Nonspecificity and theory of mind: new evidence from a nonverbal false-sign task and children with autism spectrum disorders

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Iao, L.-S. ORCID: 0000-0002-3509-9712 and Leekam, S.R., 2014. Nonspecificity and theory of mind: new evidence from a nonverbal false-sign task and children with autism spectrum disorders. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 122, pp. 1-20. ISSN 0022-0965

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Official URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2013.11.017

Abstract

Understanding of false belief has long been considered to be a crucial aspect of theory of mind that can be explained by a domain-specific mechanism. We argue against this claim using new evidence from a non-verbal false representation task (false-sign task) with typically developing children and children with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD). Experiments 1 and 2 showed that typically developing children (mean age = 62.67 months) were equivalent in their performance across non-verbal and verbal forms of both the false-belief and false-sign tasks. Results for these two misrepresentation tasks differed from the results of an outdated representation task (“false” photograph task). Experiment 3 showed that children with ASD had difficulties with the false representation tasks and this could not be explained by executive functioning or language impairments. These findings support the view that children with ASD may not have a specific theory of mind deficit.

Item Type:

Journal article

Publication Title:

Journal of Experimental Child Psychology

Creators:

Iao, L.-S. and Leekam, S.R.

Publisher:

Academic Press

Place of Publication:

Maryland Heights, MO

Date:

2014