Evaluating Theories of Liberal Hegemony and Small States in U.S.-Jordanian Relations Since 2000.

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PhD Thesis
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No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning. No sources other than those acknowledged in the bibliography have been used.

Signed: Date:
Abstract

The present thesis takes as its main object of study the features and solidity of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. While the power disparity between the U.S.A, as the sole superpower in the current international system, and Jordan, as a small state, is undeniably huge, it is claimed that the relations between the two countries are rather power relations, especially during the unprecedented era of U.S. power and unilateralism during President G.W. Bush’s two terms. This thesis, however, argues that these relations between the two countries are better explained by attributing a level of a mutually agreed relative autonomy to the weaker side, Jordan.

The thesis therefore uses the work of Ikenberry on U.S. liberal hegemony in its relations with its allies combined with some elements of small states’ politics in order to examine the dynamics and interactions between the two countries in more detail and accuracy, to assess the features of the relations between the U.S.A and Jordan in the recent historical and Middle Eastern context. To do that, the thesis explores three main issues that have shaped these relations in general and had extra weight in shaping these relations in the era of President G.W. Bush and King Abdullah II; these issues are the security cooperation between the two countries in the global ‘War on Terror’, the U.S. promotion of democracy in the Middle East and Jordan, and the tri-dimensional relations between Jordan, Israel and the U.S.A.

The usage of liberal hegemony and small states’ politics in investigating these contemporary issues establishes the originality of this thesis by providing a more accurate
and fresher interpretation of these relations, which adds new scope to our understandings of power relations in the Middle East. This usage of the theoretical framework allowed the thesis to discover unseen realities regarding U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s in the sense of Jordan’s ability to manoeuvre and to avoid U.S. exigencies while simultaneously maintaining a strong alignment with the U.S.A
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Thanks also to my family back in Jordan, especially my parents, for believing in me and for their indispensable support, which made me grateful and indebted to all of them forever. Finally, I want to thank my wife Ghadeer, who has been by my side in the last four years during our stay in Nottingham.

To my one year son Abdullah, who managed to be quiet during the last year, although not all the time! I hope one day he will reply to this dedication with a similar one in the future, insha Allah!
Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................. 2

Acknowledgement .............................................................................................. 4

Contents .............................................................................................................. 5

Abbreviations ..................................................................................................... 10

Introduction ........................................................................................................ 12

1. Background of U.S. involvement and policies in the Middle East .................. 20

1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................. 20

1.2 The Middle East in World Politics ................................................................. 21

1.3 The U.S.A and the Middle East during the Cold War ................................... 24

1.4 The U.S.A and the Middle East after the Cold War .................................... 29

1.5 The U.S.A and the Middle East in the 2000s ................................................. 33

1.5.1 U.S. Unilateralism and the G.W. Bush Presidency .................................. 33

1.5.2 9/11 and U.S. Foreign Policy ................................................................ 36

1.5.3 The Neo-Conservatives and the Middle East ......................................... 40

1.5.4 U.S. Security Perspective in the 2000s ..................................................... 44

1.5.5 U.S. Democratisation in the Middle East .................................................. 48

1.6 Jordanian Foreign Policy and its relations with the U.S.A .......................... 52

1.6.1 Regional and Domestic Politics ............................................................... 53

1.6.2 Liberalisation and Jordanian Foreign Policy ............................................ 55
1.6.3 The Peace Agreement and U.S.-Jordanian Relations .............................................. 57
1.6.4 Jordan and King Abdullah II ............................................................................. 59
1.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................ 61

2. Theoretical Debate and U.S.-Jordanian Relations:
   Deriving a Hegemonic Approach ........................................................................... 64
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 64
2.2 The Importance of Theories in Studying International Relations ....................... 65
2.3 Developing Countries and International Relations Theories ............................... 67
2.4 Neorealism ............................................................................................................ 70
2.5 Neoliberalism ....................................................................................................... 81
2.6 Differences and Overlaps between Neorealism and Neoliberalism ...................... 92
2.7 Ikenberry’s Liberal Hegemony ............................................................................ 95
2.7.1 Liberal Hegemony and the U.S.A ................................................................. 96
2.7.2 Challenges to U.S. Liberal Hegemony ......................................................... 104
2.8 Small States and International Relations ............................................................. 107
2.8.1 Small States and the Problem of Security ..................................................... 108
2.8.2 Small States and the Level of Analysis ......................................................... 110
2.8.3 Small States and the International System ................................................... 111
2.9 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 113

3. Methodology, Methods, and Core Research Questions ....................................... 116
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 116
3.2 Knowledge, Social Science, Qualitative and Empirical Research ....................... 117
5.3 U.S. Democratisation and the Middle East..................................................201
5.4 Obstacles to Democratisation in the Middle East........................................204
5.5 Terrorism and Democratisation.................................................................209
5.6 Democratisation in Jordan..........................................................................213
5.7 U.S.-Jordanian Relations and Democratisation.............................................219
5.7.1 U.S. aid and Jordanian Democratisation..................................................221
5.7.2 The Islamists and Jordanian Democratisation...........................................224
5.8 Regional Impacts on Jordanian Democratisation.........................................229
5.9 Jordanian Democratisation and the War on Terror....................................235
5.10 Conclusion..............................................................................................238

6. The Tri-Dimensional Relations Between Jordan, Israel and the U.S.A in the 2000s

6.1 Introduction..................................................................................................242
6.2 Israel From U.S. Perspective.......................................................................245
6.3 Israel and U.S. Middle Eastern Policies.......................................................248
6.4 Israeli Security and the Role of Jordan.......................................................252
6.5 Mutual Security Concerns of Israel and Jordan.........................................257
6.6 The Peace Process and Jordanian-Israeli Relations...................................262
6.7 Jordan’s Relations with the Palestinian Authority......................................266
6.8 The Two-State Solution.............................................................................268
6.9 The Jordanian Option................................................................................273
6.10 Israel and the Jordanian Domestic Front..................................................278
6.11 Conclusion..............................................................................................282
7. Conclusions

7.1 Overview and Structure of the Thesis.......................... 286
7.2 The Theoretical Argument of the Thesis.......................... 290
7.3 The Findings of the Thesis........................................... 293
7.4 The Originality of the Thesis......................................... 301
7.5 Concluding Remarks.................................................... 303

Bibliography................................................................. 307
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AEI</td>
<td>American Enterprise Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (U.S.A)</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GAAT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
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<td>GID</td>
<td>General Intelligence Department in Jordan</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>G8</td>
<td>Group of Eight</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>IAF</td>
<td>The Islamic Action Front in Jordan</td>
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<td>IC</td>
<td>Intelligence Community in the U.S.A</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>IGC</td>
<td>Iraqi Governing Council</td>
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<td>KASOTC</td>
<td>King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre</td>
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<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
<td>Millennium Challenge Corporation</td>
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<td>MEPI</td>
<td>The Middle East Partnership Initiative</td>
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<td>MNNA</td>
<td>Major Non-NATO Ally</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCIX</td>
<td>The National Counterintelligence Executive (U.S.)</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>The National Military Strategy of the United States</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>U.S. National Strategy of Information Sharing</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>The National Security Strategy (U.S.)</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<td>PEF</td>
<td>Peace Enforcement Force</td>
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<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestinian Liberation Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PNAC</td>
<td>Project for the New American Century</td>
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<td>QIZ</td>
<td>Qualified Industrial Zones</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signal Intelligence</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Introduction

This thesis explores U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. The choice of this topic and its time scope, the 2000s, as the focus for this thesis was due to different reasons. Since King Abdullah II succeeded to the Jordanian throne in 1999 he aimed at making U.S.-Jordanian strategic relations the cornerstone of the Jordanian foreign policy (Lasensky, 2006: 11). Although both King Hussein, the late King of Jordan, and his son King Abdullah II were pro-U.S.A and moderate monarchs, King Abdullah II differs from his father in some ways; he is more pro-globalization and favours open economic policies, and his attention to the Jordanian-U.S. relationship, including supporting U.S. policies and strategies, is more intense (Andoni, 2000: 77). This change in the Jordanian style of leadership concurred with new challenges in the Middle East and new changes in global politics. In 2000, for example, the presidential election in the U.S.A resulted in new leadership that lasted until 2008, which has been the focus of many debates regarding its new perspectives towards international affairs, particularly the Middle East. These changes in the leaderships of both the U.S.A and Jordan had an impact on the relations between the two countries, and will influence these relations in the years to come.

While the U.S.A has a considerable impact on events all over the world, this fact is more salient in the Middle East than in other regions mainly because of the region’s instability and economic importance for the U.S.A. This reality has been noticeably clearer during the Bush era (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 30). In addition, the well-known U.S. diplomat Nicholas Burns argued that the focus of the U.S. foreign policy in the 1990s
was in Europe, as a result of the end of the Cold War; whereas during President Bush’s era, the U.S. foreign policy focus shifted towards the Middle East, mainly because the U.S. national interests were at stake in this region (Burns, 2006: 3). This increase of attention given to the Middle East in Bush’s foreign policy has influenced U.S.-Jordanian relations in different ways.

Although the 1990s witnessed remarkable events, such as the end of the Cold War at the international level and the peace process in the Middle East regionally, these topics have been already covered by other researchers. In addition, these events have lost their relative importance and direct influence over the current relations between the U.S.A and Jordan. Nevertheless, this thesis is addressing the relations between the U.S.A and Jordan in a period of time that is very recent and close to the preceding era, analysing the new dimensions of relations that evolved during previous periods of time to produce new developments in relations, because of the many events that took place with greater reciprocal importance for both countries.

The years since 2000 until the time of writing this thesis witnessed different events that are of great importance to the U.S.A and have influenced its policies towards the Middle East, including with Jordan, such as the re-emergence of the neoconservatives in the U.S.A, and their influence over the U.S. administration and policymaking; the increasing debate on the unilateral tendency in the U.S. foreign policy; the catastrophic terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and its consequences such as the Global War on Terror; terrorist plots in different countries in the Middle East (including Jordan); U.S.
democracy promotion initiatives in the Middle East; the war and regime change in Iraq in 2003; the continuation of the no war no peace status in the Middle East regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict; the increased presence of Iran in the region, and its nuclear ambitions; the rise of Hamas and Hezbollah; and finally and significantly, the absence of genuine counterbalancing of the U.S. hegemony in world politics; all of these events have influenced the features of U.S.-Jordanian relations in different ways. These events and realities inspired the researcher to investigate U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. As a result, this research will provide a much needed analysis of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the current international and Middle Eastern contexts, which have particular importance for Jordan.

This thesis will explore the temptation of applying U.S. liberal hegemony, a paradigm applied by John G. Ikenberry to his interpretation of the U.S. relations with democratic and industrialised countries in Europe and Asia (Ikenberry, 1999), combined with small states’ politics to U.S.-Jordanian relations since the 2000. The essence of this thesis is in the applicability of the liberal hegemonic paradigm to the relations between a small Middle Eastern country, where the influence of regional politics is very high and democracy is still at early stages, with the U.S.A during an era of an unprecedented U.S. power, and the remarkable influence of the neoconservatives over its policymaking who favour the practice of such power. Therefore, assessing the interactions between the neoconservatives’ policies and liberal hegemonic ideas and assumptions in a different context from the one Ikenberry has used, I believe, is what makes this thesis unique and original. By applying the chosen theoretical framework and methodology to answer the
research questions, and to test the hypothesis, I expect that this thesis will contain sufficient originality to justify a PhD degree.

The findings of this empirical research, which are highlighted in the conclusion (chapter seven) of this thesis, indicate that there is strong potential for gaining solid and original knowledge of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. The theoretical combination will strengthen this thesis’ originality in different ways; it will result in an assessment of the adequacy of the two works, liberal hegemony and the one of small states in more contemporary and different contexts. The interaction between the two works in empirical cases will examine and test the solidity of their basic arguments and principles, and will illustrate their defects and explanatory power. The thesis will therefore establish a claim to originality in both the theoretical and empirical arguments that are important to our understanding of IR in both branches; academia and practice. Analyzing U.S.-Jordanian relations and testing such a theoretical framework during years that witnessed intensity of unprecedented simultaneous events mentioned above are of great significance to evaluate the ability of these relations to withstand challenges and to assess the ability of this theoretical framework in providing a sophisticated understanding of U.S.-Jordanian relations in an intense context.

While this thesis aims to assess liberal hegemonic foreign policy theory combined with small states’ politics empirically in order to analyze the policy processes and outcomes of U.S.-Jordanian relations since 2000, it will explore and answer a related group of questions that are concerned with the level and nature of Jordan’s independence and
manoeuvrability as a small state in its relations with the U.S.A, the sole military superpower active in the Middle East at the current time. The purpose and argument of these questions are to test and assess the following hypothesis, which assumes that there are realities and mechanisms determining U.S.-Jordanian relations. This hypothesis is:

Although U.S.-Jordanian relations are undeniably asymmetric, for a range of reasons to be explored in this thesis, Jordan has had and retains a higher level of freedom of movement within the relationship than conventional foreign policy theories predict, and it will ask how far the dynamics of that relationship are better explained by liberal hegemonic theory than other alternatives (neo-realism in particular).

To achieve this aim, the thesis explored existing literature on U.S.-Jordanian relations in the recent Middle Eastern historical context to analyze the interactions between the two countries. This allowed the researcher to figure out the features of U.S.-Jordanian relations since the 2000, and how far they are compatible with Ikenberry’s argument regarding U.S. grand foreign policy with its major allies. In order to strengthen the judgment regarding these claimed features, the researcher interviewed a group of highly experienced Jordanian policymakers in different security and political establishments to identify their perspectives regarding the nature of relations between the two countries. The focus on the Jordanian side of the story is based on the belief that the small and weak state in any relations is the one that is more sensitive and concerned about its
independence and manoeuvrability in its relations with the strong state, as Ikenberry and Hey argued (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008: 157; Hey, 2003).

For that reason, the Jordanian interviewees are more adequate in expressing Jordan’s perspective and sense regarding its independence and manoeuvrability in its relations with the U.S.A. Resultantly, the argument of this thesis is a reflection of the Jordanian interpretation and perspective on U.S. Jordanian relations in the 2000s. However, it must be asserted in this regard that while most of the interviewees were Jordanian, the choice of those interviewees and questions were intended to achieve the required impartiality. To achieve that, some of the interviewees were retired and highly experienced politicians from previous eras, former security officers, figures who were not involved in the policymaking during the time of the interviews, and other figures in the opposition. A list of the interviewees will be provided in the bibliography of this thesis.

This thesis is composed of two consistent main parts; the first part is composed of the first three chapters. Chapter one addresses the historical background of the U.S. policies in the Middle East and the main pillars of U.S.-Jordanian relations. Chapter two explores the debate between the leading theoretical approaches in IR, neorealism, and neoliberalism, in order to explain the adequacy of the conceptualised theoretical framework used in this thesis, which is liberal hegemony combined with small states’ politics. Chapter three is concerned with the methodological characteristics of this research, which are embodied in the interconnectedness and reciprocal influence of the
research characteristics and core theory and methods of this thesis, resulting in raising the research questions that explore the empirical chapters that follow.

The second part of this thesis is composed of three empirical chapters (four, five and six). In these chapters I provide a critical analysis of U.S.-Jordanian relations regarding three main themes concerning the two countries in the 2000s, by responding to the research questions that are structured and formulated by the interaction of the theoretical framework and the rest of the literature discussed in the first part of this thesis. Chapter four addresses the security cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan, chapter five is concerned with the U.S. democratisation initiatives and the Jordanian response to them, and chapter six explores the Jordanian relations with Israel in light of U.S.-Jordanian relations regarding security cooperation and democratisation, respectively discussed in chapters four and five.

It is essential to mention that the three ideas that underpin these chapters are interlocked and compatible. The War on Terror and democratisation in the Middle East are compatible with the Israeli interests and major pillars of the U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East under the influence of the neoconservatives; as Martin Indyk has argued, President Bush’s vision of a New Middle East is one of democracy, peace and order; therefore, regime change, particularly involving radical organisations that are threatening Israel and political reform in the region, were major U.S. strategies in the region during Bush’s era (Indyk, 2006: 3). Chapter seven concludes this thesis by clarifying and summarising the main arguments and analysing the main findings and results of this
thesis; this chapter also provides the features of this thesis and what it stands for in terms of originality and significance.
Chapter One: Background of the U.S. involvement and policies in the Middle East

1.1 Introduction

This chapter highlights the salient motivations and policies of the U.S.A in the Middle East. The chapter also explores both the history of the U.S.-Jordanian relations and the development of these relations in different historical contexts. The main aim of this chapter is to figure out and identify the main U.S. aims and policies in the Middle East in different historical contexts in order to allocate the position of Jordan in U.S.-Middle Eastern interactions, with extra emphasis on G.W. Bush’s era. This historical investigation is essential to provide a general and comprehensive understanding of U.S. relations with the Middle East to facilitate exploring the pillars of the Jordanian foreign policy and its relations with the U.S.A accordingly. These relations were highly influenced by both the U.S. foreign policy in the region and regional politics associated with different historical contexts.

The chapter starts with general identifications of the geopolitical significance of the Middle East to the U.S.A. Then the chapter starts reviewing the U.S. policies during the Cold War and in the 1990s in order to arrive at the status of the U.S. policies in the 2000s, which is the main theme of the current U.S.-Jordanian relations. Afterwards, the chapter looks at the main characteristics and events that shaped U.S. foreign policy during the 2000s and its strategies towards the Middle East accordingly. This cohesive exhibition of U.S. foreign policy and its strategies in the Middle East during the
Presidency of G.W. Bush is followed by general identification of the Jordanian foreign policy and the main issues that are of concern to U.S.-Jordanian relations since the succession of King Abdullah II. While the study of U.S.-Jordanian relations must be started off by general understanding and awareness of regional and international factors that affect these relations, this chapter is designed to allow the researcher to investigate and critically analyse the main current features and pillars of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s, which is the main theme of this thesis.

1.2 The Middle East in World Politics

Historically, most of the previous empires that had global hegemonic aspirations were interested in the Middle East for its strategic importance, whether for geopolitical reasons, trade, or for its different natural resources (Khalidi, 2004: 75). The strategic location of the Middle East between Asia, Africa and Europe attracted the attention of the U.S.A after the Second World War; this attention was intensified after the British-Iranian oil crisis in the early 1950s and the resultant potentiality of the Communist and Soviet accessibility to the region (Heiss, 2006: 78). This importance of the Middle East and the containment of influence of the Soviet Union played a substantial role in shaping the U.S. policies toward the Middle East and its European allies. For example, the U.S.A supported Britain in its crisis over Iranian oil but undermined it a few years later in the Suez crisis in 1956. Both U.S. policies aimed at the same ambition; ensuring its oil supply and inhibiting the Soviet presence in the region. These aims, as well as supporting Israel and other allies such as Jordan, and stabilising the region, were salient in the U.S.
foreign policies in the Middle East, in spite of the occasional dissatisfaction of some of its
crucial European allies (Heiss, 2006: 89). In addition, the dynamics of the region, and
events such as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraq-Iran war (1980 to 1988) and the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 made the U.S.A ever-vigilant in the politics and the developments in the
Middle East regardless of other powers’ considerations (Heiss, 2006: 92).

The orientation and focus of many U.S. scholars and studies about the Middle East were
shaped by the desires and interests of U.S. officials towards the region, especially at early
stages of the U.S. involvement in the area (Bilgin, 2005: 77). Therefore, some scholars
argued that the term “Middle East” is a meaningless concept, lacking historical and
cultural unity; for example, Robert Cox stated that all regional terms are for someone and
for some purpose (Cox, 1981); as a result, the term “the Middle East” is believed to be
conceptualised by Britain and the U.S.A to serve the geopolitical interests of these
powers by organising their actions and policies into this region among the expanded
foreign policies of these two powers (Bilgin, 2005: 80). In other words, as Ali Dessouki
and Jamil Matar asserted, the term “the Middle East” is a political one, for political
purposes. They preferred the term “the Arab System or World”, as the term “the Middle
East” weakens the Arab System by including other nations and countries in the region
(Bilgin, 2005: 81).

The Arab Regional System concept is based on the assumptions that the security and
interests of the Arab countries are linked together and differ from those of non-Arabic
countries in their midst (such as Israel, Turkey and Iran), and also from the interests of superpowers such as the U.S.A (Bilgin, 2005: 85). Therefore, there were rejections in many Arab countries, especially by Islamists and Arab Nationalists, of the term “the Middle East” lest that Middle Eastern classification would de-emphasise the Arabic and Islamic characters of the region. Interestingly enough, in the post-Cold War era, many countries such as Jordan adopted many policies which were more compatible with the New Middle East than with the Arab Regional System, such as peacemaking with Israel, consolidating its ties with the U.S.A and seeking its own individual security plans and arrangements that contradicted with the old Arab Security System. No less importantly, it is believed that these policies have their origins in previous eras of the post-Cold War period, as we shall see regarding Jordan in the subsequent section (Bilgin, 2005: 131).

Although the applicability of the Clash of Civilisations thesis by Samuel Huntington was relatively dismissed by the governments of both Western and Muslim countries, it became more influential as far as terrorism is concerned. However, the study of Muslim-Western relations is a major component of the study of Middle Eastern politics and international relations in general; therefore, it should be perceived in a broader and more complex manner than as a source of a terror threat or exploitation (Murden, 2002: 186). For example, Fred Halliday argues that although there were some ideas and beliefs among the Arabs and Muslims similar to those of Samuel Huntington of a clash of civilisations and hostility between the West and Islam even before Huntington’s contribution to the theme (Halliday, 2005: 156), the relations between these countries and the West were not shaped merely upon such a clash of beliefs and ideologies but also
upon a clash or harmony of some ties of interests, just like any relation among these
countries or with other external powers, not to mention that the threat, whether military or
economic, posed by the Middle East towards the West is limited or non-existent
(Halliday, 2005: 159).

Some people argue that the capacity of the Arabic and Islamic countries is limited and
that made them receptive to the dominant secular state system, where the nation, territory
and sovereignty of the state are the main the characteristics of the international system,
allocating a very limited role to religions. In another words, the current international
system, with the U.S.A at the top of it, would not accept or tolerate an active religious
authority, whether domestically or internationally; therefore, and for a variety of reasons,
most Arab and Muslim states behaved according to their individual and national interests.
Many of these interests are with a limited, well-organised and united impact of Islamism
or Arabism on these states’ foreign policies, to the extent that their behaviours clashed
between each other over security issues and over different national interests of these
states (Murden, 2002: 188).

1.3 The U.S.A and the Middle East during the Cold War

Although the United States had been interested in the Middle East since the early
beginning of the twentieth century, it became more involved in the region during the
Cold War (Hinnebush and Etheshami, 2002: 57). During the Cold War the security of the
Middle East was perceived from a Western and a U.S. perspective as the preservation of
Western and U.S. interests in the region. The threat of the Soviet Union’s influence to harm the flow of the Middle Eastern oil at reasonable prices to the West, the stability of friendly regimes to the U.S.A, and preventing the emergence of a regional hegemonic power hostile to the West were fundamental issues to the West in general and to the U.S.A in particular during this period (Bilgin, 2005: 1). This “top-down” Western conceptualisation of Middle Eastern security, based on the presence of external threats and influence of superpowers in the region, resulted in the validity of allies to the West in the region (Bilgin, 2005: 2). It is vital to point out in this regard that a major characteristic of the Middle East in the postcolonial era was that the region was divided into two camps: those who desired to continue cooperation and to have strong connections with the West and the U.S.A, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia; and those who wanted a closer connection with the Soviet Union, such as Syria and Egypt. Both camps aimed to ensure their stability and independence from regional and international powers by allying themselves with one of the major blocks at that time (Hinnebush and Etheshami, 2002: 58).

While the main aims of the U.S. policies and strategies in the Middle East during the Cold War were to counter the Soviet and Communist influence in the region, to guarantee the flow of oil to the industrial world, mainly to the West, and to sustain the security of Israel and the stability of the region, the U.S.A implemented several strategies to achieve these aims, such as the Baghdad Pact in the 1950s, a defence treaty initiated by the U.S.A, Turkey, Iran and Iraq to create an alliance system within the Middle Eastern countries to resist the Soviet influence. Moreover, the U.S.A created the Tripartite
Agreement with France and Britain to limit arms sales in the region in order to establish a balance of power between Israel and the Arab countries who were involved in the conflict in order to achieve stability in the region (Hinnebush and Etheshami, 2002: 59). In addition, between 1947-1959 the U.S.A also initiated a programme called “Point Four” which aimed to aid many countries in the Middle East military and economically; during this period the U.S.A spent $2.94 billion in the Middle East in order to help these countries in their developmental programs and to bring them closer to the U.S. orbit; Jordan received $12.7 million from the U.S.A, which was a huge amount of money for a country like Jordan in that period of time (Bryson, 1977: 174).

These U.S. policies and the increase of the U.S. involvement in the region were simultaneous with the increase of the presence of the Soviet influence, especially after the remarkably decreased presence of the British and French influence in the region after the Suez war in 1956. The aims of Point Four, as claimed by President Truman, were to achieve collective security in the region, reforming the political and economic situations of these countries and to create a stable region. However, Thomas Bryson claims that many people perceived these programmes as a U.S Trojan horse for the economic penetration and political domination of the Middle East (Bryson, 1977: 175). Contrary to this perception, Bryson, himself, argues that the U.S.A was the first superpower that used economic and military assistance effectively in the Middle East as part of its foreign policy during the Cold War, and these aids were essential in fostering fledgling countries and regimes (Bryson, 1977: 204).
The Truman Doctrine in 1947 also aimed to aid Middle Eastern countries to maintain stability in the region in order to guarantee that U.S. strategic interests would not be challenged by the growth of the Soviet influence in the Middle East. The U.S.A need for Middle Eastern oil was essential to sustain its economic growth and its capacity to support and aid the rebuilding programmes of its European allies after the devastation of the Second World War (which aid itself aimed to contain the increased influence of the Soviet Union in Europe) (Little, 2003: 120). During the beginning of the Cold War the Middle East witnessed major events such as the creation of Israel in 1948, and the increase and activation of Arab Nationalism among the Arab countries in the 1950s. That resulted in regime change in Egypt and Iraq, from pro-Western monarchies to national revolutionary regimes in these two countries which were a challenge and threat for other conservative regimes such as those in Jordan and Saudi Arabia (Bryson, 1977: 174).

The U.S. strategies mentioned above could not also prevent the establishment of close ties between the Soviet Union and some Arabic countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt in the 1960s, all of which are Jordan’s neighbours. Noticeably, although the U.S.A during the Eisenhower era was supportive of Jordan and was willing to continue this support, the U.S.A was ready to sacrifice the monarchy to appease Arab nationalists, to reduce the Soviet influence in the region; only the determination and the “spunk” of King Hussein of Jordan, as President Eisenhower himself stated, sustained the U.S. support of Jordan at that time. The Jordanian regime fought against Communism in Jordan and in the region, which was a major aspiration and aim of the Eisenhower doctrine; to support countries
and regimes which fought for themselves and for U.S. interests, not merely depending on Western help in the battle against Communism (Satloff, 2003: 128).

The growth of Arab nationalism in Egypt and Syria and the close ties between these countries and the Soviet Union resulted in the appliance of the Eisenhower Doctrine (1957-1959). This doctrine was a U.S. commitment to the fulfilling of any military or economic requests to any country in the Middle East in order to help these countries to counter the Soviet Union and its clients’ influence in the region. Interestingly, it has been argued that Jordan was one of the first countries that the Eisenhower Doctrine was applied to. The lack of stability in the region, reflected in regime change in some countries, and Jordanian economic needs made President Eisenhower himself announce in April 1957 the U.S. commitment to the stability and integrity of Jordan as well as the importance of supporting Jordan economically (Bryson, 1977: 209). Moreover, although Jordan was not part of the Baghdad Pact, after the collapse of the pact in 1958 Jordan and Saudi Arabia were the closest Arabic countries to the U.S.A (Bryson, 1977: 209). In addition, the U.S. relations and support to Jordan were enhanced remarkably after 1957 when Britain terminated its treaty with Jordan and halted its aid; the U.S.A compensated Jordan with its military, economic, and diplomatic needs. As a result, between 1952 and 1970 Jordan received more than $500 million in economic aid and $200 million in military aid from the U.S.A. Although the U.S.A was ostensibly relatively impartial during the “Arab Cold War” in the 1960s, it remained close to and aware of its allies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. In 1970, when Jordan witnessed a civil war, the U.S.A
warned that it will not accept any external intervention in the Jordanian affairs and accelerated a proposed aid package to Jordan in that year (Bryson, 1977: 259).

1.4 The U.S.A and the Middle East after the Cold War

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc the U.S.A remained deeply involved in the Middle East. It believes in the importance of the region and of the necessity of its containment policies in the region, such as those towards Iraq and Iran. It perceived the regimes of these two countries (Iran after the revolution and Iraq under the rule of Saddam Hussein) to be hostile to the security and stability of the region as well as to be threats to U.S. interests and friendly regimes in the Middle East (Hinnebush and Etheshami, 2002: 60). According to El-Shazly and Hinnebush, the inability of the Arab countries to achieve their internal and external security and stability in the region resulted in a remarkable role for non-Arabic regional powers such as Israel, Turkey, and Iran in Arab affairs; more importantly, these situations increased U.S. hegemony in the region (Hinnebush and Etheshami, 2002: 87).

Murden argued that the U.S.A, as a hegemonic security manager in the Middle East, placed itself at the centre of the Middle Eastern politics and compelled the countries of the region to deal with America’s unprecedented power and influence in the region (Murden, 2002: 44). In addition, the U.S.A continued to perceive the Middle East through the same lenses that it used during the Cold War, focusing on military means to achieve its goals. However, many scholars, such as Sayigh, argue that the end of the Cold War,
and the major events in the region such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the peace process, and the decline of Arabism resulted in questioning the validity of perceiving the Middle East as a unified region shaped by one system. He argues that the fragmentation of the Middle Eastern state system lessened the cooperation within the region to the extent that it became a “region without regionalism” (Bilgin, 2005: 11). This is not to argue that there is not a desire for cooperation and interest in regionalism among the Arabic countries; what should be mentioned here is that in the 1990s the geopolitics of the Middle East were substantially affected by the U.S.A. and its interests in the region (Bilgin, 2005: 12). As a result, the politics of the Middle East were affected by the changes of the strategies, policies, and aims of external powers, especially the U.S.A. Consequently, defining and clarifying the politics of the Middle East is complex as they were changeable according to changes in the U.S. strategies in the world in general since as well as its specific involvement in the region (Bilgin, 2005: 68).

The presence and the influence of the U.S.A. increased and evolved in the Middle East markedly after its victory in the Gulf War in 1991. This overwhelming victory was simultaneous with its victory in the Cold War, resulting in more U.S. hegemony and superiority in the Middle East in the 1990s than in the rest of the period since 1945. To maintain its strength in the region and to achieve its vital interests there the U.S.A. had to protect its allies, solve major disputes between them, and increase its political and military accessibility into the region (Murden, 2002: 47). Therefore, the Arab-Israeli peace process was in the interests of the U.S.A. in order to stabilise the region. However, the complexity of achieving agreements over many issues, such as Jerusalem and the
Palestinian refugees, made a full deal between the two parties unattainable. In addition, the U.S. impartiality as arbiter made the Arabic countries suspicious of the U.S. hegemonic ambitions in the region (Murden, 2002: 55).

Pinar Bilgin argues that the U.S. approach towards the security of the Middle East in the post-Cold War era remained military and based on a “top-down” approach. One of the main reasons behind the insecurity and instability of the Middle East is the presence and activeness of multiple approaches of security in the region with different aims and initiatives. These approaches, whether backed by the U.S.A or Arab nationalist governments and Islamist groups, made the stability of the region difficult to accomplish (Bilgin, 2005: 156).

The threats posed by Iran and Iraq to Gulf countries as well as to Israel committed the U.S.A to the security of these countries, mainly because Iran and Iraq had the desire to threaten these countries and because they potentially had the desire to possess Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). They also rejected any peace settlement with Israel in the region and their rejection of any security alliance in the region which the U.S.A is in the centre and favour of (Murden, 2002: 56). Therefore, many of the U.S. security practices and initiatives in the Middle East were accused of aiming only to achieve military goals and were state-centric, neglecting regional actors, concerns and preferences. However, the term “the Middle East” and what it entailed remained strong compared with other terms and concepts such as the Arab Regional System, mainly because the advocates of the term “the Middle East” such as the U.S.A, Turkey, Israel and the pro-U.S. Arabic
countries are the major players in the region, especially since the Gulf War in 1991 (Bilgin, 2005: 126).

The end of the strategic and ideological rivalry between the U.S.A and the USSR, and the acceleration of the erosion of economic, cultural, and political barriers between states had a noteworthy impact on world politics in all regions, including the Middle East. However, there was resistance to many of these trends from Middle Eastern governments, they were suspicious of losing control over their economies and general policies, not to mention their suspicion of U.S. strategies in the region, and of globalisation in general (Halliday, 2005: 133). Meanwhile, one of the major consequences of the end of the Cold War on the Middle East is that for the first time in the last two centuries Russia did not have any direct borders with the Middle East and, consequently, became sidelined in the politics of this region (Halliday, 2005: 136). Nonetheless, the end of the Cold War and the demise of the USSR, and the neutralisation of Iraq by the Gulf War did not result in harmonious relations between the U.S.A and all Arab countries; the U.S. policies continued to be perceived as biased in favour of Israel, and there was popular dissatisfaction with the increase of U.S. hegemony and presence in the region, which resulted in the increase of anti-Americanism and terrorist attacks on different U.S. targets, most notably 9/11, which itself led to extra U.S. involvement in the region and intensified the interest and importance of the region to the U.S.A (Halliday, 2005: 143).
1.5 The U.S.A and the Middle East in the 2000s

The focus of this thesis is the relationship between the U.S.A and Jordan in the 2000s, and while this period witnessed dramatic events and changes in U.S. perspectives towards international affairs that influenced its relations with Jordan in different ways, the sections below will provide more focussed analysis of the main U.S. perspectives and strategies in the 2000s that are of concern to this thesis before starting to look at the major events and issues that are concerning Jordan regarding its relations with the U.S.A in the 2000s in the remainder of this chapter.

1.5.1 U.S. Unilateralism and the G. W. Bush Presidency

According to Mohamedi and Sadowski, one of the major criticisms that the Bush administration made of the Clinton administrations was that Clinton’s foreign policy resulted in many U.S. involvements in issues and disputes around the globe of limited concern to the U.S. national interest and security. They accused these policies of endangering the U.S. national interests in many places and occasions (Mohamedi and Sadowski, 2000: 13). Therefore, at the beginning of President Bush’s era, U.S. foreign policy focussed only on issues with vital and direct impacts on U.S. national interests. Issues such as peace in the Middle East and democratisation were perceived by the U.S. administration as being of secondary importance. Consequently, there were no direct interventions of President Bush in peacemaking and diplomacy in the Middle East as there had been by Clinton. Bush’s policy toward Iraq was clear from the beginning, and
centred on regime change. In other words, U.S. foreign policies at the beginning of President Bush’s era used to be selective in their engagement in international affairs and were perceived as preferring a unilateral approach, especially towards the Middle East (Mohamedi and Sadowski, 2000: 14).

The growth of U.S. power and its unprecedented status in the world made it easier to ignore and abandon secondary relations and actors in international politics (Ikenberry, 2003: 533). It has been argued that the growth of U.S. power could increase its tendency towards unilateralism; on the other hand, some U.S. scholars assert that U.S. unilateralism does not cover and is not embedded in all matters and issues related to its foreign policy; issues related to economic relations with other states continued to be guided by a multilateral attitude under G.W. Bush (Ikenberry, 2003: 540). The issues on which the Bush administration was most averse to multilateralism were arms control and the use of its force when its security was under threat, mainly because the U.S administrations believed that unilateralism serves the U.S. interests in these matters more than any other alternatives (Ikenberry, 2003: 544).

In the early twenty-first century some scholars of international affairs and U.S. foreign policy such as Krauthammer argued that the U.S.A should exploit the uni-polarity of world politics to enhance its position and global status (Krauthammer, 2001). Other scholars such as Nye believed that the U.S.A had to reshape its foreign policy and the way it perceived the world, especially after 9/11. Nye’s expectations appeared to be realised when President Bush shifted his focus from dealing only with key players and
major powers in the world and gave extra attention to small and weak actors and states and nongovernmental organisations in a globalising world (Nye, 2003: 61). Moreover, Nye argued that the U.S administration realised after 9/11 how the “democratisation of technology” and “privatisation of war” dramatically illustrated the importance of giving considerable attention to these issues, which are more connected to small actors in international affairs (than the Bismarckian great power games of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries), and their impact on U.S. security and hegemony in different ways (Nye, 2003: 62).

Some voices favoured “soft unilateralism” during the first term of Bush’s presidency; his Secretary of State, Colin Powell, believed that the U.S.A should have good connections with the main international institutions, and must make some consultations with main actors in the world and its allies in different regions while shaping its foreign policy. On the other hand, the majority of the U.S. administration favoured the use of “hard unilateralism”; they believed that the U.S. actions should come first then international cooperation came as a result of the U.S. actions. They accused international cooperation and coalition of being inefficient, causing vacillation and harm to U.S. security and interests (Mohamedi and Sadowski, 2000: 15). Therefore, there was no consensus among the U.S. foreign policy makers and scholars about which strategy the U.S.A should follow after 9/11. They were divided into two camps: some people believed that the U.S.A should act by adopting a cooperative approach with its allies and international institutions (“Wilsonians of the right” or “multilateralists”); the other group believed that the U.S.A must act alone regardless what other actors may think or prefer (“Jacksonian
unilateralists” or “unilateralists”) (Nye, 2003: 62). From Nye’s point of view, using only bilateral policy and depending heavily on the use of hard and military power without the agreement and support from allies and international community would result in limited desire of other states to cooperate with the U.S.A in its crucial strategies such as the War on Terror. Therefore, the willingness of a state to cooperate with the U.S.A to counter terrorism depends on its own self-interest in doing so, as well as the attractiveness of the U.S. policies and strategies (Nye, 2003: 63).

There are different dimensions of criticising President Bush’s foreign policy; some neo-liberals argued that his administration undermined the robustness and efficiency of international principles and institutions which have shaped the international order during the second half of the twentieth century. On the other hand, realists were aware of the U.S. failure to achieve strong international support for its foreign policy, which might have reduced the desire of regional powers to bandwagon with the U.S.A, which may have resulted in an increased possibility of the desire of those states to gravitate against the U.S.A (Hastedt, 2006: 83).

1.5.2 9/11 and U.S. Foreign Policy

During the Cold War, small states used to be either pro-West and pro-U.S. or pro-Soviet. Many expected that the demise of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War, and consequently limited U.S. involvement in regional politics would result in more freedom for smaller states to manoeuvre and to engage in multiple alignments. However, the U.S.
involvement in the Middle East did not decrease after the Cold War; remarkably, after 9/11 the U.S. administration perceived states that do not join the U.S. coalition against vaguely-defined terrorism as part of the evil block (“axis of evil”) allied with Al Qaeda. In other words, the U.S.A perceived itself and the world as if they are again in a new global war, and in a death match between two hostile camps (Mohamedi and Sadowski, 2000: 21).

Walt argues that many countries joined the U.S. coalition to fight terrorism not only because they perceive terrorism as an international threat, but also because the U.S.A made it clear that neutrality is not an option for them and because these states found fighting terrorism a great opportunity to achieve their own domestic and international aims, including their interests with the U.S.A (Walt, 2002: 61). In addition, according to Buzan, one of the main differences between the Cold War and the global War on Terror is that the latter embedded and legitimised U.S. unilateralism in the making of its foreign policy and its dealings with other countries, as well as dealing with international issues (Buzan, 2006: 1102). This might be right in the aftermath of 9/11, but to what extent unilateralism will continue serving the U.S.A and its foreign policy in future is something that cannot be taken for granted, and is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The events of 9/11 and their consequences, mainly the global War on Terror, resulted in refocusing and redefining U.S. foreign policy, which was accused by many scholars of losing its purpose since the end of the Cold War (Hastedt, 2006: 21). However, apart from counter-terrorism, U.S. foreign policy lacked certainty and suffered from a lack of a
typical and defined foreign policy problem. U.S. foreign policy towards specific issues or regions used to be shaped and affected by the history and the origins of its policy toward these issues and regions; the policy towards Eastern Europe, for example, had to take a new dimension after the demise of the Soviet bloc that it never took before. Similarly, although the U.S.A has had long historical involvement in the Middle East, the events of 9/11 made the U.S.A adopt new strategies and policies in the region, mainly because the Bush administration could not deal with the new challenges in the Middle East by referring to previous experiences and strategies which were used to tackle different challenges and consequences in the region (Hastedt, 2006: 22).

Since the beginning of the Cold War the U.S.A was very generous and supportive to its allies such as Jordan; the events of 9/11 did not significantly alter the status quo ante. Halliday argues that it is misleading to believe that major events in the international arena, such as 9/11, changed everything (as is often claimed by mass media and politicians alike), or that they have not changed anything, including the U.S. relations with its allies (Halliday, 2002: 213). Therefore, U.S. diplomacy post 9/11 aimed to obtain the support of other states in its War on Terror, not only by encouraging them to participate in the international efforts to fight terrorists outside their borders, but also to fight terrorist supporters and sympathisers within their borders and societies. To do so, the U.S.A helped the governments of these countries to develop their abilities to obtain efficient skills to deal with and fight local and international terrorism. In addition, U.S. diplomacy not only targeted the governments of these countries, but also tried to obtain public support for its War on Terror (Hastedt, 2006: 83).
Although the Bush administrations disagreed with the Israelis regarding how to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, U.S.-Israeli ties were enhanced remarkably after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In addition, these events made the relationship between U.S. policymakers and some thinkers in the academic elite closer; the U.S. administration became more aware of the ideas of Samuel Huntington, Daniel Pipes, and Bernard Lewis of the inevitability of the clash between the U.S.A and the Islamists, and of the necessity of containing the latter; these ideas had notably less influence during Clinton’s administrations (Little, 2006: 45).

One of the major difficulties that U.S. policy (arguably mistakenly) faced during the Presidency of G.W. Bush in the Middle East was that it was trying to achieve all of its strategic aims simultaneously. These aims were vital for the U.S.A, such as controlling the region, with its rogue states and their unconventional weapons ambitions; controlling the oil industry; fighting terrorism; and shaping the region in favour of its national interests generally (Plamer and Plamer, 2004: 261). Although these aims overlapped and were located in the same region and time, all of them needed specific strategies and policies. Fighting terrorism is an aim which needs a global strategy and needs the cooperation of many groups and parties; the U.S.A is believed to face many obstacles to tackle it alone because this catastrophe is global in nature (Plamer, and Plamer, 2004: 262). After 9/11 the U.S. administration launched many policies embodied in the War on Terror to disrupt the Islamist’s presence all over the world; in addition, the U.S.A waged different wars on different fronts, but basically for the same aims and reasons. The war in Afghanistan and Iraq aimed at regime change in these countries which were hostile to the
U.S. security and interests in the region. Moreover, some may argue that the increase in U.S. support to Israel after 9/11 and the encouragement given to the Palestinian people to marginalise Yasser Arafat aimed also at regime change in the Palestinian Authority (PA) by more moderate leadership (Hudson, 2005: 298).

1.5.3 The Neo-Conservatives and the Middle East

The main ideological beliefs of the “neoconservatives” are that the U.S.A has an exceptional role in defending liberty and democracy. They are committed to U.S. primacy and perceive the world as anarchical; therefore, they assert that the use of U.S. power to advance U.S. security and interests is justifiable (Owens, 2008: 25). In addition, the neoconservatives believe that U.S. power should be used for moral reasons such as the spread of democracy and liberalism; not for the sake of these values themselves, but to enhance U.S. security and interests. They believe that international conflicts are struggles and conflicts over ideologies and values; they also perceive that international law and international institutions are too weak and inefficient in achieving international security, justice and stability; therefore, they assert that it is the duty of the U.S.A to address these goals, which are better achieved by a unilateral approach (Fukuyama, 2006: 49).

The neoconservatives who surrounded President G.W. Bush had a special perspective toward the Middle East and Israel. These views clashed with other views from different executive branches and backgrounds in the U.S. administration (Hudson, 2005: 302).
addition, Escobar argues that the U.S. foreign policy directions during Bush’s presidency were a reflection and an implementation of the beliefs and ideas of a think tank based in Washington which started to flourish in 1997, and manifested itself in the Project For The New American Century (PNAC), a document published in September 2000 by a conservative lobbying group. This group of scholars admire the unilateral approach and the importance of advancing the U.S. economic and military capabilities in order to be the uncontested world hegemonic power in the twenty-first century, and to manipulate international affairs in favour of U.S. security, interests, and principles (Escobar, 2003: 26). This group also admires the Reaganite strategy which was based on the necessity of preparing for and preventing all possible security challenges in the future by depending on a bold foreign policy which promotes American principles abroad, even if that would require regime change in some countries (Escobar, 2003: 26).

There has been an increase in the influence of the Christian Right movement, with an alliance with the pro-Israeli lobby and think-tanks, in the making of the U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East during President G.W. Bush’s years. Although the salience of the Christian Right has continued since the 1970s, the election of President Bush in 2000 and the events of 9/11 gave this group the opportunity to enter the political mainstream more strongly and effectively (Wanger, 2005: 217). There are several reasons for the growth of the Christian Right in the U.S.A and its connection and alignment with pro-Israeli organisations. Firstly, the imminence of the start of the third millennium made the American public more aware of religious beliefs and closer to religious materials such as books and films. Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union made both the Christian
Right and the Zionists search for a new enemy in order to justify many ideological beliefs and policies. Thirdly, the timing of the rise of Islamic extremists in the Middle East was simultaneous and compatible with the religiosity of the American people and the search for a new enemy for these movements (mentioned in the previous two reasons). Fourthly, the increased presence of the neo-conservatives in the U.S. administration after the election of Bush, who converged with the Christian Right and the Zionists on many points, made the implementation of their beliefs and policies more achievable (Wagner, 2003: 236-237).

There were great connections, similarities and reciprocated influence between the (PNAC) group, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), and the Likud party in Israel, especially in the way they perceive Islam as a threat, and in the way they identify their countries interests in the Middle East. For example, among these issues was the restoration of the Hashemite monarchy, the current ruling family in Jordan, in Iraq; an option was prevailed among these organisations during the preparation for the campaign for regime change in Iraq (Escobar, 2003: 31). In addition, it has been claimed by the Bush administration that one of the main aims for the war in Iraq and removing Saddam Hussein from power was to establish democracy in Iraq as a model and as a starting point for democratisation and transformation in the entire Middle East. All of these policies and visions were an embracement of the neoconservatives’ doctrine in the Middle East, as a new phase in the role of the U.S.A in the world (Khalidi, 2004: 39).
Many scholars believe that U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East is profoundly connected with U.S. domestic politics; for example, Quandt argued that the Middle East is one of the most central regions in the calculations of U.S. policymakers, including the president, mainly because of the awareness that whatever policies might be adopted towards this region will have an impact at home, whether on economic or security policies. In addition, most of the U.S. foreign policy actors are involved in and concerned with the policies towards the Middle East, especially the policies which deal with highly important issues for both the U.S.A and the Middle East (Hudson, 2005: 296). However, the compatibility of the neoconservative hegemonic vision and ambition and the Israeli vision in sharing many strategies and concerns in the Middle East contradicted with democratised governments and people freely expressing their views, whether in the U.S.A or in the region (Khalidi, 2004: 53). As a result, Alam argued that one of Bush’s strategies in the War on Terror after 9/11 was to magnify and fuel the threat imposed by terrorists to prepare the world and the American public for different policies and a long, protracted war wherever it suits U.S. interests and hegemony (Alam, 2003: 6).

The neoconservatives’ foreign policy differs from other realist and liberal U.S. foreign policies that are using consultation with the members of the region and other major powers, soft power, diplomacy, aid, military assistance and the use of multilateral approach. Although the main U.S. interests in the region remain the same, the success of the neoconservatives will depend not only on the resistance of other U.S. foreign policymakers and players in the U.S.A but also the resistance and the interaction of the Middle Eastern actors with this neoconservative project (Hudson, 2005: 305).
1.5.4 U.S. Security Perspective in the 2000s

The garrisoning of U.S. troops in many regions all over the world for long periods of time, such as those in Germany and Japan after the Second World War, the former Yugoslavia since the mid-1990s and Central Asia and Afghanistan after 9/11 are all indications of the U.S. tendency to locate its military bases in every vital strategic region in the world. The Middle East is no exception; many U.S. troops remained in the Gulf countries after the Gulf War in 1991, not to mention the increase of these troops after the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Blum, 2003: 9). This distribution of U.S. military forces aimed to maintain regional and international order, which serves U.S. hegemony in these vital regions and prevents the emergence of any challenger to U.S. interests in them, consequently preventing the emergence of any challenger to U.S. hegemony in the world. In addition, the expansion of the U.S. influence and intervention in many international affairs increased or at least remained as if the Cold War was still progressing, to the extent that many people perceive its growth, influence and military presence everywhere as a growing empire all over the globe (Blum, 2003: 14).

A hegemonic power usually represents different strategies and visions of civilisation. This representation and dissemination might be military or cultural, and so may be the resistance to it. Because of the fact that hegemonic power has different interests outside its borders, its self-defence might take place inside other countries’ borders. In addition, to defend interests and ideas in other countries, it may assume that these interests and ideas are part of a global project which is believed to be universally accepted and
manifestly desirable (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1380). According to PNAC, the U.S.A has an unprecedented opportunity to increase its hegemony in world politics and to enhance its security, economy, and wealth with the help of its allies and friends all over the world. Moreover, the PNAC asserted the vitality of the universality of the U.S. hegemony; the report argued that maintaining the U.S. superiority in military and security affairs through extra-territorial and security cooperation with other countries is a major component of the U.S. global leadership (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1393).

It has been argued that most U.S. presidents found that issues related to foreign affairs have several dimensions which intersect and overlap; for example, George Shultz stated that U.S. foreign policy is about repeatedly dealing with the same issues in different faces and interpretations (Hastedt, 2006: 21). As such, according to Pipes, Islamic fundamentalism replaced the Communist threat to the U.S.A and to the international order. He argued that Islamic fundamentalists are more hostile to the U.S.A than the Communist ideology, mainly because of the means they use and the deep differences between the West and Islamic fundamentalist views towards everything in life (Gerges, 1999: 24). Even before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, many scholars of U.S. foreign policy and policymakers believed in the incompatibility between the U.S. interests in the Middle East and political Islam; they perceived political Islam as a vital combatant to U.S. interests and desires in the region (Gerges, 1999: 24).

Lieven, among many others, argued that the U.S.A is the superpower without any challenger military, ideology or economically. Even countries such as China and Russia
are building economic and elite ties with the U.S.A, which inhibit any serious clash between these powers. Therefore, Lieven argues that the U.S.A does not need to worry about major powers; rather it should worry about international terrorism and radical religious organisations (Lieven, 2002: 246). The great danger of terrorism is posed by the possibility that different terrorist organisations, ethical, religious, separatist and others start to work together to challenge the current international order. Therefore, most countries in different regions, including major powers, claim to support the U.S. War on Terror (Lieven, 2002: 249). Additionally, the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (NSS) in 2002 indicated that there a great threat is imposed by rouge states and terrorist organisations. More dangerously, the NSS indicated that these states and organisations might have the capability of using weapons of mass destruction in attacking the U.S.A or its allies. This vitalised the strengthening of alliances between the U.S.A and its friends and allies in counterterrorism issues to overcome this major threat (NSS, 2002: 14).

The U.S.A assumed that its allies would welcome many U.S. initiatives in this regard. In addition, it is expected from U.S. allies to counter terrorism at different levels, internationally, regionally, and domestically (Wanandi, 2002: 184). This made many scholars and U.S. policymakers argue that although the U.S. administration was willing to lead an international coalition against terrorism, it did not have to consult all its allies about all the details of its policies and strategies (Wanandi, 2002: 184). Therefore, the neoconservatives’ desire of reshaping the security of the Middle East is based on the belief of the U.S. “just cause” and on the overwhelming power of the U.S.A However,
some may argue that history shows that direct control of the Middle East by Western powers proved to be ephemeral and costly (Hudson, 2005: 5).

Richard B. Myers, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, asserted in 2004 that the first priority to achieve the U.S. national security is winning the War on Terror. According to the National Military Strategy of the United States (NMS) in 2004, the first line of the defence of the U.S.A is abroad, by working with U.S. allies against mutual enemies, especially with those who are close to terrorist’s sources (NMS, 2004: 2). Preventing attacks on the U.S.A or on its interests in many regions requires vigilant intelligence and cooperation by the U.S.A and its partners. Therefore, the cooperation between the U.S. armed forces and those of friends and allies, especially in countries which have terrorism origins, will contribute to a better international counterterrorism environment (NMS, 2004: 10). As a result, this cooperation is expected to enhance the stability of key regions and prevent conflicts that may cause threats to U.S. interests. Moreover, security cooperation, including intelligence cooperation, leads to better rapid crisis response and preventing surprise attacks (NMS, 2004: 12).

The NMS in 2004 also asserted that achieving U.S. security and strategies requires the global presence of the U.S. military, and obtaining intelligent information from different allies. However, it argues that although the U.S. overseas presence is essential and can take different faces, it should result in improving the regional actors’ and allies’ abilities (NMS, 2004: 25). This has also been asserted in NSS in 2006. According to Korb and Boorstin, treating developing countries as allies and partners, especially in key regions
and issues, is more efficient than imposing policies upon them in building a better coalition and inducing cooperation (Korb and Boorstin, 2006: 13).

Halliday argued that one of the major dimensions of globalisation is international security and stability, which is the responsibility of all states in all regions, especially those who suffer from the lack of it, such as those in the Middle East (Bilgin, 2005: 166). Therefore, the future of the security and economy of many states in the Middle East is determined by the fear of their policymakers of being marginalised in a more globalised world, and that is what made many of them, such as Jordan, support and participate in many global and U.S. initiatives (Bilgin, 2005: 169).

1.5.5 U.S. Democratisation in the Middle East

The rise of nationalism and statehood in each modern Arabic country, especially after the Second World War, aimed to unite each country with its multiple and complex ethnicities and religious beliefs to withstand internal and external threats. However, the policies adopted by the governments of these countries to achieve this national unity and identity were at the expense of democracy and development (Khalidi, 2004: 68). Noticeably, the emergence and the continuity of similar regimes which share many characteristics, such as being undemocratic, politically stagnant, and inefficient in economic and socioeconomic advancement, were simultaneous with the extraordinary involvement of the U.S.A in the affairs of these countries. The promise of these national regimes to free the Arab countries from colonial powers led to dependence on the U.S.A regarding their
external and internal security and affairs, which made the entire region susceptible to U.S. intervention and hegemony (Khalidi, 2004: 70).

The U.S. criticism of the Arab democratic status targeted its allies in the region, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, as well as its foes such as Syria and Iraq. Since 9/11, promoting democracy in the Middle East has been espoused as one of the major aims of the U.S. administrations. It is believed that not only has democracy become one of the weapons to counter terrorism, but it is also a major element of the U.S.A and the neoconservatives’ world-view (Dalacoura, 2005: 963). Therefore, promoting democracy in the Middle East was embodied in different ways and levels; the Bush administration focussed its discourse on the importance of spreading democracy in the region by initiating the Middle East Partnership Initiative (METPI) in 2002, which aimed to encourage the countries in the region to promote economic, educational, political and social reforms which would lead to liberalising and modernising the governments, societies, and economies of these countries in order to foster the people’s conditions and eliminate extremism (Dalacoura, 2005: 964).

Many U.S. foreign policy scholars and policymakers, such as Martin Indyk (Indyk, 1992: 30) and Judith Miller (Miller, 1993: 52) believed that serious political reforms and free elections in the Arabic countries would weaken pro-U.S. governments in the Middle East, and would be an opportunity for the Islamists to seize power with their hostile anti-American agenda. Therefore, these people rationalise their acceptance of authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes in the region as the lesser of two evils (Gerges, 1999: 27).
Moreover, they believe that the current regimes are very efficient and cooperative with the U.S.A and its policies and strategies in counter terrorism. This group of scholars, who were termed as the “Confrontationists”, perceived political Islam as a devastative threat to the U.S. interests in the region; they urged the U.S governments to support any regime or policy in the Middle East which crushed the Islamists (Gerges, 1999: 30).

The counter argument to the “Confrontationists” was embodied in the ideas of the “Accommodationists”; this group believed that the marginalisation of the Islamists by the U.S. government and by the undemocratic regimes in the region; the U.S. support of those corrupt, autocratic regimes and refusal to deal with the Islamists; and the unconditional U.S. support for Israel were the main reasons for the radicalization of the Islamists and their hostility towards the U.S.A (Gerges, 1999: 31). Therefore, Dalacoura rightly stated that, in reality, U.S. policies toward the Middle East were driven by neoconservatives’ beliefs in the sense that the U.S. interests in the region were best served by combining two strategies together; promoting liberalisation and democratisation in these countries in order to guarantee their continuous cooperation with the U.S.A in the future, and the use of hard power to ensure the efficiency of the U.S. strategies and interests in the region simultaneously (Dalacoura, 2005: 974).

Islam as a religion, tradition, and as a political ideology is still very strong in many Arabic countries. Although the extent to which these shared threads are translated to common international policies among these countries is still debatable, Islam remained and is exploited as the legitimising power for many regimes in the Middle East and those
resisting these regimes as well (Murden, 2002: 186). As a result, the U.S. governments became suspicious of the validity of promoting democracy in this region if that would increase the political power of anti-American movements (Dalacoura, 2005: 973). This fact not only made the U.S. government reluctant to promote these programs, but also lessened the U.S. credibility among many people in the region. U.S. policies and initiatives were perceived by many people in the region to be inconsistent and aiming only to achieve its own interests, such as protecting Israel and increasing the U.S. influence and hegemony in the Middle East regardless of the democratic and human rights standards in the region (Dalacoura, 2005: 973).

For many reasons that most Middle Eastern countries share in common, there is limited evidence that U.S. aid is an efficient tool in promoting democracy in the Middle East (Knack, 2004: 260). Khalidi argued that enhancing democracy in the Middle East does not require Western intervention and American enlightenment; Khalidi asserts that there are origins and buds of democracy in most Middle Eastern countries and a rejection of the perceptions of incompatibility between Islam and democracy (Khalidi, 2004: 62). In addition, Chollet and Goldgeir also doubted and questioned the possible success of the U.S. policies which were intended to promote a new Marshal Plan in the Middle East and Africa in April 2002 (Chollet and Goldgeir, 2005-06: 13). They argued that the European needs and circumstances after World War Two were different from those of the Middle Eastern countries and people at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The analogy between Europe and the Middle East might not lead to the same success if a similar Marshal plan in the Middle East was promoted. It has been argued that although the
U.S.A has been aiding Egypt intensively since the peace agreement with Israel in 1979, this did not prevent the remarkable growth of anti-Americanism and radicalism among the Egyptian population (Chollet and Goldgeir, 2005-06: 16).

In order to get the desirable outcomes of any assistance policies towards the Middle Eastern countries, it is essential first of all to encourage the governments and the people of these countries to fight corruption, adopt the rule of law, respect human rights and adopt open economic market policies to foster and develop civil societies in these countries (Chollet and Goldgeir, 2005-06: 17). However, I may argue that U.S. aid and political support to the current regime in Egypt, despite the negativity of it for America’s image in Egypt, prevented the Islamists from seizing power in the most populous Arab state, where the Islamists have been always powerful. If that had happened, another Iran (in a Sunni style) would have entered the region, which might have been very dangerous for U.S. interests and the stability of this vital and troubled region. The sections below will highlight more specifically the pillars of the Jordanian foreign policy and its interactions with the U.S.A, in order to allocate them in subsequent chapters of this thesis within the new pillars of the U.S. strategies and foreign policies that have been discussed in this chapter.

1.6 Jordanian Foreign Policy and its Relations with the U.S.A

The foreign policy of any state is about choices, aims, values and principles that the state gives an account of and considers when shaping its foreign policy. Moreover, the
challenges and threats that a state is facing and the sacrifices it has to make in order to achieve its desirable and vital aims are highly influential in the making of its foreign policy (Hastedt, 2006: 20). Ryan argues that Jordan is a relatively small and weak country compared with its surrounding powerful neighbours. However, its geopolitical importance and location gave it a considerable attention from regional powers as well as superpowers, which enabled it to survive and become an active partner in the Middle East (Hey, 2003: 137). For example, during the Cold War, Jordan was perceived by the Western superpowers as a conservative resisting player against radical Arabic Nationalist movements with strong ties to the Soviet Union, in addition to which it was a potentially moderate power in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. Its utility to U.S. foreign policy objectives and its own need for Western economic and military support fostered strong relations between Jordan and the U.S.A (Hey, 2003: 138).

1.6.1 Regional and Domestic Politics

There are many events and process in the Middle East which have made Jordan safer and more protected from external and internal threats. The elimination (or at least the reduction of) Pan-Arabism after the Arab defeat in the Six Days war in 1967 and the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt in 1979 made a new open war between Israel and other Arabic countries unlikely. In addition, the victory of the Jordanian regime in 1970 in expelling the forces of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) eliminated the internal threat that resulting from the demographic changes in Jordan after the 1967 war (Hey, 2003: 140).
Jordan’s economic weakness remained a major factor in shaping its foreign policy; therefore, its full support of Iraq in its war against Iran (1980-1988) was unsurprising, mainly because the Jordanian-Iraqi economic ties were vital for both countries during that period. Not only did Jordan benefit economically from Iraq during this war, but also received financial support and oil supply from other Gulf countries who viewed the Iranian revolution as a major threat to the region. The Jordanian backing of Iraq in that war also enhanced the regime’s reputation domestically; Saddam Hussein was believed to be the advocate of the Arab cause during that decade, especially given the limited Egyptian role in Arab affairs in that period as a result of its unexpected peace agreement with Israel in 1979 (Shulman, 2006: 3).

The regime’s survival and the state’s security were always paramount factors in the making of Jordanian foreign policy; however, the Jordanian leadership managed, relatively successfully, to combine the regime’s interests and legitimacy with national interests. For example, Jordan was noticeably absent from the international collation led by the U.S.A against Iraq in the Gulf War (1990-1991). Although Jordan condemned the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it kept its ties with Iraq very strong, not to mention that the public support for Iraq in Jordan was very high. This policy, however, harmed the Jordanian relations with the U.S.A and the Gulf countries remarkably; Jordan lost much international aid, from the U.S.A and from Gulf countries, and was regionally and internationally isolated due to its position in the war (Swaidan and Nica, 2002: 2).
Jordan found that by using its geopolitical status and joining the peace process between the Arab countries and Israel which was initiated after the 1991 Gulf War would help Jordan to reengage in regional and international politics and to achieve its needs and security. As a result; making peace with Israel in 1994 was a great opportunity to change the regional circumstances that were binding Jordan from achieving its interests and to rebuild its relations with the U.S.A in order to sort out many of its vital concerns regarding its economy and security (Hey, 2003: 141). Therefore, Jordan shifted its foreign policy toward Iraq by becoming more critical of the Iraqi regime in the mid 1990s and managed to rebuild its relations with the Gulf countries, especially with Saudi Arabia, and enhance its ties with the U.S.A and Britain (Hey, 2003: 142).

1.6.2 Liberalisation and Jordanian Foreign Policy

Brand argued that the Jordanian leadership was worried about the remarkable success of the Islamists in the election of 1989, which came as a result of the liberalisation process in that year (Brand, 1999: 53). In addition, while one of the reasons for supporting Saddam Hussein during that war was domestic pressures on King Hussein, it was vital for the Jordanian regime later to manipulate the domestic sphere to accomplish the required compatibility between the new Jordanian foreign policies and major regional and international changes such as the defeat of Iraq, Jordanian economic needs, the peace process, the end of the Cold War and the increase of the U.S. involvement and power in the region accordingly. Therefore, the Jordanian regime adopted many restriction policies from 1989 to 1993, and many laws were revised, such as the electoral law and press law,
in order to guarantee a limited presence of Islamists in future parliaments. These decisions aimed to enable the regime to have more autonomy and freedom from domestic pressures in the making of its foreign policies. Needless to say these changes and preparations by the Jordanian government occurred alongside the negotiations for a peace treaty with Israel, which was expected to be opposed by the Islamists (Brand, 1999: 58).

According to Wiktorowicz, political liberalisation and civil society empowerment in Jordan as well as in many other countries in the Arab World were termed “Defensive Democracies” (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 46). These policies were argued to be promoted by the regimes of these countries and were not a natural development of these societies generated by the people or regimes of these countries to achieve valid and genuine democracies. Furthermore, it is believed that the aim of these policies was to ensure and enhance the survival ability of these regimes in the face of economic and political crisis rather than increasing political freedom and participation. These kinds of policies helped the regimes of these countries to achieve better control and manipulation of social and economic spheres, as new factors and players started to emerge increasingly and actively in these societies in facing different crises in these countries (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 50).

Jillian Schwedler argued that it took King Hussein five years of hard working and many serious and sensitive decisions had to be taken by Jordan, such as the peace treaty with Israel, to rebuild Jordan’s ties with the U.S.A and to ensure its stability and vital needs (Schwedler, 2003: 23). Therefore, it became vital for the Jordanian regime not to be very sympathetic to Jordanian public opinion regarding foreign affairs, especially when these
opinions clashed with Jordanian foreign policy towards the U.S.A and other crucial issues, such as Israel, peace in the region, and the Islamists. As a result, King Abdullah II is aware of the danger of jeopardizing Jordan’s ties with the U.S.A, especially after what Jordan experienced because of its sympathy towards Iraq in the Gulf War (Schwedler, 2003: 23).

In his speech to the Jordanian parliament in October 1994 (after the signing of the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel), President Clinton emphasized the importance of promoting democracy and resisting terrorism and extremism in the region in order to foster peace, stability and prosperity in the Middle East (Gerges, 1999: 54). However, Haass and Paris questioned the validity of Clinton’s policies of promoting the democratization of the Middle East. They argued that such policies would harm U.S. interests in the Middle East, believing that wide political participation in Jordan would have risked the peacemaking between Jordan and Israel, and lessened Jordanian cooperation with the U.S.A; therefore, they believed that supporting the current political status quo in Jordan is an essential strategic requirement (Gerges, 1999: 114).

1.6.3 The Peace Agreement and U.S.-Jordanian Relations

After the peace agreement with Israel in October 1994 the U.S.-Jordanian bilateral relations improved remarkably; in 1996 the U.S.A treated Jordan as a Major Non-NATO ally (MNNA), which is an unusual and privileged status. Jordan benefited a lot from this treatment, mainly in the form of military aid and increased security support and
cooperation from the U.S.A. This, beside the peace agreement with Israel, resulted in increasing Jordan’s role as an active player in different kinds of cooperation with different major actors in the region such as Turkey, Israel and Egypt. In addition, Jordan showed a remarkable flexibility in its foreign policies to obtain relatively good relations with the main players in the Middle East as well as with the U.S.A. Although Jordan was concerned about its security from external threats, it was also motivated by its domestic needs and affairs, political as well as economic (Hey, 2003: 143).

In October 2000 Jordan and the U.S.A signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries in order to eliminate all of the tariffs and other barriers in trade between the two countries within ten years. It is argued that these agreements are used by the U.S.A only to encourage its partners to adopt liberal economic and political approaches (Rosen, 2004: 62-65). However, the FTA gave Jordan the privilege to become one of only four countries in the world at that time (after Canada, Mexico and Israel) to have such an agreement with the U.S.A. For the U.S.A, trade with Jordan is not important due to the smallness of the Jordanian market compared with other partners, but this agreement aimed to achieve a political rather than an economic goal; the U.S.A aimed to support its foreign policy in the Middle East by projecting its image as a great supporter of its strategic allies in this region by empowering and supporting them in order to further their policies in the region. On the other hand, for Jordan, the agreement achieved essential political and economic vital goals; Jordan was rewarded for its compliance with the peace process and supporting different U.S. policies in the region. In addition, this agreement
removed any discriminatory measures against Jordan in its trade with the U.S.A, which increased remarkably after the signing of this agreement (Rosen, 2004: 62-65).

1.6.4 Jordan and King Abdullah II

There are some similarities and differences between King Abdullah II, who succeeded to the Jordanian throne in February 1999, and his father King Hussein, who ruled Jordan from 1952 until his death in 1999. Both of them were pro-Western and moderate monarchs, but from his first year in office King Abdullah II lessened Jordan’s focus on regional politics to enhance domestic affairs and developing the Jordanian economy, by integrating it in the global economy to become part of regional Pax Americana (Andoni, 2000: 77).

According to Andoni, although King Abdullah II was against the embargo of Iraq, he was uncritical of the U.S. policies in the region as well as in the world; neither was he critical of the Iraqi regime (Andoni, 2000: 80). Moreover, King Abdullah II believed that the Arab-Israeli conflict is the main obstacle for the modernisation and development of Jordan and the region which can only be achieved by U.S. involvement in the region and its domination of world affairs. Therefore, King Abdullah II supports the different interests and policies of the U.S.A in the region and in the world. Notably, unlike King Hussein, King Abdullah II’s policies and beliefs have not faced major internal and regional challenges, mainly because of the absence of the legacy of the Cold War and
pan-Arabism and their impact on Jordan and on the region, not to mention the increased ability of the Jordanian regime in manipulating internal affairs (Andoni, 2000: 81).

From his accession to the throne King Abdullah II realised the weaknesses and the problems that the Jordanian economy was facing, and the depressing social impacts of these problems. The main political concern of these problems was that they could reach a level that might jeopardize the stability of the country at early stages of his era. Therefore, he supported privatisation and reform policies of the Jordanian economy as the sole solutions for these problems; it is worth mentioning in this regard that such solutions and policies are compatible with the U.S. vision (Andoni, 2000: 85). Consequently, his first visit to the U.S.A and Europe in May 1999 aimed to ensure economic aids and debt relief from these countries. However, the U.S. government conditioned its support for the “new Jordan” upon it remaining a moderate and cooperative partner with the U.S.A and its policies in the region, supportive of the peace process in the Middle East (Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 1999: 30-31).

Nonetheless, according to Vogt, the U.S. support of Jordan did not prevent the emergence of anti-Americanism among some Jordanian people and some political powers and parties. Many U.S. aid programs to Jordan were accused by these groups, especially the Islamists, of being associated with normalisation attempts with Israel, which they believe to be harmful to Jordan (Faath, 2006: 139). On the other hand, it is argued that anti-Americanism in Jordan is not profoundly oriented by ideological or cultural beliefs and differences; rather, the major factor that fuels anti-Americanism in Jordan is the U.S
foreign policy in the region, especially regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Iraq (Faath, 2006: 140).

1.7 Conclusion

This chapter provided a general description of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East and the position of Jordan within these policies and strategies accordingly. In addition, the chapter highlighted the main concerns of Jordan and the pillars of the Jordanian foreign policy since King Abdulla II succeeded to the throne. This historical revision of U.S. strategies and concerns in the Middle East aimed to understand the standing point of U.S. strategies and concerns in the region during the Presidency of G.W. Bush in order to be aware of the international and the regional environments that Jordan was operating in when conducting its relations with the U.S.A.

It has been mentioned in this chapter that in the early 1990s Jordan did not support the U.S.A in the Gulf War of 1991, then later it shifted its foreign policy towards Iraq by being more critical of Saddam Hussein and closer to the U.S.A. Although these policies and shifts in Jordan’s foreign policy proved to be costly internationally and domestically, they manifested the ability, and more importantly the necessity, of Jordan to manoeuvre and to act freely, occasionally with balanced calculations of international, regional and domestic factors. In addition, it is salient also from this chapter that Jordan has been significantly dependent on the U.S.A in many of its pivotal needs; therefore, the chances for Jordan and its relatively new monarch to succeed in practicing such kinds of
manoeuvring not only depend on Jordan’s desires and its regional and domestic calculations, but also on the features of the relations between the two countries and the U.S. interactions and responses to these policies, especially in a more uni-polar world with more tendency towards bold unilateralism in U.S. policies, especially in the Middle East, after 9/11, which this thesis will examine more deeply in later chapters.

It is obvious from the preceding discussion that the events of 9/11 and the neo-conservatism of U.S. foreign policy added new dimensions to U.S. policies in the Middle East. These policies influenced its relations with Jordan remarkably, especially those such as the intensification of security cooperation between the U.S.A and its allies in different counter-terrorism strategies and the U.S. democratisation process to erode extremism in these countries. These U.S. dimensions and policies have huge consideration and calculations of Israel and its prevailing importance for the U.S.A as discussed earlier in this chapter, especially from the neoconservative perspective. Therefore, the impact of these U.S. policies on U.S.-Jordanian relations will be explored in depth and will occupy chapter four regarding U.S.-Jordanian security cooperation, chapter five regarding U.S. democracy promotion in Jordan, and chapter six regarding the consequences of these U.S. policies on the tri-dimensional relations between the U.S.A, Israel and Jordan. Each of these chapters will explore the features and the pillars of U.S.-Jordanian relations regarding these issues during the 2000s. It is important to stress here, given the resources available, that these chapters will focus slightly more on Jordanian experiences in U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s regarding the issues mentioned
above. This is largely because Jordanians, as the weaker side in these relations, are best-placed in order to assess how far Jordan is independent in its relations with the U.S.A.

It is clear however that the neoconservatives and U.S. policies in the region are overlapping and reciprocal. According to the key neoconservative figure Robert Kagan, the U.S. approach after 9/11 was driven by two motivations: national security and ideological and moral commitments (Hudson, 2005: 299). This illustrates that the U.S. foreign policy during the Bush era was driven by a contradicting combination of some realist and idealistic motivations in its foreign relations, including with its historical allies. Therefore, the chapter that follows will investigate the main theories of IR in order to figure out the appropriate theoretical framework by which the relations between the U.S.A and Jordan in the 2000s can be successfully investigated.
Chapter Two: Theoretical Debate and U.S.-Jordanian Relations: Deriving a Liberal Hegemonic Approach

2.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the main theoretical concepts of IR that this thesis is concerned with. The overreaching aim of this chapter is to provide an identification and justification for the theoretical framework that is used for this thesis. This aim will be fully accomplished in the following methodology chapter. The reason for this delay of identifying and justifying the theoretical framework used is due to two reasons; firstly, the chosen theoretical framework and its two main concepts or pillars are derived from a process of including and excluding some concepts from a set of independent theories and paradigms of IR that are addressed in this chapter. Secondly, while this thesis is aiming to obtain reliable knowledge regarding the subject matter, the theoretical framework is designed to be compatible with the main methodological characteristics of this academic inquiry, which are going to be addressed in the following chapter. As a result, the specific aim of this chapter is to conduct an analysis and comparison of the main theories and paradigms that the theoretical framework is composed of in order to verify the adequacy of the norms that compose it.

The chapter starts by highlighting the logic behind theories of IR in order to be aware of the quality and type of the required theoretical framework while establishing the core theory for this academic investigation. Then, as this thesis investigates the relationships
between a superpower and a developing country, a brief discussion of how applicable the main theories of IR are to such relations will be provided. These two sections provided the researcher with guidelines for the next step of this chapter while exploring the debate that took place in the 1990s and 2000s among the main two paradigms of IR; neorealism and neoliberalism. This debate will conduct a process of including as well as excluding some norms from these two leading approaches in order to compose the theoretical framework of this research. The chapter will justify the derivation of liberal hegemony as a result of this debate and its adequacy for this thesis compared to other alternatives such as the theories of hegemonic stability and American empire. Based on this debate, the chapter highlights two paradigms and their adequacy for this study: U.S. liberal hegemony and small states’ politics. These two paradigms underlie the theoretical framework, in which a combination process of their main concepts is performed in the methodology chapter, based on the chosen methodological characteristics of this research, which will be tested and judged empirically in the subsequent chapters to the following chapter.

2.2 The Importance of Theories in Studying International Relations

International politics is a very wide field and covers all aspects of the political life of a state and its interactions with other states, in a complex firmament of internal and external conditions and variables. Therefore, scholars of international politics need IR theories to provide them with an organised generalisation of international politics. Moreover, IR theory helps in narrowing and focusing attention on the main actors and
issues in this field and how they affect the ways states behave, perform, and interact in order to have greater ability to understand and predict the outcomes of the interplay between internal and external actors in foreign policymaking (Weber, 2001: 126). In addition, a major reason for studying and using theories of IR is to facilitate making this field more sensible; theories provide scholars of world politics with conceptual frameworks by which they can interpret different events at the international arena that resulted from a variety of motivations and aims more accurately (Burchill and Linklater, 2005: 17).

IR theories are the lenses through which scholars observe the world to give them a clearer vision about their objects, in order to obtain better understanding of the logic and nature of relations between states. Therefore, a theory of IR should be able to describe, explain, and predict the behaviour of states and the outcomes of this behaviour with an ability to generalise its assumptions (Neuman, 1998: 14). Moreover, any theory of IR should be able to narrow down its scope of inquiry by being selective in choosing the most important and decisive factor or factors as the level of analysis and inquiry (Burchill and Linklater, 2005: 13). However, theories of IR not only differ in the object or the level of analysis as the main actor in the field, they also differ in the purpose and method in investigating each level of analysis. As a result, they help to include as well as to exclude different components according to their importance for the state and its foreign policy or their importance in particular events and relations at the international arena. Each theory has its own understanding and perspective of international politics based on different realities, cases and historical contexts. However, many theories and concepts have
derived and evolved from the debate between the main assumptions of major theories in IR, such as neorealism and neoliberalism (Ayoob, 1998: 31).

2.3 Developing Countries and International Relations Theories

While the major component of the core theory of this thesis is Ikenberry’s liberal hegemony, and while Ikenberry argues that liberal hegemony is exclusive to advanced, industrialised and democratic countries (Ikenberry, 2001), this section provides a vital discussion about the adequacy of theories of IR in general in the study of developing countries in order to justify the usage of some concepts of major theories in IR from which Ikenberry’s liberal hegemony derives.

Some scholars such as Singer and Wildavsky believe that understanding world politics should be based on a division between the politics of the North and the South of the globe. They argue that the Northern countries are democratic, peaceful, powerful, and prosperous, whereas the South is a zone of turmoil, underdevelopment, dictatorships and conflicts. One aspect of this is the claim that the interaction and the mutual influence between the two parts of the world are limited (Neuman, 1998: 4). In other words, some scholars argue that world politics is based on separation rather than interrelatedness between the parts of the world. Accordingly, theories of IR and their main assumptions may suit one part of the world or a set of states, but not necessarily the other.
On the other hand, other scholars such as Ayoob argue that the developing countries are an important and active part of the international system (Ayoob, 1995). Ayoob asserts that the growth in interdependency of world politics makes the periphery a major component in the understanding of world politics and in achieving the stability of the entire system, resulting in a considerable weight of developing countries in super powers’ calculations. For that reason, Ayoob rejected the idea of two separate international systems and emphasized the existence of one wide, interlocked, international system, which includes both developed and undeveloped countries and zones in one world (Neuman, 1998: 5). For example, the policymakers of Middle Eastern countries as well as those of major states and superpowers who are involved in the region are aware of the fact that the politics of the Middle East cannot be fully understood independently from world politics and major events in the international arena (Halliday, 2005: 20). As a result, one of the major facts of Middle Eastern relations and its relations with superpowers is the interlocking of regional and international affairs and crisis and the interlocking of the policies implemented by these superpowers (Halliday, 2005: 131).

Some scholars believe that modern theories of IR are Eurocentric and originate in the U.S.A, they believe that these theories aimed to explain the international politics in the West and they can also be generalised to the rest of the world (Neuman, 1998: 2). On the other hand, some scholars questioned and doubted the adequacy of generalising these theories; they also questioned the applicability of many basic concepts of these theories to non-Western countries, such as the concepts of rational choice, the state or the nation state, sovereignty, and international alliance (Neuman, 1998: 7). For example, Ayoob
argues that neorealism and neoliberalism, as the main paradigms of IR, are mainly
designed to tackle the relations between great industrial powers only. These theories
based their assumptions on the Westphalian style of state, which is not the case of many
developing countries, mainly because they neglect many domestic factors that are still
strong in determining the foreign policies of these countries (Ayoob, 1998: 37). More
importantly, neorealism and neoliberalism emerged and evolved in the developed world
during the twentieth century based on loaded and rich historical interactions between
these states and on the development of previous ideas and arguments accordingly. During
the emergence of these two leading theories, however, many developing countries, until
now in some cases, were still at early stage of the state-making process which took place
in Europe and the West in the seventeenth century. In other words, Ayoob claims that the
current premature and untimely progress of the developing countries’ international
politics undermines the applicability of these two leading theories to these countries

However, while the purpose of this chapter is to select and justify a theoretical
framework for this thesis, it is essential to tackle these major two theories using a
selective approach in order to establish the core theoretical concepts which are going to
be tested empirically in this thesis. Not less importantly, while this thesis addresses the
relations between the U.S.A and Jordan as a developing country, the assessment of the
theoretical framework will be of great importance for this debate and the robustness and
adequacy of the norms of these theories. Most important of all, the core theory of this
thesis is not neorealism or neoliberalism; it is a conceptualised theory that includes and
excludes some norms from these two major theories, and from other norms such as small states’ politics and U.S. liberal hegemony. This core theory resulted from considering the disparities between the two countries, the U.S and Jordan, in terms of power and other different characteristics.

2.4 Neorealism

The emergence of any international concept or theory does not take place in a vacuum, their engagement and presence in the field based on their sense and power. Major historical events in the international arena encouraged the emergence and the shape of some theories of IR (Nye, 1998: 235). However, while historical and international events encourage the emergence of theories, they can also limit their power and adequacy. For example, the implications of international cooperation enhanced the conceptualization and the identification of the state’s different interests, contrary to the realist thought which focuses its attention on the security and survival of the state and its focus only on power politics (Nye, 1998: 240).

From a realist perspective the state is the main actor in IR and there is no higher authority than it. Moreover, the clash of interests between states is inevitable. Therefore, the major aim of the state is to achieve its survival by adopting a self-help approach and possessing power. No less importantly, the sovereignty of the state is paramount to international law and cooperation. As a result, policymakers and heads of state must be free in their choices in order to protect their states’ vital interests. Realism also assumes that people
are misanthropic by nature and aim to dominate other countries, even by force, which makes absolute trust between states impossible, even between allies. Therefore, for realists, stability at the international arena results from a balance of power between states, whereby no single state or group of states has the ability to overpower others (Kegley, 1995: 5).

The power of realism in predicting and analysing international affairs and the behaviours of states were salient during war times, such as the period between the First and the Second World Wars. However, the effectiveness and relevance of realism lessened when the international conditions changed to more harmonious and peaceful relations between states (Kegley, 1995: 6). Therefore, while the increase of international trade and stability which were simultaneous with huge critics of classical realism in the 1970s, the emergence of Neorealism in Waltz’s book *Theory of International Politics* in 1979 aimed to refresh and to provide a supplementary approach to classical realism by describing many aspects of international politics that started to decline after the Second World War (Nye, 1998: 240). The main achievements of Waltz and neorealism were that they defined and described the international system and structure well enough in order to be a basic and a discrete framework of explaining the state’s behaviour and international politics in general (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993: 23).

The claim that neorealism is more scientific than other theories of IR, especially liberalism, gave it some privilege in the study of world politics in the post-war era (Forde, 1995: 141). For Waltz, what makes neorealism more scientific is its sharp focus
and narrow scope on the structure of the international system, which enables neorealism to be more predictive, empirical and wide-reaching. There are many debates and studies on the adequacy of focusing merely on the structure of the international system, however, rationalism is a basic element of the neorealist understanding of international politics and the behaviour of states in an anarchical world (Forde, 1995: 142). For neorealists, there are two features related to the structure of the international system which characterise the system: the configuration of the system, whether it is a multi-polar or bipolar system; and the permanent anarchical nature of any international system (Forde, 1995: 145).

Neorealist theory of IR is based on the idea of system, structure and units. The international system is a group of states (units) and the behaviour of each unit is important for all of the others. Moreover, understanding the interactions between states is very important in order to perceive the nature, logic and the coherence of the system (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993: 29). For Waltz, neorealism is based on the ideas that: political structure is the organizing principle of the international system, the differences are in the unit’s functions and capabilities (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993: 36). Therefore, Waltz’s understanding of power is as a means for the state rather than a desire; he believes that states’ foreign policies aimed not only to achieve their survival, but also other aims such as gaining wealth, prosperity and influence (Donnelly, 2005: 42). Waltz argued that international politics is better understood by relying on a systematic theory by emphasizing the importance of the structure of the international system where the units interact (Waltz, 1986: 71). Therefore, the position of the state in the system and how it is arranged and positioned within the system are very important in understanding the
international system and the behaviour of the states within it. As a result, it is the system and its structure, not the states themselves, which are able to position the states in the system and determine their place, behaviours, and policies within it (Waltz, 1986: 71).

Neorealists hold that the international system is a coherent but anarchical structure by spontaneous coexistence and interactions between the sovereign states, which all aim to survive and act without external constraints. Therefore, self-help is the main motivation of the behaviours of all states in the international system, although they differ in their behaviours, all aim to survive in an anarchical world (Waltz, 1986: 85). The structure and shape of the international system, from Waltz’s point of view, are determined by two interrelated factors: firstly, the behaviours and the interactions between states in the international system; and secondly, the capabilities of states, as well as the distributions of these capabilities among them (Waltz, 1986: 90, 91). Therefore, the distribution of power and capability between the actors and the change of this distribution are the driving forces behind the change in the nature of the international system, as well as the change in the nature of the behaviours and interactions between its units, the states (Waltz, 1986: 92). For neorealists, what also identify the international system are the interactions between states and the regularity of their behaviours; moreover, the ordering principle (anarchy), the functions of the states and the distribution of capabilities and power are also main factors that shape the international system (Nye, 1998: 241).
Waltz argued that the international system is anarchical in nature and lacked international government to force order within the system; moreover, he insisted that although international organisations do exist and sometimes function effectively, they could not do so without the acquiescence and the support of the state (Waltz, 1986: 81). Therefore, there is always a possibility of the use of force and violence in relations between different states. In this regard, Waltz argued that the use of force and violence is associated with the nature of men, whether it is within the states or among them, regardless of the presence of the government or an agent, nationally or internationally (Waltz, 1986: 98).

In an anarchical system, Waltz argued, units are alike and they behave similarly, therefore, the use or the non-use of force does not distinguish domestic politics from international politics. The difference between the national and international systems is in the presence of a hierarchy of government which monopolises the legitimate use of power to organise the relations between the members such as the one in the state itself. On the other hand, at the international level the main doctrine is self-help in the absence of a legitimate international hierarchy, so each state has to protect itself by any affordable means (Waltz, 1986: 100).

Neorealism tried to interpret the behaviour of states and international conflicts by focusing on the impact of the anarchical environment which is imposed on the states and on the system. Neorealism assumes that the dynamics of the international system and structure compel the state to behave in a certain way, therefore, to understand the behaviour of the state it is important to understand the international environment and the situation and the position of the state within the international system, and how that affects
its performance (Shimok, 1992: 293). As a result, neorealism constitutes a conceptualization framework of IR which differs from classical realism, although some scholars (such as Keohane) believe that neorealism is solely a systemization attempt of classical realism (Shimok, 1992: 296).

Neorealists refused to explain international politics by referring merely to the characteristics of the state or the human, they argue that what determines the state to be cooperative or aggressive are the international system in which the state acts and the distribution of power among states in the system (Shimok, 1992: 298). Moreover, Waltz argued that change in the international structure will affect the behaviour of the states and the outcomes of their interactions (Kegley, 1995: 74). Neorealism assumes that the survival of the state and its security are paramount to economic prosperity and interdependence, which may harm the state’s sovereignty and freedom of action in a competitive and anarchical system; therefore, international cooperation and economic motivations will always be bound to how secure the state feels in an anarchical world (Burchill, 2005: 66).

Waltz asserted that states, if they have the choice, prefer to maintain their positions in the system rather than to maximize their power (Waltz, 1979). As a result, balancing against strong states is the expected behaviour of weaker states rather than bandwagoning, especially when major changes in the distribution of capabilities take place. According to Keohane, the ambiguity which neorealism is facing is that it is focusing on the capabilities of the states whereas its implications stress external threats and influences
that the state is facing in the international system (Keohane, 1984). In addition, Walt argues that states not only aim to counterbalance superior power, but also possible threats; for example, many states chose to ally themselves with the U.S.A despite the fact that it was more powerful than the Soviet Union during the Cold War mainly because the Soviet Union was perceived as a greater threat to many weaker and smaller countries (Keohane and Walt, 1988: 171). Walt argues that what determines whether a state is a threat to another state or not are its proximity, offensive capability and intentions. Moreover, he believes that balancing is more prevalent than bandwagoning because states bandwagon only in certain situations, such as when the state is very weak, suffers from unavailability of allies, and when the policymaker of these states believe that the appeasement of the threatening power could work effectively (Keohane and Walt, 1988: 172).

Neorealists assume that the inequality of different sources of power between states makes any cooperation between them result in unequal distribution of the expected gain. Moreover, because of the anarchical nature of the international system, which includes the potentiality of war and the security dilemma which states live in, the state must not compromise or disarm itself, even if that will result in more cooperation and gains for both states. Waltz justifies such policies mainly because in doing so the state will put its security and survivability at risk from the other state, which would gain more and enhance its capability (Waltz, 1986: 102).
There are other ways in which the structure of the international system limits cooperation between states; a state avoids cooperation with others lest it become too dependent on them. Small states are likely to import and export more because of their limited resources and markets, which makes them more interdependent on others. In order to enhance well-being, cooperation between states should be based on a division of labour, which can result domestically from an imperative act by the government, but this cannot be done internationally (Waltz, 1986: 103). On the other hand, because neorealism does not give much credit to human nature and condition, some people may argue that there is in fact an opportunity for optimism in international politics. This optimism is derived from the belief that anarchy has not been proven to be an immutable feature of international politics. Moreover, neorealism does not perceive conflicts between states as inevitable if the security and the interests of these states are achieved and met (Shmoke, 1992: 299). When the level and capacity of the interactions between states are very high and when the foreign policies of these states aim to engage in interdependency then the volume, speed and the reliability of the interaction and cooperation between states may override the anarchical nature and the structure of the international system (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993: 78). According to Buzan, scientific and technological developments increased the exchange among nations in order to achieve prosperity and welfare resulting in more interdependency and cooperation between them. However, the limitation of trade and international economic interdependence between the East and the West during the Cold War were major reasons for the limitation of international cooperation, and peace in general during this period of time (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 124).
For neorealists, wars take place between states because “there is nothing to prevent them” (Waltz, 1979: 113). Therefore, the first priority of the state is to survive and to protect itself from external aggression instead of achieving the individual’s well-being. Moreover, from a neorealist perspective, states aim to maintain their position in the international system by increasing their capabilities and being aware of other states’ capabilities. Therefore, neorealists believe that the aim of relations with other states is not to achieve the highest possible gain, as neoliberals believe, but to prevent others from advancing their power lest they became more powerful than others. Neorealism assumes that because the state is a positional actor in the international system this lessens its desire to cooperate, because the gain that will result from its cooperation may change and enhance the position of other states, which may be in favour of other states. Meanwhile, neoliberals expect that anarchy will impede cooperation between states because of the possibility of incompliance by some states to rules and agreements, and because of the possibility of cheating and defection between states while cooperating with each other (Grieco, 1995: 161).

There are different neorealist views of the criteria for power. They argue, for example, that international order derives from two concepts; balance of power or hegemonic stability. The theory of hegemonic stability is based on two propositions; firstly, the accomplishment of order in the international system is normally created by a dominant power, such as Great Britain in the nineteenth century, and the U.S.A from the mid-twentieth. Secondly, the role of a hegemonic power as a stabilizing actor is crucial to maintain order in world politics (Keohane, 1984: 31). Hegemonic power must
accomplish accessibility and control over raw materials, resources, and markets, as well as the capacity of obtaining greater industry. Moreover, hegemonic power must have enough military power in order to be able to protect and maintain the international order and its hegemony from adversaries, and their temptation to change the international system and its structure, and controlling vital regions (Keohane, 1984: 39).

However, Keohane argued that international cooperation and the establishment of international regimes which are based on hegemonic stability would be impotent if based merely on the realist concept of power and interests. In other words, Keohane asserted that international cooperation and order do not coexist with hegemony in the long run. Although he believed that hegemony may help at the beginning of establishing an international regime, because it facilitates cooperation between states, it is not a requirement for the maintenance of such a system (Keohane, 1984: 32). Moreover, Keohane argued that the empirical evidence for the validity and continuity of the hegemonic stability theory is weak, citing the case of Britain in the nineteenth century (Keohane, 1984: 38).

Despite its popularity and relative success, neorealism faces much criticism and limitation in its capacity in interpreting international affairs. Although neorealism claims that it takes side with the American revolutions of realism and science against idealism and traditionalism, in practice it reduced the importance of politics by perceiving and interpreting it through analogizing politics to economics, as well as applying scientific methodologies to technical enterprises (Ashley, 1984: 227). Ashley also argued that
neorealism adopted only the importance of power from classical realism, and took from
science the significance of increasing control. This selective approach perceived power as
a rationale without limits, and resulted in a positivist structuralism which deals with the
given order as the natural and permanent one leading to limitation in political discourse
and subordinating all social practices that are important to social learning and change to
the static of control (Ashley, 1984: 228).

There are other criticisms of Waltz and neorealism, including that Waltz focussed too
much on the system and the structure of the system, neglecting other important actors.
Moreover, many scholars accused neorealism of being narrow and static. For example,
Cox (1986) and Ashley (1988) argued that the reason behind the narrowness of
neorealism is its marginalisation of other agents which are important to political
outcomes. Similarly, scholars such as Keohane and Nye argued that there are un-
structural incentives behind many behaviours of the state (Keohane and Nye, 1987). The
charge that structural realism is too static based on Waltz’s belief that the continuity of
the nature of the international system and its structure are over change. Therefore, Waltz
was accused also of keeping the variables of his theory to a minimum (Buzan, Jones and
Little, 1993: 24, 25, 26).

Keohane argued that Waltz had an over-militarised conception of power, let alone that he
ignored the impact of the international economy on international politics and on the
behaviour of the state. In support of Keohane’s points, Ruggie justified his accusation of
neorealism as being too narrow and static by claiming that Waltz ignored the density of
the interactions between states in the system, which takes different levels in different issues, which are highly important for any state. Waltz assumed that the differentiation between states can be used as characteristics of the structure, whereas Ruggie stated that states evolve and change, and consequently their functions within the structure will change and evolve as well (Nye, 1988: 242). Thus, although neorealism highlighted the importance of the international system and the role of the hegemonic power, which will be of concern while discussing the theoretical framework of this thesis, it does not provide us with an adequate and sufficient explanation about international affairs under the current international conditions, especially those which concern the relations between small states and the U.S.A in the 2000s. Therefore, an optimistic and more dynamic vision and perspective of international affairs are required, especially in an apparently more changeable and dynamic world.

2.5 Neoliberalism

The contradiction between realism and liberalism is relatively similar to that between reality and aspiration; however, the aspirations of many countries and indeed of many relations are embodied in many policies between these countries, which have a great impact on the realities of the nature of these relations.

The main assumptions of the liberal theory are that humans are good by nature and willing to cooperate with each other, and that collaboration between them is possible. In addition, liberals believe that negative human behaviour such as wars, selfishness, and
aggressiveness are the results of bad institutions and bad structural arrangements (in short, bad government) which encourage people and politicians to behave in such ways. Moreover, they believe that wars can be avoided by eradicating the anarchical conditions which could be eliminated by collective international efforts (Kegley, 1995: 4). According to many liberals, such as Kant, the nature of the relations between people as well as between states is based on harmony, peace and cooperation (Kant, 2006). Moreover, liberals believe that people are capable of being peaceful by nature, but undemocratic regimes and corrupted governments use wars and international conflicts as means to enhance their power and wealth, because wars and conflicts provide politicians with the conditions that help them to remain in power and increase their authority by increasing taxes and reducing liberty, controlling the people and the political life in their countries (Burchill, 2005: 58).

The common threads of liberal internationalist theory are the beliefs in the progress of human freedom, the increase of cooperation among nations, and the importance of modernization and democracy as the driving forces behind cooperation and human development. On the other hand, because of the scepticism of the high level of optimism of human progress, some liberals such as Stanley Hoffmann (Hoffmann, 1981) and Robert Keohane (Keohane, 1989), argued that liberal international theory, which is based on a relative and cumulative progress of humanity, leads to the belief that the individual is not and should not be the only major actor or the level of analysis in liberal international theory (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 121).
The main aims of international cooperation for liberals are to maximize benefits, to minimize the damage of interaction between states, and to increase the possibility of achieving national and international security, peace, justice and welfare for all states and people (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 110). For liberals, mutual interest is a main reason for cooperation between states, and this mutuality of interests will grow as a result of the spread and intensification of international interdependency and democratic values among countries. In addition, the development of industry and the spread of advanced technology in information and communications foster connectivity between countries. As a result, states will be more able to monitor each other and be more aware of their interests, resulting in a reduction of the negativity of relative gain and an increase of interdependency between countries. The help of the international organisations in this regard will make it more difficult for any state to cheat or to resort to the use of coercive power in dealing and interacting with other states (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 119).

According to Carr (Carr, 1945: 5-6), many wars took place between states in the eighteenth century in order to increase the wealth and power of these states; this was simultaneous with the belief that the wealth and the power of the state can only be enhanced at the expense of other states’ wealth and power, mainly because of the belief that wealth and power were a fixed quantity and not susceptible to increase and share (Burchill, 2005: 62). Barriers between states increase or at least maintain a high level of nationalism among the people of these states, which lessens the mutual interaction and understanding between these peoples (protectionism). Therefore, the tension and the likelihood of conflicts between these countries increase. On the other hand, free trade
breaks the divisions between states and enhances the possibility of peaceful achievements for all sides. In addition, trade increases the contact between different cultures and civilizations, which mitigates the differences and enhances the mutual recognition between different peoples (Burchill, 2005: 63). According to classical liberals such as Adam Smith and Tom Paine, free movement of commodities, capital, and people across the world would extirpate the origins of wars and conflicts (Burchill, 2005: 64).

The heart of the modern interdependence theory is based on free trade between countries. States engage in free trade in order to eliminate the possibility of conflicts between them by increasing the common interests and values among them. According to Robert Keohane, the main assumptions of neoliberalism are that the state is a rational actor which does not behave by self-abnegation but seeks the possible maximization of its gain under the conditions of stability in the international regime (Keohane, 1984). Moreover, Keohane believes that world politics are not completely dominated by cooperation and harmony; discord is a common fact in world politics and this is why for neoliberals such as Keohane the idea of international regime is highly important to maintain cooperation, which erodes the origins of conflicts (Hobson, 2000: 95).

It is vital to highlight, however, in this regard that international cooperation is not always antithetical to hegemony. Hegemony can create order based on asymmetrical relations and cooperation. At the same time, international cooperation can be facilitated by the international regime and can exist without the presence of hegemonic power (Keohane, 1984: 50). Cooperation between countries is a political process which starts in the
perception by each state of its preferences and interests and how they differ according to other states. Therefore, cooperation is the result of the adjustment of these interests and policies between these states, even if these adjustments include the negative inducement of one party (Keohane, 1984: 53).

Cooperation between states may result from a reaction to an existing or potential conflict. The idea of absolute harmony between states in world politics envisioned by the founders of the League of Nations and the United Nations is becoming a utopian and vanishing one because of the increase in the complexity of the international economy and its impact on domestic issues and policies in each country (Keohane, 1984: 55). Therefore, discord and the impediment of international cooperation are the results of the lack of trust and communications between states (Keohane, 1984: 69). Meanwhile, some neoliberals such as Robert Axelord accept some realist views, especially about the role of the state and anarchy. He believes that the state cooperates with others but aims to achieve the most possible absolute gain regardless of other states’ gain and satisfaction (Grieco, 1995: 159).

According to Schumpeter, wars are the result of the aggressive instincts of the minority who obtain power, therefore the solutions and strategies to demise the reasons behind wars are democracy and free trade (MacMillan, 1995). By establishing the liberal state, which is based on individual rights, freedom, equality, and representative government, the desires and incentives for wars and conflicts will be reduced (Burchill, 2005: 59). Peaceful foreign policies of democratic states are the results of shared democratic and
liberal principles and values and the reciprocal recognition and commitment to the role of international law. Some liberals assert that liberal states do not engage in international conflicts unless in the cases of self-defence or humanitarian reasons, wherein the other side is usually an undemocratic state (Burchill, 2005: 60). Neoliberalism assumes that the government of a democratic country where the role of law and people’s rights, dignity, freedom and participation in political life are all guaranteed will deal with other countries in the same manner in which it deals with its people; as a result, its foreign policy will be peaceful and civilised (Burchill, 2005: 67).

Many scholars of IR argued that the spread of democracy in the world after the end of the Cold War empowered the liberals and the Wilsonian vision of a peaceful world (Kegley, 1995: 10). For example, Francis Fukuyama argued that the spread of democracy and legitimacy, which are based on liberal principles, among states in the world would result in the reflection of these ideas at the international level and in the relations between countries and their foreign policies (Burchill, 2005: 57). Therefore, a reciprocal recognition between states would create a peaceful international order. On the other hand, neorealists responded to the liberal approach by claiming that the moral aspiration which liberalism overvalues will be challenged by the reality of the absence of an international hierarchy, and the fact that anarchy is a major permanent fact of the nature of world politics. In addition, neorealists claim that anarchy caused the homogenization of states’ foreign policies by socializing with each other under the strategy of power politics (Burchill, 2005: 57).
For Keohane, international regimes are autonomous from international anarchy and the distribution of power. Therefore, cooperation between states is engineered and constructed by the international regime. States value and consider long-term gains, which are provided and enhanced by the international regime, and while states are international agents’ powers, they can negotiate with each other and reach agreements. Meanwhile, the international regime helps states to overcome anarchy; however, all of these achievements and roles given to the regime cannot take place without making the international regime equipped with the sufficient autonomy from anarchy and hegemony (Hobson, 2000: 96). By contrast, hegemonic stability theory, derived from neorealism, assumes that cooperation and order take place only by the enforcement of the hegemonic power, mainly because states do not cooperate voluntarily and spontaneously. Therefore, cooperation and order are not granted forever; they depend on the hegemonic state’s power and policies and on the distribution of power. This, from the neorealist perspective, makes the decline of the hegemonic power and the decline of international order and regime linked together. Consequently, neoliberalism claims that it is superior to neorealism in explaining and analysing the continuity and efficiency of the international regime, regardless of the existence of a hegemonic power (Hobson, 2000: 98).

For many liberals, international order can only be achieved with the help and support of international institutions. According to Stephen Krasner, the origin of neoliberal institutionalism emerged as a result of the problems that neorealist hegemonic stability theory suffered from, especially its limited predictability of the continuity of the free trade regime and international cooperation post-1970s (Hobson, 2000: 95). Liberal
institutionalism and neorealism theories of IR agree upon the basic role of the state in an anarchical environment, however, liberal institutionalism believes that there is a high possibility of cooperation between states under the supervision and coordination of international institutions. For liberal institutionalism, international institutions offer the member state the opportunity of widening and broadening their interests, as well as chances of extra participation in world politics, which will help the state in identifying and achieving its interests under a set of agreed international manners and rules. Thus, international institutions are the stabilisers and organizers of international politics by orienting the member states behaviour in certain international issues and manners (Burchill, 2005: 64).

International rules and agreements increase the ability of the international system and regime to predict and organise the behaviours of different states to the extent that cooperation between them can take place without the presence of a dominant power to enforce order. As a result, international regime, from liberal institutional perspective, enhances trust and stability in an anarchical international environment (Burchill, 2005: 65). Moreover, Keohane argues that the role of the international institutions is not only to provide and enforce the rules of the international regime, but also to provide the states with information about each other and about the international system to make anarchy more malleable (Hobson, 2000: 102). Although Keohane concurs with Waltz on the importance of the outside-inside perspective in analysing the state’s behaviours, Keohane focussed on the role of the international regime and institutions and their impact on the state’s behaviour (Keohane, 1984: 26).
The main role and duty of the state according to liberalism is to meet its citizen’s economic and social needs; moreover, when the state become socially adaptive it possesses an agential power at the international arena which makes it contribute to world peace (Hobson, 2000: 64). However, the First World War, which took place at the apogee of the era of classical liberal internationalism, which is based on the minimalist role of the state, caused major criticism of this approach which could not prevent the emergence of anarchical environment. Moreover, for neoliberals, a positive state which is more active in the international arena is a requirement for world peace and welfare (Hobson, 2000: 73). For neoliberals such as J.A. Hobson, the capacity of the state to intervene against the negative economic impacts of capitalism, whether domestically or internationally, is important to achieve reconciliation in the struggle between classes and elites. Although Hobson believed that free international trade is essential for international peace, it will not evolve naturally without intervention of the state. In addition, Hobson argued that mitigating anarchy by achieving collective security by and for all states needs a commission of states able to use its power to foster peace and prevent wars (Hobson, 2000: 80, 81). As a result, some scholars, such as Hedly Bull, argued that the sovereign state is the best political institution which is able to create international order and eliminate anarchy (Hobson, 2000: 89).

Other scholars, such as Lake, argued that the increase of economic interdependence resulted in a reduction in the role of the state and an increase in the role of private organisations, whether within the state or among states (Kegley, 1995: 11). The people’s impact on the government and its foreign policy became more salient regarding many
international issues. In other words, neoliberalism made it clear that domestic and foreign politics are linked together and the boundaries between states are irrelevant; this Wilsonian vision was based on the belief that less barriers between countries would lead to less wars between them. Therefore, some neoliberals rejected the realist claim of the centrality of the state in world politics; instead, they believed that international organisations and agencies are the main actors at the international arena. Moreover, they believed that the contemporary modern state is decentralised, locally and internationally (Grieco, 1995: 153).

Liberals believe that states became more dependent on each other economically, making wars very costly for them, and this prevents wars. According to Mitrany, for example, the spread of industrialization and democratization made most states focus increasingly on welfare, economic growth, prosperity and social security. Therefore, they became less concerned with power politics and international prestige to the extent that made them perceive others as partners to cooperate with rather than enemies and rivals, as realism would like us to believe (Grieco, 1995: 154).

According to Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, the international society is best defined as a group of states and independent political communities which by their interactions and communications with each other establish rules and institutions in order to achieve their common interests and maintain arrangements between each other (Buzan, 1993: 330). There are different perspectives of the meaning of the international society. Bull argued that international society is associated and connected with the idea of international order,
which means that international society can only be established or emerged after the accomplishment of international order and stability. On the other hand, some scholars based their definition of international society by focusing on the definition of the term “society” in general. They argue that a society may evolve and grow naturally, and forms its common values and characteristics, or a society is made and constructed by the act, the will and the interactions of its members (Buzan, 1993: 333).

At the same time, some scholars argue that international society can only be built upon an international system because the international system is the basic and prior idea. As a result, the international system can exist without the international society. The same logic can be applied to the formation of the international system, which is composed of the states and the interactions between them, which include conflicts as well as harmony (Buzan, 1993: 331). Waltz argued that the impact of anarchy differs according to the type and level of interactions among the states, and the nature of the relations between states are determined by the capacity of the interaction between them (Buzan, 1993: 332).

The main aim of these temptations of defining international society is to find out when and how states (as parts of the international system) can be parts of the international society. Buzan argues that international society may evolve as a result of the performance and function of the state under the logic of anarchy without the existence of previous cultural ties between states. Although the Waltzian conception of anarchy may not result in a homogeneity between states, the interactions between them will facilitate the emergence of a sufficient level of factors such communications, trade, and balancing
which will be the cornerstone of the international society which is based on a primitive international system (Buzan, 1993: 344).

### 2.6 Differences and Overlaps between Neorealism and Neoliberalism

The neorealist-neoliberal debate is a major round of the continuing debate in IR theory (Smith, 1995: 22). According to Baldwin, neorealism and neoliberalism differ on several points. Firstly, neorealists believe strongly in that the nature and consequences of anarchy are major motivations behind the state’s behaviour compared to neoliberals. Secondly, neorealists assume that international cooperation is more difficult to achieve than neoliberals believe. Thirdly, neorealists believe more in the centrality of relative gains whereas neoliberals believe more in absolute gains. Fourthly, neorealists deal more with national security issues, while neoliberals deal more with political economic matters and how they affect international cooperation. Fifthly, neorealists look at the capabilities of states, whereas neoliberals look at intentions and perceptions. Finally, neoliberals believe that international institutions are capable of mitigating anarchy, whereas neorealists doubt that strongly (Smith, 1995: 23).

There are many points which differentiate the English School scholars of IR such as Hedley Bull from neorealists. Bull argues that international order does not require the presence of a world hegemonic power to apply and foster order; instead, he argues that all states can contribute collectively to guard the international system and maintain order. In contrast to Waltz, Bull believes that the balance of power is not inevitable and not
spontaneous, but it is a means of maintaining the order and stability in a multi-state system or society. More importantly, neorealists believe in the great impact of the invisible hand of anarchy on state’s foreign policies and on the international system. On the other hand, neoliberals assume that the ability of the state in mitigating anarchy at the international system is high and can be over the impact and the role of anarchy (Hobson, 2000: 91).

Two of the main assumptions of neorealism are that the only alternative to anarchy is hierarchy and states are always reluctant to engage in economic openness and cooperation because of the fear of absolute gain that the other state may achieve. On the other hand, for neoliberalism the developing of co-binding institutions and cooperation can mitigate anarchy without the creation of hierarchy. In addition, the fear and argument of relative-absolute gains are absent in advanced capitalist economies, where interdependency reached a level of complexity to the extent that none of the actors will be a loser or the winner forever (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999: 192). According to Scholte, many international and global issues have been raised for which the analytical value of structural realism has been negligible, and which it could not predict or explain systematically (Scholte, 1993: 8). Moreover, many liberals accused realists of ignoring the importance of economic welfare and interdependence as a path for international order, peace, harmony and prosperity (Kegley, 1995: 12).

Although Keohane and Waltz share the belief that the state practices high agential power in the domestic arena, they disagree regarding the extent to which it has the same power
internationally. Keohane attributes more freedom to the state in its foreign policy from international restraints than Waltz assumes. Another difference between Keohane and Waltz is that the former believes in the ability of states in resisting the nature and logic of the international system and making them compatible with their interests, especially their desire and willingness to cooperate in achieving gains, whereas Waltz assumes that states are hostages for the international system and its structure. Moreover, Waltz assumes that cooperation will make the state vulnerable to deception and cheating (Hobson, 2000: 102). One of the major differences between liberalism on one hand and realism and Marxism on the other is that liberalism gives little attention to clarifying its assumptions; it instead focuses on describing the actors and the reasons behind their behaviours and the outcomes of these behaviours (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 138). According to Keohane, liberal international theory does not provide us with a fully, perfect, comprehensive and complete account and explanation of IR. Therefore, many contemporary liberals accept some occasional explanations provided by different kinds of realists and Marxists to explain some coercive and exploitive aspects of IR (Zacher and Matthew, 1995: 140).

The differences between neorealism and neoliberalism demonstrate the vitality of the need for coherent theoretical concepts which can be applicable to the historical context of this research, which differs from the periods of the apogee of each of these two major theories. The interaction between the reality and aspirations does not unavoidably result in an overtaking of one side over the other, in some cases resulting in a unique position with some reflection of both sides. This is to say that this debate is not intended to result in a synthesis of neorealism and neoliberalism; rather it results in a partially developed
synthesis of some aspects of the two. Such an alternative is reflexive of the successful aspects of these two major theories and avoidance of their defects in contemporary political contexts.

Therefore, finding out the best theoretical concept which is capable of efficiently tackling a particular relationship is based on considering the temptations of including as well as excluding specific concepts from the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism. As a result, a mixture of theoretical concepts is required while dealing with asymmetrical relations such as those of the U.S.A and Jordan in the 2000s. The justification of a combination is, indeed, essential to rationalize the suggested theory for such asymmetrical relations. Therefore, the section below will explore liberal hegemony as a more focussed and up to date paradigm of liberalism as the first part of the theoretical combination that is used in this thesis. After that, the chapter will carry on exploring the second part of the theoretical combination, which is small states’ politics.

2.7 Ikenberry’s Liberal Hegemony

Historically, the reordering of IR took place after major wars in a specific region and time, such as the one which took place in Europe in 1648. However, afterwards, the reordering of IR become wider, which recently covered nearly all the globe and most international issues and concerns (Ikenberry, 2001: 8).
One of the remarkable facts and events after the end of the Cold War is the continuity of international order and alliance between the U.S.A and other advanced democratic and industrialised countries. Many observers expected major changes in the international arena after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. There was an anticipation of a decrease in the U.S. alignments and cooperation with the advanced democratic and industrialised countries. These expectations were based on the belief that Communism and the Soviet bloc were the threats which bound the Western countries together; on the contrary, that did not take place and the alignments and cooperation between the U.S.A and these countries continued and expanded (Ikenberry, 1998: 43). This was a major challenge to the neorealist approach in analysing and explaining the continuity and durability of the post war order which gave extra credit and attention to the liberal character of the international order. In addition, that emphasized the significance role of the international institutions in fostering cooperation and preventing exploitation between these countries after the Cold War. The main logic of this kind of orders is that the institutional and democratic characters of this order reduce the incentives of states to practice rivalry and balancing against each other or against U.S. hegemony in particular (Ikenberry, 1998: 44).

2.7.1 Liberal Hegemony and the U.S.A

There are several reasons why critiques of realism and liberal institutionalism are powerful. Firstly, realism clashes with the basic values and elements of the embedded liberalism found in the US government. In this regard, realism does not provide the
American policymakers with a favourable perspective of themselves and the world. Secondly, American scholars perceive war as only the last resort to protect the world from evil powers and to spread democracy. Realism, however, perceives war as a useful tool to maintain the balance of power, not to mention that realism does not categorise powers as good and evil; all are determined by power politics and survival doctrine. Thirdly, while realism believes that war is inevitable between states and therefore it is a pessimistic theory in essence, human progress is a deep American belief (expressed in such concepts as ‘land of the free’ and ‘manifest destiny’) which contrasts with the predominantly pessimistic character of realism. Fourthly, during the time of shaping the American culture and because of its geographical isolation, the U.S.A had a legacy in isolationist foreign policy which resulted in limited U.S. involvement in world politics, which was based on the origins of realism such as balance of power and alliance politics. All of that made liberal theories more attractive for the American people and policymakers. In addition, liberalism not only replaced realism in the U.S.A, but also reflected grass-roots American values more (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995: 49).

One of the significant results of the Second World War was the emergence of an open world economy and a hegemonic world order led by the U.S.A, which encouraged and facilitated economic interdependence and free trade between countries. That made the connection between U.S. hegemony and economic globalisation very strong. Moreover, the U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Second World War has aimed to establish and support international institutions such the United Nations (UN), Bretton Woods, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
and more recently the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Ikenberry, 2007: 41). The U.S.A not only intensively participated in the creation of these institutions and located itself in the centre of their activities, but also it made them useful for their members as well as for its ambitions and strategies. Ikenberry believes, as does Niall Ferguson, that the leading state “enhances its own security and prosperity by providing the rest of the world with generally beneficial public goods: not only in economic freedom but also the institutions necessary for the markets to flourish” (Ikenberry, 2007: 43).

The leading state provides stability and security for the international system by upholding the rules; in return, the other states agree to operate within the order. International institutions and the mechanisms, rules, and norms shape the international system and provide all states, including the hegemonic power, with the atmosphere where they all can participate willingly without the use of force, so they cooperate not only in economic issues but also in political and security issues. Therefore, the leading state restricts its use of power and this reassures the weaker states that they will not be dominated or exploited by the hegemonic power (Ikenberry, 2007: 43). However, some scholars, such as Mearsheimer, are suspicious about the validity and the inevitability of the international order, basing their argument on the fact that the international institutions have a limited role in maintaining international peace and order. Mearsheimer argues that there is little empirical evidence that international institutions can change states’ behaviour (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995: 47).
The major difference between Ikenberry’s theory of liberal hegemony on the one hand and neorealism and neoliberalism on the other is over the role of the hegemonic power and the international institutions in shaping international order (Ikenberry, 2001: 11). For neorealists, international institutions do not play a primary role in organising international relations and shaping order; moreover, they believe that hegemonic order and stability are based on the ability of the hegemonic power in practicing inducements and threat. On the other hand, Ikenberry argues that there are many cases, such as Britain in the nineteenth century and the U.S.A after the Second World War, where the hegemonic power’s behaviour in establishing order was not merely based on the concept of power but they acted in order to reach a mutually agreed set of norms and rules which required a practice of restraint in the use of power (Ikenberry, 2001: 12). Moreover, although after the demise of the Soviet Union as an external threat to the West and as a source of cohesion among the Western countries, they remained bound together and even deepened their ties instead of balancing against the U.S.A (Ikenberry, 2001: 13).

For neoliberals, the roles of the international institutions are to reduce cheating between states and to provide them with the relevant information while cooperating with each other. Moreover, they believe that the role of the institutions is more salient after the start of the decline of the hegemonic power. For Ikenberry, however, the profundity of the prevailing order between democratic and industrialised countries make the problem of cheating unlikely to take place or at least a secondary problem (Ikenberry, 2001: 17). Liberal hegemony also differs from offensive realism; while Mearsheimer argues that superpowers the U.S.A are always seeking hegemony by force, whenever necessary, to
accomplish their security and interests (Mearsheimer, 1994-1995), liberal hegemony argues that the role of the hegemonic international institutions is critical and essential in establishing international order and in securing cooperation between the U.S.A and other great powers as well as in other U.S. asymmetrical relations (Ikenberry, 2001:17). Therefore, it can be argued that liberal hegemony differs from these main theories on the level of analysis; at both the structural level and the foreign policy level which the theoretical framework of this thesis is addressing.

It is worth mentioning in this regard that hegemonic stability, which derives from neorealism, focused on the role of the hegemonic power in any relations and neglects the impact of the foreign policy of secondary states. If used in this thesis this would neglect some issues studied and would restrict the researcher from tackling the other side of the relations, which is Jordan in the case of this thesis. However, liberal hegemony does not ignore the role of the hegemonic power, its main argument is that the U.S.A deliberately allows its partners to raise their own preferences and desires within their relations with the U.S.A. Therefore, liberal hegemony assumes that US relations with other states have different characters than those which are implied by neorealism. These relations are based on extensive interactions between states in a wide range of issues. These interactions make the relations between the hegemonic power and its partners liberal in the sense of the existence of mutually agreed roles that allows the weaker side to be able to have an impact in shaping these relations. In other words liberal hegemony adopts from neorealism the impact of the international system and the role of the hegemonic power in shaping these relations but in different features. In addition, it adopts from
neoliberalism the impact of mutual harmony and cooperation between states especially when these states are a hegemonic power that will remain decisive in the international system and a small state that is willing to remain active within the this system.

The theory of hegemonic stability, as argued by Duncan Snidal, is with limited range and only applicable to certain conditions, issues and periods of time, although it claims comprehensiveness and longevity (Snidal, 1985: 579). In addition, contrary to the argument of hegemonic stability, the U.S.A became no longer able to practice an overwhelming dominance over European affairs (Snidal, 1985: 580), while the usage of liberal hegemony, which contradicts with hegemonic stability regarding the features of the relations between the states, to the study of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s in a Middle Eastern context, will broaden the inapplicability of hegemonic stability in different relations and periods of time that Snidal talked about.

The theory of hegemonic stability is powerful only when there is simultaneous approval of two main conditions: the presence of the hegemonic power to maintain international order and free trade, and that this order is beneficial for all parties in all affairs (Snidal, 1985: 582). The absence of these two conditions in U.S.-Jordanian relations made the theory of hegemonic stability narrow and inadequate for this thesis of which free trade is not one of its major pillars. On the other hand, liberal hegemony is more flexible and comprehensive for allowing the researcher to explore the features of these relations and to provide more details regarding different topics of these relations.
While one of the main assumptions of hegemonic stability is the decline of the hegemonic power as a result of providing free trade and public goods for the international system and for other countries, many scholars such as Joseph Nye, Samuel Huntington, Francis Bator, and Susan Strange disagree with this statement arguing that the U.S.A is not declining as a result of these policies (Grunberg, 1990: 444). In addition, Ikenberry argues that different U.S. policies, including being liberal hegemonic, are aiming and contributing in maintaining the U.S. status and in increasing its power, not the other way around (Ikenberry, 2001). In other words, the use of hegemonic stability would result in interpreting U.S. – Jordanian relations in the 2000s as if they are one sided and dominated by the U.S.A. Whereas liberal hegemony allows the researcher to investigate these relations in more detail and to tackle different important issues for the two countries that hegemonic stability considers as secondary issues and in some occasions do not exist.

According to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, the idea of American Empire is associated with the imperial character of the American constitution which will lead to the global reach of U.S. internal constitutional project. In another words, for Hardt and Negri, American empire is a process of extending the American ideas, beliefs, and culture all over the globe (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 182), while for Ikenberry, although the U.S.A is concerned with promoting liberty and order, it is expected to allow its allies to differ with the U.S.A in their external policies including in major issues occasionally, let alone in their internal affairs. Not less importantly, Adam Walson rightly distinguished between empire and hegemon as empire is the “administration of different communities form the
imperial centre” and hegemony is the ability of the hegemon of practicing influence and power some times over other countries regarding their external behaviours and leaving them independent in their internal affairs (Beeson and Higgott, 2005: 1174).

While Negri argues that a global empire constitutes the sovereignty of the market (Negri, 2008: 8), this thesis as mentioned above, does not take as of its main object to explore U.S.-Jordanian trade relations and the impact of the market on them. Moreover, the concept of American empire, as Mathew Morgan put it, is associated with the concept of globalization in both its dimensions; economically and culturally (Morgan, 2008; 146), which this thesis is not going to tackle while its focus is on the features of the relations between the governments of these two countries.

For some scholars, such as Loch Johnson and Kiki Caruson, the driving forces for U.S. foreign policies especially during G.W Bush two terms are unilateralism, selfishness, dominant ambitions and arrogance toward other countries (Johnson and Caruson, 2003: 9). However, other scholars, such as Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, argue that many scholars from different theoretical backgrounds criticise U.S. foreign policy based on selective and occasional cases (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2005: 254). In addition, although hegemony might attract resistance or enmity, U.S. hegemony has generally been indirect and at a distance, direct U.S. military intervention has been the exception not the rule (Beeson and Higgott, 2005: 1176).
The favourability of liberal hegemony to the study of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s is based on the assumption of the absence of exploitation whether form the small side to the hegemonic power leading to the decline of the hegemon as hegemonic stability argues, or the dominant power to the small power as Hardt and Negri argue who are oriented by communists and exploitive beliefs but surprisingly neglect the tradition of historical materialism (Boron, 2008: 25). Moreover, the overestimation of Hardt and Negri to the role of the UN and its different organisation where they argue about the equality between countries makes their work inadequate to the understanding of the current international system which has an asymmetrical character in which the U.S.A is a central player (Boron, 2008: 28).

2.7.2 Challenges to U.S. Liberal Hegemony

It has been argued that the unprecedented superiority of U.S. power after the end of the Cold War and after the beginning of the twenty-first century was simultaneous with an increasing tendency in the U.S. foreign policy toward a unilateral approach. The extreme and tremendous power of the U.S.A makes it sometimes give less attention to weaker states and its small allies (Ikenberry, 2003: 533). On the other hand, some people argue that although the opportunities for a U.S. unilateral approach have increased, with some usage of it occasionally, in general the U.S.A remained committed to the entire multilateral order which it has been at the centre of since its creation after the Second World War (Ikenberry, 2003: 536). For example, according to Fareed Zakaria, the U.S.A was the most supportive country to major international organisations and institutions and
their creation, even when it was at its peak of power and the most powerful country in the world, such as its support for the League of Nations and the United Nations. In other words; the U.S.A behaved unilaterally only occasionally, and then by pleading self-defence (Ikenberry, 2003: 538). In addition, there are deep systematic, institutional, domestic, and structural sources for multilateralism in the U.S. foreign policy. The main issues, however, which the U.S. unilateralism is most clear on, are the issues of arms control and the use of force (Ikenberry, 2003: 544).

The sources of unilateral approach rest in the fact that the unprecedented status of the U.S.A made her sometimes less aware of the costs of rejecting other states’ demands at the negotiation and bargaining table. Moreover, because the U.S.A became so powerful and its impact on different international issues and states is very huge, the attitudes and beliefs of some key figures in the U.S. foreign policymaking that were influenced by these U.S. power and status and who favoured the unilateral approach were enough to reflect a unilateral approach in the U.S. foreign policy. This makes many states perceive the attitudes of those U.S. administrative figures as the official and the lasting U.S. strategy in dealing with world politics (Ikenberry, 2003: 539). Moreover, the recent international structure, led by the U.S.A, made the views of those figures in the U.S. administration more effective than in other international circumstances. Although there are signs of unilateral dimensions in the U.S. foreign policy, which are mainly adopted by the neoconservatives, these tendencies are rejected by many other figures in the U.S. administration, as well as by many American people. In addition, many previous unilateral policies adopted by previous administrations resulted at the end in the creation
of multilateral initiatives. For example, Nixon’s cancellation of the Bretton Wood system resulted soon after in the U.S. creation and sponsoring of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is a major and active institution in the current international order (Ikenberry, 2003: 540).

Liberal hegemony is an essential paradigm in understanding U.S. foreign policy in its particular context toward specific countries, however, while this paradigm represents the features of the current U.S. political culture in both of its dimensions (U.S. liberal values as well as its wide ambitions as a hegemonic power), this paradigm can be qualified to be inclusive of other U.S. relations with other kinds of countries and contexts if some additions are made. While U.S.-Jordanian relations are undeniably asymmetrical relations, and because Jordan is a small and weak state according to many criteria, several expectations and behaviours by Jordan as a small country are expected. Therefore, an analysis of small states’ politics is required in order to be able to interpret these policies throughout the thesis. In addition, there are many concepts of liberal hegemony and of small states’ politics complementary to each other, and will be malleable to the study and the conceptualization of U.S.-Jordanian relations. Therefore, the section below will discuss the main features of small states and their politics in order to be able to conceptualise a theoretical framework that can be complementary to liberal hegemony in order to investigate the U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s efficiently and professionally.
2.8 Small States and International Relations

During the nineteenth century, especially after the emergence of the nation state, the study of small states was less attractive because of their limited role in the international arena, as they were defenceless to big nations. For example, one of the major enemies and threats to small states is the national unification state. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century and after the establishment of the League of Nations and the United Nations later on, and after the increased role of international law and the right of self-determination, small states became more secure and more important in the international arena than previously. Although after the Second World War major attention remained focussed on major players in the international system (favouring on a realist approach), the post-war world still favoured the participation of smaller powers more than any previous system of international relations, and after the end of the Cold War small states gained much activeness and importance in the international arena (Neumann and Gstohl, 2006: 9).

There are different ways to define small states. These definitions are based on different factors and criteria such as geographical size, population, and the state’s participation and influence in international affairs. However, many scholars perceive these criteria and definitions as unhelpful in the understanding and prediction of the foreign policies of small states, because they cannot be exclusive only to small states (Hey, 2003: 2). Therefore, some scholars focus on the idea of “perception” and how small states perceive themselves, and how that reflects on their foreign policies and abilities. Rothstein, for
example, argued that “a small power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by the use of its own capabilities and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of others”. Moreover, Keohane used a perception concept to identify small states: “[A] Small power is a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the system” (Hey, 2003: 3).

The size of the state is important not only at war times, but also in peace; big states with large economic resources and populations have more influence on international events and have more international prestige. On the other hand, small states are more affected by external pressures, and also because of their limited human and economic resources they face difficulties in surmounting obstacles and obtaining their needs. Meanwhile, human and material issues are not the only factors that determine the ability of the state; other issues such as policies’ efficiency, geographical location, level of development, cohesion of population and the level of internal support to the government are important factors and play a considerable role in determining the preferences of a small state and its foreign policy (Vital, 2006: 77).

2.8.1 Small States and the Problem of Security

Small states face different kinds of threats to those different kinds that states face, and perceive the same threats differently. The most important threats to small states are military, economic, and political threats. Buzan argued that the major political threat to a small state is when other powerful states question its existence or the legitimacy of its government. All of these threats or the possibility of them in the future have a major
weight in the calculations of the policymakers of small states (Knudsen, 1996: 26). Therefore, small states seek protection and support from major powers, especially when the international system and international norms are unable to protect them. However, the recent growth of the ability of the international system and international norms to resist and prevent wars resulted in an increase of the potentiality of conflicts within the boundaries of small states, especially when there is an invitation from powers inside the state to external powers for intervention (Knudsen, 1996: 24).

Economic threats take different faces; the increase of economic interdependency and market logic which are both based on asymmetric relations may result in unequal distribution of gains. The other economic threat a state may face is economic sanctions, which are very harmful for small state, especially when it faces it from a dominant state within its economic sphere (Knudsen, 1996: 25). Moreover, small states usually face general economic weakness, mainly because of their territorial smallness, which results in limited resources and markets. Therefore, when a small state is relatively safe politically and military, and is facing an urgent economic problem, it tends to sacrifice some of its political goals and sovereignty to obtain its vital economic needs (Handel, 2006: 157).

Most of the existing literature on small states’ foreign policy is based on the realist approach of IR, which was the dominant paradigm in small states’ politics during the Cold War, mainly because small states used to be very aware of their security and the external threats they were facing. However, after the end of the Cold War realism became
less relevant in explaining small states’ foreign behaviours, mainly because it focuses on the security of these states which have become safer these days. Therefore, Neack, Hey and Haney argue that extra attention should be paid to other factors, such as the individual leaders of these states, bureaucratic politics, and the state level, which includes other domestic factors in order to accomplish an advanced and contemporary understanding of the foreign policies of small states (Hey, 2003: 8).

2.8.2 Small States and the Level of Analysis

According to Rosenau, there are major factors that have major roles in determining the main level of analysis of small states’ politics. These factors are the size of the state, the level of development, and the political system of the state (Hey, 2003: 8). For Rosenau, the main levels of analysis are the international system, the state level (including bureaucratic, social, cultural, and public opinion), and finally the individual level (Hey, 2003: 9). Rosenau perceives the individual level as the most important factor for undeveloped and undemocratic states, regardless of their size. For developed states, however, he believes that the role of bureaucracy is the most important factor in determining and explaining the foreign policies of these states. For small states, the international system was ranked as the second factor after the individual level. According to Rosenau, the foreign policies of small states, especially undeveloped ones, are more likely to change according to the changes in both their leaderships and in the international system, and this change is more likely to take place than in other states which differ in terms of the size and level of development (Hey, 2003: 185).
However, although individuals are the most important factors in shaping the foreign policy of an undeveloped, small state, policymakers cannot ignore other domestic and systematic pressures, especially when considering that the legitimacy and survivability of their regimes are always at risk (Hey, 2003: 192). Therefore, international and regional politics are major forces behind the behaviour of small states. Moreover, less developed small states seek in their foreign policies to ensure their regimes’ security and legitimacy, and they have to engage in international institutions which provide them with credit and aids (Hey, 2003: 193).

2.8.3 Small States and the International System

From a systemic theorist point of view, when defining and studying small states the focus must be on the role of the state in the international system. While the system as well as the state dominates the international system, it has been argued that the state can be categorised according to its presence, role, and influence in the system (Keohane, 2006: 59). Therefore, a “system determining state” is the state which plays a critical role in the international system; as a result, small states can be called as “ineffectual states” because of their limited impact on the international system individually or collectively; even when they work as a group the impact of each state on the system will be minimal. Therefore, the foreign policies of these states are simple adjustments to the international reality rather than a rearrangement of it (Keohane, 2006: 59). According to Keohane:
A great power is a state whose leaders consider that it can, alone, exercise a large, perhaps decisive, impact on the international system; a secondary power is a state whose leaders consider that alone it can exercise some impact, although never in itself decisive, on the system; a middle power is a state whose leaders consider that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systematic impact in a small group or through an international institution; a small power is a state whose leaders consider that it can never, acting alone or in small group, make a significant impact on the system (Keohane, 2006: 60).

Some people argue that the study and analysis of small and great powers’ foreign policies requires different level of analysis in order to be able to predict and explain the behaviours of these different states (Elman, 1995: 175). There is also a scholarly consensus that because small and big states behave in different domestic and international contexts, their different foreign policies will reflect different constraints. For example, Snyder assumes that big and strong states are more influenced by their own domestic factors than by the international environment in the making of their foreign policies, mainly because they are less vulnerable to external threats (Elman, 1995: 176). Therefore, in order to explain and predict big states’ foreign policies, the “unit” level of analysis should be considered. On the other hand, domestic level explanations are not very useful in predicting and analysing small states’ foreign policies, which are concerned more about external pressures and threats and their survival. For these reasons, small states are more attentive to regional and international structures and the constraints they face (Elman, 1995: 176). According to Walt, because of small states’ vulnerability and their secondary position in the international system, their foreign strategies seek to
bandwagon with greater powers to ensure their security. Whether small states bandwagon with or balance against a great power depends on the kind of the threat they are facing, as well as the availability and the impact of other great powers in the international system; therefore, the international structure and systematic level of analysis are adequate in understanding the foreign policies of small states (Elman, 1995: 177).

2.9 Conclusion

As has been mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the construction of the theoretical framework for this thesis will take place in the next chapter, as the theoretical framework needs to be reflective of the methods and characteristics of this research. This chapter, however, has demonstrated the major different concepts of IR that the theoretical framework of this thesis is evolved from. Exploring these different theoretical concepts has been determinative as well as constructive in justifying the selection of the main concepts that are framing the core theory of this thesis.

The theoretical debate that has been conducted in this chapter resulted in highlighting the inadequacy of the exclusive usage of either neorealism or neoliberalism in the study of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. The narrowness and static of neorealism undermines its capacity of explaining different dynamics and details of U.S.-Jordanian relations during the era of the absence of balancing. Needless to say, Jordan is a small state with a limited ability to impact on the structure of the international system. Therefore, neorealism and its exaggerated focus on the international structure cannot
explain the features of the foreign policy of such a small state, especially in its interactions with a superpower like the U.S.A

On the other hand, neoliberalism gave sufficient account to the role of international institutions and the importance of economic cooperation between states while undermining the impact of security issues in shaping states policies toward each other (Smith, 1995: 23). However, Jordan and the U.S.A have substantial common mutual security interests that are explored in chapter four. These security interests are reciprocal interests with limited impact of international institutions upon them. In addition, although economic relations between the two countries are important, especially to Jordan, they are one-sided. Trade between the two countries is still at too early stage to claim that there is economic interdependence between the two countries (Rosen, 2004: 62-65). As a result, neoliberalism is sufficient to the study of U.S. relations with other countries that share with the U.S.A the profundity of institutionalism and trade that developed during a long period of time, such as those relations with European countries. Therefore, the use of neoliberalism would result in rather a simplistic, over-optimistic and unrealistic explanation of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s.

The choice and adequacy of liberal hegemony and small states’ politics is a natural consequence and a realistic outcome of the debate between neorealism and neoliberalism to the study of the relations between countries like the U.S.A and Jordan in the 2000s. Ikenberry’s work on liberal hegemony illustrated that the U.S.A. interacts with its allies based on liberal principles to achieve realist aims, such as hegemony and preventing
inhibition of its power. Therefore, Ikenberry’s work of liberal hegemony is a sensible temptation of describing the current international order especially in terms of the presence of an effective hegemony and its role in establishing order and maintaining cooperation among advanced and industrialised democratic countries (Ikenberry, 2001).

Therefore, the use of liberal hegemony is a well-calculated and rational step forward in explaining relations between countries that are witnessing increasing connectedness such as the U.S.A and Jordan. In other words, liberal hegemony is facilitating the understanding of the current move from power politics to interdependency, especially between countries that suffer huge power disparity.

However, Ikenberry focussed his attention on the relations between the U.S.A and these countries with less attention to other kinds of states, in a world where the U.S has an overreaching impact and interests including with small powers, especially in regions that are of great importance to the U.S, let alone that these small powers started to play a remarkable role. This role was also explained by different realist and liberalist theorists of IR. Therefore, while this thesis is addressing the relations between Jordan as a small state, which in many regards differ from the U.S allies that Ikenberry has mentioned, and the U.S.A during relatively the same period and characteristics of U.S. foreign policy that Ikenberry has explained, the chapter has had to necessarily identify the major concepts of small states politics in order to figure out the concepts that can be integrated and bound together with those of liberal hegemony in the next chapter to compose the theoretical framework of this thesis.
Chapter Three: Methodology, Methods, and Core Research Questions

3.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to demonstrate the relevant methodology that is used in this thesis. The chapter will illustrate and justify the characteristics, methods, core theory, and research questions of this thesis and how they are bound with each other, and how they suit the research topic. The reciprocal connectedness and mutual effect of the research style and approach on one hand, and the core theory and methods on the other will establish the logic of this thesis, which will result in raising the main research questions of this thesis at the end of this chapter.

The main methodological characteristics of this thesis are: firstly, it is based on qualitative and normative research and methods. Secondly, at different stages it is also an empirical study which employs quantitative methods. Thirdly, it is a critical study aiming to evaluate and assess the findings of this research and the chosen theoretical claims in this thesis by using the case studies in the following chapters. Finally, it is aware of and considers the realist philosophy of knowledge and science. This combination of characteristics is designed in order to avoid the limitations and the imperfections of each of these methodological approaches. By characterizing this research with these characters the research will be of good quality as much as possible. Therefore, this chapter will first justify these characteristics and why they are important and convenient for this thesis and for scientific social research.
After exploring the methodological characteristics, the chapter then provides detailed analysis of the core theory that is developed by a combination process of the two concepts of liberal hegemony and small states. The chapter will also illustrate the methods used in obtaining the required data for this research. As a result, the chapter will conclude by discussing the logic of this thesis by highlighting the interconnectedness between the methodological characteristics of this research and the core theory and methods used, and how this interconnectedness formulates the research questions of this research that shaped the empirical chapters of this thesis, chapters four, five and six.

3.2 Knowledge, Social Science, Qualitative and Empirical Research

According to Aristotle, truth and knowledge seeking are major activities and desires of a human’s life. In addition, there are major motivations for seeking knowledge, such as curiosity, and practical reasons and needs related to daily life (Goldman, 1999: 1). However, there are several assumptions and basic features of the scientific approach to knowledge. Firstly, the regularity and order of the natural world means that things can be understood, and changes to the order of these things can be studied and observed empirically (Nachmias, 1987: 6). The second assumption is that the human’s ability to gain knowledge about nature is applicable to and possible for social phenomena and the life of humans in general. While the human’s mind is capable of knowing nature and its laws, humans are also capable of making their own (and others’) minds amenable to scientific investigation, although scientific knowledge is tentative and changeable (Nachmias, 1987: 7).
The third assumption is that cause-and-effect relationships can be employed to understand and explain natural as well as social events and phenomena. This led to the assumption that scientific research and approaches are superior to unthinking, dogmatic belief in supernatural forces. Thus, scientific thinking must be critical and sceptical because knowledge is not self-evident. Finally, understanding the real world needs to be based on empirical experiences, which must use perceptions, senses and observations (Nachmias, 1987: 8).

Scientific social research must also meet other criteria, which should aim to achieve descriptive and explanatory inferences based on empirical information. While facts can be gained by different direct methods, inference is a vital characteristic of any research to obtain data that beyond observation. In addition, the research must contribute to the area of social science by using explicit, codified and public methods and procedures in order to allow others to assess the conducted research (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 8). While inference is imperfect, uncertainty is a major characteristic of knowledge and social research, and scientific social research must be able to acknowledge and estimate a reasonable level of uncertainty of the gained knowledge and results to allow a level of interpretability. Finally, it should be aiming at knowledge and scientific enterprise and the use of scientific methods and rules, not only focusing on the subject matter while its material is endless (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 9).

The basic activity of qualitative research is the process of evaluating and assessing the interpretation of the subject matter. In addition, qualitative analysis is based on the
process of connecting and reconceptualising the available data which describes the studied objects in order to get a fresher analysis about the subject matter (Dey, 1993: 30). Such a process of connecting concepts will take place later in this chapter while framing the theoretical framework of this thesis, which will shape the discussion of later chapters.

There are major features that characterise qualitative research. These features are: firstly, qualitative research is a philosophical and interpretive method aiming to know how a social phenomenon can be interpreted and experienced; secondly, it is based on both flexible and sensitive methods of data generating; thirdly, qualitative research is based on methods which lead to analysis and argument building that lead to advanced understanding (May, 1987: 3). Therefore, good qualitative research must meet some criteria, such as not only providing description but also explanation and argument. In addition, it must provide the reader with the necessary data which they can judge; it should be fallible and not beyond judgment. While qualitative research focuses on the understanding and explanation of the social world through the interpretation of its participants, it must be aware of the possibility of not being neutral; therefore the researcher must involve critical self-scrutiny during the research process (May, 1987: 8).

Qualitative research seeks to ground the used theory in reality by trying to conceptualise the studied phenomenon in a way that is compatible with the theory. As a result, some critics accuse qualitative researching of avoiding challenging or testing the theory, which is a major requirement of good research (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 315). Although qualitative research is accused of focusing on in-depth knowledge of the
subject at the expense of generalizing the findings of the research for other similar cases or topics (Burnham et al., 2004: 31), generalisation in the social world and science does not eliminate the importance of details; knowing about a specific entity is useful and helpful in generalising knowledge in other studies. In addition, more knowledge about specific issues can be gained by knowing more about the general, and vice-versa (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 35).

It is worth emphasising here that this thesis is broadly empirical, but not empiricist. Empiricism views knowledge as grounded in facts or events which can only be observed and what can be counted as knowledge is the information which talks about and refers to atomised objects (Smith, 1996: 19). It has been argued that science in general can be perceived as the linkage of empirical facts and the reason behind them. In addition, science is believed to be associated with the systematic process of gaining knowledge and search for truth about an empirical facts and problems. Therefore, in order to talk about a science of IR there should be relations between countries and empirical problems or issues within these relations (Krippendorff, 1982: 17).

It is assumed that empiricism underestimates the necessity and the role of theoretical assumptions and concepts in explaining social phenomena, both of which have major roles in the ability to observe and describe things (Smith, 1996: 20). It is impossible to perceive and understand facts without interpretation, which always needs theory. As a result, good empirical research must be guided by a theory in order to have and shape the right questions and inquiries in the study being conducted. Therefore, the theory and the
empirical research must be strongly connected. At the same time, after choosing the adequate theory, conducting the empirical research must be based on choosing the right observables that are relevant to the chosen theory (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994: 30). For example, Halliday argued that although facts are important in IR, there should be a preconception and distinction between which facts are more significant, because facts do not speak for themselves and can be interpreted differently (Halliday, 1994: 25).

There is a reciprocal relationship between theory and empirical research in the sense that the theory shapes the aim and the argument of the research. In addition, the explanation and interpretation of a political concept or phenomenon must be empirically tested in order to measure the scientific adequacy of the explanation and interpretation. At the same time, the finding of the inquiry may result in a revision of the theory in future studies (Mayer, 2002: 124). Using concepts in social sciences is very important and useful in describing a phenomenon, however, in empirical researches the use of concepts must lead to a high degree of empirical reference even if the concept does not refer directly to an observable. Therefore, the precision of the concept is very important and the concept must refer to one set of properties related to the phenomenon; moreover, the concept should relate in some way to the theoretical concept which the theory is based on (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 21).

In order to adopt a critical approach of studying a phenomenon or doing a critical social research it is required first to explore the meaning and the advantages of being critical of something (Hammersley, 1995: 21). The basic meaning of being critical of something is
to be vigilant of its defects by neutral intention. According to Horkheimer, the intention of a critical approach should be social totality and concerned with human needs and ideals based on the integration between philosophy and empirical researching (Hammersley, 1995: 26).

One of the major characteristics of critical inquiries in social sciences is that critical inquiries combine explaining and understanding approaches together. This approach allows critical theorists to be practical in conducting their research and gaining knowledge about it (Bohman, 2003: 91). In addition, a critical social inquiry is the one which produces practical knowledge about the topic in the sense that it can be reflective of different social perspectives and criticisms. This reality of critical research is embodied in the rejection of the demand of a single unified theory to be employed in all historical contexts, mainly because the comprehensiveness of a social theory may undermine the explanatory power of the theory itself and limiting the understanding of the subject matters (Bohman, 2003: 93). In IR therefore, the main aims of critical theories are the reinterpretation and restructuring of political ideas by challenging and replacing different existed approaches (Brown, 1994: 58).

Realism, as a scientific model of explaining and understanding, avoids the positivist and relativist traditions of epistemology. Realism’s main feature is that explanation is essential in the advancement of scientific knowledge (Pawsan and Tilley, 1997: 55). According to realist philosophers, such as Van Fraassen, the growth and development of science is a process of endless self-correction and discovery rather than invention
(Goldman, 1999: 244). In addition, Fraassen argued that scientific theory is empirically adequate for the field and to the real world (Goldman, 1999: 245).

Bhaskar argued that philosophical realism is committed to the belief of the existence of some disputed kind of being. In addition, philosophical realism argues that people’s behaviour is affected by the knowledge they have about their social world, which does not exist independently of this knowledge (May, 1987: 12). Therefore, and because the people’s knowledge may be partial or incomplete, the duty of the researcher in social sciences is to explain social observations (May, 1987: 13). According to Quine, all kinds of knowledge, including scientific knowledge, are a synthetic and human-made ‘fabric’ (George, 1994: 143).

On the other hand, Van Fraassen argued that scientists reject the realist’s conjunction of consistent theories because they are rather pragmatic. Grander argued that scientists from different approaches such as realists and instrumentalists have different views and perspectives in the use of theories in social sciences (Enfield, 1991: 479). Nonetheless, a sensible theory is the one which can serve the researcher or the practitioner, such as an ordering framework in the usage of the available data in predicting and explaining empirical phenomenon of the real world. Moreover, an adequate theory is one which can be embodied in the field in the sense that it can help the researcher in conceptualizing and prescribing the major objects and events related to the topic or at least to hypothesise them accordingly (Sayer, 1992: 50).
There are different perspectives regarding the development and advancement of a science; some scholars argue that the processing of a science results from the modification and reinterpretation of old and existing ideas and theories of this science. On the other hand, others suggest that the development of a science takes place only after dramatic and fundamental changes and developments took place in the subject matter, which essentially would result in rejection of previous ideas and beliefs (Enfield, 1991: 468). Popper affirmed that the development of science is a rational process. In addition, Lakatos argued that the replacement of a theory by another one is also part of the rational process in the development of any science (Nicholson and Bennett, 1994: 199).

The methodology of IR is not a concern of international issues and affairs themselves, but about how these issues are studied and researched, although they are normally overlap and interdependent (Nicholson, 1985: 56). The recent debate over theories of IR resulted in a methodological debate about the discipline, with issues such as that a major reason for methodologies in IR is to develop the relationship between the field itself and the real world, but this relationship was a challenge to the field in some occasions (Halliday, 1994: 23).

The study of IR faced a dispute between two camps; those who favoured the idea that the field should be studied based on the classical approach, which uses the same methods for the study of history and classical political theory. On the other side were those who favoured applying the usage of scientific methods in the study of IR and neglecting the
The importance of linking the development of this field to the study of history (Little, 1991: 465).

Waltz argued that the methodological errors in studying IR resulted in undermining the understanding of IR and its development as a science. This led, according to Waltz, to the need of assessing and evaluating the methodology of studying IR (Little, 1991: 470). In addition, Waltz believed that the use of methods is just a tactical device which could easily result from the adequacy and appropriateness of the logic behind the use of these methods, the methodology and the subject matters. Therefore, it is important for any researcher to be aware of choosing the right methods and methodology which suits the researcher’s questions but at the same time not allowing the methodology or the theory to dictate these questions and the nature of the topic (Little, 1991: 471).

3.3 The Core Theory

The advancement or modification of a scientific theory is a response to a crisis that the theory is facing or because of scepticism of its adequacy among its practitioners. In addition, competition and tension between two major theories has been, historically, resolved by the evolvement of a third theory that combines and unifies their most relevant and compatible assumptions and principles (Enfield, 1991: 469-479). However, in order to have a useful theory it must meet several criteria, such as: firstly, it must be testable in the sense of its applicability to the real world to the extent that its assumptions can be used in supporting or falsifying the expected behaviours of the observables; secondly, the
components and assumptions of the theory used should be logically connected and compatible with each other without inconsistencies; thirdly, the theory must be communicable in the sense that other specialists in the field can understand and examine its assumptions and hypotheses; and fourthly, it must be general by being applicable to different empirical cases and periods of time (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 20).

The core theory of this thesis, which will be addressed later in this chapter, is embodied in a combination of some theoretical concepts and assumptions of both the works of Ikenberry regarding the current international liberal order, and the U.S. role in it on one hand; and the one of small states’ foreign policies and their role in international relations on the other. The major concept of Ikenberry’s work is embodied in what is known as strategic restraint, which will be discussed in the next section. As explained in the previous chapter, Ikenberry’s work is based on a critical perspective of the two major theories of international relations, neorealism and neoliberalism. His analysis is based on the realisation of empirical realities regarding the current international order and the U.S. role in it, especially since the end of the Cold War.

The use of some theoretical assumptions regarding small states is highly important in this thesis for two reasons: firstly, the reality of Jordan as a small state requires the usage of some concepts which suit its criteria in order to obtain reliable and accurate data. Secondly, the combination of Ikenberry’s work and small states theory are compatible and complementary for each other, especially when dealing with relations such as those of U.S.-Jordanian relations, mainly because Ikenberry focuses his analysis on the
hegemonic behaviour and perspective in general; therefore, some concepts of small states’ politics are essential and are required to accomplish a more comprehensive perspective of the relations between these two countries.

This combination will strengthen this thesis in different ways. It will result in an assessment of the adequacy of the two works, Ikenberry’s and those on small states. The interaction between the two in an empirical case will examine and test their basic principles in general. This interaction will illustrate the strengths and defects of the two theoretical concepts and their explanatory power based on the real world of contemporary international politics. More importantly, while this combination will be based on a conceptual selection of both works, the combination will result in narrowing down the theme of this theoretical framework to establish an original and more focussed argument that the thesis is concerned with.

The choice of the theoretical framework was made after careful consideration of the research’s aims and questions. In order to understand and explain U.S.-Jordanian relations in the twenty-first century the theory used must grasp the multidimensional nature of the topic. Therefore, the use of only one part of the theoretical combination will be problematic, partial, ineffective, and unfortunate, especially when taking into account the possible comprehensiveness of the combination. In addition, while the current international order and system and the status of the U.S.A in it seems to be relatively static for the foreseeable future, most of the other states in the system seem to be secondary if not “small” compared to the U.S.A, therefore, if the theoretical combination
proves to be very successful and adequate for the study of the U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s, it can be applied to other U.S. relations, especially with those in the Middle East regarding many contemporary international issues, concerns, and dilemmas that they share with Jordan in their relations with the U.S.A, or at least the use of this combination may guide to the necessary sense of direction toward a more adequate and comprehensive theoretical framework to contemporary similar topics.

3.3.1 Liberal Hegemony and U.S. Strategic Restraint

As discussed in the previous chapter, there are different interpretations and theoretical claims regarding the international order. From the liberal hegemonic perspective, establishing order between states with huge power asymmetries seems to be difficult and undesirable for both sides; the hegemonic and the periphery, unless there is assurance that such an order is beneficial and vital for both. Therefore, the U.S.A has to engage in “strategic restraint” in its relations with its allies in order to guarantee their compliance and cooperation. By doing that the U.S.A will assure weaker states that it will not abandon or dominate them on one hand, while on the other it is reassured that these states would participate within the order cooperatively (Ikenberry, 1998: 45).

The character of the international order is changeable according to the change in the state’s capacities to restrain its power at the international arena. The most recent development in what has been called “strategic restraint” is embodied in establishing intergovernmental institutions in order to institutionalise the relations between states. The
The main outcome of the U.S. strategic restraint is obvious in the absence of any balancing power against U.S. unipolarity after the end of the Cold War. Most of the great powers which could be the potential challengers to the U.S.A prefer to comply with the
U.S. policies mainly because broadly speaking they believe that U.S. intentions are not hostile to their interests (Brown, 2005: 237), not to mention that any changes in the U.S. hegemonic order would be very costly for many states, including those who have the potential ability to change the order, because of the substantial connectedness which emerged around different organisations and economic activities which are already established and supported by the U.S.A and the current order. In another words, the U.S. hegemonic order became so deep and profound for both the leading state and for the periphery to the extent that it is very difficult to be changed, which is what makes it stable and expansive (Ikenberry, 1999: 139).

The major belief that recent U.S. foreign policy has been based on is that the U.S. hegemonic leadership and international cooperation are complementary to each other (Keohane, 1984: 179). By adopting and fostering an open world economy the U.S.A aimed to achieve many vital aims: firstly, to obtain accessibility to the markets and resources in different regions in the world, to help in enhancing the wealth, power and security of its nation. The second aim is political as well as economic, that by integrating in the world economy the U.S.A will be able to influence the political and economic strategies of these states to guarantee their cooperation and ensure the openness and the interdependence of the world economy, which are crucial factors for U.S. prosperity and its hegemonic position in the world (Ikenberry, 2007: 43). Thirdly, by deliberately increasing the interdependence between great powers as well as between small states and the U.S.A, the desire of these powers to gravitate against the U.S.A and to become its rivals and competitors decrease. In other words, this strategic interdependence aimed to
make the potential competitors have less desire and be less able to become fully autonomous from the leading power. Finally, the U.S. policies had the aim of creating a path for democratic values and principles in undemocratic countries which are part of the world economy to expand the order and its hegemony (Ikenberry, 2007: 45).

In response to the main liberal institutional scholars such as Ruggie, Keohane, and Martin, who believe in the efficiency and superiority of liberal institutional theory, Mearsheimer argues that their claim of the state and international institution’s behaviours are consistent with realism in many occasions and aspects. Mearsheimer asserted that the main genuine motivation behind the behaviours of these institutions and their members is power politics (Mearsheimer, 1995: 84). In addition, he asserted that international institutions do not independently change state behaviour. However, he does not deny the role of these institutions in facilitating cooperation between states by settling gain distribution disputes, but he is unconvinced of the claim that international institutions are a source of peace between states (Mearsheimer, 1995: 87).

International orders are established at the international arena after major wars and international events. After the end of a global conflict and at the beginning of a new era which witnesses the establishment of a new international order, the dominant and victorious power will find itself more powerful than before and than other powers. It faces at this stage a major and a determinative crucial crossroad, not only for the dominant power itself but also for all the international system and the theme of IR. This crossroad is about the choices and strategies that the dominant power will adopt and how
it will affect the international order, and centre on whether the power isolates itself from the international arena or engages more profoundly in global issues with its greater capacity and influence. Therefore, while the leading state may choose to engage in international politics in a leading manner with all its overwhelming weight in order to establish a durable and survivable international order, it must override the fears of its weaker partners of being dominated or abandoned under the new order and the hegemonic status of the dominant power (Ikenberry, 2001: 4).

Two variables determined the incentives and capacities of the dominant power to employ international order and political control. Firstly, the power disparities between the dominant state and other states are very effective in this regard. The greater the power disparity is the more ability the leading state will have in employing international order. This will be embodied by encouraging both sides, the hegemonic power and the weaker state, to engage in strategic restraint, by the dominant state’s ability not to use its surplus power and grant some of it to international institutions. Secondly, the more democratic the states which are involved in institutional order the stronger the interlocking between these states will take place (Ikenberry, 2001: 5). When the hegemonic power is a liberal state, the secondary state has many channels and accessibility to the hegemonic power’s policymaking mechanism in order to represent its interests and to make its voice heard. Moreover, the liberal features of the hegemonic state offer a great deal of transparency, so the secondary state will not be surprised by any policy that the leading state may adopt and it will be aware of the decisions that the leading state is intending to make regarding
a specific issue of mutual interest. Therefore, a reciprocal influence takes place between the core state and the periphery regarding policymaking (Ikenberry, 1999: 186).

3.3.2 Small States’ Foreign Policies

Some scholars summarize the behaviour of small states by expecting them to exhibit limited involvement in international affairs, adopt a narrow foreign policy limited to their regions only, prefer using diplomatic and economic tools to military ones, choosing neutrality, obeying international law and engaging in international agreements and organisations, depending on superpowers to ensure their security and vital needs, they behave cooperatively, and finally they focus their foreign policies mainly on guaranteeing their political survival (Hey, 2003: 5). However, Hey argues that this list of expected behaviours is too long to be exclusive only to small states and at the same time some of these characteristics are contradicting. For example, it is difficult for a small state to be neutral while allying itself with a superpower which provides the small state with security and supports it needs. Therefore, it is very important to understand the nature of the international system and conditions under which a small state operates. For example, Paul Smith argues that it is important to focus on the international system and adopt the system level of analysis in order to understand the behaviours of small states, mainly because they are weak to the extent that they always behave reactively to the international status. In another word, the behaviours of small states are shaped according to the issues and conditions outside their borders which are determined by international politics and superpowers (Hey, 2003: 6).
According to Rothstein, there are three aspects which can be generalised for small power politics; outside help is always needed for a small state, a small state’s margin of safety is narrow and the time available to correct mistakes is limited, and small states’ leaders are always aware of the unalterable weakness of their states. Although these aspects are shared by some big states on some occasions, they are more prevalent in small powers (Keohane, 2006: 56). Moreover, Michael Handel argues that while small states are preoccupied with the vitality of their survival and security, this makes them more affected by the policies of other states and that leaves little room for domestic or bureaucratic factors in the making of their foreign policies. According to Handel, the international system in which small states perform is very important for the understanding of small states’ foreign policies, which are expected to be very rational and focussed on seeking survival and the maximization of benefits (Handel, 2006: 150). Other scholars such as Elman and McGraw argued that small states’ domestic politics are paramount in shaping and changing its foreign policies. As a result, it is difficult to generalize whether international or domestic politics is the supreme factor in the foreign policies of small states, however, it can be argued that only when a small state guarantees that it will not jeopardize its international interests, especially with great powers, will it consider its domestic factors a priority in its foreign policy (Hey, 2003: 7).

Scholars of small states argue that small states are, or should be, moral actors, and they can be the glue which supports the cohesion of the international system, being more responsible actors than great powers. Moreover, they believe that great powers and their selfishness and the desire they have for domination make them the major destabilizing
actors in the international order (Sens, 1996: 86). On the other hand, other scholars accuse small states of behaving irresponsibly by bandwagoning with growing and threatening powers in order to provide them with the security which small states are always concerned about. They argue that one of the reasons for destabilising the international system is when small states empower a growing great power to be further out of the equilibrium (Sens, 1996: 88). As Rothstein argued “If power corrupts, so does the lack of it” (Rothstein, 1968).

Nevertheless, the role of small states in the international system can be developed by the strategies they adopt; they can be main players in stabilising the system and activating the role of the international organisations and institutions. In addition, they can also be a mediator between other states and participate in enhancing the cohesion of the system, especially if their own interests are better served in a more cooperative and peaceful international environment, particularly if the risks and the sacrifice which may result from such policies is limited (Sens, 1996: 90).

Although small states are constantly conscious of and preoccupied with their survivability and security, they survived and still exist and some of them are very active. They differ in their sensitivity towards their survival, depending on their geographical location, but most of them share the inability to relax their vigilance on security issues and are always on alert to external factors (Handel, 2006: 152). In addition, small states may be unable to protect themselves, but they can manoeuvre within the international system to get help from other states, especially when they have the freedom to choose
their great and strong allies and know how to use them and the international system and tensions between great powers. Therefore, in many cases, the danger for a small state is higher when it isolates itself from the international system (Handel, 2006: 190). Therefore, it is argued that small states have more freedom to manoeuvre within the international system than classical IR theories expect, depending on their policies and on the surrounding conditions; as Keohane stated, the compliance of small states is not always guaranteed (Ingebritsen, 2006: 289).

There are different views about what determines the survivability of a small state; Vital argues that long-term survival depends on small state’s own policies and the quality of these policies in terms of making the right decisions based on the wisdom and smartness of its policymakers (Vital, 1971). On the other hand, Mathisen believes that the policies of a small state cannot make a significant impact to its survival on the long run; external factors and mainly powerful states will remain having the upper hand in determining the security and the survival of a small state (Knudsen, 1996: 8). The response to Mathisen’s beliefs is that although the hegemonic power will retain the upper hand and be committed to the support of its allies, it also aims to restrain its usage of power and resources in its relations in order to reduce the cost of its foreign strategies, and to make the international order which it rules expansive and attractive for small as well as for major powers (Ikenberry, 2001: 131).

Different variables should be considered while examining power disparities, most of which are external ones. These variables are: the strategic location of the small state from
the perspective of great powers, the tension between great powers, the history of the relations between the small state and the great power, the relations between the small state and other rivals or allies for great powers, the role of the multilateral frameworks in stabilising power disparity, and the phase of the power cycle in which the superpower operates (Knudsen, 1996: 9). Not all of these variables are equally important, they differ from one case to another, but taken together, the interaction between them define the international and political environment of power disparity which have a substantial impact on the security and foreign policies of small states (Knudsen, 1996: 17).

Based on this discussion, the strength or weakness of a small state can be measured by examining its ability in withstanding external and internal threats and pressures and in its ability to perform its own choice of policies. Some small states overcome their weakness by allying themselves with big powers, but that normally be at the expense of their autonomy and ability to manoeuvre (Vital, 2006: 79). Therefore, for a small state, testing its ability in resisting other states’ demands and measuring its capacity to manoeuvre are more accurate in identifying its power and in predicting its policies accordingly (Fox, 2006: 40).

3.3.3 The Combination of U.S. Liberal Hegemony and Small States

From the discussion above, the foreign policies of small states can only be accurately studied and interpreted while attributing them to the major characteristics of world politics and the international system with consideration of the prevailing paradigm, such as the one of Ikenberry’s liberal hegemony, which has been highlighted in the previous
chapter and explored above in this chapter. In addition, while small states are always concerned about their security, which makes them affected more by the international system as discussed above, they are more willing to cooperate with others and participate effectively in maintaining the international order (Hey, 2003: 50; Sense, 1996: 68). Therefore, the hegemonic power’s practice of strategic restraint that Ikenberry stressed is a major guide for the expectations of the foreign policies of both sides, the hegemonic power and the weaker state (Ikenberry, 1998: 45).

This acknowledgment of these major characteristics of the policies of both sides rationalises the expectations of small states to be more responsible in achieving their security and survivability, whether by their ability in withstanding external pressures (Fox, 2006: 40) or as Vital argued by adopting the right and smart policies that are compatible with their vital needs (Knudsen, 1996: 8). This will fundamentally require small states to be equipped with the necessary ability in manoeuvring in their foreign policies at the international arena, especially with the hegemonic power, as far as possible, to overcome their vulnerabilities.

The accomplishment of the priorities and survivability that shape the foreign policies of small states do not result solely from their own policies, nor from the support and protection offered by the hegemonic power; they are rather obtained from the policies of small states which are based on the combination of the recognition of both the realities of the international order and the role of small states in it on one hand, and the implementation of the hegemonic power’s policies and terms in the international system
and its consequent implications. Therefore, the activeness of the small state in the international system and its support to the hegemonic power to achieve international order and its vigilance of the mechanisms that determined the priorities of the hegemonic power accordingly are essential for the small state to overcome its security problems and achieve survivability. Consequently, from this theoretical framework, it can be assumed that while democratic and industrialised countries willingly cooperate with the U.S.A, small countries like Jordan have extra vital incentives and interests to be active and compatible in their behaviours with the liberal international order and U.S. hegemony in the twenty-first century. Meanwhile, for a small state like Jordan, being an active and reliable U.S. agent must not prevent it from manoeuvring to utilize from such a liberal order to withstand occasional detrimental U.S. exigencies.

3.4 Methods of the Thesis

According to de Vaus, the importance of the research plan is to enable the researcher to find the necessary, valid, objective, and accurate data for the research questions by using the appropriate and available methods (Burnham et al., 2004: 33). Therefore, the research methods are central in the process of finding results in any political inquiry and designing them is an essential element of political science in general (Burnham et al., 2004: 1). Bryman argued that good research is the one which is well designed and has a framework for data collection and analysis according to the priorities of the research (Burnham et al., 2004: 30). The research design also determines how the research will be conducted, using
a combination of methods and strategies is important in order to provide complementary data to support the results (Burnham et al., 2004: 31).

The unjustifiable increase in the use of quantitative methods in political research at the expense of epistemological inquiries resulted in many cases in the inadequacy and inefficiency of these methods (Mayer, 2002: 125). Therefore, Cox suggested that theory and methodology are for someone and for some purposes that suit the research topic; in addition, theory and methods should be connected and compatible with each other and must be for a specific purpose for each researcher and each topic (Burnham et al., 2004: 276). For this research, side-by-side with elite interviewing, archival and document analysis will take place. Moreover, investigating and analysing academic materials is a key method of this thesis. This method is highly significant, reading these materials is essential to integrate and connect different parts of the data with each other to obtain the required ground for the analysis of the subject matter (Dey, 1993: 82). This would result in a combination of different methods, which are believed to deepen the outcomes of any research (Burnham et al., 2004: 206).

Most styles of interviewing share the same feature, such as that they engage in an interaction and dialogue between the researcher and the interviewee (Mason, 2002: 62). According to Kahn and Cannell, interviews are “a conversation with a purpose” (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 108). As a result, the researcher’s ontological perspective gives an account of the people’s view, knowledge, interpretations, and experience which are major part of the social reality that the research is exploring (Mason, 2002: 63). In
addition, there is a pragmatic reason for choosing qualitative interviewing; the required data may be unavailable by other means. Moreover, interviews will help the researcher to explore the research questions from different angles, especially when the researcher is using other methods. Interviewing is also a method which provides the researcher with large amounts of data in a very short time (Mason, 2002: 66).

Elite interviews are those which focus on individuals who are considered to be influential, well-informed and expert in the research topic and area. The advantages of this kind of interview are that the interviewee’s position in the realms related to the research enable them to offer the researcher an overall view of the topic as well as vital details and information, whether related to the past, present or even future plans related to the issues; they will be in the heart of the topic (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 113). For political research, elite interviewing is a key technique mainly because it is an effective way for the researcher to obtain vital information about decision making from experts about the topic. Because of the fact that qualitative interviewing is based on the assumption that knowledge is constructed more than excavated, the interview’s questions should focus on the interviewee’s knowledge and experience rather than asking hypothetical questions and scenarios (Mason, 2002: 68). In addition, the high knowledge and intellectual ability of the interviewee in the topic makes the researcher neutral and limited in their ability to capriciously manipulate the information and the matter under discussion during the interview (Burnham et al., 2004: 205).
Interviews in general have their own problems which the researcher who is using them should be aware of when designing research strategies. Because of the importance of the interaction and cooperation between the researcher and the interviewee, the latter may be unwilling to cooperate with researchers or to share some valid information they have, as well as unwilling to support the researcher’s desire to explore the topic (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 110). In addition, the most important elite people tend to be very busy, which may cause difficulties for the researcher in terms of access and sufficient time during the interview. More significantly, on some occasions, the researcher may have to adapt the interview and its structure and questions to meet the desires and predilections of the interviewee person, especially when considering the fact that they may have the ability to take charge of the interview and avoid responding to specific advanced and sensitive questions and inquiries (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 114).

Although elite interviewees may offer the researcher the needed vital information, they may cause some scientific risks, especially if the researcher lets them shape the researcher’s definitions and concepts of the observables and the research process with their invalid information (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 321). This may happen if the researcher is not aware of the facts, or if the respondents give limited or inaccurate information in their answers to the questions, or they provide the researcher with misinformation when tackling ideological, personal or sensitive issues (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 322). However, these problems can be overcome if the researcher has strong conceptualization of the research problem and questions, as well as advanced knowledge of the topic in general (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 115). No less
importantly, while the researcher may not have full control over the interview, the researcher must not take all the information provided by elite people as factual data because understanding political behaviour requires a distinction between what is fact and what is claimed to be a fact and true by politicians and elites. Consequently, the researcher should interview more than one source of information, especially when collecting data regarding very crucial events or concepts related to the topic, and compare the provided information and analyze them carefully and compare them also with the data obtained by other means and methods (Manheim, Rich and Willnat, 2002: 323).

While the researcher should be knowledgeable enough about the topic in order not to be manipulated and misled by invalid or unbalanced answers and information, the intentions of the first two expanded chapters of this thesis were to provide the researcher and the thesis with extensive basic knowledge about the topic in both of its dimensions, empirically in chapter one and theoretically in chapter two. The reasons for that are to enable the researcher to formulate the right questions and to establish the adequate argument of this thesis with limited influence of the interviewees’ motivations or intentions, and to be equipped with solid comprehension of the topic in order to be aware of any invalid information that is provided by any participant or source. In addition, the researcher’s career experience in the Jordanian Parliament (1998-2005) allows him to be aware of Jordanian politics and the profiles of its elites, which helped him in selecting adequate interviewees for this research and its characteristics, let alone that the researcher examined more than two hundred books and other publications of different academic journals and specialized institutions and centres in different countries, including the
U.S.A, in particular the Library of Congress, specialized centres in strategic and Middle Eastern studies, and many others. This wide and diverse range of materials published by different scholars and experts in the topic from different angles and backgrounds aimed to ensure balanced, up-to-date, and advanced information and data that are complementary with what is obtained from interviewing.

During the field research in the summer of 2008, the researcher interviewed seventeen Jordanian experts in U.S.-Jordanian relations. As a result, the interpretations of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s provided in this thesis are mainly from a Jordanian perception of these relations. These interviewees were from different establishments and political backgrounds to obtain balanced views about the subjects matter. Most of them are high-ranking politicians, academics, analysts, and current and retired officials from the Jordanian Armed Forces and other institutions. Although the number of interviews is not too big, the interviews were long and deep discussions about details that are of high importance to the understanding of the features of these relations which could not be obtained from other sources or a larger cohort of interviewees. The selection of the interviewees was based on their relevance and expertise on the topics covered in this thesis, and their involvement in these topics within the timescale of this thesis.

3.5 The Core Theory and Methodology

The interlocking between the methodological characteristics of this thesis and the core theory and methods can be described as follows. Firstly, this research is a qualitative one aimed at achieving a complex and profound understanding and knowledge of U.S.-
Jordanian relations in the 2000s. The theory and methods used in this research are designed to provide the necessary data for argument building and analysis to enrich the understanding and the knowledge of the subject matter. It is vital to mention in this regard that interviewing in general is one of the most used methods in qualitative studies (Mason, 2002: 62). In addition, while the connection of different concepts is a major aspect of qualitative research, as discussed earlier in this chapter (Dey, 1993) the combination of the works of Ikenberry and small states’ politics together aimed to provide a conceptualisation framework which can challenge other frameworks and to strengthen the understanding of the subject matters and to be applicable to similar cases.

Secondly, this research is an empirical one concerned with the relations between two countries, the U.S.A and Jordan, in a specific period of time. At the same time, the research is driven by a theoretical framework which itself was based on observed facts; Ikenberry’s assumptions were built upon observation of historical evidences and cases. In addition, the theory used, as discussed in the combination section, has its say in determining and choosing the observables in this thesis. While scientific inquiry is a systematic process of gaining knowledge (Krippendorff, 1982: 17), elite interviewing is an efficient tool in gathering knowledge and constituting facts regarding particular topic and issue (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 113). Moreover, while the interpretation of a political phenomenon must be empirically tested (Mayer, 2002: 124), the research questions that are asked in the elite interviews tackled the nature of the subject matters.
Thirdly, the nature of the core theory, as discussed above, is that it is critical of the major leading theories of IR. This research is based on a critical methodology not only because the core theory itself is critical to others, but also because this theory was chosen in order to be assessed and evaluated based on empirical case and research. The combination of the theoretical assumptions aimed to achieve two major elements of any critical study, it aims first to understand deeply the nature of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s and then to explain its nature and characteristics. To achieve that, the core theory of this research is designed in order to guarantee that the research will include and tackle the entire primary objectives and observables that fabricate U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s which are embodied in the following three chapters of this thesis. Remarkably, while in IR a critical study and theory aim to the reinterpretation and restructuring of ideas (Brown, 1994: 58), elite interviewing is a practical means to achieve that by being able to tackle the topic from different angles (Mason, 2002: 66), and by being able to access the most influential and knowledgeable people on the topic (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 113).

The final feature of this study is that it is inclusive research in the sense that the subject matter and the theory used will be assessed based on observation and interpretation of the reality of the issues related to the topic. In addition, the rationale of using this theoretical framework is to accomplish a powerful explanation of the reality of the topic. The desire for explanation is also designed to enhance the progress towards a more complete knowledge of the subject matter, and at the same time it is considered that the knowledge produced in this thesis could be incomplete at one point depending on the developments
and the future of the subject matter. For these reasons, the choice of topics and timescale covered in this thesis are fixed. While U.S.-Jordanian relations are shaped by the people’s knowledge, mainly politicians and those who dealt with the matter in general, interviewing people who are experts in the topic and revising secondary resources published by specialist in the theme are the best methods to offer the researcher with the required data to accomplish a solid research (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 113). As a result, this thesis aims to arrive at more comprehensive knowledge of this topic, which may result in a proof of the people’s knowledge or may result in an indication of more accurate knowledge which may differ from that available from these people.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has addressed the interaction and interlocking between the relevant methodological characteristics of this research on one hand and the invented theoretical framework on the other. This interaction and interlocking have established the logic of this thesis, which is embodied in the nature and rationale of the research questions. These research questions do not claim that they offer an absolute understanding of the relations between the U.S.A and Jordan, empirically or theoretically, rather they suggest that they offer a better understanding of the current relations between the two countries.
These questions are:

- Despite the radical differences in power relations between the U.S.A and Jordan, there is a certain level of interdependence and cooperation between the two countries: how far does a theory of liberal hegemony and small states’ politics better explain these relations than neorealism or neoliberalism?

- How far is Jordan a reliable U.S. partner or agent in security issues in Middle Eastern contexts after 9/11?

- To what extent are Jordan’s domestic policies of political reform driven by U.S. exigencies of democratization in the region?

- How far did Jordan manage to maintain simultaneous alignment and manoeuvrability within its relations with the U.S.A, and U.S. neoconservatives, with Israel separately?

These questions are formulated to explore U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s in a way that can offer deep understanding, interpretation and original knowledge of the current nature of the relations between the two countries. The first question is designed to provide basic but advanced theoretical grounds for the nature of the relations between the two countries in order to allow the thesis to establish its argument that is derived from its theoretical framework. The other three questions are initially derived from the first
question, but address precise issues, each of which is concerned with one of the empirical chapters respectively. The empirical questions, questions two, three, and four, are also designed to answer the theoretical question, question one, in order to justify the usage of this theoretical framework by exploring the relations between the two countries empirically in the chapters that follow.

All in all, these questions aim to tackle the research topics in a qualitative manner in the sense of their trends towards achieving argument building and sophisticated understanding of the relations between the two countries in the 2000s. In addition, these questions study specific objects and observables that are of high importance to the relations between the U.S.A and Jordan, the subsequent chapters therefore are going to address these observables regarding fundamental issues such as the security cooperation between the two countries in the 2000s in chapter four, the U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East after 9/11 in chapter five, and the tri-dimensional relations between the U.S.A, Israel and Jordan in chapter six.

These questions are also derived from the central assumptions of the theoretical framework of this thesis, which is a critical concept to other dominant paradigms in the theme. As a result, these questions address the current relations between the U.S.A and Jordan from a critical and unique point of view aiming to provide a unique interpretation of the subject matter. Meanwhile, these questions and the topics that are covered in the following chapters are exploring the current realities of the relations between the two countries regarding specific interpretations, issues and period of time. Therefore, these
types of questions are tackling the most significant topics of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s in the following chapters in order to provide sophisticated, deep, and coherent but sensible knowledge that is required for this thesis. In other words, there is reciprocal influence between the topics of subsequent chapters and the rationale behind them on the one hand and the interlocking between the characteristics and core theory of this thesis on the other.
Chapter Four: Security Cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan in the 2000s

4.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the security cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan since 2000. The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the nature and intensity of security cooperation between the two countries over a specific period of time that has witnessed unprecedented events regarding the security of both the U.S.A and the Middle East. While the Middle East and the U.S.A witnessed major military events during this period of time, the security cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan is a vital component in exploring the features of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and their consequences, especially the War on Terror and the war in Iraq in 2003 have not only resulted in more security interactions between Jordan and the U.S.A, but also made their relations in this regard more sophisticated and advanced.

The main argument of this chapter is that despite the huge power disparity between Jordan and the U.S.A, the two countries are practicing a high level of alignment, interdependence, and mutual influence in very sensitive issues regarding their securities, with a considerable level of thoughtfulness. The originality of this chapter is embodied in assessing the role that a small state like Jordan can play as a vital player in regional and international politics, as well as its ability in accomplishing simultaneous independency and considerable attention from a superpower like the U.S.A during a very crucial time. As a result, the level of domination by the U.S.A over Jordan will be assessed regarding
security affairs and cooperation, even though Jordan as a small state depends heavily on U.S. support and protection.

This chapter, therefore, will explore the importance of the cooperation between the two countries in security issues and the value of each country’s policies in this increasing mutual interaction. To achieve that, the chapter will start with the recent nature of the Middle Eastern security situation and the impact of U.S. security policies and strategies that were highlighted in chapter one, which will address the major issues and aspects of U.S.-Jordanian security relations. This will allow the researcher to provide satisfactory analysis of these relations in more detail regarding major events and concerns that are adequate for this thesis, such as 9/11; the war in Iraq in 2003; and the Islamist threat to the region, Jordan and U.S. interests accordingly. The chapter then focuses on more mutual security relations between the two countries, such as Jordanian internal security, the development of Jordanian forces, and intelligence cooperation between Jordan and the U.S.A. These specific mutual issues would not be investigated appropriately before exploring the major events and issues mentioned above that have shaped the security policies of each country. These major events and issues have had huge influence on fashioning the current security cooperation between these two countries.

The sources used for the purpose of this chapter are diverse; besides academic materials, the researcher used publications of U.S. specialist centres in the Middle East as well as those of Defence Department. In addition, the researcher interviewed two senior officers in the Jordanian Intelligence and Military Intelligence. This diversity of resources aimed
to avoid the limitation of information regarding the security cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan, especially in the issue of intelligence cooperation.

4.2 Security Cooperation in the Middle East

It is important to highlight the meaning and characteristics of security cooperation in general and its implications on Middle Eastern security mainly because these realities have great impact on security relations between the two countries. According to Antonia and Abram Chayes, the core idea of cooperative security is the assurance and the confidence of the participant state that other participant states are abiding within the cooperative security system. Therefore, cooperative security is based on the agreements between sovereign states in the limitation of the military arms race and the use of force mainly because the assurance of cooperation is a complex idea due to the sensitivity of the state’s sovereignty regarding military issues (Chayes and Chayes, 1994: 65). The compliance of the state within these agreements requires that the security regime be legitimate by being fair and indiscriminate in implementing its procedures among all participant states. Moreover, transparency and accessibility to information among states increase the state’s assurance and the efficiency of these agreements. All of these characteristics and procedures must guarantee the state’s security in order to be accepted (Chayes, and Chayes, 1994: 66).

The end of the Cold War resulted in a major change in the meaning and requirements of international security and cooperation. The purpose of security cooperation at the
international level after the end of the Cold War was to deepen the cooperation between countries to face new threats and security challenges different from those of the Cold War era. In addition, cooperative security aims at reaching a mechanism between states to prevent wars by preventing the assembling and accumulation of the necessary means for an organised and deliberate aggression and conflict (Chayes, and Chayes, 1994: 5).

Middle Eastern countries face many kinds of security threats and challenges. This region has experienced many conventional wars; some of these countries possess nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Significantly, Islamic terrorism is believed to have Middle Eastern origins. In this region there are border disputes, water scarcities, and high possibility of internal violence and instability due to poor governance. The Arab-Israeli conflict, the weakness of regional organizations, and the limited, or in some cases the absence of regional cooperation and trade increased the insecurity and instability of this region (Laipson and Hokayem, 2006: 153).

After the end of the Cold War, the Middle East witnessed major events which affected the region in many ways, especially its security arrangements. The legacy of the Gulf War (1990-1991), the defeat of Iraq, and the peace process which started accordingly were simultaneous with the beginning of a new era in international affairs such as the intensification of the internationalisation of security arrangements and arms control initiatives. These realities increased the desire of Middle Eastern countries to enhance their security cooperation whether among them or with external powers (Kemp, 1994: 392). No less importantly, the Gulf War illustrated the vulnerability of most poor and
small Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan and smaller Gulf countries in the face of regional or international powers. External protection and modern technological weapons and military support systems became affordable only to rich, oil-producing countries or major U.S. allies like Israel, which receives substantial U.S. economic and military aid. Another characteristic of Middle Eastern security is the possibility of the use of WMD; the concentration of the population and economic infrastructure in main cities in Middle Eastern countries makes the use of this kind of weapon even more catastrophic than usual (Kemp, 1994: 394).

According to Steinbruner, the aim of cooperative security is to control and prevent the circumstances that cause wars and confrontation between countries by implementing rules and transparency among states to stop of offensive behaviours (Steinbruner, 1992: 20). However, he asserted that although cooperative security in the Middle East is an advantage for all countries in the region, it is still an unachievable idea, mainly because of the rejection attitude toward the principles of cooperative security in the region (Steinbruner, 1992: 22), not to mention the absence of the criteria for security cooperation, discussed above with reference to Antonia and Abram Chayes.

The instability of the Middle East prevented many foreign investors from investing in the region. More importantly, the lack of stability and harmony and the inefficiency of the peace process are preventing the establishment of a unified trading block which would enhance the idea of building a security block that would be concerned with the stability of the region as well as with international security (Kemp, 1994: 399). There is also an
absence of any security community in the Middle East which is sufficiently capable of providing these countries with the needs for their national and regional security preferences and to make the responsibility of the security of these countries associated with their sovereignty. Therefore, it is believed that many Middle Eastern policymakers experience that their policies and preferences must be adapted to be compatible with U.S. priorities in the region, so these countries can accomplish their national security accordingly (Laipson and Hokayem, 2006: 154).

Because of the fact that most of the required components of regional security cooperation mentioned above are weak among Middle Eastern countries, and because the challenges and concerns for the security and survivability of a small state like Jordan, which is located in such a region, are paramount, many countries in the Middle East such as Jordan build strong alliances with the U.S.A, especially while the requirements for security cooperation between these countries and the U.S.A are more adequate than those among Middle Eastern countries.

4.3 The U.S.A and Middle Eastern Stability

The presence of a great power in a region is essential for establishing regional stability and order (Miller, 2004: 240). In addition, the type of engagement which a great power conducts in a region shapes the balance of power in it, by policies of arms supply, alignment, economic assistance, or by sanctions and embargo, the international system and great powers have major influence in regional politics (Miller, 2004: 240). Moreover,
resolving international conflicts and civil wars are important factors in enhancing international and regional security as well as U.S. security especially when considering that international conflicts and failed states mainly those in the Middle East became breeding grounds for terrorists and their organisations which became a threat to the U.S.A and its allies (Walt, 2001: 62).

According to Yossi Alphar, U.S. security strategies and concerns in the Middle East after 9/11 shifted from the Arab-Israeli conflict and focussed on issues related directly to U.S. security. President Bush perceived stagnation and lack of freedom and democracy to be combined with terrorism, WMD, and rogue states and organisations as the major threats to the stability of the Middle East, as well as to the international order and to the U.S.A. In other words, President G.W. Bush differed from President Clinton, who believed that sustainable peace between the Arabs and the Israelis would result in a more stable Middle East (Laipson and Hokayem, 2006: 162).

Remarkably, the achievements of U.S. policies in the Middle East such as containing Communism, supporting Israel, and access to the oil trade were successful with modest costs in terms of human and economic costs compared to the costs of U.S. policies in other regions. Apart from the tragedy of the events of 9/11 and the U.S. policies that followed in the region, only 500 Americans died as a result of U.S. policies in the region in the fifty years prior to 9/11, whereas, for example, in South East Asia 50,000 Americans lost their lives as a result of U.S. policies during the same period (Quandt, 2003: 461). Therefore, and because of the vitality and significance of U.S. goals in the
Middle East, different U.S. administrations had the determination and public support to respond boldly to the threats to U.S. interests in the region such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the events of 9/11. This makes the U.S. War on Terror and countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction major elements of U.S. policies towards the region (Quandt, 2003: 461).

Although wars of anticipation are hard to justify, it was argued by the Bush Administration that after 9/11 the War on Terror was different from any other kind of war (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1389). In addition, the prevailing attitude among the Bush administration prior to 9/11, that the U.S.A did not need the support of other countries, became unconvincing. International terrorism and its nature made the support of U.S. allies and friends indispensable, mainly because counterterrorism requires sharing intelligence information between countries as well as accessing other countries’ territories (Walt, 2001: 63). It is worth mentioning in this regard that prior to 9/11, interstate alliances were between states against states, whereas the alliance to fight terrorism is mainly against non-state terrorist organisations and those who sponsor them, which requires different kinds of interactions and cooperation between allies (Lieven, 2002: 249).

The U.S.A engages in different asymmetrical military alliances, despite the fact that it is the most powerful country in the world. It is worth mentioning that the U.S.A builds two kinds of security alliances, those which are based on formal agreements with other states such as NATO, and informal alliances which are not based on formal agreements such as
those between the U.S.A and small countries in the Middle East (Tertrais, 2004: 136). The U.S.A benefited from these alliances in the sense that the other part of the alliance shares the costs and responsibility with the U.S.A, let alone that the other partner’s foreign policy will be influenced by different U.S. strategies (Tertrais, 2004: 136). At the same time, different allies of the U.S.A benefit considerably from their relationship with the U.S.A; they guarantee U.S. protection from external threats and aggressions, and by cooperation with the U.S. forces they modernise their militaries and develop their skills. More importantly, U.S. allies gain access to U.S. military and political elites which make these countries have an impact on U.S. policymaking in issues related to their security and vital mutual interests (Tertrais, 2004: 141).

One of the significant facts of current world politics, according to Professor Kamel Abu Jabber, is that the U.S.A is almost an immediate neighbour to most countries in the world even though it is not geographically close to them. Because of its presence, power, wealth, outreach and worldwide interests, the U.S.A has a huge influence in the politics and interests of many countries and regions in the world. This fact is more profound for small countries like Jordan, taking into consideration the importance of the Middle East for the U.S.A. Therefore, the U.S.A is not only next door to the Middle East, it is rather inside the Middle East. For example, Abu Jabber claimed that the U.S.A is planning to establish 923 military bases all over the world, which is equivalent to 4-5 bases in each country; current U.S. policies in Iraq indicated a bigger number than that in Iraq (Interview: Abu Jabber, 2008).
4.4 The Role of Jordan in the Stability of the Middle East

Jordan is central to the geopolitics of the Middle East. It borders Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel and the West Bank. This location places Jordan between the two most hot arenas and conflicts in the Middle East; the Israeli-Palestinian and the Iraqi theatres (Terrill, 2008:1). However, this location gives Jordan a strategic advantage, as the location of Jordan makes it a buffer state between both Israel and other Arab countries neighbouring Jordan, especially when hardliners in each side are in power (Interview: Hamami, 2008). Furthermore, the Jordanian forces are playing a vital role in maintaining stability in the region; it controls and monitors the Jordanian borders to prevent smuggling drugs, weapons, and terrorists to surrounding countries which are major U.S. allies such as Israel, Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Interview: Al-Ka’abneh, 2008).

The Jordanian army is very supportive of U.S. allies in the region; many officers from different Arab countries have their military education in Jordan which adopts the western school of military thought. Jordan also sent many of its military missions to other Arab countries for training. In April 2002 Jordan sent Special Forces to Yemen to help U.S. forces in training Yemeni forces in fighting terrorism. In addition, Jordanian forces trained almost 100 officers from the post-Taliban government in Afghanistan in counterterrorism and special operations (Terrill, 2008: 56). The ultimate goal of the U.S. and Jordanian governments in creating sustainable support of the Jordanian forces is not only to retain the loyalty of these forces to the current regime, which is very vital for any small state in the developing world, but also to enable these forces to do their important
tasks regarding regional stability. This loyalty has become taken for granted for the current regime over time. The strategic location of Jordan, which has the longest border with Israel and is a buffer state between Israel and other countries, and its role in fighting terrorism, made the role of Jordanian forces essential and strategic in stabilizing the region (Interview: Al-Raggad, 2008).

Although U.S.-Jordanian relations are historically strong, since his accession to the Jordanian throne in 1999 King Abdullah II aimed to build a strategic relationship with the U.S.A and to make U.S.-Jordanian relations the cornerstone of Jordanian foreign policy (Lasensky, 2006: 11). A small country likes Jordan, about the size of Indiana, with limited resources and of population around six million has to depend heavily on external support and protection (Terrile, 2008: 2). One of the main factors in the survivability of Jordan is its leader’s realization of its limited power and its perpetual need for the support of a superpower (Interview: Hamai, 2008).

King Abdullah II had most of his education and training in the U.S and has an excellent military background; this makes King Abdullah II aware of U.S. interests in the region and gives him a full understanding of the mentality and desires of U.S. policymakers. Moreover, Al-Ka’abneh stated that by adopting many policies of arms supply and mutual alliances between the U.S.A and Jordan and other Middle Eastern countries, the U.S. involvement and presence in the Middle East are positive for Jordan as well as for stabilizing the region and preventing wars and conflicts (Interview: Al-Ka’abneh, 2008). According to Benjamin Bell, Jordan is an extremely reliable ally for the U.S.A in the
global War on Terror. He emphasised that Jordan cooperates with the U.S.A on a daily basis in issues related to stability of the region and helping the U.S.A for better understanding of many details in the region (Interview: Bell, 2008).

4.5 9/11 and U.S.-Jordanian Security Cooperation

Increasingly, after 9/11, the U.S. approach towards Middle Eastern security remained military (Bilgin, 2005: 150). The events of 9/11 and the threat imposed by international terrorism on the U.S.A and its allies resulted in extraordinary involvement and different strategies by the U.S.A in the Middle East. The U.S.A anticipated that regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan would protect U.S. interests and allies and eliminate eminent and imminent threats in the region (Miller, 2004: 258).

It has been argued that the events of 9/11 and the War on Terror and on Al-Qaeda provided the U.S.A with the justification to expand its presence and to further its interests in the Middle East. These events and their consequences on the U.S. strategies in the Middle East are similar to those of Pearl Harbour and the Soviet influence which allowed the U.S.A to legitimatise its strategies in the Far East (containing Japanese imperialism and communist expansion respectively) (Thayer, 2003: 36). Some people argue that the U.S. government has not identified terrorism in order to keep this term a flexible and political one so that its policies are not bound and contradicted. In addition, by keeping the term “terrorism” flexible, the U.S.A will have more advantages by being able to ask
its allies for more cooperation in many related issues in the name of fighting terrorism (Interview: Braizat, 2008).

Although many realists believe that non-state actors in the international arena, such as Al-Qaeda, are not capable of combating a hegemonic power such as the U.S.A, it is recognised that by the events of 9/11, Al-Qaeda aimed at a strategic goal, to undermine the U.S. presence and hegemony in the region. Al Qaeda’s leaders hoped that the terrorist attacks would provoke the U.S.A to overreact in the Middle East which would cause huge anti-U.S. sentiments in the region, leading to the overthrow of many pro-U.S. regimes such as those in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan in order to replace them with fundamentalist Islamic alternatives (Layne, 2004: 107).

Military alliance took different faces and was motivated by different reasons. For the U.S, terrorism after 9/11 and the issue of weapons proliferation have resulted in strengthening already existing alliances between the U.S.A and other countries, as well as the creation of new ones (Tertrais, 2004: 135). The unprecedented power of the U.S.A and its defence policies after 9/11 made many countries in the world bandwagon with the U.S.A. However, great powers such as Russia and China decided to distance themselves from the U.S.A, mainly because of their national interests and pride (Tertrais, 2004: 147). Other countries which are traditional allies with the U.S.A started their own alliances and defence policies amongst themselves, such as Israel and Turkey. Although these countries share a common threat, Islamic fundamentalists, their cooperation with each other was a reaction to the increased cooperation between the U.S.A and other countries
in the Middle East. The term ‘ally’ for the U.S.A was interpreted in different dimensions after 9/11. Many western democratic countries which have been allied with the U.S.A for many decades have opposed the U.S. war in Iraq and other U.S. defence policies. At the same time, other countries which did not share the values of the U.S.A became major allies, mainly because of their tactical importance for the U.S. strategies in its War on Terror (Tertrais, 2004: 148).

In 2002 after the events of 9/11 the NSS asserted that the U.S.A will work with its allies in different regions in the world to encourage them to destroy different terrorist organisations, especially those of global reach, by disturbing their financial network and system (NSS, 2002: 6). The U.S.-Jordanian relations have always been excellent on all fronts and the major and dominant principle of these relations is alignment, by which Jordan has been considered one of the best allies of the U.S.A in the world. This alignment has faced ups and downs on a few occasions, but since 9/11 the relations between the two countries have been strengthening (Interview: Al-Massry, 2008). King Abdullah II was the first head of an Arabic state to visit the U.S.A after the events of 9/11. During this visit, on the 28th September 2001, King Abdullah II assured President Bush of the full Jordanian support of the U.S.A in the war against terrorism, and Jordan offered everything in its capacity in this war. President Bush himself stated that “the cooperation of our friends, the Jordanians, is strong and powerful” (Prados, 2003: 4).

The cooperation between the two countries developed directly after the events. Although the Jordanian forces did not participate in military operations in the war in Afghanistan,
Jordan sent two important humanitarian missions to Afghanistan in December 2001, which were very helpful for the U.S.A to achieve the required stability in Afghanistan. These missions were operating in Afghanistan in 2002 as a military field hospital in Mazar Al- Shareif and the second was helping the U.S. forces in logistic issues such as anti-personnel landmines clearing unit and guarding food and medical supply routes. This Jordanian participation in Afghanistan was seen by some figures in the Jordanian opposition as if the Jordanian forces were joining the U.S. forces in a war against a Muslim country (Bookmiller, 2003: 179). However, according to the U.S. Defence Department fact sheet in June 6, 2006, the Jordanian hospital treated 68,811 patients in Afghanistan, in addition to which the Jordanian Army mines-clearing unit helped to clear almost 70,000 square meters of territory, including an air base, of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines (Prados, 2003: 4).

The Jordanian participation in the war in Afghanistan was modest on the ground mainly because of the geographical distance between the two countries, however, the Jordanian support to the U.S.A was perceived as unique compared to other countries. It shows the courage and vigilance of Jordan in seizing the moment and offering avoidable support to the U.S.A. In another words, Jordan found from the events of 9/11, and the war in Afghanistan in particular, a great chance to involve itself in U.S. major strategies in a way that showed a considerable level of pragmatism and initiative. Moreover, after 9/11 the Jordanian cooperation with the U.S.A developed significantly on other issues related to this war and the War on Terror and Al-Qaeda, such as the indispensible intelligence cooperation and other activities, which will be explained later in this chapter.
4.6 The War on Iraq in 2003

The U.S.-Jordanian relationship has been one of the key strategic relations for the U.S.A in the Arab countries. These relations developed significantly after 2003 as a result of the U.S. difficulties in Iraq (Terrill, 2008: ix). Before the political decision by the U.S. government to launch a military campaign to invade Iraq, the military planning considered and prepared for the methodical aid support from U.S. allies in the region (Baker and Robinson, 2002: 1). After the events of 9/11 the U.S. government started to increase its aid to its allies, especially those who could help them in the war in Iraq. For example, between 9/11 and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, Jordan received $350 million in military aid and six U.S. F16 fighters, and was promised more in the future. It is important to point out that these were major boons to a small country and army like the Jordanian (Garcia, 2003). Additionally, in early 2003 Jordan received three U.S. Patriot missile batteries from the U.S.A to enhance its defence capabilities (Prados, 2004: 14). In the summer of 2002, Jordanian bases were used by the U.S. air forces for deployment and preparation for the battle (Jordan’s borders are the closest to Baghdad among the U.S. allies who neighbour Iraq, at only 340 miles) (Baker and Robinson, 2002: 2).

Although King Abdullah II rejected any direct Jordanian engagement in the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Jordan allowed more than 3,000 U.S. troops to be stationed in the Jordanian desert close to the Iraqi borders to operate the U.S. Patriot missiles system. In case of any Iraqi missile strike against Israel, these troops were also prepared to conduct rescue missions inside Iraq when required, let alone that Jordan permitted U.S. coalition forces
to use Jordanian airspace (Garcia, 2003). Jordan agreed to allow U.S. Patriot missiles batteries to be based in the Jordanian desert near the Iraqi borders mainly because Jordan was anxious about two points; firstly, Israel would attack Iraq via Jordanian airspace if Iraq would have launched a Scud strike at Israel, and the use of the Jordanian airspace by Israeli fighters would greatly damage the regime’s creditability in Jordan and in the region. Secondly, while the issue of the influx of Palestinian refugees to Jordan has always been a major concern to Jordan, Jordan feared that Israel would exploit the war as a chance to transfer a large number of Palestinians to Jordan. If these two scenarios, public anger and transferring Palestinians to Jordan, were to occur, the Jordanian government would have faced many internal challenges (Bookmiller, 2003: 182).

On March 2003, just after the war began, the Jordanian government expelled five Iraqi diplomats of Saddam’s regime accusing them of terrorist plots against U.S. interests in Jordan; these plots were also aiming to destabilise Jordan. On the other hand, after the war Jordan welcomed the appointment of the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) in July 2003 as a major step towards achieving stability in Iraq. In addition, Jordan supported the U.S. desire of conducting an election in Iraq in 2005, although the Jordanian government and leadership advised the U.S.A to postpone the election mainly lest that the situation in Iraq at that time and the role of the Shiite will provide Iran with the opportunity for extra interference in Iraq (Prados, 2004: 7).

One of the major roles and participation of Jordan in the war in Iraq was the training of the new Iraqi police forces. These forces were vital for the security and stability of Iraq,
especially after dismissing the Iraqi police and security forces of Saddam’s era. According to Marwan Muasher, the Jordanian foreign minister during the U.S. invasion of Iraq, in the years 2003 and 2004 Jordan trained approximately 35,000 members of the Iraqi police in order to build and enhance security and stability in Iraq after the regime change (Muasher, 2004). These police forces were very helpful for the U.S.A in stabilising Iraq. In addition, while Jordan refused to send troops to Iraq (apart from medical missions), after the war Jordan sent and transferred some of its own military equipment and machinery to the new Iraqi army, which was critically weak and in need of many of these equipments to regain the efficiency of these forces to accomplish security and order in Iraq (Terrill, 2008: 27).

After removing Saddam Hussein from power, Jordan repeatedly announced that it will not send any Jordanian forces to Iraq and its role and participation in supporting the Iraqi police were exclusively to train these forces in Jordan, however, there were indications that the Jordanian Special Forces in particular were joining the U.S. forces in conducting some counterterrorism operations inside Iraq (Lasensky, 2006: 9). Lasensky asserted that although Jordan publicly opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a former anonymous senior U.S. diplomat stated that King Abdullah II was, privately, supportive of the U.S. invasion and assertive of the importance of achieving U.S. strategies and its existence as the only dominant power in the region (Lasensky, 2006: 1). In addition, the U.S.A and Jordan share the same objectives regarding Iraq as a unified peaceful country with its neighbours, more importantly, they fight for freeing Iraq from Islamist fundamentalists and terrorist groups. A stable united Iraq, free from extremists, maintaining a free market
and Sunni rights are in the interests of the U.S.A and Jordan. However, instability in Iraq in the years following the U.S. invasion became a major source of anxiety for Jordan (Lasensky, 2006: 3).

Jordan’s major security concerns, apart from terrorism, were, an early U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, which would leave Jordan caught between an unstable Iraq in the east and worsening violence in the west between the Israelis and the Palestinians; the division of Iraq is a major concern for Jordan mainly because that would complicate its security requirements and allow other regional powers to be closer to Jordan, which would in turn force it to make greater efforts to secure its borders with different countries or political entities instead of one unified Iraq (Lasensky, 2006: 4). Finally, Jordan is concerned with the role of Iran in Iraq and in the region in general, especially considering the Iranian revolutionary agenda in the region and its ties and support to groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah that reject the peace process and the role of the U.S.A and other moderate players in the region like Jordan (Lasensky, 2006: 4).

According to one of the Republican candidates for the U.S. presidency in 2008, Rudolph Giuliani, the strategy of future administrations in the U.S.A should focus on strengthening the role of the U.S.A in the international system to widen its defence and influence which terrorists are trying to harm. Giuliani argued that the main threat to the U.S.A is that if it fails in its war in Iraq that would give the terrorists and other anti-American movements a great chance to target U.S. interests in the region and U.S. allies and that would strengthen these organisations (Giuliani, 2007: 3). While Iraq is a very
rich, big, and strategic place for terrorists to operate from, U.S. failure in Iraq would not
only harm the U.S. prestige and interests in the Middle East, but also in other regions in
the world, mainly because countries with different agendas from the U.S.A, whether
competitors with the U.S.A or those which are classified as rogue states, would exploit
the moment and U.S. weakness (Giuliani, 2007: 4).

The Iraq Study Group stated in its report in December 2006 that the U.S. policy towards
Iraq should be shifted towards less military combats and more inclusion of regional
powers to support long-term security and political reconciliation in Iraq. Additionally, it
acknowledged the role of Jordan as a neighbouring country to Iraq in achieving the
stability of Iraq and Jordan (Iraq Study Group, 2006: 24-26). As a result, after the U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq, Jordan will need to work and cooperate with regional actors to face
its first enemy, terrorism, and some of these actors are unallied with the U.S.A such as
Syria, Iraqi Sunnis and other regional organisations and powers. The U.S.A should not
disapprove of Jordan’s links with these actors given the importance of the Jordanian

According to Ambassador Paul Bremer, Jordan was a very helpful ally during the
invasion of Iraq by offering indispensable logistic support to the U.S.A in the war in Iraq
such as allowing U.S. Special Operation Forces to operate from Jordanian territories
(Terrill, 2008: 24). However, the Jordanian interests were well-calculated and considered
in the Jordanian support to the U.S.A. A retired U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant General
Bernard Trainor stated that Jordan and the U.S.A engaged in a lengthy negotiation on the
number of U.S. troops to be stationed in the Jordanian desert close to the Iraqi border and other military bases. The U.S.A requested 14,000 troops which were perceived as a big number by Jordan, and ultimately only 5,000 soldiers were agreed between the two sides to be stationed in Jordan during the war in Iraq, and this number was reasonable for Jordan (Terrill, 2008: 24). Not to mention that although the purpose of a large segment of these troops to operate Patriot anti-missile batteries to protect Israel from possible Iraqi strikes, the prevention of such strikes was in the best interests of Jordanian internal stability, as discussed above.

In 2003 the U.S.A understood the Jordanian situation, and Jordan made its voice clear to the U.S.A, given the fact that Iraq is a strategic backyard for Jordan, the U.S.A was considerate of this fact and did not ask Jordan for heavy demands (Interview: Abu Jabber, 2008). In general Jordan was very supportive of the U.S.A in their war in Iraq, and they offered a lot of vital help. Meanwhile, Jordan offered only the help that would be harmless to the stability and survivability of Jordan and its regime. The number of U.S. troops that Jordan agreed to station in Jordan during the war was far less than the number that the U.S.A asked for initially. This illustrates the extent to which the U.S.A was considerate of Jordan’s desires and preferences, despite the power disparities between the two countries and U.S. crucial need for help in such issues; let alone that many U.S. allies and neighbours of Iraq were reluctant to help, especially those who are stronger than Jordan and more difficult for the U.S.A to pressure, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In other words, the U.S.A was considerably considerate to Jordan despite the fact that Jordan was the only country that the U.S.A could pressure while the others, apart from
Kuwait, refused to help. In addition, Jordan received a lot of U.S. aid, especially in military issues. The Jordanian support in the war was also in the interests of Jordan; apart from being a closer ally to the U.S.A, Jordan preferred a more liveable, peaceful, stable and moderate Iraq than the one of Saddam’s era.

4.7 The Islamists

Although associating terrorism with Islam has been debated and questioned by critical approaches and scholars in studying this phenomenon, fighting terrorism have multiple U.S. uses while it is a crucial concern for its different strategies and foreign policy in the region as well as defining its allies and foes (Dalacoura, 2009: 130).

It is believed that the majority of Jordanian people are moderate Muslims, however, many U.S. policies in the region, especially the U.S. interference in the Islamists’ affairs and the undermining of their political status, would result in the radicalization of many moderate people (Interview: Abu-Nowar, 2008). Moreover, although Jordanian people are against the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and they consider it to be not only crime against American people but also against humanity, they oppose the occupation of Iraq and the huge U.S. military presence in the region and its commitment to protect Israel. These issues resulted in the government’s securitisation of many public affairs which concern Jordanian people (Interview: Arabyat, 2008). The Islamic party in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) and the Jordanian people are moderate and are not intrinsically against cooperation with the U.S.A at different levels and issues, but they prefer to have
more balanced relations based on mutual respect and recognition (Interview: Arabyat, 2008). Likewise, Joseph Nye argues that international cooperation and the will of the U.S. allies are essential in this war to accomplish its required outcomes. In addition, Nye asserted that “The United States will win the War on Terror only if moderate Muslims win, and the United States’ ability to attract moderates is critical to victory” (Nye, 2003: 75).

The wider Middle East hosts the home, sympathisers, and infrastructure of many terrorist organisations which became a major challenge to U.S. interests in the region and its overall security. Therefore, the U.S. different policies including the war in Iraq were aiming to tackle all these challenges to enhance its security and interests in the region (Inbar, 2004: 1). According to Richard K. Bitts, the continuous huge U.S. presence and influence in Middle Eastern affairs are causing continuous resistance from terrorist organisations and Islamic fundamentalists to U.S. policies in the region (Layne, 2004: 108). However, terrorist organisations and their activity lack the capability to force the U.S.A to shift its foreign policy towards specific issues mainly because the U.S. military power and efficient diplomacy in building coalitions minimise the destruction caused by these activities to a bearable level (Layne, 2004: 108).

Jordan’s foreign policy in supporting U.S. strategies, especially the War on Terror, made it a main target for terrorists. On the other hand, these policies made Jordan perceived by the west and the U.S.A in particular as a main partner in fighting different Jihadist groups such as Al-Zarqawi’s (Sharp, 2008: 16). In August 1999 the Jordanian government closed
the office of the Hamas organisation on the grounds that this organisation was conducting illegal political activities in Jordan contrary to the accord between Hamas and the Jordanian government not to practice such activities. In addition, in October 2001, directly after the events of 9/11, the Jordanian government made amendments to many laws that related to counterterrorism such as banning all sorts of banking operations to organisations that were believed to have links with terrorist organisations or those who were sympathetic to these organisations (Prados, 2003: 6).

Interestingly, although Jordan became the first Middle Eastern country that ratified the International Criminal Court (ICC) in April 2002 and was very supportive of it since its inception, the Jordanian government and parliament ratified an agreement with the U.S. government preventing Jordan from surrendering to the ICC any American nationals as well as non-American nationals working for U.S. establishments who are accused of violating international law. According to this agreement; Jordan has to surrender them to the U.S. government instead (IRIN, 2006). The U.S. government justified its position toward the ICC by claiming that the court will be motivated by political reasons against the U.S. government, especially in its War on Terror. The Jordanian government; however, justified its action by claiming that U.S. law requires states that receive U.S. military and economic aids to ratify U.S. exemption from the ICC. Therefore, in July 2003 President Bush gave Jordan six months time to ratify the agreement before agreeing on a planned $333 million aid to Jordan in 2004 (IRIN, 2006).
The NSS in 2006 asserted that the greatest threat to the U.S. security are the proliferation of WMD, and being obtained by rogue states such as Iran, mainly because Iran is believed to be a major sponsor to terrorists and threatening Israel and other U.S. allies in this vital region (NSS, 2006: 19). According to Bradley A. Thayer, the current greatest threat to U.S. interests and strategies in the Middle East is derived from Iran for three reasons. Firstly, he argued that Iran has connections and ties with Al-Qaeda as the Iranians themselves acknowledged, and the ex-U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld claimed in 2003 (Thayer, 2003: 25). Secondly, it is clear that Iran is supporting resistance organisations to the U.S.A and its allies in the Middle East such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine, and Hezb–Islami in Afghanistan, which operates against the U.S. backed government of Hamid Karazi (Thayer, 2003: 26). Thirdly, and more dangerously, Iran is assertive in developing nuclear weapons, which will increase its regional status and deterrence (Thayer, 2003: 27).

After the war in Iraq and the toppling of Saddam’s regime in Iraq, there was a power vacuum in Iraq, and as a result, major change in the balance of power occurred in the region in favour of Iran, which started to interfere in Iraqi internal affairs and in other countries in the Gulf region, and elsewhere like Lebanon and Palestine. These Iranian policies were designed to meet Iranian interests regardless of the stability of the region or the interests of other countries in the Middle East (Interview: Hassan, 2008). During and directly after the war the Arab countries were absent from the Iraqi theatre, including Jordan, for fear of public criticism. This absence was an advantage for the Iranians and their role in Iraq. Therefore, Jordan was one of the first countries to counter the Iranian
role in Iraq by supporting Iraqi forces to fill the power vacuum which was used by Iran (Interview: Hassan, 2008).

The Iranian support to different Islamic groups and organisations such as Hezbollah and Hamas, its anti-Arab-Israeli peace agenda, its interference in Iraq, and more importantly its nuclear programme and the threat it imposes on Israel accordingly made containing Iran one of the paramount U.S. priorities in the Middle East (Nasr and Takeyh, 2008: 85). It is not surprising therefore that these Iranian policies and its alignments with different organisations and non-state actors in the region are perceived as a counter-hegemonic project against the U.S.A and its allies (Dalacoura, 2009: 132). For Jordan and King Abdullah II, the Iranian intervention in the Iraqi election that took place after the war was a major concern. The fear was that the Shiites would dominate Iraq, so that Iraq would become another Islamic Republican state similar to Iran (Terrill, 2008: 48). In addition, the Iranian negative and provocative behaviour towards the peace process and the Palestinian issue have a negative impact on these issues as well as on Jordan. Therefore, it has been argued recently that the contests and rivalries in the Middle East are not overwhelmingly derived from, or based on the Palestinian issue. The gravity in the region has shifted from Palestine to the Gulf to the extent it is believed that the Palestinian-Israeli peace depends upon the peace and stability in the Gulf, where Iran is an active player, not the other way around (Nasr and Takeyh, 2008: 87).

There are strong reasons for the unwillingness of the U.S. government to attack Iran at the present time which would make the U.S. government prefer an Israeli strike on Iran
rather than a U.S. strike. A U.S. strike might cause Iran to halt the flow of oil from the Gulf, not to mention exacerbating the difficulties the U.S.A faces in Iraq. An Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear establishments would free the U.S.A from such a responsibility and reduce the Iranian pretexts for any action in the Gulf. However, an Israeli attack would require Israeli fighters to penetrate Jordanian and Iraqi airspace (Thayer, 2003: 31). Meanwhile, an Israeli or U.S. strike on Iran is unlikely, mainly due to Iran preparing for such an attack by establishing very sophisticated protection by its nuclear programme, and they are capable of responding to Israel in different ways. Jordan is unable to prevent or to help such an action (Interview: Abu-Jabber, 2008). Moreover, a military action against Iran requires an international coalition which is difficult to obtain by the U.S.A under the current international circumstances, especially after the Iraq war (Interview: Al-Raggad, 2008).

Jordan is cooperative with the U.S.A and has been a stabilizing factor in the region since the 1950s. The Islamic party in Jordan, the IAF, perceives the security of Jordan as a priority and terrorism as a main threat (Interview: Arabyat, 2008). According to the party’s leaders, while Jordan played a major role in supporting different U.S. policies, including containing Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, it can also play a major role as a mediator between these powers and the U.S.A for better stability of the region and an advanced role for Jordan and its security (Interview: Arabyat, 2008). Significantly, channels of communication were opened between Jordanian intelligence and Hamas in the summer of 2008 in Jordan, in order to establish dialogue between the two sides to solve disputes in order to start cooperation between them and to meet the challenges that
Jordan and the region are facing (Interview: Mansour, 2008). It is worth mentioning that the officials of Hamas who used to stay in Jordan are now in Syria and have strong ties with Syria and Iran (Interview: Mansour, 2008). In another words, the role of Jordan in containing the Islamists can be highly significant not only by military or confrontational means, but also by conciliation and appeasement. Jordan as a small country can play this role as the U.S.A is assured that Jordan, as a small and trustworthy ally, will remain bound by its alignment with the U.S.A and considers U.S. interests. The same role by another bigger state in the region would give it extra independence from the U.S. desires and interests. Adding to that, the democratic status of Jordan and the presence of the Islamic party are advantages for Jordan to play such a role compared to other regional countries.

4.8 The Development of the Jordanian Forces

In general, U.S. military aid to Jordan is highly important for Jordan due to their contribution to the efficiency of the Jordanian forces in fighting terrorism and enhancing the stability of the country and, consequently, for Jordan’s future development (Interview: Abu Nowar, 2008). The historical U.S.-Jordanian military relations and sales have experienced different levels of achievements and difficulties. The U.S. supply of arms to Jordan was enhanced in the 1960s mainly because of the Cold War and the fact that Jordan could have asked for arms from the Soviet Union at that time. During this, Jordan was in hostility with regional powers supported by the Soviet Union such as radical Arab nationalists and Palestinian organisations (Terrill, 2008: 53). However, the
delivery of U.S. arms to Jordan slowed down as a result of U.S.-Jordanian differences over regional issues such as the peace process in Camp David in the late 1970s and more noticeably over the Second Gulf War in the early 1990s. However, the U.S.A has never sacrificed Jordan, and the later managed to differ with the U.S.A in very critical issues and to regain its prominent ties with the U.S.A subsequently. For example, after the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994, witnessed and esteemed by the U.S.A, Jordan regained U.S. arms supplements, support, and cooperation, which have increased dramatically after 9/11 (Terrill, 2008: 54).

In May 2005 President G.W. Bush signed legislation to fund and offer U.S. guidance for establishing a training centre in Jordan initiated by King Abdullah II to train Special Operations Forces (SOF), King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Centre (KASOTC). For Jordan, the aim of this centre is to develop the Jordanian SOF and, more importantly, to attract international customers in order to make Jordan the regional leading country in Special Forces training and skills development and to allow the Jordanian Special Forces to associate with the U.S.A and other countries forces regarding fighting terrorism. This kind of cooperation will enhance the coordination between the two countries in their mutual strategies and affairs. The centre is designed to be the meeting house for Special Operation and paramilitary forces from friendly countries to Jordan and the U.S.A in particular in the region in order to develop the international coordination in fighting terrorism (Kessner, 2006).
According to Colonel Maher Halaseh at the KASOTC, the King’s vision of the centre is to develop the Jordanian Special Forces and to enhance its ties with the U.S. Special Forces. This vision started before the King’s accession to the Jordanian throne while he was the commander of the Jordanian Special Forces in 1998. However, the emergence of new threats such as terrorism in the region and in the world and the unpredictability of the Middle Eastern security stoked the King’s desire to commit to the project in 2004 (Kessner, 2006). Maj. Gen. Frank Keary, the head of U.S. Special Operations Central Command, asserts that empowering the skills and the training of military personnel are very important in fighting terrorism. He believes that establishing and funding the centre are of great importance and in the best interests of the U.S.A and its allies in counterterrorism (Kessner, 2006). According to Frank Keary, the centre will be owned and operated by the Jordanian government and army. At the main time, the U.S. government and army will provide the centre with the required support for training without interfering in the sovereignty of Jordan and its forces (Kessner, 2006).

King Abdullah II envisions the international security to be based on greater international cooperation and on the sharing of information and techniques regarding the War on Terror. He is also planning a greater cooperation in the future between coalition partners to establish other centres dealing with intelligence and multinational rapid reaction forces, which will be a privilege for Jordan at the international arena in the future. However, these initiatives will depend on the willingness of other countries, especially the U.S.A, to share such visions (Kessner, 2006). These initiatives and ideas are similar to those of the NMS in 2004, especially in their effect in more rapid crisis response and
the prevention of surprise attacks (NMS, 2004: 12). This means Jordan is trying to be an international or at least a regional hub for security cooperation in fighting terrorism, which is an admirable idea by the U.S.A during an era while terrorism is a main player.

Many Jordanian officials participated in many meetings and activities of NATO, in addition to which, Jordanian forces have participated in many peacekeeping missions within NATO’s involvement. When NATO started to politicise its role in world politics and to expand its missions and activities beyond its geographical territory, the Jordanian forces were active and present on many occasions (Interview: Dodeen, 2008). Any country which has the privilege of being a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA), like Jordan, can benefit from the U.S.A in different ways. It has the chance to cooperate with major NATO members such as the U.S.A in researching to develop defence projects and counterterrorism technology. In addition, companies from MNNA have the chance to bid in contracts with the U.S. government for foreign repair of U.S. defence equipments (Scoville, 2004: 2). Moreover, an MNNA is eligible to receive U.S.-owned reserve stockpiles on its territory, and to obtain U.S. assistance to purchase depleted uranium ammunition. The ally is entitled to engage in agreements with the U.S.A for cooperative training and it has the right to receive military loans directly from the U.S. Secretary of Defence with no need to get approval form other executive or legislative bodies in the U.S.A (Scoville, 2004: 3).

Some commentators argued that military alliances became very costly for the U.S.A as well as for its allies. Permanent deployment of U.S. forces in these countries created
unnecessary friction between these troops and the people of these countries. This in many cases damaged the reputations of the U.S.A and the governments hosting them among the populations of these countries and made these forces vulnerable to terrorist attacks (Tertrais, 2004: 141). Although Jordan has never allowed the U.S.A to establish permanent military bases on Jordanian soil, which would be a major risk for the regime’s reputation, Jordanian and U.S. forces have together participated in many joint military exercises in Jordan such as Exercise Eager Tiger, which focussed on counterterrorism. There were other kinds of collaboration between the two forces such as the cooperation between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Jordanian army in Exercise Infinite Moonlight and Early Victory. Moreover, Jordan participated in a multilateral exercises supported by the U.S.A such as Bright Star exercise in Egypt in 2005 (Terrill, 2005: 55).

The Jordanian forces have always been engaged with the U.S. forces in training at different levels. By doing this, the Jordanian army has been introduced to high levels of professionalism and technology in war affairs, not to mention the strengthening of the ties between the Jordanian army and that of the U.S.A and its allies in the region (Interview: Habashneh, 2008). In addition; the costs of this training are fully covered by the U.S.A, and this economic support is very important for the Jordanian army; to get trained at a very professional level for free is great advantage for a country like Jordan, which suffers economic scarcity. Needless to say, many Jordanian officers at different ranks and from different branches of the Jordanian forces have their military education and training in the U.S.A (Interview: Al-Ka’abneh, 2008).
The U.S.A is continuously supporting Jordan in modernising and developing its military capabilities (Prados, 2003: 6). For example, the Fiscal Year (FY) of 2008 budget request included extra military assistance to the Jordanian Army of $200 million. The aim of this assistance is to upgrade the Jordanian air force, radar system, purchasing air-to-air missiles and U.S. Blackhawk helicopters. It is worth mentioning that the tasks and capabilities of these equipments are to enhance border monitoring and counterterrorism (Sharp, 2007: 17-18).

In general the U.S.A has been very generous to Jordan, and it sends a lot of its military expertise to train Jordanian forces in using new military equipment as a result of Jordanian cooperation with the U.S.A in the region. The U.S.A wants Jordan to be a very successful and helpful country for both Israel and Iraq, where the main U.S. interests and concerns lie (Interview: Bell, 2008). According to Dr. Mohammed Al-Momani, 50% of U.S. aid to Jordan goes to the military field. While the Jordanian government is very aware of its strategic importance for the U.S.A, this makes them aware of cost-benefit calculation of its policies toward the U.S.A. Jordan, therefore, makes sure that it is going to benefit or get paid by the U.S.A for any action it takes that serves the U.S in one way or in another. This indicates that Jordan makes its foreign policies upon a well-calculated strategy with the U.S.A (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008).

Jordan is a stable country in a troubled region; Jordan and Israel are the best allies of the U.S.A in this region, especially in fighting terrorism. There is great deal of predictability and sustainability in Jordanian different policies which make Jordan a reliable ally for the
U.S.A (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008). Conclusively, Jordan will always remain in need of the U.S. military support and aids. This makes Jordan constantly prioritise the U.S. demands and preferences. The capacity and transparency of Jordan allows the U.S.A to be very generous with them. On its part Jordan knows what it is required to do and how to use this in their needs from the U.S.A based on reciprocated interests and trust.

4.9 Jordanian Internal Stability

Jordan has always denied terrorism and supported all means to fight this phenomenon mainly because Jordan suffered a lot from terrorism and it is harming the stability of the region as well as different Arab causes (Interview: Al-Massry, 2008). After 9/11, especially during the Iraq war, Jordan witnessed different terrorist plots. The main actor and planner for the attacks and plots was the Jordanian Abu Musab Al- Zarqawi, the Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq after the invasion (Levitt and Sawyer, 2004: 1). Al Zarqawi oversaw the bombing of the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad in August 2003, the unsuccessful huge intended attack which was designed to use chemical materials to attack the U.S. embassy in Jordan as well as major Jordanian official headquarters such as the Prime Ministry and the General Intelligence Department. The Jordanian authorities expected that the attack would result in approximately 160,000 casualties. This operation, according to the Jordanian authorities, was funded and facilitated by a network in Syria and Iraq led by Al-Zarqawi. These plots, Levitt and Sawyer argued, made Jordan a strategic country in fighting terrorism through its raids, arrests and the freezing of terrorist funds and logistic operations in the region (Levitt and Sawyer, 2004: 3).
On 9th November 2005 three suicide attacks took place in three different hotels in the Jordanian capital Amman. These attacks resulted in the death of 60 civilians and the injury of 100 others. These attacks were also masterminded by Al-Zarqawi and Al-Qaeda as revenge for the support Jordan holds for the U.S.A in its War on Terror and in Iraq (Middle East Report N 47, 2005). In the words of U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on 9th November 2005 after the attacks: “The United States has had no closer ally than Jordan in the War on Terror, and Jordan will find no better friend than the United States at this difficult hour”. Al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed responsibility for the attacks and they justified the attacks by claiming that the Jordanian regime by its support to the U.S.A in the War on Terror and in the war in Iraq made Jordan a backyard for the enemy of Islam, the U.S.A (Arkin, 2005).

This shows that the main threat to Jordan and to the region is international terrorism, which is embodied in some Islamic organisations such as Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah. These organisations are supported by Iran and they serve Iranian interests in the Middle East. They aim to attack the U.S. forces, interests and allies. As a result, the tasks of the Jordanian security establishments are to protect Jordan from terrorism and to prevent smuggling weapons, especially form terrorist organisations from Iraq and Syria to Jordan. Although Jordanian forces are very efficient, there is still a terrorist threat to Jordan mainly due to the region’s instability, which makes these organisations able to operate (Interview: Al-Mawazreh, 2008). What makes the situation more difficult for Jordan is that it is located in the middle of hot and conflicted points in the Middle East; in addition, not all Jordanian neighbours are very cooperative in this regard, especially Syria. Iran and
Syria are the sources of instability in the region and they allowed Jordan to be targeted on many occasions. However, these facts make Jordan closer to the U.S.A not only because these countries aim to harm Jordan, but they also aim to destabilise the region (Interview: Al-Mawazreh, 2008).

There are few voices in the U.S.A which undervalue the importance of the political status quo of Jordan. They raise the option of solving the Israeli-Palestinian dispute at the expense of Jordan, by creating a formal Palestinian entity in Jordan. This approach is a devastating threat to the internal stability of Jordan and its regime, and for future cooperation between Jordan and the U.S (Interview: Abu-Nowar, 2008). Likewise, according to Dr. Abdul Lateef Arabyat, while Jordan has been cooperative with the U.S.A and has been a stabilizing factor since the 1950s in the region, it is in the interests of the U.S.A to oppose any temptation of questioning its existence. The Israeli desire of creating a Palestinian state in Jordan is perceived by the Islamic party, as well as from all political powers in Jordan, to be a national security threat (Interview: Arabyat, 2008).

These Jordanian fears are clear for the U.S.A, mainly because Jordan is very aware of them and is keen to raise them with the U.S.A when necessary. Therefore, although Jordan is very cooperative with the U.S.A in regional issues, it is very sensitive regarding its internal affairs. It offers limited cooperation with the U.S.A on some occasions related to internal politics such as the distribution of power and political participation. By doing that, Jordan aims to keep all its options open in key security issues regarding the domestic front. These issues do not undermine the Jordanian alignment and cooperation with the
U.S.A in vital issues such as the War on Terror (Interview: Bell, 2008). While these regional affairs are of mutual interest, they are more important for the U.S.A than Jordanian internal issues. This allows Jordan to be free from U.S. demands regarding Jordanian internal affairs and preferences, although U.S. assurance of non-Israeli intervention in Jordanian affairs would be of great benefit to Jordan. These issues will be discussed in more depth in the forthcoming chapters.

Some Islamist figures such as Hamzah Mansour, the head of the IAF in the Parliament, asserted that U.S. cooperation with Jordan is limited to security issues and it does not sufficiently support Jordan economically. He accuses the Bush administrations of exploiting other countries such as Jordan to achieve its major strategies without paying enough attention to these countries’ needs and preferences. These policies may result in the U.S.A losing the War on Terror, and will increase the threats on the American soil because this war required the cooperation of not only the government of these countries but the public as well (Interview: Mansour, 2008). On the other hand, Jordanian government and security establishments found it advantageous that the U.S. government prioritised security on other issues, and by that they enjoy extra freedom of action in internal affairs as well as extra power and support from the U.S.A. This is a main source of stability and continuity of the status quo in Jordan; a considerable sector of Jordanians depend on their livelihood on working in public sector in general, including the military, and these establishments would receive less support from the U.S.A if it had different priorities (Interview: Braizat, 2008).
Although the presence of U.S. forces abroad can be perceived as an indication of U.S. commitments to its allies (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1391), and although President Bush was determined to build an international coalition to fight terrorism, because of the nature of terrorism and the spread of Al-Qaeda’s cells in many countries and regions, it is not possible nor necessary for the U.S.A to do the fighting alone in all of these countries, especially while the security establishments of these countries can do the job more effectively, due to their information and capacity to work in their territories (Posen, 2002: 43). Barry R. Posen argued that the U.S.A can not solve all the problems of the countries which it is trying to persuade to support the War on Terror, neither can it afford to make all of its allies prosperous and to solve all regional conflicts, mainly because the U.S.A needs the support of all of the parties involved in these conflicts (Posen, 2002: 51). However, these U.S. concerns are not applicable to Jordan. Many U.S. officials are satisfied with the ability and efficiency of the Jordanian policies and forces to achieve their obligations (Bell, 2008). The section below explains the U.S. satisfaction regarding the Jordanian establishments, especially the intelligence.

4.10 Intelligence Cooperation between the Two Countries

After 9/11, intelligence became a more vital element in enhancing U.S. security at home and abroad from international terrorism. The vitality of intelligence in the War on Terror indicated the importance of allies’ cooperation in this element (Posen, 2002: 46). The failure of U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) to anticipate the threat coming from Al-Qaeda pre-9/11 and the overestimation of the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction made the U.S. government and its different intelligence agencies recognise the need for changing
the U.S. intelligence strategy, especially in sharing information within the U.S. agencies and also with international partners and allies (Reveron, 2008: 2). Interestingly, intelligence cooperation between the U.S.A and other countries is not only a vital tool for the War on Terror, but also one of the greatest opportunities and tools for other countries willing to cooperate with the U.S.A, to cooperate in a covert way to avoid public criticism, especially in an era of highly anti-American public sentiment about foreign policies, especially in the Middle East, for which reason the governments of these countries are reluctant and not willing to use their armed forces publicly alongside the U.S.A (Reveron, 2008).

The former U.S. Director of the CIA, R. James Woolsey, stated that Jordan is a natural target for terrorism and Al-Qaeda (Silverstein, 2005). The Jordanian intelligence has always been a central pillar for Jordan’s safety, which compelled the Jordanian regime build a strong relationship between its intelligence and the CIA. Since the leadership of Allan Dulles of the CIA in the 1950s and 1960s, Jordanian intelligence was perceived as a main partner in the Middle East by the U.S.A. Since that time, the CIA believed that the Jordanian intelligence should be supported and equipped with high level of professionalism. This professionalism made the Jordanian intelligence one of the closest intelligences in the Middle East to the U.S.A (Terrill, 2008: 58).

U.S.-Jordanian intelligence cooperation is highly beneficial for both countries. For example, the U.S. finances the Jordanian intelligence secretly to subsidise its budget. These subsidies are believed to be annual and are not included in the U.S. aid packages to
Jordan (O’Sullivan, 2005). After 9/11, the U.S.A increased funds and technical support to the Jordanian intelligence, for example, the CIA established a permanent signal’s intelligence (SIGINT) monitoring station in Jordan for counterterrorism purposes. This station facilitated the tasks of not only the Jordanian intelligence, but also the CIA in the region (Arkin, 2005). Noticeably, the U.S. and Iraqi forces missed many opportunities to hunt down Al-Zarqawy in 2005 and 2006 mainly because of limited knowledge about the man available for them until the Jordanian intelligence got involved after Al-Zarqawy targeted Jordan on different occasions, such as the hotel bombings in November 2005 (Silverstein, 2005).

According to an anonymous CIA officer, the CIA and the Jordanian intelligence conducted very sophisticated joint operations regarding the war in Iraq and fighting terrorists in the region. Michael Scheuer, a former key figure in the CIA who retired in 2004 after twenty-two years of service in the agency with expertise in Al-Qaeda stated that Jordanian intelligence and the CIA share the same agendas and strategies. He believes that although the Israeli Mossad is considered to be the closest U.S. ally in the Middle East, the Jordanian intelligence is more efficient in fighting terrorism and has a wider reach within the region than any other agency. Moreover, the former CIA Middle East division Chef Frank Anderson highlighted the capability of the Jordanian intelligence staff in fighting terrorism, mainly because they know the language, culture and attitude of the terrorists while interrogating them (O’Sullivan, 2005).
Jordanian intelligence was used to do the dirty work on behalf of the CIA, including kidnapping high value terrorists, torture and interrogation (Arkin, 2005). Larry Johnson, a former State Department counterterrorism officer stated that Jordan is an ideal partner for the rendition program because the Jordanian intelligence has the most professional and sophisticated interrogators that the U.S.A can rely on (Silverstein, 2005). As a result, the Jordanian General Intelligence Department (GID) was accused by Amnesty International in July 2006 of detaining and torturing while interrogating CIA prisoners accused of terrorism mainly because the American law banned torture (Sharp, 2008: 17). According to Joanne Mariner, Director of the Terrorism and Counterterrorism Program for Human Rights Watch (HRW), there were many renditions in Jordan after 9/11 where some non-Jordanian terrorist suspects were sent to Jordan by the CIA from different countries, including Afghanistan, to spend time in the Jordanian intelligence for interrogation and torture before being sent back to the CIA (Fisher, 2008).

There is continuous cooperation between the Jordanian intelligence and its counterparts in the region, especially those of U.S. allies, to exchange information and experiences regarding security challenges to the Middle East (Interview: Al-Raggad, 2008). Interestingly, Jordanian intelligence and military intelligence are claimed to be the most reliable and honest with the U.S.A. One of the main reasons for the exceptional ties between the Jordanian intelligence and the U.S.A is that the Gulf countries are very worried about the Iranian ambitions in the region, which resulted in the commencement of some private channels between these countries and Iran, where they deal with Iran in spite of their relations with the U.S.A; the Syrian regime and the current Iraqi
government are allies of Iran. These multidimensional relations with Iran make Jordan very reliable and neutral among the U.S. allies in the region regarding Iranian activities and ambitions. Needless to say, the location of Jordan and its vital interests of stability and survivability force these establishments to generate a great deal of vigilance, efficiency and credibility regarding security affairs (Interview: Al-Mawazreh, 2008).

According to the U.S. National Strategy of Information Sharing (NSC) released in October 2007, information sharing with other countries is a vital key to the achievement of U.S. security. This strategy recommended that the U.S. government and agencies must deal with information from other countries with high confidentiality and sensitivity and should be based on agreements and understandings with these countries to assure them of the secrecy in sharing information in order to help them avoid criticism (NSC, 2007: 25). No less important, according to the National Counterintelligence Executive in the U.S. (NCIX), the U.S.A War on Terror requires effective counterintelligence activity to halt terrorists from gaining vital information about the U.S. military activities and intentions, or to mislead the U.S.A by invalid information about terrorists’ activities (NCIX, 2005: 4). These concerns indicate the extent to which the U.S.A is aware of its ally’s sensitivities to guarantee sustainable cooperation with the U.S.A.

Although the U.S.A supports Jordanian intelligence financially and with training, the U.S.A does not have power over Jordan nor does it impose its security agenda on Jordan; mainly because Jordanian security concerns and objectives are much closer to those of the U.S.A in the region, not to mention the role and importance of Jordan for these U.S.
concerns. Therefore, Jordan practices a high level of autonomy in its strategic security relations with the U.S.A (Interview: Al-Raggad, 2008). Meanwhile, based on the U.S. concerns regarding intelligence cooperation and information sharing, and based on the record of the Jordanian intelligence as indicated above, it is not surprising that the level of mutual trust and dependency between the two countries in intelligence cooperation is paramount and sophisticated. Given the importance of intelligence cooperation between the two countries and the role of the GID in Jordanian policy making, especially regarding sensitive and fundamental issues, the researcher managed to access some sources that are a great help, however, the limitations of these sources prevented the researcher from using some evidence that it was not possible to confirm.

4.11 Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the mutual security collaboration between Jordan and the U.S.A during an exceptional era of military and security affairs. The role of a small state like Jordan in providing vital support to a superpower like the U.S.A in very strategic affairs proved to be indisputable. This has resulted mainly from the Jordanian acknowledgment of U.S. strategies in the Middle East and how to respond to them actively and skilfully. On the other hand, Jordan performs in a calculating manner; it receives almost every necessary support it needs from the U.S.A to accomplish its survivability, which is a major concern for any small state. This shows, as a matter of fact, the U.S. awareness of its allies and partners.
Although Jordan as a Middle Eastern country is expected to offer more help to the U.S.A in the War on Terror than any other U.S. ally located in another region, many of the U.S. policies that Jordan has supported are in the best interests of Jordan in the first place, not to mention that Jordan was able to avoid some U.S. demands that otherwise would be harmful to Jordan preferences. There is no doubt that the Jordanian cooperation with the U.S.A and its War on Terror in general is enhancing Jordanian security and stability (Interview: Al-Ka’abneh, 2008). This however does not mean that Jordan is equivalent to the U.S.A in terms of mutual influence and importance; it suggests that if a small state has the sufficient awareness of the circumstances surrounding her and adopts brave and adequate policies, it will have the chance of winning vital U.S. support and consideration of its preferences and priorities. In many cases discussed in this chapter, Jordan has had the chance to make its voice heard and preferences superior. Unquestionably that required Jordan to be an energetic, vigilant and trustworthy ally from the U.S. perspective regarding strategic and vital affairs.

The location and credibility of Jordan, side by side with its armed forces’ professionalism and wise policies, made the security cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan a major pillar of U.S.-Jordanian strategic relations in general since 2000. These strategic and sustainable relations however, are based on other interconnected pillars and dimensions which are associated with the security cooperation between the two countries, especially in the 2000s. U.S. democracy promotion in the region and its impact on Jordan’s democratisation process as well as the Israeli concerns and its significance to the U.S.A are highly attached and intersected with the security cooperation between Jordan and the
U.S.A. More importantly, U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East and the significance of Israel are major components of U.S. policies in the region during the Bush’s and neoconservatives’ era in the region that influenced U.S.-Jordanian relations in different ways, which makes these two topics the themes of the two subsequent chapters of this thesis.
Chapter Five: U.S. Democracy Promotion in the Middle East and Jordan

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with U.S. democracy promotion as a major element of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East and its impact on the democratisation process in Jordan and on its relations with the U.S. accordingly. Since democratisation became a major U.S. demand in the region after 9/11, it is vital for the sake of this thesis to investigate the interaction between the U.S. and Jordan regarding this issue. By doing this, the chapter aims to assess both the U.S. seriousness in enhancing the democratic status of Middle Eastern countries, including allies such as Jordan, and the ability of the Jordanian regime in responding to U.S. exigencies for political reform and democratisation.

The main argument of this chapter, though, is that democratisation in the Middle East has fluctuated as a major element of U.S. foreign policy in the region; this resulted from the inconsistency between U.S. strategies in the War on Terror and its democracy promotion in the region after 9/11, let alone its possible consequences. By applying the theoretical framework of this thesis on democratisation in Jordan and its relations with the U.S.A, it is expected that the Jordanian regime will be able to choose the path in which it democratises itself away from U.S. pressures. The chapter therefore argues that the U.S.A turns a blind eye to the slow pace of Jordanian reform while the regime is very skilful in allocating priorities and concerns within relations with the U.S.A, even in issues that are considered of high value for the U.S.A. More importantly, such a slow Jordanian reform
is essential for the U.S.A to maintain Jordanian cooperation with the U.S. strategic War on Terror, as discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, the originality of this chapter is in clarifying the dynamics of both U.S. democracy promotion in the region after 9/11 and the slow reform process in Jordan in the current context of counterterrorism.

In order to profoundly explore U.S.-Jordanian democratisation interactions, the researcher had to provide a rationalization for both the incentives and obstacles of both U.S. democratisation in the region and the slow political reform process in Jordan. The researcher believes that although sometimes the complexities of the two issues are wide, a comprehensive understanding of the subject matter requires coverage of the multidimensionality of the topic. Therefore, the chapter will start by analysing U.S. policies and efforts in promoting democracy in the Middle East in general, in order to examine the seriousness and capacity of the U.S.A as a democracy promoter in the region. Subsequently, an evaluation of these policies will be provided. This evaluation will consider the obstacles of democracy promotion and the impact of the U.S. War on Terror on the democratisation process in the region. These topics will enable the researcher to accomplish a profound knowledge about the topic in order to explore in depth the Jordanian political reform and U.S relations accordingly in the second half of this chapter. Therefore, the chapter will be finished with an investigation of the dynamics of the Jordanian slow reform and the impact of the Islamists and regional politics on the democratisation process in Jordan and how these features are affected by and shape U.S.-Jordanian relations in the issue of political reform.
5.2 U.S. Foreign Policy and Democratisation

It is believed that the U.S.A has benefited a lot from promoting democracy all over the world. Major previous enemies of the U.S.A were autocratic countries such as Japan and Germany during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Therefore, the consolidation of democracy in Germany and Japan after World War II increased the security of the U.S.A as well as other strategic interests. However, some U.S. strategists and policymakers during the Cold War supported the U.S. ties with some enemies of communism regardless of their democratic status, as any regime change in these countries would be replaced by pro-communist alternatives. Interestingly, many current enemies of the U.S.A are autocratic and endorse antidemocratic ideas, such as Al-Qaeda (Fukuyama and McFaul, 2007-2008: 26).

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the abandonment of the Marxist ideology were simultaneous with, or smoothed the way for, a wave of democratisation process in the world and with a turn by many authoritarian regimes to a discourse of pluralist democratic language to legitimise their presence and behaviours (Parry and Moran, 1994: 10). Many people believe that the twentieth century was termed the “democratic century” mainly because of the U.S. influence during that century to the extent that many people conceived the terms the “American century” and “democratic century” to be synonymous. Historically, the U.S. political and military powers were used to promote democratic systems in different countries, especially erstwhile enemies. In addition, the U.S. productivity and economic capacities and its favour of free market economies,
which are associated with democratic values and politics, made the U.S.A an influential actor and beneficiary in favour of this kind of governance. Lastly, the U.S.A takes a great role in knowledge and information structures and technology, which allowed the U.S.A to practice an extraordinary influence over other countries in this regard. These factors made the U.S.A a great pioneer of democratization during the last century and in the years to come (Parry and Moran, 1994: 265). As a result, John Ikenberry asserts that the more democratic the states that are allied with the U.S.A, the more these alignments last with higher durability (Ikenberry, 2001: 5).

In President G.W. Bush’s speech at West Point in June 2002 he asserted the importance of creating a new world order based on liberal values and human freedom. In this speech, the President was clear in emphasising the great role the U.S.A should play to achieve these goals; the President also asserted that achieving these goals requires the U.S.A to practice its military hegemony as a major element of creating the intended new order. Furthermore, the U.S. National Security Strategy, published a few months after this speech, suggested that the use of U.S. military power does not require a global consensus, although it must practice a global reach (Rhodes, 2005: 228). Therefore, democracy, freedom, security cooperation, and hegemonic peace were all linked to the U.S. hegemonic project. In other words, there are obvious interlocking combinations between morality, principles, and extra-territoriality in the U.S. foreign policy after 9/11, and the concept of a moral and just mission is the main tool used in justifying U.S. policies and extra-territorial activities and policies in a world of sovereign states (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1385).
Promoting democracy and enhancing human rights have been always supported by different U.S. administrations, institutions, political communities and the American public. However, the differences among the two dominant parties in the U.S.A, the Republicans and the Democrats, are divided in the extent to which this issue should be adopted in U.S. foreign policy and affected different U.S. institutions regarding the implementation of these ideas. Even within the same party there are widely different views about promoting democracy. Although the Republicans are more supportive of the idea than the Democrats, Realist Republicans prefer limited involvement in promoting democracy, whereas the neoconservatives are still strongly attached to the idea; whereas the American public became more doubtful about it, especially after the war in Iraq in 2003 and its consequences (Carothers, 2007: 1).

Many people argue that promoting democracy as an element of U.S. foreign policy is a rhetorical strategy rather than a genuine policy. However, the Bush administrations have always argued that democratisation is a real goal in U.S. foreign policy, exemplifying the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan despite the fact there were different views and reasons among Bush’s team to go to war in each case. For example, the first Bush administration’s Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld supported the wars for security justification and the U.S. status in the world, while other key figures such as the Secretary of Defence Paul Wolfowitz perceived the war in Iraq as a step forward to building a new democratic and pro-Western Iraq, which would lead to a wave of democratisation in the Arab world (Carothers, 2007: 6).
Thomas Carothers argues that Bush’s policies of promoting democracy were driven by a semi-realist framework similar to most previous administrations, but publicly presented as exuberant in order to connect promoting democracy with other U.S. policies and strategies. In addition, Carothers denied the assumptions made by the Bush administration that his democratisation policy represented the first genuine U.S. attempt to promote democracy abroad. Also, he denied that these policies presented a full press on U.S. democracy promotion and that future administration can start from where Bush’s era ended. Carothers argued that other previous administrations tackled the issues, especially those of Presidents Ronald Regan and Bill Clinton (Carothers, 2007: 16).

There are different trends that differentiate Bush’s democracy promotion from previous administrations, the most salient one being that it focussed on the Middle East. This region has never been a main target of such a U.S. policy; not less importantly, there is a limited record of democratic achievements in the region. Previous U.S. policies targeted hostile regimes to the U.S.A and countries which are already in a democratic flux, and their cultures are more compatible with democracy, whereas these criteria are not fully present in most Middle Eastern countries (Carothers, 2007: 17).

5.3 U.S. Democratisation and the Middle East

The desire for democracy in the Arab countries mainly results from domestic frustration and the inefficiency of the governments of these countries in following up other countries in terms of standard of living, human rights, facing and responding efficiently to major
challenges in these countries and crises in the region, such as the Arab-Israeli disputes and the situation in Iraq (Rubin, 2007: 1). In principle, achieving stable and full democracy in the Middle East combined with free market economies are in the best interests of the U.S.A in the long term. The most important challenges, however, are in accepting the process of democratisation by the regimes and peoples of the region and the U.S. realisation that promoting democracy requires time and effort, which sometimes would result in undesirable outcomes (Hawthorne, 2002: 81).

Supporting political reforms and promoting democracy are useful policies for the U.S.A and should remain part of the U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. This norm is based on the notion that these policies will be very efficient in eliminating dictatorships and the mentality that accompanies them, which are harming the U.S.A in achieving its interests and are unhelpful in solving the region’s problems and dilemmas. At the same time, the U.S. needs to have good ties with some key regimes in the region in order to achieve its vital present strategies in the region. Therefore, Barry Rubin argues that the U.S.A should adopt a policy which conditions U.S. aid to these regimes and countries with the implementation of reasonable U.S. demands related directly to U.S. interests in the region. Moreover, while the U.S.A is supporting most countries in the Middle East in different ways, it has the right to ask for something in return. In other words, the U.S.A must ask for attainable demands from these regimes and ignore basic and fundamental political changes in these countries lest these changes jeopardise U.S. interests and the stability of the region (Rubin, 2007: 15).
In the long run, promoting democracy in one of the most autocratic regions in the world should enhance the legitimacy of the regimes in this region which will reduce the chance of the emergence of anti-systematic organisations such as Al-Qaeda. Because of the fact that democratic countries are generally more stable than dictatorships, promoting democracy in the Middle East would increase internal stability within these countries and would reduce the likelihood of conflicts between them. This would reflect positively on U.S. interests in the region and reduce the necessity of a costly military presence in the region which proved to be harmful to the U.S. reputation and the reputation of the regimes of the Arab countries where these troops were based (Fukuyama and McFaul, 2007-2008: 26).

Tamara Cofman Wittes argues that U.S. interests in the Middle East require the U.S.A to protect the status quo in the Arab countries and to rely on key Arab regimes such as in Jordan. However, she argues that there are many challenges in these countries such as the combination of demographic growth, economic stagnation, bad governance, lack of sustainable development and lack of democracy. These realities are presenting huge challenges for the legitimacy and survivability of these regimes (Wittes, 2005: 21). More importantly from a U.S. perspective, these challenges are risking the status quo and the sustainability of U.S.-Arab relations in the future and U.S. interests in this region. Therefore, enhancing the relationship between the regimes of the Arab counties and their citizenry is essential in order to guarantee the support of the people to the regimes in these countries, to accomplish a sustainable cooperation between the U.S.A and these countries (Wittes, 2005: 23).
In practice, U.S. policies toward its autocratic partners and allies in the Middle East were toothless and fruitless regarding promoting democracy to the extent that they can be categorised as semi-realist policies, in the sense that the U.S.A prioritised security and economic interests over democratisation. The U.S.A practiced the same policies with other countries such as Russia for security reasons and with China for economic reasons, at the time when both of these countries took backward steps on liberalisation (Carothers, 2007: 7). Therefore, there is a combination of two reasons, economic and security, for the reluctant U.S. policies in promoting democracy robustly in the Middle East; economic reasons such as the importance of the oil industry and price stability in the Gulf countries, and security reasons such as the War on Terror and the Islamists such as Hamas and Iran in countries like Egypt and Jordan (Carothers, 2007: 13).

5.4 Obstacles to Democratisation in the Middle East

Anti-Americanism in the region lessens the credibility of U.S. democratisation initiatives and efforts among the people and governments of these countries (Hawthorne, 2002: 89). Richard Crockatt argues that anti-Americanism in the Muslim world is a profound conviction, U.S. policies in the Middle East are perceived as if they are against the Arab interests and aiming at exploiting the Arabs and causing them humiliation, and to achieve deprivation for these countries from genuine development (Crockatt, 2003: 43).

Dalacoura argues that the problem with U.S. democracy and human rights promotion in the region is that the Arab public perceives it as a kind of hypocrisy, in the sense that the
U.S.A has a hidden agenda behind these initiatives, such as U.S. domination of the region and protecting its interests and allies such as Israel. In fact, according to Dalacoura, the U.S.A is serious about democracy and human rights in the Middle East, but the problem is that the neoconservatives believe that the type of democracy they want to accomplish in the Middle East is the only solution for all the problems in this region, mainly because they combine realist assumptions with the role of democracy in enhancing U.S. security and interests in the region (Dalacoura, 2005: 974).

According to Steven Cook, a main reason behind limited democratisation in the Arab countries is the flawed nature of the institutions which deal with citizens’ liberties and political rights in these countries. The institutions which enforce and represent the laws and regulations in these countries are aiming only to consolidate the role of the autocratic regimes and their executive branches. Therefore, institutional change and reform are critical keys in Arab political reforms which can be achieved by using positive pressures by the U.S.A (Cook, 2005: 94).

The military and security establishments have the upper hand in shaping the domestic and foreign policies of most Middle Eastern countries (Laipson and Hokayem, 2006: 159). Moreover, Middle Eastern countries are facing major difficulties in political transition, mainly because of state capacity and determination to manipulate democratic forces and oppose reforms. Therefore, democratic and political transition is very difficult when the regime has control over the security forces and establishments which provide the state with coercive apparatus to oppose real political transition. The security establishments of
any undemocratic state are always in desperate need of international support to maintain its capacity to hold on to power. Even after the end of the Cold War, different western powers, especially the U.S.A had security concerns in the Middle East which resulted in the continuation of international backing for specific undemocratic regimes and their different security establishments (Bellin, 2004: 142).

No less importantly, Hinnebusch argued that one reason for the limited success of democratisation in the Middle East is that when these states were founded the structural conditions for democracy were neglected. For example, the limited power of the bourgeoisie and working classes in Middle Eastern societies deprived these societies of indispensable actors for the demand and consolidation of democracy. This resulted in the state ownership of the economy and made the people dependent on the state in their livelihood, and allowed the state to be unbound in structuring the social and economic systems and powers of these countries which aimed mostly to strengthen the status of the regimes in these countries (Hinnebusch, 2005: 33).

Brumberg argued that to promote democracy in the Arab world and to modernise the Islamists the U.S. policies and the Arab governments should not target ideological transformation of these groups, as this would create spontaneous resistance and sensitivity not only among the Islamists themselves but also among the public. The policies must aim at institutional and procedural reforms which encourage the Islamists to interact with other powers, whether the current regimes or other non-Islamist parties, for power sharing and real political competition. This would force the Islamists to
compromise and shelve their ideological priorities in favour of a system of compromise and coalition governments (Brumberg, 2005: 99).

Although a free election and full democratic reforms would be a great chance for the Islamists to gain power and could result in more anti-American governments in the Middle East, it is worth mentioning that these governments would be restrained by domestic pressures, which pressures and demands are highly influenced by the support and cooperation of the U.S.A, whether regarding economic issues or the Arab-Israeli conflict. A government hostile to U.S. interests in the region would face huge difficulties in achieving its goals and retaining public support. As a result, any U.S. democratic reforms must guarantee the continuous cooperation between these countries and the U.S.A in different internal and regional issues (Wittes, 2005: 25).

In most Arab countries, the liberals or reformists are trapped between the likelihood of the triumph of either the Islamists or the Nationalists in a genuinely neutral and free election. Liberals fear an Islamist takeover because they want a free society, which compels them to side with the regime against the Islamists; however, when the regime is deeply hated, liberals side themselves with the Islamists against the regime. In most cases, however, liberals do not support either side and choose their own independent approach, although that limits their power and influence. By allying themselves with one side they would influence either the regime for more openness or the Islamists for more moderation (Rubin, 2007: 13). Rapid regime change whether from below or from above is expected to create chaos and violence, not democracy and stability, in many cases of
Middle Eastern countries where power sharing and political tolerance are still weak and inexperienced (Brumberg, 2005: 105).

According to Roger Harrison, a former U.S. ambassador to Jordan, the U.S. idealistic vision of spreading democratic values is facing realistic obstacles. He believes that the U.S.A does not have the capability to change other countries’ ideologies and social systems and many previous attempts to do so led to violence. This is not to say that the U.S.A should not interfere when there are abuses of human rights and international conflicts; he believes that the U.S.A should be careful when restructuring the political landscape for other countries and it should do so when it is possible to further people’s aspirations (Harrison, 2002: 79). In addition, Harrison argues that some changes in the behaviour of some Middle Eastern countries towards their citizens have occurred not because of continuous U.S. exigencies but because of other external factors such as the impact of globalisation and its complexity. These factors forced the regimes to give an account to the public opinion and their increasing and changeable demands and desires as a result of their interaction with the outside world. In other words, the U.S. policy of democratising other countries can be supported and consolidated by U.S. support of different globalisation policies and forces with their multiple dimensions which are in favour of everyone (Harrison, 2002: 80).

It is believed that the U.S. democratic promotion policy is not oriented toward the Middle East as a single unified region; the U.S.A is selective in targeting these countries based on U.S. interests not on the applicability of reform in these countries. Some people
believe that the U.S.A should focus on countries which have abhorrent authoritarian regimes and high violation of human rights. Others argue that the U.S.A must focus on countries which already have political openness and roots of democratic evolution so it can flourish and became a success story in the region which will justify U.S. demands for change in other countries (Hawthorne, 2002: 89).

5.5 Terrorism and Democratisation

President G.W. Bush started his presidency without a mission of spreading democracy and freedom in the world. During his first presidential candidacy he demonstrated a modest foreign policy agenda that include political reform in the developing countries. It was only after the events of 9/11 that the U.S. administration shifted its intention regarding the importance of promoting democracy and freedom in its foreign policy as it believed that there is a link between the level of democracy and international threats such as terrorism (Fukuyama and McFaul, 2007- 2008: 24). However, while many people questioned the intersection between U.S. traditional interests in the Middle East and democracy promotion, to justify the War on Terror the U.S. government asserted that terrorists reject basic human values and hate the U.S.A for its culture, beliefs and fundamental principles (Flint and Falah, 2004: 1391).

According to the NSS in 2006, transnational terrorism is derived from countries where people have no voice in political life. These people are easily manipulated and exploited by terrorists. Therefore, the U.S.A has to support new democracies which empower
peaceful and moderate Muslims, such as Jordan. Democracy will advance freedom and human dignity, which are believed to be the best long-term solutions to terrorism (NSS, 2006: 11). The strategy assures that rising democracies are the enemies of terrorism while one of the main aims of terrorists is to overthrow these young democracies (NSS, 2006: 12).

Promoting democracy in the Middle East became a major element of the U.S. foreign policy mainly because of the consensus among U.S. policymakers that promoting democracy in the region is vital for the U.S. security by eliminating extremism. Gerecht, a Middle East analyst supportive of Bush’s policies of promoting democracy in the region, argued that although allowing democracy to flourish in the Middle East is likely to result in more anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism in the region, it is a normal thing to happen, and according to Gerecht this is “actually good. It is the fever that will break the disease. You have to let it go” (Kaye et al., 2008: 13).

Many people argued that the U.S. War on Terror should not only have a military dimension, but that other constructive engagement must take place in many U.S. policies in different countries (Harrison, 2002: 79). In addition, Joseph Nye argued that international cooperation and the will of U.S. allies, not only the governments but also the people, are essential to accomplish its required outcomes. Moreover, as stated in the previous chapter, Nye asserts that “the United States will win the War on Terror only if moderate Muslims win, and the United States ability to attract moderates is critical to victory” (Nye, 2003: 75). On the other hand; some key figures in the Bush
administrations, especially in the Pentagon, were sceptical of the efficiency of the U.S. soft power and the multidimensional nature of the War on Terror (Nye, 2003: 75). F. George Gause III argued that there is limited evidence of the relationship between democracy and the reduction of terrorism in the Middle East, arguing that a democratic election is not guarantor of producing a government willing to cooperate with the U.S.A to achieve its different goals, especially in eliminating terrorism (Gause III, 2005: 62). Pape also asserted that democracy and political reform are not major motives for terrorists’ behaviour; on the contrary, terrorists are driven by their rejection of foreign influence, culture, and domination rather than the desire for democracy, which is perceived by terrorists as part of foreign influence and culture (Gause III, 2005: 63).

It has been argued that democratic countries usually build reliable alignments together and support each others’ policies. However, the war in Iraq highlights a different norm regarding the relationship between regime type and its foreign policy. Most of the countries that opposed the U.S. invasion of Iraq are democratic, including Turkey, which is believed to be one of the most democratic countries in the Middle East (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004: 775). The complement to domestic demands regarding unpopular alliances disappoints strategic allies. According to James Morrow, alliance duration and durability in asymmetric alliances are stronger than those of symmetrical ones, especially when there is huge disparity in military capability between partners. In addition, Scott D. Bennett argued that there is limited evidence to prove that democracy enhances and empowers alignment between countries (Gartzke and Gleditsch, 2004: 778).
There are some risks by either promoting democracy in the Middle East or stymieing this process. It is worth mentioning in this regard that the outcomes of repression and of resisting the results of the Algerian election in the early 1990s were disastrous. Political reform requires awareness of internal sensitivity and the extent to which an external agent like the U.S.A can influence the process (Kaye et al., 2008: 173). Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder assert that quick democratic transition in the Middle East would be a destabilising factor, basing their argument on the belief that immature and incomplete democracies would create institutional imbalance and political exclusion of key actors. This would result in less efficiency and legitimacy of the system from a public perspective, and cause anxiety among controlling elites, with more resort to violence by both sides. Therefore, in the words of Mansfield and Snyder, “democratising the Arab states is a major gamble in the War on Terror” (Kaye et al., 2008: 25).

Some sceptics of democracy promotion argue that while Al-Qaeda and other transnational organisations are the main terrorist threats and enemies to the U.S.A, promoting democracy in Middle Eastern countries has a limited effect on these groups mainly because the key members of these organisations are already exiled from their countries of origin, and these organisations have worldwide cells, not to mention that they perceive democracy as a deviant and corrupted western system and a conspiracy against the Muslim countries. Therefore, Douglas Borer and Michael Freeman argue that promoting democracy in the region is insufficient to counter the grievances that feed Al-Qaeda and other organisations’ grievances and ambitions. These organisations aim to free the Muslim world from U.S. influence and occupation and to free them from the current
regimes, which are perceived by these organisations as U.S. agents and traitors, and to replace them with a Caliphate and Islamic law (Kaye et al., 2008: 21).

On the other hand, Paul Pillar argues that democratisation has a positive impact on local radical groups, in addition to the impact of democratisation in de-legitimising these groups and increasing public support of counterterrorism policies, democratisation is also a moderating factor for other widespread organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Jordan and Egypt. In other words, there are different impacts of democratisation in reducing or eliminating terrorism and in moderating radical Islamist groups, depending on the level of repression of the state, the kind of activities and motivations of the these groups, and the level of political inclusion offered by the regime to these groups (Kaye et al., 2008: 23). The remainder of this chapter will explore the Jordanian democratisation process and its interactions with U.S. democracy promotion and other policies, counterterrorism in particular.

5.6 Democratisation in Jordan

According to the Freedom House ranking regarding the democratic status of Middle Eastern countries, Jordan is among those few countries which has achieved some progress in political reform and democratisation compared with most other Arab countries (Bellin, 2004: 139). Jordan’s bicameral parliament is composed of an elected 110-member lower house and an appointed 55-member upper house. Although the parliament has the theoretical right to challenge the king’s policies, in practice the
parliament has limited power, and a majority of two-thirds is required to do so. The king has the constitutional right to dissolve the parliament, postpone elections for up to two years, and can also issue royal decrees which are not accountable to the parliament (Sharp, 2008: 3). Moreover, major decisions in Jordan are made by institutions that are not accountable to the parliament, such as the Royal Court and the intelligence services. The King in Jordan has the constitutional rights of appointing and dismissing the cabinet, dissolves the parliament and can veto legislation, and his government can decree provisional laws while the parliament is dissolved (Choucair, 2006: 3).

The most recent parliamentary election in Jordan was in November 2007. It resulted in a continuation of the highly managed political and democratisation process to guarantee the regime’s dominance of political life in Jordan. The parliament was dominated by loyal tribal candidates, wealthy business elite, and former loyal officials in the army or in the public sector. The Islamists captured only six seats out of 110 in this election, which was a defeat compared with the previous elections such as the one in 2003 when they secured 17 seats (Kaye et al., 2008: 63). The IAF, the political wing of the MB in Jordan, accused the government of rigging and fraud in the election in favour of the regime’s supporters, arguing that these results will cause a decline in transparency and accountability (Kaye et al., 2008: 64).

Some observers of the Jordanian democratic progress argue that many Jordanian voters support candidates who have ties with ruling elites and governmental officials in order to help them to obtain patronage and facilities in public services they seek from the
governments. In addition, they indicate that in many cases the government and its officials allocate privileges for deputies and their acquaintances to avoid deputies’ criticism and any opposition to governmental policies (Okar, 2006: 460). Therefore, the priority for many Jordanian voters is gaining access to the state services rather than the policy making of it. More importantly, apart from the limited presence of the IAF, political parties in Jordan have a limited role in the behaviour of the Jordanian constituencies and, consequently, the behaviour of the deputies (Okar, 2006: 467).

Not surprisingly, many Jordanian politicians defend Jordan’s democratic status. For example, Marwan Dodeen, a long-serving member of the Jordanian Upper House, argued that Jordan is developing its own concept of political reform that suits its political, demographical and historical structure. In this regard Dodeen argues that western concept of representation according to the population does not suit Jordan and is not fair. For example, two-thirds of the territory of Jordan is in the southern part of the country which is the most scarcely populated part of the country, inhabited by only 10% of the Jordanian population; therefore, it is not fair to represent this part of Jordan with only 10% of seats in the parliament. This argument is against the Islamists’ desires, because their power and presence is allocated in the urban populated cities, whereas the rural areas with less population in Jordan host most of the supporters of the regime (Interview: Dodeen, 2008).

Taher Al-Massry, a former Jordanian Prime Minister and current deputy Speaker of the Upper House, argues that although the foreign policy of Jordan is made by the King and
his government, because of the closeness of Jordan to Palestine and Iraq, Jordanian foreign policymakers significantly consider Jordanian public opinion (Interview: Al-Massry, 2008). Other politicians such as the former prominent foreign minister Kamel Abu-Jabber perceive the policies of Jordan as being dictated by its geography, human and natural. Abu-Jabber argues that Jordan is an open society compared to other countries and has achieved remarkable steps forward in the right direction in terms of modernity and democracy, asserting that the U.S.A realises that Jordan has to operate within a sphere of public opinion (Interview: Abu-Jabber, 2008). Rami Khouri, a prominent journalist in Jordan, argues that taking into consideration the stability and level of security in Jordan, most Jordanians are satisfied with the level of freedom and dignity they enjoy living in compared to other Arab countries (Sharp, 2008: 7). In other words, the level of democracy that Jordan enjoys is satisfactory at least from the Jordanian elites’ perspective.

After the Arab Summit in Tunisia in May 2004, in which the Arab leaders committed to reform, King Abdullah II launched a Royal Committee of the National Agenda to draw a plan for political reform in Jordan to fulfil the commitment to reform. According to the head of the committee, Marwan Muasher, this agenda faced many criticisms especially from the ruling elite in the country, who are termed the “old guard”. This group of policymakers and politicians perceive any reform and change to the status quo as a threat to their status, arguing that widening decision-making and public participation in high politics in Jordan would jeopardise the national interests and security of the country. In addition, they argue that opening up the system will bring the Islamists more strongly
into the political system of Jordan. On the other hand, the reformists’ counterargument is that not opening up the system with the current defects of governance and economic and social challenges in Jordan will be the reasons for the increase of the Islamists power and assertiveness and support among the public, mainly because the Islamists are gaining power in issues and areas where the government are failing to meet the public demands (Muasher, 2008: 252).

Taher Al-Massry, another key member of the committee and activists for reform; argues that although political reform has been a public demand in Jordan, there are backward steps in political freedom in Jordan, arguing that there is only the appearance of reform with absence of real substance. Al-Massry asserts that the royal mission had produced very valuable and applicable recommendations for reform. These recommendations tackled the central issues of political reform in Jordan such as the electoral law, the media, women’s empowerment, civil society and political participation. Surprisingly, the Jordanian government was unwilling to take these recommendations into account, and none of them were implemented despite of the fact that all these recommendations were considerate of the regime’s concerns and priorities regarding security affairs and political reform in general. They were not designed to limit the monarchical authority or the security establishments’ role, or even to reduce the presence and power of regime supporters, they were designed only to enhance political freedom and to allow extra presence and representation of different political powers and parties in Jordan (Interview: Al-Massry, 2008). Mustafa Hamarneh, also a member of the mentioned committee, argued that despite of the fact that King Abdullah II is always calling for political reform
and democracy in Jordan, in practice the monarch is more efficiency driven in his policies than being a democrat (Interview: Hamarneh, 2008).

There are several demands by the Jordanian opposition for political reform, such as democratically elected government, wider authority to the parliament that is to be elected by better electoral law, new democratic press and publication laws, less interference in NGOs’ affairs and activities by the government, and a smaller role for security establishments (Choucair, 2006: 10-12). Quintan Wiktorowicz argued that in many Arab countries, including those which have good level of democracy such as Jordan, civil society is not completely independent from the state. Therefore, the Jordanian regime skilfully allowed some organisations of civil society to foster and grow in order to attain greater state social domination and manipulation of these organisations and public life in general (Wiktorowicz, 2000: 43-61).

All of these realities indicate that political reform in Jordan is a top-down process. By western standards, Jordanian political reform is a slow and hesitant process. It is believed that while the regime achieves a step forward in reform in issues relation to education, women’s rights, or economic liberalisation, it takes a step backward in other vital issues such as freedom of speech and press and institutional reform (Sharp, 2008: 7). Therefore, and because of the fact that democratisation in Jordan is not a paramount priority to the regime, possible progress is subordinate to different factors such as regional stability, the opposition capacity to make significant change, and a remarkable change to the regime’s support base (Choucair, 2006: 10-12).
5.7 U.S.-Jordanian Relations and Democratisation

It has long been argued that although the U.S.A is reluctant to pressure Jordan to democratise, the long-term interests and durability of the relations between the two countries are better served by more political openness and reform in Jordan. This belief is more profound when taking into consideration the vitality of Jordan as a U.S. ally in the region and the Jordanian contribution to the stability of the Middle East, where many of the U.S. vital interests are located (Choucair, 2006: 17). In addition, the U.S. government prefers to deal with partners who are willing to raise the challenges for both sides in order to face these challenges at earlier stages, rather than hiding them until they become insurmountable threats to the interests of both sides in the sense that facing dilemmas rapidly and suddenly are very costly for all (Interview: Bell, 2008).

Benjamin Bell, the Deputy of the Political Section Chief in the U.S. embassy in Jordan, argues that partners who raise challenges are stronger and more reliable allies that the U.S.A prefers to deal with in the Middle East (Interview: Bell, 2008). Therefore, the U.S.A is watchful of the growing presence of the Islamists in Jordan and the extent to which the Jordanian government is capable of maintaining the public support and reserving the role of moderate Islamists at the expense of the radicals. Bell clarifies that Jordan is a major U.S. ally in regional affairs but it keeps all its options open regarding its domestic front and reform and is less cooperative in its internal affairs. Bell believes that political reform in Jordan is a vital component for healthier and more durable relations
between the two countries in the future, even if that will cause some challenges for this relationship in the short run (Interview: Bell, 2008).

The IAF in Jordan accuses the U.S. government of not being serious regarding political reform in Jordan. They argue that the U.S.A stopped pressuring the regimes and governments in the region to reform their political status and democracies when it realised that such reforms will result in the domination of the Islamists in these countries. In addition, the General Secretary of the IAF Hamza Mansour asserts that the main cooperation between the U.S.A and Jordan is in security affairs (Interview: Mansour, 2008).

Mansour argues that the great deal of anti-U.S. policies among the Jordanian people made the U.S. government support the current political status quo in Jordan, including the electoral law, which is designed to limit the presence of the IAF. The U.S. desire to have a strong front in Jordan which can govern the country efficiently, a front that is compatible with the U.S. preferences, contradicts with how the Jordanian people perceive the U.S. policies in the region and IAF principles. Therefore, for the IAF the survivability and stability of Jordan and its regime does not derive from supporting U.S. strategies and projects, they rather derive strength from the solidarity of the Jordanian people, the Jordanian support of the Palestinian cause, and a genuine desire for political reform which allows the silent majority in the country to participate in public life and have their say (Interview: Mansour, 2008). It is worth mentioning in this regard that the regime fears and avoids such simultaneous reform and closeness to the Palestinian issue lest that
would result in jeopardising Jordan’s internal stability and its strategic relations with Israel and the U.S.A accordingly.

On the other hand, the Jordanian regime is a beneficiary from the containment of the Islamists, and the U.S.A recognises that Jordan is one of the few countries, if not the only one, in the Arab world which contained political Islam without violence. Consequently, Jordan can be an exemplar of toleration with the Islamists and the coexistence between political Islam and other powers and the regime. Therefore, the Jordanian experience in accomplishing peaceful and cooperative coexistence of political Islam and the regime is a good example for both the U.S.A and other Arab countries at the present time (Interview: Dodeen, 2008).

5.7.1 U.S. aid and Jordanian Democratisation

Although King Abdullah II made the commitment to democracy unwavering after his succession to the Jordanian throne, it is argued that economic reform and regime stability are paramount to political reform for the Jordanian monarch. King Abdullah II gave extraordinary attention to the Jordanian economy by enhancing foreign investments, aid, Jordanian exports, and the privatisation of some elements and services of the public sector, although many of these policies were unpopular with the public (Choucair, 2006: 8).
It is believed that due to the economic stagnation in some Middle Eastern countries such as Jordan, and due to these countries’ reliance on the IMF’s policies and reform packages, which in many cases were unpopular with the public, the governments of these countries use their economic difficulties as a licence to slow down political reform (Ehteshami, 1999: 212). Meanwhile, while Jordan is prioritising economic reform on political reform and seriously aiming and working to modernise its economy and market, political and economic reform can only be achieved simultaneously (Bell, 2008).

In general, Jordan is one of the main recipient countries of U.S. aid, ranked third in the Middle East after Egypt and Israel. U.S. aid packages aim to improve the reputation of the U.S.A in Jordan and to get more positive publicity about the U.S.A. The idea of these aids is that they are from the American people to the Jordanian people; in this regard the Jordanian regime has no objection to supporting the U.S. reputation in the country. However, the Jordanian government is skilful in practicing cost-benefit policies with the U.S.A by getting different aids and support in return for being cooperative with different U.S. initiatives and policies. At the same time, the Jordanian government is very sensitive towards foreign interference in its internal affairs such as its human rights record, cooperation with Jordanian high level opposition, and electoral law (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008).

The Jordanian government is also wary about some elements and consequences of U.S. projects and aids, especially those which have a political character. Some of these projects targeted the Jordanian parliament in terms of training the staff and providing
them with modern technology, and to develop their performance. In general, these programs do not interfere with issues related to the sovereignty of Jordan or the real tasks of the parliament such as legislating laws and monitoring the government. As a result, the Jordanian government welcomes these programmes. On the other hand, the government is seeking to prevent these projects from reaching significant achievements that would result in undesirable political outcomes for the regime, such as to disrupt the current power distribution and the political status in the country. In other words, the Jordanian regime would not allow a bottom-up change to take place in the country or to face an uncontrollable reform process (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008).

While Jordan is depending heavily on U.S. support and aids, this makes the U.S.A able to decisively demand more reforms. As a major recipient country of U.S. aid packages, and being involved with the U.S.A in different trade agreements and relations, Jordan has no other option but to democratise demonstrably if the U.S.A compels or insists upon political reform in Jordan. After the 2003 war in Iraq the U.S.A doubled its aid to Jordan, with $450 million ($250 million in economic aid and $200 million in military assistance) being given to Jordan and more than $1 billion supplement to offset the impact of the war on the Jordanian economy; none of these crucial assistances to Jordan were conditioned by the U.S.A on tangible progress in political reform in Jordan (Choucair, 2006: 17).

Jordan entered the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s (MCC) Threshold Programme in September 2006. This programme offers Jordan, as a member, $25 million annually as assistance to meet reform measures. None of the main used measures in this program is
related to the genuine needs of any developing democracy like the one in Jordan. Issues like electoral law, strengthening political parties, and protecting human rights were mentioned as important but secondary issues; more weight was given to issues like municipal governance and customs administration, which are not very sensitive issues for the Jordanian regime. Many U.S. projects to develop democracy in Jordan aim at training parliamentary staff and advocating the rights of women and emerging community leaders, although laudable goals, do not solve the fundamental defects and problems of Jordanian democracy (Choucair, 2006: 19).

Noticeably, political reform in Jordan was not mentioned while negotiating the Free Trade Agreement between Jordan and the U.S.A which went into effect in December 2001. It could be argued, however, that political reform in Jordan does not necessarily mean or would result in less ability of the Jordanian regime to cooperate with the U.S.A in security and military affairs, mainly because these issues will remain in the high national interests of Jordan (Choucair, 2006: 20).

5.7.2 The Islamists and Jordanian Democratisation

The IAF gained almost one-third of seats in the 1989 election, but thereafter its success in the Jordanian parliamentary elections was limited in 1993 and 2003, and it boycotted the election in 1997. Not only the electoral law, which was amended in 1993 prior to the election that year, caused this limitation of the IAF presence in the parliament, but it was also the policy of the IAF of not nominating big numbers of its members to these
elections; the IAF recognizes that the Jordanian regime will oppose any possibility of an IAF majority in the parliament. Likewise, the IAF recognizes that a parliamentary majority is detrimental under the current domestic and regional circumstances and environment. Dominating the Jordanian parliament will force the IAF to face very hard choices and crossroads regarding internal and regional issues on the one hand and their political survivability, reputation and ideological beliefs and commitments on the other (Brown, 2006: 12).

Abdul Lateef Arabyat, a key current leader in the IAF and the former Secretary General of the IAF and the Speaker of the Jordanian parliament (1990-1993), asserted that the IAF is not planning to dominate the parliament under the current domestic and regional circumstances and that is clear from the number of its nominations in each election. Arbyat also argues that although the IAF is an opposition party, it is committed to the Jordanian constitution and Jordanian national security and preferences, asserting that the IAF is an evolutionary power believing in gradual and peaceful change exemplifying their tolerant, pro-democracy and patriotic policies in the parliament of 1989, in which they were strongly present and active. However, he argued that many traditional powers in Jordan, especially those who are corrupt beneficiaries of the current political status quo, fear the growing power and presence of moderate Islamists and the IAF. These powers perceive real political reform and fairer electoral law as a chance for more representation of the Islamists, which will be harmful and damaging to their presence and privileges (Interview: Arabyat, 2008).
According to Jillian Schuredler, the inclusion of the Islamist opposition in the Jordanian political sphere did not originally aim to moderate these groups, mainly because they are already moderate, and Jordan has very limited experience of violence with these groups compared with other Arab countries. Some people argue that limited violence in Jordan is attributed to the cooperation offered by the MB to the Jordanian government. Moreover, there is reciprocal recognition among the Jordanian regime and the MB; the MB opposed the government’s policies but not the legitimacy of the regime. The political inclusion of the Islamists in Jordan, especially the IAF, made the IAF tolerant with other political oppositions that differ with the IAF ideologically. This inclusion pushed the IAF to interact with other powers in the Jordanian political spectrum in order to play political game with these powers in order to organise a broader opposition towards specific issues and governmental policies (Kaye et al., 2008: 72).

The inclusion of the IAF prevents the radicalisation of this political power; however, the IAF fears that repressive policies against them by the government and security establishments would result in an undesirable resistance and radicalisation among some members of the organisation, similar to what took place in Egypt during Nasser’s era in the 1950s and later in the early 1990s (Kaye et al., 2008: 73). Wiktorowicz argues that weakening the MB or its political wing the IAF is very dangerous for Jordan lest some members of these organisations move to more radical and Salafi attitudes, especially when considering the wealth and mobility of the MB in the Jordanian society (Kaye et al., 2008: 77).
Although the liberalisation process in Jordan is arguably limited to the extent that some scholars identify the system in Jordan as a liberal autocracy, political inclusion of the Islamists with its impact of moderation and the fears from the regional situation that Jordan would follow the Iraqi fate made many Jordanians accept the regime’s slow policies toward reform. This is because many people in Jordan admit that in preserving the stability and security of Jordan, including the current regime is a priority in order to protect all actors, including the opposition (Kaye et al., 2008: 80).

In some open countries like Jordan, liberals fear that political reform would be a great chance for the Islamists to win under the current circumstances on the expense of other political powers and minorities. Therefore, many liberal powers and minority groups in Jordan would prefer the U.S.A to stop any pressure on the Jordanian regime to progress in political reform and to synchronize it to a rhythm that would give them chance to flourish and catch up with the Islamists. These powers claim that the regime allowed only the Islamists to flourish during the Cold War because that served the regime’s strategies at that time in containing the nationalists and the communists (Kaye et al., 2008: 172).

The mixed coalition of hawks and doves in the IAF has resulted in multiple dimensions of the IAF relations with the regime in Jordan, and it prevented the regime from resorting to an aggressive containment of the organisation. Additionally, it created powerful voices among both sides to avoid confrontation. However, the regime continues to view the IAF as a challenge, mainly because of its ability in mobilising the public and in transforming foreign issues, that both sides have different views and strategies regarding them such as
Palestine, Iraq, and Jordan’s relationship with the U.S.A to domestic challenges and public disagreement with the regime (Brown, 2006: 21).

Susser argues that the Jordanian regime and its well-established services, especially the security establishments, enabled the regime to undermine the presence and power of the Islamists compared to the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Palestinian services could not prevent the growing power of Hamas mainly because of the inefficiency of its governance and different establishments (Susser, 2008: 6). The hawks among the Jordanian Islamists who are very critical of Jordan’s policies and ties with the U.S.A drew a mistaken lesson from the victory of Hamas in Palestine in the 2006 election. For most Jordanians the government policies are reasonably acceptable and different establishments have a great impact on people’s life, so Susser argues that Jordan is not Palestine in this regard (Susser, 2008: 6).

It is worth mentioning here that since the summer of 2008 the relationship between the Jordanian government and the Islamists, especially the IAF, has developed remarkably. This change was contrary to the expectations that the relationship between the two sides would reach a confrontation after both the election of a hardliner, Hammam Said, as the General Guide of the MB in May 2008, and after the poor performance of the IAF in the parliamentary elections in November 2007, which was followed by widespread accusations of government rigging of the election. These developments helped to establish ties between the Jordanian government and Hamas in Gaza and Syria (Hamid, 2008). These changes in Jordanian discourse highlight the ability of Jordan to shift its
preferences even with actors considered to be very hostile to the U.S.A while these changes are helpful for the Jordanian regime’s self-interest.

5.8 Regional Impacts on Jordanian Democratisation

The Jordanian state managed to survive despite regional instability, shortage of resources, and huge number of Palestinian refugees. Under these circumstances the regime also managed to weaken institutionalised opposition to its rule. Moreover, although elections are regular and political parties are legal in Jordan, the democratic change and political reform are still a hesitant top-down process as a result of the regime’s survival strategies in maintaining stable domestic front in facing external pressures and economic challenges and need for foreign aids (Choucair, 2006: 3).

While public criticism in Jordan of governmental policies of privatisation, and regional tension and pressures rose due to the collapse of the peace process between the Israelis and Palestinians in 2000, the events of 9/11 and its aftermath, and the preparation for the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Jordanian government became very conscious of security issues and possible challenges to the stability of the country. Moreover, the regime decided to support the U.S.A in its War on Terror, including the war in Iraq, as discussed in the previous chapter. This resulted in restrictions on political activities; the most obvious example was the King’s decision to postpone parliamentary elections supposed to take place in late 2001 for another two years, to avoid public and domestic criticism regarding internal and external policies. Between 2001 and 2003, during the dissolution of the
parliament, the Jordanian government issued more than 200 provisional laws and amendments and decisions, most of them regarding economic issues and restrictions to liberties. Therefore, since 2000, Jordan found itself facing demands for political reforms that were simultaneous with instability in region due to two conflict zones in Palestine and Iraq (Choucair, 2006: 9).

However, although Jordan’s democracy has many defects, it is progressing better than other countries in the region in the issue of reform. It is perceived by the U.S.A as the home of a growing democracy which recently, after the war in Iraq, became the best model for political reform. While the Jordanian democratic status is an advantageous for Jordan in its relation with the U.S.A as of its preference of dealing with reliable and predictable allies, Jordan is keen to maintain its relative democratic advantages in the region. Jordanian foreign policy aims to highlight and develop the image of Jordan as a moderate, progressive, and reformist partner in the region compared to others. In other words, Jordan will always aim to be in a better position regarding political reform compared with other Arab countries. This is to say that for strategic calculations, Jordanian political reform will also be motivated by the achievements of these countries in reform as well (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008).

There are multidimensional calculations for slowing down political reform in Jordan and there is interaction between internal and external factors; Jordan’s neighbours, whether U.S. allies or not, would not be satisfied if Jordan adopted genuine political reform. For example, Saudi Arabia, which provides Jordan with vital political and economic support,
has a poor record in political reform, and the Saudi regime would be embarrassed internally and more importantly internationally if a smaller and poorer neighbour like Jordan was more advanced in this regard in contrast to Saudi Arabia’s poor record in human rights and political reform. Needless to say, as the Saudi and Jordanian societies share some common elements such as tribalism and the presence of Islamists, the Saudi regime prefers not to allow these powers to imitate their counterparts in Jordan or to be provoked by them in case of a genuine political participation in Jordan (Interview: Braizat, 2008).

While political reform will allow more representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origins in the parliament and in Jordanian politics in general, Israel will be watchful of such a development. Needless to say that the Jordanian monarch is unwilling to be blamed for any major changes in the political distribution of power in Jordan or fully political accommodation of Palestinians at the expense of east Jordanians, who are the major pillar of the survivability of the regime and the functionality of its different security services. This is to say that a real reform in Jordan is contingent upon a real peace between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Interview: Braizat, 2008). The victory of Hamas in 2006 in the Palestinian legislative election also intensified U.S. and regional fears of the Islamists, which allowed Jordan to use this fear expertly to slow down reforms and to mitigate U.S. demands. After the victory of Hamas, the head of Jordanian intelligence at that time was able to convince a U.S. Congressional delegation of the vitality of controlling public life and preventing Islamists from winning elections in Jordan (Interview: Hamarneh, 2008).
The IAF’s criticism of the Jordanian government, its anti-Americanism, and opposition to Israel and the peace process increased after the war in Lebanon in the summer of 2006. This was simultaneous with Hamas victory in the Palestinian parliament, which exacerbated the Jordanian government’s fears of the increasing ties between the IAF in Jordan and Hamas and Hezbollah. It is worth mentioning in this regard that these fears were based on a strategic calculation by the regime: given the fact that Syria and Iran compose an axis in the region with strong relations with both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Palestine, the Jordanian regime perceives these ties and realities as challenges if they get out of control by uncontrollable reform in the country. Needless to say, the IAF enjoys huge public support among Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who compose approximately half of the population of Jordan (Kaye et al., 2008: 77).

These realities and developments in the region caused tensions between the Jordanian government and the opposition, especially the IAF, after the deteriorating situation in the Palestinian territory. For example, in September 2006 the Jordanian government issued a new counterterrorism law which gives the intelligence and other security establishments extra power and authority at the expense of public liberties. The Jordanian regime’s main concerns and fears were based on the deteriorating situations close to Jordanian borders in both Iraqi and Palestinian territories, which could spill over inside Jordan, resulting in new security and stability challenges to the kingdom (Choucair, 2006: 12).

The MEPI became more serious and worrying for the Arab governments when in February 2004 a draft of the initiative leaked indicated that the U.S.A was planning to ask
for the support of the Group of Eight (G8) countries in this initiative. The U.S.A aimed to make it a more international and a serious initiative with heavy demands on the Arab countries for reform. The important thing about the leaked draft was that it was very harsh on the Arab governments regarding their democratic status. Therefore, according to the Jordanian foreign minister Dr. Marwan Muasher (2002-2004), in March 2004 in a meeting of the Arab foreign ministers as a preparation meeting for the Arab Summit in Tunisia later that year, Jordan tried to include the issue of political reform at the agenda of the approaching Arab Summit in May 2004, arguing that the Arab countries must start their own initiative of reform to create their home-grown democracies before it was imposed by external factors such as the U.S.A and the G8 (Muasher, 2008: 236).

Interestingly, the Jordanian argument was supported mostly by the small Arab states such as Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. Big Arab countries like Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia opposed the idea. Besides being very sensitive towards the harshness of the draft, which provoked their significance as major sovereign states, these big countries would face bigger challenges and problems in conducting reform compared with smaller countries which have better credit in democracy and more manoeuvrability in doing so; small countries have to spend less and they have smaller bureaucracies and populations which are easier to deal with (Muasher, 2008: 237).

Jordan played a major role before the Arab Summit and the G8 meeting in May and June 2004 respectively in convincing other Arab countries to accept the idea of reform. The Jordanian efforts resulted in the Tunisia Declaration of Principles regarding political
reform and included the issue of reform in the agenda of the Arab Summit as well. Meanwhile, King Abdullah II and his foreign minister Marwan Muasher convinced the U.S. administration of the vital need of not producing the initiative in the approaching G8 Summit in Georgia in June 2004. They argued that in order for the Arab governments and public to accept political reform, they need to perceive it as a home-grown project and launching the initiative at the G8 would damage the already bad reputation of the U.S.A in the Arab world (Muasher, 2008: 241).

While the U.S. administration needed an Arab seriousness approval regarding commitment to political reform, the Jordanian foreign minister submitted a draft resolution to the Arab League which included all the vital components regarding political reform in the region which was accepted in the Arab Summit. As a result of these Jordanian efforts, the U.S. administration and other G8 countries not only shifted their position towards the intended initiative, but also emphasised the impracticality of achieving reform from outside the region, which was a major concern for the Arab countries. The Jordanian efforts and ties with the U.S.A, which were embodied in several visits and interactions between the Jordanian policymakers and their U.S. and Arab counterparts during the first half of 2004, resulted in mitigating the positions of both the U.S. and the Arab governments, especially those who were very sensitive to and critical of the idea of reform. Therefore, Jordan worked very hard on two simultaneous fronts; to create an Arab endorsement of reform which would have been undesirable if the U.S.A would have insisted to include it in the G8 Summit agenda that year, and to convince the U.S.A to appreciate the Arab commitments and not push the initiative forward (Muasher,
Thus, on this occasion, Jordan demonstrated the vital role that an active and vigilant small state can play in the region and its ability to use the political space the U.S.A allows these countries.

5.9 Jordanian Democratisation and the War on Terror

The U.S.A perceives some dictatorships as sources and reasons for terrorism. By political reform and democratisation the U.S.A believed it will beat terrorism. U.S. major allies in the region with low records of human rights and political reform such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia could not protect U.S. interests and security. However, it is argued that the U.S.A used and abused democratisation for its own interests and priorities. For the Jordanian government and security establishments, it is an advantage that the U.S.A is prioritising security over democracy. On the other hand, these U.S. priorities are harmful for political reform in Jordan because there is less emphasis on individual rights and more power for different security establishments which is good for the stability and security of the country but harmful in the long-run for democracy in Jordan (Interview: Braizat, 2008).

The strategic significance of Jordan to the U.S.A does not derive from how democratic Jordan is, rather it is from the Jordanian role in stabilizing the region and cooperating with the U.S.A in supporting its different policies and strategies in the region, especially in the War on Terror. These strategies and policies are preventing the U.S.A from jeopardising these ties and interests for the sake of political reform in Jordan. On the other hand, these realities result in a decrease in the Jordanian public opinion’s weight in
the making of Jordanian foreign policy, mainly because different U.S. policies in the region after 9/11 made the Jordanian people very critical of these policies (Interview: Al-Massry, 2008). Mustafa Hamarneh asserts that one of the main obstacles for democratisation in Jordan is the securitisation of public and political life in Jordan by the government. He argues that all key components of political reform in Jordan have been securitised, such as the media and publication law, electoral law, economic reform and foreign investment, the relationship with Hamas and political parties’ law. All of these affairs and issues became security profiles and are perceived from a security and stability point of view. Hamarneh also argues that these policies of securitisation are a source of instability for Jordan in the long run, exemplifying that these policies have never succeeded in the recent past regionally or internationally (Interview: Hamarneh, 2008).

After the bombing of the Jordanian hotels in November 2005 and the victory of Hamas in January 2006, the Jordanian government tightened liberties. According to Human Rights Report in 2007, the Jordanian government restricted NGOs’ activities and abused many laws related to assembly and association. These policies were justified by the government by claiming that external factors and instability are forcing the government for such policies to insure stability and security in the country (Kaye et al., 2008: 64).

There is great support from the IAF of Hamas, including of its military actions in Israel-Palestine. In addition, the IAF opposed the peace agreement between Israel and Jordan and all kinds of normalisations between the two countries (Brown 2006: 8). Although the Jordanian support of the U.S. war in Iraq was a taboo, the IAF was very critical of the
U.S. invasion and it perceived the insurgency in Iraq against the U.S. forces as a legitimate resistance to a foreign occupation. Many hawks among the IAF praised the actions of Al-Zarqawi in targeting U.S. forces (Brown, 2006: 10). The precise nature of Jordanian cooperation and support of the U.S. war in Iraq was relatively hidden, which made this cooperation a taboo; it appeared as if there was no tangible or overt Jordanian involvement in the war, which enabled the IAF to criticise the war and enthusiastically support the insurgency in Iraq while not referring to the Jordanian regime. Therefore, the victory of Hamas in Palestine and the endorsement of the IAF of insurgency in both Palestine and Iraq made the Jordanian regime perceive the IAF as a major challenge to Jordanian stability and its strategic relations with the U.S.A under these conditions (Brown, 2006: 16).

While the IAF rejects violence and terrorism, and it has a long record of that since its creation in the 1940s, its support of Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Iraqi insurgency made the Jordanian regime uneasy about the IAF’s peaceful commitments in the future, mainly because some trends within it flirt with jihadist ideologies. The IAF was also very unenthusiastic and critical of “Jordan First”, a slogan that the palace launched in 2002. This slogan and campaign indicated that Jordan’s domestic interests and more importantly foreign policies must not be bound with regional problems and affairs (Brown, 2006: 18). No less importantly, some Salafi groups in Jordan support violence and have external ties and agendas that may influence the IAF. After the peace agreement between Jordan and Israel, and increasingly after the war in Iraq in 2003, the MB and its
political wing the IAF became more critical of the Jordanian policies and its cooperation with the U.S.A in the War on Terror (Kaye et al., 2008: 66).

It can be argued though that Jordan and the U.S.A are dealing with each other on the principles of a political game. Jordan offers the U.S.A a great deal of cooperation and support in its regional strategy, in return the U.S.A neglects Jordanian democratic defects and slow reform (Interview: Braizat, 2008). The U.S.A consequently became careful of what it wishes for in Jordan regarding political reform, allowing Jordan to democratise itself gradually on its own timetable and in the ways that fit Jordanian security and preferences (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008).

5.10 Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the motivations behind both U.S. policies to promote democracy in the Middle East after 9/11 and its reluctance to do so energetically. It is obvious from the discussion in this chapter that the U.S.A is very careful of not jeopardising its vital interests, especially the War on Terror, by simply increasing political participation in Jordan, bearing in mind the importance of Jordan in supporting U.S. counterterrorism policies (as discussed in the previous chapter).

The U.S.A was not willing to pressure Jordan to democratise in a way that does not suit the regime’s priorities, however, the U.S. modest policy of reform toward Jordan would not have taken place without the regime’s vigilance of what Jordan needs and its
eagerness and ability to convince and mitigate U.S. exigencies of reform. As Julia Choucair argues, the Jordanian regime managed to make the survivability and stability of Jordan and its current regime in the interests of both domestic and foreign fronts alike, especially while the regime is motivated by the belief that although the existence of Jordan is not at stake, its political shape and features are unclear in the future (Choucair, 2006: 4).

The chapter argues that the regime in Jordan realised the challenges in the region and the possibly hugely damaging impact of any major alteration of U.S. policies regarding democratisation in the region and in Jordan. The Jordanian regime also knew what most worries the U.S.A in the region, which is the Islamists. Therefore, the regime’s best interest and strategy in this regard is to publicise the Islamists demands and the U.S. demands for reform simultaneously, which enabled the Jordanian regime to mitigate the U.S. demand for reform as discussed in the chapter. Some may even argue that the commonality of Islamists’ and U.S. demands for reform raise suspicion of the Islamist’s credibility, which led to the unprecedented criticism of the Islamists of the U.S.A to deny such a link between them.

The chapter argued that the Jordanian regime showed skilful political management in appeasing all the parties involved in the issue of reform, especially the Islamists and the U.S.A. The inclusiveness of the Islamists within the Jordanian political system helped Jordan in maintaining internal stability. Interestingly, the chapter highlighted that the Islamists in Jordan are reasonably moderate and non-violent, and additionally, the
Jordanian government and different security establishments proved to be capable of containing the Islamists by peaceful means, which questions the rationale behind the U.S. reluctance of pressuring Jordan for reform while there is possible reconciliation and coexistence between the Islamists and opening up the political system in the country. It is possible to argue that the Jordanian domestic policies, especially those which are related to political reform and its foreign policy, such as its relations with the U.S.A, are with remarkable reciprocal effect, as a result the Jordanian regime as discussed in the chapter proved to be very skilful in manoeuvring within these relations and realities to make his interests considered and to modify U.S. policies in order to be more compatible with the regime’s interests and calculations.

This is not to say that Jordan managed alone to influence U.S. policies in the issue of reform without the impact of regional context and the incompatibility of reform and counterterrorism, it shows however the ability of the Jordanian regime in exploiting and exaggerating these issues to mitigate U.S. exigencies. The fact that the U.S.A remained unwilling to pressure Jordan regarding reform despite of the facts that Jordan is a major recipient of U.S. aids and a good candidate for reform bearing in mind its location as model for reform in the region and its Islamists’ characteristics as more moderate than those in other countries indicate how really considerate and how far sympathetic the U.S.A is to the Jordanian regime’s sensitivities, priorities and preferences in controlling its reform and democratisation process. This indicates that the U.S.A, as a hegemonic superpower, is willing to be flexible and considerate with its partners regardless of their size and power, even regarding issues of high importance such as political reform in an
era of unprecedented international radicalisation in which democratisation is believed to be its best solution.

To conclude, it is clear that there is a significant impact and connectedness between Jordanian security cooperation with the U.S.A in the battle against terror and political reform, which have been explored in this chapter and the previous chapter. However, these two issues and U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s in general cannot be fully investigated without the obvious impacts of the significance of Israel and its relations with both the U.S.A and Jordan, which have been highlighted through this chapter and the previous one. Therefore, the subsequent chapter will explore these relations and their impact on both U.S. Jordanian security cooperation and the obstacles for political reform in Jordan, leading to more sophisticated understanding of the current features of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s.
Chapter Six: The Tri-Dimensional Relations Between Jordan, Israel and the U.S.A in the 2000s

6.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates the tri-dimensional relations between Jordan, Israel and the U.S.A in the 2000s. The chapter discusses the special relations between the U.S.A and Israel and how they influenced U.S.-Jordanian relations since 2000 regarding many issues of concern to the three countries. Although U.S.-Jordanian relations have developed remarkably since the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994, as discussed in the background chapter, this chapter does not tackle the particular impact of the peace treaty, which has been covered by many other researchers (Lukacs, 1999; Al-O’ran, 1999; Quandt, 2005). Rather, the chapter focuses on the interactions between the three countries on more contemporary issues which are affecting the current relations between them and will do so in the years to come. These interactions are complementary and profoundly relevant to other topics that have been already explored in the previous two chapters of security cooperation and democracy promotion. The researcher believes that these three topics cannot be fully understood independently; moreover, understanding the nature of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s requires covering all the dynamics and pillars that shape these relations, such as the significance of Israel for the U.S.A as well as for Jordanian security policies and other Jordanian internal issues, particularly the issue of political reform.
The main aim of this chapter is to determine the extent to which U.S.-Jordanian relations have been influenced by the Israeli relations with both Jordan and the U.S.A. The chapter also intends to highlight the limitations of the impact of the Israeli significance for the U.S.A on its interactions with Jordan. While Israel and its conflict with the Palestinian has had a great impact on Middle Eastern stability as well as on the policies of many Arab countries that are close to Israel, particularly Jordan (Virost, 2003: 178), the chapter intends to find out to what extent the Israeli policies have shaped the nature of Jordanian relations with the U.S.A and how Jordan copes with different Israeli and U.S. policies that are of great impact, such as the peace process and the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The originality of this chapter derives from the findings of the interaction between two ideas that are shaping the argument of this chapter. These ideas are: while U.S.-Israeli relations are unquestionably very strong and distinctive (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006) and while the theoretical framework of this thesis assumes that the U.S.A is a faithful hegemonic power that does not abandon its allies (Ikenberry, 1999), the originality results from figuring out how far Ikenberry’s claim is applicable to U.S.-Jordanian relations regarding Jordan’s concerns and relations with Israel and its policies that are of great impact on Jordan. Thus, it is worth mentioning here that, given its special relations with the U.S.A, Israel and its relations with Jordan are the best area of research to assess the strength of the theoretical framework under the given realities and circumstances. In addition, this chapter is original in the sense of being complementary to other main Jordanian foreign policies associated with the U.S.A since the 2000s, such as those that
have already been discussed in previous chapters. No less importantly, the interviews that the researcher conducted added unique findings regarding the Jordanian relations with both Israel and the U.S.A.

The chapter starts with explanations of the U.S., and more precisely the neoconservatives’, perceptions of Israel and the consequences of the special relations between them on the U.S. policies in the Middle East. This will provide the thesis with the basic realities in which Jordan is interacting regarding this tri-dimensional relations. Then the chapter moves on to discuss the major issues that are shaping Jordanian-Israeli relations in the 2000s, such as security cooperation, with attention given to the U.S. interaction with such cooperation between the two countries. After that, the chapter focuses on the current vital issues that concerning Jordan in its relations with Israel, such as the peace process, the two-state solution and the Jordanian option. In these topics, the reaction of the U.S.A to the interaction between the two countries in these vital issues will be provided in order to enable the researcher to assess the extent to which the reality of Israeli-Jordanian relations are compatible with the argument of this thesis regarding the considerate feature of U.S. relations with Jordan, while Jordan a trustworthy ally for the U.S.A, and its different strategies such as the security of Israel.

Although the water issue between Israel and Jordan is a major concern for the two countries that has been a major theme of the peace treaty in 1994 and will influence the relations between the two countries in the future (Schwarz, 2004: 43), this issue will not be covered in this chapter mainly because it is merely a mutual issue that has a very
limited impact on U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s compared to other issues that will be covered in this chapter.

6.2 Israel From a U.S. Perspective

The neoconservatives as well as many other U.S. politicians believe that Israel was the best U.S. strategic ally in the Middle East during the Cold War. This paradigm evolved after the Israeli victory in 1967 against the Arab countries, mainly Egypt and Syria, who were the Soviet allies in the region at that time (Hadar, 2006: 95). Most of President Ronald Reagan’s team at the beginning of his era were the early generation of the neoconservative movement, who supported the paradigm that the U.S.A should support Israel strongly, especially during the tension with the Soviet Union. Needless to say, at that time the PLO was perceived by the West as a Soviet terrorist tool. However, the neoconservatives’ influence on U.S. foreign policy towards Israel decreased after the mid-1980s after Reagan’s recognition of the cost that such policy caused to the U.S. interests with other actors in the region. Nevertheless, the events of 9/11 and the Second Intifada in 2000 made the neoconservatives’ paradigm of the Israeli strategic asset regain its power among the U.S. policymakers (Hadar, 2006: 96).

Since Israel’s creation, the U.S.A has contributed substantively in maintaining Israel’s qualitative military superiority to the Arab countries (Wunderle and Briere, 2008: 1). In the National Security Strategy of the United States of America (2006), President Bush stated that Israel is a bastion of democracy and defender of Western values in the Middle
East, as such, Bush insisted that Israel’s survival is in the best interests of the U.S.A (Wunderle and Briere, 2008: 1). Moreover, the U.S. diplomat and Middle Eastern expert Dennis Ross asserted that a capable and strong Israel is in the best interests of the U.S.A in facing common threats and dangers such as terrorism and Iran, claiming that Iran’s nuclear ambitions would jeopardise not only Israel but also the whole world. Furthermore, the Israelis perceive the alliance between Israel and the U.S.A as not only based on mutual interests, but also as a more natural and moral alliance than other partners for both sides (Hadar, 2006: 20). For example, many Israeli figures such as Natan Sharansky believe that both countries, the U.S.A and Israel, are founded on the same principles such as national identity and democracy, which is not the case of other countries, including many European countries which are founded upon nationalism. As a result, some defenders of the special relations between the two countries argue that the strategic relations and alignment between them are based on the interlocking between moral values and strategic interests (Hadar, 2006: 21).

The remarkable influence of Israel and the Israeli lobby on different U.S administrations and policies toward the Middle East resulted in unwavering and unconditional U.S. support to Israel on many occasions regarding different issues. This suggests that U.S. foreign policy makers perceive U.S. and Israeli interests as being identical (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 30). For example, Israel is the largest recipient of U.S. economic and military aid, receiving $3 billion annually from the U.S.A. In addition, Israel is exempt from being bound by the U.S. aid roles that require the recipient country to be supervised by the U.S.A regarding the expenditure of these aid packages. Israel has a free hand in
using U.S. aid, thus it is free to use them in building illegal settlements in the West Bank which the U.S.A (and UN) officially opposes. Moreover, the U.S.A provides Israel with intelligence access and cooperation in issues that the U.S.A deprives some of its NATO allies of. Additionally, the U.S.A ignored Israeli nuclear capability and refusal to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and prevents Arab countries from appealing this issue to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). No less importantly, the U.S.A backs Israel with the indispensable diplomatic support, especially by vetoing all UN Security Council resolutions that condemned Israel for its different offensive policies (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 31).

Remarkably, the U.S. administration during President Bush’s years was even more supportive of Israel than its predecessors. In his last year in office President Bush proposed a $30 billion aid package to Israel for the following years to enable Israel to maintain its military qualitative superiority (Oren, 2008: 3). This extraordinary U.S. support to Israel can be explained by recognizing that President Bush was surrounded by strong supporters of Israel’s right-wing policies, such as Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz. Furthermore, the President’s religious beliefs and his relations with the Christian Right and Christian Zionism made him perceive Israel and the U.S.A to be joined together are in a messianic struggle against evil threats deriving from the Middle East (Virost, 2003: 184).

In addition to the linkage between the neoconservatives and Christian Right with Israel during Bush’s era, President Bush was aware of the impact of the lack of American Jews
votes on his father’s failure to be re-elected in 1992, as a result of his father’s pressure on Israel to freeze settlement building in the Palestinian territories at that time (Christison, 2004: 47). Leon Hadar argues that the neoconservatives in the Bush administration convinced the President to support all of Israel’s desires and demands, such as attacking Israel’s enemy, Iraq, in 2003 to win the American Jews’ votes in the subsequent election in 2004. It is worth mentioning that President Bush could not obtain these votes in the election of 2000, making it very difficult for him to win in the first place during that election (Hadar, 2006: 94).

6.3 Israel and the U.S. Middle Eastern Policies

The neoconservatives’ perception of Israel as a top U.S. priority in the Middle East affected many U.S. policies towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well as shaping President Bush’s vision towards the conflict and the region. For example, at the beginning of the Bush era, the U.S. government vetoed a Security Council resolution to send UN forces to protect the Palestinian people in the Palestinian territories and insisted on the necessity of preventing international interference in the negotiations between the two parties. This resulted in many accusations that the U.S.A was biased in favour of Israel, and ignoring the imbalanced power between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Moreover, at the beginning of 2002, Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. National Security advisor at that time, stated that the U.S. War on Terror and its preparation for the war on Iraq and the transformation of the Middle East are paramount to marginal issues such as
the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians; such policies were at the best interest of Israel at that time (Christison, 2004: 37).

These U.S. policies resulted from the Bush administration’s belief and argument that Palestinian violence is the root of the conflict, not the Israeli occupation. This belief was magnified by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, which made the main focus of U.S. strategies and foreign policies in the region counterterrorism, and reshaping the Middle East with Israel as the dominant power in it. For the Bush administration, the suffering of the Palestinian people is weightless compared to the Israeli readiness to aid the regional role of U.S. dominance in advancing U.S. global hegemony. As a result, the legitimacy of the Palestinian cause and the Arab perspective of the conflict were given scant regard by the Bush administration (Christison, 2004: 41).

During the two Bush administrations the U.S.A allowed Israel to proceed in its policies of occupation and settlement building in the West Bank and Gaza. One of the salient policies of President Bush toward the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was the extraordinary U.S. support to the Israeli policy that endorsed the vitality of crushing the Palestinian resistance and terrorism prior any negotiations with them (Benn, 2005: 88). Remarkably, the main U.S. policies in the region such as the war in Iraq, the isolation of Iran and Syria, and the temptation for the transformation of the Middle East were aiming to reshape the region in favour of Israel’s strategic interests. For example, in the summer of 2006, during the war with Hezbollah, the U.S.A opposed all the international pleas for a
ceasefire to allow Israel to accomplish its military objectives (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 31).

One of the most salient justifications that the Bush administration used to justify its unprecedented support of Israel after 9/11 is that the U.S.A and Israel are facing the same threat, terrorism. This claim explains the U.S. support to Israel in its war with Hezbollah and Hamas and the Israeli rejection of compromising with the Palestinian peace talks (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 32). It is vital to remark here that the Israeli lobby in the U.S.A is a major reason for most of the U.S. support to Israel in different administrations. This fact was more profound during Bush’s two terms. The Israeli lobby not only aimed to provide Israel with U.S. aid and support, but also to shape the entire U.S. foreign policy in the region in favour of Israel, such as the war in Iraq and the U.S. policies towards hostile countries such as Syria and Iran. The events of 9/11 and the role of the neoconservatives and their linkage with different radical Jewish organisations in the U.S.A paved the way for the war and regime change in Iraq as the first step of reordering the Middle East (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 62).

The U.S.A and Israel perceive Hamas as a terrorist organisation that rejects any kind of contact or concession with the organisation lest such a policy would be perceived as compliance with terrorism (Crouch II et al., 2008: 18). More importantly, both the U.S.A and Israel perceive Iran as a major threat with growing regional hegemonic ambitions (Freilich, 2007: 3). The Iranian support of organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah and the insurgency in Iraq makes Iran a de-stabilizing actor in the region. A major Israeli
concern regarding Iran is its role in shaping the political future of Iraq that would allow Iran to have an influence on Iraq’s neighbouring countries, such as Jordan bringing Iran closer to Israel (Freilich, 2007: 3). However, according to the Congressional testimony of the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in January 11th 2007, the threat that Iran poses with its nuclear ambitions and ties with radical organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah resulted in strengthening the strategic alignment between the U.S.A and regional moderate and pro-peace countries such as Jordan, Israel, Turkey, Egypt and the Gulf countries (Wunderle and Briere, 2008: 11).

After the Israeli war with Hezbollah in 2006 King Abdullah II of Jordan, alongside the Egyptian and Saudi leaders, were very critical of Hezbollah and Syria during the war at the Arab League meeting in August 2006. In addition, the increasing Iranian influence in Iraq and the war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006 increased the common interests between Israel and moderate Sunni leaders such as King Abdullah II of Jordan and the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and also the leaderships of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to eliminate the influence of Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah in order to facilitate peacemaking between the Palestinians and the Israelis (Indyk, 2006: 7). In such an environment, it is argued that Jordan has a major role to play; the U.S. government wants Jordan to be an active, successful, and useful country in its relations and cooperation with both Iraq and the Israel, whether regarding stability in Iraq or peacemaking between the Palestinians and Israel (Interview: Bell, 2008).
Many people perceive that the significant U.S.-Israeli relations are problematic and debatable; Leon Hadar argued that Israel, as the U.S. and the neoconservatives’ strategic asset and proxy in the Middle East, failed to shift the power balance back to Washington regarding the Israeli failure in its war in 2006 with Hezbollah, the Iranian proxy, and the challenges that the U.S.A faces in Iraq because of Iran (Hadar, 2006: 92). In addition, John Mearsheimer and Stephan Walt argued that Israel was useless to the U.S.A on many occasions, for example, despite the Israeli exigencies to topple Saddam Hussein and to wage a war on Iraq, the U.S.A could not ask Israel for any help in the 2003 war lest any Israeli contribution would increase the flame of Arab opposition to the war, which would exacerbate the entire situation (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 32). No less importantly, although Israel has the strongest army in the Middle East, a strong economy, and has achieved peace agreements with key countries such as Egypt and Jordan, Israel will remain vulnerable and totally dependent on U.S. economic, political and military support in both times of crisis and peace (Usher, 2005: 27).

6.4 Israeli Security and the Role of Jordan

While small states behave more peacefully and less aggressively than their bigger and stronger counterparts, they are also more cooperative and concerned about international stability (Hey, 2003: 5). These arguments are applicable to Jordan’s relations with Israel. Remarkably, although Jordan has been involved in almost all the Arab-Israeli wars, Jordan and Israel have maintained communication and cooperation channels even during periods of crisis to prevent any escalation between the two countries. In addition, Israel
perceives the Jordanian state as the least hostile among its Arab neighbours, and as a political and geographical barrier with other more extreme and strong Arab countries. The nature of Jordan and Israel as pro-West (and pro-U.S.A in particular), during both peace and enmity, made the two countries closer to each other, leading to a smother peace agreement between the two sides in 1994 (Wolfsfeld, Eitan and Kailani, 2008: 380).

Jordan has the longest borders with Israel; its strategic location and professional forces mean that Jordan plays a remarkable role in stabilising the region by preventing friction and clashes between Israel and other countries in the region (Interview: Al-Raggad, 2008). For example, Gal Luft argued that although the Syrian government showed restraint on many occasions by not retaliating to Israel after its conducted operations in Syria (targeting some alleged terrorists’ bases) and Lebanon since 2001, any possibility of war between Israel and Syria suggests that Jordan would not allow Syria to use its strategic territories to attack Israel from its eastern front or from the Jordan Valley (Luft, 2004: 19).

David Unger argues that besides the ability of the Israeli government to create a wide public opinion base to achieve its security strategies and continue its iron-handed policies with the Palestinian people, there are two major conditions that Israel always needs to continue these policies. Firstly, Israel always needs the uncritical and unconditional U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military support which both the governments of Sharon and Olmert received from President Bush. Secondly, the cooperation and will of Israel’s
neighbouring countries in preventing the passage of fighters and weapons and other kind of support to the Palestinian resistance groups. While this condition proved to be unlikely from Syria and Lebanon regarding their support to Hezbollah and other Palestinian resistance organisations, and while Egypt proved to be incapable of fully controlling its borders with Gaza to prevent weapons smuggling, Jordan proved to be the most capable and the most cooperative country in these kinds of affairs with Israel (Unger, 2008: 61).

The Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee in 2003, Dr. Yuval Steinitz, argued that the Egyptian government has not been doing everything in its capacity to prevent weapons smuggling into Gaza from its borders. On the other hand, Steinitz stated that the Jordanian government is far more serious and cooperative with Israel in this regard, which otherwise would be very dangerous for Israel if radical organisations such as Hezbollah found Jordan incapable or not serious in preventing weapons smuggling from its territories to the West Bank. In addition, Steinitz asserted that the Egyptian government is also not serious in boycotting Hamas and limiting the organisation in Gaza’s supplies through the Egyptian border. Steinitz argued that such policies by Egypt aim to harm Israel in order to make Egypt the dominant actor in the region. The Egyptian government captures few weapons smugglers, and then only after U.S. pressure (Steinitz, 2003: 2). On the other hand, the former Jordanian Chief of Staff Abdul Hafez Al-Ka’abneh confirmed that the Jordanian forces are playing a vital role in controlling the Jordanian borders with all its neighbours to prevent any illegal movements of people or weapon and terrorists from these countries to Jordan, or from Jordan to these countries such as Israel and Iraq (Interview: Al-Ka’abneh, 2008).
The Israeli mistrust of the efficiency and will of the Palestinian security forces in fighting radical groups resulted in the need of an external force to achieve order and counterterrorism in the West Bank. However, some analysts such as J.D. Crouch II and Montgomery C. Meigs suggest that a Peace Enforcement Force (PEF) composed of NATO and the U.S. is an undesirable option for these powers, mainly because of the high possibility of disagreements among the members of NATO and the U.S.A regarding the leadership of these forces and the nature of their tasks and missions, bearing in mind the challenges and disagreements that they are already facing in both Iraq and Afghanistan. No less importantly, the deployment of such forces would result in frictions between these forces and radical Israeli settlers and Palestinian organisations such as Hamas, as well as between these forces and the Israeli forces (Crouch II et al., 2008: 16).

Some people believe that the deployment of Jordanian forces is one of the best options compared with other international alternatives. Given the Jordanian proximity to the West Bank and knowledge of the conflict and actors involved, deploying Jordanian forces in the West Bank would serve the goal better, to integrate with the Palestinian forces and upgrade the Palestinian forces’ capability to achieve order in the territories (Crouch II et al., 2008: 17). However, there are many crucial Jordanian concerns regarding any security responsibilities in the West Bank. For example, the same concerns would apply to these Jordanian forces regarding tensions between these forces and the Israeli forces that would harm the strategic peaceful relations between the two countries. Jordanian forces in the West Bank would also be the targets of Hamas or other Palestinian groups, leading even to targeting Jordan on its own soil. This could result in tensions and
instability within Jordan, which has a large Palestinian cohort demographic, let alone the sympathy of the IAF in Jordan to Hamas, as explained in the previous chapter. For these reasons, Jordan has always rejected any kind of involvement in the West Bank. The only reason that would force Jordan to take such a step is the fear that a weak Palestinian Authority and forces would fail, allowing Hamas to take over the West Bank, which is an undesirable option for Jordan and not worth risking given the fact the proximity and long border between Jordan and the West Bank (Crouch II et al., 2008: 18).

While the importance and sensitivity of final status issues such as borders, refugees, and Jerusalem have been the traditional focus on the final arrangement of peace between the Palestinian and the Israel, the security and stability for Israel and the Palestinians are of no less importance to establish any durable peace deal between the two sides (Crouch II et al., 2008: 1). Therefore, in 2002 the Jordanian government was very active in preparing for the Saudi peace initiative mainly in convincing other Arab countries to endorse the initiative. While the initiative fulfilled all of the Arab demands, the Jordanian government was very aware of the necessity of addressing the Israeli concerns regarding its security and the issue of refugees in the initiative. As a result, Jordan managed successfully, alongside with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to convince other Arab countries, especially Syria and Lebanon, to endorse the initiative that addresses the major Israeli security and refugees concerns in order to make Israel and the wider international community accept such an initiative (Muasher, 2008: 121).
6.5 Mutual Security Concerns of Israel and Jordan

Israel and Jordan clearly have some areas of disagreement. But they also have vital overlapping interests, especially in security affairs (Luft, 2004). The Israeli security strategy is changeable according to the events in the Middle East. After the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003, devastating Iraqi economic and military capabilities, the isolation of Syria and the weakening of its military after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the peace treaty with Jordan in 1994 and Egypt in 1979, most analysts asserted that the main threats to Israel were from terrorism and Iran (Luft, 2004: 1). For example, the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister in 2008, Haim Ramon, argued that the main focus of the Israeli policies has shifted from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and peacemaking to fighting terrorist organisations such as Hamas and Hezbollah and their Iranian and Syrian backing. For that reason, it is essential for Israel, Ramon argued, to maintain its cooperation with moderate Arab countries in the region in the battle against extremists in order to prepare the conditions for peace deal (Ramon, 2008: 31).

In contrast to his father, one of the first steps of King Abdullah II after his succession to the throne in 1999 was to end the presence of Hamas in Jordan, which was perceived as a terrorist organisation by the U.S.A and Israel. This step had been a long standing demand by Israel (Wolfsfeld, Eitan and Kailani, 2008: 386). For both governments in Jordan and in Israel, terrorism and organisations such as Hamas are the paramount concerns. For the Israeli government, suicide bombs and rocket attacks by Hamas are causing enormous public pressure to respond. In Jordan, although public pressure on the government is
limited, terrorism is linked to internal stability and the government relations with the Islamists (Byman, 2008: 6). Hamas could also pose a danger if it controlled the West Bank is that its ability to launch rockets to major Israeli cities and populated centres, as well as its ability to increase other kinds of attacks into Israel, including providing Iran with a third potential proximal front to attack Israel beside Hezbollah from the Israeli northern borders with Lebanon and Gaza from the South (Crouch II et al., 2008: 4).

For Jordan, the Palestinian character of the IAF and its closeness to Hamas made many Jordanian officials perceive it as a Palestinian organisation within Jordan. These realities and the instability of the region reminded the Jordanian regime of the deteriorated situation that followed the war in 1967. After that war different Palestinian organisations operated attacks in Israel and the Palestinian Territories from Jordan, which led to many clashes between the Jordanian and Israeli armies on the borders between the two countries. These events and the presence of these organisations also led to a civil war in Jordan in 1970 when Jordan expelled these organisations lest their presence would have removed the monarchy or caused another war between Jordan and Israel at a time when the Jordanian army was very weak after defeat in the Six Day War of 1967. Therefore, the Jordanian regime feared allowing the IAF to flourish in Jordan democratically, and as Jordan is the only route for the movements of Palestinian people and finance from and to the West Bank, Jordan restricted IAF activities and was watchful of its ties with Hamas, as discussed in the previous chapter, lest these ties and the instability in the region would lead to a situation similar to that of 1970, which would jeopardize Jordan’s strategic relations with Israel and the U.S.A (Brown, 2006: 15).
The victory of Hamas in the legislative election which led to the formation of the Palestinian government by Hamas in 2006 and its take-over in Gaza in the summer of 2007 resulted in an increase of security concerns and the possibility of taking over in the West Bank. These realities and the increasing power of Hamas, which rejects Israel’s right to exist and endorses armed resistance to it, made Israel reluctant to engage in peace talks with the Palestinians, despite the moderate Palestinian Authority (PA) is losing power and popularity. These conditions made Israel and other external players such as Jordan and the U.S.A believe that the presence of the Israeli army in the West Bank is essential to prevent Hamas taking over (Crouch II et al., 2008: 4).

The threats that Israel faces make it worry about the survivability of key friendly regimes such as those in Jordan and Egypt. Israel perceives that the replacement of these regimes would only be in favour of radical Islamists allied with Iran, which would exaggerate the threats and challenges to Israel (Wunderle and Briere, 2008: 13). Therefore, Paul Scham argued that there are considerable commonalities of interest between moderate Arab countries such as Jordan and Israel. These commonalities, Scham argues, are more important than the interests between these governments and some local powers such as the radical and religious organisations within the Arab countries, mainly because these organisations have undesirable and challenging impacts on domestic and foreign policies (Scham, 2007: 9). For example, Daniel Byman stated that the Jordanian government has always been worried about a Hamas victory in Gaza if a clash between Hamas and the Israeli forces would break out similar to the war that took place between Hezbollah and Israel, in which Hezbollah achieved remarkable positive publicity among the Arab public
in 2006. As a result, the Jordanian government called upon the U.S. administration to restrain the Israeli desire to crush Hamas military in Gaza, and called for the support of President Mahmoud Abbas to build up the capability of the PA (Byman, 2008: 3).

The reduction of the threat to Israel from its eastern front would encourage Israel to reconsider its military presence in the Jordan Valley. Doing so would facilitate territorial contiguity among the Palestinian territories leading to the possibility of a Palestinian state with joint borders with Jordan. Such arrangements would provide the Palestinians with free movement of goods, services, and people, leading to a better economic development in these territories. However, most Israeli strategists, especially those in the IDF and other political figures such as the former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and his Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz, asserted that due to unpredictable developments in the region, the eastern front of Israel must be permanently secured and controlled by the Israeli army in spite of Israel’s advantageous after the developments in the region since 2003 (Luft, 2004: 3).

Some Israelis perceive a Palestinian state in the West Bank with joint borders with Jordan would be a greater challenge to Jordan and its monarchy, given the fact that a huge portion of the Jordanian population is from Palestinian origins. Therefore, the Israeli military presence alongside the Jordan River and its control of the borders with Jordan are essential not only to prevent weapons and terrorists smuggling into Israel from its eastern front, but also to the insurance of the Jordanian stability and survivability which are a major concerns for Israel and its security (Luft, 2004: 4). It worth mentioning in this
regard, given the Israeli security exigencies of the importance of the Jordan Valley, that
Jordan agreed in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in 1994 to allow Israel some military
presence in some Jordanian territories such as Natanya and Zofar for twenty-five years
(Luft, 2004: 31).

Although the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 gave Israel a more secured
eastern front from a conventional military perspective, Israel is arguably still facing a
terrorist threat from its eastern borders. While Iraq became a major centre for
international terrorism, many terrorists tried to enter Jordan from Iraq to attack Israel. For
instance, in August 2005 a group of terrorists entered Jordan from Iraq to attack a U.S.
ship in the Jordanian port of Aqaba, and fired a rocket attack on Elat, an Israeli port on
the Red Sea. Consequently, the threat that Israel is facing from its eastern front has a
terrorist face. This highlights again the importance of the Jordan Valley and Jordan’s
strategic location and cooperation for Israel’s security. For example, the former Israeli
Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon stated in January 2006 that regardless of the extent to which
the U.S. forces succeed in fighting terrorism and insurgency in Iraq, Jordan will remain
an important country for the security of Israel, mainly because these terrorists would
escape from Iraq to a neighbouring countries closer to Israel such as Jordan and Syria
(Gold, 2006:1). In addition, an early U.S. withdrawal from Iraq before destroying
terrorism there would make Iraq a main base for Al-Qaeda and other terrorist
organisations. More importantly, U.S. withdrawal from Iraq could result in control of Iraq
by the Shiites, with their Iranian backing. In such a scenario, Jordan would face severe
security challenges that would result in destabilising the country. Not far away from these
possibilities, while Hamas is strong and has ties with the Islamists in Jordan, these realities make Israel more assertive of controlling its borders with Jordan to enhance the security of both countries by preventing insurgencies to move from Iraq to Israel. In another words; Jordan’s strategic location is significant for the security of Israel not only in conventional war times but also during the current era of international terrorism (Gold, 2006: 2).

6.6 The Peace Process and Jordanian-Israeli Relations

On many occasions during the two Bush terms, King Abdullah II emphasised that the central issue in the region is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, not Iran, as the U.S. administration would like the countries of the region to believe and act. The King believes that the conflict has major consequences for Jordan and the region in general (Ottway and Herzallah, 2008: 1). The proximity of Jordan to Israel and the huge presence of Palestinians in Jordan as well as the issue of transfer are always worrying Jordan and resulted in remarkable cooperation between Jordan and Israel (Wolfsfeld, Eitan and Kailani, 2008:381). Dan Meridor, the former Israeli minister of Strategic Affairs in 2006 stated that Israel perceives Jordan as its primary partner in peace and in stabilizing the region to enable Israel to meet its security challenges. These challenges made Israel consult Jordan in its policies towards the Palestinians and the peace process (Meridor, 2006: 23).
The U.S.A has always been perceived by Israel and other Arab countries as the indispensable external actor to any Arab-Israeli settlement (Scham, 2007: 2). According to Josef Joffe, to have an efficient mediator for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the mediator should be powerful and capable of contributing to the solution. Therefore, only the U.S.A can be that mediator with the help of other regional actors in this conflict (Joffe, 2002: 175). In addition, Ahmed Abdul-Halim argued that one of the most significant steps to end the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the U.S.A building of an international and regional coalition to formulate a comprehensive and final agreement between the two parties (Abdul-Halim, 2002: 196).

While Jordan recognises the role of the U.S.A in any peace settlement, since his succession to the Jordanian throne King Abdullah II has always attempted to convince and encourage the U.S. administrations and Congress to mediate actively in solving the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In his speech to a joint session of the Congress in March 2007, King Abdullah II pleaded for U.S. leadership and support in peacemaking between the Palestinian and the Israelis (Sharp, 2008: 11). The King asserted that this conflict is the core and the main reason for the instability in the region, arguing that the Saudi or the Arab initiative that was launched by the Arab League in March 2002 would lead to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East which needs the U.S. endorsement and leadership. On the other hand, the Jordanian government has made it clear for the U.S.A that the Israeli policy of settlement enlargement is undermining the possibility of peace. The King also supported the U.S. initiative in Annapolis in 2007 to advance negotiations between the two sides highlighting the danger of its failure in the growth of the power of
radical movements as a result of the absence of peace and their impact on radicalizing the people of the region, including those in Jordan (Sharp, 2008: 11).

While Johan Ikenberry asserts that the U.S.A as a liberal hegemonic power allows secondary states to address their concerns, and takes their views into consideration (Ikenberry, 1999: 186), Jordan, despite its smallness, alongside Saudi Arabia and Egypt, played a significant role in the years that followed 9/11 in encouraging the U.S. administrations and other international actors such as the European Union (EU) to engage in peace making in the region. Equally important, these countries aimed to make the U.S.A consider the Arab demands and perspective of the Arab-Israeli conflict (Muasher, 2008: 149).

As Jordan is the most affected country among the Arabs by any peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians, and as it is knowledgeable about the U.S. foreign policy making and attitude toward the Middle East, Jordan was very active and assertive in raising the Jordanian and the Arab concerns to the U.S.A. These efforts achieved considerable success in influencing U.S. policies toward the peace process. For example, in his meeting with President Bush in May 2002, King Abdullah II convinced the President to endorse and support a time framework, which was called later the Road Map, to achieve a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians leading to the creation of a Palestinian state. Such an U.S. endorsement, the King argued, would undermine the radical powers that were harming and slowing the peace process at that time (Nathan, 2003: 1).
The Arab and the Jordanian efforts to encourage U.S. involvement in the peace process resulted in the U.S. endorsement of the Road Map. In his speech in June 2002 President Bush, for the first time, recognised the importance of the two-state solution within three years for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, addressing the main Arab concerns that Jordan has always called for. Although President Bush was very critical of Yasser Arafat in his speech, and called upon the Palestinians to undertake political change and moderation, Jordan perceived this speech as an endorsement of a Palestinian state by the U.S.A, and as a remarkable development in the peace process (Muasher, 2008: 154).

However, the continuous violence in the region, the war in Iraq, and the influence that the Israeli lobby held over the U.S. foreign policy resulted in a negative impact on the U.S. desire to pressure Israel to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Mearsheimer and Walt, 2006: 62). Meanwhile, Marwan Dodeen argued that the limited achievements on the peace track and the U.S. policies towards Israel and the peace process did not illustrate a weak Jordanian foreign policy. Rather, he asserts that the absence of an Arab influence is due to the absence of sustainable Arab collective efforts to make any difference in the U.S. policies. Dodeen argues that although the U.S.A has vital interests with the Arab countries, there is no Arab lobby similar to the Israeli one in the U.S.A that can pressure U.S. foreign policymaking in favour of the Palestinians or the Arabs in general, or at least to mitigate the Israeli influence on the U.S. administrations regarding the peace process (Interview: Dodeen, 2008). It is vital to remark from the above discussion that although the Israeli lobby practiced remarkable influence on the Bush administrations, and despite
the absence of an Arab lobby, Jordan managed to make a remarkable difference in Bush’s policies toward the conflict, as indicated above.

6.7 Jordan’s Relations with the Palestinian Authority

According to the former Jordanian foreign minister Dr. Marwan Muasher, King Abdullah II was keen to encourage the former Palestinian President Yasser Arafat in the years that followed 9/11 to rebuild his credibility with President Bush and his administration in fighting terrorism. For example, Jordan tried to convince the Palestinian leadership at that time to arrest Palestinian insurgents and those who were responsible for the ship “Karin A”, a Palestinian ship captured by Israel in 2002 full of arms sent by Iran, to smuggle these arms into the Palestinian territories. These Jordanian efforts were designed to encourage the PA to change its behaviour, to persuade the U.S. administration to tolerate the PA and its leadership at that time, which experienced neglect and accusations from the Bush administration (Muasher, 2008: 118).

Jordan also supported the moderate Palestinian leadership of Mahmoud Abbas and the Fatah faction of the PLO to prevent Hamas’s influence in the West Bank. For example, the Jordanian police forces trained several battalions of the Palestinian police in Jordan in order to enhance the ability of the Palestinian forces in achieving stability and security in the Palestinian territories, let alone that the capability of these forces is essential also to prevent Hamas taking over in the West Bank. It is vital to indicate in this regard that
these training programs were funded and supervised by the U.S. government (Sharp, 2008: 12).

As mentioned in the section above, Jordan perceives the resumption of the peace process, especially on the Israeli-Palestinian track, the most important issue in the region. This importance, for Jordan, derives from the fact that the longer the status quo remains, the worse the situation will get and the weaker the Palestinian Authority will become. These possibilities will result in more fragmentation among Palestinians, leading to insecurity in the occupied territories as well as in Israel, with harmful consequences on Jordan in different ways (Interview: Hassan, 2008). In his meeting with the then U.S. Defence Secretary Colin Powell in Amman on 11 April, 2002 during his visit to the region that followed the deteriorating situation between Israel and the Palestinians, King Abdullah II insisted on the importance that the Israeli security achievements and policies must be parallel and simultaneous with progress on the peace process. This, the King argued, would make the PA and the Palestinian people feel that there is hope for peace and settlement on the horizon so that the Palestinian Authority remains strong and functional (Shweid, 2002: 1).

The Hamas control of Gaza is a salient element in radicalising the Palestinian people and encouraging other radical organisations in the region to increase their presence in the Palestinian territories. In addition, the presence and power of Hamas would result in radicalising moderate political organisation within the Palestinian political sphere such as Fatah, which would find by radical attitudes and behaviours a source of popularity and
political survival among the Palestinian people to counterbalance the power of Hamas (Glick, 2008: 8). Therefore, while Jordan is supportive of the PA in its stance and desire for a two-state solution, it is believed that one of the primary reasons for the Jordanian exclusion and continuous boycott of Hamas since 2000 is Hamas’s rejection and blocking of policies leading to the possibility of achieving the two-state solution. In addition, Jordan’s continuous policy of isolating Hamas was aiming to force Hamas to change its attitude and behaviour towards the peace process and Israel, as well as towards moderation and political sharing with the PA (Barari, 2008: 2). The Jordanian support of the PA has been discussed in this chapter in different sections, such as in the previous section regarding peacemaking and in the following section of the Jordanian role in the two-state solution.

6.8 The Two-State Solution

The Jordanian state perceives the two-state solution for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to be in Jordan’s best strategic interest. The reason for that is such a solution would eliminate any Jordanian involvement in any everlasting settlement for the conflict, such as a confederation between Jordan and the Palestinian territories, which has always been an aversion option for Jordan (Barari, 2008:1).

In July 2007 President Bush re-proposed a plan to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by adopting the two-state solution. He insisted upon the urgency of establishing a Palestinian state that is democratic, peaceful, and moderate, compatible with the U.S. strategy in the
Middle East (Aly, 2007: 1). The U.S. administration believed that the plan would advance U.S. interests in the region, such as the security of Israel, regional stability, undermining radical movements and states, and allowing democracy to flourish in the region, leading to more regional integration in the global economy. However, although Bush’s plan addressed the need for international and regional involvement and support based on meetings chaired by the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, some Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were not enthusiastic about the plan, because President Bush did not commit his personal involvement in these meetings, leaving them to his Secretary of State, and he also categorised the initiative as an international meeting rather than a conference similar to the Madrid conference in the early 1990s; these countries were therefore sceptical of the U.S. seriousness and commitment to the success of the initiative (Aly, 2007: 3).

The two-state solution means the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean. However, for this assumption to work Israel has to meet its security requirements by adopting several essential principles such as the following: Firstly, conditional strategic depth; because of Israel’s limited width, it requires in the case of a Palestinian state to be eligible of deploying some forces in certain eastern areas in case of a threat from the east (Yanai, 2005: 13). Secondly, the demilitarisation of the Palestinian state; the Israeli argument is that because of the security challenges to Israel in the case of establishing a Palestinian state, Israel will insist on the demilitarisation of such a state, and prevent it from engaging in any military alliance with a third party. Thirdly, any two-state solution must guarantee full security
cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian state, especially in counterterrorism (Yanai, 2005: 15). It is worth mentioning in this regard that Jordan can be a main player in implementing these principles, mainly because of its location to the east of Israel and the Occupied Territories, and its relations with both parties and its security cooperation record in the region.

Robert Rothstein argued that the margin of time and safety that a small state has to overcome its challenges is limited (Keohane, 2006: 56), and the Jordanian government has always been sensitive and concerned about development on the ground in relation to its vital interests such as the two-state solution, the Separation Wall, and the power of Hamas in Gaza and its possible control of the West Bank. These concerns would be extremely serious if a Palestinian state were established under the current circumstances, which would lead to Hamas control of such a state. The power of Hamas and the MB in Jordan and the linkage between them are making the Jordanian government vigilant of the circumstances in Jordan as well as in the OPT could be simultaneous with the establishment of the Palestinian state. These fears are what the Jordanian regime wants to overcome by a peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians that would lead to a viable Palestinian state to end all of the Jordanian concerns (Eiland, 2008: 30).

Ariel Sharon’s decision of the Israeli unilateral withdrawal from Gaza and part of the West Bank in 2005 was aiming to melt the possibility of a Palestinian state in the future. Prime Minister Sharon assumed that the democratisation process promoted by President Bush in the Middle East after 9/11 would induce the Palestinians in Jordan and in the
West Bank to pressure the Jordanian government to agitate for the establishment of a federation with the Palestinian territories. In addition, Sharon believed that the Separation Wall that is dividing the West Bank into parts would worsen the Palestinians’ daily livelihood by making it difficult for them to enter their farms and lands and go to their jobs (Sussman, 2005: 1). Therefore, Nathan Brown argues that the election of Hamas in 2006 and its consequences in Gaza, as well as the different Israeli policies under both Ariel Sharon and Ehud Olmert, made a two-state solution less viable to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Brown, 2008: 1).

According to Gary Sussman, the Israeli policies such as the expansion of the settlements and the Separation Wall and several security fences created major challenges and obstacles to the two-state solution. For example, these policies are argued to be designed by Israel to shape the geography of only one state. Moreover, many Israeli hardliners in different political parties and those in the IDF assert that Israel should only surrender the OPT to a reliable partner such as Jordan, leading to the creation of a federation with Jordan. This option has been always rejected by Jordan because of the threat it poses to the Jordanian identity and the political structure, as well as to the regime in the future (Sussman, 2004: 6).

It has been argued that small states normally resort to superpowers to address their vital concerns and survivability (Hey, 2003: 5). As a result, in a meeting with President Bush in December 2003, King Abdullah II raised the issue of the Israeli Separation Wall and its negative consequences on the peace process and the viability of a Palestinian state,
which Jordan perceives as a solution for its vital concerns. Although Bush was very considerate of the Jordanian point, he was very critical of the Palestinian suicide bombs and understanding of the Israeli justifications for self-defence (Muasher, 2008: 220). Under such circumstances, and while Jordan perceived the Wall as a national security threat, Jordan used all of the diplomatic channels and legal means available to address the Wall issue. For example, Jordan was very active in building an international political and legal campaign against the Israeli Wall. In addition, although the U.S. administration vetoed a Palestinian proposal to the Security Council to condemn the wall, Jordan strongly backed the Palestinians in referring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Muasher, 2008: 221).

Although the U.S.A and Israel pressured Jordan to cease its involvement in the Wall issue, arguing that it is merely an Israeli and Palestinian issue in which Jordan should not get involved, the Jordanian government’s counterargument was that Jordan was the first country in the Arab world to condemn suicide bombings, which resulted in many domestic and regional criticisms, however, Jordan would do everything in its capacity to protect its national interests insisting that Israel could build the Wall in its territories, not the Palestinians’. In addition, Jordan argued that while the ICJ would deal with the case from a historical perspective, the West Bank where the wall is being built was under Jordanian sovereignty prior to the occupation. As a result, the Jordanian government was very serious in its backing of the case, despite the U.S. and Israeli dissatisfaction. As a result, Jordan solicited the professional services of the well-known British lawyer, the late Sir Arthur Watts, to support the Arab argument. These Jordanian efforts resulted in
the remarkable decision of the ICJ on July 9, 2004. The court decided not only the illegality of the wall, but also the illegality of the Israeli settlement policies, and asserted the fact that the West Bank was occupied from Jordan, denying by that the Israeli claim that the West Bank was a no-man’s land when it was occupied, and asserted the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination (Muasher, 2008: 226).

6.9 The Jordanian Option

Although there were tensions in U.S.-Jordanian relations during the Gulf War in 1990-1991, the U.S. administration warned the hardliner Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir at that time not to interfere or harm Jordan as a result of indications that he was planning to exploit the situation in the Middle East and the regional and international isolation that Jordan suffered from to destabilize Jordan. On that occasion the U.S. government made it clear that Jordan is a red line that Israel should not consider crossing (Interview: Hamami, 2008). However, Barry Buzan has argued that the major threat to any small state is that when powerful states, such as the U.S.A and Israel in the case of Jordan, question its existence, legitimacy and future survival (Krudsen, 1996: 26).

The neoconservative movement has Cold War origins and perceived Israel as a main player in undermining the Soviet’s influence in the region, and the neoconservatives still perceive Israel as the main strategic asset from security perspective and the Palestinians as a threat. This resulted in offering Israel all possible U.S. help. For example, Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, who were the leaders of the neoconservatives during Bush’s
era and were known for their boundless support of Israel, stated in September 2002 that the shape of the Middle East after the war in Iraq will be that all of Palestine will be for Israel, and Jordan will be Palestine. In addition, Douglas Feith, a neoconservative figure in the Defence Department during that era, asserted that territorial compromise and the land for peace notion would lead to the destruction of Israel, therefore, for Feith, the only legitimate land and state for the Palestinians is Jordan (Christison, 2004: 43).

The demographic problem has always been a major concern for the Israelis, especially those on the right wing, who perceive the Palestinian people, whether in Israel or in the West Bank, as a threat to the Jewishness of the state of Israel in the future. According to Robert Blecher, many Israeli politicians from different parties believe that the transfer of Palestinians outside Israel and the West Bank is the most excellent solution to many Israel’s problems and concerns. Although they recognize the impracticality and difficulty of such a solution, they believe that Israel should utilize any regional and domestic conditions that can facilitate such a policy, such as the war in Iraq and a major war with the Palestinians. As a result, regional instability combined with regime failure and instability in Jordan would be an adequate chance for large numbers of Palestinians to be transferred to Jordan (Blecher, 2002: 24).

Jordan is keenly aware of these Israeli attitudes. For example, the former Jordanian Prime Minister Taher Al-Massry argued that Jordan is aware of the Israeli desire in preventing the creation of a Palestinian state in order to be able to expand Israel all over Palestine. Therefore, Jordan avoids disagreements and tensions with the U.S.A regarding its
policies in the region to preserve its relations and assets with the U.S.A, in order to pressure Israel in the case of a possible Israeli conspiracy or different types of aggression on Jordan. Al-Massry stated that while Jordan holds big numbers of Palestinian refugees, it cannot tolerate any Israeli temptation to pressure Jordan for confederation with the West Bank or transferring Palestinians from the Occupied Territories to Jordan (Interview: Al-Massry, 2008).

The Israeli policies of occupation and siege of the West Bank since the second intifada and building the Separation Wall have radicalised the Palestinian people and weakened their economy. This makes any Jordanian involvement in the West Bank very risky, and increases the domestic and Arab criticism of being strongly pro-Israel and pro-U.S.A, something Jordan has always been accused of. More importantly, any Jordanian involvement, even a limited one, in the West Bank would be perceived as if Jordan is capable of being part of the solution for the conflict. For many Jordanians, especially the nationalists, such a step would be the start of a process aiming to weaken the Jordanian identity and Jordanian dominance of the politics of the country, in order to allow the Palestinians to take over power in Jordan (Lynch, 2004: 2). Therefore, the Jordanian King met the ex-Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in March 2004 warning him of the impact of the Israeli policies of occupying the West Bank and building the Separation Wall. Jordan perceived these policies with harmful impacts on Jordan and on the peace process. In that meeting King Abdullah II made it clear to Sharon that any temptation or thinking of the Jordanian option is intolerable to Jordan in all respects, especially as the idea of the
Jordanian option emerges whenever Israel talks about unilateral disengagement from the Occupied Territories (Lynch, 2004: 4).

Israel argues that the major aim of building the Separation Wall is to enhance its security by preventing terrorists and suicide bombings from entering and attacking Israel and its civilians. However, it has been argued that Israel is also aiming by building the wall to create conditions on the grounds that prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. For example, the route of the Separation Wall is separating Palestinian cities from each other, making the establishment of a coherent and contiguous Palestinian state impossible. Therefore, these policies can be seen as if Israel is creating the conditions on the ground for the Jordanian option by ending up with the annexation of the remainder of the West Bank by Jordan. In addition, some may argue that the weakening of the Palestinian leadership and administration will lead to worsening the people’s situation and to regionalising the problem, and denationalising the Palestinian question would result in forcing Jordan to be part of the solution (Usher, 2005: 38). For instance, Dan Dicker and Pinchas Inbari argued that although Jordan refuses at the present time any kind of engagement in the West Bank, it would be the best scenario for Jordan to do so at the security level in case of the collapse of the PA to prevent unbearable numbers of Palestinian refugees emigrating from the West Bank to Jordan (Dicker and Inbari, 2005: 1).

Jordan realised the weakness of the moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the fact that the Bush administration was running out of time, and its status as a “lame
duck” would not enable it to launch any serious changes to the peace process. These realities were simultaneous with the Jordanian perception that Hamas had become a dominant player in the Palestinian politics that Jordan can no longer afford to exclude. Although Hamas has strong ties with the Jordanian IAF, the peace talks between the PA and Israel were halted, and the situation in the Palestinian territories was deteriorating; Jordan was aware of these critical circumstances (Sharp, 2008: 12). It is important to highlight here that David Vital believed that a small state must depend on its own policies that are of high quality as well as on its leadership bravery, wisdom, and smartness in order to achieve interests and survival (Krudsen, 1996: 8). Therefore, in the summer of 2008 the Jordanian government conducted dialogue with Hamas through the intelligence services to address political and security concerns for both sides. For Jordan, it has been argued that regional circumstances and limited peace achievements made Jordan need to widen its alliances and relations with all the influential actors in the region, and not to bind itself with alignment only with the PA, Israel and the U.S.A (Sharp, 2008; 12).

While Jordan’s dialogue with Hamas will not change its position towards peace and the two-state solution, not to mention its strategic relations with Israel and the PA, Jordan’s new contacts with Hamas are focusing on solid Jordanian security interests and priorities, such as to guarantee Hamas non-interference in Jordanian politics and its relations with the Jordanian MB and IAF; such issues Hamas can afford to cooperate in to get out of its isolation, and make contact with a significant player in the Palestinian issue such as Jordan. More importantly, it is worth mentioning in this regard that the circumstances mentioned above which would lead to deteriorating developments in the region made
Jordan perceive its contacts with Hamas as vital option to protect Jordan from any undesirable consequences such as the “Jordanian option” (Barari, 2008:2).

6.10 Israel and the Jordanian Domestic Front

For almost all countries in the world the Palestinian question seems to be a foreign policy issue, but for Jordan it is a vital foreign as well as domestic issue (Interview: Abu Jabber, 2008). As a result, for the Jordanian monarchy and East Jordanian public and political elite, the Jordanian relations with Israel and finding a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are political survival interests. Despite criticism from opposition powers such as the IAF, the Palestinian community, and the Professional Organisations in Jordan to the government relations and cooperation with Israel, the Jordanian government and King have always supported the efforts for regional peace and normalising between the two countries in order to advance different mutual interests and solve dilemmas that are of vital concern for the future of Jordan (Sharp, 2008: 11). On the other hand, the Israeli policies and the situation in the region have been radicalising forces of some elements of the Jordanian people who became a challenge to the Jordanian government. This is not a surprise, although a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is in the best interests of Jordan and other moderate countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt (Sham, 2007: 9).

The intensity of anti-Americanism in Jordan depends on the events in the region, especially those related to Israel and its actions toward the Palestinians in the Occupied Territories. One of the major aspects of anti-Americanism in Jordan is the movement
against normalisation with Israel, which associated itself with being anti-U.S. and anti-Israel simultaneously. It is vital to mention in this regard that the major pillar of this movement is the IAF. This movement was active domestically and regionally; in August 2000 the movement organised a regional meeting in Jordan to coordinate the Arab efforts to isolate Israel economically and culturally (Vogt, 2006: 141).

Domestically, the movement published a list of political figures, journalists, and companies to mobilise the Jordanian public against them, accusing them of normalizing the relations with Israel, or “the enemy” as the movement preferred to call it. More importantly, in coordination with the IAF and other opposition powers such as the Federation of Labour Union, the anti-normalisation movement played a major role in mobilizing Jordanian public against the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003, and the situation in the Palestinian Territories that resulted in many demonstrations and tensions between these powers and the Jordanian public on one hand and the government on the other (Vogt, 2006: 142).

Furthermore, the movement mobilised the Jordanian public to boycott American products and to undermine a major element of the Jordanian modern economy, the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ). These zones were established as a result of the significant U.S.-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement in 2000, which allows Jordanian companies, with Israeli partnership, to export goods to the U.S. market with an exemption of quotas and taxes. These Israeli activities and presence in the Jordanian economy were perceived by the movement and opposition as temptations to interfere and dominate the Jordanian
economy and society. In addition, the movement accused the Jordanian government of allowing Israel to use Jordan and its economy and market as a bridge for Israel to access other Arab countries’ markets and economies (Vogt, 2006: 135). However, the Jordanian government responded strongly to the movement’s activities by arresting its leaders and activists in November 2002. Moreover, the government ruled that the movement and its campaign against Israel and the U.S.A are illegal and harmful to Jordanian national interests (Vogt, 2006: 136).

For the Islamists in Jordan, the most notable disagreement with U.S. policies in the region is the influence of the Israeli and Zionist lobbies on the making of the U.S. Middle Eastern policies. These influences are perceived by the Islamists in Jordan as being very dangerous to Jordan and to the Palestinian cause. In addition, as indicated in the previous chapter, the Islamists in Jordan perceive that the paramount interest of Jordan is not with its alliance with the U.S and its relations with Israel; rather, they argue that Jordanian interests are better served by more Jordanian closeness and support of the Palestinians and by genuine political reform in the country. They argue that the Jordanian government must get closer and more supportive of the Palestinians in their struggle with Israel (Interview: Mansour, 2008).

On the other hand, many indications highlight that the major threat to Israel from Jordan is from such policies as the Islamists are calling for, which will reshape the structure of Jordanian internal politics and, consequently, foreign policy, especially towards Israel and the U.S.A. For example, an uncontrollable democratisation or unmanageable
confederation with the West Bank or a situation of anarchy in the country could destabilise the current political system and lead to a Palestinian/Islamist takeover in Jordan. Moreover, although the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza holds an opportunity for all parties, including Jordan, to achieve permanent stability, there would still be a challenge accompanying such a solution with the current situation in Iraq and Iran, as well as the presence of Hamas in the Occupied Territories and the IAF in Jordan. A Palestinian state that Israel would agree to is likely to be a small fragment of historical Palestine subject to extreme political control and arbitration of foreign powers and shorn of such accoutrements as armed forces, hardly the fulfilment of the national aspirations of the Palestinian people after their long and bloody struggle for a state of their own. This would keep the Palestinians’ desire to expand their state alive. While such an expansion would be unlikely to take place towards the Israeli side, a confederation with Jordan, where there is a demographical advantage in the form of a massive Palestinian population (with more influence and power than that in Israel, called the “Israeli Arabs”), would be compatible with the Palestinian vision, and Jordan will remain alert about the development of any alternative solution (Luft, 2004: 23).

According to the Israeli defence analyst Ze’ef Schiff, a Palestinian expanded state on both sides of the River Jordan is a strategic threat to the survival of Israel and Jordan alike, insisting on the importance of the Israeli control of Jordan Valley. Therefore, Israel perceives the stability of Jordan, ruled by the Hashemite Royal family, as an essential requirement for regional stability and the security of Israel whether in peace time or during periods of conflict and instability. Therefore, Israel perceives that any peace deal
in the region requires a regional and U.S. commitment and guarantee of the stability and survivability of Jordan and its monarchy, mainly because that will increase the durability of any peace deal and the Israeli sense of security (Luft, 2004: 28). While such a positive Israeli attitude towards Jordan is not always prevalent among the Israeli elite and different parties, Jordan will have to be always alert of the developments at all fronts to secure its strategic interests. It is indisputable that Jordan’s strategic relations with the U.S.A have served Jordan in this regard. To sustain that, Jordan has to remain able to raise its concerns and to try to influence policymaking in the U.S.A.

6.11 Conclusion

This chapter analysed the interactions of the trilateral relations between the U.S.A, Israel and Jordan regarding vital concerns for the three countries. The chapter explored the consequences of the Israeli policies on both the Jordanian foreign and domestic policies that are of U.S. concerns. It is clear though that Israel and the U.S have unique ties and advanced mutual relations and interlocking between them. Undeniably, the strength of these relations allowed Israel to influence U.S. relations with other countries in the Middle East, especially since 2000, as much as the U.S.A does so. Thus, the U.S. or the Israeli relations with any Middle Eastern country are affected by policies made in both Washington and Tel Aviv.

For Jordan, however, these special relations between the U.S.A and Israel did not prevent Jordan being a beneficiary of such relations. Fortunately for the Jordanians, in many
cases, the motivations and aims of these special relations were in the Jordanians’ own
best interests and were compatible with the Jordanian national policies and preferences,
such as counterterrorism and containing rogue states and organisations in the region, as
has been discussed in this chapter as well as in chapter four. Moreover, Jordan finds in
the Israeli overall current and future security requirements and the cooperation between
the two countries in this vital issue a strong justification to mitigate U.S. demands for
political reform in Jordan, as discussed in the previous chapter. Jordan has also proved to
be a very reliable and cooperative ally for both the U.S.A and Israel regarding Israeli
security and the stability of the region, making Jordan perceived by these two countries
as a strategic and indispensable partner, as has been proven in many instances in this
chapter.

It is essential to stress here, as has been explored throughout the chapter, that the
Jordanian security policies in the region, as well as regarding Hamas and its domestic
front, were not designed to serve the Israeli security and the U.S. preferences and
interests for their sake; all of these policies were serving the Jordanian national security
in the first place, as well as tangentially concurring with those of Israel and the U.S.A.
Hence, the Jordanian strategy as well as its survivability and well-being was in the
interests of both the U.S.A and Israel. These realities illustrate that Jordan is aware of the
regional and international environments in which it operates, making it attentive to its
strengths and weaknesses, as well as a dynamic player in seeking its stability and future
survival, even if that has resulted in disappointing Israel and the U.S.A on some
occasions.
The chapter explains that there are some serious Israeli policies and desires that clash fundamentally with the Jordanian priorities and national interests, such as some policies regarding peacemaking with the Palestinians, the two-state solution, the Separation Wall and the Jordanian option. Interestingly, Jordan has not fled from facing these crucial Israeli challenges. It raised these issues assertively with both the U.S.A and Israel as discussed in each topic, in order to achieve its interests and to make itself present in the heart of all these issues, of which it has profound knowledge, as they significantly affect Jordan’s preferences and national interests. As a result, Jordan raised all of these issues skilfully with the U.S.A and made its voice heard without compromise or hesitation given the seriousness of these issues for Jordan’s national interests, thanks to the understanding and faithful features of the U.S. hegemony, despite of the undeniable ascendancy of the Israeli lobby during the neoconservative era of the presidency of G.W. Bush.

The U.S.A on its part showed considerable support to Jordan, although Israel is its main strategic ally in the region. For example, Jordan did not face serious challenges on the ground during Bush’s era regarding the Israeli focus on the Jordanian option, the gravest concern for Jordan. It is worth mentioning in this regard that although Jordan faced remarkable challenges from Israel regarding the issues mentioned above, it has never shown any kind of usurpation regarding its cooperation with Israel or with the U.S.A to address its demands regarding these issues. By that Jordan shows considerable deal of rationale and insight. In addition, the new Jordanian ties with Hamas illustrate the ability of the Jordanian government to practice a margin of manoeuvrability with the U.S.A,
which acted in a restrained manner with Jordan concerning this move. It is vital to stress here that this move was not designed to blackmail Israel or the U.S.A; rather it was solely aiming to ensure Jordanian internal stability and security.

In summary, although Jordan is the weakest side in this triangle, it was able to preserve at least a modestly influential position, especially with the strongest side, the U.S.A, to address its concerns and interests. This is not to suggest though that Jordan achieved all of its concerns and preferences regarding these tri-dimensional relations. It suggests rather that Jordan has had realistically high expectations, and success, from its relations with these two countries. These expectations kept Jordan energetic in utilizing its position within these relations. It also shows that Jordan has the ability to manage in dealing with such sophisticated and unique relations between the U.S.A and Israel in an unpredictable and unstable region of great importance for both parties, especially in the 2000s. This indicates that Jordan has learned from its experiences with both the U.S.A and Israel. This ability resulted from two main pillars: the vigilance, assertiveness, and faithfulness of Jordan, despite of its smallness; and the consideration, faithfulness, and self-restraint of the U.S.A in dealing with its allies, despite of its unprecedented status and paramount interests in the Middle East, let alone its extraordinarily staunch support of Israel during the neoconservatives’ era.
Chapter Seven: Conclusions

7.1 Overview and Structure of the Thesis

This thesis sets out to investigate the features of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s and the solidity of the relations between the two countries. It has aimed to examine the dynamics and interactions between the two countries, given the undeniably huge power disparity between them, in order to assess the liberal features of the relations between the U.S.A and Jordan in recent historical context.

The thesis started by exploring the main components and motivations of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East in different historical contexts. Within these historical contexts, the thesis highlighted the place of Jordan and the nature of its relations with the U.S.A based on the pillars that shaped U.S. Middle Eastern relations and policies. Then the thesis moved on to discuss the theoretical approach in chapter two and the methodology in chapter three that were used for the remaining chapters that explored U.S.-Jordanian relations empirically.

The background chapter and the two chapters of theory and methodology are intended to outline the pillars of the relations between the two countries and the theoretical framework and research characteristics applied to tackle this academic investigation. The rationale of this intention derived from the research problem and questions that are derived from the grounding and embodiment of the usage of the critical theory and the research characteristics of this thesis regarding the bases of U.S.-Jordanian relations that
are discussed in chapter one. Therefore, the theory and methodology used in this thesis aimed to demonstrate and assess the current nature of the relations between the U.S.A, the sole superpower in the current years, and Jordan as a small state.

The issues covered in the empirical chapters which are concerned with the current U.S.-Jordanian relations are to a great extent a continuance, but in new dimensions and nature, of the main issues that shaped U.S.-Jordanian relations in other historical contexts that are covered in chapter one, whether regarding the Cold War and fighting terrorism, the stability of the Middle East and U.S. allies, or regarding Israel and its significance to the U.S.A. These empirical chapters are overlapping and complementary to each other as a result of the connectedness of these issues and their enduring importance to contemporary U.S.-Jordanian relations.

This research is based on a range of resources such as academic materials, empirical reports that were conducted by specialists and well-known centres and think tanks in the U.S.A and the Middle East, news reports and elite interviews in Jordan. The publications of these centres in the U.S.A and Israel that were used enriched this thesis with the perceptions of different commentators and bureaucrats about the Middle East and Jordan’s relations with both the U.S.A and Israel. These resources are important in so far as the researcher has been unable, due to financial and other restraints, to conduct extensive interviews other than in Jordan. However, a wide range of supporting evidence has been gathered, and the conclusions drawn recognise the limitations of sources appropriately. The choice of this range of different resources and materials aimed to
provide the researcher with a full range of data in order to obtain valid data that are required to accomplish a valid assessment and comprehensive understanding and explanation of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. Some of the materials used were influenced remarkably by the infamous events of 9/11, especially those published in the aftermath of those terrorist events. Others were exploring the democratic reform of the Middle East and in Jordan from Western perspective and in light of the end of the Cold War and 9/11, let alone the limitation of accessing intelligence resources. As a result, the researcher had to rely on as much as possible different resources and methods in order to obtain the critical lenses required for the accomplishment of this academic enterprise.

The interviews that were conducted in the summer of 2008 in Jordan are of high importance for the findings and originality of this thesis, and they provided the researcher, who is knowledgeable about the policymaking in Jordan due to his seven years of career experience in the Jordanian Parliament, with the substance of fresh empirical experiences of high ranking politicians and experts in Jordanian foreign policy and its relations with the U.S.A. These elite interviews added to the findings of the thesis the voices of personal experiences of U.S.-Jordanian relations in different areas and from different Jordanian political backgrounds. The interviewees represent different political parties and ideologies in Jordan who were able to express freely their different perspectives about the relations between the two countries, whether regarding Jordan’s security concerns, democracy and the impact of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on Jordan. The list of interviewees included politicians from different backgrounds as well as military and security experts, academics and researchers involved in the topic. Many of
the interviewees were highly experienced and had been involved in the Jordanian foreign policymaking in previous eras, and are still active intellectually; these interviewees provided the researcher with the voice and judgment of aged experts in the topic who witnessed previous eras of U.S.-Jordanian relations in order to increase the impartiality of the research. While these aged experts are well-known in Jordan for their academic knowledge and previous political professionalism, they enabled the researcher to filter the attitudes and judgments of other interviewees who are currently involved in the topic and Jordanian political life.

The timing of the interviews, the summer of 2008, was precisely compatible with the purpose, originality and argument of this thesis. The events that concern this thesis, such as 9/11, the war in Iraq in 2003 and U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East were the focus of the literature while these events were fresh; the interviews however were conducted after adequate time of these major events allowing the interviewees to have extra time to observe and analyse the impact of these events and their consequences on Jordan, resulting in making this thesis original in the sense that it is complementary to the literature used.

The year 2008 was the eighth and last year of the presidency of President G.W. Bush and the ninth year of King Abdullah’s II reign in Jordan. Therefore, the interviewees had sufficient observations of the subject matter regarding the Jordanian relations with the U.S.A in order to provide reliable and balanced analysis of the topics covered during the interviews. At the same time, the interviewees were able and enthusiastic to provide the
researcher with detailed and precise answers to the questions without preservations or anticipations. It must be highlighted in this regard that the responses of the interviewees to the research questions varied according to the specific issue being asked about. However, apart from the Islamists that the researcher interviewed, most of the interviewees were aware of the details that shaped the relations between the two countries and were relatively satisfied regarding U.S.-Jordanian relations. They have realistic, high expectations of the level of independence that Jordan enjoys in its relations with the U.S.A This indicates that Jordanian policymakers have learned how to respond to U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Interestingly enough, the Islamists were not willing or able to provide precise cases that show the invalidity of the argument of the theoretical framework of the thesis; rather their argument was driven by general rhetoric and regional circumstances that are remarkably anti-American and anti-Israeli, with little reflection on the process and outcomes of the interactions between the Jordan and the U.S.

7.2 The Theoretical Argument of the Thesis

The main argument of this thesis is based on a theoretical framework that assumes the U.S.A is a liberal hegemonic power in its dealings with its allies, including the small ones like Jordan, who are aware of their weaknesses and vigilant of the international environment they operate in. These assumptions expect small allies of the U.S.A to be aware of the importance of practicing a considerable margin of freedom in their relations, as Ikenberry has argued that the more powerful and capable of dominating others the
dominant state is, the more the small state becomes aware of its manoeuvrability and about U.S. power restraint (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008: 157). Therefore, the thesis hypothesised that the maintenance and durability of U.S. relations with other countries, including the small ones like Jordan in the case of this thesis, are not attributed only to the commonality and consistence between the two countries regarding their shared interests, as many realists would perceive them. They are also derived from both the practices of manoeuvrability of these allies within their relations with the U.S.A and from U.S. strategic restraint with its allies and overriding their fears of domination or abandonment, which Ikenberry addressed in his liberal hegemonic assumption (Ikenberry, 2001).

For Ikenberry, the stability of the relations between the U.S.A and its allies is attributable to the fact that the U.S.A is a reluctant hegemonic power in its relations with its allies. The U.S.A allowed its allies to penetrate U.S. policymaking as a result of the liberal feature of the U.S as a polity resulting in the absence of referring to power in the relations between the U.S.A and its allies (Ikenberry, 2002: 224). By applying such a framework to U.S.-Jordanian relations it is expected that there is considerable and useful margin of manoeuvre for Jordan in its relation with the U.S.A, as has been argued in many occasions throughout this thesis and as has been asserted in the findings summarised in the remainder of this conclusion below.

The usage of this theoretical framework was comprehensive in the sense it provided the researcher with the necessary tools in covering the multiplicity of U.S.-Jordanian
relations, whether concerning Jordan’s foreign policy as a small state or concerning the U.S.A as a liberal hegemonic power. The applicability of this theoretical framework to U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s is evidenced by the facts that this theoretical framework enabled the thesis to tackle the main interactions and pillars of the subject matter and by providing successfully the essential empirical, broad and inclusive argument and explanation for the understanding of the current realities of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s, as discussed in the empirical chapters.

By testing the combinability of the works of both small states’ politics and John Ikenberry of U.S. liberal hegemony in the set up of this theoretical framework, this thesis found that the theoretical framework is coherent enough to claim that such a framework is providing an influential detailed and critical analysis of the relations between countries that are witnessing substantial power disparity, which is also the case of the relations between the U.S.A and many countries in the current International Politics. Such an analysis is more adequate than the one that would have been provided by another theory of IR especially by neorealism or by only one of the works that made up this theoretical framework. The applicability of this theoretical framework to the topic of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s with its complexity of different issues such as security affairs reminds us of the mixture of real politics and the liberal features of such relations which are an important indicator for the scholars of IR of the dynamic and evolutionary characters of the discipline itself, and an indicator of the possible future advancement of its different flexible theories.
7.3 The Findings of the Thesis

Although the main issues that shaped U.S.-Jordanian relations during the Cold War and the 1990s were basically the same as those that shaped the relations between the two countries in the 2000s, such as security and stability, they differ in their level of intensity and the nature of the interaction between the two countries as hegemonic power and a small state. U.S.-Jordanian relations during the Cold War, as discussed in chapter one, were influenced to a remarkable extent by the structure of the international system at that time and its consequences on the region. In the 2000s, however, the relations were more intense, more liberal, and had more reciprocal effect between the two sides, as has been argued in this thesis.

While Jordan has remarkable credibility with the U.S.A and predictability in its policies (Interview: Al-Momani, 2008), it was able to conduct some policies that differ from U.S. preferences. This ability was based on the U.S.A being assured that these policies were not aiming to challenge the U.S.A or to counter its interests; rather they were only serving the sensitivity of Jordan as a major small ally in the Middle East. Noticeably, there are obvious occasions that Jordan managed to avoid U.S. exigencies regarding different issues in which the U.S.A did not pressure Jordan excessively (Interview: Masarweh, 2008). It has been illustrated in different places and issues through this thesis that such a combination of shared interests and features of U.S. liberal hegemony are the driving forces behind U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s.
It is clear that due to domestic and regional reasons Jordan had to have a free hand in cooperating with the U.S.A on some issues and had to free itself from the U.S.A in others. This cooperation, as discussed in chapter four, was vital for the U.S.A in its War on Terror as well as for Jordan’s stability. For example, King Abdullah II rejected the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003 but ended up helping the U.S. government in its difficulties during the war, especially in issues that were compatible with the Jordanian interests in that war such as fighting terrorism (Luft, 2004: 21). On the other hand, during 2006, the U.S. Secretary of State at that time, Condoleezza Rice, tried to form an anti-Iranian alliance composed of the six Gulf Cooperation Council as well as Jordan and Egypt, which used to be called (the Gulf Countries + 2) to counter the Iranian challenge in the region. Although these countries met in Kuwait in January 2007, their meeting did not result in any clear commitments to regional cooperation or security arrangements against Iran without any convention until the time of writing this thesis (Ottaway, 2008: 1).

More interestingly, Jordan conducted many steps forward in improving its relations with some major U.S. competitors such as Russia to address Jordanian interests with these countries; King Abdullah II has met President Dmitry Medvedev three times during the first eight months of his Presidency to increase cooperation between the two countries, including in military affairs (Hamid, 2008). Another striking example of Jordan’s freedom of action is its new ties with Hamas, as discussed in chapter six; Jordan established dialogue with Hamas in the summer of 2008 when Jordan perceived such a dialogue to be in its interest, without jeopardizing its ties with the U.S.A and Israel,
which perceived Hamas as one of the most dangerous and hated organisations in the region at that time.

King Abdullah II proved to be a moderate leader with the remarkable ability of controlling the Jordanian domestic front and to preserve a balance between Jordan’s Arab identity and its commitment to peace and strong ties with Israel and faithfulness to the U.S.A, despite serious disagreements with some policies of both countries. In addition, during the high tensions with Israel that occurred during the Palestinian Second Intifada, Jordan maintained its diplomatic relations with Israel. Moreover, King Abdullah II has shown also remarkable ability in maintaining internal stability in Jordan regarding the Islamists and the Palestinian community, as well as containment of the economic hardship of the country to a bearable level (Luft, 2004: 21). Certainly, as discussed in chapters four and five, the manageable democratisation process that Jordan practiced during Bush’s two terms facilitated the security cooperation between Jordan and both the U.S.A and Israel, and allowed the Jordanian government to address its own and preferable political reform programme. It is vital to stress in this regard, as discussed in chapter five, that the Jordanian government managed to make its preferences concerning reform and security collaboration in the region significant in the calculations of the U.S.A.

Jordanian security cooperation with the U.S.A in the region and its response to the democratisation initiatives discussed in chapters four and five respectively are affecting the Jordanian relations with Israel in different dimensions. As has been argued in the
empirical chapters, especially chapter six, Jordan is playing remarkable role in contributing to Israeli security, whether regarding counterterrorism or preserving stability and preventing friction in the region. In addition, the Jordanian control of its political reform process and its preferable support of east Jordanian in political life are aiming to prevent the Islamists from controlling the political life in Jordan, which would lead to less cooperation with Israel and the U.S.A. These policies aim to prevent Jordanians of Palestinian origin from gaining a greater political role in Jordan. These Jordanian policies simultaneously aimed to put off any temptations of the Palestinians, whether in the West Bank or in Jordan and other external actors, especially Israel and the U.S.A, of imposing any solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on the current Jordanian political system, such as a confederation between Jordan and the Occupied Territories or the Jordanian option.

On these grounds, it is not surprising that the Jordanian government is attentive to events in the region and vigilant of all the parties and the mechanisms involved as they shape their policies regarding issues of concern. For example, while Israel is aware of the events in the Occupied Territories and the internal situation in Jordan, and the U.S.A is watchful of the unpredictability of the region, the Jordanian government is very sensitive to the Jordanian Islamists’ ties with Hamas. Although the Islamists in Jordan illustrate their commitment to Jordanian security and the rejection of the “Jordanian option”, the unpredictability of events in the region might lead the Islamists in Jordan to break their commitment, which would affect the policies of major players like the U.S.A and Israel, leading to a potentially disastrous scenario for Jordan. Therefore, these realities and
Jordanian concerns and calculations make Jordan perceive its manoeuvrability within its relations with the U.S.A as a matter of national survival, not only a foreign policy or diplomatic matter.

While Jordan was cautiously cooperative with the U.S.A during the Cold War due to domestic and regional grounds, its cooperation with the U.S.A became more overt and institutionalised in the 2000s as a result of the development of the U.S. status in the international system and the impact of that on its policies with its allies. The U.S. fearlessness of its friends and allies of joining a counterbalance coalition against the U.S.A allowed it to offer its allies a greater margin of mutual influence. As argued in the empirical chapters, Jordan supported many U.S. strategies but at the same time was able to avoid some policies that would be harmful for its interests and considerations, and those of the U.S.A accordingly. Therefore, contrary to Waltz’s neorealist theory, which assumes that the foreign policy of states change according to the changes to the structure of the international system (Waltz, 1979), we find from this thesis that Jordan and the U.S.A remained allies in the 2000s with stronger incentives and motivations from both sides, not only from Jordan, to do so, even though Jordan has little impact on the current structure of the international system.

As the sole super power in a unipolar era, it is natural that the U.S.A tends to behave in a hegemonic manner. However, Husam Hamami, a former Jordanian ambassador to the U.S.A (1988-1992) and the current head of the Jordanian Institute of Diplomacy, asserted that in practice the system in the U.S.A is open and liberal, where the administration
recognises and allows its counterparts to express their views related to mutual interests (Interview: Hamami, 2008). In addition, as explained in the thesis, Marwan Muasher, the Jordanian ambassador to the U.S.A (1996-2002) and the Jordanian foreign minister (2002-2004) used to raise strongly Jordanian concerns regarding Middle Eastern affairs with key figures in different U.S. administrations. More importantly, Muasher asserted that Jordan was able to convince the U.S. administration regarding different issues in the Middle East that are in the interests of both Jordan and the U.S.A (Muasher, 2008).

It can be argued therefore that Jordan, as a small state, proved to be able to achieve its priorities and interests within its relations with the U.S.A. These Jordanian achievements were achieved not only by the Jordan’s own policies and abilities, nor exclusively by U.S. support, which was in some occasions and on some issues difficult to obtain; rather they were accomplished by the combination of the Jordanian policies, which are based on the identification of both the realities and preferences of the regional and international order (that the U.S.A is on the top of them), and Jordan’s vulnerabilities and faithfulness to the U.S.A, which in its part allows Jordan to practice a sufficient margin of manoeuvre, initiative and reciprocal effect to overcome its weaknesses and challenges when necessary. As a result, the activeness of Jordan as a small state in the international order and its vigilance of the mechanisms that determined the priorities of the hegemonic power were essential to overcome its concerns and are major components in shaping the relations between the two countries.
This thesis also found that the U.S.A became profoundly involved in the Middle East in the 2000s more than any previous era, and as a result, and while Jordan was an important actor in the region, and had strong relations with the U.S.A during different historical eras such as during the Cold War to contain the Soviet presence, and in the 1990s to achieve peace and stability in the region, its role was even more important during the two Bush administrations. In this regard Jordan showed a grasp of the features of U.S. foreign policies with its allies and managed to address its preferences within the U.S. strategies regarding the renewable threats and challenges in the region which are, fortunately, of major concern to Jordan as well.

This tells us that the U.S.-Jordanian relations are profound enough to maintain the sustainability of the relations between the two countries that have endured since the beginning of the Cold War. The evolution of these relations is compatible and simultaneous with the increased involvement of the U.S.A in the region and Jordan’s necessities and vulnerabilities. This resulted in more activeness of Jordan regarding different U.S. strategies, making Jordan a major focus of U.S. policies in the region with increased importance. Remarkably, Jordan proved to be a reliable ally to the U.S.A with the notable ability of achieving its interests and influencing U.S. policies on issues that are of major concern to Jordan, despite its smallness.

What makes these realities striking is the ability of a small state like Jordan to assume such a role during one of the most unilateral eras of U.S. foreign policy. Such an ability of a small state however cannot be attributed only to the small state itself, it is also due to
the permission of the U.S.A for such a relationship to function in such a way. Therefore, it is vital to stress in this regard that in an era of globalisation and U.S. preponderance there is great mutual interlocking between states in different regions in the globe with the U.S.A, contrary to the assumptions of both Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky of the limited connectedness between the politics of the advanced countries and developing countries (Nueman, 1998: 4).

By and large, this thesis found that regarding security cooperation, democratisation and Jordan’s relations with Israel, Jordan finds itself able to achieve most of its vital interests in its relations with the U.S.A with reasonable costs. Jordan proved to be able to make good use of the U.S.A about other interests that the U.S.A has the upper hand regarding them leading for better bargaining position for Jordan on other issues. These interests would not have been achieved without U.S. liberal hegemony. Indeed, the U.S. liberal hegemony is marked by transparency and decentralization. The accessibility of other countries to U.S. policymaking enabled Jordan to manage to raise its concerns and make a difference in U.S. preferences regarding domestic issues in Jordan, or issues affecting Jordan in the region. It can be argued that the Jordanian policies and relations, whether with the U.S.A or with Israel, regarding security cooperation, democratisation or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict serve Jordanian interests, not only those of Israel and the U.S.A. These realities make Jordan perceive U.S. liberal hegemony as desirable, especially in a fragile region like the Middle East. Therefore, it is not surprising that Jordan places its relations with the U.S.A as the cornerstone of its foreign policy, which will remain the case for the foreseeable future.
7.4 The Originality of the Thesis

The originality of this thesis derives from achieving the main aim of this project which is to assess the applicability of liberal hegemony combined with small states politics to U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s. Therefore, with regard to the project questions, critically and empirically, the prevailing attitude among many scholars that U.S. policies with its small partners in the 2000s were based to a great extent on a unilateral approach and dominant ambitions by the U.S.A. For these reasons, this investigation is a focussed study on a major contemporary concern and debate among scholars of IR and U.S. foreign policy in particular. While this concern and debate has loaded the capability of many scholars in a Western and advanced countries context, this thesis provides a new perception of U.S.-Jordanian relations in a particular Middle Eastern context, where such a perception has been avoided and neglected. Such an unusual perception and interpretation of these relations added new understanding of the nature of these relations that are associated with the intensity of the increasing reciprocal interactions between the two countries on different issues since 2000.

This sharp interpretation would be constructive in making sharper calculations by policymakers of each country leading to higher predictability of the foreign policy of each state. In addition, this thesis broadens our understanding of U.S.-Jordanian relations in the sense that it provides an optimistic interpretation of these relations that make us more aware of the importance of the details and continuous interactions between the two countries. This interpretation of the U.S.-Jordanian relations is timely and original; while
U.S.-Jordanian relations experienced different historical contexts which required different interpretation that lasted for decades during the Cold War and for years in the transformational 1990s, this thesis provides a well-timed, rich, and innovative interpretation of U.S.-Jordanian relations that is appropriate for an era which is expected to last for significant amount of time.

Finally, this thesis is a unique one as a result of its focus not only on the outcomes of the interactions between the U.S.A and Jordan, which have been the prevailing focus of most of the materials that are used in this thesis, but also on the nature of the interactions between two countries different in size, power and importance. Because of the problems of neorealism and the inconvenience of neoliberalism to the study of such relations, and as a result of the findings of this thesis which confirm the level of autonomy of a small state and the role of the liberal hegemony in U.S.-Jordanian relations, it can be argued that such a combination of small states’ politics and liberal hegemony added to the literature of this area of IR a new dimension to the understanding of these relations and other similar relations. For example, by using an imitative theoretical approach and by focusing on the features of the interaction between states and not only on the outcomes, investigating other cases will lead to the inferring of the outcomes of these relations, leading to better and more accurate calculations of policymakers of these countries and to the understanding of the relations between these countries and the U.S.A.
7.5 Concluding Remarks

After the removal of Saddam Hussein from power in 2003 and the decision of the Libyan leadership to renounce its unconventional weapons and turn to the West, the Arab governments have neither the desire nor the capacity to challenge or antagonise U.S. policies in the region, including Syria and Sudan, which are in reality seeking better relations with the U.S.A, which for its part was reluctant to do so during Bush’s two terms. However, despite of the undesirability and inability of the Arab countries to challenge the U.S.A, many countries in the Arab world, including those who are categorised as traditional U.S. allies, were reluctant to follow all of Bush’s policies in the Middle East, especially those policies which are related directly to these countries’ crucial interests. In other words, despite their faithfulness to the U.S.A, many countries in the Middle East have their own agendas. For example, the Gulf and other Arab countries avoided building an anti-Iranian coalition designed against Iran and to isolate Syria, as the U.S.A wished them to do (Ottaway, 2008: 1).

Meanwhile, as discussed in chapters five and six, Jordan and other actors in the region are concerned about U.S. abandonment or the unlikely decreased involvement in the region such as an untimely withdrawal from Iraq; therefore, as Ikenberry argued, the U.S. allies in Europe and Asia do not fear U.S. domination, rather they fear its abandonment, lest they lose the vital services that the U.S.A is providing them, making these countries’ demand for the U.S. hegemony and presence high (Ikenberry, 2002: 231). The same
concept can be applied to Jordan in its relations and perceptions of the U.S.A, as has been proven from the discussion of this thesis.

Democratisation and reform were successful U.S. policies toward major powers like Germany and Japan after the Second World War in order to make them prosperous and liberal, so they would not desire to challenge or balance the U.S.A. (Owe VI, 2002); interestingly, as discussed in chapters one and five, after 9/11 the U.S.A promoted democratic reforms in the Middle East and there was the analogy and perspective among U.S. policymakers of the requirement for a Marshall Plan in the Middle East. In the case of Jordan, these U.S. policies proved to be considerate to Jordan’s own preferences for vital reasons for both countries, as discussed in depth in chapter five. Consequently, while Ikenberry claims that the connectedness and commonality between the U.S.A and other democratic, advanced and industrialised countries such as those in Europe and Asia led to the liberal feature of the relations among them, it can be argued from the findings of this thesis that some small developing countries, such as Jordan, due to their smartness, progress and integrated policies in the U.S. orbit can establish relations with the U.S.A based on the same principles that are shaping U.S. relations with these advanced countries.

Nevertheless, this thesis does not claim that U.S.-Jordanian relations in the 2000s are similar to those of U.S. relations with European countries or Japan regarding their solidity and intensity, or are going to be so in the foreseeable future; rather it claims that the motivations of the two countries are similar and the interactions between them are
witnessing the commencement of the applicability of the same principles that are shaping U.S. relations with these countries, as discussed through the thesis. In addition, the practices of these principles in the relations between the two countries are evolving and enhancing the intensity and solidity of the relations, leading to the same path of the current relations between the U.S.A and other advanced countries. Such principles and practised policies would result in more integration between the advanced countries and their developing counterparts, regardless of their size, in an era of more globalised international relations.

While these assumptions were applicable to U.S. foreign policy during the Bush era, when the neoconservatives and their preferable unilateral tendency had been at their apogee and maximum influence over the policymaking of the U.S.A, especially towards the Middle East, it would be more promising to evaluate the applicability of these assumptions and principles during the Presidency of Barak Obama, who appears more liberal in his foreign policy even to those who used to be termed “rogue states” and “axis of evil”, not to mention to a historical ally to the U.S.A like Jordan. The findings and limits of this project in terms of time and size suggest that such an approach should not be passed over; it is recommend though that such an approach should be reevaluated in further studies over time and for events of concern to Jordan and the U.S.A. It is also recommended that using a similar approach in further research for other U.S. relations with other countries is essential in order to come to a decision of the extent to what we can make a generalisation of this approach to U.S. relations with other countries, especially in the Middle East.
Historically, U.S.-Jordanian relations since 2000 have been at their best stage at all levels. There is strong cooperation and agreement between the two countries upon the principles that are shaping these relations, and what needs to be done in the region strategically, although there are bearable disagreements in the priorities for each country in some occasions (Interview: Hassan, 2008; Interview: Bell, 2008). The satisfaction of both sides of the current relations indicates the functionality and the solidity of the principles and pillars that shape these relations. Finally, the progress of these relations in the future depends to a great extent on the two countries’ adherence to the principles and pillars that have shaped the current relations between them, which have also shaped the core argument of this thesis.
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