‘Humanising’ Construction?1 The Languages of Industrial Relations Reform, Full Employment and Productivity after 1945

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The impact of “human relations” ideology remains contentious. This article examines how such ideas were deconstructed in the British building industry during the postwar battle to raise productivity. Construction offers a useful testing bed for a strategy based on organic, workplace co-operation: it has the dichotomous attributes of past “human neglect” within a reputed industrial relations framework of harmonious mutuality. The industry suffered heavily from unemployment before 1939. It might be expected, therefore, that mindsets changed significantly with the onset of full employment. But did a common understanding of “human relations” exist to disable workplace antagonisms and past insecurity? Indeed were such constructs viewed as a priority, and in that sense have meaning? This article concludes that the past continued to haunt the industry, and that meanings were ambiguous and misconstrued, but that nevertheless a new purposeful, common agenda arose.

A 1946 survey of British building workers’ attitudes to work highlighted that operatives saw themselves as being significantly undervalued: ‘the “Cinderellas” of industrial workers’. It added, matter of factly, that the negative ‘psychological implications’ of this on productivity ‘need no elaboration.’2 Indeed construction was widely disparaged as being exceptionally ‘backward’ and anti-modern, technologically but also in terms of its working environment and practices. Insiders and outsiders were also pressing for change to an industry where the ‘employer has always relied, more than the average, on fear of the sack to get work out of his employees’.3 Prominent in the Labour government’s supply-side approach to economic restructuring was an emphasis on ‘human relations’ — the assumption that efficiency and workplace co-operation were causally linked, and ‘secured by recognizing the social significance of work to the individual.’4 Certainly, reformist texts argued for improved conditions of work, welfare provision, works committees to improve worker motivation, and better management — especially personnel management.5 Indeed the building industry itself afforded special weight to ‘psychological factors’ as ‘perhaps the most important of all’ in raising the industry’s notoriously poor post-war productivity levels. What was needed was a ‘spirit of collaboration’ and of ‘real community of interest’.6

Yet was this merely rhetoric: part of a near universal exhortation of the period calling for higher productivity?7 This article examines the impact such discourses had in an industry noted for its ‘archaic’ socio-industrial practices but also for its consensual touchstones of compromise, where industrial relations at a regional and national level particularly were positive, and prolonged disputes, therefore, comparatively rare. It was also a strongly masculine industry that valued self-reliance and robustness, embedded within a certain ruthlessness in site management practices: a still heavily casualised industry where employers warned against ‘pampering’ operatives, unions had in the past neglected the ‘human’ component of site life and where, anyway, operatives could be ambivalent, or even antagonistic, to such reform.8 Thus, as contemporaries admitted, construction offered a potentially hostile ‘testing’ environment for ‘human relations’ philosophy.9 Indeed, as has been argued in other contexts, to succeed reformist discourse had to ‘engage with, and in part echo, pre-existing popular beliefs’ on both sides of the industrial divide.10 In such contexts, how willing were building unions and employers —
as institutional agenda setters — to modify their past behaviour to fit altered post-war circumstances and supposed new priorities? Part and parcel of this process of mediation, it will be argued, was that through contemporary and historical contextualisation, ‘humanising’ in construction came to have different priorities: tailored to the governing everyday perceptions of the building world. Implicitly, too, the process of ‘humanising’ suggested a positive attitude and bipartisan language of agreed governing institutionalised concepts and objectives: functioning outside a zero sum perception of winners and losers — of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Whether this occurred comparatively remains central to this enquiry.

The Languages of Reform

Why was reform thought particularly necessary for construction after 1945? Total factor productivity in building had fallen uniquely during and immediately after the war: on average by a massive 2.5 % p.a. between 1937-1951, against a comparative cross sector growth of 1.1 % p.a.. In 1947 building productivity was still thought to be some 30 % below pre-war levels. However imprecise such estimates were – and ministry officials accepted that this was the case – falls of this overall level of magnitude and the subsequent failure of the industry to recover caused alarm: so that it was widely believed in and outside of government planning circles that the ‘prospects for productivity in the building industry’ were ‘bleak’. This downturn occurred in the context of the heavy political demands placed on construction — a consequence of the political promises made — and consequential tendency to overload and dislocate further an already ‘fully-employed’ sector. Recovery was severely exacerbated in the immediate post-war years by a regime of continuing material shortages that plagued site activity, and dislocation aided the large numbers of builders engaged on repair work and, as importantly, in the frequently more lucrative ‘black market’ where similar small contracts leached resources. Thus by 1949 still only half the building labour force was engaged on new construction work. The overall result was that ‘resources were very thinly spread, and the quantity of work started was only distantly related to the supply of building materials and labour then available.’ Extending from this ‘exceptional’ productivity shortfall, national policymakers argued that construction was in urgent need of modernisation integral to Labour’s post-war industrial strategy. Thus reforms were proposed to the industry’s ‘human relations’ apparatus, as well as in areas like greater mechanisation and the diffusion of applied research.

Indeed in the years immediately after the war, there was a strong tendency to see productivity questions primarily as a labour and industrial relations issue, which married to the zenith of ‘human relations’ influence on management thought formation. Pre-war, while many employers across industries talked about the ‘human touch’, a majority did little to develop a new practical philosophy beyond, perhaps, employing a personnel or welfare manager. Indeed, despite a much trumpeted war-time success in the building industry linking improved welfare conditions to productivity gains, generally employers proved resistant to ‘giving the system a fair trial’. Full employment, it is argued, changed mental attitudes, but less readily the applied practices that sprang from these. Thus, not only in construction was the broader view taken that fear of unemployment had been the key factor motivating labour before 1939, and that, post-war, so far no ‘positive’ inducement had taken its place.
Academics have viewed subsequent reform as being essentially conservative and of limited impact: for the lack of principled agreement over reforms; but also because of the limited enthusiasm with which even agreed measures were supported by unions and employers. A number of test criteria have been offered in judging this: for example, quantitatively, the provision of associated training and the diffusion of Joint Productivity Committees (JPC), and, qualitatively, the remits that these adopted — for example, their commitment to pressing for forms of industrial democracy. Among the general conclusions that followed were that management rarely operated on ‘human relations’ principles, and was generally less enthusiastic than union officials or Labour politicians about such activity. Teamwork building, too, was less than evident. Interestingly, welfare issues are only given passing mention in this ‘testing’ rubric, despite its perennial popularity as a topic for discussion at JPCs and at other national practitioner forums. Indeed a preoccupation with welfare rather than industrial ‘democracy’ has since been viewed pejoratively: because it squeezed out discussion of more ‘important’ issues.

Yet degrees of caution must also colour such evaluations. Human relations as a management strategy was always neo-paternalistic: seen by its proponents to be less about joint consultation than persuasion and effective leadership — pointing out a common purpose. Nor was there ever any intention of relinquishing the ‘right to manage’ or linking joint consultation to wage bargaining: a codicil readily accepted by local and national trade union leaderships, but which perhaps also helps explain the lack of worker interests in joint consultation. Nevertheless the accompanying promotional activity was impressive. For example, the Anglo-American Council on Productivity (AACP) from 1948, in launching something of a ‘moral crusade’, organised exchange visits, educational and training programmes to disseminate American best-practice in the ‘newly emergent discipline of “human relations”’ that ‘reached from the shop-floor to university lecture theatres’. Contextually, a ‘crude popularization’ (concurrent with the onset of the cold war) culturally distorted this broader message so the emphasis was ‘frequently on the need for workers to work harder, and for unions to be less obstructive and readier to accept changes dictated by management, rather than on the need for companies to invest more in modern plant’. Certainly, if judged through the British section of the AACP, ‘employers and managers had little or no interest in improving or transforming underdeveloped management control systems’ to fordist principles preferring instead to emphasise lower costs, rather than productivity improvement through expanded output enabled by standardisation. Nonetheless, poor British economic performance subsequently continues to be attributed to a failure by industry to invest in human capital and to poor labour management techniques: notably because of the propensity to externalise industrial relations to industry-wide federated negotiating systems so that firm-specific labour management structures ossified.

How did this relate to the self-proclaimed doctrine circulating in construction circles that it particularly needed to place the ‘human factor’ to the fore? Some of the omens were not good. Exceptionally of all industries, only the Building AACP report insisted that American productivity was higher because its operatives worked harder. The first comments from the AACP building team – consisting of employers, trade unionists and building professionals – as it stepped of the boat at Southampton was to suggest that in contrast to British workers, American operatives put ‘everything’ into their ‘work without holding back’.

The full report concluded, in more mellow terms, that:
The fact that output in the building industry is so much higher in America than in Britain is not due only to the better organisation which has been developed and the natural advantages that are enjoyed. It depends, too, to a great extent upon the keenness and initiative of the individual workman, who is proud to be a member of the building industry and anxious by his own effort to maintain the status in society and the standard of living he derives from it. He takes an interest in the job as a whole … and co-operates wholeheartedly with his employer and with other workmen. Changes in site organisation, where these are necessary to raise output, are readily accepted, and he willingly assists in the development of new methods and techniques.32

Thus, in common with AACP reports on other industries, although it was in their ‘discussion of technical matters that the teams were best informed, it was on the vaguer psychological elements that they tended to place their greatest emphasis.’33 Yet it was not only the construction worker who was being severely criticised by default. Other survey material reported that on most sites ‘the relationship of the operatives to the management’ was best ‘characterized by lack of contact and ignorance’, and that ‘supervision’ was ‘lacking both in quantity and quality’.34 War-time discourse held that personnel management particularly offered the key to improved morale and better productivity — and was thus a touchstone for human relations. Certainly there were calls for a significant investment in both personnel management as a specialised function, and as part of a yet to be delivered broader management training programme.35 Building, of course, was not on its own in this respect. But its record in personnel management was particularly poor, conditioned heavily by the high levels of unemployment before 1939, where cheap and abundant supplies of labour negated investment in human and capital assets. This, it was being argued, needed to be redressed radically with the onset of full employment after 1945. Indeed, the AACP building report argued that aside from ‘individual’ effort, the ‘consciousness of forming part of a well-organised team’ was critical to improved productivity.36

How responsive was the building system to structural readjustment? The National Federation of Building Trade Operatives (NFBTO) and National Federation of Building Trade Employers (NFBTE) operated as model sector-wide industrial relations agencies: among the largest and ‘most highly developed of all industrial federations’.37 Both were exemplars of the externalised, federated system already criticised. Whether changing industrial relations are shaped respectively by trade-union initiated demands, by employer strategies/market pressures or government intervention continues to be keenly contested (indeed judgments tend to be based more on ‘the degree and incidence of each actor’s influence’).38 In fact, through the pronouncements of the institutional parties — the prism by which each primarily related to the other but also to the broader world — we see a third pattern of relationships developing in construction, where ownership of reform was more shared than contested. For example, NFBTO correspondence acknowledged that the impetus to introduce national collective bargaining after the First World War lay more with employers. But critically in this subsequent historical narrative both sides were labelled dissatisfied with a status quo where each trade negotiated its own working conditions and rates locally.39 And — in terms of later development and ownership — origins were deemed less significant than that the decision was ‘endorsed by a large majority’ of both the employers and union memberships. Here a consensual overview of a ‘community of interest’ became the dominant treatise disseminated by both parties.
during the late 1930s.\textsuperscript{40} Common ‘understandings’, therefore, had bred a common ‘ownership’ of reform.

This does not mean that consensual understanding necessarily promoted reform; it might equally inject co-operative passivity. Nonetheless, in operating as a non ‘zero sum’ equilibrium, this is not how it was presented, or subsequently internalised and retold. Employers and unions alike continually and jointly lauded the National Joint Council for the Building Industry (NJCBI) as the pinnacle of mutual equitableness: labelling it ‘probably the most effective machinery for industrial relations and industrial negotiation in the country’.\textsuperscript{41} As the NFBTO president reported in 1939:

> Our relations with the employers have been actuated by friendly understanding, tact and good judgement.... Both ourselves and the employers have become more industry-conscious.... What is best for the industry has increasingly been the motive of mutual approach, consultation and practical joint action. This has led ... to joint support for measures and reforms to effect the better organisation and greater efficiency of the Building Industry, and improved working conditions.\textsuperscript{42}

Whether this was more myth than fact was perhaps functionally less significant: such a self-view cemented a governing ideology for both union and employer leaderships.

Employer/union mutuality solidified during the Second World War. Reporting on improved ‘fringe’ benefits by 1945, the employers’ federation argued that the NJCBI had ‘emerged with credit, having given repeatedly evidence of its flexibility and adaptability.’ Indeed employers thought it capable of ‘extending its functions in many [new] directions’— for example, to the soon to be formalised ‘provision of paid holidays’ and other human betterments.\textsuperscript{43} Notwithstanding the hoped for associated productivity gains, lionising and introducing additional functions that increased building costs in a post-war building market where demand was anticipated to be highly elastic speaks of a growing employer conformity to a dominant reformist ideal. Such conformity was reinforced by external agencies. The ‘new rules’ minimising casualisation — by offering a guaranteed working week — was one such ‘war-induced’ measure where state pressure was important.\textsuperscript{44} Through the 1920s employers had strongly resisted this key union demand. But shortly after — as union sources again acknowledged — ‘there was a change of attitude’ amongst the employers to one of ‘co-operation ... to evolve a scheme that would be satisfactory to all parties.’\textsuperscript{45} Why was reform thought necessary? Firstly, because of market driven ‘changes in building methods’, and a ‘general demand ... for speedy completion of contracts’, so that ‘external and internal operations’ had to be carried out simultaneously. Consequently, it was more difficult to ‘conserve internal work for execution during inclement weather’.\textsuperscript{46} Thus reform promoted flexible working patterns, but significantly it also enhanced industrial consensus by honouring under new circumstances past obligations to provide continuity of work for operatives where possible. Only the outbreak of war stopped this voluntary agreement on the guaranteed week being introduced — although almost half of all operatives strongly opposed this against NFBTO executive advice because it was a \textit{contributory} scheme.\textsuperscript{47}

Thus there were limits to mutuality, although its ideas and representations increasingly overwrote, temporarily or permanently, dissident discourses. But we must also consider how clearly this construct was based on a common vocabulary jointly understood. Consistent with the argument being developed, this needs to be examined under the more demanding remit of a post-war ‘humanising’ process which acquired a dynamic beyond

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\textsuperscript{40} For a fuller discussion of this earlier period see R. Shute, \textit{The Building Industry in Canada, 1800-1990}. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991).\textsuperscript{41} The NFBTO president reported in 1939: “Our relations with the employers have been actuated by friendly understanding, tact and good judgement. Both ourselves and the employers have become more industry-conscious. What is best for the industry has increasingly been the motive of mutual approach, consultation and practical joint action. This has led to joint support for measures and reforms to effect the better organisation and greater efficiency of the Building Industry, and improved working conditions.”\textsuperscript{42} This is not how the equilibrium was presented, or subsequently internalised and retold. Employers and unions alike continually and jointly lauded the National Joint Council for the Building Industry (NJCBI) as the pinnacle of mutual equitableness: labelling it “probably the most effective machinery for industrial relations and industrial negotiation in the country.”\textsuperscript{41} Notwithstanding the hoped for associated productivity gains, lionising and introducing additional functions that increased building costs in a post-war building market where demand was anticipated to be highly elastic speaks of a growing employer conformity to a dominant reformist ideal. Such conformity was reinforced by external agencies. The “new rules” minimising casualisation — by offering a guaranteed working week — was one such “war-induced” measure where state pressure was important.\textsuperscript{44} Through the 1920s employers had strongly resisted this key union demand. But shortly after — as union sources again acknowledged — “there was a change of attitude” amongst the employers to one of “co-operation ... to evolve a scheme that would be satisfactory to all parties.”\textsuperscript{45} Why was reform thought necessary? Firstly, because of market driven “changes in building methods”, and a “general demand ... for speedy completion of contracts”, so that “external and internal operations” had to be carried out simultaneously. Consequently, it was more difficult to “conserve internal work for execution during inclement weather”.\textsuperscript{46} Thus reform promoted flexible working patterns, but significantly it also enhanced industrial consensus by honouring under new circumstances past obligations to provide continuity of work for operatives where possible. Only the outbreak of war stopped this voluntary agreement on the guaranteed week being introduced — although almost half of all operatives strongly opposed this against NFBTO executive advice because it was a \textit{contributory} scheme.\textsuperscript{47}

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that of pre-war ‘mutuality’. All parties, for example, now favoured the retention, post-1945, of a non-contributory wage guarantee. All equally claimed to be acting in the industry's interests. Government thought it essential to securing an adequate labour force. Building workers, for example, disliked ‘the stigma of casual labour’. They generally opposed their sons entering the industry because of its lack of job security and irregular wages; a non-contributory scheme was favoured here also. Employers saw ‘wet time' payments as important to stabilising labour conditions; but also argued that voluntary retention would pre-empt government intervention. Richard Coppock (general secretary, NFBTO) argued that voluntary agreement would establish ‘a mutual confidence’ in the future of the industry. Nevertheless for Coppock ‘wet time’ payments were quintessentially a ‘very important act of social justice’, not an economic physic. Employers, anyway, refused to cover the full 44-hour week (arguing it offered operatives too much security, reducing the incentive to work!). The end result — after protracted negotiation — was a ‘compromise between the two sides'.

Thus, post-war, ‘humanising’ construction — as a defining moment of dialogue — offered multiple meanings within the overarching precepts of mutuality. It was also a broader, less focused, impetus than one strictly following the dictates of a ‘human relations’ agenda. As employers related this, it was recognition of the ‘fundamental importance of fostering industrial conditions in the industry in which workers … are most likely to co-operate wholeheartedly in achieving the utmost production’: especially through positive incentives beyond the basic pay nexus. In one respect, too, the declarations of common interest offered by employers and unions were misleading: the public and private language of consensus was a short form for pragmatic compromise rather than unity. Nevertheless contained within was a dynamic for ‘agreeing’ change beyond self-interest: subtle and self-fulfilling in the sense that conformity to a past and continuing narrative of joint agreement was culturally restraining on all parties and positively charged. Mutuality, and to a greater degree a ‘humanising’ agenda, filled the space between actors and agencies: it offered a language for reform, less perhaps a conduit than an electrolyte, without which ‘progress’ would have been slower and less directed.

Deconstructing Full Employment

It has been hypothesised thus far that common understanding around a core discourse — that of a ‘humanising’ mutuality — enabling reform, particularly after 1945. Critically, however, not all key components intruding into this construct were positively charged. This significantly diluted the impetus provided by changing labour markets that separated the inter and post-war periods. Contextually, the onset of full employment should have ‘presented powerful inducements’ for managers and employers ‘to find a more effective philosophy towards labour than [the] domination or indifference’ of the past. As part of the same conversation, employers, operatives and their leaderships should have experienced attitudinal changes reflective of alterations in structural circumstances (acute factor shortages, increased demand for housing, and as a valued capital good to promote industrial regeneration).

There is no doubting the post-1945 hostility amongst building trade union leaders to the pre-war condition: a hostility that paradoxically gathered force, rather than diminishing, with the passing of time. Thus a mythology — a signifier of intimate,
immediate but less than precise understanding — arose where for operatives the pre-war industry meant:

an army of 200,000 workers always unemployed; wherein those in employment never knew from hour to hour whether they would be sacked or not; wherein it was common practice to deny men work and wages whenever it rained or snowed … and wherein there was neglect of safety measures and a complete indifference to the common welfare of the men on sites. ‘Never again!’ must be our resolve…. The pre-war Building Industry was reared on untold wretchedness below, and incredible mismanagement above.54

The ‘transformation’ from this ‘pre-war insecurity to post-war security’ through full employment, it has been suggested, ‘was probably the largest improvement in [building] operatives’ experience since the early nineteenth century.’55 Yet many industrial workers were psychologically less than reassured by this apparent metamorphosis. Instead, fear of ‘the past’ returning was omnipresent. It had already had a significant, and arguably determining, impact on voting choice in the 1945 general election, and to counter its spectral presence the Labour government felt obliged to launch propaganda campaigns of reassurance thereafter.56 These were largely unsuccessful. ‘Even the young workers with no personal experience of pre-war conditions’, building employers were arguing as late as the mid-1950s, ‘are infected with this fear [of unemployment] by their older relations and fellow workers.’57

Adjusting to the frequently contradictory and volatile discourses prescribing the tenor of post-war workplace security proved problematic for building management. Year on year, the NFBTE could be found having repetitively to recite the same basic propaganda message: now that

the assurances of full employment have largely discounted the fear of unemployment which formerly used sometimes to be a spur to endeavour … Much more could be expected, in these times, from the removal of genuine grievances, from good organisation of jobs (including welfare arrangements) and from positive incentives to better individual output.58

Perhaps, too, ‘the threat of unemployment and the risk of failure’ had culturally always been more important — more deeply ingrained and resonant — in maintaining incentives for workers and employers in construction than elsewhere.59 Indeed government officials hinted that perhaps the best counter to falling productivity was to engineer a downturn in building activity to exaggerate the spectre of unemployment. For employers now too familiar with ‘full order books’, a ‘restoration of keenness’ would also drive forward efficiency.60 It was a course favoured by many. ‘The policy of full employment’, noted *The Builder* in 1950, ‘is obviously the main cause of our productivity difficulties.’ ‘It is a pity’, it rebuked, that official reports should only comment, ‘rather supinely’, that ‘the absence of a large reserve of unemployed labour’ was something to which the ‘industry must adjust’.61 Not all were this ‘hesitant’. Returning from the United States, the Building Productivity team immediately announced that higher American productivity depended directly on the existence of a greater pool of unemployment and fewer state welfare entitlements.62

It is difficult to reconcile such abrasive discourses ‘promoting’ the value of fear of unemployment with the more ubiquitous employer narratives of community of interest and compromise. Again we need to stress contexts: that the industry’s collective identity
bespoke a masculine self-independence within a hard, caustic industrial environment, where the ‘cult of toughness’ was construed positively. It also had a ‘remembered’ tradition of casual employment and unemployment that normalised such practices, just as it bred the fear of having such new-found security removed. Indeed, perhaps we should simply accept that such counter-discourses were irreconcilable: the product of disparate employer opinion, but also two sides of the same coin — one dependent on the other for its form. Certainly progressives vigorously linked full employment to the need for new incentives — and a changed employer ‘psychology’— so that the former is seen as a precursor for the introduction of additional non-wage benefits.

Perhaps not surprisingly, ‘anxiety’ narratives in the industry continued to circulate through to the highest levels. Writing in 1947 to Attlee (Labour Prime Minister) Coppock argued that guarantees of future work were a pre-requisite to increasing building productivity: it was ‘vital that we should know that we are organising for production and not for unemployment.’ Indeed government ministers came to accept that ‘positive’ incentive schemes promoting efficiency were failing because both employees and employers feared that increased productivity would mean future unemployment and idleness. Such was its negative influence. Explicit political assurances of continuity of work never materialised. Attitudinally, therefore, the materiality of full employment was overshadowed by surviving pre-war mentalities in construction more than in most other industries — where continuity of work was increasingly ‘taken for granted.’

Nevertheless, in his 1948 survey, Zweig contends that noticeable differences existed between pre- and post-war industrial relations in construction, particularly in the area of consensual practice by employers and unions. How did this renegotiation under a ‘humanising’ umbrella impact on the post-1945 industrial condition?

**Tailoring Solutions to Circumstances**

Speaking to fellow employers in 1948, D.C. Burgess (president of the London Master Builders’ Association), began by commending the NJCBI for its past efficiency in preventing strikes and lockouts, but added that:

> it is a distressing fact that this machinery has tended more and more to obliterate human relations. Its very success has brought into being the two so-called ‘sides.’ … If we are to succeed the operatives must lose that inherent antagonism to the so-called ‘employers’ side’ and be given reason to trust the integrity of the employers’ intentions … it is unfortunate that when the operative looks back he realises that it is through his ‘side’ fighting the employers that the improvements have taken place ... means must be found of forging these two sides into one team in the real meaning of the term. We must realise that it is the will to work on the part of the operative that is all-important in securing high output, and no effort on our part should be spared to bring about that attitude of mind. Money is by no means the greatest incentive.

Clearly here the ‘origins’ and the partisan ‘ownership’ of past reform initiatives are being read together antagonistically. Burgess then proceeded to list those pragmatic appendages thought likely to improve industrial relations, and thus productivity. Firstly, work must be made interesting: combining those traditional appeals to the building craftsman’s attenuated sense of pride with a modern ‘human relations’ emphasis on job satisfaction rather than monetary reward. Difficulties in providing site welfare amenities, he argued, must also be ‘overcome’. This, too, was a recent concern that only highlighted the past apathy by both construction unions and employers to such issues.
And, perhaps most importantly, Burgess emphasised, to forge team ‘spirit’ the men must ‘know what the programme is’ and what is expected of them. ‘Let us’, he urged, ‘take them into our confidence on every possible occasion in every possible way…. Every one of us must play our part in this humanising of the relationship between the employer and the operative.’ This is your ‘job as individual employers’.70

At face value Burgess was outlining a bespoke recipe — albeit one at variance with the criteria of contemporary human relations philosophy — ideally tailored to building operatives’ tastes and the industry’s needs, for it emphasised practical improvements where working conditions had been poor, in an industry where a strongly imbued sense of crafts pride and independence already existed. Low productivity in construction, the Girwood Committee (1948) reported in terms reflective of a cross-sectional attitude within the industry, was best solved by ‘rewards rather than penalties’ in exactly these terms: pride in craftsmanship, sense of partnership, better working conditions and welfare provision, and improved personnel management and joint consultation.71

What was perhaps most unexpected was Burgess’s displacement of national joint consultation: the criticism that mutuality produced weak, reliant internal management structures antipathetic to good human relations.72 It could be argued, of course, that a co-operative ethos generally bequeathed a cautiousness that stymied internal innovation. Bitter union opposition made it impossible, for example, for employers actively to promote cost efficient ‘labour only’ subcontracting (known later as the ‘lump’) in the 1940s. So important a productivity issue was this to them that they considered withdrawing from the NJCBI until structural forces operating in the industry propelled its increased application anyway.73 Yet, strong as these impulses were, the pull of stability and continuity were culturally stronger. If we judge by what was being spoken or written, it was the language of formally ‘working together’ — rather than a company-led individualism — that dominated after 1945, increasing in frequency and strength over its pre-war usage. Praise for the NJCBI was ongoing: ‘it was by such methods that the great problem of the building industry — increased productivity’ — was to be solved, for productivity was a ‘co-operative process, and greater productivity must depend on mutual aid.’74

Co-operation also complemented a broader commitment to post-war reconstruction. This should be seen in the context of TUC support particularly for productivity initiatives.75 It would be naive, however, to suggest that this overrode home-grown priorities. More commonly, for example, union members’ interests were seen to coexist with that of the Labour government and the nation, but where increasing productivity offered a moral bargaining chip: as, for example, with union demands for state guarantees of continuity of work.76 Yet the relationship could also be more adventurous than demands for quid pro quo reciprocity and national tub-thumping. ‘Productivity’, asserted the president of the NFBTO in 1947, ‘will only be in a satisfactory state when, and only when, wages and conditions attached to it are such as to allow men to live a full life.’ This entreaty went beyond questions of the cash nexus, or even better site amenities, into a humanising context. A ‘contented mind’, it was conjectured, would also ‘encourage productivity on the workers’ side’.

Is not a large part of our economic malformity due to the ‘they’ and ‘us’ attitude — the means by which the community is separated into hostile classes. If faulty production is looked upon as the joint
responsibility of all of us, instead of providing the occasion for lectures and minatory adjuration to some, I think we shall have arrived half way towards a solution of our industrial and economic ills.\(^77\)

Such ideas readily complemented the strong crafts traditions of semi-autonomy that defined site life.\(^78\) Indeed, beyond the exhortations of government and employers, within the trade-union leadership there co-existed a core ethical belief in partnership and workplace satisfaction for an economic and cultural reorganisation of values that went far beyond that envisaged by employers. Nevertheless, on site union/employer mutual co-operation improved considerably. Strike levels in construction, for example, in the decade after 1945 were markedly lower than in the ten years before or after this decade.\(^79\)

As one well placed union official confirmed, ‘The employers have got sense at last, and they are understanding. The old-time aggressive employer is disappearing fast.’ Even the ‘old type of bullying foreman, who used to shout and swear at his men, is now at a discount.’\(^80\) Another union official recalled of joint council meetings:

> I remember how the employers and we used to sit apart and look askance at each other with suspicion and distrust, as if coming from different planets; now we talk to each other and behave friendly. There is no comparison with former times in the present atmosphere.\(^81\)

But what, beyond a more ‘convivial’ atmosphere (significant as that was) was achieved practically: which of the associated panaceas circulating were enacted and how fully? ‘It has become a widely accepted axiom in Britain’, the AAPC noted dismissively in 1950, ‘that adequate welfare arrangements are essential to higher production, and that canteens or other feeding facilities, rest-rooms and sanitary accommodation should be provided by the contractor.’\(^82\) Certainly the NFBTE thought in terms of improving site welfare in such ‘humanising’ terms, but specifically also to counter press criticism that poor productivity correlated directly with poor site labour conditions. Naturally, having invested in better site facilities encapsulated in a new Welfare Code (1948), employers were happy to claim credit, noting that this had ‘contributed, no doubt, to a better spirit among workers on many jobs.’\(^83\)

Some in management wanted to take improvements further, arguing that the ‘importance of treating the men … as human beings’ was now generally recognised. It provided the ‘means of promoting efficiency and the avoidance of discontent, which frequently arises when men feel that no one cares much about their working conditions so long as they do their jobs’.\(^84\) But employer discourses generally on ‘human problems’ and ‘Why Welfare Pays’ remained low key, even self-effacing:

> It is the spirit of the thing that counts. The operatives themselves show great ingenuity in improvising nooks where they can rest and brew tea; an employer needs no great resource to improvise something a little better for them. If he cannot offer hot meals on site, he may be able to arrange means for the operatives to heat their own snacks—and reap the benefit of men stimulated by a warm meal instead of dragging through a winter day on a couple of sandwiches. If he cannot provide elaborate sanitary equipment, he can at least see that it does not become neglected, and thus … ‘an insanitary nuisance and a menace to health.’ When a hut or shelter is provided for the men, especially for meals, it can be reserved for this purpose and not allowed to deteriorate into an untidy and dirty general store.\(^85\)

When labour is short, it was suggested, employers who ‘neglect’ welfare would ‘ultimately lose workers to those who do not, however high the wages paid, because in the long run men do not work only to live’, and anyway ‘attention to welfare pays for
itself in higher productivity’. Many individual employers failed quickly to adopt the standards agreed by the industry’s jointly sanctioned 1948 welfare code, and too many, according to reformers, only observed the letter of the law. This was especially true of smaller sites and contractors, where canteen conditions, for example, remained ‘primitive and unsatisfactory’. Indeed generally standards varied significantly between employers, locations and according to contract size — amid flagged continuing shortcomings like poor washing facilities. Nonetheless it was still agreed to be a ‘remarkable improvement in the standards’ from the pre-war years.

The NFBTO’s discourse, by contrast, was wholly reformist, particularly when measured against a self-acknowledged complicity before 1939 in condoning low standards by concentrated singularly on money wages. It had, by its own admission, previously ‘underestimated our human value’ as workers. Thus an equally marked disparity existed between pre- and post-war union attitudes as it did between that of employers’ caution and unions’ robust campaigning for better welfare after 1945. Now the latter consistently argued that

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Production narratives interacted with those working to enhance status — providing ‘an opportunity for building trade workers to go to work and return home looking clean and respectable’ — and negatively, descriptors that in arguing ethically for enhanced ‘human value’, derided earlier provision — where site mess room and sanitary accommodation was too often ‘absolutely disgusting.’ Much discontent, it was suggested, would be ‘overcome if there was a decent standard of welfare.’ Yet, for example, although the standard of washing accommodation on site remained ‘generally low’, even when exemplary provision was made, the majority of site operatives — including numbers of skilled workers — failed to use it. And, to return to the subject of canteens, on those sites where ‘the most elaborate arrangements had been made for feeding’, union officials ‘were struck’ still by the lack of interest shown by site operatives. ‘To discuss this subject upon the airy assumption that all building trade workers are eager to take a mid-day meal on the job would be entirely wrong.’ That this was so at a time of food rationing adds to its significance. In 1947-48, for example, only some 20 per cent of the men took their meals from canteens. Even ‘on jobs where the food is good and moderate in price’ there was ‘often great difficulty in getting sufficient men to take the meal’. Thus overall, privately union officials acknowledged that higher productivity was more causally linked to higher cash payments, including bonus schemes, than non-money rewards and that though welfare standards were still ‘generally poor with few exceptions’, even when provided to a high standard ‘operatives had not fully availed themselves’ of such services.

Judged by past lacklustre standards, therefore, the 1940s marked a period of significant improvement: where welfare — intellectually — became a ‘live issue’ within the humanising agenda; and, pragmatically, reforms were implemented on site. Yet it
was never simply a question — as the leaderships implied — of a past indifference being replaced and transformed by a ‘the evangelising zeal of the propagandist’; convincing operatives and recalcitrant employers alike of the need for ‘better conditions rather than the primitive ones’ to which all were accustomed.\(^95\) For rather than enthusiasm, as has been shown elsewhere, instead for many operatives apathy, drawn from a construct of traditional self-reliance and the masculine robustness of site life, accompanied workplace improvements.\(^96\) Perhaps this was a lesson that unions learned more quickly than employers, but more likely it simply reflected the differing imperatives motivating discussion: for while the NFBTE continued to flag productivity through welfarism during the 1950s, the unions quietly let the matter drop for a decade until cyclically unemployment again began to fall markedly and thus union bargaining power increased. It was only then when non-money wages became once again a live issue in terms of collective bargaining, and unions argued, for example, that the only way to improve recruitment into the industry was to improve site working conditions.\(^97\)

The industry’s welfare code had been designed and instigated — as were all changes to pay and conditions — through a process of national joint consultation. Employers, however, as noted earlier, envisaged broader, if not wholly specified, mechanisms through which operatives should be taken into the employers’ ‘confidence on every possible occasion in every possible way’: part of a cathartic process to bring both sides of the industry together to heal the ‘us’ and ‘them’ divides imposed by formal collective bargaining.\(^98\) Perhaps employers had good reason to be concerned. Contemporary survey material recorded that ‘supervision’ on site was the ‘weakest point in the building industry’. Now workers, it was reported, wanted to be consulted on matters of production method and deprecated the ‘lack of personal contact between management and operatives’.\(^99\) As one Manchester operative noted:

> This job would run more efficiently if the men were in a position to know the kind of building on which they were working. There is no access to plans or drawings with the result that men are working in the dark and mistakes thereby often occur, which wastes materials and labour.\(^100\)

Another, working on a non-traditional, prefabricated housing site from the North West, argued that the site management were:

> Working to plans and cutting lists without drawing on the experience of the men on the job. I have worked on this type of house previously but the experience gained is not used by [the] contractor to improve the efficiency of the other contractors. When I went on this job they were making the same mistakes I had experienced on previous jobs.\(^101\)

If this interest was real and sustained, and it was not simply an over emphasised and wishful product of a dominant humanising discourse, the experiences of the construction industry ran against the presumed tide elsewhere. In British industry generally the diffusion of joint consultation was partial, and considerably slower than the government wanted. Management and unions had opposing objectives: the former wanted to disseminate information and explain decisions; the latter to receive information and raise complaints. Opinion remains divided as to whether workers themselves remained largely uninspired by the productivity, and especially the welfare dominated, agenda on offer, and the ‘value’ that such a welfare agenda had within the humanising construct.\(^102\) With
a constant high labour turnover (some two and a half times that of manufacturing) the 
construction industry was not a natural candidate for consultation at site level, although at 
a regional and national level consultation on productivity reputedly worked well, being 
favourably received by both sides as a useful adjunct to minimising the disruption caused 
by factor shortages. Nonetheless, regional and national production committees 
remained an abstract from a site perspective, lacking as a ‘spontaneous expression of rank 
and file effort’. And at a site level, and despite local enthusiasms, while building 
employers, in conjunction with trade unionists, might commend JPCs in theory, privately 
employers did ‘not favour these arrangements’, and the unions, too, had ‘misgivings 
about them’. Institutionally, employers were concerned lest JPCs significantly 
undermine the ‘right to manage’. Moreover, both feared that site committees would 
simply strengthen the ‘unofficial movement’, providing platforms for political extremists 
to engage in disruptive behaviour. This took greater form as cold war fervour took 
hold. Union leaders were also particularly wary that ‘consultation’ might be a cipher 
for excluding organised labour from site negotiation, nor did they want JPCs to become 
undirected venues for simply ‘venting grievances’.

Nevertheless, union enthusiasm for greater formal site consultation went beyond that 
of employers. As one Scottish operative recorded, ‘There is a failure of the management 
to get the confidence of [the] men and also [their] co-operation: they see J.P.C.s as a 
waste of time rather than a help.’ This begs the question as to how the latter otherwise 
proposed to take operatives directly into their confidence. Consultation, the unions 
argued, would add to craft status at a time when this was under attack as new ‘deskilling’ 
techniques were being introduced. There were practical considerations also. Site 
committees offered useful venues to resolve problems over bonus incentives — of great 
interest to operatives. A belief also existed that full knowledge by operatives, and 
practical advice from them, would enhance productivity to the benefit of all. In fact such 
union articulations differed little from the ‘human relations’ bonding so frequently 
exalted by employers. But union leaders also saw JPCs in more grandiose and abstract 
terms: as a means to stimulate further an operative’s ‘sense of civic responsibility’ to 
raise productivity. ‘This seems so elementary as not to be worth mentioning’, 
Coppock commented, ‘but it is surprising that the obvious is so often missed’. If this 
was indeed a central objective, then we should perhaps wonder instead at any level of 
operative enthusiasm.

Division, nevertheless, remained at its broadest away from the practical and around 
the widely believed idea that shortfalls in productivity were ‘the result of an attitude of 
mind.’ In perhaps the best example from the post-war years, building employers could 
be found eulogising over American social values. Thus ‘a large part of the difference 
between American and British productivity’ was ‘accounted for only by the individual 
attitude to work’: the duality of an operative ‘not holding back’, ‘anxious by his efforts to 
maintain’ his ‘status in society and the standard of living he derives from it’, and, 
negatively, his need to avoid ‘the social scrap-heap which is reserved for failure’. Such a discourse obviously has to be read within the broader context of widespread and 
corrosive operative fears of an ‘imagined’ unemployment discussed earlier. Not 
surprisingly, union leaders’ attitudes to an ideological Americanisation of values were 
wholly antipathetic. Trade unionists had in mind a radically different organic 
‘humanising’ view from that ‘ideal’ envisaged by employers — where the ‘tempo’ of the
job should be fixed ‘like a machine belt in a factory, and each one who does not keep to
the line … is rejected.’ To the operatives’ leadership, a ‘good standard of living’
embraced

a leisurely approach to life — time for reflection and for the enjoyment of the imponderables, time to
live as human beings … not as human machines enslaved by the machine. If going at a job ‘hell for
leather’ is the only answer to our economic problems, … then it is doubtful whether we want the
problem solved…. Let America, if it so wishes, pursue its febrile activities…. For our part we choose
otherwise.115

Coppock was to be equally blunt but, perhaps too, wholly out of touch with his own
membership. Undoubtedly, in ‘holding that unemployment must be planned against’, he
reflected a core preoccupation, but he went on to argue that:

The [American] building trades craftsman is immeasurably better off in a material sense than his British
counterpart: he enjoys (if ‘enjoys’ is the right word) a standard of living which we cannot hope to
emulate yet. But against this we have to decide what a ‘standard of life’ encompasses…. No one, I
hope, would be foolish enough to despise good conditions, but the only point which arises is, can they
be gained at too high a price?… If a fellow has a radio, a television, a “fridge”, a car, will he have a
fuller life than a man who, lacking these amenities, finds ecstatic enjoyment in the contemplation of a
sunrise, or of a Goya or in listening to one of the sonata?116

In fact ready access to personal possessions — particularly at a time of social austerity —
was exactly what operatives coveted (and what in the decades that followed most
acquired). Indeed, any construct drawing rigid dichotomous lines between
transatlantic practices — in terms of motivational drives linked to consumptive desires —
ignores the already ingrained habits of British working-class consumerism.118 Coppock,
in positing such a construct, was advocating an ‘improving’, anti-commercial/anti-
American aesthetic that jarred heavily against the lived culture of site operatives.119 As
motivational, positive discourses neither anti-materialism nor other forms of cultural
elitism carried well.

There was one further major inconsistency to be teased out from the importation of
supposed American mores. Its building industry, held to be an icon to productivity,
rejected payment by results, holiday pay and wet-time, while site-welfare provision was
‘almost non-existent’.120 Yet all, in the years following 1945, were cited by British
employers as likely ways to counter low productivity. Of these, bonusing schemes were
deemed the ‘most effective incentive’ and the most likely to counter the negative pulls of
full employment.121 Not all have accepted this diagnosis. Studies of management
techniques in other industries have judged piecework a ‘crude mechanism for ensuring
worker output’. Incentive schemes, it is argued, frequently exacerbated workplace
consensus because of disputes over rate setting, and offered a less effective mechanism
for countering low productivity than ‘fringe benefits’.122 Certainly, post-war, building
economists concluded that without better working conditions, a guaranteed week and
stability of employment ‘it was doubtful’ whether monetary incentives offered anything
other than a short-term solution: indeed that the ‘wage incentive is neither the only, nor
always the most important incentive’.123 Not only did it run counter to the humanising
concept of values, it again operated directly against ingested constructs of insecurity then
prevalent: in short, it was those solutions that stressed value, continuity and stability that
offered the most coherent solutions to poor productivity.124
Nevertheless, government and employers’ leaders increasingly projected incentive payments as the great panacea. Employers, individually, were less enthusiastic: resisting its broader diffusion during war-time, and, thereafter, remaining split on its virtues (with smaller builders being the most hesitant). Trade union leaders were consistently hostile to its retention. Indeed they remained inwardly antagonistic even after succumbing to government pressure to adopt the scheme. As Zweig accurately recorded:

The old-fashioned Trades Unionists see in the bonus system a threat to their own principles, afraid that men will be separated from men and the old social solidarity will go. The crafts unions are afraid of scamped work and slave driving.... Small and medium-sized firms are afraid of unfair competition on the part of large firms, because the operating of a bonusing scheme is very expensive ... Some other employers cannot find a common language between themselves and their operatives, nor agree upon common standards. The fact is that progressive employers jump at the scheme, while the orthodox employers are all against it.

Thus, ironically, a strong overlap existed between employers who favoured bonusing and those advocating ‘cash-free’ humanising incentives. It was more a case of divisions existing between those favouring reforms generally and those who did not. In this ‘progressive’ context union leaders remained on the outside: arguing that ‘the only inducements the worker requires’ were ‘good wages and conditions and sufficient nourishing food to sustain him in his effort.’ But they also admitted that the withdrawal of war-time bonus payments was causing operative ‘discontent’. Thus, union leaders were drawn into conformity by pressure from below and by the crescendo of argument circulating above. ‘To be perfectly frank and realistic’, the introduction of payments by results, it was admitted, ‘was inevitable in view of the almost universal recognition that increased productivity can be obtained only if the worker is given some [direct] incentive to work harder’. Most operatives, too, took a complementary position: voting heavily to accept a wage settlement tied to payment by results. Yet contemporary survey data also reveals that operatives remained in principle opposed to bonus payments: they wanted more pay but based on traditional plain time rates. This option, however, was not on the ‘progressive’ menu as prescribed by government or promoted by employers’ leaders. Here it quickly acquired an elemental fervour: where the very ‘future of the industry depends to a large extent upon this important experiment in reducing cost’. A return to pre-war ‘stability by itself’ was suddenly considered insufficient.

Conclusion
We started by positing that construction offered a potentially harsh testing environment for a human relations ideology, making it particularly worthy of study. We might conclude that within and flowing around this industry in the years immediately following the Second World War, several overarching constructs pertaining to ‘humanising’ construction existed simultaneously. This reflected not simply an employer/union divide, although this was certainly evident at times. In fact, employer disagreed with employer, union with operative, and expert with expert in terms of emphasis, direction, and occasionally much more. It might even be argued that the underlying dynamic promoting ‘human relations’ in construction was fatally flawed: for neither operatives nor employers wholly accepted that full employment after 1945 was a ‘reality’. That many employers would have welcomed a return to the insecurities of unemployment only added to this perception.
Yet clearly, too, individuals and organisations did come together to discuss, and, within very natural limits, reach agreement over the necessity of ‘humanising’ construction. This was not wholly driven by the post-war productivity crisis in the industry, for the humanising agenda existed within a broader discourse of ‘mutuality’ that predated 1939. Nor was the post-war enhanced language of mutuality simply abstract: strike levels in construction, for example, fell in the decade after 1945 as social relations in the industry improved. Mutuality was a construct in which both sides took pride: it came to be believed. Taken from this, ‘humanising’ was thus a derivative: an abstraction based on broader ‘human relations’ discourses and the industry’s own past. But it was also practical and apposite — a product of its own time tailored to the industry’s seeming needs after 1945.

Everyday experience, in fact, tempered the impact of that ‘remembered past’ of the 1930s — dark, cogent and immediate as it remained. But that past, nonetheless, continued to have an impact. If we consider briefly the other favoured response to low productivity: payment by results. By the early 1950s only some 16% of firms, covering 27% of sites but 37% of men employed, operated bonus schemes. Ministers, in rightly noting that ‘resistance had traditionally been strong because of irregularity of employment’, argued that this response was now ‘clearly out of date’. However, successive investigations revealed that ‘the main difficulty in introducing incentive schemes was that both employees and employers feared that by increasing the rate of production … they would work themselves out of a job.’ 132 By contrast, a humanising agenda, although also productivity driven, carried fewer perceived and less immediate risks, where the associations were made not with unemployment but with human betterment, stability and established co-operative genres.

But obviously, too, humanising meant different things to different groups, as the discussion on ‘values’ succinctly illustrates. From this cocktail union officials and employers undoubtedly were left to take what they wanted from the ‘humanising’ narratives circulating to suit their own purposes and understandings: all under the legitimising umbrella of the necessity of reform. Thus, strictly, joint understanding was curtailed, and in some cases was non-existent: for example, over the anti-humanising importation of ‘American’ values — which we must remember was subsequently ignored by employers — and the anti-materialism that operatives rejected as being out of place. But this did not necessarily subvert the process, nor was it primarily a subverting activity. We asked initially whether or not employers and unions — in subscribing to a humanising agenda — operated outside of a zero sum perception of winners and losers. In areas this was clearly the case. If both institutional sides remained lukewarm about greater site consultation (although many operatives on site thought this worthwhile) there was considerably greater enthusiasm for regional and national productivity consultation to overcome the factor shortages of the 1940s. For this exercise was read positively: as a method of guaranteeing jobs in the present. But there was also redefinition to suit other immediate needs of the industry: where, for example, improved welfare provision was a notable success and innovation when viewed against the industry’s own neglected and imagined past. Such reform was designed to attract new labour and prevent those operatives already employed in construction from leaving to find work in other industries. But, importantly, it could also be presented and subsequently understood in its humanising guise — for it had at its core a progressive ethos that signified positive
change. Indeed, it became part of the zero sum of continuing moderation: for trade
unionists also desired labour stability and progressive employers wanted to project a
greater ethicality in their dealings with operatives. Indeed, ironically, the very harshness
of the construction environment spurred this process, and this time largely against
operative indifference. We might conclude, too, that such a project should be read more
positively than it has thus been the case, because, for contemporaries, conformity to such
a message became a key component of industrial relations at this time.

Endnotes
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