PEDAGOGY IN MANAGEMENT HISTORY:  
THE SCHOLARSHIP OF REPRESENTATION

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Paper Type: Conceptual

Purpose: This paper reflects on some aspects of pedagogy in management history, using Boyer’s (1990) model of scholarship as a framework for consideration.

Approach: Drawing on the Boyer’s (1990) model of scholarship, this paper considers how we might apply the notion of the “scholarship of representation” to our teaching efforts in management history.

Research & Practical Implications: Satisfied that our conceptions of the past are developed in ways that, as far as possible, make them useful in creating our future, we then need to represent those conceptions in a meaningful way. This paper considers some of the issues of which those seeking to represent those conceptions must be cognisant.

Value: Learning from the lessons of management history depends, at least in part, on the quality of the scholarship of representation, which should be a combination of transmission and transformation.

Keywords: Management History, Pedagogy.

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Progress, far from consisting in change, depends on retentiveness. When change is absolute there remains no being to improve and no direction is set for possible improvement: and when experience is not retained, as among savages, infancy is perpetual. Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

(Santayana, 1905/1998:82)

INTRODUCTION

In my previous editorial, as well as reflecting on the collection of papers in the issue, I provided a brief overview of the range of methods that are available to us as scholars of management history, and attempted to demonstrate the range of perspectives and styles that can be, and are being, brought to the various subjects of study here in JMH. I’d like to continue in this themed vein and, in this issue of JMH, I explore other aspects of scholarship, using Boyer’s (1990) model of scholarship as a touchstone. But first, some observations on the current collection of papers.

As part of a continuing study of the parallels between military/grand strategy formulation and the similar activity in business (cf Grattan, 20005, 2004a, 2004b), the first paper in this issue of the Journal of Management History (Grattan, 2006) reviews the eleven lessons propounded by Robert McNamara in the film “The Fog of War” and considers them in the context of theories of strategic management. The film is taken as a case study and the evidence is considered against the background of Mr McNamara’s career and contemporary events, triangulated wherever possible by additional accounts so that bias is avoided as much as possible. Grattan (2006) finds that, despite a life-long rational, empirical approach, McNamara has discovered that there are limits to these methods, while there are also values, morals and ethics to consider. In turn, business strategists should acknowledge the limits of rationality and the importance of intangible factors, especially those involving the vagaries of human nature.

In the next paper, Yoo, Lemak and Choi (2006) consider strategy implementation. Their work reflects a key theme of JMH- the extent to which the past informs the present and the future – by way of an examination of how Fayol’s principles of management can be utilised to effectively implement Porter’s cost leadership and differentiation strategies. In doing so, Yoo and his colleagues once again remind us that earlier writers like Fayol (and perhaps now even Porter?) are not merely of “historical” interest, but continue to offer valuable insights to contemporary managers.
That is not to say that we should not be on the lookout for ways to further develop and improve those insights to match other developments in the marketplace. This has been the work of Lagrosen and Svensson (2006) in the presentation of their framework of marketing schools. Noting that recent developments in marketing, such as services marketing, industrial marketing and relationship marketing, do not fit earlier frameworks of marketing schools, their updated framework seeks to incorporate these developments. One of their concerns is to “assist practitioners to understand the current status of marketing by connecting to the past, and the future by revealing unexplored areas of the marketing discipline”.

Readers may re-call last year’s paper by Kidd and Low (2005), who found that, from pre-medieval to post-modern times, logistics routes and their modalities have not changed much. In the same way, Low (2006) has examined management and economic practices in the building processes of ancient China as presented in the *Yingzao Fashi* (or “Treatise on Architectural Methods”), which explains the official systems instituted for public projects; the management of labour, design and planning of construction works; quantity surveying practices; the use, control and recycling of building materials; and inspection of building elements. The results of his examination suggest that lessons in the principles of construction project management in ancient China bear many similarities with modern-day project management.

Another paper on management in China, albeit in regard to management knowledge of more recent vintage (Morgan, 2006), shows that Chinese entrepreneurs and managers were exposed to modern management ideas from the early 20th century. Utilising a variety of Chinese journal articles, archive materials and books from the period, Morgan’s (2006) paper shows us that Chinese industrialists, officials and academics were attracted to Taylor’s ideas of scientific management during the 1920s and 1930s. Far from being a new phenomenon, the transfer to China of management ideas has been (at least) a century-long process of transfer and adaptation of western management theory and practice.

This apparent “confusion” as to the spread of Taylor’s influence might be due to the disparate portrayals of his ideas across different textbooks (Payne, Youngcourt, and Watrous, 2006). Payne and her colleagues (2006) examined 93 books used as textbooks in a variety of management and psychology programs to see the extent to which they presented a similar or dissimilar picture of Taylor and his works. They established, *inter alia*, that the majority of information contained therein was reasonably accurate. On the other hand, insofar as the space devoted to Taylor varied between 20 and 2150 words, one could gain a very different impression of the significance of the man and his ideas, according to the textbook chosen. They conclude with a call to the textbooks’ authors and publishers, as well as those responsible for their incorporation in management curricula, to remember the importance of providing students a comprehensive, accurate representation of the material they cover.

This now brings me to my observations about the scholarship of representation and Boyer’s (1990) model, which goes beyond the traditional focus on research to give equal weight to other important aspects of academic work, *viz*:

> Surely, scholarship means engaging in original research. But the work of the scholar also means stepping back from one's investigation, looking for connections, building bridges between theory and practice, and communicating one's knowledge effectively to students. Specifically, we conclude that the work of the professoriate might be thought of as having four separate, yet overlapping, functions. These are: the scholarship of discovery; the scholarship of integration; the scholarship of application; and the scholarship of teaching.
Boyer describes traditional research – the pursuit and discovery of new knowledge for its own sake – as the *scholarship of discovery*. This kind of scholarship not only contributes to the stock of human knowledge but also to the intellectual climate of the university. The *scholarship of integration* makes connections and draws insights from discrete facts and findings. As Boyer (1990:19) says, "what we mean is serious, disciplined work that seeks to interpret, draw together, and bring new insight to bear on original research. The *scholarship of application*, the service role of the academic, is concerned with questions such as "How can knowledge be responsibly applied to consequential problems? How can it be helpful to individuals as well as institutions?...Can social problems themselves define an agenda for scholarly investigation?" (Boyer, 1990: 21). Here the academic relates acquired knowledge in one's own field of expertise to the larger community. Boyer's (1990) fourth form of scholarship is that of *teaching*, what we might call the scholarship of representation. At its best, teaching is not only the transmission of knowledge, but the transformation and extension of knowledge through study and debate.

The scholarship of discovery and integration is, of course, the “bread and butter” of traditional academia, while the scholarship of application is the *sine qua non* of JMH as regards the implications we draw from our traditional scholarship in management history to apply to current management issues. Satisfied that our conceptions of the past are developed in ways that, as far as possible, make them useful in creating our future, we then need to represent those conceptions in a meaningful way to those who wish to learn the lessons – we complete the cycle of scholarship in management history through our efforts to transmit and transform that which we have discovered, integrated and identified as relevant. Following is an example of my approach to “closing the loop” in the classroom.

In issue 12(1) of JMH, I commented on the excellent analysis by Michele and Paul Govekar (2006) concerning the Triangle (1911) and Hamlet (1991) fires, identified as the worst and second-worst industrial accidents in the United States. I drew parallels with the *Challenger* and *Columbia* space shuttle disasters, suggesting that the Govekars’ (2006) findings were not dissimilar to the findings of both space shuttle disaster investigations – a failure of regulation and regulatory effort were found to be significant contributors to the fires and their consequences, while the culture of NASA and its safety regimes were implicated in both sets of findings in relation to the space shuttle “accidents” (cf, Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 1986; Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003). I concluded my comments on their paper by expressing the hope that those who need to learn the lessons of Triangle and Hamlet identified by Govekar and Govekar (2006) are as responsive as NASA has been more recently in relation to the difficulties experienced by space shuttle *Discovery* in July/August 2005 (cf NASA, 2005) and again in June/July 2006 (cf NASA, 2006).

I have more than a passing interest in the circumstances surrounding the *Challenger* and *Columbia* disasters because, for more than a decade now, I have been using the *Challenger* disaster as a case to demonstrate the importance of taking a multi-perspective approach to understanding organisations and the behaviour that occurs in them. I have used the three editions of Bolman and Deal’s (1993/1997/2003) *Reframing Organizations* as an accessible introduction to this multi-perspective approach, considering the structural, human resource, political and cultural influences on behaviour in organisations. One of the case studies used by Bolman and Deal to highlight the importance of an appreciation of organisational politics is that of the disintegration of the space shuttle *Challenger* seventy-three seconds after launch on 28 January 1986. As Bolman and Deal (2003:185) observe, “Challenger was an
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extraordinary tragedy, but it illustrates political dynamics that are normal and universal in organizational life”.

In teaching this case, I take a broader approach than Bolman and Deal’s focus on the politics of the decision to launch the Challenger shuttle, identifying the structural, human resource and cultural issues that also contributed to the decision. For example, charged with investigating the Challenger disaster, The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident (1986:102) concluded that “a well structured and managed system emphasising safety would have flagged the rising doubts about the Solid Rocket Booster joint seal. Had these matters been clearly stated and emphasised in the flight readiness process … it seems likely that the launch of 51-L might not have occurred when it did”. This summary statement highlights the systemic and cultural issues that formed the context of the decision-making process.

Even in my first efforts at encouraging students to consider the lessons of this case in the mid-1990s, I was confronted by students who made comments to the effect that “This was nearly 10 years ago – we’ve learned a lot and a lot has changed since then”. I persisted on the basis that if that was the approach that we took to anything that was “old”, then apparently we would have nothing to learn from Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Sun Zi and the other “ancients”. After the exposition of the learning points, the students generally conceded that it was like a lot of the case studies they examined – “old”, but probably had something to say. At the same time, the further the timeline extended, the more the students became resistant to this “old” case.

In any event, NASA (1987) had responded to the report of the Presidential Commission with its own report on the implementation of the series of recommendations made by the Presidential Commission, some 12 months later. Among the initiatives was the establishment of a Space Flight Safety Panel, chaired by astronaut Bryan O’Connor, with a charter to promote flight safety for all NASA space flight programs involving flight crews, including Space Shuttle and Space Station. NASA also established an Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance, reporting to the NASA Administrator, with responsibility for related functions in all NASA activities and programs.

Notwithstanding the apparent efforts of NASA, seventeen years later, on 1 February 2003, the space shuttle Columbia and its crew were lost during re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere, sixteen minutes before landing. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board inquiry heard extensive testimony suggested that little had been learned from the lessons of two decades earlier (cf Columbia Accident Investigation Board, 2003), and a series of headlines in the New York Times over the following months were eerily familiar:

*Engineer Warned of Dire Effects of Liftoff Damage*, February 13, 2003
*NASA Is Held Down by Its Own Bureaucracy*, February 18, 2003
*NASA Pressed on When Officials Learned of E-Mail About Shuttle* February 28, 2003
*Shuttle Myopia*, March 4, 2003
*Supervisor at Shuttle Plant Cites Pressure Over Repairs*, March 4, 2003
*NASA’s Work With Contractors a Focus of Columbia Investigation*, March 6, 2003
*NASA E-Mail Writer Says He Was Hypothesizing*, March 11, 2003
*Shuttle Team Sought Satellite Assessment of Liftoff Damage* March 13, 2003
*NASA Was Asked to 'Beg' For Help on Shuttle Photos*, March 14, 2003
Panel Examines Whether NASA Was Out of Touch With Safety Problems, March 26, 2003
Space Agency Culture Comes Under Scrutiny, March 29, 2003
Senior Engineer Faulted NASA for Not Seeking Satellite Help, April 1, 2003
Inadequacy of Tests on Shuttle Hinders Part of Inquiry, April 9, 2003

These headlines are included in the teaching materials that now accompany the Challenger case that I present to students, as part of the “closing of the loop”. Just as Govekar and Govekar (2006) strove to draw out the parallels between the Triangle and Hamlet fires, so there is, sadly, a basis for drawing similar comparisons between the circumstances surrounding Challenger and Columbia.

CONCLUSION

One can only wonder if the people at NASA would have been like my students in the seventeen years between Challenger and Columbia – “we’ve learned a lot and a lot has changed since then”? I suspect not. Rather, I would like to think that the people at NASA continued to try and draw the lessons from the initial disaster. That being the case, and given the subsequent events, it highlights the difficulty of even those close to the events in appreciating the lessons and then translating those lessons into changed behaviours. The recent responses by NASA to the difficulties experienced with the Discovery shuttle suggest a greater appreciation of lessons learned. It is to be hoped that those students much further removed from these events also benefit from the scholarly efforts at discovery, integration, application, and transmission/ transformation.

AFTERWORD

With this issue, we complete the first year of publication of the Journal of Management History as a once more independent journal. Accordingly, I want to take this opportunity to thank all those responsible for contributing to the revitalisation of JMH – all the authors and reviewers who have taken up the challenge to demonstrate through their respective labours that the scholarship of management history continues to be a worthy endeavour. The Editorial Advisory Board has been a source of great support and inspiration, as has JMH’s excellent Managing Editor, Anna Torrance. Together, we have made progress in true Santayana style – through retentiveness; through our remembering of the past and in identifying the lessons for us, now and in the future. Thank you, one and all.

REFERENCES


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