

**A Critical Discourse Analysis of News Reports on the Israeli/Palestinian
Conflict in Selected Arab and Western Newspapers**

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent
University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

October 2009

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1 Introduction and Historical Background

1.1 Introduction to Research

As one of the most violent, ideological and intractable conflicts in modern history, sited in a very sensitive and strategic region, the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has always been under the spotlight of media and politicians. The conflict is almost a constant item in the coverage of news outlets, especially since the outbreak of the spiraling violence that marked the end of the peace process and the beginning of the second Palestinian uprising in the fall of 2000. The discourse of the conflict is as ideological and controversial as the conflict itself. Even news reporting, which is governed by values of truthfulness, accuracy, balance, impartiality and integrity, has always been the object of scrutiny and criticism by members of both sides who often accuse newspapers of bias against them. The discourse of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has been the object of a number of academic studies. This thesis aims to contribute to this body of knowledge about the discourse of the conflict by critically analysing the discourse of news reports on selected events of the second Intifada, both from cross-cultural and inter-cultural perspectives, by exploring the way Arab and Western newspapers report on some recent events of the conflict and the way different newspapers issued in the UK cover the same events.

The approach utilised in the study is Critical Discourse Analysis; henceforth (CDA) serves as an analytical framework to examine the representation of selected events from the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the selected newspapers. The purpose of the research is to compare the representations of certain events and entities related to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict following on from the second Palestinian uprising, in selected newspapers in order to show how power relations and ideology shape discourse when reporting the same event in newspapers that are clearly sited in different political and historical contexts. Therefore, the representations of the same events and entities in an Arab newspaper (the *Arab News*) and an American newspaper (the *New York Times*), as well as in two UK newspapers with different political orientations (the *Times*) and (the *Guardian*) are compared by means of a linguistic analysis focusing on a number of discourse categories. Although this study considers contextual and ideological factors, it

is primarily a linguistic study, and those linguistic features are meant to inform the analysis.

1.1.1 Aims of research

- To compare the representation of selected events and entities relating to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in American, Arab and British newspapers using a modified version of CDA.
- To examine the role of ideology and power relations in news reportage of events of the conflict by means of a textual analysis focusing on a number of specific linguistic features which are present in the data, taking into consideration the historical and socio-political context, as well as the context of news production and consumption.

1.1.2 Research questions

This research aims to answer the following questions:

- How is the difference in power between the different sides of the conflict reflected in the discourse of the conflict?
- How does ideology influence discourse, i.e. how does it affect some of the discursive strategies implemented to represent the same event in different newspapers?
- How are the three discursive levels selected for examination in this thesis, namely narrative, transitivity and lexicalisation, used differently in the selected newspapers to represent the same events and entities?
- How do the historical, social and political contexts affect news discourse?
- How have the representations of different sides of the conflict changed over the period of the second uprising?

1.1.3 Research Hypotheses

This research aims to test the following hypotheses:

- The reporting of the events of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the selected newspapers is not free from bias and values, but rather it reflects the interests,

ideologies and different points of view of the different newspapers.

- The disproportionate power between both sides of the conflict is reflected in their representations to the advantage of the more powerful group.
- The discourse of reporting events of the conflict is a site of struggle between different ideologies.

In the following section, the historical context is outlined. The history of the land of Palestine and the state of Israel is explained since the time of Abraham to the year 2006, and then perceptions of both sides of the conflict in the West are discussed. These are very important aspects for understanding the conflict and its representation in Arab and Western newspapers.

1.2 History of the Israeli/Palestinian Conflict

The area of Israel and the Palestinian territories is about 10,000 square miles in size bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the west, the Jordan River and Jordan to the east, Lebanon to the north and Egypt to the south. Israel controls 88% of the land and the remaining part supposedly comprises the Palestinian territories; nevertheless, these territories have been under Israeli occupation since 1967. The Palestinian territories are divided into two unconnected sections: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. There are also many Israeli settlements inside the Palestinian territories. There are more than two hundred Israeli settlements in the West Bank and twenty- nine in East Jerusalem. Although Israel evacuated the twenty- five settlements in the Gaza Strip in 2005, it has continued to expand settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem despite international condemnation. The population of Israel was estimated to be 7.2 million people, and the population of the Palestinian Territories was estimated to be 4.01 million people in July 2009. About one-third of the Palestinian population lives in the Gaza Strip while the remainder lives in the West Bank.

The early history of Palestine is of extreme importance to the conflict since one of the fundamental claims of the Jews to the land of Palestine is based on its early history, i.e. 2000 BC. The Old Testament has a biblical promise that this land will eventually belong to the descendants of Abraham, and the Jews interpret this as a promise that the land is theirs. According to the Old Testament, the Lord ordered

Abraham to leave his homeland in Ur in Southern Iraq and move to Palestine to settle there with his descendants. 'The Lord had said to Abraham, "Leave your country, your people and your father's household and go to the land I will show you' GENESIS 12:1. After traveling to Palestine, the Lord made a promise that this land would belong to Abraham's descendants forever. 'To your descendants I give this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the Euphrates' GENESIS 15:18. According to the Old Testament, Abraham moved from one place to another in the hill land of Palestine and traveled to Egypt at the time of famine before returning to Palestine. At the end of the book of Genesis, the twelve sons of Jacob, Abraham's son, move to Egypt escaping famine (Chapman, 2002).

After about four hundred years of settling in Egypt, the twelve tribes of Israel escaped the oppression of the Pharaoh under the leadership of Moses. They spent forty years in the Sinai Peninsula, but around 1280 BC they then tried to occupy Palestine under the leadership of Joshua. After that, they fell under the control of other peoples like the Philistines, the Canaanites, among others. Around 1050 BC, Saul managed to lead the tribes and controlled most of Palestine, and was succeeded by King David whose son, King Solomon, built a great temple in the heart of Jerusalem. The connection between the land, Jerusalem and the temple is emphasised in the Old Testament (Chapman, 2002). After the death of King Solomon, the tribes revolted against his successor, and two kingdoms were formed: Israel in the north and Judah in the south. In the sixth century BC, the Babylonians took over the land of the Assyrians and also annexed the southern kingdom. In 597 BC, Nebuchadnezzar of Babylon captured Jerusalem and deported most of its people; nevertheless, when the Persians took over from the Babylonians, they repatriated many groups from exile. After their return to Palestine the Jews fell under the control of the Greeks in 330 BC.

Palestine was invaded by the Romans in 63 BC. Jerusalem was captured and the temple established by Solomon was destroyed. The Romans erected a pagan temple for Jupiter and forbade the Jews from entering into the city. The Christian Byzantine Empire attempted to convert the Jews to Christianity by force between 527 and 614. In 634, Palestine became part of the Muslim empire for nearly four hundred and fifty years. Muslims did not attempt to expel Jews or Christians from Palestine or to convert them to

Islam; however, many people converted to Islam either willingly or to avoid heavy taxation imposed on non-Muslims. Towards the end of the seventh century, Muslims built a mosque known as the Dome of the Rock on the stone platform where the Jewish temple once stood. On the same platform also exists Al-Aqsa Mosque which is the third most sacred place in the Islamic faith (Ovendale, 1999).

In 1096, when Palestine was under the rule of the Mamluks, it was attacked by the Crusaders. They captured Jerusalem, slaughtered both the Muslims and the Jews and established a Christian kingdom. In 1187, Saladin defeated the Crusaders and expelled them from Palestine. After the Mamluks, Palestine fell under the control of the Ottoman Turks until the First World War. Meanwhile at the end of the nineteenth century, there had been a great deal of discrimination and persecution practised (against Jews in Europe, emanating from *anti-Semitism* which can be understood as “an irrational or abstract hatred of Jews” (Finkelstein, 2003).

The ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity embraced by the French revolution resulted in the emancipation of the Jews in France. But following Napoleon's defeat, riots started in many European countries such as Germany, Austria, Denmark, Hungary and Poland blaming Jewish bankers for the financial difficulties these countries were going through. In 1881, the Jews in Russia were massacred in a series of attacks known as the pogroms. Due to European persecution, more than three million Jews escaped Europe to the United States, Canada, Australia, Britain and South Africa. Many Jews around the world felt that this racial and religious discrimination would persist as long as they were treated as minorities in different countries, and many came to believe that the only solution for their dilemma was to establish a Jewish state. This movement came to be known as *Zionism*, i.e. “a movement for the re-establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, as promised in the Old Testament” (Vital, 1980).

Theodor Herzl, a young Austro-Hungarian journalist, changed Zionism into a coherent political movement. He studied law but, being a Jew, he was unable to practise it. He worked as a journalist and reported on the trial of Alfred Dreyfuss, a Jewish officer in the French army who was accused of passing secrets to the Germans. Herzl was so influenced by this trial and by his personal life that he started to think of practical solutions to the problems of the Jews. He came to be regarded as ‘the father of political

Zionism' in 1896 after he wrote his famous book '*Der Judenstaat*', or '*the State of the Jews*' in which he asked that Jews be granted sovereignty over a territory that is adequate to serve as their political centre.

Herzl thought of both Palestine and Argentina, but he preferred Palestine for its great symbolic value in Jewish history and faith. "Palestine is our ever-memorable historic home. The very name of Palestine would attract our people with a force of marvelous potency" (Herzl, quoted in Chapman, 2002). Herzl planned everything in his book, except for the way to dispose of the local population which he wrote in his diary. He assumed that the land needed to form the Jewish state would already be populated by a few landowners and many poor peasants. The land would be purchased simultaneously from the rich owners, and the poor peasants would be deprived from employment and thus removed from the land by the new Jewish owners (Ovendale, 1999; Philo & Berry, 2004).

In 1896, Herzl tried to convince the Ottoman Sultan of his plans, but he failed. He realised that he should rally support for his ideas among the Jews first; thus, he organised the first Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897. The World Zionist Organisation, a national flag, a national anthem and the Jewish National Fund came as products of this first congress. Herzl then moved to Britain hoping to convince the British to grant a Jewish company a charter with sovereign rights in the Middle East that would eventually lead to a sovereign state. He played on the imperial interests of Britain in the Middle East and on British concerns of the floods of Jewish immigrants to Britain. He suggested the establishment of a Jewish colony in Palestine, which appealed to British politicians (Ovendale, 1999).

In 1904, Herzl died and was succeeded by Chaim Weizmann who succeeded brilliantly in promoting the Zionist programme in Britain. In 1906, Weizmann met Arthur James Balfour who was critical of anti-Semitism in Europe and who supported an act that restricted Jewish immigration to Britain on economic grounds. Weizmann succeeded in convincing Balfour of the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine. In 1917, the British promised the Jews a sovereign state in Palestine although it was still under Turkish rule. The British promise was contained in a letter from Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild, an English Jew, who was the then British Foreign Secretary.

The Balfour Declaration encouraged more Jews to emigrate to Palestine. In 1919, the number of Jews in Palestine reached 60,000, representing about 9% of the total population; the remaining 91% were Arabs. By 1929, the immigration rate accelerated due to economic difficulties facing the Jews in Eastern Europe and American restrictions on Jewish immigration; thus, the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine reached 82,000 people. Jewish settlers started to acquire land in Palestine by purchasing it from absentee landowners. About nine tenths of all land acquired by the Jews up to 1929 was sold by absentee Turkish landlords. Small holders were forced to borrow at interest rates of up to fifty per cent and under the burden of debt they were forced to abandon their little blots of land. Jewish settlement and land purchase was not resisted by Arab leaders who were weak and incompetent (Chapman, 2002; Hirst, 1984).

The Arab territories were part of the Ottoman Empire, and they were in chaotic conditions which led to antagonism and resistance to the Ottoman Turks and the rise of Arab nationalism. Britain cultivated Arab feelings against Turkey to balance Turkish propaganda promoting Muslim sentiment and started to show profound interest in Palestine to protect Egypt and communications with the East. The Balfour Declaration increased alarm among the Arabs who felt that their interests were being threatened by Zionist plans. On the seventeenth of December 1917, the British forces captured Jerusalem and proclaimed that Britain's objective was to liberate all peoples oppressed by the Turks and to establish national governments for them. A Zionist commission was sent to Palestine, headed by Weizmann, as it felt it was necessary to put the Balfour Declaration into practice (Ovendale, 1999).

Frictions between the Arabs and the Zionists increased as the Arabs feared the Zionist plans to establish an independent Jewish state in Palestine. Britain recognised that Palestine was included in the areas and pledged to the Arabs that Britain was committed to the independence of all Arab areas under Turkish rule including Palestine; Britain also realised that the Balfour Declaration promised the Jews a Jewish nation in Palestine. In 1920, a conference was held at San Remo to decide the future of the Middle East. It was decided that the mandates for Syria and Lebanon were allotted to France and those for Palestine and Mesopotamia to Britain, and that Britain was to implement the Balfour Declaration.

In May 1922, a White Paper on Palestine was published. It reassured the Arabs that Britain was not contemplating the conversion of Palestine into a Jewish national home, but rather that it could become a centre for the Jewish people with no subordination of the Arab community. The document resulted in comparative calm among the Arabs. Britain wanted its overall policy in the Middle East to appear balanced, flexible and responsive to local needs; however, this became more difficult to attain with the growing number of Jewish immigrants coming into Palestine and the increased oppression of the Arabs in Palestine. In the period between 1919 and 1931, the Jewish population in Palestine grew from 60,000 to 170,000, i.e. from 9% to 18% of the total population. The Arabs suffered economically as a result of Jewish immigration and Jewish opposition to employing them (Ovendale, 1999).

In September 1928, the Jews started a riot when police removed a wall that they had established illegally to separate women and men praying at the Wailing Wall, which resulted in the killing of one hundred and thirteen Jews and one hundred and sixteen Arabs in one week. The British Inquiry Commission suggested that Jewish immigration should be regulated in accordance to the economic capacity of the land of Palestine to absorb new arrivals. Britain sent Sir John Hope to Palestine to investigate the question of land, and he reported that cultivated land in Palestine was not sufficient to provide for the existing population of Arabs and Jews, and that there was no more room for more Jewish settlers. This report was the basis of the 1930 Passfield White Paper which initiated immigration restrictions. In response, there were anti-British demonstrations throughout the Jewish world, so the British government reaffirmed its intention to support Jews in creating a national home in Palestine by further settlement and immigration (Ovendale, 1999).

In January 1933, Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany, and his persecution of the Jews increased. The following Zionist Congress in Prague demanded that the building of the Jewish national home in Palestine happen more quickly. Jewish immigration increased dramatically, and Arabs were alarmed by the numbers of Jewish immigrants and by news that Jews were smuggling arms into Palestine, so they ordered a general strike. A rebellion broke out and resulted in the death of thirty-eight Britons, eighty Jews and one hundred and forty-five Arabs. Following these events, the British

disarmed the Arabs and provided the Jews with weapons and trained them to suppress possible Arab riots. The British government also sent a commission to investigate the causes of the riots. In 1939, the Cabinet approved a policy that states that Palestine would be neither a Jewish nor an Arab state. Jewish immigration was to be curtailed unless the Arabs of Palestine approved it. Zionists were alarmed and replied with a series of terrorist attacks targeting both Arabs and Britons; the Stern gang, an underground Zionist group assassinated Lord Moyne, the Minister Resident in the Middle East. For Britain, plans for the future of Palestine could not be considered in such a climate (Ovendale, 1999).

After losing the sympathy of Britain, Zionists started to focus on the US. The identification of Americans with Zionism was not difficult, since Zionism is the attempt by European Jews to build a national home in Palestine in *somewhat* the same way as American settlers developed the West. The Arabs were regarded as the aboriginal who must go down before the march of progress (Finkelstein, 2003). Besides, the Jews in the United States threatened electoral punishments if the US failed to support a Jewish state in Palestine. Shortly after the American Zionist Conference in New York in 1942, David Ben-Gurion became the successor of Weizmann. He moved away from the gradualist approach that Weizmann had been advocating to an activist one and urged that the US should be stimulated into supporting the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. Zionists succeeded in preventing the issuance of an Anglo-American statement about the question of Palestine, and this left a legacy in the US whereby American Zionist pressure groups were capable of changing policies. Zionists started to concentrate on the US president and Congressmen. The American Palestine Committee was formed in 1941, and along with the Zionist Emergency Council, it supported the establishment of a Jewish army, unrestricted Jewish immigration into Palestine and the reconstitution of Palestine as a Jewish commonwealth (Ovendale, 1999).

Zionist attacks against British soldiers in Palestine increased, e.g. five British officers were kidnapped, the King David Hotel in Jerusalem was blown up by the Irgun and the Haganah, and ninety-one people were killed. Moreover, Zionist terrorists murdered twenty British soldiers in an attack on the British Officers' Club in retaliation for death sentences passed on Zionist terrorists. These acts resulted in eroding the

morale of the British forces and outraged the British public. Consequently, Britain decided to withdraw from Palestine and handed the Palestine problem to the United Nations without any recommendations for a solution in February 1947 (Ovendale, 1999).

The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was formed of eleven neutral states. In August 1947, UNSCOP's report suggested partition of Palestine into an Arab state and a Jewish state with Jerusalem under international trusteeship. Britain would administer the mandate during an interim period and 150,000 refugees would be admitted into the Jewish state. In November 1947, the UN General Assembly voted for partition. The Arabs refused to accept the partition plan, for before 1947 the Jews owned less than 10% of the land of Palestine and were less than a third of the population, but the plan gave them 55% of the land, including the most strategic areas (Ovendale, 1999).

Britain decided to withdraw as soon as possible due to continuing violence against British soldiers in Palestine. The British mandate over Palestine ended on the 14th of May 1948, and on the same day David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the establishment of Israel, a Jewish state in Palestine. On the following day, Arab armies from Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq entered Palestine. The combined Arab armies amounted to around 40,000 men; only 10,000 of them were trained. Zionists had 30,000 trained soldiers, 10,000 others for local defence and 25,000 in a home guard. In addition, there were 2,000 experienced terrorists in the Irgun and 800 in the Stern gangs. After the outbreak of war, each side suffered at least 1,200 casualties. The British forces tried not to get involved, but they arranged a ceasefire in order to evacuate civilians from conflict areas and to withdraw their troops. Haganah utilised information of the British withdrawal effectively to control Haifa. Most of the Arab population of 100,000 was terrorised by Zionists into leave their homes and their lands (Ovendale, 1999).

The Irgun and Stern gang, under the Haganah command, attacked Arab villages and drove their inhabitants from them by force; for example, by the time Jaffa surrendered to the Jews only 3,000 of its Arab population of 70,000 remained. When they encountered resistance in the village of Deir Yasin, they murdered two hundred and forty- five men, women and children. In retaliation, Arabs besieged a Jewish medical

convoy, and killed seventy- seven doctors and nurses. The United Nations interfered and arranged a four-week truce, which the Israeli army used to turn itself into a modern fighting force with help from Europe.

Arabs increased their forces, but did nothing to improve their capabilities. When they started fighting again, the Israelis were largely successful. In February 1949, an armistice was signed in Rhodes between the Egyptians and the Israelis. Israel gained 21% more land than the UN Partition Plan, covering almost 80% of the area of the Palestine mandate. As a result of Zionists' expulsions of Arab populations from villages during the war and not allowing them to return, the number of Palestinian refugees amounted to almost one million in 1949. Most Arab refugees moved to refugee camps in Gaza, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. The Israeli government encouraged Jews from neighbouring Middle East countries to move to Israel; hence, more than 567,000 Jews from the Middle East and North Africa settled in Israel. Arabs resorted to economic strategies against Israel such as closing the Suez Canal and oil pipelines to Israel. However, these steps did little damage to Israel.

Disappointed Arab peoples had a growing sense of Arab nationalism as a result of the profound sense of injustice they felt after losing part of their land. The defeat in war led to upheavals in many Arab countries, starting with Syria in March 1949. In 1950 Nasser headed the Free Officers' Executive Committee in Egypt, and in July 1952 they seized power in a coup. General Mohammed Naguib became president, but in 1954 he was replaced by Nasser, and in the same year Britain and Egypt signed an agreement stating that British troops would withdraw from Egypt within twenty months. This agreement marked a significant decline in British dominance in the Middle East.

In December 1954, Britain moved its headquarters from the Suez Canal Zone to Cyprus. Israel raided Gaza in February 1955, so Nasser decided to increase Egypt's armament immediately and to build the Aswan Dam to provide electricity. He turned to the West for a loan, but America and Britain refused and so, he nationalised the Suez Canal Company to use its revenues to finance the dam. Britain and France were determined to respond with resolution, and Paris invited Israel for discussions. In October 1956, Israel launched a full-scale attack on Egypt as an independent action, but

the attack did not reach the Suez Canal area. In November the UN demanded a ceasefire, and Israel agreed to withdraw.

After the war, Israel gained the sympathy of the American administration and Britain and was able to enhance its international status as well as its domestic and military development. After the end of the 1956 War, Nasser became convinced that he needed to maintain peace on the borders with Israel. He declared a union between Egypt and Syria in February 1958, under the name of the United Arab Republic, but Syrian independence was proclaimed in September 1959. In 1964, a Palestine conference was organised in Jerusalem, and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) was formed with the aim of uniting all expatriate Palestinians. Nasser offered the PLO Egyptian instructors and equipment but still, he believed that a war between Arabs and Israel was not possible as Arabs lacked weapons and training.

The West was unaware of the plight of Palestinian refugees whose number had reached two million by 1967. Jews in the US and Europe enjoyed distinguished positions as university professors, film directors, actors, authors, editors, publishers, managers of leading businesses, etc. Zionist propaganda succeeded in making the Western public forget Jewish terrorism against British and Arabs in Palestine, and made them rally support for Jews and their new state in Israel. American cinema tackled issues of anti-Semitism and at the same time depicted Arabs as devious, sadistic and treacherous. Nasser's anti-Western propaganda alienated him and Arabs from Western sympathies, and the Western public regarded Jews as Nasser's victims. Western media gave wide coverage to Israel, little to Arab states and none at all to Palestinian refugees. Thanks to Western aid, the Israeli economy grew rapidly, and Israel became an industrial and successful agricultural country.

Israel increased its military force substantially and was prepared to face attacks on all its borders simultaneously and developed nuclear technology with French help. The whole population was provided with military training and was ready to bear arms in war. In the beginning of 1967, Israel was in a much stronger military position than the Arabs. Although Arab armies had modern weapons, they lacked proper training; they also lacked an effective defence strategy and lost the propaganda war in the West. Israeli

and Syrian forces clashed at the beginning of 1967. Syria and Jordan criticised Nasser for not doing anything against Israel. Nasser closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping in May, and Israel interpreted this as an act of aggression. In response, on the 5th of June, Israeli planes destroyed the Egyptian air force, and Israeli forces advanced into Egyptian territories. By the 8th of June, Israel gained control over the area from Gaza to the Suez Canal down to Sharm El-Sheikh. On the 7th of June, Jordan had conceded Arab Jerusalem, Nablus, Jericho and the rest of the West Bank; nonetheless, Israel managed to drive the Jordanian forces out of the West Bank and occupied it. Israel also seized the Golan Heights from Syria by the 10th of June. In the Six Day War of 1967, Israel lost 1,000 men and Arabs lost 18,000 (Ovendale, 1999).

After the Six Day War, great powers soon interfered; Russia made good the military losses of the Arabs, and the US compensated Israel. The Palestinian refugee question started to gain world recognition. On the 22nd of November 1967, the UN Security Council issued 'Resolution 242' which provided for "just and lasting peace" within "secure recognised boundaries" and Israel was to withdraw "from territories occupied in the recent conflict." After the defeat in the Six Day War, Nasser worked on obtaining the most up-to-date Russian weapons, along with technical assistance and training. He started the War of Attrition to prevent de facto new borders of Israel being formed which included Sinai. Egypt was sustaining considerable losses, with more than 10,000 killed. Therefore, Nasser agreed to the American-sponsored ceasefire on the 23rd of July 1970.

The Palestinians in Jordan refused King Hussein's attempts to achieve a settlement with Israel and tried unsuccessfully to assassinate him in June and again in September 1970. After he survived both attempts, fighting broke out between the Palestinians and the Jordanian army. In the same year, the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked an aircraft to Dawson Field, near Amman, and demanded the release of Palestinians held in Israeli, British and western jails. When western countries refused, they blew up the aircraft. In response, Hussein attacked Palestinian concentrations north of Jordan, killed thousands of Palestinians and moved the remaining Palestinians to Lebanon. In Syria, Hafiz Al-Asad attacked Palestinian refugee camps and moved them to Lebanon in 1971.

In 1972, eight Palestinian militants held eleven Israeli athletes hostage in Munich at the Olympic Village and demanded the release of two hundred Palestinian prisoners. The rescue operation resulted in the death of the eleven hostages and four of the captors. In response, Israel attacked Syria and Lebanon killing five hundred people. This incident was followed by a number of attacks organised by Palestinian militant groups against embassies and airliners in a number of countries, e.g. Palestinian militants hijacked some airliners and killed thirty-four American passengers in Rome Airport. In response, Israel shot down a Libyan airliner over Sinai killing all of its one hundred and six passengers (Philo & Berry, 2004).

On the 28th of September 1970, Nasser died and was succeeded by Anwar El-Sadat who obtained arms for Egypt from Moscow and tried to improve relations with Washington. He thought that war was the only way of achieving a settlement in the Middle East and getting the great powers to consider the Arab predicament. When preparing for war, Sadat had to consider Israel's air, technological and tactical superiority. He tried to achieve Arab unity and to win the support of different trends in the Arab world. Cairo started to send signals denoting that war was not imminent to benefit from the element of surprise.

On the 6th of October 1973, conditions were favourable for crossing the Suez Canal. It was also Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement and the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. The Arab operation was well planned, and it achieved tremendous success. After four days of Israeli reverses, Washington started to make good the Israeli losses. On the 17th of October, the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporters decided to reduce oil production. Most Arab countries embargoed oil for the US after \$2.2 billion was approved as emergency aid for Israel. On the 20th of October, the US and Russia drafted a ceasefire agreement based on the implementation of UN 'Resolution 242' and negotiations for just durable peace in the Middle East. The agreement was accepted by both sides on the 22nd of October. However, the Israeli army violated the ceasefire and encircled the Egyptian Third Army on the east bank of the Suez Canal; thus, another ceasefire was affected on the 24th of October.

A new movement, known as "political Messianism," started in Israel in the Seventies to link religion to policies of annexation. In 1975, Israel started a new policy

of settlement on the West Bank leading to annexation. In January 1976, the UN Security Council issued a resolution affirming the rights of the Palestinian people to establish a state, but it was vetoed by the US. In November 1977, Sadat announced that he was willing to go to the Knesset to negotiate peace with Israel. He offered Israel recognition and permanent peace in return for withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories including Arab Jerusalem, recognition for Palestinian statehood and secure boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbours. On the 26th of March 1979, Sadat and Begin signed a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel at Camp David. Arab reaction to the agreement was hostile; the Arab League imposed a political and economic boycott on Egypt and moved its headquarters to Tunis (Ovendale, 1999).

In Lebanon, Palestinian refugees made significant changes, as they changed the ratio of Christian to Muslim population which was the basis of the Lebanese government. The Lebanese society became divided which resulted in the outbreak of the civil war in 1975. The conflict was solved by a ceasefire agreement in October 1976, and a deterrent Arab, predominantly Syrian, peacekeeping force was appointed. In March 1978, the PLO raided Israel from South Lebanon, and the Israeli forces responded by a massive attack into the Lebanese territories and a United Nations force (UNIFIL) was deployed to South Lebanon.

In June 1982, there was an attempt to shoot the Israeli ambassador in London, which Israel used as a pretext to invade Lebanon. Israeli forces bombed PLO targets and reached West Beirut. Israel also destroyed eighty Syrian aircraft and damaged SAM missile sites. Beirut was besieged and bombed for two months in 1982, which left 18,000 people dead and 30,000 wounded- most of the casualties were civilians. Israel said that it would end the siege only if the PLO fighters, numbered 9,000, along with the Syrian troops in Lebanon surrendered and left Lebanon; thus, the PLO headquarters moved from Beirut to Tunis. A multinational peacekeeping force was deployed to Beirut. Phalangist militia and the Israelis surrounded Palestinian refugee camps in Sabra and Shatila and massacred about 2,000 civilian Palestinian refugees which resulted in international condemnation (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005; Ovendale, 1999).

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon resulted in great dissent inside Israel; moreover,

it triggered strong international condemnation of Israel, weakened the Israeli and American presence in Lebanon and strengthened the Syrian role. President Regan proposed a peace plan between the Israelis and the Palestinians, but it was rejected by both sides. The Arabs proposed another peace plan which was rejected by Israel. In September 1985, three Israelis were killed by PLO members in Cyprus. Israel retaliated by bombing the PLO headquarters in Tunis in October, killing fifty- eight Palestinians and fifteen Tunisians. Consequently, members of militant Palestinian groups hijacked a TWA airliner and became involved in shootings in airport lounges in Rome and Vienna. Moreover, members of the PLF hijacked the cruise ship 'Achille Lauro' and killed an elderly Jewish passenger. The escalation of violence and terrorism between both sides attracted world attention (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005).

The Palestinian Intifada or Uprising started in December 1987, in a climate of prevailing frustration among Palestinians due to the practises of the Israeli occupation which dominated all aspects of their lives, the expansion of settlements and violence against them. In addition, they were frustrated with the failure of Arab governments in addressing their problems and the failure of the PLO to achieve self-determination for the Palestinian people. The Palestinians started an unorganised and unarmed uprising when Israeli tanks went through a line of cars, killing four Palestinians and wounding seven others. Israel used excessive force to try to curb the uprising, which resulted in the death of more than one hundred and fifty people and the wounding of over 11,500; furthermore, tough measures were taken, such as imposing curfews, closing universities and colleges, arrests, demolishing houses, breaking the bones of stone throwers, etc.

The Intifada succeeded in drawing world attention to the situation of the Palestinians, due to the killing of so many people. In November 1989, the International Red Cross revealed that eight hundred Palestinians had been killed by Israeli security forces during the Intifada, two hundred of whom were children. Besides, 16,000 were imprisoned, and 1,100 were held in administrative detention. Moreover, three hundred Palestinian homes were demolished or confiscated. At the same time, Israel was still expanding settlements, expropriating properties and encouraging Israeli citizens to settle in the occupied territories. By the end of 1987, 55% of the West Bank and 30% of Gaza had been expropriated by Israel. In November 1988, the UN General Assembly issued a

resolution condemning Israeli oppression in the occupied territories and violations of Palestinians' human rights, by a vote of 130:2 (the two being Israel and USA). Arafat and the PLO tried to take credit for the Intifada, and to use it to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005; Hirst, 2003).

Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) started in Gaza and it established a large number of medical and educational institutions to serve the impoverished Palestinian community. These services increased in popularity among Palestinians. Sheikh Ahmed Yassin became prominent as the founder and leader of Hamas. In mid November 1988 during an Arab League summit in Algiers, the Palestinian National Council (PNC), which is the Parliament of the PLO in exile, proclaimed the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and thirty- seven nations extended recognition to the Palestinian state within three days. Israel and USA rejected the declaration. The PNC announced that it accepted a two- state solution and that the Palestinians would limit their struggle to Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1967, i.e. 22% of the historical land of Palestine. Furthermore, the PLO implicitly recognised Israel. A group of American Jews met with PLO representatives in Stockholm in December 1988 and issued the Stockholm declaration which involved the A Zionist commission, headed by Weizmann, was sent to Palestine, as it felt it was necessary to put the Balfour Declaration into practise (Ovendale, 1999). PLO's recognition of Israel and condemnation of violence (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005).

Arafat was to outline a peace proposal at the UN General Assembly, but he was denied a visa to enter the USA; hence, the UN General Assembly convened in Geneva where Arafat detailed his peace plan. Shamir announced that Israel was not ready to talk to the PLO. Arafat announced that the PLO accepted the UN 'Resolution 242' and 'Resolution 338' which involved recognising the state of Israel and its right to exist and so the USA announced that it would open dialogue with the PLO. In May 1989, the US proposed a peace plan, and the Egyptian president represented the PLO in preliminary dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In March 1990, the Knesset passed a vote of no-confidence against Shamir's government, and no other government was formed through May which resulted in a complete halt to peace efforts. The Intifada was provoked again after an Israeli soldier killed seven Palestinians in Tel Aviv, and Arafat

called on the Palestinian people to step up protests (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005; Hirst, 2003).

The cold war had ended by 1990, and the Soviet Union collapsed in December 1991. The new situation enhanced Israel's capabilities compared to the Arabs who obtained arms from the former Soviet Union. In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, which raised the worries of industrial countries, especially the US, about the future of oil supplies from the Gulf. Massive multinational forces, led by the US, were immediately deployed. The US-led coalition launched operation "Desert Storm," on the 16th of January 1991, and President Bush announced the liberation of Kuwait on the 27th of February. The Gulf War crisis distracted the world's attention from the Palestinian Intifada. Moreover, it weakened the Palestinians' position for supporting Saddam Hussein, and PLO credibility was severely eroded. Furthermore, PLO funding diminished considerably (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005).

The Gulf War and conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Bosnia decreased attention to the Intifada. Israel took advantage of the situation to crack down harder on the Palestinians. The US increased pressures on Israel and Arab states to hold an international peace conference in Madrid in October 1991. It did not achieve much progress, as old positions were reiterated. In June 1992, Yitzhak Rabin formed a Labour-led coalition Israeli government. He freed eight hundred political prisoners, halted settlement activities, and called for 'land for peace'. In January 1993, secret talks between the PLO and Israeli officials started in Oslo in which they agreed the main points of a framework for peace (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005).

Under the sponsorship of President Clinton, on the 13th of September 1993, Rabin and Arafat signed a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government for the Palestinians. The PLO and Israel recognised each other's existence and agreed to work together for peace. The peace process was seen as a great breakthrough by most people. However, agreement between both sides was not easy. The Palestinians regarded the peace process as a first step towards a Palestinian state, but Israel viewed it as a step towards Palestinian self-rule without any sovereignty; therefore, negotiators on both sides failed to conclude details of the agreement. In fact, Israel and the Palestinians did not have the same negotiating power, as Israel was the controller of all aspects of

Palestinians' lives and the historical ally of the US – the formal sponsor of the peace process. Hirst (2003) holds that during the peace process, Israel's 'right to exist in peace and security' took precedence over the Palestinians' right to continue the struggle for their rights. Roy (1986) remarks that the most significant feature of the Oslo process is the abandonment of international law in favor of bilateral negotiations between two parties of grossly unequal power; therefore, Oslo agreements overwhelmingly reflect Israeli interests and concerns.

Negotiations led to finalising the "Gaza-Jericho First" agreement of interim self-rule for the Palestinians, signed in Cairo in May 1994. After the signing, Israel withdrew from Jericho and Gaza, and the Palestinians began to take control of internal affairs. Palestinian militant groups escalated violence after signing the accord. In response, Israel stopped taking further steps to implement it and started to take measures to separate the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples. Attacks by Palestinian militants undermined Arafat's authority, so he started to use extreme measures such as court martial against Palestinians accused of attacks against Israel. Palestinian and Israeli negotiators continued their discussions and agreed to increase the power of the Palestinians to areas such as industry and trade. They signed another agreement known as the Taba Accord or Oslo II in Egypt in September 1995. In November, a Jewish extremist assassinated Rabin. Peres formed a new government and worked on implementing Oslo Accords. The Palestinians elected Arafat president and elected members of the Legislative Council. The Israeli assassinations of leaders of two Palestinian groups provoked revenge attacks against Israel. Peres stopped peace negotiations and sealed off the Palestinian territories (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005).

In March 1996, Hizbullah militants in South Lebanon attacked an Israeli military post killing seven, and in April they fired two missiles on North Israel wounding thirty-six. Israel responded by sending warplanes to Lebanon, destroying Lebanon's infrastructure, killing two hundred civilians and wounding thousands. In April, Israel shelled a UN shelter in Qana killing more than one hundred civilians. The Israeli operation triggered wide international criticism and alienated Israel from its allies in the Arab world. Peres announced early elections in Israel in May 1996. Benjamin Netanyahu became Israel's Prime Minister. He opposed the Palestinian statehood and

lifted the freeze on building new settlements which meant the expropriation of more Palestinian land. Peace negotiations came to a halt after Netanyahu's decision to expand settlements in Jerusalem and after a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv in March 1997. Violence and repeated Israeli closures resulted in significant harm to the Palestinian economy. Netanyahu authorised an assassination attempt against a Hamas leader in Amman. The attempt failed, and King Hussein demanded the release of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas who was imprisoned in Israel, in return for the agents who attempted the assassination. Israel refused to implement the Oslo Accords, and the US made a new proposal for peace which the Palestinians accepted and the Israelis rejected. Clinton was distracted by the Lewinsky affair (Bickerton & Klausner, 2005).

Eventually, Israeli and Palestinian delegations met at Wye River. Slow and difficult negotiations resulted in the Wye River Agreement which was signed in October 1998. Netanyahu refused to implement any articles of the agreement due to internal problems. The Knesset voted to dissolve the government and decided that new elections be held in May 1999. Ehud Barak, leader of the Labour Party, won the elections. He did not show willingness to make progress with the Peace Process. In his first meeting with Clinton, Barak expressed his wish to wrap up the Wye River Agreement into final status talks. This was not welcomed by the Palestinians, as the move to final status talks without the agreed withdrawal could mean more Palestinian concessions on the most controversial issues of settlements, refugees and Jerusalem (Hammami & Tamari, 2001).

Under American sponsorship, the Sharm El Sheikh Agreement was signed to set out a timetable for a final peace settlement by September 2000. Final Status talks were very difficult, as both sides were unwilling to compromise on any of the sensitive issues, and both were pressurised domestically not to make compromises. The Palestinians demanded the dismantling of settlements, a state in the West Bank and Gaza, and the return of about three million refugees, but Israel refused. President Clinton invited Arafat and Barak for a summit at Camp David, but it ended with no resolution. The declaration of a Palestinian state which was scheduled for September the 13th was postponed which resulted in a strong sense of frustration among the Palestinians. The Oslo peace process has not achieved much improvement to the lives of ordinary

Palestinians. During the peace process, the settler community in Gaza and the West Bank increased 77%, from 110,000 to 195,000; Israeli settlements and bypass roads divided Palestinian territories; and Israeli restrictions made the movement of Palestinians from one area to another impossible, not to mention the systematic brutalisation and humiliation that the Palestinians had to undergo (Rabbani, 2001).

During the Oslo period, the Palestinian economy suffered devastating losses, e.g. between 1992 and 1996, unemployment increased from 3% to 28%, Gross National Product (GNP) declined 18.4%, and per capita GNP declined 37%. This is mainly due to Israeli closures of Palestinian territories which restricted the movement of goods and labour. What Oslo agreements have granted the Palestinians is a limited self-rule over small, noncontiguous, isolated enclaves under Israeli jurisdiction. Under Oslo, there were 227 separate Palestinian enclaves under full or partial control of the Palestinian Authority. Almost 88% of them are less than 2 kilometers in size. Israel had all key resources in Palestinian territories and the territories that were given to the Palestinians are those least desirable and least productive economically (Carey, 2001; Searle & Adams, 1986).

On the 28th of September 2000, the second Palestinian Uprising, or Al-Aqsa Intifada started with a visit of the Israeli leader of the Likud Party, Ariel Sharon, to the Temple Mount or Haram Sharif, a site holy for both Muslims and Jews. Sharon was guarded by more than 1,000 Israeli officers, and he pledged that Israel would never give up the mount or any part of Jerusalem. This provoked the Palestinians and led to demonstrations in Jerusalem immediately after his visit and unrest rapidly extended to the West Bank and Gaza. Israeli security forces responded harshly to Palestinian demonstrations. The Al-Aqsa Intifada marked the end of the peace process and the beginning of a new violent phase of the conflict. Roy holds that the Al-Aqsa Intifada emanated from a context of continued occupation and dispossession that characterised the Oslo peace process (Searle & Adams, 1986).

Mutual escalation of violence has been the pattern since the beginning of the second uprising. The death toll increased to over sixty Palestinians in a single week, while Israel besieged all the Palestinian territories and shelled the offices of the

Palestinian Authority. Despite international calls for calm in the region, the situation deteriorated very quickly. Clashes between Arab and Jewish citizens inside Israel escalated resulting in the deaths of more people on both sides. Clinton, Arafat and Barak held a peace summit in Egypt, but they could not achieve any progress. As the UN Assembly adopted a resolution condemning Israel's excessive use of force against the Palestinians, Barak suspended talks with the Palestinians. Israel started a new tactic of targeted killings against Palestinians, euphemistically called 'surgical strikes.' Barak declared early elections in Israel in November. Early in December the UN reported that the Palestinian economy was ruined since the beginning of the uprising.

In 2001, Clinton proposed a new peace plan at the end of his presidency, but it did not succeed. On the 20th of January, George W. Bush became president of the USA, and Ariel Sharon, leader of the Likud Party, became Israel's Prime Minister in February. He ordered a blockade around all the Palestinian territories. Palestinian violence against the Israelis escalated, and Israel increased its policy of house demolitions and land confiscation for security purposes and for the expansion of settlements in the Palestinian territories. An international fact-finding committee led by the former United States Senator George J. Mitchell investigated the situation and issued a report calling on Israel to freeze settlements and the Palestinians to end 'terror'. The Bush administration decided to adopt the findings of the Mitchell report. The Palestinians and the Israelis accepted the report in principle and agreed to use it as a basis for negotiations, yet spiraling violence claiming more lives on both sides did not make negotiations possible. Israel increased the scope of assassination operations against Palestinian militants and politicians despite US objections and international condemnation. Palestinian militants responded with shootings and suicide bombings against Israelis, and Israel in turn responded by more incursions and attacks in the Palestinian territories.

On the 11th of September 2001, hijacked airliners destroyed the World Trade Centre and part of the Pentagon. As the world was shocked, Israel raided Jericho on the 12th of September and the Gaza Strip on the 15th of September. The US, aiming to recruit Arab states to a broad war coalition, pressurised Israel for ceasefire talks, but Sharon refused and warned of plans to bring a million more Jews to Israel. This provoked more Palestinian attacks which in turn resulted in harsher retaliations by Israel and it barred

Arafat from travelling.

Violence between both sides continued throughout 2002 with more Palestinian suicide bombings and Israeli assassinations, arrests, demolitions, closures, deportations, etc. Israel and the US blamed Arafat and the Palestinian Authority for the deteriorating situation, and the US threatened sanctions against the PA. The Palestinian economy collapsed, as the Palestinians were banned from work in Israel, and movement of goods between Israel and the Palestinian territories came to a halt. The first week of March 2002 witnessed the killing of more than eighty Palestinians and thirty-one Israelis. In April, Israel attacked Bethlehem; around two hundred and forty Palestinians, some of them armed, took refuge in the Church of Nativity. Despite international condemnation, Israel besieged the church, and snipers targeted Palestinians inside the church killing seven and seriously injuring a priest. Finally, an agreement was reached to end the thirty-eight-day siege, with the exile of thirteen militants the deportation of twenty-six to Gaza for trial. Israeli forces undertook a major incursion in the West Bank and targeted the Jenin refugee camp with air and ground raids, killing more than one hundred and twenty-four Palestinians and wounding more than three hundred and thirty-seven others. Israel was strongly criticised by the international community and blocked a UN fact finding mission to Jenin. President Bush announced the “Road Map” plan for Peace between Israel and the Palestinians in which he called for calm between both sides and envisaged a Palestinian state after three years.

According to Amnesty International, violence between the Palestinians and the Israelis in 2002 resulted in the killing of more than one thousand Palestinians, including around one hundred and fifty children at the hands of Israeli forces. Moreover, about thirty-five Palestinians were assassinated in targeted killings. On the other hand, more than four hundred and twenty Israelis, at least two hundred and sixty-five of them civilians including forty-seven children, were killed in suicide bombings and other attacks by Palestinian armed groups. About two thousand Palestinian homes were destroyed, and thousands of Palestinians were arrested (Amnesty International Report, 2003).

Violence and counter violence continued throughout 2003. Israel closed

Palestinian universities and started to build a security fence around the Palestinian territories in the West Bank despite strong international criticisms. In April the new international Road Map was announced, but mutual violence hindered its implementation. The UN issued a resolution calling on Israel to tear down the West Bank security fence, but Israel decided to ignore it. In November, the EU formally condemned the West Bank fence, and the UN Secretary General declared Israel in violation of international law for flouting a UN resolution calling for dismantling the fence. Amnesty International reports that in 2003 Israel killed more than six hundred Palestinians, including more than one hundred children, most of them killed in raids and incursions. Palestinian armed groups killed two hundred Israelis, including twenty-one children. Israeli restrictions resulted in unprecedented poverty, unemployment and health problems among the Palestinians. Israel also continued house demolition and the destruction of Palestinian cultivated land.

In 2004 Ariel Sharon revealed a unilateral disengagement plan which involved withdrawal from all Israeli settlements in Gaza in return for formally annexing all Jewish settlements in the West Bank. On the 22nd of March, Israel assassinated Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of Hamas in an air strike. On the 25th of March, the US blocked a UN resolution condemning Israel's assassination of Sheikh Yassin. His successor, Dr. Abdel-Aziz al-Rantissi, was also assassinated by Israel in April. Hamas decided to keep the identity of its new leader secret, as Israel threatened to assassinate any Hamas leader. Ariel Sharon warned that Yasser Arafat could be the next Palestinian leader to be assassinated by Israel. In July, the World Court called Israel's West Bank barrier, a de facto land grab and ordered Israel to tear it down and compensate Palestinian victims. Ariel Sharon rejected the ruling and claimed that it encouraged terrorists. Arafat became seriously ill, and the Israeli government permitted him to be flown to Paris for medical treatment, but he died on the 11th of November and was buried in Ramallah. During 2004, eight hundred and twenty-one Palestinians, including one hundred and seventy-six children were killed by Israeli forces, and one hundred and eight Israelis, including eight children were killed by Palestinian militants.

In 2005, Mahmoud Abbas became the Palestinian president. A suicide bomber killed six Israelis in Gaza, and Israel announced suspending all contact with Abbas in

response. Israel confirmed that the government was continuing its expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem's city council ordered the mass demolition of the homes of about one thousand Palestinians in a neighbourhood claimed by Jewish settlers. In August 2005, settlers started to evacuate settlements in the Gaza Strip, as Israel bombed targets in Gaza and raided West Bank towns. Sharon resigned as Prime Minister and set up the new Kadima party.

At the beginning of 2006, the Israeli Prime Minister Sharon suffered a massive stroke, *which left him in a coma*. Ehud Olmert succeeded him as prime minister and leader of Kadima party. The Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) won Palestinian parliamentary elections, and both Fatah and Hamas formed a coalition government, with Ismail Haniyeh from Hamas as Prime Minister, and Mahmoud Abbas from Fatah as President. Immediately after Hamas' victory, Israel ruled out working with Hamas or the Palestinian government. The U.S. and the EU, which brand Hamas as a terrorist group, stopped financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. Israel imposed closures on Palestinian territories especially in Gaza where socioeconomic conditions deteriorated significantly, and the population became increasingly reliant on food aid.

Israel destroyed Hamas offices and arrested Hamas ministers and Members of Parliament in response to a Palestinian raid in which elements from Hamas were involved. In June 2006, Palestinian militants raided an Israeli military post near Gaza killing three soldiers and kidnapping one. Militant groups holding the Israeli soldier refused to release him without a prisoner exchange agreement. This resulted in violent Israeli reactions including several incursions and raids against Gaza. All crossings to Gaza were closed which resulted in a humanitarian crisis and severe shortage in food and medicines. In November, the UN Security Council issued a resolution condemning Israeli attacks on Gaza, but it was vetoed by the US. Violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians which marked the long history of the conflict is still persistent until the time of writing this thesis.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict affects much more than the Israelis and the Palestinians; it affects the world as a whole. Its impacts are much wider than the immediate casualties on both sides. The conflict is generally perceived as one of the

most intractable conflicts in modern history. It can be argued that the conflict is one of the main factors that affects the relationship between Arabs and the West. Historical sympathies and perceptions of different sides of the conflict have always been prominent elements that fuel tensions and underline differences between both sides. The following section deals with another aspect of the context which is perceptions of Israel and the Palestinians held in the West. In order to understand the representation of conflict in Arab and Western newspapers, it is important to consider how both sides of the conflict are perceived, the origins of these perceptions and their implications on the representation of the conflict. The perceptions of the Israelis and the Palestinians have been affected by the long history of rivalry between Islam and the West, especially that the Zionist ideology is based on Western ideals while the Palestinians are perceived as Arabs.

1.3 Perceptions of Israel and the Palestinians in the West

The relationship between Islam and the West is old and complex. It has long been regarded as a relationship of rivalry. Hitti (1962) traces it back to the emergence of Islam which posed a threat to the Christian West since its appearance, due to Muslim Arab conquests of the territories of the Christian Byzantine neighbours. Therefore fear, hostility, and prejudice are the main factors that shaped the Western view of Islam. The Christian West regarded Muslims as the enemies and their beliefs as false. The negative image of Islam in the West was further distorted by medieval writings, Crusaders' literature, and by the writings of some Eastern Christians like St. John of Damascus who depicted Islam as an idolatrous worship of a false prophet.

The Muslim conquest of the Iberian Peninsula caused more hostility towards Islam that was clear in the writings of Spanish Christian theologians who distorted the image of Islam by introducing invented stories. After the failure of the Crusades, a new movement emerged to win the war against Islam by persuasion rather than conflict through Western missionaries. However, the activities of missionaries failed to achieve any success among Muslims, for it was very difficult to inculcate Christian Trinitarian doctrine in the minds of Unitarian Muslims. While the Western world was waging this war of words on Islam, the Islamic world was largely unaware of it and uninterested in

it. Muslims were blinded by what they regarded as their superiority and paid relatively little attention to the West. They apparently failed even to realise that they were scientifically and technologically surpassed by the West until after the French invasion of 1798.

Translations of the Qur'an were attempted or commissioned by Christian scholars with the aim of promoting Christian knowledge. The first attempt was to translate it into Latin in France in 1141, and it was supplemented by 'a refutation of the beliefs of the Mohammedans'. This Latin translation was then translated into English and French. In the eighteenth century, traders and travellers to the Islamic world reported their journeys and helped refute some of the prevailing medieval fallacies, yet their attempts were encountered by more attacks on Islam by Christian missionaries.

When the Ottomans ceased to be a threat to Europe and when trade and travel between the West and the Ottoman Empire increased, Oxford University created a Chair in Arabic and appointed Edward Pocock who lived in Syria and had first-hand experience with the Arabic language and Islam in the job. Pocock translated and edited a number of books about Islam and criticised the largely imaginary stories about Islam and Mohammed. Historians and philosophers were more perceptive in their treatment of Islam than literary writers and theologians; however, their knowledge of Islam was impaired by the fact that many of them were ignorant of the Arabic language. They treated medieval stories about Islam and Mohammed with some skepticism though. The translation of the Arabian Nights and their popularity among Westerners opened a new window to the Orient. Along with travel literature, the tales from the Orient made the world of Islam look more colourful, wonderful and mysterious and brought it nearer to the minds and hearts of Westerners. This new image of the Orient resulted in certain perceptions that later came under much criticism from the proponents of Orientalism.

Orientalism is a very important concept that changed drastically in a relatively short period. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the word 'orientalist' referred to "a scholar versed in the language and literature of the orient (Turkey, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, later also India, China and Japan, and even the whole of Asia)". Then, in the 1960s, the meaning of the word changed, due to the critiques of

some scholars mostly of Middle Eastern origins. The term 'orientalism' came to acquire a number of new critical senses including: "a corporate institution designed for dealing with the Orient; a partial view of the Islam; an instrument of Western imperialism; a style of thought, based on an ontological and epistemological distinction between the orient and the occident" (Macfie, 2000: 1-2).

This transformation which turned the word 'Orientalism' to one of the most highly charged words in modern scholarship came about as a result of the critiques of four scholars who adopted a critical attitude towards the representation of the Orient in the West. The most influential of these critiques was that of Edward Said, *Orientalism* (1978) in which he criticises Orientalism as "a cumulative and corporate identity", and a "saturating hegemonic system." Said argues that orientalists 'created the Orient,' which is based on a number of stereotypical images, according to which "Europe (the West, the 'self') is seen as rational, developed, humane, superior, authentic, active, creative and masculine, while the Orient (the East, the 'other') ... is seen as being irrational, aberrant, backward, crude, despotic, inferior, inauthentic, passive, feminine, and sexually corrupt." Orientalism contributed to the creation of other concepts like an Arab mind, an oriental psyche, and an Islamic society. Together they contributed to the construction of a saturating hegemonic system that is designed to promote European imperialism and colonialism (Macfie, 2000: 4).

In *Orientalism*, Said describes the 'imaginative geography' that divides the Orient and the Occident which is not a natural division, but rather a human production (Boer, 2003). He argues that "the Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences" (Said, 1978: 12). He emphasises Orientalism as a discourse dealing with the Orient, which the West used to describe it, teach it, authorise views of it, and rule over it. Said regards this discourse as necessary for understanding the discipline by which "European culture was able to manage – and even produce – the Orient during the post-Enlightenment period." He also holds that continued investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness. He also argues that Orientalist discourse divides the world into a conceptually evolving, modern, and superior

Occidental “us” versus a static, backward, and weakened Oriental “them” (Semmerling, 2006: 5-6). Orientalism can be viewed as a western style for dominating, restructuring and influencing authority over the Orient, and in this way Orientalist discourse is representative of the pattern of relative strength between East and West. Moreover, Orientalism has been a very important approach not only in understanding the Orient, but also in understanding Western culture and thought; “Orientalism is – and does not simply represent – a considerable dimension of modern political-intellectual culture, and as such has less to do with the Orient than it does with ‘our’ world’ (Said, 1978: 12).

Other prominent critiques of Orientalism include those of Anouar Abdel-Malek who criticised Orientalism as “an instrument of imperialism designed to secure the colonisation and enslavement of parts of the so-called Third World”; Tibawi who criticised Orientalism as “a mode of understanding and interpreting Islam and Arab nationalism” with the aim of achieving ‘a better understanding of an old problem;’ and Turner who criticised Orientalism as “a justification for a syndrome of beliefs, attitudes and theories, affecting the geography, economics and sociology of the Orient.” These critiques, along with Said’s, had a revolutionary impact on Western thought and outlook which resulted in the re-evaluation of many values and concepts. Consequently, the word ‘Orientalism’ which once stood as a positive term came to be used negatively as a type of radicalism or imperialism (Macfie, 2000: 2-4).

Orientalism has alerted the West to negative representations of the Orient, but it has not changed them significantly. Muslims and Arabs are regarded by many Westerners as the ‘Other’, and they typically have a negative image in Western mentality. Ghareeb (1977: 17) argues that “most Americans picture Arabs as ‘backward,’ ‘scheming,’ ‘fanatic terrorists,’ who are dirty, dishonest, oversexed and corrupt.” These negative stereotypes have been present in the West for centuries, and they are clearly noticed in the way Arabs are depicted in popular culture, e.g. in movies and novels where they still appear in negative images and roles. Shaheen examines the representations of Arabs on American television and argues that “on television entertainment programs and documentaries the Arab is depicted as pimp, cheat, and backstabber ... All the worst possible images of the Arab, from the blood-feuding

Bedouin to the oil blackmailer, are offered” (Shaheen, 1977: 164).

Although negative stereotypes of Arabs and Muslims in the West existed long before the creation of Israel, they have been further aggravated with the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, especially in the USA. Ghareeb holds that “the American public today generally sees Israel as ‘little,’ ‘brave,’ ‘beleaguered,’ ‘heroic,’ while Arab nations are seen as ‘backward,’ ‘ignorant,’ and ‘bloodthirsty’” (1977: vi). After the 1967 War, the Arab image was further distorted by stereotypes of the ‘bumbling, cowardly Arab’; later, this image was replaced by that of an “Arab terrorist.” Little holds that “for Americans Israel’s military triumph in June 1967 completed the transformation of Jews from victims to victors while branding the Arabs as feckless, reckless, and weak” (Little, 2004: 48). Moreover, the 1973 War and Arab oil embargo gave rise to another image, i.e. the super-rich Arab sheikh who controls world oil and intimidates the West by threatening its oil supplies. All the negative stereotypes of Arabs persist in the US; however, there is now an increasing awareness of the Orientalist origins of these stereotypes.

American Cinema and other forms of popular culture have contributed to disseminating negative stereotypes about Arabs. In *Reel Bad Arabs*, Shaheen explains how the American film industry abuses the character of the bad Arab, and he warns that “when one ethnic, racial, or religious group is vilified, innocent people suffer” and reminds us that cinema’s hateful Arab stereotypes are reminiscent of abuses of earlier times of characters like Native Americans, blacks, and Jews (Shaheen, 2001: 4). Semmerling (2006) uses the American animated series *South Park* to show how the “evil” construction of the Arab has gone so far that the character is made more “evil” than evil itself. As the long time purveyor of evil, terror, and fear in human culture, Satan, is a wimp in comparison to this “evil” Arab. “Saddam ... is more evil than Satan. He is ruthless, uncaring, and selfish. He is oversexed, more sexually impetuous than Satan himself.” Semmerling links such views to American Orientalism and argues that:

Our latest cultural discourse of national self, since the arrival of George W. Bush’s administration and the events of September 11th, relies upon a world that is no longer multicultural, but rather strongly bifurcated between good and evil. The lines have been

drawn once again in the latest military endeavor of the United States and its allies against the “evil” Arabs. The “evil” Arabs and the Middle East have become our antithesis, and may continue to be so as our national self is more and more compared to the Other through the nexus of foreign policy. For the foreseeable future, U.S. forces will continue to occupy Iraq, Palestinians will persist in struggling for statehood, and al-Qaeda will continue its call to attack the United States. Oil will continue to be imported from the Arab states, and oil embargoes, some thirty years after the first one, remain a frightening thought deep in the American psyche. (Semmerling, 2006: 267)

On the other hand, the representation of the Israelis in American media generally carries positive images, as the Israelis are seen as “tough, energetic, hard-working, persecuted and courageous people.” They are modern pioneers who have made the desert bloom and democracy a reality amidst the backward Middle East. Israeli Jews are depicted in American media as “high-minded, altruistic, trustworthy, compassionate, and deserving of sympathy and support.” These representations resulted in gaining a great deal of sympathy for the Israelis among the Americans who came to believe that the best course of action for a resolution of the conflict in the Middle East is to empathise with the more rational, democratic, and culturally similar Israelis (Ghareeb, 1977).

Cultural proximity of Israel to the West, especially to the American culture, plays an important role in the perceptions of Israel in the USA and the West in general. The story of the Israelis settling in Palestine is often compared to the story of the American exploration of the West, and the Palestinians are compared to an aboriginal people; therefore, the American public identifies with the Israelis. “Americans tend to identify themselves with foreign societies or cultures projecting a pioneering new spirit (e.g. Israel) of wresting the land from ill use of savages” (Said, 1981: 64). Also, many Jews occupy distinguished positions in Western societies and contribute to these societies in many ways. Furthermore, the ideology of Zionism was based on European ideologies, and the chief architects of Zionism come from well-established Western intellectual traditions and thus, the ideas of Zionism were accessible to Western minds.

The story of Zionist achievement in Israel has a steady, reassuring pulse to it. It is continuous, it is peopled with recognisably human figures who are themselves tied justly great and justly famous Jews in the West (Einstein, Freud, Chagall, Rubinstein, and so on); it can have a universal validity imputed to or felt in it. The people who speak the

narrative represent a world the average Westerner knows. Zionist history as incarnated in the narrative or modern Jewish achievements in short is official, or semi-official. Only a native or an alien terrorist and troublemaker will feel uncomfortable with it. And indeed most Palestinians speaking their history are unlikely to be of (however much they may be in) the West. Their language is Arabic; their religion is Islam or Eastern Christianity, their culture decidedly un-Western. Whereas for the Israeli Jew it has long been possible to describe the agonies of the Holocaust and the restitution provided by the return to Zion, for the Palestinians there is no vast historical tragedy of apocalyptic proportion to draw on, and certainly no vindicated return (Hitchens & Said, 1988: 6).

A number of Jews occupy distinguished positions in Western societies, and they are familiar with narratives that appeal to Western audiences. This enables them to use the weapon of the media to present their cause and their point of view successfully to the Western public, while the Palestinians fail to do so, especially since the Israelis have used the media to support their Zionist cause. Prominent Israeli figures are often quoted in American and other Western media, and their rhetoric is then absorbed and transmitted by journalists in various media channels. The Israelis understand that media is a weapon of popular persuasion, and they have always used it skillfully to promote and sustain their Zionist cause (Said, 2002).

It is by no means an exaggeration to say that the establishment of Israel as a state in 1948 occurred partly because the Zionists acquired control of most of the territory of Palestine, and partly because they had already won the political battle in the international world in which ideas, representations, rhetoric, and images were at issue (Hitchens & Said, 1988: 1).

On the other hand, the Palestinians have been ineffective in promoting their cause, and they failed to influence Western policies or even views regarding the conflict.

From the beginning of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict almost a century ago, Palestinians have been particularly ineffective in advancing their own case and attempting to insert themselves and their cause into the framework that forms public thought and policy in the United States ... Palestinian political disorganisation, the lack of a national political structure, and the lack of any public-relations effort in the years leading up to Israel's creation, as well as during the two decades in which Palestinians languished in shock and political quiescence following their dispossession and dispersal, have been noted (Christison, 1999: 285).

American and Western attitudes towards Israel have been influenced by other important considerations, such as the history of persecution of Jews in Europe which created a sense of guilt in the Western conscience and resulted in great historical concessions and apologies, not to mention the ensuing sensitivity towards criticising the Jews and Israel, which is often labelled ‘anti-Semitism’. The Jewish lobbies, the Anti-Defamation League, among other Jewish institutions in the West play a powerful role in the maintenance of a positive image of Israel and the suppression of any criticism of it. The ‘Jewish Lobby’ comprises several organisations like the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the Jewish Agency for Israel Appeal, the World Zionist Organisation, the Jewish Fund, etc. They are dedicated to the support and maintenance of the state of Israel. Historically, they have been intolerant of any criticisms to the state of Israel and respond to them by ‘anti-Semitism’ charges and threats to withdraw their support to the American administration in the Congress, in addition to threats of denying electoral support in presidential and other elections. Lilienthal argues that “the mere presence of the powerful anti-Defamation League, even before the fearsome “anti-Semitic” label might be brandished, has imparted sensitivity so powerful as to smother any idea of private discussion, let alone public debate, on the grave issues involved” (1983: 4).

Anti-Semitism has played an important role in silencing criticisms to Israel; “the resort to charges of anti-Semitism (or in the case of Jews, Jewish self-hatred) to silence critics of Israel has been quite a general and often effective device” (Herman & Chomsky, 1994: 15). In the *Holocaust Industry*, Norman Finkelstein, an American Jew and son of two Holocaust survivors argues that invoking the Holocaust is used to delegitimise all criticism of Jews, and that organised Jewry has exploited the Nazi holocaust to deflect criticism of Israel and its morally indefensible policies. He explains that after the June 1967 war, some American politicians expressed their worries concerning Israel’s occupation of neighbouring Arab states, its militarisation and alienation from the Arab world. American Jewish elites responded to critics of Israel by evoking memories of the Holocaust and by claiming that Israel did so because of its fears of a second Holocaust. Accordingly, Holocaust memory was moved center stage. By the 1970s, Jewish leaders warned of a ‘new anti-Semitism’ which helped them

enhance the image of Israel as a last resort for American Jews in case they needed one, and also helped them raise funds to combat this new anti-Semitism. In addition, the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war was claimed to exacerbate American Jewish fears of Israel's vulnerability (Finkelstein, 2000).

After the June 1967 war, American Jews advocated Israel strongly and endeavored to represent it as "America's newest strategic asset." They established the Israeli-American alliance which is now called "the special relationship" (Finkelstein, 2000: 20). This special relationship is based on common biblical heritage; a shared belief that because of the Holocaust and earlier centuries of suffering, Jews must have a homeland and the US identification with what some have called Israel's 'national style,' particularly in its pioneering beginnings and its commitment to Western democracy (Christison, 1999). Additionally, Israel has historically served as a symbol of US domination and supremacy in the Middle East.

This special relationship has resulted in immense American support to Israel in every possible way, e.g. the US supports Israel politically by vetoing UN resolutions that involve criticism of Israel, for example, between 1972 and 1997, the US used its veto thirty-two times to stop draft resolutions critical of Israel. Moreover, the US assists Israel financially as no other nation in the world does, e.g. between 1978 and 1982, Israel received 48% of all US military aid and 35% of all its economic aid (Herman & Chomsky, 1994). The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs states that the Jewish state continued annually to receive more American economic and military aid than any other country, with \$2.9 billion on tap for 2003 (Hanley, 2003). Nevertheless, Christison notes that the climate is now changing and criticism of Israeli policies in the US has become much more widely acceptable. However, "the Palestinians are still not fully accepted as legitimate contenders for public and policymaker attention, and in many subtle ways the national mind-set remains closed to the Palestinian viewpoint" (Christison, 1999: 276). It has to be recognised that there are vast differences in perceptions of the Israeli/ Palestinian conflict, not only in the Middle East; much of the world is not as supportive of Israel as the United States is (Seib, 2004).

2 Theoretical Background

The aim of this chapter is to introduce the theoretical approach utilised in the study, namely CDA, its objectives, methods, theoretical origins, main approaches and critiques. Various approaches will be outlined with special consideration to their respective lines of tradition, definitions of CDA, aims, central terms and concepts, critiques, as well as their relevance to the present research.

2.1 Introduction to CDA, its Methods and Objectives

CDA is a contemporary approach to the study of discourse structures in relation to social structures. It started in the late Eighties and developed rapidly to become one of the most influential approaches, not only in discourse analysis but in the social sciences in general. van Dijk (1993a) states that the aim of CDA is to investigate the relationships between power structures and discourse structures. CDA assumes that there are systematic connections between discourse practices and social practices and structures, and that systematic asymmetries of power and resources between language users can be linked to their unequal access to linguistic and social resources. These resources can be used to make asymmetric power relations and particular textual representations of the world appear natural, and it attempts to make these connections transparent by means of textual and contextual analyses. The aim of CDA is “to investigate critically social inequality, as it is expressed, signaled, constituted, legitimised and so on by language use” (Wodak & Meyer, 2001: 2).

“There is no single theory or method which is uniform and consistent throughout CDA” (Blackledge, 2005: 13), yet its various approaches have a common theoretical background, basic assumptions and goals. Its methodologies can be described with reference to specific approaches of theorists within the field, e.g. Fairclough, Wodak and van Dijk, among others. CDA draws on different disciplines, and it has been adopted by researchers from various fields with different research interests for a variety of purposes. It is a young approach since most of its developments and resources date from the Nineties, and it is continuously being developed by new insights from research in the field of CDA itself and by its applications to related fields (Jenner & Titscher, 2000: 78).

CDA is problem-oriented, as it takes a specific social problem, e.g. ‘racism’ or

'sexism' as its object of study. Studies in CDA typically deal with data such as news reports, media interviews, organisational and institutional discourse in schools, hospitals, etc. This data is analysed with the aim of revealing the embodied manipulative structures that seem natural to most people (Teo, 2000). CDA is an interdisciplinary approach which is concerned with the linguistic character of social and cultural processes and structures. Its view of discourse as social practice implies a dialectical relationship between discourse structure and social structure, i.e. discourse is socially constituted and conditioned and at the same time socially constitutive and conditioning. It aims to explore power relations embedded in discourse and to relate them to wider social and cultural contexts. It also aims to make people aware of the relationships between discourse and social structures, of which they are normally unaware. Multidisciplinarity in CDA gives the opportunity to study the relationships between texts and their contexts, between discursive structures and social structures, and between language and power.

CDA studies power in and over discourse and its ideological potential. It regards itself as a politically-involved approach with an explicit agenda, and seeks to have an effect on social and political practises. Therefore, it is important for analysts to be aware of their own stance towards discourses and phenomena under investigation. CDA aims to uncover the ideological assumptions hidden in discourse, as well as to resist power in and over discourse. It is concerned with analysing discourse to reveal the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality and bias; and how these sources are initiated, maintained, reproduced and transformed within specific social, economic, political and historical contexts (van Dijk, 1988). Wodak holds that the aim of CDA is to analyse "opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language" (Wodak, 1995: 204). CDA is politically-involved research with emancipatory objectives. It aims to challenge existing power structures and to help the oppressed resist them. In other words, "CDA enables us to investigate the discursive dimension of power abuse which leads to injustice and inequality" (Flowerdew, Li & Tran, 2002: 323).

CDA tends to avoid simple deterministic relations between discourse and the social; instead it examines discourse within a particular context and studies power in relation to discourse. It starts with the assumption that powerful groups try to naturalise

and conventionalise discourse in a way that makes the dominant ideology seem as 'given' or 'taken-for-granted'. Resistance to the dominant ideology involves questioning the existing conventions and trying to change them. To study the relationship between conventional and creative uses of language, it is important for CDA to examine discourse in context and to analyse its intertextual and interdiscursive properties. CDA also regards discourse as historical and argues that it can only be understood in relation to its context; this implies a systematic relationship between the text and its context (Wodak, 1996).

CDA belongs to a tradition of language critique which brings critical social science together with linguistics in a single theoretical and analytical framework (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). It attempts to describe, interpret and explain the use of linguistic forms in relation to their functions in a particular socio-cultural context. It assumes that certain networks of form-function relationships are privileged for being valued in society more than others for their ideological effects. CDA studies investigate these networks and explain the form-function relationship by linking privileged systems of meaning to social practices. CDA is critical in the sense that it takes an explicit stance towards the study of ideology in discourse since it assumes that discourse is inevitably ideological (Rogers, 2004). Thus, CDA is critical in the sense that it addresses social problems and analyses the way discourse constructs and is constructed by social structures. The origins of CDA are traced to critical linguists, and it is associated with the critical theory of the Frankfurt School which rejects naturalism, naturality and neutrality. Moreover, it argues for a dialectic between individual agency and social determinism (Rogers, 2004). The analytical approach of CDA is critical, as it involves having distance from the data, embedding the data in the social context, taking a political stance explicitly, and having a focus on self-reflection.

In sum, CDA is an interdisciplinary analytic approach which aims at describing, interpreting, analysing and critiquing the social world. The principal unit of analysis for CDA is the text which can be written, spoken or multimodal, and it analyses texts at sentence and word level. The task of CDA is both deconstructive and constructive. In its deconstructive moment, it aims to deconstruct, i.e. analyse and disrupt the themes and power relations of everyday discourse; in its constructive moment, it aims to achieve a

more equitable distribution of discourse resources (Fairclough, 1992a). The theory and methods of CDA are derived from various linguistic, social and philosophical approaches.

2.1.1 Theoretical Origins of CDA

The theoretical framework for CDA is derived from various disciplines, including linguistics, social theory, critical theory, philosophy, etc. CDA draws heavily on Systemic Functional Linguistics, the linguistic theory of MAK Halliday (1985). Renkema (2004) argues that in CDA "more and more attempts are being made to ground analyses and interpretations of power relations on systematic descriptions of discourse." It draws heavily on Louis Althusser's theories of ideology. (Althusser, 1976; Althusser, 1984; Althusser & Brewster, 1971; Althusser & Brewster, 1972), For Althusser, ideology is not only a realm of ideas but also material social practices in social institutions; it is a way of positioning people as social subjects (Fairclough, 2001). CDA also benefits from Mikhail Bakhtin's genre theory (Bakhtin & Holquist, 1981; Bakhtin, Holquist & Emerson, 1986), the philosophical traditions of the Frankfurt School, Michael Foucault's orders of discourse (Foucault, 1967; Foucault, 1972; Foucault, 1974; Foucault & Kritzman, 1990), among others. The core theoretical basis of CDA can be described as neo-Marxist, "since it claims that cultural, rather than merely economic dimensions are significant in the creation and maintenance of power relations" (Jenner & Titscher, 2000).

From neo-Marxism, CDA draws on the assumption that discourses are produced and consumed within political economies and thus produce and articulate broader ideologies, interests, social formations, and movements within those fields. Also relevant to CDA is Gramsci's notion of 'hegemony', as the practise of power which operates mainly through discourse to represent the order of things with natural inevitability making them appear natural or universal. These theories investigate the relationship between political and social structures and recognise the role ideologies play in political and social institutions, and hence in discourse which can be regarded as a type of social practice (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000; Jenner & Titscher, 2000).

CDA has also been influenced by the ideas of the Russian theorists Mikhail

Bakhtin and Valentin Volosinov, since their linguistic theory of ideology posits that all instances of language use are ideological. They regard the linguistic sign as the domain of class struggle. Bakhtin recognises the dialogic properties of texts, i.e. their “intertextuality” which views a text as part of a series of texts with which it reacts and refers. Bakhtin’s genre theory has a great influence on CDA, since it sees every text as dependent on socially predetermined repertoires of genres which can be mixed in creative ways.

The poststructuralist assumption that discourses have a constructive function in forming and shaping human identities and actions is also relevant to CDA. Foucault claims that language and discourse are not transparent or neutral means of describing or analysing the social world. They construct, regulate and control knowledge, social relationships, and institutions. He also argues that natural and social worlds are not knowable, accessible or analysable without discourse and he examines discourses as constitutive phenomena, in the sense that they shape the identities and practises of human subjects. The ideas of Foucault and Bourdieu on power relations are also influential to CDA theory and methods. Foucault’s ideas on the ‘orders of discourse’ and ‘power-knowledge’ have been particularly relevant to the approach. CDA draws on Bourdieu’s assumption that textual practises and interactions with texts become “embodied” forms of “cultural capital” with exchange values in particular social fields (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000; Thompson, 1990).

CDA also benefits from the ideas of Habermas with regard to the relationship between linguistic or other semiotic and social processes (Habermas, 1983; Habermas, 1988; Habermas, 1990; Habermas & Shapiro, 1971). His work on critical theory inspired CDA scholars to analyse and understand social problems that are mediated by mainstream ideology and power relations, and which in turn are perpetuated by discourse in everyday life. Habermas’ conception of critical science is that it is self-reflective, in the sense that critical scientists must reflect on their own ideas, biases and interests and consider their social implications.

CDA is strongly influenced by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School in its investigation of power relations and its rejection of naturalism (that social practises, labels and programs represent reality), rationality (the assumption that truth is a result of

science or logic), neutrality (the assumption that truth does not reflect particular interests), and individualism (Rogers, 2004). Moreover, CDA draws heavily on various linguistic fields, e.g. pragmatics, narratology and speech act theory, which argue that texts are forms of social action that occur in complex social contexts. Systemic Functional Theory shows that language forms can be systematically linked to social contexts and functions. CDA uses analytic tools from these fields to examine the discursive aspects of wider social and cultural issues. CDA aims to uncover the ideological assumptions underlying discourse to resist power over discourse in everyday texts. It attempts to study how discourse is ideologically constructed to serve and reflect the interests of a particular group.

Ideology is a central concept in CDA. Thompson points out that the term “ideology” appeared in the eighteenth century in France, and since then it acquired a range of meanings. He defines it as “meaning in the service of power” (Thompson, 1990). He argues that the study of ideology investigates ways in which meaning is constructed and conveyed by various symbolic forms. Ideology establishes and maintains unequal power relations and makes them appear natural and unquestionable. CDA examines ideology invested in discourse as a means of establishing and maintaining unequal power relations. It questions the taken-for-granted uses of discourse, challenges existing power structures and attempts to change them, or at least to make people aware of things they are normally unaware of. This had also been the purpose of Critical Linguistics, the predecessor of CDA.

2.1.2 Critical Linguistics

Critical Linguistics (CL), an earlier version of CDA, was developed in the Seventies by researchers from the University of East Anglia; namely, Fowler, Kress, Hodge and Trew who aimed at utilising Halliday’s Systemic Functional Theory “to isolate ideology in discourse” and to find how ideology manifests itself in discourse structures and processes (Fowler, 1991). Kress and Hodge (1979: 13) argue that “language should be seen more properly as the medium of consciousness for a society, its forms of consciousness externalised. Linguistics then, is an exceptionally subtle instrument for the analysis of consciousness and its ideological bases” Critical

Linguistics considers that language is an integral part of the social process (Fowler, 1979). It holds that discourse cannot exist without social meanings and that a strong relationship exists between discourse structures and social structures; thus, all instances of language use are ideological. Critical Linguistics attempts to find the ways ideology manifests itself in discourse structures and processes. It regards the text as a whole and draws upon systemic grammar and speech act theory in its analysis.

Important grammatical categories that are examined by critical linguists include: transitivity, nominalisation, passivisation, among others, and it uses them to examine the way language is used to represent a particular world-view and to see how texts embody particular ideologies. Its aim is “recovering the social meanings expressed in discourse by analysing the linguistic structures in the light of their international and wider social contexts” (Fowler, 1979: 195-6). CL distinguishes itself from other linguistic approaches prevailing at the same time, namely, sociolinguistics and transformational grammar, as it aims at investigating the relationship between language and the social at a deeper level than sociolinguistics and refuses the opposition of form and content advocated by Chomskyan transformational grammar. Instead, CL calls for the analysis of authentic texts with an emphasis on their relationship to the context of their use. Its main objective is to read social meanings in texts, and to interpret them politically and ideologically.

Critical Linguistics has been developed by a number of theorists – most notably Fairclough, Wodak and van Dijk – into what is now known as CDA. Although various approaches to CDA share the same basic assumptions, especially regarding the relationship between discourse, power and ideology, they apply distinctive methods depending on the backgrounds of the theorists who develop them.

2.1.3 Fairclough’s CDA

Norman Fairclough became interested in CDA in the Eighties. In 1989, he started to develop ‘Critical Language Study’ to examine the relationship between discourse and power. His later work developed the theory and methods of CDA significantly. In *Discourse and Social Change* (1992b), Fairclough constructs a social theory of discourse and provides the methodological blueprint for the practice of CDA (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000). Fairclough defines CDA as:

"discourse analysis which aims to systematically explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination between texts, discursive practices, and wider social and cultural structures; and to investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and hegemony" (Fairclough, 1995a: 132).

Fairclough reviewed the main approaches to discourse analysis, e.g. content analysis, sociolinguistics and pragmatics, and he concluded that they lacked a critical perspective and therefore proposed his approach to CDA in order to achieve a social theory of discourse. He holds that CDA developed as a response to the traditional division between linguistics and other areas of social science (Fairclough, 2003c). The challenge of CDA is to develop a microlinguistic analysis that is capable of informing a wider social analysis. It explores how discourse figures in relation to other social elements in processes of social change. It provides the resource for tracing the relationship between discursive processes, relations and patterns on the one hand, and wider social political, economic and cultural relations, processes, practises and structures on the other hand (Fairclough, Pardoe & Szerszynski, 2006).

Fairclough's framework is based on a number of linguistic, philosophical and social approaches, e.g. Bakhtin's "theory of genre", from which he borrows the concepts of productivity and creativity of discourse practise and its textual realisations. He also draws on Bakhtin's concept of intertextuality whereby texts become heterogeneous in form and meaning by virtue of being constituted from other texts and discourses. Moreover, he uses Gramsci's 'theory of hegemony' to explain political and ideological dimensions of discursive practice. He argues that discourse can be regarded as a mode of political and ideological practice, and it can constitute, naturalise, sustain and change significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations, and that any discursive practise draws on conventions which naturalise particular power relations and ideologies.

Fairclough's approach has been greatly influenced by Foucault's thinking, e.g. he draws upon claims related to the constitutive nature of discourse, i.e. the role of

discourse in constructing the social including “objects” and “subjects”, and the claim related to the primacy of intertextuality and interdiscursivity, i.e. the relationship between any discursive practise and other discourses it draws upon. Central to Fairclough’s approach are ideas related to the discursive nature of power, the political nature of discourse and the discursive nature of social change. From the field of linguistics, Fairclough’s main point of reference is Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics which is considered to be a valuable resource for CDA because it is concerned with the relationship between language and other elements of social life.

The aim of Fairclough’s work is “to bring together linguistically oriented discourse analysis and social and political thought related to discourse and language” (Fairclough, 1992b: 62). CDA sets out to demonstrate that discursive features are systematically connected with what is going on socially, and what is going on socially is indeed going on partly or wholly semiotically, or linguistically, or both (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999). Fairclough’s CDA “is based upon the assumption that language is an irreducible part of social life” (2003a: 2). The view of discourse as a form of social practise implies that discourse is both action and representation. Fairclough believes that there is a dialectical relationship between discourse and social structure, i.e. discourse is shaped by social structure and shapes it at the same time. In other words, discourse not only represents the world, but it also constitutes it. Fairclough identifies three constitutive aspects of discourse in the social world; discourse contributes to the constitution of social identities, social relationships, and systems of knowledge and beliefs. Discourse also contributes to transforming them (Fairclough, 1992b).

Fairclough describes CDA as a theory and method for studying language in its relation to power and ideology. He defines power both in terms of asymmetries between participants in discourse and their unequal power over the production, distribution and consumption of texts. In his “three-dimensional” analytical framework, each discursive event is regarded as a textual practise, a discursive practise and a social practise. The framework can be conceptualised as three layers embedded in each other with analysis of language or text at the centre, analysis of the discursive practise in the middle, and an encompassing sociocultural analysis (Fairclough, 1995a). In the analysis of the first layer, namely “discourse-as-text, Fairclough suggests studying textual features and the

linguistic organisation of text. He proposes systematic attention to all properties of text that are potentially ideological, e.g. choices of specific lexical domains or vocabulary patterns, certain grammatical structures and strategies. Textual properties of the text make them sensitive indicators of sociocultural processes, relations and change. In his view, CDA should not attend to only features present in the text but also those absent from it, as they can be equally significant indicators of the sociocultural context.

The second layer, namely discourse as discursive practise, represents the link between text and social practise. In this dimension Fairclough suggests examining processes involved in text production, distribution and consumption in society. Complex processes involved in the practises of text production, circulation and consumption vary between different types of texts and discourses. For example, conversation is produced and consumed immediately while the production of a newspaper article is a complex process which requires the collective effort of groups of correspondents, reporters, editors, among others. The processes of text consumption are also complicated since they depend on the addressees' backgrounds and their different modes of interpretation. The process of text production leaves "cues" in the text for interpretation. An analysis of this level involves the analysis of how participants in discourse produce texts and interpret them. Interpretation involves an interplay between cues and members' resources (Fairclough, 1992b).

The analysis of this level also involves the relationship of a discursive event with other "orders of discourse," i.e. "interdiscursivity", which views a text historically as transformation of past conventions of text production into the present form. This may happen in a relatively conventional and normative way, or it may happen in a more creative way where it involves new elements of orders of discourse. This process needs to be linked to socio-political change to explain discursive change within wider socio-cultural change. Fairclough (2001) regards 'orders of discourse' as diverse genres and discourses networked together, or "a particular social ordering of relationships amongst different ways of making meaning." Fairclough defines two other categories of discourse within orders of discourse; namely, 'discourses' which relate to specific areas of experience and knowledge and 'genres' which relate to particular types of activity.

For the actual analysis, Fairclough suggests attending to certain features of texts which act as an intermediate level or link between the textual and contextual levels. Intertextual analysis is a major dimension of Fairclough's CDA. Intertextuality is defined as "basically the property texts have of being full of snatches of other texts, which may be explicitly demarcated or merged in, and which the text may assimilate, contradict, ironically echo, and so forth" (Fairclough, 1992b: 84). It provides the basis for an interpretative analysis, as it bridges the gap between text and context. He distinguishes between two types of intertextuality: 'manifest intertextuality' where specific other texts are overtly drawn upon in the text, and 'constitutive intertextuality' or 'interdiscursivity' where texts are constituted of elements of orders of discourse (Fairclough, 1992b).

At the level of discourse as social practise, Fairclough aims to relate discourse to ideology and power. Fairclough defines ideologies as representations of aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation (Fairclough, 2003a). He argues that "ideologies embedded in discursive practises are most effective when they become naturalised and achieve the status of common sense" (Fairclough, 1992b: 87). Although he argues that ideology invests language in various ways at various levels, he claims that it is not possible to 'read off' ideologies from texts because meanings are produced through interpretations, and texts are open for diverse interpretations which may differ in their ideological import (Fairclough, 1992b).

Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999) outline a method of CDA which can be seen as an 'evolution' of methods outlined in Fairclough's earlier works (Fairclough, 1989; Fairclough, 1992b; Fairclough, 1995a). This method aims to locate CDA within wider social theory and to outline the theoretical basis of CDA both within linguistics and other social theories. The authors aim to combine (micro)linguistic analysis with (macro) social analysis, i.e. to use linguistic description to explain the social. They draw on diverse theoretical approaches, and their framework is inspired by the applications of CDA to new areas of social life and by developments in theorisation of discourse. For Chouliaraki and Fairclough, CDA begins from some perception of a discourse related problem in some part of social life. Problems can either be in activities or the reflexive construction of a social practise. They outline three types of analyses and obstacles to

them.

The first stage concerns identifying a social problem which has a semiotic aspect and specifying the configurations of practises in which discourse is located. The complexity of this stage depends on the number and range of practises linked together. One aspect is to link discourse to its immediate context of production and consumption which gives rise to the question of how discourses are interpreted. The second stage concerns the analysis of particular practise or practises which the discourse in focus is a moment of, with particular regard to the dialectic between discourse and other moments, i.e. when discourse is part of the activity, or when discourse is in the reflexive construction of the activity, or both.

The third stage concerns the analysis of discourse proper, which is oriented towards both structure and interaction, i.e. the social resource which enables and constructs interaction and the way that resource is interactively worked, i.e. its interdiscursivity and its relation to interdiscursivity and other systems. It is important to locate discourse in its relation to the network of orders of discourses and to specify how the discourse draws selectively upon the potential of that network, i.e. which genres, discourses, voices, and from which orders of discourse. From the perspective of interaction, the concern is with how genres and discourses which are drawn upon are worked together in the textual process of discourse and what articulatory work is done in the text. Questions of power link with questions of ideology, and they are best treated in terms of relations between the discourse moments of different practises and different orders of discourse (Chouliaraki & Fairclough, 1999).

2.1.4 Wodak's CDA

Ruth Wodak participated with her colleagues at the Vienna School in the development of the 'discourse historical approach' which was used in the study of anti-Semitism in Austria. Her approach is based on sociolinguistics, Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, cultural studies and the sociology of Bourdieu, among other theories and approaches. It is particularly influenced by Quasthoff's (1978) sociopsychological assumptions about the social function of prejudice, the constructivist approach of Wetherill and Potter (1987), and on van Dijk's (1989) positive self-representation and

negative other-representation. The Discourse-Historical Approach is also influenced by Systemic Functional Linguistics, argumentative theory and the German “politico-linguistics” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001).

Wodak’s interest in CDA started with her attempt to relate sociolinguistics to social theory. She tried to relate sociolinguistics to grand theories through middle range theories and to justify linguistic analysis in term of social theories by relating text to context and discourse to social structures. This link requires an interdisciplinary approach like CDA. For Wodak, CDA is not seen as a homogeneous approach, but rather as a heterogeneous school or ‘research program’ with various theoretical and methodological approaches. This allows for open discussions and debates, for changes in the aims and goals, as well as for innovation (Wodak, 2002). She holds that it is useful to think of CDA as ‘a theoretical synthesis of conceptual tools.’ The diversity of theory and methods can be considered a specific strength of CDA which provides opportunities for “innovation and productive theory formation” (Weiss & Wodak, 2003: 9).

CDA aims to analyse “opaque as well as transparent structural relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in language” (Wodak, 1995: 204). It has emancipatory goals, and its practitioners always take the side of the oppressed. Starting from the problem-oriented nature of CDA, Wodak views discourse about a particular topic or problem as the starting point within one field of action, and moves through to another. Her approach favors undertaking an analysis of genres involved in a given discourse before embarking on a detailed analysis, since discourses, genres, and texts overlap and refer to each other, and they are socio-functionally linked to each other. This is known as intertextuality and interdiscursivity relations.

In Wodak’s approach, *Hybridity* refers to the heterogeneous mixture of different genres or genre features in a concrete linguistic token. *Intertextuality* can take the form of explicit reference or the form of topical correlations, evocations, allusions, or (direct and indirect) quotations. *Interdiscursivity* means both the mutual relationships of discourses and the connection, intersection or overlapping of different discourses in a particular heterogeneous linguistic product. *Textual Chains* refer to the sequence of succession of thematically and/or functionally related texts, which is pre-shaped by the

frame of particular configurations of conventionalised linguistic practises (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001).

Wodak regards discourses as socially constitutive, as they contribute to the production of certain social conditions; they reproduce, justify and maintain a certain condition; they change or transform the status quo; and/or they contribute to dismantling or destroying the status quo. The Discourse Historical Approach involves contrasting linguistic manifestations of prejudice with historical facts. It attempts "to integrate systematically all available background information in the analysis and foregrounds the historical contexts of discourse in the process of explanation and interpretation." It also considers the textual, intertextual, interdiscursive and contextual features of discourse, as well as background social and political fields (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 1999b: 12-3).

The Discourse Historical Approach is problem-oriented, and it involves movement back and forth between theory and analysis and the examination of intertextual and interdiscursive properties of discourse, as it looks into relations between various genres and discourses. The historical context is an integral part of the approach. The application of results and findings is of paramount importance. Wodak's approach follows a complex concept of social critique. It attempts to integrate as much as possible of available knowledge about historical sources and the social and political contexts in which discursive events are embedded. Furthermore, it analyses the historical dimension of discursive actions by exploring the ways in which particular genres of discourse are subject to diachronic change (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2001).

The Discourse Historical Approach endeavours to work with different approaches multi-methodically and empirically to minimise the risk of being biased. It follows the principle of triangulation which involves interdisciplinary, multi-methodological work on the basis of a variety of empirical data including background information. This approach involves linguistic analysis, as well as systematic historical, political, sociological and/or psychological analysis. This principle is based on the concept of context which involves four levels: the immediate linguistic co-text; the intertextual and interdiscursive relations between texts, genres and discourses; the context of situation which involves social variables and institutional frames; and the

broader sociopolitical and historical contexts, e.g. the history of the event (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak & Meyer, 2001).

Wodak's study of the construction of national identity in Austria focuses on the discursive construction of national sameness for the in-group and of difference which leads to the exclusion of the out-groups. The study identifies four types of discursive macrostrategies. A strategy is defined as "a more or less accurate and a more or less intentional plan of practice including discursive practice adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic aim." The strategies identified are: constructive strategies; preservative or justificatory strategies; transformative strategies; and deconstructive strategies. The choice of a specific strategy depends on the social field and context (Wodak & Meyer, 2001).

In the analyses that Wodak conducted using this approach, the starting point was defining the categories of analysis. They involved three steps: defining the topic of discourse, e.g. racism, anti-Semitism, etc; establishing the discursive strategies, e.g. argumentation; and examining the linguistic realisations of the discriminatory stereotypes. Wodak's analysis of discriminatory stereotypes within the framework of the Discourse Historical Approach attempts to draw up an inventory of discursive discriminatory strategies. Her model is influenced by van Leeuwen's representation of social actors (van Leeuwen, 1993; 1996). Based on his ideas, she argues that the inclusion or exclusion of social actors is a significant linguistic strategy. Exclusion can be used to conceal persons responsible for certain activities, or it can be used to exclude or marginalise a certain group of actors which may disadvantage them. It can also lead to the "under-representation" of ethnic minorities.

2.1.5 Van Dijk's CDA

Van Dijk is one of the major contributors to CDA. For him, the critical perspective on which CDA is based can be traced back to Aristotle, the philosophers of the Enlightenment, Marx, and scholars of the Frankfurt School, e.g. Adorno, Benjamin, Jürgen Habermas, and others. There is also a great influence from the work of Gramsci, Stuart Hall, Althusser, Foucault and Pêcheux, among others. Feminist ideas also play a significant role in the development of CDA (van Dijk, 1993b). According to van Dijk,

CDA is concerned with analysing discourse to uncover the discursive sources of power, dominance, inequality and bias within specific social, political and historical contexts.

Van Dijk defines CDA as “a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social-power abuse, dominance and inequality are enacted, reproduced and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context” (Wodak & Meyer, 2001: 89) He regards CDA as a multidisciplinary approach which involves the study of discourse in relation to social and political problems and issues. Such studies need to consider the relationships between discourse, social cognition, power, ideology, society, politics, culture, etc. Furthermore, he maintains that power and dominance are usually organised and institutionalised in a way that gives the power elite privileged access to discursive and other resources that enable them to control and manipulate the minds of others to serve the interests of the powerful groups (van Dijk, 2001) .

Dominance involves not only manipulation, but also naturalisation where mind control happens through routine and everyday forms of text and talk which appear natural. The aim of CDA is to reveal the discursive strategies which legitimate or naturalise unequal power relationships, i.e. the discursive sources of power abuse and injustice. CDA should involve a critique of discourse and the political processes involved in the maintenance and resistance of dominance. Thus, CDA practitioners should take an explicit socio-political stance and show solidarity with the most vulnerable or powerless. The success of CDA is measured by its contribution to change, especially in areas such as class struggle, racism, sexism, etc.

A very important concept in van Dijk’s approach is ‘social cognition’ which can be defined as ‘the socially shared representations of societal arrangements, groups and relations, as well as mental operations such as interpretation, thinking, arguing, etc.’ Van Dijk holds that such cognitions mediate between micro and macro levels of society, i.e. between discourse and action, or between the individual and the group. They are shared by group members and underlie the social and cultural organisation of society as a whole. They can be used theoretically to link dominance to discourse, as they explain the production and interpretation of dominant discourse. Van Dijk’s approach to CDA is known as the socio-cognitive approach because it focuses on the role of social cognition

in discourse (van Dijk, 1993b).

Van Dijk perceives discourse analysis as ideology analysis. He regards ideologies as 'the basis of social representations shared by members of a social group,' and perceives ideology as a schema for the representation of the in-group or out-group, or 'us' versus 'them' as social groups (van Dijk, 1998). Ideologies are fundamental social cognitions that reflect the basic aims, interests, and values of groups and influence the personal cognition of group members. He maintains that "ideologies are typically, though not exclusively, expressed and reproduced in discourse and communication" (van Dijk, 1995). Ideological mental representations "are often articulated along 'Us' versus 'Them' dimensions, in which speakers of one group will generally tend to present themselves or their own group in positive terms, and other groups in negative terms". CDA should provide a detailed description, explanation and critique of the ways dominant discourses influence such socially shared knowledge, attitudes and ideologies (van Dijk, 1993b: 257).

The discourse-based strategies for the reproduction of dominance in contemporary societies require justification or legitimation, e.g. by claiming that dominance is natural or necessary, or by the denial of the existence of dominance. Justification involves positive self-representation and negative other-representation. This is presented within the lines of 'Us' and 'Them', stressing the positive features of the in-group and the negative characteristics of the out-group. Such representations help form mental models (schemata) for representing certain groups. There are several discursive persuasive strategies to achieve these representations, e.g. choice of certain lexical style, argumentation, storytelling, rhetorical figures, quoting credible sources, etc.

Within the broad socio-cognitive model, van Dijk's approach focuses on the structure of text and talk. The aim of analysing discourse structures is to show how power relations are enacted and exhibited in discourse and how discourse manipulates the minds of a certain group to serve the interests of another. The discursive reproduction of dominance has two major dimensions; production and interpretation. This involves the analysis of both discursive structures and social cognitions. The enactment of dominance in discourse interpretation is a subtle phenomenon, and the socio-cognitive model is used for this purpose. The enactment of dominance in the

process of discourse production is more straightforward and can be studied by analysing discourse structures and social cognitions. Van Dijk's model examines aspects of access and control, i.e. how powerful groups have privileged access to certain types of discourse and how they control the context of interaction. This may result in the exclusion of some less powerful groups and in depriving them from a fair opportunity to take part in the process of discourse production. At the level of discourse structures, the analysis examines subtle manifestations of dominance at all linguistic levels, e.g. lexical, syntactic, rhetorical, semantic, stylistic, etc. The three approaches outlined above are the most prominent in the field, yet they are not the only ones. CDA has been applied to a large number of domains by different scholars

2.1.6 Research Trends in CDA

CDA is regarded as a politically and socially involved approach with emancipatory goals, and an agenda that advocates change and empowerment of weaker groups. Therefore, it has been applied to research in various fields, and it has proved to be a very useful tool for many researchers. In addition to major research work undertaken by Fairclough, Wodak and van Dijk outlined in the previous sections, this section briefly outlines other research in the field. Most CDA research deals with current issues, topics and social domains. It deals with political discourse, racism, institutional discourse, gender, etc. CDA practitioners have applied CDA to a variety of discourses for various ends depending on their respective backgrounds and aims.

Political discourse has been the focus of a great deal of research in CDA, including for example (Chilton, 2004; Chouliaraki, 2004; Fairclough, 2001; 2003b; Fairclough et al., 2006; Fowler, 1979; Lazuka, 2006; Wodak, 1989). *Ideology*, i.e. the role of discourse in the reproduction and dissemination of a certain ideology has been the main topic of some of the research of (Kress, 1983; Kress & Hodge, 1979; Kress & Trew, 1978; Lassen, Strunck & Vestergaard, 2006; Luke, 2002; van Dijk, 1998). *Racism* is another important issue that many CDA practitioners dealt with (Mehan, 1997; Reisigl & Wodak, 2000; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Rojo & van Dijk, 1997; van Dijk, 1987a; 1989; 1992; 1993a; 1996; 1989; Wodak, 1999a). *Gender*, including gender inequalities and the representation of women in media has been the focal point of the research of

(Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard, 1996; Clark & Zyngier, 1998; Koller, 2004; Lazar, 2005; Wodak, 1997). Institutional Discourse has been covered by the research of other scholars (Wodak, 1986; 1996; 1997). Cultural and identity analysis is another major topic for CDA research, as evident by many studies (Barker & Åski, 2001; Benwell & Stokoe, 2006; Gabrielle Hogan-Brun, Clare Mar-Molinero & Stevenson, 2009).

Media language has received a great deal of attention in CDA research, e.g. (Bazzi, 2009; Caldas-Coulthard & Coulthard, 1996; D'Haenens & Bink, 2007; Erjavec, 2001; Fairclough, 1995b; Fowler, 1991). Newspaper discourse has been the focus of the research of many studies, for example (Achugar, 2004; Bazzi, 2009; Bekalu, 2006; Flowerdew et al., 2002; Higgins, 2004; Pietikainen, 2003; Sezgin & Wall, 2005; Teo, 2000; van Dijk, 1987b; 1991). CDA has also been applied to the field of education, for example (Kidd, 2004; Rogers, 2003; 2004). These are only examples of current applications of CDA to research. CDA is one of the most visible approaches in discourse analysis, and has been attracting more researchers and students than any other field which promises more research into other areas not covered previously.

2.1.7 A Modified Version of CDA

There are different approaches to CDA and various methods of application which vary according to many factors including the aim of research and the nature of data, among others. For the purpose of the current study, a modified version of CDA has been devised which includes selected aspects of the major CDA approaches outlined above and selected categories from various applications of CDA. This section presents the selected aspects of the three main approaches to CDA and the categories chosen for analysis.

Fairclough's definition of CDA and its aims are quite relevant to the modified version of CDA, especially as regards the relationship between texts and what is happening socially, as well as the role of power relations in shaping discourse. CDA is utilised to examine the use of certain linguistic features that are ideologically relevant in relation to particular contextual variables, e.g. the use of specific grammatical structures in the reporting of acts of violence committed by different sides of the conflict in different newspapers. Fairclough's three-layered analysis provides a systematic

framework for the analysis although it is not always easy to keep this division clear cut in application. The study focuses on the linguistic analysis of texts and integrates contextual features when appropriate for the interpretation and explanation of the findings of the linguistic analysis. Fairclough (2003: 15) argues that “textual analysis is ... inevitably selective.” Accordingly, the analysis concentrates on three linguistic levels and analyses them consistently in all texts.

There are, however, certain aspects of the model that have been modified for the purpose of analysis. Fairclough’s multi-dimensional framework (1995: 2) involves the analysis of discourse practice, including the processes of text production, distribution and consumption. The analysis considers the production of news reports, especially institutional practices involved in news production. Although these aspects are not the core of the analysis, it is vital to consider them so as not to attribute every linguistic feature to ideology when it can be the result of certain the institutional practices of newspaper editing and style, or other practical issues such as the location of the reporter or access to news sources. Nevertheless, consumption does not play an important part in the analysis, as the corpus of data is quite homogeneous, i.e. it comprises only newspaper reports. If the corpus had been more varied, e.g. newspaper reports and TV news stories, a consideration of the modes of consumption would have been more useful.

Fairclough’s analyses involve tending to “a range of properties of texts ... regarded as potentially ideological” (1995: 2) which may lead to choosing certain features that support the claims made by the analyst while ignoring others that do not support them. In this study, however, a set of levels and features is selected and examined throughout the whole corpus. Furthermore, interpretation is a key aspect of Fairclough’s model which has been criticised for being ‘critical discourse interpretations’ (Widdowson 2004: 103), but this study focuses mainly on linguistic analysis while interpretation and explanation are based on the findings of the linguistic analysis.

Wodak’s Discourse Historical Approach is particularly relevant since the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is deeply rooted in history and since history affects the status and representation of each side. Moreover, the discourse of news reports on the conflict

is loaded with historical references which cannot be understood adequately without proper consideration of the history of the conflict. Additionally, discourse reflects the historical phase of the conflict, for instance, during the peace process and the Oslo Accords, discourse was mainly about agreement, fair and just settlement, naturalisation etc. However, with the end of the peace process, discourse focused on mutual violence, therefore history of the conflict has been reviewed as a background to the analysis, which provides a good understanding of the origins of the conflict and the attitudes of different parties, especially the USA, Britain and Arab states. This background is considered vital for this research to achieve its aims, and it is used in the contextualisation of the findings of the linguistic analysis.

Certain aspects of Wodak's approach are more relevant to the analysis than others. As stated earlier, consideration of the historical, political and socio-cultural contexts is very important to the interpretation and explanation of the findings of the linguistic analysis. Nonetheless, Wodak's focus on sociological and psychological analysis is not considered very pertinent to the analysis. Wodak's notion of linguistic strategies is also used for the analysis, yet it is applied more generally rather than focusing on the constructive, destructive and transformative strategies outlined by Wodak in her study on the discursive construction of national identity.

Van Dijk's approach to CDA is also useful to the current study, especially his emphasis on ideology, as well as positive and negative group representations. As the current study deals with a highly controversial and ideological conflict in which group representations in newspapers with various orientations are of paramount importance, van Dijk's approach is applicable; moreover, as the study concerns the relationship between ideology and discourse, van Dijk's definition of ideology and his ideology analysis are pertinent to the analysis. Another aspect of van Dijk's approach that is relevant to the study is the notion of access to linguistic and other resources, as access to certain linguistic sources, e.g. knowledge of foreign languages and access to other resources such as access to news outlets and journalists affects the ability of certain groups to convey their perspectives in news reports. However, van Dijk's cognitive analysis is not used in the current study.

In addition to the selected aspects of major CDA approaches, the modified version also includes selected aspects from CDA applications, e.g. van Leeuwen's analyses of social action, social actors and purpose in discourse (van Leeuwen, 1995; 1996; 2000). Also relevant to the current study is Hodge & Kress's (1993) relational and actional models, and the distinction between transitive and non-transitive structures, and the ideological implications of using them. The linguistic analysis focuses on three discourse categories; i.e. narrative, transitivity and lexicalisation. These levels have been chosen because they can be invested ideologically to serve certain purposes of language users.

The narrative structure of news reports is a key element that affects the presentation of the event reported, e.g. which elements of the story are highlighted in the headline, how the story is presented in terms of actions, consequences and purposes, and how news sources and contextual details are used in the story. Transitivity affects the way actions and agency are presented, e.g. if the transactive model is used, the agent is known to the readers, but if the non-transactive model is selected, the agent remains unknown. Lexicalisation affects the way members of certain groups are labelled and described which can lead to negative or positive evaluations. Chapter 3 includes a detailed discussion of each linguistic level, the ways in which it can be manipulated and its analysis in the current study.

2.2 Review of Related Literature

The discourse of the Israel/Palestinian conflict has attracted the attention of academics since the first Intifada, mainly because the Intifada has succeeded in drawing a great deal of media attention to the suffering of the Palestinians under the Israeli occupation. A significant and detailed study was published under the title of: "*Framing the Intifada: People and Media*" by Cohen and Wolfsfeld (1993). It deals with media coverage of the first intifada which began in December 1987. It comprises a collection of studies undertaken as part of "the Intifada Research Project" which began in October 1988, when researchers at the Smart Family Foundation Communications Institute of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem launched a series of studies on the topic. The studies focus on communication and the Intifada; they deal with aspects of Palestinian graffiti, one of the major channels of communication available to Palestinian young people;

analysis of the personal narratives of Israeli soldiers; as well as public opinion about the Intifada in Israel and America. Media studies deal with how television news cover the first fifteen months of the Intifada in four countries: the US, the UK, (West) Germany and Israel. In addition, there are two studies on newspaper coverage of the Intifada, including a study of headlines dealing with the Intifada in Hebrew newspapers and the Intifada coverage in an Arab and a Jewish newspaper issued in Jerusalem, examining features such as texts, cartoons and letters to the editors. Two researchers from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Nir and Roeh (1992), published a study that deals with Intifada coverage in the Israeli press. It compared different aspects of the Intifada coverage in two Israeli newspapers, including the headlines, referential strategies, etc. In addition, it discusses the role of news coverage in maintaining social consensus.

The Peace Process which culminated the first Intifada has also been the object of some studies, notably Wolfsfled (2004) "*Media and the Path to Peace*" which examines how different sides of the conflict compete over news media to promote a positive image of the self and thus to gain legitimacy. The book traces the dynamics of media handling of the peace process since its beginning until its disintegration into the Second Intifada. It deals with the beginning of the peace process, how Israeli media deals with peace and the Palestinians, how it deals with the Israel-Jordan peace process, and finally the collapse of Oslo and the return to violence. Wolfsfled also includes comparative data on the case of Northern Ireland and the signing of the Good Friday Agreement. In this book, Wolfsfled argues that media plays an active role in the promotion of peace or conflict and that media is more likely to promote conflict than peace due to its focus on negative events with dire consequences and the desire of some journalists to construct sensationalist news stories.

The second Intifada has been the focus of a very important study by the Glasgow University Media Group, published under the title of "*Bad News from Israel*" (Philo & Berry, 2004). It deals with coverage of the second Intifada in British TV news reports and includes a comprehensive historical background, content analysis and audience studies. Philo and Berry conclude that the Israeli perspective dominates news reports on the conflict and that the lack of proper contextualisation results in showing both sides of the conflict as equal in power which conceals the great discrepancy in power between

them and which, in turn, leaves viewers ill-informed. They also discuss the practises of news production and conduct interviews with journalists that mention pressures to produce an interesting story in very brief reports, which often happens at the expense of explaining events. The role of powerful Jewish lobbies in the West in influencing the media is also discussed.

A major study on the coverage of the second Intifada in American newspapers of record was initially commissioned by the Jewish Federation of Metropolitan Chicago to examine perceived anti-Israeli bias in American press (Zelizer, Park & Gudelunas, 2002). The news coverage of thirty days of the first year of the Intifada in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post* and the *Chicago Tribune*, all of which are considered newspapers of record in the USA was analysed. Different aspects of news coverage including frequency of reporting, length of reports, use of photographs and graphics, lexical choices, syntactic choices were investigated. The researchers noted a similarity between the three newspapers in the manner of reporting and revealed that all the newspapers are aligned with the Israeli perspective. They conclude that bias in the news is inescapable, and that “no feature of American print news presentation was free of values and preferences.” The study identified a pro-Israeli slant in coverage, yet it warned against simplistic claims of bias and called for the development of a framework for the study of partisan reportage.

Another study which was published by Grade the News Project of Stanford University (McManus, 2003) dealt with the journalistic practises of news coverage with special attention to the coverage of deaths in the second Intifada in the *San Jose Mercury News* in the period from April to September 2002. It demonstrated that Israeli deaths were more likely to appear in the front page headlines of the paper, unlike Palestinian deaths and that the paper presented 77% of Israeli deaths in front-page headlines in comparison with 7% of Palestinians deaths. Moreover, reports were more likely to emphasise Israeli suffering and to use first person narration with it. Language used to refer to Palestinians was also considered, and it was found that the paper uses mostly labels with negative connotations, e.g. ‘militants’ and ‘gunmen’, rather than neutral labels like ‘fighters.’ Sources of bias were identified as the identification of Israeli victims as civilians and most Palestinian victims as combatants; the accessibility of

Israeli sources and Israeli restrictions on reporters who wanted to go to the Palestinian territories; cultural affinity between the Israelis and American journalists and editors; as well as the nature of news of being event driven rather than issue driven.

A thorough and in-depth study of the journalistic practises of reporting on the conflict in American mainstream media has been recently published under the title of *Pens and Swords: how the American Mainstream Media Report the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict* (Dunsky, 2008). This comprehensive study by a scholar and a journalist who worked in the Middle East scrutinises reporting of the conflict in American mainstream media and presents a comprehensive and critical analysis of current practices. The book focuses on reportage on a number of issues, e.g. Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, violence in the spring of 2002; and it includes interviews with reporters from the main American mainstream newspapers and also relates reporting practises to American policies in the Middle East. Dunsky analyses news reports obtained from more than twelve mainstream news outlets. She points out that news reports lack essential contextualisation, especially in relation to the American role in the conflict or international law and relevant agreements. She proves that news reflects official American foreign policy and that it often supports the view-point of the American administration. Dunsky also provides empirical evidence of pro-Israeli bias in American mainstream media reports on the conflict.

A very recent study published by Samia Bazzi in 2009, under the title of *Arab News and Conflict: a Multidisciplinary Discourse Study*, deals with the representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Arab media in the period from 2001 to 2009. It critically examines the representation of the conflict in different Arab news outlets and relates these representations to prevailing ideologies in the Arab world. Arab media outlets examined in the study include satellite channels, news agencies and newspapers, e.g. Al-Manar Satellite Channel, Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel, Reuters Arabic and Associated France Press (AFP) Arabic, Assafir and Al-Mustaqbal newspapers, which represent a spectrum of Arab opinion. The author outlines various approaches to media discourse with a focus on semiotic, ideological and critical discourse approaches. She explains her approach for analysing media texts which includes contextual analysis, including aspects related to the translation of media texts, as well as an analysis of

textual strategies including transitivity, mood and modality and thematic and lexical texture. From the textual analysis, Bazzi concludes that “hegemony, interpellation, power relations, cognition and editorial control give legitimate and logical reasons for the final semantic, structural and pragmatic choices found in a politically motivated text” (Bazzi, 2009: 181). Another major part of the study focuses on the role of translation in the representation of the conflict in Arab media, and Bazzi concludes that “the forms of political resistance to an alien media code can be legitimised and built into the translation commission itself, thus achieving the effects preferred by both the target elites and their target audience” (Bazzi, 2009: 212)

As shown in the previous review of related literature, the discourse of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict has been the focus of a number of studies in various disciplines. It has been investigated in areas like communications studies (Cohen & Wolfsfled, 1993), media studies (Philo & Berry, 2004; Wolfsfled, 2004), journalism (McManus, 2003; Zelizer et al., 2002), and in some recent interdisciplinary studies (Bazzi, 2009). Most of these studies deal with the relationship between ideology and the representation of the conflict, and some attempt to demonstrate that this representation is not free from bias, as different sides of the conflict are not represented in the same way.

Certain aspects of these approaches have been useful to the current study, e.g. some labels used by Cohen and Wolfsfled (1993) are used in the lexical categorisation of the members of different groups. From the study of Wolfsfled (2004), the consideration of the role of media in the perpetuation of war or peace helped in the interpretation and explanation of the findings of the analysis. The studies of McManus (2003) and Zelizer et. al. (2003) that concentrate on the journalistic practices involved in the representation of both sides and attempt to demonstrate the influence of ideology on the representation of the conflict in US media, were very useful for the interpretation and the explanation of the findings of the linguistic analysis. From the study of Dunskey (2008), I drew on the consideration of contextual factors including US policy and the socio-cultural and political contexts of the conflict, and their influence on its representation in news media. The current thesis aims to contribute to this body of research from the perspective of CDA. The study focuses primarily on the discourse of the conflict. Journalistic practices and theories of media studies, which are the focus of

previous research, supplement discourse analysis in the study.

2.3 Critiques of CDA

CDA is a relatively young approach, and its methods are continuously being developed. It has been implemented by scholars with different backgrounds, and therefore there is not a single method for conducting CDA analyses, yet there are some common principles in different approaches. CDA has been critiqued by many scholars; some criticisms dealt with its methodology while others were about its theoretical basis. Stubbs (1997: 102-3) describes data collection in CDA as “often restricted to text fragments” and CDA methods as ‘inexplicit’. Widdowson criticises CDA for being politically rather than linguistically motivated. He argues that “interpretation in support of belief takes precedence over analysis in support of theory” (Widdowson, 1995: 159). He also claims that CDA seems ‘essentially unprincipled’; the CDA analyst is accused of taking from theory “whatever concept comes usefully to hand.” He also critiques CDA for its “disregard of inconvenient textual features,” and argues that CDA uses many concepts such as ideology and power vaguely (Widdowson, 1998: 137).

Along the same line, Hammersley (1997) maintains that over-ambition in CDA “encourages the presentation of what can only be speculations as if they were well-grounded knowledge ... and this can lead the researchers to over-interpreting their data” (Seidlhofer, 2003: 131). Wetherell (2001) raises concerns about the objectivity of CDA and what might constitute sound scientific practice, while Toolan (1997) argues that CDA analysts claim objectivity and at the same time take an explicit stance towards the problem and data they analyse. Schegloff (1997) argues that serious critical analysis of discourse presupposes serious formal analysis of discourse, and he also suggests that CDA often applies sociological categories to discourse without justification. Luke (2002) claims that CDA theorists pull together a range of linguistic and social theories – so that those that lean ‘towards comprehensive, rational grand theory’ sit beside those with a ‘radical skepticism towards system and structure.’ Kress critiques CDA for its focus on interpretation, and for not providing guidelines or making recommendations that can be used for text production. “CL and CDA ... are heavily reception/reading oriented, with no strongly explicit account of production, or of producers. CL or CDA

have not offered (productive) accounts of alternative forms of social organisation, nor of social subjects, other than by implication” (Kress, 1996: 16).

Some of these issues have been resolved in more recent CDA studies, such as vagueness in the use of terminology which has been addressed in many recent studies in CDA, such as van Dijk’s work on ideology (van Dijk, 1998), and Wodak’s studies on national identity, power, racism and discrimination (Reisigl & Wodak, 2000; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Wodak, 1989; Wodak, 1999a), among many others. These and other studies contribute to disambiguate these terms that are claimed to be used vaguely in CDA. Moreover, more recent analyses became more explicit and focused in their methods and more systematic in data collection. This can be evident in more recent studies, e.g. (Charteris-Black, 2006; Fairclough et al., 2006; Lazuka, 2006; van Dijk & Wodak, 2000; Wodak & Leeuwen, 2002; Wodak & Meyer, 2001).

Blommaert (2005) has argued that although CDA focuses on inequality, it has concentrated on the First World too much, both in terms of its object of analysis and of the theories which it typically draws upon. He suggests that CDA needs to focus more on Third World problems and to benefit more from theoreticians who deal with Third World issues. CDA has also been criticised for focusing on problems and inequalities; in response, Martin (1999) has argued for a positive discourse analysis (PDA) which focuses on emancipatory discourses, as an antidote to critical approaches; it is an approach which exemplifies a positive style of discourse analysis that focuses on hope and change (Bhatia, Flowerdew & Jones, 2008).

In this study, I have been conscious of the critiques of CDA, and I tried to address them in my analysis. To address criticisms of the method of data collection in CDA which is often restricted to text fragments, full texts of news reports are analysed in the current study. Critiques of CDA as being unprincipled, vague and as disregarding inconvenient textual features have also been addressed in my study, as the research focuses on a number of linguistic levels and selected features at each level which are analysed consistently and systematically throughout the corpus of news reports. Moreover, the analysis focuses more on linguistic analysis, whereas interpretation and explanation are subsequent to the linguistic analysis and are based on it. Regarding

criticisms of CDA as being reading/reception oriented, my research takes into consideration the production of news, as the process of news production and its impact on news discourse and content are explored; furthermore, the concluding chapter presents some recommendations for newspapers regarding the presentation of events of the conflict.

Despite the critiques of CDA, which have been addressed as much as possible in the current study, it still presents a very useful theoretical approach for the current study. CDA is a multidisciplinary approach that provides systematic links between discourse and the social world, moreover it is problem-oriented with a focus on issues such as inequality, access/lack of access to linguistic and other resources. This thesis deals with the representation of a crucial political issue that affects the lives of millions of people in the Middle East and in the world at large. The discursive representation of the conflict in news media has a significant impact on the perception of the conflict and attitudes towards those involved in it and actions they undertake. Therefore, an approach that links the discursive to the social is deemed most appropriate for the current study; moreover, the links between discourse and historical, political and socio-cultural contexts are extremely important for the interpretation and explanation of the discursive phenomenon under investigation. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a very sensitive and critical issue with far reaching impacts in the world today. To achieve an adequate understanding of its discursive representation, a multi-disciplinary approach like CDA is needed.

This chapter presents a theoretical background to the analysis with a focus on CDA as an analytical framework. It presents background to CDA, its main approaches, applications and critiques. It also presents the modified version of CDA applied in the current study, which includes selected aspects of major approaches to CDA and of its applications and which focuses on selected linguistic features at the levels of narrative, transitivity and lexis. The following chapter presents a more detailed explanation of the method of undertaking the study, by focusing on the linguistic levels chosen for analysis and how they can be invested ideologically, along with an explanation of the method of applying CDA in the current study.

3 Methodology

This chapter presents the method of undertaking the critical analysis of the discourse of news reports on violent events of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict in the selected newspapers.

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this section is to introduce the method used for data analysis; to present discourse categories chosen for analysis, i.e. narrative, transitivity, and lexis; and to illustrate their potential to be ideologically invested. The analysis follows the three stages or moments of CDA outlined by Fairclough; more specifically, description, interpretation and explanation (Fairclough, 1992b; 1995a; 1995b; 2001). Description involves describing relevant linguistic features and strategies present at the levels chosen for analysis, i.e. narrative, transitivity and lexis. The description of narrative follows Bell (1998), van Dijk (1991), Toolan (2001) and White (1997) to examine the way news stories about events of the conflict are constructed. It also involves studying contextual details and use of news sources.

The description of transitivity is based on Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics (Halliday, 1994), and Hodge and Kress' (1993) relational and actional models. It also benefits from the framework outlined by van Leeuwen to analyse the representation of social agents, social actions and purpose in discourse (van Leeuwen, 1995; 1996; 2000). Discursive processes, including nominalisation and passivisation are also examined. The description of lexis involves examining referential and predicational strategies used with each side of the conflict, as well as their role in the categorisation of each side and their positive and negative presentation.

The levels of analysis, i.e. narrative, transitivity and lexicalisation have been chosen for their potential to be ideologically invested by different newspapers. In view of the many voices that appear in news reports which include quotations that represent opinions of experts, eye-witnesses, officials and ordinary people from different sides; these quotations are examined in the analysis of narrative, while the analysis of lexis and transitivity concentrates mainly on the parts of reports that are produced by newspapers' editorial staff and correspondents to construct the news story. The findings of the

linguistic analysis are interpreted with reference to their role in the positive and negative presentation of different sides of the conflict and explained with reference to wider historical and political contexts.

Central to the current study is the concept of discursive strategies which can be defined as “linguistic means used to achieve goals in discourse” (Mehan, 1997). The meaning and consequences of discourse strategies depend on the sociocultural context in which they are used. The study examines a number of discursive strategies at the relevant linguistic levels that play a role in the ideological positive or negative representations of different sides of the conflict. Another important concept is that of selection since “the choice of any linguistic option necessarily implies rejection of other options” (Janks, 2005). The selection of particular lexical, transitivity and narrative structures to the exclusion of others can have ideological implications. The following sections explain how data is analysed at each level, i.e. which linguistic features and strategies are examined at the levels of narrative, transitivity and lexis, and why.

3.2 Narrative

Rudrum (2006) argues that narrative is very difficult to define due to its varied uses, nevertheless a variety of definitions have been offered by many theorists. Genette (1980) defines narrative as “the oral or written discourse that undertakes to tell of an event or a series of events” and “the representation of an event or a sequence of events” (Genette, 1982, quoted by Rudrum, 2005). Prince (1982) defines narrative as “the representation of at least two real or fictive events or situations in a time sequence, neither of which presupposes or entails the other” (Prince, 1982, quoted by Andrews, 1989). Hinchman and Hinchman (1997) define narrative as “discourse with a clear sequential order that connect events in a meaningful way for a definite audience.”

Elliott (2005) argues that temporality and causality are among the key features of narrative. Typically, events in a narrative are arranged in a plot that relates events to each other and involves a change in the situation whereby an initial situation is disrupted by certain events, and this is when causality emerges as an important aspect of narrative, for it contributes to the coherence of the narrative structure. Hesse argues that “readers’ perception of causal sequence is crucial ... To say this ‘happened’ as a result of ‘that’ is

to supply a relationship between the two, to make a judgment” (Hesse, 1989). Chatman (1980) argues that without explicit causal links, readers tend to attribute causality to the sequence of events, so that events that occur first are seen as causes of following ones.

Attempts to describe narrative structure date back to Aristotle who analyses the narrative text as containing three chronologically-ordered stages: beginning, middle and end. A relationship of causality holds between these stages, so that each stage leads to the following, and it is at the same time the result of the previous. Vladimir Propp tried to analyse narrative structure, in his *Morphology of the Folktale* (1958 [1928]). He identified a set of thirty-one recurrent functions or motifs and seven personae which provide the building blocks of Russian folktales. In their study of personal oral narratives, Labov and Waletzky (1967) identify six elements of personal oral narratives: abstract (introducing the story); orientation (time, location, participants and circumstances); complication (disrupting event); evaluation (significance); resolution (solution to the disruption); and coda (relating the story to the present). A minimum narrative should contain at least complicating action and evaluation, otherwise, it would be considered empty or pointless. Socially, evaluation is the most important element of narrative as it shows how the narrator wants the story to be interpreted and helps avoid the ‘so what?’ response from the audience. It can be presented explicitly or implicitly, or it can be conveyed indirectly in the way the story is told.

Narrative is considered a very important component of news reports which aim to recount events that take place in reality. News reports, or hard news stories, have a distinctive structure which differentiates them from other forms of narrative because the narrative structure in news stories does not relate events temporally, but rather they have a distinctive structure that is socially and politically motivated, i.e. narrative is structured in a special way that serves certain ideological purposes. News reports or news stories have a distinctive generic structure which distinguishes them from other genres and which enables them to serve a complicated and demanding task. News reports need to reconcile two basic and contradictory functions: to entertain and to inform; in other words, they have to be attractive and entertaining with an element of drama attached to them and at the same time they have to be factual and objective in their presentation of events (van Leeuwen, 1987). This contradiction has led to controversies regarding the

narrative or non-narrative status of news reports and whether to consider them a form of narrative or of reporting. There seems to be, however, a general agreement that news reports are a special genre of narrative.

In addition to informing and entertaining, news has other important functions in society. Tuchman (1978) holds that “news aims to tell us what we want to know, need to know, and should know”. News reports do not only present information, they also provide their audiences with a framework for understanding it. Teo (2000) states that “news reporting ... often comes packaged with the interpretation as well.” Thus, news not only disseminates information, it also contributes to shaping people’s knowledge, especially as regards topics about which people are ignorant. Moreover, news plays a major role in representing culture, people, politics and other aspects of social life, as Pietikainen (2003) holds “news representations contribute to ways in which people see themselves, their own identity and that of others.” Hall et al (1978) emphasise the role of news media in actively shaping public opinion, reinforcing consensual notions in society and setting agendas.

The complex roles of news in society make it necessary to have a special generic narrative structure that enables the fulfillment of these complex ideological functions. Several attempts have been made to describe the generic structure of news reports, in various disciplines, such as journalists’ training, linguistics, media studies, etc. Montgomery states that “news as a genre is woven out of sub-genres ... the structural composition of news discourse may be seen in terms of the chaining together of units each of which is realised by a different sub-genre”. He also holds that genre describes more than a patterned, recurrent configuration of elements. Indeed, it also encompasses shared understandings between producers and audiences about forms and the purposes they serve (2007: 26-27).

Van Leeuwen (1987) describes the generic structure of press journalism using systemic functional linguistics. He identifies five stages that make up the generic structure of news reports: *narration* which is concerned with descriptions of actions, events and people; *exposition* which is concerned with explaining; *procedure* which is concerned with instructing; *adhortation* which is concerned with persuading and influencing; and *description* which is concerned with describing. He explains that these

stages are linguistically realised through the systems of transitivity, mood, theme, tense, reference, and conjunction and that all these stages are combined in a news report to achieve the social purpose of the text. Narrative attracts readers to the entertaining story; exposition generalises the story and explains it; adhortation provides suggestions in a subtle way, and so on. It is not obligatory for journalists to follow all the stages or to present them in any particular order.

The structure of a news report is a very important factor in its effectiveness. There are aspects of structure that can be manipulated ideologically, e.g. the use of quotations or headlines. Van Dijk (1988; 1991) describes the superstructure or textual schemata of news reports, which consists of a number of conventional categories in a linear or hierarchical order. News reports conventionally begin with a *headline* and an optional *lead* which express the major topics of the texts and function as an initial summary. The *body* of the news report contains newsworthy information organised according to importance or prominence. The main event is the central element in the body, and usually the most prominent or most recent events come first in the news report; the *episode* includes the main event and its consequences. *Background information* allows better understanding of the story, and it may be of two basic types: *context* which relates the story to other current events and *history* which relates it to previous ones. *Consequences* are major parts of the story. A special kind of consequence is *verbal consequences* or opinions of major news actors. This category allows reporters to safely voice interpretations and opinions about events without having to venture unnecessarily subjective and possibly controversial personal evaluations. News reports may also contain *comments*. Some of these categories of the schema are obligatory, e.g. headline and main event, while the others are optional, e.g. comment.

The most important feature of news reports is the use of the headlines and/or lead which express a very concise form of the story. They provide the most newsworthy information and determine the way the story is developed in the report. The choice of headline/lead can have a powerful ideological effect on the perception and interpretation of events. Van Dijk (1988) states that the headline/lead have important textual and cognitive functions. They are brief, printed on top, in large bold type, and often across several columns to summarise the most important information in the report. In terms of

structure, they are often incomplete sentences, a feature which may lead to vagueness or ambiguity and which may have an ideological function, e.g. to conceal agency for a certain action. Van Dijk (1991) argues that headlines are a subjective definition of the situation; journalists may upgrade a less important topic by expressing it in the headline, thereby downgrading the importance of the main topic. This influences interpretations made by the readers who often use information expressed in the headlines strategically to understand the story. In addition, many readers often read no more than the headline. It activates relevant knowledge in the memory of the reader to construct a mental model of the situation. The second most prominent element in a news report is the lead which needs to be packed with information and news appeal and at the same time remain brief and clear.

Bell (1991; 1998) outlines a framework for news story structure as consisting of three main parts: attribution, abstract and story. the *attribution* shows where the story comes from; the *abstract* consists of the headline, lead and the 'intro' of the news story; and the *story* consists of one or more episodes or clusters of events which share a common location or set of news actors. There are three additional types of material, i.e. *background* or prior events; *commentary* or observations, assessments or comments on the action; and *follow-up*. Bell calls the *headline* a micro-story, as it typically contains the actors, main event and place, as well as the most newsworthy details of the story. It can be regarded as a directional summary of the story, i.e. it presents the focus of the story and its news values. The *lead* forms the beginning of the story; it provides new information that can be further developed in the body, but should not be repeated. The *body* of the news story provides details such as the time and place of the main events. The story itself presents the main event, and it can be supported by facts, quotations, etc.

White (1997) explains that event stories in modern English newspapers are not structured temporally like most types of narrative; instead, they have a special generic organisation in which they rearrange or fracture chronology. Most news stories move back and forth quite freely on the timeline irrespective of the chronology of the events they describe. This characteristic can be explained in terms of institutional practices involved in the production of news stories, so as to allow for 'radical editability' which may involve the deletion of several paragraphs, without affecting the coherence or

meaningfulness of the story. In terms of consumption, most news readers do not read all details of the story, but they often read the headline and scan through the body. The genre of news stories recognises this particular mode of consumption and adapts to it. White (1997) argues that news is about events which are construed as threatening to damage, disrupt or rearrange the social order in its material, political or normative guise. Within the genre of news reports, we can find two sub-types: *the event story* which deals with events that disrupt the normal social order and *the issue report* which deals with semiotic activities that attract public attention, such as debates or speeches. White also holds that hard news stories in English medium newspapers are not told chronologically, but rather they have a lead-dominated and orbitally-organised generic structure which is based on a number of cultural and ideological decisions made by reporters and editors (Toolan, 2001).

Hard news stories are oriented around the headline and lead, which contain the most newsworthy details of the story, i.e. the disruptive or counter-expectation events. The main ideas presented in the headline/lead are developed in the body of the story through a series of specifications. The body of a news report is made up of successive segments that are not related to each other in a series. Instead they are linked to the lead paragraph in five broad kinds of satellite: *elaboration*, *cause and effect*, *justification*, *contextualisation* and *appraisal-attribution*; thus, the lead is the nucleus of hard news stories. *Elaboration* describes or exemplifies information provided in the headline/lead; *cause and effect* describes causes and the results of events described in the headline; *justification* provides justifications of action; *contextualisation* places the events in a temporal, spatial or social context; and *appraisal* appraises the headline/lead through statements of experts or external sources. White argues that this structure of repetitive amplification of a previously selected lead helps to naturalise the ideology which informs the selection of this story and to it portray as commonsensical (White, 1997).

The structure of news stories is affected by the institutional practises involved in their production. News is the end product of a complex set of institutional practises of news gathering, sorting, selecting and editing. News stories typically deal with events that are dramatic, unexpected, with grave negative consequences or involving elite personalities and nations. Most newspapers derive the majority of the information in

their international news section from other organisations, such as major international news agencies. Press releases issued by news agencies are usually re-written and edited several times by the editorial staff, so that in the end it becomes difficult to identify who has produced which part of the report (Bell, 1991; Tuchman, 1978).

News media take an active role in the selection of stories according to their news value and in the choice of details about them, and they construct them into news items. Details are chosen so as to provide identification and contextualisation for the event. Identification involves defining the situation which is usually 'counter-expected' and outside the direct experience of audiences in order to make it meaningful to them, while contextualisation involves reference to familiar contexts and background frames of reference to help audiences make sense of it. This process takes into account common assumptions and cultural knowledge shared by the majority of audiences (Hall, 1978).

Hall et al (1978) argue that practical pressures on news media to produce news regularly and to work against the clock force them to form allies with powerful institutions in society which are capable of securing regular access to news and information and of providing accredited sources who are able to make authoritative statements on news to give it credibility and objectivity. Therefore, interpretations of these sources help define the social situation, and they can be seen as 'primary definers of topics'. Media reproduce definitions offered by these sources and adopt them as 'interpretative frameworks'. To ensure balance, views of other sources are also presented, but they serve as 'secondary definers', and they must take primary interpretations as their starting point. "The media thus tend, faithfully and impartially, to reproduce symbolically the existing structure of power in society's institutional order." Scannell (1992) argues that dependence of legitimised sources of information results in a predominantly established view of the world, in which lay people are only entitled their experience, but not their views. In this way, the use of quotation becomes a gate-keeping device that admits only those in position of power and shuts out the opinions of the powerless. Thus, while the powerful are further empowered thorough quotations that enhance their status and visibility, the systematic silencing of the powerless further disempowers them.

The analysis of narrative is considered to be a very important aspect of the

current study, as narrative gives structure and coherence to the news story and enables the reader to make sense of what goes on in the real world. Based on the various approaches to the analysis of news structure outlined above, it has been observed that narrative operates at various levels in news stories. There is the nucleus narrative which is represented by the main event or episode. It is connected to a wider narrative in the rest of the news report which is made up of different categories such as consequences, comments, etc; and this in turn is part of a broader narrative of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as a whole, often through contextualisation.

The narrative structure of news reports on events of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is examined with a specific focus on the main event of nucleus narrative. It attempts to answer the question; how is the main story of the report told, especially in terms of events, participants, causes and consequences? Other elements of the report, e.g. headline and lead are examined carefully, with special attention to their relation to the main story and how they set the framework for understanding it. Another important factor that is considered is the use of sources in reports and how they help define the situation for the interpretation of the news story. Other elements that affect the narrative structure of news stories are also considered, e.g. stories are sometimes ‘de-narrativised’ by means of elimination of details or engulfing them with other types of details so that in the end it is difficult for the reader to reconstruct the event. Sometimes stories are dramatised by means of using figurative language or emphasising certain incidents at the expense of others. The choice of certain transitivity constructions can play an important role in the de-narrativisation of some news stories.

3.3 Transitivity

Transitivity is the linguistic means of representing social reality. The choice of grammatical patterns used to encode experience affects the content significantly (Iwamoto, 1996). Transitivity is one of the main systems in Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics (Eggins, 1994; Halliday, 1994), which regards language as a social semiotic, i.e. a resource for making meaning within a particular social context. It focuses on the way people use language to make meanings and on the way language is organised to enable meanings to be made (Eggins, 1994). According to functional grammar, language is interpreted as a system of meanings, accompanied by forms

through which meaning is realised. Halliday (1994) holds that when constructing meaning, speakers of any language make choices from ‘networks of interlocking options’.

Transitivity is the grammatical system concerned with the realisation of the ‘experiential’ or ‘ideational’ function of language, i.e. the representation of the material and mental worlds as processes, participants involved in them and circumstances associated with them. This kind of analysis is particularly relevant to the present study because it is important to examine the way events of the conflict are construed in news reports in terms of processes, participants involved in them and circumstances around them. Flowerdew (2008) notes that some of the systems and concepts within Halliday’s framework, such as transitivity (categories of verbal processes and participant roles), modality, thematic development, and grammatical metaphor have been used in CDA studies. Teo (2000) argues that the functional grammar offers critical discourse analysts a useful tool to systematically uncover and interpret the underlying motivations, intents and purposes of text producers as well as the attitudes, perceptions and stereotypes that drive them.

Based on Systemic Functional Linguistics, Kress and Hodge regard language as consisting of a related set of categories and processes and classify processes into *actionals* or processes that involve actions and *relationals* or processes that involve classifications and descriptions. Actionals are further classified into transactive and non-transactive models, based on causality. In the transactive model, there is actor, process and affected entity; therefore, causal steps are clearly indicated and judgments can be made on reasonably secure grounds. In the non-transactive model, only one entity is directly involved in the process. Vagueness of the non-transactive model results in a version of causality that is implicit or inherent causation, and spontaneous, sometimes self-caused action, i.e. non-transactives obscure the nature of complex processes and fragment causal sequences. The basic transactive model for physical processes can be termed agentive, in which the subject is the prime mover in the action; however, in mental-process transactives, the receiver is passive and his action is a reaction. The relational model does not express actions or processes, but rather relationships between entities and qualities. It is used for classification or specifying qualities. It is the most

straightforward model for presenting a comment or a judgment (Hodge & Kress, 1993; Kress & Hodge, 1979).

Van Leeuwen (1995) explains the ideological implications of the transactive model. Material processes can be *transactive*, i.e. involving two participants – the actor and the goal, or *non-transactive*, i.e. involving only one participant – the actor. Non-transactive actions represent their actors as having no effect on the world. The ability to transact requires power. The greater the power is, the greater the range of goals that may be affected by the actor's actions. Agency is a very important concept for the understanding of actions, as it implies both intentionality and responsibility for the action concerned (Davidson, 1971). Yamamoto (2006) argues that the use or misuse of agency can have political significance, e.g. by manipulating the expression of agency, one can manipulate the way the others would think and act.

Hodge & Kress (1993) explain the processes of passivisation and nominalisation as transformations, i.e. operations that can be performed in language. They involve deletion, substitution, combination or reordering of elements of simple linguistic forms, and they serve two functions; economy and distortion. "Transformations always involve suppression and/or distortion, but they are also normally reversible... Transformations can create the illusion of such knowledge for both hearer and speaker, masking contradictions or confusions, and imposing an unexamined consensus." Passivisation can have a significant effect on the presentation of reality, as the passive transformation inverts the order of actor and affected; therefore, the actor is no longer directly related to the verb, and the link between the agent and process is weakened. The theme of the sentence also changes from the actor to the affected, and the actual process changes into a finished process, like an adjective or a state. The actor may be deleted which makes it difficult or even impossible to recover. Causality is no longer the main concern, but instead attribution or classification. Passivisation can serve three different functions: topicalisation, impersonalisation and detransitivisation (Kress & Hodge, 1979).

Kress and Hodge (1993) describe nominalisations as sentences, parts of sentences, descriptions of actions and the participants involved in them, turned into nouns and nominals, which results in the loss of the specific identities of the actors and the affected participants. This alters the focus of the expression and narrows the vision

of listeners. Nominalisation creates a world of thing-like abstract beings or objects which are capable of acting or being acted on. They are harder to reverse in order to arrive at the underlying structure, as they change the meaning from a process to a state, from activity to an object, from specific to general, and from concrete to abstract. The identity of the participants may be irrecoverable. Nominalisations are not marked for tense and thus are outside the indications of time and modality. They can be used as agents of other processes, which results in more mystification of processes and causal relations. Nominalisation is one of the crucial resources used in news reporting. It "de-narrativises" a process, making it a mere background, more like an entity. Nominalisation assumes narrative but does not tell it. It can be exploited and abused because it enables the user to refer without explicit reporting; thus, it can be used ideologically to mitigate or transfer responsibility (Toolan, 2001).

Agency is a very important element in transitivity. Davidson defines the concept of 'agency' as follows: "a man is the agent of an act if what he does can be described under an aspect that makes it intentional" (1971:7). Teo (2000) maintains that "transitivity is a useful analytic tool that foregrounds the agency or, more accurately, the attribution of agency and process to various participants in the text". Van Dijk (1991) stresses the ideological investment of agency in the press; "the way the press presents and represents social actors is part of the broader ideological structure of values." Van Leeuwen (1996) attempts to draw a socio-semantic inventory of possible representation of social actors in English and explains that discourse includes or excludes social actors according to the interests and purposes of the addressers in relation to their intended addressees. Social actors can be excluded by being either suppressed or backgrounded. Suppression leaves no reference to the social actors anywhere in the text while backgrounding mentions the agents elsewhere in the text, but not in relation to a particular activity. Exclusion can be achieved by agentless passives, nominalisation, non-finite clauses serving as agents, deletion of beneficiaries and the coding of the activity in the middle voice. Such exclusions of social actors represent them as something that is not to be further examined or contested.

In certain contexts, choices have to be made as to which roles are allocated to which participants in a particular representation and which interests are served by these

allocations. Participants can be represented as either active agents acting as a dynamic force in the activity or passive patients undergoing the activity. In systemic functional terms, participants are coded differently in relation to various types of processes: material processes have actors and goals, mental processes have ‘sensors’ and phenomena, verbal processes have ‘sayers’ and verbiage, and relational processes have carriers and attributes. Social actors can be referred to in generic or specific terms, i.e. as classes or as specific actors. Social actors can also be individualised or assimilated into groups. *Assimilation* is achieved by aggregation, i.e. quantification and treating actors as statistics as in opinion polls and surveys; or by collectivisation through a noun that denotes a group, such as ‘nation’ or ‘community’. *Aggregation* is marked by the use of quantifiers, e.g. 40%, or ‘a number of’, etc., and serves to regulate practise and manufacture consensus, as it represents itself as merely reporting facts. *Collectivisation* serves agreement and represents social actors as a homogenous group.

Social actors can also be represented in terms of their *association* with a specific activity. Conversely, they can be represented in terms of *dissociation* from a certain activity. *Indetermination* involves representing social actors as anonymous, i.e. without specified identities while *specification* involves specifying the identity of social actors. *Nomination* is typically realised by proper nouns and presents the unique identities of social actors. *Categorisation* involves referring to social actors in terms of identities and functions they share with others. *Functionalisation* involves referring to social actors in terms of a function or role they do. *Identification* involves referring to social actors in terms of what they permanently are by classification, relational identification and physical identification. *Classification* represents social actors in terms of major categories, such as age, wealth and race. *Physical identification* represents them in terms of their physical characteristics while *relational identification* represents them in terms of their personal, kinship, or work relations.

Personalisation occurs when social actors are referred to as human beings while *impersonalisation* occurs when social actors are represented in ways that do not include the feature ‘human’. *Abstraction* occurs when social actors are referred to by a quality assigned to them. *Objectivation* is expressed by a place or thing social actors are associated with, for instance *spatialisation*, e.g. Australia; *utterance autonomination*,

e.g. the report; *instrumentalisation*, e.g. a mortar shell; or *somatisation*, e.g. hands. *Impersonalisation* has an important ideological function, as it backgrounds the identity and role of social actors and lends impersonal authority or force to an activity or quality of the actor. It can add positive or negative connotations to an activity or utterance of a social actor. It can deny responsibility for negative actions, and so it is associated with bureaucratic uses of language (van Leeuwen, 1996).

Transitivity analysis is crucial for the representation of activities, participants involved in them and circumstances associated with them. It is the main resource for the representation of social activity and its consequences; therefore, transitivity analysis is a major component of this study. Van Leeuwen's analysis of social actors, social action and purpose in discourse (van Leeuwen, 1995; 1996; 2000) is very useful for the current study to discuss the way participants and their actions are represented in different newspapers and the ideological implications of such representations. Therefore, the Palestinians and the Israelis are discussed in terms of their roles as agents and affected participants of processes that describe acts of violence in the four different newspapers, and how this relates to the ideology of the newspaper that offers certain representations. This analysis is closely related to the analysis of narrative and lexis.

3.4 Lexicalisation

For the purpose of describing lexis, it is very important as a first step to define what is meant by the term 'lexical item'. It has been very difficult to define what is meant by the term 'word'; attempts to define it referred to its orthography or properties, but failed to provide an accurate definition. The term used in this study is 'lexical item' which can be described as "a hold-all term that includes, but is not limited to vocabulary items, fixed phrases, idioms and metaphorical extensions" (Carter, 1987; quoted by Hadley, 1997). The basic function of lexis as a linguistic resource is to enable people to name and describe different elements of the world in which they live. Such nominations and attributions reveal the way they view entities and represent them; therefore, they differ according to the ideologies of different groups of people. With specific reference to lexical choices in newspaper discourse, Pisarek (1983) explains that the analysis of words used in newspapers will allow us to reconstruct the image of the world presented

by the press and the attitudes propagated by it.

Hodge and Kress (1993) state that classification is at the basis of language and thought. It orders reality, therefore, it can be regarded as an instrument of control since society uses it to control perceptions of reality. These perceptions are not necessarily the same for the whole society; indeed, different groups may have different classification systems. It can be argued that classification constrains thought, as it provides the framework for organising the world and its elements. Systems of classification are not fixed, as they can change gradually over a long period of time, especially with the change in the material, social, political or ideological environment. Culturally-determined systems of classification are very important, as they show how the world is represented in the minds of language users, and they form part of their ideologies (Hodge & Kress, 1993).

The analysis of lexis is very important for displaying underlying ideologies in discourse. Van Dijk (1991: 53) holds that “lexicalisation ... is never neutral: the choice of one word rather than another to express more or less the same meaning, or to denote the same referent may signal the opinions, emotions, or special position of a speaker”. Toolan (2001) expresses the importance of lexical choices especially in the context of newspaper discourse; journalists have rich inventories of overlapping descriptors to choose from as they sort out which characterisation fits their (ideologically contextualised) account of things best. Ideology plays a vital role in the positive representation of certain groups and the negative representation of others. This can be done through the choice of certain lexical items to refer to individuals, groups and actions, as well as to attributing certain traits and characteristics to them; thus, lexical choices are crucial in determining how people and their actions are represented and perceived. With regard to studying the discourse of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, lexical choices can serve ideologically in the representation of different sides of the conflict and the legitimisation or delegitimisation of their actions, depending on the ideology of the newspaper.

When examining the lexical aspect of news reports dealing with violent events of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, it is important to study referential and predicational strategies, as they play a crucial role in the positive and negative representation of

different groups, as well as in the legitimisation and deligitimisation of their actions. In their study of discriminatory discourse, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) emphasise the role of referential and predicational strategies in positive and negative representations and their ideological power. Referential or nomination strategies are used to construct and represent social actors, and predicational strategies are used to provide social actors with predications, which aim at labelling them more or less positively or negatively. They may be realised as stereotypical, evaluative attributions of negative and positive traits in the linguistic form of implicit or explicit predicates. Sometimes it can be hard to distinguish predicational from referential strategies since some nominations have certain predications associated with them; therefore, the pure referential identification often involves evaluative labelling of social actors. Reisigl and Wodak list some referential strategies relevant to discriminatory discourse which affect the positive and negative representations of various groups. Nir and Roeh (1992) examined referential strategies used to refer to Palestinian and Israeli actors in Israeli newspapers during the time of the first Palestinian Uprising. They listed a number of methods that were used to refer to actors on different sides, including: name, age or age group, occupation or social status, domicile status, national affiliation, role in the events, number, and group. Reference by name recognised the actor as a person with a clear-cut identity. Reference by occupation or as a group tends to emphasise stereotypes.

Membership categorisation is closely related to referential and predicational strategies. Van Leeuwen (1996) defines categorisation as “the representation of social actors by functionalising, identifying or appraising them, i.e. by referring to them by virtue of ascribing to them identities, functions and positive or negative evaluations that they share with others. Categorisation is used by people in social interaction to refer to entities in the world and to classify them. The selection of a certain category creates a bond between the thing being categorised and other members of the same category. The selection of categorisation devices in media can point to ideological relations predicated on power relations (Jalbert, 1983).

Sacks & Ziferstein (1992) suggest that everyday knowledge about people is organised in membership categorisation devices which consist of membership categories which are, in turn, constituted by category-bound activities. “Membership categorisation

has a strong pragmatic component – it orients to practical action. Much of the categorising consists of delimiting one’s own moral, social and religious characteristics as well as those of the opponents, and in doing so accomplishing rejections, recruiting allies” (Leudar, Marsland & Nekvapil, 2004). Another ideologically invested categorisation device is *category boundedness*. In category-bound activities, members of a category are recognised as performers of certain activities, e.g. voters elect. Categorising a person or a group into a particular social schema influences the perception of the meaning of the actions of the person or group. In other words, how we categorise a social group affects the way we relate to them and perceive their actions. Jalbert notes that “the repeated reference to the Palestinians as ‘terrorists’ by the media has created this category boundedness between the members of the category” (Jalbert, 1983).

Fowler (1991) discusses a number of lexicalisation processes including over-lexicalisation, re-lexicalisation and under-lexicalisation, as well as their ideological underpinnings. Over-lexicalisation is the use of many synonyms and quasi-synonyms to refer to the same entity. It is used in relation to problematic issues that are hard to define or express; therefore, it is a formal linguistic marker of an exclusive social practise. By contrast, the use of a single term for an entity denotes the existence of a basic consensus over it. Fowler argues that powerless people are over-lexicalised, e.g. ‘female lawyer’. Over-lexicalisation often has a pejorative effect as it signals a kind of deviation from the social convention or expectations and reflects perceptions and judgements from the essentially biased standpoint of such cultural norms or social expectations (Teo, 2000). There are other relevant features that can be discussed in relation to the use of lexis in the reporting of violence in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict; for instance, generalisation, connotations, implications, presuppositions, as well as the use of certain rhetorical devices, such as hyperbole, ridicule, contrast, vagueness, irrelevance, metonymy, synecdoche, among others. The metaphorical use of language can also be examined in this context. All these categories can be invested ideologically in relation to the lexicalisation of the different sides of the conflict, and they can thus contribute to their positive or negative representations.

3.5 The Method of CDA in the Current Study

As explained earlier, there is not a single method for undertaking CDA, but different studies employ different methods depending on the aims of the study, the type of data to be analysed, etc. In this study, newspaper reports on violence in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict are analysed to examine the way different sides of the conflict are presented in newspapers that are issued in different contexts or that have different orientations. The previous sections have explained the three selected categories, i.e. narrative, syntax and lexis and their potential to be ideologically invested. In this section, I present the features that are examined under each category if present in the data.

The analysis of the narrative structure considers different elements of news reports, e.g. the choice of headline and lead, the presentation of the story, as well as the use of sources and background information. The headline is the most prominent aspect of a news report; it summarises the story and highlights its most significant details. It also guides readers' interpretation of the story, e.g. when the consequences of the event are highlighted in the headline, the event is presented as serious or grave; whereas when causes are highlighted in the headline, the event is presented as justified. The lead of the story indicates the source of the story and provides an initial summary which often points out the direction in which the story is developed in the rest of the report. Both the headline and lead are analysed for their significance in the presentation of the story especially given that they present the interpretative frames which highlight particular aspects and direct readers' understanding of the story.

The analysis also examines how the story is told, i.e. which details are given about violence committed by different sides and how they are presented. A crucial aspect to consider in this regard is the narrative structure of the story, as sometimes the story is de-narrativised and presented in a factual reporting format, while in other instances it is presented in a more coherent narrative structure with chronological events, clear agency, causality and consequences, which has a significant impact on readers' ability to reconstruct the story and to make sense of it. Another important element to consider in the analysis is the use of sources who often present verbal reactions or expert views on the story. Hall (1978) makes an important distinction between sources that act

as primary definers of the situation whose interpretations are adopted by the newspaper and those who act as secondary definers providing the opposing view to balance views presented by the primary definers, but whose views are not endorsed by the newspaper. Also considered in the analysis is contextual or background information which assists readers to make sense of the story and which are often selected strategically by reporters to support the interpretative frames that accompany the story.

The analysis of transitivity structures considers how syntactic structures are used to represent violent actions committed by each side, which can have important implications on the presentation of the action, as it affects readers' understanding of the action and responsibility for it. At the level of transitivity, the selection of actions undertaken by each side is examined, along with the choice of transitivity structures, agency structures, and affected participants. Certain choices at the level of transitivity are crucial for the presentation of action, e.g. the use of nominalisation, the non-transactive model, the agentless passive and the middle voice contribute to the suppression of agency for certain violent actions. On the other hand, the use of the transactive model and agentive constructions clearly present the agent of violent actions. The inclusion or suppression of agents can have serious implications on the presentation of the actions of each side and on readers' interpretations.

The presentation of the consequences of violent actions and participants affected by them is also important, e.g. violence can be presented as targeting people and affecting them or it can be presented as targeting inanimate objects or as being unintentional. The expression of intentionality and responsibility is affected by such choices. Also relevant to the analysis of transitivity is the presentation of purpose of violence which can have the effect of presenting the action as justified or even legitimate and presenting it as unjustified and illegitimate.

The analysis of lexis focuses on the presentation of different sides of the conflict, i.e. which labels and semantic roles are assigned to each side, and which actions are undertaken by each side, and the effect of such choices, e.g. the choice of labels related to militancy contribute to the delegitimisation of the actions of a given group, whereas the choice of labels related to the military register have the opposite effect of

legitimising the actions of a certain group. In addition, the analysis includes the choice of descriptions used with each side and their role in their positive and negative evaluation. Other categories that are also included in the analysis are the use of categorisation and generalisation with members of each group, which can potentially underrepresent certain groups, e.g. civilians in areas of conflict. Lexical processes of re-lexicalisation and over-lexicalisation are also examined. Re-lexicalisation can reframe the action to present it from a different perspective, e.g. more neutrally, while over-lexicalisation often has the effect of presenting groups and issues as problematic and hard to define. Certain rhetorical devices are also considered where appropriate, e.g. connotations, presuppositions, vagueness, metonymy, among others.

Finally, an attempt is made to interpret and explain the findings of the linguistic analysis of the above features by reference to the institutional practices involved in news production and by integrating elements of the historical, political, socio-cultural contexts. This involves a discussion of how the use of certain linguistic features by newspapers can contribute to the positive or negative presentation of different sides of the conflict and their actions; it also considers how they can contribute to certain strategies of discriminatory discourse, e.g. othering, exclusion, legitimisation, delegitimation, naturalisation, neutralisation, mitigation, criminalisation, avoidance, vagueness, problematisation, dehumanisation, blaming the victim, etc.

Thus, the critical analysis of news reports undertaken in this study follows the modified version of CDA discussed in chapter 2. It includes the three stages of CDA adopted from Fairclough (1992); namely, description, interpretation and explanation. The linguistic analysis focuses on selected features at three linguistic levels, i.e. narrative, transitivity and lexis that are believed to have the potential to be ideologically invested in different newspapers. The analysis draws on Wodak's discourse-historical approach by integrating features of wider historical, political, socio-cultural contexts, and also draws on van Dijk's notion of access to linguistic, material and cultural resources by different groups. The following chapter presents an overview of the corpus of news reports selected for analysis and background information about the sources of these reports.

4 Corpus Sources and Method of Selection

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the corpus of news reports used in the study, to introduce its sources and sampling method, as well as to give background to the newspapers from which reports are obtained and the events selected for analysis.

4.1 Description of Corpus and Method of Data Selection

The corpus used in the analysis is made up of hard news reports on violent events of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict starting from the second Palestinian Uprising (Al-Aqsa Intifada) which started in September 2000, obtained from four newspapers. The selected newspapers are the *New York Times* from the USA, the *Arab News* from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, as well as the *Guardian* and the *Times* from the UK. They are daily, quality mainstream papers, which are issued in English and which enjoy good status and wide elite readerships in their respective countries. They have been selected so as to make it possible to compare the way the same event is represented in Arab and Western newspapers, i.e. *Arab News* and *New York Times*, and also to compare the way the same event is represented in two newspapers with different orientations from the same country, i.e. the *Guardian* and the *Times*.

Reports used for analysis are obtained from online sources, i.e. the official websites of the selected newspapers; more specifically, the *Arab News* (<http://www.arabnews.com>); the *New York Times* (<http://www.times.com>); the *Guardian* (<http://www.guardian.co.uk>); and the London *Times* (<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/>). Some reports are derived from electronic databases such as LexisNexis Executive (<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/executive/>), and Thompson Gale newspaper Databases (<http://www.gale.com/>). Data is obtained from online sources due to accessibility of online material and to avoid the difficulties, delay and costs incurred in using the print versions which are issued in three different countries.

The online versions of newspapers have some differences from the print version. The multimodal nature of electronic media makes it possible for online papers to have hyperlinks to related stories and to other resources, e.g. background information; moreover, they display more graphic illustrations such as colored photographs, interactive maps, and audiovisual materials. In addition, the ease and speed of updating

news stories in real-time makes it possible to produce various versions of the same story. The use of interactive or multimodal features should not affect this study, as it is concerned mainly with the linguistic aspect of the story, i.e. the actual wording. If more than one version of the story is available, the latest version is chosen, as it supersedes all previous ones. The differences between the print and online versions of the newspapers should not affect the results of this research because the online version should not be expected to display discourses or ideologies different from those displayed in the print version since they are issued by the same institutions and are authored by the same editorial staff, although they are intended for a much wider potential readership, due to the universal reach of materials published online. Furthermore, obtaining all data used in this research from online sources achieves consistency.

News reports selected for analysis cover six years of the second Palestinian Uprising. The Israeli/Palestinian conflict is eventful, violent and intractable, especially the period of the second uprising which involves a great deal of bloodshed on both sides. Texts used in the analysis report on violence committed by the Israelis and the Palestinians against each other. With regard to the vast amount of data on the conflict and the practical constraints imposed by the availability of time and other resources, a sampling method had to be chosen to produce a corpus that is both representative of the huge amount of data available, and at the same time analysable with view of existing restrictions. The selected corpus has reports that deal with acts of violence committed by each side against the other. Similar acts undertaken by both sides are chosen, e.g. raids, killings and bombings. Reports are selected so that they cover the six-year period of the second Uprising, by means of a method of convenience sampling, which is a method convenient for the purpose of this research, and that does not involve probability calculations.

Initially, two events were selected for analysis from each year of the sampling period; one deals mainly with Palestinian violence and the other deals mainly with Israeli violence. This led to collecting forty-eight reports dealing with twelve acts of violence. Then, this corpus was narrowed down to twenty-four reports dealing with six acts of violence. Effort was made to choose reports that deal with similar acts undertaken by different sides, e.g. a Palestinian raid in Israel and an Israeli raid in the

Palestinian territories, a Palestinian bombing among Israelis and an Israeli bombing among Palestinians, etc. In this way, it becomes possible to compare and contrast the way similar actions undertaken by different sides are presented. Reports are selected from different years of the sample period, i.e. 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2006; thus, the sample spans over a period of six years from 2001 to 2006 and represents the development of events and discourses over the period chosen for analysis. The overall corpus consists of twenty-four news reports on six of the events of the conflict, i.e. about 19,500 words. The following section presents background information about the newspapers from which reports are obtained for analysis.

4.2 Background to the selected newspapers

4.2.1 *The Guardian*

The *Guardian* is an influential daily British newspaper owned by the Guardian Media Group. It is a left-leaning national prestige daily (Bell, 1991), published in London and Manchester. It appears Monday to Saturday, and its sister newspaper the *Observer* appears on Sunday. It was founded in Manchester in 1821 by a group of non-conformist businessmen headed by John Edward Taylor, and it was issued weekly under the title of the *Manchester Guardian*. When Stamp Duty was lifted in 1855, it became a daily paper. Its most famous owner and editor for 57 years, C. P. Scott, made the *Manchester Guardian* into a nationally recognised newspaper. In June 1936 ownership of the paper was transferred to the Scott Trust, which ensured the paper's independence, as financial security guaranteed its independent liberal stance. In 1959 the paper came to be known as the *Guardian*.

Scott's friendship with Chaim Weizmann played a role in the Balfour Declaration, and in 1948 the *Guardian* was a strong supporter of the State of Israel. The story of the relationship between the *Guardian*, the Zionist movement and Israel is told in Daphna Baram's book "*Disenchantment: the Guardian and Israel*". During the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, the *Guardian* attracted a significant proportion of anti-war readers for being most critical of British and American military initiatives. The *Guardian* is currently highly critical of Israeli defence policies. In December 2003

journalist Julie Burchill left the paper for the *Times*, citing this as one of the reasons for her move.

The *Guardian* enjoys a high standard in writing, quality and opinion, and it is highly respected worldwide. Editorial articles in the *Guardian* are generally in sympathy with the liberal to left-wing ends of the political spectrum. The paper is traditionally affiliated with the centrist Liberal Party. A MORI poll in 2000 showed that 80% of the *Guardian's* readers were Labour Party voters. In November 2005, the *Guardian* had a certified average daily circulation of 378,618 copies. It has been awarded the National Newspaper of the Year in 1999 and 2006 by the British Press Awards. The Guardian Unlimited website won the Best Newspaper category two years running in 2005 and 2006.

In June 1993, the *Guardian* bought the *Observer* from Lonrho thus gaining a serious Sunday newspaper partner with similar political views. Its international weekly edition is titled the *Guardian Weekly*. It includes sections from a number of other internationally significant newspapers of a somewhat left-of-centre inclination, including *Le Monde*. The *Guardian* is famous for its cosmopolitan view, literary and artistic coverage and criticism section. In 2004, it introduced an online digital version of its print edition. All of its news is published online with free access both to current news and an archive of three million stories. The *Guardian* has a reputation for text mangling, technical typesetting failures and typographical errors, although such errors are now less frequent than they used to be. It is also known as “Britain’s non-conformist conscience” due to its independent liberal stance and its editorial excellence (Encyclopaedia Britannica inc.).

4.2.2 *The Times*

The *Times* is a one of the oldest and most influential British newspapers, regarded as Britain's newspaper of record. It is a national daily published in London since 1785. The paper was founded in 1785 as the *Daily Universal Register* by John Walter who was also its first editor. In 1788 its name was changed to the *Times*. John Walter's initiative to obtain international news helped enhance the paper's reputation and readership. The *Times* used contributions from significant figures in the fields of

politics, science, literature and the arts to build its reputation. For much of its early life, the profits of the *Times* were very large and competition minimal. In 1817 Thomas Barnes was appointed general editor. He succeeded in boosting the popularity of the *Times* and increasing its influence. It was given the title “the Thunderer” to reflect its strong independent popularity, and its influence on public opinion. It was the first newspaper to send special correspondents abroad and to send war correspondents to cover particular conflicts.

In 1967, the *Times* started printing news on the front page for the first time, and merged with the *Sunday Times* to form Times Newspapers Limited, which the Australian publisher Rupert Murdoch headed since 1981. He provided the paper with up-to-date printing technology. Though the *Times* is traditionally a right-wing newspaper and a strong supporter of the Conservatives, it supported New Labour for elections, after Murdoch allied himself with Tony Blair. It has also come to stress Murdoch's "neo-conservative" views over a broader and more balanced range of conservative views it has traditionally put forward.

The *Times* is known for its accuracy and rigorous standards, ruled by tradition and editorial independence. Long considered the UK's newspaper of record, the *Times* is regarded as a serious publication with high standards of journalism. However, Robert Fisk, seven times British International Journalist of the Year, resigned as foreign correspondent in 1988 over what he saw as political censorship of his article on the shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655 in July of that year. The latest figures from the national readership survey show the *Times* to have the highest number of readers and the largest numbers of readers in London of any of the "quality" papers (Encyclopaedia Britannica inc.).

4.2.3 *The New York Times*

The *New York Times* is owned by the New York Times Company, published in New York City by Arthur Ochs Sulzberger Jr. and distributed internationally. It is the largest metropolitan newspaper and is regarded as a newspaper of record in the US. It was founded in 1851 by experienced journalist and politician Henry Jarvis Raymond and former banker George Jones as the *New-York Daily Times*, and in 1857 it changed to its

current name. It started as a penny paper, but came to enjoy early success, as it appealed to a cultured, intellectual readership. In 1896, Adolph Ochs acquired it, and under his guidance, it achieved international scope, circulation, and reputation. The paper is known for its full reporting of news and its good coverage of international news. The *New York Times* gave its name to Times Square in New York 1904 after it moved to new headquarters.

The *New York Times* is one of the most prominent American daily newspapers, although it trails *USA Today* and the *Wall Street Journal* in circulation. It has traditionally printed full transcripts of major speeches and debates. In 1971 it published leaked documents revealing that the U.S. government had been painting an unrealistically rosy picture of progress of the Vietnam War. When referring to people, the *New York Times* uses titles, (except among the sports pages, in which last names stand alone). Its headlines tend to be verbose, and, for major stories, come with subheadings giving further details, although it is moving away from this style. The *New York Times* has had a strong presence on the web since 1995.

In *Manufacturing Consent* (1994), Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky analyse a variety of major U.S. media outlets, with an emphasis on the *New York Times* and conclude that bias exists which is neither liberal nor conservative in nature, but rather aligned towards the interests of corporate conglomerates, such as those that now own most of these media. Chomsky has explained that this bias functions in all sorts of ways: "...by selection of topics, by distribution of concerns, by emphasis and framing of issues, by filtering of information, by bounding of debate within certain limits. They determine, they select, they shape, they control, and they restrict – in order to serve the interests of dominant, elite groups in the society." Chomsky also touches on the specific importance this perceived bias has in the *New York Times*, saying: "...history is what appears in the *New York Times* archives; the place where people will go to find out what happened is the *New York Times*. Therefore it's extremely important if history is going to be shaped in an appropriate way, that certain things appear, certain things not appear, certain questions be asked, other questions be ignored, and that issues be framed in a particular fashion."

In summer 2004, the newspaper's then public editor, Daniel Okrent, wrote a piece on the *New York Times*' alleged liberal bias. He concluded that the paper did have a liberal bias in coverage of certain social issues, gay marriage being the example he used. He claimed that this bias reflected the paper's cosmopolitanism, which arose naturally from its roots as a hometown paper of New York City. Okrent did not comment at length on the issue of bias in coverage of "hard news"; however, he noted that the paper's coverage of the Iraq war was, among other things, insufficiently critical of the George W. Bush administration (Encyclopaedia Britannica inc.).

4.2.4 *The Arab News*

The *Arab News* started in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1975. It was founded in 1975 by Hisham and Mohammed Ali Hafiz. It is owned by the Saudi government and published by the Saudi Research and Publishing Co. (SRPC), a subsidiary of Saudi Research and Marketing Group (SRMG). It is the first Saudi English-language daily newspaper. The *Arab News* has become a well respected leading paper. From its initiation, the paper has been serving the interests of both Saudis and a large expatriate community and in consequence introduced them to each other, by offering regional news from Europe, America, India, Pakistan, Philippines and other Middle Eastern countries in English for the heterogeneous mix of its readership.

The *Arab News* is distributed in all Gulf States in addition to the Near East, North Africa, Europe and the USA. It also has an online version published from its offices in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. The paper regards itself as offering Arab and non-Arab readers news from an Arab perspective, and in-depth regional information. The *Arab News* is popular among many sections of Saudi society, including nationals and foreign residents. However, since it is published in English, the majority of its readership is made up of expatriates and highly educated nationals.

The *Arab News* reflects the official Saudi perspective and offers a wide range of national, regional and international news. The readership profile of the paper indicates that 85% of the readers are non-Arabs, and only 15% are Arabs. It is serious in its approach and in dealing with political issues, but since it is published in English to a mainly foreign readership or educated Arabs, it presents news from a Saudi perspective

that is more conciliatory with Western views. The paper has correspondents in many Arab and foreign capitals, yet it obtains a great deal of foreign news from news agencies and depends on them to a large extent.

The *Arab News* has a website (www.arabnews.com) which publishes the issues of the paper online on a daily basis. In addition, it also has a searchable archive with articles that date back to 2001. The paper states that the website gets hundreds of thousands of hits every day from Web surfers worldwide. After the background to the selected newspapers, an overview of the news stories is presented, including some quantified data about the selected reports.

4.3 An Overview of News Stories

The following table presents an overview of the news stories selected for analysis. It compares them in terms of length, choice of headline, by line and source, quoted sources and key features. It aims to present an overview of the news stories in a factual form.

First Story: Published 31st July 2001				
	<i>The Arab News</i>	<i>The New York Times</i>	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>The Times</i>
Headline	Israeli gunships pound Gaza	In Mideast, a Day of Resounding Violence	Blast kills six Fatah men on Israel's hitlist	Six men killed in Gaza explosion
Length	554 words	822 words	650 words	211 words
Source	Nazer Majally, Arab News Staff, GAZA	CLYDE HABERMAN JERUSALEM	Suzanne Goldenberg in Jerusalem	Ross Dunn in Jerusalem
Quoted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Israeli Army - Israeli political sources - Arafat's top aide Nabil Abu Rudeina - Fatah officials - The Palestinians - Ahmad Abdel-Rahman, an aide to Arafat 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Israelis - Israel - Mickey Levy, the city's police chief - A middle-aged woman - Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, the deputy defence minister - Palestinian officials - some Palestinians 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Israel's deputy defence minister, Dalia Rabin Pelossof - Hospital officials - The Israeli army - Mr Sharon - Palestinian leaders 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, Israel's Deputy Defence Minister
Key Features	The report focuses on violence against Palestinians and avoids violence against Israelis.	The report mentions violence against both sides and is careful about blaming any side for it.	The report mentions violence against both sides and highlights violence of the cell to which victims belong.	The report is too short and is not accurate about the location of the bombing.
Second Story: Published 1st August 2002				
	<i>The Arab News</i>	<i>The New York Times</i>	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>The Times</i>
Headline	Jerusalem Bomb Kills Seven	AT LEAST 7 KILLED AS MILITANTS BOMB JERUSALEM CAMPUS	Bomb kills seven at university Hamas attacks mixed campus in revenge for assassination	Hamas bomb kills seven students at Jerusalem's multicultural university
Length	618 words	1272 words	623 words	606 words
Source	Occupied Jerusalem	By James Bennet and John Kifner, Jerusalem	Suzanne Goldenberg in Jerusalem	Stephen Farrell in Jerusalem

Quoted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The sources - An Israeli government spokesman ... Avi Pazner - Hamas - Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin - The Palestinian Authority 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Spencer Dew, 26, a divinity student from the University of Chicago - Abeer Salman, 19, a student from the Arab village of Beit Safafa - Alistaire Goldrein, 19, of Liverpool, England - Kobi Cohen, the student union president - Israeli officials - Ron Krumer, a spokesman for the Hadassah Medical Center - Dror Lederman, 26, a student of economics - Sophia Aron, 19, of Los Angeles - Shlomo Avineri, a political science professor - The Islamist group Hamas - The Palestinian Authority - Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, a political leader of Hamas 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sharon Avital, 26, an MBA student - Daniel Farahan, a 20-year-old from Indiana - The police spokeswoman Sigal Toledo - Alistair Goldrein, from Liverpool - The public security minister, Uzi Landau - Hamas - the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin - Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Alastair Goldrein, 20, a student from Merseyside - Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority
Key Features	The report presents the bombing generally and avoids blaming Palestinians for it initially.	The report highlights Hamas responsibility for the bombing. It is based mainly on quoting Israeli and American sources. The headline is capitalised.	The report is clear about Hamas responsibility for the bombing and its consequences. It quotes many Israeli sources.	The report is very clear about Hamas responsibility for the bombing and its consequences. It does not quote many sources.
Third Story: Published 15th January 2004				
	<i>The Arab News</i>	<i>The New York Times</i>	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>The Times</i>
Headline	Mother-of-Two Bomber Kills Four Israelis	Gaza Mother, 22, Kills Four Israelis in Suicide Bombing	Human-bomb mother kills four Israelis at Gaza checkpoint	'It was my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists'
Length	790 words	832 words	826 words	640 words
Source	Nazir Majally, Asharq Al-Awsat — Additional input from agencies	GREG MYRE in EREZ, Gaza Strip	Chris McGreal in Gaza	Ian MacKinnon in Gaza
Quoted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Raanan Gissin, a spokesman for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon - Brig. Gen. Gadi Shamni, the Israeli military commander in Gaza - Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin - A Palestinian woman standing - She (the bomber) - Her brother-in-law Yusef Awad - Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qorei 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - David Baker, an official in the office of Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon - Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas - She (the bomber) - A relative 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Gaza divisional commander, Brigadier-General Gadi Shamni - Lieutenant Ayelet Kadosh - She (the bomber) - The spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin - He (her brother-in-law, Yusuf Awad) - A Hamas official 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brigadier-General Gadi Shamni, commander of the Israeli Army's Gaza division - Yossi Vaknim, an Israeli from the nearby Nisanit settlement - The bomber - Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas
Key Features	The report highlights the status of the bomber as a	The report details all actions of the bomber	The report presents a lot of background	The headline quotes the bomber in a highly

	mother and presents Hamas responsibility clearly.	and presents Hamas responsibility clearly.	information and quotes the bomber and Israeli sources extensively.	ideological statement.
Fourth Story: Published 22nd March 2004				
	<i>The Arab News</i>	<i>The New York Times</i>	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>The Times</i>
Headline	Murder	Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike	Israel assassinates Hamas leader · Yassin killed in missile strike · Mass protests by Palestinians · Militants vow revenge attacks	Hamas spiritual leader killed in Israeli air strike
Length	658 words	832 words	872 words	640 words
Source	Hisham Abu Taha, Arab News, Gaza	By JAMES BENNET GAZA	George Wright and agencies	FROM AP IN RAMALLAH
Quoted	- Sharon - Salah Amudi, 30 - Top Hamas official Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi	- The Israeli military - The army - Israeli officials - The Israeli deputy defence minister, Zeev Boim - Mr. Netanyahu - Palestinians at the scene - One witness, Maher al-Beek - Hospital officials - Sheik Yassin - Ahmed Qurei, the Palestinian prime minister	- An Israeli defence spokeswoman - Israeli defence forces - Gideon Meir, an Israeli foreign ministry official - The Israeli daily Ha'aretz - The Israeli defence minister, Shaul Mofaz, - Taxi driver Yousef Haddad - Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh, a close associate of Yassin - Abu Abeer, a spokesman for a group of militant Palestinian organisations in the occupied territories - Hamas - The Palestinian Prime Minister, Ahmed Qureia	- Israel - Gideon Meir, an Israeli Foreign Ministry official - One Israeli official - The Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat - the Hamas leadership - Yassin - Ismail Haniyeh, a Hamas official and a close associate of Yassin - medics - the Palestinian Authority - Abdel Aziz Rantisi The militant groups Islamic Jihad and Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades
Key Features	The report focuses on Israeli actions and presents more details	The report focuses on Palestinian reactions and quotes many sources.	The report focuses on Palestinian reactions and highlights Israeli responsibility.	The reports focuses on Palestinian reactions and quotes many sources
Fifth Story: Published 26th June 2006				
	<i>The Arab News</i>	<i>The New York Times</i>	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>The Times</i>
Headline	2 Israeli Troops Killed in Attack by Palestinians	MILITANTS' RAID ON ISRAEL RAISES TENSION IN GAZA	Israel promises revenge for soldier deaths · Hamas warned after two killed in pre-dawn raid · Abbas ordered to secure seized corporal's release	Soldier kidnapped in deadly tunnel ambush
Length	743 words	1563 words	1100 words	526 words
Source	Hisham Abu Taha, Gaza — With input from agencies	Conal Urquhart in Tel Aviv	By STEVEN ERLANGER, JERUSALEM	Ian MacKinnon in Kerem Shalom and Stephen Farrell in Erez
Quoted	- Israeli Army radio - Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri - Unnamed officials from Abbas' Fatah movement	- Israeli officials - Mark Regev, a spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry - The Israeli chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan	- Israeli officials - Ehud Olmert, the Israeli Prime Minister - Mark Regev, a spokesman for the Israeli foreign ministry	- Ehud Olmert, the Israeli Prime Minister - Brigadier-General Aviv Kochavi, head of the Gaza Division - Ghazi Hamad, a

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Abbas - Palestinian Cabinet spokesman Ghazi Hamad - The Palestinian presidency 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Halutz - Israel's security cabinet - The Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Olmert - The Israeli government - Ms. Livni, the Israeli Foreign Minister - Ghazi Hamad, a spokesman for the Hamas government - Mr. Abbas - a spokesman for Hamas, Sami Abu Zuhri, - Hamas spokesman, Mushir al-Masri, - The spokesman for the Popular Resistance Committees, Abu Mujahid 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Israeli officials - Amir Peretz, the Defence Minister - The Palestinian Deputy Prime Minister, Nasser Shaer - Aides of Mr Abbas - Sami Abu Zuhri, a Hamas spokesman - Ghazi Hamed, the government spokesman - Mr Abbas 	spokesman for the Hamas-led Government
Key Features	The report presents Palestinian actions and highlights Israeli reactions.	The report details Palestinian actions & uses capitals in headline.	The report highlights Palestinian actions and has extensive background information.	The report highlights Palestinian actions, Israeli reactions and consequences.
Sixth Story: Published 7th July 2006				
	<i>The Arab News</i>	<i>The New York Times</i>	<i>The Guardian</i>	<i>The Times</i>
Headline	Israeli Missiles and Shells Kill 21	Fighting Surges and Deaths Rise as Israel Drives Deeper in Gaza	18 die in worst fighting since withdrawal last year	Death toll rises in north Gaza despite lull in fighting
Length	952	1127	412	765
Source	Hisham Abu Taha, Arab News — — Additional input from agencies	By STEVEN ERLANGER and GREG MYRE BEIT LAHIYA, Gaza Strip	Conal Urquhart in Beit Lahiya	By Jenny Booth and agencies
Quoted	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Defence Minister Amir Peretz - Noam Shalit - Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, - One father, fleeing a Beit Lahiya neighborhood 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Israel's defence minister, Amir Peretz - The Israeli military - Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his aides - The Palestinian Interior Minister, Said Siam - The Palestinian Prime Minister, Ismail Haniya, - Mr. Hamad 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Israeli army - A spokeswoman for the - The army - Mohammad Farajalah, 24, an ambulance man 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lieutenant Colonel Yaniv - Israel - Mr Peretz - Lieutenant General Halutz - Ismail Haniya, the Palestinian Prime Minister, - His ruling Hamas movement
Key Features	The report focuses on Israeli violence and Palestinian suffering. It mentions UN resolution condemning Israeli actions and arrest of Hamas officials.	The report mentions both Israeli and Palestinian violence. It presents Israeli violence as purposeful and as movements.	The report presents Israeli violence generally and highlights the suffering of Palestinians in Gaza under the attack.	The report focuses on the lull in fighting and mentions both Israeli and Palestinian violence in Gaza.

The following table compares reports from the four newspapers quantitatively, in terms of the percentage of the text dedicated to dealing with Israeli violence, Palestinian violence (not including causes and impacts) as well as Israeli quotations and Palestinian quotations.

First Story: Published 31st July 2001 (Israeli Bombing)				
	AN	NYT	G	T
Length	554	822	650	211
Israeli violence	55 (10%)	19 (2 %)	23 (4%)	14 (6%)
Palestinian violence	0	128 (16%)	97 (15%)	17 (7%)
Israeli quotations	55 (10%)	167 (20%)	107 (16%)	22 (10%)
Palestinian quotations	172 (31%)	137 (17%)	97 (15%)	33 (16%)
Context	43 (8%)	69 (8%)	126 (19%)	44 (21%)
Second Story: Published 1st August 2002 (Palestinian Bombing)				
	AN	NYT	G	T
Length	618	1272	623	606
Israeli violence	51 (8%)	26 (2%)	63 (10%)	20 (3%)
Palestinian violence	19 (3%)	117 (9%)	87 (14%)	120 (20%)
Israeli quotations	63 (10%)	571 (45%)	288 (46%)	160 (26%)
Palestinian quotations	102 (17%)	104 (8%)	138 (22%)	8 (1%)
Context	50 (8%)	186 (15%)	112 (18%)	218 (36%)
Third Story: Published 15th January 2004 (Palestinian Suicide Bombing)				
	AN	NYT	G	T
Length	790	832	826	640
Israeli violence	85 (11%)	21 (3%)	15 (2%)	0
Palestinian violence	87 (11%)	147 (18%)	108 (13%)	167 (26%)
Israeli quotations	68 (9%)	36 (4%)	121 (15%)	89 (14%)
Palestinian quotations	177 (22%)	153 (18%)	194 (23%)	171 (27%)
Context	163 (21%)	251 (30%)	232 (28%)	134 (21%)
Fourth Story: Published 22nd March 2004 (Israeli bombing and assassination of Sheikh Yassin)				
	AN	NYT	G	T
Length	658	832	872	640
Israeli violence	57 (9%)	7 (1%)	24 (3%)	69 (11%)
Palestinian violence	43 (7%)		23 (3%)	31 (5%)
Israeli quotations	17 (3%)	156 (19%)	193 (22%)	84 (13%)
Palestinian quotations	110 (18%)	197 (24%)	217 (25%)	371 (28%)
Context	65 (10%)	369 (33%)	86 (10%)	171 (27%)
Fifth Story: Published 26th June 2006 (Palestinian Raid)				
	AN	NYT	G	T
Length	743	1563	1100	526
Israeli violence	117 (16%)	57 (4%)	0	27 (5%)
Palestinian violence	162 (22%)	265 (17%)	151 (14%)	99 (19%)
Israeli quotations		270 (17%)	154 (14%)	103 (20%)

Palestinian quotations	203 (27%)	302 (19%)	180 (16%)	57 (11%)
Context	30 (4%)	142 (9%)	243 (22%)	38 (7%)
Sixth Story: Published 7th July 2006 (Israeli raid)				
	AN	NYT	G	T
Length	952	1127	412	765
Israeli violence	167 (18%)	177 (10%)	80 (19%)	108 (14%)
Palestinian violence	11 (1%)	155 (14%)	50 (12%)	28 (4%)
Israeli quotations	120 (13%)	97 (9%)	63 (15%)	167 (22%)
Palestinian quotations	67 (7%)	155 (14%)	66 (16%)	97 (13%)
Context	83 (8%)	92 (8%)	51 (12%)	54 (7%)

The reports of 31st July 2001 come from the first year of Al-Aqsa Uprising. In 2001, tension between both sides was heightened, as the Palestinians continued their protests which started in September 2000 under the name of Al-Aqsa Intifada and Israel failed to stop them despite resorting to excessive force which resulted in international condemnation, and despite many international summits that also failed to stop violence. In that year, around seven hundred and thirty-seven Palestinians and one hundred and sixty-four Israelis had been killed, including civilians from both sides. The reports from 2001 deal with various incidents of Israeli and the Palestinians violence, but the focus of the reports is the killing of six Palestinian militants in a blast in the West Bank and the Israeli bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza.

The *Arab News* report focuses on violence against the Palestinians and avoids mentioning any violence against the Israelis. Palestinian quotations represent 31% of the report while Israeli quotations represent 9% of the report. The *New York Times* presents violence committed by both sides; however, violence committed against the Israelis represents 20% of the report while violence committed by the Israelis represents 2% of the report. The report quotes sources on both sides, but there are more Israeli quotations. Palestinian quotations represent 15% of the report and Israeli quotations represent 19%, and Palestinian violence represents 14% of the report in comparison with less than 1% representing Israeli violence. The *Guardian* report includes incidence of violence committed by both sides. It includes more incidents of Palestinian violence (15%) than Israeli violence (4%). It also includes quotations by both sides about (15%) each. The *Times* report is the shortest, and it presents both Israeli and Palestinian violence and quotations by both sides. Contextual details represent 21% of the report.

2002 was another violent year in which there were many suicide bombings against the Israelis, and there were a lot of Israeli incursions and raids in the Palestinian territories creating hundreds of victims on both sides. The death toll reached more than one thousand Palestinians and more than four hundred Israelis. Both peoples were separated, and the Palestinian territories were sealed. The reports of 1st August 2002 deal with a Palestinian bombing at a café at the Hebrew University which was claimed by Hamas and which killed seven people including foreigners.

The *Arab News* report mentions Palestinian violence briefly (3%) although the report deals mainly with a Palestinian bombing. The report includes more Palestinian quotations (17%) than Israeli quotations (10%). The *New York Times* is dominated by quoting sources, especially Israeli sources (45%). Palestinian violence is prominent in the report since it focuses on a Palestinian bombing. The *Guardian* report is also dominated by quoting Israeli sources (46%). The *Times* report includes most contextual details (36%), and it focuses on Palestinian violence (20%) as well as quotations by Israeli sources (26%).

2004 was a very violent year characterised by a great deal of bloodshed on both sides. Two reports have been selected from that year; one of them deals with Palestinian violence and the other deal with Israeli violence. The reports of the 15th of January 2004 deal with a suicide bombing at an Israeli check point in Gaza, which claimed the lives of four Israelis and injured seven others including four Palestinians. The most newsworthy detail about this bombing is that it was undertaken by a female bomber who is also a mother of two young children. This is highlighted in all news reports.

Although the report deals mainly with a Palestinian bombing, the *Arab News* report presents both Palestinian and Israeli violence (11%) each. Palestinian quotations dominate the report (22%). The *New York Times* report focuses mainly on Palestinian violence (18%) in comparison with (3%) of Israeli violence. The report includes many contextual details (30%). The *Guardian* report also focuses on Palestinian violence (13%) and includes a lot of contextual details (28%). The *Times* report gives the most elaborate account of Palestinian violence (26%). Palestinian violence is prominent in all the reports, as they focus on a Palestinian bombing.

The reports of the 22nd of March 2004 deal mainly with the Israeli assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader and founder of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in Gaza by an Israeli missile strike that killed him, seven others and injured fifteen others. This event is significant because of the symbolic value and political role of Sheikh Yassin as a symbol of resistance for all Palestinians. Yassin's assassination resulted in international condemnation of Israel.

The *Arab News* report clearly presents Israeli violence (9%), and it includes Palestinian violence as well (7%). Palestinian quotations represent 18% of the report while Israeli quotations represent only 4%. The *New York Times* presents Israeli violence very briefly (1%). It includes a lot of contextual details (33%) and quotations of sources on both sides; (19%) Israeli sources and (24%) Palestinian sources. The *Guardian* report presents violence on both sides briefly (3%) each. It is dominated by quoting sources on both sides; (25%) Israeli sources and (22%) Palestinian sources. The *Times* report presents Palestinian violence clearly (11%). It presents more Palestinian quotations (28%) than Israeli quotations (13%).

The reports of the 26th of June 2006 deal mainly with a Palestinian raid on an Israeli military post that resulted in killing two Israeli soldiers, injuring three and capturing one, as well as the killing of two Palestinian fighters. This is a significant event because it was unexpected, and it led to a great deal of Israeli violence against the Palestinians in response including several raids and an all-out war against Gaza in 2008.

All the reports focus on the Palestinian attack and present it as quoted from the Israeli military. The *Arab News* report focuses on Palestinian violence (22%), and it also presents Israeli violence (16%). Palestinian quotations represent 27% of the report. The *New York Times* focuses on Palestinian violence, and it presents a lot of quotations on both sides. The *Guardian* report is also focuses on Palestinian violence (14%). It is characterised by detailed background information (22%). The *Times* report includes a detailed account of Palestinian violence (19%) and briefly presents Israeli violence (5%).

The reports of the 7th of July 2006 deal mainly with an Israeli incursion in Gaza, in response to the capture of an Israeli soldier on the 26th June 2006 by Palestinian

militants and the firing of homemade rockets from Gaza towards Israel. The incursion claimed the lives of around twenty Palestinians and one Israeli soldier; moreover, thirty Palestinians and one Israeli soldier were injured. This event is significant as it represents the Israeli military measures against the Palestinians in response to the kidnapping of the Israeli soldier.

The topic of the four reports is the Israeli raid against Gaza. The *Arab News* report focuses on Israeli violence (18%), and it presents Palestinian violence very briefly (1%). The *New York Times* presents more Palestinian violence than Israeli violence although the report deals mainly with an Israeli incursion that killed 20 Palestinians. The *Guardian* report focuses on Israeli violence (19%), and it also presents Palestinian violence (12%). The *Times* report focuses on Israeli violence (14%) and briefly presents Palestinian violence (4%). The report also focuses on Israeli quotations (22%).

5 Narrative Analysis

This chapter presents a critical analysis of the narrative structures of news reports on violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the four selected newspapers. The aim is to investigate how narrative structures work to represent the same events; focusing on comparing and contrasting the way the same event is represented in two newspapers that are sited in different countries and contexts, i.e. the *Arab News* (henceforth, AN) and the *New York Times* (henceforth, NYT); and two newspapers that appear in the same country but have different orientations, i.e. the *Guardian* and the *Times*.

Narrative is crucial for the news story genre which recounts real events. As stated earlier in chapter 3, news narrative has a distinctive structure adapted to the complex functions that news reports serve. The analysis of narrative structure of news reports in this thesis draws on the works of many scholars who studied narrative in general and narrative in the news in particular, and it examines different aspects of the structure of news reports, including choice of headline and lead; interpretative frames; the foci of reports; the choice and order episodes of violence and how they are constructed, especially as concerns the representation of violent acts of different sides, their causes and consequences; the use of quotations and sources on both sides; and contextual details used with each story.

The analysis of the headline and head

The first element examined is the choice of headline and lead. Van Dijk regards the headline as the most prominent element of a news report that has an important cognitive and ideological function which can influence readers' interpretations of the story and it highlights the most prominent aspect of the story and thus downplays others. He describes the headline as 'a subjective definition of the situation' (van Dijk, 1988). The analysis considers both the ideas highlighted in the headline as the most relevant and the way language is used to express them, as well as their impacts on the presentation of the story, e.g. highlighting consequences, agency, etc.

The lead is also considered in the analysis. Toolan (2001) argues that "the

modern English-medium hard news story is oriented around the opening sentence, which will include the most tellable and critical world-disturbing event.” White (1997) described the structure of the news story as ‘lead-dominated and orbitally-organised’ since news stories are not presented chronologically, but rather they are developed by expanding the lead by different types of satellite. In this way, the lead represents the nucleus of the story, and along with the headline it sets its interpretative frame. For the crucial textual and ideological function of the lead, it is examined in the analysis with reference to the ideas it presents, the way language is used to present them, and its role in directing interpretations of the story.

The analysis of the main story

The analysis also considers the main story or episode of the report, which is examined by focusing on how it presents the event, which details are included or excluded, as well as which elements are highlighted and which are downgraded. The analysis benefits to some extent from the work of Labov and Waletzky (1967) on the analysis of the structure of narrative. Although they examined the structure of oral narrative, the elements of narrative provide a useful approach to examining the way the main story is presented in the news report. Labov and Waletzky identified six elements of the narrative structure, with two elements required for a minimum narrative. The analysis considers which elements of narrative are present in stories of violence about each side. A relevant point here is Toolan’s discussion of the narrativisation or de-narrativisation of news stories which are presented as factual reporting rather than as narrativisation of events (Toolan, 2001). To study the way the story is presented, elements of narrative included in the main story, e.g. characterisation, complication, details, etc. are examined in stories about violence committed by each side. Another aspect which is considered here is the way agency, causes and consequences are presented in stories about violence committed by each side.

The analysis of the sources’ statements and contextual details

The analysis of narrative structure also examines the use of sources from both sides. They provide verbal reactions and expert views about the reported events. Hall (1978) distinguishes between sources that are used as primary definers who “promote

the dominant definitions of events,” and secondary definers of the situation who present “counter-definitions of the situation”. Definitions offered by the primary definers are often those endorsed by the newspaper, while counter definers “have no access to the defining process” (Hall, 1978: 64). The analysis of the use of news sources in reports draws on Hall’s classifications of sources into primary and secondary definers of the situation by examining in which capacity each newspaper uses sources on both sides. The use of contextual details is another aspect of the analysis. Contextual details and background information are considered in terms of which details are selected about each side and the role they play in the presentation of the story and the actions of each side.

The following section investigates the use of narrative structure in NYT to represent Israeli and Palestinian violence by examining the following features: headlines; leads; interpretative frames; the narrative structure of the main episode, i.e. characterisation, complication and resolution; the use of sources and quotations; and the selection of contextual details.

5.1 Narrative Analysis of the *New York Times* Reports

NYT uses narrative structures differently to represent violence committed by the Israelis and the Palestinians. The following section presents an analysis of reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence.

5.1.1 Narrative and the representation of Israeli violence

	31 st July 2001	22 nd April 2004	7 th July 2006
Headline	In Mideast, a Day of Resounding Violence	Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike	Fighting Surges and Deaths Rise as Israel Drives Deeper in Gaza
Lead	The state of Israeli-Palestinian relations is looking more and more like a police blotter. That was conspicuously so today as bombs, mortars, missiles and knives left casualties on both sides across the length of the land.	Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader and founder of the militant Palestinian group Hamas, was killed early Monday by an Israeli missile that struck him as he left a mosque in Gaza City, his family and Hamas officials said. They said at least two bodyguards had been killed with him.	A member of Hamas was reported killed in an airstrike Friday, less than 24 hours after Israeli troops and Palestinian militants had waged their most intense battles since Israel re-entered the Gaza Strip last week to secure the release of a captured soldier and stop rocket fire into Israel.

In reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence, NYT headlines present events generally without attributing clear responsibility to Israel; moreover, there is sometimes

an effort to naturalise these events, conceal crucial agency and downplay consequences. The first headline (In Mideast, a Day of Resounding Violence) is too general and vague. It highlights violence in the Middle East, yet it is a nominal phrase with no action or agents involved. Readers cannot know from the headline who caused this violence and who suffered it.

The second headline (Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike) summarises the assassination story. It uses passivisation with inanimate agent to mitigate Israeli responsibility. Passivisation highlights the outcome of the action and presents it as completed action more like a state and at the same time downplays agency and responsibility for it. Israeli involvement is expressed, however, loosely through the use of the circumstantial, which fails to establish a confirmed causal relationship between the strike and the killing.

The third headline (Fighting Surges and Deaths Rise as Israel Drives Deeper in Gaza) is also too general and vague. The use of the nominalisations '*fighting*' and '*deaths*' and the middle voice verbs '*rise*' and '*surge*' which are semantically associated with natural occurrences naturalises the reported events and their consequences and mitigates responsibility for them. The circumstantial presupposes that Israel has already driven deep in Gaza, so readers accept this as an unquestionable proposition; it also fails to establish a clear causal relationship between fighting and deaths on the one hand and Israeli movements on the other hand. Considering the interpretative frames that these headlines set, NYT headlines present Israeli violence generally and vaguely without blaming Israel clearly for it which mitigates Israeli responsibility and downplays the impact of Israeli violence on Palestinians.

In line with the headlines, the lead paragraphs of NYT also attempt to conceal or mitigate Israeli responsibility for violence or represent violence as a mutual action undertaken by both sides, e.g. the lead paragraph of the report of the 31st of July 2001 that deals with an Israeli bombing of the police headquarters in Gaza and the killing of six Palestinian activists in a blast. It presents a simile where the Israeli-Palestinian relations are compared to '*a police blotter*', which emphasises that many incidents of

violence have taken place between both sides. This is further elaborated by mentioning several incidents of violence (*bombs, mortars, missiles and knives left casualties on both sides*). The metonymical substitution of human agents by weapons avoids blaming violence on any side and maintains vagueness as the headline.

The second report deals with the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in an Israeli air strike. The lead uses passivisation and an inanimate agent to mitigate Israeli responsibility. Yassin is described as (*spiritual leader and founder of the militant Palestinian group Hamas*), which delegitimises him by association with a militant group. Consequences of the attack are presented as the killing of two bodyguards although seven others were killed in the attack. The story is presented as quoted from Yassin's family and Hamas officials to give it credibility; however, it is very unlikely that Yassin's family and Hamas officials would call him leader of a militant group, try to mitigate Israeli responsibility or underestimate the number of victims.

The third report deals mainly with an Israeli raid on Gaza. The lead highlights the killing of a member of Hamas in an airstrike using an agentless passive. Fighting between both sides is presented as mutual. The contrast between '*Israeli troops*' and '*Palestinian militants*' legitimises Israeli actions. The expression '*since Israel re-entered Gaza*' contextualises for the event and naturalises the Israeli incursion in Gaza, as if Israel has the right to enter and re-enter Gaza freely. It also presupposes previous entries. It does not recognise that the Israeli presence in Gaza is considered a military occupation of the Palestinian territories. The purpose of the Israeli incursion is presented as '*to secure the release of a captured soldier and stop rocket fire into Israel*' which legitimises the Israeli actions by presenting them as purposeful and legitimate.

The selection of details to include in each report and the presentation and organisation of these events are very important. In reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence, NYT reports deal with violence committed by both the Palestinians and the Israelis against each other, which serves to justify Israeli violence and to show it as mutual or as a response to Palestinian violence; moreover, NYT presents Israeli violence briefly, not in a coherent narrative, using structures that can de-narrativise stories, e.g.

the use of non-human agents or middle verbs associated with spontaneous actions. Another important feature is that reports highlight the purpose of Israeli violence and downplay the consequences of such actions.

The report of the 31st of July 2001, which deals mainly with an Israeli attack against Gaza and the killing of six Palestinians, mentions a lot of violence against the Israelis e.g. the injury of members of border police, a nine-year old girl and a Jewish man, in addition to other ‘false alarms’. NYT represents both sides as victims of violence and also as undertaking violence against each other; however, it focuses on violence against the Israelis and presents it in detail with vivid descriptions and sometimes exaggerates Palestinian threats and dramatises them.

Narrative structure is used differently with Israeli and Palestinian violence reported in the report. The main episode of the Israeli bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters is summarised in one sentence (*seven Palestinian police officers were wounded when Israeli helicopters fired at a building in the police headquarters compound*); it foregrounds the consequences of the action using an agentless passive and presents the act of bombing in a circumstantial with a non-human agent and an inanimate target. The story is de-narrativised; there are no human agents involved or complication and resolution. The story is presented as a finished action, and the circumstantial fails to establish Israeli responsibility and intentionality. The episode of the killing of six Palestinian activists is dominated by speculations about how the men were killed, and the newspaper adopts the Israeli perspective on their death as a ‘work accident’.

The report also includes several acts of violence against the Israelis including the shooting of members of the borders police, the injury of a nine-year old girl and the stabbing of a Jewish man in Old Jerusalem. Responsibility for these incidents is not clear in the report, yet it can be understood from the context that Palestinians are to be blamed; moreover, these acts of violence are presented in clearer and more coherent narrative structures than Israeli violence, e.g. (*Palestinians showered stones on Jews*

praying at the Western Wall in the Old City, an action that touched off skirmishes with Israeli police officers at the Aksa Mosque compound).

The report also mentions several non-violent incidents that take place in Jerusalem. They have no news-value as they do not involve any counter-expected or aberrant events, e.g. the bursting of a can and a bus tyre. It is unusual to find such stories in an international news report. The aim is to underscore the tense situation in Israel and the psychological impacts of such incidents. This serves to exaggerate the threats of Palestinian violence against the Israelis. Moreover, the arrangement of episodes in the NYT report supports the Israeli perspective, e.g. Israeli claims that they attacked a mortar factory in the police headquarters is followed by an episode of the injury of a nine-year old girl as a result of a mortar round; and the injury of Palestinian policemen as a result of an Israeli aerial attack is preceded by a story of the injury of members of the Israeli border police in a shooting. In this way, Israeli fears are represented as valid and Israel's violent actions as justified.

The report of the 22nd of March 2004 deals with the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, NYT presents the story very briefly through Israeli army statements. It focuses on the Palestinian reactions to the killing and the Israeli justifications for undertaking it; moreover, it presents a lot of background information related to Hamas, Sheikh Yassin and Israeli views of both. The report foregrounds angry Palestinian reactions to the killing, rather than the killing itself which is presented briefly through the statements of the Israeli army which are contested by Palestinians, i.e. (*the army said it had targeted a car carrying Sheik Yassin*). At the time of the attack Yassin was in his wheelchair which was smashed in the attack, yet the army refers to it euphemistically as 'a car', and NYT adopts the same expression although it is inaccurate.

The consequences of the attack are presented as (*Israeli weapons punctured the pavement*), which indicates the force of the explosion, but which also presents Israeli violence as targeting and affecting inanimate objects. NYT describes Sheikh Yassin as '*quadriplegic*' which is a technical term that does not invoke the sympathy gained by the more common term 'disabled' which is avoided completely by NYT although Yassin

was in fact paralyzed and was unable to move his hands or legs. The report is vague about the number of victims. It mentions two bodyguards only although seven people were killed and fifteen were injured. The most prominent consequences of the assassination in NYT report are angry Palestinian reactions, demonstrations and vows of revenge.

In terms of the narrative structure of the main episode of the report, there are no human characters involved in the main story. The main and only character is Sheikh Yassin who was killed by an Israeli missile. The story is summarised in one sentence that uses passivisation with an inanimate agent (*was killed ... by an Israeli missile*). This choice contributes to the de-narrativisation of the story which is presented as a finished process, and the focus of the report is on the Palestinian reactions to the killing.

The report of the 7th of July 2006 deals with an Israeli raid against Gaza. The NYT report presents the story in details, yet it does not present it coherently. It concentrates on mutual violence between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants and gives details of the movements and activities of the Israeli forces in Gaza during the incursion, their purpose and impacts, in addition to the activities of Palestinian militants and their consequences. Israeli violence is mainly represented as movement of forces; furthermore, most of the episodes of Israeli violence are de-narrativised by means of representing them as abstract nominals e.g. *'death'*, or as spontaneous actions that do not require agency e.g. *'fighting erupted.'* Besides, the agents of violent acts are often either deleted or replaced by inanimate agents e.g. *'an Israeli airstrike killed'* Therefore, it becomes harder to reconstruct the story. Israeli violence is represented as justified and purposeful, even when it is directed against children, e.g. (*Israeli soldiers fired near groups of children in what appeared to be an effort to get them to scatter*). Episodes of Israeli violence are not presented chronologically or coherently; instead, they are separated by details of Palestinian violence, justifications, contextual details, etc. This is a common feature in news narrative which does not have to be told chronologically.

The report also includes episodes of Palestinian violence which are presented with details, specific actions and clear agents, e.g. *'Palestinians were seen planting*

explosives in manholes, 'one masked fighter rode away on a bicycle after laying such a charge'. The Palestinians are represented as doing most of the fighting and using weapons. Their actions are represented as targeting Israelis with clear agency; furthermore, Palestinian violence is never represented as justified although it can be seen as resisting the Israeli occupation to the Palestinian territories or protecting their people against the atrocities of a military operation in their towns. Details of Israeli violence occupy almost the same length as Palestinian violence although Israeli violence resulted in twenty-folds the number of victims, not to mention other forms of suffering and damage. The only Israeli victim is mentioned twice, and the agent is criminalised and represented as a '*sniper*'.

In conclusion, NYT presents Israeli violence against the Palestinians in certain ways that mitigate responsibility for it and downplay its consequences. Moreover, it de-narrativises the stories of violence and fragments them by presenting them with no coherence or chronological order. Israeli violence is always presented as justified and purposeful, and it is often presented as a reaction to Palestinian violence. In most of the cases, the Israelis and the Palestinians are presented as being involved in mutual violence against each other.

Another element to consider is the use of sources and quotations. In the three reports, NYT uses Israeli sources as primary definers of the situation and presents Palestinians' quotations against those of the Israelis. In the first report, the paper's comments cast doubts on Palestinian statements as unconvincing (*despite a lack of conclusive evidence*), untrustworthy (*on closer inspection, neither version held water, prompting still further speculation*), contradictory (*no, others said...*). These comments by NYT discredit Palestinian sources and their statements. At the same time, Israeli statements are evaluated positively, e.g. (*Israel's explanation was simpler*). Besides, Israeli sources are institutionalised, and they are identified by name and institutional capacity, e.g. (*Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, the deputy defense minister*), unlike Palestinian sources that remain unnamed. As a result, Israeli arguments are presented as more convincing and trustworthy than the Palestinians' statements in NYT.

When reporting the killing of Sheikh Yassin, the story is presented as quoted from unnamed Palestinian sources. Some consequences are also quoted from Palestinians such as an eye-witness who says that he could not recognise the sheikh's body and hospital officials who say that his body was smashed in the attack. NYT quotes two Hamas members promising revenge for Yassin's death, and the Palestinian Prime Minister condemning the assassination and describing it as a "*crazy and very dangerous act*". Yassin is also quoted by NYT in his response to Israeli threats of assassination saying: "*we do not fear death threats. We are seekers of martyrdom.*" NYT quotes many more Israelis, e.g. it quotes details of the attack from Israeli military and its accusations to Yassin of being connected to terrorism. NYT also quotes an Israeli minister threatening to eliminate Yassin. The report also includes Netanyahu's comments on Sharon's plans to withdraw from Gaza.

In the report of the 7th of July 2006, NYT quotes officials on both sides. Israeli sources include the Israeli Prime Minister and the Minister of Defence. Their statements explain the purpose of the Israeli incursion in Gaza. Palestinian personalities quoted include the Interior Minister and the Prime Minister. Quotations of the Palestinians are general and somewhat vague, e.g. "*called on all Palestinian security and military services to participate in the moral, national and religious duty to defend our people*". This statement mentions Palestinian military services that do not exist, as the Palestinians have no army or military services; moreover, it is not clear from the statement what the moral, national and religious duty to defend our people entails or how to defend them. In sum, NYT always uses Israeli sources as definers of the situation. It adopts their definitions and statements and presents them positively as institutional and trustworthy. On the other hand, Palestinian quotations are often vague and too general. They are sometimes challenged and undermined by the newspaper. Palestinian sources are sometimes presented as unnamed and void of institutional capacity. Sometimes Palestinian sources are used to justify Israeli violence, e.g. when militants are quoted threatening violence against Israel.

In terms of contextual details, NYT often chooses contextual and background details that justify Israeli violence, e.g. the report of July 2001 focuses on the mutual

violence between both sides, yet it presents violence as initiated by Palestinians with no provocation (*Palestinians showered stones on Jews praying*). It also refers to the declared ceasefire that degenerated into ceaseless fire and to previous denials of assassinations by Israel. In the report of March 2004, NYT provides information about Hamas which delegitimises the group and justifies the assassination of its leader, e.g. that it is officially committed to the destruction of Israel and that it runs low-cost schools and clinics to broaden its ideological reach. The Israeli views of Hamas as the most organised militant group are also presented. The report mentions the establishment of Hams in 1987 and the imprisonment of Yassin in Israel for three years and his release after plunged assassinations in Amman. It also includes information about two suicide bombings claimed by Hamas and another group, and an Israeli raid on Gaza, as well as the unilateral withdrawal plan of Sharon. Contextual details in the report show an old and deep animosity between Israel and Hamas, and present Hamas as committed to the destruction of Israel and as undertaking suicide bombings against it. These contextual details present Yassin and Hamas in a negative light.

To contextualise the report of July 2006, NYT refers to Israel’s entrance into Gaza the week before, the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a year earlier, the start of the Palestinian uprising, the capture of Cpl. Shalit, and rocket fire at Israel. All Palestinian actions used for contextualisation are negative to justify the Israeli incursion while the Israeli actions are both positive and negative. However, negative Israeli actions are neutralised by their presentation in less negative terms, e.g. as ‘re-entering’ Gaza, rather than occupying it. To conclude, the choice of contextual details in NYT often justifies Israeli violence against the Palestinians.

5.1.2 Narrative and the representation of Palestinian violence

	1 st August 2002	15 th January 2004	26 th June 2006
Headline	AT LEAST 7 KILLED AS MILITANTS BOMB JERUSALEM CAMPUS	Gaza Mother, 22, Kills Four Israelis in Suicide Bombing	MILITANTS' RAID ON ISRAEL RAISES TENSION IN GAZA
Lead	A powerful bomb hidden in a bag and left on a table by Palestinian militants tore apart a bustling cafeteria during lunch at Hebrew University here today, killing seven people,	A young Palestinian mother, feigning a limp and requesting medical help, blew herself up Wednesday at the entrance to a security inspection center for Palestinian workers, killing	In an ominous development, Israel threatened strong military action on Sunday after eight Palestinian militants in Gaza, including members of the governing faction Hamas, emerged

	including at least three Americans, and wounding more than 80.	four Israeli security personnel and wounding seven people, the Israeli military said.	from a secret tunnel dug 300 yards into Israel, killed two soldiers, wounded three and kidnapped another.
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In reports that deal mainly with Palestinian violence, NYT headlines present Palestinian responsibility clearly and highlight the consequences of violence. The headline of the report of the 1st of August 2002 foregrounds the consequences of the attack, i.e. the killing of at least seven. It clearly presents militants' responsibility for the killing using the transactive model; moreover, the use of capitalisation makes the headline even more prominent. The headline of the report of the 15th of January 2004 highlights the identity of the bomber and her actions. It identifies the bomber in terms of family relations, age and origin, as it is unexpected for a young mother to undertake such action as a suicide bombing. Consequences of the attack are clear in the headline using the transactive model.

The headline of the report of the 26th of June 2006 underlines the involvement of Palestinian militants in the raid and underlines its political consequences as raising tension in Gaza. It uses activation and the present tense which present the event as vivid and relevant. Capitalisation is also used to make the headline more prominent. NYT headlines about Palestinian violence show responsibility and causal relationships clearly; therefore, readers can confidently make judgements about Palestinian actions; moreover, presenting the consequences of such actions clearly in the headlines proves their seriousness and impacts on Israelis. Two of the three headlines dealing with Palestinian violence in NYT use capitalisation.

The lead of the report of the 1st of August 2002 foregrounds the strength of the bomb and the agency of Palestinian militants, as well as the consequences of the bombing. It uses the transactive model to represent the actions and active participles to represent the consequences. This contributes to presenting the action clearly and vividly. It clearly presents agency and responsibility, as well as details of the bombing and its consequences. The lead of the report of the 15th of January 2004 provides more information about the actions of the bomber (*feigning a limp and requesting medical help*), as well as location of the bombing and its consequences. All details are quoted

from the Israeli military. The lead emphasises the negative actions and the deception of the bomber, and it clearly presents the consequences of the bombing.

The lead of the report of the 26th June 2006 describes the event as (*an ominous development*) which arouses readers' interests and highlights its significance. It presents a summary of the event and its consequences, as it begins with Israeli threats of strong military reaction which are not addressed to any particular side. It presents details of the number of militants, their affiliations, the use of a secret tunnel and the consequences of the raid, i.e. killing, wounding and kidnapping Israeli soldiers. It also presents Israel as involved in one verbal action (*threatened*), while Palestinian militants are involved in four material actions (*emerged, killed, wounded and kidnapped*). The transactive model clearly presents the Palestinians as active agents responsible for violence and its impacts. The use of the lead in NYT reports that deal with Palestinian violence highlights Palestinian responsibility for violence against the Israelis and the consequences of this violence.

The story of the bombing presented in the report of the 1st of August 2002 is presented in a clear, coherent and chronological narrative. All the basic elements of narrative are present in the story, therefore, it is possible for readers to reconstruct the story and understand it. The story includes orientation, characterisation, complication and consequences (*A powerful bomb hidden in a bag and left on a table by Palestinian militants tore apart a bustling cafeteria during lunch at Hebrew University here today, killing seven people, including at least three Americans, and wounding more than 80*). There is no resolution to the story; the report presents an open narrative. The report is dominated by eye-witness statements from the location of the bombing which highlight the consequences of the attack, especially the killing of Israelis and foreigners. The story of the bombing is presented clearly, coherently and chronologically, with a vivid description of the scene of the attack (*through a bedlam of screams and crashing glass, students fled in horror from the cafeteria, in the Frank Sinatra Student Center, some trailing blood onto the concrete courtyard*).

Responsibility for the bombing is clear through quoting Hamas' statement claiming responsibility for the bombing. The report also refers to Israeli violence against the Palestinians, i.e. the Israeli assassination of Hamas leader by bombing his home as the cause of the attack (*Israel's killing last week of a top Hamas leader. Fourteen others, including nine children, died in that attack, in which Israel bombed a house in Gaza City*) and state that nine children were killed in the attack. NYT also mentions the Israeli offensive against the Palestinian territories. It is presented as a justified and purposeful response to Palestinian attacks (*After back-to-back bombings killed 26 people here more than a month ago, Israel began a ground offensive in the West Bank to suppress Palestinian violence*). Although the report presents Israeli violence, the focus is the Palestinian bombing of the university café.

The story of the suicide bombing is also prominent in the report of the 15th of January 2004. Just like the first report, the narrative structure of the story has all the basic elements of a narrative, i.e. orientation (*Wednesday at the entrance to a security inspection center for Palestinian workers*), characterisation (*a young Palestinian mother and soldiers*), and complication (*when the alarm sounded, the soldiers told her to wait while they called an army woman to search her, the military said. Seconds later, Ms. Reyashi detonated her bomb, estimated at about 10 pounds and packed with ball bearings and screws to make it more lethal*). The consequences of the bombing are clear in the report; they include both killing and injury of victims, as well as physical damage to the building. The actions of the bomber are presented in a vivid, coherent and chronological structure. Details include the bomber's claim that she had metal implants to be able to escape a military check and carry out the bombing. NYT uses language in a way that negatively evaluates the actions of the bomber, e.g. (*deceived*) and (*lethal*). The bomber's actions are not given any justification, yet she is quoted in a video recording saying that she had always wanted to be the first woman martyr, and NYT quotes militant groups saying that the bombing is in revenge for Israel's killing of Palestinians.

The consequences of the attack are prominent in the report. They include the killing of four Israelis and injury of seven others including four Palestinians; damage to the building is also mentioned. NYT also highlights the economic and political

consequences of the attack and blames Palestinian violence for ruining the Palestinian economy and for the stalemate of peace negotiations; thus, while the causes of the attack are presented briefly and mainly in terms of bomber's personal wishes, its consequences are prominent in the report and are told in terms of deaths and injuries, physical damage to buildings as well as economic and political impacts. The Israeli response is presented in terms of closing the crossing to Palestinian workers.

The story of the Palestinian raid in the report of the 26th of June 2006 is presented in detail and is described vividly and chronologically, giving the exact details of fighters' actions and their consequences in a coherent story with clear actors, actions and affected participants. It has the basic elements of narrative including, orientation (*near the spot where Gaza, Israel and Egypt meet, about 5:15 a.m.*), characterization (*the eight Palestinian fighters*), and complication (*emerged from the tunnel and split into small teams. One blew up an armored personnel carrier, which was empty, and another threw grenades into an Israeli Merkava tank, killing First Lt. Hanan Barak, 20, from Arad, and Sgt. Pavel Slutzker, 20, from Dimona. Antitank missiles were also fired toward the vehicles from Gaza*). NYT presents the story twice in the reports; it is introduced briefly at the beginning of the report and explicated in more details later. The narrative structure includes all basic elements of narrative and highlights the consequences of the attack. The story is quoted from the Israeli military. The report includes many details, e.g. preparations for the attack and the tunnel, and it identifies Israeli victims by name, rank, age and place of origin. The causes of the attack are presented through quoting Palestinian officials and militants. The causes of the attack fall short of legitimising or even justifying it, as they do not refer to any moral values, as they are presented in terms of revenge.

The consequences of the attack are prominent, especially the deaths, injuries and kidnap of Israeli soldiers. They include actual, potential and political consequences, e.g. the killing, injury and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, the deaths of Palestinian fighters, and the closure of crossings (actual); the Israeli warnings or threats of response (potential); as well as the embarrassment of Mr Abbas and failure of inter-Palestinian talks (political). The report presents the Israeli response mainly in terms of planned rather than actual military action. However, the report mentions Israeli tanks moving a

short distance into Gaza without explaining their activities or their outcomes. The purpose of the movement is present clearly (*to search and to investigate the tunnel.*) In conclusion, the details of the activities of Palestinian militants are presented in a coherent chronological narrative with agents, actions and consequences. Israeli reactions are presented as potential which leaves the narrative structure open. Readers do not know what the resolution of the narrative is, but expect more of the story to unfold later.

NYT consistently quotes sources on both sides, however Israeli sources are often used more than Palestinian sources, and they are always used as the primary definers of the situation. Quotations are very prominent in the report of the 1st of August 2002 which quotes American, Israeli and Palestinian sources, e.g. it quotes President Bush condemning the attack and other Americans commenting on the number and identities of the American victims of the attack. The Israeli side is quoted extensively, as the report is dominated by quoting eye-witnesses and victims of the attack. They act as the primary definers of the situation, alongside the Israeli military from which the story is quoted. The victims are of different nationalities, and they describe events of the attack and their reaction to it.

There is a vivid description of the victims, including their physical appearance and psychological state, which emphasises the severity of the attack and its consequences. These quotations delegitimise the attack and present it as unjustified and criminal, e.g. *"I know there are justifications -- bad justifications ... It's killing college students. That's no political solution for anything. It's killing college kids", "I saw dead people. I saw people with no heads. There was a guy, I gave him mouth to mouth, but he was dead.", "I saw blood and shoes and I.V.'s on the ground"*, etc. Quotations from hospital officials contribute to the same presentation, e.g. *"victims suffered "penetrating injuries, with lots of metal elements, such as bolts and screws and nails, all over their bodies"*.

The report quotes Hamas claiming responsibility for the attack. The cause of the attack is presented through Hamas statement (*it was in retaliation for the Gaza raid that killed its military leader, Salah Shehade, and nine Palestinian children.*) Quoting the causes from Hamas, which is regarded as a militant and even a terrorist organisation by

the West, makes it less credible and convincing. Israeli officials are quoted rejecting Hamas' justifications for the attack and claiming that it is a "*continuous effort by the Palestinians to kill as many Israelis as possible in order to sabotage the peace process*". These statements serve to gain sympathy for the victims and criminalise the Palestinian attack.

The report on the bombing of the 15th of January 2004 quotes sources from both sides. The story of the bombing is quoted from Israeli military sources, and they are the main definers of situation. It quotes an official in the Israeli Prime Minister's office saying that Palestinian terrorists strike Israel and destroy their own economy. The Palestinians are also quoted by the paper, e.g. they both quote the bomber talking about her actions in a video message. NYT presents a longer quotations, and quotes her saying "*it was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists and to knock on the doors of heaven with the skulls of Zionists,*" and also saying that her wish to be a martyr is stronger than her love for her children, which shows strong hatred for Israelis and very strong ideological attitudes against them. The paper also quotes Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who comments on the use of a female bomber for the first time by Hamas. NYT comments on his statement that he cites purely tactical reasons. Relatives of the bomber are also quoted expressing shock and disbelief.

The report of the 26th of June 2006 quotes members of both sides, e.g. Hamas government officials denying involvement in the attack and calling on the captors to treat the Israeli soldier well and keep him alive. It also quotes president Abbas' condemnation of the attack. A Palestinian militant is quoted stating that the attack came to avenge the assassination of a militant group leader by Israel. NYT presents the cause of the attack through quoting a Palestinian official from Fatah who states that it was ordered by Hamas leadership abroad, and a Palestinian official from Hamas describing the attack as a natural response to Israeli crimes against the Palestinians. NYT presents this statement along with the Israeli interpretation as evidence of Hamas welcoming the attack, rather than being an explanation of its causes. This undermines the validity of the statement and presents it as evidence to discredit Hamas rather than a justification.

From the Israeli side, the paper quotes details of the attack from Israeli army

sources. Many Israeli officials are quoted, e.g. the Israeli Prime Minister holding the Palestinian Authority responsible for the attack “*with all that implies*”, the Israeli Foreign Minister calling members of the international community to urge Abbas to remain in Gaza until the situation is resolved, the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry casting doubts on the legitimacy of Hamas and the effectiveness of the Palestinian Authority. Not only does NYT quote Israeli officials, it endorses their views. For instance, it first presents the Israeli interpretation of Hamas’ statement twice that the attack is a natural response to Israeli crimes against the Palestinians. The first time it is presented with the Israeli interpretations of Hamas’ statement as welcoming the raid “*But Israeli officials noted that Hamas, if not officially claiming responsibility for the raid, seemed to welcome it*”, and the second time, the paper presents a similar statement by Hamas with its interpretation as welcoming the attack “*But another Hamas spokesman...welcomed the attack.*” Although the Israeli and Palestinian perspectives are present in the report, NYT endorses the Israeli perspective and uses Israeli sources as primary definers of the situation while casting doubts on the legitimacy of the Hamas government and stressing Hamas involvement in the attack.

In the report of the 1st of August 2002, contextual details in NYT present information about previous Palestinian attacks that killed twenty-six Israelis and the Israeli response to them. There is information about the mixed student body and workers at the Hebrew University. NYT comments on Hamas by saying that “*Hamas leaders consider all of Israel to be occupied territory, not just the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which Israel occupied in 1967*”, and quotes an Israeli professor who confirms the same statement. Contextual details presented in NYT show the Palestinian attack as a continuation of previous attacks and also present this as part of the ideology of Hamas.

The contextualising details in the report of the 15th of January 2004 present details about the bomber’s family background and her children. The paper mentions details about the crossing and the Palestinian workers who use it daily. It also mentions the story of a previous suicide bombing and its consequences and the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank since 1967. The bomber’s background is relevant because it is unexpected, and details relating to previous bombings and to the crossing where the bombing took place emphasise the impacts of the bombing and present it as a

continuation of Palestinian attacks against Israelis.

Considering contextualisation in the report of the 26th of June 2006, NYT refers to Palestinian talks between Hamas leaders and Abbas at the time of the attack. It tells the story of the last Israeli soldier who was captured by the Palestinians in 1994 and refers to Palestinian rocket attacks against Israel and the Israeli response which resulted in the death of Palestinian civilians and the end of the truce with Hamas. It refers to the killing of Palestinian civilians, however it is presented in terms of an unintentional error (*some have gone wrong, leading to the deaths of at least 14 Palestinian civilian*). It also mentions a wanted militant group leader who became a commander in Hamas. Although the NYT contextual details are relevant to the event, there is essential context that is absent from the report, especially in relation to the Israeli control over all aspects of Palestinians' lives and the role of military posts, like the one attacked, in the enforcement of this control. The lack of this context leads to regarding Palestinians' actions in terms of violence and militancy rather than in terms of resistance.

In conclusion, there are very obvious differences between the way Israeli and Palestinian violent acts are presented in NYT. Firstly, headlines dealing with Israeli violence are too general and vague with no clear agency while headlines dealing with Palestinian violence present Palestinian agency of violence and its consequences clearly. Capitalisation is sometimes used in headlines dealing with Palestinian violence but not with Israeli violence. The lead paragraphs are similar to the headlines but present more details. Secondly, the narrative structure of stories of Israeli violence often de-narrativise them, so that the story is presented as unconnected events that are separated by other details, and the basic elements of narrative are often missing from reports. Stories dealing with Palestinian violence, on the other hand, have all the basic elements of narrative structure including orientation, characterisation, and complication; however, the resolution is often missing and a form of open narrative is presented. Palestinian violence is presented in NYT in coherent and chronological narrative with clear causality and consequences. Moreover, Israeli violence is often presented as justified and purposeful unlike Palestinian violence which is rarely given justification. Causes of Palestinian violence are often quoted from Palestinian militants who are illegitimate and untrustworthy.

Thirdly, NYT uses Israeli sources and their quotations are the primary definers of the situation. They are often identified by name and institutional capacity, unlike Palestinian sources that are often presented without identification or institutional efficacy. Stories of violence are often quoted from Israeli military sources. NYT often casts doubt on Palestinian statements and endorses Israeli statements. Contextual details chosen often refer back to previous Palestinian violence which serves to show Palestinian violence as continuous and which also serves to justify Israeli violence.

5.2 Narrative Analysis of the *Arab News* Reports

5.2.1 Narrative and the representation of Israeli violence

	31 st July 2001	22 nd March 2004	7 th July 2006
Headline	Israeli gunships pound Gaza	Murder	Israeli Missiles and Shells Kill 21
Lead	Violence in the Middle East threatened to spiral out of control yesterday after six Palestinians were killed in a West Bank blast and Israeli combat helicopters pounded Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza City.	Israel assassinated Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin yesterday, provoking global condemnation and cries of revenge from Palestinian resistance	Israeli tanks moved deeper into Gaza Strip and its forces killed at least 21 Palestinians yesterday in the bloodiest day since the Jewish state invaded Gaza on June 28 over a soldier's capture. During yesterday's operation, one Israeli soldier was also killed and five were injured

The headlines of reports dealing mainly with Israeli violence in AN present Israeli responsibility clearly and sometimes criminalises Israeli actions. The headline of the report of the 31st of July 2001 highlights the Israeli raid against Gaza and represents Israel as actively involved in violence against the Palestinians. Agency and responsibility are represented clearly through the use of the transactive model. The headline foregrounds Israeli weapons used in the attack. There is an exaggeration in the headline, for the Israeli attack is represented as targeting Gaza as a whole not the Palestinian police headquarters only. The headline of the report of the 22nd of March 2004 criminalises the Israeli action by labelling it '*murder*'. It is a nominalisation that is brief and vague, as it does not include agents or time frame for the action. This may be a way of attracting readers to read more to know more details about the crime.

The headline of the report of the 7th of July 2006 foregrounds the Israeli weapons

used against the Palestinians and clearly presents the impacts of using them as killing twenty-one Palestinians. The transactive model clearly establishes causal relationship between the Israeli weapons and the Palestinian deaths. In sum, in reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence, AN focuses on Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians and criminalises it. The interpretative frameworks set in these headlines point to Israeli involvement and responsibility for violence against the Palestinians. Israel is presented as the perpetrator of violence and the Palestinians are presented as the victims.

The lead paragraph presents the core of the story and indicates how it will be developed in the rest of the report. In line with the headlines, the lead paragraphs of AN present Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians clearly. The lead paragraph of the report of the 31st of July 2001 emphasises the threats of spiraling violence and represents them as the result of the killing of six Palestinians and the Israeli raid against the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza. It highlights Israeli violence against the Palestinians and indirectly blames Israel for the escalation. The lead paragraph of the report of the 22nd of March 2004 summarises the story using the transactive model which clearly establishes causal relationships and Israeli responsibility. The choice of the verb '*Assassinated*' denotes that the Israeli action is politically motivated, intentional and criminal. The consequences of the attack are presented using the active participle in terms of international condemnations and cries of revenge from Palestinian resistance. The word '*resistance*' acknowledges the Palestinians' right to resist Israeli occupation.

The lead of the report of the 7th of July 2006 summarises and foregrounds the Israeli advancement in Gaza and the killing of twenty-one Palestinians. It uses activation with the Israeli movement and the transactive model with the killing, and it contextualises the events by reference to the beginning of the Israeli incursion and delegitimises it as '*since the Jewish state invaded Gaza*'. The use of the transactive model underpins Israeli agency and responsibility. Israel is labeled '*the Jewish state*' which foregrounds its ideology. The cause of the Israeli operation is presented as '*over a soldier's capture*' which implies that this is a pretext. Israeli victims are presented in an agentless passive construction. The lead paragraphs in AN are used to summarise the

main story in the reports, and they emphasise Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians who, in turn, are represented as victims.

In AN reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence, the main episode highlights Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians. At the same time, they downplay Palestinian violence and its impacts on the Israelis. Reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence contain very little or no Palestinian violence at all. In the report of the 31st of July 2001, Israeli violence and its consequences are prominent, especially the injury of four Palestinian policemen in an Israeli aerial attack. The impacts of the attack are prominent in the report both in terms of the injury of policemen and damage to the building. The cause of the attack is presented through quoting the Israeli army. The report also mentions the killing of six Palestinians in the West Bank, yet it does not blame Israel directly for it. Israeli responsibility is expressed indirectly through quoting Palestinians blaming Israeli tank shells for it.

The report also mentions the provocative actions of Jewish ultra-nationalists that resulted in clashes and the injury of eighteen Palestinians, however it does not mention any incidents of Palestinian violence against the Israelis. It represents the clashes as being provoked by Jewish ultra-nationalists who held a symbolic ceremony to lay the cornerstone for a Jewish Temple in Haram Al-Sharif (*the latest escalation in violence came after a tiny group of Jewish ultra-nationalists held a brief but symbolic ceremony Sunday near the Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem's Old City to mark the laying of a cornerstone for a new temple on the site*).

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, the report provides a detailed description of the Israeli operation and its consequences, as well as the scene of the attack. It focuses on international condemnations of the assassination. The story of the killing is prominent in AN, and it is foregrounded in the report. Israeli responsibility is clearly indicated and the involvement of the Israeli Prime Minister is emphasised. The story is presented with vivid narrative description of an eye witness who was present at the time of the attack. It includes the explosion of three missiles one after the other, and the consequences of the attack (*Yassin's head was cut in two by the blast and part of his brain had fallen out*). It also mentions his wheelchair that lay broken in a pool of blood and the efforts of the

witness and the nurse to collect body parts of the Sheikh to take them to hospital. The report also refers to the number of victims as seven killed and fifteen injured including two of Yassin's sons. Other consequences are mentioned in the report, e.g. demonstrations in the streets of Gaza and the killing of four Palestinians including an eleven-year-old at the hands of the Israeli forces. AN presents the story of the assassination of Sheikh Yassin clearly with a vivid description of the Israeli actions and their consequences.

The report of the 7th of July 2006 presents the Israeli incursion by describing Israeli actions and by quoting Palestinian civilians in Gaza. It foregrounds the UN Human Rights Committee condemnation of (*rights violations by Israel*) and the demands to (*a halt to Israel's "extensive military operations" against Palestinians*). The story of the incursion is presented in one coherent section. It includes vivid description of the actions of the Israeli attacks against the Palestinians using the transactive model, e.g. (*Israeli aircraft targeted Palestinians with missile strikes...*). Causes of the Israeli operation are given as a response to capturing an Israeli soldier and firing two upgraded rockets at Israel, and the consequences of the attack are very prominent in the report. In addition, the suffering of Palestinian civilians is presented through the story of a Palestinian family fleeing their home due to the Israeli offensive. This shows some aspects of the humanitarian situation of Palestinian civilians under the Israeli attack.

Considering the use of sources and quotations, AN uses Palestinian sources as the primary definers of the situation, and it adopts their perspective. The report of the 31st of July 2001 is dominated by quoting Palestinian sources, e.g. *Arafat's aid* and the *Palestinian Authority*. They comment on incidents of violence, blame Israel for them and promise revenge. AN quotes Palestinians four times compared with two Israeli quotations. Palestinian sources comment on events while Israeli quotations are presented against those of the Palestinians. Moreover, Palestinian sources are identified by name and institutional capacity, e.g. (*Arafat's top aide Nabil Abu Rudeina*), unlike the two Israeli quotations which are attributed to the Israeli army and unnamed political sources. In the reports of the 22nd of March 2004, AN quotes two Palestinians; an eye-witness and a top Hamas official. The eye-witness describes a horrible scene of the attack and

the Israeli missile strikes, and Abdel Aziza Al-Rantissi pays tribute to Yassin and vows retaliation for his death. The report also quotes Sharon announcing the assassination of Yassin.

In the report of the 7th of July 2006, AN quotes both Israeli the Palestinian official and unofficial sources. The official Palestinian perspective is represented by quoting the Palestinian Prime Minister who describes the assault as a ‘*collective punishment*’ and demands ‘*international intervention*’ which underlines Palestinians’ vulnerability. The unofficial Palestinian reaction comes from a Palestinian who had to flee his home with his family in fear of the dangers of the Israeli operation. The Israeli official viewpoint is represented by the statement of the Israeli Defence Minister who threatens to operate in Gaza in any way that the Israelis like and who shows both confidence and caution in dealing with the situation. The unofficial reaction comes from the father of the captured soldier who blames the Israeli government for not negotiating for the release of his son. Although AN often quotes both sides, Palestinian sources are used more than Israeli sources and the newspaper takes them as primary definers of the situation.

In terms of contextual details, in the report of 31st of July 2001 AN refers to violence in the preceding weekend and presents it as provoked by Jewish ultra-nationalists. It also refers to the number of casualties on both sides since the beginning of the US-sponsored ceasefire, i.e. forty-four Palestinians and seventeen Israelis. Disagreement between both sides about the formation of a truce monitoring force is also mentioned, as Palestinians insist on an international force while Israel demands an American-only force. In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, AN hardly provides any contextualisation for the story. It refers to the international condemnation of the attack with specific reference to the UK, France and the EU. Most contextualising details in the report of the 7th of July 2006 relate to Israeli violence, e.g. the invasion of Gaza, killing sixteen Palestinians in 2004, holding 9,000 Palestinians prisoners, withdrawing from Gaza in 2005 after thirty-eight years of occupation. The report also mentions Palestinian rockets fired at Israel and the capture of the Israeli soldier.

5.2.2 Narrative and the representation of Palestinian violence

	1 st August 2002	15 th January 2004	26 th June 2006
Headline	Jerusalem bomb kills seven	Mother-of-Two Bomber Kills Four Israelis	2 Israeli Troops Killed in Attack by Palestinians
Lead	A bomb ripped through a busy university cafeteria in Jerusalem yesterday, killing seven people, five of them foreigners. Some 70 people were injured. At least one of the dead was an American woman, while another victim was a Frenchman	A Palestinian mother of two blew herself up yesterday at the Erez Crossing at the Israel-Gaza border, killing three Israeli soldiers and a private security guard and signaling a new tactic by Hamas, who had never before dispatched a woman suicide bomber.	A daring pre-dawn Palestinian attack on an Israeli Army post bordering the southern Gaza Strip yesterday left two Israeli soldiers and two Palestinians dead and one Israeli soldier was abducted, the Israeli Army and Palestinian officials said.

In AN, the headlines of reports that deal mainly with Palestinian violence try, where possible, to mitigate Palestinian responsibility for violence against the Israelis. The headline of the 1st of August 2002 is vague and does not refer to any side in particular, so readers do not know on which side is the victim or the perpetrator. This is the result of the metonymical substitution of the agent with ‘*Jerusalem bomb*’ and the presentation of victims as a numeral ‘*seven*’. The headline of the 15th of January 2004 foregrounds the family status of the bomber – a mother of two – as being the most counter-expected detail; it also highlights the consequences of her actions using the transactive model. The headline of the 26th of June 2006 foregrounds the killing of two Israelis in an attack by Palestinians. It uses passivisation to represent the event with the effect of presenting it as a finished process, i.e. more like a state. The circumstantial ‘*in attack by Palestinians*’, loosely relates the Palestinian attack to the killing of the two Israelis. In sum, AN headlines of reports that deal mainly with Palestinian violence try, where possible, to mitigate responsibility.

In line with the headlines, the lead of the report of the 1st of August 2002 conceals agency and presents the actions with few detail, however it presents its consequences clearly. The lead of the report of the 15th of January 2004 presents details about the bombing and summarises the story; it presents details about the location of the bombing and the identities of the victims, as well as contextual details about Hamas that has never before dispatched a woman suicide bomber.

The lead of the report of the 26th of June 2006 describes the Palestinian operation as an ‘*attack*’, and presents its consequences as the death of two Israeli soldiers and the

abduction of one, in addition to the death of two Palestinians. It naturalises these consequences by the use of the expression ‘*left dead*’ which obfuscates agency and responsibility. The lead mentions the Israelis and the Palestinians who died together as victims of the attack. The capture of the Israeli soldier is described as ‘*abduction*’ in an agentless passive construction, and the location is described as on the border-line between Israel and the Palestinian territories rather than inside Israel.

As for the main episode of the reports that deal with Palestinian violence, AN tends to highlight the causes of Palestinian violence and to present it as justified. However, it often presents details of Palestinian violence as quoted from Israeli sources. The report of the 1st of August 2002 deals with both Israeli and Palestinian violence. The story of the bombing at the Café is presented briefly in one sentence only without clear agency (*a bomb ripped through a busy university cafeteria in Jerusalem yesterday*). The scene of the attack and its impacts are described (*the blast sent people fleeing in panic. Victims staggered out of the cafeteria*). Responsibility for the bombing is clear through quoting Hamas’ statement claiming responsibility for the bombing; moreover, the cause of the attack is also presented through a Hamas statement (*it was in retaliation for the Gaza raid that killed its military leader, Salah Shehade, and nine Palestinian children.*) The consequences of the Palestinian bombing are prominent in the report (*killing seven people, five of them foreigners*).

The report refers to Israeli violence against the Palestinians, e.g. the assassination of a Hamas leader by bombing his home as the cause of the attack which is presented as (*the Gaza raid that killed its military leader, Salah Shehade, and nine Palestinian children*). The report also refers to the Israeli policy of deporting relatives of those involved in suicide attacks. The paper presents both sides as being involved in violence against each other. Although the focus of the report is on the Palestinian bombing of the university café, Israeli violence is presented in more detail and occupies longer sections of the report.

The story of the suicide bombing is also prominent in the report of the 15th of January 2004. The story is quoted from Israeli army sources, and the narrative structure of the story has all the basic elements of a narrative, i.e. orientation (*at the Erez Crossing*

yesterday morning), characterization (*a woman identified as Reem Raiyshi, soldiers and Palestinians*), and complication (*she was taken for a security search to a special room, where she set off the bomb*). The story does not have a resolution though, therefore it presents an open narrative. The actions of the bomber are presented in a vivid, coherent and chronological narrative. The consequences of the bombing are clear in the report; they include the killing of four Israelis and injury of seven others including four Palestinians, as well as damage to the building. The bomber's actions are not given any justification, yet she is quoted in a video recording saying that she had always wanted to be the first woman martyr. Although the report deals mainly with Palestinian violence, Israeli violence is also prominent. The report refers to the death of a British man who was shot by Israeli troops. This story is presented in details with background information about the victim, his shooting and charges against the Israeli soldier who shot him.

The story of the Palestinian raid in the report of the 26th of June 2006 is presented in detail and is described vividly and chronologically, giving the exact details of fighters' actions and their consequences in a coherent story with clear actors, actions and affected participants. The story is quoted from the Israeli military, and the narrative structure includes all basic elements of narrative, e.g. orientation (*pre-dawn Palestinian attack on an Israeli Army post bordering the southern Gaza Strip yesterday*), characterization (*fighters from within the Gaza Strip, an eight-man attack team and soldiers*) and complication (*the attacking force split into three teams. One tried — and failed — to attack an armored personnel carrier in the area, one charged the post, firing at the soldiers, and one attacked a tank with grenades killing the two soldiers and wounding two others*). The consequences of the attack are prominent in the report, especially the deaths, injuries and kidnap of Israeli soldiers. The causes of the attack are presented through quoting Palestinian officials and militants. The causes of the attack fall short of legitimising or even justifying it, as they do not refer to any moral values; instead, they are presented in general terms as a response to Israeli crimes and as being ordered by Hamas leadership abroad.

The AN report foregrounds the Israeli incursion in Gaza in response to the Palestinian attack. It is presented as being undertaken by the Israeli army and as involving movements of troops and tanks in Gaza. It is presented vividly through

quoting a Palestinian civilian who witnessed the attack. The report also mentions the Israeli closure of the crossing in response to the attack. There is also mention of potential Israeli military response through quoting an Israeli army source.

AN generally quotes more Palestinian than Israeli sources, and it uses them as primary definers of the situation. In the report of the 1st of August 2001, AN quotes Palestinian sources four times, including Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Hamas is quoted claiming responsibility for the attack and stating that it came in response to the killing of one of its leaders and nine children. AN also quotes Sheikh Yassin confirming Hamas statement by saying “*when Israel bombs a civilian building full of women and children and kills 15 people, this is the response they should expect*”. The Palestinian Authority condemns the attack and blames the Israeli Prime Minister for it. The Israeli side is quoted twice in the same report. An Israeli source is quoted commenting on the deportation of a Palestinian from the West Bank. An Israeli spokesman is also quoted accusing Arafat of provoking violence to avoid reforming his administration.

In the report of the 15th of January 2004, AN quotes more Palestinian sources than Israelis. The story of the bombing is quoted from the Israeli military spokeswoman. Two other Israeli sources are used; one commenting on the closure of the crossing and the other on the potential Israeli response to the bombing. The three Israeli sources are identified by name and institutional capacity. Palestinian sources are used extensively in the report, including the bomber, Hamas sources, ordinary people and Palestinian officials. Sheikh Yassin is quoted commenting on the use of a woman as suicide bomber. He tries to justify it and calls it ‘resistance’. The bomber is quoted saying she wanted to be the first woman martyr. Ordinary Palestinians are also quoted; an eye witness describes the scene of the attack, and a relative of the bomber condemns her actions. The Palestinian Prime Minister is quoted saying that escalation is the result of Israel’s attacks and restrictions on the Palestinians.

The story of the Palestinian raid on the 26th of June 2006 is quoted from Israeli military sources. The Israeli army radio is also quoted commenting on the condition of the abducted soldier. Palestinian sources are used extensively, including Hamas and the Palestinian Authority sources. A Hamas spokesman is quoted saying that the assault is

(a natural attack on the Israeli occupation crimes.) The Hamas government is quoted denying involvement in the attack and calling on the captors to treat the Israeli soldier well and keep him alive. A Palestinian official from Fatah states that the attack was ordered by Hamas leadership abroad. President Abbas is quoted condemning the attack and calling on the international community to intervene to prevent Israel from *(taking advantage of the attack by carrying out a large scale offensive against the Gaza Strip.)* A Palestinian farmer who is an eye-witness of the Israeli military incursion in Gaza in response to the Palestinian attack is also quoted in the report.

Contextual details help explain the events. AN does not usually refer to previous Palestinian violence much. In the report of the 1st of August 2002, AN contextualises for the story of the bombing at the Hebrew University café by referring to talks between Sheikh Yassin and Jesse Jackson that were cancelled because of the attack. It also refers to a Palestinian who was deported from the Palestinian territories by Israel for being a relative of a man who was involved in a Palestinian bombing of an Israeli bus. In the report of the 15th of January 2004, on the suicide bombing, AN presents details about the bomber's family background and her children; it also describes her appearance in the video recording she left. AN also mentions information about the crossing and Palestinian workers using it, as well as the industrial area where they work which includes businesses with joint Israeli and Palestinian ownership. Moreover, AN tells the story of a British man who was killed after being shot by an Israeli soldier months earlier. Contextual details presented in AN do not focus on previous Palestinian violence. They are mainly concerned with the immediate context of the events and lack historical background that can help readers make sense of the situation.

5.3 Narrative Analysis of the *Guardian's* Reports

5.3.1 Narrative and the representation of Israeli violence

	31 st July 2001	22 nd March 2004	7 th July 2006
Headline	Blast kills six Fatah men on Israel's hitlist	Israel assassinates Hamas leader Yassin killed in missile strike Mass protests by Palestinians Militants vow revenge attacks	18 die in worst fighting since withdrawal last year
Lead	A powerful explosion killed six Palestinian activists in the West Bank, and Israeli helicopter gunships rocketed the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza City yesterday, punctuating a day of sharply escalating tensions.	Palestinian militants today warned of swift and bloody retaliation against Israel after it "opened the gates of hell" by assassinating Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of militant group Hamas.	At least 17 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier were killed yesterday in the most serious violence since Israel withdrew its forces from the Gaza Strip last year.

In this section, various elements of the narrative structure of the *Guardian's* reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence are examined beginning by headlines. In reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence, the *Guardian* tends to express Israeli responsibility for violence more clearly when responsibility has been confirmed or when it cannot be denied, e.g. the report of the 22nd of March 2004 which deals mainly with the assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, (*Israel assassinates Hamas leader*) This headline presents a summary of the story using the transactive model with clear agency and causal relationship. The choice of the verb '*assassinates*' confirms the intentionality and political motivations of the killing. There are three sub-headlines that present further details of the story and some consequences (*Yassin killed in missile strike - Mass protests by Palestinians - Militants vow revenge attacks*).

When Israeli responsibility is not confirmed, the *Guardian* tends to be very careful about expressing it in the headlines, e.g. the headline of the report of the 31st of July 2001 (*Six Blast kills six Fatah men on Israel's hitlist*), which summarises the main episode of the report. Although it uses the transactive model, the use of the inanimate agent '*blast*' completely conceals agency and responsibility. The victims are labelled '*Fatah men on Israel's hitlist*' which presents them as activists targeted by Israel; this delegitimises them but it may also indirectly hint at Israel's involvement. The headline of the report of the 7th of July 2006 (*18 die in worst fighting since withdrawal last year*) is vague. It naturalises the killing as a result of the incursion by the verb '*die*' which is

associated with natural death; moreover, it aggregates victims on both sides together using the figure '18'. This conceals the fact that seventeen of these victims are Palestinians, and only one is Israeli. In terms of setting the interpretative frames, the *Guardian's* headlines attribute responsibility to Israel directly if its involvement in violence has been confirmed. This makes it easier for readers to reconstruct the story and to understand the events.

Considering the lead paragraphs of reports dealing mainly with Israeli violence, they tend to follow the same strategies used in the headlines in terms of expressing responsibility or mitigating it; however, they provide more details than the headline. In the report of the 31st of July 2001, the *Guardian's* lead mentions both the killing of six Palestinians in a powerful explosion and the shelling of the Palestinian police headquarters by Israeli gunships. Both incidents are expressed using inanimate agents. Consequences are presented generally as '*punctuating a day of sharply escalating tensions*'.

The lead of the report of the 22nd of March 2004 highlights one of the consequences of the assassination, i.e. threats of violence by Palestinian militants. It quotes Palestinian militants commenting on Israeli actions as "*opened the gates of hell*". The use of scare quotations distances the paper from the statement. The lead also describes Israeli action as killing and presents agency and responsibility clearly. The lead of the report of the 7th of July 2006 explains that at least seventeen victims are Palestinians and one is Israeli. The quantifier '*at least*' implies the possibility of the existence of more Palestinian victims. Victims are mentioned together in an agentless passive construction. The circumstantial '*in the most serious violence*' is ambiguous, and it presupposes previous serious violence. Contextualisation is achieved by reference to Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The *Guardian's* lead represents violence vaguely without blaming any side for it. To sum up, the lead paragraphs are usually similar to the headlines, especially in terms of expressing agency and responsibility or concealing them.

The main story in the report of the 31st of July 2001 presents several violent incidents between both sides. Israel is represented as firing rockets at the Palestinian

police headquarters. The cause of the action is presented close to the description of the action through an Israeli army quotation (*it had attacked a mortar factory*). The impacts of the attack are presented as (*sending out great clouds of white smoke, and injuring at least three people*). The report also includes incidents of violence against the Israelis although most of it is not directly blamed on Palestinians, e.g. (*a small blast from a booby-trapped beer can ... the stabbing of an Orthodox Jewish man*). The consequences of both actions are presented generally as (*underlined the tense security situation.*) The report also includes failed attempts of Palestinian violence against Israelis, i.e. *a car bomb attack*. The report refers to a lot of Palestinian violence in the background information, although there is not any actual Palestinian violence on the day of reporting.

The killing of six Palestinians is covered in detail. The *Guardian* presents Palestinian accusations against Israel for the killing through quoting officials and Fatah leaders. The Israeli denial and explanation of the deaths as a work accident are also present and are supported by witnesses' statements. The report criminalises the victims by representing them as being on Israel's most-wanted list and as belonging to a shadowy militant cell that carries out gang style killings and attacks inside Israel. Although the details of the victims' militancy are not confirmed and are presented as uncertain, the newspaper seems to adopt them, and there is no sympathy expressed towards them. The report gives a vivid description of the scene of the killing with details that support the Israeli claims, e.g. that the blast came from the inside which dismisses the possibility of an aerial shelling. The structure of the report is more of reporting than of narrative; it includes many incidents that are presented briefly without the proper elements of a narrative structure.

The story of the assassination in the report of the 22nd of March 2004 is presented briefly, yet its consequences are clearly presented as the killing of seven other people and the injury of seventeen. The story is presented in one passive sentence with no human agency (*Yassin was killed in a missile strike by Israeli helicopters*). There is not a clear narrative structure for the story. An eye-witness is quoted describing the scene of the attack with the twisted wheel chair that Yassin used and dead people near him. The cause of the attack is also clearly presented in terms of Israeli blame for Yassin for

(orchestrating a wave of suicide bombings). The report focuses on the reactions of the Palestinians to the assassination, e.g. Palestinian militants firing ten rockets towards settlements in Gaza, thousands of people participating in the funeral procession and the angry calls for revenge against Israel. The report also mentions clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli forces in which Israelis killed four Palestinians including a thirteen-year-old boy when firings at crowds.

The main story of the report of the 7th of July 2006 deals with fighting between Israeli forces and Palestinian militants during the Israeli incursion in Gaza. It is presented through the reporter's description and through quoting both sides. Israeli violence is not presented in a coherent story, as details are separated by quotations, description of militants' actions, etc. Israeli actions in Gaza are described in terms of movement (*pushed to the outskirts of Beit Lahiya*) or as targeting inanimate objects (*Israeli tanks and bulldozers were destroying orchards and crops*) or militants (*it killed 10 militants*). One Palestinian civilian victim is mentioned in some detail; nevertheless, his death is not blamed on any side (*gunfire cut through the walls and hit his nephew in the back*). The purpose of Israeli violence is prominent in the report as (*to prevent rocket fire at Israel and put pressure on the captors of Corporal Gilad Shalit*). Incidents of Israeli violence are justified (*Israel increased its offensive after three Qassam home-made rockets hit central Ashkelon*). Their consequences are presented in terms of the death of at least seventeen Palestinians and one Israeli soldier. The Palestinians who get killed are described as militants or as being killed after firing a rocket towards Israel. The only civilian victim mentioned is the farmer, yet his death is attributed to fighting and to the delay in the ambulance reaching him.

The report also includes Palestinian violence, as militants are described as attacking Israeli forces (*Palestinian gunmen began to attack them*), placing roadside bombs and carrying different types of weapons. Details of the actions of Palestinian militants are presented vividly with many details, e.g. (*three Hamas gunmen, followed by three from Fatah, moved along the road. One Hamas man carried an anti-tank weapon in a holdall while others placed bombs*). Palestinian violence is not given any justification. To sum up, the *Guardian* presents Israeli violence without a clear narrative construction, but rather as incidents reported briefly. Palestinian violence is also very

prominent in all reports that deal with Israeli violence, so that Israeli violence is often presented as a reaction to Palestinian violence or it is presented as mutual between both sides; moreover, Israeli violence is often presented as justified, and its causes are often prominent in the reports.

Considering the use of the sources, the *Guardian* takes Israeli sources as the primary definers of the situation while Palestinian sources are used as secondary definers. The report of the 31st of July 2001 quotes many Israeli and Palestinian officials and presents their statements against each other, e.g. the Palestinian accusations of Israeli involvement in the killing and the Israeli denial. The paper quotes Israel's Deputy Defence Minister who blames the victims for their own death (*attackers who are trying to activate explosive devices ... recently they have been making many mistakes ... and they pay with their lives for it*), and supports her statement via witnesses' statements which at the same time discredit the Palestinian version (*witnesses said there were no signs of shell fragments in the debris*). The Israeli Prime Minister is also quoted saying "*that there is no negotiation under fire,*" Which presupposes that the Israelis are under Palestinian fire.

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, the *Guardian* quotes sources on both sides. Palestinian leaders of militant groups are quoted promising revenge on both Israel and the US for the assassination. The Palestinian Prime Minister is quoted describing the assassination as one of '*the biggest crimes*' committed by Israel and Arafat describing the assassination as a '*barbaric act*'. In addition, the *Guardian* also quotes a Palestinian eye-witness who describes the scene of the attack. Israeli sources are quoted justifying the attack by blaming Yassin for suicide bombings and for killing Israelis. An Israeli Foreign Ministry Official is also quoted stating that Yassin is "*responsible for sending children and women to explode themselves.*" The Israeli Defence Minister is also quoted pledging that "*the battle against Hamas will continue.*" The *Guardian* also mentions Arab condemnation with specific reference to Kuwait, and foreign condemnation with reference to Britain.

In the reports of the 7th of July 2006, the *Guardian* uses sources extensively. Most of the reported information is quoted from sources, thus the paper avoids giving its

views on the reported events. The Israeli army is quoted twice, giving justification for the incursion and some details about Israeli actions. Israeli sources are considered primary definers of the situation, as they are quoted first, and their statements are very prominent in the report. The Palestinian sources are ordinary people who do not have institutional capacity to enhance their credibility although they are eye-witnesses and victims of fighting. The Palestinians quoted in the report are an ambulance man who cannot reach injured people due to the fighting and a relative of the first Palestinian victim who was killed due to the fighting. The Hamas government is not mentioned at all in the report, and no Palestinian official is quoted; consequently, the Palestinians official point of view is absent. In sum, the *Guardian* consistently quotes both Israeli and Palestinian sources; however, Israeli sources are always used as primary definers of the situation. Their quotations are often adopted and supported by the newspaper. Israeli sources are often identified by name and/or institutional capacity which make their statements more effective and convincing. Their statements usually justify Israeli violence or deny responsibility for it. Palestinians' statements are often presented against those of the Israelis', and they are often not adopted or supported by the newspaper. Palestinian officials are often quoted condemning violence against the Israelis, and militants always vow revenge against them. The *Guardian* tends to quote ordinary people who are usually eye-witnesses or victims of violence.

In terms of contextualisation, the *Guardian* often presents a lot of background information and contextualising details. In the report of the 31st of July 2001, it presents detailed information about the Palestinian armed group to which the victims are believed to belong, and its activities, including attacks against Israel and the Palestinians. These details criminalise the victims, present them as dangerous militants, and also justify their inclusion on Israel's hit-list. Furthermore, they eliminate sympathy for them and make Israeli claims that they were bomb makers seem more plausible. There is also reference to the Palestinian uprising and international efforts to end violence. Background information is long and detailed although information about the six Palestinians is unconfirmed. A lot of Palestinian violence is presented as background information.

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, contextual details focus on Sheikh Yassin, e.g. a previous assassination attempt by Israel, and his imprisonment in Israel for

the formation of Hamas and then his release following the request of King Hussain of Jordan after a failed Israeli assassination attempt in Amman. The paper also mentions that Yassin is (*the most prominent Palestinian leader to be killed in more than three years of Israeli-Palestinian fighting*). Condemnation from Arab and foreign states is also mentioned in the report.

In the report of the 7th of July 2006, the *Guardian* contextualises the Israeli incursion by reference to two closely-related Israeli actions, i.e. withdrawal from Gaza and the evacuation of the Israeli settlements there; this serves to present Israel positively. It presents Palestinian actions, i.e. the capture of the Israeli soldier and the firing of rockets from Gaza at Israel. The choice of certain events to use as background information or as contextualising details affects the way the story is perceived and interpreted by readers. Therefore, when positive Israeli actions are mentioned as background information, they help justify Israeli violence and to present Israel in a more favourable light generally. Moreover, the choice of negative contextual and background details with Palestinians presents them negatively and justifies violence against them.

5.3.2 Narrative and the representation of Palestinian violence

	1 st August 2002	15 th January 2004	26 th June 2006
Headline	Bomb kills seven at university Hamas attacks mixed campus in revenge for assassination	Human-bomb mother kills four Israelis at Gaza checkpoint	Israel promises revenge for soldier deaths - Hamas warned after two killed in pre-dawn raid - Abbas ordered to secure seized corporal's release
Lead	The bombers of Hamas struck at the heart of student life yesterday, killing at least seven people and injuring more than 70 in a lunchtime attack on a crowded university cafeteria	A 22-year-old Palestinian mother of two small children, pretending to be disabled, killed four Israelis at a Gaza border crossing yesterday after duping soldiers into allowing her a personal security check rather than going through a metal detector.	Israel has warned Hamas that it will pay a "deadly price" for a daring raid on Israeli positions yesterday in which militants killed two soldiers and kidnapped a third.

In reports that deal mainly with Palestinian violence, responsibility for violence is usually expressed clearly in the headlines, and the consequences of violence are also prominent. The headline of the report of the 1st of August 2002 (*Bomb kills seven at university - Hamas attacks mixed campus in revenge for assassination*) underscores the bombing and its consequences. In addition, it also highlights Hamas' responsibility for

the bombing and presents its cause. The headline of the report of the 15th of January 2004 (*Human-bomb mother kills four Israelis at Gaza checkpoint*) provides a summary of the story and foregrounds the identity of the bomber as a human-bomb mother. The bomber is metonymically substituted by 'bomb' which dehumanises and instrumentalises her. The consequences of the bombing are clear in the headline through the use of the transactive model.

The headline of the report of the 26th of June 2006 (*Israel promises revenge for soldier deaths - Hamas warned after two killed in pre-dawn raid - Abbas ordered to secure seized corporal's release*) focuses on Israeli reactions to the Palestinian raid, especially threats of revenge and warnings to Hamas and Abbas. The headline also summarises the consequences of the raid, i.e. killing two Israeli soldiers and seizing another. In general, headlines of reports dealing mainly with Palestinian violence highlight the consequences of the violence and present Palestinian responsibility clearly. In terms of setting the interpretative frames, the *Guardian's* headlines are very clear about Palestinian violence, responsibility for it and its consequences; therefore, readers can get a clear idea from the headline of what the Palestinians have done and how it had affected the Israelis.

The lead paragraphs of reports dealing with Palestinian violence in the *Guardian* tend to summarise the story and present responsibility for violence clearly. The lead of the report of the 1st of August 2002 summarises the main story (*the bombers of Hamas struck at the heart of student life*) and its consequences (*killing at least seven people and injuring more than 70*). It uses activation with human agency to establish clear agency and responsibility. The lead uses metaphoric language (*at the heart of student life*) to highlight the significance of the event. The story is presented clearly and coherently in the lead paragraph.

The lead the report of the 15th of January 2004 summarises the main story and its consequences. It foregrounds the identity of the bomber, being the most unexpected detail (*a 22-year-old Palestinian mother of two small children*). It gives a lot of details about the bomber's deception and pretence to carry out the attack (*pretending to be disabled ... after duping soldiers into allowing her a personal security check rather than*

going through a metal detector). The lead uses the transactive model with human agency to establish clear agency and responsibility (*killed four Israelis*).

The lead of the report of the 26th of June 2006 foregrounds Israeli warnings to Hamas; they are presented as '*deadly price*', and the use of the scare quotations shows how the paper distances itself from the statement. The transactive model clearly establishes militants' responsibility for the raid and its consequences, and the verbs '*killed*' and '*kidnapped*' involve the criminalisation of the Palestinian action and victimisation of Israeli soldiers. The lead refers to Israeli reactions to the Palestinian raid in terms of verbal reactions as '*promises revenge*' and '*warns*'. The lead paragraphs of the *Guardian's* reports highlight Palestinian violence and its consequences. They summarise the events in clear coherent narratives with human agency and obvious causality and responsibility.

Stories of Palestinian violence are usually presented in coherent and chronological narrative structures. In the report of the 1st of August 2002, the story of the bombing is told in detail. The report begins by describing the scene of the attack and presents it as being caused by a powerful bomb. The consequences of the attack dominate the report both through reporter's description and eye-witness accounts. Clear agency structures with human agents establish responsibility clearly, and the consequences are the focus of the report. The paper attributes responsibility for the attack to Hamas, and both present the cause of the attack through Hamas' statement as seeking retaliation for the killing of one of its commanders and fourteen others. The report also refers to Israeli violence, i.e. the killing of a Hamas commander and others which is the cause of the attack according to Hamas, which is represented as (*Israel's decision to drop a one-tonne bomb in Gaza City, killing a commander it had targeted for assassination and 14 other Palestinians*). The killing of fifteen Palestinians is reified and presented as a nominal '*decision*'.

The story of the bombing in the report of the 15th of January 2004 is presented coherently and chronologically, with many details quoted from Israeli sources, such as the bomber faking disability to reach her target, detonating explosives and causing harm and damage. The report identifies the bomber by name, age and family status, and it

describes her actions vividly. It also comments on her intentions and emphasises that she deceived Israeli soldiers by pretending to be disabled. The story is presented chronologically, coherently and in many details, including all actions of the bomber starting with queuing at the check point until she detonates her bomb giving details of all her actions and statements.

The story of the Palestinian raid on the Israeli army post on the 26th of June 2006 is presented in detail. The *Guardian* gives details of the number of militants, their affiliations, their actions, as well as the impacts of these actions. Details of the actions of Palestinian militants are quoted from Israeli army sources, and they are described vividly, giving details in a coherent chronological manner with clear actors, actions and affected participants. The *Guardian* presents the causes of the attack through quoting Palestinian militants saying that it was in response to (*Israeli assassinations and attacks on civilians in recent weeks*). Moreover, the paper states that (*kidnapping an Israeli soldier has been a key aim of Palestinian militants for years. They believe it is the only way to force Israel to release Palestinian prisoners.*) The causes of the attack are mainly presented in terms of revenge and blackmail which fail to legitimise or justify it; moreover, causes are mainly presented through statements of Palestinian militants who are regarded as illegitimate, which invalidates these justifications.

The consequences of the attack are elaborated in the report. The deaths, injuries and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers are prominent. The *Guardian* mentions options available to Israel such as a full scale invasion of Gaza or targeting Hamas leaders, as well as Israeli threats and preparations to respond to the Palestinian attack; however, it does not mention the Israeli incursion that has already started in Gaza, yet it discusses the political implications of the attack as eroding confidence in the Hamas government.

The *Guardian* quotes both Israeli and Palestinian sources; however, Israeli sources are always used as primary definers. The report of the 1st of August 2002 is dominated by the statements of three eye-witnesses, i.e. British, Israeli and American students. They describe the consequences of the attack, their reactions to it and their views of it. The report also quotes the police spokeswoman describing the planting of the bomb. The Palestinian side is also quoted both directly and indirectly. The Hamas

spiritual leader is quoted commenting on the attack as an expected response to the Israeli killing of fifteen people; an unnamed official is quoted saying that it is the first of many attacks. The Palestinian Authority is quoted condemning the attack and blaming the Israeli Prime Minister for violence.

In the report of the 15th of January 2004, the *Guardian* quotes sources on both sides, most prominently the bomber who is quoted from the video recording she left saying ("*it was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists*"). She is also quoted saying that her love for martyrdom is more than her love for her kids. Both statements are very controversial and hard to understand, especially for Western readers. They show how ideological her motives are and how much she hates Israel. This hatred is represented as irrational, and there is nothing that she says to justify it other than her wish to become a martyr. The paper also quotes Sheikh Ahmed Yassin warning that resistance will continue and more female bombers will follow. Other Hamas officials comment on the use of women as suicide bombers.

Details of the bombing are quoted from Israeli sources which are used as primary definers of the situation. An army general deplores the bomber's use of a faked medical condition. The *Guardian* also quotes an official in the Israeli Prime Minister's office who accuses the Palestinians of always trying to kill Israelis and blames the bombing for the closure of the crossing which will make thousands of Palestinians go hungry.

In the report of the 26th of June 2006, the *Guardian* quotes members of both sides. From the Palestinian side, it quotes Hamas' officials denying involvement in the attack and calling on the captors to treat the Israeli soldier well and keep him alive and President Abbas condemning the attack. It also quotes a Palestinian minister, a Hamas government spokesman and Abbas asking the captors to free the soldier. Abbas is also quoted stating that the attack violated national consensus and contradicted recent negotiations between the Palestinians. From the Israeli side, the *Guardian* quotes the Israeli Defence Minister threatening Palestinian militants of paying a (*deadly price*), the Israeli Prime Minister holding Hamas and the Palestinian Authority responsible for the raid, and a spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry calling on Abbas to stay in Gaza to resolve the situation.

In terms of contextual details, the *Guardian* often presents a great deal of background information. In the report of the 1st of August 2002, it stresses the mixed nature of the campus with Arabs and Israelis together in harmony. It mentions previous Palestinian bombings, and it states that this is the second bombing in one day. It also refers to an article in the university newspaper which envisaged a similar attack four months earlier. The *Guardian* refers to Sharon's decision to expel relatives of Palestinian militants for the first time since Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank in 1967. Although the paper refers to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, it is backgrounded and presented as undisputed fact.

In the report of the 15th of January 2004, the *Guardian* states that it was the first time that Hamas sent a female suicide bomber and provides some information about her identity, family and children. It also mentions Palestinian workers who will lose their livelihood due to the closure of the crossing after the attack. It states that there have not been many suicide bombings in the last few months before the attack and describes two of the latest bombings and their consequences.

In reports of the Palestinian raid on the 26th of June 2006, the *Guardian* contextualises the event by mentioning the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza a year earlier, meetings between Hamas leaders and Abbas, and provides detailed and thorough background information about Israeli hostages held by Palestinians in the past. The background information tells stories of Israeli soldiers or remains of soldiers that Palestinians held to trade with hundreds of Palestinians prisoners in Israel. It presents the Arabs in a very negative way while Israel is represented as honourably pledging to bring its citizens home at any cost. The Arabs are represented as blackmailing Israel; this presents an explanation for the abduction of the Israeli soldier and gains sympathy for him and for Israel.

5.4 Narrative Analysis of the *Times* Reports

5.4.1 Narrative and the representation of Israeli violence

	31 st July 2001	22 nd March 2004	7 th July 2006
Headline	Six men killed in Gaza explosion	Hamas spiritual leader killed in Israeli air strike	Death toll rises in north Gaza despite lull in fighting
Lead	SIX Palestinian activists died in an explosion on the West Bank yesterday. Later, missiles from Israeli helicopters damaged the Palestinian police headquarters in the Gaza Strip, although no serious injuries were reported.	Tens of thousands of mourners jammed the streets of Gaza City today for the funeral procession of the Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin and seven others killed in an Israeli air strike at daybreak	The death toll rose again in northern Gaza today as Israeli forces and militants continued desultory exchanges of fire after the bloodiest day of clashes in the strip since Israel withdrew last summer

When dealing with Israeli violence, the *Times*' headlines tend to conceal Israeli responsibility, for example, the headline of the report of the 31st of July 2001 is vague and inaccurate. It does not explain any circumstances of the death of the men, who they are or even whether they were Palestinians or Israelis. Moreover, the killing took place in the West Bank not in Gaza! It is very unusual to find such inaccurate reporting in a respectable newspaper like the *Times*, especially in the headline. The headline of the report of the 22nd of March 2004 summarises the story, however, the use of an agentless passive conceals agency and responsibility although the circumstantial loosely indicates causality. The headline of the report of the 7th of July 2007 naturalises death using the nominal '*death toll*' and the middle voice verb '*rise*'. The information structure in the headline presents the rise in the death toll as given information which is less likely to be questioned by the readers, while new information relates to the lull in fighting which presents the rise of the death toll as counter-expected. Thus, the *Times*' headlines tend to mitigate Israeli responsibility for violence against Palestinians and naturalise or conceal it. In terms of setting interpretative frames, the *Guardian's* and the *Times*' headlines are very careful about attributing responsibility when dealing with Israeli violence. They tend to present it as a natural occurrence or use structures that mitigate responsibility for it and undermine its consequences.

The *Times*' lead paragraphs tend to use the same strategies used in the headlines although they may provide more details. The lead of the report of the 31st of July 2001 highlights the killing of six Palestinians which is expressed as a spontaneous action *died*,

and the bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza which is expressed using an inanimate agent. The lead presents the consequences of the attack as (*damaged the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza although no serious injuries were reported*). The lead of the report of the 22nd of March 2004 focuses on the funeral of Sheikh Yassin, especially the participation of (*tens of thousands of mourners jammed the streets of Gaza City today for the funeral*). It summarises the story using an agentless passive which conceals agency (*the Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin and seven others killed in an Israeli air strike*). The use of the circumstantial loosely indicates Israeli involvement.

The lead of the report of the 7th of July 2006 begins with the vague statement '*death toll rose again*'. The use of '*again*' makes this rise presupposed, so readers do not question it. Fighting between the Israeli forces and the Palestinian militants is represented as ongoing and mutual. The contrast between '*forces*' and '*militants*' serves to legitimise the actions of the Israelis and delegitimise the Palestinians. Nominalisations such as '*exchanges*' and '*clashes*' suppress agency. Events are contextualised by reference to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The lead of the *Times* naturalises the deaths and mitigates responsibility for it; moreover, they present fighting as a mutual action between the Israelis and the Palestinians. In conclusion, the leads of the *Times*' reports that deal with Israeli violence are general and sometimes vague about responsibility for violence and its consequences.

Details of Israeli violence are often told briefly without a coherent narrative structure in the *Times*' reports; moreover, violence is always presented as mutual. The report of the 31st of July 2001 describes the Israeli attack very briefly, trivialising the consequences as (*no serious injuries*). It does not mention incidents of violence against the Israelis although it refers to potential Palestinian violence (*a new wave of Palestinian bombing attacks*). This statement presupposes previous wave(s) of bombings. In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, the story of the assassination is presented very briefly, yet its consequences are clearly presented as the killing of seven other people and the injury of seventeen. The cause of the attack is clearly presented (*Israel said it held Yassin responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people*). The report focuses on Palestinians' reactions to the assassination, including firing ten rockets towards

settlements in Gaza with no reports of injuries and the participation of thousands of people in the funeral procession and the angry calls for revenge on Israel. The report also mentions clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli forces in which Israelis killed four Palestinians including a thirteen-year-old boy when firing at crowds.

In the report of the 7th of July 2006, the *Times*' report foregrounds the purpose of the Israeli incursion in Gaza. Violence is mainly represented as a mutual action between the Israeli army and Palestinian militants (*ground forces engaged in fierce skirmishes with masked Palestinian gunmen*), or as targeting militants (*Israeli aircraft targeted Palestinian militants with missile strikes*). The reported twenty-four Palestinian victims who lost their lives in the incursion are aggregated, and there are not many details about them. The focus of the report is the latest Israeli movements out of Palestinian towns and the anticipated end of the operation, which serves to present Israel positively by concentrating on its positive rather than negative actions. The *Times*' correspondent in Gaza provides an eye-witness account of the actions there. He emphasizes that the Israeli operation is coming to an end e.g. '*tanks have pulled back slightly now and there is a lull*.' Palestinian victims are euphemistically and indirectly indicated to; '*there will probably be a lot of funerals later*'. The correspondent's account focuses on the limited scope of Israeli actions and the foreseen end of the Israeli operation. The purpose of Israeli violence is prominent in the report (*in an attempt to win freedom for a captured soldier and put Israel out of the militants' increasingly longer rocket range*). Palestinian violence is presented without any explanation or justification, yet its impacts are very prominent in the report; for example, even though the reported rocket attacks did not cause any physical damage, their psychological and political impacts are presented (*the latest rocket attacks have caused concern for Israeli army chiefs and panic among civilians*).

The *Times* usually quotes sources on both sides, however it takes Israeli sources as the primary definers of the situation while Palestinian statements are presented as secondary definers. In the report of the 31st of July 2001, the *Times*' report quotes Israel's Deputy Defence Minister and supports her claims through a factual statement (*there were, however, no Israeli helicopters in the area at the time of the blast*) and the description of the explosion which indicates that it came from within. The *Times*' report

does not quote any Palestinian sources directly, and Palestinian statements are presented against those of the Israelis. They deny that the six victims were militants and accuse Israel of the killing. The paper also quotes an Israeli official denying the Palestinian accusations. In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, the paper quotes sources on both sides. It quotes Palestinian officials and leaders of militant groups promising revenge for the assassination on both Israel and the US. It also quotes Arafat condemning the attack and describing it as a ‘*cowardly crime*’ and Palestinian medics commenting on the injury of one of the victims of clashes between Israeli forces and demonstrators. Furthermore, it quotes Israeli sources that justify the attack in terms of Israel blaming Yassin for suicide bombings and for killing Israelis, e.g. it quotes an Israeli Foreign Ministry Official who says that Yassin is “*responsible for sending children and women to explode themselves.*” The *Times* also mentions British and French condemnations and the US calling for calm.

In the report of the 7th of July 2006, the *Times* presents the verbal reactions of Israeli and Palestinian officials, however the Israeli side is quoted much more extensively. Israeli army officials are quoted three times stating that the Israeli forces are winding up their mission in Gaza and that the Israel is not intending to reoccupy Gaza. There are also justifications for the deaths of Palestinian civilians by blaming it on militants who use them as human shields and justifications for the Israeli incursion as a way of retaliation for harm done to Israeli citizens. The Israeli officials quoted are identified by name and institutional capacity which enhances their status and presents them as credible sources. The Palestinian Prime Minister is briefly quoted describing the Israeli operation as a ‘*crime against humanity*’. He is also reported calling for international intervention to stop the Israeli offensive. The report focuses on Israeli quotations which are about four times longer than Palestinian quotations; furthermore, they are more focused, and the Israeli point of view is represented very clearly.

In terms of contextual details, the *Times* does not present extensive contextual details like other newspapers. In the report of the 31st of July 2001, the only contextual details relate to the visit of the archbishop of Canterbury to the Middle East and his calls to the Christians to remain in the Holy Land. In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, contextual details focus on Sheikh Yassin, e.g. a previous assassination attempt by Israel

in September, and to his imprisonment in Israel for the formation of Hamas and then his release following the request of King Hussain of Jordan after a failed Israeli assassination attempt in Amman. It also mentions Israel's targeting of other Hamas leaders like Rantissi in June. In the report of the 7th of July 2006, it contextualises the story by reference to the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and by referring to Palestinians' firing rockets at Israel and capturing an Israeli soldier. The Israeli actions used for contextualisation are positive while Palestinians' actions are negative.

5.4.2 Narrative and the representation of Palestinian violence

	1 st August 2002	15 th January 2004	26 th June 2006
Headline	Hamas bomb kills seven students at Jerusalem's multicultural university	'It was my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists' Suicide-bomb mother fakes disability to kill four as Hamas launches fresh front	Soldier kidnapped in deadly tunnel ambush
Lead	Blood and shredded ivy cling to columns inside the cafeteria that was until yesterday one of the few symbols of cross-community life in Israel.	A PALESTINIAN mother of two faked a disability yesterday to trick her way past Israeli guards before detonating a vest packed with explosives, killing four security staff and wounding seven people at a checkpoint.	Israeli troops were hunting last night for a soldier who is thought to have been kidnapped after a Palestinian ambush on a military post near the Gaza border that left two other soldiers dead.

In reports that deal mainly with Palestinian violence, responsibility for violence is usually expressed clearly in the headlines of the *Times*, and the consequences of violence are also prominent. The headline of the report of the 1st of August 2002 summarises the story with clear agency and emphasizes the consequences. It uses the transactive model which establishes clear causal relationships and responsibility, and places the action in the present time frame to present it as vivid and relevant to the present. The headline of the report of the 15th of January 2004 is sensational; as it includes a condemnable statement of the bomber "*It was my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists*". It serves to attract readers' attention and to highlight the violent and ideological nature of the incident. The sub-headline summarises the story (*Suicide-bomb mother fakes disability to kill four.*) It highlights the identity of the bomber as a mother and her actions (*fakes disability to kill*) which points out her deception and presents her in a very negative light. The circumstantial (*as Hamas*

launches fresh front) puts the event in a larger political perspective and implies that this event is part of an ongoing war between Hamas and Israel. Hamas is represented as the initiator of violence. The headline of the report of the 26th of June 2006 foregrounds the kidnapping of a soldier and describes the attack as ‘*deadly tunnel ambush*’ which includes clear negative evaluation.

The lead of the report of the 1st of August 2002 does not provide a summary of the story, as expected, but describes the scene of the attack. It dramatises the consequences and highlights not only its actual impacts but its symbolic impacts also. The lead of the report of the 15th of January 2004 summarises the story and highlights the identity of the bomber as a mother and her actions (*a PALESTINIAN mother of two faked a disability yesterday to trick her way past Israeli guards*) which points out her deception and presents her in a very negative light. Capitalisation is used with the nationality of the bomber to highlight it. There are a lot of details relating to the actions of the bomber, and the consequences are prominent in the lead. The lead of the report of the 26th of June 2006 begins with Israel hunting for the kidnapped soldier and underpins the killing of two other soldiers. The Palestinians’ attack is nominalised as an ‘*ambush*’. The *Times*’ lead is brief and presents information a very condensed way. The paper does not present details as established facts, but presents them as hitherto uncertain (*who is thought to have been kidnapped.*)

The *Times*’ generally presents Palestinian violence clearly in coherent and chronological narrative structure. The report of the 1st of August 2002 tells the story in a coherent narrative and informal style. It foregrounds the consequences and presents the bombing as the cause. The story is told twice; at the beginning of the report and towards the end. The report is dominated by the consequences of the bombing, both through the reporter’s description and eye-witness accounts. Agency structures establish human responsibility clearly, and the consequences are the focus of the report. The paper attributes responsibility for the attack to Hamas, and presents the cause of the attack through Hamas’ statement as seeking retaliation for the killing of one of its commanders and fourteen others. The report also refers to Israeli violence, i.e. the killing of a Hamas commander and others which is the cause of the attack according to Hamas. The *Times* presents it as (*the death of 15 Palestinians including its military commander, Salah*

Shehadeh, in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza last week). Israeli responsibility is mitigated, as the fate of the Palestinian victims is presented as ‘*death*’ which is a nominal, and which is a spontaneous event that does not require agency. Israeli involvement is represented through a circumstantial that loosely relates the consequences to the action.

The story of the report of the 15th of January 2004 is presented coherently and chronologically. Many details are quoted from Israeli sources, such as the bomber’s faking disability to reach her target, detonating explosives and causing harm and damage. The report identifies the bomber by name and describes her actions vividly. It also comments on her intentions and emphasizes that she deceived Israeli soldiers by pretending to be disabled. The story is presented chronologically, coherently and in great detail, including all actions of the bomber starting with queuing at the check point until she detonates her bomb giving details of all her actions and statements.

The story of the 26th of June 2006 gives details of the number of militants, their affiliations, their actions, as well as the impacts of these actions. Details of the actions of Palestinian militants are quoted from Israeli army sources, and they are described vividly, giving details in a coherent chronological manner with clear actors, actions and affected participants. The *Times* presents the causes through the statements of militants that it was in retaliation for Israel's assassination of a militant leader and civilian deaths. The cause of the attack is mainly presented in terms of revenge which fails to legitimise or justify them; moreover, causes are mainly presented through statements of Palestinian militants who are regarded as illegitimate, which invalidates these justifications. In addition, the causes are not presented close to the actions, so it is difficult to read it as purpose or justification. The consequences of the attack are elaborated in the paper. The deaths, injuries and kidnapping of Israeli soldiers are prominent in the report. The *Times* discusses the impact of the raid on the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. It mentions Israeli threats and preparations to respond to the Palestinian attack. The *Times* mentions military actions in Gaza as an attack designed to destroy the tunnel and search for the missing soldier, which presents it as justified and purposeful.

The *Times* quotes sources on both sides, but it uses the Israeli sources as primary definers. The report of the 1st of August 2002 which deals with a bombing at the Hebrew

University quotes a British student at the Hebrew University who describes his reactions to the attack and its consequences. It does not quote any Palestinians directly, but states that the Palestinian Authority condemned the attack. The report of the 15th of January 2004 quotes sources on both sides, most prominently the bomber whose quotations appears in the headline. It presents excerpts from the video recording left by the bomber, particularly "*it was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists*". It also quotes her saying that her love for martyrdom is more than her love for her kids. Both statements are very controversial, and they show how ideological her motives are and how much she hates Israel. This hatred is represented as irrational, and there is nothing that she says to justify it other than her wish to become a martyr. The paper also quotes Sheikh Ahmed Yassin warning that resistance will continue and more female bombers will follow. Other Hamas officials comment on the use of women as suicide bombers. The report quotes details of the bombing from Israeli sources which are used as primary definers of the situation. They also quote an army general who deplores the bomber's use of a faked medical condition. An Israeli settler who is also an eye-witness is quoted describing the horrible scene of the attack and blaming it on Sharon for proposing to withdraw from settlements in Gaza.

In the report of the 26th of June 2006, the *Times* quotes members of both sides. It quotes a Hamas officials denying involvement in the attack and calling on the captors to treat the Israeli soldier well and keep him alive, as well as President Abbas condemning the attack. It also quotes a Hamas spokesman and mentions contacts between the Palestinian Authority with the Egyptians and other parties to resolve the issue. It quotes the Israeli Foreign Minister urging Abbas to remain in Gaza until the situation is resolved and holding the Palestinian Authority responsible for the attack. It also quotes the Israeli Prime Minister and Israeli army sources commenting on the attack. The details of the attack are quoted from the Israeli army, and Israeli sources are used as primary definers of the situation.

Contextual details in the *Times* emphasize violence between both sides. In the report of the 1st of August 2002, contextual details stress the mixed nature of the campus with Arabs and Israelis together in harmony. They include a previous Palestinian bombing in Jerusalem in April. It also refers to an article in the university newspaper

which envisaged a similar attack four months earlier. In the report of the 15th of January 2004, the paper mentions that it was the first time for Hamas to send a female suicide bomber and provides information about her identity, family and children. It also mentions Palestinian workers who will lose their livelihood with the closure of the crossing after the attack. In the report of the 26th of June 2006, the *Times* tell the story of the last Israeli soldier who was captured by Palestinians in 1994.

The above discussion of specific aspects of the narrative structure of the news reports demonstrates that different reporters tell the same story from different perspectives. This is exemplified by the choices they make of details to include or to exclude; to foreground or to background; and also from the choice of certain events to use as background information or as contextualizing details, etc. In the following sections, transitivity structures used to represent the actions of each side and the events reported in each newspaper are examined. The analysis focuses on actions undertaken by each side and how they are represented using various constructions that reveal or conceal certain aspects of the action, e.g. its agents or affected participants; and the impact of such choices on the presentation of each side of the conflict.

5.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, the previous analysis has shown that there are differences between the way narrative structure is used to represent Israeli and Palestinian violence in each newspaper. In this section, the use of narrative to represent violence is compared in NYT and AN as examples of Arab and Western (American) newspapers, and between the *Guardian* and the *Times* as examples of newspapers that are issued in the same country but have different orientations.

There are obvious differences between the use of narrative to represent violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in NYT and AN. Headlines are the most prominent aspects of news reports. They summarise the stories and highlight the most important details of the story. Headlines and leads are used strategically to serve ideological purposes and to convey the views of each newspaper, e.g. by highlighting certain aspects of the story and downplaying others or by concealing agency for certain actions. Considering the use of headlines and leads by AN and NYT, when a story deals mainly

with Israeli violence, NYT uses general headlines that do not directly indicate Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians, e.g. (*In Middle-east, a Day of Resounding Violence*) [NYT, 31 July 2001]. On the other hand, the same story is presented in AN with a headline that clearly shows Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians, e.g. (*Israeli gunships pound Gaza*) [AN, 31 July 2001].

By contrast, AN tries to present Palestinian responsibility for violence generally and vaguely in the headline and lead, e.g. (*Jerusalem bomb kills seven*) [AN, 1 August 2002], while NYT presents the same story and other stories on Palestinian violence with clear agency and responsibility, e.g. (*AT LEAST 7 KILLED AS MILITANTS BOMB JERUSALEM CAMPUS*) [NYT, 1 August 2002] (*capitalisation in original*). In two of the three reports dealing with Palestinian violence, NYT uses capitalisation in the headline which makes it more prominent. Both papers present responsibility and agency clearly when they are newsworthy, i.e. when they are the most unexpected details of the story. For example, when a young mother-of-two carries out a suicide bombing, both papers present agency and responsibility clearly in the headlines since it is the most unexpected detail in the story, e.g. (*Mother-of-Two Bomber Kills Four Israelis*) [AN, 15 January 2004], and (*Gaza Mother, 22, Kills Four Israelis in Suicide Bombing*) [NYT, 15 January 2004].

The lead paragraphs serve to provide an initial summary of the story and indicate how it will develop in the rest of the report. They should provide more information than the headlines. However, lead paragraphs are usually used in ways similar to the headlines, i.e. when the headlines are vague or general, the same vagueness is maintained in the lead, e.g. the reports of 31 July 2001 in the NYT and of 1 August 2002 in AN have headlines and lead paragraphs that are vague, and they do not tell who is responsible for violence. A very large proportion of readers read no more than the headline and lead, and in this way they remain uninformed about crucial aspects of the story such as who undertakes the violence.

News narrative has a distinctive structure that differs from other narrative forms in that it does not always develop chronologically, but it has a special structure which White (1997) describes as 'lead dominated and orbitally organised' and argues that this

structure helps “naturalise and portray as commonsensical the ideology which informs the selection of this story”. The narrative structure of news reports is very important for the proper understanding of the events; therefore, it is often manipulated ideologically by different newspapers. There is a tendency in NYT to *de-narrativise* stories about Israeli violence, and at the same time to present stories of Palestinian violence in a clear, coherent and chronological narrative. De-narrativisation of reports about Israeli violence is done in many ways, e.g. the story is fragmented, incomplete, and incoherent, i.e. separated by other information, e.g. details of Palestinian violence, quotations, justifications of violence, etc. The effect of these strategies is that readers often find it difficult to reconstruct the story and understand exactly what goes on and how events develop and relate to each other. Moreover, when reporting on Israeli violence, NYT tell stories of mutual violence, even if the report deals mainly with Israeli violence.

On the other hand, NYT tells stories of Palestinian violence in a clear, vivid, chronological and coherent narrative with the basic elements of a minimum narrative, i.e. orientation, characterisation and complication. Agency, causality and impacts are often presented clearly, and the consequences of Palestinian violence are always prominent in the reports. Palestinian violence is represented as open narrative. Readers can easily reconstruct stories of Palestinian violence presented. In NYT, the representation of Israeli and Palestinian violence shows striking contrast, between the ways stories of Israeli and Palestinian violence are told, as Palestinian violence is consistently told in a coherent chronological narrative, as evident in all the stories analysed in this study. AN reports try to present Israeli violence in a clear coherent narrative structure – when enough information is available. Although AN endeavours to present Palestinian violence generally or vaguely in headlines and leads, it often presents it clearly in the body of the report. In some cases, AN avoids mentioning Palestinian violence altogether, e.g. in the representation of the Israeli raid against Gaza on 7th July 2006, and the AN report does not include any details of the movements and actions of Palestinian militants which are prominent in the reports of other newspapers.

NYT presents the causes of Israeli violence clearly and strategically, as they are often presented earlier in the reports and positioned close to close to description of violent actions. Israeli violence is often justified by reference to statements of Israeli

officials. There is an effort to legitimise Israeli violence by presenting the justifications or causes of Israeli violence in relation to moral values, e.g. (*to secure the release of a captured soldier and stop rocket fire into Israel*) [NYT, 7 July 2006]. Causes of Israeli violence are often presented in AN as well, mainly through statements of Israeli officials, however they are not presented prominently. In NYT, Palestinian violence hardly receives any justification. When causes are presented, they are presented through statements of militants or other dubious sources mainly in terms of revenge; moreover, they are not mentioned close to the description of violent actions. AN presents the causes of Palestinian violence, yet it does not attempt to legitimise it; moreover, it presents most causes in terms of revenge.

The consequences of Israeli and Palestinian violence are often prominent in both papers. In fact, they are often the most important and most visible part. Both papers often present consequences accurately and prominently because they have great news value. However, NYT presents the consequences of Israeli violence in certain ways that contribute to legitimising them, e.g. by presenting victims as militants; by presenting violence as targeting inanimate objects; by presenting consequences as unintended or occurring due to an error; or by using transitivity constructions that naturalise consequences, e.g. middle voice or constructions that conceal agency. NYT almost completely avoids the effects of Israeli violence on Palestinian civilians, e.g. the Israeli raid against Gaza is mentioned while avoiding its consequences on civilians who live there. Palestinian violence, on the other hand, is presented with very clear consequences with obvious agency and responsibility. When Palestinian violence does not affect victims or lead to any physical damage, NYT highlights its psychological effects on Israeli civilians, e.g. causing panic, concerns, rattling nerves, etc. The psychological, humanitarian, physical effects of Israeli violence on Palestinian civilians are almost always absent from NYT reports. The only things that are mentioned accurately are the numbers of those killed and injured, often in terms of statistics or numbers.

The analysis of narrative structures in AN and NYT also reveals that there are certain patterns that dominate reports in both papers when using sources. Teo (2000) demonstrates that quotation patterns can act as a “powerful ideological tool to manipulate readers’ perception and interpretation of people and events in news reports”.

Both newspapers try to ensure balance and objectivity by presenting the views of both sides. However, the choice of the ‘primary definers’ and the ‘secondary definers’ differs from one newspaper to another, especially that primary definers set the limits of the situation, and ‘secondary definers’ are forced to insert themselves into the definitions of the primary definers. AN typically takes Palestinian sources as the primary definers of the situation and adopts their interpretations as interpretative frameworks for understanding the situation. They are often named and are given institutional capacities. Israeli views are usually presented against those of the Palestinians.

NYT takes Israeli sources as the main definers of the situation and Palestinian sources as secondary definers. Palestinian sources are often presented as anonymous, especially if they are from outside the Palestinian Authority; this results in depriving them of status and efficacy. NYT also uses sources from Palestinian militant groups whose statements are often vowing revenge, threatening and violent; thus, they contribute to delegitimising Palestinian violence, and they are not treated as trustworthy. NYT also attempts to discredit Palestinian sources as exemplified in the analysis of the report of 31 July 2001 where Palestinian statements are presented as baseless, contradictory, unconvincing and uninformed.

The choice of primary definers has an ideological aspect to it. Yet, there are other practical and institutional factors that can have important implications on such decisions, e.g. the availability and credibility of sources. Newspapers prefer credible sources with institutional status, as the statements of these informed sources give credibility and validity to the report itself; therefore, Israeli media contacts with their effective communication apparatus are more accessible to Western newspapers and news outlets and their statements feature constantly on Western newspapers, unlike Palestinian sources that are often inadequate and inaccessible. In addition, Israel does not allow Israeli or foreign journalists into the Palestinian territories since the beginning of the Intifada, which results in difficulty in reaching Palestinian sources. In sum, the analysis reveals that elements of narrative are used differently by NYT and AN to represent violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians, and these differences are linked to the ideologies of the newspapers, as they contribute to negative or positive presentations.

There are some differences between the representation of violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the *Times* and the *Guardian*, but there are a lot of similarities as well. The *Guardian's* reports are often longer and contain more details and background information than the *Times'*. In terms of narrative structure, the *Guardian's* headlines are often clearer than the *Times'* when reporting on confirmed Israeli violence, e.g. when reporting on the Israeli assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the *Guardian's* headline (*Israel assassinates Hamas leader*), and the *Times* headline (*Hamas spiritual leader killed in Israeli air strike*) [22 March 2004]. On the other hand, when reporting Palestinian violence, both papers often express Palestinian responsibility clearly, however, the *Times* can be more dramatic in its presentation of Palestinian violence, e.g. (*Human-bomb mother kills four Israelis at Gaza checkpoint*), [the *Guardian*, 15 January 2004], (*It was my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists'*) [the *Times*, 15 January 2004]. When describing Israeli violence, the stories are told in more or less similar ways, e.g. the causes of Israeli violence are prominent in the reports of both newspapers and stories are told mostly in similar ways; however, the impacts of Israeli violence are often presented more clearly in the *Guardian*.

When reporting Palestinian violence, both papers present it in detail and in similar ways, especially that they both quote its details from Israeli sources in most instances. Its causes are often present in terms of revenge, and its consequences are prominent in the reports of both papers. The main difference is that the *Guardian* reports are often more detailed and present the actions of both sides and their consequences more clearly than the *Times* which tends to avoid describing Israeli violence where possible, e.g. in the very short reports of 31 July 2000 two incidents of Israeli violence are described in two clauses only, and their consequences are downplayed; moreover, in the reports of 7 July 2001, the report focuses on the temporary calm after the violence at the expense of describing Israeli violence and its impacts on Palestinians. The paper also focuses on Palestinian reactions to Israeli violence and highlights them rather than Israeli violence which triggered them, as is the case in the reports of 22 March 2004. On the other hand, the *Times* presents Palestinian violence, not only clearly but also in dramatised ways, e.g. the presentation of the suicide bombing on 15 January 2004 and

the Palestinian raid on 26 June 2006. The consequences of Palestinian violence are very prominent in reports, and causes are often toned down.

Both papers take Israeli sources as the primary definers of the situations and present Palestinian statements in relation to those of Israeli sources; however, in five out of six reports the *Guardian* uses more Palestinian quotations. As for contextualisation and background information, the *Guardian* provides much more detailed background information than the *Times*. This was clearly the case in the reports on the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier by Palestinian militants on 26 June 2006, where background information about previous kidnapping incidents of Israeli soldiers represents more than 20% of the length of the report. The *Guardian* and the *Times* show more similarities in the way they present violence undertaken by both sides of the conflict.

In conclusion, different newspapers manipulate narrative structure to serve ideological purposes when presenting events of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Such manipulation includes highlighting or downplaying certain aspects of the story, e.g. crucial agency, in the headlines and lead paragraphs, manipulating the narrative structure of news stories, or the use of quotations and contextual details. Obvious differences can be observed between Arab and Western newspapers.

6 Transitivity Analysis

This chapter deals with the way transitivity structures are used to represent violence undertaken by the Israelis and the Palestinians in the four selected newspapers. The analysis examines which actions are undertaken by each side; how they are construed; and how agency, causality and responsibility for violence are represented.

6.1 Transitivity Analysis of the *New York Times* Reports

6.1.1 Transitivity and the representation of Israeli violence

In reports that deal mainly with Israeli violence, NYT represents violence as a mutual action; moreover, it often uses transitivity constructions that mitigate Israeli responsibility for violence and undermine its consequences. The report of the 31st of July 2001, which deals mainly with the killing of six Palestinians and the bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters, contains many details of violent actions undertaken by both sides. Israel is represented as involved in one violent action only, i.e. firing at the police headquarters, and this violence is mainly represented using non-agentive passive constructions, e.g. (*seven Palestinian police officers were wounded when Israeli helicopters fired at a building*). Israeli involvement is indicated through the circumstantial, and the firing is presented as undertaken by and directed towards inanimate objects, i.e. '*helicopters and building*.' Israeli responsibility cannot be denied because only Israel can use gunships against the Palestinians. The killing of six Palestinians is not blamed on Israel, and it is presented using a non-agentive passive construction especially that Israel denies responsibility for the killing (*six Palestinians... were blown apart in an explosion*); agency and responsibility are completely obfuscated.

In the same report, Palestinians are represented as involved in violence against the Israelis using the transactive model (*Palestinians showered stones on Jews praying*). There are other incidents of violence against the Israelis presented in a non-agentive passive, e.g. (*a Jewish man was stabbed and critically wounded*) or middle voice, e.g. (*a small bomb exploded*). These actions are not blamed on any side, and responsibility for them is not clear. Nominalisations are used to represent mutual violence, e.g. *violence, attacks, etc.* There are other incidents that are non-violent, but are represented as

affecting the Israelis, e.g. (*there was a report of another bomb in the Sheik Jarrah section of eastern Jerusalem. It turned out to be a can ... word came of a bus bombing across town.*) These are mainly presented through existentials and nominalisations.

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004 that deals with the Israeli assassination of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, NYT presents Israeli violence briefly. It is presented mainly using agentless passives, as in the headline (*Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike*), or in the body of the report (*at least two bodyguards had been killed with him, 14 other people were wounded, etc.*) Activated clauses that are used to represent Israeli violence are used with inanimate agents, e.g. (*the Israeli weapons punctured the pavement*). Most of the actions of Israel are represented in terms of speech acts, e.g. (*the Israeli military confirmed the killing, the army said it had targeted a car, etc.*) Nominalisations are also used with Israeli violence, e.g. (*strike, targeted killing, raid, assassination*). It is clear from all the above that NYT uses transitivity constructions that mitigate Israeli responsibility for the killing although Israeli involvement is obvious from the context; moreover, it is confirmed through army statements. Palestinian actions are presented in detail, using activation and clearer agency structure, e.g. (*Palestinians began burning tires in the streets, demonstrators chanted for revenge, etc.*) Palestinian officials are presented as agents of speech acts, e.g. (*Ahmed Qurei, the Palestinian prime minister, condemned the attack*). The report also refers to other Palestinian violent acts in the background information, e.g. (*two Palestinian suicide bombers from a Gaza refugee camp blew themselves up*).

In the report of the 7th of July 2006 that deals mainly with an Israeli raid against Gaza, NYT represents both sides as involved in many actions both separately and mutually. Fighting and deaths are represented as either spontaneous as in the headline and the lead, e.g. (*fighting surges and deaths rise*). ‘Fighting’ and ‘deaths’ are nominalisations, which have the effect of concealing agency. Both nominalisations are used as subjects of other clauses; this adds to the complexity of the statement. Death conveys natural occurrences, as opposed to killing. ‘Surges’ and ‘rise’ are middle voice verbs associated with spontaneous events. This completely mitigates agency and conceals responsibility. This pattern is repeated later in the report, e.g. (*heavy fighting erupted; the death toll had risen; fighting quickly escalated, etc.*). Furthermore, certain

actions are presented as mutual, e.g. (*Israeli troops and Palestinian militants had waged their most intense battles.*) This also mitigates responsibility for whoever started the action which is represented as mutual.

NYT represents the Israeli side as involved in many violent actions using a variety of structures, e.g. the non-transactive model is used repeatedly to represent the actions of the Israeli forces in terms of movements, e.g. (*moved, re-entered, started edging, etc.*). Agentless passives are used with actions that involve killing Palestinians, e.g. (*at least two bodyguards had been killed with him, 14 other people were wounded, etc.*) The transactive model is used mainly with inanimate agents and goals, so as to avoid directly blaming Israelis for such actions, e.g. (*the Israeli weapons punctured the pavement*). Nominalisations are also used, with the effect of changing the action into a thing or state to mitigate responsibility for them, e.g. (*killing, assassination, strike*). NYT represents Israeli actions as purposeful and justified (*to secure the release of a captured soldier and stop rocket fire into Israel*). Most of the killing is represented with affected participants such as (*militants, gunmen, armed men, Hamas members or Islamic Jihad members*), which justifies the killing, as it targets dangerous militants.

Transitivity structures used to represent Palestinian violence in the same report are used differently from those used to represent Israeli violence. The report does not present any purpose or justification for Palestinian actions. Palestinian violent actions are represented in details, using active structures indicating clear causal relationships, e.g. (*Palestinians were seen planting explosives in manholes, One masked fighter rode away on a bicycle after laying such a charge; gunmen from various Palestinian factions fired automatic rifles and antitank rockets at the Israeli troops; etc.*) The great majority of Palestinian violent acts in the report are activated, and most of them are in the transactive model with agents and affected participants clear in the clauses. When passivisation and nominalisations are used with Palestinian violence, nominalisations are linked to the Palestinians and most passive constructions are agentive, e.g. (*Cpl. Gilad Shalit, a tank gunner, was captured just inside Israel by militants, one Israeli soldier was reported killed by a sniper, etc.*) Palestinians' responsibility for undertaking violent acts against Israelis is clear in the NYT report, unlike the Israelis whose responsibility for violence against the Palestinians is mitigated by means of agent

deletion or substitution, among other strategies. Although Israeli violence resulted in twenty times more deaths and injuries among the Palestinians, transitivity structures in the report mitigate Israeli violence for these killings and injuries.

6.1.2 Transitivity and the representation of Palestinian violence

Transitivity structures used to represent Palestinian violence in NYT are used differently from those used to represent Israeli violence. Palestinian violence is often presented without any purpose or justification. Palestinian violent actions are represented in details, and they appear together in vivid descriptions using active structures with agents, actions and affected participants; thus, causal relationships and responsibility are clearly indicated.

In the report of the 1st of August 2002 that deals mainly with a Palestinian bombing at the Hebrew University, NYT headline (*at least 7 killed as militants bomb Jerusalem campus*) foregrounds the outcome of the attack and presents agency of militants clearly using the transactive model with human agents. The story of the bombing is told; NYT presents the agency and responsibility of Palestinian militants through an agentive passive in a subordinate clause (*hidden in a bag and left on a table by Palestinian militants*). The consequences of the attack are presented in the lead using the active participle (*killing seven people...*). More consequences are clear through the statements of eye-witnesses and victims quoted by NYT. Responsibility for the attack is presented through the verbal process (*claimed responsibility*), with Hamas as the agent. The causes of the attack are quoted from Hamas in terms of retaliation for the Israeli assassination of a Hamas leader.

There is also Israeli violence mentioned in the report, i.e. the killing of a Hamas leader a week before the bombing. NYT presents it as (*Israel's killing last week of a top Hamas leader. Fourteen others, including nine children, died in that attack, in which Israel bombed a house in Gaza City*). NYT uses a nominalisation (*Israel's killing*), and it presents the consequences of the attack using the middle voice (*died*) which presents them as spontaneous. NYT also refers to an Israeli offensive in the West Bank (*after back-to-back bombings killed 26 people here more than a month ago, Israel began a ground offensive in the West Bank to suppress Palestinian violence*). The Israeli

offensive is represented as a reaction to Palestinian violence, and it is presented as purposeful and justified. The deportation of relatives of militants is also presented as a potential action. In sum, NYT clearly presents Palestinian militants as responsible agents, and the consequences of the attack are the focus of the NYT report, and they are presented mainly through descriptions and through the accounts of eye-witnesses mostly in a conversational style.

The report the 15th of January 2004 deals mainly with a suicide bombing that claimed the lives of four and injured seven others. Transitivity structures present the story with clear agency and causal relationships, especially that the bomber left a video recording in which she admits responsibility for the bombing. The story is quoted from Israeli sources, and it is presented with clear transitivity and agency structures using the transactive model, e.g. (*Gaza Mother, 22, Kills Four Israelis, Ms. Reyashi detonated her bomb, The blast tore apart the simple structure, etc.*) Palestinian violence is very prominent in the report, and it is presented mainly using activation to describe the actions of the bomber and other Palestinian violence as well, e.g. (*a young Palestinian mother ... blew herself up, Ms. Reyashi detonated her bomb, the blast tore apart the simple structure, Palestinians have carried out more than 100 suicide bombings, etc.*)

The consequences of the bombing are prominent in the report, and they are presented through the use of passivisation and the active participle, e.g. (*killing four Israeli security personnel and wounding seven people, Two soldiers, a border policeman and a civilian security guard were killed and seven people were wounded.*) There is no justification given for the attack, yet the bomber explains her motives in terms of her personal wish to become a martyr in a video message. Responsibility for the bombing is expressed through the use of verbal processes (*Hamas, the Islamic movement, and the Aksa Martyrs Brigades ... took joint responsibility for the attack*). Relationals are used to comment on the bombing, e.g. (*such attacks have been extremely rare in the fenced-in Gaza Strip*). Israel is represented as reacting to Palestinian violence by closing the crossing to Palestinian workers (*Israel responded by immediately shutting down the industrial zone*). The paper uses activation, particularly the transactive model, to present the actions of the Palestinian militant with clear agency, consequences and causal relationships. Israel is not presented as undertaking many actions, but as reacting to

Palestinian violence.

In the report of the 26th of June 2006 which deals mainly with a Palestinian raid against an Israeli military post, NYT concentrates on Palestinian actions, their consequences as well as Israeli reactions to them. Activation is the dominant mode of representing Palestinian actions, e.g. (*emerged, killed, kidnapped, escaped, fired, attacked, etc.*) Inanimate agents are used twice; once in the headline to summarise the story, which means that human agency and responsibility for violence are clear in the great majority of instances of Palestinian violence. Moreover, Israeli people and objects are represented as the affected participants of these actions. Passive constructions are used three times with Palestinian violent actions, including wounding, firing missiles, and kidnapping. There is also an instance of using the agentive passive to represent contextual background information of kidnapping an Israeli soldier in 1994 by Hamas. Relationals are used to provide additional information and descriptions, and to make comments on the raid.

The Israelis are predominantly represented as affected participants of Palestinian actions, and they are not presented as actively involved in violence against the Palestinians. The Israeli side is mainly presented as undertaking a number of mental and verbal processes including (*decided, want, denied, urged, talked, etc.*) These processes emphasise Israel's reaction and present it as less violent and more rational and sensible. The Israeli military actions that started in Gaza in response to the attack are mainly presented in terms of movements of forces rather than actual military activities. Moreover, the purpose of these movements is presented clearly. Passivisation is used with one Israeli action to represent the killing of two Palestinian militants who took part in the attack. In sum, NYT represents the Palestinians as being involved in many more violent actions than the Israelis. Israeli actions, including the incursion in Gaza, are represented in neutral terms as movements, mental processes and speech acts unlike Palestinian actions which are represented as violent acts, e.g. (*killed, kidnapped, etc.*) Moreover, agency and affected participants are clear with Palestinian actions, thus causal relationships and responsibility are obvious.

6.2 Transitivity Analysis of the *Arab News* Reports

6.2.1 Transitivity and the representation of Israeli violence

When reporting Israeli violence, AN tends to use transitivity structures that present agency and responsibility clearly. It also tends to highlight the consequences of such violence and to present them prominently in reports. In the report of the 31st of July 2001, the AN report focuses on Israeli violence against the Palestinians. Israeli actions are represented using the transactive model which clearly indicates causal relationships and responsibility, e.g. (*Israeli gunships pound Gaza*). The consequences of the action are prominent in the report, e.g. (*the blast smashed walls and blew out windows*). The report also mentions the killing of six Palestinians in a non-agentive passive construction. Although transitivity does clearly indicate Israeli responsibility, it is indirectly blamed on Israel through quoting Palestinian sources. Jewish ultra-nationalists are represented as provocateurs and initiators of violence. Their action and its consequences are also represented in the transactive model (*the Jewish action sparked clashes which left at least 18 Palestinians injured*).

The Palestinians are not represented as involved in any violence against the Israelis. Instead, they are largely represented as affected by Israeli violence, e.g. (*at least four Palestinian policemen were injured*). The report includes mutual violent actions that are represented using nominalisations, e.g. *unrest, clashes, escalation of violence, etc.* In sum, AN represents Israeli violence using clear transitivity and agency structures that firmly establish Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians. There is no mention of any Palestinian violence, yet escalation and clashes are expressed using nominalisations as a mutual action.

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, AN concentrates on the killing of Sheikh Yassin and presents Israeli actions against Sheikh Yassin in details using activation, e.g. (*Israel assassinated Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Sharon personally ordered and monitored the helicopter attack, etc.*) The use of activation and particularly the transactive model clearly establishes causal relations and confirms Israeli responsibility for the killing. The main story of the AN report is told within a wider context of other Israeli violent acts that took place before and after the bombing, e.g. (*Israel tried to kill*

Sheik Yassin, Israeli forces killed four Palestinians, etc.) There are some nominalisations as well, e.g. (*murder, assassination, etc.*) They semantically criminalise the Israeli actions, and present them in a condensed way, e.g. in the headline. AN presents three violent Palestinian reactions to the assassination using activation, e.g. (*the occupied territories erupted in anger, an Arab stabbed and wounded three passengers on an Israeli bus and an ax-wielding Palestinian wounded three people*). Although Palestinian violent reactions are present in the report, they are presented as reactions.

In the report of the 7th of July 2006, AN presents many violent actions undertaken by the Israelis, including *killing, invading, targeting, fighting*; they are mostly presented as affecting the Palestinians e.g. (*its forces killed at least 21 Palestinians, Israeli aircraft targeted Palestinians.*) The report includes a lot of violent actions undertaken by Israelis which are presented using a variety of structures. Activation, particularly the transactive model, is the most common mode for reporting on Israeli violence. The headline and lead employ the transactive model to highlight Israeli responsibility for violence and its consequences, e.g. (*Israeli Missiles and Shells Kill 21, the Jewish state invaded Gaza, etc.*) Nominalisations are used with some Israeli actions; although nominalisations have the potential to conceal agency and causal relationships, AN makes these relations explicit by using attributions and prepositional phrases, e.g. (*Israel's extensive military operation, violations by Israel*).

The purpose of the Israeli actions is presented in a prepositional phrase 'over a soldier's capture', which presents it as a pretext rather than a justification. The impacts of the Israeli actions are prominent in the report, e.g. (*nine Palestinians were killed, at least 24 wounded in an Israeli bombardment, etc.*) The purpose of Palestinian violence is not present in the report at all. Its impacts are also downplayed, with the effect of presenting the Palestinians as unable to affect the Israelis. The AN report also includes violent actions undertaken by Palestinians, especially in the background. Transitivity structures used in the report contribute to the presentation of the Palestinians as unable to act. The Israelis are represented as doing most of the violence, while the Palestinians are mainly represented as affected participants. Even when the Palestinians are represented as undertaking violent acts against the Israelis, such acts are presented as futile, or unable to affect the Israelis, e.g. (*Hamas activists fired two upgraded rockets ...*

No one was hurt). In sum, transitivity structures used in AN represent the Israelis as responsible for many violent actions against the Palestinians who are represented as victims.

6.2.2 Transitivity and the representation of Palestinian violence

AN tries to mitigate Palestinian responsibility for violence against the Israelis where possible; however, this is not possible in most of the cases due to the effective Israeli media that communicate information about Palestinian violence widely and quickly. In the report of 1st of August 2002 which deals with a bombing at an Israeli university, the main event is represented vaguely in the headline (*Jerusalem bomb kills seven*) using the transactive model with an inanimate agent '*Jerusalem bomb*' and a numeral '*seven*' as the affected participant, which completely conceals the identities of both the perpetrator and the victims. AN keeps the identity of the agent concealed in the lead as well (*a bomb ripped through a busy university cafeteria*). Although AN uses the transactive model to present Palestinian violence, human agency is not presented at all along with it; instead, the agent is presented as bomb, explosion, etc.

The consequences of the attack are presented in the leads of both papers using the active participle (*killing seven people...*). The cause of the bombing is presented clearly in the report as the killing of Hamas leader by Israel a week before the bombing. AN represents it as (*it was in retaliation for the Gaza raid that killed its military leader, Salah Shehade, and nine Palestinian children*), AN presents the Israeli raid using the transactive model (*killed its military leader*). Responsibility is presented through a verbal process (*responsibility for the lunchtime blast at Hebrew University at Mount Scopus was claimed by Hamas*).

The report of the 15th of January 2004 deals mainly with a suicide bombing at a Gaza checkpoint. Transitivity structures present the story with clear agency and causal relationships, especially since the story is quoted from Israeli military sources. Activation is used to represent the events, e.g. in the headline, lead and body of the report (*Mother-of-Two Bomber Kills Four Israelis, a Palestinian mother of two blew herself up, etc.*). The consequences are prominent in the report, and they are mainly presented through active participles, e.g. (*killing three Israeli soldiers, signaling a new*

tactic by Hamas). Responsibility is expressed using a verbal process (*the bombing was jointly claimed by Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades*). The Israeli side is represented as undertaking many violent actions as reactions to the attack: (*it will temporarily close the crossing to Palestinians*) as background information (*a British man shot in the head by Israeli troops in Gaza Strip last April*); and as a potential response (*Israel would hit back*).

In the report of the 26th of June 2006, AN describes the actions of Palestinian militant during the attack as well as Israeli responses to it. The AN report presents details of the Palestinian attack using active clauses to describe the movements and actions of fighters who undertook the operation, e.g. (*fired, smuggled, charged, and attacked*). The inanimate agent '*the attack*' is used in the lead to summarise the story. Active participles are used to present the consequences, e.g. *killing, wounding, etc.* The Palestinians are also presented as involved in a number of speech acts which convey different actions and reactions to the attack, e.g. (*condemned, appealed, urged, announced, etc.*) The main construction for presenting consequences of the attack is passivisation, e.g. (*was abducted, were wounded, etc.*)

AN uses activation to present Israeli military and non-military responses to the attack, e.g. the movements and actions of the Israeli forces in Gaza, e.g. (*sent tanks and troops, moved, opened gunfire, and closed the crossings*). Activation is also used with speech act verbs that present verbal reactions of Israeli officials, e.g. (*phoned, urged, etc.*) Passivisation is used one time only with Israeli actions in relation to closing the Rafah terminal. It is also used to present contextual information about the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories in 1967. In conclusion, the AN report focuses on the Palestinian attack and its consequences, as well as reactions to it. However, the Israeli military response is also prominent in the report which presents both sides as involved in violence against each other. Activation is the most prominent structure for presenting the actions of both sides, and agency is clear in the report, even the instances of agent deletion or substitution can be recovered from the context.

6.3 Transitivity Analysis of the *Guardian's* Reports

6.3.1 Transitivity and the representation of Israeli violence

The *Guardian* reports represent Israeli violence with clear agency and responsibility when Israeli responsibility has been confirmed. In general, the *Guardian* represents violence as mutual between both sides. The *Guardian's* report of the 31st of July 2001 includes many violent incidents, mainly the killing of six Palestinians and the bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters. Responsibility for the killing is completely obfuscated through the use of abstract nominalisations as agents, i.e. *explosion* and *blast*, and the non-agentive passive (*were killed*). This is appropriate as Israel denied responsibility, and agents remain unknown. When Israeli responsibility for violence is confirmed, it is clearly represented in the report (*Israeli helicopter gunships rocketed the Palestinian police headquarters*). Although Israeli responsibility is clearly presented, there is a metonymical substitution of real agents by non-human agents (*Israeli helicopter gunships*). The purpose of the bombing is presented in close proximity to the action through a statement of the Israeli army which presents the attack as justified. The consequences are also presented through active participles (*sending out great clouds of white smoke and injuring at least three*).

The Palestinian side is represented as involved in a number of violent actions mostly in background information; some violence is against other Palestinians, (e.g. *the gangland-style killing of the chief of Palestinian television*), and other incidents are against Israel, (e.g. *attacking targets inside the Jewish state*). There is also potential Palestinian violence that has not materialised which is expressed through nominalisations, e.g. *bombing attempts*. There are some violent actions against Israelis; they are expressed through nominalisations and are not blamed on Palestinians, e.g. *the stabbing of a Jewish man*. The *Guardian's* report deals mainly with violence against the Palestinians that left six dead and at least three injured, yet the report presents more Palestinian than Israeli violence through the presentation of background information and potential violence. There is no cause or purpose presented for Palestinian violence. Agency for Palestinian violence is clearly presented through activation, e.g. *claimed the gangland-style killing*. Even with potential violence which is expressed through nominalisation, agency is presented through a prepositional phrase, e.g. *a car bomb*

attack ... by militants.

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004 which deals with the assassination of Sheikh Yassin, the *Guardian* uses transitivity structures that present Israeli agency and responsibility clearly in the headline, e.g. (*Israel assassinates Hamas leader*); and in the body of the report, e.g. (*Israeli soldiers fired on the crowds*). The choice of the transactive model with clear agency makes causal relationships and Israeli responsibility obvious. The consequences of the killing are represented using the active participle and the non-agentive passive, e.g. (*killing Yassin and seven others*), and (*seventeen people were wounded*). Most of the actions of Israeli officials are represented as mental or verbal processes, e.g. (*the Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, oversaw the operation, Shaul Mofaz, defiantly pledged.*) The cause of Israeli action is clearly presented using quotations from Israeli sources. Nominalisations are also used to represent some Israeli actions, e.g. (*assassination, strike, etc.*)

The Palestinians are represented as involved in violence some of which is directed towards the Israelis. Palestinians' angry reactions to the killing are expressed in terms of threatening revenge, pouring into the streets, etc. These acts are associated with the threatening behaviour of an angry mob, e.g. (*militants vow revenge attacks, tens of thousands of mourners poured on to the streets, angry crowds called for revenge against Israel and the US*). The transactive model is used to represent the firing of ten rockets towards Israel (*Palestinian militants fired 10 home-made rockets toward an Israeli settlement in Gaza*). The *Guardian* presents the harsh Israeli response to Palestinian demonstrations as spontaneous clashes between both sides, and the death of the victims is presented in an agentless passive construction (*violent clashes between demonstrators and Israeli security forces broke out, and four Palestinians - including a 13-year-old boy and a journalist - were reported to have been killed when Israeli soldiers fired on the crowds*).

Although the reports of July 2006 deal primarily with an Israeli incursion in Gaza, violence is represented as committed by both sides against each other. The *Guardian* represents some violent actions as mutually undertaken or as affecting both sides; these are represented vaguely while avoiding placing responsibility for them on

any side. Constructions used in them include middle voice verbs (*18 die*), agentless passives (*at least 17 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier were killed*), inanimate agents (*gunfire cut through the walls and hit his nephew*) and existentials (*there was shooting*). In these constructions, it is not possible to determine which side undertook the action. The purpose of the Israeli incursion and the subsequent violence is prominent in the beginning of the report; (*to prevent rocket at Israel and put pressure on the captors of Corporal Gilad Shalit*).

Agents of Israeli violent actions are institutionalised, e.g. (*it 'the army' killed 10 militants*) and (*Israel increased its offensive*). This legitimises the actions and conceals the crucial agency for them. Agents are sometimes metonymically substituted by inanimate agents, including actors and affected participants, e.g. (*Israeli tanks and bulldozers were destroying orchards*). Moreover, Israeli violence is presented as targeting or affecting either militants or inanimate objects, so that violence is either directed towards legitimate targets or inanimate objects. This downplays the impacts of such violence and justifies it. Additionally, civilian victims are mentioned in relational or middle voice constructions that do not require agency or responsibility. In conclusion, transitivity constructions mitigate Israeli responsibility for violence in a number of ways: mostly agent deletion or substitution, or representing the action as mutual or spontaneous.

6.3.2 Transitivity and the representation of Palestinian violence

The *Guardian* represents Palestinian violence with clear agency, transitivity structures and highlights its consequences. In the report of the 1st August 2002, which deals mainly with a bombing of a café at the Hebrew University, transitivity structures present the bombing, its consequences and Palestinian responsibility for it clearly. Palestinian violence is activated in the headline, lead and body of both papers. The headline (*Bomb kills seven at university - Hamas attacks mixed campus in revenge for assassination*) uses the transactive model with material processes which represents causal relationships and responsibility clearly. The lead uses activation and human agents for the same effect. The consequences of the attack are presented using the active participle (*killing at least seven people and injuring more than 70*). The body of the report focuses on the consequences of the attack, which are presented in a variety of

constructions, e.g. agentless passives (*the forecourt of the Frank Sinatra international students' centre was splattered with blood ...*). Some consequences are presented through the statements of eye-witnesses which are mostly in short sentences and conversational style.

In the reports of the 15th of January 2004, transitivity structures present the actions of the bomber clearly and vividly with no mitigation. The transactive model is used mainly to represent her actions with clear agents, actions and consequences. The bomber is represented as involved in many actions, e.g. (*killed four Israelis, detonated her 2kg bomb, etc.*) Her actions are presented in detail, especially with regards to deceiving Israeli soldier and faking disability; moreover, the consequences of the attack are presented clearly using activation, e.g. (*killed four Israelis, the blast tore open the corrugated iron, etc.*) The Israeli side is represented as involved in very few actions, chiefly verbal reactions to the bombing, as well as other reactions, e.g. *closing the crossing, and the demolition of the family house of the bomber.*

The report of the 26th of July 2006 provides a clear and coherent description of the actions of militants during the raid. The Palestinian militants are represented as involved in actions that target Israeli people and objects and affect them, such as (*attacked, fired, etc.*) In addition, Palestinian officials and militants are involved in a number of speech acts such as (*called on, said, etc.*) On the other hand, most of the actions of the Israeli side are represented as speech acts and planned response. The report focuses on Palestinian violence and reactions to it. Activation, and particularly the transactive model, is used extensively with Palestinian violence and its consequences, e.g. (*killed, kidnapped, attacked, etc.*) Human agency is prominent in the majority of these actions, and the Israeli people and objects are represented as affected participants; this expresses causal relationships and firmly establishes Palestinian responsibility. Reactions to the attack and its consequences are also activated, e.g. (*condemned, said, declared, etc.*)

Israel is largely represented as reacting using mental and verbal processes. Activation is used to represent such reactions, e.g. (*promised revenge, ordered, threatened, etc.*) Nominalisations are used to predict or introduce potential Israeli

reactions, e.g. (*assassination, attack, invasion, threat, etc.*) The report does not mention the Israeli military action in Gaza which started shortly after the attack. In conclusion, choices of transitivity constructions in the *Guardian* contribute to presenting Palestinians' actions vividly and clearly, and violence is presented as targeting the Israeli side. On the other hand, the Israelis are presented as involved in mental processes and speech acts as reactions.

6.4 Transitivity Analysis of the *Times*' Reports

6.4.1 Transitivity and the representation of Israeli violence

The *Times* tends to use transitivity structures that mitigate Israeli responsibility for violence and that represent violence as spontaneous or as mutual action. The report of the 31st July 2001 which deals with the killing of 6 Palestinian activists and the bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters is very short, and it includes very few actions. It includes one Israeli act of violence against the Palestinians, i.e. (*missiles from Israeli helicopters damaged the Palestinian police headquarters*), which uses the transactive model with non-human agents, and Israeli involvement is expressed through an adjectival. Consequences of the attack are mitigated and presented as (*no serious injuries*). Although there is no real Palestinian violence, potential violence is represented through a nominalisation, i.e. (*Palestinian bombing attacks against Israel*). The killing of six Palestinians is naturalised through the use of the middle voice (*died*), and an agentless passive (*six men killed*); therefore, responsibility for it is completely mitigated. Both papers use transitivity structures that conceal agency for most of the actions reported, as responsibility for many of the actions is not clear.

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004 that deals with the assassination of Sheikh Yassin, the *Times*' report tries to mitigate Israeli responsibility, e.g. in the headline (*Hamas spiritual leader killed in Israeli air strike*) through the use of an agentless passive that obfuscates agency and mitigates responsibility, although it is loosely indicated by the use of the circumstantial. In the body of the report, the *Times* uses both activation and passivisation to represent Israeli violence; however, the two instances of using activation are in the non-transactive model, e.g. (*two Israeli helicopter gunships hovered*).

The paper clearly presents Palestinians' angry reactions to the killing which are associated with the threatening behaviour of an angry mob, e.g. (*tens of thousands of mourners jammed the streets of Gaza City, others clamoured for revenge, Hamas promised a harsh response.*) The harsh Israeli response to angry demonstrations by the Palestinians is represented, however the *Times* mentions one victim only, i.e. the boy, and represents his death in agentive passive (*a 13-year-old Palestinian boy was killed by Israeli troops during a mass demonstration in the southern Gaza Strip town of Khan Yunis*).

In the report of the 7th of July 2006, transitivity structures used in the *Times* to represent violent events in Gaza conceal responsibility for about one third of the reported actions which are represented using structures that completely mitigate responsibility. These actions are represented as spontaneous actions using the middle voice, e.g. (*death toll rose*), (*fighting that broke out*); as nominalisations, e.g. (*fighting, clashes, exchanges*); and using existential structures, e.g. (*there had been exchanges of fire*), (*there is fighting*). Moreover, a number of actions are presented as mutual, e.g. (*Israeli forces and militants continued desultory exchanges of fire*). The Israeli side is represented as undertaking a number of violent activities. More than one third of these actions are nominalised, i.e. they are represented as abstract nouns, rather than actions, e.g. (*assault, airstrike, fire, etc.*) Most of the remaining actions have inanimate agents that substitute human agents, e.g. (*Israel renewed its assault, aircraft fired at four armed Palestinians, etc.*) The purpose of Israeli actions is presented clearly, e.g. (*to win freedom for a captured soldier and put Israel out of the militants' increasingly longer rocket range, etc.*)

Although the Palestinians are represented as involved in fewer actions, their actions are not given any purpose or justification. Palestinian agency and responsibility for violence against Israelis is clear through the use of activation, e.g. (*Palestinian militants used as cover to fire 14 missiles towards*); and the agentive passivise is used with Palestinian violence, e.g. (*Corporal Gilad Shalit, captured ... by militants*). The impacts of Palestinian violence are represented clearly and in detail even when they do not have any physical effect, e.g. (*the latest rocket attacks have caused concern for Israeli army chiefs and panic among civilians*). It is clear from the above analysis that

the actions of the Palestinians and the Israelis are presented differently. The *Times* represents most of the actions as mutually responsible and presents the Israeli actions as justified while Palestinian actions are denied any justification. The activities of Israeli forces against the Palestinians often have concealed agency and mitigated responsibility.

6.4.2 Transitivity and the representation of Palestinian violence

Palestinian violence is represented clearly in the *Times*, with clear actions, agents and affected participants. In the report of the 1st of August 2002, the bombing at a café at the Hebrew University and its consequences are the focus. Transitivity structures present the bombing, its consequences and Palestinian responsibility for it clearly through the use of activation, and particularly the transactive model. The *Times*' headline (*Hamas bomb kills seven students at Jerusalem's multicultural university*) uses the transactive model to establish clear causal relationships and responsibility. The lead presents some of the consequences of the bombing through description, i.e. destruction caused by the attack. The body of the report tells the story of the bombing and underlines its consequences, e.g. (*Seven ... lay dead and more than 80 injured after a Hamas bomber struck*). Palestinian violence is expressed using activation with human agents which establishes clear causality and responsibility. The same story is repeated later in the report (*a bomb left in a bag on a table inside the crowded cafeteria exploded near the till, shredding bodies*). The consequences of the attack are presented through active participles, descriptions and eye-witness accounts.

In the report of the 15th of January 2004, transitivity structures present the actions of the bomber clearly. Actions are presented along with clear agents and consequences, e.g. (*the woman detonated a larger device than usual, shrapnel peppered the walls and left a scene of charred devastation inside the cabin, etc.*) The bomber is represented as involved in many actions, such as faking a disability and detonating a large device. Her actions are presented in detail, especially with regards to deceiving an Israeli soldier and faking disability. The consequences of the bombing are presented mainly using active participles, e.g. (*killing four security staff and wounding seven people*), and some consequences are passivised, e.g. (*its corrugated aluminium roof was peeled back, Seven people were injured, etc.*) The report focuses on Palestinian violence only, and it does not mention any Israeli violence even in background information, etc. The Israeli

reaction is presented in terms of closing the crossing, and it is nominalised.

The report of the 26th of June 2006 provides a clear and coherent description of the actions of militants who are represented as involved in actions that target Israeli people and objects and affect them. The actions of Palestinian militants are presented coherently, e.g. (*Palestinians, including Hamas members, launched a pre-dawn raid on Kerem Shalom beside southern Gaza, emerging from a tunnel to hurl bombs and grenades at the base, etc.*) In addition, Palestinian officials and militants are involved in a number of speech acts such as (*called on, said, etc.*) On the other hand, most of the actions of the Israeli side are represented as speech acts and planned response. The *Times* mentions actual military actions in Gaza briefly with its purpose foregrounded.

The *Times* also focuses on Palestinian actions and their consequences. Activation, particularly the transactive model, is used as the main construction to represent Palestinian violence, e.g. (*launched a raid, attacked, launched rockets, etc.*) Passivised constructions are used when representing certain Palestinian actions, e.g. (*kidnapping, abducting, snatching, and claiming responsibility*). Nominalisation is also used with Palestinian actions, e.g. (*ambush, raid, attack, assault, operation, etc.*) Activation is used to represent some Israeli actions, especially with speech acts and the incursion in Gaza in response to the attack, including (*hunting for the soldier, mounting an assault and firing into open fields.*) Israeli violence is not represented as affecting Palestinians; it is presented in the non-transactive model as movements, e.g. (*crossed into Gaza, moved a short distance into Gaza*) or as targeting inanimate objects, e.g. (*fired into open space.*). Moreover, the purpose of the Israeli action is foregrounded, e.g. (*to hunt for the kidnapped soldier, to search and investigate the tunnel and to destroy the tunnel.*) In sum, the report focuses on violence undertaken by the Palestinians, responsibility for violence and its consequences which are clear with Palestinian actions, unlike Israeli actions which are either verbal or non-transitive.

6.5 Conclusion

In this section, the use of transitivity structures to represent Israeli and Palestinian violence is compared in the four selected newspapers. In line with the use of narrative structures, NYT uses transitivity structures that contribute to the de-

narrativisation of stories of Israeli violence and that mitigate responsibility for violent actions and downplay their effects on Palestinians. In most of the reports, Israeli violence is expressed using constructions that suppress or background agency and also obfuscate causality and responsibility for violence, e.g. using *middle voice verbs* associated with spontaneous actions without involvement of agents (*Fighting Surges and Deaths Rise*) [NYT, 7 July 2006]; nominalisations that present actions like entities void of time and process or change (*fighting, deaths, etc.*); and passivisation which presents the action as a finished process, i.e. more like a state than a process (*a member of Hamas was reported killed, the militant was killed, about 30 Palestinians were wounded, nearly 20 Palestinians have been killed*) [NYT, 7 July 2006]. In addition, the substitution of human agents with inanimate agents is used, so as to hide crucial agency and responsibility, e.g. (*Israeli tanks fired shells at houses, Three separate airstrikes accounted for the deaths of six Palestinians, Israeli tank fire killed two militants, etc.*) [NYT, 7 July 2006].

More than one feature can be used together to make agency and responsibility almost impossible to recover, e.g. the use of nominalisations with middle voice verbs, e.g. (*Deaths Rise*) [NYT, 7 July 2006]. It is also common to represent violence as a mutual act in which both the Israelis and Palestinians are involved e.g. (*Israeli troops and Palestinian militants had waged their most intense battles*) [NYT, 7 July 2006]. On the other hand, NYT in most of the cases presents Palestinian agency and responsibility for violence very clearly without trying to conceal or mitigate it, e.g. (*gunmen from various Palestinian factions fired automatic rifles and antitank rockets at the Israeli troops, Palestinians fired eight rockets from Gaza at Israel on Thursday, Palestinians were seen planting explosives in manholes, Palestinian fighters had been preparing earthen barricades, explosive charges and positions for shooting, etc.*) [7 July 2006]. Palestinian violence is also presented without any justification or purpose, and its consequences are often prominent and sometimes they are exaggerated.

On the other hand, AN shows Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians clearly and tries to conceal agency when representing Palestinian violence, especially in headlines and lead paragraphs. It focuses on the consequences of Israeli violence, and its causes are usually presented as well. In sum, transitivity structures are

used ideologically by both papers, as NYT, in most of the instances, tries to use constructions that conceal agency for Israeli violence against the Palestinians and to foreground its causes and background its impacts, especially on civilians, while agency for Palestinian violence is often presented clearly with prominent consequences. On the other hand, AN shows Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians clearly and foregrounds its consequences.

Considering the use of transitivity constructions in the *Guardian* and the *Times*, both papers use a variety of constructions to represent the actions of both sides. However, the main difference between both papers is that the *Guardian* often uses constructions that present Israeli responsibility for violence against Palestinians more clearly than the *Times*, especially when Israeli responsibility for violence is confirmed or cannot be denied. As explained in the example about the assassination of Sheikh Yassin; (*Israel assassinates Hamas leader*) [the *Guardian*, 22 March 2004] and (*Hamas spiritual leader killed in Israeli air strike*) [the *Times*, 22 March 2004].

Both newspapers present Palestinian violence very clearly with obvious agency, causality and responsibility. There is hardly any attempt to conceal agency or responsibility, or even to downplay its consequences. The transactive model is the preferred structure to represent Palestinian violence. When it comes to the representation of Israeli violence, both papers represent it along with Palestinian violence in the same report. Reports often include a lot of violent actions which are undertaken by both sides against each other; some of which are presented as mutual. The most notable difference between both papers in the presentation of Israeli violence is that the *Times* uses structures of transitivity to conceal Israeli agency and responsibility for violence against the Palestinians by using actions with inanimate agents in mostly non-transactive constructions, e.g. (*two Israeli helicopter gunships hovered in the sky*), (*troops opened fire from a watchtower*), etc. [the *Times*, 22 March 2004]. On the other hand, the *Guardian* tends to use transitivity structures to represent Israeli responsibility more clearly, e.g. (*Israeli soldiers fired on the crowds*), (*Israel assassinates Hamas leader*), etc. [the *Guardian*, 22 March 2004].

7 Lexical Analysis

Lexis is a very important resource available for journalists. It has the vital role of labelling and describing people and their actions; thus, it affects the positive and negative representation of people and their actions. The choice of a certain label to the exclusion of others often carries values that are conveyed to the readers or other recipients of discourse. In this section, the use of lexis to refer to different sides of the conflict and their actions in the selected newspapers is examined.

7.1 Lexical Analysis of the *New York Times* Reports

7.1.1 Lexis and the representation of Israeli violence

In the report of the 31st of July 2001 which deals mainly with the killing of six Palestinian activists in the West Bank and the bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza, the dominant image of the Israelis is that of victims, even if this violence is merely false alarms. NYT represents the Israelis both collectively and individually, and both as ordinary people and as officials. Labels used with them include reference to national identity (*Israelis*), age (*9-year-old girl*), religion (*a Jewish man*), and occupation (*police officers*) as well as being identified by name and institutional capacity (*Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, the deputy defense minister*). There is also metonymical substitution of Israelis by (*Israeli helicopters*), and as such they are represented as involved in the action of firing at a Palestinian building. Israeli institutions mentioned in the report include *Israel, army* and *army radio*. NYT presents the Israelis as victims of some violent incidents like stabbing, and also of other insignificant ones like tyre or can bursting. The inclusion of certain incidents of no newsworthiness in the NYT report and their dramatisation demonstrate a great deal of sympathy towards the Israelis. For example, in relation to the incident of a can bursting, this sympathy is expressed explicitly in the report (*no one was hurt. But nerves were rattled, and the mere rumor of yet another attack jangled them further*).

In the same report, NYT represents the Palestinians by reference to their national identity (*Palestinians*), occupation (*police*), and militant activity (*bomb makers*). The

only person mentioned by name is (*Yasir Arafat*). The Palestinian institutions mentioned in the report include the *Palestinian Authority* and a militant group *the Aksa Brigades, the armed branch of Mr. Arafat's Fatah faction*. Arafat is mentioned in relation to both institutions which presents him as controversial or even dubious. The Palestinians are represented as involved in some violent actions against the Israelis, e.g. (*showered stones at Jews praying*). NYT avoids mentioning Palestinian civilians and ordinary people who are completely absent from the report, and the only Palestinian who is identified by name is Mr. Arafat. The killing of six Palestinians is presented mainly by focusing on the conflicting views about the circumstances of their death; NYT casts doubts on all views that blame Israel for the killing, and at the same time it positively presents Israeli views, which blame the victims for their own deaths. NYT does not express any sympathy for the six Palestinians who were killed, instead, it presents them as bomb makers, as members of a militant group and as wanted terrorists which delegitimises them.

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004 which deals with the assassination of Sheikh Yassin, lexicalisation is a crucial resource in the presentation of this event. The use of lexis to refer to Sheikh Yassin and Hamas and to describe them makes all the difference in the presentation and the interpretation of the events. NYT refers to Yassin as (*the spiritual leader and founder of the militant Palestinian group Hamas, the most significant Palestinian militant, etc.*) This delegitimises him for being associated with militancy. The paper also presents Yassin as a controversial character (*Sheik Yassin, a symbol to Palestinians of resistance to Israel and to Israelis of Palestinian terrorism*); moreover, it does not use the word 'disabled' to refer to him, instead it uses the technical term '*quadriplegic*' to refer to his medical condition. This term does not have the same effect and does not invoke any sympathy like the common label 'disabled'.

NYT presents ordinary Palestinians in terms of their sheer numbers as an angry mob involved in violence and calling for revenge, e.g. (*thousands of Palestinians, more than a thousand people, demonstrators, etc.*) Ordinary Palestinians are also presented as witnesses and victims, e.g. (*one witness, Maher al-Beek, at least two bodyguards, etc.*) The third image of Palestinians is that of officials, e.g. (*Ismail Haniya, a political leader*

of Hamas,) and (*Ahmed Qurei, the Palestinian prime minister*). The last image of Palestinians is that of militants, and they are presented as members of Hamas and as involved in violence and threats against Israel. This image is very prominent in NYT. On the other hand, Israel is institutionalised, and its main image is official and military through the representations of Israeli officials and military institutions, e.g. (*Israeli officials, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, soldiers, etc.*) Weapons are also prominent, e.g. (*an Israeli missile and the Israeli weapons*), especially as agents of violence. In sum, the most prominent image of Palestinians in the report is that of militants while the most prominent image of Israelis is official and military.

In the report of the 7th of July 2006 which deals with an Israeli incursion in Gaza, the Palestinians are predominantly represented as militants, through the choice of certain labels and descriptions, e.g. (*militant, gunman, fighter, masked, etc.*) They are also mentioned in conjunction with organisations such as ‘*Hamas*’ and ‘*Islamic Jihad*’ which are considered by Israel and the West as terrorist, e.g. (*militants from Islamic Jihad, Hamas militant, etc.*) This delegitimises them and presents them as criminals and terrorists since they belong to terrorist organisations. Palestinian militants are mainly represented as involved in violent actions that target the Israelis e.g. (*preparing earthen barricades, explosive charges and positions for shooting, using light weapons, fired automatic rifles and antitank rockets, etc.*) These actions are presented with no justification, which makes them seem irrational and condemnable. In addition, Palestinian militancy is also emphasised and confirmed by mentioning ‘*weapons*’ that the Palestinians possess and use, e.g. (*light weapons like Kalashnikovs, M-16's and antitank grenades, rockets, explosives, light weapons, etc.*) Furthermore, the home-made rockets that are fired from Gaza towards Israel are mentioned as a justification for the Israeli incursion and as a threat. The emphasis on weapons that the Palestinians have and use against the Israelis contributes to the delegitimation of the Palestinians and to their representation as a threat to the state of Israel and the security of its citizens. Palestinians are criminalised by choice of words like ‘*sniper*’ which implies deliberate criminal actions.

Palestinian victims of the Israeli incursion are downplayed in the NYT report,

and responsibility for their deaths is mitigated. The reported Israeli incursion left twenty Palestinians dead and thirty others injured, however, the fate of Palestinian victims is naturalised as ‘*death*’ which obfuscates human agency. The verb ‘*kill*’ is used in passive constructions and/or with inanimate agents. Besides, most of the Palestinian victims are represented as ‘*militants*’ or ‘*gunmen*’, not as civilians. This justifies the Israeli actions against them, as they are represented as posing a menace to Israel. Victims are also aggregated and treated like numbers or statistics, which has the effect of dehumanising them and downplaying the effect of their deaths. Dehumanisation of the Palestinian people is most obvious in the sentence that describes the way Israeli soldiers use firearms near Palestinian children in order to get them to scatter. Although children are most vulnerable and worthy of protection, and there are important social values associated with their protection, Israeli soldiers use firearms to scatter them, and NYT naturalises this and justifies it in the report (*Israeli soldiers fired near groups of children in what appeared to be an effort to get them to scatter*). Although the report deals mainly with Israeli violence which resulted in the death of twenty Palestinians, the Palestinians are represented as violent militants who appear mainly as perpetrators of violence. The report does not offer any justification or cause for Palestinian actions. NYT does not mention the tens of thousands of civilians who live in Palestinian towns e.g. Beit Lahiya where most of the fighting takes place, has more than 40,000 civilians.

The most prominent image of the Israeli side is the military image. This presentation helps institutionalise and legitimise Israeli actions in Gaza. Various Israeli institutions are mentioned in the report including: (*Israel, the Israeli military, the armed forces, etc.*) Institutionalisation of the Israeli side contributes to the positive presentation of Israel as a country of institutions, a representation that is consistent with Western values of a democratic state. In addition, it contributes to the mitigation of Israeli responsibility for violence by attributing it to institutions which impersonalises and legitimises it, since institutionalisation represents actions as formal, impersonal and legitimate. This is used in relation to controversial actions undertaken by the Israelis, as well as controversial statements and decisions, e.g. (*Israel drives deeper in Gaza, Israel says it will not negotiate for the release of the soldier.*)

Israeli violence is naturalised by the choice of verbs associated with natural occurrence, e.g. ‘surge’ and ‘rise’ are associated with natural phenomena such as ‘sunrise’ and ‘wave surge’. The reader is less likely to ask about those responsible for the increase of fighting and deaths. The same applies to the choice of the nominal ‘deaths’ which is preferred to ‘killing’ although it is less accurate in this context. Israeli violence is also neutralised by presenting it in less negative terms, for instance in terms of movement, e.g. (*drives deeper, entered, re-entered, ventured, and moved.*) The presentation of the Israeli incursion as movement downplays it and reduces its impacts.

Responsibility for Israeli violence is mitigated by the metonymical substitution of human agents with inanimate agents such as weapons, e.g. (*Israeli tanks fired shells; an Israeli airstrike killed two militants, etc.*) Thus, crucial agency is concealed, and violence is represented as undertaken by inanimate agents that cannot be held accountable. Mitigation is also achieved by means of vagueness and generalisations, e.g. ‘it was one of the bloodiest days in Gaza’, or by presenting the actions as mutual, e.g. ‘Israeli troops and Palestinian militants had waged their most intense battles’. The Israeli victim is very prominent in the report although the Israeli incursion left twenty Palestinians dead and thirty injured. The one Israeli soldier who was killed is mentioned twice in the report, although it is against good journalistic practice to repeat any information in the text. Bell (1991) states that: “repetition is a mortal sin in news writing”. In both occasions, the agent of the killing is labelled ‘sniper’. Whereas the killing of Palestinians is naturalised and responsibility for it is mitigated, the killing of the Israeli soldier is criminalised. In conclusion, NYT presents the Israelis and the Palestinians in different categories, yet both sides are represented as mutually involved in violence against each other. While Palestinian violence is criminalised, Israeli violence is naturalised, justified and mitigated.

7.1.2 Lexis and the representation of Palestinian violence

The representation of Palestinian violence in NYT is quite different from the representation of Israeli violence. In the report of the 1st of August 2002 which deals with a bombing at the Hebrew University. The bombing resulted in the death of seven and the injury of many others. NYT expresses a great deal of sympathy towards the

victims and uses lexis in a personal way with the Israeli side. Many eye-witnesses and victims who are interviewed are named, and there is information about their age, origin and institutional capacity e.g. (*Spencer Dew, 26, a divinity student from the University of Chicago, Kobi Cohen, the student union president, etc.*). NYT uses a variety of expressions, e.g. (*seven people, students, their peers, civilians, victims*). These expressions underpin their vulnerability and present more details about them which gains sympathy for them. NYT also names other sources and presents their professional capacities, so as to be more credible, e.g. (*Gideon Meir, a senior Foreign Ministry official, Ron Krumer, a spokesman for the Hadassah Medical Center, etc.*). The paper also mentions civilian institutions, e.g. (*the Hebrew University, the American Friends of the Hebrew University, etc.*) It uses adjectives and adverbs, e.g. (*stunned, frantically, worried, shirt spotted crimson and his khaki pants torn, etc.*) They highlight the severity of the attack and its consequences. Eye-witness accounts and statements are full of ideologically loaded expressions that negatively evaluate the bombing and highlight its consequences, e.g. *carnage, anarchy, killing, disgusting, etc.* In sum, the two prominent images of Israelis in the report are the civilian victims and the informed officials. There is a great deal of sympathy expressed towards them.

The main image of representing the Palestinians in the report is the militant, e.g. (*Palestinian militants, suicide bomber, etc.*) The other image which is less prominent is that of ordinary people, and they are presented in terms of co-existing peacefully with Israelis in the university before the bombing, e.g. (*Arab students and Arab workers*). Palestinian officials mentioned belong to Hamas, e.g. (*a top Hamas leader and Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, the political leader of Hamas*). The spokesman of Hamas confirms Hamas' responsibility and warns of more attacks against Israel. NYT mentions Palestinian militants who were involved in attacks against Israel. With regard to Palestinian institutions, both papers refer to *the Palestinian Authority and Hamas*. NYT describes Hamas as (*Islamist*), as opposed to Islamic, which implies that it has an extremist ideology.

In the report of the 15th of January 2004 which deals with a suicide bombing, NYT represents the Palestinians in three main categories: as militants, officials and

ordinary people. The most prominent category is the militants, as the report deals mostly with a suicide bombing. This is clear in expressions like (*bomber, suicide bomber, Hamas activist, etc.*) The report highlights the contrast between the identity of the bomber as a mother and as a bomber in expressions like (*mother-of-two bomber*), being the most newsworthy aspect of the story. NYT identifies the bomber by name and national identity, and it emphasises her young age and her being a mother, e.g. (*Gaza Mother, 22, Reem al-Reyashi, 22, etc.*) She is represented as involved in actions like (*killed, blew herself up, etc.*) NYT presents the story with many details, so the bomber is represented as involved in many actions, e.g. (*deceiving, feigning a limp, etc.*) It also mentions *Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas* and the militant organisations involved in the attack, namely *Hamas* and *Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades*. Another image of Palestinians is the image of ordinary Palestinians who are represented mainly as workers who need to pass the crossing to go to their work inside Israel, e.g. (*Palestinian workers, roughly 4,000 Palestinian workers, etc.*) The loss of their livelihood is blamed on the bombing. Other ordinary Palestinians are presented in both papers as relatives of the bomber, e.g. (*a son aged 3, her husband, a relative, etc.*). The last image of Palestinians presented in the report is that of officials, e.g. (*the Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qorei, Palestinian leaders, the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat*). They are involved in speech acts, e.g. declining to condemn the bombing and commenting on it. Relevant to the same image is Palestinian institutions, e.g. (*Fatah movement and the Palestinian leadership*.) The Israeli side appears in two main images, as victims and as officials. The NYT report represents one of the victims of the bombing as civilian which underpins his vulnerability (*a civilian security guard*). Other victims are presented as (*four security personnel*.) The official image is clear in the representation of officials who comment on the bombing. They are identified by name and institutional capacity, e.g. (*David Baker, an official in the office of Israel's prime minister*).

In the report of the 26th of June 2006 which deals with a Palestinian raid on an Israeli army post, the Palestinians are presented as militants and as officials. The militant image is presented with words like (*militants, guerrillas, fighters, etc.*), and they serve as agents of actions like (*killed, kidnapped, attacked, fired, etc.*) They are

negatively evaluated using descriptions like (*armed, etc.*) The official image can be noted in expressions like (*President Abbas, the spokesman for the government, Hamas Prime Minister, etc.*) They mainly serve as agents of speech acts such as (*condemn, appeal, announce, etc.*) Several Palestinian institutions are mentioned in the report, including the three militant groups involved in the attack including Hamas; moreover, there are legitimate institutions such as (*the Palestinian Authority.*) NYT singles out the Palestinian government as '*Hamas-government*'. This can be noted in expressions like (*the Hamas prime minister, Hamas ministers, the Hamas-led government, Hamas officials.*) This over-lexicalisation serves to present the government pejoratively, as it foregrounds affiliation to Hamas to its actual roles as the Palestinian government; thus, the government and its officials are not presented as legitimate mainstream representatives of the Palestinian people but are seen as belonging to Hamas. This creates a sense of otherness and undermines the fact that they were freely elected by the Palestinian people in democratic elections in January 2006. Moreover, the involvement of certain elements of Hamas in the attack is foregrounded in the report, so the link between Hamas and the government officials presents them negatively.

The Israeli side is represented in two main capacities: military and official. The military image is prominent in expressions like (*soldiers, corporal, military, army, etc.*) In this capacity, the Israelis serve mainly as victims of Palestinian violence, i.e. (*being killed, abducted, attacked, etc.*) The official image is presented through expressions like (*the Israeli Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, military officials, etc.*) They are presented as involved in a number of speech acts including (*phoned, urged, etc.*) Institutions mentioned in the reports include (*the Israeli army, the government Security Cabinet, etc.*) Objects associated with the Israeli side include arms and weapons, e.g. (*tanks, armed personnel carrier, Israeli military post, etc.*) that were attacked by Palestinian militants during the raid. Moreover, the paper mentions Israeli weapons that were used in a military incursion in Gaza in response to the Palestinian attack. NYT describes their actions as movements without referring to their impacts on the Palestinians, e.g. (*crossed into Gaza, moved a short distance into Gaza.*) These actions are presented as targeting inanimate objects, e.g. (*fired into open space.*) Moreover, the purpose of these actions is foregrounded, i.e. (*to hunt for the kidnapped soldier, to*

search and investigate the tunnel and to destroy the tunnel.)

7.2 Lexical Analysis of the *Arab News* Reports

7.2.1 Lexis and the representation of Israeli violence

In this section, lexical items used to represent the members and actions of the Israeli side are analysed. In the report of 31st July 2001, AN uses lexis differently with members of each side and their actions. The Israelis are referred to collectively only without reference to any individuals. They are represented in terms of occupation (*police*) and institutional capacity (*political sources*). There is one more category, i.e. (*a tiny group of Jewish ultra-nationalists*) which is expressed in negative terms as a group with an extremist ideology. Israeli institutions include *Israel* and *the army*. Moreover, there are instances of metonymical substitution of the Israelis by their weapons which are used against the Palestinians, e.g. (*Israeli gunships, combat helicopters, etc.*) Israel is represented as involved in many actions against the Palestinians, e.g. *pounding Gaza, firing five missiles, provoking clashes, etc.*

The Palestinians are referred to both collectively and individually, and labels that refer to them indicate national identity (*Palestinians*), political activity (*protesters*), occupation (*police*), institutional capacity (*Fatah officials*), and also names and positions (*Arafat's top aide Nabil Abu Rudeina*). AN describes Arafat as (*president*) which results in representing the Palestinians positively as a free nation with a president. Palestinians are mainly represented as victims of violence; moreover, they are not represented as involved in many actions which emphasises their helplessness and vulnerability, and which expresses sympathy with them. Palestinian institutions mentioned in the report include *Fatah Movement* and the *Palestinian Authority*.

AN refers only to legitimate and civilian Palestinian institutions and highlights Israeli *gunships* and *helicopter gunships* used in the attack against the Palestinians. It also represents them as victims of the provocation of *a tiny group of Jewish ultra-nationalists*. In this way, it depicts them as extremists undertaking provocative symbolic actions of laying the cornerstone of a Jewish temple in holy Palestinian places. Moreover, AN avoids mentioning Israeli civilians and ordinary people who are

completely absent from the report.

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, Israel is institutionalised, and its main image is official and military. This is clear in expressions like (*Israeli security sources, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, deputies from his Likud party, etc.*) Israeli institutions support the same image, including (*the Israeli armed forces, etc.*) Israelis also appear as civilians in expressions like (*three passengers in an Israeli bus, etc.*) On the other hand, AN presents Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Hamas in neutral or positive terms, e.g. it refers to Yassin as (*Hamas leader and the 67-year-old symbol of Palestinian resistance and patriarch*). Ordinary Palestinians are also present in the report; AN presents them as victims of Israeli violence who were killed and injured in the attack, e.g. (*at least seven other people, two of Yassin's sons, the 15 wounded, etc.*) They are also represented in terms of their reactions to the assassination, e.g. (*wailing Gazans, an ax-wielding Palestinian, etc.*), and one person is presented as an eye-witness. AN refers to one Hamas official who comments on the Israeli assassination of Sheikh Yassin, i.e. (*Top Hamas official Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi*).

In the report of the 26th of June 2006, AN represents the Palestinians in three main categories: as civilians, officials and fighters. In terms of their semantic roles, the Palestinians are mainly presented as victims of Israeli violence, e.g. (*its forces killed at least 21 Palestinians, Palestinian officials and civilians arrested during the offensive, targeted Palestinians with missile strikes, etc.*) The report emphasises civilians in Gaza, e.g. (*civilians, residents, etc.*) Related to the same image is the presentation of the Palestinians in terms of their age groups and family relations, e.g. (*babies, children, father, and wife.*) Moreover, adjectives used with them underpin their vulnerability and suffering, e.g. (*terrified, occupied, arrested, scurrying, etc.*)

In the official image, the Palestinians are institutionalised; this enhances their image and credibility, e.g. (*Palestinian officials, government, ministers and MPs, mayors, etc.*) Palestinian officials are represented as being under Israeli threats, which emphasises the vulnerability and subjugation of the Palestinians and the domination of the Israelis, e.g. (*sixty-four members of Hamas, including a third of the Cabinet and 26*

MPs, were arrested, Hamas-led government has been directly targeted in the offensive). Many Palestinian officials are identified by name and institutional capacity, which stresses their status as individuals and as holders of important positions in legitimate institutions, e.g. (*Finance Minister Omar Abdelrazeq, Planning Minister Samir Abou Eisheh, etc.*). Palestinians who confront the Israeli forces are called ‘*fighters*’, a label which is more neutral than ‘*militants*’. It endows them with some legitimacy which is denied by the word ‘*militants*’ with its negative connotations. This can be exemplified by the use of ‘*fighters*’ in collocations like ‘*fire fighters*’. The same applies to the use of the word ‘*activists*’ in relation to Palestinians who are affiliated to Hamas.

The predominant image of Israel in the same report is military. The majority of lexical items used to refer to Israeli individuals, institutions, actions and objects are derived from the military register, e.g. (*soldier, leaders, Minister of Defense, army, army radio, incursion, offensive, airstrikes, attack, occupation, aircrafts, apache helicopters, sappers, flares, etc.*) Similarly, Israeli actions are mainly represented using verbs like (*killed, invaded, targeted, etc.*) and nominals like (*military operation, violation, offensive, missile strikes, etc.*) They contribute to the representation of the Israeli side as a strong military force using weapons and arms against the Palestinian people, which in turn points out the great discrepancy in power between both sides. The invasion and occupation of Palestinian territories is prominent in expressions like: (*the Jewish state invaded Gaza, the occupied Palestinian territories, 38 years of occupation, and the occupied West Bank*). ‘*The Jewish state*’ is a highly ideological label of Israel which foregrounds the ideological differences between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The only Israeli non-military individual mentioned is the father of the captured soldier. Israel and its actions are described and evaluated in the AN report much more than the Palestinians and their actions. This shows that the paper has certain attitudes towards Israel and expresses them explicitly. It also expresses sympathy for the Palestinians representing them largely as victims of the Israelis.

7.2.2 Lexis and the representation of Palestinian violence

In the report of the 1st of August 2002 which deals mainly with a Palestinian bombing, AN uses lexis with the Israeli side in an impersonal way and only two people

are named, both officials, i.e. *Prime Minister Sharon* and *the government spokesman*. Israeli victims are mainly represented using a numeral (*seven, seventy people*), and the word (*victims*) is used with them only once. Some Israelis are mentioned vaguely without identification but in terms of their contribution to the report, e.g. (*political sources and sources*.) Institutions mentioned in the report include (*Israel, Israeli security cabinet, etc.*) Israelis are represented in an impersonal way, even the victims are presented as numbers or statistics. Israel is also represented as undertaking violence against Palestinians in terms of the deportation of relatives of militants.

AN uses lexis to refer to the Palestinians in a more personal way, as it refers to more Palestinian personalities, e.g. *Sheikh Ahmed Yassin*. AN refers to a Palestinian who is to be deported from the West Bank for being a relative of a militant. AN uses few adjectives with the Israeli side, but AN refers to the Cabinet and Security Cabinet only. AN refers to Palestinian civilians, e.g. one to be deported.

In the report of the 15th of January 2004, the Palestinians are presented in three main categories: as militants, officials and ordinary people. The most prominent category is the militants, as the report deals mainly with a suicide bombing. This is clear in expressions like (*bomber, suicide bomber, Hamas activist, etc.*) The report highlights the contrast between the identity of the bomber as a mother and as a bomber in expressions like (*mother-of-two bomber* and *woman suicide bomber*), as it is the most counter expect and newsworthy aspect of the story. Another image of Palestinians is that of ordinary people. They are represented as workers who need to pass the crossing to go to work inside Israel, e.g. (*Palestinian workers, thousands of workers, etc.*) Other ordinary Palestinians are presented in both papers as relatives of the bomber, e.g. (*a son aged 3, her husband, a relative, etc.*) The report also refers to shared businesses between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the industrial zone (*Israeli, Palestinian and jointly owned factories*). The last image of Palestinians presented in the reports is that of officials, e.g. (*the Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qorei, Palestinian leaders, the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat*). They are involved in speech acts, e.g. declining to condemn the bombing and commenting on it. Relevant to the same image is Palestinian institutions, e.g. (*Fatah movement* and *the Palestinian leadership*.)

The Israelis are also represented in two main roles and images in the report; i.e. officials and military. The official image is clear in the representation of officials who comment on the bombing. They are identified by name and institutional capacity in both papers, e.g. (*Raanan Gissin, a spokesman for Prime Minister.*) The military image is also prominent in both reports in expressions like (*two soldiers, senior Israeli military officials, Israeli soldiers, etc.*) Israeli institutions mentioned in the report include (*Israel, and Israeli TV*).

In the report of the 26th of June 2006, the Palestinians are mainly presented as militants and as officials. The militant image is presented in words like (*fighters, attack team, etc.*) AN avoids using negative terms like militants and militia, and uses more neutral terms like fighters and activists. They serve as agents of actions like (*fired, smuggled, tried, charged, attacked, etc.*) AN quotes details of the attack from the Israeli military. The official image can be noted in expressions like (*President Abbas, the spokesman for the government, Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, etc.*) They mainly serve as agents of speech acts such as (*condemn, appeal, announce, etc.*) Several Palestinian institutions are mentioned in the report, including the three militant groups involved in the attack; moreover, there are legitimate institutions such as (*the Palestinian Authority*.) Objects associated with the Palestinians include weapons used in the attack, e.g. (*anti-tank rockets, and grenades*.)

The Israeli side is represented in two main capacities: military and official. The military image is prominent in expressions like (*troops, soldiers, military, army, etc.*) In this capacity, the Israelis serve as participants affected by Palestinian violence, i.e. (*being killed, abducted, attacked, etc.*) The official image is presented through expressions like (*the Israeli Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, military officials, etc.*) They are presented as involved in a number of speech acts including (*phoned, urged, etc.*) Institutions mentioned in the report include (*the Israeli army, the government Security Cabinet, etc.*) Objects associated with the Israeli side include arms and weapons, e.g. (*tanks, armed personnel carrier, Israeli military post, etc.*) that were attacked by Palestinian militants during the raid. Moreover, the paper mentions some Israeli weapons that were used in a military incursion in Gaza in response to the

Palestinian attack.

AN has another image of the Palestinians, i.e. as civilians. This image is presented through quoting a Palestinian eye-witness (*Ryad Jargoun, a farmer*) who presents information about an Israeli incursion that started in Rafah shortly after the attack. This image is not very prominent in the report which deals mainly with the Palestinian attack. In accordance with this image, the Israeli side is presented as actively involved in a number of actions against the Palestinians, e.g. (*Israeli tanks moved, Israeli helicopters opened heavy indiscriminate gunfire*).

7.3 Lexical Analysis of the *Guardian* Reports

7.3.1 Lexis and the representation of Israeli violence

The report of the 31st of July 2001 deals with the bombing of the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza and the killing of six Palestinians in the West Bank. The Israelis are represented mainly as officials, e.g. (*intelligence officials, Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, Israel's Deputy Defence Minister, etc.*) Some officials are identified by name and institutional capacity, e.g. (*Israel's prime minister and Ariel Sharon.*) There is also mention of ordinary Israelis and violence against them, e.g. (*an orthodox Jewish man.*) Israeli institutions are also included in the report, e.g. (*Israel, the Jewish state and military.*) 'The Jewish state' is highly ideological, and it is used to emphasise that the Palestinian armed group attacked targets inside the Jewish state, not in the Palestinian territories. Institutionalisation of the Israeli side is emphasised by reference to certain procedures and official documents, e.g. (*cabinet meeting, foreign ministry research paper, Israel's hit-list, Israel's most-wanted list, etc.*)

In the same report, the Palestinians are represented in a number of categories, most importantly as militants. This is clear in expressions like (*activists, militants, bomb makers, etc.*) The six Palestinians who were killed are not represented as innocent victims; instead, they are represented as *activists* who belong to a *shadowy armed cell* that is involved in a number of criminal activities, e.g. (*gangland style killing, attacking targets inside the Jewish state, etc.*) Objects mentioned in relation to them are unpleasant and resented, e.g. (*a junkyard of rusting cars, some bloodied playing cards, etc.*) Such

images are repulsive and alarming and are consistent with other representations such as 'gangland way of living' which further criminalise the victims. Palestinians are generally evaluated negatively through adjectives like (*shadowy, gangland-style, etc.*) In this way, the victims are delegitimised, criminalised and negatively evaluated. Palestinians are also represented as an angry mob (*2,000 angry mourners*) which is a threatening and alarming image. The report also refers to a number of Palestinian institutions mainly armed groups and they are evaluated negatively, e.g. (*a shadowy cell, al-Aksa group, etc.*) They are represented in relation to very negative actions, e.g. *killing*. In conclusion, the *Guardian* represents the Israelis and the Palestinians in different images. The Palestinians are represented as militants involved in negative actions and are killed in mysterious circumstances. The Israelis are represented as military involved in some military actions against the Palestinians and also as victims of violence.

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, Israel is institutionalised and is represented as a military force; this is clear in expressions like (*Israeli soldiers, military officials, etc*). Israeli officials are identified both by name and institutional capacity, e.g. (*Gideon Meir, an Israeli foreign ministry official, Israeli defence minister Shaul Mofaz, etc.*). Israeli institutions support the same image, including (*the Israeli security forces, Israeli defence forces, Israeli security cabinet, etc*). Objects associated with the Israeli side include weapons used in the assassination, e.g. (*missile, Israeli helicopters, etc*). Israeli officials are represented as justifying the attack and commenting on it. The *Guardian* represents Israeli responsibility for the killing clearly and calls it 'assassination' which highlights the political nature of the killing

The Palestinians are presented in two main roles, as militants and as ordinary people. The most prominent character in the report is Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who is identified by name, age (*the 67-year-old*) and by his role as the (*the founder and spiritual leader of militant group Hamas*). Yassin is mentioned in association with Hamas and militancy. The *Guardian* describes him as (*the most prominent Palestinian leader killed by Israel*). The paper avoids describing Yassin as 'disabled'. The main image of the Palestinians is that of militants, and this is clear in expressions like (*masked militants, masked gunmen, etc.*) They are involved in negative actions like firing into the

air, firing rockets towards Israel, threatening revenge, etc. The report focuses on militant groups, e.g. (*militant group Hamas, the militant groups Islamic Jihad, etc*). However, the Palestinian Authority is mentioned in relation to condemnation of the attack.

Ordinary Palestinians are also present in the report. The *Guardian* presents them as victims of Israeli violence who were killed and injured in the attack, e.g. (*Seven other people, another 17*), and victims who were killed in demonstrations, e.g. (*a 13-year-old boy and a journalist*), and as an eyewitness, i.e. (*Taxi driver Yousef Haddad*). Ordinary Palestinians are represented as mourners of Sheikh Yassin, and they are presented as an angry mob involved in violence, e.g. (*angry crowds, tens of thousands of mourners, etc.*) Palestinian officials, e.g. (*the Palestinian prime minister, Ahmed Qureia and the Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat*) are presented as involved in speech acts condemning the attack. The leaders of militant groups, e.g. (*Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, a prominent Hamas leader, etc.*) are represented as threatening and vowing revenge on Israel.

In the report of the 7th of July 2006, the dominant image of the Israelis is military. This is clear in the choice of words from the military register like (*soldier, army, corporal, forces, etc*). Actions of the Israeli army are represented as (*incursion, offensive, attack, etc.*), and objects associated with it include (*navy gunboats, helicopter gunships, tanks, etc*). Militarisation is a form of institutionalisation, so it serves to present Israelis in positive terms. Nevertheless, it also represents the Israelis in a negative light for operating militarily in the Palestinian territories.

The Palestinians are presented in two main categories: as civilians and militants. The paper recognises the existence of Palestinian civilians in Gaza at the time of the Israeli incursion and identifies them by name, age and occupation, e.g. (*Mohammad Farajalah, 24, an ambulanceman, a farmer, Mohammad Atari, 2*). They are represented as eye-witnesses from the scene of violence, and also as those who suffer from it. However, it does not blame their suffering on the Israeli side; instead, they are represented as victims of fighting. Moreover, aggregation is used to represent the number of Palestinian victims, e.g. (*at least 17 Palestinians and civilian deaths.*) Palestinian militants are presented in several roles, as targets of Israeli violence, as the

captors of the Israeli soldier, and as undertaking militant activities against the Israeli forces including firing rockets into Israel. Details of actions of Palestinian militants against the Israeli forces are very clear in the report, e.g. (*One Hamas man carried an anti-tank weapon in a holdall while others placed bombs at the roadside*). This representation serves to delegitimise them and to justify Israeli violence against them. The report avoids mentioning the controversial Palestinian government formed predominantly by Hamas which makes the Palestinians' official point of view missing from the report.

7.3.2 Lexis and the representation of Palestinian violence

In the report of the 1st of August 2002 which deals with a bombing at the Hebrew University, the *Guardian* represents the Palestinians mainly as militants, e.g. (*the bombers of Hamas, commander, militants, the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin*). Even the Palestinians who suffer deportation by Israel are presented in terms of their relationship to militants (*a relative of a Palestinian militant, the families of wanted Palestinian men, etc.*) The report also mentions two Palestinian institutions *Hamas* and *Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority* which is over-lexicalised by its attribution to Arafat. This presents the PA pejoratively; not as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but in terms of its association with Arafat, who was at that time blamed by Israel and the USA for inciting violence among the Palestinians.

In the same report, the most prominent image of Israelis is that of civilian victims. They are presented as (*students, wounded, seven people, Israeli citizens, more than 70, etc.*) This emphasises their vulnerability and criminalises the attack against them. The *Guardian* presents another prominent image of the Israelis, i.e. as officials (*the police spokeswoman Sigal Toledo, the prime minister, Ariel Sharon, etc.*). Israeli officials comment on both the bombing and the deportation of Palestinians related to militants. There are two Israeli institutions, i.e. *the Hebrew University* where the bombing takes place, and *the police* that comment on the bombing. The use of lexis underlines Palestinian militancy and involvement in violence against the Israelis, as well as the vulnerability of the Israeli side that suffers Palestinian violence.

In the report of the 15th of January 2004, the *Guardian* presents the Palestinians

in two main categories: as militants and as ordinary people. The militant image is clear in expressions like (*a suicide bomber, Hamas activist, human-bomb, etc.*) It appears in relation to the identity of the bomber as a woman and a mother of two, and this is emphasised in both reports, and it is clear in expressions like (*human-bomb mother, female suicide bomber, etc.*). This is the most prominent image of the report, as it deals with a suicide bombing; moreover, the paper mentions Sheikh Yassin, the leader of Hamas, and Hamas officials and activists who comment on sending a female bomber and warn that more would follow. They are involved in verbal actions. The only institutions mentioned are militant organisations, e.g. (*Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the al-Aqsa Martyrs brigade*). Ordinary Palestinians are represented by workers who queued at the crossing at the time of the bombing. Palestinian officials are absent from the report.

The Israelis are represented in two main categories, military and ordinary people. The military image is represented through a number of expressions, e.g. (*soldiers, the Gaza divisional commander, Brigadier-General Gadi Shamni, etc.*). The military is mainly represented as involved in speech acts. There is one more action represented which is closing the crossing. The civilian image is also present in the expression (*a civilian security worker*). In conclusion, the *Guardian* presents the Israelis in the military category as victims and the Palestinians as militants involved in violence. The bombing is emphasised and criminalised, and it is not given any justification.

In the report of the 26th of June 2006, the *Guardian* represents the Palestinians as militants and as officials. The militant image is clear in words like (*militants, gunmen, captors, etc.*) which serve as agents of actions like (*killed, kidnapped, attacked, fired, etc.*) These actions agree with the stereotypical image of Palestinians as militants and as terrorists. The purpose of these actions is not prominent in the reports, though it is present as a form of 'revenge'. The second prominent image of Palestinians is the official, e.g. (*Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas Prime Minister, etc.*). They serve as agents in a number of actions, mainly speech acts such as (*call on, say, etc.*)

Several Palestinian institutions are mentioned, including the three militant groups involved in the attack: *Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees and the Islamic*

Army; moreover, *the Palestinian Authority* and *the government* are also present. Objects associated with the Palestinian side include weapons used in the attack against Israel, e.g. (*anti-tank weapons, grenades, etc*). The *Guardian* uses over-lexicalisation in relation to the Palestinian government by attributing it to Hamas even though it came into office through free and democratic elections in January of the same year; this is clear in expressions like (*the Hamas-led Government, the Hamas prime minister, Hamas ministers, etc*). These expressions have a pejorative effect, as they single out the government as attributing to Hamas rather than being a representative of all Palestinians.

The Israeli side is represented in two main images; military and official. The military image is prominent in expressions like (*soldiers, military, army, corporal, etc.*) which serve as participants affected by Palestinian violence, i.e. being (*killed, abducted, attacked, etc*). The official image is presented through the presentation of (*Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, military officials, etc.*), who are involved in speech acts such as (*phoned, urged, promised, threatened, etc*). Israeli institutions include (*the Israeli army, the government Security Cabinet, etc*). Objects associated with Israelis include weapons and other objects that were attacked by Palestinian militants during the raid, e.g. (*tanks, Armed Personnel Carrier, Israeli military post, fence, etc.*).

The *Guardian* identifies the Israeli victims by name and age. Israeli reactions towards Palestinian actions are rationalised and institutionalised, and they are presented as response, or as options or possibilities being investigated by the Israeli cabinet; moreover, most Israeli actions are represented using mental and verbal processes. The Israeli incursion in Gaza is absent from the report.

7.4 Lexical Analysis of the *Times* Reports

7.4.1 Lexis and the representation of Israeli violence

The report of the 31st of July 2001 is very brief, and it represents both sides in few roles. The Palestinians are presented as *members of Fatah* and as *activists* who are killed in mysterious circumstances; they are described as being on *Israel's list of suspected terrorists* which delegitimises them. The Palestinians are also presented as *officials* who are involved in verbal actions, e.g. *denied* and *accused*. The report includes a Palestinian institution, i.e. *Fatah*, yet its members are described as being on *Israel's list*

of suspected terrorists. The Israeli side is represented in two main roles; as officials and as military. Israeli officials are presented by name and institutional position, e.g. *Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, Israel's Deputy Defence Minister*, unlike the Palestinians who are not named at all. Real agents of violence are metonymically substituted by weapons *missiles from Israeli helicopters*. The Israelis are not very prominent in the report, except as involved in verbal actions. The most prominent image of the Palestinians is the image of militants and activists, while the most prominent images of the Israelis are the official and military images.

In the report of the 22nd of March 2004, the *Times* presents the Israelis as institutionalised and they are represented as a military force; this is clear in expressions like (*security officials, Israeli troops, etc*). Officials are identified both by name and institutional capacity, e.g. (*Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a former army general, Gideon Meir, an Israeli Foreign Ministry official, etc*). Israeli institutions support the same image. Israeli officials are represented as justifying the attack and commenting on it.

The most prominent character in both reports is Sheikh Ahmed Yassin who is identified by name, age (*the 67-year-old*) and by his role as the (*Hamas spiritual leader, Hamas leader*). Yassin is mentioned in association with Hamas and militancy. The *Times* describes him as (*the most prominent Palestinian leader killed by Israel*). The *Times* states that he (*used a wheelchair*), yet it does not explicitly refer to him as 'disabled'. The main image of the Palestinians is that of militants, and this is clear in expressions like (*Palestinian militants, masked gunmen, etc*). They are involved in negative actions like firing rockets towards Israel, threatening revenge, etc. The reports focus on militant groups, e.g. (*militant group Hamas, the militant groups Islamic Jihad, etc.*) However, the Palestinian Authority is mentioned in relation to condemnation of the attack.

Ordinary Palestinians are also present in the report, e.g. other victims of the attack and the thirteen-year-old who was killed in demonstrations. Ordinary Palestinians are also represented as mourners of Sheikh Yassin, and they are presented as an angry mob, e.g. (*mourners, tens of thousands of Palestinians, etc.*) The report also mentions Palestinian officials, e.g. (*the Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat*) who are presented as

involved in speech acts condemning the attack, as well as leaders of militant groups, e.g. (*Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh, Abdel Aziz Rantisi, a prominent Hamas leader, etc.*) who are represented as threatening and vowing revenge on Israel.

The *Times* report on the 7th of July 2006 institutionalises Israel by militarisation and by reference to state departments and officials. The dominant image of the Israelis is that of a military force, e.g. people (*Israeli forces, Israeli soldier, troops, Lieutenant Colonel Yaniv, a battalion commander, Israeli army chiefs, etc.*); objects (*aircraft, tanks, etc.*); actions (*airstrikes, tank fire, operation, invaded, mission, incursions, etc.*); and institutions (*the Israeli Defence Force (IDF), the Israeli army, army radio, etc.*). This contributes to the presentation of Israeli actions from a positive perspective.

Another image of the Israelis is that of ‘victims’, as they are represented as vulnerable victims of Palestinian violence, e.g. (*a captured soldier, civilians, etc.*). Vulnerability of Israel and the Israelis is prominent as a justification of the Israeli incursion: (*in an attempt to win freedom for a captured soldier and put Israel out of the militants’ increasingly longer rocket range.*)

7.4.2 Lexis and the representation of Palestinian violence

In the report of the 1st of August 2002, the *Times* uses lexis to emphasise the involvement of Palestinian militants in violence against the Israelis who are presented as victims. The *Times’* report also presents the Palestinians as militants, but also stresses the existence of Palestinian workers and students at the Hebrew University alongside Israelis in expressions like (*2,000 Palestinian students and numerous Arab staff*). The report mentions two Palestinian institutions *Hamas* and *Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority* which is over-lexicalised by its attribution to Arafat. This presents it pejoratively; not as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, but in terms of its association with Arafat. The most prominent image of Israelis is that of civilian victims. They are presented as (*students, people, etc.*). This emphasises their vulnerability and criminalises the attack against them. The paper focuses on one Israeli institution, i.e. *the Hebrew University* where the bombing takes place. In conclusion, lexis underlines Palestinian militancy and involvement in violence against the Israelis, as well as the vulnerability of the Israeli side that suffers Palestinian violence. The most

prominent image of Israelis in this report is that of victims, especially since the report deals with a powerful bombing at the Hebrew University that resulted in deaths and injuries on the Israeli side.

In the report of the 15th of January 2004, the paper presents the Palestinians in two main categories: as militants and as ordinary people. The militant image is clear in expressions like (*a suicide bomber, Hamas activist, suicide-bomb, etc*). It appears in relation to the identity of the bomber as a woman and a mother-of-two, and this is emphasised in the report, and it is clear in expressions like (*human-bomb mother.*) This is the most prominent image of the report, as it deals with a suicide bombing; moreover, the paper mentions Sheikh Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, and Hamas officials and activists who comment on sending a woman bomber and warn that more would follow. They are involved in verbal actions. The only institution mentioned in the report is Hamas (*Hamas, the militant Islamic group*). Ordinary Palestinians are represented by workers who queued at the crossing at the time of the bombing (*as many as 20,000, thousands of Palestinian workers, etc*). The report also mentions the children of the bomber and their ages, but it does not mention any Palestinian officials.

The Israelis are represented in two main categories: as military and ordinary people. The military image is represented through a number of expressions, e.g. (*soldiers, Brigadier-General Gadi Shamni, the Gaza divisional commander, etc.*). The military is represented as involved in speech acts. There is one more action represented which is the closing of the crossing. The most prominent Israeli institution mentioned in the report is *the Israeli military or army*. The civilian image is not clear in the report. Israelis are presented as victims of killing and injury at the hands of the bomber.

In the report of the 26th of June 2006, the *Times* represents the Palestinians as militants and as officials. The militant image is clear in words and actions of militants who raided the Israeli army post. The second prominent image of Palestinians is the official, e.g. (*Ghazi Hamad, a spokesman for the Hamas-led government.*) They serve as agents of speech acts. Several Palestinian institutions are mentioned, including the three militant groups involved in the attack: (*Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees and the Islamic Army*). Moreover, *the Palestinian Authority* and *the government* are also

present. Objects associated with the Palestinian side include weapons used in the attack against Israel, e.g. (*bombs, grenades, etc.*). The report uses over-lexicalisation with the Palestinian government by attributing it to Hamas, in expressions like (*the Hamas-led Government.*)

The Israeli side is represented in two main images; military and official. The military image is prominent in expressions like (*soldiers, military, army, corporal, etc.*) which serve as participants affected by Palestinian violence, i.e. being (*killed, abducted, attacked, etc.*). The official image is presented through the presentation of (*Ehud Olmert, the Israeli Prime Minister, etc.*), who are involved in speech acts. Israeli institutions include (*the Israeli government, the Security Cabinet, etc.*). Objects associated with the Israelis include weapons and other objects that were attacked by Palestinian militants during the raid, e.g. (*tanks, Armed Personnel Carrier, etc.*). Israeli reactions towards Palestinian actions are rationalised and institutionalised, and they are presented as response, or as options or possibilities. The Israeli incursion in Gaza is minimally present in the *Times*.

7.5 Conclusion

Lexicalisation is another important resource that is used ideologically in news reports. In NYT, the Palestinians are presented as militants. This is understandable in news reports that deal with Palestinian violence undertaken by Palestinian militants; however, the same image is also prominent in reports dealing with Israeli violence. Thus, Palestinian civilians are under-represented in NYT, while militants are very prominent. This may lead to overgeneralisation of militancy to all Palestinians. In addition, Palestinian militants are often over-lexicalised by the use of many expressions to refer to them, e.g. *militants, gunmen, militia men, guerrillas, fighters, sniper, masked gunmen, Hamas militants, etc.* They are described in intimidating images as *wearing masks, holding weapons, etc.* They are also represented as involved in negative militant actions, e.g. *using weapons, shooting, digging manholes or tunnels, firing missiles and rockets, attacking, etc.* Even in speech acts they are represented as undertaking violent actions, e.g. *vow revenge, threaten, etc.* There is no sympathy for them, even when they are killed, and their killing is represented as self-explanatory without the need for

justification, as if they were legitimate targets for Israeli violence.

The actions of Palestinian militants are always presented negatively with no explanation or justification; moreover, they are often exaggerated. Their actions are always delegitimised and presented as falling outside the moral, normative and socio-political order. In addition, the lack of the crucial context of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories further delegitimises their actions and eliminates any possible justification for them. Also relevant to this category is the representation of Palestinian militant organisations, e.g. *Hamas, Islamic Jihad, etc.* They are very prominent in all reports, and labels used with them always emphasise militancy, e.g. (*militant groups, militant Palestinian factions, Islamic Jihad, the militant Palestinian group Hamas, another militant group, Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades, etc.*). They are represented as claiming responsibility for militant attacks, vowing revenge in response to Israeli attacks, etc. When militants are quoted, their statements are often translated into unidiomatic English which further downplays them and their statements.

The other prominent image of Palestinians is that of suicide bombers who are involved in acts of indiscriminate killing that are illegitimate and illegal. News reports often present this violence as if it starts with no underlying causes except hatred and revenge. Violence is prominent and delegitimised, but the causes behind this violence are never explored. Newspapers never question what may drive young Palestinians to blow themselves up among Israelis to kill them; thus, their actions are always presented as irrational, inexplicable and unjustified, and their statements are always presented in terms of hatred. the socio-political context (that is never presented adequately), the despair as well as the lack of hope and opportunity among Palestinians and the daily humiliation at the hands of Israeli forces are never told in news reports. Therefore, the real causes of suicide bombings never appear in reports. The way newspapers deal with this particular issue can be said to be very superficial. They never probe nor do they encourage readers to probe what might cause these acts, and whether there could be peaceful and rational ways to deal with it like any other problem.

This became more intense after the events of the 11th of September when America itself became the victim of suicide bombings. The discourse of US (the US and

its allies) versus THEM (terrorists and their allies) dominated the discourse of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The way America chose to deal with the problem by eliminating terror was also adopted in Israel. Restrictions on the Palestinians and violence against them became the accepted and unquestioned procedure. Israel launched its own war on Palestinian terror, and just like the American war, it did not discriminate between civilians and militants! This war was very hard to challenge just like the American war on terrorism. Moreover, it was overshadowed by the war led by the USA. In sum, after 9/11, Palestinian militants became terrorists and fought in the Israeli war on terror. No dialogue or peaceful solution could be proposed or foreseen. It may be worth mentioning that almost all Palestinian militant groups and organisations are on the American list of foreign terrorist organisations (see: <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/terrorist-groups.cfm>).

The third prominent image of Palestinians is the official image. The Palestinian Authority is often presented in NYT as inefficient, especially since it was blamed not only for failing to stop the uprising but also for intensifying it. Arafat, in particular, has been the subject of a great deal of criticism, accusations, humiliation, confinement and threats from Israel. At the beginning of the Intifada, NYT referred to him generally as (*the Palestinian Authority chairman*) [2001]; however, in time it started to refer to him as (*the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat*) [2004], which undermines his institutional role, especially since he was confined and humiliated by Israel. NYT represented the Israeli measures against Arafat without much criticism. The Palestinian Authority is often overlexicalised, problematised, and presented as ineffective and corrupt. It is often presented in terms of its relationship to militant organisations, e.g. (*the Aksa Brigades, the armed branch of Mr. Arafat's Fatah faction*) [NYT, 31 July 2001]. Palestinian officials are often left anonymous and deprived of institutional status, which denies them credibility and efficacy. Official statements condemn Palestinian violence against the Israelis and Israeli violence against the Palestinians. Other statements are often too general and lack accuracy.

Ordinary Palestinians do not get much representation in NYT. In the sample analysed, NYT refers to Palestinian civilians once only as victims of Israeli attack; however, it is mentioned as an error (*the Israeli military has stepped up its actions, but*

some have gone wrong, leading to the deaths of at least 14 Palestinian civilians in recent weeks). Palestinian civilians appear as an angry mob rioting or expressing their anger in response to Israeli violence, e.g. (*demonstrators chanted, thousands of people took to the streets, thousands of Palestinians, more than a thousand people, etc*). These expressions relate to the negative threatening image of an angry mob, and they stress the sheer numbers of Palestinians which could exaggerate their potential threat. Palestinian civilians are also mentioned when they are quoted as eye-witnesses, e.g. (*Palestinians at the scene, one witness, Maher al-Beek, etc*). Palestinians civilians are often referred to using neutral categories, e.g. family relations or age group, e.g. (*youths, a relative, etc*).

NYT represents Israel in terms of its institutional image. There are certain organisations presented prominently, e.g. (*the Israeli military, the Israeli government and the Israeli army*). These representations contribute to the legitimisation of Israeli actions, even the most controversial and most violent ones, due to the power of institutional discourse. Moreover, Israeli actions are often described in “neutral formal terms or in positive legitimating terms”. The institutionalisation of Israel has the effect of legitimating its actions, and at the same time delegitimising others’, e.g. the Palestinian perspective; “institutional discourse is authoritative, thereby delegitimising alternative discourses” (Rojo & van Dijk, 1997). NYT endeavours to present Israel and its actions in positive or at least neutral terms. Actions of the Israeli army are sometimes re-lexicalised in an attempt to redefine them in more favourable or at least less condemnable terms; e.g. when mentioning the Israeli raid on Gaza in the reports of 7th July 2006, NYT refers to the Israeli action, which is considered a military occupation of the Palestinian territories as movements or entering, using expressions like ‘moved deeper, entered, re-entered, started edging, etc’. These expressions represent the actions of Israeli forces neutrally and avoid the political implications of these movements. As discussed earlier, Israeli civilians are often represented very prominently in NYT reports, especially those dealing with Palestinian violence. They appear as victims of Palestinian violence, and their suffering is prominent even if it is fear or panic. They are often interviewed as well to describe how they feel which gains a lot of sympathy for them.

The difference in status between Israel and the Palestinians and the subsequent

institutionalisation of Israel result in the legitimisation of Israeli actions against Palestinians. Legitimation discourse, as discussed by van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) contributes to the overall positive representation of the Israeli side and the subsequent negative presentation of the Palestinian side. Moreover, the institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of discourse about Israel and its actions promotes the representation of these practices as routine, anonymous, normalised and well-established procedures, which further legitimates Israeli violence against the Palestinians. Institutionalisation also has a euphemistic effect that contributes to the conceptualisation of violent Israeli actions as appropriate, logical and rational. In addition, the emphasis of the negative actions of the Palestinians is used as a justification of actions taken against them in newspapers.

Just as in NYT, the most prominent image of Palestinians in the *Guardian* and the *Times* is the militant. Palestinian militants are referred to using a number of labels including (*militants, gunmen, militia, fighters, bombers, activists, etc*). Their actions are described in terms of militancy and are negatively evaluated in both papers. On the other hand, Israel is predominantly institutionalised and militarised which serves to legitimise Israeli actions and at the same time to delegitimise Palestinians' actions. Israelis, both civilians and officials, are often named, while Palestinians are presented anonymously in most of the instances. When Israelis are victims of Palestinian violence, both papers emphasise their vulnerability and express a great deal of sympathy for them; however, when Palestinians fall victim of Israeli violence, reports often still mention their militant image and they also emphasise their angry mob image and present them in threatening angry images that do not gain them any sympathy, e.g. (*angry crowds, demonstrators, the crowds, tens of thousands of mourners*) [the *Guardian*, 22 March 2004]; (*tens of thousands of mourners, tens of thousands of Palestinians*) [the *Times*, 22 March 2004]. The *Guardian* sometimes also presents Palestinians as civilians and as victims of violence; however, they only blame their death or injury on Israelis when Israel admits responsibility for their fate, but when responsibility is not confirmed, they are often represented as victims of violence without blaming Israel for it, e.g. in the reports on the Israeli raid on Gaza 7 July 2006. It has also been noted that sometimes the *Guardian* recognises Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories, and refers to them as '*the*

occupied territories.'

Lexis is used in AN differently because it tends to label the Palestinians in more neutral terms than Western newspapers. For example, AN never uses the label '*militant*' with Palestinians, instead it uses the words '*fighter*' or '*activist*' which are more neutral in connotation than '*militant*'. Moreover, AN recognises Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories and uses expressions like 'Occupied Jerusalem,' etc. However, AN does not try to justify or legitimise Palestinian violence. AN underpins the vulnerability of Palestinians and represents the Palestinians as victims with no ability to affect the Israelis. AN emphasises the civilian status of Palestinians and refers to them using family relations and other relevant labels used with ordinary people. It also highlights legitimate Palestinian institutions like the Palestinian Authority and government. Palestinian militancy is not prominent in many reports, especially those that deal with Israeli violence. AN reports highlight Israeli military activities against the Palestinians and represent the discrepancy in power between both sides clearly, e.g. the Israeli side is always represented in terms of a military power used against the Palestinians. AN often avoids mentioning Israeli civilians and ordinary people who are completely absent from most reports.

It should be emphasised that not all the differences between the reports are ideological, but some of them are the outcome of the historical and political context of the conflict. There is a big difference between both sides of the conflict in terms of power and status. Israel is a state and a full member of the United Nations which gives it the status of a state with institutions like state departments and a military. On the other hand, the Palestinians do not have a state, and therefore lack the status and institutional capacity that come with it. Journalists have the option to refer to Israel as a state, but this is not the same for the Palestinians, as there is no state yet called 'Palestine'. For this reason, fighting or military activities undertaken by the Palestinians are often characterised as militancy since there is no military for the Palestinians. However, news reports often ignore any mention of the Israeli occupation and control of the Palestinian territories which can have the effect of depicting Palestinian fighting as resistance to an illegal occupation and thus justify it.

8 Conclusion

This thesis presents a study in CDA that examines a corpus of news reports that deal with violence between the Israelis and the Palestinians during the second uprising. The study aims at comparing the way members of each side and their actions are represented in newspapers that are sited in Arab and Western countries and also in newspapers that have different attitudes but appear in the same country. The study also aims to examine the role of ideology in representing the conflict. The analysis has focused on three linguistic features: narrative, transitivity and lexis.

In order to achieve these aims several steps have been taken. As background to the study, the history of the conflict and the history of the relationship between the Arabs and the West, as well as the perceptions of both sides in the West and in the Arab world have been reviewed. Theoretically, major approaches to CDA have also been reviewed with the aim of identifying the best approach to undertake the study. However, no single approach was deemed appropriate; therefore a modified version of CDA that includes selected aspects of different approaches has been devised. Methodologically, three linguistic levels have been selected for the analysis, and they have been theoretically researched to achieve a better understanding of how they work and how they can be ideologically invested in news discourse. Based on the above theoretical research, a method for the analysis of news reports that focuses on certain features and strategies to examine at each linguistic level has been developed.

CDA has proven to be a very useful tool for the analysis, and the three linguistic levels chosen for analysis have shown evidence of the ideological use of language to represent both sides of the conflict and their actions. Although CDA has proven to be a useful tool for the study, certain aspects of different approaches have been more appropriate for the analysis than others; for narrative analysis, the approaches of Toolan (2001), van Dijk (1987b, 1988 & 1991), and White (1997), as well as Hall et al (1978) for transitivity analysis, the approaches of Fairclough (2003), Hodge and Kress (1993), and van Leeuwen (1995, 1996 & 2000) have proven most fruitful; and for lexical analysis, I drew on the approaches of Flowerdew (2002), Wodak (1999) and Reisigl &

Wodak (2001).

The application of this method to the selected news reports has proven useful for the analysis of lexicalisation and transitivity; however, the analysis of narrative proved to be a more demanding task, as the narrative structure of news reports has the potential to mask ideological views with an appearance of neutrality and impartiality, and it was not an easy task to prove the ideological workings on discourse at the level of narrative. Therefore, further research into the areas of cultural and media studies especially the theories of Stuart Hall in the study of the use of sources as primary and secondary definers of the situation in news discourse was also included in the analysis.

Ideology and bias in the news are not easy to identify, especially with the factual nature of news reporting and the apparently balanced representation of different views, however it was evident through the study of the positive and negative presentation of different sides of the conflict and their actions, as well as the use of agency and causality to represent responsibility for violence undertaken by both sides, and the way narrative structure and news sources are used in news discourse.

The analysis revealed that, in most of the instances, different newspapers use discourse ideologically to represent events of the conflict. There are similarities and differences between news reports about the same events, and there are many factors, some of which are ideological while others are not, that affect the degrees of similarities or differences. Many similarities have been noted between the four newspapers. Firstly, all reports represent the conflict in terms of two warring nations, while ignoring the asymmetry of power between both sides; consequently, readers may have the false impressions that both sides are more or less of equal power. This can result in an inaccurate and superficial understanding of the conflict. Bennett (1996) maintains that “the absence of attention to power further encourages the audiences to abandon political analysis.”

Secondly, all reports lack proper contextualisation which results in reports that are not very meaningful to an uninformed readership. Events of the conflict are essentially represented in terms of incidents of violence and counter violence, and all reports focus on *here* and *now* without presenting any of the underlying issues that affect

the conflict. Incidents of violence are often contextualised by reference to previous incidents without proper explanation of the wider context of the conflict; in this regard Dunsky calls for the reconsideration of these practises and argues that:

“it is time for a new approach to reporting that, over time and across media, investigates and illuminates the organic essence of the conflict as a much needed complement to the easily obtained snapshots of the daily drama unfolding between the Israelis and Palestinians in the field” (Dunsky, 2008: 368).

Thirdly, all newspapers endeavour to present an accurate description of the outcomes of violence between both sides, i.e. they all try to represent the exact numbers of victims on both sides and the material damage as well. This is largely due to the values of journalism that focus on accuracy of presenting facts. Fourthly, the historical and political contexts of the conflict impose certain constraints on the way language is used by all newspapers. This is most obvious in the difference in status between Israel, as a recognised state and a full member of the UN, and the Palestinians who are thus far stateless. Israel is always institutionalised; this endows it with legitimacy of which the Palestinians are deprived. This is most notable in the representation of violence or confrontations between both sides. Israel is a state with a military; therefore, aggression against the Palestinians is institutionalised and presented as military action. On the other hand, since the Palestinians lack the same institutions, aggressions they undertake against the Israelis cannot be presented as military action; instead it is represented as militancy.

Finally, Palestinian violence is always represented as illegitimate and unjustified. Its causes are mainly presented in terms of revenge or retaliation, and it is never legitimised like Israeli violence. This can be explained in terms of a moral ‘closure’ in relation to Palestinian violence. Davis and Walton (1983b) argue that in news reporting on some subjects, like political violence, are approached from an assumed moral consensus. The moral imperative to condemn (violence or terrorism) leads to routine practises of moral ‘closure’ at the level of language. Moreover, condemning acts of violence legitimises other forms of violence (e.g. state violence in response to rioting) which is somehow placed in a different category (Davis & Walton, 1983a). In the case of reporting the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there is a case of moral consensus that leads a moral closure and thus to the condemnation and delegitimation of Palestinian

violence. There is no room for justification of Palestinian violence, or even an attempt to present it as legitimate resistance. AN often avoids Palestinian militancy if it is not the main news story.

There are many differences between Arab and Western newspapers in the representation of violence between both sides. Generally, AN highlights Israeli violence and international condemnations to this violence more than other newspapers, e.g. it is the only newspaper to mention the condemnations of the UN Human Rights Committee to the Israeli raid against Gaza in July 2006 and to detail the Israeli violence against members of the Palestinian government which are completely absent from all other newspapers. At the level of narrative, all the newspapers present Palestinian violence in a clear coherent narrative structure although the structure of hard news stories does not relate events temporally. Details of Palestinian violence are often quoted from Israeli military sources in all newspapers which can explain the similarity. However, the three Western newspapers tend to present Israeli violence less clearly and less coherently; they often de-narrativise it by different strategies that are discussed in detail in the analysis of narrative. AN, on the other hand, tries to present Israeli violence as clearly and coherently as possible, depending on the available information. Another major difference between Arab and Western newspapers has to do with the use of news sources who often decide the interpretative frame for understanding events. Western newspapers take Israeli sources as the primary definers of the situations while AN takes Palestinian sources as the primary definers.

In terms of transitivity structures, all newspapers present agency, causality and responsibility clearly when representing Palestinian violence. AN tends as much as possible to mitigate responsibility for Palestinian violence in the headline, but it is often made clear later in the report. Using transitivity to report Israeli violence is more complicated. NYT and the *Times* often use transitivity constructions that mitigate Israeli responsibility for violence, such as the agent deletion by means of nominalisations or agentless passives, or its substitution by inanimate objects like the weapons used for killing, etc. On the other hand, the *Guardian* tends to present Israeli responsibility more clearly, especially if Israeli responsibility has been confirmed. It does not often try to mitigate or conceal responsibility except when Israeli responsibility is not confirmed.

AN consistently presents Israeli responsibility for violence against the Palestinians very clearly. Israel is always presented as initiating and undertaking violence against the Palestinians who are in turn represented as its victims.

At the level of lexicalisation, both sides of the conflict are represented in a limited number of roles that have a great deal of overlap between different newspapers. The Israeli side is largely institutionalised, and its members are presented as military personnel and as officials. The civilian image of the Israelis is prominent in the reports of NYT, the *Guardian* and the *Times*, however, this image is hardly present in AN. In terms of presenting the Palestinians, the most prominent images for them in NYT, the *Guardian* and the *Times* are the militant and the official. These images are clear in most of the reports analysed. AN presents the official image as the most prominent image, but militants are often presented using more neutral terms like ‘fighters’ and ‘activists’. Moreover, AN highlights the civilian status of the Palestinians and presents it clearly in most of the reports, however, it is almost absent from NYT and *Times* reports. Palestinian civilians are clearly presented in some of the *Guardian* reports as well. Lexis is used ideologically by different newspapers for positively or negatively evaluating the members of certain groups and for legitimising or delegitimising their actions.

Some of the differences between reports in different newspapers are based on ideological considerations while others result from practical necessities or institutional practises relevant to news production. For instance, during the second uprising Israel barred all international journalists from entering the Palestinian territories for security concerns; therefore, they were mainly based in Jerusalem or accompanying the Israeli army in its raids. On the other hand, AN reporters were based in the Palestinian territories. So, reporters in different locations did not have access to the same sources or information. Fowler (1991) holds that news discourse is constructed according to the stylistic and ideological conventions of the newspapers, which differ from one institution to another and affect the way the same story is presented in different newspapers.

Tuchman (1978) notes that news, as a social institution, is an ally of legitimate institutions, such as governments and politicians. News organisations endeavour to

maintain effective relationships with powerful institutions and to serve the interests of the news organisation itself. They often try to frame stories within the interpretations offered by powerful institutions and within accepted common assumptions shared by the majority of their audiences. Therefore, most information about the conflict comes from the Israeli side that can also communicate its interpretations, as Israel has a superior and efficient communications apparatus and a recognised state with legitimate institutions. The Palestinian side, on the other hand, with its limited resources, ineffective institutions and its lack of efficacy is not a reliable ally of media outlets and is unable to communicate its views effectively.

The history of the relationship between the Arabs and the West in addition to developments in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict have resulted in certain orientalist stereotypical images of the Arabs in general and the Palestinians in particular in the West; “the Palestinians and their organisations and the Arabs more generally, have been portrayed in terms of violence, terrorism, irrationality, and uncompromising refusal to come to terms with the existence of Israel or to accept the norms of decent behavior” (Herman & Chomsky, 1994). On the contrary, positive stereotypes of Israel prevailed in Western media based on the suffering of Jews in Europe during the Holocaust and the success of the Zionist movement in establishing a national home for persecuted Jews, as well as cultural proximity and mutual interests between Israel and the West. As Ghareeb (1977) emphasises in relation to American media “Zionism has been made to appear as a force for progress and liberation in a backward Arab world. The Arabs were thought of in terms of pyramids, camels, dancing girls, and perhaps, oil.” In addition, the undeniable role of invoking memories of the Holocaust and Western fears from charges of anti-Semitism have had a strong influence on media representations of Israel.

“The Holocaust has proven to be an indispensable ideological weapon. Through its deployment, one of the world’s most formidable military powers, with a horrendous human rights record, has cast itself as a ‘victim’ state, and the most successful ethnic group in the United States has likewise acquired a victim state” (Finkelstein, 2000).

The critical examination of the representation of the conflict in Western and Arab newspapers, as well as in newspapers with different orientations reveals that news reporting of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict does not provide an objective, unbiased account of events as claimed by different newspapers. With reference to the

representation of the second Intifada, the result of such practises in reporting is the reduction of a very complex conflict to a mere military confrontation between the Palestinians and the Israelis, to the detriment of millions of Palestinian civilians in Gaza and the West Bank who remain under-represented, to a large extent, in news media, as well as to Israeli civilians who are also under-represented, as the military image of Israel dominates the reporting. The legitimation and mitigation of Israeli violence against the Palestinians will only result in its persistence, while reporting it clearly and bravely may lead to encouraging Western governments to pressurise Israel to change its policies towards the Palestinians and hopefully lead to peace between both sides.

It is worth noting that there have been notable changes of attitudes both in the media and public views towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. These changes have been the result of many factors including the recent history of the conflict, especially the establishment of the Israeli security barrier in the West Bank, the Israeli war against Gaza in 2008 with the aim of stopping Hamas rockets against Israel and the Israeli blockade on the movement of people and goods to and from the Palestinian territories. The disproportionate use of power and the siege of Gaza have alerted the public and the media to the situation of the Palestinians. Media in different parts of the world were very critical to Israel during the war against Gaza, and certain practises of the Israeli forces, especially the indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas and the alleged use of internationally forbidden weapons have particularly been prominent in media reports. Moreover, as Israel barred international news crews from entering Gaza, many news outlets were forced to source news and footage from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya channels which contributed to filtering some views that are sympathetic to the Palestinians to Western audiences. The unprecedented media criticisms of Israeli practises during the war and the increased awareness of the humanitarian aspect of the conflict usher significant changes in attitudes towards the conflict and its reporting.

This study represents a contribution to a small but growing body of research about the discourse of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It presents an application of a modified version of CDA to an interesting corpus that deals with a timely and vital issue for peace in the Middle East and in the world at large. It shows that representations of the conflict are ideological and that they reflect and naturalise the asymmetries of power

between both sides of the conflict. It also shows that news reporting of the conflict is not as objective and free from bias and value judgments as it should ideally be. It is hoped that this may encourage newspapers to reconsider their representations of the conflict, so as to provide better contextualisation of events, balance the views of both sides and use linguistic structures in ways that do not mitigate responsibility for violence in order to represent events clearly and allow the readers to have a better understanding of events in context. The analysis shows that the members and actions of different sides are represented differently and that some of the differences are ideologically motivated. These representations can result in swaying the public opinion and giving the public a superficial and uncritical view of the conflict and its events. Both sides of the conflict are represented in a limited and fixed set of roles that are related to stereotypes of each side. This is true of media representations of the conflict in Arab and Western newspapers.

I started this research because I noted the great discrepancy between the representation of the events of the conflict in Arab and Western media. Sometimes, it seemed to me as if they were describing different events and different groups when they really described the same events. In the course of my study, I came to scrutinise the representations of the conflict in different newspapers and also to re-evaluate my own ideas and position towards the conflict and its events. I grew up in an Arab country, and I learned history from an Arab point of view, but in the course of my study it became apparent that this is only one point of view and that there are other views of the conflict that can be quite different and also more influential and more widely accepted. I realised also that discourses of the conflict in Arab and Western cultures are so different that they do not enable mutual communication and the creation of a common ground for peace. I have concluded that media representations contribute to confirming prevailing conceptions of the conflict and its sides in each culture, and thus maintain the status quo. What I have achieved in my study at a personal level was a transformation of my views about the conflict, as I came to realise that the conflict is too complex to be understood from one point of view only. Peace between both sides requires a great deal of change of views, discourse and attitudes of and towards both sides of the conflict. I have also realised that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is critical not only for peace in the Middle

East, but also for world peace and for better relationships between the West and the Arab world.

This study demonstrated certain aspects of the ideological workings of discourse in the representation of the conflict in newspapers issued in English in the Arab world and in the West; I plan to concentrate in my future research on the critical analysis of newspapers that are issued in Arabic. There is a need for studies that deal with the ideological representations of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Arab media and their role in the promotion of peace or conflict. Similarly, there is a need for more studies that examine its representations in Hebrew media. More studies that scrutinise the discourse of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are needed in order to be able to challenge the current conventions of representing the conflict and to change the discursive practises that promote violence and that maintain and naturalise the asymmetry of power between both sides, so as to replace them with practises that promote justice, peace and reconciliation between both sides. It is hoped that these academic studies can contribute to the enlightenment of peoples in both cultures and the achievement of peace for both the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples.

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Appendices: Articles used for analysis

Appendix 1 - The Reports of 31st July 2001

The Arab News

Israeli gunships pound Gaza

By Nazer Majally, Arab News Staff —

GAZA CITY, 31 July — Violence in the Middle East threatened to spiral out of control yesterday after six Palestinians were killed in a West Bank blast and Israeli combat helicopters pounded Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza City.

The upsurge in tensions came after a weekend of rioting in Jerusalem, where Israeli police and Palestinian protesters fought running battles on the Al-Haram Al-Sharif complex, one of the holiest sites in the Jewish and Islamic faiths. The unrest has left a US-sponsored cease-fire in tatters, with the death toll since it was declared June 13 rising to 61 — 44 Palestinians and 17 Israelis.

At least four Palestinian policemen were injured when Israeli helicopter gunships fired five missiles at the walled compound which Israeli Army said was being used to make arms and mortar shells. The blast smashed walls and blew out windows of the compound, known as “Arafat City,” after the Palestinian President Yasser Arafat, who was in Tunisia to push for an Arab conference to tackle the 10 months of violence.

“This is another Israeli crime,” Arafat’s top aide Nabil Abu Rudeina told AFP. “It will only escalate the situation. We ask the international community, namely the United States, to move swiftly to stop the Israeli aggression and its war against the Palestinians and to provide international protection.”

The death toll rose sharply in the early hours yesterday morning when an explosion in a car junk yard in the West Bank village of Farah killed six Palestinian men, at least three of them militiamen from Arafat’s Fatah movement. Fatah officials vowed to exact “rapid and painful revenge.” “Our response will be more painful than can be imagined and it will be quicker than the (Israeli) occupation expects,” it said.

The Palestinians said the men were killed by Israeli tank shells fired from a Jewish settlement northeast of Nablus. Around 10,000 Palestinians, shouting “revenge, revenge” and waving flags, swarmed into Farah from the neighboring towns of Nablus and Jenin for the funerals, which passed off without incident despite flaring tempers.

The latest escalation in violence came after a tiny group of Jewish ultra-nationalists held a brief but symbolic ceremony Sunday near the Haram Al-Sharif in Jerusalem’s Old City to mark the laying of a cornerstone for a new temple on the site. The Jewish action sparked clashes which left at least 18 Palestinians injured and caused fury in the Arab world.

The Palestinian Authority rejected earlier an idea to have a US-only monitoring force oversee a cease-fire and insisted on a fully international team. Ahmad Abdel-Rahman, an aide to Arafat, said the PA would welcome US participation “within the observation force” but would not compromise on having people from other countries included. “We need Americans and others, not only Americans. It is very clear, Americans alone are not enough,” he told Reuters. Israeli political sources said last week Israel could agree to the deployment of as many as 10 US Central Intelligence Agency officers to monitor a cease-fire hammered out by the agency’s director, George Tenet, in June. Israel has refused any international presence other than a US one in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, maintaining it would serve as a shield to Palestinian attacks on Israelis.

The New York Times

In Mideast, a Day of Resounding Violence

By CLYDE HABERMAN
JERUSALEM, July 30

The state of Israeli-Palestinian relations is looking more and more like a police blotter. That was conspicuously so today as bombs, mortars, missiles and knives left casualties on both sides across the length of the land.

In the northern part of the West Bank, six Palestinians allied with Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian Authority chairman, were blown apart in an explosion at a roadside tin shack between Nablus and Jenin.

Despite a lack of conclusive evidence as to what caused the blast, Palestinian officials accused Israel of carrying out an assassination, part of an army pattern of targeted killings. The charge was firmly denied by the Israelis, who called the explosion "a work accident" -- the euphemism here for Palestinians' inadvertently blowing themselves up while preparing bombs for terrorist operations.

The West Bank incident, which occurred before dawn, set the tone for a long day of violence. It reflected the deepening mistrust and anger between the two sides, which find themselves mired in a warlike situation that is not really a war: a declared cease-fire that has degenerated into ceaseless fire, resisting international appeals for calm.

The attacks came today in a steady tattoo.

In northern Israel, three members of Israel's border police were wounded in a drive-by shooting while they were on patrol near a kibbutz not far from the West Bank border. In Gaza City, seven Palestinian police officers were wounded when Israeli helicopters fired at a building in the police headquarters compound. Israel said the building was a mortar-producing factory. Palestinian officials said the helicopters had hit a weapons storeroom.

At Kfar Darom, a Jewish settlement in the Gaza Strip, a 9-year-old girl was hit by shrapnel from a mortar round that landed near her. In Jerusalem, a Jewish man was stabbed and critically wounded as he was walking out of the Muslim quarter of the Old City.

Even before then, Jerusalem was on edge a day after Palestinians showered stones on Jews praying at the Western Wall in the Old City, an action that touched off skirmishes with Israeli police officers at the Aksa Mosque compound.

Uneasiness hung in the air. The United States consulate general in Jerusalem issued a notice reaffirming that its employees would be wise to keep away from crowded areas and stay off public buses. The Jerusalem police added their own security alert for Israelis.

"There are concentrated efforts to drag Jerusalem into the circle of violence," cautioned Mickey Levy, the city's police chief. Some government workers downtown said they were told this morning to stay in their offices and off the streets.

In mid-afternoon, a small bomb exploded in a basement supermarket on heavily traveled King George Street, in the heart of town. No one was hurt. But nerves were rattled, and the mere rumor of yet another attack jangled them further.

Soon after the supermarket explosion, there was a report of another bomb in the Sheik Jarrah section of eastern Jerusalem. It turned out to be a can that had been left in a car, where it burst

from intense heat. A couple of hours later, word came of a bus bombing across town, in an area called Givat Shaul. It was another false alarm. A tire on the bus had burst.

Some in Jerusalem found it all increasingly hard to take. "We're strong," a middle-aged woman said as she walked by police cordons set up along King George Street. "But emotionally this is difficult."

In the West Bank explosion, the six who died were described as men of consequence in the Aksa Brigades, the armed branch of Mr. Arafat's Fatah faction. Palestinian officials said three had been on an Israeli wanted list. That struck the officials as quite a coincidence. This had to be an assassination, they insisted.

But no one could say how it was supposedly carried out.

At first, some Palestinians said helicopters had fired missiles at the shack, in a village called Al Fara. No, others said, Israeli tanks shelled the place. On closer inspection, neither version held water, prompting still further speculation in Al Fara that Palestinians collaborating with Israel had somehow arranged for explosives to go off inside the shack.

Israel's explanation was simpler: there were no assassins.

"It was a work accident," said Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, the deputy defense minister. Bomb makers, Ms. Rabin-Pelosoff said on the army's radio station, "have recently been making many mistakes, and they pay for it with their lives."

"It is not the first time the Palestinians have claimed we killed a squad," she said.

It was also not the first time that Israel denied responsibility for the sudden deaths of Palestinians allied with Mr. Arafat. There have been at least three known "work accidents" in the last 10 days or so.

Even if that is indeed what they were, these incidents have added to the tensions, producing Palestinian promises of reprisals that in turn lead to Israeli warnings of swift counterattacks.

The Guardian

Blast kills six Fatah men on Israel's hitlist

Suzanne Goldenberg in Jerusalem
Tuesday July 31, 2001

A powerful explosion killed six Palestinian activists in the West Bank, and Israeli helicopter gunships rocketed the Palestinian police headquarters in Gaza City yesterday, punctuating a day of sharply escalating tensions.

The six Palestinians - who were on Israel's most-wanted list - were killed soon after midnight when an explosion ripped through a shack in a junkyard north of the West Bank town of Nablus.

Palestinian leaders immediately accused the Israeli army of firing tank shells on the shack, and said that the men were targeted as part of Israel's policy of assassinating Palestinian militants.

In Nablus, Fatah leaders said they believed the men were killed by a bomb planted by one of the Israeli collaborators who have infiltrated Palestinian political and security organisations.

However, Israel's deputy defence minister, Dalia Rabin Pelosof, said the men were killed in a

"work accident" - the local euphemism employed when bombmakers blow themselves up. Witnesses said there were no signs of shell fragments in the debris.

"Attackers who are trying to activate explosive devices ... recently they have been making many mistakes ... and they pay with their lives for it," she told Army Radio.

The explosion blew the roof off the shack in a yard of rusting cars near the Fara refugee camp, hurling body parts 30 yards from the table where the men had apparently been sitting. Several bloodied playing cards were recovered from the wreckage. All six victims were activists in Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement; three of them had served in the Palestinian security forces.

Some of the victims were believed to belong to a shadowy cell within Fatah, the Revolutionary Martyrs of al-Aqsa Saints. The group, which emerged in the early months of the latest uprising, has broken with the main organisation by attacking targets inside the borders of the Jewish state.

Within the West Bank and Gaza, it has also been deployed to punish suspected collaborators, or those suspected of corruption. The al-Aqsa group claimed the gangland-style killing of the chief of Palestinian television in a Gaza City seaside restaurant last January. Palestinian officials said the six men had taken to sleeping in the shack because they feared an attack on their homes as Israel steps up its policy of attacking Palestinian militants accused of planning raids inside Israel.

Israel, meanwhile, was on heightened alert yesterday for a car bomb attack intelligence officials believe was in the process of being staged by militants based in Nablus. In recent days, Israeli security forces have thwarted a spate of bombing attempts inside Israel. Several have concentrated on the Jerusalem area.

A small blast from a booby-trapped beer can at a supermarket in central Jerusalem yesterday underlined the tense security situation, as did the stabbing of an Orthodox Jewish man at the gates of the old city of Jerusalem. Hospital officials said he was in serious condition.

As 2,000 angry mourners took the six men to their graves in the West Bank yesterday afternoon, Israeli helicopters fired at least three missiles on Gaza City's main police compound, sending out great clouds of white smoke, and injuring at least three people. The Israeli army said that it had attacked a mortar factory.

The sharp upswing in violence comes during a momentary lull in international diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful resolution to the 10-month Palestinian uprising.

At yesterday's cabinet meeting, Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, set aside a foreign ministry research paper proposing Israel carry out long-delayed transfers of land to the Palestinians set out in the Oslo peace accords.

"Every morning we must learn this sentence by heart: there is no negotiation under fire," Mr Sharon said.

The Times

Six men killed in Gaza explosion

Ross Dunn in Jerusalem

SIX Palestinian activists died in an explosion on the West Bank yesterday. Later, missiles from Israeli helicopters damaged the Palestinian police headquarters in the Gaza Strip, although no serious injuries were reported.

The two incidents have heightened fears of a new wave of Palestinian bombing attacks against Israel.

Palestinian officials denied claims that the six men who died in the explosion in the West Bank town of Jenin were preparing explosives and accused Israel of murdering them with tank shells. There were, however, no Israeli helicopters in the area at the time of the blast, which blew the roof off a shack, indicating that the explosion had come from within. Some were identified as members of Fatah, the Palestinian security establishment, and were said to be on Israel's list of suspected terrorists.

Dalia Rabin-Pelosoff, Israel's Deputy Defence Minister, said: "Attackers who are trying to activate explosive devices...recently they have been making many mistakes."

The Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr George Carey, on a four-day pastoral visit to the Middle East, appealed to Christians to remain in the Holy Land. "Stay put, make your mark, but share your message with the rest of us around the world," he said.

Appendix 2 - The Reports of 1st August 2002

The Arab News

Jerusalem Bomb Kills Seven

OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, 1 August — A bomb ripped through a busy university cafeteria in Jerusalem yesterday, killing seven people, five of them foreigners. Some 70 people were injured. At least one of the dead was an American woman, while another victim was a Frenchman.

Responsibility for the lunchtime blast at Hebrew University at Mount Scopus was claimed by Hamas which said in a statement that it was in retaliation for the Gaza raid that killed its military leader, Salah Shehade, and nine Palestinian children.

Many of those in the cafe at the Frank Sinatra International Students' Center were foreigners on summer courses. There were some Palestinians, too. Witnesses said the bomb appeared to have been stashed in a plastic sack. It exploded shortly before 2 p.m. and gutted the eatery. The blast sent people fleeing in panic. Victims staggered out of the cafeteria, located in an Israeli enclave of Arab East Jerusalem.

Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin said: "When Israel bombs a civilian building full of women and children and kills 15 people, this is the response they should expect."

US civil rights leader Jesse Jackson canceled talks in Gaza with Sheikh Yassin. "We canceled that meeting to show respect for the victims and their families," Jackson said after turning around at the Israel-Gaza border. "We feel no useful purpose would be served to meet under the current conditions," he said. Jackson is currently on a peace mission to the occupied territories at the head of an inter-faith delegation.

The Palestinian Authority of Yasser Arafat condemned the attack. So did US President George W. Bush. Bush vowed the bombing would not undermine his "vision of peace" for the Middle East.

"There are clearly killers who hate the thought of peace and therefore are willing to take their hatred to all kinds of places, including a university," he told reporters after a Cabinet meeting at the White House.

"This country condemns that kind of killing, and we send our deepest sympathy to the students

and their families," Bush said. "I also want to make it clear to the killers they won't stop us from rallying the world to fight their kind of terror, nor will they stop us from having a vision of peace."

Before the blast, Israel's Security Cabinet decided to expel to the Gaza Strip a relative of a West Bank resident who had attacked Israelis, political sources said after the meeting. The man will have 12 hours to appeal the decision, the sources said.

The online edition of the Israeli daily Haaretz said the man in question was a relative of a Palestinian who ambushed a bus near the Jewish settlement of Emmanuel on July 17, killing nine people.

The decision emerged as the Security Cabinet met to consider new ways of tackling bombings a day after a teenager blew himself up in Jerusalem, injuring seven Israelis. If the expulsion goes ahead, it will be the first time the controversial measure, which has been criticized at home and abroad, has been used by Israel since the start of the Palestinian uprising, or intifada, in September 2000.

An Israeli government spokesman accused Arafat of "encouraging" the rash of attacks to avoid carrying out reforms in his own administration. "This is an attempt by the Palestinian Authority to try to avoid making the necessary reforms. It is Yasser Arafat who directly encourages this," Avi Pazner said.

The Palestinian Authority retorted, "The leadership considers Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon as being responsible for this cycle of terror. This cycle of terror is a result of policies that are adopted by Sharon's government."

The New York Times

AT LEAST 7 KILLED AS MILITANTS BOMB JERUSALEM CAMPUS

By JAMES BENNET and JOHN KIFNER

JERUSALEM, July 31

A powerful bomb hidden in a bag and left on a table by Palestinian militants tore apart a bustling cafeteria during lunch at Hebrew University here today, killing seven people, including at least three Americans, and wounding more than 80.

Through a bedlam of screams and crashing glass, students fled in horror from the cafeteria, in the Frank Sinatra Student Center, some trailing blood onto the concrete courtyard of Nancy Reagan Plaza.

Because of the campus' diverse student body -- it is one of the few enclaves here where Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs still mix -- students said they had felt safe, even as new violence threatened the city this week. Arab students were among the wounded, hospital officials said, as were foreign students.

In Washington, the State Department reported the deaths of the three Americans, two women and one man. One victim, Janis Ruth Coulter of New York City, was identified tonight by the American Friends of Hebrew University.

The State Department declined to identify the American victims further as consular officials worked to notify relatives.

An administration official said there might be more Americans among the dead. He gave no further details, except to say that the identification process was continuing. The Israeli consul in

Boston, Hillel Newman, told The Boston Globe last night that four Americans had been killed in the attack.

Philip Reeker, a department spokesman, called the attack "absolutely tragic and outrageous."

President Bush condemned the bombing and said it was perpetrated by "killers who hate the thought of peace and therefore are willing to take their hatred to all kinds of places, including a university."

The bombing at the campus, on Mount Scopus, was the second in two days in Jerusalem. The Islamist group Hamas claimed responsibility for the bombing, saying that it acted in retaliation for Israel's killing last week of a top Hamas leader. Fourteen others, including nine children, died in that attack, in which Israel bombed a house in Gaza City.

Spencer Dew, 26, a divinity student from the University of Chicago studying here for the summer, was eating on the patio when he heard the blast, then smelled gunpowder. Lacerated by flying glass, he joined the fleeing crowd, then returned for a notebook, which had also been pierced by glass.

"I know there are justifications -- bad justifications," he said of the political violence, his shirt spotted crimson and his khaki pants torn as he left a hospital here. "It's killing college students. That's no political solution for anything. It's killing college kids."

As emergency workers cleared the site, Abeer Salman, 19, a student from the Arab village of Beit Safafa, sat on the plaza steps, stunned.

"I was across the plaza," she said. "My friend wanted to get something to drink. After two minutes we heard a blast, and we can't find her."

The campus is fenced, and guards check the bags of those who enter. But some students complained that the security was porous. An investigation by a campus paper in January warned that a cafeteria would be an appealing, accessible target.

"The security tries to do their best," said Kobi Cohen, the student union president. "But there are a lot of holes in the fence. A lot of guards don't check the bags well."

Mr. Cohen, who helped evacuate the wounded, said, "We always believed that because there are Arab students here and Arab workers, nobody will try to hurt us here."

The attack was unusual in that it appeared not to be the work of a suicide bomber. Police officials said initial investigation suggested that the bomb was hidden in a bag.

Israeli officials said the attack fit a Palestinian strategy of killing civilians. "This is a continuous effort by the Palestinians to kill as many Israelis as possible in order to sabotage the peace process," said Gideon Meir, a senior Foreign Ministry official. "It has nothing to do with what happened in Gaza City a week ago."

The Palestinian Authority, led by Yasir Arafat, issued a statement saying that it "absolutely condemns the attack against Hebrew University" but adding that it blamed Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon, for provoking violence.

After back-to-back bombings killed 26 people here more than a month ago, Israel began a ground offensive in the West Bank to suppress Palestinian violence.

But Palestinian militants vowed retaliation after the bombing last week. After five people were injured in the suicide bombing here on Tuesday, Mr. Sharon met senior security advisers before

today's attack to discuss ways of coping with suicide bombers, and the group endorsed the idea of deporting members of the killers' families. Tonight, Israeli military officials convened to consider possible retaliation.

Ron Krumer, a spokesman for the Hadassah Medical Center, where some of the wounded were taken, said the victims suffered "penetrating injuries, with lots of metal elements, such as bolts and screws and nails, all over their bodies."

The bomb sprayed blood across the ceiling tiles, tore apart wooden chairs and scattered the antique radios decorating the cafeteria. A large jar of pickled radishes sat unbroken on one counter, as an officer a few feet away used large tweezers to pick evidence out of a pool of blood.

Students jotted down lists of friends and frantically dialed their cellphones, checking off the names of those who responded. Others called home to say they were all right.

"I got delayed; I'm the luckiest man in the world," Allistaire Goldrein, 19, of Liverpool, England, told his worried father, calling from England. Mr. Goldrein said he ate in the cafeteria every day and was delayed today by another student.

"I was coming around the corner and suddenly there was this huge explosion," he said. "I can't describe it -- huge. The very foundation of the stone structure was shaken."

Mr. Goldrein said he raced inside. "It was carnage in there," he said. "Carnage, anarchy. It was disgusting. I saw dead people. I saw people with no heads. There was a guy, I gave him mouth to mouth, but he was dead."

Just outside the campus this afternoon, the police detained scores of Arab men, including some who appeared to be students, keeping them standing in the sun for several hours as they searched for suspects.

Representatives of an anti-Palestinian faction arrived at the blast site and unfurled a banner declaring, "It's them or us" and "Expel the Arab enemy." Dror Lederman, 26, a student of economics and accounting, angrily accosted one man. "Get out of here," he said. "You come every time. You come to dance on the blood."

Students watched in shock as emergency workers carried their peers away on orange stretchers, through an area where graduation ceremonies are held. "I was standing in the Forum and watching them bring people on stretchers, and I saw blood and shoes and I.V.'s on the ground," said Sophia Aron, 19, of Los Angeles, a student from the University of California, Davis, who is studying here for a year. "Right in the Forum. It freaks me out. But I'm not leaving."

Dr. Mahmoud al-Zahar, a political leader of Hamas, blamed Israel for the attack. "Such operations will continue until the elimination of the occupation," he said. Hamas leaders consider all of Israel to be occupied territory, not just the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which Israel occupied in 1967.

Shlomo Avineri, a political science professor at the university, said: "This is beyond the pale, to attack a university, and it shows what the war is about. It's not about the settlements. It's not about occupation. It's about the very existence of a Jewish population in this country."

The Guardian

Bomb kills seven at university

Hamas attacks mixed campus in revenge for assassination

Suzanne Goldenberg in Jerusalem
Thursday August 1, 2002

The bombers of Hamas struck at the heart of student life yesterday, killing at least seven people and injuring more than 70 in a lunchtime attack on a crowded university cafeteria.

In the maelstrom of the intifada, the Mount Scopus campus of Hebrew University had remained a rare preserve of co-existence between Arab and Jew, and attracted scores of foreign exchange students during the summer months.

Yesterday, the forecourt of the Frank Sinatra international students' centre was splattered with blood, food, smashed trays and shards from huge plate glass windows blown out by a powerful bomb apparently left inside.

Hamas said the bombing was the first act of retaliation for Israel's decision to drop a one-tonne bomb in Gaza City, killing a commander it had targeted for assassination and 14 other Palestinians.

Sharon Avital, 26, an MBA student, had just put down her tray at a table by the windows when an explosion rocked the heavy concrete pavilion.

"First of all there was silence, and then the screaming started," she said, after being treated for minor head cuts. "There were screams, people lying on the floor, blood, and darkness. I felt a blow to the back of my head, and then I looked down and my hands were covered in blood."

One of the dead was an American exchange student, officials at Jerusalem hospitals said, and foreign students - an American, an Italian, and three from South Korea - were among the wounded. At least 10 Arab students were also injured.

Most of the wounded were aged 18-30, and were hit by shrapnel or metal rods when the ceiling collapsed.

Students ripped up their T-shirts for tourniquets and carried the wounded to ambulances. The corpses were laid out under black plastic sheeting against the nearby law faculty building.

"I saw a girl my age covered up with a blanket because she was dead," said Daniel Farahan, a 20-year-old from Indiana with long dreadlocks under his kippa [skullcap]. "You see it on TV all the time, but this was nothing like TV."

The bombing marked a departure from Hamas's usual methods - primarily suicide bombings.

"The bomb was in a bag which had been planted on a table in the centre of the restaurant," said the police spokeswoman Sigal Toledo.

Within minutes of the attack, police began rounding up young Palestinian men in Arab areas near the campus, forcing them to stand spread-eagled against walls.

Until now, educational institutions were seen as off-limits to attackers - particularly Hebrew University, where a high proportion of students are Arabs, Palestinians and Israeli citizens from the Arab towns of the Galilee.

"How do you justify walking into a university and blowing up children who are studying?" asked Alistair Goldrein, from Liverpool, who has been studying at the university for a month. "These were students. A lot of people are heavy leftwingers who want to get out of the territories right away."

In an implicit claim of responsibility, the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, said the attack was the natural consequence of events in Gaza.

"When Israel bombs a civilian building full of women and children, and kills 15 people, this is the response they should expect," he told the television cameras. "Today's Israeli government should bear responsibility." A Hamas official said it would be the first of many attacks. It was the second bombing in Jerusalem in 24 hours.

Although Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Authority was swift to say it "absolutely condemns the attack", it also laid the blame at the feet of the prime minister, Ariel Sharon, for continuing Israel's policy "of destruction, killing and collective punishment".

Just hours before the attack, Mr Sharon's security cabinet ordered the first expulsion of a relative of a Palestinian militant since Israel occupied the West Bank and Gaza in 1967.

Although Israel's plans to deport the families of wanted Palestinian men have been condemned abroad, the public security minister, Uzi Landau, told Israel Radio yesterday that it was "enough for a relative of a relative of a suicide bomber to set up a mourning tent or visit a mourning tent for him" in order to be selected for exile.

It said the first candidate for deportation - a relative of one of the militants ambushed a bus of Jewish settlers two weeks ago - would be given a chance to appeal. However, he was expected to be deported yesterday.

The Times

Hamas bomb kills seven students at Jerusalem's multicultural university

Stephen Farrell in Jerusalem

Blood and shredded ivy cling to columns inside the cafeteria that was until yesterday one of the few symbols of cross-community life in Israel.

Amid the bustle of the kosher restaurant no one noticed the bag beneath a Meeting Place sign where Jewish, Arab, American, British and other foreign students have studied together for years.

Yesterday seven of these students at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, including one American, lay dead and more than 80 injured after a Hamas bomber struck while they chatted over coffee and bagels beside the Frank Sinatra International Student Centre.

Alastair Goldrein, 20, a student from Merseyside, said: "Glass was flying everywhere. Tables were flying everywhere. Things were flying out of the window. It went quiet for a few moments and then there was wailing.

"It was anarchy. I joined with a few others and tried to take bodies out. The wounds were just appallingly awful. It was beyond anything that you could ever imagine. There were holes in people's bodies.

"I was stuffing scraps of paper from exercise books into people's wounds, there was so much screaming and desperation on people's faces," he said. "There were Israelis there, Arabs and kids from all over the world. In this cafe, Arabs and Jews ate their lunch in harmony, in peace, without any of the divides you hear about so much elsewhere in the world.

"This is a very mixed university, a very cosmopolitan university. I carried out one girl obviously of

Arab extraction and she was very badly wounded."On one shattered window hung a notice warning that no milk products were allowed, in line with Jewish dietary rules. In another corner, next to a pile of bloodstained napkins lay a durbaka, an Arab drum.

Everyone thought that the university's Mount Scopus campus was one of the safest places in a dangerous country, its modernist angular limestone buildings hidden from Jerusalem and outlying Palestinian villages by a screen of fir trees and conifers providing a sense of security.

True, guards checked bags at the campus gates and, true, the student university newspaper printed a warning last April, visualising, with uncanny accuracy, a terrorist attack in which Palestinians kill seven people and injure dozens.

But as shaken students sitting on blood-spattered park benches testified yesterday, there were no armed guards on the campus itself because everyone assumed that the presence of 2,000 Palestinian students and numerous Arab staff among the 16,000 on campus guaranteed immunity from attack.

This delusion was shattered shortly before 2pm when, police believe, a bomb left in a bag on a table inside the crowded cafeteria exploded near the till, shredding bodies, ripping the fake 1950s bakelite wirelesses off the walls and blowing a South Korean student through a window.

For Mr Goldrein it was his second such encounter, after being just yards from a blast in a central Jerusalem shopping precinct last December.

Responsibility for the attack was taken by Hamas, the Islamic group seeking revenge for the death of 15 Palestinians including its military commander, Salah Shehadeh, in an Israeli airstrike in Gaza last week.

Yassir Arafat's Palestinian Authority condemned the strike. President Bush said that he would continue to seek peace in the Middle East. "There are clearly killers who hate the thought of peace and, therefore, are willing to take their hatred to all kinds of places, including a university," he said.

Appendix 3 - The Reports of 15th January 2004

The Arab News

Mother-of-Two Bomber Kills Four Israelis

OCCUPIED JERUSALEM, 15 January 2004 — A Palestinian mother of two blew herself up yesterday at the Erez Crossing at the Israel-Gaza border, killing three Israeli soldiers and a private security guard and signaling a new tactic by Hamas, who had never before dispatched a woman suicide bomber.

Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin said the use of a woman bomber was unique for the group, but holy war "is an obligation of all Muslims, men and women."

Israel said it will temporarily close the crossing to Palestinians, preventing thousands of workers from traveling to a nearby Israeli-Palestinian industrial zone that is one of the last vestiges of cooperation between the two peoples after more than three years of violence in which thousands have been killed.

The army said four of the seven wounded in the attack were Palestinians.

The bombing came as efforts to restart peace negotiations remained stalled, with Israel's leaders threatening to impose a new boundary between Israel and the Palestinians if no progress is made soon.

Meanwhile, a British man shot in the head by Israeli troops in Gaza Strip last April died Tuesday after nine months in a comatose state, his family said yesterday. Tom Hurndall, a member of the International Solidarity Movement, was trying to help children out of the path of a tank in the Rafah refugee camp when he was shot.

An Israeli soldier was charged Monday in the incident. A military official said on condition of anonymity that the indictment could be upgraded to manslaughter.

At the Erez Crossing yesterday morning, a woman identified as Reem Raiyshi, 22, told soldiers checking Palestinians that she would set off a metal detector because she had an implant to repair a broken leg. She was taken for a security search to a special room, where she set off the bomb, said Maj. Sharon Feingold, a military spokeswoman.

“I heard soldiers screaming, the blast was very strong,” said a Palestinian woman standing outside the room who identified herself only as Amena. She said another Palestinian woman in the room ran out, bleeding from her legs.

After the explosion, a temporary structure made of corrugated metal had a large hole in the roof, and destroyed desks and computers were scattered nearby.

The bombing was jointly claimed by Hamas and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, linked to Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat’s Fatah movement. However, Raiyshi was described as a Hamas activist.

“This is an indication that resistance will continue,” Yassin said.

The tactic of using a woman appeared aimed at piercing Israeli security, which mainly focuses on men as possible suicide bombers. Other militant groups have used women in the past but Hamas had not done so.

In a video made before the bombing, Raiyshi wears the traditional hijab covering for women, holds an assault rifle and stands before two green Hamas flags.

“I always wanted to be the first woman to carry out a martyr attack, where parts of my body can fly all over. That is the only wish I can ask God for,” she said with a smile.

Raiyshi had two children: a girl, Doha, 18 months, and a boy, Obedia, 3. Her brother-in-law Yusef Awad expressed disbelief that she had abandoned her children. “We were not expecting that from her. We would not have thought it possible,” he said.

Palestinian Prime Minister Ahmed Qorei declined to condemn the attack, saying that continued Israeli attacks and restrictions on the Palestinians are leading “to more escalation on both sides.”

There have been several previous attacks at the Erez Crossing. In response to yesterday’s attack, Israeli officials said they would close the Erez Crossing to Palestinians for several days. Roughly 6,000 Palestinians have to enter Erez to get to jobs at an industrial zone filled with Israeli, Palestinian and jointly owned factories.

“We are not going to close it (permanently) but no one can blame us for making more stringent checks,” said Raanan Gissin, a spokesman for Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

Brig. Gen. Gadi Shamni, the Israeli military commander in Gaza, indicated that Israel would hit back. “I imagine that we will know how to respond at the time, place and method of our choosing,” he told Israel TV.

The industrial zone straddling the Israel-Gaza border provides crucial jobs to residents of the impoverished coastal plain, where 60 percent of working-age people are unemployed.

A US official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said the attack on Erez appeared aimed at pushing Israel to close the border, depriving thousands of Palestinians of work and making life in Gaza even more miserable — which raises the popularity of militant groups.

— Additional input from agencies

The New York Times

January 15, 2004

Gaza Mother, 22, Kills Four Israelis in Suicide Bombing

BYLINE: By GREG MYRE

A young Palestinian mother, feigning a limp and requesting medical help, blew herself up Wednesday at the entrance to a security inspection center for Palestinian workers, killing four Israeli security personnel and wounding seven people, the Israeli military said.

The bomber, Reem al-Reyashi, 22, said in video released after her attack that "it was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists and to knock on the doors of heaven with the skulls of Zionists." Ms. Reyashi left behind a son aged 3, and a year-old daughter.

Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, said this was the first time his group had dispatched a woman to be a suicide bomber. Some militant Palestinian factions have been reluctant to do so, and some Islamic groups have questioned whether it is permitted under Islamic law.

But when Sheik Yassin was asked why Hamas had decided to send a woman, he cited purely tactical concerns. "It could be that a man would not be able to reach the target, and that's why they had to use a woman," he said.

Ms. Reyashi's attack, in an industrial zone at the northern edge of the Gaza Strip, was the first Palestinian suicide bombing to kill Israelis since a Dec. 25 blast at a bus stop outside Tel Aviv, which also left four dead. Middle East violence has been down recently, but the blast ratcheted up tensions and dealt another blow to peace efforts that have been stalled for months.

Israel responded by immediately shutting down the industrial zone and sending home the roughly 4,000 Palestinian workers employed in its factories.

"Palestinian terrorists are not only committed to striking Israelis at every opportunity, they are also bent on destroying their own economy," said David Baker, an official in the office of Israel's prime minister, Ariel Sharon.

Palestinians have carried out more than 100 suicide bombings during the past three years of violence. But such attacks have been extremely rare in the fenced-in Gaza Strip, where Palestinian contact with Israelis is largely limited to security checks at places such as Erez.

Ms. Reyashi was able to carry out her bombing by momentarily deceiving the soldiers with her claim that she needed medical treatment inside Israel, the military said.

She joined the line where the Palestinians go through a security check each morning as they enter the industrial zone.

As she approached the building's entrance, which has a metal detector at the doorway, she was limping, the Israeli military and Palestinian witnesses said. She told soldiers she had a recent leg operation, and a metal pin had been implanted that the detector would register.

She was allowed to pass, and when the alarm sounded, the soldiers told her to wait while they called an army woman to search her, the military said. Seconds later, Ms. Reyashi detonated her bomb, estimated at about 10 pounds and packed with ball bearings and screws to make it more lethal, the military said.

The blast tore apart the simple structure, sending part of the roof skyward and leaving behind dangling strips of metal. The floor was sticky with blood and littered with body parts, and bloodstains speckled the walls.

Two soldiers, a border policeman and a civilian security guard were killed and seven people were wounded, including both Israeli security personnel and Palestinians heading to work.

Ms. Reyashi, who came from a middle-class family in Gaza City, appeared in her video wearing combat fatigues, with an automatic rifle in her hands and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher on the desk in front of her.

"God gave me the ability to be a mother of two children who I love so," she said. "But my wish to meet God in paradise is greater, so I decided to be a martyr for the sake of my people. I am convinced God will help and take care of my children."

After the bombing, her husband was seen crying outside the family home. A relative said he had no knowledge of his wife's plans, Reuters reported.

Hamas, the Islamic movement, and the Aksa Martyrs Brigades, a faction loyal to the Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, took joint responsibility for the attack, saying it was revenge for Israel's killing of Palestinians.

Mr. Arafat and the Palestinian leadership usually condemn suicide bombings inside Israel, but issued no such statement after Wednesday's blast.

The Palestinian leaders rarely criticize attacks against Israeli soldiers or settlers in the West Bank or Gaza, land Israel has occupied since the 1967 war.

Hamas had not carried out a suicide attack for the past four months, and senior Israeli military officials said last month that they believed Hamas had temporarily suspended them.

But Sheik Yassin said Wednesday that "there is no truce, operations will continue."

Wednesday's bombing raised the prospect of a step-up in battles between Hamas and the Israeli military.

Last summer, Israel's military struck at four senior Hamas leaders, including Sheik Yassin, while the Islamic faction carried out several suicide bombings.

The Guardian

January 15, 2004

Human-bomb mother kills four Israelis at Gaza checkpoint

BYLINE: Chris McGreal in Gaza

A 22-year-old Palestinian mother of two small children, pretending to be disabled, killed four Israelis at a Gaza border crossing yesterday after duping soldiers into allowing her a personal security check rather than going through a metal detector.

The Islamic resistance movement Hamas and the al-Aqsa Martyrs brigade said the attack by Reem Riyashi, from Gaza City, was a joint operation in revenge for weeks of Israeli incursions into West Bank cities that have left about 25 Palestinians dead.

It was the first time Hamas had used a woman as a human bomb.

She left a videotaped message in which she was pictured in combat fatigues, holding an automatic rifle and with a rocket-propelled grenade in front of her. She said she had dreamed since she was 13 of turning "my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists".

"I always wanted to be the first woman to carry out a martyrdom operation, where parts of my body can fly all over," she said. "God has given me two children. I love them (with) a kind of love that only God knows, but my love to meet God is stronger still."

Mrs Riyashi detonated her 2kg bomb inside a building used to check thousands of Palestinians who cross each day from Gaza to work in a neighbouring industrial zone. The Israeli army said that when she reached the metal detector, the suicide bomber pretended to be crippled and said she had metal plates in her leg which would sound the alarm. She asked to be checked with a body search.

She was taken to an area where a group of soldiers and policemen was checking bags and was told to wait for a woman to come and search her in a cubicle. She then detonated the explosive.

The blast tore open the corrugated iron roof and sent shards of metal and glass ripping through the room. Soldiers used putty knives and pieces of plastic skirting board to scrape strips of flesh from the floor and walls.

All the dead were Israelis: two soldiers, a policeman and a civilian security worker. Seven other Israelis and about four Palestinians were injured.

The Gaza divisional commander, Brigadier-General Gadi Shamni, described the attack as a cynical abuse of his soldiers' attempts to treat women with dignity.

"We're doing our best to be humanitarian, to consider the problems associated with searching women. She said she had a medical problem, that's why the soldiers let her in, to check her in private because she is a woman," he said. "That's a very cruel, cynical use of the humanitarian considerations of our soldiers."

The attack came after months of relative quiet by the Palestinians which has seen few suicide bombings. An attack on Christmas Day by Islamic Jihad killed four Israelis. Last week, a teenage suicide bomber killed himself, but no one else. Prior to those attacks, there had been no

bombings since October.

However, the spiritual leader of Hamas, Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, yesterday warned that other women would follow Mrs Riyashi's example.

Her family swiftly set up the traditional memorial tent near her home in Gaza City. Her relatives offered neither praise for her attack nor an explanation of why a mother with children just three years and 18 months old should choose to become a suicide bomber.

Her family is wealthy, whereas most bombers come from poorer backgrounds. She is the eighth female suicide bomber, but only one other had children.

At Mrs Riyashi's house, her brother-in-law, Yusuf Awad, was dismantling the main gate and moving out furniture in preparation for the arrival of an Israeli army demolition team, which usually blows up the homes of suicide bombers.

"I denounce her attack," he said. "I support peace. We don't accept women doing such things. She has two children. It is not right."

A Hamas official at a memorial service in the local mosque, who called himself Abu Jihad, said there would be more such women bombers.

"We should expect that more female martyr warriors will do this. It is allowed in Islam because Hamas saw that it is no longer easy to send a male warrior to attack them (the Israelis). This year will see a large number of women joining in the attacks," he said.

The Israeli military responded by immediately closing the Gaza crossings to Palestinians for several days.

"They're always trying to kill, even if they hurt themselves," said Lieutenant Ayelet Kadosh.

"What will happen is that while we are investigating the crossing will be closed and thousands of Palestinians will go hungry because they cannot go to work."

About 4,000 Palestinians work in factories in the sealed industrial zone connected to Gaza, many of them providing for extended families in Gaza where there is 70% unemployment.

A further 14,000 Palestinians cross from Gaza to Israel each day. The military swiftly ordered Palestinians out of the factories and, under heavy guard, sent them home.

The Times

January 15, 2004, Thursday

BYLINE: Ian MacKinnon

'It was my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists'

Suicide-bomb mother fakes disability to kill four as Hamas launches fresh front, writes Ian MacKinnon in Gaza.

A PALESTINIAN mother of two faked a disability yesterday to trick her way past Israeli guards before detonating a vest packed with explosives, killing four security staff and wounding seven people at a checkpoint.

The suicide bomber was named as Reem al-Rayashee, 22, the mother of a girl aged 18 months and a boy, 3.

Hamas, the militant Islamic group, said that it was the first time that it had deployed a woman in such an attack and marked a new tactic in its battle against Israel.

In a videotape explaining her actions, the bomber was seen seated between two Hamas flags, clutching an assault rifle. "It was always my wish to turn my body into deadly shrapnel against the Zionists and knock on the doors of Heaven with the skulls of Zionists," she said. "I always wanted to be the first (Hamas) woman to carry out a martyrdom operation where parts of my body can fly all over."

She said, smiling at times, that she had the dreams since she was 13. "God gave me two children and I loved them so much. Only God knew how much I loved them." She asked that her children should study in religious schools.

In Gaza City, mourners gathered in pouring rain at a mosque to remember Mrs al-Rayashee, the wife of a lifeguard who patrolled Gaza's beaches a short distance from the home of her wealthy extended family.

One family member at her home condemned the attack, but shed no light on her motive. Thousands of Palestinian workers who were using the Erez crossing, where the blast occurred, were held there for hours in the rain before being taken back to Gaza. As many as 20,000 are likely to lose their livelihood for days or weeks if, as expected, the crossing remains shut.

Mrs al-Rayashee had passed along hundreds of metres of heavily guarded razor wire to enter the security cabin at about 9.30am, shortly after the main wave of workers had crossed into Israel or an adjacent industrial zone.

She said that she wanted to apply for a new security pass, either to enter Israel for work or medical treatment. She passed through a metal detector and, when it sounded an alert, told soldiers that she had metal pins in her legs.

Israeli soldiers in the cabin, equipped with airport-style baggage screening equipment, told her to stop while they summoned a female soldier to conduct a search in the privacy of a room at the rear. As they waited, the woman detonated a larger device than usual, the Israeli Army said.

"She was faking a medical condition," Brigadier-General Gadi Shamni, commander of the Israeli Army's Gaza division, said. "The soldiers were waiting to take care of her. That's a cruel and cynical exploitation of our humanitarian treatment of her."

Two soldiers, a policeman and a civilian security guard died. Shrapnel peppered the walls and left a scene of charred devastation inside the cabin. Its corrugated aluminium roof was peeled back. Seven people were injured, four of them Palestinians waiting to be screened.

Yossi Vaknim, an Israeli from the nearby Nisanit settlement, was one of the first at the scene. "When I got there it was almost impossible to look at," he said. "It was awful." He blamed Ariel Sharon, the Prime Minister, for talking of withdrawing from Israeli settlements to forge peace.

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, said that the death of Mrs al-Rayashee represented a new departure for the organisation. Holy war was "an obligation of all Muslims, men and women", he said. "This is an indication that resistance will continue." It was the first Hamas suicide bomb in many months.

A local Hamas activist gave warning of an upsurge in violence, which he said was in response to continuing Israeli attacks.

Appendix 4 - The Reports of 22nd March 2004

The Arab News

Murder

Hisham Abu Taha, Arab News

GAZA, 23 March 2004 - Israel assassinated Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin yesterday, provoking global condemnation and cries of revenge from Palestinian resistance.

Israeli security sources said Prime Minister Ariel Sharon personally ordered and monitored the helicopter attack on the 67-year-old symbol of Palestinian resistance, whose wheelchair lay smashed in a pool of blood after three missiles exploded outside the Gaza mosque he had left minutes earlier after the Fajr prayer.

"The state of Israel this morning hit the leader of the Palestinian assassins and terrorists," Sharon said in a brief address to deputies from his Likud party as he congratulated his armed forces on the operation.

At least seven other people died in the missile strike and two of Yassin's sons were among the 15 wounded.

Salah Amudi, 30, said he and a first-aid nurse had picked up Yassin's remains from the ground and took them to Al-Shifa Hospital in plastic bags.

"I was also at the mosque praying. Upon leaving, I heard a first missile, then a second and third," he said, still shaken. "It was ugly, we didn't know what to do. We thought they (the Israeli Army) would strike again."

Yassin's head was cut in two by the blast and part of his brain had fallen out.

The occupied territories erupted in anger following the announcement of Yassin's death, with groups of Palestinians spontaneously taking to the streets to call for swift reprisals. Israeli forces killed four Palestinians, including an 11-year-old.

The United States strongly denied any involvement in the assassination but said the Jewish state had the right to defend itself against the "terrorist" group.

Speaking on morning television interviews, White House national security adviser Condoleezza Rice said the United States did not have advance warning of the assassination.

"It is very important that everyone step back now and try to be calm in the region," Rice told NBC's "Today" show.

But Rice made it clear on whose side Washington is. "Let's remember that Hamas is a terrorist organization and that Sheikh Yassin himself has been heavily involved in terrorism," she said.

At noon, a sea of wailing Gazans took part in the funeral procession for a man seen by many as a patriarch, in the largest march the strip had seen since the start of the Palestinian uprising. The procession left the hospital and went to Yassin's modest Gaza house before attending a service at a mosque and finally burying him in the city's "martyrs' cemetery".

Top Hamas official Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi said: "Yassin was a man in a nation, and a nation in a man. And the retaliation of this nation will be of the size of this man. You will see deeds not words."

A website published a statement purporting to come from an Al-Qaeda-linked group vowing revenge on the United States and its allies over Yassin's murder. "We tell Palestinians that Sheikh Yassin's blood was not spilt in vain and call on all legions of Abu Hafs Al-Masri Brigades to avenge him by attacking the tyrant of the age, America, and its allies," said the statement by the group carried by the Al-Ansar forum website.

Hours after Yassin's murder, an Arab stabbed and wounded three passengers on an Israeli bus in Jaffa before fleeing, a police spokeswoman said. Earlier, an ax-wielding Palestinian wounded three people outside an army base near Tel Aviv.

In northern Israel, Lebanon's Hezbollah attacked Israeli posts in a disputed border area, drawing air raids. There were no immediate reports of casualties.

The European Union criticized the "extra-judicial killing" but also recalled past EU condemnations of bombings.

British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said Israel had the right to defend itself against terrorism. "But it is not entitled to go for this kind of unlawful killing and we therefore condemn it," he said.

EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana condemned the killing as "very, very bad news" for the Middle East peace process.

The New York Times

Leader of Hamas Killed by Missile in Israeli Strike

March 22, 2004

By JAMES BENNET

GAZA, March 22 - Sheik Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader and founder of the militant Palestinian group Hamas, was killed early Monday by an Israeli missile that struck him as he left a mosque in Gaza City, his family and Hamas officials said. They said at least two bodyguards had been killed with him.

Sheik Yassin, a symbol to Palestinians of resistance to Israel and to Israelis of Palestinian terrorism, was by far the most significant Palestinian militant killed by Israel in more than three years of conflict.

Black smoke curled over Gaza City as Palestinians began burning tires in the streets and demonstrators chanted for revenge. Mosque loudspeakers blared a message across Gaza of mourning for Sheik Yassin in the name of Hamas and another militant group, Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades.

Thousands of Palestinians took part in a funeral procession for the Sheik and others killed in the attack.

The Israeli military confirmed the killing, saying in a statement that the sheik was "responsible for numerous murderous terror attacks, resulting in the deaths of many civilians, both Israeli and foreign."

The army said it had targeted a car carrying Sheik Yassin, but Palestinians at the scene said that the Sheik was not in car when he was hit.

The Israeli weapons punctured the pavement of the street where Sheik Yassin, a quadriplegic, was being escorted home. Blood splattered the walls of surrounding buildings. "I could not recognize the sheik, only his wheelchair," said one witness, Maher al-Beek.

In interviews with American television stations this morning, the White House's national security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, said that the United States did not have advance warning of the assassination, and urged calm in the region.

In refugee camps like Rafa and Khan Yunis, strongholds of Palestinian militancy, thousands of people took to the streets. Ismail Haniya, a political leader of Hamas, addressed more than a thousand people who gathered outside the autopsy center at Shiffa Hospital in Gaza City.

"You don't have to cry," he said. "You have to be steadfast, and you have to be ready for revenge, because the sheik has implanted the soul and the spirit of martyrdom and courage in your souls."

He said that "the blood of Sheik Yassin will run in the veins of all Palestinians," and predicted that his death would give "more momentum for the liberation of Palestinians from the criminals, the Jews."

Hospital officials said the sheik's body had been smashed in the attack.

Like other political leaders of Hamas, Sheik Yassin denied involvement in planning specific attacks, but Israeli officials said he was directly connected to terrorism.

Ahmed Qurei, the Palestinian prime minister, condemned the attack. "This is a crazy and very dangerous act," he said, according to Reuters. "It opens the door wide to chaos. Yassin is known for his moderation, and he was controlling Hamas, and therefore this is a dangerous, cowardly act."

The Israeli Army said it had closed off the Gaza Strip, which is bracketed against the Mediterranean by an Israeli fence, and shut checkpoints that effectively divide it into three sections.

Israel has again stepped up its pressure on militants in Gaza since two Palestinian suicide bombers from a Gaza refugee camp blew themselves up last Sunday at the Israeli port of Ashdod, killing 10 Israelis. That attack was jointly claimed by Hamas and Al Aksa Martyrs Brigades.

The country has also appeared eager to show that a plan announced by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to withdraw Israeli settlers and soldiers from Gaza did not amount to a victory for Palestinian militants, as some of them had claimed.

Israel tried to kill Sheik Yassin on Sept. 6, dropping a 550-pound bomb on a Gaza apartment building where he was holding a meeting. The sheik escaped with a slight shrapnel wound to his

right hand, and 14 other people were wounded. That strike came as Israel declared "all-out war" on the group after a suicide bombing in Jerusalem in August.

On Jan. 16, the Israeli deputy defense minister, Zeev Boim, said Sheik Yassin was "marked for death" by Israel. "He should hide himself deep underground where he won't know the difference between day and night," Mr. Boim said at the time. "And we will find him in the tunnels, and we will eliminate him."

Sheik Yassin responded: "We do not fear death threats. We are seekers of martyrdom."

Hamas is officially committed to Israel's destruction, not just a withdrawal from the occupied territories. The word means `zeal` in Arabic, and that is an acronym for Islamic Resistance Movement.

The group runs a network of low-cost clinics and schools that have broadened its ideological reach while helping to give its popularity a boost among Palestinians. Israeli security officials regard it as the most organized and disciplined of the militant groups.

Sheik Yassin helped found Hamas in 1987. He later spent eight years in an Israeli prison, before being freed in 1997 as a gesture to King Hussein of Jordan after a bungled assassination attempt on a Hamas leader in Amman, the capital.

The targeted killing followed an Israeli raid on Sunday into the southern Gaza Strip that left four Hamas militants and one Palestinian woman dead. Israel said it had been seeking to arrest one of the Hamas men who died in the operation.

Also on Sunday, Prime Minister Sharon gained qualified backing from his top right-wing rival, Benjamin Netanyahu, for Mr. Sharon's plan for a Gaza withdrawal. Mr. Netanyahu said he might back the plan if Mr. Sharon achieved an "appropriate return," including support for retraining some blocks of settlements in the West Bank, from the United States.

He also said Israel must remain free to act militarily in Gaza after any withdrawal.

The Guardian

Israel assassinates Hamas leader

- Yassin killed in missile strike**
- Mass protests by Palestinians**
- Militants vow revenge attacks**

George Wright and agencies

Monday March 22 2004

Palestinian militants today warned of swift and bloody retaliation against Israel after it "opened the gates of hell" by assassinating Ahmed Yassin, the founder and spiritual leader of militant group Hamas.

Yassin was killed in a missile strike by Israeli helicopters as he left a mosque in Gaza city at dawn. Seven other people, including the 67-year-old's bodyguards, were killed. Another 17 - including two of Yassin's sons - were injured in the attack, according to initial reports.

Witnesses described a horrific scene, with a large area of the pavement where the missiles landed covered in blood and strips of clothing. Yassin, who used a wheelchair, was said to have been directly hit by the first missile, and his body was severely disfigured.

Taxi driver Yousef Haddad, who was in a nearby shop at the time of the attack, and was one of the first on the scene, told the Associated Press: "His wheelchair was twisted. Two or three people were lying next to him on the ground. One was legless."

Israel blamed Yassin - the most prominent Palestinian leader to be killed in more than three years of Israeli-Palestinian fighting - for orchestrating a wave of suicide bombings. An Israeli defence spokeswoman said that his assassination was a "life-saving mission".

Hamas and other militant groups warned of an immediate explosion in violence in the Middle East as tens of thousands of mourners poured on to the streets of Gaza for Yassin's funeral procession.

His body, wrapped in a green Hamas flag, was carried along the route in an open coffin, accompanied by an honorary Hamas guard.

In scenes repeated in towns across the occupied territories, angry crowds called for revenge against Israel and the US, and masked militants fired automatic rounds into the air.

Violent clashes between demonstrators and Israeli security forces broke out, and four Palestinians - including a 13-year-old boy and a journalist - were reported to have been killed when Israeli soldiers fired on the crowds.

"Words cannot describe the emotion of anger and hate inside our hearts," Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh, a close associate of Yassin, said.

Abu Abeer, a spokesman for a group of militant Palestinian organisations in the occupied territories, told pan-Arab satellite channel al-Arabiya there would be "swift and serious" repercussions.

"They have opened the gates of hell," he warned. "For us, everything is now permissible after this assassination."

For the first time, Hamas threatened revenge on the US as well as Israel, saying that US backing of Israel had made Yassin's assassination possible.

"All the Muslims of the world will be honoured to join in on the retaliation for this crime," Hamas said in a statement.

Yassin, who escaped an Israeli assassination attempt last September, was sentenced to life imprisonment by Israel in 1989 for founding Hamas and inciting Palestinians to attack Israelis.

He was released in 1997 as a goodwill gesture to Jordan's King Hussein after a failed Israeli attempt to assassinate another Hamas leader in Amman.

Israeli defence forces issued a statement confirming that Yassin had been killed in the strike, and saying that he was directly responsible for "dozens of terrorist attacks and the deaths of Israelis, foreigners and security personnel".

Gideon Meir, an Israeli foreign ministry official, said Yassin had been "the one who is sending children and women to explode themselves" in suicide attacks against Israel.

According to the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, the Israeli security cabinet took the decision to assassinate him following a double suicide bombing at the Ashdod port earlier this month in which 10 people were killed.

The Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, oversaw the operation, receiving constant updates from military officials at his Negev ranch, the paper reported.

Political leaders across the Arab world and beyond lined up to condemn Israel's action, while the US appealed for calm on both sides.

The Palestinian prime minister, Ahmed Qureia, said: "This is one of the biggest crimes that the Israeli government has committed." The Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, described the assassination as a "barbaric crime". His aides expressed fears that he might be next on the Israeli's list of assassination targets.

The British home secretary, Jack Straw, said that Yassin's killing was "unjustifiable" and "unlikely to achieve its objectives."

In Kuwait - one of the US's closest allies in the Arab world - the prime minister, Sheik Sabah al-Ahmed al-Sabah, warned: "Violence will increase now, because violence always breeds violence."

Despite the international outcry, the Israeli defence minister, Shaul Mofaz, defiantly pledged that "the battle against Hamas will continue", suggesting more air strikes and raids against the group.

Meanwhile, Israeli security forces were placed on high alert following the attack. Israel closed its borders on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, barring all Palestinians from entering.

Israel's military commander, Lieutenant General Moshe Yaalon, met senior officers in Tel Aviv to discuss the possible fallout, and more forces were ordered to the Gaza Strip.

In a first response, Palestinian militants fired 10 home-made rockets toward an Israeli settlement in Gaza. There were no immediate reports of injuries.

The Times

March 22, 2004

Hamas spiritual leader killed in Israeli air strike

FROM AP IN RAMALLAH

Tens of thousands of mourners jammed the streets of Gaza City today for the funeral procession of the Hamas founder Ahmed Yassin and seven others killed in an Israeli air strike at daybreak.

The death of the 67-year-old spiritual leader has prompted threats of unprecedented revenge by Palestinian militants against Israel and the United States.

The British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, condemned the killing of Yassin as "unacceptable". The French foreign ministry also said that the assassination broke international law.

The Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat earlier denounced the killing of the Hamas leader and declared a three-day mourning period saying that the Israelis had crossed "all red lines".

Twenty-one Palestinian police officers formed an honour guard as the coffin holding Yassin's body was carried out of Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Mourners jostled, trying to touch the coffin, which was draped in a green Hamas flag. Others clamoured for revenge. Women ululated and threw flowers into the air. Two Israeli helicopter gunships hovered in the sky, which was darkened by the thick black smoke of burning tyres.

Yassin, who has been in a wheelchair since an accident in his youth, is the most prominent Palestinian leader to be killed by Israel. Despite Israeli threats against him, Yassin had never changed his routine. Every morning, attended pre-dawn prayers at the local mosque in the Sabra neighbourhood of Gaza City. Today he did the same, being wheeled to the house of prayer by bodyguards. As he emerged at around 5.30 am (0330 GMT), three Israeli missiles hit killing Yassin and seven others, including several bodyguards. Seventeen people were wounded.

Announcing Yassin's death over mosque loudspeakers, the Hamas leadership said, "Sharon has opened the gates of hell. and nothing will stop us from cutting off his head." At Shifa Hospital in Gaza City, where Yassin's body was taken, masked gunmen shot in the air. Some aired recordings of Yassin, saying, "We chose this road, and will end with martyrdom or victory."

In a spontaneous outpouring of rage and grief, tens of thousands of Palestinians poured into the streets of Gaza City after hearing of Yassin's death. "Words cannot describe the emotion of anger and hate inside our hearts," said Ismail Haniyeh, a Hamas official and a close associate of Yassin.

A 13-year-old Palestinian boy was killed by Israeli troops during a mass demonstration in the southern Gaza Strip town of Khan Yuni. Medics said he was fatally hit in the head when troops opened fire from a watchtower in the nearby Jewish settlement of Ganei Tal.

Israel said it held Yassin responsible for the deaths of hundreds of people. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a former army general, was updated throughout the operation, security officials said.

The Yassin assassination is seen as an enormous gamble by Mr Sharon, who is trying to score a decisive victory against Hamas ahead of a possible Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, but risks triggering a dramatic escalation in bloodshed that could turn the popular mood in Israel against him.

Gideon Meir, an Israeli Foreign Ministry official, said Israel held Yassin directly responsible for the scores of suicide attacks Hamas unleashed since 2000. "He is the one who is sending children and women to explode themselves," Mr Meir said.

Flags at Yasser Arafat's headquarters in the West Bank town of Ramallah were lowered to half-staff today, and the Palestinian Cabinet was to hold an emergency session later Monday.

"President Arafat and the Palestinian leadership, with national and Islamic factions, condemn the crime of assassinating the hero Sheik Ahmed Yassin and the other brothers killed after praying in the mosque," the Palestinian Authority said in a statement. "This cowardly crime will do nothing but increase the national unity among the Palestinians to confront the Israeli conspiracy, which has crossed all red lines.

"Arafat and the Palestinian leadership ask the Palestinian people for more unity and to continue with steadfastness, emphasising that there will be no stability without the removal of the occupation," the statement continued. Arafat declared the mourning period in the Palestinian territories and for the millions of Palestinians living abroad.

Fearing revenge attacks, Israel has clamped a closure on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, barring all Palestinian from entering Israel. The army chief, Lieutenant General Moshe Yaalon, met with army commanders in Tel Aviv to discuss the possible fallout, and more forces were ordered to the Gaza Strip.

Hamas promised a harsh response. "Yassin is a man in a nation, and a nation in a man. And the retaliation of this nation will be of the size of this man," said Abdel Aziz Rantisi, a prominent Hamas leader in Gaza who himself escaped an Israeli assassination attempt last June.

For the first time, Hamas also threatened the United States, saying America's backing of Israel made the assassination possible. "All the Muslims of the world will be honoured to join in on the retaliation for this crime," Hamas said in a statement. The United States has urged both sides to show restraint.

The militant groups Islamic Jihad and Al Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades, sometimes at odds with Hamas, also promised revenge. "This crime has affected every Palestinian, and the retaliation for it will be from every Palestinian," said Abu Qusay, an Al Aqsa leader in Gaza. An Al Aqsa statement said retaliation "will be in the coming hours, God willing."

In a first response, Palestinian militants fired ten home-made rockets toward an Israeli settlement in Gaza. There were no immediate reports of injuries.

Israel had previously tried to kill Yassin in September when a warplane dropped a bomb on a building where he and other Hamas leaders were meeting, but Yassin escaped with just a small wound to his hand. One Israeli official recently said Yassin, a Hamas founder, was "marked for death."

Appendix 5 – the Reports of 26th June 2006

The Arab News

2 Israeli Troops Killed in Attack by Palestinians

GAZA CITY, 26 June 2006 — A daring pre-dawn Palestinian attack on an Israeli Army post bordering the southern Gaza Strip yesterday left two Israeli soldiers and two Palestinians dead and one Israeli soldier was abducted, the Israeli Army and Palestinian officials said.

The Israeli Army sent tanks and troops into the Gaza Strip in response. Military officials were quoted as saying the incursion was part of a search for the abducted soldier.

At least three other Israeli soldiers were wounded in the attack, which began when fighters from within the Gaza Strip fired an anti-tank rocket at the army outpost near the Kerem Shalom crossing. Israeli military officials said simultaneously an eight-man attack team smuggled into the military outpost through a tunnel dug under the Gaza border.

The attacking force split into three teams. One tried — and failed — to attack an armored personnel carrier in the area, one charged the post, firing at the soldiers, and one attacked a tank with grenades killing the two soldiers and wounding two others.

The attack was claimed by three Palestinian groups — Hamas, Al-Naser Brigades, the armed wing of the Popular Resistance Committees, and a new group named the Islamic Army. Sources close to the groups said that two fighters identified as Hamed El-Rantisi from Al-Naser Brigades and Mohammad Ferwan from the Islamic Army were killed in the attack. Six other fighters were back safely to their base.

Ryad Jargoun, a farmer living near Kerem Shalom crossing, told Arab News that the Israeli tanks moved about 500 meters into eastern Rafah areas at 10 a.m. local time. In addition, three Israeli helicopters opened heavy indiscriminate gunfire at Al-Shohda village which is close to the Shalom crossing, he added. “No one can move in the area, it’s more than a curfew,” he said. Directly after the attack, the Israeli Army closed Kerem Shalom crossing that the European observers use to travel to reach the Rafah crossing in a sign that the terminal will also be closed.

Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri said the assault was “a natural attack on the Israeli occupation crimes.” The abducted soldier was reportedly in stable condition, after having suffered blows to the chest and abdomen, Israeli Army radio reported. In wake of the attack, Israel closed down all border crossings and terminals with the Gaza Strip until further notice.

Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert was to convene the government’s security Cabinet and assess Israel’s response to the attack.

The attack is a major embarrassment to Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who has been trying to get Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to end their daily rocket attacks on Israel. Abbas has also been trying to get Hamas to agree to a platform, drafted by Palestinians in Israeli jails, which among its provisions calls on Palestinians to limit attacks only in territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 Middle East War.

Unnamed officials from Abbas’ Fatah movement were quoted in the Jerusalem Post daily yesterday morning as saying the attack on the Israeli post was engineered by Hamas leader in exile Khaled Mashaal in order to thwart any possible agreement on the document.

Meanwhile Abbas condemned yesterday’s attack in a written statement to the press, saying they “contradict with the attitudes we heard over the past two days, and it is in breach of the understandings that were voiced by leaders of factions we met.”

Abbas called on the Palestinians who abducted the Israeli soldier and those who kept the remains of the other soldiers, to bring them back, warning that if they keep the soldier, Israel would harshly retaliate.

Palestinian Cabinet spokesman Ghazi Hamad urged the fighters holding the Israeli soldier to “keep him alive and treat him well.” Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni reportedly phoned members of the international community urging them to press Abbas to remain in Gaza until the situation is resolved.

Abbas arrived in Gaza on Friday and held a series of meetings with Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, and representatives of factions in preparations for declaring the outcomes of inter-Palestinian talks.

The Palestinian presidency also announced it would order a quick and comprehensive investigation into the parties that participated in the attack, including the new group, which some Palestinians fear is related to the Al-Qaeda terrorist network.

Meanwhile, Abbas appealed to the international community to intervene to prevent Israel “taking advantage of the attack by carrying out a large-scale offensive against Gaza Strip.”

— *With input from agencies*

the New York Times

June 26, 2006 Monday

MILITANTS' RAID ON ISRAEL RAISES TENSION IN GAZA

By STEVEN ERLANGER, JERUSALEM, June 25

In an ominous development, Israel threatened strong military action on Sunday after eight Palestinian militants in Gaza, including members of the governing faction Hamas, emerged from a secret tunnel dug 300 yards into Israel, killed two soldiers, wounded three and kidnapped another.

Two of the Palestinians were killed but the rest escaped into Gaza with the captive Israeli soldier, Cpl. Gilad Shalit, 19, who is believed to have been wounded. He was the first Israeli soldier kidnapped in more than a decade.

Israeli tanks moved a short distance into Gaza on Sunday, the first tank raid since Israel withdrew from the territory last summer.

Israeli officials talked of a harsh response to the raid on an Israeli Army outpost near the Kerem Shalom kibbutz, close to the Egyptian border. The raid was weeks in the planning, and the military wing of Hamas took partial responsibility, as did militant groups like the Popular Resistance Committees and a new formation called the Army of Islam.

But Israel and the Hamas leadership were looking for ways to defuse the tense situation. Israel asked Egypt, which has influence in Gaza, for help in freeing the soldier. The Israeli foreign minister, Tzipi Livni, called Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to seek support.

Ghazi Hamad, a spokesman for the Hamas government in Gaza, urged the soldier's captors "to protect his life and treat him well," and urged Israel "not to escalate the situation." But others who said they spoke for Hamas were more militant.

There was a sense that, with some elements of Hamas participating in a deadly armed attack in Israel, the tunnel raid could portend a grimmer phase in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, particularly if further harm came to the kidnapped soldier.

Mark Regev, a spokesman for the Israeli Foreign Ministry, said simply, "This is a crisis."

The Israeli chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, said, "The Palestinians are responsible for the fate of the kidnapped soldier, and we will do everything in our power to retrieve him."

Israel's security cabinet met Sunday night and authorized the military to plan a response to the raid, but decided to postpone any military action to see if Corporal Shalit was released, said an Israeli official. Some response is expected no matter what happens, but the officials do not want

to damage the chances of his safe return to Israel.

The Israeli prime minister, Ehud Olmert, told the cabinet that Israel held the Palestinian Authority, its Hamas government and its president, Mahmoud Abbas, known as Abu Mazen, "responsible for this event -- with all this implies."

The Israeli government urged Mr. Abbas to act to free the soldier.

Mr. Abbas condemned the raid, saying it was against "the national consensus." In a statement, he said, "We have always warned against the danger of certain groups or factions leaving the national consensus and carrying out operations for which the Palestinian people will always have to pay the price."

Mr. Abbas, who has been trying to get Hamas to at least implicitly recognize Israel's right to exist, was embarrassed by the raid. He called off meetings with Hamas leaders scheduled for Sunday.

The attack is the latest in a cycle of violence and reprisal as Palestinian guerrillas have fired inaccurate Qassam rockets into Israel to retaliate for Israeli attacks on militants, who Israel has said were either firing rockets or planning attacks.

In an effort to stop the Palestinian rockets, the Israeli military has stepped up its actions, but some have gone wrong, leading to the deaths of at least 14 Palestinian civilians in recent weeks, not including 8 killed on a Gaza beach, for which Israel has denied responsibility. That in turn has led the military wing of Hamas to renounce the truce it declared in February 2005, and helped open the way to the attack on Sunday.

The last Israeli soldier known to have been kidnapped was Cpl. Nachshon Waxman, 19, seized by Hamas in 1994 and killed in a rescue operation.

A former Interior Ministry spokesman, Elias Zananiri, suggested that Hamas's military wing attacked on orders of its leadership abroad, in particular Khaled Meshal, the leader of the Hamas political bureau, while the Hamas prime minister, Ismail Haniya, was kept in the dark.

But Israeli officials noted that Hamas, if not officially claiming responsibility for the raid, seemed to welcome it. "The operation is a natural response to the occupation's crimes and massacres against the Palestinian people," a spokesman for Hamas, Sami Abu Zuhri, said on Al Jazeera television. "Hamas will continue to resist as long as there is occupation."

Mr. Regev, the Foreign Ministry spokesman, waved away questions about whether the Hamas-led government should be held responsible. "What part of Hamas is responsible is irrelevant," he said. "Hamas as an organization has endorsed it. And maybe for those in the international community who are talking about whether there is a new, pragmatic Hamas, this is a wake-up call."

Ms. Livni, the Israeli foreign minister, urged Mr. Abbas to remain in Gaza and act quickly to release the soldier. "This is an opportunity for Abu Mazen to prove how serious his intentions are," she said. "He has all the necessary resources, including military means, to secure the release of the soldier."

Mr. Regev said: "Abu Mazen goes to foreign capitals and says, 'I'm the partner you want. I'm the address.' But if he's not a partner in stopping violence, how can he be a partner for peace?"

If the soldier "isn't returned immediately, then Israel will have to act," Mr. Regev said.

In his statement, Mr. Hamad, the Hamas spokesman, said, "The government is following this issue and there are many contacts between many sides, and the Egyptians and the president are trying to reach a solution for this problem."

But another Hamas spokesman, Mushir al-Masri, a member of parliament, welcomed the attack. "We consider this operation a part of the natural response to Zionist crimes, especially after the series of killings of children, women, old men and whole families in Gaza," he said. "It is the right of our people to defend themselves with all the means available."

The spokesman for the Popular Resistance Committees, Abu Mujahid, said the attack was to avenge Israel's assassination of the group's leader, Jamal Abu Samahdana, on June 8. Mr. Samahdana, who had been wanted by Israel, had also been serving the Hamas-led government as commander of a new "executive force," a mostly Hamas militia that has clashed with Fatah-dominated security forces.

No Palestinian spokesman would admit to holding Corporal Shalit.

Israeli officials said Sunday that the tunnel, which extended from Gaza at least 600 yards and emerged behind Israeli lines, had taken many weeks, if not months, to dig. Israel clearly had warnings of an attack and had closed the Kerem Shalom crossing between Israel and Gaza for several days last week for security reasons. That closing meant that the nearby Rafah crossing between Egypt and Gaza was also shut, because the European monitors for Rafah get there via Kerem Shalom.

On Sunday, Israel quickly shut all crossings into Gaza and kept them shut, even to journalists, who protested.

The Israeli Army outpost that was attacked is near the Egyptian border, but not at the Kerem Shalom crossing point. According to reports, the eight Palestinian fighters emerged from the tunnel near the spot where Gaza, Israel and Egypt meet, about 5:15 a.m., and split into small teams. One blew up an armored personnel carrier, which was empty, and another threw grenades into an Israeli Merkava tank, killing First Lt. Hanan Barak, 20, from Arad, and Sgt. Pavel Slutzker, 20, from Dimona. Antitank missiles were also fired toward the vehicles from Gaza, the Israeli Army said.

Another Israeli soldier who was seriously wounded and the missing soldier, Corporal Shalit, were also in the tank, the army said. A third group moved about a half mile northeast to the outpost near the kibbutz and attacked it. The Palestinians then blew a hole in the fence separating Gaza and returned with Corporal Shalit. The two Palestinians who died in the attack were apparently killed as they tried to climb up the side of the outpost. They were identified as Muhammad Farawneh and Jihad Rantissi.

Afterward, Israeli tanks supported by a helicopter crossed into Gaza to search and to investigate the tunnel.

Mr. Abbas's scheduled meetings with Mr. Haniya and other Hamas officials, which he canceled, had been intended to discuss a united political position, based on a document drafted by prisoners, that calls for a Palestinian state in pre-1967 borders and a focus on "resistance" against Israel in the occupied territories.

Mr. Abbas has expressed hope that agreement would allow Western aid to flow again to the Hamas-run Palestinian Authority and give him a platform for negotiations with Israel.

But the dialogue has been difficult, Palestinian officials have said, and Mr. Abbas's allies say that Hamas has been reluctant to recognize Israel or to agree that attacks should be limited to occupied territory. Israel has said that the document is an internal Palestinian issue and will not affect its view of Hamas.

The attack on Sunday morning was inside pre-1967 Israel. An aide to Mr. Abbas, Nabil Abu Rudeineh, said, "What occurred today brings us back to zero" in the talks.

The Guardian

Israel promises revenge for soldier deaths

· Hamas warned after two killed in pre-dawn raid

- Abbas ordered to secure seized corporal's release

Conal Urquhart in Tel Aviv

Monday June 26, 2006

Israel has warned Hamas that it will pay a "deadly price" for a daring raid on Israeli positions yesterday in which militants killed two soldiers and kidnapped a third.

Members of Hamas played a leading role in the pre-dawn attack, in which gunmen took Israeli forces by surprise and raised the prospect of a major escalation of violence.

Israeli officials also told Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, that they held him responsible and expected him to remain in Gaza until he secured the release of the kidnapped Israeli soldier.

The attack, which was carried out by Hamas with the Popular Resistance Committees and a little known group called the Islamic Army, overshadowed attempts yesterday by Mr Abbas to come to an agreement with Ismail Haniyeh, the Hamas prime minister.

They were due to meet to discuss a joint platform, commonly known as the "prisoners' document". This would entail implicit recognition of Israel and end Palestinian infighting and the isolation of the Palestinian Authority.

The dawn raid seemed likely to undermine the credibility of Hamas as a political player and forced Mr Haniyeh to postpone the meeting to avoid potential assassination by Israel.

It was the first attack by Palestinian militants in Gaza against the Israeli army since it withdrew from the strip last year. In a series of statements, the militants said that the attack was in response to Israeli assassinations and attacks on civilians in recent weeks.

The kidnapped soldier, Corporal Gilad Shalit, 19, is said to have been injured in the stomach but is receiving treatment in Gaza from his captors.

Ehud Olmert, the Israeli prime minister, said that he held the Palestinian Authority responsible for the attack, including the president and the Hamas-led government, "with all that implies".

Israeli ministers met last night to discuss a response to the attack. Options include a full-scale invasion of Gaza or the targeting of Hamas's political wing, its leaders and ministers. Israel may feel that any action it takes could endanger the life of Cpl Shalit.

Last night, the Palestinian deputy prime minister, Nasser Shaer, called on the kidnappers to release Cpl Shalit.

Hamas ministers began taking security precautions yesterday while Mark Regev, a spokesman for the Israeli foreign ministry, said the ministry expected Mr Abbas to secure the release of the soldier. "Mr Abbas has all the necessary resources, including military resources, to ensure the release of the Israeli soldier. He must prove the seriousness of his intentions. We call on him to remain in Gaza and act immediately to resolve this crisis," he said.

Aides of Mr Abbas said they believed the Israeli statement carried a veiled threat that he would not be allowed to leave Gaza. Israeli officials denied that the Palestinian president had been told he could not leave.

Kidnapping an Israeli soldier has been a key aim of Palestinian militants for years. They believe it is the only way to force Israel to release Palestinian prisoners.

The Israeli army said that at around 5.30am eight gunmen from Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees entered Israel using a tunnel dug under the security fence. The tunnel extended 300 metres (985ft) past the fence guards.

The gunmen split into three groups and approached their targets from behind. One group

attacked an empty armoured personnel carrier and another group threw grenades at the tank, which exploded inside, killing two soldiers and severely injuring a third. The last group attacked a 23-metre high observation post.

While the three groups attacked, others fired anti-tank weapons from inside Gaza.

The spokesman said at least two of the gunmen were killed but the rest managed to escape to Gaza through holes in the perimeter fence.

The two dead Israeli soldiers were named as Hanan Barak, 20, who was buried yesterday, and Pavel Slutsker, 20.

Dan Halutz, the Israeli chief of staff, warned that a major invasion of Gaza was possible. Amir Peretz, the defence minister, said the militants would pay a "deadly price" for the attack.

Some Palestinians reacted with jubilation to the success of the attack while others condemned it and tried to distance themselves from it.

Sami Abu Zuhri, a Hamas spokesman, said: "This is a natural response to the Israeli crimes of killing women and children and the assassination of two leaders."

Members of Hamas in government took a different tone. Ghazi Hamed, the government spokesman, told reporters in Gaza City that it had learned of the kidnapping from the Israeli media.

"We are calling on the resistance groups, if they do have the missing soldier ... to protect his life and treat him well," he said.

In a statement, Mr Abbas said that the raid, near the Kerem Shalom crossing, "violated the national consensus". He called on the international community "to prevent Israel from exploiting the attack to carry out large-scale aggression in the Gaza Strip".

He said that the attack contradicted all assurances he had been given by militant groups in recent negotiations.

Trading Bodies

Kidnapping and the macabre trade of bodies has long been a strategy followed by all sides in the Middle East conflicts. In 2004, Israel released 429 Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners and returned 59 corpses in return for the release of one Israeli and three corpses.

At the Erez border crossing between Gaza and Israel there is a poster promising a reward of \$10m (£5.5m) to anyone who can provide information about four Israeli servicemen who disappeared during Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon. Two of the men have been missing since 1982.

The Israeli state's pledge to bring home its soldiers and civilians, whether dead or alive, has encouraged militant groups to make kidnapping Israelis a priority.

The Israeli army has said that a number of cross-border raids by Hizbullah militants in recent years were attempts to kidnap soldiers. Palestinian militants have also declared their aim to kidnap Israelis to secure the release of their prisoners but have rarely been successful.

The last time Palestinians kidnapped an Israeli soldier was in 1994. Ariel Nachson Waxman, a 19-year-old Israeli-American, was killed with his three captors when the house where he was being held was stormed by Israeli commandos.

In 2004 Palestinian groups seized body parts of Israeli soldiers in two separate incidents after they were spread around areas of Gaza in large explosions.

The Israeli army embarked on large operations to recover the body parts which were eventually transferred through the Red Cross after negotiations.

The Times

June 26, 2006, Monday

Soldier kidnapped in deadly tunnel ambush

Ian MacKinnon in Kerem Shalom and Stephen Farrell in Erez

Israeli troops were hunting last night for a soldier who is thought to have been kidnapped after a Palestinian ambush on a military post near the Gaza border that left two other soldiers dead.

Corporal Gilad Shalit was abducted when Palestinians, including Hamas members, launched a pre-dawn raid on Kerem Shalom beside southern Gaza, emerging from a tunnel to hurl bombs and grenades at the base.

The Israeli Government held the Hamas-led Government responsible for the first such attack since Israel withdrew from Gaza last summer, and the security Cabinet met last night to consider its response.

The raid, which used a secret tunnel bored from inside Gaza to 300m (980ft) beyond the Israeli fence that seals off the Palestinian strip, also left two Palestinian fighters dead. It triggered a brief Israeli incursion into the strip.

Ehud Olmert, the Israeli Prime Minister, issued a thinly veiled threat against the Palestinian Authority, making no distinction between the new Hamas-led Government and President Mahmoud Abbas. "We in Israel view the Palestinian Authority, headed by Chairman Abu Mazen (Mr Abbas) and the Palestinian Government, responsible for this incident, with all that implies," Mr Olmert said.

Ghazi Hamad, a spokesman for the Hamas-led Government, denied all knowledge of the kidnapped soldier. "We appeal to all the resistance factions if they have the kidnapped soldier to preserve his life and treat him well," he said.

He added that the Government was talking to President Abbas, the Egyptians and other parties to resolve the issue.

Shalit, 19, from Mitzpe Hila, is the first Israeli soldier to be kidnapped since 20-year-old Corporal Nachshon Wachsmann was snatched by Hamas in October 1994 north of Jerusalem. He was killed in a raid mounted to free him.

Brigadier-General Aviv Kochavi, head of the Gaza Division, described the apparently well-planned assault as a "complex" operation.

"They divided into three cells. One attacked an armoured personnel carrier. The APC was empty. Another group attacked a tank with grenades...causing two deaths and one serious injury," he said.

The raid was claimed as a joint operation by the People's Resistance Committees, the previously unknown Army of Islam -thought to be a PRC splinter group -and Hamas's armed wing. They said that it was retaliation for Israel's assassination on June 8 of Jamal Abu Samadhana, the PRC leader, and the deaths of seven members of a single family on a Gaza beach during Israeli shelling. Israel denies responsibility.

The Hamas Deputy Prime Minister, Nasser Shaer, made a direct appeal for the soldier's release last night, but the call was rejected.

Israeli troops mounted a ground assault on the outskirts of Gaza, with tanks rolling half a mile into the strip while helicopter gunships fired into open fields. The Israeli Defence Forces said that it was designed to destroy the tunnel.

The attack strains to breaking point the tattered ceasefire observed by Hamas for 16 months

until it restarted launching rockets into Israel after the recent beach deaths. Yesterday's violence embarrassed Mr Abbas, coming as he held talks with Hamas to persuade it to give up attacks.

Appendix 6 - The Reports of 7th July 2006

The Arab News

Israeli Missiles and Shells Kill 21

Hisham Abu Taha, Arab News —

GAZA CITY, 7 July 2006 — Israeli tanks moved deeper into Gaza Strip and its forces killed at least 21 Palestinians yesterday in the bloodiest day since the Jewish state invaded Gaza on June 28 over a soldier's capture. During yesterday's operation, one Israeli soldier was also killed and five were injured.

In Geneva, the United Nations Human Rights Council agreed to send a fact-finding mission to the Palestinian territories to report back urgently on rights violations by Israel.

The 47-member forum adopted a resolution put forward by the member states of the Organization of the Islamic Conference that demanded a halt to Israel's "extensive military operations" against Palestinians.

The decision, announced by Council Chairman Luis Alfonso de Alba of Mexico, was taken on a majority vote at the end of a two-day special session.

"It (the Council) decides to dispatch an urgent fact-finding mission... on the human rights situation in the occupied Palestinian territories," the resolution read.

The vote was 29 delegations in favor, 11 against, with five abstentions and two delegations absent for the vote.

Those who voted against the resolution were Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Ukraine and Britain.

The abstaining members were Cameroon, Mexico, Nigeria, Republic of Korea and Switzerland.

The 29 countries which voted in favor of the resolution were Algeria, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Cuba, Ecuador, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Uruguay and Zambia.

John Dugard, UN special rapporteur on human rights in the territories, will head the fact-finding team.

The Council vote also condemned Israeli action and called for the release of Palestinian officials and civilians arrested during the offensive.

Throughout the day, Israeli aircraft targeted Palestinians with missile strikes, while Israeli tanks took up positions between tightly packed homes. Apache helicopters hovered overhead, firing flares and machine guns to support ground forces engaged in fierce skirmishes with Palestinian fighters.

Israel said it decided to step up the offensive, launched last week in response to the capture of the Israeli soldier, after Hamas activists fired two upgraded rockets into the southern Israeli city of Ashkelon. No one was hurt, but the rockets were the first to reach the city of 110,000, infuriating Israeli leaders.

In the worst incident, nine Palestinians were killed, including two Hamas activists, and at least 24 wounded in an Israeli bombardment on the northern Gaza town of Beit Lahiya, medics said.

Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, whose Hamas-led government has been directly targeted in the offensive, slammed the assault as "collective punishment" on his people and demanded international intervention.

The massive predawn land and air assault on Gaza sent terrified residents scurrying from their homes with babies and belongings. “We woke up and the tanks were right there. There were fighters in our garden. We had to flee to protect the children,” said one father, fleeing a Beit Lahiya neighborhood with his wife and four children. In northern Gaza, ground forces, armored vehicles and sappers advanced up to five km in a bid to expand a unilaterally declared security zone aimed at preventing rocket attacks on Israel.

The Palestinian death toll is the highest in a single day since Israeli forces killed 16 people in October 2004 in a raid on a Khan Younis refugee camp.

Defense Minister Amir Peretz said that although Israel quit Gaza last year after 38 years of occupation, “no one should see that as a guarantee that we cannot reach territory in which we feel we have no choice but to operate.”

“We have no intention of sinking into the Gaza swamp,” he added.

Twenty-seven Hamas ministers and MPs appeared before Israeli military tribunals yesterday to be remanded further in custody after being arrested last week in a massive West Bank sweep.

Local Government Minister Issa Al-Jaabari, Employment Minister Mohammed Barghouti and Jerusalem Affairs Minister Khaled Abu Arafah, along with six lawmakers appeared before a court in Ofer, near the West Bank town of Ramallah.

Finance Minister Omar Abdelrazeq, Planning Minister Samir Abou Eisheh, Prisoner Affairs Minister Wasfi Kabha and Social Affairs Minister Fakhri Turkman, together with 10 MPs, appeared before another tribunal in Salem.

The mayors of the West Bank towns of Qalailya and Jenin appeared before the same tribunal.

On Wednesday, the military tribunal in Ofer remanded Religious Affairs Minister Nayef Rajub and four MPs in custody for a further five days.

Sixty-four members of Hamas, including a third of the Cabinet and 26 MPs, were arrested in a massive Israeli operation in the occupied West Bank on June 29.

The father of the captured Israeli soldier appealed to the government to swap Palestinian prisoners for his son and back down on its refusal to negotiate with his captors.

Fighters linked to Hamas captured Cpl. Gilad Shalit, 19, on June 25 after tunneling through from Gaza to southern Israel and attacking a military post just over the border.

His captors have demanded that Israel release 1,500 of the 9,000 Palestinian prisoners it holds, but Israel has refused, demanding unconditional freedom for its soldier.

Noam Shalit said he did not expect the Palestinians to give up his son for nothing.

“Everything has a price. I don’t think there will be any sort of move to free Gilad without a price,” the elder Shalit told Army Radio in his first comments on the government’s handling of the affair. “That’s not the way it works in the Middle East.”

There has been no sign of life from the soldier since he was seized, but he is presumed to be in Gaza.

— Additional input from agencies

The New York Times

Fighting Surges and Deaths Rise as Israel Drives Deeper in Gaza

By [STEVEN ERLANGER](#) and [GREG MYRE](#)

BEIT LAHIYA, Gaza Strip, Friday, July 7 — A member of Hamas was reported killed in an airstrike Friday, less than 24 hours after Israeli troops and Palestinian militants had waged their most intense battles since Israel re-entered the Gaza Strip last week to secure the release of a

captured soldier and stop rocket fire into Israel.

The death toll had risen throughout Thursday in sometimes fierce fighting involving everything from rifles to airborne missiles.

It was one of the bloodiest days in Gaza since the uprising began in 2000. The death toll varied and the Palestinians provided no official figures. The Associated Press counted at least 21 dead Palestinians, and Reuters 19. One Israeli soldier was reported killed by a sniper. Reuters reported Friday that the militant was killed after an Israeli plane fired at four armed men near the scene of the worst violence from the day before.

Most of the deaths Thursday were in northern Gaza, where after days of sporadic clashes Israeli forces moved south from the destroyed former Israeli settlements to the outskirts of Beit Lahiya. There, in the northwest corner of Gaza, Palestinian fighters had been preparing earthen barricades, explosive charges and positions for shooting.

Israel's defense minister, Amir Peretz, said that although Israel pulled out of Gaza last year, "no one should see that as a guarantee that we cannot reach territory in which we feel we have no choice but to operate."

Heavy fighting erupted in and around Beit Lahiya, especially in the western neighborhoods of Atatrah and Salatin near the sea, with Palestinian militants using light weapons like Kalashnikovs, M-16's and antitank grenades, fighting running battles with Israeli troops in armored personnel carriers, modern tanks and armored D-9 bulldozers.

Palestinians were seen planting explosives in manholes, hoping to blow up a vehicle as it drove by. One masked fighter rode away on a bicycle after laying such a charge, a spool of electrical wire unrolling from the back of his bike.

Israeli tanks fired shells at houses where Palestinian fighters sheltered, and soldiers fired at groups of armed Palestinians who fought in the streets, sometimes surrounded by curious and excited children. At times, Israeli soldiers fired near groups of children in what appeared to be an effort to get them to scatter.

The Palestinian interior minister, Said Siam, who is responsible for most of the security services, declared a state of emergency. His spokesman said the minister "called on all Palestinian security and military services to participate in the moral, national and religious duty to defend our people."

The Palestinian prime minister, Ismail Haniya, called on Arab and international groups to help the Palestinians and to press for an end to the Israeli offensive.

"Solving issues can't be through military escalation or expanding their scope, but through stopping the aggression, and respecting the will of the Palestinian people and answering to their just nationalist demands," Mr. Haniya said.

Three separate airstrikes accounted for the deaths of six Palestinians near Beit Lahiya. The Israeli military said all six were gunmen, while Palestinian officials, medical workers and witnesses gave conflicting information on how many were militants and how many were civilians.

In the same area, gunmen from various Palestinian factions fired automatic rifles and antitank rockets at the Israeli troops. Israeli tank fire killed two militants, Palestinians and the Israeli military reported.

About 30 Palestinians were wounded in the Beit Lahiya area, according to the Palestinian medics.

Also, an Israeli soldier was shot in the head and killed in Beit Lahiya, apparently by a sniper, the military said. The Popular Resistance Committees, a faction of gunmen from various groups, claimed responsibility. A second soldier was wounded in the area, the military added.

Before dawn, a Hamas militant and a Palestinian policeman were killed in an Israeli aerial attack on a beach in northern Gaza, the Palestinians and the Israelis said.

In southern Gaza, an Israeli airstrike killed two militants from Islamic Jihad in Abasan, near the southern town of Khan Yunis, Palestinian witnesses and security officials said. The men were firing an antitank rocket at Israeli tanks and troops positioned there.

Israel's military has re-entered both the north and the south of Gaza for what it says is a two-pronged mission.

In the south, the troops were sent in shortly after Cpl. Gilad Shalit, a tank gunner, was captured just inside Israel by militants and taken to Gaza on June 25. Ghazi Hamad, a spokesman for the Palestinian Authority, said the sides should seek a diplomatic solution that would lead to Corporal Shalit's release.

"We don't want Gaza destroyed, nor do we want attacks," Mr. Hamad told Israel radio. "And you want him to return to his family."

However, Israel says it will not negotiate for the release of the soldier, and has rejected Palestinian demands that large numbers of Palestinian prisoners be freed.

The militants have at various times demanded that all women and youths held by Israel be released, and they have also said that 1,000 prisoners of various nationalities must be freed. But the militants, and Hamas leaders, say that the corporal should not be released without some kind of Israeli prisoner release in return.

The Arabic-language newspaper Al Hayat, which is based in London, reported Thursday that militants had revised their demands, saying that Corporal Shalit could be freed if all Palestinian women are released from Israeli jails along with 30 men who are serving long-term sentences. There was no independent confirmation of that report.

The Israeli military said Palestinians fired eight rockets from Gaza at Israel on Thursday, but only four made it into Israeli territory and none caused injury. Three apparently landed inside Gaza and one fell in the sea, the military added.

In the north, Israeli troops began edging into the territory on Monday with the aim of preventing Palestinian rocket fire on southern Israel.

But until Thursday, the armored forces, consisting mostly of tanks and armored personnel carriers, had ventured only about half a mile into northern Gaza, remaining outside the Palestinian towns, and there was only occasional shooting.

As the Israeli troops moved on Beit Lahiya on Thursday, the fighting quickly escalated. Israeli tanks also entered three former Israeli settlements on the northern edge of Gaza that were evacuated last year.

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and his aides have said the current offensive is not an attempt to reoccupy Gaza. But Mr. Olmert, along with some political and security officials, has urged the Israeli public to be patient and suggested that the operation could be quite lengthy.

Over all, nearly 20 Palestinians have been killed since the Israeli incursion began, most of them militants.

The Guardian

18 die in worst fighting since withdrawal last year

Conal Urquhart in Beit Lahiya

Friday July 7, 2006

At least 17 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier were killed yesterday in the most serious violence since Israel withdrew its forces from the Gaza Strip last year.

The Israeli army said its incursion into Gaza was designed to prevent rocket fire at Israel and put pressure on the captors of Corporal Gilad Shalit.

A spokeswoman for the army said that it killed 10 militants in five separate attacks. The number of civilian deaths was not immediately clear. In the early hours of this morning Israeli forces took over settlements they evacuated 10 months ago in northern Gaza and pushed to the outskirts of Beit Lahiya.

There has been little progress in international negotiations on the release of Corporal Shalit, 19, who was abducted by Palestinian militiamen on June 25, but Israel increased its offensive after three Qassam home-made rockets hit central Ashkelon, an area previously out of range. The army said eight more Qassam rockets were fired yesterday.

At least two of the Palestinians were killed after firing a rocket towards Israel but the rest of the casualties occurred in northern Gaza. Supported by navy gunboats and helicopter gunships, Israeli tanks and bulldozers were destroying orchards and crops when Palestinian gunmen began to attack them.

About 100 metres from Israeli positions two ambulances waited for the all clear to pick up casualties. Mohammad Farajalah, 24, an ambulanceman, said they were aware of four casualties nearby but they were waiting for the Red Cross to negotiate a safe passage. "We were called out to a casualty and we found ourselves in front of a tank," he said. "There was shooting all around us and we had to wait there two hours until they allowed us to go. While we were there I saw a bulldozer tearing down trees, protected by three tanks."

As the ambulancemen waited, three Hamas gunmen, followed by three from Fatah, moved along the road. One Hamas man carried an anti-tank weapon in a holdall while others placed bombs at the roadside and rolled out command wires.

The first victim of the fighting was a farmer, Mohammad Atari, 25. Abdul Hadi Atari, 36, said tanks and bulldozers were moving around their home when gunfire cut through the walls and hit his nephew in the back. The ambulances came two hours later. By the time they reached the hospital he was dead.

The Times

Death toll rises in north Gaza despite lull in fighting

BY JENNY BOOTH AND AGENCIES

The death toll rose again in northern Gaza today as Israeli forces and militants continued desultory exchanges of fire after the bloodiest day of clashes in the strip since Israel withdrew last summer.

Twenty-four Palestinians and one Israeli soldier have now been killed in fighting that broke out in the area after Israeli tanks and troops, backed by aircraft, seized control of a ribbon of land in an attempt to win freedom for a captured soldier and put Israel out of the militants' increasingly longer rocket range.

After sunrise, Israel renewed its assault with two airstrikes, killing one militant from the Palestinians' ruling Hamas Party, and wounding three, party and hospital officials said. The Israeli Defence Force (IDF) said that aircraft fired at four armed Palestinians in an area where there had been exchanges of fire. Two were wounded in the second airstrike, hospital officials said.

In a separate incident, a Palestinian teenager was killed by Israeli tank fire.

Israel, meanwhile, signalled its intention to reduce the scope of its operation near two Palestinian towns it invaded yesterday. Lieutenant Colonel Yaniv, a battalion commander, said he expected troops to wind up their mission on the outskirts of Beit Lahiya and Beit Hanoun within a day or two because their mission there would be accomplished.

A mile across a sandy waste from Beit Lahiya lie three deserted, rubble-strewn Jewish settlements, which Palestinian militants used as cover to fire 14 missiles towards and into the southern Israeli city of Ashkelon earlier in the week, more than seven miles north of the border.

The latest rocket attacks have caused concern for Israeli army chiefs and panic among civilians as they reached significantly farther inside Israel than at any time before.

Steve Farrell, Times Middle East correspondent who is in Beit Lahiya, said: "We had a look today at the Palestinian village of Atatra, about a mile from Beit Lahiya, which is the one populated Palestinian area where Israeli tanks did take up positions yesterday. The tanks were pulled up right in amongst the houses, inside the urban area, and there was fighting.

"The tanks have pulled back slightly now and there is a lull. It is Friday prayers and also the Jewish Sabbath, so I think both sides have decided to take it easy. There will probably be a lot of funerals later, which will keep people off the streets."

Amid the fighting, there was still no word on the fate of Corporal Gilad Shalit, captured on June 25 by militants affiliated to Hamas.

Israel insisted it was not planning to reoccupy Gaza, but military commanders said they had orders to win the soldier's release and prevent militants from firing rockets, even if that meant repeated short-term incursions.

This morning Amir Peretz, the Israeli Defence Minister, and Lieutenant General Dan Halutz, the IDF chief of staff, toured a base in southern Israel that is a staging area for the operation.

"We have no intention of sinking in the Gaza mire," Mr Peretz repeated. On the other hand, "we will find a way to hurt anyone who tries to hurt Israeli citizens," he added, accusing militants of using Palestinian civilians as human shields.

Lieutenant General Halutz refused to say when Israeli forces would pull back from Palestinian territory. "It doesn't mean there won't be Qassam (rocket) fire if we leave tomorrow or the day after," he added. "But it does mean that terror organizations will pay a high price for every Qassam (missile) fired."

After touring Gaza's main hospital, Ismail Haniya, the Palestinian Prime Minister, called for international intervention to stop the Israeli offensive, which he called a "crime against humanity."

His ruling Hamas movement, which has so far refused to recognise Israel, also issued a statement, saying that Israel's expanded military offensive in Gaza had set back efforts to resolve a crisis over an abducted soldier, and hardened the defiance of militants.

Yesterday more than 20 Palestinians and one Israeli soldier died as heavy clashes escalated throughout the day. Israeli aircraft targeted Palestinian militants with missile strikes, while Israeli tanks took up positions among Palestinian homes. Apache helicopters hovered overhead, firing flares and machine guns to support ground forces engaged in fierce skirmishes with masked Palestinian gunmen.

An Israeli soldier died in one of the skirmishes - the first Israeli casualty. Israel Radio and Army Radio said the army was checking the possibility that he was killed by errant Israeli gunfire. The army spokesman's office said he was killed by a Palestinian gunman.