From Spring to Summer?
Revolutionary Change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya

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Abstract: This article offers an analysis of the early stages of the revolutions that have been taking place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. Here we consider the early stages of the revolutions from winter 2010-11 up until the summer of 2012 and offers a comparative study of the experiences of the early stage of the revolutions in each case study. In particular this study considers the roles of six variables on the process of regime change and transition as follows: 1) duration of the uprising up to regime change; 2) the initial outcome of the revolution/uprising; 3) the number of deaths and casualties; 4) the post-regime change status of key members of the former governing elite; 5) the existence and nature of post-regime change elections; and 6) levels of international involvement. This study finds that in all three case studies, considering these variables offers insight into the nature and effect of the early stages of the revolutions. Furthermore, in each case there are key similarities in some of these variables but significant differences in others which suggest that the processes of transition are not directly comparable with each other. This article also offers some thoughts on how the early stages of these revolutions could affect the direction and pace of change in each state.

Keywords: Democratizations, Regime Change, Arab Spring, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya

Introduction

The Arab Spring (as the revolutions taking place across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have come to be known) has significantly altered the political and economic landscape of the region and has already

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had ramifications for international relations more broadly. It has been argued (Steinem et al, 2012; Manhire, 2012) that these changes represent the most dramatic geo-political development since the 1989-91 period. This article investigates the nature of the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya from their start to summer 2012 and considers the similarities and differences between them. We consider the early stages of these revolutions as running from winter 2010-11 at the start of the popular uprisings (varying but close dates for each case) up until the summer of 2012. Our three case studies and the period of time considered have been chosen for a number of reasons. Primary among them is that Tunisia, Egypt and Libya were the first states in the region to experience sustained revolutions. Secondly, they were the first states to have experienced regime change as part of the Arab Spring. Thirdly, these three states have progressed farther down the line of political and economic transition than any other state in the region experiencing the Arab Spring. The period of study has been chosen due to the existence of key processes including: mass uprising, confrontation, regime change, transitional government, democratic procedures (in particular elections), and public discourse and response vis-à-vis the transitional process.

To address the aims this article analyses the roles of six key variables on the revolutionary process and compares them for each state up to the summer 2012 (what we identify as the early stage of these revolutions) as follows: 1) duration of the uprising up to regime change; 2) the initial outcome of the revolution/uprising; 3) the number of deaths and casualties; 4) the post-regime change status of key members of the former governing elite; 5) the existence and nature of post-regime change elections; and 6) levels of international involvement.

**Analyzing ‘Governance’ in the Middle East and North Africa**

The literature on democracy and authoritarianism in the MENA region is quite extensive in terms of the quantity of monographs, refereed journal articles, reports and other research outputs. However, there are a limited number of over-arching themes that are engaged with and drawn upon. There are also significant limitations with regards to the range of questions that get asked, with a traditional focus on western-centric interests. These
realities represent a problem for the analysis of governance in the MENA region and revolutionary change, especially in the current environment.

Raymond Hinnebusch (2006: 373-395) offers a useful overview of the dominant themes (but does not aim to break from them entirely) and provides us with a useful starting point to present a more eclectic analysis. Among the most widely explored themes are those which we can term *culture-specific*, namely, discussions of the role of Islam (and other MENA religions to some extent) and ethnicity (primarily Arab and Persian but also others including Kurdish, Berber and Turkomen) in the forms of governance witnessed in the region. Bernard Lewis (2003: 208-219), Samuel Huntington (1984: 193-218), Thomas Friedman (for a useful discussion see Fernandez, 2011), and Elie Kedourie (1992) have discussed forms of governance in the MENA region predominantly through the culture-specific lens and their works have been influential in some parts of the academic and policy-making communities in the West. The general arguments and conclusions that these and other scholars make are often very similar and hinge on the beliefs that Islam (and other MENA religions) and ethnicity (predominantly Arab and Persian, which get used interchangeably) determine what form of governance a state/community has. Bernard Lewis in particular has long been an advocate of the argument that Islam is more of a political ideology than a religion and that it is an ideology which is inherently incompatible with democracy (which he assumes to be one thing for the entire world over: Western democracy (Lewis, 2003)). At the same time Ellie Kedourie has focused on Arab culture as being one supportive of patriarchy, paternalism, and autocratic rule (Kedourie, 1992). Again, the assumption here is that all Arabs, just as all Muslims for Lewis, are the same and represent one monolithic and unitary community. This approach is something we hold to be not only grossly incorrect but also harmfully misleading. As Katerina Dalacoura (2012: 63-79) argues, thinking of the *Arab world* as one unitary block and thinking of an *Arab* event or process can ‘constitute a set of blinkers’ (ibid: 63).

A second theme in the literature that reinforces this culture-specific one is a historicism. This is the belief that the history for the MENA region is static and unchanging in so far as one can examine a series of events, processes and structures from one era, say 1000C.E., and find general laws ap-
Applicable to the region today. Samuel Huntington adopts this theme to support his understanding of international relations as being characterised by a balancing act between different religio-cultural groups (1996). These scholars have been critiqued in detail elsewhere (See: Hinnebusch, 2006; El Badawi and Makdisi, 2011) and are often seen as overly subjective in their treatment of the MENA region in general. However, they are not the only ones who have adopted a culture-specific and ahistorical approach to understanding governance in the MENA region. Even scholars who are more objective in their analyses or who are subjective, but offer a measure of respectful understanding of and interest in the MENA region and the people who reside there often add to the literature that uses these two themes. Amaney Jamal (2006: 51-63), for example, has written about the relationship between Islam and governance as well as on perceptions of and support for democracy in Islam. Jamal’s work offers a more balanced and effective analysis of the dynamic and varied nature of Islam and how it can influence political discourse (and when it does not), but at the same time and perhaps in response to those more critical of Islam’s influence, Jamal still engages with a culture-specific (but not ahistorical) approach. In parts of Overstating the Arab State Nazih Ayubi (1995: 399) also engages with this debate, highlighting that within Islam (and other monotheistic religions) there are many interpretations, practices and discursive elements which encourage mass engagement with politics and representative government, such as *ijtihad* (interpretive judgement), *ijma* (consensus) and *shura* (consultation). While directly challenging the arguments of Lewis, Huntington, Kedourie, Friedman and others, Ayubi nonetheless still approaches governance in the MENA region by drawing on a culture-specific epistemology. Fadia Faqir (1997: 165-174), Tariq Ismael and Jacqueline Ismael (2011), Sami Baroudi (2004: 132-141), and Muqtader Khan (2005) have all offered coherent analyses that focus on religion and/or ethnicity and governance. The culture-specific theme has been dominant in discussions of governance in the MENA region. At the same time, however, there are alternative themes which are also important in this area of study and can offer more convincing analyses.

Analyses which consider aspects of political economy offer another type of approach to understanding and explaining forms of governance and tend
not to engage with culture-specific themes and are not ahistorical in approach. While discussing Islam and politics, Jamal (2005: 545-547), for example, has also explored the relationship between economic reform and democratisation in the Arab world, concluding that economic and political reform are essential pre-requisites. On the other hand Samih Farsoun and Christina Zacharia (1995) offer a discussion outlining the ways in which liberal economic reform does not necessarily lead to democracy in the short term, but may in fact reinforce authoritarianism. Elsewhere, Burhan Ghalioun (2004: 126-132) has argued that some governments in the MENA region (for example, in Tunisia and Egypt) have reneged on the state-society social contracts established in the first post-independence decades, by adopting IMF-inspired structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) and neoliberal economic reform, thus reducing their national legitimacy and limiting their ability to democratise.

As has been demonstrated throughout the experiences of the Arab Spring, media technologies such as satellite TV, the internet and mobile communications devices are increasingly important as tools to be used in political reform. Lawrence Pintak (2008) offers a good discussion of how the changing political economy of these tools is having a significant impact on opening up space for political discourse. Pintak argues that ownership structures are highly significant here. One compelling study by Ibrahim El Badawi and Samir Makdisi (2007: 813-831) concludes that the political economy of hydrocarbons and conflicts in the region represent a ‘dummy’ effect which is unique to the region in terms of how it impacts patterns of governance. They argue that it is these factors that determine forms of governance in the MENA and not religion or other cultural phenomena. The existence of effective state services, the rule of law, economically dynamic middle classes, high levels of literacy and educational enrolment have also been seen as key features of the region’s political economy that need to be realised in order for representative government to be established (2008: 151-160).

The Framework of Analysis

In some respects we can find faults with the key elements of the political economy theme as well as with the culture-specific and ahistorical ap-
approaches in discussions of governance in the MENA region. Nevertheless, it is not within the remit of this study to engage with these debates further. We will simply acknowledge their dominance in the existing literature and move on to outlining the theoretical and methodological approach used in this study, which reflects closely a political economy approach but differs from existing analyses in the key political, economic and security variables we consider. Here we do not seek to provide a generalised model that can be applied to all states and communities in the MENA region (something that the culture-specific approach tends to do). Instead we find more merit in considering each state as different and as having some specific historical processes of social, political and economic change, and unique security and international relationships, while at the same time sharing some similarities: the analysis presents a set of questions that can be applied to other cases of revolutionary change in the MENA region.

As a key starting point, we adopt Hinnebusch’s (2006) understanding of the potential for post-authoritarian politics in the MENA region. This model suggests that there are two possible paths towards democratisation in the region. Firstly, if authoritarian governments can ‘deliver increased rule of law, better regulatory frameworks, educational reforms and merit-based recruitment to the bureaucracy, they will precipitate the investment and economic growth needed to expand the middle class, civil society and an independent bourgeoisie’ (ibid: 391-392) necessary for democracy to take root. Outside of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), governments have thus far been largely unable to provide any of these things and the Arab Spring has demonstrated that time is likely up for this path to democracy to materialise. This leads us to the second potential path to representative government: regime change/collapse could provide the setting for cross-society coordination and participation in politics – but this needs to be a domestic process without significant involvement by external actors (ibid: 392). Underlying both of these possibilities is the political economy of employment, poverty reduction and economic advancement.

The Polity IV method is the most widely used method to identify levels of democratic governance and while it has some short-comings it is the most effective approach and we draw upon its definitions of democracy and
authoritarianism here. Media analysis is used to further our understanding of the process of revolution in the early stage. It is worth highlighting again here the variables that have been studied as for each of the three case studies. These are: 1) duration of the uprising up to regime change, 2) initial outcome (with three possibilities – revolutionary/rebel victory and successful un-negotiated regime change, a negotiated settlement for the regime to remain but reform, a negotiated regime change, and finally governmental victory and maintenance of the status quo), 3) number of deaths and casualties, 4) post-regime change status of members of the former governing elite, 5) elections, and 6) international involvement (ranging from low levels (international media coverage, diplomatic activity and so on) to high levels (external military involvement) and where greater international involvement can complicate the processes of change unfolding). We now turn to a more detailed discussion of these variables.

Wagner (1993) claims that the duration of uprisings and civil conflicts is largely determined by whether one side is able to achieve a decisive political and/or military victory and/or the willingness of all parties to negotiate a settlement. On the other hand Cunningham (2010: 116) echoes these claims but in addition suggests that external intervention also has an impact on the length of uprisings and civil wars. We posit that the amount of time taken to achieve regime change directly affects the ability of the new regime, and civil society and political actors to provide the public goods and services required for a stable and efficient move to democracy. If the process of regime change takes longer the resulting disruption to the operations of government and other public, civil society and economic actors will increase, negatively impacting the ability of these actors to support the democratisation process. The initial outcome of any uprising or civil conflict has perhaps the most immediate impact on the potential for democratic change. Here, the existing authoritarian regime must be either removed from power or compelled to irreversibly commit to rapid democratic reform in order for democratisation to occur. Governmental victory in suppressing any revolutionary movement will result in continued authoritarian rule. At the same time a negotiated regime change has the potential to facilitate democratisation but is likely to result in the maintenance of the status quo in
the medium- to long-term due to significant elements of the former regime remaining in post/positions of power and influence.

There is a direct (and negative) correlation between the number of deaths and casualties caused during the early stages of revolutions and civil conflicts and future reconciliation, whether regime change occurs or not. A greater number of deaths and casualties (in absolute terms when comparing cases), as well as overall destruction of property and infrastructure, leads to divisions within society, an inability of the judicial system (both domestic and international) to investigate and conclude criminal cases, high financial costs to the public and private sectors, and social feuds. Combined, these pose challenges to democratic change as this relies on national coordination, reconciliation and socio-economic normalisation.

With regards to the fourth variable, the accountability of the former governing elite (for corruption, police brutality, lack of transparency and openness, political censorship, electoral fraud, high levels of poverty and unemployment, as well as a lack of social welfare) was in many ways the key factor driving these revolutions. As such, the status of the former ruling elite is very important for the continued transition towards democracy. The ability of the former governing elite to promote counter-revolutionary interests is also very important. The continued existence of old-guard actors in positions of power (or with access to those in power) and who maintain their political and economic interests and relationships pose serious challenges to transitions away from the previous regime. Revolutions which take place in opposition to authoritarian governments, such as the Arab Spring revolutions, take place in order to replace the existing regime with a fairer and more representative one. Elections represent the most important and overt element of democratic governance and the ability of post-regime change governments to legislate, organise and conduct fair and transparent electoral processes is very important in satisfying the demands of the masses. Elections, therefore, represent key indicators of a government’s progress in democratising.

There are two main ways in which external actors can intervene in any domestic revolution or civil conflict: firstly, they can intervene diplomatically to facilitate negotiations between the domestic actors in order to normalise the situation. Secondly, external actors can militarily intervene (in
particular in the case of civil conflicts by providing military and economic support for one side or another (or perhaps covertly to both) (ibid). Much literature on civil conflicts suggests that external interventions are important in affecting the outcome of the domestic processes of change taking place. El Badawi and Sambanis (2000: 244-269), and Reagan (2002: 55-73) demonstrate that external interventions directly affect the duration and eventual outcome of civil wars and civil uprisings. Direct military intervention on behalf of the weaker group in any civil war tends to prolong the conflict due to an approach to parity in the domestic balance of power. This is usually then followed by an imbalance and subsequent victory for one side over time. At the same time military involvement is not the only important form of international relationship that is important. Post-regime change processes of democratisation can be helped by transparent and unbiased international involvement. For example, in helping to organise elections, providing financial assistance to the government to help provide public goods and services, and help in reconstruction efforts where needed. However, where external involvement is intense and embedded in domestic political and economic processes the pace of change is likely to be slowed. We now explore the nature and impact of these variables in the early revolutionary stages in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya.

**Revolution, Regime Change and Political Transition in Tunisia**

The catalyst of the broader region-wide process commonly referred to as the Arab Spring began in Tunisia which was the first state in the MENA region to experience a campaign of civil resistance and regime change. The events leading up to the self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi in the small central town of Sidi Bouzid have been recounted in detail elsewhere (See: West, 2011; Dabashi, 2012; Noueihed and Warren, 2012) and will not be done so again here. But suffice it to recount that this event occurred on December 17, 2010 and by the following day significant protests had started in Sidi Bouzid. Heavy-handed governmental repression of the peaceful protests that began on December 18, 2010 and wide-spread police brutality helped to encourage protests and civil resistance across Tunisia in the following weeks with protests and strikes reaching Tunis by December 27,
2010. By the start of January 2011 wide-spread strikes by worker’s unions across the country had begun. For example, on January 6, 2011 the chairman of the national bar association announced that virtually all of Tunisia’s lawyers had gone on strike in protest to government repression of peaceful protests and more specifically the beating of lawyers during the preceding week. National teachers’ and other labour unions had joined the strike within days of this announcement.

As the protests progressed the governmental response was characterised by two over-arching features. The first was ever-intensifying police brutality and physical repression of protests. The second was half-hearted attempts at appeasing the demands of the protesters and the erection of a façade of promised reforms (ICG, 2011a: 3-5). These tactics would ultimately prove ineffective in stemming the revolutionary process and on January 14, 2011 President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali officially resigned after fleeing to Saudi Arabia (Al Jazeera, January 15 2011). But Ben Ali’s removal from power (the first such modern experience of a MENA dictator being removed from power by a civil movement) did not end the revolution. The motivating factors behind the revolution were much deeper than just the leadership of one man. Immediately following Ben Ali’s departure a caretaker government was installed and Fouad Mebazaa and Mohamed Ghannouchi were confirmed as President and Prime Minister respectively. However, the inclusion of Ghannouchi and other members of Ben Ali’s Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party as the majority in the new government reinforced the revolution as protesters called for the disbandment of the RCD and the removal of all RCD members from the government, as well as the holding of free and fair elections. Following further civil resistance, Prime Minister Ghannouchi removed all RCD members from the government and then resigned on February 27, 2011, and the RCD was dissolved on March 9, 2011 (see: Dabashi, 2012). The outcome of this revolution can be classified as the first of our four categories: revolutionary victory and un-negotiated regime change.

We can argue that the most important single mile-stone of the Arab Spring revolutions (but certainly not the only key event) is the removal of the incumbent leader. This took eighteen days in Tunisia but revolutionary
change continues at the time of writing. According to the most reliable governmental and media figures, the revolution resulted in approximately 220 deaths (mostly civilians) and over 500 casualties (again, mostly civilians) (Al Jazeera, January 23, 2011). These are relatively small figures for a revolution that resulted in regime change, especially when compared to the other two case studies. This would suggest that reconciliation within Tunisia in the post-regime change transition would not be as deeply affected as in Egypt or Libya as discussed below.

One of the key influences on post-regime change transition, as discussed above, is the status of the former governing elite. If this elite mostly maintains the same political and economic status and existing power relationships are preserved then the transition to a new system of governance will be negatively affected. There will also be the emergence of a counter-revolutionary movement. In the Tunisian case a significant amount of the core governing-elite left Tunisia all-together in the period up to summer 2012. Ben Ali and his closest relatives and aides fled to Saudi Arabia, France and other Euro-Med states taking with them vast amounts of money and resources (Byrne, 2012). On the other hand, a significant number of Ben Ali’s close friends and relatives were arrested in Tunisia (Chrisafis, 2011). On June 20, 2011 Ben Ali along with his wife were sentenced in absentia to 35 years in prison for money laundering, theft and unlawful possession of money and jewellery (Adetuniji, 2011). Interpol issued an arrest warrant for Ben Ali on January 28, 2011 and the Tunisian government asked the Saudi government to extradite Ben Ali to serve his prison sentence. However, neither effort has had any affect and is unlikely to in the future.

At the same time other former leading political and economic actors have also moved elsewhere, albeit perhaps only temporarily in some cases. By summer 2012 there were a significant number of former RCD members still in Tunisia but not all were politically active and those that were tended to be bureaucrats and technocrats as opposed to formerly central figures (ICG, 2012a: 1-38). Overall, the new government did not seek to investigate, arrest and/or put on trial former regime members with much haste for fear of destabilising the transition (ibid). This caused some tension between the new government and the public as many saw the failure to bring to justice those who
committed crimes against protesters during the revolution as a sign of continued impunity for such crimes (common under the Ben Ali regime) (ibid).

On October 23, 2011 national elections were held for the National Constituent Assembly (NCA). This body of 217 lawmakers was charged with re-writing the constitution and ushering in further democratic processes including further parliamentary elections once a new constitution was created (the initial timeframe given under the temporary legislation created to enable the election was one year, however, this was subsequently extended). These elections were widely acclaimed as transparent and fair by both Tunisian and international observers and commentators – over 10,000 Tunisian and 500 international observers witnessed the election. In the spring of 2011 political space was opened up and all formerly-banned political parties were legalised leading to almost 100 political parties emerging in the months up to the NCA elections. The main parties to emerge were Ennahda, the Congress for the Republic, the Progressive Democratic Front, and the Popular Petition for Freedom, Justice and Development. The formerly-banned, moderate Islamist party Ennahda won the October elections with 41% of the total vote and 89 out of the 217 seats in the NCA (Al Jazeera, October 26, 2011). Ennahda subsequently nominated Hamadi Jebali, its secretary-general, for the position of Prime Minister and this appointment was confirmed on December 14, 2011 by the NCA-elected President, Moncef Marzouki, of the CPR (BBC News, November 21, 2012). By summer 2012 the NCA had created a new constitution and was set announced new elections for parliament by the end of 2012.

During the early stages of the revolution international support for the civil movement came from both civil society and governments in the MENA region, Europe and beyond. However, there was not a significant level of overt international involvement leading up to the point of regime change (although rather ironically the French government did initially offer to send French paramilitary forces to help suppress the uprising (Samuel, 2011)). The regime change in Tunisia was mostly isolated from international influences and it was only by the late 2011 in the post-regime change phase that international financial, political and civil society relationships became more important.
Revolution, Regime Change and Political Transition in Egypt

While the revolution in Tunisia was in its early stages a civil movement for change emerged in Egypt, the second state in the region to experience the Arab Spring (with Yemen almost simultaneously experiencing the start of its revolution). As with the discussions of Tunisia’s revolution it is not necessary to revisit the events of the early stage of the revolution in Egypt in detail, rather it is necessary to highlight some of the key events and stages leading up to regime change and the subsequent transition period. The revolution started in earnest on January 25, 2011 in cities across Egypt with peaceful mass protests, demonstrations, civil disobedience, large scale labour strikes and the occupation of key locales like Cairo’s Tahrir Square continuing through February 2011. The government’s response was similar to that of Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia: heavy-handed suppression of peaceful demonstrations using the police and hired thugs, arbitrary arrests, detention and torture, and imposition of curfews as well as the enforcement of emergency laws (which having been in place since 1981 had been relaxed somewhat in more recent years) (Al Jazeera, January 25, 2011). The government also tried to appease the protest movement in much the same way as Ben Ali tried to do in Tunisia. But the Mubarak regime was unsuccessful in stemming the tide of public frustration and anger. The more the government responded with force while at the same time using the same language of democratisation and change that the protesters themselves were using, the more cynical and brutal the regime looked. The infamous battle of the camels in Tahrir Square on February 2, 2011 was seen as a particularly dramatic event and one that highlighted the nature of the regime and Mubarak’s apparent untrustworthiness.

Following several days of massive labour strikes which were organised by Egypt’s main trade and labour unions Hosni Mubarak was compelled to step down from the Presidency on February 11, 2011, just eighteen days after the protests started (compared to the 28 days it took for Ben Ali to flee Tunisia) (BBC News, February 12, 2011). His newly appointed Vice President Omar Suleiman also stepped down from his position (Mubarak had not appointed a Vice President since he took office until the uprising began,
wrongly believing this move would placate the protesters). Following his resignation, Muammar’s former ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), was dissolved and all its assets transferred to the state (BBC News, April 16, 2011). The parliament was also dissolved pending future democratic elections while the constitution was suspended pending the creation of a new one by a democratically elected national assembly. Furthermore, the hated State Security Investigations Service was disbanded and Mubarak and many of his former governing elite were investigated, arrested and in many cases put on trial. The military forces, through the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over the reins of power following Mubarak’s resignation (discussed more below).

Overall, the early stage of the revolution in Egypt led to a form of negotiated regime change with the military acting as the mediator, successor regime and then handing over to a transitional government. While the revolutionary movement required less time to bring down the Mubarak regime than it took in Tunisia to remove Ben Ali from power, the number of deaths and causalities was higher in Egypt with approximately 850 deaths and 6000 casualties (BBC News, April 19, 2011) up until Mubarak’s resignation and then several hundred in each category up until summer 2012 as the revolution continued in protest to the SCAF’s domination. One would expect that these higher numbers of deaths and casualties would have a negative influence on the transitional period and many in Egypt blamed the SCAF for failing to protect civilians adequately and as even being responsible for further deaths and casualties through 2011 and 2012 once it took power (BBC News, November 21, 2011).

Unlike the experience of Ben Ali’s former governing elite, the former governing elite from Mubarak’s regime largely remained in Egypt and some key individuals either were side-lined by the SCAF and the civil movements or were arrested and put on trial for various crimes relating to the government’s behaviour during the revolution for crimes dating back through Mubarak’s rule (BBC News, May 4, 2012). Ain the early stage of the revolution in Egypt, Mubarak himself had his assets frozen in late February 2011, was placed under arrest in mid-April 2011, was put on trial for complicity in the killing of protestors and for corruption, and was found
guilty for the former and sentenced to life in prison by late summer 2012. This trial began on August 3, 2011 when Mubarak, his two sons Gamal and Alaa, Mubarak’s Interior Minister Habib Al-Adly along with six of his top aides, were charged with pre-meditated murder (pertaining to the killing of protesters during the revolution), embezzlement and corruption. On June 2, 2012 Mubarak and Al-Adly were both sentenced to life in prison, but Mubarak’s sons and the six top security aides were acquitted (Al Jazeera, June 2, 2012). The trial was plagued by interruptions and seen to be weak overall with limited hard evidence presented, SCAF mismanagement and hesitation, and witnesses for the prosecution changing testimony once on the stand in favour of Mubarak’s defence. However, other top Mubarak era individuals were also investigated, charged, arrested and put on trial (mostly for corruption, embezzlement and bribery) from March 2011 onwards. These trials and hearings were managed more effectively than that of Mubarak and included the former secretary of the NDP for organisational affairs Ahmed Ezz, former Minister of Trade Rachid Mohammed Rachid and former Housing Minister Ahmed El Maghrabi (El-Nahhas, 2011). The process of investigating and trying former regime officials proceeded quite well and a higher proportion of cases were closed than in Tunisia. For example, Rachid was tried in absentia, found guilty of embezzlement and sentenced to five years in prison by late June 2011 (Al Jazeera, June 25, 2011).

Parliamentary elections were held in several rounds from late November 2011 until mid-January 2012. These served to appease some of the main concerns of the masses. These elections saw key changes to Mubarak era electoral legislation, allowing for two-thirds of the parliamentary seats to go to candidates (both independents and party members) elected by proportional representation and one third elected using the first-past-the-post method (subsequently amended by the SCAF). The minimum age of candidacy was lowered from 30 to 25. These changes were among the key demands made by many of the political parties that contested the elections and were authorised by the SCAF following months of debate and pressure. The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won 47.2% of the votes while the Salafist party Al-Nour won 24.7% resulting in the parliament being dominated by Islamists (Al-Ahram, 2012). However, on June
14, 2012 Egypt’s Supreme Court declared that the parliamentary elections had been carried out unconstitutionally as one third of the seats should have been reserved for independents but were actually contested by members of political parties (BBC News, June 14, 2012). Following the court’s announcement the SCAF declared the parliament to be unconstitutional and ordered its dissolution. All legislative powers, the responsibility to write the new constitution, control over the budget and autonomy in military matters, were seized by the SCAF (see: Al-Ahram, June 18, 2012; Al Jazeera, June 18, 2012) causing dismay across the political spectrum in Egypt with supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Nour, leftists, communists, various youth movements and others coordinating in their condemnation of this decision and demanding the parliament be restored.

Presidential elections were held on May 23-24, 2012 representing the first democratically contested presidential election in modern Egyptian history (the 2005 presidential election was officially contested but was characterised by fraud, governmental interference and other violations). Nine candidates were allowed to run in the election with three main competitors receiving most public support prior to the election. The first round of the election did not result in an out-right majority of 50% or more for any candidate. Former Mubarak-era Prime Minister, Ahmad Shafiq and Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohammed Morsi were the two leading candidates in the first round with approximately 24% and 26% of the votes respectively. Shafiq and Morsi faced each other in an election run-off which took place on June 16-17, 2012. The first round of the election was largely seen as transparent and fair although some irregularities were reported and several of the other candidates led by Hamdeen Sabahi called for a partial recount and the suspension of the second round run-off until allegations of vote-rigging could be answered. The run-off took place on time, however, and Ahmed Shafik was declared eligible following a decision by the constitutional court which was considering the constitutionality of an earlier parliamentary decree barring any Mubarak-era officials from office. On June 24, 2012 the electoral commission declared Morsi the winner of the run-off with 51.85% of the vote (BBC News, June 25, 2012). Since assuming power the SCAF repeatedly declared that it would hand over power to a democratically
elected civilian government once the presidential elections had been held and a new government formed (Al Ghad, 2012) and it was amongst the first to issue a statement congratulating Morsi on his victory. It had fully handed over power to the civilian government by late summer 2012.

During the 18 days of protest and uprising that toppled the Mubarak regime the international community remained largely excluded from what was happening inside Egypt. From Arab League states to the European Union, the United Nations and the United States, external actors were left several steps behind as they tried to understand what was happening in Egypt and what would happen to their allies there (ICG, 2011b). The United States limited its public statements to urging both the Egyptian government and the protesters to refrain from violence and to engage in dialogue. Washington remained wary of the outcome of the uprising and it seemed above all to not want to see an unstable and/or anti-west regime emerge there. Leaders in both Washington and European capitals were largely caught off-guard by the events in Egypt and the disparity in their statements from one day to the next suggests that their need to address different constituencies at home and internationally limited their ability to influence the events in Egypt (ibid, p. 26). Above all it was perhaps Washington’s close relationship with the Mubarak regime that restricted its agency in Egypt. Unable to put too much pressure on Mubarak for fear of being seen to overtly suppress democracy (which the United States has long professed it seeks to support (see: Brinkley, 1997: 110-127; Cox et al, 2000)) and thus increase the resentment and dislike that many Egyptians already feel for US policy, while at the same time being unable to throw its lot in completely with the protesters for fear that instability and an anti-United States regime would emerge left Washington with few real options. European and Arab states found themselves in much the same position. The period following Mubarak’s resignation up until summer 2012 saw greater international involvement and the key international and regional actors developed more coherent policies towards the transition in Egypt.

**Revolution, Regime Change and Political Transition in Libya**

On February 15, 2011, just four days after Mubarak stepped down in Egypt, protests broke out in Benghazi in eastern Libya. As had happened in
Tunisia and Egypt the protests spread quickly to most of the east of the country and to parts of the west. Protesters were concerned by police brutality, governmental censorship, restrictions on media, freedom of speech, representation, mass arrests and torture, as well as economic corruption, unemployment and poverty (ICG, 2011c). Gadhafi’s response was even less flexible than Ben Ali’s or Mubarak’s. The regime responded to the protests by brutally suppressing the peaceful demonstrations in Benghazi and elsewhere in Libya using police and paramilitary forces (ibid). Gadhafi himself vowed to fight with all of the resources available to him to suppress what became a full-scale uprising, offering no concessions to the opposition. Contrary to the events in Tunisia and Egypt where military forces did not engage the protesters, in Libya military forces were deployed almost immediately and were heavily involved in suppressing protests. This helped lead to a military response from the protesters and instead of suppressing the protests, the more people Gadhafi’s forces killed the more Libyans were compelled to join the uprising (ibid: 5). By late March 2011 the opposition was able to spread the uprising across most of Libya and had founded a National Transitional Council (NTC) to act as a government in opposition (ibid: 24).

The conflict that emerged in Libya lasted for just over eight months until all of Libya, including Tripoli, Sirte and Sabha (the last major Gadhafi strongholds) were taken by the rebels. The resulting regime change with the NTC taking power for the transitional period and the Gadhafi regime overthrown is exemplary of a rebel victory and un-negotiated regime change. This all came at a very heavy cost in lives, however, with conservative estimates setting the total at approximately 10,000 deaths and a further 20,000 casualties – with the UN Human Rights Council reporting 10-15,000 deaths by June 2011 (Reuters, June 9, 2011) and the NTC calculating 25,000 by the end of the conflict (IISS, 2011). The lengthy duration of the conflict had a direct impact on the level of destruction of infrastructure and property, number of deaths and casualties. The international involvement in the conflict as discussed below also contributed to these factors.

By late summer 2012 many of the former governing elite under the Gadhafi regime were either arrested, killed in the conflict or fled the country – it is important to note that during the uprising and conflict many gov-
government employees resigned their posts and many defected to the opposition. Muammar Gadhafi was killed on October 20, 2011 as he tried to escape from Sirte. Several of his close relatives were also killed during the conflict, including Khamis Gadhafi, Gadhafi’s youngest son and commander of the infamous Khamis Brigade (which was the most well-armed security force in Libya at the start of the conflict and was responsible for heinous crimes during the fighting) who was killed in a NATO and rebel attack on his convoy south of Tripoli on August 29, 2011 (Reuters, August 30, 2011). Saif Al-Islam Gadhafi, son and heir apparent to Gadhafi was captured in the southern desert near the town of Urabi by militiamen from Zintan. He was held without charge by this militia (BBC News, April 18, 2011). Another of Gadhafi’s sons, Saadi Al-Gadhafi, was granted asylum in Niger on humanitarian grounds but his movement was largely restricted. Former intelligence chief, Abdullah Al-Senussi (long seen as one of the more brutal individuals in the Gadhafi regime) was arrested in Mauritania after having flown there from Morocco on a false passport. In addition, Ali Al-Mahmudi, the former prime minister has been extradited to Libya from Tunisia where he had sought political asylum (Al Jazeera, June 25, 2012). The events of the conflict and its aftermath resulted in the former governing elite being depleted, fractured and displaced suggesting that their influence on Libyan politics was limited.

One of the key goals as professed by the NTC following the end of the conflict was to conduct parliamentary elections for a temporary government to write a new constitution and organise another round of elections for a full-term parliament and government. This project moved forward with elections for local councils being held in May and June 2012 and parliamentary elections held on July 7, 2012. The intention was then for a Public National Conference/parliament to write the new constitution paving the way for further elections and representative government in 2013 (Al Jazeera, January 22, 2012). In order to conduct these elections the NTC produced new electoral legislation establishing the number of seats in parliament (200), the voting system (parallel voting), the age to stand for election (21 years), the constituency to party list seats ratio (120:80) and eligibility (dual nationality candidates are eligible) (UN, 2012). The political
space that opened up in Libya allowing for these parties and many more to organise and become active is quite remarkable given the past 40-plus years of stunted political discourse.

The level of international involvement in the Libyan revolution was greater than in the other two case studies and continues in the form of financial, political and technical support as well as military engagement. By late February 2011 a number of Arab League states condemned the Gadhafi regime’s response to the protests and offered financial and other support to the revolutionaries. At the same time the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed resolution 1970 placing sanctions on Gadhafi and his regime. A further UNSC resolution (UNSC 1973) authorised the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya, a sea blockade and action to protect civilian populations. Following these resolutions an international coalition of states provided military forces to enforce the no-fly-zone and assist the rebel movement as it slowly gained control of Libya (BBC News, March 25, 2011). Overall, 19 states (Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Holland, Italy, Jordan, Norway, Qatar, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UAE, UK and USA.) contributed to the military intervention either by providing supplies, infrastructure, financial resources or engaging in combat operations. The broad-ranging coalition of states helped to legitimise the UN-authorised action to some extent and in particular the involvement of Arab states was important in this regard. Without the international military involvement it is unlikely that the uprising would have succeeded in over-throwing Gadhafi as the regime’s military forces, training and coordination were on the whole far more effective than those of the rebels. For example, the counter-attack by Gadhafi forces in the first month of the uprising was poised to quell the rebellion in eastern Libya, in particular in Benghazi, until NATO air strikes destroyed much of the regime forces approaching the city. Many observers, however, have questioned the extent to which the NATO operations surpassed their UN mandate by not only protecting civilian populations but also coordinating with the rebel forces and conducting offensive joint military operations with them.

Following the fall of the Gadhafi regime and the end of the conflict in October 2011 the international military intervention ended and the UN mandate
completed (Al Jazeera, October 31, 2011). International involvement in Libya through the summer 2012 remained significant with many in the international community offering financial, technical, diplomatic and other support. Libya was suspended from the Arab League on February 22, 2011 as a result of the Gadhafi regime’s crackdown on the uprising, however, its membership was restored in August 2011 following an Arab League vote in favour of recognition of the NTC as the representative authority of Libya (Al-Ahram, August 28, 2011). The Arab League continued to work closely with the NTC in its reconstruction efforts and political development.

**Table 1. Summary of initial regime change in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Libya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
<td>28 days</td>
<td>18 days</td>
<td>8 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcome</strong>*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of deaths &amp; casualties</strong></td>
<td>c.310</td>
<td>c.1100</td>
<td>c.10,000-20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Status of former elite</strong></td>
<td>Exile</td>
<td>Trial, Status Quo</td>
<td>Deceased, Exile, Trial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Elections Held</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Planned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Involvement</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Where: 1 = revolutionary/rebel victory and successful un-negotiated regime change; 2 = a negotiated settlement for the regime to remain but reform; 3 = a negotiated regime change; 4 = governmental victory and status quo

**Conclusions**

The findings of this project suggest that the events and processes of the revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya up to summer 2012 shared some similarities but differed in key ways. The nature of regime change and level of casualties in particular differed and directly affected the pace and direc-
tion of subsequent change. The assessment presented here finds that the experiences in Tunisia in the early revolutionary stage up to summer 2012 should have been less disruptive to subsequent changes. The outcome and speed of the initial regime change, the relatively small number of deaths and casualties, the exile, removal and/or arrest and imprisonment of many of the former ruling elite, and the holding of successful national elections suggest that Tunisia can move towards democracy. The nature of the early stage of the revolution in Egypt was assessed here to have been more disruptive than in Tunisia but less so than in Libya. The holding of parliamentary and presidential elections as well as the arrest and trial of many members of the former ruling elite indicated that reform could be achievable over time.

Libya faced significantly more difficult challenges from early 2011 to summer 2012. Extremely limited previous experience of civil and representative political institutions and mass participation in political processes there meant that the early stage of the revolution was more disruptive than in Tunisia and Egypt. The early stage of the revolution in Libya, therefore, is likely to have a lasting impact on reform in Libya in the medium-term. The long duration of the uprising and civil conflict along with the high levels of death, destruction and international involvement are also likely to hinder Libya’s move to democracy. Efforts at national reconciliation and compensation are going to be very important over the coming years. Nevertheless, the status of the former governing elite, the holding of local and national elections (which appear to have been transparent and fair) and the support (but not interference) of many in the international community will serve to help Libya ultimately achieve democratic governance over time.

Özet: Bu makale, Tunus, Mısır ve Libya’da ortaya çıkan devrimlerin erken aşamalarının analizini yapmayı hedeflemiştir. Çalışma, devrimlerin 2010-2011 kişindan 2012 yazına kadarki erken aşamaları ele alarak, devrimlerin erken aşamalarının deneyimlerini karşılaştırmalı bir perspektifle ortaya koymaktadır. Çalışmada ayrıca rejimlerin geçiş ve değişim süreçlerindeki unsurları şu değişkenler etrafında el almıştır: 1) rejim değişikliği için ayaklanmanın takip süresi; 2) devrimlerin ilk sonuçları; 3) ölü ve yaralıların sayısı; 4) eski rejimdeki yönetim elitinin kilit üyelerinin statülerinin değişmesi; 5) re-
Jim değişikliği sonrası seçimlerin yapılabilmesi ve işlevi 6) uluslararası sisteme ilişki düzeyleri. Bu durumların her birinde temel benzerlikler vardır, fakat geçiş süreçlerinin bir biri ile doğrudan karşılaştıramaz olduğunu destekleyen bazı önemli farklılıklar da vardır. Bu makale ayrıca, bu devrimlerin erken aşamalarının her devletin değişim yönünü ve hızını nasıl etkileyebileceğini hakkında bazı konuları da dikkate getirmeye çalışmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokratikleşme, Rejim değişikliği, Arap Baharı, Tunus, Mısır, Libya

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