

Exploring the nuances of the British anti-Islam Populist Radical Right: who expresses support for them and why?



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Trigger Warning

The content of this thesis is controversial. Some academics (e.g., Esseveld & Eyerman, 1992) argue that even researching the far-right can lead to negative outcomes such as giving these groups a platform for their offensive and hate-filled arguments. I disagree. By refusing to research these groups, we fail to understand the nuances of their arguments, their self-created realities of the world, and their motivations for supporting these far-right groups. Nevertheless, some of the arguments made by supporters or leaders in this thesis are offensive and disturbing. The topics covered include the so-called grooming gang cases, Child Sexual Exploitation, terrorism, racism, sexism, Islamophobia, conspiracy theories, white supremacy and other related topics.

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List of Abbreviations

AfD - Alternative for Germany
ANTIFA – Anti-Fascists
BNP – British National Party
CBT – Cultural Backlash Theory
CSE – Child Sexual Exploitation
DFLA - Democratic Football Lads Alliance
EDL - English Defence League
ER - Extreme Right
EU - European Union
FLA - Football Lads Alliance
GAL - Green-Alternative-Libertarian
GI – Generation Identity
GRD – Group Relative Deprivation
LGBT - Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
NA – National Action
PEGIDA UK - Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West
PRR - Populist Radical Right
RR - Radical Right
RRGG - Radical Right Gender Gap
RTA - Reflexive Thematic Analysis
SMT – Social Movement Theory
TAN - Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist
TERF - Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminist
TFBM - The For Britain Movement
TGR – The Great Replacement
UK - United Kingdom
UKIP - United Kingdom Independence Party
UN – United Nations
US - United States of America
WEF - World Economic Forum
WW2 - World War Two

Abstract

Far-right activity is a major threat in most Western, liberal democracies. In the United Kingdom, the far-right is the fastest-growing form of extremism (Home Office, 2021). This thesis aims to address gaps in the far-right literature by conducting three related studies on the Democratic Football Lads Alliance, The For Britain Movement and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of European. It aims to understand who expresses support for these groups and why? It addresses these questions by conducting a Facebook demographic study of 9,000 supporters, a Reflexive Thematic Analysis of over 30 hours of YouTube videos and 15 semi-structured interviews with supporters and leaders of these three groups.

The first study finds that the conservative nativist supporter (typically the white, older, lower-educated male) is the most common supporter. However, sexually modern nativists (women and higher educated people) are also present. Crucially, it develops a new supporter category; the ethnically diverse nativist, representing British PRR supporters who are racially minoritized. This new category emphasises the diverse nature of the anti-Islam movement.

Further, the second study finds that politically-based grievances are the main grievance but concern relating to Islamic ideology is the overarching narrative, making it the most important grievance. Individuals conceal their anti-Islam arguments with 'strategically populist' and 'strategically liberal' arguments to appear less culturally racist. However, it finds that while some interviewees hold illiberal and strategically liberal arguments (relating to women's rights, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual rights and animal rights), others hold semi-liberal arguments, especially previous supporters of left-wing political parties (Berntzen, 2019). This research highlights the need to not only focus on the typical far-right supporter (illiberal, conservative nativist) when researching the British PRR but also on individuals that divert from this type in order to present a more accurate picture of the far-right and counter this threat.

Chapter 1

Introduction

Far-right extremism has increased globally in the last decade (e.g., Wallner & White, 2022). Some of the most significant increases have occurred in 'Western' Europe and more specifically, in the United Kingdom (Home Office, 2021; Ravndal, 2017; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). The 2021 Prevent report stated that that 'for the third consecutive year, there were more adopted cases for individuals referred for concerns related to Extreme Right-Wing radicalisation' in comparison to Islamist extremism (Home Office, 2021). Despite these statistics, far-right activity has not been given due attention (Mudde, 2019). This lack of academic research into the far-right may be due to the normalisation of anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric within the government and society more widely (Syal, 2023; Bale, 2022; Brown & Mondon, 2021; Mondon & Winter, 2017). For example, the Independent Review of Prevent argued that the Prevent programme overfocuses on far-right extremism and not enough on Islamist extremism (Lowles et al., 2023, p. 63; Shawcross, 2023). The reviewer, William Shawcross is known for his anti-Islam views (Grierson & Dodd, 2021). This kind of report, although it has faced backlash (May, 2023), may shift attention back towards Islamist extremism taking the little focus on the far-right away.

Although 'more articles and books have been written on far-right parties than on all other party families combined' (Mudde, 2017, p. 2), there are certain areas that are understudied in academia. There are twelve academic gaps that this doctoral thesis aims to address: (1) despite far-right terrorist attacks outnumbering all other forms of terrorism in 'Western' liberal democracies (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34), there has been a significant over-focus on Islamist extremism and terrorism (Ebner, 2021; Schuurman, 2019; Conway, 2017). Schuurman (2019) argues that right-wing extremism has been under examined and Mudde (2019) claims that the research that has been conducted is not adequate. (2) For example, academic research on the far-right often analyses political parties rather than street movements (Caiani & Parenti, 2016). Despite this, across Europe (Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Austria, and France), between 2010-2012, there were 70-100 Radical Right (RR) street movements in each of these countries (Caiani & Parenti, 2016). Although this focus is now changing with a

significant number of academics focusing on street movements (Berntzen, 2018; Caiani et al., 2012; Blee & Creasap, 2010), there are still a number of street movements that have not gained academic attention. Due to this, some far-right social movements are either understudied or have not been examined before.

(3) In addition, most research conducted on the far-right explores the economic or cultural grievances expressed by far-right groups. Little research explores both these grievances together, despite research suggesting that both are important in far-right support (e.g., Ausserladscheider, 2019). An even smaller amount of literature explores the political-based grievances of the far-right. Despite this, Ajil (2022) created a model that included political-based grievances in addition to cultural and economic-based grievances in the process of radicalisation. Therefore, political-based grievances may also be important in far-right activism. (4) There is also a limited amount of research on the ethnicity, sexuality and gender (non-male) of far-right supporters (e.g., Pilkington, 2016; Jackson & Feldman, 2011; Boon, 2010). Demographic information that is available often assumes far-right supporters are white, older, heterosexual men (e.g., Mudde, 2019; Pilkington, 2016; Jackson & Feldman, 2011). While some research alludes to it (e.g., Pilkington, 2016), little research explores the presence of racially minoritized¹, homosexual or non-binary people and women. (5) In addition, limited research analyses how the far-right uses pro-animal rights narratives (Pilkington, 2016; Zúquete, 2008).

(6) Further, while Lancaster (2020) outlines three typologies, she only uses three demographics: gender, age and education level. (7) Although some far-right leaders and supporters attempt to differentiate between Islam the religion and Islamist extremism, many do not or contradict themselves (e.g., Innes et al., 2018; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2015). (8) While some on the PRR claim to protect children from all perpetrators, most PRR groups only reference child abuse perpetrated by immigrants and/or Muslims (e.g., Robinson, 2017; Pilkington, 2016). (9) The research that is conducted on far-right groups often uses a quantitative methodology (e.g., Rovny & Polk, 2020; Albright, 2018; Kimmel, 2018; Belew, 2018). While other research uses ethnographic methods (Belew,

¹ I have decided to use the term racially minoritized instead of non-white people or people of colour. The term racially minoritized describes people that are a racial minority in the UK. As white people are dominant in the UK, this is a useful term (Eseonu, 2022).

2018; Pilkington, 2016), semi-structured interviews are still under-used (Ajil, 2022). (10) Research comparing different far-right groups is also under researched which has limited understanding of far-right groups (Conway, 2017).

(11) Further, some PRR groups have also adopted some liberal values. Most research assumes that this is strategic to appear more moderate (e.g., Farris, 2017; Puar (2013). However, other research suggests that this might not be the case (Berntzen, 2019). (12) Finally, there are several British far-right groups that have been under-researched in academia. Most research on the far-right in the UK focuses on the EDL or the British National Party (BNP) (e.g., Pilkington, 2016; Goodwin, 2011). A limited amount of research focuses on other British far-right group, for example, the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA) (Sibley, 2023a; Allchorn, 2023; Allen, 2019; Mudde, 2019; Fekete, 2019), The For Britain Movement (Sibley, 2023; Mudde, 2019) and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA UK) (Sibley, 2023; Mudde, 2019; Vorländer et al., 2018; Allchorn, 2018; Puschmann et al., 2016).

According to Allchorn (2018), one of the main policy responses to the far-right in the UK is to ignore it. However, this does not make the threat go away. This doctoral thesis aims to address these twelve gaps, build on knowledge and help counter this threat. It focuses on three British anti-Islam PRR groups: the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. Study 2 and 3 splits these groups into supporters and leaders to assess any similarities and differences between them. Two of the three groups examined in this doctoral thesis are social movement groups (the DFLA and PEGIDA UK). Study 1 uses open-access Facebook demographic data to create an informal supporter list for all three groups and explore who expresses support for them. It also includes demographics that are less studied in far-right literature such as their ethnicity and sexuality. These additional demographics can further understandings of who supports these three far-right groups. More current data can help prevent other vulnerable people becoming involved in the far-right and also may help prevent violence from individual supporters.

Further, study 2 explores the importance of grievances using YouTube qualitative data and conducting a Reflexive Thematic Analysis (RTA). It examines cultural-based

grievances, economic-based grievances (Ausserladscheider, 2019) and political-based grievances (Ajil, 2022). This is important for policy makers; a current understanding of the British far-right will help allocate resources to improve community cohesion between different groups (for example, far-right supporters and Muslims). Study 3 contributes to the discussion on whether the PRR use some liberal values strategically or not (e.g., Berntzen, 2019). This is important as the typical far-right supporter is assumed to be a conservative nativist and illiberal. By highlighting the nuance in liberal arguments, this thesis may help identify supporters/leaders that hold some liberal values and can be brought back into mainstream politics. In order to address the twelve research gaps highlighted above, I² outline two research aims and develop three research questions. The methodology and theoretical framework I use also helps me address the twelve research gaps.

1.1 Research aims

I identify two research aims that guide this doctoral thesis:

1. To identify who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK
2. To explore why people express support for these groups

Based on these aims, I identify three broad research questions:

- i) Who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK?
- ii) What are their main grievances?
- iii) Why do individuals express support for these groups?

1.2 Thesis structure

Including this chapter, this doctoral thesis consists of nine chapters. The second chapter sets the scene by discussing the processes underpinning the 21st century, the definitions used in the doctoral thesis and far-right terrorist and extremist statistics in Europe and the UK. Chapter 3 provides an overview of the demographics and concerns of the European far-right and the British far-right. Chapter 4 discusses the theoretical framework starting by examining previous theories used in academic far-right literature.

² As I use a Mixed-Methods design in this doctoral thesis, I use a mixture of the First-person and Third-person voice as suggested by Zhou and Hall (2016).

Then I justify each theory and the concepts used in this doctoral thesis. In the fifth chapter, I detail the mixed-methods design. Starting with philosophical assumptions, I summarise the methods used in studies 1, 2 and 3. I conclude with a section on researcher positionality.

Chapter 6 discusses study 1; the first empirical chapter. Using manually gathered Facebook demographic open-access quantitative data, this chapter addresses the first research question. Using descriptive statistics, it provides a detailed overview of who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK based on demographics. In contrast to study 1, Chapter 7 (study 2) adopts a qualitative methodology and gathers qualitative data from YouTube videos of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. It employs RTA to address the second research question and explore the main grievances of these groups. Chapter 8 provides information on the third empirical study. Building on the findings from studies 1 and 2, study 3 utilises semi-structured interviews and RTA. In combination with study 2, study 3 aims to explore the nuances of the supporters and leaders of these groups. By talking directly to supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK this study aims to address what the main grievances of these groups are and why people express support for them. It also discusses the use of certain liberal values by supporters and leaders of each group. This builds on the PRR category findings from study 1 and the grievance findings from study 2. Finally, the last chapter provides a brief overview of the doctoral thesis outlining the key findings and limits of this research.

In summary, this doctoral thesis focuses on the demographics and grievances of the anti-Islam Populist Radical Right (PRR) and explores why people express support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. It consists of three empirical studies: study 1 explores the demographics of each group, study 2 examines the main grievances of both supporters and leaders of these groups and study 3 discusses why individuals express support for these groups and how both supporters and leaders use certain liberal values.

Chapter 2

Setting the far-right scene

The far-right attracts a significant amount of scholarly attention (e.g., Lancaster, 2020; Mudde, 2019; Dubslaff, 2017). This is due to the complex nature and the continuing growing threat from the far-right (Toscano, 2019; Traverso, 2019). This threat comes in many forms. In its most moderate form, it can pose a threat to liberal democracy - although in its most extremism form it can result in terrorist attacks (Mudde, 2019). To better respond to this threat, it is important to understand who expresses support for far-right groups and why? The best way to understand a phenomenon is to identify its main components to protect those who are susceptible to far-right narratives (Allchorn, 2018). Despite this, the far-right remains understudied in comparison to other forms of extremism, for example, Islamist extremism (Ebner, 2021; Schmid, 2011). This is especially true for far-right social movements (Mudde, 2019; Caiani & Parenti, 2016). This doctoral thesis aims to address this gap. To fully understand the modern-day far-right, it is necessary to contextualise this threat from the 1930s to the 2020s to understand where the far-right groups in this doctoral thesis have come from. This chapter outlines the rise of the far-right in 'Western' (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34), liberal democracies, the possible reasons for this increased activity and the parallels shared between the 21st century and the pre-World War Two (WW2) environment. This helps set the far-right scene to address the three research questions in this doctoral thesis.

This introductory chapter begins by outlining the transformation of fascism in Europe after WW2. It then explores the structural changes that have allowed the far-right to become a more prominent threat to European societies. In the next section, it defines key terms used in this doctoral thesis while the third section outlines the increase in far-right activity in Europe and the United Kingdom (UK). The final section justifies the research presented in this doctoral thesis.

2.1 The processes underpinning the rise of fascism and the far-right in the 20th and 21st century

Far-right support has increased in many countries in the last decade. For example, there has been a significant increase in Europe, Russia, the United States (US), Turkey, Brazil and South Africa (Wallner & White, 2022; Ashby, 2021; Traverso, 2019). This increase has manifested itself in the form of increased hate crimes (Koehler, 2019), terrorist attacks (Hof, 2022; Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018), political voting preferences for far-right political parties (Monaco, 2023) and anti-immigration rhetoric (Muis & Reeskens, 2022; Guia, 2016). However, far-right support is not a unique recent manifestation, especially in 'Western' Europe (McAlexander, 2020; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). 'Western' Europe has an extensive history regarding far-right extremism and terrorism (McAlexander, 2020; Ravndal, 2017; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). The most notable example of the European far-right is WW2 which led to the Holocaust (Bilsky, 2020).

After WW2, European fascism split into three strands: non-fascistic political parties, revolutionary ultranationalists and the European New Right. Fascistic political groups reduced their extremist rhetoric making them more compatible with liberal democracy (Dobloug, 2021; Griffin, 2003). This non-fascist development led to modern right-wing political parties such as France's Front National Party, Hungary's Jobbik, Italy's Lega Nord, Britain's The For Britain Movement and Austria's Freedom Party (Tosun & Debus, 2021; Pertwee, 2020; Shekhovtsov, 2017; Betz, 1994). The second group are post-war European revolutionary ultranationalists. These individuals support the core foundations of fascism and are often referred to as either neo-fascist/fascist or neo-Nazi/Nazi (Anton, 2021; Shekhovtsov, 2017). For example, Greece's Golden Dawn oppose the democratic political system and support violent xenophobic activism. Golden Dawn is considered a neo-Nazi party (Zaptsi, 2020). The third strand, called the European New Right (Dobloug, 2021; Shekhovtsov, 2018) was developed in the 1960s with the formation of the French New Right which later spread across Europe (Taguieff, 1993). This movement tries to influence the liberal mainstream and oppose the hegemonic left. The French New Right espouses continental nationalism which focuses on Europe in general rather than a specific nation within Europe (Dobloug, 2021). For example, Generation Identity (GI) is considered part of the French New Right due to its transnational nature (Dobloug, 2021). This strand began to focus on the cultural

differences between peoples when biological racism was discredited after WW2 (Kotljarchuk, 2020). These three different strands rooted in fascistic ideology show the diverse manifestations of modern far-right groups.

Structural changes within liberal, European societies and the growth of far-right groups

Despite classical fascism being discredited after WW2 (Kotljarchuk, 2020), due to structural changes within liberal democracies, post-fascist groups and parties are a prominent threat in the 21st century (Wallner & White, 2022; Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018; Ravndal, 2017). According to Traverso (2019), in 2019, the world had experienced the biggest increase in far-right ideology since the lead up of WW2 in the 1930s. This far-right threat manifests in different ways depending on the extremity of the group (Mudde, 2019; Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018). Some far-right political parties, for example, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) pose a threat to liberal democracy, especially the rights of immigrants and asylum seekers through harsh immigration policies and welfare chauvinism which restricts benefits and services to certain groups (McManus, 2021). While other more extreme fascistic groups, such as Greece's Golden Dawn, pose a threat to the physical safety and security of immigrants, Muslims, asylum seekers and left-wing individuals (Zaptsi, 2020).

There are different reasons for this increased far-right threat. These include the rise of post-materialist movements, anti-European Union (EU) sentiment, high immigration levels, economic decline and the UK's exit out of the EU. However, it is important to note that there is no single structural change that has enabled this increase in far-right ideology (Eatwell & Goodwin³, 2018). Firstly, minority groups and women have gained more political and social power in 'Western', liberal democracies (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). Liberal movements during the post-war era, collectively known as the silent revolution, such as #MeToo, #TimesUp, #RefugeesWelcome and other campaigns related to Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and

³ Despite the controversy around Matthew Goodwin and his new book (Goodwin, 2023), he has contributed a significant amount to the academic literature on the far-right (e.g., Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017; Goodwin, Cutts & Janta-Lipinski, 2016; Ford & Goodwin, 2014a, b; Goodwin, 2013; Goodwin, 2011; Goodwin, Ford, Duffy & Robey, 2012; Goodwin, 2007; Goodwin, 2006). For this reason, I use his work in this thesis.

Transgender (LGBT)⁴ communities, climate change and multiculturalism (Morris & Inglehart, 2019; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018) have significantly impacted society reducing white, heterosexual male privilege (Levy & Mattsson, 2023; Inglehart, 2015). Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue that this silent revolution has created a *cultural backlash* against these new post-war liberal movements. Some see this backlash as an attempt to regain the power and control which white, heterosexual men have lost (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Further, anti-EU sentiment is widespread in the European far-right (Lorimer, 2023; Chrisafis, 2016) and this resentment is further fuelled by the increase in immigration levels and the refugee crisis (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). According to the European far-right, the freedom of movement policies in the EU threatens national sovereignty and the cultural homogeneity of nations (Van Kessel et al., 2020). Borders may be considered inadequately policed by the EU and thus may render countries vulnerable to mass immigration and Islamist terrorism (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). Shifts in demography can also create structural changes (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Garrett, 1993). Significant demographic shifts have taken place in Europe as a result of the refugee crisis and mass migration. In 2022, the EU received almost one million asylum applicants (Eurostat, 2022). In Luxemburg (a country that has received some of the highest levels of immigration in Europe) immigration makes up over 45% of the entire population (European Migration Network, 2018). According to Harmsen and Högenauer (2020), most people migrated for job opportunities and most migrants came from the 27 EU member states as Luxemburg is an advocate for European integration. While Luxemburg is an outlier, it highlights the significant effect immigration has had on the populations of some European countries. More recently, in 2022, 30.2% of residents in Switzerland were foreign-born and 20.1% in Iceland further highlighting the significant number of immigrants in some (especially small) European countries (European Commission, 2022).

⁴ Previous research on the far-right uses different acronyms to highlight sexually progressive views. Some use LGBT (e.g., Lancaster, 2020; Spierings et al., 2017) while others use LGBTIQ (e.g., Turner-Graham, 2019) and LGBTQ+ (Foster & Kirke, 2023). Therefore, in this thesis, I use different acronyms corresponding to the previous literature.

This mass migration inspires fear that the majority group may become the minority group. For example, in 2021, some of the UK's major cities such as London and Birmingham experienced significant ethnic make-up change. In these cities, white people have become a minority despite the UK being a white majority country (Office for National Statistics, 2023a; 2021a). Research also suggests that the rate of ethnic change is often a more significant predictor of anti-immigration sentiment compared to the number of immigrants living in a certain place (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017). Some on the far-right argue that the more people that immigrate to a country, the more competition there is for the country's limited resources (Boateng et al., 2021; Rydgren, 2007). More recently statistics suggest that European attitudes towards asylum seekers have hardened (Vallianatou & Toremark, 2023) and the perceived importance of the issue of immigration has sharply increased in Europe (Dennison & Dražanová, 2018).

In addition to mass immigration, the 2008 financial crash (the biggest economic crisis since 1929) and economic decline led to further anxiety and uncertainty (Blanco et al., 2020; Turner & Cross, 2015). Becker et al. (2011) argue that social and economic uncertainty can lead to increased resentment and prejudice against scapegoats (such as Muslims) who are held responsible for the societal problem being experienced. They argue that identifying a scapegoat adds a level of control as the scapegoat is discriminated against which minimises the perceived harm caused to the community by the identified group. Economic decline and uncertainty exacerbate economic grievances which help European far-right parties gain more support (Abou-Chadi et al., 2022; Mieriņa & Koroļeva, 2015).

Finally, further structural changes within the EU have impacted the far-right. In 2016, the UK voted to leave the EU (Parnell, 2022; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). Brexit has re-energised the European far-right who share these anti-EU views (Chrisafis, 2016). If the far-right gathers support for an anti-EU movement in their own European country, this could lead to further EU fragmentation. This could potentially further fuel the European far-right due to ensuing instability (Traverso, 2019).

Historical parallels between the 1930s and the 21st century

In addition to the structural changes to liberal society outlined above, there are also certain parallels between the lead up to WW2 and contemporary Europe. The main parallels are the persecution and prejudice against Jews and the Great Depression leading to the crisis of capitalism (Traverso, 2019). Although anti-Semitism still exists, Islamophobia is often considered the modern-day anti-Semitism (Uzunçayir, 2021; Klug, 2014). Garner and Selod (2015, p. 13) define *Islamophobia* as ‘a set of ideas and practices that amalgamate all Muslims into one group and the characteristics associated with Muslims (violence, misogyny, political allegiance/disloyalty, incompatibility with Western values, etc.) are treated as if they are innate’. For the last two centuries, European nationalist countries saw Jewish people as a foreigner living within the state (Traverso, 2019) who would upset the ethnic cohesion in European society (Uzunçayir, 2021). In the 21st century, the Muslim immigrant has replaced the Jewish immigrant as the main perceived threat within for many far-right groups (Uzunçayir, 2021; Traverso, 2019; Klug, 2014). Far-right terrorist attacks targeting Muslims have become more common (between the years 1990 and 2018) whereas attacks against Jewish people are less common (Ravndal et al., 2019). Islam is conceptualised as an authoritarian threat to British liberal values, such as women’s rights, LGB rights and animal rights (e.g., Sibley, 2023b; Berntzen, 2019; Pilkington, 2016).

The second parallel relates to the Great Depression. As of 2023, the world economic output growth is projected to be the lowest in recent decades. This is due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, surging inflation, the climate emergency and the food and energy crisis (UNCTAD, 2023). More specifically, as a result of COVID-19, the number of unemployed people in the UK rose from 4% to 5.2% January-March 2020 and October-December 2021 (at the height of the pandemic) but this fell to 3.7% in January-March 2022 suggesting that the labour market recovered (Francis-Devine et al., 2020). However, the economic crisis caused by COVID-19 has been exacerbated by the Ukraine/Russia war and Brexit which has caused a cost-of-living crisis in the UK (Hourston, 2022; Partington & Kirk, 2022). Elliot (2023) argues this has led to an increase in the unemployment rate to 3.9% and increasing prices which are rising faster than wages. These statistics suggest that although the UK slightly recovered after

COVID-19 and will not go into a recession, there is a projected downward economic forecast and an increased unemployment rate (Elliot, 2023). The UK far-right are likely to capitalise on this economic downturn. As Vieten and Poynting (2016) argue, during times of economic hardship, support for right-wing populism and fascism is likely to increase. This links to economic-based theories of the far-right where economic instability leads to greater support for the far-right (Rathgeb & Busemeyer, 2022; Betz, 1994). Therefore, the economic effect of COVID-19 and the cost-of-living crisis may lead to a further crisis of capitalism resulting in proposed alternatives. The British police have already warned that COVID-19 and the cost-of-living crisis may lead more people to join the far-right, especially young people (Davies & Davies, 2023). These variables, while not causal, share similarities with the pre-WW2 environment.

The ideological change from fascism to post fascism in Europe

However, in spite of the similarities between the pre-WW2 environment and the current socio-political environment, fascist ideology has changed. As discussed above, after WW2, fascism fractured into three main groups. Although one of these groups remained overtly fascistic, the two other groups use a more liberal, co-operative and democratic approach. For these two groups, the term post-fascism is more appropriate (Traverso, 2019). Ideological differences exist between classical fascism and post-fascist ideology. Whereas anti-Semitism was the most widespread form of xenophobia in Nazi Germany, although anti-Semitism is still a major issue, Islamophobia is now the main form of xenophobia in modern far-right groups/parties (Uzunçayir, 2021). In addition to this shift, far-right groups/parties now often focus on the perceived dilution of cultural traditions rather than focusing on the mixing of races (Traverso, 2019; Camus, 2018). This allows post-fascistic groups/parties to distance themselves from classical fascism. Finally, in contrast to fascistic groups, Berntzen (2019) argues that some European post-fascistic groups support democracy and use some liberal values. These include women's rights, LGB rights and animal rights. He argues that this directly contrasts to fascist ideology which does not support democracy, women's rights, LGB rights or animal rights.

How the modern far-right capitalised on these structural changes

The modern far-right has capitalised on these structural and ideological changes. These modern groups have gained considerable support from individuals that argue they have been 'left behind' by modernisation and mainstream political parties (Ford & Goodwin, 2014, p. 10). Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) outline four major areas (the four D's) that the modern far-right have capitalised on: distrust, destruction, relative deprivation and de-alignment.

The first is distrust of the liberal elite and the elitist nature of liberal democracy (Vaughan & Heft, 2023; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). Some post-fascistic parties, such as UKIP in the UK, exploited anti-EU sentiment (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Haller, 2008). Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue that the silent revolution mentioned above, inspired a counter-attack which has resulted in the vote to leave the EU and Donald Trump being elected for President of the United States. This far-right counter-attack may be an attempt to take back control from the liberal elite.

The second is the perceived destruction of the nation through the erosion of cultural, religious and social values. Research by Eatwell and Goodwin (2018) suggests that ethnic and cultural change is more concerning for people that question immigration levels compared to economic-based grievances. Despite this, many mainstream political parties do not address this concern and have lost many voters to far-right fringe parties (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). For example, Evans and Mellon (2016, p. 4) argue that Labour moved to a 'liberal consensus' on immigration and the EU neglecting those that were apprehensive about immigration and wanted to leave the EU. They argue that some Labour supporters switched to UKIP, a fringe right-wing party.

Related to this perceived destruction is relative deprivation, the belief that some get special treatment while others are 'left behind' (Gheorghiu et al., 2022; Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Ford & Goodwin, 2014a, p. 10). This theory compares one group's situation to another and further compares these two groups with a target out-group to assess how they are better or worse off. If the individual is worse off than the two other groups, this can lead to relative deprivation (Kunst & Obaidi, 2020; Abrams & Grant,

2012). In this scenario, the out-group are often immigrants who are blamed for the country's economic hardship (Gheorghiu et al., 2022; Vieten & Poynting, 2016).

According to Eatwell and Goodwin (2018), the fourth is de-alignment with traditional mainstream parties. They found that those that have de-aligned themselves either do not vote or vote for another party. Fringe parties addressing major concerns ignored by mainstream parties may attract voters who previously opted not to vote. For example, they found that in 2017 Alternative for Germany won more than 90 seats in parliament, most of their voters came from individuals that had previously not voted for a party. Further, in the UK, both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party lost voters to UKIP as UKIP is perceived by some to support the British, white working class while the Labour Party and Conservative Party are perceived to prioritise immigration and the liberal elite. Therefore, the far-right are gaining new votes through de-alignment.

As a result of the far-right capitalising on these structural changes, far-right rhetoric has entered mainstream politics (Brown et al., 2023). Although popularists are not winning in national elections, populist ideology is. The British mainstream is becoming increasingly 'national populism-lite' (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018, p. 291), attempting to win the votes of people that perceive themselves to be 'left behind' (Brown et al., 2023; Ford & Goodwin, 2014a, p. 10). These individuals are often categorised as the blue-collar working class who, as a result of the rapid social and economic changes that have occurred over the last 50 years, have been forgotten by mainstream political parties (Ford & Goodwin, 2014a). For example, the centre right parties, such as the Conservative Party in the UK have adopted aspects of UKIP which align to a national populist agenda. According to Eatwell and Goodwin (2018, p. 285), the Conservative party has become 'UKIP-lite' to appeal to UKIP voters where racism is widespread (Cole, 2022). More recently, the Conservative party have moved even further to the right on economic and immigration issues. For example, the party has become increasingly authoritarian on immigration and asylum issues which is shown in their new anti-asylum Rwandan policy (Walker, 2022). Brexit also reflects this mainstreaming of nationalist and populist ideas about culture, race, national identity and immigration (Brown et al., 2023). This highlights the mainstreaming of far-right

ideas which led to significant structural changes both in Europe and the UK (Brown et al., 2023).

2.2 The definitions used in this doctoral thesis

As well as understanding the contextual rise and factions of fascism, it is also important to outline the complex and often contested terminology used to categorise modern far-right groups (Mudde, 2019; Moten, 2010). This section defines the difference between left-wing and right-wing politics, political parties and street movements, the Extreme Right (ER) and the Populist Radical Right (PRR) and far-right terrorism and extremism.

According to Bobbio (1996), the distinction between the left and right political spectrums lies in the emphasis on equality or hierarchy. The left is mainly concerned with equality whereas the right is concerned with hierarchy. According to Spierings et al. (2017), there are two accepted dimensions of politics: the left is associated with (1) GAL (Green-Alternative-Libertarian) and the right is associated with the (2) TAN (Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist). These two dimensions are positioned as opposing sides of the political spectrum, with the far-right categorised as the latter. The term *far-right* is an umbrella term, often encompassing groups with different views, values and motives (Mudde, 2019; Allen, 2014) in relation to immigration, identity and race which are considered more extreme than the centre right (Lowles et al., 2019). The far-right comprises of both democratic and anti-democratic extremists who accept nativism, inequality and authoritarianism at its core (Ravndal & Bjørge, 2018). In this case, far-right groups that are pro-democracy work within the democratic boundaries, for example, political parties. In contrast, far-right groups that are anti-democracy endorse violence and other non-democratic means to gain political change (Mudde, 2019).

However, the distinction between the left and right is becoming less clear as different parties adopt policies of the opposing side (Duina & Carson, 2019; Spierings et al., 2017; Piccone, 1993). For example, some far-right groups (Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, the Sweden Democrats in Sweden and the National Rally in France) use some progressive, liberal values such as gender equality and gay rights. These values are

ideologically associated with left-wing politics not the far-right (Duina & Carson, 2019). Further, some radical far-right groups adopt redistribution economic policies which are often associated with the left (Rovny & Polk, 2020). Differing from the left, for some far-right groups, this redistribution is rooted in welfare chauvinism (Rovny & Polk, 2020). As some far-right groups are adapting their narratives, it is important to highlight that these definitions of left and right are contested. Despite this, academic research on the far-right often use this left-right distinction (e.g., Ivaldi et al., 2017; Mudde, 2013). Therefore, this doctoral thesis uses the left vs right distinction laid out by Bobbio (1996).

Further, within the far-right, there are two main different groups: political parties and street movements. Whereas political parties concentrate their efforts on elections and public office, street movements focus on mobilising public opinion through rallies and protests (Castelli Gattinara & Pirro, 2019; Caiani et al., 2012). Within the literature, the term far-right is often used in reference to street movements and the term right-wing is used for political parties. Despite this, these two terms are often used interchangeably (Mudde, 2019; Ravndal & Bjørge, 2018). This doctoral thesis also uses these two terms synonymously.

According to Mudde (2019; 2015), within political science the umbrella term far-right can be divided into two distinct categories, ER and PRR. Both groups can be classed as post-fascistic as they are contemporary far-right groups. These sub-categories are based on their connection with fascism. The *Extreme Right* are closely linked to fascism and can also be called 'neo-fascist' (Cammaerts, 2020, p. 241; Taggart, 1995, p. 1), 'autocratic-fascist' (Minkenbergh, 2013, p. 12) or 'traditional' (Betz, 1994, p. 153) extremist right parties. *Populist Radical Right* groups, in contrast, deny any connection with fascism (Ignazi, 2010, p. 32). Fascistic ideology is anti-democratic, opposing liberal democracy (Mudde, 2019; 2007). In contrast to the ER, the PRR position themselves as anti-system (Ignazi, 2010; 2003), challenging the establishment (Schumacher et al., 2022; Betz, 1994). PRR groups adopt a populist rhetoric and support economic protectionism (Ennsner-Jedenastik, 2018).

Further, according to Mudde (2019), the PRR are radical, trusting the people but opposing the elites, supporting elections and opposing violence. In contrast, the ER are

revolutionary, anti-elections and pro-violence. For example, UKIP are a PRR political party that claim to speak for the people and oppose violence (Mudde, 2019; Sanders-McDonagh, 2018). Whereas National Action (NA) (a UK neo-Nazi proscribed terrorist group) are revolutionary and pro-violence. They celebrated the murder of MP Jo Cox and wanted to start a race war in the UK (Crown Prosecution Service, 2022; Morris, 2022). Research suggests that ER voter support is mainly linked to economic-based threats, whereas PRR support is more affected by perceived cultural-based threats (Georgiadou et al., 2018).

While there are clear distinctions between the ER and the PRR, within academic accounts of far-right activity, the term PRR is generally referred to as Radical Right (RR) or Right-Wing Populist (Mudde, 2019). Further, the terms used for the PRR have changed over time: from neo-fascism to ER in the 1980s, from RR in the 1990s to right-wing populism in the 21st century and finally, more recently the far-right (Mudde, 2019). Therefore, some researchers, such as Lancaster (2020), use the term RR rather than PRR. In this doctoral thesis, these terms are synonymous. The reason for this lack of cohesive terminology is due to the nature of far-right groups and parties themselves. For example, unlike left-wing party families such as socialists or Greens, PRR parties do not self-identify as right, radical or populist. Many supporters/leaders of the PRR reject the left-right distinction. Therefore, researchers categorise based on their own expertise (Mudde, 2015).

Despite the inconsistent terminology used for the PRR, Mudde (2015) argues that most scholars agree that the core essence of the PRR ideology combines at least three main features: (1) authoritarianism, (2) nativism and (3) populism. Although the PRR might differ on specific additional features such as anti-Semitism or anti-Islam, these three core features are present in all PRR groups and parties. *Authoritarianism* can be defined as the belief in a strictly ordered society where transgressors are harshly punished. *Nativism* positions certain individuals as part of 'the native group' where outsiders are seen as a threat to the homogenous nation-state. Finally, *populism* positions the 'pure' people against the 'corrupt' elite (Mudde, 2015, p. 19).

While both considered far-right, the ER and PRR do not cooperate. The ER attacks the PRR for being weak, corrupt and for selling out to the political establishment. In contrast, the PRR argue that the ER is dangerous and politically ineffective. According to Mudde (2019), the ER are a more extreme version of the PRR. This doctoral thesis focuses on three British far-right groups: the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), The For Britain Movement (TFBM) and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA UK). As discussed above, there is no consensus on the categorisation of far-right groups and political parties. In his research, Mudde (2019) refers to PEGIDA UK as PRR, TFBM as ER and the DFLA as a football sub-group of the far-right. Related to PEGIDA UK, Volk and Weisskircher (2023) and Volk (2020) categorise PEGIDA Germany as PRR rather than ER. Mudde (2015) also highlights that although PRR groups share three core features highlighted above, additional features, such as their targeted minority group differs depending on the group. Therefore, like Pilkington (2019) who categorised the English Defence League (EDL) as closer to the PRR as an anti-Islam movement, this doctoral thesis argues that all three groups are PRR and are part of a sub-category of the PRR, anti-Islam PRR. It categorises these groups as PRR due to their focus on Islam, their interest in contributing to elections, their supposed opposition to violence and their ideology which has moved away from fascism and towards liberalism and democracy. This categorisation is further discussed throughout the empirical chapters.

Although this doctoral thesis categorises these three groups as PRR, it recognises that some of the arguments they hold are extremist. According to the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (2019), the focus on violence and the advocacy of violence to categorise far-right groups is too simplistic and overlooks the complexities of the far-right. According to their research, British far-right groups are deemed unacceptable by the British government if they advocate violence. This is also the case in relation to social media platforms. Therefore, they argue, most British far-right groups (including the three studied in this doctoral thesis) have changed their language and their relationship with violence in order to appear more moderate and to remain active. I am, therefore, aware that the frontstage persona of these groups is different to the backstage which is likely to be more extreme (Golder, 2016). However, for the reasons mentioned above, this thesis categorises the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK as PRR.

The adoption of the term anti-Islam PRR is further supported by Berntzen's (2019) three master frames: the fascistic master frame corresponds to the ER; the ethnopluralist master frame corresponds to the PRR; and the anti-Islam master frame. According to Berntzen (2019), the anti-Islam master frame links with the fascist master frame in relation to its focus on hierarchical worth. It also links to the ethno-pluralist master frame through its emphasis and acceptance of democracy, opposing the fascistic master frame. However, although linked, the anti-Islam master frame breaks with the fascistic and ethnopluralist frames by adopting a more liberal, progressive perspective. The anti-Islam frame, although distinct from the previous two, does not have its own corresponding supporter category (Berntzen, 2019) and, therefore this doctoral thesis uses the term anti-Islam PRR to describe the three groups and parties.

Key to post-fascistic far-right groups using the ethnopluralist and anti-Islam master frames is the term cultural racism. In order to distance themselves from the fascistic far-right, PRR groups adopt cultural racism to appear more moderate (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2016; Allen, 2010; Wieviorka, 2004). *Cultural racism* is defined as the new racism which dispenses with biological markers and shifts to markers of inclusion and exclusion positioning fears about immigration as a threat to 'their way of life' or culture (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2016, p. 391; Allen, 2010). Muslims are the main outgroup identified by the anti-Islam PRR as a threat to this way of life. Islamophobia is a key characteristic of the anti-Islam PRR. The PRR define 'Western values' as 'shared' liberal ideas rooted in the enlightenment (Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2005, p. 346). The focus on enlightened 'shared values' of liberalism shifts the PRR from ethnic nationalism (nationalism based on race) to civil nationalism (nationalism based on shared values) (Moffitt, 2017, p. 117; Halikiopoulou et al., 2013; Akkerman, 2005). The PRR argue that 'Western culture' is essentially liberal, supports democracy, freedom of expression, the separation of church and state and the equality between men and women. Consequently, the PRR argue that liberal values can only be defended against Islam by a cultural war. As Islam is perceived to be an anti-liberal religion which opposes democracy and human rights it should be rejected wholesale (Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2005, p. 348). However, conceptualisation of 'Western values' is often only used to exclude ethnic groups and support their anti-immigration arguments

(Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). Therefore, the far-right may use some liberal, 'Western' values strategically (Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34).

The term Islamophobia is also contested as it focuses on Islam as a religion rather than Muslims as individuals. Allen (2010) argues that the term anti-Muslimism has been coined to shift focus away from the religion of Islam and onto the discrimination against Muslims. The far-right are also aware of this focus on Islam and have used it to their advantage. In an interview, the British National Party (BNP) leader, Nick Griffin said, 'I am not anti-Muslim, I am anti-Islam' (Clifton, 2014, p. 7). There is a difference between the term anti-Islam and anti-Muslim. Muslim relates to an ethno-religious group or community whereas Islam connects with a perceived cultural, civilisation or religious threat (Richardson, 2012). According to Altomonte (2021, p. 24), 'anti-Muslim hatred is motivated by hostility or bias towards people perceived to be Muslim'. The use of the term anti-Islam instead of anti-Muslim, deracialises the far-right's arguments linking it to issues of culture and religion rather than to ethnic groups (Doerr, 2021; Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Further, although this doctoral thesis does not focus on far-right extremist groups, Volk and Weisskircher (2023) argue that the line between the PRR and the ER is 'blurred' and contested. For example, the distinction between PRR and ER normally centres around the use of violence. They argue that because of their violent rhetoric, Dresden-based PEGIDA should be considered 'not (yet) violent' but this blurs the line between peaceful far-right groups and violent far-right groups (Volk & Weisskircher, 2023, p. 321; Schmid, 2014). Therefore, the line between moderates and extremists is 'blurred' (Volk & Weisskircher, 2023, p. 321).

Because of the connection between the PRR and the ER (e.g., Dearden, 2018), it is important to discuss terrorism definitions and statistics. There is no single universal definition of terrorism (Greene, 2017). According to the UK Crown Prosecution Service (2017, p. 1), *terrorism* is defined as 'the use or threat of action, both in and outside of the UK designed to influence any international government organisation or to intimidate the public. It must also be for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial, or ideological cause'. According to the Terrorism Act 2000 (United Kingdom Government,

2020), the UK does not separate domestic and international terrorism and defines terrorism in broad terms in relation to domestic, international and cyber terrorism (Simeon, 2019). However, perpetrators of far-right violence are often not described as terrorists (Ravndal & Bjørge, 2018). This is likely due to the cognitive bias that 'all terrorists are Muslims but never white' (Kearns et al., 2019; Corbin, 2018, p. 455). This cognitive bias may be an effect of institutional racism/Islamophobia within strategies like the Prevent programme which has been criticised for its suspicion of Muslim communities (Younis & Jadhav, 2020). Due to this, far-right perpetrators are sometimes described as extremists instead of terrorists.

The British government define extremism as 'vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs' (Home Office, 2019a, p. 1). This definition highlights the importance of protecting perceived liberal British values. However, this definition is criticised for its subjectiveness, especially relating to British values (Allen, 2021). Therefore, this doctoral thesis does not use this definition. Instead, it uses a more precise definition of far-right extremism; a group that accepts or advocates the use of 'illegal violence to promote right-wing policies' which often relate to social inequality (Ravndal, 2017, p. 83).

2.3 Far-right extremism and terrorism statistics in Europe

Although the anti-Islam PRR supposedly opposes violence these groups are still either directly or indirectly connected to far-right violence/extremism and can be considered 'not (yet) violent' (Volk & Weisskircher, 2023, p. 321; Dearden, 2018; Schmid, 2014). Due to these connections, this section discusses the increase in far-right violence and terrorism worldwide. As research suggests (Wallner & White, 2022), there is a significant amount of far-right activity in many different countries. However, due to the British far-right focus of this doctoral thesis, only far-right activity related to Europe and the UK is discussed.

As discussed above, far-right violence is increasing (Koehler, 2019). According to the five biggest global extremist and terrorist datasets (United States Extremist Crime

Database, Combating Terrorism Centre's, Right-Wing Terrorism and Violence, Database on Terrorism in Germany and RTV-RUSSIA), since 1990, the number of far-right fatal attacks has exceeded all other ideological attacks globally, including Islamist attacks (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018). In 'Western' Europe, the number of far-right terrorist attacks far outnumber Islamist terrorist attacks (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). Between 2009 and 2020, the UK, Sweden, Finland, Greece and Germany had the highest rate of right-wing terrorist attacks per capita in Europe (Jones et al., 2020). Due to these statistics, this doctoral thesis focuses on far-right activity in the UK.


2.4 Far-right extremism and terrorism statistics in the UK

As far-right activity has increased in 'Western' (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34) liberal democracies, this is also true in the UK. In the lead up to the EU referendum in 2016, far-right terrorist, Thomas Mair, murdered British MP Jo Cox (Cobain & Taylor, 2016). In 2017, Darren Osborne drove a van into a group of Muslims murdering one and injuring 11 other people (Malkin et al., 2017). In 2019, Vincent Fuller stabbed a Bulgarian teenager while targeting racially minoritized people in cars (Dearden, 2019b, p. 1). BBC News (2019a, p. 1) quoted him shouting 'kill all the non-English and get them out of our England'. While in the same year, Tristan Morgan set fire to a synagogue in Exeter in an antisemitic terrorist attack (Lee et al., 2022). Finally, in 2022, Andrew Leak threw three incendiary devices at a Dover migration centre in an attempt to kill asylum seekers (Syal, 2022).

In order to address this rise in far-right activity, in 2018, MI5 took over from the police as the lead investigators of far-right extremist and terrorist threats in the UK highlighting the perceived threat from the far-right (Agerholm, 2018). In 2019, the metropolitan police stated that far-right terrorism is the fastest growing threat to the UK (Singh, 2019). In 2021, the Home Office Prevent report stated that out of 688 people adopted as a Channel case (the government's counter-extremism programme) 317 (46%) were adopted for ER radicalisation compared to 154 (22%) adopted for Islamist radicalisation, as shown in Figure 1. These figures highlight the seriousness of the ER threat in the UK (Home Office, 2021).

Figure 1.

A breakdown of individuals that were referred, discussed, or adopted as a Channel case



Note. The percentage of people referred for different forms of extremism ending in March 2021 (Home Office, 2021).

Despite this increase in far-right activity, in March 2019, a former Home Office specialist anonymously reported that the right-wing terrorist threat was not being taken seriously (Rhodes, 2019). Policy research suggests that one method used to deal with far-right rallies is to simply ignore them (Allchorn, 2018). More recently, in his Independent Review of Prevent, William Shawcross argued that the Prevent programme is overfocusing on far-right extremism and should focus more on Islamist extremism (Lowles et al., 2023, p. 63; Shawcross, 2023). Despite this, Schuurman (2019) argues that academic research already overfocuses on Islamist extremism and terrorism rather than far-right extremism and terrorism, leading to an underdeveloped understanding of far-right extremism (Schuurman, 2019). This Independent Review of Prevent is likely to continue this overfocus on the Islamist threat rather than the far-right threat. Because of the recommendations made by Shawcross to minimise focus on the far-right and the rising threat from the British far-right, some (e.g., Amnesty International) have criticised his motivations and objective stance as a reviewer (May, 2023). According to Grierson and Dodd (2021), Shawcross is known for his anti-Islam views. Shawcross claimed that 'Islam is one of the greatest, most terrifying problems of our future' and that 'all European countries have vastly, very quickly growing Islamic populations' (Amnesty International, 2021, p. 1). The Conservative government agreed with the 34 recommendations made by Shawcross and announced that these recommendations

would be swiftly implemented (Allen, 2023). As the Conservative government employed Shawcross as an Independent Reviewer, this could reflect wider Islamophobia in the Prevent programme itself which has previously been criticised as painting Muslims as the only extremist threat to the UK (Allen, 2023; Younis & Jadhav, 2020).

This also highlights the growing normalisation of Islamophobia, anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant narratives in the Conservative government and the UK generally (Syal, 2023; Bale, 2022; Brown & Mondon, 2021; Mondon & Winter, 2017). Prevent, the UK's counter-terrorism programme) may highlight this institutional Islamophobia. Qurashi (2018, p. 3) argues that the Prevent programme frames the terrorist threat as an 'Islamic threat' where Muslims pose a national security threat to the UK. As surveillance is an important aspect of the Prevent programme in order to be aware of potential radicalisation cases, Muslim communities are heavily monitored. He argues that the Prevent programme is rooted in practices and power relations underpinning it, reflecting the wider nature of Islamophobia in the British institutions. Using the wider context and the definitions discussed in this chapter, this thesis aims to address three research questions outlined in this doctoral thesis:

This chapter discussed the research on the European and British far-right. Using previous literature, it aimed to address three research questions: (i) 'who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK?', (ii) 'what are their main grievances?' and (iii) 'why do individuals express support for these groups?' In order to address these three research questions, this chapter identified several research gaps in the academic literature on the far-right. Each gap corresponds to the numbered gaps in Chapter 1.

2.5 Research questions

This chapter outlined the complex far-right scene highlighting the need for up-to-date research on the far-right ecosystem. It identified an important research gap in the counter-extremism literature which tends to overfocus on Islamist terrorism compared to far-right terrorism and extremism (Ebner, 2021; Schuurman, 2019; Conway, 2017). I will address this gap through my own research, contributing to knowledge. I will do this by addressing three broad research questions: (i) who expresses support for the DFLA,

TFBM and PEGIDA UK, (ii) What are their main grievances, and (iii) Why do individuals express support for these groups?

The far-right threat is continuously growing and adapting (Toscano, 2019; Traverso, 2019). The economic effect of COVID-19, the cost-of-living crisis, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine along with other events may lead to a further crisis of capitalism where new alternatives may appear (Davies & Davies, 2023). Far-right ideas are often offered as an alternative to capitalism during periods of economic downturn (Davies & Davies, 2023). Further, far-right rhetoric has entered mainstream politics in Europe and specifically in the UK (Brown et al., 2023), potentially encouraging more people to support far-right groups. The far-right poses a threat to liberal democracy and those that may be targets of the far-right (Mudde, 2019). It is, therefore, imperative that more research is conducted on groups categorised as far-right. I will address this research gap in this thesis and, therefore contribute to knowledge. It can, however, be difficult to conduct such research. Far-right literature crosses multiple discipline boundaries making the language used to explain the far-right phenomenon inconsistent as well as difficult to find (Mudde, 2019). The far-right is often multi-faceted and complicated but gets homogenised as a single group within counter-terrorism/counter extremism strategies, such as Prevent in the UK. More multi-disciplinary research, therefore, is needed to adequately explore some of these nuances. This thesis uses multi-disciplinary research to answer the three broad research questions addressing the lack of multidisciplinary research on the far-right. This is another contribution to knowledge.

While post-war liberal movements may have triggered a cultural backlash in those that oppose all forms of liberalism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) it may also have changed the supporter landscape in certain sections of the far-right (Berntzen, 2019). According to Berntzen's (2019) master frames, the far-right is separated into three strands: fascistic, ethnopluralist and anti-Islam. The PRR can be positioned between the second and third master frames with the ethnopluralists opposing liberal values while those categorised as anti-Islam may embrace some types of liberal values (Berntzen, 2019). Those that fit the anti-Islam frame are likely to have changed the demographic landscape of the PRR supporter. These master frames highlight the complex nature of

the far-right and warrants further research into the sub-sections of the far-right and PRR specifically. These changes within the far-right landscape may influence supporter demographics and the narratives used by anti-Islam groups. This doctoral thesis will make an original contribution to knowledge by specifically addressing this potential change and by highlighting the different types of anti-Islam PRR supporter.

The next chapter analyses the relevant literature on the far-right relating to who expresses support for the European and British far-right and what are their main grievances. This builds context to address the three research questions in this doctoral thesis.

Chapter 3

A review of the academic literature on the European and British far-right

In addition to contextualising the modern far-right, to fully address the research questions, this doctoral thesis must be grounded in the wider literature. This chapter discusses previous literature that focuses on who supports the European and British far-right, what their main grievances are and why people express support for them. In doing so, it discusses the relevant literature needed to address research questions i, ii and iii. Far-right terrorism has posed a long, persistent threat to Europe (Pantucci & Ong, 2021). In 'Western' Europe, the number of far-right terrorist attacks far outnumber Islamist terrorist attacks (Ravndal & Bjørgo, 2018; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). More specifically, the European countries with the most right-wing terrorist attacks per capita are the United Kingdom (UK), Sweden, Finland, Greece and Germany (Jones et al., 2020). Therefore, due to the prevalence of far-right terrorism in Europe and the limited scope of this doctoral thesis, this chapter focuses on the European far-right and the British far-right; it does not study other continents.

Chapter 3 is divided into two main parts. The first discusses the literature on Europe and the second discusses the literature on the British far-right. Part one consists of two sections. It begins by outlining the key demographics of European far-right groups, including gender, age, education level, ethnicity, religion, sexuality and class. It then outlines four identified key grievances of the European far-right as presented in the literature on the topic: immigration leading to economic and cultural segregation, the perceived erosion of 'Western' (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34) cultural and religious values, corruption through the dissemination of biased and fake news through mainstream media and foreign policy. Part two follows the same structure as part one but specifically focuses on the UK and adds three additional key concern themes as identified in the literature: (1) political disillusionment, (2) loss of nationhood and (3) the COVID-19 pandemic.

3.1 The demographics of supporters of the European far-right

While this doctoral thesis specifically focuses on three British anti-Islam Populist Radical Right (PRR) groups, it is important to discuss the wider far-right context in order to draw on relevant theories and concepts in the literature which may help analyse the findings in this doctoral thesis. Context is also important as all three British far-right groups are part of a wider European far-right network (Mudde, 2019; Copsey, 2010; Beck, 2008). These transnational movements are linked by a shared concern which often relates to Muslims (Mudde, 2019). The term 'counter-jihad' refers to a loosely connected international anti-Islam network. Examples of counter-jihad groups include Stop Islamisation of Europe and Stop Islamisation of America (Marinov & Stockemer, 2021; Copsey, 2010) which are based on the premise that 'the West' and Islam are at war (Allen, 2019; CREST, 2016, p. 1; Huntington, 1996, p. 2). These coalitions include far-right anti-Islam groups across the world, primarily in the US and Europe (Marinov & Stockemer, 2021; Copsey, 2010).

This section considers the literature that discusses the demographics of different European far-right groups and the literature that outlines the concerns of these groups and their supporters. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are differences between the Extreme Right (ER) and PRR far-right groups. These differences are prevalent in the demographics of the ER compared to the PRR. This section critically analyses these differences to further understand how the far-right supporter has changed. It follows the structure outlined by Arzheimer (2012), Norris and Inglehart (2019) and Pilkington (2016) in which the socio-demographics of far-right supporters are divided into (1) gender, (2) education, (3) age, (4) ethnicity, (5) religion, (6) sexuality and (7) social class.

While these seven demographics are important in far-right research, Mudde (2019) highlights that membership secrecy is important for far-right groups. He argues that there is stigma associated with far-right membership and supporters are keen to remain anonymous. As a result, demographic research on the far-right often relies on small interview samples which are not representative. Further, he argues that membership of non-party organisations, or smaller local/regional parties are even harder to research due to accessibility issues and supporter mobility from one group to

another. Therefore, it is important to understand the demographics of individuals that support the far-right. Based on the previous literature, the first demographic outlined is gender⁵ (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Arzheimer, 2012). As existing research suggests (as shown in Table 1), the main supporter of the European far-right is overwhelmingly male.

Table 1

The typical voter or supporter of each European ER and PRR groups

	Gender	Age	Education level	Sexuality
	ER groups			
Golden Dawn Ellinas (2013)	Male	Young (18-24)	Middle level	
Generation Identity (GI)		Young Maly (2023)	Secondary school IDées (2013)	
		Young IDées (2013)	University IDées (2013)	
		Young Valencia-Garcia (2018)		
Austria (Freedom Party Austria) Kessler and Freeman (2005)	Male	Young	Low educated	
Belgium (Vlaams Belang, National Democracy) Kessler and Freeman (2005)	Male	Young	Low educated	
Denmark (Progress Party, The Danish People's Party) Kessler and Freeman, (2005)	Male	Young	Low educated	
Italy (Italian Social Movement/Brothers of Italy) Kessler and Freeman (2005)	Male	Young	Low educated	

⁵ When referring to gender, Arzheimer was only talking about men and women.

Netherlands (Centre Democrats) Kessler and Freeman (2005)	Male	Young	Low educated	
PRR groups				
France (Front National)	Male Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) 1988: Male (62%) 1995: Male (61%) 2002: Male (59%) 2007: Male (57%) 2012: Male (52%) Mayer (2013) Male Kessler and Freeman (2005)	Different ages 1988: All ages 1995: 25-34 2002: 50-64 2007: 50-64 2012: 18-34 Mayer (2013) Young Kessler and Freeman (2005)	Low educated Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) Low educated 1988: Secondary school 1995: Secondary school 2002: Primary school 2007: Primary and secondary school 2012: Secondary school Mayer (2013) Low educated Kessler and Freeman (2005)	Some gay men Lancaster (2020) 10% were sexually modern nativists Spierings, Lubbers and Zaslove (2017)
Germany (Alternative for Germany)	Both male and female Hansen and Olsen (2019)	Young Hansen and Olsen (2019)	Varying levels of education Hansen and Olsen (2019)	Lesbian co-leader Wildman (2017)
Romania (Greater Romanian Party)		Older Sum (2010)		
Research generally on the European PRR		Older Norris and Inglehart (2019)		
Finland (Finns Party)		Both younger and older Stockemer et al., (2018). Older Kestilä (2006)		

Note. I created this table author (author's own) to aggregate previous research on the European far-right. It covers data from 1988 to 2022 from multiple sources (Maly, 2023; Lancaster, 2020; Hansen & Olsen, 2019; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Valencia-Garcia, 2018; Stockemer, Lentz & Mayer, 2018; Wildman,

2017; Spierings, Lubbers & Zaslove, 2017; Ellinas, 2013; Mayer, 2013; IDées, 2013; Zaslove, 2011; Sum, 2010; Kestilä, 2006; Kessler & Freeman, 2005).

Using the above three demographics (gender, age and education level), Lancaster (2020) outlined three types of RR supporter: the conservative nativist, the sexually modern nativist and the moderate nativist. The *conservative nativist* is the typical far-right supporter: a white, low educated, older male. The *sexually modern nativist* is specifically linked to the PRR. These types of supporters are young, higher educated women with sexually liberal values. They are usually pro-women's rights and pro-Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual (LGB)⁶ rights (Lancaster, 2020; Spierings et al., 2017). Lancaster (2020, p. 14) found that the PRR sexually modern nativist supporter had become the dominant supporter in 2016 making up 45% of the PRR vote compared to just 12.7% in 2004. The *moderate nativists* are those that fall between conservative nativists and sexually modern nativists. Although the sexually modern supporter-type does exist in the PRR, the majority of far-right supporters in Europe are still categorised as conservative nativist (the white, lower educated, older male). This is discussed in the next paragraphs which outline the seven main demographics in far-right support.

According to Ralph-Morrow (2022, p. 3), 'overrepresentation of men is one of the radical right's most salient features' (Harteveld & Ivarsflaten, 2016). Research suggests that men make up 70% or 69% of PRR parties respectively (Mudde, 2007; Klandermans & Mayer, 2005). Although there are parties that have female leaders, for example, the Danish People's Party and the Norwegian Progress Party (Heidar & Pedersen, 2006), women often hold informal and invisible leadership roles where they provide emotional support to members and leaders which sustains the cohesion of the group (Pilkington, 2016; Blee, 2003). However, this gap may be changing. In the 1980s men made up more than 80% of the Front National Party membership. By 2012, due, in part, to the new female leadership from Marine Le Pen, the female membership level had increased to 45% (Mayer, 2015; Perrineau, 2014).

The second factor outlined is education level (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Arzheimer, 2012). Research suggests that those that are highly educated are less likely

⁶ They do not support Trans rights

to vote for the ER and education can be used to predict far-right support and anti-immigration attitudes (Margalit, 2019; Arzheimer, 2012; Merkl & Weinberg, 2003). In contrast, other research suggests that education level has little effect on far-right support (Hansen & Olsen, 2019; Ellinas, 2013; IDées, 2013; Canetti & Pedahzur, 2002). For example, Generation Identity (GI) has been successful in recruiting a significant number of university graduates into their support base (Ebner, 2021; Arzheimer, 2012) as shown in Table 1. While Brils et al., (2022) argue that the relationship between education level and far-right support is nuanced.

The next factor outlined is age (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Arzheimer, 2012). Research by Stockemer et al., (2018) suggests that age alone is not a strong predictor of PRR support. Despite this, as shown in Table 1, some previous research found that older people are more likely to support the Europe PRR (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Zaslove, 2011; Sum, 2010; Kestilä, 2006). In contrast, other research found that younger individuals were more likely to support European ER and PRR (Maly, 2023; Hansen & Olsen, 2019; Merkl & Weinberg, 2003). The age of supporters differs depending on the type of groups. For example, supporters of the ER tend to be young whereas supporters of the PRR tend to be older and younger (Table 1). There are different reasons why older and younger people may be more vulnerable to recruitment. As Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue, older people may be engaging in a backlash against modernity, globalisation and social progress. In contrast, young people experiment with their identity, they have not found a solid sense of self have no strong affiliations with any mainstream political parties and are more likely to use technology compared to older people (Forbes, 2022; Brandtzaeg & Chaparro-Dominguez, 2020; Geeraerts, 2012; Arzheimer, 2012; Bartlett & Littler, 2011). This means that they have less of a fixed identity and may be vulnerable to manipulation.

Ethnicity is the next factor (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Although most research does not explicitly discuss the ethnicity of PRR supporters, it is implied that the majority are white. Some notable research that does explicitly state that the majority of PRR supporters are white are by Mondon and Winter (2020a), Mudde (2019) and Kinnvall (2015). This is not surprising given the close relationship between the far-right and white superiority (Mondon & Winter, 2020b).

The next demographic is religion (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Previous research found that individuals that were Christian but attended church less than once a week were more likely to support the far-right. However, Xia (2021) suggests that European PRR parties receive low levels of support from Christians while Trevor (2017) found that non-believers were over-represented in the European far-right (Trevor, 2017). Research indicates, therefore, that there is little relationship between religiosity and PRR support (Xia, 2021).

The sixth demographic is sexuality (Foster & Kirke, 2023; Pilkington, 2016). As Blee (2017a, p. 197) argues, 'far-right movements are decidedly heterosexual'. However, previous research highlights that some members of the LGB community do support PRR groups/parties in Europe (Foster & Kirke, 2023; Zúquete, 2008). For example, Anne Marie Waters, Alice Weidel and Pim Fortuyn are all openly gay. Anne Marie Waters is the leader of TFBM (Waters, 2018), Alice Weidel is one of the co-leaders of Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Pim Fortuyn is the founding leader of Pim Fortuyn List, a xenophobic party in The Netherlands (Faiola, 2017; Akkerman, 2005). Further, the sexually modern nativist PRR supporter has pro-Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) views. According to Spierings et al., (2017), this type of supporter (someone who is pro-LGBT rights but anti-immigration), is more likely to vote for a PRR group than traditional nativists (someone that does not support LGBT rights and is anti-immigration). Although there is not extensive research on the sexuality of PRR supporters in Europe, the presence of sexually modern nativist suggests that sexuality is an important factor in the European PRR.

The final factor is social class. The majority of research finds that far-right supporters are often working class (Stefanovic & Evans, 2019; Davidson & Saull, 2017; Vieten & Poynting, 2016). However, Mondon and Winter (2020a) argue that this relationship is complicated. For example, Richards (2019) found that GI, a European far-right group, was mainly supported by middle class people. Research by Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2019) also found that the far-right generally is increasingly appealing to the middle class. This further complicates the class picture within the far-right literature.

3.2 The concerns of supporters of the European far-right

This section begins by critically analysing the four main concerns of the European far-right outlined by Mudde (2019). These are (1) immigration, especially Muslim immigration, (2) security, especially cultural security, (3) corruption, for example, the perceived corruption of mainstream media, and (4) foreign policy, especially the territory they have lost/might lose and the perceived loss of national sovereignty.

Immigration

The first concern relates to immigration and the potential segregation it causes. Previous research suggests that factors such as poverty, unemployment and falling/failing living standards increases support for the far-right within the European Union (EU) (Stevkovski, 2015). This is largely because insecurity and instability can lead to an increase in far-right support (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2022). Previous research found a positive association between ER crimes and high levels of unemployment (Rees et al., 2019; Falk et al., 2011). In contrast, other research suggests that rising unemployment levels do not necessarily increase support for the far-right (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2019; Coffé et al., 2007). This suggests that there is no clear relationship between economic decline, unemployment, poverty and far-right support.

Although economic decline may be a concern, cultural threat is perceived to be a more significant threat by the far-right (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Ivarsflaten, 2008), especially the PRR (Mudde, 2019). Immigration has become their main concern (Milner, 2021; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Right-wing parties use four themes to frame immigrants: immigrants as a threat to ethno-national identity; immigrants as the cause of criminality; immigrants as the cause of unemployment; and immigrants as abusers of the welfare state (Rydgren, 2008; Betz & Johnson, 2004). The refugee crisis (2014-2017) has contributed to a growing hostility towards migrants, immigrants and refugees, especially those that are Muslim (Thorleifsson, 2017). These individuals, in some European countries such as Hungary, have been described as criminals or 'crimmigrant' which associates Muslim immigrants with criminal activity (Thorleifsson, 2017, p. 322). The third and fourth frames are part of the welfare chauvinism doctrine which states

that 'social benefits should be generous but limited to citizens' (Cavaille & Ferwerda, 2023, p. 20). Welfare chauvinism also implies that citizens and immigrants need to compete for these same social benefits (Rydgren, 2008). These four frames suggest that immigration is a complicated issue for the far-right and each group or supporter might have a different reason for questioning immigration levels.

Connected to immigration is the increased presence of Muslims and the perceived increase of political power they hold in European countries (Berntzen, 2019). According to Allen (2004), 9/11 acted as a catalyst to renew old anti-Muslim rhetoric and fears. These anti-Muslim attitudes have persisted in some parts of Europe (Riaz et al., 2023). In 2019, the Pew Research Centre found that 77% of Slovaks have a negative view of Muslims, 66% of Polish people, 64% of people from the Czech Republic, 58% of Hungarians, 57% of Greeks, 56% of Lithuanians and 55% of Italians (Wike et al., 2019). Eastern and Southern European countries have experienced strict immigration controls negatively impacting anti-Muslim attitudes (Wike et al., 2019). These figures suggest that the increased presence of Muslims is a concern for many people, not just those that are supporters of the far-right.

This concern may be specific to the anti-Islam PRR as the fascistic far-right often focus on Jewish immigration (Berntzen, 2019; Zúquete, 2008). This anti-Islam stance is largely inspired by the thesis written by Huntington (1996; 1993) called *'The Clash of Civilizations'* where Islam is argued to be incompatible with 'Western values' (Froio, 2018; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). Huntington argued '[in the future] the dominating source of conflict will be cultural [...]. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future' (Huntington, 1993, p. 22). The main conflict will occur between the 'Western civilisation' and the Islamic civilisation. He argued that Islam would threaten 'the West's' progressive Greek-Judeo-Christian heritage (Huntington, 1996, p. 2). This thesis has since been debunked for its lack of academic rigour and Islamophobic undertones (Fuller, 2002; Hunter, 1998; Esposito, 1997) but is still used by the far-right (Haynes, 2021; Bottici & Challand, 2013). The far-right's anti-Islam position is also inspired by Islamist terrorist attacks (Pew Research Centre, 2016a), the refugee crisis (Pew Research Centre, 2016a), anti-Islam rhetoric used by mainstream politicians (Gilks, 2020; Allen, 2004) and the media (Ansari & Hafez, 2012). In addition to the perceived

incompatibility between Islam and 'the West', some more extremist interpretations of current events (normally accompanied by conspiracy theories), see Muslim migrants, immigrants and refugees as the fifth column of a supposed Islamic empire wherein Muslims conquer Christian Europe (Froio, 2018; Uenal, 2016; Huntington, 1996, p. 2).

Related to this perceived threat from immigration is the belief in conspiracy theories. Conspiracy theories play a significant role in the perceived threat from the other in the PRR (Wodak, 2019). The most significant anti-immigration conspiracy theory is The Great Replacement (TGR) which states that white people are being replaced through migration, violence and birth rates (Obaidi et al., 2022; Ebner, 2021; Davey & Ebner, 2019). Renaud Camus wrote a book entitled *Le Grand Remplacement* (The Great Replacement) which helped radicalise Brenton Tarrant (Obaidi et al., 2022; Davey & Ebner, 2019). Tarrant committed a terrorist attack in New Zealand in 2019 leaving behind a manifesto entitled *The Great Replacement* (Tarrant, 2019). According to Camus (2018, p. 21), the central premise of TGR focuses on the idea that white people are being replaced by racially minoritized people: 'replacers, mostly from Africa, and very often Muslims' are replacing the 'replaced, the indigenous population'. He argues that this replacement constitutes genocide through substitution highlighting the perceived cultural threat.

The threat to 'European' culture

The second concern is the fear that European (often Christian) values are being eroded by a foreign people migrating into the country. According to the European PRR, European values include LGB rights, women's rights and animal rights (Berntzen, 2019; Pilkington, 2016; Busher, 2015; Camus, 2005). Islam is seen by the far-right as a threat to these rights and liberal tolerance (Foster & Kirke, 2023; Berntzen, 2019; Pilkington, 2016; Busher, 2015; Halikiopoulou et al., 2013; Camus, 2005). In contrast to historical far-right groups, most PRR groups advocate for certain women's rights, for example, gender equality and female liberation in Islam (Cheri & Damerow, 2023; Akkerman, 2015). European far-right groups in Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Portugal, France, Italy and Germany all use gender equality rights for LGBT people to oppose Islam (Santos & Roque, 2021; Scrinzi, 2014a; 2014b; Meret & Siim, 2013). This strategy is used

in an attempt to reinvent each party as progressive and liberal by advocating gender equality (Berntzen, 2019; Mayer et al., 2014). Therefore, this research suggests that although the PRR are concerned about modern, liberal values, this concern may be being manipulated to criticise Islam.

Connected to the protection of liberal values is the protection of perceived Christian values which is also outlined as a key concern of the European PRR. Some on the far-right argue that Christianity is the foundation of European civilisation (Auger, 2020) and that Europe shares the common moral values outlined in Christianity (Berntzen, 2019; Zúquete, 2008). For example, according to some of the far-right these include freedom of speech, democracy and some liberal values such as women's rights (Berntzen, 2019). The far-right argues that these moral values are being eroded by Islam (Foster & Kirke, 2023; Berntzen, 2019; Zúquete, 2008). Despite this, research found no correlation between RR parties and wanting to only allow Christian immigrants into the country (Rydgren, 2008).

The corruption of Mainstream media

The perceived biased nature of mainstream media is the third concern of the European PRR. According to Figenschou and Ihlebæk (2019), far-right actors oppose the mainstream media for six reasons: (1) mainstream media is biased, (2) conditional, (3) elitist, (4) a mouthpiece for those in power, (5) is left-wing biased and (6) is part of a wider conspiracy. The first is that the mainstream media, the stories and the journalists are intimated to be deceitful, biased or partisan. The second concern is the perception that access to mainstream media is conditional and limited. Some far-right groups argue that the media hold a pro-immigration stance blocking anti-immigration arguments. This is especially true of Muslims who are perceived to always be given the victim status. The third relates to the anti-elitism rhetoric often connected to the far-right. The argument claims that journalists do not cover topics that are of concern to general citizens, thereby, distancing themselves from their fellow citizens. The fourth relates to the notion that the mainstream media is used as an uncritical mouthpiece and platform for those in power and is perceived to have a left-wing bias, especially concerning political

correctness, immigration and Islam. Finally, the most extreme criticism claims that the mainstream media is part of a wider series of conspiracies (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019).

This perceived corruption of mainstream media feeds into the wider cultural Marxist conspiracy. According to conspiracy theorists, cultural Marxists 'are an unholy alliance of abortionists, feminists, globalists, homosexuals, intellectuals and socialists who have translated the far left's old campaign to take away people's privileges' from 'class struggle' into 'identity politics and multiculturalism' (Moyn, 2018, p. 1). According to the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (2019), the term cultural Marxism was first used by Marxist scholars like Antonio Gramsci in the 1920s who argued that the socialist revolution failed because they did not undermine the cultural values that allow capitalism to flourish. Political change, therefore, only comes with cultural change. The Frankfurt School later adopted this need for cultural change. When Jewish members of the Frankfurt school fled Nazi persecution to the US, the cultural Marxist conspiracy theory started positing that the Jewish Marxists were undermining Christian values by introducing feminism, multiculturalism, gay rights and atheism into US and later European society. This developed into the right-wing conspiracy of cultural Marxism (Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2019).

Foreign policy

The final concern of the European PRR relates to foreign policy. This concern is split into two sections: (1) concern about the territory that they have lost or may lose, and (2) concern about national sovereignty. Firstly, some groups focus on the land they have lost or land they may lose. The far-right reference the crusades between Islam and Christianity and the fall of European empires that led to the loss of power (Strømme & Schmiedel, 2020; Gardell, 2014; Spruce, 2007). The PRR are also concerned about the land they may lose through globalisation, immigration and 'Islamisation' (Waters, 2018, p. 123).

Further, the PRR are concerned about national sovereignty and argue that international organisations undermine national sovereignty (Heinisch et al., 2020). Some PRR groups argue for the reassertion of greater national control (Heinisch et al.,

2020). There are three variants of 'sovereignism': economic, national and popular (Heinisch et al., 2020, p. 165). Economic sovereignism states that economic policies should work to build the wealth of the people. For example, by rejecting international trade agreements and bringing jobs back to each European country (Heinisch et al., 2020). National sovereignism seeks to defend national borders against external threats. It uses binaries to position the nations 'own people' against the outside other (Heinisch et al., 2020, p. 165). Finally, popular sovereignism claims that the people are the only legitimate authority and political power (Spruyt et al., 2016). Some PRR groups, therefore, are concerned that globalisation and Muslim immigration is leading to a loss of national sovereignty.

Conclusion of the European far-right

Based on previous research, the typical European PRR supporter is the conservative nativist (the older, low educated male). However, Lancaster's (2020) typologies only uses three demographics: age, education level and gender. In addition to these factors, the typical supporter is a working class, white, heterosexual, Christian or non-believer. In contrast, other research by Lancaster (2020) also suggests that the sexually modern-type of far-right supporter is also prevalent. This suggests that young, higher educated women also support European PRR groups.

According to Mudde (2019), the European PRR have four main grievances: immigration, security, corruption and foreign policy. PRR parties argue that mass immigration is a cultural threat which erodes European values. The Great Replacement conspiracy is central to this PRR argument that immigrants, especially Muslims, represent a threat to Europeans and their way of life (Ekman, 2022). Security includes cultural, economic and physical security, linking with the first theme of immigration. The security theme is connected to nativism, where the way of life is being disrupted by an outsider creating insecurity. The way of dealing with this insecurity is through authoritarian anti-immigration responses. Corruption includes the belief that the elite, for example, mainstream media, are corrupting each country with postmodernist, cultural Marxist ideas. Finally, in relation to foreign policy the PRR are concerned about the territory they have lost and national sovereignty.

3.3 The demographics of supporters of the British far-right

As well as posing a threat in Europe, the growing far-right threat is also significant in the UK (Lowles et al., 2019). This section, therefore, is divided into two. The first section discusses research relating to who expresses support for the British far-right. The second outlines what their main grievances are. As with the European PRR part, this section outlines seven demographics identified as important in far-right support in previous literature: (1) gender, (2) education, (3) age, (4) ethnicity, (5) religion, (6) sexuality and (7) social class (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Pilkington, 2016; Arzheimer, 2012). Table 2 highlights the main three demographics outlined by Arzheimer (2012): gender, age and education level. As with the European demographics above, this section uses Lancaster's (2020) supporter categories to understand different far-right supporters.

Table 2

The typical voter of each British ER, PRR and anti-Islam PRR group

	Gender	Age	Education level
ER groups			
Patriotic Alternative		Target young people Ariza (2020)	Target University level students (Briggs and Mann, 2021)
NA Allen (2019a)	Male	Young	Target ' <i>intelligent</i> ' people
			Target University level students Macklin (2018)
National Front Harrop et al., (1980)	Male	Young (but all age groups)	
British National Party (BNP) Goodwin (2011)	Male	Middle aged (34+)	No education or GCSE level
PRR groups			
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)	Male (72%) Goodwin and Evans (2012)	Older (60+) (69%) Audickas et al., (2019)	
	Male (75%) Audickas et al., (2019)		
Anti-Islam PRR			

English Defence League (EDL)	Male (97.74%) Allen (2011) Male (81%) Bartlett and Littler (2011) Male (64%) Goodwin and Evans (2012)	Young (18-29 or 16-25) Gaston (2017) Pilkington (2016) Bartlett and Littler (2011) Copsey (2010) Older (Over 30) Gest et al., (2018) Goodwin (2013)	Low educated Pilkington (2016)
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Note. This table was created by the author (author's own) and aggregates previous research to outline the main demographics of the British far-right highlighted by multiple researchers (Briggs & Mann, 2021; Ariza, 2020; Allen, 2019a; Audickas, Dempsey & Loft, 2019; Macklin, 2018; Gest, Reny & Mayer, 2018; Gaston, 2017; Pilkington, 2016; Goodwin, 2013; Goodwin & Evans, 2012; Goodwin, 2011; Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Allen, 2011; Copsey, 2010; Harrop, England & Husbands, 1980).

The first factor outlined in previous literature is gender (Pearson, 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Arzheimer, 2012). As shown in Table 2, research suggests that the majority of British far-right members are men (Gest et al., 2018; Pilkington, 2016; Ford & Goodwin, 2014b; Treadwell & Garland, 2011; Copsey, 2010). For example, Goodwin and Evans (2012) found that 30% of the BNP and 36% of the EDL were female, Pilkington (2016) found that 23% of EDL supporters were female and research by Audickas et al., (2019) found that 25% of UKIP supporters were female. Therefore, research suggests that the typical PRR supporter is male.

Age is the second factor (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Research suggests that young people are more likely to support the British ER whereas older people are more likely to support the PRR (shown in Table 2). The ER often recruit people online (Mondon & Winter, 2020; Ebner, 2017; Bartlett & Littler, 2011). Operating online has encouraged young, educated, technologically competent individuals to become involved with the far-right (Ebner, 2017; Bartlett & Littler, 2011). Before their Facebook account was removed, the EDL had nearly 100,000 supporters (Pupcenoks & McCabe, 2013). Britain First's Facebook group had over 2.1 million likes (Golding, 2019). However, groups such as Britain First, the BNP and the EDL have now been banned from Facebook (Hern, 2019). Because of this ban, many members operate online through social media platforms and anonymous forums such as Reddit, 8chan, Zeronet, Telegram and Gab (Lowles et al., 2019; Paul, 2019; BBC News, 2019b; Ebner, 2017).

Potentially due to the use of technology, previous research found that the majority of EDL supporters were between 16-29 years-old (Gaston, 2017; Pilkington, 2016; Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Copsey, 2010). For example, Bartlett and Littler (2011) found that 72% of EDL supporters were under 30 years old. This was much higher than the general population of England where 36% of individuals were under 30 years old (Statista, 2021). Data for under 30-year-olds in 2011 was not available as age was split into 0-14, 15-64 and 65+ age categories (Office for National Statistics, 2012). This figure was also much higher than other PRR groups such as the BNP where 35% of supporters were under 30-years-old (Boon, 2010). However, Pilkington (2016) suggests that these findings were overestimated. She argues that the findings were skewed towards younger supporters as the research was conducted on Facebook which in 2011 (when the research was conducted) used to attract a younger audience (Bartlett & Littler, 2011). Similarly, a survey by Gest et al., (2018) found that men over 30 were more likely to support the PRR. Goodwin (2013) also found that 84% of individuals that supported the EDL were over 30 years old (Table 2). This was higher than the general population of England (Statista, 2021). Therefore, previous research suggests that older supporters are more likely to support the British far-right.

The third demographic is education (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Table 2 highlights that supporters of the British PRR tend to have a low level of education (defined as Level 1 and 2, secondary school level) (Gest et al., 2018; Winlow et al., 2017). Pilkington (2016, p. 66) found that 20% of (n=35) EDL supporters had not completed secondary school education. Further, Goodwin (2013) found that for 39% (n=298) of EDL supporters, GCSEs were their highest academic qualification (Level 1 or 2). In the general population of England and Wales, in 2011, the most common education level (27%) was level 4 (First or higher degree) followed by no qualifications (23%) and 14% stated that level 1 or 2 was their highest level of education (Office for National Statistics, 2011a). In 2021, the most common education level (33.8%) was level 4 while 22% had a level 1 or 2. These statistics suggest that supporters of the PRR are less educated than the general population (Office for National Statistics, 2011a; 2021b). However, other far-right groups such as NA, Sonnenkrieg Division and System Resistance Network (now proscribed terrorist organisations) have previously attempted to recruit individuals from

Universities in the UK (Staton & Warrell, 2020; Allen, 2017). This suggests that it is not only lower educated people that support the far-right.

Ethnicity is the fourth demographic. As well as a possible change in the gender landscape, there may also be a changing ethnic landscape in the far-right. As the majority of people in England and Wales are white (81.7%) (United Kingdom Government, 2022), it is not surprising that previous research found that the majority of British far-right supporters were also white (Pilkington, 2016; Jackson & Feldman, 2011), including 98% of all BNP members (Boon, 2010). However, some PRR groups have attracted racially minoritized people to their organisations. Sikhs, Hindus, Jews and even Muslims all attended EDL protests and divisional meetings as the EDL claimed to be 'open to all' (Pilkington, 2016, p. 101). However, research concerning the ethnicity of far-right supporters is limited and more is needed.

The fifth factor important in far-right support is religion (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Pilkington, 2016). As highlighted above, The Clash of Civilisations thesis (Froio, 2018; Huntington, 1993) is an important theory within the far-right (e.g., Waters, 2018; Robinson, 2017). This theory positions 'the West' (identified as countries founded on Judaeo-Christian values) and the Middle East (identified as Islamic-majority countries) as opposing (Marranci, 2004; Huntington, 1996, p. 2). Therefore, religion is also important within the PRR (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Pilkington, 2016). Previous research suggests that 45% of EDL supporters identified as Christian (Bartlett & Littler, 2011). According to the 2011 census (the same time as the EDL survey), 59% of the population of England and Wales self-identified as Christian (Office for National Statistics, 2011b). This suggests that less supporters of the EDL identified as Christian compared to the general population, but Christianity is still the most prevalent religion in the British PRR.

Sexuality is the sixth demographic (Foster & Kirke, 2023; Pilkington, 2016) and significantly differs between the ER and the anti-Islam PRR. Fascistic groups are normally extremely homophobic (e.g., Severs, 2020). Although some fascistic groups do allow gay supporters into the group, these individuals often exhibit hypermasculine traits (Claus & Virchow, 2017). In contrast, the anti-Islam PRR attracts supporters that identify as LGB rather than the stereotypical hypermasculine male. Previous research on the EDL found

that 0.85% of 85,000 EDL supporters were members of the LGBT division (Pilkington, 2016). In comparison, in the UK, 2.2% of the general population identified as LGB (Office for National Statistics, 2020a). These figures suggest that there are fewer individuals that identify as LGB in the EDL compared to the general population. However, Pilkington (2016) and Foster and Kirke (2023) highlight the need for further research identifying the sexuality of PRR supporters.

The final demographic is class. Most research suggests that supporters of the far-right are working-class (Winlow et al., 2017; Pilkington, 2016; Garland & Treadwell, 2011). These individuals are defined as the 'left behind', the losers of modernisation (Brown et al., 2023, p. 163; Betz, 1994). However, other research suggests that the working class are only 'a little more likely to support UKIP' than other social classes (Mondon & Winter, 2020a). Further, research by Richards (2019) suggests that some far-right groups, such as Generation identity (GI) (including the UK branch), are mainly supported by people from the middle class (Richards, 2019). The relationship between class and far-right support is nuanced.

3.4 The concerns of supporters of the British far-right

This section critically analyses the concerns of the British PRR. These are: (1) immigration and segregation (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Garland & Treadwell, 2011), (2) the erosion of British (Christian) values (Pilkington, 2016; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2015; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34) (3) political disillusionment or de-alignment (Foster & Feldman, 2021; Tyndall, 2015), (4) the loss of nationhood, (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018; Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017), (5) fake news and cancel culture (Pereira De Sá & Pereira Alberto, 2022) and (6) the COVID-19 pandemic (Ehsan, 2020).

Immigration and segregation

The first concern relates to economic and cultural segregation and immigration. The gap between the rich and the poor is increasing in the UK (Winlow et al., 2017). Allchorn (2018) argues that the widening gap of inequality may be a contributing factor to the increase of the far-right. Previous research suggests that there is a correlation between

economic decline and the success of the EDL (Garland & Treadwell, 2011). Pai (2016) argues that some far-right groups are driven by the British working-class community. Research outlines how the working class are sometimes categorised as forgotten (Brown et al., 2023, p. 163; Collins, 2014), often seen as resentful of the changing cultural makeup in relation to ethnic diversity (Open Society Foundation, 2014). Some working-class communities argue that the mainstream political parties, especially the Labour party, no longer represent them (Bickerton, 2019) enabling PRR groups to capitalise on this rhetoric and attempt to speak on behalf of those that feel they have been forgotten (Robinson, 2017; Treadwell & Garland, 2011).

Members of the far-right express concern over the lack of working-class jobs. In 1945, manufacturing made up one third of the nation's output with 40% of the national workforce (Stocker, 2017). In the 1950s/1960s, Britain produced 20% of world exports (Stocker, 2017). This industrial prosperity began to decline in the 1970s when British manufacturing firms collapsed due to foreign competition and mismanagement (Stocker, 2017). This high level of unemployment is apparent in many areas where religious and ethnic tensions have arisen such as Bedford, Luton and Birmingham where both the EDL and Britain First have held rallies (Allchorn, 2018). This industrial decline did not only affect the local economy, it also negatively affected social and cultural aspects of the working-class communities (Stocker, 2017) where ethnic and economic tension emerged. Some argue that immigrants make it harder for working-class people to get jobs as immigrants' needs are prioritised (Winlow et al., 2017). Unemployment, therefore, may be a concern for individuals that support some far-right groups.

However, other research suggests that economic factors are not as significant as the perceived or real cultural threat to identity (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Ivarsflaten, 2005). Immigration is also a major concern for PRR groups (Milner, 2021; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Anne Marie Waters and Tommy Robinson argue that immigration, when individuals are integrated well, can have benefits to a democratic society (Waters, 2018; Robinson, 2017). However, they argue that when immigration levels are not controlled and when immigrants do not assimilate into the native landscape this can split the shared national identity (Waters, 2018; Robinson, 2017). Some individuals fear that they are becoming the minority in their community (Winlow et al., 2017). However,

in the YouTube video entitled Former EDL leader Tommy Robinson brings Pegida to the UK | Guardian Docs (2016), Tommy Robinson and PEGIDA UK argue that 'multiculturalism hasn't failed, Islam has failed', highlighting that some far-right groups focus largely on Muslim immigration.


The main concern within immigration and segregation is the increase of Muslims and political Islam (Berntzen, 2019). Islam differs from political Islam. Political Islam 'seeks to use religion to shape the political system [...] remoulding public life in accordance with a specific interpretation of Islamic text and traditions' (Akbarzadeh, 2021, p. 1). Some far-right groups attempt to distinguish between Islam (the religion), and Islamist terrorism (the political ideology) (Allen, 2019b; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2015). For example, the Football Lads Alliance (FLA) and the EDL claim to be against Islamist extremism as opposed to the religion (Allen, 2019b). However, many fail to make this distinction (Allen, 2019b; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2015), and others often contradict themselves. Kassimeris and Jackson (2015, p. 5) found that the most frequent topics out of 86 EDL news posts related to Islam were 'extremism' (55.8%), followed by 'terrorism' (33.7%) suggesting that Islam was mainly associated with extremism and terrorism. The EDL (Innes et al., 2018), Tommy Robinson (McCloughlin & Robinson, 2017), Anne Marie Waters (Waters, 2018) and Paul Golding (Golding, 2019) all fail to make the distinction between Islam and Islamist terrorism. Many supporters of far-right groups such as the EDL, DFLA, Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA UK) and The For Britain Movement (TFBM), also do not make this differentiation (Allen, 2019b; Waters, 2018; Winlow et al., 2017; Ebner, 2017; Allchorn, 2016).

Due to this lack of differentiation some far-right supporters/leaders are concerned with what Waters calls the 'Islamisation of Britain' (Waters, 2018, p. 123) where public life is remoulded to adhere to a specific interpretation of Islamic text and traditions (political Islam). She interprets this remoulding of public life as taking away the rights of women and LGB members. Due to this conflation between Islam generally and political Islam, Waters (2018) argues that Islam is the biggest threat to the UK since WW2 (Waters, 2018; Robinson, 2017). This fear is further exacerbated by rising Muslim birth rates, Muslim immigration in the UK (Pilkington, 2016) and the declining Christian population (Figure 2). In 2001, 3% of the English and Welsh population identified as

Muslim, in 2011 4.9% were Muslim and in 2021, 6.5% were Muslim. In contrast, in 2001 72% identified as Christian, in 2011 59% were Christian and in 2021 46% were Christian (Office for National Statistics, 2021c; 2011b; 2001). This highlights the growing nature of Muslims and the declining nature of Christians in the UK.

Figure 2

The percentage of Christians and Muslims in the UK



Note. Information taken from the UK census from 2001 to 2021 (Office for National Statistics, 2021c; 2011b; 2001).

In addition, projected migration figures show that there is likely to be a large increase in the Muslim population in the UK. According to Pew Research Centre (2017), by 2050, in a high-migration situation, the Muslim population will make up 10.3% of the UK. Further, between 2015-2025, projected figures suggest that European women are likely to have an average of 1.6 children compared to Muslim women who are estimated to have 2.6 children on average. These figures suggest that there is a fear that the Muslim population will increase through migration, refugee acceptance, increased birth rates and religious conversion (Pilkington, 2016). If the Muslim presence increases and becomes the religious majority, it is argued that Sharia Law will be introduced diminishing women's rights, LGB rights and other institutional rights such as democracy (e.g., Waters, 2018). This fear of mass Muslim-immigration is detailed in TGR conspiracy theory and is perceived to be a threat to cultural identity. The Great Replacement

conspiracy was propagated by Alan Lake, the alleged financier of the EDL (Robinson, 2017; Copsey, 2010), the EDL generally, as well as Patriotic Alternative (Ariza, 2020; Davey & Ebner, 2019).

The erosion of British (Christian) values

The erosion of perceived British values due to Islam and immigration is the second main concern of the far-right. Historically British far-right groups were associated with overt racism, homophobia and sexism (Lowles et al., 2019). However, many anti-Islam PRR groups have attempted to distance themselves from the traditional far-right stereotype (Robinson, 2017; Garland & Treadwell, 2011; Copsey, 2010). Kassimeris and Jackson (2015, p. 176) found that out of 86 EDL news posts related to Islam, 20.9% of material related to misogyny or sexism, 14% related to Islam's anti-democratic system and 14% related to homophobia. This highlights the EDL's focus on human rights and democratic concerns.

The perceived treatment of women within Muslim majority societies is a concern of supporters of the PRR. For example, some EDL supporters stated that women do not have the same rights as men in Islam under Sharia Law (Pilkington, 2017; Winlow et al., 2017). However, research suggests some far-right groups also hold anti-feminist beliefs (Lowles et al., 2019). For example, women were welcome within the EDL but sexist language, female objectification and inappropriate sexual touching from men was commonplace (Pilkington, 2017). Britain First's leader, Paul Golding also referred to feminism as 'destructive feminism' which promotes the dismantling of the traditional family and marriage (Golding, 2019) further complicating this PRR pro-women rights stance.

Members of the PRR are also concerned about the treatment of homosexuals in Islam (Foster & Kirke, 2023; Winlow et al., 2017; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2015). For example, the EDL advocated LGBT rights and had their own LGBT division (Pilkington, 2016; Robinson, 2017). Further, Waters (the ex-leader and creator of TFBM) is also an advocate of LGB rights and openly describes herself as a lesbian (Waters, 2018). This highlights the adoption of some LGB rights by the PRR (Berntzen, 2019). Despite some

far-right groups actively encouraging members of the LGBT community to join their groups, exclusion of those that identify as Intersex and Queer is common (Turner-Graham, 2019). Therefore, the distinction between LGB support rather than LGB(TQ+) is important as some PRR groups present themselves as being pro-LGB rights, but they do not support Trans or other gender/sexuality rights (Foster & Kirke, 2023). For example, Paul Golding (leader of Britain First) referred to a counter-protest as 'Transgender oddballs' (Golding, 2019, p. 103). However, despite this acceptance of some in the LGB community, homophobia is still present within far-right groups. For example, some gay EDL members stated they had been punched in the face at EDL demonstrations (Pilkington, 2017). Previous research highlights that the relationship between LGBTQ+ rights and the PRR is complicated. Due to this, Froio (2018) states that this connection between far-right groups and certain liberal values (such as LGBT) needs to be researched further.

PRR supporters are also often concerned about the treatment of children in Islam. Tommy Robinson singles out Rotherham where more than one thousand children were raped and abused for years (Robinson, 2017). The PRR mainly focus on the ethnicity and religion of the sex gangs where 'a significant proportion of those found guilty nationally of group Child Sexual Exploitation [were] from a Pakistani and/or Muslim heritage' (Oxford Safeguarding Children Board, 2015, p. 114; BBC News, 2013, p. 1). Many EDL supporters claimed that The Qur'an and the Hadith allow girls to be married to old men as 'Mohammad, when he was 73...married his 6-year-old niece' (Pilkington, 2016, p. 134). This, some EDL members argued, has led Muslim men to claim it is permissible to have sex with a child (Pilkington, 2016). However, as most British far-right groups are concerned about child abuse cases that are connected to assumed Muslim or Asian perpetrators, more research needs to identify if other types of child abuse perpetrated by individuals from other ethnic and religious backgrounds are also a concern.

It is not only human rights that the anti-Islam PRR claim they advocate. Animal rights is also a concern specifically relating to halal meat in Islam. Waters and Robinson argue that halal slaughter is inhumane as the animal is not stunned before it is killed in the Islamic ritual killing (Waters, 2018; Robinson, 2017). This is not a new argument used

by the far-right. The BNP supported animal rights and use these rights to criticise Islam (Zúquete, 2008). Research suggests that individuals who hold right-wing social attitudes are likely to support animal exploitation and consume meat because they support human supremacy (Becker et al., 2019; Dhont & Hodson, 2014). However, unrelated to Islam and human supremacy, The For Britain National Manifesto (2020) aims to reduce unnecessary suffering of animals through organic and natural farming and aims to implement restrictions to animal experimentation. Some other members of far-right groups claim that they are vegan (Pilkington, 2016). Therefore, research needs to be conducted to understand why some new groups advocate animal rights and whether animal rights advocacy is limited to opposing Islamic rituals.

Related to this perceived protection of liberal values is the Populist Radical Right's repeated references to Christianity (Auger, 2020; Marzouki et al., 2016). Although paradoxical as Christianity emphasises greater tolerance and inclusiveness which is at odds with the PRR anti-Islam message, some on the PRR argue that they uphold Christian values (Woodbridge, 2010). It is argued that the UK and its institutions are rooted in Judea-Christian values (e.g., Strømme & Schmiedel, 2020; Harries, 2010; Huntington, 2000). Despite this, some far-right groups argue that Islam is eroding Christianity in the UK (Woodbridge, 2010). For example, Maddox (a BNP writer) claimed that Christianity 'is at its eleventh hour in Britain' and that 'atheistic liberalism and Muslim expansionism' could end 'Christian civilisation' (Woodbridge, 2010, p. 36). Due to the focus on Islam as a civilisational threat, some PRR groups focus on the perceived civilisational threat from Islam rather than just a threat to their country (Brubaker, 2017). Heydon, another BNP member, developed a new concept 'Civilisational Christianity' arguing that the BNP needed to defend it as Britain 'is currently deep in a clash of civilisations with Islam' (Woodbridge, 2010, p. 36). This Civilisational Christianity has led to identarian Christianity which is primarily a liberal defence of gay rights, free speech and gender equality (Brubaker, 2017). Christianity, therefore, is adopted as a civilisational identity not as a religion and is combined with secularism and certain liberal values (Brubaker, 2017). This is called 'secularised Christianity-as-culture' (Mouritsen, 2006, p. 77). Those associated with the Christian Civilisation are positioned as liberal and those associated with Islam as illiberal (Berntzen, 2019; Brubaker, 2017). Some PRR

groups use this historical connection with Christianity to propagate their arguments and beliefs.

Political disillusionment and de-alignment

The far-right is also concerned about the British establishment. Anti-establishment sentiment is common among ER and PRR groups (Allchorn, 2023; Tyndall, 2015; Bartlett & Littler, 2011). When referring to mainstream politics Tommy Robinson stated, 'people have had enough, they look for other options' (Ebner, 2017, p. 136). Britain First's, Paul Golding (2019) claimed that he joined the BNP because there was no other choice at the time. Members of the EDL have voiced their concern regarding prioritising minorities (especially Muslims) within multicultural Britain and ignoring the heterosexual, white, working-class male (Winlow et al., 2017). Since the 1960s, the political left has abandoned its commitment to class struggle by moving towards identity politics (Gest et al., 2018; Winlow et al., 2017). Bangstad et al., (2019, p. 9) argue that the Labour party have become a party of 'champagne socialists', ignoring the concerns of working-class British people. This has led some previous Labour supporters to vote for the Conservative Party or UKIP or abstaining from voting (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018). EDL members stated that individuals like Tommy Robinson speak for them as he did not attend Eton and they share a similar upbringing (Pilkington, 2016). This suggests that some far-right groups attempt to voice the concerns of disenfranchised British citizens.

Loss of nationhood

Loss of nationhood may also be a concern for the PRR. *Nationhood* can be defined as 'imagined communities' of people connected through 'social solidarity, common descent or any other bases for constituting a political community' (Anderson, 2006, p. 13; Calhoun, 1993, p. 216). Fascistic and nationalistic groups focus on the perceived lack of cohesive nationhood in the UK (O'Toole, 2018; Tyndall, 2015) and the notion of Englishness is 'now an uncertain identity' (Haseler, 2017, p. 11). Nationhood and cohesion relate to immigration and migration. The mixing of races and nationalities is a concern among some members of the far-right (Dafnos, 2020). It is argued that the formation of the EDL was a symptom of an English identity crisis which was weaponised

against Islam (Copsey, 2010). Groups such as Britain First, the BNP and the EDL are concerned about Britain's culture and ancestral ethnic heritage, highlighting the fear of immigration (Dafnos, 2020; Allen, 2014). Some EDL supporters argue that symbols of English patriotism (such as flags) have been suppressed in British politics and society (Allchorn, 2018) further eroding this sense of nationhood.

Fake news and cancel culture

Fake or biased stories propagated through mainstream and social media is also a concern. PRR groups are critical of the media, especially the BBC. For example, a BBC Newsnight video called 'Are we witnessing a 'new wave of far-right extremism' In the UK' (2019) showed that while the BBC filmed a DFLA rally, a spokesman of the DFLA said 'all of you are fake news' (BBC Newsnight, 2019, 10:06). Research by Pilkington (2016) found that one third of EDL members accused the media of misrepresenting the EDL. The For Britain National Manifesto (2020) states that mainstream media favours multiculturalism, socialist ideas and open borders while Tommy Robinson argues that he has been censored by the mainstream media (Cleland et al., 2018). He states that social media companies act on behalf of the British government and are banning him from Facebook, Twitter and YouTube in an attempt to reduce his audience and silence him (Jones et al, 2019). This connects to TGR conspiracy theory which states that any argument against mass immigration is censored (Camus, 2018) and links to a perceived victimisation of the far-right.

Related to this perceived censorship, research suggests that British far-right supporters argue that liberal society has been infiltrated by 'woke culture' which involves 'deplatforming, trigger warnings, safe spaces, the campaign against microaggressions, claims of cultural appropriation and the rise of cancel culture' (Malešević, 2022, pp. 1-2; Pereira De Sá & Pereira Alberto, 2022). *Cancel culture* 'is a manifestation of wokeism which is an ideology that views reality as socially constructed and defined by power, oppression and group identity' (Velasco, 2020, p. 2; Beiner, 2020). The far-right argues against moral relativism in woke culture where there is no objective truth only relativism. There are the oppressors and the oppressed (Malešević, 2022). While the far-right are often the perpetrators of hate crime and anti-immigration

hatred (Copsey et al., 2013), supporters of the PRR argue that they are the victims of a woke culture that aims to oppress dissenting, anti-woke voices (e.g., Waters, 2018; Robinson, 2017).

The COVID-19 pandemic

Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic is a concern of the British far-right (Wondreys & Mudde, 2022; Ehsan, 2020). Although some argue that COVID-19 posed a significant danger to the nation, most PRR arguments denied the existence of COVID-19, believing it instead to be a conspiracy of oppression (Wondreys & Mudde, 2022). The main conspiracy theory utilised by the far-right relating to COVID-19 is The Great Reset. This conspiracy argues that the technocratic global elite are reducing personal freedoms by creating a totalitarian socialist-communist New World Order (Rectenwald, 2021). It is a combination of different conspiracy theories meaning that different people support this conspiracy depending on their positionality, ideology and beliefs (Christensen & Au, 2023). For example, some people support The Great Reset conspiracy theory because it opposes corporate power while another might be concerned about lockdown measures and mask mandates because it infringes upon their freedom (Christensen & Au, 2023). According to the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2022), depending on the combination, The Great Reset is said to either lead to economic collapse, Marxist rule or a corporate capitalist surveillance dystopia. They argue that The Great Reset conspiracy claims that COVID-19 and the vaccination programme have been specifically implemented to oppress mass populations.

Conclusion on the British far-right

As with the typical European PRR supporter, although sexually modern supporters are present, the most common PRR supporter is the conservative nativist (the older, low educated male). However, these typologies only utilise three demographics: age, education level and gender. Therefore, the additional four demographics suggest that the typical British far-right supporter is a white, working class, heterosexual, Christian.

Previous research highlights six main grievances of the British PRR: (1) segregation and immigration, (2) the erosion of 'Western', cultural, and religious values (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34), (3) political disillusionment or de-alignment, (4) loss of nationhood (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018), (5) fake news and cancel culture and (6) the COVID-19 pandemic. Some supporters of the PRR are working class and fear that immigration poses a threat to their job. However, immigration may also be a threat to the perceived national cultural identity causing religious and ethnic segregation. Muslims and political Islam are perceived to be a threat to British (Christian) values. These values include women's rights, LGB rights, children's rights and animal rights. Some PRR supporters are also concerned that the mainstream political parties prioritise Muslims, immigrants and minorities over the heterosexual, white, working-class male (Winlow et al., 2017) leading to a loss of nationhood. This threat is further exacerbated by the perceived fake news and cancel culture which the PRR argue favours multicultural Britain. The COVID-19 pandemic is also a concern of the British PRR. Some claim that the ruling elite used COVID-19 to install a global totalitarian dictatorship.

3.5 Overall Conclusion

This chapter discussed the research on the European and British far-right. Using previous literature, it aimed to address three research questions: (i) 'who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK?', (ii) 'what are their main grievances?' and (iii) 'why do individuals express support for these groups?' This chapter has also identified several research gaps in the academic literature on the far-right. In doing so, it provides the basis for the empirical work underpinning this doctoral thesis to make an important contribution to the field.

This chapter highlighted several research gaps in the far-right literature. Little research focuses on far-right street movements because these groups are hard to access (Mudde, 2019). In this research I will analyse two far-right street movements, the DFLA and PEGIDA UK. This will contribute to knowledge. Although research has examined whether cultural or economic grievances are more powerful predictors of far-right support, little research has explored the importance of political-based grievances. I will, therefore, explore all three types of grievances in this thesis: cultural, economic and

political contributing new knowledge to the far-right research field. Although some research explicitly states that the majority of British far-right supporters are white (Pilkington, 2016; Jackson & Feldman, 2011; Boon, 2010), existing research (Pilkington, 2016) suggests that the EDL attracted some supporters that were racially minoritized. This type of supporter has gained limited attention in the field of far-right research and, therefore, little is known about who they are and what their view/arguments might be. This supporter will be explored in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 to better understand this type of supporter and contributing to knowledge.

Although previous research explores the relationship between far-right groups and pro-animal rights positions (Pilkington, 2016; Zúquete, 2008), little research has explored the spectrum of animal rights arguments in the anti-Islam PRR. Some supporters of the PRR are concerned that British (Christian) values are being eroded by mass immigration, especially Muslim immigration. An example of these British (Christian) values are animal rights. However, some contrasting research suggests that the far-right are only protecting certain liberal views to oppose Islam. Berntzen (2019) argues that supporters and leaders of the anti-Islam PRR can be either strategically liberal or semi-liberal. Although there appears to be different arguments used in relation to liberal values in the anti-Islam PRR, few researchers have explored this phenomena. This will also be explored in Chapter 8 of this thesis contributing to the far-right literature field.

Further, Lancaster (2020) outlined three supporter categories, but these are only based on three variables: gender, age and education level. In her research, she identified the presence of sexually modern nativists in the European PRR: the young, higher educated woman. This contradicts the typical supporter of the far-right, the conservative nativist (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This category, therefore, will be further developed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 to explore who the sexually modern nativists are and what are their main views and arguments contributing to the far-right literature field. Further, sexually modern nativists overtly state that they want to protect 'Western' liberal values including LGB(T) rights and women's rights (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). However, the protection of these values is heavily related to opposing Islam which is seen by sexually modern nativists as being anti-LGB(T) rights and against women's rights. This perceived support of LGB(T) rights differs from other more extreme right

groups and warrants further exploration (Foster & Kirke, 2023). In Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in this thesis, therefore, I will explore this use of LGB(T) rights by the supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK and highlight the heterogeneity of their LGB(T) arguments. This has not been explored before and will be a contribution to knowledge.

Some far-right supporters and leaders differentiate between Islam the religion and Islamist extremism. However, some do not, and others contradict themselves (e.g., Innes et al., 2018; Kassimeris & Jackson, 2015). I will explore this relationship in Chapter 7. This is another contribution to knowledge. Further, while some PRR groups claim to protect children from all perpetrators, most PRR groups only reference child abuse assumed to be perpetrated by immigrants and/or Muslims (e.g., Robinson, 2017; Pilkington, 2016). In this thesis I will, therefore, explore the relationship between children's rights arguments and the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. This has also not been explored before and is another contribution to knowledge. This doctoral thesis aims to address each of these research gaps. In addition to the three research questions which address the twelve research gaps outlined in Chapter 1, the theoretical framework also helps address some of these gaps. This theoretical framework is explored in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

A theoretical framework for the anti-Islam PRR

While the three research questions, the definitions, distinctions and previous findings are relevant to this doctoral thesis, the theoretical framework used in this research is also important. This, therefore, is the focus of this chapter. It begins by comparing different theoretical frameworks within far-right research: authoritarian personality (Adorno, 1950), social class (Lipset, 1960), the single-issue theory (Mudde, 2019), the Clash of Civilisations theory (Huntington, 1993), the losers of modernisation theory (Betz, 1994), Cultural Backlash Theory (CBT) (Norris and Inglehart, 2019), rate of change theory (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017) and Group Relative Deprivation (GRD) theory (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). It then discusses the two theories and six concepts I use to analyse the findings in the three empirical chapters in this doctoral thesis (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). The two theories and six concepts are: CBT, GRD, strategic liberalism (homonationalism, femonationalism, animal nationalism, vegan nationalism) and semi-liberalism. Finally, it discusses how I use this theoretical framework in this research and outlines the originality of this doctoral thesis. In doing so, it discusses which theories I use to address research questions i, ii and iii.

4.1 Theoretical framework used in far-right research

As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, much academic research has focused on the topic of the far-right. However, one of the main difficulties with researching this area is related to the overarching theoretical framework. Researchers have attempted to explain right-wing activism, violence and terrorism through a number of theories. These include (but are not limited to): the authoritarian personality (Adorno, 1950), social class (Lipset, 1960), the single-issue theory (Mudde, 2019), the Clash of Civilisations theory (Huntington, 1993), the losers of modernisation theory (Betz, 1994), CBT (Norris and Inglehart, 2019), rate of change theory (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017) and GRD (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018).

Due to the multi-disciplinary nature of far-right studies (e.g., Macklin, 2020; Mudde, 2019; Pilkington, 2016; Roiser & Willig, 2002; Lipset, 1960), most of these

theories are distinct from each other and focus on different aspects of the far-right. For example, the authoritarian personality (Adorno, 1950) is from a Social Psychology approach and focuses on the authoritarian attitudes of the supporter (Roiser & Willig, 2002), while the Social Class theory is from a Sociological approach (Lipset, 1960) and hypothesises that working class people are more prone to authoritarian and anti-democracy tendencies (Dekker & Ester, 1987). By using two main theories (CBT and GRD), this doctoral thesis focuses on certain aspects of the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), The For Britain Movement (TFBM) and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA UK). It, therefore, focuses on some dimensions of these groups more than others. For example, this thesis does not use the Social Class theory (Lipset, 1960) potentially meaning that some issues relating to class are missed in the three empirical chapters. Despite this, I use CBT and GRD theory as they were the most applicable and helpful when analysing the data from the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK.

To understand the CBT and GRD theory, this section discusses the importance of demand and supply-side factors of the Populist Radical Right (PRR). Within the PRR literature both supply and demand-side factors influence the rise, success and failure of the PRR (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Van Kessel, 2015). *Demand-side factors* are societal forces that shape public belief, attitudes and values such as immigration, globalisation and rising ethno-cultural diversity (Spierings et al., 2020; Goodwin, 2011). These create opportunities for parties or groups to attract new supporters who have views that are not discussed by other political parties (Spierings et al., 2020; Mudde, 2007). The *supply-side factors* are the appeals made by political parties which seek to attract new supporters as well as the institutional context that shapes the electoral system (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). For example, by moderating any messages that might be considered as 'xenophobic' for the purpose of appearing more moderate and not being deplatformed (Spierings et al., 2020; Goodwin, 2011). Previous research recognises that a combination of both supply and demand-side factors influence the PRR (e.g., Spierings et al., 2020; Golder, 2016). Therefore, this doctoral thesis focuses on both the supporters (primarily demand-side) and leaders (primarily supply-side) of three British anti-Islam PRR groups, exploring who expresses support for these groups, what their main grievances are and why people express support for them.

Previous research has focused on both the demand and supply side of the far-right. Early theories used to explain far-right support centred around two distinct directions: (1) the psychoanalytical argument of the authoritarian personality, understanding the far-right as a pathology of modernity and (2) vulnerability to radicalisation by the lower classes (Lipset, 1960; Adorno, 1950). Later, between 1980 and 2000, researchers argued that RR groups were single issue groups only focusing on immigration. However, this single-issue theory has been debunked as the PRR usually focuses on four main themes: immigration, security, corruption and foreign policy (Mudde, 2019). Further, the Clash of Civilisations thesis (Huntington, 1996; 1993) has been used to explain the rise in the far-right (e.g., Haynes, 2021). The far-right have also used this theory (often implicitly) to divide the 'Western' civilisation and the 'Islamic' civilisation (Haynes, 2021; Bottici & Challand, 2013). In his thesis, Huntington (1993) argued that the most significant global conflicts would result from a clash between the 'Western' and the 'Islamic' civilisations. This clash would primarily be political due to perceived different attitudes towards the democratic system with 'Western' (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34) countries supporting democracy and Muslim-majority countries opposing democracy. Although influential, researchers have criticised this theory of conflict for its lack of rigour and its Islamophobic undertones (Fuller, 2002; Hunter, 1998; Esposito, 1997). Therefore, I do not use this theory to analyse the findings in this doctoral thesis. However, as some far-right groups use this theory to explain their worldview (e.g., Haynes, 2021) I use this theory to understand the British PRRs perception and views.

As new research debunked the old far-right theories, two main theories have become the most prevalent in explaining the far-right: economic insecurity and cultural backlash (Georgiadou et al., 2018). Economic insecurity focuses on the so-called 'left behinds' in society as a result of the transformation of the post-industrial workforce (Ford & Goodwin, 2014a, p. 10). An example of an economic-based theory (e.g., Bornschier, 2018; Ford & Goodwin, 2014a) is the *losers of modernization theory* (Betz, 1994). A study by Hopkin and Blyth (2019) found that there was a positive relationship between far-right success and how market economies distribute risk, wealth and income. Although there is research to suggest that far-right activity is primarily driven by economic-based grievances, other research is inconclusive or does not support this

theory (Inglehart & Norris, 2019; 2016; Carvacho et al., 2013; Givens, 2005; Sniderman et al., 2004; Golder, 2003; Lipset, 1983).

In contrast to economic-based theories, cultural-based theories focus on the rejection of certain values related to multi-culturalism and cosmopolitanism. Previous research suggests that cultural grievances are the most important for far-right mobilisation (Mudde, 2019). It is argued that the contemporary far-right are engaged in a culture war with the left, in opposition to the cultural revolution that occurred in the 1960s (Drolet & Williams, 2022). In their research, Inglehart and Norris (2016) found that distrust in political elites and governance, authoritarian values and anti-immigration sentiment are more consistently predictive of far-right support in comparison to economic insecurity, such as social benefits or unemployment.

More specifically, previous research highlights that there is a difference between the Extreme Right (ER) and the PRR, especially regarding theories that explain voter support for these two distinct categories. Economic-based theories are more likely to explain ER support, whereas culture-based theories are effective when discussing PRR groups (Georgiadou et al., 2018). ER groups are more influenced by taxation, unemployment, Gross Domestic Product contraction and the wage share compared to the PRR (e.g., Georgiadou et al., 2018; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Norris, 2005). In contrast, concern over immigration is the most important factor for PRR supporters, with political cynicism being the second most important (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Ivarsflaten, 2008; Rydgren 2008; Norris, 2005; Van der Brug et al., 2000). Further, rate of change theory is also an important theory in far-right literature. This theory posits that it is not only immigration that influences anti-immigration attitudes but also the rate at which immigration increases (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017). Sudden significant demographic changes can trigger significant political reactions (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017).

Research specifically on the PRR suggests that cultural-based grievances are more important for PRR support and mobilisation (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Economic-based theories, therefore, are addressed to some extent through GRD and CBT which are discussed in the next paragraphs. However, this thesis does not engage in separate and detailed analysis of economic-based theories in isolation (such as the losers of

modernization theory) as it is beyond the scope of this doctoral research. However, despite the importance of culture-based theories, concerns relating to economic security can be argued to reinforce the cultural backlash. For example, areas with high unemployment rates are likely to be more sensitive to immigration leading to demographic changes. In these areas, high unemployment levels are likely to be blamed on immigration driving voters to the ER. Therefore, economic-based theories and cultural-based theories likely overlap to some degree as can be seen in CBT and rate of change theory (Georgiadou et al., 2018; Gidron & Hall, 2017). As outlined by Ausserladscheider (2019), although these theories are often presented as opposing, they can be combined to explain the rise of the far-right, especially in certain social and economic contexts.

Further, subjective perceptions of deprivation can also influence the far-right (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2022; Manstead, 2018; Lipset, 1983). For example, if one group perceives themselves to be worse off than another group, they may feel relatively deprived compared to the other group. Even if they are not relatively deprived in absolute terms, their perception is important (Meuleman et al., 2020). Group Relative Deprivation theory aims to explain grievances due to perceptions of different types of deprivation (Ausserladscheider, 2019; Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). In this doctoral thesis, I combine CBT, GRD theory and theoretical concepts under the umbrella of strategic liberalism (femonationalism, homonationalism, animal nationalism, vegan nationalism) and semi-liberalism to analyse the main findings. The next section outlines the specific theories and concepts I use in this doctoral thesis.

4.2 Cultural Backlash Theory


The CBT has been used by previous researchers to analyse the far-right. (e.g., Off, 2023; Kriesi, 2020). Therefore, CBT is the first theory I use to analyse the findings in this doctoral research. As outlined in Figure 3, *Cultural Backlash Theory* (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) argues that:

1. since the 1970s, 'Western' (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34) democratic societies, including the United Kingdom (UK), have transitioned from focusing on

materialist values, such as the economy, to post-materialist values, such as racial equality and feminism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

2. This has occurred as a consequence of a silent revolution which has resulted in an encouragement of tolerance between different ethnic, cultural and religious groups as well as diverse lifestyles in general (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).
3. Cultural Backlash Theory argues that when society reaches a tipping point, where social conservatives (conservative nativists) became the cultural minority as a result of the silent revolution, some individuals (especially older, less educated, white men who hold authoritarian attitudes) oppose these changes in values. For example, some individuals may oppose racial or gender equality, be anti-immigration or believe climate change does not exist. This pushback against the silent revolution is called the authoritarian reflex (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).
4. The recent migration of people (including refugees and individuals with different ethnic, cultural, and religious backgrounds) has changed the cultural dynamic of the West which can be perceived as threatening core European values. When combined with the increased terrorist attacks from Islamist groups, fluctuating identification with Europe, and lack of trust in government and the establishment, this strengthens the authoritarian reflex (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Figure 3

The six-stage process of cultural backlash

Note. This figure highlights the process of CBT which was created by Norris and Inglehart (2019).

To summarise, CBT argues that a cultural cleavage has emerged due to immigration, economic conditions and rapid cultural change. This has triggered an authoritarian reflex among certain individuals who perceive themselves to be threatened by these rapid changes in cultural values. This authoritarian reflex encourages collective security through increased conformity to traditional values - an Us and Them narrative and support for strong leaders. This reflex is reinforced by populist narratives emphasising anti-establishment rhetoric, attacking politicians and immigrants and reasserting power to the people (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). There are two dimensions to this theory: the demand-side and the supply-side. The first four components of this theory can be

considered the demand-side and the last two can be considered the supply-side where politicians have gained power and more votes through populist and anti-immigrant rhetoric. This doctoral thesis focuses on both the demand-side and supply-side factors, in order to understand why individuals express support for these three anti-Islam PRR groups, what their main grievances are and why people express support for them.

Assumptions in Cultural Backlash Theory

In addition to understanding the main arguments of the CBT, it is also important to highlight the main assumptions of this theory: the silent revolution and the definitions of populism and authoritarianism. The silent revolution is important in CBT. This is the assumption that beginning in the 1970s there was a significant cultural shift from materialist values, such as physical security, to post-materialist values, such as environmentalism (e.g., Norris & Inglehart, 2019; 2009). This assumes that the spread of post-materialist values has become dominant through inter-generational replacement where Generation X and Millennials, who are less authoritarian, replace the Interwar and Baby Boomer birth cohorts, who were more authoritarian (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Inglehart, 2008).

According to this theory, there are four main generations: (1) The Interwar cohort, who were born before 1945 and would now be a minimum of 76 years old, (2) the Baby Boomers cohort, born between 1946 and 1964, who would now be between 57 and 75 years old, (3) Generation X who were born between 1965 and 1979 and would now be between 42 and 56 years old and (4) Millennials who were born between 1980 and 1996 who would now be between 25 and 41 years old (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Social conservatives are the most likely to engage in this cultural backlash and are from the Interwar and Baby Boomer generations. *Social conservatives* can be defined as individuals that have traditional values regarding family, country and faith. They are most commonly white, older men. These individuals were once the majority in 'Western' (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34) democratic society but because of cultural value changes and birth cohorts, they have become the minority (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Two terms are used in the literature to describe this group of people: social conservative (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) and conservative nativist (Lancaster, 2020). They represent the typical far-right supporter - the older, low educated, white conservative male who reacts

against post-materialism (Lancaster, 2020). Therefore, this doctoral thesis uses both terms simultaneously to describe the typical PRR supporter.

The second assumption relates to the definitions used in CBT: populism and authoritarianism. Norris and Inglehart (2019, p. 66) define a populist group as believing that (1) 'the only legitimate democratic authority [comes] directly from the people', and (2) 'established powerholders are' perceived as 'deeply corrupt, and self-interested, betraying public trust and thwarting the popular will'. Specifically, populist narratives challenge power structures of the state that link the people and state within liberal democracies. This includes the rule of law, the courts, the elected members of parliaments, mainstream political parties, mainstream media and public-sector bureaucrats as well as policy technocrats such as think tanks, scientific consultants and opinion formers (Norris and Inglehart, 2019).

Further, according to Norris and Inglehart (2019), there are two premises that authoritarian cultures are based on: (1) The first is the Us and Them distinction. This belief centres around a shared identity through culture, language, religion etc where a group of people are seen as compatible and homogenous. This comprises the Us component. Then, there is a Them component where a group is identified as incompatible with the Us group making clear distinctions between the two groups. (2) The second premise is the belief that the group's security is under threat from the other group. Both politicians and other groups are not to be trusted (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). If an individual deems their country and way of life to be under threat, this could trigger an authoritarian reflex (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). All three anti-Islam PRR groups in this doctoral thesis display some or all authoritarian traits. In their research, Norris and Inglehart (2019) do not treat populist and authoritarian narratives and values as distinct categories, they treat them as a matter of degree. Therefore, this doctoral thesis also treats populist and authoritarian rhetoric as a matter of degree.

4.3 Social Movement Theory

While CBT may explain some aspects of the PRR (Lancaster, 2020), other theories are also needed to fully explain the three groups in this doctoral thesis. Social movements can be defined as 'a critical tool of facing an unequal world' (Burawoy, 2015, p. 17) 'that reflect existing inequalities and with their transformative power give hope for a better

future' (Muliavka, 2021, p. 2). The use of *Social Movement Theory* (SMT) is important as researchers of the far-right often focus on political parties thereby limiting understanding of far-right social movements (Caiani & Parenti, 2016; Carter, 2013; Art, 2011; Ignazi, 2003). Although scholars primarily use SMT to research progressive social movements (Blee, 2017b), other researchers use SMT as a framework for researching contentious political groups, such as terrorist groups (Anderson & Sandberg, 2020; Beck, 2008), white supremacist groups (Blee, 2017b), PRR groups (Caiani & Della Porta, 2018) and far-right extremist groups (Pilkington, 2016).

Castelli Gattinara and Pirro (2019) detail how far-right researchers could categorise far-right groups as social movements, thereby, adopting a SMT theoretical framework. More recently, one of the few pieces of academic research focusing on the DFLA by Allen (2019b) conceptualised the DFLA as a new social movement. Further, Ravndal (2018) focused on three mobilising features of right-wing movements within SMT: grievance, political opportunity and polarization theory while Castelli Gattinara et al., (2022) focused on grievances, opportunities and resources in the far-right using SMT. Other researchers have focused specifically on the grievances within SMT that motivate individuals to support far-right groups or parties. Further, Ajil (2022) identified three related grievances in his radicalisation research: (1) ethnic, racial and religious grievances, (2) socioeconomic grievances and (3) political grievances. As shown, several experts in far-right research have used SMT and therefore, I also use SMT in this doctoral thesis.

Relative deprivation theory

Within SMT there are two main theories used to explain social movements: grievance theory synonymously known as relative deprivation theory (Gurr, 1970) and opportunity theory (Koopmans, 1996). Grievance theory focuses on how grievances can lead to mobilisation. Previous research suggests that grievances are the main motive for joining rebellious movements (Siroky et al., 2020; Pilkington, 2016; Petersen, 2002; Horowitz, 1985; Hechter, 1977; Gurr, 1970; Davies, 1962), radical groups (Brils et al., 2022; Doosje et al., 2016; Peterka-Benton, 2014) and for engaging in right-wing violent extremism and terrorism (Garcia, 2015; Heitmeyer, 2003). In contrast, the opportunity-based model

outlines how political elites, institutions and parties can shape political opportunities that can lead to mobilisation (Koopmans, 1996). These two theories focus on different aspects of the political process. Relative deprivation theory focuses on the demand-side and political opportunity theory focuses on the supply-side of politics. Although, Ravndal (2018) found that both the grievance model and the opportunity model explained the rise in far-right extremism, as this doctoral research mainly focuses on demand-side factors of the far-right, I use relative deprivation theory rather than political opportunity theory to analyse the findings from the three empirical studies.

This doctoral thesis also draws on the definition by Simmons (2014, p. 3) who states that the term grievance refers 'to the central claims a social movement is making – the practices, policies, or phenomena that movement members claim they are working to change (or preserve)'. For example, the grievance model theorises that grievances relating to asylum seekers, foreigners and perceived marginalisation are the cause of far-right mobilisation. According to the theorists of deprivation theory, social movements are created when people in society perceive themselves to be deprived of certain resources, goods or services (Kunst & Obaidi, 2020; McAdam et al., 1988; Opp, 1988).

Greitemeyer and Sagioglou (2019) and McAdam et al., (1988), argue that there are two branches within deprivation theory: absolute deprivation and relative deprivation. Absolute deprivation theory treats the grievances of certain individuals and groups as isolated from the person or groups position in society. Relative deprivation theory focuses on the grievances of people that feel they are deprived in comparison to others within society. The belief that an individual is relatively deprived in comparison to others within society can create feelings of grievance, frustration and resentment (Greitemeyer & Sagioglou, 2019; Smith et al., 2012, p. 204; Pettigrew, 2002, p. 361). Kus et al., (2014) argue that the perception of relative deprivation is more important than the group's objective condition. Relative deprivation, in comparison to other related economic-based theories, may be the best theory to explain certain grievances as 'structural inequalities need to be perceived to be unfair, in order to spark mobilization' (Must & Rustad, 2018, p. 500; Schwander & Manow, 2017; Gurr, 1970). Gurr (1970), argues that the greater the gap (the degree of relative deprivation) the more likely

political violence will occur, further highlighting the important influence of relative deprivation. Although some researchers found a weak link between relative deprivation and collective action (Allan et al., 2015), Muliavka (2021) argues that this weak link is due to the over focus on economic grievances.

Research on relative deprivation has focused primarily on testing the relationship between economic grievances, relative deprivation and social mobilisation (Kurer et al., 2019; Kern et al., 2015; Solt, 2015). However, Muliavka (2021) proposes a theoretical framework of grievance theory, which returns to Gurr's (1968) conceptualisation of grievance which included both economic and political grievances. This theoretical framework expands the focus of relative deprivation theory. Therefore, I use relative deprivation theory in this doctoral thesis to analyse the findings using both dimensions of grievance. More specifically, Meuleman et al (2020) links Group Relative Deprivation to the far-right. *Group Relative Deprivation* focuses on the group as a whole which is deemed relatively deprived compared to another group. For example, an in-group (for example, Christian British citizens) may perceive themselves to be relatively deprived compared to an out-group (for example, Muslims in general) creating the perception of GRD. This GRD contrasts with the notion of individual relative deprivation which is less powerful in predicting anti-immigration prejudice (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). I, therefore, use GRD to analyse the findings in this doctoral thesis.

Further, some also argue (for example, Ahmad & Monaghan, 2019) that previous research within the field of radicalisation has ignored other factors such as the wider socio-political causes of radicalisation. Instead, they argue research on radicalisation has overemphasised the importance of the individual and group (Ahmad & Monaghan, 2019; Lafaye & Rapin, 2017; Kundnani, 2012; Sedgwick, 2010). For example, the treatment of Muslims generally as 'suspects' in the UK's counter-terrorism Prevent programme (Pilkington & Acik, 2020, p. 181) has increased Islamophobia and influenced grievances related to Muslims and Islam in the far-right (Abbas, 2020; Abbas & Awan, 2015). This highlights the importance of the socio-political context and its impact on grievances. Because of this neglect of socio-political issues, Ajil (2022) proposes that scholars should prioritise focusing on grievances to further understand why individuals support social movements within the field of radicalisation. Further, Siroky et al (2020)

argues that in order to understand why social movements mobilise, research needs to focus on different types of grievances (Siroky et al., 2020). Drawing on multi-disciplinary literature from security studies, SMT, sociology, civil war disciplines, political science and social psychology, Ajil (2022) identified three types of grievance in the field of radicalisation: (1) ethnic, racial and religious (referred to as *cultural-based*), (2) socioeconomic (referred to as *economic-based grievances*), and (3) *political grievances*. These three grievance types often overlap as shown in Table 3. Ajil's (2022) model incorporates cultural-based grievances rather than just economic-based and political-based grievances like Muliavka (2021) and Gurr (1968). Due to the importance of the CBT in far-right research (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), Ajil's (2022) inclusion of cultural-based grievances is important. In this doctoral thesis, therefore, I follow the three types of grievances identified in the left and right columns of Ajil's (2022) model.

Table 3

The three types of grievances in radicalisation

	Locally oriented/inspired	Globally oriented/inspired
Ethnic, religious, racial grievances	Hostile majority, ethnic dominance Discrimination based on ethnic, religious or racial factors Securitization, 'suspectification', misrecognition Ethnic, racial or religious hatred, racism, xenophobia, 'othering'	Systematic or recurring stigmatization and discrimination of a collective characterized by race, ethnicity or religion on a global level
Socio-economic grievances	Low socio-economic status, poverty, relative material deprivation, economic deprivation Economic discrimination, exclusion and marginalization, characterized by income inequality, hampered access to the labour or housing markets and the education system	Grievances related to the negative repercussions of globalization, modernization and capitalism
Political grievances	Dysfunctional mechanisms of political representation, low representation of minorities in positions of influence, lack of civil rights Hampered access to the political system, alienation and exclusion from mainstream political processes Loss of trust in the government, corruption Suspension of civil liberties, censorship, banning of political parties, political repression (e.g. anti-terrorism laws) Violent state repression, persecution of minorities	Domination and primacy of a hegemonic power Deficient or biased system of international accountability: impunity of crimes of war Legacy of colonialism and imperialism, expansionist and interventionist foreign policy (military occupations and invasions), systematic large-scale violence and persecution of minorities

Note. The three types of grievances with examples. These grievances account for dissatisfaction with social, political or economic conditions (Ajil, 2022, p. 8).

In addition to Ajil's (2022) model, I also use Lancaster's (2020) three RR typologies: (1) conservative nativists or social conservatives (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) who are older, low educated men, (2) sexually modern nativists who are less nationalistic and support women's rights and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) rights but are still anti-immigration or anti-Islam. These individuals are more likely to be higher educated, young women. (3) Moderate nativists defined as individuals that fall between conservative nativists and sexually modern nativists. As Lancaster (2020) does not outline the demographics for the moderate nativist supporter, I primarily use the conservative nativist type and sexually modern nativist type to categorise the supporters/leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK.

The above section focused on SMT, Ajil's (2022) model and Lancaster's (2020) three typologies. Within SMT, there are two main theories: grievance theory or deprivation theory and opportunity theory (Castelli Gattinara et al., 2022; Koopmans, 1996; Gurr, 1970). Grievance theory focuses on grievances that can lead to mobilisation whereas opportunity theory focuses on how political elites, institutions or parties can shape political opportunities that can lead to mobilisation (Castelli Gattinara et al., 2022; Koopmans, 1996; Gurr, 1970). As this doctoral thesis primarily focuses on demand-side factors, I use deprivation theory. There are two branches of deprivation theory: absolute deprivation and relative deprivation (Greitemeyer & Sagioglou, 2019; McAdam et al., 1988). This thesis is concerned with relative deprivation as it discusses perceptions of deprivation rather than simply the objective condition of individuals. More specifically, research on the far-right suggests that GRD is powerful when predicting anti-immigration prejudice (Kunst & Obaidi, 2020; Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). Therefore, I use GRD to analyse the findings in the three empirical chapters. Further, grievance theory has previously been used to analyse economic-based grievances and political-based grievances (Muliavka, 2021; Gurr, 1968). Ajil (2022) further expands on these grievances to include ethnic, religious and racial grievances making his model more applicable to this doctoral thesis. Finally, Lancaster (2020) outlined three RR typologies: the conservative nativist, the sexually modern nativist and the moderate nativist. I also, therefore, use these typologies to categorise the PRR supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK.

4.4 Strategic liberalism and semi-liberalism

In addition to the concepts associated with CBT and GRD theories, I also use other concepts in this doctoral research. As highlighted in Chapter 2, the anti-Islam PRR use some liberal values (Berntzen, 2019; Pilkington, 2016). Researchers (e.g., Foster and Kirke, 2023) have debated whether this use is authentic. This doctoral thesis, therefore, continues this debate in Chapter 8 furthering understanding of the PRRs use of liberal values which may help bring some supporters/leaders of the PRR back into mainstream politics.

Different terms have been used in the literature on the far-right to describe this strategic use of some liberal values. Terms include ethnocentric liberalism, liberal nationalism, liberal illiberalism, instrumental liberalism and alter-progressivism (Foster & Kirke, 2023; Berntzen, 2019; Margulies, 2018; Moffitt, 2017; Akkerman, 2005; Griffin, 2000). However, these terms were not developed to analyse the anti-Islam far-right specifically. Berntzen (2019) on the other hand specifically developed the term strategic liberalism to explain the anti-Islam far-right's use of certain liberal values. The term strategic liberalism, therefore, is specifically applicable to the three groups in this doctoral thesis. Berntzen (2019) identified two pathways into anti-Islam PRR groups: the strategic calculation pathway and the emotional response pathway. In the *strategic calculation pathway* individuals were anti-Islam when they started to support the anti-Islam PRR but then strategically used some liberal views (Berntzen, 2019). This includes strategically using women's rights, LGBT rights and animal rights in an attempt to appear more liberal and moderate. *Strategic liberalism* then includes all four theoretical concepts I use in this doctoral thesis: homonationalism, femonationalism, animal nationalism and vegan nationalism. These four concepts are all rooted in nationalism and are discussed in the next paragraphs.

According to Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2019), *nationalism* is by definition exclusionary. It centres around the idea of the in-group and out-group (Bonikowski et al., 2019). It seeks to preserve national homogeneity by focusing on the identity and perceived unity of a nation by excluding those that are perceived as the out-group and not part of the nation (Singh, 2021; Breuilly, 2003). There are two types of nationalism: ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. *Ethnic nationalism* is exclusionary which focuses on native culture and common descent. This form of nationalism is organic and the criteria is unchangeable (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2019; Smith, 1991). The civic form of nationalism is more inclusive and emphasises ideological, legal and political criteria. Researchers often associate the PRR with ethnic nationalism (e.g., Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). Despite this, some PRR groups use civic elements in their agendas (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2019; Halikiopoulou et al., 2013). This far-right *civic nationalism* narrative has two features: value-based exclusion and welfare chauvinism. The following paragraphs discuss concepts relating to both ethnic nationalism (white

nationalism) and civic nationalism (homonationalism, femonationalism, animal nationalism and vegan nationalism).

This section discusses the main concepts used in this doctoral thesis. According to Hartzell (2018), *white nationalism* is a form of ethnic nationalism. It is typically concerned with protecting and preserving the white 'race' ensuring there is a separate territory for white people. It opposes multi-cultural diversity which is a threat to the white 'race' and aims to prevent the mixing of races and cultures (Hartzell, 2018, p. 10). This form of nationalism is unrelated to value-based exclusion and exclusively focuses on race-based exclusion.

The next concepts discussed are forms of civic nationalism, value-based nationalism. According to Puar (2013, p. 337), *Homonationalism* can be understood as 'fundamentally a deep critique of lesbian and gay liberal rights discourses and how those rights discourses produce narratives of progress and modernity that continue to accord some populations access to citizenship -cultural and legal- at the expense of the delimitation and expulsion of other populations'. One of the most important contributions of this concept to the far-right literature is 'how nationalist ideologies underscore public positions that favour LGBT rights' (Angevine, 2019, p. 1). Homonationalism combines tolerance of the LGBT⁷ community with racism and nationalism in an attempt to attract more LGBT members to the PRR and appear more tolerant than Islam (Pilkington, 2017). Homonationalism claims that individuals that identify as LGB need to be protected from the outsider who is threatening their freedoms. LGB individuals are conceptualised as one of the groups that are under threat reinforcing who is part of the nation and who is deemed an outsider (Hunklinger & Ajanović, 2022; Spierings, 2021; Puar, 2018; Schotten, 2016). According to Spierings (2021), populist homonationalists are the most likely to support PRR parties. Therefore, I use the concept of homonationalism in this doctoral thesis.

Femonationalism is connected to homonationalism. Farris's (2017) work builds on Jasbir Puar's (2013) concept of homonationalism. According to Farris (2017, p. 4), *femonationalism* is defined as 'the exploitation of feminist themes by nationalists and

⁷ Trans rights are often excluded from this far-right narrative where lesbian, gay and bisexual people are considered part of the people, but trans people are not (Spierings, 2021)

neoliberals in anti-Islam (anti-immigration) campaigns and to the participation of certain feminists and femocrats in the stigmatisation of Muslim men under the banner of gender inequality'. She argues that femonationalism is sometimes used by the far-right in an attempt to appear more liberal, more women friendly and superior to Islam. She highlights how Islamophobic narratives often argue that Islam is a misogynistic religion where Muslim women are self-enslaved and Muslim men are seen as oppressors of women. Femonationalism describes an attempted liberalisation of the far-right through the strategic use of gender equality. Farris (2017) claims that this equality argument is used in order to claim Islam is misogynistic. For example, Darya Safai is an Iranian-Belgian member of the nationalist and conservative New Flemish Alliance in Belgium. As a femonationalist, she argues that she supports old feminism, equality between men and women and states that new feminists support cultural relativism, where gender equality depends on culture and related factors (De Nieuwe Maan, 2019). Safai (2017) claims that feminists and progressives ignore the female victims of Islamism, instead focusing on Islamophobia, the burqa bans and other 'phantom' issues (Rahbari, 2021, p. 49). Other far-right leaders use femonationalism to increase hatred for the outsider but love and bonding for their country and people (Möser, 2022; Tebaldi, 2021). Therefore, I use the concept of femonationalism in this doctoral thesis.

Animal nationalism and vegan nationalism are both related to femonationalism and homonationalism. *Animal nationalism* is the strategic use of animal rights with nationalism in an attempt to appear more liberal but also superior compared to other countries or cultures (Miller, 2021; Gillespie & Narayanan, 2020). Howell (2015) argues that individuals use the treatment of animals to justify the inferiority of some peoples and cultures. For example, peoples/cultures that treat animals in a 'humane' way are positioned as superior to peoples and cultures that are perceived to treat animals inhumanly (Howell, 2015, p. 1). Like animal nationalism, *vegan nationalism* 'is a hegemonic discourse that positions vegans (and by extension their respect and support of animal rights) as another example of the ethical superiority of nations that welcome vegans as members of an exceptional minority group' (Yasui, 2022, p. 9). I also use animal nationalism and vegan nationalism in this doctoral thesis.

The concepts discussed above all assume that the PRR use some liberal values strategically to appear more moderate (e.g., Farris, 2017). However, in contrast to the

strategic calculation pathway outlined above, Berntzen (2019) developed a second pathway into the anti-Islam PRR: the *emotional response pathway*. He argues that some supporters and leaders of anti-Islam far-right groups are *semi-liberal* in that they support liberal values, including women's rights and LGB rights, but this support is not linked to nationalism. This suggests a move away from ethnic based nationalism on the one hand, but also a move towards authoritarian anti-Islam values on the other. He also argues that most supporters and leaders of anti-Islam groups and parties started from a liberal standpoint and drifted to the right in contrast to other far-right groups that started from an authoritarian standpoint and strategically used liberal values to distance themselves from the fascistic far-right. According to Berntzen (2019), the pivotal moment in turning from liberalism to authoritarianism was the conception that Islam is a totalitarian, oppressive religion. Some of the arguments made by PRR supporters/leaders in this doctoral thesis may be semi-liberal which are not explained using concepts of strategic liberalism. Consequently, I use both theoretical concepts of strategic liberalism and semi-liberalism in this doctoral thesis.

4.5 The theoretical framework I use in this doctoral thesis

In this doctoral thesis, I use CBT, GRD, concepts of strategic liberalism (homonationalism, femonationalism, animal nationalism, vegan nationalism) and semi-liberalism to analyse the findings of the three empirical chapters and address the three research questions: (i) Who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK, (ii) what are their main grievances and (iii) why do individuals express support for these groups? As I use a mixed methods design (addressed in Chapter 5), I use a combination of an inductive approach and a hypothetico-deductive model (Henn et al., 2009) to identify who expresses support for these groups and why? In study 1, I mostly employ a hypothetico-deductive model whereas in studies 2 and 3, I mainly employ an inductive approach. Although previous research on the far-right has used all eight theories and concepts (CBT, GRD, strategic liberalism, homonationalism, femonationalism, animal nationalism, vegan nationalism and semi-nationalism), in isolation, these theories do not adequately explain this far-right phenomena. I use this combination of two theories and six concepts to complement each other, combining both cultural-based theories and economic-based theories (Ausserladscheider, 2019). In addition to these theories and concepts, I also use the grievance-based model outlined by Ajil (2022), as shown in Table

3, in order to understand which type of grievance is more important for the supporters of these three groups: (1) ethnic, religious, and racial grievances (referred to as cultural-based grievances in this doctoral thesis), (2) socio-economic grievances (referred to as economic-based grievances in this doctoral thesis) and (3) political grievances. This model helps identify which grievance or combination of grievances is the most important when supporting the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK.

4.6 Originality of this research

This doctoral thesis further expands on the far-right literature in a number of methodological ways. Firstly, to my knowledge, the combination of CBT, GRD theory, strategic liberalism; femonationalism, homonationalism, animal nationalism, vegan nationalism and semi-liberalism has not been used before in academic research to explain the PRR. Further, as far as I am aware, researchers have not applied a mixed-methods design in grievance-based research focusing on these three groups. Researchers that have conducted research on the far-right using a grievance-based model have often only used a quantitative, statistical, deductive, hypothesis testing approach (Ajil, 2022, Lamprianou & Ellinas, 2017). Few scholars use an inductive and deductive approach in grievance-based research providing another dimension of originality in this doctoral thesis. This research also focuses on the perception of threat rather than actual, objective grievances (e.g., Must & Rustad, 2018). This may mean that other grievances, rather than simply cultural-based grievances, are expressed as this research allows further elaboration on grievance-based motivations. Finally, I use new models and theoretical frameworks outlined by Ausserladscheider (2019), Norris and Inglehart (2019), Muliavka (2021), Ajil (2022), Farris (2017), Puar (2013; 2018) and Yasui (2022) which to my knowledge, have not been combined in academic research before.

4.7 Overall conclusion

This chapter discussed theories that have been used in far-right research. Previously, researchers have overfocused on the economic-based motivations for supporting far-right groups, for example, the losers of modernization theory. However, research now suggests that cultural-based theories, such as CBT, may better explain far-right mobilisation, support and activity. Cultural-based theories are especially important to explain support for the PRR. In contrast to other researchers, Ausserladscheider (2019)

suggested that economic-based theories and cultural-based theories may not be opposing and may complement each other when analysing the far-right. Therefore, in addition to CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), which focuses on culture-based grievances, I use GRD theory in this doctoral thesis to focus on economic-based grievances. As GRD theory primarily focuses on economic-based grievances, I also employ Muliavka's (2021) theoretical framework of relative deprivation to include political grievances. Finally, I use Ajil's (2022) model to include ethnic, racial and religious grievances (cultural-based grievances in this doctoral thesis). Although CBT and GRD theory complement each other, I argue that six new concepts are needed to fully explore the grievances related to women's rights, LGB rights and animal rights. Therefore, I use a combination of strategic liberalism; femonationalism, homonationalism, animal nationalism, vegan nationalism and semi-liberalism in this doctoral thesis to explore certain arguments.

This chapter outlined the theories, concepts and models which are used to address the twelve research gaps and the three research questions in Chapter 1. Far-right social movements are under researched (Caiani & Parenti, 2016). In order to focus on far-right movements, I use GRD theory which is a SMT. Ajil's (2022) model is especially applicable in these studies and explores the importance of cultural-based grievances as well as economic-based and political-based grievances. The use of CBT implicitly assumes that the typical PRR supporter is white. However, the concepts of femonationalism, homonationalism, animal nationalism, vegan nationalism, ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism are used to explore any findings that contradict this assumption. Most research on the far-right uses a quantitative methodology and secondary level data (e.g., Rovny & Polk, 2020; Albright, 2018; Kimmel, 2018; Belew, 2018) rather than interview-based, close-up methods. The focus on grievances and the analysis of illiberal, strategically liberal and semi-liberal arguments encourages the use of qualitative and close-up methods to explore the nuance of argument.

Further, research comparing different far-right groups is under researched which has limited our understanding of such groups (Conway, 2017). In this doctoral thesis, I use CBT, strategic liberalism and semi-liberalism to analyse the narratives of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. As each far-right group, supporter or leader is not homogenous, these theories and concepts allow for the analysis of the illiberal, strategically liberal and semi-liberal arguments that individuals might hold. This encourages the analysis of

individuals as well as individual groups. Further, because of these potential differences, these theories/concepts also encourage comparisons between the three groups to be made. Using the concepts of strategic liberalism and semi-liberalism (Berntzen, 2019), this doctoral thesis also explores whether the supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK are only strategically liberal or whether some are semi-liberal. Finally, as I use contemporary concepts (strategic liberalism and semi-liberalism) and focus on grievances of the far-right, this allows me to study new PRR groups rather than over studied historical groups such as the English Deference League (EDL) (e.g., Pilkington, 2016).

This chapter discussed how this theoretical framework helps address the twelve research gaps outlined in Chapter 1 leading to the three research questions: (i) Who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK, (ii) what are their main grievances, and (iii) why do individuals express support for these groups? Equally as important to the theoretical framework is the methodology used in this doctoral thesis. This is the focus of the next chapter.

Chapter 5

Researching the British anti-Islam PRR online: a mixed-methods design

In this doctoral thesis, I used Cultural Backlash Theory (CBT), Group Relative Deprivation (GRD) theory, concepts of strategic liberalism (homonationalism, femonationalism, animal nationalism, vegan nationalism) and semi-liberalism to analyse the findings of the three empirical chapters. Connected to this theoretical framework is the methodology used. Consequently, this chapter discusses the ontological, epistemological and methodological approach in addition to the different methods I used in this doctoral thesis. It begins by restating the research aims and questions highlighted in Chapter 1. It then discusses the sequential pragmatic mixed-methods design highlighting the underpinning philosophical assumptions of this doctoral thesis which addresses the three key research questions:

- i) Who expresses support for the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), The For Britain Movement (TFBM) and the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA UK)?
- ii) What are their main grievances?
- iii) Why do individuals express support for these groups?

Next, it outlines the mixed methodology design used: a combination of a large Facebook frequency analysis, a YouTube Reflective Thematic Analysis (RTA) and a semi-structured interview-based RTA. Starting with study 1, it focuses on the ethical considerations of the first study relating to confidentiality, duty of care and sampling. It also examines the use of Facebook and replicability. For this primarily deductive study, I used a large quantitative Facebook demographic dataset (N = 9,000), relating to 'who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK' partly addressing the first research question. I also used a step-by-step process outlined by Stieglitz et al. (2018) in study 1: data discovery, collection, coding, preparation, and frequency analysis and end with a discussion of the limitations of study 1.

For study 2, I conducted a (mostly) inductive Reflexive Thematic Analysis (RTA) using YouTube video data wherein I developed grievance-based themes⁸. This study partly addresses the second and third research questions ‘what are their main grievances and why do people support these groups?’. First, this section justifies the use of YouTube as the source of data collection. I used Braun and Clarke’s (2021a) RTA analysis six-stage step-by-step process in this study: familiarisation of the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes, reviewing themes, defining and naming themes and producing the report (Braun & Clarke, 2021a). This section concludes with limitations of study 2. In the third study, I conducted in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews using RTA which partly addresses the second and third research questions ‘what are their main grievances and why do people support these groups?’. I used study 3 to expand on the findings in the previous two studies. I also applied the six-stage step-by-step process outlined by Braun and Clarke (2021a). This section concludes with the limitations of study 3 and a section on reflexivity. In doing so, this chapter discusses the mixed-methods design used to address the three research questions in this doctoral thesis.

5.1 Philosophical assumptions

The methods used are central to addressing the three research questions in this doctoral thesis. Consequently, I used a pragmatic, mixed-methods research design (Nunes & Henn, 2022). A mixed-methods design employs philosophical assumptions and methods which combine quantitative and qualitative data (Nunes & Henn, 2022; Creswell & Clarke, 2017). The mixed methods design’s central premise is that the combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies provides a better understanding of a research problem (Nunes & Henn, 2022; Creswell & Clark, 2017).

While some researchers argue that qualitative and quantitative research methods are incompatible (e.g., Guba, 1987), according to Nunes and Henn (2022), pragmatism claims that quantitative and qualitative research can be epistemologically coherent and can be combined. Pragmatists object to the perceived prioritisation of

⁸ As RTA is an active process, I develop themes rather than identify them (Braun & Clarke, 2021a).

ontology over epistemology and epistemology over method. They argue that this type of design focuses on the connection between epistemology and methods with equal attention being devoted to both connections. It focuses on the research questions being asked (Maarouf, 2019; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2021). Therefore, the pragmatist approach encourages researchers to use methods that are appropriate to address the research questions (Maarouf, 2019; Creswell, 2013; Howe, 1992). The research questions are central to this doctoral thesis. Therefore, the design used aimed to explore the demographics of three anti-Islam Populist Radical Right (PRR) groups and to understand grievance-based motives for expressing support for these groups. In order to address these research aims, in study 1, I used an externalist quantitative method (Goodwin, 2006) to address the first research question: 'who expresses support for the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), The For Britain Movement (TFBM) and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA UK)'.

In comparison, in studies 2 and 3, I used qualitative data to address the second and third research questions: 'what are the main grievances of these groups and why do people express support for them?'. Studies 2 and 3 were concerned with perceptions of inequality and injustice rather than actual differences. Previous research suggests that the majority of studies conducted on the British far-right are conducted using statistics to understand voting preferences (Allen, 2011; Goodwin, 2011; Copsey, 2010). As highlighted by Goodwin (2006), most research on the far-right uses externalist methods which use secondary-level data obtained at a distance to assess the macro-social and macro-political determinants that underpin a far-right political party. However, this does not explore the motivations behind support for far-right groups. Accordingly, Peucker and Spaaij (2023) and Blee and Creasap (2010) highlight the need for qualitative-based research within the field of the far-right to explore these motivations through direct contact and close-up research (for example, interviews). While some researchers have used qualitative methods such as interviewing to research the far-right (e.g., Sibley, 2023b; Peucker & Spaaij, 2023; Pilkington, 2017; Rhodes, 2011; Klandermans & Mayer, 2005), researchers still primarily use quantitative statistical methods in far-right research (Pilkington, 2016). In studies 2 and 3, I used an internalist qualitative-based method (Goodwin, 2006) to further explore the nuances and perceptions of supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK rather than

just voting preferences. Finally, according to Ajil (2022), semi-structured interviews provide depth and breadth of grievance-based data. Therefore, I used in-depth interviews in study 3. Consequently, this rationale led to the implementation of both quantitative and qualitative methods in this doctoral thesis.

More specifically I used a complementary mixed-methods design in this doctoral thesis (Greene et al., 1989). According to Dawadi et al., (2021), there are three key considerations when conducting mixed-methods research. The first consideration relates to the relative priority of the approaches used (Dawadi et al., 2021). Due to the pragmatic nature of this doctoral thesis, in each study I used the approach that was most suited to address each research question. For example, I used quantitative data to address the first research question ‘who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK?’ and qualitative data to address the second and third research questions ‘what are their main grievances and why do people express support for these groups?’ The second consideration relates to the level of interaction between each dataset. In this doctoral thesis, I ensured that each dataset did not interact with each other meaning that I only mixed the two approaches (quantitative and qualitative) during the interpretation stage (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017). According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2017), there are four stages where two datasets can be combined in a mixed-methods approach: during the design stage, during the data collection stage, during the data analysis stage and during the data interpretation stage. I used the fourth stage to combine and interpret the three different datasets (quantitative, qualitative and qualitative).

The third consideration relates to the timing of the quantitative and qualitative approaches (Dawadi et al., 2021). Mixed-methods research can either be sequential or concurrent. A sequential approach is used when the findings from one approach inform another. A concurrent approach refers to approaches that are independent from each other and data were collected in parallel (Dawadi et al., 2021; Creswell and Plano Clark, 2017). I used a sequential design. Although each study was self-contained and addresses a specific research question(s), each study informed the other. Study 1 informed study 2 and studies 1 and 2 informed study 3 following a complementarity design seeking illustration, enhancement, elaboration and clarification (Greene et al., 1989). I used this

complementary mixed methods design to assess similar but also different aspects of a phenomena (Nunes & Henn, 2022; Greene et al., 1989).

While this doctoral thesis does not cleanly fit into any one mixed-methods design, the most related approach is the explanatory sequential design (Toyon, 2021). The first quantitative study primarily informed the third study. For example, McKim (2017) used quantitative-based results to develop focus group questions. Similarly, I used the demographic findings from study 1 in this doctoral thesis to shape the questions asked in study 3, the semi-structured interviews. For example, in study 3, I further explored the presence of female supporters in the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK (which I found in study 1) by asking questions related to women's rights. I interpreted both the findings from studies 1 and 3 to add a deeper understanding of 'who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM, PEGIDA UK and why do people express support for these groups?' According to Toyon (2021), in the conventional sequential explanatory design, quantitative data are prioritised. However, Ellinas (2021) criticises this overemphasis on quantitative data. Although I ensured study 1 was a self-contained study which partly addressed the first research question, I also used it to build context for studies 2 and 3. I prioritised qualitative data methods over quantitative data methods to provide a deeper understanding of who expresses support for these groups and why? I, therefore, followed the second design outlined by Morgan (1998); quantitative followed by **qualitative**, with an emphasis on qualitative methods (Clark & Ivankova, 2016).

Using this design, I employed an objective, distanced approach in the first study (study 1) which explored 'who expresses support of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIFDA UK?' To address this question, I used a deductive statistical frequency analysis. In the second and third study, I employed a subjective, close-up approach (Peucker & Spaaij, 2023; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2021) to explore what their main grievances are and why people express support for these groups. For the second and third studies, I used RTA and for the third study I used semi-structured interviews. Consequently, I adopted a pragmatic, complementary mixed-methods approach to address the research questions and to find a solution to real-world problems (who expresses support for these groups and why).

5.2 Methods used in study 1: demographic Facebook study

This section discusses the first deductive frequency analysis study. In study 1, I used Facebook to gather data and in study 3, I used Facebook to recruit people. Despite its archive of data, Kosinski et al (2015) argue that Facebook's potential has been overlooked within social science. This is likely due to the ease of participants opting out of online studies on Facebook, negatively influencing sample sizes while increasing bias and non-representative data (Kosinski et al., 2015). Nevertheless, Facebook is used by some academics, especially to access hard-to-reach groups (e.g., Muis & Klein, 2020; Weiner et al., 2017). Further, Facebook was the most popular social media networking platform in 2020 when I collected the data for study 1 (Richter, 2020). In 2023, it continues to be the most used form of social media; in March 2023 it had 2.96 billion active monthly users worldwide (Lau, 2023).

In addition to Facebook's widespread use worldwide, the far-right also commonly use Facebook (Stier et al., 2017; Engström, 2014). It was the preferred platform for PEGIDA Germany (Stier et al., 2017) and was the preferred platform for Britain First and Tommy Robinson before they were removed (Collins et al., 2019; Nouri & Lorenzo-Dus, 2019). In 2011, Breivik, the Norwegian far-right terrorist called on all European patriots to join Facebook (Breivik, 2011). In 2019, Brenton Tarrant live-streamed his far-right terrorist attack in New Zealand on Facebook (Davey & Ebner, 2019). This suggests that some far-right groups use Facebook as one of their main platforms. Further, Facebook offers a range of demographic data which can be useful in social research. It allows cross-referencing and demonstrates differences in populations through analysis. For example, the names of individuals on Facebook are made available to find specific people on the platform (Cucu, 2022; Kosinski et al, 2015). Other social media platforms, such as Twitter, do not display personal demographics (Sloan, 2017). Therefore, even within the social media realm, Facebook was preferable for this research.

5.2.1 Ethical considerations

Although there are advantages to using Facebook to collect data, there are also ethical considerations. The most serious ethical issue relates to privacy and consent (Zimmer,

2020; Kosinski et al., 2015). However, it is easy for Facebook users to opt out of academic or third-party research. Facebook has adjustable privacy settings which allow an individual's profile to remain private (Kosinski et al, 2015). The three Facebook pages used in this doctoral thesis are categorised as public, meaning that they are open pages and do not require registration to join or comment on the page (Legewie & Nassauer, 2018). Kosinski et al., (2015) argue that demographic and other forms of data can be collected from public Facebook profiles as long as the data has been made public by the individuals themselves, that there is no contact with the participant, that data is anonymised, and that no data point can be associated with the individual. As I adhered to all criteria in this doctoral thesis, Kosinski et al., (2015) argue that the researcher does not need to gain consent from the individuals they are researching.

Further, a recent study found that out of 132 academic research articles that used public data from Facebook, YouTube and other open access platforms, 85 did not include a section on ethical considerations in their research. Within the 85 articles, researchers argued that there were no ethical issues with using the data as the data they were using were publicly available (Stommel & Rijk, 2021). Therefore, certain academics deem it acceptable to use public online data without consent. Finally, Facebook's terms and conditions state that automated data scraping on Facebook violates their rules (Facebook, 2010). To adhere to their regulations, I used a manual data collection process in this study.

In addition to the ethical considerations of using Facebook, I also needed to ensure my own security. For this, I used a Facebook researcher profile which did not contain identifiable information. Using a Facebook research profile reduced the risk of targeted harassment once I published any work related to this doctoral thesis. To ensure the confidentiality of my participants, I created two separate datasets: the first was an encrypted identifiable dataset which had the names of the individuals while the second dataset corresponded to the first dataset but was anonymous. Having two separate datasets allowed me to anonymise the participants and protect them during and after the study.

5.2.2 Sampling

In addition to ethical considerations, I also had to consider sampling criteria. For study 1, I took a criterion sample from each of the three profiles (the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK) resulting in 3,000 supporters for each group (N = 9,000). Kristensen et al (2017, p. 1) suggests that a single 'Like'⁹ of a politician or group's post directly links to voting preference and support. Therefore, the demographics of individuals that have liked posts of these three anti-Islam PRR Facebook pages can offer an informal supporter list of these groups. I began data collection with the most recent posts and worked down through the Facebook page. To ensure an adequate dataset, I collected data from posts that had over 100 reactions. I used a total of 18 posts (Appendix 1), with reactions ranging from 145 (Post 6) to 1,700 (Post 15). I only used popular posts with the largest number of reactions to ensure a big enough sample size. A bigger sample size reduces the possibility of error and skewed data, more accurately reflecting the population sample (Field, 2013). To ensure a large sample size, I used criterion sampling with the criteria being the post reaction size (Poecze et al., 2022) starting with the most recent posts. All the posts collected across all three groups were from between the 1st of August 2018 and the 11th of July 2020.

5.2.3 Replicability

Due to the quantitative nature of this research, it was also important to ensure a level of replicability. Therefore, I followed a four-stage social media process: data discovery, data collection, data preparation and data analysis (Stieglitz et al., 2018) with the addition of a fifth stage - data coding - which comes after the data collection stage. First, I selected three groups that had a large Facebook presence. Since 2018, many far-right groups have been banned from Facebook for advocating violence (e.g., Collins et al., 2019; Nouri & Lorenzo-Dus, 2019) as shown in Table 4.

⁹ A 'Like' is a reaction to a Facebook post. If an individual supported or appreciated a post, they could use the 'Like' function on Facebook to show this support (Kristensen et al., 2017, p. 1).

Table 4

United Kingdom (UK) individuals and groups banned and not banned from Facebook

Group	Facebook
English Defence League (EDL)	Red
British National Party (BNP)	Red
Britain First	Red
NA	Red
TFBM	Green
PEGIDA UK	Green
DFLA	Green
Jayda Fransen	Red
Paul Golding	Red
Anne Marie-Waters	Green
Tommy Robinson	Red

Note. Groups and far-right activists that have had their social accounts banned (red) and not banned (green) as of January 2020 (Collins et al., 2019; Democratic Football Lads Alliance, 2018; Home Office, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c; Hern, 2019; Lomas, 2019; MacWhirter, 2019; Mulhall, 2019; The For Britain Movement, 2019a; Macklin, 2018; Sharman, 2018; BBC, 2017; Patriot Promotional Page: Patriots Voice, n.d).

While I conducted this research, only three British far-right groups were still active on Facebook. Each of these three groups had an adequate following. On Facebook, users can choose to 'like' certain posts, groups or pages. According to Kosinski et al (2015, p. 545) 'liking' a page or group allows users to stay connected with the group/page and post information on the page themselves. This creates a live dataset that can be analysed. As of August 2020, the DFLA had 21,000 likes, TFBM had 32,000 likes and PEGIDA UK had 35,000 likes showing that all three groups had an adequate online population size to be included in this doctoral thesis. For these reasons, I used the official Facebook pages of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK to collect data.

To understand these groups, it is important to discuss when they were founded, why they were founded and what they stand for. Each of the three groups can be considered far-right, anti-Islam, counter-jihad groups. The first group is the DFLA (Allen, 2019b). The DFLA started as the Football Lads Alliance (FLA) which was founded after the Islamist terror attacks on London bridge in 2017 (Steinberg, 2019). After the founder, John Meighan resigned as leader of the FLA, the FLA became inactive. Consequently, the FLA broke up but left a smaller group of individuals who were still active and more extreme than the FLA. The DFLA was a football-based anti-Islamist street group established in 2018 (Figure 4) who claimed to be against all forms of extremism but primarily focused on Islamist extremism (Steinberg, 2019). I used the official DFLA Facebook page (Figure 4) to collect demographic data on individuals that expressed support for the DFLA (Democratic Football Lads Alliance, 2018).

Figure 4

The official Facebook page of the Democratic Football Lads Alliance



Note. DFLA official Facebook page. I took this screenshot on the 1st of November 2019 (Democratic Football Lads Alliance, 2018).

The second group is TFBM - an anti-Islam PRR political party. In 2017, Anne Marie Waters lost the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) leadership contest primarily due to her extreme anti-Muslim views which caused divisions in the party (Mitchell, 2023; Oppenheim, 2017). After her loss, she created a new anti-Muslim party with a stronger focus on Islam and immigration (Hope Not Hate, n.d). She argues that Islam is inherently a violent religion and is eroding democracy in the UK through its abuse of human rights, women's rights and animal rights (Waters, 2018). The party never gained momentum and was deactivated in 2022 (The For Britain Movement, 2022). In 2023, Anne Marie Waters returned back to UKIP (Mitchell, 2023). In study 1, I used the official Facebook profile of TFBM (Figure 5) to collect demographic data of individuals that expressed support for this group (The For Britain Movement, 2019a).

Figure 5

The official Facebook page of The For Britain Movement



Note. The official Facebook page of TFBM. I took this screenshot on the 1st of November 2019 (The For Britain Movement, 2019a).

The third group is PEGIDA UK. PEGIDA was created in Dresden, Germany in 2014 and focused on protecting so called 'Judeo-Christian Characteristics of the Culture in the West' (Lee, 2016a, p. 1). Tommy Robinson, Anne Marie Waters and Paul Watson then created an off-shoot version of Germany PEGIDA, PEGIDA UK in 2015 (Ebner, 2017; Lee, 2016a). This new group primarily campaigned against Muslim immigration and the building of mosques in the UK (Allchorn, 2016). Tim Scott became the new leader of PEGIDA UK but after an interview where he failed to outline what PEGIDA UK stood for and what their grievances were, the movement started to decline (Allchorn, 2016). However, it remained active on Facebook under the name Patriot Promotional Page: Patriots Voice (Allchorn, 2016; Patriot Promotional Page: Patriots Voice, n.d). In study 1, I used the official PEGIDA UK Facebook page (Figure 6) to collect demographic data of individuals that expressed support for these groups (Patriot Promotional Page: Patriots Voice, n.d).

Figure 6

The official Facebook page for PEGIDA UK



Note. I took this screenshot on the 1st of November 2019 (Patriot Promotional Page: Patriots Voice, n.d).

Using these three Facebook pages, I used the step-by-step guide to social media research outlined by Mayr and Weller (2017). According to their guide, a set of questions should be answered to conduct reliable social media research. In the next sections, I address these questions. Facebook was the only online platform I used in this study. Once I discovered the data, I then started data collection (Mayr & Weller, 2017). Previous social media research has used timeframes, topics, keywords, geo-locations, language, or format as their criteria. However, due to the focus of this study, I used criterion sampling based on reaction size as highlighted in section 5.2.2. Consequently, I excluded individuals that had reacted to a less popular post from this dataset. Further, I used small data in this study. Small data are considered data that are small in volume, not collected continuously and are collected to answer a specific question. Big data in contrast are large in volume, varied in nature, collected continuously and often collected through new information and communication technologies (Kitchin & Lauriault, 2015).

The posts I used for each group can be found in the Appendices: TFBM (Appendix 1, post 1 to 7), the DFLA (Appendix 1, post 8 to 12) and PEGIDA UK (Appendix 1, post 13 to 18). Next, I explored the profiles of individuals that had reacted to one of the posts shown in Appendix 1. To gather relevant demographic data, I used different areas of the person's profile (Appendix 2). I did not collect the demographic data from two

individuals as they explicitly requested not to be used in any commercial or academic studies. Each piece of demographic data I gathered related to the first research question in this doctoral thesis. As outlined in Table 5, I collected a total of six demographics from each user's Facebook page. I stored these data in six separate SPSS datasets (three anonymous and three identifiable datasets).

Table 5

The number of data points for each demographic

	TFBM sample size by demographic*	DFLA sample size by demographic*	PEGIDA UK sample size by demographic*
Gender	N = 3,000	N = 3000	N = 3,000
Education	N = 972	N = 1,130	N = 1,051
Ethnicity	N = 987	N = 2,382	N = 2,107
Religion	N = 84	N = 56	N = 78
Sexuality	N = 298	N = 284	N = 414
Age	N = 216	N = 227	N = 178

Note. I created this table to highlight the sample size of each demographic I used (author's own). *Out of the overall sample (N = 3,000 for each group) only a certain number of people had each demographic on their profile page. For example, in the PEGIDA UK sample, 3000 people displayed their gender meaning that everyone displayed their gender on their profile page. Out of these 3000 people, only 178 people stated their age meaning that each demographic has a different sample size. The raw statistical results can be found in Appendices 3.

Following the replicability method outlined by Medley-Rath (2019), I took screenshots of the Facebook profiles. The details relating to how I decided what data represented each category can be found in Appendix 2. Often, more than one item of datum was available to cross analyse to assess the credibility of the information. For example, the individual may have had a picture of a cross which implied that they were Christian but they also self-identified as Christian in their personal bio on their Facebook page. I, therefore, cross analysed these two pieces of datum to ensure this information was correct. I then coded each demographic using SPSS.

First, I collected and coded all of the data using the codes outlined in Table 6. I then prepared the datasets for analysis. Following Clavio's (2008) research, I conducted a frequency analysis on six demographics in all three groups and used SPSS to provide

an overview of who expresses support for these three anti-Islam PRR groups addressing the first research question 'who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK?' (Chapter 6). For the gender and education demographics, I conducted a Chi-Square Test on each of the three datasets to assess the relationship between these two factors.

Table 6

The codes used in study 1 across all three groups

	Codes
Gender	1 = Male 2 = Female
Education	1 = School 2 = College 3 = Undergraduate 4 = Masters 5 = PhD 6 = No education 7 = 'Uni of life' 8 = 'School of life'
Ethnicity	1 = White 2 = Racially minoritized
Religion	1 = Christian 2 = Other 3 = non-religious 4 = Muslim
Sexuality	1 = Straight 2 = Gay 3 = Bisexual
Age	1 = 15-25 2 = 26-40 3 = 41-60 4 = 61+ 5 = 0-14

Note. I created this table to highlight the six demographics I used (author's own). All raw data can be found in Appendix 3, 4, 5 and 15.

5.2.4 Limitations of study 1

Although there are advantages to using social media data, there are also some limitations. Facebook is a live dataset and certain data will be removed or added to the platform. This makes replicability and comparability of the Facebook data collection process difficult as future datasets will not be the same as the originals used in this doctoral thesis. However, due to the large sample size in the three groups, these changes are unlikely to change the data significantly.

Fake profiles may also be an issue in Facebook research. Bartlett and Littler (2011, p. 35) estimated that within the EDL Facebook page, 10% of the EDL supporters 'could be trolls', individuals that spread disinformation. Therefore, up to ten percent of the profiles collected (9,000 in total) in this doctoral study could also be fake. However, due to the sample size, fake profiles are unlikely to have skewed the data significantly. Further, research now suggests that younger people are less likely to use Facebook and are more likely to use other social media platforms such as Instagram, Snapchat and Tick Tock (YouGov, 2023). Consequently, there may be a bias towards the age groups most likely to use Facebook. Although there are limits of this study, I ensure validity and replicability by collecting a large sample and implementing an academic social media framework.

5.3 Methods used in study 2: YouTube thematic analysis of grievances

In the second study, I used YouTube data to assess the main grievances of each group through RTA. Similarly, to Facebook there are advantages to using YouTube data. In 2021, when this second study was being conducted, YouTube was the second biggest search engine in the world (Gismondi, 2021) and the second most used social media site in the world with 2.2 billion monthly users (Ang, 2021). Political actors that are not positively represented in the mainstream media use YouTube as a platform, bypassing traditional gatekeeping roles (Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 2020; Lewis, 2018). This allows certain groups, political actors or parties to develop alternative media (Puschmann et al., 2016) which reject the mainstream media's portrayal or framing (Haller & Holt, 2019). This provides data on how groups/parties want to be framed as the videos are not filtered through mainstream media. Thus, YouTube offers marginalised individuals a platform to disseminate their views (Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 2020; Renninger, 2015). Because of this critique of the mainstream narrative, far-right groups have been attracted to YouTube since its creation (O'Callaghan et al., 2015). For example, Germany's PEGIDA uses YouTube to disseminate information to their supporters (Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 2020). I collected first-hand data for the second study as I was interested in what grievances lead to PRR support.

5.3.1 Ethical considerations

According to Legewie and Nassauer (2018), there are five areas of ethical consideration when using online videos for research: informed consent, unique opportunities, privacy, transparency and minimising potential harm. Within online video research, gaining informed consent can be impossible if there are several people depicted in the video. Thus, Rat (2014) claims informed consent is not necessary to obtain if access to the platform is unrestricted. Radonjic et al., (2020) and Bruckman (2002) argue that publishing videos online implies consent, especially if it is open-access and is attracting a mass audience (Legewie & Nassauer, 2018). Further, unique opportunities for data collection also offer some ethical justifications (Legewie & Nassauer, 2018). For example, some anti-Islam PRR groups are difficult to access and any direct contact (for example, gaining informed consent) could lead to safety issues. Unfiltered online videos allow research to be conducted on these groups in a safe and cost-effective manner (Legewie & Nassauer, 2018). Therefore, I did not gain informed consent from the people in the videos in this study.

Legewie and Nassauer (2018) also argue that transparency is a key aspect of online video research. It allows other researchers to analyse the video data and assess your findings (Salganik, 2017; Heath et al., 2010). Due to this goal of transparency, I ensured that the transcripts, links to videos and the data collected and analysed in this doctoral thesis will be accessible to other researchers. However, these researchers will need to pass ethical approval before they gain access to this material. This ensures the protection of the research participants but also encourages transparency of the research process and findings. Minimising potential harm is the fifth consideration (Legewie & Nassauer, 2018). In this doctoral thesis, I anonymised each transcript. The only identifying characteristics are accessible through the links to the raw video footage which only certain researchers will have access to as outlined above. This ensures a higher level of anonymity, thereby protecting the research participants.

5.3.2 Sampling

In addition to the ethical considerations above, I also considered sampling criteria. First, I searched YouTube using the names of each of the three anti-Islam PRR groups (DFLA,

TFBM and PEGIDA UK). I then collected all the videos in the search results. I used additional selection criteria for TFBM leaders' videos as there were more videos than those collected. The selection criteria related to the number of different topics that were discussed in a video. For example, I preferred to use a video that discussed immigration, Covid-19 and Islam rather than a video that only discussed Islam. This ensured that many themes were developed. There were fewer DFLA and PEGIDA UK videos available on YouTube meaning that I analysed every relevant video available for these two groups. In this study, I was interested in the similarities and differences between groups, but also sub-groups. Consequently, I created six separate NVivo datasets: by group and by level (leaders and supporters). The relevant information for the six separate datasets is shown in Table 7.

Table 7

The number of videos, minutes collected, and nodes used in each dataset in study 2

Dataset	Number of videos used	Number of minutes collected	Number of nodes used
For Britain leaders	N = 10	N = 301 minutes (5 hours)	N = 32
For Britain supporters	N = 17	N = 325 minutes (5.4 hours)	N = 24
DFLA leaders	N = 11	N = 247 mins (4.1 hours)	N = 26
DFLA supporters	N = 13	N = 408 (5.8 hours)	N = 24
PEGIDA UK leaders	N = 13	N = 326.55 (5.4 hours)	N = 17
PEGIDA UK supporters	N = 9	N = 295.05 (4.9 hours)	N = 18

Note. I created this table to present the title, duration and links of each YouTube video I used (author's own). More details can be found in Appendix 6.

5.3.3 Reflexive Thematic Analysis

In study 2, I used inductive YouTube RTA. I primarily used an exploratory, data-driven inductive approach (Henn et al., 2009) due to the lack of literature on the three far-right groups (e.g., Allen, 2019b; Saunders et al., 2009). However, as discussed in Chapter 4, I rooted this doctoral thesis in a theoretical framework highlighting the use of both inductive and deductive reasoning in this study (Henn et al., 2009). RTA is an active process, where the researcher identifies and develops salient themes within qualitative data and organises them in a systematic way (Braun & Clarke, 2021a; Nowell et al., 2017). RTA is, therefore, an interpretive and reflexive process that is well suited to interpretivist epistemologies (Braun & Clarke, 2019). However, Braun and Clarke (2021a, p. 211) argue that research is 'nearly always a pragmatic activity, shaped and constrained by the time and resources available to the researcher' highlighting the compatibility of RTA with a pragmatist mixed-methods inductive and deductive approach. I chose RTA as it is more theoretically flexible than other forms of analysis, such as Interpretive phenomenological analysis, which is theoretically grounded in phenomenological epistemology (Braun & Clarke, 2021a; 2006; Shinebourne, 2011). Finally, I applied both an experiential and a critical approach. The experiential approach captured people's perspectives and understandings and the critical approach involved 'interrogating and unpacking meaning about a topic or issue' (Braun & Clarke, 2021a, p. 10). I used a combination of both experiential and critical approaches in this research to understand but also critically interpret meanings in the data.

I developed each theme using the six-stage RTA process created by Braun and Clarke (2021a), outlined in Table 8. First, I transcribed each of the videos outlined in Table 7 above using the free YouTube transcription tool. As this tool can be inaccurate, I corrected the transcript to retain the correct meaning and gain familiarity with the data (Braun & Clarke, 2021a; Bird, 2005). I then rewatched the videos for immersion purposes.

Table 8

*The six-stage process of RTA**

Phase	Describing the process
1. Familiarizing oneself with your data	Three practices: 1) develop an intimate knowledge of your dataset and immerse yourself by rewatching the videos and re-reading the transcripts. 2) Start to get critically engaged with the data. Question the discourse and your reactions and thoughts. Develop familiarity (immersion) and distance (critical engagement). 3) Focus on note-making and thoughts related to the dataset.
2. Doing coding	Inductive or deductive data analysis develops individual codes of meaning. Each code can be a semantic, explicit representation of the text (participant-driven, descriptive), or a latent, implicit representation of the text (researcher-driven, conceptual).
3. Generating initial themes	Generating provisional themes is a development process and includes exploring codes that share meaning and grouping them to develop a multi-faceted theme. These themes are only provisional and are not fixed.
4. Developing and reviewing themes	This phase is particularly recursive and involves interacting with the data to check each code accurately represents the data and that each theme accurately represents the clustered codes. Recursive movement between phases three and four is important including revisiting the entire dataset and distinguishing between topics and themes.
5. Refining, defining and naming themes	Honing themes and refining analysis by creating theme definitions.
6. Writing matters for analysis	Completing the analytical work, interpreting and telling a story.

*This table collates the information from Braun and Clarke (2021a). In their practical guide for Thematic Analysis each stage is a chapter. I, therefore, created this table to better highlight each stage of RTA (author's own).

Once I had familiarised myself with each video, I interacted critically with each transcript and took notes (stage 1). I then began to inductively code across the dataset both at the

descriptive, semantic level and the conceptual, latent level gathering several hundred codes across all six datasets (Braun & Clark, 2021a). Braun and Clark (2021a) define codes as the smallest units of analysis that identify interesting features of the data which are potentially relevant to your research question. They are the building blocks for themes, which are larger patterns of meaning, underpinned by a single central organising concept, a shared core idea. Further, they define a theme as 'a pattern that has an identifiable central organising concept, as well as different manifestations of that idea' (Braun & Clarke, 2021a, p. 98). I used the online software NVivo for flexibility during the coding process (Braun & Clarke, 2021a). I coded previously developed themes in the literature first, such as concerns about immigration levels (stage 2) followed by codes that were unidentified in the literature (Braun & Clarke, 2021a), such as animal rights. Once there was a unique, sufficient and diverse number of codes, I then developed each code into themes and sub-themes by clustering codes that shared a common central idea (stage 3).

As suggested by Braun and Clarke (2021a), I coded as much text as possible ensuring that no interesting theme was missed. I used the concept of 'information power' to decide when coding was sufficient (Braun & Clarke, 2021a, p. 28; 2021b; Malterud et al., 2016). This refers to the richness of the data to address the research questions (Malterud et al., 2016). Once I developed the most common themes using hierarchy charts (see Appendix 7 for an example), I deleted some codes and collapsed others into existing themes (stages 4 and 5). This depended on whether there was sufficient data to justify it as a theme or sub-theme. I used Patton's (1990) criteria for categories to justify each theme: internal homogeneity which ensures data within themes are coherent in meaning and external heterogeneity where each theme is identifiably different. This homogeneity and heterogeneity consist of two levels. Level one concerns reading all the extracts that form a code to establish whether the coded extracts form a coherent pattern. Level two concerns the whole dataset. At this level, I assessed the validity of the dataset and whether the themes and the overall thematic map accurately reflected the meanings of the dataset. At this phase, I re-read the datasets to ensure that each code and theme adhered to the guidelines laid out by Braun and Clarke (2021a) (stages 4 and 5).

Next, I named and defined each theme (stage 6). I wanted to identify the story that each individual theme was telling but also the overall story across the dataset with other themes. At this stage, the sub-themes are important in establishing the full story of complex themes. I reworked, collapsed and deleted some of these sub-themes depending on how they fit into the story. Overarching themes were also important at this stage. Braun and Clark (2021a, p. 87) define an overarching theme as ‘an umbrella concept or idea that embraces a number of themes’ (Braun & Clark, 2021a, p. 87). I then used this story to address the relevant research questions in this doctoral thesis (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In each of the six datasets, I developed several themes (as shown in Appendix 8). As suggested by Braun and Clarke (2021a), quote examples and definitions of each theme and sub-theme can be found in Appendix 9. I coded the leaders’ and supporters’ arguments separately to highlight similarities and differences in their arguments. This can be seen in Chapters 7 and 8.

Finally, in the last stage of the RTA process outlined by Braun and Clarke (2021a), I developed themes to tell the complicated story. I then connected these themes to the research questions to discuss the findings. In Chapter 7, I selected extracts that most represented each theme and sub-theme and contextualised these extracts in a wider analysis to address the two last research questions in this doctoral thesis (Braun & Clarke, 2021a; 2006).

5.3.4 Limitations of study 2

Although there are advantages to using RTA such as flexibility and accessibility (Braun & Clarke, 2021a; 2021b; 2019; 2006), there are limitations to this type of analysis. For example, Braun and Clarke (2019; 2006) argue that without an existing theoretical framework, thematic findings may have limited interpretative power beyond description. However, I grounded this doctoral thesis in a complex theoretical framework (Chapter 4) enabling a deeper interpretation of the findings beyond mere description. More generally I used a primarily inductive, qualitative approach which also has limitations. Due to the primarily exploratory nature of this study definitive conclusions cannot be drawn and the findings are not generalisable to other groups and political parties. However, as argued by Braun and Clarke (2021a) this perceived

limitation is incompatible with the philosophical position of RTA which centres around subjectivity, contextual and situational factors. Due to the in-depth subjective nature of this research, this study adds a deeper understanding of the main grievances of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK.

5.4 Methods used in study 3: thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews

For the final study, I conducted in-depth interviews with supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. As highlighted by Goodwin (2011), interviews with far-right leaders and supporters are difficult. Despite this, I was able to gain access to the three groups and conduct interviews with both leaders and supporters. I used Facebook to contact potential interviewees. Researchers often use Facebook in interview-based studies to access hard-to-reach or radicalised groups (e.g., Sikkens et al., 2017; Weiner et al., 2017). I used these interviews to build on the demographic findings in study 1. Following the process used by Sikkens et al (2017), I then contacted individuals that had responded to a post via the Facebook messenger platform to recruit participants for a semi-structured interview. Kosinski et al., (2015) argued that a researcher does not need to gain ethical approval to gather demographic-based Facebook data (study 1) if the researcher does not have any contact with said individual. To ensure that I adhered to the conditions of Kosinski et al., (2015) outlined in study 1, I did not include the demographics (study 1) of the individuals interviewed in study 3.

5.4.1 Identification

For the semi-structured interviews, I recruited a total of 15 participants and used a series of selection criteria to identify and recruit these participants. Firstly, individuals must have liked, commented on or reacted to one of the Facebook posts on these groups' public pages (the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK). Once I contacted these people (discussed in more detail below) I confirmed that each individual expressed support for one or more of these groups before continuing with the study. I did not use any geographic restriction criteria for selecting participants for this study.

5.4.2 Recruitment

Once I identified potential participants, I then contacted these individuals with an invitation to take part in the study via the Facebook messenger function. Given the informal nature of Facebook, I adopted a relatively friendly while professional tone. It was vital for me to be respectful in this study, especially considering some participants' may have been sceptical of academic researchers (Pilkington, 2016). I sent several different invitation messages to bypass the Facebook no-spamming rules. To prevent a temporary block, I moderated each message sent¹⁰.

In total I contacted 1,344 users within eight months between September 2021 and April 2022. This elicited 17 responses from users and resulted in 12 interviews. I recruited an additional three interviewees through other recruitment methods discussed below. I sent 1,344 messages to potential participants due to the low response rate. There are several potential reasons for this; users may have been suspicious of my intentions as discussed in section 5.5, users may have been inactive, users may have seen the message and forgotten to reply, or they did not see the message. I, therefore, sent follow-up messages to those that had not replied.

I sent all messages from a professional research profile specifically created for this study. This was suggested by the Nottingham Trent University ethics board which granted ethical approval for this study on 12.05.21. The Facebook profile provided the following details: the author's real name, professional academic affiliation and location of residence. The password-protected profile contained a single profile picture of me taken from a distance and looking to the side with no recognisable features. As highlighted by Hall (2020), Facebook users populate their pages and profiles with personal details and data. A lack of personal information on my researcher Facebook page may have created a barrier between me and potential participants. I, therefore,

¹⁰ "Hello David, I hope you don't mind me contacting you out of the blue. My name is Alice, I am a researcher at Nottingham Trent University, and I am currently researching why people like or support PEGIDA UK. I am contacting you because you liked one of their recent Facebook posts. I would like to talk to you if you wouldn't mind about why you like PEGIDA UK. Please let me know and I can send you the participation sheet for more details. Thanks for taking the time to read this and I hope you have a nice day".

did provide some personal information to reduce this potential barrier. For safety reasons, however, I did not use my personal Facebook profile. There are issues with this prioritisation of safety. I had access to thousands of different public Facebook profiles containing personal details of the individuals. In contrast, the personal details on the author's research profile were limited, potentially exacerbating the researcher-researched power differentiation. However, I prioritised my own safety as researcher safety is a key issue in qualitative interview-based research (Kamp et al., 2019). More information can be found in section 5.5.

In addition to the sampling considerations outlined above, due to the difficulty of recruiting far-right supporters, I used a snowball sampling method. Waldner and Dobratz (2019) highlight that a successful researcher of the far-right is flexible in their recruitment tactics to ensure a large enough sample size in hard-to-reach groups. Consequently, I asked participants to pass on my details to other supporters of the groups in question. One individual, Michael, was key in this study. As a regional organiser, he put me in touch with two leaders of TFBM: Bob and Anne Marie Waters. As with study 2, in this study I was interested in comparing and contrasting themes of supporters and leaders. For this reason, I interviewed both leaders and supporters in this study. Once I had conducted the 14 interviews, I contacted Tommy Robinson (whose real name is Stephen Yaxley) by submitting a form to the inactive historical Tommy Robinson website. I was then contacted by his assistant via email and was given his private phone number to arrange a meeting in person. Because this meeting had to be conducted in person, I applied for new ethical approval which was granted for this in-person meeting (granted on 16.03.22). The interview with Tommy Robinson took place on the 13th of April 2022 in Luton.

5.4.3 Final participant group

In total there were 15 participants in the final group: 11 men and four women. In line with RTA 15 participants was considered an adequate sample size. According to Braun and Clarke (2021a), the adequacy of a sample is not due to the size but the pragmatic recruitment considerations, identity-based diversity of participants, the lengths of each interview, diversity in the data and the scope of the project all of which resulted in high

'information power' (Braun & Clarke, 2021a, p. 28; Malterud et al., 2016). I gave each participant a pseudonym when they agreed to take part (Waldner & Dobratz, 2019), while I stored basic characteristics on Pulse Secure, the password-protected encrypted platform. The anonymised characteristics of each participant are in Table 9 to protect their identity and to abide by the ethics code in this doctoral thesis. There were two exceptions to this: Anne Marie Waters and Tommy Robinson both explicitly consented to their 'real'¹¹ names being used in this research. As they are public figures and they wanted their voice to be heard, there was no harm in using their real names.

As Table 9 highlights, all 15 participants were between 23 and 77 years old. Each lived in a different geographical location across the UK, two lived in the US although Gerre was British but was an American citizen and Matthew was British but lived in Thailand. Harry was the only individual that spoke about his working-class background while the majority of other interviewees were likely middle-class, but this was not explicitly discussed. Both Gerre and Anne Marie Waters self-identified as gay or lesbian while Maria was racially minoritized with Muslim heritage on her dad's side. Maria and Jacob were also vegan, and Gerre, Frank and Carl were vegetarian.

¹¹ Tommy Robinson is also known by other names such as Stephen Yaxley-Lennon (BBC News, 2022).

Table 9

The demographic information for all 15 interviewees

Participant number	Pseudonym	Sex	Location	Age	Ethnicity	Sexuality	Vegan or vegetarian
1	Frank	Male	Unknown	Over 50	White	Heterosexual	Vegetarian
2	Carol	Female	Kent	Over 50	White	Heterosexual	Unknown
3	Alfie	Male	Bolton	74	White	Heterosexual	Carnivore
4	Michael	Male	South-West	77	White	Unknown	Unknown
5	Gerre	Male	Phoenix, Arizona, USA	66	White	Homosexual	Vegetarian
6	Bob	Male	North Lincolnshire	Over 50	White	Unknown	Carnivore
7	Jacob	Male	Unknown	55	White	Unknown	Vegan
8	Carl	Male	Unknown	Over 50	White	Heterosexual	Vegetarian
9	Anne Marie Waters	Female	Hartlepool	44	White	Homosexual	Unknown
10	Matthew	Male	Leeds (Now Thailand)	Under 50	White	Heterosexual	Carnivore
11	Amanda	Female	Florida	54	White	Heterosexual	Unknown
12	Harry	Male	Northumbria	Over 40	White	Unknown	Unknown
13	Maria	Female	Unknown	41	Racially minoritized	Unknown	Vegan
14	Mark	Male	Norwich	23	White	Heterosexual	Unknown
15	Tommy Robinson	Male	Luton	39	White	Heterosexual	Carnivore

Note. I created this table to outline the demographic information for each of the 15 people I interviewed in study 3 (author's own).

5.4.4 Informed consent

According to Xu et al (2020), informed consent is integral in sound interview-based research. Once I received written confirmation to take part in this research project from each participant, I then asked for their email address. Once they had sent this, I sent them the participant information sheet and consent form (Appendix 10) explaining who I was, what the research entailed and why it was being conducted. I then asked them to sign the consent form and I scheduled an online meeting. I used this procedure for all participants except for Tommy Robinson. I gave him the documents to sign in person. At the beginning of each interview, I paraphrased the participant information sheet in a simple manner. I then asked each interviewee if they had any questions. Once they were satisfied with the answers given, I reminded them that the interview would be audio recorded. Once they had given their consent, I started the interview. I stored all the voice recordings and anonymised transcripts for each interview in Pulse Secure. In this study, I focused on qualitative-based data (interview data) using an interpretivist approach. This approach focused on the meaning attributed by actors to their behaviour and actions (Braun & Clarke, 2021a). I was concerned with why people supported these groups based on their arguments and motivations.

5.4.5 Data collection

To explore these motivations, I interviewed each participant once between the 28th of October 2021 and the 13th of April 2022 yielding 20 hours and 7 minutes of interview data. I conducted 14 of the 15 interviews online using the Microsoft Teams platform and interviewed Tommy Robinson in person. The interviews ranged from 57 minutes to 1 hour and 54 minutes, detailed in Appendix 11. As highlighted by Waldner and Dobratz (2019), while the use of multiple methods for interviewing is not ideal as it may increase the risk of bias, sometimes flexible interviewing methods are needed to conduct a study. For example, Tommy Robinson would only meet in person and would not conduct the interview online. I met this condition due to his influence in the British far-right scene.

There may have been some differences between interviews I conducted online and the interview I conducted in person. Gray et al., (2020) highlight the potential

differences in the research conditions that arise from interviewing participants online. Specifically important during the period of this study, this method was advantageous as it minimised the spread of COVID-19, reduced potential financial barriers and reduced the potential physical risk to both the participant and interviewer (Oliffe et al., 2021; Deakin & Wakefield, 2014). Conducting online interviews also allowed some participants, such as Jacob and Harry, to remain anonymous by wearing glasses and in Jacob's case, wearing a hood. This flexibility increased the overall recruitment potential.

However, there are issues with online interviewing and building rapport can be difficult (Weller, 2017). Although Smyth and Mitchell (2008) argue that building rapport in certain groups, such as the far-right, is often not considered desirable or even necessary, Ellinas (2021) and Weiss (1995) suggest that building a level of trust between the researcher and participant encourages participants to disclose information about their feelings, thoughts and experiences at length. This then can facilitate a deeper understanding of how each participant makes sense of the world (Ellinas, 2021; Yilmaz, 2013). In contrast to face-to-face interviews, online interviews only focus on the individual's face and parts of their upper body making it difficult to read body language. Depending on the video and WIFI quality, some details of expressions were difficult to read. Because of these issues, I used active listening techniques such as nodding, smiling and making vocal indications that I understood or was paying attention.

Another issue with online interviewing relates to distractions and interruptions. On several occasions, the WIFI signal dropped, or interviewees were interrupted by a phone call which delayed the interview. Research by Oliffe et al., (2023) and Seitz (2016) suggests that distractions and interruptions can disrupt the flow of the interview, making it difficult to build rapport, while Deakin and Wakefield (2014) argue that conducting interviews online does not negatively affect the quality of the conversation. In most interviews in this study, participants were not interrupted and those that were apologised and put their phones on silent. I built rapport with those that received a phone call through actively listening, not interrupting them, acknowledging and disclosing some personal information when I shared something in common with the interviewee. For example, in the case of Maria, I disclosed that I was vegan after Maria

herself disclosed that she was vegan, which encouraged her to talk more about her values.

Further, for interviewees to speak freely about topics that concerned them I used semi-structured interviews. This allowed the interview to be driven by the interviewees while I prompted them to stay on topic (Adeoye-Olatunde & Olenik, 2021; Skinner, 2013) thereby complimenting the primarily interpretivist and inductive approach in this study (King & Horrocks, 2010). Each interview was unique. There were, however, some questions that I asked to every participant. These questions were based on the findings from studies 1 and 2. A list of the questions asked to every interviewee can be found in Appendix 12. A list of the main themes and sub-themes that were developed in study 3 can be found in Appendix 13.

5.4.6 Reflexive Thematic Analysis

As discussed in section 5.3.3, I used inductive RTA in the third study. I had already developed the main grievance-based themes of the three anti-Islam PRR groups in study 2. Although I used a combined inductive and hypothetico-deductive approach (Henn et al., 2009) I primarily used an inductive data-driven approach (Saunders et al., 2009) to ensure I developed all the main grievance-based themes. In study 3, I developed grievance-based themes to elaborate on or compare previous themes developed in study 2 and discuss themes that had not been developed.

In this study, I followed the same RTA process outlined by Braun and Clarke (2021a) in section 5.3.3. In Chapter 8, to ensure adequate attention for each theme, I only focused on four themes across the three groups. The full list and examples of themes and sub-themes for study 3 can be found in appendices 12 and 13. I aggregated each of the four main themes into a complex story, highlighting themes that either supported or contradicted previous research. As highlighted in section 5.3.3, in RTA, the researcher's positionality and reflexivity are key in understanding how and why each theme has been developed. Themes are developed from the participant's data but are influenced by the researcher's positionality. I discuss this positionality in section 5.5.

Further, in Chapters 7 and 8, I used RTA to analyse qualitative data in both the second and third study. I discuss the main findings from the research including the main themes and sub-themes developed across each group. I represent each theme by a direct quote which highlights the main argument in the theme. I have taken these quotes from the transcripts of studies 2 and 3. They are the words of supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. Unless stated otherwise, I use quotes to represent typical arguments expressed and were broadly agreed by other supporters and leaders. I report each quote verbatim. Consequently, there may be grammatical errors in these quotes reflecting the language and style used by the interviewees. I have made no attempt to correct these quotes in an effort to keep the arguments as accurate as possible. The only amendments that I have made are either '[...]' to signify that the text was too long, and I have edited it, or I have added words to add clarity to an argument. For example, when someone is talking about Islam but does not explicitly refer to Islam in that specific quote, I have added '[Islam]'. Finally, due to the nature of this doctoral thesis, some of the quotes used may be offensive.

5.4.7 Limitations of study 3

In addition to the inductive and qualitative-based limitations outlined in section 5.3.4, some limitations are specific to semi-structured interview-based research. COVID-19 was a main theme in this study, and this was heavily influenced by the environmental context at the time. I conducted the interviews during the global pandemic; therefore, this research is context-specific (O'Keeffe et al., 2016). Further, in this study, I overfocus on the voices from TFBM. At the time of this research, TFBM was the most active group on Facebook. PEGIDA Germany (the parent group of PEGIDA UK) are notoriously unwilling to talk to the mainstream media or researchers (Volk & Weisskircher, 2023). I was also falsely represented as a journalist by the DFLA admin, further discussed in section 5.5. This may explain why neither PEGIDA UK nor the DFLA were as willing to talk to me as TFBM. Because of the in-depth nature of semi-structured interviews, they are also time-consuming and labour intensive, which limits the sample size (Braun & Clarke, 2021a; Queirós et al., 2017; Adams, 2015). However, as discussed by Braun and Clarke (2021a), this limitation can be mitigated by conducting in-depth interviews with a

diverse group of participants with diverse stories, thereby ensuring the maximum number of themes are developed.

5.5 Researcher positionality and reflexivity

Reflexivity stems from the assumption that all methodologies used in research are shaped by the researchers that use them (Braun & Clarke, 2021a; Bonacich, 1989). Every aspect of the research then is influenced by who the researcher is (Dodgson, 2019; Taylor, 1998). Reflexivity is more important when researching individuals that have opposing views to the researcher or voice views that are at odds with many within the academic community. It is, therefore, important to discuss how my personal views may have influenced this research (Hall, 2020) while also reflecting on challenges that I experienced during the close-up interview study in this doctoral thesis.

Using social media for academic research can pose some problems. This is especially true when using social media to recruit participants for interviews. Social media is known to attract abuse (Ferrara et al., 2020; Duggan, 2017), especially when concerning political discussions. According to Marwick et al., (2016), being targeted by online harassment from disenfranchised, angry users and ‘trolls’ was a possibility. For this reason, researching the far-right can be anxiety-provoking (Waldner & Dobratz, 2019). This is especially true when you get unwanted attention. During the recruiting process, I only received one response from the DFLA group, and we were discussing a date and time for the interview. However, after a week, the individual withdrew from the study stating that they were no longer interested in taking part. I was surprised by this, so I went back to the group’s Facebook page to see their recent activity. On the 1st of October 2021, the group’s admin had written a post about me and my research with my Facebook profile picture, name and academic affiliation attached to the message. They had advised people not to talk to me as they claimed I was a journalist who was trying to misrepresent and manipulate their words, as can be seen in Appendix 14.

Far-right groups and supporters are often hard-to-reach, distrustful of academics and journalists due to the portrayal of the far-right in the media as well as stories of infiltration to expose the group and its supporters (Ellinas, 2021; Klandermans & Mayer,

2005). This may explain why the DFLA admin were suspicious of me and why they identified me as a journalist. There was nothing aggressive about the Facebook post itself, but the post received 250 likes, 28 comments and 16 shares. Of the 28 comments, five were insulting or threatening with offensive language and reference to rape jokes. I also received a private message that said 'kys', which is internet speak for 'kill yourself' which was disturbing. More information relating to this episode of online harassment can be found in Sibley (2024).

Research by Lewis et al., (2017) suggests that online abuse, especially related to rape and death threats can be traumatic. In response to my exposure the first point of contact was to get emotional support from my partner, friends and family. I then took screenshots of the post, comments and private messages I had received as well as the perpetrators' Facebook profile pages. I contacted my supervisors who emailed the pro-vice chancellor of research and the chair of the ethics committee. I also met with student support services and Nottingham Trent Student Union. During these meetings, I was advised to contact the police to ensure I had additional non-university protection. I, therefore, contacted the police, attaching screenshots of the abuse I had received as evidence. The police never replied to my emails. Despite the support I received from the university, this event left me feeling vulnerable to potential physical abuse and subsequently affected my mental health. In addition to these actions, I also debated contacting the DFLA admin and other supporters again for interviews. Although I chose not to do this in the end, I was concerned that this failure to gain access to one of the three groups I was researching would jeopardise my doctoral thesis and cause an imbalance in my research. I was willing to put myself in potential danger to gain the required data. According to Kušić and Záhora (2020), this need to gather worthwhile data is often a motivation of PhD candidates.

In addition to researcher safety, in this doctoral thesis I primarily focused on the grievances expressed by both the groups generally and by the individuals within the groups using close-up research methods. However, some scholars (e.g., Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) argue that close-up research should not be conducted on discriminatory and dangerous groups; doing so may legitimise their views and ideologies. Research provides increased visibility of the groups (Pilkington, 2019), and close-up methods and

grievance-based theories may affirm the legitimacy of their grievances, ideologies and views (Hall, 2020; Esseveld & Eyerman, 1992). As discussed in section 4.3, researchers mainly apply grievance theory to progressive movements due to issues with justifying distasteful views and arguments. However, this has led researchers to use pathologizing theories to analyse those that have distasteful views. In this doctoral research, I do not believe that the individuals that support the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK should be pathologized. I believe that these individuals may have some legitimate concerns that need to be understood in order to reduce community tensions. I also believe that each individual creates their own conception of reality and that these individuals may perceive themselves to be under threat. Although their reality is socially constructed, this does not mean that their fears and grievances should not be listened to, especially since previous research of far-right groups has found that supporters are concerned about a wide range of grievances which are often shared by the wider population (Jones & Unsworth, 2022, p. 25; Allan et al., 2015). As Ajil (2022) recommends, the best way to gather useful grievance-based data is through close-up research, preferably interviews.

Because the wider population may also hold some of the same grievances as the supporters of the PRR, I argue that although there are issues with legitimising and justifying certain harmful values, beliefs and views propagated by the anti-Islam PRR, attempting to reduce community divisions through deeper current understandings of grievances is more important. Views and grievances, no matter how uncomfortable must be treated seriously both politically and academically rather than ridiculed and dismissed (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Kenny, 2012; Back, 2002). Klandermans and Mayer (2005) highlight how most supporters of the far-right are not taken seriously as few people take the time to listen to their story and try to understand their position. There is an important reason as to why these grievances need to be understood and taken seriously. Pilkington (2016) argues that while anti-Islam PRR groups are often Islamophobic, anti-Muslim and racist, these views and grievances may not be dissimilar to the general British population. For example, of 1,667 respondents, 39.8% of respondents totally agreed that 'Islamophobia in Britain is in response to the everyday behaviour of Muslims', 32% of respondents totally agreed that 'Islam threatens the British way of life' and 20% totally agreed that Islam/Muslims has had a negative effect on the UK (Jones & Unsworth, 2022, p. 25). These figures suggest that it is not only the

far-right that hold Islamophobic views or perceive Muslims and Islam as a threat. Therefore, understanding grievance-based motivations through close-up methods may help understand how to reduce wider-held xenophobic views and improve community cohesion in the UK.

Interview-based methods are rarely used in far-right research. Far-right groups often hold discriminatory and 'distasteful' views (Pilkington, 2016, p.14). In order to avoid the contagion stigma associated with far-right activism, most researchers of the far-right adopt a pathologizing theoretical framework allowing them to distance themselves from so-called 'distasteful groups' (Pilkington, 2016, p. 14; Kirby & Corzine, 1981). In order to distance themselves, they use distancing methods such as self-complete questionnaires and secondary material, thus keeping their 'hands clean' (Pilkington, 2016, p. 13; Esseveld & Eyerman, 1992). This is what Goodwin (2006) calls externalist methods that adopt a distanced, objective methodology. A specific example of this distancing tactic is the use of social media to look at how individuals are recruited into the far-right (Berlet et al., 2015; Bartlett et al., 2011). However, by categorising certain groups and individuals as abnormal or deviant, this prevents 'deeper examination of the political and social conditions behind its rise' (Mohamedou, 2017, p. 2) which has led to the masking of political grievances (Burgat, 2016; Sedgwick, 2010; McEvoy, 2003).

As Pilkington (2016) argues, there are no methodological or epistemological issues relating to close-up far-right research. Avoiding close-up methodologies when researching the far-right reduces current understandings of motivations for supporting such groups and understanding of the groups themselves. Therefore, Berntzen (2019) and Art (2011) argue that more interviews with far-right activists are needed. I believe it is important to listen across ideological boundaries to encourage productive change and decrease societal divisions (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Further, some social scientists (e.g., Yilmaz, 2013; Doucet & Mauthner, 2002) argue that to do qualitative research, the researcher must develop empathy with the participants to understand their lifeworld's. Developing this type of relationship would be ethically concerning given the potentially offensive nature of some arguments. However, it is argued that research with these types of problematic groups is conducted under different conditions, and therefore, the

same research standards are not necessary (Waldner & Dobratz, 2019; Esseveld & Eyerman, 1992). Consequently, Waldner and Dobratz (2019, p. 54) claim that 'siding' with the researched or accepting their worldview is not a necessary requirement in social research.

However, there are difficult ethical concerns in this type of research. According to Blee (2007), one of the most significant issues relates to our ethical obligation to our participants. I considered this carefully in the third study where I conducted close-up interviews. This ethical obligation determines how honest the researcher must be in their study and to what extent the researcher exposes their values, views and research agenda. Pilkington (2019) argues that to build rapport in close-up research researchers do not need to fake a friendship through deception. If faking a friendship was necessary to build rapport this would apply to all close-up research as the researcher needs to maintain a degree of distance to the participants (Duncombe & Jessop, 2002). However, Blee (2007) comments on the dilemmas of deciding how much information to disclose about their views to their participants.

Despite these challenges, Waldner and Dobratz (2019) argue that there is no one right way of conducting this type of research and how much personal information the researcher should disclose. My approach was to keep open-minded about each individual with the knowledge that overall, the groups were problematic and offensive. I attempted to never be deliberately dishonest with any of my participants. However, before I began to recruit participants for my third study, I deleted several public accounts on the internet, increased my privacy settings and changed my name on my social media profiles. This allowed me to use my real name for my research Facebook profile which reduced access to my political opinion history, thereby giving me more control over what I disclosed.

In addition to reducing my public opinion history, during the interviews, I used the strategy of 'deflection' outlined by Waldner and Dobratz, (2019, p. 52) rather than an opposing, more transparent approach (Blee, 2003). As I was interested in the grievances individuals have within these three groups, it was important to interrupt as little as possible to enable the participants to talk freely about their concerns. Opposing their

arguments would have restricted conversation through defensiveness. In addition, as Hall (2020) comments, some participants in this research specifically supported these groups because they felt ignored in mainstream discourse. I discuss this in Chapters 7 and 8. Therefore, it was important to encourage participants to speak without feeling the need to be defensive. Despite this, unlike Simi and Futrell (2009), I never pretended to agree with participants on a topic. However, I did use the active listening techniques discussed by Waldner and Dobratz (2019), which as Hall (2020) argues, could have been interpreted as agreement.

Related to this is my researcher status. According to Braun and Clarke (2021a), there are two research positions. The insider, the researcher who is part of the researched group, and, the outsider, the researcher who is not part of this group. Although I am not a supporter of the anti-Islam PRR, I am both an insider and outsider. As a white, British (specifically English) citizen, I share similarities to supporters of the anti-Islam PRR (Lancaster, 2020; Pilkington, 2016). This positions me as an insider. However, I am also a left-wing academic. This positions me an outsider. Far-right groups may have assumed that as I was white, I secretly agreed with their Islamophobic or racist views (Blee, 2008). As previous research suggests, it is likely that as a white woman I was perceived to be less threatening than a racially minoritized man (Simi & Futrell, 2009; 2015; Blee, 2003). However, during the interviews it became apparent that my assumed socio-economic status (being part of the educational elite, my assumed values, being left-wing and my assumed profession as a journalist) counteracted the perceived lack of threat in relation to my gender and ethnicity. There was certainly a lack of trust as to what my intentions were during this research (Ellinas, 2021) as seen in the online abuse I received.

It was clear at the early stages of this research that some supporters/groups did not trust me, and some supporters held extreme and offensive views towards Muslims, immigrants and politicians. As a left-wing, Labour supporter with a Mexican partner and a diverse group of friends, this was difficult for me to hear. In the beginning, I firmly opposed the views of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. Similarly, to Hall (2020), I was influenced by my desire to expose different forms of prejudice and discrimination. As anti-Islam PRR groups often position themselves as anti-Islam single-issue groups, I

wanted to highlight other potential targets of these groups (Berntzen et al., 2017). Consequently, along with my cognitive and intellectual interpretations, I also reacted with strong emotions during studies 2 and 3. I am aware that I consist of multiple identities which are fluid and overlap and that my strong emotional responses are the result of my ideology, identity and values. I, therefore, incorporated these strong subjective, emotional reactions into my interpretation. However, my curiosity for understanding the grievance-based motivations for supporting these groups allowed me to be open-minded when listening to their arguments in studies 2 and 3. The more I researched and listened, the more I understood that the participants were 'complicated' individuals that were more than their ideological positions (Waldner & Dobratz, 2019, pp. 54-55). This new approach allowed me to identify the 'common ground' that I shared with some of the participants.

However, this also confused me in relation to my political position. I felt politically and philosophically confused, fearing I was adopting the worldview of my participants. I was surprised by the presence of sexually modern nativist supporters in these groups (discussed in Chapter 6). As these individuals were female, highly educated and pro-LGB rights in addition to being vegan and pro-animal rights, I identified more with some of these supporters than I expected to. I started questioning things I previously had not questioned. I had more negative thoughts about multiculturalism, immigration and Islam, especially concerning protecting liberal rights in the UK. I became more wary of people generally. But I was lucky enough to have a partner who discussed these fears with me helping me navigate my way through the emotional maze. I actively sought out counter-arguments from discriminated and minority groups to balance my perspective. This psychological journey as a researcher helped me to understand more deeply the arguments presented by the anti-Islam PRR, while also critically engaging with the deeper meanings within their arguments.

5.6 Overall Conclusion

This chapter outlined the methodology used in this doctoral thesis combining demographic statistical analysis with YouTube RTA and semi-structured interviews. It discussed the pragmatist approach I used to address the three research questions and

justified the mixed-methods design I used in the three studies. In study 1, I collected public data from Facebook profiles, anonymised the data to ensure participant protection and used a criterion sampling technique to ensure an adequate sample size. I followed a four-stage process outlined by Stieglitz et al (2018) to ensure the replicability of the study: data discovery, collection, preparation and analysis with the additional stage of coding added. In the data coding stage, I used Mayr and Weller's (2017) step-by-step social media research guide focusing on the use of Facebook posts with large numbers of reactions. I conducted a frequency analysis on SPSS to provide an overview of each group's demographics. There were issues with the live dataset and how this affects replicability. These issues related to the presence of fake profiles and Facebook's attractiveness to an older audience.

In study 2, I used YouTube due to its large user base and its attractiveness to marginalise individuals and groups. I then discussed five main ethical considerations: informed consent, unique opportunities, privacy, transparency and minimising potential harm (Legewie & Nassauer, 2018). I argued that published videos imply consent and offer unique opportunities due to the unfiltered nature of online videos. I ensured transparency by granting other researchers access to the datasets and minimising potential harm by anonymising the transcripts. I used a criterion sample, transcribed and thematically analysed the videos using Braun and Clarke's six-stage approach (2021a). This chapter then discussed the limitations of RTA. In this study, TFBM were overrepresented as they were the most active of all three groups. Further, due to the methodological position of RTA, the results are not generalisable to other groups.

For study 3, I used Facebook to identify potential participants and used a combination of convenience and snowball sampling recruitment methods to ensure an adequate sample size. As a result of this recruitment process, I experienced online harassment from some supporters of the DFLA which reduced the potential recruitment pool. Overall, there were 15 interviewees across all three groups in the final sample. To analyse these interviews, I followed the six-stage thematic process by Braun and Clarke (2021a) leading to the development of four main themes.

I then discussed researcher positionality and reflexivity. First, I examined my experience of online abuse from the DFLA as a result of recruiting participants on Facebook. Then I considered how my positionality as a white, British, highly educated, left-wing woman with a multicultural friendship group influenced my interpretation of the data. Grievance-based research has been criticised for legitimising groups with problematic views, however, I argued that attempting to understand grievance-based motivations in far-right activism is important to reduce societal divides. Consequently, I used deflection strategies encouraging participants to talk in a non-defensive, uninterrupted manner. This led to the reflexivity discussion concerning how I responded emotionally as a researcher and how this research influenced my personal worldview.

The first five chapters of this thesis have outlined the twelve gaps identified in the far-right literature, the three research questions this thesis will address, the academic literature available on the far-right, the theoretical framework and methodology I use in this doctoral thesis. The following three chapters discuss the results of the three studies. Chapter 6 explores the results for the demographic statistical analysis, Chapter 7 considers the results from a grievance-based (primarily) inductive YouTube RTA and finally, Chapter 8 discusses the results from an RTA semi-structured interviews.

Chapter 6

A changing demographic landscape in the British anti-Islam PRR

As discussed in Chapter 2, the British far-right presents a significant threat to social cohesion and democracy. According to the Home Office (2021), this threat has been consistently growing since this doctoral project began in 2019. Despite this, Allchorn (2020) found that the most common response of the United Kingdom (UK) government to this threat is to exclude far-right groups by banning them. This closes down the opportunity structure for far-right groups preventing them from gaining support, for example, through media interviews (Allchorn, 2020). However, banning these groups does not explain who supports them and why. Although demographics can be used to understand who supports the far-right (Mudde, 2019), little research has outlined the main demographics of the British far-right (e.g., Pilkington, 2016). The research that has been conducted is often out of date, focusing on dissolved far-right groups such as the English Defence League (EDL) (Gest et al., 2018; Pilkington, 2016; Ford & Goodwin, 2014b; Treadwell & Garland, 2011; Copsey, 2010). Consequently, the previous research conducted is unlikely to adequately reflect the current demographic make-up of the British anti-Islam Populist Radical Right (PRR).

One of the main reasons for this under-research relates to membership or lists of far-right supporters which are difficult to access due to the stigma attached to being part of these types of groups (Mudde, 2019). Membership can be fluid and ever changing, making it hard to access membership details. As discussed in Chapter 3, membership can potentially cross group boundaries with individuals supporting more than one far-right group. Supporters can span across the anti-Islam PRR, the Extreme Right (ER) and terrorist right (Mudde, 2019). This makes it especially important and challenging to collate the demographics of these groups without a formal membership. Social media offers an alternative opportunity to access these demographics as there are non-formal supporter details online. All three of the groups in this doctoral thesis have an official Facebook page. Each page has or had over 20,000 likes on Facebook, offering an alternative supporter list (The For Britain Movement, 2019b; The Democratic Football Lads Alliance, 2019; Patriot Promotional Page, 2019). Using frequency analysis,

data was collected manually from Facebook and analysed six demographics. For more methodology details, refer to section 5.2.

This chapter aims to provide both practical and theoretical insight into up-to-date PRR demographics addressing the first research question in this doctoral thesis ‘who expresses support for the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), The For Britain Movement (TFBM) and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA UK)?’ It does this by focusing on six demographics: gender, age, education, ethnicity, sexuality and religion. As highlighted in Table 10, all of these factors have previously been identified by academics as notable demographics when researching the far-right. These additional demographics can further understandings of who supports these three far-right groups. More current data helps identify new anti-Islam PRR typologies which can help prevent other vulnerable people becoming involved in the far-right and also may help prevent violence from these supporters. Although previous research has outlined the importance of social class in the far-right (e.g., Pilkington, 2016), this type of data was not available on Facebook. Therefore, social class is not included in this study.

Table 10

Demographics identified as important in far-right support

Number	Demographic	Identified as important
1	Gender	Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Gest et al., 2018; Pilkington, 2016; Ford and Goodwin, 2014b; Arzheimer, 2012; Treadwell and Garland, 2011; Allen, 2011; Goodwin, 2011; Copsey, 2010
2	Age	Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Ebner, 2017; Gaston, 2017; Pilkington, 2016; Arzheimer, 2012; Bartlett and Littler, 2011; Goodwin, 2011; Copsey, 2010
3	Education level	Staton and Warrell, 2020; Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Gest et al., 2018; Winlow et al., 2017; Allen, 2017; Pilkington, 2016; Goodwin, 2013, Arzheimer, 2012; Goodwin, 2011
4	Ethnicity	Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Pilkington, 2016; Jackson and Feldman, 2011; Boon, 2010; Goodwin, 2011
5	Sexuality	Pilkington, 2016
6	Religion	Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Arzheimer and Carter, 2009

Note. I created this table to aggregate previous research and highlight which demographics have been identified as important by previous academics (author's own).

As discussed in Chapter 4, Lancaster (2020) analysed three demographics (gender, age and education level) to develop three Radical Right (PRR in this doctoral thesis) typologies: (1) conservative nativists or social conservatives (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) who are older, low educated men, (2) sexually modern nativists who are less nationalistic and support women's rights and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) but are still anti-immigration or anti-Islam, and (3) moderate nativists defined as individuals that fall between conservative nativists and sexually modern nativists. Lancaster's (2020) typologies suggest that there is no single type of person that supports the PRR. This first study expands on these previous PRR typologies. The frequency analysis conducted on the six demographics outlined above suggests that there were

four types of supporters in this sample: three that have previously been outlined by Lancaster (2020): (1) the conservative nativist, (2) the sexually modern nativist, (3) the moderate nativists (discussed more in Chapter 8), and one that is developed in this doctoral thesis (4) the ethnically diverse nativists. This individual is racially minoritized and challenges the stereotype that far-right supporters are only white, older, low educated (to secondary school level) men.

This chapter begins by presenting the six demographic-based findings outlined in section 6.1. It discusses each demographic in comparison to the wider British political landscape and considers how each finding sits within previous literature especially relating to the three typologies outlined by Lancaster (2020). To analyse the six demographics and four typologies, this chapter uses Cultural backlash theory (CBT), Group Relative Deprivation (GRD) theory, femonationalism and homonationalism. Consequently, a new type of supporter in this sample is identified (ethnically diverse nativist) developing the previous typologies outlined by Lancaster (2020). This is important because far-right support is often equated with the typical conservative nativist: the white, older man omitting potential threat from other types of supporter.

6.1 The demographics of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK


The first section presents the results for (1) gender, (2) age, (3) education level, (4) ethnicity, (5) sexuality and (6) religion. The most common supporter of TFBM in this sample was an older (60+ years), school educated, white, Christian, heterosexual male. The most common supporter in the DFLA dataset was an older (40-60 years), school educated, white, Christian, heterosexual male. Whereas the most common supporter in the PEGIDA UK dataset was an older (60+), school educated, white, Christian, heterosexual male. There were no major differences between each of the three samples. The next section discusses these findings starting with the gender demographic.

6.2 Gender and support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

Figure 7 indicates that the majority of supporters in the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK were male, 70%, 70% and 75% respectively, although women made up a large minority in each group, 30%, 30% and 25%. Interestingly, there were also individuals that self-identified as non-binary in all three groups, 0.4%, 0.5% and 0.3% respectively. No major differences in gender were found across all three samples but the DFLA and TFBM samples were the groups with the highest percentage of female supporters (both have 30%).

Figure 7

The gender differences within the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK



Note. N = 9,000 (author's own).

Men are overrepresented across the political scene (e.g., Bitzan, 2017; Dalton, 2008). While some research suggests that women are not less politically active, they engage in politics in different ways (e.g., Harrison & Munn, 2007), other research indicates that there is a political participation gender gap in a number of 'Western' democracies (Bitzan, 2017; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). Men are consistently found to be more politically active than women (Bitzan, 2017; Dalton, 2008; Burns, 2007; Gallego, 2007; Kunovich,

Paxton & Hughes, 2007; Norris, 2002; Burns et al., 1997). In addition, men are more likely to be involved in right-wing groups specifically (Bitzan, 2017; Betz, 1994) as shown in Table 11. The Radical Right Gender Gap (RRGG) is the gap between male and female supporters of RR parties (Donovan, 2023; Givens, 2016).

Table 11

The gender-balance within mainstream British political parties and within far-right groups

Political Party	Percentage of men	Percentage of women
Conservative Party (2019)	71%	29%
Labour Party (2019)	53%	47%
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) (2019)	75%	25%
British National Party (BNP) (2010)	69%	31%
EDL (2011)	81%	19%
TFBM (2020)	70%	30%
The DFLA (2020)	70%	30%
PEGIDA UK (2020)	75%	25%

Note. This table combines previous research in addition to the findings in this doctoral thesis. It presents the breakdown of male and female supporters in the Conservative Party, Labour Party, UKIP (Audickas et al., 2019), the BNP (Ford & Goodwin, 2010), the EDL (Bartlett & Littler, 2011), and in the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK's datasets created in this thesis (author's own).

Table 11 suggests that all three datasets of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK had more men than the Labour Party. Both the DFLA and TFBM datasets had the same number of male supporters as the BNP and fewer than the Conservative Party and the EDL. This is an interesting finding as the far-right (especially the ER) previously have been associated almost solely with men (Donovan, 2023; Bitzan, 2017; Dubslaff, 2017; Givens, 2016; 2004). The movement towards attracting more women into these groups is part of the transition from the fascistic ER groups to the PRR, where women's rights and LGBT rights are valued (Traverso, 2019; Farris, 2017). This more democratic and liberal approach differentiates the ER and anti-Islam PRR (Traverso, 2019). This is a constant theme in this doctoral research and is discussed in more detail throughout the thesis. However, men were still overrepresented in these datasets.

One of the main arguments for this male overrepresentation is the nature of their involvement in the labour market (Givens, 2016; Rippeyoung, 2007). This can be explained through the losers of modernisation theory (Kriesi et al., 2006; Betz, 1993) which argues that workers are modernization losers due to the erosion of industrial mass production, the rise in information technologies and international trade. Industrial workers have been displaced by a modernising world (Oesch, 2008).

In addition, manual labour is an unstable profession which is affected by cheap labour from immigrants willing to do the same job for less money (Winlow et al., 2017; Fennema, 2005) leaving some unemployed (Allchorn, 2018). Research suggests that men are more likely to be blue collar workers (Givens, 2016; Hartevelde, 2016). In contrast, women tend to be in service or non-manual clerical or public sector jobs, which are less threatened by immigration (Hartevelde, 2016; Rippeyoung, 2007). According to Hartevelde (2016), in the context of the RR the majority of economic migrants in Europe are low-skilled and male. He argues, therefore, that immigration poses a disproportionate economic threat to low-skilled, low educated, working-class men who have to compete for the same jobs as economic migrants. Coffé (2013) also found that class predicts male support for the RR but not female support. As previous research suggests the European PRR attracts most of its support from the working class, this then explains why most supporters within the RR are male (Pilkington, 2016; Oesch, 2008). Traditionally men were more likely to work in skilled or unskilled working-class manual

jobs. Due to modernisation, working class men had lost their worth in the labour market and were more susceptible to RR support (Stockemer & Normandin, 2022).

However, other research (e.g., Stockemer & Normandin, 2022; Anderson & Bjørklund, 1990, p. 211) suggests that women that are economically dissatisfied may be more vulnerable to PRR recruitment than men (Stockemer & Normandin, 2022). Mayer (2013) argues that economic grievances do not solely affect male dominated jobs. Service jobs, a market dominated by women, are also threatened by immigration (Mayer, 2013). She further argues that women are overrepresented in the unskilled labour market (Mayer, 2013) contrasting the argument that the main losers of modernisation are disproportionately male (Stockemer & Normandin, 2022). Some researchers argue, therefore, that women are in more precarious job markets, which could make them susceptible to welfare chauvinist policies of the PRR where 'welfare services should be restricted to our own' (Stockemer & Normandin, 2022; Anderson & Bjørklund, 1990, p. 211). In addition to welfare chauvinistic policies, PRR groups use femonationalism to appeal to women and position PRR groups as the defenders of women (Berntzen, 2019). Due to this use of femonationalism, Stockemer and Normandin (2022) found that across 16 European countries (including the United Kingdom) women who were economically dissatisfied were more likely to support the PRR than men who were economically dissatisfied. This suggests that the losers of modernisation thesis does not adequately explain male support for the PRR.

Contrasting research suggests (Mudde, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Ivarsflaten, 2005) that although the perceived economic threat is a motivating factor for far-right recruitment, the perceived cultural threat is more significant. This is the primary motivating factor for RR recruitment (Mudde, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Ivarsflaten, 2005). Similarly, research suggests that racism arises out of conflicting values rather than competition over material goods or resources (Swift, 2021; Norris & Inglehart, 2019; McConahay, 1982). Therefore, the theory of economic threat does not explain why men are overrepresented in these three PRR groups. The perceived cultural threat may better explain the overrepresentation of men in these groups. Research suggests that in 'Western Europe', men are more likely to hold authoritarian values than women (Spierings & Zaslove, 2017; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34; Givens, 2004). According to

CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), men that hold authoritarian values may reject the silent revolution which has improved women's rights, LGBT rights and racial equality among other civil rights movements. Until the silent revolution, less educated, white men were the dominant social-political group within 'Western' (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34) liberal democracies. However, since the Baby Boomer era, the hegemonic status of white men has been challenged leading to a reduction in their privilege. It is likely that the majority of supporters in these three groups were men (conservative nativist) because they reject their loss of hegemonic privilege (Lancaster, 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Due to this new perceived loss of privilege, some men argue that their in-group are relatively deprived compared to identified out-groups, such as Muslims (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). This is further discussed in Chapters 7 and 8.

Table 11 suggests that men are overrepresented in nearly every mainstream British political party including anti-Islam PRR groups such as the EDL. However, the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK datasets had a higher percentage of female supporters than the EDL. In addition, the DFLA and TFBM had a higher percentage of women than the Conservative Party and UKIP. A Facebook study of 12 European PRR parties (n=10,667) by Bartlett et al., (2011) found that 75% of the supporters were male highlighting the RRGG discussed above. The first study in this doctoral thesis supports research on the RRGG (Bitzan, 2017). However, some women *do* support these groups. The transition from the traditional right to the anti-Islam PRR may explain why some women in these datasets support these groups. This is important as the far-right is normally not associated with female participation and therefore, the demographic make-up of certain sub-sections of the far-right may be changing. People previously ignored by the far-right may now be vulnerable to recruitment. This is especially true for those identified as sexually modern nativists (Lancaster, 2020; Spierings et al., 2017). This new type of PRR supporter is more likely to be higher educated, younger and female (Lancaster, 2020).

Anti-Islam PRR groups strategically use femonationalism which explains why some women in these datasets support these three groups: the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. Inglehart et al., (2003) argue that feminism and the mainstreaming of feminism is likely to have played a main role in why women are less likely to support or vote for the far-right. Traditional far-right parties often support traditional gender roles reducing

women to a mother or a spouse. For women that support feminist arguments, this support of traditional roles is unlikely to appeal to them. This is particularly true for younger women (Lancaster, 2020; Inglehart et al., 2003). Consequently, some anti-Islam groups use a femonationalist approach where they advocate for women's rights (Pilkington, 2017). As discussed in the fourth chapter of this doctoral thesis, femonationalism is the exploitation of feminist themes by nationalists (Farris, 2017).

For example, in 2012, Marine Le Pen increased female participation from 20% to 45% in France's Front National Party (Perrineau, 2014) closing the RRGG (Mayer, 2015). She framed the immigration debate in a way that makes the Front National Party the protectors of democracy in a fight against Islam to uphold the rights of women, the LGBT community and certain minority groups (Mayer & Tiberj, 2015). The party is now more sympathetic to feminist egalitarian values, sharply contrasting to the previous traditional values of the Front National Party. This has made the Front National Party more attractive for female voters (Mayer, 2015). However, analysis by Mayer (2015) found that when controlled for, feminism did not significantly impact people's decision to vote for the Front National Party suggesting that there is another reason why the far-right is gaining support from women. This strategic use of femonationalism also does not support CBT in that the use of femonationalism embraces feminism rather than rejects it (Gandesha, 2018). Feminism is one of the post-materialist movements that social conservatives (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) or conservative nativists (Lancaster, 2020) would reject (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Therefore, although CBT does explain male participation, it does not explain why anti-Islam PRR groups have used femonationalist narratives nor why some women support these groups (sexually modern nativist supporters) (Lancaster, 2020; Gandesha, 2018).

Further, more recent research found that 'strikingly, tolerance towards gays and lesbians predicts greater far-right support among women' and 'far-right support among women correlates with culturally progressive positions at both the individual and party level' (Allen & Goodman, 2021, pp. 136-147). Therefore, in addition to femonationalism, the use of homonationalism is likely to have increased female support in this sample. As discussed in Chapter 4, homonationalism is the combination of tolerant views towards members of the LGB community, nationalism and racism (Freude & Bosch, 2020). This

progressive stance is specific to female supporters of the PRR (Allen & Goodman, 2021) and is likely due to their positioning of Islam as based on anti-liberal values and as an oppressive, patriarchal ideology (discussed in Chapter 7 and 8). The homonationalist theme is ongoing throughout this doctoral thesis and is, therefore, discussed in more detail in sections 6.6, 8.2.2 and 8.4.3.

One of the most surprising findings in this study was the presence of non-binary supporters. While only making up a tiny percentage of supporters in this sample, 0.4% of TFBM, 0.5% of the DFLA and 0.3% of PEGIDA UK, this finding is important. All three PRR groups had a higher percentage of non-binary supporters compared to the general population of England and Wales. According to the 2021 census, 0.06% of people self-identified as non-binary (Office for National Statistics, 2023b). Although the statistics in this study were very small, they suggest that non-binary people were over-represented compared to the general population.


The anti-Islam PRR represents a new type of far-right movement, one that focuses on Islam and embraces certain liberal values, such as women's rights and LGBT rights. This supports previous research by Lancaster (2020) who found that sexually modern nationalist supporters supported LGBT rights. However, the relationship between the PRR and LGBTQI rights is complicated. Despite this support of LGB rights, other liberal values such as Trans, Queer, and Intersex rights, including non-binary rights were not supported by supporters and leaders of these groups. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. Like Foster and Kirke (2023) found in their research, the use of homonationalism (Puar, 2013) by the anti-Islam PRR groups in this doctoral thesis is limited to protecting LGB rights rather than the rights of other marginalised groups associated with LGBTQI rights. The non-binary finding in this doctoral thesis then lies outside of the conservative nationalist, moderate nationalist and the sexually modern nationalist types, expanding on previous research and suggests that the supporter category of sexually modern nationalist may need to be revised to include non-binary supporters too.

6.3 The age differences of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

The second factor outlined by Norris and Inglehart (2019) is age. Figure 8 indicates that in each dataset, the data related to the most common age group differed for each of the three groups. The For Britain Movement sample had a large over 60-year-old support network making up 60% of the dataset (n=216). The category with the most supporters in the DFLA dataset (N = 227), in contrast, were between 40-59 years old (45%). Finally, the PEGIDA UK dataset (N = 178) suggests that people from all ages were attracted to this group and there was no clear majority. Most supporters were above 60 years old (32%), followed narrowly by people aged between 40-59 years old (30%), then 26-39 (23%) and, finally, 15-25 years old (16%). These results contrast to the 2021 census where 24.4% of the population were over the age of 60 (Office for National Statistics, 2022a). Further, these results contrast to previous research on other British anti-Islam PRR groups, especially the EDL which found that the most common age group consisted of younger people under 30 years old (Gaston, 2017; Pilkington, 2016; Bartlett & Littler, 2011; Copsey, 2010). However, these results also support previous demographic research on the PRR generally which found that most supporters fit the older conservative nativist supporter type (Lancaster, 2020).

Figure 8

The different ages of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK supporters



Note. N = 621 (author's own).

As shown in Table 12, previous research suggests that the majority of party supporters in 2019 were over 60-years-old (Conservative Party, 53% and UKIP, 69%) (Audickas et al., 2019). Similarly, 60% of TFBM sample were over 60-years-old. In the DFLA sample, 45% of supporters were between 40-59 making up their most common age group. The closest political party with a similar number of supporters between the ages 40 and 59 was the Labour Party with 33% of Labour membership (Audickas et al., 2019). This suggests that the DFLA sample had supporters of a certain age group that were unrepresented in the political mainstream. The results from PEGIDA UK's dataset share similarities with the BNP voters which tend to be more spread out (Boon, 2010). The next section discusses why older people were more prevalent in these samples compared to younger people.

Table 12

The age of members/supporters in mainstream and fringe political parties/groups

Age Group	18-24	25-39	40-59	60+		
Conservative Party (2019)	5%	13%	29%	53%		
Labour Party (2019)	4%	18%	33%	45%		
UKIP (2019)	1%	4%	26%	69%		
Age Group	18-24	25-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69
BNP (2010)	12%	23%	18%	14%	17%	16%
Age Group	16-20	21-25	26-30	31-40	40-50	51+
EDL (2011)	36%	24%	12%	14%	9%	4%
Age Group	0-15	16-25	26-39	40-59	60+	
TFBM (2019)	-	5%	8%	27%	60%	
The DFLA (2019)	2%	12%	12%	50%	30%	
PEGIDA UK (2019)	-	16%	23%	30%	32%	

Note. The age of supporters of the Conservative Party, the Labour Party, UKIP (Audickas et al., 2019), BNP voters (Boon, 2010), and the EDL (Bartlett & Littler, 2011), combined with samples of TFBM, the DFLA and PEGIDA UK created in this thesis (author's own). Due to the different age ranges that have been used in each study, the age groups in this table differ.

Supporting previous literature (Lancaster, 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), the most common type of supporter in the three datasets were older men above 40 years old. There are several reasons as to why the conservative nativist supporter was over-represented in these samples (Lancaster, 2020). Birth cohort is the strongest predictor of authoritarian views (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Since the 1970s, 'Western' (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34) democratic societies have experienced a growing focus on socially liberal, post-materialist values. This is especially true in the younger cohorts of society (Inglehart, 2020; 1977). Young people in Western, liberal democracies (such as Millennials) are more likely to be accepting of racial, gender and LGBTQI equality and are more tolerant towards other cultures and religions (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; 2013). Social media and technological advancements have allowed young people to live in an online world devoid of physical boundaries between peoples encouraging a more global, multi-cultural outlook (Norris & Inglehart, 2013). In comparison, the older generations (the Interwar generation and Baby Boomers') are more likely to reject these new cultural values of the silent revolution (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

In addition, Norris and Inglehart (2019) argue that demographic changes and age are influencing a cultural backlash. Levels of foreign-born citizens are increasing in liberal, 'Western' democracies (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). Each new birth cohort has a higher level of foreign-born citizens than the last. This may help to explain why in both Europe and the United States of America (US), older people are more likely to hold Islamophobic views (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Kaya, 2015; Chandler & Tsai, 2001). In short, there is a significant difference between the values and attitudes of each birth cohort with the oldest holding more authoritarian views and the youngest holding more liberal views (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Research also suggests that this difference is due to generational differences as opposed to life-cycle effects (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Cultural Backlash Theory explains not only why older individuals are more likely to support these anti-Islam PRR groups but also why younger cohorts such as Millennials were so underrepresented in this research. However, Schäfer (2022) argues in contrast to Norris and Inglehart (2019) that birth cohort has less impact on PRR support than cultural grievances (discussed in Chapters 7 and 8) which are independent and more specific than birth cohort as Norris and Inglehart (2019) suggest. Therefore, CBT alone may not adequately explain these findings (Schäfer, 2022; Gandesha, 2018).

The overrepresentation of the 40-59 category may be further explained through mainstream political party membership. Table 12 shows that the 40-59-year-olds category was underrepresented in all mainstream British political parties. The political party with the closest percentage of 40-59-year-olds was the Labour Party with 33% of their membership. In comparison, 45% of the DFLA supporter sample was made up of 40-59-year-olds. Previously anti-Islam PRR groups, such as the EDL and UKIP, appealed to individuals that perceived themselves to be marginalised by mainstream political parties through a process of de-alignment (de Jonge, 2022; Ford & Goodwin, 2014b; Garland & Treadwell, 2011). This marginalisation can lead some individuals to move into fringe politics. In the case of UKIP, Ford and Goodwin (2014, p. 278) describe the 'left-behind voter' as older, white working class with few qualifications. According to Lancaster's (2020) far-right categories, this supporter represents the conservative nationalist. Many supporters of the DFLA sample fit into this category. Out of the three groups, the DFLA sample had the most white supporters, they specifically attracted

people between 40-59-years-old and argued they had been marginalised and left behind by mainstream political parties (discussed in Chapters 7 and 8).

However, this doctoral study only used data from Facebook. Therefore, the use of Facebook as a platform may have influenced the age range of the supporters or followers of each anti-Islam group. People that are 65-years-old and over are the fastest growing age group on Facebook indicating that Facebook users are getting older (Pew Research Centre, 2019a) and younger people are more likely to use other social media platforms, such as Snapchat and Instagram (Pew Research Centre, 2019b). Although this study found that older people were more likely to support these three anti-Islam PRR groups, this finding may have been influenced by the data used.


6.4 Education level and support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

The next factor outlined in previous literature is education level (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). As shown in Figure 9 the findings suggest that the majority of TFBM dataset (n=972) had a secondary school education as their highest academic qualification at 54%, while 23% had attended or were attending college¹² and 18% had or were attending university at bachelor's degree level. In the DFLA dataset (n=1,130), the majority of DFLA supporters also had low levels of education, 62% of supporters were educated to school level. This was followed by college level education with 25% and undergraduate level education with 9%. Finally, the PEGIDA UK dataset (n=1,051) also suggests that the majority of people did not attend college or university: 53% of supporters stated that school, high school or secondary school was their highest academic qualification, 27% had attended college and 16% had attended university and completed an undergraduate degree. As shown in Table 13, the sample suggests that although a small number of men were more likely to have a master's degree or PhD, women tended to be higher educated at university level, especially in the DFLA and PEGIDA UK datasets.

¹² In the UK, students can go to college or sixth form after finishing school at 16 years old. This is different from the US definition where college means university (Kopaczewski, 2018).

Figure 9

The differences in education level achieved by the supporters of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK



Note. N = 3,153 (authors own).

Table 13

The breakdown of education level and gender divided by group: the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

Qualification level	School		College		Undergraduate		Masters		PhD	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
TFBM	54%	55%	22%	25%	18%	18%	0.5%	0%	0.1%	0%
DFLA	63%	61%	25%	24%	8%	12%	0.1%	0.3%	0%	0%
PEGIDA UK	53%	55%	28%	23%	15%	20%	0.7%	0%	0.3%	0%

Note. Chi-Squared tests found no relationship between education level and the gender of the supporter in this study in any of the three groups. In the DFLA dataset, $\chi^2(12, N = 1130) = 10.7, p = .557$. In The For Britain Movement dataset, $\chi^2(12, N = 972) = 7.4, p = .829$. In the PEGIDA UK dataset, $\chi^2(12, N = 1051) = 11.2, p = .510$ (author's own).

The findings in Figure 9 and Table 13 suggest that although in these samples the majority of supporters were educated to a relatively low level suggesting a conservative nativist supporter (Lancaster, 2020) not all of the supporters in these three groups had the same education level. The datasets show that the DFLA supporters, when male and female supporters are combined, were the lowest educated with 9% of supporters attending university, this is followed by the PEGIDA UK sample with 16%. In their sample, TFBM supporters were the highest educated out of the three datasets with 18% attending university. This suggests that there were some sexually modern nativists supporters, especially those that were higher educated women in TFBM sample. These findings, therefore, support previous research which found that the most common supporter of the PRR is low educated compared to the general population (Lancaster, 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). For example, in 2021 between 37.9% of 18-year-olds in the general population attended university (UCAS, 2021). This suggests that all three groups were lower-educated than the general population. However, Chi-Squared analysis of the gender and education demographics show that there was no relationship between these two demographics (Appendix 15). This contradicts Lancaster's (2020) finding that women who support the PRR are more educated than male supporters of the PRR (sexually modern nativists compared to conservative nativists).

As discussed in section 6.2, low educated individuals are likely to be working in unskilled (industrial, manual jobs) insecure jobs. These jobs are argued to be vulnerable to immigration (Winlow, Hall & Treadwell, 2017). The losers of modernisation theory argues that job insecurity can lead to far-right support (Betz, 1994, p. 25). Low educated, unskilled, workers may be more vulnerable to far-right attitudes. However, the losers of modernisation thesis primarily focuses on the relationship between education and unemployment and previous research suggests that this relationship is complicated and variable depending on geographic context (Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2019; Bjørklund, 2007). An article by Bjørklund (2007) found that in Denmark, there was little relationship between unemployed individuals and far-right support. Whereas in Norway, findings suggest that there was a correlation between unemployed individuals and far-right support (Bjørklund, 2007). This suggests that the economic grievance theory may not be applicable to the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK's or may be applicable to some supporters

but not all. Therefore, alternative theories need to be applied to adequately analyse these findings.

The economic grievance thesis argues that lower educated individuals are more likely to hold authoritarian attitudes due to job insecurity, career opportunities and other economic-related variables (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Goodwin et al., 2016). However, this loser of modernisation thesis does not consider the intergenerational aspect of authoritarian attitudes (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Consequently, CBT combines education and birth cohort (section 6.3) to understand the interaction of these demographics with authoritarian attitudes (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). According to this theory, not only are young people more likely to be more tolerant towards the silent revolution, but higher levels of education are also systematically associated with more tolerant attitudes towards ethnic, racial and religious minorities as well as other outgroups (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Meeusen et al., 2013). Education is consistently predictive of authoritarian views, with lower educated individuals more likely to hold authoritarian attitudes (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

As outlined by Norris and Inglehart (2019), individuals that were born in the Interwar period who are uneducated and white males are unlikely to support the silent revolution as they have different values and beliefs epitomising the conservative nativist supporter (Lancaster, 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Universities are at the forefront of this cultural change (Dalton, 2014). According to Goodhart (2017), individuals that attended university are among the strongest supporters of post-materialist values. Education may be associated with liberalism for a combination of reasons. Academics, writers and scientists often benefit from an open, collaborative society and are usually open to diversity and have liberal views on sexuality and race (Goodhart, 2017). University educated individuals may also be more liberal due to socialisation effects and student mobility (Oxford University, 2017; SurrIDGE, 2016; Stubager, 2008) and education encourages critical thinking expanding students' knowledge, capacities and cognitive skills (Storm et al., 2017; Ford, 2008; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008; Coenders & Scheepers, 2003). Those that are less educated are likely to be less liberal, potentially rebelling against the new post-materialist, liberal society. Education, therefore, has played a significant role in the silent revolution and the counter cultural backlash

movement which has created a conservative nativist supporter (Lancaster, 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

6.5 Ethnicity and support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

As expected (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Pilkington, 2016; Jackson & Feldman, 2011; Boon, 2010), in the three samples, the majority of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK supporters were white, 97%, 99% and 90% respectively. This compares to census data where 81.7% of the English and Welsh population was white (Office for National Statics, 2022b). Therefore, these results suggest that all three groups had an over representative sample of white people in comparison to the general population. The findings in this doctoral study suggest that the DFLA and TFBM datasets had similar numbers to UKIP as shown in Table 14.

Table 14

The percentage of black and minority ethnic supporters in right-wing political parties and groups

Political party or group	BME
UKIP (2015)	2%
TFBM (2019)	2.8%
The DFLA (2019)	1%
PEGIDA UK (2019)	9.6%

Note. UKIP (Ipsos Mori, 2015) and TFBM, DFLA and PEGIDA UK (author's own).

Although white people appear to be overrepresented in these three anti-Islam PRR datasets, as shown in Table 14, 9.6% of PEGIDA UK dataset were racially minoritized. This is an important finding as the far-right generally is associated with the typical white, lower educated male (conservative nativist) (Gest et al., 2018; Kimmel, 2018; Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Lubbers et al., 2002). This finding expands on previous far-right supporter research and highlights the need for a new category. This doctoral thesis develops the term *ethnically diverse nativist* which highlights support for the British anti-Islam PRR from a new type of supporter - one that is racially minoritized. In addition to the sexually modern nativist, this new category diverts from the typical PRR supporter and further evidences the continuing evolution of the anti-Islam PRR and its supporters.

White nationalism may explain why the majority of these supporters were white but also, why some of their supporters were racially minoritized. White nationalism aims to preserve and protect the white race through not mixing. This enhances cultural belonging creating the in and out group (Hartzell, 2018). White nationalists attempt to frame their viewpoints as protecting diversity by protecting each race, in contrast to liberals who, they argue, are eradicating diversity through multiculturalism. This means that if an individual is white and nationalistic, they are also likely to be anti-immigration (Osborne, et al., 2019). Although white nationalism concerns the white race, it is also about cultural belonging (Hartzell, 2018). Stinton (2019) argues that some people attack racially minoritized people to reinforce their sense of white Britishness. In light of the research by Blee (1996), where members of the Ku Klux Klan stated that race was based on loyalty, not skin colour, the othering of another group could be used as a way to become part of the in-group, in this case, the white British. This sense of belonging may explain why some individuals, such as Nissar Hussain (a supporter of TFBM who identifies as an ex-Muslim and is racially minoritized) associates with a group like TFBM. He identifies a loss of identity when he decided to no longer be Muslim as shown in the YouTube video entitled Anne Marie Waters – For Britain Rally in Essex (2019c). This ethnically diverse nativist category is further expanded in Chapters 7 and 8.

Further, far-right groups often identify themselves as the voice of the people. Because of this, some working-class individuals support these types of groups. For example, the EDL specifically appealed to white working-class communities in the United Kingdom (Allchorn, 2019; Copsey, 2010). Members of the EDL argued that as British white working-class they were a disadvantaged and marginalised minority (Pilkington, 2016; Garland & Treadwell, 2011). As discussed above, some white working-class individuals argued that the mainstream Labour Party no longer represented them, especially after new Labour formed and increased both income and social inequalities (Dorling, 2010). Previous research suggests that this disillusionment with mainstream political parties across Europe has led some individuals in the white working-class to associate with other far-right organisations that they argue listen to their concerns (Mondon & Winter, 2020a; Garland & Treadwell, 2011). Therefore, it is possible that the white working-class were overrepresented in these three far-right datasets. This topic is discussed further in Chapter 7.

As with the argument made in section 6.2, some men in this sample may support these groups as they want to preserve their white privilege. Harris (1993, p. 1713) argues that there are a 'set of assumptions, privileges, and benefits that whites sought to protect'. While Olson (2008, p.708) argues that white people assume they have an advantage over black people, a 'glass floor below which the white citizen could see but never fall'. These assumptions have become expectations passed through generations. In the latter half of the 20th century white working people enjoyed an era of social dominance (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999), political cohesion (Poole & Rosenthal, 2000) and economic mobility (Crafts & Toniolo, 1996). It was assumed by some that each generation would be more prosperous than the last and understood as the 'natural order of things that cannot legitimately be disturbed' (Harris, 1993, p. 1778). However, this 'natural order' has been disturbed through changes in the global economy, societal demographics and decisions by political elites (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). Social change, through the cultural revolution has subverted the dominant racial groups' (white) status in British society (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Hofstadter, 2012).

Despite this societal change, Gest et al., (2018) argue that there is a white supremacy expectation that white people accept. This is especially true in the PRR. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) found that the PRR was largely driven by cultural symbolic concerns relating to identity and nation. This symbolic threat has resonated specifically with the increase in racially minoritized immigration (Mudde, 2019; Sniderman et al., 2004). Nostalgic deprivation, then may be driving some white support for the PRR. Nostalgic for the way things used to be and disappointment about how they are now (Gest et al., 2018). In response to this, certain white people engage in a political reaction or backlash to oppose this social and demographic change (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Hofstadter, 2012). This further explains why white people were dominant in these three samples.

6.6 Sexuality of DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK supporters

Table 15 suggests that in the three samples the majority of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK self-identified as straight, 92%, 95% and 93% respectively. However, some individuals self-identified as gay/lesbian, 4%, 2% and 2% and others self-identified as

bisexual, 4%, 3% and 5% respectively. As shown in Table 15, the DFLA sample had the lowest number of LGB supporters when the percentages of LGB were combined. In comparison, the PEGIDA UK sample had the highest number of bisexual supporters and TFBM sample had the highest number of gay/lesbian supporters.

Table 15

The sexual orientation of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK supporters

	TFBM (n=414)	DFLA (n=193)	PEGIDA UK (n=311)
Straight	92%	95%	93%
Gay/Lesbian	4%	2%	2%
Bisexual	4%	3%	5%

Note. No individual self-identified as Transgender in the dataset (authors own).

These findings can be compared to the EDL and the UK general population. Despite the EDL having its own LGBT division and claiming to support LGBT rights (Allen, 2011) all three of the samples in this doctoral thesis had more LGB supporters than the EDL, as shown in Table 16. In 2011, Allen found that out of 85,000 EDL online supporters, 720 were part of the EDL LGBT division (0.85%). In comparison, in 2018, 2.2% of the general population identified as part of the LGB community (Office for National Statistics, 2020a). This suggests that when combined (gay, lesbian and bisexual percentages) each of the three samples had a higher percentage of supporters that self-identify as LGB than the general population: 8% of TFBM, 5% of the DFLA and 7% of the PEGIDA UK datasets. There may be several reasons for this anti-Islam PRR support from some members of the LGB community.

Table 16

The Percentage of people that self-identify as gay, lesbian, bisexual or Transgender

	Members of the LGB(T) community
EDL (T) (2011)	0.85%
UK general population (2020)	2.2%
TFBM (2019)	8%
DFLA (2019)	5%

PEGIDA UK (2019)	7%
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Note. (T) represents the inclusion of Transgender in LGB. Only the EDL explicitly included T in their LGBT division. There were no supporters of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK that self-identified as Transgender. This table represents the number of LGBT EDL supporters (Allen, 2011), the number of people that self-identified as gay, lesbian, or bisexual in the UK in 2018 (Office for National Statistics, 2020a) and the sample results in this study (author's own).

It is unsurprising that the DFLA sample had the smallest number of gay and bisexual supporters (5%). This may be due to the hypermasculine environment created by DFLA supporters. Previous research suggests that there is a strong positive correlation between hypermasculinity and homophobia (Kelly, 2018; Parrott et al., 2002; Sinn, 1997). A hypermasculine environment does not encourage people that do not fit gender norms to support the group and may explain why the DFLA sample had a smaller LGB support network. However, this does not explain why some people who self-identified as LGB (5%) did support the DFLA in this dataset. Other research may explain this. Von Praunheim (2004) interviewed openly gay ER activists who argued that members of the far-right are not anti-gay, they are anti-unmanliness. For them, men are supposed to embody masculinity. Therefore, attraction to hypermasculine men legitimises homosexuality for some in the far-right (Claus & Virchow, 2017). However, this only explains support for gay men and does not offer insight into why individuals that self-identified as lesbians and bisexuals supported these groups.

Cultural Backlash Theory (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) argues that individuals that are not supportive of the silent revolution and who focus on materialist values rather than post-materialist values are likely to also oppose any deviance from heterosexuality. However, previous research found that some xenophobic nativist groups have a more complex relationship with sexuality. For example, one of the co-leaders of Alternative for Germany (AfD) is an openly gay woman (Faiola, 2017). Attitudes towards gay and lesbian leaders or supporters are not consistent within the far-right and this change in sexuality demographics is representative of the transition from the fascistic ER to the anti-Islam PRR.


The presence of LGB supporters in the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK samples illustrates a clear shift in values in these three groups compared to fascistic ER groups

that marginalise members of the LGB community. While some previous ER groups embraced hypermasculine gay men (Von Praunheim, 2004), some PRR anti-Islam groups position LGB values as 'core civilisational values of the West' which are perceived to be under threat from immigrants/migrants, especially Muslims (Foster & Kirke, 2023; de Lange & Mügge, 2015, p. 62). As with femonationalism, some PRR groups use homonationalism, the combination of LGB rights with nationalism and racism (Foster & Kirke, 2023; Puar, 2013). This framing of protecting LGB rights and women's rights against the invading other, namely Muslims, may encourage more women and members of the LGB community to support these groups (Spierings & Zaslove, 2015). This expands on previous research by Lancaster (2020) who found that the sexually modern nativist supporter was a young, higher educated female who had sexually progressive values. The sexuality findings in this doctoral thesis suggest that this category needs to include supporters that self-identify as LGB. As highlighted in the gender demographic section (6.2), the use of more liberal, co-operative values and policies differentiates the new right from the fascistic right (Traverso, 2019). However, despite the strategic use of homonationalism by some far-right groups, violence against homosexuals is still a serious issue within the far-right scene (Koehler, 2016) as is transphobia (discussed in Chapter 8). These sexuality nuances are further explored in Chapters 7 and 8.

6.7 Religious orientation and support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

Figure 10

The differences in religious orientation of DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK supporters



Note. N = 218 (author's own).

Figure 10 indicates that the majority of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK sample identified as Christian, 61%, 54%, and 53% respectively. The results in this study suggest that there were more Christians in these three anti-Islam groups compared to the EDL (45%) (Bartlett & Littler, 2011). In comparison, in 2021, the census general population data found that 46% of England and Wales self-identified as Christian. This suggests that Christians were overrepresented in all three samples compared to the general population of England and Wales (Office for National Statistics, 2021c).

Previous research on the far-right suggests that Islam is seen as a threat to perceived English, Christian values such as liberal values and democracy (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019; Treadwell & Garland, 2011). Despite only 45% of EDL supporters being Christian, supporters perceived England to be a Christian country which was threatened by Islam (Bartlett & Littler, 2011). Further, authoritarian attitudes are strongest in individuals that are very religious, linking religion to CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Individuals that are Christian may see their perceived traditional, national values being eroded by the silent revolution, which may encourage certain individuals to

support authoritarian and populist parties or groups to prevent this cultural shift through a cultural backlash (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Some far-right activists argue that the UK is a Christian country and Islam poses a threat to its culture and values (Strømmen & Schmiedel, 2020; Jackson, 2010). As detailed in Figure 2, Chapter 3, the 2021 census highlighted that 46% of the population of England and Wales were Christian compared to 6.5% who are Muslim (Office for National Statistics, 2021c). Although Christianity still makes up the clear majority of the population, Islam was the biggest minority religion in England and Wales in 2011 and 2021 (Office for National Statistics, 2021c; 2020b).

In addition, Islam is the fastest growing religion in the UK. In 2021, the average age of Christians in the UK was 51 years compared to the average age of Muslims which was 27 years old. This is 13 years younger than the median age of the population in England and Wales. While 84.5% of Muslims were under 50 years old. The decrease in Christianity was especially prevalent in the younger generation in England and Wales with only 5.1% of individuals that identified as Christian being between 21 and 25 years old (Office for National Statistics, 2023c). These statistics suggest that Christianity is declining in young people in England and Wales, whereas belief is increasing in the Muslim population (Office for National Statistics, 2023c; 2020b). These statistics are often used by the far-right to propagate The Great Replacement (TGR) conspiracy theory (Ekman, 2022) which is discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. Finally, as expected (Berntzen, 2019; Pilkington, 2016) this study highlights the lack of Muslims in these anti-Islam PRR samples. Only two individuals self-identified as Muslims across all three datasets. Unfortunately, it is unknown if these individuals were actual supporters, fake profiles or researchers. Future research could address this gap and discuss the presence (if there is one) of Muslim anti-Islam PRR supporters.

6.8 Overall conclusion

Analysing six demographics on Facebook, this chapter shed light on the more contemporary demographics of the British PRR and addressed several of the research gaps highlighted in Chapter 1. This chapter focused on the similarities and differences in

the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK, two street movements (the DFLA and PEGIDA UK), the ethnicity of the supporters, six different demographics rather than the three analysed by Lancaster (2020), and, finally, three groups that are under-researched in academia (the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK). By addressing these gaps in the literature, this chapter addressed the first research question in this doctoral thesis 'who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK' and contributes to knowledge.

As found by Norris and Inglehart (2019) and Lancaster (2020), the conservative nativist was the most common type of supporter in these three groups. Supporting Lancaster's (2020) findings, the sexually modern nativist was also present in these groups which contradicts CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). However, I expand on Lancaster's (2020) findings by highlighting the presence of non-binary supporters in these datasets. This is an original contribution to the far-right literature. I, therefore, argue that the sexually modern nativist category could be expanded to include non-binary supporters. I also argue that the three groups explored in this thesis do not support Trans rights. This contrasts to Lancaster's (2020) sexually modern nativist supporter category, who argued that this type of supporter was pro LGBT rights. This relationship between the PRR supporters/leaders and Trans rights will be explored further in Chapter 8.

As expected according to previous research (Lancaster, 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), older men over the age of 60 were overrepresented in all three samples compared with the national age profile as noted in the UK 2021 census (Office for National Statistics, 2022a). In addition, individuals that expressed support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK, were less educated than the general population (UCAS, 2021). This supports Norris and Inglehart's (2020) findings. Some supporters did have a high level of education, for example a Bachelor's degree supporting Lancaster's (2020) findings. However, a Chi-squared analysis suggested that there was no relationship between gender and education. Lancaster found (2020) that female supporters of the PRR were more highly educated than were their male counterparts. In contrast to Lancaster's (2020) findings, this doctoral thesis found no evidence that such a relationship exists.

Further supporting Norris and Inglehart's (2019) findings, in two of the datasets, white people were over-represented in comparison to the general population (Office for National Statistics, 2011). However, in contrast to Norris and Inglehart's (2019) findings, in the PEGIDA UK sample 9.6% of supporters were racially minoritized suggesting that a new supporter category is needed. The presence of racially minoritized supporters of the PRR has not been explored in far-right research before. I, therefore, named this new category the *ethnically diverse nativist*. This category highlights the need to shift counter-extremism measures towards a more diverse range of people not simply the typical conservative nativist. I will further explore the grievances and views of the ethnically diverse nativist supporter in Chapters 7 and 8.

As expected, the majority of supporters in all three PRR groups identified as heterosexual (Lancaster, 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). However, in this thesis, the sexuality demographic found that all three samples had more LGB supporters than the general population (Office for National Statistics, 2020a) and the EDL (Allen, 2011). Support for LGB rights generally is likely due to the presence of the sexually modern nativist category (Lancaster, 2020) which contradicts CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). However, according to Lancaster (2020), this far-right category does not include members of the LGB community that support the anti-Islam PRR, it only included individuals that support LGB rights. The chapter in this thesis argued that due to the high number of supporters of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK that self-identify as a member of the LGB community, the sexually modern nativist category should also include supporters that identify as LGB. This is an original contribution to the far-right literature. I will further explore the relationship between sexuality, CBT and homonationalism in Chapters 7 and 8 to explore different strategically liberal and semi-liberal narratives (Berntzen, 2019).

The next chapter further explores the new category outlined in this chapter while addressing the research question "what are the main grievances of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK and why do people express support for these groups?".

Chapter 7

All roads lead to Islam: a thematic analysis of the main grievances of three British anti-Islam Populist Radical Right groups

The previous chapter identified three types of supporters: the conservative nativist, sexually modern nativist and the ethnically diverse nativist. This chapter focuses on the main grievances of the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), The For Britain Movement (TFBM) and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA UK). As outlined in Chapter 4, most research focusing on the far-right is conducted from a quantitative methodological perspective (Pilkington, 2016; Goodwin, 2011). Little research discusses grievance-based motivations using qualitative methods (e.g., Latif et al., 2018), often limiting arguments to causal and correlational findings. However, quantitative research alone offers little insight into the complexities within each grievance-based theme (Braun & Clarke, 2021a). Although some academics (e.g., Esseveld & Eyerman, 1992) argue that researching the grievances of the far-right validates their racist and Islamophobic views, Norris and Inglehart (2019, p. 191) argue that 'dismissing people as bigots, racists, or deplorables does not solve the problem'.

This chapter, therefore, explores the demand-side of three anti-Islam Populist Radical Right (PRR) groups. It focuses on grievance-based themes expressed by supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK using qualitative data from YouTube videos. As discussed in Chapter 4, grievances are often the key motivating factor in far-right support (Mudde, 2019). According to Ajil's (2022) grievance-based model, there are three types of grievance: (1) ethnic, religious, and racial grievances (referred to as cultural-based grievances in this doctoral thesis), (2) socio-economic grievances, and (3) political grievances. Although previous research has focused on the grievances of the far-right generally (e.g., Hopkin & Blyth, 2019; Betz, 1994), little research has focused on the anti-Islam PRR. To address this research gap, this chapter analyses grievances (Ajil, 2022) expressed by supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK.

Using a YouTube RTA, I created six datasets focusing on the grievances of each supporter and leader of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. As discussed in Chapter 5,

YouTube videos are accessible online with little external influence from outside sources. These YouTube videos are intended to be seen by a wide audience, potentially operating as a form of recruitment (Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 2020; Puschmann et al., 2016). Therefore, YouTube videos uploaded by the groups or supporters themselves express some grievances that may influence far-right support. This data allows academics to explore these grievance-based arguments.

This chapter partly addresses the second and third research questions ‘what are their main grievances and why do people express support for these groups?’ It examines each of the main themes identified using Reflexive Thematic Analysis (RTA) and discusses both the explicit and implicit links between these themes. The seven main aggregated findings (12 when not aggregated) are highlighted in Table 17. This chapter argues that although political-based grievances appeared to be the main type of grievance, cultural-based grievances were more important as all seven grievances led back to Islam. The groups may have used political-based grievances strategically to politicise and deracialised issues related to Islam. This represents a type of strategic populism, a term developed in this chapter. The main grievance-based concern, therefore, related to the perceived cultural threat from Islamic ideology. By presenting the concept of strategic populism, this research offers new insight into the grievances of the British anti-Islam PRR, suggesting that future grievance-based research on these groups should primarily focus on perceived cultural-based grievances. This is important for policy makers; a current understanding of the British far-right’s grievances will help allocate resources to improve community cohesion between different groups (for example, far-right supporters and Muslims).

Table 17

The main themes, their sub-themes and characteristics across all three groups: the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

	Theme	Characteristics
1	Concern about the perceived threat of Islamic ideology	Islam is a regressive political ideology which opposes and threatens progressive British values.
	1.1 Islam is anti-women's rights	Islam is oppressive and patriarchal. Women need liberating from oppressive Islam.
	1.2 Islam is not a religion of peace	Islam encourages violence, terrorism, and sexual abuse. Whereas Christianity is a religion of love underpinned by progressive ideals.
	1.3 Islamification of Britain	Islam is a political ideology wherein Muslims are soldiers of Islam. Muslim immigration is a threat to British liberal values because Islamic values are fundamentally regressive and anti-liberal.
2	Concern that supporters are silenced for their political ideology	They are silenced through labels due to their anti-Islam arguments which oppose the governments' agenda.
	2.1 They are silenced	They are silenced for their political beliefs. This is done through deplatforming, being banned on social media, or being fired.
	2.2 They are labelled	Derogatory labels such as 'Nazi' and 'Islamophobe' are used to silence their anti-Islam arguments.
3	Concern that the government and politicians prioritise Muslims over British citizens	Muslims are prioritised over British citizens leading to relative deprivation.
	3.1 Dissatisfaction	Both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party have the same pro-Islam agenda, but Labour are Communist posing a bigger threat.
	3.2 Corrupt politicians	The police are used by the government to target those with anti-Islam arguments and silence them.

4	Concern that The Great Replacement (TGR) and The Great Reset are real	Conspiracy theories are used by the government and the global elite to create a new multicultural, oppressive world order.
	4.1 TGR	The Great Replacement is facilitated by the global elite to create division and oppress European/British white citizens.
	4.2 The Great Reset	COVID-19 was used by the global elites to introduce measures to oppress European/American citizens.
5	Concern that Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) is facilitated by a corrupt political system	The corrupt political elites are facilitating CSE and ignoring the victims.
	5.1 Failed by the authorities	The authorities prioritise the perpetrators of ' <i>grooming gangs</i> ' rather than the victims of CSE. Authorities are complicit and facilitate sexual abuse.
	5.2 Support for the victims of CSE	The authorities ignore the victims of CSE. Supporters and leaders of the DFLA need to support the victims instead.
6	Concern that they are legally oppressed for their political ideology	Liberals and Muslims are treated better than the anti-Islam PRR by the police and the legal system because they support the governments pro-Islam agenda.
	6.1 Concern that the police are not impartial	The police prioritise ' <i>Remainers</i> ' in the European Union (EU) referendum and Muslims in the United Kingdom (UK) discriminating against ' <i>Leave</i> ' supporters' and anti-Islam supporters.
7	Concern about the perceived threat from left-wing ideology	Left-wing ideology is equated with communism, socialism, and terrorism.
	7.1 Concern about ANTIFA (Anti-Fascists)	ANTIFA are part of a cultural Marxist conspiracy to destroy Western civilisation.

Note. Using RTA, I identified seven aggregated grievances in a 30-hour YouTube dataset (10 hours for each group). In total, I analysed 71 YouTube videos as discussed in Chapter 5. The characteristics of each theme represent the arguments made by each group. I do not detail the prevalence of each theme and sub-theme. As discussed in Chapter 5, RTA uses an interpretivist position. Therefore, themes are normally not quantified as quantifying a theme links to a positivist epistemological position. However, for the purpose of this word-limited doctoral thesis, this chapter discusses the seven most commonly referenced themes and sub-themes. This does not suggest that these were the most common grievances for these groups in general, just in this doctoral thesis. I outline the main seven grievances in this table (author's own).

This chapter begins by reporting the main seven aggregated grievances as shown in Table 18. Next, it contextualises and discusses each of the seven findings using theories and concepts highlighted in Chapter 4, to understand why people express support for these groups and what their main grievances are. Finally, it argues that each grievance leads back to Islam further consolidating these groups as anti-Islam PRR.

7.1 The main grievances of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

Using RTA, I analysed over 30 hours of YouTube data, as outlined in Chapter 5. Table 18 presents the main two grievance-based themes of the leaders and supporters of the three groups. It presents the seven main aggregated grievances.

Table 18

The two most common grievances of the leaders and supporters of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

Group or party	Grievance 1	Grievance 2
TFBM Leaders	Concern that TGR and The Great Rest are real (4)	Concern that the government and politicians prioritise Muslims over British citizens (3)
TFBM supporters	Concern about the perceived threat of Islamic ideology (1)	Concern that supporters are silenced for their political ideology (2)
DFLA leaders	Concern that CSE is facilitated by a corrupt political system (5)	Concern that supporters are silenced for their political ideology (2)
DFLA supporters	Concern that they are legally oppressed for their political ideology (6)	Concern about the perceived threat of Islamic ideology (1)
PEGIDA UK Leaders	Concern about the perceived threat of Islamic ideology (1)	Concern that the government and politicians prioritise Muslims over British citizens (3)
PEGIDA UK supporters	Concern about the perceived threat of Islamic ideology (1)	Concern about the perceived threat from left-wing ideology (7)

Note. This table highlights the main two grievances of each group by supporters and leaders (author's own). The numbers represent the theme number of each aggregated grievance: For example, (1) corresponds to grievances about Islamic ideology, (2) the concern that they are silenced and (3) corresponds to grievances related to the government and politicians.

7.2 Theme 1: Islamic ideology

As expected (Allen, 2019b), the theme concern about Islamic ideology was the most important grievance. This theme represents the perceived threat that Islam, and by extension Muslims, pose to the UK and its perceived cultural values, such as women's rights. This suggests that cultural-based grievances (Ajil, 2022) are the biggest concern for the DFLA supporters, TFBM supporters and PEGIDA UK's leaders and supporters. In contrast to findings on the English Defence League (EDL) (Pilkington, 2016), little attempt was made by these groups to differentiate between moderate Muslims and extremists. This can be seen in the quote below where it was argued there is no such thing as 'moderate Islam' (TFBM supporters, Video 4). In this doctoral study, the leaders' and supporters' arguments focused on the perceived incompatibility of Islamic values which are 'intolerant, hate-filled' 'demanding violence' and opposed to 'Western' values (TFBM supporters, Videos 4 and TFBM leaders, Video 8): 'If you read the Quran [...] you come to realise that there cannot be any such thing as moderate Islam. The verses in the Qur'an [...] are intolerant, hate-filled, demanding violence' (TFBM supporters, Video 4).

In this doctoral thesis, only the DFLA leaders and TFBM leaders did not reference Islam as one of their main themes. Although TFBM leaders did not identify Islam as a main theme, the leaders highlighted Islam's perceived role in conspiracy theories, especially The Great Replacement (TGR) (discussed in section 7.5). The DFLA leaders were the only group that attempted to distance themselves from Islam. This is further discussed in themes 5 and 6 of this chapter. Interestingly, in the DFLA supporter's dataset, concern about Islam generally was their second most referenced theme. This supports previous research by Allen (2019b) who found that the DFLA was concerned about Islamic ideology. However, it expands on this research as there is a discrepancy between the concerns of the DFLA leaders, who focus on political-based grievances, and the concerns of the DFLA supporters, who focus on political and cultural-based grievances. This discrepancy is discussed in theme 5 of this chapter. Nevertheless, in the other groups in this study, the focus on Islam was substantial. This supports previous research that identifies these groups as anti-Islam (Allen, 2019; Allchorn, 2018).

7.2.1 Sub-theme 1: Islam is anti-women's rights

According to existing research, anti-Islam PRR groups often position women's rights as a cornerstone of British values (Berntzen, 2019; Allen, 2014). This doctoral study supports this finding. Concern that Islam is anti-women's rights was a common sub-theme across all three groups when discussing Islam (Table 17 & 18). Individuals stated that Islam treats women as second-class citizens in comparison to the UK where they argued men and women are treated as equals. The quotes below focus on TFBM supporters' interpretation of Islam which they argued oppresses women through unequal treatment: 'I very quickly realised that in Islam a woman is never independent in her own right, all the rights that I had, had been afforded to me by the British culture and by the British values, it was not through Islam' (TFBM supporters, Video 13)

I'm being told, you're a girl so you are lesser than a man, men will always be over you, men are responsible for women, men are the guardians of women and that's the reason for the guardianship laws in countries like Saudi Arabia, why women can never be independent human beings. This is based on the doctrines of the religion and so you have to accept [...] the prophet of Allah said women are less intelligent than men (TFBM supporters, Video 8).

These quotes highlight the perceived loss of independence for Muslim women and the oppressive, anti-liberal men's guardianship laws in certain Muslim majority countries. The For Britain Movement supporters drew on extreme examples of misogyny in Muslim majority countries like Saudi Arabia (which was the Muslim-majority country most often cited), which has a long history of women's rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The For Britain Movement supporters used these women's rights abuses to connect patriarchal laws to Islam and thus all Muslim men. For example, TFBM focused on male guardianship laws in Saudi Arabia where women are under a man's control (Human Rights Watch, 2019). It is no coincidence that the most extreme misogynistic laws in Muslim majority countries were highlighted by the anti-Islam PRR. Further, existing research suggests that the anti-Islam PRR uses the concept of femonationalism (Farris, 2017). The study in this doctoral thesis supports this finding. Women's rights were only

referenced in association with Islam. Women's rights were not discussed outside of Islam.

The quotes above imply that in the UK, women are treated better than in Muslim majority countries where women are identified as 'less intelligent than men' and therefore, are denied their independence (TFBM supporters, Video 8). A woman's perceived inferiority in Islam was used to position British values as superior to Muslim majority countries. This women's rights argument supports previous research (Rahbari, 2021; Brubaker, 2017). Women's treatment within society has long been used to draw civilisation boundaries positioning one civilisation as more advanced than another (Towns, 2014). This women's rights marker of civilisation differentiated the savages, those opposed to women's rights from the civilised, those that supported women's rights (Towns, 2014). More recently, the status of women within society is more closely connected to a country's past values and traditions. Women's rights are held to be a product of European enlightenment and unique to the West (Towns, 2014). This is especially true within the PRR (Brubaker, 2017) and the three groups in this doctoral thesis. Therefore, this positioning of women's rights as a cornerstone of Western, liberal democracies implies that the UK is superior to other civilisations, namely the 'Muslim world' which is argued to oppress women (Towns, 2014, p. 608).

In addition to supporting previous research on the strategic use of femonationalism to appear more liberal and moderate (Farris, 2017), this finding also extends previous understanding and expands on the new supporter category outlined in Chapter 6 – the ethnically diverse nativist. The two quotes above were from ex-Muslim women who supported TFBM. These two ex-Muslim women were abused by Muslim men, including an 'Al Qaeda' operative. As a result of this mistreatment, they identified Islam as the oppressive force that legitimised their partner's violence towards them (TFBM supporters, Video 13). This led to the Islamophobic argument that Muslim men are inherently violent because of their religion. These quotes present the use of femonationalist arguments by ex-Muslim racially minoritized people, highlighting that it is not only white, British far-right supporters that use this nationalistic argument (Rahbari, 2021). The For Britain Movement, therefore, used survivors of abuse by Muslim men to legitimise their own Islamophobic arguments. This chapter coins the

term *strategic emotional support* to further highlight this strategy. This supports previous research which found that the far-right use 'female, non-white...migrants/refugees' narratives to further their own political agenda (Rahbari, 2021).

Finally, inclusive nationalism may also explain why some ethnically diverse individuals, such as those quoted above, support the British anti-Islam far-right. Inclusive nationalism refers to the idea that a group is perceived to be inclusive because they have some supporters from a migrant or refugee background (De Tijd, 2019). Some nationalists argue that having supporters from a migrant or refugee background makes far-right groups more inclusive (Rahbari, 2021). Ethnically diverse supporters of the three anti-Islam PRR groups in this doctoral thesis provide a voice that is deemed to be credible because they are racially minoritized or not British. They were seen as an insider of the targeted community, in this case the Muslim community. Previous research on the PRR suggests that inclusive forms of nationalism do not include Muslims as they are still considered the out group (Simonsen & Bonikowski, 2020). This may explain why ex-Muslims were used as the voice of the perceived oppressed women in Islam. They were considered both an insider of the Muslim community because they used to be a Muslim but were included by the PRR because they left Islam and are no longer Muslim. They now oppose Islam arguing that it is patriarchal and opposes British values (TFBM supporters, Video 8; TFBM supporters, Video 13). The For Britain Movement have then given them a platform to provide a more credible anti-Islam voice and legitimise their anti-Islam/anti-Muslim narratives (TFBM supporters, Video 8).

7.2.2 Sub-theme 2: Islam is not a religion of peace

According to Kassimeris and Jackson (2015), Islam is not a religion of peace for many on the far-right. This doctoral study supports this finding. To evidence this sub-theme, supporters of TFBM referenced blasphemy and apostasy laws and argued that Islam is intolerant of non-Muslims. This argument extended to British Muslims as well as non-British Muslims (TFBM supporters, Video 4). The DFLA and PEGIDA UK supporters equated Islam with a violent ideology and positioned all Muslims as the outside other:

'[Islam] is an ideology and a political organisation that promotes violence, warfare, terror and submission before Allah' (PEGIDA UK leader, Video 6)

If we want to end this scourge in the world, then we have to oppose the ideologies [Islam] that use terrorism, that use violence. Ideologies that rely on terrorism in order to propagate themselves have no place in Western, liberal, democratic civilisation (DFLA supporters, Video 2)

Overall, the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK argued that Islam is a political ideology that is 'barbaric' and 'intolerant' (TFBM supporters, Video 13). This supports previous research (Verkuyten, 2013). Of key importance here is the focus on Islam as an ideology rather than Muslims in an attempt to deracialise their arguments. Focusing on Islam rather than Muslims conceals Islamophobic narratives and hate crime which can lead to deplatforming (Howard, 2017; Hafez, 2014). This supports previous research (Pilkington, 2016). By associating Islam with a political ideology, these groups challenge the assumption that Islam is a religion. If Islam is not categorised as a religion, for them, religious discrimination laws do not apply (Schulson, 2017). In this doctoral study, Islam was argued to be a political ideology that dictates every aspect of a Muslim's life, for example, dress attire: 'I am not veiled. They [veils] are barriers to communication. I call these women political Muslims and the burka is their uniform' (DFLA supporters, Video 13)

Further, unlike the EDL which attempted to differentiate Muslims from Islamist extremists (Pilkington, 2016), the present three groups made no such attempt. These groups perceived not only Islam to be a threat to British values, such as women's rights, but also Muslims generally who live as the Qur'an dictates, through 'violence, warfare, [and] terror' (PEGIDA UK leader, Video 6). This echoes Huntington's (1996) sentiment in *The Clash of Civilizations* thesis where Islam was argued to threaten 'the West's' progressive Greek-Judeo-Christian heritage (Huntington, 1996, p. 2). Although these PRR groups attempted to criticise the ideology of Islam rather than Muslims as individuals, they still made connections between violence, Islam and Muslims, as can be seen in the quote below: 'So now I'm appealing directly to the Muslim parts of Great Britain. You want to say you are peaceful, you want to integrate with us, call for the 109

violent verses in the Qur'an to be removed' (DFLA supporters, Video 13). Therefore, this positioning of Islamic ideology as violent and destabilising rather than a religion of peace, may be strategic to appear non-discriminatory. This finding supports previous research (Verkuyten, 2013) and suggests that Islamic 'ideology' and Muslims are considered a threat to British values (DFLA supporters, Video 2).

In addition, supporters of TFBM presented Judeo-Christian values as rooted in 'democracy, rule of law, individual liberty, mutual respect and tolerance of those with any faith or even no faith.' (TFBM supporters, Video 13). In contrast to these values, they argued that Islam would not afford the same values and would not allow ex-Muslims to have individual liberty (TFBM supporters, Video 13). All three anti-Islam PRR groups referenced Christianity. When referring to Islam, DFLA supporters said 'this is a Christian country' (DFLA supporters, Video 11), 'it's [Islam] a contaminant, it's anti-human and it's anti-Christian' (DFLA supporters, Video 5). This implicit argument is important as religion is held as being the primary marker of a civilisation according to *The Clash of Civilisations* (Haynes, 2021; Huntington, 1993). This can also be seen in the PEGIDA UK leaders' argument made by a Muslim convert to Christianity. Despite being an ex-Muslim Pakistani man, he positioned Islam and Muslims as the other in the quote below (PEGIDA UK leaders, Video 3):

I will say this to the Pakistani [Muslim] community, you can hound us, the ones who've turned away from Islam, you can abuse us, you can hate us, you can attack us, but we will not return hate with the hate, we will always love you and forgive you and that's the essence of humanity (PEGIDA UK leaders, Video 3)

This suggests that one of the markers of the in-group within these three groups is the implicit association with Christianity either through faith or ancestry. The main marker of the out-group is the Muslim faith. Therefore, an individual is part of the in-group if they are not Muslim, including individuals that were previously Muslim but have converted to Christianity. This may explain why a Pakistani ex-Muslim Christian supports the anti-Islam PRR and is an example of the ethnically diverse nativist supporter type discussed in Chapter 6 - someone that is racially minoritized and supports a British PRR group. The presence of the ethnically diverse nativist supporter suggests that religion is

central to the in-group (Christian) and out-group (Muslim) identity rather than race or ethnicity, allowing a Pakistani Christian to be part of the in-group. This religious faith or ancestry is then connected to certain religious values which are deemed incompatible (Haynes, 2021; Huntington, 1993). Previous research suggests that the far-right uses Christian nationalism and civilisational Christianity in an attempt to defend their assumed Christian heritage which is perceived to be threatened by Islam (Whitehead et al., 2018; Brubaker, 2017). This study supports previous findings. Some individuals used certain liberal Christian arguments to present Britain's perceived superiority due to their Christian heritage, especially concerning compassion and liberalism as seen in the quote below: 'The abolition of slavery is not quite two centuries old, and it was abolished in Christian countries of the West. No Islamic country [...] has voluntarily abolished slavery' (TFBM supporters, Video 4).

Supporters and leaders of these groups were concerned that perceived British, Christian, progressive values are being eroded by Islamic, 'intolerant' values, supporting previous research (Berntzen, 2019; Zúquete, 2008). This can be understood as an imagined community where individuals perceive themselves to be part of a collective whole. *Nationalism* 'is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; it invents nations where they do not exist' (Gellner, 1964, p. 169). It is argued that nationalism has its cultural roots in religion connecting the idea that the UK is rooted in Christianity, the dominant religion (Anderson, 2006). Nationalism also encourages hierarchical attitudes (Anderson, 2006) where the anti-Islam PRR positions the UK as superior to Muslims majority countries as it advocates liberal rights. Therefore, the anti-Islam PRR position British and immigrant Muslims as the outsider whereas they accept non-Muslim Christian immigrants into the imagined community through naturalisation and their assumed support of liberal rights (Anderson, 2006). In the same way as the Jewish German was always an imposter (Anderson, 2006), the British or non-British Muslim is also an imposter or an 'alien' 'in a Christocentric European environment' (Roy, 2023; Marranci, 2004, p. 106). In contrast, according to some in the anti-Islam PRR, a non-British Christian is not considered an imposter because they are accepted as part of the imagined community.

7.2.3 Sub-theme 3: The Islamification of the UK

The anti-Islam PRR are concerned about Muslim immigration (Berntzen, 2019; Pilkington, 2016). This was also an important sub-theme in this study. Individuals were primarily concerned that Britain is becoming Islamised through Muslim immigration and birth rates, as shown in the quotes below: 'Islam invaded Spain in the year 711 and seven centuries later, in 1492, they were driven out [...] that loss is being compensated for today by Muslims immigrating into Spain, they plan on taking over Spain and this time they want to keep it' (TFBM leaders, Video 11), 'if we don't do something, this country will become an Islamic state within the next 20-30 years and I'm not going to [...] let it happen' (DFLA supporters, Video 13), 'look at the demographics of various towns and cities, our country's been overtaken by Islam' (PEGIDA UK supporters, Video 6).

Overall, these arguments present deep assumptions made about Islam and reflect The Clash of Civilisations thesis (Haynes, 2021; Huntington, 1993). The above quotes highlight the belief that 'the West' and Islam are in a centuries-old civilisational war (Huntington, 1996, p. 2). Muslim immigration into the UK then is argued to be the latest part of this civilisational war (Huntington, 2002; Huntington, 1996, p. 2) and is leading to the 'Islamisation' of Britain (TFBM, Video 7), a term also used in The Clash of Civilisations thesis (Huntington, 1993, p. 94). Consequently, certain individuals engage in a backlash against Muslim immigration (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) to counter this perceived invasion. This supports previous research which found that some far-right groups see the movement of Muslim refugees, migrants and immigrants as a strategy to conquer Christian Europe (Froio, 2018; Uenal, 2016), linking to section 7.5.

Haynes (2021) and Bottici and Challand (2013) argue that this civilisation thesis has become a cognitive scheme through which some people, especially Right-Wing populists like Donald Trump, view the world. The civilisational thesis is also used by the anti-Islam PRR in this doctoral research. This may explain why the main grievance for the three anti-Islam PRR groups in this research is cultural-based (especially religion-based) as Huntington (1996) predicted; Huntington used the term culture to mean religion (Mungiu-Pippidi & Mindruta, 2002).

Of key importance in this sub-theme is the focus on Muslim immigration rather than ethnic minorities in general. These arguments reflect cultural racism which shifts to markers of inclusion and exclusion, positioning fears about immigration as a threat to our 'way of life' or culture (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2016, p. 391; Allen, 2010). Certain ethnic minority groups, therefore, such as Sikhs and Hindus were included, while Muslims were excluded, positioning them as the outside threat linking to section 7.5. This focus on Muslims rather than ethnic minorities is likely to be a strategy to distance these anti-Islam PRR groups from the fascistic ER (Pilkington, 2016; Copey, 2010). Although anti-immigration generally was not a main theme, this does not mean that anti-Muslim arguments did not have anti-immigration undertones, only that their focus was specifically on the excluded out-group identified as Muslims. This argument is further developed in Chapter 8.

Goldberg (2006, p. 346) argues that developing from European colonial perceptions of Muslims, the Muslim is perceived to be 'the monster of our times' which threatens the death of Europe itself. This positions Muslims uniquely as detrimental to British values due to Islam's perceived monolithic nature and the innate influence of Islam on Muslim's lives. All three sub-themes in the 'concern about Islamic ideology' theme further support the argument that the anti-Islam PRR position all Muslims as immigrants/outsideers rather than British citizens. The quotes above suggest that Islam is associated with the notion of being 'invaded' through 'demographics' which will cause the UK to be 'dominated' by Muslims within the next '20-30 years' revealing the racialised anti-Muslim undertones (TFBM leaders, Video 11; DFLA supporters, Video 13; PEGIDA UK supporters, Video 6).

7.3 Theme 2: Being silenced for their political ideology

The DFLA leaders and TFBM supporters were concerned about being silenced for their political ideology. This finding supports previous research on the anti-Islam PRR (Pilkington, 2016). More specifically, they claimed that labels were used to silence them by the wider liberal society for their anti-Islam arguments (Velasco, 2020). This falls into a wider debate relating to cancel culture (Norris, 2023) where views that oppose the 'dominant currents of certain social movements' are cancelled (Velasco, 2020, p. 2).

7.3.1 Sub-theme 1: Being silenced for their anti-Islam arguments

Previous research suggests that the far-right is concerned about their beliefs being silenced (Oaten, 2014). This doctoral study supports this finding. Due to the DFLA leaders and TFBM supporters' criticism of Islam, individuals referenced being de-platformed, having their social media account removed for breaking regulatory rules (Rogers, 2020), being banned from the UK, being banned from schools and universities, being fired, receiving death threats and being the victim of doxing. *Doxing* is 'the intentional public release onto the internet of personal information about an individual by a third party, often with the intent to humiliate, threaten, or punish the identified individual' (Douglas, 2016, p. 199): 'I'm a college lecturer in North London and I'm about to lose my job because I refused to lie about the life of Mohammed to my students' (TFBM supporters, Video 10).

I have been in contact with around 100 conservatives. Those whose names are within the Muslim Council of Britain dossier on Islamophobia within the Conservative party [...] three of them have left or been expelled from the Conservative Party for expressing a negative opinion about Islam (TFBM supporters, Video 4)

The quotes above highlight the perception that if you criticise Islam, you will be silenced. Those identified as the silencers and part of a pro-Islam majority were the 'liberals', 'the government', 'lefties', 'the hard left' and 'the media' (TFBM supporters, Videos 3, 14 and 15). The DFLA leaders and TFBM supporters argued that their legitimate criticisms of Islam were being silenced, leaving them relatively deprived (Kunst & Obaidi, 2020) compared to the left-wing, pro-Islam majority. This perception of silencing and victimhood is part of an overarching theme in the culture wars (Marcks & Pawelz, 2022; Norris, 2023). Previous research may help explain why those on the PRR may want to be perceived as victims. For example, during the Rwandan genocide, some individuals that were either perpetrators or were on the oppressive side strategically changed their narrative and positioned themselves as the victims of the genocide to avoid backlash and gain social credibility (Fujii, 2010). As highlighted in theme 3 below, these British far-right groups argued that immigrants and Muslims are afforded victim status in British

society which gains them greater social status. Supporters of the anti-Islam PRR, therefore, may be attempting to present themselves as victims of a perceived left-wing elite government and a totalitarian dictatorship (Islam), to afford themselves greater social standing. This argument is further explored in theme 3 of this chapter.

While previous research has identified the far-right's use of populist arguments to appear less antisemitic (Hafez, 2014), little research has applied this concept to the anti-Islam PRR. Expanding on previous research, although at face value these arguments could be classed as political-based grievances relating to cancel culture, because of the underlying focus on Islam, this may be a strategic use of anti-establishment populism concealing a cultural-based grievance. These groups are likely to be using less racialised discourse and using certain liberal values to prevent being de-platformed or doxed.

7.3.2 Sub-theme 2: Being silenced through stigmatised labelling

The main way that individuals argued they were silenced for criticising Islam was through stigmatised labelling. Stigmatising labels such as 'Nazi' (TFBM supporters, Video 3) identifies these individuals as the oppressors and their victims (Muslims) as the oppressed (Malešević, 2022). As they are identified as the oppressors, this undermines their (racist) arguments and silences them. This supports previous research on stigmatised labelling and the anti-Islam PRR (Pilkington, 2016): 'We have to challenge the labels that we are being brandished with and dismantle the term Islamophobia, Islamism, these are intellectual imposters. They're not real things' (TFBM supporters, Video 13), 'you are now being branded a Nazi, a racist, an Islamophobe, a xenophobe, simply for having a differing point of view' (TFBM supporters, Video 3).

This use of silencing is linked to cancel culture generally which has been framed as 'a form of intolerance against opposing views' (Velasco, 2020, p.1) sharing similarities with fascism and totalitarianism (Geran Pilon, 2020). Stigmatising labels such as 'racist' are argued to publicly shame an individual to stop them from voicing their opinions which have broken the norms of social acceptability (Velasco, 2020). Individuals then are publicly shamed, deplatformed or fired in order to remove their opinions from public discourse (Beiner, 2020). Some argue that cancelling someone is a power play where

marginalised voices cancel those that hold power or privilege whose opinions are deemed socially unacceptable (Lim, 2020). In this case, the individuals in this doctoral thesis hold anti-Islam views which are deemed unacceptable and, therefore, they have been cancelled through doxing, de-platforming and other measures. Velasco (2020) argues that this is an ideological purge of dissenting voices. The individuals in this doctoral thesis, then, argued that freedom of speech no longer exists in the UK.

Considering the groups in this study implicitly positioned freedom of speech as a Christian-derived value, as discussed in section 7.2.2, they positioned Islam as anti-freedom of speech. For some, Muslims and the left-wing are working together to silence voices that criticise Islam ‘the country is becoming a disaster and it is largely because of this religion [Islam] [...] the great misery of the left-wing Islamic alliance’ (TFBM leaders, Video 10), ‘I’m a college lecturer in North London and I’m about to lose my job because I refused to lie about the life of Mohammed to my students’ (TFBM supporters, Video 10). Some supporters perceive Islam to be part of a multicultural, politically correct strategy to enforce authoritarianism and undermine perceived British (Christian) values of freedom of speech. The DFLA and TFBM, therefore, opposed Muslim immigration but not all manifestations of multiculturalism as it was only Islam that they perceived as a threat to freedom of speech. Further, they specifically focused on Islamic ideology rather than Muslim immigration. This further highlights the attempts to focus on the deracialised arguments in order to evade stigmatising labels which can lead to being de-platformed.

7.4 Theme 3: The government prioritises Muslims/immigrants over British citizens

According to previous research, anti-Islam PRR groups are critical of the political system, the government and elites (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Tyndall, 2015). This was also an important theme in this doctoral study. Supporters and leaders were particularly concerned about their dissatisfaction with the political system, arguing that both the Conservative Party and the Labour Party propagate the same pro-immigration arguments. They were also concerned about perceived government corruption, arguing that the government uses the police to ‘cover up’ crimes committed by Muslims thereby prioritising Muslims over non-Muslims (TFBM leaders, Video 10). In this context, the

term prioritisation means that the Conservative Party, the Labour party and the police deem Muslims or immigrants to be more important than non-Muslims or British citizens (TFBM leaders, Video 10). They, therefore, protect Muslims or immigrants to ensure their electoral support to continue their multi-cultural agenda (TFBM leaders, Video 10).

7.4.1 Sub-theme 1: Dissatisfaction with the political system

Dissatisfaction with the political system is a common theme in the PRR (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) and was present in this study. The first argument in this sub-theme was that the Conservative Party and the Labour Party are both a threat to the UK: 'These are our choices, Labour or the Conservatives. We have either Sajid Javid in the Home Office or Diane Abbott in the Home Office. These are our choices, and there isn't a great deal of difference [...] between Sajid Javid and Diane Abbott' (TFBM, Video 10). In this quote, it was argued that the two main British political parties are the same. As discussed in section 7.4.2, the current Conservative government is argued to be pushing a multi-cultural agenda and silencing critics of this agenda linking to section 7.3. However, the leaders of TFBM and PEGIDA UK considered the Labour Party to be a more significant threat to British people than the Conservative Party. This was primarily due to the assumption that the Labour Party was in an 'Islamic alliance' and harming the UK by pushing a communist, multi-cultural, globalised agenda while prioritising immigrants and racially minoritized people (TFBM leaders, Video 10). Supporters and leaders particularly focused on ex-Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn because of his perceived communist, multicultural views (TFBM leaders, Video 3):

The Communists are on the march, they are in the schools, they want to destroy our liberties and reduce us to a totalitarian state [...] We will stop them. We will identify these people [...] and we will make everyone understand what Communism is, what it does and who is propagating it today. Overwhelmingly Corbyn's Labour Party. Jeremy Corbyn is a Communist, he must be stopped (TFBM leaders, Video 3)

The country is becoming a disaster, and it is largely because of this religion [Islam] and [...] I can tell you that it wouldn't be causing the problems it's causing

if it wasn't for the left wing's accommodation of it, the great misery of the left-wing Islamic alliance (TFBM leaders, Video 10)

Supporters and leaders argued that both Islam and Communism were oppressive 'ideologies' (PEGIDA UK leader, Video 6) that intend to undermine individual liberty and freedom. Communism has become the prime enemy of the far and moderate right (Seymour, 2020; Moyn, 2018). Once a potential threat to capitalism, the global threat from Communism is now an unsubstantiated threat (Seymour, 2020; Moyn, 2018). Despite this, the perceived threat rose again out of antisemitic cultural Marxism, a conspiracy theory rooted in the Judeo-Bolshevik myth which aims to destroy 'Western civilisation' (Seymour, 2020; Moyn, 2018; Huntington, 1996, p. 2). This conspiracy argues that white men have had their rights taken away and given to feminists, black people, immigrants and other people (Moyn, 2018). This conspiracy theory positions Communism as an outsider enemy, one that is a threat to individual citizens aiming to undermine their freedom as discussed in section 7.8. The cultural Marxist myth has evolved to incorporate new shadowy enemies (Moyn, 2018) including Islamist Jihad and Islam (Rabinowitz, 2018; Mayer, 2016).

The assumption that the Labour Party is in alliance with Islam is part of TGR conspiracy theory and is further explored in theme 4 of this chapter. However, contrasting to theme 4, in this theme the leaders did not refer to this 'alliance' as a conspiracy, but as an 'accommodation' to gain more votes. This represents a populist argument where the Labour Party prioritises a Muslim minority over the British majority, 'three words UK government, protect your people' (PEGIDA UK leader, Video 12), implying that Muslims are the outsider threat. Consequently, this is another example of the PRR using anti-establishment arguments to conceal the underlying cultural-based grievance, the assumption that Muslims are the outsider group threatening British values through 'the left-wing Islamic alliance' (TFBM, Video 10).

7.4.2 Sub-theme 2: Political corruption

Concern about political corruption is one of the key characteristics of the PRR (Mudde, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) and was a theme in this doctoral study. As in section 7.3,

TFBM leaders and PEGIDA UK leaders implied that not only are the left in an Islamic alliance but that the police are in an alliance with the current government to cover up certain crimes by Muslims and target those that oppose 'multicultural political correctness' (TFBM leaders, Video 10). These quotes highlight the belief in the deep-seated level of corruption in the police service and the current government: 'they [the UK police] are out there stopping political opposition to the status quo...This is not the role of the police to determine [...] how people vote, but they are actively involved in shutting down [political] events [...] the [British] police themselves' (TFBM leaders, Video 10), 'the line is, are you going along with the multicultural political correctness of the government? If you're not, then you're on the target list for law enforcement' (TFBM leaders, Video 10).

This theme relates to the assumption that the government use the police service as an authoritarian arm to oppress those that are deemed anti-multiculturalism to gain more votes. This supports previous research highlighting the link between the PRR and populism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In this doctoral study, perceived corruption is linked with immigration-related conspiracies, as shown in section 7.4. The implicit narratives of conspiracy theories underpinned most arguments made in this study. As discussed in theme 3 of this chapter, Muslims are represented as an outsider threat to British citizens. It was implied that the British government and politicians 'cover up' crimes committed by assumed Muslims (Charter, 2016) putting the British public in danger (TFBM leaders, Video 10). TFBM leaders and PEGIDA UK leaders, therefore, are engaged in a cultural backlash to oppose multiculturalism from Muslim-majority immigration (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) representing a concealed cultural-based grievance.

7.5 Theme 4: The Great Replacement and The Great Reset

Previous research suggests that conspiracy theories are integral to the far-right (Kalil et al., 2021). Conspiracy theories were also present in this doctoral study. Although conspiracy theories were implicitly referenced throughout most themes in this chapter, for example, cultural Marxism was implicitly referenced in theme 3, only TFBM leaders explicitly referenced conspiracy theories. Consequently, this theme focuses on two conspiracies that TFBM leaders explicitly stated were real: TGR and The Great Reset.

7.5.1 Sub-theme 1: The Great Replacement

The Great Replacement conspiracy theory (discussed in Chapter 3) is integral to the far-right's narrative (Ekman, 2022; Davey & Ebner, 2019). TFBM leaders, especially Anne Marie Waters, propagated this conspiracy theory (Table 17 & 18). This is likely due to her connection with Generation Identity (GI) who support TGR conspiracy (Davey & Ebner, 2019) and explains why only TFBM leaders discussed this conspiracy explicitly. When discussing TGR theory, Anne Marie Waters claimed:

It means the replacement of white Europe with non-Europeans [...] so, whilst you can't worry about an individual Muslim because it's just an individual, you can worry about hundreds of thousands of Muslims because hundreds of thousands of Muslims means Islam and Islam means our current culture will be changed. It will be pushed back, it will be diluted, it will be transformed into something more like that culture and I don't want that culture [...] I don't accept it [Islam] as equal to my culture, I certainly don't accept it as superior to my culture, I will describe it to you. It is inferior to my culture, enormously inferior [...] because it's immoral because it's violent, because it's unjust (TFBM leader, video 8)

There are two aspects of TGR conspiracy theory: physical and symbolic replacement (Obaidi et al., 2022). Physical replacement is evidenced by the quote above where white people are argued to be physically replaced by Muslims. This supports previous research arguing that the subject, the ordinary 'white' man, is threatened by imagined others. The fear is not only that these imagined others will take something away from the ordinary 'white' man, for example, economic security, but will 'take the place of the subject itself' (Ahmed, 2004, p. 117).

Symbolic replacement relates to a perceived cultural replacement where Islamic values, beliefs and systems replace so-called British values such as women's rights, discussed in section 7.2.1. This was the main argument in this sub-theme. Water's positioned British and European cultures as superior cultures, with similar histories and values. In contrast, she positioned 'Islam' as an 'inferior' culture. By positioning British, white culture identified as pro-women's rights, pro-democracy and pro-rule of law as

superior to Islam, she argued that this ‘replacement’ by Muslims undermines Britain’s superiority. It does this by absorbing ‘inferior cultures’ which are ‘immoral [...] violent [...] and unjust’ thereby ‘diluting’ British, white culture (TFBM leader, video 8). Support for TFBM Party then is likely due to a backlash (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) against the perceived ‘*invading*’ Muslims to protect superior British ‘white culture’ (TFBM leader, video 8). This theme is further discussed in Chapter 8.

7.5.2 Sub-theme 2: The Great Reset

Connected to TGR conspiracy is The Great Reset (discussed in section 3.4). The Great Reset is a conspiracy devised by the technocratic global elite to create a new totalitarian socialist-communist New World Order reducing personal freedoms (Rectenwald, 2021). During COVID-19, The Great Reset conspiracy became a narrative in far-right discourse (Hampden-Turner & Trompenaars, 2021). TFBM leaders commonly referenced this conspiracy theory. According to TFBM leaders (TFBM Leaders, Video 5), the Great Reset links conspiracy theories about COVID-19 (Anti-vaxxers), mass immigration (TGR) and a social credit system (transhumanism). They argued that this combination of conspiracies, which are based on the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) initiative, will undermine social cohesion and lead to oppression from the global elites. In the quote below, Anne Marie Waters refers to a documentary called ‘Planet Lockdown’ which featured Catherine Austin Fitts, the former assistant secretary for Housing and Urban Development under the presidency of George HW Bush between the years 1989 and 1990:

She [Catherine Austin Fitz] calls transhumanism, the injecting of materials into the body that hooks us up to the cloud, to the technological systems. Our actual bodies and minds will be hooked up to these systems. She said we will be facing a world [...] with zero privacy and we know already the WEF has talked about this, and the United Nations (UN) has talked about this (TFBM Leaders, Video 5).

The For Britain Movement leaders focused on the ‘global elites’ normally categorised as the WEF, the UN, big tech, big pharma and big media. In combination, these factors are called ‘Mr. Global [...] the nickname she [Catherine Austin Fitz] has given to the secret

governance' (TFBM Leaders, Video 5). This targeting of the WEF and the UN is important. According to Norris and Inglehart (2019), these two international organisations are perceived by the PRR to be a threat to nation states, holding power over sovereign nations thereby reducing individual freedom through communist totalitarianism. In this study, TFBM leaders focused on reducing perceived cultural threats in an attempt to ensure cultural cohesion by separating cultures that are perceived to be incompatible. These international organisations, then, pose a threat to this perceived culturally cohesive nation-state, leading people to support TFBM in an attempt to push back against this perceived oppression (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

7.6 Theme 5: A corrupt political system facilitates Child Sexual Exploitation

The anti-Islam PRR is also concerned about the 'grooming gang' cases in the UK, officially known as CSE (Cockbain & Tufail, 2020; Cockbain, 2013, p. 24). This was also an important theme for the DFLA leaders in this doctoral study. The 'grooming gang' cases relate to a series of child sex gang cases where young girls were sexually exploited across the UK in places like Telford and Rochdale (Cockbain & Tufail, 2020; Cockbain, 2013, p. 24). Democratic Football Lads Alliance leaders claimed that the victims of CSE were failed by the authorities who 'covered up' these crimes (DFLA leaders, Video 7). They singled out Labour councillors as the cause of this cover-up and implied that Muslims were the perpetrators of the sexual abuse (DFLA leaders, Video 7 and 15). This continues the stereotypical far-right argument that the left cover-up the crimes of perceived immigrants (Leidig, 2021; Coulter, 2015). Further, DFLA leaders argued they were concerned about the victims of CSE, not only white and British sexual abuse victims but all types of victims, including Muslim victims. There were two sub-themes in this fifth theme: concern that victims of CSE were failed by the authorities and concern about the victims of CSE.

7.6.1 Sub-theme 1: The victims of CSE were failed by the authorities

The most important sub-theme in the DFLA leaders' dataset was that the victims of CSE were failed by the authorities. Coined by The Times newspaper in 2011, the term 'grooming gang' has been associated with Pakistani men, and the terms 'Pakistani',

'Asian' and 'Muslim' are often used interchangeably in the 'grooming gang' cases (Cockbain, 2013, p. 24). The far-right use the term 'grooming gang' (Cockbain & Tufail, 2020, p. 22). In comparison to other anti-Islam PRR groups such as the EDL (Pilkington, 2016), when referencing CSE, the DFLA leaders attempted to focus on the political-related concerns of this abuse rather than the racialised profile of the perpetrators. Their main argument was that the British authorities, children's services, councils, Criminal Prosecution Service, the government and the police were implicated in these CSE cases. They argued that the authorities (especially Labour councillors in Telford and Rochdale) were covering up systematic abuse of children in these CSE cases. Some individuals even argued that council members and MPs were perpetrators themselves, as can be seen in the quotes below: 'it's [CSE] endemic in a lot of these towns, that these Labour counsellors have covered it up for so many years' (DFLA leaders, Video 4), 'it is also alleged that there are properties owned by elected members of Rochdale Borough Council that have been used by the gangs for the use of CSE' (DFLA leaders, Video 7), 'these people [authorities] are supposed to be looking after our children not covering up and allowing them to be abused by MP's, by members of the public' (DFLA leaders, Video 4).

The far-right often label left-wing political groups, such as 'Labour counsellors' (DFLA leaders, Video 4) as a threat to British girls (Leidig, 2021). However, this focus on the authorities contrasts with research by Blisset (2018, p.1) which concluded that the DFLA 'organises almost exclusively against Muslim grooming gangs, under the guise of women's rights and protecting (white) women and girls'. In this doctoral study, the DFLA leaders attempted to distance themselves from this anti-Islam racialised argument and move towards the political-based argument 'we are not marching today against certain communities, we're marching against the system which is letting kids down up and down the country' (DFLA leaders, Video 8). Related to this finding is the use of the term CSE rather than the racialised term 'grooming' (Cockbain & Tufail, 2020; Cockbain, 2013). The term 'grooming' was only used in a couple of references. Although the DFLA leaders appeared to have changed their focus and terminology, they only discussed CSE crimes that would be classed as 'grooming gang' cases including 'Rochdale' and 'Telford' (DFLA leaders, Video 15). They did not discuss CSE cases concerning operation YewTree, a similar case of systematic child abuse in the UK involving white celebrities such as Jimmy

Saville, or other related CSE cases (Denti & Iammarino, 2021; Miah, 2015). They position the 'groomers' as an external threat, implicitly associated with Pakistani Muslim men, who are attacking the 'dominant white culture or nation itself' (Cockbain, 2013, p. 25). This continues the identification of brown men as a threat to white women, a stereotypically colonial argument where Muslim men are portrayed as hypersexualised, deviant others (Leidig, 2021). This has influenced far-right perceptions of Muslim men (Bangstad, 2019).

7.6.2 Sub-theme 2: The victims of CSE

Previous research highlighted the DFLA's focus on the victims of CSE (Cockbain & Tufail, 2020). The DFLA leaders also referenced this sub-theme in this doctoral study. They claimed they support any victim of CSE regardless of skin colour or religion, again highlighting the attempt to distance themselves from the stereotypical far-right racialised argument: 'I will support any victim no matter who the perpetrator is whether they are black, white, Christian, Hindu, Sikh, I do not care. I also help Muslim women and I support them too' (DFLA leaders, Video 15), 'I stand with every Muslim woman, I stand with every non-Muslim woman, I stand with every child, I stand with every single person who stands against this heinous crime, and I stand here as a survivor, a warrior' (DFLA leaders, Video 15).

The quotes above indicate that the DFLA leaders are concerned about different types of sexual abuse survivors. Despite claiming that they support all victims of CSE regardless of the perpetrator, the DFLA only referenced the stereotypical far-right CSE cases and claimed, 'our children are being raped' (DFLA leaders, Video 5). This adds a nativist argument implying that Muslim men are a threat to British girls (DFLA leaders, Video 8). They also explicitly mention that they even support Muslim victims, 'I also help Muslim women', 'I stand with every Muslim woman', suggesting that although Muslim men are perceived to be the enemy, they will support Muslim women, further suggesting that Muslims are either the perpetrators or victims of Islam. They position the Muslim male other as a hypersexualised threat to 'our children' who need to be protected by white men (Leidig, 2021). This is a case of 'white men saving brown women from brown men' and is rooted in colonial superiority discourse (Spivak & Riach, 2020,

p. 93) linking back to the idea that in a civilised society, women are protected (as discussed in section 7.2.1) (Spivak & Riach, 2020, p. 93). This represents the use of femonationalist narratives (Farris, 2017). Expanding on this concept, the DFLA combine children's rights with nationalism, positioning British values (implied to be pro-women's and children's rights) as superior to Islamic values. This chapter adds to the literature by coining the term *juvenationalism* which represents the combination of juvenile and nationalism. This new term addresses the DFLA's strategic protection of children where women and children are positioned as innocent (Carpenter, 2016) who need protection from Muslim men (Ralph-Morrow, 2022).

Although the DFLA leaders attempted to portray this grievance as politically based, their arguments represented cultural-based grievances highlighting their strategic use of populism. This is due to their focus on the racialised 'grooming gang' cases and their nativist 'our children' argument when referring to the victims of the 'grooming gang' cases. This suggests that some individuals support the DFLA because they are concerned about crimes perceived to be committed by Muslims and the British government's implied collusion in covering them up. This perceived treatment of the survivors of CSE implies there is a type of relative deprivation (Kunst & Obaidi, 2020) where the perpetrators are protected by the authorities 'covering up' the crimes, but the victims of CSE are not. Therefore, the DFLA leaders were mainly concerned about the perceived threat from the Muslim other and the perceived prioritisation of the Muslim other over 'our children'. This leads to the next theme in which the DFLA supporters argued that the law is not applied equally.

7.7 Theme 6: They are legally oppressed for their political ideology

According to Pilkington (2016), the EDL argued that they were treated as second-class citizens. In this doctoral study, DFLA supporters were concerned that the police are not impartial and treat them unfairly due to their political ideology and anti-EU stance. They also argued that Muslims are a prioritised minority group in the UK. This supports previous findings (Pilkington, 2016).

7.7.1 Sub-theme 1: The police are not impartial

The idea that the police are not impartial is often propagated by the far-right (Pilkington, 2016). The DFLA supporters were also concerned about this sub-theme representing both a political and cultural-based grievance. They argued that the police were ‘nicking everyone’ at a pro-Brexit rally, that they were ‘kettled in’ by the police, ‘forced to give their details’ and they were ‘a victim of police brutality’ (DFLA supporters, Video 4). They also argued that they were unfairly treated in comparison to the left, especially in relation to Remainers during the EU referendum: ‘the law is different for them [Remainers] [...] They [the police] are already preparing to kettle us. They didn’t do that with the Remainers the other day did they?’ (DFLA supporters, Video 4).

Some DFLA supporters, therefore, perceived themselves to be unfairly treated by the police who use harsher suppression tactics against them because they are ‘on the right’ (DFLA supporters, Video 4). The main group they compared themselves to was the left in general who they equated with voting to remain in the EU. This links to themes 2 and 3 where both main political parties were perceived to propagate multiculturalism and silence those that are critical of multiculturalism discussed in sections 7.3 and 7.4. The DFLA supporters concern about Remainers highlights their opposition to the EU, another international organisation that is perceived to pose a threat to the UK, as discussed in section 7.5.2.

The second group referenced by the DFLA supporters in this sub-theme were Muslims. They argued that Muslims are treated better than them. The quote below highlights this victim argument (Sengul, 2022), where British non-Muslims are presented as the victims in acts of ‘reverse racism’ (Sengul, 2022, p. 594). This narrative is often used to justify anti-immigration, in this case, anti-Muslim arguments (e.g., Sengul, 2022; Beider, 2015; Rhodes, 2010). The DFLA supporters use the stereotypical far-right argument that minority groups are undeserving beneficiaries of government support (Rinaldi & Bekker, 2021; Lone & Silver, 2014) and are treated better than British citizens (Pilkington, 2016; Rhodes, 2011). This links to section 7.2 and 7.5.1 where Muslims, regardless of nationality are considered the exclusive outsider threat. Although other groups, such as TFBM employed a white victimhood narrative (e.g., Rhodes & Hall,

2020), in the data analysed for this study, the DFLA supporters did not use this white victimhood argument. This is shown in the quote extract below:

What they've done [the police] effectively, they've given these barbarians [Muslims] a green light and they leave us the victims [apostates] wide open to abuses and to be picked off and I just couldn't afford to get myself killed and put my family through any more distressing experience (DFLA supporters, Video 5)

One of the main arguments of the DFLA supporters related to the persecution of apostates that had left Islam but were not being protected by the British government. The individual speaking in the above quote (DFLA supporters, Video 5) was an ex-Muslim, Christian, Pakistani man. He can be classed as an ethnically diverse nativist - a British PRR supporter who is racially minoritized (Chapter 6). In comparison to the last paragraph, the quote above is not an example of white victimhood as he was not discussing issues related to 'reverse racism' and 'white supremacy' (Sengul, 2022, p. 594) but about being an apostate. This again highlights the importance of Muslims as the other and Christians (as well as Sikhs, Hindus, and Jews) as the in-group discussed in section 7.2 and 8.2.

7.8 Theme 7: The perceived threat from left-wing ideology

The political left generally is a grievance of the far-right (Jamin, 2018; Pilkington, 2016). PEGIDA UK supporters referenced political left-wing ideology as an important concern. They defined the left as the establishment including the media, left-wing politicians and left-wing supporters. All were implied to be part of a cultural Marxist conspiracy to destroy 'Western civilisation' (Huntington, 1996, p. 2).

7.8.1 Sub-theme 1: ANTIFA

ANTIFA is a left-wing militant anti-fascist group that organises counterprotests against the far-right (Fausset & Feuer, 2019). The far-right identity ANTIFA as an enemy in the UK (Copsey & Merrill, 2021; 2020). In this doctoral thesis, ANTIFA was a main theme in the arguments of PEGIDA UK supporters. One supporter claimed that ANTIFA supports

Islamist terrorists ‘how can you support a [Islamist] terrorist?’, while others expressed their anger towards assumed communists and socialists ‘I hate commie scum’ ‘get that socialist wanker off our streets’ (PEGIDA UK supporters, Video 9) representing both a political and cultural grievance.

Within the British far-right, ANTIFA is identified as part of an oppressive conspiracy in connection with the government to reduce the freedoms of British citizens (Copsey & Merrill, 2021). In this study, PEGIDA UK supporters referenced terrorists, communism and socialism, all of which have previously been argued to be part of a cultural Marxist conspiracy theory. In this conspiracy theory, the far left and the left in general, are accused of attempting to destroy ‘Western’ Christian civilisation (Busbridge et al., 2020, p. 722; Berkowitz, 2003). PEGIDA UK implicitly categorise ANTIFA as far-left. More recently, the conspiracy has included an ‘unholy alliance’ between Marxism and Islamism which share the same goals of destroying ‘Western civilisation’ (Rabinowitz, 2018; Huntington, 1996, p. 2). This may explain why PEGIDA UK supporters connect ANTIFA with Islamist terrorists linking back to section 7.4.1. Although opposition to ANTIFA could be classed as a political-based grievance due to different ideological positions between the far-left and far-right, cultural Marxism focuses on the perceived cultural-based threat arguing that ‘Western’ (Busbridge et al., 2020) culture is being destroyed through political correctness linking to theme 2 in this chapter. Theme 7, therefore, can be argued to be a cultural-based grievance as ANTIFA was identified as being part of this perceived cultural destruction (Lind, 2005).

7.9 The limited presence of economic, immigration-related and class-based grievances

Although previous research suggests that immigration-related grievances are a significant driver of far-right support (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Rydgren, 2008), in this doctoral study immigration in general was not a common theme. Concerns about immigration were only present when discussing Islam. This supports previous research by Pilkington (2016) who found that the EDL were accepting of multiculturalism but not Islamic or Muslim influence. Therefore, the findings in this doctoral thesis suggest that future research on grievances should not exclusively focus on immigration (Stockemer et al., 2021).


As discussed in Chapter 3, Pilkington (2016) found that class-based grievances were key motivating factors for the EDL leading to support from working-class communities. Many EDL supporters were unemployed and received benefits or social housing (Pilkington, 2016). In this doctoral research, however, class was not a prominent theme. These results support other studies that suggest new social movements, such as anti-Islam groups, are largely unconcerned with social class issues (Allen, 2016; Jackson & Feldman, 2011). Instead, they are driven by their constructed shared identity based on cultural, social and political grievances (Allen, 2016; Jackson & Feldman, 2011).

Linking to class, the three PRR groups in this thesis did not reference many economic-based grievances. Instead, they only referenced cultural and political-based grievances. This supports previous research specifically on the PRR which highlights the focus on cultural-based grievances (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Mudde, 2019) instead of economic-based grievances. Research suggests that although the Extreme Right (ER) is connected to materialist, economic-based concerns, the anti-Islam PRR is more characterised by its focus on post-materialist cultural grievances, such as Islam (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Cole, 2005). The focus on post-materialist issues in these three anti-Islam PRR groups, therefore, is explained through the difference between the ER and the anti-Islam PRR.

7.10 All roads lead to Islam: the use of strategic populism

Figure 11

The most common concern of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK across all seven grievances



Note. This figure highlights how each of the other six themes leads back to Islam (theme 1) (author's own). Using thematic analysis, although some themes seemed unrelated to Islam, the underlying grievance related to the perceived threat from Islam. For example, the concern about being silenced related to the perception that participants were silenced for criticising Islam. Islam was identified as the overarching theme (Braun & Clarke, 2019).

In this study, Islam was the main concern within all three groups meaning that ethnic, religious and racial grievances (cultural grievances) were most prominent according to Ajil's (2022) model. Islamic ideology represents the overarching theme (Braun & Clarke, 2021a) in these three groups. Although, political-based arguments were present across most themes, as shown in Figure 11, most of the seven grievances concealed deeper cultural, specifically religious grievances (Ajil, 2022). In this chapter, these included the perceived threat that Islam and Muslims posed to the UK (Theme 1) in alliance with the government (Theme 3), politicians (Theme 3), police (Theme 3) and the left (Theme 2, 3, 4 & 7). Other grievances relating to the law and child abuse implicitly focused on the perceived prioritisation of Muslims over non-Muslim British citizens (Theme 5 & 6). Further, although the DFLA leaders did not explicitly focus on Islam, highlighting their political-based grievances, the DFLA supporters referenced concern about Islam as their second most common theme. Therefore, the DFLA leader's political-based grievances may be a strategy to conceal their racialised cultural-based grievances.

To address the second and third research questions in this doctoral thesis, these three groups are concerned about cultural-based grievances concealed by political-based grievances which all lead back to the perceived threat from so-called Islamic ideology. This indicates that although some grievances expressed by these three groups may be legitimate, for example, criticism of the government's handling of the so-called 'grooming gang' cases, the implementation of these grievances is rooted in cultural racism. In European countries the most common form of xenophobic populism is Islamophobic populism (Oztig et al., 2021). Populist parties use Islamophobic arguments to appear more moderate as anti-Islam rhetoric is considered to be an 'accepted racism'. In this way they distance themselves from their antisemitic arguments while attracting anti-Islam supporters (Hafez, 2014, p. 479; Williams, 2010). More recently, Oztig et al., (2021) argue that Islamophobic populism is used by some PRR groups as an electoral strategy to gain more votes undermining belief in mainstream politicians, highlighting Islam as a problem and then offering practical solutions to deal with this perceived problem. They argue that as only 20% of the European population have anti-Islam attitudes, anti-Islam PRR parties strategically use populism to appeal to a wider audience. This chapter offers a related but alternative argument.

As shown in theme 2, clear Islamophobic arguments can lead to the PRR being silenced, doxed or de-platformed which is a concern for the groups in this doctoral thesis. This chapter developed the concept of *strategic populism* in this doctoral thesis drawing on Hafez's (2014) argument that populism is used to conceal the far-right's antisemitic past. However, instead of concealing antisemitism, the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK may use populism to conceal their Islamophobic arguments. Strategic populism argues that the anti-Islam PRR uses populist arguments to appear more moderate, while strategically distancing themselves from Islamophobic arguments to evade being de-platformed, silenced or arrested. Far-Right groups have recently been de-platformed from Facebook, Twitter and YouTube including the British National Party (BNP), Britain First, the EDL and Tommy Robinson (Bond, 2022; Hern, 2019). As the three groups in this doctoral thesis remain active on Facebook and have not yet been banned, this supports the strategic populist argument that populism has been used to appear more moderate and less Islamophobic. In this case language and arguments may have been modified to remain active on social media platforms as using hate speech would lead to a ban. Although strategic populism is not always present and some arguments may represent genuine populist arguments (highlighted in Tommy Robinson's arguments in Chapter 8, theme 2), in this doctoral study, supporters and leaders overfocused on the perceived threat from Islam within political-grievance themes. The term strategic populism helps identify these concealed cultural-based grievances.

Further, as highlighted in Theme 1 and Theme 5, certain voices have been used to legitimise these groups' Islamophobic, nationalistic arguments. Survivors of sexual and physical abuse by Islamist extremists and CSE abuse survivors in the 'grooming gang' cases have been given a platform to speak at anti-Islam PRR groups' rallies. Ex-Muslim apostates threatened by their Muslim community were also present at rallies highlighting the presence of ethnically diverse nativists. To explain the presence of these individuals, this chapter coined the term *strategic emotional support*. This represents the voices of sex-abuse survivors and apostates that have been used to position Muslims, especially Muslim men, as the outsider enemy posing a threat to British women and ex-Muslims. Although the groups argue that they are concerned about women's rights and children's rights, the concept of strategic emotional support addresses the underlying cultural grievance with a specific focus on Islam. The DFLA and

TFBM both used survivors of certain types of Muslim-perpetrated crime to legitimise their Islamophobic arguments. This links to the strategic argument that children's rights are a cornerstone of British democracy. Similarly, to the concept of femonationalism (Farris, 2017), Theme 5 highlights the DFLA's argument for children's rights in combination with nationalism to implicate Muslim men as the perpetrators of CSE in the UK. To legitimise this children's rights nationalist argument, the DFLA used the voices of the survivors of the 'grooming gang' cases. This chapter, therefore, coined the term *juvenationalism* to explain this pro-children's rights position.

7.11 Overall conclusion

This chapter addressed the second and third research questions (ii) 'what are their main grievances' and (iii) 'why do people express support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK?'. Using RTA, I developed seven aggregated grievances. Concern about Islamic ideology was the most common theme supporting previous research (Allen, 2019; Allchorn, 2018). In contrast to Pilkington's (2016) findings on the EDL, TFBM and PEGIDA UK made no attempt to distinguish between Islam and Muslims. Only the DFLA tried to distinguish between Islam and Muslims which supports previous findings by Allen (2019b). These findings expand on previous research and suggest that there is a discrepancy between what the leaders and supporters of the DFLA are concerned about with the leaders focusing on political-based grievances and the supporters focusing on political and cultural-based grievances. This is a contribution to knowledge.

Further, leaders and supporters of all three groups used women's rights as a marker of civilisation positioning British values (pro-women's rights) as superior to perceived Islamic values (anti-women's rights). This finding supports previous research by Berntzen (2019) and Allen (2014). This chapter argued that this concern about women's rights was a form of femonationalism used to liberalise these groups' arguments. This supports Farris's (2017) findings. Expanding on previous research, these three groups used racially minoritized ex-Muslim women who were abused by Muslim men to tell their stories. These stories highlighted the perception that Islam is a misogynistic religion that restricts women's freedoms and used femonationalism to position Britain as the country that champions women's rights. This is an example of the

far-right using abused women strategically to further their own political gains. I termed this strategy as *strategic emotional support*. This is a new term and focuses on an area of the far-right that has previously gained little attention. This is an important contribution to counter-extremism and far-right research. This term also builds on the finding from the previous chapter, the ethnically diverse nativist. As these groups are using ex-Muslim women to further their political goals, these women are examples of ethnically diverse nativists, the category developed in Chapter 6. However, little is known about their political views and why they support these groups in the first place. This will be further explored in Chapter 8. Christianity was also found to be the marker of the in-group in the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. This means that ex-Muslims that had converted to Christianity were used by the anti-Islam PRR to further their anti-Islam agenda. This further develops the ethnically diverse nativist category and suggests that some of these supporters are used by the anti-Islam PRR to further their political agenda. Muslim immigration was also deemed a threat to Western civilisation, a finding that supports previous research (Froio, 2018). The focus on Muslims rather than ethnic minorities is likely to be a strategy to distance these anti-Islam PRR groups from the fascistic ER (Pilkington, 2016; Copsey, 2010). This will be explored further in Chapter 8.

Supporters and leaders were also concerned that they were being silenced as part of a cancel culture. This supports previous findings (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Oaten, 2014). However, expanding on previous research, this chapter found that these PRR groups focused on the political-based grievances related to cancel culture rather than the cultural-based grievances, despite their main concern relating to Islam and Muslims. They strategically masked their cultural-based grievances with political-based grievances developing on Hafez's (2014) argument that the far-right use populist arguments to appear less antisemitic. I, therefore, coined the term *strategic populism* to explain these group's use of populism which they use to mask Islam-related grievances to prevent deplatforming. They were also critical of the political system, government and elites, supporting previous research (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). However, they used *strategic populism* to claim that the Labour Party prioritises the Muslim minority over the British (non-Muslim) majority. They focused on the political component of the grievances despite the cultural-based grievance being the root of the concern. This finding develops on previous research and contributes to knowledge.

The next contribution of this study expands on the argument made in Chapter 2; that the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK are part of a sub-category of the PRR typology. I called this sub-category the anti-Islam PRR. This study suggests that Islamic ideology (cultural-based grievances) was the main grievance for all three groups. This focus on Islam supports previous literature on the anti-Islam PRR (Pilkington, 2016) and further consolidates the categorisation of these three groups as anti-Islam PRR groups rather than ER or PRR groups in general.

Furthering the concept of strategic populism is the DFLA leaders' approach to the CSE cases. Interestingly, the DFLA leaders were the only group that did not explicitly reference Islamic ideology as a main concern. In an attempt to distance themselves from racialised arguments relating to CSE, they focused on children's rights and the failures of the authorities. In comparison to other anti-Islam groups such as the EDL (Pilkington, 2016) when they referenced CSE, the DFLA leaders attempted to focus on the political-related concerns of this abuse rather than the racialised profile of the perpetrators. However, the DFLA only referenced the 'grooming gangs' cases, implicitly associating Pakistani Muslim men as the outside perpetrators of CSE. This argument was used by the DFLA to further their anti-Muslim narrative. I, therefore, developed the term *juvenationalism* to highlight this anti-Muslim, pro-children's rights narrative. This develops on the work on femonationalism by Farris (2017) and homonationalism by Puar (2018) and is a further contribution to knowledge.

Finally, this chapter found that immigration did not appear to be a significant driver for these groups, contradicting Norris and Inglehart's (2019) findings. However, it supports Pilkington's (2016) findings that the EDL were supportive of multiculturalism but not Islamic or Muslim influence. As there is competing evidence, I will further address this question of immigration in Chapter 8. Pilkington (2016) also found that class-based grievances were key motivating factors for the EDL. My research contradicts this finding. I found that the groups in this thesis were more concerned with a shared identity based on cultural, social and economic-based grievances supporting Allen's (2016) findings. Finally, supporting previous research by Norris and Inglehart (2019) and also by Mudde (2019), I found that all three groups did not prioritise economic-based

grievances, but instead they mainly focused on cultural-based grievances and political-based grievances.

This chapter addressed six research gaps outlined in Chapter 1: Using Ajil's (2022) model, it explored the economic, cultural and political-based grievances of the three groups. It further explored the ethnicity of supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. It discussed the lack of differentiation between Islam and Islamist extremists by all three PRR groups and examined themes related to child abuse and whether child abuse concerns were only raised when Muslims or immigrants were the perpetrators rather than non-Muslims and British citizens. It also used qualitative research to explore the main grievances of all three groups and it compared the themes of all three groups and analysed the differences and similarities between the supporters and leaders' themes.

This chapter provides three main contributions to the far-right literature: the concepts strategic populism, strategic emotional support and juvenationalism which all help reveal cultural-based grievances rooted in Islam that are masked by political-based grievances. However, while all roads lead to Islam in these groups, the concerns of the British anti-Islam PRR are more complex and are not simply driven by their anti-Islam cultural racism. The next chapter discusses the main grievances identified in the interview-based RTA study. I conducted 15 interviews with the leaders and supporters of the three groups in this doctoral thesis to partly addresses the research questions 'what are their main grievances and why do people express support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK?' This chapter develops on the findings from studies 1 and 2.

Chapter 8

Exploring the nuances of arguments within the British anti-Islam PRR

The far-right is known to employ strategic narratives to appear more moderate (e.g., Farris, 2017). Although political-based grievances were the most dominant theme in the last chapter, the concept of strategic populism was developed to explain the strategic masking of Islamophobia with populist arguments. The application of this concept highlighted the importance of cultural-based grievances in the anti-Islam Populist Radical Right (PRR). This chapter focuses on other aspects of potential strategic masking by deconstructing four main grievances developed in this study relating to the use of certain liberal values by the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), The For Britain Movement (TFBM) and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA UK). The use of certain liberal values is one of the main characteristics of the anti-Islam PRR (Sibley, 2023b; Traverso, 2019; Jackson & Feldman, 2011). This liberal rights stance highlights the movement away from fascism (which opposes liberal values).

Using four main themes, this chapter addresses the second and third research questions: 'what are the main grievances of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK and why do people express support for these groups?' It focuses on the nuanced arguments of supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. I combine concepts associated with the anti-Islam PRR with a semi-structured interview-based method (Chapter 5) to build on the findings in the last two studies. As discussed in Chapter 5, to avoid contagion stigma associated with researching the far-right, researchers rarely use interview-based methods in far-right research (Pilkington, 2016). However, as Pilkington (2016) argues this reduces our understanding of far-right groups. Consequently, Berntzen (2019) and Art (2011) both advocate for the use of interview-based methods when researching the far-right. Therefore, after the first two studies, I used semi-structured interviews with supporters and leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK to explore the nuances of interviewees arguments. The method of interviewing was particularly useful as Anne Marie Waters and Tommy Robinson argued that they were

not often approached themselves for interviews. During our discussion, Anne Marie Waters (Interview 9), the leader of TFBM commented that:

There was a magazine in Dublin [...] they wrote an article about me entitled, who is Anne Marie Waters? And nobody spoke to me about it. Not a single word. How can you write an article entitled Who is Anne Marie Waters, without ever speaking to Anne Marie Waters? (Anne Marie Waters – Interview 9).

Similarly, Tommy Robinson (Interview 15), the ex-leader and creator of the English Defence League (EDL) and PEGIDA UK said:

No, journalists don't talk to me. They just write about me. Lizzie Dearden for example, I got a stalking ban from this journalist. She wrote over 200 news articles about me, she has never even met me. [...] Never asked a question to me. [...] Tells everyone who I am. Doesn't even know me (Tommy Robinson – Interview 15).

The interviews gave both me and the interviewees the opportunity to discuss complicated topics and issues not explored in the first and second studies. While there were common themes shared by all 15 interviewees, the arguments made by each individual were diverse. Researchers still do not fully understand why people support or vote for the far-right. This is especially true for individuals that deviate from the typical far-right supporter demographic (Urbanska & Guimond, 2018) such as sexually modern nativists (Lancaster, 2020) or ethnically diverse nativists discussed in Chapter 6. This chapter, therefore, explores these nuances by interviewing a wide range of supporters and leaders not only the typical supporter. Using semi-structured interviews, this chapter explores the concerns of each supporter and leader in detail prioritising the 'voices from below' (Ajil, 2022, p. 308). This chapter begins by discussing the main four themes identified and ends with a conclusion and outline of the final chapter.

8.1 The main grievances of 15 supporters/leaders of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

In total, I conducted 14 online interviews and one in-person interview. As discussed in Chapter 5, I then anonymised these interviews and gave each interviewee a pseudonym to protect their identity (with the exception of Tommy Robinson and Anne Marie Waters who have been named due to their public profile). Then, I developed four main themes using RTA. The main themes and sub-themes can be found in Table 19 and the characteristics of each theme/sub-theme can be found in Table 20. In total, I developed four main themes: (1) the threat posed by Islamic ideology, (2) the threat from COVID-19, (3) the threat to liberal values, (4) and the threat posed by immigration.

This chapter argues that most supporters and leaders strategically used liberal values and deracialise their arguments to appear more moderate, while others promoted some semi-liberal values as they previously transitioned from the left to the right side of the political spectrum. This is important as the typical far-right supporter is assumed to be a conservative nativist and illiberal. By highlighting the nuance in liberal arguments, this thesis may help identify supporters/leaders that hold some liberal values and can be brought back into mainstream politics. Further, it also argues that while Islam remains the main perceived threat, perceived oppressive measures implemented to reduce the spread of COVID-19 may become the main concern of the British anti-Islam PRR. This can further inform policy and tech companies to direct their funding on counter-messaging campaigns (for example, fact checking campaigns) to prevent more people becoming involved in the PRR due to their belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Finally, although immigration was perceived to be a threat to the United Kingdom (UK), Islam was still perceived to be a more serious threat because of its perceived incompatibility with 'Western' (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34) and British values. This chapter first discusses the main four findings in this study. It focuses on the difference between strategically liberal and semi-liberal arguments and discusses the nuances of each argument relating to Islam, COVID-19, liberal rights and immigration. It concludes with an overall discussion and an outline of the final discussion chapter.

Table 19

The main concerns of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK across 15 interviews

	Main theme	Sub-theme 1	Sub-theme 2	Sub-theme 3
Theme 1	Islamic ideology	<i>Islam is not a religion of peace</i>	<i>Islam is Anti-liberal values</i>	
Theme 2	COVID-19	<i>Anti-vaccines</i>	<i>COVID-19 is a conspiracy</i>	
Theme 3	Liberal values	<i>Women's rights</i>	<i>Animal rights</i>	<i>LGB rights</i>
Theme 4	Immigration	<i>Balance of immigration and mass migration</i>	<i>Type of immigration</i>	

Note. I created this table to outline the four main grievances developed in study 3 (author's own). In total I 'developed'¹³ 26 themes in this study as shown in Chapter 5 (Appendix 13). As with Chapter 7, although the prevalence of a theme is not an epistemologically and ontologically coherent justification for focusing on certain themes within RTA, for the purpose of this word-limited doctoral thesis, this chapter discusses the four most commonly referenced themes. Some of these four themes build on the arguments made in Chapters 6 and 7, for example, Islam (theme 1 of Chapter 7), while also introducing new topics, for example, themes 2, 3 and 4, focusing on COVID-19, liberal rights and immigration.

¹³ As discussed in Chapter 5, section 3.3, in reflective thematic analysis themes are 'developed' or 'constructed' rather than discovered (Braun & Clarke, 2019, p. 594)

Table 20

The main themes, their sub-themes, and characteristics across all 15 interviews

Theme	Sub-themes	Characteristics
1. Concerned about the perceived threat from Islamic ideology	1.1 Islam is not a religion of peace	Islam encourages violence, terrorism, and sexual abuse.
	1.2 Islam is anti-liberal values	Islam is regressive, oppressive, and patriarchal; anti-women's, LGB and animal rights.
2. Concerned that COVID-19 is used to enforce oppression	2.1 Anti-vaccines	People should not be forced to have COVID-vaccines.
	2.2 COVID-19 is a conspiracy	COVID-19 is a conspiracy theory, used as a weapon for elites to gain more control.
3. Certain liberal values need to be protected	3.1 Women's rights	Women need more rights in the UK.
	3.2 Animal rights	Animals need more rights in the UK.
	3.3 LGB rights	Members of the LGB community need more rights in the UK.
4. Concern about Immigration into the UK	4.1 Balance of immigration	There needs to be a balance between the UK population and the immigrant population.
	4.2 Type of immigration	Certain types of immigration are more positive than others.

Note. This table highlights the main themes and subthemes (author's own). Using RTA, I developed four aggregated grievances in 15 different semi-structured interviews. In total I collected 20 hours and 7 minutes of data as discussed in Chapter 5. The characteristics associated with each theme/sub-theme were present across all interviewees that discussed said topics. This table expands on the information provided in Table 19. It outlines each theme, sub-theme and what each theme/sub-theme represents.

8.2 Theme 1: The cultural threat posed by Islamic ideology

The most common theme in this study related to the perceived cultural threat posed by Islamist Ideology. This theme has two sub-themes: Islam is not a religion of peace and Islam is anti-liberal values.

8.2.1 Sub-theme 1: Islam is not a religion of peace

Previous research suggests that the British far-right are concerned about Islam (Shroufi, 2023; Allen, 2019b; Pilkington, 2016). Islamic ideology was also the main grievance for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK in this study. For many, as discussed in 7.2, Islam was perceived as a religion of violence that aimed to dominate the world. Two main concerns were highlighted in this theme: the first related to the 'growth of Islam' in the UK and the second related to the perceived intension of all Muslims to 'convert the world to Islam'. This study supports previous research (Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2005) where the anti-Islam far-right frames Islam as an oppressive, totalitarian ideology which threatens 'Western' liberal way of life (Akkerman, 2005, p. 34).

As identified in the last chapter (section 7.2.3), interviewees were concerned about the perceived growth of Islam in the UK. Jacob and Harry (Interview 7 and 12) argued that Christianity was declining while mosques and sharia courts were built for the growing Muslim population. Harry (Interview 12) perceived this as a threat arguing that British citizens will no longer have a home country and will no longer be welcome. Jacob (Interview 7) supported this argument, claiming that this increase would lead to a civil war: 'Well, it's going to be in the next 20 to 30 years isn't it when the majority of the numbers will start imposing it [sharia law] on us, on the indigenous people [...] then they'll be a civil war won't there' (Jacob – Interview 7).

Kühnel and Leibold (2007) and Leibold et al., (2006) argue that being anti-Islam does not necessarily link to anti-Muslim discourse. However, in this doctoral research most individuals claimed that Muslims wanted to covert the world to Islam linking anti-Islam and anti-Muslim rhetoric. This is highlighted in the quote from Bob (Interview 6) below:

The whole ideology of Islam is conquest and subjugation, so maybe not every Muslim's got that in the top of the mind, but I think it's pretty clear enough of them have for it to be a problem for the future [...] They [Muslim's] do not come

to Britain because they want to be British. They come to Britain because they want to turn it Islamic (Bob – Interview 6).

This furthers the argument in section 7.2.2 that the anti-Islam PRR focus on Islamic ideology rather than Muslims to circumvent stigma, avoiding de-platforming and convictions under hate speech laws (Howard, 2017). Some interviewees, therefore, strategically deracialised their arguments to appear more moderate. This tactic was also used by the British National Party (BNP) in the early to mid 2000s where they moved away from using language related to race and immigration and started using terms such as security, identity, freedom and democracy (Ford & Goodwin, 2010). In this doctoral study, Carol, Michael and Bob (Interview 2, 4, 6) conceptualised Islam as a political ideology. They associated Islam with the threat of conquest and conversion leading to the argument that Islam is fascistic and oppressive (Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2005). Many interviewees expressed a desire to fight this perceived oppression. Michael (Interview 4) maintained that not all Muslims were extremist. He argued that the Qur'an itself is extremist and the silent majority of Muslims allow the minority of Islamist extremists to become more powerful 'inbuilt extremism [...] spreads from the more illiberal elements [...] the extreme elements [and] I think it will affect and trickle down into those elements [of Islam] which would prefer not to have to address them' (Michael – Interview 4). Carol (Interview 2) argued that Muslims will use various means to achieve world domination which threatens the British way of life. Bob (Interview 6) argued that Muslims do not come to Britain in support of British values, they want to convert 'us' through conquest.

Further, Tommy Robinson (Interview 15) also highlighted his concern about so-called 'grooming gangs' discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 in this doctoral thesis. The perception that Muslim men are a threat to white British girls has been an ongoing theme in this research. Tommy Robinson made a new documentary series called *The Rape of Britain* (Urban Scoop, 2023) where he targets Muslim men and harasses those that have been accused of sexual abuse in the UK. While discussing this documentary series and the 'grooming gang' cases he said:

So, the Sikh's formed a national gang called SP in the 1980s, where every temple has to put up volunteers. If they [Muslim men] touch a Sikh girl, hundreds of men turn up. Wars have gone on in the last few years. Google the case in Coventry, 20 Sikh men went to jail. Only cause they [Muslim men] went, and fucking raped their [Sikh] kids, and they [Sikh] went and targeted the Muslims. And that's what's really needed. We were thinking about doing that in the EDL, like putting forward volunteers and going after the Muslims. But then you go to war, and you become a vigilante group who you're not meant to be. So, I thought, I'll just do the documentaries [Rape of Britain] and just embarrass them. Embarrass the gangs and embarrass the police. And hope that someone listens (Tommy Robinson - Interview 15).

This quote further connects to the ethnically diverse nativist supporter developed in Chapter 6. This is a good example of where some groups, for example, in the Sikh community, may have influenced the British far-right and potentially vice versa. Both the British far-right and some Sikh communities, for example, Sikh Youth UK, have been outspoken about their belief that Muslim men are targeting British and Sikh girls for grooming and in the case of Sikh girls, converting them to Islam (Cockbain & Tufail, 2020; Sikh Youth United Kingdom, 2018). In 2013, it was reported that a group of five Sikh men attacked Muslim men accusing them of grooming a teenage Sikh girl in Leicester (Mend, 2015). This is the vigilante justice that Tommy Robinson is referring to in the above quote (Interview 15).

Both sub-themes, 'growth of Islam' and 'convert the world to Islam', position Islam as a cultural threat to the British population. Interviewees (for example, Tommy Robinson – Interview 15) argued that as Islamic power grows in the UK, Muslims will have more access to higher political positions and are likely to create more sharia courts within the UK leading to Muslim conversion. This reduces non-Muslim, white British hegemonic power which is threatened by mass migration. Some interviewees oppose this demographic change and engage in a cultural backlash (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) against those identified as outsiders and a threat to British culture, values and society.

8.2.2 Sub-theme 2: Islam is anti-liberal values

Interviewees (for example, Anne Marie Waters - Interview 9) intimated that they were afraid of the 'growth of Islam' and 'conversion to Islam'. They feared Islam's perceived oppressive stance on women's rights, animal rights and gay rights which interviewees expressed as integral British values. Therefore, most individuals argued that Islam had a contrasting value system to the UK. This suggests that some of the interviewees use a form of strategic nationalism, the use of some liberal values with nationalism (e.g., Berntzen, 2019); femonationalism, homonationalism and animal nationalism (Gillespie & Narayanan, 2020; Puar, 2018; Farris, 2017; Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016; Howell, 2015).

As discussed in Chapter 4, according to Berntzen (2019), there are two pathways into anti-Islam PRR groups. The first pathway from the nativist outlook is a strategic calculation pathway wherein individuals were anti-Islam when they started to support the anti-Islam PRR but then strategically used some liberal views (Berntzen, 2019, p. 17). The strategic nationalistic argument is discussed in this section. This pathway links to the moderate nativist supporter (Lancaster, 2020). The second liberal, progressive pathway or emotional response pathway is through a response to fear-based attacks, such as Islamist terrorism. These moral shocks trigger an emotional response leading people to view Islam as a totalitarian, existential threat, exacerbating inequality in the UK (Berntzen, 2019, p. 17). These are semi-liberal arguments which are discussed in theme 3 of this chapter. Individuals related to this liberal pathway are more likely to be linked to Group Relative Deprivation (GRD) and semi-liberalism rather than a cultural backlash as they do not have an authoritarian background and express concern about inequality. Those that were nativist may correspond to the conservative nativists or moderate nativists in Chapter 6. Those that were liberal may correspond with the sexually modern nativist (Lancaster, 2020; Berntzen, 2019), while the ethnically diverse nativist supporter in Chapter 6 may be explained by both pathways. More research is needed to assess which pathway this supporter category corresponds to. The first pathway explains the use of femonationalism, homonationalism and animal nationalism. This pathway is discussed in the next section.

8.2.2.1 Women's rights in Islam

The strategic use of some women's rights (femonationalism) can be explained by the first strategic calculation pathway outlined by Berntzen (2019, p. 17). As in Chapter 7 (section 7.2), interviewees were concerned about women's rights within Islam. Most interviewees referenced the treatment of women within Islam as one of their main grievances. Some interviewees, for example, Alfie (Interview 3) and Tommy Robinson (Interview 15), were only concerned about women's rights when discussing anti-Islam arguments. This strategic use of women's rights represents femonationalism. Alfie (Interview 3) and Tommy Robinson (Interview 15) argued that under Islamic law women are not treated equally to men and therefore, Muslim women need to be liberated by the West. As Tommy Robinson argued:

People say, you are against immigration. Nope, I would open the British embassy tomorrow and get every woman out of Saudi Arabia. Every single one of them. And just leave loads of cave men scratching their heads going, what the fuck is going on, all the women have gone (Tommy Robinson - Interview 15).

In this study, interviewees used both the protector frame and the equality frame to justify their anti-Islam stance regarding women's rights (Berntzen, 2019). In the protector frame, interviewees, for example, Tommy Robinson (Interview 15), argued that Muslim men are a threat to non-Muslim women, like in the case of Saudi Arabia (a commonly referenced Muslim-majority country) in the quote above. Therefore, some interviewees use the protector frame to argue that Muslim men are a threat to women in general. Interviewees also used the equality frame where Muslim women are seen as vulnerable within patriarchal Islam, positioning Muslim men as a threat to British, liberal values leading to gender inequality through cultural exceptionalism. For example, Carol (Interview 2) argued 'in Islam...women are for giving birth aren't they [...] there's child marriage [...] there's female genital mutilation'. She (Interview 2) claimed that women are imprisoned by patriarchal Islam and Muslim men, therefore, pose a threat in both the protector frame and equality frame (Berntzen, 2019). As the anti-Islam PRR often position women's rights as a cornerstone of Western, progressive democracy, this inequality is seen as an assault on certain democratic liberal values (Akkerman, 2005).

Consequently, some interviewees strategically use women's rights. For example, Tommy Robinson (Interview 15) argues that he supports women's rights in the quote above.

However, Robinson has supported misogynist influencer Andrew Tate who is accused of rape and human trafficking crimes (Hope not Hate, 2023). Robinson claims that Tate is innocent, and this is a plan by the so-called 'the matrix' which represents the global governmental elite (Hope not Hate, 2023, p. 31). Robinson's support of misogynists highlights his femonationalist position. The use of femonationalism continues the strategy of the far-right to moderate their language/arguments to appeal to more supporters, an old BNP strategy (Goodwin, 2011). Klein and Muis (2019) suggest that far-right political parties are more likely than street movements to moderate their xenophobic arguments to attract more supporters. In this study, 14 of the 15 individuals interviewed were either a supporter or leader of TFBM. As TFBM is a political party, they are likely to moderate their language/arguments to appear more moderate. This is concerning as Tommy Robinson is currently making a documentary series about the so-called 'grooming cases' where he uses the stories of survivors of sexual abuse to target Muslim men accused of the sexual abuse (Hope not Hate, 2023, p. 33; Urban Scoop, 2023). This develops on the concept of strategic emotional support developed in sections 7.2.1 and 7.10. However, in theme 3 (discussed later in this chapter) interviewees were concerned about liberal rights in general, not only in relation to Islam and nationalism. For some interviewees, femonationalism does not explain their semi-liberal arguments. Another concept, therefore, is needed to understand these different arguments.

8.2.2.2 Animal rights in Islam

The second main concern presented within the anti-liberal rights theme related to animal rights. Some interviewees, such as Alfie (Interview 3) and Bob (Interview 6), argued that Islam is anti-animal rights. Alfie (Interview 3) claimed that although he ate meat, he opposed 'cruel' unstunned halal meat. However, he did not mention any other form of animal cruelty that was not connected to Islam, suggesting that Islam was his

main grievance rather than animal welfare. Bob (Interview 6) also focused his attention on halal meat as shown in the quote below:

Definitely against halal and I've actively campaigned against that myself. One little problem it brings for us is that you can't pick on halal, you've got to include Kosher as well, to be fair [...] We had Jewish Members who were quite upset by the idea that we were opposed to Kosher. So, we describe it as religious slaughter now rather than picking on halal or kosher which makes it slightly uncomfortable because, the amount of kosher slaughter in this country is minimal. It's virtually none at all, but halal is everywhere now and most supermarket meat is halal, and we can't tell because it's not labelled (Bob – Interview 6).

Michael (Interview 4) in contrast, voiced his concern about halal and kosher meat, as they are both ritualistically slaughtered, and also argued that abattoirs should be regularly checked to ensure animals are completely stunned before 'slaughter' (Michael – Interview 4). He claimed that taking away the pain of an animal during execution was his main concern. In their animal welfare arguments, Bob, Alfie and Michael (Interviews 3, 4, and 6) primarily focused on their criticism of halal, unstunned slaughter. Although Michael (Interview 5) did criticise kosher meat as well (due to the ritualistic slaughter), he did not discuss any other form of animal abuse or advocate for any other animal rights outside of nationalism representing a type of animal nationalism. Thus, Bob, Alfie and Michael's (Interviews 3, 4 and 6) arguments are rooted in nationalism and superiority.

Similarly, to femonationalism some interviewees used this pro-animal welfare position to oppose Islamic values and beliefs¹⁴ in an attempt to limit Islam's influence on British society. Alfie, Michael and Bob (Interviews 3, 4 and 6) argued that Muslims treat animals badly and are unconcerned about their welfare. This opposition to halal meat and other types of religious slaughter is not new within the PRR and ER. Arnold Leese, a notorious fascist wrote to the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to

¹⁴ Islamic values are presented by these groups as anti-women's rights, anti-Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual rights and animal rights.

Animals in an attempt to ban the practice of shechita slaughter or Jewish slaughter (Leese, 1945). After Leese, some far-right groups such as The National Front, moved towards anti-Muslim narratives to oppose halal slaughter (Lawrence, 2020). More recently, in the UK, the EDL, the BNP, Britain First and Patriotic Alternative have all also opposed halal slaughter (Backlund & Jungar, 2022; Lawrence, 2020). Concern for animal rights, specifically in reference to halal or kosher ritualised slaughter of animals has remained one of the constants of the fascistic far-right and anti-Islam PRR (Lawrence, 2020).

The anti-halal arguments made in these interviews (Interviews 3, 4 and 6) reflect animal nationalism. As discussed in Chapter 4, animal nationalism is the combination of animal rights with nationalism in an attempt to appear more liberal and superior compared to other countries or cultures (Miller, 2021; Gillespie & Narayanan, 2020; Howell, 2015). Some interviewees use their PRR ideology of nativism, authoritarianism and populism to drive their nationalistic animal welfare arguments (Backlund & Jungar, 2022). Therefore, by specifically focusing only on halal unstunned ritualised slaughter certain individuals are able to position British law, which enforces stunned slaughter, as superior and more civilised to Islamic law. This links to the markers of civilisation argument in section 7.2.1 where women's rights and the treatment of women in society was used as a marker of civilisation (Spivak & Riach, 2020; Towns, 2014). However, as with the femonationalist argument, animal nationalism does not explain every argument within these three groups. Theme 3 discusses these contrasting arguments.

8.2.2.3 Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual rights in Islam

Previous research suggests that gay rights are a concern for the anti-Islam PRR (Pilkington, 2016). Interviewees also voiced their concern relating to the perceived erosion of LGB rights in this chapter. To explore the PRR's use of certain LGB rights, Foster and Kirke (2023) developed four main themes within the PRR relating to alter-progressivism (strategic liberalism in this thesis). These are cisnormativity, a clear perceived incompatibility between illiberal Islam and the liberal West, a perceived threat posed by Islam towards members of the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer and plus (LGBTQ+) community and that the PRR were the sole protectors of LGBTQ+ community against this threat. The arguments in this doctoral study support

the findings by Foster and Kirke (2023). In her interview, when discussing gay rights, Anne Marie Waters (Interview 9) argued:

I'm gay, I'm worried about gay rights [...] The Guardian carried out a survey¹⁵ going back about 10 or 15 years now, of British Muslims, and asking them whether or not they found homosexuality acceptable and 100% said no, 100%. And then more recently [another Guardian poll¹⁶ asked] should homosexuality be criminalised? 52% of British Muslims said yes [...] they weren't asked about the death penalty. Did you know that in many Muslim societies, homosexuality carries the death penalty, and they weren't asked that question and I would like to know what the answer to that question would have been (Anne Marie Waters – Interview 9).

This both supports and critiques CBT. Interviewees wanted to ban or reduce Muslim immigration because of the perceived cultural threat it posed. Thus, positioning these groups as authoritarian (Berntzen, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Nevertheless, the reasons given for opposing Muslim immigration was the perceived erosion of British liberal values which most PRR interviewees position as integral to British democracy (Akkerman, 2015; 2005; Halikiopoulou et al., 2013). This supports research by Berntzen (2019) who argues that PRR supporters who use strategically liberal arguments respond with authoritarian solutions. Their aim is to reduce Muslim immigration, to limit the perceived Muslim illiberal influence on British liberal values. In this homonationalist argument, Islam poses a threat to LGB equality protected by liberalism. This is not explained by CBT which posits that supporters of the anti-Islam PRR are likely to fight against progressive liberalism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

The strategic use of homonationalist arguments attracts gay and lesbian supporters of nationalist parties/groups. This is shown in the sexually modern nativist

¹⁵ The Guardian article Anne Marie Water's referred to was conducted in 2009 and states that out of 500 British Muslims surveyed, none thought homosexual acts were morally acceptable (Butt, 2009).

¹⁶ The Guardian article Anne Marie Water's referred to was conducted in 2015 and states that 52% of British Muslims agreed that homosexuality should be illegal while 18% said they agreed it should be legal (Perraudin, 2016).

supporter type (discussed in Chapter 6) as it allows LGB rights to be positioned as a cornerstone of Western, liberal democracies while claiming Islam threatens these liberal values (Lancaster, 2020). When discussing LGB rights, Gerre, Bob and Matthew (Interviews 5, 6 and 10) referenced how 'If that was Islam, they would throw him off a building, they would hang him, they would beat him' (Gerre – Interview 5), Muslims 'throw gays off roofs' (Bob – Interview 6) and 'hang you [gay people]' (Matthew – Interview 10). These quotes highlight the perceived illiberal and violent nature of Islam against gay people.

Some individuals, such as Matthew (Interview 10), stated that being gay was wrong according to the bible. However, he also claimed that 'homosexuality might make Christians a little bit [...] uncomfortable in their seat, but we are not going to hang you, for goodness' sake' (Matthew – Interview 10). This is an example of strategic liberalism through the use of homonationalism, where Matthew uses certain pro-gay arguments to present a positive, progressive image of Britain and Christianity compared to the backwards, negative image of Islam which is anti-gay rights, anti-progressiveness and anti-freedom of choice (Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2005). This argument supports the dichotomy of the 'gay-friendly West and homophobic Middle East' (Yasui, 2022, p. 9) and further connects to the markers of civilisation argument discussed in Chapter 7 (Spivak & Riach, 2020; Towns, 2014). The use of strategic liberalism or homonationalism implies that civilised nations support and protect LGB (but not T) rights (Foster & Kirke, 2023). The UK, therefore, is positioned as superior to Muslim-majority countries where LGB rights are argued to be abused. This reflects Tommy Robinson's (Interview 15) homonationalistic argument as shown in the quote below. Tommy Robinson claims to support gay rights despite other evidence suggesting that he holds some homophobic views in the documentary entitled 'I made Tommy Robinson go viral, will you forgive me?' | Caolan Robertson documentary, 2021:

I support gay people's rights. If someone was to come in and start on a homosexual, I'd beat them up. I have done growing up because I do not care. You want to do what you want to do; you go and do it. But then, when you start talking about Islam because of these views, you're a fucking extremist, you're far-right (Tommy Robinson - Interview 15).

This supports Foster and Kirke's (2023) findings. As discussed in previous chapters, the use of strategic liberalism (femonationalism, homonationalism and animal nationalism), allows anti-Islam PRR groups to distance themselves from the fascistic far-right by liberalising some of their arguments while appealing to a broader supporter base (Foster & Kirke, 2023; Gillespie & Narayanan, 2020; Farris, 2017; Pilkington, 2016). The anti-Islam, pro-liberal rights arguments (in section 8.2.2) are examples of strategic liberalism and represent the first calculation pathway according to Berntzen (2019). However, Gerre, Anne Marie Waters and Maria (Interviews 5, 9 and 13) were concerned about women's rights, animal rights and gay rights which were unconnected to their grievances relating to Islam. This is focused on in theme 3 of this chapter. Although the arguments presented in the interviews primarily focused on Islam and Muslims there has been a shift in the focus of the British anti-Islam PRR (for example, Tommy Robinson - Interview 15). Due to the global pandemic and the British government's response to this crisis, conspiracy theories surround COVID-19. Unsurprisingly then, interviewees discussed issues relating to COVID-19. This is the focus of the next section.

8.3 Theme 2: The COVID-19 pandemic

I conducted the interviews in this chapter during the global COVID-19 pandemic (between October 2021 to April 2022). Thus, it is not surprising that interviewees referenced concerns relating to COVID-19 as the second most common theme in this doctoral study. According to Wondreys and Mudde (2022), COVID-19 became a main focus of the European far-right in 2022. Interviewees, therefore, primarily referenced two sub-themes relating to COVID-19: 'Anti-vaccines' and 'COVID-19 is a conspiracy'.

8.3.1 Sub-theme 1: The COVID-19 vaccines

Although some participants were vaccinated¹⁷, the majority of interviewees were suspicious of the COVID-19 vaccines. Frank, Bob, Carl and Harry (Interviews 1, 6, 8 and 12) argued that the vaccines were used by the government, pharmaceutical companies

¹⁷ I asked each interviewee questions about the Covid-19 pandemic and their position on the COVID-19 vaccines.

or the global elite to control the masses. As a result, some interviewees (for example, Harry - Interview 12) chose not to get vaccinated, while others expressed regret for having consented to being vaccinated (for example, Michael - Interview 4). The primary reasons for their scepticism were either a belief in a global conspiracy using the vaccines to manipulate the masses or personal doubts about the vaccines' efficacy. During the interviews, both Frank and Carl (Interviews 1 and 8) asserted that COVID-19 was a conspiracy aimed at transforming individuals into transhumans, as detailed in section 7.5.2. Frank (Interview 1) stated, 'people who have had two jabs are effectively transhuman [...] that part of the vaccine has altered your genetic code so you're affectedly transhuman'. While not all interviewees explicitly mentioned conspiracy theories, others invoked arguments from various COVID-19-related conspiracies indicating a prevalent belief in such notions.

Frank and Carl (Interview 1 and 8) asserted that COVID-19 vaccines were part of a global conspiracy aimed at transforming individuals into transhumans. On the other hand, Michael, Bob and Harry (Interviews 4, 6 and 12) harboured doubts regarding the reactions and intentions of the government. Michael (Interview 4) expressed concern that governments world-wide used COVID-19 as a tool of oppression by imposing lockdowns, mandating vaccinations and promoting cashless payments to erode citizens' freedoms and privacy. He also questioned the accuracy of the reported death count arguing that some deaths attributed to COVID-19 were misclassified.

Bob (Interview 6) was concerned about the influence, intention and accountability of pharmaceutical companies and the government. The Big Pharma conspiracy theory argues that a small group of people are secretly working to oppose the public interest by withholding medication and cures while prescribing medication that causes adverse side effects and death. In the wider COVID-19 conspiracy, some far-right groups argue that Big Pharma was behind the spread of the virus itself and that people like Bill Gates were acting on behalf of Big Pharma (Ali, 2022; Jamieson, 2021). This further connects to the argument made in section 7.5.2 where transnational organisations are not accountable to the public. Big Pharma, therefore, is seen as a threat to sovereign nation states that are being controlled by totalitarianism, undermining individual rights (Douglas, 2021; Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

The response to COVID-19 was seen as a threat to individual freedoms and the sovereignty of nation states. Harry (Interview 12) in particular was concerned about 'body autonomy' and consent as he had a motor disability he did not know how he would react to the vaccine, especially considering it has not been tested over a '7–15-year' period to ensure its compatibility with his disability (Harry – Interview 12). 'You know when you're a in the medical field, everything is done by consent, you don't do medical procedures without consent and I'm going to do as me grandma used to say, I am going to die fighting' (Harry - Interview 12). He was also concerned about the intentions of the British government and the pharmaceutical companies as well as the 'medical apartheid' he argued developed where the unvaccinated were discriminated against.

Frank, Bob, Carl and Harry (Interviews 1, 6, 8 and 12) opposed the perceived authoritarian measures that were implemented by the government in response to COVID-19. This opposes CBT which argues that those on the PRR support authoritarian measures (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Harry argued that there was a medical apartheid. He expressed a sense of GRD where unvaccinated people were discriminated against in the British two-tiered legal system (Kunst & Obaidi, 2020). However, Alfie (Interview 3) expressed disappointment in those that refused to have the COVID-19 vaccine. He had volunteered for the National Health Service during the pandemic to vaccinate people and was, therefore, pro-vaccine. Alfie epitomises CBT. He identified as a 'white, male, heterosexual, Christian, carnivore' (Alfie - Interview 3). As well as harbouring resentment and intolerance about certain out-groups, Muslims, and Asian immigrants in general, Alfie also expressed a degree of resentment with respect to those that did not socially conform during the pandemic. These interview responses highlight the variety of positions within the British anti-Islam PRR, suggesting these groups and supporters are not homogenous and different theories explain different arguments.

8.3.2 Sub-theme 2: The conspiracy of COVID-19

As well as vaccination-related conspiracies most interviewees were suspicious about the virus, the response of the government, the intention of the government and other

related elites, as shown in the quote below. Although some conspiracy theories were mentioned (for example, The Great Reset) most interviewees did not overtly talk about a conspiracy theory and were keen to highlight they were not conspiracy theorists (for example, Bob - Interview 6). But most interviewees did discuss their lack of trust in the government during the COVID-19 pandemic arguing that they may have had ulterior motives for implementing lockdowns, as shown in the quote below:

Again, the truth isn't being allowed to be debated. And I don't trust it, for that reason. I'm not saying there's no virus. Of course, there's a virus. Where it came from doesn't particularly bother me either [...] But the government's reactions to it, I don't trust. You know, when a government says, we're so concerned about your health, we have to lock you down and destroy your business [...] and not let you go to your dying parent [...] This is not concern about our health (Anne Marie Waters – Interview 9).

Berntzen (2019) argues that anti-Islam groups and parties can range from believing that elites are misguided to believing that the elites are involved in a conspiracy and are traitors of the people. These were the two main themes developed in this COVID-related conspiracy theme. Frank, Michael, Bob, Jacob, Carl, Matthew, Harry and Tommy Robinson (Interviews 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 15) intimated that all the governments around the world were being controlled by 'elites' (Tommy Robinson – Interview 15). Some individuals argued that Bill Gates, Big pharmaceutical companies, the EU, the World Health Organisation, WEF and the UN were behind the global conspiracy (Frank, Michael, Bob, Jacob, Carl, Matthew, Harry and Tommy Robinson). The conspiracies referenced related to The Great Reset which incorporates transhumanism with The Great Replacement (TGR) (discussed in Chapter 7). Harry (Interview 12) claimed the pandemic was a 'plandemic', a co-ordinated attack against the white population, the global population as a whole and middle and working-class people, in which the elites attempted to depopulate and eradicate the middle and working classes. 'Plandemic' refers to a planned pandemic (Ahmed et al., 2020). This represents a 'superconspiracy' where different conspiracies are aggregated together to create one overarching conspiracy theory (Barkun, 2013, p. 52).

According to Willaert et al., (2022), The Great Reset conspiracy theory argues that the coronavirus pandemic was a hoax in order to install a New World Order government. The purpose of this government was to ‘destroy capitalism, turning humans into communist worker drones’ (Willaert et al., 2022, p. 1) linking with theme 7 in Chapter 7, which discusses the far-right’s opposition to communism. The Great Reset conspiracy is heavily connected to antisemitic narratives that Jews control the world (Willaert et al., 2022) linking to the more extreme end of the far-right spectrum. Several interviewees referenced The Great Reset conspiracy theory. The presence of this COVID-19 theme, therefore, may highlight a shift in focus for some British PRR groups from Islam-related grievances to perceived government oppression-related grievances. In his interview, Tommy Robinson (Interview 15) argued:

So now as I’ve progressed, I believe that all these things [...] everything that happened with Islam [TGR], everything that happened to me [perceived persecution], all the censorship, then COVID, it’s all part of the same thing under different names, different banners. The same objective, the objective is to divide [...] this is The Great Reset [...] they’ll destroy everything so much [...] that people will be crying out for a basic credit system [...] for more law and order [...] for more freedoms to be taken away, more cameras, more facial recognition (Tommy Robinson – Interview 15).

This quote highlights the ever-evolving nature of the anti-Islam PRR and illustrates how they use crises to their advantage. Although many interviewees did reference conspiracy theories when discussing COVID-19, most individuals argued that the virus was real and unplanned. They argued that the elites used the pandemic to their advantage to erode freedoms, for example, through the 2022 – Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act (United Kingdom Parliament, 2022).

The arguments presented in section 8.3 in this chapter both support and contradict CBT. Some interviewees (for example, Tommy Robinson – Interview 15) were concerned that the white middle and working class were being erased in The Great Reset conspiracy. This supports CBT as individuals argued that their racial and socio-economic identity is being threatened by elites. Individuals engaged in a backlash to fight for the

survival of the British, white, middle and working class. However, it also opposes CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). As in the anti-vaccine sub-theme, individuals claimed that the restrictions implemented to prevent COVID-19 from spreading were oppressive. Individuals engaged in a cultural backlash to ensure the survival of their racial and socio-economic identity. They, therefore, oppose the perceived threat from the hegemonic, liberal globalists and perceived oppression (further addressed in section 7.5.2) (Drolet & Williams, 2022).

8.4 Theme 3: The erosion of liberal rights in the UK

One of the foundation blocks of the anti-Islam PRR and one of the differences to the fascistic Extreme Right (ER) is the championing of liberal values as a cornerstone of liberal democracy (e.g., Berntzen, 2019). As discussed in section 8.2.2, there are two pathways into the anti-Islam PRR: the authoritarian pathway (strategically liberal) and emotional response pathway (semi-liberal). Section 8.2.2 focused on pathway one corresponding to strategic liberalism as highlighted in the following quote by Tommy Robinson (Interview 15). When discussing his opposition to Islam, he argued that Islam is anti-liberal rights and Britain was pro-liberal rights: 'I'd say, my opposition to Islam comes from my liberal views. I am a liberal' (Tommy Robinson – Interview 15).

In contrast, this section focuses on pathway two corresponding to semi-liberalism. As discussed above, although some interviewees strategically used liberal arguments (for example, Michael, Bob and Tommy Robinson - Interviews 4, 6, and 15) many other interviewees held liberal arguments that were not nationalistic. These arguments are not explained using CBT, femonationalism, animal nationalism and homonationalism. Spierings and Zaslove (2015a) argue that there are two opposing gendered ideologies in the PRR – the traditional patriarchy and the progressive gender equality positions. According to Pearson (2020), some supporters/leaders of the PRR do take women's rights issues seriously. In this third study, Anne Marie Waters (Interview 9) argued that her left-wing colleagues were ignorant of the growing threat of Islam and thus, she and her supporters were attracted to new fringe parties and social movements advocating anti-Islam arguments. This reflects previous research which argued that the BNP was attracting disgruntled former Labour supporters in the early to mid 2000s (e.g.,

Goodwin, 2011). It is understandable, therefore, that many of the individuals within the anti-Islam PRR have some liberal values that are distinct from the fascistic right, specifically women's rights, animal rights and LGB rights (Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2005).

8.4.1 Sub-theme 1: Women's rights in the UK

As discussed in section 8.2.2 of this chapter, many interviewees expressed concern about women's rights within Islam. This highlights a significant difference between the PRR, where women can be leaders and the ER, where women hold supporting roles. For example, there are several PRR parties that have or had female leaders: Frauke Petry (AfD), Marine Le Pen (National Rally), Giorgia Meloni (Brothers of Italy), Pauline Hanson (One Nation), Pia Kjaersgaard (Danish People's Party) and Alice Weidel (Alternative for Germany) (Mudde, 2019). In their interviews, Anne Marie Waters, Gerre, Amanda and Maria (Interviews 5, 9, 11 and 13) all discussed women's rights arguments that were not connected to Islam or nationalism (femonationalism). Amanda (Interview 11) spoke about her support of 'the first women [...] to serve in the role as lieutenant governor in the state of Virginia', while Gerre (Interview 5) argued that he was 'still a liberal, I still believe in women's equality', Maria (Interview 13) spoke about a village where the women 'got so fed up with how the men were treating them, that they set up their own village [...] there's like an all women village and they built all the structures themselves, they do all the farming themselves [...] they just keep the men away because they were so badly treated'. Further, in this third study, Anne Marie Waters (Interview 9) discussed sexism issues she experienced as a female leader within her political arena:

You've got to contain yourself, cause if you get angry, they'll be like, oh hysterical woman [...] it's relentless. If you speak out about sexism, she's pulling the sexism card. If you don't, you just have to sit there and take it. Which I do a lot of the time. If you do say something, you have to make sure you say it in a certain way so that they don't dismiss you as a hysterical woman, probably has her period. Believe me, women still face this and in politics, it is everywhere. (Anne Marie Water – Interview 9).

Water's position on women's rights is not only explained through femonationalism as she was concerned about a range of feminist issues that are unrelated to Islam or nationalism. This is likely due to her shift from a left-wing Labour supporter to a right-wing TFBM leader as shown in Table 21. Waters, Gerre and Maria (Interviews 5, 9 and 13) had all previously voted for left-wing parties, it is unknown if Amanda had previously supported the left. Some of Water's, Gerre's and Maria's liberal values remain and they can be defined as both semi-liberal but also semi-authoritarian (Berntzen, 2019) representing the sexually modern nativist (Lancaster, 2020). In his research, Berntzen (2019) found that out of 30 main leaders of the anti-Islam movement an equal number were from left-wing backgrounds and right-wing backgrounds. Only a minority had a history in the PRR or ER. It is, therefore, likely that not only does femonationalism not explain the arguments of Anne Marie, Gerre and Maria but the label of femonationalism may be used to dismiss some legitimate women's rights arguments made by the PRR.

Table 21

The political allegiance pathway of interviewees from the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

	Previous	Women's rights	Animal rights	LGB rights
Anne Marie Waters	Left-wing	Semi-liberal	Semi-liberal	Semi-liberal
Gerre	Left-wing	Semi-liberal	Semi-liberal	Semi-liberal
Maria	Both Left and Right-wing	Semi-liberal	Semi-liberal	Strategically liberal
Tommy Robinson	Right-wing	Strategically liberal	Unknown	Strategically liberal
Alfie	Right-wing	Strategically liberal	Strategically liberal	Unknown
Bob	Right-wing	Strategically liberal	Strategically liberal	Strategically liberal
Matthew	Right-wing	Semi-liberal	Unknown	Strategically liberal and illiberal

Note. I created this table to highlight the political leaning of seven interviewees (author's own). According to Berntzen (2019), those that are from a Right-wing background are

likely to hold authoritarian views and use liberalism strategically and those that are from a left-wing background are more likely to be semi-liberal.

Within this semi-liberal argument, Anne Marie Waters (Interview 15) also expressed her concern about Trans rights being prioritised over women's rights:

Now you have this absolute madness of self-identification [...] But it is being exploited, [by] predatory men [...] predators pretending to be transsexuals. Being placed into women's prisons, even when they rape and abuse women in women's prison. By the way, most women in prison have been abused, which is why they're in prison in the first place and they have to put up with being raped and abused inside prisons by predatory convicted rapists. And if you say a word, you're a transphobe and a fascist [...] so, the concept of being a woman is a biological reality. Women are trampled on all over the world. They can't identify out of it, if a 14-year-old girl being forced into marriage, she can't self-identify as a man and get out of it. Women are punished [...] oppressed [...] all over the world because they are female. They can't identify out of it (Anne Marie Waters – Interview 9).

Her argument again positions women as the potential victims of predatory men who identify as Trans women and take advantage of women in safe spaces. This view was only held by Anne Marie Waters. While other interviewees did discuss Trans rights, for example, Gerre (Interview 5), their arguments were unrelated to women's rights. These arguments are, therefore, discussed in section 8.4.3 below. From Water's perspective, women need to be protected because they are vulnerable to abuse. They are deprived of safety and security compared to their male counterparts (Fitzgerald, 2021; Shastri, 2014). Waters identifies with this GRD, and she speaks out against this perceived abuse. Because of these semi-liberal arguments, Waters can be categorised as a sexually modern nativist. She is an educated, lesbian, female who is clearly distinct from the conservative nativist supporter (Chapter 6). Examples of sexually modern nativists, such as Waters, call into question CBT outlined by Inglehart and Norris (2019) (Lancaster, 2020). However, unlike Lancaster's (2020) sexually modern nativist which supported Transgender rights, Waters did not support Transgender rights, further complicating this supporter category.

8.4.2 Sub-theme 2: Animal rights in the UK

One theme that is often ignored within PRR literature is the PRR's relationship with animal rights. Exceptions include research by Backlund and Jungar (2022), Miller (2021) and Davis (2013). However, as outlined by Backlund and Junger (2022) research that does assess the relationship between the far-right and animal rights often does not focus on the PRR, instead focusing on fascistic groups. This section, therefore, focuses on the relationship between the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK and animal rights to add to this under researched body of literature. Previously, fascistic groups have focused on protecting the environment as a way to preserve their homeland, as discussed above in section 8.2.2. However, the arguments in these interviews were different to purely fascistic or nationalistic arguments. This can be seen in the quote below:

I find it difficult to put into words, how much compassion and empathy I feel for animals [...] this is their planet, every bit as much as ours. And for us to treat them with cruelty and complete lack of respect says something very dark about us [...] I consider humanity's treatment of animals to be the presence of evil. And I think we will never ever be evil free, but every step we take towards compassion for animals, is a step in the right direction (Anne Marie Waters – Interview 9).

While Alfie, Michael and Bob (Interviews 3, 4 and 6) focused on halal discussed in section 8.2.2, Frank, Gerre, Jacob, Carl, Anne Marie Waters and Maria (Interviews 1, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 13) were concerned about a range of issues related to animal rights. This suggests that this pro-animal rights stance does not always represent the combination of animal rights and nationalism to oppose Islam and may be semi-liberal.

In Chapters 7 and 8 the concern about Islam was the main theme in both studies. It is likely, therefore, that most individuals that mentioned the cruelty of halal (section 8.2.2 in this chapter) took this position because of their anti-Islam views and use of animal nationalism (Miller, 2021; Howell, 2015). However, of 15 interviewees, Jacob and Maria (Interviews 7 and 13) identified as vegan and Frank, Gerre and Carl (Interviews 1, 5 and 8) were vegetarian. Unlike Alfie and Bob (Interviews 3 and 6) who used animal

nationalism, these individuals used semi-liberal arguments when discussing animal rights. Jacob (Interview 7) spoke about how society has been 'indoctrinated' to 'eat dead bodies and to drink the milk of other species', Gerre (Interview 5) spoke about the 'plight' of animals in 'factory farms'. Frank (Interview 1) 'watched slaughterhouse videos' and couldn't even 'walk down the meat aisle'. Waters (Interview 9), although not vegetarian or vegan, also argued that she was passionate about animal rights. She mentioned that she volunteered in an animal shelter in India and argued that animal abuse is 'one of the evils of this world' (Anne Marie Waters - Interview 9). Finally, when asked why she had become vegan, Maria (Interview 13) spoke about the 'horrific' nature of the 'dairy industry' highlighted in the quote below:

I didn't realise how horrific the dairy industry was [...] so I guess it was just from finding out about things that I didn't know that went on in the animal industry, in the farming industry and things like that. And one thing as well, I already turned vegan at this point, but we lived in a very rural area a few years ago. There's a field over there and it had cows in it and then one day we just heard that cows making the most horrific, groaning noise and it wouldn't stop and they went on for days and I spoke to the neighbour, and he said it was the day they took their calves away. It was haunting (Maria - Interview 13).

These quotes suggest that some of the arguments seen in the interviews in this doctoral thesis are not explained by animal nationalism. Instead, the arguments were focused on the abuse of animals generally. Therefore, the term semi-liberalism better explains these arguments. This semi-liberal position supports previous research which found that animal welfare arguments are not only used by the PRR 'as a pretext to denigrate immigrants, but also reflects a broader commitment to animal welfare' (Backlund & Jungar, 2022, p. 14). This is likely to be due to the liberal background of some of the leaders and supporters who have adopted authoritarian values as solutions but still hold some of their liberal values (Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2005). For example, Jacob, Frank, Gerre, Carl, Waters and Maria (Interviews 1, 5, 7, 8, 9 and 13) all presented pro-animal rights arguments that were unrelated to nationalism and superiority. As Table 21 illustrates, Gerre, Waters and Maria (Interviews 5, 9 and 13) have previously supported left-wing parties, suggesting that there may be a relationship between the use of

liberalism and previous political allegiance. Therefore, semi-liberalism may explain these pro-animal rights arguments.

8.4.3 Sub-theme 3: LGB rights in the UK

The PRR often use LGB rights to oppose Islam as Islam is positioned as anti-LGB rights. This theme was discussed in Chapter 7. Foster and Kirke (2023) argue that researchers and academics need to take this support of LGB rights more seriously as it could change the sexuality demographics of the PRR. This potential change in demographics is reflected in the presence of sexually modern nativists and ethnically diverse nativists in this thesis (discussed in Chapter 6). However, Foster and Kirke (2023) also argue that while some PRR groups do support LGB rights it is unclear if this support is strategically used to oppose Islam, or if it is authentic support. This section provides further insight by analysing the nuanced arguments made by the anti-Islam PRR concerning LGB rights. There were a range of LGB arguments presented in this study. Some were anti-LGB rights (for example, Alfie and Matthew – Interviews 3 and 10), some were strategically pro-LGB rights (for example, Bob and Tommy Robinson - Interview 6 and 15) as shown in section 8.2.2, some were semi-liberal (for example, Gerre, Anne Marie Waters & Maria – Interviews 5, 9 and 13) and all were anti-Trans rights.

Pro-Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual rights

As discussed in section 8.2.2, some interviewees used homonationalism to appear more moderate and appeal to a wider population. However, Water's and Gerre's (Interviews 5 and 9) pro-gay rights arguments are not explained by homonationalism. Both identified as either gay/lesbian and presented pro-gay rights arguments that were unrelated to Islam or nationalism. For example, Gerre was an active pro-gay rights activist: 'I was always involved in [gay rights movements] as a gay man, I was [...] thrust into the left because the left were campaigning for civil rights, where the Conservatives were, you know, hiding and using rent boys and getting married and lying basically' (Gerre - interview 5).

Gerre's stance as a gay man is uncommon but not unique. In this study, two more people interviewed self-identified as gay or lesbian, including Waters. More gay and lesbian people are becoming leaders or are publicly identifying as gay within the PRR, including Pim Fortuyn and Michael Kühnen (Germany's National Front of National Socialists) and Alice Weidel (Alternative for Germany). This leadership pattern is also becoming more common within the PRR (Mudde, 2019). Spierings et al., (2017) found that people that were anti-immigration but members of the LGB community were more likely to support the PRR than individuals that were only anti-immigration. New tactics are also being used by the PRR to attract new LGB supporters. Some British PRR groups deploy alter-progressive arguments to attract a cisgender LGB supporter but also oppose Trans rights, as discussed above in section 8.2.2.3. The alter-progressive supporter is not progressive in relation to mainstream liberalism, but they are also not anti-progressive as seen in neo-Nazism, they are between these two spectrums (Foster & Kirke, 2023). Therefore, LGB supporters of the PRR may hold some liberal values but not others, for example, Trans rights. Trans rights might be deemed too liberal and not part of the heteronormative mainstream in which gay men specifically strive for acceptance. This links to Klein's model (1993) of sticky identities or fortress identity discussed in the Anti-Trans rights section below.

These semi-liberal arguments suggest that although homonationalism may explain some anti-Islam positions, semi-liberalism may explain the other pro-LGB arguments. Semi-liberalism may also explain the anti-Trans arguments discussed below. This is especially true for supporters such as Gerre and Waters (Interviews 5 and 9) who are from a left-wing, liberal background and moved over to the right later in their life (Table 21). Therefore, for some, semi-liberalism is more likely to explain support for pro-LGB rights within the anti-Islam PRR (Berntzen, 2019). This opposes the Green-Alternative-Libertarian (GAL) and Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist (TAN) dichotomy outlined in Chapter 2, where it is assumed pro-LGB(T) individuals are GAL rather than TAN (Spiering et al., 2017).

Anti-Trans rights

Despite the strategic use of homonationalism and the semi-liberal position of some interviewees this liberalism did not extend to Trans rights. Not a single interviewee expressed a pro-Trans rights argument. Alfie (Interview 3) argued that the concept of transgenderism was a 'fashion' which will not last. Michael (Interview 4) argued that 'there are only two genders' and children should not be taught that there are more than two genders in schools. Gerre (Interview 5), a prominent gay-rights activist, argued that the term transgender was an 'oxymoron' and those that self-identified as transgender have a 'mental illness' as shown in the quote below:

I won't use the word transgender cause it, it's an oxymoron. You cannot transition gender. You cannot transition species. You cannot transition your race [...] the left that I used to be on is telling you that this biological male can have a surgeon cut a hole, invert the penis and that hole is equivalent to a vagina that creates life (Gerre - interview 5).

These arguments are part of a wider right-wing narrative criticising a perceived 'gender ideology' (Kováts, 2018, p. 1) and represent Trans-Exclusionary Radical Feminist (TERFs) arguments. TERFs are critical of the concept of gender and argue for gender essentialism (Williams, 2020). For TERFs biology determines gender and therefore, Trans women are categorised as men (Serano, 2016). TERFs usually use women's rights and safety as a reason to oppose Trans rights but other arguments are also made to exclude Trans women (Lu & Jurgens, 2022). This essentialist view of biology positions Trans people as a threat to the binary divide rooted in colonial thought (Pearce et al., 2020) supporting CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). According to Patel (2023), trans-exclusionary arguments use racialised, colonialist narratives that imply that white cis women need protecting from racialised (especially black women) and non-binary people who are perceived to be dangerously masculine and, therefore, a threat. This continues the colonial narrative that racialised women are less feminine and more masculine than white women (e.g., Pearce et al., 2020, p. 4; McClintock, 2013). Anyone that deviates from this white, heterosexual cis woman then is deemed 'gender suspect', especially if they are racially minoritized and Trans, Intersex or non-binary (Pearce et al., 2020, p. 4; Gill-Peterson,

2018). However, Trans-exclusionary activists prefer the term 'gender critical'. This focuses more on the biological essentialism of their arguments and not only on the perceived infringement on women's rights by implementing Trans rights. Gender critical activists also criticise LGBTIQ+ inclusive school education (Pearce et al., 2020), an argument highlighted by Michael in this study (Interview 4).

As discussed, individuals that have authoritarian and populist traits can also have liberal traits which is shown in their support for LGB rights (Schäfer, 2022). However, they are less likely to be supportive of more controversial liberal values such as Trans rights. It is likely that these interviewees oppose Trans rights even though the individuals are semi-liberal and gay. For example, in the case of Waters and Gerre (Interviews 5 and 9), they may oppose Trans rights as they see Trans people as a threat to their cis, gay/lesbian identity. This represents alter-progressivism where some liberal values are used to exclude others (Foster & Kirke, 2023). According to Klein's model (1993), some gay men are concerned about their physical and social inadequacy compared to straight men and seek acceptance in heterosexual society. In order to gain this social acceptance, some gay men may be attracted to overtly heteronormative environments and behaviour. According to Cooper's (2013) model, gay men may demonstrate sticky identities or fortress identity, where the former aims for inclusion in the mainstream and the latter aims for exclusivity which creates a psychological shield against humiliation, social abuse and rejection within the mainstream. By combining these two strategies, fear and insecurity can be projected onto other minorities that are less socially accepted, such as Muslims or Trans people.

Other groups, such as Gays Against Sharia aim to defend marginalised sexualities but focuses almost exclusively on the threat of Islam on sexual freedom but this protection does not extend to Trans people. This group, where Waters is a key member, highlights a progressive shift where sexual identity is a justification for supporting the PRR but also a justification for excluding Trans people (Foster & Kirke, 2023). The findings that every interviewee was anti-Trans further complicates the sexually modern nativist supporter category. Lancaster (2020) states that sexually modern nativist supporters are pro-LGBT rights. In this study, sexually modern nativists were anti-Trans rights. This supporter category, therefore, may need to be adapted.

8.5 Theme 4: Immigration in the UK

As discussed in Chapter 3, immigration is normally a central concern of the PRR (Mudde, 2019; Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). However, in the last chapter (study 2) immigration in general was not developed as a main theme. In contrast, in this chapter (study 3) concern about immigration generally was present and was the final main theme. Study 3 allowed each interviewee to explore their anti-immigration sentiments which were often related to the concept of cultural threat and cultural exceptionalism, and thus, cultural backlash.

8.5.1 Sub-theme 1: The balance of immigration and mass migration

Most interviewees argued that immigration posed a specifically cultural threat. Tommy Robinson (Interview 15) argued that he was not anti-immigration, but immigration needs controlling. While Michael and Bob (Interviews 4 and 6) intimated that the balance of immigrants to 'indigenous' populations can affect community and ethnic tensions which can have a negative impact on society (Bob – Interview 6). Michael (Interview 4) argued that a good mixture without the overwhelming presence of immigrants ensures a balanced relationship between different people. Mass migration and rate of change (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017) can cause tensions within communities which can lead to a fragmented society. Michael (Interview 4) argued that immigration itself is not a problem, but the number of immigrants assimilated into a country is an issue:

The last migration from Africa and the Middle East is going to cause an imbalance in the ethnicity of the country. That concerns me. Not because they're black, not because their African or Arab or Asian or anything else, it is just that the sheer numbers that are coming in and the effects on the economy and the effect on the areas that we need to balance up like education and health and transport and housing (Michael – Interview 4).

For some, such as Alfie and Matthew (Interviews 3 and 10) immigration in general was too high and should be limited or stopped completely reflecting CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This can be seen in the quote below:

I can remember before the lockdown arriving by bus walking down the precinct area just loitering about near the shops, and I thought to myself, where am I? All I could hear were different languages. These people were not tourists like you might see in London and I jokingly said I should have to get myself into Marks and Spencer's to hear an English accent. Yeah, it's changed. Radically [...] It's uncomfortable (Alfie - Interview 3).

Maria (Interview 13) stated that immigration was good, her dad was an immigrant, and she would not be in the UK if he had not migrated from Mauritius. However, she argued that there are too many people, and it is putting a strain on the local services which is causing suffering. With increasing ethnic diversity through immigration, increased birth rates of racially minoritized populations and decreased birth-rates of white populations, the ethnic landscape of England is changing rapidly. Those that are young in England are used to multiculturalism and living among different types of peoples (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Éger, 2017; Alba & Foner, 2015). Some in the older generation, however, are less accustomed to this diverse demographic landscape which some see as being rapidly transformed into a world they no longer know (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). For Alfie, Matthew and other conservative nativists or social conservatives, this rapid change in demographics has triggered a cultural backlash against this change (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). However, it was not only the balance of immigration that Alfie and Matthew opposed.

8.5.2 Sub-theme 2: The type of migration in the UK

The type of immigration was also expressed as a concern in this study. The rate of change (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017) and cultural backlash (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) may explain certain anti-immigration arguments relating to the balance of immigration. However, they do not explain other anti-immigration arguments that do not mention the scale of immigration but focus more on the type of migration and the origin of immigrants. Alfie, Matthew and Amanda (Interviews 3, 10 and 11) were concerned about illegal immigration. Alfie (Interview 3) claimed that there are no real refugees in the UK as they are supposed to claim asylum in the first country they escape to. He

argued that immigrants were prioritised by the government and British systems which led to GRD. Amanda (Interview 11) argued that legal immigrants are welcome as they contribute to society. However, illegal immigrants are prioritised and given help that neither she nor legal immigrants receive. Both Gerre and Matthew (Interviews 5 and 10) were legal immigrants themselves but wanted to reduce immigration into the UK. The quote below from Matthew highlights this argument:

I'm an immigrant myself in Thailand, and hopefully one day I can become a Thai citizen. That would be a dream, that would be fantastic [...]. As far I'm concerned, if you have a British passport, you are British [...] I don't care if you have ginger hair, blonde hair or brown hair or black hair, it doesn't matter as long as you do the right way (Matthew – Interview 10).

However, echoing theme 1 in Chapters 7 and 8, Jacob (Interview 7) directed his anti-immigration hostility only towards Muslims. He highlighted that Romanian and Polish immigrants were welcome but opposed Muslim immigration because of their perceived opposing values to British people as discussed in themes 1 and 3 in this chapter. Bob (Interview 6) also argued that people from Hong Kong are welcome whereas for others [Muslims] 'I'd want to build a wall'. This suggests that some immigrants are more welcome than others with Muslims being at the bottom of the priority list and Europeans and people from ex-colonies being at the top of the list because of the perceived shared values they hold with British citizens. In this instance, some immigrants or communities (for example, East Europeans) are granted 'relative valorization' over other peoples (in this case Muslims) but still suffer 'civic ostracism' by the majority white community (Kim, 2000, p. 16). According to Parvulescu (2015), relative valorization can be interpreted as passing for white and being deemed superior to other people. Kim argues that racialisation is not a form of single hierarchy, it occurs in a 'field of racial positions' which are produced in relation to each other (Shih, 2008, p. 1351). Therefore, racialisation is changeable depending on the situation. In this instance, Bob (Interview 6) positioned East Europeans as superior to Muslims but in another discussion, East Europeans could be positioned as inferior to the British working class who might be competing for the same jobs (Parvulescu, 2015).

The cultural-based issues concerning mass immigration represent the cultural backlash in which certain older individuals with some authoritarian and populist traits are attempting to push back against mass immigration, multiculturalism and globalisation which they argued is eroding their values and beliefs. The assimilation of new, culturally different people threatens this cultural and political hegemony, for example, through changes in the language spoken (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This perceived difference is then exacerbated by the number of people that migrate to the UK as this rapidly changes the ethnic population. This rapid rate of change can be seen in places like Dewsbury as discussed in the YouTube videos entitled Anne Marie Waters – For Britain rally in Essex (2019) and Anne Marie Waters // GI conference with Q and A (2019). When minority groups grow to become a substantial part of the ethnic population, they then gain political and cultural power, thus changing the values and culture of local areas and the country generally. This increase in political and cultural power, some argued then leads minority groups to be prioritised leading to GRD of the British population (Kunst & Obaidi, 2020). Amanda (Interview 11) argued that this is exacerbated by perceived cultural exceptionalism where minority groups are not only prioritised but also are exempt from certain laws. It is perceived therefore, that migrant populations are treated better than ‘indigenous’ Britons (Bob – Interview 6) echoing findings from Chapter 7 (themes 5 and 6).

8.6 Overall conclusion

Although the far-right is often portrayed as a homogenised group, in this study individuals had different opinions relating to Islam, liberal values, COVID-19 and immigration. In this chapter, I developed four main grievance-based themes from 15 semi-structured interviews. These main grievances support previous research (for example, Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Pilkington, 2016). In theme 1, interviewees argued that Islam represents a cultural threat, promoting values that were considered to be anti-liberal at odds with Britain’s pro-liberal values. Interviewees combined nationalism with women’s rights (femonationalism), with LGB rights (homonationalism) and animal rights (animal nationalism) to position perceived British values as superior to perceived Islamic values. This supports previous findings by Farris (2017) and Puar (2018) but also adds new insight into how the PRR use animal nationalism, a term that has previously

not been used to explore the far-right's position on animal rights (Miller, 2021; Howell, 2015) contributing to new knowledge. This use of strategic liberalism contradicts CBT which theorises that far-right activists oppose all types of progressivism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019).

Other interviewees were concerned about the perceived erosion of some liberal values in the UK. Some individuals were concerned about a range of women's rights, animal welfare issues and LGB rights unrelated to Islam and nationalism. Therefore, semi-liberalism better explained this specific pro-liberal rights position. Within the LGB rights theme, while some strategically used liberalism which undermined CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) and the concept of homonationalism (Puar, 2018), Waters and Gerre held semi-liberal views potentially due to their transition from the left to the right side of the political spectrum. This builds on Berntzen's (2019) work who found that anti-Islam supporters that were previously left-wing were more likely to hold semi-liberal arguments whereas those that were previously right-wing were more likely to use strategically liberal arguments. Some of the findings in this chapter, therefore, support Berntzen's (2019) findings.

Another contribution of this chapter relates to interviewees' position on Trans rights. All 15 participants opposed Trans rights, adding weight to CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This also contradicts Lancaster's (2020) findings that sexually modern nativists support LGBT rights, including Transgender rights. Building on the findings from Chapters 6 and 7, this finding suggests that the sexually modern nativist supporter category should be modified to only include pro-LGB arguments not pro-Trans arguments as previously stated by Lancaster (2020). This is the final original contribution of this chapter.

This chapter addressed four research gaps identified in Chapter 1. It analysed the importance of economic, cultural and political-based grievances in each of the 15 interviews, it explored the ethnicity, sexuality and gender of interviewees, it assessed interviewees pro-animal rights stance, it explored the use of liberal values, it investigated the lack of differentiation between Islam and Islamist extremism in each of the 15 interviews, it used semi-structured interviews to address the overfocus on

quantitative research within research on the far-right (e.g., Rovny & Polk, 2020; Albright, 2018; Kimmel, 2018; Belew, 2018) and it used concepts of strategic liberalism and semi-liberalism (Berntzen, 2019) to explore the use of certain liberal values by the 15 supporters/leaders interviewed in this study. The final chapter highlights the main contributions of this doctoral thesis, it discusses the limits of this thesis and explores potential future research opportunities.

Chapter 9

Discussion and conclusions

At the outset, this doctoral thesis aimed to address twelve gaps in the academic literature on the far-right outlined in Chapter 1. It sought to understand who the supporters/leaders of three contemporary British anti-Islam Populist Radical Right (PRR) groups were: the Democratic Football Lads Alliance (DFLA), The For Britain Movement (TFBM) and Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (PEGIDA UK). Its intention was to question mainstream assumptions of the British anti-Islam PRR by combining a mixed-methods design (prioritising qualitative data) with Cultural Backlash Theory (CBT), Group Relative Deprivation (GRD), strategic liberalism and semi-liberalism to explain the British far-right phenomenon. In particular, it set out to address three broad research questions:

- i) Who expresses support for the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK?
- ii) What are their main grievances?
- iii) Why do individuals express support for these groups?

This doctoral thesis addressed the first research question in studies 1 and 3, while it addressed the second and third research question in studies 2 and 3. This final chapter discusses the key themes, ideas and concepts outlined in the wider literature on the far-right and in this doctoral thesis. The findings in this thesis are important as far-right activity, support and terrorist attacks have increased globally in the last decade, especially in 'Western' liberal democracies (e.g., Home Office, 2019b; Koehler, 2019; Malkin et al., 2017; Akkerman, 2005, p. 34). Far-right activity is a threat to the cohesion of society and poses a safety threat to citizens globally (Home Office, 2019b; Koehler, 2019). Therefore, it is important to prevent far-right activity spreading (Koehler, 2019; Allchorn, 2018; Ramalingam, 2014). One of the best ways to counter the far-right is to understand it (Koehler, 2019; Allchorn, 2018; Ramalingam, 2014). This doctoral thesis, therefore, aimed to address twelve research gaps in the literature to further understand these groups.

This chapter begins by outlining how this doctoral thesis contributes to the main arguments encountered within the literature on the far-right. It highlights the practical and theoretical insights acquired by conducting this research before considering the application and the implications of these findings. Finally, this chapter ends with the overall limits of this research and possibilities for future research.

9.1 The main contributions of this doctoral thesis

This doctoral thesis aimed to contribute to previous research conducted on the PRR. The first original contribution of study 1 relates to the sexually modern nativist category developed by Lancaster (2020). In Lancaster's original supporter category, the sexually modern nativist is a younger, higher educated woman that supports the far-right and is pro-LGB values. However, Lancaster (2020) does not argue that the sexually modern nativist supporter might be from the LGB community themselves. In this thesis, all three PRR groups had a higher number of LGB supporters than the general population. Therefore, due to the high number of LGB supporters, I argued that the sexually modern nativist category should be expanded to include people that self-identify as LGB. Finally, due to the absence of any supporters that self-identify as Trans, I argued that the sexually modern nativist supports LGB rights but not Trans rights contradicting Lancaster's (2020) findings. The role of Trans rights in these groups was further developed in the third study.

The second contribution was the presence of a new type of supporter that had not been identified in previous research - one that was racially minoritized. This expanded on previous research by Lancaster (2020) which outlined the presence of the conservative nativist, the sexually modern nativist and moderate nativist supporter. These racially minoritized individuals identified in study 1 were named ethnically diverse nativists, and they highlight the growing evolution of the anti-Islam PRR moving away from the ER. This suggests that a diverse range of people were present in the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK datasets and researchers/the British government should not only focus on the typical far-right supporter (conservative nativist). It is also likely that the further these PRR groups move away from traditionalism and towards progressivism (femonationalism and homonationalism) the more successful they may be in attracting

greater numbers of female members, closing the Radical Right Gender Gap (Harteveld et al., 2015). This then highlights the importance of up-to-date demographic research within the far-right movement.


Study 2 continued to discuss who expresses support for the anti-Islam PRR but also analysed why people express support for them. In this chapter, political-based grievances were the most common grievances expressed across all three groups. Nevertheless, Chapter 7 argued that these political-based grievances were concealing deeper cultural-based grievances. Consequently, CBT only explained political concerns that were authentic. This theory did not explain political based grievances that were concealing deeper cultural-based grievances (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Hafez (2014) argues that populism is used to mask antisemitic arguments to appear more moderate and compatible with liberal democracy. Similarly, Chapter 7 argued that in this study political-based grievances often concealed cultural-based grievances, especially concerning Islam. Populist arguments, therefore, concealed Islamophobic arguments. This strategy was termed strategic populism and was the first contribution of the second study in this thesis. Both liberal arguments (strategic liberalism) and populist arguments (strategic populism) were used to conceal deeper cultural-based grievances highlighted in Figure 12. This term further explains the use of overtly deracialised populist arguments concealing racial/religious-based arguments.

The second contribution of study 2 relates to another term created to explain these three groups: strategic emotional support (Figure 12). The three groups in this thesis used women's rights as a marker of civilisation and used femotionalism to argue that the UK is more pro-women's rights than Muslim majority countries. This supports Farris's (2017) findings. However, in this study, these three groups used racially minoritized women and ex-Muslims who had previously been abused by Muslim men to tell their stories about perceived misogyny in Islam. This is an example of the far-right using abused women strategically to further their political gains. I called this strategic use of racially minoritized women, strategic emotional support which builds on the findings from study one, the ethnically diverse nativist. As these groups used ex-Muslim women to further their political goals, these women are examples of ethnically diverse nativists.

The third contribution relates to another concept I developed to explain the strategic use of children's rights: juvenationalism. In study two, the DFLA focused on children's rights, specifically related to the so-called 'grooming gang' cases across the UK. They did not discuss any other form of child abuse in the UK suggesting that this was another tactic to strategically further their political anti-Islam message while trying to appear more moderate by not directly connecting Islam with these CSE cases. However, the so-called 'grooming gang' cases are overwhelmingly associated with Pakistani Muslim men. Therefore, by only mentioning these specific cases, it was implied that the perpetrator of CSE was Muslim. This is an example of using children's rights to mask deeper grievances related to Islam. This strategic use of children's rights was termed juvenationalism (Figure 12).

Figure 12

Theories used to analyse grievances of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK



Note. I created this figure to highlight the theories and concepts I used to analyse two types of grievances (author's own). In study 2, political-based grievances were most prevalent. However, Chapter 7 argued that the use of populism was likely a strategy to appear more moderate. All of the arguments made across all three groups were rooted in Islamophobia and their concern about Islamic ideology. Although some political arguments made about the government and elite may have been authentic, it is likely that most individuals used strategic populism, strategic emotional support and juvenationalism to further their anti-Islam arguments.

The last original contribution of study 2 expands on the arguments in Chapter 2; the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK as a sub-category of the PRR. I called this sub-category the anti-Islam PRR. Islamic ideology (cultural-based grievances) was the main grievance maintained in this study. This focus on Islam supports previous literature on the anti-Islam PRR (Pilkington, 2016) and further consolidates the categorisation of these three groups as anti-Islam PRR groups rather than ER or PRR groups in general.

Finally, in study 3 (Chapter 8), I analysed 15 semi-structured qualitative interviews with supporters and leaders of the three anti-Islam PRR groups to identify whether they used strategically liberal or semi-liberal arguments. It was important because most research on the far-right uses quantitative research rather than qualitative research (e.g., Rovny & Polk, 2020; Albright, 2018; Kimmel, 2018; Belew, 2018) limiting understanding of the demand-side of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK. This is the first contribution of this chapter. It was also important to focus on their use of liberal values as PRR groups are changing to become more inclusive as highlighted in the sexually modern nativist (Lancaster, 2020) and the ethnically diverse nativist supporter categories. This is the second contribution of this chapter.

The third contribution relates to PRR supporter's different use of liberal values. The PRR use some liberal values to attract a new type of supporter (Berntzen, 2019). However, it is unknown if PRR supporters are semi-liberal or if they use liberal values strategically to appear more moderate (Foster & Kirke, 2023). By addressing this research gap, Chapter 8 found that although the 15 interviewees had different arguments, they all shared grievances related to Islamic ideology. Some made illiberal arguments (Lancaster, 2020; Norris & Inglehart, 2019), some made strategically liberal arguments while others made semi-liberal arguments. These findings suggest that counter-extremist programmes should not only focus on the typical far-right supporter. Focusing on the typical supporter and neglecting to acknowledge the risk from non-typical supporters could lead to a lack of monitoring and surveillance of non-typical supporters. This, consequently, could lead to undetected violence or attacks from these types of supporters.

As highlighted above, each chapter contributed to the academic field of far-right studies in several ways. However, contributions were also made when chapter findings were combined. Findings from section 7.5 and 8.3 highlight an apparent shift in the arguments of the anti-Islam PRR. This is another contribution of this thesis. Although Islam was the constant main grievance expressed in this doctoral thesis, interviews with supporters and leaders in Chapter 8 suggest that perceived government oppression may be the new main target of the British anti-Islam PRR. An overarching COVID-19 conspiracy theory was the second main concern in Chapter 8 and was expressed by

TFBM leader in Chapter 7. This conspiracy theory identifies an oppressive government elite which contrives to remove the liberty and freedoms of UK citizens through a divide-and-conquer method. Both the leaders of PEGIDA UK and TFBM used this argument in their interviews (Chapter 8) suggesting that COVID-19 may have acted as a pivotal moment in shifting focus away from Islam/Muslims toward perceived government oppression.


Further, Chapters 6 and 8 expanded on the theories used to explain the far-right. These chapters found that theories used to explain the anti-Islam PRR need to be further developed. In addition to Lancaster's (2020) supporter categories (conservative nativist, the sexually modern nativist and the moderate nativist), Chapter 6 added a fourth type of supporter in the PEGIDA UK sample: the ethnically diverse nativist supporter. This new category represents a type of supporter that may have been previously overlooked in the literature on the far-right. As represented in Figure 13, CBT explains typical supporters that are conservative nativists (Lancaster, 2020) or socially conservative (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Nevertheless, one of the main characteristics of the anti-Islam PRR is the use and expression of some liberal values (Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2015; Halikiopoulou et al., 2013). Differing from the conservative nativists, some sexually modern nativists maintain semi-liberal values (as evidenced in study 3). Cultural Backlash Theory posits that those in the PRR are authoritarian, and authoritarianism does not positively correlate with any liberal values (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Therefore, CBT does not explain the sexually modern nativist supporter (Lancaster, 2020).

Further, there were also supporters/leaders who strategically used some liberal values to oppose Islam. These individuals may be classed as moderate nativists or may be categorised as a new supporter category. It is unknown if moderate nativists (those that lie between the conservative and sexually modern nativists) use certain liberal values strategically or whether they have some liberal values but are less liberal than sexually modern nativists. Consequently, CBT does not explain this category either. In addition, neither CBT nor strategic liberalism (femonationalism, homonationalism and animal nationalism) explain anti-Islam PRR support from those that express semi-liberal arguments (the sexually modern nativists supporter) nor those that fit the ethnically

diverse nativist category. Group Relative Deprivation and semi-liberalism best explain support from sexually modern nativists (Berntzen, 2019; Urbanska & Guimond, 2018). Additionally, Christian nationalism partly explains the presence of ethnically diverse nativists. However, new theories need to be developed to explain this new type of supporter.

Figure 13

The theoretical landscape of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK



Note. I created this figure (author's own) to aggregate previous research (Lancaster, 2020; Berntzen, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) and the findings in this doctoral thesis. It combines theories and concepts (Berntzen, 2019; Norris & Inglehart, 2019) to explain the supporter categories outlined by Lancaster (2020) and the ethnically diverse nativist identified in Chapter 6. Social conservatives (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) or conservative nativists (Lancaster, 2020) are illiberal and are explained by CBT (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Moderate nativists are between conservative nativists and sexually modern nativists (Lancaster, 2020). Moderate nativists may be strategically liberal (explained through the use of strategic liberalism), or semi-liberal (Berntzen, 2019) but more focused research is needed to further understand this supporter category. Semi-liberalism (Berntzen, 2019) and GRD explain the sexually modern nativist supporter (Lancaster, 2020). Christian nationalism partly explains the presence of the ethnically diverse nativist. However, no theory adequately explains this new type of supporter. More research is needed to fully explore this new category which is represented by the question mark.

Finally, this doctoral thesis highlighted the difference between the illiberal, strategically liberal and semi-liberal supporters/leaders of these groups. This is the final contribution from the aggregated chapter findings. As shown in Figure 14, although the people interviewed in study 3 were all supporters/leaders of the three British anti-Islam PRR

groups, some expressed different arguments relating to liberal values. Some conservative nationalists maintained illiberal arguments, which positioned them more towards the ER part of the spectrum. Others used strategic liberalism, supporting certain liberal values to oppose Islam which was deemed illiberal and totalitarian. Moving towards the liberal left, in contrast to the illiberal and strategically liberal arguments, some expressed semi-liberal views relating to women's rights, LGB rights and animal rights. They can be described as sexually modern nationalists. More information is needed to place the moderate nationalist and ethnically diverse nationalist on the left-right political spectrum. It is unknown if they are illiberal, strategically liberal or semi-liberal. Figures 13 and 14 further highlight the complex diverse nature of the British anti-Islam PRR and the need for new theories that explain support from non-typical supporters.

Figure 14

The spectrum of supporters of the DFLA, TFBM and PEGIDA UK

Illiberal PRR		Anti-Islam PRR		The liberal left
Illiberal Conservative nationalist	Strategically liberal	Semi-liberal Sexually modern nationalist		Liberal

Note. I created this figure (author's own) based on the findings in this doctoral thesis in combination with research by Lancaster (2020) and Berntzen (2019). Those from an authoritarian background were more aligned with the PRR and those from a liberal background were closer to the liberal left. There are two fundamental arguments within the British anti-Islam PRR and although both arguments position Islam as the problem, they have different motivations (Berntzen, 2019). Supporters that argued from an illiberal stance were conservative nationalist supporters while those that argued from a semi-liberal stance tended to be sexually modern nationalists. More information is needed for the moderate and ethnically diverse nationalist typologies to be placed on this scale. However, it is likely that the moderate nationalist is strategically liberal, and the ethnically diverse nationalist is semi-liberal due to their support of women's rights (as shown in section 7.2.1).

Overall, this research suggests that the far-right is not monolithic. Although anti-Islam PRR groups are often equated with extremism, they differ from the ER. This is important; in the UK, far-right counter-extremism policy often mirrors Islamist counter-extremism policy (Pearson, 2020). However, the use of liberalism, especially women's rights, in the anti-Islam PRR is different to Islamist extremist groups (Pearson, 2020). This doctoral thesis highlights the heterogeneous nature of the British PRR and therefore,

a counter-extremism strategy needs to be tailored to the British far-right. Further, as the global and British far-right threat is significantly increasing (e.g., Schneider, 2022), future research needs to pay close attention to these changes to prevent more typical and not-so-typical people from supporting the anti-Islam PRR. More support for these groups means a bigger threat to British liberal democratic values and to British society. However, as this doctoral thesis has shown, it is important to keep vigilant; it is not only the white, conservative nativist, heterosexual, lower-educated male that poses this threat.

9.2 The limits of this doctoral thesis

The last section highlighted the main contributions of this doctoral thesis to the anti-Islam PRR literature. However, as with any piece of research, there are limits to this thesis. Study 1 deployed descriptive statistics and a Chi-Squared test which was the statistical analysis required to address the first research question. However, future research might be conducted using more complex inferential statistics to go beyond purely descriptive data. As suggested by Field (2013) more complex inferential statistics could examine the causal relationships between demographics, grievances and support for the anti-Islam PRR.

Study 2 presented criteria sampling issues (Poecze, et al., 2022). As some groups had more videos on YouTube than others, I developed criterium for sampling. TFBM had too many videos to analyse within the scope of this doctoral research, whereas the DFLA and PEGIDA UK had fewer videos and, therefore, all were included in the study. Where sampling was necessary, videos were selected based on the number of topics covered in combination with their length (as long videos focusing on only one topic would skew the themes developed). Hence, it is likely that arguments from TFBM were overrepresented in this doctoral thesis. However, due to the interpretivist methodology used within the study, the findings are not designed to be statistically representative – and therefore, this may not be a limitation (Braun & Clarke, 2021a). Moreover, YouTube is a mainstream platform that has regulations relating to hate speech. It is also likely that the arguments I analysed on YouTube were moderated and part of a frontstage

persona. Had I used another encrypted platform or app, the arguments discussed may have been more extreme (e.g., Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2015; 2005).

Finally, interview studies already present accessibility issues with any group as there may be a number of reasons individuals do not want to talk to academic researchers. This is especially true with hard-to-reach groups such as the far-right. Consequently, this is one of the reasons that researchers of the far-right often do not interview supporters or leaders (Ellinas, 2021). Despite this, while they were a hard-to-reach group, some supporters/leaders were more willing to talk than others. Supporters and especially leaders of TFBM were keen to take part in this research. Supporters of PEGIDA UK and leaders and supporters of the DFLA were less keen to take part in this research. For example, in one instance potential access ended when a gatekeeper posted my picture on the group's Facebook page, as discussed in section 5.5. As highlighted by Pilkington (2016), gatekeepers are powerful in research as they can either permit access to a hard-to-reach group or deny access, limiting research potential. Hence, this meant that the arguments of TFBM were overrepresented in this study. However, as this study does not claim to be representative, but rather to present and understand some of the arguments made by supporters and leaders of the anti-Islam PRR, these criticisms are not necessarily limitations (Braun & Clarke, 2019).

9.3 Policy recommendations and avenues for future research

This doctoral thesis has highlighted themes and typologies within the anti-Islam PRR. These findings have policy implications. The first focuses on the heterogeneity of the British PRR. This thesis found that supporters were not only white, older, heterosexual men. There were also ethnically diverse nativists, sexually modern nativists, LGB supporters, women and animal rights activists. This suggests that counter-extremism measures should not only focus on the typical far-right supporter. Focusing only on the typical supporter could create a feedback loop where less typical supporters are overlooked and are not part of counter-extremism measures. This may result in more arrests of those identified as the typical supporter of the far-right because they are being focused on more. If we also look for non-typical supporters of the far-right, this will interrupt this feedback loop.

Further, in studies 2 and 3 in this thesis, supporters and leaders discussed their fear and contempt towards deplatforming strategies where people are banned from certain social media sites if they are deemed to spread hate speech or discriminatory material. However, research suggests that deplatforming strategies may be counterproductive and backfire as people feel silenced (Beiner, 2020; Lim, 2020). Therefore, the research in this thesis suggests that the government and related agencies should explore other avenues rather than deplatforming when curating counter-extremism strategies. This thesis also found that some of the supporters/leaders in the three groups held semi-liberal values and could potentially be reintroduced to mainstream politics. Deplatforming these semi-liberal individuals is likely to push them further to the fringes of politics rather than encourage them to come back to mainstream politics. Therefore, I recommend other strategies instead of deplatforming to counteract some of these Islamophobic narratives. One recommendation would be to educate people more about Islam and the different sects of Islam. This would encourage more nuanced thinking about Islam and the diversity of Muslims depending on their culture, history and region. As this thesis suggests, supporters/leaders of the British PRR homogenise Islam and, therefore, Muslims positioning them as a monolithic group that are a threat to perceived British values. Further education exploring the nuances of Islam may help counteract this homogenised view.

Another recommendation instead of deplatforming could be to encourage debate. Oxford University have previously invited Tommy Robinson and Anne Marie Waters to debate at the Student Union (Lake, 2018; BBC News, 2014). Instead of silencing supporters/leaders of the far-right, I suggest it is better to debate and explore arguments in an open, democratic setting. This will encourage supporters/leaders to critically engage more with their ideas rather than encourage people to become more polarised and use fringe tools such as BitChute, Parley, Odysee, Minds, Gorf, Gettr and Gab. This driving of people towards fringe sites means that they will likely radicalise themselves further by talking to like-minded people and becoming part of an echo chamber (Whittaker, 2020).

My final policy recommendation relates to far-right analysts. The far-right is ever-evolving. Groups become deactivated and new groups are created. Supporters are

fluid and there is rarely a permanent membership list. It is imperative, therefore, that the government and related agencies invest enough time and money into analysts that specialise in the Extreme Right-Wing or the far-right generally. Due in part to the Shawcross report (2023), the British government were advised to focus more on Islamist extremism and re-evaluate their Prevent policy relating to Right-Wing extremism. Shawcross (2023) argued that the concept of the far-right was too broad and encompassed many people that were not a threat to society. Although concepts are ever-changing and need to be re-evaluated, this overfocus on Islamist extremism and the under focus on the Extreme Right-Wing is likely a mistake. The Prevent figures from the last few years clearly state that the Extreme Right-Wing is a serious threat to British society. Each agency/company needs to ensure that they are adequately focusing on the Extreme Right-Wing and have at least one analyst who specialises in the Extreme Right-Wing on their counter-extremism/terrorism desks. This is even more important with the hijacking of generative artificial intelligence (AI) by extremist groups making it easier to access extremist material including bomb-making instructions and recruit new people (Borgonovo et al., 2024). If we fail to focus enough of the Extreme Right-Wing threat, we will be even further unaware of their use of new tools like generative AI which could result in catastrophic consequences.

Further developing on these policy recommendations, this doctoral thesis addressed some of the gaps highlighted within the far-right literature. As a consequence, it has also discovered more gaps that require investigation. To begin, in Chapter 6, four types of anti-Islam PRR supporters were present across the three datasets. More research needs to be conducted on the moderate nativist and ethnically diverse nativist typologies. It is unknown whether these individuals have liberal values and if so, whether these are strategic or semi-liberal. This is important because this could further change the ideology, partnerships and demographics of the British anti-Islam PRR. Due to time limitations in this thesis, I was unable to explore this development in more detail. In my final study, I was only able to recruit one individual that fit into the ethnically diverse nativist category, and she was semi-liberal suggesting that more detailed analysis is needed with more supporters/leaders that are racially minoritized. Moreover study 1 found that more research needs to be conducted to understand the non-typical supporter outside the conservative nativist stereotype. This

would further explain why new types of people support the British far-right and how the far-right scene might be changing. This would inform new police and government initiatives focusing on countering the far-right to limit this ever-evolving threat. Although I have identified this development in this thesis, more research needs to further explore this finding.

Further, as highlighted in section 7.2 and 8.2, ex-Muslim women support some of these anti-Islam PRR groups representing ethnically diverse nativists (section 6.5). The strategic emotional support concept explains why far-right groups use ex-Muslim individuals but does not explain why these people choose to support these groups. Future research, therefore, needs to investigate why some ex-Muslims decide to leave Islam and support groups such as TFBM, to further understand their motivations which lead to this support. Although I did explore this finding in this thesis, due to time constraints and the structure of this thesis (study 1, 2 and 3), I was only able to focus on a few ethnically diverse nativists in studies 2 and 3 where I discuss the connection between Christian nationalism and ex-Muslim PRR supporters. Further research exploring why ex-Muslims support the British PRR would further highlight the move away from the conservative nativist stereotype discussed in Chapter 6.

Study 3 also provides the opportunity for further research. For individuals that hold authoritarian views and use liberal values to distance themselves from fascism, researchers need to be aware of the more extreme concealed backstage. Statistical analysis and discourse analysis needs to be conducted to understand the makeup of the anti-Islam PRR, how many supporters/leaders are strategically liberal, how many are semi-liberal, and how strategically liberal individuals conceal their authoritarian, more extreme backstage arguments, while also identifying how the far-right strategically use liberalism to appear more moderate. This would help identify semi-liberal supporters/leaders that may be able to be brought back into the political mainstream. I was unable to explore this idea as it was not the focus of this thesis. However, the concepts of strategic liberalism, strategic populism and strategic emotional support pave the way for further research to explore these potential performative identities. This doctoral thesis suggests that the anti-Islam PRR is not homogenous, and there are differences within anti-Islam PRR groups, not only between. To understand the anti-

Islam PRR fully, research needs to be conducted to identify the origin differences between those from the authoritarian pathway and the liberal pathway. Although I explored the origins of interviewees in Chapter 8, I only focused on seven interviewees due to the small sample in the third study. This small sample was due to several factors including the time it took to recruit far-right activists for interviews who were sceptical of my research, the organization of interviews themselves and the navigation of difficult experiences relating to being targeted online by far-right activists during the recruitment process. More research with a bigger sample size needs to assess why people choose to move from the left-political spectrum to the right and what moral shock caused this movement. Finally, future research needs to explore why authoritarian individuals are choosing to become involved in the anti-Islam PRR rather than the ER, and how we bring people with semi-liberal views back into mainstream politics.

All three studies suggest that the anti-Islam PRR is distinct from its PRR and ER counterparts. Research highlights that some anti-Islam PRR groups use some liberal values (e.g., Foster & Kirke, 2023; Berntzen, 2019). Although I explored the anti-Islam PRR as a sub-category of the PRR in this thesis, more research needs to further solidify this category. This research needs to assess whether this move towards the moderate nativist and sexually modern nativist (Lancaster, 2020) is occurring more in the anti-Islam PRR, rather than the PRR generally. This research would further our current understandings of the anti-Islam movement and how it differs from other, potentially more radical or extremist groups and parties.

As highlighted above, there are several areas for future research to add to the far-right literature. However, research on hard-to-reach groups should also be prioritised. For example, in this doctoral thesis, I attempted to contact supporters and leaders of the DFLA. This, as discussed in section 5.5, did not happen for this particular group, due to potential security risks and gatekeeper rejection issues (Pilkington, 2016). Gaining access to hard-to-reach groups is key to understanding the far-right, especially anti-Islam social movements which are less likely to engage in discussion with researchers compared to political parties (Ellinas, 2021; Pilkington, 2016). Arguably the best way to access hard-to-reach groups is through ethnographic or autoethnographic

research. This allows the researcher to build rapport with activists and gain their trust (Pilkington, 2016). Unfortunately, this was not an option in this doctoral thesis due to the COVID-19 pandemic but opens up the opportunity for future researchers. However, this type of research does potentially pose some security risks which need to be carefully considered (Giordano, 2021) as discussed by Sibley (2024).

In addition to ethnographic research, other research focusing on encrypted platforms and freedom of speech platforms, such as BitChute, Parley, Odysee, Minds, Gorf, Gettr and Gab, needs to be conducted to analyse the backstage presence of these groups (e.g., Berntzen, 2019; Akkerman, 2015; 2005). This thesis focused on the front stage of these groups rather than the backstage. During the research, I identified new concepts that help identify some of these front-stage personas. These new concepts can be used to compare back-stage to front-stage personas, but this was not the focus of this thesis and, therefore, was not explored more fully. By comparing the frontstage and backstage arguments, this research will further our understanding of which groups are strategically liberal and which groups are semi-liberal (Berntzen, 2019). The anti-Islam, counter-jihad movement is always changing. New groups are created and old groups merge or deactivate (Lowles, Mulhall & Ryan, 2023). Hence, it is important to be aware of the ever-changing nature of the far-right. This doctoral thesis highlighted this change from the ER to the anti-Islam PRR. Chapter 8 suggests that there may be a new primary enemy of the anti-Islam PRR which is less connected to Islam. Although this thesis began to explore this apparent shift, future research should investigate this new shift in focus away from Islam and toward perceived oppression in response to COVID-19 through The Great Reset conspiracy theory. Berntzen (2019) argues that Islamist terrorist attacks may have acted as a moral shock moving individuals over to the anti-Islam PRR. This doctoral research found that COVID-19 may have also acted as a moral shock leading to more people believing in The Great Reset conspiracy theory. This may have led more people to support social movements and political parties that claim to oppose The Great Reset. Previous research suggests that critical events or experiences can make an individual re-evaluate their ideological position and change their views on certain topics (Goodwin, 2011). COVID-19, therefore, may have triggered certain people to change their ideological focus. This also needs to be further explored in future research.

Finally, the theoretical landscape of far-right research is multidisciplinary and disjointed. The research I conducted for this thesis suggests that theories come from a range of fields including political science, sociology, civil war studies, psychology, anthropology and counter-terrorism. As highlighted by Mudde (2016), although typologies of the far-right have developed since the 1960s, the theoretical far-right landscape has not, leaving old theories with limited explanation potential as the main theories used to explain the contemporary far-right. Further, most of these theories do not focus on the far-right generally or the anti-Islam PRR specifically. For example, while Huntington's (2002) theory of the clash of civilisations can explain some aspects of the anti-Islam PRR, it is a much broader international relations theory that explains politics, power and relations on a global scale. Relative deprivation theory is a Social Movement Theory that can be applied to the far-right (Gurr, 1970), CBT focuses on the PRR, and the losers of modernisation theory focuses on the ER, but none focus on the anti-Islam PRR. Consequently, these theories are limited in their application to the anti-Islam PRR. Berntzen's (2019) concepts of strategic liberalism and semi-liberalism are the only concepts that focus specifically on the anti-Islam PRR, but these concepts are limited to the assessment of liberal values. The concepts I developed in this thesis (juvenationalism, strategic emotional support, strategic populism) focus on explaining certain arguments but these concepts are limited to specific views. Although this was not possible to develop in this thesis due to the complexity of the task, a more cohesive theory is needed which specifically focuses on the anti-Islam PRR and incorporates: (1) the conservative nativist, the moderate nativist, the sexually modern nativist and the ethnically diverse nativist, (2) cultural-based grievances, economic-based grievances and political-based grievances, and (3) the illiberal, strategically liberal and semi-liberal arguments within the anti-Islam PRR. A holistic, cohesive theory is needed to explain all of these differences, not only the typical supporter and arguments. This then would help researchers, policy makers and counter-extremism experts explain and understand these anti-Islam PRR groups more fully and, therefore, counter this evolving threat.

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Appendix

Appendix 1: The 18 posts I used in study 1

The For Britain Movement	Posts
The For Britain Movement post 1 from the 10 th April 2020.	 <p>The For Britain Movement 10 April at 00:56 · 🌐</p> <p>STANDARD.CO.UK Police won't be allowed to check supermarket trolleys, says Patel</p> <p>👍❤️😲 342 94 comments 85 shares</p>

The For Britain Movement post 2 from the 11th July 2020.

The For Britain Movement
11 July at 03:02 · 🌐

BREITBART.COM
UK Soldiers Banned from Taking the Knee in Uniform
British soldiers have been banned from taking the knee in solidarity with...

👍❤️ Barry Noldart, Peter Swain and 993 others 103 comments 61 shares

The For Britain Movement post 3 from the 21st March 2020.

The For Britain Movement
21 March · 🌐

TELEGRAPH.CO.UK
Muslim population of the UK could triple to 13m following 'record' influx

👍👎👏👤 639 204 comments 928 shares

The For Britain Movement post 4 from the 10th April 2020.

The For Britain Movement
10 April at 11:58 · 🌐

Steve Hedley Anna Scott stay safe Anna you're doing a wonderful job and I don't want to offend you but if Bojo pops his dogs I'm throwing a party 🍻👏👍

Like · 1d · Edited

APPLE.NEWS
Union boss said he would 'throw a party' if Boris Johnson died of coronavirus — Metro



👍👎👏👤 Barbara Jupp and 496 others 261 comments 192 shares

The For Britain Movement post 5 from the 21st April 2020.

The For Britain Movement
21 March · 🌐

BPILLARSUK.COM
Hundreds of UK mosques remain open for Jumu'ah despite closure calls

👍👎👏👤 713 369 comments 1.7K shares

<p>The For Britain Movement post 6 from the 20th March 2020.</p>	
<p>The For Britain Movement post 7 from the 20th of June 2020.</p>	

<p>The Democratic Football Lads Alliance</p>	<p>Posts</p>
<p>DFLA post number 8 from the 24th of March 2020.</p>	

DFLA post number 9 from the 5th of April 2020.

The Official DFLA - Democratic Football Lads Alliance
5 April at 21:20 · 🌐



UK.REUTERS.COM
Queen Elizabeth invokes WW2 spirit: we can defeat the coronavirus

👍❤️ 399 32 comments 25 shares

DFLA post number 10 from the 23rd of April 2020.

The Official DFLA - Democratic Football Lads Alliance
23 April at 05:30 · 🌐

The DFLA would like to wish each and every one of you a Happy St George's Day 🇬🇧



👍❤️ Peter Swain and 837 others 32 comments 374 shares

DFLA post number 11 from the 22th of June 2020.

The Official DFLA - Democratic Football Lads Alliance
22 June · 🌐



The Telegraph
TELEGRAPH.CO.UK
The question can no longer be avoided: is it time to scrap the mayor of London?

👍❤️ Peter Swain, Pauline Thomas and 667 others 191 comments 114 shares

DFLA post number 12 from the 22th of May 2020.

The Official DFLA - Democratic Football Lads Alliance
22 May · 🌐

On this day 7yrs ago Fusilier Lee Rigby was tragically taken,
Today we remember him
Our thoughts are with his family and friends
May he R.I.P



👍👎👉 1.4K 198 comments 3.4K shares

PEGIDA UK

PEGIDA UK post number 13 from 7th of June 2020.

Posts

Patriot Promotional Page: Patriots Voice
@pegida.uk

Home
About
Photos
Events
Videos
Invite Your Friends!
Welcome
Donations
Welcome
Twitter
Posts
Community

THE MEDIA AND THE LEFT HAVE MADE GEORGE FLOYD INTO A MARTYR. BUT WHO WAS HE REALLY?

1996 10 MONTHS IN PRISON ARMED ROBBERY.
2002 8 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR COCAINE
2004 10 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR COCAINE
2005 10 MONTHS IN PRISON FOR COCAINE
2007 5 YEARS FOR ARMED ROBBERY OF A PREGNANT WOMAN IN HER HOME.

WHEN HE WAS KILLED, HE WAS HIGH ON METH GETTING READY TO DRIVE A CAR AND POSSIBLY KILL YOUR KID. TOO BAD THE PREGNANT WOMAN DIDN'T HAVE A GUN.

👍👎👉 379 129 comments 785 shares

PEGIDA UK post number 14 from 17th December 2018.

Patriot Promotional Page: Patriots Voice
17 December 2018 · 🌐

"Because of strict packing quotas, set at 240 boxes an hour, practising Muslims are struggling to pray five times a day."



THE SUN.CO.UK
Muslim Amazon workers protest against online firm & say there's no time to pray

👍👎👉 337 206 comments 135 shares

PEGIDA UK post number 15 from 28 December 2018.

Patriot Promotional Page: Patriots Voice
28 December 2018 · 🌐



👍❤️🔥 1.7K 507 comments 35K shares

PEGIDA UK post number 16 from 19th of November 2018.

Patriot Promotional Page: Patriots Voice
19 November 2018 · 🌐

Everyone likes a happy ending...



JIHADWATCH.ORG
Chechnya: Muslima blows herself up near police station, succeeds in killing only herself

👍❤️🔥 510 82 comments 141 shares

PEGIDA UK post number 17 from 1st of August 2018.

Patriot Promotional Page: Patriots Voice
1 August 2018 · 🌐

TR walks free from prison









👍❤️🔥 210 12 comments 21 shares







👍 Like 💬 Comment ➦ Share

Most relevant ▾

<p>PEGIDA UK post number 18 from 24th of July 2018.</p>	<div style="text-align: center;"> <h2>Europe's Anti-Muslim Countries</h2> </div> <table border="0"> <tr> <td>Hungary</td> <td>0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Poland</td> <td>0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Czech Republic</td> <td>0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties</td> <td></td> </tr> <tr> <td>Slovakia</td> <td>0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties</td> <td></td> </tr> </table> <div style="text-align: center; background-color: black; color: white; padding: 10px; font-style: italic;"> <p>Does anyone think there is a pattern here??</p> </div> <div style="text-align: right; margin-top: 10px;">  </div>	Hungary	0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties		Poland	0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties		Czech Republic	0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties		Slovakia	0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties	
Hungary	0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties												
Poland	0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties												
Czech Republic	0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties												
Slovakia	0 Muslim migrants 0 Terror casualties												

Appendix 2: Demographics

<p>The first section where the researcher found gender-based information</p>	<p>Basic info</p> <p> Female Gender</p>
<p>The second place the researcher found information relating to education level, places lived and where the person was born</p>	<p>About</p> <p>Overview</p> <p>Work and education</p> <p>Places lived</p> <p>Contact and basic info</p> <p>Family and relationships</p> <p>Details About Murielle</p> <p>Life events</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">  No workplaces to show  No schools/universities to show  No places to show  No relationship info to show
<p>This is one of the profile pictures of a DFLA supporter. It is clear from this picture that the individual is white.</p>	

<p>This picture is taken from the persons profile pictures. It suggests that the person is Christian.</p>	
<p>This information, found under the basic information part of the profile under the About tab, shows that the individual is a Christian.</p>	
<p>This information, found under the basic information part of the profile under the About tab, shows that the individual is a Christian. Whether they are practicing or not is unknown.</p>	
<p>This information, found under the basic information part of the profile under the About tab, shows that the individual is an Atheist and previously supported the Labour Party.</p>	
<p>This information was taken from an individual's Facebook profile page. It can be found under the About tab, under the Contact and basic info subcategory.</p>	
<p>This information was taken from an individual's Facebook profile page. It shows the individual date of birth. From this, the researcher is able to find out the age of the supporter. This information can be found under the About tab, under the Contact and basic info subcategory.</p>	

Appendix 3. The raw SPSS data for the number of people in each demographic for The For Britain Movement

		Statistics							
		Gender	Location	Education	White	Born	Religion	Sexuality	Age
N	Valid	3000	1337	972	2013	1234	84	298	216
	Missing	0	1663	2028	987	1766	2916	2702	2784
Mode		1.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	4.00

Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Male	2092	69.7	69.7
	Female	897	29.9	29.9
	Other	11	.4	.4
	Total	3000	100.0	100.0

Education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	School	528	17.6	54.3
	College	223	7.4	22.9
	Undergraduate	171	5.7	17.6
	Masters	5	.2	.5
	PhD	1	.0	.1
	Uni of life	37	1.2	3.8
	School of life	7	.2	.7
	Total	972	32.4	100.0
Missing	System	2028	67.6	
Total		3000	100.0	

White

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	White	1956	65.2	97.2
	Non-white	57	1.9	2.8
	Total	2013	67.1	100.0
Missing	System	987	32.9	
Total		3000	100.0	

Religion

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Christian	45	1.5	53.6	53.6
	Other	10	.3	11.9	65.5
	Not Religious	28	.9	33.3	98.8
	Muslim	1	.0	1.2	100.0
	Total	84	2.8	100.0	
Missing	System	2916	97.2		
Total		3000	100.0		

Sexuality

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Straight	275	9.2	92.3
	Gay	11	.4	3.7
	Bisexual	12	.4	4.0
	Total	298	9.9	100.0
Missing	System	2702	90.1	
Total		3000	100.0	

Age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	15-25	11	.4	5.1
	26-40	17	.6	7.9
	40-59	59	2.0	27.3
	60+	129	4.3	59.7
	Total	216	7.2	100.0
Missing	System	2784	92.8	
Total		3000	100.0	

Appendix 4. The raw SPSS data for the number of people in each demographic for DFLA.

Statistics

		Gender	Location	Education	White	Born	Religion	Sexuality	Age
N	Valid	3000	1464	1130	2382	1378	56	284	227
	Missing	0	1536	1870	618	1622	2944	2716	2773
Mode		1.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	3.00

Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	2085	69.5	69.5	69.5
	Female	901	30.0	30.0	99.5
	Other	14	.5	.5	100.0
	Total	3000	100.0	100.0	

Education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	School	704	23.5	62.3	62.3
	College	280	9.3	24.8	87.1
	Undergraduate	104	3.5	9.2	96.3
	Masters	1	.0	.1	96.4
	No education	2	.1	.2	96.5
	Uni of life	34	1.1	3.0	99.6
	School of life	5	.2	.4	100.0
	Total	1130	37.7	100.0	
Missing	System	1870	62.3		
Total		3000	100.0		

White

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	White	2357	78.6	99.0	99.0
	Non-white	25	.8	1.0	100.0
	Total	2382	79.4	100.0	
Missing	System	618	20.6		
Total		3000	100.0		

Religion

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Christian	34	1.1	60.7	60.7
	Other	7	.2	12.5	73.2
	Not religious	14	.5	25.0	98.2
	Muslim	1	.0	1.8	100.0
	Total	56	1.9	100.0	
Missing	System	2944	98.1		
Total		3000	100.0		

Sexuality

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Straight	271	9.0	95.4
	Gay	5	.2	1.8
	Bisexual	8	.3	2.8
	Total	284	9.5	100.0
Missing	System	2716	90.5	
Total		3000	100.0	

Age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	15–25	27	.9	11.9
	26–39	26	.9	11.5
	40–59	102	3.4	44.9
	60+	68	2.3	30.0
	0–14	4	.1	1.8
	Total	227	7.6	100.0
Missing	System	2773	92.4	
Total		3000	100.0	

Appendix 5. The raw SPSS data for the number of people in each demographic for PEGIDA UK.

Statistics

		Gender	Location	Education	White	Born	Religion	Sexuality	Age
N	Valid	3000	1458	1051	2107	1363	78	414	178
	Missing	0	1542	1949	893	1637	2922	2586	2822
Mode		1.00	9.00	1.00	1.00	9.00	1.00	1.00	4.00

Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Male	2254	75.1	75.1
	Female	738	24.6	24.6
	Non-binary	8	.3	.3
	Total	3000	100.0	100.0

Education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	School	561	18.7	53.4
	College	284	9.5	27.0
	Undergraduate	165	5.5	15.7
	Masters	7	.2	.7
	PhD	3	.1	.3
	Uni of life	24	.8	2.3
	School of life	7	.2	.7
	Total	1051	35.0	100.0
Missing	System	1949	65.0	
Total		3000	100.0	

White

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	White	1905	63.5	90.4
	Non-white	202	6.7	9.6
	Total	2107	70.2	100.0
Missing	System	893	29.8	
Total		3000	100.0	

Religion

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Christian	41	1.4	52.6	52.6
	Other	14	.5	17.9	70.5
	Not religious	23	.8	29.5	100.0
	Total	78	2.6	100.0	
Missing	System	2922	97.4		
Total		3000	100.0		

Sexuality

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	Straight	385	12.8	93.0
	Gay	8	.3	1.9
	Bisexual	21	.7	5.1
	Total	414	13.8	100.0
Missing	System	2586	86.2	
Total		3000	100.0	

Age

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Valid	15-25	29	1.0	16.3
	26-40	40	1.3	22.5
	40-59	53	1.8	29.8
	60+	56	1.9	31.5
	Total	178	5.9	100.0
Missing	System	2822	94.1	
Total		3000	100.0	

Appendix 6

The For Britain Movement Leaders			
Video	Title	Length	Link
Video 1	Anne Marie Waters speech FLA Birmingham 2018-03-24	13:26	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bYgnf9qxqqQ
Video 2	Anne Marie Waters at Speaker's Corner: 27_05_2018	10:44	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YN094AsWpi0
Video 3	Anne Marie Waters //National Conference// For Britain	39:51	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XmF0HDFE78I
Video 4	A message from Anne Marie Waters	2:39	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJ469sQJTr4
Video 5	For Britain Live: Looking Back at 2020	01:02:51	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VWHBCI-99ZU
Video 6	The Great Threat to Britain //Anne Marie Waters // For Britain	29:15	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S5fnOCJw88
Video 7	Anne Marie Waters - Free Tommy Rally	10:22	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BRHYTZBpTVM
Video 8	Anne Marie Waters // GI Conference with Q and A	48:20	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79qWHvgRyGk
Video 9	USA Breaking Point // Anne Marie Waters	35:22	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5V-KukbQ8ec
Video 10	Anne Marie Waters - For Britain Rally in Essex 2019	49:46	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8wQbDUYFIQQ

The For Britain Movement Supporters			
Video	Title	Length	Link
Video 1	Why I joined For Britain	3:26	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dfDiYqLsgLY
Video 2	For Britain – Our Union flag is banned – Durham Miner's Gala 2018	2:48	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bwsFgFwgvw
Video 3	For Britain Party Conference 2020 - Part 1	43:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=On3hdF6QjvQ
Video 4	For Britain 2020 Party Conference - Part 1	10:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ykl7ADRKGeY
Video 5	For Britain 2020 Party Conference - Part 1	2:20	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=On3hdF6QjvQ
Video 6	For Britain 2020 Party Conference - Part 2	27:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ykl7ADRKGeY
Video 7	For Britain 2020 Party Conference - Part 2	5:50	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ykl7ADRKGeY
Video 8	Anne Marie meets Yasmine Mohammed // For Britain	1:12:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cIX_8RNLSOM
Video 9	Pamela Geller // National Conference 2019 // For Britain	29:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=onY_Y9eEbMU

Video 10	Katie Hopkins // National Conference 2019 // For Britain	6:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2F8civ_ss_M
Video 11	Dr Bill Warner // National Conference 2019 // For Britain	18:25	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uUt1wieAtKg
Video 12	Shazia Hobbs at the For Britain National Conference 2018	9:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNO9fjj1Y
Video 13	An ex-Muslim gives a talk at the For Britain National Conference 2018	16:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qoqGFx6lg3U
Video 14	katie Hopkins at the For Britain National Conference 2018	29:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUYpgXxDM_k
Video 15	Tania Groth at the For Britain National Conference 2018	17:13	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a3JA-DSzMmU
Video 16	Live Animal Exports – For Britain Animal Welfare	6:52	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8gxn3STtkbg
Video 17	Hunting with Dogs – Lawrence Rogers – For Britain	29:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dUYSExqVq6o

DFLA leaders			
Video	Title	Length	Link
Video 1	D-FLA Football Lads Alliance Birmingham UK	22:40	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2c56vm3ugc
Video 2	Veterans Against Terrorism Demo DFLA FLA UKIP Birmingham	7:33	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B5G6FSOMNh0
Video 3	Sunderland sept 15 2019 J4WC/DFLA & VAT DEMO against RAPE RB INMANS EPIC speech	5:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nGDHe8bt0Js
Video 4	D.F.L.A VETERANS AGAINST TERRORISM, ROCHDALE CHILD SEX ABUSE SCANDAL PRT 1	20:00	https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC9gXUO6bK0qRQxCqmjKBenQ/search?query=d%20f%20l%20a
Video 5	D.F.L.A + VETERANS AGAINST EXTREMISM BIRMINGHAM PRT 8	33:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8PnbicBLV2I
Video 6	D.F.L.A.+ VETERANS AGAINST EXTREMISM BIRMINGHAM	27:18	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R3i_oEI2UIw
Video 7	D.F.L.A VETERANS AGAINST TERRORISM TERRORISM ROCHDALE CHILD ABUSE SCANDAL PRT 4	7:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o8FO4vjsnI0
Video 8	D.F.L.A TELFORD SCANDAL DEMO .PRT 4	24:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eNXDer-KevU
Video 9	DFLA LEADERS – VIDEO 9	27:54	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G17Ieh0LHU8
Video 10	The Official DFLA Democratic Football Lads Alliance was live 1st May 2019	1:09:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X9ifKI60kuQ
Video 11	DFLA DELIVER LETTER TO THE GUARDIAN HQ	5:53	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=20Nm89imDGg


DFLA supporters			
Video	Title	Length	Link
Video 1	DFLA Manchester - Great support for Tommy Robinson	3:40	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MwRkqjTnUDo
Video 2	UKIP leader flirts with 'racist' Democratic Football Lads Alliance	7:45	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFXS9aIQAos
Video 3	Black Van Man mini-interview from #DFLA demo #sharetherisk	15:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DclOpYbYfmw
Video 4	Zero News : #dfla #BREXIT DEMO #LONDON LIVE #BORIS #FUEU part 2	1:00:53	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LyURGxEZZYg
Video 5	Zero news short: #DFLA have called for action. We should be there(?) #sharetherisk #brexit	4:32	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G77Dr_Q3KGs
Video 6	Zero News: #dfla #BREXIT DEMO #LONDON #LIVE #BORIS #FUEU	1:00:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWe3mYg7uo8
Video 7	Zero News: #dfla #BREXIT DEMO #LONDON #LIVE #BORIS #FUEU	1:00:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UWe3mYg7uo8
Video 8	Birmingham UKFM & DFLA Veterans Against Terrorism Teaser	3:29	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a4h4vFqHWZQ
Video 9	DFLA ('Democratic Football Lads Alliance) fascists Tommy Robinson Attack defenceless Muslims	14:58	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5L4pb-40Hns
Video 10	JAMES GODDARD wannabe Tommy Robinson DFLA fascists GAMMONS! At Speakers Corner	15:01	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kq6breEk-RQ
Video 11	DFLA March in Manchester 2 nd June 2018	1:45:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGMjTKszCYs

PEGIDA UK Leaders			
Video	Title	Length	Link
Video 1	PEGIDA UK Leadership Announcement	16:19	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9zTQRFerII
Video 2	PEGIDA UK Leadership visit Denmark	17:14	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MPJW-MsTlf8
Video 3	PEGIDA UK – ROTHERHAM June 04 th 2016	25:29	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dO4vtRM8k-s
Video 4	PEGIDA UK – Birmingham 2016	10:11	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rW20FZ83KAo
Video 5	Former EDL Leader Tommy Robinson brings Pegida to the UK Guardian Docs	10:59	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2gzgWE7GS9g
Video 6	LIVE: PEGIDA take to the streets of Newcastle in first-ever UK rally	1:00:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePsI0KEmSqQ
Video 7	PEGIDA UK: Tommy Robinson's anti-Islam street movement	3:13	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qiq1kSlis00

Video 8	Tommy Robinson 'PEGIDA UK' in Cologne	13:40	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6-Vbt4agJJw
Video 9	Anne Marie addresses the media	9:18	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WBasC3svyil
Video 10	Come join PEGIDA in Birmingham	15:52	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSKZFQjFVEc
Video 11	Pegida in Rotherham by Anne Marie Waters	7:4	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYc4DZPwMvs
Video 12	LIVE: PEGIDA demo to be met by counter protest in Birmingham	156:59	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yjPWIZJVlkg
Video 13	PEGIDA UK: academic beaten by migrant's visits march	4:31	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9tPKDQL9qYk

PEGIDA UK Supporters			
Video	Title	Length	Link
Video 1	LIVE: PEGIDA take to the streets of Newcastle in first-ever UK rally	1:00:00	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePsiOKEmSqQ
Video 2	PEGIDA UK Rotherham 4 6 16	11:41	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vGGME6K0SwQ
Video 3	PEGIDA UK Rotherham 4 6 16	7:22	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4xlvthUpPXg
Video 4	PEGIDA UK Rotherham 4 6 16	17:38	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pb42mb1iPk4
Video 5	Pegida uk, peaceful protest	09:14	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f1zKWAgNnAE
Video 6	Islam out, demand PEGIDA UK	09:59	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6i8z6zY3uhs
Video 7	Anti-Islamists demonstrate in Britain: Hate in Europe	08:15	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IjaiJ_maUEY
Video 8	Anti Islamisation march prompts protests and death threat claims	4:08	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y-lpkHNTQ4k
Video 9	LIVE: PEGIDA, EDL rally meets ANTIFA counter-protest in London	2:48:11	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x82jp_tB2WI

Appendix 7. An example of the sunburst, hierarchy chart used to identify the most common themes in each dataset. The example is from the PEGIDA UK leaders data set.



Appendix 8. Overall themes in all three NVIVO datasets

	The For Britain leaders	The For Britain supporters	DFLA leaders	DFLA supporters	PEGIDA UK leaders	PEGIDA UK supporters
1	Concerned about change	Concerned about animal rights	Concerns about soldiers	Concerned about English or British identity, culture and values	Certain people don't see the effects of Islam	Concern that they are victimized and persecuted
2	Concerned about Black Lives Matter	Concerned about Brexit	Concerned about Gurkha's rights	Concerned about homeless veterans	Concern about the treatment of immigrants	Concerned about child abuse
3	Concerned about left-wing	Concerned about change	Concerned about unity	Concerned about lack of	Concern about the way things	Concerned about freedom

	charities and think tanks			support for victims	have changed in the UK	and freedom of speech
4	Concerns about LGBT rights	Concerns about children's rights	Concerns about children's safety	Concerns about oppression	Concern over the treatment of Jewish people	Concerned about hate towards communities
5	Concerns about power to the people	Concerns about communism	Concerns about cultural relativism	Concerns about representation	Concern about Brexit	Concerned about whether someone is British or not
6	Concerns about the future	Concerns about conspiracy theories	Concerns about democracy	Concerns about truthfulness	Concern about Conspiracy theories	Concerned about Islam generally
7	Concerns about the trans movement	Concerned about COVID-19	Concerns about English and British identity	Concerns that the government appeases terrorism	Concern about mass immigration	Concerned about Islamist extremism and terrorism
8	Concern for the world	Concerned about democracy	Concerns about far-right terrorism	Concern that justice is not being upheld	Concerned about politicians and the political system	Concerned about multiculturalism
9	Concerned about alliances with Islam	Concerned about disillusionment with mainstream political parties	Concerns about freedom of speech	Concerned about all types of extremism	Concern about rights	Concerned about rights being eroded
10	Concerns about animal rights	Concerned about globalization	Concerns about Irish terrorism	Concerns about child abuse	Concerned about the left	Concerned about the EU
11	Concerned about Brexit	Concerns about human rights	Concerns about Islam	Concerns about conspiracy theories	Concern about their image	Concerned about the future
12	Concerned about Britain	Concerns about Islam	Concerns about Labour causing harm	Concerns about foreign occupation	Concern about victimization and oppression	Concerned about the government and politicians
13	Concerns about child abuse	Concerns about Mainstream media	Concerns about Mainstream media	Concerns about immigration	Concern for the safety of women	Concerned about the left
14	Concerns about communism	Concerns about oppression	Concerns about migrants	Concerns about Irish terrorism	Concerned that European culture and way of life is under threat	Concerned about the media
15	Concerned about competition	Concerns about politicians	Concerns about Muslims being in danger	Concerns about Islam and Islamic ideology	Concerned that institutions are pro-Islam and silencing people	Concerned about the police
16	Concerns about conspiracy theories	Concerns about the future	Concerns about oppression	Concerns about protecting Muslims	Concerns about Islam generally	Concerned about the threat to English identity
17	Concerns about democratic ideals	Concerns about the truth	Concerns about tarnishing everyone with the same brush	Concerns about the establishment	Concerns about Islamist extremism and terrorism	Concerned about their image
18	Concerned about equality	Concerns about the world	Concerns about the establishment	Concerns about the future of the country		Concerned about women's rights

19	Concerned about gender norms	Concerns about victimisation and persecution	Concerns about truthfulness	Concerns about the media		
20	Concerned about globalisation	Concerns about war	Concerns about victims of terrorism	Concerns about Tommy Robinson		
21	Concerned about Islam	Concerns about Western civilization	Concerns about women's rights and safety	Concerns for women's rights		
22	Concerned about Jewish rights	Concerns for ex-Muslims	Concerns for homeless people	Concerns that Brexit has been hijacked or will not happen		
23	Concerned about the lack of control	Concerned their voice is ignored	Concerned that people are ignoring the warning signs	Concerned that democracy will fall in the UK		
24	Concerned about law and order	Concerns about how Europe has changed	Concerns that politicians do not represent the people	Concerns that the UK is losing its freedoms		
25	Concerned about the enemies within		Concerns that the government appeases terrorism			
26	Concerned about the left		Concerns that the UK is in danger			
27	Concerned about the welfare state					
28	Concerned about totalitarianism					
29	Concerned about truth					
30	Concerned about victimization and persecution					
31	Concerned about women's rights					
32	Concerned about Tommy Robinson					

Appendix 9. Examples of themes and sub-themes

Themes *	
Group 1: The For Britain Movement leaders	
<p>Theme 1: Concerned about conspiracy theories used to oppress citizens</p> <p>Definition: Explicit concern that there is a sinister plot by global elites to destroy civilisation as we know it creating more inequality and oppression. Positions several different groups, systems and institutions are enemies of the people as they want to control the masses through sinister oppressive methods, specifically referencing white, British, or Western persons being the target of these conspiracies.</p>	<p>“Why is it so easy for our state to jail Tommy Robinson when it is so difficult to jail a group of men found in and under it with an underage girl in the bedroom? Why is it so much easier to jail Tommy Robinson? Why is it so easy to jail a man for leaving bacon at a mosque and so difficult to jail jihadi who preach murder and death? Why is it so easy for judges to make rulings that allow known terrorists and jihadist to stay in our country? Why is the British government allowing ISIS fighters to return from Syria and threaten our safety? Why do we talk and investigate and get angry about an accidental fire in Grenfell, but are expected to immediately forget or not look back in anger about the deliberate ideology driven murder of British children? Why are Muslims allowed to cover their faces with a black sack while the rest of us are subject to strict security? Why are children being mutilated and forcefully raped while the law looks the other way, forcefully married, child marriage, while the Law looks the other way? Why we're animals slaughtered in agony and terror and halal impose upon all of us in a country that has legislation against on unstun slaughter? Why is it so easy Theresa May, to jail Tommy Robinson but so difficult to do anything at all about the monstrous crimes committed in the name of Islam all over this country every day? Why? Shall I answer the question for you? Because our government is facilitating the referent Islamization, of us, of our society for their own political gain. The global elites are the ones</p>

	<p>that want our borders open, but the truth about the religion of peace, is proven to be a fly in the ointment. Therefore, they must not only hide the truth but mercilessly persecute anyone who dares to speak it loudly. Tommy Robinson is one of the bravest people in this country, if not the. He has faced endless persecution for speaking the truth, he has had his life placed in danger” (The For Britain Movement leaders – Video 7)</p>
Sub-theme 1: The Great Replacement	<p>“Let’s look at Pakistan as an example of why it might but first of all let’s answer the question before I move on to Pakistan, let’s answer the question is The Great Replacement happening? The left again and by which, I mean the mainstream will tell you absolutely not, how dare you you, Nazi you racist you Fascist. No, there’s no Great Replacement, what are you talking about? Those same people will celebrate when London becomes minority English, they will tell you that we’re all alike more in common we’re all the same really. What difference does it make, why are you talking about ethnicity why are you talking about race why are you talking about Europe versus non-Europe? It doesn’t matter, we’re all the same, those very same people will be advocating multiculturalism the next day, they will be talking about how wonderful diversity is, they will walk into a room and say there’s far too many white people in this room, where is the diversity? But I thought you said it didn’t matter, I thought you said it didn’t matter in slightest, we’re all alike aren’t we, we’re more in common aren’t we so why must we have diversity? Of course, we are different, of course we are different. We have different groups; we have different cultures we have different value systems around the world. I am talking globally of course even within Europe there are a variety, very similar but still different” (The For Britain Movement leaders - Video 8)</p>
Sub-theme 2: The Great Reset	<p>“She calls transhumanism, the injecting of materials into the body that hook us up to the cloud, to the technological systems. Our actual bodies and minds will be hooked up to these systems. She said we will be facing a world, as a result, a world with zero privacy and we know already the World Economic Forum has talked about this and the UN has talked about this. How we will own nothing, we will have no privacy and we will all be ecstatically happy. Well, I can tell you now, for sure, I won’t be ecstatically happy. My privacy means a great deal to me. We are heading towards a social credit system, like the one in china, where you your behavior is, and by behavior i mean your willingness to obey the state, will determine your life chances and your life itself and they may even and will, as she insists, cut off even our ability to spend and this is why currency and getting rid of currencies is so important. We can see that happening, we’re heading into a cashless society, we have done for a long time. Heading into a cashless society as a means of control, so if the bank controls your spending, which it does for many of us now, then you can be cut off even being able to buy food. If you don’t behave yourself, she said, and again I’ll quote her we are digitizing everything, including the human body and mind” (The For Britain Movement leaders – Interview 5)</p>
<p>Theme 2: Concern that the government and politicians prioritise immigrants over British citizens Definition: Concern that the government and politicians work against the interests of the British public. They prioritise Muslims, immigrants and non-British people over British people and oppress those that speak out against this perceived prioritisation. Implicit concern about a conspiracy between left-wing politicians and Islam but not an explicit collaboration.</p>	<p>“Now it’s our government that we are obliged to struggle against.” (The For Britain Movement leaders – Video 6)</p>
Sub-theme 1: They are dissatisfied with the government	<p>“Because the British government has taken away our free speech with so-called hate legislation” (The For Britain Movement leaders – Interview 6)</p>
Sub-theme 2: Concerned about corrupt politicians	<p>“What are you going to do about the fact that a free man [Tommy Robinson] is being persecuted regardless of this case? He has been persecuted since he first started speaking out against the [Islamic] ideology” (The For Britain Movement leaders – Video 2)</p>

Group 2: The For Britain Movement supporters	
<p>Theme 1: Concerned about the perceived threat from Islamic ideology Definition: Islamic ideology aims to destroy civilisation as we know it through oppression and totalitarianism. This Islamification is mostly occurring in Western, powerful nations that are not historically or culturally Islamic and which have different cultural beliefs and values. These values positioned as superior to 'Islamic' values are being eroded by 'inferior' Islamic values moving away from progressivism and towards oppression. Islamification was not explicitly categorised as a conspiracy theory, any reference to a conspiracy was implicit.</p>	<p>"We need to discuss Islam, Islam itself" (The For Britain Movement supporters – Video 4)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 1: Islam is anti-women's rights</p>	<p>"I very quickly realized that in Islam a woman is never independent in her own right, all the rights that I had, had been afforded to me by the British culture and by the British values, it was not through Islam. I suffered 12 years of abuse and Islam provided my husband the platform to treat me as an inferior subordinate. In 2005, I was forced to perform the hajj with him and his extended family, whilst in the most sacred place in the whole world known to Muslims, I was sexually assaulted not once but twice. I couldn't scream, I couldn't escape, I couldn't even tell anybody what happened. I couldn't report it because in Islam I would need two witnesses, I would need two witnesses, male witnesses, if it was women there need to be four because women are of deficient mind and so there's no witnesses but also because I was married, if I had no witnesses, I would be accused of adultery and that meant the punishment of either being stoned or 100 lashes and I was not going to put myself through that. I told my husband who really rejoiced and reminded me that Allah was punishing me because I was a slag and maybe I should have been raped to be taught a lesson and to be more obedient to my husband" (The For Britain Movement – Video 13)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 2: Islam is not a religion of peace</p>	<p>"After September 11th 2001, the attack on the World Trade Towers, Church phones begin to ring and a voice on the other end of the line said, hi I'm such-and-such a Muslim and we would like to come to your church and present a talk on Islam the religion of peace" (The For Britain Movement supporters – Video 11)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 3: Islamification or Muslim immigration</p>	<p>"Today is my second last day of a two-week journey to an East European country to visit a German friend who has also been very public and active in fighting Islam and the migrant invasion albeit in her case from Germany" (The For Britain supporters – Video 15)</p>
<p>Theme 2: Concerned that they are silenced for their political ideology Definition: Different means of victimisation are used to oppress individuals that critique the mainstream pro-Islam narrative. Those that critique this mainstream narrative are oppressed by different institutions including the government, the police and liberals who are argued to have a pro-Islam agenda. Labels are used to silence individuals with far-right arguments resulting in a form of oppression. This pro-Islam agenda is implied but not explicitly referenced.</p>	<p>"We look west towards you in England, with the Islamic sex so-called grooming gang scandals where the victims are young vulnerable English girls. We see the cover-ups and the totalitarian nature of your government, a government that punishes not the perpetrators but the people who try to solve the problems, such as Anne Marie Waters, Paul Weston, Tommy Robinson and a host of other good people, many here present" (The For Britain Movement supporters – Video 15)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 1: They are silenced</p>	<p>"It is just not happening quite as fast, no we have for example not yet had a Muslim grooming gang like here in England, where authorities are in an unholy cocktail of political correctness and fear of being called racist has escalated the outrage and where the authorities tried to close the mouth of the people, and in particular Tommy Robinson, who is attempting to uncover, speak about and shine a light on the problems" (The For Britain Movement supporters – Video 15)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 2: They are labelled</p>	<p>"Now when I heard this I thought well that'll never go anywhere, but it's gone all over the world and now then it shuts us up, well it doesn't shut me up but it shuts many people up and then they call you a racist, hater, bigoted, Islamophobe and being threatened with being told that a lot of people just say well I won't talk about Islam at all because I don't want to be a bigot or seen as a bigot." (The For Britain Movement supporters – Video 11)</p>

Group 3: DFLA leaders	
<p>Theme 1: Concerned that child sexual exploitation is facilitated by a corrupt political system</p> <p>Definition: Concern about child sexual exploitation that has been facilitated by a corrupt council and political system. Perpetrators of the 'grooming gang' cases were allowed to continue their sexual abuse of young girls due to political incompetency and corruption. Any conspiracy between 'Muslim perpetrators', Labour councillors and the police was implied and not explicitly referenced.</p>	<p>"We've got to stop calling it that, we've got to start looking at this, and our children, it is rape. A child under the age of 16 cannot consent to somebody above the age of 16 and certainly not to grown men. I'd like to ask as I give you this today, Al Capone, they went after him for being a mobster, they couldn't get him for being a mobster, so they got him on something else, tax evasion. So, let's start looking at plying minors with alcohol, that's an offence, a criminal offence and you'll attest to that, plying them with prescription drugs, plying them with class A drugs and obviously the supplying of class A drugs and this thing about consensual sex, it can't be can it. I'd like that to be handed to Chief superintendent" (The DFLA leaders – Video 12)</p>
Sub-theme 1: Concerned that the victims were failed by the authorities	<p>"One girl in particular was raped by over a hundred men. She gave 80 names of those men to the police officers and the police officers didn't arrest one single man." (The DFLA – Video 15)</p>
Sub-theme 2: Concerned about the victims of CSE	<p>"So I stand with every Muslim woman, I stand with every non-Muslim woman, I stand with every child, I stand with every single person who stand against this heinous crime and I stand here as a survivor, a warrior." (The DFLA – Video 15)</p>
<p>Theme 2: Concerned that they are silenced for their political ideology</p> <p>Definition: Different means of victimisation are used to oppress individuals that critique the mainstream pro-Islam narrative. Those that critique this mainstream narrative are oppressed by different institutions including the government, the police and liberals who are argued to have a pro-Islam agenda. Labels are used to silence individuals with far-right arguments resulting in a form of oppression. This pro-Islam agenda is implied but not explicitly referenced.</p>	<p>"They have wrote a lot of articles about us that are lies, alright, they are lies. They never give us the right to reply so we have to come and present you with this letter. We'd like you to hand that to the editor in chief and if nothing is done about it, we'll come back again" (The DFLA leaders – Video 11)</p>
Sub-theme 1: Concerned that they are silenced	<p>"I've been looking at something that's been happening behind us and I think somebody just turned up the heat. It's a sunny day on the temperatures getting turned up politically as well that's why we're here. There's a song written several years ago and hope it's going to be sung later on today the first line of that song said this, you've got the words to change a nation but you're biting your tongue. We're not going to bite our tongues anymore; we are not going to be silenced anymore. See we are the silent majority and, and the people that tried to close us down earlier on, the people that tried to silence us, they are fascists because they hate freedom of speech and we're Patriots because we love freedom of speech" (The DFLA leaders – Video 14)</p>
Sub-theme 2: Concern that they are labelled	<p>"We're fed up of being called right wing and racist, we've had enough of it. If that doesn't appear in the paper, we'll come back here stronger, alright?" (The DFLA leaders) – Talking to The Guardian newspaper about not calling them right-wing and racist</p>
Group 4: DFLA supporter	
<p>Theme 1: Concerned that they are legally oppressed for their political ideology</p> <p>Definition: Critics of the pro-Islam, pro-multicultural narrative are oppressed by a corrupt political and legal system. The police and legal system oppress those that are critical of Islam and multiculturalism. Individuals are not treated as equal citizens in the eyes of the law due to their political ideology. Instead of an explicit conspiracy, this pro-multicultural agenda was referenced implicitly where immigrants are prioritised for their vote.</p>	<p>"What gets me mate it doesn't matter what community of people that the police are doing that to if they're going to decide to have winners and losers between different identities then that is a severe problem because you know you're making the others an outcast when we all should be one civilization" (The DFLA supporters – Video 5)</p>
Sub-theme 1: The police are not impartial	<p>"Now to the police Chowdhury, a well-known hate preacher told one of your own that he should not be wearing a help the heroes wristband because it was political. So, the police officer took it off." (The DFLA supporters – Video 13)</p>
<p>Theme 2: Concerned about the perceived threat from Islamic ideology</p> <p>Definition: Islamic ideology aims to destroy civilisation as we know it through oppression and totalitarianism. This Islamification</p>	<p>"We all oppose terrorism; we're all opposed to murder and indiscriminate crime. If we want to end this scourge in the world, then we have to oppose the ideologies that use terrorism that use violence. Ideologies that rely on</p>

<p>is mostly occurring in Western, powerful nations that are not historically or culturally Islamic and which have different cultural beliefs and values. These values positioned as superior to 'Islamic' values are being eroded by 'inferior' Islamic values moving away from progressivism and towards oppression. Islamification was not explicitly categorised as a conspiracy theory, any reference to a conspiracy was implicit.</p>	<p>terrorism in order to propagatate themselves have no place in Western, Liberal, Democratic civilization" (The DFLA supporters – Video 2)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 1: Islam is anti-women's rights</p>	<p>"Today I want to talk about things that make the UK Great. The reason I'm allowed to wear what I am wearing today is because I am not afraid, and I am nobodies' property. Nor am I owed by a religious bigot of a man. You can clearly see my face, my expression, and my looks. I am not veiled." (The DFLA supporters – Video 13)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 2: Islam is not a religion of peace</p>	<p>"But not in the West so to going back to that point so what they've done effectively they give these barbarians a green light and they leave us the victims wide open to do abuses and to be picked off and I just couldn't afford to get myself killed and put my family through any more distressing experiences and can I just say I class myself as a refugee in this country. I am born and raised here and my family and I we pass ourselves as refugees in our own country in our own backyard and I could just simply go on and on but all I can say to you actually that this is not the England that I grew up in until something is drastically reversed turned around and somebody reforms Islam then I think it's a very grave danger" (The DFLA supporters – Video 5)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 3: Islamification or Muslim immigration</p>	<p>"Exactly, and the Muslim population is like 5%, why would they be changing all the rules for 5% of the population? Takeover, I can't see any other reason" (The DFLA supporters – Video 7)</p>
<p>Group 5: PEGIDA UK leaders</p>	
<p>Theme 1: Concerned about the perceived threat from Islamic ideology Definition: Islamic ideology aims to destroy civilisation as we know it through oppression and totalitarianism. This Islamification is mostly occurring in Western, powerful nations that are not historically or culturally Islamic and which have different cultural beliefs and values. These values positioned as superior to 'Islamic' values are being eroded by 'inferior' Islamic values moving away from progressivism and towards oppression. Islamification was not explicitly categorised as a conspiracy theory, any reference to a conspiracy was implicit.</p>	<p>"His name was Mohammed, and what was he doing out there in Libya or Syria or where ever he is, he is doing nothing that the prophet Mohammed did not personally do. Did Mohammed the Prophet, behead people? Yes, he did. Did he take girls as sex slaves, yes he did. Did he raise jihad, yes he did. And now, we have our own little pocket Mohammed over there doing exactly the same thing and all of the media and the political class in this country are all saying what happened to him. What inspired this nice, well educated young man at Westminster university to go over there and start chopping off English people's heads? It's quite simple, he has not been radicalised by some peculiar, imaginary ideology, he has taken the words of the Qur'an at their literal value. So when Mohammed said, I have been commanded to wage war against all mankind until they testify that there is no god but Allah and Mohammad is his messenger. That is what Jihadi John is doing in Libya, it's literal, it's real. And when Mohammad said, I will instil terror into the hearts of the disbelievers, strike at their necks, that is what jihadi John is doing in Libya. It has nothing to do with the perverted ideology he has taken, it is the literal words of the Qur'an and it's about bloody time that everybody in this country understood that this is a nook of hatred, terror, and submission" (PEGIDA UK leaders – Video 6)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 1: Islam is anti-women's rights</p>	<p>"This treatment of women is utterly appalling and completely incompatible with a democratic free society" (PEGIDA UK leaders – Video 1)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 2: Islam is not a religion of peace</p>	<p>"We have continually spouted Islam is a religion of peace, it's got nothing to do with Islam after every atrocity" (PEGIDA UK leaders – Video 1)</p>
<p>Sub-theme 3: Islamification or Muslim immigration</p>	<p>"Left liberals will try to suggest we're not at war with Islam so therefore there can be no such thing as war booty but yet again this comes down to their woeful and their deliberate ignorance rather than any keen eyed and logical or impartial evaluation. Islam divides the world into two separate entities: the da al Islam and the da al-hab. Dar al-Islam means the house of submission where Islam rules, the dar al-haab is the house of war and its termed the house of war simply because it has not yet submitted to Islam and in this particular case the house of war is now the west it's America, it's Canada, it's Australia, it's Europe, it's</p>

	Paris, London, Rotherham, Malmo, Toronto, Cologne, Sydney, Berlin, the Muslim rape epidemic we see unfolding all around us is entirely predictable simply because we've allowed into the west a supremacist religious and political ideology quranically commanded to subject us to their laws and to subject us to their culture and left liberals continue to celebrate diversity and continue to celebrate multiculturalism" (PEGIDA UK leaders – Video 10)
Theme 2: Concern that the government and politicians prioritise immigrants over British citizens Definition: Concern that the government and politicians work against the interests of the British public. They prioritise Muslims, immigrants and non-British people over British people and oppress those that speak out against this perceived prioritisation. Implicit concern about a conspiracy between left-wing politicians and Islam but not an explicit collaboration.	"I wish our political leaders were doing [opposing Islam] it because they're the ones who get paid to do it, they're the one that have the security to do it because we face it we face attacks, we face imminent threats" (PEGIDA UK leaders – Video 1)
Sub-theme 1: They are dissatisfied with the government	"We can no longer rely on the police or the government to protect our women" (PEGIDA UK leaders – Video 8)
Sub-theme 2: Concerned about government corruption	"The second most important message that has to come out of Rotherham on the 4th of June is to our politicians. We know what you're doing, we know how unimportant the British electorate is and we know that you are covering up crimes by immigrants, by Muslims in order to protect your open border delusion in order to answer to your foreign masters" (PEGIDA UK leaders – Video 11)
Group 6: PEGIDA UK supporters	
Theme 1: Concerned about the perceived threat from Islamic ideology Definition: Islamic ideology aims to destroy civilisation as we know it through oppression and totalitarianism. This Islamification is mostly occurring in Western, powerful nations that are not historically or culturally Islamic and which have different cultural beliefs and values. These values positioned as superior to 'Islamic' values are being eroded by 'inferior' Islamic values moving away from progressivism and towards oppression. Islamification was not explicitly categorised as a conspiracy theory, any reference to a conspiracy was implicit.	"Do you think that fact that there has been such a problem with Muslim paedophile gangs in Newcastle is the reason why so many people have turned out today?" (PEGIDA UK supporters – Video 6)
Sub-theme 1: Islam is anti-women's rights	"The oppression of women, I mean, would you like to wear a Burka, I wouldn't want to walk around with a Burka, that's what Sharia law courts for" (PEGIDA UK supporters – Video 7)
Sub-theme 2: Islam is not a religion of peace	"It's the facade of respectability that Islam puts up and far too many people in the media fall for this. They're living in a totally fantasy world in the tiny little metropolitan bubble which ignores places like East Birmingham where I live" (PEGIDA UK supporters – Video 13)
Sub-theme 3: Islamification or Muslim immigration	"I think it's been good, I'm am I am the party treasurer in my day job, but I'm not a party Treasurer today, I'm a mayor, I'm councillor Clive Jefferson, normal bloke with kids worried about the future of our country and worried about where it's going to leave with the Islamification of our fine land" (PEGIDA UK supporters – Video 6)
Theme 2: Concerned about the perceived threat from left-wing ideology Definition: Concerned about left-wing ideology aims to destroy society as we know it and introduce oppressive measures. The left-wing is depicted as violent, irrational Islamist extremist sympathisers. Implicit links between left-wing supporters and Islamist extremists were made but explicit links were not.	"Remember guys, we are not the people who throw bottles here, we are not the people who throw bottles. We've got a legitimate complaint; we have got a legitimate complaint. Islamic extremism is out of control in this country, it's a reasonable protest. These people [the left] are totally off their heads" (PEGIDA UK supporters – Video 9)
Sub-theme 1: ANTIFA	"How can you [ANTIFA] support a terrorist you fucking twat?" (PEGIDA UK supporters – Video 9)

*Each group was divided into two: leaders and supporters. This table shows the main two grievances of both the leaders and supporters of the three groups: The For Britain Movement, The DFLA and PEGIDA UK

Participant information sheet

Thank you for considering taking part in this research project. Before you decide whether you want to take part in this project, it is important that you understand the reason why this research is being carried out, and what your participation will involve. I would be grateful if you would take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with colleagues or other people if you wish. Please feel welcome to get back to me if anything is unclear, and to take as much time as you need to decide whether or not to take part.

Who am I?

My name is Alice Sibley. I am a PhD researcher at Nottingham Trent University.

What is the purpose of this study?

I want to understand why you have joined this group specifically. What motivated you to join this group and what are your main concerns regarding a range of topics: the UK, politics, immigration, Islam etc.

This is a piece of academic research. You should understand that this interview is not an attempt to gain intelligence on this group or its members/supporters. Further, this interview is not concerned with criminal activity that the participant may have been involved in. Therefore, disclosure of any criminal activity related to this group is not required. However, I do have an obligation to report criminal behaviour to the PREVENT, counter-terrorism programme. Therefore, members/supporters may not want to disclose this information during the interview.

This study will take place over a period of 8 months. It will start in September 2021 and will continue to April 2022. Only 1 hour of your time will be required within this timeframe.

Who is funding this study?

This study is being funded by Nottingham Trent University.

Why have I been chosen to take part in this study?

I am conducting online research on three groups: The For Britain Movement, DFLA and PEGIDA UK. You have been chosen because you are a Facebook member or supporter of one of these three groups.

Do I have to take part?

No. Participation in this research is voluntary. You should feel in control during the interview process. If at any point, you feel uncomfortable with what is being asked, you can either choose not to answer that question specifically or, you can remove yourself from the study completely with no penalty. You have the right to remove yourself from the study at any point of the recruitment process. Once the interview has been conducted, you will have 2 weeks to withdraw from the study if you so wish.

Will I be paid for participating in the research?

You will not be paid for your participation in this research.

What do you want me to do?

I would like to invite you to take part in an interview with me. It will take one hour and will be conducted via Microsoft Teams or Skype. However, if you do not feel comfortable using the video camera and would like to increase your anonymity, I would be happy to discuss alternative communication options such as these platforms without the video camera or telephone. Please be aware that for research purposes these interviews will be recorded but no identifiable data will be recorded, such as your real name. More information is given in the confidentiality and anonymity section of this document.

Examples of questions that will be asked are:

- When you think about the UK, what are your main concerns?
- Do you think the UK is improving or worse? Why?
- How do you feel about Muslim immigration?
- Do you feel that you are treated unfairly?

What will happen to the information I give in my interview?

I am conducting research for my PhD thesis. Therefore, the findings gathered from the data in this interview will be published in my thesis. I may also publish and present my findings in other academia-related documents. Information about your safety and confidentiality is outlined in the next paragraph.

How will you protect my confidentiality and anonymity?

Due to the sensitivity of this work, each participant will be safeguarded with several forms of confidentiality. No personal details will be collected, for example, your name, home address, Facebook username, Skype username, email address and phone number (unless the interview takes place via phone). If any identifiable data, such as phone number, is collected, this will be stored in an encrypted file on a USB drive with no other identifiable information ensuring the participants anonymity.

Each interview will be audio recorded, the file will be encrypted and will be stored on a USB drive. These audio recordings will only be accessed by me, Alice Sibley. No one else, including the supervisors in this project, will have access to these recordings unless absolutely necessary. If I do have to send them your audio recording, I will ensure that they are not able to identify you. After each interview, I will transcribe the interview, and this is what will be accessible to my supervisors and other researchers in the future. There will be no identifiable information on these transcripts making it impossible for anyone to identify you from the research project. Once the PhD has been completed, these audio recordings will be destroyed.

I understand that some of the information you choose to disclose will be sensitive and you may fear repercussions. Therefore, I will ensure confidentiality and anonymity of your data is taken seriously.

What are the possible disadvantages and risks taking part?

The main disadvantage in this project is time. You will be required to take part in an hour-long interview and, therefore, this may inconvenience you. However, I can be flexible regarding timings and dates for when the interview takes place and, therefore, this should minimize the inconvenience on your end.

Another possible disadvantage is related to you disclosing information which does not show this group in a positive light. Although I am interested in the groups concerns as a whole, I am also interested in your specific concerns. Therefore, if anything is said that you feel uncomfortable about disclosing, you can either choose to have that specific information deleted/redacted or I can outline in the research that this concern is personal and is not shared with the general group.

Finally, it is understood that some of these topics will be sensitive. You can, therefore, rest assured that these interviews are not being monitored by the government or any counter-extremism body. This is purely for academic scientific research.

What are the possible benefits?

I hope to find some legitimate, important concerns within these three groups. Therefore, the concerns that you disclose will be published and hopefully, will help further discussion around these issues with other researchers, organizations and the general public.

I hope it will be an enjoyable experience for you to talk to me about what you are concerned about but also, what you like about the group and how you feel the group helps you. We can also talk about a range of topics. The interview will be semi-structured, meaning that I will ask some initial questions, but the

majority of the interview will be guided by what you want to talk about regarding what your concerns are in relation to the UK, politics, immigration, Islam etc.

What will happen to the results?

The results of this study will be published in my PhD thesis and will be presented in other academia-related documents.

Has anyone reviewed this project before it is conducted?

Yes. This project has passed several checkpoints to be approved. Approval for this project was given on the 2nd March 2020. Ethical approval for this study was given on the 12th of May 2021. Each checkpoint has been assessed by an academic committee at Nottingham Trent University.

Who do I contact if there is an issue?

If you have any questions or queries, you can contact me via email with the information below. If, for any reasons, you have a minor complaint, then you need to contact me in the first instance:

Alice Sibley

Address: Doctoral School, Schools of Business, Law and Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham, NG1 4FQ, **Email:** alice.sibley2019@my.ntu.ac.uk

After discussing your complaints with me, if you have a more serious complaint which we cannot deal with, please contact one of my supervisors below.

Katerina Krulisova (Primary supervisor)

Address: Schools of Business, Law and Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham, NG1 4FQ. **Email:** Katerina.krulisova02@ntu.ac.uk

Matt Henn

Address: Schools of Business, Law and Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham, NG1 4FQ, **Email:** matt.henn@ntu.ac.uk

Janka Lloyd

Address: Schools of Business, Law and Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham, NG1 4FQ, **Email:** janka.lloyd@ntu.ac.uk

What do I do now?

If you would like to take part in this project, please email alice.sibley2019@my.ntu.ac.uk

I will then contact you directly to explain what happens next.

What motivates people to support DFLA, and what concerns do they have?

Please read and confirm your consent to being interviewed for this project by ticking the appropriate boxes and signing and dating this form. Once you have completed the form, please email it to Alice Sibley: alice.sibley2019@my.ntu.ac.uk

1. I confirm that the purpose of the project has been explained to me, that I have been given information about it in writing, and that I have had the opportunity to ask questions about the research

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw up to 2 weeks after the interview has been conducted without giving a reason

o

3 I give permission for the interview to be audio recorded, on the understanding that the recording will be destroyed at the end of the project

o

4. I agree that I am over 18 years old

o

5. I agree to take part in this project

o

Name of respondent

Date

Signature

Name of researcher taking consent

Date

Signature

PROJECT ADDRESS:

Alice Sibley, PhD research at Doctoral School, Schools of Business, Law and Social Sciences, Nottingham Trent University, 50 Shakespeare Street, Nottingham, NG1 4FQ. Email: alice.sibley2019@my.ntu.ac.uk

Appendix 11

Participant number	Name (Pseudonym)	Location	Duration
1	Frank	Online	1:10:12
2	Carol	Online	56:58
3	Alfie	Online	1:12:58
4	Michael	Online	1:28:16
5	Gerre	Online	1:29:52
6	Bob	Online	1:26:18
7	Jacob	Online	1:07:35
8	Carl	Online	1:30:34
9	Anne Marie Waters	Online	1:38:40
10	Matthew	Online	1:33:45
11	Amanda	Online	1:12:49
12	Harry	Online	1:54:37
13	Maria	Online	1:39:34
14	Mark	Online	1:25:14
15	Tommy Robinson	The White Heart (Amphill)	1:45:00

Appendix 12

Interview questions for The For Britain Movement supporters

- I will be audio recording this and transcribing using the tool on Microsoft teams
- Once the data has been collected, you have two weeks to decide you do not want the data to be used in this research
- Before asking any questions
 - What I am doing
 - What I am trying to achieve from this research: covering topics that are often not discussed
 - I am only interested in motivations from an academic standpoint.
 - Highlight that I am not a journalist, and I am doing academic research similar to other researchers that have focused on other political parties
- Let them ask any questions they may have
- Remind them that they have a right not to answer

Demographics:

- What gender do you identify as?
- How old are you?
- What is your ethnicity?
- Where do you live?

Open questions:

- What are you mainly concerned about?

Detailed question:

- **Islam:** How do you feel about Islam and Muslims?
- **Islam:** Do you think that Islamophobia has any comparison to anti-Semitism? If not, why not?
- **Government:** How do you feel about the government's response to the increase in Muslim immigration and the growth of Islam?
- **Government:** How do you feel about the way the government has responded to the grooming gang cases across the country?
- **Government:** How do you feel about the government's response to terrorism?
- **Women's rights:** What is your stance on women's rights and LGBT rights?
- **LGBT rights:** Are you concerned about trans rights?
- **Animal rights:** Animal rights is a concern for the leaders of For Britain (Animal Justice Project). Is this a concern of yours? What concerns you most?
- **Victimization and persecution:** Are you happy with how you are treated in society?
- **Victimization and persecution:** Do you think we live in a cancel culture? Do you feel that you are being cancelled?
- **Conspiracy theories:** Are you concerned about The Great Replacement theory?
- **Conspiracy theories:** What do you think about COVID-19?
- **Conspiracy theories:** What do you think about the vaccine?
- **Media:** Do you think the media correctly portrays the issue of immigration?


Other:

- Is there anything else you think is important that I have not covered in this interview that you would like to talk about?
- What alias do you want me to use?

Appendix 13. The main 26 themes that interviewees highlighted as a concern

Main node numbers	Name of node
1	Backlash for leaving the far-right
2	Brexit was the trigger
3	Business and money
4	Climate change
5	Conspiracies
6	COVID-19
7	Erosion of all freedoms
8	Everything is made about race
9	Government
10	Grooming gangs
11	Group Relative Deprivation
12	Identity
13	Immigration
14	Islam
15	Islamist terrorism
16	Liberal rights
17	Mainstream media
18	Multiculturalism
19	Negative trajectory of society
20	Objective truth
21	Political allegiance or position
22	Political disillusionment
23	Secularism
24	The 1% - elites
25	Too much division
26	We are not a free society anymore

The main 7 concerns supporters and leaders of The For Britain Movement, The DFLA and PEGIDA UK have




Examples of themes and sub-themes

Theme	Quote extract
Theme 1: Concern about Islamic ideology Definition:	<p>“And let me explain, you said not all Muslims of course, you’re right, and that to me goes without saying. But, if you have mass migration from Muslim societies, most people, not all, but most, are shaped by their culture and their teachings and what they learn when they’re growing up. Most. They do bring those beliefs with them, most. And you are going to see the impact of those beliefs, and particularly on women. So, I don’t want immigration from these societies any longer” (Anne Marie Waters, Interview 9)</p>
Sub-theme 1: Concerned that Islam is not a religion of peace	<p>“I know that I am very Christian, and radical Muslims hate Christians, which is weird because they have Jesus in their Qur’an, they just don’t really recognise him as, the son of God they just recognise him as a prophet. But I feel that a culture that pervasively wants to eradicate Christianity and Judaism from the map is troubling for me.” (Amanda – Interview 11).</p>
Sub-theme 2: Concern that Islam is anti-liberal values	<p>“Because of the teachings. I believe there is a mass population in Iran that is demanding liberalism. I believe the true feminists are the women that are taking their fucking hijabs off. No one has stood up for them” (Tommy Robinson – Interview 15).</p> <p>“But is it wrong to say that a culture that thinks you should be thrown off a building if you’re gay? That’s wrong. I’m not wrong in saying that, you know. I mean, that’s that’s my opinion. I think that is wrong. Is it wrong to segregate men and women? Yes, I think it is wrong” (Maria – Interview 13)</p>
Theme 2: Concern about COVID-19 Definition:	<p>“I remember seeing videos of people in China collapsing. Like in the beginning, when COVID first started happening. Ok, let’s play it safe, right, we don’t know how dangerous this thing is, but as now we’ve got</p>

	more data and figures, it's fine, is it really worth? And this is what really gets me angry cause I do care about people, there is no recognition about the mental health implications about people losing their jobs, look at the suicide rates" (Matthew – Interview 10)
Sub-theme 1: Concerned about vaccines	"I don't know how much the vaccines work, I have heard a load of different things including from the health professionals who think they're going to get chips inside them. I don't particularly believe that but anyway, it's one of those things" (Mark – Interview 14)
Sub-theme 2: Concerned that COVID-19 is a conspiracy	"So, yes, they are being bought, the pharmaceutical companies, Bill Gates, the WHO, I mean, I'm pretty sure now that Bill Gates is the biggest funder of the WHO because it used to be America but Donald Trump, when he was president, he stopped it all." (Carl – Interview 8)
Theme 3: Concerned about liberal values Definition:	"Women's rights, homosexuals rights. I'd say, my opposition to Islam comes from my liberal views. I am a liberal, I don't care what people say, you can say what you want, I am a liberal. I am totally liberal in my views, I want small government, I support women's rights, I support gay people's rights" (Tommy Robinson – Interview 15)
Sub-theme 1: Concerned about women's rights	"Oh, there always is. I mean there is sexism everywhere you go. I'm not one of those who sees sexism where there is none, but I see it where there is. We face it everywhere you go. Absolutely, absolutely, but it's not just being a woman that's the problem for me. Being a woman who speaks up for women, a lot of people don't like that. And particularly on the right of politics as well, 100%. Don't think I don't notice for a minute that a lot of the men, if you look at labour where a lot of the men over there don't really care about women either. If they did, they wouldn't be doing what was happening with the grooming gang wise and more would not have been happening if they cared about women. But don't think for a minute that I don't notice that a lot of the men on this side of politics don't think a woman should be leading it, and particularly a woman who speaks up for women. They'll accept a woman as long as she's the right key, you know, if she's one of the lads, you know, and again, I'm not, I don't obsess about this. I don't see it every five minutes and I'm able to look at myself, you know, and I don't blame on my, you know other failures that I experience on sexism. You know, some of it's me. But yeah, of course, sexism as part of life, women face sexism all the time and especially if you're a woman who speaks up for other women. We'll get it in the neck every time" (Anne Marie Waters, Interview 9)
Sub-theme 2: Concerned about animal rights	"But yeah, so so I guess it was just from finding out about things that I didn't know that went on in the animal industry, in the farming industry and and things like that. And one one thing as well, I already turned vegan at this point, but we lived in a very rural area a few years ago. There's a field over there and it had cows in it and then one day we just heard that cows making the most horrific, groaning noise and it wouldn't stop and they went on for days and I spoke to the neighbor and he said it was the day they took their calves away. And it was haunting, and even my husband, he stopped eating beef after that, he doesn't eat beef anymore. It was just horrible. Yeah, just just these things that you didn't realize before. You know you're kind of shielded from it all right?" (Maria – Interview 13)
Sub-theme 3: Concerned about LGBT rights	"I support gay people's rights. If someone was to come in and start on a homosexual, I'd beat them up" (Tommy Robinson – Interview 15)
Theme 4: Concerned about immigration Definition:	"Immigration generally for sure. And again, immigration is one of these things you're not allowed to say well, that's enough immigration, or should there be a certain cap on immigration, or should we limit? And we're not even allowed to say it, it has to be open border, limitless immigration. Like, why does it have to be that?" (Matthew – Interview 10)
Sub-theme 1: Concerned about the balance of immigration and mass migration	"Uh, now, I except not every single immigrant, is bad, but the balance, I think, is detrimental" (Bob – Interview 6)
Sub-theme 2: Concerned about the type of immigration	"We have immigration problems over here, I don't know if you've watched the news there, we have a problem with the south border in Mexico of people just coming across the border. I don't know what the latest tally is but it was upwards of a million people that have crossed the border illegally in the last 10 months. So, I've actually employed a number of people that have been here on visa that have been from other parts of the world. I am definitely not anti-immigration; I just want to see people come in through the right door. And I know that, I mean, I used to have a job where I would help people fill out their paperwork for their green card, which is like their visa for work here. And it breaks my heart to see some of their situations, I just want them to do it the right way" (Amanda – Interview 11)

Appendix 14. Online harassment



Appendix 15. Chi-Squared Test

The For Britain Movement

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	7.409 ^a	12	.829
Likelihood Ratio	9.898	12	.625
Linear-by-Linear Association	3.367	1	.066
N of Valid Cases	972		

a. 12 cells (57.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

Democratic Football Lads Alliance

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	10.676 ^a	12	.557
Likelihood Ratio	10.571	12	.566
Linear-by-Linear Association	.510	1	.475
N of Valid Cases	1130		

a. 13 cells (61.9%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .00.

PEGIDA UK

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymptotic Significance (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	11.220 ^a	12	.510
Likelihood Ratio	14.000	12	.301
Linear-by-Linear Association	.541	1	.462
N of Valid Cases	1051		

a. 11 cells (52.4%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .01.