Reasoning under uncertainty: the role of two informal fallacies in an emerging scientific inquiry

Cummings, L., 2002. Reasoning under uncertainty: the role of two informal fallacies in an emerging scientific inquiry. Informal Logic, 22 (2), pp. 113-136. ISSN 0824-2577

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Abstract

It is now commonplace in fallacy inquiry for many of the traditional informal fallacies to be viewed as reasonable or non-fallacious modes of argument. Central to this evaluative shift has been the attempt to examine traditional fallacies within their wider contexts of use. However, this pragmatic turn in fallacy evaluation is still in its infancy. The true potential of a contextual approach in the evaluation of the fallacies is yet to be explored. I examine how, in the context of scientific inquiry, certain traditional fallacies function by conferring epistemic gains upon inquiry. Specifically, I argue that these fallacies facilitate the progression of inquiry, particularly in the initial stages of inquiry when the epistemic context is one of uncertainty. The conception of these fallacies that emerges is that of heuristics of reasoning in contexts of epistemic uncertainty.

Item Type:	Journal article
Publication Title:	Informal Logic
Creators:	Cummings, L.
Publisher:	University of Windsor
Place of Publication:	Windsor, Ontario
Date:	2002
Volume:	22
Number:	2
ISSN:	0824-2577
Divisions:	Schools > School of Arts and Humanities
Record created by:	EPrints Services
Date Added:	09 Oct 2015 10:37
Last Modified:	12 Oct 2015 12:37
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/15750

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