

School of Social Sciences
Politics and International Relations Division

Political Consumerism as Political Participation:

A mixed-methods, paired-country comparison project with young people
in the UK and in Greece.

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for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy*

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“To the vegans who fly every week.
To the meat eaters who only shop local.
To the DIY mums who use disposable nappies.
To the electric car owners who don’t compost.
To the zero wasters who eat fast food.
To the gardeners who buy fast fashion.
And to the recyclers who have long showers.
To all of those who *are* making a difference...”

(Unknown Source)

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I declare that the work presented in this thesis is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, original and my own work, except as acknowledged in the text. The material (presented as my own) has not been submitted previously, in whole or in part, for a degree at any other institution.

Statement of Contribution to Others

In those cases in which the work presented in this thesis was the product of collaborative efforts, I declare that my contribution was substantial and prominent, involving the development of original ideas, as well as the definition and implementation of subsequent work. Detailed information about my contribution to collaborative work in this thesis is outlined in **Appendix IV**.

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Abstract

Political consumerism refers to citizens' use of boycotting and buycotting as they seek to influence political outcomes within the marketplace, rather than through more traditional routes such as voting. It has been widely theorised as a lifestyle form of political participation, which reflects the progressively converging roles of the *citizens* and the *consumers*. Young people in particular, are increasingly harnessing their individual consumer power to collectively express their political, ethical, and environmental considerations through their consumer choices. However, the perceived persistence of such a market-oriented form of political participation despite the ongoing financial crisis, calls for a re-evaluation of the underlying motivations, values and orientations of young political consumers.

Given the susceptibility of political consumerism to a neoliberal *modus operandi*, the lack of literature problematising its emergence in response to the tenets of neoliberalism is somewhat surprising. The present study will thus address this gap by distinguishing between two antithetical, yet complimentary effects. Firstly, the internalised neoliberal critique of democracy emphasises a 'push' effect out of the political, and into the commercial sphere. Secondly, the neoliberal emphasis on the effectiveness of the markets, advanced by young people's postmaterialist sensitivities, calls attention to the existence of a parallel 'pull' effect into the marketplace as a locus of political participation.

The overarching aim of this study therefore is to identify and interpret the key drivers underpinning the persisting patterns of political consumerism among young people in Greece and in the UK, using a mixed-methods, paired-country research approach. It initially develops a *Political Consumerism Index*, a new theoretical tool for the measurement of the phenomenon. It subsequently uses a primarily quantitative research approach, in conjunction with young people's own insights from a series of focus groups, to provide a comprehensive picture of young people's political consumption in times of austerity.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1. Political consumerism past and present

At the time this doctoral thesis was being written, the UK Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Secretary, George Eustice, at the daily coronavirus briefing on March 21, 2020, urged British citizens to “Be responsible when [they] shop and [to] think of others’ (BBC News, 2020). The phrasing of this address frames consumption as an individual act, albeit with collective implications, embedded with political meaning. However, the act of consumption as an action imbued with political meaning is hardly a new phenomenon.

Captain Boycott – from whom ‘*boycotting*’ got its name - was originally an Irish land agent, against whom the peasants organised in 1880 (Gabriel and Lang, 2015, p. 154). However, the practice of consumer activism which came to be known under this name, may be as old as the boycotts of British goods as part of the Boston Tea Party protest on December 16, 1773 (Ulrich, 2013), which provides one of the first instances of consumer citizenship in recent history. The American revolutionary John Adams writes in his diary in 1773, “This destruction of the tea is so bold, so daring, so firm, intrepid and inflexible, and it must have so important consequences, and so lasting, that I can’t but consider it as an *Epocha* in History” (Ulrich, 2013, p. 66).

Bruni and Zamagni (2016, p. 137) note that John Stuart Mill’s insight on “consumer sovereignty” in the late 19th century found its application almost one century later, since “consumers potentially have the ability to send messages to producers to persuade them to take into account the values they, as consumers, believe in”. By spending their money in a certain way instead of another “they send a very precise signal to producers”, which communicates not only *what* they would like them to produce, but also the *way* they would like them to produce it. Consumer citizenship, or as it has been often described “voting with your wallet” (Bruni and Zamagni, 2016, p. 138; Stolle et al., 2005), becomes thus a notable example of social and political innovation.

The concept of consumer citizenship has been in evidence ever since. It was prominent in the Civil Rights movements of the 1960s. Following the arrest of Rosa Parks for refusing to give up her seat on a Montgomery City Line in 1955, a by-stander casually proposed that, “every Negro in town should stay off the buses for one day in protest” (Vogel, 1978, p. 21). Examples of political consumerism during the 1980s and 1990s included high-profile campaigns against Nestlé, and even boycotting whole countries like France or the USA against their position on

the Gulf War (1990-1991), as this was considered an effective means of influencing political decisions through the use of the market.

At the wake of the Global Justice Movement in the late 1990s, political consumerism exhibited a sharp increase across all Western democracies (Grasso, 2018). Although in the previous decades consumerism was primarily perceived as the “very paradigm that is fuelling our eco, social and political decline” (Schossboeck, 2012), the social movements that emerged after the widespread mobilisation against the WTO in Seattle in 1999 recognised the opportunity of harnessing this individual consumer power towards collective ethical, political and environmental concerns, and thus utilising the marketplace as an arena of political activism (Della Porta, 2006). Political consumerism therefore, was re-introduced in the vocabulary of several grassroots civic initiatives that flourished in the same period.

More recently, it resurfaced in particularly visible fashion through the demands of the 2011 Occupy movement, enriched with discursive actions such as flash mobs, mall sit-ins, community events or ‘walks of shame’ as additional methods of raising awareness against certain consumer brands (Cloke et al., 2016). Even more recent examples include the boycotting of the NFL League, in response to Colin Kaepernick’s exclusion from the league, which followed his attempt to draw attention to racial inequality (McNeal, 2017); or Starbucks facing boycotts after barring its employees from wearing logos in support of ‘Black Lives Matter’ movement (Ortega, 2020).

On the production side, several corporations have responded to these consumption trends by developing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) schemes, which seek to monetise on consumers’ demand for ethical and political responsibility (Soulas and Clark, 2013). Latest figures for the value of all ethical purchases in the UK recorded an 8.5% growth during 2018 to an impressive £38 billion of overall value, whereas consumers’ ethical spending in their local community surged by 11.7% (Triodos, 2018). These figures exhibit a continuous growth trend for the thirteenth consecutive year, reflecting the persisting appeal of political consumerism, despite the ongoing global financial crisis.

Simultaneously however, political consumerist initiatives have shifted away from the mainstream business sector, so as to include local-based exchange networks, alternative currency systems and time-banks (Sotiropoulou, 2012); that is, grassroots civic initiatives that seek to experiment in practice with the theoretical frameworks of *Economies of De-growth* and the *Transition Movement* (Schneider et al., 2010). Although the expansion of such initiatives can be observed all around Europe, they are particularly prominent in the European South since they are being perceived as alternative, inclusive and participatory ways of withstanding the disproportionately adverse effects of the 2008 global financial crisis, both on practical

(Petmesidou, 2016), but also ideological terms (Kousis, 2017). It can be argued therefore that the crisis may have served as a catalyst for the emergence of grassroots, bottom-up, participatory initiatives which involve the use of the market as an arena for collective action (D’Alisa et al., 2015; Kousis, 2017; Lekakis, 2015), and which seek to “simultaneously foster and facilitate a new form of political engagement/participation aimed to strengthen open, democratic forms of governance” (Kousis and Paschou, 2017, p. 142).




Figure 1: ‘Have engaged’ or are ‘willing to engage’ in boycotts among young people up to 29 years of age (World Values Survey, 2017-2020, N = 62,703).

Resource link: <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSOnline.jsp>

These trends are particularly evident among the young (Nonomura, 2017; Ward and de Vreese, 2011; Wicks et al., 2014). Stolle et al. (2010) report that boycotting was the form of political participation that demonstrated the greatest rate of growth over time by the end of the 20th century, with young people being four times more likely to engage in it in 1999 as opposed to 1974. Survey data from the World Values Survey (WVS) reports that several lifestyle forms of political participation – such as buycotting and boycotting - have visibly been on the rise among the younger generations in many European countries. Although the Scandinavian

countries remain consistently the world leaders in political consumerist practices (Stolle et al., 2010), similar trends are also discernible both in Greece (Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018) and in the UK (Pickard, 2019c). The 2017-2020 wave of the WVS (see **Figure 1**) reports that young people up to 29 years of age, have engaged or are willing to engage in boycotts, by 61.4% in Greece and by 55.6% in the UK; whereas 15.8% and 10.2% of the same age category had already done so in each country respectively, in the previous 12 months.

As a consequence, the consumer-citizen has re-emerged in the spotlight of political action. Instilled with the postmaterialist values of their affluent socialisation before the outbreak of the ongoing global economic recession (Copeland, 2014b; Henn et al., 2017; Inglehart, 2018), the consumer-citizen aspires to become a key figure of the globalised market.

2. Research Aims and Objectives

Motivated by the perceived persistence of political consumerism, despite the ongoing financial crisis, the overarching research aim of the present thesis therefore, is:

1. to identify and interpret the key drivers underpinning the changing patterns of political participation amongst young people, with particular emphasis on political consumerism, using a paired-country comparison research approach, among young people in the UK and in Greece.

In order to achieve the overarching aim of the thesis however, the following research objectives needed to be addressed:

2. Firstly, to gain insights concerning young people's motivations for, and patterns of, political consumerism, through a series of focus groups conducted in the two countries;
3. secondly, to inform the design of a unique survey questionnaire with the insights gained from the focus groups, and devise an innovative measurement instrument for political consumerism; and,
4. finally, to analyse data from the survey, to identify the key drivers underpinning young people's decisions to engage in political consumerism in the UK and in Greece.

3. Thesis Outline

Given the focus of this thesis on political consumerism as a lifestyle form of political participation, which is particularly prominent among the young, it is crucial to commence by

providing definitions of the main concepts. This is the main focus of **Chapter 2**, which takes the position that young people do not constitute a homogeneous demographic collective, with identical backgrounds, life-stories, values or political behaviour. This chapter therefore, delineates whom exactly we mean when we refer to 'young people' in political participation research. Given the continuous emergence of alternative, more intuitive, creative and lifestyle forms of participation, election-focused definitions of political participation are unable by themselves to fully capture the changing patterns of what is now being understood as 'political' by young people themselves (Pontes et al., 2018). Instead, this chapter will provide a purposely wide working definition, which will be able to accommodate political consumerism as a lifestyle form of political participation. It will introduce its two main variants, namely positive (buycotting) and negative (boycotting) political consumerism. The definitions provided in this chapter will form the basis upon which the following chapters will be built.

Chapter 3 outlines some of the most widely used theoretical models in political participation research. These models will be then used throughout the present research as the basis of analysis, seeking to trace the shaping factors of political consumerism among young people in Greece and in the United Kingdom. It will start by laying out the *Socio-Economic Status (SES)* model of political participation, which focuses on the expressions of individual socioeconomic status as the key predictor of political participation. It will then discuss the *Mobilisation* model, which emphasises the existence of opportunity structures behind citizens' political participation patterns. In turn, the *Rational Choice* model assumes that citizens will calculate the costs and benefits behind their political behaviour. This will be followed by the *Social Capital* theory, which highlights the relationships between individuals and their community. Finally, it will investigate the role of the prevalent economic conditions during one's socialisation as factors behind the rise of *postmaterialist value orientations*; these may also influence the preferred styles of political participation of young people, in a continuously evolving socio-political context.

Chapter 4 discusses how the consumption of goods and services in late modernity has instilled products with political meaning. It will commence by illustrating consumption as *identity* and *responsibility*. As a result of these developments, it will argue that late modernity has brought about the convergence of the previously distant notions of the citizen and the consumer, by using the market as an alternative political arena (as opposed to the predominant electoral arena).

As a market-oriented form of political participation, political consumerism is particularly susceptible to the ideological framework that pertains the markets. **Chapter 5**, therefore discusses the effects of neoliberalism, as an overarching contextual factor which may influence

young people's decisions to engage in political consumerism. It posits that the neoliberal critique of democracy may 'push' young people away from electoral politics into alternative political domains. Conversely, the internalisation of neoliberal principles is likely to influence young people's market behaviour, and thus may also 'pull' them into the market as an alternative political arena within which they may express their political concerns.

Chapter 6, provides the theoretical background for the study of political consumerism on the country level. With regards to the use of the market for political purposes, *Varieties of Capitalism* (VoC) theory suggests that young people in the UK, having been socialised within a Liberal Market Economy (LME), will be more likely to be influenced by the neoliberal conviction in favour of the 'invisible hand' and therefore be 'pulled' to express their political concerns within the market. By way of contrast, having been socialised in a Mixed Market Economy (MME), young people in Greece are expected to adopt more collective, bottom-up approaches to political consumerism. The chapter then delivers an empirical overview of the expressions of political consumerism in Greece as opposed to the UK. Finally, the observation that political consumerism is often measured with market indicators such as volume of sales of ethically-sourced products, points towards the need for the development of a unified measure for the study of political consumerism.

Chapter 7 therefore, presents the rationale behind the need for such a measure in the study of political consumerism as a form of political participation. The inconsistent measures used elsewhere in the relevant literature, along with the differing motivations behind positive and negative consumerism, expose the need for the development of a unified measure of political consumerism which will be able to capture not only its behavioural aspects, but also the responsibility and the frequency behind the actions. The chapter proposes such a methodological instrument, in the form of the *Political Consumerism Index* (PCI). The PCI will be subsequently tested for validity and reliability, providing in this way an original contribution to knowledge in the form of a comprehensive, but intuitive instrument for measuring political consumerism.

Having thus defined the dependent variable of the study (the PCI), **Chapter 8** discusses the methodology of the analytical part of the thesis. It will commence by laying out the aim and the objectives of the study, and introduces its main research questions. It proceeds by establishing the philosophical assumptions of the study, which in turn have dictated the methodological approach adopted. The chapter concludes by outlining the independent contribution to knowledge, derived from this research.

Chapter 9 presents the findings from an exploratory study on the motivations of young political consumers in the UK and Greece, which have informed the survey questionnaire. The

insights derived from the thematic analysis of the focus groups point towards the understanding that young people in Greece are being pushed away from institutional forms of political participation, such as voting in elections. Instead, the insight from the focus groups indicate that young people in the UK are being primarily pulled into the market as an arena for political participation.

The subsequent chapters will therefore be categorised according to this distinction. Firstly, **Chapter 10** will examine the demographic variables of the survey and will then explore a variety of push factors that are associated with the institutional political domain. Similarly, **Chapter 11** will in turn, discuss the market-oriented factors that may be ‘pulling’ young people to express their political considerations within the market. The findings of these two chapters, will provide further valuable insights in the study of political consumerism among the young people in the UK and Greece.

Ultimately, **Chapter 12** will employ the PCI to conclusively identify the factors correlated with young people’s decisions to engage in political consumerism in the UK and in Greece. The chapter will conclude by outlining, discussing and problematising the main findings of the thesis, while at the same time providing directions for future research on the topic of political consumerism as a lifestyle form of political participation of young people in the UK and in Greece.

Chapter 2: Defining Young People, Political Participation and Political Consumerism

1. Introduction

Social sciences refer to the study of human society and social relationships. But as these evolve, so should our definitions of the key terms involved in their study. Nevertheless, a great part of the available research on youth political participation neglects to define whom exactly we mean when we refer to 'young people'. Similarly, political participation itself, remains to this day an evolving (Theocharis and van Deth, 2018), and often contested term (Pontes et al., 2018). However, the working definitions of both 'youth' as a sociological category, and 'political participation' as a field of study may significantly impact the pertinent measurements and thus the findings of relevant research. For example, the more narrow definitions of youth political participation, as well as the persistence on election-centred definitions of the term, especially since electoral participation has traditionally been lower among the young (Kyranakis and Nurvala, 2013), are likely to result in portrayals of young people as inherently 'apathetic' (Quaranta, 2016). Instead, the use of wider definitions that move beyond solely electoral expressions of youth political participation usually deliver quite different, and - for some - more pragmatic accounts of young people's political engagement (Cammaerts et al., 2014; Kiouпкиolis and Pechteliđis, 2018; Pickard, 2019a; Sloam and Henn, 2018).

Pickard (2019a, p. 57) argues that the available definitions of what constitutes political participation are both 'period sensitive' and 'beholder sensitive'. In other words, they depend on when they were devised and by whom. Moreover, the often subjective binary categorisations in the available academic typology of political participation, such as for example conventional/unconventional or traditional/untraditional, although convenient for academic research, may lead to simplistic or imprecise analyses of the subject.

Furthermore, the continuous creative and imaginative expansion of the repertoire of political participation of young people, influenced by a series of factors like the advent of digital technologies (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012), globalisation (Sloam and Henn, 2018), postmaterialist values (Henn et al., 2017) or disillusionment from institutional politics (Hay, 2007; Henn et al., 2005) makes the study of political participation based on anachronistic definitions almost impossible. For this reason, new typologies are constantly emerging in an attempt to capture these creative expressions of youth political participation, such as a new taxonomy of political participation proposed by Theocharis and van Deth (2018), or the concept of 'Heteropolitics', proposed by Kiouпкиolis and Pechteliđis (2018).

Recent research (Sloam and Henn, 2018) points to the direction that despite the portrayal of young people as inherently disinterested or even apathetic (Eliasoph, 1998; Galais, 2012; Putnam, 1995; Quaranta, 2016), they have recently become increasingly active and engaged in both electoral politics (Cammaerts et al., 2014; Sloam and Henn, 2018) as well as in lifestyle forms of non-electoral participation (Kioupiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018; Pickard, 2019c). Young people's political participation is therefore not only increasing, but also diversifying.

The present chapter therefore, will seek to problematise the issue of the definitions in the study of the political participation of young people. Given the varying conceptualisation of 'young people', coupled with the variety of electoral and non-electoral repertoires of political participation, it is unrealistic to anticipate an exhaustive coverage of the research published on the subject. For the scope of this thesis however, this chapter will firstly focus on **a)** defining whom we mean by young people. It will then **b)** argue that the available definitions of political participation are often subject to the historical period of their emergence and by whom they were developed. It will subsequently proceed with **c)** the coverage of the most common conceptualisations and definitions of political participation, and it will **d)** introduce more contemporary conceptualisations of political participation, in the form of life politics, subpolitics and lifestyle politics. These concepts will form the basis of the conceptualisation of political consumerism as a form of political participation. The next section will **e)** advocate for a working definition of political participation which will be used throughout this thesis. Finally, the chapter will **f)** conclude by introducing *political consumerism* as a form of political participation which falls within this purposely wide definition.

2. Who are the 'young people' in contemporary Political Participation research?

For Brunet and Pizzi (2013), the existing conceptualisations of 'youth' as a sociological category may be summarised as follows. Firstly, the *essentialist* standpoint implies that 'young people' constitute a homogeneous demographic collective, with identical backgrounds, life-stories, values or political behaviour. However, Bourdieu (1980), contests this essentialist view, asserting instead that 'youth' is – and has always been – an evolving concept; layers upon layers of values which echo the often contradictory moral, social and political concerns of their respective times.

The *functionalist* perspective instead, understands the concept in relation to one's life-cycle. Functionalism pertains that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are being defined

exclusively by their functionality; that is their causal relations with other mental states, behavioural outputs and external conditions. On these grounds, the *biographical* standpoint rose in prominence amidst the economic crisis of the 1970s and the resulting backwardness of stable employment prospects, which to some extent redefined who could be considered as young. This perspective is being emphasised under the '*markers of adulthood theory*' (Shanahan, 2000), which examines the active struggles of young people to shape their biographies, given the socially structured limitations and opportunities that define their pathways into adulthood. Likewise, '*transitions theory*' (Furlong, 2013; Heinz, 2009) suggests that this extended period of precarity and dependency for many contemporary young people, whereby they generally spend an increasingly longer time in education, and are entering stable employment much later in life than their predecessors, will also define their attitudes towards certain policies that may be perceived as responsible for their condition. For instance, the expansion of neoliberal policies has been considered responsible for an increasing rejection of electoral politics in the UK (Hart and Henn, 2017) or the rise of alternative forms of participatory practices in Greece (Kioupiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018)

Class *nominalism* instead, proposes class membership as the precondition for relationships between objects with different characteristics. For example, just like any two blue spheres share the property that they both 'belong' in classes inclusive of these properties - that of being blue and being spherical - so should any two young citizens belong both in the categories of 'young' and that of 'citizens; each defined by a different set of nominal characteristics (Quinton, 1957). On these grounds, generational labels such as 'Generation Z' or 'Millennials' are being often used to broadly refer to those young people who were born between 1997 and 2012. However, Pickard (2019e, p. 28) rightfully advises that the use of generational labels in academic research is inherently problematic. Firstly, the precise years of birth for these generational cohorts are rather vague and imprecise and this lends to the unscientific nature of these monikers. Furthermore, the essentialist connotations behind their use, imply the existence of a clearly demarcated set of attributes and outlooks that the members of each cohort share with each other.

Nevertheless, generational categories have been used in Political Sciences to designate cohorts which have been socialised in a particular point in history and/or who may display similar social and political traits. Mannheim (1998) has used his concept of '*generational units*' to examine political behaviour, referring however to a set of idiosyncratic social and political traits of young people, as a result of the distinctive social, political and economic characteristics prevalent at the time of their socialisation. In this respect, generational cohorts such as the 'Thatcher Generation' can be used in a meaningful way to denote the effects of a certain set of economic and social policies, such as those introduced by successive UK Governments in the

1980s (Gewirtz et al., 1992). Instead of attributing an essentialist set of characteristics intrinsic to these cohorts, the term is being used to signify a set of socioeconomic conditions which were imposed on them, like for example economic inequality, precariousness, or austerity.

Similar conditions were arguably the ones enforced on the young people born from 1990-2001 in both the UK and Greece, coupled with an intensified social and political polarisation, during the Grexit referendum in Greece on the 29th June 2015 (Boukala and Dimitrakopoulou, 2017) and the Brexit referendum on the 23rd June 2016 (Hobolt, 2016), in Britain respectively. In *'Britain after Brexit: A nation divided'* Ford and Goodwin (2017, p. 17) write that "The result of the EU referendum was the latest and most dramatic expression of long-term social changes that have been silently reshaping public opinion, political behaviour, and party competition in Britain and Western democracies". Similarly, Galbraith, in his essay *'Grexit, Brexit, Fixit: The dynamics of division in the age of Trump'* (2017) discusses the drift towards European dissolution, in the wake of the Athens Spring in 2011 and its subsequent repression in Greece, all the way to the Brexit referendum in the summer of 2016; within a political context of social and attitudinal shifts that made the rise of the right-wing, populist UK Independence Party (UKIP) and the extreme-right political construct of Golden Dawn in Greece, possible. They both discern "a certain dynamics of division" (Galbraith, 2017, p. 381), which apply in both of the populist-induced polarisations of the Brexit, and the Grexit referendum before it.

In such contexts therefore, generational labels can be used in a meaningful way to denote a set of social and economic conditions prevalent during one's socialisation. Similar categorisations have been previously used effectively to measure a process of materialist to postmaterialist generational displacement (Inglehart, 1977, 1997), or as a way to understand a given generation's drivers of political participation (Grasso, 2018; 2016; 2014)¹.

a. Age brackets and thresholds

Age, just like gender, serves as one of the primary bases on which people classify one another. It thus serves as a perceptual indicator of skills, abilities, competences, experience and even health status. The lack of clarity of the generational labels discussed above, makes the analysis of the political participation of young people particularly difficult. An even further complication

¹ Throughout this thesis, the terms *'Brexit Generation'* and the *'Grexit Generation'* will thus be used to signify a set of economic and political conditions imposed on these generations, including but not limited to austerity, employment precariousness, political polarisation and neoliberal cuts in both countries.

arises from the fact that there is not a consensus on a fixed age bracket, neither any established legislative boundaries defining 'young people'.

The first complication stems from the assumption that all the young people within a certain age bracket may be treated as a homogeneous group, with analogous views and political behaviour. It is through such use of generational age brackets that the essentialist standpoint is being reproduced. Intragroup heterogeneity is therefore often overlooked, since for example, not all 18-24 years-old voted for Britain to remain in the European Union in 2016, nor all 18-24 years-old voted for SYRIZA in the Greek Parliamentary Elections in 2015.

Secondly, it is also easy to overlook that these age brackets include young people from broad socio-economic and cultural contexts. Likewise, gender, and social class are also often ignored, in favour of an inclusive categorisation of young people. For example, in the 2017 UK General Election it was particularly young females of semi-skilled and unskilled manual occupations and those unemployed, who broadly voted for Labour, and not young people in general as it was often reported. Yet the discussion over the 'Youthquake' that followed the 2017 General Election, overshadowed these specific findings (Sloam, 2017).

Finally, the use of age brackets implies that the transition from one age category to the next one happens overnight, and the use of age brackets can therefore seem arbitrary and unscientific. According to Statista Market Forecast (2020), population by age in Greece for the 15-24 years-old group amounts to 10.1% of the overall population and 10.8% for the 25-34 age bracket. The same figures for the UK are 11.4 % for the 15-24 years-old, and 13.5% of the 25-34 age bracket, respectively. However, it is arguable that even within the same age category, a 25 year old person who works in the docks of Piraeus shares little in common with the 34 year old single parent from Greece who only recently moved abroad as a result of the precarious economic environment; other than that they are both broadly socialised in similar socioeconomic and political environments, in the same country, in a given period in time. Their individual experiences however, remain unique and the categorisation under the same age bracket has little to offer as a signifier of common attitudes, values or political behaviour.

Moreover, the arbitrariness of the age brackets from one institution to the other adds to the comparability issues in the study of political participation. As mentioned above, Statista Market Forecast makes use of the 15-24 and 25-34 age brackets. In contrast, the Office for National Statistics (ONS) uses 5-year divisions (15-19, 20-24, 25-29), whereas the British Election Study (BES) uses the 18-25 and 26-35 age brackets. The polling agencies Ipsos MORI and SKY Data in turn, use the 18-24 and 25-34 age brackets, whereas YouGov distinguishes between the 18-19 age bracket and continues with a 10-year sequence (18-19, 20-29, 30-39) (Pickard, 2019e, p. 47).

With regards to the different membership criteria for the youth wings of different political parties in the UK, Mycock and Tonge (2012) explain that these may range from an upper limit of 26 years for the Young Labour and Liberal Youth, to an upper limit of 35 years for UKIP. But such arbitrariness among the youth wings of certain parties is not exclusive in the UK. For example, in Greece different parties have established different age criteria for their youth wings. According to the founding statute of Young SYRIZA (Νέοι–Νέες ΣΥΡΙΖΑ), any young person from 14 to 32 years of age may become a member (Νεολαία ΣΥΡΙΖΑ, 2014); whereas the youth wing ‘ΟΝΝΕΔ’ of the right-wing New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία) expands the age bracket by one year (13-32). Complicating the conceptualisation of young people even further, the official site of the far-right extremist group Golden Dawn² (Χρυσή Αυγή) describes young people as those who are young “not only in terms of age, but also in disposition”.

The cultural subjectivity of the term ‘young people’, complicates the issue of defining young people with a single, clear-cut age bracket even further. The latest round of the European Social Survey (ESS) (European Social Survey, 2018) includes the question “At what age do you think people generally stop being described as young?”.




Figure 2: Age people stop being described as young (European Social Survey, 2018, N = 1,133).

The ESS Online tool reveals that 81.6% of the respondents in Greece said that “It depends on the person”, as opposed to only 10.8% in the UK. Over a quarter (27.9%) of the UK respondents suggested people should stop being considered as young at the ages 18, 19, 20, and 21, with only 19% stating the same in Greece. Instead, most of the responses in the UK suggested the age of 30 as the cut-off point for ‘youth’ with 61.3% of the responses, as opposed to only 14.2% in the case of Greece. It seems therefore that not only is there no fixed threshold

² <http://www.xrisiavgi.com/en/>

according to which people stop being considered as ‘young’, but this also varies widely from country to country and from one cultural context to the next one. In the case of Greece, it seems that the age at which people stop being described as young is much more subjective than in the UK, where instead, the concept of “youth” seems to have a wider definition.

Despite the problems described above, social sciences rely heavily on age brackets as a convenient method to empirically quantify age-based patterns of political participation, to then be able to analyse them statistically. However, this is the case predominately when it comes to electoral participation. The wide availability of data on electoral rounds in the majority of western democracies, which are then easily subdivided according to age brackets, render the study of electoral political participation much more easily quantifiable, and may thus explain the tendency within Political Science to focus on voting and turnout in elections or referendums as representative indicators of young people’s political engagement.

Instead, although available data on other forms of political participation, such as political consumerism, may also appear on many prominent, large-scale quantitative social surveys such as the ESS or the WVS, these are not always consistent between different rounds of the same survey, or from one survey to the next one. For example, the question about boycotts in the ESS featured only in the 2002 round; but it was dropped thereafter, keeping only the one about boycotts. Likewise, although the UK features prominently in all of the rounds of ESS from 2002 to 2016, this is not the case for Greece, which did not take part in the rounds after 2010. Such omissions and inconsistencies are making large-scale comparative studies on political consumerism, particularly difficult³.

b. Working definition of ‘young people’

The previous section has addressed the importance of definitions in the study of the political participation of young people. As there is no widely accepted definition of the term ‘young’, several researches on the topic will either succumb to generational labels, like the ‘Millennials’ or ‘Generation Z’, or will treat young people as an age bracket within their respective research designs. The use of generational categories, although widely used in popular media and everyday conversations, lack both scientific precision and theoretical grounding. Instead,

³ Moreover, the difficulty with which political scientists draw their primary data, especially with regards to lifestyle forms of political participation, means that a big part of work on the subject is often based on unrepresentative samples, which are however subsequently presented as ‘scientific facts’. Pickard (2019d) discusses the claims of Prosser et al. that their findings from the British election study 2017 were “as close to the truth about who turned out to vote as is possible to get” (2018, p. 2), despite the use of a relatively small sample size of face-to-face interviews.

although the use of age brackets to denote young people may be equally arbitrary (and often inconsistent across countries and institutions), it allows for direct comparisons between certain age-cohorts across countries. For the study of political consumerism among young people in the UK and in Greece, it is thus preferable to use consistent age boundaries that are clearly defined.

For this reason, throughout the present thesis, following the suggestion of Pickard (2019e) I will abstain from the use of generational labels, in favour of the consistent use of the more neutral term 'young people'. The term will be commonly employed to refer to the young (18 to 29 years of age) respondents of my survey questionnaire and the focus groups in both the UK and Greece, unless where it will specifically refer to a set of socioeconomic conditions imposed on the young people at the time of their socialisation, in the two countries under consideration. In this latter case, the terms '*Brexit Generation*' and '*Grexit Generation*' will be cautiously employed to signify an inclusive categorisation of the young people who were around the age of 18 at the time the referendums took place in the respective countries, and who were subjected to a set of conditions such as precarious life prospects, neoliberal cuts, austerity and most importantly an environment of political polarisation.

Having therefore already defined whom exactly we mean with the term 'young people', the sections that follow will proceed to conceptualise what we mean by 'political participation'. The following sections will thus provide a purposely wide definition of the concept, so as to encompass its lifestyle variants, such as political consumerism.

3. Problems in defining political participation.

Within the disciplines of political and social sciences a plethora of definitions have been proposed which seek to capture and accommodate the changing political participation patterns of young people at any given time. Pickard (2019a) argues that these are bound to be both *period* and *beholder* sensitive. With regards to the former, the way political participation is being defined is contingent on the prevailing social, economic, political as well as technological contexts of their time. The expansion of educational attainment (Henn and Foard, 2014), globalisation (Sloam and Henn, 2018), neoliberal policies (Allsop et al., 2018), postmaterialist value orientations (Henn et al., 2017), technological progress (Gotlieb and Cheema, 2017) or trust in politicians and the electoral establishment (Henn and Foard, 2012), have all been widely examined as motivating factors behind the changing patterns of the political participation of

young people. As the repertoire of political action is expanding however, so should our definitions of what constitutes political participation.

Definitions are also beholder sensitive, depending on who is formulating them. Different scholarly traditions will often conceptualise political participation in their own terms (Kioupiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018). However, these are not always consistent with the definitions of the politicians, which are often dependent on the objective circumstances but also on their subjective political orientations (Lamprianou, 2013). Moreover, neither the academic conceptualisations, nor the ones of the politicians necessarily coincide with the conceptualisations of the young citizens themselves (Pontes et al., 2018; Sant, 2014). For example, the differing and often contradicting conceptualisation of the recent Black Lives Matter mobilisations, in Minnesota but also around the globe, are characteristic of these developments. The Republican US president Donald Trump, tweeted that these were merely an act of “thuggery” (CBS News, 2020), whereas the democratic leader Joe Biden portrayed the mobilisations in response to George Floyd’s death “just the latest in a series of injustices stemming from racism against black people” (Mangan, 2020), and called for institutional reforms in the police forces. However, none of these standpoints may fully capture the motivations and value priorities of each individual protestor.

Pickard (2019a) posits in the words of Schwartz (1984, p. 1118) that “whether something counts as being political participation depends on our point of view, our interpretation, our conceptual template [...]. Participation is subjective contingent on the conceptual lens of the observer”. As a result, the study of political participation will reflect the historical conditions of their time, in conjunction with the conceptual framework of the researcher. In turn, the selection of the working definition of each study will influence the collection, operationalisation and interpretation of the respective findings.

According to Brady (1999, p. 739) virtually all available definitions of political participation comprise of four basic and interconnected elements: **a)** activities or actions, **b)** intended to influence a desired outcome, **c)** by ordinary citizens, and/or **d)** by politicians, government personnel, or decision-makers. The first element a) is often referred to as the praxial⁴ element of political participation, whereas b) is being referred to as the teleological⁵ element. According to these two elements therefore, political participation comprises of ‘actions for desired change’. In turn, the third element (‘by ordinary citizens’) points towards the legitimising component of popular engagement in western liberal representational democracies. These three components therefore epitomise - in the famous words of Abraham

⁴ Deriving from the Greek word ‘praxis’ meaning ‘action’.

⁵ Deriving from the Greek word ‘telos’ meaning ‘goal’ or ‘outcome’.

Lincoln in the Gettysburg Address - the necessary requirements of democratic governance: "...government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth" (Oppenheimer and Edwards, 2012, p. 232)

The fourth component however (that political participation should also involve politicians and decision-makers) is more problematic to capture objectively. For example, both the UK and Greece have recently witnessed a series of riots of young people in London and all around the UK in August 2011 (Lightowlers, 2015) and the Athens Spring riots earlier that same year (Lyrintzis, 2011). Should one classify these riots as a form of political participation? After all, they adhered to the first three components of Brady's conceptualisations of political participation, insofar they involved a) actions, b) by ordinary people, in order c) to bring about desired change. Although the Labour Party condemned the acts of violence across Britain, it recognised that there was an "inconvenient truth" in the form of a message passed by the rioters, which should be addressed by politicians (Lamprianou, 2013, p. 23). As a result, the riots were perceived by the Labour Party as actions (albeit admittedly unlawful) by ordinary citizens charged with a discernible political message. In other words, the praxis of the riots was an unlawful, but symbolically effective political way of expressing the ordinary citizens' demands for change. On the other hand however, the UK Prime Minister at the time, David Cameron, on the 15 of August 2011 in Oxfordshire, dismissed the London riots as acts of "pure criminality" (Lamprianou, 2013, p. 23), on the grounds that they were not involving the mainstream political sphere; in essence, their *telos* was not achieved through a narrow set of 'prespecified' and 'lawful' *praxis*, in order for it to be considered political as conventionally defined. Such a narrow interpretation however, would exclude even the French Revolution as the par-excellence symbolic manifestation of popular political participation, since the activities involved were 'unlawful' and not 'political' insofar they did not involve the powerful elites of the time.

Hay (2007, p. 23) upholds that scholars "with the most restrictive and conventional conceptions of political participation identify a strong and consistent pattern of declining political participation and engagement over time, whilst those with a more inclusive conception discern instead a change in the mode of participation". A working definition of what is 'political' in political participation therefore remains essential before moving on to conceptualise political consumerism as such. The section that follows will provide an overview of the evolving and widening definitions of political participation, and will make the case for a deliberately wide working definition which will be able to accommodate such citizen-led actions as political consumerism.

4. The evolving and widening definitions of political participation.

In – maybe - the most commonly cited starting point in the study of defining political participation, Almond and Verba (1963) found that the political culture of a nation influences the political behaviour of the individuals who are prone to adapt to and follow the prevailing participatory norms of that nation. For Almond and Verba (1963) therefore, political participation refers to the actions of regular citizens, either individually or collectively, whereby these actions target the government, either through elections or non-electoral means (Fox, 2014, p. 498).

In an almost contemporaneous study on political participation in the US, Milbrath (1965) discerned a cumulative effect of political participation, as any citizen will become increasingly engaged in more, but also in more intensive political activities. Consequently, for Milbrath there exists a hierarchy of political participation, with more and progressively more intensive forms of participation added to the previous ones. As a result, for Milbrath (1965, pp. 16-22), people may be categorised in different types according to the degree of their engagement, namely the *'apathetic'*; the *'spectators'* and the *'gladiators'*. Moreover, he also discerned a 'life cycle' effect, according to which people will accumulate knowledge and experience over time, peaking their political participation by the time they reach adulthood, only to then gradually decrease it as they grow old. Milbrath's later definition of political participation thus (1977, p. 2) was formulated as "those actions of private citizens, by which they seek to influence or to support government and politics", which thus, includes all four elements of Brady's (1999) definitional conceptualisation.

Subsequent understandings of political participation have since evolved to conceptualise it as an even more multi-dimensional phenomenon. In their widely cited work, Verba and Nie (1987, p. 2) defined political participation as "those activities by private citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of government personnel and/or the actions they take". Their definition places emphasis on a) the praxial component, b) by ordinary people with c) teleological objectives, d) addressed towards government personnel. However, their conception of what is deemed as political was particularly restrictive, as they included four non-hierarchical modes: a) voting, b) campaigning for political parties, c) partaking in communal activities, and d) contacting decision makers, such as elected representatives and officials. It is noteworthy that all these four modes involve an interaction with the state in a conforming and lawful way. Almost two decades later, Verba et al. (1995, p. 42) utilised an equally restrictive definition, according to which political participation "affords

citizens in a democracy an opportunity to communicate information to government officials about their concerns and preferences and to put pressure on them to respond”.

The momentous surge of youth-led political protests across several western democracies in the 1960s and early 1970s led Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979, p. 42) to employ a significantly wider definition which could reflect the societal changes of their time. Their definition therefore involved “all voluntary activities by individual citizens intended to influence either directly or indirectly political choices at various levels of the political system”. Under this working definition they proceeded to analyse the differences and similarities of the political participation of young people and their parents. For their analysis, they further subdivided political participation into two categories, *conventional* and *unconventional*. The former comprised of voting in elections and other activities directly linked to elections, campaigning and political parties (such as working or volunteering for a party or a candidate; being part of a trade union; contacting officials in public bodies), to more nuanced participatory activities such as reading about, or discussing politics with others. In a similar vein, unconventional forms of political participation involved actions intended to contest and influence political decision-makers and elites (Barnes et al., 1979). Such actions included among others signing a petition, taking part in protests, marches, sit-ins or demonstrations, involvement in new social movements, as well as even more non-conventional activities, like refusing to pay taxes or rents, occupying buildings, blocking the traffic, to damaging property. Prominent among their list of non-conventional political participation methods stood the engagement in *boycotts*. The conceptualisation of non-conventional political participation by Barnes and Kaase et al. (1979) therefore, sought to encapsulate instances of civil disobedience, including political violence and market-oriented forms of dissent, such as boycotts, which they found were particularly widespread among the young.

The widening of the definitions of political participation continued to evolve as a response to the similarly evolving forms of political participation. For example, Conge (1988) supported an even more comprehensive definition. He thus, initially proposed the following: “political participation is any kind of action (or inaction) of an individual or a group of individuals that intentionally or unintentionally oppose, support, or change any or some characteristics of a government or a community” (Conge, 1988, p. 246). Responding to the criticisms that such a definition was “so broad as to be virtually meaningless and incapable of any concrete application” (1988, p. 246) he subsequently eliminated all the passive and inactive forms, such as attitudes, sentiments, intentions and political awareness. However, he insisted that if any activity is not oriented towards local or national state structures, authorities and decision-makers regarding the allocation of public goods, then it cannot be considered as political participation.

In turn, Inglehart (1990, p. 335), in response to the political developments of his time, attempted to position political participation in the context of the plethora of new social movements that emerged after the 1960s, which were perceived to deviate significantly from the conventional political participation paradigm. He hypothesised firstly, that the rise of the post-industrial economy has caused the emergence of new forms of political participation and secondly, that these were significantly different from the prevalent forms under the industrial economic structure. Their primary difference laid in their teleological goals, as these new forms of participation focused not on issues of materialistic concern (such as economic wellbeing), but more on – what he termed - postmaterialist issues related to human rights, such as LGBTQ rights or pacifism. In parallel to his teleological distinction from materialist to postmaterialist goals (see **Chapter 3**), he also formulated the terms ‘*elite-directed activities*’ and ‘*elite-directing activities*’. The former include activities like voting, party-membership and running for office. The latter instead, include the participation of people in new social movements, demonstrating, signing petitions, occupying public spaces, and finally boycotting. For Inglehart, due to the increase in postmaterialist value orientations, western democracies have become progressively more likely to engage in elite-challenging forms of political activities, particularly among the younger people. It follows therefore, that if these forms of political participation cannot be encompassed by the working definitions of contemporary political participation then our accounts of the political participation of the younger people will be particularly erroneous (Pickard, 2019a, p. 67).

Of particular interest to the present thesis on political consumerism as a form of political participation, is the work of Pattie et al. (2004) on citizenship, due to their conceptualisation of political participation as inclusive of ‘*micro-politics*’ and ‘*consumer-citizenship*’ (2004, p. 267). They posit that the conservative neoliberal agenda of former UK Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and John Major between 1979 and 1997 endorsed the notion of ‘active citizenship’. Empowered by the rolling back of the state and the progressive marketisation of society in all its facets, evidenced by the wide-scale privatisation reforms that followed, it has encouraged ordinary citizens to assume greater individual and collective responsibility with regards to issues previously understood as responsibilities of the state.

However, conceptualising consumer citizenship posits the challenge of distinguishing between the individual as a citizen of a state and as a consumer-citizen. For Kneip (2010) these two roles will inevitably overlap, as she exemplifies with regard to citizens’ rights. For example, the right to product-related information can be conceived as both a right of the consumer and of the citizen of a state. Moreover, the dual role of the citizen-consumer becomes particularly apparent in the case of economic-political regulations. In order to influence those regulations, the citizen-consumer may resort either to traditional repertoires of the citizen (voting for a

specific party, for example) or to consumer-oriented repertoires (for example, engaging in boycotts of products and/or services).

Consumer citizenship therefore, places emphasis on citizens' duties. These in turn, are predominately framed in terms of responsibility: 'The ethic of responsibility is geared [...] to the consumer who is urged to buy socially conscious goods' (Baxter, 2003, p. 13). When outlining the duties of a consumer-citizen, literature on consumer citizenship focuses on those responsibilities stemming from consumption decisions. Thus, responsibility is traced back to the assumption that choosing certain products bears societal relevance and it reinforces the structural background of these products, for example in terms of ecological consequences of production or consumption or labour conditions (Gabriel and Lang, 2015; Micheletti, 2003). The debate on consumer citizenship, which has resulted in an even wider repertoire of micro-political actions and a consumer-oriented understanding of citizenship, has therefore resulted in the need of an even wider definition of political participation.

Political actions therefore, can now be defined as those actions by ordinary citizens which aim to influence state or non-state actors (such as corporations) to change their economic and social practices (Micheletti, 2003). Attempting to change social practices, by influencing state and non-state actors through consumption, politicises the actor even further, following Milbrath's (1965) rationale discussed above. The consumer thus, becomes progressively the bearer of political responsibility, not only within the economic, but also within the social and political arenas. Among these new forms of consumer oriented participation that have recently attracted reinvigorated scholarly attention, are those that involve the politicisation of consumer choices (such as political consumerism) which are addressed not only towards the traditional political sphere, but also towards the wider social context by influencing the systematic patterns of social behaviour (Copeland, 2014a; Koos et al., 2016; Micheletti and Stolle, 2010).

The revival of neo-Tocquevillian thought (Lane and Ersson, 1999) in social sciences during the 1990s, and the corresponding communitarian emphasis that it inspired, underlined the need for an even wider definition. As a critic of individualism, Tocqueville believed that through associations, that is the coming together of people for common goals, Americans in the 19th century were able to overcome their individualistic desires, creating thus both a self-conscious and active political society and a vibrant civil society, functioning in unison and complimenting each other. In that respect, the individualistic consumption patterns of vegetarians for example, may indeed be interpreted as a political consumerist form of *political participation* insofar they are intended towards influencing national and international policies with regards to the production processes of meat and dairy products. However, they may also

be addressed (at least initially) as a form of *civic engagement* intended towards altering the systematic consumption patterns of what is deemed as ‘*accepted*’ social behaviour; attempting to influence not the government directly, but the behaviour of other citizens, so as to reach a critical mass which in turn will exert further influence on the state to alter its policies accordingly.

A further widening of the conceptual area of political participation was thus offered by Norris (2002, p. 16), who asserts that activities “...which attempt to alter systematic patterns of social behaviour” can be valid examples of political participation, in addition to the activities dealing with government and institutional politics. The definition suggested by Norris therefore, moves away from the teleological emphasis of previous definitions in relation primarily to electoral processes (Milbrath and Goel, 1977), influencing elected representatives and officials (Verba et al., 1995), local or national state structures and authorities (Conge, 1988), or democratic ‘elites’ (Inglehart, 1990). Instead, Norris (2002) places emphasis on the teleological influence of patterns of *social behaviour*. As a result this latter definition encapsulates all those individual acts which aim to alter collective social behaviour, as for instance vegetarianism or veganism.

As a consequence of the expansion of the definitions of political participation from the strictly political sphere towards the social context of the polity, the term ‘*political participation*’ has been often used interchangeably with the term ‘*civic engagement*’ (van Deth, 2014). Macedo et al (2005, p. 16) clarify that they do not draw a sharp distinction between ‘*civic engagement*’ and ‘*political participation*’ since they recognize the interconnectedness between civil society and the mainstream political sphere. In a similar vein, Zukin et al (2006, p. 52) highlight the broad repertoire of engagement among young people in the US, given which “...the boundaries between political participation and civic engagement are not clear ones”. Their definition of ‘*civic engagement*’ highlights the arbitrariness of a clear distinction between the two. Although with regards to political participation they follow the definition of Verba, Scholzman and Brady (1995) as any “activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action” (Zukin et al., 2006, p. 6); civic engagement instead is being defined as “organised voluntary activity focused on problem solving and helping others, a definition that obviously encompasses a vast range of settings, goals, and behaviours” (Zukin et al., 2006, p. 61).

Despite the alleged interconnectedness of the terms political participation and civic engagement, two elements seem to be emerging from this discussion: Firstly, the term ‘*civic engagement*’ is being used primarily in relation to the associations between the individuals of any given society, as opposed towards addressing elected officials, elites and the state as

political actors. Secondly, and as a result of the above, the term civic engagement has a wider, communitarian and social connotation, than the more individualistic and state-oriented term 'political participation'. Throughout this thesis therefore, the term 'civic engagement' will be used to denote any '...activity, individual or collective, devoted to influencing the collective life of the polity' (Macedo et al., 2005, p. 6).

5. Subpolitics, Life politics, and Lifestyle politics

The definitional widening of political participation discussed in the previous section reflects the complexity of political actions in a changing world (see **Chapter 4**). A variety of terms has been used to encompass the increasing complexity of contemporary political actions. Giddens' (1991) '*life-politics*', and Beck's (1992) '*subpolitics*', have been proposed among others, both of which are often captured by the more general term '*lifestyle politics*' (De Moor, 2017). Lifestyle politics thus consists of the politicisation of everyday life and includes ethical, moral and political decisions about a variety of subjects which pertain to everyday-life decisions and attempts to influence political outcomes (Bennet, 1998; Giddens, 1991; Micheletti, 2003). Lifestyle politics "...depart from a realisation that one's everyday decisions have global implications, and that global considerations should therefore affect lifestyle choices" (De Moor, 2017, p. 4).

Against the academic viewpoint that political participation is in decline (Putnam, 1995), Ulrich Beck (1992, 2002, 2018) contests that such a perspective is predicated upon a misapprehension of the current political and social environment in late modernity (Holzer and Sørensen, 2001). Instead, Beck claims that the observation that interest in institutional politics appears to wane in many liberal democracies should not be understood as an indication of political disengagement, since as he posits, focussing on the traditional arenas and forms of politics alone would be looking for politics in the wrong places (Beck et al., 2003). Therefore, instead of understanding politics in terms of parliamentary debates or elections, he advises we should be looking for politics hiding in alternative political arenas, as for example in the everyday actions and choices of people and in the spontaneous and often informal expressions of the 'political', whether collectively (as for example in social movements), or more privately (as in political consumerism). To denote these new ways of doing politics and to distinguish them from the traditional ones, he coined the term '*subpolitics*', which he associates primarily with ecological concerns. He thus posits that:

In the world risk society, politics is made in various realms of subpolitics, whether it is in the laboratory, at the gas station, or in the *supermarket*. New types of conflict emerge and new coalitions become thinkable. Subpolitics thus questions the status of existing systems, calls for a rethinking of the various schemes of classification according to which people are accustomed to perceive their organizational environment, and asks for the invention of new institutional ways to deal with environmental risk. (Beck, 1997, p. 1)

Generally speaking, subpolitics refers to small-scale, or even individual decisions-making that “either have a direct political frame of reference or achieve political significance by way of their aggregation (...).The prefix ‘sub’ is not to indicate that this form of politics is less important than formal politics but that it is less institutionalised” (Holzer and Sørensen, 2001, p. 3). It may thus be understood as a way of doing politics outside of the institutional framework of the formally defined political system of the state, and it therefore has implications on transnational politics across the globe. For Beck therefore, ‘subpolitics’ is placed beneath the nation-state but this does not mean that it is not in a position to influence and even challenge it from *below*, further widening the definitional conceptualisation of politics in late modernity. Foreign and domestic policies, or policies related to environmentalism and technology have been significantly influenced from grassroots peace, women’s and environmental movements and as such their objectives are partially designed from below. Subpolitics therefore for Beck is a form of *bottom-up* politics rather than *top-down* (Pickard, 2019c, p. 383). This particular conceptualisation will be utilised in this thesis to capture young people’s own conceptualisation of politics and its effect on their political consumerism behaviours.

Giddens’ concept of ‘*life politics*’ has been often used interchangeably with Beck’s concept of subpolitics. However, Giddens introducing the concept of ‘life politics’ further expands on Beck’s definition. Although he shares the basic assumptions of Beck’s position, his concept of life politics is even more general - and illustrates an unlimited and constantly evolving conceptualisation of the ‘political’ that expands in almost every area of contemporary life. In his seminal work ‘*Modernity and Self Identity*’, Giddens (1991) argues that traditional politics are losing prominence and discerns a progressive shift towards what he terms ‘life politics’ instead. By ‘traditional politics’ Giddens refers to what he calls ‘emancipatory politics’, which have dominated political thought throughout modernity. For Giddens, whether one took a radical, liberal or a conservative ideological standpoint with regards to politics, they operated within the framework of emancipatory politics. For example, both radical and liberal politics have been historically associated with liberating people, and their discourse often revolved around class or social groups, whether those were the bourgeoisie, the working class, racial minorities or women. On the other hand, all conservative politics should be understood as reactions to these attempts at liberating these social groups. In ‘*Beyond Left and Right*’ (1994),

Giddens extends this argument by claiming that the old political cleavage of 'left' and 'right', dating as far back as the French Revolution, is a rather outdated conceptualisation and no longer reflects contemporary political reality. Holzer and Sørensen (2001, p. 8) explain that:

Today the traditional left, the traditional radical political position, is getting more and more conservative in trying to hold on to the established welfare state, whereas the traditional conservatives, the right, to a large extent have turned in to neo-liberals arguing in favour of the free market and thereby contributing to the erosion of tradition. The distinction between left and right in politics is therefore no longer helpful.

Of course, both emancipatory politics, as well as the traditional left/right cleavage, are still relevant in contemporary postmodern societies, but the overall political reality can no longer be fully captured by these traditional definitions of politics. Instead, Giddens posits that contemporary politics is *both* emancipatory politics *and* life politics and that life politics is getting increasingly important. Consequently, we should start thinking of politics beyond these traditional distinctions. One way to so, is to focus more on life politics, as this thesis will be doing with regards to one of its expressions, namely political consumerism.

For Giddens therefore, the 'political' within life politics is associated with the impact that our everyday individual (and collective) decisions have on others, the environment and the world as a whole. Giddens' understanding of social change refers therefore to our choice to act in different ways than we used to. If enough people change their behaviour accordingly, that is if we reach a critical mass, institutional change and change of the structures of society may also be attainable. Moreover, as people are progressively faced with more life choices as Beck's risk society thesis asserts, then our institutions and fundamental societal structures are constantly changing. This assumption reflects the fluidity of postmodernism and will be further discussed in **Chapter 4**. For now, the major implication of both Beck's and Giddens' analysis could be summarised in the claim that the choices we make as individuals in our everyday life matter politically, since they have the power to "*preserve, renew or change*" (Holzer and Sørensen, 2001, p. 9) the structures and institutions of the society as a whole. This is exactly why Giddens urges us to place more emphasis on the politics of everyday life.

Despite the inexorable significance of Beck's subpolitics and Giddens' life politics in the study of political consumerism, the present thesis will adopt the more contemporary and even more general term '*lifestyle politics*' as introduced by De Moor (2017), and defined at the beginning of this section. Recent developments under postmodernism have augmented the use of lifestyle politics especially among young people. Indeed, several studies demonstrate that lifestyle politics are on the rise (Bartolini, 2011; Fox, 2014). The globalisation of governance that follows the postmodern social processes has rendered decision-making at the governmental

level a less obvious target of political action. Moreover, the emerging power-shift towards international political and economic organisations and multinational corporations (Bartolini, 2011; Fox, 2014) has resulted in an unprecedented democratic deficit where ordinary citizens lack the opportunity to influence decisions (Fox, 2014; Norris, 2011). Lifestyle politics have thus become “one of the most emblematic types of political action in the era of late modernity” (De Moor, 2017, p. 4) allowing political and social challenges to be addressed at the global level directly through the politicisation of individual everyday life-choices (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012).

The idea of addressing collective concerns through individual life choices is often exemplified in popular proverbs like *‘think global, act local’*, or *‘be the change you want to see in the world’* (De Moor, 2017, p. 4). For example, environmental lifestyle politics are based on the premise that “reversing the degradation of the environment depends upon adopting new lifestyle patterns (...) [since] the greatest amount of ecological damage derives from the modes of life followed in the modernized sectors of world society” (Giddens, 1991, p. 221). Other ethical or political considerations are similarly linked to individual lifestyle choices, as for example animal welfare or ethical modes of production. In this way, vegetarianism for instance, becomes such a lifestyle form of political participation which seeks to address these ethical considerations on the global level by altering individual consumer and behavioural practices (Balsiger, 2013; Micheletti and Stolle, 2010). What all these practices have in common is that they use private life choices in order to influence collective attitudes with respect to public matters and causes. According to Micheletti and Stolle (2011), it is this individual and collective interplay that renders them political.

Therefore, the political impact of individual behaviour in an attempt to influence collective decisions becomes the foundation of lifestyle political participation. The simultaneous coexistence of these two dimensions – the individual and the collective - of lifestyle politics reflects on the one hand, the politicisation of individual lifestyle choices and on the other, the mobilisation of others into making lifestyle choices with an ethical and political compass (see **Chapter 4**). In other words, on the one hand, it refers to the use of one’s individual decisions in their private life towards the “allocation of common values and resources, in other words for politics” (Micheletti and Stolle, 2010, p. 126) and on the other, it refers to the mobilisation element of lifestyle politics of several groups which “consciously and actively promote a lifestyle (...) as their primary means to foster social change” (Haenfler et al., 2012, p. 2).

However, since the politicisation of everyday life may pertain to practically every field of one’s life, almost every activity may fit within the definition of lifestyle participation, risking

that it may evolve into a ‘theory of everything’ (van Deth, 2014). Micheletti and Stolle (2011) claim that what distinguishes lifestyle politics from any other generic lifestyle choices, is that the former are ‘*other-regarding*’ and take into consideration the organisation of society at large; whereas the latter are prompted by ‘*self-regarding*’ motives, like one’s personal health.

Although a comprehensive taxonomy of lifestyle political action is yet to be found in available literature, van Deth’s (2014) ‘*Conceptual map of political participation*’ and De Moor’s (2017) ‘*Lifestyle politics and the concept of political participation*’ are questioning which activities should fall under this classification. Lifestyle political participation is therefore defined as those activities which “are often enacted throughout different private, public and institutional arenas, and that they are often targeted at various social, economic and political actors at once” (De Moor, 2017, p. 1)⁶.

In face of the continuous emergence of alternative, more intuitive, creative and lifestyle forms of participation, the election-focused definitions of political participation constitute an anachronistic conceptualisation of the phenomenon and fail to capture the changing patterns of what is being perceived as *political*. It is thus important for the present research to conceptualise political participation through an intentionally wide definition, which will be able to capture a constantly widening conceptual map of political participation. Moreover, a shift of interest from electoral participation to lifestyle forms of political participation, will also significantly enhance the relevance of the present research to young people’s own understanding of the phenomenon. Flanagan (2013, p. 2) posits that “politics is about more than party affiliation and elections. Politics concerns membership in communities and the

⁶ For instance, De Moor (2017, p. 1) discusses the case of a Critical Mass Movement (CMM) local action in Budapest, as a prime example of lifestyle political participation. The CMM is a worldwide grassroots movement committed to better bicycling infrastructures. Their actions often revolve around mobilising large groups of cyclists (hence their name) who occupy a city’s streets, thereby claiming attention to their cause. In 2008, about 80.000 cyclists occupied the streets of Budapest, in what was heralded as the largest action ever conducted under the Critical Mass Movement (CMM). The CMM’s activists’ primary demand focused on a more bicycle-friendly infrastructure in the city (Furness, 2010). CMM’s motivations were clearly environmental ones: they strived to encourage green modes of transportation (in this case cycling), and to promote more environmentally friendly lifestyles. However, since the urban infrastructure presented a crucial impediment to such modes of transportation, CMM activists demanded from their governments to modify cities’ infrastructure with the aim of supporting those environmentally conscious lifestyle choices. The CMM thus, may be considered as an interesting example of the emerging political repertoires that interact throughout multiple private and public arenas, integrating several political action forms by on the one hand drawing on traditional, state-oriented forms of political participation, as well as emerging forms of ‘lifestyle politics’.

process and practices whereby we work with fellow members of those communities to determine the kind of communities, society and the world we want to live in”.

In that respect therefore the working definition of political participation throughout the present thesis will be a deliberately wide one, as proposed by Pickard:

Political participation encompasses both individual and collective shared values and actions (both online and offline) in public and in private, which deliberately seek to maintain or bring about change to political, societal or environmental contexts within a community, locally, nationally and globally (2019a, p. 61).

The section that follows therefore, will discuss how political consumerism fits within this expanded definition of political participation, recognising it thus, as a lifestyle form of political participation.

6. Recognising political consumerism as political participation.

Despite their inherent differences, the terms ‘*ethical shopping*’, ‘*ethical purchase behaviour*’, ‘*ethical consumption*’, ‘*political consumption*’, and ‘*political consumerism*’ among others, have often been used interchangeably. Civic values such as citizens' rights, equity, ethics, sustainability and social responsibility are being associated with consumerism, pointing to the eventual collapse of the dividing lines between the previously exclusive notions of ‘citizenship’ and ‘consumerism’ (Gabriel and Lang, 2015; Hirschman, 2013). Consequently, a recent strand of political sociology has increasingly identified the consumer as a moral agent, with specific consumption patterns intended as a means to a political end (Sassatelli, 2006).

This section will deliver a detailed conceptualisation of political consumerism as the basis on which the following chapters will expand. It will inquire when consumer behaviour may be deemed as political, and it will reflect upon its positioning amongst different forms of political participation. Importantly, it will adopt an individualist standpoint in the study of political participation, as the most appropriate and effective way of capturing the phenomenon in a comparative context.

In their seminal work on the political implications of consumer behaviour ‘*Politics, Products, and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present*’ edited by Wirt (2017) and first published in 2004, Micheletti et al. define political consumerism primarily in terms of choice. Political consumerism then, stands for the “consumer choice of producers and products

with the goal of changing objectionable institutional or market practices” (Wirt, 2017, p. xiv). As they explain:

It is based on attitudes and values regarding issues of justice, fairness, or non-economic issues that concern personal and family well-being and ethical or political assessment of favourable and unfavourable business and government practice. Regardless of whether political consumers act individually or collectively, their market choices reflect an understanding of material products as embedded in a complex social and normative context which may be called the politics behind products. (Wirt, 2017, pp. xiv–xv)

For Schossboeck (2012) therefore, “[P]olitical consumerism is one way of rethinking our own consumerist behaviour and to influence the public agenda”. Political consumerism thus refers to the deliberate choice to buy (or abstain from buying) individually or collectively a specific product or service for ethical or political reasons (Micheletti, 2004). Later studies (Balsiger, 2013; Stolle and Micheletti, 2013; Zorell, 2019b) describe it as an individualised form of collective action and have embedded in their definition also environmental motivations (Koos, 2012, p. 37). However, they all clarify that it encompasses mainly two types of action. *Buycotting*, or positive political consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013; Zorell, 2018) consists of the deliberate buying of a particular product or service with the intention of making a political statement. Instead, *boycotting* or negative political consumerism, refers to the deliberate abstention from purchasing a certain product or service with the intention of making a political statement (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013; Zorell, 2018).

The underlying motivations behind both boycotting and buycotting vary from concerns related to social justice, to ideological issues in relation to the prevalent economic system, to more idiosyncratic motivations such as the health of the individuals and their families (Micheletti and Stolle, 2014). Both varieties of political consumerism nevertheless, aim to express a particular set of values and predilections of an ethical, political or environmental nature with which these products or services are associated. The end-recipients of these political statements are intended to be either the firms behind the products or the governments and regulating bodies of the market. In making these statements, political consumers can either act individually or collectively (as for example in the context of an organised campaign). Additionally, they may operate openly in relation to a wider social issue of concern or privately, that is boycotting or buycotting without mentioning it to anyone and expecting their purchasing behaviour to be noticed by the respective firms (Zorell, 2019b).

It is essential therefore to distinguish between what constitutes everyday shopping and what constitutes political consumerism, since the variety of aims, motives, targets and types of political consumption encapsulated in its definition makes it difficult to recognise when a

consumption activity may be perceived as a political action and when not. In order to solve this conceptual problem, Zorell (2019b, pp. 39–40) proposes two different standpoints which can assess whether the act of consumption should be considered as political: the *outsider's standpoint* and the *individual's own perception*.

Drawing from Neilson's definition of political consumerism as "publicly motivated consumption" (2010, p. 214), Zorell (2019b) asserts that in order to assess an act of consumption as 'political' from the outsider's standpoint, this must be publicly recognised as such. This means however, that the political consumer's own intentions behind their actions "would not suffice to determine its political character" (Zorell, 2019b, p. 39).

Defining thus political consumerism from the outsider's standpoint rests on whether any consumption-based political statement is being recognised as such by its intended recipients, which are often big corporations or privately owned businesses⁷. Assuming the outsider's standpoint in the study of political consumerism therefore makes it particularly problematic, as the individuals' own understanding of whether an activity is intended as a political one is unavoidably overlooked (Fergusson, 2013; Pontes et al., 2018; Sant, 2014). Moreover, focusing entirely on the recipient's acknowledgement of an act as political, would raise comparability issues across different research studies (Zorell, 2019b). For example, a multi-national corporation, which is often the target of large-scale boycotts, is likely to be less responsive to a comparatively small decline in sales. Instead, an equal increase in the sales of a small local cooperative (which is often the recipients of buycotts) may have greater social and political repercussions in its local community. This may indeed be the case despite the intended political message in both cases being the same, that is the rejection of impersonal trading networks, for example.

Focusing instead on the individual's perception of whether an act of consumption is intended as political, amplifies the acuteness of these problems. The problem of recognition of a political act by its intended recipients and the proposed solution to it by focusing on the individual is being exemplified in the practice of the British Co-operative Bank. The bank issues an annual 'Ethical Consumption Report' (Triodos, 2018) on which it presents data on the progress and development of ethical consumption activities in the country. Its operationalisation of ethical consumption activities is based on two parallel measures: the first involves figures on the sales of products and services that are explicitly ethical and are being marketed as such (outsider's standpoint); the second relies on consumer surveys asking them

⁷ This example is reminiscent of David Cameron's refusal to recognise the intent and consequently the political statement of the protesters during the London riots in 2011, and his dismissal of the riots as acts of "pure criminality" (Lamprianou, 2013, p. 23).

about their motivations when they purchase ‘ethical invisibles’⁸ (individual’s standpoint). The ‘Ethical Consumption Report’ recognises thus this conceptual distinction and relies on both the outsider’s and the individual’s own understanding of what constitutes political consumerism (Clouder and Harrison, 2005).

According to Verba and Nie (1987) political participation is being defined as a means by which citizens communicate their preferences to the government and its elected officials. For Verba and Nie therefore, whether the government or elected officials effectively respond to citizens’ demands is inconsequential in classifying the action as political participation (Teorell, 2006). Likewise, Newman and Bartels (2011) in their ‘citizen-centred view of participation’ argue that consumerism becomes political as soon as the consumers embed their purchasing decisions with (their subjective) political meaning.

Moreover, according to van Deth (2014, p. 360), it is the intentions and objectives of the citizens that constitute if an action is a political one or not. What differentiates a political consumerist act therefore, from every-day consumption is the individual’s own intent. For van Deth therefore, political consumerism would be categorised as a *motivational* form of political participation, since it is the underlying *motivation* behind the act of consumption which embeds it with political meaning.

Summarising the benefits of the individual’s standpoint in the study of political consumerism, Zorell (2019b, p. 41) posits that if the research study seeks to develop a concise understanding of the motivations and intentions of the political consumers - as is the case in this thesis – assuming the individualist perspective is the most appropriate and efficient standpoint. Relying on the individual’s own assessment of when an act of consumption is to be understood as ‘political’, allows for a clear-cut delineation of the phenomenon; whilst it also permits for cross-country comparisons irrespectively of the opportunity structures prevalent in each country. The present thesis will therefore assume the individualist standpoint for the study of the underlying motivations of the young political consumers, in the UK and Greece.

⁸ *Ethical invisibles* involve the consumption of goods or services which may exist irrespectively, and whether they will be classified as such depends entirely on the intentions of the consumer when they purchase them. Examples of ethical invisibles include using the public means of transport for environmental reasons, buying locally to support local economy, buying second hand clothing or simply consuming less (Harrison et al., 2005, p. 97).

7. Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated that the topic of political participation has been a substantial field of research among political scientists. The reason is that it is typically perceived - and for good reasons - as the archetypical act of citizenship within contemporary democratic states. Whereas voting and electoral behaviour have traditionally attracted the greatest share of researchers' attention, several non-electoral forms of political participation have until recently gone unnoticed. The chapter has argued therefore, for a wide definition of political participation which is in a position to capture the changing participatory patterns in a constantly evolving world.

This chapter has thus sought to problematise the issue of the definitions deployed in the study of the political participation of young people. It has therefore first defined whom exactly this thesis means when it refers to 'young people'. Subsequently, it proceeded to define what political participation means. It has therefore introduced a selection of the most widely-used definitions; it has reviewed their evolution in time; and has discussed how these are both 'period' and 'beholder' sensitive. For this reason, it has provided an admittedly wide working definition, which is however, able to accommodate political consumerism as a lifestyle form of political participation. Likewise, it has proposed a concise conceptualisation of political consumerism as the basis on which the following chapters will build upon. It discussed when consumer behaviour may be understood as political participation, and when not. Finally, it proposed the individualist standpoint in the study of political participation as the most appropriate and effective way of capturing the phenomenon in a comparative context.

Given the aim of the thesis on tracing the underlying factors behind young people's propensity to engage in political consumerism, the following chapter will outline some of the most influential theoretical models in political participation research. These will be subsequently used in the following chapters as the basis of analysis, seeking to identify the drivers of political consumerism among young people in the UK and Greece.

Chapter 3: An assessment of the main theoretical frameworks in the study of political participation

1. Introduction

Although for many years the common underlying axiom of the available definitions of political participation has involved its conflation to electoral turnout (Leighley, 1995), **Chapter 2** has discussed the need for a conceptual expansion of the definitions of political participation, to include its *lifestyle* variants, such as *political consumerism*. Given the aim of the present research on identifying the underlying factors behind the expansion of political consumerism among young people, this chapter will instead discuss and assess some of the most commonly used theoretical models in political participation research. These will be subsequently used throughout the thesis as the basis of analysis, seeking to trace the determining factors of political consumerism among young people in Greece and in the United Kingdom.

This chapter will therefore commence by **a)** laying out the *Socio-Economic Status Model (SES)* of political participation, with its focus on the socioeconomic status of the individuals as a predictor of their political participation patterns. It will continue by **b)** addressing the *Mobilisation model*, which is focusing on the importance of the availability of opportunity structures in the individual's environment, as predictors of their political participation behaviour. This will be followed by **c)** the *Rational Choice* model, which assumes citizens calculate the costs and benefits behind their political participation behaviour. In turn, **d)** *Social Capital theory*, emphasises on the existence of relationships among individuals and their community, in the form of relationships of trust. The chapter will conclude by **e)** investigating the role of the economic conditions prevalent during one's socialisation, as critical factors behind the emergence of *Postmaterialist Values*, which may in turn influence the preferred modes of political engagement of young people, in a constantly evolving social and political context.

2. The Socio-Economic Status Model

A significant part of the available literature on political participation draws heavily from the classic work of Verba and Nie (1987). This assumes that political participation is dependent on

the one hand, on the attitudes people hold towards themselves and the political system, and on the other, on their personal resources, such as time, money and skills (Verba and Nie, 1987).

The Socioeconomic status (SES) model of political participation – as it came to be known - captures the individual's position on a social and economic scale and thus distinguishes between *high-status* and *lower-status* individuals, based on these characteristics (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017). The determinants of the socio-economic status of the individuals may be the accumulated experiences during the individual's life-cycle, such as their job type, employment status, church attendance or family structure, which are all likely to influence the development of their civic skills.

Thus, high-status individuals are more likely to participate than their low-status counterparts, since they are likely to have partaken in such social environments which reinforce participatory civic skills (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017). Factors like gender, education attainment, employment status, class and income levels, or belonging to a minority have all been consistently found to be significant predictors of political participation, from the 1960s (Almond and Verba, 1963; Barnes et al., 1979; Milbrath, 1965; Verba and Nie, 1987), to this day (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017); and will therefore also be also considered in the present thesis.

SES can be measured in two separate ways, either by the *objective* material resources or capital or by the *subjective* experiences of those same resources. *Objective SES* is generally measured by indicators of income or wealth, education, and occupational status. Conversely, assessments of *subjective SES*, depend on the perceptions of the individuals' own socioeconomic status and capture their sense of place in the hierarchy relative to others (Singh-Manoux et al., 2005).

A low-status citizen therefore, living in a high-status neighbourhood, may score significantly lower on the *subjective* relative income scale than their objective income levels would otherwise indicate, as they would compare their individual status with those prevalent in their immediate environment. Conversely, a high-status citizen living in a middle-class neighbourhood is likely to report higher scores on the subjective class scale, by comparing themselves to their (subjective) average in their perceived vicinity, and not, for example, the world's top 1% income levels. The benefit of subjective over objective SES measures therefore, stems from the fact that the former takes into account a cognitive 'averaging' of a range of personal and economic factors, such as income, education, opportunities for development, and it can therefore represent a more accurate forecaster of behaviours than any objective measure (Singh-Manoux et al., 2003). For this reason, the present study will adopt the subjective SES standpoint with regards to issues such as subjective class and relative income.

With regards to age, participation tends to increase as the people get older, since young people generally have lower civic skills, education and are often less integrated into their community (Jennings, 1979; Jennings and Markus, 1988; Jennings and Niemi, 2014). Instead, participation tends to diminish after a certain age for the elderly (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993a), giving rise to what is often referred to as *the life-cycle model* of political participation (Erkulwater, 2012).

Education has been found to be another predictor of participation, demonstrating a significant positive relationship throughout the literature, with income factors following second, demonstrating though a generally lower weight (Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017; Kitanova, 2017). The prevailing view in the literature therefore, is that social class and educational history seem to be key forecasters of political engagement (Manning and Holmes, 2013; Sloam, 2012), especially when it comes to the political participation of young people, (Flanagan et al., 2011; Henn and Foard, 2014).

However, the relevant findings with regards to gender, race and ethnicity are not so consistent. Men and women are consistently equally likely to vote (Conway, 1981; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993a; Teixeira, 1987), while they present differences in either direction with regards to other forms of political participation, such as protests and community campaigns (Verba, Scholzman, Brady, and Nie, 1993). With respect to political consumerism, this has been shown to be a gendered form of political participation, with women being particularly more likely to engage in it, than their male counterparts (Micheletti, 2004; Stolle and Micheletti, 2006).

The SES model has gained wide acceptance in the academic circles, since it provides evidence for the inter-relation of political participation to a series of easily identifiable and widely available socioeconomic determinants. However, this does not mean that it has remained immune to criticism. The greater part of the available empirical research utilising the model focuses almost exclusively on the demographic and social class characteristics of the individuals, rather than on the distinct factors which led them to choose one participatory method over any other, overlooking the architects of the model, who forewarned that there is no causal priority for social class over other social characteristics (Verba and Nie, 1987). Therefore, the model has been often criticised insofar it underemphasises the individual's motivations to participate, as well as the contextual and institutional factors of their political environment, stripping the individuals out of their social contexts and interpersonal relationships (Knoke, 1990).

Wolsfeld (1986) instead, recognised that the relationship between SES indicators and political participation may be better understood as mediated by other variables. This implies

that variables such as personal values or psychological factors, may function as mediators in the relationship between SES and political participation⁹. For Wolsfeld (1986) therefore, SES characteristics may indeed delineate the potential for political participation, but this happens because they capture the effects of personal and social resources, such as political efficacy¹⁰.

To summarise, the positive relationship between SES and political participation therefore may be based on cognitive and motivational characteristics typical of lower-SES individuals, that may be discouraging political participation, or distinctive characteristics of higher-SES, that may be encouraging political participation instead (Milbrath, 1965; Verba et al., 1995). For this reason, the present research will examine, in addition to (subjective) demographic factors, as per the standard SES model, the respondents' interest in politics and a series of personal values, including - but not limited to - political efficacy.

Moreover, the SES model does not distinguish between electoral and non-electoral participation activities. Instead, highly engaged participants in elections and those who are highly engaged only in political consumerism would be equally classified as high-status individuals. Consequently, the SES model seems insufficient to explain why some high-status individuals will choose electoral participation, while other high-status individuals non-electoral methods.

Another line of criticism stems from the observation that the standardized SES model assumes an even distribution of participation opportunities across its demographic or social-status categorisations, and it therefore fails to account for intra-group heterogeneity. Failure to account for intra-group heterogeneity would, for example predict that all high-status individuals are likely to demonstrate higher levels of participation. Following the same reasoning, the SES model also fails to provide any insight on the differential participation levels among the same status individuals across time (Hansen and Rosenstone, 1983), even if their SES status has remained unchanged. For example, the SES cannot explain the difference in voter's turnout between different electoral rounds among people with unchanged employment status.

⁹ At this point, the benefits of multivariate factor analyses, over bivariate comparisons across demographic cohorts as an analytical tool becomes pertinent. Yet very little research has empirically tested this prospect.

¹⁰ The inclusion of political efficacy determinants will be further discussed under the mobilisation model in the section below.

However, for Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the difference in participation levels within cohorts with the same SES status, or across time, could be attributed to different sets of opportunities prevalent within cohorts and across time. For example, one may not participate in a demonstration, if a demonstration has not been organised; sign a petition if a petition has not been presented to them; or even vote in a referendum if a referendum does not take place. A common example in support of this line of criticism may be derived from the interpretation of survey data: if respondents have reported that they have engaged in acts of political consumerism, i.e. they have bought an environmentally friendly label in the last 12 months, we can be certain that they were presented with such an opportunity. If, however, they report that they have not, does this mean that they had the option to do so and chose not to, or that they were not presented with such an opportunity to start with?

It is at this point that the examination of contextual factors and opportunities behind political participation becomes pertinent. The next section will thus proceed to provide an overview of the *Mobilisation Model*, which seeks to address the criticisms of the SES model discussed above.

3. The Mobilisation Model

The Mobilisation model posits that political participation is dependent also on contextual factors, such as the opportunities present in the individual's environment. In general, people may participate less or more based on their individual socio-economic characteristics (as the SES model suggests), but also based on their social context and available opportunity structures. In other words, the decision to refrain from political participation could be because, based on their individual preferences, they simply chose not to; but also because they could not or because nobody asked them to (Verba et al., 1993).

Although the skills and motivations of the individuals are still being considered, the socioeconomic status of individuals is now recalculated under the *Mobilisation model* to include both the individual's civic orientations, as well as the level of their political mobilisation. Therefore, the high-status individuals will have higher personal skills on the one hand, but also more opportunities to utilise them, either through the existence of more institutional opportunities, or more informal, mobilisation opportunities. For example, recent survey data (European Social Survey, 2018) clearly indicate that a growing number of citizens are turning to the market to express their political and moral concerns. However, what these data fail to capture is whether this is because the citizens chose to do so on their own accord, or whether they were presented with more fair-trade or organic products available in their local grocery

shop. The *Mobilisation model* poses that the skills of the high-status individuals of the SES model are more likely to be translated into behaviour in a contextual environment that allows them to flourish into political action.

In a conceptualisation reminiscent of the nature and nurture cleavage of the natural sciences, intrinsic political attitudes become no longer the only factor behind the expression of political behaviour. Instead, this is now dependent not only on 'internal' attitudinal drivers such as membership in the high-status cohorts of the SES model would suggest; but also on the 'external', environmental factors of the existing mobilisation opportunities. Even the highest status individuals would be unable to participate in the elections in a political environment which persecutes the organisation of elections. Similarly, a political consumer would find it increasingly difficult to buy certain products for ethical, political, or environmental reasons, if such products were not available in their vicinity. To account for this, the *Mobilisation model* takes into consideration the reciprocal relationship between the presence of political opportunities and the civic skills of the individuals (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993).

Although the development of the *Mobilisation model* of political participation presented a major contribution in the study of political participation, a great part of available empirical research based on the effects of mobilisation factors on political participation fails to avoid common operationalisation problems. Political participation is often operationalised as voter turnout, whilst mobilisation is typically measured by campaign spending (Boyd, 1989; Caldeira, Patterson, and Markko, 1985; Tucker, 1986).

However, several other factors influencing mobilisation, such as the effectiveness of institutional (party, candidate, organisation) communication campaigns have also been identified (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993b). Mobilisation therefore becomes dependent on electoral competitiveness, institutional campaigning, and the effectiveness of social movements. For example, Dubuisson-Quellier et al. (2011) analyse the main fields of action of three French consumer organisations: consumer education, implementation of alternative forms of trade and consumer mobilisation in protest campaigns. They demonstrate that these actions require the mobilisation of social actors in order to build representations of consumers on the one hand, but also to provide them with widely available ethically-labelled products, among which to choose from. This approach therefore, emphasises on the role of collective action with regards to political participation and, by implication, in determining the amount and forms of individual political participation (Kriesi, 2008).

For instance, membership in voluntary association has been consistently identified as a factor which is likely to increase overall participation, with membership in voluntary associations with strictly political goals (party membership, labour unions) having stronger

effects on electoral and campaigning activity, but also on the communal activity of the individuals. Verba, Nie and Kim (1987) explain the dynamics of the above relationship whereby membership in voluntary organisations trains the individual in the participative process, augmenting thus their personal and political skills, which are then more likely to spill over back to the electoral political sphere.

Most importantly however, the Mobilisation model is able to respond to the criticism of the SES model with regards to intra-group heterogeneity, discussed in the previous section. The perceived difference between participation levels across groups of the same socioeconomic status has received special attention by Verba, Nie and Kim (1987) within the framework of the *Mobilisation model*. Their findings, indicate that in the absence of strong group mobilisation processes, socioeconomic status remains a strong predictor of participation levels, validating the SES model. However, when effective group mobilisation processes are in place, this relationship is typically insignificant. The same applies not only to voter turnout, but also to participation in social movements (McAdam, 1986).

These findings reflect the importance of the inclusion of the contextual opportunity structures in models of political participation. For example, almost one fourth of the local party leaders in the 1960s reported that they 'were asked to do so' (Bowman and Boynton, 1966). Beck and Jennings (1979) report that as a result of the political opportunity structure of the 1960's, there was a reversal of the tendencies of participation in party politics, with more young liberals participating, as opposed to older conservatives, which was the norm till that time. Overcoming the individualistic bias of the SES model, Koos (2012) extends the comparative analysis of actor-centred accounts behind the rise of political consumerist practices, by focusing on political, cultural and economic opportunity structures and on globalisation. He concludes that opportunities for political consumption are provided by national affluence, retailing structures and the availability of environmental and fair-labelled goods. Following this rationale, this thesis will be examining the influence of neoliberalism as a contextual factor behind political consumerism among young people in the UK and Greece, as it will be discussed in detail in **Chapter 5**.

Summing up, the participation decisions of the individuals will therefore reflect **a)** a set of socioeconomic characteristics of the individuals, according to the SES model; but will also reflect **b)** the available opportunity structures presented to them at any given time. The Mobilisation model thus, stresses the importance of the availability of options in the process of the participatory decisions of the agent; and emphasises the role of mobilisation opportunities in the creation of these options. But where there are options, there are also decisions. Therefore, another part of the literature on political participation pertains that participation

remains primarily a '*decision*' insofar it involves certain costs and benefits for a – presumably - rational agent. The following section will discuss the dynamics of this assumption, in the emergence of the *Rational Agency model*.

4. The Rational Agency Model

Most mainstream economic theories are based on the assumption of rational agency. Similarly, the *Rational Agency model* of political participation, assumes that individuals will choose to engage in a political activity as long as its benefits outweigh the costs involved (Aldrich, 1993; Jackman, 1987, Whiteley, 1995). It follows that rational political agents will seek to avoid the costs of participation, since in modern liberal democracies they may be entitled by definition to its benefits, leading to what in economic literature has been termed the 'free-rider problem' and 'collective-action problem' in Political Sciences¹¹.

Downs (1957) discussing electoral participation in his classical work '*An Economic Theory of Democracy*', has termed the same concept as '*the calculus of voting*'. Since the marginal probability of each voter to determine the outcome of an election is minimal, he claims, the cost of voting will always surpass its benefits and therefore the rational voter should always choose to abstain. However, such an assumption would lead to zero, or no participation, and although turnout in elections has indeed been shown to be declining (Ipsos, 2015), participation is still a common practice, leading to what has been termed '*the paradox of participation*' (Olson, 1965). The most common approaches used to resolve this paradox involve **a)** reviewing downwards the costs of participating; and **b)** expanding the weight of the benefits involved in participating.

With regards to reviewing downwards the costs of participating in political consumerism therefore, the rational agency model would predict that political consumerist participation would be higher, the higher **a)** the satisfaction with the availability of certain ethical-labelled products; **b)** the satisfaction with the prices of these ethically-labelled products; **c)** the satisfaction with the variety of retailers in the vicinity of the consumer; and finally **d)** the satisfaction with market information for these products. These four variables therefore, will form part of my survey questionnaire and will be subsequently examined as contributing factors behind the decision of young people to engage in political consumerism in the UK and Greece.

¹¹ For an overview of rational agency models, see Aldrich (1993) and Whiteley (1995).

With regards to expanding the weight of the benefits involved in participating, the overall support for democracy in principle, has been considered as a driving factor behind an individual's decision to participate. For an individual to decide to participate, they should be satisfied that their long-term benefits from doing so should outweigh the costs involved. In order to satisfy this condition, the greatest part of scholars who approach the paradox of participation will attempt to expand the weight of the benefits involved with participating. This approach often develops based on Downs' own observation (1957, p.266) that one of the factors entering one's (long-term) calculated benefits from voting should include "the value of voting per se". This is often captured by the 'Democracy Value' (or D-Value for shorts), which represents the long-run value the individual attributes to preserving democracy in their country¹².

The D-value therefore, would represent "a pay-out from fulfilling one's civic obligation or duty to vote" (Feddersen, 2004, p. 101). The D-Value will thus be addressed in the questionnaire of the present thesis by the questions 'How important is democracy for you?' which aims to capture the relative importance the young people in the UK and Greece attribute to the long-term benefits of preserving democracy in their country; and the question 'Voting is a duty?', which similarly aims to capture the relative importance of voting as a civic duty. Both of these questions have previously (Galais and Blais, 2016; Wattenberg, 2015) been employed in explaining young people's political participation in general, and particularly their engagement with political consumerism (Gotlieb and Wells, 2012).

The rational choice model of political participation demonstrates therefore the importance of subjectivity of ideological factors and soft incentives as a basis for group membership, with respondents citing the weight of achieving certain public policy outcomes as the basis for their participation, as opposed to the importance of immediate gains which are typically considered less important (Leighley, 1995). It could thus be argued that the rational agency model is based on a generalised and subjective cost-benefit analysis of participating. For example, if one places increased value on *postmaterialist* concerns (Inglehart, 2018), such as self-expression or the freedom of speech associated with participation, their decision to participate will be entirely rational, since the benefits (self-expression) will outweigh the costs involved (time).

¹² Possibly the most influential reformulation of Downs' calculus of participation, has been the one proposed by Riker and Ordeshook (1968, p. 27) with the addition of the D-Value in the calculated benefits. The formula thus assumes the following form: $pKB - C + D > 0$

The study of the age-specific underlying value orientations of young people should therefore attain further scrutiny. Moreover, the focus of the above models of participation has been primarily quantitative, i.e. they examine whether there is less or more participation. As Leighley puts it however, “...to account for more than ‘how much’ participation, we must conceptualise the participation decision not as a choice between activity and inactivity, but rather as a choice of a particular type of political act out of a set of potential acts” (Leighley, 1995, p. 198).

It thus follows, that more emphasis should be placed on questions such as ‘what kind of action’, and ‘in which social context’ (Salisbury, 1975, p. 336). When it comes therefore to examining **a)** non-electoral forms of political participation such as political consumerism, and **b)** the underlying social context as a predictor of engagement in these, the *Social Capital Model* is in a position to provide valuable insights, as it will be demonstrated in the section that follows.

5. The Social Capital Model

The theory of Social Capital draws heavily from the sociological perspective of the rational-choice sociologist Coleman (1988). It is being perceived as an overarching concept which describes the existence of relationships among the individuals of a community, and demonstrates positive effects to their levels of education and social status (Teney and Hanquinet, 2012).

Since the publication of Putnam’s landmark work (1995) on the decline of social capital and its consequences on political participation in the US, research on social capital and political participation has flourished, especially in relation to the different forms this assumes among young people. Building upon the work of Coleman (1988), Putnam developed his own influential conceptualisation of social capital (Fine, 2010), which is understood as resulting from *networks* and *relations of trust* among individuals, and which is expected to accelerate the capacity for several non-electoral forms of political action, and increase the likelihood of individuals to participate in these forms (Paxton, 1994).

Teney and Hanquinet (2012) instead, perceive social capital as a multifaceted phenomenon whose different components are associated with different dimensions of political participation. As a concept which is intended to capture the effects of varying social relations on political participation, they argue that social capital may take equally different forms. However, to this day, the complex relationship between social capital and political participation

has produced contradictory results (Fine, 2010) due to the **a**) varying and often inconsistent definitions of the term, and as a result of this, **b**) an equally inconsistent operationalisation of the concept. This section will therefore discuss the problem of definition of social capital, and consequently the problem of operationalisation that emerges from it.

With regards to the former, earlier attempts to define social capital are placing emphasis on individual factors. Portes' (1998, p. 6) definition poses that "social capital stands for the ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social structures". Instead, Putnam, drawing from Tocqueville's and Rousseau's perspective on civil society, shifted the emphasis of the concept from the individual to the collective perspective (Kim and Kim, 2009). Putnam's definition therefore, identifies social capital as "features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit" (1995, p. 67). It follows therefore that communities with high social capital are more likely to cooperate, as opposed to communities with low social capital.

For Putnam (1995; 2002) therefore, social capital consists of three intertwined elements, namely *trust*, *networks* and *norms of reciprocity*, the interplay of which enhances cooperative behaviour within any given community and promotes social cohesion. Higher social capital facilitates political participation, understood as a means for the resolution of communal conflicts, by sharing information and strengthening the sense of belonging to the community. In subsequent literature, a common conceptualisation of social capital places emphasis on its first two constituent elements, trust and associations (Widmalm, 2005, 2007). The former, trust, is further subdivided into institutional and personal trust (Khodyakov, 2007; Misztal, 2013). Institutional trust is theorised to have a positive effect to voter's turnout since it implies support for the established status quo and the electoral processes. Personal trust on the other hand tends to demonstrate a positive relationship with respect to alternative forms of political participation such as protests, demonstrations, and community campaigns (Widmalm, 2005, 2007).

With regards to the effects of social (personal and institutionalised) trust to political participation, several mechanisms have been proposed. Firstly, trust reduces insecurity of social relations, allows the agent to continue to be dependent on their social interactions and afford the risks of unforeseen behaviours, encouraging social interaction and thus cooperation for a common goal. Like any other social domain, the costs associated with political participation discussed under the rational agency model are more easily overcome with the existence of high levels of trust. It is therefore expected that trust will have a positive effect on political participation. Especially in the case of institutional trust it may be argued that highly-

trusting citizens will seek to optimise their limited political resources by placing their trust on politicians and political institutions. It follows therefore that high levels of institutional trust would foster institutional participation. However, if trust to politicians declines, because of unpopular measures by the government for example, then it is likely that the individuals will seek to voice their concern through non-institutional means (Warren, 1999), like political consumerism.

In turn, membership in voluntary associations has been often used as a proxy for the 'network' element of social capital. Membership in associations is a meaningful source of social capital, insofar it proliferates civil virtues, encourages the dissemination of information, and induces mobilisation (Campbell, 2013; Helliwell and Putnam, 2007). Moreover, people tend to participate more when they are asked to do so in person (Campbell, 2013), or when their social network includes people with high interest in politics (McClurg, 2006). All of these elements have been assumed to augment political participation in all its forms.

However, this is not always the case. A further subdivision of the associational element of social capital divides it into two main categories. Bonding (or particularised) social capital refers to the 'in-group' of any given community, such as family, circle of friends, and people with whom one shares a common ethnic and cultural identity. Bridging (or generalised) social capital instead, describes those social links one shares with their extended social network. An important difference between the two therefore, is that bonding social capital is contingent to the individuals' perception regarding who constitutes their ingroup, whereas bridging social capital is part of one's overarching value structure (Damron, 2004).

Since the aim of the present research is to identify the factors behind engagement in political consumerism among young people, bridging social capital will be measured by the variables 'Intention to work with others' with regards to a social, political or environmental issue of concern, and 'Intention to take part in a voluntary association' for the same reasons. Similarly, bonding social capital will be captured by the element 'Intention to demonstrate' since demonstrations have been shown to be associated with political resilience (Aldrich, 2012; Kousis and Paschou, 2017) and are characterised by high levels of bounded solidarity (Schwedler, 2003).

The use of social capital as an analytical tool in social sciences may be relatively recent. However, it has already attained a variety of interpretations, definitions and uses across several disciplines. The concept has often been treated as a panacea for a variety of pressing social issues (Portes, 1998; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000). Even though social capital theory continues to expand into new areas of research, it has also received extensive criticisms, with its critics arguing that the term itself is vague, difficult to measure, or poorly defined (Fine, 2002).

Despite its shortcomings, mainly with regards to its conceptualisation and operationalisation, social capital expands the predominately individualistic theoretical underpinnings of the SES model and the rational agency model, by addressing not the opportunity structures available (as the mobilisation model suggests), but the existence of social relationships and the investigation of their different combinations, as different forms of social capital. Social Capital theory therefore re-imagines the individual not as merely a member of a demographic cohort; neither as an outcome of its available opportunities within its environment; but also nor as a one-dimensional rational agent. Instead, Social Capital theory reintroduces the role of personal interactions in the form of trust and interpersonal associations as determining factors behind people's political participation. Especially the decline of trust in traditional political institutions (Putnam, 2001) has often been identified as a primary factor behind the corresponding emergence of alternative socio-political arenas, within which political consumerism holds a central position (Neilson and Paxton, 2010).

The diverse consequences of Social Capital theory remain a pertinent issue of research, since its relation to other forms of political participation, like political consumerism, remains relatively understudied. This thesis will shed light in that direction by examining the relationship of social (personalised and institutionalised) trust and associational membership (intention to work with others, volunteer and demonstrate) with political consumerism among young people in the UK and Greece.

6. Postmaterialist value orientations and the Silent Revolution thesis

The transition from the individual to the wider social determinants of political participation which may be discerned in the evolution of the theories discussed above, paves the way for the study of the underlying value orientations of citizens as a response to the prevalent societal conditions. Yet another influential approach, especially pertinent to young people's non-electoral political participation, comes in the form of the *Silent Revolution* thesis, as developed by Ronald Inglehart (1977, 1997).

According to Inglehart, there has been a '*silent revolution*', in terms of the changing values of the overall population from the 1970s onwards in many industrialised democracies, as a response of the relatively favourable economic conditions, economic stability and physical security. Pickard (2019c, p. 378) quotes the architect of the thesis who states that:

...important groups among the population of Western societies [...] are acting in pursuit of goals which (unlike symbols of affluence) no longer have a direct relationship to the

imperatives of economic security. These individuals – drawn largely from the younger cohorts of the modern middle class – have been socialised during an unprecedentedly long period of unprecedentedly high affluence. For them, economic security may be taken for granted (Inglehart, 1971, p. 991).

Inglehart's thesis therefore comes in direct contrast to Putnam's (1995) thesis of diminishing social capital, according to which each new generation was found to be less politically engaged, and more concerned with the accumulation of material wealth than their predecessors. Inglehart instead, provides evidence in support of his hypothesis that the younger the participants, the more likely they are to favour what he initially termed '*post-bourgeois*' value priorities. Conversely, the older the participants the more likely they were to favour '*acquisitive*' value priorities (Inglehart, 1971, p. 1000). Although in his later work he transitioned to the use of the terms '*postmaterialist*' and '*materialist*' value priorities, the underlying principles of the theory remain the same. The major implications of Inglehart's thesis therefore, are that **a)** individual value orientations are rooted in the prevalent economic conditions during the individual's formative years, **b)** these will remain relatively stable throughout adulthood, and finally that **c)** affluence during their formative years will result in postmaterialist values, and scarcity to materialistic value orientations.

At the heart of the Silent Revolution thesis therefore, stand the '*scarcity*' and the '*socialisation*' hypotheses. Maslow's (1975) *scarcity hypothesis*, maintains that individuals tend to value highly what is in short supply. Therefore, they will place higher value on concepts such as material security and physical survival, as long as these are still scarce. According to Inglehart however, the post-World War II generations were socialised in an unprecedented period of peace and economic prosperity. As a result, they tended to take physical safety and economic security for granted and therefore they prioritised postmaterialist values connected to quality of life, self-expression and environmental concerns.

As a result of this increased material security, the postmaterialist cohorts are therefore significantly more future-oriented, demonstrate an almost teleological belief in progress and seek to find the "natural, true and authentic" (Seippel, 1999, p. 139) within oneself. Liberated by the urgency of material subsistence, the postmaterialist cohorts are therefore expected to express their disapproval of the confines presented by institutional participation and they will instead be fascinated by non-conventional, transformative forms of political engagement in order to advocate political reforms. This shift in value orientations has eventually led to new issue demands on which, the traditional political institutions were hardly equipped to respond. Consequently, the emerging postmaterialist cohorts have turned their back on the traditional political institutions in an attempt to express their political demands by way of new political

movements and within alternative political arenas, which are able to accommodate their postmaterialist concerns.

In general, the Silent Revolution thesis posits that affluent societies will demonstrate a general postmaterialist value orientation, whilst in contrast the poorer societies will remain primarily materialistic. The question that arises therefore, is whether young people will continue to carry with them their postmaterialist value orientations as they age in an economic environment of relative precariousness as a single Mannheimian generational unit (see **Chapter 2**) or whether these postmaterialist value orientations will give way to materialist ones as the political life-cycle hypothesis would suggest.

Inglehart's response to this question stems from his '*socialisation hypothesis*', which poses that the value orientations acquired during one's formative years (typically associated with childhood and adolescence) are critical and will remain stable throughout adulthood. And will define one's values throughout their lifetime. It follows therefore, that if the younger cohorts have experienced different material conditions than their older counterparts, one may observe substantial and persisting alterations between the basic value-orientations of older and younger generations. This particular hypothesis of the Silent Revolution theory has not remained uncontested, mostly on the grounds that it is not grounded in the field of Psychology (Abramson, 2011). Nevertheless, Inglehart (1997) has diagnosed a persisting trend in favour of postmaterialist values since the 1970s through a process of *generational replacement*. In '*Generational Replacement and Value Change in Eight Western European Societies*' (1992), Abramson and Inglehart attribute shifts in values between young people and their older counterparts to their differential conditions growing up. But as the younger cohorts progressively replace the older ones over time, they also observed predictable changes in the values and behaviour of the population of that society as a whole.

However, the greatest part of Inglehart's research was published before the 2008 financial crisis. In a much more recent article, Inglehart and Norris (2016) partly anticipate a *cultural backlash* of materialist values as a result of the precarious economic conditions. The austerity measures that were implemented as a response to the crisis, have had a defining adverse impact especially upon young people in both the UK and Greece (Pickard, 2019a; Kioupiolis and Pechteliadis, 2018). As a result, these have been the first generations to experience a deterioration of their material conditions compared to the generations before them (Grasso, 2018). The implications of such developments have been anticipated by Inglehart even earlier:

Recent developments, such as relatively high unemployment, the collapse of stock markets and welfare state retrenchment, have increased economic insecurity; if this

went far enough, it could undermine the prevailing sense that survival can be taken for granted, and, in the long run, bring a resurgence of materialist values (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005, p. 98)

Nevertheless, the implications of the financial crisis in young people's persistence or dissolution of postmaterialist value priorities has been significantly understudied (Henn et al., 2017). More recent research posits that periodic economic booms and downturns will be followed by periodic fluctuations in the materialist/postmaterialist value orientations continuum within given age cohorts. Henn et al. (2017) examine whether the seeming rejection of traditional forms of political participation in favour of more unconventional forms perceived over time in the UK, may be explained by the fluctuating economic conditions of the last couple of decades¹³. Their results confirm Inglehart's hypotheses only partly. On the one hand they report slightly lower levels of postmaterialism, as a result of the lower levels of affluence in the second sample, providing support to Inglehart's *scarcity* hypothesis. On the other hand however, they also report that young postmaterialists in Britain are considerably more likely to participate in both institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms of political engagement alike.

This implies that, as a result of the precariousness brought about by the 2008 financial crisis, young postmaterialists may now be obliged to take an equal interest in materialist values *in addition* to their postmaterialist socialisation. Manning (2015, p.6) pertains that social movements, like Occupy London, which was particularly active during winter 2011 (see Gitlin, 2012) reveal that "young people can still be mobilised around an agenda of material needs and inequality". Similarly, Kioupkiolis and Pechteliadis (2018, p.1) report that many young people in Greece will increasingly engage in alternative forms of political participation as a response to "social dislocation, the failures and the pressures of the market and the state". Pickard (2019c, p. 380) however, suggests that one form of participation does not exclude the other, and that "while many young people have immediate materialist priorities this does not prevent them from having postmaterialist values and ideals too, such as environmentalism, social justice and attachments to various freedoms that provide hope for a fairer and greener world".

Moreover, an equally significant, albeit often overlooked, implication of Inglehart's theory of value orientations is related to the role of authority, with general affluence (and

¹³ They do so by contrasting the results from two different surveys of British 18 year olds; one conducted in 2002 during an era of relative global affluence, and another one in 2011 - at the midst of the global financial crisis.

hence higher-order postmaterialist values) leading to diminishing support for authority as this may be represented by both tradition and religiosity. In another article Inglehart posits that:

Current changes enable [younger people] to play an increasingly active role in formulating policy, and to engage in what might be called 'elite-challenging' as opposed to 'elite-directed' activities. Elite-directed political participation is largely a matter of elites mobilizing mass support through established organizations such as political parties, labour unions, religious institutions and so on. The newer 'elite-challenging' style of politics gives the public an increasingly important role in making specific decisions, not just a choice between two more set of decision makers (Inglehart, 1990, p. 5).

According to Inglehart therefore, young postmaterialists will tend to be less trusting towards the establishment. However, this does not mean they are politically apathetic, but instead that due to their elite-challenging postmaterialist values they will *choose* to participate differently. For Inglehart therefore, western democracies "have become markedly more likely to engage in elite-challenging forms of political participation" (1997, p. 296) and generally non-electoral forms of political participation.

Consequently, younger cohorts will not only display preferences for higher-order postmaterialist concerns like freedom of expression or environmental sustainability. Liberated from the urgency of material subsistence, these young postmaterialist cohorts are also likely to display higher...

...awareness of, and frustration with, the limits of existing democratic arrangements and institutionalized forms of political participation – and more so than their materialist counterparts. Instead, they were attracted to an alternative and transformative politics, advocating political reform while also supporting and participating in new forms and styles of non-institutionalised political action (Henn et al., 2017, p. 716).

In this process, novel participation styles and methods are rapidly replacing the old ones, especially among the younger generations who tend to be more eager to participate in a non-hierarchical, informal networks and a variety of lifestyle mobilisation endeavours. The postmaterialist cohorts thus, will demonstrate a noteworthy inventiveness when it comes to voicing their concerns about such one-issue demands into alternative political fields conducive of their postmaterialist agenda. Involvement in informal youth groups, spontaneous rallies and demonstrations, online engagement and the tendency to consume politically are merely a few instances of this phenomenon (Grasso, 2018; Kioupiolis and Pechteliadis, 2018).

The postmaterialist thesis has not remained immune to criticism¹⁴ both on a methodological (Clarke et al., 1999; Davis and Davenport, 1999), as well as on theoretical grounds (Flanagan et al., 2016). Summarising, Davis and Davenport (1999) suggest that the four-item index developed by Inglehart is invalid because its first two options are randomly correlated and that it therefore conveys an erroneous picture of the respondents' position on theoretically relevant social issues. For this reason this thesis will employ the expanded 12-item postmaterialism index instead, as employed by the World Values Survey (Davis and Davenport, 1999).

The greatest part of criticism however, refers to the postmaterialist assumption of a generational shift. Flanagan et al. (2011) pertain that there is no evidence for a long-term generational shift towards postmaterialism. Instead, taking a life-cycle approach, they suggest that young people are merely temporarily suspending their engagement with politics and that they will begin to participate in conventional politics only after they have attained the markers of adulthood – such as home-ownership and secure employment.

In a different vein, Grasso (2014) contests the postmaterialist assertion that young people's propensity to engage in non-conventional forms of political participation comes about as a result of the affluence during their socialisation. Controlling for age, period and cohort effects, she concludes that being socialised in a politically volatile era, marked by strong ideological divisions, is much more significant in driving young people to engage in non-institutionalized acts of political participation. The prolonged austerity of the current financial crises, and the political volatility it has brought about on the European level therefore, may have exactly the opposite effects of what the postmaterialist thesis would normally suggest and may instead intensify the postmaterialist orientation of young people.

The hypothesis that the critical changes brought about by the financial crisis may have had an effect on the relative importance of postmaterialist values for young people in the UK and Greece, as well as their support to non-institutional forms of political participation such as political consumerism, will be further investigated in the present thesis. In line with the theory above, it is anticipated that the postmaterialist cohorts in both countries, will be more prone to engage in forms of active citizenship and elite-challenging political participation, given the progressively greater lack of trust in the authority of the state, and politicians.

Inglehart's thesis has attained academic prominence, especially with regards to its application to the study of youth political participation (Henn et al., 2017), since it has far

¹⁴ Abramson (2011) provides a thorough analysis of the criticisms and the relevant responses of Inglehart on the subject.

reaching implications with regards to public perceptions on issues ranging from the standard of living and quality of life, to work and employment patterns, political orientation, environmental protection, minority and women's rights, consumption patterns and eventually lifestyle forms of political engagement such as political consumerism. In this process, class politics are increasingly losing prominence (Bernardi, 2009; Ferrer-Fons and Fraile, 2013; Pakulski and Waters, 1996) in face of an ongoing political transformation in a number of European societies, as policies initially advocated at the fringes of the political spectrum are being introduced into mainstream political agendas. In this context the postmaterialist thesis, in addition to coming in contrast to Putnam's conceptualisation of diminishing social capital, also challenges the assumptions of the SES model, which is predominately tracing the drivers of political participation in people's socio-demographic characteristics. Even though, Inglehart's thesis never did overlook the effects of key socio-demographic indicators such as age, social class and education, as predictors of postmaterialist value preferences, it suggests that it is the latter that predominately defines political participation (Inglehart, 2016). The upsurge of the postmaterialist left (Inglehart, 1977, 1997), and to some extent the postmaterialist right (Achterberg and Houtman, 2006) herald the emergence of novel political discourses which are based less on the economic components of class struggle, and more towards the internalised feelings of individuals (Lakatos, 2015).

Moreover, the postmaterialist thesis is particularly useful in the study of young people's political participation during periods of economic downturn. Notwithstanding cyclical effects in response to the economic environment, the postmaterialist thesis discerns a long-term rise in non-conventional participatory forms over the past decades, as a response to an alleged long-term postmaterialist shift (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). Political consumerism has been shown to have a particularly strong link with postmaterialist value orientations, especially among younger, more educated citizens (Stolle et al., 2005). Young political consumers therefore, have been previously shown to be significantly more likely to favour non-conventional forms of political participation, doubt the effectiveness of institutionalised politics and assume postmaterialist value orientations (Copeland, 2014a).

In addition to the models that preceded it, Inglehart's materialist/postmaterialist cleavage therefore, provides another useful analytical tool for the study of political consumerism, as a form of youth political engagement, detached from traditional forms of political participation, and pulled towards the marketplace as an alternative political arena, and will assist in identifying the drivers of young political consumers in the UK and Greece.

7. Conclusion

Given the aim of this doctoral research is to identify the underlying factors behind the emergence of political consumerism, this chapter discussed and critically evaluated some of the most commonly used theoretical models in the study of political participation. These will be used throughout the thesis as the basis for the selection and operationalisation of the variables, in the search for the determinants of political consumerism among young people in Greece and in the United Kingdom.

The chapter started by reviewing the *Socio-Economic Status Model* (SES) of political participation. The SES model emphasises the socioeconomic status of individuals and remains an influential tool in the study of political participation to this day. However, a major shortcoming of the SES model is that it overlooks the opportunity structures behind one's political participation decisions. The *Mobilisation model* seeks to address this gap by identifying the role of the opportunity structures present in the individual's environment, as factors behind their political participation behaviours. In turn, the *Rational Choice* model of political participation perceives citizens as rational, profit-maximising agents, who will calculate the cost and benefits behind their preferred political participation activities, and then rationally decide whether to engage or not in different forms of political participation (such as political consumerism). The theoretical assumptions of the rational agency theory however, do not seem to enjoy empirical support. Finally, the *Social Capital* theory asserts the existence of relationships among individuals and their community, and thus reintroduces the collective element in the study of political participation. Trust (towards others and towards politicians) and associational membership are both pivotal elements of social capital theory. However, problems of definition and operationalisation render it particularly problematic in the study of political participation. Finally, the *postmaterialist thesis*, with its focus on the underlying economic conditions prevalent during one's socialisation is yet another valuable tool in the study of politics of consumption, since these are inextricably dependent on the economism of the market.

This chapter therefore has outlined some of the most influential theories in political participation research, which will be used in the subsequent chapters to examine the patterns of political consumerism among young people in the UK and in Greece. Since this doctoral thesis intends to examine consumerism as an action imbued with political meaning, it is also crucial to expand the discussion so as to include the ideological and discursive elements of consumer culture and appreciate why consumers may instil their objects of consumption with political

meaning. The chapter that follows will therefore, discuss how the consumption of goods and services in late modernity has been interpreted within the relevant literature.

Chapter 4: Sociology of Consumption and the emergence of the Citizen-Consumer

1. Introduction

Chapter 3 has problematised the issue of the definitions in the study of the political participation of young people. In turn, **Chapter 4** outlined some of the most widely used theoretical models in political participation research. These definitions and theoretical models will be employed throughout this doctoral research as the basis of analysis, seeking to trace the factors driving and shaping political consumerism among young people in the UK and Greece.

The present chapter in turn, will review the social theory behind the politics of consumption. It will a) commence by illustrating consumption as *identity* and *responsibility*, and it will subsequently b) make the case that as a result of these two developments, late modernity has brought about the convergence of the previously distant notions of the *citizen* and the *consumer*, in the form of a citizen-consumer hybrid which uses the market as an arena to express its political concerns. It will argue that political consumerism as a form of political engagement that has been the result of these developments on the social and economic spheres, and stands as the behavioural embodiment of the convergence of the citizen and the consumer realms.

2. Consumption as Responsibility and Identity

In mainstream economics, consumption is understood as the last stage of the material cycle; following production and distribution. The primary purpose of consumption has traditionally been the satisfaction of the basic human needs for food, water, clothing and shelter; in order to survive and procreate. To these, it could be argued that late modernity has added also sanitation, education, healthcare, and the internet. Consumption plays thus an indispensable part in the progress of human civilisation. It stands central to the functioning of the market economy whereby money becomes a medium of exchange for the acquisition of consumer goods. The three stages of the material cycle are intricately interconnected and mediated by the use of money as a medium of exchange. In other words, one has to back up their consumer needs with their consumer power.

But the act of consumption becomes much more than merely an economic transaction in postmodern societies. The available definitions of postmodernism vary to such an extent that

a single exhaustive definition becomes thus virtually impossible (Haanpää, 2007, p. 2). However, two elements are commonly present in all: firstly, postmodernism tends to transcend the emphasis of modernity on grand meta-narratives. Arguably, no other meta-narrative has attracted more widespread criticisms from postmodern thinkers than Marxism, with its materialist conception of history, and emphasis on class struggles. Secondly, postmodernism stresses the symbolic – or sign value – behind production, products and social processes. It therefore “directs our attention to changes taking place in contemporary culture” (Featherstone, 1991, p. 2). With its shifting emphasis away from collective class struggles, the postmodern condition therefore, is being perceived as conducive of individualism and value change; particularly with regards to freedom of choice, change of lifestyles (both in terms of consumption and political activities) and the emergence of new social movements, including, but not limited to, environmentally conscious consumption (Bauman, 2000). Shifting the emphasis away from production costs and the use-value of commodities, implies that the postmodern consumer will deliberately seek goods and services not only as a way of satisfying their basic materialistic needs, but as symbolic of their *lifestyles*.

Similarly, the available literature provides a wide range of definitions for lifestyles; from a Weberian manifestation of class association (Bennett, 2004), to recognisability (Haanpää, 2007). For Miles (2000), youth lifestyles denote a material expression of identity, whereas Veal (2000) defines lifestyle as a pattern of social and individual behaviour which characterises a group or an individual. Veal’s definition therefore, emphasises the approach that lifestyle is a set of behavioural patterns, dictated by an underlying set of values and attitudes that the agent is free – but also responsible - to choose from, without any considerations with regards to class membership. Lifestyle becomes thus a synonym for the coherence behind the behavioural patterns of a group or an individual (Spaargaren and van Vliet, 2000).

This postmodern conceptualisation of lifestyles has led to the understanding of lifestyle politics, such as political consumerism, as being associated with the responsibility of choice behind individuals’ consumption patterns (Southerton et al., 2004) on the one hand; and the symbolic dimension of these consumption patterns on the social level, with regards to the creation of individuals’ identity (Spaargaren and van Vliet, 2000), on the other. The available literature under the postmodernist standpoint on the subject therefore traces predominately two, often intertwined, constituting elements of lifestyle politics. These are the notions of consumer *responsibility*, and the role of consumerism in the creation of *identity*.

This section will therefore examine consumption as responsibility and identity, and their consequences in terms of consuming for ethical, environmental and political reasons. These developments will eventually pave the way to discuss the emergence of the citizen-consumer,

as an agent of political responsibility. These developments will provide the backdrop against which the following chapters will examine political consumerism as a form of political participation amongst young people in the UK and in Greece.

a. Consumption as Responsibility

Slater (1997) refers to postmodern society as the locus of '*post-responsibility*' in two ways, one positive and one negative. With regards to the former, postmodernism liberates people from the traditional '*dominant myths*', such as those of class and gender belonging, allowing them to trace new sources of symbolism through their consumption patterns. With regards to the negative implications of post-responsibility however, it also liberates them from commitments to stables of ethical, participatory or political nature (Slater, 1997, p. 198). These two implications will be discussed below.

The *positive expression* of post-responsibility for Slater, refers to the liberation from the dominant myths prevalent during modernity. In modernity both *political*, and *consumption* behaviour were perceived as the interpretative framework within which social processes and relations were taking place. By contrast, with the transition to postmodern societies both political affiliations and consumption patterns came to be perceived merely as signs, independent from class or party affiliations and even from the satiation of the basic materialist needs.

For example, whereas a person's job and the resulting position on the social ladder that this previously signified, would almost automatically dictate their party affiliation as well as their style of fashion, taste and generally their consumption patterns (Bourdieu, 1986), these previously durable bonds are increasingly losing prominence today. Instead, in postmodern societies one's consumption patterns no longer signify one's life-long membership in a certain class.

The increased material prosperity and the corresponding existential security of the post-war generations have shifted the individuals' attention to the active pursuit of non-materialistic aspirations and towards what Inglehart has termed as postmaterialist goals, instead (Inglehart, 1977, 1990). These include aims like the conservation of the environment or safeguarding individual rights and freedoms. But this expansion of individual pursuits has extended the fragmentation of interests in society, and thus traditional political affiliations have lost prominence (Crouch, 2004, pp.63–64). The diminished significance of traditional institutional structures and the substitution of class belonging by individual identity as the basis for political engagement (Bennett, 1975), has brought about the advent of *lifestyle politics*.

These forms of political participation are primarily characterised by an increased emphasis on political issues which are more closely related to the individualised concerns of the postmodern citizen, than to some predetermined understandings of citizenship determined by class and expressed primarily by formally established institutions, such as labour unions and political parties. Such a development therefore, has offered citizens the freedom, but also the responsibility, to choose their own symbols of citizenship through an expanded repertoire of civic engagement, without being confined by the restrictions imposed by the monopoly of a dominant, class-dependent civic culture.

The same *positive* consequences of Slater's post-responsibility thesis extend also to the consumer domain. Here instead, for Jäckel (2013) the emphasis is shifting from the satiation of basic needs, to lifestyle. Economic developments in late modernity in many western countries, have brought about a convergence of the living conditions of the greatest part of the population, and have expanded the middle class. This however, leaves little room for defining one's self through consumption simply by how much one can spend on luxury items and the signified social status such a purchase may have reflected under modernity. Instead, individuals have started seeking alternative ways to differentiate themselves through their consumption patterns. Such alternative ways may be found in the increased availability of products that are imbued with ethical, environmental or political meaning, such as fair-trade, organic and 'green' products, which the postmodern consumers are now free, but also responsible to choose from.

Nevertheless, a great part of consumer behaviour remains connected to materialist conceptions of consumption, as for example when buying products simply for their use value (Autio and Heinonen, 2004). The act of consumption of fair-trade or organic products may be simply motivated by their price or personal preferences with regards to their taste. For instance, some people may consistently avoid multinational fast-food franchises not because they protest against US's foreign policy (Bové and Dufour, 2002), nor because they seek to raise awareness against the carbon emissions of meat production (Knudsen et al., 2008), but simply because they do not like hamburgers. Stern (2000) argues that political consumers' consumption patterns diverge from general consumer behaviour with regards to their levels of *commitment* and *responsibility*. This responsibility in turn, is a reflection of their underlying values and general ideological standpoint with regards to ethical, political and environmental concerns (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013).

Moreover, whereas partaking in generic consumer behaviour presupposes an appraisal of the likely costs and benefits, solely for the individual consumer who engages in it, political consumerism is inherently more collective and future-oriented, as it evaluates costs and benefits for the extended community, the environment or the society as a whole, including the

costs and benefits for the future generations (Micheletti and Stolle, 2010). For instance, the political consumers are more likely to take into considerations the ecological implications for the future generations of their carbon footprint when they travel with long distance flights; the consequences of their consumption of certain products produced in sweat shops under questionable labour conditions; or when they buy from second-hand shops in their vicinity to support their local community. This development of consumers' responsible consumption choices has allowed for the advent of lifestyle forms of political participation through the individuals' consumption choices, as in the case of political consumerism.

In turn, the negative expression of post-responsibility refers to the implications of those choices. Although such developments may be liberating on the individual level, they become problematic when one considers their collective implications. The postmodern individual may now choose to forfeit the ethical and political obligations that were linked to the dominant narratives of citizenship under modernity, choosing eventually without any reference to external constants, such as values, needs, or even truth itself. Keynes (2004) refers to the term 'post-truth' politics to denote a political culture according to which political debate is framed principally by appeals to emotion; disengaged from actual policy and legislative implications and ignoring factual rebuttals. Similarly, the political commentator Eric Alterman (2005) coins the term 'post-truth presidency', and investigates the misleading statements allegedly made by the Bush administration at the aftermath of 9/11.

Colin Crouch (2004), first used the phrase "post-democracy" in his book with the same name to denote a political model where "elections certainly exist and can change governments" but "public electoral debate is a tightly controlled spectacle, managed by rival teams of professionals expert in the techniques of persuasion" (Crouch, 2004, p. 4). Crouch points directly towards the advertising industry of political communication, and its strategic appeals to emotion, as the primary responsible for the crisis of trust in the institutional political sphere that post-democracy has brought about. Based on Crouch, other scholars have recognised the role of political marketing towards a general *apathy* and *distrust* against political institutions (Harsin, 2018). Since then, political commentators have repeatedly identified post-truth politics in different countries across the globe, like Brazil, Russia, India, but also in western democracies like the United Kingdom and Greece, and have identified as underlying factors for their emergence a combination of the 24-hour news cycle, unbalanced reporting of news, the increasingly uncontrolled social media and fake news websites (Connor, 2014; Gopalakrishnan, 2016).

The two consequences – one negative and one positive - of the 'post-responsibility' hypothesis provide the theoretical framework behind both the 'decline thesis' of political

participation (Hay, 2007; Pharr et al., 2000; Putnam, 1995), as well as the increase of extra-institutional or lifestyle forms of political participation (De Moor, 2017; Pickard, 2019c) such as political consumerism (Balsiger and Moor, 2018; Stolle and Micheletti, 2013). With regards to the former, the apathy and distrust towards traditional political institutions will drive individuals to refrain from the class-based ethical commitments to electoral participation, party or labour union membership, as it was previously dictated under modernity. Researchers have portrayed the advent of post-truth politics as responsible for the decline of trust particularly of young people to traditional electoral politics (Ball, 2017; Hay, 2007), and the abrupt decline of voter turnout and party membership of the last decades, especially among young people (Henn and Oldfield, 2016).

With regards to the latter however, that is the positive implications of post-responsibility thesis, liberated from the traditional 'dominant myths' of their civic commitment to electoral politics, individuals are now free to trace new sources of symbolism with regards to their individualised understandings of citizenship. Consumerism, with its power to create and reproduce a sense of identity, provides therefore the par-excellence framework for young people to redefine their civic duties and responsibilities, as it will be discussed in the following section. It is this empowering element of consumerism that has brought about the convergence of the citizen and the consumer, and thus the emergence of political consumerism as a form of political participation which uses the marketplace as an alternative arena for political participation. The sections that follow will examine these dynamics.

b. Consumption as Identity: Two parallel narratives

A common thread in the social theories of Ulrich Beck and Antony Giddens (Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991) is the understanding that in late modernity people define themselves through the signs they transmit to others via the commodities they decide to consume. In this process they manipulate appearances and thus they devise a unique self-identity. In a market environment where there are increasingly more commodities available, the obligation of self-identification resides almost entirely on the consumer. This section will explore these dynamics of self-identification through consumption among young people, in the works of Ulrich Beck (1992), Anthony Giddens (1991). The role of consumption in the creation of identity will be subsequently used to elucidate a perceived convergence of the previously distant notions of the citizens and the consumer, and thus the emergence of the political consumer.

The significance of Beck's (1992) work resides in his conceptualisation of a process of *reflexive modernisation*. The process of social modernisation that followed the industrialisation of the economy in the West offered the promise of establishing a sense of control over the

insecurities of the pre-industrial era. In turn, reflexive modernisation for Beck, refers to a process whereby technology and science was increasingly applied on all aspects of society so as to counteract the harmful consequences of industrialisation. In a way, under reflexive modernisation the underlying logic of modernisation is being applied to itself. Science and technology are increasingly applied on the evaluation of the production process itself attempting to control a range of unpredictable and often invisible risks.

But Beck's analysis does not stop there. Instead, he proceeds to apply the same notion of reflexivity on the social circumstances of the individual, and identifies a clear tendency towards increased individualisation, that takes place in three stages:

- The *Disembedding dimension* denotes the removal from historically prescribed social structures and commitments, such as those of class, gender and materialist concerns and their expression via traditional forms of political participation.
- The *Disenchantment dimension* describes the loss of the security which the practical arrangements of party-affiliation according to class and other guiding societal norms used to provide.
- The *Re-embedding dimension* establishes a novel, highly individualised form of social commitment within the market as an alternative political arena, within which young people may now express their concerns, and re-instils the sense of control lost in the previous stage.

As income levels, class, family structure or even gender are increasingly losing prominence as identifiers of their reflexive biographies, individuals become the "agents of their own livelihood mediated by the market" (Beck, 1992, p. 130). In the words of Beck:

People with the same income level, or put in the old-fashioned way, within the same 'class', can or even must choose between different lifestyles, subcultures, social ties and identities. From knowing one's 'class' position one can no longer determine one's personal outlook, relations, family position, social and political ideas or identity (1992, p. 131).

With respect to young people's political participation therefore, the process of the increased automation outlined above initially liberates young people from the traditional commitments of party affiliation as dictated by class (the disembedding stage). A result of this liberation however, young people are likely to sense a loss of control with regards to their influence on the traditional political sphere (the disenchantment stage). As a consequence, young people will seek to replace their electoral and party affiliation commitments by

secondary agencies and institutions within the marketplace (the re-embedding stage), which in turn “stamp the biography of the individual and make that person dependent upon fashions, social policy, economic cycles and markets” (Beck, 1992, p. 131), or in other words, an entirely new set of risks that the individual has now to face.

It is at this point of Beck’s analysis that the element of responsibility discussed above resurfaces. In Beck’s individualised risk-society, new forms of personal risks arise with regards to the elective biographies chosen by the individuals, as the responsibility of one’s biography lies now almost entirely on the hands of the individuals, mediated only by the possibilities the market has to offer. As a result of this process, now “...individualisation means market dependency in all dimensions of living” (Beck, 1992, p. 132). The complexity of the contemporary global trade environment reduces the ordinary consumer’s understanding of the production process behind the greatest part of consumer commodities. Lacking this access to the full information behind the products therefore, consumers are unable to assess the risks of their consumption decisions on the political, social, and environmental level. As a result, a relatively new market segment has emerged that promotes products which provide transparent information about their production. The proliferation of Fair Trade, organic, ethical, or 0-miles labelling schemes carry the advantage of informing consumers about the environmental footprint of the said products, or about the conditions under which they were produced. Contemporary consumption therefore reflects these shifting risks of the creation of identity through consumption; or in other words of living in - what Beck calls - a *‘risk society’*.

The examples from the application of Beck’s theory of risk-society to political consumerism are numerous: For instance, consuming meat and dairy products contributes to climate change (Bakker and Dagevos, 2012; De Boer et al., 2013). On the other hand however, cultivating soy as an alternative for meat consumption, has been reported to be the prime driver of deforestation in the Amazon basin (Nepstad et al., 2014). Similarly, savouring a chocolate bar might be contributing to the propagation of slavery and child labour in the cocoa plantations of Western Africa (Schrage and Ewing, 2005). However, opting for fair-trade chocolate instead, which ensures that the workers are being paid fair wages and work under humane conditions, may have severe repercussion with regards to the increased carbon emissions involved in their distribution (Unger, 2010). Furthermore, the textile production needed to sustain the contemporary fast fashion industry, has been often associated with child labour, bad working conditions, and environmental depletion (Connell, 2019). It follows therefore that each time consumers purchase a new jacket from Primark, consume particular kinds of food, or even when they attempt to lift their moods by enjoying a hot cup of cocoa, they unavoidably, and often unbeknownst to them, are influencing various societal issues across the globe. Beck’s conceptualisation of risk-society perceives that these risks are

unavoidable, and as such it is the consumers' responsibility to address them accordingly, by developing an individualised self-identity according to their preferred consumption patterns.

In turn, Anthony Giddens (1991) examines the nature of these new risks the individuals now face in sustaining their elective self-identities. Giddens defines self-identity as "the self as reflexively understood by the individual in terms of his or her biography" (1991, p. 244). For Giddens, the choice of the elective biographies out of all the complex diversity of non-binding alternatives available in the market is critical; especially since the market offers "little help as to which options should be selected" (1991, p. 80). He then proceeds to explore the multitude of pressures that render this commodified self-identity problematic. For Giddens, the commodification of identity through the facilitation of the market, simultaneously attacks tradition and enhances the individualisation process. As such, the "[m]arket-governed freedom of individual choice becomes an enveloping framework of individual self-expression" (1991, p. 197). For Giddens therefore, the sign-value of consumed commodities increasingly outweigh their use-value. In other words, by purchasing fair trade coffee, one does not simply buy the utility of being able to brew a hot cup of coffee the following day, but also purchases in part the self-identity of a responsible citizen – either of an *activist* when boycotting, or a *rebel* when boycotting.

Giddens' major contribution to the study of the formation of identity under consumerism stems from his emphasis on the resistive element of postmodern consumption to the standardisation of mass consumption. Similarly to Beck, Giddens stresses the element of choice behind every-day consumption decisions, and the uncertainty that this creates. Unlike Beck however, for Giddens this does not bring about any significant risks. Consumption for Giddens is generally a positive, and constructive activity in a continuous process of self-identification. In that respect a change of one's consumption patterns will simply eventually lead to a different conceptualisation of the self in the long run. Consumption therefore for Giddens is a significantly less risky endeavour than for Beck, since biographies can be continuously re-written. For both Beck and Giddens, commodities (clothes, cars, cigarettes etc.) serve primarily as markers of identity and as such they are evaluated for their symbolic significance. Moreover, for Giddens, just like for Beck, consumption remains primarily an instance of individual choice. Whether consumers actually exercise this choice or not is irrelevant, since they will be judged as if they have done so. For Giddens therefore, political consumerism represents an inevitable – and generally positive - shift of young people's identity creation under postmodernism.

For Giddens therefore, the distinction between *individualised* and *collective* identity that will follow in the next section is a rather limited way of interpreting what should be better

understood as “an expansion of social reflexivity” (1994, p. 13). In the high reflexivity that characterises postmodern societies, individuals need to achieve a certain degree of autonomy of action, in order to survive the novel risks, of Beck’s (1992) ‘risk-society’. But for Giddens (1994, p. 13) “autonomy is not the same as egoism and moreover implies reciprocity and interdependence”. Political consumerism therefore “should not be seen as a form of protecting social cohesion at the edges of an *egoistic* marketplace. It should be understood as one of reconciling *autonomy* and *interdependence* in the various spheres of social life, including the economic domain” (Giddens, 1994, p. 13).

What both accounts above have in common is the acceptance that consumption matters, because it defines self-identity, and is a critical part of its creation and maintenance. In postmodernity, consumption has moved away from its understanding as a means to ensure the physical survival of the self (as it was primarily understood under modernity), and towards the creation and perpetuation of elective biographies based almost entirely on individual choice. But with this choice also increases the insecurity of this new self, as new risks come to replace the old ones.

Applying the theories outlined above to young people’s political participation, it could be argued that the increased individualisation of postmodern societies would initially liberate young people from the traditional commitments of citizenship, as for example those of institutional, election-centred participation, and within that, party affiliation according to one’s class. Such a development however, also brings the loss of control and influence on the purely political sphere, as young people increasingly abstain from these forms of political participation. As a consequence therefore, young people are likely to seek other means of expressing their political agency. The marketplace is thus the only way to turn, as for Giddens this is the only place in postmodern societies that offers a *certainty* of an identity. Nevertheless, Beck remains cautious that such a displacement of one’s citizenship commitments from political to market institutions as a means of expressing one’s political considerations can be particularly problematic.

For Bauman (2005) instead, a great part of the problems that arise from Beck’s risk-society stems from the observation that this has been accompanied by an identity displacement away from collective forms of political participation, such as elections, and towards individualised forms of political participation within the market. This observation provides the connection for the analysis of the opposite dynamic – that of the re-establishment of collective concerns in individual purchasing decisions. The section that follows will explore this reverse dynamic.

3. Between the Individual and the Collective?

As displayed above, for the postmodern thinker, consumption becomes the primary determining factor behind the emergence of a variety of individualised lifestyles (Bauman, 2000; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). However, other social commentators (Maffesoli, 1996) emphasise the opposite dynamic, insofar different consumption patterns reflect new social ideologies and cause consumers to cluster into new social '*tribes*'. For instance, Copeland (2014b) demonstrates how environmentally-friendly consumption patterns reflect postmaterialist value-orientations (Inglehart, 1997). These complementary understandings of the liquid, postmodern self as simultaneously individualistic and collectivist in orientation will be the focus of this section.

As outlined in the previous section, postmodern consumerism is linked to the creation and reproduction of individual identity. Products are impregnated, knowingly or not by the buyer, with a greater significance than merely the utility of their use would dictate. Acknowledging the symbolic value of the products indicates that consumption itself is a factor of the construction and perpetuation of identity, irrespectively of young people's circumstances of birth, gender, class or race. The very act of consumption becomes thus a highly-individualised activity and this may lead some consumers to assume that their individualised consumption patterns distinguish them from their societal counterparts.

However, Todd (2012, p. 48) argues that this is merely one part of the argument. Instead, Todd perceives consumption as a form of communication between the consumer and society at large. On the one hand therefore, consumption distinguishes one consumer from the next one. On the other hand however, it also communicates a set of common underlying values shared with like-minded consumers. In that respect therefore, consumption-driven self-identification has less to do with '*who am I?*' and more with '*who are we?*' or '*with whom do I belong?*'. For example, McCarty and Shrum (2001) explore the influence of individualistic and collectivist value orientations on environmental beliefs and subsequent consumer behaviour and find that individualism is associated with shared beliefs about the inconvenience of recycling, whereas collectivism is related to beliefs about the importance of recycling instead. In turn, Poortinga et al. (2004) demonstrate that people who exhibit low levels of environmental concerns prefer free-market solutions rather than advocating for the introduction of environmental policies on the mainstream political arena.

This conceptualization of consumption as *communication of identity* draws heavily from Baudrillard's semiotics. Baudrillard (2016) demonstrates how society has moved away from reality and meaning, to the use of symbols and signs. Utilising the signifier-signified distinction,

Baudrillard establishes that the consumer no longer purchases a product (a signifier), with a certain utility value, but a 'piece of language' (the signified symbolism this product conveys) which defines his identity only through the consensus of such a meaning from the Other. In this respect, our individual consumption patterns reflect our desire towards a collective identity. Thus, political consumerism does not only provide fertile grounds for expressing one's individualised concerns, but also provides the benefit of a sense of belonging in a community for the young people who will engage in it, albeit an *'imagined'* one (Anderson, 2006).

Maffesoli's (1996) sociological concept of "neo-tribalism" as an outcome of shared beliefs, passions and social rituals, becomes thus pertinent. For Maffesoli, society has moved away from the modern conceptualisation of the Self, with its emphasis on instrumental reason, and the blind faith to individual agency. So, if Beck and Giddens emphasise on individualism, Maffesoli introduces the concept of *'togetherness'* as the key notion of his theory of tribalism. In view of the contingency of the postmodern Self, the concept of *'togetherness'* as an essential element in one's socialisation, bridges the gap between the creation of individual and collective identities.

According to Hebdige (2012) the 'style' adopted by each 'subculture' is meant as both a way to comment on the larger framework of the society, while simultaneously marking their membership to their distinctive subculture or their social positioning. On such a grounds, therefore, the consumption patterns of neo-tribes, such as vegetarians, vegans, Extinction-Rebellion activists and right-wing skinheads alike, cease to be about the individual but more about the collective, wherein the consumers will choose a distinctive sense of style, which communicates their membership in their ingroup of choice.

The notion of collective identity has been extensively employed by social movement theory in an attempt to explain how social movements produce and maintain cohesion and commitment between individual actors over time. Despite its wide application in social theory, collective identity remains a particularly abstract concept (Fominaya, 2010). For Melucci (1989, p. 34) collective identity is defined as a "shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their actions take place". Similarly, Polletta and Jasper (2001, p. 285) define it as "an individual's cognitive, moral and emotional connection with a broader community, category, practice or institution". Collective identity theory therefore, focuses primarily on the ways through which individuals form attachments with likeminded individuals with similar goals. The above analysis begs the question of how this consumption-based individualised Self relates and interacts on the collective level with its social counterparts to form imagined communities on the political level. Consumption-based collective identity has

the advantage of not requiring the existence of formal organisations, other than the market. Instead it relies primarily on the common choices of individuals, based on their – shared – ethical, environmental and political value orientations.

The theory of *imagined communities* (Anderson, 2006) first developed in 1983 to advance the study of nationalism, becomes of particular interest for the study of political consumerism. Imagined communities are “larger than face-to-face-societies, the communal bonds felt by their members are imagined, that is exist in their minds [...] it is imagined because their members will never know most of their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 2006, p. 7). The theory of imagined communities can therefore explain how collective identity based on individual consumption behaviour becomes possible. Ethical and political consumers share bonds and practices that rise above national borders, by constructing imagined community-based identities. The theory of imagined communities implies that political consumerism has the potential to transcend the mere aggregate of disparate individual purchasing decisions. Instead it suggests the existence of a collective of consumers who share a common collective identity, based on a similar set of values and common political goals, embodied in the purchase of similar commodities. The potential of political consumerism to generate social and political change is being augmented by the belief that other people, with similar motivations, are making similar choices (Lekakis, 2013a).

Political consumerism seems to closely fit within the discussion above as it constitutes a non-electoral form of political participation, that expresses at a first instance an essentially individualistic form of civic action. The greater part of the available literature considering political consumerism has indeed stressed significantly more the individualistic nature of political consumerism, at the expense of its collective appeal (Micheletti and Stolle, 2010; Stolle and Micheletti, 2013), linking its perceived expansion to a general trend towards individualistic modes of political participation (Dalton, 1996).

Despite however, its essentially individualistic nature, political consumerism has also a dormant collective appeal. Even though Zukin (2006, p. 79) reports that citizens participated in acts of political consumerism “because it’s a good thing to do”, emphasising thus its normative, individualistic appeal, Micheletti and Stolle (2010) identify also social solidarity as a determinant for political consumerism. This renders political consumerism an *individualised-collective* form of political participation, that instead of perpetuating the individualist-collective cleavage, it rather reconciles the two. Political consumers therefore, partake in an imagined community which, on the one hand, opposes the global production networks of western societies, but also operates within them by either punishing or rewarding certain production

processes through their collective consumption decisions. Political consumerism therefore, demonstrates the potential to expand beyond locally-based imagined communities and evolve into a global phenomenon (Axtmann, 2018).

To sum up, the use of consumerist practices towards the constant reinvention of the Self, away from gender, class, racial and social rigidities, echoes the fluidity of postmodernism. However, our consumption patterns do not only help us develop a sense of identity, but also allow us to collectively redefine our civic duties. Political consumption based on individualised decisions in relation to one's environmental, ethical and political considerations bears the potential of creating imagined communities with other likeminded consumers across the globe. Jacobsen and Dulsurd (2007, p. 471) pose that, “[w]hen aggregated, these individual choices have the potential to transcend the actions of individuals to form political movements that may, in turn, challenge political and economic powers”.

The democratic repercussions of the aggregated dynamics of individual consumer choices, based on imagined communities which share collective values, in relation to issues of justice, fairness, or environmental concerns (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013), echoes the political potential of the market as an alternative political arena. The section that follows thus, will be discussing this convergence of the previously distant notions of the citizen and the consumer and the emergence of the citizen-consumer hybrid.

4. The emergence of the Political Consumer

The traditional conceptual distinction between the *'homo politicus'* and the *'homo oeconomicus'* (Faber et al., 2002) under modernity, refers to the self as being divided between these two separate outlooks. For example, Cohen (2004) emphasises the dichotomous role between citizens and consumers. The former are defined as individuals who have the obligation to fulfil certain civil duties in connection to the government in order to guarantee their rights and privileges. The latter instead, are perceived as merely preoccupied with satisfying their private material needs and desires.

This distinction however, implies that political opinions and consumer decisions are created and subsequently exist in void, independently of each other. Sagoff (2007, p. 8) exemplifies this fragmentation: “As a citizen, I am concerned with the public interest, rather than my own interest; with the good of the community”, whilst “as a consumer [...] I concern myself with personal or self-regarding wants and interests”. The societal developments brought about under postmodernism however, have allowed for this distinction to fade away.

On the one hand, the emergence of ‘lifestyle politics’ that ensued these developments, is being characterised by a shift of the emphasis of citizenship, from collective concerns, to individualist concerns (Bennett and Segerberg, 2012; Micheletti and Stolle, 2010). As a result, people will thus increasingly rely less on institutionalised forms of political participation on the one hand, and will simultaneously expand their repertoires of preferred modes of political action (Giddens, 1994; van Deth, 2012), as a way of expressing their individualised values. Zorell (2019b, pp. 48, 49) captures this process: “Election-centred political participation is extended or even replaced by a customised inclusion of ‘politics’ in everyday life, based on a personal and ‘flexible’ set-up of varying political participation modes and group belonging”.

On the other hand however, a relatively recent strand of political sociology is increasingly identifying the consumer as a moral agent, with specific consumption patterns intended as a means to political ends (Sassatelli, 2006). Schudson (2007), for example, emphasises the complementarity of the roles of the citizen and the consumer, in the emergence of the ‘*political consumer*’. The political consumer therefore is being understood as a consumer empowered by ethical, environmental and political concerns. As a consequence, for Schudson (2007, p. 237), consumer choices are no less an “inferior form of human activity compared to voting at the polling place or otherwise exercising citizenship”.

Summarising then, identity, values and behaviour under postmodernism are no longer necessarily linked to the profession, income levels or class positioning they previously signified – neither in terms of citizenship, nor in terms of consumption patterns. Instead, individuals are now increasingly faced with the risk, but also the responsibility, of establishing an elective set of values or what Bernardi (2009) has termed ‘elective’ biographies, which will express themselves simultaneously both in the political, as well in the consumer arena. As a result, these two arenas are consequently being conflated.

The increasing interconnectedness in today’s globalised political and market environments involves an equal interconnectedness of the problems that pertain simultaneously to the political and consumer realms (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013; Zorell, 2019b). The examples are numerous, and range from environmental depletion, genetically modified products, contaminated crops as well as the exploitation of the workers, sub-standard wages in the manufacturing sectors etc., which all correlate both to the roles of consumers as citizens and to citizens as consumers, who increasingly appreciate that citizenship grants not only rights but also responsibilities (Zorell, 2019b, p. 49). Unlike the traditional conceptualisation of the self as being fragmented between the private and the public spheres (Sagoff, 2007), this novel set of responsibilities however, is connected to both the private and the public realms. As a result, more and more individuals seem to have started recognising that

as “consumers [they now] have power to influence a fair and moral marketplace” (Neilson, 2010, p. 214).

Zorell (2019b, p. 50) summarises these developments: “Together, the desire to feel and act freely and self-determinedly, the wish to convey a particular ‘self’ in public, the focus on new issues, and the recognition of consumer power, seem to lead to a fundamental shift: the entangling of the citizen and the consumer roles”. This entanglement of these previously distinct roles into a single hybrid, in the form of ‘citizen-consumer’, is being accompanied by another important consequence. This is the realisation that developments in the purely consumer sphere may foster developments in the strictly political sphere, and set in motion changes in both. Such changes would not be possible if the spheres were not aligned (Zorell, 2019b).

The emergence of a critical mass of empowered consumers with increasingly postmaterialist values, has only recently rendered possible what Kotler describes as a ‘democracy of goods’ (Kotler et al., 2002, p. 36). Sassatelli thus, (2006, p. 188) stresses, in the words of Beck (1992) that “If modernity is a democracy oriented to producers, late modernity is a democracy oriented to consumers: a pragmatic and cosmopolitan democracy where the sleepy giant of the ‘sovereign citizen-consumer’ is becoming a counterweight to big transnational corporations”.

5. Conclusion

The discussion above provides an overview of the sociological understanding of consumerism, and the ensuing developments under postmodernism that have enabled the emergence of the citizen-consumer. Most prominent stand the conceptualisations of consumption as responsibility and as identity. However, the conceptualisation of consumption as responsibility provides support to the standpoint that consumer behaviour under postmodernism is also influenced by altruistic norms and motives, fostered by the collective identity orientation of postmodern consumers. For instance, awareness of the consequences that consumption has on the environment, motivates altruistic consumption behaviour and greater responsibility with regards to individual consumption decisions. In that respect, consumer responsibility seeks to critically assess the creation of consumer identity, embedding it with ethical, political and environmental collective considerations.

Consumer identity therefore, lingers between the postmodern emphasis on *individualisation* on the one hand, and *collective responsibility-taking* on the other. The chapter has thus discussed two parallel narratives, drawing from Beck (1992) and Giddens (1991),

which explore the paradox that while the increased individualisation of liquid modernity leads to greater freedom of choice, it also transfers the responsibility of that choice back to the individuals. As a result, consumers find themselves in a context where they need to decide between their individual needs, wants and desires and the collective repercussions of their consumer behaviour on the environment and the future generations.

This chapter argues therefore, that it is exactly this conjunction of the notions of postmodern responsibility and identity that has brought about the convergence of the previously distant notions of the citizen and the consumer. Consumerism therefore, with its ability to create and reproduce a sense of identity and responsibility, provides the underlying framework for young people in late modernity to redefine their civic duties and responsibilities as *citizen-consumers*. But as a form of political participation that operates predominately within the bounds of the market, political consumerism is inexorably connected to the neoliberal ideological framework that has permeated the markets for more than 30 years in western democracies. The next chapter will thus problematise the contextual influence of neoliberalism with respect to political consumerism.

Chapter 5: Neoliberalism and Political Consumerism

1. Introduction

The politics of consumption discussed in **Chapter 4**, have not remained uncontested. One of the resurfacing questions in the study of political consumerism is the degree to which the phenomenon is susceptible to market appropriation. Indeed, Mukherjee and Banet-Weiser (2012) present the potential of the transformation of consumer activism into another branded commodity, under a neoliberal economic and ideological superstructure. In turn, Lekakis (2013a, p. 23) highlights that a “focal point of interrogation in the conceptualisation of ethical consumption as a political phenomenon has been the question of whether and how much it has become enveloped into the gulfs of *neoliberal* capitalism”. Furthermore, a recently revived strand of literature in the field of youth political disengagement (in general) connects it to the expansion of neoliberal policies (Allsop et al., 2018). However, there has been significantly less attention placed on the connection of neoliberalism to political consumerism (in particular).

The discussion on the convergence of the citizen and the consumer in the previous chapter, will thus form the backdrop on which this chapter will seek to establish political consumerism as a form of economic voting within a neoliberal market context. The chapter will proceed to identify and distinguish between a set of ‘*push*’ and ‘*pull*’ factors associated with neoliberalism that may either drive young people away from conventional participation (such as voting), or in turn may induce the young neoliberal subjects into market-oriented forms of political participation, such as political consumerism.

2. Neoliberalism and youth political (dis)engagement

a. The neoliberal rationale

Since its first use in 1938, ‘neoliberalism’ has been a highly contested concept. Especially after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, neoliberalism is being often perceived as the root of all evil with regards to its social, political and environmental implications. For a term that has received so much attention and criticism in the academic, political and social discourses, it is surprising that there is hardly a single working definition. Harvey (2007a, p. 18) defines neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets,

and free trade". The range of available definitions stress a process of reconstitution of the power of the state through, and interplay between, the tools of privatisation, finance, and market forces. State interventions in the economy are diminished, while the onus of the state as the primary caretaker of its citizens' welfare is similarly reduced (Harvey, 2007a).

Neoliberalism therefore, with its emphasis on affirming free markets, is remodelling "every human need or desire in a profitable enterprise" (Brown, 2015, p. 28) and is thus "reducing all forms of life to economic ones" (McAfee, 2017, p. 11). It perceives competition as the distinctive property of human relations, and therefore it defines citizens primarily as consumers, whose democratic resolution is best exercised by buying and selling within a deregulated global market. Any attempt to limit market competition is thus perceived as detrimental to liberty, and therefore any kind of government regulations should be minimised. Collective bargaining and trade unions are deemed as market distortions which hamper the restoration of a '*natural hierarchy*'. In turn, inequality is considered as a virtuous premium for the generation of wealth, which is destined to trickle-down to all members of the economy. In contrast, any egalitarian effort is not only counter-productive, but also morally repugnant, since the free market will grant everyone what they deserve according to their individual contribution to the economy.

Peck (2010) distinguishes between the '*roll-back*' and the '*roll-out*' effects of neoliberalism. The former refers to the institutional, laissez-faire economic principles of neoliberal reasoning, such as the deregulation and privatisation of the state. The latter, however, refers to the attempt of neoliberalism to harness the existing social forces and to remould them around its own objectives, either by accentuating competition as an inherent force of human nature, or by the marketisation of previously non-market social domains.

This double assault of neoliberal rationality on both the existing institutional and social constructs has been exemplified in the work of Foucault (Zamora and Behrent, 2016), who describes neoliberalism not as an externally-induced form of ideological control, but instead as a highly internalised form of self-regulation and self-discipline, and coined the term *governmentality*¹⁵ to describe this process (Byrne, 2017).

¹⁵ The term is a synthesis of the French *gouverner* and *mentalité* – 'governing' and 'mode of thought' – and is roughly translated into English as '*governmental rationality*' (Byrne, 2017, p.348).

For Foucault (1991), government is not static and encompasses not only the traditional political sphere linked to state institutions, but also that which operates at the community level, including the *government of the self*. Governmentality thus defines a configuration of power which bears mainly two defining elements: first, it primarily targets the people, “aiming to produce a happy and well-ordered society of workers and consumers” (Byrne, 2017, p. 348); and secondly it dictates ‘political economy’ as the guiding framework to achieve these aims. That is, society as a whole should be remodelled following the principles of the market. Neoliberalism throughout this thesis will thus be defined in Foucauldian terms, as a form of governmentality.

In this way, neoliberalism becomes an internalised “form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods” (Byrne, 2017, p. 349). Whereas however, the state should therefore, paternalistically safeguard its operation according to market principles for the wellbeing of its citizens, the actual responsibility for the citizens’ education, health and social security has been displaced to individuals. As a result, neoliberal governmentality, in a process that has been described as “creative destruction” (Harvey, 2007b, p. 1), has accelerated a paradigm shift from the power of the people to that of the market - and consequently, an equal shift from the agency of citizens to that of the consumers.

As a result, society as a whole had to undergo a process of internalisation of the neoliberal values. The neoliberal emphasis on entrepreneurism, consumerism, the scarcity hypothesis, and the corresponding competition of resources that follows it, have been internalised to such an extent by neoliberal subjects that these processes and phenomena combine to define people’s political identity and behaviour (Kennelly, 2011).

This roll-out process of neoliberalism, has been augmented by the adoption of the neoliberal rationale by think-tanks, academia, and political parties across the ideological spectrum from the 1980s onwards, and was intensified after Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1979-1990). So ubiquitous has the roll-out process of neoliberalism been that it is hardly recognised as a distinct ideology anymore, providing support to the Foucauldian understanding of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality. Instead, it is often portrayed as merely descriptive of a natural force, similar to gravity or a biological law, reflecting the intrinsic human nature, neglecting to recall that we are referring

to a “philosophy that arose as a conscious attempt to reshape human life and shift the locus of power” (Harvey, 2007a, p. 3).

As a result of the internalisation of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality, individuals are being called to compete for scarce employment and insecure jobs, diminishing wages and increasing price levels (Dardot and Laval, 2013). However, this prevalence of neoliberalism on the international political, economic and social domains, came allegedly to an abrupt halt following the outbreak of the ongoing global financial crisis, which for Harvey (2007b, p. 38) has disclosed the failings of the neoliberal rationale.

b. A crisis of neoliberal capitalism

A thorough analysis of the enduring global financial crisis is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, given that the thesis aims to explore the motivations behind the political consumerist practices of young people in the UK and Greece in a time of austerity, at least some background information about how the crisis has affected perceptions about neoliberal capitalism remains indispensable.

The measures which were introduced as a response to the crisis and the magnitude of their underlying rhetoric were in direct contrast to the neoliberal narrative that had dominated the financial, but also the political spheres for almost three decades. Garrett (2019, p. 195) posits that these “would have been viewed as outlandish by the political mainstream only months previously”. For example, several governments at the heart of the EU coordinated massive rescue efforts of virtually bankrupt banks and financial institutions, which for Callinicos (2010, p. 8) “amounted to the greatest nationalisations in world history”.

Eventually, the dominant narrative in response to the crisis developed into one of “macro-Keynesianism and micro-Neoliberalism” (Callinicos, 2010, p. 129). In other words, democratic states were more partial to financial interventions in an attempt to save the corporate banking sector, whereas the working class, the unemployed and many marginalised groups continued to be affected by coercive interventions (Garrett, 2019, p. 195).

However, these developments have also ignited the emergence of opposition to neoliberal political forces, with parties, such as the Bloco de Esquerda in Portugal, Diem25 on the European level, but also a surge of electoral support for Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour (and an alleged Youthquake in Britain) (Sloam and Henn, 2018), which are directly confronting the

hegemonic neoliberal rationality. Among these parties there may be observed – maybe for the first time so openly on the institutional level - narratives in favour of alter-globalisation (Pickerill, 2007), post-growth and post-capitalism (Shiva and Mies, 2014), or post-consumerist (Blühdorn, 2017) tendencies, all of which are associated with higher-order postmaterialist value orientations, especially among young people (Henn et al., 2017).

According to Inglehart’s socialisation hypothesis however, in a context of a neoliberal austerity, these postmaterialist forms of political engagement should no longer be presumed to be the result of affluence during young people’s socialisation. Recent research suggests that there has indeed been a relative reduction in postmaterialist values in many western democracies as a result of the ongoing austerity (Cameron, 2013; Janmaat, 2016). Inglehart has previously anticipated this development by conceding that during times of economic downturn the advance of postmaterialist values is likely to slow down (Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). But despite such cyclical patterns of postmaterialism in relation to short-term economic fluctuations, the long-term tendency remains that of a continuously increasing proportion of the population adhering to postmaterialist values (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). Indeed, Henn et al. (2017) find that postmaterialist values seem to persist among young people in Britain, despite the transition of the economy from a context of relative affluence to that of austerity after the onset of the global recession. Even though these findings seem to contradict Inglehart’s socialisation hypothesis, they do “suggest by implication that Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis has ongoing theoretical and explanatory value with respect to British youth in contemporary context, even under conditions of economic austerity” (Henn et al., 2017, p. 733).

Instead, Grasso (2018) provides a complimentary explanation for the perceived increased engagement of young people in non-institutionalised forms of political participation, such as political consumerism. Assuming an approach that draws equally from social capital and political mobilisation theories, she argues that being socialised in a politically volatile era, marked by strong ideological divisions, is a much more significant driver of young people’s engagement in non-institutionalised acts of political participation, than postmaterialist values are. It can thus be argued that the widespread discontent from neoliberal policies, which are held responsible for the crisis, coupled with the ensuing prolonged austerity, and the political volatility it has brought about on the national and European levels, may have instead intensified

young people's need to seek the '*political*' in alternative, lifestyle forms of political engagement.

On the institutional political domain in the UK, Corbyn's election as the leader of the Labour Party and the party's performance during the General Election of 2017 bring to light the extent of public antipathy toward the post-crisis neoliberal agenda (Garrett, 2019). A similar pattern is evident on the non-institutional political domain in the UK. Since the outbreak of the crisis, several informal and more established groups have emerged, such as the People's Assembly Against Austerity (Mercea and Yilmaz, 2018), the Occupy movement (Clope et al., 2016), the UK Uncut (Street, 2015), and the Extinction Rebellion (Shah, 2019), to mention just a few.

Likewise, in Greece, the prolonged austerity that followed the neoliberal crisis, has resulted in a political polarisation that has led to the emergence of SYRIZA's coalition government with Independent Greeks (ANEA). However, the widespread discontent from the institutional political domain, has also led young people to increasingly engage in grassroots solidarity initiatives and collective organising 'from below' which seek to address everyday basic needs for food, clothing, services and health treatment. Prominent examples include the Residents' Committee and the Solidarity Network of Exarcheia area in Athens (Arampatzi, 2017), or the establishment of Alternative Currency Systems in Volos (Streinzer, 2018). As Kiouпкиolis and Pechteliidis (2018, p. 1) observe, such initiatives aim to respond "to social dislocation, the failures and the pressures of the market and the state".

The direction and the intensity that these usually 'bottom-up' participatory initiatives will assume however, are being defined by the 'Concept of the State' theories, which will be the focus of **Chapter 6**.

c. Neoliberalism, Political Engagement and Dis-engagement

The simultaneous emergence of alternative political forces on the institutional domain, along with the emergence of informal collective organisations from below, are being predominately understood as a direct consequence of the neoliberal crisis (Grasso, 2018; Shah, 2019; Streinzer, 2018). As a consequence, it could be argued that perhaps the most intrusive effect of neoliberal governmentality is not the economic impact it has instigated, but a political one. As the responsive power of the state is significantly diminished, so is the capacity of the citizens

to influence their livelihoods through electoral participation. Instead, the neoliberal doctrine proposes the market as an alternative arena in which citizens may exercise individual choice through their spending behaviour.

Such is the ideological hegemony that neoliberalism had achieved on the institutional level, that global political leaders often acceded to neoliberal technocratic solutions for addressing economic and social problems (McAfee, 2017). Furthermore, these decisions were usually determined not by the EU's democratic institutions, but by technocrats operating behind closed doors (McAfee, 2017), pointing towards what Habermas has referred to as “a dismantling of democracy” within the EU (Diez, 2011). Consequently, the resulting disempowerment, especially among the lower and middle-income cohorts and the young, turned into disenfranchisement, as more parties of the traditional right—but progressively also of the former left - complied with the ideological hegemony of neoliberalism.

Several scholars have asserted that these developments have left behind a “regulatory vacuum in global governance” (Micheletti, 2003, p. 9; Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, p. 899; Vogel, 2008, p. 266; Zorell, 2019a, p. 80). As a result, private businesses intercepted and filled this vacuum by increasingly assuming social and political responsibilities which previously belonged exclusively to the state. These include the provision of public goods and services like healthcare and education or even lobbying to influence the laws of the state (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011, p. 900; Zorell, 2019a, p. 80). Scherer et al. posit that in this context “the nation state is losing part of its regulatory power [and] the private-public distinction gets blurred” (2009, p. 322). It is argued that eventually, private firms effectively become ‘political actors’, able to influence decisions and actions on the political and social domains.

Consequently, similar to the convergence of the roles of the citizens and the consumers discussed in **Chapter 4**, here we have the dissolution of the traditional division between the state and the business sector, whereby socio-political responsibilities were previously the domain of the former, while economic responsibilities were the domain of the latter. This understanding has been internalised by young people to such a degree, that the market becomes now the par-excellence arena of political participation.

In conclusion, the shift of industrial modernity to postmodernism has resulted in the convergence of the previously distant notions of the citizen and the consumer in the form of the citizen-consumer hybrid; the prominence of neoliberal policies in western democracies

have likewise, brought about the convergence of young people's understanding of the roles of the state, and the business sector.

The following section will therefore argue that neoliberalism has resulted in two antithetical, but complimentary effects in the UK and Greece. Initially, the neoliberal critique of democracy accentuates a '*push*' effect on young people away from electoral politics, and into the commercial domain. However, the politicisation of the market domain calls attention to the presence of a parallel '*pull*' effect into the neoliberal market as a field of potential youth political engagement, in the form of political consumerism.

3. Factors influencing political consumption decisions

The previous section has argued that neoliberalism has resulted in many citizens (and young people in particular) eschewing electoral politics, and choosing to express their political, ethical and environmental concerns within marketplace. This section will trace these complimentary dynamics associated with neoliberalism, that on the one hand '*push*' young people away from institutional forms of political participation, and which simultaneously '*pull*' young people into the marketplace as an alternative political arena.

a. Push Factors

Published work on political engagement has identified at least three distinct paths through which neoliberalism may negatively affect the propensity of young people to engage with formal politics, '*pushing*' them away from participating in traditional democratic deliberation processes (Crouch, 2011). Firstly, the neoliberal insistence on the importance of economic policies over purely political responses has rendered political actors unable to respond to the demands of their constituency (Edwards, 2009). Secondly, and as a consequence of the above, the neoliberal critique of democracy itself has made the constituents highly suspicious of the motives of politicians (Hay, 2007). Finally, the electoral inequality that has resulted from the proliferation of the neoliberal ideology has acted as an additional barrier to the franchise and the subjective understanding of citizenship (Birch and Mykhnenko, 2010) limiting both young people's capacity, as well as their motivation, to engage with electoral politics.

Hart and Henn (2017) discern an interconnectedness of these strands, which, when combined and reinforced by neoliberalism's roll-out process, form a neoliberal matrix that discourages young people's electoral participation. More specifically, neoliberal governmentality indicates that the rules that safeguard the free-market principles should be untouched by democratic deliberation. As such, technocratic limitations should be enforced on democracy, especially when it comes to market interventions, since only through the free market is social emancipation possible. It follows, therefore, that politicians are increasingly bound to the technocratic parameters of a free-market logic, irrespective of the mandate of their constituency.

Building upon this logic, James Buchanan (1978) expanded the neoliberal critique of democracy. Armed with the assumption of rational, utility-maximising agents, Buchanan claims that politicians are bound to govern in favour of their own narrow interests rather than those of their constituents. Buchanan's critique of the capacity of democracy itself to respond to social problems is threefold. Firstly, collective decision-making is unable to satisfy individual preferences. Secondly, and following from the previous argument, the politicians are likely to support increased state control, in order to maintain their own power, and to increase their influence and salaries. These criticisms point back to a principal-agent problem: "Agents are supposed to represent the interests of their principals, but in fact they tend to put their own interests ahead of the interests of those whom they are supposed to represent" (Soros, 2009). Thirdly, profit-maximising politicians are likely to favour certain social groups in return for votes. The political parties are therefore prone to converge towards the ideological centre (Downs, 1957) in search of maximising their share of the constituency by ideologically approaching the median voter, making these parties especially inelastic to the demands of the underrepresented youth (Henn and Foard, 2012; Sloam, 2007).

The above critique portrays politicians as not only *unable* to influence political outcomes within a technocratic economic environment, but also as inherently selfish (and as such, *untrustworthy*) and thus unwilling to represent the mandate of their constituency. In the contemporary European political context, this is reflected in recent empirical research (Henn and Foard, 2014) which suggests that young people are disengaged with electoral politics because the latter is "... hierarchical and remote, the province of self-serving elitists with little interest in their lives" (Hart, 2017). The consumer logic that has permeated the neoliberal subject allows for expressing their support or rejection of the available options by deliberately

‘purchasing’ among the available options of politicians and political parties (Downs, 1957). However, this will inevitably be expressed by increased disengagement from electoral politics if the interests of the young voters continue to be underrepresented in the political debate, in favour of the median voter.

Taking the individualist standpoint, these opportunity structures will be measured on the individual level by measures of political efficacy. Political efficacy has played a pivotal part in the study of youth political engagement (Amnå, Munck, and Zetterberg, 2004) and political consumerism (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013) alike, and has been emphasised during the focus groups conducted for this thesis (see **Chapter 9**). Amnå et al. (2004) define Internal Political Efficacy (IPE) as the subjective individual aptitude to understand and to influence political matters. Similarly, they define External Political Efficacy (EPE) as the individual’s confidence that decision makers will consider and attend to the opinions of their constituents; that is, the extent of responsiveness of the political system to their individualised claims. In the present thesis, EPE will be further subdivided in terms of **a)** the perceived inability of politicians to respond to the claims of their young constituents within a neoliberal economic environment; and **b)** in their inherent unwillingness to do so. In turn, **c)** the subjective understanding of citizenship will be measured by an open-ended question, where the respondents will be asked to define what politics mean to them. Their responses will be subsequently coded into a dichotomous variable as “bottom-up” and “top-down” politics, according to Beck’s (1997) definition of subpolitics.

b. Pull Factors

The sections above have illustrated that the politics of consumption are inextricably dependent on neoliberal doctrine. With its emphasis on rationality, competition, and striving for burgeoning economic expansion, neoliberalism ceases to be yet another position on the ideological spectrum. Instead, reinforced by its roll-out process, it has been described as a form of non-politics (Duggan, 2012), the only rational and viable way forward. Neoliberalism thus has accelerated a clear shift of power and responsibility from the state to that of the market. Political consumerism therefore, as a market-oriented form of political participation, offers young people access to an *alternative* form of democratic participation.

At the individual level, neoliberal governmentality equates the marketplace with a democracy, where citizen-consumers vote according to their purchasing power, each time they purchase a product or a service. In contrast to the typical model of electoral politics in which citizens' participation opportunities are restricted to voting in periodical electoral contests, engaging in acts of political consumerism presents the additional benefits of *frequency* and *immediacy*. On the one hand, people register and reiterate their political support or opposition to a certain production process on a daily basis via their purchasing decisions. In this way, citizens-consumers will support certain production processes (and penalise others) directly through their purchasing actions in the marketplace rather than through the mediation of their elected representatives.

This consumer-oriented democracy, or '*marketopoly*' as Lekakis (2013a) terms it, may more adequately reflect the individual preferences within the market as a highly decentralised framework of political action, and thus increasingly '*pulls*' the underrepresented young people to operate within it. Political participation becomes in this way a commercialised product, and the widespread diffusion of the neoliberal creed, coupled by the birth of the 'citizen-consumer', herald the end of traditional understandings of citizenship (Falk, 2000).

The classical notions of citizenship are therefore re-forged into a commodified interpretation of citizenship. In this context, the factors that may attract young people to express their political considerations within the marketopoly should not be very dissimilar from the factors that influence them to purchase any commercial item.

Drawing from the discipline of consumer studies, this thesis will thus introduce the notion of Perceived Consumer Efficiency (PCE) as a possible factor behind young people's political participation. PCE stands for the self-reported perception that the consumer is able to influence the production process and influence the prices of products, coupled with the availability of alternative products and the availability of product-related information (Bray et al., 2011). Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) define PCE as the extent to which people have confidence in their individual consumer behaviour as a means for solving environmental issues. They suggest that this is a critical factor in explaining environmentally-friendly consumer behaviour. The similarities of the PCE to Internal Political Efficacy (IPE) introduced in the previous section, are striking, even though they derive from different academic disciplines. Their primary difference however is that, whereas IPE refers to the conviction that individual *political* action can have a significant impact upon political outcomes, PCE captures the belief

that individual *consumer* action can have a significant impact upon ethically desirable market outcomes.

Some of the factors that may therefore ‘pull’ young people to engage in political consumerism include **a)** their Perceived Consumer Efficiency (PCE), that is their perception that they are able to influence the production process and influence the prices of products (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002), coupled with **b)** the availability of alternative products and **c)** the availability of product-related information (Bray et al., 2011).

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, the crisis of neoliberal capitalism of 2008 has served as a catalyst behind the emergence of oppositional political narratives to a hegemonic neoliberal paradigm that has been perceived as responsible for the social ailments of the post-crisis social and political domains. Simultaneously however, the internalisation of neoliberal governmentality along with the politicisation of the market, has assisted the expression of these oppositional forces through the use of the market as an arena imbued with political meaning.

Disillusioned and disenchanting by institutional forms of participation, young people in the UK and in Greece will thus be ‘*pushed*’ away from institutional (electorally-focused) political participation and will seek the ‘political’ within the marketplace. Having however internalised the neoliberal doctrines in favour of an all-powerful market, they will simultaneously be ‘*pulled*’ into the marketplace as an arena for politics.

The decision therefore to deliberately buy, or to refuse to buy a product or a service based on one’s ethical, environmental or political considerations is a result of a combination of factors at the micro and macro-levels. **Chapter 6** will therefore proceed to discuss these micro-level factors, such as the individual attitudes, values and orientations of young political consumers, in the context of the macro-level determinants prevalent in the UK and in Greece.

Chapter 6: Political consumerism at the country level

1. Introduction

Although the recent global financial crisis has accelerated a widespread rejection of the general tenets of neoliberalism, neoliberal governmentality has nonetheless been instilled in young people's understanding of the 'political', and they are therefore likely to seek its expression within the bounds of the marketplace. **Chapter 5** has discussed these dynamics on the individual level: on the one hand, the chapter claims that the neoliberal critique of democracy 'pushes' young people away from electoral processes, while neoliberal governmentality simultaneously 'pulls' young people into the market as an alternative domain of political participation. These dynamics can be understood as a result of an alleged convergence of young people's understandings about which duties and responsibilities pertain to the state, and which to the business sector.

In addition to the theories delineated in **Chapter 3**, the '*Varieties of Capitalism*' theory may therefore, be particularly well-suited to explain these processes, as it connects the micro-level determinants of political participation to broader socio-political developments taking place on the macro-level. In doing so, it shifts the focus of analysis from the demographic characteristics of the SES model; beyond the availability of opportunity structures of the mobilisation model; and in parallel to the social capital theory and the postmaterialist thesis, on the effects of '*civic culture*' on political participation. This chapter therefore, will consider whether the processes and outcomes of neoliberalism discussed in **Chapter 5** are uniform across the range of advanced liberal democracies or whether they differ from one country to the next. The chapter will proceed by discussing the expressions of political consumerism in the UK as opposed to Greece, and will conclude by suggesting a *multi-layered approach* in the study of political consumerism.

2. On the concept of the state and Varieties of Capitalism

Within each country, certain factors will have a greater or lesser impact according to the perceptions of the citizens with regards to their duties and responsibilities (Kim et al., 2013). Hofstede (1983, p. 388) discerns patterns within countries, or as he prefers to term it, a '*collective mental programming*', according to which "citizens exhibit similar patterns of

behaviour and attitudes depending on the country they come from” (Zorell, 2019a, p. 83). This mental programming reflects the Foucauldian conceptualisation of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality (Byrne, 2017).

In a similar conceptualisation, Zorell (2019a) asserts that this mental programming is inclusive of a country’s civic culture. Almond and Verba (1963, pp. 14, 15) define civic culture as “the particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of a nation”. In turn, this consists of “attitudes toward the political system and its various parts” and their “attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 13). Similar to the development of postmaterialist values outlined by Inglehart (1997), for Almond (1990, pp. 143, 144), civic culture on the individual level is an outcome of one’s political socialisation during childhood, but also of one’s education, the influence of the media as well as the socioeconomic and political circumstances during adulthood. In other words, although these attitudes manifest on the individual level, they are being influenced by macro-level determinants. Moreover, although they develop on the individual level, they collectively form the backdrop upon which the society as a whole will operate (Hofstede, 1983). In this way, they provide a comprehensive framework for the study of political participation which connects attitudes and dispositions on the individual level, with patterns on the social level, and eventually with institutional political participation.

The distinct advantage of the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) for the study of political consumerism, is that it challenges the clear-cut distinction of the ‘political’ and the ‘cultural’, understood as separate spheres of life which define individual behaviour independently from each other. In other words, the object of analysis under the CVM is the interrelation of the individual to the state and private business actors (Zorell, 2019a), and in particular the understanding of which duties and responsibilities pertain to each. The positioning of the citizen-consumer is thus central in this arrangement (see **Figure 3**, adapted from Shamir, 2015, p. 247).




Figure 3: *The citizen-consumer according to the CVM (Shamir, 2015, p.247).*

A similar understanding motivates the ‘Concept of the State’ theories. These refer to the interrelation of citizens’ attitudes concerning the state, the market and civil society and the relationship between the three. It focuses on the views that the citizens of a country have with regards to “who is responsible for what, and how cooperation between the actors should look” (Zorell, 2019a, p. 84). Under this standpoint, the ‘Concept of the State’ defines the desired equilibrium between free competition and economic collaboration among the individuals of any given country (Arts and Gelissen, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1990). In turn, this individualised understanding of the state will define the preferred “repertoire or ‘tool kit’ of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct ‘strategies of action’” (Swidler, 1986, p. 276; see also Wahlström and Peterson, 2005). In a context therefore where duties and responsibilities between individuals, the state and the private sector are being reorganised according to the individuals’ understanding of which responsibilities pertain to each, new repertoires of political action will emerge which are able to express simultaneously the preferences of the individual citizens and those of society as a whole, with regards to how these may influence policy-making on the institutional level.

Based on this premise, Hall and Soskice (2001, 2003) developed the ‘*Varieties of Capitalism*’ (VoC) theory, according to which each country will demonstrate concrete patterns with regards to how it responds to socioeconomic and political challenges. Similarly to the Civic Voluntarism model developed by Almond and Verba (1963), Hall and Soskice capture the distinct patterns of political action between the individual, the social and the institutional

domains. They describe these patterns as nation-specific, that is, moulded by cultural, historical and religious circumstances (Hall and Soskice, 2001, pp.15,16), which the authors suggest have led to systematic divergences between countries with regards to their preferred decision-making processes.

Thus, they commence by describing what they have termed as '*Coordinated Market Economies*' (CME) (Hall and Soskice, 2001, pp. 16–18). Under this approach, the prevalent means of dealing with tasks of socio-political significance involve non-market-based forms of cooperation between the state, the market and civil society. These means focus on establishing a form of *consensus*, or *equilibrium* between the three, while relying on business networks and associations across industrial sectors. Moreover, the policies that will be established through this interplay will in turn, often focus on further enhancing non-market cooperation and coordination. For the architects of the thesis, examples of this approach include Germany, Austria, Belgium, Japan, Sweden, and Finland (Hall, 2018, p. 4; Hall and Soskice, 2001, pp. 46, 47)

Instead, in '*Liberal Market Economies*' (LME), individuals, business and state actors will rely almost exclusively on *laissez-faire market competition* to coordinate decision-making. Liberal market economies will therefore reject any institutional state intervention and will instead rely on the invisible hand of the market to safeguard successful – and allegedly more efficient - interactions between the state, the private sector and civil society. Similarly to the CME, the ensuing policies in LME are so designed that they further encourage market competition on the institutional level, but also in all domains of life. For Hall and Soskice, examples of LMEs include the UK, USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland (Hall, 2018, p. 5; Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 46).

Finally, they distinguish a third cluster of countries, which combines elements of the previous two. They term these '*Mediterranean – or Mixed-Market Economies*' (MME). These include Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece ¹⁶ (Hall, 2018, p. 6,7; Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 21). They claim that these countries share common elements with both the CMEs and LMEs, but they also deviate from both in some other respects. One main common characteristic the MMEs share, of particular interest to the emergence of political consumerism as a form of political participation, is the prevalence of structures that favour cooperative approaches

¹⁶ To these may also be included France, which currently shares many elements with the MMEs of southern Europe (Hall and Soskice, 2003, p. 21).

between different civil-society actors on the one hand, and liberal approaches when it comes to the interaction of corporations with civil society and the state, on the other (Hall and Soskice, 2001, p. 21)¹⁷.

To summarise, different kinds of socioeconomic and historical legacies will shape the political culture of any given country and create different styles of institutional regimes, which in turn will foster the reproduction of their political institutions and form the predominant attitudes in the country with regards to the roles of the market, the state and the ensuing notions of citizenship.

The Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) theory provides on the macro-level, a firm and time-inelastic response to the classical theories of political participation (see **Chapter 3**), as it is able to explain why political participation patterns differ consistently from one country to the next one, and across time. In other words, just like in the CVM of Almond and Verba (1963), it provides a socio-political *constant* for each country which influences the preferred decision-making processes both on the individual level and the institutional level.

With respect to the individual level, the VoC theory implies that the type of a country's market economy will in-turn shape the individuals' understandings of citizenship and the anticipated roles of the state, the market and civil society respectively (Zorell, 2019a). Moreover, as VoC theory observes, these conceptualisations will differ significantly from countries that operate under a different market system, as for example between Greece and the UK, but will instead be relatively constant among the individuals of each country (Schwartz, 2006, p. 172).

For example, the theory assumes that individuals living in functioning representative democracies will be ideally satisfied with the prevailing market system in their country (Almond and Verba, 1963; Schwartz et al., 2010). The rationale is that in liberal, representational democracies, citizens should— at least in theory - be able to influence the balance of power between the state, the market and civil society via institutional forms of political participation,

¹⁷ These special arrangements, they claim, have been the result of comparable historical and socioeconomic backgrounds: most of the countries in this cluster have only recently restored democracy from autocratic regimes, which resulted in a large segment of their industry sector being controlled by the state, and on the social level, the establishment of strong family ties and informal networks (Zorell, 2019a, p. 85).

as for example by their electoral vote, their involvement in political parties or unionisation. The model assumes that in the long run, the systemic balance of powers should reflect the expectations of the majority of the citizens of any given country.

Instead, individuals who are living in a Coordinated Market Economy (CME), having been nurtured in an environment of cooperation and coordination, would be expected to have developed an understanding of the state which relies on these principles. These expectations are being supported by research in the field of social psychology, which suggests a congruence between seeing oneself as part of an ingroup; whether that is a country, a nation, a voluntary association, or even an imagined community (Anderson, 2006), and adopting the values, norms and structures of this group (Chen and Li, 2009; Huddy, 2013).

As a result, individuals who are living in countries operating under a Liberal Market Economy (LME), much like young people in the UK for example, are likely to adopt an equally liberal concept of the state. Consequently, they would be expected to have adopted the general belief that the invisible hand of the market will lead to optimal market outcomes, and this belief will also influence their individual behaviour. Accordingly, in countries like Greece with a Mixed Market Economy (MME), it would be expected that young people would demonstrate an understanding with regards to the role of the state as a regulating mechanism (Molina and Rhodes, 2007, p. 225), but they would also be familiar with informal networks – based on social trust and rules of reciprocity - as the Social Capital theory suggests. Hence, the citizens of MMEs are likely to generally demonstrate less responsibility to get politically engaged. Nevertheless, when they do, they would prefer more informal or collaborative methods (Molina and Rhodes, 2007, p. 225; Zorell, 2019a, p. 86).

The propensity of young people in Greece and the UK to engage in political consumerism should therefore be examined through their similarities, but also their underlying differences. The following section will thus provide an empirical overview of the expressions of political consumerism in an MME country, such as Greece, as opposed to an LME country like the UK.

3. Political Consumerism in Greece and in the UK

In terms of their similarities, the rise of political consumerism among young people between the both countries (Tilikidou and Delistavrou, 2018; Triodos, 2018), should be understood within the framework of a generalised anti-institutional political climate that permeates

Western democracies (Hay, 2007). Voters' turnout for Greece in the 2019 European Assembly Elections was close to the country's historical low (58.7% in 2019, as opposed to 52.5% in 2009). Likewise, voters' turnout for the UK was 37.2% in 2019, and continued to be at levels consistently lower than the EU average of 50.7% (European Parliament, 2019). Despite the sudden rise (and equally abrupt fall) of new political forces on the institutional domain, such as the Coalition of Radical Left (SYRIZA) and the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which signify the emergence of new political actors on the institutional level, a generalised partisan dealignment of the young people in both countries has been well-documented (Kioupiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018; Sloam and Henn, 2018).

In terms of their differences, Greece represents a Mediterranean Market Economy (MME) (Hall, 2018) country with the highest youth unemployment in Europe (35.2% in January 2020) (OECD Database, 2020) and some of the lowest levels of consumer participation in Europe (Grasso, 2018). UK instead, stands representative of a Liberal Market Economy (LME) country (Hall, 2018), with one of the lowest youth unemployment rates, at 11.1% of the youth labour force, by the beginning of 2020 (OECD Database, 2020), and one of the highest levels of consumer participation in Europe (Triodos, 2018). Generally, the available literature on political consumerism often emphasises that practices of market-based political engagement are significantly more widespread in Northern European economies than in the South. On the country level, Stolle and Micheletti (2013) trace the reasons behind such differences on several factors, such as the differences in the per capita income distribution, and the authoritarian legacy of countries in the European South; while Zorell (2019d) emphasises on the availability of opportunity structures. The following sections will thus discuss the expression of political consumerism in Greece as opposed to the UK.

a. Political Consumerism in Greece

At the turn of the 21st century, the European Social Survey reported a steep increase in the levels of boycotts and especially buycotts in most of the European countries under examination (Koos, 2012). However, when it comes to buycotting and boycotting in Greece, the country remains consistently at the bottom of the list (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013). For instance, Greece was fifth from last among the 21 countries examined in the first wave of the European Social Survey (2002/2003) (Lekakis and Forno, 2017, p. 2). Nevertheless, the case of Greece (along

with Italy, another South European country) is unique across Europe and USA, where boycotts appear to be more frequent than buycotts (Lekakis and Forno, 2017). Examination of different rounds of the European Social Survey, combined with data from the World Values Survey, which is particularly useful in order to trace boycotting trends for the years prior to 2000, conveys similar patterns. They consistently confirm lower market-based participation rates throughout recent decades, with Greece being persistently more prone to boycotts than buycotts (Stolle and Micheletti, 2013, p. 50).

Country specific research in connection to political consumerism in Greece remains limited. This may also be on account of the lack of formal organisational structures in relation to political consumerism, at least in comparison to the European North. Research points out that the fair-trade market in the country remains far less developed than any other European country (Tilikidou and Delistavrou, 2007) while the primary aim of Fair Trade Hellas, which was founded only in 2004, remains that of awareness-raising. Moreover, according to its site¹⁸, the official Fair-trade retailer in the city centre of Athens was eventually reduced to an online shop in 2016, in an attempt to cut down operational costs in response to the financial crisis.

This lack of formally established organisational structures however, is being offset to an extent by the proliferation of informal, community-based networks especially after the outbreak of the crisis. As a response to the austerity measures introduced to the economy at the time, and an alleged deficit of democratic legitimacy in the country, young people sought to redefine the commonly accepted definition of politics. Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis (2018) have termed these attempts as '*heteropolitics*', and frame them as a response to the political disenfranchisement brought about by the crisis. The civil society therefore reorganised using collaborative, bottom-up (or *subpolitical*) methods and have effectively managed to disseminate collective forms of political consumerism throughout the country (Kioupkiolis and Pechtelidis, 2018).

Several clusters of political consumerism existed prior to the crisis. Characteristic is the case of the Exarcheia area, in the centre of Athens, which since the early 1980s has been at the forefront of political and social movements in the country and is renowned for its capacity for insurgency and its anti-capitalist ethos. Chatzidakis et al. (2012, p. 510) illustrate how Exarcheia, provides a site for utopian practice, particularly in relation to a range of green and ethical

¹⁸ www.fairtrade.gr

behaviour. They report that in the area of Exarcheia, responsibility-taking and autonomy concerns often took the form of consumer-oriented activism. Moreover, Vathakou (2015) reports that similar initiatives of consumer-oriented activism have recently spread from Alexandroupolis on the far north of the country, to Crete on the south, as an attempt to restructure collective resilience efforts under austerity. Especially market-based participatory methods, such as boycotting and boycotting, became an indispensable tool towards a wider socioeconomic transition, starting from the local level, but striving for collective outreach (Lekakis and Forno, 2017).

It has been suggested thus, that that a critical factor for the rise of political consumerist practices throughout Southern Europe is the outbreak of the financial crisis (Lekakis and Forno, 2017), perceived as a reaction to the austerity measures imposed thereafter. This standpoint provides support to the hypothesis that political consumerism in Greece is primarily connected to the 'push' effects of neoliberalism, and thus driven primarily by the perceived inability and unwillingness of the mainstream political sphere to respond to young people's pressing needs, as well as by the changing perceptions of young people on what constitutes the 'political'.

Although political consumerism has been commonly understood as a result of affluence and as such, as a primarily postmaterialist phenomenon (Copeland, 2014b; Micheletti, 2003; Stolle et al., 2005), recent empirical research proposes that it needs to be re-evaluated in the context of the ongoing recession (Guidi and Andretta, 2015). Indeed, political consumerist practices in Greece after the outbreak of the crisis tend to stem from an ideological critique of materialism, neoliberal consumerism and mass production, concerns towards equal distribution of wealth and opportunities, direct and unmediated relationship between consumers and producers and a generalised interest for solidarity (Forno and Graziano, 2014). Indeed, Tilikidou and Delistavrou (2018) report that political consumers in Greece exhibits anti-materialist value orientations, and high levels of universalism.

Consequently, political consumerist instances in Greece seem to represent "a tool through which grassroots groups build, construct and reinforce solidarity ties in order to foster collaboration among usually small-scale of actors of consumers and producers starting from the local level" (Lekakis and Forno, 2017, p. 5). Solidarity-based networks, zero-kilometre exchange groups, time-banks, urban gardening and alternative currency systems crop up in the neighbourhoods of Athens on an almost weekly basis. Their emphasis is on local empowerment, strengthening community ties and environmental sustainability. Such instances

tend to interpret political consumerism primarily as a means of mobilising individuals to achieve and empower collective action (Dubuisson-Quellier et al., 2011).

b. Political Consumerism in the UK

Both activist and academic critiques of capitalist globalisation and intrusive neoliberalist policies in the UK, have resulted in a widespread interest in the examination of the political potential of so-called 'alternative economic spaces' (Leyshon et al., 2003), including also research on alternative food networks, alternative currency systems, and social economy (Amin et al., 2002; Hughes, 2005). As a result, after the crisis there have spurred several informal and more established consumer and environmental groups like the People's Assembly Against Austerity (Mercea and Yilmaz, 2018), the Occupy movement (Cloke et al., 2016), the UK Uncut (Street, 2015), and the Extinction Rebellion (Shah, 2019), just to mention a few. One particular area that has received extensive attention in the country however, has been the growth of fair-trade and organic labelling schemes.

According to the British Sociological Association (BSA), in 2004 about 38% of people in the UK had deliberately boycotted or buycotted products for political, ethical or environmental reasons. This figure remained relatively stable till 2014 (38%) (POSTnote, 2015, p. 3), despite the outbreak of the crisis. Distinguishing between boycotting and buycotting however, yields that buycotting is on the rise and is more common than boycotting products and services throughout the country (Lekakis and Forno, 2017). This may be in part because many large scale campaigns have shifted towards supporting labelling schemes like 'Fairtrade', and away from the use of boycotts as a campaigning tool (Ward and deVreese, 2011). This observation may also provide support to the hypothesis that young people in the UK are primarily driven by the 'pull' factors of neoliberalism into the marketplace.

Fair-trade is being described as a market-driven ethical consumption (Nicholls and Opal, 2005) and refers to a "movement that seeks to harness the mechanisms of the market to address socioeconomic inequalities and environmental harms associated with the global economic system" (Clarke et al., 2007, pp. 583–584). Although often used interchangeably, there is a marked distinction between the terms 'ethical' and 'fair-trade' (Smith and Barrientos, 2005).

Ethical trade places emphasis on “labour conditions in mainstream production and distribution networks”(Clarke et al., 2007, p. 584) and, as such, its practices vary significantly between different countries. The most prominent of these campaigns in the UK is the Ethical Trading Initiative, which works in coalition with trade unions and NGOs. Its main aim is to enforce corporate codes of practice in relation to sustainable living wages and conditions in the workplace, and as such, it usually targets major market players such as Gap, Nike, and Bodyshop.

The *fair-trade* movement instead, aims to help promote and actualise the “development of alternative spaces of production, trade, and consumption”(Clarke et al., 2007, p. 584) and involves cooperatives, producer organisations, trading networks, retailers and certification agencies. Its goals include improving market access to disadvantaged producers, including women and indigenous groups, through partnership in trade through dialogue, respect and transparency, both by new trading agreements with said groups, but also through awareness-raising and campaigning.

In the UK, the diffusion of fair-trade initiatives is based on a long history of consumer campaigns. Oxfam’s first shop was opened in 1948 in Oxford, whereas it currently numbers more than 750 physical shops throughout the country (Clarke et al., 2007, p. 584), selling not only second-hand items, but also a selection of fair-trade products. But Oxfam is hardly the only example. Cafédirect, Tropical Wholefoods, Fairtrade Foundation (FTF), and Traidcraft among others take part in a network which is oriented at the production, distribution, marketing, and retailing of fair-trade goods. Although each organisation is specialising in separate activities, these are almost never mutually exclusive (Clarke et al., 2007).

The FTF has recently cooperated with the Trade Union Congress, the leading labour union representative body in the UK, in an attempt to ensure that its activities adhere to the established labour rights of the national labour union organisations (Clarke et al., 2007). As a result, in 2017 alone, sales of ethical goods and services reached £81.3 billion, while UK’s ethical market demonstrated a market growth of 3.2% from the previous year. Moreover, the sector of Ethical Food and Drinks alone, saw a growth of 9.7% growth, at a time when the British economy was just recovering from the recession, with an overall GDP growth of only 1.9% (Office for National Statistics, 2017). The category of Ethical Food and Drinks has more than doubled in value since the outbreak of the crisis in 2008, and it currently stands at £9.8 billion. The value of consumer boycotts alone, in the same year, was estimated at about £2.5 billion.

Moreover, 42% of UK consumers preferred to shop locally in 2017, spending an estimated £2.7 billion. However, by its own – very high - standards, growth over the previous three years had been relatively sluggish, averaging just 4.3%, meaning that 2018's year-on-year increase of 9.7% shows a return to stronger performance in this sector. Vegetarianism alone shows a 30% increase since the outbreak of the crisis. A steady 5.1% annual growth in sales of vegetarian products denotes a sharp surge in the number of people who are deliberately changing their diet for ethical reasons (Triodos, 2018, p. 5).

The above figures from '2018 Ethical Consumer Report' (Triodos, 2018) draw a picture of ethical and fair-trade products in the UK as a thriving, market-based economic sector. As the VoC theory suggests, the ethical and fair-trade business sector has been cooperating with political organisations such as labour unions on the institutional level. In this context, the individual consumer in the UK is being faced with a multitude of ethically sourced products. As a result, having internalised the discursive neoliberal monopoly, they are likely to turn to these market-based alternatives to express their (political) concerns for ethically responsible production processes.

Even at the academic level, the volume of sales of ethical-trade products is often interpreted as evidence of a broader increase of political consumerism (Chatzidakis et al., 2012; Lekakis, 2013a; Nicholls and Opal, 2005). The main analytical tool for understanding both fair-trade and ethical trade in the UK is therefore predominately related to the volume and value of commodities traded between producers in the global South and consumers in the North (Lekakis, 2013a; Petkova, 2006). This standpoint however, interprets political consumerism merely as the domain of consumers, devoid of its essential responsibility element in relation to ethics, ecology, and politics (Chatzidakis et al., 2012).

Indeed, Clark et al. (2007) challenge the assumption that the actors involved in the growth of fair-trade movement should be primarily understood as mere consumers, since its explicit focus is the empowerment of local communities, democratisation, and active civic participation. However, even though this need is extensively acknowledged in research in relation to the impact of fair-trade on producer communities in the global South (Lekakis, 2013a; Moberg, 2005), the study of ethical consumption in the global North is persistently constrained by the assumption that the key actors in these practices are conventional consumers trying to satisfy their primarily materialistic needs. As the previous chapters

however have demonstrated, this is hardly the case, since the political consumers instil their market behaviour with ethical, environmental and political motivations.

This realisation bears two implications for the future of research on political consumerism: Firstly, more research is deemed necessary in order to identify the value orientations of political consumption behaviour in each country. Secondly, this analytical oversight points towards the need to generate new ways of measuring political consumerism, which will be able to capture both its behavioural components (buycotting and boycotting), in addition to the embedded responsibility concerns that accompanies them, as well as the frequency with which they take place. The present thesis intends to provide an original contribution to knowledge in both of these areas, by employing a multi-layered approach to the study of political consumerism among young people, in the UK and Greece.

4. Putting the pieces together: A multi-layered approach to Political Consumerism

Despite the ideological hegemony of neoliberal governmentality in western democracies since the late 1980s, this chapter has suggested that the ways through which citizens express their political considerations within the marketplace varies significantly, according to their understandings pertaining to the desired role of the state, the business sector, and civil society. Throughout this thesis, political consumerism is being studied from the individual's standpoint. **Chapter 2** discussed why conceptualising political consumerism in terms of the subjective motivations of the consumer was deemed to be the most appropriate and efficient way, since it permits for cross-country comparisons irrespectively of the opportunity structures prevalent in each country.

Furthermore, as **Chapter 3** discussed, the decision at the individual level of how one will participate may be shaped by their personal socioeconomic background but also by their (level of) social capital and their underlying values. In light of the ideas developed in this current chapter however, it follows that the individual's standpoint is, in turn, being influenced by the macro-level context in which they operate. The prevalent 'Variety of Capitalism' in each country therefore, is likely to determine the individual's standpoint on political consumerism. This suggests that political consumerism should be understood as a process which develops primarily at the individual level, but is also influenced by the macro-context at the country level.

This macro-context will manifest in different ways on the individual level depending on which concept of the state is dominant in each country.

It would thus be expected that, in its capacity as a lifestyle form of political participation (which simultaneously operates within a market instilled by the neoliberal rationale), political consumerism would be highly appealing for young people from Greece. On the one hand, as a lifestyle form of political participation, it provides the framework to respond to their expected disenchantment (Datta, 2014) and disillusionment (Hart and Henn, 2017) from the institutional political sphere, which followed the financial crises since 2008 and exposed the inherent contradictions of capitalism (Kiouпкиolis and Pechteliđis, 2018), as the VoC suggests. On the other hand, in its capacity as a market-oriented form of political participation, young people in Greece would be less trusting with respect to the capacity for political consumerism to bring about significant change; at least compared to young people in the UK who are expected to have internalised the centrality that LMEs place on the ability of the market to effectively influence political outcomes. Moreover, the VoC approach suggests that young people in Greece (a MME country) would be likely to choose political consumerist forms that are more cooperative and informal in nature than their UK counterparts, who have been socialised in a LME system.

Indeed, Lekakis and Forno (2017) report that, even though political consumerism continues to be less widespread in Southern European (SE) countries than in North-western European countries (NWE), the global financial crisis of 2008, with its particularly adverse effects in Southern Europe (Hall, 2018), seems to have resulted in an abrupt increase in political consumerism practices in the country (Lekakis and Forno, 2017). However, they clarify that political consumerism practices in SE demonstrate a more communitarian approach, based on grassroots, locally-based consumer networks, influenced by the principles of solidarity economy (Bergeron et al., 2015; Miller, 2010). It follows therefore, that as the VoC theory suggests, young people in Greece are expected to demonstrate greater disillusionment from institutional politics, and a more bottom-up, informal and cooperative understanding of politics.

This hypothesis echoes Beck's (1997) conceptualisation of *subpolitics*. As it has been discussed in **Chapter 3**, the term subpolitics for Beck (1997) refers to a form of bottom-up politics (Pickard, 2019c, p. 383), which is less institutionalised and more informal (Holzer and Sørensen, 2001, p. 3). It is being described as a way of doing politics outside the institutional

framework of the formally defined political system of the state. Similarly therefore, one would expect that when it comes to political participation through the use of the market, young people from Greece would also choose a more *subpolitical* approach.

Conversely, young people in the UK, being socialised in a LME, are expected to be more influenced by the conviction that the invisible hand of the market is likely to lead to optimal market outcomes, and this belief is also likely to influence their individual behaviour when it comes to boycotting and boycotting. With regards to their preferred forms of political consumerism, they are therefore expected to have a more top-down understanding of politics – whether in the institutional domain or the market domain. This means that ‘politics’ for them will be understood more as the domain of ‘politicians’ rather than as a place for grassroots collective action.

Similarly however, young people in the UK are also expected to have an equally top-down understanding of market-oriented political participation. Influenced by their internalised conviction in favour of the professed capacity of the market to achieve greater and more effective (political) outcomes, they are more likely to engage in political consumerism as a market-oriented form of political participation. However, also influenced by their top-down understanding of ‘politics’ - and unlike their counterparts from Greece - they are expected to demonstrate a top-down approach with respect to political consumerism, in its guise as political participation. For example, they are expected to be more responsive to Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) schemes or market(ing) campaigns organised from ‘above’, unlike the young people from Greece who, as we saw, are expected to be attracted to and engage in more informal, bottom-up approaches to political consumerism (Lekakis and Forno, 2017).

To summarise, it is expected that as a result of the global neoliberal crisis of 2008 which has allegedly exposed the failings of neoliberalism in terms of ideology and in practice, young people from the UK and also from Greece would be disillusioned with the institutional political domain, and the perceived inability and unwillingness of politicians to respond to their individualised claims. They are therefore expected in both countries to demonstrate low External Political Efficacy (EPE) and therefore be ‘pushed’ away from institutional politics. However, due to young people in Greece having been nurtured in a Mixed Market Economy (MME) they are expected to demonstrate higher levels of Internal Political Efficacy (IPE) than their UK counterparts, reflecting their bottom-up understanding of politics. This is expected to

further 'push' them away from institutional politics, as they would have greater confidence in doing politics collectively, from the bottom-up, and through their own means.

Instead, it would be expected that young people in the UK, having been nurtured in an LME, will be more susceptible to the pull-effects of neoliberalism into the market as an alternative political arena. In other words, young people in the UK are expected to demonstrate higher levels of Perceived Consumer Efficacy (PCE); higher levels of satisfaction with respect to the available range of ethically-sourced products and services; and greater satisfaction with product-related information, which will pull them into the marketplace as an alternative political domain.

Nevertheless, factors such as political interest, political knowledge or subjective social positioning, as suggested from the classical theories of political participation outlined in **Chapter 3** are also expected to play a role on the political consumerist behaviour of young people. For example, individuals with high levels of political knowledge may thus also be more interested in comprehending and exposing the perceived contradictions or failures of the style of market economy in their country.

Moreover, despite the professed '*death of class*' in postmodern societies (W. Atkinson, 2007; Bernardi, 2009; Pakulski and Waters, 1996), the VoC theory retains that one's subjective social position may also be important, since better-off citizens are more likely to be satisfied with the style of market economy in their country and perceive it as more fair and egalitarian. Instead, a long term unemployed young person who is thus dependent on the welfare state, is likely to compare their individual circumstances with others who are better-off and develop a dissatisfaction of the prevailing system altogether as being unjust (Jost et al., 2008; Jost and Andrews, 2011). This dissatisfaction may eventually radicalise them politically so that they will refuse to acknowledge the democratic legitimacy of the prevailing system; instead, they may turn to lifestyle forms of political participation, such as political consumerism, in order to express their disdain from the existing institutions. However, this claim has not been confirmed in the existing literature. Moreover, despite the professed shift of politics beyond the traditional conceptualisation of left and right under postmodernism (Giddens, 1994), one's ideological orientation may also remain pertinent as it would influence the extent of satisfaction and dissatisfaction at the individual level from the prevalent variety of capitalism in one's country.

Exploring the factors that influence young citizens' decisions to engage in political consumerism in the two countries, the analysis of the present thesis will thus be organised accordingly: Firstly, **Chapter 10** will examine a set of 'push' factors that the literature review has suggested may be responsible for pushing young people away from institutional forms of political participation. Subsequently, **Chapter 11** will instead examine a series of 'pull' factors that the literature review has suggested may be responsible for pulling young people to express their ethical, environmental and political concerns within the market¹⁹. Finally, **Chapter 12** will employ the use of the Political Consumerism Index (PCI), a new comprehensive but intuitive measure of political consumerism, so as to provide a conclusive image of the underlying factors behind young people's decisions to engage in market-oriented participation in Greece as opposed to the UK.

This thesis therefore, will employ a multi-layered approach to the study of political consumerism, taking into consideration the micro-level approach of the classical theories of political participation outlined in **Chapter 3**, in the context of the convergence of the citizen and the consumer spheres discussed in **Chapter 4**, and within the framework of the neoliberal crisis discussed in **Chapter 5**.

The previous chapters therefore, have cumulatively provided the theories and definitions necessary for the analysis of political consumerism among young people in Greece and in the UK. Empirical literature on the subject indicates that there may indeed be a difference in the focus of political consumerism varieties, with political consumerism in Greece demonstrating a more collective than individualistic orientation and being generally more rooted in local communities (Graziano and Forno, 2012). Instead, in the UK, political consumerism is often interpreted in terms of the volume and value of fair and ethical products traded (Triodos, 2018). This realisation exposes the need for the development of a unified measure of political consumerism which will be able to capture not only the behavioural aspects of political consumerism, but also how often it takes place and the levels of motivation behind it.

¹⁹ Examples of the factors examined in each chapter include the following: **Neoliberal 'push' factors:** a) Inability of political actors (EPE), b) Untrustworthiness of political actors (EPE), c) Internal Political Efficacy (IPE). **Neoliberal 'pull' factors:** a) Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE), b) Availability of products in the market, c) Availability of product-related information.

Chapter 7 therefore, will shed light in this direction, and will argue for the need for the development of a Political Consumerism Index (PCI), which will be incorporating both of the behavioural dimensions of political consumerism, enhanced with the responsibility the individual demonstrates in engaging in the action, and the frequency with which they do so.

Chapter 7: On measuring Political Consumerism

1. Introduction

In **Chapter 6**, the actions, methods, processes and intended outcomes of political consumerism were considered on the country level. However, in face of the continuous definitional expansion of political participation it is critical to delimit the single varieties of political consumerism to be examined in this thesis, or else we bear the risk of evolving into a ‘theory of everything’ (van Deth, 2014), whereby every market-oriented action could be considered as a form of political consumerism, eventually trivialising its ‘political’ character. Besides, the findings of the thesis are likely to vary depending on the definitions used. A concise delineation of the main concepts on which the ensuing examination will be based therefore is indispensable if we want to avoid misleading comparisons and inaccurate conclusions.

This chapter, intends thus to provide a precise definition of the varieties of political consumerism and shed light on their underlying character. It will commence by **a)** discussing some of the numerous terms which have been used when referring to politically-oriented purchasing behaviour and will consider their meaning. It will suggest that, instead of being understood as distinct varieties of politically-oriented behaviour, they all are parts of a wider concept; that of ‘political consumerism’. The chapter will proceed by suggesting that, **b)** when studying political consumerism as a form of political participation, the emphasis should predominately lie on the double expression of the phenomenon, namely positive (buycotting) and negative (boycotting) consumption of products and services. It will discuss buycotting and boycotting independently from each other, in order to demonstrate that the use of the general term ‘political consumerism’ fails to capture the differing underlying motivations, attitudes and values of each. Ultimately, it will posit that examining only the behavioural elements of political consumerism, runs the risk of overseeing the breadth and depth of the phenomenon. The final section of the chapter therefore, **c)** will advocate for the creation of a Political Consumerism Index (PCI) which not only attributes additional weight when one engages in both buycotting and boycotting, but it also captures the responsibility and frequency of the said behaviour within a single index. The PCI will then be used in **Chapter 12** of the present thesis, to analyse the political consumerist behaviour of young people in the UK and Greece.

2. Varieties of Political Consumerism

The variety of approaches, aims and motivations which comprise political consumerism in the various forms it has assumed across countries and throughout history, has already resulted in an extensive literature on the subject. However, the focus of enquiry varies from one publication to the other. The main distinction in the relevant literature extends in two dimensions. Firstly, some scholars focus their research on the *content* of political consumerism. In other words, they are trying to trace the variety of motivations, attitudes and aims behind the phenomenon. Secondly, other scholars emphasise instead the “*shape of the action*” (Zorell, 2018, p. 41); that is, the different ways through which these motivations, attitudes and aims of the first dimension, are being expressed through actions. It is this second dimension that includes the distinction between positive and negative consumerism.

Within the first dimension, several terms have been used. All of these terms however, intend to capture the differing motivations, attitudes and aims behind the more general term ‘political consumerism’. Along with the different terms used, the conceptual understanding attached to them also varies. Some scholars will thus examine a specific aspect of political consumerism in isolation, and hence use a specialised term (Lekakis, 2013a; Mazar and Zhong, 2010), whereas others will use the same issue-specific term but in its general context (Atkinson and Kim, 2015). As a result, terms such as ‘*sustainable consumption*’, ‘*ethical consumerism*’ or ‘*green buying behaviour*’ (Andorfer, 2013; Atkinson and Kim, 2015; Rumpala, 2011; Young et al., 2010) have often been used interchangeably. Nevertheless, a closer look at the differing use of issue-specific terms within the relevant literature “reveals that, ultimately, all these terms are rather specialised sub-concepts which allude to the characteristics of a product, but they are not truly distinct types of actions used to communicate a political preference” (Zorell, 2019b, p. 41, 42).

In other words, the deliberate purchase of a product based on ethical, sustainable or green considerations, emphasises on the underlying *motivations* behind such a purchase, which could be categorised alongside general drivers of conventional purchases such as price, quality or brand loyalty (Zorell, 2019b). In a similar way, voting for example, may be equally driven by environmental, ethical, or green considerations (as well as conservative, liberal or nationalist

ideological orientations). However, unless one is examining a specific driver behind voting decisions, voting is generally perceived as a single mode of political participation.

The use of such issue-specific terms (whether with regards to voting, or to political consumerism) therefore, involves the risk of shifting the focus of enquiry from the *actual act* of political participation to its underlying *content*. Instead, the more general term 'political consumerism', presents the benefit of being able to accommodate all the various motivational sub-categories into one. In this way, political consumerism may stand alongside other types of political participation, such as voting, signing a petition, or demonstrating. Therefore, when studying political consumerism as a form of political participation that falls within the various political participation repertoires, the general term 'political consumerism' appears to be the more accurate option.

With regards to the second dimension, that is, the distinction between the positive and the negative forms of political participation, the use of the term also varies significantly. This variation however, differs from the one above insofar it does not relate to the underlying motivations behind which type of products one is buying, but instead to the way that individual is acting; that is, it captures its praxial dimension. This feature refers to political consumerism as a form of political participation which takes predominately two forms: positive (buycotting) and negative (boycotting) political consumerism. But although these two variants are the ones most often found in the available literature, Micheletti et al. (2012) have expanded the conceptual variation of political consumerism even further. They discern thus, two more modes of political consumerism, alongside buycotting and boycotting. These are 'discursive actions' and 'lifestyle choices' (Micheletti et al., 2012)

'*Discursive actions*' are being defined as "the expression of opinions about corporate policy and practice and even consumer culture in a variety of communicative efforts and venues" (Micheletti et al., 2012, p. 146), whereas under 'lifestyle choices' they classify the decision to integrate environmentally, ethically and politically responsible action consistently into one's everyday life (Micheletti et al., 2012, p. 145). In other words, the expansion of the classification of political consumerism as a discursive action emphasises the extent of 'openness' behind one's political consumerist activities, whereas 'lifestyle choices' relate to the frequency or consistency of the said action throughout the individual's life. In response to the additional classification by Micheletti et al. outlined above however, Zorell (2019b, pp. 42–47) makes the point that notwithstanding if one buycotts or boycotts openly or more privately, and

whether they decide to do so only a few times a year or more frequently, the act itself essentially consists of either supporting a certain product or firm (buycotting), or deliberately rejecting it (boycotting).

Moreover, each of the two additional types of political consumerism may also involve other forms of political participation in addition to buycotting or boycotting. For example, under discursive actions one may want to decide to openly demonstrate or circulate a petition (Harrison and Scorse, 2010) or even exchange emails (Peretti and Micheletti, 2011) as it happened during the iconic mobilisation against the use of sweat-shops by multinational corporations like Nike in the early 2000s. Similarly, with regards to lifestyle choices one may decide to not only boycott meat and dairy products, but also to grow their own sustainable, organic plants privately, in their backyard (White, 2011) or more openly in urban community gardens (Bendt et al., 2013) as a way of building transitions towards post-capitalist urban commons (Chatterton, 2016). However, this conceptualisation would conflate political consumerism with other forms of political participation, resulting eventually into what van Deth (2014, p. 351) described as a 'theory of everything'.

To summarise, both 'discursive actions' and 'lifestyle choices' encompass variable behavioural repertoires, which may move beyond political consumerism (as for example signing petitions, demonstrating or even voting). Therefore, instead of conceptualising them as separate variants of political consumerism next to buycotting and boycotting, they may instead be understood as extra features indicating the *breadth* (in the case of discursive actions), and the *depth* (in the case of lifestyle choices) of one's involvement in political consumerism.

This however, makes them especially difficult to capture in political participation research, as is being evidenced by the general lack of studies presenting empirical data on either discursive actions and lifestyle choices, particularly on a comparative, cross-national level (Micheletti et al., 2012; Zorell, 2019b, p. 43). Therefore, instead of conflating different forms of political participation, at the additional risk of raising comparability issues, concentrating exclusively on buycotting and boycotting seems to be the most helpful approach. Such an approach will thus be assumed in the present thesis.

Conversely, even though most scholars acknowledge boycotting and buycotting as facets of political consumerism, a great part of research fails to distinguish between the two. Instead, only a handful of researchers consistently scrutinise buycotting and boycotting in their own rights (Baek, 2010; Copeland, 2014a; Koos, 2012), whereas the greatest part of the

research on the subject tends to examine political consumerism as a unified concept (Bossy, 2014; Micheletti et al., 2012; Newman and Bartels, 2011). In some of these studies, this practice is unproblematic. For example, if political consumerism is primarily understood as an expression of underlying values, distinguishing between buycotting and boycotting may be not be necessary. For instance, Newman and Bartels (2011), perceive political consumerism as a single unified phenomenon and scrutinise it as a way of achieving policy objectives and expressing political preferences, in comparison to other means of political participation. For Newman and Bartels therefore, the emphasis lies on the positioning of political consumerism as a single-dimensional phenomenon along other repertoires of political participation, rather than on the underlying drivers between buycotting and boycotting.

However, buycotting and boycotting are based on fundamentally dissimilar motivations. On the one hand, buycotting entails the deliberate decision to buy a certain product or support a specific firm as a means to reward their ethical production process, or their business conduct in relation to environmental concerns. As such, it may be perceived as an investment, or as a form of economic voting (Zhang, 2015). Instead, boycotting entails the deliberate rejection of the business conduct of certain firms and the production processes behind certain products, and as such it may be understood as a form of economic *ostracism* (Malkopoulou, 2017). As a form of political participation therefore it can be argued that it shares more similarities with demonstrations and generally with the politics of dissent (Pickard, 2018).

In view of the differing underlying motivations behind the two behavioural expressions of political consumerism therefore, one may regard buycotting as an appropriate form of political participation for certain political, ethical or environmental claims, and boycotting for others. For this reason, when the object of analysis is political consumerism in itself (and not in relation to other forms of political participation), using the general term 'political consumerism' as a unified phenomenon bears the risk of misinterpreting its significance to its entirety.

3. Determinants of Political Consumerism

Nevertheless, the findings of a great part of the research regarding the motivations of citizens to consume politically²⁰, are often interpreted as descriptive of a single, archetypical ‘politically consumer’. Instead, distinguishing between the generalised concept’s different praxial varieties, may yield significantly different (or even contradictory) results.

With regards to *age*, the greater part of research does not distinguish between boycotting and boycotting. Instead, it tends to focus on motivations on the individual level, largely based on distinct phases of one’s life (Kotzur et al., 2017; Lorenzini and Bassoli, 2015; Ward and deVreese, 2011). Newman and Bartels (2011) find that young people from 16 to 30 years of age are particularly more likely than their older contemporaries to take part in political consumerism – and that unlike conventional political participation, political consumerism is likely to decrease with age. Elsewhere, Gotlieb and Wells (2012) find a strong positive relationship between engagement in political consumerism at a young age and the development of those civic competencies necessary for the engagement in institutional politics as adults. Wicks et al. (2014) demonstrate that the predictors of adult political consumerism do not necessarily coincide with those of youth political consumerism, and they find that parental modelling is a significant predictor for both boycotting and boycotting at a young age²¹.

With regards to *gender*, significantly more females are political consumers within the same age cohorts (Stolle et al., 2010). These results have been confirmed in several other studies (Lorenzini and Bassoli, 2015; Micheletti, 2004; O’Neill and Gidengil, 2013; Petersson et al., 1998), and have led to a widespread academic perception that political consumerism is a ‘gendered’ form of political participation, which bridges the participation gap of institutional participatory forms (Bateman and Valentine, 2010; Micheletti, 2004; O’Neill and Gidengil, 2013; Stolle and Micheletti, 2006). One of the latest available studies on the subject (Zorell, 2019e, pp. 131–132), confirms that involvement in boycotting and boycotting has been on a steady

²⁰ These may include their socio-economic characteristics, opportunity structures, the cost of participation, particularised and generalised trust and postmaterialist values among others (see **Chapter 3**).

²¹ Nevertheless, their findings also suggest differing effects for boycotting and boycotting. They report that young boycotters are much more likely to be either liberal or conservatives, than moderate. Instead, young boycotters demonstrated support for individualism, and were more likely to also engage in other forms of political engagement.

rise over the last decade, with more women (63%) than men (60%) being active political consumers, although the gender difference has been declining, compared to older studies. However, it also reports that out of the subset of active political consumers, almost 81% of men and women have boycotted over the past year, while 85% of women have boycotted over the same period, as opposed to 77% of men.

With regards to *class* and *socioeconomic status*, contrary to concerns which perceive political consumerism as an elitist type of political participation (Maxton-Lee, 2020; Micheletti and Stolle, 2014; Tobiasen, 2004) that only a relatively small part of the overall population may be able to access, individual income levels seem to bear only a marginal effect – if any at all – on people’s propensity to engage in political consumerism (Copeland, 2014b; Tobiasen, 2004). Stolle et al. (2005) even discern a negative effect (albeit a weak one) with students from richer households being less likely to consume politically. When however, the studies are distinguishing between boycotting and boycotting among the general population, the results may be significantly different. For instance, Koos (2012, p. 47) reports that higher household income has a strong positive effect on boycotting, but no effect on boycotting.

Generally, when examining the influence of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (under the standpoint of the SES model of political participation) on political consumerism as a unified concept, findings indicate that political consumers are more likely to be individuals who are female, young, highly educated, and highly interested in politics (Newman and Bartels, 2011; O’Neill and Gidengil, 2013; Quintelier and van Deth, 2014; Tobiasen, 2004). However, in many of these studies, several participants indicate that they have either engaged in boycotting only or boycotting only and significantly less will typically respond that they have engaged in both (Stolle and Micheletti, 2005, p. 45). For example, Neilson (2010) examines the underlying motivations behind boycotters and boycotters only, and those who engage in both (dualboycotters) and finds that women, and more trusting and altruistic people are more likely to boycott, than boycott. Contrary to the unified conceptualisation of political consumerism therefore, these studies reveal differing demographic and socio-economic determinants for boycotters and boycotters. These differences support the inclusion of independent measures for boycotting and boycotting, in the study of political consumerism.

Nevertheless, even when the studies include separate measures for boycotting and boycotting, but examine only the SES characteristics of the respondents, the findings convey only a partial understanding of the drivers behind the individuals’ decisions to boycott or

boycott only, or to engage in both. Instead, studies that examine the phenomenon in light of the *Social Capital theory*, show that having high generalised trust and low trust in political institutions seems to be associated with higher involvement in political consumerism (Baek, 2010; Copeland, 2014b; Micheletti and Stolle, 2005). Moreover, examination of boycotting and boycotting separately provides somewhat more revealing findings. Neilson (2010, p. 220) considers the psychological variations between boycotters and boycotters and reports that, boycotters demonstrate much lower levels of trust in institutions (particularised trust) and in their fellow citizens (generalised trust), when compared to the boycotters. Moreover, whereas individuals with very low levels of particularised trust seem more likely to engage in boycotts than not to consume politically at all, it is only when they have high levels of generalised trust that they will tend to boycott than to not consume politically at all, demonstrating a difference behind their underlying dispositions behind each political consumerist variant when examined separately. Similar findings are being confirmed also by Baek (2010) and Copeland (2014a, p. 182).

With regards to the *rational agency* model, boycotts typically involve a greater cost than boycotts, which do not involve a monetary 'investment' that entails the risk of a loss. Consequently, boycotters can more easily observe whether their fellow citizens are also engaging in the same action, and thus do not require them to be so trusting. Moreover, boycotts are intended to influence producers and state regulations to change objectionable features of production processes or company conduct. Boycotts thus, as an expression of political dissent (Pickard, 2018) are expected to be associated with lower levels of institutionalised trust. For the same reason, boycotts will also be expected to have a positive correlation with support for Democracy in principle, unlike boycotts, which as a form of participation that conveys dissatisfaction with the prevailing market economy, may yield the opposite results.

Furthermore, studies emphasising on the *macro-level* determinants of political consumerism, reveal rather different patterns of boycotts and boycotts across countries. Political consumerism seems to be much more widespread in Northern European countries (Pellandini-Simányi and Gulyás, 2018) and in the US (Katz, 2011), with engagement rates steadily increasing over the past decade (Copeland, 2014a; Koos, 2012; Micheletti et al., 2012). However, the distinction between boycotting and boycotting discloses higher rates of boycotting in the US than in Europe as a whole (Copeland, 2014a, p. 180), with marginally lower

rates in the Western European countries, such as Germany, France, Switzerland and the UK, compared to Scandinavian countries (Koos, 2012, p. 46).

Moreover, the latest comprehensive and publicly available, large-scale, cross-national surveys that include measures for both boycotting and boycotting are rather dated: these include the Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy Study (CID) conducted in 2000 and the 2002/03 wave of the European Social Survey (Zorell, 2019b, p. 47). Nevertheless, both surveys clearly indicate that boycotting is more widespread than boycotting in almost every country under examination. Notable exception is Greece, which is the only country (along with Italy in the ESS, another MME country) which demonstrates higher levels of boycotts instead. Generally, the percentages for boycotting range between 4 and 11 percent in Southern and Central European countries; and 25 and 48 percent in Middle and Northern European/Scandinavian countries. In turn, when it comes to boycotting only, the percentages are much lower and vary between only 3 to 5 percent in Central and Southern Europe, and 10 to 32 percent in Middle and Northern European countries. More recent studies emphasising in single countries (Copeland, 2014a; Stolle et al., 2010) are maintaining that the distribution of boycotting and boycotting varies significantly across countries. This observation further highlights the importance of distinguishing between the two forms when studying political consumerism as a form of political participation.

Summarising, this section argues that on the one hand, when studying political consumerism as a form of political participation, the more comprehensive term 'political consumerism' is preferable than the more particularised terms 'ethical' and 'green' consumerism, or 'sustainable consumption'; since it allows the researcher to focus on the praxial component of the activity, rather than on its content (Zorell, 2019b, p. 47). The present thesis therefore, will assume the use of the term 'political consumerism' throughout, instead of its more particularised variants.

On the other hand, previous findings suggest that the way through which individuals engage in the two forms of political consumerism varies with regards to their socioeconomic characteristics and their underlying values and attitudes. Boycotting seems thus to be driven by a different set of factors than boycotting, or engaging in both. Treating boycotts and boycotts interchangeably, might underestimate the differences between the two. As a result, effects between individual factors and boycotting and/or boycotting may be erroneously attributed to all political consumers when, in fact, these may be associated with only one of the

two. Moreover, the magnitude of these effects may also be erroneously reported if, for example, they are positive for boycotting and negative for boycotting, cancelling each other out. For this reason, the first part of the analysis of the present thesis will examine the effects of a number of factors previously identified in **Chapter 3**, with regards to positive and negative consumerism separately. Moreover, instead of using the cumulative measurement for dualcotters (those who have engaged in both boycotting and boycotting), this thesis will employ a third measure for ‘boycotters/boycotters’, that is those who have engaged in either boycotting or boycotting. When used in conjunction to individual measures for boycotting and boycotting, this approach provides the benefit of discerning whether the individual effects of the single measures either spill-over to the cumulative measure, or whether they cancel each other out.

However, emphasising only on the praxial elements of political consumerism, that is in the actions of boycotting or boycotting only, still fails to capture the *breadth* and the *depth* of one’s involvement in political consumerism. The following section therefore, will devise a cumulative *Political Consumerism Index (PCI)*, consisting of the responsibility the consumer attributes to their purchasing decisions, the frequency with which they engage in such behaviour, in addition to its praxial elements. Unlike the combined measure for boycotters/boycotters above, the PCI attributes higher weight when the consumers engage in both boycotting and boycotting, as opposed to when they engage only in one of them. The PCI will thus be used as the dependent variable in **Chapter 12**. The following section will discuss the theoretical underpinnings behind the construction of the PCI, and will evaluate it in terms of validity and reliability.

4. Constructing the Political Consumerism Index (PCI)

Unlike other forms of political participation, as for example party or union membership, it is not possible to capture the full extent of political consumerism with a single-item question (Stolle et al., 2005). Nevertheless, although the discussion on the challenges and potentials of the creation of a simple and reliable empirical measure has recently received renewed attention (Gundelach, 2020), there still is “no population survey available that includes a variety of measurements of political consumerism” (Stolle et al., 2005, p. 10). One of the objectives of this thesis therefore, is to address this gap in the literature by constructing and employing a single valid and reliable survey tool to measure political consumerism that will be then used in

conjunction of the non-parametric analysis in **Chapters 10** and **11** to shed some light on the underlying motivations of young political consumers. In a series of articles at the beginning of 2000s, Stolle, Michelletti and Hooghe (2005; 2006), proposed the development of an Index of Political Consumerism, but this has been used thereafter only sporadically (Pellandini-Simányi and Gulyás, 2018) and has not gained academic traction. The present thesis will thus expand on this research, and will propose a variation of their *Index of Political Participation* which will then be used in the last chapter of this thesis to provide a definitive answer with regards to the differences and similarities of the phenomenon, among young people in Greece as opposed to the UK.

The discussion in the previous sections has indicated that measuring political consumerism as a single unified concept may misinterpret the underlying motivations behind its two praxial components, namely positive and negative consumerism. However, although taking into consideration boycotting and/or boycotting separately instead of the cumulative measure ('buy/boycotters') may be much more revealing, it still fails to capture the breadth and depth of the phenomenon. It follows therefore, that an effective operationalisation of political consumerism will have to incorporate other elements than just its two behavioural components. For Stolle et al. (2005; 2006), there are three conditions which need to be taken into consideration for a meaningful analysis of political consumerism as a form of political participation. These are **a)** behaviour, **b)** motivation, and **c)** frequency.

The *first* condition refers to the two praxial components of political participation, as discussed and analysed above. It is self-evident that the PCI will actually have to take into consideration whether consumers boycott or boycott certain goods and services, for them to be effectively classified as *political* consumers. This implies that citizens who never make any independent consumer decisions, either because they do not have their own income, or because they do not engage in shopping, are automatically excluded from this form of political participation. Most existing large-scale studies only include a cumulative measure ('buy/boycotters'), but as demonstrated, distinguishing between the different forms of political consumerism may reveal a different image of the phenomenon. For this reason, the PCI developed in this chapter will incorporate both positive and negative consumerism and will attribute additional weight for those political consumers who have engaged in both.

The *second* condition refers to the motivation behind the action itself. According to the working definition of political consumerism (see **Chapter 2**), political consumerism refers to the act of deliberately buying or refusing to buy certain goods and services, for ethical, environmental and political considerations (Stolle et al., 2005). Consequently, it is possible that individuals buy fair-trade or organic products simply because they are partial to how they taste

or because they were on sale. For example, some people never go to McDonald's (or other multinational fast-food franchises) not because they protest against the cultural hegemony of Americanism (Bové and Dufour, 2002) but simply because they do not like hamburgers. Stolle and Micheletti (2005, p. 11) thus argue that for political consumers to be classified as such, they need to be "motivated by ethical or political considerations, or at least by the wish to change social conditions, either with or without relying on the political system". The second component of the PCI therefore will be capturing how responsible people feel with regards to the impact of their purchasing decisions, in relation to their environmental, ethical or political considerations; that is, the *depth* or *content* behind their consumption behaviour.

Likewise, the *third* condition of the PCI will refer to the *breadth*, or *frequency* behind these consumption patterns. Although an isolated act of political consumerism can be important in and by itself, and would automatically classify the agent of the action as a political consumer in the majority of published studies on the subject, the PCI proposed in this study suggests that the consistency of these actions is equally important. Regular involvement in political consumerism activities therefore, needs also to be considered and distinguished from sporadic engagement. The third component of the PCI therefore, will be capturing the habitual commitment to political consumerism, with consumers who engage in it often, or almost always when they go shopping being attributed with greater weight in their PCI scores. Summarising therefore, the respondent's engagement in political consumerism will be operationalised by a single scale, consisting of three components which will capture the participants' *behavioural*, *attitudinal* and *habitual* patterns.

Stolle and Micheletti (2005, p. 11) refer to the attitudinal component of their index, as the extent to which "respondents believe in the political effectiveness of buying certain products and services, in addition to their view on whether citizens in general have the responsibility to choose the 'right' company (ethically or politically speaking that is) from which to buy products and services". However, it is important at this point to clarify that the attitudinal component of the PCI in this study will be capturing only the *responsibility* aspect behind one's consumer decisions. The reason is that when testing the index for reliability through a Principal Component Analysis (PCA), the Perceived Consumer Effectiveness components scored outside the quadrant where the behavioural and frequency components lay.

The exclusion of the Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) from the PCI as measured in this study, significantly improves the one previously developed by Stolle and Micheletti

(2005). Although the reliability test of their index²² was actually confirming that their PCI provided a reliable tool for the measurement of political consumerism as a multi-dimensional phenomenon, the factor analysis proved to be much more problematic. Their factor analysis conducted through a Principal Component Analysis (PCA), disclosed several difficulties as discussed in detail in their article, despite the progressive exclusion of several leading factors. They report that the more reflexive survey questions about whether respondents perceived boycotting as an effective tool, displayed low factor loadings during the PCA. This was also the case with respect to their industry-specific ethical considerations when choosing restaurants, banks, and paper products. As a result, attitudes did not load as sturdily on their index as behaviours did. For this reason, industry-specific questions were dropped from the PCI in this thesis, which instead perceives political consumerism as a phenomenon which transcends the various industries of any individual economic sector. Moreover, the inclusion of 13 items only for their attitudinal component seemed to be an overly complicated and time-consuming way of measuring political consumerism, especially for national polls and surveys which often suffer from financial and time constraints (Pontes et al., 2018); and would only hamper the subsequent use of the index in future studies. It can be argued that the reason the PCI did not gain traction in subsequent research on political consumerism is exactly because of its complex operationalisation.

In this study therefore, the measurement of the PCI scale will be reduced to a single manageable scale, consisting of only four variables and three components. These components are **a)** behaviour ('BUY' and 'BOY'), **b)** attitude (measured as consumer responsibility 'RES'), and **c)** habitual consistency or frequency ('FRE'). The PCI in this chapter will thus assume the following form:

$$PCI = (BUY+BOY) * (RES+FRE)$$

The actual phrasing of the 4 questions included in the PCI therefore is as follows (see also **Appendix II**):

- **BUY:** In the past 12 months, did you actively purchase one product or brand over another for ethical, environmental or political reasons? (0: No; 1: Yes).
- **BOY:** In the past 12 months, did you actively refuse to purchase a product or brand based on ethical, environmental or political considerations? (0: No; 1:Yes).

²² Cronbach's alpha for their 13-items battery was .86; higher than the .70 reliability cut-off point, confirming that their index consistently measured the phenomenon.

- **RES:** How responsible do you feel with regards to choosing the 'right' brand when you go shopping? (0: Not at all responsible; 4: Very responsible).
- **FRE:** How often do you purchase, or avoid purchasing certain products, services or brands for ethical, environmental or political considerations? (0: Hardly ever; 4: Every time I go shopping).

BUY and BOY are both dichotomous variables, which assume the value '0' if the respondents *have not* deliberately purchased (buycotted), or if they *have not* purposely refrained from buying (boycotting), a product or brand for political, ethical and environmental considerations in the previous 12 months. Conversely, they assume the value '1' if the respondents have engaged in these activities. As a result, the combined behavioural component (BUY+BOY) assumes the value '0' if the respondents have engaged in neither of the two activities; '1' if they have engaged in either buycotting or boycotting only; and '2' if they have engaged in both. The variable RES ranges from 0 ('Not at all responsible') to 4 ('Very responsible'). Likewise for the variable FRE, which ranges from 0 ('Hardly ever') to 4 ('Every time I go shopping'). As a result, the combined component (RES+FRE) may assume values ranging from 0 to 8.

This means that if the respondent has engaged in either buycotting or boycotting or both (values 1 and 2), but they reported not being 'responsible' when they did, and they simultaneously reported doing so 'Hardly ever' in the past 12 months, the component (RES+FRE) will assume the value '0', eventually nullifying the PCI. Conversely, if the respondents reported high responsibility and high frequency with regards to their consumer decisions, but they reported that they had not engaged in either buycotting or boycotting in the past 12 months, the component (BUY+BOY) will similarly assume the value '0', similarly nullifying the PCI. If however, the respondent has engaged in both buycotting and boycotting, (BUY+BOY) assumes the value '2', eventually doubling their score in (RES+FRE). The PCI therefore takes the form of a continuous scale, ranging from 0 to 16. These interventions have thus led to the construction of a much more intuitive PCI, consisting of only four variables.

Testing for reliability, the Cronbach's Alpha score was above the conventional cut-off point of 0.700, suggesting that the PCI is highly reliable, precise, reproducible, and consistent from one testing occasion to another. That is, if the survey was repeated with a different group of respondents, then broadly the same results would be obtained.

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
.728	.795	4

Moreover, the PCI scale in this study is also reliable for both the subsamples of the UK (Cronbach's Alpha: 0.720) and Greece (Cronbach's Alpha: 0.734), further supporting the reliability of the scale.

Reliability Statistics

1-GR, 2-UK	Cronbach's Alpha	Cronbach's Alpha Based on Standardized Items	N of Items
Greece	.734	.801	4
UK	.720	.786	4

The validity of an index instead, is the degree to which the tool measures what it claims to measure. Testing for validity using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) the PCI has been shown to be one-dimensional (Eigen Value: 2.480) and captures 62% of the variance in political consumerism.

Total Variance Explained

Component	Total	Initial Eigenvalues		Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
		% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.480	62.001	62.001	2.480	62.001	62.001
2	.642	16.039	78.040			
3	.476	11.889	89.929			
4	.403	10.071	100.000			

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

The analysis above therefore points towards an understanding of political consumerism, as consisting not only of its praxial components (buycotting and boycotting), as in the majority of other studies. Instead, in addition to buycotting and boycotting, the PCI includes also the attitudinal and frequency elements of the phenomenon. Consequently, the development of the PCI provides a state-of-the art contribution to the study of political consumerism.

An independent sample t-test revealed that the respondents from Greece ($M_{GR}=7.58_{PCI}$, $SD_{GR}=5.21$) did not score significantly differently from those in the UK ($M_{UK}=6.50_{PCI}$, $SD_{UK}=5.34$), ($t_{(554)}=2.41$, $p=0.016$), indicating that there is not a statistically significant difference in the expression of political consumerism among young people in the two countries, as it can be seen in **Figure 4**.




Figure 4: Mean score of the PCI per country

5. Conclusion

This chapter has provided a precise delineation of the conceptual varieties of political consumerism – namely positive and negative political consumerism - and has discussed their underlying character, independently from each other. The chapter began by introducing some of the several issue-related terms which have been used in the broad study of politically-oriented purchasing behaviour. Terms such as ‘sustainable consumption’, ‘ethical consumerism’ or ‘green buying behaviour’ have been often used interchangeably. However, a closer examination on the use of such terms reveals that, eventually, all these terms are specialised, issue-specific sub-concepts in relation to the specific characteristics of a product, but they are not really separate forms of actions used to express a political preference. The first section of this chapter therefore has advocated that these may all be understood as subparts of the more general term of ‘political consumerism’.

The second section of the chapter proceeded by suggesting that, in the study of political consumerism as a form of political participation, researchers should take into consideration both of the constituting behavioural expressions of the phenomenon - namely positive (buycotting) and negative (boycotting) political consumerism. It has therefore discussed buycotting and boycotting in their own rights and independently from each other. It has made the case that the use of the general term 'political consumerism' as a unified conceptualisation of the phenomenon, when used interchangeably to signify either engagement in buycotts only, in boycotts only or engagement in either/or both, fails to capture the differing underlying motivations, values and attitudes behind its two separate behavioural expressions.

Nevertheless, it has also discussed how examining only the behavioural components of political consumerism (whether individually or in their sum), runs the risk of ignoring the breadth (the responsibility behind the action) and depth (frequency, or habitual consistency) of the phenomenon. Therefore, the chapter concluded by proposing the development of a Political Consumerism Index (PCI) which has two key purposes: on the one hand, it is able to capture both the behavioural aspects of political consumerism (by attributing additional weight when the respondents have engaged in both buycotting and boycotting); on the other hand, it is simultaneously able to capture the responsibility and frequency of the said behaviour in a single intuitive index. The PCI has been tested for validity and reliability and will be used in **Chapter 12** as the dependent variable, so as to provide a conclusive image about the factors underlying political consumerism among young people in the UK and in Greece.

Chapter 8: Methodology: Overview of the study procedure

1. Research aim and objectives

This thesis uses a mixed-method approach. The initial analysis of the focus groups conducted in the two countries informed the subsequent development of the survey questionnaire. The use of primarily quantitative research methods, in conjunction with qualitative data provides a comprehensive (and comparative) picture of political consumption in the UK and in Greece. The lack of conclusive empirical evidence in the available literature on the determining factors of political consumerism, has informed my research aim and objectives.

Therefore, the overarching research aim of this thesis is:

1. to identify and interpret the key drivers underpinning the changing patterns of political participation amongst young people, with particular emphasis on political consumerism, using a paired-country comparison research approach, among young people in the UK and in Greece.

In order to achieve the overarching aim of the thesis however, the following research objectives need to be addressed:

1. Firstly, it is necessary to gain insights concerning young people's motivations for, and patterns of, political consumerism, through a series of focus groups conducted in the two countries;
2. secondly, to inform the survey questionnaire with the insights gained from the focus groups, and devise an innovative measurement instrument for political consumerism; and
3. finally, analysing the data from the survey, to identify the key drivers underpinning young people's decisions to engage in political consumerism in the UK and in Greece.

In this process however, having had indications from my preliminary analysis about the contextual influence of neoliberalism on young people's decisions to engage in political consumerism, I have decided to expand the research objectives above. A final objective therefore is:

4. to examine the extent to which young people in the UK and Greece may be driven into political consumerism by the 'push and pull effects' of neoliberalism.

2. Research questions

Although Diamond (2008, p. 294) has argued that in order to build free, democratic societies around the world, both "leaders and citizens must internalise the spirit of democracy", the present thesis has assumed a comparative individualist approach that moves beyond the usual elite-focused literature. Notwithstanding a continuous increase and expansion in political consumerist activities (Copeland and Boulianne, 2020; Gundelach, 2020), not much is known about their emergence and their political nature or about the profile of the political consumers (Baek, 2010; Brown-Iannuzzi et al., 2017; Dhaoui et al., 2020). Following Stolle et al. (2005) this doctoral research project acknowledges five areas of inquiry into political consumerism, which will be cumulatively pursued throughout this thesis:

- RQ 1:** First and foremost, stands the question of operationalisation. How should we measure political consumerism? How can we make sure that this measure captures those young people who consistently and intentionally purchase, or refrain from buying, products or services for environmental, ethical or political considerations? Although the issue of measurement has recently received renewed interest (Gundelach, 2020), it remains an issue of critical concern, as we are still a long way from an intuitive, but comprehensive instrument which captures political consumerism's *praxial* components, as well as the *breadth* and *depth* of the phenomenon.
- RQ 2:** The second issue this thesis will address refers to the economic or market-related predictors of the phenomenon. Given the centrality that political consumerism places on the market, would income levels, economic and market-related factors '*pull*' young people to engage in it? Stolle et al. (2005, p. 252) posit that "income makes a difference here; citizens with deeper pockets might be able to afford ethical products (...) while those with more limited budgets might not". Further to their subjective socio-economic conditions, how does satisfaction from the market-environment or the internalisation of neoliberal governmentality affect their decisions to use the market as an arena for politics?
- RQ 3:** A third issue of concern is how these economic conditions may affect the value-orientations and the social embeddedness of young political consumers. Post-modernisation literature (Inglehart, 1997, 2016) has consistently emphasised the role of the prevalent economic conditions during one's formative years, towards the development and crystallisation of postmaterialist values. These in turn, have been

found to be associated with a perceived increase of lifestyle forms of political participation. However, this theory was developed in times of unprecedented economic prosperity. Would the same apply to young political consumers in the UK and in Greece, who are socialised in times of economic austerity instead?

RQ 4: A fourth issue derives from social capital theory, which broadly put, suggests that embeddedness in informal networks, such as voluntary associations, in the form of generalised and particularised social trust, allows young citizens to overcome collective action problems (Putnam, 1995). Mobilisation theory (Almond and Verba, 1963) expands this rationale suggesting that networks and associations facilitate recruitment for political participatory acts (Almond and Verba, 1963). The theory of imagined communities (Anderson, 2006) in turn, implies that the personal outlook of the agent affects their conception of the ingroup and may further enhance the engagement of young people in participatory activities. Sloam and Henn (2018) have recently discerned the role of widening personal identity outlook, or cosmopolitanism, behind an alleged 'Youthquake' in Britain. What is the role of the formation of individual and collective identities on young peoples' propensity to engage in political consumerism?

RQ 5: Finally, what is the relationship of political consumerism to more traditional forms of participation? From the standpoint of *risk society* and *sub-politics* (Beck, 1992), we should expect that political consumers would be less trusting of political institutions and would therefore utilise alternative ways of making their voices heard. Is political consumerism therefore 'crowding-out' institutional forms of political participation, and if so, to which extent is the traditional political arena responsible for alienating the young people, and thus 'pushing' them away from traditional repertoires of participatory action, towards more imaginative approaches such as political consumerism? Is such a relationship exclusive or does it instead imply a widening of the available political participation repertoires (Pickard, 2019b; Theocharis and van Deth, 2018), so as to include both contentious and institutional politics?

Of course, the issues above cannot be examined in isolation, especially since they are to a great extent interrelated, and contextual background information should therefore also be considered. This thesis will therefore assume a multi-layered process (Zorell, 2019c) with regards to the examination of political consumerism. The following sections will thus discuss the philosophical assumption and the methodological approach that will be utilised throughout this thesis.

3. Philosophical assumptions

The term ‘social sciences’ refers to “the disciplined and systematic study of society and its institutions, and of how and why people behave as they do, both as individuals and in groups within society” (Pontes, 2019, p. 120) and encompasses several areas like psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics and political sciences (Halloran, 2010). The philosophical bases of social sciences therefore may be divided into **a)** ontological, **b)** epistemological, and **c)** methodological. The first relate to the existence of a ‘real’ and ‘objective’ world. The second links to how we can acknowledge this world and the forms this knowledge will take. Finally, the latter refers to the selection of instruments that may be used to acquire this knowledge (Corbetta, 2003, pp. 13–14). A clear distinction between these three components of social sciences is therefore needed in order to avoid confusion when recognising and discussing theoretical approaches to social phenomena (Pontes, 2019, p. 123).

The two predominant ontological approaches in social sciences may be summarised as follows: *essentialism* comprises of the standpoint that phenomena are ‘real’, that is natural, inevitable, and biologically determined. *Constructivism*, instead rests on the standpoint that – although not any less ‘real’ – what we call external or objective ‘reality’ is a social construct and highlights language as the epistemological ‘tool’ by which we interpret experience. With regards to young people’s political participation, an essentialist ontological position would consider young people being fundamentally different from adults, demonstrating features that are common across cultures, and persistent across time. This thesis instead, perceives these differences as *socially constructed outcomes* of their nurture and the material, social and economic conditions in which they are being brought up. The approach taken in **Chapter 2** on the definition of ‘young people’ has already assumed a clear constructivist standpoint on the ontological approach of this thesis.

The purpose of this thesis therefore is not merely to identify the patterns with which young people engage in political consumption, but to inform our ontological understanding of how these patterns are being influenced by the prevalent socio-economic conditions during their socialisation, allowing for these patterns to be altered in a socially desirable way. The emphasis of this thesis on consumption as a post-modern phenomenon and lifestyle forms of political participation, according to young people’s own understanding of the concept, is indicative of this standpoint. For example, examining young people’s postmaterialist value orientations (Inglehart, 1997) is indicative of the constructivist ontological standpoint of this study. The postmaterialist thesis is focusing on the existence and the role of material conditions

prevalent during one's socialisation in the development of their values and attitudes throughout adulthood. By implication, a change in these conditions could potentially alter young people's focus, patterns and intensity of political engagement in the foreseeable future.

This ontological position has in turn, informed the epistemological approach of the thesis. Two contrasting epistemological positions have dominated research in social sciences: '*Positivism*', which is often associated with quantitative research and '*Interpretivism*' which is usually associated with qualitative research. The former advocates the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social interaction (Pontes, 2019, p. 123). A purely positivist epistemological standpoint with regards to political participation would perceive the political engagement of young people as linked to essentialist attributes of being 'young'. For example Ackermann (2017) emphasises individual differences and personality traits of young people in explaining participation in protests. An interpretivist epistemological position instead, is predicated upon a methodological approach that "requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social action" (Bryman, 2016; Pontes, 2019, p. 122). For instance, Sloam (2018) assumes an interpretivist epistemological position by seeking to understand the processes through which young people become politically active. Since the present thesis will utilise a primarily quantitative approach, its positivist dimension is self-evident. However, the intention to *interpret* the processes through which young people engage in political consumerism is central to the aims and objectives of the thesis. Transcending thus the standard epistemological cleavage between positivism and interpretivism, the quantitative findings will be augmented by the qualitative insights from the focus groups, so as to *identify* and *interpret* the processes through which young people engage in political consumerism.

4. Methodological approach

This study will thus utilise a paired-country comparison method, within a *multi-method research* design. It initially conducted a series of focus groups in the two countries, the insights of which informed both the survey questionnaire and subsequently the theories utilised to support the findings. In other words, the research approach of this thesis utilises elements of *grounded theory*, whereby "theory emerges from the data" (Henn et al., 2009:184) through an iterative process.

The architect of grounded theory, Strauss, defined the three elements any research design utilising grounded theory should include (Legewie and Schervier-Legewie, 2004):

- *Theoretical sampling*, refers to deciding which variables to examine next or whom to interview according to the status of theory generation. In other words, starting the analysis with the first samples, or transcriptions, and developing hypotheses from an early stage.
- *Theoretical sensitive coding*, refers to generating theoretically robust insights from the data to explain the phenomenon under scrutiny.
- The necessity of *comparisons* between contexts and phenomena to strengthen the theories developed.

The research design of this thesis therefore, is based primarily on quantitative methods, while however, when appropriate, traces support from the qualitative data, that is the insights of the young people themselves, collected during the focus groups.

According to Bergman (2008) multi-method analysis diverges from the traditional quantitative versus qualitative methodological cleavage by recognising how different research methods – when combined - may complement each other and “generate confident, well-rounded research findings” (Robertson, 2009, p. 67). On the one hand, quantitative methods are particularly useful in understanding large data sets and allow therefore for comparisons across different cases. Such an approach however, when used in isolation, often lacks contextualisation, and therefore presents the difficulty of confidently explaining divergent findings. By way of contrast, qualitative methods remain restricted to much smaller population sizes. For the same reason however, they present the benefit of more in-depth and contextualised insights, which may allow for more convincing explanations behind particular findings (Kuehn and Rohlfig, 2010).

Research on youth political participation has often acknowledged important differences between researchers’ and young people’s own understandings of politics (Henn and Foard, 2014). Consequently, closed-ended survey questions alone, which ask about people’s participation, interest and trust in politics, are likely to result in a distorted representation of young people’s engagement levels. Conversely, research that introduces politics in general terms and relates it to young people’s own attitudes and experiences may yield significantly different findings. For example, a mixed-methods study of young people’s political engagement in Britain (Henn, Weinstein, and Wring, 2002), disclosed that participants held strong opinions when asked in focus groups about political issues that concerned them, despite their survey responses conveying an overwhelming disillusionment with formal party politics.

The following sections therefore will outline the research design of the present study, which involves: **a)** a paired country comparison, using a combination of **b)** focus groups, in conjunction to **c)** survey questionnaire analysis.

a. Paired-country comparison

The decision to conduct a paired-country comparison was informed by the concise advantages of this approach over large population studies on the one hand, and single-country case studies, on the other (Robertson, 2009, p. 39). With regards to the former, which usually aim to compare and contrast several countries at once, paired-country comparisons allow for more in-depth examination into the underlying factors behind the dependent variable. In this way, they avoid the conceptual stretching which is often detected in large population studies (Landman and Carvalho, 2016; Robertson, 2009). With regards to a single-country case study, a paired-country comparison approach also offers distinct advantages, since it allows the findings “to be tested across contrasting political, economic and social contexts” (Robertson, 2009, p. 40) and therefore is able to generate more robust conclusions, instead of a crude description of a single national case.

The decision to compare and contrast political consumerism in the UK and in Greece, has been dictated on the one hand by practical reasons, that is my personal access in these societies, but also on theoretical grounds because of their underlying economic and socio-political differences, which **Chapter 6** has already discussed in detail. With regards to political consumerism for example, by holding the dependent factor constant (that is political consumerism measured either in terms of boycotting and boycotting in **Chapters 10** and **11**, or by the PCI in **Chapter 12**), and contrasting it among the UK, that is a ‘Liberal Market Economy’ (LME) country, as opposed to Greece, a ‘Mediterranean – or Mixed- Market Economy’ (MME) country (see **Chapter 6**), has allowed me to unpack the country-specific factors which influence young people’s engagement in political consumerism, in each. Especially in view of the lack of studies examining the impact of neoliberalism on political consumerism, and the fact that the greatest part of existing research is based on large population studies or independent case studies instead (Copeland and Boulianne, 2020), a paired-country comparison approach is expected to offer useful insights in the field.

b. Focus groups

With the above in mind, this thesis assumed the position that focus group discussions were a particularly appropriate method for gaining insights concerning young people’s motivations for, and patterns of, political consumerism. Focus groups allow participants to openly talk about the topic under examination in terms of their own frames of reference and have been previously employed elsewhere to study both consumer motivations (Bray et al., 2011), as well

as youth political engagement (Pontes et al., 2018) with similar numbers of participants and research designs to this study.

This thesis therefore has followed the recommendations of Henn et al. (2009) according to which small groups are usually preferred during focus groups to minimise potential social-desirability bias effects, especially in cases where young people may feel reticent in large groups to challenge opinions which are at variance with their own. Two focus groups were thus assembled in Greece and also two in the UK, each ranging in size from four to six young political consumers, aged 18 to 29 years of age²³.

Previous research (Hopkins and Williamson, 2012) has examined the links between neighbourhood design and preferred political participation modes. In order to minimise these effects, the focus groups in Greece were conducted both in the capital city of Athens and the rural town of Epidavros, to ensure representation from both urban and rural populations. Likewise, the UK focus groups took place in Nottingham, a large city in central England, and participants included young people from a mixed socioeconomic background, distinguishing between inner-city (socio-economically deprived) cohorts and outer-city (socio-economically advantaged) cohorts. However, during the analysis of the focus groups, there has been no attempt to compare insights according to residency, class or gender as sample numbers are too small to make generalisations across these variables. These factors however, have not been neglected during the analysis of the survey.

The focus groups were arranged with emphasis on gender-balance. Although Kitzinger (2007) contends that focus groups are particularly conducive to feminist studies, allowing access to the interactional context of women's lives, this study conducted mixed-gender focus groups instead. The intention was to capture how young people interacted in mixed groups when discussing their political consumerist motivations and how they responded to disagreements. The interactive dynamic of the mixed focus groups was a critical element shaping our selection of participants. The moderator and the assistant moderator used certain tactics to mitigate the danger of 'dominant talkers' – an issue that is particularly gender- and class-sensitive in focus groups (Henn et al., 2009). These included tactfully asking participants to curtail their contribution, or by noting how they expressed certain points and how others

²³ In order to make sure that none of the participants had any previous theoretical knowledge on the topic of political participation or neoliberalism which could drive the discussion away from young people's own understandings and towards existing theoretical paths, students of political and social sciences were excluded from the focus groups.

reacted to these - including gestures, posture or facial expressions - to ensure, as far as was possible, that all voices were encouraged, heard and amplified.

As mentioned above, the research approach of the focus groups utilised elements of grounded theory, whereby “theory emerges from the data” (Henn et al., 2009, p. 184) through an iterative process. Having thus introduced the general topic of political consumers’ motivations, the moderator offered participants opportunities to shape the course of key aspects of the discussion. Having conducted the focus groups, I coded their transcriptions thematically, searching for patterns and relationships within the data. Subsequently, I turned to theory in order to explain these patterns. Previous work on the subject (Bray et al., 2011; Hay, 2007; Stolle et al., 2005) did of course partly inform my thinking about which key themes to address, whilst however, remaining open to data-driven understandings emerging from the discussions.

The eventual aim of the focus groups was to reveal important insights concerning the dynamics of young peoples’ engagement in political consumerist activities within a broad political, spatial and social context, in both countries. Given the exploratory nature of the research and the sample size, the qualitative part of my research design does not make any claims concerning the generalisability of the findings. Instead, the intention behind the focus groups was to enhance the knowledge from the literature review by accessing the young participants’ own understandings and frames of reference on the topic of political consumerism. Such insights would not have been possible to acquire alone by using a survey-based study involving a large number of participants. **Figure 5** below presents the participants’ characteristics from both countries in terms of gender, age, occupation²⁴ and residency, while the guide for the focus groups questions can be found in **Appendix I**.

²⁴ ‘NEET’ in **Figure 5** stands for ‘Not in employment, education or training’.

Participant	Gender	Age	Occupation	Focus Group	Country	Area
Participant A	Female	20	Student	A	GR	Athens
Participant B	Male	24	Student	A	GR	Athens
Participant C	Male	25	Student	A	GR	Athens
Participant D	Male	19	Student	A	GR	Athens
Participant E	Male	24	NGO worker	A	GR	Athens
Participant F	Female	24	Freelancer	A	GR	Athens
Participant G	Male	19	Private sector	B	GR	Epidavros
Participant H	Female	25	Housewife	B	GR	Epidavros
Participant I	Female	24	NEET	B	GR	Epidavros
Participant J	Female	20	NEET	B	GR	Epidavros
Participant K	Female	25	Student	C	UK	Inner city
Participant L	Female	25	Student	C	UK	Inner city
Participant M	Male	25	Student	C	UK	Inner city
Participant N	Female	18	NEET	C	UK	Inner city
Participant O	Male	19	NEET	C	UK	Inner city
Participant P	Male	18	Student	C	UK	Inner city
Participant Q	Male	23	Student	D	UK	Outer city
Participant R	Female	20	Student	D	UK	Outer city
Participant S	Male	25	Journalist	D	UK	Outer city
Participant T	Female	26	Student	D	UK	Outer city
Participant U	Female	20	Student	D	UK	Outer city

Figure 5: Focus groups participants' characteristics

c. Survey questionnaire

In turn, the quantitative part of this study has adopted an intensive cross-sectional research design. The survey questionnaire was developed online on Smart Survey platform²⁵, the expenses for which were covered from the research grant provided by Nottingham Trent University. Several questions are adapted with permission from a survey on political participation of young people previously conducted by Henn et al. (2012). Others have been adapted from the European Social Survey (ESS)²⁶ and the World Values Survey (WVS)²⁷. However, I have personally created the majority of the questions and the survey design. An initial pilot test on a sample of 34 completed responses from Greece and 26 from the UK with respondents commenting on errors, omissions, unclear wording, and problems with question order. This feedback allowed me to change the unclear language, question order and to include some additional questions. The responses of the test samples were then discarded. A full copy of the final survey is being provided in **Appendix II**.

A convenience sampling method resulted in 1,114 survey responses created, 471 of which were only partially responded, yielding eventually 634 completed responses among young people, 18 to 29 years of age, from both Greece (n= 313) and the UK (n=321). Having conducted a scoping study of other PhD theses and peer-reviewed articles on youth political participation, the results indicated that such a sample size was reasonable, considering both the financial and time constraints of the study. For example, Long (2010) analysing ethical consumption in the state of Colorado utilised a sample of 463 completed surveys in his thesis, whereas Pontes (2019) in her thesis on a comparative study between Britain and Portugal utilised a primary sample of 257 and 297 completed responses respectively. Moreover, in their seminal and widely influential study on political consumerism, Stolle et al. (2005) based their study on a sample of 372 university students from Canada, 284 from Sweden, and only 187 from Belgium.

The UK participants were recruited both at Nottingham Trent University and via other UK educational institutions and likewise for the Greek participants, from the National and Kapodestrian University of Athens. The selection of the above educational institutions was made because they provide relatively easy access to a large pool of respondents within the age cohorts of concern. The overall sample of the initial respondents was subsequently also disseminated to youth civil society organisations in both countries. The helpful approach of the representatives of Youth Mobility Centre (YMC) and the Youth and Lifelong Learning

²⁵ https://www.smartsurvey.co.uk/s/EN_Consumerism2018/

²⁶ <https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/>

²⁷ <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/>

Foundation of Greece in Greece and Epic CiC in Britain, was invaluable with regards to the dissemination of the questionnaire.

Although these contacts significantly facilitated the dissemination of the survey, the resulting collection of responses was lagging behind with regards to the agreed timelines, so I decided to personally disseminate the survey in open spaces in Nottingham, Cardiff, Stirling and London, in the UK and in Athens, Epidavros, and the island of Kythira in Greece. All of the young people who finally took part in the research were requested to sign an Informed Consent Form (see **Appendix II**), stating that they agreed to do so on an individual and voluntarily basis, and not as members of the organisations above. The following section presents the demographic and socio-economic profile of the overall sample.


d. Profile of the overall sample.

Across the whole sample (n=634) , 64.5% (n=409 respondents) reported that they had actively engaged in boycotts in the past 12 months, as opposed to 59.6% (n=378) who engaged in boycotts. The percentage of those who engaged in either boycotts or boycotts, reaches 73.2% (n=464) of the overall respondents, demonstrating that political consumerism has become one of the most widespread forms of political engagement among the young (Albacete, 2014; Stolle et al., 2010b; Ward and de Vreese, 2011).

1.1 By country:

With regards to the distribution of the respondents by country, out of the 634 respondents of the overall sample from both countries, 49.4% were respondents from Greece, while the remaining 50.6% were from the UK, for an almost equally divided sample (**Table 1.1**).


Entire Sample		
Country	%	N
Greece	49.4	313
UK	50.6	321
Total	100	634



1.2 By gender:

According to the latest wave (2017-2020) of WVS, women constitute 52.6% and men constitute 47.4% of both Greece and the UK in the age category up to 29 years of age. **Table 1.2** reveals therefore that there is an oversample of females over males in my sample: women are constituting 61.0% of the respondents and men 37.5%, whereas 1.4% of the total sample indicated 'other' or preferred not to answer.


Table 1.2 <u>Gender:</u>	<u>Entire Sample</u>	
	%	N
Male	37.5	238
Female	61.0	387
Other	1.4	9
Total	100	634



1.3 By age:

In terms of the age of the respondents, data from the WVS indicates that young people up to 29 years of age in Greece and in the UK constitute 18.1% of the overall population of both countries. All of the participants of my survey were between 18 and 29 years old at the closing date of the survey (March 2019). **Table 1.3** shows the distribution of the respective age of the respondents within this larger age cohort. The greatest part (44%) of the respondents were between 21 to 23 years of age.


Table 1.3 <u>Age:</u>	<u>Entire Sample</u>	
	%	N
27-29 years	14.5	92
24-26 years	21.3	135
21-23 years	44.0	279
18-20 years	20.2	128
Total	100%	634



1.4 Belonging into a minority:

Table 1.4 illustrates the respondents' self-reported belonging into a minority, whether ethnic, religious or sexual. The corresponding graph indicates that 76.5% did not belong into a minority, as opposed to 23.5% who responded that they belonged into one.


Table 1.4	<u>Entire Sample</u>	
	<u>Minority:</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes	23.5	149
No	76.5	485
Total	100	634



1.5 Living with parents:

Similarly, **Table 1.5** displays the percentage of those participants out of the overall sample who were living with their parents (48.7%), as opposed to those who were living on their own (51.3%). These figures present a noteworthy difference from the available data from the latest WVS wave (2017-2020), according to which 64.0% of those up to 29 years of age live on their own.


Table 1.5	<u>Entire Sample</u>	
	<u>Living with parents</u>	<u>%</u>
Yes	48.7	309
No	51.3	325
Total	100	634



1.6 Primary household earner:

In turn, **Table 1.6** shows the percentage of those participants who were the primary earners of their household (20.5%) as opposed to those who were not (79.5%). Benchmark data from the WVS for both countries, reveal a similar tendency among the greatest part of young people up to 29 years of age not being the primary earner in their household (34.1% and 65.9% respectively).


Primary household earner	Entire Sample	
	%	N
Yes	20.5	130
No	79.5	504
Total	100	634



1.7 Residence

In terms of residence, **Table 1.7** reveals that 56.9% of the respondents of the overall sample were living in a city or a town, whereas 41.6% were living in a village or in the countryside. These figures present a much more equal representation on the urban/rural divide, compared to the 86.7% of young people up to 29 years of age living in urban centres, according to the WVS.

Residence	Entire Sample	
	%	N
Urban	56.9	361
Rural	41.6	264
Prefer not to say	1.4	9
Total	100	634




1.8 Subjective class

The respondents were also asked to identify whether the tasks they often engaged in were predominately manual or intellectual. **Table 1.8** shows that 66.9% of the respondents of the overall sample considered themselves as 'mostly intellectuals', as opposed 33.1% who considered themselves as belonging into the 'mostly manual' category²⁸.

²⁸ The different categorisation of subjective class, and the lack of available data for the UK in the latest (2017-2020) wave of WVS do not allow for comparisons on this variable.


Subjective class	Entire Sample	
	%	N
Mostly Manual	33.1	210
Mostly Intellectual	66.9	424
Total	100	634



1.9 Relative income

The respondents were also asked to indicate in which income group they would say their household belongs, compared to other households in their country. The resulting distribution for the overall sample is reported in **Table 1.9**.

Relative income	Entire Sample	
	%	N
Low	23.7	150
Medium Low	33.3	211
Medium High	32.2	204
High	10.9	69
Total	100	634




1.10 Education attainment

The same applies for social class measured by education attainment. **Table 1.10** reports the distribution of the overall sample according to educational attainment. The overwhelming majority were either university graduates or currently studying for their degree.

Table 1.10 Entire Sample

Education attainment	%	N
Primary	0.6	4
Technical / Vocational	1.3	8
Incomplete Secondary	6.0	38
Complete Secondary	5.8	37
University student	21.8	138
University graduate	62.9	399
Other	1.6	10
Total	100	634




1.11 Employment status

Finally, **Table 1.11** shows that 59.8% were still in education, 27.6% were in paid employment and 8.2% were currently unemployed. According to the WVS (2017-2020) the figures for those up to 29 years of age in paid work was 43.9%; for those in education was 23.3%; and for those unemployed was 16.4%. There is therefore a noticeable over-representation of students in this survey, given that a great part of the respondents were recruited from (or around) university campuses in both countries. For the same reason, there also seems to be an under-representation of those young people in paid work and those currently unemployed.

Table 1.11 Entire Sample

Employment status	%	N
Paid Work	27.6	175
In Education	59.8	379
Unemployed	8.2	52
Other	4.4	28
Total	100	634



5. Ethical considerations with regards to anonymity and confidentiality

Prior to circulating the survey, I had obtained the relevant Ethical Approvals from the Ethical Research Committee of Nottingham Trent University, for both the qualitative (21/06/2018) and

the quantitative (19/07/2018) stages of my research. I was thus, aware of the risks to anonymity, confidentiality and privacy posed by all kinds of personal information storage and processing which could directly identify a respondent (e.g. questionnaire responses, audio-tapes and e-mail records). Although accidental breaches of confidentiality were deemed highly unlikely, it was agreed that if I, or a member of my research team, would have indications of confidentiality being threatened, relevant records would be destroyed. The collection, storage, disclosure and use of research data complied with the Data Protection Act (1998)²⁹ according to which all personal information collected was considered privileged information and was dealt with in such a manner as not to compromise the personal dignity of the participant or to infringe upon their right to privacy.

6. Independent contribution to knowledge

Through the multi-method research design outlined above, the original contribution of this thesis will be to identify the key drivers behind young people's decision to engage in political consumerism, in the UK and Greece.

Although both anecdotal and case-study evidence have long suggested that consumer behaviour such as the boycotting or boycotting of products and services for political, ethical and environmental reasons can take on political significance (Stolle et al. 2005), it will be the first time that such a study will be focusing on young people socialised in times of austerity, examining how the material conditions of relative scarcity at the time of their socialisation may have affected their propensity to engage in political consumerism. Moreover, and despite claims that political consumerism has become more widespread in recent years, it has not been examined systematically in a cross-sectional comparative study between the UK and Greece. By doing so, not only will this thesis provide insights about the underlying behaviour, attitudes and value orientations of young political consumers in both countries; but it will also help in positioning political consumerism among the emerging repertoires of youth political participation, in a changing political context, where the political and the economic spheres become increasingly indistinguishable.

Moreover, the literature review along with the preliminary findings, have identified – not unexpectedly, but unplanned for – an additional contextual factor behind the perceived

²⁹ Available at: www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1998/19980029.htm

rise of political consumerism in both countries, albeit in different directions in each. That is none other than the internalisation of neoliberal governmentality, as discussed in **Chapter 5**. Disenfranchised and disillusioned by the seeming incapacity of the purely electoral-political sphere to respond to their individualised claims, and having internalised the neoliberal critique of democracy, the young empowered citizen-consumers will thus often search for the ‘political’ within the bounds of the marketplace and will be increasingly attracted to consumerist methods of political participation, such as boycotting and buycotting. Given the susceptibility of political consumerism to a neoliberal modus operandi, the lack of available literature problematising its emergence as a response to neoliberal principles is somewhat surprising. This thesis therefore will address this gap by connecting the declining levels of electoral participation among younger generations in post-crisis UK and Greece, to the expansion of political consumerism, within the contextual neoliberal ideological hegemony of the ‘marketopoly’. It will thus be distinguishing between two broad sets of antithetical, yet complimentary, effects. Firstly, the internalised neoliberal critique of democracy emphasises the ‘push’ effect out of electoral politics. Secondly, young people’s internalised trust in the power of the market calls attention to the existence of a parallel ‘pull’ effect into the marketopoly, as a habitus of youth political participation. This conceptual cleavage has not been previously identified in the available literature of the subject.

Moreover, Copeland and Boulianne (2020), in the latest meta-analysis on political consumerism published in May 2020, confirm that the overwhelming majority of studies on political consumerism operationalise it as boycotting (78 studies), significantly less operationalise it as buycotting alone (38 studies), while many of them blur the distinction between boycotting and buycotting (68 studies). Out of the latter, the most common approach is combining one measure of boycotting and one measure of buycotting into a single, dichotomous variable coded 0 if the respondent did not engage in political consumerism and 1 if the respondent engaged in at least one mode of political consumerism. However, as it has already been discussed in **Chapter 7** and will be demonstrated empirically in **Chapters 10** and **11**, this approach fails to **a)** account for the differences between buycotting and boycotting, and **b)** account for the breadth and depth of the phenomenon. Ultimately therefore, this thesis will devise a simple and intuitive measurement tool for political consumerism, which will then be used in conjunction with the operationalisation approach above, to offer a more well-rounded understanding of political consumerism in both countries. Although the discussion on the challenges and potentials of the creation of a simple and reliable empirical measure has recently received renewed attention (Gundelach, 2020), to my knowledge there still does not exist a “population survey available that includes a variety of measurements of political consumerism” (Stolle et al., 2005, p. 10). In this way, the present thesis intends to advance the

study of political consumerism among young people, and by extension the study of young people's political participation.

Chapter 9: Exploratory study using focus groups: Motivations and neoliberalism

1. Introduction

Although several studies emphasise the need to develop an effective measurement of political participation activities beyond voting (Ekman and Amnå, 2012; Kousis and Paschou, 2017; Theocharis and van Deth, 2018), significantly fewer studies focus on young people's own conceptualisation of political participation, and even fewer have done so in a comparative context (Pontes et al., 2018). With regards to political consumerism research which is also focusing on young people's own understanding of the concept, the available research is virtually non-existent. This section aims to shed some light in this direction, providing an original contribution to knowledge with regards to **a)** studying political consumerism, **b)** in a comparative context (between the UK and Greece), **c)** among young people, **d)** and according to young people's own conceptualisation of the phenomenon.

The present chapter will therefore present the findings of the focus groups conducted in the two countries. The chapter will be divided in two sections: the first part, will discuss the *motivations* of young participants behind their engagement in political consumerism. The second section will provide evidence for the neoliberal factors previously identified in **Chapter 6**, associated with young people's engagement in political consumerism in the UK as opposed to Greece.

These findings have informed my understanding about young people's own motivations and values behind the use of the market for ethical, environmental and political reasons, and have in turn assisted in the creation of the survey questionnaire, which will be used at the quantitative analysis of this thesis (in **Chapters 10** and **11**).

2. Motivations of Political Consumerism

Previous research indicates that there may be a difference behind the motivations of political consumers in different countries (see **Chapter 6**), with political consumerism in southern Europe demonstrating generally a more collective than individualistic orientation and being more rooted in local communities (Graziano and Forno, 2012). With this in mind, the participants of the focus groups were asked to discuss their underlying motivations to engage in political consumerism. In this way, they cumulatively came up with a list of six broad themes. These were subsequently analysed thematically and categorised according to their intended outreach, ranging from individualistic to more collective and eventually global outreach. These resulted in **Q.21** of the survey questionnaire, and will be subsequently analysed in **Chapter 10** of the thesis, with the intention to identify whether young political consumers in the UK and Greece are driven by different motivations. The following themes were thus identified:

- a) Benefit my personal health
- b) Protect animal rights
- c) Support national economy
- d) Improve social ties with my community
- e) Support ethical production processes overseas
- f) Protect the planet and encourage environmentally responsible lifestyles.

Generally, the focus groups participants in both countries expressed a perceived interconnectedness with respect to most of the points above, but also their assertion that consumption can indeed be action imbued with political meaning. A typical response³⁰ among the participants in both countries was the following:

Participant F: Since I started being a vegetarian, 3-4 years ago, I have eaten meat on very rare occasions. However, I have never bought meat products myself. Buying meat is no longer in my consumer options. And I believe that in not doing so I play my part in the *whole*. It is therefore a decision which has indeed political implications.

However, the participants in Greece stressed consistently point b. *Protecting animal rights*, and they also demonstrated a significantly more national focus (c. *Support national economy*) than their UK counterparts with respect to their political consumerist motivations. This may be as a result of the prolonged austerity and the resulting recent economic hardships of the country at the national level (Grasso, 2018). A typical response from the participants in Greece was that:

Participant D: Yes, I have boycotted Greek products, as part of the campaign for buying Greek. I am also buying organic and environmentally friendly products to the extent that I can. However, the first thing that comes in mind when I hear boycotting is boycotting products which have been tested on animals, and boycotting would be buying nationally produced products to boost the national economy.

Nevertheless, although several participants' initial motivation was associated with more individualistic concerns (a. *Protecting my personal health* and b. *Protecting animal rights*), they eventually evolved into having a more holistic understanding of their consumption implications, stressing eventually the importance of their consumption decisions on the environment on a global scale (f. *Protect the planet and encourage environmentally responsible lifestyles*):

Participant F: [Me becoming a vegetarian] started by accident. I happened to watch some documentaries about animal brutality and I decided to give it a try. I decided to keep it up initially because I saw that I was not craving [eating meat]. Subsequently, I got

³⁰ Direct quotes are reported verbatim, with no changes made to correct grammatical errors. Use of ' . . .' within a focus-group quote denotes a pause by the participant; use of '(. . .)' denotes contraction of text; use of '[]' indicates the inclusion of text by authors to explain context.

more information about what being a vegetarian means, and my main consideration [now] is the environmental impact of my consumer decisions. It is also an ethical issue connected to the depletion of communal resources. So although it all started by accident, I sought information on my own. I do not know if I would still be a vegetarian if it was only for the ethical factor (animal brutality, for example). My main concern is the environmental one.

Instead, the participants in the UK expressed predominately a simultaneous emphasis on *d. Improving social ties in their community*, and *f. Protecting the planet and encouraging environmentally responsible lifestyles*. The emphasis the UK participants placed on the need to support their local communities was expressed primarily in terms of a shared concern that the sense of *community* in their cities and neighbourhoods has been recently deteriorating. This was consistently a point of critical concern during the UK focus groups. This particular observation contrasts directly with the findings of Graziano and Forno (2012) that political consumerism in southern Europe is generally more rooted in local communities.

When asked about their fears, contributions and expectations (see **Appendix I: C. Guide for Focus Groups**) with regards to the general political environment in their countries, Participant K from the UK responded as follows, with a view shared by most:

Participant K: So, my *fears* first: climate change, droughts, food security and (...) people not growing their own food and buying it from somebody else (...). I also fear about the lack of community in the area where I live (...). I have recently been involved in a community garden that has added so much in our local community. People come in with their kids and they are like “Oh, what is this? I did not know [certain plants] grew up like that, although I eat it all the time” (...). People make this connection that we need to take care of the environment around us and that food does not simply come from the supermarket shelves.

Participant M assumed a similar approach when asked about his contributions:

Participant M: My *contributions* is educating myself, learning about gardening and small scale community projects. At a larger scale studying at the university and learning about larger-scale solutions to [environmental] issues such as desertification.

The findings of the focus groups above are confirmed by the results from the quantitative analysis of the survey questionnaire in **Chapter 10**, which reveals that political consumerism in Greece demonstrates a relatively more nationalistic outreach, whereas in the UK it is generally more rooted in local communities. However, young people in both countries perceive political consumerism as a means to promote environmentally responsible lifestyles.

This section has thus established **a)** a set of broad motivations behind the phenomenon. The discussion then proceeded into **b)** exploring the ‘neoliberal’ factors that the participants of the focus groups associated with political consumerism. The following section will thus outline the focus groups findings in this direction.

3. Neoliberal factors influencing political consumption decisions

Chapter 6 has identified in the literature different ways through which neoliberal governmentality, reinforced by the continuous marketisation of previously non-market social provinces, has inhibited young people's participation, '*pushing*' them away from institutional politics. Conversely, it has also discussed the different ways young people may instead be '*pulled*' into the market as an alternative political arena.

This section will thus explore the factors associated with neoliberalism that influence young citizens' decisions to engage in political consumerism in the two countries and will provide insights from the focus group discussions with respect to their underlying motivations. Thematic analysis of the focus groups confirms the interplay of six 'push' and 'pull' factors, with regards to the effects of neoliberalism on young people's motivations to engage in political consumerism, including important differences observed in Greece and in the UK. These factors are summarised below:

- **Neoliberal 'push' factors:**
 - a) External Political Efficacy (EPE): Inability of political actors,
 - b) External Political Efficacy (EPE): Untrustworthiness of political actors,
 - c) Internal Political Efficacy (IPE).
- **Neoliberal 'pull' factors:**
 - a) Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE),
 - b) Availability of products in the market,
 - c) Availability of product-related information.

Each of these will be explored in the sections that follow:

a. Neoliberal 'push' factors

The focus groups revealed three neoliberal 'push' factors that underpin young people's withdrawal from formal electoral politics but at the same time pulling them toward non-institutional forms of political participation, including different forms of political consumerism. The first of these is a widely shared perception among the participants from both countries, that politicians and political parties are under-serving their constituencies.

Previous research on the subject (Brown, 2015) emphasises that the pervasive and enveloping influence of neoliberalism has significantly weakened the responsive power of traditional political institutions in many advanced liberal democracies. As a consequence, political leaders are often obliged to concede to technocratic solutions when addressing economic and social problems. The recent imposition of austerity measures, designed by technocrats behind closed doors despite the opposing popular mandate in several European countries, illustrates what Habermas has referred to as the dismantling of democracy within

the EU (Diez, 2011) and the disenfranchising of citizens - particularly the young (Hart and Henn, 2017).

During the first focus group in Greece, participants returned repeatedly to the failure of the SYRIZA–ANEL coalition to capitalise on their victory in the July 2015 referendum and to deliver on their promise to alleviate austerity measures. This was viewed as a matter of critical concern, fuelling young people’s conviction that ‘politicians are unable to influence political outcomes, even if they were willing to do so’. Participants consistently used phrases such as ‘their hands are tied’, especially when the discussion focused on EU politics:

Participant F: This shows how the neoliberal establishment subverts public opinion (...). It shows that you are allowed certain choices but there are limits placed on these choices by bigger power structures; limits to what is acceptable under capitalism. When it comes down to challenging ideas such as the free market they are like... oh, well you are not allowed to decide that for yourself (...), elections are not allowed to change economic policies.

Participants from the UK seemed to share similar views as typified by Participant S:

Participant S: We were taught that a democracy follows the will of the people and it is as simple as that, while actually, there are many more interests at play and voting is only a small part of it (...). You can choose if you want your buses green or blue or whatever, but when it comes down to decide on the economic system of the country people have absolutely no say.

These critical perspectives indicate a common perception of the young focus group participants that politicians are not only unable to influence political outcomes within a technocratic neoliberal economic environment, but that they are also considered as predominantly ‘self-serving elitists’ and as such inherently untrustworthy. These views are consistent with the neoliberal critique of democracy (Buchanan, 1978), which postulates that politicians are likely to govern in favour of their personal narrow interests instead of those of their voters, pointing back to a principal-agent problem - which makes them especially unresponsive to the demands of the under-represented youth. As a consequence, young people are likely to express this scepticism by diminished engagement with electoral politics, as long as their interests continue to be under-represented in the mainstream political arena (Hart and Henn, 2017).

The discussion during the first Greek focus group revolved around the twinned problems of nepotism in the parliament since the restoration of democracy in 1974 as well as a generalised doubt that a young person could succeed in running for office and competing with the established political elite. Young people in both countries expressed their disillusionment with electoral politics, even though: (i) in their majority, they still intended to

vote and acknowledged that voting as a practice is important (Furlong and Cartmel, 2011); (ii) they exhibited a deep awareness about political issues (O'Toole and Gale, 2010); and (iii) they were committed supporters of democracy in principle (Henn and Foard, 2014).

When asked whether they felt particularly disillusioned by democracy in principle, the UK focus group participants stated:

Participant S: Not exactly democracy in itself. It is more about how democracy works in practice in the UK at the moment. I do not believe there is anything much better than democracy, but there are many ways in which democracy could get better.

Similar views were expressed during the focus groups in Greece:

Participant A: The kind of democracy we have now is a quite limited version. We have quite limited participation. Certain stuff are clearly not put up for debate. Especially things that might be happening on the European level where you cannot really challenge them democratically. But ultimately, the more democracy the better really (...). I am certainly not an anti-democrat at all.

It is therefore only when they feel their voice is being heard and that the dominant political agenda particularly pertains to them, that they will exhibit a significantly more responsive disposition towards electoral participation. Only Participant O from the UK focus groups expressed his concern about democracy in principle ('Democracy scares me!'), on the grounds that '...it disconnects people in power from ordinary people'; however, this participant added that they still intended to vote as this was the minimum they could do to make their voice heard. However, unlike the almost unanimous support for democracy (in principle) expressed by their counterparts in the UK focus groups, the views of the participants in Greece were relatively more mixed. For instance, Participant E seemed to be indifferent on the question of whether to vote or not, while Participants F and H were adamant in their intention of abstaining at future elections, and justified that position in terms of making a political statement (Amnå and Ekman, 2014) and reiterating their non-participation as a conscious political action (Fergusson, 2013). As Participant F stated, 'I refuse to feed a system that lies to us! (...) I have absolutely no hope for the future; there is not a single chance that things will ever improve in any way'.

In contrast to the neoliberal discursive dominance of non-participation as disengagement rather than as social exclusion (Fergusson, 2013), the young participants in Greece remained mindful of the responsibilities of the government to its citizens. However, the general consensus emerging from the Greek participants was that, given the inability of the state apparatus to respond to their pressing needs, the only viable alternative is radical collective action:

Participant E: It should be the case that with all individual responsibility we should be able to work together to trigger collective action which should then be picked up by the government. However this is hardly the case. Which connects to where I work, that is with refugees...and it connects back to how NGOs' work is really positive on the one hand, but it is also taking this kind of responsibility away from the government. (...) it is the government that should help with unaccompanied minors and getting people jobs and getting people citizenships and getting people work permits.

Participant F (also from Greece) replied to this particular observation accordingly:

Participant F: People my age are tired of waiting results from the politicians (...). Tangible results do not come by ventilating our frustration in demonstrations anymore, and definitely not through the parliament. I do not need politicians to represent me and make decisions for me. Results come from individual responsibility taking, grabbing the bull by the horns and work collectively for a common goal no matter what that may be.

This particular view suggests that political consumerism may indeed be crowding-out electoral participation among young people in Greece, whereas there is no support for such an effect in the UK. It also reflects the simultaneous individualistic and collective orientation of the political consumers of late modernity, an issue previously identified by Stolle and Micheletti (2013). In contrast, the UK participants expressed a relatively more economic understanding of their civic duties when asked about how they could contribute in shaping politics in their country:

Participant T: ... one thing about the UK is that I do not feel I have been able to be effectively part of the decision making process (...) which I always found quite frustrating as my understanding is that since you pay taxes you should have the right to have your voice heard. That made me indifferent about politics in general (...) the only way I believe I contribute in anything, I would say, is by paying my taxes.

The motivating factors behind young people's disengagement from electoral politics in view of a hegemonic neoliberal governmentality is well supported from the available literature (see **Chapter 6**). The next section will proceed to examine the factors that emerged from the focus groups behind young people's engagement with political consumerism.

b. Neoliberal 'pull' factors

The previous section examined the ways through which neoliberal governmentality pushes young people away from the traditional (electoral-based) political sphere. As a response to the perceived practical failure of representative democracy, the adoption of free-market principles in almost every facet of political life echo the replacement of young people's subjective understanding of citizenship from that of the sovereign citizen to that of the sovereign consumer. The neoliberal critique of democracy assumes that only this consumer-oriented democracy, or *marketopoly* (Lekakis, 2013), can adequately reflect individual preferences. The marketopoly therefore serves as a highly decentralised framework of political activity and presupposes an underlying trust in the market environment to respond effectively to young people's concerns. Consequently, it '*pulls*' the underrepresented and disillusioned young people from electorally-focused politics into the marketplace as an alternative political arena. This section will examine the ways through which this effect is being manifested in Greece and the UK.

Three distinct - but interrelated - factors were identified during the focus groups which capture young people's beliefs that the market environment is better equipped to respond to their political considerations and aspirations. These are: **a)** their Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) on prices of ethical products; **b)** their satisfaction with the availability of ethical over conventional products in the market; and **c)** their satisfaction with the availability and quality of product-related information for such products.

In terms of their PCE on pricing, research by Bray et al. (2011) concludes that while consumers may generally prefer locally produced goods, they are reluctant to change their usual purchasing behaviour in favour of locally-sourced and ethical alternatives, if the prices of the latter are considered to be significantly higher. However, in our focus groups the participants from the two countries were divided on the topic of pricing. When asked if they would be willing to pay the extra cost usually associated with organic products, Participant R from the UK replied, with a view shared by all, that: 'Definitely, as long as it is a reasonable price difference'.

Instead, the participants from Greece typically perceived ethically-sourced organic products as luxury items, boosted by advertisement and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) schemes. The general consensus during the Greek focus groups was that their individual budget - and the economic precariousness of the country as a whole - impeded their preference for ethical choices, especially when purchasing food products. This reflected a lack of PCE – a perception that they had no power to influence pricing. A typical response was:

Participant G: Sometimes [the price of organic products is] even 6-7 times higher.

If I can buy a kilo of potatoes for 60 cents, I honestly do not see the reason to pay 2.5 euros for organic ones. I honestly find it hard to understand how the Market logic is at play here.

In terms of the *availability of ethical alternatives* in the market, Zorell (2019c) has suggested that although buycotters may demonstrate high levels of confidence in the existing

labelling schemes in principle, they may be lacking access to the said schemes in practice, emphasising the availability of opportunity structures as the focal point behind the proliferation of political consumerism. With this in mind, the participants were asked about their levels of satisfaction with regards to the variety of products in the market and the availability of independent, ethical or organic alternatives. Among the participants from the UK there seemed to be a widespread consensus that 'You can buy everything all year around; there's nothing seasonal in the UK':

Participant O: In the UK, (...) there is a lot of variety for everything. You can buy products of all levels and spectrums. England is one of the first countries in Europe that come in mind when we talk about commercialism. One of the first places that started placing attention to reusing clothes, with the whole vintage, second-hand clothing industry and made it acceptable to do so rather than having only poor persons doing so.

By way of contrast, participants from Greece were typically sceptical of this alleged market availability, focusing instead on 'an illusion of choice':

Participant B: I'd say in a lot of ways [our choice] is limited. Even though if lately, especially here in Athens, there are lots of different grassroots initiatives, they are quite fringe really. The supermarkets will sell pretty much everything [and] they have greater market share than any independent store. In neighbourhoods that are more wealthy or more politically engaged you also get a lot of independent green groceries, independent bakeries; sometimes farmer's markets and the like. This creates an illusion of choice. But most people my age do not really get to choose. I think I read somewhere that 75% of the food market is owned by three supermarket chains.

This view drew support from the rest of the participants in Greece:

Participant F: When it comes to fair trade and organic, I feel that they are merely (...) a niche in the market and that explains their higher prices. I do not really believe they really make a difference when you consider the big picture.

Thirdly, in terms of the availability of product-related information, Zheng and Chi (2015) drawing on the theory of planned behaviour, have established that the more informed consumers are about environmental issues, the greater their pro-environmental consumption will be. During the focus groups, participants from both Greece and the UK agreed that in the

age of information, environmental knowledge is almost entirely a matter of personal responsibility. However, whereas the participants from the UK emphasised the importance of personal responsibility for 'educating [them]selves' and 'listening and learning' when consuming for political, ethical and environmental reasons, their Greek counterparts were significantly more doubtful about the quality of product-related information in their country. Avoiding products or companies that have received bad press seemed important, especially among the UK participants. Instead, and consistent with Bray et al. (2011), their counterparts in the Greek focus groups demonstrated higher levels of cynicism and inertia in their purchasing behaviour. Participant G, who had previously stressed the importance of pricing on his purchase decisions, explained:

Participant G: Generally, I am not sure I trust the information I get on certain products from the market [or] the information on the labels. Sometimes it feels it is exactly the same product just rebranded to accommodate the 'alternative, eco-friendly' consumer.

This perspective reflects Carrigan and Attalla's (2001) emphasis on the correlation between time pressure, information overload and people's negligence when it comes to consumers' ethical behaviour. They argue that motives like selflessness or solidarity are often overridden by selective motives which can range from brand loyalty through to saving money, time and effort. After all, as another participant of the focus groups in Greece added:

Participant I: There are many rumours about every major corporation. If I were to double check every rumour I would not have time for anything else.

This attitude-behaviour gap in ethical consumption has been examined by Papaoikonomou et al. (2011), who discuss how brand loyalty may generate a consumer bias, so that the consumers would only believe positive information while overlooking negative messages. As a consequence, consumers' loyalties to certain brands may cause them to be less motivated to purchase or actively seek ethical alternatives (Bray et al., 2011). Correspondingly, the higher their loyalty, the higher the consumer tendency to disregard bad practices allegedly committed by the company.

To summarise, political consumerist instances raised by the participants in the focus groups in Greece seemed to be resulting primarily from their higher Internal Political Efficacy (IPE), following a generalised distrust towards traditional political actors, who were perceived as not only untrustworthy, but also unable to effectively represent their interests. This renders young people themselves as the primary agents of their political behaviour and has empowered them to search the political within the market – via a process which may be crowding-out their electoral engagement.

Instead, and although not entirely unaffected by these same push effects, political consumerism among the focus groups participants in the UK seemed to be predominately driven by their underlying confidence in the capacity of the market environment to effectively

respond to their claims for ethical corporate agency. This was captured by their conviction that they are able to effectively promote desirable (and punish objectionable) production processes based on their environmental, ethical and political considerations - whereas their counterparts in Greece typically felt powerless to express their political concerns within the context of the market. Moreover, young people in the UK were also satisfied with both the availability of ethical alternatives in the market, as well the extent and quality of product-related information, whereas their counterparts in the focus groups in Greece demonstrated more cynicism with regards to both these factors.

4. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the main findings deriving from a thematic analysis of the transcriptions of the discussions from the focus groups, utilising elements of grounded theory. The chapter has: **a)** established a set of broad motivations behind the phenomenon, and **b)** revealed the factors behind political consumerism associated with neoliberalism, as previously discussed in **Chapter 5**.

Although the participants in both countries stressed that their political consumerist motivations are generally intertwined, the chapter has indicated that the motivations of young political consumers in Greece are primarily linked to: **a) Protecting animal rights**, and **b) Supporting national economy**. In contrast, young political consumers in the UK were primarily motivated by **c) Improving social ties in their community**, and **d) Protecting the planet and encouraging environmentally responsible lifestyles**.

Moreover, evidence from the focus groups provides support to the claim (as previously discussed in **Chapter 5**) that neoliberalism has accelerated two contrasting dynamics that on the one hand *push* them out of the mainstream political arena, and on the other *pull* them into the market as a way for them to express their political contestations. When combined, these two mutually reinforcing dynamics may be motivating political consumerist behaviour among young people. These findings will be further examined in the quantitative part of this thesis, in **Chapters 10** and **11**; they provide an original contribution to knowledge in terms of the study of political consumerism - and by extension to young people's political engagement - in the UK and in Greece.

Chapter 10: Push-Factors: Who are the political consumers and what do they believe about politics?

1. Introduction

For Micheletti et al. (2008, p. xiv) political consumerism stands for the “...consumer choice of producers and products on the basis of attitudes and values [...] as well as ethical or political assessment of *business* and *government* practice”. As such, it is directed towards two targets: one that is connected to businesses, and one that is connected to the government. In turn, the analysis from the focus groups in **Chapter 9**, conceptualised those attitudes and values associated with the government as ‘*Push factors*’, expecting that the disillusionment from the institutional (predominantly, electoral) political domain pushes young people away from electoral politics. Instead, those values and attitudes that are associated with the market environment may instead be ‘pulling’ young people to engage in boycotting and boycotting practices in order to express their ethical, environmental and political concerns.

Chapters 10 and **11** will thus examine each of these dynamics separately, with regards to boycotting and boycotting. In addition to these a third, second-order variable (buycotters/boycotters) has been devised out of the previous two, to include those who in the past 12 months had actively engaged in *either* or *both* boycotting and boycotting³¹. It should therefore not come as a surprise that this third variable will consistently report higher participation across all categories, compared to the other two. Although in the relevant literature, buycotts and boycotts are often treated as interchangeable and homogeneous acts under the term ‘political consumerism’ (Newman and Bartels, 2011) (see **Chapter 7**), the analysis in this and the subsequent chapter will illustrate that they often bear significant differences. Whereas boycotting is reward-oriented, and as such, more cooperative in nature and practice, boycotting is largely punishment-oriented, and reflects an element of resilience to the terms and conditions available within the market.

For example, Barnes and Kaase (1979) include boycotts in their list of ‘unconventional’ forms of political participation, alongside signing a petition, protests and demonstrations, occupying a building, or damaging property. It is therefore expected that boycotting will be


³¹ Boycotting and boycotting were coded as ‘1’ if the respondent reported boycotting or boycotting one or more products for environmental, ethical or political considerations in the past 12 months and ‘0’ if the respondent did not. Likewise, boycotting/boycotting was coded as ‘1’ if the respondent reported either boycotting or boycotting, or both. The reported counts are those which were coded as ‘1’ in all three of the categories.

positively associated with other forms of participation that directly seek to change the status quo, or in other words what Tarrow (2011) refers to as '*contentious politics*' and other scholars have termed '*politics of dissent*' (Pickard, 2018; Zamponi and Fernández González, 2017). Instead, boycotting denotes the implicit acceptance of the terms and conditions of the market, as well as the political environment within which the market operates. Positive political consumerism therefore, is expected to be associated with more institutional or cooperative forms of political participation, such as intention to vote or intention to work with others for a political goal. For example, Neilson (2010, p. 1) has previously reported that people who are more trusting of institutions and are more involved in voluntary associations, are more likely to boycott than buycott, and elsewhere Adugu (2014, p. 1) has found that boycotting is more common among those with greater political efficacy and higher income levels.

However, this perceived variance in the motives and orientation of buycotters and boycotters has been often overlooked in a great part of the available literature, which instead perceives political consumerism as a unified form of political participation (Newman and Bartels, 2011). Questioning thus the empirical approach which perceives political consumerism as a homogeneous act, this chapter will seek to disentangle the dynamics of positive and negative consumerism. The insights collected from the separate analysis of boycotting and buycott will therefore be compared to the cumulative behavioural variable (engaging in either or both boycotting and buycott) so as to demonstrate that this often fails to capture the idiosyncratic natures of positive and negative consumerism.

The chapter will employ non-parametric statistical tests to examine the relationship of political consumerism to **a)** the demographic characteristics of young political consumers, **b)** their interest in politics, **c)** their support for democracy in their country, and **d)** the extent of their participation in other forms of political engagement and community affairs (see **Figure 6, Tables 1-4**). These variables are generally expected to have a negative relationship to political consumerism in the two countries, pushing young people away from formal, state and government-oriented, institutional political affairs.

Figure 6: Conceptual map of factors influencing Political Consumption



2. Who are the political consumers in Greece and in the UK?

This section will compare the demographic and socioeconomic attributes of boycotters and buycotters in Greece and in the UK. **Tables 2.1.0 to 2.10.1** therefore, report the cross-tabulations for *buycotters*, *boycotters* and *buy/boycotters* across different categories, in Greece and in the UK. The variables analysed include gender, age, belonging in a minority, whether they are living with their parents, whether they are the primary earner in their household, residence, subjective class, relative subjective income, education and employment status.

Chi-Square tests will be employed to test the relationships between these variables and the behavioural components of political consumerism (buycotting, boycotting and buycotting/boycotting). Chi-square is a non-parametric test that evaluates whether there exists an association between two categorical variables by comparing the *observed* pattern of responses in the cells to the pattern that would be *expected* if the variables were indeed independent of each other. Measures of statistical significance will therefore be reported and discussed both *across the overall distribution (p-values)*, as well as *within the categories (adj.res.)*³². It is therefore possible that a variable does not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship *across* the whole distribution ($p > .05$), but it does *within* the respective categories ($\text{adj.res.} > \pm 1.7$). Instead, if there is a statistical significance *within* all (or most) of the categories ($\text{adj.res.} > \pm 1.7$), this is likely to spill-over also to the p-values *across the distribution* ($p < .05$). All statistically significant values *within the categories* ($\text{adj.res.} > \pm 1.7$) will be reported in red next to the percentages. The same for the statistically significant p-values, which will be reported under the totals for each measure

³² Measures of statistical significance (Pearson's Chi-Square and p-values) among the *whole distribution* are reported at the bottom of each category for each activity. Instead, the adjusted standardised residuals (adj.res.) are reported next to the percentages of each respective category. This is important because it allows us to assess whether the observed cell counts are significantly different from the expected cell counts. Consequently, an observed value higher than the minimum cut-off point of ± 1.7 indicates a significant relationship, while an observed value higher than the conventional cut-off point of ± 2.0 indicates a highly significant relationship. Instead, an observed value between -1.7 and $+1.7$ indicates there is no significant difference of the observed cell counts to that of a normal distribution (Field, 2017). The adjusted standardised residual (adj.res.) should not be confused with 'Adjusted R-Squared' (Adj. R.), which will be used in **Chapter 12** to measure the goodness of fit of the regression models.

of political participation; with the additional indication of asterisks according to their levels of significance (* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$).

The chapter will then proceed in the same format to comparatively discuss in section (3) young people’s interest in politics and elections; in section (4) their attitudes with regards to democracy in their countries; and (5) how active they are in politics and community affairs.

2.1 Gender

Table 2.1.0 reports the distribution of the subsamples of Greece and the UK by gender. In both countries there is an oversample of female to male respondents. This was expected according to the bibliography (Sax et al., 2003), which predicts that women (especially students) respond at much higher rates than men in survey questionnaires, irrespectively of whether these are administered via paper, the internet, or some combination of the two. The greater representation of young women in the survey may also reflect a recently observed reversal in the traditional gender gap in political interest (Ferrín et al., 2019).

Table 2.1.0 Gender	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Male	38.3	120	36.8	118
Female	59.7	187	62.3	200
Other	1.9	6	0.9	3
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321




Table 2.1.1³³ below, displays higher engagement of the Greek subsample than their UK counterparts in all three activities, across both genders. The table reveals that the females in both Greece and the UK were significantly more likely to have engaged in boycotting, having a positive

³³ This and all subsequent Chi-Square crosstabulations can *also* be found in **Appendix III** (p. 345) for ease of reference.


difference of 17.2% and 22.2% with respect their male counterparts. Likewise, for boycotting, where the females were more likely to have engaged in this activity, by 11.2% in Greece and 20.6% in the UK. These differences are also evident in the cumulative category of buycotters/boycotters, where the females from Greece and the UK reported higher engagement, by 12.4% and 17.2% respectively. The observed values are significantly different from the expected values across all three activities ($\text{adj.res.} > \pm 2.0$), confirming that political consumerism is statistically more prominent among women in both countries. These findings are consistent with the greatest part of the literature on the subject which portray political consumerism as a gendered form of political participation (Lorenzini and Bassoli, 2015; O'Neill and Gidengil, 2013; Stolle and Micheletti, 2006).

Table 2.1.1 Gender	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Male	55.0	-3.3	49.2	-3.9	56.7	-2.1	42.4	-3.6	68.3	-2.6	59.3	-3.2
Female	72.2	2.8	71.5	4.1	67.9	1.8	63.0	3.5	80.7	2.2	76.5	3.2
Other	100	1.8	33.3	1.9	83.3	1.0	66.7	0.4	100	1.4	66.7	-0.1
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	Significance across the whole distribution:											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	12.791		22.02		5.361		23.698		8.135		10.464	
P-Value	0.012**		0.000***		0.252		0.000***		0.017**		0.005**	

2.2 Age

Table 2.2.0 reports the distribution of the respondents by age. The largest group of respondents in both countries belonged to the 21-23 age bracket (44.1% for Greece, and 43.9% for the UK).

Table 2.2.0: Age	Entire Sample			
	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
18-20	21.7	68	18.7	60
21-23	44.1	138	43.9	141
24-26	18.8	59	23.7	76
27-29	15.3	48	13.7	44
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321




The crosstabulations by age for both countries in **Table 2.2.1** do not convey any clear trend of political consumerism with regards to age. The percentages of the young people who engaged in any of the three political consumerist activities are higher in Greece when compared to the UK, across almost all the age cohorts. However, the data does not demonstrate any statistically significant differences to the expected counts throughout the crosstabulations, and as such it may be deduced that age (at least those aged 18-29) is not statistically associated with political consumerism in Greece or in the UK.

Table 2.2.1: Age	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
(Percentages within each country)												
18-20	69.1	0.6	66.7	0.7	70.6	1.3	51.7	-0.7	79.4	0.7	73.3	0.6
21-23	67.4	0.4	61	-0.6	63.8	0	56	0.2	76.8	0.2	68.8	-0.4
24-26	66.1	0	64.5	0.3	64.4	0.1	42.1	1.5	78	0.3	72.4	0.5
27-29	58.3	-1.2	61.4	-0.2	54.2	-1.5	45.5	-1.4	68.8	-1.3	65.9	-0.7
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution:</i>												
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	4.672		2.659		5.727		8.203		1.991		0.964	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.586		0.85		0.455		0.224		0.574		0.809	

2.3 Belonging into a minority

With regards to belonging in an ethnic, religious or sexual minority, the respective figures are reported in **Table 2.3.0**. Generally Greece is considered to have one of the most ethnically homogenous populations, with the WVS (2017-2020) reporting 98.8% of the respondents being white and only 1.2% being of Central Asian origins. The same figures for the UK according to YouGov (2011 Census) were 86.0% for white, 7.5% Asian, followed by Black ethnic groups (at 3.3%) and Mixed ethnic groups (at 2.2%). The figures below therefore reflect partly the greater diversity among the overall population in the UK. The formulation of this particular question however, referred to the *self-reported* belonging of young respondents not only in *ethnic*, but also *religious* and *sexual* minorities.

Table 2.3.0 Minority	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Yes	15.7	49	31.2	100
No	84.3	264	68.8	221
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321




The intention was to capture whether political consumerism in any of its forms was associated with feelings of exclusion due to a self-reported belonging in a minority. However, although the crosstabulations reveal higher engagement of the Greek subsample in all three engagement categories, these are not statistically different from the expected count (adj.res.<±1.7)

Table 2.3.1	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
<u>Minority</u>	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Yes	73.5	1.2	62.0	-0.2	63.3	-0.1	54.0	-0.4	79.6	0.6	69.0	-0.3
No	64.8	-1.2	63.3	0.2	64.0	0.1	56.1	0.4	75.8	-0.6	70.6	0.3
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	Significance across the whole distribution:											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	1.851		0.161		0.777		0.474		0.337		0.83	
P-Value	0.396		0.923		0.678		0.789		0.562		0.773	

2.4 Living with parents

The same applies for the category 'living with parents' (**Table 2.4.1**). The distribution of the respondents reveals that more young people in the sample were still living with their parents in the UK than in Greece. As mentioned earlier, these figures are comparable with benchmark data from the WVS (2017-2020) which similarly reports a higher percentage of young people up to 29 years of age living with their parents in the UK (37.5%) than in Greece (30.9%).

Table 2.4.0:	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
<u>Living with Parents</u>				
Yes	42.5	133	54.8	176
No	57.5	180	45.2	145
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



However, the Chi-square analysis does not reveal any statistical differences from the expected values, nor throughout the subsamples, nor within the respective categories for each form of consumer engagement. It may therefore be deduced that living with parents is not associated with the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism in either of the two countries.

Table 2.4.1 <u>Living with Parents</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Yes	64.7	-0.5	61.9	-0.4	65.4	0.5	51.7	-1.5	77.4	0.4	67.6	-1.1
No	67.2	0.5	64.1	0.4	62.8	-0.5	60	1.5	75.6	-0.4	73.1	1.1
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	Significance across the whole distribution:											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	1.45		0.221		0.729		4.873		0.151		1.143	
P-Value	0.484		0.895		0.695		0.087		0.698		0.285	

2.5 Primary household earner

Table 2.5.0 reports that there are more people in Greece (24.0%) than in the UK (17.1%), who reported they were the primary earners in their household. Nevertheless, being the primary wage earner does not seem to be statistically associated with engagement in political consumerism; neither across, nor within the distribution (**Table 2.5.1**).

Table 2.5.0: Primary Earner	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Yes	24.0	75	17.1	55
No	76.0	238	82.9	266
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321





Table 2.5.1: Primary Earner	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res.	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Yes	70.7	1.0	65.5	0.4	62.7	-0.3	58.2	0.4	78.7	0.5	72.7	0.5
No	64.5	-1.0	62.4	-0.4	64.3	0.3	54.9	-0.4	75.6	-0.5	69.5	-0.5
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
Significance across the whole distribution:												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	1.189		5.579		4.106		0.667		0.291		0.22	
P-Value	0.552		0.061		0.128		0.713		0.589		0.639	

2.6 Residence

In turn Table 2.6.0 reports the subsamples of young people living in urban or in rural areas. The figures in this category consisted of more young people living in or close to urban centres in Greece (69.3%), and less in the UK (46.5%). The survey seems to have an oversample of young people in the UK living in rural areas (53.5%). Benchmark data from YouGov from 2014³⁴ indicate 83% of the overall population living in urban areas. Instead, the percentage of young people in Greece seems to be consistent with the figures from the WVS (2017-2020) which indicates 74.6% of the overall population are living in urban areas.

³⁴ <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/rural-population-and-migration/rural-population-201415>

Table 2.6.0: Residence	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Urban	69.3	214	46.5	147
Rural	30.7	95	53.5	169
Total	49.4	309	50.6	316



The reported figures in **Table 2.6.1**, reveal that boycotting is significantly more likely in Greek urban centres, than in rural areas. Instead, the opposite is true in the UK where positive consumerism seems to be significantly more prominent in rural than urban areas. With respect to negative consumerism, this continues to be a predominately urban phenomenon in Greece, with boycotting being 1.5 times more likely in Greek urban centres, than in Greek rural areas (71.0% over 48.4%), and this difference is highly statistically significant (adj.res. = ±3.9) at p<.01. However, boycotting in the UK does not demonstrate any significantly different counts between urban centres and rural areas. The same holds true for buy/boycotting, which is 1.25 times more likely (81.3% over 65.3%) to take place in urban centres than rural areas of Greece (adj.res.=±3.0).


Table 2.6.1 Residence	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Urban	69.6	1.9	59.2	-1.7	71.0	3.9	56.5	0.3	81.3	3.0	68	-0.7
Rural	57.9	-2.0	67.5	1.8	48.4	-3.9	55.6	0.1	65.3	-3.0	73.4	1.4
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
Significance across the whole distribution:												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	4.6		6.654		15.873		4.204		9.387		7.152	
P-Value	0.331		0.155		0.003**		0.379		0.009**		0.028*	

Generally, it can be argued that buy/boycotting in Greek urban centres is higher (and statistically significant) than in the UK by almost 13 percentage points, painting the picture of political consumerism being primarily an urban phenomenon especially when it comes to boycotting. Instead, political consumerism is more popular in the rural areas of the UK (although not always significant), especially when it comes to buycotting (adj.res.>±1.7). Living in or close to urban centres has previously been reported to have a statistically significant, though moderate, association with environmental attitudes (Arcury and Christianson, 1993). Although this is not being confirmed from the present sample for the UK, there are strong indications that this is indeed the case in Greece.

2.7 Subjective class

Ferrer-Fons and Fraile (2013) have previously investigated whether social class influences the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism in Western Europe, through a multilevel analysis using European Social Survey data. They conclude that contrary to their hypothesis, social class continues to strongly affect the likelihood of being a political consumer. In this study however, this result is being marginally confirmed only for the UK, while there is no support found from the Greek subsample.

Subjective Class	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Mostly Manual	30.7	96	35.5	114
Mostly Intellectual	69.3	217	64.5	207
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



With regards to the subjective class variable (**Table 2.7.0**), 30.7% of the Greek subsample, self-reported they affiliate to the ‘Mostly manual’ category, as opposed to 35.5% of the UK subsample. Conversely, 69.3% of the Greek subsample reported affiliation to the ‘Mostly intellectual’ category, compared to 64.5% of the UK subsample.

When it comes to the crosstabulation of buycotters and boycotters with respect to subjective class, the ‘mostly intellectual’ respondents were 1.2 times more likely to have engaged in either or both of these activities (adj.res.=±2.3), for a cumulative 70.1% engagement, significant at $p < .05$. The same tendency is being revealed when it comes to boycotting (58.9% of ‘Mostly intellectuals’ over 49.1% of ‘Mostly manual’), with significance at the minimum cut-off point of ±1.7 adjusted residual, whereas there is no significant relationship with regards to buycotting in the country. This observation portrays political consumerism in the UK as a primarily intellectual phenomenon, and that this is mainly due to negative consumerism. However, it also denotes that the cumulative measure of political consumerism, is not always able to capture these differing effects between buycotting and boycotting.


Table 2.7.1 Subjective Class	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Mostly Manual	65.6	-0.1	58.8	-1.1	58.3	-1.4	49.1	-1.7	70.8	-1.5	62.3	-2.3
Mostly Intellectual	66.4	0.1	65.2	1.1	66.4	1.4	58.9	1.7	78.8	1.5	74.4	2.3
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	Significance across the whole distribution:											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	1.633		1.371		5.591		2.889		2.341		5.148	
P-Value	0.441		0.504		0.061		0.236		0.126		0.023*	

The respective percentages for the Greek subsample do not demonstrate any statistical significance whatsoever, pointing to the direction that subjective class is not a determinant of their propensity to engage in political consumerism, unlike the UK, where subjective class still remains a resilient indicator of their consumer engagement, especially when it comes to boycotting. This observation reflects the persistence of class divisions as an indicator of unconventional political participation in the UK (Melo and Stockemer, 2014).

2.8 Relative income

Relative income was not associated with the consumer engagement of young respondents, neither in Greece, nor in the UK. The distribution of the subsamples is shown in **Table 2.8.0** below:

Table 2.8.0: Relative Income	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Low	20.8	65	26.5	85
Medium Low	35.1	110	31.5	101
Medium High	36.1	113	28.3	91
High	8.0	25	13.7	44
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



The corresponding figures are not significant both across the three consumer activities, nor within the respective categories for the two countries. Only when it comes to boycotting, the 69.9% of the respondents from Greece who belonged in the medium-high category reveal a positive significance above the expected count (adj.res.=+1.7), and the 46.5% from the UK who belonged in the medium-low revealed a negative significance (adj.res. = -2.2) to the expected count.

Table 2.8.1: Relative Income	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res.	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Low	61.5	-0.9	63.5	0.1	60	-0.7	62.4	1.5	67.7	-1.8	71.8	0.4
Medium Low	67.3	0.3	62.4	-0.1	70.3	-0.6	46.5	-2.2	77.3	0.3	71.3	0.3
Medium High	66.4	0.1	64.8	0.4	69.9	1.7	58.2	0.6	79.6	1	67	-0.8
High	72	0.6	59.1	-0.6	56	-0.9	56.8	0.2	80	0.4	70.5	0.1
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
Significance across the whole distribution:												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	1.702		5.48		9.342		6.547		3.615		0.591	
P-Value	0.945		0.484		0.155		0.365		0.306		0.898	

This indicates that at least when it comes to boycotting, young people in Greece belonging in relatively affluent households are more likely to boycott, and young people in the UK belonging to less affluent households are less likely to engage in the same activity. The same applies for the 67.7% of the buy/boycotters in Greece who belong in the lower relative income group who are


significantly less likely to engage in political consumerism. This is consistent with Baek (2010) who has previously found a negative relationship between income levels and political consumerism³⁵. However, the relationship of relative income and political consumerism in this sample is not statistically significant across the whole distribution ($p > .05$).

2.9 Education attainment

Baek (2010), using data from the 2002 National Civic Engagement Surveys in the United States, has previously found that that people with a university education are significantly more likely to boycott than buycott, while people with lower than high school education are more likely to buycott than boycott. It is therefore quite surprising, that the completed level of education of the respondents in this sample can hardly reveal any significant results.

Table 2.9.0:
Education Attainment

	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Primary	0.3	1	0.9	3
Technical / Vocational	1.6	5	0.9	3
Incomplete Secondary	6.1	19	5.9	19
Complete Secondary	3.5	11	8.1	26
Some University	19.8	62	23.7	76
University Degree	67.7	212	58.3	187
Other	1.0	3	2.2	7
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



³⁵ It is also worth noting that the percentages of buy/boycotting in Greece seem to be increasing as the respondents' incomes rise, while in the UK the opposite holds true. As a result, young people in the UK belonging in the lower categories, are more likely to engage in buy/boycotting than their Greek counterparts; who are in turn, more likely to engage in the same activity if they belong to the higher income categories instead. Yet, there hardly is any statistically significant support for this claim. It will be nevertheless interesting, to examine in the subsequent analysis whether the allegedly higher postmaterialist values associated with the affluent socialisation of the Greek high-income cohorts will explain this perceived higher propensity to engage in political consumerism, and conversely if the lower income cohorts in the UK will demonstrate a more materialist orientation.

Table 2.9.1 shows that only the 69.3% of the Greek subsample with a university degree were significantly more likely to have engaged in buycotts (adj.res.=+1.7), whereas those with completed primary education in the UK were less likely to boycott, reversing Baek’s findings. However, the very small sample size of the respondents in the latter observation (n=3), along with the non-statistically significant observations (p>.05) across the distributions, do not allow for generalisations from this sample with regards to education attainment.

Table 2.9.1 Education Attainment	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Primary	0.0	-1.4	33.3	-1.1	100.0	0.8	0.0	-1.9	100.0	0.6	33.3	-1.4
Technical / Vocational	60.0	-0.3	33.3	-1.1	40.0	-1.1	33.3	-0.8	60.0	-0.9	66.7	-0.1
Incomplete Secondary	57.9	-0.8	73.7	1.0	47.4	-1.5	68.4	1.2	63.2	-1.4	73.7	0.4
Complete Secondary	63.6	-0.2	65.4	0.3	81.8	1.3	65.4	1.1	81.8	0.4	73.1	0.3
Some University	59.7	-1.2	59.2	-0.8	67.7	0.7	52.6	-0.6	79.0	0.6	67.1	-0.7
University with Degree	69.3	1.7	64.7	0.8	63.7	-0.1	54.5	-0.4	76.9	0.3	71.1	0.5
Other	66.7	0.0	42.9	-1.1	66.7	1.0	71.4	0.9	66.7	-0.4	71.4	0.1
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	10.074		14.524		12.76		14.173		3.501		2.602	
P-Value	0.609		0.269		0.387		0.29		0.744		0.857	


2.10 Employment status

The figures under employment status, however, reveal much more interesting insights. More respondents were in paid work in Greece at the time they took the survey (38.1%) as opposed to only 19.9%, in the UK. This difference is offset by the higher percentages of those who were in education in the UK (77.5%), as opposed to 47.2% in Greece. In turn, those unemployed in Greece were 14.7% of the subsample, while in the UK they were only 2.6%³⁶. Benchmark data from the WVS (2017-2020) among young people up to 29 years of age, similarly reports a higher percentage

³⁶ An equal percentage of 4.5% in each country consisted of those who were permanently sick or disabled, those who were doing housework or were looking after other persons, and those in community or military service. These were classified as ‘other’ and were excluded from the analysis for ease of presentation.

of young unemployed in Greece (21.2%) than in the UK (13.3%). However, in this survey there is an oversample of young people in education. The WVS reports 31.9% for Greece and only 17.9% for the UK, whereas it seems that collecting responses close to university campuses in both countries has been responsible for an over-representation of students in the current sample (47.2% and 77.5% respectively).

Employment status	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Paid Work	38.1	114	19.9	61
In Education	47.2	141	77.5	238
Unemployed	14.7	44	2.6	8
Total	49.4	299	50.6	307



The distribution in **Table 2.10.1** is significant for the boycotters ($p < .05$), and for the buy/boycotters ($p < .01$) from the UK only. Those in paid work from the UK cohort were more likely to have engaged in buycotts, boycotts or either of the two, with the figures being 72.1%, 68.9% and 82.0% respectively (all above the adj.res. = +1.7 threshold of significance). Conversely, those in unemployment were significantly less likely to have engaged in either of the three activities (adj.res. > +2.0). Surprisingly however, those unemployed in Greece were 3.5 more likely to have engaged in either or both of these activities compared to those unemployed in the UK (86.4% over 25%, significant at adj.res. > +1.7). The same holds true, when it comes to boycotting only, where the Greek unemployed cohort was 6.2 times more likely to have engaged in this type of activity (77.3% over 12.5%). Generally young unemployed people in Greece are more likely to engage in boycotts (adj.res. = +2.0), whereas young unemployed people in the UK are less likely to engage in the same form of activity (adj.res. = -2.5).

Table 2.10.1 Employment status	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	(Percentages within each country)											
Paid Work	69.3	0.9	72.1	1.7	69.3	1.5	68.9	2.3	79.8	1.1	82	2.3
In Education	61.7	-1.5	60.9	-1.3	57.4	-2.2	53.4	-1.3	72.3	-1.5	67.6	-1.6
Unemployed	75	1.3	25	-2.2	77.3	2	12.5	-2.5	86.4	1.7	25	-2.8
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
Pearson's Chi Sq.	4.523		9.716		12.392		15.464		7.323		14.172	
P-Value	0.606		0.137		0.054		0.017*		0.062		0.003**	

These figures are providing support to the claim that political consumerism in Greece acts as an alternative form of resilience in response to the relatively harder economic times the country has been facing (Kousis and Paschou, 2017). Conversely, in the UK the phenomenon seems to be primarily popular among the young people who were in paid employment, supporting Zhang's (2015) assertion that political consumerism is heavily skewed in favour of more affluent cohorts, even though this was not confirmed by the subjective relative income variable in **section 2.8** of this chapter.

In conclusion, apart from gender, there isn't a situation where demographic and socioeconomic indicators have a uniform and consistent direction of impact in both countries. Noteworthy exception is gender where, consistent with previous literature (Long, 2010; Stolle and Micheletti, 2006), young females in both Greece and the UK demonstrate a much higher inclination to engage in either boycotting and buycotting. Moreover, age within the 18-29 bracket is not associated with engagement in political consumerism. Likewise, the categories 'Belonging in a minority', 'Living with parents' and being the 'Primary earner' in one's household have been found to not be associated with political consumerism in either of the two countries, across any of the three political consumerist measures.

Instead, we can note impact in one country that may not be reproduced in the other. For example, all three measures (buycotting, boycotting and buycotting/boycotting) are significantly more likely in the Greek urban centres, than in the Greek rural areas. The opposite seems to hold true in the UK, where however, only buycotting is a primarily rural phenomenon. Subjective class measured by 'subjective income' remains a resilient measure of young people's consumer engagement, but only in the UK. Moreover, young 'intellectuals' are more likely to engage in

boycotts in the UK. In Greece instead, the figures reveal that subjective class is not statistically associated with political consumerism. The 'relative income' category reveals that young people in Greece belonging in relatively affluent households are more likely to boycott, and young people in the UK belonging to less affluent households are less likely to engage in the same activity. This observation partly confirms previous findings according to which boycotting is skewed in favour of relatively more affluent cohorts (Zhang, 2015).

Moreover, although it has been often assumed that education attainment is generally associated with higher levels of political consumerism (Long, 2010, p. 61), having a university degree in the current sample is statistically associated only with boycotting in Greece. Nevertheless, analysis of the employment status of the respondents discloses that in Greece, political consumerism is particularly popular among the unemployed, potentially as a tool of economic resilience (Kousis and Paschou, 2017). On the other hand, in the UK the phenomenon is primarily popular among the young people in paid employment, providing support to the hypothesis that political consumerism in the country is strongly connected to cohorts with higher purchasing power. This observation comes to support the argument laid out in **Chapter 9** according to which political consumerism in Greece is primarily associated with the discontent from the neoliberal market environment, whereas in the UK it is primarily a result of a series of pull-factors into the marketopoly.

The demographic and socioeconomic indicators therefore, convey only a partial understanding of political consumerism in the two countries. However, trying to draw the profile of the young political consumer in the two countries, it seems we are referring to **a)** unemployed, **b)** females, **c)** living close to urban centres in Greece; whereas in the UK the phenomenon is particularly popular among **a)** intellectual **b)** females **c)** in paid work. The section that follows will inquire into the links of the beliefs and attitudes of young people in Greece and the UK in relation to their understanding of politics.

3. Political consumerism and young people's views about, and engagement with politics

This section examines and compares the interest in politics of young political consumers in Greece and in the UK, against the three measures of political consumerism. **Tables 3.1.0 to 3.6.1**

therefore, deliver the Chi-Square tests³⁷ for boycotters, boycotters and buy/boycotters across the indicators which capture the respondents' attitudes and beliefs about politics. Consistent with **Figure 6** (p.165), the variables analysed in this section include **a)** the respondents' subjective definition of politics, **b)** their interest in politics, **c)** political knowledge, **d)** political orientation in the left/right spectrum, **e)** strength of partisanship, and **f)** support for organised protests³⁸.

3.1 Subjective definition of politics

Consistent with Beck's (1997) conceptualisation of 'subpolitics' as politics from below, the respondents were asked in an open-ended question to provide their own definition of what politics means to them. Their responses were then categorised as '*top-down*' if they predominately involved the actions of politicians, political parties, a political elite, authority or an abstract and remote 'government'. Conversely, they were categorised as '*bottom-up*' if they primarily referred to 'us' ordinary people, individuals and individual responsibility-taking, and 'our' community. For example, some typical examples of a 'bottom-up' responses were the following:

- 'Politics is everywhere, we are political beings after all. The way we move around in our society is a political act. And of course, the way we influence the world around us. This means we are (or try to be) self-aware and responsible citizens and that we care about our communities and society as a whole';
- 'Personally speaking, everything is politics as it determines our way of living and therefore the way we are expressing ourselves, move and generally exist in this world';
- 'The power to make decisions for the public good, the organisation of our communities and common living, the resolution of conflicts within our societies'.

Instead, examples of 'top-down' responses included the following:

- 'Political parties, their members and actions';

³⁷ Measures of statistical significance (Pearson's Chi-Square and p-values) among the whole distribution are reported at the bottom of each category for each activity. The adjusted standardised residuals are being reported next to the percentages of each respective category.

³⁸The variable 'support for organised protests' is intended to capture young people's views about this form of political participation. The actual 'intention to demonstrate' will be analysed in **section 5.5**, along other forms of formal, informal and online forms of political engagement.

- ‘I personally believe that the whole thing revolves around a global game of power and authority and not so much around the best interests of the people’;
- ‘Political parties, parliament, government laws/legislation/policies, government ideas and who/what they support’.

The ensuing distribution of the responses according to this categorisation is presented in **Table 3.1.0**. It is interesting to note that young people in the UK were much more likely to indicate a top-down or mostly top-down understanding of politics (74.3%), than were their counterparts in Greece (53.3%), by a difference of 21 percentage points.

Table 3.1.0 Definition of Politics	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Bottom Up	23.5	72	14.4	46
Mostly Bottom Up	15.0	46	8.2	26
Neutral / Indifferent	8.2	25	3.1	10
Mostly Top Down	16.0	49	9.1	29
Top Down	37.3	114	65.2	208
Total	48.3	306	50.3	319




Table 3.1.1 reports the crosstabulation of the respondents’ subjective definition of politics with respect to boycotters, boycotters and those who engaged in either of the two.


Table 3.1.1 Definition of Politics	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Bottom Up	74.3	0.6	66.7	-0.2	81.4	2.4	54.5	-0.7	80.6	0.9	71.7	0.3
Mostly Bottom Up	76.3	0.7	75.0	0.8	65.1	-0.8	56.0	-0.3	73.9	-0.4	73.1	0.4
Neutral / Indifferent	78.3	0.8	70.0	0.2	63.6	-0.7	50.0	-0.5	80.0	0.4	70.0	0.0
Mostly Top Down	68.9	-0.4	64.0	-0.4	71.4	0.2	61.5	0.3	71.4	-0.9	65.5	-0.5
Top Down	67.3	-1.2	67.5	-0.1	66.0	-1.2	60.4	0.7	76.3	0.0	69.7	-0.1
Total	71.4		67.8		70.3		59.0		76.5		69.9	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	2.288		0.790		6.157		0.952		1.702		0.467	
P-Value	0.683		0.940		0.188		0.917		0.790		0.977	

The table discloses that boycotting in Greece is a tool primarily of those who adhere to a 'bottom-up' understanding of politics. In other words, boycotting is being perceived as another way with which 'we, as young people' may influence the reality of the world around 'us'. Instead, there are no other statistically significant differences across the rest of the categories.

3.2 Interest in politics

In turn, examining the variable 'Interest in politics' in **Table 3.2.0** amongst young people in both countries reveals that this is skewed in favour of the higher levels of interest, which however is to be expected by those who took the time to respond to a survey on political participation.

Table 3.2.0 Interest in Politics	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
None at all	2.9	9	4.0	13
Not very much	16.7	52	18.4	59
Some	30.5	95	31.2	100
Quite a lot	36.0	112	29.6	95
A great deal	13.8	43	16.8	54
Total	49.1	311	50.6	321



At a first glance on **Table 3.2.1**, and if one was to judge only by the cumulative measure, political interest does not seem to have a significant relationship with political consumerism

($p > .05$). However, when one looks at boycotting separately this is found to be statistically significant for both countries ($p < .01$ for Greece and $p < .05$ for the UK), and so is buycotting for the UK subsample ($p < .05$). This observation provides support to the argument that the cumulative dimension is a rather inefficient measurement of political consumerism, since examining each political activity separately conveys a very different image. In Greece buycotting is less likely to be used by those who have no interest in politics at all. In the UK instead, buycotting is primarily a tool of those who have a great deal of interest in politics. The significance of political interest becomes more centralised when it comes to boycotting, with those who had quite a lot of interest in politics being more likely to have engaged in it, in both countries.

Table 3.2.1.
Interest in Politics


	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
None at all	33.3	-2.1	53.8	-0.7	66.7	0.2	38.5	-1.3	66.7	-0.7	61.5	-0.7
Not very much	57.7	-1.4	54.2	-1.5	46.2	-2.9	44.1	-1.9	71.2	-1	59.3	-2.0
Some	67.4	0.3	62	-0.2	56.8	1.7	53	-0.6	72.6	-1.1	71	0.2
Quite a lot	70.5	1.2	64.2	0.3	76.8	3.5	63.2	1.8	84.8	2.6	71.6	0.4
A great deal	69.8	0.5	74.1	1.9	67.4	0.5	63	1.2	72.1	-0.7	79.6	1.7
Total	66.2		62.9		64		55.5		76.5		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	10.644		16.703		20.585		17.282		6.886		6.201	
P-Value	0.223		0.033*		0.008**		0.027*		0.142		0.185	

Generally, political consumerism, in either of its two forms, seems to increase along with political interest, both in Greece and the UK. More specifically however, boycotting seems to be primarily a tool of those in the middle of the distribution of political interest. Instead, buycotting is primarily a political engagement tool of either those who have a great deal of political interest as it happens for example in the UK, while conversely it is less likely to be utilised by the politically disinterested, as for example happens in Greece. This could be partly because boycotting has become a relatively mainstream activity in recent years targeting often a single company, or product at a time. Instead, buycotting requires arguably more in-depth information in relation to the practices followed by the companies being buycotted.

3.3 Political knowledge

Although political interest has been shown to be a relatively strong indicator of political consumerism, especially when it comes to boycotting for both countries and buycotting in the UK, the same cannot be argued for political knowledge (**Table 3.3.1**). In this question, the respondents were asked to specify how confident they felt with regards to their level of knowledge of politics and political parties when it comes to deciding how to vote at election times.

Political Knowledge	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not at all confident	14.2	44	10.3	33
Not very confident	34.2	106	29.5	94
Fairly confident	39.0	121	41.1	131
Very confident	12.6	39	19.1	61
Total	48.9	310	50.3	319



Across the whole distribution, there is not any significant relationship ($p > .05$) with regards to the extent of political knowledge of the respondents in either country, for any of the three political consumerist measures. Within the categories however, we may see that boycotting in Greece has a negative significant relationship ($\text{adj.res.} > \pm 2.0$) with the 55.7% of those who were not very confident, and a positive one with the 70.2% who were fairly confident about their extent of political knowledge, indicating that boycotting in the country is a tool primarily of those who are moderately confident about what is going on in the political scene. This confirms similar findings by Baek (2010), who also reports that people with relatively higher levels of political knowledge are more likely to boycott than buycott.


Table 3.3.1 Political Knowledge	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all confident	56.8	-1.5	66.7	0.5	65.9	0.3	54.5	-0.1	72.7	-0.7	75.8	0.7
Not very confident	67.9	0.4	59.6	-0.8	55.7	-2.3	48.9	-1.5	75.5	-0.4	66.0	-1.1
Fairly confident	69.4	0.9	66.4	1.1	70.2	1.8	60.3	1.4	81.0	1.4	73.3	1.0
Very confident	64.1	-0.3	59.0	-0.7	66.7	0.3	55.7	0.0	71.8	-0.8	67.2	-0.6
Total	66.5		63.0		64.2		55.5		76.8		70.2	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	5.465		8.376		5.556		7.774		2.254		2.152	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.486		0.212		0.475		0.255		0.521		0.541	

Nevertheless, it is worth noting at this point that the formulation of this question might have influenced the responses. Although the previous question on political interest did not refer to political parties but generally on their interest in politics, this question explicitly referred to 'politics and political parties'. As it will be later demonstrated in **section 3.5** and **5.1 to 5.8** political consumerism is consistently non-associated with variables that involve any reference to partisanship, or electoral processes.

3.4 Political orientation

The respondents were subsequently asked to position themselves with regards to their political orientation on the Left/Right spectrum. The distribution of their responses is reported in **Table 3.4.0**.

Table 3.4.0 Political Orientation	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Far Left	21.4	67	19.3	62
Moderate Left	31.3	98	32.4	104
Centre	33.2	104	28.3	91
Moderate Right	12.5	39	16.2	52
Far Right	1.6	5	3.7	12
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



Across all three types of activities and both countries, there are clear indications that political consumerism is primarily a tool of those positioning themselves in the far left (consistently significant above $adj.res.=+2.0$). Instead, the respondents who self-reportedly belonged in the centre were statistically less likely to have engaged in all three political consumerist measures across both countries. Both of these observations are consistent with previous research that portrays the centre-voters less engaged in political consumerism, and left-wing voters more engaged in it (Terragni and Berg, 2007).

Although those placing themselves as moderate right in Greece were statistically less likely to engage in boycotts, they were statistically more likely to have engaged in boycotts instead. This may be understood in the context of the widespread boycott campaigns on German products in the country, primarily associated with the right-wing parties. This difference would not be discernible from the cumulative measure only (which reports a negative sign for this category) and discloses the inefficiency of this measure to fully capture the intricacies of political

consumerism’s two separate behavioural dimensions. Moreover, it is worth noticing that the respective percentages demonstrate a decreasing trend in almost all dimensions, in both countries, as the respondents’ political orientation shifts to the right³⁹.

Table 3.4.1 Political Orientation	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Far Left	83.6	3.4	79.0	2.9	83.6	3.8	72.6	3.0	92.5	3.5	83.9	2.6
Moderate Left	64.8	1.1	63.5	0.1	67.3	0.9	57.7	0.6	80.6	1.2	75.0	1.3
Centre	68.8	-2.7	54.9	-1.9	53.8	-2.6	45.1	-2.4	79.4	-2.7	60.4	-2.4
Moderate Right	51.3	-2.1	59.6	-0.5	51.3	1.8	53.8	-0.3	61.5	-2.3	65.4	-0.8
Far Right	80.0	0.7	50.0	-0.9	40.0	-1.1	33.3	-1.6	80.0	3.8	50.0	-1.5
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	22.583		11.099		24.686		18740		20.198		13.716	
P-Value	0.004**		0.196		0.002**		0.016*		0.000***		0.008**	

In conclusion, political orientation has been so far (along with gender) the strongest indicator of political consumerism among young people in Greece and the UK. Political consumerism, whether expressed as buycotts, boycotts or either of the two, is thus primarily a tool of those respondents who reported belonging in the far left in both countries, demonstrating diminishing trend as the political orientation of the respondents moves towards the right.


3.5 Partisanship

As have seen, political orientation is one of the strongest indicators of political consumerism in both the UK and Greece. However, as analysis of **Table 3.5.1** reveals, this does not spill-over to

³⁹ A noteworthy exception to this diminishing trend can be found at the 80% of the respondents of the far right in Greece (adj.res.= +3.8) who reportedly engaged in either or both of the two activities. However, the low reported frequency in this category for Greece (n=5), indicates one should be rather hesitant to interpret it as a clear indication of increased engagement of the far right in Greece in political consumerism.

partisanship. The respondents were asked to state if they usually think of themselves as being a supporter of one particular party or not⁴⁰.

Table 3.5.0 Partisanship	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not a supporter	78.0	244	42.1	135
Fairly strong supporter	14.7	46	42.4	136
Strong supporter	1.9	6	8.1	26
Do not know	5.4	17	7.5	24
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



The figures demonstrate a widespread alienation of young people in Greece from party-politics, with 78.0% of the young respondents not being supporters of any political party – almost 36 percentage points higher than in the UK. Young people in the UK instead were divided between not being a supporter at all and being a fairly strong supporter (42.1% over 42.4%). Also indicative of young peoples’ alienation from formal politics is that the figures for the “Don’t Knows” in both countries is greater or comparable to those who said they were strong supporters of a political party.

⁴⁰ Although throughout the variables in this section the ‘Do not know’ responses were dropped from the final analysis so that they would not skew the findings, in this particular category I decided to keep them since they are indicative of the alienation of young people from party politics.

Table 3.5.1 Partisanship	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not a supporter	67.6	1.0	58.5	-1.4	66.4	1.7	51.9	-1.1	78.7	1.8	68.1	-0.6
Fairly strong supporter	67.4	0.2	65.4	0.8	58.7	-0.8	58.1	0.8	71.7	-0.8	70.6	0.2
Strong supporter	83.3	0.9	69.2	0.7	66.7	0.1	53.8	-0.2	83.3	0.4	73.1	0.3
DK	35.3	-2.8	66.7	0.4	41.2	-2.0	62.5	0.7	52.9	-2.3	75.0	0.5
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	8.875		6.064		11.547		12.378		6.603		0.646	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.181		0.416		0.073		0.054		0.086		0.886	


Across the distribution, the data reveals no clear relationship with partisanship and political consumerism ($p > .05$). However, examining the relationships of partisanship within the respective measures of political consumerism we may discern somewhat more interesting findings. Firstly, we note that for the UK there is no relationship between party affiliation in any of the categories examined. Secondly, we may see that those who are unsure of their political affiliations in Greece are statistically less likely to engage in political consumerism in any of its forms. Thirdly however, we may also infer that the 78.7% of the political consumers in Greece in the cumulative measure are significantly more likely (adj.res.= +1.8) not to be a supporter of any particular political party. We can also see that this is primarily because of the 66.4% of the boycotters in the country in the same category (adj.res.= +1.7), although there is no statistical relationship with the buycotters. However, the cumulative measure fails to capture this significant difference.

Therefore, and consistent with the discussion from the focus groups in **Chapter 10**, this observation provides further support for the hypothesis that in Greece young people are pushed out from party-politics. More specifically, young boycotters in Greece are significantly more likely to not be a supporter of any particular political party.

3.6 Support for organised protests

Finally, the overwhelming majority of young people in both countries agree that people should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government (**Table 3.6.0**).

Table 3.6.0	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
<u>Organise Protests</u>				
Agree	96.4	271	93.4	271
Disagree	3.6	10	6.6	19
Total	44.3	281	45.7	290



Although boycotting does not convey any significant relationship with support for organising protests, boycotting is being perceived as an alternative engagement tool for those who support organising public meetings to protest against the government in both countries. The reason may be that negative political consumerism is directly targeting certain unfavourable business practices within the market. In other words, boycotting may be understood as a form of economic protest, and as such, it is associated with organised protests against the government. Once again, the cumulative measure fails to capture this significant difference.

Table 3.6.1	<u>Buycotter</u>				<u>Boycotter</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotter</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
<u>Organise Protests</u>	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Yes, I agree	67.5	1.2	65.3	1.6	66.4	1.7	59.4	2.4	78.6	2.1	72.7	2.4
No, I disagree	50.0	-1.2	47.4	-1.6	40.0	-1.7	31.6	-2.4	50.0	-2.1	47.4	-2.4
Total	66.9		64.1		65.5		57.6		77.6		71.0	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	3.623		3.347		3.545		6.191		4.535		5.535	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.163		0.188		0.170		.045*		.033*		0.019*	

In conclusion, the indicators on the respondents' beliefs and attitudes about politics disclose a generally stronger explanatory power than the demographic and socioeconomic indicators discussed in the previous section. The analyses in **sections 3.1 to 3.6**, reveal that **a)** only

boycotting in Greece is associated with a bottom-up understanding of politics, instead of the domain of a remote political elite. Moreover, there is a strong statistical relationship between **b)** interest in politics and political consumerism among the respondents of both countries. Although however, political interest is strongly associated with political consumerism, **c)** knowledge about party politics is not associated with political consumerism in either of the countries. In turn, **d)** political identification with the far-left is associated with boycotting and boycotting in both countries while this association seems to be diminishing as we move towards the right. Nevertheless, this association is not reflected in party-politics. Instead, **e)** boycotting in Greece seems to be perceived as an alternative form of political participation for those young people who are not a supporter of any particular political party. Finally, **f)** support for organising protests in both countries is associated with boycotting, since this is being perceived as a form of market-oriented protest. These findings contradict Giddens' (1994) claim about the diminishing relevance of the left/right continuum. Instead, they provide support for the argument that political consumerism is primarily a tool of those young people who are affiliated to the *ideological*, but not to the *political* left as this is being expressed in contemporary party politics.

4. Political consumerism and young people's views about elections, politicians and democracy?

Previous research has suggested that although young people "do not feel that they can exercise real influence over decision-making" they continue to be strong supporters of democracy in principle (Henn and Foard, 2014, p. 2). This section will thus discuss the relation of democratic ideals and support for electoral processes with political consumerism in the UK and Greece.


Sections **4.1** to **4.6** report and discuss the crosstabulations for boycotters, boycotters and buy/boycotters, across different indicators that are designed to capture young people's support for and ideals about democracy. Consistent with the conceptual map of **Figure 6** (p. 165), the variables analysed in this section will include **a)** the conviction that by voting they may change how their country operates (External Political Efficacy, EPE); **b)** their particularised trust towards politicians, **c)** the extent they believe they may influence the governance of their country (Internal Political Efficacy, IPE), **d)** their disillusionment from elections, **e)** their generalised trust, or how much they trust other people, **f)** their conviction that voting is a duty; **g)** how important

democracy in principle is for them, **h)** how democratic they deem their country to be, and finally **i)** their satisfaction with political information.

4.1 External Political Efficacy

Table 4.1.0 reports the distribution of young people’s conviction that by voting they may change how their country is being run, that is their levels of External Political Efficacy (EPE).

Table 4.1.0 By Voting I can change my country (EPE)	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Strongly disagree	11.7	36	5.4	17
Disagree	23.8	73	16.7	53
Neither/nor	21.2	65	21.8	69
Agree	33.2	102	46.4	147
Strongly agree	10.1	31	9.8	31
Total	48.4	307	50.0	317



Generally, young people’s EPE, does not convey any statistically significant results ($p > .05$) across any of the three political consumerist activities for either country (**Table 4.1.1**). However, it is worth noticing that boycotting seems to be primarily a tool of an unrepresented 52.8% of those who strongly disagree with the statement in Greece, whereas in the UK it is similarly a tool of a 48.4% minority of those who strongly agree with it ($\text{adj.res.} = -1.8$). This latter relationship persists and is even reinforced ($\text{adj.res.} < -2.0$) also for the other two measures, but only in the UK subsample. Political efficacy thus has a negative effect on political consumerism in the UK subsample, revealing that the young UK respondents are less likely to engage in political consumerism if they believe they may change their country by voting instead. In Greece however, young people are less likely to boycott if they also feel unable to influence their country by voting.

Table 4.1.1 By Voting I can change my country (EPE)	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Strongly disagree	52.8	-1.8	70.6	0.7	75.0	1.5	52.9	-0.2	77.8	0.2	76.5	0.6
Disagree	71.2	1.1	67.9	0.8	63.0	-0.2	64.2	1.3	82.2	1.4	75.5	0.9
Neither/nor	64.6	-0.2	59.4	-0.7	56.9	-1.3	56.5	0.1	72.3	-0.8	72.5	0.4
Agree	67.6	0.5	65.3	0.8	62.7	-0.3	56.5	0.2	74.5	-0.5	70.7	0.1
Strongly agree	64.5	-0.2	48.4	-1.8	71.0	0.9	38.7	-2.0	74.2	-0.3	51.6	-2.4
Total	65.8		63.1		63.8		55.8		76.2		70.3	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	9.255		6.265		6.034		12.015		2.268		6.348	
P-Value	0.321		0.618		0.643		0.151		0.687		0.175	


Despite concerns about a crowding-out effect of lifestyle forms of political participation, on voting (Putnam, 1995), **Table 4.1.1** reveals instead a crowding-out effect of voting on political consumerism, at least in the UK. In other words, young people in the UK are significantly less likely to engage in either buycotting or boycotting if they strongly believe that by voting they can achieve tangible changes for their country. Consistent with the findings from the focus groups, young people in the UK with high trust towards electoral processes (EPE) are therefore less likely to resort to alternative forms of political engagement within the market. In Greece in turn, political consumerism seems to be generally unrelated to electoral processes. In other words, young people in Greece are equally likely to engage in buycotting or boycotting irrespectively of their views or support of electoral processes. An exception can be discerned for the highly disillusioned young people in Greece ('strongly disagree'), who are also less likely to engage in buycotts as a means to attain change.

4.2 Trust towards politicians EPE

Analysis of the variable considered in the previous section in **Table 4.1.1** captured the trust that young respondents have of electoral processes. This variable instead, intends to capture young people's trust towards *politicians*. There may be discerned a robust *negative* link between

political consumerism and trust of politicians. Generally, young people in Greece seem to hold lower trust towards politicians, than do their counterparts in the UK (**Table 4.2.0**).

Trust Politicians	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not at all	52.4	162	28.6	90
Fairly	35.6	110	41.6	131
Neither/nor	7.4	23	23.5	74
Only some	3.2	10	5.7	18
Most can be trusted	1.3	4	0.6	2
Total	48.7	309	49.7	315



However, this does not seem to be related to their likelihood to engage either in buycotts, nor in boycotts ($p>.05$). Instead, there is an overall significant negative relationship in the UK ($p<.01$), when it comes to the cumulative measure. This is found primarily within young boycotters in the country ($p<.001$), and to a lesser extent within buycotters ($p<.05$). In particular, those who do not have any trust in politicians at all, seem to be significantly more likely to engage in political consumerism in all its forms ($\text{adj.res.}>+2.0$).


Trust Politicians	Buycotters		Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters					
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Not at all	67.3	0.2	73.3	2.2	69.1	1.8	65.6	2.1	81.5	2.0	78.9	2.0
Fairly	67.3	0.2	64.1	0.1	59.1	-1.4	59.5	1.0	72.7	-1.3	74.8	1.2
Neither/nor	69.6	0.3	48.6	-3.1	60.9	-0.4	16.5	-3.9	73.9	-0.4	52.7	-4.0
Only some	70.0	0.2	77.8	1.3	70.0	0.4	72.2	1.4	80.0	0.2	83.3	1.2
Most can be trusted	0.0	-2.8	50.0	-0.4	25.0	-1.7	0.0	-1.6	25.0	-2.5	50.0	-0.6
Total	66.7		63.8		64.4		56.2		77.0		71.1	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	10.027		17.394		8.230		30.096		9.259		17.472	
P-Value	0.263		.026*		0.411		0.000***		0.055		0.002**	

Contrary to the expectations from the focus groups, it is young people in the UK, and not from Greece, who seem to be pushed out from institutional politics, since they perceive politicians as inherently untrustworthy (Hart, 2017). Instead, young people in Greece who believe that most politicians can be trusted are less likely to engage in either boycotting or boycotting, presumably since they believe that they may attain the desired results through the representations of politicians instead.

4.3 Influence on governance IPE

In turn, **Table 4.3.0** shows that young people in both countries hold comparable levels of Internal Political Efficacy, that is that they have little confidence that they are able to directly influence the governance of their country.

Table 4.3.0 Influence on Governance	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not at all influence	40.5	123	26.3	83
A little influence	32.2	98	41.3	130
Neither/nor	16.1	49	23.8	75
Quite a lot of influence	5.9	18	6.7	21
A great deal of influence	5.3	16	1.9	6
Total	47.9	304	49.7	315




However, despite the opposite indications from the focus groups discussed in **Chapter 10**, there seems to be no statistical association between IPE and political consumerism ($p > .05$) for any of the three measures, indicating that the extent that young people believe they are able to influence the political processes in their country is not related to their likelihood to engage in political consumerism.

Table 4.3.1 Influence on Governance	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	(Percentages within each country)											
Not at all influence	66.7	0.0	62.7	-0.2	65.0	0.4	59.0	0.6	79.7	1.0	72.3	0.3
A little influence	69.4	0.7	66.2	0.8	67.3	0.9	59.2	0.9	79.6	0.8	73.1	0.7
Neither/nor	65.3	-0.2	64.0	0.1	57.1	-1.1	49.3	-1.4	69.4	-1.3	68.0	-0.6
Quite a lot of influence	61.1	-0.5	52.4	-1.1	55.6	-0.8	57.1	0.1	66.7	-1.0	66.7	-0.4
A great deal of influence	62.5	-0.4	50.0	-0.7	62.5	-0.1	33.3	-1.1	68.8	-0.8	50.0	-1.1
Total	66.8		63.5		63.8		56.2		76.6		70.8	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	3.616		4.261		13.558		7.652		4.106		2.128	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.890		0.833		0.094		0.468		0.392		0.712	

4.4 Disillusionment from elections

The next question asked whether young people agreed with the statement that ‘Elections allow voters to express their opinions but don’t really change anything’ and was intended to measure the extent of their *disillusionment* from elections. The Greek subsample demonstrated a generally greater disillusionment with electoral politics than is evident among UK youth (**Table 4.4.0**).

Table 4.4.0 Disillusionment from elections	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Strongly disagree	5.2	16	7.5	24
Disagree	17.7	55	23.5	75
Neither/nor	19.7	61	19.7	63
Agree	43.2	134	38.2	122
Strongly agree	14.2	44	11.0	35
Total	48.9	310	50.3	319




Previous literature (Nonomura, 2017) portrays political consumerism as an alternative political participation tool among those young people who feel powerless to express their concerns through the electoral political arena. However, and contrary also to the expectations derived from the focus groups, **Table 5.4.1** does not reveal evidence of any statistically significant relationship between young people’s disillusionment from politics and their propensity to engage in buycotts or boycotts.

Table 4.4.1 <u>Disillusionment from Elections</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Strongly disagree	68.5	-0.3	63.6	-0.5	75.0	0.4	65.2	0.6	81.3	0.4	66.7	-0.4
Disagree	78.8	1.3	67.6	-0.1	74.0	0.7	61.2	0.4	80.0	0.6	68.0	-0.5
Neither/nor	69.0	-0.5	71.9	0.7	69.1	-0.2	54.1	-0.9	72.1	-1.0	71.4	0.2
Agree	72.0	0.2	67.0	-0.3	68.9	-0.4	59.6	0.1	77.6	0.3	69.7	0.2
Strongly agree	65.9	-0.9	69.7	0.2	68.3	-0.3	60.0	0.1	75.0	-0.3	77.1	-0.9
Total	71.6		68.1		70.1		59.3		76.8		70.2	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	2.288		0.701		0.727		1.13		1.369		1.185	
P-Value	0.683		0.951		0.948		0.889		0.850		0.881	

4.5 Generalised trust

Table 4.5.0 reveals that young people in the UK are less trustful towards people in general than are their counterparts in Greece.

Table 4.5.0 Generalised Trust	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
You can't be too careful	10.0	31	18.0	57
Should be careful	20.0	62	23.3	74
Neither/nor	43.2	134	38.5	122
Some people only	20.0	62	16.4	52
Trust most people	6.8	21	3.8	12
Total	48.9	310	50.0	317



With regards to the association of the variable of generalised trust to political consumerism, **Table 5.5.1** reports that there is no statistical significance across the full distribution for either country ($p > .05$). However, those who responded that 'Some people can be trusted' in Greece are significantly more likely ($\text{adj.res.} > +2.0$) to have engaged in political consumerism, and boycotting in particular ($\text{adj.res.} = +1.9$). Unlike **section 4.2** which found that political consumerism in Greece is *less likely* if young people trust *politicians*, here we find that boycotting is *more likely* if they believe that at least 'some people can be trusted'.


Table 4.5.1 Generalised Trust	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
You can't be too careful	58.1	-1.0	66.7	0.6	67.7	0.5	56.1	0.1	74.2	-0.3	71.9	0.2
Should be careful	61.3	-0.9	55.4	-1.6	61.3	-0.5	50.0	-1.2	74.2	-0.5	63.5	-1.5
Neither/nor	64.9	-0.4	64.8	0.4	57.5	-2.0	59.8	1.1	70.9	-2.0	73.0	0.7
Some people only	72.6	1.2	71.2	1.3	74.2	1.9	57.7	0.3	87.1	2.2	78.8	1.4
Trust most people	81.0	1.5	50.0	-1.0	76.2	1.2	41.7	-1.0	90.5	1.6	50.0	-1.6
Total	66.1		63.4		63.9		55.8		76.5		70.7	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	9.840		7.467		7.740		9.327		8.758		6.328	
P-Value	0.276		0.487		0.459		0.315		0.067		0.176	

Previously, Neilson (2010) has reported that more trusting people are more likely to boycott than boycott. Similar findings have also been reported by Baek (2010) and Copeland (2014a, p. 182). The explanation provided in the context of social capital theory is that boycotts are typically a much more private endeavour, and therefore, since individuals cannot know who else engages in it, they need to be more trusting of their fellow citizens than boycotters do. Instead, boycotts, are frequently more public in nature, since they often tend to be the result of coordinated public actions aimed to increase public awareness on certain issues, and therefore do not require high levels of generalised trust. However, this is not confirmed by the data in this study, where there is found instead an association of boycotts to generalised trust, and only in the case of Greece. However, the link between generalised trust and boycotting across the whole distribution in the country is statistically spurious ($p > .05$).

4.6 Voting is a duty

In the next question the respondents were asked whether they agreed with the statement that they would be seriously neglecting their duty as a citizen if they didn't vote. Generally, respondents from Greece were relatively more sceptical about voting being a duty. Instead, UK respondents were relatively more 'dutiful' than those from Greece (76.4% of 'agree' and 'strongly agree', over 63.5% for Greece).

Voting is a Duty	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Strongly disagree	6.9	21	4.1	13
Disagree	11.5	35	6.6	21
Neither/nor	18.1	55	12.9	41
Agree	31.3	95	34.6	110
Strongly agree	32.2	98	41.8	133
Total	47.9	304	50.2	318



The Chi-square tests (**Table 4.6.1**) do not convey any effect across the overall distribution ($p > .05$). In Greece there is no discernible relationship whatsoever neither within, nor across the distribution. Within the categories however, boycotting in the UK seems to be a tool of the highly

dutiful voters (adj.res.>±2.0), and this relationship spills over in the cumulative measure. Moreover, boycotting in the UK is also a means of engagement for a minority of those who either disagree with the statement (adj.res.=-1.7) or are indifferent to it (adj.res.=-2.0).

Table 4.6.1 Voting is a Duty	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Strongly disagree	61.9	-0.5	53.8	-0.7	61.9	-0.3	53.8	-0.2	81.0	0.4	61.5	-0.7
Disagree	65.7	-0.1	47.6	-1.6	71.4	0.9	38.1	-1.7	80.0	0.4	57.1	-1.4
Neither/nor	63.6	-0.5	56.1	-1.1	58.2	-1.1	41.5	-2.0	70.9	-1.3	63.4	-1.1
Agree	63.4	0.4	65.5	0.5	64.2	-0.1	56.4	0.1	77.9	0.2	69.1	-0.5
Strongly agree	68.4	0.4	67.7	1.3	67.3	0.6	63.2	2.2	78.6	0.4	77.4	2.2
Total	66.8		63.5		64.8		56.0		77.3		70.8	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	1.730		7.278		4.715		11.228		1.695		6.504	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.988		0.507		0.788		0.189		0.792		0.165	

In other words those young people in the UK who do not perceive voting as a duty, or those who are indifferent to this statement are less likely to engage in boycotts. It can thus be concluded that boycotting is a tool used primarily by the dutiful young citizens, but only in the UK. Copeland (2014a) has previously theorised that boycotting is associated with norms of dutiful citizenship, since as a punishment-oriented form of political participation it shares several key features with electoral politics.

4.7 Support for democracy

Unlike the previous variable which captures young people’s levels of support for voting, this variable is intended to capture the overarching democratic ideals of the respondents. ‘Support for democracy in principle’ is the strongest predictor of political consumerism in this section, especially by the Greek subsample. **Table 4.7.0** displays the distribution of the responses per country.

How important Democracy is?	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not important	1.3	4	1.2	4
Fairly important	2.9	9	2.8	9
Neither/nor	6.1	19	14.0	45
Very important	12.5	39	17.8	57
Absolutely important	77.3	242	64.2	206
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321




Table 4.7.1 shows that support for democracy is related to boycotting both in Greece ($p < .01$), and the UK ($p < .05$). However, although boycotting is highly related to support for democracy in Greece ($p < .001$), it bears no significance in the UK. The same applies for buy/boycotting ($p < .05$). This is yet another very obvious example of why the cumulative measure of buy/boycotting is a rather inefficient measure of political consumerism, confirming Baek's (2010), Koos's (2012) and Zorell's (2018) assertion, that boycotters and buycotters should be distinguished because their demographic backgrounds, participatory practices and democratic ideals are substantially different.


How important Democracy is?	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Not important	50.0	-0.7	50.0	-0.5	75.0	0.5	75.0	-0.2	75.0	-0.1	75.0	0.2
Fairly important	44.4	-1.4	33.3	-1.9	33.3	-1.9	44.4	-1.7	55.6	-1.5	44.4	-1.7
Neither/nor	52.6	-1.3	53.3	-1.4	47.4	-1.5	35.6	-2.0	57.9	-2.0	60.0	-1.6
Very important	61.5	-0.6	35.9	-1.2	51.3	-1.8	54.4	0.1	66.7	-1.5	63.2	-1.3
Absolutely important	69.0	2.0	68.4	2.7	68.2	2.9	60.2	2.2	80.2	2.9	75.2	2.7
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	23.267		17.694		30.205		13.393		9.721		8.971	
P-Value	0.003**		0.024*		0.000***		0.099		.045*		0.062	

Nevertheless, within the categories there is the tendency that the more the young people from both countries value democracy in principle, the more likely they are to engage in political consumerism. Both boycotting and boycotting are consistently more likely (adj.res. >+2.0) to have taken place among those respondents who value democracy in their country as ‘*Absolutely important*’, confirming political consumerism as a form of political participation that reflects the democratic ideals of those who practice it.

4.8 How democratic is my country?

In turn, young people in the UK demonstrated a generally more positive assessment about how democratic their country was in practice (**Table 4.8.0**).

Table 4.8.0 How Democratic is my country?	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not at all	11.5	36	5.3	17
Fairly democratic	28.4	89	11.5	37
Neither/nor	26.5	83	27.1	87
Very democratic	27.5	86	43.0	138
Absolutely democratic	6.1	19	13.1	42
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321




The extent of how democratic the respondents believe their countries are in practice (**Table 4.8.1**) demonstrates a statistical relationship only for boycotters in Greece ($p < .05$), and this lies primarily among those who answered that their country is neither democratic, nor undemocratic (adj.res. < -2.0). Negative political consumerism was more likely to have taken place from the 73% who considered Greece being only fairly democratic; perhaps as a way of expressing their dissatisfaction with the quality of democracy in their country. Instead, the UK subsample does not reveal any significant relationships with democracy in practice in any of the political consumerist activities examined.

Table 4.8.1 How Democratic is my country?	<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all	63.9	-0.3	58.8	-0.4	66.7	0.4	64.7	0.8	75.0	-0.2	76.5	0.6
Fairly democratic	67.4	0.3	62.2	-0.1	73.0	2.1	62.2	0.9	82.0	1.5	70.3	0.0
Neither/nor	55.4	-2.4	59.8	-0.7	51.8	-2.7	54.0	-0.3	67.5	-2.2	70.1	0.0
Very democratic	73.3	1.6	65.9	1.0	61.6	-0.5	52.9	-0.8	76.7	0.1	69.6	-0.2
Absolutely democratic	78.9	1.2	61.9	-0.1	78.9	1.4	57.1	0.2	89.5	1.4	69.0	-0.2
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	16.725		4.323		14.528		9.341		7.068		0.371	
P-Value	.033*		0.827		0.069		0.314		0.132		0.985	

4.9 Satisfaction with political information

Table 4.9.0 displays the satisfaction with political information in the two countries, with the Greek cohort being more dissatisfied than the one from the UK.

Table 4.9.0 Satisfaction with Political Information	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	N	%	N
Not at all satisfied	19.2	60	10.3	33
Not satisfied	31.0	97	27.7	89
Neither/nor	25.2	79	29.0	93
Satisfied	20.1	63	28.3	91
Very satisfied	4.5	14	4.7	15
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



Nevertheless, satisfaction with the availability and the quality of political information does not reveal any significant relationships across the political consumerist activities for either country (Table 4.9.1).

Table 4.9.1 Satisfaction with Political Information	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all satisfied	63.3	-0.5	66.7	0.5	60.0	-0.7	54.5	-0.1	75.0	-0.3	78.8	1.2
Not satisfied	71.1	1.3	60.7	-0.5	66.0	0.5	49.4	-1.3	81.4	1.4	64.0	-1.5
Neither/nor	60.8	-1.2	62.4	-0.1	59.5	-0.9	58.1	0.6	69.6	-1.6	69.9	-0.1
Satisfied	66.7	0.1	61.5	-0.3	66.7	0.5	57.1	0.4	76.2	0.0	71.4	0.3
Very satisfied	71.4	0.4	80.0	1.4	78.6	1.2	66.7	0.9	85.7	0.8	80.0	0.9
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	5.109		6.754		5.048		3.972		4.117		3.525	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.746		0.563		0.752		0.860		0.390		0.474	

To summarise, the analysis throughout this section confirms ‘Support for democracy in principle’ as the most robust indicator of engagement in political consumerism, primarily in Greece. The quality of democracy in practice, however, is only related to boycotting in Greece, whereas satisfaction with political information does not convey any statistically significant results. Interestingly, boycotting in Greece is an alternative form of political engagement for a minority who feel unable to change their country by voting, whereas in the UK political consumerism in all its forms is an engagement tool of those who have a great deal of confidence that by voting they may change how their country operates. Moreover, boycotting is primarily a tool of the highly dutiful voters only in the UK.

Generally, the analysis of all the variables that relate to the government and elections, have displayed a spurious or no statistical association to political consumerism. This observation disassociates political consumerism from electoral political processes.

Only boycotting may be perceived as a political tool of the highly dutiful young citizens, and only in the UK. However, this relationship may be because the phrasing of this question (‘I

would be seriously neglecting my duty as a *citizen*, if I did not vote’) which is only implicitly related to voting, and more related to ‘citizenship’. The same could be argued for the variable ‘trust to politicians’ which demonstrates a negative relationship to political consumerism in the UK. In this case too, the distrust towards the politicians should not be misinterpreted as a negative relationship of political consumerism with elections. Instead, it is the perceived untrustworthiness of the politicians (and not the elections) which pushes young people towards political consumerism. Political consumerism should therefore be viewed as a form of political participation, *separate* from electoral processes altogether. However, this does not mean that it should also be perceived as separate from democratic ideals, since ‘support for democracy’ is positively associated with political consumerism in both countries. It can therefore be concluded that political consumerism is **a)** unrelated to elections and **b)** negatively associated with politicians, but **c)** positively associated with democracy in principle.

Moreover, this section has also demonstrated that the beliefs about elections, politicians and democratic ideals are substantially different between young buycotters and boycotters (Baek, 2010; Koos, 2012; Zorell, 2018), and that the cumulative measure of political consumerism fails to capture such important distinctions. Furthermore, the emphasis of the analysis above has been quantitative with respect to several push-factors which were suspected that might be alienating young people from formal politics and drive them instead to participate within the market context. In other words, this section has examined whether there is *less* or *more* participation in political consumerism according to young people’s levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with elections, politicians and democracy respectively. However, according to Leighley (1995, p. 198) “...to account for more than ‘how much’ participation, we must conceptualise the participation decision not as a choice between activity and inactivity, but rather as a choice of a particular type of political act out of a set of potential acts”. The next section therefore will examine which other forms of **a)** formal political participation, **b)** informal political participation, and **c)** online political participation the young political consumers may also be involved in.

5. Participation in politics and community affairs.

As society experiences processes of civic change, reflected in the variables above, young people in particular will embrace novel ways of engaging with civic life, such as political consumerism.

Understanding the relationship between these new practices and established methods of political participation remains therefore an important field of research. The debate on whether political consumerism is '*crowding-out*' participation in institutional politics, or whether the expansion of political repertoires within the market provides young people with an even wider array of political participation activities, in addition to those of formal, informal and online politics remains inconclusive (Gotlieb and Wells, 2012). This section seeks to shed light in this terrain by examining how active young boycotters and boycotters are in other forms of political participation and community affairs.

This section will thus investigate the political consumers' levels of engagement in three separate domains, namely in formal politics, informal politics and online engagement. Participation in formal politics will be measured by **a)** intention to vote in the next general elections, and by **b)** directly contacting an MP. In turn, engagement in informal politics will be measured by **c)** the intention to work actively with a group of people to address a public issue or tackle a problem, **d)** the intention to be active in a voluntary organisation, like a community association, a charity group, or youth club and **e)** the intention to participate in a protest, a rally or a demonstration, to show concern about a public issue or problem.


According to the bibliography, it is expected that boycotting, as a conflict-oriented behaviour (Friedman, 1999) will be more strongly related to intention to demonstrate (Copeland, 2014a). Moreover, it is also expected to be more associated with the variables measuring the formal dimension. Copeland notes that boycotting is more likely to involve disputes between organised consumer groups and corporations, identifiable conflict and broad attention from the media, all of which are typically elements of traditional political campaigns. Although boycotts seldom involve the selection of government personnel, "they have the potential to influence elected officials' public policy preferences indirectly, especially if they garner a substantial amount of media coverage" (2014a, p. 175). Instead, boycotting has arguably more in common with civic engagement than with traditional interest-based politics (Copeland, 2014a, p. 215) and therefore is more likely to involve informal, cooperative activity away from traditional political organisations (Zukin et al., 2006). We would therefore expect stronger association of boycotting with the variables 'intention to work with others' and 'intention to volunteer', than with the formal participation variables. Finally, online participation (Gibson and Cantijoch, 2013; Kelm and Dohle, 2018) will be measured by **a)** signing an electronic petition, **b)** the intention to simply share a link about an important social or political issue over a social networking site, and **c)** the intention

to create a group or a page on a social networking site, or a blog to inform others about an important social or political issue. Previous research has reported a positive association of political consumerism to online forms of political engagement (Kelm and Dohle, 2018).

5.1 Formal: Intention to vote

The distribution of the responses with regards to young people’s intention to vote demonstrates that young people in the UK were generally more likely to vote in the next general elections than young people in Greece (**Table 5.1.0**)⁴¹.

5.1.0 Formal: Intention to Vote	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Very unlikely	6.9	21	2.8	9
Unlikely	7.9	24	3.2	10
Neither/nor	7.9	24	5.0	16
Likely	21.3	65	15.5	49
Very likely	56.1	171	73.5	233
Total	48.1	305	50.0	317



Generally however, the analysis on the variable ‘Intention to vote’ reflects the findings of the previous section (**Tables 4.1-4.4**) according to which political consumerism should be perceived as disconnected from electoral processes, as there is no discernible statistical relationships in any of the political consumerism measures used ($p>.05$).

⁴¹ However, one should be cautious with the interpretation of this finding, bearing in mind that the collection of the survey questionnaire took place amidst a period of consecutive electoral rounds in the UK, which might have positively influenced their inclination to vote.


5.1.1 Formal: Intention to Vote	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	57.1	-1.0	66.7	0.2	61.9	-0.3	55.6	0.0	76.2	-0.1	77.8	0.5
Unlikely	54.2	-1.4	40.0	-1.5	50.0	-1.6	50.0	-0.4	62.5	-1.8	50.0	-1.4
Neither/nor	75.0	0.9	68.8	0.5	58.3	-0.7	62.5	0.6	75.0	-0.2	75.0	0.4
Likely	69.2	0.5	51.0	-1.9	66.2	0.3	42.9	-1.9	81.5	1.0	57.1	-2.1
Very likely	67.8	0.4	66.1	1.8	67.3	1.1	57.9	1.4	77.8	0.3	73.0	1.9
Total	66.9		63.1		64.6		55.5		77.0		70.0%	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	12.034		15.354		5.257		14.152		3.731		7.189	

More specifically however, within the respective categories, we may discern that those who are 'likely' to vote in the UK, are less likely to have engaged either in buycotting or boycotting (adj.res.<-1.7), pointing towards a mild crowding-out effect of voting on political consumerism in the country. However, the 66.1% of the young UK sample who were very likely to vote, were also more likely to have engaged in buycotts, and this relationship also spills over to the cumulative measurement. Generally, the figures in **Table 5.1.1** mirror those in '**Table 4.6.1: Voting is a duty**' as it is reasonable to assume that those who perceive voting as a duty will also be more likely to demonstrate greater intention to vote in the elections when that time comes. Whereas however the dutiful political consumers in the UK were more likely to engage in boycotts, those who are very likely to vote in the next general elections are more likely to engage in buycotts instead (66.1%, adj.res.=+1.8). This relationship is also reflected in the cumulative measure of buy/boycotters, which however once again fails to inform us about the differing dynamics between buycotting and boycotting.

5.2 Formal: Contact a politician

With regards to likelihood of directly contacting an MP or a politician, there may generally be discerned a sharp diminishing trendline for both countries (**Table 5.2.0**).

5.2.0 Formal:		Greece		UK		
Contact MP						
	%	N	%	N		
Very unlikely	33.6	91	36.9	113		
Unlikely	24.4	66	30.1	92		
Neither/nor	26.2	71	14.7	45		
Likely	12.5	34	13.4	41		
Very likely	3.3	9	4.9	15		
Total	42.7	271	48.3	306		



Moreover, the observation that market-oriented political participation is virtually unrelated to electoral processes gains further support from the analysis of the variable ‘Intention to contact your MP’, where there may be discerned no statistical association across the distribution ($p > .05$) for any of the three measures. Whereas however, those young people who are very likely to contact their MP in Greece ($n=9$) are more likely to have engaged in boycotts, those who are likely to have contacted their MP in the UK, are more likely to have engaged in boycotts instead ($\text{adj.res.} > +1.7$). Once again, the cumulative measure fails to capture this difference.


5.2.1 Formal:	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
Contact MP	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	65.9	-0.5	64.6	0.5	62.6	-0.8	56.6	0.3	78.0	-0.1	70.8	0.3
Unlikely	69.7	0.4	57.7	-1.5	63.6	-0.4	47.8	-1.8	78.8	0.1	63.0	-1.7
Neither/nor	63.4	-0.9	64.4	0.3	71.8	1.3	55.6	0.0	77.5	-0.2	73.3	0.5
Likely	70.6	0.4	68.3	0.8	58.8	-0.9	70.7	2.1	73.5	0.7	80.5	1.6
Very likely	100.0	2.1	66.7	0.3	88.9	1.5	53.3	-0.2	100.0	1.6	66.7	-0.3
Total	67.9		62.7		65.7		55.6		78.2		69.9	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	7.383		6.851		10.840		11.811		2.984		4.613	
P-Value	0.496		0.553		0.211		0.160		0.560		0.329	

These observations further reinforce the ones in the previous section, according to which political consumerism is not related to formal methods of political participation, neither in terms of intention to vote, nor in terms of directly contacting an MP. At the very least, boycotting and boycotting do not seem to crowd-out electoral participation. On the contrary, political consumerism seems to be a tool among those young people who are also likely or very likely to vote. This finding reasserts the observation in the previous section according to which market-oriented participation is associated with the dutiful respondents, but only in the case of the UK.

5.3 Informal: Intention to work with others

Instead, the relationship of political consumerism to the intention to work with others for a common goal is much more robust. The distribution of the responses in **Table 5.3.0** shows that this form of participation is more common in Greece, confirming the assertion of Graziano and Forno (2012) that collective forms of political participation are on the rise in southern Europe.

5.3.0 Informal: Intention to Work with Others	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Very unlikely	7.9	24	10.5	33
Unlikely	12.9	39	25.2	79
Neither/nor	22.8	69	24.8	78
Likely	35.6	108	26.4	83
Very likely	20.8	63	13.1	41
Total	47.8	303	49.5	314



With respect to boycotting, there is a robust statistical association of this variable for both subsamples ($p < .001$ for Greece and $p < .01$ for the UK). When it comes to boycotting however, only the Greek subsample is associated with the intention to work with others ($p < .05$), whereas boycotting in the UK is not associated with the intention to work with others for a common goal ($p > .05$). This observation may be reflecting the more individualistic nature of boycotting, especially in the UK, since purchasing a product for environmental, ethical and political considerations is something that usually happens individually each time one goes shopping and

thus requires lower levels of cooperation with others (Baek, 2010; Copeland, 2014a). Once again, this difference is not captured by the cumulative measure of buy/boycotting, where both countries display a highly significant relationship of political consumerism and intention to work with others ($p < .001$).


5.3.1 Informal: Intention to Work with Others	<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	37.5	-3.2	57.6	-0.8	45.8	-2.0	51.5	-0.6	62.5	-1.8	69.7	-0.2
Unlikely	53.8	-1.9	51.	-2.6	48.7	-2.2	38.0	-3.9	64.1	-2.1	54.4	-3.8
Neither/nor	59.4	-1.5	62.8	-3.0	53.6	-2.1	57.7	0.2	66.7	-2.4	71.8	0.1
Likely	76.8	2.7	71.1	1.6	69.5	1.4	67.5	2.3	83.3	1.9	79.5	1.9
Very likely	77.8	2.0	80.5	2.4	84.1	3.7	73.2	2.3	92.1	3.2	87.8	2.5
Total	67.0		64.0		64.4		56.7		77.2		71.3	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	23.770		14.020		14.02		20.721		21.330		19.250	
P-Value	0.003**		0.081		0.001***		.008**		.000***		.001***	

Generally speaking however, it can easily be perceived in both countries the much stronger relationship of this informal and cooperative form of political participation to political consumerism, compared to the formal election-oriented forms of political participation in the previous two subsections.

5.4 Informal: Intention to volunteer

The same applies for the variable 'Intention to volunteer'. The graph in **Table 5.4.0** shows a more steep trendline for Greece than in the UK, an indication that this form of civic engagement is more popular on the overall in Greece than in the UK.

5.4.0 Informal: Intention to Volunteer	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Very unlikely	7.5	23	6.9	22
Unlikely	9.1	28	18.3	58
Neither/nor	13.7	42	19.9	63
Likely	30.6	94	31.5	100
Very likely	39.1	120	23.3	74
Total	48.4	307	50.0	317



However, **Table 5.4.1** reports that there is a relationship of ‘Intention to volunteer’ to political consumerism, consistent for all three measures in both countries ($p < .05$). Those who answered they are ‘very likely’ to work with others are also statistically more likely to have engaged in boycotting, boycotting, and buy/boycotting ($\text{adj.res.} > +2.0$) for both countries. Generally, the pattern that emerges is that the higher the intention to volunteer, the more active the young respondents will be in political consumerism for both countries. Nevertheless, the association of volunteering to political consumerism is generally more consistent for the UK.

5.4.1 Informal: Intention to Volunteer	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Very unlikely	34.8	-3.4	45.5	-1.8	30.4	-3.5	45.5	-1.0	52.2	-3.0	63.6	-0.8
Unlikely	57.1	-1.2	48.3	-2.6	60.7	-0.4	39.7	-2.7	75.0	-0.3	53.4	-3.2
Neither/nor	73.8	1.0	54.0	-1.7	57.1	-1.1	39.7	-2.9	78.6	0.2	60.3	-2.0
Likely	62.8	-1.1	67.0	0.9	62.8	-0.4	66.0	2.5	72.3	-1.3	75.0	1.2
Very likely	76.7	2.9	83.8	4.2	75.8	3.3	71.6	3.1	85.8	2.9	89.2	4.0
Total	67.1		63.4		64.5		55.8		77.2		70.7	
Significance across the whole distribution												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	19.896		29.079		23.665		26.187		14.648		25.227	
P-Value	0.011*		0.000***		.003**		.001***		.005**		0.000***	


Theoretical support for this strong relationship of volunteering to political consumerism in both countries may be traced within the Civic Voluntarism Model (CVM) and has been

previously applied to political consumerism by Copeland (2014a, p. 175) in the US, without however delivering robust results. In the CVM, Verba et al. (1995) pose that the likelihood of engaging in civic and political behaviour is connected primarily on two factors, motivation and capacity. In that respect therefore, the higher perceived motivation of the Greek subsample to engage in volunteering (**Table 5.4.0**), may be counteracted by the higher available opportunity structures for volunteering in the UK.

5.5 Informal: Intention to demonstrate

The same applies for the variable ‘Intention to demonstrate’. Generally, **Table 5.5.0** reports higher intention to demonstrate in Greece than in the UK.

5.5.0 Informal: Intention to Demonstrate	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Very unlikely	9.2	28	21.1	67
Unlikely	15.4	47	26.8	85
Neither/nor	18.3	56	19.6	62
Likely	30.7	94	21.5	68
Very likely	26.5	81	11.0	35
Total	48.3	306	50.0	317



We should maybe remember at this point that the relationship between ‘Support for organised protests’ in **section 3.6** was much stronger for the UK, especially among the boycotters, confirming Friedman’s (1999) proposed relationship of boycotting to demonstrations, on the grounds it shares common features with demonstrations, as for example that they both requires more organisation and attract more media attention. We should therefore expect a stronger relationship between boycotters and intention to demonstrate. **Table 6.5.1** shows that this is indeed the case, at least for the UK, where boycotting is having a stronger relationship with intention to demonstrate ($p < .001$) than boycotting ($p < .01$). For Greece instead, the relationship between the participant’s intention to demonstrate is consistent at $p < .001$ for both boycotting and boycotting. Once again the cumulative measure fails to capture these intricacies and reports a consistently high relationship at $p < .001$ for both countries.

5.5.1 Informal: Intention to Demonstrate	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	39.3	-3.2	52.2	-2.1	42.9	-2.5	41.8	-2.5	57.1	-2.6	58.2	-2.4
Unlikely	57.4	-1.5	61.2	-0.4	51.1	-2.1	47.1	-1.8	70.2	-1.2	65.9	-1.1
Neither/nor	55.4	-2.0	58.1	-0.9	48.2	-2.8	45.2	-1.8	62.5	-2.9	61.3	-1.7
Likely	73.4	1.7	69.1	1.2	69.1	1.2	77.9	4.2	81.9	1.3	85.3	3.0
Very likely	81.5	3.3	85.7	2.9	85.2	4.6	77.1	2.7	92.6	3.9	91.4	2.9
Total	66.7		63.1		64.4		55.5		77.1		70.3	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	25.116		16.470		34.105		36.372		26.605		22.722	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.001***		0.036*		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***	


The CVM of Verba et al. (1995) may once again provide support for these (minor) differences among the countries. Protests and large scale demonstrations have become an almost daily occurrence in the streets of Athens in the years after the 'movement of the piazzas' in many Mediterranean countries in 2011 (Leontidou, 2012, p. 1). It may therefore be argued that the opportunity structures for demonstrations are more widespread in Greece, just like the opportunity structures in volunteering associations are more widespread in the UK, and this might explain the variance in the findings of the last two variables.

Nevertheless, the relationship of all three variables of informal participation, are significantly more strongly associated with political consumerism than the two variables of formal political participation at the beginning of this section. For example, Vrablíková and Linek (2013) explain why protestors are not likely to vote. They claim that this group of citizens, although highly interested in politics, choose to bypass voting at elections, which is viewed as providing legitimacy to representative democracy. The same therefore may be claimed for political consumerism, and is consistent with young people's own responses during the focus groups (see **Chapter 9**).

5.6 Online: Sign a petition

When it comes to online forms of political participation, young people in the UK are more likely to engage in signing a petition than in Greece (**Table 5.6.0**). When it comes to young political consumers in both countries however (**Table 5.6.1**), this trend is being reversed, with those who responded they are ‘very likely’ to sign a petition being more likely to engage in political consumerism (99.6% in Greece over 77.4% in the UK, $p < .001$).

5.6.0 Online: Sign a Petition	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Very unlikely	9.0	27	4.4	14
Unlikely	13.0	39	5.4	17
Neither/nor	17.1	51	11.0	35
Likely	33.1	99	37.2	118
Very likely	27.8	83	42.0	133
Total	47.2	299	50.0	317




With regards to the distinction between positive and negative consumerism for those who are ‘very likely’ to sign a petition, young people in Greece demonstrate consistently higher engagement than their contemporaries in the UK (88.0% over 70.7% for boycotting and 81.9% over 66.9% in boycotting, all significant at $\text{adj.res.} > 2.0$). Generally however, there is a strong link between signing a petition and engaging in political consumerism for both countries. Across the whole distribution there is a significant statistical relationship for Greece across all three measures ($p < .01$), while for the UK there is a statistically significant relationship at $p < .001$ for both the cumulative measure and boycotting, but not for boycotting ($p > .05$).

5.6.1 Online: Sign Petition	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	48.1	-2.3	50.0	-1.1	48.1	-2.0	71.4	1.2	63.0	-2.0	78.6	0.7
Unlikely	53.8	-2.0	47.0	-1.4	51.3	-2.0	23.5	-2.8	69.2	-1.4	47.0	-2.2
Neither/nor	54.9	-2.1	45.7	-2.3	56.9	-1.4	20.0	-4.5	66.7	-2.1	45.7	-3.4
Likely	67.7	0.0	64.4	0.3	65.7	0.1	56.8	0.3	79.8	0.5	72.9	0.7
Very likely	88.0	4.7	70.7	2.3	81.9	3.8	66.9	3.4	91.6	3.5	77.4	2.3
Total	67.6		63.4		65.2		55.8		77.9		70.7	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	33.087		15.170		22.29		36.155		18.167		18.730	
P-Value	0.000***		0.056		0.004**		0.000***		0.001***		0.001***	

5.7 Online: Share a link

The same holds true and is even reinforced for the intention to simply share a link about an important social or political issue over a social media site, such as Twitter or Facebook (Table 5.7.0). The association between online participation and political consumerism has been previously well documented (Kelm and Dohle, 2018).

5.7.0 Online: Share Link	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Very unlikely	9.1	28	12.3	39
Unlikely	11.3	35	11.7	37
Neither/nor	12.6	39	13.6	43
Likely	28.5	88	31.0	98
Very likely	38.5	119	31.3	99
Total	48.7	309	49.8	316



The relationship between sharing a link or an article online and political consumerism is highly correlated for both countries across all three measures ($p < .001$). A noteworthy exception is the category boycotters in the UK where the relationship between the two falls at $p < .05$, which however remains statistically significant. Generally, the more likely young people in the two


countries are to share a link or an article on a social media platform, the more likely they are to also engage in political consumerism, with Greece demonstrating significantly higher percentages for the ‘very likely’ category than in the UK across all three measures (adj.res.>+2.0). This observation comes to be added to the consistently higher association of political consumerism to both informal and online forms of political participation.

5.7.1 Online: Share Link	<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	50.0	-1.9	48.7	-2.0	50.0	-1.6	43.6	-1.6	67.9	-1.2	61.5	-1.3
Unlikely	42.9	-3.1	56.8	-0.9	48.6	-2.0	43.2	-1.6	62.9	-2.1	59.5	-1.6
Neither/nor	53.8	-1.8	48.8	2.1	43.6	-2.9	48.8	-1.0	64.1	-2.0	58.1	-1.9
Likely	63.6	-0.6	64.3	0.2	65.9	0.4	57.1	0.3	73.9	-0.7	71.4	0.2
Very likely	83.2	5.0	76.8	3.4	77.3	3.8	66.7	2.7	89.1	4.1	82.8	3.2
Total	66.3		63.3		64.1		55.7		76.7		70.6	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	45.005		27.255		27.028		17.610		19.035		14.128	
P-Value	0.000***		0.001***		0.001***		0.024*		0.001***		0.007**	

5.8 Online: Create a blog

Academics often criticize online political action, referring to it as “slacktivism” (Morozov, 2009) or “clicktivism” (Karpf, 2010), characterising it as including low-risk and low-effectiveness forms of political participation which – for some - carries with it hidden dangers for the public sphere (Karpf, 2010, p. 1). It is admittedly much easier to share a link of an article online than to take the time and write that article yourself. Young people in the two countries are therefore less likely to write a blog than to sign a petition or to simply share a link. Also, **Table 5.8.0** shows that this is less likely to happen in the UK than in Greece.

5.8.0 Online:		Greece		UK	
Create a Blog		%	N	%	N
Very unlikely		25.6	79	32.5	103
Unlikely		26.0	80	37.2	118
Neither/nor		23.7	73	14.5	46
Likely		15.6	48	11.7	37
Very likely		9.1	28	4.1	13
Total		48.6	308	50.0	317



With regards to the likelihood of creating a group or a page on a social media site, or a blog to inform others about an important social or political issue, there is a statistically significant relationship ($p < .01$) only among boycotters in Greece. This may be because political consumerism is generally associated with the recent expansion of online sites which provide information about which companies to support with one's consumer behaviour. However, this form of participation is much less widespread especially among boycotters in both countries, compared to simply signing a petition or sharing a link, which both presumably involve less costs in terms of time, effort and commitment. With this specific comparison, it is hard to avoid the portrayal of young people as lazy and self-interested. However, this standpoint would overlook the high levels of engagement of young political consumers in both countries in community-oriented forms of political participation discussed above.

5.8.1 Online: Create Blog	<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Very unlikely	48.1	-4.0	61.2	-0.5	53.2	-2.5	54.4	-0.4	67.1	-2.4	68.0	-0.6
Unlikely	67.5	0.2	58.5	-1.3	60.0	-1.0	53.4	-0.7	75.0	-0.5	64.4	-1.8
Neither/nor	76.7	2.1	69.6	1.0	71.2	1.4	54.3	-0.2	83.6	1.5	78.3	1.3
Likely	68.8	0.4	70.3	1.0	72.9	1.3	62.2	0.8	79.2	0.4	78.4	1.1
Very likely	85.7	2.3	76.9	1.1	78.6	1.6	76.9	1.6	89.3	1.6	92.3	1.8
Total	66.6		63.1		64.6		55.8		76.9		70.3	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	21.403		7.083		14.064		6.496		8.837		7.808	
P-Value	0.006**		0.528		0.080		0.592		0.065		0.099	

In general, despite claims that lifestyle forms of political participation may be crowding-out electoral participation (Putnam, 1995), the analysis of the two formal participation variables in relation to political consumerism in this section indicate that there is little to no relationship between the two. It seems therefore that for the young political consumers in both countries, political participation is less about voting for political parties, and contacting politicians via email. Instead, they seem to be embracing offline, non-institutional forms of citizenship such as working actively with others to address a public issue of common interest; volunteering in a community association, a charity group, or youth club and participating in a protest or a demonstration. The collective outreach of these forms of political engagement contradicts the standpoint that political consumerism is an inherently individualistic form of political participation. When it comes to online participation, young political consumers are embracing its non-institutionalised variants, like signing an online petition or sharing an already existing link or blog to inform others about a social or political issue they consider important. Instead, creating a blog or a social media page themselves, is only a tool among young boycotters in Greece.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has initially sought to analyse the demographic and socioeconomic profile of young political consumers in Greece and in the UK. Although the demographic and socioeconomic indicators in **section 2** reveal a generally spurious association with political consumerism, the analysis indicates young political consumers in Greece as being especially **a)** unemployed, **b)** females, **c)** living close to urban centres. In the UK instead, political consumerism is particularly popular among **a)** intellectuals **b)** females **c)** in paid work.

In turn, the indicators on the respondents' beliefs and attitudes about politics in **section 3** reveal a generally stronger association than the demographic and socioeconomic indicators. As a result, it can be deduced that **a)** boycotting in Greece is associated with a bottom-up understanding of politics, **b)** political interest is strongly associated with political consumerism in both countries, although this is not also reflected in terms of **c)** knowledge about party politics. Moreover, political consumerism in both the UK and Greece **d)** is predominately a left-wing phenomenon and diminishes as the ideological orientation of young people shifts towards the right. However, although the ideological orientation of the respondents demonstrates a robust

association with market-oriented political participation, the same cannot be said about partisanship. On the contrary, **e)** boycotting in Greece seems to be perceived as an alternative form of political participation for those young people who are not supporters of any particular political party. These findings contradict the alleged diminishing relevance of the left/right continuum under postmodernism (Giddens, 1994). Instead, they provide support for the argument that political consumerism is primarily a tool of those young people who are affiliated to the ideological left, but not to the political left as this is being expressed in contemporary party politics in their countries. Finally, this section reconfirms the previously well-documented association of negative political consumerism with **f)** support for organising protests in both countries (Friedman, 1999).

The perceived lack of connection between political consumerism and electoral processes, but not to ideological orientations is being reinforced in **section 4**. Despite the concerns that lifestyle forms of political participation are crowding-out electoral participation (Putnam, 1995), the analysis of this section indicates that this is not the case, at least when it comes to political consumerism, which is generally unrelated to voting and elections. This observation supports the standpoint that political consumerism should therefore be viewed as a distinctive form of political participation, independent from electoral processes altogether. Nevertheless, a widespread distrust towards politicians may indeed be pushing young people away from electoral processes, towards market-oriented political participation, but only in the UK. This observation therefore provides support for the claim set out in **Chapter 9**, but only partially: although distrust towards politicians may indeed be pushing young people away from elections, political consumerism should generally be understood as entirely unrelated from electoral political participation. However, this does not mean that it should also be viewed as separate from democratic ideals, since 'support for democracy' is positively associated with political consumerism in both countries. It can therefore be concluded that political consumerism is **a)** unrelated to elections and **b)** negatively associated with politicians, but it is **c)** positively associated with democracy in principle.

Further support in this direction is being provided in **section 5**, which reports that there is little or no association between political consumerism and either **a)** intention to vote or **b)** intention to contact a politician. Instead, there is a strong statistical association between non-institutional forms of citizenship such as **c)** working actively with others to address a public issue of common interest, **d)** volunteering in a community association, a charity group, or a youth club

and **e)** participating in a protest or a demonstration. The same applies for online forms of political participation, such as **f)** signing a petition, or **g)** sharing a link of political content on a social media platform, although only young boycotters in Greece do not demonstrate signs of indolence when it comes to **h)** creating this content themselves, by writing a political blog.

These findings may be interpreted in two ways. On the one hand, the continuous hollowing-out of the nation-state (Jessop, 2013) has rendered elections as irrelevant to young political consumers in the two countries. Long (2010, p. 12) argues that “less regulation and power leaves ordinary citizens searching for novel methods to manage risk since traditional political avenues are less effective. Ethical consumption is an ideal method of risk management for ordinary citizens”. This tendency is being reinforced, especially in the UK, by a continuous distrust towards politicians (Henn and Foard, 2012), which is pushing young people in both countries into alternate, informal and more community-oriented forms of political participation such as volunteering, working actively with others, or demonstrating. The collective outreach of these forms of political engagement contradicts the perception that political consumerism is an inherently individualistic form of political participation. Instead, this collective orientation of political consumers is being expanded even further into the online realm, forming a global, online imagined community (Anderson, 2006). In this way, young people’s individual consumption patterns reflect their desire towards a collective, cosmopolitan identity (Sloam and Henn, 2018).

The personality outreach of the political consumers will therefore be further examined in the following chapter, along with those market-related factors which are expected to pull young people into the marketplace as an alternative political arena.

Chapter 11: Pull-factors, motivations and personal orientation.

1. Introduction

The thematic analysis of the focus groups in **Chapter 9** has distinguished between two antithetical, but complimentary effects with regards to political consumerism. It argued that on the one hand, the neoliberal critique of democracy accentuates a 'push' effect on young people away from electoral politics, and into the commercial domain. Nevertheless, the analysis of **Chapter 10** has only partially confirmed this claim. Whereas distrust towards politicians may indeed be crowding-out electoral participation, electoral processes in themselves seem to be statistically unrelated to political consumerism. The same however cannot be argued with respect to democratic ideals, since political consumers in both countries demonstrate high support for democracy in principle. As a result young people are more likely to engage in informal, community-oriented forms of political participation and online forms of political engagement, than in voting or contacting a politician.

On the other hand however, the perception that as consumers young people may be able to influence the production processes and product prices, the availability of ethical products and product-related information, as well as the variety of retailers, suggests the existence of a 'pull' effect into the market as a field of political participation. All these factors point to the direction that a generalised trust in the market environment, and a widespread confidence that the invisible hand of the market is able to effectively regulate consumer needs, as the neoliberal dictum suggests, may also be influencing young people's likelihood to engage in political consumerism. This chapter will therefore examine these market-oriented factors that may pull young people into the marketopolis as an alternative arena of political participation, along with young people's motivations to do so and their personality outreach.

Consistent with **Figure 6 (Tables 5-8, p.165)**, these will thus include **a)** their consumer behaviour, **b)** their consumer motivations, **c)** their personal values, and finally **d)** their personality outreach (individualistic or cosmopolitan). Having provided a first instance of the relationships of political consumerism to these broad categories, **Chapter 12** will subsequently employ stepwise linear regressions to conclusively define those characteristics that demonstrate the greatest weight in determining political consumerism, measured this time by the PCI.

2. Consumer behaviour pull-factors

The variables that will be examined in this section include the variables under **Table 5: Consumer behaviour**, in **Figure 6** (p.165). They will thus consist of **a)** Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) for the world as a whole, **b)** Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) in relation to their local community, **c)** satisfaction with the available range of products and services, satisfaction **d)** with range of prices, **d)** with range of retailers, **e)** with market information, and **f)** whether they tend to act alone or in response to an organised campaign. Finally, the section will examine young people's **g)** support for market competition, and **h)** their support for free-market economy.

6.1 Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) World

Studies within the field of consumer studies (Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002), define the PCE as the extent to which people have confidence in their individual consumer behaviour as a means for solving environmental issues. Given the conceptualisation of political consumerism as an individualised-collective action (Micheletti, 2003), that is, as an action that lingers between the individual and collective orientations of the political consumers, this section will divide the collective orientation of PCE in two separate dimensions. **Section 6.1** will therefore examine the perceived effectiveness to bring about the desired change in the *world as a whole*, whereas **section 6.2** will discuss the perceived effectiveness to bring about the desired change in their *local community*. The aim of this distinction is to identify where exactly the collective outreach of political consumers lies.

Table 6.1.0 PCE (World)	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Very ineffective	4.0	12	4.2	13
Ineffective	14.0	42	17.9	56
Neither/nor	21.6	65	23.6	74
Effective	43.9	132	42.8	134
Very effective	16.6	50	11.5	36
Total	47.5	301	49.4	313




Table 6.1.0 shows that PCE-World is higher among young people in Greece than in the UK. The crosstabulation in **Table 6.1.1** shows that the PCE-World is statistically associated with the cumulative measure of buy/boycotting for both Greece ($p < .05$) and the UK ($p < .01$), with 7.4% more people in Greece than in the UK (77.4% over 70.0%). Generally, the higher the belief that their consumer behaviour is able to bring about the desired change for the world as a whole, the greater young people's involvement with political consumerism. What this measure fails to portray however, is that this relationship exists only for buycotting, where the figures for both countries are significant at $p < .01$, while there is no significant relationship with boycotting.


Table 6.1.1 <u>PCE (World)</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very ineffective	58.3	-0.7	53.8	-0.7	50.0	-1.1	53.8	-0.2	66.7	-0.9	61.5	-0.7
Ineffective	50.0	-2.6	57.1	-0.9	45.2	-2.9	53.6	-0.4	61.9	-2.6	69.6	-0.1
Neither/nor	56.9	-2.0	44.6	-3.7	61.5	-0.7	41.9	-2.8	72.3	-1.1	54.1	-3.4
Effective	72.0	1.5	72.4	3.1	71.2	2.0	63.4	2.3	81.8	1.6	77.6	2.6
Very effective	86.0	3.1	75.0	1.6	74.0	1.4	61.1	0.7	88.0	2.0	77.8	1.1
Total	67.4		62.6		65.1		55.9		77.4%		70.0%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	21.859		22.275		14.821		10.165		12.207		14.132	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.005**		0.004**		0.063		0.254		0.016*		0.007**	

Once again, Friedman's (1999) conceptualisation of boycotting as a conflict-oriented political behaviour may explain this difference. Boycotting is therefore expected to be less associated with measures of effectiveness of the said behaviour. Instead, buycotting, as a form of political participation that rewards companies for socially desired behaviour is more likely to be utilised if one strongly believes in the effectiveness of their consumer behaviour to bring about change in the world.

6.2 Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) Local

In turn, as we may see from the trendlines of the two countries in **Table 6.2.0**, PCE-Local is also relatively higher among young people in Greece than in the UK.

Table 6.2.0 PCE (Local Community)	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Very ineffective	1.7	5	1.9	6
Ineffective	6.6	20	10.2	32
Neither/nor	13.6	41	23.5	74
Effective	46.7	141	45.7	144
Very effective	31.5	95	18.7	59
Total	47.6	302	49.7	315



In this case however, the crosstabulations in **Table 6.2.1** demonstrate more highly significant relationships of political consumer engagement for Greece compared to the UK for all three measures.


Table 6.2.1 PCE (Local Community)	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Very ineffective	20.0	-2.2	50.0	-0.6	0.0	-3.0	16.7	-2.0	20.0	-3.0	50.0	-1.0
Ineffective	35.0	-3.1	59.4	-0.4	45.0	-1.9	50.0	-0.7	55.0	-2.4	62.5	-0.9
Neither/nor	58.5	-1.2	54.1	-1.7	61.0	-0.5	52.7	-0.6	70.7	-1.0	64.9	-1.0
Effective	67.4	0.2	58.3	-1.3	63.1	-0.5	54.2	-0.6	75.9	-0.4	66.7	-1.0
Very effective	78.9	3.0	84.7	4.0	75.8	2.8	71.2	2.6	88.4	3.2	88.1	3.4
Total	66.9		62.2		64.6		55.9		76.8		69.5	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	33.740		23.787		23.112		13.151		22.516		12.783	
P-Value	0.000***		0.002**		0.003**		0.107		0.000***		0.012*	

As expected, the higher the PCE-Local, the higher the likelihood to engage in political consumerism in both countries. The cumulative measure bears a significant relationship at $p < .001$ for Greece and $p < .05$ for the UK, and indicates a greater participation in Greece (76.8%) than in the UK (69.5%). Again, this lies primarily among boycotters in both countries (66.9% in Greece and 62.2% in the UK). However, this time there is also a statistically significant relationship for boycotters in Greece too ($p < .01$) but no significance for boycotters in the UK. It seems therefore, that the more the PCE moves from global concerns to concerns pertinent to young people's local community in Greece, the more boycotting is understood as an effective tool that may promote desired change.

6.3 Satisfaction with available range of products and services

Table 6.3.0 shows that young people in the UK are generally more satisfied with the range of products and services in their country.

Table 6.3.0 Satisfaction with Products	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not at all satisfied	4.2	13	1.6	5
Not satisfied	17.9	56	13.1	42
Neither/nor	25.6	80	20.6	66
Satisfied	42.5	133	54.2	174
Very satisfied	9.9	31	10.6	34
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



However, there is found to be no significant relationship between the young people's satisfaction with the available products and services and the likelihood to engage in political consumerism.


Table 6.3.1 Satisfaction with Products	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all satisfied	84.6	1.4	80.0	0.8	61.5	-0.2	40.0	-0.7	84.6	0.7	80.0	0.5
Not satisfied	69.6	0.6	71.4	1.2	73.2	1.6	64.3	1.2	83.9	1.5	81.0	1.6
Neither/nor	58.8	-1.6	63.6	0.1	68.8	1.0	60.6	0.9	71.3	-1.2	71.1	0.2
Satisfied	66.2	0.0	60.3	-1.0	57.1	-2.1	54.6	-0.3	74.4	-0.7	67.8	-1.0
Very satisfied	71.0	0.6	61.8	-0.1	64.5	0.1	41.2	-1.8	80.6	0.6	64.7	-0.7
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	6.122		8.706		9.037		7.669		4.013		3.537	
P-Value	0.634		0.368		0.339		0.446		0.404		0.472	

This variable was intended to capture the influence of the availability of opportunity structures on young people's political consumer engagement (Zorell, 2019c). However, the available opportunity structures, at least with regards to the range of products and services, does not seem to have an impact on young people's decision to engage in political consumerism. If anything, there seems to be a negative relationship of young people who are satisfied and very satisfied with the available range of products in both countries, to their likelihood to boycott. It can be presumed that if they are generally satisfied with the range of products and services, they see no reason to punish the companies behind the products.

6.4 Satisfaction with range of prices

The opposite holds true for their satisfaction with the range of prices. Generally, young people in the UK seem to be relatively more satisfied with the existing prices, whereas the almost flat trendline for Greece in **Table 6.4.0** indicates that young people in the country are in their majority neither satisfied, nor dissatisfied.

Table 6.4.0 Satisfaction with Prices	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not at all satisfied	6.1	19	1.6	5
Not satisfied	30.0	94	15.0	48
Neither/nor	28.1	88	25.9	83
Satisfied	30.0	94	49.5	159
Very satisfied	5.8	18	8.1	26
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321




Although there may be discerned no statistically significant relationships across any of the three political consumerism measures for either country, within the categories for boycotters we discern the opposite dynamic than in the previous variable. That is, young people in both Greece and the UK seem to be more likely to punish companies by boycotting, if they do not agree with their pricing.

Table 6.4.1 Satisfaction with Range of Prices	Boycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Not at all satisfied	73.7	0.7	80.0	0.8	63.2	-0.1	100.0	2.0	78.9	0.3	100.0	1.5
Not satisfied	70.2	1.0	62.5	-0.1	72.3	2.0	54.2	-0.2	83.0	1.8	72.9	0.5
Neither/nor	63.6	-0.6	62.7	-0.1	63.6	-0.1	50.6	-1.0	71.6	-1.2	67.5	-0.6
Satisfied	61.7	-1.1	62.3	-0.2	55.3	-2.1	58.5	1.1	72.3	-1.1	68.6	-0.6
Very satisfied	72.2	0.6	65.4	0.3	66.7	0.3	46.2	-1.0	83.3	0.7	76.9	0.8
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	5.334		3.330		6.472		8.845		4.786		3.347	
P-Value	0.721		0.912		0.595		0.356		0.310		0.502	

6.5 Satisfaction with variety of retailers

With regards to satisfaction with the variety of retailers, such as big malls as opposed to local, independent stores for example, the almost flat trendline for Greece indicates that this is not a big issue of concern. Young people in the UK instead are rather satisfied with the availability of retailers in the country. Indeed Participant O in the focus groups had said: “In the UK, (...) there is a lot of variety for everything. You can buy products of all levels and spectrums. England is one of the first countries in Europe that come in mind when we talk about commercialism. One of the first places that started placing attention to reusing clothes, with the whole vintage, second-hand clothing industry”.

Table 6.5.0 Satisfaction with Retailers	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not at all satisfied	6.7	21	2.2	7
Not satisfied	24.9	78	18.7	60
Neither/nor	28.4	89	22.7	73
Satisfied	33.2	104	48.0	154
Very satisfied	6.7	21	8.4	27
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



Nevertheless, it seems that there is a significant relationship ($p < .05$) of those young people in the UK who are ‘Not at all satisfied’ and ‘Not satisfied’ with the variety of retailers to engage in political consumerism in either of its two forms. Instead, young people in Greece who are dissatisfied with the existing variety of retailers tend instead to protest by boycotting and thus punish the said retailers ($p < .05$).


Table 6.5.1 Satisfaction with Retailers	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all satisfied	66.7	0.1	71.4	0.5	52.4	1.1	71.4	0.9	66.7	-1.1	100.0	1.7
Not satisfied	71.8	1.2	75.0	2.1	80.8	3.6	71.7	2.8	84.6	2.0	83.3	2.5
Neither/nor	60.7	-1.3	60.3	-0.5	58.4	-1.3	53.4	-0.4	74.2	-0.6	63.0	-1.5
Satisfied	68.3	0.6	59.7	-1.1	61.5	-0.6	51.9	-1.2	76.9	0.2	67.0	-1.0
Very satisfied	57.1	-0.9	59.3	-0.4	47.6	-1.6	40.7	-1.6	61.9	-1.6	66.7	-0.4
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	4.716		9.549		18.400		13.469		6.726		10.383	
P-Value	0.787		0.298		0.018**		0.097		0.151		.034*	

Although the table does not tell us which retailers are those the young people are satisfied or dissatisfied with, Neilson (2010, p. 223) has previously informed us that boycotters tend to be supporting smaller, local, or independent brands because they feel that in this way they are making a noticeable impact in their local community. Instead, the logic behind boycotting is centred on discrediting the market leaders as a way of influencing changes in the industry as a whole.



6.6 Satisfaction with market-related information

Moreover, (and despite the opposite claims of some of the participants in the Greek focus groups) young people in both countries seem to generally have a positive image with regards to market-related information available in their countries.

Table 6.6.0 Satisfaction with Market Information	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not at all satisfied	6.4	20	2.8	9
Not satisfied	18.5	58	16.2	52
Neither/nor	30.4	95	32.4	104
Satisfied	34.5	108	41.4	133
Very satisfied	10.2	32	7.2	23
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



In particular, when this information is compared to the satisfaction from political information in the two countries (see **Table 4.9**), we may see that that young people in both Greece and the UK are more satisfied with *market-related* information than with *political-related* information. This is especially the case in Greece, where the satisfaction from political information demonstrates a particularly steep trendline.



However, as in the case of political information, this is not significantly related to their likelihood of engaging in political consumerism. Although the percentages of young boycotters in both countries seem to be increasing the more dissatisfied they are with product-related


information, only young people in the UK who are 'Not at all satisfied' demonstrate a statistically significant tendency to boycott. Generally however, it seems that satisfaction from product-related information is not statistically related to political consumerism.

Table 6.6.1 Satisfaction with Market Information	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all satisfied	75.0	0.9	77.8	0.9	80.0	1.5	88.9	2.0	85.0	0.9	88.9	1.2
Not satisfied	74.1	1.4	65.4	0.4	67.2	0.6	51.9	-0.6	84.5	1.6	71.2	0.2
Neither/nor	66.3	0.0	62.5	-0.1	62.1	-0.4	51.9	-0.9	76.8	0.1	68.3	-0.5
Satisfied	63.9	-0.6	60.2	-0.9	63.9	0.0	50.2	1.4	73.1	-1.0	69.2	-0.3
Very satisfied	53.1	-1.6	69.6	0.7	53.1	-1.3	39.1	-1.6	65.6	-1.5	73.9	0.4
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	6.882		10.413		8.413		10.582		5.619		1.924	
P-Value	0.549		0.237		0.394		0.227		0.229		0.750	

6.7 Acting alone or in organised campaigns

The same applies to the question of whether young people usually act alone or as part of an organised campaign when they shop. The overwhelming majority in both countries said they often acted on their individual basis when they go shopping.

Table 6.7.0 Alone or Campaign	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Alone	89.1	279	91.0	292
Organised Campaign	10.9	34	9.0	29
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



With regards to the distribution of this majority in buycotters and boycotters, although there are no statistically significant relationships across the whole distribution, young buycotters


in the UK seem to be statistically more likely to act alone when they boycott, confirming the more individualistic orientation of this form of political consumerism compared to boycotting. However this is not the case for Greece, where there is no statistical significance nor across, or within any of the three measures.

Table 6.7.1 Alone or Organised Campaign?	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Alone	66.7	0.6	64.7	2.1	62.4	-1.6	56.2	0.8	75.3	-1.3	71.2	1.4
Organised Campaign	61.8	-0.6	44.8	-2.1	76.5	1.6	48.3	-0.8	85.3	1.3	58.6	-1.4
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	2.426		4.510		2.614		0.665		1.687		2.002	
P-Value	0.297		0.105		0.271		0.717		0.194		0.157	

6.8 Support for market competition

When asked to indicate what they tend to believe about the benefits and drawbacks of competition in the market on a 10 point scale, ranging from 1 (Competition is harmful: It brings out the worst in people), to 10 (Competition is good: It stimulates hard work and new ideas), more young people in both countries responded in favour of the latter, with the UK cohort indicating more support to market competition than the respective cohort in Greece, by almost 10 percentage points (59.4% in Greece, compared to 69.2% in the UK).

Table 6.8.0 Market Competition	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Harmful: Brings out the worst in people	40.6	127	30.8	99
Good: Stimulates hard work and new ideas	59.4	186	69.2	222
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



According to the discussion in **Chapter 6** on political consumerism as a neoliberal form of political participation, it is expected that the higher the positive outlook on the capacity of market to bring about the desired change by stimulating hard work and fostering the development of new ideas, the higher the engagement of young people in political consumerism.

When it comes to the UK cohort, the discourse on market competition is not statistically associated with the likelihood of young people to engage in political consumerism. Nevertheless, it is worth noticing that unlike Greece, the percentages of those who engaged in any of the three political consumerist activities in the UK are greater (or equal) among those in favour of market competition on the grounds that it stimulates hard work and new ideas, than among those who deem market competition as essentially harmful. This dynamic, although not statistically significant, is consistent with the intuitive standpoint that political consumerism presupposes a form of internalised neoliberal governmentality, which ‘pulls’ young people to express their ethical, environmental and eventually political contestations within neoliberal marketopoly.

However, when we look into the crosstabulation of political consumers from Greece with respect to market competition, we see instead that an overwhelming majority (97.0%) of those who believed that competition was harmful in Greece, had engaged in either or both of political consumerist activities within the previous 12 months. This relationship is statistically significant above the conventional cut-off point of +2.0 adjusted residual. The same holds true for the separate activities of boycotting and boycotting (adj.res.>+2.0) in Greece where the figures were 77.2% and 74.0% of those who believe that market competition is essentially harmful since it brings out the worst in people. Conversely, there is an opposite, negative, relationship for those

who believe that competition is good, and this is again statistically significant across all three measures (adj.res.< -2.0). Moreover, the relationships across all three political consumerist activities for Greece are all highly significant at p<.01, providing further confidence for the interpretation of these findings.

Table 6.8.1 Market Competition	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Harmful: Brings out the worst in people	77.2	3.4	58.6	-1.1	74.0	3.1	55.6	0.0	97.0	2.7	68.7	-0.4
Good: Stimulates hard work and new ideas	58.6	-3.4	64.9	1.1	57.0	-3.1	55.4	0.0	71.0	-2.7	70.7	0.4
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	11.654		4.564		9.618		1.321		7.377		0.135	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.003**		0.102		.008**		0.517		0.007**		0.713	

Although previous research on the subject (Lekakis and Forno, 2017) has empirically argued that political consumerist instances in the European south stem from an ideological critique of capitalism and market competition, the statistical findings above are rather counter-intuitive. Moreover, they are confirmed statistically for the first time, providing thus an original contribution to knowledge on the subject.

6.9 Support for free market (Schwartz index).


Although the formulation of the previous question is part of the WVS questionnaire⁴² on political values and has been previously used elsewhere in political research (Oorschot et al., 2008; Poloni-Staudinger and Wolf, 2019), the surprising nature of the findings above called for further scrutiny. For this reason, I decided to introduce late an additional question in my survey design, which intended to capture young people's neoliberal governmentality, so as to further assess whether there was indeed a relationship between neoliberal governmentality and political consumerism in Greece, as the findings of the analysis of the previous question indicated. The 'free market

⁴² Available at www.worldvaluessurvey.org

index', was first used and validated by Schwartz et al. (2010), based on the observations of Feldman (1988). The late introduction of this 4-item index in my survey explains the lower population number in **Table 6.9.0**.

This index therefore consists of four separate questions, which are then combined into one single index. The respondents were asked how much they agree with the following statements: **a)** it would be a good idea to privatise all of the public enterprises, **b)** the less the government gets involved with business and the economy, the better-off this country will be, **c)** there should be more incentives for individual initiative even if this reduces equality in the distribution of wealth, and **d)** all high school and university education should be made private rather than controlled and supported by the government. This last question is particularly pertinent to the livelihoods of young people. It is not surprising therefore that the formulation of this set of questions attracted much lower support for free enterprise, compared to the one on market competition.

Table 6.9.0 Schwartz Index	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Completely disagree	46.4	128	49.1	137
Agree a little	39.5	109	38.0	106
Agree a great deal	14.1	39	12.9	36
Completely agree	0.7	2	2.9	8
Total	43.5	276	44.0	279



The analysis of the free enterprise index holds overall significance only for boycotting in Greece and buy/boycotting in both cohorts at $p < .05$. Nevertheless, those who completely disagree with free enterprise in both countries, are consistently more likely to consume politically in any of its forms (adj.res.> +2.0), whereas those who completely agree with it are significantly less prone to political consumerism only in Greece (adj.res.>+2.0 and adj.res.>+1.7 for boycotting and boycotting respectively), confirming the findings of the previous question.

Table 6.9.1 Schwartz Index	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Completely disagree	73.4	2.4	69.3	2.3	69.5	2.0	62.8	2.7	82.0	2.0	76.6	2.6
Agree a little	63.3	-0.8	60.4	-0.5	59.6	-1.0	48.1	-1.6	73.4	-1.0	67.0	-0.7
Agree a great deal	53.8	-1.8	44.4	-2.4	56.4	-1.0	44.4	-1.3	71.8	-0.8	50.0	-2.7
Completely agree	0.0	-2.0	50.0	-0.7	0.0%	-1.9	37.5	-1.0	0.0%	-2.6	62.5	-0.4
Total	66.2		62.4		63.3		54.4		76.6		69.3	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	13.097		10.463		10.066		10.085		9.786		10.223	
P-Value	0.042*		0.106		0.122		0.121		0.020*		0.017*	

We seem to be confronted therefore with what may be termed the ‘*Paradox of Political Consumerism*’. In other words the findings from the analysis of the last two variables demonstrate that those young people with the greatest dissatisfaction from market economy and market competition will choose an inherently market-oriented means of political participation to express their ethical, environmental and political contestations. This surprising finding deserves further scrutiny and with thus be discussed in more detail in a separate section at the conclusions of this thesis (see **Chapter 12, section 3**).

3. Motivations of political consumerism

Previous research (Gotlieb and Wells, 2012; Neilson, 2010; Zorell, 2019e) indicates that there is a considerable variation with regards to the motivations of political consumers. With this in mind, **Chapter 9** discussed the underlying motivations for engaging in political consumerism among the participants of the focus groups. Analysing the focus groups qualitatively identified a set of six broad motivations, which were then ranked according to their intended outreach, ranging from individualistic to more collective and eventually global outreach. This section will analyse these motivations quantitatively, with the intention of identifying differences and similarities in the UK

and Greece with respect to boycotters, boycotters and those who engage in either or both of these activities.

The following themes will thus be examined: engaging in political consumerism to **a)** benefit my personal health, **b)** support local producers and improve social ties within my community, **c)** support national economy, **d)** support ethical production processes overseas, **e)** protect animals and support animal rights, and lastly **f)** protect the planet and encourage environmentally responsible lifestyles. **Figure 7** presents the distribution of the responses of those who said they were willing to pay more for each of these reasons.





Figure 7: Motivations by country, % of those who said they are willing to pay more for each.

7.1 Personal health

As it may be seen in **Table 7.1.0**, both cohorts were willing to pay more for a product or service if they believed this would benefit their personal health. The percentages are similar across both countries, with 86.1% in Greece and 87.3% in the UK.

Table 7.1.0 Personal Health	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not willing to pay more	13.9	42	12.7	40
Willing to pay more	86.1	261	87.3	276
Total	47.8	303	49.8	316




Nevertheless, the crosstabulations on **Table 7.1.1** show that this particular motivation has a statistical significance only with the boycotters in Greece ($p < .05$), whereas for the boycotters in the UK there is a significant relationship within the categories ($\text{adj.res.} > \pm 2.0$), showing that benefitting one's health is a statistically significant motivation, but only among boycotters. Once again, the analysis of this variable discloses the inefficiency of the cumulative index to discern the individual underlying motivations behind the two separate behavioural aspects of political consumerism.

Table 7.1.1 Personal Health	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Not willing to pay more	50.0	-2.6	47.5	-2.2	59.5	-0.8	52.5	-0.4	73.8	-0.5	62.5	-1.1
Willing to pay more	70.1	2.6	65.6	2.2	65.5	0.8	55.8	0.4	77.4	0.5	71.4	1.1
Total	67.3		63.3		64.7		55.4		76.9		70.3	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	6.805		5.405		0.982		3.329		0.262		1.317	
P-Value	0.033*		0.067		0.612		0.189		0.609		0.251	

7.2 Local producers and social ties

In turn, supporting local producers and fostering social ties in their communities, seems to be much more associated with all three political consumerist measures in both countries.

Table 7.2.0 Local Producers & Social ties	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not willing to pay more	18.4	56	19.2	59
Willing to pay more	81.6	248	80.8	248
Total	47.9	304	48.4	307



Once again, this relationship is stronger for buycotters ($p < .001$), than for boycotters in both countries. The nature of buycotting as a positive form which rewards desirable production practices is particularly compatible with this motivation, as it is expected that buycotters would be more likely to buy local produce in order to support their local community in practice. However, although boycotters are generally punishing companies or producers for undesirable business practices, they are significantly more likely to also support local producers, showing the interconnectedness of the two forms of behaviour (Table 7.2.1).


Table 7.2.1 Local Producers & Social ties	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Not willing to pay more	46.4	-3.6	44.1	-3.8	50.0	-2.5	39.0	-3.2	64.3	-2.6	50.8	-4.2
Willing to pay more	71.4	3.6	70.2	3.8	67.7	2.5	61.7	3.2	80.2	2.6	77.8	4.2
Total	66.8		65.1		64.5		57.3		77.3		72.6	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	13.423		14.550		6.811		10.669		6.621		17.450	
P-Value	0.001***		0.001***		0.033*		0.005**		0.010**		0.000***	

The analysis of this variable has been one of the most strongly associated with political consumerism in both Greece and the UK so far and demonstrates the strong community orientation of political consumerism as a form of political participation.

7.3 National economy

The focus groups indicated that supporting national economy was associated particularly with boycotting, especially among the participants in Greece. Indeed, the ‘Buy Greek’ campaign was considered at the time the survey was administered as a popular way of supporting the national economy. This is reflected in the distribution of the responses in **Table 7.3.0**, where young people in Greece were more willing to pay a higher price so as to support their national economy by 5.5 percentage points, compared to the UK.

Table 7.3.0 <u>National Economy</u>	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not willing to pay more	33.3	101	38.8	118
Willing to pay more	66.7	202	61.2	186
Total	47.8	303	47.9	304




This is also reflected in **Table 7.3.1**, especially among the boycotters in Greece ($p < .001$) who were significantly more likely to be willing to pay more to support their national economy, although there is no overall significant relationship for boycotters in the UK, and among boycotters in either country. It is surprising however, that when it comes to the cumulative measure for the UK there is a significant positive relationship for the 71.4% of buy/boycotters who considered supporting national economy as a motivation behind their consumer decisions. This however, does not seem to be reflected neither in their boycotting, nor in their boycotting behaviour. Once again this observation supports the standpoint that the cumulative index is not always a reliable measure for political consumerism.

Table 7.3.1 National Economy	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not willing to pay more	52.5	-3.7	57.6	-2.0	57.4	-1.6	52.5	-0.9	72.3	-1.2	62.7	-2.7
Willing to pay more	73.8	3.7	68.8	2.0	66.8	1.6	58.1	0.9	78.7	1.2	76.9	2.7
Total	66.7		64.5		63.7		55.9		76.6		71.4	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	13.799		3.978		2.715		1.554		1.554		7.096	
P-Value	0.001***		0.137		0.257		0.212		0.212		0.008**	

7.4 Fairtrade and ethical production overseas

Supporting fair-trade and ethical production overseas has been a much more popular motivation amongst the young people in the UK, than in Greece, by a difference of 11.4 percentage points.

Table 7.4.0 Ethical Production Overseas	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not willing to pay more	27.6	83	16.2	51
Willing to pay more	72.4	218	83.8	264
Total	47.5	301	49.7	315




Nevertheless, it seems that in addition to supporting local producers and fostering social ties, the ethical element of political consumerism as captured by this variable is one of the most important for young political consumers in both countries, at $p < .001$ for all three measures.

Table 7.4.1 Ethical Production Overseas	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not willing to pay more	37.3	-6.9	39.2	-4.0	45.8	-4.3	29.4	-4.2	55.4	-5.7	45.1	-4.5
Willing to pay more	78.9	6.9	68.6	4.0	72.5	4.3	61.4	4.2	86.2	5.7	76.1	4.5
Total	67.4		63.8		65.1		56.2		77.7		71.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	48.080		18.596		19.062		20.189		32.990		20.044	
P-Value	0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***	

7.5 Animal rights

The same holds for the next variable 'Protect animals and support animal rights'. **Table 7.5.0** reports that 71.9% in Greece and 77.8% in the UK are willing to pay more to support animal rights.

Table 7.5.0 Animal Rights	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Not willing to pay more	28.1	86	22.2	70
Willing to pay more	71.9	220	77.8	245
Total	48.3	306	49.7	315




Although support for animal rights is more widespread in the UK (**Table 7.5.0**), young political consumers in both countries are significantly more likely to support animal rights, with the intention of eventually protecting animals. This suggests that the ethical dimension captured from the previous variable does not remain limited to an anthropocentric understanding of morality (Capra, 2007), but instead extends towards deep-rooted ecological considerations (Naess, 1995).

Table 7.5.1 <u>Animal Rights</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not willing to pay more	52.3	-3.5	45.7	-3.5	53.5	-2.6	37.1	-3.6	67.4	-2.6	54.3	-3.4
Willing to pay more	73.2	3.5	68.6	3.5	69.1	2.6	61.2	3.6	81.4	2.6	75.1	3.4
Total	67.3		63.5		64.7		55.9		77.5		70.5	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	14.650		12.385		8.804		13.871		6.862		11.338	
P-Value	0.001***		0.002**		0.012*		0.001***		0.009**		0.001***	

7.6 Environmentally responsible lifestyles

This insight gain further support from the analysis of the variable 'Promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles'. **Table 7.6.0** shows again that environmental concerns are extended beyond protecting animals and animal rights to the environment as a whole, especially among young people in the UK.

Table 7.6.0 <u>Environmentally Responsible Lifestyles</u>	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	N	%	N
Not willing to pay more	14.6	45	11.0	35
Willing to pay more	85.4	263	89.0	283
Total	48.6	308	50.2	318



Nevertheless, among political consumers in both countries promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles is significantly related to political consumerism across all three measures.

Table 7.6.1 Environmentally Responsible Lifestyles	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not willing to pay more	35.6	-4.8	31.4	-4.2	42.2	-3.5	25.7	-3.8	51.1	-4.5	31.4	-5.4
Willing to pay more	72.2	4.8	67.5	4.2	68.8	3.5	59.4	3.8	81.7	4.5	75.3	5.4
Total	66.9		63.5		64.9		55.7		77.3		70.4	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	23.608		18.861		15.253		14.303		20.538		28.746	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.001***		0.000***		0.000***	

To conclude, the analysis in this section demonstrates that political consumerism is mostly related to community-oriented motivations. The understanding of young political consumers however seems to be that this community does not remain limited to their immediate neighbourhood, but extends to include the animal world and, even further, the environment as a whole. Consequently, their ethical considerations also extend across these dimensions. Instead, individualistic concerns in relation to one's personal health seem to be supported only by buycotters in Greece. Likewise, their ethical obligations towards national or state actors are statistically significant only amongst buycotters in Greece. The analysis of the motivations of young political consumers in this section seems to be consistent with the findings from **section 5** in the previous chapter, which has similarly indicated no association of political consumerism with other formal (national or state-oriented) forms of political participation. Instead, it has revealed a positive relationship with community-oriented forms of participation such as volunteering or working with others for a common goal, extending even further towards online – and thus global – imagined communities.

This perceived conceptual expansion of the ontological identification of young political consumers, begs the question of whether an expanded personal outlook may be associated with political consumerism. The following section will therefore explore this dimension.

4. Personal orientation


The findings from the previous section indicate that there is a significant motivational expansion of the political consumers in both countries. Although boycotters in Greece may indeed act with individualistic motivations related to their personal health, a connection to a broader community (whether physical or imagined) of likeminded political consumers with whom they share common concerns and goals seems to be enabling young people to get further mobilised in political affairs. Indeed, Micheletti (2003, p. 56) refers to political consumerism as an *individualised* form of *collective* action, that is as both a *bridging* and a *bonding* political activity which “creates cooperative settings, behaviours, and trust” among people who share similar values. Gotlieb and Wells (2012) argue that identification with other political consumers can help to foster a cooperative spirit which in turn helps to mobilise collective action around consumer issues even further. Moreover, Atkinson (2012) posits that political consumerism provides opportunities for individuals to forge durable ties in their local communities. This in turn implies the development of social capital which has been theorised to be essential for engagement in cooperative forms of political activity (Putnam, 1995). Although, this study has found a spurious association of generalised trust and a negative association of particularised trust in the UK (**Tables 4.1** and **4.5**) with respect to political consumerism, this section will seek to examine the direct relationship of personality orientation to political consumerism.

Following Gotlieb and Wells (2012) the specific contribution of this section therefore is to note whether a distinction between an *individualistic*, as opposed to a *collectivist*, personality outlook is associated with political consumerism. In view of the expanded motivational orientation of political consumers discussed in the section above, it is expected that engaging in political consumerism will be more likely for those respondents who identify with a more expanded personality outlook.

8.1 Individual outlook

Starting by examining the individual outlook of young people, that is the belief that they primarily identify with one’s self, **Table 8.1.0** shows that young people in the UK generally hold a more individualistic outlook (90.7%), compared to Greece (77.6%).

Table 8.1.0 Individual outlook	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Disagree	22.4	70	9.3	30
Agree	77.6	243	90.7	291
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321




Among political consumers in the two countries however, **Table 8.1.1** shows that there seems to be no statistical association between individualistic outlook and the likelihood to engage in political consumerism ($p > .05$), in any of the three measures.

Table 8.1.1 Individual outlook	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Disagree	64.3	-0.4	53.3	-1.1	68.6	0.9	46.7	-1.0	80.0	0.8	63.3	-0.8
Agree	66.7	0.4	63.9	1.1	62.6	-0.9	56.4	1.0	75.3	-0.8	70.8	0.8
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	0.273		2.159		0.936		3.55		0.663		0.721	
P-Value	0.872		0.340		0.626		0.169		0.416		0.396	

8.2 Local community outlook

In turn, young people in Greece have reported a higher affiliation with their local community (**Table 8.2.0**). More than three-quarters (76.4%) of the respondents from Greece held a local community outlook, compared to 66.7% in the UK. As it was expected, these figures are comparable to the local community *motivations* ('Support local producers and enhance social ties') in **Table 7.2.1**.

Table 8.2.0 Local community outlook	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Disagree	23.6	74	33.3	107
Agree	76.4	239	66.7	214
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321




Nevertheless, when it comes to political consumers, it seems that it is mostly boycotters who have reported a greater local-community outlook ($p < .05$). Once again, the nature of positive consumerism is particularly compatible with this community-oriented personal outlook. It is thus expected that boycotters, having a higher community-oriented personal outlook would be more likely to purchase local products in order to foster social ties among members of their community.

Table 8.2.1 Local community outlook	<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Disagree	56.8	-2.0	54.2	-2.3	55.4	-1.7	48.6	-1.7	70.3	-1.4	62.6	-2.1
Agree	69.0	2.0	67.3	2.3	66.5	1.7	58.9	1.7	78.2	1.4	73.8	2.1
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	6.947		6.067		3.394		3.519		1.989		4.280	
P-Value	0.031*		0.048*		0.183		0.172		0.158		0.039*	

8.3 National outlook

In turn, **Table 8.3.0** displays that the national outlook of the young respondents was reportedly higher in the UK (69.5%), than in Greece (63.3%). However, in **Table 8.3.1** we may see that it was those young people who were more affiliated with their nation in the UK, that showed a lower likelihood to engage in political consumerism in the cumulative measure ($p < .05$).

Table 8.3.0 National outlook	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Disagree	36.7	115	30.5	98
Agree	63.3	198	69.5	223
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321




In other words, there is a statistically significant negative relationship (adj.res.>+2.0) between political consumerism in the UK and the national outlook of the respondents. This observation further supports the insights from the previous sections that political consumers are either not related at all, or negatively associated with the concept of the state or the nation and consequently to formal, state-oriented forms of political participation.

Table 8.3.1 National outlook	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Disagree	62.6	-1.0	66.3	0.8	67.0	0.9	62.2	1.6	75.7	-0.2	78.6	2.2
Agree	68.2	1.0	61.4	-0.8	62.1	-0.9	52.5	-1.6	76.8	0.2	66.4	-2.2
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	1.707		1.373		0.807		2.875		0.050		4.837	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.426		0.503		0.668		0.237		0.823		0.028*	

8.4 European outlook

Expanding the conceptualisation of young people's personal outlook even further, when it comes to identification beyond one's country, but with Europe as a whole, the respondents in Greece reported higher levels (72.8%) than those in the UK (65.4%).

Table 8.4.0 European outlook	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Disagree	27.2	85	34.6	111
Agree	72.8	228	65.4	210
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



However, despite the higher overall figures of European outlook in Greece, **Table 8.4.1** indicates that political consumerism is statistically more likely among young people with a European outlook in the UK (73.3%, adj.res.= +1.7). This is primarily due to the young boycotters in the country, who are likely to engage in this form of activity by 66.7% (adj.res.> +1.7) if they have a European outlook.


Table 8.4.1 European outlook	<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Disagree	62.4	-0.9	55.9	-1.9	64.7	0.2	50.5	-1.3	72.9	-0.9	64.0	-1.7
Agree	67.5	0.9	66.7	1.9	63.6	-0.2	58.1	1.3	77.6	0.9	73.3	1.7
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	5.652		3.818		0.078		1.743		0.755		3.041	
P-Value	0.059		0.148		0.962		0.418		0.385		0.081	

It should be noted however, that this variable should only be interpreted as the mirror image of the analysis on the national outlook in the previous section, as the pro-European narrative in the UK at the time the research took place was inexorably associated with a more liberal, left-wing, or even cosmopolitan agenda (Sloam and Henn, 2018).

8.5 Cosmopolitan outlook

Respondents were subsequently asked whether they agreed with the statement that they predominately perceived themselves as ‘citizens of the world’. It is therefore probably as a result of the pre-electoral polarisation in the country that UK cosmopolitan orientation was reported almost on a par with Greece (**Table 8.5.0**), although Greece is arguably historically much less exposed to the relatively high cultural diversity that characterises the UK (Warde et al., 2008).

Table 8.5.0 Cosmopol itan outlook	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Disagree	14.7	46	16.8	54
Agree	85.3	267	83.2	267
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



The crosstabulation of cosmopolitan outlook to political consumerism however, reveals a positive association, especially among boycotters in the both countries ($p < .05$). This relationship spills over to the cumulative measure only for the UK. Cosmopolitanism therefore seems to be linked primarily to positive political consumerism, in both Greece and the UK, but also for boycotters in Greece ($\text{adj.res.} > 2.0$).

Table 8.5.1 Cosmopolitan outlook	<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>												
Disagree	52.2	-2.2	48.1	-2.5	50.0	-2.1	48.1	-1.2	65.2	-1.9	55.6	-2.6
Agree	68.5	2.2	65.9	2.5	66.3	2.1	56.9	1.2	78.3	1.9	73.0	2.6
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	6.379		6.126		5.608		2.112		3.707		6.546	
P-Value	0.041*		0.047*		0.061		0.348		0.054		0.011*	

The sections above have demonstrated that, consistent with the latest literature, political consumerism is increasingly related to an expanded ontological conceptualisation of the self. Contrary to older research (Stolle and Micheletti, 2006) which has portrayed political consumerism as a (predominately) individualistic form of political participation, this study confirms later conceptualisations (Copeland, 2014b; Gotlieb and Wells, 2012) which describe political consumerism as a form of individualised-collective action, instead. In particular, whereas individual outlook has been found to bear no association with political consumerism in any of its forms, neither in Greece, nor in the UK, the analysis reveals that boycotting is particularly associated with a local-community-oriented and a cosmopolitan-oriented outlook in both countries. It would be more accurate therefore to start describing political consumerism as a *community* and *cosmopolitan*-oriented form of political participation, instead.

Moreover, the two variables that are referring to formal institutional formations, whether in relation to the national or the European levels, convey only weak statistical associations, and only for the UK. However, although national outlook in the UK is negatively related to the cumulative measure of political consumerism, European outlook demonstrates a positive association, instead. We should not however forget at this point that the collection of the survey responses in the UK took place amongst the Brexit negotiations, where the discourse between the national and European orientation of the British political scene was at its height. This observation therefore may be rather reflecting a *conservative* versus *liberal* political orientation (Duch and Taylor, 1993; Graaf and Evans, 1996), which has been associated by-and-large with the *national* versus *pro-European* pre-electoral political cleavage in the country (Zappettini, 2019; Zmigrod et al., 2018). **Section 4.4** has, after all, already demonstrated that political consumerism is strongly associated with a left-wing (and thus a relatively more *liberal*) political agenda.

Furthermore, these observations are consistent with the conclusions in **section 5** in **Chapter 10**, with regards to the probability of young political consumers participating in other forms of political action. Those findings have similarly shown that political consumerism is not associated with formal, institutional forms of political participation, such as voting and contacting a politician. Instead, the young political consumers were particularly active in informal forms of political participation operating within and aiming towards cooperation for change in their local community (such as intention to work with others and intention to volunteer), and to online forms of political participation, which can be argued that they are linked to a global imagined, and thus *cosmopolitan*, orientation.

5. Postmaterialism

Although the connection of postmaterialist values to political consumerism is rather intuitive, and the academic consensus on the theoretical level is in favour of the existence of such a relationship (Copeland, 2014b), empirical evidence connecting political consumerism to postmaterialism to this day remains inconclusive, if not contradictory. In their seminal study, on a sample of undergraduate students from Canada, Belgium, and Sweden, Stolle et al. (2006) report a strong connection between postmaterialism and political consumerism. In a similar vein, Baek (2010) posits that political consumers place more emphasis on pollution and environmental concerns (demonstrating postmaterialist values) than non-political consumers. However, he also reports no significant differences with respect to other postmaterialist concerns such as racial equality, or abortion rights. In contrast, Andersen and Tobiasen (2004) using a representative sample of Danish citizens, conclude that postmaterialist values do not increase the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism.


Another common criticism of the postmaterialist thesis with regards to its application to political consumerism, is the one that refers to a northern bias in both its theoretical and empirical focus. Micheletti herself (2017, p. 32) in an article titled ‘Reflections on “Political virtue and shopping”’ which was published almost 15 years earlier, admits that “This is a very important criticism that I agree with fully”. With a few recent exceptions that focus on Latin America (Echegaray, 2015) and on eastern and central Europe (Pellandini-Simányi and Gulyás, 2018), the overwhelming bulk of relevant literature focuses on established democracies in the northern hemisphere. The cases of Scandinavian countries (Sønderskov and Daugbjerg, 2011; Tobiasen, 2004), Canada (Trillo et al., 2012) and the United States (Baek, 2010; Katz, 2011) have been particularly overemphasised. This section therefore will examine the relationship of postmaterialist values to political consumerism in the UK and Greece aiming to shed light on the differences and similarities of the phenomenon between the European north and the European south.

Moreover, unlike the majority of studies on the relation of postmaterialism and political consumerism (Copeland, 2014b; Micheletti, 2003) which, for convenience, use Inglehart’s (1971) original 4-item index, this study used instead the expanded 12-item index developed later for the WVS in response to criticisms (Abramson, 2011; Davis and Davenport, 1999) about the validity of

the original index⁴³. The respondents who scored between 1-3 were classified as 'Pure materialists' while those who scored between 10-12 were classified as 'Pure postmaterialists' instead. Likewise, those who scored between 4-6 were classified as 'Mixed postmaterialists' and between 7-9 as 'Mixed postmaterialists'.

Table 9.1.0 displays the distribution of the scores in this 12-item postmaterialism index, among the respondents from Greece and the UK. The corresponding graph demonstrates a surprisingly higher postmaterialist value orientation in Greece as opposed to the UK. This is counterintuitive since the Greek cohort was presumed to be less affluent and more severely hit by the current global recession and austerity policies.

Table 9.1.0 <u>Postmaterialism</u> <u>Index</u>	Greece		UK	
	%	N	%	N
Pure Materialist	10.9	34	23.7	76
Mixed Materialist	25.6	80	27.7	89
Mixed Postmaterialist	31.0	97	29.6	95
Pure Postmaterialist	32.6	102	19.0	61
Total	49.4	313	50.6	321



Further statistical tests were therefore performed to confirm whether this perceived difference in postmaterialist values was statistically significant. A Levene's test revealed a significant difference in the variances of the respondents from Greece and the UK, $F(1,632) = 4.42$, $p = .036$. As such, the difference in the means between the two groups using a Welch's t-test was also tested. This revealed that there was a statistically significant difference in the Postmaterialism scores between Greece ($M_{GR} = 2.85Pmat$, $SD_{GR} = 0.99$) and the UK ($M_{UK} = 2.44Pmat$, $SD_{UK} = 1.05$), $t(631.6) = 5.08$, $p = .00$) (see **Figure 8**).

⁴³ The actual phrasing of the 12-items postmaterialism index can be found in pp.342-343 of the survey questionnaire in **Appendix II**.





Figure 8: Bar graph (with ± 1 standard deviation error bars showing mean score of the Postmaterialism index, for Greece and the UK.

The findings contradict Inglehart's scarcity hypothesis which assumes that people socialised in conditions of relative affluence are more likely to demonstrate postmaterialist value orientations. Although one should not underestimate the recent conditions of (relative) economic contraction in the UK as a result of the financial crisis and their effect on the livelihoods of young people in the country, austerity and economic fragility remains more evident in Greece. For instance, the World Bank⁴⁴ reports the UK in 5th place in the ranking of GDP out of 196 countries in 2019, whereas Greece was reported at the same time in 52nd place. Moreover, examining whether this perceived statistically significant difference in the postmaterialism index could be related to an over-representation of higher-income respondents from Greece, the data in **Table 3.8.0** display almost overlapping trendlines for the two countries in terms of subjective relative income.

⁴⁴ www.data.worldbank.org



Nevertheless, in terms of the connection between postmaterialist values and engagement in political consumerism among the boycotters and boycotters in the two countries, there was found to be a robust positive relationship, consistent across all three measures ($p < .001$), both in Greece and the UK.

Table 9.1.1 Postmaterialism Index	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Pure Materialist	55.9	-1.3	40.8	-4.6	55.9	-1.0	35.5	-4.0	67.6	1.3	47.4	-5.0
Mixed Materialist	56.3	-2.2	61.8	-0.3	51.3	-2.7	46.1	-2.1	66.3	-2.5	65.2	-1.2
Mixed Postmaterialist	62.9	-0.8	69.5	1.6	59.8	-1.0	65.3	2.3	71.1	-1.5	80.0	2.5
Pure Postmaterialist	80.4	3.7	82.0	3.4	80.4	4.2	78.7	4.1	92.2	4.6	90.2	3.8
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	22.270		35.653		23.063		36.166		21.526		35.923	
P-Value	0.001***		0.000***		0.001***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***	

However, the observation of the difference on the postmaterialist scores of the young people in the two countries raises important concerns about the interpretative power of the

postmaterialist index, which deserve thorough attention and will thus be discussed in a separate section in the concluding chapter.

6. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the crosstabulations of a series of pull-factors which were expected to be attracting young people towards engaging politically within the neoliberal marketplace. However, the analysis of the two variables intended to capture the respondents' support for market competition or the support for free enterprise have both surprisingly been found to be negatively associated with political consumerism, especially in the case of Greece. In other words the respondents with the greatest dissatisfaction with market competition and the neoliberal principles of free-enterprise will choose an inherently market-oriented means of political participation to express their ethical, environmental and political contestations. We are therefore confronted with what may be termed the '*Paradox of Political Consumerism*'. This surprising finding deserves further scrutiny and will therefore be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

Moreover, contrary to the expectations derived from the focus groups and discussed in **Chapter 9**, this chapter has demonstrated that **a)** satisfaction with the range of products, **b)** satisfaction with the range of prices available in the market, and **c)** satisfaction with market-related information are not statistically associated with political consumerism in either country. Satisfaction with **d)** the variety of retailers is only associated with boycotters in Greece and buy/boycotters in the UK, displaying however a statistical relationship primarily among those who reported not being satisfied with the existing availability of retailers. Instead, the analysis of the two Perceived Consumer Effectiveness variables, whether **e)** with regards to the *world as a whole*, or **f)** with regards to the respondents' *local community*, has revealed that they are both - as expected - key factors behind young people's decision to engage in political consumerism, and more so with regards to boycotting.

This observed relationship of boycotting to both the local and the global consumer effectiveness, has driven me to further explore the association of political consumerism with regards to the political consumerist *motivations* derived from the analysis of the focus groups. The findings of this section confirmed those in the previous one, with young people's engagement

with political consumerism being significantly more likely as the respondent's motivations shift from *individual* to *collective* and eventually towards *global* motivations.

In order to examine this relationship even further, the next section proceeded to examine directly the association of political consumerism with the respondents' personality outlook; that is their reported identification with an ever-expanding imagined community. The findings from this section provide even further evidence for a strong relationship between political consumerism and both **a)** a local-community-orientation and **b)** a cosmopolitan-orientation. A noteworthy exception has been **c)** the discerned negative association of a national personal outlook and political consumerism in the UK. These observations therefore render political consumerism no longer as an *individualised-collective* form of political participation as previous literature was suggesting (Micheletti, 2003), but rather as a *collective-cosmopolitan* form of political participation instead, which however also reflects **d)** the postmaterialist value orientations of the young political consumers in both countries.

Chapter 12, will bring the discussion of these insights together by conclusively identifying the driving factors behind young people's political consumerist decisions in the two countries. The chapter will conclude by discussing and problematising the main findings.

Chapter 12: Conclusion: Drivers of Political Consumerism in the UK as opposed to Greece

1. Introduction

Chapters 10 and **11** have discussed boycotting and boycotting independently from each other, and have made the case that the use of the general term ‘political consumerism’ as a unified conceptualisation of the phenomenon, used interchangeably to signify either engagement in boycotts only, in boycotts only or engagement in either/or both, fails to capture the differing underlying motivations, values and attitudes behind these two separate behavioural expressions. **Chapter 7** has previously discussed how examining only the behavioural components of political consumerism (whether individually or in their sum), runs the risk of ignoring the breadth (the motivation behind the action) and depth (the frequency, or habitual consistency) of the phenomenon. This concluding chapter therefore, will conclude the analysis by testing the Political Consumerism Index (PCI) developed in **Chapter 7** which, on the one hand captures both the behavioural aspects of political consumerism (BUY+BOY), while it simultaneously captures the responsibility (RES) and frequency (FRE) of the said behaviour in a single index, according to the following formula:

$$PCI = (BUY+BOY) * (RES+FRE)$$

The PCI will therefore be used in this chapter as the dependent variable under examination, so as to provide a definitive answer to the questions **a)** who are the young political consumers in the UK and Greece, and **b)** what are their underlying motivations, values and attitudes with regards to politics and the market. Finally, it will **c)** trace the similarities and delineate the differences between the two countries. The chapter will conclude **d)** by outlining, discussing and problematising the main findings of the thesis and providing directions for future research.

2. Drivers of political consumption in the UK and Greece

Having developed and subsequently validated the PCI as a continuous scale (ranging from 0 to 16) provides the benefit of utilising it as the dependent variable in a stepwise linear regression analysis to reveal the relative weight of each of the variables analysed in the previous two

chapters. The primary advantage of stepwise regression analysis is its computational efficiency. In other words it provides a simple but efficient method of identifying the relative weight of a multitude of factors with regards to the dependent variable (Field, 2017), which in the case of this study is young people's engagement with political consumerism in Greece and in the UK. Although, its performance is arguably not as good as some alternative methods (Tibshirani, 1996), its ability to effectively manage large amounts of potential predictor variables, and automatically fine-tune the model so as to choose the best predictors from the available options, makes it ideal for the analysis in the present section. This means that if two or more predictors in the model are highly inter-correlated, only one will make it into the model. Consequently, this method allows for narrowing down the perceived relationships discussed in the previous two chapters into a handful of predictors for each country, making it thus possible to draw a conclusive profile of young political consumers in each country under examination.

Table 10.0.0 therefore presents the results from the comparative Stepwise Linear Regression analysis. This final model demonstrates an adjusted R-squared (Adj.R^2) of 0.415 for Greece and 0.413 for the UK, indicating that the model accurately predicts 41.5% and 43.2% of the variation of political consumerism in Greece and the UK respectively. The R-squared value ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 indicating perfect predictive accuracy. Since the R-squared value is adopted in various research disciplines, there is no standard guideline to determine the level of predictive acceptance. Henseler (2009) proposed a rule of thumb for acceptable Adj.R^2 with 0.75, 0.50, and 0.25 being described as substantial, moderate and weak respectively. However, it is worth remembering that an Adj.R^2 of 0.60 or higher is generally required for studies in the natural sciences since the behaviour of particles and molecules are generally easier to accurately predict. Instead, an Adj.R^2 as low as 0.10 is generally accepted for studies in the field of arts, humanities and social sciences because human behaviour is markedly more unpredictable. As a consequence, a model that accurately predicts more than 40% of the variation of human behaviour as this model does, can be safely assumed that it conveys – at least - a *moderate* predictive power.

The analysis of all of the factors discussed in the previous chapters, excluding however, for covariances between them (Stepwise Criteria: Probability-of-F-to-enter ≤ 0.050 , Probability-of-F-to-remove ≥ 0.100) result in a set of eleven predictors of political consumerism among young people aged 18 to 29 years in both countries. These factors will be each presented in the sections that follow, while their effects are summarised in **Figure 9**. The differing size of the bars indicate

therefore the relative weight (or the relative strength of the effect) of each independent variable on the PCI.

Table 10.0.0 Stepwise Regression: Factors Influencing Political Consumption (All Variables)

Factor:	Dependent Variable: PCI3	(a)		(b)	
		GR		UK	
1	Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (Local) (1-Very Ineffective, 5-Very Effective)	0.261	***	0.197	***
		0.343		0.323	
2	Competition (1-Harmful, 10-Good)	-0.254	***	–	
		0.136		–	
3	Intention to Demonstrate (1-Very Unlikely, 5-Very Likely)	0.216	**	0.155	*
		0.322		0.269	
4	Environmentally Responsible Lifestyle (1-Not willing to pay more, 4-Willing to pay a lot more)	0.219	**	0.248	***
		0.480		0.456	
4	Gender (1-Male, 2-Female)	–		0.263	***
		–		0.653	
6	Sign a Petition (1-Very Unlikely, 5-Very Likely)	0.224	**	0.174	**
		0.284		0.332	
7	Age (18-29 years old)	–		0.205	***
		–		0.152	
8	Local Community (1-Strongly disagree, 4-Strongly Agree)	–		0.165	**
		–		0.440	
9	National Economy (1-Not willing to pay more, 4-Willing to pay a lot more)	0.142	*	–	
		0.771		–	
10	Party affiliation (1-No, 2-Fairly 3-Strong)	-0.138	*	–	
		0.799		–	
11	Postmaterialism Index (1-Materialist, 12-Postmaterialist)	–		0.133	*
		–		0.332	
Constant:		-6.969	**	1012.780	***
		2.452		303.320	
N		313		321	
Adj. R ²		0.415		0.432	

PCI3 = (BUY+BOY) * (FRE+RES), 2 countries: Greece, United Kingdom

Standard errors below the coefficients

* p<0.05, ** p < .01, *** p < 0.001




Figure 9: Comparative factors influencing political consumption in Greece and the UK.

a. Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) to their local community:

Political consumerism in both Greece and the UK is being driven by the PCE of the respondents with regards to their local community, and more so for Greece ($b=0.261$, $p<0.001$) than for the UK ($b=0.197$, $p<0.001$). Kollmuss and Agyeman (2002) have previously suggested that PCE is a critical factor in explaining environmentally-friendly consumer behaviour. However, this section reveals that political consumerism is predominately associated with the PCE in relation to one's local community. Although **Tables 6.1.1** and **6.2.1** have previously demonstrated that both PCE for the world as a whole and PCE for their local community were significantly associated with the likelihood of engaging in political consumerism, the regression analysis in this section has unsurprisingly detected some covariance between the two variables. As a result, '*PCE – World*' has been dropped from the final model, in favour of '*PCE – Local*' when accounting also for the attitudinal (RES) and frequency (FRE) components of political consumerism, as captured by the PCI. However, although the PCI attributes additional weight when the participants have reportedly engaged in both boycotting and boycotting, it fails to inform us which of the two is primarily associated with the independent variable. Returning to **Table 6.2.1** however, we may see that PCE-Local is primarily associated with boycotting in both countries, but also boycotting in the case of Greece.

b. Intention to demonstrate:

Another common determining factor of political consumerism in both countries is the intention to demonstrate. Vrablíková and Linek (2013) have previously suggested that although protestors are highly interested in politics, they often choose to bypass voting at elections, as they refuse to provide legitimacy to representative democracy. It seems therefore that young protestors in both countries are more likely to engage in political consumerism instead, as a means of expressing their political objectives. During the focus groups both the young political consumers from Greece and the UK were consistently in favour of organised protests. Although during the focus groups **Participant F** from Greece had said "People my age are tired of waiting results from the politicians (...). Tangible results do not come by ventilating our frustration in demonstrations anymore, and definitely not through the parliament", it seems that participating in demonstrations is significantly more associated with political consumerism than voting is. Although **Table 3.6.1** has previously indicated that *support* for organised protests is associated only with boycotters in the UK, **Table 5.5.1** subsequently confirmed that the *actual intention* to take part in a demonstration is statistically significant for both countries. This is also confirmed from the analysis of the PCI, where 'intention to take part in a demonstration' is a common driver for political

consumerism in both countries, with weights 0.216 ($p < 0.01$) for Greece and 0.155 ($p < 0.05$) for the UK, respectively.

c. Promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles:

The political consumers from both Greece ($b = 0.219$, $p < 0.01$) and the UK ($b = 0.248$, $p < 0.001$) were also significantly more likely to be willing to pay more to promote environmentally responsible lifestyles. **Table 7.6.1** has previously indicated that this variable has been one of the most consistently related to both boycotting and boycotting in both countries. When asked to write a letter to their 'future self' during the focus groups **Participant L** from the UK, capturing these environmental motivations, stated:

"I am writing urging you to boycott the production of X product. It is detrimental to the environment, humanity and the planet earth as a whole and you therefore need to play your part in promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles. We all need to act *now* to encourage the new age of technology and that comes through boycotting products that are not only unnecessary but also wasteful and damaging the planet"

This variable therefore captures the expanded motivational outreach of the political consumers in both countries, as it was also shown in **Tables 7.1.1** to **7.6.1**.

d. Online: Signing a petition:

Finally, the last common driving factor behind young people's engagement in political consumerism tested in the stepwise linear regression model (**Table 10.0.0**) is signing a petition online, and more so in Greece ($b = 0.224$, $p < 0.01$) than in the UK ($b = 0.174$, $p < 0.01$). From **Table 5.6.1** we may see that 'signing a petition' online did not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship among boycotters in the UK, when only the behavioural (BUY and BOY) aspects of political consumerism were being considered. However, it seems that accounting also for the responsibility (RES) and the habitual engagement (FRE) of the political consumerist behaviours (BUY+BOY) via the PCI, renders the variable 'signing a petition' as a statistically significant predictor of the likelihood of young people to consume politically.

Previous research has shown that online participation is being perceived as less costly and thus more accessible especially during times of economic hardship, which is when Pacheco and Plutzer (2008) anticipate decreasing levels of participation. Calenda and Meijer (2009) and later Espinar-Ruiz and Gonzalez-Rio (2015) have previously demonstrated that there is a positive relationship between time spent online and several forms of political participation. Theocharis (2011), focusing explicitly on Greece, contradicts these findings

(Weiss, 2020). Instead, he reports that although spending time online is more likely to cultivate a postmaterialist value orientation, this postmaterialist mindset is associated with a general disinterest in political participation. The research for this doctoral thesis indicates that this disinterest may indeed hold for its institutional variants, but not for political consumerism. Instead, young political consumers in both Greece and the UK are embracing non-institutionalised, online variants of political participation, like signing an online petition, presumably so as to promote the environmentally responsible lifestyles captured in the previous variable.

Figure 10 therefore graphically illustrates that among the four common factors discussed so far in this chapter, **a) PCE-Local**, **b) Intention to demonstrate** and **c) Intention to sign a petition** demonstrate a higher weight on the PCI in Greece than in the UK, whereas young people in the UK are **d) willing to pay more to promote environmentally responsible lifestyles**, than in Greece.




Figure 10: Common drivers between the UK and Greece

e. Gender:

In turn, gender is a statistically significant predictor of political consumerism only in the UK, where political consumers are statistically more likely to be women ($b=0.263$, $p<.001$). Scholars have previously proposed as an explanation that women are more prone to pursue their political participation in non-hierarchical and decentralised ways and in arenas that relate to their everyday lives (Ackelsberg, 2003). Stolle and Hooghe (2004) suggest that just like other lifestyle forms of political engagement, political consumerism appeals more to

women as it circumvents the restrictions of membership and personal interaction. Moreover, traditional and essentially patriarchal gender roles which perceive women as the primary household caretakers, have been employed as a possible explanation. For instance, the term 'momism' has been used in older studies (Eliasoph, 1998) referring to values of nurturance and compassion as drivers of political participation. It has thus been claimed that traditional gender roles will encourage women to be more concerned about the quality of products purchased with regards to the effects of their consumption to their family, especially when it comes to food products and home appliances. More recent research (Gotlieb and Wells, 2012) reports a similar factor weight to this study among all the ages examined. However, Stolle et al. (2010) report that although there is still a small gender difference in the overall descriptive statistics, gender becomes a non-significant indicator of political consumerism in multivariate analysis for the 18-29 age group.

Nevertheless, this study concludes that political consumerism can indeed be perceived as "an engendered form of political participation" for the 18-29 years age cohort, when attitude and frequency are being taken into consideration, but only for the UK. However, gender is not a statistically significant predictor of political consumerism, as measured by the PCI, in Greece. This observation is consistent with the findings in **Table 2.1.1** where gender demonstrated a lower statistically significant relationship for boycotters in Greece ($p < .01$) and a non-significant one for boycotters ($p > .05$).

f. Age:

This section demonstrates the concrete advantage of the PCI, as opposed to using only the behavioural factors of political consumerism. **Table 2.2.1** has previously portrayed political consumerism as statistically non-associated with relative age within the 18-29 cohort, when accounting only for the behavioural elements of political consumerism (BUY and BOY). However, measuring political consumerism with the PCI, that is accounting for the responsibility (RES) and frequency (FRE) of the said behaviour (BUY+BOY), age becomes a statistically significant predictor ($b = 0.205$, $p < .001$) for the UK.

This finding indicates that the older UK participants within the 18-29 age group are more likely to engage in political consumerism than those at the younger end of this age group. This observation may be interpreted in terms of Milbrath's (1977) life-cycle effect, according to which the younger respondents may still be lacking those civic skills that foster their civic engagement, and as such it parallels a similarly observed life-cycle effect in voting (Wass, 2008). With respect to political consumerism however, it may also mean that younger

people are still lacking the income (and thus the consumer power) to engage politically through their purchasing decisions. This latter interpretation gains support from the crosstabulations in **Table 2.8.1**: 'Relative subjective income', and **Table 2.10.1**: 'Employment status'. The first one shows that, those young people in the medium-low category of subjective relative income were significantly less likely to boycott in the UK, whereas the latter has showed that those in paid work in the UK were significantly more likely to boycott (adj.res.=1.7), to boycott (adj.res.=2.3), or to engage in either of the two (adj.res.=2.3). Instead, those unemployed in the UK were found to be statistically less likely to engage in either of these actions (adj.res.<-2.0).

Nevertheless, the data indicate that age is indeed a predictor of political consumerism in the UK, when one accounts not only for its behavioural components, but takes also into consideration the breadth and depth of the phenomenon.

g. Local-community personality outlook:

Although Graziano and Forno (2012) have previously suggested that political consumerism in southern Europe is more rooted in local communities, this is not confirmed by this study. **Table 7.2.1**: 'Support local producers and promote social ties in my community', has previously displayed a statistically significant relationship of both boycotting and boycotting in both the UK and Greece. Likewise, the analysis of this variable, i.e. 'Local-community personality outlook' has been shown in **Table 8.2.1** to be statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) only for boycotters in both the UK and Greece. However, when one accounts for the frequency and responsibility components of political consumerism as captured by the PCI, this factor has been found to be statistically associated only for the UK ($b = 0.165$, $p < 0.01$).

The inclusion of this variable in the final model for the UK, further supports the conceptualisation of political consumerism as a community-oriented form of political participation, as discussed in **section 4** of **Chapter 12**. However, it simultaneously reflects the emphasis that the participants from the UK focus groups repeatedly placed on the need to preserve and support their local community. **Participant K** had said "I also fear about the lack of community in the area where I live. I believe in things being solved (...) with the active involvement of all the members of my community".

h. Postmaterialist values:

Table 9.1.1 indicated a strong statistical association between postmaterialism and political consumerism for both countries (consistently below $p=.001$). In this final stepwise linear regression model (**Table 10.0.0**), postmaterialism is shown to be a statistically significant predictor only for the UK ($b=0.133$, $p<.01$). However, the observation of the higher postmaterialist scores of the young people in Greece than in the relatively more affluent UK has already raised concerns with regards to the interpretative power of the postmaterialist index. Although postmaterialism has been surprisingly found to be significantly higher in Greece, it shows as a predictor only for the UK in the final model. This may indicate one of two things. It either implies that, although there are more young postmaterialists in Greece than in the UK, these same Greek postmaterialists are not significantly more likely than UK postmaterialists to engage in political consumerism when taking into account the depth (RES) and breadth (FRE) of the phenomenon. However, given the particularly robust statistical association of postmaterialism both to boycotting and boycotting in both countries in **Table 9.1.1**, it is safer to argue that the findings from the regression analysis in **Table 10.0.0** indirectly reflect in their sum the postmaterialist value-orientations of young people in both countries.

According to the accepted definition of political consumerism as ‘consumption for political, ethical and environmental reasons’ (that is essentially postmaterialist reasons), postmaterialism is –almost by definition - expected to be associated with political consumption. Moreover, postmaterialism has been previously shown to be associated with an array of extra-institutional behaviours like lifestyle and DIO politics (Pickard, 2019c) and cosmopolitanism (Sloam and Henn, 2018), which both have been shown in the previous chapters to be strongly associated with political consumerism.

However, the relationship between postmaterialism and political consumerism in particular may not be so straightforward. On the one hand, political consumption, as a lifestyle form of political action that expresses simultaneously the community and global-oriented motivations of young people is expected to be highly associated with postmaterialism. After all, engaging in political consumerism for *ethical*, *environmental* and *political* considerations involves, almost by definition, the use of non-materialist criteria when making consumption decisions. Copeland (2014b, p. 216) discusses political consumerism as a postmaterialist phenomenon and argues that it “entails the use of non-materialist values when making *material* choices about consumption” as for example when buying groceries, dairy and meat products. She therefore explicitly concludes that “to purchase or avoid

products in light of ethical, environmental, social, or political considerations *is*⁴⁵ to add postmaterialist considerations to materialist choices” (2014c, p. 264). The interrelationship of *postmaterialist* motivations for purely *materialist* choices therefore is likely to blur the picture of the association of postmaterialism as a separate variable, to political consumption.

Indeed, Inglehart’s theory of value change is equally known for its interpretative power, as well as for the criticisms that have followed it (see Abramson, 2011). With regards to the reliability of Inglehart’s index, that is whether the index actually captures what it claims to be capturing, critics (Duch and Taylor, 1993; Flanagan and Lee, 2003; Graaf and Evans, 1996) suggest that postmaterialism is merely a proxy for other values or beliefs. With regards to the effect of postmaterialism on political participation in general, the consensus is that both materialist and postmaterialist values influence participation, but in opposite directions. For example, McLeod (2001) finds that while postmaterialist values increase the likelihood of following the news and participating in politics, materialist values decrease the likelihood of participating in politics. However, other researchers (Brooks and Manza, 1994), insist that distinguishing between materialist and postmaterialist values is not intrinsically useful when examining political participation, since as they argue these are not mutually exclusive. In other words, both materialist and postmaterialist values could motivate people to participate in political affairs. For example, in one of Inglehart’s latest publications with Norris (Inglehart and Norris, 2016), they anticipate a retroactive reaction, especially from the older, less educated white men who, motivated by the erosion of their privileges brought by the economic decline, will reject postmaterialist values, reverting back to more traditional norms. This ‘cultural backlash’ may in turn reinvigorate their participation, especially in response to populist appeals. However, this is not the case for young people in Greece who, although socialised in time of economic hardships, demonstrate remarkably high postmaterialist orientations.

The perceived association of postmaterialism with respect to political consumerism therefore, may mean either of the following. Firstly, materialist values, could also be associated with higher engagement in political consumerism. With regards to the relation of the materialist components of Inglehart’s 12-item index to political consumerism for example, the element ‘Maintaining order in the nation’ could be associated with nationally-oriented boycotting. Indeed, and although in **Table 8.3.1** we saw that national outlook is negatively associated with the cumulative measure of political consumerism in the UK, **Table 7.3.1** demonstrated that support for the national economy is statistically associated with boycotts

⁴⁵ *Italics* added for emphasis.

in Greece, and this relationship is also discernible with respect to the PCI, as we may see in **Table 10.0.0**. Moreover the materialist elements 'Stable economy', or 'Fighting rising prices' of Inglehart's index could in a similar vein be interpreted as confounded with 'satisfaction with range of prices' in **Table 6.4.1**, where however, this study found no statistical relationship with political consumerism.

Secondly, postmaterialist values may be similarly unrelated to political consumerism. For instance, the postmaterialist component 'Giving people more say in important government decisions' of Inglehart's index is very similar to the variables examined in **Table 4.1.1**: 'By voting I can change my country' and **Table 4.3.1**: 'Influence on governance'. However, in both of these cases this study has found no statistical relationship with the propensity of young people to engage in political consumerism.

The robust statistical association ($p < .001$) however of both boycotting and boycotting to postmaterialism for both countries in **Table 9.1.1** points towards a third direction. Although postmaterialist values may indeed be associated with higher engagement in political consumerism, this may be due to other confounding factors. For example, scholars argue that Inglehart's index is primarily a proxy for ideology; with conservatives favouring materialist values, and liberals endorsing postmaterialist values instead (Graaf and Evans, 1996). Likewise, Duch and Taylor (1993) maintain that it is instead progressive liberal ideology and support for democratic norms which increase unconventional political participation, not postmaterialist values per se. Indeed, this study has previously demonstrated in **Table 3.4.1**, that boycotting in Greece and boycotting in both countries are strongly associated with a leftist (and thus liberal) ideological orientation, and that boycotting in both countries and boycotting in Greece is associated with support for democracy in principle (**Table 4.7.1**).

Moreover, Inglehart's postmaterialist component 'Progress towards a less impersonal and more humane society' could be confounded to the collective and communitarian orientations of political consumers, as captured in **Table 7.2.1**: 'Support local producers and social ties in my community', or **Tables 5.3.1**: 'Intention to work with others for a common goal' and **Table 5.4.1**: 'Intention to volunteer', which have all been found to have a positive relationship with political consumerism. Likewise, the postmaterialist element 'Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful' may similarly reflect the support of political consumers for environmental concerns, as captured for instance in **Table 7.6.1**: 'Environmentally responsible lifestyles', which again has been found to have a positive relationship to political consumerism both through the Chi-square tests, as well as through the regression analysis on the PCI. Furthermore, it can be argued that Inglehart's

postmaterialist component 'Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money' is likely to be associated with a generalised rejection of market competition (**Table 6.8.1**) or free enterprise (**Table 6.9.1**). Indeed, rejection of the former has a clear positive relationship with political consumerism across all three measures, but only for Greece; whereas rejection of the latter has a positive relationship for the cumulative political consumerism measure for both countries.

In general, the postmaterialist elements of Inglehart's index mentioned above seem all to be part of a left-wing, libertarian, democratic and environmental political agenda, and therefore seem to coincide to a great extent to the findings from the regression analysis in **Table 10.0.0**, indicating that the effect of postmaterialist values may already be captured by the rest of the variables in the table.

Finally, even if postmaterialism generally is indeed associated with higher levels of engagement in political consumerism, this is not necessarily the case with regards to other forms of participation (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). It should be expected that since postmaterialists have arguably more psychic energy available for politics, postmaterialism should also increase the likelihood of engaging in all forms of political participation, including voting, or contacting a politician. However, in **Tables 5.1.1** and **5.2.1** we saw that this is not the case, since the (postmaterialist) political consumers in both countries are significantly less likely to engage in elections or to contact politicians, in favour of informal and online forms of political participation instead.

Although the Chi-square tests in **Table 9.1.1** have demonstrated postmaterialism to be individually associated with both of the behavioural aspects of political consumerism (in both the UK and Greece), the points above raise noteworthy concerns about the reliability of the postmaterialist index. Nevertheless, when one accounts also for **a)** political consumerism's responsibility and frequency components, along with **b)** the confounding effects of the other statistically significant variables for each country, postmaterialism is conclusively shown to be a determining factor only for the UK.

In conclusion, this can mean one of two things: either **a)** postmaterialism is associated more with the responsibility and frequency components of the PCI scores in the UK, or **b)** there exists a confounding effect of the 12-item postmaterialism index with the other factors in the model. Since however, the PCI scores of the two countries have been shown to be non-statistically different from each other (see **Figure 4**, in **Chapter 7**), it follows that the remaining drivers only for the Greek cohort in this final model should be implicitly capturing also the

respondents' underlying postmaterialist values. It may therefore be argued that the observed link between the postmaterialism and political consumerism corroborates the link between the rest of the drivers of political consumerism revealed in **Table 10.0.0**, but it remains a statistically significant predictor only for the UK. However, the absence of postmaterialism as a predictor for Greece in the final model does not negate the robust statistical association of postmaterialism, at least to the behavioural elements of political consumerism, for *both* countries, as previously revealed in **Table 9.1.1**.

The following sections will thus discuss those drivers which have been found statistically significant only for Greece, and which may be implicitly capturing the surprisingly high postmaterialist score of the 'Grexit generation'.

i. Support national economy:

The first variable which has been found exclusively related to Greece in the final model, does not fit the rationale laid out in the previous section and points towards a third interpretation for the absence of postmaterialism in the final model for Greece. The motivational element 'support for national economy' has been found to be statistically associated only for Greece ($b=0.142, p<.05$). The inclusion of the variable 'support for national economy' as a predictor for Greece in the final model in **Table 10.0.0**, may therefore partly explain the absence of postmaterialism in the same model for Greece, despite the robust statistical association of postmaterialism with the behavioural elements of political consumerism for both countries, in **Table 9.1.1**. The section on postmaterialism above has already discussed how this variable is very similar and may thus be associated with the materialist components 'Maintaining order in the nation'; 'Stable economy'; or 'Fighting rising prices' of Inglehart's 12-item postmaterialism index, effectively excluding postmaterialism from the final regression model for Greece.

Although the relevant literature perceives political consumerism as a predominately postmaterialist phenomenon (Copeland, 2014c), it often overlooks nationally motivated political consumerism, or 'economic nationalism' (Lekakis, 2015), which has been shown to be particularly prominent in southern Europe under austerity. For example, the previous section has already discussed how materialist values may indeed be associated with higher engagement in nationally-motivated boycotting. Moreover, during the focus groups **Participant D** from Greece has asserted, in a statement supported by most, that "the first thing that comes in mind when I hear about (...) boycotting would be buying nationally produced products to boost national economy". Indeed, **Table 7.3.1** has already

demonstrated that 'support for national economy' is statistically associated with boycotts in Greece ($p < .001$), although this does not also coincide with a similarly statistically significant association of 'national outlook', as it has been shown in **Table 8.3.1**.

This positive relationship between 'support for national economy' is thus also discernible with respect to the PCI in Greece. Whereas political consumerism in the UK has been shown to have a predominately community-oriented character, in Greece there is an observed national-oriented character instead, although this is not reflected in a higher nationalistic orientation of young people in Greece.

j. Party affiliation:

The following two variables for Greece have been found to have a negative relationship with political consumerism (see **Figure 9**). Although Henn et al. (2017) have previously reported a negative association of party affiliation for young postmaterialists in the UK, **Table 10.0.0** indicates a negative relationship of party affiliation to political consumers only in Greece, where young people are being 'pushed out' of party politics (by a relative effect of -0.138 , significant at $p < .05$).

As in the discussion on the relative importance of 'Age' for the UK, this finding also demonstrates the comparative advantage of the use of the PCI, instead of the dichotomous behavioural measures of political consumerism. It is worth remembering that **Table 3.5.1** had revealed no association between 'party affiliation' and political consumerism ($p > .05$), neither for boycotters, nor boycotters, in any of the two countries. Only within the categories was there discerned a statistically significant association for boycotters for those who were 'not a supporter', and a negative association among those who were unsure of their political affiliations ('Don't know'). However, dropping the 'Don't Know' from the final model and taking into consideration both the responsibility and the habitual consistency behind the actions has rendered this variable a statistically significant predictor of political consumerism in Greece.

Young boycotters in Greece therefore are being pushed out of party politics, since they are statistically less likely to be a supporter of any particular party, confirming thus the lifestyle character of this form of political participation in the country.

k. Support for market competition

The financial crisis has allowed for important insights into the relation of neoliberal policies and the informal political participation of young people (Sakellaropoulos, 2012; Sotiris, 2010, 2014; Zamponi and Fernández González, 2017), but less so with regards to political consumerism. **Chapter 6** has already discussed political consumerism as an inherently neoliberal phenomenon. Given that political consumerism operates within a neoliberal economic framework, this gap in the literature is somehow surprising. Based on the insights from the focus groups this thesis has therefore assumed that neoliberal governmentality impacts on young people's engagement with political consumerism because of the outcomes from two inter-related dynamics: on the one hand neoliberal governmentality pushes young people away from institutional participation, and on the other it pulls them to express their political concerns within the bounds of the market.

Nevertheless, in **Table 6.8.1** we saw a clear rejection of the rules of competition among young political consumers in Greece, on the grounds that these are intrinsically harmful as they bring out the worst in people. Similarly, **Table 6.9.1** identified a negative relationship between young people's support for free enterprise and boycotting in Greece and the cumulative measure for both countries. Neoliberalism therefore, measured as 'support for market competition' is a statistically significant driver for political consumerism in Greece, demonstrating a strong negative effect of 0.254, significant at $p < .001$. This finding provides support to the claim laid out in **Chapter 10**, that neoliberalism pushes young people in Greece away from institutional politics. Indeed, the inclusion of the variable 'party affiliation' above, in the final model indicates that young people in Greece are less likely to be a supporter of any particular political party, revealing their dissatisfaction with the supply of political options.

It could thus be argued that we seem to be confronted with what may be termed as the "*Paradox of Political Consumerism*". In other words, the findings from the analysis of the two variables in relation to market competition and free enterprise have demonstrated that those young people in Greece with the greatest dissatisfaction from free market economy and market competition will choose an inherently market-oriented means of political participation to express their ethical, environmental and political contestations. This paradox will be discussed in the section that follows.

3. The paradox of political consumerism and directions for future research.

In order to explain the paradox of political consumerism, we may seek to understand how different scholars have previously attempted to explain the paradox of political participation discussed under the Rational Choice theory in **Chapter 3**. Olson (1965) coined the phrase ‘the paradox of political participation’ to describe the perceived phenomenon that people tend to vote even though the rational actor should choose to abstain from elections. The theory posed that since the marginal probability of each voter to determine the outcome of any particular electoral round is minimal, the cost of voting would always surpass its benefits and therefore the rational agent should choose to abstain (Feddersen, 2004). As discussed in **Chapter 3**, the most common approaches used to resolve this paradox involve **a)** reviewing downwards the costs of participation; and **b)** expanding the weight of the benefits involved in participating.

a. Reviewing downwards the costs of participation.

With regards to **a)** reviewing downwards the costs of participating in political consumerism, the rational agency model would predict that engagement in political consumerism should be optimised where there is the greater satisfaction with: the availability of certain ethical-labelled products; the prices of these ethically-labelled products; the variety of retailers in the vicinity of the consumer; market information for these products, and vice versa. When it comes to political consumption, these may be considered as increased ‘political opportunities’ (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993) according to the mobilisation theory.

According to the rational agency model of political participation, one would expect that the *dissatisfaction* from these market features would *disincentivise* young people from engaging in political consumerism, whereas satisfaction from the same market features would instead indicate *a relatively lower cost* of political consumerism, and therefore higher engagement in it. However, the analysis of these variables in **Tables 6.3.1** to **6.6.1** reveals the reverse dynamics, insofar as young people who are dissatisfied with the existing range of products, prices, retailers and market information will choose an inherently market-based form of political engagement such as political consumerism. For example, those who are satisfied with the range of products (**Table 6.3.1**), are less likely to boycott; and those who are not satisfied with the range of prices are more likely to boycott (**Table 6.4.1**); those not satisfied with the variety of retailers are generally more likely to score highly on all three

measures of political consumerism (**Table 6.5.1**); and finally those not at all satisfied with product related information in the UK are more likely to boycott (**Table 6.6.1**).

These observations therefore, indicate that the approach of **a**) reviewing downwards the costs of participation, is not able to provide an effective explanation for the paradox of political consumerism, and if anything complicates the image even further. Instead, they paint a picture of political consumerism as a form of political participation that expresses primarily dissatisfaction and dissent (Pickard, 2018). On these grounds, it is thus not surprising that political consumerism is strongly associated with ‘intention to demonstrate’ as well as with ‘signing a petition’ on the online realm, as discussed in the sections above.

b. Expanding the weight of the benefits involved in participation.

With regards to the second approach, that is **b**) expanding the weight of the benefits involved in participating, the variable ‘support for democracy’ has been previously used to explain a rational agent’s decision to participate in elections (Feddersen, 2004), and may thus also provide a more plausible explanation with regards to engagement in political consumerism.

For any (rational) individual to choose to participate therefore, their long-term benefits from participating should outweigh the costs involved. In order to satisfy this condition, the greatest part of researchers who approach the paradox of political participation have tended to emphasise the weight of the benefits involved with participating. This approach was developed based on Downs’ own observation (1957, p.266) that one of the factors of a rational agent’s long-term calculated benefits from voting should incorporate the value of voting per se. This was captured by the ‘Democracy Value’ (or D-Value), which represents the long-term value that individuals attribute to preserving democracy and democratic values in their country (see **Chapter 4**).

The D-value therefore, represents the personal satisfaction or in rational agency terms, the *benefit* from fulfilling one’s civic obligations; in other words their *duty* to vote (Feddersen, 2004, p. 101). This has been addressed in the questionnaire of the present thesis by the following two questions. Firstly, ‘How important is democracy for you?’ which aimed to capture the relative importance that the young people in the UK and Greece attribute to the long-term benefits of preserving democracy in their country. Secondly, the question ‘Voting is a duty?’, which in a similar way intended to capture the relative importance of voting as a civic duty. Both of these questions have previously (Galais and Blais, 2016;

Wattenberg, 2015) been employed in explaining young people's political participation in general.

With respect to political consumerism in particular, Gotlieb and Wells (2012) have previously reported that the dutiful cohorts were significantly less likely ($b = -0.47$, $p < .001$) to engage in political consumerism⁴⁶; however, this doctoral study has found a significantly positive relationship between both variables 'Voting is a duty' and 'Support for democracy'. More specifically, 'Voting is a duty' has had a positive relationship with boycotters in the UK and 'Support for democracy' for all three political consumerist measures, for both countries among those who deemed democracy as 'Absolutely important' (Tables 4.6.1 and 4.7.1).

This approach is therefore based on a generalised and subjective cost-benefit analysis of participation. It emphasises the significance of subjectivity of ideological factors and soft incentives as a basis for engagement in political consumerism, instead of the importance of immediate gains which are typically considered less important (Leighley, 1995). For example, if one places increased value on postmaterialist concerns, such as self-expression or the freedom of speech, as the UK respondents do in this study, their decision to participate will be entirely rational, since the benefits (self-expression) will outweigh the costs involved (time and resources), even though they may be dissatisfied by the actual products, prices, and retailers. The approach therefore of expanding the weight of the benefits involved in participating may indeed be a plausible explanation behind young people's engagement in political consumerism, despite their generalised rejection of neoliberal values.

c. Movement of affluence or movement of crisis?

The present thesis has examined political consumerism among young people as a form of political participation, and has therefore traced support for the phenomenon in the relevant literature. Yet, another field of research that may be in the position to offer a plausible

⁴⁶ This difference however is explained by the different measures involved in their study. Gotlieb and Wells, quite arbitrarily defined their 'dutiful' cohort in generational terms, as "those born prior to 1946" (2012, p. 216), in contrast to baby-boomers and generations X and Y. Instead, this study captures the *actual* value orientations of young people aged 18-29 in both the UK and Greece, providing a much more accurate portrayal of the values of young people.

explanation for the perceived paradox of political consumerism, draws from social movements theory, and could offer a fruitful direction for future research.

Vráblíková (2015), examining why young people engage in protests, discusses two – usually presented as competing - theories. She claims that we can expect two types of protests, on the one hand ‘*protest of affluence*’ and on the other ‘*protest of crisis*’, which each are related to a different set of predictors. Examples of the former can be found in the new social movements of the 1960s which were understood as a result of postmaterialist generational shift and “emphasized symbolic politics and recognition of alternative identities” (Vráblíková, 2015, p. 1). Contemporary anti-austerity movements instead, mobilise in response to the “economic and political crisis of capitalism and get active around issues of socio-economic inequalities and material redistribution” (Della Porta, 2015; Vráblíková, 2015, p. 1). Given the perceived association between engagement in protests and political consumerism (**Table 5.5.1**) it would make sense to further examine the phenomenon in light of social movements theory instead.

Drawing from Kerbo (1982), Vráblíková claims that movements of affluence correspond to the ‘well-off’ postmaterialist theories and explain participation in ‘new social movements’ types of protests, such as environmental, civil and minority rights movements that mobilised first in 1960s. These are being understood as a result of a post-materialist value change and as such, they are usually more common among financially secure people. Instead, movements of crisis usually originate from *grievance* due to a relative shortage of socio-economic resources and are therefore performed by those who are “experiencing life-threatening conditions whose improvement became the purpose of their mobilization” (Vráblíková, 2015, p. 4). The recent uprising of the Black Lives Matter movement, in response to the assassination of George Floyd, as a response to a historically persistent police brutality against members of the underprivileged black community in the US, is a recent example of movements of crisis.

With regards to its application on political consumerism, recent research suggests that a similar theoretical framework may also apply to the expansion of political consumerism in response to the economic crisis. Della Porta (2015) examines political consumerism as part of a new wave of ‘grievance’ movements, such as the contemporary anti-austerity movements or the Occupy movement before them. Unlike the new social movements of the 1960s, which were driven primarily by postmaterialist concerns, these contemporary ‘grievance’ movements bring “the class and capitalism back” (Della Porta, 2015, p. 1). These forms of social movements (of which political consumerism is part) are being performed by the “losers

of neoliberalism” (Vráblíková, 2015, p. 4), that is by the poor, excluded and marginalised groups, who seek an alternative way of getting their voices heard. Vráblíková (2015, p. 1) claims that “the ‘well-off’ postmaterialist explanation should still explain participation in the first type of movements, while grievance theory will probably account for participation at the new contemporary wave of activism, such as anti-austerity demonstrations or the protests of unemployed, homeless, radicals, and ethnic minorities”.

It is therefore the grievance theory of social movements that best explains participation in contemporary political consumerism in Greece, whereas political consumerism in the UK better fits with the description of a movement of affluence. This standpoint would also explain the inclusion of postmaterialism in the final model for the UK, although the Greek cohort was found to have scored significantly higher in the postmaterialism index. This claim gains further support from **Table 2.7.1**: ‘Subjective class’, which reported political consumerism in the UK as being statistically more likely among young intellectuals in the UK. Conversely, it also draws support from **Table 2.10.1** which reported that political consumerism in the UK was statistically more likely among young people in paid work (and therefore more financially secure), whereas instead it was statistically more likely among young unemployed people in Greece.

Moreover, the *common* drivers of political consumerism in the final model presented above, namely **a)** increased perceived consumer effectiveness, **b)** intention to demonstrate, **c)** promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles, and **d)** signing petitions in the online realm, indicate that in both countries this is associated with the politics of dissent both in the real and online world (‘intention to demonstrate’ and ‘intention to sign petitions online’); driven by an internalised neoliberal governmentality (‘perceived consumer effectiveness’) which pulls young people to express their environmental concerns (‘promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles’) within the bounds of the marketplace.

Nevertheless, political consumerism in the UK is also being driven by **e)** gender, with females being significantly more likely to participate in it. Previous research has explained the impact of gender on political consumerism in terms of an anachronistic conceptualisation which ascribes women as the primary household caretakers (Eliasoph, 1998), or even in terms of the standpoint which imputes women with an inherent “ethic of care” (Micheletti, 2004, p. 256). From this standpoint therefore, it could be argued that it is their resilience to the traditional patriarchal gender roles, which triggers the participation of the often excluded and oppressed young females into political consumerism, as a form of political participation which bridges a long standing gender gap in electoral participation (O’Neill and Gidengil, 2013; Stolle

and Micheletti, 2006). Under this standpoint, we could infer the impact of gender on political consumerism in the UK, in the context of grievances theory.

The rest of the UK-related factors however, that is **f)** age, **g)** local community and **h)** postmaterialist values paint the picture of political consumerism in the country being part of movements of affluence. Most importantly, postmaterialism is directly associated with movements of affluence, since it was developed to explain the rise of such movements in the 1960s. Secondly, the emphasis that young political consumers place on their local community may be related to the rural character of the phenomenon in the UK as opposed to its urban character in Greece (**Table 2.6.1**). ONS reports higher disposable income levels in rural England than in urban areas (Office for National Statistics, 2018), which again portrays political consumerism in the UK as adhering to a ‘movement of affluence’ conceptualisation. Finally, with regards to age, it can be claimed that the older young people are within the 18-29 year old age cohort, the more consumer power they have to engage politically within the market. This is further supported by the observation that political consumerism in the UK is popular among those in paid work, unlike Greece where it is primarily a tool used by young unemployed people (**Table 2.10.1**).

Instead, the factors related only to Greece, that is **i)** support national economy, and the negative relationship with **j)** party affiliation and **k)** support for market competition, depict political consumerism in Greece as being predominately a movement of crisis, since it is practiced by young people who are driven by (materialist) motivations in relation to their national economy, their disillusionment with party politics, and their rejection of neoliberal policies.

4. Conclusion

The aim of this thesis was to identify the underlying drivers of political consumerism among young people in the UK and compare them to those in Greece. This chapter has identified these drivers in both countries by considering the findings from the analysis of the survey (**Chapters 10** and **11**) and the insights generated by the young focus groups participants (**Chapter 9**). An examination of a series of push and pull factors in **Chapters 10** and **11**, has offered a comprehensive representation of the phenomenon in the two countries. In order to do so however, it was necessary to devise an original and intuitive Political Consumerism Index (PCI) (**Chapter 7**) which has allowed for the analysis of political consumerism in **Chapter 12** not only in terms of its behavioural dimension, but taking also into consideration its

breadth and depth, offering thus an original contribution to knowledge in the field of young people's political participation.

a. Main findings

Given its aim and objectives therefore, this thesis has revealed that political consumerism is generally unrelated to voting and elections, negatively associated with views of politicians, but positively linked to democratic values and to an expanded personal outlook of the respondents. The environmental orientation of young political consumers in both the UK and Greece was a common predictor of their likelihood to engage in political consumerism, with the 'Promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles' motivating young people in both the UK ($b=0.248$, $p=.001$) and Greece ($b=0.219$, $p=.01$).

As members of a Mixed Market Economy, the Grexit generation was expected to show higher levels of disillusionment from institutionalised politics and distrust in politicians, than was the Brexit generation who were socialised in an Liberal Market Economy. Indeed, the findings of this chapter indicate that party affiliation is statistically negatively associated with political consumerism only for Greece. Instead, young people in the UK were expected to demonstrate higher levels of conviction about the effectiveness of the market to influence political and non-political outcomes. However, contrary to the expectations, although Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) to their local community has been shown to be a statistically significant predictor for political consumerism in both countries, it is significantly higher in Greece ($b=0.261$, $p=.001$) than in the UK ($b=0.197$, $p=.001$). Moreover, the preferred political consumerist practices were expected to be expressed in different ways too: a bottom-up, local-community orientation was expected among young people in Greece, as opposed to more top-down approaches in the UK. However the findings of this chapter indicate that local community outlook is a statistically significant predictor for the UK only ($b=0.165$, $p=.01$), whereas support for national economy is a statistically significant factor for Greece ($b=0.142$, $p=.05$).

Furthermore, political consumerism seems to be primarily an *elite-challenging* form of political participation in both countries, with intention to demonstrate being a statistically significant predictor for both Greece ($b=0.216$, $p=.01$) and the UK ($b=0.155$, $p=.05$). Moreover, in both countries political consumerism is associated with online forms of political participation, with the variable 'intention to sign a petition online' being a statistically significant predictor for both Greece and the UK ($b=0.224$, $p=.01$; $b=0.174$, $p=.01$). Age ($b=0.205$, $p=.001$) and gender ($b=0.263$, $p=.001$) are significant predictors of the phenomenon

only in the UK. Moreover, there are indications that political consumerism in the UK should be understood as a *movement of affluence*, whereas in Greece it is better perceived as a *movement of crisis*, with ‘support for market competition’ being statistically *negatively* associated with political consumerism in the country ($b=-0.254$, $p=.001$). More research in this direction is however, deemed necessary.

On the whole, the main findings of this thesis can be graphically summarized as follows. The radar chart below (**Figure 11**) shows that political consumerism in Greece is determined by the seven factors as indicated:




Figure 3: Factors influencing political consumption in Greece

Likewise, **Figure 12** demonstrates that political consumerism in the UK is being determined by the following eight factors, instead. Only factors **a**) Perceived Consumer Effectiveness (PCE) **b**) Intention to demonstrate, **c**) Promoting environmentally responsible lifestyles, **d**) Signing a petition online are common to both country cohorts. The key differences between the two are that **e**) Gender, **f**) Age, **g**) Local-community personality outlook, and **h**) Postmaterialist values are key predictors of young people’s political consumerism in the UK but not in Greece; while **i**) Support national economy, **j**) Party affiliation, **k**) Support for market competition are statistically significant drivers in Greece but not in the UK.




Figure 4: Factors influencing political consumption in the UK

Although one of the primary factors associated with political consumerism in both countries was found to be a leftist ideological orientation (**Table 3.4.1**), this has not been discernible in the final model. The best way therefore to summarise the findings of this thesis is in the words of young people themselves, who when asked during the focus groups if they felt they belonged to the ‘left’, responded:

Participant L: I feel part of a global movement that is centred around social justice and solidarity among the people (...) and this is best practiced first in our everyday interactions and our immediate community.

Moderator: Yes, but where does this place you on the political spectrum?

Participant L: I do not know...and I do not really care, to be honest.

b. Directions for future research

Nevertheless, the present thesis has also disclosed a conceptual paradox, whereby young people in Greece with the greatest dissatisfaction with respect to the free market economy and market competition will choose an inherently market-oriented means of political participation to express their ethical, environmental and political concerns. The final sections of this chapter therefore provide directions for future research, in order to respond to this paradox. The statistical analysis in **Chapters 10, 11 and 12** indicate that although a) reviewing

downwards the cost of participation (as the rational agency and the mobilisation model of political participation would suggest) is unlikely to be able to provide an adequate explanation, **b)** expanding the weight of the long-term benefits involved with participation, and **c)** analysing political consumerism in light of social movements theory may be a more fruitful course of action.

Of course, further research still needs to be conducted, especially in different geopolitical and socioeconomic contexts so that an even more comprehensive understanding of young people's engagement in political consumerism may be established. Since a simple and intuitive measurement tool for political consumerism has now been devised, and a first understanding of the drivers of the phenomenon in the UK and Greece during recession has been acquired, more emphasis should hereafter be placed on the ways in which this understanding may influence policies that can effectively enhance young people's engagement with politics and political consumerism in particular. For instance, policy makers who are responsible for youth engagement and civic education programmes which seek to foster young people's political engagement in either country, may benefit from considering the differing motivations and value orientations of young people, as evidenced by this study.

Moreover, although this study has validated and administered the PCI in countries of the European north compared to the European south, it needs also to be applied and validated in countries and communities beyond the global capitalist north, so as to eventually transcend the Eurocentric and North-American focus of the overwhelming part of existing literature on the subject. This would allow politicians, policymakers, political scientists, and youth advocacy agencies and organisations to gain a deeper understanding of the drivers of political consumerism and by extension lifestyle forms of political participation, and allow for better policies and strategies to address young people's concerns and encourage them to better engage with the different aspects of politics. After all, as the young people themselves said during the focus groups "the more democracy the better, really" (**Participant A**); but "there are many ways democracy could get better" (**Participant S**).

c. Original contribution to knowledge and final remarks

The present thesis has therefore highlighted and compared the main drivers behind young people's engagement with political consumerism in the UK and in Greece. This is important because very few existing research studies have until now considered the phenomenon of political consumerism **a)** through a mixed-methods comparative research design, **b)** between a northern and a southern European country, **c)** in times of austerity, **d)** according to young

people's own frames of reference, **e)** accounting not only for its behavioural dimension, but taking also into consideration the breadth and depth of the phenomenon, and **f)** surprisingly enough, the effect of neoliberal governmentality on an inherently market-oriented form of political participation, such as political consumerism.

Chapter 2 therefore, has specified who are the young people in political participation research and has defined what exactly we mean by political participation. **Chapter 3** has discussed and problematised the most widely-used theories in political participation research which would subsequently be used throughout the thesis to contextualise its analysis. **Chapter 4** has discussed the emergence of political consumerism as a result of the convergence of the citizen and the consumer, whereas **Chapter 5** introduced neoliberalism as the underlying ideological framework within which political consumerism operates. **Chapter 6** in turn, discussed political consumerism at the country level, and delivered an empirical overview of its expressions in Greece, as opposed to the UK. The inconsistencies of the existing measures of political consumerism and the factors that have been associated with it in previous research, were discussed in **Chapter 7**, which also developed and validated the PCI, a new instrument for measuring political consumerism. **Chapter 8** laid out the methodological approach that would be used in the empirical part of the thesis. **Chapter 9** reported the main findings from a series of focus groups conducted in the UK and Greece, which subsequently informed the quantitative analysis of the survey questionnaire in **Chapters 10** and **11**. Ultimately, **Chapter 12** utilised the PCI so as to conclusively identify the main drivers of the phenomenon in the two countries, providing thus an original contribution to knowledge in the study of political consumerism among young people in a time of austerity.

There is no question that the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic is already transforming the political landscape as we previously knew it. The full extent of its impact on our individual livelihoods, our healthcare system and the economy as a whole is yet to be seen. Nevertheless, it is also bound to change our overarching consumption priorities, as well as what we deem as 'political'. While on the one hand, it has already arguably amplified the pre-existing divisions of wealth and privilege around the world, it has also rekindled our interest about the sustainability of the environment, the protection of our communities, and ultimately the greater common good. We are already planting urban gardens in our back yards, we are sewing masks for our healthcare workers, and we are leaving a fresh carton of milk on our neighbours' doorstep.

In this changing socio-political context therefore, and in view of the aim and objectives of this study, this PhD thesis makes an original contribution to knowledge by examining the

main factors behind young people's political consumption decisions. In order to do so, it has developed a valid and reliable instrument to measure young people's political consumerism, and has tested it in a comparative study among young people in the UK and in Greece, so as to identify the main drivers of the phenomenon in each. This thesis therefore offers an original contribution that advances the academic discourse on the political participation practices of young people, with particular emphasis on consumption as a way of bringing about the desired change towards the world they want to live in. _

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Appendix I: Focus Groups

A. Participant's Information Sheet:

1. Information about the project:

My name is **George Kyroglou** and I am conducting my PhD research project in Politics at Nottingham Trent University.

I am investigating what motivates young people to engage in non-electoral forms for political participation, as for instance in boycotts and buycotts – which together are termed “Political Consumerism”; by comparing the contemporary young generations of Britain and Greece.

2. Why have I been chosen/asked?

You have been chosen because you belong to the groups of people that we want to talk to, namely young people 18-25 years of age, residing either in Britain or Greece.

3. What do I have to do?

You will be asked to attend a focus group organised and delivered by the researcher and an assistant. The group will last about 60 minutes and will involve up to 5 other participants. The group will be asked to share views and experiences on a range of issues relating to your perception of Politics, political participation and shopping decisions. We will be taking notes and audio recording the event and only the research team will listen back and transcribe key themes from the audio recording.

There are no right or wrong answers to the focus group questions. We want to hear many different viewpoints and would like to hear from everyone. We hope you can be honest even when your responses may not be in agreement with the rest of the group. In respect for each other, we ask that only one individual speak at a time in the group and that responses made by all participants be kept confidential.

4. Data protection, Anonymity and Confidentiality

All information you provide will be securely kept on a password protected computer. No names or other personal data will be identified within the research process unless you specifically consent to this. Data from the focus groups will be kept securely and fully anonymised. Names and other identifying features will not be used in any reports. Any demographic information we collect and use will be used purely to provide context to any quotations in the report. Any personal and sensitive data (for example, names, ethnicity, age, gender) will not be kept with the data collected from the focus groups. Your data will be coded so that only the researchers will be able to link your comments or data to your name. All data will be presented in reports, presentations or other final summaries in a summarized format so that no one will be able to identify you from your comments or data. All data will be **fully** anonymized immediately after the end of the focus groups, after which you will not be able to request withdrawal of your data.

5. Participation, Withdrawal And Rights of Research Participants

You can choose whether to be in this study or not. You may withdraw consent at any time without academic or other consequences of any kind. You may exercise the option of removing your data from the study, any time before or during the focus groups. After the focus groups however, all identifying information will be removed and all focus group responses will become anonymous and thus it will not be possible for participants to ask for their data to be removed from the study.

You may also refuse to answer any questions you don't want to answer and still remain in the study. The investigator may withdraw you from this research if circumstances arise that warrant doing so. You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this research study.

6. Whom to contact?

If you have any query about the focus group you can speak directly with the researcher. I can be contacted via email here: georgios.kyroglou2016@my.ntu.ac.uk.

Alternatively, my supervisor, Professor Matt HENN, Department of Politics and International Relations, can be contacted at matt.henn@ntu.ac.uk.

7. What will happen with the results of the study?

A report will be transcribed out of the audio-recording immediately after the focus groups. All data used directly from participants will be fully anonymised. The results of the study will be shared in reports, conferences, presentations and may be published in internal reports and in published journals.

8. Who has reviewed this study?

The study has been reviewed and approved by the Nottingham Trent University College of Business, Law and Social Sciences Ethics Committee.

I certify that I have presented the above information to the participant.



George Kyroglou,

Nottingham, United Kingdom
April, 2018

B. Informed Consent Form:

Thank you for attending this focus group organised by **George Kyroglou**, *PhD Candidate in Politics and International Relations at Nottingham Trent University*.

The focus group will last about **60 minutes** and we will be taking notes and audio recording the session. All the data collected is confidential and the results will be fully anonymised. The aims of the project will be explained to you and will have an opportunity to ask questions about the research.

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the participant information sheet for the above study and I had the opportunity to ask questions.
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time before or during the focus groups, without giving a reason.
3. I understand that all the information I provide will be treated in confidence.
4. I agree to notes being taken and having the focus groups **audio-recorded** as part of the research project.
5. I agree to take part in the research project.

Name of participant:

Signature of participant:

Email: Tel:

Name of Researcher:.....

Signature of researcher:

Date/Place:

.....

C. Guide for Focus Groups:

a) Introduction:

Good evening and welcome to our session. Thanks for taking the time to join us to talk about youth political engagement in the county. My name is *George Kyroglou* and assisting me is (...). We're both PhD Students at Nottingham Trent University. The supervisor of the study is *Prof. Matt Henn*, whose contacts you may find at the Informed Consent Form (5' min) you will soon be asked to read and sign. The purpose of this study is to identify the reasons behind the perceived youth political dis-engagement and examine to which extent Political Consumerism (boycotting and buycotting for political, ethical or environmental considerations) may (or may not) be considered as an alternative form of youth political participation. In other words, we try to understand why some young people in the country, prefer to engage in alternative forms of political participation such as Political Consumerism, as opposed to voting in elections, and gain an insight with respect to what motivates their shopping decisions.

You were invited because you belong to the groups of people that we want to talk to, namely young people 18-25 years of age, residing either in Britain or Greece.

There are no wrong answers but rather differing points of view. Please feel free to share your point of view even if it differs from what others have said. Keep in mind that we're just as interested in negative comments as positive comments, and at times the negative comments are the most helpful.

You've probably noticed the microphone. We're tape recording the session because we don't want to miss any of your comments. People often say very helpful things in these discussions and we can't write fast enough to get them all down. We will be on a first name basis today, and we won't use any names in our reports. You may be assured of complete confidentiality.

For the next 5 minutes you are invited to read and sign the Informed Consent Form, you will find in front of you.

Well, let's begin. We've placed name cards on the table in front of you to help us remember each other's names. Please take 2 minutes to write your first name on the **name card** (5' min) and add a quick drawing or symbol that identifies you as a person. Let's find out some more about each other by going around the table. Please tell us your name and why you chose the specific symbol.


Thank you! Now that we hopefully know a bit more about each other, we may proceed to our following activity which is named "**The Tree of Life**" (10'min). In this flipchart you can see we have drawn a tree. If this tree represents the current political system in your country, the roots of the tree represent our fears, or all those reasons we may be dissatisfied with the current political system. Likewise, the trunk represents our obligations and contributions, what we - as young citizens - need or should do in order to sustain and improve the existing political system. The upper part of the tree, the foliage, represents our hopes and dreams; how we expect to see this system changing in the future, or how we expect the current political system to evolve in the years to follow. In front of you, you will find three different post-it notes, the **red** for the roots, the **yellow** for the trunk and the **green** for the foliage. Please



take 2' to write on each post-it your fears, contributions and expectations. When you think you are ready, please proceed to the flipchart and stick the note to the relevant part of the Tree of Life and tell us a few thinks about what you noted down on each section.

b) Main Session:

The following activity is called "**Human Thermometer**" (10'min) and intends on the one hand to identify our personal values on a scale, with regards to certain issues, and on the other to act as an energiser, an opportunity to stand up and move freely in the space provided. As you may have noticed, we have drawn a thermometer on the floor, which ranges from cold (highly disagree), to hot (highly agree). Please stand up, and as soon as I read some statements, please stand on the thermometer depending if you agree or disagree with the following statements:



- I am very interested in Politics.
- I will most likely vote in the next General Elections.
- I believe I may be politically active even though I do not vote in the elections.
- People should have more say in government decisions.
- Most people should not have a say in government decisions since they are not adequately educated.
- I consider the Order of the nation as a priority.
- Most people can be trusted.
- Most politicians can be trusted.
- I am willing to pay more for food products knowing that more money is returning to the disadvantaged producers who have created it.
- I am willing to pay more for food products that were produced under environmentally friendly conditions.
- I am willing to pay more for products that were produced locally? How about nationally? (Please explain your position and give examples when possible).

Here is a **sample set of questions** (25' min) that could be used for many consumer products. The questions might be applicable to such products as: soap, breakfast cereal, fast food restaurants, automobiles, youth or other clubs, equipment, cosmetics, deodorant or a variety of other products. The following questions are intended to allow us a chance to start a discussion. There are no right or wrong answers to the focus group questions. We want to hear many different viewpoints and would like to hear from everyone. We hope you can be honest even when your responses may not be in agreement with the rest of the group. In respect for each other, we ask that only one individual speak at a time in the group and that responses made by all participants be kept confidential.

- Suppose that you were in charge and could make one change that would make the world a better place. What would you do?
- What can each one of us do in our daily lives to make the world a better place?
- How have you been involved in the past in the decisions that pertain to you in your local community?
- How often do you use organic or Fair Trade brands or products?
- Who or what influences your personal decision to purchase a particular type of products?
- When you decide to purchase certain products, what do you look for? Take a piece of paper and jot down three things that are important to you when you purchase food products?
- Let's list these on the flip chart. If you had to pick only one factor that was most important to you, what would it be? You can pick something that you mentioned or something that was said by others.

- Would you be willing to pay more for food products knowing that more money is returning to the disadvantaged producers who have created it? (Please explain your position and give examples when possible).
- Would you be to pay more for food products that were produced under environmentally friendly conditions? (Please explain your position and give examples when possible).
- Would you be willing to pay more for products that were produced locally? How about nationally? (Please explain your position and give examples when possible).
- Have you ever changed brands or types of products based on ethical or environmental considerations? What brought about the change?
- Identify market based activities you have participated in or with which you are simply familiar with in your country, which in their opinion would fall under an expanded definition of political consumerism.
- Of all the things we've talked about, what is most important to you?

Letter to one's self (5' min): Now please imagine yourself in exactly one year from now. Imagine that your future self is being asked to invite your present self to participate in a boycott campaign, what would you say in the invitation? Please take a piece of paper and spend the next 5' minutes to write down your invitation to your present self. Feel free to create a concrete example of a campaign, either real or imaginary.

c) Summary question

The moderator provides a brief oral summary: "Is this an adequate summary?"

d) Final question

The moderator reviews the purpose of the study and then asks the participants: "Have we missed anything?"

(Total Duration: 65')

Appendix II: Survey Questionnaire



A. Participant's Information Sheet and Informed Consent Form.

Hello,

Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.

I am George Kyroglou and I am conducting my PhD research project in Politics and International Relations at Nottingham Trent University.

I am studying why and how some young people get involved in Political Consumerism as a way of participating in politics. You will therefore be asked to respond to a set of questions on your computer screen. Your participation in this survey should take approximately 10 to 15 minutes. This consent form will be stored separately from your data. Your participation in this survey is entirely voluntary and you have the right to withdraw at any time during the survey, or for 6 weeks after your submission, without specifying any reason. In order to protect your right to withdraw your data, you will be provided with a Unique Identification Code.

Please retain this Identification Code, which will be used to identify your data so that it can be removed from the final analysis if you so wish. If, during the survey, you have any queries regarding your instructions, or if you have any questions regarding the nature of the research, please do not hesitate to contact me directly via email.

I can be contacted via email here: georgios.kyroglou2016@my.ntu.ac.uk

My supervisor, Professor Matt Henn at the Nottingham Trent University Department of Politics and International Relations, can be contacted on matt.henn@ntu.ac.uk.

I certify that I have presented the above information to the participant.

George Kyroglou, Nottingham, United Kingdom November, 2018

*Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research project. If you are willing to continue, please confirm the statement below by ticking the box. **

I voluntarily consent to participate in this study. In completing this form I certify that I am 18 years of age or older. I can download a copy of this consent form and my responses to keep.

B. [Survey Questionnaire](#)

Your Interest in Politics and Elections

How much interest do you generally have in what is going on in politics? *

- A great deal
- Quite a lot
- Some
- Not very much
- None at all
- Don't know

When people talk about "politics", what does that mean to you, exactly? PLEASE WRITE IN THE SPACE BELOW.

In political matters, people often talk of "the left" and "the right". Generally speaking, how would you place your views on this scale? (If 1 indicates "Left" and 10 indicates "Right") *

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| Left | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10. Right |
| <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Some people think of themselves as usually being a supporter of one political party rather than another. Do you usually think of yourself as being a supporter of one particular party or not? *

- Yes - a strong supporter
- Yes - a fairly strong supporter

No - not a supporter

Don't know

How confident are you that you know enough about politics and political parties when it comes to deciding how to vote at election times? *

Very confident

Fairly confident

Not very confident

Not at all confident

Don't know

Before voting, you might seek information from a variety of sources, such as the newspapers, the candidate's campaign or the internet. How satisfied would you say you are with the overall availability of information about the current political affairs? Please rate your views on this scale. *

Not at all satisfied	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Absolutely satisfied
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

It takes too much time and effort to be adequately informed and active in politics and current affairs. *

Yes - I agree

No - I do not agree

Don't know - Not sure

People should be allowed to organise public meetings to protest against the government. *

- Yes - I agree
- No - I do not agree
- Don't know - Not sure

People often talk about the benefits and drawbacks of competition in the market. How would you place your views on the following scale? *

Competition is harmful: It brings out the worst in people	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Competition is good: It stimulates hard work and new ideas
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

In your opinion, what is the single most important issue that influences your life at the moment? PLEASE WRITE IN THE SPACE BELOW WITH AS MUCH DETAIL AS YOU CAN.

Democracy in my country

Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

By voting, I feel as if I can really help to change the way my country is being governed. *

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree/ disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

Elections allow voters to express their opinions but don't really change anything. *

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree/ disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

I would be seriously neglecting my duty as a citizen if I didn't vote. *

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Neither agree/ disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree
- Don't know

How active you are in politics and community affairs

Thinking about the next few years, how likely is it that you will: *

	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Neither unlikely/ nor likely	Likely	Very Likely	Don't Know
Vote in the next General Election?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Work actively with a group of people to address a public issue or tackle a problem?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Be active in a voluntary organisation, like a community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	Very unlikely	Unlikely	Neither unlikely/ nor likely	Likely	Very Likely	Don't Know
association, a charity group, or youth club?						
Participate in a protest, like a rally or a demonstration, to show your concern about a public issue or problem?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Contact your MP by email?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sign an electronic petition?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Create a group or a page on a social networking site (such as Facebook), or a blog to inform others about an important social or political issue?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Share a link about an important social or political issue over a social networking site (such as Facebook)?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Consumer behaviour

Now you will be asked about your behaviour and habits when you purchase products and services.

How effective do you believe your consumer behaviour can be in bringing about the desired change for the world as a whole? *

	Very ineffective	Ineffective	Neither effective/ nor ineffective	Effective	Very effective	Don't know
Effectiveness of my consumer behaviour	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How effective do you believe your consumer behaviour can be in bringing about the desired change to your local community? *

	Vey ineffective	Ineffective	Neither effective/ nor ineffective	Effective	Very effective	Don't know
Effectiveness of my consumer behaviour	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How responsible do you feel with regards to choosing the 'right' brand when you go shopping? *

	Not at all responsible	Not responsible	Neither responsible/ nor not responsible	Responsible	Very responsible	Don't know
Responsibility for choosing the right brand	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

In the past 12 months, did you actively purchase one product or brand over another for ethical, environmental or political reasons? *

- Yes, I have actively purchased a product or brand for ethical, environmental or political reasons.
- No, I have NOT purchased any products or brands for ethical, environmental or political reasons.
- Don't know

In the past 12 months, did you actively refuse to purchase a product or brand based on ethical, environmental or political considerations? *

- Yes, I have refused to purchase a product or brand for ethical, environmental or political reasons.
- No, I have NOT refused to purchase any products or brands for ethical, environmental or political reasons.
- Don't know

How **often** do you purchase, or avoid purchasing certain products, services or brands for ethical, environmental or political considerations? *

	Hardly ever	Not so often	Often	Nearly every time I go shopping	Every time I go shopping	Don't know
Frequency	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

How much more would you be willing to pay for a brand or product, for any of the following reasons? *

	Not willing to pay more	Not willing to pay very much more	Willing to pay a little more	Willing to pay quite a lot more	Don't know
Benefit my personal health	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Protect animal rights	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Support national economy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Support local producers and improve social ties within my community	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Support fair trade and ethical production processes overseas	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Protect the planet and encourage environmentally responsible lifestyles	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Other:

When buying an item, we usually have several choices regarding where to buy it from. Generally speaking, how satisfied are you with the variety of retailers, the range of products, and their price range available to you? Please rate your views on this scale. *

	Not at all satisfied	Not satisfied	Neither satisfied/ nor dissatisfied	Satisfied	Very Satisfied
Range of products and/or services	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Range of prices of products and/or services	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Variety of retailers (Big corporations/ local businesses)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Before making a purchase, you might seek information from a variety of sources, such as the product's label, the brand's advertising campaign or the internet. How satisfied would you say you are with the availability of information in the market about your products of choice? Please rate your views on this scale. *

Not at all satisfied	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	Absolutely satisfied
<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Do you often act alone or as part of an organised campaign, when you decide which product, service, brand, or company you will buy or refuse to buy? *

- Alone
- Organised campaign (Consumer groups, Local Purchasing Initiatives etc.)

During the past 12 months, did you engage in any of the following activities?(Feel free to tick more than one answer). *

- Brandalism or Culture Jamming
- Alternative Consumption Festivals
- Local Exchange Trading System (LETS)

- Participating in Solidarity Purchase Networks (GAS)
- Time-Banks
- Sharing Economy Initiatives (Carpooling, etc.)
- Barter Networks
- Intending to vote for a Political Party based on their environmental agenda.
- Consume Less for De-growth purposes
- Recycle, Reuse, Reduce.
- Zero waste products
- Zero miles Production
- Vegetarianism/Veganism
- None of the above/ Don't know/ Not familiar with the terms
- Other (please specify):

Personal Values

Generally speaking, on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means " You can't be too careful" and 5 means "Most people can be trusted", would you say that you can't be too careful when dealing with people; or that most people can be trusted? *

- 1. You can't be too careful
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5. Most people can be trusted
- Don't know

On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "No trust at all" and 5 means "A great deal of trust", how much do you trust politicians in general? *

- 1. No trust at all
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5. A great deal of trust
- Don't know

On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 means "No influence" and 5 means "A great deal of influence", how much influence would you say you have on how your country is being governed? *

- 1. No influence
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5. A great deal of influence
- Don't know

People have different views about themselves and how they relate to the world. Can you please tell me how strongly you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about how you predominately see yourself? *

	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly agree
I see myself as an individual.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I see myself as part of my local community.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
I see myself as part of my nation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means that it is "not at all democratic" and 10 means that it is "completely democratic," what position would you choose? *

"Not at all democratic"

"Completely democratic"

People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Below are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority to. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the next most important? *

First most important

Second most important

Maintaining order in the nation

Giving people more say in important government decisions

Fighting rising prices

Protecting freedom of speech

People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Below are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority to. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the next most important? *

First most important

Second most important

A high level of economic growth

Making sure this country has strong defence forces

Seeing that people have more say about how things are done at their jobs and their communities

	First most important	Second most important
Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

People sometimes talk about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. Below are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the next most important? *

	First most important	Second most important
A stable economy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Progress towards a less impersonal and more humane society	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Progress toward a society in which Ideas count more than money	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
The fight against terrorism/crime	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Demographics and Personal Information

All of the responses will remain confidential and will be used only for the purposes of the research.

You identify yourself as: *

- Male
- Female
- Prefer not to answer
- Other (please specify):

Please indicate your country of residence. *

Greece

United Kingdom

Other (please specify):

Can you tell me your year of birth, please? *

Would you say you belong to any kind of minority, based on your racial, ethnic, religious or sexual orientation?(If Yes, please describe below): *

No, I do not belong in a minority.

Yes, I belong to a minority, based on my racial, ethnic, religious or sexual orientation.
(Please describe below)

Please describe:

What is the highest educational level that you have attained? [NOTE: if you are a student, please indicate the highest level you expect to complete soon]: *

Which of these descriptions applies to your current status? (If you have more than one job please respond only for your main job). *

If you chose "other", please define:

Are the tasks you do at work mostly manual or mostly intellectual? If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the past. Use this scale where 1 means "mostly manual tasks" and 10 means "mostly intellectual tasks" *

Mostly
manual

Mostly
intellectual

With this question, we would like to ask in what income group you would say your household is, compared to other households in your country. Please, indicate the appropriate number.(1 indicates the lowest income group and 10 the highest income group in your country). *

Lowest
income

Highest
income

Do you live with your parents? *

Yes

No

Are you the primary wage earner in your household? *

Yes

No

Which phrase best describes the area where you live?

Urban area

Rural area

Appendix III: Cumulative list of Chi-square crosstabulations in Chapters 10 and 11

2. Who are the political consumers in Greece and in the UK?

Table 2.1.1 Gender	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Male	55.0	-3.3	49.2	-3.9	56.7	-2.1	42.4	-3.6	68.3	-2.6	59.3	-3.2
Female	72.2	2.8	71.5	4.1	67.9	1.8	63.0	3.5	80.7	2.2	76.5	3.2
Other	100	1.8	33.3	1.9	83.3	1.0	66.7	0.4	100	1.4	66.7	-0.1
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	Significance across the whole distribution:											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	12.791		22.02		5.361		23.698		8.135		10.464	
P-Value	0.012**		0.000***		0.252		0.000***		0.017**		0.005**	

Table 2.2.1: Age	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
18-20	69.1	0.6	66.7	0.7	70.6	1.3	51.7	-0.7	79.4	0.7	73.3	0.6
21-23	67.4	0.4	61	-0.6	63.8	0	56	0.2	76.8	0.2	68.8	-0.4
24-26	66.1	0	64.5	0.3	64.4	0.1	42.1	1.5	78	0.3	72.4	0.5
27-29	58.3	-1.2	61.4	-0.2	54.2	-1.5	45.5	-1.4	68.8	-1.3	65.9	-0.7
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	Significance across the whole distribution:											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	4.672		2.659		5.727		8.203		1.991		0.964	
P-Value	0.586		0.85		0.455		0.224		0.574		0.809	

Table 2.3.1 <u>Minority</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Yes	73.5	1.2	62.0	-0.2	63.3	-0.1	54.0	-0.4	79.6	0.6	69.0	-0.3
No	64.8	-1.2	63.3	0.2	64.0	0.1	56.1	0.4	75.8	-0.6	70.6	0.3
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
Significance across the whole distribution:												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	1.851		0.161		0.777		0.474		0.337		0.83	
P-Value	0.396		0.923		0.678		0.789		0.562		0.773	

Table 2.4.1 <u>Living with Parents</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res.
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Yes	64.7	-0.5	61.9	-0.4	65.4	0.5	51.7	-1.5	77.4	0.4	67.6	-1.1
No	67.2	0.5	64.1	0.4	62.8	-0.5	60	1.5	75.6	-0.4	73.1	1.1
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
Significance across the whole distribution:												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	1.45		0.221		0.729		4.873		0.151		1.143	
P-Value	0.484		0.895		0.695		0.087		0.698		0.285	

Table 2.5.1: Primary Earner	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res.	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Yes	70.7	1.0	65.5	0.4	62.7	-0.3	58.2	0.4	78.7	0.5	72.7	0.5
No	64.5	-1.0	62.4	-0.4	64.3	0.3	54.9	-0.4	75.6	-0.5	69.5	-0.5
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
Significance across the whole distribution:												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	1.189		5.579		4.106		0.667		0.291		0.22	
P-Value	0.552		0.061		0.128		0.713		0.589		0.639	

Table 2.6.1 Residence	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Urban	69.6	1.9	59.2	-1.7	71.0	3.9	56.5	0.3	81.3	3.0	68	-0.7
Rural	57.9	-2.0	67.5	1.8	48.4	-3.9	55.6	0.1	65.3	-3.0	73.4	1.4
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
Significance across the whole distribution:												
Pearson's Chi Sq.	4.6		6.654		15.873		4.204		9.387		7.152	
P-Value	0.331		0.155		0.003**		0.379		0.009**		0.028*	

Table 2.7.1 Subjective Class	<u>Buycotter</u>				<u>Boycotter</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotter</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res.	%	Res.	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Mostly Manual	65.6	-0.1	58.8	-1.1	58.3	-1.4	49.1	-1.7	70.8	-1.5	62.3	-2.3
Mostly Intellectual	66.4	0.1	65.2	1.1	66.4	1.4	58.9	1.7	78.8	1.5	74.4	2.3
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	Significance across the whole distribution:											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	1.633		1.371		5.591		2.889		2.341		5.148	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.441		0.504		0.061		0.236		0.126		0.023*	

Table 2.8.1: Relative Income	<u>Buycotter</u>				<u>Boycotter</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotter</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res.	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Low	61.5	-0.9	63.5	0.1	60	-0.7	62.4	1.5	67.7	-1.8	71.8	0.4
Medium Low	67.3	0.3	62.4	-0.1	70.3	-0.6	46.5	-2.2	77.3	0.3	71.3	0.3
Medium High	66.4	0.1	64.8	0.4	69.9	1.7	58.2	0.6	79.6	1	67	-0.8
High	72	0.6	59.1	-0.6	56	-0.9	56.8	0.2	80	0.4	70.5	0.1
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	Significance across the whole distribution:											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	1.702		5.48		9.342		6.547		3.615		0.591	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.945		0.484		0.155		0.365		0.306		0.898	

Table 2.9.1 Education Attainment	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Primary	0.0	-1.4	33.3	-1.1	100.0	0.8	0.0	-1.9	100.0	0.6	33.3	-1.4
Technical / Vocational	60.0	-0.3	33.3	-1.1	40.0	-1.1	33.3	-0.8	60.0	-0.9	66.7	-0.1
Incomplete Secondary	57.9	-0.8	73.7	1.0	47.4	-1.5	68.4	1.2	63.2	-1.4	73.7	0.4
Complete Secondary	63.6	-0.2	65.4	0.3	81.8	1.3	65.4	1.1	81.8	0.4	73.1	0.3
Some University	59.7	-1.2	59.2	-0.8	67.7	0.7	52.6	-0.6	79.0	0.6	67.1	-0.7
University with Degree	69.3	1.7	64.7	0.8	63.7	-0.1	54.5	-0.4	76.9	0.3	71.1	0.5
Other	66.7	0.0	42.9	-1.1	66.7	1.0	71.4	0.9	66.7	-0.4	71.4	0.1
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	10.074		14.524		12.76		14.173		3.501		2.602	
P-Value	0.609		0.269		0.387		0.29		0.744		0.857	

Table 2.10.1 Employment status	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Paid Work	69.3	0.9	72.1	1.7	69.3	1.5	68.9	2.3	79.8	1.1	82	2.3
In Education	61.7	-1.5	60.9	-1.3	57.4	-2.2	53.4	-1.3	72.3	-1.5	67.6	-1.6
Unemployed	75	1.3	25	-2.2	77.3	2	12.5	-2.5	86.4	1.7	25	-2.8
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
Pearson's Chi Sq.	4.523		9.716		12.392		15.464		7.323		14.172	
P-Value	0.606		0.137		0.054		0.017*		0.062		0.003**	

3. Political consumerism and young people's views about, and engagement with politics

Table 3.1.1 <u>Definition of Politics</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Bottom Up	74.3	0.6	66.7	-0.2	81.4	2.4	54.5	-0.7	80.6	0.9	71.7	0.3
Mostly Bottom Up	76.3	0.7	75.0	0.8	65.1	-0.8	56.0	-0.3	73.9	-0.4	73.1	0.4
Neutral / Indifferent	78.3	0.8	70.0	0.2	63.6	-0.7	50.0	-0.5	80.0	0.4	70.0	0.0
Mostly Top Down	68.9	-0.4	64.0	-0.4	71.4	0.2	61.5	0.3	71.4	-0.9	65.5	-0.5
Top Down	67.3	-1.2	67.5	-0.1	66.0	-1.2	60.4	0.7	76.3	0.0	69.7	-0.1
Total	71.4		67.8		70.3		59.0		76.5		69.9	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	2.288		0.790		6.157		0.952		1.702		0.467	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.683		0.940		0.188		0.917		0.790		0.977	

Table 3.2.1 <u>Interest in Politics</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
None at all	33.3	-2.1	53.8	-0.7	66.7	0.2	38.5	-1.3	66.7	-0.7	61.5	-0.7
Not very much	57.7	-1.4	54.2	-1.5	46.2	-2.9	44.1	-1.9	71.2	-1	59.3	-2.0
Some	67.4	0.3	62	-0.2	56.8	1.7	53	-0.6	72.6	-1.1	71	0.2
Quite a lot	70.5	1.2	64.2	0.3	76.8	3.5	63.2	1.8	84.8	2.6	71.6	0.4
A great deal	69.8	0.5	74.1	1.9	67.4	0.5	63	1.2	72.1	-0.7	79.6	1.7
Total	66.2		62.9		64		55.5		76.5		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	10.644		16.703		20.585		17.282		6.886		6.201	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.223		0.033*		0.008**		0.027*		0.142		0.185	

Table 3.3.1 Political Knowledge	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all confident	56.8	-1.5	66.7	0.5	65.9	0.3	54.5	-0.1	72.7	-0.7	75.8	0.7
Not very confident	67.9	0.4	59.6	-0.8	55.7	-2.3	48.9	-1.5	75.5	-0.4	66.0	-1.1
Fairly confident	69.4	0.9	66.4	1.1	70.2	1.8	60.3	1.4	81.0	1.4	73.3	1.0
Very confident	64.1	-0.3	59.0	-0.7	66.7	0.3	55.7	0.0	71.8	-0.8	67.2	-0.6
Total	66.5		63.0		64.2		55.5		76.8		70.2	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	5.465		8.376		5.556		7.774		2.254		2.152	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.486		0.212		0.475		0.255		0.521		0.541	

Table 3.4.1 Political Orientation	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Far Left	83.6	3.4	79.0	2.9	83.6	3.8	72.6	3.0	92.5	3.5	83.9	2.6
Moderate Left	64.8	1.1	63.5	0.1	67.3	0.9	57.7	0.6	80.6	1.2	75.0	1.3
Centre	68.8	-2.7	54.9	-1.9	53.8	-2.6	45.1	-2.4	79.4	-2.7	60.4	-2.4
Moderate Right	51.3	-2.1	59.6	-0.5	51.3	1.8	53.8	-0.3	61.5	-2.3	65.4	-0.8
Far Right	80.0	0.7	50.0	-0.9	40.0	-1.1	33.3	-1.6	80.0	3.8	50.0	-1.5
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	22.583		11.099		24.686		18.740		20.198		13.716	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.004**		0.196		0.002**		0.016*		0.000***		0.008**	

Table 3.5.1 Partisanship	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not a supporter	67.6	1.0	58.5	-1.4	66.4	1.7	51.9	-1.1	78.7	1.8	68.1	-0.6
Fairly strong supporter	67.4	0.2	65.4	0.8	58.7	-0.8	58.1	0.8	71.7	-0.8	70.6	0.2
Strong supporter	83.3	0.9	69.2	0.7	66.7	0.1	53.8	-0.2	83.3	0.4	73.1	0.3
DK	35.3	-2.8	66.7	0.4	41.2	-2.0	62.5	0.7	52.9	-2.3	75.0	0.5
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	8.875		6.064		11.547		12.378		6.603		0.646	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.181		0.416		0.073		0.054		0.086		0.886	

Table 3.6.1 Organise Protests	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Yes, I agree	67.5	1.2	65.3	1.6	66.4	1.7	59.4	2.4	78.6	2.1	72.7	2.4
No, I disagree	50.0	-1.2	47.4	-1.6	40.0	-1.7	31.6	-2.4	50.0	-2.1	47.4	-2.4
Total	66.9		64.1		65.5		57.6		77.6		71.0	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	3.623		3.347		3.545		6.191		4.535		5.535	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.163		0.188		0.170		.045*		.033*		0.019*	

4. Political consumerism and young people's views about elections, politicians and democracy

Table 4.1.1 By Voting I can change my country (EPE)	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Strongly disagree	52.8	-1.8	70.6	0.7	75.0	1.5	52.9	-0.2	77.8	0.2	76.5	0.6
Disagree	71.2	1.1	67.9	0.8	63.0	-0.2	64.2	1.3	82.2	1.4	75.5	0.9
Neither/nor	64.6	-0.2	59.4	-0.7	56.9	-1.3	56.5	0.1	72.3	-0.8	72.5	0.4
Agree	67.6	0.5	65.3	0.8	62.7	-0.3	56.5	0.2	74.5	-0.5	70.7	0.1
Strongly agree	64.5	-0.2	48.4	-1.8	71.0	0.9	38.7	-2.0	74.2	-0.3	51.6	-2.4
Total	65.8		63.1		63.8		55.8		76.2		70.3	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	9.255		6.265		6.034		12.015		2.268		6.348	
P-Value	0.321		0.618		0.643		0.151		0.687		0.175	

Table 4.2.1 Trust Politicians	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all	67.3	0.2	73.3	2.2	69.1	1.8	65.6	2.1	81.5	2.0	78.9	2.0
Fairly	67.3	0.2	64.1	0.1	59.1	-1.4	59.5	1.0	72.7	-1.3	74.8	1.2
Neither/nor	69.6	0.3	48.6	-3.1	60.9	-0.4	16.5	-3.9	73.9	-0.4	52.7	-4.0
Only some	70.0	0.2	77.8	1.3	70.0	0.4	72.2	1.4	80.0	0.2	83.3	1.2
Most can be trusted	0.0	-2.8	50.0	-0.4	25.0	-1.7	0.0	-1.6	25.0	-2.5	50.0	-0.6
Total	66.7		63.8		64.4		56.2		77.0		71.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	10.027		17.394		8.230		30.096		9.259		17.472	
P-Value	0.263		.026*		0.411		0.000***		0.055		0.002**	

Table 4.3.1 Influence on Governance	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all influence	66.7	0.0	62.7	-0.2	65.0	0.4	59.0	0.6	79.7	1.0	72.3	0.3
A little influence	69.4	0.7	66.2	0.8	67.3	0.9	59.2	0.9	79.6	0.8	73.1	0.7
Neither/nor	65.3	-0.2	64.0	0.1	57.1	-1.1	49.3	-1.4	69.4	-1.3	68.0	-0.6
Quite a lot of influence	61.1	-0.5	52.4	-1.1	55.6	-0.8	57.1	0.1	66.7	-1.0	66.7	-0.4
A great deal of influence	62.5	-0.4	50.0	-0.7	62.5	-0.1	33.3	-1.1	68.8	-0.8	50.0	-1.1
Total	66.8		63.5		63.8		56.2		76.6		70.8	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	3.616		4.261		13.558		7.652		4.106		2.128	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.890		0.833		0.094		0.468		0.392		0.712	

Table 4.4.1 Disillusionment from Elections	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Strongly disagree	68.5	-0.3	63.6	-0.5	75.0	0.4	65.2	0.6	81.3	0.4	66.7	-0.4
Disagree	78.8	1.3	67.6	-0.1	74.0	0.7	61.2	0.4	80.0	0.6	68.0	-0.5
Neither/nor	69.0	-0.5	71.9	0.7	69.1	-0.2	54.1	-0.9	72.1	-1.0	71.4	0.2
Agree	72.0	0.2	67.0	-0.3	68.9	-0.4	59.6	0.1	77.6	0.3	69.7	0.2
Strongly agree	65.9	-0.9	69.7	0.2	68.3	-0.3	60.0	0.1	75.0	-0.3	77.1	-0.9
Total	71.6		68.1		70.1		59.3		76.8		70.2	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	2.288		0.701		0.727		1.13		1.369		1.185	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.683		0.951		0.948		0.889		0.850		0.881	

Table 4.5.1 Generalised Trust	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
You can't be too careful	58.1	-1.0	66.7	0.6	67.7	0.5	56.1	0.1	74.2	-0.3	71.9	0.2
Should be careful	61.3	-0.9	55.4	-1.6	61.3	-0.5	50.0	-1.2	74.2	-0.5	63.5	-1.5
Neither/nor	64.9	-0.4	64.8	0.4	57.5	-2.0	59.8	1.1	70.9	-2.0	73.0	0.7
Some people only	72.6	1.2	71.2	1.3	74.2	1.9	57.7	0.3	87.1	2.2	78.8	1.4
Trust most people	81.0	1.5	50.0	-1.0	76.2	1.2	41.7	-1.0	90.5	1.6	50.0	-1.6
Total	66.1		63.4		63.9		55.8		76.5		70.7	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	9.840		7.467		7.740		9.327		8.758		6.328	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.276		0.487		0.459		0.315		0.067		0.176	

Table 4.6.1 Voting is a Duty	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Strongly disagree	61.9	-0.5	53.8	-0.7	61.9	-0.3	53.8	-0.2	81.0	0.4	61.5	-0.7
Disagree	65.7	-0.1	47.6	-1.6	71.4	0.9	38.1	-1.7	80.0	0.4	57.1	-1.4
Neither/nor	63.6	-0.5	56.1	-1.1	58.2	-1.1	41.5	-2.0	70.9	-1.3	63.4	-1.1
Agree	63.4	0.4	65.5	0.5	64.2	-0.1	56.4	0.1	77.9	0.2	69.1	-0.5
Strongly agree	68.4	0.4	67.7	1.3	67.3	0.6	63.2	2.2	78.6	0.4	77.4	2.2
Total	66.8		63.5		64.8		56.0		77.3		70.8	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	1.730		7.278		4.715		11.228		1.695		6.504	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.988		0.507		0.788		0.189		0.792		0.165	

Table 4.7.1 How important Democracy is?	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not important	50.0	-0.7	50.0	-0.5	75.0	0.5	75.0	-0.2	75.0	-0.1	75.0	0.2
Fairly important	44.4	-1.4	33.3	-1.9	33.3	-1.9	44.4	-1.7	55.6	-1.5	44.4	-1.7
Neither/nor	52.6	-1.3	53.3	-1.4	47.4	-1.5	35.6	-2.0	57.9	-2.0	60.0	-1.6
Very important	61.5	-0.6	35.9	-1.2	51.3	-1.8	54.4	0.1	66.7	-1.5	63.2	-1.3
Absolutely important	69.0	2.0	68.4	2.7	68.2	2.9	60.2	2.2	80.2	2.9	75.2	2.7
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	23.267		17.694		30.205		13.393		9.721		8.971	
P-Value	0.003**		0.024*		0.000***		0.099		.045*		0.062	

Table 4.8.1 How Democratic is my country?	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all	63.9	-0.3	58.8	-0.4	66.7	0.4	64.7	0.8	75.0	-0.2	76.5	0.6
Fairly democratic	67.4	0.3	62.2	-0.1	73.0	2.1	62.2	0.9	82.0	1.5	70.3	0.0
Neither/nor	55.4	-2.4	59.8	-0.7	51.8	-2.7	54.0	-0.3	67.5	-2.2	70.1	0.0
Very democratic	73.3	1.6	65.9	1.0	61.6	-0.5	52.9	-0.8	76.7	0.1	69.6	-0.2
Absolutely democratic	78.9	1.2	61.9	-0.1	78.9	1.4	57.1	0.2	89.5	1.4	69.0	-0.2
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	16.725		4.323		14.528		9.341		7.068		0.371	
P-Value	.033*		0.827		0.069		0.314		0.132		0.985	

Table 4.9.1 Satisfaction with Political Information	<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all satisfied	63.3	-0.5	66.7	0.5	60.0	-0.7	54.5	-0.1	75.0	-0.3	78.8	1.2
Not satisfied	71.1	1.3	60.7	-0.5	66.0	0.5	49.4	-1.3	81.4	1.4	64.0	-1.5
Neither/nor	60.8	-1.2	62.4	-0.1	59.5	-0.9	58.1	0.6	69.6	-1.6	69.9	-0.1
Satisfied	66.7	0.1	61.5	-0.3	66.7	0.5	57.1	0.4	76.2	0.0	71.4	0.3
Very satisfied	71.4	0.4	80.0	1.4	78.6	1.2	66.7	0.9	85.7	0.8	80.0	0.9
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	5.109		6.754		5.048		3.972		4.117		3.525	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.746		0.563		0.752		0.860		0.390		0.474	

5. Participation in politics and community affairs

5.1.1 Formal: Intention to Vote	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	57.1	-1.0	66.7	0.2	61.9	-0.3	55.6	0.0	76.2	-0.1	77.8	0.5
Unlikely	54.2	-1.4	40.0	-1.5	50.0	-1.6	50.0	-0.4	62.5	-1.8	50.0	-1.4
Neither/nor	75.0	0.9	68.8	0.5	58.3	-0.7	62.5	0.6	75.0	-0.2	75.0	0.4
Likely	69.2	0.5	51.0	-1.9	66.2	0.3	42.9	-1.9	81.5	1.0	57.1	-2.1
Very likely	67.8	0.4	66.1	1.8	67.3	1.1	57.9	1.4	77.8	0.3	73.0	1.9
Total	66.9		63.1		64.6		55.5		77.0		70.0%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	12.034		15.354		5.257		14.152		3.731		7.189	

5.2.1 Formal: Contact MP	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	65.9	-0.5	64.6	0.5	62.6	-0.8	56.6	0.3	78.0	-0.1	70.8	0.3
Unlikely	69.7	0.4	57.7	-1.5	63.6	-0.4	47.8	-1.8	78.8	0.1	63.0	-1.7
Neither/nor	63.4	-0.9	64.4	0.3	71.8	1.3	55.6	0.0	77.5	-0.2	73.3	0.5
Likely	70.6	0.4	68.3	0.8	58.8	-0.9	70.7	2.1	73.5	0.7	80.5	1.6
Very likely	100.0	2.1	66.7	0.3	88.9	1.5	53.3	-0.2	100.0	1.6	66.7	-0.3
Total	67.9		62.7		65.7		55.6		78.2		69.9	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	7.383		6.851		10.840		11.811		2.984		4.613	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.496		0.553		0.211		0.160		0.560		0.329	

5.3.1 Informal: <u>Intention to Work with Others</u>	<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	37.5	-3.2	57.6	-0.8	45.8	-2.0	51.5	-0.6	62.5	-1.8	69.7	-0.2
Unlikely	53.8	-1.9	51.	-2.6	48.7	-2.2	38.0	-3.9	64.1	-2.1	54.4	-3.8
Neither/nor	59.4	-1.5	62.8	-3.0	53.6	-2.1	57.7	0.2	66.7	-2.4	71.8	0.1
Likely	76.8	2.7	71.1	1.6	69.5	1.4	67.5	2.3	83.3	1.9	79.5	1.9
Very likely	77.8	2.0	80.5	2.4	84.1	3.7	73.2	2.3	92.1	3.2	87.8	2.5
Total	67.0		64.0		64.4		56.7		77.2		71.3	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	23.770		14.020		14.02		20.721		21.330		19.250	
P-Value	0.003**		0.081		0.001***		.008**		.000***		.001***	

5.4.1 Informal: <u>Intention to Volunteer</u>	<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	34.8	-3.4	45.5	-1.8	30.4	-3.5	45.5	-1.0	52.2	-3.0	63.6	-0.8
Unlikely	57.1	-1.2	48.3	-2.6	60.7	-0.4	39.7	-2.7	75.0	-0.3	53.4	-3.2
Neither/nor	73.8	1.0	54.0	-1.7	57.1	-1.1	39.7	-2.9	78.6	0.2	60.3	-2.0
Likely	62.8	-1.1	67.0	0.9	62.8	-0.4	66.0	2.5	72.3	-1.3	75.0	1.2
Very likely	76.7	2.9	83.8	4.2	75.8	3.3	71.6	3.1	85.8	2.9	89.2	4.0
Total	67.1		63.4		64.5		55.8		77.2		70.7	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	19.896		29.079		23.665		26.187		14.648		25.227	
P-Value	0.011*		0.000***		.003**		.001***		.005**		0.000***	

5.5.1 Informal: <u>Intention to Demonstrate</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	39.3%	-3.2	52.2%	-2.1	42.9%	-2.5	41.8%	-2.5	57.1%	-2.6	58.2%	-2.4
Unlikely	57.4%	-1.5	61.2%	-0.4	51.1%	-2.1	47.1%	-1.8	70.2%	-1.2	65.9%	-1.1
Neither/nor	55.4%	-2.0	58.1%	-0.9	48.2%	-2.8	45.2%	-1.8	62.5%	-2.9	61.3%	-1.7
Likely	73.4%	1.7	69.1%	1.2	69.1%	1.2	77.9%	4.2	81.9%	1.3	85.3%	3.0
Very likely	81.5%	3.3	85.7%	2.9	85.2%	4.6	77.1%	2.7	92.6%	3.9	91.4%	2.9
Total	66.7%		63.1%		64.4%		55.5%		77.1%		70.3%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	25.116		16.470		34.105		36.372		26.605		22.722	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.001***		0.036*		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***	

5.6.1 Online: <u>Sign Petition</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	48.1%	-2.3	50.0%	-1.1	48.1%	-2.0	71.4%	1.2	63.0%	-2.0	78.6%	0.7
Unlikely	53.8%	-2.0	47.0%	-1.4	51.3%	-2.0	23.5%	-2.8	69.2%	-1.4	47.0%	-2.2
Neither/nor	54.9%	-2.1	45.7%	-2.3	56.9%	-1.4	20.0%	-4.5	66.7%	-2.1	45.7%	-3.4
Likely	67.7%	0.0	64.4%	0.3	65.7%	0.1	56.8%	0.3	79.8%	0.5	72.9%	0.7
Very likely	88.0%	4.7	70.7%	2.3	81.9%	3.8	66.9%	3.4	91.6%	3.5	77.4%	2.3
Total	67.6%		63.4%		65.2%		55.8%		77.9%		70.7%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	33.087		15.170		22.29		36.155		18.167		18.730	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.000***		0.056		0.004**		0.000***		0.001***		0.001***	

5.7.1 Online: Share Link	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	50.0%	-1.9	48.7%	-2.0	50.0%	-1.6	43.6%	-1.6	67.9%	-1.2	61.5%	-1.3
Unlikely	42.9%	-3.1	56.8%	-0.9	48.6%	-2.0	43.2%	-1.6	62.9%	-2.1	59.5%	-1.6
Neither/nor	53.8%	-1.8	48.8%	2.1	43.6%	-2.9	48.8%	-1.0	64.1%	-2.0	58.1%	-1.9
Likely	63.6%	-0.6	64.3%	0.2	65.9%	0.4	57.1%	0.3	73.9%	-0.7	71.4%	0.2
Very likely	83.2%	5.0	76.8%	3.4	77.3%	3.8	66.7%	2.7	89.1%	4.1	82.8%	3.2
Total	66.3%		63.3%		64.1%		55.7%		76.7%		70.6%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	45.005		27.255		27.028		17.610		19.035		14.128	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.000***		0.001***		0.001***		0.024*		0.001***		0.007**	

5.8.1 Online: Create Blog	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very unlikely	48.1%	-4.0	61.2%	-0.5	53.2%	-2.5	54.4%	-0.4	67.1%	-2.4	68.0%	-0.6
Unlikely	67.5%	0.2	58.5%	-1.3	60.0%	-1.0	53.4%	-0.7	75.0%	-0.5	64.4%	-1.8
Neither/nor	76.7%	2.1	69.6%	1.0	71.2%	1.4	54.3%	-0.2	83.6%	1.5	78.3%	1.3
Likely	68.8%	0.4	70.3%	1.0	72.9%	1.3	62.2%	0.8	79.2%	0.4	78.4%	1.1
Very likely	85.7%	2.3	76.9%	1.1	78.6%	1.6	76.9%	1.6	89.3%	1.6	92.3%	1.8
Total	66.6%		63.1%		64.6%		55.8%		76.9%		70.3%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	21.403		7.083		14.064		6.496		8.837		7.808	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.006**		0.528		0.080		0.592		0.065		0.099	

6. Consumer behaviour pull-factors

Table 6.1.1 <u>PCE (World)</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very ineffective	58.3	-0.7	53.8	-0.7	50.0	-1.1	53.8	-0.2	66.7	-0.9	61.5	-0.7
Ineffective	50.0	-2.6	57.1	-0.9	45.2	-2.9	53.6	-0.4	61.9	-2.6	69.6	-0.1
Neither/nor	56.9	-2.0	44.6	-3.7	61.5	-0.7	41.9	-2.8	72.3	-1.1	54.1	-3.4
Effective	72.0	1.5	72.4	3.1	71.2	2.0	63.4	2.3	81.8	1.6	77.6	2.6
Very effective	86.0	3.1	75.0	1.6	74.0	1.4	61.1	0.7	88.0	2.0	77.8	1.1
Total	67.4		62.6		65.1		55.9		77.4%		70.0%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	21.859		22.275		14.821		10.165		12.207		14.132	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.005**		0.004**		0.063		0.254		0.016*		0.007**	

Table 6.2.1 <u>PCE</u> <u>(Local Community)</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Very ineffective	20.0	-2.2	50.0	-0.6	0.0	-3.0	16.7	-2.0	20.0	-3.0	50.0	-1.0
Ineffective	35.0	-3.1	59.4	-0.4	45.0	-1.9	50.0	-0.7	55.0	-2.4	62.5	-0.9
Neither/nor	58.5	-1.2	54.1	-1.7	61.0	-0.5	52.7	-0.6	70.7	-1.0	64.9	-1.0
Effective	67.4	0.2	58.3	-1.3	63.1	-0.5	54.2	-0.6	75.9	-0.4	66.7	-1.0
Very effective	78.9	3.0	84.7	4.0	75.8	2.8	71.2	2.6	88.4	3.2	88.1	3.4
Total	66.9		62.2		64.6		55.9		76.8		69.5	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	33.740		23.787		23.112		13.151		22.516		12.783	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.000***		0.002**		0.003**		0.107		0.000***		0.012*	

Table 6.3.1 Satisfaction with Products	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all satisfied	84.6	1.4	80.0	0.8	61.5	-0.2	40.0	-0.7	84.6	0.7	80.0	0.5
Not satisfied	69.6	0.6	71.4	1.2	73.2	1.6	64.3	1.2	83.9	1.5	81.0	1.6
Neither/nor	58.8	-1.6	63.6	0.1	68.8	1.0	60.6	0.9	71.3	-1.2	71.1	0.2
Satisfied	66.2	0.0	60.3	-1.0	57.1	-2.1	54.6	-0.3	74.4	-0.7	67.8	-1.0
Very satisfied	71.0	0.6	61.8	-0.1	64.5	0.1	41.2	-1.8	80.6	0.6	64.7	-0.7
Total	66.1		62.9%		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	6.122		8.706		9.037		7.669		4.013		3.537	
P-Value	0.634		0.368		0.339		0.446		0.404		0.472	

Table 6.4.1 Satisfaction with Range of Prices	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all satisfied	73.7	0.7	80.0	0.8	63.2	-0.1	100.0	2.0	78.9	0.3	100.0	1.5
Not satisfied	70.2	1.0	62.5	-0.1	72.3	2.0	54.2	-0.2	83.0	1.8	72.9	0.5
Neither/nor	63.6	-0.6	62.7	-0.1	63.6	-0.1	50.6	-1.0	71.6	-1.2	67.5	-0.6
Satisfied	61.7	-1.1	62.3	-0.2	55.3	-2.1	58.5	1.1	72.3	-1.1	68.6	-0.6
Very satisfied	72.2	0.6	65.4	0.3	66.7	0.3	46.2	-1.0	83.3	0.7	76.9	0.8
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	5.334		3.330		6.472		8.845		4.786		3.347	
P-Value	0.721		0.912		0.595		0.356		0.310		0.502	

Table 6.5.1 Satisfaction with Retailers	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all satisfied	66.7	0.1	71.4	0.5	52.4	1.1	71.4	0.9	66.7	-1.1	100.0	1.7
Not satisfied	71.8	1.2	75.0	2.1	80.8	3.6	71.7	2.8	84.6	2.0	83.3	2.5
Neither/nor	60.7	-1.3	60.3	-0.5	58.4	-1.3	53.4	-0.4	74.2	-0.6	63.0	-1.5
Satisfied	68.3	0.6	59.7	-1.1	61.5	-0.6	51.9	-1.2	76.9	0.2	67.0	-1.0
Very satisfied	57.1	-0.9	59.3	-0.4	47.6	-1.6	40.7	-1.6	61.9	-1.6	66.7	-0.4
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	4.716		9.549		18.400		13.469		6.726		10.383	
P-Value	0.787		0.298		0.018**		0.097		0.151		.034*	

Table 6.6.1 Satisfaction with Market Information	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not at all satisfied	75.0%	0.9	77.8%	0.9	80.0%	1.5	88.9%	2.0	85.0%	0.9	88.9%	1.2
Not satisfied	74.1%	1.4	65.4%	0.4	67.2%	0.6	51.9%	-0.6	84.5%	1.6	71.2%	0.2
Neither/nor	66.3%	0.0	62.5%	-0.1	62.1%	-0.4	51.9%	-0.9	76.8%	0.1	68.3%	-0.5
Satisfied	63.9%	-0.6	60.2%	-0.9	63.9%	0.0	50.2%	1.4	73.1%	-1.0	69.2%	-0.3
Very satisfied	53.1%	-1.6	69.6%	0.7	53.1%	-1.3	39.1%	-1.6	65.6%	-1.5	73.9%	0.4
Total	66.1%		62.9%		63.9%		55.5%		76.4%		70.1%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	6.882		10.413		8.413		10.582		5.619		1.924	
P-Value	0.549		0.237		0.394		0.227		0.229		0.750	

Table 6.7.1 Alone or Organised Campaign?	Buycotters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Alone	66.7	0.6	64.7	2.1	62.4	-1.6	56.2	0.8	75.3	-1.3	71.2	1.4
Organised Campaign	61.8	-0.6	44.8	-2.1	76.5	1.6	48.3	-0.8	85.3	1.3	58.6	-1.4
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	2.426		4.510		2.614		0.665		1.687		2.002	
P-Value	0.297		0.105		0.271		0.717		0.194		0.157	

Table 6.8.1 Market Competition	Buycoters				Boycotters				Buy/Boycotters			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Harmful: Brings out the worst in people	77.2	3.4	58.6	-1.1	74.0	3.1	55.6	0.0	97.0	2.7	68.7	-0.4
Good: Stimulates hard work and new ideas	58.6	-3.4	64.9	1.1	57.0	-3.1	55.4	0.0	71.0	-2.7	70.7	0.4
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	11.654		4.564		9.618		1.321		7.377		0.135	
P-Value	0.003**		0.102		.008**		0.517		0.007**		0.713	

Table 6.9.1 Schwartz Index	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
		<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>										
Completely disagree	73.4	2.4	69.3	2.3	69.5	2.0	62.8	2.7	82.0	2.0	76.6	2.6
Agree a little	63.3	-0.8	60.4	-0.5	59.6	-1.0	48.1	-1.6	73.4	-1.0	67.0	-0.7
Agree a great deal	53.8	-1.8	44.4	-2.4	56.4	-1.0	44.4	-1.3	71.8	-0.8	50.0	-2.7
Completely agree	0.0	-2.0	50.0	-0.7	0.0%	-1.9	37.5	-1.0	0.0%	-2.6	62.5	-0.4
Total	66.2%		62.4%		63.3%		54.4%		76.6%		69.3%	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	13.097		10.463		10.066		10.085		9.786		10.223	
P-Value	0.042*		0.106		0.122		0.121		0.020*		0.017*	

7. Motivations of political consumerism

Table 7.1.1 <u>Personal Health</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not willing to pay more	50.0	-2.6	47.5	-2.2	59.5	-0.8	52.5	-0.4	73.8	-0.5	62.5	-1.1
Willing to pay more	70.1	2.6	65.6	2.2	65.5	0.8	55.8	0.4	77.4	0.5	71.4	1.1
Total	67.3		63.3		64.7		55.4		76.9		70.3	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	6.805		5.405		0.982		3.329		0.262		1.317	
P-Value	0.033*		0.067		0.612		0.189		0.609		0.251	

Table 7.2.1 <u>Local Producers & Social ties</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not willing to pay more	46.4	-3.6	44.1	-3.8	50.0	-2.5	39.0	-3.2	64.3	-2.6	50.8	-4.2
Willing to pay more	71.4	3.6	70.2	3.8	67.7	2.5	61.7	3.2	80.2	2.6	77.8	4.2
Total	66.8		65.1		64.5		57.3		77.3		72.6	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	13.423		14.550		6.811		10.669		6.621		17.450	
P-Value	0.001***		0.001***		0.033*		0.005**		0.010**		0.000***	

Table 7.3.1 <u>National Economy</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not willing to pay more	52.5	-3.7	57.6	-2.0	57.4	-1.6	52.5	-0.9	72.3	-1.2	62.7	-2.7
Willing to pay more	73.8	3.7	68.8	2.0	66.8	1.6	58.1	0.9	78.7	1.2	76.9	2.7
Total	66.7		64.5		63.7		55.9		76.6		71.4	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	13.799		3.978		2.715		1.554		1.554		7.096	
P-Value	0.001***		0.137		0.257		0.212		0.212		0.008**	

Table 7.4.1 <u>Ethical</u> <u>Production</u> <u>Overseas</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not willing to pay more	37.3	-6.9	39.2	-4.0	45.8	-4.3	29.4	-4.2	55.4	-5.7	45.1	-4.5
Willing to pay more	78.9	6.9	68.6	4.0	72.5	4.3	61.4	4.2	86.2	5.7	76.1	4.5
Total	67.4		63.8		65.1		56.2		77.7		71.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	48.080		18.596		19.062		20.189		32.990		20.044	
P-Value	0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***	

Table 7.5.1 <u>Animal</u> <u>Rights</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not willing to pay more	52.3	-3.5	45.7	-3.5	53.5	-2.6	37.1	-3.6	67.4	-2.6	54.3	-3.4
Willing to pay more	73.2	3.5	68.6	3.5	69.1	2.6	61.2	3.6	81.4	2.6	75.1	3.4
Total	67.3		63.5		64.7		55.9		77.5		70.5	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	14.650		12.385		8.804		13.871		6.862		11.338	
P-Value	0.001***		0.002**		0.012*		0.001***		0.009**		0.001***	

Table 7.6.1 <u>Environmentally</u> <u>Responsible</u> <u>Lifestyles</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Not willing to pay more	35.6	-4.8	31.4	-4.2	42.2	-3.5	25.7	-3.8	51.1	-4.5	31.4	-5.4
Willing to pay more	72.2	4.8	67.5	4.2	68.8	3.5	59.4	3.8	81.7	4.5	75.3	5.4
Total	66.9		63.5		64.9		55.7		77.3		70.4	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	23.608		18.861		15.253		14.303		20.538		28.746	
P-Value	0.000***		0.000***		0.000***		0.001***		0.000***		0.000***	

8. Personal orientation

Table 8.1.1 Individual outlook	<u>Bycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Disagree	64.3	-0.4	53.3	-1.1	68.6	0.9	46.7	-1.0	80.0	0.8	63.3	-0.8
Agree	66.7	0.4	63.9	1.1	62.6	-0.9	56.4	1.0	75.3	-0.8	70.8	0.8
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	0.273		2.159		0.936		3.55		0.663		0.721	
P-Value	0.872		0.340		0.626		0.169		0.416		0.396	

Table 8.2.1 Local community outlook	<u>Bycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Disagree	56.8	-2.0	54.2	-2.3	55.4	-1.7	48.6	-1.7	70.3	-1.4	62.6	-2.1
Agree	69.0	2.0	67.3	2.3	66.5	1.7	58.9	1.7	78.2	1.4	73.8	2.1
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	6.947		6.067		3.394		3.519		1.989		4.280	
P-Value	0.031*		0.048*		0.183		0.172		0.158		0.039*	

Table 8.3.1 National outlook	<u>Bycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Disagree	62.6	-1.0	66.3	0.8	67.0	0.9	62.2	1.6	75.7	-0.2	78.6	2.2
Agree	68.2	1.0	61.4	-0.8	62.1	-0.9	52.5	-1.6	76.8	0.2	66.4	-2.2
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	1.707		1.373		0.807		2.875		0.050		4.837	
P-Value	0.426		0.503		0.668		0.237		0.823		0.028*	

Table 8.4.1 <u>European outlook</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Disagree	62.4	-0.9	55.9	-1.9	64.7	0.2	50.5	-1.3	72.9	-0.9	64.0	-1.7
Agree	67.5	0.9	66.7	1.9	63.6	-0.2	58.1	1.3	77.6	0.9	73.3	1.7
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	5.652		3.818		0.078		1.743		0.755		3.041	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.059		0.148		0.962		0.418		0.385		0.081	

Table 8.5.1 <u>Cosmopolitan outlook</u>	<u>Buycotters</u>				<u>Boycotters</u>				<u>Buy/Boycotters</u>			
	<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>		<u>Greece</u>		<u>UK</u>	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Disagree	52.2	-2.2	48.1	-2.5	50.0	-2.1	48.1	-1.2	65.2	-1.9	55.6	-2.6
Agree	68.5	2.2	65.9	2.5	66.3	2.1	56.9	1.2	78.3	1.9	73.0	2.6
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
<i>Pearson's Chi Sq.</i>	6.379		6.126		5.608		2.112		3.707		6.546	
<i>P-Value</i>	0.041*		0.047*		0.061		0.348		0.054		0.011*	

9. Postmaterialism

Table 9.1.1 Postmaterialism Index	Greece		UK		Greece		UK		Greece		UK	
	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res	%	Res
	<i>(Percentages within each country)</i>											
Pure Materialist	55.9	-1.3	40.8	-4.6	55.9	-1.0	35.5	-4.0	67.6	1.3	47.4	-5.0
Mixed Materialist	56.3	-2.2	61.8	-0.3	51.3	-2.7	46.1	-2.1	66.3	-2.5	65.2	-1.2
Mixed Postmaterialist	62.9	-0.8	69.5	1.6	59.8	-1.0	65.3	2.3	71.1	-1.5	80.0	2.5
Pure Postmaterialist	80.4	3.7	82.0	3.4	80.4	4.2	78.7	4.1	92.2	4.6	90.2	3.8
Total	66.1		62.9		63.9		55.5		76.4		70.1	
	<i>Significance across the whole distribution</i>											
Pearson's Chi Sq.	22.270		35.653		23.063		36.166		21.526		35.923	
P-Value	0.001***		0.000***		0.001***		0.000***		0.000***		0.000***	

Appendix IV: Declaration of Collaborative Work

Chapter 5: Neoliberalism and Political Consumerism

Kyroglou, G., and Henn, M. (2017). Political Consumerism as a Neoliberal Response to Youth Political Disengagement. *Societies*, 7, 34.

Contributions of the first author to this literature review:

- Conceptualisation and development of the key ideas,
- Initiation, review, organisation and analysis of the literature,
- Write-up of the first draft of the manuscript,
- Integration of feedback provided by the co-author,
- Online submission of the manuscript,
- Write-up of the response letter to the comments of the reviewers.

Chapter 9: Exploratory study using focus groups: Motivations and neoliberalism

Kyroglou, G., and Henn, M. (2020). Pulled in and pushed out of politics: The impact of neoliberalism on young people's differing political consumerist motivations in the UK and Greece. *International Political Science Review*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120935521>

Contributions of the first author to this empirical study:

- Conceptualisation and development of the main ideas, rationale, and design of the study,
- Application for ethical approval from the Nottingham Trent University,
- Recruitment of participants,
- Conducting the focus groups,
- Write-up of the first draft of the manuscript,
- Integration of the feedback provided by the co-author,
- Online submission of the manuscript,
- Write-up of the response letter to the comments of the reviewers.