Testing two cognitive theories of insight

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Jones, G. ORCID: 0000-0003-3867-9947, 2003. Testing two cognitive theories of insight. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29 (5), pp. 1017-1027. ISSN 0278-7393

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.29.5.1017

Abstract

Insight in problem solving occurs when the problem solver fails to see how to solve a problem and then-"aha!"-there is a sudden realization how to solve it. Two contemporary theories have been proposed to explain insight. The representational change theory (e.g., G. Knoblich, S. Ohlsson, & G. E. Rainey, 2001) proposes that insight occurs through relaxing self-imposed constraints on a problem and by decomposing chunked items in the problem. The progress monitoring theory (e.g., J. N. MacGregor, T. C. Ormerod, & E. P. Chronicle, 2001) proposes that insight is only sought once it becomes apparent that the distance to the goal is unachievable in the moves remaining. These 2 theories are tested in an unlimited move problem, to which neither theory has previously been applied. The results lend support to both, but experimental manipulations to the problem suggest that the representational change theory is the better indicator of performance. The findings suggest that testable opposing predictions can be made to examine theories of insight and that the use of eye movement data is a fruitful method of both examining insight and testing theories of insight.

Item Type:

Journal article

Description:

This article may not exactly replicate the final version published in the APA journal. It is not the copy of record.

Publication Title:

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition

Creators:

Jones, G.

Publisher:

American Psychological Association

Date:

2003