ABSTRACT:

The dissertation argues that the modern national sovereignty is the political expression of modern subjectivity and it dominates as such the contemporary discourse of human life, ethnic minorities included, in world politics. The analytical mechanism is grounded in social constructivist theorisations of discourse analysis. It evaluates whether and to what extent the enlargement of the European Union (EU) and its accession conditionality affect the discursive mechanisms of the national, sovereign subjectivity and its relations with national minorities. The cases studied here have been chosen because of the two states being inscribed in the recent past (Romania) and currently (Turkey) in the enlargement process.

The dissertation builds methodologically on Agamben’s understanding of sovereignty as state of exception, interpreted here originally qua exception from the temporality of human life and therefore apt to author political time. In national form, this is understood as the production of the national time of politics, with a double ontological consequence: it constitutes the political nation, while concomitantly and inherently excluding non-national human life from political possibilities. The method of research develops this methodological perspective to analyse national sovereignty, drawing also on Heidegger, as factualisation of two purely theoretical constructs: the nation and the principle of sovereignty. The method therefore analyses national sovereignty in the process of constitution and producing its own presence as fact of human life through the engineering of time. The result of this engineering is the authorship/production of a historical and objective presence, the notion of ‘presence’
being borrowed from Derrida. The method allows for identifying specific elements in
the dominant intellectual discourses in Romania and Turkey, which signal a
subjective presence. This authors its historical presence in texts heavily employed in
national education systems. It also legitimises the production of the nations’ objective
presence, as formalised in legislation on citizenship and the official language of the
respective states. The dissertation tests the hypothesis that the EU enlargement
conditionality does affect the formal mechanisms producing the objective presence of
national sovereignty, but leaves intact the mechanisms through which its historical
presence continues to be fabricated. Consequently, the enlargement process does not
affect the mechanisms of temporal engineering through which national sovereignties
exclude ontologically the ethnic minorities from the time of the nation.

The author claims that the dissertation contains strong elements of originality,
starting from the methodological particularities and reflected in conclusions. It builds
the analytical mechanism on the idea that sovereignty is inseparable from the
subjectivity discoursing it, the onomastic terms of that discourse, and the relation
established by the sovereign subjectivity with temporality in a given space. The result
is the theorisation of sovereignty in relation with time. This is then employed in the
original exploration of the Romanian and Turkish sovereignties in their historical
becoming from the nineteenth century until the moment of writing. The appeal for the
first time to a significant number of primary sources in this particular analytical
context is also a strong element of originality. The method also allows for the original
interpretation of minority politics as different from minority policies throughout the
entire dissertation, which will lead in conclusions to valuable suggestions concerning
much needed initiatives at the level of EU policy design.
THE EUROPEAN UNION, STATE OF EXCEPTION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION – ROMANIA, TURKEY AND ETHNIC MINORITY POLITICS

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3 October 2011

Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Regulations for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at Nottingham Trent University
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## Romanian and Turkish Pronunciation

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Romanian letter</th>
<th>Turkish letter</th>
<th>English pronunciation*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>Close to the second vowel sound as in ‘brother’ and ‘sister’.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>â, î</td>
<td>The closest equivalent is the vowel sound produced between the letters ‘s’ and ‘m’ in words ending in ‘-ism’. The sound, however, is slightly harder. Other close equivalents are the false third vowel in ‘relations’ or the false vowel in the second syllable of ‘rhythm’ (Turkish transliterations ‘rilaişinz’ and ridm, respectively).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>Like j as in ‘John’.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ç</td>
<td>Like ch as in ‘challenge’.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ğ</td>
<td>It is not pronounced and generally prolongs the sound of the vowel sound preceding it.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ô</td>
<td>Close to the French eu as in ‘bleu’ and ‘feu’.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ş</td>
<td>Like sh as in ‘sharp’.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ü</td>
<td>Close to u as in ‘cute’ but lacking the initial ‘y’ sound.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ţ</td>
<td>Close to ts as in ‘cats’ and ‘tsar’.</td>
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</tbody>
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* Produced with the help of Ian White, English language instructor and phonology expert at Izmir University of Economics.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP  Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
ANAP  Motherland Party (Turkey)
AP  Justice Party (Turkey)
BBC  British Broadcasting Corporation
BDP  Peace and Democracy Party (Turkey)
CEECs  Central and Eastern European Countries
CEFTA  Central European Free Trade Area
CHP  People's Republican Party (Turkey)
CIA  Central Intelligence Agency (United States)
CoE  Council of Europe
CUP  Committee of Union and Progress (Turkey)
DCR  Democratic Convention in Romania
DEHAP  Democratic People’s Party (Turkey)
DLP  Democrat-Liberal Party (Romania)
DP  Democrat Party (Romania and Turkey)
DTK  Democratic Society Congress (Turkey)
DTP  Democratic Society Party (Turkey)
DUHR  Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania
ECHR  European Court of Human Rights
ECJ  European Court of Justice
ECRML  European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages
EDRC  Ethnocultural Diversity Research Centre (Romania)
EEC  European Economic Community
EP  European Parliament
ERCH  Eastern Revolutionary Cultural Hearths (Turkey)
ERRC  Eastern Region Reform Commission (Turkey)
EU  European Union
GAP  Southeast Anatolia Project (Turkey)
GNA  Grand National Assembly (Turkey)
GRP  Greater Romania Party
HAD  Hungarian Autonomous District (Romania)
ICCP  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IR  International Relations (theory)
ISPA  Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-Accession
IUE  Izmir University of Economics
JP  Justice Party (Turkey)
JTA  Justice and Truth Alliance (Romania)
MHP  Nationalist Movement Party (Turkey)
MP  Member of Parliament
MRGI  Minority Rights Group International
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NLP  National Liberal Party (Romania)
NSC  National Security Council (Turkey)
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Salvation Front (Romania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTU</td>
<td>Nottingham Trent University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE-HCNM</td>
<td>High Commissioner for National Minorities at OSCE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHARE</td>
<td>Poland Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Party of Kurdistan Workers (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP</td>
<td>Romanian Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDCA</td>
<td>Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association (Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNUP</td>
<td>Romanian National Unity Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>Romanian Orthodox Church</td>
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<tr>
<td>RWP</td>
<td>Romanian Workers’ Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAPARD</td>
<td>Special Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democrat Party (Romania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRR</td>
<td>Socialist Republic of Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCE</td>
<td>Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMEB</td>
<td>Turkish National Education Ministry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TÜIK</td>
<td>Turkish Statistical Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWP</td>
<td>Turkish Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YÖK</td>
<td>Higher Education Council (Turkey)</td>
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation analyses whether and to what extent the European Union (EU) enlargement process determines a profound change in the relations between ethnic majorities and minorities in two countries. More explicitly, the author questions whether the EU enlargement, beyond preparing candidates for membership in the Union’s current institutional configuration, also prepares them for a politically multicultural, post-national Europe. This interrogative act is legitimated by the very history of European integration starting from the establishment of the Communities, described by Jean Monnet as uniting peoples and not states (Europa 2011). Does then the post-Cold War enlargement aim to further this project toward the edification of a people’s Europe beyond the predication of political life by sovereign nation-states?

The first case studied is Romania, a country that has completed the accession negotiations and became a EU Member State in 2007, while the second one is Turkey, which has started accession negotiations in 2005. The dissertation initiates the argument from the recognition of the dominant discourse on minority rights in world politics being structured by the understanding of such rights by national sovereign subjectivities (Onuf 1989, p. 243; Agamben 2000, p. 18; Isyar 2005, p. 350). The main result is inevitably the configuration of certain possibilities for the formulation of majority-minority relations in which minorities become exiled in positions of inferiority, at the periphery of those possibilities (Bleiker and Chou 2010, p. 12). They become objects of policies of national sovereignties and of their ‘consensual power’ (Manning 2004, p. 65), one that has always already decided upon the national form and content of political life.
The result is the elimination, with the very constitution of a national sovereignty, of the possibility of a politics of multilingualism and multiculturality (ibid. p. 64), theorised later here as politics of inter-ethnic equality (see pp. 39-40, 102-103). Indeed, inter-ethnic inequality is ontologically inherent to the constitution of national sovereignties, which exclude minorities in order to exist (Panayi 2000, p. 215). The historical engineering of political nations has brutally diminished the natural multiculturality of human life by subjecting it to mere policies, i.e. authoritative actions (e.g. Roskin et al. 1997, p. 39) gradually turning non-sovereign nations into objects of minority policies. Such policies are institutionalised, staffed and budgeted on the basis of the ethno-logic that the national state necessarily reflects the will of the titular nation, always in the national language.

The specific main question guiding the research is then whether the EU membership conditionality and its enlargement process affect this predication of ethnic minorities by the national sovereignty in Romania and Turkey. In other words, does the EU stimulate in candidate countries the replacement of inter-ethnic relations of inequality, as encoded in national minority policies, with an inter-ethnic relations and politics of discursive equality, multilingualism and multiculturality? In order to address this question, the author will theorise the notions of minority policies in antithesis with inter-ethnic politics of equality (see pp. 39-40, 102-103) within the context of the methodology of research. This is designed to explore in Chapters 4 and 5 the historical formation of the discourse of national sovereignties in Romania and Turkey until and including the EU enlargement process. The focus of the analysis is not on the national sovereignties per se, but on elucidating whether and to what extent the enlargement process destabilise them and their predication of ethnic minorities as to allow for the emergence of post-national politics in Europe.
Romania has been included in this research because the author, a Romanian citizen, hypothesises that the EU membership conditionality has not altered the general predication of ethnic minorities by the Romanian national sovereignty despite this country becoming EU member in 2007. Thus, essential aspects in the understanding of national sovereignty in Romania continue to be present in the formulation and implementation of law, as well as in the content of the national education system. This is understood here as a form of state nationalism and represents the central focus point in this research because it continues to place ethnic minorities in a condition of inferiority.

The Hungarian minority, the largest in Romania (see Annex 6), has however challenged this state of affairs after the collapse of communism. Its main political representatives have claimed collective rights equal to those of the ethnic majority on the basis of the minority’s perception of itself as constitutive of the Romanian sovereign state, together with the titular majority (Csergo 2002; 2007). Such demands suggest a call for a denationalised conception of sovereignty in Romania. From the theoretical perspectives briefly sketched above and elaborated upon later (see pp. 39-40, 101-103), this could lead to inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality in Romania. For the political representatives of the ethnic Hungarians, the numeric, quantitative superiority of the Romanians is not relevant and what is proposed instead is a notion of sovereignty in which different ethnic communities share sovereign rights (Borbely 2009). Thus, unlike the Roma, or the Slavophone, Turkophone and other smaller minorities, the Hungarians have managed to formulate a coherent political discourse challenging the Romanian national sovereignty. And this is the main reason why this particular minority group has been selected for this research.
Turkey, the author’s current country of residence, is analysed here because it is a state now involved in the EU enlargement process. Thus, the study of this case can help a better understanding of whether and to what extent this process affects the predication of minorities by a national sovereignty facing the membership conditionality at the very moment of writing (June 2011). And the most coherent, non-Turkish political discourse in Turkey has been for decades that of the Kurdish minority, the country’s largest (Kurban 2007, p. 11; Ataman 2002, p. 123; CIA 2010), these being the reasons why the dissertation focuses on the Kurdish challenge to the Turkish national sovereignty. Moreover, there are signs that certain political representatives of this community are beginning to formulate demands similar to those of the Hungarians in Romania. They ask essentially for the redefinition of the state in terms of equality between Turks and Kurds regardless of difference in numbers and point at other similar examples in Europe (Anon. 2011g; Bozkurt 2011a). One such ‘similar example’ is that of the Hungarians in Romania explained above, and another one has been signalled in the case of Albanians in Macedonia (Atanasova 2002, p. 393).

The Kurdish and other minorities in Turkey encounter, however, a form of state nationalism much stronger than that in Romania, one placed at the very foundation of the Turkish Republic by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself and perpetuated in time through the Kemalist ideology. This and other reasons (see pp. 47-49, 54-55) justify the author avoiding a clear-cut comparative approach to the two cases. Instead, the focus will be here on the historical formation of the formal discourse of national sovereignty, and especially on the ways, if any, in which such discourse is altered within the context of EU enlargement. Certain results of the analysis will suggest interesting similarities and differences between the two cases,
but the predominance of differences and the analytical focus of the research will not allow for precise comparative evaluations in the conclusions.

Another important methodological aspect is that the dissertation does not analyse the nationalist ideologies and movements *per se* in Romania and Turkey. The fact that nationalism has become ‘the dominant ideology of the modern epoch’ (Smith 2008, pp. 563-564) cannot be contested, but as such it does not affect decisively the political condition of ethnic minorities. It is when nationalism reaches the seat of sovereign authority, i.e. state nationalism, that it takes control of political possibilities by imposing the consensus of national sovereignty (Rancière 1999; Manning 2004, p. 65). Ethnic minorities are in this way ontologised at the periphery of the national political ‘normality’ (see pp. 59-63 for detailed explanation). They have to struggle for asserting their historical presence in a given space already occupied in human memory by the sovereign majority. Under the authority of the nationalised sovereignty, the curricula of the national education systems tell, especially in history and geography textbooks, a story of the nation in ethnic keynote, which leaves little if any room for ethnic minorities in the temporal line of the human realm. They also have to submit every day to the law, which implicitly proclaims the nation’s (read ‘ethnic majority’) everydayness.

This will be identified here as an *engineering of time*, made possible by the sovereign consensus over the meaning of time past, present and future (Manning 2004, pp. 62-63). The result is the exclusion of the very ‘time of politics’ (Dasgupta 2009, p. 3), i.e. the politics of intrinsic lack of consensus over the meaning of political life, the only time in which one can talk indeed about politics of equality (Rancière 1999, p. 61; Manning 2004, pp. 62-63) between ethnic majorities and minorities. Erin Manning’s perspective, coupled later (see pp. 101-103) with that of Jacques Rancière
and others is thus interpreted here as implying the idea that sovereignty is also a sophisticated engineering of time under the authority of the sovereign consensus. In nationalised form, this authority subjects all minorities to the terms of the ethnic majority and its ‘minority policies’ that exclude, through homogenisation, the inter-ethnic politics of equality.

Put simply then, the cases of the Hungarian and Kurdish minorities in Romania and Turkey respectively have been chosen precisely because they call explicitly, within the context of those countries’ accession to EU membership, for the de-nationalisation of sovereignty and a politics of inter-ethnic equality. They practically eliminate the numeric, read quantitative, difference from the majority-minority relations. In effect, they challenge core notions in the content of international relations theory (IR), and the dominant discourse of minority ‘rights’, which will be analysed here necessarily from the perspective of qualitative analysis.

This dissertation attempts to elaborate upon this interpretation and reveal its worth in evaluating the effects of EU membership conditionality on minority politics in Romania and Turkey. Consequently, the research contributes to the general field of political science with an elaborate theorisation of national sovereignty as authoring/engineering of a national political time. Implicitly, this presupposes the production of an innovative methodology and analytical approach in Chapter 3. The dissertation starts, however, by exploring the meaning of ethnic minorities in our political world, where national sovereignties have been defining political life for more than two centuries now as expressions of ethnic groups dominating particular spaces (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 73).

The argument must take into account a number of major narratives in which the concept of minority has become relevant. There is a body of international law
predicating the concept in a language of rights and protection from national sovereignties. This has been enriched over the last decades with an increasingly coherent approach from the EU, especially within the context of its enlargement policy (Kymlicka 2007, pp. 379-380; Rechel 2008). However, both international law and international organisations, such as the EU, are contexts where discursive rules, limits and possibilities have been defined gradually by nation-states as basic political forms of the world (Giddens 1985; Cowan 2007). They are also responsible for the very absence of a ‘legally binding uniform definition’ of minorities and for the predominance, instead, of multiple discourses predicating the human domains of national sovereignties in terms of various conceptualisations of citizenship (Cholewinski 2005, pp. 698-699). The argument developed here is built, however, on author’s distrust in the capacity of nation-states ever to facilitate the political discoursing of ethnic minorities beyond the ethno-logic of the nation-state itself.

The constitution of national sovereignties brought with it notions of political identity that gradually replaced the multicultural logic of sovereignty, legitimacy and allegiance of the imperial order. Language, citizenship and an understanding of kinship heavily charged with ethno-metaphors have been the primary tools in this enterprise (Hobsbawm 1990; Anderson 2006; Smith 1999; Mansbach and Rhodes 2007). They have served to establish the supremacy of ethnic majorities qua national sovereignties through self-imposition upon human life. This we know. We also seem to know what sovereignty is since it has been defined so scrupulously in our law and academic literature over the last centuries. However, the way/mode in which sovereignty, in particular national sovereignty, institutes itself as fact of life is much less clear a notion. The mainstream academic literature on this concept (see especially section 2.1) tends to focus under the influence of empirical positivism on the
technical-legal understanding of sovereignty. That is while it gives little if any attention to sovereignty’s mode of **factualisation**, i.e. the ways in which the abstract principle of sovereignty becomes fact of human life.

The scholarship on nationalism and the engineering of nations seems, however, to indicate paths toward the clarification of these aspects. This literature has raised awareness of the role played by human imagination in the production of the **national**, inspired by eminent scholars after the Second World War (e.g. Barth 1969; Weber 1976; Gellner 1983; Brubaker 1992, 2004; Smith 1971; 1999; 2000). The theorisation of the nation as imagined community in the early 1980s (Anderson 2006) also helped an understanding of states’ engineering of this community. They have developed increasingly complex mechanisms of social engineering and administration, on the basis of legal principles enshrined in national constitutions. In this way, the law became the ‘form for that which cannot have a legal form’ (Rosén 2005, p. 147), i.e. the national political built precisely on the imagined community. The constitutional law of the nation-state can be said then to have factualised the imagined communal bonds in the concreteness of the national political community. Secondary legislation specifying rules of citizenship, or regulating the use of language and the educational systems also contribute to the factualisation of the nation in the everydayness of human life.

Thus, the legal definitions of the political community in terms of its name, official language, and citizenship have been central in the process. The second and the third aspects are seen here as derived from and bound to the first one, the name of the nation and the nation-state, an aspect elaborated upon in section 2.2 and Chapter 3. Serving all, in the name of the nation, is always a national education system propagating through generations the sovereign understanding of human life in
national terms. It is essentially in this political life, one populated with national languages and citizenships, that ethnic minorities became gradually relevant as issues of state and inter-state policies. And the fundamental questions in this dissertation refer to whether and to what extent the supranational, post-modern political form of the EU (Ruggie 1993, p. 140; Wiener 1997, p. 551) alters in its expansion the discursive mechanisms through which national human realms are realised, toward the edification of a politically multicultural, post-national Europe (see pp. 10-12).

The main hypothesis from which this research starts is that the EU enlargement process does produce change in the formal aspects of minority policies in Romania and Turkey; this, however, does not alter significantly the discursive mechanisms of self-institution through which the two sovereignties continue to dominate political life. In other words, the EU enlargement process softens the positions of sovereign majorities in their policies regarding minorities in the two case studies without yet leading to the de-nationalisation of sovereignty and the emergence of inter-ethnic politics of equality. The research will converge toward preliminary conclusions regarding Romania in Chapter 4 and Turkey in Chapter 5, and the final conclusions in Chapter 6 as to demonstrate the validity of the main hypothesis indicated above. They will also suggest approaches that EU officials may find making sense from the perspective adopted here. However, it is important to note that the main hypothesis is held open throughout the thesis until the concluding chapter 6, as it is always possible to be found invalid.

The appeal to the current academic literature on sovereignty and majority-minority relations will not suffice precisely because, as suggested above, such literature tends to prioritise possibilities of political imagination established by and with the reality of the nation-state. Consequently, this exploration will take the reader
along paths opened with theorisations, especially by and following Giorgio Agamben, attempting to push the limits of our imagination beyond those of the constituted political modernity. Agamben’s exploration of sovereignty as state of exception is particularly relevant here since it theorises a pre-constituted state of sovereign law in the act of concomitantly binding/abandoning life to law (2005, p. 1). Thus, the meaning of sovereignty will be searched for beyond its already constituted form in legalistic accounts and academic perspectives dominating modern political practices.

The analytical strategy will presuppose the destabilisation of hegemonic discourses of national sovereignty in general, with their exaggerated confidence in the territoriality of sovereignty as necessary and sufficient for the principle as a whole to pass for reality. Therefore, the dissertation will build on the idea that time, at least as much as space, is the medium in which sovereignty operates to constitute itself and especially the national version of itself. So, when Işın and Wood (1999, p. 4) say that, ‘[s]ince the late nineteenth century, the polity that has “colonized” everyday life in the world has been the nation-state’, the general idea is fully embraced but for a specification. The word ‘colonisation’ is not taken here to refer only to the colonisation of space, but also of time (Cooper 2003, p. 48), i.e. of history and the time given to us for living, the time of the past, future and the now in which we dwell. Legalistic accounts of sovereignty explain in terms of territorialized authority the now of the national sovereignty and its human domain. However, human life is also fixed in everydayness through, say, citizenship laws. Such laws order the ways in which we are politically present as physical bodies (presence) in time (now-present) and the possibilities of moving inside and outside the spatial-temporal domain of sovereignty.

The passage of, for instance, a native of Podgorica from Yugoslav to Montenegrin citizenship took place with territorial modifications, but also
presupposed an engineering of time from a Yugoslav past (which was a wonderful ‘now’ for some) to a Montenegrin now. But what if the respective native of Podgorica is ethnically a Macedonian in fact? Which factuality can she/he be said to dwell in? Which nationalised nowness? The law that that person lives by, the Montenegrin law factualising her/his political present-presence in terms of citizenship and language, is the only one by which we currently evaluate answers to such questions. Ironically, both that state’s official language (Cvetcovik and Vezic 2009) and the person’s Macedonian identity (see, for instance, Michailidis 1998; Balalovska 2004) are still far from generally accepted notions. The lives of the people from minority communities are clearly regulated by national legislations valid on territories of states. However, such legislations also proclaim a national now as limit/possibility of being politically. Such present-presence is built on an engineering of past and present, hence of future implicitly, that this dissertation will analyse.

There are actually three main reasons for focusing on time here. The first has to do with those specific moments when we encounter national sovereignty in its legal form, such as when registering for the first identity card, election card, or passport. These acts regulating citizenship in modern states set the membership of the national political community in ‘civic’ form (Mansbach and Rhodes 2007, p. 451) but under an ethnic name, thus bringing the ‘other’ face to face with a nationalised now of political life inside the respective national sovereignty. This logic, however, is founded on an already constituted national sovereignty. Ethnic minorities, already inside by the moment when such sovereignties are constituted, are then condemned to these nationalised nows and bound to develop predetermined relations with majorities. Moving beyond these always already nationalised nows presupposes an
examination of the modes in which sovereignty constitutes itself and its own national time, with space already a solved issue.

Another reason for focusing on temporality is given by the fact that we, inhabitants of national states, encounter the engineering of time by the national sovereignty in school at all levels. Long before we reach the age of political maturity, we hear the logic of national sovereignty explained so carefully in, say, history textbooks. They tend to construct the story of the imagined national community as a perfect temporal continuum, with clear origins, stages of becoming national and even suggestions of a no-end future. They practically condemn the nation to eternity in the name of its evident presence in the now, while geography textbooks also nationalise the territory with toponyms in the nation’s language. A history textbook suggesting an end to the national state that issued it, or a geography textbook using foreign toponymy is unheard of. The ‘tradition’ of nationhood is thus created as ‘means of handling time and space, which inserts any particular activity or experience within the continuity of the past, present and future’ (Giddens 1990, p. 37). Temporality and spatiality are nationalised in this way through a continuum explaining everything and making contingency look ridiculous, when the ‘imaginary of the nation’ has always already ordered time itself (Manning 2004, p. 63). Ethnic minorities, if mentioned at all, appear in the story of the sovereign nation as always already contained in the already constituted spatial-temporality of the national community.

Last but certainly not the least, space contains life by the laws of gravitation. In our tellurian world, the verticality of gravitational forces is inevitable, indeed, while the three-dimensional geometries of spatial territoriality only become political with their discursive politicisation by identifiable subjectivities. The main philosophical argument in this dissertation touches precisely upon this aspect by
interpreting sovereignty as inherent in the subjectivity that produces the political relevance of its own human realm (Derrida 1992, pp. 11-12; Campbell 1996, p. 165).

Temporality is thus the medium in which the national sovereignty produces the national community by consuming, or wasting time (Manning 2004, p. 77), in the sense of eliminating the possibility of alternative, non-national temporalities. The contingency inherent in multicultural, multiethnic human life is annulled with the self-institution of national sovereignty that ‘seeks to contain the act of decision-making within the bounds of nationally timed narratives’ (ibid.). National sovereignty becomes with this logic the nationally defined factuality of sovereignty, its present-presence as national ‘now’ under the name of the nation.

This act of authorship will be defined here consequently as an onomastic act that nationalises the time of a people in/under the name of the nation. The demand of ethnic minorities for recognition emerges precisely against this national temporality authored with the onomastic act of national sovereignty. Chapters 4 and 5 in this dissertation, as well as the huge literature on minorities in general, are filled with these communities’ demands for cultural rights, especially concerning education in mother tongues. These can be interpreted as acts of resistance to the colonisation of time with the languages and cultures of the sovereign majorities dominating political nowness through national law, and the historical time through history or geography textbooks. Space is then identified here methodologically as a ‘straw man’ due to its inevitability in the gravitational context of tellurian life, while the production of national political life presupposes rather the nationalisation of time in which the possible and impossible take shape. With this we are at the heart of ontology where thinking is guided by the question whether a post-national political life, i.e. political
life outside the ethno-logic of national sovereignties is or is not possible in Europe (see pp. 10-12).

As Barkin and Cronin (1994, p. 112) have put it, ‘juridical borders can be fixed objectively, whereas national identification, being inherently subjective, cannot be fixed in the same way’. This dissertation, too, is not and cannot be an exploration of the objective aspects of sovereignty, but an exploration of the subjectivity authoring the national political life. The mode in which the modern subjectivity fixes its own conception of the polity and of human life is viewed here then as conditioned (1) on the character of modern subjectivity in general and (2) on its capacity and ways of engineering time.

The institution of national sovereignty can be then interpreted as the constitution of an ethnic majority as an exceptional, sovereign subjectivity, apt to discourse all life within its realm. It does so through a legalistic, constitutional discourse of ethnic hegemony placing the ethnic other away from a core where sovereign rights are formulated. The argument presented here will thus elaborate on the idea that the self-institution of (national) subjectivities constitute their present-presences and construct time itself in terms of their nowness.

Inspired by these briefly sketched views, the dissertation starts with the clarification of the object (Chapters 1 and 2) and the preliminary methodological details of this research (Chapter 2). This is followed by a detailed explanation of the research mechanism employed in the analysis of the national sovereignty discourses and the relation between national sovereignty and ethnic minorities from the perspectives proposed here (Chapter 3). The third chapter also indicates the specific methods employed in this analysis deriving from the general methodological perspectives (section 3.3). The dissertation then focuses (Chapter 4) on the historical
formation of the Romanian sovereign subjectivity (section 4.1), its encounter with the Hungarian minority after 1918 (sections 4.2, 4.3), and the ways in which the majority-minority relations in Romania have been affected by the EU enlargement (section 4.4). Some preliminary conclusions in the case of Romania (section 4.5) are then employed in the analysis of the condition of the Kurdish minority under Turkish sovereignty (Chapter 5) and especially of the capacity of the EU to affect this condition (section 5.2). The Conclusions (Chapter 6) sum up this research to build an answer to its main question, i.e. whether and to what extent the EU enlargement impacts on the predication of minorities by national sovereignties engaged in the process (see pp. 10-12). They will also point at solutions to certain problems evidenced in the process of research and specific aspects that, in this author’s opinion, could mark decisively future developments in the EU-Turkey relations.

The argument is founded upon the assumption, essentially qualitative, that the medium of sovereignty is the subjective notion of time beyond the inevitable terrestriality of all political constructs. The dissertation builds therefore on a large amount of literature exploring these aspects. Temporality has been approached in relation with sovereignty by a number of scholars. Essential for this dissertation are theorisations by Martin Heidegger (1962; 1993; 2000; 2003) and Jacques Derrida’s (1981; 1982; 1992; 1997; 2003) of the intimate relation between human subjectivity, language and time. John Agnew (2003, especially pp. 35-50) examined the relation between sovereignty, space and time as shaped by different idealised historical experiences in different ages. The more recent work of R.B.J. Walker (1993; 2010) is also important because it expands political imagination beyond limits set by territorial conceptions of sovereignty, toward comprehending the special relation of sovereignty with time. Kimberly Hutchings (2008), too, has examined various notions of time in
world politics and the intellectual contexts in which they have emerged, after Helga Nowotny’s (1994) interpretation of modern and post-modern experiences of time. However, Giorgio Agamben’s philosophical excursions (1998; 2000; 2005; 2007), inspired by the Heidegerrian phenomenology, into the pre-constituted form of sovereignty and his explicit theorisation of potentiality and temporality in this context are central for the argument developed here. This approach will be balanced, however, with an appeal to other works, such as those by Koselleck (1985), Bhabha (1990), Greenhouse (1996), Manning (2004), Mesnard (2004), Borislavov (2005), Prozorov (2005), Gratton (2006), Genel (2006), DeCaroli (2007), Mazower (2008), Ungureanu (2008), Dasgupta (2009), O’Connor (2009) and others mentioned later.

While recognising the contributions above to the analysis of sovereignty, the relation between spatiality and temporality and nationalism, the author also claims that the dissertation contains certain *elements of originality* starting from particularities in the methodology of research and reflected in its outcome. It gathers relevant aspects in the accounts above and others to build an explicit theorisation of sovereignty becoming national sovereignty through an engineering of temporality. The notion that stands above all other in this context is that of *living human life* understood in terms of survival, which here means duration, resilience in time. Agamben’s philosophy of sovereignty (especially 1998; 2005) is central in the argument developed here precisely because it explores the relation between sovereignty and bare life, that is, life uncontaminated by particular, spatially constituted sovereignties. The relation between national sovereignty and bare life will then be interpreted here (sections 3.2 and 3.3) as one producing the passage from the infinite potentialities inherent in human imagination to the eventual fixation of human life through sovereign law in the particular, national political form. The author’s
position is therefore, simply put, on the side of human life and against sovereign fixations in spatial geometries and nationalised temporalities.

The dissertation also contributes to political science and IR theory with a formulation, within the context of the methodology adopted here, of the notion of inter-ethnic relations and politics of discursive equality. The notion is necessary due to two main reasons. Firstly, the contemporary majority-minority relations are set by national sovereignties and the international law as relations of power, with the majorities dominating the minorities (see esp. pp. 39-40, 102-103). Secondly, the Hungarian minority in Romania and the Kurdish minority in Turkey explicitly challenge this situation by demanding instead inter-ethnic relations of equality (see pp. 12-14). The respective notion will then be instrumental in the analysis of the historical formation of national sovereignty in the two countries as to reveal the forms in which the two sovereignties have produced and continue to produce blatant inter-ethnic inequality even within the context of EU enlargement.

An important contribution to general political theory will be then a coherent interpretation of minority politics as a notion different from and preferable to minority policies (see pp. 10-11, 39-40). The former presupposes the recognition of a temporality of the minority by the majority, while the latter imply the partial or total subjection of the time of political life to the time of the majority and its onomastic policies. The dissertation thus radicalises the methodological approach to the relation between sovereignty and human life by scrutinising the pre-constitutional, pre-factual form of the sovereign presence and hence the zone whence the notion of sovereignty becomes relevant to the word *is*. The author is thus able to analyse qualitatively the becoming ‘national’, or the *nationalisation* of sovereignty and of its human realm through the nationalisation of time and space.
The analysis captures the intellectual efforts of identifiable groups of people, in both Romania and Turkey, taking over the idea of sovereignty and nationalising it, long before the (f)actual establishment of the two sovereignties. It follows then in historical development the intellectual engineering of a national human domain of sovereignty, when ethnic minorities also become facts of political life. Thus, the dissertation explores the ontology of national sovereignty as subjective sovereignty authoring itself and its human domain, with attention to identifiable intellectuals formulating the imperatives of national sovereignty and clear elements of intentionality in their efforts.

One main aspect analysed is the (f)actualisation of the imagined community as sovereign subjectivity in constitutional law establishing the national political community in terms of citizenship and official language. The other main aspect is the perpetuation of this perspective for generations through relevant intellectual productions in general and national education policies in particular. Both forms are creations of identifiable authors, most of them prominent figures in the Romanian and Turkish national pantheons, which suggests the possibility of this dissertation indicating clear responsibilities in this context. The analysis takes language as principle of realisation for the specific national form of sovereignty because it has represented, with inspiration especially from Herder and Rousseau, the basis of cultural nationalisms in the nineteenth century Europe, with the decisive aid of the media (Anderson 2001, p. 40; 2006, pp. 60, 135).

This allows for yet another claim to originality here. The thesis employs a constructivist methodological perspective (Chapter 2) in an exploration of intellectual and constitutional developments relevant for the making and performance (Baumann 1999, p. 26; Ifversen 2002, p. 6) of national political cultures in Romania and Turkey.
To this end, it follows the respective developments from the establishment of those sovereignties until present time, which means practically their entire history. The dissertation also provides, for the same period, a richly documented account of the organisation and content of public instruction building historically a sense of the imagined national communities in Romania and Turkey. The exploration of the bibliography used in this analysis confirmed the novelty of this dissertation exploring, from a complex methodological perspective, an important number of primary sources illustrating the historical emergence, self-institution and self-propagation of the Romanian and Turkish sovereign selves until present time.

The methodological strategy detailed in Chapter 3 is built on the author’s view of a high interdependence between subjectivity and sovereignty especially in the modern discourse of sovereignty constituted along spatial-temporal coordinates. Political theory has tended however to overemphasise the spatiality of sovereignty (see especially section 2.1) while temporality has been more or less taken for granted. The author of this dissertation argues that the categories above cannot be understood in isolation from each other. The genealogic analysis of sovereignty in general and of the historical development of sovereignties in particular unaccompanied by the interpretation of the modern sovereign subjectivity per se would misunderstand the grounding and scope of this dissertation. The same would result from overemphasising the spatiality of sovereignty by comparison with temporality. Chapter 3 explains in detail the methodology of this research, building therefore on the idea that the individual notions of subjectivity, sovereignty, space and temporality are impossible to isolate from a comprehensive account of modern sovereignty. Until then, the following two chapters will bring necessary clarifications concerning the object of this research and the preliminary methodological considerations.
CHAPTER 1: THE EUROPEAN UNION, MINORITY RIGHTS AND PRELIMINARY DATA CONCERNING MAJORITY-MINORITY RELATIONS IN ROMANIA AND TURKEY

1.1. The EU enlargement and ethnic minorities

One premise of this dissertation is that there is a perceivable degree of change taking place at the formal level of minority policies in Romania and Turkey under the influence of the European Union (EU). However, the author hypothesises that the EU enlargement process does not alter significantly the discursive mechanisms of self-institution through which the two sovereignties continue to dominate their human realms (see pp. 18-19). What does change mean therefore, when this refers to relations between modern national sovereignties and national minorities under the auspices of the supranational political form of the EU? The question here is then not about what causes change, but about what is it that takes place qua change between national sovereignties and minorities when national sovereignties adapt to the EU standards. This approach will allow for clarifications concerning the dissertation’s research questions (see pp. 10-12, 29), i.e. whether and to what extent the EU membership conditionality and its enlargement process affect this predication of ethnic minorities by the national sovereignty in Romania and Turkey.

The main reasons behind the EU’s commitment to support reforms in Eastern Europe have derived from, or have been related mainly to, the political project of enlargement toward continental integration. The broader political imperative has been the strengthening of continental security through the encouragement of democracy,
respect for human rights and sustained economic development. Thus, minority issues have tended to be viewed in relation to security imperatives and the promotion of stability immediately after the collapse of the communist regimes in the early 1990s (Bojkov 2004, p. 341-342; Sasse 2009, p. 17). After that event, coupled with the establishment of the EU in 1992-1993, the political agenda of the Union had to advance along new coordinates. In 1991, post-communist regimes in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland took the initiative and expressed their political commitment to membership in the Euro-Atlantic organisations with the so-called Višegrád Declaration. The group also established two years later the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), followed by a series of similar initiatives at the Baltic and Black Seas, the countries involved indicating insistently that Euro-Atlantic integration was their main desideratum (Bechev 2006, pp. 29-31).

This clear objective made necessary the coordination of a continental movement toward integration from a centre able to support politically and logistically its pace. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the fifteen EU Member States adopted in March 1998 the Council Regulation 622, a legal document indicating the Accession Partnership as the framework for relations between the EU and applicant states, the priorities envisaged and, most importantly, the specific principles, intermediate objectives and conditions (Maresceau 2001, p. 7). Thus, the EU became the main actor promoting integration at the heart of its continental agenda by gradually developing a complex set of policies, with the European Commission as principal manager in constant dialogue with the applicant states (Grabbe 2002, p. 5; Hughes and Sasse 2003, p. 2; Johnson 2006, pp. 38-39). These applicant states became responsible in turn for elaborating national policy programmes addressing the objectives indicated in the Accession Partnerships (Nugent 2004, pp. 36-37).
However, the processes of democratisation and market liberalisation were excruciatingly slow. Soon economic, social and political hardships led to the emergence of the nationalist playing card in domestic politics. Within this context, ethnic minorities became scapegoats whose non-alignment to the ‘national cause’ explained all failure (Chen 2003, p. 169; Pappas 2005; Sadurski 2008, pp. 223-225). This led to minority rights being perceived as highly related to security issues in the EU itself (Atanasova 2004, p. 354; Bojkov 2004, pp. 341-342; Sasse and Thielemann 2005, pp. 660-661). The EU’s insistence on the respect for and protection of minorities in its relations with acceding and neighbouring countries, too, can then be understood indeed as part of a general concern with continental security, including here migration issues and related policy fields (Sasse 2005, pp. 685-686; 2009, p. 22).

There is in this context a general opinion of the EU enlargement as a success story of the Union’s ‘external governance’ (Mungiu-Pippidi 2005, pp. 40-41; Dannreuther 2006, p. 183; Johnson 2006, p. 35; Phinnemore 2006a, p. 7). Communist regimes had left behind them serious problems, such as backward infrastructures, underdeveloped administrative apparatuses, poor economic performance, absence of deeper regional mechanisms of stabilisation, and a serious vacuum in security guarantees (Guggenbühl and Theelen 2001, pp. 217-218; Denton 2001, pp. 145-147; Mungiu-Pippidi 2005, p. 40). The EU became therefore a major source of financial and technical support, while setting in the process a mechanism of conditionality in terms of ‘reinforcement by reward’ (Schimmelfenning et al. 2003, p. 496; McCormick 2005, p. 225). The main policy instruments in this process were financial assistance programmes (PHARE, ISPA, SAPARD, etc.) and institutional ties as forms of control expressed in the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ and especially the human rights element insisted upon in the 1993 Presidency Conclusions (Schimmelfenning et
The prospect of membership in the EU was however by far the most important incentive.

Within this context, Kelley (2004) has notoriously insisted that the EU membership conditionality has been the decisive factor that determined the adoption and implementation of legislation promoting ethnic minority rights in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs). The epicentre of the transition has been located in the domain of institutional and political reforms aimed at helping those candidate countries to leave behind the heavy burden of their authoritarian past and step decisively into the democratic age. The EU was, however, only one of the many international organisations interested in such reforms. The Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO, international financial organisations such as the World Bank (WB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) also exerted pressures in the same direction (Pridham 2007, p. 236). The EU membership remained, indeed, the most attractive ‘carrot’ for the CEECs in this context, but it was conditioned on the treatment of minorities, encoded explicitly in the ‘Copenhagen’ political criteria as ‘respect for and protection of minorities’ (European Council 1993, p. 1).

Despite the apparent clarity of this conditionality regarding minority issues, academic scrutiny has revealed that the EU policy fields specifically addressing minorities are in evident want of implementation mechanisms (Vermeersch 2003, p. 86; Weller 2008, p.1). The main aspect underlined within this context is the absence of concrete instruments, such as benchmarks, designed to avoid the ‘dilemma of implementation’ (Hughes and Sasse 2003; Sasse 2009, p. 22). The Treaty on the European Union (TEU), for instance, contains no specific reference to the body of international law protecting minority rights. Its Article 151 points indeed at ‘national
and regional diversity’ as a Community value, important for ‘the flowering of the cultures of the Member States’. This is however the only article where the cultural diversity of human life in the Union is suggested, and it stresses the ‘regional’ form rather than the ethno-linguistic substance of cultural specificity. It is also interesting to note that the TEU contains the word ‘ethnic’ only in the anti-discrimination article 13(1), while the word ‘minority’ simply does not appear anywhere in the text (Official Journal of the European Union, 2006).

By the same token, anti-discrimination principles in the Amsterdam Treaty (1997, Art. 6a) do point at the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) as institutions where discrimination against individual members of minority communities could be attacked. However, the respective article does not encode comprehensively the protection of minority communities (Amato and Batt 1998). Inside the Union, as ‘a creature of consensus politics’, the EU’s own position on minority issues remains balanced by the positions of the Member States (Weller 2008, p. 2). Some of them refrain even from recognising the existence, to some extent, of particular minorities within their territories (e.g. France, Greece, and some CEECs; see Hughes and Sasse 2003, note 28; Sasse and Thielemann 2005, p. 660; Galbreath 2006). Minority issues have received thus a rather incoherent approach from the EU and even the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) does not change the situation. Both the Treaty and its Charter of Fundamental Rights contain only vague references to minorities and do not alter substantially the existing situation (Weller 2008, p. 2).

Despite this obvious want of coherence, the EU is still considered, and sees itself as, a global champion of human and minority rights with a missionary role, especially in its relations with candidate countries (Donnelly 1998, p. 15; Sasse 2009,
That is because it is eventually armed with certain policy tools, such as the ‘mainstreaming’ (Toggenburg 2005, p. 718) and especially the annual Regular Reports for candidate countries. The latter have become instrumental in the explicit formulation of respect for and protection of minorities as political conditionality, especially when coupled with the monitoring activity and Commission’s recommendations (Dobre 2003, pp. 62-63; Rechel 2009, p. 4).

Indeed, the Regular Reports of the European Commission ‘have been the EU’s key instrument to monitor and evaluate the candidates’ progress towards accession’. The Commission refers in them to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (henceforth Framework Convention) adopted by the CoE in 1995 as primary instrument, which the applicant states are required to sign and ratify (Sasse 2009, p. 20). The annual Regular Reports are therefore accounts of progress in applicant states vis-à-vis the provisions of the Framework Convention and that is why the analysis of developments in Romania and Turkey (sections 4.4 and 5.2) will refer mainly to them. It is therefore necessary to identify the meaning attached to the concept of minority by international law in general and the Framework Convention in particular.

1.2. The concept of minority rights in international and EU law

Contemporary world politics has been marked, among other things, by an increasing concern with the condition of human beings and their cultural communities in relation with various forms of authority. The first coherent formulation of minority rights emerged under the aegis of the League of Nations but it was to be heavily exploited by the German Nazi regime as pretext for territorial expansion (Hughes and
Sasse 2003, p. 4; Kymlicka 2007, p. 380). That formulation was thus to be left out in the first relevant document adopted by the United Nations (UN). However, the UN did establish a Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities in 1947, under the Economic and Social Council (Freeman 2002, p. 114). Following this, the UN General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with its Resolution 217 A (III) on 10 December 1948. Putting aside the interests of signatory states in manipulating such young concerns, the document served as foundation for future developments by providing a ‘basic normative exposition’ for the concept of human rights (Rosas 1995, p. 62).

Despite its rather vague formulation from legal viewpoints and the absence of specific reference to minority rights, the Universal Declaration is relevant for the argument developed here. It expressed for the first time at the level of world politics ‘a paradigmatic challenge to the Hobbesian strand of Westfalian legacy’ and the concern of all signatory states regarding the relation between state sovereignty and its human domain (ibid.). It enunciated in the Preamble the doctrine of natural rights for all individuals as ‘members of the human family’ (UN 1948) and pointed at the state as ‘principal duty-holder’ concerning the protection of such rights through national and international measures (Bojkov 2004, p. 332). Crucially, it viewed humans as ‘“born free and equal in dignity and rights”, rather than the nationals (citizens) of a given state’ (Rosas 1995, p. 63). This particular formulation suggested then an understanding of human life as a category of world politics in an un-named form, i.e. independent from civic-political labels of citizenship, or of belonging to particular, ethnically defined communities.

However, minorities are always identifiable as groups of individuals bound together on various grounds; ethnic minority communities are obviously bound
together on the basis of individual members acknowledging their belonging to specific ethno-linguistic groups. The various conceptualisations of group rights tend to agree on the nature of this category as external protection rights, i.e. rights conferring, to identifiable groups, protection from potential external threats to group identity. Among them are threats posed by majorities constituted legally (Kymlicka 1995, Chapter 4) and apt to protect themselves as sovereign entities. The UN General Assembly made yet another contribution to the emergence of a notion of ethnic groups’ rights in international law by adopting in 1966 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 27 of the ICCPR provides that in those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, ‘persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language’ (Office of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1966).

The ICCPR was thus apparently much more specific than the Universal Declaration concerning ethnic minorities. Critics of the ICCPR were however quick to note that it actually encouraged states not to recognise ethnic minorities existing within their jurisdiction since it applied only to states where such groups did exist. It encouraged individuals (Article 1) and groups (Article 27) to invoke the right to self-determination as national minorities, which national sovereignties would view with suspicion (Sasse and Thielemann 2005, p. 658; Babbitt 2006, p. 187). Moreover, the Covenant mentioned ‘persons belonging to such minorities’ and not minorities as such, the text being therefore interpretable as addressing individual and not community rights. The ontological weight of these provisions and the debates around them is obvious and that is precisely why this dissertation will elaborate upon implications in the next chapters.
There are two main approaches established in practice concerning the above: the protection of minority identity through the protection of individuals belonging to minority groups and the protection of minority communities as such. The first, *individualist*, approach is predominant in the Anglo-Saxon thinking, especially in the United States. Its logic relies on the idea that civil and political rights being granted to all citizens, regardless of their belonging to national or ethnic groups, makes minority communities protection redundant (Sadurski 2008, p. 217). The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, adopted by the UN in 1992, refers to individual persons as holders of such rights. The provision in its Article 1 does indeed speak of the obligation on behalf of states to protect minority cultures and linguistic identities. This demands though ‘positive measures’ from states themselves, an aspect not elaborated upon in the respective treaty (Freeman 2002, p. 115).

This ambiguity was to be corrected with a 1994 interpretation, which marks the alternative *community* or *collective* approach, by the UN’s Human Rights Committee of Article 27 (ICCPR) indicating that it applied to ethno-cultural minority communities regardless of territorial disposition or of how old they were on a particular territory, thus making it a ‘truly universal cultural right’ (Kymlicka 2007, pp. 381-382). The 1992 UN Declaration also recognised minorities’ rights to political representation, adding the right to participation in decision-making (Miller 2002, p. 187). But such provisions did not establish legally the *duty* of signatory states to adopt wider positive measures for the protection of minorities as cultural communities. The EU enlargement conditionality does suggest, on the other hand, the duty of states engaged in the accession to the Union to assist minorities. The implementation of such desiderata remains nevertheless dependent on the actual willingness of regimes
in that direction. The EU did give initially some attention to collective minority rights regarding the candidate CEECs, but renounced monitoring this issue during the 2000s (Toggenburg 2005, p. 733; see sections 4.4, 5.2, and Chapter 6).

Eventually, expectations may be too high concerning the capacity of liberal democracy to incorporate in its practice the very notion of minority in a sense other than that of a loser in elections. The theoretical scheme of liberal-democracy, as framed especially by Rousseau, leaves virtually no room for the conceptualisation of ethnic and cultural minorities within a human realm in which the dominant discourse is built by the ‘general will’, constituted with its own political culture. Such discourse naturally favours the majority and the granting of only certain individual rights to minorities, while being generally insensitive to the idea of communities inside that produced by the general will (Freeman 2002, pp. 115-116; Miller 2002, pp. 189-190; Deets 2006, p. 430; Kymlicka 2007, p. 383).

This old incompatibility became evident in Europe where the individualist approach simply failed to counteract the upheavals of the twentieth century, culminating with the horrors of Nazism, Communism, or the Balkan wars later. The community approach tended therefore to be given increasing attention in Europe only after World War Two in the format of collective rights for minorities within the larger, majority or nominal groups, defining national sovereignties. As indicated above, the EU renounced, however, monitoring collective minority rights in the 2000s. And in the multicultural context of factual life in Central and Eastern Europe, the preservation of a cultural identity demands the recognition of the ethno-political identity of the respective community. This in turn means much more than the relevance of language rights for the political participation of minorities in the democratic process (Sadurski 2008, p. 219). It means the very right of minorities to be
as ethno-cultural entities within the human domain of nominal ethno-sovereignties. At stake is ontology beyond just political games.

Such developments and questions have constantly called for clarifications concerning the concept of ethnic minority. Internationally, the most often mentioned definition has been that of a former member of the European Court of Justice, Francesco Capotorti (1985, p. 389). In his view, ethnic minorities are groups residing in a state but differing from the majority in that state in terms of numerical inferiority and non-dominant position. Their members ‘possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the rest of the population and […]', if only implicitly, maintain a sense of solidarity directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language' (ibid.; also quoted in Weber 1998, note 181; Grigoriadis 2006, p. 447; Kurban 2007, p. 8). This definition stresses the non-dominant position of the ethnic minority in order to exclude colonial or other situations where such minorities were dominant. It clearly points at the ‘subjective criteria’ (ethnicity, language, religion, sense of communal solidarity) marking the distinction of minority from majority (Sasse 2005, p. 676; Sasse and Thielemann 2005, p. 657).

In the spirit of the definition above, the contemporary relations between ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities in a nation-state are understood here in terms of effective power, which implies rights in effect, since in a democracy the majority contends rights to rule. This also represents, in this dissertation, the central element distinguishing minority policies, designed by the more powerful majorities, from what is described here as inter-ethnic politics and relations of equality (see pp. 10, 14, 102-103). Regardless of their actual numbers, ethnic minorities are non-ruling communities within the system of power in the societies of national states (Barzilai
However, it must be kept in mind that there is still no international consensus regarding the specific legal definition of the national minority, i.e. the ethnic minority group under national majority sovereignty, in international law (Jackson-Preece 1998, pp. 9-17, 27-29; Hughes and Sasse 2003, p. 5; Cholewinski 2005, p. 698; Galbreath 2006, p. 72, 74; Kymlicka 2007; Sadurski 2008, p. 216). In Europe, the CoE’s Recommendation 1201/1993 addressed the matter in its Article 1 (PACE 1993) stating that,

[T]he expression ‘national minority’ refers to a group of persons in a state who:
- reside on the territory of that state and are citizens thereof;
- maintain longstanding, firm and lasting ties with that state;
- display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics;
- are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of that state or of a region of that state;
- are motivated by a concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language.

The term can also be identified in the long history of European diplomatic practice referring to ‘historically settled groups, living on or near what they view as their national homeland, who find themselves as a minority in a larger state’ (Kymlicka 2007, p. 384). They have emerged as such after having lost in the grand European process of national state formation, their homelands being incorporated in larger states dominated by nominal ethnic groups (ibid.).

In general, modern sovereign states accept reluctantly to recognise minority rights because this tends to encourage outside interference in domestic politics. Additionally, there are also difficulties in finding universally accepted solutions to the particular problems of specific minorities, the general threat to the cohesion of states posed by minorities, and the possibility that the promotion of minority rights can discriminate against majorities (Eide 1992, p. 221). Nevertheless, Recommendation
presented above and other relevant conventions that the EU refers to in its enlargement documents suggest the existence of a specifically European regime of national minority rights (see sections 4.4 and 5.2).

In the early 1990s, the European Communities were in a process of redefining their own future, concluded with the agreement on and ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992/1993. And, while minority rights had been present on the enlargement agenda ever since the first Spanish application in the early 1960s (Bojkov 2004, pp. 341-342; Bartels 2005, p. 50), a clearly structured reference to this issue emerged only in 1993, with the political criteria for EU membership (Hughes and Sasse 2003, p. 5; Cowan 2007, p. 554; Mungiu-Pippidi 2007, p. 62). The reasons behind this sudden concern for specificity in Brussels have been identified in the growing concern with continental security after 1989 (see pp. 30-31). It was feared, indeed, that the degradation of communist authority throughout Eastern Europe would make possible the explosion of latent inter-ethnic tensions with consequences difficult to predict at continental scale (Sasse 2005, p. 675; Sadurski 2008, p. 209).

Thus, the Union imported into its enlargement policy formulation the nexus democracy-minority rights from the political conditionality of the Council of Europe (CoE), while the other crucial nexus – between security and minority protection – that completed the current construction of minority rights came from the OSCE (Sasse 2009, p. 20). There is however a significant number of researchers that identify only a rather weak relation between the enlargement conditionality and the concrete development of policies or institutional reforms addressing the issue of ethnic minority protection in the candidate countries (Hughes 2004, p. 8; Sadurski 2008, p. 210; Sasse 2009). While still considering itself a global champion of minority rights through the imposition on states of signing and ratifying legally binding treaties as
accession conditionality, most such treaties came to light under the aegis of the UN and the CoE. Thus, the EU remains first and foremost probably the best partner of such international organisations, including the OSCE, promoting the relevant treaties. The OSCE also created an institution in 1992 to address issues concerning minorities in conflicting situations between member states, namely the High Commissioner on National Minorities (henceforth OSCE-HCNM).

Given the absence of an international or an internal consensus on the legal meaning of the ethnic national minorities, sources of law are extremely limited (Sadurski 2008, pp. 209, 211) and hence the UN/CoE/OSCE understanding of minority rights is crucial. The lack of harmonisation between the three major understandings however determines inevitable confusion in implementation. Norms expressed in the CoE’s Framework Convention and by the OSCE-HCNM differ for instance from international law under the UN in their specific reference to ‘national minorities’, even without defining the concept (Hughes and Sasse 2003, pp. 6-7). Article 27 in the UN’s ICCPR ‘lumps together “national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities” and accords them all the same generic minority rights’ (Kymlicka 2007, p. 384).

The Framework Convention on the other hand, while remaining currently the only legal instrument for setting relevant standards, is minimalist and calls for a political approach rather than a clear-cut judicial implementation (Sadurski 2008, p. 213). The elaboration of the Copenhagen minority criterion as a tool for monitoring the compliance of candidate states could not suffice then since it is not supported by a solid legal foundation except for the reference made in Accession Partnerships to the minimalist Framework Convention (Sasse 2009, p. 20; Rechel 2009, p. 4). Students of minority politics within this context were right then to look, like Csergo (2002; 2007),
into the domestic politics of candidate countries for explanations of EU enlargement success concerning the treatment of minorities there. The undeniable achievements in this field, clearly determined by the Union’s ‘role in shaping and stabilising minority issues’ (Sasse 2009, p. 17) could not be explained in the absence of reference to significant developments taking place inside the candidate states.

However, such explanations tend to fall into the methodological trap of causality by following the underlying logic of the context in which causes begin their chained existence. And, in a world politics build on the foundations of an inside/outside logic defined by the nation-state (Walker 1993), causes cannot go much beyond these foundations. The dissertation will clarify, in fact, that certain change in the treatment of minorities did emerge as caused explicitly by pressures associated with the EU enlargement (see especially section 4.5 and Conclusions). Such change is restricted, however, to the formal level of inter-ethnic relations and therefore, in conformity with the main hypothesis (see pp. 18-19), does not alter their configuration in terms of effective power. Problems between national sovereignties and ethnic minorities are bound to last as long as the language of their communication remains the language of national sovereignty, which has produced the separation between them in the first place. Profound and irreversible reforms should then address this aspect, as also suggested in the conclusions to this dissertation.

The central example in this sense is the constitutional language of national sovereignties, which fixes the natural cultural diversity of human life in the immobile text of law. National constitutional law thus confines human life to objective juridical borders (Barkin and Cronin 1994, p. 112) proclaiming, implicitly or explicitly, the inferior status of minorities in their relations with nominal majorities. Seriously contentious issues in inter-ethnic relations under a national sovereignty may be
eliminated provided that such legal discourse ends, i.e. when it ceases to be instrumental in the production of a nationalised political life. The success of EU membership conditionality in the field of minority politics must mean that political solutions are found, with inspiration from the EU’s discourse of enlargement, as to overcome the tension between minority rights and the discourse of liberal-democracy balancing between the general will and individual rights (Freeman 2002, pp. 115-116). This presupposes, however, the elaboration of a *philosophy of denationalised sovereignty*, outside the modern box limiting political life to national possibilities, an aspect that will be elaborated upon in the conclusions (Chapter 6). Until then, the immediate next step is the preliminary presentation of the formal relations between the Romanian and Turkish national sovereignties and the most numerous minorities in their realms.

1.3. Romania and Turkey toward EU membership: preliminary considerations regarding ethnic minorities

Following the collapse of Ceauşescu’s communist and dictatorial regime in December 1989, Romania had applied for EU membership in 1995, but was invited to start accession negotiations only in 1999 owing mostly to the difficulties related to its communist past (Gallagher 1998, p. 111; Ioniţă 2003, p. 160). The country also entered the CEFTA only in 1997 due to the slow pace of reforms and the same reasons led to its being left out of the 2004 enlargement wave (European Commission 2000, p. 35; Bechev 2006, p. 29; Pridham 2007, pp. 236-238). Romania’s rather sluggish integration reforms were also determined by the return of authoritarianism at times and in various forms during the first half of the 1990s (Ardovino 2005, p. 35;
Pridham 2007, p. 239). To all these must be added serious difficulties in fighting corruption, or reforming the justice system and the administration (European Commission 2000, p. 18; Mungiu-Pippidi 2005, p. 47). Indeed, labelled as it was during its accession process as ‘the most corrupted country in Europe’ (Pridham 2007, p. 237), Romania had always had a long way to go before being recognised as truly belonging to the European family of states where the rule of law was the norm.

The revolutionary moment of December 1989 brought to power the National Salvation Front (NSF), a revolutionary type of grouping that became political party with the incorporation of elements from the previous regime under the leadership of Ion Iliescu, a former apparatchik in the Romanian Communist Party (Ciobanu 2007, p. 1432; Bechev 2009, p. 213). The Front gradually adopted a nationalist agenda and enjoyed a six-year domination of the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, thus impacting decisively on the country’s capacity for reform. Romania’s first and only post-communist constitution (1991) imposed in this context a legal framework constructed on a profoundly ethnic understanding of the ‘people’, with the nominal ethnicity seen as reigning sovereignly over others (Mihăilescu 2005, p. 30).

The current situation of the country as a member of both the EU and NATO owes much to the reforms started by the governing coalition under the first anti-communist President, Emil Constantinescu, who inaugurated a process of democratisation between 1996 and 2000 (Gallagher 1998; Constantinescu 2005). However, this is eventually a country where ‘illiberal nationalism’ ruled for many decades before the significant democratic change during the second half of the 1990s (Gallagher 1998, p. 112; Chen 2003). The systematic protests of ethnic minority groups, especially the more numerous and better politically organised Hungarians, coupled with the unfortunate clashes between ethnic Romanians and Hungarians in
Transylvania in March 1990, inevitably marked the period as the most convulsive in the country’s post-communist history.

From the perspective of this dissertation, one of the most significant features of the post-communist Romanian political landscape has been the dominance of a state-centric discourse, following a historical tradition illustrated in Chapter 4. Ethnocentrism played a significant role in this context, President Ion Iliescu insistently equating demands for decentralisation and local autonomy in early 1990s with threats to the very existence of the nation-state (Iordachi and Trenčsényi 2003, p. 424; Dobre 2005, p. 359). The situation improved with the gradual adoption of liberal-democratic reforms. While the anti-communist coalition government of 1996–2000 was indeed decisive in this respect, it should also be accepted that the continuation of reforms during the socialist government with Adrian Năstase as Prime Minister also played an important role. Far from parting with the ethno-centric discourse of Ion Iliescu and his nationalist allies (Dobre 2005, p. 361), Năstase advanced a number of measures that contributed to the improvement of country’s performance within the context of EU enlargement (Pridham 2002, pp. 968-969). It all culminated with the official invitation from the EU to start accession negotiations in 2000, a process that brought eventual membership in 2007.

Turkey, on the other hand, had started close relations with the European Economic Community (EEC) much before Romania. It applied unsuccessfully for full membership in 1959, concluded the Ankara Agreement in 1963 aiming at establishing the EEC-Turkey customs union with a view to full membership of the Communities, and applied again for membership, again unsuccessfully, in 1987 (Wood 1999, p. 95; Müftüler-Baç 2000, p. 164). Turkey’s relations with the EEC/EU have been seriously affected by a number of developments, among them being three military coups, the
Kurdish and Cyprus crises, the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the very establishment of the EU with the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Some scholars have insisted that the political decision of the EU to give priority to the enlargement with the former communist states affected mostly Turkey’s hopes of accession (Kubicek 2002, p. 761). One of the main premises in this dissertation is, however, that the Turkish political system was much more affected by domestic developments, which impacted negatively on its relations with the EEC/EU (Özbudun 2007; Turan 2007).

The invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974 and the military coup d’État of 1980 altered radically Turkey’s stand in the international arena and its relations with the Communities. Especially during the years of military rule, those relations were frozen and remained in that state until significant steps were taken toward democratisation (Müftüler-Baç and McLaren 2003, p. 21). Turkey eventually normalised its internal political situation, applied for full EEC membership in 1987 and established the customs union with the EU in 1995. This step was considered by the then Prime Minister Tansu Çiller as demonstrating the irreversibility of her country’s path to EU membership (Wood 1999, p. 97). However, Turkey was to receive candidate status much later, at the Helsinki European Council of 1999, accession negotiations starting officially in October 2005 (EurActiv 2005; Gates 2009, p. 402; Kaya 2009, note 5; Ünlü Bilgiç 2009, p. 816). By the time that the process started, the major eastward enlargement effort of 2004–2007 had already been almost completed and the EU had upgraded seriously the importance of political criteria for membership (Öniş 2000, p. 465; Pridham 2007, p. 237). Thus, the Turkish story of European integration is undoubtedly much more complex than that of
Romania and this is yet another reason why a comparative approach will not be undertaken here.

While there are some similar points, the two cases also present different types of relations between the respective national sovereignties and the ethnic minorities within their human realms. Thus, similarities are to be found in the adoption of a profoundly ethno-national perspective in the assertion of sovereign rights at the moment when the two states were founded (sections 4.1 and 5.1). Similar also are the particular typologies of reactions toward demands for recognition on behalf of important ethnic minorities living within the borders of the respective sovereignties. However, the Romanian and Turkish national sovereignties are fundamentally different in what concerns their perception of ethnic minorities in time. More precisely, while the Romanian sovereignty has traditionally recognised the existence of ethnic minorities in its constitutional definitions of the human domain, the Turkish sovereignty has always refused such recognition. These and other reasons (see pp. 13-14, 54-55) allow only for a limited comparative approach as also evident in the final conclusions.

The initial years of research behind this dissertation made possible the identification of certain boundaries within which it could be undertaken. It meant the gradual clarification of research questions and the idea that the dissertation needed to focus more on the historical formation of the Romanian and Turkish sovereignties. This justifies the length of the dissertation given that the treatment of ethnic minorities is seen here as conditioned by the historical understanding of national sovereignty in the two countries. Further explorations showed clearly that discussing ethnic minorities in general would not have contributed to a clear mirroring and interpretation of the Romanian and Turkish national sovereignties in their relations.
with internal ethnic others. What was needed was the concentration of interpretation on the two sovereignties in tandem with one significant minority in each case.

The communities of Hungarians in Romania and Kurds in Turkey have been chosen therefore because those minority groups have challenged historically the two national sovereignties and explicitly contested the sovereign rights of Romanians and Turks respectively. The two minorities are the most numerous in the two countries and their actions challenge ontologically the position of sovereign superiority assumed by titular ethnic majorities (see also pp. 11-12, 14). Without taking a clear-cut comparative approach, the dissertation will demonstrate, however, that the accession to EU membership has not affected fundamentally the historical making of the Romanian sovereign self in its relations with the internal ethnic other. The conclusions to the study of the Romanian case will be also confirmed by the research on Turkey. In the next section, the respective majority-minority relations are briefly sketched, while more detailed accounts will be given in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively.

1.4. Romania and its Hungarian minority

According to the 2002 census, ethnic Hungarians numbered 1,434,377 people in Romania, while the entire population reached 21,698,181 (Annex 6). Hungarians however reside in significant concentration right in the middle of the country’s territory, especially in the districts of Covasna, Harghita and Mureș (see maps in Annexes 1, 2 and 3). There, they represent 73.79, 86.61, and almost 40 per cent respectively out of the entire number of inhabitants (EDRC 2002; Mihăilescu 2008, p. 555). The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DUHR) is the most important political voice of the community. It has represented Hungarians in the
Romanian Parliament ever since the fall of Ceauşescu’s communist dictatorship in December 1989, displaying a remarkable capacity of adapting to various schemes of political cohabitation (Gallagher 2008, p. 328). This party has made autonomy for the Hungarian community and especially the districts of Covasna, Harghita and Mureş one of its political objectives (see map in Annex 3). The objective of secession has never been explicit in the political discourse of the DUHR especially given the geographical location of the three counties and, moreover, the party’s electorate also seems uninterested in territorial revisions (Atanasova 2004, p. 415; Borbély 2009). However, the DUHR has been constantly vocal against the unitary and national definition of the state. It proposes instead a multinational conception of Romania, based on the view that all ethnic groups throughout the country are ‘state-constituting’ communities and have consequently equal rights with the majority (Csergo 2002, 2007; Borbély 2009).

The discourse of some Romanian political parties in the 1990s employed then a rhetoric built on the idea that the demands of the ethnic Hungarians undermined the country’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity (Dobre 2005, p. 359; Mihăilescu 2008, p. 557). This can be in fact interpreted as a continuation of Ceauşescu’s own response to the massive anti-communist manifestations initiated in Timişoara in November-December 1989, when the Hungarian pastor László Tökés emerged as a leading figure of the movement (Hall 2000, p. 1075-1076; Linden 2000, p. 129). That in turn may indeed be viewed as a continuation of nationalist discourses and practices of the pre-socialist age targeting the infiltration of communist ‘internationalists’ from imperial USSR (Verdery 1993, p. 181). The idea is important because it points at a regrettable continuity in Romanian politics of the nationalist theme, spanning actually over more than a century.
The Romanian sovereignty has lost no part of its territorial definition since the settlements that ended the Second World War. The developments following the collapse of the communist regime did not alter its territorial configuration either, despite the serious turmoil in former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. However, the post-communist attitudes of the Romanian ethnic majority and its political representatives did change and gradually left behind a rather long history of xenophobia. The first substantially positive sign was given by the inclusion of DUHR in the coalitions that have ruled Romania after the 1996 elections and the measures taken ever since to promote Hungarian minority’s rights (Deletant and Siani-Davies 1998; Maresceau 2001, p. 16). Since the territorial definition of sovereignty remained constant, what then was there that produced change in majority-minority relations? How can one explain the eventual acceptance of DUHR as partner by other parties in various ruling coalitions while suspicions regarding the ‘real’ aims of DUHR still persisted in the public opinion? And, in direct relation with the main question in this dissertation, do such developments indicate a profound change in the conception of political life by the Romanian sovereignty and in inter-ethnic relations?

Most answers from political scientists would refer to quantitative analyses starting, for instance, from the ‘reality’ of the 6.81 per cent of popular votes for the Senate and 6.64 per cent for the Chamber of Deputies in favour of DUHR in 1996 (Deletant and Siani-Davies 1998, p. 164). However, the DUHR did not take part officially in all subsequent ruling coalitions after 1996. Still, it continued to have a ‘decisive impact on the understanding of minority politics in Romania’, as described by one of the party’s leading figures (Borbély 2009). The questions above are not superfluous then. The formal aspects of majority-minority relations in Romania did change to a certain extent and the DUHR did play a decisive role in the context. This
did not mean, however, a fundamental alteration of the predication of national sovereignty and, as demonstrated in sections 4.4 and especially 4.5, did not lead to the emergence of inter-ethnic relations and politics of discursive equality (see pp. 10, 14, 22, 40, 102-103).

1.5. Turkey and its Kurdish minority

In the case of Turkey, the majority-minority scheme refers to relations between the nominal Turkish majority and the most numerous of all minorities in the country, i.e. the Kurdish ethnic group. The situation is, however, much more problematic than in the Romanian case for at least two reasons. First, it is still impossible for researchers to obtain official statistical data concerning the percentage of Muslim ethnic minorities in this country. Given particular sensibilities around the ‘Kurdish issue’ caused mainly by association with terrorist actions, figures concerning the number of Kurdish people in Turkey have been continuously surrounded by controversy (Mutlu 1996, p. 517). That is also because Ankara, as insisted on by the Minority Rights Group International (MRGI), is still applying strictly the provisions in Section III of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and recognises as minorities only the religious ones, that is, the Armenians, Jews, and the Rum Christians¹ (Lausanne Treaty 1923; Toktaş 2006, p. 490; Kurban 2007, p. 3; Tocci 2008a, p. 252). Consequently, the official census forms never include questions concerning the self-perception of individuals in terms of ethnicity and even the question of mother tongue disappeared after 1965. Under these conditions, the state recognises no political difference between Turks and Kurds despite the two groups being culturally and

¹ ‘Rum’ is the name given officially in Turkey to ethnic Greeks of Christian faith.
linguistically different, a fact recognised by the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk himself (Yeğen 2009, p. 598). And this particularity of the Turkish case is yet another reason among others (see pp. 13, 48-49, 55) why a clear-cut comparison with the Romanian case is not undertaken here.

The MRGI could only provide some vague figures approximated on the basis of the 1965 data. This suggests a number of Kurds living in Turkey anywhere between 10 to 23 per cent of the total population, this making them ‘the largest ethnic and linguistic minority in Turkey’ (Kurban 2007, p. 11; see also Ataman 2002, p. 123; CIA 2010). The research of Mutlu (1996) gave an approximation of over 7 million Kurds living in Turkey as of 1990, while the EU has estimated a number of 20 million (Bonner 2005, p. 59). Another study undertaken in the second half of the 1990s and based on the Turkish Demographic and Health Survey suggested a Kurdish-speaking population of around 15 per cent of the total population (İçduygu et al. 1999, p. 1002). A recent independent survey also showed that 12.5 per cent of the Turkish citizens consider Kurdish their mother tongue (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007, p. 23). That is while, according to the last official census published on 31 December 2008, the figure for the entire population of Turkey was 71,517,100 (TÜİK 2008). The most notorious political group claiming to represent the Kurdish population was until recently the Democratic Society Party (Turkish acronym DTP), a continuator of the Democratic People’s Party (Turkish acronym DEHAP).

Despite nation-wide suspicions, the statute and official positions of the DTP until eventually banned was not indicating the party making territorial secession an objective of its activity in Turkish politics. Various former heads of the DTP in Turkey have expressed publicly their support for the country’s territorial integrity, one of them even publishing an article on the matter in a daily journal with large
national readership (Tuğluk 2007). However, the matter mostly invoked in the Turkish public political discourse as negative about the DTP is its connection with the infamous Party of Kurdistan Workers (known throughout all the world by the Kurdish acronym PKK). This terrorist organisation claimed and continues to claim responsibility for many acts of armed violence that have dramatically altered security conditions in Southeast Turkey and Northern Iraq for around three decades now (see Annex 4 and 13). In November 2009, the Turkish Constitutional Court eventually ruled unanimously that the DTP became ‘a focal point for terrorism against the indivisible integrity of the state’ and banned its political activity (Anon. 2009).

Thus, the second aspect making the majority-minority relation in Turkey a problematic one is obviously derived from the rather ambiguous relation between DTP members and an organisation reputed for its non-peaceful means of pursuing political objectives, in themselves inimical to Turkish territorial sovereignty and integrity. The EU and USA together with Turkey have acknowledged the PKK as a terrorist organisation. The DTP has refused during its period of public activity to condemn the PKK’s terrorist activities and seemed to pursue in Turkish politics the ‘maximalist demands’ of the PKK hard-liners (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 25). This led even analysts involved in the design of EU foreign policy to suggest that the links between the DTP and PKK may actually be a kind of ‘secret de Polichinelle’: while not acknowledging it officially, decision-makers take it into account when planning official policies (World Bulletin 2007).

Given these conditions and especially its absence from Turkish political life following the ban of November 2009, it seems rather unproductive to contextualise DTP here on par with the DUHR in Romania. Some political groupings do seem to be successful in replacing the DTP in 2011 (detailed in section 5.2), but all are still far
from the political coherence of the DUHR. This also explains why the research could not adopt a clear-cut comparative perspective. Another is that even the public claiming of an ethnic Kurdish identity has been unconceivable in Turkey until recently. Unlike Romania, and in the spirit of the Lausanne Treaty mentioned above, Turkey does not yet recognise explicitly in constitutional law the very existence of any Muslim, non-Turkish minorities. A third aspect, specific for Turkish politics, is the high electoral threshold of 10 per cent for entering the unicameral parliament, namely the Turkish Grand National Assembly (\textit{Meclis}, henceforth GNA), especially high when compared with the 5 per cent threshold in Romania.

With this unusually high threshold for the Turkish demographic context, coupled with the traditional political factionalism in the large Kurdish community, parties representing the Kurdish minority are not able to obtain seats in the Assembly. They have adopted over the last decades the tactic of allowing their members run in elections as independent candidates to whom the threshold rule does not apply. In this way, twenty pro-Kurdish politicians were elected in 2007 to represent constituencies with majority Kurdish people in the GNA (Kurban 2007, p. 25; Ciddi 2008, p. 439). Considering the hurdles posed by the electoral system and the Kemalist establishment in general, it is difficult to predict whether another political force will be able to emerge as a powerful representative of the Kurdish community in the future (Kurban 2007, p. 25). Despite these serious problems, however, the government in Ankara has initiated in recent years a series of reforms aiming at improving, among other aspects, the socio-political condition of Kurdish population in Turkey within the context of EU accession negotiations (Hale 2003; Toktas 2006, p. 513; Kadıoğlu 2007; Özbudun 2007; see section 5.2).
The questions asked in this dissertation (see pp. 10-12, 29) point, however, at rather more subtle aspects. They concern not only the overall reform effort in Romania and Turkey vis-à-vis ethnic minorities, but also how profound reforms are as to encourage a politics of inter-ethnic equality. Even more importantly, what is the meaning of such transformations for the future conception of political life in Europe? If the EU is indeed the ultimate target for all countries of the continent in the long run, all possible answers to such questions cannot be but extremely valuable. However, the path to those answers is rather sinuous and the next two chapters clarify the general perspective and the methodology employed in this analysis.
2.1. Problems concerning the positivist understanding of sovereignty and a social constructivist solution

This dissertation explores the formation of the contemporary Romanian and Turkish sovereign subjectivities, from their emergence in the nineteenth century until the encounter with the EU enlargement process, and their relations with the Hungarian/Kurdish minorities in this context. Unlike Romania, Turkey did not experience the hurdles of the post-communist transition, during which the management of inter-ethnic relations brought about high political costs (Atanasova 2004, p. 428; Sasse 2009, p. 18). However, given the political turmoil of three military coups and a long tradition of state-centred, nationalist authoritarianism (Steinbach 1984; Poulton 1999; Navaro-Yashin 2002; Özbudun 2007), the imperative of democratisation places this country on a similar par with Romania from the perspective of the ‘Copenhagen’ criteria.

Throughout the entire Eastern Europe, the 1990s marked the beginning of processes of democratisation and market liberalisation. However, it soon became clear that the reformation of majority-minority relations represented one of the most sensitive issues and called for redefining national identities (Galbreath 2006, p. 71). Accession to the EU membership presupposed the preparation on behalf of candidate states for entering a space in which classical formulations of sovereignty already
suffer, gradually, fundamental alterations (see, for instance, Cooper 2002, 2003; Spruyt 2002; Walters 2004; Agnew 2005).

However, as hypothesised here (see pp. 18-19), the EU enlargement has not altered significantly the essentially discursive mechanisms of self-institution through which the Romanian and Turkish sovereignties continue to dominate their human realms. The questions asked here are about whether and to what extent the EU’s process of enlargement affects the predication of ethnic minorities by the respective national sovereignties toward the emergence of inter-ethnic politics of equality in EU-member Romania and EU-candidate Turkey (see pp. 10-12, 14, 29). And despite relative formal change at the institutional level, explained in sections 4.4 and 5.2, the enlargement has not altered the nationalisation of political possibilities especially in constitutional law and in the respective national education systems. The author is therefore interested methodologically in the ways, if any, in which the EU enlargement affects not only the general formulation and practice of sovereignty, but also and especially the historical nationalisation of possibilities of political life in Romania and Turkey. In order to address these concerns, the dissertation must build an understanding of national sovereignty beyond mainstream theoretical accounts for reasons that will become clear in what follows.

From its very emergence sometime in antiquity, i.e. from the beginning of non-nomadic history, the understanding of the principle of sovereignty has been constructed primarily along spatial coordinates as ultimate authority conditioning wealth and power (Bartelson 1995, p. 41, Barkin and Cronin 1994, p. 107; Aalberts 2004, p. 25; Behr 2007, p. 113). The logic of formulation was thus one legitimising a constituted power and the relations between it and its constituted subjects. This
scheme became increasingly sophisticated throughout the ages, the phenomenon leading to the emergence of the modern state.

This state is said to have been invented at least twice throughout its historical becoming: first with the emergence of the city-states in Renaissance Italy and then, once again, in the Westphalian laboratory (Ruggie 1993, pp. 147, 166; see also Bartelson 1995; Jackson 1999a; James 1999; Sørensen 1999; Spruyt 2002; Teschke 2003; Agnew 2005). Those two major episodes shaped an understanding of sovereignty as the right gained by kings to supreme, territorially defined authority to decide upon the religious definition of their subjects (Knutsen 1997, p. 85) within juridical borders (Barkin and Cronin 1994, p. 111; Spruyt 2002, p. 134; see also Thomson 1995). The full affirmation of this political principle in real life has been a rather long and complex process. However, students of sovereignty tend to agree that it led to the ‘modern’, territorially sovereign state replacing the feudal project of universal empire with a system of formal relations between itself, as monopoly over coercion, and individual subjects (Weber 1964; Tilly 1990, pp. 84-91; Thomson 1995, p. 213; Teschke 2003, p. 116).

The second half of the eighteenth century marked the beginning of yet another process of sophistication during which sovereignty became associated with the notion of nation as source of legitimacy. The national awakenings against empires following the American and French Revolutions waved the model of the United States Constitution of 1787 and the French Constitution of 1791. They famously advanced the principle of popular sovereignty, which turned subjects into citizens (Spruyt 2002, p. 133). However, this new formulation of sovereign authority also reinstated the old distance between subjects and sovereign kings by establishing citizens’ rights and duties in relation to a rather imaginary national community.
This linked inextricably two central ideas in the conceptualisation of national sovereignty until our times: that authority derives from the people and that the home of the people is a particular territory where they can protect their values under self-government (Jackson 1999b, p. 22; James 1999, p. 473). The nation-state made thus possible the localisation of the people territorially in the realm of sovereignty and subjectively in the site of power speaking sovereignly of its human domain by virtue of the quantitative superiority of the ethnic majority. The name of that majority became the name of the entire political nation, thus marking what is understood here as the *nationalisation of sovereignty*. This historical phenomenon led to an understanding of the sovereign authority as deriving from a physically identifiable national community, located in a physical realm, whose boundaries mark the limits of that authority. It has thus established the palpable materiality of the national state in terms of physically observable entities.

The twentieth century was to reveal the devastating consequences of the nationalist ideology taking over the seat of sovereign power in some countries with the overtones of fascism and communism. In these forms, national sovereignty became most aggressive as it overtly aimed at exterminating those who did not fit in the official predication of political normality in, for instance, the Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Romania, or Hungary, in Atatürk’s Turkey (section 5.1), or in Stalin’s Soviet Union. Such developments called for a more profound reading of political history and theorisations of the sovereign authority in relation with violence and death. Dean (2002, p. 123), for instance, has identified three most distinct accounts of sovereignty in the twentieth century: (1) as territorially-defined claim to exclusive monopoly on the legitimate employment of violence (Weber 1964; 1981), (2) as ‘decisionistic’ act of the sovereign, i.e. ‘he who decides the state of exception’
(Schmitt 2005, p. 5), and (3) in the form of the sovereign right over death from which all other powers are deduced (Foucault 1992, pp. 135-159).

In the context of world politics after the Second World War, the concept received then diverse interpretations from various schools of thought, including for instance liberal views of sovereignty suggesting its relative rather than absolute character (James 1999, pp. 457-458). Some scholars have even become comfortable with the historicity and artificiality of the concept as ‘a juridical idea and institution’ (Jackson 1999b, p. 10; italics added; see also Jackson 1999a, p. 432), or mere social construct (Wendt 1992, p. 412-415; Barkin and Cronin 1994, p. 109; Krasner 1999; Werner and De Wilde 2001). Extreme positions include the claim that sovereignty is only a myth (Biersteker and Weber 1996) that can even be eliminated from political philosophy, as proposed by Jacques Maritain more than fifty years ago (Thomson 1995, p. 214).

Myth or not, our contemporary political practice is still dominated by the Westphalian assemblage of the concept as a sovereign’s right to absolute internal authority to rule coercively, inviolable from within and without, over a territorially bound state (Walker 1993; Thomson 1995, p. 219; Krasner 1999; Wendt 1999, pp. 206-211; Sassen 2006). This suggests the profoundly legalistic foundation of the principle, also perpetuated in the practice of inter-state relations after 1945, as ‘an institution that expresses a territorial definition of political authority’ (Jackson 1999b, p. 24). Space, government, authority and population remain the physical ingredients necessary and sufficient for the contemporary state to pass for (political) reality. Subjective aspects, such as the historical nationalisation of sovereignty and the consequence of this phenomenon for non-majority citizens remain mere givens within
this context of world politics, one constituted by and through the constitution of national sovereignties.

However, in an environment dominated by tellurian gravitational forces, territoriuality is at best a matter of spatial positioning (Aron 1966, p. 182), the human individual being bound to occupy a portion of the earth’s surface for counting as being in the world (Bartelson 1995, p. 31). If one accepts the inevitability of inert territoriuality, what still remains to be elucidated is the medium through which the sovereign authority comes to establish a relation with its living human realm and, secondarily, its spatial distribution. It is in this relation, indeed, that a nationalised sovereign authority comes to discourse human life and its spatiality in the terms of national citizenship and national language, this bearing ontological consequences for the condition of ethnic minorities.

It must also be noted that most accounts of sovereignty summarised above theorise the manifestation of the constituted sovereignty and human life as already subjected to it. Such perspectives do not capture the ways, central here, in which the principle comes to constitute itself and objectify human life in its own discursive terms, including the terms of nationality. Moreover, the contemporary theorisation of sovereignty circumvents accounting for the ways in which the principle turns from a juridical idea, or construct (Jackson 1999b, p. 10; Wendt 1992, p. 412-415; Krasner 1999) into a fact of life after joining yet another subjective notion, the nation as ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2006).

It is eventually by objectification through constitution qua national sovereignty that the human realm of the national sovereign is created and this produces the ontological conditions for the actual being of ethnic minorities. Research on these minorities has revealed that the constitution of any ‘national’ sovereignty
entails inevitably their exclusion (Panayi 2000, p. 215) as to confirm the dominant position in the state of the ethnic majority group (Atanasova 2004, p. 357). However, the ways in which this actually takes place within the borders of the territorial realm of national sovereignty cannot be caught methodologically when research is guided by the contemporary understanding of sovereignty stressing physically constituted aspects only. What is needed is the comprehensive theorisation of this concept in its constitution, when it also constitutes a relation with a not yet nationalised human life.

In order to produce such theorisation, this dissertation must therefore reach beyond the legalistic accounts shaping contemporary politics (Barkin and Cronin 1994, p. 107), i.e. beyond the already constituted meaning of already instituted sovereignty. This is understood here as a pre-theoretical stage, when the concept is *factualised* in the living world, i.e. when it passes from the status of idea, or notion to that of fact of life. After the consummation of this event, one can experience only the form of political life predicated by the constituted sovereignties of the world. Theorising the ways in which the nationalised sovereignty comes to be the main speaker of political possibilities presupposes theorising the formation and self-institution of the subjectivities authoring the discourse of national sovereignty. This discourse dominates nowadays both theory and practice of world politics, being thus invoked in virtually all definitions of what counts as political normality inside and between states. Even the advent of the IR theory as academic field in the aftermath of the First World War (Smith *et al.* 1996, p. xi), with its dependency on the principle of sovereignty, confirms the legitimacy of the state inside/outside spatial containers as well as inside/outside all theory about them.

The insistence of mainstream theorists of sovereignty on physicalities, such as the territory and the physical population under its authority, as essential in the
formulation and functioning of sovereign authority is not erroneous. However, it leads to theory circumventing the aspects suggested above. By taking this perspective, the dissertation is placed then on the border between the positivist tradition and a post-positivist, essentially social-constructivist path. This does not necessarily imply the author denying the achievements of positivist research, which has dominated the past and most of the present social theories (Nicholson 1996, p. 128). It does imply, however, an attempt to move beyond the limits set by such dominant perspectives.


The consequence was that socially formed meanings of socio-political categories, such as the ‘national’ understanding of sovereignty, became rather difficult to digest by positivist methodologies. They tend to separate meanings from the ‘world out there’ (George 1994, pp. 11, 21, 53) and treat them as unobservables, i.e. unfit for the physical experience of human senses (Patomäki and Wight 2000, p. 217). By isolating meanings in this way, positivist empiricism could then fix social phenomena through the epistemological reduction of knowledge to categories. Following this preparation, the identification of causal links and regularities in social life became apparently a facile task: social phenomena, now reduced to mere
categories, became available for empirical research (Neufeld 1995, Chapter 3; Nicholson 1996, pp. 128-129, 134; Smith 1996, p. 19; Best and Kellner 1997, p. 201). Even personal political attitudes fell into the inexorable mechanisms of reductionist episemologism, evident in behaviourism, for which only observable human behaviour is scientifically relevant, thus depriving the world of its right to (semantic) depth (Patomäki and Wight 2000, p. 225). The result was an anti-natural depiction of the human society as system, apt to accomplish the Comtean project of establishing ‘the scientific or “positive” foundations of politics in order to reorganise industrial society’ (Zouboulakis 2008, p. 88).

When confronted with the richness of meanings inherent in the language of politics, this positivist scientism was caught improperly equipped for exploring such unobservables. It preferred the comfort of viewing sovereignty as territorially fixed essence of states’ authority making possible all state-related notions in the Euclidean spaces of modern politics (Walker 1993, p. 176). The contemporary, mainstream theory and practice of sovereignty became thus an instance of the ‘very restricted range of permissible ontological claims’ that positivist imagination allows for (Smith 1996, p. 17). However, they say eventually nothing of sovereignty per se in the absence of the state’s physicalities (territory, government, population) and, especially, nothing about how it becomes a fact of life in national dress. Consequently, positivism cannot account for the condition of minorities beyond merely acknowledging that they are there simply because national sovereignty is there.

Questions about meanings and the interpretation of social phenomena have been left to research practices that positivist scholarship views at best with suspicion. And the social constructivist perspective has been criticised later by scholars from the positivist camp precisely for the lack of a ‘systematic inquiry into the property-related
social sources of identity formation, which define particular interests and generate specific institutions’ (Teschke 2003, p. 245). However, given the discursive understanding of the main object of research, the broader methodological approach is guided in this dissertation precisely by the social constructivist assumptions concerning the reality of world politics as produced through social, discursive interactions.

The intimate bonds between the analytical study of discourse and the main tenets of social constructivism have been widely acknowledged in the academic environment (Onuf 1989; Milliken 1999, p. 225; Finnemore and Sikking 2001, pp. 394-395; Debriz 2002). The attention given by discourse analysis to the production of reality through language was thus naturally matched by the basic social constructivist understanding of reality as actively ideational and not fixed in epistemological givens (Wendt 1996, p. 48; 1999, p. 1; Hacking 1999; Howeling and Amineh 2003, p. 322). It is from this perspective that constructivism rejects the positivist belief in the possibility of objective observation and claims instead that ‘objects of knowledge are constructed’ (Guzzini 2000, p. 160), while theory-free observation is an illusion. From the constructivist perspective adopted here, political ‘reality’ can thus be said to be as the result of discourse predicating politics, political actors and phenomena.

The constructivist theory of world politics originated, in fact, in the so-called linguistic turn of the hermeneutic scholarship (Smith 2000; Neumann 2002; Howeling and Amineh 2003, p. 315). One of the main propositions of constructivism is that our knowledge of world politics is invariably mediated by interpretation. This proposition opposes explicitly the positivist view that ‘phenomena can constitute themselves as objects of knowledge independently of discursive practices’ (Guzzini 2000, p. 159). This is not to deny that there exists something called material reality ‘out there’ that
can be merely described, possibly in what John L. Austin called ‘constative’ language (Diez 2001, p. 87). Others would call it language narrating the existent as opposed to language producing reality, i.e. with ontological status (Neumann 1999, p. 225). While leaving room for such materiality, constructivist accounts insist however that ‘social realities exist only by human agreement’ (Christiansen et al. 2001, p. 3), which implies accepting that our lives are shaped by ideational factors, social practices and discursive performances with instrumental and normative dimensions (Ruggie 1998, p. 33).

Despite this obvious awareness about ideational reality in world politics, theoretical accounts of the EU enlargement, too, treat it with indifference sometimes. Incentives, EU membership above all (Dobre 2005), have invaded the academic scholarship in the field, which seems blinded by the goal of explaining enlargement, including reforms of minority policies, in quantitative terms of political bargaining between ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’, even in the absence of policy templates (Grabbe 2002, p. 14; Dobre 2005, p. 353; Babbitt 2006, pp. 190, 192). This excessive attention to quantitative aspects owes much to classical accounts in IR, such as realism and idealism, liberalism and Marxism, which tend to assume actors’ identities without problematisation (Ashley 1984; Wendt 1987; Agnew and Corbridge 1995). And assuming the nature of actors and of incentives guiding their interests is an analytical reflex so familiar to positivist accounts of world politics (Ashley 1984; Walker 1993; Demeritt 2002, p. 784; Teschke 2003, p. 27).

However, the analytical focus in this dissertation is not on formal, institutional reforms already taken in Romania and Turkey toward meeting the ‘minority’ aspects of the EU enlargement conditionality. While fully evidenced in sections 4.4 and 5.2, such reforms are mere results of certain governments perceiving the EU incentives as
strong enough to undertake them. The content of the reforms, however, may not be at all conducive to substantial alterations in the inferiority status of ethnic minorities under sovereign majorities, this view representing the main hypothesis here (see pp. 18-19, 58). The methodological focus in this dissertation on the question of minorities’ status and on the discursive production of the national political life justifies then a social constructivist perspective and a qualitative approach in terms of discourse analysis. Eventually, the very idea of a better treatment of minorities in countries candidate to EU membership can indeed be ‘best understood as political and social construct’ (Sasse 2009, p. 17).

Relations between national sovereignties and ethnic minorities, and the notion of protection of minorities, are established and fostered primarily at the ideational level. And the object of research in this dissertation is the nature of change in the predication of minorities by national sovereignties under the influence of the EU, and not the material causality behind that change (see pp. 10-12, 43). This does not exclude referring to quantitative aspects, explicable in terms of causes and incentives, regarding the formal level of relevant reforms. However, the research concentrates on interpreting the meaning of change in this context, which clearly indicates a qualitative analysis approach.

The following section will clarify the ontological weight of the name of the nation in the discursive production of political life by national sovereignties. Under this name, the sovereign authority inherently promotes in its discourse the ethnic majority’s interests while at the same time excluding minorities (Panayi 2000, p. 215). The linguistic nature of this aspect and its perpetuation in daily political life legitimises, one more time, the social constructivist path taken in the dissertation. Moreover, it also calls for a coherent theorisation of the relation between sovereignty
and language, which will be undertaken with a phenomenological approach and method clarified in Chapter 3. The role of the next section is then to connect the basic social constructivist tenets explained above with the author’s phenomenological understanding of national sovereignty.

2.2. National sovereignty as onomastic act: toward a phenomenological analysis of national sovereignty

The nation-state is not understood here as an already constituted actor whose identity is assumed and whose behaviour can be measured and predicted. This would presuppose accepting and taking for granted its authority to discourse human life, which implies accepting the nationalisation of possibilities of political life. The above-mentioned questions guiding this research demand stepping beyond this perspective toward a pre-constituted stage of sovereignty, whence a subjectivity advances a discourse of human life in the terms of the ‘nation’ and then becomes dominant discourse of sovereignty. In other words, the focus here is on the national sovereign subjectivity authoring historically its own political domain, including the human domain. This act of authorship makes possible the legitimately constituted (Mouffe 1995, p. 217) mechanism of territorially defined and ultimate authority (Ardrey 1966; Agnew and Corbridge 1995). However, the territoriality of sovereignty is understood here as mere reference point for locating the object of research, which is then simply bracketed out methodologically. Terrestrial territoriality responds only to the question where, while the main focus here falls on the how, i.e. the ways in which sovereignty turns national and in effect fixes the space and time of human life all together in the national meanings of political life.
Discourses of national sovereignty dominate domestic political agendas (Babbitt 2006, p. 192) and tend to shape the general limits of political possibilities even when sovereign states encounter the conditionality of EU enlargement. If this research is to establish whether and to what extent the predication of ethnic minorities has changed in Romania and Turkey under the EU influence, then the Romanian and Turkish discourse of national sovereignty needs to be clearly identified in its historical construction up to and including its encounter with the EU discourse of European values and norms (Rechel 2009, p. 3-4).

This presupposes precisely the exploration of the how about the construction of sovereign political identities (Doty 1993, p. 299). The question is about how they come to act as homogenising principles producing apparently coherent, culturally monolithic actors on the international stage and how such monolithic structures are affected by change (Rae 2002, pp. 17, 22). The idea of nation, comprehensible as discursive form, also takes material substance as factualised through the nationalisation of territory and life within its borders. Territory serves for the situation of the nation in geographic materiality, but it is discourse propagating the idea of national sovereignty that nationalises space and turns it into ‘ethnoscape’ (Smith 1999, p. 150). And the same national sovereignty authorising national history textbooks that propagate the story of the ethnoscape also nationalises the political present of human life through the notion of citizenship (Kratochwil 1996, pp. 184-185). Part of the nationalisation process is also the incorporation of the language of the dominant ethnic group into the political concept of citizenship. This becomes the official language of the state and its citizenry, while minority ethnic groups and their languages become anomalous within the normalcy instituted by national sovereignties (Rae 2002, p. 256). These three steps lead to the nationalisation of possibilities of
political life in relation with the territory of national sovereignty, but they are accomplished through the construction of national pasts and presents.

The ideational notion of nation takes thus over *qua* political principle of constitution the physical human realm by turning human life into political object of national polity building. This has been clearly seen in our times with the emergence of various citizenship regimes (Brubaker 1992, p. 3; Allina-Pisano 2009, p. 266) and the political engineering of language by ‘identitarian entrepreneurs’ (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, p. 27) in post-communist Europe. Through such engineering, the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2006) leaves its ideational home and invades the materiality of factual/actual life through fixation in laws of national citizenship and the usually single, official language of the national state. This is a clear example of discourse producing reality, an aspect that will be elaborated upon in what follows. Within the concrete analytical perimeter of this dissertation, it means the *nationalisation of sovereignty*, with ontological consequences for ethnic minorities (see pp. 59-63). Analysing this political (f)actualisation of the nation makes necessary then a qualitative approach apt to elucidate the ways in which the actual multicultural mix of human life is fixed discursively in the national political form.

Another reason for a qualitative approach here is that quantitative solutions are insistently avoided in the EU’s position, too, especially on issues in which minority politics are central. The documents associated with the enlargement policy insist on aspects that could rather be grouped in a category referring to the *quality of human life* in terms of political, economic, and social conditionality. When addressing the issue of minority protection, the Regular Reports contain a discursive construction of the human domain of sovereignty in terms of care before control and respect before policing. No reference is made there to territoriality, secessions, autonomies, numbers
of people, or any other quantitative aspects. The main elements of conditionality in the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’ (European Council 1993, p. 1) indicate clearly this perspective:

Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

The text expresses a general concern with the capacity of candidate states to perform according to specified standards vis-à-vis (1) the common European institutions and (2) their citizens. Nominal citizenship becomes in this context a matter of responsibility and not of sheer, irresponsible power over minorities. Most importantly, the criteria indicate clear awareness on behalf of European institutions regarding the multiethnic and multicultural human life in its realm, since all candidates are warned about the protection of minorities.

However, the EU enlargement cannot be expected to interrupt in an instant the discursive fluency of national sovereignties in their relations of power with their human realms. Titular ethnic majorities have been engineering national communities from seats of sovereign authority for almost two centuries now (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 73; Agamben, 2000, p. 18; Atanasova 2004, p. 357). The enlargement process could only alter the conception of human life in the discourse of national sovereignty in terms of ethnic wholeness, and determine it to adopt ethnically neutral predications of human life and security (Sasse 2009, p. 17). The dissertation will reveal eventually the extent to which these expectations are confirmed in fact in the cases of Romania, which has become EU Member State in 2007, and Turkey, which has started accession negotiations in 2005.
As suggested above, the discoursing of human life by the respective national sovereign subjectivities is, nevertheless, the result of long historical processes. Analysing then the historical production of national sovereignty in the two cases is the first task, which presupposes the assembling of an intricate research mechanism. This builds essentially on the axiom according to which constructivism is ‘epistemologically about the social construction of knowledge, and ontologically about the construction of social reality’ (Guzzini 2000, p. 160; italics in original). It is precisely the historical construction of the national reality by the national sovereign subjectivities in Romania and Turkey that will need to be approached here. In order to advance in this methodological direction, the remainder of this section will clarify the specific social constructivist path to be adopted toward a phenomenological analysis of national sovereignty, which Chapter 3 will elaborate upon.

The fate of ethnic minorities is nowadays bound to the political form that is the norm of present world politics, i.e. the nation-state form. As a result, nation-states dominate the imagination of political possibilities and institute their mono-cultural exceptions from the otherwise multicultural content of human life. The legal-political form of the nation-state can be thus said to have fixed human multiculturality in the territorialised patterns of contemporary world politics as designed through interactions between national sovereignties over the last two centuries. There is significant academic literature insisting that the condition of minorities inside and outside (national) states continues to be determined along the logic of the nation-state (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 73; Agamben 2000, p. 18; Csergo 2007, pp. 11, 112; Rae 2002, pp. 14-15, 251-58; Kelley 2004; Isyar 2005, p. 350; Kymlicka 2007, pp. 381-82). This ‘now’ we live in is therefore a nationalised temporality in which non-sovereign
nations have little if any chance of asserting their own, political present-presence within the boundaries of nationalised spaces of sovereignty.

This author accepts that boundaries make possible entities (Abbott 1995, p. 860), but also that boundaries are instituted by subjective intentionality. Boundaries of the national possibilities of political life are instituted by national sovereign subjectivities. Their constitution is understood here as far more important than their practices as constituted subjectivities because it is in the act of constitution that the national is instituted as ontological norm of political life. Alterity is born with the constitution of the national domain of sovereignty, i.e. long before being materialised in actual borders (Wendt 1999, p. 225) and, in Abbott’s logic, long before the constitution of social entities. Elucidating the (f)actualisation of national sovereign subjectivities is then a legitimate step toward theorising the condition of non-sovereign ethnic communities. This presupposes explicating the turning of the ideas of the nation and sovereignty (see p. 61) into facts of human life.

We owe to Benedict Anderson the unmasking of the imagined character of the national community (2006). Other contributions, pioneered for instance by the work of Eugen Weber (1976), helped reveal the ways in which the imagined community was actualised in human life. Our contemporary understanding of nation- and state-building could not have been possible in the absence of these inquiries. However, they were not designed to cover all aspects of the process. Eugen Weber, for instance, has pointed at the role of the education system, especially the teaching of ‘national’ history and geography, in the production of a national conscience (1976, pp. 333-334). His research did not aim at revealing the subjectivity behind the constituted physicality of an educational system and the ways in which constructions of the national self make possible that system. Neither Benedict Anderson, nor Eugen
Weber addressed the very making of the sovereign national self and the birth of a negative conception of alterity inside it.

Modern sovereignties have developed border management systems, the passport and the identity card, complex forms of record keeping, and the legal concept of official language, all highly efficient mechanisms able to literally turn the ‘idea’ of sovereignty (Jackson 1999b, p. 10) into palpable reality (İşin 2007, p. 215). Positivist social sciences encounter no trouble in approaching these tangible and therefore measurable aspects of political life. Their precision diminishes however when the question is not about such post-constitutional forms, but about what sovereignty is in the first instance and, specifically, about what is that which makes it capable of instituting the particular ‘national’ name as rule of constitution. If it is indeed true that the issue of ethnic minorities arises at the moment when ‘the people or the nation, rather than the ruler or the government, become the referent for sovereignty’ (Jackson 1999b, p. 23), then scholarly research should be able to reveal the how.

Positivist accounts cannot touch upon this aspect of national sovereignty simply because the act in question is onomastic and thus discursive par excellence. It is the simplest act of naming the realm of sovereignty and thus producing, not only the political identity of the domain, but also its entirety (Campbell 1996, p. 165), its omnipresence and wholeness, hence possibilities of alterity to itself. This is a discursive act productive of reality (Doty 1993, p. 302), one that positivism avoids to discuss for lacking empirical evidence (Milliken 1999, p. 227). It is essential then for this dissertation to step methodologically outside the empiricist box of palpable data into the non-physical, subjective intimacy of sovereignty whence it defines itself. That means following the constructivist path opened by the linguistic turn in social sciences (Neumann 2002, pp. 627-628) and the assembling of a mechanism of
discourse analysis capable of capturing the ontological consequences of the sovereign idea becoming a fact of human life.

The becoming national of sovereignty can be caught methodologically only in its pre-constituted form, at the moment when it proclaims its existence toward (f)actual constitution. That is the historical moment when the existence of the nation is announced triumphantly in an emerging national literature and historiography even before the constitution of the national political form, usually rising against a foreign and inimical sovereignty. This is eventually the story of all national liberations from, say, the Greek episode of early nineteenth century to Kosovo. Proclaiming the existence of the nation implies in such cases a claim to present-presence constituting the fact of the nation aiming at instituting its (f)actual sovereign authority. The name of the nation is omnipresent in the process as agent of nationalisation producing the national political normality. It signals the national sovereign subjectivity qua ‘metapolitical authority […] empowered or authorised to decide what is political in the first place’ (Thompson 1995, p. 214) under the name of the dominant ethnic group.

National sovereignty represents in this way a particularisation of sovereignty’s abstract idea of legal substance (Jackson 1999b, p. 10; Dahlman 2009, p. 29) with the sovereign authority taking the name of the nation. It thus conditions the political being of human life on its fitting into the scheme of meanings attached to the concept of nation and giving sense to its name. The territorialisation of national sovereignty comes a posteriori to this onomastic act in descriptive, constative language (Derrida 1992, p. 18) serving basically the identification in space of political life, its location. However, the nationalisation of this constative language also neutralises ‘the eventfulness of the event’ (Derrida 2003, p. 43) of human life by subordinating it to life only in the name of the nation. The territoriality of sovereignty
says in essence only that this human realm is under the authority of this sovereign due to its presence within these territorial borders. The territorial aspect however consumes its discursive energy with this act of fixation, while it is the onomastic act that produces the content of identity expressed then as legal substance of national sovereignty in written law (Barkin and Cronin 1994, pp. 107-108).

The act of naming has received certain attention in the twentieth century. Derrida approached it in essays gathered under the title On the Name (1995), which suggest the ontological weight of onomastics. Levinas saw naming and especially proper names in their sublime role of standing, as individual signifiers of thinking human subjects, against the modern ‘dissolution of meaning’ (1997, p. 4). Gadamer also discussed naming when exploring man’s relationship with the world, characterised by freedom of choice. To Gadamer, this resembled God’s entrusting Adam with the power to name creatures (1998, p. 444). The contextualisation of the onomastic power of man within the sphere of freedom indicates however some problems that will be approached in the next chapter (see p. 116). Until then, let us note at this point that these prominent voices of twentieth-century philosophy refrained from a more extensive analysis of this onomastic power from the perspective of political thought on sovereignty. The dissertation explores therefore this path and builds originally, in Chapter 3, a specific methodology and method of research starting from the very premise that naming is the cornerstone in the construction of modern, national sovereignties.

The form of authority manifesting sovereingly toward its human domain by defining it in national terms seems to this author more than merely ‘ultimate’. This is a status suggesting the superiority of sovereignty to all other possible forms of authority on a definite territory (Spruyt 2002, p. 134). The authority inherent in the
onomastic exercise, the exercise of the power of naming, belongs to entities that cannot be opposed from the outset, similar more to the authority of a parent toward a newborn. The newborn’s coming into the social world starts always, in any culture and any historical age, with the act of naming. And the newborn can do nothing against being born and being named. Sovereign authorship is understood here precisely in this sense in which it is even more than irrefutable act. Irrefutability would presuppose the possibility of contestation, while the sovereign act of authorship, in order to be at all, is always already irrefuted. It is a demiurgic act constitutive of reality and not already constituted in an already existent environment where evaluations of degree can recognise it as ultimate, irrefutable or else. It is not force, or power of fixing, demarcating and protecting a territory and the potentiality of nature within it (Foucault 2007, p. 65). Such force or power would be already constituted and refutable within an already constituted context of forces and powers capable of contesting claims to ultimacy.

The search for this sovereignty qua authorship comes in irreconcilable conflict with positivism recognising the right to existence and implicit scientific relevance only to things that can be observed (Clark 1998, p. 1244). The observables inherent in the manifestation of constituted sovereignty (territory, state, physical coercion, formal recognition, citizenship papers, etc.) find room in the positivist panoply of scientific evidence (Thomson 1995). Unobservables, such as the discursive act constitutive of sovereignty, are then exiled into what has been called the ‘deviant community’ of ‘bad science’ troubling itself with social constructions (Milliken 1999, p. 227). An exploration guided by how-questions concerning sovereignty as discursive authorship of its domain allows thus little room for positivists armed with measurement tools.
Instead, the search inaugurated here is for the logic behind the constitutive act of sovereignty as discourse of national sovereignty, that is, the logic of the always already irrefuted discourse of naming the human realm. It is in the formation of the national sovereign subjectivity discoursing political life that one can find the basic discursive elements constructing the relation between the sovereign nation and human life in general. And it is in that same formation of the national sovereign self that one can also find elements constructing the position of the sovereign nation toward ethnically non-national others inside it.

The concrete forms of this construction that the dissertation takes under scrutiny are the legal, in particular constitutional, definitions of the human realm of sovereignty in terms of national citizenship and national language. Such definitions are seen here as fundamental in the constitution of a national political ‘reality’, populated with national citizens speaking officially one national language against the multicultural and multiethnic background of human life. Specific state apparatuses, including the educational system, help the popularisation of the ‘national’ language, ‘national’ history, or ‘national’ geography (Weber 1976, pp. 333-334) but they repeat in doing so the very act of authorship, or constitution. Moreover, history textbooks tell the national past in what geography textbooks describe as an already constituted national topography situating in space the nationalised nowness. This suggests then a sophisticated engineering of time by a sovereign subjectivity building legally sanctioned, subjective borders within material borders.

So, it is true that the national sovereign rule applies within the borders of the national territory (Spruyt 2002, p. 134) but those boundaries have been always already in place by the time the constituted national sovereignty initiates the colonisation of time. It is within already appropriated space that sovereign rights are
invoked in the construction of the national now through legal formulations of citizenship and official language, which set possibilities of political life. It is again within already appropriated space that national education systems initiate the tiring liturgy of the national past, present and even future, ‘replete with its organisation of heroes and victims’ (Manning 2004, p. 64).

Ethnic minorities come thus face to face with a national sovereign ban on alternative, non-national predications of political life. This ban is territorially based, but essential to it is that it operates in and especially with time. Elucidating the condition of ethnic otherness under a national sovereignty makes then necessary the comprehensible theorisation of national sovereignty in relation with the national time it authors. The philosophical excursion in Chapter 3 explains the concrete solution adopted here in order to evidence in the analysis of Romanian and Turkish sovereignties their historical becoming as sovereign national selves apt of banning the non-national. It must be reiterated at this point that the main hypothesis in this dissertation (see pp. 18-19, 58) is that the EU enlargement facilitates formal reforms and formal political dialogue on the condition of minorities in Romanian and Turkey. However, the enlargement process does not alter significantly the mechanisms of self-institution through which the two sovereignties continue to dominate their human domains.

The bibliography employed in the argument suggests the exploration of the phenomenological understanding of Being following a tradition opened by Husserl but decisively elaborated upon by Heidegger. The line of thought uniting the Heideggerian conception of Being in language and time with Agamben’s theorisation of sovereignty as fact of human life will guide the argument leading to the formulation, crucial here, of the elementary relation between national sovereignty and
bare, unnamed life. That formulation will then be employed originally, in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, in the analysis of the historical formation of Romanian and Turkish sovereignties, which seem to survive the EU enlargement conditionality and continue to condition the ordinary life of ethnic minorities.
CHAPTER 3: A METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY FOR THE ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGN SUBJECTIVITIES DISCOURSING HUMAN LIFE

The configuration of the object of analysis and the preliminary methodological considerations explained in Chapter 2 suggest the adoption of a qualitative approach focused on the discursive formation of the modern sovereignty subjectivity. The elaboration of the analytical apparatus to be employed here builds upon an intellectual line opened by the phenomenological understanding of the relation between language, Being and time in the Heideggerian oeuvre (1962; 1993; 2000; 2003). The main target is the identification of the elemental discourse of modern sovereign subjectivity in relation with human life, viewed here as setting our modern limits to political imagination (Somers 1994, p. 614; Walker 2010, pp. 187 note 1, 206) in national terms. Whether or not the EU membership conditionality determines change in the condition of minorities should become evident in the modification of the discourse mechanisms of national sovereignties formalising the life of minorities.

The adoption in this dissertation of the interpretive approach implies the acceptance of Gadamer’s distancing from ‘a social thinking based on epistemology’, implicit in his founding of contemporary hermeneutics (Shapiro 1992, p. 43). This is important because epistemology represents constituted knowledge, of which the sovereign constitution of meanings of political life is a part. Gadamer thus clearly added ‘anti-scientific’ and anti-positivist character to interpretive art (Farrands 2010, p. 35). And this opened the way for the interpretation of socio-political phenomena outside the positivist box of physicalities arranged in chains of material causalities.
Moving outside this box also suggests the reflexive character of the research explained here, deriving from author’s general suspicion vis-à-vis epistemology, particularly because of its recognised versatility when it comes about producing a world of its own. Discourse analysis represents therefore, at least in this dissertation’s terms, more than just a research tool: it is a decisive step toward ‘expanding the conception of reason beyond positivistic episteme’ (Neufeld 1995, p. 46; italics in original). The analysis builds therefore on a vast range of sources meant to widen the possibilities of imagination beyond the confines of positivism and lead to a theorisation of the nationalisation of sovereignty and its becoming fact of human life.

Within this context, sovereignty will be explicated in its relation not with physicalities, but with potentiality as power of being or not being in fact, hence mastering potentiality itself, understood here as temporal category. Carl Schmitt’s theorisation of the concept as state of exception will be therefore interpreted as sovereign exception from and emergence through potentiality, hence temporality, in factuality. The exceptionism envisaged here is consequently not the one meaning mere singularity, peculiarity, or uniqueness of character and values concerning particular peoples, as found in comparative studies (e.g. Breuilly 1993, pp. 96-115; Frederickson 1995; Bojkov 2004, p. 326). It is the sovereign exceptionality from the ordinary temporal flux of life but maintaining itself ‘in a potential relation’ (Agamben 1998, pp. 20-21) with it in order to decide on its own possibility of being, on constituting itself, its own normality, and the exceptions from that normality (Wolfe 2007, pp. 129, 144-145).

Time is then advanced here as a medium at least as important as space for the factualisation of sovereignty in intimate bond with the subjectivity discoursing it. Over-emphasising one by comparison with the other leads inevitably to distortions
that this dissertation tries to avoid. To this end, the author builds in this chapter a methodological perspective and method of analysis as freed as possible of the already constituted knowledge and language of scholarship on sovereignty, with its emphasis on legalistic aspects. Instead, the dissertation attempts to elucidate the relation between sovereignty and bare life beyond the epistemic load of contemporary scientism. The argument will converge in section 3.4 toward the original assembling of a specific method of analysis apt to explicate sovereignty as sovereign subjectivity authoring political life in terms of spatial temporality.

3.1. Toward an analysis of the modern subjectivity predicating national sovereignty

The discourse of sovereignty, like any other discourse (Doty 1993, p. 302; Farrands 2000; Foucault 2002), does produce a reality of its own (see also section 2.2). It unites and at the same time antagonises large masses of people, it somehow ties ideas and developments in politics, makes people express themselves in relation with it, even die for it. Moreover, the modern discourse of national sovereignty produces material, legal markers of national citizenship, such as identity papers, border management systems, or naturalisation rules (Jackson 1999b, p. 10; Işın and Wood 1999, p. 4; Işın 2007, p. 215). From these derive an entire panoply of effects, such as duties, rights, various forms of allegiance and multiple understandings of status perceived in social contexts and expressing connections in terms of ‘identity and virtue’ between individuals and the idea of state (Heater 1990, pp. 2, 182).

Discourse analysis should be able then to indicate the subjectivity discoursing behind the formal indicator ‘sovereignty’ and the structures of intentionality making it opt for specific predications of sovereign authority. Given contemporary accusations
regarding discourse analysis as lacking methodological precision (Milliken 1999, pp. 226-227), this enterprise should start with the clarification of what is that which discourses sovereignty and then move to the basic elements of this discourse. The real problem with sovereignty may then be not that it has no essence, but that ‘the essence of sovereignty is rarely defined’ (Barkin and Cronin 1994, p. 107; italics in original). Its invocation in social practices suggests, however, that a minimal source of meaning must be there as to facilitate the reproduction of the discourse as a whole.

In this author’s view, whatever intentionality the sovereign subjectivity is capable of it is one that inaugurates the constitution of national sovereignty in ethnic dress, thus making ethnic minorities politically relevant. Acknowledging the existence of and identifying that sovereign subjectivity can lead then at least hypothetically to the clarification of its structures of intentionality, hence the elemental structures of its discourse, that formulate the conditions of political life. However, the subject speaking sovereignty has been hidden behind the enormous epistemological load of modernity for which positivist scientism is held responsible (see pp. 57-64).

Social sciences have participated assiduously in this process leading to the emancipation of the self from the dark Middle Ages by proclaiming the human mind as source of all meaning (Odysseos 2007, p. 5), grounded in rationality and confirmed by sensorial experience (Flax 1993, pp. 95-96). This represented an enormous intellectual effort aiming at accumulating data about nature, structuring data, and the abstractisation of the world through reduction to categories, as illustrated for instance in Foucault’s monumental research (1971; 1995; 2002; 2003; 2007). Thus, Braudel saw human sciences in the 1960s in a competition for the complete understanding of the social and for the accumulation of knowledge, with the consequence that ‘they [were] all overwhelmed by their own progress’ (1980, p. 25). Such accumulation
made necessary the excessive preoccupation of social sciences, history included, with
the management of knowledge through mechanisms of reduction and categorisation.
This inevitably meant reducing ‘the diverse to the simple or the nearly simple’ and the
excessive focus on ‘quintessential heroes’ in a history reduced to a collection of ‘facts
but no humanity’ (*ibid.*, pp. 10-11).

In the particular domain of sciences of the political, such reductionism
facilitated the factoidisation through abstractisation of notions giving a sense to
sovereignty and setting the limits of political life. Walker (2010, p. 258) underlined in
this sense ‘the enormous role of abstractions in shaping what we can and cannot be as
both political and human beings’. Part of this process has been the historical
engineering of corporate state identities in the name of the sovereign right of states
over the formulation of modern political identity (Rae 2002, p. 9). The manipulation
of law on rights and duties of citizens in relation to the nation-state and the
performance of national pedagogies accompanied the process and led to the gradual
homogenisation of peoples (Shapiro 2000, p. 95).

It was eventually the construct resulting from this engineering of identity that
was then imposed on human life *qua* national political culture starting as early as the
nineteenth century (Weber 1976, p. 5), with the essential aid of the ‘national’ media
(Anderson 2006, p. 135). And this led gradually to the production of increasingly
sophisticated mechanisms of national citizenship, such as the passport or the national
identity card, the educational or taxation systems (*İşin and Wood* 1999, p. 4; Jackson
1999b, p. 10; *İşin* 2007, pp. 215, 221). Modern sovereignties have come in this way to
massify human diversity in corporate national identities and address us first by
whatever written in our identity documents and only then, derivatively, as humans.
However, especially following the horrors of the World Wars, a vast number of intellectuals rose against this massification. They identified and criticised the grand narratives legitimising complex systems of knowledge throughout the modern times and with them the modern state and society (Lyotard 1984, p. 34). Thus, there begun to be questioned fundamental notions on which the entire edifice of political modernity rested. Foucault, Lyotard, Derrida, or Deleuze and Guattari among others identified critically various forms of repression behind the social and political forms of modernity and with this came a ‘claim that the autonomous rational ego of modern theory is disintegrating’ (Best and Kellner 1991, p. 283). The twentieth century brought thus with it a particular concern with the sovereign state that went to some extent beyond the genealogical perspective and explored its constitution. Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005) eventually developed Schmitt’s conceptualisations toward a formulation of the relation between the principle of sovereignty and human life. The result may be the beginning of a ‘paradigm shift’ (Kuhn 1970, p. 175), i.e. a profound change in imagining sovereignty as fact of our lives.

This comes in an intellectual context where Nietzsche’s contestation of ‘universal truths’ of modernity (Bleiker and Chou 2010, pp. 8-9), or Heidegger’s deconstruction of the modern subject (Odysseos 2010, p. 20) is increasingly internalised in contemporary thought (Best and Kellner 1991, p. 16). Let us recall that it was Heidegger who famously identified the ‘thoroughgoing quantification and objectivation of all reality’ in the context of modern (social) science, in which humanity is reduced to ‘“human resources” instrumentalised within the technological ordering of world’ (Sinnerbrink 2005, p. 242). It is this technologised humanity, this subject of history ready to even technologise itself, which the so-called post-modern critics have challenged. The result is increasing awareness about modernity’s reliance
on the existence of a world out there as ‘residual zones of “nature” or “being”’, which mankind was able to instrumentalise in its activities to the extent that nature gradually disappeared and was incorporated into culture (Jameson 1991, pp. ix-xx). And the dominant political culture of our times has been and continues to be that of nation-states.

The very focus in this dissertation on the condition of minorities under national sovereignties expresses in fact the author’s deep concern with the condition of life in political modernity (see p. 25). A strategy needs thus to be adopted here for theorising human life in relation with sovereignty and especially the temporal dimensions of this relation, which should help us comprehend the impact of the nationalisation of sovereignty on the political condition of humanity. And the strategy adopted is that of deconstructing, especially with the aid of Heidegger and Derrida, the modern subject as historical author of the modern predication of sovereignty.

This will be followed by the exploration of the discourse of sovereignty and the identification, inspired especially by two major works of Giorgio Agamben (1998; 2005), of the elemental relation established discursively between sovereignty and human life. It will be underlined that, although physically rooted in spatial geometries and condemned to territoriality by gravitational forces, the discourse of sovereignty massifies the human domain around a specific understanding of the temporality of human life. As such, the nationalisation of the principle of sovereignty means from this dissertation’s perspective the tiding of the human domain to a national time of sovereignty. This aspect has been captured to some extent, for instance, in certain works by Koselleck (1985), Bhabha (1990), Greenhouse (1996), Shapiro (2000), or Manning (2004). The present dissertation will add to these accounts an understanding of the specific instruments manipulating temporality through which the two national
subjectivities studied here have constituted themselves sovereignly as facts of human life and have thus taken control of it. The struggle for minority rights against the authority of national sovereignties signifies therefore, in this text, the struggle for a temporality other than that constituted with the constitution of national sovereignty.

The methodology detailed in the following sections builds on Heidegger’s understanding of the relation between language as home of Being, hence home of sovereign subjectivity, too, and life. He decried the replacement of thinking by the human preoccupation with ‘-isms’ in modernity, constituted in what he called the ‘peculiar dictatorship of the public realm’ over the simple act of thinking (1993, p. 221). The basic elements in the discourse constituting sovereignty have also been effaced by the historical sedimentation of theories of sovereignty. To this was added ‘the historically specific dominance of certain discursive practices’ (Shapiro et al. 1988, p. 399) related to it and veiling the discursive act of sovereignty constituting itself as facticity in human life.

Discourse analysis as art of interpretation, like constructivism (Howeling and Amineh 2003, p. 315), originates in the theological hermeneutics of the Middle Ages. It built a solid philosophical tradition toward the nineteenth century with the contribution of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, or musicians like Schumann and Wagner (Farrands 2010, p. 35). Nevertheless, the current impetus owes much to existential phenomenologists, especially Husserl, Heidegger, or Gadamer, Derrida, Levinas and others later, who have established firmly the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ in social sciences (Neumann 2002, pp. 627-628; Deetz 2003, pp. 421-422; Howeling and Amineh 2003, p. 315). It all culminated with Peter Winch placing the idea that ‘language constructs social reality’ at the heart of
social philosophy after mid-twentieth century, hence producing an ‘important focus around which much other debate is organised’ (Farrands 2000, p. 79).

Gadamer’s translating the ‘linguistic turn’ into a methodology with *Truth and Method* (1998) was also important in the process. Following Heidegger’s path toward the origins of human intellectuality in the context of ancient Greek thought, Gadamer insisted on the idea that the Greek ontology was built on language as factualness (1998, p. 446). Understanding was thus not a subject-dependent activity, but ‘activity of the thing itself, the coming into language of meaning’ (*ibid.*, p. 474). In Gadamer’s opinion, then, the real war of the contemporary intellectuality was with the positive natural sciences precisely because they presuppose the ‘abstraction’ that man and language can be conceived of as separate, this entailing the possibility of objective knowledge (*ibid.*, p. 476).

A more incisive perspective was announced by Heidegger (1962, pp. 203-204) and then explicitly formulated by Gadamer, that ‘*Being that can be understood is language*’ (1998, p. 474; italics in original). Both say then that being and language are bound together by the relation of intelligibility (Heidegger 1962, p. 204; Gadamer 1998, pp. 475-476). In turn, this makes man a ‘shepherd of Being’ as sayer of it (Heidegger 2000, pp. 234, 245), and hence *responsible* for the being of things (detailed discussion on p. 96). This profound relation of equivalence builds obviously on the Heideggerian view of language as the home of Being (1993, p. 223; 2000, pp. 81-86) but it was Gadamer who placed it at the methodological foundation of the interpretive approach to phenomena (Farrands 2010, p. 39). The method of discourse analysis employed in this dissertation is constructed then on the inseparability between subjectivity, sovereignty, spatiality and temporality (see pp. 27-28, 100-101) and on the equivalence between Being and language, ontology and epistemology.
This perspective also resonates with the constructivist principle that phenomena simply cannot have a ‘language-independent’ existence (Guzzini 2000, p. 159). The sayer of existence is the human being, inevitably responsible therefore for anything counting as language and Being. If sovereignty is also language-dependent, it is in identifiable human beings that responsibility for its factualisation in national form will be naturally placed.

It is thus in discourse that human life can be said to exist and the condition of human life is set along possibilities imagined by discoursing subjectivities. Derrida has proposed the identification of mechanisms producing such possibilities by ‘criticising unconditionally all conditionalities’ (2003, p. 34), in this way destabilising discourses of possibility through the deconstruction of their apparent wholeness. This can facilitate thinking ‘in the most faithful, interior way’, in relation with ‘the meaning of Being as presence’ (Derrida 1981, pp. 5-6; italics added). The approach undertaken in this dissertation also aims precisely at elucidating the ways in which the concept of sovereignty reaches actuality as fact of life and its relation with its living domain. To that end, the argument builds in what follows on Heidegger’s deconstruction of the very subjectivity held responsible for factualisation of modern sovereignty, with reference to Agamben’s understanding of sovereign authority as state of exception.

3.2. The factualisation of the modern subjectivity and the production of political life

The ‘linguistic turn’ in social sciences inaugurated a general suspicion about the apparent wholeness of the modern subject, which seemed to efface the actual ‘rich and unstable a mix of voices’ behind it (Antonio 1991, p. 158). The critique of this
modern subjectivity was thus to reveal its thinness as linguistic convention (Rosenau 1992), while attempting to deconstruct and decentre it (Pilbeam 2001, p. 34). This dissertation adopts a phenomenological position toward the object of research in connection with the realisation, initiated by Husserl, that human knowledge is conditioned pre-reflectively and pre-theoretically. Logically then, the social, cultural and intersubjective “‘I’ (a point from which to view), constituting activity in relation to the world’ (Deetz 2003, p. 422) has historically conditioned human reflection.

This understanding initiated by Husserl served then the phenomenological exploration of a pre-theoretical relation with the world (Kisiel 1993, p. 25) and implicitly the possibility of identifying the ways in which concepts come to take hold of life. Husserl saw the mode of modern subjectivity as one in which ‘man’s involvement with things and the world’ was mediated by that subjectivity. This he labelled the ‘natural attitude’, while the phenomenological attitude presupposed ‘the suspension of the intentions and convictions that operate in the natural attitude’ (Odysseos 2010, pp. 25-26). It presupposed a strategy of approaching things and the world while the theoretical load of modern subjectivity was suspended, a method that Husserl called phenomenological *epoche*, or reduction. This made possible the distancing of the phenomenologist from the intentions, convictions or ‘beliefs’ of the modern subject in order to observe the structure of such theoretical formations. The method, anti-scientific and anti-positivist at the same time, aimed then at ‘unobjectified access to experience, which already constituted theories of the natural sciences could not obtain’ (Quine 1951, p. 37). This promised therefore access to a pre-constitutive stage of subjectivity, which is central in the analysis undertaken here (see pp. 62-64, 79-80).
However, in Odysseos’ interpretation, the problem with Husserl’s phenomenological method was that it relied on the possibility of an absolute pre-theoretical account of things and the implicit possibility of a transcendental subjectivity. This led Heidegger to ‘question and radicalise’ that perspective (Odysseos 2010, p. 30; see also Derrida 1997, pp. 21-22) and develop his own method in the process. The Heideggerian approach preserved the idea of phenomenological reduction but made room for the accommodation within its realm of a conception of life belonging to Being and the living subjectivity always already understanding itself in this belonging. He thus proposed the method of formal indication, which ‘formulates the understanding that life has of itself into concepts that merely designate certain terms in a formal manner to denote the phenomena under scrutiny’ (ibid., p. 42; italics in original). In Deleuze’s interpretation later, a proposition consists of a sense (expression of an idea) and a designation (indicating the objects of application for what is expressed). Sense is just the domain of meaning, while judgments of truth and/or falsity are possible only in the domain of designation, i.e. in relation with objects indicated/designated by the proposition as in, say, examples (Deleuze 1994, p. 153). Herman Philipse (2001, p. 581) described the consequence of this departure of Heidegger from Husserl as follows:

[W]hereas Husserl claimed that phenomenology is a theory-free description of phenomena in terms of concepts derived from these phenomena, Heidegger holds that interpretation has a projective nature and that the concepts which it uses derive their meaning from the ultimate sense or direction of a project.

Truth, falsity, and any other judgments are dependent on projection, or designation, toward a thing exemplifying the sense of a proposition. Meaning is thus built in and
through the world, this implying that language is inseparable from the world while the
facticity of the world is possible only through language.

Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity, essential for the analysis of the
factualisation of sovereign subjectivity here, was born at this point of divergence from
Husserl and affected fundamentally the understanding of interpretation based on the
hermeneutic circle. Put simple, the hermeneutic circle means ‘interpretation
proceeds by relating the parts in terms of the whole and reciprocally’ (Pouliot 2007, p. 366). It consequently presupposes ‘reciprocity between text-interpretation and self-
interpretation’ (Ricoeur 1974, p. 95; see also Farrands 2010, pp. 39-42). Heidegger’s
hermeneutics of facticity built thus on the idea that understanding was always already
part of the world of things as expressed in words, which are formal indicators of
things. This implies that the factuality of the world finds expression in and
confirmation through its mere mentioning in language. But, in Being and Time,
Heidegger had already made clear his view of Being as ‘the transcendens pure and
simple’ and implying ‘the possibility and the necessity of the most radical
individuation’ for such transcendence to be possible in facticity (1962, p. 62; italics in
original). He also specified that (ibid., p. 82; italics in original),

[W]enever Dasein is, it is a Fact: and the factuality of such a Fact is
what we shall call Dasein’s facticity. The concept of facticity implies
that an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-the-world in such a way
that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the Being
of those entities which it encounters within its own world.

Heidegger’s understanding of facticity is fundamental for this dissertation
because it helps elucidating the relation of subjectivity with life in its discourse of life
and within the fact of life. The position of subjectivity speaking life sovereignly
cannot be above (f)actual life since language is, from the Heideggerian perspective at
least, the condition of facticity. The subject saying sovereignly that sovereignty belongs to and derives from the nation cannot then be an unaccountable spirit, a ghostly general will. On the contrary, it is a corporeal entity responsibly suspending multicultural (f)actual life and proclaiming its nationalness from a sovereign position only imagined as above life, whence it decides upon what is and what is not national. It is, nevertheless, an identifiable speaking subject claiming the sovereign right to predicate life and accountable for its act of sovereignty to life itself, of which it is always already a part. This perspective will help comprehending the immense responsibility of those uttering the discourse of national sovereignty predicating life exclusively in national terms and thus producing minorities, that is, groups of people not fitting in the nationalised political life. And Heidegger’s theorisation of modern sovereign subjectivity in relation with life, language and time is fundamental for understanding the ontological dimensions of this responsibility.

In Odysseos’ words, ‘Heidegger challenged the use of the modern subject, which had grounded post-Cartesian philosophy, on the basis of prior presuppositions, and sought a method with which to gain access to the facticity of existence, to existence as it shows itself’ (2007, p. 30; italics in original). This promises the opening of a path leading beyond subjectivity, i.e. toward the pre-constituted subjectivity whose very constitution presupposes a sovereignly irrefuted definition of human life. This dissertation aims precisely at capturing the very gesture of constitution though which a sovereign subjectivity institutes itself in human life and defines it, the pre-constituted form constituting human life politically. From this author’s methodological perspective, it is in that gesture that one has a chance to see beyond the limits of the already constituted political life that political theory in general and IR theory in particular build upon.
This logic suggests the existence of a key moment when the modern subject decides on what it wants to be out of innumerable possibilities. Thinkers inspired by this logic have unveiled the modern self as a product of upheavals that took place in the seventeenth century. That context favoured ‘the collapse of the view of the cosmos as a meaningful order in which man occupied a precise and determined place – and the replacement of this view by a self-defining conception of the subject’ (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 94). Man thus superseded the divine as foundation of certainty. In this way, the Cartesian *ego cogito, ergo sum* became the formula explaining the new, post-medieval order, one centred on the human body and mind as source of all meaning (Abbott 1995, p. 860; Odysseos 2007, p. 5). Crucial here is however the image of a deciding, hence responsible, subjectivity establishing such meaning, i.e. producing an inherently definite facticity of Being founded upon a particular linguistic relation with life out of innumerable possibilities of meaning.

Such a sovereign self of modernity was bound to come in some form of conflict with a similarly rational and self-confident political structure growing gradually into sovereign maturity itself, i.e. the state. Ettiene Balibar insisted that Kant and the Enlightenment, rather than Descartes, are to be held responsible for the emergence of the modern subject through the ‘reformulation of the ancient notion of subjection and dependence into an inner obedience to an inner voice of the moral and juridical law’ (paraphrased in Seshadri 2008, p. 45). Indeed, the idea of ‘an effective law of world citizenship’, implying the later development of universal human rights, does owe immensely to Kant (Owens 2010, p. 81; Walker 2010, pp. 26-28). It produced the ‘individualistic and secular understanding of human nature’ (Rogobete 2004, p. 275) constituting the basis for the edification of the general discourse of human rights precisely in opposition to the absolute authority of the sovereign state.
Both human and state sovereignty can then be understood as epitomising the Cartesian conception (Heidegger 1962, p. 45) of a self-sufficient modern subjectivity mastering sovereignly the world *in general*, humanity included (Odysseos 2007, pp. xxiv, 97, 138). The meeting point of the human and state sovereignty may actually be the one when/where the state could be envisaged as vehicle for the assertion of human self-sovereignty in a world of innumerable such sovereign selves. The fact that the national conception of sovereignty prevailed eventually should then indicate the prevailing *not* of a human self in the process, but of a particular sovereignty intent on predicking human life in the particular terms of nationality. And the nation-state is, in this scheme, one form in which sovereignty proved apt to fulfil modern subjectivity’s ontological needs (Walker 2010, pp. 27-31, 45, 71), a form in which human collectives became radically anthropomorphised (Neumann 1999, p. 2). This radical anthropomorphisation became even more radicalised with the particularisation of the omniscient modern subject in the name of the nation and discoursing its homogenous certainty exclusively in national terms.

Indeed, one of the most spine-chilling characteristics of the modern subject is its assumed certainty, which seems ‘part of its essence’ and ‘better seen as self-instituted’ (Odysseos 2010, p. 21). This self-institution presupposes a concomitant claim to unity effacing multiplicity, as famously noticed by Nietzsche (Odysseos 2007, p. 7; Bleiker and Chou 2010, pp. 12-13). It is not then accidental that a number of scholars have pointed at the historical perpetuation of a conception of the state as resembling the indivisibility of the human individual (Bartelson 1995, p. 24; Edkins and Pin-Fat, 2004). The concept of sovereignty eventually describes any situation in which the subject is autonomous, self-sufficient, and endowed with ultimate authority of decision (Connolly 1991, p. 78). It simply does not need to be confined only to the
political sphere (Bartelson 1995, p. 2). Such views suggest that the modern subjectivity and the modern state share in fact a general aspiration to indestructible unity, which inherently presupposes the exclusion of anything, exogenous or endogenous, affecting it. In consonance with this idea, Odysseos gave the following description of the modern self (2010, p. 21):

Such a subject is sovereign, best captured by the ‘I’, where this term is so much more than simply a pronoun: the ‘I’ exhibits not only autonomy and rationality, connected to its inherent capacity for reason and reflection, but achieves mastery over itself, other entities and the world itself in its relations of representation.

The ways in which such relations are produced call for the question, suggested by Derrida (1981, pp. 5-6; see above), about ‘the meaning of Being as presence’. In other words, how does the sovereign subjectivity constitute itself in order to become relevant to the word is? How does it insinuate itself into the factuality of human life as to take hold of it?

The phenomenological exploration of Being and of the presence of beings has revealed their ontological foundation in time (Heidegger 1962; Derrida 2003, p. 19). ‘Presence’ is understood here, in continuation of this line of thought, essentially as temporal category, i.e. present-presence. This builds particularly on Derrida’s understanding of the concept as also signalling unmediated access to the ‘pure subjectivity’ asserting presence (Ungureanu 2008, p. 304), history being simply the ‘presentation [Gegenwärtigung] of Being’ (Derrida 1973, p. 102). The Western philosophy, from Parmenides and Plato to phenomenology, has always understood spoken language as closest to Being, which is accessible to the speaking subject as presence (Derrida 1981, p. 22; 1982, p. 34). This demanded ‘an authentic experience of the flow of time’, or ‘authentic private temporality’ in which the subjectivity
speaking Being could accomplish its telos in terms of “presence” as a final, full now’ (Ungureanu 2008, p. 305). The idea that present-presence signals a subjectivity and its particular temporality also explains how the past and the future mirror the story of that subjectivity and are thus ‘always determined as past presents or as future presents’ (Derrida 1982, p. 34).

The presence of the subjectivity speaking the world, thus conferring Being to the world (see pp. 90-91 above), builds a present temporality legitimising its own past and future. Absolute pasts and futures are unimaginable because imagining them always presupposes a subjectivity, which imagines from and according to its own, already constituted present-presence. Temporality thus tends toward homogeneity through comprehensible ‘successivity’ from past to future, which are always already subjectively understandable as past presents and future presents (Derrida 1997, pp. 66-67). And when subjectivities narrate their nowness and all life in that nowness by also naming it, as national sovereignties do, this becomes clearly an act of violence, ‘originary violence’, to Being through mere naming (ibid., p. 112).

History abounds of chronologies in which the time of unnamed life becomes named temporality, when human life per se becomes life in the time of Caesar, Napoleon, Victoria, or the Beatles. These are, indeed, brutal reductions of life to collections of ‘facts but no humanity’, which imply the effacing of diversity for the commodity of simplicity in the name of ‘quintessential heroes’ (Braudel 1980, pp. 10-11). Such onomastic exercises simply condemn the diverse (f)actuality of life to life in a particular name. The consequences of such exercises are dramatic when the name is an ethnic indicator and the subjectivity imposing it on human life does so from a position of political sovereignty.
Derrida (1982) saw the mystical power inherent in the particularisation of life through the onomastic act. It presupposes a profound understanding of the demiurgic, mystical dimensions of this power, which produces through naming a particular identity occupying spatiality and temporality concomitantly. This demands a sophisticated engineering of time for the self-institution and fulfilment of subjectivity in its own nowness, an aspect leading Dasgupta (2009, p. 17) to conclude that time is for Derrida ‘ontologically out of joint’. The self-institution of subjectivity presupposes a constitutive transgression of an established order and adding to it a subjective ‘surplus’ (Prozorov 2005, pp. 83-84). And this indicates, indeed, ‘a rupture in history, a break with the past and an opening onto a contingent future, a puncture that makes history possible’ (ibid., p. 92) by adding to its chain yet another ‘private temporality’ (Ungureanu 2008, p. 305) under a private name.

In nationalised form, this inaugurates the particular time of the respective national subjectivity as temporality disjointed from the temporal flux of unnamed life and subjected to the name of the nation. The result is the constitution in (f)actuality of an exception from already constituted normality (Prozorov 2005, p. 83) in a new, nationalised form, concomitantly establishing its own, national normality. This act is, nevertheless, much more than the occupation of nowness; it also presupposes the nationalisation of past and future, which are turned in this way in national past presents and future presents (Derrida 1997, pp. 66-67).

Chapters 4 and 5 will demonstrate that the Romanian and Turkish sovereignties have constituted their present-presence in world politics in profound ontological relation with the idea of the respective nations’ historical continuity, which is a nationalised flux of human life. And the sovereign subjectivity authoring political life through national onomastics can be analysed by destabilising its
wholeness, its subjective particularity and temporality. This approach is also linked to two important aspects already underlined here. The first is that sovereignty cannot be comprehended in isolation from subjectivity, spatiality and temporality, which is one of the cornerstones of the dissertation’s methodological approach (see pp. 28, 90-91). The second is that understanding the nowness of nationalised sovereignty makes compulsory the exploration of its historical constitution in relation with unnamed human life as temporal flux.

Erin Manning’s theorisation (2004) of the temporality of politics and of national sovereignty serves here as important guidance to a certain extent. She took inspiration from Jacques Rancière’s discussion of the differences between the consensus of the legal order and the politics of disagreement. For Rancière, the law establishes ‘an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to a particular place and task’ (Rancière 1999, p. 29). The sovereign law thus decides upon what is visible and sayable and what is not (ibid.). Such authority establishes then a relation of inequality between its self-sufficiency and human individuals. The sovereign law constitutes itself as a specific subjectivity ‘correlating to the absolute of a sovereign power’ that excludes alternative discourses through the very constitution of the sovereign order (Rancière 1999, p. 78). Politics, on the other hand, is the contestation of this order as moment of heterogeneity of discourses, when a multitude of discourses emerges on the stage in relations of equality to each other. This generates the disagreement constitutive of politics as opposed to the consensual discourse of sovereign authority (ibid., p. 50).

Manning elaborated upon Rancière’s theory, which allowed her to reveal more of the temporal dimensions of the relation between the sovereign consensus and
politics. The result of the national engineering of time is the proclamation of a national, sovereign consensus over the meaning of time past, present and future (Manning 2004, pp. 62-63). The centrality of language in this mechanism implies the exclusion of the natural linguistic heterogeneity of human life from the sovereign consensus and with it the exclusion of a politics of multilingualism and multiculturality from the time of the nation (ibid., p. 64). The national engineering of the sovereign consensus on time therefore produces a time of the national politics representing in fact policies objectifying and silencing the non-national both in domestic and foreign affairs (ibid., p. 73). Time functions ‘as the marker for the homogenisation of the [national] imaginary’, while politics contests the national ordering of time with a time of its own, different from and opposing the coherence of the national time (ibid., p. 70). The discourse of ethnic minorities contest the ethno-logic behind the predication of space and time by the sovereign subjectivity in the nation-state, as also revealed by the study of the two cases scrutinised here.

Inter-ethnic politics of equality may thus be possible with the constitution of the state as to allow for a time of politics resisting ‘narratives of sovereign hierarchy’ and open to ‘the myriad of possibilities’ that non-sovereign politics can lead to (ibid., p. 77). Manning’s account indicates that such a state would have to build on the idea that space and time are contingent and not pre-determined in the logic of national sovereignty, that a politics of disagreement is preferable to the sovereign consensus. Such politics would have to fill the timelessness of national sovereignty with the many possible predications of time that wait behind the sovereign fixation of life in the national. Manning’s argument, however, is not designed to explore the ways in which the sovereign coherence becomes possible, i.e. the zone whence it emerges from potentiality into (f)actuality in the particular national form. Her solution to the
problem raised by the sovereign politics of inter-ethnic inequality seems then to be the destabilisation of the entire hierarchy of sovereign politics. Given, however, the stubborn perpetuation of politics of sovereignty throughout the entire political history, this dissertation explores the possibility of inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality within the sovereign consensus.

In this dissertation, the possibility of inter-ethnic relations and politics of discursive equality is considered an accomplishable project, indeed, within the limits to political life fixed by the sovereign consensus. And the solution proposed here is enlarging those limits as to allow for the equal participation of all ethnic groups regardless quantitative accounts of numbers to the production of the sovereign consensus, as also demanded by the minorities under scrutiny here (see pp. 12-14). This should imply and build a political philosophy of denationalised sovereignty (see p. 44) on the recognition of the ‘national’ rather than ‘sovereignty’ in national sovereignty as the real source of discomfort for non-national ethnic communities. Admitting that the national can be severed from sovereignty may also open a path toward a post-national politics of multiculturality in Europe (see pp. 10-12).

Such philosophy would need to rely, however, on a profound understanding of the ways in which national sovereignty becomes a fact of our lives in the everydayness of political life. The self-institution of a nationalised sovereignty in the factuality of human life remains then a central aspect to be explicated here. And this task calls for an exploration, with the help of Agamben, of the specific mechanisms employed by the national sovereignty in the engineering of its own time. An analytical strategy apt to identify those mechanisms would also lead to recognising the ways in which they can be circumvented toward the production of a post-national, de-ethnicised form of sovereignty.
3.3. State of exception and the production of political temporality under sovereign consensus

O’Connor (2009, p. 340), in his analysis of Agamben, notes that ‘[t]he state of exception consolidates sovereign power by virtue of the suspension of legal normality’ and the institution of the exceptional normality in which life is ‘stripped of potentiality and possibility’ in order to be subjected to the new norm. The only possibility left for life is the particular form constituted by the sovereign power. Destabilising here the coherence of the sovereign subjectivity particularising life in the name of the nation will therefore presuppose deconstructing the hierarchy of binary oppositions upon which the sovereign subjectivity was founded (Derrida 1981, pp. 40-41; Dasgupta 2009, p. 10). Among them are notions of inside/outside, us/them, or good/bad associated with the national/non-national, all building the nationalised nowness of political life in which ethnic minorities dwell.

Agamben’s work can be understood as completing that of Foucault and Arendt on biopolitics and totalitarianism respectively (Cowan 2007, p. 557). The works of both Foucault and Agamben evolve around the place of human life and biology in the context of politics. The former was preoccupied with the ways it relates to power while the latter, building on Foucauldian perspectives, focused on the relation between and political relevance of zoé (natural life of man) and bios (man’s life in the collective body). Phillipe Mesnard (2004, p. 142) suggests that this is a ‘distortion by Agamben’ in the sense that, ‘whereas Foucault sees in “biopower” the major orientation of modern politics, the Italian philosopher postulates that this concept is the bare essence of politics as such’. This distortion facilitates nevertheless the
visualisation of sovereignty itself as exception from and suspension of law, ‘thereby creating a zone of indistinction between _bios_ and _zoê_’ (Seshadri 2008, p. 48).

It is in this way, indeed, that sovereignty, rather than biopower, ‘aims to control the deepest dimension of its subjects, the very dimension which escapes it in principle’ (Mesnard 2004, p. 142), and constituting bare life in this way into political life. Foucault thus took biopower as his hypothesis, while Agamben explored sovereignty in its relation with bare life starting from biopower as thesis (Genel 2006, pp. 43-44). Agamben managed with this strategy to reveal the mode in which sovereignty constitutes itself as factual presence in human life.

Foucault was not preoccupied in fact with the content of sovereignty beyond its already constituted forms. He abandoned that zone of encounter between the law and bare life in ‘juridico-institutional models’ (Agamen 1998, p. 5) and focused instead on the specific ways in which already constituted power operated on and with human biology. And it is precisely the constitution of sovereignty, i.e. its institution in relation with bare life that represents the central aspect explored here. This will help elucidating the ways in which human life emerges from its politically pre-constituted, unnamed form and its ordinary flux of time into the condition of subjection to constituted sovereignty and part of the nationalised temporality.

Minorities become as such, and pass from the condition of bare and unnamed human life to that of linguistically defined juridical category, with/through the constitution of majorities into national sovereignties. It is precisely at this point, ‘the hidden point of intersection between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power’, that Agamben builds his own philosophical inquiry around the idea that the production of bare life as object of the political realm is ‘the original activity of sovereign power’ (1998, p. 6). This implies then an exceptional relation that
sovereignty establishes with potentiality and factuality as temporal categories, which also presupposes an exceptional relation between the temporality of sovereignty and the temporal flux of life.

Walker has perceived one side of this aspect when noting (1993, pp. 167-168) that the state does, indeed, oscillate historically between being and not being, between one and other particular form, between larger and smaller sizes, prosperity and famine, war and peace. However, the principle of sovereignty tends to act in this context as an epistemic anchor of ‘timelessness […] against the flux (doxa) of time, and to confirm the existence of the state as something “out there” separate from the ordinary experience of people’s lives’. Walker thus associates human life with the ordinary experience of temporality, while sovereignty is excepted from this ordinary flux of time, having the role of preserving the notion of state in human memory all along the flux. This assimilates timelessness with a suspension/exception from the temporal flow of ordinary life.

Manning also touched on the timelessness of sovereignty in the specific case of nationalised sovereignty, under which ‘a timeless coherence takes place in the name of the nation’, with time understood as ‘marker for the homogenisation of an imaginary’ (2004, p. 70). As such, the sovereign consensus consumes time, or it is a ‘waste of time’ because it puts an end to the contingency inherent in politics of disagreement on the very content of sovereignty. Consequently, taking time for politics means ‘a re-casting of time amongst and between possible worlds’ (ibid., p. 77), with the non-majority ethnic groups possibly standing equal to the majority in such politics. The two theorisations of the sovereign timelessness above do not aim, however, at elucidating the passage of sovereignty from timelessness into the timely
factuality of life. Formulating, with the aid of Agamben, its relation with potentiality and only then with factual life is the next logical step in that direction.

The concrete space selected by Agamben for this exploration is significant for he had to find one that was not constituted as political category under an already instituted legal order. He therefore opted for the concentration camp as ‘the space that corresponds to this originary structure of the *nomos*’ because the condition for the possibility of *nomos* itself must be necessarily a state of lawlessness, that is, an anomic situation (1998, p. 20). There is no legal order protecting human life in a concentration camp created for the extermination of human life. The camp is thus home to a permanent state of exception in which decisions are made concerning a life stripped of meaning.

In the camp human life is suspended, together with all sense of reality (Arendt 1994, p. xv), by a power of demiurgic and hence ‘banal’ proportions, i.e. a power able to manage life in discretionary ways and decide whether it is or is not. The condition of life in this anomic situation implies, however, the production of a temporal relation between the state of exception and bare life. If one can formulate the state of exception from the temporal flux of human life in terms of timelessness, as seen above, how could one then formulate the activation of sovereignty inside this flux of human life, as to perform its authority toward it? Agamben addresses this question by analysing the relation between sovereignty and law.

As emanation of sovereignty, the law presupposes ‘the nonjuridical (for example, mere violence in the form of the state of nature) as that with which it maintains itself in a potential relation in the state of exception’ (Agamben 1998, pp. 20-21). This exceptionality is one in which law is suspended to allow for the government to step in with emergency measures, for instance. For Agamben this state
of exception is therefore ‘an anomic space in which what is at stake is a force of law without law’ (2005, p. 39). Essential here is the sketching of the site of sovereignty simultaneously suspended from the time of the law and concomitantly included in the time of law as called in when law itself is invoked. In relation with human life then, sovereignty *is in* the time of human affairs only when invoked by/in the human domain and when not invoked, it does not mean that *is not*.

Students of modern subjectivity insist that its self-institution (Odysseos 2007, pp. 5, 7) is not part of a chain of causalities, but an act authoring a particular normality. By suspending an established normality, ‘he who decides the state of exception’ (Schmitt 2005, p. 5), i.e. the sovereign, comes out of the magic bottle and institutes itself as (re)creator of normality (O’Connor 2009, p. 340). Conceived in this way, sovereignty can indeed be comprehended as temporal externality/internality, i.e. as characterised by ‘timelessness’ (Walker 1993, p. 167) in the sense of suspension not only from the ordinary relations between physicalities *per se*, but also from the time of such relationality precisely in order to constitute its own time. Agamben felt the need to cite Arendt in describing such a situation because the Nazi extermination camps represented spaces where the state of exception was evident in the fact that there ‘everything [was] possible’ (Agamben 1998, p. 170; Cowan 2007, p. 558). Sovereignty is authority instituting its own consensus on the meaning of life, space and time and to which all alternatives of self-institution are possible. And ‘possible’ means here all possibilities, which is not the opposite to impossibility, but the very essence of contingency, i.e. the very condition for imagining possibilities of being, including the imagination of a national being.

Rad Borislavov (2005) has noticed that the ontology of sovereignty is in *Homo Sacer* coincidental with potentiality, most visible precisely in the relation
between constituent and constituted power. Indeed, ‘an act is sovereign when it realizes itself by simply taking away its own potentiality not to be, letting itself be, giving itself to itself’ (Agamben 1998, p. 46) and thus revealing its subjectivity (Derrida 1981, p. 22; 1982, p. 34; Ungureanu 2008, pp. 304-305). In Borislavov’s interpretation, in order to be and not dissipate in actuality, potentiality needs to be ‘sovereignly’, i.e. unconditioned by the immediate necessity of being in fact. The reversed logic of the statement indicates that ‘actuality is then that which does not have being but depends on the sovereign suspension of potentiality’. And the suspension of potentiality allows for the sovereign consensus on actuality to emerge, as seen in instances when transgressions of that consensus occur (Borislavov 2005, p. 177). Sovereignty remains in its own timelessness whence it is activated in the temporal flux of political life whenever the rule of possibility under sovereign consensus is transgressed in the everydayness of politics.

Indeed, the ‘idea’ of sovereignty (see p. 61) becomes violently material to the transgressor of its domain. The everyday criminal X, the illegal immigrant Y, or the secessionist Z are all instances of transgression in the absence of which X, Y, and Z would have had no physical contact with the irrefutedness of activated sovereignty. The specific moments and places when/where sovereignty is invoked seems then less important than this unique quality of emerging whenever invoked into the time of law and of human life, the time of the ordinary, from its own everness as potentiality. And it is in instances of transgression, indeed, that one can see the sovereign authority reconstituting its exceptional norm, which disciplines the temporal instances of transgression back into the timeless sovereign consensus. The instance succumbs in this way to the sovereign predication temporal possibilities, which denies the possibility of a time beyond its conception of time. One can therefore see in each
instance of transgression a permanently potential passage from sovereign timelessness and potentiality to the temporality of constituted, (f)actual life.

This concomitant occupation of timelessness and temporal (f)actuality is what determined Agamben to insist that ‘the constitution presupposes itself as constituting power’ (1998, p. 40; italics in original). It is with this perspective in mind that one can comprehend the productive/reproductive capacity of the sovereign subjectivity that ‘divides itself into constituting power and constituted power and maintains itself in relation to both, positioning itself at their point of indistinction’ (ibid., p. 41). Only in that point of indistinction between potentiality and factuality as sovereignly potential, in Borislavov’s description, or as anchor of timelessness in Walker’s, can the long-claimed omnipresence of sovereignty be explicated while itself explaining the state as ‘separate from the ordinary experience of people’s lives’ (Walker 1993, p. 168). Sovereignty is then nothing but the authoring of a particular form of political life encoding a particular conception of time out of a sea of possibilities.

Agamben confirms this perspective of sovereignty as authorship in his elaboration on the nature and power of sovereignty in the last chapter of the State of Exception. After acknowledging, together with Arendt (1993, p. 91), the confusion and controversy around the concept (Agamben 2005, p. 75), he searches again for its original meaning in the legal texts of ancient Rome whence it emerged. The theoretical account in the State of Exception produces thus an understanding of the nature of authority (auctoritas) as derived from the context of the Roman principate, in particular from the formulation given by Augustus himself, in Res gestae, to the very authority he enjoyed (ibid., pp. 81-82).

By corroborating that text with the results of philological research, Agamben is able to clarify the intrinsic antithesis between authority and power (potestas).
Augustus understood power as something he shared with any other magistrate in the state apparatus, while what defined the particularity of his position was authority. Authority, on the other hand, was the attribute of the auctor as ‘he who legitimates and guarantees the whole of Roman political life’ and imperium was ‘an extreme form of auctoritas’, i.e. not a magistracy (ibid., p. 82). Sovereign power is not a function in a constituted system, but the very authoring of that system. It is also important to make at this point the observation that one etymological descendant of auctoritas is ‘authorship’, fruit of the original link between the words ‘auctor’ and ‘augere’, the Latin word for ‘to augment’.\(^2\)

The sovereign is the closest to politically unconstituted life, i.e. bare life (Agamben 2005, p. 85), as constitutor of political life. Sovereign authority adds to bare life (X) something of its own (Xs) (Prozorov 2005), the political constitution, in a human reflex of creation also suggested by Hannah Arendt with her insistence on humans as beginners by nature (Arendt 1994, pp. 478-479; 2005, p. 321; Owens 2007, p. 137; 2010, pp. 76-77). The Roman principality contained thus probably the first legal formulation of the sovereign as physically among the magistrates and therefore under the norm but sovereignly above them and defining the state itself. Sovereignty is not a power but the ultimate authority making possible the particular form of the state where political action and power relations take place (see also Schwarz and Jütersonde 2005, pp. 657-658; Gajic 2008, pp. 165-166).

Based on the entire argument up to now, the particularisation of political possibilities in a specific state form is considered here the original act of sovereign authority and the individual subjectivities discoursing state sovereignty are held responsible for the particular state form in which sovereignty is factualised. The

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national form of sovereignty is then a radicalisation of this particular through the brutal reduction of multicultural possibilities of human life to one, mono-ethnically defined form of political life and its nationalised temporality.

The idea that politics of equality would demand the elimination of the sovereign consensus is not considered reasonable here due to the evidenced perpetuation throughout history of sovereignty as principle of political constitution (see pp. 102-103). It is also clear from the argument above that eliminating the sovereign consensus from the conception of politics is not reasonable because the sovereign authors the very particular form in which politics take place. Politics can be said then to become possible, even if contrary to the logic of Rancière and Manning (see pp. 101-102), through the constitution of sovereignty, but following a radical de-ethnicisation of contemporary politics on the basis of a philosophy of denationalised sovereignty (see pp. 44, 103).

De-nationalising demands, however, an interpretation of the mechanisms nationalising sovereignty and political life with it. The next section will therefore theorise the way in which the idea of sovereignty (see p. 61) and the imagined national community (Anderson 2006) become fact of human life as national sovereignty. It will be demonstrated that the instruments employed in the nationalisation of sovereignty and political life are temporal categories, which means, indeed, that national sovereignty operates with time in order to nationalise time itself. The identification of those elements in the next section will also help then the clarification of the specific method for analysing the historical production of national sovereignty in Romania and Turkey in the next chapters.
3.4. The time of national sovereignty and the nationalisation of political life: clarifications concerning the method of analysis

As argued in the previous section, sovereignty is the subjective authoring of a particular sovereign consensus (f)actualised in a state form where political life is thus constituted with spatial and temporal dimensions. This perspective is in consonance with the social constructivist view in IR of human collectives, states included, as ‘talked into existence by forging identities for themselves along a temporal and a spatial axis’ (Neumann 1999, p. 223). This section will substantiate this interpretation toward a theorisation of the specific engineering of time presupposed by the nationalisation of sovereignty and its human domain.

In Walker’s words, ‘the modern world learned to put order into time, and even to put time in its proper place’, thus constructing grand pasts and futures, or ages such as the pre-modern, modern, and post-modern (2010, p. 65; see also Hutchings 2008). The discourse of sovereignty also represents a continuous resolution in space of various images of temporality, between universality and particularity (Walker 1993, p. 78; 1995, p. 314), through the ‘actualisation in time’ of universal ideas of good, beautiful, just and the like’ (Walker 1993, p. 63). However, in accordance with one of the fundamental premises in this dissertation (see pp. 28, 90-91), sovereignty cannot be understood in isolation from the subjectivity behind it. As Agamben also insisted, the origin of the act of sovereign authorship is in necessity and this ‘clearly entails subjective judgment’ (Agamben 2005, p. 30).

The constitution of sovereignty as fact must concomitantly establish then, in order to gain locatable corporeality, an intimate relation with temporality, too. And the sovereign authorship of a particular political form also entails the authorship of its
particular temporality constituting thus the limits to our imagination of political time. In national form, the sovereign authority leaves even less room to imagination by confining the time of political life to the time of the nation. The previous section theorised sovereignty only as authorship of the political form and its spatial-temporal dimensions. This section will attempt to theorise the authorship of the particular conception of time by the modern, sovereign subjectivity, and the production of the particular national predication of time in the process.

Thinkers of the last century have revealed the self-institution of this modern self (Odysseos 2010, p. 21) as self-sufficient, indivisible, unitary and making itself present discursively by authoring its own ‘now’ (Heidegger 1962, p. 458) a deciding on what was or was not intelligible (1993, p. 221). The modern subjectivity became the ‘final ground’ (Odysseos 2007, p. 5) of all possibilities of political life, which involved delineating spaces of self-realisation together with ‘a specific philosophy of time’ (Walker 2010, p. 8). This was built on a discursive construction of the world with reference to specific conceptions of ‘natural necessity’ in which security, from Hobbes to us, tended to appear as the value making possible all others (ibid., p. 62).

In the Middle Ages, for instance, this understanding produced the value-charged model of a heroic self idealising the chivalric excellence associated with security and the Christian way of life (Wilks 1963, pp. 151-183; Arendt 1993, pp. 125-127; Bartelson 1995, pp. 91-95; Jackson 1999a, p. 436). The transformation of the space of security around the sovereign subjectivity into a national space did not modify much its axiological content. It only presupposed an intensive process of nationalisation through ‘mythology, interpretations of history, and ideology’ instituting the national community within the secure space of the sovereign nation-state (Sørensen 1999, p. 599). Nevertheless, the historical perpetuation of this process
led to the institution of the nation-state’s jurisdiction over history (Walker 1993, pp. 161-162) through a specific ‘decisionism about national values’ (ibid., p. 172). Within this context, however, the non-national human life became synonymous with the non-secure, the undesirable and even the inimical.

The preservation of the nation, with its language and culture and the community of people perpetuating them, are nowadays the absolute values upon which national sovereignties predicate the security of their being. With the name of the nation as both ethnic and political marker, ethnic minorities are thus condemned to a national political life defined by majorities, one in which the dominant language and culture become symbols of power. De-nationalising this discourse of national sovereignty (see pp. 101-103) would demand then taking the name of the nation off the seat of sovereign authority.

Heidegger, yet again, was among the first to underline this overwhelming ontological weight of the name. In the Introduction to Metaphysics, he insisted that Being ‘dwells in language’ (2000, p. 82) and, had we not had access to the meaning of Being, ‘then there would be no language at all’ (ibid., p. 86; italics in original). In the Letter on Humanism, he decried the language-mediated oppression of Being by the public realm, which ‘decides in advance what is intelligible and what must be rejected as unintelligible’ (1993, p. 221, italics added). Heidegger went on then to suggest that, ‘if man is to find his way once again into the nearness of Being he must first learn to exist in the nameless [...] must first let himself be claimed again by Being, taking the risk that under this claim he will seldom have much to say’ (ibid., p. 223; italics added). Thinking is then ‘at home on the path to silence’ (ibid., p. 246). Silence signals the activity of thinking and at the same time the return of man to Being in the
sense of rejoining the flux of wordliness, while discursive-onomastic acts, i.e. naming acts, interrupt that flux by fixing Being in language.

Drawing on Heidegger, Gadamer also theorised the relation between man and the world as ontologically bound to language and illustrated by man’s biblically confirmed power of operating with names that bring ‘the world into language’ (1998, p. 444; italics added). He saw this power evident in man’s rising above the influence of his own ‘milieu’ toward an encounter with the world and the freedom ‘for variety in exercising his capacity for language’ through the names man gives to things (ibid.). Gadamer apparently failed, however, to see that man’s freedom for variety in operating with names acts actually toward annulling variety. Once exerted, the power of naming as sovereign potentiality (see pp. 107-109) is consumed in the actuality of the name. The world is thus limited to these onomastic possibilities mastered by one, essentially sovereign subjectivity instituting the ‘most radical individuation’ through language (Heidegger 1962, p. 62). Potential variety vanishes with a particular name becoming the condition of being. When the respective name is an ethnic one, alternative ethnicity is banned from the nowness of national sovereignty with the very assertion of such sovereignty.

The constitution of national sovereignty is precisely the consumption of inherently sovereign potentiality in the named factuality of the nation-state and the proclamation of a national political ‘reality’ (Campbell 1996, p. 165). Language becoming the political principle of constitution for national sovereignties (Spruyt 2002, p. 133), it also provides their ontological foundation (Mansbach and Rhodes 2007, pp. 448-449). It ties in this way human life to a political predication of life in the name of the nation, subordinating the entire structure of discourse to the discoursing subject, that is, the ethnic majority naming the nation-state from the
discursively dominant position of titular majority (see for instance Sasse 2005, p. 685; Johnson 2006, p. 43; Allina-Pisano 2009, p. 268). This also presupposes a nationalisation of political time, with the ethno-name of the nation and its language instrumental in the process.

It is in this sense than one can also read Deleuze’s theorisation of proliferation though repetition. He describes one ‘paradox of sense’ illustrated in the proliferation of sense through its being ‘designated by another name which doubles the first’ (1994, p. 155). The chain of such designations is founded by an origin, and ‘[e]very origin is a singularity and every singularity is a commencement [on a] line of ordinary points on which it is prolonged like so many reproductions or copies which form the moments of a bare repetition’ (ibid., p. 202). Multiplication and repetition of the name of the nation creates the national singularity of political life under a sovereign subjectivity in national dress as irrefuted onomastic authority. Such subjectivity takes the national language as origin of all reality regardless of a multilingual nowness.

The repetitive insistence on a linguistically defined sovereignty institutes an ethnic fixation of life conditioning its political survival on appropriateness to the ideal of the imagined community. Instituting this fixation in the factuality of life presupposes, however, the working of a sophisticated, essentially discursive mechanism factualising national sovereignty as temporal presence with two necessary dimensions: objective and historical. The objective presence is that instituted through law in the everydayness of politics of sovereignty, which objectifies the people as subjects of national sovereignty. The historical presence is that promoted by the national education system, or national pedagogy (Shapiro 2000, p. 84), turning the people into ‘historical “objects”’ (Bhabha 1990, pp. 294-297). Both temporal dimensions remain within the limits of the national sovereignty consensus provided
that they remain, together with the political life they indicate, subordinated to the onomastic marker of sovereignty: the ethno-name of its human domain.

Indeed, if things first come to be in and through language (Heidegger 2000, p. 15), the ‘now’ of things political is also authored in this way as presence (Heidegger 1962, p. 458). This inaugurates the time of the said, its ‘authentic private temporality’ (Ungureanu 2008, p. 305). Language thus constitutes a temporality of its own through mere uttering of names of things in its own particular dialect that becomes sovereign over the being of things. In Agamben’s words, ‘[l]anguage is the sovereign who, in a permanent state of exception, declares that there is nothing outside language [...]’. That is while language, like law, ‘expresses the bond of inclusive exclusion to which a thing is subject because of the fact of being in language, of being named’ (Agamben 1998, p. 21, italics added).

When a particular language becomes political principle under a particular national sovereignty, it institutes the now of the nation speaking that language and that precisely as to exclude the non-national, the anti-national, or the post-national. Such discourse indicates the nationalism of a certain subjectivity predicing it, i.e. a nationalist subjectivism limiting possibilities of political life and imagination to those thus predicated (Derrida 1981, p. 22; 1982, p. 24; Heidegger 1993, p. 244; Ungureanu 2008, pp. 304-5). This narrows even more the limits inherent in the sovereign handling of potentiality to the extent that the non-national faces elimination from the story of the political community. Indeed, ‘all nation-states practise ethnic exclusion’ and had they not, ‘they would not exist’ (Panayi 2000, p. 215). The institution of national sovereignty on the principle of language implies then a double ontological consequence: it proclaims onomastically the present-presence of the national
community speaking it and its position of sovereign authority, while concomitantly and inherently excluding non-national human life to various degrees.

This is evidenced by the partial or total contestation of minorities’ legal, *objective presence* in countries like France, Greece, Germany, Turkey and others (Brubaker 1992; Hughes and Sasse 2003, note 28; Cholewinski 2005, p. 700; Grigoriadis 2007, p. 428). The multiplicity of meanings inherent in a multicultural ‘reality’ of the human domain is thus effaced purposefully with the establishment of a national sovereignty, which inaugurates the time of the nation as fulfilment of the national subjectivity in nowness (Ungureanu 2008, pp. 304-305). And that always implies the predication of people in terms of their appropriateness to the construction of the nation as moral category.


Such hegemonic positions of sovereign authority allow for the predication of the historical and objective presence of the nation in law and the national education
system respectively. They build on an understanding of the nation’s historical time continuous from past to present toward the homogenisation of the national imaginary (Manning 2004, p. 70), an aspect richly illustrated for the cases of Romania and Turkey in the next two chapters. Despite Eugen Weber seeing such conception of historical time as ‘dubiously applicable’ in the 1970s (1976, p. 485), the more sophisticated discourse analysis elaborated later brought precious clarifications in this context. As already indicated above (see pp. 98-99), sovereign subjectivities predicate time from their own spatial-temporal position of present-presence and thus construct temporality as present-oriented continuum in which the past and future become past-present and future-present (Derrida 1997, pp. 66-67; Ungureanu 2008, pp. 304-305). The result is the ‘private temporality’ (ibid., p. 305) of the nation constituted in continuity from origin to present, the future remaining left open in all textbooks telling the national history. And this speaks, indeed, of the sovereign coherence over the homogeneity of national time (Manning 2004, p. 70).

Destabilising these sophisticated constructions will presuppose the deconstruction of their proclaimed truths (Derrida 1997, pp. 10-11; 2003 pp. 33-34; see also Dasgupta 2009, p. 10). This has already begun here with the deconstruction of the named political form under national sovereignty with reference to unnamed life. Moving toward the concrete cases of Romania and Turkey will demand identifying and analysing the concrete moments when those sovereign subjectivities emerged, proclaiming their present-presence. The analysis will thus search for the two moments of origin when the Romanian and Turkish sovereign selves begun to insert their own ‘atemporal temporalities’ (Derrida 1996, p. 92; Prozorov 2005, p. 92) in the time of world history. This will presuppose tracking the birth of discourses of the nation and of national sovereignty in the two cases before their actual proclamation.
The analysis of those discourses will reveal certain elements giving sense to what has become in our times, following long historical processes, the dominant discourses of the nation and of national sovereignty in the two countries. The perpetuation of those elements throughout history will be thus followed until their encounter with the official discourse of the EU enlargement conditionality. The conclusions in Chapter 6 will then indicate whether those elements have survived the enlargement process, or continue to define the understanding of political life in Romania and Turkey, with critical consequences for the condition of minorities.

The method of research is therefore built here with ethnic minority discourses understood literally as declarations of ‘resistance to imposed or fixed identities’ (Kaya 2007, p. 708), which sometimes develop their own predications of the human domain. They come as ‘actors’ (Debrix 2002, p. 207) in a competition for ‘conceptual hegemony’ with majority discourses over the meaning of the nation (Sutherland 2005, p. 195). Consequently, the consensus of national sovereignty is understood here as product of dialogic practices presupposing, in Ricoeurean interpretation, relations of power. Ricoeur’s theorisation builds on Gadamer’s (Pouliot 2007, p. 365, Farrands 2010) and demands an understanding of the hermeneutic circle as phenomenon of appropriation of otherness and with this its transformation into sameness (Ricoeur 1974, pp. 106-107). This suggests a relation of power established by the speaking subjectivity with the world, also signalled by certain literature on relations between ethnic majorities and minorities in nation-states (see pp. 39-40). And minorities resist precisely to this ontological tendency of the national subjectivity to assimilate otherness with its own (national) identity and transform heterogeneous human life into homogenous national life. Indeed, discourses make possible identity always only within certain limits presupposed by a ‘particular subjectivity’ indicating a ‘mode of
being’ for the human domain (Doty 1993, p. 298). If that mode of being is ‘national’, the non-national is bound to construct its own discourse of resistance and engage in dialogic competition with the dominant one. And this binary scheme will be employed in Chapters 4 and 5 for the analysis of the competition between ethnic majorities and minorities in Romania and Turkey for defining political life.

Such dialogic processes, animated by power relations between ethnic majorities and minorities (see pp. 39-40), produce ‘systems of exclusion in which one group of discourses is elevated to a hegemonic status while others are delimited, condemned into exile’ (Bleiker and Chou 2010, p. 12; see also Milliken 1999, p. 229-230). Minority discourses will therefore be interpreted in what follows as such exiled narrations of human life, hierarchically demoded and marginalised at the same time, in an axiology where the national is the commonsensical best, the most just, beautiful and appropriate.

Drawing on Jutta Weldes’ (1999) inroad to the production of common sense, Jennifer Milliken (1999, p. 238) has systematised discourse analysis as an exploration of the ways in which such constructs are articulated so that ‘people come in some fashion to take up discursive constructions as representing reality for them’. Extremely relevant for this dissertation is that such articulations can be analysed because they are founded on cultural and linguistic notions that are already common sense to people (ibid.; Weldes 1999, p. 154). They become ‘national’ common sense concerning the self, security, education, and so on, following the ‘national’ reformulation of social interests. The onomastic exercise gives in this context the seat of authority to the name of the nation as source of sense.

The work of metaphors is especially instrumental in this process since they are designed to transfer an aura of superiority and authority to the majority ethnic group.
They play a decisive role in the ‘attribution’ of particular characteristics to the subject of a discourse (Ricoeur 1974, p. 100), thus adding a rich complexity to the self-conception of subjectivities. They also contribute to the construction of the ‘common myths and memories’ (Smith 2000, p. 3) that turn the imagined national community into a coherently discoursed notion. The analysis (especially in sections 4.3 and 5.1) will show how the repeated invocation of such constructions in public cultural activities adjusted the national mythologies to present (Agamben 2007, p. 83) and thus (f)actualised the imagined community in human life. Coherence and wholeness of discourse, however, is crucial for the formulation of a sovereign self (Rancière 1999; Manning 2004; Reid 2010, p. 120).

In line with Doty’s view of the relation between signifiers and the signified (1993, p. 301), the dominant understanding of the ‘national’ is understood here as the signified, one produced through the metaphorical exaggeration of national qualities, such as hospitality, honesty, heroism, and other markers of national narcissism. Such constructions are then employed as ‘resource’ (Shapiro et al. 1988, pp. 398-399) to feed a world of subsequent signifiers such as emblematic literary and artistic works, major public activities, political statements, or public monuments. Thinking outside this grand metaphor of the nation becomes then ‘virtually impossible’ (Doty 1993, p. 302), with serious consequences for ethnic minorities.

The analysis of the Romanian and Turkish sovereignties will therefore focus methodologically on the particular discourse elements performing metaphorical functions (Milliken 1999, p. 235) as to (f)actualise coherently the imagined national whole. Attention will be given to metaphors exaggerating heroism, sacrifice, or other elements constituting the exceptional character of the nation and making sense of the national wholeness and its self-sufficiency. Such discourses nationalise history with
acts of individual and collective heroism homogenising (Manning 2004, p. 64) the flux of ordinary life into a temporal continuum, with the past and the present united through rites in a ‘synchronic structure’ (Agamben 2007, p. 83).

The method indicated above will thus be employed in identifying the emergence of the idea of national Romanian/Turkish sovereignty sometime in the nineteenth century, focusing then on the gradual sophistication of that idea throughout the twentieth century in both cases. Attention will be given predominantly to the configuration of dominant discourses of the Romanian and Turkish communal values that also contain specific predications of ethnic minorities. The predication of temporality within this context will be particularly scrutinised, as it marks the temporal authenticity (Ungureanu 2008, p. 305) of the respective national communities. This will be explicated as structured in terms of nationalised pasts, presents, and futures, which leave little if any portion of time for ethnic minorities to assert their own temporalities.

The research will focus therefore on the production of the double temporal dimensions indicated above (see p. 117): the historical and the objective presence of the nation. In order to capture the production in the ‘national pedagogy’ (Shapiro 2000, p. 84) of the historical presence of the nation (see p. 117), the dissertation will examine the design and content of the national education systems in Romania and Turkey. The analysis of the content of educational programmes will focus then on metaphoric and epithetic structures constructing the heroic-mythical time of the nation and expanding it abusively and indiscriminately to the entire human domain. The aspect of continuity is essential in this pedagogical engineering of the national temporality because it is ‘a factor of survival’ for the family and hence for the nation understood as a family (Weber 1976, p. 191). The analysis will also focus then on
particular discursive techniques aiming at producing in history textbooks a sense of national continuity denying in fact the cultural-linguistic heterogeneity of historical life in Romania and Turkey.

The notion of the historical continuity of the nation will prove central in analysing the discourse of national sovereignty in the two countries. It presupposes equating the notion of present with that of presence and thus blurring the line between temporality (historical, present) and factuality (presence), while concomitantly uniting the mythical past and present (Agamben 2007, p. 83). In effect, what is actually blurred is the line between the documented historical fact and myth. Temporality is thus left vulnerable to engineering in the name of the nation and this also allows for the nationalisation of space. Nationalised toponymies invade in this way geography textbooks and construct in this way, together with the nationalised stories of space in history textbooks, the national ‘ethnoscape’ (Smith 1999, p. 150). The result is that temporal and spatial coordinates become colonised with the name and language of the ethnic majority, this leaving minorities exiled at the periphery of political possibilities (Bleiker and Chou 2010, p. 12), or simply excluding them from the history of the nation (see pp. 118-119).

In parallel with the focus on the historical presence, the dissertation will also analyse the production of the objective presence of the nation (see p. 117) in constitutional law through the legal formulation of citizenship and of the states’ official language. Such legislation is interpreted here as factualising the imagined national community in a nationalised everydayness. The ontological dimension of language is most visible in this case. The national legislation on citizenship and the official language of a state objectifies bare human life in relation with national sovereignty and turns it into political object bearing a particular name and speaking a
particular language. These elements carve out an ethnically defined political identity from an always-multiethnic human life and, as such, in arrogant defiance of human life per se. Herder was the first authoritative voice to preach that language was the ‘private-property’ principle constitutive of ‘nation-ness’ (Anderson 2006, p. 68). However, the constitution of the state on language as principle of constitution is a totally different matter. It activates in everydayness the double ontological effect of national sovereignty (see pp. 118-19) that institutes itself while concomitantly excluding the heterogeneity of human life and with it the politics of multilingualism and multiethnicity (Manning 2004, p. 64).

The national sovereignty discourse could not become dominant discourse (Milliken 1999, p. 229-230) in the absence of sustained efforts in that sense on behalf of certain intellectual leaders as makers and performers of the national culture (Baumann 1999, p. 26; Ifversen 2002, p. 6). The mechanism of analysis explained above will also serve then for identifying in the next chapters those responsible for the perpetuation of the discourse of national sovereignty in Romania and Turkey, the importance of this task having been already underlined above (see pp. 90-91, 95-96). The production of national community-feelings can be generically attributed to elites responsible for the engineering national pedagogies that construct homogenous identities as expressions of superior national wills (Weber 1976, pp. 95, 333; Smith 2000, p. 10; Spruyt 2002, p. 133). Nationalists in the nineteenth-century Europe constitute the archetype of such elites whose ideals descend from the Herderian theorisation of the nation. Those following them in our times are by no means less responsible, however, for the continuous assertion of the time of the nation, which concomitantly excludes (see pp. 118-119) non-national conceptions of political life.
Herder viewed the nation as an organic, unitary community with a distinctive, exclusive and linguistically defined culture (Gellner 1998, p. 68; Smith 2000, p. 9; Anderson 2006, pp. 60, 68). His views, enriched in the nineteenth century with Darwinist conceptions of human life (Gellner 1998, p. 69) and Romantic ideas (Smith 2000, p. 10), have been heavily employed in the fabrication of ethno-heroes and ‘ethnoscapes’ (Smith 1999, p. 150). And Herder’s influence among Romanian and Turkish nationalists will be clearly evidenced, especially during the early stages of nation-building (sections 4.1 and 5.1). They have entered the national pantheons in Romania and Turkey, thus marking two similar traditions in the predication of national culture and national interests. And tradition, in Giddens’ words, ‘is a means of handling time and space, which inserts any particular activity or experience within the continuity of the past, present and future, these in turn being structured by recurrent social practices’ (1990, p. 37).

Certain, identifiable Romanian and Turkish intellectuals have abusively assumed in different historical ages the role of collective consciences predicating human life in terms of their own understanding of the imagined community and its sovereign subjectivity. The influence exerted by those esteemed individuals on the interpretation and teaching of national history is extremely important (Weber 1976, p. 333). All the myths of ethno-genesis and national continuity presented in the cases of Romania and Turkey have been products of cultural and educational campaigns attentively orchestrated by political and intellectual elites, as illustrated throughout the entire remainder of the dissertation.

Finally, apart from the method of analysis indicated above, the general method of interpretation employed in the reading of the discourse of national sovereignty needs some clarification. More specifically, the author sees at this point the need to
reiterate his specific position regarding the elements of the analytical mechanisms sketched above. It was pointed out here (p. 25) that human life represents the main point of reference throughout the entire dissertation. This also indicates the author’s methodological positioning on the border between human life not yet subjected to the onomastic exercise of national sovereignty and the nationalised political life. As such, the author is precisely in the position of sovereign potentiality having the ‘ability not to be’ (Agamben 1998, p. 46; Borislavov 2005, p. 177) and thus apt to contemplate the national particular as one among innumerable others. From this position, the interpretation of the discourse of sovereignty confronts it, in Derrida’s understanding (Aradau 2010, p. 107), with potentialities that have escaped that discourse.

Inspired by Heidegger, this strategic positioning allows then for a perception in the apparent roundness of sovereign subjectivity of the very sense of otherness constituting it (Odysseos 2010, p. 30). Consequently, the method of interpretation proposed here is built on an understanding of human life exactly opposite to its predication by the national sovereign subjectivity as a named, unitary and continuous temporality. In other words, the author of this dissertation brackets out the historical nationalisation of the human domain in a world of national sovereignties and imagines instead human life as natural part of an ordinary, nameless flux of time. Bare human life is thus considered life in the nameless (Heidegger 1993, p. 223) and human individuals, in the very spirit of the Resolution 217 A (III)/1948 of the UN (see pp. 35-36), as “‘born free and equal in dignity and rights”, rather than the nationals (citizens) of a given state’ (Rosas 1995, p. 63). This method allows then for discourses of national sovereignty to be understood as authoring the national form by imposing on unnamed human life a story of a named imagined community that cancels the potentiality of human life and fixes it into a particular national (f)actuality.
The method of predicate analysis explained above has started from the original conception of sovereignty in interdependence with the notions of subjectivity, spatiality and temporality. As such, sovereignty represents here a discursive gesture of subjectivity carving political life out of bare life in spatial and especially temporal dimensions. The methods detailed above are employed in the next chapters to illustrate originally the historical perpetuation of particular predications of human life by the Romanian and Turkish sovereignties. Chapters 4 and 5 in the dissertation will present the historical formation of these discourses in a dialogic competition with minority discourses concerning the definition of human life under the respective national sovereignties. This will start from the historical periods when the idea of national sovereignty became relevant in contemporary Romania and Turkey, which for both can be located approximately during the second half of the nineteenth century. They developed increasingly sophisticated discursive constructions producing the reality of their national communities as temporal factuality.

The process of EU enlargement found these two sovereignties at a stage of maturity, when disrupting their mechanisms of intelligibility is difficult. The following chapters will demonstrate that the EU conditionality does affect the form of these constructions. It, however, leaves unaltered their content, which continues to function as source of meanings, thus ‘creating locations which enable various speaking/acting identities and excluding others’ (Shapiro et al. 1998, p. 398). Thus, the official discourse emanating from EU institutions and predicking the enlargement conditionality does not yet lead to the emergence of inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality (see pp. 101-103), an aspect that will be discussed again in Conclusions.
CHAPTER 4: THE FORMATION OF THE ROMANIAN SOVEREIGN SUBJECTIVITY AND THE EFFECTS OF EU ENLARGEMENT ON MINORITY POLITICS

This chapter presents in historical perspective the formation of the Romanian sovereign self and its discourse of human life. In order to support the argument, the author appeals to a vast number of original sources from the nineteenth and early twentieth century to our times. The encounter between national sovereignty and the Hungarian minority in Romania became possible only following the incorporation of Transylvania with the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. However, the Romanian state had been already established in 1859 with the union of Walachia and Moldova and by 1920 the authorities in Bucharest were already speaking the political language of a national sovereignty. The historical becoming of this national sovereign self is analysed here for the first time from the original perspective and method detailed in section 3.4.

Engineering the self-confidence and sufficiency of the Romanian sovereign self has involved the complex production by elites of a national culture and identity contributing essentially to a sense of a national tradition of homogenous unity (Smith 1999, p. 150). This in turn presupposed, as insisted in the previous chapter, subordinating conceptions of time and space to an imagined continuity of national life, thus nationalising past, present and future (Giddens 1990, p. 37). Understood here as the nationalisation of temporality, this made possible the intellectual conditions that gave sense to the legislative definition of the human domain in the ethnicised terms of citizenship and official language. Such mechanisms, especially
coupled with the workings of a national education system teaching the ethnicised story of the people, colonised gradually the time of human life with the Romanian onomastic formula. It all contributed to the production of a double dimension of presence, historical and objective, i.e. the private temporality of the Romanian nation (see pp. 124-126).

This political identity was born objectively in the nineteenth century, forged in the incandescence of the two World Wars and the communist period, and encountered the EU membership conditionality during its first truly democratic age after 1989. The focus of this chapter is thus on the post-communist period and addresses the following basic questions derived from the dissertation’s main question (see pp. 10-12, 17-18): What is it precisely that has changed in the Romanian minority politics under the influence of the EU? To what extend did change occur and what is the meaning of change in this case? The main hypothesis in this dissertation (see p. 17) is that the conditionality mechanisms of the EU accession process did produce change in the country’s minority policies. However, the discursive structures behind the production of the national sovereign subjectivity have not been altered. Thus, the engineering of a nationalised temporality, a national present-presence, continues to exile ethnic minorities at the periphery of political possibilities in Romania as objects of ‘minority policies’. Consequently, the emergence of inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality (see pp. 13-15, 39-40, 101-103) seem far from achievable even after the country’s accession to EU membership in 2007.

The chapter captures first (section 4.1) the formation of a national sovereign self among Romanians under the influence of intellectual elites in the early eighteenth century, that is, before the establishment of the independent Romanian state in 1859. The analysis points then at the production of a discourse of national sovereignty in the
Romanian Kingdom during the second half of the eighteenth century. The analytical focus is on particular elements of that discourse indicating its double ontological consequence (see pp. 118-119), i.e. it institutes onomastically the present-presence of the national community, while concomitantly and inherently excluding non-national human life from the nationalised political life. The perpetuation of those basic elements in the discourse of national sovereignty is traced then in the interwar period when Transylvania and its Hungarian community came under Romanian sovereignty (section 4.2). The analysis continues then with attention given to the discourse of national sovereignty during the communist regime (section 4.3) and, finally, in the post-communist years when the country entered the EU enlargement process (section 4.4).

The argument builds essentially on the idea that Romania encountered the EU enlargement conditionality with a political subjectivity constituted through the complex, historical sedimentation of identifiable beliefs, values and ideals. The gradual affirmation of a Romanian political identity was meant to help the emancipation of this specific ethnic group from the political, economic and social domination of other ethnic groups. Romanians represented a majority in Walachia, Moldova and Transylvania in the nineteenth century (see map in Annex 10). Thus, the entire wave of change in the Romanian society, starting sometime in the early eighteenth century, was described as aiming to eliminate the foreign element, usually better off economically, and replace it with a prosperous class of Romanians (Lovinescu 1972, p. 305). In this sense, the birth of a Romanian political identity and national sovereignty can be understood as the result of a grand political and cultural entrepreneurship project initiated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and aiming at ‘making the Romanians’ (Livezeanu 1995, p. 19), as political category.
Before starting the analysis of this historical process, the author must indicate in what follows certain elements that have been and continue to be central in the production of the Romanian sovereign subjectivity.

Engineering this subjectivity started with the Romanian nationalism in Transylvania that was born in direct relation with the Hungarian other at the end of the eighteenth century and influenced later the interpretation of the national identity in Walachia and Moldova (Bădărău 1987, p. 132). The intellectual efforts of the Romanian elites took inspiration in this process especially from the French, Italian and German experiences in nation-building and thus made extensive use of the imagistic potential of those national romanticisms (Boia 2001, pp. 33-34; Quinney 2007; McMahon 2009; Neumann 2010a, pp. 30-31). Central in this context was the searching for ancient, illustrious roots of the nation. In the case of Romanians, this meant reference to the period of Roman rule in ancient Dacia, when the Latin language and the imperial law were established in the region. It all started with the conquest of Dacia by Emperor Trajan, followed by more than five generations (106-275 A.D.) of direct Dacian-Roman ethno-linguistic synthesis (Boia 2001, Chapter 3; see also RRG and Sozan 1979, p. 144; Light and Dumbrăveanu-Andone 1997, p. 31; Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003, p. 420; Romocea 2004, p. 162).

The Romanian historiography has tended then to describe that ancient period as glorious in antithesis with the present, especially in influential literary works of earlier, Romantic nationalists throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Bădărău 1987, p. 134; Boia 2001, pp. 46-50; Mitu 2001, pp. 109-117). The traditional temporal coordinates in this historiography are construed in relation to the Roman Dacia and the three subsequent unifications of principalities inhabited by Romanians. The first and brief union of Walachia, Moldova and Transylvania under
Michael the Brave took place in 1599 (see Annex 10), usually presented as the fruit of natural political instincts in the respective principalities (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 230-231; Livezeanu 1995, p. 130; Petrescu 2009a, note 45). It was followed by the union of Walachia and Moldova creating the so-called Old Kingdom of Romania in 1859 (Annex 11; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 374-378), and the union of the Romanian Kingdom with Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina in 1918 that founded Greater Romania (Annex 11; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 384-421; Boia 2001, p. 83; Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003, pp. 419-420).

The periods between these events are depicted by nationalist historiographers in terms of processes that led inevitably to the respective acts of union by virtue of natural national bonds. This idea is in turn circumscribed to the most persistent theme in Romanian historiography, i.e. the continuity of the Romance cultural identity in the space ‘naturally’ delimited by the Tisza and Dniester Rivers in the West, North and North-East, the Black Sea in the East, and the Danube in the South (Boia 2001, pp. 113-114; Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003, p. 427). It is not then accidental that most manifestations of Romanian nationalism have been referring insistently to the territory indicated above as Greater Romania and the Roman province of Dacia as its geo-strategic hearth. The Latin language of its ancient inhabitants, from which modern Romanian preserves significantly (Ahonen 2007, p. 23; Quinney 2007, p. 446; Sălăgean 2008, p. 277), became in this context the organic bond of Romanianhood and principle of its political factuality.

The continuity thesis has been actively employed in heated political-cultural debates on the international stage when Romanian historians aimed to counter the

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1 Walachia and Transylvania united in 1859 under the official name of United Principalities, which gained independence from the Ottomans in 1877-1878 and became Romanian Kingdom in 1881. This is unofficially known as the Old Kingdom, as not to be confused with the ‘new’ Kingdom of Romania (1918-1940) established with the Great Union of Romania with Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina in 1918. This last territorial configuration is commonly referred to as ‘Greater Romania’.
Sulzer-Roesler theory serving Hungarian interests. This latter theory maintained in essence that the Roman withdrawal under Emperor Aurelian in the third century A.D. had left Transylvania uninhabited and so the Huns found it in the fourth century. It followed then logically that the Hungarian sovereignty over the province was legitimate (Ellis 1998, pp. 223-224; Boia 2001, pp. 115-116; Romocea 2004, p. 162). This debate became central in the bitter conflict between Romanian and Hungarian nationalisms during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, determining a major ideological mobilisation of intellectuals and politicians on both sides (Mitu 2001, pp. 15-37). The continuity theme is therefore omnipresent in Romanian historiography as political statement of identity (Boia 2001, Chapter 4; Mitu 2001, p. 24; Iordachi and Trenčsényi 2003, p. 432) and became an efficient propagandistic tool in preparing the way for the 1859 and 1918 unifications (Light and Dumină-Andone 1997, pp. 31-32). It also appeared in the production of a racial view of Romanianhood within the context of interwar fascist nationalism (Turda 2007, pp. 426, 428; 2008, p. 448; McMahon 2009, pp. 110-111), and in the fabrication of a homogenous ‘socialist Romanian nation’ under Ceauşescu’s nationalist communism (Korkut 2006, p. 144; Petrescu 2009a, pp. 523, 532).

Transylvania is central in this context as what Anthony D. Smith called an ethnoscape, i.e. a land covered discursively by ‘a tradition of continuity’ through which it is integrated in the culture of a particular ethnic group, thus taking ‘collective significance’ (Smith 1999, p. 150; see also Giddens 1990, p. 37). The clear location of most Dacian-Roman sites in Transylvania made this region quintessential for any possible conception of Romanian continuity as historical physical presence and consequently entitled to sovereignty. This chapter will demonstrate that this nationalisation of temporality de-legitimised alternative, minority conceptualisations
of human life and strengthened instead the claim of the majority to objective presence, (f)actualised through the legal formulation of the national political identity.

The nationalisation of time presupposed the subordination of all possible manifestations of political life to the name of the nation, defined here (see pp. 22, 74-79) as onomastic act authoring the human domain of national sovereignty. This presupposed, however, the ethnicisation of the very ‘Romanian’ (român in Romanian language) name of the people, since it originally had more than an ethnic connotation. Giurescu evidenced in the beginning of the twentieth century that the word ‘rumân’ had a profound social connation at least since the sixteenth century. It indicated the peasant serf who represented virtually the entire rural population of Walachia and Moldova (Giurescu 2008, pp. 31, 57-58).4 The word ‘Romania’ itself had been in use until early modern times to indicate not the contemporary sovereignty, but the Latin Empire of Constantinople from the thirteenth century (Wolf 1948).

The Romanianisation of the past can then be interpreted as an abusive colonisation history by contemporary Romanians through a historiography behind which one can see clearly a subjective, ethnically self-defined intentionality. It aimed strategically, in contexts explicated below, at excluding abusively alternative histories of ethnic others by building a nationalised temporality on the mere present-presence of the Romanian majority in the (f)actuality of the region. In order to escape scientific scrutiny, this nationalisation of time resorted to the mythologisation of national history. In the words of Iordachi and Trencsényi (2003, p. 427):

The cult of Romanian ethnic continuity, referred back to prehistoric timelessness, is also a perverted mythological manifestation of political modernity, where the repetition of founding acts, periodically confirming this continuity, ultimately means a regression into the ‘bottomless well’ of the past.

4 Unless otherwise specified, all translations of Romanian language texts employed in this dissertation have been done by the author.
Accounts aligned to this view of history suggest that the nation is so ancient that historian themselves cannot comprehend its temporality. This has produced a national time as ‘atemporal temporality’ (Derrida 1996, pp. 28; 92) and hence an evasion of critical evaluations. Interpreted here as a state of exception from the ordinary flux of human life, this move allowed then for the emergence of a sovereign national self, suspended from human life and thus apt to (f)actualise it under the name of the nation, in the language of law (see pp. 77-79 and Agamben 1998, p. 21). Such historiography led then inevitably to the ‘temporal priority’ of the Romanian nation (Verdery 1991, p. 175), with ontological consequences for non-Romanians under the majority’s sovereignty.

The palpable scientific evidence concerning Dacian-Roman ethnogenesis has been inserted in this national timelessness without problems of coherence since this placed Romanians in advantage throughout the entire Eastern Europe vis-à-vis other peoples. All those others were presented as Slavic, Turkic, or Ugric peoples descending from migratory tribes that invaded Europe after the Roman occupation of Dacia and provoking the well-documented collapse of the Roman Empire. The ‘after’ above, intimately tied to the ‘other’, has been the cornerstone of all constructions of the Romanian sovereign subjectivity. The Romanian language above anything else attested clearly the present-presence (Derrida 1982, p. 34; 1997, pp. 66-67; Ungureanu 2008, pp. 304-305) of this ethnic group in constituted form long before the constitution in the region of other contemporary sovereignties. The national subjectivity thus produced a conception of time in terms of nationalised past present and future present that build on the present-presence of the nation (see pp. 98-99). Once this view was placed at the confluence of any conceptions of Romanian identity
in historical literature, it could easily invade the intellectual spaces where the political identity was forged.

We shall see in what follows that the emergence of a Romanian sovereignty and citizenship in the second half of the nineteenth century produced a Romanian present time signalling arrogant forgetfulness about the natural multiculturalism of human life (section 4.1). The national education system nurtured then generations of patriots who later contributed to more extreme manifestations of Romanian nationalism, in racist-fascist (section 4.2), or communist (section 4.3.) forms. In short then, the sovereign exceptionality of the Romanians authored their onomastic normality and the exceptions from that normality (Wolfe 2007, pp. 129, 144-145). In the flux or ordinary life, as this chapter will demonstrate, this meant the authoring of a national sovereign self that supposedly post-national political forms, such as the EU, would need to learn to understand in order to ‘break’ (Cooper 2003).

4.1. The birth of the Romanian sovereign subjectivity and its state of exception from human life

The political belonging of present Romanian lands to the Roman world ended with the withdrawal of the Empire’s borders on the Danube under Aurelian between 271-275 A.D. (Hitchins 1964, p. 670; MacKendrick 1975, pp. 116, 143, 161; Ellis 1998, p. 221). This was followed by a long succession of various conflicting powers occupying the region (e.g. Angevin Hungary, Bulgarian Tsardoms, Tatar Khanates, Poland, the Hapsburgs, the Ottoman and Russian Empires) until the nineteenth century. These foreign sovereignties have been interpreted in the modern discourse of Romanian political identity simply as unfortunate periods of interruption in the line of
Romanian *continuity* of Latin stock (Câmpeanu 1991, p. 820; Boia 2001, pp. 113-114; Rogobete 2004, p. 287; Mincu 2009, p. 59). Central to this is the idea that the survival of the Romance language throughout history despite the successive political domination by non-Romance peoples attested essentially for the continuity of ethnic Romanian presence in the region (Chen 2003, note 65; Quinney 2007, pp. 445-447).

The *national language* has been the most precious element in the construction of Romanian political identity as making actually possible the notion of continuity and thus legitimising contemporary sovereignty. It is also one of the main reasons for the Romanian people developing a ‘mentality of islanders’ lost in a ‘Slavic sea’ (Tănăsoiu 2005, p. 120) where linguistically non-Romance enemies were omnipresent (Mitu 2001, pp. 30-33). In such context, the nation was only too unfortunate to be geographically situated at the gates of the Orient, while its identity was bound to Western Europe, particularly Latin Europe, that the Romanians were one with in values and destined to guard from Eastern alterity (Lovinescu 1972, p. 67; Spiridon 2006, p. 377; Mitu 2001, pp. 197-198).

The name of the nation, reminding of the people’s Roman ancestry, emerged gradually as a point of distinction from the non-Romance neighbours. After its brief use in the thirteenth century (Wolff 1948, pp. 9, 13), the term ‘Romania’ reappeared in the eighteenth century in some minor works on the region’s geography (Boia 2001, p. 34). The term ‘rumân’ and ‘rumânie’ was by this time already in use in Walachia and Moldova, referring to the rural serf and his condition respectively (Brezeanu 1999, pp. 229-232; Giurescu 2008, pp. 31, 57-58, 119-146). However, the modern, ethno-political understanding of the name owed especially to the intellectual impetus given by the militant Enlightenment movement in Transylvania.
A numerical majority but socio-economically and politically marginal population, Romanians in Transylvania had been for centuries under the domination of Hungarian and Saxon landlords. A cultural movement for national emancipation appeared toward the end of the eighteenth century and was labelled Transylvanian School by contemporaries. Its representatives were learned ethnic Romanians who took the initiative of promoting their distinct cultural identity in a community where the majority peasants were overall rather passive (Hitchins 2000, p. 15; Mitu 2001, p. 84). The nationalism of later historical stages reproduced the specifically anti-Hungarian militancy of Romanian intellectuals in Transylvania, with the image of the Romanian peasant at the heart of its symbolic constructions (Verdery 1991; Haddock and Caraiani 1999, p. 258; Stewart 2008, pp. 407-409).

The Romanian ethnic identity was recognised officially by the Habsburgs only following the revolutionary movement of 1848 (Iorga 1989, pp. 407-408; Mitu 2001, p. 28). Before 1848, the condition of Romanians in Transylvania had been one metaphorically simplified, in the discourse of the ruling class of Hungarians and Germans, through the syntagma ‘stupid, but plenty’ (Mitu 2001, p. 215). They were thus portrayed as a marginal entity, exiled at the periphery of all possibilities of emancipation in the Transylvanian society despite being numerically dominant (Hitchins 2000, p. 63; Mitu 2001, pp. 224-225). Mitu illustrates then richly that probably ‘[t]he most obvious feature of the self-image developed by the Romanian Transylvanians at the beginning of the modern era is its competitive tendency to exist as a vehement reply to the hostile images constructed by foreign observers’ (2001, p. 15). All throughout South-Eastern Europe, in fact, such inferiority complexes gave birth to impressive national cultural forms aiming at emancipating ‘the plenty’ (Gallagher 2008, p. 19).
While in Transylvania the self-other schema was impersonated by the Romanian-Hungarian ethnicities, in Moldavia and Walachia the other was Oriental, either Slavic or Ottoman. Consequently, ‘antinomies such as European/Non-European were extremely appealing to Romanian agents in charge of national identity construction’ (Spiridon 2009, p. 149; italics in original). Even in Transylvania, Romanianhood was understood in a special relation with Europe as continent’s ‘sentinel’ against Oriental otherness. The Hungarians belonged in this scheme to otherness as descendants from Asian migratory peoples, a view that was to mark the next generations and is still vivid in contemporary nationalist discourse (Mitu 2006, p. 128-132; Maner 2010, pp. 246-247). In general then, Romanian intellectuals of the time tended to view themselves as culturally close to the Italians and the French (Quinney 2007). Neighbouring non-Romanians were portrayed, in line with the general European tendencies (Neumann 1998, 1999), as originating typically from the non-Indo-European, non-Latin Orient (Atanasova 2004, p. 367; McMahon 2009, pp. 105, 113; Spiridon 2009). This early, Romantic patriotism was embraced by the 1848 generation, who became decisive in the emergence of the first Romanian sovereignty through the union of Moldova and Walachia in 1859.

The important year 1848 marked therefore not only the emergence of a Romantic national identity discourse among educated Romanians (Hitchins 2000, p. 16; Brubaker 2004, p. 168), but also a process of cultural entrepreneurship with the foreigner inside objectified as ethnic and axiological other. This simple scheme took a more coherent form in Transylvania with the narcissist portrayal of the Romanian as an always smart, innocent, justice loving, mature, generous and merciful self in profound contrast with an always revengeful, badly tempered, untidy, and shrewd ethnic other, Hungarian especially (Mitu 2001, pp. 205-214). The axiological other
was in any case clearly impersonating a cultural universe away from the European sphere of values, hence foreign to Romanians’ understanding of European normality. The Romanian militant literature advanced this logic in the mid-nineteenth century in a general European context marked by the emergence of the ‘national’ media (Anderson 2006, p. 135) and thus apt to exert ‘a tremendous axiological impact’ (Spiridon 2009, p. 150). It aimed to produce discursively a subjectivity deeply anchored in a temporal niche divorced from a past of serfdom and dedicated to a future of emancipated Romanians.

Social and cultural emancipation had also formed the main political platform in the anti-Ottoman strategies of Walachian and Moldovan principalities ever since the eighteenth century. The administrators of the principalities appointed by the Porte, the so-called Phanariots (Greeks from the Fener quarter of Istanbul), were held especially responsible for the corruption of the state and society (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 299-329; Ioanid 2004, p. 428; Rogobete 2004, p. 287; Korkut 2006, p. 145; Spiridon 2006, p. 380). Following the Treaty of Adrianopole (1829) between Russian and Ottoman Empires, Walachia and Moldova become Russian protectorates governed in 1830s under Organic Regulations. Given the abuses of Tzarist governors who even confiscated state treasuries, the anti-Russian ‘popular sentiment’ reached extremely high levels toward mid-nineteenth century (Bădărău 1987, p. 103; see also Hitchins 1996, p. 200). This indicates that tolerance for the foreign element in these principalities was already growing thin decades before their union and independence.

The element of leadership in the affirmation of a national identity in this context was represented by a remarkable generation of intellectual patriots. They contributed to the revolutionary movement of 1848 in Moldova, Walachia and Transylvania, the union of Walachia with Moldova in 1859, and the achievement of
independence in 1878 (Iordache 1997, p. 5). Among those people were Mihail Kogălniceanu, C.A. Rosetti, Ion C. Brătianu, August Treboniu Laurian, or Nicolae Bălcescu. It is interesting to note that all these men were active as literary authors, publicists, historians, politicians, and, most importantly, pioneers of the national education system. Kogălniceanu from Moldova and Bălcescu from Walachia especially, together with representatives of the Transylvanian School, were effective in promoting at the centre of the education philosophy the idea of national emancipation (Boia 2001, p. 131; Spiridon 2009, p. 153). The underlining logic was that once subjection to foreigners ended, Romania would continue its normal historical becoming, ‘marked by its Latin origins’ and thus belonging to the European history (Boia 2001, p. 50). The works of most Romanian intellectuals from 1848 until the interwar period promoted this conceptual congruence between the Latin continuity and ‘normality’ inscribed in the formation of the modern Romanian subjectivity. And this inevitably limited the imagination of non-Romanian possibilities of political life.

What emerged in the mid-nineteenth century was a collectivist understanding of the national self that constructed upon a particular conception of the ‘true’ nation. Its members were necessarily born in Romanian lands, defining themselves linguistically and ethnically as Romanians, and religiously belonging to the Romanian Orthodox Church (Rogobete 2004, p. 287; Boatcă 2006, p. 556; Korkut 2006, p. 137). The ‘others’ – Hungarians, Gypsies, Jews, Germans, Greeks, Tatars, Turks, Russians, Ukrainians and other ethnicities – were tacitly excluded from the domain legitimising the sovereign authority (Iordachi 2001, p. 159; Dragoman 2008, p. 68; Mateescu 2008, pp. 294-295). And that was despite those ethnic minority groups having been physically present on the lands of Romanian sovereignty for centuries before its actual establishment (Panayi 2000, pp. 10-12, Gallagher 2008, p. 19). This announced
then an arrogant defiance of actual human life by the (f)actualised imagined community as instituted by its own sovereign subjectivity (see pp. 96-100). It will take full legal form only in 1866, but following decades during which generations were already beginning to learn the meaning of a Romanian national life and history.

Long before the actual proclamation of sovereignty in 1859 and the subsequent emergence of a national education system, ideas about a unitary Romanian identity already emerged in literature and some forms of education. The public of the time in Walachia, Moldova and Transylvania was consuming a huge volume of literature dedicated solely to proving that Romanians were a unitary nation whose *continuous presence* in the region could not be denied. Scientific quality was not among priorities. The exaggerations of the Transylvanian School are anthological, while the School’s influence on the emergence of a Romanian nationalist historiography cannot be doubted (Boia 2001, p. 131; Mitu 2001, p. 183).

Gheorghe Şincai (1754-1816), writing in 1811, was trying to convince his readers that even the Bulgarian Tsardoms of the tenth century were in fact supported by Romanians from the southern bank of the Danube who were left there after the Romans evacuated Moesia (Boia 2001, pp. 114-115). Petru Maior (1756-1821), friend of Şincai, produced in 1812 an extremely influential work (Mitu 2001, pp. 16-18), which claiming that the Romans had exterminated all Dacians after conquering them and thus Romanians were of pure Roman stock (Hitchins 2000, p. 25; Boia 2001, p. 86). Maior and Şincai, together with Samuel Klein, represented the ‘Transylvanian triad’ that initiated the Romanian nationalist historiography insisting on the Latin purity of Romanian language (Hitchins 1964, p. 675; Coakley 2004, p. 538). Since it was a tongue of such ‘primordial purity’ (Mitu 2001, p. 233), it was then not only different from, but also *superior* to Hungarian. Samuel Klein (1745-1806) even
created a system of transcription exaggerating etymological closeness between Romanian and Latin, which he and Şincai employed in their *Elementa Language Daco-Romanae* (Hitchins 1964, pp. 671-672) and influenced similar exaggerations in Moldova and Walachia. The education in Romanian language also emerged within this context in which prominent intellectuals were experimenting with the imagined community.

Elementary education in Romanian language appeared, with the support of the Habsburgs, at Blaj in 1754 (Mărza 2010, p. 82). Following a 1781 edict, the Romanian Orthodox Church in Transylvania was also allowed to build schools. Under Şincai’s guidance, some three hundred village-schools were established in localities with more than one hundred Romanian families (Hitchins 1964, pp. 664-666; Bârbolescu et al. 1998, p. 296). Significantly, the main problem was the lack of Romanian teachers. Those from Walachia and Moldova were avoided by the Habsburg authorities suspecting that they would make ‘Dacian-Romanian propaganda’, unhealthy for the political stability of the province (Mády 2009, pp. 200-201). Under a foreign sovereignty, Transylvanian Romanians could not eventually hope for more.

The content of education however was already influenced by the Transylvanian School, of which Klein, Maior, Şincai and Ion Budai-Deleanu were by far the most effective in transmitting the national message to the next generations. Budai-Deleanu (1760-1821) in particular produced an influential discourse ‘charged with ethno-cultural and political meanings’ (Mărza 2010, p. 88). His work, much influenced by Herder’s theories and very popular among educators (*ibid.*), insisted on language as central for political identity and supported the thesis of Romanians’ pure Latinity (Hitchins 2000, p. 26). Budai-Deleanu’s *Gypsiad*, the only epic poem in
Romanian literature, evolves around the metaphor of the Gypsy camp symbolising the poor terrestrial condition of the Romanians who had forgotten their illustrious Roman ancestry and fell into serfdom to foreigners. As such, Romanians had come to long for ‘a flight from history’ (Mitu 2001, p. 76) understood as a withdrawal from the time of ordinary servitude into a glorious past.

Evading the ordinary time of the real human life was also implicit in the ways in which Petru Maior imagined the perpetuation of the Roman stock in Dacia. After advancing the thesis of the Romans exterminating the Dacians (see p. 144), he maintained that Roman men could not have married ‘such barbarians as the Dacian women’. The modern Romanians kept the same habit unlike the Hungarians, who came from the East to Pannonia without women and were thus forced to mix their blood with local women of Slavic, Romanian, or Greek ethnicity (Boia 2001, p. 86). The Romanians were then superior to Hungarians due to their older and purer roots in time. Such views filled the first textbooks on Romanian history in the nationalist and rather naïve spirit of Transylvanian Enlightenment (Hitchins 1964, p. 662, 664). The objective of the education institutions of Romanians in Transylvania was synthesised by Şincai as having to coagulate the neam, or popor5 (Mârza 2010, p. 89) around the Romanian Orthodox clergy.

Such strategies were soon to cross the Carpathian Mountains into Walachia and Moldova. Gheorghe Lazăr (1779-1823), another Transylvanian scholar, is considered nowadays one of the founding fathers of the Romanian education system. He was born, raised and educated in Transylvania but was forced later to flee to Walachia. There he noticed the humiliation of Romanians in face of Greek Phanariots, who had imposed Greek as the language of education. To counteract the

5 Neam and popor are Romanian words for kinship and the community of language, implying relations similar to family relations between descendants of the same ancestor, as in the German Volk (see, for instance, Csergo 2007, p. 37).
Phanariotisation of education, Lazăr established the first modern Romanian school in Bucharest, named Saint Sava Academy, and thus initiated learning in Romanian as fundamental for national emancipation (Schifirneț 2007, p. 23; Bochmann 2010, p. 107). The Saint Sava Academy benefited from the enthusiastic work of Lazăr, Eufrosin Potecă, Ion Heliade-Rădulescu and others but also draw inspiration from the patriotic content of education in the Mihăilean Academia of Iași, capital city of Moldova. Together, the two schools were to contribute decisively to the emergence of a unitary educational system. This in turn created the intellectually conditions making possible a Romanian 1848, the unification of Moldova with Walachia in 1859, and the War for Independence from Ottomans in 1877-1878 (Bădărău 1987, pp. 164-165, 174). The Mihăilean Academia was especially influential as it gathered under its roof an important group of literati, known later as founding fathers of modern specialised schools in Romania. It was in this context that Mihail Kogălniceanu imposed his understanding of national history (ibid., pp. 103-105).

Founded in 1835 as Moldova’s first school of higher education in Romanian language (Mitu 2001, p. 64), the Mihăilean Academia promoted the revolutionary ideals of the time and the patriotic views of the Transylvanian School. Its principles were to be transferred, together with all faculties, to the University of Iași after 1860. A similar transfer was made from Saint Sava College to the University of Bucharest in 1864. Thus, the nationalist teachings of the Transylvanian Enlightenment were to permeate the entire education system of the United Romanian Principalities after the Union of Moldova with Walachia in 1859 (Bădărău 1987, pp. 10-11). Kogălniceanu, who later played a major role as Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs in the United Principalities, had already taken up the task of inaugurating national history courses at the Mihăilean Academia.
That was a time when the concept itself was unclear among the elites in Iași and Bucharest. Educated under the heavy influence of Herder’s understanding of the nation (Spiridon 2009, p. 153; Escudier 2010, p. 73; see also pp. 126-127 here), Kogălniceanu gave an inaugural speech in 1843 marked by what is now understood as Romantic patriotism. The event is considered a major one in the making of the Romanian nation because the speaker exposed the principles of the historical science and the role it plays in the formation of patriotic citizens with ‘national breath’ (Bădărău 1987, pp. 106-107). It was also important because Kogălniceanu praised in it the historical figure of voivode Michael the Brave, who united Romanians in 1599 and thus remade ancient Dacia (Boia 2001, p. 41), a dangerous discourse given the political context of 1843. The fragment below (Kogălniceanu 1967, p. 107; for another English version see Mitu 2001, p. 186) confirms the centrality of historical science in Kogălniceanu’s view of the Romanian ethno-political ontology:

We are in urgent need of a history of our country, even if only for the defence of our rights against the foreign nations. While we still lack a history, any foreign enemy will feel he has a right to come and say […]: ‘The beginning of your people is unknown, the name you bare is not yours, nor the land you inhabit; [...] forget your origins, rid your name, or take the name I will give you, pack up your things and leave the land you live on, for it is not yours […]’.

The quotation is evidence that Kogălniceanu saw in historiography an instrument for engineering a national temporality in which onomastic politics was fundamental. The mastering of the national space was only derivative, in his discourse, from the historical being of the nation, which had to be asserted through an ethno-political historiography. And that was a time, in 1843, when such discourse would be seen as a major threat by the dominant powers in the region, i.e. the Russians, the Ottomans and the Hapsburgs. The general European developments favoured, however, the cultural emancipation of nations without states through elite-driven movements of
‘vernacular mobilisation’ toward the engineering of ‘ethnic nations’ (Smith 2000, p. 72; italics in original). In this continental context, the Romanians were already building their own system of public instruction despite lacking political independence.

Moldova and Walachia had advanced in this direction during the 1830s and 1840s by initiating education policies placed under imperatives of a national ‘cultural revolution’, Kogălniceanu being among the main ideologues (Bădărău 1987, p. 9; Spiridon 2009, p. 153). The intellectual construction of a national identity during this period took inspiration again from Herder’s ideas (see pp. 126-127), via Edgar Quinet’s French translations (Escudier 2010, p. 73), about the nation as community endowed with a spirit of its own and defined by its common language. This was to be achieved through the ‘ethnicisation of Romanian linguistic conscience’ already preached by the Transylvanian School (ibid.). Nicolae Bălcescu, enthusiastic revolutionary in 1848 and prolific historian, produced immediately after the revolution a book titled The History of Romanians under the Voivode Michael the Brave. In that work he presented the unification as ‘the dearest dream of the great Romanian voivodes’ going back long before Michael himself. As such, it was the first history treatise in which ‘the medieval history of the Romanians, of the three Romanian lands, was explicitly treated as national history’ (Boia 2001, pp. 41-42; italics in original).

The understanding of history by Bălcescu and Kogălniceanu indicate clearly the ontological weight attributed within this context to the name of the nation and its temporality in direct relation with the political right to mastering physical land. Kogălniceanu’s programmatic speech invited history students to think Romanian and insert the Romanian temporality in the time of European nations, with attention given to the valuable origins of this people. The effort was undoubtedly inscribed in the
long-term project of political unity of all Romanians under their own national sovereignty. This dream was to come true under the very ideological leadership of Kogălniceanu himself among others (Bochmann 2010, p. 111). His commitment was undisputable as he even accepted to give national history courses without payment when financial problems made it difficult for the Mihăilean Academia to hire new teachers (Bădărău 1987, p. 106). Moreover, he also initiated a literary movement with the short-lived but later extremely influential Dacia Literară journal in Iași (1840), a nationalist liberal publication promoting insistently an original Romanian literature inspired by the national history.

The examples above announced a massive colonisation of time, legitimising the proclamation of the Romanians’ *historical presence*, soon followed by legal acts signalling the emergence of their more *objective presence* in fact (see pp. 124-126). Elites in Moldova and Walachia were becoming increasingly receptive to the Enlightenment ideas and educated their young in the spirit of the French Revolution (Bădărău 1987, p. 45; Quinney 2007, pp. 449-450). Political developments also supported national emancipation. After 1831, both Moldova and Walachia were administered as Russian protectorates, with Organic Regulations as their basic law. The Regulations stipulated that the education system was to become state responsibility and the first ‘national’ education laws were issued. Article 421 of the Regulations made vernacular Romanian the basic language of instruction. The Regulations also allowed for the establishment of a well-budgeted network of primary and secondary schools throughout the Principalities (Bădărău 1987, pp. 58-59, 61).

In this legislative context, Gheorghe Asachi edited in 1832 the Regulation for Public Instruction in Moldova, which provided a set of rules concerning both the form and content of education. Asachi’s view in that document influenced all successive
reorganisations of public schools as a national unitary system, ‘subsumed to national ideas and interests’ and controlling the administration, the scientific licence, budgeting and the curricula (ibid., p. 63). Courses of history and geography in particular were designed to nurture patriotism. They insisted on the definition of the nation, inspired by the German philosophy, in terms of blood ties and the fatherland as space where the dominant ethnic community was the master of all affairs (Murgescu 2001, pp. 268-269).

Kogălniceanu was the key figure of the process in Moldova and later in the United Principalities, his conceptions owing much to the understanding, inspired by the Transylvanian School, of the Romanian nation as ‘most ancient’ in the region (Mitu 2001, p. 221). This insistence on redefining temporality was also accompanied, in line with Petru Maior’s thesis (see pp. 144, 146), by an increasingly public abhorrence of mixing blood with foreigners (McMahon 2009, p. 105). Such perspectives also marked political discourses and expressed pragmatic concerns about the fate of the nascent Romanian middle class under threat from ‘the Jewish domination of commercial activities’ (Feldman 1979, p. 53). These ideological constructions were to also give birth, after 1859, to a constitutional discourse overtly against the rich Jewish minority in the United Principalities.

The first modern sovereignty bearing the name Romania appeared with the unification of Moldova and Walachia on 24 January 1859 in one state, officially named United Principalities and having the capital in Bucharest starting from 1862 (see map in Annex 11). It was confirmed politically only with the adoption of the Constitution in 1866 (Hitchins 1992, pp. 1065, 1068; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 374-378; Linden 2000, p. 127) but a policy of bureaucratic nationalism had already started after 1859 under prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza (Iordachi 2001, p. 163). Attention was
given to the strengthening of the Romanian Orthodox Church through the nationalisation of properties owned by foreign, especially Greek, monasteries. The new state’s policies aimed at creating a working administration able to unify the systems in Walachia and Moldova (Stan and Turcescu 2000, pp. 1467-1468; 2007, pp. 18-21; Korkut 2006, p. 137). This approach is nowadays understood in the nineteenth century logic of Romanian political modernity as a ‘natural’ reaction to foreigners in the process of unification following centuries of servitude (Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003, pp. 425-426).

The gradually increasing authoritarianism and corruption of the Cuza regime led to its demise following a coup d’etat in February 1866 and the enthroning of a foreign prince, namely Carol I of Hohenzollern (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 383; Iordache 1997, p. 16; Gallagher 2008, p. 22). The motives behind this move explain enduring patterns in Romanian politics over the next generations, in particular the determination of cultural and political elites to reform the Romanian society in line with Western models. Prominent Liberal politician I.C. Brătianu worked hard to convince France to support Romania in bringing a foreign Prince on the throne of the United Principalities. In March 1866, he also published a manifesto in France explaining that Romanians have been for centuries under threat from their Polish, Hungarian, Tatar, and Turkish neighbours. The Western powers consequently had to allow a European royal on the Romanian throne and a hereditary monarchy to end local drama (Iordache 1997, p. 27-29).

The justification sketched above is illustrative of the profound relation between political actions and the cultural orientation of the Romanian society toward Western values in the nineteenth century. The massive intellectual effort behind this project was a complex oddity in that it forced a historical shortcut. Jealous of the
political and economic achievements of Western societies during and following the Enlightenment, Romanians had already developed throughout the eighteenth and early nineteenth century an understanding of themselves as unfortunate. Mitu (2001, pp. 109-117) documents this sentiment among Romanians in Transylvania, while Brătianu’s argument above suggests a similar rationale behind fundamental political change in the United Principalities.

The country’s unfortunate geographic position on the non-Latin side of Europe was interpreted as main cause of backwardness. The belonging of the Romanian people to the common Roman past of Western Europe contained then the promise of national emancipation. In this sense, ‘recovering the Romance character of the Romanian language was considered key to catching up with the Enlightenment’ (Quinne 2007, p. 446). This Europeanisation avant la lettre built on a strong element of collectivism typical for the outward-looking Romanian nationalism in the nineteenth century. It will be replaced, however, toward the twentieth century by a totally different cultural understanding of the Romanian subjectivity in terms of autochthonous specificity (Boia 2001, p. 59).

The process leading to the legal formulation of a Romanian citizenship was circumscribed to this general context of a cultural and political search for a national identity. In the general discoursing of the national self, the Ottoman, Russian and Jewish others were already beginning to contrast with the stressed Latinity of Romanians and their strident commitment to Western values. In the legal formulation of national sovereignty and citizenship with the first constitution of sovereign Romania in 1866, the Western models also played a central role (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 384; Iordachi 2001, p. 159). The political and legal discourse concerning these aspects placed conceptually the legal expression of national sovereignty

Drawing on Brubaker’s seminal work on citizenship (1992), Iordachi adopts the view that assigning citizenship in Romania was (from its inception) a matter of choice between the principles *ius sanguinis* and *ius solis* (Iordachi 2001, p. 163). The former meant that citizenship was granted on the basis of individuals’ blood ties to Romanian ethnicity, while the later was about the granting of citizenship by conditioned legal decision. The analysis of the legislative discourse related to the adoption of the 1866 Constitution leads Iordachi to the conclusion that, ‘[f]rom 1866 [on], the principle of *ius sanguinis* […] served as an exclusive basis for ascribing Romanian citizenship.’ This was in observance of the principle of the unitary and indivisible national polity (Article 1) and the principle according to which (Article 3), ‘Romanian territory cannot be colonised with foreign population’ (*ibid.*, p. 164; Romanian Constitution 1866).

The political and legal discourse of the following period tended to place the Romanian majority in terms of xenophobic contrast with the foreign Greek Ottomans and the Jews who had been politically and economically dominant (Livezeanu 1995, p. 4; Korkut 2006, p. 133; Leuștean 2007b, p. 730). The 1866 Constitution sanctioned this perspective by assimilating the notion of citizenship with that of Romanian, i.e. ‘Romanianhood’⁶, while the notion of ethnic minority did not appear at all. Instead,

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⁶ The words ‘citizen’ (*cetățean*) and ‘citizenship’ (*cetățenie*) cannot be found anywhere in the text.
all non-Romanian inhabitants of the territory under the young sovereignty were denominated as ‘aliens’ (streini), of whom only Christians were eligible for Romanianhood (Romanian Constitution 1866, Title II). Article 82 also demanded that the heirs of the Catholic German Prince Carol I convert to Orthodox Christianity, thus placing Romanians’ religious denomination at the top of the pyramid of power in the new state (Korkut 2006, note 44; Leuștean 2007b, p. 718). Romanianhood was granted only to inhabitants of Christian faith (Article 7) as to exclude foreigners from the space of political rights (Leuștean 2007b, p. 718) and especially the Jews, seen as a socio-economic threat to the still-fragile local businesses (Iordache 1997, p. 193). Thus, in only a couple of decades, the notion with social connotations of ‘rumân’ (see p. 136) turned into a name of the imagined national community with a history of its own and became objective presence (see pp. 125-126) with the constitutional framing of citizenship. The ontological consequences for non-Romanian human life under this young sovereignty were objective, too, as the Jews in particular became a clear target of economic discrimination.

The oppressive policies of the Austrian administration in Galicia and the Russian pogroms against the Jews had determined their migration in large numbers to the new Romanian state immediately after 1859 (Feldman 1979, p. 53). There, the domestic political discourse was already shaped, however, by strong anti-Jewish positions, with Kogălniceanu authoritative among them. A pragmatic politician, he supported religious rights being granted to this minority. However, as spokesman for the committee on political rights in the Divan (Assembly) of Moldova, he also insisted in 1857 that the Assembly ‘grant such rights only to Christians’. This was meant to protect the emerging commercial class of Romanians competing with the Jewish community (ibid.). Even this support had, in Kogălniceanu’s understanding, to
lead to the inclusion of other non-Orthodox Christians in the Romanian nation, thus
‘consolidating the Romanian nationality’ through the ‘rejection of differences’
(Kogălniceanu 1967, p. 208). This is, to this author’s knowledge, the first discourse in
Romanian politics militating for the political assimilation of minorities with the
purpose of subordinating alternative cultural identities to the national core.

Before 1859, Walachia and Moldova were not confronted with such a
situation and the influx of immigrants threatened to destabilise the young Romanian
state with a total population of only 5 million people (Iordache 1997, pp. 73-74). The
anti-Jewish constitutional provision (Article 7) was to be erased later following
Dragoman 2008, p. 68; Iijima 2010, p. 314). It indicated however clearly the general
orientation of the constitutional discourse in nineteenth-century Romania toward the
exclusion of ethnic others from the sovereign conception of the human domain as
community of prosperity (Gallagher 2008, pp. 21-22). Romania eventually granted
citizenship rights to the Jews under the above-mentioned pressures but on individual
basis, only 2000 of them becoming citizens after 1878 (Ioanid 2004, p. 424; Turda
2008, pp. 443-444). Xenophobic attitudes dictated therefore a specific, local
interpretation of international commitments and this was to recur later in similar
instances. The implementation of legislation on property will confirm this tendency of
discriminating against internal foreigners (Iordachi 2001, p. 186).

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mihail Kogălniceanu officially proclaimed
Romania’s independence in a speech given to the Assembly on 9 May 1877. On that
occasion, he reiterated the fact that sovereignty and independence had been on the
political agenda of the Romanian nation for centuries and especially after 1848
(Kogălniceanu 1967, p. 315). The Ottomans’ defeat in the Russo-Turkish War of
1877-1878, with Romanian forces on the Tsar’s side, brought independence to the United Principalities. Prince Carol became thus officially the ruler of a sovereign Romania, which was upgraded to Kingdom in 1881 and remained in collective memory until nowadays as the Old Kingdom (Regatul Vechi) (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 384-389; Iordachi 2001, p. 161, note 16; Stan and Turcescu 2007, p. 20; Gallagher 2008, p. 22). Victory in the Independence War also meant that the country’s territory was enlarged with the inclusion of Dobrogea (see maps in Annexes 9 and 11). By now, the Romanians were already a solid majority of more than 92 per cent, in 1899 numbering 5,489,296 people out of Kingdom’s population of 5,957,000 (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 400; Gallagher 2008, p. 23).

In Dobrogea, Turks and Tatars formed a significant Muslim group around the beginning of the 1880s (Stan and Turcescu 2007, p. 18). They represented approximately 30 per cent of the population in that province, Romanians and Bulgarians sharing the bulk of the rest (Iordachi 2001, p. 175). After entering under Romanian sovereignty, the province also became subject to the Kingdom’s policies of colonisation with its legislation on citizenship and land property. Dobrogea was thus intensely populated with ethnic Romanians whose numbers increased significantly over the next two decades. Land ownership had been almost 50 per cent in the hands of local Turks and Tatars under Ottoman laws, but major changes were to follow.

By 1905 Romanians reached 63 per cent in land ownership in Dobrogea, especially due to the gradual effects of an 1882 act, which in turn applied the 1866 constitutional principles of Romanian citizenship (Iordachi 2001, pp. 172-175). The scale of Romanian policies on land property in Dobrogea becomes clearer if

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7 Eminov (2000, p. 133) prefers less certainty regarding these numbers due to the unreliability of sources. Dobrogea passed from Ottoman to Romanian, then Bulgarian, then again Romanian sovereignties between 1878 and 1945. Nowadays this geographic region on the western shores of the Black Sea is divided politically between Romania and Bulgaria (see map in Annex 9).
confronted with the figures of the 1930 census. This indicated that Turks and Tatars formed 1 per cent of country’s total population (Annex 5) but over 20 or even 30 per cent in Dobrogea (King 1973, p. 48; Eminov 2000, p. 134). The figures suggest yet again that the Romanian national sovereignty and the conception of national citizenship were from inception intended to favour systematically the majority Orthodox Romanians (Iordachi 2001, p. 186). The legislation on national citizenship was thus, indeed, a dynamic concept of political design with practical value and effective agency of social change (Somers 1993). From this dissertation’s perspective (see pp. 125-126), this meant the discursive production in legal form of a Romanian factual, or objective presence that excluded ethnic others in the logic of the double ontological effects of national sovereignty (see pp. 118-119).

The Romantic patriotism of the time was thus pragmatically set to meet socio-political imperatives of nation-building, backed by an increasingly sophisticated cultural search for a clearer, hence narrower, definition of Romanianhood. This was also reflected in the education system and the public discourse after 1866. Analyses of public discourses, especially those given by esteemed intellectuals in public schools, between 1831 and 1877 in the Romanian provinces of Walachia and Moldova suggest an image of the ideal Romanian individual. The basic model was that of a ‘good Christian’, i.e. exemplary of Orthodox Christian religious and moral values metamorphosed in a civic culture (Murgescu 1999, p. 43; Mincu 2009, p. 58). To this was added a sense of particularism and uniqueness encouraged by Romanticism of German inspiration (Neumann 2010a, p. 31). Importance was given in this spirit to the nation’s idealised rural space and the Romanian peasant, that is, the main character in this ‘ethnoscape’ (Smith 1999, p. 150). This is also a clear example of the
discourse of the nation implying inherently a radical individuation and anthropomorphisation (see pp. 96-98) detrimental to alternative forms of human life.

This view of the Romanian individual tended to be portrayed discursively in congruence with an image of the people as a ‘linguistically and ethnically organic community, explicitly excluding cultural pluralism’ (Mincu 2009, p. 59). In this sense, the educational system constructed relatively fast a sophisticated mechanism producing an understanding of the past and the now of the nation’s objective presence in a relation of reciprocal legitimisation. At work here was then the discoursing of life by a subjectivity predating temporality as nationalised past present and future present, in terms of its own, national nowness (see pp. 98-100).

Thus, a reading book for the elementary school published in 1871 founded its entire argument about the national history on evidence of the people speaking Romanian. This may have been true about the year 1871, but it was highly questionable for the earlier, ancient and medieval ages that the respective textbook covered. It contained no chapter/section dedicated exclusively to minority communities. Instead, the respective textbook taught pupils that Romanian was only one born from Romanian parents, speaking Romanian language and sharing with brethren the same customs and religion. Additionally, a Romanian vowed to fight aliens living in Romania – among them being Jews, Greeks, Hungarians, Russians, Bulgarians and Germans – a view shared the members of the country’s General Council of Public Education (Murgescu 2001, pp. 270-271). This is illustrative of the nationalisation of present time, hence of the objective presence of human life, in the conscience of immature children. Certain possibilities of imagination were constructed in this way that will configure the mainstream political culture.
In the Romanian Kingdom of the 1890s, around 92 per cent of inhabitants were ethnic Romanians (Gallagher 2008, p. 23). Over 80 per cent of the entire population was rural (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 400) and illiteracy reached around 85 per cent (Livezeanu 1995, pp. 30-31; Gallagher 2008, p. 24). A reform law in 1864 had introduced free and compulsory education but the poor infrastructure and lack of teaching staff, coupled with the refractory attitude of the population toward education, made its implementation almost impossible (Livezeanu 1995, p. 30). However, the rural population remained at the heart of the national education policies, in line with the ideological principles expressed by Kogălniceanu in 1862 when, speaking to the Assembly, proclaimed the peasantry as the ‘foundation of our nationality’ (Kogălniceanu 1967, p. 241).

The approach was reinvigorated toward the end of the nineteenth century by Spiru Haret, a member of the Liberal cabinets as Secretary General and then Minister of Education during three periods: 1897-1899, 1901-1904, and 1907-1910. His most significant achievement was the law of 1898, which encoded legally an education philosophy evolving around the idea of a unitary national approach at all levels of instruction. Haret thus promoted the enlightening of the peasantry with technical knowledge (elementary mathematics, reading and writing) so that the worker in agriculture became ‘educated producer’ (Livezeanu 1995, pp. 30-31; see also Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 398; Iordachi 2001, p. 181-182 and note 118; Gallagher 2008, p. 26). Despite the limited success regarding the eradication of literacy, Haret’s reforms managed to bring the school to villages and, through a complex social programme, to diminish the influence of the local landlords over peasantry (Livezeanu 1995, pp. 32-33). This policy approach reflected an axiom of the Romanian intellectualty, from Kogălniceanu to national poet Mihai Eminescu (1850-
1889) and titanic historian Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940). According to it, ‘peasants made the nation, and the national state could be but the clear expression of their interests’ (Schifirneț 2007, p. 239).

In Transylvania, the dual Austro-Hungarian sovereignty was established in 1867, following which the problem of nationalities became increasingly relevant (Hitchins 2000, p. 50). From 1867 and until the union with Romania in 1918, Transylvanian Romanians faced the systematic refusal of political rights and regime’s pressures for ‘Maghiarisation’, or Hungarian cultural homogenisation (Livezeanu 1995, p. 129). Through the Nationalities Law of 1868, the Austro-Hungarian dual sovereignty offered ethnic Romanians limited cultural and religious autonomy. Then, the Hungarian Parliament adopted in 1879 an act making education in Hungarian language compulsory in all primary schools. This was followed in 1883 by a similar act addressing education in secondary schools, and in 1891 by a third one imposing the use of Hungarian language in non-Hungarian kindergartens (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 407-408; Hitchins 2000, pp. 191-193). A number of other pieces of legislation in 1883 and 1889, turned employees of the Romanians’ Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Churches into functionaries of the Hungarian government (ibid., pp. 174-187). The banning of the Romanians’ National Party in 1894 determined eventually the abandonment of the idea of autonomy in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Instead, the Transylvanian Romanians developed a nationalist discourse placing independence and union with Romania at its centre (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 408; Hitchins 2000, p. 121).

In the Romanian Kingdom, the pace of cultural and political activism was also increasing and thus themes of unionist nationalism became commonplace toward the end of the nineteenth century on both sides of the Carpathians. Iași-born A.D.
Xenopol (1847-1920), author of the first complete history of Romanians, popularised the thesis of the Carpathian Mountains as nation’s natural fortress, enclosing the Transylvanian plain as cradle of the Dacian-Roman symbiosis and Latin continuity (Boia 2001, p. 116). There, Xenopol maintained, Romanians dwelled and fought for their freedom for centuries. After heroic resistance against migratory peoples, they re-colonised the ancient territories of Roman sovereignty through the legendary ‘dismountings’ of [Romanian] voivodes Negru in Walachia and Dragoș in Moldova (Bârbulescu et al. 1998, p. 158; Boia 2001, p. 116). Such view was supported by the observation, omnipresent especially in the Transylvanian historiography (Boia 2001, pp. 114-115; Mitu 2001, p. 221-222), about the overwhelming numerical superiority of Romanians in the province.

Synchronised with these depictions was the insistence on Hungarians being of Asian origins and having invaded Transylvania much after the Dacian-Roman symbiosis (Boia 2001, p. 114; McMahon 2009, pp. 110, 113). Writers in the Romanian Kingdom were diligently contributing to these intellectual efforts. Among them were Kogălniceanu and Xenopol, accompanied by Bogdan P. Hașdeu, Gheorghe Brâtianu, Dimitrie Onciul, Vasile Pârvan, or Nicolae Iorga. All these prominent cultural and political icons dedicated major works to the theme of Romanian continuity and the historical importance of Transylvania in this context. Many of them specifically designed their theories to counteract the ‘Roeslerian hypothesis’ (see p. 135 and Boia 2001, pp. 118-119). Overall, this massive publication activity, connected directly with national education policies, contributed to the formation of a popular sense of ethnic unity across historical time, bridging the present with the past.

8 The real identity of this ‘voievod’ is actually unknown (Bârbulescu et al. 1998, p. 153).
and the future in a coherent understanding of national continuity, in terms inimical to the Hungarian other.

The Romantic age of nationalist historiography was hit toward the end of the nineteenth century by the harsh criticism of the Junimea (Youth) cultural movement, which condemned the excessive accumulation of ‘forms without content’ in Romanian culture. This literary society was founded in 1863 in Iași (moved to Bucharest in 1885) and was led by Titu Maiorescu (Bârbulescu et al. 1998, p. 391; Boia 2001, pp. 54-59). It represented an autochthonous reaction to the excessive imports from Western cultures, which were invading Romanian public discourse as empty forms. Foreign institutions and ideas had become abundant, but the domestic elites lacked a profound understanding of these notions and the consequence was the gradual construction of a Romanian culture of forms without substance or content (Mitu 2001, pp. 96-97). Maiorescu (1840-1917) wanted to raise public awareness concerning such drawbacks and encouraged the search for ‘national originality’ expressing the unique qualities of the nascent Romanian literature (1966, p. 395).

The main target of this intellectual camp was the nineteenth century historiography, preoccupied obsessively not with methodology but with building a privileged place for Romanians among other European nations, a scientific error labelled ‘Oriental barbarism’ by Maiorescu in 1868 (Lovinescu 1972, p. 292; Boia 2001, p. 58). Such writing was ‘possibly patriotic, possibly political, too, but not historical’ (Maiorescu 1966, p. 402). He accused history professors at the Universities in Iași and Bucharest for not developing thoroughly documented studies of national history and summarised his beliefs by stating that (ibid., pp. 143-144),

Fate has taken us, Romanians, without warning out of the darkness of Turkey and brought us face to face with Europe. The gates of the Carpathians have opened together with the Danube for allowing forms of civilisation from France and Germany to envelope the public life of our people. […] Everything
that today is empty form in the movement of our public life must be turned into felt reality […]. It is unconceivable that a people enjoy outside forms of a higher culture while following inside the ways of barbarity.

A number of historians have described the Junimea cultural movement as an autochthonous criticism of modernity from conservative positions (Boia 2001, pp. 59-63; Mitu 2001, p. 97; Boată 2007, p. 374). More specifically, the target of criticism was cultural stereotypes borrowed indiscriminately from the more advanced nations of Romance languages, particularly France, the Junimists demanding scientific rigour inspired by their admiration for the German and British cultures (Mitu 2001, p. 102-103; Schifirneţ 2007, p. 54-55). Initially, the focus of this criticism was on literature and especially literary works on history (Bărăulescu et al. 1998, p. 391; Mitu 2001, p. 99) as the most efficient tools of cultural development at that time. Nevertheless, these ideas spread gradually into political culture (Heinen 2010, p. 469).

Maiorescu served as Foreign Minister and Prime Minister between 1910 and 1914. In this role he advanced a philosophy of government already announced in a speech given in front of the Parliament in December 1894. He had stated then that, ‘this country must advance only through the most productive national labour, through the development of our ethnic character in language, in literature, in physical work, in dress, history, social form and in the form of the state’ (Schifirneţ 2007, p. 78). The Junimist ideas were propagated by authoritative voices, such as historians A.D. Xenopol and Nicolae Iorga, philosophers Vasile Conta and Constantin Rădulescu-Motru, the poet Mihai Eminescu and playwright Ion Luca Caragiale, popular writers Ion Creangă and Bogdan Petriceicu-Haşdeu, plus an entire generation of Romanian patriotic intellectuals in Transylvania (Bărăulescu et al. 1998, p. 391; Mitu 2001, pp. 97-103; Schifirneţ 2007, p. 78; Heinen 2010, pp. 455-456). Most of these popular men were also politically active and remained so throughout the process that led to
the Great Union of 1918 and in the interwar period. The influence of Junimea’s autochthonist conservatism on the social and political upheavals of the next generations toward our time is thus particularly relevant here.

Crucial for this dissertation is the fact that the movement contributed essentially to the replacement of the Romantic patriotism, born with the 1848 Revolution and having an ‘European finality’, with a modern, inward oriented, autochthonous nationalism (Boia 2001, p. 59). Despite alternatives to the Junimist outlook being also popular at that time (see for instance Boata 2006, pp. 563-564) the Maiorescian line prevailed eventually as dominant discourse. Especially in the ideological form adopted toward the First World War, it disliked the old-fashioned patriotism of 1848 and favoured staunch conservative, xenophobic perspectives instead, even tolerance for authoritarian political reflexes (Schifinț 2007, p. 122). And these were to become the main sides – Europeanist and autochtonist conservative, or traditionalist – that the Romanian elites could opt for in the beginning of the twentieth century (Boia 2001, p. 59; Gallagher 2008, p. 26; Bochmann 2010, p. 122). This came right at the time when Europe was sliding toward the age of totalitarian ‘political religions’ (Gentile 2000).

This section has offered evidence concerning the configuration of a dominant political discourse in the Romanian society of the nineteenth century gradually defining the subjective sovereignty and its human domain. It was shaped by essential elements of national subjectivity propagated by the Transylvanian School, also reflected in a rich literature by Romantic patriotic intellectuals in Moldova and Walachia. This discourse of the national self started from the notion of ‘rumân’ and ‘rumânie’, which had initially social connotations (see p. 136), and turned them into ethno-onomastic tools as ‘Romanian’ and ‘Romania’. Romantic nationalist
intellectuals from Transylvania, Moldova and Walachia attached to these notions a temporality of their own through an exaggerated engineering of time. This constituted the *historical presence* (see p. 124-125) of the imagined Romanian community stretching much beyond possibilities of scientific verification. It stressed the superiority of Romanianhood to alternative identities in the specific terms of belonging to a Roman-European history. In this historical presence, descendants from migratory peoples invading Europe *after* the Roman colonisation of Dacia, i.e. contemporary non-Romanians, had no legitimate place.

This particular conception of the nation’s temporality presupposed its self-suspension, or exception from the multicultural reality of actual life in an imagined, romanticised national history. It made possible the instrumentalisation of human life as such and the categorisation of its non-Romanian elements in the terms of inferiority to the glorious historical presence of the Romanians. This nationalist discourse signalled an emerging sovereign national subjectivity (see p. 98-99) and advanced to the level of dominant political culture starting especially with the revolutionary year 1848 in Walachia and Moldova.

Like elsewhere in Eastern Europe (Mincu 2009, p. 58), the patriotic, nationalist imagery and discourse also produced the intellectual conditions for the institutionalisation of Romanian citizenship with palpable effects for non-Romanian ethnic groups. This is understood here as the (f)actualisation of the *historical presence* of the imagined community into an *objective presence* encoded in the legislation on citizenship and the state’s official language (see pp. 125-126). The emergence of an intellectual current of autochthonist conservatism in the 1870s pushed for an inward-oriented form of nationalism that narrowed even more the conception of a Romanian political life. This will become dominant discourse during the first half of the
twentieth century. While the 1866 Constitution influenced the political discourse on
constitutional law until the imposition of the communist regime in 1947 (Iijima 2010,
p. 312), the discourse of patriotic nationalism and especially its autochthonist version
was to set the meaning of patriotism for future generations of Romanians. In the next
section, this discursive line continues by defining even more clearly, and implicitly
limiting even more, the notion of ‘good’ Romanian as human being under Romanian
sovereignty in the interwar period.

4.2. The Romanian sovereign subjectivity meets its internal Hungarian other: 1918-
1945

As underlined in the Introduction (see pp. 13-14), this dissertation is not about
nationalist ideologies *per se*, but about the formation and performance of state
nationalism, i.e. nationalism in the seat of sovereign authority whence it subordinates
human life to a nationalised temporality in terms of the nation’s historical and
objective presence. In the case of Romania, the twentieth century brought about the
culmination of this state nationalism taking authoritarian forms in the interwar period
and under the communist regime. The Union of 1918 in particular was to become a
symbol of national strength for all subsequent manifestations of state nationalism,
while at the same time representing the darkest moment for Hungarians as it annulled
their sovereign rights in Transylvania (see p. 222).

The diplomatic games in Paris at the end of the First World War made
possible the creation of *România Mare*, or Greater Romania (see map in Annex 11),
following the official unification of Transylvania, Bessarabia, and Bukovina with
The event was marked symbolically by the successor of Carol I, Ferdinand I, who entered the city of Alba Iulia on 15 October 1922 to be enthroned as king of all Romanians in the fashion of Michael the Brave more than three centuries earlier. But the 1918 unification also meant that a significant number of foreign ethnic groups, previously under Austro-Hungarian, Russian, or Ottoman rule, became subjects of the Romanian sovereign.

In the Old Kingdom (Walachia and Moldova), ethnic minorities (mostly Jews) had amounted to less than 8 per cent of the total population, while in 1920 around 30 per cent were ethnically non-Romanian (Hitchins 1992, pp. 169-170; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 420; Gallagher 2008, p. 23). The Hungarians became the largest minority group, followed at considerable distance by Germans, Ukrainians, Russians, Bulgarians, Roma and Jews (Livezeanu 1995, pp. 9-10; Gallagher 2008, p. 29; Korkut 2006, p. 133; see also Annex 5). Some sources suggest that only 53.8 per cent of the entire population was made of ethnic Romanians after the Union (Illyés 1982, p. 21). The census of 1930 indicated 70 per cent (almost 13 million), Hungarians counting almost 1.5 million (7.2 per cent). They represented, however, almost 30 per cent of the population in Transylvania, followed by Germans (5.1 per cent), Jews (4 per cent), and Ukrainians (4.2 per cent) (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 441; see also Annex 5).

In this rich cultural context, the central authorities in Bucharest continued the predecessors’ efforts of producing an objective presence of the nation with the Constitution of Union (1923) expanding the principles established in 1866 (Iijima 2010, pp. 312, 314). Despite certain positive aspects concerning the ethnic minorities (Iordachi 2001), the 1923 Constitution was framed by the Liberal Party as to confirm the unitary, indivisible and centralised character of the state (Article 1). This was also reflected later in the legislative acts nationalising the educational system (Livezeanu
1995, p. 23). The Constitution of Union promoted an apparently civic understanding of Romanian citizenship that granted the freedom of conscience (Article 5), civil rights and equality before the law (Articles 7 and 8), the right to association (Articles 28 and 29), and the right to serve in the armed forces (Article 119) regardless of ethnic, linguistic or religious belonging (Romanian Constitution 1923).

However, this effacing of ethnic, linguistic and religious differences being operated by the majority, inevitably strengthened the ‘ethnic Romanian character of the new state’ (Gallagher 2008, p. 30). It thus produced a definition of citizenship grossly defying the multiculturalism of actual human life. Moreover, despite containing the words ‘citizen’ (cetățean) and ‘citizenship’ (cetățenie) that were not known to the framers of the 1866 Constitution (see p. 154 and footnote 6), the fundamental law of 1923 did not define Romanian citizenship and denominated the subjects with the ethnic term ‘Romanians’. The word ‘Romanian’ appears both in adjectival and substantive forms, which implied the subordination of all ethnic identities to the ethno-political definition of the political unit. Thus, Romania was proclaimed constitutionally a unitary, centralised and indivisible state (Article 1) with Romanian as official language (Article 126), these articles leaving room only for individual rights to be granted for the protection of non-Romanian ethnic groups.

The Constitution of Union reflected to some extent the provisions of the 1919 Minority Treaties under the League of Nations and promised certain political rights (Iordachi 2001, p. 183). It granted citizenship to the nearly 770,000 Jews already inhabiting the Old Kingdom (Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002, pp. 212-213) but the protection of minority rights in general was reduced merely to this reference to relevant international treaties. The constitutional text focused instead only on individual rights (Iijima 2010, p. 314). The political elites were in any case already
embarked on the mission of producing a common political identity that overwhelmed other ethnicities with its apparent civic form, but a content building on the ethno-logic of national sovereignty. In this spirit, the Constitution also confirmed the ‘dominant’ position of the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) in the religious order under state protection (Leuștean 2007b, p. 728. Additionally, the 1921 Land Reform, aiming primarily at reducing the Bolshevik control in Bessarabia (Brown 1979, pp. 464-465; Gallagher 2008, p. 30), was also to affect the ethnic minorities by allowing for the confiscation of land from small and medium-size properties, minority schools and religious establishments (Illyês 1982, p. 90).

The 1925 Public Administration Act introduced an oath of allegiance to Romanian sovereignty for all job applications in the public sector and institutions of education. This led to many Hungarians being replaced with Romanians in Transylvania. The implementation of provisions in the same act also produced a new administrative organisation of the country, which diminished the role played by local minority communities (ibid., pp. 91-92; Culic 2006, pp. 176-177). Despite formally granting legal equality to all ethnic groups, the Constitution of Union was also far from helpful in solving the older Jewish problem of citizenship in the territories acquired with the Union. Thus, 80,000 Jews in Bessarabia were still not registered as Romanian citizens with property rights in 1928 (Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002, p. 213; Livezeanu 1995, p. 123).

The considerable enlargement of Romanian territory at the expense of neighbouring states made the administration fear especially Russian and Hungarian irredentism; an intensive Romanianisation policy was therefore implemented in the newly acquired provinces (Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002, p. 223). This was accompanied by a renewed state activism in the direction of promoting the economic
interests of ethnic Romanians in line with similar policies of the previous century. The main promoter of this approach was the Liberal Party during the 1920s. Influenced by the theoretician of Romanian Liberalism, Ştefan Zeletin (Hitchins 1992, pp. 1077-1078), the Liberals opted for protectionist economic policies behind the slogan ‘Through Ourselves’. The aim was the elimination of foreign capital and supporting the Romanian control of infrastructure and the main industries to the detriment of foreigners from within and without (Daskalov 1997, p. 151; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 437-438; Müller 2010, pp. 213, 221).

The interwar period also saw the sophistication of economic policies under the influence of Mihail Manoilescu (1891-1950), an overt sympathiser later of the fascist ideology (Ornea 1995, pp. 265-266; Livezeanu 2002, p. 159; Ioanid 2004). His view of agriculture was deeply marked by the increasing public belief of the time that the hearth of the Romanian nation was the village, while a capitalist agriculture ‘altered the soul of the Romanian peasant’ (Ioanid 2004, p. 443). Manoilescu was impressed with the initial positive results of intensive industrialisation and economic nationalism in Italy and Germany at the time. Influenced by those models, he also believed in the ‘corporatist’ forms, ideally promoted through state protectionism, which was to inspire later even the planners of the communist economy (Chirot 1978, p. 493; Gallagher 2008, p. 33). Concerning politics, Manoilescu also distrusted democracy and admired the single-party authoritarianism of fascist and Nazi inspiration, which could, he believed, ‘purify’ the Romanian bourgeoisie of exploitative tendencies and modernise it (Hitchins 1992, p. 1079; Ornea 1995, pp. 46, 268-269). His view of the ethnic minorities would become clear in the 1930s. In line with the political discourse of the time and reminding of the nineteenth-century xenophobia, he wrote that
Romania had no social, but ethnic problems and overtly supported the replacement of Jews with Romanians in key economic positions (Ioanid 2004, p. 440).

The intellectual productions of Manoilescu, Iorga, Nae Ionescu, Lucian Blaga and others continued the views of the late nineteenth-century Romanian intellectuals of nation-building through agricultural and educational policies focused ideologically on the peasantry (Bârbulescu et al. 1998, p. 391; Hitchins 1992, pp. 1072-1073). The Romanian culture had been shaped gradually toward the twentieth century by the autochthonist conservatism of Junimist vein, with its distrust of Western forms and support for the production of an original national culture. This dominant discourse was opposed by that of Westernising, Europeanising elites, spiritually linked to the Romantic patriotism of earlier decades. These two major formulas made ‘a duality of polarised intellectual traditions’ that marked all Romanian modernity (Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003, pp. 416-417). They marked the profound division of Romanian culture between Europeanisation and ‘endogenous ethnospecificity’, between urbanisation-industrialisation and traditional agrarianism (Mincu 2009, p. 60; see also Bârbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 391-395; Hitchins 1992, p. 1073; Korkut 2006, p. 134).

The interwar meaning of Romanian identity was to be shaped by a generation of intellectuals more or less close to the autochthonist ideas of ethno-religious specificity and grouped around literary journals such as Cuvântul (The Word), or Gândirea (The Thinking). Among them were nationalist thinker Nichifor Crainic, poet and philosopher Lucian Blaga, religions historian Mircea Eliade, plastic artist Constantin Brâncuși, playwright Eugen Ionescu, philosophers Mircea Vulcânescu and Emil Cioran, or Nae Ionescu, the later ideologue of Romanian fascism. Some of them became extreme nationalists, anti-Jewish militants and supporters of the fascist movement (Bârbulescu et al. 1998, p. 426; Alexandrescu 2002, p. 159; Ioanid 2004,
p. 432; Bejan 2006, p. 115; Bochmann 2010, p. 123). Their ideals were to be summarised in three words by Nae Ionescu: Orthodoxy, nationalism, and monarchy (Boia 2001, pp. 146-147; Bochmann 2010, p. 123). These were also the foundation stones of Romanian racist nationalism before the Second World War, a cultural construction that narrowed considerably the definition of political appropriateness. Only devout Orthodox individuals of pure Romanian ethnicity could fit that nationalised definition of the human domain under Greater Romania’s sovereignty.

Nicolae Iorga (1871-1941) was highly influential in the interwar period as continuator of the Kogălniceanu-Xenopol line in historiography with his enormous works. He served as Member of Parliament, President of the post-First World War National Assembly, minister and Prime Minister until assassinated by the fascist organisation Iron Guard in 1940 (Ioanid 1992, p. 469; Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002, p. 221). Iorga’s works insisted on the agrarian essence of the idealised Romanian past, the future of the state depending therefore on peasantry as ‘bulwark of the nation’ (Korkut 2006, p. 134). However, he conceived of the ideal rural Romania as inhabited by “ethnically pure” free peasants’ (Ioanid 1992, p. 470). This complemented his general understanding of the nation in terms of ethnicised Orthodoxy and explained Iorga’s political alliance in 1922 with extreme right politician Alexandru Cuza (Turda 2008, p. 446). While recognising that the sense of belonging to a common ethnic identity was not uniformly distributed in the society, Iorga also gave license to the image of contemporary Romanians as inheritors to all Eastern Orthodox Latinity (Boia 2001, pp. 119-120; Iordachi 2001, p. 171).

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9 This ultra-nationalist, anti-Semitic, anti-communist and ultra-Christian Orthodox organisation was established in 1927 under the name ‘Legion of Archangel Michael’ and became later known as the Legionary Movement (Ornea 1995; Haddock and Caraiani 1999, p. 260; Boia 2001, pp. 213-214; Ioanid 1992; 2004).
The equivalence between the Romanian ethnic identity and Christian Orthodoxy, clearly a product of Romanian nationalism in eighteenth century Transylvania (Hitchins 1964, 2000, 2002), had already spread in Walachia and Moldova with the contribution of the 1848-generation. But this inward orientation was exacerbated by the coming into contact of Romanian sovereignty with its Catholic Hungarian minority after 1918 and the general tendency among elites, inaugurated with Junimea, to distrust Western stereotypical forms while exalting the ethnic content of culture. Keith Hitchins (1992, p. 1073) has portrayed suggestively in this sense the Romanian society in the beginning of the twentieth century:

In the two decades after the First World War, the traditionalists drew sustenance from general European currents of thought opposed to rationalism and scientific positivism. They turned for guidance to, among others, Nietzsche, whose anti-rationalism fascinated them, and Spengler, whose theories about the inevitable decline of civilisations, notably the West, provided them with welcome analytical tools. Strikingly new in their own thought was an emphasis on Eastern Orthodox spirituality as the essential component of Romanian ethnic consciousness.

The extremely violent peasant uprisings of 1907 and the inevitable general economic decline after the Union, coupled with the effects of the Great Depression (Brown 1979, p. 458; Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002, p. 216) led to a major reorientation of Romanian elites toward extreme nationalism. These tended to victimise/idealise the peasantry and put all blame on the Jews, a discourse that became radicalised toward the Second World War. The Romanian youth was consequently more and more ready to rally behind popular rightist intellectuals, such as Alexandru Cuza and Nicolae Iorga (Ioanid 1992, p. 473; Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002, p. 221). The Orthodox Christian identity of the nation helped the differentiation between the Romanian self and the Jewish or Hungarian Catholic alterity. In fact, Orthodoxy proved so versatile that was to be instrumentalised in the mid-interwar
period even in the racial conception of the nation (Turda 2007, p. 436; McMahon 2009).

Education policies began to reflect this trend, too, with a focus on convincing pupils of the historical presence (see pp. 124-125) of the Romanian nation within the limits set by the intellectual predication of political life. The interwar continuator of Haret’s energetic beginnings (see p. 160) was Constantin Angelescu, who made the unification of the people under one common political identity an imperative of public instruction after 1918. A member of the Liberal Party like Haret, Angelescu became the champion of a policy expressed in three pieces of legislation in 1924, 1925 and 1928, which aimed at creating a unified national education system in all territories of Greater Romania. History books were to tell the story of the nation with the exclusion of minorities from the nationalised time. In Livezeanu’s words, the bills ‘devoted attention to the teaching (in Romanian) of Romanian language, history, geography and civics in non-Romanian schools’ and aimed to eliminate the competition from Hungarian, Russian and German schools (1995, pp. 44-45). The main objective was that of limiting regionalist tendencies and local patriotisms to a minimum by imposing a unified conception of the official language, history, geography and civic values under the Romanian national sovereignty.

In Transylvania, where the Habsburg and the Austro-Hungarian policies contributed to the greater development of public instruction ever since the end of the nineteenth century, the old system started degrading after 1920 (Atanasova 2004, p. 395). In the dispute with the local churches, which were fondly guarding the cultural specificities of their peoples, Angelescu delivered in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies in Bucharest a series of discourses. He insisted that the Union offered the state a leading role in moulding the soul of its citizens and spreading irreversibly
among them the use of Romanian language. The target was the creation of an educated Romanian majority ‘whose mobility to elite status the state now encouraged’ (Livezeanu 1995, pp. 47-48). The reorganisation of the education system was entrusted to Onisifor Ghibu, a nationalist educator and Secretary General of the Department of Public Education and Religions, who summarised the principles of the new policy in the following way (ibid., p. 155):

The day of December 1, 1918, inaugurates a new world: Românism [Romanianhood] has become free and its own master. It must build for itself its own state and set its own mission in this world. In this historic work, what role belongs to school and education? [...] The oppression of the Maghyar language, [...] history, and [...] geography has fallen [...]. In high schools and the University instead of the Maghiar language, the French, English, and Italian languages [will be taught]. Romanian language, [...] history, [...] and geography [will serve] the purpose of consolidating a new state and founding a nation.

Ghibu thus announced a major project of nation-building in which the public instruction was intended to play a major role. The level of education in the Romanian society welcomed the approach. The efforts of previous governments in Romania and of the national movement in Transylvania could not eradicate the problem of illiteracy (Gallagher 2008, p. 24; Mincu 2009, pp. 60-61). Consequently, the new national system had the chance to penetrate the widest possible part of the population, unexposed previously to the systematic education of another state. Training at high-speed teachers of acceptable quality was difficult (Livezeanu 1995, pp. 158-159). However, despite these problems and the economic hardships especially after the Great Depression in 1929-1933 (Hitchins 1992, pp. 1068-1069; Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002, pp. 216-217), the Romanianisation of education was overall a success. Higher education in particular became entirely Romanian during the interwar period and the minorities remained until the end of the Second World War in inferiority in this respect (Culic 2006, p. 177).
The content of public instruction also reflected the offensive nationalism of the unified kingdom. A history book by Ion Popescu-Băjenaru was given the ‘Angelescu’ Award by the Romanian Academy in 1925 for presenting the ‘popular masses’ with a story of the ‘millennial’ development of the nation and for its patriotic spirit (Popescu-Băjenaru 1925, p. 1). The Romanian Academy was thus licensing an idea, inherited from previous generations (see section 4.1), of the national temporality stretching far beyond scientific evidence. In Popescu-Băjenaru’s volume, the Dacian-Roman ethno-linguistic synthesis is presented as completed by the time of Aurelian’s withdrawal in 271 A.D., which however allowed only for the imperial administration and the rich of the day to escape the offensive of migratory peoples in the third century. The lower classes of Dacian-Romans remained in Dacia, being ‘bonded to the land they had worked’ (ibid., p. 29). Scientific accuracy did not really matter as much as the fact that such perspective matched the centrality of the peasant in the conception of the national self both in state’s policies and the general public discourse. And this confirms yet again the radical individuation and anthropomorphisation of human life (Heidegger 1962, p. 62; Neumann 1999, p. 2) that the discourse of the nation produces, while inherently and concomitantly excluding those whom it does not acknowledge (see pp. 96-97; 118-119).

Moreover, in line with the importance given to Orthodoxy in that context, Popescu-Băjenaru’s ‘story’ imposes on readers the image of Christianity appearing north of Danube ‘ever since the Roman settlement in Dacia’ (ibid., p. 30). The author made such a daring assertion despite that even today archaeologists cannot offer reliable evidence concerning the beginnings of Christianity on the left bank of the Danube (Ahonen 2007, p. 23). The scientific evidence is so scarce (only some objects bearing Christian symbols in a Dobrogean cave) that it cannot confirm even the very
traditions of the Orthodox Church regarding the evangelisation of Dobrogea by Apostles Andrew and Philip. And that event took place toward the end of the third century A.D., that is, at a time when Aurelian’s withdrawal was already in process (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 104).

The lack of solid evidence did not hinder, however, political authorities and the Church from insisting on the temporal simultaneity of Romanianhood and Orthodoxy for two thousand years as organically bound together (Stan and Turcescu 2007, p. 48). Given the absence from Popescu-Băjenaru’s textbook of any structured account of minorities, it is clear that it served strictly majority’s political imperatives through a gross exception from the ordinary temporality of human life into a timelessness whence anything could be imagined. Intellectual productions to which large masses of pupils where exposed, such as Popescu-Băjenaru’s, bear then responsibility for the construction of an image of the community that was hostile to ethnic alterity from the outset.

A high-school textbook penned by Nicolae Iorga and published six years later perpetuated similar and other myths, again without reference to minorities other than in pejorative tone. Among the elements of national imaginary is the notion of ‘Romanian land’ taken by the author to mean any piece of land ‘inhabited overwhelmingly until nowadays by our Romanian brethren [neam]’ (Iorga 1931, p. 4; for the notion of neam, see note 5 at p. 146). This is illustrative of the (f)actualisation of the nation identified linguistically as presence in a nationalised geography turned ‘ethnoscape’ (Smith 1999, p. 150), elaborated upon in Chapter 3 (see p. 125). In the Iorga’s logic, this historical presence (see pp. 124-125) legitimated physical presence as the now of the nation and its sovereign ownership of the land.
The entire part entitled ‘Romanian Land’ (Iorga 1931, pp. 3-7) in the textbook portrays the Romanian people as dwelling in the region from times immemorial, hence incontestably masters of the present. It is also relevant to point that Iorga, together with Vasile Pârvan, was among those who established in Romanian historiography the essentially temporal concept of Romanian survival. They viewed the survival of Romanians in the Balkans as contrasting with the general disappearance of Latinity in the same region; this made Romanians the inheritors of all spiritual legacy of Rome in the east (Boia 2001, p. 120). Iorga thus enlarged the space of the imagined community, but the main element in this strategy was, again, the engineering of time, which established the notion of national continuity (see p. 125) at the heart of subsequent Romanian historiography.

Iorga, like Popescu-Bâjenaru among many other Romanian historians, also felt the need to stress the Christianisation of the local population in Dacia under the Romans. He even went further to suggest that under Emperor Aurelian, in the third century A.D., there existed ‘Christian bishops’ on the southern bank of the Danube who served inhabitants of the northern bank (Iorga 1931, p. 34, italics in original). He insisted then that the theory according to which the Bulgarians Christianised the populations on the northern bank was nonsense. That was because, ‘an older and more cultured people [neam] could not usually receive such spiritual additions from a newer and more savage people [neam]’ (ibid., pp. 36-37).

Here, too, the temporal aspect dominates the entire argument as it crosses the border between the imagination of the community and the real human domain. The text asserts the axiological superiority of the Romanian people compared to the Bulgarians by virtue of the very temporal scheme it advances erroneously. Iorga goes even further with the exaggeration when suggesting that Trajan himself, the
conqueror of Dacia in the beginning of the second century A.D., had colonised the province with ‘inhabitants from all Empire at a time when the law of Christ spread everywhere’ (ibid., p. 37). As evidence supporting this argument, he indicates only the existence in contemporary Romanian language of words from the religious lexicon with Latin etymology (ibid.).

This method, commonplace in the modern Romanian historiography ever since the ‘Transylvanian triad’ (see p. 144), implied the forced connection between linguistics, space and time designed to serve political imperatives of the present. This illustrates clearly the sovereignty of language in state of exception deciding on what is by ‘being named’ (Agamben 1998, p. 21) and therefore on what is not. The coordinates of operation are temporal rather than spatial, as this method obviously subordinates the exploration of the past, hence the past itself, to the now of the ethnic community and its political objectives. Through such a method, the contemporary language takes over the silenced temporality of the past and forces it to speak in the making of the political present, with the majority’s language at the heart of the process. The result is, indeed, a nationalised past present making possible the imagination only of a nationalised future present, a line of temporal continuity central in the production of national histories (see pp. 98-100; 125).

Iorga’s prestige (he was a prolific historian and fluent in many languages) established him as a leading figure in Romanian culture. He believed in the power of tradition to hold a nation together and understood tradition as ‘national spirit’, and history writing as an act of patriotism (Bârbulescu et al. 1998, p. 392; Boia 2001, p. 17). Belonging to the ‘old generation’ of intellectuals in the interwar period (Bejan 2006, p. 123), he saw the nation as an organic living entity rooted in the solid ground of the village and the immovable moral principles of the peasant (Bârbulescu et al.
His error was to also believe, along with many historians of his time that patriotism and the historical science go well together. Unfortunately, this was to remain the mark of Romanian historiography long after him, constructed through an engineering of time that he also licensed.

With only around 600,000 of ethnic Romanians left outside the borders of the new Kingdom, the nation-state of this people became a ‘reality’ in 1920 (Hitchins 1992, p. 1067) and intellectuals played a crucial role in moulding its sovereign subjectivity (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 421). The nationalist political culture of the interwar period tended to base its entire structure of meanings on the belief that the nation, too, was a perfectly tangible thing, i.e. a present-presence (see p. 118-119). Indeed, for nationalist ideologue Nichifor Crainic, as well as for former Junimist and later far-right politician Alexandru Cuza, ‘the nation was an ontological reality’ (Turda 2008, p. 447). This conception became evident within the context of the state’s racist nationalism toward the Second World War after a complex process of intellectual change. It narrowed the old fashioned patriotism of Western form toward a national subjectivity defined along ethnic, religious and racial coordinates.

The process originated in the profound ethnicisation and anti-Jewish racialisation of the Romantic patriotism toward the end of the nineteenth century. This produced a divide between autochthonist traditionalists and modernist Europeanists (Hitchins 1992, pp. 1071-1072; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 423-424; Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003, p. 417; Bejan 2006, p. 117; Korkut 2006, pp. 133-134). The former benefited from the contribution of prolific writers such as Bogdan P. Hasdeu (1838-1907) (Turda 2008, p. 443; Trencsényi 2010, pp. 346-347). His work stressed the importance of ethnography and linguistics for the affirmation of a national cultural
identity and even the centrality of the national character as basis for the legislative act (Boia 2001, p. 53; Trencsényi 2010, p. 347).

Historian A.D. Xenopol (1847-1920), teacher of Iorga, also advanced in his works at the beginning of the twentieth century the idea of the nation as a community of psychological and physiognomic commonalities. These particularities made the nation much more than a political community and could be passed organically to the following generations (ibid., pp. 348-349). It was not accidental then that Xenopol formed an anti-Jewish alliance with aggressive peasantist nationalist Alexandru Cuza (Turda 2008, p. 446). The two, among other illustrious Romanian intellectuals guided toward the German academic environment by Maiorescu (Trencsényi 2010, p. 352), took the nineteenth-century concern with the Jewish ‘threat’ into the interwar period (Brustein and Ronnkvist 2002, p. 220).

The intellectual alternative to this conservative nationalist direction was that which came in continuation of the West-oriented Romantic patriotism. Garabet Ibrăileanu, Mihail Ralea, Ștefan Zeletin and Eugen Lovinescu among others made this group of more or less explicit supporters of the Europeanisation theme (Hitchins 1992, p. 1077; Korkut 2006, p. 134). Ibrăileanu (1871-1936), despite the racial arguments in his theory of the national character (Turda 2007, p. 415, note 9), inaugurated a future-oriented view of the national specificity, underlining the popular participation in the formation of a national culture (Trencsényi 2010, pp. 352-353). Mihail Ralea (1896-1964) even acknowledged in 1920s that the concept of nation was a product of modernity, invented in the ideological melting pot of the French Revolution. He thus signalled an important point of rupture with the Junimist, organic tradition in Romanian culture (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 425; Korkut 2006, p. 134; Trencsényi 2010, pp. 353-354).
Eugen Lovinescu (1881-1943) also militated in literary criticism and journalism for the creation of a future-oriented society and against the idealisation of the past (Trencsényi 2010, p. 356). However, this Western-oriented, Europeanist current could not convince the majority of the elites. It was to be overwhelmed by traditionalist intellectuals who tended to view the nation (f)actualised in the healthy body and Orthodox morality of the Romanian peasant. For these continuators of the autochthonist nationalism, this made possible an ethnic ontology of the national community, capable of defying alterity (Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003, p. 437; Turda 2007, p. 421; 2008, p. 445; Trencsényi 2010, pp. 342, 356).

Particular to this dominant discourse in interwar Romania was yet another and even more sophisticated engineering of time. It represented a ‘new discourse, connected to a non-historical or supra-historical normative vision’, dominated by the abstract notion of ‘national being’ (Trencsényi 2010, pp. 356-357). Lucian Blaga (1895-1961) was the most prominent Romanian ‘national philosopher’ who contributed to this ethnic ontologisation of the nation and implicitly to the homogenising tendency of modern nation-state formation in Romania (Iordachi and Trencsényi 2003, pp. 437-438). While avoiding extremism and explicit political positions (Alexandrescu 2002, p. 159; Bejan 2006, p. 118; Gallagher 2008, p. 34), Blaga was however an essential contributor to the journal Gândirea. There he promoted among others the idea of an organic link between Orthodoxy and Romanian ethnicity (Boia 2001, p. 146; Korkut 2006, p. 136).

Most relevant for the argument in this dissertation, Blaga also launched in two major works, notably The Mioritic Space (1936) and The Trilogy of Culture (1944), his vision of the Romanian ethnic spirit as defined by an artistic style of its own. This was rooted in the rural universe and thus suspended from the flux of urban life in the
timelessness of the village from which it ‘boycotted’ history (Blaga 1985, p. 307; see also Boia 2001, p. 146; Tănăsoiu 2005, p. 125; Bejan 2006, p. 120; Ștefănescu 2010, p. 68). This Romanian ethnic spirit, or being, permitted therefore only a metaphorical or metaphysical understanding, since it belonged to a space of rural innocence that the contemporary civilisation no longer comprehended (Bârbulescu et al. 1998, p. 426; Boia 2001, p. 146).

The engineering of time in Blaga’s poetry remained the cornerstone of most intellectual discoursing of the national being over the next generations. Many after him have felt with emotion the profoundness of his proclaiming in a poem that, ‘eternity was born in the village’ (Blaga 1995, p. 130). He thus attached to the mystical image of the nation a concrete spatial location and the factuality of its eternal dweller, the Romanian peasant. Little, if any, attention has been given, however, to the word ‘eternity’ and its weight in that metaphoric construction from the perspective of political analysis.

Blaga’s view about the cultural tradition of his people was clearly expressed in The Mioritic Space, one physically located in the countryside but spiritually ‘timeless’. It was manifesting itself in time but, ‘measured by our ephemeral horizon, being above time’ (Blaga 1994, p. 166). This ‘atemporal temporality’ (Derrida 1996, pp. 28; 92; see p. 137 above), or ‘atemporal spiritual eternity’ has been noticed by students of Romanian folkloric legends, which all suggest the escaping from present (Tănăsoiu 2005, p. 124). As suspension from the present time, it confirms, from this dissertation’s perspective (see p. 83), the specific temporal exceptionalism of the national sovereign subjectivity placing in this way political life under national onomastics. Blaga’s conception of national temporality is also a clear example of the
radical individualisation presupposed by the (f)actualisation of the imagined national community, which inherently excludes the non-national (see pp. 96-97, 118-119).

The exaltation of the national self on these coordinates took racial connotations during the second half of the interwar period, Blaga himself contributing explicitly to this development (Turda 2007, p. 424 and note 49). His influence in the contemporary Romanian culture is enormous and even in his youth he was one of the most popular poets and philosophers of Greater Romania. His philosophy of culture is still the most coherent to date and his contributions to the Gândirea, together with those of Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran, Mircea Vulcănescu and many others, made the journal one of the most valuable tribunes of the interwar modernist intellectuality. The succession of nationalist theologian and journalist Nichifor Crainic (1889-1972) to the top editorial position in 1926 was however to change decisively Gândirea’s political stance. He gradually turned the journal into a mouthpiece of aggressive fascist, organic peasantist ideology, which called for the reconstitution of the state as embodiment of the racial nation, the monarchy and Orthodoxy (Hitchins 1992, pp. 1073-1074; Bejan 2006, pp. 117-118; Leuştean 2007b, p. 730; Turda 2008, p. 447). In typical Junimist tradition, Crainic and his followers believed that the elites ‘had alienated the masses, creating a superficial contemporary Romanian culture, which lacked the “dough of religious thought” essential to connecting intellectual and spiritual ideas’ (Korkut 2006, p. 136).

Resonating with this view was Nae Ionescu (1890-1940), Professor of Metaphysics at the University of Bucharest. Ionescu considered that Romanianhood and Orthodoxy were ontologically so much bound together that adherence to another religion meant automatic exclusion from ‘Romanian nationality’ (Ornea 1995, pp. 91-95; Fischer-Galati 2006, p. 247; Leuştean 2007b, p. 729). Theoretician of Romanian
existentialism, Ionescu saw the West, through Spenglerian lenses, as succumbing to the superficiality of technologism. The Romanian culture, on the other hand, survived through its mystical, Orthodox spirituality (Bârbulescu et al. 1998, p. 426; Hitchins 1992, p. 1074). In line with Crainic’s overt support for an ethnocratic regime, Ionescu also maintained that the pure Romanian spirituality could be protected from the Western positivist rationalism in a political order founded on ‘the pre-eminence of the organic conception [of the regime] over the contractual one’ (Ornea 1995, p. 71). This announced actually what later was to become the essential idea of the fascist totalitarianism of the Iron Guard regime, with Ionescu as main ideologue.

Nae Ionescu’s influence on the generation reaching maturity toward the end of the 1920s was enormous, exerted especially through Cuvântul (The Word), another high-quality literary journal until Ionescu himself turned it into an extreme nationalist tribune (Livezeanu 1995, p. 273; Bejan 2006, p. 117). He was considered ‘the most popular of the interwar Romanian intellectuals’ (Neumann 2010c, p. 406) and the real leader of those who ridiculed mercilessly the imitation of French models by Europeanists (Spiridon 2009, p. 156). Part of that generation of intellectuals were Mircea Eliade, Emil Cioran and Crainic, who were to become supporters of the fascist Iron Guard. Others, like Eugen Ionescu, Mihail Sebastian and Lucian Blaga, preferred to remain outside the dangerous political waters stirred by Gândirea and Cuvântul (Hitchins 1992, p. 1074; Bejan 2006, p. 115; Quinney 2007, p. 451).

However, nationalism of various intensities and forms dominated undisputedly the public space. Even George Călinescu, a respected historian of Romanian literature with no sympathy for extreme nationalism, was to embrace the idea of Romanian unity as founded upon its racial specificity, illustrated in ancient myths. One of the most important of these myths, Călinescu suggested, was the story of Roman Emperor
Trajan and Dochia, daughter of Dacian king Decebal. It was categorised by Călinescu (1982, p. 56) as a myth of national origin and it entered history books with this weight, narrating metaphorically the Dacian-Roman synthesis in the purity of a ‘Primordial Time’ (Tănăsoiu 2005, pp. 117-118). This confirmed Călinescu’s general view of the nation as founded upon a specifically autochthonous spirituality and racial distinctiveness (Boia 2001, p. 147). Given the spread of such themes arguably over the entire spectrum of interwar Romanian intellectuality, it came as no surprise when they constituted the core of the Iron Guard’s fascist ideology. This organisation was to become the embodiment of Romanian interwar racism by bringing on the political stage a strident cry for the salvation of country’s rural soul and the cult of sacrifice, the legionary death meaning engagement to eternity (Livezeanu 1995, p. 305; Fischer-Galati 2006, p. 246; Leuștean 2007b, p. 730).

The interwar generation of Romanian intellectuality was not in totality extreme nationalist. However, during the third and fourth decade of the twentieth century, radicals took over the public stage and gave voice to ideological seeds of the autochthonist education they had received in the beginning of the twentieth century (Livezeanu 1995, pp. 245-247). The leader of the Romanian state during the Second World War, Marshal Ion Antonescu (1882-1946) was to give in 1941 a sincere expression of the values that those generations were raised with: ‘That was how I grew up, with hatred against the Turks, Jews, and Hungarians. This sentiment of hatred against the enemies of the patria must be pushed to the last extreme. I take upon myself that responsibility’ (quoted in Neumann 2010b, p. 396).

It is essential therefore to understand that Romanian fascism was not an extraordinary phenomenon in the cultural history of a society otherwise not prone to such manifestations. On the contrary, the nationalist education of pre-Union Romania
produced the extreme, fascist nationalism of the interwar period in corroboration with the process of nation-building. It was thus legitimated by an intellectual tradition and appealing to a young generation of fanatic believers in an ever Greater Romania (Livezeanu 1995, p. 248). The rise of Romanian fascism and the Legionary (Iron Guard) movement was undoubtedly facilitated by the difficult social and economic context in the interwar period, a situation where political extremism could flourish, in line with developments in Spain, Italy and Germany (Høvik 1974, p. 287; Hitchins 1992, p. 1071; Solonari 2006, p. 477; Leuștean 2007b, p. 730). Its intellectual roots reflected, however, much older beliefs, constructed with the contribution of generations of cultured people, many of those individuals being mentioned here. The Legionary understanding of the nation as ethnically pure, Christian Orthodox and attached to the sacred land was to also influence future nationalisms in Romania, the communists only taking over this theme (Haddock and Caraiani 1999, p. 258) to develop it in a more secular form after 1948.

Just before the Second World War, the country fell to the authoritarian rule of King Carol II until 1940, followed by the de facto control by the anti-Bolshevik regime of Prime Minister and Marshal Ion Antonescu under young King Mihai I until 1944 (Høvik 1974, p. 287; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 453-463; Solonari 2006, p. 473; Leuștean 2007b, p. 734). Under Antonescu, Romania became a National Legionary State, the Iron Guard remaining ‘the only political movement allowed to function’ (Gallagher 2008, p. 38). The state implemented a criminal treatment of the Jewish community (Burleigh 2001, p. 657; Brustein and King 2004, p. 432; Cioflâncă 2004, p. 38; Ioanid 2004, pp. 427, 448; Gesin 2007, p. 62; Dragoman 2008, p. 68). Research focusing on the politically less relevant minorities of Dobrogea also insists
on the ‘generally negative political climate for most minorities in Romania at that time’ (Eminov 2000, p. 134).

Antonescu acted as a staunch nationalist in his positions at the helm of the government and the armed forces (Bârbulescu et al. 1998, p. 453) and was considered especially a symbol of anti-Semitic ethno-nationalism by extremists dominating Romanian politics of the time (Ioanid 2004, pp. 434-435; Solonari 2006, p. 474). His regime, at least before it became clear that Germany would not win the war, developed a systematic policy of Romanianisation of minorities (ibid., p. 480). Thus, while the general constitutional language was far from the extremism of the nineteenth century, the political and administrative practice in interwar Romania was evidently marked by nationalism with strong anti-Semitic and anti-Bolshevik tones.

Despite the obvious inimical atmosphere toward minorities, ethnic Hungarians were dealt with rather carefully in official practices of the state mostly due to the Hungry being an ally of Romania in the anti-Bolshevik alliance supporting Nazi Germany. Top figures, such as Foreign Minister Iorga and Antonescu himself, were doing their best not to provoke Budapest during the war with inappropriate actions (Ioanid 1992; Solonari 2006, pp 481 Gesin 2007, p. 66). This apparent equilibrium was, however, dramatically altered by the German-Italian pact of 1940 in Vienna (Vienna Award, or Diktat), when the northern part of Transylvania was offered to Hungary and the Dobrogean Cadrilater to Bulgaria. Following the Soviet successes against Nazi Germany, Romania switched sides and was thus able to take back all Transylvania at the end of the Second World War (Linden 2000, p. 127; Fischer-Galati 2006, pp. 248-249; Leuştean 2007, p. 733; Gallagher 2008, p. 38).

These considerable territorial changes over a short period of time made the condition of Hungarians a sensitive subject of inter-state politics. People from this
minority were also already courted by the Comintern to propagate the cause of communism. Illustratively, between 1921 and 1945, the Romanian branch promoted Russians, Jewish, Hungarians, Ukrainians, or Bulgarians ‘but not a single Romanian’ (Câmpeanu 1991, p. 813). These and other aspects underlined in the next section gradually led after World War Two to the increasingly anti-Jewish and anti-Hungarian stance of the communist regimes in Romania, culminating with Ceaușescu’s nationalisation of the socialist ideology in the 1980s.

4.3. Romanian communism and its socialist nation: 1945-1990

The end of the Second World War brought the Red Army far beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, in Eastern and Central Europe. Antonescu’s Romania had taken enthusiastically the German side in the conflict with the aim of recovering Bessarabia, lost to Russians with the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact in 1939 (Câmpeanu 1991, p. 826; Chirot 2005, pp. 156-157; Mungiu-Pippidi 2007b, p. 98). Another strategic aim had been the elimination of the communist threat to the Romanian capitalist society (Chirot 1978, pp. 459-460; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 458-459; Gallagher 2008, p. 39; Light 2006, p. 10). The patriarch of the Orthodox Church had himself blessed the army ready to start ‘the “holy war” against the communist [Soviet] “nation without God”’ (Leuștean 2007b, p. 734). The war ending with the defeat of the Germans left the Romanian Kingdom extremely vulnerable to the Soviet political plans in Eastern Europe. However, Stalin did not seem to be prepared for the situation. Given the Romanians’ historical disliking of the Russians (Bădărău 1987, p. 103; Verdery 1991, p. 175; Hitchins 1992, p. 1065; Chen 2003, p. 176; Judt 2005, p. 130; Țîrău 2005, p. 332) and the absence of a strong communist camp from the
domestic political landscape, the Soviets had to find supporters for the political encroachment of Romania mostly from among the oppressed Jewish, Hungarian and other minorities (Gallagher 2008, p. 44).

Hungarians especially were bound to form a significant group in this project given that they represented around 12 per cent of the country’s total population in 1945 (Deletant 1995, p. 108). They had been dominant in the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) before the World War Two in response to the damage brought to their social-economic status by the interwar regimes (Tismăneanu 2005, p. 88; Korkut 2006, p. 140; Gallagher 2008, pp. 44-47; Leuștean 2005, p. 443). Hungarians were also found in the leadership of the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP), continuator of the RCP, immediately after the Second World War and during most of its first decade in power (Deletant 1995, p. 108; Crampton 2004, p. 214; Țirău 2006, pp. 311-312; Petrescu 2009a, p. 526). Joining them were representatives of other ethnic minorities (Jews, Bulgarians, Russians, Ukrainians, etc.) that returned from the USSR with the Red Army (Chirot 1978, p. 460; Câmpianu 1991, p. 813). Some of these people also enrolled in the communist secret police, later known as the infamous Securitate, and thus helped the emergence of the new regime, while others became the Securitate’s initial victims (Deletant 1995, pp. 108-109).

Many of these representatives of the ethnic minorities had been militants devoted to the cause of socialism long before the entry of the Red Army in Romania. Given the nationalist policies of Greater Romania, that was not a major surprise. But this also explains the gradual reappearance of nationalism under communist regimes, founded on growing suspicions about ethnic others. The end of more than eighty years of constitutional monarchy under the Hohenzollerns and the emergence of a

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10 There were somewhere between 900 and 1000 official members of the then illegal Communist Party who were active in Romania in August 1944 (Chirot 1978, p. 460; Bârăușescu et al. 1998, p. 470; Chen 2003, p. 176; Petrescu 2009a, p. 526).
The communist regime meant the beginning of country’s darkest period. One party, the RWP (re-named Romanian Communist Party, RCP, in 1965) was to rule unchecked, most private property being nationalised and all meaning of democratic liberties distorted (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 492-496; Gallagher 2008, pp. 44-45; Tismăneanu 1992, p. 106; 2008, p. 5). Ethnic minorities, especially Hungarians, were to become instrumentalised in the policies of the regime mostly as ‘scapegoats’ in times of social-economic hardships (Atanasova 2004, p. 380; Troie 2004, p. 41; Gallagher 2008, pp. 192, 221, 292), or as enemies of the nation and its regime (Securitate Directive 1951; Kiss 1969).

The objective presence (see pp. 125-126) of the Romanian nation became circumscribed to a communist political life with Stalinist principles as formalised with the 1948 Constitution (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 493; Tismăneanu 1992, p. 75; 2005, Chapter 5; Leuştean 2007c, p. 307). This fundamental law proclaimed Romania (Article 1 and 2) a people’s republic and a popular, unitary, independent and sovereign state ‘established with the struggle of the people led by the working class against fascism, reactionism, and imperialism’. Title III (Fundamental rights and duties of citizens) confirmed the non-ethnic definition of the population and the equality between citizens before the law ‘regardless of sex, nationality, race, religion and level of education’ (Article 16).

It is important to note that the 1948 Constitution was the first one not instituting the political ethnicisation of the people. Thus, the notion of citizenship is mentioned in the fundamental law without a specific definition and the word ‘Romanian’ appears only in adjectival and not substantival form, as in previous constitutions. Concepts like ‘ethnicity’, or ‘minority’ were also discarded from the political, administrative and legislative discourse since it was reminiscent of the racial
superiority theory of the previous regime (Țărău 2006, p. 307, note 2). Thus, the preferred term was that of ‘co-existing nationalities’, which were also granted the right to use their native languages in education, administration and the justice system (Romanian Constitution 1948, Article 24). The internationalism inherent in the communist revolution was thus reflected in the act of 1948, inspired by the 1936 Fundamental Law of the USSR (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 493).

However, unlike its overtly atheist counterpart in the Soviet Union, the Romanian Constitution of 1948 indicated the equality and protection of all religious groups. Such tolerance was conditioned on religious institutions becoming subordinated to state control and its main concerns (Article 27), that is, ‘public security and morals’ (Leuștean 2007c, p. 307). In a similar approach, the Law of Religious Cults (4 August 1948) guaranteed the liberty of consciousness. Its Articles 6 and 7 subordinated, however, that right to the constitutional provisions concerning internal security, public order and ‘general morality’. Thus, the payment of clergy’s salaries by the state was to be conditioned all along the communist period by their conformity, regardless of their religious belonging, with the RWP/RCP demands. This led to many cases of imprisoned priests, the general oppression of the religious cults and their gradual subordination to the political imperatives of the regime (Deletant 1997, pp. 70-71; Stan and Turcescu 2000, p. 1474; Andreescu 2008, pp. 139-140).

This suggests the emergence in post-Second World War Romania of a specific communist morality that was to subordinate all political understanding of good and evil over the next two generations (Tismăneanu 1992, pp. 146-147). The prioritisation of the communist ideals also determined, as noted by Verdery, a type of social mobilisation that excluded ethnic sentiments from the panoply of social forces and implied the ‘ethnic demobilisation’ of minorities (1985, pp. 62-63). Practically the
entire population regardless of ethnicity (Deletant 1995, p. 108) was to become subordinated to the regime’s ideals (Atanasova 2004, pp. 407-408). The main theme was that of social emancipation being possible only through popular coagulation around the RWP/RCP, accomplished through the socio-political engineering of a Romanian ‘socialist nation’ denying ethno-religious specificities (Culic 2006, pp. 179, 180; Petrescu 2007, p. 39; 2009, p. 531). In practice, this presupposed policies addressing issues from education, socialisation in state-run industrial and agricultural sites, to migration patterns. These all aimed at producing the complex ‘organised solidarity’ of the masses around the socialist, but eventually ethno-culturally imagined community (Petrescu 2009a, p. 525; see also Light 2006, p. 12). Such practices culminated later with the overt nationalism of the Ceaușescu regime, but they originate in the struggle for power in the RWP between the majority Romanians and representatives of ethnic minorities during the first decade after World War Two.

Overall, the treatment of minorities under the 1948 Constitution was rather ambiguous. The first communist government under Prime Minister Dr. Petru Groza took measures in the ethnically neutral spirit of the fundamental law. As already indicated above, representatives of the ethnic minorities were even co-opted in the government. Under the Nationalities Status of 1945, the Hungarian language was used in public administration, RWP meetings, or various economic sectors of public interest (Culic 2006, note 20). The Hungarian Bolyai University was also established in 1946 with teaching in Hungarian language, while the Decree Law 629 from 3 August 1945 replaced in administration the term ‘national minorities’ with ‘co-existing nationalities’ (ibid., p. 178).

Despite the small numbers and poorly organised structures of local communists (Chirot 1978, p. 460; Țirău 2005, pp. 330-331), the RWP managed to
establish a new political order with the cooperation of ethnic minorities and massive Soviet aid (Leuştean 2005, p. 442; Light 2006, p. 11). Minority political representation can thus be said to have existed at all levels in the ruling party. However, like in the interwar period, the above-mentioned measures acknowledging the existence of the Hungarian minority did not mean the emergence of inter-ethnic relations of equality (see pp. 101-103). Given also the authoritarian essence of the regime, politics \textit{per se} had little chance to take place at all beyond mere negotiations inside the ruling party and with the Soviet sponsors.

The Soviet control of Romania was to be strengthened one year before the death of Stalin with the adoption of the 1952 Constitution (Korkut 2006, p. 141). Its preamble declared the state a popular democracy of the working people resulting from the victory of the USSR over fascism and the country’s ‘liberation’ by the Red Army. It also underlined that popular democracy was ‘crowning’ the historical victory in ‘the century-old struggle of the Romanian working people for liberty and national independence.’ The seventh paragraph indicated that, ‘national minorities from the Popular Republic of Romania enjoy full equality in rights with the Romanian people’ (Romanian Constitution 1952).

The text did not contain the word ‘ethnic’ and employed instead the notion of ‘national minorities’. It should be recalled that the terms ‘minority’ and ‘ethnic’ had been banned in 1944 on grounds of communist political correctness (Ţirău 2006, p. 307, note 2). The 1952 Constitution bringing back the notion of minority inaugurated the gradual subordination of the entire human domain, in line with pre-communist practices, to the historical and objective presence of the sovereign nation. It implied a double discursive subordination of minorities, first to the political communist
community and then to the majority making its ethnic essence, which marked a point of departure from the communism internationalism.

The 1952 fundamental law granted the use of minority languages in education, local administration (Article 82), and in courts (Article 68). Article 17 (j), however, read as follows: ‘The Romanian state, democratic-popular, unitary and independent, ensures the development of the Romanian people’s culture and the culture of national minorities, socialist in content, national in form’ (Romanian Constitution 1952). This was suggestive of the ethnic majority considering a more substantive ethnicisation of the regime. The name of the nation was insistently placed in this constitutional text in the position of sovereign authority, the discourse of national communist sovereignty in Romania being uttered from now on in the name of the ethnic majority. As if to confirm the methodological logic adopted here (see pp. 119-121), this discursive strategy led in a couple of decades to the ethnic minorities being gradually exiled at the periphery of political possibilities.

On the surface, the 1950s represented, however, a positive period for inter-ethnic relations in communist Romania. To start with, the problem of a large number of Slavs had disappeared with the territorial loss of the Dobrogean Cadrilater to Bulgaria, and of Bessarabia and North Bukovina to the Soviet Union (Hitchins 1992, p. 1082; Solonari 2006, p. 473; Gallagher 2008, p. 38; see maps in Annexes 8 and 11). The remaining Hungarians, Germans and other smaller minorities, including the Jews and the Roma (Annex 9), became the centre of unprecedented government attention in line with the Stalinist internationalist principles (Chirot 1978, pp. 487-489; Atanasova 2004, p. 362). Even for the considerably smaller communities of Tatars and Turks in Dobrogea, the state established schools in their languages and included representatives of the Muslim community in meetings between the RWP
nomenklatura and religious leaders (Eminov 2000, pp. 134-136; Leuștean 2007a, note 20). A Hungarian Autonomous District (HAD) was also established in the Mureș county (see Regiunea Autonomă Maghiară on map in Annex 8). There, Hungarians represented over 77 per cent of the population (Deletant 1995, p. 109; Gallagher 2008, pp. 46-47; Culic 2006, p. 178) and the Hungarian language was used in schools and administration (Deletant 1995, pp. 109-110; Chen 2003, p. 183; Atanasova 2004, p. 362; Mihăilescu 2005, p. 29).

However, Article 20 of the 1952 Constitution made it clear that its provisions and subsequent decisions of the central authorities in Bucharest were applicable to all administrative regions. Thus, the autonomy of the HAD was far from functional and within only a few years Romanians would gradually come to take control of its key institutions (Chirot 1978, p. 488, Deletant 1995, p. 110; Mihăilescu 2005, p. 29). Moreover, the end of the 1950s saw the first changes that announced the intensifying nationalism of the communist regime. This was determined especially by the 1956 uprising against the communist authorities in Hungary and the Soviet military intervention (Chirot 1978, p. 488; Culic 2006, pp. 178-179). Following the 1956 events, the Soviet leadership took two measures considerably impacting East European politics.

The first was the armed intervention itself in Hungary, repeated in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and showing the capacity of the Red Army to back Soviet foreign policy decisions. The second was the support given by Moscow to new ruling groups, ‘ethnically as representative as possible’, in its satellite communist countries (Țirău 2005, pp. 394-395). In Romania, the communist elite and especially its new leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, were suspicious about the growing agitation of the ethnic Hungarians and feared the spread among them of anti-Stalinist ideas (Chirot
1987, p. 488; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 519-520; Gallagher 2008, p. 54). Most importantly, the Romanian leader also became increasingly willing to ‘disengage’ from Moscow given the obvious readiness of the Soviets to interfere brutally in the domestic politics of their satellites (Sălăgean 2008, p. 276).

The European communist regimes in general entered now their nationalist phase (Ţirău 2005, p. 393) and Romania made no exception (Petrescu 2009a). In Irina Culic’s perspective, this period then inaugurated ‘the beginning of the autochthonous, national, mode of realising the developed socialist society and the socialist nation in Romania’ (2006, p. 179). The domestic integration policies of the RWP government under Gheorghiu-Dej toward the end of the 1950s announced the nationalist turn. The Hungarian Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca was forced to merge with the Romanian Babeş University and form the bilingual Babeş-Bolyai University in 1959 (Chen 2003, pp. 183-184; Culic 2006, p. 179; Korkut 2006, p. 146). The event determined the Hungarian pro-rector at Bolyai University, his wife and five other professors to commit suicide (RRG and Sozan 1979, p. 144; Deletant 1995, p. 112) and eventually led to Hungarian professors gradually losing decision-making power in that institution (Deletant 1995, pp. 112-113; Korkut 2006, p. 146; Csergo 2007, p. 31; Dragoman 2008, p. 72). Until 1960, the distinct place of the Hungarian language was also eliminated at the Agricultural College and the Medical-Pharmaceutical Faculty in Târgu-Mureş (Deletant 1995, pp. 112-113; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, pp. 520-521).

Overall, the government’s ‘policy of integration’ under Gheorghiu-Dej aimed strategically at diminishing the presence of the Hungarian language in public instruction by promoting dual-language schools (Deletant 1995, pp. 112-113; Culic 2006 p. 179; Csergo 2007, p. 30). In these schools, Hungarian would not be the sole tongue of instruction and pupils would have to study in both Hungarian and
Romanian. Thus, in Transylvania, there were 1,022 primary schools and 493 secondary schools teaching in Hungarian language in 1955-1956. Three years later, only 915 primary and 469 secondary schools survived, while numbers of dual-language schools increased from 38 to 124 (primary) and from 10 to 77 (secondary) (King 1973, p. 153; Deletant 1995, p. 112, note 8).

The leaders of the RWP also worked toward strengthening the Romanian element in its apparatus. In the early 1950s, Gheorghiu-Dej eliminated his Hungarian and other minority rivals in the Party (Verdery 1991, p. 104; Deletant 1995, pp. 108-110; Korkut 2006, pp. 141-142; Leuştean 2007a, p. 54). The RWP became thus dominated overwhelmingly by the Romanian ethnic element and oriented more toward a rural membership, considered essential by the group around the party leader (Gallagher 2008, pp. 56-57; Korkut 2006, p. 142). Following the gradual exit of Soviet troops from Europe in general and from Romania in particular, Gheorghiu-Dej also worked assiduously for the elimination of Russian elements from the party structures toward and after 1960. In Câmpeanu’s words, the move aimed at promoting ‘a nationalist-orientated Stalinism against the Stalinism of a pro-Soviet orientation’ (2000, p. 147). Thus, a nationalist understanding of the state marked the inter-ethnic relations in the single party regime under Gheorghiu-Dej. This confirms the double ontological consequence of the discourse of national sovereignty even in a case of communist politics: it constitutes the present-presence of the nation, while inherently and concomitantly exiling the non-national to the periphery of political possibilities (see pp. 118-119).

Nicolae Ceauşescu continued Gheorghiu-Dej’s policy of integration (Deletant 1995, p. 113; Panayi 2000, p. 181; Novák 2006, p. 397; Petrescu 2009a, p. 523) and gradually turned it into a policy of national homogenisation through the assimilation
of ethnic minorities in general and the Hungarian minority in particular (Chirot 1978, p. 488; Newall 1988, p. 4; Chen 2003, p. 192; Csergo 2007, p. 30; Gallagher 2008, p. 62). He ruled over a period in Romanian communism (1965-1989) that saw an increasing appeal to nationalist themes coloured with the overt distrust of the Soviets, which had helped Ceauşescu and others advance rapidly in the hierarchy of the RWP (Gallagher 2008, p. 57). During his first year in power, the Party became the Romanian Communist Party (RCP) and the Grand National Assembly, sitting as Constitutional Assembly, adopted the 1965 Constitution that proclaimed Romania a Socialist Republic. In Article 1, it declared the Socialist Republic of Romania (SRR) a sovereign, unitary, and indivisible state, a legal form under which inter-ethnic equality would not be possible (Atanasova 2004, pp. 392-393).

Specific provisions in the text seemed to contradict this view. Article 22, for instance, granted the use of native languages to national groups other than Romanian in education, the media and administration, while Article 109 ensured the same right in courts (Romanian Constitution 1965). Moreover, the predication of the human domain of sovereignty seemed as ethnically neutral as in 1948. The 1965 fundamental law did not contain the words ‘minority’, or ‘ethnic’ at all, while the word ‘Romanian’ appears only in adjectival, i.e. not substantival form. Instead, the text abounds, in typically communist fashion, of the terms ‘people’, or ‘citizens’. For the ethnic minorities, the phrase ‘co-existing nationalities’ returned and remained the preferred formulation until December 1989 (Culic 2006, p. 180). The unnamed subject predicating human life above is however easy to identify in the ethnic majority, (f)actualised as legally sanctioned objective presence (see pp. 125-126), while ethnic others were shown their place in a condition of ‘co-existence’.
There were initially some positive measures concerning, for instance, the use of Hungarian language, especially the opening of a Hungarian language and literature department at the University of Bucharest. This was accompanied in 1969 by the establishment of the Kriterion Publishing House. This institution promoted the literature of minorities, the broadcasting of radio and TV programmes, and the establishment of theatres, music groups, and various cultural organisations in Hungarian language (King 1973, p. 158; Deletant 1995, p. 114; Panayi 2000, p. 150-151). However, government practices were to contradict all this apparent support for the condition of minorities, especially under the laws addressing the administrative organisation, the education and religion. Overall, the period 1965-1989 can indeed be described as one during which the communist regime alternated ‘facility granting and repression’ (Culic 2006, p. 180). The general framework, however, was designed to contain ethnic otherness in the socialist Romanian nation (King 1973, pp. 146-153; RRG and Sozan 1979, p. 135; Csergo 2007, p. 31).

The first significant move in that direction was the adoption in 1968 by the Grand National Assembly, with Ceaușescu in control as Secretary General of the RCP, of a Public Administration Law (Deletant 1995, p. 113; Novák 2006, p. 397). The act aimed at producing an administrative basis for modernisation from above, preparing the country for the socialist industry and agriculture (ibid., pp. 397-398; Petrescu 2009a, p. 531). The ethnic minorities were poorly represented in the elaboration of the respective legislative proposal (Novák 2006, p. 399) and the views that prevailed were those of the majority Romanians headed by Ceaușescu himself. The only most important Hungarian member of the RCP leadership, János Fazekas, was suggesting a large Hungarian district that could maintain the local support for the socialist ‘brotherly struggle’ (ibid., p. 404). Ceaușescu opted, however, for the
establishment of two districts, namely Harghita and Covasna (map in Annex 3). It is important to note that, in 1960, Gheorghiu-Dej had already changed the original design of the HAD. By transferring two of its districts to the Brașov Region and by replacing them with three new districts where the Romanians formed majorities, the previous numerical superiority of Hungarians there was drastically diminished (Deletant 1995, p. 113; Culic 2006, p. 179; Novák 2006, p. 409).

Ceaușescu’s administrative reform of 1968 contributed then even more to the division of areas where Hungarians were dominant. This move was calculated to bring two advantages. First, the local elites in Harghita and Covasna should have become more loyal to the RCP since they were pleased to see their main cities becoming district capitals (Novák 2006, pp. 408-409). Second, the central communist authorities were satisfied for not creating a ‘monolithic block of Hungarians’ (Deletant 1995, p. 115). In the long run, however, the ethnic Hungarians were to be gradually replaced with Romanians in key administrative positions in the new administrative forms (Newall 1988, p. 4; Atanasova 2004, p. 362). Moreover, the state initiated during that time a policy of industrialisation and urbanisation determining young Hungarian graduates of various educational institutions to take jobs outside their home regions, which in turn received significant numbers of Romanian ethnics (Deletant 1995, p. 108; Panayi 2000, p. 42; Korkut 2006, p. 146; Dragoman 2008, p. 69; Gallagher 2008, p. 62).

Given these developments and the outcomes of policy negotiations, a preliminary conclusion could be that there was no room under Ceaușescu’s authority for inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality. Instead, the RCP was administering affairs in terms of sovereign politics of consensus, a context in which ethnic minorities in general and the Hungarians especially would remain mere objects of
majority’s policies (see pp. 10-11; 100-103). The gradual transformation of the regime into a totalitarian one was also to aggravate the condition of ethnic minorities by accelerating the policy of national homogenisation.

The communists’ suspicion about the Hungarian minority was not new; due to previous historical developments, Hungarians and Soviet Russians could interfere to affect stability in Transylvania at any time (King 1973, pp. 166-167). In 1951, a directive of the infamous secret police Securitatea had indicated ‘German and Hungarian nationalists’ as subjects of sustained intelligence actions. The document listed them as threats, together with the Ukrainian and Bessarabian nationalists, Zionist, Titoist, Trotskyite groups, or leaders of the Catholic and Greco-Catholic Churches (Securitate Directive 1951, p. 7). As a result, the ethnic Hungarian intelligentsia was gradually eliminated from the first line of domestic politics after the summer of 1956 (Tismăneanu 2005, p. 191).

In 1969, an article in the internal journal of the Securitate also indicated concrete actions of the secret police against agents of Hungarian irredentism envisaging ‘the annexation to Hungary of a territory [Transylvania] where their co-nationals dwell’ (Kiss 1969, p. 28). A 1978 issue from the same journal pointed again at the need for the neutralisation of ‘active elements that were part of former Hungarian, German, Ukrainian and other nationalist-fascist and irredentist organisations and parties’ (Derscanu 1978, p. 7). However, such actions addressed individuals involved in more or less subversive actions, while Ceaușescu’s policies of urbanisation and industrialisation affected the entire human domain.

The most painful was the urbanisation, which culminated toward the end of the regime with a ‘systematisation programme’ aiming at the replacement of thousands of villages with agro-industrial complexes (Ronnas 1989, p. 543; Gallagher
2008, p. 64). The first formulation of this programme appeared in 1972, when the RCP assigned economic roles to regions and urban localities in conformity with the plans for a socialist economy. In 1974, this was translated into a policy concerning the organisation of rural areas on the basis of town structures, with the concentration of rural population in multi-storey buildings for more efficient use of land (Ronnas 1989, pp. 543-544; Turnock 1991, p. 253).

However, practical work on this project lagged behind plans until the second half of the 1980s. Rumours about a new approach on the matter emerged in 1987 (Gallagher 2008, p. 64). In March 1988, Ceaușescu himself gave a speech making the systematisation programme a priority of the regime. One of the key objectives was the reduction in number of rural settlements from 13,000 to maximum 5-6,000 and the increase in towns from 400 to around 550 (Ronnas 1989, p. 546; Turnock 1991, p. 256). Despite the programme affecting clearly the entire population of Romania (Ronnas 1989, p. 548; Turnock 1991, p. 259), it led in the end to the destruction of hundreds of Hungarian villages. Thousands of Romanians were also resettled in Transylvania, this modifying the majority-minority ratios in some regions (Newall 1988; Turnock 1991, p. 259; Atanasova 2004, p. 363; Csergo 2007, p. 129; Gallagher 2008, p. 62; Granville 2009, p. 366).

Protests against the programme came mainly from the international community outside Romania and few from professional communities inside (Turnock 1991, pp. 258-259). They invoked the human drama and referred to the human rights provisions in the 1975 Helsinki Accords (Cornea 1991, pp. 84-85; Gallagher 2008, p. 62). However, similar to the case of the provisions regarding minority rights in the 1919 Paris Treaties that were not implemented by the interwar governments (see pp. 169-170), international treaties did not mean much for Ceaușescu’s government
either. Despite signing a number of international acts guaranteeing individual and minority rights, the SRR implemented them only arbitrarily. The signature on the 1975 Helsinki Final Act meant, however, that relevant international groups and organisations could at least monitor the condition of minorities (Deletant 1997, p. 152; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 545). However, an even subtler and more aggressive effort of assimilation was at work in the fields of culture and education. The regime gradually developed a sophisticated intellectual discourse asserting irrefutably the *historical presence* (see pp. 124-125) of the nation through a sometimes hilariously abusive nationalisation and ideologisation of the past.

In form, the communist policies for eradicating illiteracy were overall successful. In a broader comparative perspective, only 10 per cent of men and 5 per cent of women went beyond primary school in the early 1900s and the numbers only doubled in the interwar period (Høivik 1974, p. 291). Illiteracy declined before the Second World War from 85 per cent in 1890 (Gallagher 2008, p. 24) to around 30 per cent (Høivik 1974, p. 286; Mincu 2009, pp. 60-61) but the communist regimes after the war managed far better. The proportion of illiterate people decreased to 24.1 per cent in 1948, 10.1 per cent in 1956, and to 6.2 per cent in 1966, and 4.1 per cent in 1992. This created in turn the conditions for an efficient dissemination of the communist culture and socialist national identity (Petrescu 2009a, p. 534).

During the first years of the communist regime, the government took control of the public instruction system and gave certain attention to the establishment of schools in minority languages (Eminov 2000, p. 134). Within this context, the Hungarians, too, had access to instruction in their language at all levels (Panayi 2000, pp. 111, 118). A centralised, state-sponsored policy of assimilation emerged especially with the Ceauşescu regime after 1965, the number of minority language
schools declining considerably (Panayi 2000, p. 111; Csergo 2007, pp. 155, 157, 159). A major role was played here, as already explained above (see pp. 197-198), by the Hungarian anti-Soviet uprising of 1956. Following that event, the proportion of pupils taking courses in Hungarian language declined from 8 per cent in 1956 to 5.5 per cent in 1975 (Panayi 2000, p. 118).

Under Ceaușescu, the trend continued at the university level. The number of ethnic Hungarian students declined from 5.4 per cent in 1970 to 3.7 per cent immediately after the fall of the communist regime (Csergo 2007, p. 157) or, according to another source, from 171,924 in 1976 to 60,613 students in 1986 (Panayi 2000, pp. 118-119). The American Helsinki Watch Committee signalled that Hungarian-language schools were ‘systematically eliminated’: the publisher of Hungarian textbooks Kriterion was closed by 1987, entrance exams to secondary education were held in Romanian, and Romanian teachers were systematically appointed to replace Hungarians (Newall 1988, p. 4).

The content of education was to be, however, the main engine of assimilation. The communist socio-political order came with the class and not the nation as its ideological core (Boia 2001, pp. 147-148). In the pre-Ceaușescu period, under the strict censorship of the head communist ideologue Mihail Roller, Romanians’ history became one of perpetual fight for liberation from under the yoke of oppressors. In Roller’s Marxist-Leninist comprehension, i.e. the official version of history under most of the communist period (Cioflâncă 2004, pp. 32-34), the Romanian society had developed through perpetual class struggle from the slavery system of antiquity to the feudal age and the capitalism of modernity. It all culminated with the final liberation of the ‘working people’ by communists. In Roller’s introduction to the official history textbook for secondary education, ‘[a]fter 23 August 1944, following the liberation of
our country by the glorious Soviet Army, the working class led by the Romanian Communist Party overthrows the fascist regime [...] and establishes the regime of popular democracy as form of proletariat’s dictatorship [...] to build the socialist society [...]’ (1952, p. 11).

All temporality on ‘Romanian’ lands became abusively populated with ‘Romanian’ heroes of the working class. The Roman colonisation of Dacia became mainly a process of ‘social differentiation’ followed by the ‘popular struggle for liberation’ (ibid., pp. 42-43). In the volume, the entire period under Hohenzollerns turns into the most oppressive capitalist order and the Union of 1918 does not even have a section of its own. Instead, the obscure communist movement (see pp. 190-191 and note 10) is dealt with in three hundred pages out of almost eight hundred in total. Even the Second World War became ‘Marxified’, together with atrocities of the Nazi Germany and Fascist Romania: the Romanian working people and they leaders instead of the Jews had been victims in concentration camps, so that the victory in 1944 was legitimately one of the denationalised social class (Cioflâncă 2004, p. 33). In short then, Roller’s historiography was a totalitarian strategy ‘to destroy Romanian historical consciousness’ (Murgescu 2003, p. 49) that the regime of the 1960s will take full advantage of to re-nationalise the public space.

Ceauşescu signalled in 1966 a fundamental change when declaring publicly that Romania was not a multi-national but a ‘united national state’ (Panayi 2000, p. 182). The abolishing of the Hungarian Autonomous Region in 1968 confirmed factually those words and by 1972 he was openly speaking about ‘the goal of national and social homogenisation’ (Gallagher 2008, p. 62; italics added). Ironically, this turn was received initially with enthusiasm by the people and especially by the intelligentsia, already impressed with the anti-Soviet stance of Ceauşescu’s foreign
The specific elements of the socialist homogenisation strategy were announced officially with the so-called ‘July Theses’ in 1971. Ceaușescu himself delivered them in a speech in front of the Executive Committee of the RCP. Tismăneanu described it as ‘monument of Zhdanovist obscurantism’,\textsuperscript{11} marking the beginning of a radical return to Stalinism and the beginning of Ceaușescu’s personality cult (2005, p. 242).

The RCP leader announced his personal demand that attention be given in all cultural forms to productions with a revolutionary character. They had to counteract the ‘not very becoming practice [...] of considering everything that is foreign to be better’ and the ‘prostration before [...] Western products’ (Ceaușescu 1972, p. 205). This ‘cultural revolution’ aimed strategically at legitimising the leader’s personal control of the regime (Verdery 1991, p. 107; Deletant 1997, p. 143; Bărbolescu \textit{et al.} 1998, p. 541; Tismăneanu 2005, p. 242-244). It presupposed stressing the place of the RCP and particularly Ceaușescu’s in the continuation of the Romanian medieval principalities, with special attention given to education as ‘crucial ingredient in the process of cultural reproduction’ (Petrescu 2009a, p. 533; see also Culic 2006, pp. 179-180). However, this was obviously just another episode in the then long tradition of cultural exercises in national narcissism and the engineering of time that marked the entire history of Romanian sovereignty.

At the heart of Ceaușescu’s strategy was the teaching of Romania’s history and geography as guided by the principle of ‘protochronism’, according to which the Romanian nation predated all other ethnic groups in its own territory. This involved, yet again, the nationalisation of the past (Verdery 1991, Chapter 6; Deletant 1997, p. 146; Boia 2001, p. 79; Korkut 2006, p. 145 and note 86). The concept of

\textsuperscript{11}Andrei Zhdanov (1896-1948), anecdotically overzealous Stalinist politician, responsible for the agricultural policies of the USSR.
protochronism suggested the nation’s uniqueness and exceptionalism, which implied the unilateral ethnicisation of the human domain and, most importantly, its temporality. The term itself was strongly connected with Ceauşescu’s ‘July Theses’. They inspired a Romanian literary critic of the time, Edgar Papu, to write in mid-1970s with some impulse from Mircea Eliade (Manea 1991, pp. 34-35) a series of works (Papu 1974; 1977). Papu advanced the idea that the Romanian literature was ‘prophetic’ in that it had announced many of the major cultural movements in Europe (Verdery 1991, p. 175; Boia 2001, p. 80).

Interestingly, Papu also felt the need to specify that the protochronist thesis meant a decisive departure from the Europeanism inherent in Eugen Lovinescu’s cosmopolitan theory of development as synchronisation with Europe through the adoption of Western values (Hitchins 1992, p. 1078; Korkut 2006, p. 135). Without rejecting the importance of synchronisation with European ideals, it was underlined that protochronism also deserved equal attention because the Romanian literature, for instance, was at least as valuable as the foreign ones, if not even more valuable (1977, p. 5). In his view, Lovinescian synchronisation amounted then to nothing less than laggardness and lack of attention to the original achievements in Romanian culture (ibid., p. 9). Thus, Papu’s notion of protochronism came in continuation of the long autochthonist line initiated by Junimea (Cioroianu 2001, p. 366), once again giving nationalist content to Romanian cultural forms. The effect of this theory went beyond all expectations as it reached, with the RCP’s support, all layers of public instruction, both in and outside schools. It also meant the emergence of yet another divide in the Romanian intelligentsia, between neo-autochthonists such as Papu, Eugen Barbu, or Mihai Ungheanu, and neo-Europeanists like Nicolae Manolescu, or Andrei Pleșu (Tănăsoiu 2008, p. 102).
Similar to the case of Junimea, Papu’s ideas referred mainly to the condition of the Romanian literature (Boia 2001, p. 80; Boată 2006, p. 572). However, the nationalist militancy intrinsic in protochronism and insisting on the ‘pioneering character of Romanian culture’ (Hitchins 1992, p. 1082) was perceived among the intellectuals of the time as guiding them, yet again, towards the rural essence of Romanian identity (Ştefănescu 2009, p. 90). It implied the engineering of an ethnic cultural core of the political nation and a ‘science of cultural otherness’ evident in the excessive attention given to ethnographic research and the abusive politicisation of the iconic Romanian peasant (Mitu 2006, p. 80).

This nationalisation of socialism narrowed, yet again, the definition of political life in what was now becoming a historical tradition of ‘individuation’ (Heidegger 1962, p. 62) of political possibilities in the name of the nation (see pp. 96-98, 118). The concrete result, detailed below, was a general framework for the assertion of the nation’s *historical presence* (see pp. 124-125) in profoundly and abusively ideologised forms. This left in turn little, if any, room for the affirmation of a historical being of non-Romanian and non-socialist human life. Here one can see then yet another example of the double ontological consequence inherent in the establishment of sovereignty in the name of the nation: it authors the national political community while concomitantly excluding the non-national (see pp. 118-119).

In Verdery’s words (1991, p. 131), Ceauşescu’s socialist nationalism built an understanding of Romania in terms of ‘a teleology of national continuity and an ideology of national values, premised on internal uniformity’. As also underlined in the methodological preparation of this dissertation, the element of continuity plays a central role in nationalist historiographies in general by gluing the communal bonds in a fashion similar to family bonds (see pp. 21, 124-125). In the case of Romania, we
saw this illustrated within the context of state nationalism in the nineteenth and early twentieth century (see pp. 134-139, 161-163, 179-180). The communist regime did therefore nothing but to take advantage of a long tradition of time engineering, which played contextually in its favour.

Thus protochronism, a concept born from intellectualist debates around the meaning of an original culture in the 1970s, was hijacked by an establishment ready to continue the traditional role of the Romanian state in the avant-garde of nation-building. Petrescu was then right to suggest that the socialist homogenisation of the human domain under Ceauşescu actually furthered the national identity formation process initiated around 1848 (2007, p. 39). This became eventually the official ideology of the regime in the 1970s and 1980s, a period during which protochronism saw a ‘brilliant career’ at the centre of virtually all forms of public art in Romania (Verdery 1991, p. 176).

The drastic curbing of the freedom of expression through government decrees, the first one coming in 1971 (Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 542), and the terror installed by Securitate produced fear especially among writers. The context became therefore favourable for the regime to promote its views with the highest efficiency (Tănăsoiu 2008, p. 91; Tismâneanu 2008). Those who wanted their works published, including authors of textbooks, had to enter the lines of obedience and this led almost inevitably to intellectual sycophantism. Intellectuals began to compete for positions in hierarchies patronised by the RCP, thus forming a simulated elite apt to engineer the national socialist ideology (Verdery 1991, p. 186; Bărbulescu et al. 1998, p. 542; Boia 2001, pp. 80-81; Tismâneanu 2005, pp. 250-252). This meant implicitly the emergence of a de facto personal dictatorship of Ceauşescu, which he did not even bother to legalise by adopting a new Constitution. The 1965 fundamental law
remained unchanged until the fall of the communist regime in 1989. Aiming officially at constructing an ambiguously conceptualised socialist nation, Ceauşescu’s regime was thus to produce instead a ‘climax of the nationalist ideology in Romania’ (Dragoman 2008, p. 69). This took shape, yet again, in the practice of government regardless of the minorities-friendly language of the law.

The overall consequence was the confiscation of the country’s cultural heritage and its subordination to the communist self-legitimating mechanisms (Haddock and Caraiani 1999, p. 259; Boia 2001, p. 75). Most importantly from the perspective in this dissertation, Ceauşescu’s ‘cultural revolution’ produced exaggerations and distortions even more ridiculous and dangerous than the pre-communist ones. Under unchallengeable state authority, the ancient Dacian kings, voivodes of the Middle Ages, revolutionaries of 1848, or anonymous ‘communists’ and other selected historical figures gradually took the central public stage as characters in heavily ideologised versions of Romanian history (Verdery 1991, p. 224; Boia 2001, pp. 78-82, 220-221; Brubaker 2004 p. 192; Petrescu 2009a, p. 533). Cohorts of more or less illustrious historical characters were to perform precise functions in the Party’s engineering of the national communist temporality. The story of each of them was presented in propaganda materials and textbooks to somehow announce the self-proclaimed, greatest Romanian leader in history, i.e. Ceauşescu himself and his epochal achievements. Verdery identified the glorification of a certain Horea as epitomising these developments.

This peasant was the leader of an uprising against feudal serfdom and against the inequality between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania toward the end of the eighteenth century. The communist establishment needed, in line with Ceauşescu’s above-mentioned theses, ‘the merger of Party history with Romanian
history [which] entailed constructing a series of “revolutions” prefiguring the communist one’. This essential requirement, in accordance with the Marxist understanding of socialism, meant that events such as Horea’s uprising had to become ‘revolutions’ (Verdery 1991, p. 232; see also Boia 2001, p. 80-81). Protochronism also demanded that the event be portrayed in the national historiography as anticipating a major European event, i.e. the French Revolution. Following a similar logic, the obscure *Teachings of Neagoe Basarab* in the beginning of sixteenth century were presented as superior to and announcing Machiavelli’s *Prince*, this defying an elementary sense of chronology. What mattered was that the *Teachings* were ‘Romanian’ and prefigured the state authority, so brilliantly continued under Ceauşescu himself (Boia 2001, p. 80). All these pieces of engineered temporality were inserted then in history textbooks and in the content of public cultural activities.

Also instrumental in the process was the massive production of tremendously popular films (Petrescu 2009b, note 41). They illustrated the continuation of the Latin ethnic stock in Romania, the superiority of this civilisation to that of nomadic Hungarian and Slavic peoples, and Romanians’ historical struggle for independence against all enemies (Boia 2001, pp. 221-222; Korkut 2006, p. 145; Petrescu 2007, pp. 37-54; Petrescu 2009a, pp. 534-535). The national art festival *Cântarea României* (Praise to Romania) also played a central role in this context. Initiated in 1976 and taking place annually until 1989, it was designed to homogenise the cultural identity of the nation through regional and national activities of megalomaniac dimensions, gathering the country’s virtually all artistic manifestations (*ibid.*, pp. 535-536).

The systematisation law of 1974 aimed also to prepare the infrastructure for such a huge, totalising event by stipulating that cultural centres were to be built in all major Romanian villages where folk culture would be extracted and produced for
integration in the socialist whole (Ronnas 1989, p. 551; Marian-Bălașa 2007, p. 200). Participating in these efforts were all citizens, regardless of ethno-religious identity. The author of this dissertation, too, had to participate as member of groups performing folkloric dances, or folkloric theatre glorifying the socialist nation despite being a student of a military academy, a half-Macedonian by ethnicity, and coming from a family with a traditional dislike for communists.

Central in the mega-manifestations Cântarea României were the historical myths propagated unabashedly by the regime. The figure of national poet Mihai Eminescu and the folkloric ballad Miorița, symbolising the connection between the national soul and a universal eternity, were omnipresent (Manea 1991, p. 35; Tănăsoiu 2008, pp. 102-103). Even the roots of local, communist socialism were presented as originating in the ancient Dacian communal life, which made Dacians popular among sycophant historiographers (Cioroianu 2002, pp. 366-367; Korkut 2006, pp. 145-146). Previously politically incorrect figures, such as Lucian Blaga, also returned to the public discourse with the Cântarea României festival (Palade 2000, p. 110; Boia 2001, p. 148; Tănăsoiu 2008, pp. 97-98).

Ethnographic themes were borrowed even from the interwar, legionary past. These were cleared of Orthodoxism, catalogued conveniently by communist sociologists as ‘patriotic exaggerations’, and then integrated without scruples into the socialist culture (Marian-Bălașa 2007, p. 198). The communist historiography also reorganised the temporality of the human domain in order to illustrate clearly the continuity of class struggle and national liberation from ancient times to Ceaușescu himself. And, as already insisted upon here, the Romanian historiography was already versed in the construction of temporal continuities after generations of historians.

12 The author of this dissertation also acted in theatrical versions of the respective ballad and recited from Lucian Blaga’s poetry within the context of the Cântarea României festival in 1988, while studying at a military academy in Transylvania.
practicing it (see pp. 134-139, 161-163, 179-180). The revolts of ethnic Romanians in Transylvania against Hungarians became central in Ceauşescu’s scheme of temporal continuity and even Hungarian princes of the late thirteenth century were turned into fighters for Romanians’ liberation (Boia 2001, p. 222).

Archaeologists also participated in this nationalisation of time with significant contributions to the protochronist view of Romanian history. During the first decade of communism, the Gheorghiu-Dej regime had already started to change Russian names of localities in order to support the theory of Dacian-Roman continuity (Chen 2003, p. 183 and note 65). The Ceauşescu regime extended the temporal line of this continuity from the historically and archaeologically identifiable Dacian-Roman coexistence to ungraspable beginnings in pre-Roman, Dacian history (Cioroianu 2002, pp. 366-367). Historians associated with the regime claimed that Romanians descended directly from the Dacians. The communist authorities even organised in 1980 the celebration of 2050 years from the establishment of the first ‘centralised, unified and independent Dacian state’ (Ellis 1998, p. 225) as forerunner of centralised, unified and independent communist Romania (Petrescu 2009a, p. 534). A most incredible exaggeration on this theme was the proclamation in the journal of the RCP’s Institute for the History of the Party of the ‘fact’ that the Latin language was a later descendent of the Dacian (Boia 2001, pp. 102-103).

The communist historiography also applied cosmetic treatments to more recent periods. A history textbook from 1985 presented high-school pupils with an image of Transylvania where of the 13.700 confessional schools in 1878, only 2700 were Romanian (Hurezeanu et al. 1985, p. 103). This suggested the bad treatment of Romanians by Hungarians. However, the author claimed only a few pages later that Hungarian and German writers could enrich their national literatures ‘in harmony’
with the Romanian writers, ‘in a spirit of understanding between all inhabitants in the country’ (*ibid.*, p. 106). Lost in between nationalist feelings and the need to confirm historically the brotherhood between the two communist states, the author seemed to forget that at the time he referred to, the 1870s, the Austro-Hungarian authorities were initiating clearly anti-Romanian policies (see p. 161). Ştirban (1987, pp. 181-182; italics added) also announced a specific line regarding the communist understanding of the Union of 1918:

*The Parliament of November 1919 – March 1920 was the place where representatives of all political parties, conservative, bourgeois and social-democratic, spoke of the legitimacy of the Romanians’ unification in a nation-state as an internal act initiated by a national will and realised through the participation of the masses and the consensus and collaboration of all parties. Parliamentarians representing both Romanians and co-existing nationalities praised and voted the laws of union. Their speeches meant a total recognition of the just Romanian cause accomplished through the unity of the national state and promised their integration together with the ones they represented in the state life of Romania.*

The section dedicated to the Union of 1918 in the 1985 textbook contained a similar view: ‘the historical legitimacy of the Union of Transylvania with Romania was also understood by open-minded representatives of the co-existing nationalities who condemned the oppressive policies of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and embraced the principle of national self-determination’ (Hurezeanu *et al.* 1985, p. 167). To this was added a rich list of congratulation letters from Hungarian and German ethnic groups, all ending with the usual quotation from Ceauşescu proclaiming the Union as the achievement of de-ethnicised ‘popular masses’ (*ibid.*, p. 168). When reading such accounts, one simply could not understand the historical enmity between the Romanian and Hungarian states and peoples.

The textbooks mentioned above, like another collective work much referred to during the communist times (Oţetea *et al.* 1970), contained no chapter or section
dedicated to minorities under the Romanian sovereignty. From the perspectives adopted in this dissertation, internal ethnic others were simply not allowed to assert a time of their own in the nationalised temporality of the sovereign majority. This signalled a sovereign subjectivity intent on asserting irrefutably a *historical* and *objective* presence of the socialist nation (see pp. 124-126). The result was the gross colonisation of the past and the future with imperatives of the socialist and national present, reiterating previous collectivist understandings of the nation.

Such engineering of time obviously built on a politics of present-presence. The temporal line of the nation was imagined and discoursed from the perspectives of the majority authoring its own nationalised now (see pp. 98-100, 118). This represented an arrogant defiance of the multiethnic life in the (f)actual reality of the Romanian society (see Annexes 1 and 6). In such a context, the authoring of the historical and objective presence of the nation exiled implicitly (see pp. 118-119) the ethnic minorities from the community of values (Verdery 1991, p. 248) and political possibilities. It is therefore correct to conclude that the communist state’s minority *policies* overwhelmed the public space, signalling the domination by a sovereign subjectivity responsible for this situation (see pp. 90, 94-96). The ‘undoing’ of that subjectivity could not be initiated and thus the ‘time of politics’ (Dasgupta 2009, p. 3), i.e. the time of inter-ethnic relations and *politics of equality*, could not interrupt the consensual time of nationalised sovereignty (see pp. 39-40, 101-103).

It can be concluded then that the Romanian communist state imposed in totalitarian fashion its own vision of the ‘meaning and purpose of collective existence within this world’ (Gentile 2000, p. 19). What became eventually *totalised* was the multicultural human life itself since its multiethnic variety was effaced under Party’s pressures for the massification of the society into the socialist nation. The main
engine of this totalising effort was a monolithic system of education (Mincu 2009, p. 69) and an ideological understanding and professing of historiography. The main instrument in the process was simply the ‘recasting of time’ (Verdery 1991, p. 249). The communist-made temporality escaped human consciousness precisely because of being so all-encompassing, hence escaping understanding or, in Verdery’s own words, ‘a time was being constructed that was timeless’ (ibid., p. 86).

An educational system and a cultural environment completely subordinated to the RCP meant that human life was almost completely exposed to the doctrine of socialist nationalism. Under these conditions, alternative conceptions of political life were virtually impossible and minorities were left only with the role of scapegoats given the socio-economic hardships (ibid.; Chen 2003, p. 169; Troie 2004, p. 41). By exposing the human domain to institutionalised, systematic indoctrinations through the educational system about a continuous and homogenous national history, the national sovereign subjectivity induced a ‘blessed amnesia’ (Gellner 1998, p. 46), which suspended all temporal flux. This made possible the exception from it, i.e. the sovereign subjectivity (f)actualising the imagined community in the obsessively repeated story and practices of its own political religion. After the fall of the communist regime and under the very eyes of the ‘post-modern’ European Union (Ruggie 1993, p. 140; Wiener 1997, p. 551), the Hungarian minority was to finally enter the public stage. Its specific demand, evidenced in the next section, was that the ethnic groups in the country share the seat of sovereign subjectivity. All the above in this chapter was meant to explain why.
4.4. Post-communist Romanian sovereignty, the Hungarian minority and the EU: 1990-2011

Toward the end of December 1989, second-echelon elites in the Romanian Communist Party managed to overthrow Ceaușescu’s regime and establish ‘a form of mild authoritarian populism’ that marked the transition to democracy (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006, p. 17; see also Kelley 2003, p. 37). The National Salvation Front (NSF) took control of government during this period under Ion Iliescu, a former *apparatchik* of the Romanian Communist Party. It dominated the political arena for six years, thus impacting decisively on the country’s reforms with the view of integration in the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The Hungarian minority was among the first in Romania to claim rights, especially concerning all-level education and separate schools in the mother tongue. This led in turn to raising suspicion among Romanians vis-à-vis Hungarians loyalty to the post-communist state (Tănăsoiu 2005, p. 125; Stewart 2008).

The relations between the two ethnic groups turned violent in the city of Târgu-Mureș in March 1990 (Gallagher 1995, p. 88; Stewart 2008, p. 411) and this increased the level of mutual distrust. A Romanian nationalist movement, *Vatra Românească* (Romanian Hearth) was established almost instantaneously in Transylvania together with its political wing, the Romanian National Unity Party (RNUP), both excelling in xenophobic rhetoric (Verdery 1993, p. 186; Stewart 2008; Tănăsoiu 2008). The central authorities in Bucharest, coordinated by Iliescu, initially kept a relative distance from those tensions and focused instead on the building of the post-communist Romanian state. The NSF managed in this context to impose in Parliament the adoption of Romania’s post-communist constitution in 1991.
This fundamental law contained, however, a profoundly ethnic understanding of the human domain of sovereignty, with the Romanian ethnicity reigning over others in the country (Mihăilescu 2005, p. 30; Tănăsoiu 2005, p. 125; Bakk and Szász 2010, p. 25; details below). Ethnic Hungarians saw initially in the NSF a true salvation front, capable of building an ‘inclusive political society’. An ethnic Hungarian even became one of the party’s vice-presidents and the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania (DUHR) openly supported the Front (Csergo 2007, p. 36). Nevertheless, the collapse of the communist regime was not to put an end to the practices of state nationalism.

While it can be accepted that the post-communist Romania has not developed a policy aiming explicitly at the annihilation of her ethnic minorities, important aspects in the general public discourse cultivated inter-ethnic hatred immediately after 1989 (Weber 1998, p. 147). Unfortunately, the main outcome of that period was the 1991 Constitution, still in force as amended in 2003. It still encodes, from this dissertation’s perspective, the most sophisticated ethnicisation of human life under Romanian sovereignty up to date. It is a fundamental law connected in form to the international treaties regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities. Its content, as demonstrated below, is nevertheless profoundly nationalist since it irrefutably asserts the objective presence of the nation by virtue of its historical presence (see pp. 124-126). This binary structure nationalises with onomastic techniques the political possibilities of human life (see pp. 98-100, 118), therefore subordinating ethnic minorities to the majority in both spatial and temporal dimensions.

In this context, the Hungarians became the ‘most vocal’ opponent of the national definition of the polity (Weber 1998, p. 149). This section will follow the particular interpretation of sovereignty given by their political representatives in
dialogic competition with the hegemonic discourse of the ethnic majority. Clashes of the two major discourses will be underlined in line with the methodological aim of capturing the resistance of the Hungarian minority to the national sovereignty consensus in Romania (see pp. 119-121). It must be noted, however, that this consensus continues to be dominant at the very moment of writing (June 2011), as imposed in the 1991 Constitution by the ethnic majority occupying the seat of sovereign power.

Article 1 in the fundamental law (Romanian Parliament 1991) proclaims Romania as a ‘sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible National State’, thus setting the legal framework for the conflation of ethnicity and citizenship (Troie 2004, p. 42). This continued the ethno-logic behind the pre-communist Constitutions of 1866 (see pp. 153-158) and 1923 (pp. 170-172). When corroborated with Article 4(1) founding the state on the ‘unity of the Romanian people’, the ethnicisation effect of this fundamental is evident, which became a matter of serious concern to the Hungarians fearing assimilation (Weber 1998, p. 149). Also, while Article 6 recognises and guarantees the preservation of the cultural, religious, linguistic and ethnic identity of minorities, Article 13 indicates Romanian as the sole official language of the state (Romanian Parliament 1991).

Such provisions and others analysed below asserted abusively the objective presence of the nation as condition of political life (see pp. 125-126) in defiance the ethnic reality of human life in the country. The census data of 1992 and 2002 (Annex 6) indicate the clear numeric superiority of the Romanians over the Hungarians, Roma and other ethnic groups. However, the same data show clearly that Romanians are not alone in that country. The constitutional insistence on one, official language of the state signals then a discursive formation with profound ontological consequences (see
paraphrasing Dante, those who enter this political establishment must leave their mother tongues at the door.

The 1991 Constitution also contains the term ‘national minorities’, used previously only in 1952 and implying their subordination to the ethnic majority (see p. 195). This subordination is also implied in Article 12 where the 1st of December is declared the National Day. The provision sanctions constitutionally the ‘happiest day’ of the Romanian nation in 1918, when Transylvania and other provinces formed Greater Romania. That day is considered, however, the most painful in Hungarian history (Troie 2004, p. 42).

This lack of respect toward the Hungarian minority was also confirmed in an opinion issued by some of the drafters of the constitution. They indicated in 1992 that, in their understanding, the state was the expression of the human community qua national community. More specifically, the concept of nation was considered more compatible with the notion of ‘human community’. That was because, unlike the notion of ‘society’, a human community ‘expresses precisely the history of those composing the nation, the genetic ties between the successive generations and their members’ willingness to live together’ (quoted in Weber 1998, p. 150). Article 30(7) in the Constitution indicates then clearly the danger implicit in the interpretations above by criminalising ‘any defamation of the country and the nation’ (Romanian Parliament 1991). Such provisions and interpretations encode legally the exclusion from the national political life of those who do not/wish not to fit in the perimeter of its ethnic definition or ‘defame’, a seriously ambiguous term, the national subjectivity issuing them.

Moreover, this constitutional setting of the post-communist Romanian polity is securely fixed in temporality. Article 152(1) indicates in this sense that the
constitutional provisions regarding ‘the national, independent, unitary and indivisible
classacter of the Romanian State [...] and [its] official language shall not be subject to
revision’ (Romanian Parliament 1991, italics added). This illustrates the ‘historical
tension’ (Barkin and Cronin 1994, p. 108) between the territorial application of the
juridical principle of sovereignty and the national form of sovereignty.

It also illustrates, from the perspectives adopted here, the arrogant fixation of
human life through onomastic-linguistic particularisation in the political time of the
imagined community (see pp. 79, 98-100). While the 1991 Constitution can be said
indeed to apply to the territory of Romania, its Article 152 says that it is to be applied
forever. Given the state’s national character, insisted upon throughout the entire
constitution, the foreverness of its application also becomes ethnic. It thus ethnicises
both space and time by simply asserting irrefutably the objective presence (see pp.
125-126) of the imagined national community. This indicates clearly, yet again, the
sovereignty of language in state of exception from the ordinary flux of a multicultural
human life, deciding on what is by simply naming things (Agamben 1998, p. 21).

The Heideggerian understanding of the inseparability of Being from language
(Heidegger 2000, p. 86) should then be taken extremely seriously, for it is at work
here to the highest degree. The constitutional language mentioned above constraints
human life under Romanian sovereignty to a Romanian political life, which translates
inevitably into a Romanian political and cultural identity, too. Only minority, inferior
specificities are left for ‘minorities’ to elaborate upon. Thus, despite some opinions
that identity cannot be fixed objectively in fact (Barkin and Cronin 1994, p. 112), the
record of Romanian constitutional thought and practice presented here in historical
perspective suggests blatantly the contrary. More specifically, it signals a Romanian
sovereign subjectivity (Derrida 1981, p. 22; 1982, p. 34) mobilised by the intention to
produce its own ‘private temporality’ (Ungureanu 2008, p. 305), ontologically detrimental to non-Romanian segments of the human domain (see pp. 118-119). The categorical ‘no’ vote of the ethnic Hungarians to the 1991 Constitution (Gallagher 2008, p. 101), the first one upon which they could express their opinion in a referendum, demonstrated clearly their opposing this nationalisation of political life.

Moreover, the record of events in post-communist Romania indicates the gradual formation of a Hungarian subjectivity opposing this state’s nationalism, for the first time in its history, with an alternative predication of sovereignty. One should not forget that this minority barely had the historical time to organise itself politically. It had been excluded from the constitution of the Romanian sovereignty in 1918-1923 and then remained inevitably silent during the interwar period when racist nationalism reigned. The initial internationalism of the Romanian communist regime and Ceaușescu’s attempt to create a socialist Romanian nation (section 4.3.) also offered little, if any, opportunity for the minorities to express their own view of the state. In fact, Romania was not a democratic country at any time and by any standards from its independence to the fall of Ceaușescu. The first truly democratic change in government took place only in 1996 (Deletant and Siani-Davies 1998, p. 155; Mather 2004, p. 109). In other words, there was no chance for inter-ethnic politics in Romania before 1989 and only the minority policies of the state could be evidenced (see pp. 10-11, 39-40, 101-102).

The emergence of political forces representing ethnic minorities was facilitated by the Law Decree No. 8/31.13.1989 on the Registering and Operation of Political Parties and Social Organizations (Romanian Parliament 1989). Its principles were also inscribed in the 1991 Constitution (Article 40). Moreover, the structure of the electoral system, with 5 per cent threshold for parties to enter the Parliament, and
the mechanisms of proportional representation made possible the entry of the DUHR and other minority organisations in the Parliament (Ram 2003, p. 37; Johnson 2002, p. 8; Mihăilescu 2008, pp. 563-564).

The DUHR, the main political organisation representing the Hungarian community in the post-communist state, was established on the very day of Ceauşescu’s execution, 25 December 1989. It participated successfully in the first two general elections (1990 and 1992) when it won more than 7 per cent of votes for both chambers of the Parliament. With a stable electoral basis (Culic 2005, p. 106) of around 800,000 ethnic Hungarians eligible to vote, the party became their main political voice in post-communist Romania (Kostecki 2002, p. 15; Csergo 2007, p. 59; Mihăilescu 2008, pp. 561-562). Backed by other opposition parties, the DUHR criticised repeatedly the 1991 Constitution for ‘legalising an ethnicised view of the state that failed to secure minorities’ fundamental rights’ (Mihăilescu 2008, p. 557, 575, see also Csergo 2007, pp. 58-59).

In the meantime, politicians associated with the NSF and its allies, especially the Romanian Hearth and the RNUP, were displaying an increasingly nationalist rhetoric during the early 1990s (Csergo 2002, p. 11; Bechev 2009, p. 214). This was also partly due to a series of unfortunate statements from authorities in Hungary, which made Romanians fear the possibility of Budapest raising certain territorial demands (Csergo 2007, p. 19). In a public statement in 1990, deliberately misquoted by the Romanian authorities, the Hungarian President Szuros had called Transylvania an ancient Hungarian land (Kostecki 2002, p. 17 and note 45). Another episode illustrative in this sense took place in 1992, with Hungarian Prime Minister Josef Antall claiming that he wanted ‘to be in spirit the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians inside and outside Hungary’ (Mihăilescu 2008, p. 558). This message
received inevitably large public attention, the unreformed state-controlled media in Romania perpetuating widely a nationalist discourse reminding of the previous regime (Johnson 2002, pp. 6-7). The DUHR received, however, the constant support of a majority of ethnic Hungarians precisely because of ‘the ruling regime’s adversarial nationalism’ in domestic politics between 1989 and 1996 (Csergo 2007, p. 59, 64; see also Bakk and Szász 2010, p. 25).

The DUHR entered dialogic competition with the hegemonic discourse of national sovereignty (see pp. 119-121) by issuing of the so-called ‘Cluj Declaration’ (25 October 1992), which pointed clearly at extremists as responsible for the deteriorating situation of minorities. It proposed a public focus on human rights, equality, decentralisation of administration, and a correct legal system as guarantees for the betterment of minority conditions (Csergo 2002, p. 10; Kostecki 2002, p. 15; Mihăilescu 2008, p. 576). Significantly, the Proclamation insisted then on the necessity of internal ‘self-determination’ for the Hungarian community as a ‘state-building’, or ‘state-constituting’ nation (Bugajski 2002, p. 867; Csergo 2007, pp. 37-38). The logic behind this was that, ‘[t]he Hungarian community in Romania constitutes a political subject, it is a state-constituting factor, and as such it is an equal partner of the Romanian nation’.

This perspective represents to this day the basis of the DUHR agenda, with reference to all minorities in the country (Csergo 2002, p. 10; 2007, pp. 37-38; UDMR 2008). From this dissertation’s perspective, it also inaugurated the binary dialogic scheme (see pp. 121-122) in which the consensus of Romanian national sovereignty begun to be contested by a coherent non-national discourse. As articulated by the Hungarian minority, this latter discourse tends to destabilise the very foundation of the sovereign consensus by contesting its reliance on the
quantitative superiority of the ethnic majority and insisting instead that all ethnic cultures in the country are equality valuable *per se* and, consequently, equality entitled to participate in the sovereign consensus.

The principle of ‘internal self-determination’ actually translates the Hungarian notion of *társ nemzet*, employed in the declaration above. And the term suggests, indeed, the conception of the Hungarian minority as ‘partner nation’, or a ‘national community’ of an equal status with the Romanian majority in the constitution of the polity understood as multinational, i.e. not a minority community whose members are treated as second-rate citizens (Csergo 2002, p. 9; 2007, p. 37; Bakk and Szász 2010, note 7). This political discourse is undoubtedly meant to counteract the negation of the multinational character of Romania by the ethno-totalitarian regime under Ceauşescu (see pp. 217-218).

However, it also suggests the solution of the denationalisation of sovereignty, which is understood in this dissertation (see pp. 102-103, 127-129) in terms of political consensus that sees *human life* as its founding principle that must not become object of ethno-onomastic policies of sovereignty. The quantitative aspects inherent in majority-minority relations of power are eliminated in the proclamation above. Its principles suggest instead the possibility of inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality (see pp. 39-40, 102-103) founded on the qualitative equality of each ethnic culture. It could be eventually in this, essentially qualitative-discursive form that the inclusion of ethnic minorities into decision-making mechanisms becomes crucial for the survival of the state as a whole (McIntosh *et al.* 1995, p. 940). In such contexts, sovereignties may have to learn to acknowledge (1) the existence of minorities, (2) their basic right to predicate human life in their own cultural terms and, consequently, (3) accept their own denationalisation.
The year 1993 brought other significant developments regarding the majority-minority relations in Romania. First, the authorities in Bucharest established the National Minorities Council as a consultative body and communication channel with legally constituted organisations of national minorities (Romanian Government 1993; Ram 2003, p. 37). Also in 1993, the DUHR submitted to the Romanian Parliament a draft bill entitled Law on National Minorities and Autonomous Communities authored originally by the Democratic Forum of Germans in Romania (Weber 1998, p. 168; Bakk and Szász 2010, p. 25).

This draft bill proclaimed the inalienable right, equal to that of the sovereign majority, to regional autonomy for national minorities defined essentially as having a communal life and, therefore, entitled to territorial self-government. The DUHR leaders see the respective draft as a ‘comprehensive majority-minority contract’ (Csergo 2002, p. 10) and consider it the best-articulated political declaration indicating the strong consensus in the party over these issues (Csergo 2007, p. 61). The DUNR was however bound to clash with the Romanian parties for which the definition of the state as national and unitary was paramount (Weber 1998, p. 168; Csergo 2002, p. 11; Dragoman 2008, p. 71).

From the very beginning of its political activity, the DUHR gave a central place in its programme to the creation of an education and administrative system based on bilingualism in regions of Romania where ethnic Hungarians were present in significant numbers (Csergo 2002, p. 11; Kostecki 2002, p. 14; Roger 2002, p. 21). The government in Bucharest confirmed the Hungarians’ fear of assimilation when it adopted, in 1991, Law No. 69 on the Local Public Administration. This act gave all power in designing administrative units to the central authorities, stipulated that all prefects be Romanian ethnics, and introduced the compulsory use of Romanian

Against this anti-minority current in domestic politics, the DUHR continued to insist on its central ideological thesis according to which the Hungarian community was constitutive of the Romanian state and thus had the right to an equal status with the majority. In 1993, the party had defined the minority as ‘the national community of Hungarians in Romania’ (Csergo 2002, p. 9; 2007, p. 59; Bakk and Szász 2010, p. 25). The majority inevitably associated this with the politically sensitive notions of separatism and secession (Linden 2000, p. 129; Culic 2006, p. 184), or claimed it was a strategic step toward altering the majority-minority balance in Transylvania (Atanasova 2004, pp. 380-381). Concomitant developments in Yugoslavia also encouraged increasingly nationalist tones and postponed debates over community rights and the redefinition of sovereignty and minority rights (Linden 2000, pp. 129-130). The context of international law was also inadequate for such debates.

It is generally accepted today that the EU enlargement conditionality regarding minority rights has built its success (Kelley 2004) on the normative nexus democracy-minority rights as formulated at the Council of Europe (CoE), the OSCE, and the UN (Sasse 2005, pp. 685-686; 2009, pp. 20, 22; see also sections 1.1 and 1.2 here). The DUHR’s particular discourse on community rights, as interpreted above, encountered serious difficulties in this context. The 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (henceforth 1992 UN Declaration) and the 1995 Framework Convention (CoE) do not recognise or define legally the autonomy of ethnic communities
The issue of the minority community as constitutive of the state together with the majority does appear under the EU law as a situation when constitutional power sharing and various forms of autonomy can be envisaged. However, such situations are rare. In practice, ‘[m]ost minorities never reach this advanced layer of protection’ (Kymlicka 2005, p. 721). More amenable in this context seems to be Recommendation 1201 (1993) of the CoE Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), which envisages the ‘special status’ of persons belonging to historical national minorities, including cultural and educational rights under local or autonomous authorities (Linden 2000, p. 131; Kostecki 2002, p. 23; Sasse 2005, p. 676; Anagnostou and Triandafyllidou 2007, p. 17).

Romania became a member of the CoE and concluded its Europe Agreement with the European Communities in 1993, which inaugurated political dialogue on issues that included minority rights (Phinnemore 2006b, p. 39). The DUHR had opposed the Romanian membership of the Council on the grounds that the country had a history of mistreatment of minorities (Gallagher 2008, p. 124). In response, the CoE welcomed Romania as a member but recognised that its relations with this country started from ‘the lowest possible base in the denial of human rights’. The official reason was that the communist regime in Romania had been built on ‘forced assimilation and denial of minority rights’ (Ram 2009, p. 180).

It was within this context that the DUHR’s had demanded explicitly collective rights in its 1993 draft proposal (see p. 228) for the law on national minorities and autonomous communities. Article 22 in the draft declared community rights as inalienable and aiming at the preservation, fostering, development and perpetuation of the identity of the national minority in ‘autonomous communities as political entities’ (Kostecki 2002, p. 67; Csergo 2007, pp. 60-61). However, this strategy was to be
blocked within the context of the negotiations between Hungary and Romania over their bilateral treaty during the first half of the 1990s.

The Romanian government refused to allow DUHR and other representatives of its Hungarian minority to participate in the bilateral negotiations, thus making clear that it viewed the respective community as internal to its sovereignty, and hence not entitled to autonomous representation (Csergo 2007, p. 105). In response, the executive and honorary presidents of the DUHR declared that, in their view, at stake was not the relation between states but the condition of the Hungarian minority inside Romania (Atanasova 2004, p. 417). However, the Romanian and Hungarian Presidents, Iliescu and Horn respectively, had initiated the negotiations having in mind an interstate arrangement toward the ‘historical reconciliation’ of the two countries, an eastern replica of the Franco-German rapprochement after the Second World War (Linden 2000, p. 131; Atanasova 2004, p. 416). As the final treaty itself was to indicate, the demands of the minority could not create problems of understanding between the two sovereignties. Western leaders also indicated explicitly to the Hungarian and Romanian governments that ‘failure to sign the friendship treaties would slow down their accession to the EU and NATO’ (Csergo 2007, p. 105).

Following the insistence of Budapest and pressure from the international community, Romania agreed to include in the bilateral treaty a reference to the CoE Framework Convention and the PACE’s Recommendation 1201, while Hungary recognised the inviolability of existing borders (Kostecki 2002, p. 24; Atanasova 2004, p. 416; Csergo 2007, p. 107). However, the Romanian government also managed to determine the inclusion of provision 13(1) stipulating that Recommendation 1201 did not imply the parties’ obligation to grant minority

The DUHR was inevitably disappointed with these developments, especially with the approval of the provision above by the Hungarian government. Its entire parliamentary group abstained when the bilateral treaty was voted in the Romanian Parliament (Linden 2000, note 9; Csergo 2007, p. 108). Following the ratification of the treaty, the nationalist manifestations in both countries decreased significantly. However, it also became more difficult for the Hungarians in Romania to invoke discriminatory practices in a state that had just initiated cooperation with Budapest on related issues (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007, p. 66). On top of these, the Western governments hurried to applaud the conclusion of the Hungarian-Romanian treaty and the reconciliation between the two states, which had received worldwide attention after 1989 (Atanasova 2004, pp. 413, 418; Csergo 2007, p. 108).

Therefore, the DUHR found itself in a difficult position. First, the Romania-Hungary treaty practically refused the perspective of internal autonomy. Second, the provisions concerning the use of the native language were vaguely formulated and their interpretation was left open for the authorities in Bucharest. Lastly, the right to the use of minority languages in the justice system and public administration was not mentioned (Csergo 2007, p. 108). One year later, in 1997, the European Commission issued an opinion on Romania’s application to EU membership in which it pointed at the provision limiting the application of the CoE Recommendation 1201.

However, the Commission’s opinion also expressed appreciation for the conclusion of the treaty as contributing to the majority-minority relations (European Commission 1997, p. 17). The DUHR’s essential objective of securing the right to local autonomy for the Hungarian communities in Romania was thus simply
marginalised in an interstate dialogue with EU blessing from which the party expected probably too much. As such, the overall militancy of the DUHR for the equal status with the ethnic majority concerning self-government within the territorial borders of sovereign Romania (see p. 228) also suffered a serious blow. The context was already dominated in the two countries by the accession to the EU and NATO and both had already subordinated their domestic agendas to these imperatives of Euro-Atlantic integration (Linden 2000, p. 131; Culic 2006, p. 186).

Romania then applied officially to EU membership in 1995, the year when the Europe Agreements and their conditionality mechanisms also came into force, with minority rights having been already explicitly formulated in the political criteria for accession in 1993 (Johnson 2006, p. 27; Bechev 2009, p. 213). Authorities in Bucharest also made public their national strategy for accession to the EU in 1995 but political and economic reforms were obviously slower than in the case of other candidate countries. Despite this, the government received encouraging signs when NATO and the EU announced in 1997 Romania’s inclusion in the future enlargements of both organisations, the EU accession process being officially launched in 1998 (Nugent 2004, p. 36; Phinnemore 2006b, pp. 40-41). However, the EU conditionality failed to address deeply rooted reflexes of national sovereignty, which had been built historically toward the exclusion of ‘foreigners’ from the conception of political life (Chirot 2005, pp. 155-157).

The Hungarians had reasons again to fear assimilation. In 1994, members of the nationalist Romanian National Unity Party (RNUP) were nominated at the Ministry of Education in cabinet positions essential for the promotion of minority languages (Csergo 2002, p. 11; 2007, p. 63; Gallagher 2008, p. 120). This was accompanied by the appointment, allegedly demanded by the leadership of Greater
Romania Party (GRP) (Gallagher 2008, p. 120), of ethnic Romanians as prefects in the Hungarian-dominated counties of Harghita and Covasna. The DUHR leaders assimilated the gesture with ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Mihăilescu 2005, p. 36; 2008, p. 557; Gallagher 2008, p. 97). It all culminated with the governing National Salvation Front (NSF) also establishing a dubious coalition with the PRNU and the GRP in January 1995. The move allowed for the GRP’s extremist discourse to invade the public arena (Linden 2000, p. 129; Culic 2005, pp. 107-108; Ciobanu 2007, p. 1434).

The fusion between the NSF populism and unabashed nationalism produced an increasingly nation-state-centred approach to reform. Public attacks on minorities (Panayi 2000, p. 248; Stewart 2008) also appeared in Parliament where the DUHR conflicted with the parties in power during 1994-1995 over the new education law. The NSF proposed a draft bill that ethnic Hungarians considered unacceptable as it restricted the use of minority languages. The DUHR, with the public support of the Czech, Slovak and German minorities, proposed a number of amendments, but were rejected in Parliament (Atanasova 2004, pp. 395-396; Csergo 2007, pp. 63-64).

The NSF-sponsored Education Law No. 84 (henceforth 84/1995) was eventually adopted in June 1995. It made education in Hungarian possible only for teachers of that language, demanded the establishment of Romanian schools in all localities at all levels of instruction, and made compulsory all university entrance examinations in Romanian (Csergo 2007, p. 396). The law did allow for minority languages to be used at primary and secondary education levels. However, it regulated the teaching of politically sensitive disciplines, especially history and geography (Weber 1976, pp. 333-334; see also pp. 20-22, 74, 125), in Romanian language at the secondary level, while vocational education was to be provided only

Most insulting for the minorities was the stipulation in Law 84/1995 (Article 120.2) that history textbooks be identical for all classes and titled ‘History of Romanians’, instead of ‘History of Romania’ (Weber 1998, pp. 160-161; Murgescu 2001, p. 280), which implied that only Romanians existed in Romania (Borbely 2009). The law thus ‘revealed the strong nationalist principle underlying Romanian educational policy’ (Csergo 2007, p. 68) and confirmed one more time that foreigners were not welcome in the country’s history. According to the same article, the teaching of geography was also to be conducted in the official language, this implying the nationalisation of mental maps with Romanian toponyms. Coupled with the compulsory examinations in Romanian for entrance to higher education institutions (Weber 1998, pp. 161-162), such legislation inevitably indicated the attempt of the authorities to maintain their hold of spatial-temporal possibilities with onomastic techniques (see pp. 22, 77-79, 116-117). The law practically continued the nationalist approaches of previous regimes, reminiscent of nineteenth-century imposing of national political cultures elsewhere in Europe (Weber 1976, p. 5), built on the ‘dubiously applicable’ (ibid., p. 485) nationalised conception of time and space.

Law 84/1995 illustrated then the deafness of Romanian authorities to the EU’s calls for a reformation of the country’s minority policies and the demands expressed to that end by minorities themselves (Dobre 2003, p. 65; Csergo 2007, p. 64; Borbely 2009). The DUHR issued a public statement describing the law as ‘more discriminatory, more anti-Magyar and anti-minority than the similar laws and regulations of the Ceauşescu system’ (quoted in Atanasova 2004, p. 396). Indeed, the education act of 1978 had offered more rights to minorities (Weber 1998, p. 182).
Besides restricting their access to essential vocational training in their mother tongues, the Law 84/1995 can be said to have actually aimed at the elimination of minorities from the conception of history, geography and the political life in education. To the DUHR protests, President Iliescu responded by accusing Hungarian leaders of ‘promoting “separatism” and the “ghettoisation” of Hungarian youth’ (Atanasova 2004, p. 396).

Iliescu’s discourse was in fact nationalist on the surface and deeply populist in essence, since Romanian society of the mid-1990s was generally very receptive to nationalist signals. An opinion poll conducted in early 1995 indicated Marshal Ion Antonescu, the leader of fascist Romania before and during the Second World War (see pp. 187-190), as the most popular historical personality. He symbolised, especially in the GRP propaganda, the authoritarian, autochtonist (see pp. 163-166, 187) icon of leadership needed for the country to pass through the harsh post-communist transition (Boia 2001, pp. 227-228; Ciobanu 2007, p. 1437).

The content of public education also indicated what an analyst of the Romanian educational system in the twentieth century labelled as the ‘ethnical spirit of Romanian pedagogy’ (quoted in Mincu 2009, p. 61). Pupils in the fourth elementary form would learn from civic education textbooks in mid-1990s that the notion of people (popor) referred to all inhabitants of a country. The Romanian popor, in turn, was described as descending from the ancient Dacians and Romans and speaking a Romance language. More details on the content of education in post-communist Romania will be given below (see pp. 255-257) but they all follow the logic suggested above. The consequence is the subtle exclusion of ethnic others from the sovereign definition of human life in texts meant to educate immature children (Murgescu 2001, p. 274).
On the domestic political stage, Romanian nationalists were arguing that efforts to obtain collective rights for the Hungarian minority, particularly in the spheres of education and local government, were obvious attempts to undermine the Romanian character of Transylvania. Consequently, they demanded the outlawing of the DUHR, the nationalist PRNU leader Funar initiating overtly provocative actions in his position as mayor of Cluj-Napoca (Linden 2000, p. 129; Kostecki 2002, p. 18; Mihăilescu 2005, p. 31; Gallagher 2008, pp. 103-104). In fact, the administrative and technocratic elite in Transylvania, aiming to preserve its dominant position, was the engine of post-communist Romanian nationalism (Atanasova 2004, pp. 380-381; Gallagher 2008, p. 103), thus extending a tradition dating back to the interwar period.

Such developments caused the DUHR to change fundamentally its political strategy toward more radical positions (Atanasova 2004, p. 387; Borbely 2009). It became an active member in the Democratic Convention in Romania (DCR) and fought in the anti-communist camp for the victory in the 1996 elections, which led to the party’s entry for the first time into the governing coalition (Deletant and Siani-Davies 1998; Mihăilescu 2008, p. 578). Additionally, following especially the adoption of the Education Law 84/1995, the DUHR also introduced an explicit reference to territorial autonomy for the Hungarian community in the political programme of the DCR, an objective that had been on the party’s agenda ever since its 1993 draft bill on national minorities (Weber 1998, p. 168; Csergo 2002, p. 12; 2007, p. 63). Even more, the DUHR showed that it was serious about autonomy (Borbely 2009) by organising in January 1995 a conference on local self-government in the Covasna district where participants elected the Council of Mayors and Local

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13 The DUHR parted with the DCR in 1995 due to misunderstandings with the other Convention members essentially over the commitment of the DUHR to respect the principles of the 1991 Constitution. However, the party was invited to enter the government coalition following the victory of DCR in the 1996 elections, this proving that the dispute was not to a dead end (Deletant and Siani-Davies 1998, note 3; Csergo 2007, pp. 66-69).
Councilors, which was made responsible for issues of local administration (Atanasova 2004, p. 387; Csergo 2007, p. 66).

Suddenly, following the dramatic developments in Yugoslavia, President Iliescu became aware of the faults of the Milosevic regime and deliberately refrained from employing a nationalist rhetoric in the electoral campaign of 1996 even at the expense of losing the elections (Chirot 2005, pp. 160-161). Thus, the strong determinacy of the DUHR and the events in Yugoslavia contributed to a significant reorientation in the Romanian domestic politics toward a discourse of cohabitation with the minorities. The DCR victory in 1996 gave hope to the Hungarian community concerning the acceptance of a degree of autonomy, even in the absence of clearer details (Csergo 2007, p. 65). Essentially, this made possible a redefinition of the relation between community self-government, a desideratum of DUHR, and national sovereignty in Romania (Csergo 2002, p. 21).

Negotiations inside of the DCR led eventually to the inclusion of two main political objectives of the DUHR into the government programme: the amendment of the 1991 law on public local government and the amendment of the 1995 education law to ease its restrictions on the use of minority languages (ibid., p. 22; Ram 2009, p. 182). The DUHR was able to name two of its members in positions considered important for the preservation of communal identity at the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Culture respectively (Csergo 2002, p. 23; Johnson 2002, p. 13). The government structure was also modified to include a Department for the Protection of National Minorities, a DUHR representative becoming its head with ministerial rank (Weber 1998, p. 184; Csergo 2002, p. 23; Babbitt 2006, p. 200; Ram 2009, p. 182).

Consequently, the newly elected President, Emil Constantinescu, had the chance to defy ‘the convention that the ruling elite must rule in the name of the ethnic
majority’ (Gallagher 1998, p. 115). The DUHR had been accepted as a partner in government without ‘popular outcry’ (Gallagher 2008, p. 145) and this seemed indeed to play against those who saw a ‘propensity toward nationalism’ in the Romanian political culture (Tănăsoiu 2008, p. 81). The European Commission, too, recognised these positive developments. It also suggested, in its 1997 opinion on Romania’s application for EU membership, that the country needed to replace the 1995 education law so that minorities ‘continue to be educated in their own languages’ (European Commission 1997).

This could be interpreted as clear pressure on behalf of the EU institutions for respect for minority rights in Romania. However, the authorities in Bucharest did not seem to adopt such interpretation, since majority-minority relations remained structured in terms of power even after Romania joined the EU in 2007. In line with the main hypothesis here (see p. 17-18), the EU enlargement process did determine formal change in the minority policies of the sovereign majority in Romania, as some of the developments detailed above and others mentioned below seem to indicate. However, it did not alter significantly the discursive mechanisms of self-institution through which the Romanian sovereignty continues to dominate ethnic minorities as objects of policies (see pp. 10-11, 39-40). Consequently, the reports and opinions issued by the EU institutions have failed to open possibilities for inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality (see pp. 14, 39-40, 102-103).

Despite tensions between political parties in Parliament, the amendments to the laws on public local government and education demanded by DUHR and the EU were eventually promoted in May 1997 through emergency ordinances, to be followed later by adoption in Parliament (Weber 1998, p. 166; Csergo 2002, p. 23). Article 23(6) in the former act allowed for the use of minority languages in public
administration ‘where a national minority represents over 20 per cent of the population’. Articles 55(3) and 58(2, 4) stipulated that persons belonging to ethnic minorities could be employed in local administration in such areas (Weber 1998, pp. 167-168; Roger 2002, p. 26). These changes met the relevant provisions in the Framework Convention (Council of Europe 1995). Another emergency ordinance, adopted eventually by the Parliament in 1999 (Csergo 2002, p. 23), stipulated guarantees for the education in the minority languages in state-administered schools from primary to graduate levels (Roger 2002, p. 26; Ram 2009, p. 183).

The respective ordinance initially contained measures also allowing for the establishment of universities in minority languages. The government, however, had to withdraw the proposal in face of harsh criticism inside the DCR. This almost determined the DUHR to leave the government coalition in 1998, a move that threatened the entire EU-inspired reform in Romania (Gallagher 2008, pp. 193-194). In this context, the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities (OSCE-HCNM) Max van der Stoel became involved directly in the negotiations between the DUHR and the majority, determining the government coalition to compromise (Babbitt 2006, p. 200). An independent Bolyai University with teaching in Hungarian was not re-established in Cluj-Napoca as the DUHR demanded. Support was given however, at the insistence of both the OSCE-HCNM and the EU, to create departments and programmes in both Hungarian and German languages at the existing Babeș-Bolyai University (Johnson 2006, pp. 39-40). These developments showed once again that the ‘language debate’ remained at the heart of majority-minority relations in Romania even during the so-called ‘consensual period’ following the 1996 elections (Csergo 2007, p. 69).
The resistance on behalf of central authorities to fundamental change in this sense was evident. The implementation of the new education and local administration acts suffered from the absence of clear norms and guidelines. The relevant international law was also of little help concerning language rights. The OSCE-HCNM van der Stoel even admitted publicly that there were no international norms guiding Romania ‘as to what it should do’ in this respect (Ram 2003, p. 45). The language policy in Europe is generally described with reference to the 1992 European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML), ratified by Romania in 2007. Similar provisions on the use of mother tongue by minorities exist in Article 10(2) of the Framework Convention and in the 1993 Recommendation 1201 of the PACE, Article 7(3), also ratified by the Romanian government (Weber 1998, p. 158). All those provisions only encourage signatory parties to ensure the communication between persons belonging to national minorities and public administration offices and courts in the languages of minorities (PACE 1993; Council of Europe 1995).

The respective treaties have been designed in the context of interstate relations under the principle of territorial sovereignty and as such limit individuals to the possibilities fixed in the ‘logic of the state’ (Csergo 2007, p. 11). In such an international context, even the European Communities granted official status only to the national languages of the Member States. Languages spoken by historical minorities were considered regional, minority, or lesser-used languages in the spirit of the ECRML. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) encourages (Article 149.2) the ‘developing [of a] European dimension in education, particularly through the teaching and dissemination of the languages of the Member States’ (Official Journal of the European Union, 2006). The hierarchical understanding of languages from ‘lesser-used’ to ‘national’ in Europe and the obvious attention given to national sovereignties
in the TEU inevitably leads then to a continental practice favouring titular majority languages (Csergo 2007, p. 11).

The basis of calculations seems then to be quantitative and territorial sovereignties are reference in evaluations. The expectations concerning language rights on behalf of the Hungarian minority in Romania were thus limited to possibilities constructed by sovereign states. That was while the Hungarians’ idea of equality with the Romanian majority in the constitution of the state ran precisely against the logic of territorial sovereignty conditioning the political ontology of the human realm. Many in the DUHR were thus not happy with Romania’s continuation on the path to EU membership despite majority-minority relations not being rearranged according to a denationalised understanding of sovereignty.

The dissatisfaction of prominent DUHR representatives with the party’s achievements as member of the government coalition came to the surface during its sixth congress in 1999. Hardliners accused the DUHR president Marko Béla of not acting decisively for the autonomy. Some 150 members even sent an open letter to the US President accusing the Romanian state of ‘ethnic cleansing’ (Roger 2002, p. 35). The European context and especially the developments in EU-Romania relations were, yet again, not particularly encouraging for the DUHR. The Romanian government called ‘key achievements’ the amendments to the education and administration laws explained above and made extensive use of their symbolic value in EU accession negotiations (Ram 2003, p. 45). The Regular Reports of the European Commission on the progress of Romania toward the EU membership also became gradually less vocal on the issue of minorities.

The first such Report was issued in 1998 and acknowledged the country’s efforts concerning the protection of the Hungarian minority, while indicating that
much remained to be done for the social condition of the Roma community (European Commission 1998; 1999). The 1999 report also mentioned as positive developments the adoption by the Romanian Parliament of the new education law replacing the discriminatory Law No. 84/1995 and the new local administration law. The attention moved then in the text to the issue of the Roma minority and the socio-economic problems it faced (European Commission 1999, pp. 18-19). The Romanian government was in this context more preoccupied to create a positive international image essential for the country’s perspectives of Euro-Atlantic integration, while the stance of the DUHR concerning the political status of the Hungarian minority became less and less disturbing in Bucharest (Csergo 2007, p. 85). Therefore, the Romanian performance concerning the minority conditionality was characterised as ‘increasingly “accommodating diversity”, although not without continued difficulty, substantial debate, and certain limits’ (Ram 2009, p. 182). The DUHR’s militancy was, however, essential in this context and will continue to be so in the 2000s.

The 1990s can be described as a period when the Hungarian minority managed to destabilise the national sovereignty consensus in Romania with DUHR’s insistence on the equal political status of all ethnic groups as constitutive of sovereignty (see pp. 226-227). However, one cannot identify an interruption in the linear continuity of the nation’s present/presence, constituted with the sovereign subjectivity’s discourse of political life in the name of the nation (see pp. 97-100 and Dasgupta 2009). As such, the discursive resistance on behalf of the Hungarian minority to the sovereign consensus failed to destabilise the position of the ethnic majority in the seat of sovereign authority (see pp. 119-122).

The EU enlargement process, too, did little to alter the power scheme inter-ethnic relations. The Union gradually changed its focus during the second half of the
1990s toward the socio-economic problems of the Roma community. Moreover, it also began to generally avoid issues concerning collective minority rights (Toggenburg 2005, p. 733) and preferred instead to contribute only ‘to the creation of domestic political space for minority participation’ (Sasse 2009, p. 27). Within this context, however, the DUHR saw again a window of opportunity and advanced in the direction it had announced during the early 1990s.

The period 2000-2004 was crucial in this sense because the elections in 2000 occasioned the coming to power of the Social Democracy Party (SDP), and again of Ion Iliescu, with 37 per cent of the votes and 46 per cent of the seats in Parliament. Alarmingly, the nationalist GRP came second with 21 per cent of votes (Gallagher 2008, p. 258). This seemed to create conditions for the coming back of nationalist discourses and less governmental attention to minority-friendly reforms. However, the international context allowed this time for a different path. The US-led ‘fight against terrorism’ and the certainty of some countries from Eastern Europe acceding to EU membership (Ciobanu 2007, p. 1438) made laggard Romania become aware of risks if it continued with the pre-1996 domestic agenda.

The DUHR made again a decisive move in this context. Given the fact that its number of seats in Parliament was insufficient to govern, the SDP had to form an alliance with any of the other parties that had passed the electoral threshold. Previous political dissentions made it difficult to accept cooperation with some parties, while shaking hands with the GRP would have affected negatively relations with the international community and the Hungarian minority. The EU had given signals encouraging an alliance with the DUHR and this (Gallagher 2008, p. 327), coupled with the prospect of billions from the Union in support of Romania’s accession, determined Ion Iliescu to invite this party to form a government coalition with the
SDP. For the DUHR, there was no other choice: either it joined the SDP to promote its agenda, or refused and thus forced the Socialists to ally with the ultranationalist GRP (Roger 2002, pp. 35-36; Troie 2004, pp. 43-44; Gallagher 2008, p. 263).

In response to the DUHR’s support, the SDP voted for the adoption of the Public Administration Law No. 212 (2001). This act conferred definite legal form to the emergency ordinance adopted previously under the DCR government and established the use of ethnic minority languages in administration (Troie 2004, p. 44; Chiva 2006, p. 410; Gallagher 2008, p. 327). The final form of this piece of legislation was based on a version approved by the European Commission and strongly supported by the pro-integration politicians and media as meeting the European, specifically CoE standards (Ram 2003, p. 45). Additionally, the government amended restrictive legislation to allow for the public use of minority symbols, the public singing of national anthems other than the Romanian one, and the re-establishment of a prestigious Hungarian high school in the city of Târgu-Mureș (Csergo 2007, p. 91). In 2003, under pressure from the European Commission expressed in the Regular Reports, amendments to the 1991 Constitution were also adopted with unanimity by the Parliament. They improved the quality of the judiciary and also granted the use of minority languages in the justice system and local public administration (Mungiu-Pippidi 2005, p. 51; Csergo 2007, pp. 91-92).

The DUHR simply could not achieve more in a context dominated, for both Romania and Hungary, by states’ concerns with Euro-Atlantic integration and in the absence of international consensus over an even minimal definition of national or ethnic minorities (Johnson 2006, p. 34). The states’ own predication of political played, therefore, a major role. Budapest was also to revive the tension between the two sovereignties in this respect by giving legal form to its understanding of the
Hungarian nation as a cultural community, thus covering territories outside Hungarian borders, including in Romania (Kymlicka 2005, p. 724). The Hungarian government under Prime Minister Orbán between 1998 and 2002 gave more attention than predecessors to the Hungarian minorities abroad (Chiva 2006, p. 413; Csergo 2007, p. 110). It promoted in this sense the so-called Status Law, adopted by the Parliament in June 2001. This law granted privileged access for Hungarians in neighbouring countries, on the basis of a ‘certificate of Hungarian nationality’, to education in Hungary. It also stipulated measures for related financial, social security, healthcare and employment support, aiming at bringing Hungarians in Europe closer to their cultural core (Kostecki 2002, p. 31; Chiva 2006, pp. 401, 415; Csergo 2007, p. 110; Gallagher 2008, p. 301) regardless of established citizenship rules.

The Status Law has been described as a “‘post-modern” approach’, as it advanced national cultural identity, kinship and language as markers of political identity instead of territorially-based citizenship. It thus pioneered the idea of ‘attenuated or shared sovereignty’ in relations between states and minorities (Culic 2006, p. 188). But, while it could be viewed indeed as ‘a unique Hungarian effort to challenge the rules of Westphalian sovereignty’ (Csergo 2007, p. 113), this act did not solve the problems of the Hungarian minorities inside the countries where they lived. The official person appointed by the European Parliament to evaluate the law indicated clearly that such acts cannot be applicable outside the borders of the issuing state and extraterritorial provisions could be enforced only with the consent of the other states concerned (ibid., pp. 112-113).

The case of the Status Law is interesting in the context of this dissertation because it occasioned the dialogue of relevant actors over a piece of legislation that challenged the contemporary possibilities of imagination concerning relations
between sovereignties and human life. The European Commission notified Budapest about the concerns created by the law in the neighbouring countries. This was its only involvement in the case, since EU legislation prohibits discrimination, including preferential treatment, on ethnic criteria (Chiva 2006, pp. 412-413). Consequently, the law does not apply to Hungarian minorities in Austria, Slovakia and Slovenia (ibid., p. 409, note 21). The Romanian and Hungarian governments called therefore upon the CoE’s Commission for Democracy Through Law – known as Venice Commission – to issue an opinion on the Status Law (ibid., p. 412; see also Troie 2004, p. 37).

In the words of the Hungarian Foreign Minister, the position of Romania in the case was based on an understanding of ‘Europe’ as ‘a union of nation-states, with clearly defined boundaries and state responsibilities toward their citizens’. For Hungary, ‘Europe’ represented a zone of multiple communities and identities reflecting the ‘dissolution of the principles of absolute state sovereignty and absolute territoriality’ (quoted in Chiva 2006, p. 414). In its October 2001 report on the matter, the Venice Commission indicated clearly that its ruling was based on the existing interstate treaties and agreements. They allowed kin-states to introduce individual rights for their co-ethnics in other states with respect of their territorial sovereignties, human rights and fundamental freedoms (Culic 2006, p. 189). Consequently, the report insisted that the ‘differential treatment of citizens of other states could only be truly justified in the areas of education and culture’ (Deets 2006, p. 443; italics added).

It came as no surprise then when the president of the DUHR expressed an opinion on the act as adding practically nothing to the previous condition of Hungarians outside Hungary, who enjoyed similar levels of support for completing education in that country before the implementation of the Status Law (Troie 2004, p.
46). Like the opinion of the European Parliament official mentioned above, the Venice Commission iterated the principle that, ‘one state’s extraterritorial provisions are only acceptable with the consent of the other state concerned’ (Csergo 2007, p. 112). It thus brought all imagination concerning territorial autonomy for the Hungarian minority and the related possibility of inter-ethnic equality of status (see pp. 232-233) back to the limits set with the bilateral treaty of 1996. Judged within this context, one must then appreciate the efforts and achievements of the DUHR in the ruling coalition between 2000 and 2004. However, that government soon became the target of corruption accusations (Ciobanu 2007, pp. 1438-1439; Gallagher 2008, pp. 312-315; Pop 2008).

Some prominent figures in the DUHR were also associated with the ‘politics of patronage’ mastered by SDP oligarchs (Gallagher 2008, pp. 327-328). On that background, the National Liberal Party (NLP) and the Democrat Party (DP, currently Democrat Liberal Party, DLP) established the Justice and Truth Alliance (JTA) that won the elections of 2004. In the same elections, the nationalist GRP lost significant political weight, dropping to 13 per cent of the total votes from 21 per cent in 2000 (Ciobanu 2007, pp. 1440-1441). The DUHR joined the JTA in government and continued to push for pro-minority reforms. The slow but steady decrease in popularity of the ultranationalist positions since 1996 and the relative stability of DUHR’s electorate made it so that the party seemed to become one ‘for all political seasons’ (Gallagher 2008, p. 328). It was and still is apt to offer precious support to any government coalition that would satisfy at least partially its agenda.

At the same time, the EU conditionality tended to become gradually more focused on the social and economic condition of the Roma minority in the CEECs and less on the essentially political issue of collective minority rights (Toggenburg 2005,
Ironically, the Union ‘had paid little attention to the Roma until they began seeking asylum in Western Europe’ (Ram 2003, p. 49). This confirmed once again that security imperatives (see pp. 29-31) dominate the European agenda on minority politics, rather than concerns with the relations between national sovereignties and human life (Bojkov 2004, pp. 341-342; Sasse and Thielemann 2005, pp. 660-661; Sasse 2009, p. 17).

The 2000 Regular Report characterised the treatment of minorities in Romania as ‘mixed’, stressing the lack of progress concerning the discrimination of the Roma. It also mentioned the ‘greatly improved’ treatment of other minorities who enjoyed the possibility of education in mother tongues, the exception being instruction at the university level (European Commission 2000, pp. 24-25). The 2001 Report signalled Commission’s satisfaction with Romania extending the use of minority languages and allowing for the establishment of a private Hungarian university with financial support from the Hungarian state. The rest of the relevant paragraph refers to the Roma community only (European Commission 2001, pp. 29-30).

The next Reports of 2002, 2003, 2004 and the last one in 2005 offer a similar understanding of the minority rights element in the accession conditionality for Romania. Increasing attention is given to the socio-economical problems of the Roma and less to the political status of the Hungarian minority. The focus falls instead on the ratification of relevant international treaties, especially the Framework Convention and the country’s commitments as member of the CoE (European Commission 2002, p. 37). The 2004 conclusions simplify the matter with the observation that Romania is party to the Framework Convention and mentions Hungarians only within the context of minorities ‘other’ than the Roma (European Commission 2004, p. 30). The 2005 Comprehensive Monitoring Report took act of
The government initiative for the adoption of a draft law on the statute of national minorities and evaluated the country’s general compliance with the political criteria as satisfactory (European Commission 2005, p. 19).

The discourse of the European Commission in these successive Reports suggests, indeed, a particular readiness to see ‘positive developments’ in the candidate countries (Johnson 2006, pp. 38-39). In fact, the only case when the EU played tough on the political conditionality card was in Vladimir Meciar’s Slovakia (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007, p. 62; Rechel 2008, p. 175). Cautious diplomacy prevailed overall, the Commission giving the impression that it was willing to share responsibility with other organisations, such as the CoE, under relevant international treaties (Hughes and Sasse 2003, p. 19). Human rights as a whole constituted the basic standard of evaluation. As such the general situation of individual political rights in candidate countries tended to be favoured over collective/community rights (see discussion at pp. 37-38). Thus, states with ‘nation-building problems’ were avoided by the EU and those ten who eventually became members in 2004 can be described as democracies constituted on the basis of individual, not communal, political rights and duties (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007, p. 63).

The accession of Bulgaria and Romania was postponed until 2007 explicitly due to the slow reforms of their justice and economic systems. Eleven so-called ‘safeguard measures’ were agreed upon in 2004, extending conditionality beyond accession and designed to ensure that Romania found the political will to reform its competition policy and eradicate corruption (Phinnemore 2006, pp. 46-47; Pridham 2007, pp. 238-239). The same measures were again mentioned in the last monitoring report in 2005 (European Commission 2005, p. 4). This report also indicated under the title ‘Protection and integration of minorities’ only the need for the adoption of the
‘draft law on the statute of national minorities providing for forms of cultural autonomy’, while considering measures concerning education in minority languages ‘satisfactory’ (ibid., p. 19). In the beginning of 2011, the DUHR could celebrate the adoption by the Romanian Parliament and the ratification by the President of the new education law, which has finally allowed teaching in Hungarian, including in ‘Romanian’ history and geography courses (Anon. 2011a).

However, the draft law on the statute of national minorities proposed by DUHR has been rejected by the Senate in October 2005 and then registered as item 502/26.10.2005 for debate in the Chamber of Deputies, but no further progress has been made up to date (Romanian Chamber of Deputies 2011). Among the reasons for this blocking in Parliament is Article 2 in the draft stating that communities, not individuals, constitute the state, a description understood as unconstitutional by other Romanian parties (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007, p. 66). Thus, given the fundamental connection it sees between the territorial right to self-government and the equality of status with the ethnic majority (see pp. 228, 232-233), the DUHR is expected to continue struggling for territorial autonomy. And the Romanian majority would most probably continue to hold control of the engineering of time from the seat of sovereign authority, thus asserting irrefutably its objective and historical presence as condition of political life (see pp. 124-126). Consequently, inter-ethnic relations and politics of qualitative equality regardless of quantitative numbers could emerge in Romania only provided that mere formal policy change is gradually replaced by a denationalised conception of sovereignty (see pp. 39-40, 44, 242).
4.5. The national state of exception survives the EU membership conditionality: preliminary reflections on inter-ethnic relations in Romania after accession to EU membership

The approach presented here has built on an understanding of national sovereignty as subjectivity nationalising human life, thus authoring the temporality of political life in national onomastic terms. This massive colonisation of temporality with the name of the nation had a double ontological consequence (see pp. 118-119). It meant the self-institution through onomastic techniques of the national sovereign subjectivity as language-bound historical and objective presence, concomitantly and inherently excluding the non-national. This perspective made possible the identification of particular patterns of excluding ethnic minorities from the temporality of political life, hence from the historical and objective dimensions of the political nation’s presence (see pp. 124-126).

The argument has been supported with the original analysis of a large number of sources evidencing the engineering of a national sovereign subjectivity in Romania from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. The main hypothesis was (see pp. 18-19) that the EU enlargement process does cause change at a formal level in the minority policies of sovereign states candidate to EU membership, as this chapter has illustrated up to now. However, as this section will also demonstrate, the enlargement could not undo Romania’s sovereign self, responsible for the predication of human life. As such, it has failed to determine the emergence of inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality (see pp. 39-40, 102-103).

A view persists, indeed, that the process of European integration has benefited, on the whole, minorities in Romania (Pridham 2007, p. 245). However, the
sections above in this chapter showed that the effects of EU conditionality have been concentrated at the formal layer of change. That is while the issue of majority-minority relations being essentially power relations (see pp. 39-40), with the majority in the seat of sovereign authority (see pp. 13-14), remained largely untouched.

Romanian authorities have been slow in complying with the EU membership criteria (Hughes and Sasse 2003, pp. 22-23) and preferred to insist on granting individual political rights, while actually continuing to predicate the human domain as belonging to one, sovereign national community. The Hungarian minority has insisted in response on its right to territorial autonomy. This has been a general tendency among historical minorities in Eastern Europe (Kymlicka 2007, p. 385), which see minority rights as mere ‘cover for the supremacy by the dominant national group’ (Atanasova 2004, p. 357). Language rights are central in the contemporary debate on minority protection (Sadurski 2008, p. 219) and the DUHR sees community autonomy as crucial for the free exercise of such rights. Community autonomy is demanded especially in local administration and in education, two fields deemed essential for the preservation of the minority identity (Kostecki 2002, p. 75). Looked at from the perspectives opened in this dissertation, the strategy adopted by the authorities implies the postponing of more profound clarifications concerning the long-term relations between the Romanian sovereignty and its human realm.

Moreover, no progress can be recorded concerning the DUHR’s explicit demand for the Hungarian minority to be accepted by central authorities as constitutive of the Romanian state together with the other ethnic communities. From this dissertation’s perspective, the denationalisation of the Romanian sovereignty (see pp. 39-40, 44) is then far from becoming a realisable objective. It is significant in this context that the DUHR proposed explicitly that the source of Romanian sovereignty
be reformulated as deriving from the ‘citizens of Romania’ instead of the ‘Romanian people’. However, political parties of the ethnic majority from all ideological camps have repeatedly rejected such modifications (Csergo 2007, p. 93).

Romanian political parties, from government and opposition alike, proved reluctant to alter the constitutional understanding of the human realm of sovereignty as unitary and national with the amendments of 2003. The political parties representing the ethnic majority have staunchly defended the relevant paragraphs in the 1991 constitution during the debates in Parliament on the respective amendments (Gallagher 2008, pp. 258-259). Consequently, the human realm under Romanian sovereignty continues to live a nationalised political life. The country becoming EU member in January 2007 seems to have actually contributed to the postponement of profound debates on the future of sovereignty. Once the membership in the Union ceased to be an incentive, there is nothing in view (Babbitt 2006, pp. 201-202) that could determine Romania to undo its sovereign self and the nationalist ways in which it has predicated human life for generations.

Under these conditions, the adoption of the minorities-friendly education law in the beginning of 2011 can be considered a major success for the DUHR. However, the party’s draft proposal for a statute of national minorities may wait a long time before being taken seriously by Romanian politicians. Even more problematic is the fact that the national sovereign subjectivity continues to display its hold on historical temporality in the content of public instruction. As briefly indicated in the previous section (see p. 236), history and civic education textbooks during the 1990s tended to ‘show an inclination to sacrifice critical spirit with ease in favour of autochthonism and the old mythical clichés’ (Boia 2001, p. 230).
A civic culture course book for the seventh form in elementary school was teaching in 2000, too, that the notion of fatherland indicated concomitantly a geographical space, a temporal dimension illustrated by the national history, and a specific national culture (Murgescu 2001, p. 276). The methodological perspective in this dissertation helps the identification here of a subtle homogenising mechanism subordinating space and time to the onomastically constituted presence of the sovereign majority in the minds of very young pupils. Another textbook also asked pupils, including inevitably minority children, ‘what duties have people towards the nation they belong to?’ (ibid., p. 278).

A high school history textbook published in 2004 is less insistent than its illustrious predecessors on the theme of Dacian-Roman cultural continuity in the space of contemporary Romania. It was designed according to the Orders of National Education Minister 4325/1999 and 3913/2000. Unlike all textbooks before, it includes a two-page section titled ‘Ethnic and confessional diversity, political solutions’, which describes the country’s cultural mosaic after the Union of 1918 (Dumitrescu et al. 2004, pp. 140-141). However, the central theme in that section is the integration of minorities in the united Romania, presented in positive terms, and the resistance of minorities, especially Hungarians, to such positive integration. The textbook also perpetuates among pupils the Romantic belief in the almost simultaneous emergence of a Romanian identity and Orthodox Christianity. The authors admit that archaeological proof is simply ‘inconclusive’ in this case, but explain that Christians from that period were ‘manifesting their belief with precaution’ only due to persecutions. It then leaves unaltered the idea that the birth of the nation was accompanied by the coming of Orthodox Christianity to the region (ibid., p. 13).
Section 4.2 (see pp. 177-180) above has showed that this particular simultaneity played a crucial role in the construction of a specific Orthodox Christian, Romanian subjectivity before communism, differentiating it from Hungarian Catholic and non-Christian others. In line with this is also the presentation in the 2004 textbook of the regime under the 1866 Constitution without pointing at its xenophobic character (Dumitrescu et al. 2004, pp. 72-89). The textbook also describes the invasion of the contemporary Romanian space by migratory peoples after Romans’ withdrawal in only three paragraphs under the title ‘Romanics [sic!] and migratory [peoples] in Dacia: the “second assimilation”’. It thus insinuates the idea of the autochthonous culture being superior to those of the invaders (ibid., pp. 14-15).

The same perspective is suggested in a 2006 history textbook for the fourth elementary form. Forty out of a total of ninety-six pages describe the ancient history of the people in Roman Dacia and the Romanian ‘ethnogenesis’, while only three sentences explain the passage and assimilation of migratory peoples by the superior ‘autochthonous civilisation’ (Mihăilescu et al. 2006, p. 32). The most recent curricula for pre-high-school education gives little hope for the inclusion of minorities into the ‘national’ history and are not designed to introduce a sense of equality of status between minorities and the majority. Two such curricula (Romanian Ministry of Education and Research 2005; 2009) for the fourth and eight forms respectively, demand that history textbooks mention the minority cultures but both, especially the latter, insist on the ‘status’ of minorities vis-à-vis the majority, thus giving a minority-equals-inferiority sense to pupils. Such approaches remind of a thesis in Ceauşescu’s discourses about the superiority of Dacian-Roman civilisation vis-à-vis Hungarian and Slavic ones (Korkut 2006, p. 145). Coupled with the adoption by the post-communist Romanian society of particular interwar intellectual heroes (Tănăsoiu
2005, pp. 118-119), this suggests the survival of a profoundly nationalist sovereign self cultivated by the elites.

In 1996, Lucian Boia also warned participants in an international conference that textbooks ‘still reflected the nineteenth-century romantic view of Romanian history with its myths’, but prominent figures of the contemporary intellectual elite criticised his position (Romocea 2004, p. 164). Lack of finance, coherent strategies and alternative sources of imagination also made change superficial in the post-communist Romanian educational system (Mincu 2009, pp. 71-72) and a profound alteration of traditional autochthonist views is to take a long time. Until then, children from the Hungarian minority may continue to hear pedagogues teaching, for instance, that their forefathers accepted with difficulty the Union of 1918 despite the ‘generous’ policies of interwar Greater Romania (Murgescu 2001, pp. 284-285).

The examples above illustrate, indeed, that the EU bodies involved in enlargement have manifested a general tendency to place ‘emphasis on state sovereignty in matters of cultural reproduction’ (Csergo 2007, p. 78). These so-called ‘supranational’ bodies are thus far from developing a more profound, possibly post-national understanding of minorities’ suspicions regarding majorities. In positions of sovereignty, these majorities continue to perform along traditional intellectual lines born in the age of nationalism during the nineteenth century, as the example of Romania clearly indicates.

The EU conditionality may have been effective at the formal level (Hughes and Sasse 2003), but moving ‘beyond a formal or technical understanding of conditionality and compliance’ (Sasse 2008, p. 855) in this field seems imperative. In the absence of EU standards apt to neutralise the manifestation of national sovereign selves in public instruction, in the absence therefore of a political philosophy of
denationalised sovereignty apt to offer alternatives, the youth in states such as Romania would continue to leave school far from ready for a multicultural social and political life. Consequently, a post-national age in Europe seems difficult to imagine.

The main question guiding this research is whether the EU enlargement process affects the majority-minority relations of power in Romania and Turkey as expressed through minority policies under the respective national sovereignties. This chapter has showed that Romania has passed the membership conditionality and became a EU Member State without this leading to the emergence of inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality (see pp. 10-13). The consequences of this situation will be elaborated upon in the Conclusions, but it must be reiterated at this point that the main focus of the research is on the EU and its capacity of determining the emergence of post-national politics in Europe (see p. 10). Before reaching the stage when specific conclusions can be drawn in this respect, however, the next chapter will analyse majority-minority relations in Turkey.

The chapter will reveal that the Kurdish minority in Turkey is gradually formulating claims similar to those of the Hungarians in Romania. Nevertheless, it cannot offer a similar account of EU’s interactions with the Turkish sovereignty since Turkey is still engaged in the enlargement process at the moment of writing (June 2011). The chapter attempts instead to illustrate the particularities of majority-minority relations there as the data gathered indicate an even more abrasive sovereign subjectivity dominating historically in Turkey. The destabilisation of the Turkish sovereign self and the implicit creation of conditions for inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality in Turkey may be much more difficult than the EU policy-makers currently imagine. This could in turn impact significantly the possibility of a politically multicultural, post-national Europe (see p. 10).
CHAPTER 5: THE TURKISH SOVEREIGN SELF, THE KURDISH MINORITY
AND THE EU MEMBERSHIP PERSPECTIVE

Turkey was granted official candidate status for EU membership by the Helsinki European Council in 1999 and formal accession negotiations begun only in 2005 (Oğuzlu 2008, p. 4; Gates 2009, p. 402, Tocci 2008b, p. 886). Majority-minority relations represent in this context, however, a much more sensitive issue in Turkey than in Romania. That is partly because the Kurds, i.e. the only ‘substantial minority’ in Turkey (Panayi 2000, p. 42), have developed historically a far more violent minority nationalism than the Hungarians in Romania. To this violence, the Turkish overwhelming ethnic majority has traditionally responded in a similar manner. And it was only very recently that representatives of the Kurdish minority adopted a more sophisticated approach.

The pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Turkish acronym BDP) militates for various forms of autonomy (Güngör 2010; Şafak 2010), or for amendments to Turkey’s constitution concerning reforms of the political system and education in minority languages (Anon. 2010a). It has even formulated for the first time explicit demands, detailed in section 5.2, concerning the cohabitation with the Turkish majority (Anon. 2011d). This is still far from the DUHR’s coherent discourse of the Hungarian minority in Romania as constitutive of the state on equal par with the majority. It represents nevertheless a significant progress from the period, analysed below, when Turkey simply denied the very existence of a Kurdish minority (Panayi 2000, p. 215).
As this chapter will try to demonstrate, the emergence of inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality (see pp. 10-12, 39-40, 102-103) in Turkey encounters almost insurmountable obstacles precisely due to the specific construction of the Turkish sovereign self. The idea of a Turkish sovereignty has emerged against domestic oppression from its Ottoman predecessor and also had to confront major external threats in the struggle for self-establishment toward the end of the First World War (see, for instance, Berkes 1998, pp. 431-460; Lewis 2002, pp. 210-293). The role played by the military in the assertion of this sovereignty under Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and especially after his death in 1938, produced a context set against democratic politics (Toprak 2005, p. 178). This, among other reasons that will be explained here, contributed to the configuration of a sovereign subjectivity in Turkey predicating human life in extreme ontological terms.

It has been argued by Panayi (2000, p. 215) that, ‘all nation-states practise ethnic exclusion’ and had they not, ‘they would not exist’. This is an aspect also theorised here as the double ontological consequence of the constitution of national sovereignty. It asserts the political and historical present-presence of the imagined national community, while inherently exiling non-national life to the periphery of political possibilities (see pp. 118-119). For Turkey, this has been the state’s very raison d’être for almost nine decades now.

By recognising as minorities only the religious ones, in strict application of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne (see pp. 52-53), Turkey refuses practically to recognise the cultural richness of its human domain. Its political form has been constituted on the basis of a strictly unitary understanding of the human domain (Heper 1985). Through this self-institution, the Turkish sovereignty has subordinated human life to the legal-political notion of ‘Turk’ (Türk), understood as a Muslim person speaking Turkish,
thus amalgamating indiscriminately ethnic alterity (Gülalp 2005, p. 356; İçduyuğ and Soner 2006, p. 455). Even more, by establishing an education system dedicated for generations now to the creation of ‘a new nation based on a single national culture, a single ethnic identity and a single religion and language’ (Çayır 2009, p. 40), the future itself seems to be condemned to Turkishness in Turkey. The ‘Kurdish problem’ is therefore crucial because, indeed, it is the key to ‘the whole question of ethnicity and nationalism in Turkey today’ (Poulton 1997, p. 209).

This chapter will show the enormous obstacles to this sovereignty’s becoming member of a European Union (EU) that values, at least in the language of articles I-2 and I-3(3) of the Constitutional Treaty, minority rights, pluralism, and its rich cultural and linguistic diversity (Official Journal of the European Union 2004). Meeting even minimal conditions for the accession to EU membership would presuppose fundamental changes in the Turkish understanding of its national self. The historical formation of a post-Ottoman national sovereignty has been marked by the persistence of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s founding principles at the ideological heart of the Turkish Republic from its establishment in 1920s until nowadays (Mateescu 2006, p. 225; Bagdonas 2008, p. 100). This suggests a conceptual continuity in the discourse of national sovereignty in Turkey vis-à-vis human life, with origins in the aftermath of the First World War, a period covered in section 5.1.

Section 5.2 presents then developments after the Second World War and the challenges posed in that context to the sovereignty of the majority in Turkey by Kurdish militants. In parallel with relevant aspects of the violent confrontation between the Turkish armed forces and the terrorist organisation PKK, the section also presents an emerging Kurdish intellectual and political answer to the state’s nationalism. This has started with nationalist historiographies elaborated in various
Kurdish publications, accompanied by a series of emerging political positions, which became increasingly strident especially after 1999, and increasingly coherent after 2002.

The gradual decrease in violence after 1999 has been accompanied over the last decade by the timid beginning of a Kurdish politics of disagreement vis-à-vis the national sovereign consensus (Rancière 1999, Manning 2004; see pp. 101-102). This has occurred within a context in which, after 2005, Turkey also started accession negotiations with the EU. Political aspects are yet to become decisive on the EU membership negotiations agenda. Therefore, the chapter does not end with comprehensive conclusions similar to those produced for the study of the Romanian case. It will become clear though that the EU enlargement process, like in the case of Romania, is far from even beginning to alter the discursive mechanisms of self-institution through which the Turkish sovereign subjectivity continues to dominate the policy consensus (see pp. 39-40, 101-103) on the meaning of political life in its realm.

5.1. The formation of the Turkish sovereign subjectivity and its state of exception from human life

The discourse of Turkish sovereignty appeared gradually in the Ottoman Empire toward the end of the nineteenth century and was preceded by the introduction of the then novel idea of Turkishness. Like the notion of ‘rumân’ in Romania (see p. 136), the term Türk was not referring exclusively at that time to the ethnic group we are accustomed with today, but had a profound social connotation. The Ottoman sovereignty, impersonated by the Sultan, or Padişah more correctly (henceforth Padişah), recognised the inhabitants of the empire as subjects (reaya or tebaa) of the
sovereign. The word for citizen (yurttaş) appeared only after a series of reform periods. The word Turk, on the other hand, was widely used by the foreigners to refer to the Ottomans (Aybay 1998). Thus, the acceptance of the term by the Ottoman elite represented only a giving in to the foreigners’ need for a linguistic simplification. Ottomans themselves continued, however, to associate the name Türk with the ignorant toilers of the earth in the Anatolian villages (Poulton 1997, pp. 43, 57; Berkes 1998, p. 227; Ünsal 1998, p. 13; Lewis 2002, pp. 1-2).14

The formation of the Turkish national identity had to surpass the serious problem of the religious definition of the people in the Ottoman state. In this respect, it must be noted that the beginning of modernisation and secular ideas in Turkey can be traced back to the ‘Tulip Era’ of reforms during the early eighteenth century, i.e. earlier than even the French Revolution (Berkes 1998, p. 84). They were followed around one century later by the legislative initiatives of Mahmud II, which announced the Tanzimat Reforms and the future role of the state as key in the transformation of the society (ibid., pp. 132, 142). The Tanzimat of 1839-1876 played a crucial role in that the respective reforms attempted to codify the intentions of the government so as to include more comprehensively the non-Muslims and non-Turks in the human domain of Ottoman sovereignty.

The Western European discourse already contained by that time references to Herderian ideas (see pp. 126-127) stressing linguistic and cultural specificity in the conception of the political community, which influenced Ottoman elites significantly (Timur 1994, pp. 121-143; Aral 1997, p. 78). In the Ottoman Empire, non-Muslim communities had enjoyed a degree of cultural and religious autonomy under the millet

14 Unless otherwise specified, the author has produced all translations from Turkish language employed in this dissertation with precious aid from Ilknur Baltaci-Mateescu.
regime (Poulton 1997, pp. 43-49; Berkes 1998, pp. 96-98). The *Tanzimat* Charter (*Tanzimat Fermanı*) under Abdülmecid I in 1839 contributed to the encoding of that situation in legislation, thus bringing closer the concept of imperial subject to the idea of citizen, but without overt ethno-racial tones (Salzmann 1999, pp. 47-48; Hanoğlu 2006, pp. 3-4). With the Charter, the Ottoman State also recognized for the first time officially the legal relevance of its subjects *qua* holders of rights, Muslims and non-Muslims alike (Lewis 2002, pp. 132-134).

The most important aspect was that the *Tanzimat* Charter abolished the medieval concept of sovereignty associated with the absolute power of the Padişah. It subjected to law his executive powers which, essential for the future of secularism in Turkey, were now clearly positioned vis-à-vis the spheres covered by the religious law, or Şeriat (Berkes 1998, pp. 146-147). However, citizenship as such was not a central concern for the *Tanzimat* ideologists, too busy as they were with international pressures for reforming the state apparatus, and the concept was rather loosely defined (Salzmann 1999, p. 56; Hanoğlu 2006, p. 4). It would therefore be safer indeed to consider the Ottoman nationality law, enforced in 1869, and especially the citizenship provisions in the 1876 Ottoman constitution under Padişah Abdül-Hamid II, as the first secular regulation on citizenship adopted by an Islamic country (Isyar 2005, p. 344; Işın 2005, p. 42). The latter gave a proto-idea of citizenship (*ibid.*), framing ‘an institutionalised ordering of the belonging-togetherness of all Ottomans and their relationships with the ruling bodies’ (Isyar 2005, p. 344).

The 1876 Constitution was also the first to define Turkish as the official language of the state and knowledge of it as condition for employment in the

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15 The word *millet*, of Arabic etymology, meant religious community and in the Ottoman Empire it was ‘applied to the organized and legally recognized religious communities’ other than Muslim (Lewis 2002, p. 335). The *millet* system thus implied the recognition by the Ottoman state of religious and not ethnic minorities, a feature preserved in the Turkish Republic under the Treaty of Lausanne (1923).
bureaucratic apparatus (Article 18) and compulsory in local assemblies (Article 57). The objective presence (see pp. 125-126) of a Turkish ‘nation’ therefore begun to emerge with its tongue fixed in the (f)actuality of life by law some decades before this onomastic exercise would cover citizenship, too. Article 68 made knowledge of Turkish language the main condition for the eligibility of candidates to election in the Ottoman Parliament (Ottoman Constitution 1876). Given also the tradition of bureaucratic practice in the Empire, it was mandatory for anyone aspiring to a position in the Ottoman state apparatus to be a Muslim and speak Ottoman Turkish (Poulton 1997, pp. 43-44).

It can then be said that the first Ottoman constitution inaugurated the legal distinction between subjects on linguistic basis and thus prefigured the ethno-linguistic definition of citizenship some decades later. Even more significantly, it was Abdül-Hamid II again who imposed with a decree in 1894 the use of a Turkish language (Eski Türkçe) cleared of Arabic and Persian words in all schools of the Empire and tolerated the emergence of debates on Turkishness in the media (ibid., p. 61; Mango 2002 p. 96). This can be inscribed, indeed, in the world process of nation-state building that intensified toward the 1900s with the decisive aid of the media (Anderson 2006, p. 135).

The political idea of a Turkish nation emerged as a cultural concept that dominated many enlightened Ottoman minds during the last decades of the empire. This was evident especially in the circles of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), a patriotic group established in 1889 and coming to power between 1908 and 1918. Some of its members joined later the Republican People’s Party (Turkish acronym CHP, henceforth CHP) and other political groups under Mustafa Kemal, who was to found the Turkish Republic in 1923. It was mainly on this path that the
constitution of Turkish national sovereignty with the Republic was permeated by the nationalism of the previous century (Hanioğlu 2006, p.19). The political context was, however, dominated by European success stories of national emancipation, those in the Balkans emerging against the Ottoman sovereignty itself (Poulton 1997, p. 106; Yeğen 2002; İşin 2005, p. 43).

By the end of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman intellectual elites were already absorbed in a public debate on political identity around three contradictory principles: imperial Ottomanism, universalist Islamism, and particularistic Turkism (Poulton 1997, pp. 54-62). The military errors of the Ottoman generals during the Balkan Wars (1912-1913), coupled with the collapse of the institutions and the erosion of communal bonds in the Ottoman society, had contributed to the gradual exit of the Empire from the front stage of continental and regional upheavals. The non-Turkish and non-Muslim peoples in the European territories of the Empire defected from the Ottoman side to the support of newly emerging nation-states in the Balkan Peninsula. This also instigated the formation of an Ottoman and later Turkish nationalisms (Mango 2002, pp. 95-96; Poulton 1997, pp. 65, 80; Isyar 2005, pp. 344-348; see also Arslan and Özen 2005, Arslan 2011). They built on an increasing loss of confidence in the millet system (see footnote 15, p. 263), considered Ottomans’ fault, and the emergence of a strong Turkish identity especially among the young military (Deringil 1993; Yeğen 2002).

In political developments, the Young Turks movement taking power after 1908 determined the CUP administration to inaugurate a policy of Turkification through the key system of education. Only primary schools were allowed to conduct some courses in native tongues, while Turkish classes became compulsory and all courses in middle and high schools had to be conducted in the state’s official
language. This approach, described as bureaucratic Turkism (*Türkçülük*), meant that it was difficult for non-Turkish individuals to work for the state and this contributed decisively to Turkishness replacing Islamic identity as the ‘basis of governing legitimacy’ (Poulton 1997, p. 80 and note 99).

Certain Ottoman intellectuals became open to definitions of the nation that suggested racial and especially religious criteria. This produced a theoretical amalgam of religious nationalism, with origins in the bureaucratic reformism of the 1840s and the Young Ottomans movement of 1860s (Irem 2004, p. 84). Extremely popular works were published by the nationalist-patriotic journals (e.g. *Türk Yurdu*, *Genç Kalemler*, *Dergah*) just before or right after the First World War. In them, prominent literati, especially Ziya Gökalp (1876-1924), or Bergsonian philosopher Ismail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu (1886-1978) later, argued forcefully that the political community was to be defined as linguistic community.

This undoubtedly influenced Mustafa Kemal and became later the core of Kemalist ideology’s definition of the nation, thus essential in the constitution of modern republican Turkey (Dumont 1984, pp. 29-31; Kinross 1995, p. 46; Mango 2002, p. 96; Irem 2004). Turkishness was defined in the literary works of the time, following Herderian ideas (see pp. 126-127), in terms of *language* and *historical traditions* (Mango 2002, p. 96; Irem 2004, p. 95; Uslu 2008, pp. 73-74). Judged from the methodological perspectives adopted here, this can be interpreted simply as an effort aiming at inserting in the public conscience a notion of language-defined Turkishness in the (f)actual nowness of human life. Thus, the nationalism of intellectuals during the last decades of the Ottoman Empire can be said to have been decisive in the formation of an imagined national community, a Turkish *historical*
presence. The sovereign Republic will turn this into law and public instruction and thus constitute the nation’s objective presence (see pp. 124-126) after 1923.

The ‘historical traditions’ component (Giddens 1990, p. 37) was to play a crucial role in the formation of the Turkish sovereign subjectivity by anchoring it in a historical temporality beyond the mental reach of (f)actual individuals. The early nationalist ideology resulting from such engineering was to mark the entire republican era until nowadays (Aral 1997, p. 78) under the label republican nationalism (millietçilik)\(^{16}\). Filling this construct with content was realised through a conceptualisation of the nation stressing the exceptional authenticity and unequalled value of the Turkish (not Ottoman) culture.

With inspiration from the Herderian and Bergsonian philosophy, the early nationalist ideologues formulated the Turkish authenticity in terms of a self-oriented understanding of the political community and pitted against Ottoman religious cosmopolitanism. This self-orientation built on a particular conceptualisation of the ‘concrete (read as culture)’ human reality as opposed to the Islamic ‘abstract (read as civilisation)’ (Irem 2005, p. 99). The concept of culture became thus available for nationalisation since the folkloric art and traditions of the Turks were perfectly palpable in contrast with the Ottoman universalist imaginary (ibid., p. 100). This early nationalist ideology incorporated gradually the notion of the nation’s authenticity and palpable, factual presence at the heart of its effort toward the cultural regeneration of the Turks. Their latent qualities, the ideology argued, had survived centuries of Ottoman oppression precisely due to their immortal intellectual energies.

These efforts coincided in time with the period during which the Romanian identity was being constructed in a similar context by intellectual elites eager to

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\(^{16}\) It is significant to note that the closest Turkish terms to the English ‘patriotism’ are Vatanseverlik, or vatancilik. However, the preferred term in the official discourse in Republican Turkey has been millietçilik, which means essentially ‘nationalism’, employed in the sense of ‘patriotism’, too.
nationalise Western ideas (see section 4.1). One particularity of the Turkish case was that circles close to power, be it the CUP or the Republican authorities later, have been more active in the process than independent intellectuals (Berkes 1998, pp. 132-135; Barkey 2000, pp. 88-90). This Turkish particularity is important because it helps understanding the dramatic position in which Mustafa Kemal was found in Anatolia in the beginning of the 1920s, when the fall of the Ottoman Empire became unavoidable. Following the collapse of institutions in Istanbul, he had to engineer rapidly a government in Ankara and a non-imperial definition of the country and of its people under the new conditions (Kinross 1995, pp. 191-201). It was in that power vacuum that the Grand National Assembly (GNA) became gradually the representative body of the Turkish nation where the official discourse of the future Republic of Turkey was born, with Mustafa Kemal as main source of meanings. And it was in those moments that the Republican political elite, guided by its leader, took up the task of making and defending the republican national self at all costs, indifferent to whatever alternative views would have emerged later.

Contemporary analysts have noticed the exceptionality of that situation when, following the Allied occupation of Istanbul, the Ottoman Parliament became dysfunctional and the nationalist authority in Anatolia ‘was forced to develop a distinct political personality’ (İçduygu and Kaygusuz 2004, p. 43). In March 1920, Mustafa Kemal pushed for the election of the new assembly in Ankara ‘with extraordinary powers’, both legislative and executive and ‘not bound to the Ottoman Constitution’ (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, pp. 9-10). The birth of the Turkish national sovereignty was to take therefore legal form under the auspices of a subjectivity refusing the Ottoman context of real life and relying instead on what it claimed to be ‘the general wishes of the people’ (Kinross 1995, p. 216).
Mustafa Kemal himself inaugurated in that period the Turkish republican discoursing of the human domain with the view that ‘the Turks were a great nation before adopting Islam’ and the Ottomans had usurped the sovereignty of the people for six centuries (Lewis 2002, p. 258; Mango 2002, p. 364; details below). Only by understanding this as a demiurgic production of a temporal point of origin can one also comprehend the essence of sovereignty in general and Turkish national sovereignty in particular as auctor of its political domains (see pp. 110-111), including the human one. This production was obviously possible only through the suspension away from factuality of the Ottoman flux of life and the concomitant affirmation of a Turkish state of exception from the ordinary temporality of that life. Only this gesture of sovereignty, in Agamben’s theorisation (sections 3.2, 3.3), could allow for the legitimisation of a Turkish sovereign self against an entire Ottoman history. And it was from this point of origin that the story of the people under Turkish sovereignty was to be written until nowadays exclusively from the perspectives of that ethno-subjectivity, inexorably excluding alternative discourses of political life.

The GNA adopted in Ankara the 1921 Constitution (Teskilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu) giving legal form to the wartime institutions of what became in turn a new, national state. The office of Padişah/Caliph remained temporarily tolerated only as ‘an ambiguous footnote’ (Kinross 1995, p. 222). At such an exceptional moment, the sovereign subjectivity took a position that can be understood, from this dissertation’s perspective, as above the multicultural (f)acuality of human life throughout the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal replaced it with an extremely pragmatic view of the nation, unitary in a purely ethnic sense (thus excluding Christian, Kurdish and Arab identities) (Poulton 1997, pp. 96-98) and territorially not extending beyond defensible borders (ibid., p. 93).
The Constitution proclaimed the *national* sovereignty of the Turkish (not Ottoman) state as its supreme source of legitimacy (İçduygu and Kaygusuz 2004, pp. 42-43). This implied inevitably the *objective presence* (see pp. 125-126) of the law-giving nation. It is interesting to note that this wartime Constitution contained provisions 11-14 dealing with administrative provinces and granting their autonomy in local affairs (Yeğen 2009, p. 598, note 3). Mustafa Kemal also promised autonomy to the Kurds in 1923 (Van Bruinessen 1994, p. 150; Poulton 1999, p. 16, note 5) in accordance with the Treaty of Sèvres (İçduygu and Kaygusuz 2004, p. 37; Uslu 2008, p. 76). Subsequent developments, to which we shall return shortly, determined however the very opposite to take shape in (f)actual life.

Following the victory over the invading Greek troops and the liberation of Izmir in September 1922, the Kemalists-dominated GNA abolished the office of the Padişah (Dumont 1984, p. 28). This opened the way for the proclamation of the Turkish Republic in October 1923, with Mustafa Kemal as its first President (Kinross 1995, p. 381; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 10). Within two months, March and April 1924, the Caliphate and other institutions associated with the domination of the society by the religious elite were also eliminated. The move was announced by Mustafa Kemal in a speech before the GNA on 1 March 1924 in which he also insisted on the creation of a unitary and centralised educational system (*ibid.*, pp. 384-386) with ‘a national character in the fullest meaning’ (Atatürk 1995, p. 98).

Thus, the making of the Turkish nation was following almost *ad litteram* the Herderian recipes in establishing the conditions through which individual self-realisation was to become possible only in the national self (Smith 2000, p. 10). A new Constitution was then adopted on 20 April 1924, legalising the new state without the institutions of Caliph, the office of Şeyh-ül-Islâm, the Ministry of Şeriat, and
implicitly without their monopoly over education, family and personal matters (Lewis 2002, pp. 264-265; Mango 2002, pp. 404-405). This made possible the gradual emergence of the new national state solely responsible for the public instruction.

The 1924 Constitution re-confirmed the status of the GNA as ‘assembly government’. It held both legislative and executive powers, which were to be exercised through the President of the Republic elected by the GNA and a Council of Ministers appointed by the President (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 11). In this way, the proclamation of popular sovereignty was far from giving control to the people (Heper 1985, pp. 50-51). The second article made Turkish explicitly the official language of the state (Earle 1925, p. 89).

On the basis of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the Republic of Turkey recognised as minorities only the non-Muslim groups in the country (Kirişçi 2000, p. 1; Toktaş 2005, p. 395; Dönmez 2007, note 20). Their rights were in any case to be ignored, the very name of the state suggesting potential discrimination against non-Turks (Van Bruinessen 1994, p. 150; Kieser 2006a, p. xvii). Students of Turkish national sovereignty are usually harshly divided on this issue. Some suggest strong similarities between Kemalist nationalism and German National Socialism (Poulton 1997, p. 112; Kieser 2006b). Others insist on the general context of racial awareness among national sovereignties at that time as an excuse (Yeğen 2002; Işın 2005; Mateescu 2006).

What is in any case relevant within the context of this dissertation is the fact that the Lausanne Treaty (see pp. 52-53) and the laws and governmental practice of the Turkish Republic were all insensitive to the actual ethnic diversity of human life. The ethnic meaning of the word ‘Turk’ left no room for alternative self-identification under the Constitution. It proclaimed bluntly (Article 88) that a child born in Turkey
was a Turkish citizen regardless of parents’ identity and, ‘without religious or racial differentiation everyone is called Turk in terms of citizenship’ (Earle 1925, p. 98; Toktaş 2005, p. 398; Köksal 2006, p. 514). This constitution of the nation’s objective presence was clearly built on an interpretation of temporal present-presence, hence on an incipient image of historical presence that nationalised the now of human life under the established sovereignty (see pp. 124-126). It thus exiled ethnic alterity not to the periphery, as in Romania, but totally outside the time of the nation.

Of all tasks, the secularisation of the Turkish society was probably the most difficult for the elite around Mustafa Kemal. It presupposed not only decisive legislative acts, but also a concerted discursive effort to dislocate religion from the popular culture and thus allow for implementation of the secular legislation. That seemed almost impossible, however, in a country where most inhabitants saw themselves as Muslims first and only secondarily bearing other identities (Mardin 1989, pp. 154-155). Mustafa Kemal himself had instrumentalised Islam during the Independence War ‘as a rallying cry against the foreign invaders’ (Poulton 1997, p. 91; see also Mango 2002, pp. 532-533). Political circles around him in Ankara were already supportive of the republican regime (Poulton 1997, pp. 90-91), but turning it into a secular order was a different matter and not all members of the GNA saw it with positive eyes. Within this context, Islamist resistance to republican secularisation continued in a variety of forms (Brockett 1999; Mango 2002, p. 405), instigated especially by the powerful local leaders in Anatolia, who continue to this day to have a significant influence in local affairs.

Part of the movement against Ankara’s secular policies was the rebellion of Sheikh Said in Eastern Anatolia, which has roots in the pre-republican years. While the Padişah was still nominally in power, the Ottoman government in Istanbul had
initiated an operation in which Colonel Ali Galip and an escort of Kurdish cavalry were supposed to arrest Mustafa Kemal and put an end to the GNA (Mango 2002, p. 249). The plan did not work but fuelled suspicions about the republican loyalty of the Kurds, a people both racially and linguistically different from Turks anyway (Kinross 1995, p. 397; Köksal 2006, p. 515; Yeğen 2009, p. 600). Suspicions in Ankara about this community were strengthened by other actions against Mustafa Kemal’s forces during the Independence War, which were mostly orchestrated by, or with the participation of the Kurdish Bedirhan family (Poulton 1997, p. 95; Mango 2002, p. 249-251). Then, an armed insurrection broke in February 1925 during which the Kurds rallied under the command of Sheikh Said, chief of the Nakşbendi religious order. This determined the swift reaction of the President with the issuing of a ‘Law for the Maintenance of Order’, lifted only in 1929. Under that law, military forces crushed the Kurdish rebellion in the southeast of Turkey and ‘independence tribunals’ were set that sentenced its leaders to capital punishment (Lewis 2002, p. 266).

The main cause of the revolt has been identified mainly in the reaction of the local overlords against the threat posed by the ‘Turkified’, secular Ankara government to their feudal authority in the region (Yalçın-Heckmann 1994, pp. 104-105; Kinross 1995, p. 397; İçduygu et al. 1999, p. 993). Ethnic identity however played its part (Van Bruinessen 1994, p. 153; Kieser 2006b, p. 24), together with religious loyalties, in the coagulation of forces around the Sheikh. Against Ankara’s Turkification policies, the rebels waved the banner of a liberated Kurdistan (Yalçın-Heckmann 1994, p. 105) and the tribal issues may have determined only the failure of this revolt (Brockett 1999, p. 52). Nevertheless, the event marked the beginning of a new intellectual effort toward a clearer conceptualisation of the political community.
and a new set of policies, all aiming at eliminating elements contrary to the Turkish, republican national identity.

The discursive strategy adopted within this context by the leaders of the Republic was subordinated to Mustafa Kemal’s belief that Ottomanism needed to be erased for the future of the Turkish nation to become possible (Barkey 2000, p. 89; Lewis 2002, pp. 263-264). He considered the Caliphate as having tied the people to the past (Kinross 1995, pp. 384-385; Mango 2002, pp. 412-413) and even wrote that ‘the Turks were a great nation before adopting Islam’ (Poulton 1997, p. 101; italics added). This announced the basic idea behind the Kemalist engineering later of the nation’s historical presence. The most comprehensive account of the President’s political views is the famous six-day speech (Nutuk) given in the GNA between 15 and 20 October 1927. Talking in front of all national representatives about the reforms that abolished the Ottoman order in the aftermath of the Independence War, he stated that (Atatürk 2005, pp. 473-474; for English translations, see Lewis 2002, p. 258; Mango 2002, p. 364),

It was by force that the Ottomans seized the sovereignty and Padişahate [kingship] of the Turkish nation; they have maintained this usurpation for six centuries. Now the Turkish nation has rebelled, has put a stop to these usurpers, and has effectively taken sovereignty and Padişahate into its own hands. This is an accomplished fact. The question under discussion is not whether or not we should leave Padişahate and sovereignty to the nation. [...]—the question is merely how to give expression to it. This will happen in any case. If those gathered here [...] could look at this question in a natural way, I think they would agree. Even if they do not, the truth will still find expression, but some heads may roll in the process.

This discourse reveals that Mustafa Kemal understood the relation between sovereignty and its human realm as one of ownership presupposing an already irrefuted onomastic authority (see pp. 77-78). Coupled with the arrangement of powers in the 1924 Constitution, the President’s conception of national sovereignty
will inaugurate the ‘strong state’ tradition (Heper 1985, pp. 50-51) in Turkish politics. Its basic principle is that the people legitimise the power in the state but the exercise of power is unconditionally the responsibility of the state alone. The quotation above also indicates the understanding of the Turkish national sovereignty as legitimately entitled to eternal mastering of the historical time of the human community. Once the Ottoman usurpation ended, the return to the Turkish ‘normality’ (see p. 83) was to be discoursed by the national sovereign subjectivity in its exclusive terms.

In the spirit of the ideas above, the Republican Justice Minister Bozkurt offered three year later an explicitly arrogant view of the government concerning the majority-minority relations in Turkey during the early republican era. The Turks were portrayed as ‘the only masters and owners of this country’, while the people that were ‘not of pure Turkish stock have only one right in this country, the right to be servants and slaves’ (quoted in Van Bruinessen 1994, p. 154; Ataman 2002, p. 126; for similar views, see also Kieser 2006b, pp. 25, 22). The nation’s ownership of sovereignty presupposed the irrefutable discursive act through which the human domain was defined exclusively in the onomastic terms of the nominal ethnicity.

This was a discourse with the ontological function of literally creating the human real of sovereignty anew, cleared of Ottoman, or foreign feelings and charged with a sense of republican self in the name of the nation. The very name of the country left no room for alternative interpretations as it described a space of discrimination against ethnic otherness (Van Bruinessen 1994, p. 150; Kieser 2006a, p. xvii). Citizenship provisions based on sanguinity and territory, both subsumed to ‘the name Turk’, were also preserved in the first Turkish Citizenship Code of 1928 (Berki 1970, p. 68). It became thus a common view in the legislative community of
the early Turkish Republic that the ethnic category and the political category under the name ‘Turk’ were in fact equivalent (Kirişci 2000, p. 1).

In the official programme of the single party, CHP, the nation was defined as a ‘social and political formation comprising citizens linked together by the community of language, culture, and ideal’ (Dumont 1984, p. 29). That was while in the Ottoman society, the last generation of which was still alive during those years, it was precisely the religious and ethnic diversity of the Empire that had been blamed for its collapse (Lewis 2002, p. 214; Dönmez 2007). Clearly, the historical complexity of cultures in Anatolia, with Kurds, Arabs, Circassians, Lazes, Georgians, Greeks, Armenians still dwelling there (Çağaptay 2004, p. 86; İçduygul and Kaygusuz 2004, p. 36; Kadioğlu 2007, pp. 284-285) made the republican regime feel uncomfortable. Mustafa Kemal’s above-mentioned ‘natural way’ of looking at political issues was then quite different from the natural cultural richness of human life under his control. This richness became gradually effaced by the ‘strong state’ tradition of the Republic (Heper 1985) defining citizenship in terms of equality of duties, but establishing serious ethnic inequality (Toktaş 2005, p. 395). The brutal onomastic power exercised here became even more aggressive in the regime’s administrative and educational policies.

The struggle for the imposition of Turkish as the only official language of the state also illustrates the immense gap between the legal constitution of national sovereignty and the cultural mosaic of human life in the country. It was the Anatolian peasants who spoke the Turkish language, while the Ottoman language of the elites was a mix of Turkish, Arabic and Persian, with some words from Italian, Greek, Armenian and other languages (Poulton 1997, p. 43; Berkes 1998, p. 192; Navaroyashin 2002, p. 10). The language reform thus confirmed the general view during the
Republican Revolution, with the Ottoman Turkish being portrayed as belonging to a
dark past and the nation having to ‘burn the bridges’ toward it (Aytürk 2004, p. 1).

The Latin script was officially legalised in 1928 and a profound language
reform started in 1932, under the aegis of a newly established Turkish Language
Institute (Türk Dil Kurumu). Its objective was that of purifying the national tongue of
non-Turkish words, Mustafa Kemal personally supervising the work (Lewis 2002, pp.
433-444). The power of Turkish language had already been instituted officially with
the 1924 Constitution stipulating that ‘persons who cannot read and write [it]’ (Article
12) were not eligible to be elected as deputies (Earle 1925, p. 90). More problematic
was that the language reform came in the continuation of the Turkish History Thesis
adopted in 1932. This thesis claimed in essence (details at pp. 281-282) that the
homelands of Turks in Anatolia and Central Asia had been cradles of all human
civilisations. Thus, the universal value of Turkish creativity was effaced only with the

This view was to be incorporated in the general understanding of the nation in
the Kemalist ideology. In its later formulation, following again Herderian ideas (see
pp. 126-127) almost ad literam, the essential features of the Turkish identity were
political, linguistic, and territorial unity, unity of lineage and roots, shared history and
morality (Poulton 1997, p. 100). The imagined national community thus became the
filter conditioning the political relevance of human life under Turkish national
sovereignty. This has been expressed in practically all constitutional forms to this day,
with language and citizenship as key markers (Steinbach 1984; Aral 1997, p. 78).

Technically, employment and participation in political life became directly
dependent on enrolment into the national education system, which came at the
expense of unconditional exposure to the discursive formulation of political identity
along the regime’s lines. Part of this was the state taking control of the cultural manifestations in the country through organisations such as the Turkish Hearths, a nationalist club founded in 1912 and associated with the Türk Yurdu (Turkish Home) journal of Ziya Gökalp (Lewis 2002, p. 350). After the liquidation of the Kurdish rebellion in 1925, Prime Minister and later President İsmet İnönü gave a speech in front of Turkish Hearths delegations summarising their mission: ‘Our immediate duty is to make Turks all those who live in the Turkish fatherland. We will cut out and throw away the minorities who oppose Turks and Turkism’ (quoted in Bali 2006, p. 44). This is sadly illustrative of the double ontological consequence that the affirmation of a national sovereignty can have for those deemed not to belong to its realm by the respective sovereign subjectivity itself (see pp. 118-119).

All Muslim citizens were to assume the republican Turkish identity and alternative ethnic identities were rejected. A campaign launched in 1928 under the slogan Vatandaş, Türkçe konuş! (Citizen, speak Turkish!) aimed at generalising the use of Turkish language by minorities (Çağaptay 2004, p. 87; Grigoriadis 2007, p. 423). The focus was, yet again, on southeast Anatolia. A GNA report prepared by deputy Renda after the 1925 rebellion also offers a broader understanding of the strategy starting from the acceptance that Turks and Kurds were two different nations, which could not coexist ‘on the same land with equal power and authority’ (quoted in Yeğen 2009, p. 600). Consequently, the Turkish population had to become dominant in southeast Anatolia.

This presupposed settling Turks in villages and rebuilding them ‘to render Turkish predominant; building schools, particularly girls-schools [...]’, the purpose being simply to make ‘those Kurds [...] Turkish’ (ibid., p. 601). In a predominantly Muslim society where young girls were condemned to a status of inferiority, the
Republic’s message about women’s emancipation was therefore to work toward the creation of generations of future mothers devoted to the secular nation-state. Reports from the military also suggested other forms of ‘demographic engineering’ in the region (*ibid.*.) and the government officials soon understood that the education system was in any case to take the main bulk of the effort. Ironically, it was precisely Turkification through education that had caused resentment among those Kurdish nationalists (Çolak 2004, p. 67), army officers, and religious leaders who had joined Sheikh Said’s rebellion in 1925 (Van Bruinessen 1994, p. 151).

The state intensified assimilation policies during the period 1925-1946. Radical measures included forced deportations, destruction of villages and massacres in response to Kurdish uprisings (*ibid.*; Poulton 1997, pp. 120-121; Dönmez 2007, p. 54). These alternated with educational programmes based ideologically on Herderian conceptualisations of the nation and Social Darwinism (Irem 2004, p. 95; Köksal 2006, p. 515). The nationalist intellectuality contributed enthusiastically to the effort, animated by genuine patriotic feelings. Patriotism was, however, to degenerate into various degrees and forms of extremism, depending many times on how close the intellectuals were to the centre of power.

The Turkish Hearths offered to ‘many prominent literary figures’, including women, (Lewis 2002, p. 350) the possibility of enrolment in an intellectual movement producing the discursive core of state policies. The government also established the Eastern Region Reform Commission (ERRC) with the mission of intensifying the Turkification of the Kurds through compulsory settlements and boarding schools. Ministers of internal affairs, justice (Bozkurt), GNA deputy Renda and the Vice Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff were among the members of the ERRC (Yeğen 2009, p. 601).
The education policy followed the doctrine that Prime Minister İnönü had clearly expressed back in 1925 in front of a gathering of the Teachers’ Union: ‘The foreign cultures must melt into this homogenous nation. There cannot be different civilisations in this nation. Each nation of the world represents a civilisation [...]’ (Bali 2006, p. 46). This suggests, yet again, a generalised obsession among the Republican elites with the Herderian view of the nation (see pp. 126-127) as epitomising cultural distinctiveness, which was soon to focus in Turkey on biological distinctiveness (Smith 2000, pp. 68-69). Central in the government strategy became the production of nation’s historical presence (see pp. 124-125) through the engineering of time in the writing and teaching of history.

Article 41 in the single party (CHP) programme adopted in 1935 indicated clearly that nationalism was the cornerstone of public instruction, citizens having to learn to ‘respect and make others respect the Turkish nation’ and cultivate ‘a perfect and ordered national language’ (Poulton 1997, pp. 112-113; italics added). The curricula of 1924 and 1927 for elementary education still contained significant elements of civic-democratic education (Salmoni 2004, pp. 91-94). However, the first official history textbook in 1924 also stressed the need ‘to build a homogenous society and a modern national state’ (quoted in Poulton 1997, p. 104). Another one in 1929 inaugurated the re-writing of history according to the regime’s principles and exalted the nation who ‘brought civilisation to the whole world’, focusing on pre-history and the Turkish racial distinctiveness (ibid., p. 105).

Such ideas were then structured and became officially formulated in the 1930s with two major intellectual constructs, The Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory, both of them supported up to one point by Mustafa Kemal but eventually eliminated from the official discourse (Kinross 1995, p. 466; Bali 2006, p.
32; Mateescu 2006, p. 235). However, we shall see in section 5.2 that some of their basic ideas remained at the foundation of contemporary history teaching. The Turkish History Thesis appeared in 1930-1931 in connection with historical research under the Turkish Hearths and Mustafa Kemal’s personal guidance. It eliminated Islam from the official formulation of Turkish political identity and maintained instead that the Turkish race was primordial. This race came, the thesis insisted, from the legendary Turan region of Central Asia and founded all the great civilisations of the world, including the Sumerian, Anatolian, Egyptian, Roman, or Aegean ones (Kinross 1995, pp. 468-469; Poulton 1997, pp. 101-102).

The Sun Language Theory came in 1936 in strong connection with the history thesis as the result of research done by amateur linguists, state officials and politicians (Çolak 2004, pp. 68, 83). They contended that the pre-historic Turks were sun worshipers and spread all over the world, hence their tongue was the mother of virtually all contemporary languages (Hirschler 2001, p. 147; Aytürk 2004, pp. 16-17; Çağaptay 2004, pp. 91-92; Çolak 2004, p. 83). In probably the most absurd example, the name of river Amazon in South America was presented as given by ancient, Turkish-speaking migratory peoples and was explained as deriving from Turkish ama (but) and uzun (long) (Mango 2002, p. 496).

Both theses represented ‘Turko-centric visions of human history’ (Bozarslan 2006, p. 26) which located the cradle of humanity in a mythical ethnoscape bearing ‘collective significance’ (Smith 1999, p. 150). They imposed the historical presence of the Turkish nation and thus colonised virtually all temporal possibilities for imagination concerning the political ontology of human life (see pp. 124-126). Pupils exposed to such constructs were condemned to a narrow interpretation of identity
within the confines of an official conceptualisation of political life by a sovereign subjectivity whose discursive capacities evolved exclusively around the name ‘Turk’.

Such perspectives formed the basis of two history textbooks published in the beginning of the 1930s and used in intermediary and high schools for decades. They both stressed the racial distinctiveness of the Turkish people as ‘motor of history’ and its archetypal status among civilisations, the ‘alien and non-Turkish’ Ottoman phase only interrupting briefly the glorious national history (Poulton 1997, p. 106). A Kurdish sociologist, Ismail Beşikçi (1977, quoted in Hirschler 2001, p. 147), evidenced clearly in the 1970s the negative effects of the Turkish history and language theories on the relations between the Turkish majority and the Kurdish minority. For this, Beşikçi was to spend years in prison later (McDowall 1996, p. 16).

The so-called Surnames Law No. 2525 of 1934 (Kurban 2007, note 16) added even more to the already considerable narrowness of the official definition of the human domain in Turkey by coming with ‘a list of approved pure Turkish names’ (Mango 2002, p. 499). Turks did not use family names and the 1934 law made this compulsory. Mustafa Kemal took the surname Atatürk, meaning father/progenitor of a line of descendants, implicitly suggesting a paternal figure for all Turks. The GNA even adopted an act restricting the use of this surname to the leader’s person only (Kinross 1995, pp. 473-474; Lewis 2002, p. 289; Mango 2002, p. 498).

In 1928, another act of the GNA had already decreed the replacement of the Arab script with the Latin one. It became thus even more difficult for the minorities in general (Bali 2006, p. 45) to adapt to the new make of the political community. With this law, even the educated became illiterate overnight (Ahmad 1993, p. 35). It formalised a national ‘oblivion’ of the Ottoman past and made possible the exclusion,
unthinkable in Ottoman times, of the non-Muslim and non-Turkish peoples from the historical time of human life in Turkey (Kadıoğlu 2007, p. 289).

The public instruction system, guided ideologically by the Turkish Hearths, began therefore resembling factories engineering the new nation through oblivion of the past, while legislation such as that indicated above colonised the nowness of political (f)actuality with the name(s) of the nation. In this way, both historical and objective forms of presence (see pp. 124-126) were totally subordinated to the titular ethnicity. Non-national forms of political life were thus concomitantly excluded (see pp. 118-119) not to the periphery of possibilities, as seen in Romania, but literally outside the realm of the sovereign consensus (see pp. 101-103). This sophisticated engineering of time also epitomises the view of national sovereignty theorised here (p. 83) as exception from the ordinary temporal flux of unnamed human life.

The exceptional position of such sovereign authority allows it to perceive the imagined community as external, thus available for objectification and instrumentalisation in policies of the national sovereignty (see pp. 10-12, 39-40). Armed with such imaginative engines such as the History and Language Theories, Kemalists were soon to even forget how much their ideology was owing to the Western Enlightenment and proclaimed the originality of their own dream (Bozarslan 2006, p. 32). The result was the radical anthropomorphisation and individuation (Heidegger 1962, p. 62; Neumann 1999, p. 2) of Turkish nationalism and the subordination of all political life to its predication in the narrow, particular terms of national subjectivism (Heidegger 1993, p. 244).

The Kurdish identity has been one of the main targets of this strategy also due to the perpetuation of armed revolts in southeast Anatolia during the 1930s (Panayi 2000, p. 173; Yeğen 2009, p. 604). Authorities in Ankara simply denied then the

Ankara unleashed massive retaliation that included excessive bombing and the execution of young Kurdish men, even from those serving in the Turkish army (Van Bruinessen 1994, p. 147). A military governor was appointed who became responsible for the deportation of large numbers of Kurds to western Anatolia (ibid., p. 153; Poulton 1997, p. 209). Eager to civilise the people ‘if necessary by the bayonet and the power of the sword’ (Bozarslan 2006, p. 34), the government eventually managed to suppress the rebellion (Panayi 2000, p. 173; Mango 2002, p. 500). A victorious Atatürk proclaimed in a speech before the GNA on 1 November 1937 that, ‘no place has been left – or will be left [...] that might hinder our nation from reaching the high level of civilisation and prosperity to which it is entitled. The results of our activities in Tunceli are a recent expression of this fact’ (1995, p. 233).

The relations between the Turkish national sovereignty and the Kurdish minority after the Second World War were bound then to start from this violent reality of the 1920s and 1930s. Obviously, the specific exercise of state authority rather than some early Kurdish nationalism constituted then the central problem (Poulton 1997, p. 96; İçdüygu et al. 1999, p. 993; Barkey 2000, pp. 91-92). Kurdishness in Turkey came out of this period moulded by violence into a ‘traumatic
collective identity’ (Dönmez 2007, p. 50), denied elementary forms of public expression, and thus condemned to political non-existence for a number of decades. Moreover, the regime enhanced even more its control over the public formulation of political identity during the second half of the 1930s. Following the failure of the dual-party system experimented at the initiative of Atatürk himself (Lewis 2002, pp. 279-281; Aydin 2004, pp. 57-59; Mateescu 2006, pp. 237-238), the President and other leaders of the CHP kick-started radical changes in education and cultural life. This meant ‘more direct and top-down policies concerning state-society relations until society would be persuaded by the ultimate ideals of the state’ (Aydın 2004, p. 59).

After 1931, networks of People’s Houses and People’s Rooms replaced the Turkish Hearths. The new organisations were designed for the dissemination of Kemalist ideology, especially its republican secularism and nationalism, through massive cultural and sportive activities, lectures, classes, publications, and social assistance facilities (Winter 1984, p. 190; Lewis 2002, p. 383; Mango 2002, p. 479). The focus of these activities was the rural Anatolia, constructed as cradle of Turkish civilisation and turned into ‘ethnoscape’ (Smith 1999, p. 150) and the Turkish intellectual elites participated with patriotic enthusiasm in the project.

Academic scholars produced an enormous quantity of ethnographic and anthropological studies in the region, which eventually invaded official textbooks employed in public education programmes (Navaro-Yashin 2002, pp. 47-48). These programmes were also designed to increase literacy among the rural masses and focused on the young, girls especially (Winter 1984, pp. 190-191; Mango 2002, p. 479). The effort fit with a particular understanding of Kemalism as a nationalist ideology of modernisation (Giritli 1984; Karaömerlioğlu 1999, p. 80). It was however circumscribed to a specifically Turkish and rather vague notion of ‘humanism’
(Berkes 1998, p. 500). Under the republican education system this became, as illustrated below, an ethnically charged notion with significant impact on the public discourse of morality.

Indeed, the content of education during Atatürk’s life indicated ambitions much beyond eradicating illiteracy. It focused on cultivating an even stauncher nationalism, as announced in the conferences promoting the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory (Çağaptay 2004, pp. 87-92; Çolak 2004, pp. 75-80). The generally liberal curricula of 1924 and 1927 for elementary education (Salmoni 2004, pp. 91-94) were replaced in 1936 with one built explicitly on the CHP platform. It did not give democratic education a central place and focused instead on the President and Prime Minister İnönü as unrivalled leaders, with the party embodying the nation (ibid., pp. 94-95).

Atatürk personally worked on and dictated passages from the Outline of Turkish History that became the basis of high school textbooks in 1930s. The respective work built on the idea that the Ottoman period with its multinational character was ‘an aberration’ (Mango 2002, pp. 493-494). Archaeological and linguistic research guided by racial observations insisted instead on the permanent existence of Turks in Anatolia from earliest, pre-historical ages. The stress on continuity in this heavily ethnicised history, so essential in any factualisation of the imagined national community (see pp. 124-125), indoctrinated entire generations with the idea that history, in any possible way, was either Turkish or did not exist at all.

The purification of language in official texts of administration and education also continued assiduously. A ridiculous situation emerged when the public use of such purified language would be affected by the purging of words without their previous replacement with politically correct, purely Turkish terms (Çağaptay 2004,
pp. 91-93). Scientific accuracy was not, however, the concern of the state authorities involved in the process. As richly illustrated in this entire section, the aim was the irrefutable institution of a Turkish historical presence acting as ontological condition for the institutionalisation of its objective present-presence through law (see pp. 124-126). With this, the border was crossed between the mythical temporality of the imagined community and the present-presence of ordinary, multicultural human life, leading to the institution of the nation as fact of human life. The spread of these constructs was helped by the enhanced centralisation of state’s control over the public education through the People’s Houses and People’s Rooms system. Ideologically, they would also benefit in the 1930s from the contributions of the Kadro and Ülkü movements, which soon came to dominate the general intellectual environment.

Both movements were promoted by the respective nationalist journals and facilitated the clearer formulation of an autonomous Kemalist ideology around Atatürk’s famous ‘six arrows’: secularism, nationalism, republicanism, revolutionarism, statism, and populism (Kinross 1995, p. 457; Bozarslan 2006, pp. 32-33). The Kadro was shut down by the government in 1934 due to the overt sympathy of its members for the ideology and achievements of the Soviet Union (Poulton 1997, p. 134; Karaömerlioğlu 1999, p. 79; Mateescu 2006, p. 236). The Ülkü journal began publication in 1933 and survived until 1950, gathering a particular elite group from the CHP and ‘explicitly designed for creating an ideology of the revolution’ institutionalised through the People’s Houses (Aydın 2004, p. 65).

This journal and the People’s Houses celebrated in general the cult of the peasant. Their ideology has been rightfully labelled, however, as ‘for the people, despite the people’ (Karaömerlioğlu 1999, pp. 83-84) due to total subordination to the ruling party. Announcing the establishment of the People’s Houses system, Atatürk
had even justified the move by the necessity of gathering in one place all nationalist forces through ‘the incorporation of the Turkish Hearths [...] with my party’ (quoted in Aydınlı 2004, p. 60; italics added). This suggested a particular form of nationalist authoritarianism that announced the post-Atatürk political culture in Turkey.

Supplied with the Ülkü version of Kemalist ideology and institutionally supported by the CHP and the President, the People’s Houses system managed to become the ‘tutor of the nation’ (Kinross 1995, pp. 456-457). By 1950, there were more than 4,000 People’s Rooms and 500 Houses in Turkey, this suggesting considerable efficiency in propagating the official doctrines (Lewis 2002, p. 283; Mango 2002, p. 479). Mass education institutionalised on such large scale facilitated the spread of a republican morality. This built on Atatürk’s notions of ‘good and evil, and salivation’ rooted in nationalism (Tachau 1984, p. 66) and replacing the Islamic and Ottoman morality (Okyar 1984, p. 51; Aydınlı 2004, p. 66; Irem 2004, pp. 93-94; Gülalp 2005, p. 365; Köksal 2006, pp. 514-515).

Central in this homogenisation effort has been a belief in the universal character of Turkishness (Rumford 2002, pp. 260-263). It allowed for one single, monolithic indeed, possibility of communal political life, marking to this day the discourse of national sovereignty in modern Turkey (Steinbach 1984; Aral 1997, p. 78). Moreover, Atatürk’s regime understood Turks as a ‘nation-army’ and children as ‘State-owned heirs of the Nation’ (Bozarslan 2006, p. 33), this allowing for rightful speculations about the totalitarian scope of the state ideology. It is significant in this context that some prominent educators of the time were also expressing publicly their admiration for the totalitarian regimes in Europe (Salmoni 2004, pp. 94-95).

There are opinions, indeed, that the Kemalist subjectivity developed a nationalist understanding of its sovereign self inevitably ‘totalitarian in [...] attitude’,
as it actually silenced even other versions of Turkish nationalisms, let aside ethnic minorities (Poulton 1997, pp. 128-129). Those opposing such an apparently discourteous opinion would argue that the President promoted authoritarian but not totalitarian policies and legislation (Akural 1984, p. 141). He even tried desperately to establish a multi-party system (Kinross 1995, pp. 449-453; Lewis 2002, p. 383; Mango 2002, p. 479). Such research would argue that more authoritarian tendencies became visible only after Atatürk’s death in 1938, with the exacerbation of Kemalism by later nationalists (Giritli 1984; Okyar 1984, p. 52; Mateescu 2006, pp. 237-239).

However, an increasing number of analysts, including this author, have come recently to see that a particular, Turkish form of totalitarianism emerged under the late Ottoman and early republican regimes, most visible in the state’s general understanding of its own people (Çaha et al. 2010, p. 37). Some still perceive it reverberating in the discourse and political programmes of nationalist parties (Canefe and Bora 2003, p. 144). It is therefore important that the author clarifies in the remainder of this section the understanding here of the Turkish state nationalism as a totalitarian discourse of political life, subordinating it totally to the ethnic majority.

Discourse itself is a structured totality of meaning and, even if it is open toward alternative stable meanings (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, p. 16), it still invites totalitarianism precisely in order to make sense in the totality of its structure. Fixed in written law, a discourse of human life subordinates it to political life as defined in the discourse itself. And it was insisted in Chapter 3 that the medium of work in such fixations is temporality at least as much as spatiality, an aspect illustrated for the case of Romania in Chapter 4. The Kemalist policies of the 1930s, too, managed to fix the ordinary flux human life in a general discourse according to which ‘all Turkey’s past and present inhabitants were ethnically and racially Turkish’ (Navaro-Yashin 2002, p.
This was typical for the young national sovereignties of the time that had built their ideologies of legitimisation on primordialist claims and the fabrication of cultural continuities between national pasts and futures (*ibid*.), but this came in gross contradiction with the reality of human life.

The 1935 census indicated that the mother tongue of over 12 per cent\(^\text{17}\) of the population in the Turkish Republic was not Turkish, Kurdish speakers numbering around 1,480,246 people (Çağaptay 2004, p. 93). Thus, while the territory of Turkey is home to a multicultural human life, the subjectivity discoursing it sovereignly simply does not take multiculturalism into account. Consequently, generations of ‘Turks’ have lived with some degree of acceptance of the *physical* presence of ethnic others, but at the same time with a systematic and essentially *political* denial of their objective and historical presence by the sovereign subjectivity.

This amounts, from the dissertation’s methodological perspective, to a total colonisation of temporal possibilities of political life: non-Turkish ethnic identities are *totally* excluded from the official, national temporality. This is also the essence of contemporary, extreme nationalist discourse suggesting that any alternative predication of political life in Turkey would lead to the end of this country. The sovereign subjectivity behind the profoundly nationalist education in Turkey may then be a nut much more difficult to crack than the designers of the EU enlargement conditionality could have ever envisaged, as the next section will illustrate.

With the Ülkü version of Kemalism remaining a model for subsequent generations even after the end of the single-party system in 1945 (Poulton 1997, p.\(^\text{17}\) Author’s approximation based on the total number of 16,157,450 inhabitants registered in the 1935 census of which 13,899,073 declared Turkish as their first language. Languages other than Turkish and Kurdish spoken as mother tongues at that time were Arabic (153,687), Greek (108,725), Circassian (91,972), Laze (63,253), Armenian (57,599), Georgian (57,325), Judeo-Spanish (42,607), Pomak (32,661), Bosnian/Serbo-Croatian (29,065/4,452), Albanian (22,754), Bulgarian (18,245), Crimean Tatar (15,615), Spanish (12,424), Abkhazian (10,099), Romani (7,855), and French (5,381) (Çağaptay 2004, p. 93).
129; Aydin 2004, p. 76; Rumford 2001, p. 94), the ideological hold of the national sovereignty over human life in Turkey remained by and large unchallenged. It continued after the Second World War to interpret political life in the terms of its own mechanisms of imagination and in line with the nationalist principles that made possible the Turkish state from inception. Kemalism has played in Turkey the historical role of self-instituted (Odysseos 2010, p. 21) sovereign subjectivity claiming a cultural unity obviously disrespectful of the cultural multiplicity inherent in human life (Odysseos 2007, p. 7; Bleiker and Chou 2010, pp. 12-13). Faced with this multiculturality, so triumphantly expressed in the figures above (and footnote 17), the Turkish national sovereign self had then to adopt nationalism as conditio sine qua non of its very (f)actualisation. This confirms, yet again, the double ontological consequence of national sovereignty theorised here (see pp. 118-119).

The next section will follow the continuation of this pattern in sovereignty-minority relations in Turkey after the Second World War and in connection with the European discourse of minority rights within the context of EU enlargement. As stated in the main hypothesis (see pp. 18-19), while the EU enlargement seems to affect majority-minority relations at the formal, policy level, the national sovereignty’s predication of human life remains by and large intact. The importance of this hypothesis becomes now even more evident. The accession of an unaltered Turkish sovereign self to Union membership would postpone indefinitely the possibility of and even the debate on a post-national political order in Europe. As such, inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality would have to wait and leave the public stage for the continuation of relations of power in which national sovereignties would continue to subject non-sovereign nations to their policies expressing their monolithic understanding of political possibilities (see pp. 101-103).
Turkey emerged after the neutrality during the Second World War displaying the same contradictory tendencies of the Atatürk era: the continuation of totalitarian state nationalism in the predication of political life and the gradual democratisation in form of the political system. In public discourse, the Kurdish identity was bluntly evacuated from the country’s entire history. The influential newspaper *Son Posta* claimed in 1946 that, ‘in Turkey no Kurdish minority ever existed, either nomadic or settled, with national consciousness or without it’ (quoted in McDowall 2004, p. 397). In legislation, this attitude was illustrated, for instance, by the adoption in Parliament of the Provincial Administrative Law No. 5442 in 1949, allowing the Ministry of Internal Affairs to Turkify village names (Robins 1993, p. 661; Kurban 2007, p. 18; Yeğen 2009, p. 605). On the other hand, an apparent move toward democratisation emerged in 1950 with the first ‘really free and fair election’ leading to the defeat of the CHP by the Democrat Party (DP) in what some consider the ‘second revolution’ in Turkey (Lewis 2002, p. 303).

In fact, the elections of May 1950 actually meant the replacement of one-party rule under CHP with one-party rule by DP, which dominated elections until the military coup of 1960 (Poulton 1997, p. 131; Karabelias 2009, p. 59). The victorious DP waved the banner of ‘national will’ against the Kemalist tradition of strong statism and promoted the interests of agricultural entrepreneurs and of a growing urban business class. It also continued the policy of tolerance toward religious groupings that had been in fact inaugurated by the CHP itself between 1946 and 1950 (Turan 1994, p. 45; Poulton 1997, pp. 170-171; Lewis 2002, pp. 316-317).
A major strategic mistake of the DP was, however, the alienation of the state bureaucracy, which gradually lost throughout the 1950s the systemic influence it enjoyed during the twenty-seven years of CHP rule (Turan 1984, pp. 114-115). Instead, the DP pursued policies aiming at consolidating its electoral success in the rural areas where it supported particularly the prosperity of local landlords (ağalar) in Southeast Turkey (Poulton 1997, p. 209; McDowall 2004, pp. 399-400; Yeşilbursa 2005, p. 127). Such measures led to unprecedented economic development, but this was visible mostly for economic circles associated with the DP.

The result was a general feeling that political power was moving to periphery, away from the traditional republican core and the state bureaucracy. Consistent opposition to the government’s patronage politics arose then precisely among the Kemalist bureaucrats and the military, especially after the DP showed signs of sliding toward authoritarianism (Tachau 1984, p. 71; Turan 1984, pp. 114-115; Poulton 1997, p. 209; Heper and Keyman 1999, pp. 261-262; Ciddi 2008, p. 444). The consequence was almost naturally the military coup of 1960. Leaders of the DP government were arrested and a National Unity Committee took power in Turkey to avoid civil conflict and re-establish democracy (Turan 1984, p. 115; Yeşilbursa 2005, p. 127; Karabelias 2009, p. 59). A civilian government was reinstated in 1961 with a new constitution, which marked the country’s return to the Kemalist principles (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 15).

The 1961 Constitution has been considered a liberal and democratic one by many (Laçiner and Bal 2004, p. 497; Toktaş 2005, pp. 408-409; Köksal 2006, p. 516). It institutionalised the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary and the judicial review of constitutionality of laws, or the autonomy of the national Radio-TV Corporation and of the universities (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 16). Some
commentators also maintain that it allowed for the expansion of the scope of citizenship and a more liberal understanding of this notion (Toktaş 2005, p. 409). Others, including the Turkish President during the DP reign, Celal Bayar, insisted that the 1961 Constitution merely legitimised the bureaucracy and the intellectual elite as source of state authority ‘in addition to the people’ (quoted in Turan 1984, p. 115; see also Belge 2009, p. 10). The Constituent assembly was indeed dominated by the military, the bureaucracy and the intellectual elites in universities, with the CHP turned into their main political representative (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 16). This also contributed undoubtedly to the return in the fundamental law of Kemalist principles concerning the sovereignty-minority relations.

Thus, Article 2 preserved the ‘nationalistic’ character of the Turkish Republic, while Article 3 reaffirmed its indivisibility ‘comprising the territory and people’ with Turkish as official language (Turkish Constitution 1961; italics added). Like its forerunners in 1921 and 1924, the 1961 Constitution does not contain the term ethnic minority, in line with the state’s ‘Lausanne’ policy of recognising as minorities only the non-Muslim communities (see pp. 52-53). Article 54 on citizenship declared instead bluntly that, ‘[e]very individual who is bound to the Turkish State by ties of citizenship is a Turk’ (ibid.), thus subordinating all human domain indiscriminately to the Turkish ethnicity through the condition of citizenship.

Yeğen has also noticed that the fundamental law of 1961, which generally used the terms ‘everyone’, or ‘citizens’ concerning the rights and duties of people, switched to the formulation ‘every Turk’ in three cases (2009, p. 607, note 50). Thus, Article 58, while stipulating that no discrimination will be made other than on the basis of job qualifications, also states that, ‘[e]very Turk is entitled to enter public service’ (Turkish Constitution 1961; italics added). Articles 60 and 68 employ the
same formulation concerning the right and duty to participate in the defence of the country and the right to be elected as deputy in the GNA respectively \((ibid.\)\). A new Citizenship Law No. 403 in 1964 also formulated the concept on the principle of \textit{jus sanguinis} (Toktaş 2005, pp. 409-410). This implied inevitably the ‘ethnification’ of Turkish citizenship, a practice that was to be confirmed with the 1982 Constitution (Yavuz 2001, p. 9), which is the fundamental law of the country at the moment of writing. In a manner that seems to confirm the totalitarianism of the Turkish state nationalism, these legal acts imply that non-\textit{Turkish} human life was simply out of the scope of rights and protections guaranteed by the fundamental law.

The apparently ‘liberal air’ in Turkish politics under the 1961 Constitution (Grigoriadis 2006, p. 449) favoured, however, the flourishing of associational activity circumscribed to the left-right polarisation. This was accompanied by the emergence into public and radicalisation of Kurdish nationalism, a Democratic Kurdistan Party even demanding a separate state in 1965 (Panayi 2000, p. 173). The condition of the Kurds was still marked in the 1960s by the period under the DP government when local landlords in southeast Anatolia supported the party in exchange for the state allowing them to control the agricultural economy of the region (Poulton 1997, p. 209). The poor, however, faced serious social and economic problems and became soon a mass of manoeuvre within a political context increasingly stirred especially by ideological leftistm (Laçiner and Bal 2004, p. 481; Peleg and Waxman 2007, p. 446; Belge 2009, pp. 10-11). Thus, Kurdish nationalism took strong nuances of socialism with an emphasis on socio-economic aspects of the so-called ‘Kurdish problem’. Logically then, the Turkish state has been trying ever since to solve this problem as a social and economic one. The approach fit quite perfectly in the general scheme of Kemalist nationalism, eager to deny the existence of a Kurdish \textit{political} identity.
Generally speaking, the Kurds were ‘relatively quiet, lacking a focal point of their disaffection’ (Robins 1993, p. 662) during the period under the 1961 Constitution and until the adoption of the current one in 1982. The birth of a Kurdish national consciousness toward 1980 seems to have been determined by the increasing state nationalism of the republic and the radical left-right polarisation in Turkish politics. Marxist-socialist ideas not only helped the secularisation of Kurdish identity, but also configured gradually a promise, popularised by certain left-wing parties in Turkey, that ‘a Marxist state would [...] inevitably lead to a solving of national questions’ (Poulton 1997, p. 210).

Such ideas became especially popular among the Kurdish elites that emerged with the state’s urbanisation policies in the 1960s. Unlike feudal landlords, these intellectual Kurds had a political message demanding the recognition of the distinct Kurdish language and cultural identity (Dönmez 2007, pp. 51-52). This inevitably led to confrontation with the governments under Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel. He openly disliked both Kurdish and socialist militancy and banned many Kurdish-Turkish leftist journals whose editors were arrested, while also sending special military forces against Kurdish socialists (Poulton 1997, p. 211). The Kurds responded with the largest mass demonstrations since 1930s, supported by the Turkish Workers’ Party (TWP), which was the first legal organisation in Turkey to recognise the very existence of the Kurds (ibid., pp. 211-212; McDowall 2004, p. 410). The fate of the Turkish/Kurdish left was, however, to be sealed by poor results in the 1965 and 1969 elections, leading to its radicalisation (Poulton 1997, pp. 210-211; Belge 2009, pp. 11-12).

The first legal political organisation of the Kurds explicitly claiming political rights for this minority was established in 1969 in Ankara under the name Eastern
Revolutionary Cultural Hearths (ERCH). It soon spread to Istanbul and throughout southeast Turkey (Poulton 1997, p. 211; Panayi 2000, p. 173). A Minority Rights Group International (MRGI) report by David McDowall described the ERCH as a movement of ‘unmistakably national character’ and collaborating closely with the TWP. An official communiqué at the TWP’s Fourth Congress in 1970 asserted that, ‘[t]here is a Kurdish people in the East of Turkey [and] the fascist authorities representing the ruling classes have subjected [it] to a policy of assimilation [...]’ (quoted in McDowall 1996, p. 16; see also Yavuz 2001, p. 9).

Ironically, the Turkish public opinion tended to blame the liberties granted by the 1961 Constitution for the radicalisation of Kurdish nationalism (Poulton 1997, p. Köksal 2006, p. 516). To this was added a significant increase in the religious activism threatening the very existence of the secular Turkish Republic. In 1968, things went so far that an Islamist convention in Bursa proclaimed sovereignty to derive from Islam. It called for the replacement of the constitution with the religious law Şeriat and for the infiltration of the national education system, the media, universities and even the armed forces by Islamists (Poulton 1997, p. 175).

The military coup d’état in 1971 targeted precisely the leftist, Kurdish nationalist, and religious challenges to the Turkish Republic. It aimed at establishing a long-term military regime pursuing radical social reforms. Its outcome was, however, a government ‘above party’, with the military in control behind the scenes to ensure the end of public disorder (Heper and Keyman 1999; p. 265; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 18). From this period dates the 1972 Population Law, which in its Article 16 prohibited newborns being given ‘names which are not in accordance with our national culture’. In this way, the authorities managed to prohibit Kurdish surnames
implicitly, without even using the word ‘Kurdish’ in the text of that law (Yeğen 2009, p. 605).

In the meantime, even the CHP took a half-left turn, marked symbolically by Bülent Ecevit becoming its president in 1972. He continued the left-of-centre course inaugurated by an aged Ismet İnönü in the 1960s, which proved popular with the masses and led to the comfortable victory in the 1973 elections (Steinbach 1984, pp. 82-83; Belge 2009, p. 13). In this atmosphere, Kurdish militants also managed to revive the ERCH – banned in 1970 together with the TWP (McDowall 1996; p. 16; Yavuz 2001, p. 10) – under the name Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association (RDCA). A Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan was also established in 1974, but both organisations were outlawed soon (Panayi 2000, p. 174). Defying Turkey’s Kemalist principles on grounds of ethnic difference became, however, a popular practice among several public figures, a cabinet minister causing scandal by declaring in 1977 that he was a Kurd (Yavuz 2001, p. 10; Ataman 2002, p. 127). The extreme right reacted under the label of the Nationalist Movement Party (Turkish acronym MHP, henceforth MHP). Its leader, Mustafa Türkeş, was a former participant in the 1960 coup and remained a dominant figure of extreme Turkish nationalism until the third military intervention in 1980 (Poulton 1997, p. 140).

Despite lacking electoral success, the MHP joined forces with the extreme-right ‘Grey Wolf’ movement and the conservative Justice Party (Turkish acronym AP) of Süleyman Demirel to form the ‘Nationalist Front’ coalitions under Demirel as Prime Minister (Arıkan 1999, p. 124; Belge 2009, p. 13). In the meantime, the extreme left and right continued to clash through the entire country, the level of violence increasing alarmingly from nine assassinations in 1969 to 1,362 in 1979 and 2,206 in 1980. Leftist journalists and Alevi Kurds were regular targets, the terror
reaching eventually ‘mass proportions’ (Poulton 1997, p. 162). Between 20 and 30 people were killed every day in the eastern Anatolia and, in December 1978, the Grey Wolves massacred more than 109 Alevi Kurds in Maraş (Kahramanmaraş) city. In total, around 5,000 were killed and 20,000 wounded in the pre-1980 violence (McDowall 1996, p. 16; Van Bruinessen 1996, p. 8; Arıkan 1999, p. 120).

Under these conditions, new Kurdish left-wing organisations appeared in the region, among them being the Apocular, founded in 1978 and militating for a Marxist-inspired revolution of the Kurdish proletariat. The group changed its name into Partiya Karkarên Kurdistan, or PKK, in 1984 (McDowall 1996, p. 17; Dönmez 2007, pp. 52-53; Belge 2009, p. 13). The emergence of such organisations marked not only the radicalisation of Kurdish activism vis-à-vis the Turkish state (Grigoriadis 2006, p. 449), but also the beginning of a clear ‘demarcation of Kurdish and Turkish identity’, which continues today (Dönmez 2007, p. 52ff). With the CHP also entangled in politics of the left on its new social-democratic path, the military decided to act alone. The result was the third coup, on 12 September 1980, aiming this time at changing radically the country’s political arrangement and inaugurating a period of military rule until 1983.

The action was justified publicly by coup leader General Kenan Evren as defending among other aspects ‘the unity of the country and the nation [...]’ (Ahmad 1993, p. 181; Karabelias 2009, p. 60). A martial law was enforced in the southeast and all parties were closed down, politicians being banned from political activities for five to ten years (Ahmad 1993, pp. 185, 187; Turan 2007, pp. 329-330). The rise of Kurdish nationalism was high on the agenda of the military junta (Yavuz 2001, p. 10), which established a National Security Council (NSC) whose recommendations were to be priorities by the government (Bilgiç 2009, p. 804). The NSC legislated the
return to the Kemalist principles (Belge 2009, p. 14) and sent two out of four armies to eliminate militants in the southeast (Robins 1993, p. 662). An explicit European response came only toward the end of 1981, when West German foreign minister Genscher warned Turkish generals that their repressive regime could lead to the country’s exclusion from the Council of Europe (CoE) and the suspension of economic aid (Ahmad 1993, p. 185).

The repression of Kurdish nationalism could not in any case address grievances that were formulated with increasing sophistication by Kurdish leaders and especially PKK’s Abdullah Öcalan. It should not be undervalued that, beyond its terror campaign, this party contributed decisively to the first coherent theorisation of the Kurdish subjectivity. This is precisely what established the PKK as ‘the most important Kurdish movement in Turkey’s history’ (İçduygu et al. 1999, p. 994). The party announced publicly its intention to fight for the establishment of a Kurdish state and to this end worked for the creation of a national consciousness. Within the methodological context of this dissertation, this announced a Kurdish discourse contesting the rights of the ethnic majority to sovereign authority. It has been aiming explicitly, ever since the beginning of Öcalan’s terrorist and propagandistic campaign, to destabilise the Turkish consensus of national sovereignty and determine the emergence instead of a politics of equality (see pp. 102-103). The violence that accompanies the dialogic processes between the Kurdish side and the hegemonic discourse of national sovereignty only confirmed, in fact, the acuteness of the issues around which this binary dialogic scheme revolves (see pp. 121-123).

In Öcalan’s view, the Kurds’ conscience was particularly affected by the state’s denial of their identity, expressed through the name and the language of the community as basic elements of ethnic distinctiveness (Özcan 2005, p. 392).
Consequently, the party had to educate its militants in the spirit of a renovated nation dwelling in lands that saw the dawn of human civilisation. The sources of this teaching have been Öcalan’s ‘talks’ (lectures, dialogues, telephone/radio instructions to party members, etc.) from late 1979 to his capture in Kenya in 1999 (ibid., p. 399).

The careful analysis by Özcan revealed that the content of those texts was strictly structured. In the section dedicated to political education, several items gave implicit attention to Marxist-Leninism, but focused more on the study of the Kurdish history and society, while the PKK was studied as a party fighting against the Turkish bourgeoisie and army (ibid, p. 397).

Such views were unimaginable in the public domain of the 1980s in Turkey, one regulated by a legislator aiming to reinforce the Kemalist principles in social life. This was eventually achieved with the 1982 Constitution, still in force at the moment of writing. Both the adoption and the content of this fundamental law suggest the enormous distance between the reality of human life in the country and the Turkish sovereign subjectivity. In the words of Ergun Özbudun, a respected constitutional expert in Turkey, its main purpose ‘was to protect the State from the actions of its citizens rather than to protect the fundamental rights and liberties of the citizens from the State’s encroachment’ (2007, p. 179).

The NSC attempted a radical restructuring of the Turkish democracy through a bicameral Constitutional Assembly in which one chamber was the NSC itself, the other being a civilian Consultative Assembly that consisted of members also appointed by the NSC (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 19). The 1982 referendum for the adoption of the Constitution was done after a campaign dominated by the pro-constitution speeches of NSC leader Evren, who was also presidential candidate in elections combined with the referendum. This suggested, indeed, the ‘absolute power’
of the military junta in the process (ibid., p. 20; see also Ahmad 1993, pp. 186-188; Dağ 2001, pp. 17-18). It also reminded of Atatürk’s engineering of the political system at the foundation of the Republic, back in the 1920s (see pp. 270-275).

In content, too, the 1982 Constitution expressed a distance from popular grievances that led to the increase in left-right polarisation. Ironically, it marked the victory of Kemalism despite the strong anti-Kemalist current in the Turkish public opinion at that time. Article 2 proclaims the state’s loyalty ‘to the nationalism of Atatürk […] based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble’. Among those tenets is ‘[t]he recognition that all Turkish citizens are united in national honour and pride, in national joy and grief, in their rights and duties regarding national existence […] and in every manifestation of national life […]’ (Turkish Constitution 1982). In its entirety then, the fundamental law subordinates human life under Turkish sovereignty to the dominant ethnic group, in continuation of the Kemalist principles of statehood.

Article 26 in the non-amended text18 prohibited the use of languages not recognised by the state ‘in the expression and dissemination of thought’, this provision implicitly criminalising the use of Kurdish language (Özbudun 2007, p. 183; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 54). That is true especially when Article 26 is corroborated with Law 2932 of 1983 on publications declaring Turkish the mother tongue of all Turkish citizens and thus banning other mother tongues (Poulton 1997, pp. 212-213; Oran 2004, p. 91; Yeğen 2009, pp. 604-605). Articles 28 (freedom of the press) and 42 (right to education) contained similar provisions prohibiting expression and education in languages other than Turkish (Argun 1999, pp. 95-96; Yeğen 2009, p. 604) This anti-minorities constitutional totalitarianism, practically criminalising

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18 The 1982 Constitution has suffered a number of modifications in time (Özbudun 2007, p. 180), to which specific reference is made later in this section.
what Öcalan had called basic manifestations of a Kurdish cultural identity (see p. 301), was complemented by articles prohibiting pro-minorities political activities.

Hindering political participation were provisions concerning association and political parties. The constitutional Article 14 (abuses of rights and liberties) stated that, ‘none of the rights and liberties embodied in the Constitution shall be exerted with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation [...]’ (Özbudun 2007, p. 181). This implicitly criminalised Kurdish political activities interpreted as separatist. Article 33 also allowed for the dissolving of associations by court decision when threatening the ‘indivisible integrity of State with its territory and nation, national security [and] national sovereignty’, similar provisions being contained in the 1983 Associations Law (Grigoriadis 2006, p. 452).

The Political Parties Law, in its Article 81, prohibited parties claiming the existence of national, religious, confessional, racial or linguistic minorities in Turkey and the use of languages other than Turkish (ibid.; see also Argun 1999, p. 96). Article 58 in the 1983 Electoral Law also prohibited the use of languages other than Turkish in electoral propaganda (Grigoriadis 2006, p. 452). The control of the society by the NSC was also enhanced by the 1982 Constitution establishing a Council on Higher Education (Turkish acronym YÖK) with a NSC representative in its executive committee (Turan 2007, p. 332; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 22). The YÖK then started a campaign to ‘de-politicise’ the universities, which meant the appointment of rectors with sympathies for the Kemalist ‘ideological purity’ (Ahmad 1993, p. 185). Such illiberal legislation and practices were inevitably disapproved by ‘the liberal states of Europe’ (Robins 1993, p. 663) as the entire constitutional arrangement under the 1982 act ‘reflected the authoritarian and statist values of its military founders’ (Özbudun 2007, p. 179). From this dissertation’s perspective, the 1982 Constitution
represents simply the irrefutable factualisation of the Turkish nation as objective presence (see p. 125-126) with the *total* negation of alternative possibilities of political life.

Ideologically, the NSC also contributed decisively under Evren’s coordination to the structuring of Kemalism according to its understanding by the staunchly republican side in the state’s bureaucratic and military elites. Irritated by the invocation of Kemalism in all strata and circles of the society, from left to right, the military junta undertook the task of systematising its political philosophy. Thus, the NSC supervised the establishment of an organisation to produce a coherent and ‘undisputed’ account of Atatürk’s principles, disseminating them through intensely popularised publications (Karabelias 2009, p. 60). A three volume book on Atatürk’s political thought issued by the respective organisation is still published today and contains numerous ultranationalist remarks that continue to feed a political culture far from accepting the country’s multicultural reality.

The NSC regime between 1980 and 1983 represented then an attempt on behalf of the republican and secular elites in Turkey to recharge the polity with the ideology that accompanied its very establishment in 1920s. The 1982 Constitution fixed those ideals again in the present of Turkish political history and thus reinvigorated the Kemalist state at a time when the society was signalling different concerns. In 1983, a civilian government was reinstated and was to control Turkish politics until 1991 under the Motherland Party (Turkish acronym ANAP). Turgut Özal was the Prime Minister, while Kenan Evren served as President of the Republic, guaranteeing until 1989 the close following of the Kemalist principles (Heper and Keyman 1999, pp. 265-266; Turan 2007, p. 333; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, pp. 20-21). Other political parties were allowed to take the public stage, too, but the new
law on political parties demanded from all of them (Article 97) to accept upon foundation the principles of the 1982 Constitution, thus ‘forcing politics into a common ideological mould’ (Ahmad 1993, p. 188).

One month after the formation of Özal’s government, in January 1984, the Foreign Minister Halefəğlu visited the European Commission in an attempt to normalise relations with the Communities. The Commission’s message indicated clearly that normalisation ‘depended on the continuation of the process of democratisation and respect for human rights’ (Dağı 2001, p. 19). On surface, the political system moved gradually toward democratic form, from that low degree of popular legitimacy in the 1980s to the period after Turkey’s official recognition as candidate to EU membership in 1999. In the formulation of national sovereignty, as evidenced below, the polity conserved, however, its Kemalist core as ontological condition inseparable from a patriotism hiding in fact self-centred nationalism.

Ironically, the restrictions on public expressions of Kurdishness left only the violent forms of political activism available for the Kurdish minority. Under these conditions, the PKK became inevitably the strongest organisation in southeast Turkey (Poulton 1999, p. 28; Dönmez 2007, p. 53). Its most visible response to the state’s anti-Kurdish policies came in the shape of a campaign of terrorist actions directed against the state and its collaborators from the Kurdish community, especially between 1984 and 1999 (Poulton 1999, p. 27; Çakmak 2003, p. 71). The consequences of the conflict have been dramatic. Thousands of villages were destroyed and millions of people displaced (McDowall 1996, p. 17; İçduygu et al. 1999, pp. 1002-1003; Poulton 1999, p. 28; Yavuz 2001, pp. 13-14). Probably above all, both Kurdish and Turkish identities were left traumatised (Dönmez 2007). The
state implemented an emergency law (Decree 285) in 1987 that was prolonged until the early 1990s (Robins 1993, p. 664; Yavuz 2001, p. 13).

In 1991, the Özal government also issued an Anti-Terrorism Law No. 3713 defining terrorism as ‘any kind of action [...] with the aim of changing the characteristics of the republic’ (McDowall 1996, p. 18). Its Article 8 prohibited actions ‘damaging the indivisible unity of the state’ (ibid., p. 19). The positive effect of this act was the abrogation of Law 2932 presented above (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 54) and no explicit prohibition of languages other than Turkish took legal form after that (Özbudun 2007, p. 183). However, Article 8 criminalised implicitly the use of Kurdish language as mother tongue of terrorists who were fighting precisely against the unitary understanding of the state and nation by the sovereign authority (McDowall 1996, p. 19; Poulton 1997, p. 213; Argun 1999, pp. 95-96).

This became in practice a gross limitation on the freedom of expression in Kurdish, understood in the country as language of terrorism. It was totally abrogated only in 2003, ‘following repeated criticism by the European Parliament’ (McDowall 1996, p. 19; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 74). Reputed intellectuals with pro-Kurdish views were prosecuted under the respective law for merely mentioning the minority (White 1999, p. 83), among them being the above-mentioned Ismail Beşikçi (see p. 283). Additionally, all parties openly supporting the affirmation of a Kurdish political identity were closed down for links with the PKK and activities criminalised in the 1991 law (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 25).

Relative liberalisation at the formal level, that is, in the Turkish ethnic policy came in the 1990s after the EU indicated that no progress in bilateral relations could be made in the absence of improvement in the human rights record. The perspective of Turkey’s EU membership, too, encouraged reforms after 1999 (Dağı 2001, p. 19;
Peleg and Waxman 2007, p. 453). While in March 1987 a senior minister could still question whether there was such a thing as a Kurd in Turkey, in the 1990s even Presidents Özal and Demirel (Yavuz 2001, p. 17) would talk openly about a Kurdish problem. The former admitted his Kurdish origins, an event marking the memory of both Turks and Kurds (Somer 2005, pp. 614-615) and helping the legalisation later of the Kurdish language (McDowall 1996, p. 18; Poulton 1997, pp. 219-220).

Despite still refusing to recognise Kurds as distinct from Turks, Özal started to criticise in 1991 the role of the military operations in southeast Anatolia and even suggested the possibility of the PKK being legalised (ibid., p. 220). His administration supported the abrogation of articles in the Penal Code referring to ‘crimes of thought’ against the secular state and nation. The Özal government also initiated measures for empowering local administration in the excessively centralised Kemalist establishment (Ataman 2002, pp. 135-136), and signed an important number of international agreements on human rights (ibid., pp. 136-137). In this environment, some Kurdish publications prospered, this allowing for the emergence of an interesting version of history suggesting a nascent Kurdish subjectivity and even its own state of exception from the ordinary flux of human life. In the terms of the methodology of analysis adopted here, this amounts to a forceful discourse of resistance to and contestation of the consensus of national sovereignty in Turkey, one suggesting implicitly the equal right of non-Turkish ethnicities to predicate political life (see pp. 121-123).

More or less professional Kurdish historiographers started publishing theories suggesting the beginning of a specific Kurdish colonisation of time, rivalling that propagated by decades of Kemalist education in Turkey. Hirschler’s research evidenced that the liberalisation of the Turkish ethnic policy initiated by Özal allowed
for the emergence of a number of newspapers, such as Öğür Gündem and others. They were published between 1992 and 1997 and contained rich debates on Kurdish identity and history. Hirschler identified two major groups of historiographers in these publications: the ‘Monopolists’ and the ‘Inter-Activists’.

The Monopolists tend to monopolise the entire history of the region ‘in a Kurdish narrative’. The Inter-Activists oppose the former for constructing a nationalist historiography representing in fact the ‘inverted copy’ of the Kemalist Turkish History Thesis (Hirschler 2001, p. 150). The nationalist historiography was constructed in both versions, however, around myths of ethno-genesis and the continuity of the Kurdish historical presence (see pp. 124-125) from the Aryans to the Medes. They also construct a Kurdish ethnoscape (Smith 1999, p. 150), i.e. a nationalised geography in contemporary ‘Kurdistan’ as a homeland myth (Hirschler 2001, pp. 152-153). This coincides to some extent on the map with the Turkish one and is inimical to it since its colonisation of time is subordinated to a different onomastic logic, hence a different historical presence.

The more extreme, Monopolist version of Kurdish history became inevitably popular with the PKK since the party had nationalist education at the heart of its fighting strategy (Özcan 2005, pp. 394-395). It presented the Kurdish people as founders of all the ancient civilisations in Anatolia and Mesopotamia, hence being older than Persian-Iranian and Turkish peoples (Laçiner and Bal 2004, pp. 476-477). As such, their historical presence entitles the Kurds to claim external recognition of their sovereign rights in the contemporary, territorial logic of sovereignty. The less extreme Inter-Activist group tends to see the Kurdish people as one of the many ethnic groups in the region (Hirschler 2001, p. 151), and this cannot feed ideologically a struggle against the oppressive Turkish state.
The Monopolist perspective is much more attractive to radical nationalists as it stresses, similar to the Romanian nationalist historiography (see especially section 4.1), the antiquity of the Kurdish people and the newness of all others in the region. Thus, Persians, Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, or Ottomans are historicised in the Monopolist narrative as ‘invaders and occupiers of the Kurdish regions’, or as barbaric, uncivilised outsiders (Hirschler 2001, pp. 153, 155). The Ottomans are assigned this role for the entire Islamic period and their ‘plunder ideology’ is seen as explaining ‘the cruelty of the present-day Turkish army’ (ibid., p. 156). Despite the minority-friendly atmosphere under Özal’s presidency, however, the Turkish state bureaucracy and nationalist groupings responded to the flourishing of Kurdish publications with violent, repressive actions. Editors of Kurdish publications in general were prosecuted for separatism, while editors and vendors of Özgür Gündem were assassinated by ‘unknown assailants’ between 1992 and 1994 (McDowall 1996, p. 18).

Overall then, descriptions of Özal’s administration as initiating a liberalisation in Turkey’s minority policies are correct, especially since it led to the opening of opportunities for alternative cultural identities, including the Kurdish one, to emerge in the public space (Ataman 2002; Navaro-Yashin 2002, pp. 80, 130). However, these developments did not alter the condition of Kurds as second-rate citizens in a polity dominated in all aspects of life by the nominal majority and the Kemalist elite. Moreover, socio-economic measures addressing poverty in southeast Anatolia did not enhance the living standards of the Kurdish community. The region remained at a per capita GDP less than half Turkey’s average. Unemployment reached 25 per cent, and illiteracy more than 50 per cent, only 61 per cent of men and 38 per cent of women having completed primary instruction (Robins 1993, p. 663; İçduyu et al. 1999, p.
The government reacted in what has become its typical fashion with socio-economic measures including a focus on the major Southeast Anatolian Project (Turkish acronym GAP), started in 1965 (Criss 1995, p. 28; Poulton 1997, p. 226).

However, the GAP seems to benefit, yet again, the already rich landlords in the region (Robins 1993, pp. 663; McDowall 1996, p. 19). In any case, it does not address the Kurdish minority as what the PKK claimed it was: a community with a name and language different from those of the Turkish nominal majority (see p. 301). In other words, the Turkish sovereign subjectivity, one built on Herderian principles of national distinctiveness (see pp. 126-127), has not as yet recognised in its law and in the content of public instruction the equally distinctive national identity of the Kurds. So, even if the liberalisation on the path opened by the Özal administration continues, it may lead to the emergence of reformed minority policies that would still confirm the superiority of the majority, and not lead to inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality (see pp. 101-103).

The European Union (EU) has encouraged relevant reforms especially after the recognition of Turkey as candidate in 1999. In 1987, the country had applied for membership in the European Communities. However, the Commission did not recommend the start of accession negotiations in its avis in 1989 and listed the state of democracy, human rights and the Kurdish policy among negative aspects in Turkey’s record (Müftüler-Baç 1999, p. 241; 2000, p. 162; Çakmak 2003, p. 78; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 81). This development made Ankara change the focus of foreign policy toward the United States (Ahmad 1993, p. 226) and became less receptive to the European agenda. Toward the mid-1990s, the Socialist and Green groups in the European Parliament (EP) objected to the implementation of a Turkey-EU customs union. The reasons invoked were problems in Turkey concerning human and minority
rights, the state’s war against the Kurds, and the occupation of northern Cyprus (Navaro-Yashin 2002, p. 55).

The EP eventually adopted the customs union agreement in 1995 upon promises from Ankara of democratic reforms and improvements on human rights (Çakmak 2003, p. 80). Following that, the Turkish government coalition announced in a strategy paper some necessary constitutional amendments. None of them referred to minorities, and one section only contained measures to restore peace and security in the southeast. On the contrary, the text indicated clearly the government’s determination to defend the ‘common political culture’ and unity of the Turkish ‘state, country and nation’ (quoted in Poulton 1997, p. 228). The ethnic diversity in the conflict-ridden region was mentioned ‘only in the context of the dangers it posed for national unity’ (ibid., p. 229). It is therefore quite fair to suggest that the customs union arrangements ‘failed to provide an appropriate mix of conditions and incentives to induce major transformation’ (Öniş 2003, p. 9). Given these conditions, the deeper transformation of the discourse of national sovereignty could not even be imagined in the second half of the 1990s.

The constitutional amendments of 1995, despite not altering decisively Turkey’s minority policies, did inaugurate the era in the legislative history of this country when intense consultations between parties in the GNA replaced the NSC-sponsored adoption of laws (Özbudun 2007, p. 180). In 1995, an amendment removed from Article 33 (freedom of association) in the 1982 Constitution specific provisions that had allowed for the closing of organisations contrary to the state (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, pp. 54-55). With the same 1995-package, Article 8 in the Anti-Terrorism Law No. 3713, prohibiting public expression inimical to the ‘indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation’, suffered a limited amending.
However, it still criminalised ‘separatist propaganda’ even in the amended form (White 1999, p. 84). Only the harmonisation package of 2003 will bring the total abrogation of the respective article (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 74).

Before the 1997 Luxembourg summit, the Commissioner for external relations Van den Broek had indicated Ankara’s ‘poor human rights record’ as a serious hurdle for deepening the country’s relations with the EU (Çapmak 2003, p. 81). Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Juncker also expressed during the summit the view that Turkey was guilty of human rights abuses and torture, being convinced that it ‘could not sit down at the EU table’ (quoted in Rumford 2001, p. 95). The 1997 European Council in Luxembourg mentioned similar concerns about human and minority rights violations, the military presence in northern Cyprus, plus the then tensed relations with Greece as causes for not including Turkey among the candidates to EU membership (Müftüler-Baç 1999, p. 242; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, pp. 81-82). Against this mood, significant developments for the Kurdish community and Turkey occurred two years after Luxembourg, in 1999.

On the Kurdish side, the PKK’s leader Öcalan was captured by the military in Kenya and imprisoned in Turkey. During trial at the State Security Court between May and June 1999, he declared that democracy and not secession was the solution to the Kurdish problem, urging the PKK to give up arms against the state (Yavuz 2001, p. 16). This public statement, especially coming within such a tensed context, confirms yet again that majority-minority relations cannot be analysed from the perspectives of territorially-bound conceptions of sovereignty. On the contrary, as insisted upon in the methodological preparation of this dissertation (especially Chapter 3), both the analysis of and the solutions to such issues call for qualitative
approaches evaluating the weight of the discoursive self-institution of subjectivities involved.

The tension around the majority-minority relations in Turkey was also eased when the country received in December 1999 the official declaration by the EU Helsinki summit in which it was recognised as a candidate state. The EU officials continued to criticise during that meeting the approach of the Turkish state to the Kurdish problem under the 1991 Anti-Terrorism Law (Çakmak 2003, pp. 79, 82). However, these two main developments of 1999 inaugurated a ‘different period’ showing a gradual decline in violence (Somer 2005, pp. 596-597).

Overall, the last years of the twentieth century revealed the ‘highly state-centric, security-orientated and crisis-ridden’ core of the Turkish political culture (Keyman and Düzgit 2007, p. 69), i.e. the very complexes on which the sovereign subjectivity was built in the 1920s. Developments after the 1999 Helsinki summit suggest, however, that the nationalist self of Turkish sovereignty may begin to melt. The official confirmation of Turkey’s EU candidacy helped the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Kurdish question along lines of democratisation reforms drawn in 1993 with the ‘Copenhagen’ criteria. Most importantly, and directly related to the decision in Helsinki, it raised awareness among the Turkish politicians concerning the importance of solving peacefully the problems in southeast Anatolia.

Mesut Yılmaz of the ANAP acknowledged the situation by declaring subsequently that, ‘[t]he road to the EU passes through Diyarbakır [...]’ (quoted in Yavuz 2001, p. 17; Gunter 2007, p. 118; see map in Annex 13). The late foreign minister Ismail Cem also admitted in a TV programme that, ‘broadcasting in other mother tongues should be allowed’ (Yavuz 2001, p. 17). The general mood in the country was far from favourable to embracing so uncompromisingly the Kurdish case
after decades of violence. However, successive governments in the 2000s have seen clearly the positive opportunities coming with the perspective of EU membership. A majority of Turkish MPs also became relatively open to more fundamental constitutional reforms.

The package of legislative initiatives in 2001 came as a direct result of the EU’s influence (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2001, p. 43) and widened the scope of fundamental rights and freedoms. They amended Article 13 in the 1982 Constitution and the criminalisation of the use of languages other than Turkish was also eliminated from Article 26 (Oran 2004, pp. 95; Kadioğlu 2007, p. 292; Özbudun 2007, p. 183). Article 28 (freedom of expression) was amended to allow for public expression in languages other than Turkish (Oran 2004, p. 96; Kadioğlu 2007, p. 292; Özbudun 2007, p. 184; Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 35). With another set of amendments in 2002, the ban on radio and television broadcasting in ‘forbidden’ languages and the ban on education in those languages were lifted (Oran 2004, pp. 98-99; Kadioğlu 2007, p. 292).

Following the victory in the 2002 elections, the government of the Justice and Development Party (Turkish acronym AKP), still in power at the moment of writing (June 2011), promised even more steps toward a normalisation in the country’s minority policies. The Prime Minister Erdoğan announced this direction by becoming the first Turkish PM to admit publicly that, ‘the state [had] made mistakes about the Kurdish issue’ (Gunter 2007, p. 118; Polat 2008, p. 1). Following the 2003 Regular Report of the European Commission, the sixth harmonisation package also repelled the prohibition of Kurdish names for newborns dating back to the 1972 Population Law (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, pp. 91, 130; Yeğen 2009, p. 605 and note 40; see p. 322). The executive, ‘strongly motivated’ by the incentive of EU accession, also
proposed in 2004 the amendment of ten articles in the Turkish legislation. The most important for minorities was probably Article 90 establishing the precedence of international agreements ratified by Turkey in the domestic implementation of law (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, pp. 66-67). The 1983 Law on Associations was also completely replaced in 2004 with Law No. 5231 in line with the amendment to the Article 33 in the Constitution and liberalising to an unprecedented degree the associational activities (ibid, p. 75).

The government’s readiness to operate democratic reforms was rewarded in 2004 by the Union deciding at the Brussels European Council to open accession negotiations, which started officially in 2005. The Enlargement Commissioner Rehn, speaking in front of an academic audience in Kayseri on 7 October 2005, congratulated Turkey for the achievement, but warned that it would have to align its legislation to the EU standards. He also underlined that Turkey would need to transform internally into a ‘fully fledged liberal democracy respectful of human rights and minorities’ (Rehn 2005, p. 56). The pace of reforms also continued afterwards with more constitutional amendments (ibid., pp. 67-68). They were accompanied by the adoption of a new Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2005, this being expected to produce significant democratic changes in the judiciary (Keyman and Düzgit 2007, p. 74).

After 2005, the European Commission followed closely the developments concerning the minority policy of the government in Ankara and issued Progress Reports each year. Brief comparison will be made here with a focus on specific provisions in the report of 2006, the first after 2005, and the last one in 2010. The aim is to show that Turkey has made little progress from the zero-tolerance policy toward minorities in accordance with the Kemalist principles of national sovereignty. It
continues to refuse the recognition of fundamental aspects of minority life despite the Union offering Ankara considerable assistance toward meeting the respective criterion of accession. The report in 2006 noted, for instance, the progress made by Turkey with the adoption of the amendments mentioned above. However, it also pointed that children could not actually learn in mother tongues other than Turkish in state-run schools (European Commission 2006, p. 20). Independent researchers demonstrated clearly, on the other hand, that Kurdish families would not be able to pay the price for private schools teaching in Kurdish (Bonner 2005, p. 63).

Observations similar to the ones in 2006 were made in the last progress report of November 2010 (European Commission 2010, p. 33). For instance, the use of languages other than Turkish in the electoral process was still illegal in 2006 (European Commission 2006, p. 20). The 2010 report indicated that amendments to the Law on fundamental principles of elections and the electoral registry in the beginning of that year allowed for the use of Kurdish in electoral campaigns. However, it is also underlined that the Law on elections and political parties continued to criminalise the use of languages other than Turkish in political life. Attention was drawn to the fact that, ‘courts have been issuing contradictory decisions in court cases against Kurdish politicians’ (European Commission 2010, p. 33).

Both reports pointed out that Turkey has not yet signed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Both expressed the Commission’s concerns about the lack of progress in the state ensuring education in the mother tongues of minorities (European Commission 2006, p. 20; 2010, p. 32). However, while legal reforms detailed above can still give the impression that the country has begun moving towards the European norms at least at the formal, policy level, the Progress Reports fail to evidence deeper problems. More explicitly, from
this dissertation’s perspective, they fail to address the perpetuation of the nationalist discourse of sovereignty in the content of public education long after the country was recognised as a candidate to EU membership.

Tuba Kanci’s research revealed that, in the 1980s, the educational curriculum presented clear signs of the Kemalist obsession with the survival of the Turkish state (2009, pp. 361-362). Even primary-school textbooks were explaining to pupils ‘the notion of threat’ from without and within (ibid., pp. 363-364). Hugh Poulton has described the Turkish educational curriculum in 1990s as also continuing the ‘traditional Kemalist line’. Textbooks from that period presented the entire population of the republic exclusively as Turkish and ‘a monolith without ethnic minorities’ in the spirit of the Lausanne Treaty (see pp. 52-53). As a consequence, no mentioning was made in textbooks of Muslim, non-Turkish minorities, including the Kurds (Poulton 1997, p. 217).

The 1990s were then years when the Kemalist conception of the nation inaugurated in the 1920s would continue to dominate all political imagination. Social sciences textbooks from the period would also contain chapters entitled ‘Homeland and Nation’, which reflected the constitutional view of the ‘inseparable unity’ implicit in the two notions (Kanci 2009, p. 366). Moreover, history courses continued to deal exclusively with the Ottoman/Turkish history, little if any attention being given to developments outside this nationalised temporality. The currently young generations of Turkish teachers are products of that educational policy in the 1990s. The author of this dissertation has noticed throughout the teaching practice at the university level in Turkey between 2001 and the time of writing that Turkish students do not have even minimal knowledge of European or world history. Explanations given by students and other teachers confirm invariably that the only history taught at the elementary and
high school level is that of the Turkish Republic, with some insight into the Ottoman age as to explain the Republican one. European and world developments are elaborated upon only if they have affected the course of the nationalised temporality.

A MRGI report pointed even in 2009 at the ‘extremely centralised’ education system in Turkey, with regional schools and directorates having no influence over the content of instruction elaborated in Ankara (Kaya 2009, p. 9). A circular from the Ministry of Education had urged in 2001 the elimination of ‘pejorative words’ about the Roma minority in textbooks (Grigoriadis 2007, p. 425). However, it did not address the fact that other minorities were not mentioned at all, even pejoratively, in the same materials. In 2003 and 2005, the state had initiated a series of educational campaigns focusing on the Kurdish minority. Civic society organisations, business associations and the UNICEF, under coordination from the Ministry of Education, supported these campaigns. However, as the minister himself declared, the focus was on solving the illiteracy problem and assimilating the minority through Turkish language courses (Yeğen 2009, pp. 613-314).

That was while politicians representing the Kurdish cause and even state officials have repeatedly indicated that public education in the mother tongue of pupils is crucial for the social emancipation of this minority. The current mayor of Diyarbakır (see map in Annex 13), Osman Baydemir, has explained how the complexity of the ballot made it impossible for the many illiterate electors in the region to identify their favourite Kurdish politicians (Olson 2008, p. 27). A state official from the Ministry of Education also warned in June 2011 that an alarming number of students quit school because their mother tongue is Kurdish, while all teaching is conducted in Turkish (Hürriyet Dalily News 2011). Given Turkish educational programmes could not solve the problem of illiteracy in decades,
demands that Kurdish be taught in public schools are then more than legitimate (Olson 2008, pp. 29-30, 35).

As a direct result of the need to integrate the Turkish public instruction with the EU norms and practices, the central authorities in Ankara initiated in 2005 a programme revising considerably the curriculum (Kancı 2009, pp. 368-369). As a result, the new textbooks contained less emphasis on notions central for Kemalist nationalism, such as the unity of the nation and the security of the indivisible state, focusing more instead on individual rights. The new textbooks also did not contain obvious representations of foreign people and countries as enemies of the Turkish nation (ibid, p. 369). However, the sections allocated to individual rights explain excessively consumer rights, while the general language continues to illustrate ‘the underlying discourses’ that made the ideological essence in previous social sciences textbooks (Kancı 2009, p. 370). Thus, sixth and seventh grade books still contain the map of Central Asian Republics titled ‘Turkish World’ and stories of the motherland in Central Asia, of the myth of origins that was central in the Turanic versions of the Turkish History Thesis (see pp. 281-282), and of the militaristic character of the nation (ibid.; see also Çayır 2009, pp. 46-47). Moreover, the increase in the PKK’s attacks on Turkish military starting in 2007 produced the resurgence of nationalist discourse in public life (Kancı 2009, p. 371). Criticism of the liberalisation of education soon emerged even in court cases, which led to the politicisation of the issue of public instruction in Turkey in 2007 and 2008 (Çayır 2009, pp. 40-41).

Within this context, reference is constantly made to the 1973 Basic Education Law No. 1739. The official webpage of the Turkish National Education Ministry (Turkish acronym TMEB) indicates in its section 1.1.3, among the main objectives of education under the law, the centrality of Kemalist principles and ‘enhancing the
prosperity and happiness of the Turkish citizens and Turkish society’. No reference is made to the multicultural substance of this society (TMEB 2011). Law No. 1739/1972 underlines, in fact, that the objective of education in Turkey is to raise citizens ‘committed to the principles and reforms of Atatürk and to the nationalism of Atatürk as expressed in the Constitution’ (quoted in Çayır 2009, p. 43).

The Preamble of the 1982 Constitution, not yet changed, continues to indicate that all Turkish citizens are united by a national culture and follow the moral values of milliçilik (nationalism) (Turkish Constitution 1982; for the meaning of milliçilik, see p. 268 and note 16). Its Article 42, still present in the amended form today, stipulates that, ‘no language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education’ (Turkish Constitution 1982). As long as such provisions remain in the country’s fundamental law, no full recognition of non-Turkish communities and no teaching in minorities’ languages would ever be possible in Turkey.

That is also why the country has not yet signed the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe. In its Article 14, the Convention requires states to recognise the right of minorities to instruction in their mother tongues (Council of Europe 1995). The MRGI report of 2009 also indicated that, in the Turkish practice of education, there continues a sustained campaign aiming at ensuring the application of the Basic Education Law and especially its Article 11. The article prohibits the teaching and expression in schools of ideologies and political opinions contrary to Atatürk’s nationalism. Teachers interviewed by the authors of the report confirmed that inspectors from the Ministry of Education insist on these aspects in their visits to schools (Kaya 2009, p. 26).
Social science textbooks have adapted only partially to the EU norms by mentioning the multilingualism of the Turkish society. However, this is presented as a ‘problem’, solved through the unitary conception of the state, and not as evidence of cultural richness to be cultivated and protected (Çayır 2009, p. 48). One can notice a sudden richness of publications on minority cultures in Turkey throughout the 2000s (Kadıoğlu 2007, pp. 293-294), as also evidenced in the bibliography employed here. The political establishment continues though to control the legal means for preserving the official discourse of national sovereignty suspended from and thus dominant over the reality of life in this country. The 2009 MRGI report evidenced in this sense that, ‘no law or [state] practice promotes the cultures of minorities’; courses in schools also do not introduce pupils to minorities or multiculturalism (Kaya 2009, p. 26). This could not even be possible under a provision in the 1973 Basic Education Law still stating that textbooks should ‘protect, develop, and teach the authentic national morality and culture without corruption within the universal culture’, in line with Atatürk’s nationalism (quoted in Kaya 2009, p. 50).

Following public criticism of the liberal turn in education after 2005, the Ministry of Education established a commission in 2007 with the responsibility of revising, yet again, the new textbooks. Following the revision, the principles of Kemalist nationalism and the state’s concerns about the unity of the nation in the face of external and internal threats returned to the curriculum (Kancı 2009, p. 371). Thus, interpreted from perspectives proposed in this dissertation, there is little hope for the Turkish sovereign subjectivity to ease its tight control of the public conscience. The historical presence (see pp. 124-125) of the nation continues to be insisted upon in terms suggesting the homogeneity of political culture around the ninety-years old principles of Kemalist nationalism. Constructed as it is on the legal foundation of the
1923 Treaty of Lausanne (see pp. 52-53), (f)actualised as physical, *objective presence* (see pp. 125-126) in both legislation and the educational system, this ethnically defined sovereign self continues to enforce its imagined story on human life. That is despite organisations representing or dedicated to the protection of minorities in Turkey expecting ‘the EU to put more emphasis on minority protection and reform of the education system in its negotiations with Turkey’ (Kaya 2009, p. 28).

It is extremely disturbing in this context for researchers on the condition of minorities in Turkey to discover that the European Commission has renounced recently mentioning the Lausanne Treaty as the *only* legal basis for the traditional approach to minorities in the Kemalist practices of the Turkish Republic. It is significant that Turkey’s historical refusal to recognise internally the cultural richness of its human realm continues to be based entirely on the international law. The EU acknowledged that in the first three Progress Reports after 2005 (European Commission 2006, p. 19; 2007, p. 21; 2008 p. 24).

Starting with the 2009 report, however, this detail has been missing from the Union’s main instrument for monitoring the performance of candidate countries. The 2010 report mentions the Treaty only in a footnote, in connection with child rights (European Commission 2010, p. 28). This confirms the academic evidence indicating that the condition of minorities in Europe remains subordinated to the logic of the nation-state even under the EU aegis (Csergo 2007, pp. 11, 112; Rae 2002, pp. 14-15, 251-58; Kelley 2004; Isyar 2005, p. 350; Kymlicka 2007, pp. 381-82). It also confirms that the EU may be a so-called ‘post-modern’ polity (Ruggie 1993, p. 140; Wiener 1997, p. 551), but far from a post-national one in the sense formulated here (see pp. 102-103).
Much more courageous have been EU officials themselves. This was illustrated in the case of reputed writer and Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk. He was prosecuted, along with other prominent intellectuals and politicians including current Prime Minister Erdoğan (Gunter 2007, p. 119; Coşkun 2010, p. 59-62), over Article 301 in the new Penal Code. The respective article criminalised public speeches ‘insulting Turkishness’. Pamuk was prosecuted in 2005 for acknowledging in an interview the so-called Armenian ‘genocide’ by Ottoman armed forces. In this context, he also became a preferred target of the ulusalcılar, a shadowy neo-nationalist group that includes high-ranking Kemalist politicians from all sides and strata of the establishment opposing the liberalisation policies of the 2000s (Uslu 2008, p. 93). The High Court of Appeal ruled that ‘all Turkish citizens could sue Pamuk’, in a gross violation of basic principles of law according to which only persons affected by a crime could file legal complaint (Coşkun 2010, p. 59). The court’s decision reflected clearly the neo-nationalist spirit in Turkey and can be considered an instigation for ‘all Turkish citizens’ to follow this path.

Illustrating more the force of this current, even the government had to dissolve a commission on minority rights founded by and working as a consultative body for the Prime Minister after the content of their report became public together with the book by Baskın Oran, employed here (Kadroğlu 2007, note 16; Coşkun 2010, p. 61). The pressure from Kemalist elites was higher then the power of the government itself and the EU representatives could not do much in this context beyond expressing official positions. The Enlargement Commissioner Rehn mentioned the Pamuk case in his speech in October 2005 by stressing that it ‘will not be a matter of serious concern only for Turkey, but for European public opinion as a whole’ (2005, p. 56). He thus
attempted symbolically to raise awareness in Turkey that self-centredness was not anymore a viable attitude within the context of the EU accession process.

The head of the European Commission representation in Ankara, Hans Jorg Kretscher, also asked publicly from the Turkish authorities to recognise the Kurdish minority and its identity as being different from the Turkish identity. He also expressed support for the notion of Türkiyeli (of/from Turkey) as more appropriate than the notion of Türk for defining Turkish citizenry (Gunter 2007, p. 121). The formulation Türkiyeli had been proposed by Baskın Oran in the governmental commission mentioned above as a term signalling the de-ethnicisation of citizenship (2004, p. 126; see also Grigoriadis 2007, pp. 430-431; Kadroğlu 2007, p. 293). General Büyükanıt, chief of the General Staff at the time, gave a public rebuke to Kretscher’s call by asserting that, ‘[s]uch approaches are an insult to the Turkey of Kemal Atatürk’ (Gunter 2007, p. 121). It is then clear why the ulusalcılar saw in Büyükanıt ‘the ideal leader for a post-Erdoğan Turkey’ (Uslu 2008, p. 93).

Another case under Article 301 was opened against the European MP Joost Lagendijk, chairman of the Turkey-EU Joint Parliamentary Commission. Lagendijk had criticised in 2005 the role of the Turkish armed forces in the Kurdish-dominated areas of the country’s southeast. The Greater Jurists Union in Turkey – the same organisation that accused Pamuk – filed a legal complaint against Lagendijk with reference to Article 301 (BBC 2005). These developments show clearly the persistence among the bureaucratic elites and the military of a Kemalist core that, as long as it maintains control of policy-making, will not allow for a break of the national sovereignty consensus and positive evolutions in the majority-minority relations.
Clearly uncomfortable with the limitations on their involvement in governmental affairs along Turkey’s EU accession process, the military continue to represent a force that reformists must permanently take into account. In fact, the Turkish military have repeatedly criticised the EU’s approach to minorities in Turkey. They continue to consider any form of minority policy a threat to the unity of the state through separatism, reminding of the partitioning of Anatolia with the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920 (Uslu 2008, p. 77). Significant reforms have been made recently, such as the recent approval by the YÖK of universities establishing departments for the study of Kurdish language and literature. The state TV and radio broadcaster also launched a Kurdish-language channel TRT 6 (Yeğen 2009, p. 615). However, the general orientation of the elites connected to power gives little hope for fundamental changes in the Turkish political culture concerning specifically the recognition of the minority’s right to equality with the majority.

The Kemalist establishment still resists fundamental changes as illustrated by the legislators-bureaucrats conflict over the implementation of amendments to the 1982 Constitution (Kadıoğlu 2007, p. 292). The current text does not suggest the full recognition of minorities in their linguistic and cultural identities at least as different from the Turkish nominal majority. This is therefore indicative of the traditional Kemalist subjectivity still holding control over the formulation of the national sovereignty consensus as hegemonic discourse designed to assimilate otherness(see pp. 121-122).

The trauma affecting the Kurdish and Turkish identities after decades of violent relations (Dönmez 2007) cannot be healed easily in a society where the moral values of Kemalist nationalism still reign from the preamble of the constitution. The country is still defined constitutionally as ‘loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk’
(Article 2) and indivisible ‘with its territory and nation’ speaking Turkish (Article 3), while sovereignty (Article 6) is vested ‘fully and unconditionally’ in the Turkish nation (Turkish Constitution 1982). These provisions ethnicise political life irrefutedly and mark the dominant position of the nominal majority in relations of power with any other minority. Within the context of this legal (f)actualisation of the Turkish imagined community as objective presence (see p. 125-126), it is simply impossible to accommodate legislation meeting the ‘maximalist’ expectations of the Kurds (Özbudun and Gençkaya 2009, p. 25).

Security complexes continue to persist in the political culture and dominate the attitude of the bureaucracy toward issues that challenge the official interpretation of national sovereignty (Aydın 2003; Diez 2005). An analysis of the Turkish sovereign self is also missing since most accounts tend to favour state-centric perspectives. There are numerous examples of works on demographic statistics and a growing historiography on minorities, even numerous books focusing on minority rights and criticising state policies in this field. However, in Karaosmanoğlu’s conclusion to his thorough research on the matter (2008, p. 135), minorities under the Turkish sovereignty still ‘cannot be conceived independently from a nationalist discourse that posits international players ready to use every means available to damage the unity of the Turkish nation.’ The ‘integral nationalism’ (Poulton 1997, p. 229) professed by the bureaucratic and military elites has construed for decades this unitary understanding of the human domain in ethnic terms. After generations of education in virtually the same spirit of Kemalist nationalism (Navaro-Yashin 2002, p. 49), things may be difficult to change.

The Europeanisation of this country, one of the central dreams of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, may then find ironically in Kemalism itself the most serious hurdle.
The understanding of the society in this ideology makes impossible the imagining by Turks of a European *now* in which the Turkish state acknowledges the multiethnic and multicultural make of human life in this society. As documented here, as well as in the rich literature on minorities in Turkey, this human *reality* resists relentlessly the imagined political community and, in the case of the Kurds at least, has managed to formulate discourses of disagreement destabilising the consensus of national sovereignty (see pp. 121-122). A recent survey showed that 12.5 per cent of the population under Turkish sovereignty consider Kurdish their mother tongue (Çarkoğlu and Kalaycıoğlu 2007, p. 23) and 47 different ethnic communities were known in the 1990s to live in the country (Criss 1995, p. 25). This suggests not only the failure of the Turkish sovereignty in its historical attempt at homogenising its human domain, but also the condemnation to failure of all imaginable attempts at silencing what is naturally expressive.
The dissertation started (see pp. 10-12) from asking whether and to what extent the EU enlargement process affects the predication of ethnic minorities by the national sovereignty in Romania and Turkey. Romania was chosen because this country has completed the accession process and became a EU Member State in 2007, while Turkey became candidate country in 1999 and started accession negotiations in 2005, which continue at the moment of writing (June 2011). The research has focused on the capacity of the EU enlargement, as a policy built around the membership conditionality expressed through the ‘Copenhagen criteria’, to determine profound change in the minority policies of the two sovereign states.

The reference for evaluating change within this context has been the notion of human life (see pp. 25-26) and a politics of inter-ethnic relations of equality (see pp. 101-103). This latter concept was theorised here, with the aid of Rancière (1999) and Manning (2004), as a politics of disagreement with the consensus of national sovereignty, which calls for a denationalised sovereignty discoursed by all ethnic communities. Such denationalised sovereignty would presuppose the equality of those communities vis-à-vis the seat of sovereign power and their equal right, regardless of numeric-quantitative differences, to constitute the sovereign state. In the cases studied here, the Hungarian minority in Romania and the Kurdish minority in Turkey have denied explicitly the right of the ethnic majorities to claim sovereign rights and demanded instead the reformulation of sovereignty in conditions of inter-ethnic equality as sketched above. To these cases can also be added the similar demands on

The research had therefore to take into account such developments and ask explicitly whether the EU stimulates in candidate countries the replacement of inter-ethnic relations of power, as formally encoded in national minority policies, with inter-ethnic relations and politics of discursive equality, multilinguism and multiculturality. Implicitly, the author questioned whether the EU enlargement, beyond preparing candidates for membership in the Union’s current institutional configuration, also prepares them for a politically multicultural, post-national Europe.

This interrogative act was seen as legitimated by the very history of European integration starting from the establishment of the Communities, described by Jean Monnet as uniting peoples and not states (Europa 2011). Does then the post-Cold War enlargement aim to further this project toward the edification of a people’s Europe beyond the predication of political life by sovereign nation-states? In order to address this question, the author has theorised the notions of minority policies in antithesis with inter-ethnic politics of equality (see pp. 39-40, 102-103) within the context of the methodology of research. The focus of the analysis was not on the national sovereignties per se, but on elucidating whether and to what extent the EU enlargement process destabilises them and their predication of ethnic minorities.

Within this context, the main hypothesis tested here (see pp. 18-19) was that the EU enlargement process does produce change in the formal aspects of minority policies in Romania and Turkey. It does not alter significantly, however, the discursive mechanisms of self-institution through which the two sovereignties continue to dominate political life. In other words, the EU enlargement process softens the positions of sovereign majorities in their policies regarding minorities in
the two cases without yet leading to the de-nationalisation of sovereignty and the emergence of inter-ethnic politics of equality.

The argument started (see p. 10) from the recognition of the dominant discourse on minority rights in world politics being structured by national sovereign subjectivities (Onuf 1989, p. 243; Rae 2002, pp. 14-15, 251-258; Isyar 2005, p. 350; Kymlicka 2007, pp. 381-382). Therefore, the constitution of national sovereignty was interpreted here as having a double ontological consequence (see pp. 118-119): it places the ethnic majority in the seat of sovereign authority, while concomitantly exiling minorities in positions of inferiority, at the periphery of political possibilities (Bleiker and Chou 2010, p. 12). Minorities become in this way objects of the ‘consensual power’ (Manning 2004, p. 65) of national sovereignties and of their minority policies, which are institutionalised, staffed and budgeted on the basis of the ethno-logic that the national state necessarily reflects the will of the titular nation. The result is the elimination, with the very constitution of a national sovereignty, of the possibility of a politics of multilinguism and multiculturality (ibid. p. 64), theorised here as politics of inter-ethnic equality (see pp. 39-40, 102-103).

The dissertation has focused therefore on the logic behind the discursive act constitutive of national sovereignty (section 3.2). This act has been identified as an always already irrefuted discourse naming human life, i.e an onomastic act (see p. 22 and section 2.2). It is in the formation of the national sovereign subjectivity discoursing its human realm in onomastic terms that one can find the basic discursive elements constructing the relation between the sovereign nation and ethnically non-national others inside. Sovereignty was theorised in this context, with the aid of Agamben (2005), as state of exception from the legal order, from the life of an existing political system, as to constitute itself as sovereign power anew. This
suggests a point of indistinction between constituting and constituted authority, one that allows the sovereign authority to objectify life and define it its own terms (see especially section 3.2). Therefore, the specific method of research employed here has been designed to capture the essential elements in the discourse of national sovereignty that objectify ethnic minorities in terms of the sovereign superiority of the majority. This build on a conception of sovereignty as inseparable from the subjectivity discoursing it, and the spatial and temporal coordinates defining its (f)actuality (see pp. 27-28, 90).

Certain reasons (see pp. 20-22) determined the author to focus on temporality and to identify national sovereignty as an onomastic act inaugurating a sophisticated engineering of time. Conceptualised here as state of exception, sovereignty was interpreted then as state of exception from the ordinary flux of life, making possible the objectivation of time and, hence, a discursive authoring of temporality in the exceptional terms of the subjectivity behind the sovereign authority (see p. 83). This does not mean a separation between sovereignty and the temporality of human life. It only means that the sovereign authority maintains itself ‘in a potential relation’ (Agamben 1998, pp. 20-21) with (f)actual life in order to decide on its own possibility of being, on constituting itself, its own normality, and the exceptions from that normality (Wolfe 2007, pp. 129, 144-145).

The specific method of research was therefore designed to capture two main dimensions of the objectification of human life and of the consequent engineering of time by the national sovereignty. The first is the production of the nation’s *historical presence* through major intellectual constructs and public instruction systems employing them. They insist on the existence and continuity throughout history of the nation, which thus turns the imagined community into a fact of history that legitimises
its claim to sovereign power (see pp. 124-125). The makes possible the second dimension of time engineering, which is the production of the nation’s *objective presence*, its nowness, through legislation fixing political life in the formal definition of national citizenship and of the official language of the state (see pp. 125-126).

The analytical mechanism briefly summarised above has been employed here to identify originally the historical construction of hegemonic discourses of national sovereignty in Romania and Turkey. The political demands on behalf of the Hungarians in Romania and the Kurds in Turkey have been therefore interpreted as discourses of resistance aiming at destabilising the national sovereignty consensus (see pp. 119-122). The confrontational dialogue between the two discursive categories has been analysed in its historical development and followed until reaching the recent period when Romania and Turkey entered the EU enlargement process. The focus of the research moved then, in accordance with the scope of the investigation, toward the question about whether and the extent to which the enlargement process affects the content of the sovereign discourse of ethnic minorities.

Romanians and Turks have built their national selves and states in different historical and cultural contexts. This, together with the general focus of the research on the EU enlargement and other reasons (see pp. 13, 48-49, 53, 55) made a comparative approach unnecessary here. Instead, the author employed the analytical mechanism to examine a vast amount of evidence illustrating clearly the historical engineering of time by the respective national sovereignties. The exploration evidenced the concrete ways in which intellectual productions and the educational systems employing them in Romania and Turkey have inculcated in generations of people a strong sense of those nations’ historical presence. Secondly, the dissertation also showed the ways in which this sense of a historical presence facilitated the
production of the nation’s objective presence through constitutional and secondary legislation on citizenship and the official language in Romania and Turkey. This sophisticated engineering of temporality was demonstrated to produce even more than the double ontological consequence signalled here (see pp. 118-119). It also produces a public sense of the (f)actuality of the nation that excludes, especially in the extreme for taken in Turkey, the very possibility of politics beyond national politics.

In the case of Romania, the result of this engineering of time is that non-national others have been allowed only subordinate temporalities in the grand narration of national history. The political efforts on behalf of the DUHR, the main political party representing the Hungarian minority, aimed to bring this community in a position of equality with the majority (section 4.4). The Romanian political system has been affected by the EU mechanisms of conditionality in the sense that political parties of the ethnic majority have come to accept after 1996 the possibility of governing in alliance with the DUHR. In general, despite various regimes taking extreme authoritarian and even totalitarian forms before 1990, as illustrated in sections 4.2 and 4.3, the Romanian state did not develop forms of totalitarian nationalism. It tended to acknowledge, even if in negative sense at times, the mere existence of minorities.

It can be said, then, that minority politics of equality could not be fully possible in Romania before 1990, but the society was allowed to live and grow with a sense of its multicultural reality. The actions by the DUHR became essential in the post-communist context. As illustrated in section 4.4, the party has not opted for violent means in political negotiations with the majority. It did not even attempt to construct an ideological historiography legitimising the de facto existence of the Hungarian minority. From the analytical perspective in this dissertation, the DUHR
has practically accepted the Romanianised political life as a fact. It initiated instead aggressive politics of presence, i.e. a politics contesting the right of the majority to exclusive objective presence and to formulate the consensus of national sovereignty (see pp. 102-103, 124-126). The strategy gradually became a systematic attack on the majority’s engineering of the national nowness in constitutional law through the excessive nationalisation of citizenship and education. Each and every achievement in this direction meant the undermining of the majority’s imagination of the ‘national’ community as factualised under the 1991 Constitution.

As concluded preliminarily in section 4.5, Romanian Hungarians do not yet enjoy relations of equality with the ethnic majority. Paraphrasing Dasgupta (2009, p. 3), they have not yet undone the national sovereign subject; its sovereign temporality is not yet interrupted by a ‘time of politics’. This would mean that the minority would occupy a seat in the hierarchy of sovereign consensus that would fix temporality in a renovated, denationalised form of sovereignty (see p. 103). From the methodological perspective adopted here, the objective presence of the nation (read ‘ethnic majority’) continues to dominate the sovereign discourse of human life in Romania. This is factualised through the constitutional understanding of the state as national and of the human realm of sovereignty in terms of ethnicised citizenship.

The postponement of a public debate on and adoption in Parliament of the minorities’ statute is significant in this context. In the formulation insisted upon by the DUHR, the statute builds on the idea that the state is made of equal communities and not of individual citizens (p. 251). By refusing the public debate on the formulation of sovereignty from this perspective, the parties representing the ethnic majority refuse practically the denationalisation of the state. The evidence indicated in the preliminary conclusions (section 4.5) illustrates how far from such a situation
Romania is four years after becoming a Member State of the EU. Consequently, the Union seems to be also far from apt to articulate a discourse of post-national politics and a mechanism of monitoring the denationalisation of sovereignty in Europe. The study of the Turkish case confirmed these conclusions and the main hypothesis guiding the research here (see pp. 18-19): the EU enlargement does affect the formal level of minority policies, but leaves unaltered the discourse of national sovereignty placing minorities in position of inferiority.

As evidenced throughout the entire Chapter 5, exiling ethnic alterity totally outside the conception of political life has been state policy in Turkey for most of its republican history. Despite the decades-long violence between Turks and Kurds and the increasing pressures associated with the EU membership conditionality, the Turkish sovereign subjectivity continues to deny in constitutional language the objective presence (see pp. 125-126) of ethnic minorities. The content of public instruction also indicates that the mentioning of non-Turkish identities as part of the nation’s historical presence (see pp. 124-125) continues to be impossible, due to the predominance of a nationalist political culture still cultivated by the Kemalist elites (see pp. 317-322).

Kurdish intellectuals have worked out a subjectivity built on their own imagined historiographies (see pp. 308-309) in response to the monolithic, ethnocentric vision of space and temporality in the Herderian-Kemalist style. However, political militancy also took violent forms, with the PKK playing the leading role. This legitimised in turn Ankara’s brutal military repression of PKK violence catalogued as terrorism. The Turkish Kurds are only now making significant steps toward building a comprehensive political message presumably apt to counteract the consensus of national sovereignty in Turkey.
During the last months of 2010 and the first half of 2011, increasingly coherent messages emerged in the public media from the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (Turkish acronym BDP), asking especially for the decentralisation of the state administration (Güngör 2010). The BDP even gave support to the Democratic Society Congress (Turkish acronym DTK), a self-declared ‘local organisation of Kurds in eastern Turkey’, for a draft-model of ‘democratic autonomy’ (Şafak 2010). The references in both cases to Turkey’s European integration also demonstrate that the EU does offer a chance for minority discourse to be heard in a context where it has shaped and stabilised the discussion of minority issues (Sasse 2009, p. 17).

The Kurdish ‘democratic autonomy’ initiative has effectively begun in February 2011 with the establishment of fifty village communes, twenty-one neighbourhood councils and four district councils in the Southeast province of Diyarbakır (see map in Annex 13). These include justice commissions run by local Kurdish people (Bozkurt 2011a). It is interesting to note that a spokesman of the DTK declared to the daily Hürriyet that, ‘[t]he solution for Turkey is not a “nation-state,” but rather “two nations living under the roof of one state,” [...] adding that there are many similar examples worldwide’ (ibid.). The dissertation has identified such ‘similar examples’ in the case of the DUHR in Romania and the Albanian minority in the FYROM (Atanasova 2002, p. 393).

To these developments must be added a recent and unprecedented declaration from one of the main opposition parties in Turkey, the legendary CHP founded by Atatürk himself. It advanced the idea that a general amnesty, an apology to the Kurdish population and a new constitution could contribute to the normalization of inter-ethnic relations (Anon. 2011b). The ruling party reacted in March 2011 with
messages from the President and the Prime Minister to the Kurdish people celebrating their traditional spring festival called Nevruz (Newruz in Kurdish). The President’s discourse on the occasion is especially relevant within the context of this dissertation as it contained the message that the entire nation ‘should celebrate [Nevruz/Newruz] peacefully. Our nation is aware of the value of living as a whole, with peace and tranquillity. Differences and diversities are our biggest assets’ (Anon. 2011c). It was for the first time since the period of Özal’s executive that a high official acknowledged the cultural diversity of human life in Turkey, which is an extremely rare instance under the Republic.

Discourse exercises such as the ones above may suggest, indeed, that the Turkish sovereign self could come to understand the value of human life and of its natural multiculturalism. However, Turkey is still far from allowing for inter-ethnic relations and politics of equality (see pp. 102-103) to fully emerge from under the overwhelming consensus of national sovereignty, built on the unity of the nation and people. Turkish politics is still subordinated to this ethno-unitary understanding of political life as inscribed especially in the Preamble of the country’s Constitution (see p. 303, 321). Added to this fundamental aspect are significant positions of Turkish officials, which confirm the perpetuation of ‘strong state’ (see pp. 324-326) reflexes with profound shades of nationalism.

In response to the BDP-DTK proposals for autonomy, the Turkish State Minister and Chief EU negotiator Bağış declared in a televised interview that, the Kurdish people ‘had not expressed demand or expectation of autonomy’ and parties announcing such claims cannot represent an entire community. He also insisted that, ‘nobody should harm national unity’ and ‘everybody should preserve national integrity’ in Turkey. Bağış then underlined the ‘need for peace in the nation’ in
connection with the announcement that twenty-six chapters have been opened and thirteen closed in accession negotiations with the EU (Anon. 2010b).

The Kurdish people continue therefore to be subordinated in the minister’s discourse to the traditional, unitary conception of the Turkish nation, while parties manifesting opposition to this view are strategically placed outside nation’s understanding of peace and its European project. Quite dangerously then, the country’s European perspectives appear as a project owned exclusively by a state blocked in its Kemalist understanding of political life, subordinated to ethnically defined unity and implicitly disrespectful of the country’s cultural richness. The Kurdish and all other minorities remain exiled in this discourse at the periphery of possibilities. Hopes for majority-minority politics of equality in Turkey remain therefore dim.

Turkey is advancing at a very slow pace in membership negotiations with the EU and political chapters are still far from becoming decisive on the agenda. But it is rather worrying, from the analytical perspectives opened here, that the Progress Reports do not contain any more reference to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 as the only justification for Turkey’s minority policies (see pp. 323). Moreover, the approach of membership negotiations on political chapters does not seem to affect the Kemalist tradition of state nationalism in Turkey. The notion of statism remains in the discourse of Turkish political identity (Navaro-Yashin 2002, p. 201) and continues to be deeply inculcated in society by an instruction system still unreformed in essence. Understood as inseparable from the Kemalist notion of nationalism, the Turkish notion of statism thus implies ontologically state nationalism. This represents a general understanding of national sovereignty that has shown a ‘remarkable potential for self-preservation in Turkey’ in both state bureaucracy and society (ibid.).
Allowing for inter-ethnic politics of equality would amount to the negation, in the inverted logic of the double ontological consequence of national sovereignty (see pp. 118-119), of the state’s very existence.

As a reaction to the dominant nationalist discourse, the leaders of the pro-Kurdish BDP have advanced more specific demands: ‘native tongue education, the release of political prisoners, democratic autonomy and the dropping of the electoral threshold’ (Anon. 2011d). This clearly suggests the gradual emergence of a coherent Kurdish policy response to the perpetuation of the state’s minority policies of negation. The end of March and beginning of April 2011 saw the consumption of yet another significant event in this context. A co-chair of the BDP, Selahhatin Demirtaş, petitioned the Education Directorate in Diyarbakır to abolish the morning oath starting with the words, ‘I am a Turk’, which his child has to recite every day in school (Anon. 2011e). Only one day later, on 1 April, the court that examined the petition dismissed it with no explanation. Mr. Demirtaş’s lawyer declared that if the appeal was also rejected, a case will be opened at the European Court of Human Rights (Anon. 2011f).

These events suggest the emergence of a particular awareness among the political representatives of the Kurdish minority about specific elements identified in this dissertation as actually producing the objective presence of the exclusively Turkish sovereign nation (see pp. 125-126). The BDP also inaugurated a campaign of civil disobedience toward the end of March 2011, to continue if the state remains deaf to the party’s demands quoted above (Anon. 2011d). These developments may then announce the historical beginning of a politics contesting coherently the national sovereignty consensus in Turkey, a process that the EU should follow up seriously.
Both cases studied here demonstrated the ontological weight of onomastic politics in the nationalisation of political temporality. In Romania, even the initially de-ethnicised and ultra-secular communist polity (see pp. 190-199) resorted eventually to onomastic instruments of time engineering in devising a policy of socialist national homogenisation (see pp. 199-219). In Turkey, the ethno-name is omnipresent even under the monitoring eyes of a multicultural EU. This ethno-name symbolises the state, the people, the country, the land, the law and virtually everything that performs a politically relevant function in the time owned by the Turkish imagined community.

In both cases, signing treaties for the protection of minorities did not constitute a major problem provided that those treaties did not interfere with the discursive engineering by the sovereign subjectivities of their own time. This is most evident in the case of Turkey, but Romania, too, has been traditionally ready to sign and ratify treaties while being slow or reluctant to implement them. Both sovereignties’ mechanisms of discoursing human life in ethno-centric terms have remained largely intact after being confronted with the EU enlargement conditionality. Supporters of European integration will therefore be right to point at these aspects as confirming the ‘intrusive presence of the nation-state’ and its intrinsic nationalism affecting the very being of the Union (Shore 1993, p. 787).

Eventually, as long as treaties continue to speak a language of ‘rights’, they will actually confirm the hegemonic position (Milliken 1999, p. 235) of sovereign majorities in the general discourse of human life in domestic and world politics. Agamben was right then to place at the heart of his political philosophy the fundamental observation that ‘the Rights of the Man’ are tied ontologically to the ‘fate of the modern nation-state’ (1993, p. 19). With the EU accession conditionality
not addressing precisely this aspect, there is practically nothing in our contemporary arrangement of politics to hinder national sovereignties in their engineering of national temporalities. They will therefore continue to discourse human life in terms of their language-bound sovereignty, which condemns minorities to a condition of subordination to national minority *policies* and postpones the emergence of inter-ethnic *politics* of equality (see pp. 39-40, 102-103).

A discourse of minority rights, either individual or communal, only serves identifying minorities toward their exclusion. In a way, it acts like the badges of Jewish identity during the Second World War, sometimes transforming all wearing them in *hominis sacrati* and as such easy targets of criminal regimes. Supporters of a more substantial form of European integration may then be right to claim that ‘the dismantling of the nation-state and its associated ideologies of nationalism’ is fundamental for the emergence of a ‘People’s Europe’ (Shore 1993, p. 787). The research presented here suggests that two minimal imperatives should guide such effort. Thus, the common EU law should incorporate the compulsory and non-negotiable requirement that all Member States and candidates to EU membership acknowledge (1) the existence of minorities *and* (2) their basic right to predicate political life in their own cultural terms.

This means in fact moving beyond the consensus of national sovereignty and its ethno-logic according to which the majority is the sovereign authority legitimately predicing political life and subjecting ethnic minorities to *policies* ensuing from this predication. It means recognising the right of all ethnic communities to participate in a politics that, under this condition, could become a politics of inter-ethnic equality regardless of quantitative-numeric differences (see pp. 102-103). Sovereignties should literally learn, therefore, to address ethnic communities by their own names instead of
naming them and their political existence, thus arrogantly denying their right to a historical and objective presence.

Looked at from the perspectives opened in this dissertation, such a major development would imply drastically expanding our imagination of political possibilities. This has never been facile throughout history and is not expected to be now, after two centuries of national sovereignties predating political life (Hobsbawm 1990, p. 73; Agamben 2000, p. 18; Rae 2002, pp. 14-15, 251-258; Kymlicka 2007, pp. 381-382). However, the theoretical account presented here also indicates a path toward the denationalisation of sovereignty in Europe. Sovereignty cannot be conceived as separated from the subjectivity discoursing it and its spatial-temporal dimensions (see pp. 27-28, 90). And, as demonstrated throughout the entire dissertation, the engineering of time is central for the (f)actualisation of the principle of sovereignty in human life.

National sovereign subjectivities have nationalised the time of our political life by taking a position of sovereign exception from (see p. 83) the pre-national temporality, which allowed them to objectify and engineer time through the onomastic act. By taking language as principle of (f)actualisation, national sovereignties have thus become embodiments of the sovereignty of language itself, which makes Being possible (Heidegger 1962, p. 204; Gadamer 1998, pp. 475-476) by simply naming things (Agamben 1998, p. 21). This produced the nationalised normality and the exceptions from that normality (Wolfe 2007, pp. 129, 144-145) as devised in historically structured discourses initiated and perpetuated by identifiable and therefore responsible intellectuals. The author of this dissertation has insisted on the aspect of responsibility (see pp. 90-96) because it helps us see the corporeal palpability of certain individuals that have been included in national pantheons while
their works have contributed in fact to the creation of the contemporary injustice of majority-minority relations. In this nationalised temporality of our contemporary political life, the EU officials should also assume then the responsibility of a sovereign exceptionality and author a discourse of a post-national political life that cannot be but life liberated from the onomastic consensus of national sovereignty, i.e in the nameless (see pp. 115, 128).

Agamben’s specific theorisation of sovereignty as state of exception helps therefore comprehending change not as gradual transformation, which in this context would amount to the EU still waiting for the gradual ‘pooling’ of sovereignty. Some authors (e.g. Manners and Whitman 2003, pp. 389-390) can see in this pooling of sovereignty a feature indicating that the EU is different from the existing order of national sovereignties and international relations. This dissertation has demonstrated, however, that it only leads to the pooling of sovereignty over formal level of policy-making, while the hold of the national sovereignty consensus (Rancière 1999; Manning 2004) over political life remains intact.

Agamben’s conceptualisation of sovereignty helps us see that change within this context cannot be but radical change. Sovereignty is cannot be a gradually achieved authority, with the consensus of other sovereignties. The contemporary sovereign consensus is the very one that established the national as limit to political imagination. Evading these limits would demand from the EU to take responsibly the position of sovereign authority as exception from the national age in order to author (see pp. 110-112) a new, post-national sovereign consensus. The fundamental principle of such constitution should be elaborated therefore with a political philosophy of denationalised sovereignty taking bare life, i.e. unnamed human life as
reference of constitution. This also means an implicit and categorical ban on the onomastic acts of national sovereignties.

A post-national sovereignty constituted on such a ban would thus make possible political life ‘in the nameless’ (Heidegger 1993, p. 223) and, moreover, the EU would be the legitimate champion of such sovereignty. As indicated in the introduction (see p. 10), the process of European integration started with the establishment of the Communities as uniting peoples and not states (Europa 2011). And the Resolution 217 A (III)/1948 of the UN (see pp. 35-36) also prefigured the denationalisation of sovereignty by proclaiming human individuals as ‘born free and equal in dignity and rights’ and ‘members of the human family’ (UN 1948). This perspective clearly supports a denationalised political life by promoting a notion of humanity freed from the label (read ‘onomastic act’) of national citizenship (Rosas 1995, p. 63).

Corroborated with a clear conception of ethnic communities outside the logic of the nation state, which is in fact already part of the Union’s discourse emphasising multiculturalism, the incorporation of such principles in the EU legislation would amount to the authoring of a form of post-national sovereign consensus. And only this form would be fundamentally different, indeed, ‘to exiting states and international relations’ (Manners and Whitman 2003, p. 389). Only by reconstituting itself as a regime of care toward non-sovereign, multicultural human life while concomitantly banning the national could the EU clearly step beyond the national age. Until then, the Union could still be described as a ‘post-modern’ decision-making system (Ruggie 1993, p. 140; Wiener 1997, p. 551) but, as demonstrated in this dissertation, it is far from becoming a post-national political form where all cultures feel equally close to or distant from the seat of sovereign authority.
THE EUROPEAN UNION, STATE OF EXCEPTION AND STATE TRANSFORMATION – ROMANIA, TURKEY AND ETHNIC MINORITY POLITICS

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Director of studies: Dr. Christopher FARRANDS

3 October 2011

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and

ANNEXES


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ANNEXES
Annex 1: Ethnic Groups in South Eastern Europe

Annex 2: Map of Languages in Europe by ethnic groups

Source: EUPEDIA at http://www.eupedia.com/images/content/europe_languages_map.jpg
Annex 3: Romania – current administrative map

Source: http://www.mapsofworld.com/romania/romania-political-map.html
Annex 4: Areas inhabited by Kurdish people
Source: Encyclopædia Britannica

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>12,981,324</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarians</td>
<td>1,425,507</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germans</td>
<td>745,421</td>
<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians (including Hutsuls)</td>
<td>594,571</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>409,150</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>366,384</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gypsies</td>
<td>262,501</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (less than 1 percent, i.e. Turks, Tatars, Gagauzi, Armenians, Albanians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Serbs, Croats, Slovenes)</td>
<td>544,055</td>
<td>3.0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>18,057,028</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
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<th>2002</th>
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<td>7.1</td>
<td>6.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.8</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
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Annex 7: Austria-Hungary and the Romanian Principalities (1904)
Source: Encyclopaedia Britannica
(http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/44386/Austria-Hungary)
Annex 8: Map of the People’s Republic of Romania and the Hungarian Autonomous Region (1952).
(Source: http://www.didactic.ro/files/19/rpr_1952.jpg)
Annex 9: Comparative percentage of population in Romania by ethnicity 1930-1966
(Source: Chirot 1978, p. 488)

<table>
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<td>85.7</td>
<td>87.7</td>
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<td>Roma</td>
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<td>Other</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
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*Understated (Chirot)
Note: Muntenia and Oltenia together form Walachia. The province of Dobrogea is shared with Bulgaria in the south and Bucovina with Ukraine in the north, while the part of Moldova east from the Prut river gained independence from the USSR in 1991 and is now recognised internationally as the Republic of Moldova.
Annex 10: Wallachia, Moldova and Transylvania briefly united under the rule of Michael the Brave

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/Mihai_1600.png
Annex 11: The first Romanian sovereignty, the United Principalities, following the union of Moldova with Wallachia in 1859 (purple). Following the Great Union in 1918, Transylvania (pink) and Bessarabia (orange) were incorporated to Romania but Bessarabia passed to the USSR in 1947.

Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/Romania_territory_during_20th_century.gif
Annex 12: Map of Europe in 1815
Source: University of Texas at Austin
URL http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/history_europe.html
Annex 13: The administrative map of Turkey (1983)

Source: University of Texas at Austin
URL: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/turkey_admin83.jpg