burglary have also been recorded. In 1998 there were 109,000 incidents of physical violence, threats of violence or verbal abuse (there were 4 incidents of violence per 1,000 staff), 85,000 incidents of criminal damage (37 per 100 premises) and 78,000 burglaries and attempts (24 per 100 premises). It is worth noting here that for incidents such as burglary and robbery, the average cost per incident was particularly high and would represent a heavy financial burden on businesses (£2,230 & £3,234 respectively).

**Table 1.2. Key findings of the British Retail Consortium Report 1999.**

<b>Incident Type</b>	<b>Number of incidents (thousands)</b>	<b>Average Cost per incident (£)</b>
<b>Shop Theft</b>	3,790	44
<b>Abuse &amp; Violence</b>	109	-
<b>Criminal Damage &amp; Arson</b>	85	340
<b>Burglary (including attempts)</b>	78	2,230 <sup>11</sup>
<b>Staff Theft</b>	19	458
<b>Robbery</b>	14	3,234

The BRC surveys have reported that businesses have high risks of becoming victims of a number of crime types. These figures are difficult to compare to household surveys due to the varying ways that incidents are measured and because certain crimes (such as shop theft) are not committed against both groups. One crime that is comparable is burglary. When compared to the British Crime Survey (Mirrlees-Black et al, 1998) it is evident that retailers have higher risks of burglary than households. In 1997 there were 7.7 burglaries per 100 households (includes attempts) compared to 20 per 100 retail premises recorded by the BRC.

<sup>11</sup> Figure is for stock loss and damage repair in a completed burglary.

The 1994 Commercial Victimization Survey (CVS) is another national survey that has measured victimisation rates against business. The CVS directly interviewed business premises rather than collect data that had been collated at head offices. As a result, the CVS may have made a more accurate assessment of crime rates against business than the BRC surveys. Here, all of the business premises were interviewed directly, rather than relying on the headquarters of business aggregating incident numbers and costs of crime for a number of outlets.

The aim of the Commercial Victimization Survey was to measure the impact of crime against retail and manufacturing premises in 1993. It was the first national victimisation survey of retail and manufacturing premises. The sample was selected from the British Telecom Businesses database which provides telephone numbers, standard industrial classification codes (SIC) and number of employees within the company. The database does have limitations as it registers only those who opt to be in the yellow pages and it can quickly be outdated as businesses open and close. The overall sample for the study was 2,925 of which 1,666 were retail and 1,259 manufacturing business premises.

In total, 80% of retailers interviewed had been a victim of at least one crime in 1993. The most common crimes were theft by customers (which 47% of retailers had experienced), burglary (24%), theft from vehicles (23%) and vandalism (22%). The CVS also considered the key characteristics of likely victims of crime. The key risk factors for retailers were being a large employer in the north and being located away from a town centre.

In contrast to retailers, the overall rates of victimisation were lower for manufacturers. Here, 63% of manufacturers experienced at least one incident of crime, which represents significantly lower crime risks than retail businesses experience (80%). The most prevalent crimes for manufacturers were thefts from vehicles (25%), burglary (24%) and vandalism (16%). Manufacturers were just as likely to be burgled as retailers, and (similarly) it was larger premises in the north that were most likely to be burgled. This was also a feature of vandalism incidents. These tended to be against larger manufacturers of alcohol and cigarettes in the north.

The CVS also estimated the costs of crime against businesses. In total, the cost of crime was estimated to be £780m for retailers and £275 for manufacturers. This represents 0.7% of retail turnover and 0.2% of manufacturing turnover. There are also

other costs of crime which are hard to assess (such as loss of orders, delayed delivery and staff absence) which the study does not note. On average a burglary cost retailers £1,660 and manufacturers £2,420. A small retailer could expect to lose on average £1,850 per year through crime and a large retailer £12,450. Small manufacturers on average lost £1,740 and large manufacturers £7,730. Retailers on commercial estates sustained the largest losses to crime (on average £19,020 per year).

The respective methodologies used by the BRC and CVS research make it difficult to draw comparisons between the two surveys. The BRC reports count the number of crimes reported by the sample of businesses in the survey, whereas the CVS uses measures of prevalence (percentage of businesses victimised over a period of time). However, the CVS does record the average number of crimes per 100 premises and the BRC the number of incidents per 100 premises for burglary, employee theft, vandalism and robbery. Therefore, we are able to compare incidence rates recorded in the CVS and BRC surveys for retail premises for 1993/94.<sup>12</sup> This data is presented in table 1.3.

**Table 1.3. A comparison of crime rates reported in the BRC and CVS surveys.**

<b>Crime Type</b>	<b>Commercial Victimisation Incidence rates per 100 businesses</b>	<b>British Consortium Incidence Rates per 100 businesses</b>	<b>Retail (1993/4)- Incidence Rates per 100 businesses</b>
<b>Burglary</b>	93	53	
<b>Employee Theft</b>	93	65	
<b>Vandalism</b>	87	28	
<b>Robbery</b>	8	3	

Table 1.3 tells us that in both surveys burglary and employee theft are the most common crimes to occur against retail premises. However, it should be noted that for each category, the average number of incidents recorded by the CVS is higher than those recorded by the BRC survey. However, it is unlikely that the business in the CVS did actually experience higher crime rates than businesses in the BRC. Therefore, this probably highlights problems with the respective methodologies. The

<sup>12</sup> These are the only two CVS/ BRC surveys that can be compared. The CVS is for 1994, the BRC survey for April 1993 to April 1994.

CVS is a premises based survey and the BRC head office based. The CVS directly interviewed business premises about their experiences of crime, whereas the BRC has to rely on data being collated at head office level. 'Premises' surveys may be a more reliable account of business crime as they deal directly with the business premises (the potential victim). It would be expected that individual premises would be more aware of the number of crimes they had experienced than head offices. Collecting data from head offices of business will under-estimate crime if outlets of a company do not report crime incidents to their head office. This appears to be apparent in the BRC survey data represented in table 1.3 above.

The crime rates recorded by the CVS and BRC surveys suggest businesses have higher risks of crime than both individuals and households. For example, 80% of retailers and 63% of manufacturers had been victims of crime in 1994, this is compared to 34% of individuals in the 1998 British Crime Survey (Mirrlees-Black et al, 1998). The CVS also records higher prevalence rates for burglary within businesses. In total, 24% of retailers and manufacturers were burgled in 1994 compared to 5.6% of households in the British Crime Survey.

Generally, national surveys of crime against business provide an account of crimes against business sectors (such as retail or manufacturing premises). One key criticism with the analysis of data in national surveys is that there tends to be little explanation of why crime concentrates against different business types within each sector (such as off-licences in the retail sector). The BRC and CVS studies do begin to highlight business types with high risks of crime though there is little detailed analysis of why businesses such as chemists and grocers experience high rates of crimes such as burglary. This suggests that using business sector categories to measure the level of crime against businesses can sometimes be misleading. Dividing businesses into categories such as 'retail' or 'manufacturing' premises assumes that all businesses within these groups have the same attributes and as a result the same crime risks. However, for many business types this is not true. For example off-licences and footwear shops are in the retail sector, though both have very different crime risks.

It is apparent that more research is required to consider crime rates against businesses that are not in the retail or manufacturing sector. Gill (1998b) begins to do this by



considering data from Forum of Private business questionnaires with 2,618 premises. Here, a number of business types across sectors such as retail, manufacture, wholesale, construction, agricultural, transport and hotels were interviewed. Some predictable patterns are found. Retailers experienced the highest rates of theft (47.2% were victims of at least one incident), though high rates of vehicle theft are uncovered in the transport, construction and agricultural sector (29.1%, 22.1% & 20.8% respectively). One other notable feature of the study is the high prevalence rate recorded for burglary, employee fraud, robbery, vandalism and vehicle theft in the transport sector.

Gill's study is a step forward in understanding business crime as it begins to highlight the risk of crime in other sectors apart from retail and manufacturing. However, it is still acknowledged by Gill that more needs to be done to understand why specific business types experience high rates of victimisation. Further help does come from the first Scottish Business Crime Survey (Burrows et al, 1999). This replicated the methodology of both the CVS and BRC surveys by conducting premises and head office surveys, though the Scottish Business Crime Survey (SBCS) interviewed business in the manufacture, wholesale/retail, construction, transport/telecommunications and hotels/ restaurants sectors.<sup>13</sup> What is of interest here is that a wider sample of business sectors is considered than in previous surveys. As a consequence, some interesting victimisation patterns are found. For example, the hotel/ restaurant sector had the highest incidence rate for any crime (716 incidents of crime per 100 premises), with the transport sector the lowest (453 incidents per 100 premises). However, the major strength of the SBCS lies in its attempt to understand why similar business types had contrasting experiences of victimisation.

As a part of the study, researchers made follow-up visits to business premises. In total, 10 pairs of businesses (two from each sector) were selected. One business had experienced high crime rates and the other low crime crimes. The aim of the exercise was to begin to understand why similar types of businesses appeared to have contrasting experiences of crime. It was found that for incidents such as burglary the high-risk businesses tended to be located on industrial estates or in areas close to a

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<sup>13</sup> In total, 2,501 'premises' surveys were conducted and 148 head office surveys covering 3,680 business premises. For an outline of the results see Burrows et al, 1997.

'problem' housing estate. Often the risks for offenders would be reduced as there would be absence of surveillance at nights or weekends, and a large yard area in which goods were kept would often surround the premises. The lower risk businesses tended to be located in areas where a ready supply of offenders was not close by and where there was constant surveillance (See Burrows et al, 1999).

The Scottish Business Crime Survey therefore begins to assess why some businesses experience high rates of crimes such as burglary. The study goes on to use Clarke's 'opportunity reducing' typology of the techniques of situational crime prevention to give examples of how businesses 'increased the effort' for offenders to commit crime, 'increased risks' for offenders and 'reduced rewards' for offenders (see Burrows et al, 1999). Many of the techniques used by businesses to reduce crime are similar to those used by people in households. For example as with households, businesses target-harden premises by using locks on doors, though many techniques used are specific to businesses. Business such as off-licences may deflect offenders by closing early to avoid trouble; pubs will increase surveillance by employing more staff at busy times; and taxi firms may make customers pay deposits on high fares to reduce the rewards of trying to make off without payment.

This chapter has so far highlighted national victimisation surveys that have published data on the rates of crime against businesses. A number of localised surveys have also been conducted to try and understand the crime problems businesses face. These studies have addressed a number of issues including burglary against small shops (Tilley, 1993b), shop theft (McCulloch, 1997), robbery at Sub-Post offices (Ekblom, 1987), ram raiding, (Jacques, 1994), crime and nuisance problems in shopping centres (Phillips & Cochrane, 1988) and racially motivated crime (Ekblom & Simon, 1988).

It is difficult to assess whether local victimisation surveys or national surveys provide the most accurate data on business victimisation rates. It is certainly true that surveys such as the BRC may underestimate crime by gathering much of its data from headquarters of businesses that aggregate data from a number of outlets. This may often result in incidents being missed or forgotten. Localised surveys tend to interview smaller independent premises that only have to provide data about their own premises. However, victims often forget about the numbers of incidents they have

been a victim of (especially shop theft that for some is a daily occurrence) and are often unsure about the actual time of year when incidents occurred (i.e. the month). Headquarters based surveys may therefore provide more precise data if accurate records of incidents that occur at business outlets are kept.

Many of the smaller, local studies have published findings that also show businesses have high rates of crime when compared to residential premises. A major breakthrough in the study of crime against business on a local level was the recent Small Business and Crime Initiative project (Wood et al, 1996; Tilley & Hopkins, 1998).<sup>14</sup> The SBCI survey was significant for four reasons. First, it was the first survey of business victimisation to consider all business sectors including the retail, manufacturing, wholesale and service sectors. Second, it was part of a crime prevention initiative that had two survey sweeps; one before implementation and one after. Third, these two surveys produced a unique panel sample of businesses that had been interviewed in both sweeps and finally, these sweeps also produced the largest localised sample of small business interviewed so far in the UK, with 865 respondents in sweep one and 945 in sweep two.

The first SBCI survey was completed in September 1995 and the second in September, 1997. Both surveys recorded data for a recall period of 12 months and found that 74% of businesses had experienced at least one incident of crime in sweep one and 60% in sweep two. The overall prevalence rate for the first sweep is similar to that recorded in the CVS (this was 74%), and the prevalence rates recorded for a number of crime types are not dissimilar. For example, the most prevalent crime in both sweeps was burglary with a rate of 40.2% in sweep one and 25.6% in sweep two (the CVS recorded a 36% prevalence rate for burglary). Abuse recorded the highest concentration rate in both sweeps (4.5 incidents per victim in sweep one and 3.6 in sweep two) and the highest incidence rates in both sweeps were recorded for fraud at 773 per 1000 businesses in sweep one and 642 per 1000 businesses in sweep two.<sup>15</sup>

There have been a number of other studies considering crime against business on a local level. Whilst many of these studies have reported on the rates of crime, other crime related issues have been identified. For example, Hopkins & Tilley (1998)

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<sup>14</sup> This is the data source for the thesis and is therefore subject to extensive discussion in chapter 4.

<sup>15</sup> The Rates of Customer theft and employee theft reported were lower in the SBCI survey for retailers than in the CVS.

reported on the findings of interviews with 87 businesses in three North London streets. Here it was found that 30% of businesses had considered relocating because of the effect of crime and 29% had considered ceasing trading. The study of business crime has also been highlighted in the context of 'Safer Cities' projects.<sup>16</sup> Tilley (1993b) highlights the vulnerability of small businesses to crime in a number of Safer Cities areas and reports on the results of surveys conducted in Lewisham, the Wirral and Hartlepool that interviewed predominantly retail outlets.

Of particular interest in Tilley's study is the assessment made of repeat burglary victimisation against businesses. Repeat victimisation has been highlighted as a predictor of future risk in residential burglary (Farrell & Pease, 1993; Pease, 1998) though few studies have considered repeat victimisation against businesses (notable exceptions being the CVS and the SBCI surveys). Safer Cities data from Hartlepool was collected over a two- year period so repeat victimisation for all businesses over a period of 12 months could be assessed. Out of 250 businesses, 97, (39%) had been burgled at least once. In total there were 306 burglaries, of which 209 (68%) were repeat victimisations. The repeat victimisations were then assessed over a time period that split the year into 5 periods of 73 days (i.e. period one was 0-73 days, period two 74-146 days etc.). This established that 119 (57%) repeat burglaries took place between 0-73 days after the first incident.

This evidence confirms that businesses have similar risks of repeat burglary to residential premises. The commercial victimisation survey (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995) also considered repeat victimisation for retailers and manufacturers across crime types such as burglary, vandalism and fraud. For retailers, 10% of respondents were repeat victims of burglary; they were 38% of all victims and had 66% of all incidents. A similar picture is seen for manufacturers. In total, 11% were repeat victims of burglary; they were 48% of victims and had 71% of incidents. Similar proportions were recorded for other incident types here.

The CVS provides useful data on repeat victimisation, though it does not publish data on the time course of incidents which could establish repeat victimisation patterns similar to Tilley (1993b). However, the first sweep of the SBCI survey (Wood et al, 1996) did publish data on the time course of repeat burglaries. This presented findings

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<sup>16</sup> The Safer Cities programme began in 1988 with the aim of reducing crime, fear of crime and 'to

similar to the previous studies on repeat domestic and commercial burglaries. Repeat burglaries were classified as any burglary that took place within 12 months after the first. This is rather a crude definition of a repeat burglary. In theory an incident could take place in September of one year and the repeat not until August of the next which calls in to question whether the subsequent burglary is an 'event-dependent' repeat or just a 'one-off' incident. Despite this, the findings were rather conclusive. Over a quarter of repeat burglaries took place within the first month of the previous incident and 43% took place within the first two months thus confirming the previous research that the risk of a repeat burglary is greatest within the first two months of the initial incident.

This section has highlighted many of the major publications that have considered crimes against business (though the review is far from exhaustive). Many of the findings are difficult to compare due to the differing ways data has been collected and analysed. There are however, many consistent patterns identified by the data. These are outlined below.

1. Research conducted both on a national and local level has shown that businesses have high rates of victimisation when compared to households and individuals for a number of crime types. Businesses therefore have higher overall crime rates than both individuals and households.
2. The British Retail Consortium surveys and the Commercial Victimisation Survey both show that businesses sustain heavily financial losses from crime.
3. It is also evident that repeat victimisation is a significant problem for businesses across a number of crime types. This has been highlighted on both a national and local level through CVS data, Safer Cities data (Tilley, 1993b) and Small Business & Crime Initiative data (Wood et al, 1996). The patterns identified here are similar to those for residential premises.
4. There are distinct variations by sector. The retail and service sectors have higher rates of crime such as robbery and abuse than manufacturers. However more analysis is required of intra-sector risks.

The research clearly identifies that crime is a significant problem for many businesses. We will now review the previous research considering abuse and violence against business.

### **Abuse and Violence against business**

Despite the revelation that retail staff have almost twice the risk of becoming victims of violence as other workers (Mayhew et al, 1988) there have still been relatively few studies that have directly considered abuse and violence against business. Many of the national studies on business crime in general have published statistics on the rates of abuse and violence against businesses, and there have been ad hoc studies reporting on risks of violence in various occupations. Examples include violence in the health service (Health and Services Advisory Committee, 1987), violence in libraries (Library Association, 1987) and violence against social workers, (Norris, 1990); though Budd (1999b), uses British Crime Survey data to assess occupational groups that have high risks of violence at work.<sup>17</sup> The most significant studies to consider abuse and violence against businesses have been a study of crime and racial harassment in Asian-run small shops, (Ekblom & Simon, 1988); a study of violent crime in small shops in London and the Midlands, (Hibberd & Shapland, 1993); and a study of abuse and violence against employees in a major retail company (Beck et al, 1994) -see table 1.4.

Although little research has been published in this area, the research that has been conducted present interesting findings. The International Crimes against Business survey (Van Dijk & Terlouw, 1995) published rates on assault across nine countries. Assault was found to be particularly prevalent against retailers in Hungary (22.6%) the UK (17.6%) and in Australia (13.6%) and least prevalent in Italy (1%), Switzerland (3.4%) and France (7.3%). This high rate of assault against retailers in the UK is confirmed by considering rates of abuse and violence published in the British Retail Consortium surveys and the Commercial Victimization survey.

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<sup>17</sup> Here it is found that key 'high risk' groups are those working in security, nurses, educational and welfare workers, care workers, those in catering/ hotels and restaurants, management/ personnel, public transport workers, teachers, leisure/ service providers, retail sales and other health professionals.

**Table 1.4: Key research considering abuse and violence against business.**

<p><u>International</u></p> <p>Rates of assault published in the International Crimes Against Business Survey (Van Dijk &amp; Terlouw, 1995), though no specific research on abuse or violence has been conducted.</p>
<p><u>National</u></p> <p>National reports such as the 'Retail Crime Costs' and the 1994 Commercial Victimization Survey published data on rates of assault and violence. Only one study of note has focused upon abuse and violence at the national level. Here Beck et al (1994) gave an account of abuse and violence against staff in a national retail outlet.</p>
<p><u>Local</u></p> <p>A number of reports here have published data on the rates of abuse and violence against staff as part of a victimisation survey considering a number of crime types (such as the Small Business and Crime Initiative Surveys and Camden Three Streets Project). However, some studies have also focused specifically upon abuse and violence. For example, Hibberd and Shapland (1993) considered violent crime in small shops, and Ekblom and Simon (1988) considered racial harassment in small Asian-run shops.</p>

The British Retail Consortium surveys have published rates on physical violence, threats of violence and verbal abuse against retail premises for the previous six years (see Burrows & Speed, 1994; Speed, Burrows et al, 1995; Brookes & Cross, 1996; Wells & Dryer, 1997; Wells & Dryer, 1998 & unauthored, 1999).<sup>18</sup> All six surveys have shown that physical violence, threats of violence and verbal abuse are a problem for retail staff. The 1997/98 survey reported that there were a total of 11,000 incidents of violence, 30,000 threats of violence and 68,000 incidents of verbal abuse against staff in retail premises. This translates into 4 per 1,000 staff becoming victims of physical assault, 12 per 1,000 victims of threats and 27 per 1,000 victims of verbal abuse.

In addition to reporting on rates of physical violence, threats and verbal abuse against retail staff, the 1996/97 BRC survey also established the types of businesses who were most at risk from violence and the causes of physical violence to staff. Chemists, petrol retailers, DIY shops and off-licences had the highest risks of violence, though no reasons were suggested as to why these premises have high risks. With regard to the causes of violence, the BRC reports have shown that most incidents of violence

arise when staff intervene in customer theft (67% in the 1997/98 survey). However, there are problems with the methodology here. In the 1997/98 survey, respondents were able to choose three possible reasons why an incident of violence had occurred. These were preventing customer theft, robbery and 'other incidents'. In the 1997/98 survey, 29% of violence was caused due to 'other incidents', though the report fails to give any indication what this consists of. For the surveys conducted in 1993/94 & 1994/95 retailers had the additional categories of 'troublemakers', 'angry customers' and 'drunk or drugged people' to choose from. This gives a clearer insight as to the causes of violence and showed that in 1993/94, 15% of violence was due to 'troublemakers', 9% drunks or drugged people and 8% angry customers. This compares to 16%, 5% and 10% respectively in 1994/95.

Another national report to publish statistics on rates of abuse and violence against businesses was the Commercial Victimization Survey (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995). Here, crime rates were considered for retail and manufacturing premises. The CVS classified abuse and violence in a slightly different way to the BRC survey. The CVS classified abuse and violence as 'all assaults and threats', 'assaults with injury' and an overall category of 'any violent crime' which includes robbery. Unlike the BRC survey, the CVS considered risks of victimisation by premises rather than incident numbers, and there was also an emphasis upon repeat victimisation. A major criticism of the CVS (unlike the BRC) analysis would be that it did not try to explain how incidents occurred and there is no assessment made of the types of businesses within the retail and manufacturing sector that were most vulnerable to abuse and violence.

The CVS shows that retailers had a higher risk of experiencing at least one incident of assault with or without injury than manufacturers. Over the recall period, 17% of retailers and 6% of manufacturers had been victim of any type of assault. Considerably less had been injured in the incidents- 2% of retailers and 1% of manufacturers. Of these victims, 28% of retailers and 70% of manufacturers only had one incident. Therefore, 72% of retailers and 30% of manufactures who were victims of assaults of any type went on to have future incidents within the 12 month recall period, though the survey is unable to say when repeat incidents occurred and if they were linked to any previous incidents. Of the repeat victims, 33% of retailers experienced four or more incidents as did 15% of manufacturers. These subsets

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<sup>18</sup> These cover financial years, April- April



accounted for 84% of all assaults against retailers and 67% of all assaults against manufacturers. In addition to this, the CVS reported on rates of assault by size of business. The analysis is conducted for two subsets, premises with 1-10 employees and those with 11 or more employees. This clearly shows that those retailers and manufacturers employing 11 or more staff have the highest risk of being victim of at least one assault. Here, 33% of retailers and 11% of manufacturers employing 11 or more staff had at least one assault or threat. In comparison, 15% of retailers and 5% of manufacturers with 1-10 employees experienced one assault or threat.

Comparisons of the rates of abuse and violence published by the BRC and CVS cannot be made because the BRC considers victimisation per 1,000 staff whereas the CVS considers victimisation per premises. These national studies of crime against business were not specifically designed to conduct research in the area of abuse and violence, though some of their findings on the subject are very informative. These surveys show that abuse and violence is a problem for some business types and the BRC survey begins to explain why some businesses are victims of abuse and violence.

Few studies have considered abuse and violence against businesses on a localised level. The first Small Business and Crime Initiative survey (Wood et al, 1996) measured rates of abuse and violence against all business sectors in two areas of Leicester (though the survey also considered other crime types such as burglary and fraud). Abuse and violence were found to be most prevalent within the retail and service sectors. In total 24% of retail and 18.2% of services were victims of abuse in the first survey compared to 13.5% of wholesale sector businesses and 11% of manufacturers. Retail and service sector premises also experienced higher prevalence rates of violence. Here 9.4% of service sector businesses and 7% of retail premises experienced at least once incident of violence compared to 2.5% of manufacturers and 1.1% of wholesalers.

The first SBCI survey also considered repeat victimisation. Here, it was found that 57% of the victims of abuse had more than one incident, and these accounted for 91% of incidents of abuse. The most chronic victims of abuse (5+ incidents) constituted 20% of victims and 70% of incidents. For violence, 43% of victims had more than one incident, and these accounted for 81% of all violence. The most chronic victims

of violence (5+) had 52% of all incidents.<sup>19</sup> The initial findings of the first SBCI survey show that most incidents of abuse and violence are concentrated against a small number of victims. Though the nature of incidents such as abuse and violence are different to incidents such as burglary, these patterns of repeat victimisation are comparable with wider research on repeat burglary victimisation, (Farrell et al, 1995; Polvi et al 1990; Polvi et al 1991). Here it is established that (as with burglary) victims of abuse and violence are also likely to be victims again in the future.

There have also been a number of studies that have specifically focused on abuse and violence against business. The most notable have been Beck et al's (1994) study of violence against staff in a national retailing company and Hibberd and Shapland's (1993) study of violent crime in small shops in the Midlands and London. Ekblom & Simon's (1988) study of crime and racial harassment against Asian-run businesses will also be considered here as a substantial amount of the report concerns abuse and violence.

Ekblom & Simon (1988) conducted a victimisation survey of Asian-run small retail business in four areas of London. The main focus of the study was on the prevalence of crime such as burglary and robbery, with particular attention paid to racially motivated crime. The areas chosen for the study were Muswell Hill, Brixton, Brent and Newham as they all had a large number of Asian shops though differing social characteristics. Muswell Hill was predominantly residential and served white middle-class people in a fashionable suburb. Brixton had a high concentration of Afro-Caribbean residents and few Asians, and it was an area with severe social problems. The third area was in the borough of Brent. This was an industrial area with a high number of Asian and Afro-Caribbean residents, more owner-occupiers than the other areas and less recorded crime. The fourth area was Newham. This, like Brent was industrialised though a white working class area. The Home Affairs Committee on Racial Attacks (Home Office, 1986) said that Newham was one of the most seriously deprived areas in the country. There was high unemployment, bad housing, poor educational standards and racial tension. It was also a known recruiting ground for the National Front (now the British National Party).

The total sample was 61 in Muswell Hill (82% Asian), 93 in Brixton (69% Asian), 72 in Brent (69% Asian) and 70 in Newham (90% Asian). Of the total sample of 296,

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<sup>19</sup> A more detailed analysis of repeat victimisation by sector will be conducted in chapter 5.

82% (240) were Asian shopkeepers. The main body of the report therefore concentrated on Asian shopkeeper's experience of crime.<sup>20</sup> Here, 14% had been a victim of assault at some time with 2% saying it was a weekly experience; 28% had been a victim of threats at some time with 9% saying it happened every week. Finally, 27% had been a victim of verbal abuse at some time, with 7% saying this was a weekly experience. Assaults, threats and verbal abuse were most common in the Brixton area. Assaults and verbal abuse were least common in Brent and threats were least common in Newham. Of the total number of Asian shopkeepers who had been victims of assaults, threats or verbal abuse, 44% thought that some assaults had been racially motivated, as did 36% who had been victims of threats and 35% who had been victims of verbal abuse.

Eklblom and Simon go on to classify racial motivation according to crime type. They suggest that 'instrumental or materialistic' crimes such as shoplifting or fraud were less likely to be racially motivated than 'expressive' crimes such as arson, assault or verbal abuse. The statistics clearly show this. The highest numbers of incidents that were perceived as racially motivated were arson (67%), abusive phone calls (58%) and assaults (44%).<sup>21</sup> The least were theft by staff (0%), price switching (5%) and fraud (5%).

In a more recent study, Hibberd and Shapland (1993) considered violent crime against small shops in the midlands and London. This study was a follow up to Eklblom and Simons' work (Hibberd & Shapland, 1993:pp5). Interviews were conducted with 92 businesses in London and 70 in the midlands. Here, several categories were used depicting a number of types of abuse and violence. These included 'assault', 'being pushed, jostled or spat at', 'sexual abuse' (for women only), 'general violence/ argumentativeness', 'threats', 'children/teenagers causing trouble', 'abuse from drunk/ disturbed people', 'racial abuse', 'verbal sexual abuse' and 'other verbal abuse'. In London the most common types of violence and abuse were general violence/ argumentiveness which 26% of shopkeepers had experienced in the previous 12 months, racial abuse (25%), children/ teenagers causing trouble (24%) and abuse from drunk/ disturbed people (22%). The least common form of abuse in

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<sup>20</sup> Abuse and violence was classified as 'assault', 'threats' or 'verbal abuse'.

<sup>21</sup> The rates of racially motivated assault recorded by Eklblom and Simon, though not strictly comparable appears to be significantly higher than those recorded by the SBCI. This is probably explained by Eklblom & Simon's concentration upon Asian businesses.

the London area was sexual assault (0%) and verbal sexual abuse (3%). In the midlands the most common types of abuse and violence were abuse from drunk/disturbed people which 47% had experienced in the previous 12 months, general violence (36%) and racial abuse (24%). The least common form of abuse and violence in the midlands were the same as in London with no business experiencing sexual assault and only 1% experiencing verbal sexual abuse.

Both Ekblom and Simon (1988) and Hibberd and Shapland (1993) show that abuse and violence are common problems for small retailers. Comparisons are difficult due to differing classifications of abuse and violence. However, both surveys record higher rates of violence/ general abuse than the Commercial Victimization survey (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1994), the British Retail Consortium reports (Burrows & Speed, 1994; Speed, Burrows et al, 1995; Brookes & Cross, 1996; Wells & Dryer, 1997; Wells & Dryer, 1998 & unauthored, 1999) and rates of violent crime for individuals published in the British Crime Survey (Mirrlees-Black et al, 1998). These studies also highlight the many different types of abuse that may occur against businesses. Ekblom and Simon (1988) obviously postulate a link between racism and abuse/violence, whereas Hibberd and Shapland (1993) also considered links between drink/drugs and abuse/violence, sexism and abuse/violence and (similarly to the BRC reports) criminal incidents such as shop theft and abuse/violence.

We have so far considered studies that have measured abuse and violence on a national level (as in the case of the CVS and BRC), and localised studies of premises in distinct geographical areas. A further study that has made a substantial contribution to understanding abuse and violence against business staff is Beck et al's (1994) account of abuse and violence in a major retail outlet. This research is distinct from the above as although it is a national study, it deals exclusively with abuse and violence within a large retail company.

Beck et al interviewed 448 employees of a national retailing company in 1993. The study records rates of abuse and physical violence against members of staff and it considers the circumstances and causes of incidents in more depth than previous studies. It established that 15% of staff had been victims of physical assault at any time (11% over the previous year), 48% of staff had been sworn at in the previous year, and 20% had been threatened. Most assaults involved victims being 'hit with

hand' (26.8%) or 'pushed or shoved' (25.4%), and the most common injuries sustained were bruising (40.6%). Unlike most of the previous research, victims were asked about their feelings after the incident and categories such as, 'scared or shaken', 'angry' or 'not bothered' are used. In total, 43.3% of victims were 'scared or shaken' after an incident of physical assault and 36.7% after an incident of verbal abuse. Only 7.5% said they were not bothered after an incident of physical abuse and 29.2% after an incident of verbal abuse.

In addition to this, all staff were asked about their level of concern in relation to incidents such as physical assault, threats and verbal abuse. Unsurprisingly, the most concern was expressed in relation to more serious types of incident. In total, 34.8% of staff were 'very concerned' about physical assault compared to 24.4% for threatening behaviour and 14.5% for verbal abuse. There were some other significant findings noted by the authors here. Most concern was expressed in London stores and the least in pedestrianised shopping malls. Females expressed greater concern than males and one in five staff felt insecure when working alone.

Similar to the British Retail Consortium reports the authors tried to establish the cause of incidents. In accordance with the BRC reports, most incidents occurred when intervening in shop theft (52.2%) though other reasons for assault were cited such as 'when dealing with a refund or exchange' (13.5%) or 'when dealing with suspicious customers' (9%). Only 10.3% of incidents occurred for no particular reason.

One of the most significant aspects of the Beck study are the victim/ offender profiles that are constructed for incidents of physical assault. The victim profiles consider demographic characteristics such as gender, age, ethnic group status within the company (i.e. manager etc.); hours worked (full-time/ part-time) and length of time with the company (i.e. 6 months to a year etc.). Here, the most likely victims of physical assault were female (67.2%), 25-39 years old (49.3%) and white (91%). They were most likely to be in management (47.8%), worked for the company for 1 to 3 years (32.8%) and were likely to have been a victim of swearing (79.1%). Whilst these findings are of great interest, the authors acknowledge they are likely to mirror the staff profile for the company as a whole (Beck et al, 1994). However, upon further analysis the authors found that the risk of victimisation for management outweighed

any other member of staff. Nearly a half of all assaults were against management, though this group only formed 28% of the sample.<sup>22</sup>

A profile of offenders was also constructed. Staff were asked about the demographic characteristics of offenders such as their gender, age and ethnic group. They were also asked if offenders were alone, under the influence of drink or drugs, and if members of staff had seen the offenders before the incident occurred. Here, it was found that offenders tended to be male (59.1%), white (71.2%) and between the ages of 15-29 (83.5%). Most offenders appeared to be sober (68%), though 10% were said to be under the influence of drink or drugs, (which is similar to the BRC findings), and 58.2% had been seen before the incident and were known troublemakers.

The findings of Beck study are extremely useful as their analysis begins to try and answer some of the questions posed by earlier studies that only considered rates of abuse and violence. It also builds upon research by Hibberd & Shapland and Ekblom & Simon, though (somewhat surprisingly) neglects the concept of racially motivated abuse. This is possibly because racially motivated abuse did not arise as a significant problem during the course of their research.

The previous research that has considered abuse and violence within the workplace has almost completely concentrated upon the retail environment as a setting for incidents. Despite this, it is still difficult to make comparisons between the surveys. For example table 1.5 outlines the rates of abuse/ violence for a number of research studies.

Here, it is seen that victimisation surveys measure abuse and violence in different ways. For example, some surveys (such as the BRC) measure incidence rates per numbers of staff, whereas most others consider rates in relation to premises (such as the CVS). All of the rates given in the table are for retail premises and it can be seen that some results are similar. For example, the SBCI and Ekblom and Simon's study recorded similar rates for abuse, and the CVS and Ekblom and Simon's study record similar rates for violence. Despite this, comparing figures is extremely difficult.

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<sup>22</sup> No analysis was made here of the demographic characteristics of non-victims.

**Table 1.5: Comparisons of abuse, threats and violence from a number of studies: Retail Premises only.**

	<b>Abuse/Threats</b>	<b>Violence/ Assaults</b>
<b>BRC (1999)</b>	27 incidents per 1,000 staff in one year	4 incidents per 1,000 staff in one year
<b>CVS (1995)</b>	No comparable group	15% of premises victims of assaults or threats in one year
<b>Eklblom &amp; Simon (1988)</b>	27% of premises victims at anytime	14% of premises victims at anytime
<b>Beck et al (1994)</b>	48% of staff sworn at in one year	15% of staff victims of violence whilst working at premises
<b>SBCI (sweep one)</b>	24% of premises experience at least one incident per year	7% of premises experience at least one incident per year

It has been noted here that few studies have considered abuse and violence in settings other than the retail environment. The only significant studies that have are the CVS (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995), the Small Business and Crime Initiative reports (Wood et al, 1996; Tilley & Hopkins, 1998), Gill's study of Forum of Private Business surveys and the Scottish Business Crime Survey (Burrows et al, 1999). All of these studies are significant as part of their sample considers manufacturing premises (and in some cases other sectors). This moves away from the large retail environment considered by Beck et al (1994), or the smaller shops considered by Eklblom & Simon (1988) and Hibberd and Shapland (1993) as a focus of study. However, one study to concentrate upon the manufacturing sector as a setting for crime was Johnston et al's (1994) study of crime on industrial estates. This is particularly significant as it considers crime in a totally different type of geographical environment to retail establishments. Many retail establishments are found in city centres or in busy shopping streets. However, industrial estates are rarely found in the city centre and are often concentrated in specifically industrial areas distinct from, even if near to, residential areas (Johnston et al 1994: pp. 1.).

Interviews were conducted with 476 tenants on industrial estates throughout the north of England.<sup>23</sup> Here, low rates of violence were found. In total, 2% (exact numbers are not given) of all crime was violence related. This is particularly low compared to rates found in surveys of retailers. The study does not take account of rates of verbal abuse against businesses, so comparisons cannot be made here. The authors go on to suggest two reasons for these low rates of violence. The first is because there is little contact between the types of businesses on industrial estates (i.e. manufacturing businesses) and the public, and secondly because the gender of the workforce is predominantly male. The rates of violence published in the Commercial Victimization survey (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995) would verify the fact that manufacturing premises experience lower rates of violence than retail premises. In both the retail and manufacturing sectors, 5% of crimes were assaults (including non injury and injury). However, manufacturers had far fewer incidents overall (on average they experienced 19 incidents of assault per 100 premises compared to 135 per 100 retail premises). In relation to the second point, there has not been any research that has suggested that the actual risks of violence in the workplace are lower as a result of being male. Studies (such as Beck et al, 1994) have suggested females have higher risks of violence in the retail workplace than males because females constitute a higher proportion of the workforce, not because there is something particular to females that produces higher risks of victimisation.

Generally, research considering abuse and violence against businesses has measured the rates of abuse and violence against premises. There has been little attempt to assess in detail why certain business types experience abuse or violence. Two studies that do begin to address this are the Scottish Business crime Survey (Burrows et al, 1999) and Poyner and Warne's guide to preventing violence to retail staff (Health and Safety Executive, 1988). The Scottish Business crime survey (Burrows et al, 1999) begins to assess why certain types of businesses experienced crimes such as violence. Here, it was found that often the victims of violence are those businesses located in town/ city centres that are open till late in the evening. These are predominantly pubs, restaurants and taxi firms and have to deal with drunken customers. In addition to this it was found that many retailers face abuse and violence after intervening in incidents

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<sup>23</sup> The North of England consisted of the geographical area northwards of Cheshire and Derbyshire.



of shop theft. Whilst the Scottish Business Crime Survey begins to assess why certain business face high risks, Poyner and Warne develop a framework for understanding violence in the workplace. They suggest that assaults can be understood in an ordered way and that for an assault to occur there has to be an assailant, employee and interaction which shapes the final outcome of the incident. They go on to say that employees and assailants will have key characteristics that are often associated with violence. For example, the attitudes, sex, personality of the employee and the personality and expectations of the assailant will be key components of violence. Along with the work environment these factors will shape interactions that generate violence.

Though Poyner and Warne (1988) begin to develop a model of violence in the workplace, there are some major problems. First, the model fails to tell us how interaction between assailants and staff will actually trigger an incident within certain contexts. Poyner & Warne highlight a number of contextual features that will be important in generating violence (such as cash handling and staff working alone) but not how incidents are triggered. Second, the model fails to recognise how incidents may begin with minor abuse and escalate into violence. Therefore the authors fail to recognise the importance of interaction between staff and customers in incidents, and how the actions of both parties can escalate abuse into violence. Finally, the model is not subject to any empirical test. It is presented as a hypothetical model of violent assaults, though it is not tested by making reference to any empirical data (a number of case studies of different settings of violence are presented in the study though these are not linked to the model).

This section has reviewed most of the research that has addressed abuse and violence against business. A number of features about the patterns of abuse and violence against business are highlighted. The major features are outlined below.

1. According to the International Crimes against Business survey, UK retail business have high rates of assault compared to other countries covered by the survey.
2. Despite the lack of research considering all business sectors, it has been established that businesses in the retail and service sector have a higher risk of

experiencing an incident of abuse or violence than businesses in the manufacturing or wholesale sector.

3. The Commercial Victimization Survey (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995) reports that staff working in both retail and manufacturing premises with 11 or more staff have higher risks of experiencing abuse and violence than those in smaller establishments. This may be because larger premises have more contact with customers and this ultimately generates more incidents of abuse and violence.
4. Patterns of repeat victimisation for abuse and violence against business have similarities to those for residential and commercial burglary. The CVS and SBCI surveys indicate that incidents concentrate against a small number of victims.
5. Research by Ekblom & Simon (1988) establishes that a significant proportion of assaults (44%), threats (36%) and verbal abuse (35%) are racially motivated.
6. There may be various causes/triggers of abuse and violence. The BRC (1999) highlighted shop theft as a major cause of abuse/violence in retail establishments; Hibberd & Shapland (1993) suggested racism, unruly children and drunks as a cause in small shops. Ekblom and Simon (1988) postulated a link between instrumental and expressive crime and racist abuse in their study of small Asian-run shops. Beck et al (1994) suggest incidents in a large retail establishment were triggered when intervening in shop theft or when customers were exchanging goods.
7. Beck et al (1994) also established that in a large retail establishment victims of abuse were predominantly female, 25-39 years old, white and in management. Offenders were male, 15-29 years old, white and were often known troublemakers.
8. Abuse and violence in the workplace leads to anxiety and fear. Beck et al (1994) established that 34.8% of staff were very concerned about physical assault. This led to staff becoming fearful of working alone in the workplace.

## **Why is more research required?**

The previous research has helped us to understand the nature of abuse and violence against business in two clear ways. First, by trying to establish the business types that are most at risk and second, by trying to establish some of the triggers of incidents. However, three major criticisms can be leveled against the previous research.

1. The previous research has almost totally focused upon retail establishments. Few studies have considered rates of abuse and violence against all business sectors.
2. Little research has considered which types of businesses within each sector are most vulnerable to victimisation. Using analysis by sectors may mask the fact that certain business types have high risks regardless of sector. For example, many businesses within the manufacturing sector may have risks that are as high as a number of business types in the retail or service sectors.
3. It needs to be identified why certain businesses have high risks of victimisation. Previous studies have linked abuse and violence to incidents such as shop theft, though this has only been done for retail establishments and not in a very systematic manner. Research such as the BRC and Beck et al's study of employees in a large retail establishment have tried to establish causes of abuse and violence (Beck et al, 1994); and Poyner and Warne (1988) have developed a theoretical model of violence in the workplace. However, a more systematic empirical analysis of the types of businesses that are victims and how incidents are triggered is required.

This chapter has outlined the major research that has considered crimes against business and abuse and violence against business. In addition to this it has also been considered why there has been a dearth in the literature and the problems that arise within this research. This thesis will expand upon the research cited here in several ways. By using SBCI data it will be established which business sectors have the highest risks of victimisation, and which businesses within these sectors are also highly victimised. This will be achieved by developing a theoretical framework that postulates that businesses and their employees have certain lifestyle features that

increase or decrease their risks of becoming victims of abuse and violence (this is outlined in chapter three). A link is conjectured between factors such as type of business, size of business, demographics of staff, demographics of customers and the risk of victimisation. The lifestyle features that increase vulnerability will be established in two ways; through SBCI data and qualitative interviews with businesses. The SBCI datasets provide two sweeps of quantitative interviews with businesses, one conducted in September 1995, the other in September 1997. These will provide data on rates of victimisation against differing business sectors and the demographics of victims and offenders. In addition to this qualitative research will establish the triggers and process of incidents of abuse and violence. These methods will be explained in detail in chapter four.

Chapter two will now consider how we can understand victimisation patterns. It will review theories of victimisation and consider if we can begin to use them to understand abuse and violence within the context of businesses.

## **Chapter Two**

### **Explaining Victimisation: A review of Theories of Victimisation.**

#### **Introduction.**

Chapter one reviewed previous research that had considered abuse and violence against businesses. It highlighted that whilst some previous research had been conducted, it had not adequately assessed the types of businesses that were most vulnerable to victimisation and the circumstances in which incidents occur. Some studies have identified possible triggers of incidents (See for example Beck et al, 1994; British Retail Consortium Reports (Burrows & Speed, 1994; Speed, Burrows et al, 1995; Brookes & Cross, 1996; Wells & Dryer, 1997; Wells & Dryer, 1998 & unauthored, 1999), though these relate primarily to retail establishments and they had not explored how incidents are generated in any depth.

If we are to understand abuse and violence against businesses we need to assess the characteristics or features of businesses that generate victimisation. Therefore we need to begin to review how criminologists have previously tried to understand patterns of victimisation and apply these explanations to abuse and violence against businesses. Here, we will draw particularly upon key theories such as the lifestyle theory of personal victimisation (Hindelang et al, 1978) and routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979). There will also be consideration of other key ideas relating to the explanation of victimisation. These will include studies of spatial distribution of crime and how we can use the concept of crime 'attractors' and 'generators' to explain victimisation. Finally, it will be considered how these ideas can help to develop a theory of abuse and violence against businesses.

#### **Definitions of Abuse and Violence.**

Chapter one highlighted the fact that abuse and violence can be measured in many ways and differing terms can be used to describe similar types of behaviour. For example the CVS referred to behaviour such as robbery, assaults and threats, and assaults with injury as violent crime, whereas the BRC referred to physical violence,

threats of violence and verbal abuse as violence against staff. Therefore, before we continue it is important to be clear about what abuse and violence actually is. Abuse is taken here to include any aggressive, threatening or intimidating verbal comment. This includes any comment that insults the ethnic group or gender of the victim. Violence is any act where aggressive physical contact is made. This may be in the form of pushing a person, taking hold of them or striking them with either a part of the body (hand or foot) or striking/ stabbing them with a weapon. These acts will be perpetrated against a business employee and the assailant will be somebody who does not work for the business premises, but is either a customer or client of the business, or somebody visiting the business with the intention of causing trouble.<sup>24</sup>

### **Understanding Victimisation.**

Theories of victimisation explain why crime occurs in specific locations against specific targets. These theories have highlighted a number of factors that can explain victimisation. These include the lifestyle characteristics of victims of crime, the routine activities of the community and locational factors that generate and attract crime.

A number of studies have established a correlation between demographic variables such as ethnicity, gender, age and victimisation.<sup>25</sup> For example, a correlation has been found between lifestyle features such as heavy drinking and victimisation (Gottfredson, 1984). British Crime Survey data have established that there are higher risks of victimisation for ethnic minority groups in the UK than the white population, and males have higher risks of becoming victims of violence than females (Mayhew et al, 1994).<sup>26</sup>

Despite the clear link between certain demographic characteristics of individuals and victimisation, there have been few attempts to build a multi-variate model of the lifestyle characteristics of individuals that are likely to generate high victimisation risks. One of the few attempts to do this was the lifestyle theory of personal

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<sup>24</sup> This was the broad definition used by the SBCI.

<sup>25</sup> Traditionally criminologists have been more interested in the lifestyles of offenders than victims.

victimisation (Hindelang et al, 1978).<sup>27</sup> Here, a lifestyle model is built and the authors establish a correlation between lifestyle and personal victimisation. Lifestyle is referred to here as 'routine daily activities, both vocational activities (work, school, keeping house) and leisure activities' (Hindelang et al, 1978:241), and it is hypothesised that the individual constructs his/ her life in a way that is more or less conducive to victimisation.

Lifestyle theory is constructed by drawing upon empirical data from two main sources. The main analysis is conducted by using Bureau of Census data taken from eight United States cities in 1972.<sup>28</sup> The data are used to analyse the victimisation event, the risk of personal victimisation, attitudes about crime and victimisation experiences. In addition to this, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) National Crime Survey data collated in 26 cities in 1972 are also used for analysis of personal, household and business victimisation.<sup>29</sup> The authors establish a correlation between the victimisation patterns and lifestyle characteristics. The lifestyle characteristics most closely associated with personal victimisation were age, marital status, employment status and sex. Overall, it was established that 51 people per 1000 had been victims of personal victimisation over the period of one year, though various sub-groups experienced particularly high risks. These risks are summarised below:

1. Those who were 16-19 years old had substantially higher risks than those outside of this group (93 per 1000 compared to 47 per 1000).
2. Within the 16-19 age group, males had higher risks than females (128 per 1000 compared to 64 per 1000).

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<sup>26</sup> This includes contact crime such as wounding, common assaults and snatch thefts; burglaries and all vehicle theft.

<sup>27</sup> Personal victimisation is defined by Hindelang as crimes 'suffered by individual victims who, at least in some sense, come into contact with the offender.' (1978, p.4) This may include, 'crimes that threaten or actually result in personal injury to the victim (such as assault), crime in which an offender confronts the victim and takes or attempts to take property from the victim's possession by force or threat of force, and crimes in which property is taken (including attempts) from the victim's person by stealth (such as pocket picking)'. (1978, p.4).

<sup>28</sup> The eight cities were Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Newark, Portland (Oregon) & St Louis.

<sup>29</sup> The 26 cities were Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, Buffalo, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Newark, New Orleans, New York, Oakland, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Portland (Oregon), St Louis, San Diego, San Francisco and Washington.

3. Males out of school had higher risks than those in school (143 per 1000 compared to 94 per 1000).
4. There were also high risks recorded for those who were single, divorced or separated compared to the married or widowed (71 per 1000 compared to 34 per 1000). Of this group males had higher risks than females (86 per 1000 compared to 58 per 1000).
5. Income earners of below \$3,000 had higher risks than those over \$3000 (100 per 1000 compared to 84 per 1000).

A causal link is then postulated between the lifestyle characteristics of victims and victimisation. It is conjectured that those between 16-19 spend more time than other age groups pursuing activities away from the home that increase the risks of victimisation in public spaces. Similar conjectures are forwarded for males who are not in school, and those who are not married. Area of residence is seen as an important predictor of victimisation for low income groups and members of ethnic minorities.

Conjectures such as those outlined above are used to form the conceptual basis of lifestyle theory of personal victimisation. The theory postulates that lifestyle characteristics are a function of four major factors (see figure 2.1). These are demographic characteristics, role expectations, structural constraints and individual adaptations to these factors. Adaptations produce the lifestyle and routine activity patterns of the individual which determine exposure and victimisation risks.

Demographic characteristics of the individual include factors such as age, sex, race, income, marital status, education and occupation. Lifestyle theory postulates that demographic characteristics are shaped by role expectations and structural constraints. Role expectations are described as 'cultural norms that are associated with achieved and ascribed statuses of individuals and that define preferred and individual behaviours' (Hindelang et al, 1978:pp242). They define how the individual is expected to act or behave depending upon demographic characteristics such as age, race or marital status. Therefore role expectations will vary from person to person. The expected behaviour of men is different to that of women, and the young may be expected to act differently to the elderly.




The other major component shaping lifestyles are structural constraints. These are defined as 'limitations on the behavioural options that result from the particular arrangements existing within various institutional orders' (Hindelang et al, 1978: 242). These limits on behavioural options are economic, familial, educational and legal. Economic constraints result from the individual's income from his or her job/occupation. Therefore income will act as a constraint upon lifestyle choices by determining where people can afford to live, how many children they can afford to raise and the quality of education they can afford for their children. The family may restrict the individual if they have children or strong family bonds, and younger people may be constrained by the educational system if it fails to give them an education that will provide opportunities to improve their lifestyle. Little is said about legal constraints except that the law will constrain people in various ways. For example, children may be constrained by child labour laws or school compulsory attendance laws. Lifestyle theory does not arrange these constraints in a hierarchy of importance but it suggests that most individuals will be constrained by one or more of these at some point in their lives.

Role expectations and structural constraints produce lifestyle patterns through individual and subcultural adaptations. These adaptations result in the individual (or a group of individuals) developing views and attitudes which shape regularities, behavioural patterns and hence lifestyle patterns. Once the lifestyle has developed there will be differences in exposure to victimisation risk through varying vocational and leisure activities, though these exposure risks will also be dependent upon associations. These are 'more or less sustained personal relationships among individuals that evolve as a result of similar lifestyles and hence similar interests shared by these individuals' (Hindelang et al, 1978:245). Associations may have an impact on personal victimisation as they lead people to have contact with others who may have criminal associations. These associations may then lead the individual to greater risk of personal victimisation.

The lifestyle theory of victimisation is a macro theoretical model of victimisation risks. It associates personal victimisation data to lifestyle features of individuals. However, the theory can be criticised as it does not establish in any detail why these

associations exist. Empirical evidence is used to establish a correlation between a number of lifestyle characteristics and victimisation though there is little explanation why these patterns exist. For example, data is used to show that there is clear correlation between time spent in public places late at night and victimisation. However, the correlation between public places and victimisation is not fully explained. A correlation is also established between robbery, rape and assault and the time when victimisation occurs. It is clear that robbery, rape and assault tend to occur in the late evening or early morning though no reason is suggested why this pattern occurs. Spatial aspects are also considered and it is recognised that crime is not uniformly distributed by place (Hindelang et al, 1978:251). Distinctions are made between places where crimes occur such as the victims home, near the victims home, on the street and inside commercial buildings or near public conveyances. Therefore, it is recognised that exposure to public places increases the risk of victimisation though no mention is made of the types of public spaces or the areas of cities where an individual may be particularly vulnerable to crime and why.

Figure 1: A lifestyle/ exposure model of personal victimisation.



Source: Hindelang et al (1978).

Lifestyle theory establishes that there is a correlation between certain lifestyle features and personal victimisation. A framework for assessing how lifestyle is built is constructed, though it is not made clear why these lifestyle features lead to victimisation. A clearer understanding of victimisation may be sought through routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Here the focus is not primarily on the victim and their lifestyle, but emphasis is placed upon how criminal violations occur through developing an understanding of how everyday routine activities generate crime through the convergence of victims and offenders within time and space.

### **Routine Activity Theory.**

Whilst the lifestyle theory focuses upon the lifestyle features of individuals that lead to victimisation, routine activity theory provides an explanatory framework for criminal violations. It places less stress upon the lifestyle characteristics of individuals (although an essential part of the theory), and more upon how victims and offenders converge within time and space. The theory has three major aims. First, it tries to understand how targets and offenders converge in time and space, secondly it provides an explanation of the link between social structure and crime rate changes and finally, it provides a unique conceptualisation of the major elements required for a criminal violation to occur.

Routine activity theory was initially a conceptual framework for the explanation of crime rate trends in the United States between 1950 and 1974. Routine activity patterns are described as, 'any recurrent and prevalent activities which provide for basic population and individual need, whatever their biological or cultural origins' (Cohen & Felson, 1979: 593). It is conjectured that macro-level structural changes within society have led to micro-level changes in the routine activity patterns of individuals and thus created greater opportunities for direct-contact predatory violations to occur.<sup>30</sup> The macro-level analysis assesses how changes within the population structure, the growth of consumerism and changes in employment activity have affected the micro-level daily

routine activity patterns of individuals and thus resulted in a rise in crime. Many studies had previously postulated a link between social structure and crime. Crime has previously been linked to changes in economic conditions (Durkheim, 1952; Field, 1990), the growth in affluence (Ehrlich, 1973) and the growth of industrialisation (Tobias, 1967). Cohen and Felson state that while previous macro-level studies of crime have provided some useful insights into the incidence of crime they have not produced a theoretical link between routine legal activities and illegal endeavours. Previous theories have failed 'to explain how changes in the larger social structure generate changes in the opportunity to engage in predatory crime and hence account for crime rate trends' (Cohen & Felson, 1979:593).

Routine activity theory conjectures that for a criminal violation to occur there has to be a convergence in time and space of a suitable target and motivated offender in the absence of capable guardianship. A suitable target is any person or object that an offence may be committed against, a motivated offender is any person with criminal inclinations and the ability to carry out those inclinations (Felson & Cohen, 1980), and a capable guardian is any person who may be able to prevent the violation. This may include physically intervening in the crime event, or by being in the vicinity of a potential target of crime perturbing potential offenders from committing a crime.

Why a target becomes suitable for crime depends upon a number of factors. These include the value, visibility, access and inertia of the target. The value of the target reflects not only the monetary value, but also symbolic value of a violation for the potential offender. In the case of physical attack, this may involve a grievance against the victim. The visibility of the target simply reflects how easy the target is to discover visually. Access relates to how easy the target is to access for violation, and inertia how easy the target is to overcome for a violation to occur (Felson & Cohen, 1980). For example, how easily property may be lifted and carried away, and in the case of assault how resistant the victim will be to attack.

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<sup>30</sup>Direct Contact Predatory Violations are defined as violations involving direct physical contact between at least one offender and at least one person or object which that offender attempts to take or damage. (Cohen & Felson: 1979:589)

As previously stated, a motivated offender is anybody with criminal inclinations (criminality) and the ability to carry out those inclinations (Felson & Cohen, 1980). The concept of the motivated offender moves away from dispositional criminological theory that suggests people who commit crime are biologically, physiologically or psychologically different from people who do not commit illegal acts. Routine Activity Theory suggests that offending is produced by rational choice decision making. The rational choice perspective (Cornish & Clarke, 1986) postulates that offenders make a rational choice to commit crime when opportunities arise. However, important distinctions must be drawn here between the crime event (when a crime occurs), criminality and the types of crimes that offenders become involved in.

Crime refers to a specific event. This will involve making a quick rational choice decision to commit a crime when the opportunity arises. This will be based on factors such as value, visibility, access, inertia and the risks of being caught. Criminality does not refer to a specific criminal act. It relates to involvement in crime over a period of time, why certain people become involved in crime, why they continue to be involved and why they finally desist (Farrington, 1994). These decisions are multistage and extend over substantial periods of time (Clarke & Felson, 1993). The point (though obvious) also has to be made that rational choice decisions need to be understood in the context of specific crime types. The rational choice decisions of the burglary (both in terms of crime event & criminal) are likely to be different to those of the rapist or violent offender.<sup>31</sup>

Cohen & Felson (1979) use empirical evidence to show how routine activity changes in the United States (1950-74) led to greater opportunities for crime to occur. Data are used from United States Bureau of the Census surveys (USBC), Law Enforcement Assistance Administration national crime survey data (LEAA) and FBI Uniform Crime Report data (UCR). This is used to observe changing human activity patterns, the property trends relating to human activity patterns, composition of crime trends and finally the relationship of the household activity ratio to crime rates in the United States.

The data show a link between changes in human activity patterns and the opportunity for crime. It is stated that there was a growth in female activity away from the home between 1960-70. The numbers of female college students increased 118% (USBC: 1975) and the married female labour force increased 31%. There was also an increase in the number of the population living alone (increase of 34%) and a greater dispersion of activities away from the home with increases in out- of- town travel and overseas travel. The net result of these changes were to increase the numbers of households that were unattended during the day. Therefore, many former capable guardians (women in the home) were no longer at home potentially preventing crimes such as burglary.

In addition to this there was a dispersion of the population across a greater number of households (i.e. due to a transient population, more people living alone and people moving away to college etc.). This has enlarged the market for consumer durables that are often portable and highly moveable. In the decade 1960-70, the sale of motor vehicles and spares increased by 71% with constant-dollar personal consumer expenditure for other durables increasing by 105% (Cohen & Felson, 1979:599). There was also a growth in electronic household appliances. During this period, goods such as televisions, radios and record players also became lighter and therefore more susceptible to theft. Therefore, a more dispersed population consumed a greater number of goods, which were expensive and light in weight. These consumer durables were suitable targets for the motivated offender.

Routine Activity Theory has been widely used by criminologists as a conceptual framework for assessing the crime event. The theory has been used in the development of situational crime prevention in the UK Home Office (Clarke, 1995) and has thus been applied to many crime types. Farrell et al, (1995) used a routine activity framework to analyse repeat victimisation of crimes such as domestic violence, racial attacks, physical and sexual abuse of children, violence in public places and burglary; and Felson (1996) applied the framework to retail theft. Since Cohen & Felson's original paper outlining the major elements of Routine Activity Theory, there have also been some additions made to the theory. Added to the original elements of suitable target, motivated offender

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<sup>31</sup> This has partly been addressed by Cornish & Clarke (1989) in the form of 'choice structuring

and the absence of capable guardianship have been 'the intimate handler' (Felson, 1986) and 'crime facilitators' (Clarke, 1992). The concept of the 'intimate handler' was developed from Travis Hirschi's control theory (Hirschi, 1969) and is described as 'somebody who knows the offender well enough to afford a substantial brake on their activities' (Felson, 1986). This could be anybody who knows the offender well enough to check their offending. This could be somebody from the offender's immediate family such as a mother or wife, or it could also be a close friend. In contrast to this, 'crime facilitators' are the tools (or substances) that are often needed for certain types of crime to occur. This may include an automobile for a bank robbery or burglary, a knife for a street robbery or the consumption of alcohol before a street fight.

Despite the clarity of routine activity theory there are some problems with the theory. The macro explanation for crime rate trends provides a plausible account for the increase in direct contact predatory crime from 1950-74. However, there are some problems with the theory on a micro level. First, it assumes that for all crimes suitable targets and motivated offenders converge in the absence of capable guardianship. It does not recognise that for a number of crimes guardians are often present such as in bank robberies or burglaries when residents are at home. Felson would suggest that the presence of a guardian would not constitute a capable guardian, they would have to be willing to intervene in the crime event. However, this still does not tell us why crimes occur when guardians are present at the crime event. Therefore the rational choice decisions of the offender must extend to not only considering whether there are 'capable guardians' in the vicinity of the crime target, but how willing guardians are to influence the crime event.

The concept of 'guardianship' has been further developed by Felson since the original routine activities thesis was written in 1979. He suggests that guardians can be split into three categories (see Felson, 1995). There are those who keep watch over potential crime targets (guardians), those who supervise potential offenders (handlers) and those who monitor places (managers). Whilst these definitions are useful in beginning to understand how the concept of guardianship can be applied to crime targets, offenders and 'places',

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properties' for gambling and suicide.



they offer little explanation as to how these types of guardianship may influence the crime event. However, help is at hand through Felson's categorisation of 'levels of responsibility' in crime discouragement. Here, it is suggested that there are four types of crime discouragement. These are personal, assigned, diffuse and general (Felson, 1995). Personal is offered by family and friends, assigned is by those employed to intervene in crime, diffuse by those employed but not assigned to intervene in crime and general, is by strangers.

These levels of responsibility can aid our understanding of guardianship and why guardians may in some circumstances intervene in crime. Problems still exist with the general level of responsibility and the 'willingness' of the general public to intervene in crime types such as violence. This is obviously dependent upon the context of the situation and crime type. The types of crime where a guardian may directly intervene are most likely to be robbery and violence. Here, intervention by third parties will be dependent upon a number of factors such as how many guardians are present and how dangerous the situation is perceived to be. Experiments have been conducted by psychologists to assess the likelihood of bystander intervention in a number of situations. For example, Latane & Darley (1970) conducted a number of experiments to assess the response of bystanders to crime. In one experiment subjects were put into an interview waiting room where a large amount of cash was left on top of a desk (sometimes the subjects were alone and sometimes they were in pairs). An additional person would be present who was to act as a thief and take the money, subjects were then asked about the theft. On 52% of occasions when subjects were alone they claimed not to have noticed the theft (25 experiments conducted), though only 25% of pairs claimed not to have noticed (out of 16 experiments).

Latane & Darley claim the subjects may have said they did not see the theft to avoid any confrontation with the offender. Some even tried to make excuses for the thief suggesting that it looked like he was changing some money or that the theft was a mistake. When alone, 24% of subjects reported the theft, though only 3 of the people in pairs reported the incident. This suggests that when confronted with a crime incident, these potential guardians may chose to ignore the crime and fail to take any action to

report it. The low numbers reporting the incident in the 'paired' subjects suggests that guardians may believe somebody else will deal with the situation.

The 'bystander apathy' observed by Latane & Darley has clear implications for routine activity theory. If guardians are not willing to intervene in a crime event then the mere presence of guardians may have limited potential in preventing crime. However, a division has to be made here between guardianship and bystander intervention. The mere presence of guardians or bystanders may prevent crimes such as burglary from occurring as offenders will not want witnesses to observe the crime. However, for violent crimes (such as street fights) the presence of guardians may have limited potential in preventing violations and in some circumstances bystander intervention could even escalate the incident.

Problems also exist with Cohen & Felson's concept of the motivated offender. The motivated offender commits crime because a rational choice is made at the crime site to do so. It is not disputed that these rational choices are made, though rational choice theory assumes that these choices are made by offenders working alone. Rational choice theory and later work on the choice structuring properties of offences (Cornish & Clarke, 1989) state that offenders will consider a range of factors before committing a crime. In the case of choice structuring properties these will be factors such as having knowledge of a method in which the crime can be committed, the potential cost of the crime or the benefits of crime (Cornish & Clarke, 1989). Potential offenders may often make these decisions, though distinctions need to be made between the rational choice decisions of offenders who work alone, how rational choice decisions are made when offenders work together in teams, and how factors such as peer group pressure affect choices. Kennedy & Baron, (1993) have suggested that rational choice decisions in acts of violence are influenced by cultural norms and processes. Therefore rational choices will often be influenced by subcultural definitions of what is acceptable and unacceptable for certain groups of individuals.

It would also appear that in conjunction with the rational choice perspective more emphasis needs to be placed upon the role of crime facilitators such as alcohol and drugs

on rational choice decisions. The importance of crime facilitators in acts of crime has been noted (Clarke, 1995), though little has been said about the influence of facilitators such as drugs or alcohol upon rational choice decisions. Links between drinking and violence have been established (Mirrlees-Black et al, 1996) as has the link between drugs and crime (Mirrlees-Black et al, 1996; Hough, 1996). From the rational choice perspective the types of decisions made by a sober offender or an offender not under the influence of drugs may be different from those offenders who are drunk or habitual drug users. However, the effects of these facilitators are still to be assessed in any detail.

Despite these criticisms of routine activity theory, it does provide an explanation for the growth of crime in the USA since 1950. The theory also provides a conceptual framework for explaining how crime occurs on the micro level (the convergence of suitable target, motivated offender in absence of capable guardianship) which has been subsequently used by criminologists for crime prevention purposes. It has been identified that the theory provides a plausible macro explanation of the increase in crime from 1950-74. However, routine activity theory fails at the micro level to explain how certain crime sites facilitate crime (for example, how certain business types may generate abuse or violence).

Both lifestyle theory and routine activity theory provide frameworks that may help us to understand abuse and violence in small businesses. Though businesses are inanimate, like people they have definable lifestyles or characteristics that distinguish them from other businesses. For example, an off-licence would have a set of lifestyle characteristics that are clearly distinguishable from a timber warehouse (different types of customers, variations in goods sold, opening hours etc). Therefore, we can begin to hypothesise that businesses have clearly distinguishable lifestyle characteristics. Here, we are interested in the lifestyles that generate incidents of abuse/violence.

To help understand how incidents of abuse/violence may occur in the workplace, routine activity theory provides a framework for conceptualising abuse and violence. The theory tells us that for a predatory violation to occur there has to be a convergence in time and space of a suitable target and motivated offender in the absence of capable guardianship.

Therefore, to understand how abuse and violence occurs, we need to understand how business lifestyles facilitate a convergence of these elements in time and space. This can be done by developing an understanding of how businesses 'generate' abuse and violence. To help us here, we will now consider the importance of crime 'attractors' and 'generators'.

### **Attractors and Generators of Crime.**

It is apparent that many communities and land uses have characteristics that generate and attract crime. A community has its own lifestyle and as a consequence of these lifestyles communities can have careers in crime (Reiss, 1986). The factors that promote crime within a community will be dependent upon the routine activity patterns of people in the area and the number of offenders resident in the community. Other factors such as the number of potential targets will also be important (this will be shaped by factors such as the number of houses, the number of businesses and other facilities such as sports and leisure centres within a community).

Brantingham and Brantingham (1991) suggest that spatial crime patterns are shaped by the cognitive awareness space that the individual has of an area. This 'awareness of space' consists of areas or land uses of towns and cities that people know well (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981). These are created by routine activity patterns shaped by nodes, paths and edges. Nodes are the central places in people's lives such as the home, work location, shopping location and where leisure activities are pursued. These nodes are linked together by the paths we use to get from home to work, shopping or leisure activities. These are predominantly roadways where people drive or use buses to reach nodal points. In theory, awareness space could also be shaped by trains or subway systems as they also raise the offenders awareness of potential attractive targets for crime and generate crime by leading to a convergence of victims and offenders. However, Brantingham and Brantingham do not mention this.

In addition to this, Brantingham and Brantingham also place significance on areas where land uses change. These are known as 'edges' and are physical and perceptual edges

where the landscape or landuses become distinctly different. In terms of physical landscape this may include the transition from land to sea, in terms of perception it may include the transition from residential to industrial area. Edges are considered to be important in the spatial distribution of crime as they provide physical barriers to movement (to and from crime sites). They can also mark changes in landuse that create areas where strangers are more readily accepted because they are not known, or mark the beginning of an area that the stranger does not know well so begins to feel uncomfortable. Rengert and Wasilchick (1985) have suggested the placement of crimes such as burglary are strongly affected by perceptual edges. They conducted research with burglars who were found to be most likely to select targets on or towards the edges of their neighbourhood. The reason for the target selection was because offenders were moving out of a neighbourhood where they may be recognised, but the offenders were still in an area they knew reasonably well.

Our cognitive awareness of space is shaped by our routine activity patterns (which in turn are shaped by the nodal points in our lives). As people conduct their routine daily activities by moving from nodal points along pathways, Brantingham and Brantingham suggest that crime patterns are shaped by crime generators and crime attractors. Crime generators are areas to which large numbers of people are attracted for reasons unrelated to any level of criminal motivation they might have or to any particular crime they might end up committing (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1991:7). Crime generators are areas where large numbers of people conduct their routine daily activities such as entertainment districts, office concentrations, sports stadia, a university campus and shopping centres. Due to large volumes of people passing through these areas crime opportunity is generated. These also include areas where major travel nodes intersect such as at bus interchanges, train stations and park and ride areas of cities.

Crime attractors are particular places, areas, neighbourhoods and districts which create well-known criminal opportunities to which strongly motivated, intending criminal offenders are attracted because of the known opportunities for particular types of crime (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1991). The whole community may be seen as a crime attractor if there are known criminal opportunities in the area and the individual business

may also be seen as a crime attractor. These crime attractors and generators may produce what Felson (1987) refers to as 'imbalanced crime production and occurrence'. These are areas or certain targets that seem to have a certain propensity to crime. Felson, (1987) analysed data from 441,561 property offences in Illinois in 1984 and found that the highest proportion of property crime (45%) took place in public areas against vehicles on streets, parking areas and driveways. It was suggested that these targets attracted crime as a result of generating activities found nearby. Therefore 'some spots appeared to draw or assemble offenders and targets, while dumping the resulting offence on the neighbours' (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1991:920). For example, Brantingham and Brantingham, (1982) highlighted that crime risks were reduced the further in distance one moved away from fast food restaurants. The restaurants were safe places, though they attracted offenders who would produce high risks for nearby properties.

Brantingham and Brantingham's work provides a useful explanation of the spatial distribution of crime patterns within urban areas. However, their work is not without its problems. Their theory is built around the idea that most offences will be committed within offenders' 'cognitive awareness of space' areas. Research also seems to verify this claim (see Rengert & Wasilchick, 1985). However, the point needs to be made that routine activities of both offenders and non-offenders and their resulting awareness space areas may not be as straight-forward as Brantingham and Brantingham state. They suggest that our awareness space area will broadly be shaped by nodes, pathways and edges. These consist of the home, the workplace and a number of shopping and entertainment facilities clustered around a central point. However, they fail to recognise that people may have nodal points all over towns and cities (especially as leisure and shopping facilities are moving out of city centres) thus creating more areas they know well and more potential for crime. Therefore, our awareness space areas will be shaped by developing knowledge of several nodal points that can change over a lifetime. For example, awareness of space areas will also be shaped by the fact that people would expect to move house (or job) several times during a lifetime. Therefore awareness of space areas are likely to grow during a lifetime. When somebody moves house awareness of space will change. Modern transport systems and road networks also mean that people are more mobile today than ever before. This is likely to increase knowledge

of wider areas as people are prepared to commute large distances to work or pursue leisure activities. Therefore awareness of space may not only be relevant across the space of one city, but between cities and within other cities where we do not even live.

On a macro level the distinction between crime generators and attractors appears to work very well. It seems perfectly feasible to suggest that some areas are crime attractors (because of the criminal opportunities that are present) and some are crime generators (as a consequence of the routine activities on these sites). However, problems are encountered when trying to test these ideas. Brantingham & Brantingham use empirical data from Burnaby, Canada and Cambridge, UK to test their ideas. Crime patterns are plotted on a map of Burnaby and spatial analysis is conducted of the crime hotspots. The data from Cambridge are presented as burglary rates by land use in the city (such as youth clubs, restaurant and off-licences). Problems are encountered with both sets of data. The Burnaby data provides an interesting macro level analysis of where crime hotspots are located. Here, the hotspots of crime are generated in the centre of the city and at transport interchanges (such as bus and rail stations). However, we are not given a breakdown of the crime types found at these hotspots. Therefore, we are not made aware of the types of crime generated at these sites.

The Cambridge data used by Brantingham and Brantingham also has a number of problems. Previous to here, the theoretical description and testing of crime generators and attractors had been conducted at the macro level. Brantingham & Brantingham suggest that the Cambridge data is used to test land use patterns, though the data are drawn from individual business premises such as off-licences, department stores and chemists. In the way that the land use patterns of cities had been previously described, one would expect the land uses of cities to consist of macro level analysis of areas such as shopping centres or office blocks, not individual premises. In addition to this, there are problems with Brantingham and Brantingham's explanations of the crime rates observed in the Cambridge data. Burglary rates per 100 land uses for 31 different types of premises are listed. From this list, it is ascertained that the highest risks of burglary are for sports (or other) clubs at 89.29 incidents per 100 premises; youth clubs (50.00 per 100) and restaurants (30.43 per 100). The lowest risks were for tailors (1.61 per 100);

public houses (1.61 per 100) and college hostels (1.72 per 100). It is suggested that sports clubs and youth clubs were most frequently burgled because they had generator characteristics -they attracted a high number of people, fit into the awareness space of a high number of people and attracted young males of lower income groups which fit the demographic profile of offenders. These premises were also likely to have alcohol on the premises and cash was held in the evenings.

This is a logical explanation as to why these premises experience high burglary rates. However, problems are encountered when comparing the Brantingham's account of why some premises experience high rates of burglary to why some experience low rates of burglary. Ironmongers, doctors, college hostels, pubs and tailors are all premises that are identified as having low risks of burglary. Brantingham and Brantingham suggest this is because, 'ironmongers are unlikely to contain much that would be attractive to burglars, college hostels and tailors have a specialised clientele and are likely to fit into only a few people's routine activity patterns and pubs have low risks because of resident owners' (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1991:19). They do not mention why doctors may have low risks.

There are problems with these explanations. The first is that an ironmongers may have expensive items on the premises that are attractive to burglars (for example BRC data shows that for DIY type shops there are high rates of burglary), they may also have a high flow of male customers who are potential offenders. Therefore the explanation given by Brantingham and Brantingham for the low rate of crime may not be sufficient. The same may apply to tailors/menswear stores. The menswear store is likely to fit into the awareness space of lots of people as it is likely to be on a main street with lots of people passing by. The fact that the shop may have specialised clientele may be irrelevant. Whether people actually enter the shop or not in their routine activity patterns is not important. Potential offenders will still be aware (just by passing by) of the types of goods that are likely to be inside the shop. Therefore the prospective burglar will be aware of where the shop is and have a good idea of the goods contained inside thus making it an attractive target. The shop also contains a number of items that are likely to be easy to sell on the black market.



This still does not tell us why the ironmongers or the tailor/ menswear shops in the Brantingham's study had low rates of burglary. To do this it would appear that one would have to look at other factors such as if these shops have particularly effective security systems or if they have particularly high rates occupancy. For example they may be situated in buildings that have flats above the premises thus increasing guardianship, or they may have particularly effective security systems such as alarms, or shutters on the windows.

There are some other patterns highlighted by the Cambridge data that Brantingham and Brantingham may find hard to explain. One particular example is that churches have higher rates of burglary than premises such as jewellers, newsagents, tobacconists and confectioners. Churches appear to have little of worth that would attract offenders. They do not generate crime (the clientele at least at face value would appear not to be criminally motivated). A church and its surrounding area (if there is a graveyard) should be a crime neutral area for a crime such as burglary. It is difficult to explain in terms of attractors and generators how a church has a higher rate of burglary than a bank or a newsagent, tobacconist or confectioner. From this one would have to conclude that Brantingham and Brantingham are not accounting for opportunity or how easy the crime is to complete. For example, opportunities to burgle churches may be easy. They are often empty, few people are passing by and they have little security. Despite its obvious lack of target suitability or generating capacity, the opportunity to burgle a church for some offenders may be too hard to resist.

There clearly are areas of towns and cities that may be regarded as crime attractors or crime generators. Brantingham and Brantingham also suggest there are areas that may be regarded as crime neutral. These are areas that 'neither attract intending offenders, nor produce crimes by creating criminal opportunities that are too tempting to resist' (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1991:9). No examples are given here of the types of areas of cities that are crime neutral, though Brantingham & Brantingham do say that 'areas are unlikely to be pure attractors or generators or purely neutral as this will depend according to crime type' (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1991:9). Two points should be

made here. First, any discussion of crime generators, attractors or crime neutral areas must therefore be crime specific and (second) crime neutral areas can only exist when crime specific analysis is conducted.

Crime specific analysis of crime generators and attractors would allow (on a macro level) for a more effective analysis of generators and attractors. On a macro level we are able to assess which areas of our cities act as crime generators (such as bus interchanges) and those that act as attractors (such as shopping centres). Crime specific analysis would therefore allow us to ask where specific crimes take place and why. This would help explain why offenders are attracted to particular types of premises and land uses and how certain crimes are generated. Brantingham and Brantingham do this for Burnaby data, but the analysis is not crime specific. Micro level analysis by crime type would also allow us to identify the premises that were most likely to attract and generate certain crimes and it would determine the areas of cities that were crime neutral for specific crimes. There are no areas of cities that could be entirely crime neutral. Even large open areas of parkland where there appears to be little to steal or burgle may attract potential muggers, or offenders attracted to quieter areas where they can vandalise property or participate in other forms of deviance such as drug dealing, drug taking or prostitution. These may be areas that would be crime neutral for crimes such as burglary. In turn areas where there are a high number of burglaries may be crime neutral for crimes such as drug dealing or prostitution.

A number of problems have been identified with Brantingham and Brantingham's work on crime attractors and generators and crime neutral areas. The main purpose of this work is to consider the role of crime attractors and generators in relation to abuse and violence against business premises. As with all incidents of crime, generators and attractors will play a part in abuse and violence. Crime attractors will be less important for abuse and violence than for crime types such as burglary. For crimes such as burglary the offender may be more likely to be drawn to areas where s/he is aware of attractive targets. There will be instances where crime attractors attract offenders to bars in the hope of engaging in violence (see for example Roncier & Maier, 1991), though incidents of abuse and violence are more likely to be a result of generating factors such as disputes

over goods or service. People are unlikely to set out specifically wanting to be abusive or violent against business employees; incidents are most likely to be a result of a convergence of suitable targets and offenders which is triggered as a result of some type of generator.

### **Theories of victimisation and abuse/ violence within the context of businesses.**

So far the chapter has reviewed lifestyle theory, routine activity theory and how differing land uses may attract and generate crime. It will now be considered how these theories can be applied to abuse/ violence in the context of businesses. This is outlined in table 2.1 (below).

All of the theories reviewed have a clear conceptual framework and can all help us in understanding abuse/ violence in businesses. The lifestyle theory of personal victimisation postulates a correlation between lifestyle attributes and the risk of victimisation. Hindelang et al (1978) use data to illustrate these correlations and construct a 'lifestyle theory' of personal victimisation. It may be hypothesised that businesses also have lifestyles that promote the risk of abuse and violence (see table 2.1). It is acknowledged that a business is an inanimate object, though it possesses a number of 'lifestyle' characteristics (such as number of staff, open hours etc.) that will increase or decrease the risk of victimisation.

Routine activity theory provides a framework for understanding how a 'crime event' occurs. Its key theoretical underpinning is that for a direct contact predatory violation to occur there has to be a convergence in time and space of a suitable target and motivated offender in the absence of capable guardianship. This provides a framework for beginning to assess how business premises may become suitable targets for abuse/ violence.

**Table 2.1: Lifestyle theory, Routine Activity Theory, Attractors and Generators.**

	<b>Lifestyle Theory Of Victimisation</b>	<b>Routine Activities Theory</b>	<b>Crime Attractors &amp; Generators</b>
<b>Key underpinnings of the theory</b>	There is a correlation between individual lifestyles and victimisation.	For direct contact predatory violation to occur, there has to be a convergence in time and space of a suitable target and motivated offender in the absence of capable guardianship.	Land uses within a city will have differing potential for attracting and generating crime.
<b>Development in relation to Abuse &amp; Violence against businesses</b>	Highlights the possibility that businesses have definable lifestyles that promote the risk of victimisation.	Some business (with lifestyles that promote abuse/ violence) will have a convergence of victims/ offenders in time and space.	Business premises differ in their potential to attract and generate abuse and violence.

Both lifestyle theory and routine activity theory begin to provide us with a broad hypothesis (that certain types of businesses will have lifestyles that increase the risk of abuse/ violence), and that for an incident to occur the suitable target must converge with a motivated offender in time and space. At this point, this broad theoretical framework requires more ontological depth. We need to begin to understand what it is about business premises that promote these risks. To this we can turn to Brantingham and Brantingham and their concept of crime attractors and generators. This raises the question about how some business premises will attract or generate incidents of abuse and violence, and allows us to begin to hypothesise about how business lifestyles attract or generate abuse and violence. This is the starting point for the lifestyle theory of business victimisation which is considered in detail in chapter three.

So far, a framework has been built to conceptualise abuse and violence against business. Whilst it is hypothesised that several business types will have lifestyles that generate abuse or violence, not all business types will generate abuse and violence. The generating potential of a business will not only be dependent upon the convergence of suitable targets and motivated offenders within the business, but also if the business has

the potential to trigger an incident. Therefore, it needs to be considered how incidents could be triggered and how a result of abuse and violence is actually generated within business premises. This is considered in detail below.

### **Explaining Abuse and Violence.**

Though it has been hypothesised that some businesses have lifestyles that promote abuse and violence, some assessment needs to be made of how incidents are generated. To help us here, we will begin to review research considering the processes that occur as violent incidents unfold. Research on aggression or violent offending can broadly be split into two areas; those studies that consider why individuals have a disposition towards violent offending and second, studies which consider the situational or processual aspects of violence or aggression. A number of studies have considered why certain individuals engage in aggressive or violent behaviour. These have focused on a number of different forms of violence such as domestic violence, robbery, fights in bars and football hooliganism (see for example, Dobash & Dobash, 1992; Gill & Matthews, 1994; Thomsen, 1997; Dunning et al, 1982). It has been highlighted that most violence is conducted by men (Campbell & Muncer, 1994; Felson, 1984), and as a consequence most of the research has focused upon men. Explanations for violent behaviour range from theories that suggest individuals become violent offenders due to biological influences, psychological disposition, and socio-cultural reasons (see for example, Moir & Jessell, 1995; Brown, 1991; Campbell & Muncer, 1994).

Whilst there has not been a plethora of research considering the situational or processual aspects of aggression, some research has been conducted. This research has not focused upon offender disposition, but on the interactions and processes that take place between offenders, victims and third parties during incidents of violence. It is clear that the setting for aggressive behaviour varies. For example, domestic violence will usually occur within the home, though public places such as bars are often common settings for aggressive behaviour (Ramsay, 1989; Thomsen, 1997). These incidents also have temporal variations with most incidents of violence in public occurring in two waves late

in the evening. First, when bars close (at 11pm) and second, when nightclubs close at 2am (Ramsey, 1989).

It has been conjectured within studies of the situational aspects of violence that incidents have a clear processual pattern and the outcomes of this process are not necessarily determined by characteristics or initial goals of the participants (Felson & Steadman, 1983). Whilst this approach stresses the importance of interaction between perpetrator, victim and any third parties in affecting the final outcomes of the incident, it does not deny that offender motivation or disposition will be a contributory factor (as will the disposition of other interacting parties such as the victim and any third parties).

Research considering the processual pattern in aggressive incidents has often focused upon incidents such as homicide (Polk, 1994). Here, it has been suggested that the intentions of perpetrators in these incidents is often not to commit homicide, but the chain of events that occur during the incidents produces a fatal outcome. Often these outcomes have been attributed to contests of honour between males and the unwillingness to appear to 'lose face' during aggressive encounters (Polk, 1994). Luckenbill (1977) suggests that homicide is a product of 'situated transaction'. Therefore incidents of homicide can be traced from initial provocation to the killing in the form of an interactive process. Polk (1994) agrees with this view, though suggests that often incidents will be extendable over time. For example, we are not only able to trace the processes involved in the final confrontation between two people, we may also be able to identify earlier exchanges or interactions that took place before the incident of violence or homicide. An example of this is found in incidents of domestic violence where the victimised wife kills her husband. The final incident led to homicide, though the build up to the final exchange would have been a long process possibly extendable over a period of years.

Several studies that have considered the processes that occur during incidents of aggressive behaviour have tried to apply a theoretical framework to them. Felson (1984) develops a number of theoretical ideas about the processes and development of aggressive encounters. Here, reference is made to three interactionist theories. These are

'aggression as impression management', 'aggression as coercive power' and 'aggression as punishment'. The first theoretical approach (aggression as impression management) hypothesises that aggression is 'a product of face saving behaviour that occurs when one perceives oneself as having been intentionally attacked' (Felson, 1984). This suggests that if people are cast into negative situational identities (through insults) they will retaliate to negate the original attack. The second approach (aggression as coercive power) suggests that aggression is used to influence people when other methods fail. This will be used to influence targets to provide certain rewards and due to the fear of the aggressor targets will often submit. The third approach hypothesises that often aggression and violence are used as a form of punishment. This is particularly true in a formal capacity in terms of punishing criminals which is intended to act both as retribution for the criminal act and a deterrence (both for the criminal caught and potential future offenders for perceived wrongdoing). This also exists in a more informal capacity; an example would be parents punishing children for misbehaving.

Felson (1984) criticises these approaches by suggesting that they are only able to explain why some aggressive encounters develop. No single theory is able to explain every instance of aggression. For example, the impression management approach is able to explain why incidents escalate through face saving or retaliatory behaviour, but not what triggers incidents in the first instance. The aggression as coercive power approach can tell us why an initial attack occurs and why some may choose to submit rather than retaliate, and the aggression as punishment approach suggests people will become violent if they feel an injustice has been done against them.

In an attempt to understand further the processes of violence, Felson hypothesises that incidents of aggression all follow a certain process. This process begins when persons violate norms or orders. A response to these violations comes in the form of an attack or a threat to attack because of a wish to produce compliance (by the target or third parties) or the attacker believes that wrongdoing deserves to be punished. This initial attack is described as 'social control' behaviour. Once the attack occurs, it is hypothesised that face saving behaviour or retaliation is involved. However, at this stage, if the costs of retaliation are too high for the target then they are likely to submit. This model draws

together aspects of impression management, coercive power and the punishment theories of aggressive interaction, though it is a somewhat simplified explanation of the incident process.

Many of Felson's ideas were formulated by previous research where case files with a sample of 84 adult and 75 youth offenders were conducted (Felson & Steadman, 1983). These case files gave descriptions of 159 incidents of violence and enabled an analysis of the interactive processes of violence. These incidents were coded into a series of ten unit actions. These unit actions included:

1. Physical attacks: These include physical violation, pursuing for physical attack and drawing and struggling for a weapon.
2. Insults: These include direct attacks on identity, including yelling.
3. Threats: These include challenges and dares and non-verbal threatening gestures. Some indicate harm is forthcoming (including contingent threats).
4. Rule violations: Including annoying behaviour, failure to discharge an obligation, ignoring, causing another's loss inadvertently, boasting, inappropriate demeanour, infidelity, taking someone's property or violating that property.
5. Reproaches: Includes accusals, complaints, protests, commands to cease some offensive action or to leave, chastisement, and asking for accounts or redress. These are social control actions that focus on the behaviour of their target, although they have implications for identities.
6. Accounts: Explanations of conduct.
7. Submission: Including apologies, compliance, crying, pleas not to attack and fleeing.
8. Orders: Requests and commands, except commands to cease offensive actions, since the latter respond to previous wrongful action. These are contingent or persuasive action i.e. actions designed to produce compliance.
9. Non-compliance: Refusal to comply and doing nothing when the antagonist has called for compliance.
10. Mediation: Actions that attempt to reconcile the opposing parties.



The results of the research identified a number of patterns that would have been expected. For example, in 86.2% of homicide cases the victims were male as were 84.4% of assault victims. However, what is of more interest is how Felson & Steadman describe incident processes. They suggested that social control was a common feature of incidents and these would often be preceded by rule violations. Here, it often seemed that initial attacks began in resistance to some form of social control or in retaliation to somebody attempting to control the actions of another person. Therefore incidents often occurred as a form of punishment for people violating norms or orders. Retaliation in incidents also appeared common to save face, punish rule violations or to be used as a form of power to deter a future attack. Often though, the 'rule violations' would go unpunished as people were unwilling to become involved in conflict. However, when reproaches or orders were made non-compliance and open conflict was more likely to occur. As a response to these reproaches sometimes accounts of behaviour were given. However, the pattern of incidents depended upon the gender of participating parties. There were similarities in the patterns of verbal aggression between males and females, though incidents involving males were more likely to escalate into physical violence as females were more likely to engage in reproaches. The processes involved in the development would be subject to variation, though often patterns would begin with rule violations followed by reproaches/accounts, orders, non-compliance, insults, threats, physical violation, submission and mediation.

Felson and Steadman's research suggests that the actions of victims had a strong bearing on the final outcome of the incident. Overall, incidents are divided into three developmental sequences. The first starts with some initial verbal disagreement followed by the perpetrator making identity attacks on the victim. These include directing verbal attacks towards the victim or shouting at them. These are followed by general threats and evasive action. If mediation is to occur it will be during this stage. Finally, the conflict then escalates into physical attack.

Similarities are found between this process and the developmental sequence identified for homicide by Luckenbill, (1977). Here, six stages are identified. First, the victim affronts the offender with insults or non-compliance, the offender then sees these as

offensive. This leads to retaliation in the form of a challenge or physical attack. The victim fails to comply or physically retaliates. A commitment to the conflict is forged and then there is the aftermath. Whilst this sequence has similarities to the sequence noted by Felson & Steadmen (1983) the sequence observed by the latter is strictly behavioural whereas Luckenbill (1977) draws attention to both behavioural and cognitive stages.

Important distinctions have to be made between behavioural and cognitive stages of the incident process. This is partly done by Shoham (1998). He hypothesises that incidents escalate as a result of complex interplay between ego (the acting individual plus his or her cognitive perceptions) and alter (how the other in the dyadic interaction is perceived by ego). During the incident process the way that speech or actions are perceived by alter may have a triggering effect on ego to partake in aggression or violence. Eventually the process may develop towards one of violence. This occurs when the distance between subjective perception and objectively ranked stimulus increases (Shoham, 1998). Therefore as individuals become involved in incidents their objectivity diminishes. The final outcome of violence is produced by a series of stimulus response cycles in which the perceptions of the actors involved will depend upon what happens within the context of the cycle and their perceptions of the background and personality of the individuals involved. However, Shoham suggests that even before the incident begins a number of cognitive perceptions may decide whether the individual becomes involved or not. These act as preventative mechanisms and include selective perceptions and differentiation processes. Selective perceptions may occur when communication is so painful that perception is evaded in self-defence. For example, 'name calling' or racial taunts may be ignored by the recipient. Differentiation processes are similar to this, though they stratify the characteristics of the provoker to avoid taking any offence. Therefore the victim may differentiate between attacks that are seen as a serious threat to their ego and those that are not. For example, taunts or 'name calling' from a child may be ignored, or in the case of men, insults from women may be ignored.

This consideration of the processes of incidents of aggression has highlighted that incidents can be characterised as interaction between two parties, one an aggressor and

the other a victim. It should be noted here that incidents of aggression will also be affected by the presence of third parties (Felson et al, 1984). Third parties may affect both the decision to engage in aggressive or violent activity and how serious the outcome of that activity is. Third parties may help to escalate the incident (if the parties are favourable to violence) or de-escalate the incident (if the parties are unfavourable to violence). Whether the third parties are favourable or unfavourable to violence may depend upon factors such as their age and gender. For example, previous research has found that males and the young tend to be more favourable to violence (Felson et al, 1984). Therefore in incidents where third parties with these demographic characteristics are present violence may be a likely outcome.

Felson et al (1984) used incident reports from 155 incarcerated males to examine the effect of third parties on incidents. The study classified third parties into two types. First, there were third parties who were not accomplices but interacted in the incident, and second, there were legally charged accomplices to the incident. In incidents where there were no accomplices, third parties would often become involved in incidents. Here, third parties seemed more likely to be aggressive than to act as mediators. In total, 70 incidents were recorded where third parties (who were not accomplices of the victim or offender) participated at some stage. In 59% of these incidents the third parties engaged in some form of aggressive action and they mediated in only 13% of incidents. Overall, it appeared that third parties had an important role to play in incidents of assault and homicide. Third parties would act as allies to offenders or victims, and even in incidents where it appeared that the violence took place between only a victim and offender, third party influence was often apparent. Here, Felson et al (1984) concluded that if third parties acted in an aggressive or violent manner before or during an incident then violence would be considered an appropriate action by both the antagonist and the victim.

### **Summary.**

Throughout this chapter, theories that have been used to understand victimisation patterns and processes of violent incidents have been reviewed. These theories will now

be shaped to aid our understanding of abuse and violence in the business environment. From these theories we can immediately draw out two broad hypotheses about abuse and violence in the workplace:

1. Certain business types will have lifestyles that generate abuse/ violence through a convergence of suitable targets and motivated offenders in time and space. Therefore, it needs to be assessed what 'lifestyle' factors of businesses are important in generating environments where suitable targets converge with motivated offenders.
2. The outcomes or results of these convergences will be situationally determined and dependent upon the processes that unfold throughout the incident. To understand these outcomes or results, further understanding of the processes of abuse and violence is required and the possible impact third parties may have on these processes.

Therefore, the review of these theories has started to give us a framework for understanding abuse and violence. This will act as a starting point for building a theoretical framework for understanding abuse and violence against businesses. This will be developed in chapter 3.

## Chapter Three

### Development of Theory: Building a Lifestyle Theory of Abuse and Violence against Businesses.

#### Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to develop a theoretical framework to aid our understanding of the types of businesses and individuals that are most vulnerable to abuse and violence, and how incidents of abuse and violence are generated within businesses. As stated in the previous chapter, the theoretical framework postulates that businesses have lifestyles that generate abuse/ violence through a convergence of suitable targets and motivated offenders in the workplace. These lifestyle patterns are shaped by the functions of the business, the lifestyles of the business staff and customers, and the routine activities of the local communities in which they serve. The theory is an application of existing lifestyle theory (Hindelang et al, 1978) and routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) to abuse and violence within the workplace.

The theory hypothesises that there are associations between a number of business 'lifestyle' characteristics such as geographical location, business type, size of business and abuse and violence. These characteristics will create the contexts in which abuse and violence are generated. Table 3.1 outlines the three key stages of an incident of abuse/ violence. First, the context or setting will have to be suitable to trigger abuse or violence. Second the incident will be triggered by a physical or verbal action from a member of staff or a customer, and (third) there will be a number of processes that occur within an incident. Initially, the theoretical framework considers the contexts in which targets and offenders may converge. This takes a number of factors into account, such as the location of the business, employee numbers and demographic characteristics of victims. The framework then considers how incidents are triggered and how these triggers generate a final outcome of abuse or violence.

**Table 3.1: Lifestyle Theory of Abuse and Violence: Contexts, triggers and processes of abuse & violence.**

Contexts	Triggers	Processes
Lifestyles/ routine Activities that facilitate abuse/ violence	Explanations of how abuse/ violence is generated	How, incidents develop from triggers to abuse/ violence

**Development of Theory (Section One): The Contexts that generate Abuse and Violence Against Businesses.**

It is conjectured here that there are six individual features of the business lifestyle that generate abuse/ violence (see figure 3.1). These are location, business types, employee numbers, demographic characteristics of staff and customers, security provisions and the risks the business has to other crime types. These lifestyle features will now be considered in turn.

**1. Geographical location of the business:**

Geographical location or 'place' has often been recognised as being essential to understanding crime patterns. Studies have considered offender residence (Shaw & Mackay, 1942; Morris, 1957; Baldwin & Bottoms, 1976) and offence locations, (Baldwin & Bottoms, 1976, Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981, Rengert & Wasilchick, 1985, Wikstrom, 1991, Clarke, 1995). Here, it needs to be considered how targets and victims converge in time and space in a business. This is shaped by two factors; first, the nature of the suitable target and second, the nature of incidents of abuse and violence. The suitable targets we are dealing with are employees within businesses. Unlike victims of crimes such as street violence their location is fixed within the business and their place of victimisation is in the business. They are therefore fixed within a certain location for long periods and may be referred to as 'static' targets. Second, abuse and violence will often be spontaneous and linked to other events. Unlike crimes such as burglary, abuse and violence will often not be planned, though may be related to opportunistic crime such as shop theft (see number 4 below). Therefore, when considering abuse and

violence against the business it has to be remembered that victims are static and that crimes are often spontaneous. Therefore it has to be considered how offenders come across specific targets at certain times and why certain targets are suitable for incidents to occur.<sup>32</sup>

The location of the business will be one of the most important factors of its lifestyle as this will determine the type of community in which the business has to operate and the type of customers which it is likely to attract. The influence of location on victimisation may be considered on three levels; the macro which considers the influence of the city areas outside of the local community on victimisation, the meso which considers the influence of the local community and the micro which considers the influence of the immediate vicinity of the business such as neighbouring premises on the street outside. The macro, meso and micro will all now be considered in turn.

#### *Macro (Routine Activities of the City)*


Baldwin & Bottoms (1976) conducted studies of the placement of both victims and perpetrators of crime across Sheffield. Here it was found that most crime occurred in the city centre. One would expect a substantial amount of this crime to be against business as they are predominant in the city centre. However, there will be other areas of cities where there are known criminal opportunities within businesses. For example, many British cities have clusters of businesses serving housing estates, and shopping areas such as those found in the West End and Belgrave areas of Leicester are a common feature of large towns and cities. These areas may attract high rates of offending and produce crime 'hotspots' outside of the city centre. This is likely to occur when potential offenders live close to areas of business, travel into the area for shopping or recreational purposes, or when potential offenders pass through the local community en route to another destination. The possibility of victimisation will also be dependent upon potential offenders visiting the community in search of businesses where there are opportunities for crimes such as shop theft.

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<sup>32</sup> This may be different in cases of repeat victimisation which may be produced through other processes.



**Figure 3.1: Lifestyle theory of business victimisation: Contexts of Abuse & Violence.**



This will be considered later in the thesis.



Outsiders will also constitute a high risk if they visit entertainment facilities in the area late in the evening, as here they are likely to be using pubs, clubs and restaurants and consuming alcohol which could act as a generator for incidents.

### *Meso (Routine activities of the local Community)*

The immediate environment surrounding the business will have a major impact upon the risk of victimisation. Previous research has considered how criminal victimisation concentrates in certain types of communities and how these communities develop. For example, Skogan (1986 & 1990b), Hope, (1995, 1998), Foster, (1995) and Bottoms & Xanthos, (1989) have all considered how the demographic characters of residents on housing estates may lead to high crime. Wilson & Kelling (1982) considered how relatively trivial incidents in a community (if unchecked) will help the community to spiral into general decline and become a high crime area and Reiss (1986), hypothesised that certain types of communities can have careers in crime.

The routine activities and infrastructure of the local community will be essential in understanding business victimisation. The structure of the community comprises of many different land uses. These include housing, businesses, leisure activities and transport networks joining these land uses together. These land uses will shape victimisation risks according to the types of people who reside in the area, the types of leisure activities in the area and temporal movement of people.

In chapter two attention was drawn to the work of Brantingham and Brantingham (1981). It was highlighted how some land uses may generate or attract crime. Our definition of crime attractors is similar to that of Brantingham and Brantingham. These will be areas or premises that people are attracted to with the intention of engaging in some type of criminal activity. On a macro level this would mean being attracted to a specific area of the city to commit crime, on the micro level this would mean being attracted to a specific premises to commit crime. We have criticised Brantingham and Brantingham's definition of crime generators as it is rather broad, so here it is split into two categories. The first is termed 'indirect' crime generators and the second 'direct' crime generators.

Indirect crime generators are produced by potential offenders visiting business premises for non-criminal purposes. As a result of activities within the premises a crime occurs at a different premises. For example, fast food restaurants may act as indirect crime generators (Felson, 1987). As a result of activities within the restaurants (young people gathering) there are high risks of crime to surrounding premises. Direct generators will generate crimes as a direct consequence of activities that take place within the crime site. This is likely to be most apparent for abuse and violence where incidents will be a result of activities on the premises and verbal exchanges between employee and aggressor. Therefore abuse and violence will usually be triggered by a dispute or disagreement that is generated on the business premises, and not by activities in surrounding premises.

We can therefore begin to assess the role that attractors and generators may play in incidents of abuse and violence. First, it is apparent that people will be attracted to areas where businesses are located for business/ shopping/ leisure purposes, though some will be attracted for criminal purposes. People will be attracted to these areas as the areas will fall into their cognitive 'awareness space areas' which are shaped by routine activity patterns. Customers/ potential offenders are unlikely to be attracted to businesses to purely be abusive or violent against staff. They will be attracted for other reasons. Those that are attracted to businesses for criminal reasons may engage in crimes such as shoplifting, fraud or fights in bars which then have a link to abuse and violence i.e. if staff intervene in the crime. However, most incidents of abuse and violence will be a result of direct crime generators rather than attractors. Most people who eventually engage in abuse or violence will not have entered the business to commit crime. They will have entered the premises as normal paying customers, though incidents will be generated as a result of some action or verbal exchange in the business (this will be considered in more detail later in the chapter).

Indirect generators will also generate abuse and violence in some circumstances. This will particularly affect premises close to restaurants, public houses and night-clubs where alcohol will act as a facilitator. Therefore, 'high-risk' times could be when public houses or night-clubs close. There may also be a problem with premises close to schools and

youth-clubs. Children from these premises may go to businesses to shoplift or they could be generally disruptive around the business and thus a cause of anxiety to staff.

*Micro (The immediate vicinity)*

There are a number of 'micro level' factors that will have an impact upon victimisation. These include the location of the business, business type, number of employees, the business risk to other crime types (besides abuse and violence), security provisions and the demographic profile of staff.

The location of the business will determine the number of potential offenders likely to visit the premises and the number of capable guardians who are likely to be present inside the business at any one time. The risk of abuse and violence is dependent upon the number of customers visiting the business willing to be abusive or violent against staff. For abuse and violence to occur there has to be a convergence of offenders and victims. If there are a high number of potential offenders in the immediate vicinity of the business, it is more likely that this convergence will occur (this has been considered in previous sections). Therefore business that attract a high number of customers who have the potential to offend (such as young males) will have a high potential to generate abuse and violence.

Businesses attracting a high number of potential offenders may also attract a high number of capable guardians and some businesses will employ assigned guardians such as security guards. Previous research has also shown that natural surveillance prevents criminal violations. Bottoms (1994) described how car parks with a constant stream of passers-by experienced lower rates of car theft than car parks without such natural surveillance, and Ekblom & Simon (1988) suggested that incidents of racial abuse against businesses were more likely to occur in premises that were geographically isolated from other businesses. Natural surveillance may have an impact upon abuse and violence in businesses in two ways. First, guardianship may be increased if there are a high number of passers-by outside the business (such as on a main road or in a busy shopping precinct), and customers inside the business will increase guardianship.

However, a number of questions can be raised about the impact of natural surveillance upon abuse and violence. Natural surveillance is more likely to have an impact upon crimes such as burglary as offenders will not want to be seen by a witness who could raise the alarm. The impact of guardians upon abuse and violence in businesses is negligible. 'Passers-by' will have little impact upon abuse or violence within the business, as often it would be unclear to those from outside of the business that an incident is taking place (even if an incident is in progress passers-by would be unlikely to intervene).

The impact of guardianship inside the business could also be brought into question. Routine activity theory suggests that the presence of guardianship will prevent an incident from occurring. However, as Felson et al (1984) suggest the impact of third parties upon incidents is not easily predicted. This will be dependent upon whether third parties are favourable to an outcome of violence. In addition to this research by Latane & Darley (1970) also suggests that often third parties (or bystanders) will not intervene in incidents of crime. Therefore, the impact of guardians or 'passers-by' will be dependent upon how willing third parties are to intervene in incidents.

## **2. Type of business/ service:**

The type of business or service offered will have a major impact on the risk of abuse and violence. There are two ways in which business type will be assessed. These are by sector of business (retail, services, wholesale & manufacture) and by sub-sets within these sectors. Previous studies such as the Commercial Victimization Survey (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995) considered crime rates by retail and manufacturing sector though not how crime risks were generated. It is suggested here that businesses within certain sectors have lifestyle features that increase the risks of victimisation. For example, businesses within the retail sector will attract more customers than those in the manufacturing sector. The higher number of customer visits for retailers will generate a higher ratio of visits by motivated offenders and a greater number of situations where abuse and violence can be generated.

Intra-sector analysis of abuse and violence will also be important as business type will determine a host of lifestyle factors (such as type of customer attracted, opening hours and so on) that generate risks. For example within the retail sector an off-licence or public house will generate differing risks of abuse/ violence from a bookshop. Off-licences and pubs are open until late in the evening and have a presence of crime facilitators such as alcohol on the premises. Therefore risk factors such as late opening and selling alcohol are lifestyle characteristics that will generate abuse and violence.

Business type will also have a large impact upon generating high risks of repeat abuse/ violence. Repeat victimisation is believed to have occurred when the same person or place suffers from more than one incident over a specified period of time (Bridgeman & Hobbs, 1997). A number of studies have focused upon the phenomenon of repeat victimisation. It has been recognised that repeat victimisation is common for crime types such as domestic burglary (Forrester et al, 1988 & 1990; Polvi et al, 1990 & 1991), commercial burglary (Wood et al, 1996; Tilley, 1993b), racial attacks, (Sampson & Phillips, 1992), car theft (Anderson et al, 1994) and domestic violence, (Farrell et al, 1995). Repeat victimisation has been a wide source of criminological interest in recent years with studies finding that for crime types such as burglary often a small number of victims suffer from a disproportionate number of crimes. For example, in a study of small businesses it was found that 17% of business suffered from 69% of burglaries (Wood et al, 1996). In addition to recognising that crime is often concentrated against a small number of victims, studies of repeat victimisation have also identified temporal patterns. This has recognised that after initial victimisation, repeats will usually occur within a month, though often within seven days of the first incident (Farrell & Pease, 1995).

For victims of personal violence, it has been suggested that they are victims because their lifestyles or routine activity patterns make them vulnerable to violent crime (for example being out on the streets late at night or drinking in city centre bars when risks are high). Research has also suggested that victims often play an important role in precipitating victimisation through their actions when interacting with potential offenders. This victim

precipitation may result in the increased risk of victimisation or injury when incidents occur (Wolfgang & Strohm, 1956). Little is understood about repeat abuse and violence against individuals within businesses except that some businesses have a disproportionate number of incidents. It has been stated in this chapter that Hindelang et al, (1978) and Gottfredson, (1984) have postulated that becoming a victim of violence is related to individual lifestyle patterns. A similar conjecture is being forwarded here in relation to business lifestyles and becoming a victim of abuse and violence, though to understand repeat victimisation it is not adequate just to say that this is a product of lifestyles and routine activity patterns.

Farrell et al, (1995) define two types of repeat victimisation. The first is a result of possessing characteristics that increase the likelihood of victimisation by different offenders (risk heterogeneity) and the second, state dependent repeat victimisation in which the repeat crimes are committed by the same offenders and are related to the initial incident (Farrell et al, 1995). Little attention has been paid to issues such as risk heterogeneity or state-dependence with regard to abuse and violence against businesses.

However, it is apparent that an initial incident of abuse/ violence could generate further incidents. Some businesses will be continually victimised because they have risk heterogeneity factors that make them conducive to victimisation. However, some may be repeat victims as offenders (from previous incidents) return to the premises to be abusive or violent against staff on more than one occasion. This event or state-dependent repeat victimisation may also be a result of offenders being attracted back to the premises after a grudge has been formed against a member of staff.

It is apparent that 'high-risk' businesses could have a number of repeat incidents of abuse and violence that are generated by 'risk heterogeneity'. For example, public houses and fast food shops will generate incidents simply because the business creates contexts conducive to abuse and violence (presence of alcohol, potential offenders etc). However, a number of incidents may also be event dependent. Here, offenders will return to the premises to be abusive towards staff. This may be because they (the offender) hold a

grudge against the business. This issue will be discussed in more detail in chapters 5 and 6.

### **3. Employee Numbers:**

Little research has considered variations in victimisation according to employee numbers. Some previous research has focused upon businesses that have been defined as 'small'. Examples include a study of violent crime against small business in London and the Midlands (Hibberd and Shapland, 1993), and a study of crime and racial harassment against small Asian-run businesses in London (Ekblom & Simon, 1988). However, the only systematic comparison of crime rates against businesses of varying size was conducted by the Commercial Victimisation Survey (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995). The CVS made comparisons of the risk of victimisation for retail and manufacturing premises in the categories of 1-10 employees and 11+ employees. Here, it was found that businesses with 11+ employees had higher rates of assaults and threats, assaults with injury and violent crime than smaller businesses. In both the retail and manufacturing sectors, businesses with 11+ employees were twice as likely to experience any assault or violent crime than the smaller businesses. Within the retail sector, businesses with 11+ employees also recorded a far higher number of incidents per 100 businesses than those with less than 11 employees. The average number of violent incidents for retailers with less than ten employees was 95 per 100 businesses. This is compared to 508 per 100 for businesses with 11+ employees. Within the manufacturing sector there was less variation in the average number of incidents per business size. On average, manufacturing premises with 11 or less employees were victims of 20 violent crimes in one year compared to 23 for those with 11+ employees.

The commercial victimisation survey tells us that businesses in the retail sector have higher risks of victimisation than manufacturers irrelevant of size. However, within each sector businesses with 11+ employees have higher risks of experiencing at least one incident of assault or violent crime than smaller businesses. There may be two reasons why these patterns have emerged. Larger business premises have more potential targets to be victimised in the form of staff and they may also have more customer visits which

means they have more potential to generate incidents. Therefore the lifestyle and routine activity patterns of the larger business will give rise to more encounters where abuse and violence are generated.

#### **4. Relationship to other crime types:**

Previous research considering victimisation patterns has tended to be crime specific. Therefore, it has measured crime according to categories such as burglary and criminal damage. However, Gill (1998c) and Felson & Clarke (1998) suggest that often crime types will be inter-related and form part of a process of events that include several crime types. Gill (1998c) considers how burglary from business premises is related to sustaining an informal economy selling stolen goods. Felson & Clarke (1998) suggest crimes such as burglary will generate many other crimes such as an assault or sexual attack, selling and receiving stolen goods or the fraudulent use of credit cards. The hypothesis that crime types are closely related may be particularly relevant for abuse and violence. Previous research here has outlined a clear 'incident process' where incidents often progress from verbal abuse to violence (Felson & Steadman, 1983; also see chapter two) and where incidents of abuse in businesses are triggered by crimes such as shop theft (Beck et al, 1994; Wells & Dryer, 1998).

Therefore, it would also be expected that abuse and violence have a close relationship with other crime types. Previous relationships have been identified between abuse and shop theft. Therefore, businesses with high rates of shop theft will also experience high rates of abuse. However, there are likely to be other crime types that have associations with abuse and violence. For example, robbery is a crime that is explicitly violent, fraud may act as a trigger for abuse and violence, and criminal damage may be used as a form of retribution against businesses after an incident of abuse. Therefore, businesses with high rates of these crime types will also experience high rates of abuse and violence.



## **5. Security and actions of businesses to reduce abuse and violence:**

Here it will be considered how security devices such as CCTV will impact upon abuse and violence. It will then be considered how additional measures such as 'having something available for use in self defence' or 'excluding specific types of people from the premises' may impact upon abuse and violence.

CCTV has increasingly been used as a method of surveillance within several contexts. These include, for example, town centres, the shopping centre, car parks, housing estates, industrial estates, underground stations, sports stadia and within shops and businesses. A growing amount of research has evaluated the impact of CCTV within some of these contexts. For example, evaluation research has considered the impact of CCTV in reducing crime on the London underground (Webb & Laycock, 1992), in car parks (Tilley, 1993a), in town centres (Brown, 1996), in retail establishments (Burrows, 1991) and on public transport (Poyner, 1988). A number of studies have also considered public perceptions of CCTV (See for example, Honess & Charman, 1992 and Beck et al, 1995).

Evaluation studies have generally shown that CCTV has an impact upon reducing crime. Brown (1996) identified how CCTV reduced burglary and criminal damage in Newcastle city centre. Evaluation of Safer Cities programmes showed how CCTV led to both a reduction in car crime, and in the context of supermarkets its utilisation has led to both a reduction in theft and violence against staff (Burrows, 1991). The impact of CCTV upon crime may vary according to the contexts in which it is implemented. In some circumstances, the perceived effect of CCTV may be to increase the risk of detection for offenders (such as in shop theft), it may allow the police to respond quickly to offences (as in car crime) or it may increase awareness of security among potential victims thus fostering a more vigilant attitude towards crime. The actual mechanisms that CCTV trigger to reduce crime requires further systematic evaluation. However, it has been suggested that in some contexts CCTV has little impact in actually detecting and removing offenders (Tilley, 1993a; 1998).<sup>33</sup>

Here, it would be expected that CCTV will reduce or prevent incidents of abuse and violence within businesses. CCTV will increase guardianship within business premises and as a result will increase the risk of detection for offenders. Therefore, in premises where CCTV has been installed potential offenders will think twice before engaging in violence. However, the impact may not be as great for abuse. Abuse is usually verbal aggression (rather than physical) and often would not be considered illegal. Therefore offenders will not be worried if incidents are captured on camera.

In addition to the conventional forms of crime reduction devices (such as CCTV), businesses will also use other methods to reduce the risk of abuse or violence. These will include, 'employing extra staff', 'making sure staff are not alone on the premises' 'having something available for self defence', and 'excluding specific types of people from the premises'. There have been no formal evaluations of the likely impact of these measures, though each could have an impact upon abuse and violence. Employing extra staff to reduce crime or trouble will increase guardianship within the premises. This increases surveillance and makes it more likely that a potential offender will be 'observed' committing crimes such as shop theft. Felson (1995) would refer to this type of guardianship as 'assigned' and it is most likely to be found in public houses or nightclubs.

'Making sure that staff are not alone on the premises' will also increase guardianship on the premises. Here, the extra staff may not have an assigned role of reducing abuse or violence, but will be available to intervene if potentially violent confrontations are generated. One would expect to find that staff are not left alone during the evenings in vulnerable businesses such as public houses, small shops and off-licences.

Businesses may also try to reduce the risk of crime and trouble by 'having something available for self-defence'. This may include having a baseball bat or a club behind a shop counter. Shop staff would hope that the use of such a weapon (as a threat rather than to inflict physical harm) would help to defuse a potentially violent situation. However, routine activity theory would suggest this could act as a crime facilitator. The

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<sup>33</sup> Tilley (1998) also provides a comprehensive framework for CCTV evaluation. This is based around

production of a weapon during an incident could help to 'raise the stakes' or escalate the incident to serious physical confrontation.

Finally, businesses will also try to reduce the risk of abuse or violence by 'excluding specific types of people from the premises'. Businesses are most likely to exclude shoplifters, customers who have been abusive to staff or those who have been violent. The impact of this will be to remove motivated offenders from the premises. However, 'banning' offenders from the premises may generate 'event dependent' repeat victimisation if offenders return to take out some form of revenge on the business or members of staff.

Here, it has been highlighted that there are a number of ways businesses may try to reduce abuse and violence. Some of these relate to conventional methods such as the use of CCTV, though there are also a number of unconventional methods that can be used (such as banning troublemakers from the premises or having something to use in self-defence). It would be expected that the victims of abuse and violence will often use these methods to reduce the risk of further victimisation. However, the impact these measures will have upon reducing abuse and violence are less clear. The impact of some of these measures (such as excluding offenders from the premises) may not prevent violence, but could act to escalate it. These issues are considered in more detail later in the thesis.

## **6. The Demographic Characteristics of Staff and offenders.**

As previously stated, research on personal victimisation has considered demographic variables of victims and offenders. British Crime Survey reports (Hough & Meyhew, 1983; Hough & Mayhew, 1985; Mathew et al, 1989; Mayhew et al, 1993; Mayhew et al, 1994; Mirrlees-Black et al, 1996; Mirrlees-Black et al, 1998) have considered violence by age, gender and ethnic group and several research papers have been published in relation to this (for example see Gottfredson, 1984). A number of other studies have also used localised data to consider the risks of violence according to ethnic group (Bowling, 1993, Sampson & Phillips 1992) and gender (Painter, 1992). British

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understanding the contexts in which CCTV fires potential crime reduction mechanisms.

Crime Survey data have recorded high rates of violence for young males (Gottfredson, 1984) and ethnic minority groups have higher risks of being victim of household or personal crime (Fitzgerald & Hale, 1995). Little such research has considered the risk of abuse and violence in the workplace according to demographic variables. Of the research that has been conducted, high rates of assaults have been recorded for females (Beck et al, 1994), and Asian shopkeepers, (Ekblom & Simon, 1988).

It is conjectured here that the patterns of victimisation for females and ethnic minority employees will show similarities to those found in previous research. Therefore, it would be expected that females and Asian/Afro-Caribbean employees will have higher rates of assault within the workplace than males or white employees. There may be several reasons why these patterns are expected to occur. Females may be suitable targets for the simple reason that they are less likely to try and defend themselves from attack. This fits in closely with research conducted by Felson (1996) and Hindelang's theory of the personal victimisation event (1978). Felson interviewed ex-offenders about 384 non-weapon incidents and 181 weapon incidents. Here, it was found that where a weapon was not used males would be more likely to attack females as they (females) were easy to overcome physically. Hindelang et al (1978) suggested personal victimisation is dependent upon the offender's perception of the potential victim and the 'vincability' of the victim. The concept of 'vincability' suggests that those who are most able to resist attack have the highest vincability, those least able to resist attack have the lowest vincability. Therefore women or older people may be more vulnerable as they are physically least capable. However this will not be so relevant for verbal abuse as this is easily directed at anybody (though it would be unwise to direct abuse at somebody who appeared to be physically capable of inflicting harm against the abuser).

If patterns recorded in surveys of personal victimisation replicate themselves here, one would also expect to find higher rates of abuse and violence against ethnic minority employees than white employees. The most obvious reason for this would be due to racially motivated attacks or abuse against employees. As with Ekblom & Simon's (1988) study in London, this may appear to be a significant problem in Leicester as there is a high population of Asian businesses (see chapter 5). Another possible reason why

one may expect to find a high rate of racially motivated abuse and violence would be due to the profile of business in the two areas under study. Asian businesses tend to be small family enterprises and often only one person would be present in the business. If staff are alone for long periods of time they may be at more risk than in businesses where a number of staff work together.

We are also interested in the demographics of perpetrators of incidents. Research conducted into the demographic characteristics of offenders has suggested that males tend to be more likely to be perpetrators of violence than females. This appears to be true in a variety of contexts. For example, males are more likely to commit homicide (Daly & Wilson, 1988 & 1990), violent acts in public (Felson et al, 1986) and to be the perpetrators of domestic violence (Dobash & Dobash, 1992). In the context of abuse and violence against businesses there is almost a complete dearth of research considering the demographics of perpetrators. The only research of note within this area was a study of 400 employees in a national retail company (Beck et al, 1994). Here, it was found that nearly 60% (59.1%) of perpetrators were male and most were white (71.2%).

According to the literature cited above, one would expect the profile of perpetrators of abuse and violence in this study to follow a similar pattern. Therefore one would expect a typical perpetrator profile to be white and male. However, it is also of interest to assess the demographic characteristics of victims and offenders within the same incidents. This has previously been assessed by the British Crime Survey (Mayhew et al, 1993). Here, it was found that for violent crime (such as mugging) white offenders were most likely to victimise white people, black offenders would target black victims and Asian offenders would target Asians. Whilst these patterns may be produced by area (for example Asians coming into contact with other Asians in the same area), the patterns may also be produced by a process Rogers and Prentice-Dunn (1981) refer to as 'reverse racial' discrimination. This is where members of one ethnic group will not be violent towards another ethnic group for fear of being labelled racist. One would expect the patterns identified here to replicate themselves within the context of small businesses. Here one would expect victims and offenders to have the same demographic characteristics in a high proportion of incidents (for similar reasons to those cited above). One would also

expect most incidents to be between males (because males are most likely to engage in aggression). Therefore, in incidents where an Asian is victim, the perpetrator will be Asian and if the victim is male, the perpetrator will be male.

This section has outlined the contexts that will generate abuse and violence. It has been emphasised how businesses may become suitable targets for victimisation and repeat victimisation. There has also been discussion of the contexts that will generate repeat victimisation (some of which will overlap with the next section). From this development of theory, we can begin to develop a number of conjectures that can be used to test the theory in relation to the contexts of abuse and violence. These conjectures are outlined below.

### **Constructing a set of conjectural statements. Business Lifestyles that generate the contexts for abuse/ violence.**

#### **The contexts of abuse and violence: risk heterogeneity.<sup>34</sup>**

##### **Conjecture One: Business Sector, Business Type and abuse and violence.**

*The risk of abuse and violence will vary as the lifestyles of businesses shape target suitability. A major lifestyle feature of the suitable business target is the type of goods it sells or the type of service it offers. This will attract varying numbers of customers into the business and customers of differing demographic characteristics and criminal motivations. This will result in variations in the prevalence and number of repeat incidents of abuse and violence. Therefore:*

a. Businesses within the retail and service sectors will experience higher rates of abuse and violence than wholesale and manufacturing business. This will be determined by the amount of contact businesses in the retail and service sector have with the public. These

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<sup>34</sup> It was stated earlier in this chapter that the location of the business will have a major impact upon the risk of victimisation. However, this hypothesis can not be tested in the context of the data used here as all the business premises are located within geographical areas with similar social characteristics. These are characterised by council housing, flats and terraced housing (these are ACORN classifications F- 'striving' E- 'Aspiring'). Few studies have made comparisons of such nature, though the recent Scottish Business Crime Survey (Burrows et al, 1999) highlighted variations in crime risks for businesses according to location. Here it was noted that the highest prevalence risk of crime was for businesses in poorest council housing areas, on council estates with older residents and in areas with private tenements and flats (Scottish ACORN areas H- poorest council estates, G- council estates with older residents and D-private tenements and flats respectively).

businesses will have a high number of potential offenders visiting the premises. This will generate conducive contexts for abuse and violence through disagreements between customers and staff over pricing of goods, quality of service and incidents generated by other crime incidents such as shop theft.

b. Within each business sector there will be variations in rates of victimisation. Some businesses within the retail and service sectors will generate lifestyles that will produce particularly high rates of victimisation while some will have low rates. For example, it would be expected that businesses such as public houses and restaurants have high rates of victimisation as the sale on alcohol will be a crime facilitator. Businesses such as off-licences will be crime attractors due to the sale of alcohol and cigarettes on the premises.

Conjecture one states that there will be variations in rates of abuse and violence against business when analysis is conducted by business sector and by individual businesses within these sectors. Variations in risk by sector have been verified by previous research (for example, the 1994 Commercial Victimisation Survey), though there has been little exploration of intra-sector variation of risk. It is conjectured that differences in the type of goods a business sells or the type of service it offers will be a key lifestyle feature of the business as this will determine many of the routine activities of the businesses. This will determine how many customers will enter into the business. It will also affect the demographic characteristics of customers, which will affect the potential for incidents to occur. For example premises attracting a large number of young male customers will be expected to experience relatively high rates or abuse and violence.

#### **Conjecture Two: Employee Numbers and Victimisation.**

*The target suitability of businesses will be dependent upon the number of staff present in the business. Previous research has found that there are higher average risks of assaults and threats per 1000 retail and manufacturing premises employing 11 or more staff than for smaller premises. There will be a correlation between employee numbers and victimisation because larger businesses have more potential targets to be victims of abuse and violence and their routine activities are likely to attract more customers who may also constitute potential offenders. However this convergence of*

*victims and potential offenders is likely to impact differently upon employees according to their role within the business. For example:*

a. Victims of abuse are most likely to be employed in larger businesses. These patterns will emerge because the lifestyles of the larger businesses will generate a greater number of convergences between victims and offenders. However, routine activity theory would also suggest that larger businesses will have a higher number of capable guardians on the premises. The presence of guardians will however have less of an impact upon abuse than violence. This is because violence is more serious than abuse and is an illegal act. Therefore, perpetrators of violence will not want witnesses to raise the alarm or intervene in incidents.

b. The first half of the conjecture suggests that a higher number of incidents of abuse will be recorded against larger business premises. Despite this, the *actual* risk of becoming a victim of abuse and violence will be greater in smaller businesses. This will be because employees in the smaller business are more likely to have direct contact with the general public than staff employed in larger businesses. This will be because employees in the smaller businesses are more likely to come into contact with the general public and as a consequence, a greater risk of coming into contact with offenders.

Conjecture one hypothesises that there is a higher risk of employees experiencing abuse or violence if they are employed in the retail or service sectors. Conjecture two hypothesises a link between the size of the business and the number of incidents of abuse and violence experienced. The conjecture above makes an important distinction between abuse and violence by hypothesising that larger businesses are more likely to experience higher rates of abuse than the smaller businesses, though smaller businesses will experience higher rates of violence.<sup>35</sup> These patterns will emerge for two reasons. First, abuse will (for the most part) not be considered an illegal act; therefore the presence of guardians will not affect its potential to occur. As larger businesses will have a greater convergence of potential offenders and victims one would expect to find a greater

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<sup>35</sup> The Commercial Victimization Survey was unable to distinguish between abuse and violence as it recorded both incident types under the label of 'assaults and threats', 'assaults with injury' or 'any violent crime' (which includes robbery).



number of incidents of abuse within the larger businesses. A different pattern will be observed for violence. Here, the assailant will be aware that the act of violence will be illegal. Therefore, it is likely to take place in contexts where there are fewer guardians to intervene or to act as potential witnesses to the incident. In the larger businesses there will be more guardians in the form of other members of staff and customers. Both customers and employees may not physically intervene in incidents, though their presence will deter assailants from engaging in violence.

The second half of conjecture two hypothesises that despite the larger premises experiencing higher average numbers of incidents, the *actual* risk to employees will be higher in the smaller businesses. This is because the smaller a business is, the more likely it is that employees will have contact with the public and thus potential offenders.

### **Conjecture Three:**

***Businesses with high risks of abuse and violence will also experience high numbers of other crime types. There will be two reasons for this:***

- a. Businesses with high risk of abuse and violence will also have a high 'risk heterogeneity' to other crime types such as burglary and fraud. Therefore the risk heterogeneity of the business generates a number of crime types.
- b. A clear 'processual' relationship between crime types such as abuse and shop theft will be established. For example, an incident of shop theft may generate abuse, which in turn may generate violence.

The first half of the conjecture hypothesises that businesses with high rates of abuse and violence will also experience high rates of other crime types. This pattern will be generated as these businesses will have a high 'risk heterogeneity' to a number of incident types. However, the second half of the conjecture hypothesises that often these incident types will be associated. In the case of abuse against business staff, incidents

will be generated by crimes such as shoplifting and fraud. Abuse will then trigger incidents of violence.

**Conjecture Four: Security, Business Actions and Victimisation.**

*Businesses will attempt to prevent abuse or violence against staff in a number of ways. These will include installing security devices to prevent incidents, or operating with particular business practices that are intended to reduce the risk to employees. It is conjectured here that those businesses that have been victims of abuse and violence are more likely to use both formal security systems and informal methods to deter motivated offenders from acts of violence or to increase guardianship. Therefore:*

- a. Businesses that have been victims of abuse or violence will take measures that increase guardianship on the premises or deter potential offenders from engaging in incidents. The security device that will be expected to have the greatest impact upon abuse and violence will be Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). This will impact upon abuse and violence by increasing surveillance and thus acting as a capable guardian/potential witness to incidents.
- b. Businesses that have been victims of abuse and violence will also employ more informal methods or business practices to reduce the risks of incidents occurring. This will include acts such as employing extra staff to increase guardianship, excluding potential offenders from the premises and acquiring weapons to reduce the risk of violence.

This conjecture hypothesises a relationship between becoming a victim of abuse or violence and the implementation of security devices such as CCTV. The first half of the conjecture hypothesises that victims of abuse/ violence are more likely to install CCTV than non-victims. The second half conjectures that victims are more likely to use more informal methods such as 'excluding customers from the premises', 'employing extra staff'; 'having something available for use in self-defence' or 'making sure that staff are not alone on the premises' than non-victims. It would be expected that victims of abuse or violence adopt several of these methods in an attempt to reduce victimisation. In addition to this, there will be some exploration of the impact of these measures. To do this, a subset of victims and non-victims of abuse/ violence will be 'tracked' over a

period of three years to assess if installing any of these measures has an impact upon reducing abuse or violence.

**Conjecture Five: Demographics of Victims.**

*Contextual analysis of abuse and violence will show variation in the target suitability of victims due to their demographic characteristics. Gender and ethnicity will be a causal factor in generating incidents. This will lead to the following patterns:*

- a. Females will experience higher rates of violence in the workplace than males. Hindelang et al (1978) suggest that target suitability will partly be dependent upon vincability (i.e. if potential victims are able physically to protect themselves from direct contact predatory violations). One would expect that women would be less likely physically to protect themselves in violent situations than men. Therefore, it would be expected that women experience higher rates of victimisation than men.
- b. Asian and Afro-Caribbean employees will be more vulnerable to abuse and violence than white employees due to racially motivated attacks by offenders.

Conjecture five hypothesises that females will have high rates of violence because they are less likely to be able to physically protect themselves from violence. Hindelang et al, (1978) suggest that often people will be targets of violence because offenders assess the vincability of potential victims. If victims appear not to be able to physically protect themselves then they may be more likely to be victims of violence. If this hypothesis were correct then one would expect females to experience higher rates of violence than males.

The second part of the conjecture hypothesises a relationship between the ethnic group of victims and the risks of abuse and violence. Previous research here has suggested that blacks are more likely to experience violence than either whites or Asians (Mayhew et al, 1992). Two reasons have been cited for this. First, blacks may have lifestyles that increase their risks of becoming victims of violent crime. For example, many reside in inner city areas where vulnerability to violent crime is high. Secondly, both blacks and Asians may be vulnerable to violence due to racially motivated attacks. Previous

research has considered the extent of racially motivated violence against Asian shopkeepers. For example Ekblom and Simon, (1988) found that 44% of assault in small Asian-run shops in London was racially motivated.

### **Conjecture Six: Demographics of Perpetrators.**

*Little research has considered the demographic characteristics of both victims and their assailants in incidents of abuse or violence. The research that has been conducted has found that in incidents of violence where victims are male, the perpetrators are also likely to be male (Mayhew et al, 1993). Similarly, it has been found that victims and offenders tend to share the same ethnic characteristics (Mayhew et al, 1993). It is conjectured here, that when considering the demographic characteristics of victims and offenders the SBCI data will show that:*

- a. The assailants in incidents of abuse and violence will predominantly be male.
- b. Victims and offenders will share the same demographic characteristics. Therefore, incidents by males will be against males and those by whites will be against whites. This will not only confirm previous research but show that these patterns are replicated within the context of businesses.

This conjecture hypothesises a relationship between the demographic characteristics of victims and offenders in incidents of abuse and violence. Initially the gender of offenders will be explored. Previous research has highlighted that assailants in incidents of abuse/violence are predominantly male (see Beck et al, 1994). Therefore, it would be expected that a similar pattern will be found here.

The second half of the conjecture explores the relationship between the gender and ethnicity of victims and offenders. No previous research has considered these factors in the context of small businesses. However, research by Felson et al (1986) found that victims and offenders in incidents of aggression tend to be of the same gender and the British Crime Survey (see Mayhew et al, 1993) has found that victims and offenders in incidents of violence tend to share the same ethnicity. According to this evidence, one would expect similar patterns to be found within the context of small businesses.

### **Development of Theory (Section Two): How is Abuse and Violence triggered?**

Routine activity theory gives an abstract account of how suitable targets and motivated offenders converge in time and space. This can help us to understand crime types such as burglary, though there are problems when using the theory to give an explanatory account of abuse/ violence against businesses. The main reason for this is because the relationship between victim and offender will be more complex in an incident of abuse/violence than for a crime such as burglary. For example, in an incident of burglary the offender may visit an area of a town or city with the intention of entering a house and taking goods. The offender will find a suitable target and commit the crime, usually without any contact with the victim. In an incident of abuse/violence, often the offender will not have the intention of engaging in an incident, though an incident occurs through a number of processes that occur within the business environment. Unlike many incidents of burglary, the outcome of the incident will be determined by the interaction between victims and offenders (or at the outset staff and customers). Therefore, routine activity theory is a useful framework to use in understanding abuse and violence, though it is not entirely ontologically adequate.

Table 3.2, outlines the major components of an incident of abuse and violence. First, a business must create the correct contexts for abuse and violence to occur (these are generated by business lifestyles that were considered earlier in this chapter). Abuse and violence within the business environment will involve a number of exchanges (either verbal or actions) between a member of staff and a customer that are caused by triggers. These triggers are the starting point of an incident of abuse/ violence and may comprise a number of factors (such as disputes over change, service or staff intervention in shop theft). Once the incident is in progress, the final outcome will depend upon the 'processes' of the incident. These processes may be split into escalators or de-escalators. Escalators are verbal or physical acts within the process that increasing the intensity or seriousness of the incident. De-escalators are verbal or physical acts that reduce the intensity or seriousness of the incident.

**Table 3.2: Contexts, triggers and processes of abuse and violence.**

Contexts	Triggers	Processes- Escalators or de- escalators	Outcomes/ results
Businesses where lifestyles foster the correct conditions for abuse/violence	Events that lead to an incident being triggered	Events within an incident that determine the final incident outcome	Abuse or violence (depending upon the number of process mechanisms)

The chemistry for abuse and violence can be summarised as: Context + Trigger + Event Processes = Outcomes/ results.

Here, we are interested in establishing what these triggers and processes of abuse/violence are. The next section will consider in more detail what these triggers and processes are, and their relationship to contexts and outcomes/ results in incidents of abuse/ violence.

#### **How do staff and customers become victims and offenders?**

It was hypothesised earlier in this chapter that businesses have lifestyles that make them more or less conducive to abuse or violence. Therefore, victims of abuse and violence will be businesses where the correct conditions for incidents of abuse and violence to be triggered are fostered. It now needs to be assessed in more detail how these conditions are generated.

It is hypothesised here that all businesses operate by staff and customers performing transactions (exchange of money/goods etc) within the constraints of 'normalised' or established behaviour. These 'normal' or established patterns of behaviour between customers and staff enable the business to function, and are found in all businesses. It is only when these norms are broken that an incident of abuse or violence will be triggered. It was noted in chapter two that interactionist theories of violence suggest that aggression is triggered when a rule or norm is violated (see Felson, 1984). Norms are not only essential for businesses to operate, but they are an essential ingredient of everyday life. All societies have norms that govern behaviour (Broom & Selznick, 1965). These norms are often unwritten rules that regulate behaviour. For example, norms govern the way

individuals act when partaking in any form of interaction with others from that society (though the norms may alter according to different societies, for example the norms in Western societies will be different to the norms in middle Eastern society). Therefore, norms govern how we conduct a conversation, interact with strangers, behave in an interview, queue for a bus and so on. The list of situations in which norms govern our behaviour is endless, though we still need to explore what norms are in slightly more detail.

Norms can be divided into mores and folkways (Broom & Selznick, 1965). Mores are norms that have the strongest set of sanctions associated with them and tend to be institutionalised through law statutes. These are norms, that when broken can evoke the strongest feelings of revulsion from wider society. The most common example here would be murder which is considered the most heinous of crimes in many societies. At the other end of the scale are folkways. These are norms where the intensity of feeling is not so strong and the rules governing the behaviour will not be so strictly applied. For example, folkways would consist of norms governing appropriate dress for an occasion, table manners or the way to address somebody. Folkways are not widely punishable by law, but they are commonly unwritten rules that most in society adhere to.

As mores and folkways regulate behaviour within any society or group of people, they also regulate behaviour within the business environment. It is only when these mores or folkways are violated that an incident of abuse/violence may be triggered. Table 3.3 illustrates the mores and folkways that can be found within the business environment.





theft, criminal damage and underage teenagers buying drink or cigarettes. These actions are all proscribed by law. As we move down the table we gradually come to folkways. Here, a number of types of behaviour that are not governed by law could act as a trigger for abuse and violence. For example giving customers the wrong change could lead to conflict in the business environment when customers question why the staff have given the wrong change.

In the right hand column of the table, we begin to establish why a link exists between the norm-breaking behaviour and abuse/ violence. These represent the beginnings of explaining how the triggers generate incidents. For example, if customers are given an incorrect amount of change they will complain. However, if the conflict is not quickly resolved, the customer will become more frustrated and potentially aggressive. It is at this point that the norms of transaction have been violated and an incident process is being generated.

In addition to an initial trigger, there will also be a number of de-escalating and escalating events that are a response to triggers that determine the final result of the incident. These processes will vary according to the perceptions and outcome aims of the participants (for example participants may want to engage in violence). The escalating acts constitute a verbal or physical act that will intensify the incident or provoke an aggressive response from the person the act is directed against. Escalating acts that may intensify an incident include:

1. Refusals by either party in the exchange to comply with certain requests or orders from the other.
2. Making identity attacks on the other in the exchange (such as name calling, swearing or racist taunts).
3. Making threats against the person or business.
4. Ignoring antagonists in the hope their behaviour will change.
5. Attempting to remove the offender(s) from premises, detain them or stop them from engaging in criminal activity.
6. Offenders damaging property or goods.

7. One party in the exchange resorting to actual violence. This may force the 'other' in the exchange to use violence.
8. Calling the police or pushing a panic button.
9. Producing a weapon.
10. Third parties escalating incidents by encouraging assailants to be aggressive or violent.

De-escalating acts will defuse a situation and reduce the risk of the incident developing into violence. De-escalating acts consist of:

1. Complying with certain requests or orders.
2. Making apologies, explanations and reasoning with the other person in the exchange.
3. Ignoring antagonists in the hope behaviour will change.
4. Removing offender(s) from the premises.
5. Calling the police.
6. Producing a weapon.
7. Third parties de-escalating incidents by encouraging assailants to back down from conflict.

For most of the escalating and de-escalating acts cited above it is relatively simple to see how they work in the incident process. For example, making identity attacks in an exchange will cause offence to the other party, thus motivating them to take some kind of revenge (by returning identity attacks or becoming violent). Refusing to comply with requests or orders will mean the person asking may be provoked to try and reinforce the request in some way. This could be done by asking again in a more aggressive manner. Making threats against a person could include making a physical threat against a member of staff (of violence) or a threat of some action against the business (such as calling the police over a disagreement). Both would be likely to escalate conflict. First, making a physical threat could make the recipient of the action more determined to be uncooperative and it could also make them return threats (retaliation). Second, making a threat against the business (such as threatening to call the police) will also generate a negative response from the recipient. Here, the recipient is not likely to be worried by

this type of threat, especially if they feel they have not acted unlawfully or are convinced the business hasn't acted in an incorrect manner.

A point to note about escalating and de-escalating acts is that on a number of occasions similar acts within the incident process could lead to different results. For example, producing a weapon could influence the incident process in one of two ways. First, it could escalate the conflict by making the 'other' in the exchange more determined to overcome the person producing the weapon. Second, producing a weapon may have the impact of making the 'other' in the exchange realise that if they do not comply, then they could be subject to physical attack. This could have the impact of diffusing the situation if the potential victim of attack backs down.

Another key point about incidents of abuse and violence is that whilst all incidents will follow this basic process they will vary in terms of duration and number of escalating and de-escalating events. Serious incidents may consist of a number of escalating events, whereas less serious incidents may consist of only a few events. An example of how escalating and de-escalating events may work in the incident process is given below in figure 3.2.

**Figure 3.2: The incident process.**


<b>Action by:</b> →	<b>Process events:</b> →	<b>Recipient:</b>
Customer	Trigger (complaint)	Staff
Staff	Escalation 1 (non-compliance)	Customer
Customer	Escalation 2 (identity attack)	Staff
Staff	De-escalation 1 (Apologies)	Customer
Third Party	De-escalation 2 (Mediation)	Customer
Customer	Escalation 3 (identity attack)	Staff
Staff	De-escalation 3 (Apologies)	Customer
Customer	Acceptance- incident end.	

This example shows how a number of escalating and de-escalating processes can work within the same incident process. The initial trigger of asking for a refund is refused by a member of staff (escalation 1- non-compliance). In reply the customer argues and begins to verbally abuse the member of staff (escalation 2 -identity attack). In reply to this the

member of staff and an intervening third party may then try to calm the situation (de-escalation 1 & 2- reproaches). In response the customer may continue to make identity attacks on the member of staff (escalation 3) though further apologies (de-escalation 3) are finally accepted and the incident ends. It is hypothesised here that the more escalating events that are fired during an incident the more chance the result of the incident will be one of violence. The more de-escalating events in an incident process will mean that there is less chance of the final result being one of violence.

We can begin to develop these ideas into a model of abuse/ violence against staff in businesses. This is done in figure 3. The left hand column outlines the contexts of abuse and violence. Here we can see that the contexts of abuse/violence will be fostered by a convergence of staff (victim) and a customer (offender). However, the incident must be triggered by some 'norm-breaking' behaviour. This may involve some form of criminality, a complaint or anti-social behaviour. The final result of the incident will depend upon the de-escalating and escalating events in the incident process.

**Figure 3.3: Model of the Contexts and Process of Abuse and Violence in the Workplace.**



The number of escalating and de-escalating events that are triggered throughout an incident will be dependent upon the attitudes of all parties in the incidents towards abuse and violence. If both staff and customers are favourable towards violence as a way of resolving conflict then a violent result is likely. If neither party is favourable towards violence then a violent result is unlikely. Therefore the result of incidents will be dependent upon:

1. **Staff Actions/ Attitudes:** The way staff react to the trigger of an incident will have a large impact on the result of the incident. If the member of staff is willing to deal with incidents in a calm professional manner then incidents are unlikely to develop unless the offender is determined to be abusive. However, if the member of staff responds to incidents by making identity attacks or threats then the member of staff will precipitate the incident.
2. **Customer/ offender Actions/ Attitudes:** The final result of the incident will largely be dependent on how the customer/ offender reacts to the situation. If the customer is willing to accept apologies or is willing to back down in aggressive situations then the final result will not be violence. However if the customer/ offender makes threats or identity attacks the results will be more serious.
3. **Guardianship/ Third Party Influence:** Here it is hypothesised that there is a distinct difference between guardianship and third party influence. Guardians may prevent incidents by being present when an incident could be triggered. For example, other members of staff or customers present could stop an incident escalating from abuse to violence because assailants would not want guardians to witness an incident (in case of apprehension). While guardians may often prevent incidents from escalating, third parties present during incidents may either escalate or de-escalate incidents. Third parties will escalate incidents if they know the assailant and are favourable to violence. This will encourage the assailant to engage in violence. However, third parties may de-escalate incidents by mediating in incidents, or their presence will discourage potential assailants from engaging in incidents.

This section has outlined how incidents of abuse/ violence in the workplace will be triggered and the processes within incidents that will generate results of abuse or violence. The next section will now develop a number of conjectures that will be tested in chapter six.

### **The Triggers of Abuse and Violence.**

#### **Section One: The Trigger of an Incident of abuse/violence.**

**Conjecture One: 'Norm-breaking' behaviour will trigger abuse and violence. An incident of abuse/violence will be provoked by an action or verbal exchange that breaks the norms of business transactions. This norm-breaking behaviour will include:**

- 1. Crime/ criminal activity on the premises that results in staff intervention. This creates a trigger for abuse as staff will confront perpetrators about their behaviour. A number of crime types will precipitate abuse. These are:**
  - a. Robbery.** Here violence, or the threat of violence is explicitly used by the assailants. If staff refuse to meet demands then the incident will escalate into more serious violence.
  - b. Fraud.** Here incidents will be triggered at the point of sales. Incidents will be triggered in two ways. First, if staff try to apprehend the offenders who in turn protest their innocence to staff. If staff do not give in to the pleas of the assailant, then the assailant may become angry and violent. Second, offenders may want staff to give fraudulent notes or credit cards back to them so they can be used somewhere else. If staff refuse, this will again lead to assailants becoming frustrated and will lead to conflict.
  - c. Criminal Damage.** This will be a source of abuse/ violence in two ways. First, if staff catch offenders damaging property and intervene, offenders may respond abusively or violently. Second, those who have previously been involved in incidents with the business (apprehended for shop theft, refused sale of cigarettes or alcohol, or

involved in abuse/ violence) may damage buildings as a form of retribution against the business.

- d. **Shop theft.** Shop theft will be a trigger for many incidents of abuse/ violence. Incidents will be triggered in two ways. First, conflict will be triggered by those apprehended for shop theft protesting their innocence. Second, it will be triggered by offenders trying to escape after being apprehended.
- e. **Underage customers trying to buy drink or cigarettes.** Here incidents will be triggered at the point of sale. Staff will refuse the sale of goods to those who are (or appear to be) under age and the assailants will protest that they are old enough to buy the goods. As a result of this disagreement, unless one of the parties back down then conflict will follow.
- f. **Customers acting in an anti-social manner.** As with criminal activity, sometimes norms will be broken in the business environment by individuals or groups behaving in an anti-social manner. This behaviour will often not be related to any incident of crime and will involve young people entering the premises swearing, messing goods around and being deliberately offensive to staff.

**2. Incidents of abuse will also be triggered by businesses breaking the norms of transaction. This will generate complaints from customers over:**

- a. **The quality of goods.** In any business transaction, customers will expect to purchase goods of a certain standard. If goods do not come up to standard customers will feel they are not getting value for money and complain. If the complaint is not accepted by the member of staff on duty the customer will become frustrated and conflict will follow.
- b. **The quality of service.** Customers will expect a certain standard of service whenever they buy goods or use services in a business. If the expected standard of goods/service is not met, customers will feel they are not getting value for money and will complain to a member of staff. If nothing is done to resolve the complaint the customer is likely to become frustrated and conflict will follow.
- c. **The amount of change given by a member of staff.** If staff give customers the wrong change after the purchase of goods, the customer will complain. If the member



of staff refuses to acknowledge that the wrong change has been given the customer will become frustrated and conflict will follow.

### **The Process Events of Abuse and Violence.**

**Conjecture Two: The final result of an incident of abuse/violence will be dependent upon a number of process events within an incident. Process events are actions by each party (staff or customer) in the incident that determine the course and final result of the incident. These process events can be categorised into escalating and de-escalating actions. Therefore:**

- a. Incidents with the most serious results will consist of a series of escalating actions from both parties. These escalating actions will continue to intensify the incident and will consist of behaviour such as making threats and identity attacks.
- b. In contrast to this, less serious incidents will consist of both escalating and de-escalating acts. However, in these incidents one party (or both) will start to back down during the incident by using a series of de-escalating acts. These will include accepting responsibility for actions and apologies.
- c. The results of all incidents will be dependent upon the attitude taken by each actor towards the incident process. If both parties are favourable to violence then a result of violence is likely.

### **Summary:**

This chapter has built a theory of how incidents of abuse and violence are triggered in the business environment. This theory has a number of key concepts. These are summarised below.

1. Some businesses have lifestyles or routine activity patterns that generate the correct contexts for incidents of abuse of violence to be triggered.

2. When the correct contexts for abuse or violence are provoked, there will be a clearly definable trigger that will begin the incident process.
3. The final result of the incident will be dependent on the number of escalating and de-escalating actions in the incident process. In turn, this is dependent upon how both parties in the incident react to these processes and how willing or prepared each party is to participate in abuse or abuse.

Chapters five and six will test the conjectures outlined here by using quantitative and qualitative data. The next chapter will consider how the methodology has been developed to test these conjectures.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Methodology.**

#### **Introduction.**

The previous chapter outlined the key underpinnings of the 'lifestyle theory of business victimisation'. This theory is based around understanding the lifestyle characteristics of businesses that create contexts that are conducive to abuse and violence. However, we are also interested in understanding how incidents are triggered and the interactive processes in incidents that determine the final result or outcome. The methodology used here has been tailored to test the conjectures that were developed in chapter three.

Two major data sources are utilised. The first are two sweeps of victimisation surveys conducted by a project known as the Small Business and Crime Initiative (SBCI), and (second) qualitative interviews with victims. These data sources will be reviewed in turn, and it will be outlined how they are used to test the conjectures, however we will begin with a brief outline of the background to the SBCI project.

#### **The Small Business and Crime Initiative.**

The Small Business and Crime Initiative was a demonstration project sponsored by the NatWest charitable trust. Its aim was to reduce crime against businesses in two areas of Leicester known as Belgrave and the West End (for a review see Wood et al, 1996 & Tilley & Hopkins, 1998). The 'West End' was situated to the south west of the city and Belgrave to the north. Both of these areas could loosely be described as 'inner urban' areas, though the areas covered by the project did expand along major routeways towards the edge of the city. Most of the businesses in the two areas were located within inner urban areas.<sup>36</sup> These areas were characterised by council housing, terraced housing and flats (ACORN classifications category E- 'aspiring' and F- 'striving', ACORN

classification index, 1997). Both areas also had a high number of Asian residents. This is reflected in the proportion of businesses in the two areas that were owned by Asians (39% of the total sample). When considered by the two areas, 18.8% of businesses in the West End had predominantly Asian staff compared to 57.4% in Belgrave.

The SBCI project had four phases. First, the project began by assessing how many businesses were actually trading in the two areas. Second, victimisation surveys were conducted to assess the crime problems experienced by businesses. Thirdly, there was a two-year period of implementation where victims of crime were targeted, and finally an evaluation survey was conducted. The victimisation surveys conducted by the SBCI are used as the basis of data collection for this study.

### **The Small Business & Crime Initiative Victimisation Surveys.**

Victimisation surveys have often been used as a source of criminological inquiry, though localised victimisation surveys have not widely been used for the study of crime against business. Victimisation surveys have tended to concentrate on residential crime assessing victimisation patterns on an international, national and local level. Examples of this come from the International Crime survey (Van Dijk et al, 1990 & Van Dijk & Mayhew, 1992) which interviewed 28,000 respondents in fourteen countries and the British Crime Survey (Mayhew & Hough, 1983; Hough & Mayhew, 1985; Mayhew et al, 1989; Mayhew & Maung, 1993) which conducts sweeps of around 10,000 households in England and Wales every two years.<sup>37</sup> On a micro-level a number of local victimisation surveys of residential premises have been conducted such as the Merseyside Crime Survey (1985), the Islington crime surveys (1986 & 1990), and the Edinburgh crime survey (1990), (Zedner, 1995).

Victimisation surveys have also been used to measure crime against business (see chapter one for a review), though these are still relatively uncommon. The major reason why victimisation surveys are used to measure crime rates is because they are able to

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<sup>36</sup> The SBCI recorded the police beats where businesses were located. According to this data, 90% of businesses in Belgrave and 94% in the West End were located in beat areas with these characteristics.

give a more accurate account of crime figures than police statistics. Often police statistics may under-record crime (Walklate, 1989) as victims fail to report crime or crimes that are reported are not recorded.<sup>38</sup> Mayhew & Maung, (1992) report that around 40% of crimes reported to the police are not recorded in official statistics. Therefore, victimisation surveys may uncover much of the 'dark figure of crime' (Hough & Mayhew, 1983). In terms of crimes against business, victimisation surveys may be more informative than police data as for crimes such as burglary and theft police data is often unable to distinguish crimes against businesses. This is because burglaries against businesses are recorded within the category of 'burglary other' which also records burglaries against garages and garden sheds, and shop theft as 'theft other' which includes all theft that is not against the person.

As a result of the way incidents are recorded (or sometimes not recorded), police statistics may also not be able to identify patterns of repeat victimisation. Usually victimisation surveys can quickly identify these patterns by recording the number of incidents that have occurred against businesses. For example, victimisation surveys will ask if the respondent has been a victim of a certain type of crime and on how many occasions. In the case of crimes against business, victimisation surveys also allow for comparisons of crime rates to be made between sectors such as retailers and manufacturers. Finally, victimisation surveys also give an insight into the type of incidents that may not always be considered crimes (such as abuse) and the attitudes of the local businesses toward crime. Examples of this type of research are found in Ekblom and Simon's study of Crime and Harassment in Small Asian-run Shops' and Hibberd and Shapland's study of 'Violent Crime against Businesses'. Both of the aforementioned studies asked businesses about abuse and violence within small shops. The Ekblom and Simon paper was more interested in incidents that were considered to be racially

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<sup>37</sup> The 2000 sweep of the BCS will however be around 20,000.

<sup>38</sup> There may be a variety of reasons for not reporting crime. The public may not realise a crime has taken place, take the view that a crime is not serious enough to report or that the police will not do anything about the crime. The police may not record crime as they may not believe a crime has taken place (McCabe & Sutcliffe, 1979), the offence may be considered too trivial or the reported offence may not be a crime. Bottomly and Coleman (1981) suggest that sometimes the police do not record crime to avoid work or improve the clear up rate.

motivated, though the major point here is that these studies were able to highlight incidents that in the main would not have been recorded by the police.

The Small Business and Crime Initiative used victimisation surveys as a method of data collection for many of the reasons stated above. The major aim of the SBCI was to reduce crime against businesses within two areas of Leicester. Victimisation surveys were therefore used to inform the initiative at two stages. First, to gauge the extent of crime against businesses within the two areas. This data was then used to inform a prevention strategy. The second survey was used for evaluation purposes. This was used as a measure of crime against businesses after a two year period of targeted implementation for the victims of a number of crime types.<sup>39</sup>

The first survey was conducted in September 1995 and the second in September 1997.<sup>40</sup> These surveys were used to measure the impact and costs of crime against business, though other questions were asked on issues such as attitudes towards crime and fear of crime. A victimisation survey was a practical way for a crime prevention project of this nature to gain accurate information about the crime types businesses were victims of. Using a structured questionnaire provided a quick route to accessing crime-related information for a large number of businesses. For the purpose of this thesis, the structured questionnaire asked businesses about their experience of abuse and violence within the previous 12 months.

The questions asked in both surveys were similar (see appendix 1&2). The first section related to features of the business, such as the general activity and amount of time the business had been trading from the premises. The second section asked attitudinal questions about the how seriously businesses rated a list of problems in their trading areas. This list included factors such as vandalism, drug dealing and youths hanging around. The next nine sections all related to the business experience of crime. Here questions were asked on burglary, criminal damage, theft by customers, theft by staff,

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<sup>39</sup> The major focus of the SBCI survey was a reduction in chronic victimisation, burglary and shop theft. For an account see Tilley & Hopkins, 1998; & Taylor, 1999.

<sup>40</sup> It should be noted here that other data sources were used for the purpose of the SBCI evaluation, most notably police data - see Tilley and Hopkins, 1998.

abuse, violence, transport-related losses, fraud and robbery. These sections all asked about the previous four incidents of each crime over a 12-month recall period. The next sections asked questions about unexplained losses, dealings with the police, insurance, security, attitudes about crime, demographics of members of staff and crime prevention partnerships. The questions in surveys one and two were worded exactly the same (even where researchers had highlighted problems) and the definitions of incident types such as burglary and criminal damage remained the same. The only differences between the surveys related to the sections on abuse and violence and a short section was added to the second survey asking businesses for their views on the SBCI project.

The first survey asked businesses if they had experienced any acts of verbal abuse, threats or intimidation in the previous twelve months. This question applied to the person answering the question, or if they had witnessed/knew of any incidents involving other members of staff. Businesses were then asked how many incidents they had experienced in the previous 12 months. A number of sub-questions were then asked about the previous four incidents which businesses had experienced. The respondent was asked which month each incident occurred, if the incident was directed at staff or if it was a dispute between customers, the gender of the victim, whether the incident was racially motivated, whether it was reported to the police, and if any time had been taken off as a result of the incident.

The questions on abuse, threats and intimidation in the second survey sweep followed a similar pattern, though a few additional questions were added (see table 4.1).<sup>41</sup> As with the first survey, respondents were asked if they had been a victim of abuse, threats or intimidation in the previous twelve months, and they were also asked how many incidents they had been victims of. Respondents were asked for the gender of the victim, whether the attack was racially motivated, whether it was reported to the police and if the victim had any time off as a result of the incident. Additional questions were included asking about the ethnic group of the person attacked, the ethnic group of the offender, and the gender of the offender.

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<sup>41</sup> These questions were added for the purpose of the thesis and not for the purpose of project evaluation.

As well as these questions, respondents in sweep 2 were asked what acted as the trigger for the previous four incidents.<sup>42</sup> They were given a choice of responses to this question including shop theft, a complaint over goods or pricing of goods, a complaint over service or as a result of a drunk/ drugged customer entering the business. Whilst this is a useful question, it is slightly problematic. First, it can give an indication as to the main trigger for an incident. However, it does not tell us about the processes that are generated within the incident and how an incident (for example) of shop theft may eventually generate an outcome of abuse/ violence. This issue will be dealt with in more detail in the section on the qualitative interviews.

The two victimisation surveys also followed a similar structure with regard to the questions asked about physical violence. Here, respondents were asked if they had experienced any violent attacks in the previous 12 months. This included attacks that the respondents witnessed on other members of staff or incidents between customers. Respondents were also asked about the number of attacks they had experienced in the previous twelve months. The 'follow up' questions for physical violence were the same as the questions in each respective survey for abuse, threats and intimidation except the questions on physical violence asked if victims had been wounded in the attack.

Prior to the first survey sweep an 'environmental audit' was conducted in the project areas. This was conducted for two reasons. The first was because the SBCI was unable to access an accurate list of the businesses operating in the Belgrave and West End areas. Researchers therefore walked the streets to compile a list of trading businesses and to gain an up-to-date list of the number of businesses trading in the two areas. Second, the audit was conducted to note a number of distinctive environmental features about business premises that could be used for the purpose of SBCI analysis. These included the geographical location of the business in relation to other land uses such as other businesses and houses, the type of routeway that the business was situated on and

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<sup>42</sup> Respondents were given a choice of seven options here. These included; intervening in incidents of shop theft, refusal to serve alcohol/ cigarettes to underage persons, disputes over change, disputes over service or drunk/ drugged customers. The seventh option allowed researchers to make a note of any other triggers behind incidents that were not on the list



surveillance points around the business. It was intended that this data was to be used for analysis with the SBCI survey data.

**Table 4.1: Questions asked directly relating to abuse and violence in sweep 1 and 2 of the SBCI surveys.**

Question	Asked in sweep 1, 2 or both?
Have you experienced abuse/ violence in the previous 12 months?	Both sweeps
How many incidents have you experienced?	Both
Month of last four incidents?	Both
Did the incident involve staff and customers?	Both
Gender of victim in each incident?	Both
Were any incidents racially motivated?	Both
Were incidents reported to police?	Both
Did staff have any time off?	Both
Were members of staff wounded in the incidents? (violence only)	Both
Race of victim in each incident	Sweep 2
Race of offender in each incident	Sweep 2
Gender of offender in each incident	Sweep 2
Trigger for the incident in each incident	Sweep 2


The environmental audit was conducted between July and September, 1995. This involved a team of researchers walking around the two areas and completing a proforma with details of all the businesses (see appendix 3 for a copy of the proforma). In total, the environmental risk survey identified 1430 businesses in the two areas. However, there were some problems in using this method to try and make an accurate assessment of the number of businesses trading in the two areas. It was found that 99 businesses had actually ceased trading or had closed between the completion of the environmental audit and the end of the interviews. In addition to this, 50 businesses began trading during this period or had previously been overlooked by researchers. This highlights two problems with this type of research. The first is that sometimes researchers could not tell if businesses were still trading or not. This was a problem with many Asian businesses that often closed for long periods during the day. The second problem was that it is virtually impossible in two areas with the business density of Belgrave and the West End to capture an accurate data set of businesses that were trading as the business turnover was too high to keep an up-to-date record.

In total, 50 questionnaires were piloted in August, 1995. These revealed a number of minor problems with the wording of the questions, though there were also a few practical problems with the research instrument. These problems surfaced in both the first and second sweep of the survey. Some victims of crime could not remember the time of year when incidents occurred (this was common for highly prevalent crimes such as abuse and shop theft), and some respondents did not like answering specific questions about their business (such as those about turnover). The questionnaire also took longer to complete than originally intended. It was originally hoped that the questionnaire would take around 20 minutes to complete. The pilots revealed that often they would take up to 40 minutes, depending upon how many incidents the business had been a victim of and how familiar the researcher was with the questionnaire.

One other major problem with the survey was getting business owners sufficiently interested to take part. The Small Business and crime Initiative had received much publicity with the official launch of the project by Princess Anne, (patron of Crime Concern) on September, 13th, 1995. This received local television coverage and with letters also being sent to every business in the West End and Belgrave it was hoped that the high profile approach would get businesses interested in the project. However, there were a variety of reasons why business did not take part (see figure 4.1).

The most common reason for businesses not taking part was because contact could not be established with them or with somebody in the business who was able to complete the survey (15%). A number of other businesses were also too busy or not interested in completing the survey. Finally, there were also 29 duplicate questionnaires discovered throughout the course of the research. Here, different researchers had interviewed different representatives from the same business.

Figure 4.1: Response to SBCI survey one.



The first survey sweep was conducted between September 1995 and November 1995. This was longer than originally intended. It had been hoped that most of the interviewing would be completed within a four-week period, though it took longer for a variety of reasons. The interview team were hired from an employment agency and as a result some were not sufficiently motivated to interview businesses for a full month. This caused problems for the initiative team as interviewers had to be replaced. When new interviewers started they had to be trained and become familiar with the research instrument. This ultimately slowed the interview schedule down. Interviewers also experienced several problems in the field, particularly when trying to arrange a time for businesses to complete interviews. Many of the business approached were only occupied by one person which made it difficult for researchers to get interviews at busy times (such as during lunch hours). Another major problem was that often appointments had to be made with businesses to secure an interview. However, on many occasions a researcher would return for the interview and the appointment would be broken. This often caused despondency amongst researchers especially if they had to walk long distances between business to conduct the interviews.

Whilst there were problems in obtaining interviews there were also a few other working problems with the survey design that had not been revealed by the pilot interviews. The first major problem was the recall period for each crime. It was decided that the recall period would be 12 months, 1st September 1994 to 1st September 1995. However, many shopowners could not remember how many incidents they had faced in that period. If they did, many were not sure about the order incidents were in and when they actually occurred. This was also true of the cost of crime to business. Those who had been victims on several occasions would often not be able to remember the cost of each incident.

The recall period also presented other problems when respondents replied to questions about their victimisation experience. The major problem here arose over the time period. The recall period was supposed to be one year, though the questionnaire worded the recall period as September 1st, 1994 to the present time (see appendix 1). Therefore those businesses interviewed on September 30th had incidents recorded for a 13 months rather than 12.

Another problem with the survey was that all of the questions asked were closed questions. This meant that respondents were not able to express their opinions on crime problems in their area, which some suggested was frustrating. The survey asked attitudinal questions, but they were in the form of tick boxes with restricted answers. This occasionally caused complaint from the interviewee that these were not the real issues that concerned them. Only two questions in the whole survey (Question J2 & J6) asked for the opinions of the respondent (at which point many respondents did make their opinions clear). Respondents viewed the survey as something that should be addressing their 'real' problems. Three comments relating to this are noted below.

*'Car crime is the real problem in this area and you've not talked about that'.*  
(Hosiery Manufacturer, West End)

*'They're going round breaking windows and leaving leaflets for window companies and the police don't listen'.* (Newsagent, West End)

*'There's three youths on this road going round intimidating shopkeepers by stealing in full view and they know nobody dare do anything'. (Bookshop, West End)*

This reveals a problem with this type of quantitative research. Respondents may often feel that the questionnaire confines them to a set agenda that does not address their own experiences and problems with crime. However, the Small Business and Crime Initiative could not address every single problem faced by businesses in the two areas. The intention of both of the SBCI surveys was to gauge crime rates and costs of crime against a large number of businesses. Quantitative surveys are the quickest and most informative way to do this.

Similar problems were experienced in the second survey sweep as those highlighted for the first survey sweep, though the severity of the problems encountered were limited by learning from the experiences of the first sweep.<sup>43</sup> In sweep two, a team of researchers was recruited from the student population by staff at Nottingham Trent University. A settled team was established and they were interviewing businesses daily, thus ensuring interviews were completed within the time limit. Problems still surfaced over businesses failing to honour appointments, and often businesses that had been interviewed in the first sweep had moved or closed down by the second sweep. The same problems also existed with the research instrument, as the second survey was a replication of the first.

#### **The Small Business and Crime Initiative Victimization Surveys: Sample Size.**

Prior to the first survey sweep, an environmental audit took place to establish how many businesses were trading in the two project areas. The audit identified 1430 trading businesses in the two areas. From this it was ascertained that 99 businesses had closed (44 in Belgrave and 55 in the West End of the city) before the surveys commenced and 50 more businesses were discovered by interviewers in the field. These were businesses that had either been overlooked by researchers when conducting the environmental audit or they opened between the duration of the audit and commencing of the interviews. This

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<sup>43</sup> The second sweep was conducted between September 1st, 1997 and October 7th, 1997.


gave a potential sample size of 1381, of which 894 businesses were interviewed. This represents a response rate of 65% for sweep one.

Though an environmental audit was not conducted before the second survey, an audit was conducted whilst interviews were taking place. This involved getting researchers to make lists of businesses on the streets to which they were assigned. These lists were then put on to a database. It was identified that a total of 1485 business were trading in the two areas in September, 1997. Of these, 10.1% (150) were new businesses, though 15.6% (216) of the original 1381 audit total had either ceased trading or relocated in the two years between surveys. A total of 965 interviews were conducted in sweep two. Similarly to sweep one, this again represented a response rate of 65%.

#### **Profile of business included in the sample:**

The term 'business' has many different connotations. A business may include anything from a massive multi-national corporation employing thousands of people to a corner shop employing one person. Despite being called the Small Business and Crime Initiative, the project attempted to conduct interviews with all businesses in the two areas regardless of size or type of business. It is therefore important to consider the profile of businesses interviewed. In both survey sweeps, the majority of the sample were from the retail and service sectors (see figure 4.2). In the first sweep, 41% (365) of the sample were retail outlets, 35% (316) were services, 14% (122) were manufacturers, and 10% (89) were wholesalers. In comparison, 38.9% (371) of the businesses in sweep two were retail outlets, 38.6% (368) were within the service sector, 13.3% (127) were manufacturers and 9.2% (88) wholesale.

**Figure 4.2: Sector variations for sweep one and two.**



These sectors consisted of many different business types that were coded using the British Telecom Standard Industrial Classification codes (SIC). Using these codes it was possible to identify individual business types within the four sectors (see appendix 4). This classification divides the four business sectors into a further 72 business types. There are 13 in the manufacturing sector, 19 in the wholesale sector, 13 in the retail sector and 27 in the service sector. As the analysis of the data was conducted it was found that these categories are not always adequate in identifying some of the key distinguishable features of businesses. For example, within the service sector code 49 represents 'eating places'. This could represent anything from a small fast food burger bar to an expensive sit down style restaurant. This category was therefore split into code 491 denoting sit down style restaurants and code 49 denoting fast food restaurants. Another problem with the SIC codes was that a number of business types interviewed did not have a code. For example codes had to be created for a number of business types including video rental stores, electrical retailers, hairdressers and bookmakers (a full list is given in appendix 5).

Overall the sample of businesses gained in the SBCI surveys tended to be small. In sweep one most businesses employed four or less staff (in 74.5% of cases) with 11.3% of businesses employing 11 or more staff. In sweep two 60% of businesses employed four or less staff with 19.2% employing 11 or more staff. There were marked differences in



the ethnic origin of staff employed in businesses in the two areas. This reflected the variation of ethnic composition in the West End and Belgrave. In sweep one the majority of the workforce in West End businesses were classified as 'white' (65% of business said the majority of their workforce was white) and 18.8% were Asian. In sweep two 87% of businesses in the West End were classed as 'white' and 13% 'Asian'. In Belgrave there was a higher proportion of Asian employees. In sweep one 57.4% of businesses said the majority of their staff were Asian and 34.8% were white. In sweep two 60% were Asian and 39% white. In both areas there were few Afro-Caribbean employees.

There were a number of similarities between the sample in sweep 1 and sweep 2. The percentage sample of businesses interviewed from each sector was similar, as was the size of businesses in terms of numbers of staff employed and ethnicity of staff. From this evidence, it can be concluded that the sample in sweep two is broadly similar to the sample in sweep one. The data analysis here will therefore mainly draw upon data from sweep one of the survey, though there will be some areas of analysis that will draw upon sweep 2 data (for example in considering the gender and ethnicity of assailants which sweep 1 did not ask about).

**Table 4.2: SBCI data and the contexts of abuse and violence.**

Conjecture	Aim
One: Business Sector	To establish if there is a correlation between business type and abuse/ violence.
Two: Employee numbers	To establish if there is a correlation between employee numbers in businesses and abuse/ violence.
Three: Association with other crime types.	To establish if there is a correlation between abuse/ violence and other crime crimes.
Four: Security	To establish if there is a correlation between security provisions and abuse/ violence.
Five: Demographics of victims	To establish if there is a correlation between gender and abuse/ violence, and ethnicity and abuse/ violence.
Six: Demographics of perpetrators	To assess the gender and ethnicity of perpetrators and the relationship between the demographic profile of the victim and offender.



The SBCI data will mainly inform us about the contexts of abuse/ violence within the business environment. Table 4.2 (above) outlines the contribution of the SBCI data to examining the conjectures outlined in chapter 3. Here, it can be seen that the SBCI data enables us to examine the contexts of abuse/ violence. It will inform us whether there are associations between business types or employee numbers and abuse/ violence, but it will not inform us why there are associations between the two. Therefore, it fails to provide an adequate explanatory account of the triggers of abuse/violence in certain types of businesses. This is where we turn to the qualitative interviews.

### **Qualitative interviews.**

It has previously been stated that we are interested in understanding how incidents of abuse/violence are triggered within specific contexts. The SBCI data will inform us of a number of contextual factors that help to generate abuse/ violence (such as types of businesses where incidents occur). However, this does not tell us how incidents are actually generated within these contexts. To elicit these generating properties qualitative interviews are used.

Few studies of crimes against businesses have used qualitative data. Predominantly, research here has utilised quantitative data to measure crime rates against businesses (see chapter 1). For example the British Retail Consortium and the Commercial Victimization survey both used quantitative surveys to measure crimes against businesses. One study to use qualitative data has been the recent Scottish Business Crime Survey (Burrows et al, 1999). Here, interviews were conducted with ten 'pairs' of businesses. In each pair were two businesses from the same sector, one with a high rate of victimisation and the other a low rate of victimisation. Visits were made to the business premises where detailed case studies were conducted to assess why similar business types had different risks of victimisation (see chapter 1).

Many textbooks highlight the differences between quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection (see for example, Jupp, 1989). There are key methodological and epistemological differences between the two approaches. In terms of methodology,

quantitative methods collect data that is empirical or quantifiable, often this data is collected by using closed type interview questions (such as those used in the SBCI surveys). When quantitative data is used to measure crime rates it is usually presented as prevalence, incidence or concentration rates. In contrast, qualitative interviews use semi-structured, unstructured or open-ended questions. The aim of qualitative data is to 'capture social meanings, definitions and constructions which underpin actions' (Jupp, 1989). Therefore, as quantitative data tries to make sense of the world by counting and measuring data, qualitative data does this through descriptions of actions.

Here, the aim of the qualitative interviews is to elicit explanations from victims about how incidents are generated and the processes that generate a final result of abuse/violence. The accounts given by victims outline the actions of both parties in the incident process. How this works as part of the overall methodological approach is highlighted in table 4.3 below.

**Table 4.3: Qualitative Interviews: Objectives.**

<b>Contexts</b>	<b>Triggers</b>	<b>Incident Processes</b>	<b>Result</b>
Types of businesses that are victims and associated factors such as employee numbers. Data captured through the SBCI surveys.	Explanations of how incidents are triggered. Data captured through qualitative interviews.	Processes or events within the incident that generate the final outcome/result. Data captured through qualitative interviews.	Abuse or violence. Data captured by both SBCI surveys and qualitative interviews.

The qualitative interviews were conducted by taking a sample of victims from the SBCI surveys. Here, a number of contextual details are noted about victims such as the business types, demographics of offenders and victims, and the number of staff who were employed in the business. Return visits were then made to these businesses.<sup>44</sup> Here, more contextual detail about specific incidents could be obtained, such as the time when incidents occurred and how many people were present when incidents occurred.

<sup>44</sup> These businesses were randomly selected from a list of victims.

However, the major aim of the qualitative interviews was to gain an understanding of the triggers and processes of incidents.

Though the interviews were qualitative, they were structured by using a prompt sheet. The interviews had three main sections (see appendix 6 for an interview prompt sheet). First, the respondents were given an introduction to the interview and a definition of abuse and violence. They were told that the purpose of the interview was to understand why certain businesses experienced incidents of abuse and violence, how incidents were triggered and what happened during incidents. Respondents were then asked to describe an incident that had occurred against them. The respondents would then give a description that would consist of varying degrees of detail. Most respondents were able to give a concise description of at least one incident. However, a series of probing questions could also be asked if respondents were drifting off the point or were not giving relevant information. These questions included asking respondents for a detailed description of verbal exchanges between themselves and the offender.

Using this methodological approach provided detailed accounts of incidents. In the second half of the interview respondents were asked to give generalised accounts of incidents of abuse and violence against their business. The aim of this section was to gain an understanding of how incidents were usually triggered within specific contexts. In this section of the interview, respondents would usually give more examples of incidents they had been involved in. As with the first section, respondents were asked to give accounts of incidents which sometimes involved having to probe respondents to elicit information (such as what exactly was said, clarification of actions and clarification of the key facts about incidents etc).

The interviews were able to provide detailed accounts of the triggers and process of incidents, a number of which are presented as case studies in chapter six. However, there were some problems with the interviews. The first was that the interviews only give the victim's account of the incident. Therefore the qualitative interviews could be criticised for presenting a 'one-sided' account of incidents, where the victim appears to have done little to escalate the incident and the offender is always in the wrong. This appears to be

the case in a number of interviews (see chapter six), though there were cases where victims admitted taking actions that could have escalated the incident. There were also some cases where interviewees were worried about describing self-discriminating evidence. For example one respondent described an incident where an iron bar was used. Just before he described the incident he said, 'I'm not sure if I should tell you this'.

Another problem with qualitative interviews is that respondents can quickly digress or begin to supply information that is not relevant to the subject. This is a common criticism of qualitative interviewing and happened on occasions here. However, steering respondents back onto the subject quickly remedied this. For example, respondents would often talk about offenders and how they felt the criminal justice system should deal with them. On these occasions, it was up to the interviewer to get respondents to talk about what was relevant to the aims of the interview by asking questions that would re-direct the route of the interview.

A final problem with the qualitative interviews was a problem that is common in any type of social research. This concerned the reliability of the data. The respondents were being asked to describe incidents that were often very short and happened quickly. Therefore, some respondents only remembered the major details of incidents and not exactly what was said and done by each party at each stage of the incident. However, similar problems exist when gathering any type of data from subjects. For example, when conducting victimisation surveys respondents will often forget when incidents occurred or in the case of incidents such as shop theft how many times they were victimised. Despite this the respondents gave reasonably detailed accounts of incidents of abuse and violence. As with all qualitative interviews some subjects were able to give more detailed accounts than others.

### **Sample of businesses in the Qualitative Interviews.**

In total 20 qualitative interviews were conducted and descriptions of 29 incidents were given (5 of which could be classified as violence).<sup>45</sup> It was felt to be both unrealistic and unnecessary to interview more businesses for two reasons. First, not only had businesses given time to the SBCI survey to be interviewed, but they were also asked to give up more time for the purpose of in-depth interviews about incidents of abuse or violence. Sometimes it proved difficult finding businesses that were able to give up time to do this. Second, conducting more qualitative interviews would not have further contributed to our knowledge of the triggers and processes of incidents. The interviews are used to draw out case studies of typical incidents (see chapter six), how they are generated and how the escalating and de-escalating processes generate abuse/ violence. This can be fully illustrated by drawing data from a number of case studies and therefore does not require a large number of qualitative interviews to be conducted. It will also be seen in chapter six that a number of common themes are found within the case studies. This was the primary goal of the interviews. Conducting more interviews would therefore have simply reiterated much of the information that had already been given.

Of the businesses that were interviewed all were from the retail or service sector (14 retail and 6 service). The reason for selecting these business types was that businesses from these sectors were most likely to be victims of abuse/ violence. Therefore, targeting these sectors seemed a fruitful way to understand how incidents are typically generated.

### **Summary.**

This chapter has outlined the research methods used to test the theoretical conjectures. Both the SBCI data and the qualitative interviews will enable us to examine the contexts, triggers and processes of abuse and violence. The SBCI data represents a structured method of data collection that can highlight the contexts of abuse and violence for a large

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<sup>45</sup> The qualitative interviews were conducted in February 1999. In total 10 interviews were taped, and in 10 interviews notes were taken by hand. In some cases respondents did not want interviews to be taped so notes had to be taken. However, there appeared to be little difference in the quality of interviews that were taped to those where notes were taken by hand.

dataset of businesses (i.e. in terms of business type, demographics of victims etc). The qualitative interviews are able to provide explanatory accounts of how incidents are generated within specific contexts.

In chapter five, the conjectures relating to the contexts of abuse/ violence will be tested. This predominantly draws upon SBCI data. In chapter six, the qualitative data is used to elicit the triggering and process events of abuse/ violence. This data will be presented through a series of case studies from which the key triggering and process events will be picked out.

## Chapter Five

### The Contexts of Abuse and Violence against Businesses.

#### Introduction:

The previous two chapters outlined the lifestyle theory of the business and how the conjectures relating to the theory will be tested (see chapters three and four). The aim of this chapter is to consider the contexts that are favourable to abuse and violence against businesses. The analysis will begin by considering the conjectures that were outlined in chapter three. Each conjecture will be considered in turn and evidence will be presented either to falsify or verify the statement. At the end of the chapter, concluding remarks will be made as to the contexts for abuse and violence against businesses.

#### Testing the theoretical conjectures.

##### Conjecture One: Business Sector, Business Type and Abuse and Violence.

*The risk of abuse and violence will vary as the lifestyles of businesses shape target suitability. A major lifestyle feature of the suitable business target is the type of goods it sells or the type of service it offers. This will attract varying numbers of customers into the business and customers of differing demographic characteristics and criminal motivations. This will result in variations in the prevalence and number of repeat incidents of abuse and violence. Therefore:*

- a. Businesses within the retail and service sectors will experience higher rates of abuse and violence than wholesale and manufacturing business. This will be determined by the amount of contact businesses in the retail and service sector have with the public. These businesses will have a high number of potential offenders visiting the premises. This will generate conducive contexts for abuse and violence through disagreements between customers and staff over pricing of goods, quality of service and incidents generated by other crime incidents such as shop theft.
- b. Within each business sector there will be variations in rates of victimisation. Some businesses within the retail and service sectors will have lifestyles that will produce particularly high rates of victimisation whilst some will have low rates. For example, it

would be expected that businesses such as public houses and restaurants have high rates of victimisation as the sale of alcohol will be a crime facilitator. Businesses such as off-licences will be crime attractors due to the sale of alcohol and cigarettes on the premises.

The analysis will begin by considering the prevalence, incidence and concentration of abuse and violence by retail, service, wholesale and manufacturing sector. Prevalence 'refers to the estimated percentage of the population at risk who are victims in a given time period' (Farrell & Pease, 1993) and here refers to the percentage of respondents who were victims within the population at risk. The incidence rate informs us of the average number of victimisations per head of the population at risk (Farrell & Pease, 1993) and crime concentration informs us of the average number of victimisations per victim (Farrell & Pease, 1993). Intra-sector analysis will then be conducted to highlight individual business types with high rates of abuse and violence.

The SBCI survey asked businesses if they had experienced any acts of 'verbal abuse, threats or intimidation' or 'physical violence' within a 12 month period. This gives us the prevalence rate for abuse and violence. Out of 877 respondents, 19.1% (n=167) of businesses said they had been victims of verbal abuse, threats or intimidation within the given time period and 6.6% (n= 58) had been victims of violence. We may immediately ascertain that employees within businesses are more likely to experience abuse than violence.

Table 5.1 highlights the prevalence, incidence and concentration rates for abuse and violence. This shows that the risks of experiencing at least one incident of abuse and violence are higher for the retail and service sectors than the manufacturing and wholesale sectors. Within the retail and service sectors 24% (n=86) and 18.4% (n=56) of businesses respectively were victims of least one incident of abuse with 7% (n=25) and 9.4% (n=29) experiencing an incident of violence. This compares to 13.5% (n=12) of wholesalers and 11% (n=13) of manufacturers experiencing at least one incident of abuse and 1.1% (n=1) and 2.5% (n=3) experiencing at least one incident of violence. Statistical measures of distribution show that data here is highly significant. The chi-square distribution for the prevalence of abuse by sector is 12.28 ( $df=3$   $p<0.01$ ). This tells us that out of 100 random samples this relationship would occur by chance less than once.



From the prevalence rate it is also possible to calculate the variation in risk according to sector. This shows that our higher risk sectors (retail and services) if merged, have an odds ratio of 1.8:1 against the wholesale and manufacturing sector. Therefore the risks for businesses in the retail and service sector of becoming a victim of abuse are nearly two times higher than the lower risk sectors.

**Table 5.1. Abuse, threats, intimidation and Violence by Sector.**

	Retail N=365		Services N=316		Wholesale N=89		Manufacture N=122	
	Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence
Prevalence	24%	7%	18.4%	9.4%	13.5%	1.1%	11%	2.5%
No of incidents	381	84	323	71	28	2	24	2
Ave. per 100 premises	104	23.4	102	25.2	30	2.25	20	*
Ave. per victim	4.9	3.4	6.8	2.7	2.3	2	2	*

\*Data Missing.

A more marked variation in victimisation risk is established when considering repeat victimisation. The retail and service sectors had the highest incident counts of abuse with 381 and 323 incidents respectively. The wholesale sector only had 28 incidents and the manufacturing sector 24 incidents. The expected distribution of incidents per sector would be 310 for the retail sector, 264 for the service sector, 76 for the wholesale sector and 106 for the manufacturing sector (calculated by using chi-square methods). Therefore businesses in the retail and service sector experienced a higher number of incidents than would be expected. The retail and service sector business had higher average risks per 100 premises than those in the wholesale and manufacturing sector. These high incidence rates produced a high average number of incidents per victim. A victim of abuse in the service sector experienced an average of 6.8 incidents, and a victim in the retail sector 4.9 incidents. This compares to an average of 2.3 incidents in the wholesale sector and 2 incidents in the manufacturing sector.

A similar pattern is found for violence, though overall fewer incidents are recorded. Here the chi-square distribution is 11.698 ( $df=3$ ) which is again significant at the 0.01 level.

The odds ratio here for retail and services against the wholesale and manufacturing sector is 4.5:1. This tells us businesses in the retail and service sectors are 4.5 times more likely to become victims of violence than businesses in the wholesale and manufacturing sector. As with abuse, the retail and service sectors experience the highest number of incidents. The service sector had the highest average number of incidents of violence per sector (25.2 per 100). This compares to 23.4 per 100 in the retail sector and 2.25 in the wholesale sector (the figure cannot be calculated for the manufacturing sector due to missing data). However, victims of violence in the retail sector were most likely to experience repeat incidents of violence. Here, there were an average of 3.4 incidents per victim compared to 2.7 for the service sector and 2 for wholesalers.<sup>46</sup>

If we consider this evidence in the light of conjecture one, there is variation in the risk of experiencing an incident of abuse or violence according to business sector. The analysis shows businesses in the retail and service sectors have higher risks of experiencing an incident of abuse or violence than the wholesale and manufacturing sectors. Businesses in the retail and service sector also experience higher numbers of incidents than would be expected. This translates into higher average numbers of incidents experienced per sector and per victim. This evidence is hard to compare to other studies as no previous studies have compared rates of abuse and violence for the four business sectors covered here. The only comparisons have been made by the Commercial Victimization Survey that recorded crime rates for retail and manufacturing premises. This indicated that retailers have higher risks of abuse and assaults (both prevalence and repeats) than manufacturers (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995).

Conjecture one postulates that these variations for sector experiences of abuse and violence will be generated by businesses having lifestyles that make them suitable targets for abuse and violence. It is apparent that businesses in the retail and service sectors do have some lifestyle and routine activity patterns that are more conducive to abuse and violence than those in the wholesale and manufacturing sector. For example, the retail and service sectors are dependent upon attracting customers into the business to view or

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<sup>46</sup> Similarities are found in the sweep two data though there was a reduction in the number of incidents of abuse and violence experienced by business premises. Here, retail and service sector premises had the highest prevalence rates and number of incidents of both abuse and violence.

buy goods or to use services available. Therefore there are a higher number of convergences between staff and customers in the retail and service sectors than the wholesale and manufacturing sectors. These convergences will result in a greater number of situations arising in the retail and service sectors where abuse or violence may be triggered.

However, this does not tell us how incidents are generated; to do this we need to assess why these convergences or opportunities generate abuse or violence. To do this the data has to be interrogated in more detail. Using a variable such as business sector is not a totally accurate predictor of abuse and violence. This is because over 76% of retail and 81.6% of service sector premises were not victims of abuse, and 93% and 90.6% (respectively) were not victims of violence. Many businesses within the 'high risk' sectors have never experienced abuse and violence. Therefore, there are variations in the experiences and generating potential of businesses within these sectors. Therefore, a more informative way to assess the risk of abuse and violence may be to analyse victimisation patterns by business type rather than sector.

### **Business Type and Abuse and Violence.**

The second half of conjecture one hypothesizes incidents will not be evenly distributed throughout each sector. We already know that unequal risks exist across business sectors from the data highlighted above. If we are to understand what it is about business lifestyles that generate abuse and violence then there has to be comparison of the businesses within each sector that are victims against those that are not victims. The SBCI data allow identification of intra-sector variations for abuse and violence as businesses were not only classified according to sector (such as retail and service) but also according to standard industrial classification sector (see appendix four). This allows identification of individual business type such as off-licence, motor fuel retailer and food shop.

The analysis here will be conducted for the retail and service sector only. This is because high risks were only identified within these sectors. In total, there were 14 different

business categories within the retail sector that took part in the survey. Of these categories, 11 (78.5%) contained businesses that were victims of at least one incident (video rental, motorbike/ car dealers & photo/ art shops did not experience any incidents). Therefore, incidents were widely distributed within this sector (the results are highlighted in appendix 7 and 8).

**Table 5.2: Businesses identified as at highest risk in retail sector.**

Sample size in brackets	% Victims		Average incidents per 100 businesses		Average incidents per victim	
	Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence
Off-licence (53)	34	21	155	26	4.5	1.3
Motor Fuels/ Parts (19)	32	21	152	26	1.4*	12.5*
Food shops (62)	32	6.5	93	14.5	3	2.2
Clothing/ footwear (51)	22	6	94	6	4.4	1

\*One business claimed to have experienced 99 incidents of abuse and violence; here this outlier is removed.

Table 5.2 (above) outlines the prevalence, average incidents per 100 businesses and average number of incidents per victim for the highest risk business types in the retail sector. The highest prevalence rates for abuse were recorded for businesses selling motor vehicle parts and motor fuels with 32% experiencing at least one incident of abuse (sample size =19). There were also high prevalence risks for off-licences (34% -sample size=53), food shops (32% -sample size=62) and chemists (27% -sample size=11). The highest average number of incidents per 100 premises was for off-licences and the highest average number of incidents per victim was also in this category at 4.5 incidents per victim. This was followed closely by clothing (4.4), food (3) and motor fuels/ parts (1.4). If we consider sweep two data similar patterns are found. Here, off-licences, food shops and motor vehicle parts/ fuels again recorded high prevalence rates for abuse at 35%, 27.5% and 21% respectively (samples= 43 off-licences, 51 food shops & 28 motor parts/ fuels). The risks for chemist shops were reduced in sweep two with only one outlet experiencing an incident of abuse.

There was a close relationship between abuse and violence in the retail sector (Pearson's product moment  $r = .9084$ ). This indicates that 82% of violence in the sector can be predicted by abuse. There were four business categories within the retail sector that experienced at least one incident of violence. All of these businesses had also experienced abuse. The business categories where incidents of violence were recorded were off-licences (21%), motor fuels/parts (21%), food shops (6.5%) and clothing/footwear (6%). Again, the second survey sweep is able to provide some corroboration of these figures. The food and off-licence sectors were the only sectors to record incidents of violence in sweep 2. Food shops experienced a similar prevalence rate to the sweep one sample (at 4%), though the prevalence rate for off-licences was reduced to 5%. Despite the fall in the prevalence rate for off-licences between sweep 1 and 2, the fact that only food shops and off-licences experienced violence in sweep two tells us these two business types have higher risks than other businesses.

If we turn to the service sector, table 5.3 outlines the prevalence, incidence and concentration for the 'high-risk' victims. A number of business categories within the service sector experienced a high prevalence rate of abuse and violence. Before describing these patterns, it is important to note that a number of the categories here consisted of only a small number of business premises. Therefore, some of the data must be treated with caution, though where appropriate we will also draw upon sweep two data to see if the patterns established are concomitant.

In the service sector, there were a total of 17 business types interviewed of which 13 (76%) experienced at least one incident (there were no incidents in the road haulage, public administration, other road passenger or storage categories). This indicates that fewer business types in the service sector are likely to be victims of abuse than those in the retail sector (a full list of the businesses that were victims is given in appendix 8). Within the 13 business categories in the service sector that experienced at least one incident of abuse there was a more even distribution of incidents than in the retail sector. In relation to this, there was also a more even distribution of violence. Here, incidents of violence were recorded within 10 business categories out of 17 (59%). This is compared to 4 out of 11 (36%) categories in the retail sector. This indicates that if a business in the

service sector experiences abuse it may be more likely to escalate into violence than an incident in a retail sector business.

**Table 5.3: Businesses in the Service sector with highest risks of abuse and violence.**

Sample size in brackets. <sup>47</sup>	% Victims		Average incidents per 100 businesses		Average incidents per victim	
	Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence
Bookmakers (4)	75	25	200	50	2	2
Postal Services (5)	60	20	220	20	3.7	1
Public Houses (21)	43	38	200* (580)	200	4.7	5.3
Hotels (4)	25	50	150	125	6	2.5
Eating Places (57)	21	3.5	47 (221)*	3.5	2.3	1

\*The figures in brackets include the outliers.

The highest prevalence risks for abuse in the service sector were against bookmakers (75%), postal services (60%), public houses (43%), hotels (25%) and eating places (21%). However, there were only four bookmakers in the sample, five postal service businesses and four hotels. Public houses and eating-places experienced the highest average number of incidents per 100 business at 580 and 221 per 100 respectively. However, both of these categories contained victims who reported incident counts of 80 and 99. If these are removed the average per 100 businesses are 200 and 47 respectively. The public house sector and eating categories also had an average number of 13.5 and 10.5 incidents per victim respectively, if the outliers are included. If the outliers are removed the figure becomes 4.7 and 2.3 incidents per victim. The hotel sector also experienced a high rate of repeat abuse (6 incidents per victim), though the highest average number of incidents per victim was 11 in the hair/beauty sector. This was produced by this sector only having two victims experiencing a high number of incidents (see appendix 8).

<sup>47</sup> It is acknowledged that bookmakers and postal services had a low sample size. However, these businesses did experience high prevalence rates. It should also be noted here that hotels experienced a prevalence rate of 25%, though there was a sample size of only 4 businesses (see appendix 8).

As with the retail sector, there was also a strong relationship between abuse and violence within the service sector (pearsons product moment  $r = .8293$ ). In total 50% of businesses in the hotel sector (though there were only two victims) and 38% of public houses experienced at least one incident of abuse and violence. Generally violence was not as prevalent as abuse, though the nightclub, travel agent and hair/beauty categories all experienced the same prevalence rate of violence as abuse. This was due to victims of abuse reporting one incident as both abuse and violence. For a number of categories there was a much lower prevalence rate of abuse than violence, the most noticeable being for the postal services, eating places and bookmakers, nursery/ children and dry cleaners. This indicates that business in these categories may have a risk of abuse, but these incidents are unlikely to develop into violence. Generally the risks of repeat violence were low. The only significant number of repeat incidents were against public houses. Here, a victim of an incident of violence experienced an average of 5.3 incidents over a 12 month period.

The data from sweep 2 of the SBCI survey show similarities to the data gathered in sweep 1. Bookmakers, postal services, public houses and eating places recorded high prevalence rates for abuse in sweeps 1 and 2; though only public houses, professional services, medical services and eating places recorded violence for sweep 2.<sup>48</sup>

Comparisons of these figures with other studies are difficult because of the way that data has been gathered and because few studies have considered this type of in-depth analysis. However, the British Retail Consortium surveys (Burrows & Speed, 1994; Speed, Burrows et al, 1995; Brookes & Cross, 1996; Wells & Dryer, 1997; Wells & Dryer, 1998 & unauthored, 1999) have highlighted that staff in DIY/hardware outlets, off-licences, chemists and petrol retailers have the highest risks of experiencing an

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<sup>48</sup> Bookmakers recorded prevalence rates for abuse in sweep two of 75%, travel agents 33%, postal services 27%, medical services 23%, hair and beauty 19%, public houses 14% and eating places 14%. There were no incidents recorded against nightclubs, hotels or nurseries. Only four categories in the service sector contained businesses that were victims of violence. These were public houses (22%), professional services (4%), medical (7%) and eating places (6%).

incident of violence. Our analysis shows high risks of violence for both off-licences and petrol retailers (motor fuels).

From this analysis, it is possible to take these business types and divide them into high, medium and low risk categories. This is done in figure 5.1. The three sub-groups that are identified here may be categorised as follows:

1. **High risk businesses:** Within this group are business types where there is a high prevalence of abuse, a high rate of repeat victimisation and a number of businesses have experienced incidents of violence. Overall, the potential of these businesses to generate abuse is high, and there is also a risk of violence.


2. **Medium risk businesses:** Within this group are businesses that have experienced at least one incident of abuse though repeat abuse and violence is generally low. Here, there is also a potential for generating abuse, though the risk of generating violence is low.

3. **The low/ minimal risk businesses:** Within this group are businesses that have experienced only one or no incidents of abuse or violence with no repeat incidents. Here, the businesses have a low potential for generating abuse or violence.

The second part of conjecture one hypothesised that intra-sector analysis would establish variations in the rates of abuse and violence against different business types. It is clear from this evidence that rates of abuse and violence against businesses do vary according to business type. Figure 5.1 allows us to begin to analyse these risk variations and to identify what it is about the lifestyles of these business types that produce the contexts that are conducive to abuse and violence.



**Figure 5.1: Business categories, risks of abuse, threats, intimidation or violence: Retail and Service Sector (service sector businesses are in italics).**



It is apparent that the businesses in figure one have distinctive lifestyle characteristics that generate or reduce the risk of abuse and violence. These risk variations have been developed in Table 5.4 (below). Here, it is hypothesised that high-risk businesses have a unique set of lifestyle attributes that promote vulnerability to abuse/ violence. These risk attributes will be subject to further investigation throughout this chapter. It is acknowledged that many low and medium risk businesses have some of these characteristics, though the higher risk businesses are more likely to have constellations of these features.

**Table 5.4. Lifestyle Characteristics of high/ low risk business groups.**

<b>Lifestyle Characteristic</b>	<b>High Risk Businesses</b>	<b>Low Risk Businesses</b>
High number of customer visits	High-risk businesses have a high number of customer visits. This maximises the potential for a convergence of targets and offenders.	Low risk businesses have fewer customer visits. This reduces the potential for a convergence of targets and offenders.
Attracting motivated offenders	High-risk businesses will attract motivated offenders or those ready to engage in aggressive behaviour. These businesses are thus likely to have a high number of encounters with potential offenders.	Unlikely to attract a high number of motivated offenders. They do not have a high degree of contact with customers
Handling cash	High risk businesses constantly handle cash and/ or credit cards	Most low risk businesses handle cash infrequently
Late opening	A number of high-risk businesses have late opening hours. This increases potential for a convergence of staff and offenders, especially at night when alcohol could be a facilitator.	Low risk businesses tend to open between 9am-5pm, thus reducing the potential for a convergence of targets and offenders.
Potential for acquisitive crime	A number of high-risk businesses also have potential for acquisitive crime such as shop theft. These crimes may have an association with abuse and violence.	Low risk businesses have reduced potential of other crime types.
Presence of alcohol	Many high-risk businesses have a presence of alcohol, either selling or serving. This increases potential for disputes over selling alcohol to teenagers and alcohol related violence.	Low risk businesses do not have a presence of alcohol on the premises.

A number of generalisations can be made about our high and low-risk businesses from the above table. The high-risk businesses are all business types with high generating potential. However the constellation of factors that produce incidents of abuse and violence will depend upon the individual business type.

The first observation about the high-risk businesses is that they will have a high number of customer visits. For example, food shops and off-licences all rely on having a constant throughput of customers. This will increase the potential for a convergence of targets and offenders, though it is obviously dependent upon other generating factors within the business. The high-risk businesses may have the potential to attract customers into the business who are likely to engage in abuse or violence. For example, public houses and bookmakers may attract the type of person who is more likely to become aggressive than a nursery. Potential offenders will also visit low risk businesses such as video rental stores and dry cleaners, though visits to these business types do not provide the contexts that generate abusive and violent encounters. Therefore, the high-risk businesses attract motivated offenders and they also generate the contexts for incidents to be triggered.

These abusive or violent encounters will be generated by one of a number of factors. The high-risk businesses constantly handle cash, which increases the potential for disputes over change and pricing. This has been noted as a source of disputes in previous research (see Ekblom & Simon, 1988; Beck et al, 1994). Businesses with a presence of alcohol on the premises will also experience higher rates of abuse and violence. Alcohol will often be a facilitator for violence in public houses or eating places as offenders may have consumed high amounts of alcohol before visiting these businesses or they will consume alcohol whilst on the premises. In off-licences alcohol will be a source of dispute if underage teenagers try to purchase it and are refused by staff.

There is obviously a strong relationship between alcohol and violence. This has been documented in a number of research studies (for example Wolfgang and Strohm, 1956; Shuntich & Taylor, 1972; Geen, 1990). Previous research has also highlighted an association between alcohol and abuse within businesses (for example Beck & Willis, 1994). However, late opening hours will also increase the risks here. Businesses that open until late will have greater risk of experiencing abuse or violence by coming into contact with assailants who may have been drinking during the evening. Late opening may also increase the risk of generating incidents relating to refusals to serve teenagers alcohol. Here, teenagers may try to buy alcohol from off-licences in the evening when few capable guardians are present.

It is also apparent that the high-risk businesses will also experience other crime types that may develop into abuse or violence against staff. These incidents will include particularly shop theft, and fights between customers in which staff become involved. Previous research has identified a relationship between shop theft and violence. British Retail Consortium data for 1996/97 found 54% of all violence in retail outlets to be related to customer theft. The high-risk businesses may also experience problems with outbreaks of violence on the premises between customers and shop theft. For example, public houses and eating-places may have high rates of violence between customers, and businesses such as food shops, off-licences and clothing/ footwear may experience problems with shop theft. This will be subject to more analysis in conjecture 3.

By developing these ideas, it is possible to score the 'risk potential' of the businesses in the sample. This is done for the high-risk and low-risk businesses below (see table 5.5). The businesses are assessed and scored according to all of the lifestyle characteristics outlined above. Therefore we ask if the businesses identified as high and low-risk have a number of the lifestyle attributes that generate abuse and violence. They are scored 2 for always/often, 1 for occasionally and 0 for rarely/never. The highest score a business could get is 16 (indicating high-risk), the lowest is 0 (indicating very low-risk).

As one would expect, the higher-risk businesses identified in the previous section have a higher average score than the low-risk businesses. The average score for the high-risk group was 10, with off-licences appearing to have the highest risk. The average score for the low-risk businesses was 2.5, with video stores having the highest score. By using this scoring system, the risk heterogeneity of abuse/violence for certain types of businesses may be relatively accurately predicted. One problem with the model is that it does not include locational factors, which in many cases will have a considerable bearing upon the risk of becoming a victim.

In addition to this, it is interesting to note how the lower scoring high-risk businesses and the higher scoring low-risk businesses share a number of similar features. For example

**Table 5.5: Risk scores for the businesses identified as high/low risk (business types in italics are those who were identified as low risk).**

<i>Business Type</i>	Does it attract offenders?	Have a high number of customer visits?	Disputes over goods/services likely?	Refusals to serve alcohol & cigarettes?	Late opening hours?	Presence of alcohol?	Is theft common?	Are there times when guardianship is low?	Final Score
Off-licence	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	16
Food	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	15
Pubs	2	2	1	2	2	2	0	0	11
Motor Parts/Fuels	2	1	2	1	2	0	1	2	11
Hotels	1	1	2	1	2	2	0	2	11
Clothing	2	2	2	0	0	0	2	1	9
Eating Places	1	1	1	0	2	2	0	1	8
Bookmakers	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	1	5
Postal Services	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	1	4
<i>Video Rental</i>	0	1	1	0	2	0	0	2	6
<i>Electrical Spares</i>	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	4
<i>Medical (doctors)</i>	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	1	4
<i>Car Dealers</i>	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	3
<i>Photo/ Art Dealer</i>	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	3
<i>Repairs</i>	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	3
<i>Florist</i>	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	3
<i>Nursery</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Storage</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Public Admin.</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Road Haulage</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
<i>Education (offices)</i>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

video stores are (according to the data) a low-risk business though they attain a score nearly as high as bookmakers which are high-risk businesses. Both businesses appear to have similar lifestyle characteristics, though there are obviously additional reasons why video stores have low risks. For example, video stores do not handle the large amounts of cash that bookmakers handle, and there is less scope for frustration to develop over money lost on bets. In addition to this, within each individual business sector (for example food/ off-licence) there are some businesses that have been victims of a large number of incidents and some that have not had any. Therefore, the model is able to predict the potential risk according to business type (for example, by stating that an off-licence would be expected to have high risks), though within these categories the actual risk will vary from one off-licence to another. Throughout the rest of this chapter, we will try to identify some of the other factors that lead to high risks of abuse/violence.

A number of lifestyle characteristics that generate incidents of abuse and violence have been cited here. Conjecture one hypothesized that business sector and type would be closely associated with abuse and violence. The data verifies this conjecture, and the types of businesses with the highest risk of abuse and violence have been identified. It has also been identified that high-risk business types will possess a number of associated lifestyle characteristics that promote risk (such as opening hours and number of likely customer visits). We will now begin to explore a number of other lifestyle characteristics that could also generate high risks of abuse and violence.

#### **Conjecture Two: Employee Size and Victimization.**

*The target suitability of businesses will be dependent upon the number of staff present in the business. Previous research has found that there are higher average risks of assaults and threats per 1000 retail and manufacturing premises employing 11 or more staff than for smaller premises. There will be a correlation between employee numbers and victimisation because larger businesses have more potential targets to be victims of abuse and violence and their routine activities are likely to attract more customers who may also constitute potential offenders. However this convergence of victims and*

*potential offenders is likely to impact differently upon employees according to their role within the business. For example:*

a. Victims of abuse are most likely to be employed in larger businesses. These patterns will emerge because the lifestyles of the larger businesses will facilitate a greater number of convergences between victims and offenders. However, routine activity theory would also suggest that larger businesses would have a higher number of capable guardians. The presence of guardians will however have less of an impact upon abuse than violence. This is because violence is more serious than abuse and is an illegal act. Therefore, perpetrators of violence will not want witnesses to raise the alarm or intervene in incidents.

b. The first half of the conjecture suggests that a higher number of incidents of abuse and violence will be recorded against larger business premises. Despite this, the *actual* risk of becoming a victim of abuse and violence will be greater in smaller businesses. This will be because employees in the smaller business are more likely to come into contact with the general public and, as a consequence, a greater risk of coming into contact with offenders.

Conjecture one identified that there is a higher risk of employees experiencing abuse or violence if they are employed in the retail or service sectors. Conjecture two hypothesises a link between the number of people a business employs and the number of incidents of abuse or violence experienced. In sweep one of the survey, 678 businesses were able to state how many staff they employed. Table 5.6 (below) outlines the proportion of staff per sector. In total, 14% (n=93) of businesses employed only one member of staff, 64% (n=433) of businesses employed between 2-4 staff and 22% (n=152) employed 5 or more staff. The high proportion of businesses in the 2-4 staff category is a reflection of the type of businesses that are found in the two sample areas. The businesses in the sample employed a total of 6665 staff, with the largest proportion (5397 or 81%) of staff employed in businesses with 5 or more staff, 18% (1175) were employed in businesses with 2-4 staff and 1% (93) in businesses employing only one member of staff.

**Table 5.6: Employee Numbers by Business Sector Expressed as a percentage of total number of staff within the sector (total number of staff in brackets).**

Employee Numbers	Retail	Service	Wholesale	Manufacture	All
1	4% (55)	1% (28)	1% (8)	<1% (2)	1.5% (93)
2-4	43% (577)	17% (388)	21% (127)	3.5% (83)	21% (1175)
5+	53% (710)	82% (1926)	78% (475)	96.4% (2286)	77.5% 5397
Total	100 (1342)	100 (2342)	100 (610)	100 (2371)	100 6665

Table 5.7 (below) outlines the average risks of abuse and violence per 100 premises, by sector and number of employees for sweep 1 of the survey. For abuse the highest average number of incidents per 100 premises for the service, wholesale and manufacturing sector are recorded for businesses employing 5+ staff. This relationship is confirmed by gamma measures of association for sector, abuse and employee size.<sup>49</sup> There is a positive (but weak) gamma correlation of .392 for the wholesale sector, .079 for the manufacturing sector and .028 for the service sector. This pattern verifies the conjecture that higher numbers of abuse will be recorded in the larger businesses. However, this pattern is not found in the retail sector (gamma -.097). Here, the highest average number of incidents per premises was in businesses employing 2-4 staff. Therefore, the average number of incidents of abuse does not rise according to number of employees for all sectors.

<sup>49</sup> Here the gamma correlation was calculated by recoding the numbers of incidents of abuse/violence into categorical variables where; 0=no incidents, 1=victim of one incident, 2= repeat victim.



**Table 5.7: Average number of incidents of abuse and violence per 100 premises by number of employees.**

	Average number of incidents per 100 premises					
	1 Employee		2-4 Employees		5+ Employees	
Sector	Ab	Vi	Ab	Vi	Ab	Vi
Retail	56	4	146	34	40	14.5
Service	86	18	97	18	120	45
Wholesale	50	0	14.5	4	61	0
Manufacture	0	0	22	4	25	1

The average number of incidents of violence per 100 businesses is more difficult to establish due to low numbers of incidents within the wholesale and manufacturing sector. Here, the highest risks in the retail, wholesale and manufacturing sectors were for businesses employing 2-4 staff, though for the service sector they were for businesses employing 5 or more staff. The gamma correlation coefficients for sector, violence and employee size highlight that for the retail and service sectors there is a negative relationship between the number of incidents of violence per employee size and sector. For the retail sector there was a strong negative relationship (-.471) and in the service sector there was a weak negative relationship (-.098). The gamma for the manufacture and wholesale sectors is unreliable here due to the low number of incidents so has not been calculated.

If we return to the first half of the conjecture, there is some evidence that abuse concentrates in businesses that employ 5 or more staff and violence in businesses that employ 2-4 staff. Though the data does not show the same pattern for all sectors, in the service, wholesale and manufacturing sectors the highest average number of incidents of abuse per premises were in businesses with 5+ staff. For violence the highest average number of incidents per premises (in the retail, wholesale and manufacturing sector) were for businesses employing less than 5 staff. Though the evidence is weak, a slight correlation is established.

Abuse may be more likely to concentrate in the large businesses because these generate a greater number of convergences between offenders and targets than smaller businesses. Therefore there may be more opportunity to engage in abuse within these businesses. However, it is interesting to note that violence is most likely to occur in the businesses with less than 5 employees. This may be because there are certain times when there is little guardianship within these premises. As the conjecture suggests perpetrators of violence will not want to be seen by witnesses or have capable guardians intervene in incidents. Though this is plausible, slight caution must be observed as the research instrument used was unable to establish how many staff or customers were present when incidents occurred. Many incidents of violence may have occurred in businesses with 2-4 staff, though we do not know how many staff or customers were actually present when incidents occurred. Therefore, the impact of guardianship can not be properly assessed in this section.

If we now turn to the second half of the conjecture and the relationship between the average number of incidents per employee and number of employees then a different pattern is observed (see table 5.8- below). For abuse, the highest average number of incidents per employee concentrates in the lower employee size categories. For all sectors the lowest average number of incidents of abuse per 100 employees were in businesses with 5+ employees. Therefore the average risks of experiencing abuse are not as high for employees in larger businesses. These overall patterns produce a weak negative correlation between the number of incidents of abuse and staff size in all sectors. The Pearsons product moment correlation coefficient here measures the linear relationship between number of employees and incident numbers. For the retail sector the Pearsons product moment  $r = -.1144$ , for services  $r = -.0612$ , wholesale  $r = -.1426$  & manufacture  $r = -.1436$ . For all sectors, there is a therefore a weak negative correlation between abuse and number of staff employed by the business.

A similar pattern is also observed for violence, though the number of incidents of violence recorded in the manufacture and wholesale sector was too low to be significant. In the retail and service sector there was a fall in the average number of incidents

experienced as the number of employees grew. This produced weak negative Pearson product moment correlations of  $r = -.0430$  for the retail sector and  $r = -.0747$  for the service sector. The product moment correlation for the relationship between staff size and violence in the wholesale and manufacturing sector could not be calculated due to the small number of incidents.

**Table 5.8: Average number of incidents per 100 employees.**

Sector	Average number of incidents per 100 Employees					
	1		2-4		5+	
	Ab	Vi	Ab	Vi	Ab	Vi
Retail	56	4	61	13	3.5	1
Service	86	18	44.5	6.5	7	2.5
Wholesale	50	0	5.5	2	4.6	0
Manufacture	0	0	27	2	1	1

These patterns verify the second part of conjecture two. The *actual* risk of becoming a victim of abuse and violence does reduce as business employee size gets larger. In some cases this is because larger businesses may not generate the same risks as smaller businesses. This will be true in some sectors. For example, manufacturing and wholesale premises generally have low risks of abuse and violence, and these sectors have a high concentration of larger businesses. Again, some caution has to be given to this conclusion as risk per employee is likely to be unevenly distributed throughout the larger businesses. For example, in a national supermarket chain thousands of staff will have little *actual* risk of abuse or violence because they will be employed in occupations where they are rarely exposed to customers (such as in warehouses). Therefore, though certain businesses may employ a high number of staff, the actual risk of victimisation may still be concentrated amongst a small proportion of the staff.

Though the data is not entirely conclusive, a number of patterns have been established. Abuse is most likely to concentrate in businesses employing 5+ staff, with violence in businesses employing less than 5+ staff. The risks of becoming a victim of abuse or violence per 100 employees are reduced according to business size. However, the overall

correlation between employee size and the risks of abuse and violence is weak. This suggests that employee size would not be a good predictor of the risk of abuse or violence.

**Conjecture Three:**

***Businesses with high risks of abuse and violence will also experience high numbers of other crime types. There will be two reasons for this:***

a. Businesses with high risk of abuse and violence may also have a high-risk heterogeneity to other crime types such as burglary and fraud. Therefore the risk heterogeneity of the business generates a number of crime types.

b. A clear 'processual' relationship between crime types such as abuse and shop theft will be established. For example, an incident of shop theft may generate abuse, which in turn may generate violence.

This conjecture will establish if businesses with high rates of abuse and violence also have high rates of other crimes, and if close relationships exist between abuse, violence and these crimes. If businesses that are victims of abuse and violence also experience high rates of other crime types, they will possess a 'high' risk heterogeneity to these incidents. However, we are particularly interested in establishing associations between these crime types. For example, it would be expected that abuse be closely related to crime types such as shop theft and violence. Shop theft will often act as a trigger for incidents of abuse, and violence will result from an escalation of the incident of abuse.

Tables 5.9 and 5.10 outline the relationship between abuse and violence for a number of crime types from sweep 1 of the SBCI survey. These are considered for the retail and service sector as these are the two business sectors that have been identified as at high risk from abuse/ violence. The tables are structured so the two left-hand columns consider the prevalence of crime against non-victims of abuse and violence. These prevalence

rates are then compared to the prevalence rates for the victims of abuse and violence in the two right hand columns. Also given are the Pearson product moment correlation coefficients. This gives a measure of the linear association between abuse, violence and other incident types.

**Table 5.9. Relationship between abuse/ violence and other incident types: Retail sector.**

Crime Type	Prevalence rates for victims and non-victims of abuse and violence compared to other crime types.			
	Non-victims of Abuse (271)	Non-victims of Violence (332)	Victims of abuse (86)	Victims of Violence (25)
Burglary	38.5% (105)	41% (136)	55% (47) r=.4736	56% (14) r=-.2448
Criminal Damage	17% (74)	18% (95)	26% (41) r=.1539	29% (19) r=-.3634
Shoplifting	23% (154)	29% (216)	69% (162) r=.7713	92% (94) r=.9346
Robbery	8% (25)	8% (34)	12% (16) r=-.0919	29% (8) r= -.2436
Fraud	40% (252)	41% (293)	53% (115) r=.2893	62.5% (67) r=-.3897
Violence	3% (8)	-	18% (75) r=.9084	100% (84) r=1
Abuse	-	21% (258)	100% (373) r=1	62.5% (114) r=.9084

The figures in brackets are the actual number of incidents.

If we consider the retail sector first, a clear pattern is observed between the prevalence rates for all crime types depending upon whether respondents had been victims of abuse or violence, (see table 5.9 above). The victims of abuse and violence experienced higher prevalence rates for all crime types than the non-victims of abuse and violence. Particular disparities exist between the prevalence rates for shoplifting. In total, 23% of the non-victims of abuse and 29% of the non-victims of violence experienced shop theft, however this is compared to 69% of the victims of abuse and 92% of the victims of violence. This suggests a strong relationship between abuse, violence and shoplifting. The strength of association is affirmed by a Pearson product moment correlation of

$r=.7713$  between abuse and shop theft and  $r=.9346$  between violence and shop theft. Previous research has also found a strong relationship between abuse/ violence and shop theft. In total 67% of all assaults in the 1998 British Retail Consortium survey (unauthored, 1999) and 52.2% in Beck et al's (1994) study of staff in a retail company had some relationship to shop theft.

A close relationship was also observed between abuse and violence ( $r=.9084$ ). Victims of abuse were more likely to experience violence than the non-victims of abuse. In total, 18% of the victims of abuse also experienced violence, whereas only 3% of non-victims of abuse experienced violence. A significant proportion of violence may be predicted by abuse. There may be an obvious processual link between abuse and violence as the onset of violence is often preceded by abuse. This suggests that often businesses experience a high number of incidents of abuse that escalate into violence. In addition to this, 62.5% of the victims of violence also experienced abuse. This figure may appear to be low, as violence will normally begin with abuse. There may be two explanations for this. First, these 37.5% of victims may have experienced violence not preceded by abuse, for example, an attempted robbery where violence was used from the onset. However, a more likely explanation is that victims recorded incidents of abuse where the final result was violence solely as 'violence' rather than recording them as both abuse and violence.

If we return to our conjecture, two conclusions can be made regarding the data considering the relationship between crime types in the retail sector. The data show that victims of abuse and violence have higher prevalence rates for all crime types than the non-victims of abuse/ violence. This indicates the victims of abuse and violence have lifestyles that are conducive to other crime types such as burglary, criminal damage and fraud. It is not being suggested here that there is a link between crime types such as burglary and abuse, though the data shows that these businesses have a risk heterogeneity that increases vulnerability to a number of crime types. The second half of the conjecture hypothesises that there will be causal links between abuse, violence and some other crime types. The data shows that there are strong statistical relationships between crime types

such as abuse, violence and shop theft. Therefore, if we know where shop theft is likely to occur then we will be able to predict where abuse and violence will occur.

We now turn to the relationship between the service sector, abuse and violence and a number of other crime types (see table 5.10, below).

**Table 5.10: Relationship between abuse/violence and other incident types: Service sector.**

Crime Type	Percentage Victims of Other Related incident types.			
	Non-victims of Abuse (252)	Non-victims of Violence (278)	Victims of abuse (56)	Victims of Violence (29)
Burglary	32% (80)	33% (92)	48% (27) r=-.2489	55% (16) r=-.0757
Criminal Damage	23% (139)	25% (155)	39% (40) r=.6782	31% (19) r=-.3883
Shoplifting	6% (19)	7% (22)	21% (16) r=.4858	28% (13) -.2074
Robbery	7% (18)	5% (14)	7% (5) r=-.5422	24% (8) r=.2500
Fraud	18% (136)	21% (153)	43% (51) r=.3758	38% (34) r=.2092
Violence	4% (13)	-	33% (62) r=.8304	100% (71) r=1
Abuse	-	13% (188)	100% (323) p=1	64% (133) p.8304

As with the retail sector, the victims of abuse and violence had higher prevalence rates for all crimes types than the non-victims of abuse and violence. Despite this, there appeared to be little association between abuse/ violence and most crime types in this sector. The only exceptions were for the victims of abuse where there were strong positive associations between abuse and criminal damage ( $r=.6782$ ), shoplifting ( $r=.4858$ ) and a strong negative relationship between abuse and robbery ( $r=-.5422$ ).<sup>50</sup> For the victims of violence there were no strong relationships between any crime types (except abuse). It should also be noted here that whilst the crime types of criminal damage and shoplifting were positively associated with abuse, they were negatively associated with

violence. Abuse will be positively associated with shop theft as incidents are likely to occur when intervening in shop theft. It may also be apparent that criminal damage is associated with abuse as it may be the end result of a dispute. If one considers that the service sector contains business types such as public houses, it is plausible that after disputes, customers who have had too much to drink may seek retribution or revenge by damaging property.

The data here verifies conjecture three. In both the retail and service sectors the victims of abuse and violence were more likely to have higher prevalence rates for all crimes than the non-victims. This suggests that businesses where abuse and violence occurs have a high 'risk heterogeneity' to a number of crime types. Some businesses have high prevalence rates for a number of crime types simply because the risk heterogeneity of the business makes them vulnerable to a number of crime types that have no clear association (for example fraud and burglary). In both sectors abuse and violence are closely associated, and in some circumstances they have a close relationship to other crime types such as shop theft. There is also a close relationship between violence and shop theft in the retail sector, though this pattern does not exist in the service sector.

These findings not only verify conjecture three, but also research by Clarke & Felson, (1998) which suggests that different crime types will often be inter-related. The data outlined above has highlighted that businesses are victims of a number of crime types that are inter-related. This has implications for understanding crime risks. If criminologists are to understand how different crimes are generated it may be important to consider crimes as processes of different actions consisting of a number of crime types that merge into one another, rather than as discrete events such as 'burglary', 'robbery' or 'assault' (as victimisation surveys classify incidents). The data outlined above established clear links between abuse, violence, and shop theft within the business environment. If we are to understand how abuse and violence are generated, then it is important to understand these processes. These ideas will be developed in more detail in chapter six.

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<sup>50</sup> The figure for robbery has to be treated with some caution due to a low number of reported incidents.



#### **Conjecture Four: Security, Business Actions and Victimisation.**

*Businesses will attempt to prevent abuse or violence against staff in a number of ways. This will include installing security devices to prevent incidents, or operating with particular business practices that are intended to reduce the risk to employees. It is conjectured here that those businesses that have been victims of abuse and violence are more likely to use both formal security systems and informal methods to deter motivated offenders from acts of violence or to increase guardianship. Therefore:*

- a. Businesses that have been victims of abuse or violence will take measures that increase guardianship on the premises or deter potential offenders from engaging in incidents. The security device that will be expected to have the greatest impact upon abuse and violence will be Closed Circuit Television (CCTV). This will impact upon abuse and violence by increasing surveillance and thus acting as a capable guardian/potential witness to incidents.
- b. Businesses that have been victims of abuse and violence will also employ more informal methods or business practices to reduce the risks of incidents occurring. This will include acts such as employing extra staff to increase guardianship, excluding potential offenders from the premises and acquiring weapons to reduce the risk of violence.

This conjecture considers how businesses that are victims of abuse and violence alter their lifestyles to prevent incidents of abuse or violence occurring or to prevent incidents developing from abuse to violence. This section begins by considering the relationship between the installation of CCTV and abuse/ violence, and the impact of CCTV upon reducing abuse/ violence. The second half of the section will consider a number of informal methods that business may use to reduce abuse and violence -such as 'removing offenders from the premises' or 'employing extra staff to prevent crime or trouble'. Here, we will consider the impact taking actions such as 'removing offenders from the premises' and 'employing extra staff to prevent crime or trouble' has upon reducing abuse/violence.

### Closed Circuit Television and Abuse/Violence.

Within the businesses that are the focus of this study, CCTV may be installed with the desired effect of reducing incidents of abuse or violence. CCTV may have an impact upon abuse and violence by increasing the offenders perceived risk of detection and deterring potential offenders from engaging in violence. Therefore, it can reduce the likelihood that offenders will engage in abuse/ violence (or associated incidents such as shop theft) as it increases guardianship within the business. The first half of this section will consider if the victims of abuse or violence were more likely to install CCTV than non-victims; and if the installation of CCTV had any impact upon reducing incidents. This will be considered for the retail and service sector as these are the two business sectors that have been identified as high risk.

**Figure 5.2: Installation of CCTV according to experience of victimisation: Retail and Service Sector.**



Sweep one data shows that in both the retail and service sector there was a correlation between victimisation and installing CCTV (see figure 5.2). Both sectors have been merged here.<sup>51</sup>

Figure 5.2 shows that victims of abuse and violence were more likely to install CCTV than non-victims.<sup>52</sup> This is particularly apparent for victims of violence. Here the repeat victims of violence were the group most likely to have CCTV with over 35% installing cameras. The non-victims of both abuse and violence were the groups who were least likely to install CCTV. Less than 20% of non-victims of abuse or violence had installed CCTV. Of those who experienced one incident of abuse or violence, just over 20% had installed cameras. The gamma correlation here shows a positive (if not strong) correlation between CCTV installation and victimisation at .189 (victims were coded 0=non-victim, 1=victim of one incident, 2=repeat victim). The probability of victims of abuse installing CCTV is 1.4:1 compared to non-victims. Therefore victims of abuse are 1.4 times more likely to install CCTV than non-victims. However, the relationship between becoming a victim of violence and installation of CCTV is more marked. This relationship produces a gamma correlation of .470. Here, the victims of violence were 1.6 times more likely to install CCTV than non-victims.<sup>53</sup>

Overall, there is a relationship between becoming a victim of violence and installing CCTV. However, the actual impact of abuse and violence upon the decision to install CCTV is less clear. CCTV was installed for a variety of reasons that are not related to a specific incident of abuse or violence. In sweep one, most businesses installed CCTV for

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<sup>51</sup> The data has been merged because there are only a small number of businesses within both sectors that were repeat victims of violence. Both sectors show similar patterns of installing CCTV according to victimisation. By merging the two groups the data is more reliable.

<sup>52</sup> In total there were 707 non-victims of abuse and 818 non-victims of violence. There were 63 victims of one incident of abuse and 31 victims of one incident of violence, and there were 80 repeat victims of abuse and 23 repeat victims of violence.

<sup>53</sup> This pattern is confirmed by sweep 2 data. Here, 35% of repeat victims of violence and 33% of repeat victims of abuse had installed CCTV. This compares to 24% of non-victims of abuse and 24% of non-victims of violence.

general security reasons (82%). Only 9% of businesses installed CCTV because they were a victim of crime.<sup>54</sup>

We now need to establish if CCTV has any impact in reducing abuse or violence. The SBCI methodology enables us to 'track' the victimisation patterns of businesses that completed both sweep 1 and sweep 2. Table 5.11 outlines the number of victims and incidents of abuse and violence in sweep 1 and 2 for businesses that had or had not installed CCTV (abuse and violence are merged to avoid having sample sizes with very low numbers of respondents). The table also includes the percentage reductions in victims and incidents between sweep 1 and 2.

The data show that installation of CCTV does not reduce the number of incidents of abuse/ violence experienced by victims. However, caution has to be taken with the figures because the research instrument did not ask businesses when they installed CCTV. Therefore, it would be possible to experience a number of incidents in January or February and install CCTV later in the year. In this instance, the survey data would give the impression that the victim experienced a number of incidents and also had CCTV. In this case, the data would suggest that CCTV had little impact upon preventing incidents within the business though CCTV was not installed until after the incidents had occurred.

Overall, the data indicates that CCTV has little impact upon reducing abuse/ violence (see table 5.11). Of the businesses that had installed CCTV in sweep 2 but not sweep 1 both the number of victims and incidents rose by 31% and 185% respectively. This indicates that CCTV had little impact upon reducing incidents, though (as mentioned above) the CCTV could have been installed after incidents had occurred. Stronger evidence about the lack of effectiveness of CCTV in reducing incidents of abuse/ violence can be found by considering businesses that had CCTV in place in both sweeps. For this subset, between sweeps one and two there was an increase in the number of

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<sup>54</sup> In sweep two 66% also installed CCTV for general security reasons. Only 6% here installed CCTV because they were a victim of crime.

victims by 31% and number of incidents by 115%. Again, this indicates that CCTV had little impact upon reducing incidents.

**Table 5.11: CCTV and reduction of abuse/violence.**

	Sample Size	Number of victims sweep 1	Number of Victims Sweep 2	% change	Number incidents sweep 1	Number incidents sweep 2	% change
CCTV installed in Sw 2 but not 1	48	9	13	+31	27	77	+185
CCTV installed in sweep 1& 2	49	13	17	+31	45	97	+115
CCTV installed in Sw 1 but removed by Sw 2	25	9	3	-66	32	3	-91
No CCTV in Sw 1 or 2	301	57	58	+2	407	114	-72

Table 5.11 also shows that the largest reductions in incidents were for businesses that did not have CCTV in sweep 2. For those with CCTV in sweep 1 but not 2 there was a 91% reduction in the number of incidents of abuse/ violence. For businesses that did not have CCTV in either sweep 1 or 2 there was also a reduction in numbers of incidents between the two sweeps. Out of a total number of 301 businesses, there were 407 incidents in sweep 1 and 114 in sweep 2 (a reduction of 72%). It should be noted here that the number of victims for the subset rose slightly from 57 in sweep 1 to 58 in sweep 2 (an increase of 2%).

If we consider this evidence in the light of the first half of conjecture one, it appears that victims of abuse/ violence are more likely to install CCTV than non-victims. There are obvious reasons why this occurs. Most victims suggested they installed CCTV for general security, though CCTV may also be perceived as an effective way to reduce the number of incidents in businesses as it increases surveillance and may deter potential

offenders. However, the evidence suggests that CCTV will have little impact upon reducing the number of incidents of abuse/ violence.

### **Abuse, Violence and other Preventative Actions.**

The SBCI survey also asked businesses about a number of additional preventative actions that may have been taken as a result of becoming a victim of abuse or violence. These actions include 'employing extra staff to prevent crime and trouble', 'having something available for self-defence', 'making sure that staff are not alone on the premises' and 'excluding specific types of people from the premises'.

Tables 5.12 and 5.13 consider the actions of businesses to prevent crime and trouble in sweep one of the survey. Both tables present the percentage of non-victims, victims of one incident and repeat victims who said they took such actions. The final column also shows the chi-square value for each action. These values were calculated by cross-tabulating each of the actions with the categories of non-victim, victim of one and repeat victim. This gave a 2x3 table for each of the actions. All of the chi-square values are therefore calculated to 2 degrees of freedom.

**Table 5.12: Actions of victims and non-victims of abuse to prevent crime and trouble.**

	Non-victim (n=707)	Victim of one incident only (n=63)	Repeat Victim (n=103)	Chi-square value
Exclude specific types of people from the premises	20%	32%	33%	12.4 p=<.01
Employ extra staff	7%	8%	13%	3.9 p=<.20
Have something available for self defence	25%	26%	32%	2.1 p=<.50
Make sure staff are not alone on premises	41%	46%	49%	.33 p=<.90

Here, the data shows that the victims and repeat victims of abuse and violence were generally more likely to take a number of other actions that were either a response to becoming victims or attempts to reduce victimisation.

If we consider table 5.12, the most common measure to take is to 'make sure staff are not alone on the premises' with over 40% in each category taking this measure. However, according to the chi-square values the most significant data was produced in the category of 'excluding specific types of people from the premises'. Here, the chi-square value is 12.4 ( $p < .01$  level). This value is produced because there were a significantly higher number of victims taking this measure than expected. The chi-square values within the other categories indicate that the variation between the observed and expected values for the non-victims, victims of one incident and repeat victims is not as significant. This indicates that victims of one incident and repeat victims of abuse are most likely to exclude specific types of people from the premises.

If we turn to table 5.13, similarities are found for this distribution when considered by victims and non-victims of violence. As with abuse, 'making sure that staff are not alone on the premises' is the most common overall action. However, the highest chi-square values are produced in the categories of 'employ extra staff' and 'exclude specific types'. The value for the former is significant at the  $p < .01$  level. This was produced by the observed figures for the percentages of victims taking the actions being far higher than expected. Therefore the victims of violence are significantly more likely to employ extra staff to prevent crime and trouble than non-victims. It should also be noted here that the chi-square values in all categories for victims of violence are higher than for abuse (except for 'making sure staff are not alone on the premises'). This indicates that victims of violence are generally more likely to take these measures than the victims of abuse.

**Table 5.13: Actions of victims and non-victims of violence to prevent crime and trouble.**

	Non-victim (n=818)	Victim of one incident only (n=31)	Repeat victims (n=27)	Chi-square value
Employ extra staff	7%	24%	25%	12.5 p=<.01
Exclude specific types of people from the premises	20%	40%	33%	7.13 p=<.05
Have something available for self defence	25%	28%	43%	5.8 p=<.10
Make sure staff are not alone on premises	42%	48%	48%	1.21 p=<.30

As one may expect these preventative actions were predominantly used by businesses in the retail and service sector. Of the victims of abuse or violence who said they would not leave staff alone on the premises, only 14% (n=18) were outside the retail and service sector. Of the other 86%, a total of 33% (n=33) were pubs, off-licences or food shops. Of the victims who had something available to use in self-defence, 39% (n=39) were pubs, off-licences, food shops or eating-places. The largest proportion of those who excluded specific types from the premises and employed extra staff to prevent crime and trouble were also pubs and off-licences (they constituted 26% and 25% of those groups respectively). There are obvious reasons why these actions would be taken. Making sure that staff are not alone increases guardianship. Excluding specific types from the premises removes people who businesses regard as potential troublemakers or offenders. Having something available for self-defence is intended to scare victims off the premises by victims threatening to use violence against perpetrators. This may have two effects. The first would be the intended action of removing the potential offender. However, there may be an unintended consequence of using weapons. They may act as a crime facilitator thus making offenders more determined to attack and may increase the risk of repeat attacks. Finally, employing extra staff will increase levels of guardianship on the premises. Therefore, businesses will have security staff on standby to physically apprehend offenders and exclude potential troublemakers.



We can try to gauge how effective each of the above preventative actions are at reducing abuse and violence by comparing the number of victims and incidents in sweep one and two where victims said they took the preventative actions. The victims of abuse and violence have been merged here because of the low number of victims of violence who responded to both sweeps. The number of victims, incidents and the percentage increase/decrease for these (respectively) is outlined in table 5.14 below.

**Table 5.14: Panel Victim sample: Number of victims and incidents of abuse and violence in Sweep One and Two for businesses taking actions to prevent crime and trouble.**

Sample Size in brackets.	Number of victims sweep 1	Number of Victims sweep 2	% change	Number of Incidents sweep 1	Number of incidents sweep 2	% change
Exclude specific types of people from the premises (41)	14	14	0	45	33	-26.6%
Make sure staff are not alone on the premises (137)	34	28	-17.6%	142	108	-24%
Have something available for self defence (106)	33	30	-9%	208	115	-45%
Employ extra staff (5)	3	3	0	3	3	0

The first point to note is that the number of victims between sweeps 1 and 2 remain fairly constant. However, there were slight reductions in the number of victims for businesses who 'made sure staff were not alone on the premises' (-17.6%) and those who 'had something available for self-defence' (-9%). Therefore taking these actions over a period of time may have a small impact upon reducing the risks of becoming a victim of abuse/violence. However, it should be noted here that if the victims of violence in sweep one are considered, those victims who said they excluded specific types from the premises experienced no incidents in sweep two (there were 9 victims in sweep 1 experiencing 23

incidents, and no victims in sweep two). Therefore, excluding specific types of people from the premises may be an effective way of reducing violence.

The businesses that did take the above measures generally had a reduction in the number of incidents between sweep 1 and 2. Businesses that had 'something available for self defence' had the largest reductions in incidents (-45%), followed by excluding specific types from the premises (-26.6%). This data tells us that though taking these measures may have had a small impact upon reducing the risk of an initial incident of victimisation, they may have a larger impact upon repeat incidents. For example, excluding specific types of people from the premises is most likely to be done after an initial incident. After an incident the perpetrator may be excluded and is then unlikely to return to be involved in further incidents. The same applies to having something available for self-defence. Here, an incident may be triggered, for example a shopkeeper produces a weapon to use in self-defence (or to warn off the perpetrator) and the perpetrator does not return again.

A number of conclusions can be made from this section. Victims of abuse/violence are more likely to install CCTV and to take additional preventative measures such as employing extra staff to prevent crime and trouble. However, it appears that these measures may be taken for general security reasons rather than specifically to reduce abuse and violence (this is possibly related to the high 'risk heterogeneity' of some businesses to a number of crime types as highlighted in the previous section). Table 5.11 shows that the *actual* impact of CCTV upon reducing these incidents is limited, as the largest reductions in incidents was for those who did not have CCTV installed in sweep 2. The data also show that taking extra measures such as 'excluding specific types from the premises' will have limited impact upon reducing the risks of becoming a victim. However, there were reductions in the number of incidents experienced by businesses taking some of these measures. Therefore measures such as excluding the offender from the premises will have an impact by preventing the offender from returning to the premises. This could potentially reduce the overall number of incidents experienced by the business.


### **Conjecture Five: Demographics of Victims.**

*Contextual analysis of abuse and violence will show variation in the target suitability of victims due to their demographic characteristics. Gender and ethnicity will be a causal factor in generating incidents. This will lead to the following patterns:*

- a. Females will experience higher rates of violence in the workplace than males. Hindelang et al (1978) suggest that target suitability will partly be dependent upon vincability (i.e. if potential victims are able to physically protect themselves from direct contact predatory violations). One would expect that women would be less likely physically to protect themselves in violent situations than men. Therefore, it would be expected that women experience higher rates of victimisation than men.
- b. Asian and Afro-Caribbean employees will be more vulnerable to abuse and violence than white employees due to racially motivated attacks by offenders.

The analysis here will begin by exploring the relationship between gender and victimisation. Figure 5.3 outlines the ratio of incidents of abuse for males and females for sweep one of the SBCI survey. The chi-square distribution here is 25.1 (1 *df*  $p=>.001$ ). This tells us that the distribution of abuse by gender is highly significant. In total, 280 incidents of abuse were recorded where the gender of the victim was known. The proportion of staff in the businesses where the 280 incidents occurred was 47.3% male and 52.7% female. The proportion of incidents against males was 61.4% (352.5 per thousand male employees); 26.8% were against females (138 per thousand female employees) and 11.8% were against both gender groups (see figure 5.3). Of the total survey sample, there were 41.5 incidents of abuse per thousand male employees and 31.8 per thousand females. This tells us that the proportion of incidents that males suffer is slightly higher than expected.

**Figure 5.3: Abuse by gender.**




A similar pattern occurs for violence (see figure 5.4). Here the chi-square distribution for gender and violence was 32.3 (1 *df*  $p \Rightarrow .001$ ). There were 81 incidents of violence in sweep one where the gender of the victim could be established. The proportion of staff in the businesses where the 81 incidents were recorded was 59.6% female and 40.4% male. The prevalence rate for males was 13.1% and 1.7% for females with 80.2% of incidents occurring against males (107.2 per thousand male employees), 11.2% against females (10.2 per thousand female employees) and 8.6% were against both sexes. Of the total survey sample, there were 15.4 incidents of violence per thousand male employees and 3.8 per thousand females. Again, this tells us that the proportion of incidents that males suffer is substantially higher than expected.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>55</sup> Similar patterns were recorded in sweep two of the SBCI survey. In total, 237 incidents of abuse were reported where the sex of the victim was known, the proportion of staff in the business where incidents occurred was 55% male and 45% female. However, the proportion of incidents against males was 60% (135 per thousand male employees); 36% were against female employees (99 per thousand employees) and 4% were against both. Of the total survey sample, there were 29 incidents per thousand male employees and 22 incidents per thousand female employees. The rates of abuse against males and females in both survey sweeps show that males have a higher risk of becoming a victim of abuse than females. Of the 33 incidents of violence in sweep 2 where the sex of the victim could be ascertained, the proportion of staff in the business was 48% male and 52% female. In total 64% of violent incidents were against males (174 per thousand employees); 33% were against females (88 per thousand). Only one incident was against both. Of the total survey sample there were 4.2 incidents of violence per thousand male employees and 3 per thousand female employees. When compared to sweep one data similarities are apparent. Again male employees have higher risks of becoming victims of violence than females.



**Figure 5.4: Violence by Gender.**



If we return to the conjecture, we may draw the conclusion that males experience higher risks of abuse and violence than females. Therefore the original hypothesis may be rejected. Studies in the UK have highlighted that males experience a higher number of stranger violence incidents than females, though this has not been highlighted within the context of small businesses (for example, see the British Crime Survey, Mayhew et al, 1992). There may be a number of reasons why females have lower risks of abuse and violence than males. These may be broadly divided into situational and behavioural factors. If we consider situational factors first, many businesses employ a high proportion of females who have little contact with the public. For example, 60% of the female workforce were employed in the 'low risk' manufacturing and wholesale sectors, compared to 50% of the male workforce.<sup>56</sup> As a consequence, females may have a slightly lower risk of contact with assailants. Secondly, females who work in the 'high risk' sectors may take steps to avoid becoming targets for abuse/ violence. For example, they may not allow themselves to work until late at night or to be left alone on the premises at vulnerable times.

<sup>56</sup> The full breakdown was; Males: 31% (987) employed in the service sector; 29% (911) retail; 27% (864) manufacturing and 13% (439) in the wholesale sector. For Females, 42% (1351) for employed in manufacturing; 31% (1004) services; 19% (610) retail and 8% (264) wholesale.

## **Victimisation by Ethnicity and Racially Motivated Abuse and Violence.**

Few studies have explored the distribution of abuse and violence in businesses by the ethnic group of owners or staff, though some studies have considered the extent of racially motivated abuse against minority groups (for example see Ekblom and Simon, 1988). Here, we will consider both the distribution of abuse and violence by ethnic group and the extent to which abuse and violence was considered racially motivated. The SBCI survey recorded the ethnic group of the majority of staff in businesses. These were recorded as 'white', 'Asian', 'black' or 'mixed'. This allows us to establish the proportion of incidents of abuse and violence against businesses according to the ethnicity of staff. This section will be considered by area due to the differing ethnic compositions of businesses in the West End and Belgrave communities.

This section will begin by considering the prevalence of abuse by ethnicity. In the West End 167 white businesses and 45 Asian businesses were able to state whether they had been a victim of abuse. Of these 14% of white and 21% of Asian businesses were victims of at least one incident. This distribution produces a chi-square of 1.480 which is only significant at the .224 level (1 *df*). However, the observed prevalence rate for Asian businesses was slightly higher than expected. This produced a gamma correlation of .228 (ethnic group coded 0=white, 1=Asian), which shows a positive association between Asian businesses and abuse. In Belgrave, 93 white businesses and 139 Asian businesses were able to state whether they had been victims of abuse. In total, 20% of white businesses and 27% of Asian businesses were victims. This produced a chi-square of 1.734, which is significant at the .188 level (1*df*). As with the distribution in the West End, this is not highly significant, though again the observed prevalence rate against Asian businesses is higher than expected. This produces a positive gamma correlation of .185 for abuse and ethnicity of staff.

If we turn to the proportion of incidents experienced according to ethnicity, table 5.15 highlights that Asians experience a higher proportion of abuse than expected in both areas (sweep 1 data).

**Table 5.15: Ethnicity of business staff and risks of abuse: Sweep 1.**

Area	Proportion of Businesses: White	Proportion of Incidents: Against White	Proportion of Businesses: Asian	Proportion of Incidents: Against Asian	Total proportion of incidents racially motivated
West End	64.9%	46.7%	18.8%	53.3%	32%
Belgrave	34.8%	25%	57.4%	72%	18.2%

Note: Afro- Caribbean omitted due to small numbers of businesses.

In the West End area, 64.9% of businesses had predominately white staff, 18.8% Asian and 14.9% were mixed white and Asian. In Belgrave, 57.4% of businesses had predominately Asian staff, 34.8% white and 7.5% were white and Asian. Only 1.3% of West End businesses and 0.3% of Belgrave businesses had a predominance of Afro-Caribbean staff. In both areas Asian businesses had higher proportions of abuse than would be expected. In the West End 18.8% of businesses had predominately Asian staff, though 53.3% of incidents of abuse in the area (this produces a chi-square value of 19 which is significant at the .001 level). In Belgrave 57.4% of businesses were Asian and they were victims of 72% of incidents of abuse (this produces a chi-square value of 3.5  $p > .05$ ). Therefore, Asian businesses experience a higher proportion of abuse than white businesses, though the pattern is more significant in the West End than Belgrave.

In total, 273 incidents of abuse were recorded where the victim was able to state whether they thought the incident was racially motivated or not. Of these 273 incidents, 22.3% were perceived as being racially motivated. If this is considered as a proportion of all reported abuse (whether victims were able to say if incidents were racially motivated or not) then 8% of all recorded abuse was racially motivated. If these incidents are considered by area, there were 80 incidents in the West End, and 180 in Belgrave where respondents were able to state whether they were racially motivated or not. Of these incidents, 32% in the West End were perceived to be racially motivated as compared to 18.2% in Belgrave. If considered as a proportion of all recorded abuse (whether victims

were able to say if incidents were racially motivated or not) then 8% of all abuse in the West End is racially motivated and 8.2% in Belgrave. In total, Asians described 31% of incidents of abuse against them as racially motivated compared to 16% of abuse against whites. Of the total number of racially motivated incidents, 67% were against Asians and 33% against whites.

From this evidence we can conclude that Asian businesses are more likely than white businesses to become victims of abuse and particularly racially motivated abuse. The most obvious explanation for the high proportion of abuse against Asian businesses is racial motivation. However, it should be noted that there were a high number of Asian businesses in high risks groups. In total, 153 businesses that could be defined as 'high risk' (see figure 5.5) were able to describe the ethnicity of the majority of staff. Of these businesses 57.5% (88) were 'Asian' and 42.5% (65) were 'white'. Therefore, Asian staff experience increased risks as they are employed in businesses with a high-risk heterogeneity to abuse.

If we turn to violence by staff ethnicity, in total there were 183 white businesses and 53 Asian in the West End who were able to say if they had been victims of violence. Of these 7.1% (n=14) of businesses where staff were predominantly white and 7% (n=53) where staff were predominantly Asian had been victims of violence. This produces a chi-square value of .001 which is not significant ( $df=1$   $p=.983$ ). Therefore the observed values here were similar to what may be expected. In Belgrave, 110 white business and 173 Asian businesses were able say if they had been victims of violence. These had a prevalence rate of 4.3% and 8.5% respectively. This distribution produces a chi-square of 1.885, which is only significant at the .170 level.

If we consider the proportion of incidents against these businesses, table 5.16 (below) suggests that white businesses experience a higher proportion of violence than Asian businesses.



**Table 5.16: Ethnicity of business staff and risks of violence: Sweep 1.**

<b>Area</b>	<b>Proportion of Businesses: White</b>	<b>Proportion of Incidents: Against White</b>	<b>Proportion of Businesses: Asian</b>	<b>Proportion of Incidents: Against Asian</b>	<b>Total proportion of incidents racially motivated</b>
<b>West End</b>	64.9%	83%	18.8%	3%	6%
<b>Belgrave</b>	34.8%	44%	57.4%	31%	7%


In total, 161 incidents of violence were recorded in sweep one where the ethnicity of the business could be identified. Of these incidents 102 (63%) were in the West End and 59 (37%) in Belgrave. In both the West End and Belgrave, white businesses were victims of a higher proportion of violence than may be expected. In the West End 83% of violence was against the 64.9% of white businesses (this produces a chi-square value of 15.4 which is significant at the .001 level). In Belgrave 44% of violence was against the 34.8% of white businesses (this produces a chi-square value of 8.8 which is significant at the .01 level). In both areas, Asian businesses were subject to less violence than one may expect, though in Belgrave the proportion of incidents against Asian businesses is higher than in the West End because of the high proportion of Asian businesses in that area. It is difficult to ascertain here why Asians appear to be victims of a higher proportion of abuse and whites a higher proportion of violence. One explanation may be that whites are more likely to precipitate incidents than Asians. However, this is hard to verify. A more likely explanation is found when considering the distribution of Asian and white businesses within the 'high risk' business types.

Figure 5.5 (below) considers the distribution of staff by ethnic group within the 'high risk' business types.<sup>57</sup> Two key observations can be made from figure 5.5. First, the types of businesses where Asians form the majority of the workforce are those such as clothing shops and off-licences. Second, whites only form a clear majority of staff in public houses. Businesses such as clothing and off-licences have a high risk of abuse (and in

<sup>57</sup> The sample sizes were as follows: Food shop= 35 (17 white, 18 Asian); Off licence= 32 (10 white, 22 Asian); Clothing/ footwear= 26 (3 white; 23 Asian); Motor vehicle parts =11 (6 white, 5 Asian); Public Houses =15 (14 white, 1 Asian) and eating places =28 (11 white, 17 Asian).

some circumstances violence), though public houses will often be settings for violence. Therefore, the high proportion of white members of staff working in public houses may have higher risks of experiencing violence than their Asian counterparts in other 'high risk' businesses.

**Figure 5.5: 'High Risk' businesses and ethnicity of employees.**



\*Bookmakers, hotels and postal services omitted due to low numbers.

The SBCI sweep 1 survey also asked if victims felt that incidents of violence were racially motivated. In total, respondents said 14% of incidents were racially motivated (out of 71). These incidents represent 6% of the total in the West End and 7% of the total in Belgrave, and were evenly split between white and Asian businesses.<sup>58</sup> Therefore fewer incidents of violence were perceived to be racially motivated than abuse. This may be because a higher proportion of violence was against white businesses. Overall, there was a strong positive correlation between ethnicity and racially motivated abuse and violence. The gamma correlation for ethnicity and racially motivated attack is .539 (here ethnicity was coded 0=white, 1=Asian; racially motivated attack includes either abuse or violence and is coded 0=no, 1=yes). When considered by area, there is a strong correlation between ethnicity and racial motivation in the West End (gamma= .774). This tells us that racially motivated abuse and violence are strongly associated with being

<sup>58</sup> In sweep 2, respondents were able to say if incidents of violence were racially motivated in 33 incidents-14% of these incidents were described by the victim as racially motivated.

Asian in this area. This may be because Asian businesses in this area would come into contact with a high number of white customers, thus increasing the risk of racially motivated abuse/ violence. In the Belgrave area this association is less marked ( $\gamma = .274$ ). Therefore abuse/ violence is less positively associated with being Asian in this area. This may be because a high proportion of contact in the Belgrave area will be between Asian staff and customers thus reducing the risks of racially motivated abuse/violence.

If we return to conjecture 5 (b), a number of conclusions can be made. In both project areas, Asian businesses experienced a higher proportion of abuse than expected, whilst white businesses experienced a higher proportion of violence than expected. Racially motivated abuse and violence was a problem for a number of businesses with Asian businesses more at risk from racially motivated abuse in both areas (though there appear to be distinct variations according to area). As we have said, this pattern may be produced in the West End because there are a high number of Asian businesses in the area that come into contact with white customers.

Asians may also appear to have high risks of abuse because they run the types of businesses that are particularly vulnerable to abuse (such as off-licences or newsagents). However, this does not explain why white businesses experience a higher proportion of violence than Asian businesses. There may be two reasons for this. First, whites are more likely than Asians to run public houses, where violence commonly occurs. Second, white members of staff may be more likely than Asians to engage in incidents to 'save face' or protect the business. This may have the impact of precipitating incidents of abuse into violence.

### **Conjecture Six: Demographics of Perpetrators and victims.**

*Little research has considered the demographic characteristics of both victims and their assailants in incidents of abuse or violence. The research that has been conducted has found that in incidents of violence where victims are male, the perpetrators are also likely to be male (Mayhew et al, 1993). Similarly, it has been found that victims and offenders tend to share the same ethnic characteristics (Mayhew et al, 1993). It is conjectured here, that when considering the demographic characteristics of victims and offenders the SBCI data will show that:*

- a. The assailants in incidents of abuse and violence will predominantly be male.
- b. Victims and offenders will share the same demographic characteristics. Therefore, incidents by males will be against males and those by whites will be against whites. This will not only confirm previous research but also show that these patterns are replicated within the context of businesses.

Within this section, we will begin by examining the gender and ethnic group of offenders. Our analysis here will consider only sweep two data due to the design of the research instruments used. The first survey sweep only asked about the demographic characteristics of victims, whereas the second sweep asked about the demographic characteristics of both victims and offenders.


Respondents were asked for the gender and ethnic group of the perpetrators of abuse and violence for all incidents. They were given the options to describe the gender of assailants as 'male', 'female' or 'both' for each recorded incident and ethnic group as 'white', 'black' or 'Asian'. This is a useful indicator of the demographic dynamics of incidents, though there are some problems with the design of the research instrument here. It does not tell us how many assailants were involved in incidents, as the respondent could only record the demographic characteristics of one assailant. Therefore, the only way that we can tell if more than one assailant is involved is if respondents record the gender as 'both'. A similar problem exists with the way ethnicity of offenders is recorded. The ethnic group of only one assailant can be recorded as either 'white', 'black' or 'Asian', although incidents may have been perpetrated by more than one



offender from different ethnic groups. It must therefore be assumed that for most incidents respondents described only the major antagonist.

For a total of 233 incidents of abuse and 32 incidents of violence, victims were able to describe the gender of the main perpetrator. For both abuse and violence the overwhelming majority of perpetrators were male (see figure 5.6).

**Figure 5.6: Gender of perpetrators in incidents of abuse and violence.**



In 81% of incidents of abuse and 93% of incidents of violence males were cited as the major antagonist. Females were the major antagonists in 15% of incidents of abuse and 3% of incidents of violence. In 4% of incidents of abuse and 3% of violence the major antagonists were described as being both male and female. The chi-square distribution for gender of perpetrators and abuse is 168 (1 *df*) which is highly significant ( $p < .001$ ).<sup>59</sup> The odds ratio here is 29:1 in favour of males. This tells us that males are 29 times more likely to be the perpetrators of abuse than females.

As expected, a strong relationship is observed between abuse/violence and perpetrators being male. This confirms the first part of conjecture six and previous research that has suggested males are more aggressive in most human societies than females (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974; 1980). However, some studies have concluded that though males may be more inclined to use violence in aggressive situations, the differences in verbal

<sup>59</sup> The chi-squared value cannot be calculated for gender of perpetrators and violence because under 5% of all incidents were perpetrated by females.

aggression between males and females are less marked. Bandura (1973) suggests overall levels of aggression by men and women may not differ greatly, though variation occurs in the means of expressing this aggression. Men are more likely to be physically violent, though women are no less aggressive in non-physical ways, such as verbal aggression. The data presented here shows that for both violence and abuse males were the most likely aggressors. However, for a larger proportion of incidents of abuse than violence, females were the perpetrators. This suggests that females may be more willing to engage in verbal than physical aggression.

### **Demographic characteristics of victims and offenders.**

The gender of offenders has so far been considered. Here the gender and ethnicity of victims and offenders within the same incidents will be considered. This will be analysed by using sweep two data as the gender and ethnicity of victims/offenders could not be assessed for the reasons stated above.

Table 5.17 outlines the demographic characteristics of assailants and victims for incidents of abuse. In total, the gender and ethnicity of victims and offenders could be ascertained in 214 incidents. However, for the assailants, Asian and black females have been omitted because few incidents were recorded where they were perpetrators. For the victims, black males and females have been omitted because only a small number of black employees were in the SBCI sample and subsequently no incidents were recorded against this ethnic group.

It is impossible to calculate the chi-square distribution for table 5:17 as a number of cells have values of below 5. However, the chi-square distribution was calculated for the observed and expected frequencies of incidents by gender and then by ethnicity. If the distribution of incidents are considered by gender (number of incidents by male/ females against males/ females in a 2x2 contingency table) a chi-square value of 47.5 is calculated (df=1  $p < .001$ ). This tells us that the relationship between victims and offenders is highly significant when considered by gender. Similarly, chi-square value for the relationship between the ethnicity of victims and offenders is also highly significant. Here, the number of incidents by white/ Asian/ black assailants were considered by the

ethnicity of offenders (this produced a 2x3 contingency table as there were no black victims). This gave a chi-square value of 21 (df=2) which is significant at the .001 level.

**Table 5.17: Demographic characteristics of victims and assailants: Abuse.**

Victims	Assailants (proportion of incidents- incident numbers are in the brackets)				
	White Males	White Females	Asian Males	Black Males	Total
White Males	35 (39)	41 (7)	18 (7)	20 (7)	30 (60)
Asian Males	24 (26)	12 (2)	44 (17)	40 (14)	29 (59)
White Females	26 (29)	29 (5)	13 (5)	14 (5)	22 (44)
Asian Females	8 (9)	12 (2)	23 (9)	14(5)	12 (25)
More than one victim	6 (7)	6 (1)	2 (1)	12(4)	6 (13)
Total	99 (110)	100 (17)	100 (39)	100 (35)	99 (201)*

\*The total number including Asian and Black perpetrators was 214

The data presented in table 5.17 highlights a number of consistent patterns by gender and ethnicity. In total 86% of incidents (out of 214) were by males of which 60% were by white males, 21% Asian males and 19% black males. In only 14% of incidents were the assailants female, the majority of these (17 out of 30) were by white females. White, Asian and black males were all most likely to be involved in incidents against other males. In total 59% of all incidents by white males were against males, as were 62% by Asian males, and 60% by black males. These patterns are consistent with previous research which has identified that incidents of aggression tend to be by males and against males (see Archer, 1994; Geen, 1990).

The data also show that for incidents of abuse, victims and offenders tend to share the same ethnicity. In 61% of the incidents by white males, the victims were also white. For white females, 72% of all incidents of abuse were against other whites, with 67% of incidents by Asians being against other Asians. The only ethnic group where this does not apply is for black assailants. This is because there were few black employees in the sample. Black assailants were most likely to be abusive towards Asians. Here, 54% (n=19) of incidents where blacks were the perpetrators were against Asians, of these incidents 52% were said to be racially motivated.

These patterns may be produced by two factors. The first is a product of geography. Incidents may often be between participants of the same ethnicity because within areas such as Belgrave Asians will have a high degree of contact with other Asians thus increasing the risk of incidents within this group. As previously noted, Mayhew et al, (1992) highlighted that for incidents of violence victims and offenders shared the same ethnicity. Here, it was suggested that these patterns emerge because a victim from a specific ethnic group is more likely to encounter an offender from the same minority group. Second, a process of 'reverse racial discrimination' may be at work. This hypothesis has been forwarded by a number of studies (see for example, Prentice-Dunn, 1981). Reverse racism is a process where conflict with somebody from a different ethnic group will be avoided due to the fear of being labelled racist. Therefore, current social norms may be inhibiting aggression between victims and offenders from different ethnic groups.

However, this does not explain why inter-ethnic conflict does occur on occasions. Here a process of 'regressive racism' may be at work. This has been noted by Rogers and Prentice-Dunn, (1981) and is a process where each racial group appears to revert to a type of behaviour characteristic of an earlier period of history (Geen, 1990: pp.155). For example, studies have noted that *in the absence of provocation* whites are less aggressive towards blacks than are other blacks (reverse racial discrimination). However if provoked, blacks or whites may revert to racial discrimination against a person of a differing ethnic background that is more aggressive than an attack against somebody of the same ethnic group (regressive racism).



There were also 26 incidents of violence where the gender and ethnic group of both the assailant and victim could be ascertained. These show similar patterns to those identified for abuse. Of these incidents 16 (62%) were by white males, 6 (23%) black males and 4 (15%) Asian males. In the incidents where a white male was the assailant, 8 victims were white males, 6 white females and 2 Asian males. Of the incidents where a black male was the perpetrator, 4 were against white males and 2 white females and of the incidents where an Asian male was the perpetrator, 2 were against Asian males, 1 against an Asian female and 1 against a white female. As with abuse, where the perpetrators are male, the victims tend to be male (this is apparent in 62% of cases). The white perpetrators here also tended to be involved in incidents against white victims (in 94% of cases). However, incidents of violence involving black and Asian perpetrators were not as race specific. It should be added here that there are very few incidents in these categories, so the data has to be treated with caution.

If we return to the second half of the conjecture, we can conclude that for a large proportion of abuse and violence, offenders and their victims share the same gender and ethnicity. It has been observed that males are more likely to be both the victim and perpetrator in incidents. Incidents also appear to be between victims and assailants from the same ethnic group. In total, 61% of incidents of abuse by white males involved white victims, as did 70% of incidents by white females; 67% of incidents by Asian males were against Asians. This pattern is not reflected by black assailants due to the absence of potential victims of that ethnicity. However, these patterns are partly produced by area, for example 65% of incidents involving Asians were in the Belgrave area. As discussed above some similar patterns are produced for violence, though one has to be careful here due to the low number of incidents.

### **'High risk' Lifestyles: Can we identify the businesses and employees who are most at risk?**

This chapter has considered the contexts that promote or generate abuse/ violence. It is clear that a number of key 'lifestyle' features are identified in the business that provide

the settings for abuse/ violence and the members of staff who become victims. These characteristics are outlined below.

1. There are a number of factors specific to business types that promote risk. The SBCI data has clearly shown businesses in the retail and service sectors have a higher risk heterogeneity in relation to abuse and violence than businesses in the wholesale and manufacturing sector. The data also show that businesses in the retail and service sectors experience higher rates of repeat victimisation.
2. Within the retail and service sector there are variations in victimisation risk. Table 5.4 identified a number of lifestyle factors that are specific to these businesses. These include having a high number of customer visits, attracting motivated offenders, handling cash, late opening and having a presence of alcohol on the premises.
3. Larger business premises (5+ employees) have a high average number of incidents of abuse than smaller businesses employing less than five staff, whereas the risks of violence are highest in businesses employing less than 5 employees. The *actual* risks of becoming a victim of abuse/violence are highest for employees working in businesses that employ less than 5 staff.
4. Businesses that are victims of abuse and violence also have higher prevalence rates for a number of crime types than non-victims of abuse and violence. Therefore, these businesses have a high 'risk heterogeneity' to a number of other incident types. Therefore, these businesses appear to have lifestyles that attract and generate a number of crime types. However, the SBCI data also tell us that there is a strong linear association between abuse, violence and shop theft.
5. Victims of abuse/violence are more likely to install CCTV than non-victims. This may be because these are more likely to be victims of a number of crime types and not just abuse and violence. CCTV did little to reduce abuse and violence. Businesses that had CCTV in sweep one and two had an increase in the number of victims and incidents between the two survey sweeps.

6. Victims of abuse/violence are also more likely than other business types to take other preventative actions such as 'employing extra staff' or 'making sure that staff are not alone on the premises'. The subsets of businesses who 'excluded specific types of people from the premises', 'make sure staff are not alone on the premises', and 'have something available for self defence' all had substantial reductions in the number of incidents they experienced between sweeps one and two.
7. Ethnicity is also a predictor of abuse and violence. Abuse is disproportionately concentrated against Asians whereas violence is concentrated against whites. The higher proportion of violence against whites is partly produced by the disproportionate number of whites working in 'high risk' businesses such as public houses.
8. A number of incidents against Asians were said to be racially motivated. This confirms the findings of previous research which have suggested that small shops will be a common setting for racially motivated abuse (see Ekblom & Simon, 1988).
9. Gender is particularly important in determining the risk of abuse or violence. Males were victims of a higher proportion of both abuse and violence than females. Males are more likely to be employed in businesses that are categorised as 'high risk' and as a result are placed in situations where risks are high or where they precipitate incidents. This issue is discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
10. Assaultants in incidents of abuse and violence were predominantly male. This confirms previous research by Beck et al, 1994. This found that 59.1% of aggressors in a national retail store were male. Here, males were the perpetrators in 82% of incidents of abuse and 93% of incidents of violence.
11. Victims and offenders in incidents tend to share the same gender and ethnicity. In incidents where victims were male the offenders were also male. In incidents where the victims were white, the offenders also tended to be white. This confirms previous research which has highlighted that victims and offenders usually share similar demographic characteristics (see Felson & Steadman, 1983 & Mayhew et al, 1992).

This chapter has highlighted a number of key lifestyle features of the victims of abuse and violence. A number of these lifestyle features can be used to predict where abuse and violence will occur. However, it is not guaranteed that simply because a number of contextual factors come together that an incident will occur. Other factors will be important in determining whether contexts that appear to be conducive to abuse and violence actually generate incidents. These will be considered in chapter six where we will consider how incidents of abuse and violence are actually triggered and the key escalating and de-escalating processes within incidents.

## Chapter Six

### **Mores and Folkways: The Triggers and Processes of Abuse and Violence against Businesses.**

#### **Introduction:**

The previous chapter outlined the contexts in which abuse and violence are triggered. We will now consider the triggers of these incidents and how incidents escalate from abuse into violence. This will be achieved primarily by using case studies from qualitative interviews with businesses, though some data will be used from the two SBCI surveys. Due to the number of business types the SBCI interviewed, it was decided that it would be unrealistic for a study of this size to try and conduct qualitative interviews with businesses from each sector. Therefore interviews were conducted with a number of victims from the retail and service sectors and a number of case studies are picked out from the interviews.

The qualitative interviews were designed to gain an understanding of the triggers of incidents and the processes that occur during an incident of abuse or violence. Therefore respondents were asked to describe how incidents were usually triggered, and the typical pattern of the incident process (see chapter four). This method was used to gain an understanding of the triggers of incidents and the escalating and de-escalating events that make up the incident process.

#### **Testing the conjectures:**

In chapter three, conjectures were outlined about the triggers and processes of abuse and violence. These conjectures are again stated below to remind the reader of their major theoretical underpinnings (see chapter three for a more detailed account).

## The Triggers of Abuse and Violence.

**Conjecture One: 'Norm breaking' behaviour will trigger abuse and violence. An incident of abuse/violence will be provoked by an action or verbal exchange that breaks the norms of business transactions. This norm breaking behaviour will include:**

- 2. Crime/ criminal activity on the premises that results in staff intervention. This creates a trigger for abuse as staff will confront perpetrators about their behaviour. A number of crime types will precipitate abuse. These are:**
  - a. Robbery.** Here violence, or the threat of violence is explicitly used by the assailants. If staff refuse to meet demands then the incident will escalate into more serious violence.
  - b. Fraud.** Here incidents will be triggered at the point of sales. Incidents will be triggered in two ways. First, by staff trying to apprehend the offenders who in turn protest their innocence to staff. If staff do not give in to the pleas of the assailant, then the assailant may become angry and violent. Second, offenders may want staff to give fraudulent notes or credit cards back to them so they can be used somewhere else. If staff refuse, this will again lead to assailants becoming frustrated and will lead to conflict.
  - c. Criminal Damage.** This will be a source of abuse/ violence in two ways. First, if staff catch offenders damaging property and intervene, offenders may respond abusively or violently. Second, those who have previously been involved in incidents with the business (apprehended for shop theft, refused sale of cigarettes or alcohol, or involved in abuse/ violence) may damage buildings as a form of retribution against the business.
  - d. Shop Theft.** Shop theft will be a trigger for many incidents of abuse/ violence. Incidents will be triggered in two ways. First, conflict will be triggered by those apprehended for shop theft protesting their innocence. Second, it will be triggered by offenders trying to escape after being apprehended.

- e. **Underage customers trying to buy drink or cigarettes.** Here incidents will be triggered at the point of sale. Staff will refuse the sale of goods to those who are (or appear to be) under age and the assailants will protest that they are old enough to buy the goods. As a result of this disagreement, unless one of the parties back down then conflict will follow.
  - f. **Customers acting in an anti-social manner.** As with criminal activity, sometimes norms will be broken in the business environment by individuals or groups behaving in an anti-social manner. This behaviour will often not be related to any incident of crime and will involve young people entering the premises swearing, messing goods around and being deliberately offensive to staff.
- 3. Incidents of abuse will also be triggered by businesses breaking the norms of transaction. This will generate complaints from customers over:**
- a. **The quality of goods.** In any business transaction, customers will expect to purchase goods of a certain standard. If goods do not come up to standard they will feel they are not getting value for money and complain. If the complaint is not accepted by the member of staff on duty the customer will become frustrated and conflict will follow.
  - b. **The quality of service.** Customers will expect a certain standard of service, whenever they buy goods or use services in a business. If the expected standard of goods/service is not met, customers will feel they are not getting value for money and will complain to a member of staff. If nothing is done to resolve the complaint the customer is likely to become frustrated and conflict will follow.
  - c. **The amount of change given by a member of staff.** If staff give customers the wrong change after the purchase of goods, the customer will complain. If the member of staff refuses to acknowledge that the wrong change has been given the customer will become frustrated and conflict will follow.

## **The Process Events of Abuse and Violence.**

**Conjecture Two: The final result of an incident of abuse will be dependent upon a number of process events within an incident. Process events are actions by each party (staff or customer) in the incident that determine the course and final result of the incident (whether the final result is abuse or violence). These process events can be categorised into escalating and de-escalating actions. Therefore:**

- a. Incidents with the most serious results will consist of a series of escalating actions from both parties. These escalating actions will continue to intensify the incident and will consist of behaviour such as making threats and identity attacks.
- b. In contrast to this, less serious incidents will consist of both escalating and de-escalating mechanisms. However, in these incidents one party (or both) will start to back down during the incident by using a series of de-escalating mechanisms. These will include accepting responsibility for actions and apologies.
- c. The outcomes of all incidents will be dependent upon the attitude taken by each actor towards the incident process. If both parties are favourable to violence, then a result of violence is likely.

**The triggers of abuse and violence: How do customers and staff become victims and offenders?<sup>60</sup>**

### *Robbery.*

Here, we begin by considering robbery. In the previous chapter the association between robbery and abuse/ violence was highlighted. One would expect to find a close relationship between robbery and violence as it is the threat of violence in incidents of

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<sup>60</sup> It should be noted that fraud cannot be covered here as no businesses were able to recall an incident that was triggered by fraud. This may be because many of the businesses in the sample did not take credit cards or cheques, and often fraud is uncovered after the incident had taken place.



robbery that makes victims give over goods and cash to assailants. However, the final outcome of an incident of robbery will be dependent upon the actions of both the victim and offender in the incident process. As already stated, robbery will consist of abuse, threats and demands on victims for goods or cash. Therefore, of primary interest is how an incident type that already contains aggression and abuse may be further escalated to one of violence.

The SBCI data (sweep 1) highlighted that robbery is not a highly prevalent crime. In total 67 business in sweep one were victims of robbery (7.7% of the sample).<sup>61</sup> These 67 victims reported 95 incidents. Weapons were used in 22 robberies and 10 of these incidents resulted in injury to staff. This shows that violence was used in at least 10.5% of robberies. The risks of being exposed to this type of violence are highly correlated with business type. In total 83% of robberies were against business in the retail or service sectors where goods and cash were commonly found on the premises. Of these businesses 58% came into the high-risk classification for abuse and violence. The business types with the highest risk of robbery and abuse/violence were off-licences. In total 12% of off-licences were victims of a robbery over a 12 month period.

We can begin to assess how incidents of robbery will generate abuse/violence by considering data from the qualitative interviews. Here, the text from the interview that describes the incident is given. This highlights the trigger of the incident (T), the de-escalating (D) and escalating mechanisms (ES) of the incident. The text is then split into a table outlining the context, the trigger, process events and the final result. The first is an

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<sup>61</sup> It is acknowledged in the SBCI report (Wood et al, 1996) that this figure is high for robbery. This is because the definition of robbery used by the SBCI was 'theft or attempted theft, by threatening or using violence, by anybody not employed by the business either on the premises or while undertaking business elsewhere'. The legal definition of robbery is 'theft where violence or the threat of violence occurs before or during the commission of any theft' Therefore the SBCI definition is likely to include incidents that occur off the business premises and those that were viewed by respondents as attempted robberies. In addition to this, questions could also be raised with the SBCI data as to how respondents and interviewers recorded incidents in sweep one. In debriefs with interviewers some stated that robbery was often confused with shop theft. In sweep two of the survey, the interview team were asked to make sure that only theft with the use or the threat of violence was recorded as robbery and not other incident types that could be mistaken for robbery. This could partly explain why only 2.4% of businesses reported robbery in sweep two.

example of a robbery that generated violence. The interview was conducted with an off-licence owner in Belgrave.

**Case Study One: Robbery and abuse/ violence.**

‘It was fairly late, I think- well it was dark. There were not that many people around. A group of lads came in, not that old but all in the gear they wear, caps and stuff and the big coats. I reckon about five or six of them. One came up and wanted fags and some booze, not to pay but just wants it. He says ‘Right give us the fags and booze’. So of course I say no. Anyway, all his mates are standing around, looking really intimidating and he asks again like ‘give us the fucking fags and booze’. I’m saying ‘no way’. If I lose that I lose a lot of cash yer know. Anyway, one of them pulls out a baseball bat (from under his coat) and I set the alarm off. I let them know its gone off and the plod will be around soon. I ask them to go, but they keep asking for fags and booze. So the guy with the bat, he says nothing and just smashes it down on the counter. Then it sort of goes off and I am telling them to get out but a couple jumped over, smashed me in the side of the face and got some fags and bottles’.

Off-licence Owner, Belgrave.

From this interview we can pick out triggers and process events that generate a result of abuse or violence. These are outlined in table 6.1 below.

**Table 6.1: The context, trigger, process events and result of case study one.**

Context	Triggers (norm breaking behaviour)	Process Events	Result
Small off-licence open until late in the evening. Only one member of staff is present.	Group of teenagers enter. Demand that staff hand over cigarettes and alcohol. Staff refuse (T).	Demands become more aggressive, but request not complied with (ES1) A baseball bat is pulled out (ES2) Victim says the panic alarm has been activated (ES3). Assailants told that police are on their way (ES4) Staff demand that assailants leave, though assailants keep asking for goods (ES5).	Baseball Bat smashed onto counter, member of staff hit, some packets of cigarettes and bottles of spirits are stolen (R).

T+ES1+ES2+ES3+ES4+ES5=R

The above example can be divided into a number of sequences or events. The incident is triggered by assailants asking staff to hand over cigarettes and alcohol (T). This is clearly a violation of the norms of business transaction as assailants are asking for goods without any exchange of cash. The member of staff does not comply with these requests and the incident process is triggered. After the initial trigger the incident is shaped by a number of escalating events. These mainly include requests by assailants for goods that are not complied with by staff. The first escalating event is an aggressive request by the assailants that the victim does not comply with (ES1). At this point the assailants become frustrated as the victim is not willing to hand over goods (even though he is heavily outnumbered). As a result a weapon is produced (which raises the stakes somewhat) (ES2). This is a clear threat of violence, though the incident is further escalated by the shop staff refusing to comply with the orders and telling the assailants that a panic alarm has been activated (ES3). This may have panicked the offenders in to thinking that they have very little time to get the goods. The victim tells the assailants that the police are on their way and he continues to ask the offenders to leave (ES4 & ES5). These actions also escalate the incident. Asking the offenders to leave the premises re-affirms the position of the member of staff that he will not hand over goods and calling the police lets offenders know they have little time if the robbery is to be a success. This escalates the incident into violence. The assailants smash the baseball bat down onto the counter, the member of staff is hit and assailants go behind the counter to get cigarettes and bottles of alcohol (R).

Interactionist theories of violence would suggest aggression is used here to try and coerce staff (see Felson, 1984). From the onset, the major goal for the offenders in case study one is to secure goods. As in most robberies, violence is used to try and coerce staff in to meeting these ends. The robbery is escalated into violence by the continued refusal of the member of staff to comply with the demands of the assailants and calling the police 'panicked' the assailants into acting quickly. Therefore the offenders were becoming more frustrated as their demands were not being met.

This example also highlights how staff play a large role in precipitating the violence associated with robbery. Here, the staff refusal to comply with orders produced a result of violence. Previous research also shows that staff handling of robbery can have a large bearing on the risks of robbery developing into violence. Gill and Matthews (1994) interviewed 341 convicted robbers and found that violence could result if staff attempted to stop the robbery or 'have-a-go heroes' tried to intervene. Robbers would then have to use violence as an attempt to gain goods and escape. Home Office advice to businesses tells staff to cooperate with offenders in incidents of robbery. 'Prevention of robbery- A Guide for Retailers' (Home Office, 1998) states, 'firstly, they (members of staff) are less likely to get hurt if they co-operate with the robbers' demands; they must keep still and not make sudden movements or risk their lives by 'having a go'.

It is therefore recognised that staff should not resist robbery, though interviews with business owners identified an attitude that was more akin to fighting off violence or aggression rather than complying with offenders. The previous example showed how staff tried to resist a robbery which generated a violent result. The next example shows how staff did not comply with offenders' demands, though a violent result is avoided. This account is given by a newsagent.

### **Case Study Two: Robbery and abuse/ violence.**

'It was January, a dark night about 5pm. These three youths, one came in then two were outside. He came in then looked around and he sees there's no surveillance. Anyway he goes back outside and the others come in. They were wearing scarves around their neck and baseball caps you know. One came to the counter and asked for something like toothpaste. The others were funny. I could tell they want nothing, I can see it in their eyes, they had floating eyes, not fixed on anything. The one was talking, the others looking round. Then he pulls up his scarf like over his face and err... say 'empty the till', so I said 'What! Get lost'. He says 'empty the fucking till Paki'. I was praying that a nice ordinary customer would come in. I pushed the button behind the counter -it lets my wife know upstairs. Then he said it for the third time and I just said, 'Fuck off'. My wife came and they ran out of the business grabbing what they could. They must have thought there were more of us or the police were on their way. They were not that forceful, they were amateurs, you could tell, but they were saying, 'Come on then you Paki.' It was a bit racist you know, but not really racially motivated'.

Newsagent, West End.

**Table 6.2: The context, trigger, process events and results of case study two.**

Context	Triggers (norm breaking behaviour)	Process Events	Result
Small Off-licence, 5pm in the evening. One member of staff behind the counter, another is upstairs.	Three youths enter the business. One asks the member of staff to empty the till. The member of staff refuses to comply (T).	Offender asks more aggressively, uses racist abuse, is again refused (ES1). Offender again makes request and is now subjected to abuse from member of staff (ES2). Third party enters and offenders leave (D1).	Offenders leave the premises grabbing whatever they can 'R'.

T+ES1+ES2+D1=R

As with case study one the incident is triggered by a violation of the norms of business transaction. This incident process is again triggered when assailants ask for goods with no intention of paying for them. Again, a process is identified where the incident is escalated as the offender makes demands upon the victim that are not complied with. The offender becomes frustrated and racist identity attacks are made against the member of staff, though the member of staff is not willing to comply with the offender's demands (ES1). Again the request is made and this time the request is refused by the member of staff by telling the offenders to 'fuck off'(ES2). Here it may be expected that the incident would now be escalated into one of violence. However, the incident takes a dramatic turn with the arrival of a third party (the victim's wife- D1). This has a de-escalating effect on the incident as the offenders soon leave.

If we return to conjecture one, it is apparent that robbery is a violation of the norms of business transaction. The refusal of staff to comply with the requests or orders of assailants for cash or goods leads to confrontation. In both case studies the incidents are escalated as staff refuse to meet the demands of assailants. Therefore violence is used to try and coerce staff into meeting the assailants demands. As a consequence staff are subject to identity attacks (which were racist in the second case). In the first case, calling the police escalated the incident to violence (which may have been expected to de-escalate the incident), and in the second the appearance of a guardian brought the incident to a quick conclusion. It should be remembered that in neither of the examples given here

were firearms used. This could potentially have a significant impact upon the likelihood of staff complying with offenders.

### ***Criminal Damage.***

Criminal damage will often have a close relationship to incidents of abuse or violence. Abuse will often generate criminal damage as assailants seek retribution against the business after an incident has taken place. The SBCI data shows that business type is a predictor of the risk of being a victim of abuse/violence and criminal damage. Of the 50 businesses in the first SBCI sweep that were victims of criminal damage and abuse/violence, 25% were off-licences or food shops and 18% were either eating places or pubs. Subsequent interviews with an off-licence and public house highlight the relationship between the two incident types. The first example highlights how refusals to serve underage teenagers acted as a trigger for criminal damage and the second highlights how criminal damage can be triggered by pub closing times. The manager of an off-licence gives the first account:

### **Case Study Three: Abuse, violence and criminal damage.**

'Well the kids try to buy alcohol but I won't serve them. They asked me again, and again I said no. Yer know, they say that it is for their parents and stuff. I know who they are, I know their parents. They give me abuse and call me 'wanker' and 'fucking coon' so I chase them out. It gets rid of them but they soon come back. So anyway next I get graffiti on the front, scratching the paint off the door and writing 'Paki' and stuff like that'.

Off-licence owner, Belgrave.

**Table 6.3: The context, trigger, process events and result of case study three.**

Context	Triggers (norm breaking behaviour)	Process Events	Result
Small food store on busy main road, open till 10pm, sells alcohol. One member of staff present.	Three teenagers enter, ask for alcohol but are refused (T).	Teenagers continue to ask for alcohol but are refused by the shop owner (ES1). Identity attacks by assailants (ES2). Victim throws them out of shop (ES3)	Graffiti on the front of the shop (R).

$$T+ES1+ES2+ES3=R$$

This example shows how refusing to serve alcohol generated abuse and then criminal damage. The incident is characterised by a number of escalating events. The member of staff is refusing to comply with a request for alcohol from teenagers who are underage (which is a violation of norms). First the initial request for alcohol is refused (T and ES1), then the owner is subject to racist identity attacks (ES2). Finally, assailants are removed from the premises (ES3). These processes appear to have led to frustration and anger in the assailants in two ways. First, by the refusal to be served alcohol and second by being removed from the premises. There is a time lapse between the initial incident and the incident of criminal damage as the owner says the criminal damage was not discovered until the day after. The final result is a form of ‘event dependent’ repeat victimisation (though the repeat incident of criminal damage differs from the original incident of abuse) that is used as retribution or punishment against the business.

The case study above highlights an ‘event dependent’ repeat involving abuse and criminal damage. A similar case study is highlighted below, though this is in a different setting. As with the previous example, criminal damage was used as retribution. The incident occurred in a public house on a busy Saturday night and is described by the barman.

### Case Study Four: Abuse, violence and Criminal Damage.

'This was on a Saturday, it was fairly busy and everyone's had a few. Gets to about half eleven and we're chuckin' out. Tryin' get rid of this bloke, he's well done- had a few and gets a bit rowdy complaining about getting' chucked out.. He's complaining saying stuff like 'I been in here all night spending cash and now you're chuckin' me out'. I'm trying to reason with him and others are too. He's having a go at the staff and in the end I gets his glass and he goes. Anyway he goes under protest, next minute 'bang', brick hits the window, goes everywhere. Everyone piles out and it's him runnin' off, so a couple of lads (staff) chase him down the street'.

Barman, Public House, West End.

**Table 6.4: Contexts, trigger, process events and result of case study four.**

Context	Triggers (Norm breaking behaviour)	Process Events	Result
Public House, busy Saturday night closing time. A number of people are in the bar- both staff and members of the public.	Customer refuses to leave at closing time despite staff encouragement (T)	Customer continues to complain about being thrown out (ES1). Staff try to reason with him (D1). Continued complaints, though leaves under protest (ES2)	Window smashed (R)

$$T+ES1+D1+ES2=R$$

Though drink is a crime facilitator in this incident, criminal damage appears to be used as a form of retribution against the pub for removing the assailant. The incident is triggered by a violation of norms over pub closing times. The assailant did not want to leave at closing time and when asked became abusive (T). The incident is then escalated by the continual refusal by the customer to leave the premises (ES1). Here, he appears to be getting more and more frustrated with staff, though the staff do try to reason with him and explain why he has to leave (D1). This appears to act as a de-escalating mechanism as he does leave the premises. However, the customer leaves under protest and is clearly angry (ES2). As with case study 3, there is a time between the incident of abuse and the subsequent criminal damage. The criminal damage is again a form of 'event-dependent' repeat victimisation, as the incident of criminal damage is related to the earlier incident of abuse.



Little previous research has considered how incidents of criminal damage are generated against businesses. Ekblom and Simon (1988) did highlight that often Asian shopkeepers felt vandalism or graffiti against their business was racially motivated, though the authors did not consider how the incidents were generated. Incidents of criminal damage will often be 'discrete' incidents not related to abuse or violence (such as a group of teenagers breaking a window or spraying a wall with graffiti for no particular reason). These case studies show how incidents of abuse/violence can generate criminal damage. Both incidents are generated by norm breaking behaviour in the business. In the first case study, teenagers are breaking norms by trying to buy alcohol despite being underage. In the second, the pub drinker is breaking the norms of the pub by refusing to leave at closing time. In both instances there is a lack of compliance from a party in the exchange. The member of staff in the first case refuses to comply with the teenagers' demands and as a result is the victim of racist identity attacks. In the second the pub drinker is refusing to comply with the demands of staff. In both cases the offenders are persistent in trying to persuade staff to let them have alcohol or to stay in the pub. However, when these demands are refused the offenders leave feeling angry towards staff/ business and gain retribution by damaging property.


### ***Shop theft.***

In chapter four the relationship between abuse/violence and shoplifting was explored. Here, a strong linear relationship was observed and it was highlighted that the risk for victims of abuse/violence also experiencing shop theft are higher than expected. In total, 52% of victims of abuse or violence experienced shop theft (the expected value is 22.7%). Therefore, the risk of abuse or violence for victims of shop theft is higher than for non-victims.

In sweep two of the SBCI survey, victims of abuse and violence were asked what had been the major trigger for incidents of abuse and violence. Of 278 incidents of abuse or violence, 17% (47) were triggered by staff intervening in an incident of shop theft. If we consider this by our sub-set of high-risk businesses, there are clear variations in incidents

being triggered in this way according to business type. Of the high-risk business, shoplifting was a significant trigger for abuse/ violence in off-licences, food and clothes shops (see figure 6.3 -below). In food shops shop theft was the major trigger in 49% of incidents (out of a total of 35). Shop theft was also a significant trigger in 43% of incidents in off-licences (out of 28) and 33% in clothes shops (out of 12).

**Figure 6.3: Shop theft as a trigger for abuse and violence.**



These types of businesses are obviously prime targets for shop theft. They all have lightweight goods of value that are relatively easy to steal and to trade. For example, off-licences contain alcohol and cigarettes that are always prime sites for theft as these items are lightweight and easily sold. Food shops have many lightweight items that are easily concealed and clothes shops contain lightweight goods that are easily resold.

From this evidence, we can conclude that for some business types shop theft clearly acts as a trigger for abuse and violence. However, it is unclear how incidents of shop theft generate abuse or violence. To highlight both the triggering and process events involved in this process we turn to data gathered from the qualitative interviews. The following example is taken from a supermarket in the West End area of Leicester.

### Case Study Five: Abuse, violence and shop theft.

'It was on a Sunday, I caught this guy shop lifting. He was taking stuff off the shelves, so I caught him on his way out and took him to the back. I set the panic button, but the police took ages to come so we had him in the shop for ages. He became restless calling me a 'fucking bitch', abusive and then punched me. Well, he denied the shoplifting, but I saw it. He wasn't happy, but I can't exactly remember what he said, a lot of bad language though'.

Supermarket member of staff, West End.

**Table 6.5: The context, trigger, process events and result of case study five.**

Context	Trigger (norm breaking behaviour)	Process Events	Result
Supermarket, sells food and alcohol open until late in the evening. Two members of staff present.	A man was spotted shoplifting so a member of staff tried to detain him (T).	Man denies shoplifting. Staff refuse to let him go and police are called (ES1). Man continues to protest innocence. Staff still refuse to let him go (ES2). He resorts to identity attacks that make staff more determined to hold him (ES3).	Female member of staff is punched in face. Offender leaves before police arrive (R).

T+ES1+ES2+ES3=R

Shop theft clearly violates the norms of business transaction as assailants attempt to take goods without paying for them. In case study 5, the incident is triggered as a member of staff detains a man who she has seen shoplifting. The process of the incident is determined by the fact that he has been detained and both victim and offender are waiting for the police to arrive (ES1). During this period of time, the member of staff and the assailant are placed in a position where direct confrontation is unavoidable. The offender protests his innocence and the member of staff continues to detain him (ES2). The offender makes sexist identity attacks against the victim (ES3), he becomes more agitated (with the expected arrival of the police) and eventually punches her in the face (R). The violence is used here as a way of trying to coerce the member of staff into letting the assailant go.

This incident again represents a form of 'event-dependent' repeat victimisation against the business. First, there is an incident of shop theft followed by an incident of violence where the former is directly related to the latter. The time period where an offender is held whilst waiting for the police to arrive poses a clear problem for business. This is a time when staff are highly vulnerable and assaults could often occur in small businesses if security staff are not present. In many small businesses, just one or two members of staff will have to apprehend and hold offenders. Shop staff represent a form of 'diffuse guardianship' in incidents of shop theft (see Felson, 1995) as they are expected to prevent shop theft by monitoring suitable targets (goods in the shop), though how they can successfully intervene in incidents is not clear. In the above case staff were not only providing 'diffuse guardianship', but they also held an offender and thus increased their risk of becoming victims of violence.

These problems may be increased if offenders work in groups. The following case study gives an example of an incident of shop theft involving several offenders. Here, the offenders were clearly shoplifting and were hoping the member of staff would feel intimidated by the numbers of offenders present. As a result of their actions, the member of staff tries to hold the shoplifters by locking them in the shop.

### **Case Study Six: Abuse, violence and shop theft.**

'They were just taking things and putting them in their pockets. Some were trying to distract me whilst the others were taking stuff. There were about 15 of them trying to 'steam the shop' I could see them doing it, so I just locked the door and wouldn't let them go out. One of them started crying and banging the door, but by that time the mess was already done and I couldn't get out, there were other people (outside) watching and not ringing the police at all, you see I have a panic button, I pressed the button and the police didn't come for an hour. I waited for ages. They were being really abusive, saying I was wasting my time. In the end I had to let them go. They would have ripped the place apart'

Off-licence/ Food shop Owner, Belgrave.

**Table 6.6: The context, trigger, process events and result of case study six.**

Context	Trigger (norm breaking behaviour)	Process Events	Result
Around 15 teenagers enter a small food shop. One staff present.	Teenagers start to put goods in their pocket at random (T).	Owner spots the shoplifting and locks assailants in shop (ES1). Assailants respond by banging on door which member of staff does not open (ES2). Public aware of incident but do nothing to help (ES3). Police fail to arrive quickly enough (ES4). Assailants abusive, but begin to suggest action of staff is not worth while (D1)	Abusive behaviour, ends with assailants being released (R).

$$T=ES1+ES2+ES3+ES4+D1=R$$

As with the previous case study, shop theft violates the norms of business transaction and triggers the incident process. The incident is unintentionally escalated by the actions of staff as offenders are detained in the shop (ES1). The assailants then become frustrated and try to escape by banging the door (ES2). The incident also escalated as third parties present at the incident do not intervene. This 'bystander apathy' does little to stop the incident from escalating and the situation is not helped by the slow response of the police (ES4). The incident is finally de-escalated when the assailants tell the member of staff that his actions are not worthwhile. The member of staff is clearly intimidated by the presence of the teenagers in the shop so releases them (R).

It was hypothesised in chapter 3 that incidents of shop theft would often trigger abuse and violence. Shop theft is a violation of the norms of business transaction and the case studies show how incidents can generate abuse and violence. Shop theft can generate abuse and violence at two stages of the incident: first, when offenders carry out the theft, and second when shoplifters are apprehended by staff. The evidence shows that assailants may operate in groups to intimidate staff into giving over goods or several offenders will create a distraction whilst others take goods. Like robbery, shop theft clearly violates the norms of business transaction, though abuse generated by shop theft is triggered when

apprehending offenders rather than refusing to comply with their requests. Apprehending and holding offenders places business staff in a difficult position as they are placed in a confrontational situation whilst waiting for the police to arrive. During this period of time, offenders may become aggressive and use identity attacks or try to reason with staff to let them go. If these tactics fail then violence may be generated.

### **Refusals to serve underage customers as a trigger for abuse/violence.**

It was hypothesised in chapter three that refusals to serve alcohol and cigarettes to underage teenagers would generate abuse and violence. The second SBCI survey sweep asked victims of abuse and violence to state how incidents had been triggered. Out of 278 incidents of abuse/ violence, 21 or 7.5% had been directly triggered by a refusal to serve those who appeared to be underage (it is assumed here that staff had to try and guess the age of the assailant). The only business types that were significantly affected by this were off-licences and food shops. Here, over 71% (n=15) of incidents triggered in this way were in these business types.

The two following examples highlight how refusals to serve alcohol to those who appear to be underage can trigger abuse and violence. The owner of an off-licence gave the first account.

### **Case Study Seven: Abuse, violence and refusals to serve to those underage.**

‘There were two West Indians and two English. They were about 15 year old but they insisted they wanted cans of Skol and I wouldn’t serve them, they did give me a lot of abuse, well black bastard and things like that but they themselves were black, but that’s what they call you. I said ‘look you know that I can’t serve you’. But they carry on, then my wife came down and they say ‘oh will she serve us’. I said again ‘look you may as well go’. Then my wife got abuse too. There was another person in the shop as well, but they (other customers) don’t help, they will just ignore it. They (other customers) just keep themselves so there’s nothing you can do about it. But, I called the police, the police came within a few minutes and I told them which way these lads gone but what happened after that I have not been informed at all’.

Off-licence owner, Belgrave

**Table 6.7: The context, trigger, process events and result of case study seven.**

Context	Trigger (norm breaking behaviour)	Process Events	Result
Off-licence, early evening on a housing estate. Two members of staff are present and other customers.	Four teenagers enter and want cans of lager. The member of staff refuses to serve them (T).	Teenagers are abusive and a member of staff is subject to racial abuse. The staff member continues to refuse to serve (ES1). Assailants continue to be abusive and again staff refuse to serve them (ES2). Assailants ask another member of staff for service who also refuses (ES3). Abuse then given to this member of staff and assailants asked to leave (ES4). Police called (D1)	Abuse/ Racial Abuse against staff (R).

$$T=ES1+ES2+ES3+ES4+D1=R$$

Here, the norms of business transaction are violated by underage teenagers attempting to buy alcohol from an off-licence. When the member of staff refuses to serve the teenagers an incident is triggered. As with many of the other case studies, the assailants become frustrated by this lack of compliance from the member of staff and he is subjected to racist identity attacks. However, these attacks fail to persuade the victim to serve the teenagers (ES1). The teenagers continue to be abusive and the victim tries to reason with them by telling them that he cannot serve them for legal reasons (ES2). However, the assailants continue to be abusive. At this point, the assailants attempt to get another member of staff to serve them, though these requests are refused (ES3). This generates abuse against the second member of staff and as a result assailants are asked to leave the premises (ES4). Eventually the police are called (D1) and the assailants leave the premises.

The above example shows how a refusal to serve alcohol generates racial abuse against two staff. Similar to the incidents of robbery that were highlighted earlier in the chapter, the above incident is characterised by assailants making requests which the victims refuse



to comply with. The assailants become frustrated and make racist identity attacks against staff. These 'identity attacks' are used by the offenders to try and coerce the member of staff to hand over alcohol. However, this fails and the assailants then attempt to get served by another member of staff. It may be significant that the second member of staff was a woman. Here the assailants may have felt she could be intimidated into serving them. Finally, the incident appears to be de-escalated when the police are called. In case study one, calling the police resulted in a violent end to the incident, though in the above case study, the police were called and the offenders left the shop without resorting to violence or damaging the shop.

What is also significant about the above case study is that another customer was present for the duration of the incident. However, as the shop owner suggests 'they don't help, they just ignore it'. This shows that bystanders will often do little to intervene in incidents. This partly confirms Latane & Darley's (1970) thesis, (see chapter 2: pp53); though it should be noted that in the above incident assailants were only abusive towards staff. Therefore, the bystander may have thought that the incident was not serious or that the two members of staff present could de-escalate the situation.

In the above example refusals to serve those who appeared to be underage generated abuse. The assailants became frustrated over being refused alcohol and were abusive to staff. However, in some cases violence can be generated. The following case study presents an example of an incident where refusals to serve alcohol generated violence.

#### **Case Study Eight: Abuse, violence and refusals to serve to those underage.**

'This guy came in, who was obviously under age at the time of the incident and he wanted alcohol and I refused to serve him. So anyway he goes over to the freezer (he points to the freezer) and he opens it and starts to mess all the ice-cream around. My wife was here and he was telling her to fuck off and called her 'a Paki bitch' and all this so I called the police. They say that it's my shop so if I want I can just push him out. So I tell him to get out and I grabbed hold of him and pushed him out, it was a nice day like today and I stood at the door. He went down near the factory (he points over the road) and he got a piece of wood came and threw it at my face whilst I was outside. He knocked all these teeth out see, (he shows me where he now has false teeth on one side of his face) you can see here what he did. The police came, but I don't



know what happened after that, the guy was in a detention centre, but I'm not sure why, they never kept me informed. Now the guy is over age and he can come and buy what he wants'.

Off-licence Owner, Belgrave.

**Table 6.8: The context, trigger, process events and result of case study eight.**

Context	Trigger (norm breaking behaviour)	Process Mechanisms	Regularity
Small Off-licence, on quiet terraced street. Two staff present.	Teenager refused alcohol (T).	Offender starts to mess goods around in shop and there are racist and sexist identity attacks against staff (ES1). Police are called, on their advice assailant is thrown out of shop (ES2).	Offender returns with piece of wood and causes injury to shopowner (R).

$$T+ES1+ES2=R$$

There are similarities between this incident and the one in case study seven. Both are small off-licences, two staff are present and the incident is triggered by the refusal to serve alcohol to somebody who is underage. However, the incident in case study eight generates violence. The norms of business transaction are broken when an underage customer tries to purchase alcohol. Staff then refuse to serve the customer and an incident is triggered. The assailant obviously becomes frustrated and initially seeks to coerce staff into serving him by messing goods around and being abusive (this may be done to try and intimidate staff). However, his behaviour at the end of the incident is a form of punishment or retribution against staff. The assailant begins to act anti-socially by messing goods around whilst also subjecting staff to racist and sexist identity attacks (ES1). Staff attempt to de-escalate the situation by calling the police who advise staff to throw the customer out of the shop (ES2). However, removing the offender acts as a major escalating mechanism as the offender then resorts to physical violence (as a form of punishment or retribution).

Three additional features can be noted about case study eight. First, whilst the refusals to serve the underage customer generated violence there was a time lapse between the first and second incident. Therefore, the incident of violence could be classified as 'event

dependent' repeat victimisation (similar to those observed in the section on criminal damage). Second, the offender is obviously frustrated and angry, though he resorts to a serious act of violence that is triggered by a trivial matter (a refusal to serve alcohol). The violence is used as retribution against the member of staff who refused to serve the customer alcohol and because the offender was eventually thrown out of the shop, though in similar circumstances assailants have usually used abuse rather than violence as forms of retribution (see section on criminal damage). Third, the advice given to the victim by the police (to remove the offender) helped to generate the incident from abuse to violence. Therefore, an action expected to de-escalate the incident actually escalated it from one of abuse to violence.

Both case studies eight and nine highlight how abuse and violence can be generated by refusing to serve those who appear to be under age. The first generates racial abuse against staff and the second violence. Incidents are generated because assailants are attempting to violate a norm of business transaction and staff refused to comply with this request. In the first incident there is a period of time where the offenders try to persuade the staff to serve them, this fails and they resort to identity attacks to try and coerce staff into serving them. In the second case the offender appears to seek retribution by hitting a member of staff. What is apparent here is that staff are placed in a difficult position when dealing with teenagers attempting to buy alcohol (this is similar to shop theft). They have to assess the age of the customer and then decide if they are going to serve them. The decision to refuse alcohol could generate serious incidents of violence such as in case study eight.

### **Other acts of criminality that generate abuse and violence.**

This chapter has so far highlighted how crime types such as robbery, criminal damage, shop theft and refusals to serve underage customers alcohol generate abuse and violence in businesses. Throughout the interviews, two other acts of criminality were highlighted that had an association with abuse and violence. These were incidents that involved sexual or racial harassment.

Racial harassment or identity attacks of a racist nature were often a feature of incidents. The SBCI survey indicated that staff were often victims of racial abuse. Respondents in the SBCI survey said that 22% of incidents of abuse and violence in sweep one and 8% in sweep two were racially motivated. The interviews gave little evidence of incidents being specifically racially motivated, though racist language was used in a number of incidents. For example, the shop owner interviewed in case study two said:

‘It was (the attack) a bit racist know you, but not really racially motivated’.

In this case study racist language was used as a way to insult the victim. Symbolic interactionist theories of violence would suggest that racist attacks are made to ‘save face’ (when the offender has been insulted in some way), as a form of punishment or to try and coerce the victim into acting according to the wishes of the offender (see Felson, 1984). Case studies 2, 7 and 8 show how identity attacks are used for these ends. During these incidents the offender appears to be prepared to insult on the basis of any easily identifiable characteristic of the victim. For example, in case study 2, the victim was referred to as a ‘Paki’ because he was Asian and in case study 8 the victim was referred to as a ‘Paki bitch’ because she was Asian and a woman. It was noted in chapter five that Grethner & Taylor (1973) suggest that the most aggressive and violent individuals are also the most likely to be prejudiced. Therefore, aggressive situations are often not produced by racial motivation for these individuals, but racial abuse is used as a ‘by-product’ of this disposition. Therefore, it would be wrong to say that any of the incidents cited above were specifically racially motivated (though it is acknowledged that there are racially motivated attacks against business as the SBCI evidence clearly shows).<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> This evidence also highlights a potential problem of using the term ‘racial motivation’ as the term is subject to interpretation. For example, some victims of a racist identity attack similar to the one in case study two would view the attack to be racially motivated, though (as cited above), the victim in case study two denies the attack was racially motivated. Therefore the term ‘racial motivation’ is subjective. Official definitions of the term ‘racially motivated’ also recognise this subjectivity. The 1999 Macpherson report considers a crime to be racially motivated ‘if the reporting police officer or the victim believes that racial motivation has played a part in the crime’ (Macpherson, 1999). This definition opens itself up to interpretation from the police and victims of crime.

The interviews also uncovered evidence of sexist identity attacks against victims. Whilst conducting the interviews in a fast food restaurant and a pub, a number of women staff mentioned that sexual harassment from male customers had been a problem for them. Often male customers had tried to 'chat them up' or had asked them out on a date whilst they were working in the business. This would happen late in the evening when the customer was under the influence of drink. When the advances of the customer were refused, the member of staff would often be subjected to sexist identity attacks. It appears that these identity attacks are used as a form of punishment against the member of staff for refusing the advances of the male. There is evidence from the case studies that sexist identity attacks are used in a similar manner to racist attacks. For example in case study 5 the victim is called a 'fucking bitch' and in case study eight the victim is referred to as a 'Paki bitch'. As with racial identity attacks, these attacks target an easily identifiable characteristic of the victim.

Thus, as with racist identity attacks, sexist identity attacks can also commonly occur during incidents. However, one interview did highlight a more serious form of sexual harassment. Here, a hairdresser was subject to an indecent sexual act whilst cutting a male customer's hair. This incident is described below.

#### **Case Study Nine: Sexual Harassment.**

'There was this male customer who was sat having his hair cut -I noticed he was playing with himself under the gown which is not all that uncommon. I was a bit shocked but carried on. When I finished cutting his hair he said he needed to use the toilet, then when he came back he reached across to get my cut throat razor. It was a bit of a struggle but luckily I had my scissors still in my hand and I managed to get him out of the shop. He didn't pay. I was more concerned about getting him out. I'm not sure if it was a sexual thing or if he was willing to pay, I wasn't bothered, I was glad to get rid of him'.

Hairdresser, Belgrave.

**Table 6.9: The contexts, triggers, process events and results of case study nine.**

Context	Trigger (norm breaking behaviour)	Process Events	Result
Unisex hairdressing salon. One female member of staff working. Victim and offender only are on the premises.	Indecent sexual act performed by customer in shop (T)	Customer performs indecent act that is ignored by staff (ES1). Customer attempts to grab cut-throat razor and struggle develops (ES2). Staff use scissors to threaten offender (D1).	Struggle develops, assailant is thrown out of shop (R).

$$T+ES1+ES2+D1=R$$

Unlike the previous case studies the violation of norms that generate the incident have little to do with a business transaction. The initial indecent sexual act violates norms as it is not the type of behaviour one would expect to come across in a hairdressing salon. The member of staff ignored the initial indecent act by the assailant (ES1). The assailant clearly has a sexual motive, though by ignoring the initial incident the victim may have given the false impression that this type of behaviour was acceptable. The incident is then escalated into violence when the customer grabs a razor (ES2). As a response, the victim has little choice but to threaten the assailant with a weapon and a struggle develops. Finally, she is able to remove the offender from the premises. This de-escalates the incident as the offender leaves the premises and does not return to seek any retribution (D1).

A number of observations can be made about this case study. First, there was little verbal interaction between victim and offender. The whole incident process almost entirely consisted of physical acts. The respondent said that the assailant sat in silence whilst he was in the shop and even during the violent struggle said little. Second, unlike some of the previous case studies, removing the assailant from the premises de-escalated the incident. Third, the incident highlights the potential risk that some women may face whilst working alone in businesses such as hairdressers (which may be one of the reasons why many businesses do not leave staff alone on business premises -see chapter 5 tables 5.12 and 5.13).

### **Anti-social Behaviour From Customers.**

The case studies presented have highlighted a number of instances of anti-social behaviour from assailants. These acts were part of an incident process where there was a clearly definable trigger. However, there were interviews conducted where it was hard to identify how a violation of the norms of business transaction triggered incidents of abuse/violence. Often these incidents began by customers acting in a purely 'anti-social' manner in the business. This would include customers coming on to the premises being deliberately rude to staff and messing goods around in the business. The behaviour is not necessarily 'criminal' though it could be regarded as intimidating and anti-social. One can only assume customers were driven purely by the intention of acting in an anti-social manner towards staff. The following example illustrates this.

#### **Case Study Ten: Anti-social behaviour.**

'I used to keep flowers outside the shop. They (the assailants) threw everything on the road and I tried to get them to stop. Not one person passing by in their cars stopped. Eventually, there were about 20 lads outside and 10 inside and not one person stopped the car. They then just rushed in to the shop. That's how they do it, they'd already done one shop on Yorkshire Road, and then they came in to my shop just to make a mess. They were throwing things around. I confronted them (there were one or two ringleaders), and they weren't bothered, they threatened to come back. At the end, they were jumping around in the street as if to say 'come on what are you going to do'. So I went in to call the police, but by the time the police came the youths had gone'.

Grocers, Belgrave.

**Table 6.10: The context, trigger, process events and results of case study ten.**

Context	Trigger (norm breaking behaviour)	Process Events	Result
Grocery shop on housing estate, only one member of staff present. Gang of 20 youths outside and 10 youths inside the premises.	Youths throw flowers around outside the shop and enter the shop to move goods off the shelves (T).	Staff request youths to stop, but they carry on (ES1). Behaviour continues and youths make threats to come back (ES2). Continued requests to stop behaviour from staff are not complied with (ES3). Police called, youths disappear (D1).	Abuse, threats (R).

$$T+ES1+ES2+ES3+D1=R$$

In the case study above, a group of teenagers violate the norms of business transaction by acting in an anti-social manner. They throw flowers across the road and then ‘mess’ goods around in the shop. It appears there is no intent to shoplift, they are simply being anti-social and disruptive. What follows are a series of requests by staff to stop the behaviour that are not complied with by the assailants (ES1). The youths make threats to come back to the premises, which may be seen as a way of telling the shop owner that they have the power to do whatever they want when they want (ES2). Further requests are made to stop the behaviour which are not complied with (ES3), and finally, the police are called which acts as a de-escalating mechanism as the youths then leave the premises (D1).

The above case study represents an example of how a group of youths decided to intimidate a shop owner purely for fun. Many members of the group could have been influenced by the fact that the whole group approved of this type of behaviour and therefore this was the type of behaviour that was expected. The case studies have highlighted other examples where offenders worked in groups (particularly teenagers) and peer group pressure may have been an influence upon offending. It is also interesting to note that a number of bystanders saw the incident in progress but made no effort to intervene. Therefore ‘bystander apathy’ plays a role in allowing the assailants to continue their behaviour. This is also consistent with a number of the other case studies.

Overall, the evidence presented here tells us there is a strong association between some crime types and abuse/violence (for example, robbery, criminal damage and shop theft). The conjecture outlined at the start of the chapter states that incidents of abuse and violence will be triggered by 'an action or verbal exchange that breaks the norms of business transactions'. Crime represents a violation of many institutionalised mores, though in the context of business some crime types will generate other forms of norm breaking behaviour such as abuse and violence. Table 6.11 highlights norm breaking behaviour that can be labelled 'criminal', and its association with abuse/ violence. The table shows that crime types such as robbery, shop theft and illegal purchase of alcohol generate abuse, and in some cases violence. Incidents of abuse may also have a racial or sexual motive, though this behaviour can occur as part of an incident that has been triggered by some other factor. An incident of abuse or violence may also trigger criminal damage, and in one case the incident of 'anti-social' behaviour appeared to be triggered by the motivation of a group of teenagers to act in a purely anti-social manner in the business.

Though all of the incidents of abuse/violence outlined in the case studies involved different processes and actions by staff and customers, some broad characteristics of incidents that are triggered by criminal activity can be drawn out (see table 6.11).



**Table 6.11: The association between various crime types and abuse/violence.**

Crime type/ criminality (norm breaking behavior)	Triggers (how crime incident triggers abuse/ violence)	Process events
<b>From robbery to abuse and violence.</b>	An explicitly aggressive crime. Staff refusal to comply with offender demands will generate further abuse/violence.	The incident will be shaped by offenders attempting to secure goods. Offenders will be favourable towards violence. If staff do not meet requests of assailants violence is a likely result. Aggression is used to try and coerce staff into meeting demands of assailants.
<b>From shop theft to abuse and violence.</b>	Triggered by apprehending offenders. Holding offenders on premises generates abuse/violence.	The incident is shaped by offenders trying to escape or persuade staff not to call the police. If requests of offenders are not met, abuse and violence is likely. As with robbery, violence is used to try and coerce staff into meeting demands of assailants.
<b>Abuse and violence to criminal damage.</b>	Criminal damage is used as a form of retribution against the business after earlier confrontation between staff and customer.	Offenders are seeking retribution after an earlier incident on the premises.
<b>Illegal purchase of alcohol and cigarettes to abuse and violence.</b>	Continued refusal to serve the customer makes them frustrated and generates abuse/ violence.	Assailants want staff to comply with their requests. Abuse is used to try and coerce staff to hand over goods or to 'save face' after staff have refused the sale of alcohol.
<b>Racial harassment and abuse and violence.</b>	Often used as identity attacks in incidents triggered by other crime types/ norm breaking behaviour.	It is unclear why racial harassment is used. Among the case studies are examples where it could be used to try and persuade staff to comply with requests, as a form of saving face or as punishment.
<b>Sexual harassment and violence.</b>	Sexual harassment may trigger abuse against staff. However, sexual attacks can act as trigger for violence as in case study nine.	Female staff who refuse propositions from males can face sexist identity attacks. However, there can be more serious attacks. Here, sexual attacks will involve violence to try and coerce victims into acting according to the wishes of the assailant.
<b>Anti-social behaviour.</b>	Assailants are immediately 'anti-social' when they enter the premises. This includes being rude, disruptive and messing goods around.	Process of the incident is shaped by offenders' anti-social behaviour. The behaviour is used as a form of coercive power against staff. It is designed to show that assailants can do whatever they wish on the premises.

Interactionist approaches to aggression can help us to explain these characteristics. Felson (1984), suggests that three key interactionist approaches help us to explain aggression. These are the 'aggression as impression management', 'aggression as coercive power' and 'aggression as punishment' approaches (explained in detail in chapter 2). In incidents of abuse triggered by robbery, shop theft and illegal purchase of alcohol and cigarettes the overall aim of the aggression is to secure goods (as in the case of robbery) or to secure release (if apprehended for shop theft). Therefore aggression appears to be used by offenders as a form of coercive power to make staff hand over goods or to try and secure release. Similarly, the incident classed as 'anti-social' behaviour could be categorised as being used as coercive power as the assailants were demonstrating that they could do 'whatever they wanted whenever they wanted' in the business premises. In incidents where criminal damage is generated, aggression is used as retribution against the business after a disagreement between staff and a customer.

In incidents involving racial or sexual attacks the initial motivation for aggression is often not of a racial or sexual nature. Racial or sexual identity attacks are used as part of an incident process for a number of reasons. For example, in case study 7 the victim is called a 'black bastard'. The offenders could be using the attack as a form of punishment against the victim for not serving them cans of beer, as an attempt to coerce the victim into serving them or as 'impression management' (saving face) because they are embarrassed at not being served. Similarly, it is difficult to determine why sexist identity attacks are used within incidents. In cases where attacks are used because a female has rejected advances of the male, they may be used to save face or as a form of punishment. However, the intention of many of the identity attacks used within the process is not clear here because the accounts were given by the victims and not offenders.

## **2. Businesses breaking the norms of business transactions: Complaints, disputes over goods, quality of service and change.**

It was hypothesised in chapter three that complaints by customers over service, goods or change will often act as a trigger for an incident of aggression. Data from sweep two of

the SBCI survey asked victims of abuse and violence if they thought incidents were triggered due to, 'disputes over change'; 'disputes over the price of goods'; or 'disputes over service'. In total, businesses in the retail and service sector were able to state how incidents were triggered in 224 incidents of abuse or violence - 136 in the retail sector and 88 in the service sector.

Overall, 30% of incidents in the retail sector and 29% in the service sector were triggered by disputes over service, prices or change. In both the retail and service sectors incidents were more likely to be triggered by a dispute over service than disputes over prices or change. Respondents said that 27% of incidents in the service and 18% in the retail sector were triggered in this way. Businesses in the retail sector were more likely than those in the service sector to be victims of incidents triggered by disputes over pricing (10% compared to 2%), whereas few incidents in either sector were triggered by disputes over change (less than 2% in each sector).

The data here tell us that a significant proportion of incidents in the retail and service sectors were triggered by disputes over service, and by disputes over pricing in the retail sector. The sector variations may be explained by the differing generating factors in these business types. For example, disputes over service would be more prevalent in the service sector because customers may often be inclined to complain over slow or substandard service in businesses such as eating-places. There were generally more complaints over pricing of goods in the retail sector because these businesses sold consumer durables where prices could be queried. There were few incidents triggered by disputes over change. This could simply be a result of employees carefully checking change given to customers. Therefore, few contexts are created in which incidents could be triggered by staff giving the wrong change to customers.

Further explanation of these patterns can be gained by analysing the high-risk subset of business and interviews that were conducted with victims of abuse/violence. In chapter five, we identified a number of businesses that were classed as at high-risk from abuse/violence. In these business types, respondents were able to state how incidents

were triggered in 118 incidents. The data here has to be treated with caution as respondents were not able to say what triggered incidents in all cases, so for some business types the data is very limited (particularly for postal services, bookmakers and motor fuels/ repairs). If we concentrate on complaints as a trigger for aggression, they were cited as a trigger for a significant proportion of incidents in food shops, eating places, and motor fuels/ parts businesses. Complaints were the most common source of conflict in eating-places and clothing stores. Here, over 40% of incidents were triggered by complaints (out of 21 and 12 respectively). In eating places, most complaints were service related (8 in total) and in clothing stores most complaints were related to a dispute over an item of clothing (5 in total).

From this evidence two broad conclusions can be drawn. First, as 29% of incidents in the service sector and 30% in the retail sector are triggered by a complaint over service, pricing or change, we can conclude that complaints are a relatively common trigger for abuse and violence within these sectors. Second, in the high-risk businesses such as eating-places and clothing stores, complaints triggered over 40% of incidents. Therefore, certain types of businesses have high risks of generating abuse/violence because of customer complaints.

Further insight as to how complaints triggered incidents of abuse and violence was obtained through the qualitative interviews. The following examples are all taken from the service and retail sectors. The first relates to a complaint over service in a fast food shop, the second a complaint over goods in a second hand shop and the third, a complaint over pricing in an electrical shop.<sup>63</sup>

#### **Case Study Eleven: Abuse, violence and complaints over service.**

'There was another, again at night. We were really busy and one customer had been waiting a while, he was all agitated getting angry. He'd been waiting and then says something like "Oh, fucking hell what's going on, I've been waiting ages". So I said, 'look just wait a minute, I'll get your food'. He says 'I want

my fucking food now, I been here for ages'. He was being very aggressive, so I told him to calm it down. Then he got a picture from the wall and chucks it at the back where the friers are, and tries to grab me. Anyway, I had nothing to do with it, I moved back behind the counter. I stood back and he left the premises. The next minute there's trouble down the street, I bet it was him'.

Fast food shop, West End

**Table 6.12: The context, trigger, process events and result of case study eleven.**

Context	Trigger (norm breaking behaviour).	Process events	Result
Fast food shop, late in the evening. Three members of staff and a number of customers are present. A number of customers had been drinking alcohol.	Drunk customer unhappy over slow service and makes a complaint (T).	Staff try to reason with customer, though customer is abusive (ES1). Staff tell customer to calm down (D1). Continued slow service (ES2). Customer uses picture from wall as a missile, member of staff moves behind counter to avoid conflict (D2)	Customer damages property, is abusive and violent towards staff (R).

T+ES1+D1+ES2+D2=R

Here, it could be argued that there are two violations of the norms of business transactions. First, the fast food business appears to be slow at serving its customers (though it is not known how slow the service actually was) and second, the customer fails to be patient and queue for his food like the other customers in the shop (T). The norms of business transaction are violated from both the business and assailant. The assailant complains to the member of staff present. The assailant is frustrated and agitated by the situation (which is made worse as he has been drinking heavily). Staff try to de-escalate the incident by reasoning with the assailant though he continues to be abusive (ES1). Staff continue to try and calm the assailant (D2) though this attempt to de-escalate the situation has little impact, as the assailant uses a picture from the wall as a missile to throw at the victim. As a result of this action, the victim moves away from the service counter (which is about 5 feet high) to avoid physical confrontation (D2).

<sup>63</sup> Here, we were unable to gain an interview with a clothing shop where an incident had been triggered by a complaint over goods, pricing or change. However, the case studies presented do show how incidents can be triggered by complaints over service, goods and pricing.

This case may be typical of the type of problems fast food shops face late in the evening. First, alcohol acts as a facilitator. The assailant has been drinking and from his actions appears to be in the mood for trouble. It could be argued here that 'indirect' crime generators are playing a role in the incident as the conflict is partly generated by alcohol consumed on another business premises (such as a pub or night club). The fast food outlet is busy and customers have to wait for their food. This causes frustration and the impatient assailant complains in an aggressive manner. Staff try to reason with him though violence is generated. Similar to a number of other case studies presented in this chapter, there are a number of bystanders present though none intervene in the incident.

Not all of the interviews identified such aggressive responses from customers when complaining about service or goods. However, the interviews did highlight how incidents could be triggered in varying contexts. For example, the following case study is taken from a business that has differing lifestyle and generating properties to the fast food shop in case study ten. The account is given by the owner of a second hand shop where a dispute is generated over the sale of faulty goods to a customer.

#### **Case Study Twelve: Abuse, violence and complaints over goods.**

'This guy bought some bass speakers. He came in and said 'do they work?' So I said that I've tried them out and they work. He said that if they don't work, he wanted a refund. Basically, I said 'you can't have a refund, not on something you've bought'. Anyway he takes the speakers. He comes back three or four days later and says he wants his money back. I told him that he can't have his money back, as I told him when he bought them that he couldn't have his money back. He started to get abusive, made all these threats and swearing. So anyway, he goes to fetch his dad. He comes in and things get nasty. He threatened me with violence and told me that I'm a rip off merchant. So I called the police. They came quickly and calmed things down. But they couldn't really do anything, they just said it is the nature of the business I am in'.

Second Hand Shop Owner, Belgrave.

**Table 6.13: The context, triggers, process events and result of case study twelve.**

Context	Trigger (norm breaking behaviour)	Process events	Result
Second hand shop, trading goods. One member of staff.	Youth buys bass speakers that don't work. He comes back and wants a refund which is refused (T).	Customer is told again that no refunds are given and he becomes abusive (ES1). Still no refund is given and the customer goes to get his father (ES2). Father comes in, no refund is given and he makes threats of violence and identity attacks (ES3). Police called (D1).	Abuse, threats (R).

$$T+ES1+ES2+ES3+D1=R$$

Here, the norms of business transaction are clearly violated by the sale of faulty goods to a customer. However, the shop owner does establish the rules of the transaction with the customer by saying that no refunds can be given. When the customer returns and wants a refund it is refused. This acts as the trigger for the incident (T). The customer complains, though the shop owner re-establishes the rules of the transaction by stating that refunds are not given. Therefore, the request for a refund is not complied with (ES1), thus generating abuse. The second half of the incident is a form of event dependent repeat victimisation as the youth goes to get his father and another incident is generated later that day. They return, and the father makes requests for a refund that are not complied with (ES3). This generated abuse and the shop owner is referred to as a 'rip off merchant'. Eventually the police are called to sort the problem out (D1). This de-escalates the incident as both the youth and his father have left the premises before the police arrive.

In case study twelve, the norms of business transaction are broken by the business as goods that do not work are sold. However, the rules of the transaction were clearly stated to the customer before purchase, so the customer was aware that he would not get a refund. As with a number of other case studies, the incident takes place over a period of time with an initial incident of abuse (where the youth was the perpetrator) and then an event dependent incident where the father was the perpetrator. As highlighted in previous

case studies, requests made by the customers were not met by the victim and abuse was generated. In this case only identity attacks (in the form of swearing at the victim) were generated, and calling the police de-escalated the incident.

The previous two case studies have highlighted how complaints can be triggered by disputes over service and disputes over goods. The SBCI survey also asked businesses if incidents were triggered by a dispute over the pricing of goods or services. Here, it was found that 10% of incidents in the retail sector and less than 2% in the service sector were triggered in this way. Though few incidents were triggered due to disputes over the pricing of goods/ services, we are able to draw on an example of an incident that was triggered because a customer was unhappy over the cost of a repair. This illustrates how a dispute over pricing can generate abuse.

### **Case Study Thirteen: Abuse, violence and complaints over pricing.**

'It started when this guy came in effin and blindin. He'd had a cleaner repaired and said I'd overcharged him for it. I looked over the counter, over the partition to say to him you know, aye up calm down chap that's enough in here. He says 'and you yer long fucker he says, I'll have you as well'. That puts my heckles up straight away, so I put the phone down and went round the corner on to the counter. I tried to passify the chap, but I still a lot of verbal abuse so I told the lad (the other member of staff present) to put out a three 9's call. Anyway he (the assailant) says 'you can get them fuckers here'. Then he carries on and I don't know if I should tell you about the bar (laughs). Well, I got the bar (shows me long bar of iron about two feet long) from the door and banged it on the counter. That shut him up. I felt the shudder go up my arm (laughs). Anyway, then he left. The police came about three hours later at about five o' clock. They said he was threatening to take me to trading standards'.

Electrical Shop, Belgrave.



**Table 6.14: The context, trigger, process events and result of case study thirteen.**

Context	Triggers (norm breaking behaviour)	Process Events	Result
Shop selling electrical items. Two members of staff. Located on busy main road.	Customer unhappy over price charged for a job. He comes into shop and is immediately abusive (T).	Member of staff tries to calm customer (D1). Customer abusive and makes identity attacks (ES1). Member of staff again tries to calm the situation (D2). The customer is still abusive (ES2). Police called (D3) More abuse from customer (ES3) Staff use weapon to make threats against customer (D4)	After being abusive the threat of violence from staff leads to customer leaving (R).

$$T+D1+ES1+D2+ES2+D3+ES3+D4=R$$

Here, the incident is triggered before the assailant enters the business. He is unhappy over the pricing of a repair. Therefore, the norms of business transactions are broken in two ways. First by the business not making the customer clear regarding the cost of the repair and second, by the customer complaining to the business in an overtly aggressive manner (T). A member of staff tries to calm the customer (D1), though he is particularly angry and starts to make identity attacks and threats against the member of staff by calling him 'a long fucker' and by saying 'I'll have you' (ES1). Staff try to 'passify' the customer (D2), though the customer is still verbally abusive (ES2). The police are called in an attempt to resolve the conflict (D3), though abuse continues (ES3). Eventually, the member of staff uses a weapon to end the dispute. The use of a weapon here could have escalated or de-escalated the conflict by rousing the offender into becoming violent as a response to the banging of the iron bar on the counter. However, on this occasion this de-escalated the situation by making the assailant leave the premises.

The above incident is of interest as throughout there are a number of attempts made by the staff to de-escalate the incident that fail. For example, on two occasions staff attempt to calm the customer by reasoning with him. Calling the police fails to calm the customer

(as he believes he is correct) and finally it takes an act of violence to de-escalate the conflict. Therefore, within this incident there are a number of process events one might expect to de-escalate a conflict and are intended to do so, but fail to have this effect.

Generally, few disputes that were recorded by the SBCI survey appeared to be triggered by customers claiming to have been given the wrong change, though there were problems identified with customers attempting to steal from the business by claiming the wrong change had been given by a member of staff. A common problem here would be for customers to claim that they had passed a £10 note to the employee when they had actually passed over a £5 note. For example one off-licence owner said:

‘sometimes what they do is give you a five pound note, then you give the change and they say no it was a 10 or 20. These are bad, because if they try to rip you off, they will get mad if you don’t give the cash. Once, I let a guy have a tenner. I was worried, he was big, mad sort of, I’m not losing my head over a tenner’.

Off-licence, West End.

This section has highlighted how complaints may trigger incidents of abuse and violence. In the case studies, the customer had a grievance against the business. Therefore, the complaint was triggered by the business breaking the norms of business transaction. In case study eleven the customer complains because of slow service; in case study twelve there are complaints over the quality of goods, and in case study thirteen the customer is unclear over the pricing of goods. In each case study the business is perceived to be in the wrong by a customer. The process events within these incidents relate to the non-compliance of businesses in rectifying or recognising the problem. Table 6.15 outlines the key triggers and processes of abuse and violence in relation to complaints.

**Table 6.15. Complaints, abuse and violence.**

	<b>Triggers (norm breaking behaviour)</b>	<b>Process events</b>
Complaints over service	Customers complain over slow, poor service which business fails to rectify quickly.	Business refuses (or is unable) to comply when the customer requests for more speedy service.
Complaints over goods	Customers complain over quality of goods which business fails to rectify quickly.	Business refuses to exchange goods or give refund.
Complaints over pricing and short change	Customers complain over pricing of goods which business fails to rectify quickly.	Lack of compliance by business to change price of goods.

In all of these cases, customers made a complaint over some aspect of service and the business failed to quickly rectify the problem. This caused frustration and anger in the customer and abuse was generated. It is clear why customers become angry and frustrated in these situations, though the overall goal of the aggression is not always clear. Part of the motivation for using aggression could be to punish the business or member of staff present. For example in case study 13 the customer threatens to get the police and trading standards to punish the business for overcharging him. However, the customers in case studies 11, 12 and 13 wanted the business to comply with a request they are making. Therefore, aggression was being used with the aim of coercing the member of staff to give in to these requests.

**The triggers of Abuse and Violence: From staff to victims, customers to offenders.**

A number of types of norm breaking behaviour generate abuse and violence within businesses. Both the SBCI surveys and the qualitative interviews highlighted a correlation between criminal acts such as robbery, shop theft and abuse/violence. This confirms research by Felson & Clarke (1998) which hypothesises that a close relationship will exist between different crime types as one crime type will often generate another.

The qualitative interviews outline how norm-breaking behaviour triggers abuse and violence and found that for most incidents of abuse/violence within a small business there will be an identifiable trigger. The conjectures hypothesised that incidents will be triggered when the 'norms' of business transaction are violated. For the purpose of the theory these triggers were arranged into a hierarchy of behaviour from robbery (mores) to giving customers the wrong amount of change (folkways). This hierarchy suggests that differing triggers will generate incidents that range in seriousness. For example, robbery is explicitly aggressive from the onset so one would expect its final result to be more serious than an incident that was triggered by shop theft or refusals to serve alcohol to those who appear to be underage. However, the case studies tell us this is not strictly true. The type of trigger for an incident does not determine the seriousness of the final result. For example, in case study 2 a robbery did not generate violence, whereas in case study 8 a refusal to serve somebody who was underage resulted in a serious assault.

In the incidents generated by criminality, conflict would have been unavoidable for the victim unless they were prepared to let customers/victims break the rules of business transaction by shoplifting, serving alcohol to underage teenagers or letting them act in an 'anti-social' manner. This may have implications for prevention purposes. If business staff become involved in conflict as a way to protect the interests of the business, then conflict could become unavoidable. Violence prevention advice tells staff that the best way to avoid violence is not to become involved in disputes with customers. The data tells us that some business staff feel they have to be 'heavy-handed' with some customers to keep order within the business.

It is debatable whether incidents generated by customer complaints could be avoided. Businesses should not overprice goods or offer slow/ poor quality service, though in the case studies outlined here, the incidents were generated by a misunderstanding of the rules of transaction between the customer and the business. Businesses should always make sure customers are clear over pricing and the rules of exchange (for example, in the sale of second hand goods) though sometimes conflict may still occur if customers feel they have not been treated well.

Overall, there are a number of common themes about the triggers of abuse and violence highlighted in the case studies. Incidents are triggered by norm breaking behaviour from either the customer or the business itself. This behaviour can be broadly grouped into four categories that are outlined below.

1. **Acquisitive -customer is norm violator:** Incidents that are acquisitive in nature are triggered because the assailants are trying to secure goods from the business- such as in incidents of robbery or shop theft. Aggression is used here to coerce staff into meeting demands.
2. **Complaints -business is norm violator:** These are incidents that are generated by a complaint over goods, services or pricing. Aggression is used as here to punish staff and to coerce staff into meeting demands of customers.
3. **Personal attacks or attacks on property -customer is norm violator:** These will include attacks on staff that are provoked purely because of their ethnic origin or gender. In the sexual attack highlighted in the case studies, aggression was used as coercive power. However, racist or sexist identity attacks within incidents may be used to punish, 'save face' or coerce victims. Attacks on property are often generated by an earlier disagreement within the business. For example, the case studies highlighted that incidents can be generated by a refusal to serve alcohol to those who appear to be underage or over public house closing times.
4. **Anti-social behaviour -customer is norm violator:** Here, incidents are generated by offenders being intent on acting in an anti-social manner by messing goods around, swearing and intimidating staff. Aggression is used here as a form of coercive power.

Incidents related to crime types such as robbery and shop theft are acquisitive and aggression is used to coerce staff into meeting the demands of the assailant. The offender is motivated by trying to obtain money or goods in the business. For example in case studies 1 and 2 the offenders were clearly after goods such as alcohol and cash. However, it has also been highlighted that incidents are also triggered by complaints. Here, the customer feels they have a legitimate grievance against the business and will be abusive

to try and coerce staff into accepting their complaint (so goods will be exchanged or a refund given). This was apparent in case study 12 where the child returns bass speakers that do not work. Some incidents also include identity attacks against the race or sex of a member of staff or attacks against property. No case studies highlighted incidents that were specifically racially motivated (though a number highlighted how racist taunts are often used as identity attacks within an incident). However, case study 9 highlighted an example of an attack against a female member of staff that was specifically triggered by a sexual motive. Case studies 3 and 4 highlight how some incidents trigger attacks on property.

It is also evident that in some incidents assailants use the business environment as a setting to act in an anti-social manner. For example, in case study 10 the teenagers were not trying to steal, they did not have a complaint nor were they being racist or sexist against staff. Their behaviour was intimidating and anti-social as they were in a gang and using their numbers to exert power over the business owner. They were showing him that they had the power to do whatever they wanted and he had little power to stop them. One should also mention here that in many contexts the presence of alcohol plays a part in the incidents. This is evident in case studies 4 and 10 where the assailant is under the influence of alcohol at the time of the attack and in case studies 1, 3, 7, and 8 where assailants were trying to buy/steal alcohol.

### **The processes of abuse and violence.**

At the beginning of this chapter it was hypothesised that the result of incidents would be dependent upon three factors -the number of escalating events, de-escalating events and how favourable the staff member and customer are to abuse or violence. Previous research has widely recognised that the final result of incidents of aggression are dependent upon processes that occur within the incident (see for example, Felson, 1984). The result of incidents will be dependent upon the context of the incident, the role played by victims, offenders and third parties in both escalating and de-escalating incidents of aggression, and how each party perceives or makes sense of actions by the 'other' in the

dyad (see Felson et al 1983; Shoham, 1997). The results of incidents are also dependent upon other factors that may change throughout the incident such as the arrival of third parties or the arrival of the police at an incident.

In the case studies presented here, there are a number of common themes about the process of incidents. The first is that the customers always seemed to be the main aggressors and staff always seemed to be attempting to de-escalate the incident. Only in case study 13, did a member of staff use violence and despite some of the identity attacks staff were subjected to, they rarely retaliated. This may have emerged because staff were determined not to be aggressive towards assailants and wanted try and keep order on the business premises or because all of the accounts of incidents were given by staff who were not willing to give any self-incriminating evidence. Therefore, the evidence given in the case studies must be treated with slight caution.

Whilst the accounts given may be slightly 'one-sided', the case studies do highlight how the processes of incidents of abuse and violence unfold within the business environment. From these accounts a number of concluding points can be made about the processes of incidents. These are outlined below.

1. Often verbal or physical actions that one would expect to escalate incidents actually de-escalate them. For example, in case study 13 the member of staff bangs an iron bar against the counter in an attempt to scare off the assailant. In many instances, this would have escalated the incident though in this case it led to a de-escalation of the incident.
2. In contrast to the above, sometimes the verbal or physical actions expected to de-escalate incidents actually escalated them. For example, in case study 1 calling the police during the robbery led to a quick escalation of the incident, and in cases one and eight (for example) calling the police had a direct impact in escalating the incident. Therefore taking an action expected to de-escalate an incident actually escalated the situation.

3. The final result of the incident is not dependent upon the number of de-escalating and escalating events. Case study 6 had a number of escalating events (4) and only resulted in abuse. Case study 8 only had two escalating events and a member of staff was victim of a serious assault.
4. Incident processes consisted of a number of threats and identity attacks. It appears that assailants will often make identity attacks against staff to make them comply with requests. Commonly used identity attacks refer to ethnicity, gender or some obvious physical feature of the victim such as their height.
5. Though incidents were relatively short, quick events, sometimes the repercussions of incidents would continue over a period of time. These could be classified as event dependent repeats. For example, in case study 12 the child complains about bass speakers that did not work. He later returned with his father who then subjected the shop owner to further abuse. In case study 8, there is an incident of abuse. The offender leaves the premises and returns a few minutes later to attack the shop owner.

We can predict the types of businesses that will provide suitable contexts for abuse/ violence and the triggers of abuse/ violence. However, it is more difficult (if not impossible) to predict the final result of an incident or the process that will follow a specific trigger. Our theory conjectured that an incident will consist of a number of de-escalating and escalating events. Incidents do consist of a number of event processes, though it is difficult to predict how perpetrators, victims and third parties will act within the context of an incident. Therefore, the final result of the incident is dependent upon the reaction of all parties involved in the exchange to the verbal/ physical action of the other parties involved in the incident. From the interviews it is possible to classify the types of victims, offenders and third parties who become involved in incidents and the role they are likely to play in the incident.

#### **Types of Customers/ Offenders who are aggressive in the business environment.**

1. **The violent thug/ criminal:** Will rely on physical confrontation to resolve disputes. Their disposition towards violence will not only be a result of finding themselves in a



confrontational situation in the business, but is also as a result of their general acceptance of violence as a means to settle conflict. This is the type of person most likely to be violent towards staff. For example in the robbery in case study 1, violence is used to enforce the wishes of the assailants when staff are failing to comply with their demands. This group are always prepared to break the norms/rules of business transactions.

2. **The 'show-off' teenager:** Works in a group, will often be abusive to staff to impress friends. In case studies 3, 6, 7 and 10 there are groups of teenagers working together. In these cases peer group pressure may have played a role in motivating the assailants. This group will break the norms/ rules of business transaction, though their actions are dependent upon others within the group.
3. **The 'irate' customer:** Generally non-aggressive customer who believes they have a valid complaint against the business. The child and his father in case study 12 and the customer in case study 13 are examples of this. This group will not readily break the norms/ rules of transactions, they only become involved in conflict if they feel they have a genuine grievance against the business.

Therefore, the attitude of the assailant will be essential to the final result of an incident. However, an offender only forms one half of the dyad required for an incident to occur. The other actor in these incidents will be a member of staff. The final result of an incident will also be dependent on how they act when confronted by a potentially violent situation. Here, we can classify staff into three distinct groups and assess what influence they are likely to have on the incident process.

1. **The protector:** Likely to own the business, will do anything to protect it, unlikely to back down in conflict though will be prepared to reason with customers and will see violence as a last resort.

An attitude that was often identified amongst business owners was that they were prepared to protect the business against crime and anti-social behaviour. This attitude was identified in a number of the case studies where the owners refused to comply with

assailants. During one interview a business owner encapsulated the attitude of many of these people by saying:

'I've not built this business for 25 years to let some fucker walk all over me'.

Electrical Shop Owner, Belgrave.

From this evidence, it can be assumed that many business owners feel they have to protect the business and they see any crime or trouble inside the business as something they have to intervene in and to try and resolve.

**2. The avoider:** Business does not belong to them, they have no interest in protecting business interests. They will avoid conflict at any cost and don't want to get involved.

In contrast to protectors, the 'avoider' will try to keep clear of any trouble. There are no examples of this from the case studies as staff here tended to be protective towards the business. However, 'avoiders' may be found in larger high street stores where the staff may feel less attachment to the business.

**3. The loyal staff member:** Will be sufficiently motivated to protect company interests. As with the protector, will be prepared to reason with customers though violence could be used as a last resort.

The loyal staff member will play a similar role to a protector in incidents. S/he will try to protect the interests of the business if customers try to steal goods or cause trouble. There were examples in the case studies where staff intervened in incidents because it was in the best interests of the business. In case study 5 the member of staff intervenes in an incident of shop theft and as a result is assaulted. In this case the staff member could easily have taken no action against the assailant to avoid conflict.

In addition to the role of staff/victims and customers/offenders in incidents, third party involvement can have an influence upon the final result of an incident. Previous research has suggested that third parties will have an influence upon the final outcome of an incident of aggression in two ways (Felson & Steadman, 1984). If third parties are favourable towards violence then a violent outcome is more likely, if they are not favourable towards violence there is unlikely to be a violent outcome. In the case studies, the third parties present when incidents took place were other members of staff, associates of offenders or other customers. The role these respective third parties played in incidents tended to vary (for obvious reasons). Staff would fit into the 'protector' or 'loyal staff member' categories as described above; associates of assailants tended to be favourable towards aggression and customers did not become involved in incidents.

Here we begin by considering the role of 'other members of staff' as third parties (i.e. those who were not directly the victim). In case studies 4, 5, 7 and 13 there was more than one member of staff present during the incident, though this did not deter offenders from engaging in aggressive behaviour. For example, in case study 4 several members of staff are present. All of the staff became involved in the incident (so could be classified as 'loyal staff members') and they try to remove the offender from the pub. As a result of this the staff are subjected to abuse. It was often apparent that in small businesses where staff worked in close proximity all staff present would become involved in incidents. Often, other members of staff present would be unable to avoid becoming involved in the incident (because the incident took place right in front of them). Their role would be to try and de-escalate the situation.

There were some cases where offenders had associates who were present at incidents. In incidents of robbery, it was obvious that associates of offenders would be favourable to aggression. However, it was also apparent in other case studies that associates of offenders were favourable to aggression. For example, in case studies 6 (shop theft) and 7 (refusals to serve) there are groups of teenagers who are all favourable towards aggression. In these incidents, the groups had a ringleader and the rest of the group could be seen as a third party who were favourable to a violent outcome. Therefore, the leader

of the group could feel compelled to act in an aggressive manner. For example, in case study 10 the group were led by ringleaders. These ringleaders may have been acting in an aggressive, intimidating manner because this is the way the rest of the group expected and encouraged them to behave.

In some incidents there were also members of the public present during incidents. It may be expected that these 'third parties' would act as 'capable guardians' (see for example, case study 6, 7 and 10). However, there were no cases where bystanders intervened in incidents. For example, in case study ten passers by or bystanders did nothing to help as the incident took place (though the victim was heavily outnumbered and people were standing watching). This confirms research by Latane & Darley (1970) that suggests often bystanders will not intervene in incidents of crime that do not directly involve them. Third parties may feel that certain disputes or conflict does not involve them, and therefore it would break the rules of conflict for them to step in.

### **Summary:**

Businesses survive by staff and customers making transactions. These transactions are governed by norms, (some of which are written in law and many that are not encoded in law) that are accepted as the way business is conducted. This chapter has highlighted how these norms can be broken and how abuse/ violence is generated from this norm-breaking behaviour. The data has shown there are a number of norm-breaking behaviours that can trigger abuse and violence in the business environment. These range from norm-breaking behaviour that is institutionalised by law (such as shop theft) to behaviour that is not considered law breaking (such as anti-social behaviour) but can still act as a trigger for abuse/ violence.

The qualitative interviews were presented as case studies that highlighted how these triggers generate incidents of abuse and violence through a number of incident processes. The case studies showed how a number of processes consisting of escalating and de-escalating events are generated during an incident. The final result of the incident is

dependent upon these processes. However, the result of an incident is not necessarily dependent upon the number of escalating events in the incident. Some incidents had few escalating events, but still had a result of violence. A final result of violence was dependent upon a number of factors such as staff compliance and the willingness of the offender to resort to violence. For example, in incidents of robbery non-compliance with offenders would appear to increase the risks of violence and there are also obvious risks of generating violence when holding shoplifters or refusing to serve alcohol to those who are under age.

There are two additional points about these case studies that need to be stated. First, abuse and violence was generated by staff trying to protect the business or arguing with a customer after a complaint had been made. Second, what is apparent from this study is the vulnerability of small businesses to abuse and violence, and the lack of help in incidents from bystanders and the police. In a number of case studies bystanders did not intervene and the police were called but arrived on the scene too late.

## **Conclusions**

### **The Lifestyle Theory of Business Victimization and the Way Forward for Future Research.**

#### **Introduction.**

This thesis has established that abuse and violence is a serious problem for some business types. It has also been established that the victims of abuse and violence have identifiable lifestyle characteristics that promote the risk of victimisation. These conclusions have been drawn by testing a number of conjectures that were developed from a theoretical framework which hypothesised that some businesses have lifestyles that generate abuse and violence. The aim of this chapter is to draw some conclusions from this study and to outline areas for future research.

#### **Lifestyles, Routine Activities and Abuse and Violence.**

A theoretical framework has been developed from the lifestyle theory of personal victimisation (Hindelang, et al 1978) and routine activity theory (Cohen & Felson, 1979) (though other theoretical ideas such as Brantingham and Brantingham's concept of crime 'attractors' and 'generators' were also used). These theories provided the two key concepts that were shaped into a lifestyle theory of abuse and violence against businesses. First, the lifestyle theory of personal victimisation tells us that people develop lifestyles that make them more or less conducive to personal victimisation. Second, routine activity theory tells us that a direct contact predatory violation can only occur when a suitable target and motivated offender converge in time and space in the absence of capable guardianship (The key underpinnings of the theory are presented in figure 1).

Here, it was hypothesised that businesses also have a set of distinguishable 'lifestyle' characteristics that generate risks. The 'lifestyle' characteristics that promote or reduce


risk are features such as geographical location of the business, business type, size of the workforce, vulnerability to other crime types, security provisions and demographic characteristics of staff. However, it was important to locate these characteristics within a framework that could help us understand how these lifestyle characteristics generate abuse and violence. Here routine activity theory was used. This theory postulates that for a direct contact predatory violation to occur there has to be a convergence in time and space of a suitable target and motivated offender in the absence of capable guardianship (Cohen & Felson, 1979). Therefore, we were interested in the lifestyle characteristics of businesses that generated target suitability and how these suitable targets converged in time and space with motivated offenders in the absence of capable guardianship.

This constituted a starting point for building a 'lifestyle' theory of business victimisation. In chapter three the theory was developed, though there was a clear problem with using the theory for understanding abuse and violence against business. Lifestyle theory and routine activity theory were able to provide an abstract framework for understanding abuse and violence. These theories are able to tell us (for example) that there is a high risk of a convergence of staff (targets) and offenders in off licences at 10 o'clock at night when there are no other staff or customers present that will generate abuse or violence. Whilst this is an important part of understanding abuse and violence against businesses, it only tells us about the context in which abuse/ violence is generated and not how incidents are triggered or how a final result of abuse or violence is generated.

Previous research tells us that aggression is generated by a rule violation or when there is a refusal by one actor in the dyad to comply with the requests of the other (see for example Felson, 1984). The previous research also suggests that the final outcome of aggression is dependent upon the processes that occur between the two actors in the exchange (though other factors such as environment and the influence of third parties are also important). Therefore, if abuse and violence are to be fully understood, it is not only the contexts in which aggression is generated that need to be recognised, but also how aggression is triggered and the processes that generate a final result of abuse or violence.

Therefore, the theory not only considered the contexts of abuse and violence, but also the triggers and processes within incidents (see figure 7.1 –below).

**Figure 7.1: Lifestyles, Triggers and Processes of abuse and violence against businesses.**



The theory also hypothesised that there are rules or ‘norms’ that govern behaviour within businesses (referred to as the rules of business transaction), and it is only when these rules are violated that abuse or violence will be generated. Both customers and the business itself can violate the norms of business transaction. Customers do this by engaging in criminality (such as shop theft) and by acting in an anti-social manner on the business premises. Businesses do this by selling faulty goods, overpricing goods or by offering a poor or substandard service. A violation of the rules of business transaction will trigger abuse and violence. In addition to this, the final result of confrontation will be dependent upon interaction between staff, customers and any third parties present during the incident. It was hypothesised here that the final result of an incident would be dependent upon the number of escalating and de-escalating events generated during an incident.



This theoretical approach represented an original way to try and understand abuse and violence against businesses. Previous research in this area has conducted surveys of rates of abuse and violence against businesses, but there has been no attempt to build a theory of victimisation. The theory was outlined in chapter 3 and a number of conjectures relating to the contexts, triggers and processes of abuse and violence were formulated. The conjectures were tested by using three data sources. The contexts of abuse and violence were analysed by utilising quantitative data from two Small Business and Crime Initiative surveys with over 800 business outlets in each sweep. Using data from qualitative interviews with victims primarily tested conjectures about the triggers and processes of abuse and violence.

This represents one of the most thorough studies of abuse and violence against businesses to date. The SBCI captured the largest localised sample of small business so far studied in the UK, and it is the first study to conduct interviews with victims of abuse and violence within the context of a small business. A summary of the results is now given below.

#### **The contexts of victimisation:**

The SBCI data were clearly able to establish some of the lifestyle characteristics of businesses that generate the contexts suitable for abuse and violence (these are outlined in table 7.1). The first patterns that were established highlighted that business premises in the retail and service sectors had the highest risk of abuse and violence. Here, retail and service sector businesses were 1.8 times more likely to be victims of abuse and 4.5 times more likely to be victims of violence than businesses in the wholesale and manufacturing sector. This partly confirmed patterns that had already been established in the Commercial Victimisation Survey (Mirrlees-Black & Ross, 1995). Here, it had been found that retail sector business experienced higher rates of assaults than manufacturing businesses.

It was also established that there were variations in risk within these sectors. The highest risk businesses in the retail sector were food shops, off-licences, motor parts/ fuels and

clothing/footwear businesses. In the service sector the highest risk businesses were public houses, eating places, bookmakers, postal services and hotels. It was established that these businesses had a common set of lifestyle features that generate the risk of abuse and violence. For example, they all relied on a high number of customer visits (which increased the risks of a convergence of victim and offender), they all regularly handle cash, have late opening hours and they often serve or sell alcohol. These were considered to be some of the key lifestyle factors that would generate abuse and violence.

A number of other contextual factors were also assessed such as number of staff employed, experience of other crime types, security provisions and demographic characteristics of staff. Here, it was found that businesses employing five or more staff experience a higher number of incidents than businesses employing less than five staff. However, the 'actual' risks of becoming a victim of abuse or violence are highest for employees who work in businesses with less than five staff. This is because the smaller businesses tend to be those in the retail and service sectors, which are more likely than the manufacturers or wholesalers to generate abuse and violence.

It was also found that victims of abuse and violence have higher prevalence rates than non-victims for a number of other crime types. For example, the victims of abuse and violence also experienced higher rates of burglary, shop theft and robbery than non-victims. This pattern may occur for two reasons. First, because victims may simply have a high 'risk heterogeneity' to other crime types (for example off-licences and burglary), or secondly because a number of these crime types are closely associated. For example in the retail sector there was a close relationship between abuse and violence (Pearsons product moment  $r=.9084$ ), and violence/shop theft (Pearsons product moment  $r=.9346$ ). Therefore it appears that some crime types have close associations.

The victims of abuse and violence were also more likely to install CCTV than the non-victims (victims of abuse were 1.4 times more likely and victims of violence 1.6 times more likely to install CCTV than non-victims). However, CCTV tends to be installed for

general security reasons and it has little impact in preventing or reducing abuse and violence.

**Table 7.1: The Lifestyle Characteristics of victims of abuse and violence.**

<b>Lifestyle Characteristic</b>	<b>High risk groups.</b>
Business Sector	Businesses in the retail and service sectors have higher risks of experiencing abuse and violence than those in the manufacturing and wholesale sectors.
Business Type	Within the retail and service sectors there are variations in risk. Business types such as off licences, food shops, bookmakers, pubs and eating places all have high risks. These businesses have lifestyle characteristics that generate incidents such as late opening hours, constantly handling cash and having a presence of alcohol on the premises.
Number of Staff Employed	Staff working in businesses with less than five employees have the highest risks. This is because many of the high-risk business types are businesses who employ less than five staff.
Risk Heterogeneity to <i>Other</i> Crime Types.	Victims of abuse/violence have high risks of experiencing a number of other crime types. There are close associations between some of these crime types. For example, shop theft, abuse and violence.
Security Provisions	Victims are more likely to install CCTV and take 'informal' measures such as 'excluding specific types from the premises' and 'having something available for self defence'.
Gender of Staff	Males have higher risks than females of experiencing an incident of abuse or violence.
Ethnicity of Staff	Asians have highest risks of experiencing an incident of abuse. Whites have higher risks of experiencing an incident of violence.
Demographics of Victims and Offenders	In most incidents of abuse and violence, victims and offenders tend to share the same demographic characteristics. If the victim is white and male, the assailant is usually white and male.

The victims of abuse and violence were also more likely than the non-victims to take other preventative actions such as 'employing extra staff to prevent crime or trouble' or 'making sure staff were not left alone on the premises'. As with CCTV, many businesses took these measures for general security reasons rather than to reduce abuse or violence. Despite this, it was found that businesses who 'excluded specific types' from the premises, 'have something available for self defence' and 'make sure staff are not alone on the premises' all had reductions in abuse/ violence between the SBCI sweeps 1 and 2. Here, it appears that taking these measures has a direct impact upon abuse and violence (unlike CCTV).

Whilst there are a number of contextual factors relating to the type of business that may be predictors of abuse and violence, demographic characteristics of staff may also affect risk. The risk of becoming a victim of abuse or violence is particularly associated with being male. There were 41.5 incidents of abuse per 1000 male staff and 15.4 incidents of violence per 1000 male staff. This is compared to 31.8 incidents of abuse per 1000 female staff and 3.8 incidents of violence. It was also found that Asians experience a high proportion of abuse of which 22.3% of incidents were said to be racially motivated. However, whites experience greater numbers of incidents of violence because they work in businesses such as public houses where violence is often generated. In most incidents of abuse and violence victims and offenders tend to share the same demographic characteristics (this is particularly true for ethnicity). In incidents where white males are the victims, white males also tend to be the assailants.

Here we have highlighted a number of novel findings about abuse and violence within the context of small businesses. From this evidence we can begin to characterise the key lifestyle features of the victims of abuse and violence (see table 7.1). Whilst these are essential to our understanding of abuse and violence, they fail to tell us how incidents are actually triggered (for example, what happens within a business that generates abuse and violence). To assess how incidents were triggered and processes generated a final result of abuse or violence, qualitative interviews were conducted with victims.

### **The Triggers and Processes of Incidents:**

It was hypothesised in chapter 3 that incidents of abuse and violence would be triggered by customers or businesses breaking the norms of business transaction. Chapter 6 used case studies from the qualitative interviews to highlight how this norm-breaking behaviour can trigger incidents. Here, it was found that acts of criminality such as robbery, shop theft and criminal damage are often part of a process of events which also consists of abuse and violence. Incidents of robbery and shop theft clearly break norms of business transaction as assailants try to secure goods without payment. Here, incidents will be triggered when staff do not comply with the requests of assailants or as in the case of shop theft try to apprehend assailants. Incidents of criminal damage are used as a form of retribution against the business after an earlier incident of abuse.

It was also found that businesses can violate the norms of business transaction. This happens when businesses offer a poor or substandard service, sell faulty goods or are not clear over the pricing of goods and services. Here, disputes were triggered when customers complained about various aspects of service and the business failed to rectify the problem. The case studies highlighted how these types of incidents can develop when customers feel the service or goods offered by the business are not of the expected standard.

Whilst most incidents will be triggered due to intervention in criminal activity or customer complaints, incidents may also be triggered by sexual attacks or if customers act in a disruptive or anti-social manner in the business. One case study in chapter six gave an example of an incident that had a sexual motive. Here, the offender exposed himself to a hairdresser and then physically attacked her. Another case was identified where the assailants appeared to be motivated by the desire to act in a purely anti-social manner on the business premises. Here, the offenders did not want to buy any goods but were motivated by the desire to act in a disruptive and abusive manner in the shop.

Racial abuse was also used in a number of incidents, though it was difficult to ascertain if incidents were racially motivated. It was apparent that racial abuse is often used as an identity attack against victims within incidents. Usually, these incidents are triggered by some other factor. For example, in one case study racist abuse was used after the member of staff had refused a request from the assailant to hand over cash from the till. After the initial request for cash was refused, the assailant made another request that included calling the victim a 'Paki'. Here, the victim said the attack was not racially motivated. There were other cases highlighted where racial abuse was apparent. In these cases, it appeared that racist abuse was used by assailants as a more forceful attempt to coerce victims into submitting to their demands.

The final result of incidents of abuse and violence will be dependent upon the contexts in which incidents are triggered. Therefore, it is not only the physical and verbal actions of the victim and offender that will have an impact upon the outcome of the incident, but also the influence of third parties and other factors such as the presence of alcohol. It was identified that third parties present at incidents could be other members of staff, other customers or associates of the assailants. The role third parties play in incidents will be dependent upon which of these categories they fall in to. Generally, if other members of staff are present when an incident is triggered they will become involved. This is usually because it would have been impossible to avoid the incident (because they are so close to the confrontation and often assailants direct abuse at more than one member of staff).

It was also apparent that other customers or bystanders will not intervene in incidents. This was identified in a number of case studies, though it is unclear why bystanders do not intervene in incidents. This 'bystander apathy' confirms Latane & Darleys' findings that bystanders often do not intervene in incidents of crime. There may be several reasons why this occurs within businesses. First, bystanders may not realise how serious an incident is (or if an incident is taking place at all). Second, they may think it is the responsibility of the business to take care of the problem and third, they may not want to risk becoming a victim of an assault by becoming involved in the incident.

The final category of third parties who can be present at incidents are associates of the assailants. In incidents where assailants were not alone, the associates of the assailant were also prepared to be abusive (and in some cases violent). Here, one person would usually be abusive to staff, though all of the associates of the assailant would share the same goal or motivation. For example in case study two, one assailant was dominant in conducting the robbery, through the other assailants also shared the same goals and motivations. Therefore associates of assailants would also be prepared to use abuse or violence.

In most of the case studies the goals or motivation of the assailants was clear. In incidents triggered by acquisitive crime such as robbery or shop theft, usually the goal of the assailant was to try and coerce the member of staff into giving them goods or letting them go after they have been caught shoplifting. The same applies to incidents where the assailant had been refused the sale of alcohol. Here, the incident will be characterised by the assailant trying to coerce the member of staff into selling them alcohol. Many other incident types were also characterised by the customer trying to coerce the member of staff into some form of action. For example, in cases that were triggered by complaints often the complaining customer would use abuse to try and coerce the member of staff into giving in to their demands. However, it must also be stated here, that abuse and violence was also often used to take revenge on the business after an incident of abuse. This is particularly apparent in cases that resulted in violence and criminal damage.

#### **The way forward for future research:**

This study has used both quantitative and qualitative interviewing to assess the lifestyle characteristics of businesses that are victims of abuse and violence, and the triggers and processes of incidents. A number of conclusions have been drawn from the research, though it has also highlighted some areas where future research could be conducted.

It was noted in chapter one that the study of crimes against businesses is still in its relative infancy, though a number of large studies have been conducted (such as the

Commercial Victimization Survey, the British Retail Consortium Surveys and the Scottish Business Crime Survey). However gaps in the research exist in terms of both crimes against businesses in general and abuse and violence against businesses.

The research that has considered crimes against business in general has tended to publish the findings of victimisation surveys. Whilst these surveys are important in establishing the prevalence of crime against businesses, they are not without problems. These problems are concerned with the methodologies used for recording crime against businesses, comparisons of the findings of surveys and how often surveys are conducted. These problems are considered in more detail below.

❖ **Methodological Approaches and Types of Businesses Sampled:** It was highlighted in chapter one that victimisation surveys employ different methodologies. This makes it difficult to compare findings. The BRC surveys interviewed the head offices of businesses, whilst surveys such as the SBCI and the CVS conducted interviews with business premises. The former can prove an easy route to accessing a large sample size. For example, one head office can provide data on hundreds of outlets. The latter approach will produce a smaller sample size, as each individual outlet has to be interviewed. However the quality of data may be improved as individual business premises will be more likely to give an accurate account of the number of crimes of which they are victim and when crimes occurred. Both methods have advantages and disadvantages (which were highlighted in chapter 4), though can create problems when comparing data between surveys. It also raises questions about which methodological approach is able to collect the most reliable data. As a remedy to this, the recent Scottish Business crime survey adopted a 'dual' methodological approach of conducting interviews with both head office and premises surveys.

Another key methodological problem relates to the sample of businesses targeted for data collection. The BRC interviews retail sector businesses only, the CVS interviewed retail and manufacturing premises, whereas the SBCI interviewed retail, service, manufacturing and wholesale businesses. It would be impossible and



impractical for all surveys to employ the same methodology and to target the same sample size. For example, the BRC represents retail businesses and has no interest in interviewing manufacturing premises. However, it is unclear why surveys such as the CVS only interviewed retail and manufacturing premises. Here, it would be of benefit if future surveys interviewed all business sectors.<sup>64</sup> Useful comparisons could then be made between the crime types and costs of crime suffered by each sector.

- ❖ **The Comparability of data:** Whilst it is often difficult to compare findings because varying methodologies have been employed, the findings of surveys can also be difficult to compare because of the differing ways surveys record crime types. The CVS (for example) recorded crime types such as assaults against staff by business 'premises', whereas the BRC measures it as a rate of victimisation per 1,000 staff. Therefore, both surveys use different units of analysis (one business premises, the other staff numbers) which makes it difficult to compare the data.

Victimisation surveys also have different ways of categorising similar crime types. The CVS has categories of 'all assaults and threats', 'assaults with injury' and 'any violent crime' for abuse and violence; whereas the BRC surveys record 'physical violence', 'threats of violence' and 'verbal abuse'. These categories are not strictly comparable. Therefore, it would also be of benefit if surveys used the same classifications and definitions of these crime types.

- ❖ **The replication of surveys:** A key consideration for future research is the replication of surveys. To date, the only national survey of crime against business to be conducted on a regular basis are the British Retail Consortium 'Retail Crime Costs' surveys. A BRC 'Retail Crime Cost' survey has been published every year since 1992 (six published to date). In comparison there has only been one sweep of the Home Office Commercial Victimisation Survey. The regular sweeps of the BRC surveys help to establish updated trends of crime against retailers where comparisons can be

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<sup>64</sup> It is also recognised here that the target sample is dependent upon the needs of those financing the research. For example, if a local authority finances research to assess the impact of crime against retail premises, then researchers are not likely to interview manufacturers or wholesalers.

made with previous survey sweeps. Here, it would also be beneficial if there were regular sweeps of The Home Office Commercial Victimization Survey. This would bring the CVS in to line with the British Crime Survey that conducts regular surveys of crime against households, and it would allow patterns of crime against retailers and manufacturers to be observed on a regular basis.

Overall, future research needs to be conscious of the problems in employing 'head office' and 'premises' based surveys and how crime types are recorded. More thought also needs to be given to the types of businesses that are sampled. The previous research has focused on retail premises, though future research needs to address crime against business in all sectors. Another problem with the previous research considering crimes against business is the lack of reflection as to why businesses are victims of certain crime types. This has been considered to a certain extent in the BRC and CVS surveys, and in a more recent study of Forum of Private Business surveys (Gill, 1998). However, researchers studying crimes against businesses need to consider the constellations of 'lifestyle' factors that generate crimes. For example, this study has shown that businesses that regularly handle cash, have high risks to other crime types, late opening hours and where alcohol is available on the premises have a high risk of abuse and violence. One could also draw constellations of lifestyle factors that are prevalent in businesses with high rates of crime types such as burglary, criminal damage and fraud.

A number of issues have been raised in this section concerning the research conducted in the area of crime against businesses. These issues also apply to the study of abuse and violence within businesses. As stated in chapter one, there has been a lack of research in this area. Figures that have been published on abuse and violence have usually been published as part of surveys interviewing businesses about a number of crime related issues. While this provides us with data on the rates of abuse and violence against businesses, it tells us little about how abuse/ violence is triggered and the processes of incidents. This suggests that there are a number of areas where future research could be conducted in the area of abuse and violence within the context of business premises. These are summarized below:

- ❖ **The rates of abuse and violence against businesses need to be regularly monitored:** A number of criticisms have been made of the previous research conducted on crimes against businesses. It has been suggested surveys need to be conducted regularly to measure rates of crime against business. This also applies to abuse and violence against businesses. It is unlikely that either national or local surveys would be conducted solely to assess abuse and violence. Therefore, surveys such as the BRC are helpful as they record rates of violence against retail staff annually. However, (as mentioned previously) this only records rates of violence against retail staff. The data could therefore be improved if regular national surveys of abuse and violence against staff in all business sectors were conducted.
  
- ❖ **There needs to be further understanding of the lifestyles that generate abuse and violence within businesses:** Victimization surveys can help develop a more detailed understanding of the 'lifestyle' factors of businesses that help to generate and attract abuse and violence. This thesis has highlighted a number of lifestyle characteristics of victims. Future research could make further inroads into assessing lifestyle constellations of victims of abuse and violence. Here, further research could assess the lifestyle characteristics of businesses that are victims of abuse and violence in varying contexts. This research has considered abuse and violence within two 'inner urban' areas of a medium sized city. Future research could consider the lifestyles of business (and employees) at a national level or in larger cities.
  
- ❖ **There needs to be further understanding of the relationship between victims and offenders in incidents of abuse and violence:** This research was able to establish how specific contexts generate abuse and violence. It was also able to assess the demographic characteristics of victims and offenders within the same incidents. Previous research has considered the relationship between victims and offenders in incidents. For example the British Crime Survey has considered the proportion of acquaintance and stranger violence. What would be of interest here would be to assess the relationship between victims and offenders in incidents of abuse and

violence in businesses and to see if patterns found in other contexts outside of the business environment replicate themselves inside the business environment. For example, it could be assessed if victims and offenders know each other, if this has any impact upon the risks of generating violence and why staff become involved in incidents. The qualitative interviews conducted as part of this study indicated that victims did not know the offenders before the incident. However, that relationship may differ according to location, business type and business size. For example, a victim of abuse in a small public house in an area such as the West End of Leicester may be more likely to know the assailant than the victim of an incident in a large supermarket in the city centre. Knowing or being familiar with a customer may play a role in affecting the risk of an incident with a result of violence. If we were fully to understand how abuse and violence is generated, it would be beneficial to understand how the victim/offender relationship affects the result of the incident.

- ❖ **Further consideration needs to be given to the processes of repeat victimisation:** More research needs to be conducted to understand repeat incidents of abuse and violence in the business environment. For example, we need to assess if repeat victimisation is generated by risk heterogeneity (businesses possessing lifestyles that generate a high number of incidents of abuse/ violence by a high number of offenders) or if incidents are event dependent (generated by the same offender returning to the premises). The qualitative interviews highlighted cases where an incident of shop theft (for example) generated abuse. Therefore, the incident of abuse could be described as 'event dependent' as it was directly related to the initial incident of shop theft. There were also incidents in the case studies where offenders returned to the premises after the initial incident had taken place to be abusive or violent. These incidents would again be classified as 'event dependent'. Future research could take a sample of 'event dependent' repeat victims of abuse/ violence, conduct interviews about why offenders had returned to the premises and conduct time-course analysis on the repeat patterns. This would tell us why offenders return to the premises and when they return. This could have implications for preventing repeat incidents of abuse and violence.

- ❖ **Further research needs to consider both victim and offender accounts of incidents:** Victims of abuse or violence gave the accounts of incidents used in the case studies. It was noted that these accounts might have given a rather one-sided view of the incident. To remedy this, it would be necessary to develop a methodology where both victims and offenders give accounts of incidents. Though, there would be obvious logistical problems in securing interviews from both victims and offenders, it would be of interest to compare the accounts and to establish if the sequence of events given by either side appeared to be accurate. These offender accounts would help understand in more detail why the assailants were violent in the contexts of businesses.
  
- ❖ **Further consideration needs to be given to the impact of abuse and violence on businesses and their staff:** There has been a dearth in the study of the impact of abuse and violence on businesses. Hopkins & Tilley (1997) suggest the impact of abuse and violence can be classified in terms of financial and human costs. The financial cost of abuse and violence impacts upon the business in terms of days lost as a result of staff taking time off due to the effect of incidents. The human costs can be characterised as an injury resulting from an attack or some psychological impact that may increase fear of crime for a victim or even cause them to leave the business. It is difficult to assess the financial cost of abuse and violence. However Beck et al (1994) suggest that it can reduce staff morale and lead to staff leaving the company. This has obvious implications for businesses in terms of recruiting, training and retaining staff.

Whilst it has been identified that there are financial and human consequences of abuse and violence, the previous research is scarce. To remedy this, national surveys of crime against business could begin to ask business about the impact of an incident. This could assess the impact of abuse and violence in more detail by making assessments of the financial cost to business and the human cost to staff. The financial costs would take into account factors such as working time lost due to injury to staff, and if staff left the company as a result of an incident. The human costs

would assess the risk of injury to staff in violent incidents and if incidents had any lasting psychological impact upon victims.

- ❖ **There needs to be a systematic review of the measures that can be taken to reduce abuse and violence and an evaluation of the effectiveness of these measures in preventing abuse and violence in different contexts:** The major aim of this research was to highlight the lifestyle features of victims and the triggers and processes of incidents. Whilst being able to identify victims and potential victims of abuse and violence is of paramount importance, it is also important to assess how incidents could be reduced or prevented. In chapter five, the impact of CCTV and taking measures such as 'excluding certain types' from the premises and 'having something available for self-defence' were assessed. However, little previous research has assessed the impact of such measures on rates of abuse and violence.

A number of publications have given advice on how to prevent abuse and violence within the business environment. For example, the Health and Safety Executive have published reports giving advice on how to reduce the risk of violence in the workplace (HSE, 1995) and Booker (1999) offers advice on how to avert aggression in the workplace. However, few studies have evaluated the impact of measures designed to reduce abuse and violence in any systematic manner.<sup>65</sup> Therefore, a systematic review of the measures that can be taken to reduce abuse and violence in different business types needs to be undertaken. Future research could identify high-risk business types or occupations at risk from abuse and violence. These business types could then be targeted for prevention and a number of reduction strategies implemented (such as installing CCTV for example). After a period of time the impact of these measures could then be evaluated.

This chapter has outlined the key findings of this study, and it has made a number of recommendations for future research. It can be concluded that certain businesses do have clearly identifiable lifestyles that generate abuse and violence. The thesis has also

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<sup>65</sup> Poyner and Warne (1988) do highlight case studies of projects that have tried to reduce violence in different business contexts such as in educational establishments, on public transport and in pubs. However, there has been little evaluation of preventative strategies in service and retail sector businesses.

highlighted a number of areas where further research could be conducted. For example, future research could provide more detailed accounts of repeat abuse and violence against businesses. There could be further investigation into advantages and disadvantages of using differing methodologies to explore crimes against businesses, and there could be some evaluation of prevention strategies designed to reduce abuse and violence.

Overall, this study has met its intended aims. It has outlined a novel theoretical framework (which could be applied to all types of business crime) and it has highlighted a number of 'lifestyle' features that generate the contexts for abuse and violence. The 'lifestyle' features identified here are not exhaustive, though this theoretical approach begins to identify a new way of understanding abuse and violence against businesses.

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## Appendix 1: SBCI survey Sweep 1.

### Natwest Trust Small Business and Crime Initiative Evaluation Survey

ID	INT	DATE	TIME

Thank you for agreeing to contribute to this investigation. The information we are gathering marks the start of a major initiative in the City Challenge and Belgrave areas. The data collected will allow us to measure both the scale and effects of business related crime in these areas. Working in partnership with the business community we will then be able to develop practical solutions to the problems found.

We can assure you that any of the information you provide will only be represented in statistical form after the analysis, and no individual business will be identified.

**A. Your business**

**A1.** How would you describe the *main* activity of the business on this site?  
(note code from card)

**A2.** Is there a secondary business activity on this site?

1. Yes (note code from card)

2. No

**A3.** Did you start trading from these premises?

1. Within the last year (note if within 6 months)

2. Between one year and five years ago

3. Over five years ago

**A4.** Is the business:

1. A public limited company- *plc*?

2. A private limited company?

3. A partnership or sole proprietorship?

4. A franchise?

5. Other?

**A5.** Is the business at this site:

1. An independent business occupying this site only

2. The headquarters of a business occupying more than one site

3. A branch subsidiary or division of a business with headquarters elsewhere

If a branch subsidiary or division, could you tell me the number of outlets in the organisation as a whole? (If the business has multiple branches, stress that only details from this one branch are required).

**B. Local Environment and its Problems**

**B1.** The questions I now want to put to you are about things that might be a problem for some businesses. Using this scale, can you tell me how much of a problem each of the following is in relation to the area around your business premises.

*CARD ONE*

- 1. A serious problem
- 2. A fairly serious problem
- 3. A slight problem
- 4. No problem at all
- 5. Don't know

- |                                  |                          |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Vandalism                     | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. Litter/flyposting/graffiti    | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. Youths hanging around         | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. Poor street lighting          | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5. Vagrants and beggars          | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6. People drinking on the street | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7. Crime                         | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8. Drug dealing                  | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9. Prostitution                  | <input type="checkbox"/> |

## BURGLARY & ATTEMPTS

### C. Experience of Crime

I'd now like to ask you about specific types of crime you may have experienced. I would remind you that we are interested in offences which happened to you in the last year, that is from 1st September, 1994 up to the present time.

C1. So, since 1st September, 1994 (or time when business started if later), has anyone burgled, or attempted to burgle, your premises (any of the buildings): that is, got into you premises (or tried to do so) without permission to steal something?

1. Yes: (go to a)
2. No: (go to C2)
3. Don't know
4. Refused

a. How many burglaries, and/or attempts have you experienced in this time?

b. Can you tell me: (*Use the table at the bottom of the page.*)

- \* the *month* and *year* when each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)
- \* the *total cost of each incident* - in terms of any money or goods stolen, damaged or lost business.

\* whether *entry was made* to the premises.

- 1= Yes

- 2= No

\* whether you *reported* it to the police.

1 Yes

If not, why not:

- |                                       |                              |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 2. No, the police would do nothing    | 6. No, wasn't serious enough |
| 3. No, police could have done nothing | 7. No, too frequent          |
| 4. No, don't like the police          | 8. No, other                 |
| 5. No, due to insurance reasons       | 9. Don't know                |

-whether you were insured against these losses?

1. No

2. Yes, but didn't claim

3. Yes, claimed and got no money.

4. Yes, claimed and got money

5. Don't know

**If insured and paid:** How much money was recovered?

Incident (previous first)	Date	Total Cost	Entry	Police	Ins	Recovered
1						
2						
3						
4						

## CRIMINAL DAMAGE

**C2.** Apart from these incidents, since September 1<sup>st</sup> 1994 (or time when business started, if later) has anyone caused any deliberate damage - including arson - to any of the buildings at these premises: that is, to the buildings themselves, or to any equipment or stock belonging to the business.

1. Yes (go to a)
2. No (go to C3 )
3. Don't know
4. Refused

a. How many incidents of criminal damage have you experienced in this time?

b. Can you tell me: (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*)

\* the *month* and *year* when each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)

\* whether it was a case of *criminal damage or arson*

1. Criminal Damage

2. Arson

\* the *total cost of each incident* - in terms of any money or goods stolen, damage or lost business

\* whether you *reported* it to the police.

1 Yes

If not, why not:

2. No, the police would do nothing

3. No, police could have done nothing

4. No, don't like the police

5. No, due to insurance

6. No, wasn't serious enough

7. No, too frequent

8. No, other

9. Don't know

-whether the incident was racially motivated?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

-whether you were insured against these losses?

1. No
2. Yes, but didn't claim
3. Yes, claimed and got no money
4. Yes, claimed and got money
5. Don't know

-If insured and paid: How much money was recovered?

Incident (previous first)	Date	Criminal damage or arson	Total Cost	Police	Racial	Ins	Recovered
1							
2							
3							
4							



## THEFT BY CUSTOMER

C3. Since September 1st, 1994 (or time when the business started, if later) has the business experienced any incidents when customers of the business stole from you, that is took without permission any stock, cash or equipment belonging to the business. This includes any incidents of shoplifting and till snatches.

(If till snatches involved violence or threats, record under robbery).

1. Yes (go to a)
2. No (go to C4)
3. Don't know
4. Refused

a) How many incidents of customer theft, or shoplifting have you experienced?   
 (If too may to recall, enter 9 and go to 3B).

b) Can you tell me: (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*).

- \* the *month* and *year* at which each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)
- \* the *total cost of each incident* - in terms of the damage or any lost business.
- \* whether you *reported* it to the police
  - 1 Yes
  - If not, why not:
    2. No, the police would do nothing
    3. No, police could have done nothing
    4. No, don't like the police
    5. No, due to insurance
    6. No, wasn't serious enough
    7. No, too frequent
    8. No, other
    9. Don't know

3B. \* How much is the average cost per year?  
 \* In general did you report these to the police? (1=Yes, 2=No)

-whether you were insured against these loses?

1. No
2. Yes, but didn't claim
3. Yes, claimed and got no money
4. Yes, claimed and got money
5. Don't know

-If insured and paid: How much money was recovered?

Incident (previous first)	Month/ year	Total Cost	Police	Ins	Recovered	Average Cost	Police
1							
2							
3							
4							

**THEFT BY STAFF**

**C4.** Since September 1<sup>st</sup> 1994 (or time when business started, if later), have you experienced any incidents when employees of the business stole from you, that is took without permission any stock, cash or equipment belonging to the business?

- 1. Yes (go to a)
- 2. No (go to C5)
- 3. Don't know
- 4. Refused

a. How many incidents of staff theft have you experienced in this time?

- b. Can you tell me (*Use the table at the bottom of the page.*)
- \* the **month** and **year** at when these incidents occurred (*note code*)
  - \* the **total cost of each incident** - in terms of the cost of lost stock, damage or any lost business
  - \* whether you **reported** it to the police
    - 1. Yes
    - If not, why not:
      - 2. No, the police would do nothing
      - 3. No, police could have done nothing
      - 4. No, don't like the police
      - 5. No, due to insurance
      - 6. No, wasn't serious enough
      - 7. No, too frequent
      - 8. No, other
      - 9. Don't know

-whether you were insured against these loses?

- 1. No
- 2. Yes, but didn't claim
- 3. Yes, claimed and got no money
- 4. Yes, claimed and got money
- 5. Don't know

-If insured and paid: How much money was recovered?

Incident (previous first)	Month/Year	Total Cost	Police	Ins	Recovered
1					
2					
3					
4					

**ROBBERY & ATTEMPTS**

C5. Since September 1<sup>st</sup> 1994 (or time when business started, if later) has anyone not employed by you stolen, or attempted to steal from you, by threatening or using violence. Please include incidents committed both on the premises or while undertaking business elsewhere.

- 1. Yes (go to a)
- 2. No (go to C6)
- 3. Don't know
- 4. Refused

a. How many robberies or attempted robberies have you experienced in this time?   
 b. Can you tell me (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*).

- \* the **month** and **year** when each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)
- \* was the attack an **attempt** or was property actually removed from you or your staff?
  - 1. Attempt
  - 2. Robbery
- \* the **total cost** of each one - in terms of lost stock, any damage or any lost business:
- \* whether you **reported** it to the police
  - 1. Yes
  - If not, why not:
    - 2. No, the police would do nothing
    - 3. No, police could have done nothing
    - 4. No, don't like the police
    - 5. No, due to insurance
    - 6. No, wasn't serious enough
    - 7. No, too frequent
    - 8. No, other
    - 9. Don't know
- \* was a **weapon** used during the robbery?
  - 1. Yes, knife
  - 2. Yes, handgun
  - 3. Yes, club
  - 4. No
  - 5. Don't know
- \* were you or any of your staff **wounded** during the attack?
  - 1. Yes
  - 2. No
  - 3. Don't know

-whether you were insured against these loses?

- 1. No
- 2. Yes, but didn't claim
- 3. Yes, claimed and got no money
- 4. Yes, claimed and got money
- 5. Don't know

-If insured and paid: How much money was recovered?

Incident (previous first)	Month/Year	Attempt	Total Cost	Police	Weapon	Wound
1						
2						
3						
4						

**FRAUD**

**C6. Since September 1<sup>st</sup> 1994 (or the time when the business started if later) has the business suffered from fraud, that is, have customers, staff or outsiders obtained goods by fraudulent methods?**

- 1. Yes (go to a)
- 2. No (go to C7)
- 3. Don't know
- 4. Refused

a. How many incidents of fraud have you experienced in this time ?

b. Can you tell me: (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*).

\* the *month* and *year* at which each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)

\* the type of fraud carried out

- 1. Credit card fraud
- 2. Cheque fraud
- 3. Counterfeit money
- 4. Goods removed in transit
- 5. Other (*please specify if they were a result of cheques bouncing*)

\* the *total cost* of each incident- in terms of the lost stock, damage or any lost business.

\* could you also indicate *who* carried out the fraud?

- 1. Customers
- 2. Staff
- 3. Suppliers
- 4. Others

\* whether you *reported* it to the police

- 1. Yes

If not, why not:

- 2. No, the police would do nothing
- 3. No, police could have done nothing
- 4. No, don't like the police
- 5. No, due to insurance
- 6. No, wasn't serious enough
- 7. No, too frequent
- 8. No, other
- 9. Don't know

-whether you were insured against these loses?

- 2. No
- 2. Yes, but didn't claim
- 3. Yes, claimed and got no money
- 4. Yes, claimed and got money
- 5. Don't know

-If insured and paid: How much money was recovered?

Incident (previous first)	Month/Year	Type	Total Cost	Who	Police	Ins	Recovered
1							
2							
3							
4							

**TRANSPORT-RELATED LOSS**

**C7. Since September 1<sup>st</sup> 1994 (or the time when the business started, if later) has the business had any transport related losses, that is thefts of and from company vehicles, acts of criminal damage on vehicles, and losses of stock in transit. (This only applied to vehicles used for business purposes).**

- 1. Yes (go to a)
- 2. No (go to C8)
- 3. Don't know
- 4. Refused

a. How many incidents of transport loss have you experienced in this time ?

- b. Can you tell me (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*).
  - \* the month and year at which each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)
  - \* did the incidents involve *criminal damage*, a *theft from vehicle* only or the *theft of the vehicle* itself?
    - 1. Criminal damage
    - 2. Theft from vehicle only
    - 3. Theft of vehicle
  - \* the *total costs* of each incident - in terms of the cost of lost stock, damage or any lost business:
  - \* *who* suffered the loss?
    - 1. The company
    - 2. Carriers employed by the company
    - 3. Employees
  - \* *where* did the incident take place
    - 1. In the street in Leicester      3. In a company car park
    - 2. In a public car park            4. Other
  - \* Whether you *reported* it to the police
    - 1. Yes
    - If not, why not:
      - 2. No, the police would do nothing      6. No, wasn't serious enough
      - 3. No, police could have done nothing      7. No, too frequent
      - 4. No, don't like the police              8. No, other
      - 5. No, due to insurance                      9. Don't know

-whether you were insured against these losses?

- 1. No
- 2. Yes, but didn't claim                      4. Yes, claimed and got money
- 3. Yes, claimed and got no money      5. Don't know

-If insured and paid: How much money was recovered?

Incident (previous first)	Month/year	Type	Total Cost	Who	Where	Police	Ins	Recovered
1								
2								
3								
4								

**PHYSICAL VIOLENCE**

**C8. Since September 1<sup>st</sup> 1994 (or time when businesses started , if later) have you or your staff experienced any violent attacks, that is an act of physical violence? And have you experienced any violent disputes between customers or others while on your premises?**

- 1. Yes (go to a)
- 2. No (go to C9)
- 3. Don't know
- 4. Refused

a) How many violent attacks have you experienced in this time ?

- b) Can you tell me (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*)
- \* the **month** and **year** when each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)
  - \* could you tell me **what type** of incident this was?
    - 1. Attack on staff
    - 2. Dispute between customers
  - \* could you tell me the **gender** of the person attacked?
    - 1. Male
    - 2. Female
    - 3. Both
  - \* Were you or any of your staff **wounded** during the attack?
    - 1. Yes
    - 2. No
    - 3. Don't know
  - \* Do you think the attack was **racially motivated**?
    - 1. Yes
    - 2. No
    - 3. Don't know
  - \* Whether you **reported** it to the police
    - 1. Yes
    - If not, why not:
      - 2. No, the police would do nothing
      - 3. No, police could have done nothing
      - 4. No, don't like the police
      - 5. No, due to insurance
      - 6. No, wasn't serious enough
      - 7. No, too frequent
      - 8. No, other
      - 9. Don't know
  - \* Did you or your staff have to take any **time** off work as a result of the incident?
    - 1. Yes
    - 2. No
    - 3. Don't know

Incident (previous first)	Month/Year	Type	Gender	Wound	Racial	Police	Time
1							
2							
3							
4							

## ABUSE, THREATS & INTIMIDATION

**C9.** Since September 1<sup>st</sup> 1994 (or time when business started, if later) have you experienced any acts of verbal abuse, threats or intimidation against yourself or your staff? And have you experienced similar acts between customers or others while on your premises?

1. Yes (go to a)
2. No (go to D1)
3. Don't know
4. Refused.

a. How many acts of verbal abuse, threats or intimidation have you experienced in this time ?

b. Can you tell me: (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*)

\* the **month** and **year** at which each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)

\* could you tell me what **type** of incident this was?

1. Verbal abuse, threats or intimidation against staff
2. Dispute between customers

\* could you tell me the **gender** of the person subjected to abuse, threat or intimidation

1. Male
2. Female
3. Both
3. Don't know

\* Do you think the attack was **racially motivated**?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

\* whether you **reported** it to the police

1. Yes

If not, why not:

- |                                       |                              |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 2. No, the police would do nothing    | 6. No, wasn't serious enough |
| 3. No, police could have done nothing | 7. No, too frequent          |
| 4. No, don't like the police          | 8. No, other                 |
| 5. No, due to insurance               | 9. Don't know                |

\* Did you or your staff have to take any **time** off work as a result of the incident?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

Incident (previous first)	Date	Type	Gender	Racial	Police	Time
1						
2						
3						
4						

**D. UNEXPLAINED LOSS**

**D1.** Since September 1<sup>st</sup> 1994 (or time when business started, if later) have you had any other unexplained losses - not dealt with above - that you feel might be attributable to crime?

- 1. Yes (go to D2 )
- 2. No (Go to section E)
- 3. Don't know
- 4. Refused.

**D2.** What do you feel these losses might be, and how did you identify the problem?  
(1=yes, 2=no).

- 1. Unobserved theft by customers (shoplifting)
- 2. Unobserved thefts by staff
- 3. Unobserved thefts by suppliers
- 4. Other (please note)

How did you identify these losses? Use *CARD TWO*.

- 1. Spots checks
- 2. Stock audits
- 3. Reports from staff
- 4. Reports from outsiders
- 5. Other (please note)

**D3.** Can you tell me the overall cost to your business of these losses?



**E. DEALINGS WITH THE POLICE**

I'd now like to ask some questions about any dealings you may have had with the police since the 1st September, 1994.

**THIS IS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME WHO HAVE REPORTED INCIDENTS TO THE POLICE ONLY.**

**E1.** You've told me that over the last year you've had reason to contact the police about crime incidents you have experienced on one/a number of occasions. Could you tell me which types of incident were - for you - the most important? (*Write up to three where incidents have been reported for the previous year*).

- |                            |                                 |  |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|--|
| 1. Burglaries and attempts | 6. Fraud                        |  |
| 2. Criminal damage         | 7. Transport related loss       |  |
| 3. Theft by customer       | 8. Physical Violence            |  |
| 4. Theft by staff          | 9. Abuse, threats, intimidation |  |
| 5. Robberies and attempts  |                                 |  |

(Now ask the following questions for up to three types of incident where the victim has made police contact- use grid at bottom of page).

**CARD THREE.**

How satisfied were you with the action the police took?

- |                                      |                      |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Very Satisfied                    | 4. Dissatisfied      |
| 2. Satisfied                         | 5. Very dissatisfied |
| 3. Neither satisfied or dissatisfied | 6. Don't know        |

**CARD FOUR.**

If satisfied/very satisfied what aspect did you find most satisfactory?

- |                               |                        |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. The level of communication | 4. Other               |
| 2. The level of service       | 5. Caught the criminal |
| 3. Everything                 |                        |

**CARD FIVE.**

If dissatisfied/very dissatisfied what aspect did you find most dissatisfactory?

- |                               |                        |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. The level of communication | 4. Other               |
| 2. The level of service       | 5. Criminal not caught |
| 3. Everything                 |                        |

Incident (previous first)	Crime	Satisfied	Aspect Satisfied	Aspect Dissatisfied
1				
2				
3				

**Non-crime contacts.**

**E2.** Thinking about your business only, apart from these reports about crime incidents, have you or someone else within the company contacted the police about any other matter since the 1<sup>st</sup> September 1994?

- 1. Yes: continue
- 2. No: go to E3

Interviewer: now ask the following series of questions for up to three types of contacts with the police

-what was the type of service or assistance you wanted from the police?

- 1. An update on local problems
- 2. A visit from the CPO
- 3. Other

**CARD FIVE**

-How satisfied were you with the response you received from the police?

- 1. Very Satisfied
- 2. Satisfied
- 3. Neither satisfied or dissatisfied
- 4. Dissatisfied
- 5. Very dissatisfied
- 6. Don't know

If satisfied/very satisfied what aspect did you find most satisfactory?

- 1. The level of communication
- 2. The level of service
- 2. Everything
- 4. Other

If dissatisfied/very dissatisfied what aspect did you find most satisfactory?

- 1. The level of communication
- 2. The level of service
- 3. Everything
- 4. Other

**E3.** Thinking about your business only, have the poice approached you to offer advice or discuss community matters in the period since 1<sup>st</sup> September 1994?

In this case no=0. If yes enter the number of times in the box

If no go to section F

Yes- how many times has this happened?

	Service	Satisfied	Aspect Sat	Aspect Dis
1				
2				
3				

**F. Insurance**

I'd now like to ask you a few questions about insurance of the building and its contents.

F1. Is your insurance a combined policy?

Do you know the breakdown? (if yes ask the following series of questions. If no enter the premium cost here).

F2. Do you have any buildings insurance, and who is it arranged by?

Again 0=No and the yes answer can be entered in the box.

0. No: go to F3

- 1. Yes, arranged by landlord
- 2. Yes, additional to landlords
- 3. Yes, arranged through company head office
- 4. Yes, arranged by you alone

**If yes, can you tell me the cost of the annual premium?**

*Leave blank for don't know, enter 0 for no*

**F3. Do you have any contents insurance? 0=No, code yes as above.**

Can you tell me the cost of the annual premium?

*Leave blank for don't know, enter 0 for No.*

**F4. Have you had any difficulty getting insurance? 0=No.**

- 1. Yes-buildings
- 2. Yes- contents
- 3. Yes-both

If yes, why did you have difficulty?

- 1. High victimisation
- 2. Shared access
- 3. Postcode area
- 4. Other (note)

**F5. Has an insurance firm ever carried out a survey of your premises?**

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

Did you follow their guidelines?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No.

## G. PREVENTION

I'd now like to ask you some questions about the measures you have installed to protect your business premises and staff against crime.

**F1.** I am going to show you a list of security devices (*CARD SIX*). Would you tell me if:  
a. You have any of them and if they have been installed since 1st September 1994 (*use grid below*).

1. Yes (old) 2. Yes (new) 3. No (Circle appropriate one)

b. Why were they installed? (put code in column B below)

1. Recommended by Police    4. Because a victim  
2. For insurance reasons    5. Not crime related  
3. For general security

	A			B
Bars/Grills on windows	1	2	3	
Bars or grilles on doors	1	2	3	
Toughened, laminated or wired glass	1	2	3	
Reinforced doors and frames	1	2	3	
Five lever locks	1	2	3	
Shutters	1	2	3	
Internal CCTV- taped or viewed	1	2	3	
External CCTV -taped or viewed	1	2	3	
Roof protection	1	2	3	
Fencing	1	2	3	
Barbed wired/ razor wire on fencing/ roof	1	2	3	
Anti-climb paint	1	2	3	
Dog on the premises	1	2	3	
Gatekeeper/ or receptionist during business hours	1	2	3	
Caretaker/ security patrol outside business hours	1	2	3	
Staff given training on security issues	1	2	3	
Safe	1	2	3	
Postcodes on valuable equipment	1	2	3	
Intercom entry	1	2	3	
Security lights	1	2	3	
Fake note detector	1	2	3	
Store detectives	1	2	3	
Tagging (Electronic Article Surveillance)	1	2	3	
Intruder Alarm	1	2	3	

**G2.** How much do you estimate your company has spent since 1<sup>st</sup> September on security devices for the premises here.

a. In capital Costs (initial outlay)

b. In revenue costs (maintenance)

c. Is there a separate budget for security? 1. Yes 2. No

**G3.** In terms of managing your business safely or handling difficult customers/clients, how many of the following precautions do you take? (Circle appropriate number)

1. Yes      2. No      3. Sometimes

- |  |   |   |   |
|--|---|---|---|
| 1. Watch out for specific types of people              | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 2. Exclude specific types of people                    | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 3. Employ extra staff to prevent crime or trouble      | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 4. Ensure that staff aren't left alone on the premises | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 5. Have something available to use in self-defence     | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 6. Lock up or close up before cashing up               | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 7. Limit the amount of cash in the till                | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 8. Take extra measures going to the bank               | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 9. Other (please note)                                 |   |   |   |

**Intruder Alarm.**

**G4.** Do you have an intruder alarm?

- 1. Yes: go to G5
- 2. 2. No – go to section H

If yes: what is the name of the alarm company (code from alarm card)

**G5.** What type is it?

- 1. Audible/ 'bells only'
- 2. Audible & lighting
- 3. Direct link to alarm company
- 4. Direct link to police
- 5. Redcare
- 6. Just a box
- 7. Other

**G6.** Does the alarm incorporate a 'personal alarm' or 'panic' facility?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

**G7.** Has your alarm gone off since 1<sup>st</sup> September 1994?

(if more than 3, record only 3 latest)

- 1. Yes, due to false alarm
- 2. Yes, due to attempted burglary
- 3. Yes, due to burglary
- 4. No

b. did the police arrive?

- 1. Yes
- 2. 2. No
- 3. Don't know

In	A	B
1		
2		
3		

**H. ATTITUDES ABOUT CRIME**

I'd now like to ask you some questions about how safe you and your staff feel about working at these premises and in this area.

**H1.** Could you tell me whether you or your staff are worried about the following happening at work:

*(CARD SEVEN)*

- 1. Very worried
- 2. Worried
- 3. Not really worried
- 4. Not at all worried
- 5. Don't know

- 1. Being physically attacked?
- 2. Having personal possessions stolen ?
- 3. Leaving cars at or around the premises ?
- 4. Racial Harassment ?
- 5. Sexual Harassment ?

**H2.** Could you tell me one time when you feel fear of crime most affects you and your staff.

*(CARD EIGHT)*

- 1. Opening up in the morning
- 2. When staff are left alone on the premises
- 3. Cashing up for the day
- 4. Going to the bank
- 5. Pay days
- 6. Closing up at night
- 7. Other (Please note)

## I. DEMOGRAPHICS

To put all these questions in context - particularly those about staff safety - I would now like to gather some details about you and the staff who work here. We need details about the company so we can relate company size to the experience and costs of crime.

**11. How many people - both full and part time - work at or from these premises? Please include yourself but exclude casual staff.**

- |            |              |
|------------|--------------|
| 1. 1       | 5. 20 - 49   |
| 2. 2 - 4   | 6. 50 - 99   |
| 3. 5 - 10  | 7. 100 - 499 |
| 4. 11 - 19 | 8. 500+      |

<input type="text"/>	(Exact number)
<input type="text"/>	(Code)

**12. Of this number, how many are male and how many female? (Approximate if necessary)**

- |           |                      |
|-----------|----------------------|
| 1. Male   | <input type="text"/> |
| 2. Female | <input type="text"/> |

**13. Aside from these, do you have any casual staff?**

- |        |                      |
|--------|----------------------|
| 1. Yes | <input type="text"/> |
| 2. No  |                      |

**14. How would you describe the race or ethnic origin of the majority of people who work here? Prompt with *CARD TEN*.**

- |                 |                     |                 |                      |
|-----------------|---------------------|-----------------|----------------------|
| <b>1. White</b> | 11. UK              | <b>3. Black</b> | 31. Caribbean        |
|                 | 12. Ireland         |                 | 32. Africa           |
|                 | 13. Other European  |                 | 33. UK               |
|                 | 14. Other           |                 | 34. Other            |
| <b>2. Asian</b> | 21. India           | <b>4. Mixed</b> | 41. White and Asian  |
|                 | 22. Pakistan        |                 | 42. White and Black  |
|                 | 23. Bangladesh      |                 | 43. Asian and Black  |
|                 | 24. African descent |                 | 44. Other            |
|                 | 25. China/Far East  |                 |                      |
|                 | 26. UK              |                 | <input type="text"/> |
|                 | 27. Other           |                 |                      |

**15. How do most of your staff get to work?**

- |                        |                      |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. By foot             |                      |
| 2. By public transport | <input type="text"/> |
| 3. By bicycle          |                      |
| 4. By car              |                      |

**16. Where do those travelling to work by car or bicycle park?**

- |                              |                      |
|------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Company premises/ carpark | <input type="text"/> |
| 2. On the street             |                      |
| 3. In a public car park      |                      |

**17. Where do you yourself live?**

- |   |                      |
|---|----------------------|
| 1. In Belgrave/City Challenge area                      | <input type="text"/> |
| 2. In Leicester but not in Belgrave/City Challenge area |                      |
| 3. Outside Leicester                                    |                      |



18. What are the normal working hours for employees?

- 1. 'Normal' business hours
- 2. Shift work, but not 24 hr
- 3. Shift work: 24 hr

19. Do staff regularly work at weekends?

- 1. Yes. Saturday
- 2. Yes. Sunday
- 3. Yes. Both
- 4. No

110. Can you tell me the approximate floor area of the buildings here excluding external areas and living accommodation?

- 1. Less than 100 sq mtrs
- 2. 100 - 500 sq mtrs
- 3. 501 - 1000 sq mtrs
- 4. 1001 - 2500 sq mtrs
- 5. 2501 - 5000 sq mtrs
- 6. 5001 - 10,000 sq mtrs
- 7. Above 10,000 sq mtrs

111. Are the premises:

- 1. Leashold? (length of lease in years)   
(period remaining in years)
- 2. Freehold?
- 4. Rented/under licence?

112. To put the cost of crime in context, could you please tell me your annual turnover in the last financial year. Once again can I assure you that your answer will be treated in confidence.

Note exact turnover a) or code b):

- 1) £10,000 or under
- 2) £10,001 - £25,000
- 3) £25,001 - £100,000
- 4) £100,001 - £500,000
- 5) £500,001 - £1m
- 6) £1m - £2m
- 7) £2m - £5m
- 8) £5m - £10m
- 9) £10m - £20m
- 10) Over £20m
- 11) Refused/Can't say

a)

b)

113. Finally, could you tell me your pre-tax profit for the last financial year?

Note exact profit a) or code b)

- 1) £5000 or under
- 2) £5000 - £10,000
- 3) £10,001 - £25,000
- 4) £25,001 - £100,000
- 5) £100,001 - £250,000
- 6) £250,001 - £1m
- 7) £1m - £5m
- 8) £5m +
- 9) Refused/Can't say

## J Partnership in Crime Prevention

Finally, I'd like to put some questions to you about your views on working together with others – the police, local authority, or other businesses – to prevent crime in this area.

**J1.** We've talked about how crime and policing affects your business and this area generally. I'd like you to look at this card and tell me which three of these (if any) would be most effective in making you feel this area was safer. Just read out the numbers from the card.

### CARD TEN

1. Cleaner streets
2. CCTV in public places
3. Fewer boarded up shops
4. Fewer empty houses
5. Less graffiti
6. More contact with neighbours/friendlier neighbours
7. Well lit streets
8. Business watch
9. Private security guards/patrols

--	--	--

**J2.** Apart from the options on the list, are there any other actions you feel would make the area safer?

Note response:

--

**J3.** It is sometimes argued that businesses should not only look to the police for crime prevention assistance. Looking at this card, could you tell me how much help you think your business could get from working with any of the following.

### CARD ELEVEN

1. A great deal of help
2. A little help
3. Not much help
4. No help at all
5. Don't know

1. The local authority
2. Businesses adjoining your own
3. Other businesses of the same type in the area
4. Householders adjoining your premises
5. Other groups


**J4.** Are you already involved with any partnership schemes?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 4. Don't Know

**J5.** Thinking about partnerships with other businesses or agencies, would you or others in the business be willing to get involved with partnership schemes to combat crime in the future?

- 1. Yes
- 2. Probably
- 3. Doubtful
- 4. Never
- 5. Don't know

**J6.** The purpose of this survey is of course to develop actions that will make the businesses in this area safer. Have you any strong ideas of actions that can be taken by businesses or others to achieve this.

*Note response:*

As I have said, the aim of the project is to develop practical ideas for preventing crime against businesses. If we feel it can assist you, or we would like your involvement in further developing the project, would you mind if we contacted you again?

- 1. Yes, would mind
- 2. No, would not mind

*Note name of interviewee for follow up purposes if they would not mind*

**For respondents who thought any crime incident(s) they suffered was racially motivated:**

You noted that you thought that one/a number of crimes against your business were racially motivated. Nottingham Trent University are conducting a wider study of this sort of crime. Would you be willing to let them contact you in the future regarding this subject?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION.

## Appendix 2: SBCI survey Sweep 2.

### SMALL BUSINESS AND CRIME INITIATIVE EVALUATION SURVEY

Business ID	
Business Name	
Road	
Interviewer	
Date	

You may be aware that the Small Business & Crime Initiative has been operating in the City Challenge and Belgrave areas for the last two years with the major aim of reducing crime against business. This survey is being conducted by the Initiative to assess businesses experience of crime during the past 12 months. To provide an accurate account of local crime problems and your views about these problems it is essential that you participate in this survey.

**We can assure you that any information you provide will only be represented in statistical form after analysis, and no individual business will be identified.**

*Interviewers: Always put code numbers in boxes.*

**A. Your business**

A1. How would you describe the *main* activity of the business on this site?  
(note code from card)

A2. Is there a secondary business activity on this site?

1. Yes (note code from card)

2. No

A3. Did you start trading from these premises after 1st September 1995?

1. Yes

2. No

If yes- when?  (note code from card)

A4. Is the business at this site:

- 1. An independent business occupying this site only
- 2. The headquarters of a business occupying more than one site
- 3. A branch subsidiary or division of a business with headquarters elsewhere

If a branch subsidiary or division, could you tell me the number of outlets in the organisation as a whole? (If the business has multiple branches, stress that only details from this one branch are required).

**B. Local Environment and its Problems**

**B1.** The questions I now want to put to you are about things that might be a problem for some businesses. Using this scale, can you tell me how much of a problem each of the following is in relation to the area around your business premises.

*CARD ONE*

- 1. A serious problem
- 2. A fairly serious problem
- 3. A slight problem
- 4. No problem at all
- 5. Don't know

- 1. Vandalism
- 2. Litter/flyposting/graffiti
- 3. Youths hanging around
- 4. People drinking on the street
- 5. Crime
- 6. Drug dealing

**BURGLARY & ATTEMPTS**

**C. Experience of Crime**

I'd now like to ask you about specific types of crime you may have experienced. I would remind you that we are interested in offences which happened to you between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997.

**C1.** Between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997; has anyone burgled, or attempted to burgle, your premises (any of the building): that is, got into you premises (or tried to do so) without permission to steal something?

- 1. Yes: (go to a)
- 2. No: (go to C2)
- 3. Don't know
- 4. Refused

a. How many burglaries, and/or attempts have you experienced in this time?

b. Can you tell me: (*Use the table at the bottom of the page.*)

- \* the *month* and *year* when each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)
- \* the *total cost of each incident* - in terms of any money or goods stolen, damaged or lost business.
- \* whether *entry was made* to the premises.
  - 1= Yes
  - 2= No
- \* whether you *reported* it to the police.
  - 1 Yes
 If not, why not:
  - 2. No, the police would do nothing
  - 3. No, police could have done nothing
  - 4. No, don't like the police
  - 5. No, due to insurance reasons
  - 6. No, wasn't serious enough
  - 7. No, too frequent
  - 8. No, other
  - 9. Don't know

Incident (previous first)	Month/Year	Total Cost	Entry	Police
1				
2				
3				
4				

## CRIMINAL DAMAGE

**C2.** Apart from these incidents, has anyone caused any deliberate damage - including arson - to any of the buildings at these premises: that is, to the buildings themselves, or to any equipment or stock belonging to the business between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997?

1. Yes (go to a)
2. No (go to C3 )
3. Don't know
4. Refused

a. How many incidents of criminal damage have you experienced in this time?

b. Can you tell me: (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*)

- \* the *month* and *year* when each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)
- \* whether it was a case of *criminal damage or arson*

1. Criminal Damage
2. Arson

- \* the *total cost of each incident* - in terms of any money or goods stolen, damage or lost business

- \* whether you *reported* it to the police.

- 1 Yes

If not, why not:

2. No, the police would do nothing
3. No, police could have done nothing
4. No, don't like the police
5. No, due to insurance
6. No, wasn't serious enough
7. No, too frequent
8. No, other
9. Don't know

Incident (previous first)	Month/year	Criminal damage or arson	Total Cost	Police
1				
2				
3				
4				

## THEFT BY CUSTOMER

**C3.** Between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997; has the business experienced any incidents when customers of the business stole from you, that is took without permission any stock, cash or equipment belonging to the business. This includes any incidents of shoplifting and till snatches.

(If till snatches involved violence or threats, record under robbery).

1. Yes (go to a)
2. No (go to C4)
3. Don't know
4. Refused

a) How many incidents of customer theft, or shoplifting have you experienced?   
 (If too may to recall, enter 9 and go to 3B).

b) Can you tell me: (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*).

- \* the *month* and *year* at which each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)
- \* the *total cost of each incident* - in terms of the damage or any lost business.
- \* whether you *reported* it to the police

1 Yes

If not, why not:

2. No, the police would do nothing
3. No, police could have done nothing
4. No, don't like the police
5. No, due to insurance
6. No, wasn't serious enough
7. No, too frequent
8. No, other
9. Don't know

- 3B. \* How much is the average cost per year?  
 \* In general did you report these to the police? (1=Yes, 2=No)

### 3B

Incident (previous first)	Month/year	Total Cost	Police	Average Cost	Police
1					
2					
3					
4					



## THEFT BY STAFF

**C4.** Between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997; have you experienced any incidents when employees of the business stole from you, that is took without permission any stock, cash or equipment belonging to the business?

1. Yes (go to a)
2. No (go to C5 )
3. Don't know
4. Refused

a. How many incidents of staff theft have you experienced in this time ?

b. Can you tell me (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*).

- \* the *month* and *year* at when these incidents occurred (*note code*)
- \* the *total cost of each incident* - in terms of the cost of lost stock, damage or any lost business
- \* whether you *reported* it to the police
  1. Yes
 If not, why not:
  2. No, the police would do nothing
  3. No, police could have done nothing
  4. No, don't like the police
  5. No, due to insurance
  6. No, wasn't serious enough
  7. No, too frequent
  8. No, other
  9. Don't know

Incident (previous first)	Month/Year	Total Cost	Police
1			
2			
3			
4			

## ROBBERY & ATTEMPTS

**C5.** Between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997; has anyone not employed by you stolen, or attempted to steal from you, by threatening or using violence. Please include incidents committed both on the premises or while undertaking business elsewhere.

1. Yes (go to a)
2. No (go to C6)
3. Don't know
4. Refused

a. How many robberies or attempted robberies have you experienced in this time?

b. Can you tell me (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*).

- \* the **month** and **year** when each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)
- \* was the attack an **attempt** or was property actually removed from you or your staff?

1. Attempt
2. Robbery

- \* the **total cost** of each one - in terms of lost stock, any damage or any lost business:

- \* whether you **reported** it to the police

1. Yes

If not, why not:

- |                                       |                              |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 2. No, the police would do nothing    | 6. No, wasn't serious enough |
| 3. No, police could have done nothing | 7. No, too frequent          |
| 4. No, don't like the police          | 8. No, other                 |
| 5. No, due to insurance               | 9. Don't know                |

- \* was a **weapon** used during the robbery?

1. Yes, knife
2. Yes, handgun
3. Yes, club
4. No
5. Don't know

- \* were you or any of your staff **wounded** during the attack?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

Incident (previous first)	Month/Year	Attempt	Total Cost	Police	Weapon	Wound
1						
2						
3						
4						

**FRAUD**

**C6.** Between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997; has the business suffered from fraud, that is, have customers, staff or outsiders obtained goods by fraudulent methods?

- 1. Yes (go to a)
- 2. No (go to C7)
- 3. Don't know
- 4. Refused

a. How many incidents of fraud have you experienced in this time ?

b. Can you tell me: *(Use the table at the bottom of the page).*

\* the **month** and **year** at which each of these incidents occurred *(note code)*

\* the type of fraud carried out

- 1. Credit card fraud
- 2. Cheque fraud
- 3. Counterfeit money
- 4. Goods removed in transit
- 5. Other *(please specify if they were a result of cheques bouncing)*

\* the **total cost** of each incident- in terms of the lost stock, damage or any lost business.

\* could you also indicate **who** carried out the fraud?

- 1. Customers
- 2. Staff
- 3. Suppliers
- 4. Others

\* whether you **reported** it to the police

- 1. Yes
- If not, why not:
- 2. No, the police would do nothing
- 3. No, police could have done nothing
- 4. No, don't like the police
- 5. No, due to insurance
- 6. No, wasn't serious enough
- 7. No, too frequent
- 8. No, other
- 9. Don't know

Incident (previous first)	Month/Year	Type	Total Cost	Who	Police
1					
2					
3					
4					

## TRANSPORT-RELATED LOSS

C7. Between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997; has the business had any transport related losses, that is thefts of and from company vehicles, acts of criminal damage on vehicles, and losses of stock in transit. (This only applied to vehicles used for business purposes).

1. Yes (go to a)
2. No (go to C8)
3. Don't know
4. Refused

a. How many incidents of transport loss have you experienced in this time ?

b. Can you tell me (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*).

- \* the month and year at which each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)
- \* did the incidents involve *criminal damage*, a *theft from vehicle* only or the *theft of the vehicle* itself?

1. Criminal damage
2. Theft from vehicle only
3. Theft of vehicle

- \* the *total costs* of each incident - in terms of the cost of lost stock, damage or any lost business:

- \* *who* suffered the loss?

1. The company
2. Carriers employed by the company
3. Employees

- \* *where* did the incident take place

- |                               |                          |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. In the street in Leicester | 3. In a company car park |
| 2. In a public car park       | 4. Other                 |

- \* Whether you *reported* it to the police

1. Yes

If not, why not:

- |                                       |                              |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 2. No, the police would do nothing    | 6. No, wasn't serious enough |
| 3. No, police could have done nothing | 7. No, too frequent          |
| 4. No, don't like the police          | 8. No, other                 |
| 5. No, due to insurance               | 9. Don't know                |

Incident (previous first)	Month/ year	Type	Total Cost	Who	Police
1					
2					
3					
4					

## PHYSICAL VIOLENCE

C8. Between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997; have you or your staff experienced any violent attacks, that is an act of physical violence? And have you experienced any violent disputes between customers or others while on your premises?

1. Yes (go to a)
2. No (go to C9)
3. Don't know
4. Refused

a) How many violent attacks have you experienced in this time?

b) Can you tell me (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*)

\* the *month* and *year* when each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)

\* could you tell me *what type* of incident this was?

1. Attack on staff
2. Dispute between customers

\* could you tell me the *gender* of the person attacked?

1. Male
2. Female
3. Both

\* the *ethnic group* of the person attacked?

1. White
2. Black
3. Asian

\* could you tell me the *gender* of the offender?

1. Male
2. Female
3. Both

\* the *ethnic group* of the offender?

1. White
2. Black
3. Asian

\* Were you or any of your staff *wounded* during the attack?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

\* Do you think the attack was *racially motivated*?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

\* What has acted as the *trigger* for these incidents?

1. Intervening in incidents of shop theft
2. Refusal to serve alcohol or cigarettes to underage persons
3. Disputes over change
4. Disputes over price of goods
5. Disputes over service
6. Drunk/ Drugged customer
7. Other (please note)

- \* Whether you *reported* it to the police
1. Yes
- If not, why not:
- |                                       |                              |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|
| 2. No, the police would do nothing    | 6. No, wasn't serious enough |
| 3. No, police could have done nothing | 7. No, too frequent          |
| 4. No, don't like the police          | 8. No, other                 |
| 5. No, due to insurance               | 9. Don't know                |

- \* Did you or your staff have to take any *time* off work as a result of the incident?
1. Yes
  2. No
  3. Don't know

Incident (previous first)	Month/ Year	Type	Gender	Ethnic Group	Gender	Ethnic Group	Wound	Racial	Trigger	Police	Time
1											
2											
3											
4											

## ABUSE, THREATS & INTIMIDATION

C9. Between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997; have you experienced any acts of verbal abuse, threats or intimidation against yourself or your staff? And have you experienced similar acts between customers or others while on your premises?

1. Yes (go to a )
2. No (go to D1)
3. Don't know
4. Refused.

a. How many acts of verbal abuse, threats or intimidation have you experienced in this time ?

b. Can you tell me: (*Use the table at the bottom of the page*)

\* the **month** and **year** at which each of these incidents occurred (*note code*)

\* could you tell me what **type** of incident this was?

1. Verbal abuse, threats or intimidation against staff
2. Dispute between customers

\* could you tell me the **gender** of the person subjected to abuse, threat or intimidation

1. Male
2. Female
3. Both
3. Don't know

\* the **ethnic group** of the person attacked?

1. White
2. Black
3. Asian

\* could you tell me the **gender** of the offender?

1. Male
2. Female
3. Both

\* the **ethnic group** of the offender?

1. White
2. Black
3. Asian

\* Do you think the attack was **racially motivated**?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

\* What has acted as the **trigger** for these incidents?

1. Intervening in incidents of shop theft
2. Refusal to serve alcohol or cigarettes to underage persons
3. Disputes over change
4. Disputes over price of goods
5. Disputes over service
6. Drunk/ Drugged customer
7. Other (please note)

\* whether you **reported** it to the police

1. Yes
- If not, why not:
2. No, the police would do nothing
3. No, police could have done nothing
4. No, don't like the police
5. No, due to insurance
6. No, wasn't serious enough
7. No, too frequent
8. No, other
9. Don't know

\* Did you or your staff have to take any *time* off work as a result of the incident?

1. Yes
2. No
3. Don't know

Incident (previous first)	Date	Type	Gender	Ethnic Group	Gender	Ethnic Group	Racial	Trigger	Police	Time
1										
2										
3										
4										



**D. UNEXPLAINED LOSS**

**D1.** Between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997; have you had any other unexplained losses - not dealt with above - that you feel might be attributable to crime?

- 1. Yes (go to D2)
- 2. No (Go to section E)
- 3. Don't know
- 4. Refused.

**D2.** What do you feel these losses might be, and how did you identify the problem?  
(1=yes, 2=no).

- 1. Unobserved theft by customers (shoplifting)
- 2. Unobserved thefts by staff
- 3. Unobserved thefts by suppliers
- 4. Other (please note)

How did you identify these losses? Use *CARD TWO*.

- 1. Spots checks
- 2. Stock audits
- 3. Reports from staff
- 4. Reports from outsiders
- 5. Other (please note)

**D3.** Can you tell me the overall cost to your business of these losses?

**E. DEALINGS WITH THE POLICE**

I'd now like to ask some questions about any dealings you may have had with the police between 1st September, 1996 and 1st September, 1997.

**THIS IS FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME WHO HAVE REPORTED INCIDENTS TO THE POLICE ONLY.**

**E1.** You've told me that over the last year you've had reason to contact the police about crime incidents you have experienced on one/a number of occasions. Could you tell me which types of incident were - for you - the most important? (*Write up to three where incidents have been reported for the previous year*).

- |                            |                                 |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 1. Burglaries and attempts | 6. Fraud                        |
| 2. Criminal damage         | 7. Transport related loss       |
| 3. Theft by customer       | 8. Physical Violence            |
| 4. Theft by staff          | 9. Abuse, threats, intimidation |
| 5. Robberies and attempts  |                                 |


(Now ask the following questions for up to three types of incident where the victim has made police contact- use grid at bottom of page).

**CARD THREE.**

How satisfied were you with the action the police took?

- |                                      |                      |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Very Satisfied                    | 4. Dissatisfied      |
| 2. Satisfied                         | 5. Very dissatisfied |
| 3. Neither satisfied or dissatisfied | 6. Don't know        |

**CARD FOUR.**

If satisfied/very satisfied what aspect did you find most satisfactory?

- |                               |                        |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. The level of communication | 4. Other               |
| 2. The level of service       | 5. Caught the criminal |
| 3. Everything                 |                        |

**CARD FIVE.**

If dissatisfied/very dissatisfied what aspect did you find most dissatisfactory?

- |                               |                        |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|
| 1. The level of communication | 4. Other               |
| 2. The level of service       | 5. Criminal not caught |
| 3. Everything                 |                        |

Incident (previous first)	Crime	Satisfied	Aspect Satisfied	Aspect Dissatisfied
1				
2				
3				

**F. PREVENTION**

I'd now like to ask you some questions about the measures you have installed to protect your business premises and staff against crime.

**F1.** I am going to show you a list of security devices (*CARD SLX*). Would you tell me if:

a. You have any of them and if they have been installed since 1st September 1996 (*use grid below*).

1. Yes (old) 2. Yes (new) 3. No (Circle appropriate one)

b. Why were they installed? (put code in column B below)

- 1. Recommended by Police
- 2. For insurance reasons
- 3. For general security
- 4. Because a victim
- 5. Recommended by SBCI
- 6. As a result of SBCI publicity
- 7. Prompted by SBCI survey of 1995
- 8. Not crime related

	A			B
1. Intruder alarm	1	2	3	
2. Five lever locks	1	2	3	
3. Toughened, laminated or wired glass	1	2	3	
4. Reinforced doors and frames	1	2	3	
5. Bars/Grills on windows	1	2	3	
6. Fake note detector	1	2	3	
7. Security lights	1	2	3	
8. Safe	1	2	3	
9. Shutters	1	2	3	
10. CCTV (Internal)	1	2	3	

c. If you have a security alarm, was the alarm installed due to insurance requirements?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

d. Have you installed any other security measures since 1st September, 1996? Prompt with *CARD SEVEN* and put code in box or name if necessary.

**F2.** Since 1st September, 1996; how much do you estimate your company has spent on security devices for the premises here.

a. In capital costs (initial outlay)

b. In revenue costs (e.g. maintenance)

**F3.** In terms of managing your business safely or handling difficult customers/clients, how many of the following precautions do you take? (Circle appropriate number)

1. Yes      2. No      3. Sometimes

- |  |   |   |   |
|--|---|---|---|
| 1. Watch out for specific types of people              | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 2. Exclude specific types of people                    | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 3. Employ extra staff to prevent crime or trouble      | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 4. Ensure that staff aren't left alone on the premises | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 5. Have something available to use in self-defence     | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 6. Lock up or close up before cashing up               | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 7. Limit the amount of cash in the till                | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 8. Take extra measures going to the bank               | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| 9. Other (please note)                                 |   |   |   |

**F4.** Are the premises leasehold? (1=yes, 2=no.)

If yes-

Do you require the landlords permission to install security ? (1=yes, 2=no.)

**G. ATTITUDES ABOUT CRIME**

I'd now like to ask you some questions about how safe you and your staff feel about working at these premises and in this area.

**G1.** Could you tell me whether you or your staff are worried about the following happening at work:

*(CARD EIGHT)*

- 1. Very worried
- 2. Worried
- 3. Not really worried
- 4. Not at all worried
- 5. Don't know

- 1. Being physically attacked?
- 2. Having personal possessions stolen ?
- 3. Leaving cars at or around the premises ?
- 4. Racial Harassment ?
- 5. Sexual Harassment ?

**G2.** Could you tell me one time when you feel fear of crime most affects you and your staff.

*(CARD NINE)*

- 1. Opening up in the morning
- 2. When staff are left alone on the premises
- 3. Cashing up for the day
- 4. Going to the bank
- 5. Pay days
- 6. Closing up at night
- 7. Other (Please note)

**H. DEMOGRAPHICS**

To put all these questions in context - particularly those about staff safety - I would now like to gather some details about you and the staff who work here. We need details about the company so we can relate company size to the experience and costs of crime.

**H1.** How many people - both full and part time - work at or from these premises? Please include yourself but exclude casual staff.

- 1. 1
- 2. 2 - 4
- 3. 5 - 10
- 4. 11 - 19
- 5. 20 - 49
- 6. 50 - 99
- 7. 100 - 499
- 8. 500+

(Exact number)  
 (Code)

**H2.** Of this number, how many are male and how many female? (Approximate if necessary)

- 1. Male
- 2. Female

**H3.** Aside from these, do you have any casual staff?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No

**H4.** How would you describe the race or ethnic origin of the majority of people who work here? Prompt with *CARD TEN*.

- 1. White
  - 2. Asian
  - 3. Black
  - 4. Mixed
  - 5. UK
  - 6. Ireland
  - 7. Other European
  - 8. Other
  - 9. India
  - 10. Pakistan
  - 11. Bangladesh
  - 12. African descent
  - 13. China/Far East
  - 14. UK
  - 15. Other
  - 16. Caribbean
  - 17. Africa
  - 18. UK
  - 19. Other
  - 20. White and Asian
  - 21. White and Black
  - 22. Asian and Black
  - 23. Other
- 

**H5.** What are the normal opening hours for the business? (Please state)

Weekdays

Saturday

Sunday

**H6.** Are there any specific times during the year when the business is closed (i.e. holiday periods)?

**I. DEALINGS WITH THE SMALL BUSINESS AND CRIME INITIATIVE.**

**II. a.** Have you ever had any contact with a member of the SBCI team ?

- 1. Yes
- 2. No
- 3. Not sure/ can't remember (if 2 or 3 go to I7).

**b.** If yes, how was the contact made? (use grid below).

- 1. Through initial survey
- 2. Cold call made by SBCI
- 3. Visit made by SBCI after an incident
- 4. SBCI introduced through police
- 5. Business contacted SBCI
- 6. Newsletters from SBCI
- 7. Other (please state below)

**II.2.** What was the most important outcome of each contact with the SBCI? (use grid below).

- 1. Prevention advice (i.e. leaflets etc.)
- 2. Security Implementation (i.e. CCTV, alarm installed by SBCI)
- 3. Financial assistance
- 4. Help in liasing with other businesses
- 5. Upgraded security (without SBCI help)
- 6. Other (please specify)

**II.3.** How satisfied were you with the outcome of your contact with the SBCI? (use grid below)

*CARD ELEVEN.*

- |                                      |                      |
|--------------------------------------|----------------------|
| 1. Very Satisfied                    | 4. Dissatisfied      |
| 2. Satisfied                         | 5. Very dissatisfied |
| 3. Neither satisfied or dissatisfied | 6. Don't know        |

*CARD TWELVE.*

If satisfied/very satisfied what aspect did you find most satisfactory? (use grid below)

- 1. The level of communication
- 2. The level of service
- 3. Response to the needs of the business
- 4. Help with crime problems
- 5. Other (please specify)

**CARD THIRTEEN.**

If dissatisfied/very dissatisfied what aspect did you find most dissatisfactory? (use grid below)

- 6. The level of communication
- 7. The level of service
- 8. Response to the needs of the business
- 9. Failed to help solve crime problem
- 10. Other (please specify)

Contact Made (Circle Appropriate).	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Outcome.							
Satisfied or Dissatisfied.							
Aspect.							

**I4.** Has the contact with the SBCI made you feel more/less safe within the business?

- 1. More
- 2. Less
- 3. No difference
- 4. Don't know

**THIS SECTION IS FOR BUSINESSES WHERE SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION WAS MADE ONLY.**

**I5.** Have you been victimised more or less since intervention was made? i.e. for same crime type.

- 1. More
- 2. Less
- 3. No difference
- 4. Don't know

**I6.** Has intervention made you feel more/less safe within the business?

- 1. More
- 2. Less
- 3. No difference
- 4. Don't know



**THIS SECTION IS FOR ALL RESPONDENTS**

**I7. Have you ever heard of the Small Business and Crime Initiative from the following sources:**  
*(1=yes, 2=no)*

- 1. A Local Newspaper (i.e. Leicester Mercury)
- 2. A National Newspaper
- 3. Local Radio or TV
- 4. National Radio or TV
- 5. Other (please note)
- 6. Never heard of SBCI

**THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR CO-OPERATION**

### Appendix 3: Environmental Audit/Business Profile

Area Reference  Business Name

Postcode  Road and no.

Police Beat  Road Classification 
 1. Major throughroute  
 2. Minor throughroute  
 3. Cul de sac

Distance from police station  Business Category

Premises state of repair (good/fair/poor)

Access to buildings FRONT REAR LEFT RIGHT

1. Access from public areas			
2. From semi public areas			
3. No access			
4. Don't know			

Activity on Adjacent Sites (Shop, school, car park etc.)

--	--	--	--

Surveillance of Access Points

1. Not overlooked			
2. From Businesses (Work hours)			
3. From Houses (24 hours)			
4. Don't Know			

Protection of Access Points

--	--	--	--

bars/grilles  
shutters

--	--	--	--

Occupancy Estimate

1. Not fully during working hours		If 3 - is this:
2. During working hours only		Flat above premises
3. More than working hours		Security guards
4. Don't know		Shared occupancy

If shared- how many businesses  Are these managed/unmanaged?

Reward estimates

cash		Type:	
product		(if risk 3 or 4)	
equipment			
other			

Ratings: 1- Low risk    2- Medium risk    3- High risk    4- Very high risk

Visible alarm system?  Name of system

Escape routes  (Rating 1-4 as above)

Other factors Promoting or reducing risk.

## Appendix 4: BT Standard Industrial Classification Codes:

### BUSINESS SECTOR CATEGORIES

1. Energy and water
2. Non-metallic minerals
3. Chemicals
4. Metal goods
5. Mechanical engineering
6. Electrical and instruments
7. Motor vehicles
8. Food drink tobacco
9. Textiles footwear clothing
10. Timber and wooden furniture
11. Paper printing publishing
12. Rubber and plastics
13. Other manufacturing
14. Construction
15. Import /export dealers
16. Raw materials
17. Motor vehicles
18. Timber and building materials
19. Motor vehicle parts and accessories
20. Machinery transport industrial equipment
21. Household goods hardware ironmongery
22. Textiles clothing footwear
23. Food drink tobacco
24. Pharmaceutical medical chemist goods
25. Other wholesale goods
26. Scrap Metal
27. Other scrap materials
28. Commission agents commodity brokers
29. Repair of motor vehicles
30. Repair of footwear/leather goods
31. Repair of electrical household goods
32. Repair of watches/clocks/jewellery
33. Other repairs
34. Food
35. CTN's off licences
36. Dispensing and other chemists
37. Clothing
38. Footwear/leather goods
39. Furnishing fabrics household textiles
40. Household goods hardware ironmongery
41. Motor vehicle parts
42. Motor fuels and lubricants
43. Books stationery office supplies
44. Other specialist retail (nonfood)
45. Mixed retail businesses
46. Hotel/guest houses
47. Nightclubs/licensed clubs
48. Public houses
49. Eating places
50. Bus/coach services
51. Other road passengers
52. Haulage
53. Travel agents
54. Freight brokers
55. Postal services
56. Banking
57. Building societies
58. Insurance
59. Estate agents
60. Solicitors/legal
61. Accountants/auditors
62. Architects
63. Surveyors
64. Advertising
65. Public relations
66. Management consultants
67. Computer services
68. Public admin
69. Education
70. Medical
71. Other services
72. Storage and warehousing
73. Don't know

CODES 1-13 ARE  
MANUFACTURING BUSINESSES  
CODES 14-31 ARE WHOLESALE  
CODES 32-45 ARE RETAIL  
CODES 46-73 ARE SERVICE

THE CATEGORIES 37 & 38 HAVE  
BEEN MERGED TOGETHER, AS  
HAVE 39 & 40; AND 41 & 42.

## **Appendix 5: Additional Business Type Codes used for analysis of SBCI data:**

Within the retail sector, the standard industrial classification codes identified 13 retail business types. From these, six business types were merged into three new categories. These were clothing/ footwear, household goods/ furnishing and motor vehicle parts/ motor fuels. In addition to this five new categories were created from the data. These were video stores (rental), TV/ video retailers, motorbike/ car dealers, photographic/ art shops and florists.

In the service sector there were 25 business types interviewed. Of these 12 were joined to form one category. These were professional/ white collar businesses such as estate agents, banking, solicitors and surveyors. These were given the title of professional services. A further four categories were created from the data. These were hair/beauty salons, nursery care/ care of the elderly, dry cleaners and bookmakers.

### **Retail Sector Businesses**

<b>Code</b>	<b>Business Type.</b>
334	Video Stores
335	Electrical/ TV stores
336	Motorbike/ car dealers
337	Photo/ art stores
338	Florist

### **Service sector businesses**

<b>Code</b>	<b>Business Type.</b>
746	Hair/beauty
747	Nursery
748	Dry Cleaners
749	Bookmakers
491	Eating places (sit down style)

## **Appendix 6: Qualitative interviews prompt sheet.**

### **Introduction.**

As you are aware, I am a researcher from the Nottingham Trent University. I am interested in incidents of abuse and violence that have occurred against you within this business. I am particularly interested in explaining why certain business experience incidents of abuse and violence, the types of people who are abusive and violent within businesses and why they go into these business. I am interested in how incidents are triggered and what happens during incidents of abuse and violence in the business. The interview is split into four sections. The first would like you to concentrate on one particular incident of abuse or violence. This will ask about the trigger of the incident, what was said during the incidents and other factors such as the gender and ethnicity of offender(s). The second half of the interview will then go on to then go on to look at incidents of abuse and violence more generally.

### **Section 1. I would like you to concentrate on a specific incident of abuse.**

Abuse is taken here to include any aggressive, threatening or intimidating verbal comment. This includes any comment that insults the ethnic group or gender of the victim. Violence is any act where aggressive physical contact is made. This may be in the form of pushing a person, taking hold of them or striking them with either a part of the body (hand or foot) or striking/ stabbing them with a weapon. These acts will be against somebody who works within a business premises and the perpetrator will be somebody who does not work for the business premises, but is either a customer or client of the business.

- a. Tell me what happened from when the person walked into the business until they left (here respondents will begin to describe an incident- the following information can be illicited through asking probing questions).
- b. Can you tell me what was said, before, during, and after the incident (probe if necessary for accurate information).
- c. Why did the offender(s) come into the business?
- d. Were staff alone when the incident occurred?
- e. Tell me about the gender, ethnic group and age of the staff who were attacked.
- f. At what time of the day did the incident occur?

Remember to establish the trigger and processes of the incident.

### **Tell me about the assailant.**

- a. Did you know the offender?
- c. Tell me about the gender, ethnic group and age of the offender/s.

d. Were the offenders under the influence of drugs /alcohol? (here probe for general characteristics of offenders)

**I would like to ask you about what happened after the incident.**

a. Did the same assailant return again? When did they return?

b. What happened when they returned?

**Section Two: Tell me, beside the incident mentioned above, have there been other incidents of abuse or violence at this business?**

a. What has usually acted as a trigger for these incidents? (Here, probe for details of any other incidents to establish triggers and processes).

b. Are staff usually alone when incidents occur?

d. Usually, what has been the gender, ethnic group and age of the victims?

e. Do you usually know who the assailants are?

f. Usually, what has been the gender, ethnic group and age of the assailants?

g. What time do events occur?

h. What do you think it is about this business that makes it vulnerable to abuse and violence?

*Thankyou for your time and co-operation.*

**Appendix 7: Retail Premises: Prevalence, Incidence and Concentration of abuse and violence.**

Premises Type	No of Premises	Prevalence		Average number of incidents per 100		Average number of incidents per victim	
		Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence
Motor fuels/ vehicle parts	19	32	21	152	26	13.5*	12.5*
Off-licences	53	34	21	155	26	4.5	1.3
Food	62	32	6.5	93.5	14.5	3	2.2
Clothing/ footwear	51	22	6	94	6	4.4	1
Chemists	11	27	0	55	0	2	0
Household goods/ furnishing	36	22	0	22	0	1	0
Books/ stationary	9	22	0	33	0	1.5	0
Florist	5	20	0	20	0	1	0
Electrical	14	14	0	28.5	0	2	0
Video	9	11	0	11	0	1	0
Repairs	17	6	0	6	0	1	0

**Appendix 8: Services: Prevalence, Incidence & Concentration of abuse and violence.**

Premises Type	No of Premises	Prevalence		Average number of incidents per business type per 100 premises		Average per victim	
		Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence	Abuse	Violence
Bookmakers	4	75	25	200	50	2	2
Postal Services	5	60	20	220	20	3.7	1
Public House	21	43	38	200 (580)	200	4.7	5.3
Hotels	4	25	50	150	125	6	2.5
Eating	57	21	3.5	47 (221)	3.5	2.3	1
Travel Agents	7	7	29	14.5	28.5	1	1
Professional Services	77	18	4	28.5	6.5	1.4	1.7
Dry Cleaners	6	17	0	16.7	0	1	-
Night-clubs	8	12.5	12.5	12.5	25	1	2
Hair/beauty	27	7	7	81	7	11	1
Education	8	25	0	25	0	1	-
Medical	15	0	7	0	7	1	1
Nursery/ Care Homes	9	11	0	1	0	1	0