A TALE OF TWO ANOMIES:

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF
(SOCIOLOGICAL) CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY TO
EXPLAINING HATE CRIME MOTIVATION

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that hate crime is simply an inherent and normal component of contemporary society. Regardless of a concerted intervention – legislative, situational and social crime prevention – against this significant social problem in the USA and Europe in recent years, there remains a ubiquitous, albeit often latent, continued existence of hate motivation throughout society which remains at a considerable and increasing risk of actualisation as individuals come into contact with other likeminded individuals. This is particularly an issue in the information age which has greatly enhanced the spatial proximity of these hate-minded people to each other. It is shown that an established body of sociologically informed criminological theory – in particular that founded on the European and US anomie traditions – can be adapted to explain and understand the existence and persistence of hate motivation at all levels of the social world. This provides the basis for an extensive educative - and thus preventive - programme to tackle pervasive cultures of hate.

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INTRODUCTION

Definition and Prevalence of Hate Crime

There are various definitions of ‘hate crime’ – or crimes of bias - but Barbara Perry (2001: 10) offers the following accessible and practical definition: ‘Hate crime is a mechanism of power and oppression involving acts of violence and intimidation against already stigmatised and marginalised groups, and intended to re-affirm the precarious hierarchies that characterise the given social order’. Perpetrators of hate activity are thus those unaccepting of the heterogeneous nature of the contemporary societies in which they live and primarily characterise social groups according to their visible ethnic, racial or sexual identity rather than their personal attributes. From that cause, a key component of hate victimisation is the existence of bias and prejudice based upon ‘what’ someone is, rather than ‘who’ they actually are.

‘Hate crimes’ are significant. Figures collated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the USA (FBI, 2003) show that hate crimes involve a higher level of assaults against the person than crimes generally. 45% to 55% of bias crimes are personal assaults, whereas only 10% of all crimes involve assault. Hate crimes are more violent than crimes generally. Assaults causing physical injury occur in 74% of bias crimes, versus 29% of non-bias crimes. Attacks are often preceded by a series of confrontations and incidents that escalate in severity. Hate crimes are more likely than other criminal activity to be committed by groups of perpetrators. Most crimes against the person are committed by someone the victim knows, hate crimes, however, are more likely to be committed by strangers (FBI, 2003:2). In the UK, the number of racist incidents recorded by the police rose from 11,878 in 1994/5 to
47,814 in 1999/2000 (Kershaw et al., 2000). Seeking to reduce hate crimes is thus unequivocally a worthwhile criminological enterprise.

**Dimensions of Intervention**

Three broad dimensions of intervention that seek to reduce hate crimes can be identified; the criminal law, situational crime prevention and social crime prevention. The first dimension, the criminal law, seeks either to deter motivated individuals to act on their prejudices for fear of the consequences or to suitably punish apprehended perpetrators. In the USA there has been a major legislative offensive against hate crimes in recent years and Morgan (2002) identifies a significant threefold trend. First, there is the inclusion of the notion of hate motivation on the part of the offender. Second, there is the provision for enhanced penalties for motivated offenders. Third, there is the identification of specific victimised groups where such enhanced penalties should be applied. Morgan argues that this body of legislation problematises the position of victims who are targets of hate crimes but have failed to organise on the basis of identity politics, lack political clout, have insufficient moral status, or who see hate crime legislation as an ineffective way of dealing with their particular concerns. This legislation is thus the source of serious acrimony with inequities built into the alignment between proving hate intent and the enhanced penalty approach giving higher symbolic status to some groups. It is a perspective resonant with that of Jacobs and Potter (1998) who are sympathetic to a traditional rule-of-law perspective that argues that all offences should receive equal criminal justice intervention regardless of offender motivation and identity of victim group. A universal criminal justice intervention strategy is nonetheless

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3 There is no specific hate crimes legislation in the UK but such offences are covered by both the Public Order Act 1986 and the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The Metropolitan Police record offences as being hate motivated if that is the view of the victim.
problematic because the police service has a long recognised lack of resources, which makes the prioritisation of certain categories of crime inevitable (see Hopkins Burke, 2004).

The second dimension of intervention, situational crime prevention strategies, is less concerned with the problem of identifying and proving motivation than in changing the situations in which crime occurs and reducing the opportunity to offend. The intention is to pre-empt crime and rests largely on the premise that if the criminal opportunity is removed the criminal act cannot take place. This approach – certainly in its more recent manifestations (see Felson and Clarke, 1998; Sutton, 2004) - does not deny the issue of criminal motivation, but is theoretically underpinned by contemporary rational actor theory premises that crime is the result of people making choices and decisions to offend based on perceptions of risk and rewards, or costs and benefits, of their actions (see Hopkins Burke, 2001: 40-48 for an overview). Motivation is thus explained by rational choice. Offenders choose to act in a certain way because these actions appear to them rational in the circumstances in which they find themselves and in terms of their knowledge base and cognitive thought processes.4

Expressive crimes such as vandalism are well explained by the related concept of crime as a function of opportunity and routine activities (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Such offences are usually unplanned and most likely to occur in places where the potential perpetrators are likely to find themselves in the normal course of their lives. A crime such as arson, for example, may have a financial motive, but it is more likely to be committed for expressive reward, to gain the approval of peers, to ‘get back at’ a target (such as a school) (see Knights,

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4 Clarke (1987) uses the terms limited or bounded form of rationality to describe a situation where the individual will not always obtain all the facts needed to make a wise decision and the information available will not necessarily be weighed carefully.
1998) or simply to alleviate boredom. All of these explanations can be conceptualised as at least sub-motivations in the execution of hate crime attacks.

Situational crime prevention strategies can be devised to protect targets and remove opportunities attractive to actual and potential perpetrators of hate crimes. Many potential casual participants encouraged by peer group pressure to engage in such activities might well be deflected from involvement in hate crimes by the difficulties encountered in doing so. But others will not be deterred and many might baulk at the notion that such people are merely displaced, left to wander free and untroubled with their poisonous and objectionable views intact until they discover the right opportunity and/or like-minded others with whom they might act to operationalise their hate. Thus, addressing the issue of motivation is a worthwhile objective.

The third dimension of intervention, social crime prevention initiatives, emphasise the need to eliminate criminogenic environments which encourage criminal motivation. It is an approach that ‘aims to prevent people drifting into crime by improving social conditions, strengthening community institutions and enhancing recreational, educational and employment opportunities’ (Bright, 1991: 62). During the past twenty-five years, in the UK, there have been a multitude of government sponsored social crime prevention initiatives introduced that have sought to intervene, in particular in the lives of young people, who have become involved in - or increasingly at risk of - offending behaviour with the intention of diverting them from these activities into a law-abiding existence (see Hughes, 1998; Crawford, 1998). A particularly effective but widely unsung organisation in the UK context

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5 Barr and Pease (1992) argue that displacement can be benign and neutral as well as malignant and propose – in an argument commensurate with that of left realists (see Lea and Young, 1984) - that there can be a diffusion of benefits and attrition and a more equitable distribution of crime.
is the local authority youth services who engage with often troubled and troublesome young people but can - as a recent national audit of their activities has shown - engage with and engender a more positive outlook (Orrock and Hopkins Burke, 2003). Such interventions can and apparently do successfully challenge the presumptions, attitudes and indeed ideologies of at least some young people. Whether or not such projects provide a cost effective general panacea for the reduction of hate crime motivation is both unclear and probably unlikely. For such intervention is invariably a reactive response to well-established and strongly founded worldviews that are quite understandable in the social circumstances in which the young people – and indeed us – live.

The Focus of the Paper

It is the central contention of this paper that involvement in hate crime should be considered a normal, rational and fully understandable activity in our society. It is acknowledged that the three dimensions of intervention outlined above have had - and will have further - success in the reduction of hate crime. Nonetheless the problem both persists and with the increasing development of information technology the potential for growth in this significant social problem has never been greater. Challenging the basis of rational hate crime motivation, the worldview of the offender, or why it is that the person thinks the way they do, is thus a legitimate and extremely worthwhile project.

Few researchers have attempted to situate hate crime within a theoretical framework. There is invariably an assumption that the perpetrators of such offences are in some way psychologically troubled individuals or groups of such like-minded individuals. Only, Barbara Perry (2000), Ben Bowling and Coretta Phillips (2002) have sought to situate racial

6 If it is reasonable to use such extravagant terms as ‘ideology’ for what are often ill-thought out and barely articulated worldviews.
hate crime within a socio-political criminological theoretical framework. This paper seeks to make a modest contribution to that literature by outlining and discussing the contribution of sociologically informed criminological theory to providing an explanation of the existence and persistence of hate crime motivation – or why it is that such behaviour is a rational act for those involved – with the intention of aiding those involved in the three identified dimensions of intervention.

The theories discussed are situated in three chronological groupings. First, we address the early-European anomie tradition encountered in the work of Emile Durkheim (1933, originally 1893) - albeit in terms of the methodological individualist interpretation of his work first articulated by Raymond Boudon (1980) - which helps us to make sense of the notion that hate crime motivation has its foundations in the origins and later development of societal structure. Second, we discuss the mid-twentieth century US anomie tradition - with its origins in the work of Robert Merton (1938) and his notion of differential adaptations via Edwin Sutherland (1939, 1947) and ‘differential association’, to the deviant subcultural theories of Albert Cohen (1955) and on to the non determinist critique of David Matza (1964) – that demonstrates how hate crime motivation has not just strongly founded macro societal origins but can occur as the outcome of rationally developed strategies developed, or encountered, by socio-economically disaffected people, with disparate commitment levels, at a local or micro societal level. Third, we develop the previous themes in terms of a more recent radical European tradition with nonetheless firm identifiable foundations in both earlier anomie traditions and which helps us to explain the complexities and variations of hate crime motivation in contemporary fragmented communities. We start with a discussion of the radical neo-Marxist sub-cultural theories formulated by the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (Brake, 1985; P. Cohen, 1972; S. Cohen, 1973; Hebdige,
1976, 1979) and develop their argument through the postmodern variant of Hopkins Burke and Ros Sunley (1996, 1998) before locating this in a poststructuralist conception of power (Foucault, 1980) to show how from this perspective rationally developed hate motivations have their origins in the relationship of individual young people – and their often chosen – sub-cultural grouping to specific developments in the contemporary mode of production. We commence our discussion with a consideration of the early European anomie tradition and the very origins of societal organisation wherein lie the foundations of hate motivation.

THE EARLY EUROPEAN ANOMIE TRADITION

The Origins of Society

In considering the socio-economic factors that lead to the creation and transmission through time of hate motivation it is appropriate to consider the essential origins of society. For economists the key factor in the beginning - and throughout history - is that of resource scarcity and the competition and collaboration that follows to acquire and distribute these (Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch, 2003). For sociologists, all societies have their origins in the sex taboo - the nature of which varies between geographical location - and which outlines who one can legitimately have sex with and, importantly in the context of this paper, who you may not (Giddens, 2001). It is through the creation and establishment of familial lines that power-blocks are initially created to ensure access to economic resources, their retention and protection, not least through inheritance. We have here a socio-economic explanation of the origins of all societies that makes considerable sense when discussing the notion of social solidarity contained in the work of Emile Durkheim (1933).
Emile Durkheim and Social Solidarity

The French social theorist Emile Durkheim writing at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries provides a discussion of social solidarity in both earlier simple and later more complex societies that is fundamental to our pursuit of the origins of hate crime motivation. First, it is appropriate to post a note of explanation regarding our methodological interpretation of Durkheim. A fundamental recurring criticism of Durkheim emphasised in virtually any introductory sociology text refers to his apparently unassailable methodological collectivism or over-determinism as it is usually termed. Individuals apparently seem to have little, indeed no, choice in their actions; or to use the language of one of us elsewhere, their lives appear predestined because of the social conditions in which they live (Hopkins Burke, 2001). It is without doubt this functionalist interpretation of Durkheim - where it appears impossible to locate any acceptable mechanism to account for social change - that has led to his work being almost universally dismissed as methodologically and politically conservative. We in fact follow the methodological individualist reinterpretation of Durkheim contained in the work of his fellow - but more recent - French compatriot Raymond Boudon (1980) and recognise that individuals do come together with others and form coalitions of interest on which they act and that it is in this way that social change can and does occur. Opportunities for conceiving of, and carrying out, that action are nonetheless invariably constrained by – sometimes overwhelming - structural constraints, not least the more strongly asserted, believed and enforced conscience collectives that are the products of the ultra, or intense, mechanical solidarities that dominate not only simple societies but also pockets of varying size within more complex contemporary societies. In short, individual choice - or acceptance or rejection of a particular way of life - is possible, from this perspective, but the choices available may be limited, or, in some cases, virtually non-existent. We now turn our attention to the substantive social theory of
Durkheim and its significance for understanding the origins and indeed persistence of hate crime motivation.

Durkheim (1933) proposed that earlier more simple forms of society – with high levels of ‘mechanical’ solidarity – were characterised by a likeness and similarity between individuals, invariably from the same ethnic group, who held common attitudes and beliefs and which constituted an intense and rigid collective conscience invariably reinforced by sacred religious belief (Durkheim, 1915). In such a homogenous, undifferentiated society, anti-social, deviant – or simply individual or innovative - acts offend the strong cohesiveness and social conscience of the people and perform the important function of delineating the boundaries between those who wholeheartedly support societal values and those who transgress. Repressive and summary punishments are used against those that transgress against the collective will and in this way commitment to the moral consensus - or worldview - of the group is encouraged with the downside of severely restricting any potential for social progress.

Durkheim notes that with greater industrialisation, societies develop greater diversity and complexity - stimulated by an essential division of labour - where different groups are inevitably interdependent on each other and are now bound together by an organic solidarity that relies less on the maintenance of uniformity and similarity between individuals but more on the management of the diverse functions of different groups. This is considered a progressive phenomenon. A more diverse society produces not an inevitable disintegration of morality but the appearance of a new form of the collective conscience where individuals and groups are - in the ideal, and probably never achieved conceptualisation of this theory,
regardless of differences in appearance, sexual preference and belief - bound together through a set of reciprocal obligations.

For Durkheim, there are two fundamental reasons why deviant behaviour occurs in more complex societies and both involve a pathological deviation from the ideal state or division of labour. First, such societies encourage a state of unbridled ‘egoism’ – or the pursuit of individual interest and invariably greed – contrary to the maintenance of collective social solidarity and commitment to the laws or rules of that society. Second, there is a greater likelihood of inefficient regulation at a time of rapid modernisation with new forms of control insufficiently developed to replace now outmoded means of maintaining solidarity. The outcome is an abnormal - or chronically unequal - division of labour where society is unable to successfully arbitrate between the interests and dealings of different social groups in their competition for limited resources; consequently there is a fundamental undermining of social justice and citizenship. Groups compete for numerous welfare resources such as social services, housing, welfare benefits, health and education (Faulks, 1998). Competition for resources within the labour market may be a particular stimulant of hatred between groups on the basis of colour or sexuality.

The classical liberal free-market laissez-faire economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo were deeply abhorrent to Durkheim and the idea that competitive individualism could ever become the basis of a civilised order was for him patently absurd (Hopkins Burke, 2002: 101). He would thus have been distinctly unimpressed with the revival of deregulated free-market capitalism that came to the fore in many parts of Europe and the USA during the last quarter of the twentieth century. Durkheim’s concept of anomie refers to unregulated social change at times of rapid socio-economic change – whether this is a period of boom or
recession – and thus covers pretty much the past two hundred years of British history. During that period very different groups of immigrants have arrived on these shores to compete for ‘scarce resources’ and have consequently born the brunt of complaint and hatred, from the Jews and Irish in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to those from the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent during the 1950s and 1960s, Vietnam in the 1980s, Eastern Europe, the Middle- and Far East in more recent times. It was however the Thatcher Governments of the 1980s that introduced economic policies that produced an unprecedented acceleration in socio-economic change and a state of what we here term hyperanomie.

The growth of entrepreneurial capitalism and de-regulation in the economic sphere with a reliance on market forces to determine supply and demand, arguably leads to a secular society consisting of egotistical individuals consumed by self interest. Moreover, the profit maximising philosophy of capitalism creates unchecked widening gaps between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. The latter become resentful of the former and this provides fertile territory for hate motivation. It is a situation acerbated by intensified competition in the employment market which can lead to tensions between ethnic groups as traditional white workers see ‘their’ jobs being taken by ‘immigrants’.

Both Fine (1997) and Weiss (1997) observe a widespread popular consensus among certain sections of the population of the USA and UK that unqualified minority workers have replaced qualified majority workers because of the effects of ‘positive discrimination’ in the labour market. Likewise, job advertisements that state: ‘we are an equal opportunities employer and particularly welcome applications from people from ethnic minorities’ are often interpreted as ‘whites need not apply’. Perry (2001) cites examples of situations where in the USA ‘positive’ or ‘reverse’ discrimination has provided a motive and rationale for
harassment and assaults on minority workers. Violence motivated by employment inequalities provides the perpetrator with an opportunity to publicly announce their indignation at the labour market and demand a ‘right to work.’

Durkheim had sought to eradicate the unequal division of labour and re-create the ‘moral constitution’ of the ideal organic society where it possible to manage ethnic and religious heterogeneities. During the latter part of the twentieth century, no society has been so publicly renowned for its inability to manage its heterogeneities than Northern Ireland (although South Africa before the end of Apartheid, Israel/Palestine and even, more controversially, the USA, are other powerful examples). At a macro level, organic society in Northern Ireland consists of two separate and invariably politically opposed ‘mechanical solidarities’ - one Loyalist (to Britain) and Protestant, the other Republican (and predominantly pro Eire) and Roman Catholic - inhabiting one ‘shared’ land-space. Within these two groups there exists at a local level, ‘terrorist’ organisations that derive their membership from predominantly working class individuals within both communities and which constitute their own - what we here term - micro-mechanical solidarities. The political peace process that has evolved in the province in recent years - as epitomised by the Good Friday Agreement - is an attempt to develop and manage an organic solidarity based on a fair division of society bringing together the various political and religious groups with very different agendas.

Thus, the concept of organic solidarity still provides a useful explanatory instrument for the understanding and management of contemporary multi-diverse societies. Indeed, many - if not most - individuals within such societies accept and even appreciate such diversity and difference. The changing nature of British society is epitomised by the reality that Indian
restaurants - virtually unknown in Britain before the 1970s - had by the end of the twentieth century a higher turnover than those previously dominant industries of coal, steel and shipbuilding combined (Hopkins Burke, 1998).

Acceptance of multi-diversity is nonetheless far from total in society and evidence is available from the incidence of minority group members who suffer psychiatric problems because of the hostility they encounter; suffering loss of self confidence, coming to question their self-worth and developing feelings of isolation (Herek and Berrill, 1992; Janoff-Bulman, 1992). It is a situation that could lead to what Durkheim (1952, originally 1897) describes as ‘egotistic suicide’, which occurs when individuals become dislocated from meaningful social support. Members of minority groups are particularly at risk when isolated, stigmatised as deviant and excluded from the overwhelming mechanical solidarity, which surrounds them. ‘Anomic’ suicide on the other hand can occur in response to the major changes in economic conditions described above - and which members of minority groups are particularly vulnerable - and which some individuals may have difficulty in coping with. A third category of ‘altruistic’ suicide can occur when an individual is so over–integrated into a group that - in the case of what we here term ultra-mechanical solidarity - any sense of individual identity is subsumed. This could be legitimately used to explain suicide-terrorists/freedom fighters driven to commit acts of terror because of both a deeply absorbed commitment to their own mechanical solidarity and an overwhelming hatred of their perceived oppressor. At a more micro level this level of commitment to the group can be usefully used to at least partially explain involvement in football hooliganism and skinhead racism.
It is clear from our discussion that even in a complex post-industrial society characterised by high levels of organic solidarity - and multifarious interdependencies - the concept of mechanical solidarity retains considerable explanatory power. Within complex and diverse worlds, mechanical solidarities continue to significantly exist at three levels in the social world. First, there is the macro societal level of national identities that may be particularly strong in those societies where the collective conscience is rigidly enforced by reference to a fundamentalist religious or political belief system. Second, there is the mezzo or intermediate level of the organisation and institution, for example the police, and organised hate groups. Third, there is the micro level of the small group or gang, such as a ‘football firm’ in Britain or Europe7 or localised less organised hate groupings.

Many contemporary hate groups have philosophies based on the notion of a collective society, consisting of common values, culture, identity, attitude and homogeneity. Those who deviate - or are in some way different from the norm - are defined and labelled as being deviant and outsiders. Deviance, is a necessary function of any mechanical society – whether it be at the macro, mezzo or micro level – inhabited by hate groups because its existence and endurance tests the boundaries of tolerance leading to an ongoing evaluation of prevailing norms and values. Transgressors against that dominant worldview are oppressed by its adherents, ‘subaltern’ (Perry, 2001) or subordinate groups.8 Those that deviate from the rigid identities constructed by these groups - whether it is because of their ethnicity, sexuality, or gender - are perceived to have contravened the white heterogeneous social order of a mechanical society and are consequently rebuked.

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7 Gangs of predominantly young males associated with ‘support’ for particular professional football clubs who engage in acts of violence against likeminded groups linked to other clubs.

8 Subaltern groups are comprised of individuals whose sexual, racial, gendered, or ethnic, identities are different to the traditional white, male, heterosexual identity that exist in a ‘normal’ society. A so-called ‘normal’ or mainstream society or ‘normal’ identity is one which is socially constructed by such white, heterosexual, males.
There are two prominent rationales for imposing law and punishment in a mechanical society; to re-instate or reintegrate the individual back into the collective, while at the same time, expressing the abhorrence of deviant acts to the rest of society. Hate groups seem to make use of two prevalent forms of punishment to assert their displeasure at deviant activities; threats and acts of violence to a person or their property, and verbal victimisation. These are considered necessary by the perpetrators for the maintenance of racial difference and many ethnic groups believe that they will not survive as a distinctive group if they do not conform to white dominated standards of behaviour (hooks: 1995). The extent to which the administered punishment is likely to meet with success is problematic. From what we can deduce from the psychology-based literature, homosexuals cannot simply ‘change’ their sexuality and become heterosexual and thus conform to the ideal of a heterosexual mechanical society (see Ashworth: 2000). It is even less possible for persons of a different ethnicity to change their identity and thus conform to the homogeneous heterosexual, white mechanical society. Therefore, to publicise difference, intimidate, humiliate and scare, must be the only rationales for punishing individuals from a different ethnicity with the apparent ultimate motivation of exclusion from that society altogether.

Ben Bowling (1993) observes that hate crime should not be seen as a single, static, or fixed event that occurs in a social vacuum, but rather as a social and dynamic process occurring within a state of constant social change. Thus, hate crime is inclined to change as the cultural identity of a nation and its demographics are transformed (Perry: 2001). In such a scenario, racial and ethnic minority groups – or mechanical solidarities - mobilise and demand a place and voice in the society that represents their identity. During the latter two decades of the twentieth century, US national identity experienced a dramatic change as immigration patterns reshaped the demographics of the country. It has been estimated that by the year
2050, white people will constitute a minority of the population (ibid). Black Nationalism in the West has a strong cultural character. Many Black people in the USA are descendants of slaves and have been raised in a culture that emphasised their inferiority. Therefore, for Black people to overcome the negative stereotype that was the legacy of slavery, it became necessary for some to look beyond the white culture in which they were raised and rediscover their cultural roots in Africa. (Heywood: 1992).

The Jamaican political ideologist and activist Marcus Garvey argued that Black people in the USA and the Caribbean should look upon Africa as their homeland. Furthermore, he advocated social solidarity for all Blacks on the grounds of race and encouraged segregation from whites, thereby developing their own form of macro mechanical solidarity. The ideas of Garvey inspired the founders of Rastafarianism - a new religion that, from there on in, was to be associated with Black Jamaican and Caribbean culture. The followers of Rastafarianism became known colloquially as ‘Rastas’ and regarded white society as the corrupt Babylon (Heywood: 1992). Whether or not Rastafarianism can really be considered a religion in the strictest sense of the word remains a matter of academic debate, it does nonetheless constitute the focus of collective Black-African identity. Moreover, in recent years such ‘means of cultural identification’ have been ‘exported’ to - and inspired solidarity - in virtually all countries of the Western, and the Westernised, world. This fusion of identities has helped facilitate and accentuate the fragmentation of the dominant macro mechanical solidarity in those countries, and encouraged the acceleration of diversity and organic society, notwithstanding that this process has managed to fuel antagonism among other micro-mechanical solidarities such as skinhead racists and at a more macro level the current Home Secretary, David Blunkett’s, recent observations about asylum seekers swamping British
society has not helped facilitate a transition to the ideal division of labour sought by Durkheim.

This situation whereby a number of mezzo and micro mechanical societies co-exist alongside each other in the same geographical space provides a fertile enabling environment for racist hate as a sense of insecurity and uncertainty can arise among at least certain sections of the traditional white majority. Both Enoch Powell (in Britain) and Jean Marie Le Penn (in France) successfully tuned in to the political opportunities proffered by this insecurity and dissent during the latter decades of the twentieth century by claiming that that non-white immigration would pose a threat to tradition, culture and opportunity for the traditional ‘white’ community (Heywood: 1992). Thus, hate crime perpetrators motivated by fears of cultural change, construct themselves as victims and demand first class preferential citizenship as they feel alienated from their traditional community.

Conclusions

We have shown that Durkheim’s ideas on the constitution of social solidarity and the nature of social change provide fertile grounds for locating the origins and transmission of hate crime in the structure of society. Contemporary complex and diverse societies tend to be far from the ideal divisions of labour that Durkheim sought but are constituted of many different competing, invariably unequal and often antagonistic mechanical solidarities at different levels of the social world. His fundamental notion that the anomic condition is inexorably linked to socio-economic disruption and increases in deviant behaviour has been developed by Robert Merton and his successors in the USA and this tradition itself provides further powerful explanatory tools in understanding hate crime motivation.
THE US ANOMIE TRADITION

Robert Merton and Anomie Theory

The US anomie tradition has its origins in the work of Robert Merton (1938) who developed the notion of societal fragmentation and unequal competition for scarce resources found in the work of Durkheim by observing that while status in US society is founded on the dominant goal of achieving material success, there is - in a hierarchically structured racially segregated society - unequal access to the legitimate means by which this desired goal can be achieved. This is a significant theoretical development because as Levin and McDevitt (1993) and Perry (2001) have observed there is a tendency for hate crime offenders to blame their economic instability or lack of job opportunities on the immigration of ‘foreigners’. It is these blocked opportunities or the under achievement of goals that Merton describes as ‘anomie.’ He proposes five possible anomic reactions or adaptations – conformity, ritualism, retreatism, innovation and rebellion - that can occur when people are not in a position to legitimately attain these internalised societal goals and we have here modified his concepts to the specific task of explaining hate crime motivation.

Conformity

The first anomic reaction *conformity* is where Merton observes that individuals continue to strive for material wealth through legitimate means even if their opportunities are constantly thwarted. At first sight this adaptation might appear non problematic in the hate crime motivation context. Nevertheless, central to the whole notion of conformity is the sense that adherents in some way buy into the legitimacy of the whole social order. Exactly why they do this is not questioned by Merton but adherence to the law, the influence of macro or localised ‘correct’ thinking, perhaps in the work context in the case of the latter, and a lack of opportunity could all be legitimate reasons why a person with latent hate crime motivation
keeps this under control. In that case the three dimensions of intervention against hate crime – legal, situational crime prevention and social crime prevention – have been effective in crime reduction. For some this is a satisfactory outcome. An ethnic minority colleague of ours recently summed up this apparent contemporary race-relations orthodoxy by observing that ‘if they aren’t saying it and they aren’t doing it then that’s ok’. But is it ok? These dimensions of intervention do not eradicate hatred itself, and the colleague had undoubtedly also seen the look in their eyes which betrayed their real thoughts. It could well be that as an outcome of a change in structural circumstances - for example, the arrival of a group of immigrants or asylum seekers in the locality, the chance meeting of a new friend or colleague with similar latent views, perhaps while on holiday or after the consumption of a few ‘social’ drinks, or as the outcome of surfing the Internet – that latent hate crime motivation could well be transformed into something more insidious.

These observations nonetheless presume a fundamental premise that hate crime motivation is essentially a pathological deviation from societal norms. We argue in this paper the converse; hate crime motivation is simply normal and unremarkable in society as currently constituted. The powerful macro, mezzo and micro mechanical solidarities identified above that exist in even the most complex contemporary organic societies - absorbed and internalised during a socialisation process that may well have prioritised notions of hard work, law-abiding behaviour and indeed conformity to the group – legitimate hate motivation as normal. Given the opportunity in the right venue among ‘our own kind’ where such views are very much the norm it is possible that latent hate motivation might well be actualised; where the at least tacit approval of the (perhaps) silent majority of conformists might provide succour, support and legitimisation for those prepared to act upon their hate motivation, a notion that is further explored below. Thus, conformity can be problematic in the hate crime motivation context.
Ritualism

*Ritualism* is a second anomic reaction that has many similarities with conformism. Merton explains that those – such as bureaucrats - who often uncritically adhere to the rules of their organisations provide the classic example. Indeed, it might well be this particular group of people overly socialised into the ultra mezzo mechanical solidarity of their organisation and its values who are most at risk of attraction to political groups seeking to restore a bye-gone world of monocultural dominance. Theodore Adorno (1969) provides an excellent example of the potential actualisation of latent hate motivation among ritualists at the macro level in his classic social-psychological study of the German lower-middle class during the early 1930s. He shows that the enthusiasm of this group for strong leadership, unequivocal rules and discipline – what he terms the ‘authoritarian personality’ – made the political programme of the Nationalist Socialists particularly attractive.

Retreatism

A third anomic reaction - *retreatism* – is where individuals reject both social goals and the means of obtaining them. For Merton, this is a category of social ‘drop-outs’ including among others drug addicts, psychotics, vagrants, tramps and chronic alcoholics. Those members of the supposedly ‘dominant’ ethnic group in society who have failed to come to terms with their inability to access the ‘good life’ through legitimate means and have lapsed into a retreatist social location may well carry - or be at risk of - resentments towards those they consider to be aliens, for example, groups of immigrants or asylum seekers who have achieved access to material success, albeit, in the guise of welfare benefits and preferential access to social housing.
Innovation

Innovation – a fourth anomic adaptation - is where the initial goal of material wealth is accepted but there is a dearth of legitimate means by which to achieve it. The individual thus embarks upon innovative and sometimes illegal or harmful routes in the hope of gaining such success. Thus, hate strategies can be used by those groups excluded from access to material resources against those who they consider to have achieved these illegitimately. During the last quarter of the twentieth century, religious tensions in Northern Ireland undoubtedly contributed to innovative anomic adaptations as an outcome of unequal competition for scarce resources in the labour market; the minority Catholic population significantly underrepresented in the workforce because of the policies of both employers and the Protestant dominated trade unions (Tonge, 1997).

Young (1995) has observed that minority ethnic groups predominantly experience exploitation in a segmented labour market that reserves skilled highly paid, unionised jobs for whites, and menial work for non-whites. Both Young and Perry (2001) observe this marginalisation to be the most dangerous form of oppression. The latter argues that whilst the acquisition of social rights by racial minorities represents a threat to white cultural identity, their economic gains represent a direct threat to white economic security; the former observes that economic marginalisation – or the exclusion from the labour market of particular social groups – leads to severe material deprivation, economic inequality, and powerlessness. In their study of the Sparkbrook area of Birmingham, Rex and Moore (1967) found that marginalisation of immigrant groups in the housing market had the same social exclusion consequences. Ethnic minorities resided in streets littered with broken bricks and glass, and resided in dwellings that had crumbling facades and paint peeling from the walls.
Those members of ethnic minorities who do manage to overcome the numerous obstacles confronting them and ascend the economic ladder are perceived as unfair competitors and the takers of white jobs who have overstepped pre-constructed economic boundaries. The Aryan group ALPHA claims that ‘historically, white men and their capabilities have made every …advancement and breakthrough possible’ (Perry, 2001: 146). Such groups claim that ethnic minority groups do not deserve to prosper, gain rewards, or compete on the same level with the more intelligent, morally sound and advanced white race. Any attempt made by a non-white to increase their employment opportunities in society is seen as detrimental to the traditional white American because it removes an opportunity for them.

Support for notions of ethnic minority inferiority and the illegitimacy of their claims to economic parity can often come from credible and apparently respectable sources. At the time of writing the widely popular – now former - BBC presenter Robert Kilroy-Silk has been removed from the screen following his comments in a Sunday newspaper that Arabs are nothing but ‘suicide bombers, limb amputators and women repressors’ who have made no significant contribution whatsoever to the development of humanity (BBC News, 2004).

Rebellion

The fifth anomic reaction - rebellion – is where people not merely reject but also wish to change the existing social system and its goals. The spread of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the world might itself be seen as an example of a growing anomic rebellion against the dominant global capitalist world order and its culture. Iran provides an example of a previously secular pro-capitalist state that has subsequently undergone a fundamentalist Islamic revolution with others such as Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria and post-war Iraq all having very strong fundamentalist oppositions. Despite being credited as the
second largest religion in the world, Islam is more than a mere religion; it is a way of life for over 750,000,000 Muslims in more than 70 countries world-wide. Historically, there has been constant conflict between Islam and the political and economic ideology of the West and undoubtedly, the vast contemporary support it enjoys constitutes a significant threat to Western ideologies throughout the world. In particular, fundamentalist Islam has posed a threat to much of Europe and America - and more recently the old Soviet-bloc and China - primarily because the industrial and technological revolutions which have led to the economic and political dominance of the West are contrary to the teachings of the ‘Koran’; the final word of God that dictates Islam will inherit the earth and all secular power (Heywood, 1992: 164).

**The Enduring Influence Of Merton**

Merton’s concept of anomic reaction or adaptation to an inability to gain legitimate access to economic resources has - despite criticisms of his apparent over-determinism and functionalism that in our view can be overcome (as in the case of Durkheim above) by the adoption of a methodological individualist perspective which recognises individual rational choice, albeit in many cases constrained by considerable structural limitations placed on that choice – has been considerably influential and both adopted and adapted by subsequent theorists. We again modify their theoretical contributions to the purpose of explaining hate crime motivation.

A significant contribution to the US anomie tradition is provided by ‘differential association’ – a social learning theory first devised by Edwin Sutherland (1939, 1947) - where it is proposed that a person is more likely to offend if they have frequent and consistent contact with others involved in such activities. Akers (1992) argues that this social learning process
usefully explains the link between social structural conditions and individual behaviours. Thus, the anomic social conditions (in the Durkheimian sense) and economic inequality that have all been linked with deviant behaviour affect the differential associations, definitions, models and reinforcements of the individual. The notion of differential association was brought together with the concept of anomic reaction by the early US deviant subcultural theorists and is particularly useful for explaining both the creation of hate crime motivation and its transmission at the micro level.

**Early US Deviant Sub-cultural Theorists**

The deviant sub-cultural tradition that emerged during the mid-1950s in the USA – with its foundations deeply steeped in the Mertonian anomie tradition - was devised and developed by various theorists in order to explain predominantly juvenile male offending. The deviancy subculture concept is nevertheless a useful one for explaining behaviour (not necessarily of a criminal kind) that has been usefully applied to other areas of the social world, not least that of corporate, or business, crime (see Aubert, 1952; Geis, 1967; Faberman, 1975; Braithwaite, 1984)\(^9\) and which we later use to discuss the behaviour of contemporary police officers. It is our purpose here, to adapt that tradition to our discussion of hate crime motivation. It will nonetheless be necessary in discussing the development of this theoretical tradition to make reference to the substantive research interests - in deviant working class young males - of the various theorists. We are well aware that hate motivation is not the sole preserve of this group and that it is indeed prevalent throughout the social world, although it may well be the case that different social classes and groups actualise their hate in different ways. The key value in discussing the work of these theorists is show how individual *people* come together and coalesce in likeminded groups.

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\(^9\) See Hopkins Burke 2001 for a full overview.
Thus, it was Albert Cohen (1955) who initiated this tradition by recognising that many young people offend not necessarily to obtain economic reward, although they might steal for fun, but predominantly to acquire status among their contemporaries by developing a reputation for being tough and 'hard',\textsuperscript{10} in the more contemporary parlance, having ‘an attitude’. It is the juvenile gang, or subculture – and their worldview – that is seen to be particularly welcoming to the young person offering possibilities for status and belonging denied elsewhere in a world dominated by alien middle-class values in which they cannot excel. For Miller (1958) it is the very nature of this tradition - with its focal concerns of toughness, smartness, excitement, fate and autonomy – that leads certain groups of young to get in trouble with the authorities.\textsuperscript{11}

There is little doubt that this early US deviant sub-cultural tradition provides a useful account of how young people from disadvantaged social backgrounds become alienated from mainstream middle-class society and its goals and develop their own sub-cultural responses which privilege resources of physical toughness, being streetwise and a collective identity focusing on shared knowledge and skills which set them apart from others. Being part of a particular ethnic group with its additional transmitted traditions and mechanical solidarities can undoubtedly act as a particular focus for collective belonging and can undoubtedly provide both the fulcrum for the actualisation of hate crime behaviour and protection against it.

Simple empirical observation suggests that these processes usually associated with the study of working class youth offending are applicable in the study of groups throughout the social world. It is indeed a particularly useful theoretical tool for helping to explain the kind of

\textsuperscript{10} Cohen was writing in the probably more innocent 1950s. We might note that much contemporary youth offending is economically motivated in the pursuit of addictive drugs (see Bennett et al, 2001).

\textsuperscript{11} Other subcultural theorists working in this early US tradition have developed this explanatory approach in an increasingly sophisticated fashion. For example, Cloward and Ohlin (1960) have developed a combination of anomie theory and differential association theory to devise an 'illegitimate opportunity structure' in contrast to Merton’s ‘legitimate opportunity structure’. While, this work clearly has some significance for the development of our argument, it is not here deemed central to the project.
institutional racist police behaviour identified in the London Metropolitan Constabulary by the Macpherson Report 1999.

There has long been a tough working class police culture – ‘canteen culture’ as it has been termed (see Holdaway, 1983; Fielding, 1988; Reiner, 2000) – that has been transmitted and adapted to changing circumstances across the generations. Working in a hard, tough environment invariably at risk of serious violence, notions of always looking after your colleagues in the face of external censure and from senior management have made considerable sense to serving officers brought together in a perceived shared adversity and has rather inevitably led to them looking inwards to the group for a supportive shared worldview. The outcome has been a ‘stereotyping’, separating and labelling of the public into categories deemed worthy of police assistance – the community or ‘those like us’ – and the others, the ‘toe-rags’, ‘slags’, ‘scrotes’, ‘scum’ and ‘animals’. Some have argued that these stereotypes drive the day-to-day nature and pattern of police work (Smith and Gray, 1985; Young, 1991, 1993) and the Macpherson Report 1999 clearly identified a significant issue of institutional racism within the Metropolitan police where young black males were apparently not deemed worthy of victim status even when murdered.

Hopkins Burke (2004) observes that this subculture was undoubtedly relatively non problematic during an era when police intervention against the rougher elements of a predominantly white monocultural working class had undoubted support from most elements of society including essentially the socially aspiring respectable elements within that class who lived cheek-by-jowl with the roughs and sought protection from them. It was with the fragmentation of that society and the emergence of ethnic and sexual preference diversity that this macho-police occupational culture became increasingly problematic.
This early US deviant sub-cultural tradition has been widely accused of being overly determinist in its apparent rejection of free-will and in this variant of the predestined actor model (Hopkins Burke, 2001) deviants are seen to be not only different from non deviants but in some way committed to an alternative ‘ethical’ code that makes involvement in deviant activity appear somewhat mandatory. While it is extremely likely that some young people, or police officers for that matter, are so strongly socialised into the mores of a particular world view – or mechanical solidarity - through membership of a particular ethnic group, the upbringing of their parents and the reinforcing influences of neighbourhood groups or gangs that they do not challenge this heritage in any way, it also likely that many others have less consistent socialisation experiences and have a far more tangential relationship to such deviant behaviour, although they may be at considerable risk of being drawn into a far deeper involvement.

We have twice above – in our discussion of the work of Durkheim and Merton – drawn attention to our methodological individualist reinterpretation of those significant sociologists whereby we recognise that human beings do have - albeit bounded - rational choices, but invariably in circumstances where their activities are constrained by sometimes considerable structural factors. It is the work of David Matza (1964) that provides both a complementary non determinist account but also an illuminating explanatory framework extremely useful for explaining peripheral commitment to hate crime motivation at the micro level and how this might – in the right enabling circumstances – develop into something more enduring.
David Matza, Delinquency and Drift

Matza (1964) significantly observed the inability of the overly-determinist US deviant subcultural tradition to explain why it is that most young offenders ‘grow out’ of offending behaviour. He proposed that offending behaviour is simply a status and delinquents are role players who intermittently act out a delinquent role. They simply ‘drift’ between deviant and conventional behaviour, are neither compelled nor committed to delinquent activity but freely choose it some times and not at others. Moreover, they can remain within the ‘subculture of delinquency’ – or we might speculate here, an enabling and legitimating hate crime discourse or micro mechanical solidarity -without actually taking part in offending behaviour. This thesis is clearly useful in helping to explain tangential, non-committed – or the simply growing out of - hate crime motivation.

Matza proposed that adolescent males go through three stages in a process of becoming deviant. The first stage is when he is in the company of other young males and where there appears to be an ‘ideology of delinquency’ implicit in their actions and remarks. In these circumstances he is motivated by his anxiety to be accepted as a member of the group and learn the ‘correct’ form of behaviour and attitudes necessary for acceptance. He therefore steals things, vandalises, hits people, racially abuses people not because he ‘really’ wants to but because he feels he ‘ought’ to and this apparently endears him to the group. What he fails to realise is that others in the group feel exactly the same as he does. It is when two or more young men confess to each other that they do not like this behaviour – and to do this, we might observe here, they have to non-conform to the values of the group (Merton) or challenge the moral boundaries of the collective conscience (Durkheim) - a particular

12 All the evidence suggests that the ‘growing up’ also means growing out of crime (Rutherford, 1992). Self-report studies show that anywhere between 50-90% of young people admit to having committed – albeit in most cases minor - criminal offences. A much smaller proportion of young people, somewhere between 3-4%, persist in – at least serious manifestations of - this behaviour into adulthood (Graham and Bowling, 1995; Hopkins Burke, 1999).
individual reaches a stage of development where he no-longer needs the status and security of the group and thus decides to cease involvement in such deviant activity.

The second stage occurs when other young males - having overcome their initial socialisation that has taught them not to be deviant\(^\text{13}\) - develop extenuating circumstances or ‘techniques of neutralisation’ to justify their deviant behaviour. Matza identifies five major types of neutralisation that we have here adapted to the hate crime motivation context:

- denial of responsibility (I didn’t really mean it);
- denial of injury (I didn’t really harm him, it was just a bit of harmless name-calling, he doesn’t really mind);
- denial of the victim (he deserved it, what are they doing over here anyway, this is our country);
- condemnation of the condemners (they come here take our houses, our jobs and our women); and
- appeals to higher loyalties (you’ve got to stand by your own kind, it’s us against them).

These techniques are excuses - and not explanations of deviant behaviour - and it is not difficult to envisage how these remarks might be made by social groups other than young working class males, although the neutralisation might be articulated rather differently. Thus, for example, the following hypothetical type of, rather all inclusive and somewhat ‘upmarket’, neutralisation might not be completely unfamiliar to some readers:

\(^{13}\) We might observe here the opposite, a possible socialised propensity to hate crime motivation learned from parents and significant others.
Well I know it is rather unpleasant and one doesn’t really like getting involved in these things, but they are different from us. They have a different way of life and it is not really what we want here. You really wouldn’t want your children to mix with them now would you! I don’t really approve of this sort of thing but something has to be done.

Matza argues that at a deeper level there is a commitment to ‘subterranean values’, which – like ‘focal concerns’ (Miller), conscience collective (Durkheim), or conformist values (Merton) – exist in the wider culture of normal society. While Matza emphasises the search for excitement that deviant behaviour brings it seems extremely likely that racist and sexual preference notions are commonplace in many local micro-mechanical solidarities and these are simply learned from parents and peers.

Matza provides a theoretical link with the social reaction or labelling theories that were at that time coming to the fore in the USA (see Lemert, 1951; Becker, 1963) and argues that the operation of the criminal justice system might actually convince young people that deviant behaviour does not really matter - even though they are punished or treated – and that they are quick to exploit this recognition in their own defence. We might observe that this process of self-justification in the hate motivation context can be reinforced further by those (and not always so subterranean) values to be found at the macro level. During the 1980s hooligan elements following English football teams in Europe - including the national team - were heavily involved in violence against overseas fans. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was virulently opposed to these actions and instigated a number of assertive measures. Many of the hooligans – noting both her enthusiasm for engaging in war against Argentina and verbal assaults on other countries in the European Union - nonetheless considered her to be secretly proud of them. Absurd as this viewpoint might seem it was given some credence by the
revelation that a - albeit idiosyncratic - government minister, Alan Clark, actually suggested that we should be proud of these young men fighting for their country (Williams, 1989).

For Matza, the third stage in a deviant career has now been reached. The young male is in a situation of ‘drift’. He knows what is required of him and has learned the techniques of neutralisation, which justify his deviant behaviour. On the other hand, he is not automatically committed to deviant behaviour but can choose to engage in it when he wishes. It is this recognition of ‘free-will’ that distinguishes Matza completely from those working in the determinist deviant subculture tradition. From this perspective, the deviant is responsible for his behaviour and – although he is well aware that what he is doing is contrary to the law – he persists in this behaviour.

Matza’s work explains the persistence of this behaviour in terms of the young person having acquired certain skills partly from his older friends and partly from the mass media, and particularly, in the contemporary situation, the Internet, which has made involvement in criminal behaviour possible, plus his ability to manage guilt in the way described above. It is at this stage – we propose - that the person, who does not have to be male, young or working class, is much more vulnerable to more than a merely tangential involvement with hate group activities. Having absorbed experiences and knowledge at each stage of their socialisation, from parents, friends and had these values reinforced by access to media - however self selecting this might be - provides the individual with choices which for them are very much rational. In a complementary study conducted for the British Home Office, Rae Sibbitt (1999) found that the views held by all kinds of race hate perpetrators are shared very much by the communities to which they belong. Perpetrators see this as legitimising their actions. In turn, the wider community not only spawn such perpetrators, but fails to condemn them
and actively reinforce their behaviour. It is this notion that hate crime perpetrators are very much part of their local micro subculture that is usefully informed by a later European anomie tradition.

**THE LATER RADICAL EUROPEAN TRADITION**

This later radical European tradition has identifiable foundations in both earlier anomie traditions and is particularly useful in helping explain the existence and persistence of often co-existing different hate crime motivations in complex contemporary fragmented communities. We commence with a discussion of the radical neo-Marxist sub-cultural theories formulated by the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (BCCCS).

*The Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies*

Neo-Marxist researchers working at the BCCCS during the 1970s (see Brake, 1985; P. Cohen, 1972; S. Cohen, 1973; Hebdige, 1976, 1979) observed that ‘spectacular’ youth sub-cultures - such as Teddy Boys, Mods, Skinheads and Punks - arise at particular historical 'moments' as cultural solutions to the same structural economic problems created by rapid social change identified by Durkheim – and Merton in a rather different way – as an anomic condition.

These researchers recognise that in contemporary societies the major cultural configurations – or we might observe, macro mechanical solidarities - are cultures based on social class, but within these larger entities are *sub*-cultures which are defined as ‘smaller, more localised and differentiated structures, within one or other of the larger cultural networks’ (Hall and Jefferson, 1976: 13). These sub-cultures have different focal concerns than the larger cultural
configuration from which it is derived but will share some common aspects or core values with the ‘parent culture’. Some, like deviant sub-cultures, are persistent features of the parent culture, but others appear only at certain historical moments; then fade away. These latter sub-cultures are highly visible and, indeed 'spectacular'. Although their members may well look very 'different' from their parents or peers, they will still share the same class position, the same life experiences, and generally the same worldview or core values of the parent culture. All they are doing, through their distinctive dress, life style, music etc., is producing a different cultural 'solution' to the problems posed for them by their material and social class position and experience. They are invariably articulating a contemporary variant of the parent culture that is in accord with their changed socio-economic circumstances.

The central concern of that collection of studies was to locate the historical and environmental context in which particular youth sub-cultures arose and the details of 'style' adopted by these. Central to their argument is the notion that style is a form of resistance to subordination which is essentially ritualistic, symbolic or magical as it is not, actually, a successful solution to the problem of subordination. Resistance is not a desperate 'lashing out' or a passive adaptation to an anomic situation of disjunction, but a collective response designed to resist or transform dominant values and defend or recapture working class or ethnic group values - to win space, to reclaim community and reassert traditional values. This resistance is nonetheless deemed to be symbolic rather than real.

Stan Cohen (1973) notes three contexts in which concepts of ritual, myth, metaphor, magic, and allegory are invoked. First, the target for attack is inappropriate or irrational in the sense of not being logically connected with the source of the problem. For example, we could argue that skinheads beating up Asian and Gay people are in reality reacting to other things,
such as, perceived threats to community, homogeneity, or traditional stereotypes of masculinity. Second, when the solution does not confront the real material basis of subordination and is not a genuinely political response, the activities are seen as merely – albeit violent - ‘gestures’. Third, when the sub-cultural style denotes something beyond its surface appearance, for example, the boots worn by Skinheads, the young people are making oblique coded statements about their relationships to a particular – in that example, white working class - past or present.

The BCCCS researchers focused on two broad but overlapping areas: mainstream youth and delinquency, especially the transition from school to work and expressive or spectacular youth sub-cultures. The two major studies of mainstream youth sub-cultures are those of Willis (1977) and Corrigan (1979) and both are concerned with the transition from school to work among urban lower working-class adolescent boys. Their 'problem' is an alien or irrelevant education system followed by the prospect of a boring and dead end job (or, nowadays, training and the benefits queue, see Hopkins Burke, 1999) and the 'solution' is a 'culture of resistance' manifested in truancy and petty offending. Actions are ritualistic (or magical) but they can never solve the problem. Spectacular’ youth sub-cultures involve the adoption, by young people of both sexes of a distinctive style of dress and way of using material artefacts combined, usually, with distinctive life-styles, behaviour patterns and musical preferences. Both variants of subculture invariably involve a contemporary manifestation of parent culture values – or in the context of this paper, hate motivations – that have been adapted to the changed socio-economic circumstances in which the group finds itself.
Later researchers have considered the co-existence of different subcultures with their foundations in the same parent culture – or macro mechanical solidarity – at a time of increased social fragmentation which some social scientists have come to term the postmodern condition.

*Sub-cultures and the Postmodern Condition*

The CCCS studies represented an important development of the earlier deviant subcultural tradition - which had recognised that deviance often occurs in response to economic or status deprivation – and identified that particular sub-cultures or status groups have arisen in response to the perceived economic problems of distinct groups. Hopkins Burke and Sunley (1996, 1998) observe, however, that these studies presume a linear development of history where different sub-cultures arise, coalesce, fade and are replaced as economic circumstances change. For example, the 'Mods' were a product of the upwardly mobile working-classes during the optimistic 1960s (Hebdige, 1976; 1979; Brake, 1980), whereas the Punks were a product of the ‘dole-queue’ despondency of the late-1970s (Hebdige, 1979; Brake, 1980; 1985). More recently the co-existence of a number of different sub-cultures expressing rather different worldviews has been identified.

Hopkins Burke and Sunley (1996, 1998) propose this co-existence to be the outcome of a fragmented society where specific groups of young people have coalesced to create solutions to their specific socio-economic problems. Central to this account is the possibility of choice. The simultaneous existence of different sub-cultures enables some young people to *choose* the solution to their problem from the various sub-cultures available although that choice will undoubtedly be constrained by structural factors.
The early deviant sub-cultural studies - and indeed the work of the Birmingham School - tended to suggest that young people had limited choices, if any, between the sub-culture in existence at a particular time and in that geographical space, and a life of conventionality. A postmodernist interpretation of youth subcultures enables us to recognise that individuals, and different groups of young people, not all members of the traditional working-class but in existence concurrently at the same historical moment, have had very different experiences of the radical economic change that has engulfed British society since the late 1970s. These very different groups have developed their own sub-cultural solutions for coping with this transformation.

Hopkins Burke and Sunley (1996, 1998) observe a wide variety of youth sub-cultures in existence in Britain in the 1990s. Two of those subcultures particularly relevant to our discussion of hate crime motivation are football hooligans and the ‘new racists’. Football hooliganism – as observed above - has been a serious issue since the 1970s when virtually every professional football match played in Britain was marred by crowd disorder and violence. Since the publication of the Taylor Report in 1990 there has been nonetheless a substantial reduction in the size and nature of the phenomenon with an increasing transition from a predominantly mass male white working-class spectator sport to a predominantly affluent middle-class family-based spectatorate watching working-class gladiators; mirroring developments in professional sport in the USA (see Carver et al., 1995).

Sporadic acts of violence continue at professional football matches, and rather more incidents occur away from the actual stadiums where the policing of large numbers of people

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14 This is not to say that other sub-cultural configurations do not share worldviews that make them highly susceptible to hate crime motivation. Hopkins Burke and Sunley (1996, 1998) observe that very different subcultural ‘solutions’ can be categorised in two broad distinctive strands. The first strand involves a nostalgic look backward to times past when a romanticised and caricatured white working-class took pride in its place in a GREAT Britain and follows in the tradition established by Teddy Boys in the 1950s (Jefferson, 1976) and Skinheads in the 1970s (Hebdige, 1979). The second strand involves a look forward and discussions of environmental issues and gender politics. Many interesting coalitions have developed between different sub-cultural groupings, but in general these can be located in the context of one of the two broader strands.
is far more problematic. Nonetheless, all the evidence points to a substantial decrease in the numbers involved. At the same time, there has been a quantitative decline there has been an increase in the qualitative seriousness of the phenomenon. Football grounds became popular recruiting grounds for far-right political groups such as the British National Party (BNP) who have become popular with disaffected working-class youngsters who have clung tenaciously to their traditions in the face of spiralling costs. It is ironic that the gentrification of professional football has alienated many of its traditional fan-base with some subsequently attracted to the simplistic political solutions of the far-right (Williams, 1992; Anti-Fascist Action, 1994; Carver et al., 1995).

In recent years there has been a more general revival of interest in extreme right-wing political parties among the working class in poor inner-city areas. Racism has long been a popular ingredient of particular sub-cultures, for example, Teddy Boys (Jefferson 1976) and Skinheads (Hebdige 1979). Indeed, it would be reasonable to suggest that the 'new racists' are merely a contemporary political manifestation of these groups. The success of the ultra-right British National Party in 1993 in winning a seat on Tower Hamlets Council, an area of extreme social deprivation with a large ethnic minority population, alerted us to a new manifestation of an old racist problem (Campaign Against Racism and Fascism, 1993). Evidence suggests that many people in the area saw their problem as being their inability to gain access to local authority housing in an area where their families had lived for generations. Perceiving groups of relatively recent immigrants from ethnic minority backgrounds to be favoured by the local Labour controlled council, they considered the solution to their problem to be support for a political party which would put the interests of indigenous white people first (Hopkins Burke and Sunley, 1998)
The 'new fascists' are, however, a widespread phenomenon not merely restricted to run-down inner city areas with large influxes of non-white immigrants or for that matter young people. Close links with the football hooliganism sub-culture were observed above and this pattern of recruitment is widespread both internally to Britain but also on an international level. There is also evidence, however, that the new fascism is gaining recruits from areas not normally associated with overt and organised racism. For example, the British National Party has moved the centre of its operations to rural central England and has been particularly successful in recruiting among young males traditionally associated with the highly organised left-wing trade union dominated coal mining industry damaged to the point of non-existence as an outcome of Conservative government policies during the 1980s. More recently, race riots occurred in the old mill-towns of Oldham and Burnley in Lancashire following the election of BNP councillors in Lancashire in recent years. 15

It nevertheless seems most unlikely that the new fascism or racism has emerged and taken root in a previously unwelcoming cultural environment. Working-class communities with high levels of trade union membership have never been the bastions of anti-racism that their more radical activists might like to suggest. Word of mouth and the evidence of our own eyes suggest that many of these communities have long been seriously unwelcoming environments for non-white non-heterosexuals. The reality appears that the contemporary fragmented social world has brought into contact invariably through interdependent necessity a whole range of groups with different origins and values, even though many of these might be objectively termed working class. The power structure within those configurations also appears complex and not easily explained by more traditional structural conceptions of power.

15 In 2001, the BNP had electoral success in Lancashire, winning one seat in Blackburn and three in Burnley. In 2003, it had further success, winning a seat in Calderdale, West Yorkshire (BBC News, 2003).
A Post-Structuralist Conception of Power

Central to our discussion is a poststructuralist conceptualism of power strongly influenced by the work of the French philosopher Michel Foucault. Structuralists had focused their attention on the issue of sovereignty and the legitimacy of power, which they saw as a means for enhancing the capacities of those who generally possess authority, and who are able to impose it upon other persons to infringe their freedoms and choice (Hindess: 1996). From that perspective, power is distributed by a sovereign body as a judicial mechanism to limit and forbid. The powerlessness of ethnic minorities is an obvious characteristic of racism and historically the opportunities of minority groups have been limited in terms of social, economic, and political power. Perry (2001) observing this point in the context of the USA cites Clarke (1969):

...invisible walls have been erected by those in the white society who have power; both to confine those who have no power and to perpetuate the powerless. In addition, to the economic and social powerlessness imposed on minority groups, the United States Government has historically imposed political powerlessness upon them by enforcing restrictions on their citizenship and its corresponding rights. This denial of rights includes limiting their right to free speech, political participation, and their freedom of expression.

Foucault (1980) in contrast argues that power is not simply the privilege of the state and - we might observe here - dominant macro groups. On the contrary, strategies – and again we might observe, relationships - of power are pervasive throughout society and the state is only one location of the points of control and resistance. Foucault (1971, 1976) argues that,
particular areas of social life - for example, medicine, law, sexuality – have been colonised and defined by the norms and control strategies through which a variety of institutions and experts devise and abide. These networks of power and control operate at all levels – macro, mezzo and micro – of the social world and are governed as much by the knowledge and concepts that define them as by any definite intentions of powerful groups at the very highest level in society.

The state, for its part, is implicated in this matrix of power-knowledge, but this is only part of it, for in this vein, it has been argued that within civic society there are numerous ‘semi-autonomous’ realms and relationship - such as communities, occupations, organisations, families and personal relationships - where certain kinds of ‘policing’ and ‘order’ are indeed present, but where the official agents of the state administration and are technically absent. These semi-autonomous arenas within society are often appropriately negotiated and resisted by their participants in ways that even now, the state has little or no jurisdiction.

Thus, from this post-structuralist perspective power in a complex fragmented society exists at all levels of the social world with there being a multitude of possibilities as to who actually possesses - and who is possessed - by power in these arrangements. Thus, while men can have power over women, white people over ethnic minorities, and heterosexuals over gays; the situation nonetheless becomes infinitely more complex. Strong men can have power over weak men, strong women over weak women and weak men. Black men can have power over white women, strong gay men over weak heterosexual men. The possibilities are endless – and we might here note the Ali G. syndrome where some white and south Asian working class males impersonate black sub-cultural icons to the point of invariably non-self conscious caricature - but the crucial word in the previous sentence is can for such power relations only.

16 Ali G is a comedy character - created by Sasha Baron Cohen – which rather lampoons this tendency of certain white males to dress like Black gangstas and talk in patois. See: www.aligindahouse.msn.co.uk and Cohen, (2001).
develop when appropriate enabling socio-economic circumstances arise which provide that window of opportunity. Hate groups at the mezzo and micro levels in society can take advantage of opportunities that come their way and from which they can gain advantage and therefore such groups normally considered to be powerless can gain – albeit limited and localised – power over other groups who are even less powerful, as the example of BNP electoral success demonstrates. Nonetheless, this power can become potentially more generalised than that particular example suggests and central to that possibility - in the diverse, fragmented world of micro and mezzo mechanical solidarities - is the considerable enabling power of contemporary global communication systems. For who living in London and South East England in 1969 would have thought that the very localised sub-cultural grouping of the time, the ‘skinheads’ with their adherence to a fast declining way of very English semi-and-non-skilled working class life (see Cohen, 1972) and a hatred of ‘alien’ groups of non-white immigrants would have come to have such an important influence on race hate groups throughout the developed world (see Perry, 2001)? The contemporary communications revolution is very much central to these developments.

The Dissemination of Hate and the Communications Revolution

It is by forming associations with other like-minded individuals, that disseminators of hate material can absorb themselves in a world consisting of numerable ‘definitions’ of why it is appropriate to act in the way they do. Contemporary communication innovations – in particular, the near universality of the world-wide web – have considerably enhanced the ability of individuals to form associations over vast distances at times of their choice. The ease at which hate groups can be found ‘on-line’ (see Sutton, 2002) enables numerous individuals to encounter, and obtain personal contact with groups that may encourage, stimulate and substantiate what at the time of access are merely transient and poorly thought
out ‘hate’ notions. In this way the individual can become embroiled in the machinery of hate group ideology.

Marshall McLuhan (1964: 5) observed during the early 1960s a new era of television global communication which he considered an ‘extension of man’ and - although even he could not anticipate the possibilities offered forty years later by the virtual universality of the Internet - many of the concerns he volunteered about this development at the time are as pertinent now as they were then. In particular, there is the recognition that the growth of electronic technology ‘alters the position of the negro and other social groups, whilst some groups can no longer be contained’ (ibid). The break out from the ghetto of their localised micro-but-invariably-ultra-mechanical solidarities has been immensely enhanced by the enabling possibilities of the world-wide-web. Quite simply, any little group of racists with the most odious views imaginable can bring themselves to the attention of like-minded others anywhere on the planet by posting a web presence on the Internet. Bigger more established hate groups can bring themselves to the attention to a wider global audience and the possibility arises of coalitions between such groups. Certainly, since the 1990s, white supremacist groups such as the Ku Klux Klan, White Aryan Resistance (in the USA), and the British National Party (Britain) have consolidated web sites and newsgroups as a permanent feature of their regimes (Back, 2001).

The increasing popularity of personal computers and increasing competitiveness of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) has greatly facilitated the virtual universality of the medium by the provision of cheap, affordable access available anonymously from the comfort and security of your home. All of this enables the formation of a ‘cyber-sub-culture’ that has many similarities to those discussed above but also with crucial differences. First, there is the
possibility of gaining support from a much wider socio-economic base in cyberspace than in
real-space. Thus, membership of a cyber-subculture does not necessarily constitute the
archetypal racist or working class subculture member. For example, Richard Miles, who
played a leading role - and carried out hate activities - in many white supremacist groups,
including the Ku Klux Clan, was a middle-manager in an insurance company and Richard
Girnt–Butler, a recent leader of Aryan Nations was an aerospace engineer. (Jones: 1998).
Second, the Internet dissolves barriers of distance that formerly kept like-minded persons
apart and allows the individual to develop a sense of intimacy with - and become involved in
– what we have termed a subculture from a distance. At the same time, a non physical
presence in cyberspace might well reduce any apprehension individuals might have in taking
part in the group. It is possible that some individuals attracted to these websites are willing
participants in these groups at this level but have no wish to become more actively involved
in the physical world. On the other hand, it seems extremely likely that the converse is true
and that many individuals who previously had no access to an illegitimate opportunity
structure (Cloward and Ohlin, 1961) are now offered one by the Internet and can now
overcome their initial anxieties by being gently absorbed into the cyber world and
progressively gaining more confidence and moving forward with their new found associates
towards becoming actually physically involved in hate group activities; a process of deviant
subculture formation that has resonance with both the early US and later European traditions.

Pease (2001) notes that technological developments always lead to new innovations in
criminal activity and observes that the Internet has changed crime in two distinct ways. First,
it has facilitated the commission of new crimes, and second, facilitated new ways of
committing old crimes. Thus, previously localised hate groups have been able to widen their
recruitment, membership, develop and dissimilate hate materials in a far more sophisticated
fashion. With technical development in crime commission, have come nonetheless more sophisticated ways of detection, including such measures as psychological profiling that aid the police in their hunt for perpetrators of, usually very serious crime. Identifying and apprehending offenders of on-line hate crime is nonetheless problematic in the cyber-world where offences can all be committed anonymously without fear of identification and apprehension. Hate crime is increasingly likely to occur in places of privilege, such as school or work. Perpetrators come from all social classes and are not the stereotypical uneducated, unemployed criminally motivated person well-known to police investigation or for that matter the stereotypical skinhead racist with Nazi tattoos. Back (2001) argues that ‘to investigate hate on the net, you must combine the skills of a detective, a lie detector, and propaganda code breaker’. He further emphasises the difficulties that Internet criminality poses by admitting that much detection is achieved by educated guess work. We argue that having a sophisticated understanding of hate crime motivation at all levels of the social world is a indispensable aid to that process.

CONCLUSION

This paper has been founded on the central contention that hate thought, at the very least, is perfectly normal and unremarkable - if undesirable - in our society as currently constituted. The extended discussion of sociologically informed criminological theories goes someway to helping us understand the existence, transmission and continuance of hate thought at the macro, mezzo and micro levels of society and how people might – usually with the assistance and support of others – come to transform these latent motivations into extremely unpleasant actual actions. While legislative interventions have been undoubtedly successful to some extent in both punishing offenders and deterring other latent hate crime motivated individuals, and while there will be undoubtedly a never ending supply of increasingly
sophisticated – and inevitably expensive - technological situationalist solutions to the problems posed by actualised motivated perpetrators (with the probably unintended but very real consequences of increasing restrictions on all our freedoms) it seems that these measures will never successfully eradicate the widespread existence of hate motivation that is embedded in the dominant culture (or macro mechanical solidarities) of our society; that is, mediated, refined and given legitimacy by institutions where racism may well be endemic (mezzo mechanical solidarities); and mutated and adapted to contemporary socio-economic conditions through different subcultures or localised groupings (micro mechanical solidarities). The cultural aggregate of the transmission of hate ideologies at these three societal levels provides a not inconsiderable legitimate basis for individuals from all social backgrounds to neutralise any hate motivations or actions they may have. The pervasive existence and persistence of these motivations provides a powerful justification for a comprehensive educative social intervention at all levels of the social world. What is undoubtedly required is the political will to tackle this highly significant issue. It is surely the task of hate crime researchers to ally themselves with campaign groups and activists to ensure that incidences of hate motivation and action are detected, documented and brought to the attention of government so to aid that campaign.
REFERENCES


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