Weak randomness seriously limits the security of quantum key distribution

Bouda, J, Pivoluska, M, Plesch, M and Wilmott, C, 2012. Weak randomness seriously limits the security of quantum key distribution. Physical Review A, 86 (6). ISSN 1094-1622


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In usual security proofs of quantum protocols the adversary (Eve) is expected to have full control over any quantum communication between any communicating parties (Alice and Bob). Eve is also expected to have full access to an authenticated classical channel between Alice and Bob. Unconditional security against any attack by Eve can be proved even in the realistic setting of device and channel imperfection. In this paper we show that the security of quantum key distribution protocols is ruined if one allows Eve to possess a very limited access to the random sources used by Alice. Such knowledge should always be expected in realistic experimental conditions via different side channels.

Item Type: Journal article
Publication Title: Physical Review A
Creators: Bouda, J., Pivoluska, M., Plesch, M. and Wilmott, C.
Publisher: American Physical Society
Date: 2012
Volume: 86
Number: 6
ISSN: 1094-1622
Rights: ©2012 American Physical Society
Divisions: Schools > School of Science and Technology
Depositing User: EPrints Services
Date Added: 09 Oct 2015 11:03
Last Modified: 23 Aug 2016 09:13
URI: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/22058

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