Analysing and attacking the 4-way handshake of IEEE 802.11i standard

Alabdulatif, A, Ma, X ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0074-4192 and Nolle, L, 2013. Analysing and attacking the 4-way handshake of IEEE 802.11i standard. In: 8th International Conference for Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST), London, 9 December 2013. IEEE, pp. 382-387. ISBN 9781908320209

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Abstract

The IEEE 802.11i standard has been designed to enhance security in wireless networks. In the 4-way handshake the supplicant and the authenticator use the pairwise master key (PMK) to derive a fresh pairwise transient key (PTK). The PMK is not used directly for security while assuming the supplicant and authenticator have the same PMK before running 4-way handshake. In this paper, the 4-way handshake phase has been analysed using Isabelle tool to identify a new Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack. The attack prevents the authenticator from receiving message 4 after the supplicant sends it out. This attack forces the authenticator to re-send the message 3 until time out and subsequently to de-authenticate supplicant. This paper has proposed improvements to the 4-way handshake to avoid the Denial-of-Service attack.

Item Type:	Chapter in book
Creators:	Alabdulatif, A., Ma, X. and Nolle, L.
Publisher:	IEEE
Date:	2013
ISBN:	9781908320209
Identifiers:	Number Type 10.1109/ICITST.2013.6750227 DOI
Rights:	© Copyright 2013 IEEE - All rights reserved.
Divisions:	Schools > School of Science and Technology
Record created by:	EPrints Services
Date Added:	09 Oct 2015 10:52
Last Modified:	09 Jun 2017 13:43
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/19525

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