The Latin Principality of Antioch and Its Relationship with the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia, 1188-1268

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

March 2016
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Abstract

The Latin principality of Antioch was founded during the First Crusade (1095-1099), and survived for 170 years until its destruction by the Mamluks in 1268. This thesis offers the first full assessment of the thirteenth century principality of Antioch since the publication of Claude Cahen’s *La Syrie du nord à l’époque des croisades et la principauté franque d’Antioche* in 1940. It examines the Latin principality from its devastation by Saladin in 1188 until the fall of Antioch eighty years later, with a particular focus on its relationship with the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia. This thesis shows how the fate of the two states was closely intertwined for much of this period. The failure of the principality to recover from the major territorial losses it suffered in 1188 can be partly explained by the threat posed by the Cilician Armenians in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. King Leon I of Cilicia attacked the Latin polity on numerous occasions during this period, making any expansion of the principality almost impossible. In the 1250s the two states entered into a long-term alliance following the marriage of the Antiochene prince with the daughter of the Armenian king. The prince of Antioch subsequently followed his father-in-law by submitting to the Mongols in 1260. However, this had disastrous consequences as the Latin principality became a target for the Mamluks – the chief opponents of the Mongols in the Near East. Antiochene-Cilician relations were almost continuously shaped by the geopolitics of northern Syria and southern Anatolia. All the alliances and conflicts between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom were heavily influenced by the non-Christian powers of the region. In sum, this thesis argues that the principality of Antioch’s most important relationship during its final eight decades was undoubtedly with the kingdom of Cilicia.
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<tr>
<td>DCT</td>
<td><em>Documenti sulle relazioni delle citta Toscanne coll’Oriente Cristiano e coi Turchi</em>, ed. G. Müller (Florence, 1879).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eracles</td>
<td>‘L’Estoire de Eraclies Empereur et la Conqueste de la Terre d’Outremer’, <em>RHC Occ II</em>, pp. 1-481.</td>
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MGH  Monumenta Germaniae Historica.

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Northern Syria
Introduction

The city of Antioch was captured by Latin Christians on 3 June 1098, during the First Crusade (1095-1099). Bohemond of Taranto took possession of Antioch after the other crusaders had continued on their journey to Jerusalem in 1099. He founded a principality that would survive for 170 years. The early Latin rulers of Antioch were able to annex a great number of towns and fortresses in Cilicia and northern Syria by pursuing an aggressive military strategy. This expansive phase in the history of the principality was brought to an abrupt end by a disastrous defeat at the battle of the Field of Blood in 1119. Thereafter, it was a struggle for the princes and regents of Antioch to hold on to their possessions on the eastern side of the Orontes River due to the aggression of the Aleppan rulers Zengi and Nūr al-Dīn. Nevertheless, the Latin principality remained significant in size until 1188 when Saladin captured numerous Antiochene strongholds and settlements, including the coastal cities of Jabala and Latakia, in one swift summer campaign.

Antioch remained under Latin control until 1268, but the principality which existed after 1188 was much smaller and weaker than the entity which preceded it. The Antiochenes recovered very little territory during the Third Crusade (1189-1192) and its aftermath. In fact, there was no significant expansion in the size of the Latin principality until 1260. Some of the reasons for this – such as lack of manpower – are obvious. However, historians have thus far under appreciated the influence of the Cilician Armenians on the principality of Antioch, even though their involvement in the Antiochene succession dispute of the early thirteenth century is well-known.

The relationship between the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia and the Latin principality of Antioch reveals much about both states and the thirteenth century Near East more generally. However, a comprehensive study examining diplomatic relations between them remains a noticeable absence in the historiography of the Cilician Armenians and the Latin East. Thus, some fundamental questions remain unanswered. How did the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia interact with each other? Why was the Latin principality the first crusader state to be destroyed in the thirteenth century, and how was this influenced by its relationship with the Armenian kingdom? Which individuals, groups, institutions, and polities had the greatest impact on relations between the two states? How did the religious similarities and differences between the Armenians of Cilicia and the Latins of Antioch affect their diplomatic relations? This thesis directly addresses these issues by analysing
Antiochene-Cilician relations in detail. It analyses the relationship primarily from an Antiochene perspective, considering how it affected the Latin principality over the course of eight decades.

This thesis examines the principality of Antioch and its relationship with the kingdom of Cilicia between 1188 and 1268. These dates have been chosen because they mark key moments in the history of the Latin principality. In 1188 it was dramatically reduced in size when Saladin conquered a large number of settlements and strongholds. Saladin’s attack on the principality of Antioch heralded a new phase in Antiochene-Cilician relations. Previously, the princes of Antioch had enjoyed a position of superiority over their Armenian counterparts in Cilicia, but after 1188 the rulers of Armenian Cilicia became the dominant partners in the relationship. The city of Antioch was seized and destroyed by the Mamluks in 1268. The Latin principality effectively ceased to exist from that moment on, although a handful of settlements and fortresses in the vicinity of Antioch remained under Latin control for several years afterwards.

Modern Historiography

Most studies of the Latin East tend to focus on the kingdom of Jerusalem and therefore the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, and the county of Tripoli have received relatively little attention in comparison. Claude Cahen produced the last major historical work which surveyed the principality of Antioch during both the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.¹ Cahen’s book provides an excellent narrative history of the Latin principality, but it lacks extensive analysis in certain areas and is based upon research undertaken during the 1930s. Its existence certainly does not preclude a new study on the thirteenth century principality of Antioch, with a specific focus on Antiochene-Cilician relations.

For decades after the publication of Cahen’s magnum opus Antioch was neglected in crusading historiography. The principality’s castles were studied by Deschamps and Kennedy,² while Metcalf examined Antiochene coinage.³ Some attention was given to the

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¹ C. Cahen, La Syrie du nord à l’époque des croisades et la principauté franque d’Antioche (Paris, 1940).
Latin Church at Antioch, but other aspects of the principality received very little serious analysis until Mayer produced a collection of twelve essays on Antiochene history. In one essay he argues that thirteenth century charters granting privileges to the Genoese in the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli are actually forgeries, but the rest of the book is predominantly focused on Antiochene affairs in the twelfth century.

The twenty-first century has heralded a new wave of scholarship on Antioch in the crusading era. The most important of these publications is a monograph by Asbridge which examines the early development of the principality from its creation in 1098 until the death of Prince Bohemond II in 1130. Furthermore, a recently completed PhD thesis analyses the evolution of the Latin principality during the remainder of the twelfth century, with a particular focus on rulership, lordship, and Antioch’s relationships with the Byzantine Empire and the kingdom of Jerusalem.

In the last decade two important collections of essays have been published on the principality of Antioch, based on the proceedings of conferences held at Hernen Castle in the Netherlands. The first includes scholarship on Antioch’s status as a centre for the production and translation of intellectual texts, the growth of the Latin Church at Antioch, and the role of Syriac Orthodox Christians in the Latin principality. The second contains studies of the castle of Margat and a mill at Baniyas. Both volumes shine further light on the history of Antioch in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but none of the essays specifically examine the principality’s relationship with the kingdom of Cilicia or refer to it in any detail.

The focus of Asbridge and others on Antiochene history prior to the Third Crusade has left a distorted picture of the principality – much more has been written about the first nine decades of the Latin state than its final eighty years. Edbury has recently examined the

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8 The author is unable to release this material before publication, but he has discussed some of his findings with me on a personal level. A.D. Buck, *On the Frontier of Latin Christendom: the Principality of Antioch ca.1130-ca.1193* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Queen Mary, University of London, 2014).


Assises d’Antioche and briefly considered how feudal law was practiced in the principality, while Burgtorf has written about the War of Antiochene Succession. Both these articles contribute to our understanding of Latin Antiochene after the principality was dramatically reduced in size by Saladin in 1188. Nevertheless, no historian has properly surveyed the evolution of the Latin principality from the beginning of the thirteenth century until Antioch’s fall in 1268 since the publication of Cahen’s La Syrie du nord.

Armenian Cilicia, on the other hand, has been the subject of numerous general histories and rigorous studies, which have examined its political development from the founding of the Armenian principalities in the eleventh century until the destruction of the Cilician kingdom in the late fourteenth century. A considerable amount of scholarship has been devoted to Armenian Cilicia since Der Nersessian wrote two important contributions on the formation and development of the realm. Both her essay in Setton’s A History of the Crusades and chapter on Cilicia in The Armenians offer a rather generalised account of the Armenian kingdom, but they have inspired more in-depth research. For example, a collection of essays edited by Boase includes detailed discussions of Baghras castle and the role of the military orders in Cilicia.

In recent decades Claude Mutafian and Gérard Dédéyan have been at the forefront of research on Armenian Cilicia. Mutafian’s first book on Cilicia examines the region over a particularly long period of time, with only one large chapter dedicated to the history of the Armenian kingdom formed there. His second major work in this field focuses completely on the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, but it does not contain a comprehensive analysis of the state’s political history. Mutafian’s most recent book, entitled L’Arménie du Levant, also concentrates on the kingdom of Cilicia. However, despite examining the Armenian kingdom’s Church, diplomacy, and political development in detail, he devotes less than two pages to its relationship with the principality of Antioch. In this short summary of

Antiochene-Cilician relations, he claims that in the thirteenth century the Latin principality became increasingly dependent on an alliance with the Armenian kingdom in order to survive.¹⁸ Mutafian also briefly refers to the relationship between these two states in an essay on the diplomacy of the Cilician Armenians.¹⁹ He observes that King Leon I ‘paid a heavy toll for his Antiochene policy’ as it allowed the Seljuks to impose their suzerainty on Cilicia.²⁰

Dédéyan has written a monograph on the Armenian lordships and principalities of the Near East in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries.²¹ He has also published studies on the interaction between Armenians and the twelfth century crusader states, and the early history of the Roupenid principality.²² In an essay on the Armenians and Lebanon, he provides a simplistic analysis of the relationship between Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, and King Hethoum I of Cilicia.²³ Neither Dédéyan nor Mutafian have written extensively about the relationship between Armenia in Cilicia and the principality of Antioch. Furthermore, when they have referred to Antiochene-Cilician relations in their research, it tends to be from an Armenian perspective.

Armenian Cilicia has also received detailed coverage from other scholars. Ghazarian’s book on the kingdom of Cilicia has a somewhat erratic structure, but it essentially covers the entire history of the Armenian kingdom and the Roupenid principality which preceded it.²⁴ Rüdt-Collenberg has produced a comprehensive genealogical survey of the Armenian dynasties that ruled Cilicia during the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.²⁵ He uses a multitude of tables to list all the known members of the Roupenid and Hethoumid families, showing who they married and who succeeded them. This research

¹⁸ Mutafian, L’Arménie du Levant, 1, p. 383.
²⁰ Mutafian, ‘Brilliant Diplomacy’, p. 103.
²⁴ J.G. Ghazarian, The Armenian Kingdom in Cilicia during the Crusades: The integration of Cilician Armenians with the Latins 1080-1393 (Richmond, 2000).
clearly demonstrates the strong dynastic links between Armenian Cilicia and the principality of Antioch. Hodgson has also highlighted the high levels of intermarriage between Latins and Armenians, and analysed the links between these matches and the diplomacy of the Christian states in the Near East.26

Some recent studies of the kingdom of Cilicia have concentrated on the realm’s diplomatic relations with other powers in the Near East. Amitai and Stewart have both written about the Mamluk threat to Cilicia in the late thirteenth century and how the Cilician Armenians responded to it.27 Stewart has produced detailed analysis of the relationship between the Mongols and the Armenian kings of Cilicia in two essays.28 Bayarsaikhan has also examined Mongol-Armenian relations, but his work focuses on the former’s impact in the Caucasus as well as Cilicia.29 Yildiz has considered how the interaction between the Latins, Cilician Armenians, and Seljuk Turks affected the fortunes of the Armenian kingdom in the early thirteenth century.30 Such scholarship provides useful analysis of the geopolitical environment in which Antiochene-Cilician relations took place.

The only study which directly examines the relationship between the principality of Antioch and Armenian Cilicia is an economic study by Scott Redford.31 He argues that the economies of northern Syria and Cilicia were interlinked, and were not separated by the frontiers which divided the polities in the region. For example, he suggests that Port Saint Symeon Ware was produced at sites in both the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia.32 This fine essay demonstrates how geography tied the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom together, but it does not analyse the political links between these states. Vorderstrasse also observes that the principality of Antioch was a major producer of pottery

during the crusading era, but suggests that it also imported pottery from Muslim controlled sites in Syria. Jacoby and others have suggested that the port of Ayas in Cilicia was a major trading centre, but only in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, after the Mamluk conquest of Antioch.

**Primary Source Material**

A large number of primary sources provide information about the principality of Antioch or the kingdom of Cilicia during the thirteenth century, although there is much less evidence about these two states than the contemporary kingdom of Jerusalem. Many different chronicles, histories and annals help to provide a rough narrative of Antiochene and Cilician Armenian politics during this period. The most valuable of these are the Old French continuations of William of Tyre’s history and the Armenian chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable. A detailed discussion of these two sources will follow as they provide more information about Antiochene-Cilician relations than any other history, and in both cases there is more than one version of the source. The chronicle attributed to Sempad is an account of the kingdom of Cilicia from a senior figure within the realm, and thus it supplies some evidence that cannot be found elsewhere. Unfortunately, there are no surviving narrative sources written by someone based in the principality of Antioch during the thirteenth century. Therefore, our knowledge of the Latin principality after 1188 comes from those who lived outside the territory and did not have strong personal knowledge of Antiochene affairs.

In 1959 Der Nersessian argued that there were three known manuscripts of an Armenian chronicle written by Sempad the Constable, brother of King Hethoum I of Cilicia. In the nineteenth century two editions of this chronicle were published and two partial French translations were subsequently made. These publications were based on two manuscripts of ‘fairly late date’ that were then stored in Etchmiadzin Cathedral and now reside at the Matenadaran in Yerevan. A third manuscript, dating from the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century, emerged in the 1870s and has been kept at the Library of San Lazzaro in

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35. One of these translations is in the Recueil des historiens des croisades. See Sempad the Constable, ‘Chronique du Royaume de la Petite Arménie, par le Connétable Sempad’, RHC Arm I, pp. 605-680.
Venice ever since. Akelian published a copy of the Venice text in 1956, but Der Nersessian notes with some disappointment that it was not a critical edition.\footnote{Der Nersessian, ‘Royal Historian’, pp. 143-144.}

There are quite a number of differences between the Etchmiadzin texts and the Venice manuscript. Both versions primarily follow the work of Matthew of Edessa and his continuator, Gregory the Priest, in their coverage of events between 951 and 1162. However, the Venice manuscript, which is longer in length, offers a fuller summary of Matthew’s chronicle and contains more than a dozen passages which are missing from the Etchmiadzin texts. The latter abbreviate Matthew of Edessa more often, but they still include two excerpts of his work which cannot be found in the longer redaction.\footnote{Smbat, pp. 16-17.}

The contrast between the Etchmiadzin texts and the Venice manuscript is far more important when considering how they record the history of Armenian Cilicia between 1165 and 1272, because this material is unique and is not found in any other chronicle. Dédéyan has outlined the events of the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries that are described in the former, but are absent from the latter. Overall though, the Venice manuscript relates the history of this period in much greater detail than the Etchmiadzin texts, particularly for the years 1251-1272.\footnote{Der Nersessian, ‘Royal Historian’, pp. 144-146.} This led Der Nersessian to conclude that the Etchmiadzin texts contain an abbreviated version of the content found in the Venice manuscript.\footnote{Smbat, p. 17.} Dédéyan, on the other hand, believes that both redactions derive from an older source and were written independently of each other.\footnote{Smbat, pp. 17-24.} He also argues that Sempad the Constable may not be the author of this chronicle because most of the Armenian language used in the three surviving manuscripts is very different from the Cilician dialect used by King Hethoum I’s brother in his other works, such as the Assises d’Antioche.\footnote{Der Nersessian, ‘Royal Historian’, p. 146; Smbat, pp. 24-26.} While Der Nersessian claims that the Venice manuscript ‘faithfully’ preserves a chronicle written by Sempad the Constable, Dédéyan suggests that it was actually composed by an anonymous senior figure within the kingdom of Cilicia, possibly from the royal chancery.\footnote{Der Nersessian, ‘Royal Historian’, p. 146; Smbat, pp. 24-26.}

This thesis utilises the testimony of both versions of the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable via the French translations available. Unfortunately there is a
particularly large lacuna in the Venice manuscript which means the folios covering events between 1230 and 1251 are missing. Thus, the evidence of the Etchmiadzin texts for this period is of great importance. Both redactions contain some factual errors, notably when dating events related to the Byzantine Empire. Nevertheless, the evidence of the Venice manuscript is particularly valuable because of the detailed and relatively unpartisan way in which it records the history of Armenian Cilicia.

The chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable is the most significant work on Cilicia in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries, but several other key Armenian sources have aided the research of this thesis. The histories of Vardan the Great, Samuel of Ani, and Vahram of Edessa supply useful supplementary information about Cilicia and the Armenian monarchy. Furthermore, the work of Kirakos of Ganjak provides unique detail about some important events in the Armenian kingdom during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. These chroniclers were not from Cilicia, but the fact that most of their testimony is supported either by each other or by other sources suggests that they were relatively well informed of the situation there. The histories of Gregory of Akner, Hethoum II, and Hayton have also been used.

The chronicle of William of Tyre is the most detailed account of the Latin East in the twelfth century. William’s narrative ends in 1184, but his work was continued by various writers who wanted to update Western audiences on later events in the eastern Mediterranean. In the early thirteenth century William’s Latin chronicle was translated into Old French. Fifty-one manuscripts of the Old French translation dating from before 1500 have survived to the present day, and forty-five of these contain a continuation. Some of these manuscripts provide a narrative of events until 1277, while others end in 1231.

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44 Der Nersessian, ‘Royal Historian’, p. 143.
45 Smbat, pp. 34-35.
The Old French continuations of William of Tyre, usually known as *Eracles*, are some of the most important sources for those researching the thirteenth century Latin East, but there has been some debate amongst historians about which version is the oldest and most authoritative. Morgan argues that the Lyon manuscript is closer to a now lost original version of *Eracles* than any of the other surviving manuscripts, particularly for the period 1184-1197, and therefore its account is superior to the others. 51 Edbury profoundly disagrees and asserts that it was ‘almost certainly’ produced later than other manuscripts, probably in the late 1240s. He also suggests that the Lyon *Eracles* provides the longest account of events between 1184 and 1197 because its compiler inserted original material of his own and not because the other versions contain an abbreviated form of this text. 52

Edbury’s research into the origins and development of the continuations of William of Tyre highlights the link between *Eracles* and another history of the Latin East – the chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer, often abbreviated as *Ernoul-Bernard*. There are eight surviving manuscripts of *Ernoul-Bernard*: five which end in 1227 or 1229 and identify Ernoul, the squire of Balian of Ibelin, as the author of a section relating to an incident which occurred in 1187; and three – two of which refer to Bernard, who may have been a monk at the abbey of Corbie – which end in 1231. Edbury observes that forty-one of the forty-five manuscripts containing an Old French continuation of William of Tyre include a narrative that is very similar to *Ernoul-Bernard* for the period 1184-1231. It would appear that in the 1230s most translators of William of Tyre chose to insert an edited version of *Ernoul-Bernard* onto the end of William’s chronicle in order to extend the narrative. These writers chose to jettison the material from *Ernoul-Bernard* covering events before 1184. 53

The four manuscripts containing a significantly different version of *Eracles* to *Ernoul-Bernard* can be divided in two. The aforementioned Lyon *Eracles* provides a similar narrative to a Florence manuscript for the years 1190-1197, although both are unique. While Morgan felt these texts were closest to the original version of *Eracles*, Edbury argues that these continuations were actually the last to be produced. Furthermore, Edbury points out that while the Lyon and Florence manuscripts include unique material in their coverage of events prior to 1197, they both follow the *Ernoul-Bernard* continuation from 1197 to 1231. 54

other version of *Eracles* is known as the *Colbert-Fontainebleau* continuation, which survives in two manuscripts. Edbury suggests that it was produced in the early 1240s by a writer who decided to considerably expand the *Ernoul-Bernard* continuation. The author of the *Colbert-Fontainebleau* version interwove new information with the *Ernoul-Bernard* narrative for the period after 1187 and wrote a completely new account of events between 1205 and the late 1230s.\(^{55}\)

Edbury has noted that scholars are ‘ill-served by the printed editions’ of *Eracles* and *Ernoul-Bernard* as none of them are based upon the oldest and most authentic surviving manuscripts.\(^{56}\) The editors of the *Recueil des historiens des croisades* chose to base their edition of the Old French continuations of William of Tyre on the *Colbert-Fontainebleau* texts, while Morgan has composed an edition of the Lyon and Florence manuscripts of *Eracles*.\(^{57}\) Unfortunately, the most recent edition of *Ernoul-Bernard*, published in 1871 by de Mas Latrie,\(^{58}\) is based upon a fourteenth century manuscript and ignores earlier versions of the chronicle.\(^{59}\)

Edbury’s argument that the *Ernoul-Bernard* continuation is the oldest version is convincing, but this thesis still makes use of evidence from the *Colbert-Fontainebleau*, Lyon, and Florence manuscripts via the *Recueil* and Morgan editions because they contain valuable information that cannot be found in the chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard the Treasurer. For example, only the Lyon and Florence *Eracles* provide a detailed account of the Roupenid attempt to seize control of Antioch in c.1193. This testimony may have been written in the late 1240s, long after the events described, but that does not mean it should be disregarded. All versions of *Eracles* and *Ernoul-Bernard* focus primarily on the main crusading expeditions and the kingdom of Jerusalem. Therefore, all references within them to the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia are significant because those states are only mentioned when events there were deemed interesting enough by the authors of the continuations to temporarily shift their focus away from the main subject.

The narrative histories of Arabic and Persian writers are also of great importance because they offer an external perspective of events involving the Antiochenes and Cilician

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\(^{56}\) Edbury, ‘New Perspectives’, p. 110.


\(^{58}\) *La Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le Trésorier*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871).

\(^{59}\) Edbury, ‘New Perspectives’, p. 110.
Armenians. Furthermore, they often provide a more detailed description of military campaigns than Latin and Old French sources. For example, Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād and ‘Imād ad-Dīn al-Isfahānī wrote fairly comprehensive accounts of Saladin’s incursion into northern Syria in 1188. Ibn al-Athīr’s major chronicle contains valuable information about that campaign and several other events relating to the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s history of the Mamluk sultan Baibars supplies crucial evidence about Mamluk attacks on the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom in the 1260s. The chronicles of Ibn al-‘Adīm Kamāl al-Dīn and Ibn Bībī provide vital information over a longer period of time.

Kamāl al-Dīn came from an elite family in Aleppo and held a number of senior positions within the city. Thus, his chief work – a history of Aleppo from the early Islamic period until 1243 – gives an Aleppan viewpoint of events in northern Syria. He is well informed on Aleppo’s relationship with the principality of Antioch in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Kamāl al-Dīn’s insight into Aleppan involvement in the Antiochene succession dispute has been particularly useful for this thesis. Relevant extracts from Kamāl al-Dīn’s Aleppan history have been translated into French. Unfortunately, however, this translation has been criticised for its ‘poor quality’. Ibn Bībī was a high-ranking official in the Seljuk sultanate of Rūm in the thirteenth century. His history of the Seljuks provides a detailed account of Anatolian politics and events during the period 1190-1280 and is available in a respected German translation. Ibn Bībī’s knowledge of the Seljuk invasions of the kingdom of Cilicia make this work a vital source.

The most detailed sources apart from chronicles are the letters written by or addressed to political and ecclesiastical leaders in the Near East. They provide evidence about the activities of rulers in northern Syria and southern Anatolia, and they also offer the perspective of men who were involved in the events taking place. This is particularly evident in the

65 Hillenbrand, ‘Sources in Arabic’, p. 318.
correspondence between King Leon I of Cilicia and Pope Innocent III during the Antiochene succession dispute. All letters composed by the papacy which refer to the Armenian king or his people are vital for understanding the attitude of the Latin Church towards the Armenians – a theme explored in this thesis.

The papal registers of Pope Gregory IX were published in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Several scholars have been involved in editing the letters of Innocent III since the first volume was released in 1964, but unfortunately they have not yet published the correspondence for the latter part of his pontificate. Therefore, the *Patrologia Latina* is also used. Pressutti’s *Regesta Honorii Papae III* provides a summary of the letters of Honorius III.

Other letters which contain important information about the Antiochenes and their prince include those written by Thomas Bérard, the master of the Temple, and Thomas Agni, papal legate and bishop of Bethlehem in 1260. They describe how Antioch reacted to the arrival of the Mongols in northern Syria. The letters of Jacques de Vitry, bishop of Acre, provide some evidence about the activities of Bohemond IV in the early thirteenth century.

Charters – the legal documents which provide an official record of transactions such as the granting of property or rights – are another important source of information. Depending on how detailed these are they can be used to identify the location of key figures on specific dates. Such data is extremely useful when trying to determine when the princes of Antioch were absent from their principality. Charters are also a good indicator of the state of relations between different individuals or institutions. For example, in 1207 Raymond-Roupen granted Jabala to the Hospitallers, even though the town was actually in Ayyubid hands at that time. This arrangement reveals more about the Hospital’s position during the Antiochene succession dispute than it does about who actually possessed Jabala. The witness lists of charters also supply evidence about senior figures within the principality of Antioch, such as who supported Raymond-Roupen prior to his investiture as prince in 1216.

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73 See Military Orders chapter.
Unfortunately, the number of surviving charters relating to the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia within the time period covered by this thesis is extremely small when compared to that of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. They can be found in collections such as the *Regesta Regni Hierosolymitani* and the *Cartulaire de la Chancellerie Royale des Roupéniens*. The cartularies of the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights provide evidence about the extent of their involvement in the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. The records of the Pisans and Genoese also contain documents recording the agreements that the princes of Antioch and kings of Cilicia made with these groups.

The *Assises d’Antioche* is a treatise on the law of the principality of Antioch. The original Old French version has not survived, but it was translated into Armenian by Sempad the Constable before the fall of Antioch in 1268. This demonstrates that senior figures in the kingdom of Cilicia were interested in Antiochene law and perhaps hoped that similar legal customs could be established in their own realm. The *Assises d’Antioche* was originally composed ‘at some point between the end of the twelfth century and the year 1219’. Therefore, it provides evidence about the Latin principality after it was substantially reduced in size by Saladin’s conquests in 1188. The *Assises d’Antioche* is available in a French translation of the Armenian text made by Alishan in the nineteenth century.

All these sources have been used to gain an understanding of the principality of Antioch and its relationship with the kingdom of Cilicia for the years 1188-1268. However, there are some gaps in the source material which make it difficult to properly assess the political situation in both states for the whole period. There is relatively little evidence about events in the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom during the 1230s and 1240s compared to earlier and later decades. This can be partly explained by a large lacuna in the Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable. However, another reason why the narrative histories offer such scant coverage of the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia in the years prior to King Louis IX of France’s arrival in the Near East.

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74 See Appendix B for charters involving the princes of Antioch.
80 *Assises d’Antioche*, ed. and trans. L.M. Alishan (Venice, 1876).
may be that the political and territorial situation was relatively stable in these states and therefore chroniclers felt there was little of interest to record.

Another concern is that the surviving sources may offer a distorted picture of what actually happened and the attitudes of important individuals. For example, during the Antiochene succession dispute Pope Innocent III corresponded with Count Bohemond of Tripoli and King Leon I of Cilicia. However, the pontiff’s letters to and from the Tripolitan count have not been preserved, whereas his correspondence with the Armenian king has. Thus, Leon’s testimony on developments in the conflict is not balanced by evidence from Bohemond. The Armenian king may not have lied in his correspondence with Innocent, but it is likely that he was selective in what he reported to the pope and he certainly presented his role in events in a favourable light. The absence of Bohemond’s perspective diminishes our understanding of the Antiochene succession dispute. Furthermore, if Innocent’s letters to the Tripolitan count had survived then it would be possible to contrast the manner in which the pope addressed these adversaries.

**The Principality of Antioch and Its Relationship with the Kingdom of Cilicia, 1188-1268**

A brief historical overview of the Latin principality will now be provided in order to contextualise the events that are subsequently discussed in this thesis. The Armenians of Cilicia and the Latins of Antioch fought against each other on several occasions prior to 1188, and they also allied together in order to resist common enemies. Much of the early conflict between them was due to their divergent interests – the Antiochenes sought to incorporate Cilicia into their principality, while the Armenians living in the region wanted to establish their own independent lordships or principalities. In the early twelfth century, Tancred of Antioch led several campaigns into Cilicia in order to capture the towns of Tarsus, Adana and Mamistra. He was eventually successful in establishing Latin rule over them and for a short period they were part of the principality of Antioch. In the long term, however, the Cilician plain did not remain under Antiochene control and it was the Armenians who came to dominate this region.

The Roupenids gradually established themselves as the most powerful Armenian dynasty in Cilicia, but others, such as the Hethoumids of Lampron, also maintained small lordships in the area for much of the twelfth century. The Roupenid principality was initially

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based around the mountain fortress of Vahka after it was captured by Constantine, son of Roupen I, in the 1090s. The conquests made by Thoros I and Leon I significantly expanded the Roupenid principality, but many of these gains were lost to the Byzantines during Emperor John I Comnenus’ campaign in 1137-1138. Thoros II and Mleh recovered this territory and consolidated their hold over it so that by 1174 Roupenid rule ‘was firmly established over nearly the whole of Cilicia’. Leon II made further conquests, including the Hethoumid fortress of Lampron, after inheriting the Roupenid principality in 1187. Thus, by the end of the twelfth century all the most important castles and cities in Cilicia were under Roupenid control.

While the Roupenid principality expanded significantly during the second half of the twelfth century, the Latin principality of Antioch was considerably reduced in size by one military campaign in the summer of 1188. Saladin captured the coastal cities of Jabala and Latakia in July and followed this success by taking several fortresses, including Bourzey, Saône, and Darbsak. After the annexation of Baghras on 26 September, Saladin agreed to an eight month truce with Prince Bohemond III of Antioch.

In c.1191 Leon II of the Roupenid principality occupied the castle of Baghras after it had been abandoned by the garrison left in place by Saladin. For more than two decades he was able to use his possession of this fortress to the detriment of the Latin rulers of Antioch. In 1193 the Roupenid prince invited Bohemond III to meet him at Baghras. Shortly after arriving at the castle, however, Bohemond was arrested and tortured by Leon. The latter then sent Hethoum of Sassoun to capture Antioch, but the Roupenid army was rebuffed by the Antiochenes, who subsequently established a commune. Bohemond was taken to Sis where he was imprisoned for several months.

Bohemond III was released in 1194 after making a number of concessions to the Roupenids, including an agreement that his eldest son, Raymond, was to be married to Leon’s eldest niece, Alice. The marriage, which took place shortly after Bohemond’s release,
was to have profound repercussions for the future of the principality of Antioch. The chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable recorded that it was agreed that the eldest born son of this union would be the heir of Leon and he would eventually succeed his father as prince of Antioch. The future of the Latin principality was thus entwined with that of Armenian Cilicia. Antiochene succession plans were then severely disrupted when Raymond died just a few years after his marriage to Alice. To complicate matters further, Raymond’s widow was pregnant and she later gave birth to a son. Leon welcomed the arrival of his great-nephew, known to modern historians as Raymond-Roupen, and instantly recognised him as his heir. The death of Raymond left Bohemond III with two possible successors – his second son, Count Bohemond of Tripoli, or his newly born grandson, Raymond-Roupen.

On 6 January 1198 Leon was crowned king of the Armenians and therefore the Roupenid principality in Cilicia became an Armenian kingdom. His coronation was attended by Conrad, archbishop of Mainz, who subsequently baptised Raymond-Roupen. Shortly after the christening Prince Bohemond III of Antioch decided to designate Raymond-Roupen as his lawful heir and ordered his barons to swear allegiance to the boy. Thus, in 1198 a baby less than a year old stood to inherit the kingdom of Cilicia from his great-uncle and the principality of Antioch from his paternal grandfather.

Count Bohemond of Tripoli hoped to succeed his father as prince of Antioch and decided to take matters into his own hands after Raymond-Roupen was designated the lawful heir to the Latin principality. In the winter of 1198-1199 the Tripolitan count expelled Prince Bohemond III from Antioch and took control of the principality with the support of the Antiochene commune. Bohemond III regained power at Antioch with the assistance of a Cilician Armenian army after three months in exile, but his restoration merely delayed a prolonged conflict between Count Bohemond of Tripoli and King Leon I of Cilicia.

The Tripolitan count took control of the Latin principality and was recognised as Prince Bohemond IV of Antioch by the Antiochene commune shortly after his father’s death.
in 1201. After learning that Bohemond of Tripoli had claimed the principality, Leon sent a Cilician Armenian army to besiege Antioch. The Armenian king was determined to ensure that Raymond-Roupen succeeded Bohemond III as prince, and he was prepared to forcibly remove Bohemond IV from Antioch in order to achieve that objective. However, in July 1201 the Seljuks invaded Cilicia and Leon was forced to withdraw his troops from the Latin principality in order to defend the Armenian kingdom.

From 1202 onwards, Pope Innocent III tried to peacefully resolve the Antiochene succession dispute. He was in regular contact with Bohemond IV and King Leon I, and the papal legates trying to mediate between the two of them. However, the Tripolitan count consistently refused to countenance relinquishing control of the principality of Antioch. Leon engaged with Innocent and his legates in the hope that they would support Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the Latin principality. After becoming frustrated by the early lack of diplomatic progress the Armenian king took military action. In November 1203 a Cilician Armenian army entered Antioch during the night and came very close to capturing the city. Leon’s men were then attacked by the Templars and forced to retreat back to Cilicia when an Aleppan force advanced towards Antioch and reached the Orontes River.

Bohemond IV appears to have spent the whole of 1205 in the county of Tripoli after becoming embroiled in a conflict with Renaud of Nephin over the baron’s marriage to the daughter and heiress of the lord of Gibelcar without Bohemond’s permission. During the Tripolitan count’s absence from the Latin principality the Cilician Armenians ransacked the area around Antioch and laid siege to the city, seemingly with the intention of trying to starve the garrison into surrender. However, the Aleppans hindered the blockade by resupplying Antioch and Leon’s forces were unable to capture the city.

In 1206 the Latin patriarch of Antioch, Peter of Angoulême, was excommunicated by Peter of Saint Marcellus, a papal legate. Bohemond IV subsequently installed the Greek patriarch of Antioch, Simeon II, in the cathedral of St Peter, thereby effectively replacing

\[97\] ATS, p. 435; DSN, p. 259; Eracles, pp. 313; Ernoul, p. 321; GC, p. 663.
\[98\] Ernoul, pp. 321-322; Eracles, p. 313; PL, 214, Col. 1004, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 79-80.
\[99\] PL, 214, Cols 1004-1005, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 79-81.
\[100\] AAC, p. 160; ATS, p. 435; DSN, p. 258; GC, p. 663; Hill, p. 480; PL, 215, Cols 687-689, No. 119; Reg. Inn. III, 8, No. 120, pp. 212-215.
\[101\] AAC, p. 160; ATS, p. 435; Eracles, pp. 314-315; GC, p. 663.
\[102\] ATS, p. 435; Eracles, pp. 314-315; GC, p. 663.
\[103\] KD, 5, p. 41.
Peter of Angoulême. The Tripolitan count ignored calls to expel Simeon and restore Peter of Angoulême after the latter had resolved his differences with the papacy. The Latin patriarch responded by participating in a revolt against Bohemond in late 1207. However, the rebels were crushed at Antioch by the count of Tripoli’s forces and Peter of Angoulême was imprisoned. The Cilician Armenians continued to raid the Latin principality during this period, but there is no evidence that King Leon I was involved in Peter’s rebellion.

In late 1210 or early 1211 the Cilician Armenians marched into the Amanus Mountains, on the frontier between the Armenian kingdom and the Latin principality, and seized land and property belonging to the Order of the Temple. Leon’s troops subsequently attacked a force of Templar knights led by William of Chartres, the Master of the Temple. Pope Innocent III excommunicated the Armenian king after news of these events reached Rome. The pontiff lifted the sentence of excommunication against Leon in March 1213, but his behaviour had discouraged the papacy from supporting Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch. A major breakthrough in the Antiochene succession dispute finally arrived in February 1216 when King Leon I led an army to Antioch and entered the city during the night. The Armenian king swiftly secured control of the metropolis by stationing soldiers throughout the streets of Antioch while most Antiochenes were still asleep. Raymond-Roupen was hastily invested as the prince of Antioch and within a few days Bohemond IV’s supporters, who had sought refuge in the Antiochene citadel, surrendered.

King Leon I appears to have remained at Antioch until the autumn of 1216, but the kingdom of Cilicia suffered in his absence. The Seljuk sultan, ʿIzz al-Dīn Kay-Kāwūs I, marched south with a large Turkish army and laid siege to the fortress of Gaban in eastern Cilicia. Kay-Kāwūs I eventually withdrew from the Armenian kingdom after becoming frustrated by his inability to capture Gaban, but he did manage to inflict a serious defeat on a Cilician Armenian army during the campaign. There was little collaboration between the

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105 PL, 215, Col. 1345, No. 9; Reg. Inn. III, 11, No. 8, p. 11.
107 Smbat, pp. 85, 87.
108 PL, 216, Cols 430-431, No. 64.
109 PL, 216, Cols 430-432, Nos. 64-65.
110 PL, 216, Cols 792-793, No. 7.
112 HII, p. 483; SC, p. 644; Smbat, p. 92.
113 SC, pp. 644-645; Smbat, p. 92.
principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia in military and diplomatic affairs after 1216. This may be explained by Bar Hebraeus’ account of a quarrel between Leon and Raymond-Roupen, caused by the ambitions of the latter.\textsuperscript{114} In the spring of 1219 Bohemond IV travelled north from the county of Tripoli and seized control of Antioch.\textsuperscript{115} His return to power effectively marked the end of the Antiochene succession dispute. Raymond-Roupen fled to Cilicia and quickly became embroiled in the politics of the Armenian kingdom. Bohemond IV’s right to rule the principality of Antioch was unchallenged thereafter.

The death of King Leon I in May 1219 sparked a succession dispute in Cilicia.\textsuperscript{116} Constantine, \textit{baillie} of the Armenian kingdom, was at the head of a group of Cilician Armenian barons that were determined to ensure that Isabel, Leon’s designated heir and youngest child, inherited the throne. Raymond-Roupen sailed from Damietta, where he had won the backing of the Hospitallers and the papal legate Pelagius, to Tarsus in order to claim the Armenian kingdom for himself.\textsuperscript{117} Leon’s great-nephew received some support from within Cilicia, but his forces were crushed by Constantine in 1221. Raymond-Roupen was then imprisoned and appears to have died shortly afterwards, although the exact date and cause of his death are unclear.\textsuperscript{118} John of Brienne briefly emerged as a third candidate for the crown of Armenian Cilicia, but he dropped out of contention after his wife – Leon’s eldest daughter, Stephanie – and child suddenly died.\textsuperscript{119}

In 1222 Isabel, daughter of King Leon I, was married to Philip, son of Prince Bohemond IV.\textsuperscript{120} Her husband was subsequently crowned king of Cilicia, and the Armenian kingdom entered into a formal alliance with the neighbouring principality of Antioch. Peace and co-operation between the two states had finally been established, but it lasted less than three years. After a short spell as king consort of Cilicia, Philip was arrested and imprisoned by a group of Cilician Armenian barons in late 1224.\textsuperscript{121} Bohemond IV was angered by the

\textsuperscript{114} BH, 1, pp. 370-371. See also Eracles, p. 347.
\textsuperscript{116} ATS, p. 437; HII, p. 484; KG, p. 427; OP, p. 234; \textit{Crusade and Christendom}, p. 190; SA, p. 459; Smbat, pp. 93-94; VE, pp. 513-514; VG, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{117} Eracles, p. 347; OP, pp. 278-279; \textit{Crusade and Christendom}, p. 222; VE, p. 514.
\textsuperscript{118} ATS, p. 437; Eracles, p. 347; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 485; OP, p. 250; \textit{Crusade and Christendom}, p. 199; Smbat, pp. 94-95; VE, p. 514.
\textsuperscript{119} Eracles, p. 349; OP, p. 250; \textit{Crusade and Christendom}, pp. 198-199.
\textsuperscript{120} ATS, p. 437; BH, 1, p. 380; Eracles, pp. 347-348; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 485; IA, 3, p. 279; KG, p. 428; OP, pp. 279-280; \textit{Crusade and Christendom}, p. 223; SA, p. 460; SC, p. 647; Smbat, pp. 95-96; VG, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{121} ATS, p. 437-438; BH, 1, pp. 380-381; Eracles, p. 347-348; HII, p. 485; IA, 3, pp. 279-280; KG, p. 428; SA, p. 460; SC, pp. 647-648; Smbat, p. 96; VG, p. 213.
treatment of his son and responded by invading the Armenian kingdom and encouraging the Seljuks to do the same. The Seljuks captured several fortresses in Cilicia in 1225, but the count of Tripoli failed to make any conquests or liberate his son. Philip was murdered and a new dynasty seized power in the Armenian kingdom. In 1226 Hethoum, son of Constantine, married Isabel, daughter of King Leon I, and was crowned king of the Armenians at Tarsus.

The deposition and murder of Philip damaged Antiochene-Cilician relations for a generation and both sides appear to have remained hostile to each other for more than twenty years. There is no record of an alliance or co-operation of any kind between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia during this period. However, there was also relatively little military conflict between them – Hethoum did not besiege Antioch or pillage the Latin principality for long periods as King Leon I had done. Bohemond IV died in early 1233 and was succeeded by his eldest son, Bohemond V, as prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli. The evidence about Bohemond V is quite limited, but he appears to have made preparations to invade Cilicia with Templar support in the 1230s. He chose not to attack the Armenian kingdom, however, after Constantine, the father of King Hethoum I, negotiated a peace agreement with the Templars.

In the late 1230s Bohemond V tried to damage the monarchy of the Armenian kingdom through diplomacy, rather than invading Cilicia. In April 1237 Pope Gregory IX wrote to the archbishop of Nazareth asking him to investigate whether the marriage of King Hethoum I and Queen Isabel of Cilicia should be annulled on the grounds of consanguinity. The pontiff suggested that he had been inundated with requests from the prince of Antioch to dissolve their union. Hethoum fiercely protested against the threat of annulment to his marriage and Gregory IX’s decree that the Cilician Armenians should recognise the supremacy of the Latin patriarch of Antioch. In 1239 the pope reversed his decision to reduce the autonomy of the Armenian Church and acknowledged that the marriage of Hethoum and Isabel was legitimate.

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122 IA, 3, p. 280.
124 ATS, p. 439; Eracles, p. 403. See Appendix B.
125 Eracles, pp. 405-406.
126 Reg. Gre. IX, 2, No. 3597, p. 618.
There is very little evidence about the affairs of the principality of Antioch in the 1240s, but towards the end of the decade steps were taken to heal its hostile relationship with the kingdom of Cilicia. Shortly after King Louis IX of France had arrived at Cyprus in September 1248 he was approached by Cilician Armenian envoys who informed him of the animosity that existed between Hethoum and Bohemond V. The French king subsequently helped to improve Antiochene-Cilician relations by bringing representatives of the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom together, and encouraging them to make peace. However, an alliance between the two states was not established until after Bohemond V’s death in 1252. Bohemond VI had not reached the age of majority, but he succeeded his father as the prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli after being knighted by King Louis IX of France. King Hethoum I used the opportunity provided by this change of leadership to strengthen ties between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. In 1254 Bohemond VI married Hethoum’s daughter, Sibylle, thereby cementing an alliance between the two states which would last until the fall of Antioch in 1268.

King Hethoum I travelled to Karakorum in 1253 and arrived back in Cilicia in 1256 after submitting to Möngke Khan and strengthening ties between the Mongols and the Cilician Armenians. There is some evidence of an improved relationship between the rulers of the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom following Hethoum’s return. Bohemond VI journeyed to Cilicia in November 1256 in order to witness the Armenian king’s eldest son, Leon, being knighted at Mamistra. Hethoum subsequently travelled to Tripoli in 1259 to meet with the prince of Antioch.

Both King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI appear to have met and collaborated with the Mongols who conquered most of Syria in the first half of 1260. During this period, Bohemond VI submitted to Hülegü, the younger brother of Möngke Khan, and Mongol suzerainty was established over both the principality of Antioch and the county of

130 ATS, p. 446; Eracles, p. 442; _Crusader Syria_, p. 140; Smbat, p. 98.
131 ATS, p. 445; BH, 1, pp. 418-419; GA, pp. 325-327; Hayton, pp. 164-166; Smbat, p. 98; VE, p. 519; VG, p. 216.
132 Smbat, p. 100.
133 Smbat, p. 103.
Tripoli.\textsuperscript{135} With the support of the Mongols, the Antiochene prince was subsequently able to reconquer a substantial amount of territory which had belonged to the Latin principality prior to 1188. The prince’s forces seized Darkoush and a number of other fortresses to the east of Antioch, and they were also able to capture the coastal city of Latakia.\textsuperscript{136} The principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia initially benefitted from the Mongols’ arrival in the Near East, but they both suffered immensely after a Mongol army was massacred by the Mamluks at the battle of Ayn Jalut on 3 September 1260.\textsuperscript{137}

In the 1260s the Antiochenes and Cilician Armenians found themselves under threat from an aggressive Mamluk enemy. The Mamluks invaded the principality of Antioch in 1262, capturing the port of St Simeon and plundering the surrounding area.\textsuperscript{138} They may even have besieged the city of Antioch itself, but their departure was hastened by the arrival of a Mongol army.\textsuperscript{139} The Antiochenes and the Cilician Armenians continued to align themselves with the Mongols, with King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI visiting the court of Hülegü in Azerbaijan in 1264.\textsuperscript{140} After they had returned to the Near East, the Armenian king led an army into northern Syria in the winter of 1264-1265.\textsuperscript{141} The Cilician Armenians were joined by Mongol and Antiochene troops, but they were forced to abandon the campaign because of severe weather.\textsuperscript{142}

In August 1266 the Mamluks invaded Cilicia, comprehensively defeated a Cilician Armenian army, and sacked several cities and fortresses in the Armenian kingdom.\textsuperscript{143} Hethoum’s realm was severely weakened, but it survived because the Mamluk force withdrew in September, rather than seeking to hold its conquests and permanently occupy Cilicia. On the other hand, the principality of Antioch crumbled when it was attacked two years later. In May 1268 the Mamluks surrounded the city of Antioch and easily overwhelmed the garrison after deciding to attack. They massacred many of the city’s inhabitants and imprisoned or enslaved the others.\textsuperscript{144} The Mamluk conquest ended 170 years

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\textsuperscript{136} DSN, p. 45; IAZ, 2, pp. 646-647.  \\
\textsuperscript{137} BH, 1, pp. 437-438; IAZ, 2, pp. 337-339; Smbat, pp. 106-107.  \\
\textsuperscript{138} IAZ, 2, pp. 400-401, 423-424; IF, p. 50.  \\
\textsuperscript{139} ATS, p. 450; Eracles, p. 446; GC, p. 755; Templar of Tyre, p. 40.  \\
\textsuperscript{140} VG, p. 220.  \\
\textsuperscript{141} IAZ, 2, p. 505; Smbat, p. 113.  \\
\textsuperscript{142} IAZ, 2, pp. 505-506.  \\
\textsuperscript{143} BH, 1, p. 446; DSN, pp. 216-217; Eracles, p. 455; GA, pp. 357-359; GC, p. 766; Templar of Tyre, p. 52; IAZ, 2, pp. 609-610; IF, p. 99; Smbat, p. 118; VG, p. 223.  \\
\textsuperscript{144} ATS, pp. 453-454; BH, 1, p. 448; DSN, p. 261; Eracles, pp. 456-457; GC, pp. 771-772; Templar of Tyre, p. 59; IAZ, 2, pp. 657-658; IF, pp. 121-126; Smbat, pp. 120-121.
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of Latin rule at Antioch and without this metropolis the surrounding principality effectively ceased to exist. Bohemond VI continued to rule the county of Tripoli, but he made no serious effort to re-occupy Antioch and rebuild his northern polity.

**The Principality of Antioch’s Most Important Relationship**

This thesis concentrates on the political, diplomatic and military aspects of the relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. Consideration is also given to economic and religious matters where they impact on relations between the political elites of these two states. This study examines the principal factors influencing Antiochene-Cilician relations between 1188 and 1268 in six thematic chapters. Such an approach provides a thorough analysis of the relationship and demonstrates why it was so significant. The activities of the Cilician Armenians had a massive impact on the principality of Antioch during this period. They hindered the Latin principality’s recovery from the territorial losses it suffered in 1188 by attacking Antioch in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, and they encouraged Bohemond VI and the Antiochenes to align with the Mongols in the 1260s. By analysing Antiochene-Cilician relations between 1188 and 1268, this thesis offers a new perspective on the thirteenth century principality of Antioch.

This study begins with an analysis of the Antiochene nobility. The territorial losses suffered by the Latin principality in 1188 dramatically reduced the number of major lordships within its frontiers. The effect of this transformation on the nobility is considered. Furthermore, a small prosopographical study, using the limited evidence available, shows how some previously influential noble families appear to have fallen out of favour in the thirteenth century, while others remained part of the principality’s elite. The role of the nobility in the Antiochene succession dispute is also analysed in detail. Antiochene nobles are hardly mentioned, either individually or collectively, in the narrative sources after Bohemond IV reclaimed the principality of Antioch in 1219. This suggests that their influence on the relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom was at its greatest during the Antiochene succession dispute, when many joined the Cilician Armenians in trying to seize control of Antioch and install Raymond-Roupen as prince. The impact of the Cilician Armenian nobility on their kingdom’s relationship with the principality of Antioch is also examined.

The second chapter provides a detailed analysis of the commune of Antioch. It charts the development of the commune from its foundation in c.1193 to the end of the Antiochene
succession dispute in 1219, when it is last mentioned in the sources. The question of what happened to the commune beyond 1219 is also contemplated. The structure of the Antiochene commune is examined and compared with the Italian communes that rose to prominence in the Middle Ages. Finally, the commune’s role in the Antiochene succession dispute is analysed, and consideration is given as to how much influence the institution actually had on the political affairs of the Latin principality in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The military orders had a strong presence in both the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia, and therefore their impact on the relationship between these two states is assessed. The Templars possessed several castles and estates in the Amanus Mountains on the frontier between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. Thus, the Order was well positioned to intervene when these territories were in conflict. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights were major landowners in Cilicia because of their strong links with the Armenian monarchy. This thesis provides a brief summary of the possessions of the three largest military orders in the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. It then examines their role in the Antiochene and Cilician succession disputes. The activities of the Templars on the frontier between the two states in the 1230s are also considered. The military orders appear to have had little involvement in Antiochene-Cilician relations in the three decades before the fall of Antioch.

The principality of Antioch was under the control of Bohemond IV between 1201 and 1216, and from 1219 until his death in 1233. His son, Bohemond V, and grandson, Bohemond VI, subsequently ruled the state until the fall of Antioch in 1268. Throughout the thirteenth century this dynasty also ruled the county of Tripoli, which lay further south on the eastern coastline of the Mediterranean. This meant that the Antiochene prince was often absent from his principality and he was not solely focused on its governance. This thesis considers whether Bohemond IV and his successors spent more of their time at Antioch or Tripoli and analyses the effect that their absences had on Antiochene-Cilician relations.

The principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia did not exist in isolation, and therefore their relationship must have been at least partly shaped by the actions of other rulers in northern Syria and southern Anatolia. In the first half of the thirteenth century the Ayyubids of Aleppo and the Seljuks of Rûm were the other major powers in this region. Both were involved in the Antiochene succession dispute and so their role in this conflict and its aftermath has been examined in detail. The power balance of this region was altered by the
arrival of the Mongols in the Near East. King Hethoum I of Cilicia and Prince Bohemond VI of Antioch submitted to the Mongols, and both suffered the wrath of the Mamluks of Egypt, who attacked the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom several times during the 1260s. After assessing the impact on these four non-Christian powers on Antiochene-Cilician relations, this thesis provides a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitical environment of northern Syria and southern Anatolia, explaining how the princes of Antioch interacted with other rulers in the region.

The final chapter considers the influence of ethnicity and religion on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. The former was a state governed by Latin Christians originally from western Europe, while the latter was dominated by Armenian Christians whose roots lay in the Caucasus. This thesis contemplates how the Antiochenes interacted with the Armenians of the Near East. It then examines the levels of intermarriage between Latins and Armenians, with a specific focus on the matrimonial unions made between the ruling dynasties of Antioch and Cilicia. The relationship between the papacy and the Cilician Armenians is subsequently analysed. This thesis argues that Antiochenes did not oppose King Leon I because of their ethnic and religious differences with the Cilician Armenians. In many respects, the kingdom of Cilicia was treated the same as the Latin states in the Near East by the papacy and the military orders.
Chapter One: The Nobility of the Principality of Antioch and the Kingdom of Cilicia

Numerous studies have been made of the nobility in the kingdom of Jerusalem, but it would be mistaken to assume that their conclusions also apply to the rest of the Latin East.\(^1\) Much less research has been conducted into the nobility of the principality of Antioch. Cahen has investigated the relationship between Antiochene lords and vassals, largely by focusing on the provisions of the *Assises d’Antioche*.\(^2\) He has also tried to locate the principality’s landed fiefs and identify which noble families possessed them.\(^3\) Asbridge has identified the Antiochene landowners in the earliest years of the principality and examined the nature of lordship prior to 1130.\(^4\) Furthermore, several historians have analysed the names of Antiochene nobles and concluded that a large proportion of them probably had Norman origins.\(^5\) However, the question of how the nobility was affected by the loss of numerous lordships in 1188 remains unanswered. The existing scholarship on the Antiochene nobility is overwhelmingly focused on the twelfth century and does not properly consider how it may have evolved in the thirteenth century.

This chapter examines the scale of the territorial losses suffered by the principality of Antioch in 1188 and considers how this affected the composition of the nobility thereafter. A small prosopographical study will also show how some longstanding noble families remained part of the principality’s political elite, while others appear to have fallen out of favour. The nobility seems to have been weakened by Saladin’s campaign in 1188 and become more dependent on the patronage of the prince. This helps to explain the behaviour of the Latin knights who supported Raymond-Roupen during the Antiochene succession dispute and the lack of evidence for any challenge to the authority of the prince after the conflict ended in 1219. The role of the Cilician Armenian barons in shaping their kingdom’s relationship with the principality of Antioch will also be analysed.


\(^3\) Cahen, *La Syrie du nord*, pp. 536-541.


The Composition of the Antiochene Nobility after 1188

During the summer of 1188 Saladin captured a large number of Antiochene towns and fortresses, beginning with the annexation of Jabala on 15 July and ending with the occupation of Baghras on 26 September. The author of the Historia de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris reflected upon the scale of the devastation by writing that ‘almost the whole principality apart from our mighty castle of Margat has been laid waste and lost’. In late September, Prince Bohemond III of Antioch sent messengers to Saladin requesting peace. The sultan reluctantly agreed to an eight month truce with the prince because his troops were tired and some of the emirs in his service wished to return to their homes. Saladin then withdrew to Aleppo, before eventually heading south to Damascus.

Bohemond III subsequently led a number of raids into lands that had previously been part of the Latin principality. However, these expeditions were unsuccessful and the prince’s army returned to Antioch having suffered heavy casualties. The Antiochenes probably realised that they would be unable to recapture the castles and port cities that Saladin had conquered and therefore Bohemond decided to meet the sultan in person to try and negotiate their return. In 1192 the prince of Antioch travelled to Beirut, where he was granted an audience with Saladin. According to Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād, the sultan bestowed the Amouq valley, the fortress of Arzghan ‘and farms whose produce was worth 15,000 dinars’ upon Bohemond III. However, ‘Imād al-Dīn al-Isfahānī, Abū Shāma, and ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād recorded that the prince was actually given a pension of 20,000 dinars which would come from the revenues of land in the vicinity of Antioch.

If Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād is correct then Bohemond III did manage to recover some of the principality’s former territory through diplomacy. Nevertheless, by the time of Saladin’s death in 1193 the Latin principality was reduced to little more than a rump around Antioch and therefore there was a shortage of land which could be held by knights as fiefs.

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6 BDIS, pp. 83-87; IA, 2, pp. 345-353; IDI, pp. 127-144; ‘Historia de Expeditione Friderici’, p. 4; The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 35-36.
7 ‘Toto principatu excepta Margato castro nostro munitissimo vastato fere et perdito’. ‘Historia de Expeditione Friderici’, p. 4; The Crusade of Frederick Barbarossa, p. 36.
8 BDIS, p. 87; BH, 1, p. 329; DSN, p. 254; IA, 2, p. 353; IDI, pp. 144-145.
9 BDIS, pp. 87-88; IA, 2, p. 354; IDI, pp. 145-148.
10 BDIS, pp. 132, 185.
11 BDIS, p. 237; DSN, pp. 255-256; IA, 2, p. 402; IDI, pp. 399-400; Smbat, pp. 67-68.
12 BDIS, p. 237.
The sources do not record any further expansion in the size of the principality, either though diplomacy or conquest, until 1260 when the arrival of the Mongols in Syria helped Bohemond VI to occupy ‘fortresses and lands’ which had formerly belonged to Antioch. Thus, the principality of Antioch remained small for most of the thirteenth century and it could not have sustained many knights through landed fiefs alone.

There were 700 knights in the Antiochene force which fought at the battle of the Field of Blood in 1119, according to Walter the Chancellor. This figure has been accepted by Smail and Asbridge as a realistic number. However, Smail argues that the number of knights in the principality of Antioch would probably have declined ‘considerably’ over the course of the twelfth century due to territorial losses. This contention is based on the idea that as the principality shrank in size there would be less land available to grant to knights as fiefs, and without land to provide an income knights would have to leave and find another lord. In the thirteenth century, the Antiochenes tended to avoid pitched battles and thus few sources provide evidence about the number of knights in the principality. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir recorded that in the winter of 1263-1264 150 knights were sent from Antioch to join the Cilician Armenian army which had marched into northern Syria in order to confront the Mamluks. This was not necessarily the full military strength of the principality because some knights may have remained at Antioch in order to defend the city. Nevertheless, the plausible account given by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir suggests that in the 1260s the principality of Antioch was still able to sustain at least 150 knights, despite its relatively small size.

After losing so much territory in 1188 it seems improbable that there was enough land in the Latin principality to provide each of the 150 knights with their own landed fief. Therefore, it is possible that there was a growth in the use of money fiefs after 1188 in order to provide an income for the knights that did not possess much land. Money fiefs were widely used in the neighbouring kingdom of Jerusalem after it was devastated by invasion in 1187.

14 IAZ, 2, pp. 646-647. See also DSN, p. 45.
17 Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 90. Marshall suggests that feudal service in the principality of Antioch would still have produced ‘several hundred knights’ in the late twelfth century. C. Marshall, Warfare in the Latin East, 1192-1291 (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 51-52, n. 20.
18 IAZ, 2, p. 505.
In the Latin kingdom there were three types of money fief: first, a lord paid a vassal a fixed sum each year; second, a lord made an annual payment to a vassal on the rents and revenues of a village; third, a lord granted the income from one of his sources of revenue, such as a gate or a group of markets, to a vassal. Furthermore, Riley-Smith asserts that ‘many vassals held mixed fiefs, consisting partly of land and partly of rents in money or kind’. The kingdom of Jerusalem appears to have experienced an expansion of the money fief system in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Both the Latin kingdom and the principality of Antioch lost vast swathes of land and numerous fortresses and towns after being invaded by Saladin in the late 1180s. However, the kingdom of Jerusalem made a partial recovery during the Third Crusade (1189-1192) and its aftermath. The composition of the nobility of the Latin kingdom was shaped by the reconquest of the coastline between Tyre and Jaffa. Several historians have identified two tiers in the nobility of the thirteenth century kingdom of Jerusalem – first, a small number of elite barons, and second, a considerable array of simple knights. The great lords of the realm controlled wealthy cities on the Palestinian coast, which provided them with very large revenues. Many knights were financially dependent on these affluent barons and provided them with military service in return for cash payments. Donnachie argues that a ‘social and political gulf’ developed between the elite barons and lesser knights based on ‘economic might’.

It seems unlikely that a division on this scale emerged amongst the Antiochene nobility because the Latin principality did not recover much territory after it had been decimated by Saladin in 1188. Apart from the possessions of the military orders, Qusair is the only fortress that was definitely under Antiochene control during the first half of thirteenth century, but it belonged to the patriarch of Antioch. If Arzghan was given to Bohemond III after his meeting with Saladin in 1192, as Bahā’ al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād suggests, then there is no evidence that any prince subsequently chose to bestow the stronghold on one of his vassals as

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a fief.\textsuperscript{26} Antioch – the only city in the Latin principality between 1188 and 1260 – had been part of the princely demesne since Bohemond of Taranto took full control of the metropolis in early 1099.\textsuperscript{27} The port of St Simeon also remained in Antiochene hands throughout the first half of the thirteenth century, but the sources give no indication that it belonged to any noble during this period.\textsuperscript{28} Charter evidence confirms that some knights continued to hold estates in the rural areas which remained part of the principality of Antioch,\textsuperscript{29} but the lordships based around castles such as Saône and Bourzey were destroyed and it is unlikely that any noble had extensive landholdings in the thirteenth century. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that any Antiochene noble enjoyed the high levels of income necessary to act as the patron of a large number of knights.

The contraction of the kingdom of Jerusalem in 1187 and its subsequent expansion in the decade that followed actually weakened the position of the king within the realm. The royal demesne was reduced to Acre and Tyre while the rest of the Latin Kingdom’s key coastal cities, such as Jaffa and Caesarea, came into the possession of a small number of elite barons.\textsuperscript{30} Consequently, a group of prosperous lords emerged that had enough strength collectively to challenge the power of the king. Indeed, these barons actually fought and defeated the forces of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II during a bitter civil war that lasted from 1229 to 1243.\textsuperscript{31} There is no evidence that an elite faction of nobles emerged in the thirteenth century principality of Antioch that was capable of seriously undermining the prince’s authority. The prince’s possession of the only large city in a small principality almost certainly ensured that his income was considerably higher than any other Antiochene lord and this meant that he could act as the patron of far more knights than anyone else.

The prince of Antioch had not always been in such a dominant position. Prior to 1188, several Antiochene nobles possessed significant lordships and when they united together they posed a serious threat to the power of the prince or regent. In the 1130s King Fulk of Jerusalem’s regency of Antioch was severely undermined by Princess Alice and her

\textsuperscript{26} BDIS, p. 237.
\textsuperscript{27} Asbridge, \textit{Principality of Antioch}, pp. 42, 148.
\textsuperscript{29} For example, in 1194 Bohemond III confirmed that a knight named Godfrey had donated uncultivated land to the Hospitallers. See Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{30} Donnachie, \textit{Reconstruction and Rebirth}, pp. 74, 308-309, 365.
\textsuperscript{31} P.W. Edbury, \textit{John of Ibelin and the Kingdom of Jerusalem} (Woodbridge, 1997), pp. 34-57.
supporters, while Bohemond III faced a baronial revolt in c.1181 after he confiscated Church property and became embroiled in a dispute with the patriarch of Antioch. Many Antiochene nobles lost their lordships in 1188 and as a result their ability to challenge the authority of the prince would have been reduced, especially if some former lords subsequently became his vassals in return for money fiefs because he would then have had the power to withdraw their source of income if they opposed him. During the Antiochene succession dispute many nobles resisted Bohemond IV’s rule of the Latin principality, but that was because they were able to serve under King Leon I of Cilicia before Raymond-Roupen was invested as prince in 1216. The Armenian king almost certainly provided his great-nephew’s Antiochene supporters with an income during the conflict as it is difficult to see how they could have collected revenue from any estates or property they possessed within the principality. There is no record of any attempt to challenge the power of the prince after Bohemond IV regained control of Antioch in 1219.

The Tripolitan nobles seem to have been much more assertive and rebellious than their Antiochene counterparts. For example, in the early thirteenth century Renaud of Nephin married the daughter and sole heir of the lord of Akkar without the permission of Bohemond IV. The count of Tripoli later seized the lordships of Nephin and Akkar after he became embroiled in a military conflict with Renaud. The fact that Renaud was willing to defy and fight against Bohemond demonstrates the power and independence of the Tripolitan nobility. Several decades later, Bohemond VI also faced revolts from the barons in the county of Tripoli, notably in 1258.

The charter evidence supports the view that thirteenth century Antiochene nobles possessed considerably less land and property than their twelfth century predecessors. Asbridge has used charters and the testimony of chroniclers to produce a database of all the identifiable lay landholders in the principality of Antioch for the period 1098-1130. Some

34 SC, p. 639; Smbat, p. 81
35 Eracles, p. 314.
36 ATS, p. 435; Eracles, pp. 314-315; GC, p. 663.
38 Asbridge, Principality of Antioch, pp. 169-180.
of these men and women held substantial lordships and therefore they were willing and able to donate land and villages to religious institutions and the military orders. For example, in 1114 Roger of Salerno, prince of Antioch, confirmed in a charter the grants made to the monastery of Notre-Dame de Josaphat by Robert of Laitor and several other lords. Later in the twelfth century, some Antiochene nobles, such as Roger of Saône and Reynald Masoir, issued their own charters without referring to the prince. Such behaviour suggests that the most powerful lords in the principality acted independently and did not need the consent of the prince to make donations. In the thirteenth century, on the other hand, no charters issued by Antiochene nobles have survived and the princes of Antioch only confirmed a handful of endowments made by their vassals in the principality. This may simply be because the relevant charters have not survived, but it does indicate that considerably fewer donations were made after 1188 because the nobility did not have as much land to give away. In the county of Tripoli, several different barons issued their own charters granting land, money, and rights to the military orders and Italian communes during the thirteenth century. It is surely not a coincidence that there is more evidence of donations made by the Tripolitan nobles than their Antiochene counterparts – it is almost certainly because they made more grants. Several major lordships in the thirteenth century county of Tripoli, such as Jubayl and Batroun, were in the hands of the nobility and therefore the barons of this polity possessed the wealth and property to make substantial donations.

The Antiochene Noble Families

It is difficult to identify many nobles in the thirteenth century principality of Antioch because most of the witnesses to charters issued by Bohemond IV, Bohemond V, and Bohemond VI appear to have been lords and vassals from the county of Tripoli, even when they were making an agreement about the principality. Of the charters issued by Bohemond V and Bohemond VI between the former’s accession in 1233 and the fall of Antioch in 1268, only eight containing witness lists have survived. Only one of these eight documents, 39 Chartes de Terre Sainte provenant de l’abbaye de Notre-Dame de Josaphat, ed. H.-F. Delaborde (Paris, 1880), No. 4, pp. 26-27; RRH, 1, No. 76, p. 17; The Antiochene Wars, pp. 205-206.

40 Roger of Saône issued a charter without reference to the prince in July 1170: CGOH, 1, No. 417, p. 289; RRH, 1, No. 473, p. 124. Reynald Masoir issued several charters without reference to the prince, such as in 1174: CGOH, 1, No. 457, pp. 313-314; RRH, 1, No. 521, pp. 138-139.

41 See Appendix B.


43 For example, in January 1228 Bohemond IV issued a charter granting a mill near Antioch to the Teutonic Knights. However, William of the Island appears to be the only Antiochene on the witness list. Most, if not all, of the other witnesses came from the county of Tripoli. RRH, 1, No. 979, p. 257; TOT, No. 61, p. 50.
originally written in 1262, includes the names of men that were definitely from the Latin principality on the witness list. Furthermore, references to notable Antiochene individuals in the chronicles are few and far between, apart from the prince and the patriarch. Thus, with such limited evidence only tentative conclusions can be made about which Antiochene nobles had a high political standing in the thirteenth century and whether or not they came from families that had traditionally played a prominent role in the principality’s affairs.

The charter issued by Bohemond VI in 1262 was witnessed by several men who came from families that had resided within the principality since at least the mid-twelfth century.44 The first witness listed on the 1262 charter is John of Angerville, bailie of Antioch. John may have been related to Richard of Angerville, who was present in the principality during the final years of Bohemond III’s rule,45 and Hugh of Angerville, who witnessed a charter issued by Bohemond II in 1127.46

The second name on the witness list of the 1262 charter is Simon Mansel, constable of Antioch. According to the *Assises d’Antioche*, Simon was the son of ‘Mancel the constable’.47 This must be a reference to Robert Mansel – the constable of Antioch who witnessed charters issued by King Leon I of Cilicia and Raymond-Roupen between 1207 and 1219.48 Robert and Simon were probably descendants of Mansel,49 whose first recorded presence in the principality was as a witness to a charter issued in 1135 at Latakia by Walter of Sourdeval.50 William, son of Mansel, who also witnessed the 1135 charter, is referred to as ‘once of Jerusalem’ in a charter recording an agreement between the abbey of Venosa in southern Italy and John, son of Hugh Mansel, in the 1140s.51 This suggests that the Mansels may have held fiefs in the kingdom of Jerusalem before establishing themselves in the principality of Antioch.

Another witness to Bohemond VI’s charter of 1262 was Bartholomew Tirel, marshal of Antioch. In 1186, Bohemond III’s ratification of Bertrand Maziol’s donation to the Hospitallers was also witnessed by a Bartholomew Tirel, marshal of Antioch.52 They cannot

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44 CGOH, 3, No. 3020, pp. 27-28; RRH, 1, No. 1317, p. 344. See Appendices A and B.
45 See Appendices A and B.
46 RRH, 1, No. 119, pp. 29-30.
47 *Assises d’Antioche*, p. 2.
48 See Appendices A and B. See also Cahen, *La Syrie du nord*, pp. 30-31, 544.
50 CGOH, 1, No. 109, p. 92; RRH, 1, No. 150, p. 37.
51 I would like to thank Andrew Jotischky for bringing this to my attention. See H. Houben, *Die Abtei Venosa und das Mönchtum im normannisch-staufischen Süditalien* (Tübingen, 1995), No. 115, pp. 350-351.
52 CGOH, 1, No. 783, p. 496; RRH, 1, No. 649, pp. 171-172.
be the same man because there is a gap of more than seventy years between their recorded appearances, but the fact that they have the same name and held the same office in the principality of Antioch suggests they were related. Cahen and Edbury have asserted that Thomas the Marshal was also a member of the Tirel family, but he is not given a surname nor described in relation to anyone else in the sources where his name is mentioned. Several Tirels served as the marshal of Antioch so it is possible that Thomas was part of the family, but it is dangerous to make such an assumption when men from other families, such as William de Cava and Hugh de Flauncurt, also held the position. William Tirel was the first Tirel to be described as the marshal of Antioch in a charter issued in 1149.

Two other Antiochenes can be clearly identified on the witness list of the 1262 charter. Peter de Hazart and John de Hazart appear to be from the same family, although the source does not specify their relationship with each other. They were probably descended from William de Hazart, who witnessed several charters issued by Raymond-Roupen, and another Peter de Hazart, whose earliest recorded appearance in the principality is in 1167. John of Angerville, Simon Mansel, Bartholomew Tirel, and Peter and John de Hazart were certainly part of the Antiochene political elite in the 1260s, with four of them holding important titles. However, it is impossible to know which other nobles obtained grand offices and political influence after Bohemond V succeeded his father as prince of Antioch in 1233 because so few charters were issued and because so many of the charter witnesses were from the county of Tripoli.

Other noble families that were so prominent in the principality of Antioch until Saladin’s devastating campaign in northern Syria almost completely disappear from the sources in the thirteenth century. For example, Robert of Sourdeval participated in the First Crusade (1095-1099) and helped to establish the Latin principality after the capture of Antioch in 1098. He subsequently gained control of the lordship of Laitor and his descendants remained part of the Antiochene political elite for many decades afterwards. Members of the Sourdeval family regularly witnessed princely charters prior to 1188.

53 Cahen, La Syrie du nord, pp. 30, 463; Edbury, ‘Law and Custom’, p. 244.
54 For a list of the marshals of Antioch see Cahen, La Syrie du nord, p. 463; La Monte, Feudal Monarchy, p. 258.
55 RRH, 1, No. 253, pp. 63-64.
56 Cahen, La Syrie du nord, p. 545.
57 See Appendices A and B.
58 RRH, 1, No. 434, p. 113.
59 Asbridge, Principality of Antioch, pp. 165-166; Asbridge, ‘Alice of Antioch’, pp. 40-41; Murray, ‘How Norman was the Principality’, p. 356.
including one of the last surviving charters issued by Bohemond III before Saladin invaded
the principality.\textsuperscript{60} However, the only mention of the Sourdevals in the witness lists of
princely charters after 1188 is in 1215, when Walter of Laitor witnessed two charters issued
by Raymond-Roupen in the kingdom of Cilicia.\textsuperscript{61} The family definitely remained in
possession of landholdings in the principality because in 1262 Bohemond VI confirmed a
donation of land near Antioch to the Hospitallers made by Walter's daughter, Sibylle.\textsuperscript{62} The
fact that members of the Sourdeval family witnessed just two of the surviving princely
charters issued after 1188 when they had been such regular charter witnesses prior to that
date suggests that Saladin's conquests in northern Syria had a damaging impact on the
Sourdevals and dented their standing within the principality. Just as their regular appearance
on the witness lists of twelfth century princely charters indicates that they were part of the
Antiochene political elite, their absence from such documents after 1188 suggests that they
were no longer an influential noble family.\textsuperscript{63} The disappearance of the Sourdevals from the
sources could be partly explained by other reasons: Walter of Laitor may have been exiled
from the principality after Bohemond IV recaptured Antioch in 1219 because of his support
for Raymond-Roupen in the Antiochene succession dispute, or he may have died without
male heirs shortly after 1215. Nevertheless, it seems fairly certain that this family had much
less influence over the affairs of the principality in the thirteenth century than it had done
prior to 1188.

There is reason to think that after he reclaimed the Latin principality in 1219, Bohemond IV chose not to exile the nobles who had backed Raymond-Roupen during the
Antiochene succession dispute. William of the Island was an Antiochene noble who entered
the service of King Leon I in 1201 and later witnessed several charters issued by Raymond-
Roupen.\textsuperscript{64} William subsequently witnessed two of Bohemond IV’s charters in 1228.
Similarly, Thomas the Marshal’s name appears on the witness lists of Raymond-Roupen’s
charters in 1215 and 1216, but also on those of Bohemond IV in 1231.\textsuperscript{65} Edbury asserts that
Thomas ‘evidently lived in exile after Bohemond IV’s restoration’ at Antioch in 1219.\textsuperscript{66} However, there is no evidence that the count of Tripoli exiled anyone and the sources clearly

\textsuperscript{60} In February 1186 Walter of Sourdeval witnessed Bohemond III’s charter. CGOH, 1, No. 783, pp. 491-496;
RRH, 1, No. 649, pp. 171-172.
\textsuperscript{61} See Appendices A and B.
\textsuperscript{62} CCRR, 3, No. 3021, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{63} For more information about witness lists see Donnachie, Reconstruction and Rebirth, p. 311.
\textsuperscript{64} SC, p. 639; Smbat, p. 81. See Appendices A and B.
\textsuperscript{65} See Appendices A and B.
\textsuperscript{66} Edbury, ‘Law and Custom’, p. 244.
demonstrate that in 1231 Thomas was still recognised as the marshal of Antioch. If any exile did occur it was temporary and Thomas was able to resume his position. The fact that William of the Island and Thomas the Marshal witnessed agreements made by Bohemond IV long after the conclusion of the Antiochene succession dispute indicates that the nobles who had supported Raymond-Roupen were not permanently excluded from the principality’s political elite after 1219. The count of Tripoli seems to have been able to reconcile with those who previously opposed him.

It would appear that the prince had a large degree of control over which nobles obtained positions of power and influence within the principality in the thirteenth century, and he could ignore those whom he viewed unfavourably. This would explain why there is no mention of anyone from Angerville in the charters issued by Raymond-Roupen, Bohemond IV, and Bohemond V. Richard of Angerville witnessed Bohemond III’s final surviving charter in June 1200, while John of Angerville’s name appears on the charter issued by Bohemond VI in 1262. It is highly likely that members of the Angerville family remained in the principality of Antioch during the first half of the thirteenth century. Their absence from the documentary evidence between 1200 and 1262 suggests that Richard and his heirs were not of such a high status that the prince needed their support and they did not have strong personal connections with Raymond-Roupen, Bohemond IV, and Bohemond V. Thus, the Angervilles were not part of the political elite that was close to the prince and they were not required to act as witnesses when he was issuing charters. The disappearance of the Angervilles could also be explained by the lack of source material, although if a member of the family had occupied a grand office or been close to the prince they would probably have been mentioned in the charters which have survived.

It is clear that some Antiochene noble families were able to adapt to the post-1188 principality better than others, although it is impossible to know whether the members of any family remained part of the Antiochene political elite throughout the thirteenth century due to the paucity of evidence. The contrast in fortunes between the Mansels and the Sourdevals is particularly indicative. Robert Mansel obtained the office of constable and was evidently one of the most powerful men in the principality during Raymond-Roupen’s short tenure in charge of Antioch, even becoming mayor of the Antiochene commune.

67 RRH, 1, No. 772, p. 206.
68 CGOH, 3, No. 3020, pp. 27-28; RRH, 1, No. 1317, p. 344.
69 See Chapter Two: The Commune of Antioch.
1260s Simon Mansel had also been recognised as the constable of Antioch and appears to have established himself as one of the leading figures in the principality. The Sourdevals, on the other hand, were one of many noble families that seem to have fallen out of the political elite after the principality was devastated by Saladin.

Murray and Asbridge have tentatively concluded that most of the nobility in the twelfth century principality of Antioch could trace their ancestry back to Normandy and the surrounding areas of northern France. However, very few of the individuals and families which they identify as having Norman origins appear on the witness lists of the princely charters after 1188. For example, both Asbridge and Murray agree that the Fresnel family was probably from La Ferté-Fresnel in Normandy, but none of the charter witness in the period 1188-1268 have the surname Fresnel. The Sourdevals were almost certainly from Normandy, but it is difficult to identify the origins of the other noble families that remained in the principality of Antioch after 1188. The Angervilles may also have been from Normandy, although Asbridge suggests they came from Angreville, south of Paris.

Edbury has shown that some elements of Antiochene law reflected legal practice in the contemporary kingdom of England, but were completely different from the customs of the kingdom of Jerusalem. He suggests that ‘the Norman element in Antiochene society’ introduced certain customs regarding the possession of fiefs. The argument is that England and Antioch shared some legal customs because of the Norman origins of their nobility. It is perfectly possible that the thirteenth century Antiochene nobility adhered to laws that originated in Normandy, but that does not mean Norman identity persisted in the principality of Antioch. The evidence of chronicles and charters demonstrates that the Normans who settled in southern Italy in the eleventh century maintained their Norman identity for several generations, even as they intermarried with the native population. However, Murray has convincingly argued that those settled in the Latin East, including the principality of Antioch, swiftly adopted a common identity and did not distinguish between men whose origins lay in

71 Asbridge, *Principality of Antioch*, pp. 163-164; Murray, ‘How Norman was the Principality’, p. 357.
72 See Appendix A.
73 Asbridge, *Principality of Antioch*, pp. 165-166; Murray, ‘How Norman was the Principality’, pp. 356-357.
different parts of northern and central France. Chroniclers who lived in the principality of Antioch or the kingdom of Jerusalem, including Walter the Chancellor and William of Tyre, refer to the Europeans who settled in Syria and Palestine after the First Crusade as Franks (Franci) or Latins (Latini) and never use the term ‘Normans’ to describe members of the Antiochene nobility. None of the princely charter witnesses in the period 1188-1268 are described as Normans and there is no evidence to suggest that any thirteenth century Antiochene noble identified himself as Norman or emphasised his Norman roots.

The Influence of the Antiochene Nobility on the Principality of Antioch’s Relationship with the Kingdom of Cilicia

In 1199 King Leon I of Cilicia wrote to Pope Innocent III stating that shortly after the birth of Raymond-Roupen, Prince Bohemond III publicly recognised the boy as his ‘lawful heir’ at a ‘plenary court’ and declared to the ‘barons’ that his grandson should succeed him as prince of Antioch by ‘hereditary right’. Furthermore, Bohemond made ‘all his liege men’ swear an oath of allegiance to Raymond-Roupen. This evidence is not contradicted by any other source and suggests that Raymond-Roupen should have received a lot of support from the Antiochene nobility, if these men remained true to their word. According to the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable, many ‘warriors’ and six ‘princes’ left the principality of Antioch and entered into the service of King Leon I after the death of Bohemond III in 1201.

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80 ‘Credimus enim vestram non latere notitiam Raimundum, filium illustri principis Antiochie maiorem natu, Aalizam, neptem nostram, divina disponente clementia sibi in uxorem duxisse et ex ea filium nomine Rupinum genuisse, quem in honore Dei venerabilis Maguntinus archiepiscopus baptizavit. Contigit nempe peccatis exigentibus, quod dolendo dicimus, ipsum R(aimundum) viam universe carnis ingredi, sed ante decessum, dum in sua bona erat memoria, patrem suum nobilissimum principem rogavit, ut ius hereditarium sibi pertinens unico filio suo reservaret. Cuius preces illustris principis non tradens oblivioni, nepotem suum Rupinum, filium Aelidis neptis nostre, coram se adduci fecit et circumstantibus omnibus baronibus et quampluribus aliis ad hoc specialiter convocatis manifestavit et confirmavit pretaxatum R(upinum) suum in plena curia esse heredem legitimum ; dehinc conversus ad nepotem suum similiter coram omnibus circumstantibus affirmavit ipsum iure hereditario sibi debere succedere. Unde in sua memoria et sua bona voluntate ab omnibus hominibus suis ligiis sanctis evangeliis et cruce Dominica eidem nepoti suo iurari et ligium hominium fieri fecit ; salva tamen fidelitate sua, quoad vixerit. Post hec ipsum puerum de Antiochia et toto principatu sagivit ; quod manifestius patet per privilegium sigillo principali munitum, unde ad audientie vestre pietatem transcriptum mittimus’. Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 242, pp. 462-465.

81 Dédéyan uses the terms ‘guerriers’ and ‘princes’ in his French translation of the Armenian text. SC, p. 639; Smbat, p. 81.
them – Oliver the chamberlain, Roger of the Mountains, and William of the Island – had previously witnessed charters issued by Bohemond III. These men had clearly decided to honour the oath they made in c.1198 and support Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch. It is unclear whether they were exiled by Bohemond IV, who seized control of Antioch shortly after his father’s death, or voluntarily chose to depart the Latin principality in order to join Raymond-Roupen’s Cilician Armenian supporters.

The documentary evidence confirms that many other Antiochene nobles supported Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality and served under King Leon I as he attempted to wrest control of Antioch from Bohemond IV. A charter composed in 1210, in which Raymond-Roupen granted the castle of Bikisrail to the Hospitallers, was witnessed by six men who appear to be Antiochene rather than Cilician Armenian. Similarly, two charters issued by Raymond-Roupen in 1215 were witnessed by twelve men whom he described as ‘my loyal barons’. These men may have appeared at the court of King Leon I soon after the death of Bohemond III, but it is also possible that some of them switched sides as the Antiochene succession dispute progressed. Either way, Raymond-Roupen had little trouble in establishing himself as the prince of Antioch in 1216 because he already had the support of much of the Antiochene nobility. The oath they had taken in the presence of Bohemond III was probably a key factor in their decision, but these nobles must also have felt that the principality would benefit from a more co-operative relationship with the Armenian kingdom.

Bohemond IV retained control of the Latin principality for fifteen years after the death of his father in 1201, but his rule over the polity was undermined by those who resided at Antioch. King Leon I and his troops entered the city during the night in 1203, and they

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82 See Appendices A and B. Of the remaining three ‘princes’, Thomas Maslebrun subsequently witnessed charters issued by Raymond-Roupen in 1215 and 1216. There is some confusion over the names of the other two due to the difficulty of translating the Armenian text. The man named ‘Pagan the butler’ by Dédéyan is called ‘Bohemond Lair’ by Dulaurier in the RHC translation. Pagan the butler witnessed a charter issued by Raymond-Roupen in 1210. The man named ‘Juart’ by Dédéyan is called ‘Louard’ by Dulaurier in the RHC translation. Dédéyan suggests that ‘Juart’ could be Eschivard, brother of Acharie the seneschal. SC, p. 639; Smbat, p. 81.

83 Their names are: Robert Mansel, constable of Antioch; Otto of Tiberias; William of the Island, Robert Tali; Pagan, butler of Antioch; Nicholas Lualn. See Appendices A and B.

84 ‘fidelium baronum meorum’. Their names are: Otto of Tiberias; Acharie, seneschal of Antioch; William of the Island; Walter of Laitor; Eschivard; William de Hazart; Thomas, marshal of Antioch; Pontius of Lombardy; Simon, chamberlain of Antioch; Baldwin de Maimendon; Thomas Maslebrun; Bartholomew de Jaune. See Appendices A and B.

85 ‘Contigit igitur nocte quadam ante adventum ipsius P. cardinalis cum omni exercitu nostro vindicantes hereditatem nepotis nostri partes Antiochenas defectu justitiae infestantes sicut domino placuit infra muros Antiochenos in manu forti intravimus’. PL, 215, Col. 689, No. 119; Reg. Inn. III, 8, No. 120, pp. 212-215.
did so again in 1216.\textsuperscript{86} The fact that the Cilician Armenians were able to get into Antioch under the cover of darkness suggests that treachery was involved. Indeed, the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable confirms that in 1216 a gate was opened for Leon’s men when they were outside the city.\textsuperscript{87} The \textit{Annales de Terre Sainte} and the \textit{Gestes des Chiprois} indicate that it was Acharie the Seneschal who betrayed Antioch to the Armenian king.\textsuperscript{88} This evidence suggests that some of the nobility which remained at Antioch throughout the succession dispute supported Raymond-Roupen. The treachery of these men was significant as it allowed King Leon I to enter the city in 1216 and install his great-nephew as prince without having to besiege it first. However, the Cilician Armenians were unable to secure control of Antioch and establish Raymond-Roupen in power after entering the city in 1203 so clearly other factors contributed to their success in 1216.

Another incident provides further evidence that some of Raymond-Roupen’s supporters remained at Antioch throughout the Antiochene succession dispute. In late 1207 the Latin patriarch of Antioch, Peter of Angoulême, was involved in an unsuccessful rebellion against the prince, which led to his imprisonment and, ultimately, his death.\textsuperscript{89} Several sources record that the commune and a group of knights were at the forefront of the uprising.\textsuperscript{90} However, they all provide extremely concise accounts of the event and do not name any of the rebels or say how many there were. It is therefore impossible to know which individuals were involved in the revolt or fully appreciate the scale of the insurrection. The wording of the sources suggests that it was an internal matter, with no mention of external participation in the rebellion.\textsuperscript{91} It appears that a group of Antiochene knights, in collaboration with Peter of Angoulême and members of the commune, tried to overthrow Bohemond IV without any help from the Cilician Armenians. However, the Tripolitan count evidently

\textsuperscript{86} DSN, p. 260; HII, p. 483; SC, p. 643; Smbat, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{87} ‘Le roi Léon s’empara habilement d’Antioche. Il gagna, par la promesse de grandes libéralités, quelques-uns des principaux de la ville, qui lui en ouvrirent la porte pendant la nuit’. SC, p. 643. ‘…le roi Lewon prit Antioche par son adresse et son habileté ; en effet, ce qu’auparavant il n’avait pu obtenir par de rudes combats, il y détermina ensuite, par de riches présents et des promesses certains des princes, qui lui ouvrirent pendant la nuit les portes de la ville’. Smbat, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{88} ATS, p. 436; GC, p. 665.
\textsuperscript{89} ATS, p. 436; Eracles, pp. 313-314; GC, p. 664; HII, p. 481; PL, 215, Col. 1322, No. 214; Reg. Inn. III, 10, No. 214, p. 383; Smbat, pp. 84-85.
\textsuperscript{90} The French translation of the Chronological Table of Hethoum records that Bohemond IV’s ‘troupes de cavalerie’ revolted against him. HII, p. 481. The \textit{Annales de Terre Sainte} and the \textit{Gestes des Chiprois} refer to ‘chevaliers’. ATS, p. 436; GC, p. 664.
\textsuperscript{91} For example: ‘Bohémond, prince d’Antioche, défit ses troupes de cavalerie, et la commune d’Antioche, insurgées contre lui. Il fit arrêter le patriarche, qui mourut dans sa prison’. HII, p. 481.
retained the support of some of the Antiochene nobility because he had the military strength to crush the uprising and maintain his grip on Antioch until 1216.

The Influence of the Cilician Armenian Nobility on the Kingdom of Cilicia’s Relationship with the Principality of Antioch

The barons of Armenian Cilicia were predominantly loyal to King Leon I following his coronation in 1198 which allowed him to concentrate on external matters.\(^{92}\) If Leon’s reign had been plagued by rebellions, he would not have been able to pursue his dual aims of expanding the Armenian kingdom and overseeing the investiture of Raymond-Roupen as prince of Antioch. It was important, therefore, for the king of Cilicia to clamp down on any noble who dared to challenge his authority. Leon acted ruthlessly to imprison barons who he thought were acting treacherously. Both Hethoum of Lampron and Constantine, son of Vasak, were dealt with in this manner.\(^{93}\) The loyalty of the Cilician Armenian nobility to King Leon I allowed him to concentrate on campaigning in northern Syria. This eventually bore fruit when he was able to secure control of Antioch and install Raymond-Roupen as prince in 1216.

A sizeable proportion of the Cilician Armenian nobility seem to have fought for their king during the early thirteenth century because he campaigned almost relentlessly during this period and he could not have done so without a large number of troops. Armenian chroniclers tend not to describe the composition of Leon’s armies in any detail so it is difficult to know which nobles were present amongst them. However, the Etchmiadzin version of the chronicle attributed to Sempad records that the king of Cilicia sent two of his most powerful barons, Constantine of Babaron and Adam of Baghras, to relieve the siege of Gaban in 1216 after the fortress was attacked by the forces of ‘Izz al-Dīn Kay-Kāwūs I.\(^{94}\) The Armenians were outmanoeuvred and easily defeated by the Seljuks, who captured several members of the Cilician Armenian nobility including Constantine himself.\(^{95}\) This incident highlights the importance to Leon of maintaining loyalty amongst his vassals, even if Adam and Constantine were beaten on the battlefield. The Armenian king may have been able to spend many months helping Raymond-Roupen establish his authority over the principality of Antioch because Leon knew that he could rely on his barons to defend Cilicia in his absence.

\(^{92}\) For a list of all the Cilician barons that attended the coronation of Leon in 1198 see Appendix C.
\(^{93}\) SC, pp. 640, 642; Smbat, pp. 81-82, 84.
\(^{94}\) SC, p. 644.
\(^{95}\) HII, p. 483; SC, pp. 644-645; Smbat, p. 92.
The Cilician Armenian nobility supported King Leon I in his attempts to put Raymond-Roupen on the throne of Antioch in the diplomatic sphere as well as in the military arena. For example, in September 1204 the Armenian king sent Constantine of Camardias to Acre to negotiate with the papal legate Soffredus of Santa Prassede, who hoped to peacefully resolve the Antiochene succession dispute. Many Cilician Armenian barons were content to fight for their king or represent him in peace talks during the struggle for control of Antioch, but that does not mean they were ardent supporters of Leon’s great-nephew. Their behaviour after Raymond-Roupen’s investiture as prince in 1216 actually suggests the opposite.

The Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad records that shortly after Raymond-Roupen took control of the principality, Leon decided to make Isabel, the newly-born daughter of his second wife, the heir to the throne of the kingdom of Cilicia and thereby disinherit his great-nephew. The Armenian king was apparently advised by his barons that he should be succeeded by his own child rather than his brother’s grandson. It is intriguing that the Cilician Armenian nobility appear to have preferred Isabel to be their next monarch, even though Leon was an elderly man with health problems and she was a baby who would not be able to participate in the governance of the kingdom for many years. They evidently did not want Raymond-Roupen to be their next king despite the problems that a potentially lengthy period of regency would bring.

There are two possible reasons for the stance of the barons who encouraged Leon to change his succession plans: either they had a strong personal dislike of Raymond-Roupen and thought he would be a bad king, or they were worried by the prospect of Armenian Cilicia being ruled by the prince of Antioch. The commune of Antioch supported Bohemond IV during the Antiochene succession dispute because they wanted to preserve the principality’s status as an independent Latin state. Similarly, many Cilician Armenian nobles may have feared that their own privileged positions within an independent Armenian kingdom would be threatened under the governance of a man who also ruled over Antioch and its environs. On the other hand, later events suggest that Raymond-Roupen was an unpopular figure amongst both Latins and Armenians so their decision to support Isabel’s claim to the throne may have been for personal reasons.

96 PL, 215, Col. 691, No. 119.
97 Smbat, p. 90.
98 See Chapter Two: The Commune of Antioch.
The death of King Leon I in 1219 sparked a succession dispute in the Armenian kingdom which bears some resemblance to the quarrel which broke out at Antioch almost two decades earlier. An elderly ruler died at a time when his designated heir was still an infant, and therefore an adult kinsman claimed the deceased man’s territory. However, unlike the crisis which engulfed the Latin principality, the nobility played the decisive role in the Cilician succession dispute. Most Cilician Armenian barons supported Isabel’s claim to the throne, and her guardian, Adam of Baghras, ruled Cilicia as regent in the months after Leon’s death. According to Eracles, Adam was murdered by the Assassins, and replaced as the regent and baillie of the Armenian kingdom by the constable, Constantine of Babaron. It is even suggested that Constantine arranged the assassination in order to usurp his rival. Regardless of the veracity of this claim, it is clear that the ambitious constable sought fill the power vacuum created by the passing of the king.

When Raymond-Roupen arrived at Tarsus in 1220 to pursue his claim to the Armenian kingdom, he received the support of a number of Cilician Armenian barons. The most notable of these was Vahram – a prominent vassal of King Leon I who held the office of marshal. The partisans of the former prince of Antioch were opposed by a group of nobles determined to ensure that Isabel, Leon’s designated heir and youngest child, inherited the throne. They were led by the baillie of the Armenian kingdom, Constantine of Babaron. According to the Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad, which provides the most detailed account of these events, Raymond-Roupen’s army was defeated by Isabel’s supporters between Adana and Mamistra. The beaten force retreated to Tarsus, but the city was betrayed to Constantine, who had all his chief opponents imprisoned. Raymond-Roupen seems to have died in prison soon afterwards.

The factionalism of the nobility in this conflict undoubtedly demonstrates that the public designation of an heir in Armenian Cilicia was largely ineffectual. Both Constantine and Vahram witnessed a number of charters issued by King Leon I, and both held important offices of state, yet they took opposing sides in the Cilician succession dispute. This

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99 ATS, p. 437; HII, p. 484; KG, p. 427; OP, p. 234; Crusade and Christendom, p. 190; SA, p. 459; Smbat, pp. 93-94; VE, pp. 513-514; VG, p. 213.
100 Eracles, p. 347; KG, p. 427.
101 Eracles, p. 347.
102 Eracles, p. 347; HII, p. 485; Smbat, pp. 94-95.
103 Smbat, pp. 94-95.
104 ATS, p. 437; Eracles, p. 347; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 485; OP, p. 250; Crusade and Christendom, p. 199; Smbat, pp. 94-95; VE, p. 514.
105 CCRR, No. 5, p. 116; CCRR, No. 8, p. 123; CCRR, No. 9, p. 125.
indicates that men who had loyally served under Leon chose to back Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the Armenian kingdom. He was not simply drawing his support from barons bearing a grudge against his great-uncle.

Some Cilician Armenian nobles were willing to ignore the designation of Isabel as the heir to the throne because they wanted to avoid the difficulties that her reign would bring. They seem to have hoped that Raymond-Roupen’s status as an adult male, with experience of ruling a sovereign state, would bring stability to the Armenian kingdom. These men may have been averse to a potentially lengthy period of regency until Leon’s young daughter reached the age of majority, particularly after Adam’s murder when Constantine took power on her behalf.

After crushing Raymond-Roupen’s attempt to seize control of Cilicia, Constantine of Babaron did not remain regent of the kingdom for long. In 1222 Isabel, daughter of King Leon I, was married to Philip, son of Prince Bohemond IV.\(^\text{106}\) Her husband was subsequently crowned king, and the Armenian kingdom entered into a formal alliance with the neighbouring principality of Antioch. The decision to marry the young queen was taken by the Cilician Armenian clergy and nobility.\(^\text{107}\) Bar Hebraeus wrote that Constantine of Babaron intended to pair her with one of his sons, but when this plan received little support he agreed to the subsequent arrangement with the Antiochenes.\(^\text{108}\) Although this information is not corroborated by other sources, it would help to explain both previous and subsequent events.

After a short spell as king consort of Cilicia, Philip was arrested and imprisoned by a group of barons in late 1224.\(^\text{109}\) There is a consensus among the chroniclers who recorded these events that he made a number of unpopular decisions which angered his subjects. Some historians recorded that the new king began to replace Cilician Armenian nobles with his own men.\(^\text{110}\) The exact nature of this policy is unclear, but there is no doubt that the nobility of Cilicia were concerned about the influx of Latins into their kingdom and that this was one of the causes of the rebellion against him. Other writers reported that, as well as behaving disrespectfully towards the Armenians, Isabel’s husband sent some of the kingdom’s wealth,
including the crown and royal throne, to his father, Bohemond IV.\textsuperscript{111} Philip was overthrown because he alienated many of the barons who had crowned him just a few years earlier and they felt no compunction about dethroning a monarch that threatened their interests.

The insurrection was led by Constantine of Babaron, who exploited Philip’s unpopularity by taking full control of the Armenian kingdom. After imprisoning the king, the \textit{baillie} seems to have ruled Cilicia as the \textit{de facto} regent for many years. Isabel’s husband died less than two years after his incarceration, apparently due to poisoning.\textsuperscript{112} It is highly likely that Constantine was behind Philip’s murder as the \textit{baillie} was the leader of the revolt that deposed the king and his family benefitted most from Philip’s death. By eliminating Isabel’s husband, Constantine reopened the possibility of marrying the queen to one of his children. The \textit{baillie} was prepared to force Leon’s daughter to wed Hethoum, his son and heir, against her will.

Both Isabel and her mother were against the proposed union, and they took refuge in Silifke when it became clear that their opposition to the match was likely to be ignored.\textsuperscript{113} After briefly laying siege to Silifke, Constantine began negotiating with the Order of the Hospital, which owned the fortress. The Hospitallers refused to evict the women, but instead agreed to surrender the castle to the \textit{baillie} while they were still inside.\textsuperscript{114} The queen was subsequently escorted to Tarsus and married to Hethoum, son of Constantine, apparently against her will.\textsuperscript{115} Although Hethoum and Isabel were crowned king and queen of Cilicia after their wedding ceremony, Constantine of Babaron continued to rule the kingdom for several years after the coronation.

The nobility played a key role in Cilician Armenian politics between 1219 and 1226. Constantine of Babaron profited most from the instability of this period, but he did not initially get his own way. His primary motive for ensuring that Isabel succeeded her father cannot have been a desire to hand the Cilician crown to a man from another ruling dynasty by matrimony. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the \textit{baillie} felt compelled to aid the young queen because she had been publicly designated as the heir to the kingdom. Constantine seems to have planned to marry Isabel to one of his sons soon after King Leon I’s death in

\begin{tiny}
\begin{enumerate}
\item KG, p. 428; Smbat, p. 96; VG, p. 213.
\item BH, 1, p. 381.
\item BH, 1, p. 381; KG, p. 429; SC, p. 648.
\item BH, 1, p. 389; SC, p. 648.
\item BH, 1, pp. 389-390; Eracles, p. 347-348; HII, p. 485; KG, p. 429; SA, p. 460; SC, p. 648; Smbat, p. 96; VE, pp. 516-518; VG, p. 213.
\end{enumerate}
\end{tiny}
However, a majority of the barons appear to have favoured a marriage alliance with the principality of Antioch so the queen was paired with Philip. In the early 1220s it was the actions of the Cilician Armenian nobility which strengthened the Armenian kingdom’s relationship with its Latin neighbour.

Constantine could not have succeeded in deposing Philip and putting Hethoum on the throne without the support of a large number of barons. Once the son of Bohemond IV had alienated most of the Cilician Armenian nobility, the baillie acted swiftly to capture and imprison the king. He was subsequently able to persuade many nobles that it would be better to marry the young queen to a man from within the kingdom, rather than someone from a different ruling dynasty. It is important to stress that while most of the Armenian kingdom’s elite appear to have supported Hethoum’s coronation, it did not receive unanimous support. Kirakos of Ganjak recorded that there was some early opposition to the new regime and Constantine responded by brutally crushing a revolt – exiling or killing most of the rebels. However, the Hethoumids could surely not have established themselves in power if a majority of the barons had resisted them.

Conclusion

The surviving evidence suggests that the strength of the Antiochene nobility was weakened by the major territorial losses suffered by the Latin principality in 1188 and consequently that the prince’s power increased. An elite group of barons did not emerge at Antioch, as they did in the kingdom of Jerusalem, and after the conclusion of the Antiochene succession dispute in 1219 there is no evidence of any challenge to the prince’s authority by the nobility. Some Antiochene noble families that had played a prominent role in the affairs of the principality prior to 1188 continued to do so, while others seem to have lost influence.

The principality’s nobility were involved in the Antiochene succession dispute, with many men choosing to support Raymond-Roupen and enter into the service of King Leon I of Cilicia. Others appear to have backed Leon’s great-nephew but remained at Antioch. These nobles undermined Bohemond IV’s rule at Antioch and helped the Cilician Armenians gain access to the city in 1203 and 1216. On the latter occasion, King Leon I established full control of Antioch and oversaw Raymond-Roupen’s investiture as prince. The Antiochene nobility clearly played a crucial role in finally settling the succession dispute, but other

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116 BH, 1, p. 380.
117 KG, p. 428; SC, p. 647.
118 KG, p. 429.
factors must also have been significant. The Cilician Armenian nobility supported King Leon I during this conflict, and were subsequently highly influential in shaping their kingdom’s relationship with the principality of Antioch between 1219 and 1226.
Chapter Two: The Commune of Antioch

One of the most significant groups operating in the principality of Antioch in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries was the Antiochene commune. It was the first commune to be established in the Latin East and it appears to have been the most enduring. The institution was apparently created in c.1193, following the capture of Bohemond III by the Cilician Armenians, but it is unclear when the commune was abolished and it may even have survived until the destruction of the Latin principality in 1268. Cahen and Prawer have provided the most detailed studies on the commune of Antioch thus far, but neither fully considered its impact upon the course of Antiochene history. This chapter will chart the development of the commune, provide a detailed examination of its structure and functions, and demonstrate its significance during the early stages of the Antiochene succession dispute.

The Development of the Commune

In 1193 Leon II of the Roupenid principality lured Bohemond III to the castle of Baghras and captured the Antiochene prince. According to the Lyon and Florence manuscripts of Eracles, he then sent Hethoum of Sassoun to Antioch with a Cilician Armenian army and two Antiochene nobles – Bartholomew Tirel and Richier d’Erminat. Bohemond III had agreed to surrender the city to Leon and therefore the Cilician Armenians probably expected to take control of Antioch with relative ease. Bartholomew and Richier helped Hethoum and his men to enter the city, but the populace reacted angrily at the prospect of Roupenid rule and it was at this moment that a commune was formed:

Immediately they assembled together in the cathedral church of Antioch, and the Patriarch Aimery was with them and they ordered among themselves and made a commune, which they had not had at all before, and it lasted thence onward until today. And they came to Raymond, the eldest son of the prince, and told him that they would hold him as lord in place of his father, until his father was freed.

There is no mention of the social or religious background of those who established the commune. It is clear, however, that the commune was comprised of Antiochene inhabitants

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2 BH, 1, pp. 343-344; Cont. WT, pp. 164-167; DSN, pp. 256-257; Eracles, p. 214; Ernoul, p. 320; Smbat, p. 68.
3 Cont. WT, pp. 166-169.
4 'Tantost furent assemblé comunaument en la maistre yglise d’Antioche, et le patriarche Aymeri avec iaus, et ordenerent entr’iaus, et firent comune, la quale devant n’aveient point eu, qui despùs a duré jusques au jor de hui. Et vindrent a Raymont l’ainz né fis dou devant dit prince, et dirent que il le tendreient por seignor en leu dou pere, tant que le pere fust delivrés.' Cont. WT, p. 169. The English translation is adapted from Prawer, Crusader Institutions, p. 68.
that opposed Roupenid control of their city. Hethoum and the Cilician Armenian troops were seized and expelled from Antioch. Raymond and the commune appear to have governed the Latin principality until Bohemond III was freed from captivity in 1194, but the commune did not disband once the prince had returned to rule his principality. Instead this institution remained in existence for decades afterwards and it would play a significant role in the Antiochene succession dispute.

On 5 January 1199 Pope Innocent III wrote to the patriarch of Antioch, Peter of Angoulême, in response to complaints about the new commune. The pontiff states that he has been informed that the commune ‘improperly subverts the customary rights of the Latin Church’ in the principality. This suggests that the number of Latin clerics in the Antiochene commune was small, or perhaps non-existent, as they were unable to prevent it from pursuing policies which undermined their Church. Thus, although the institution was formed in St Peter’s cathedral and in the presence of Aimery of Limoges, the Antiochene patriarch at the time, it seems to have been a largely secular body dominated by the laity. Innocent’s letter also mentions that the commune of Antioch ‘burdens the churches, the clerics and their men, of whatever status or language they may be, with the exaction of a tallage contrary to ancient custom’, in order to raise revenue for its own spending purposes, thereby ignoring the privileged position of the Latin Church. The commune had evidently developed into a powerful institution in a short period of time if it had the ability to tax the Antiochene clergy.

Prawer links the commune’s tallage on the churches and clerics of Antioch to the time when Count Bohemond of Tripoli seized his father’s principality. If, however, Cahen is correct in dating Bohemond’s arrival at Antioch at the very end of 1198 then the commune actually began undermining the Latin Church before the Tripolitan count reached the city. News of the tallage had reached Innocent III by 5 January 1199 and therefore it must have been introduced before the preceding November because it took more than two months for messengers to travel from the Latin East to Italy.

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5 Cont. WT, pp. 168-169.
6 ATS, p. 434; Cont. WT, pp. 176-177; Ernoul, pp. 320-321; SC, pp. 631-632; Smbat, pp. 71-72.
7 ‘...iura ecclesie Latinorum consuetudinibus abusive pervertunt’. PL, 214, Col. 474, No. 512; Reg. Inn. III, 1, No. 512, pp. 747-748.
8 Cont. WT, p. 169.
9 ‘communia ipsius civitatis ecclesias, clericos et eorum homines, cuiuscumque conditionis vel lingue sint, in exactione tallie contra antiquam consuetudinem aggravant’. PL, 214, Col. 474, No. 512; Reg. Inn. III, 1, No. 512, pp. 747-748.
10 Prawer, Crusader Institutions, pp. 70-71.
11 Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p. 593.
Count Bohemond of Tripoli took control of the principality of Antioch for more than three months in the winter of 1198-1199.\textsuperscript{12} He was unhappy that Prince Bohemond III had designated Raymond-Roupen as his lawful heir shortly after the boy’s birth in early 1198.\textsuperscript{13} Rather than accepting that he was to be excluded from his father's inheritance, the Tripolitan count travelled to Antioch and claimed that he was the rightful successor to the principality. The Antiochene commune decided to support Bohemond of Tripoli – ‘the commune excluded the lord prince’ from the city and declared that ‘the count is the lawful heir of the prince’.\textsuperscript{14} Bohemond III was forced into exile, as his son took control of Antioch, and he was only restored to power with the assistance of the Cilician Armenians. When the events of c.1193 are taken into consideration, it is difficult to see how the count of Tripoli could have seized Antioch and ruled the principality without the support of the commune. Even in its earliest years this institution had considerable influence over who controlled this Latin state.

In 1199 the commune joined the patriarch of Antioch, the prince of Antioch, and the count of Tripoli in calling for King Leon I of Cilicia to give the castle of Baghras to the Templars. The source for this information is a letter sent by Innocent III to the Armenian king so it is not absolutely clear if they were lobbying individually or collectively.\textsuperscript{15} The fact that the pope viewed the Antiochene commune as an important institution, to be listed alongside the patriarch and prince of Antioch, once again demonstrates just how influential it had become in a short period of time. The commune’s hostility to any Roupenid presence in the principality is also clear – it opposed Leon’s occupation of Baghras, just as it opposed his attempt to seize Antioch in c.1193.

Two years later, the Antiochene commune played a leading role in the transfer of power following the death of Bohemond III in 1201. Count Bohemond of Tripoli arrived at the city of Antioch on the day of his father’s burial and took control of the principality:

He sounded the bell of the commune and assembled all the people, knights and other good men; then he begged and requested that they received him as lord, and

\textsuperscript{12} PL, 214, Cols 811-812, No. 252; Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 242, pp. 463-465.
\textsuperscript{13} PL, 214, Col. 811, No. 252; Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 242, p. 463.
\textsuperscript{14} ‘Habito consilio cum communia dominum principem B(oemundum) – proh dolor – exclusere et tam contumeliis minarum quam injuriis detractorum exasperaverunt. Exulato itaque principe guidam ficti amici comitis et precio et precibus ipsi comiti alligati populum Anti(o)ch(ie) venenoso instinctu suo subverterunt, dicentes comitem esse legitimum heredem principis: quod nephas est predicare’. PL, 214, Col. 812, No. 252; Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 242, p. 464.
\textsuperscript{15} ‘Cumque dilecti filii… magister et frater militie Templi cum nuntiis venerabilis fratris nostri… patriarche et… illustris principis Antiocheni,… Tripolitani comitis et totius Antiochene communie supplicassent’. PL, 214, Col. 819, No. 259; Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 249, p. 476.
invested and held him as the lawful heir of the principality, whilst his father was
dead. They received him and ensured that he remained as lord and prince.\textsuperscript{16}

By recognising the Tripolitan count as Prince Bohemond IV of Antioch, the commune
directly contradicted the wishes of his father who had specifically designated Raymond-
Roupen as the heir to the principality.\textsuperscript{17} Winning and retaining the support of the commune
was even more essential to Bohemond IV in 1201 than it had been in 1198. As the ruler of the
county of Tripoli – another fragile state with problems of its own – he could not permanently
reside in his new principality. If Bohemond IV was to establish himself as the successor of
Bohemond III then he would need a strong base of supporters at Antioch who would
defend the city against King Leon I. Considering the number of attacks that the Armenian king made
on the Latin principality in the early thirteenth century, it seems unlikely that the Tripolitan
count could have retained control of Antioch until 1216 without the support of the commune.

The next references to the Antiochene commune in the primary sources concern the
events of 1207-1208 when the principality was engulfed in both political and ecclesiastical
disputes. In March 1208 Pope Innocent III wrote a letter to the patriarch of Jerusalem in
which the ‘mayor and consuls of Antioch’ were threatened with the sentence of
excommunication if they helped to maintain the presence of a Greek patriarch at Antioch.\textsuperscript{18}
Innocent wanted Simeon II, the Greek patriarch, to be removed from his position in the
cathedral of St Peter and replaced with the Latin patriarch, Peter of Angoulême.\textsuperscript{19} Bohemond
IV had appointed Simeon to minister at Antioch after Peter of Saint Marcellus, a papal legate,
had suspended Peter of Angoulême in 1206.\textsuperscript{20}

Innocent’s letter suggests that Simeon II enjoyed the backing of the Antiochene
commune and this was almost certainly the case because Bohemond IV could not have
imposed an unpopular patriarch upon the citizens of Antioch without seriously jeopardising

\textsuperscript{16} ‘Il sona la canpane de la comune et assembla toute la gent, chevaliers et autres bons homes ; et lor prea et
requist que il le receussent a seignor come cil qui estoit le dreit hoir de la princée de quoi son pere estoit morz
saisis et revestus et tenant. Il le receurent et li firent ce que il durent come a seignor et a prince’. Eracles, p.
313.

\textsuperscript{17} PL, 214, Col. 811, No. 252; Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 242, p. 463.

\textsuperscript{18} ‘memoratum intrusum omnino deponas et a tota provincia facias removeri et contradictores censura
ecclesiastica sublato appellations impediemento compescens eodem comiti necnon…maiori et consulibus
Antiochenis sub pena excommunicationis inhibeas, ne dictum intrusum aut clericos Grecos in tali rebellione
temere manutenerere presumant’. PL, 215, Col. 1345, No. 9; Reg. Inn. III, 11, No. 8, p. 11.

\textsuperscript{19} In March 1208 Innocent III thought Peter of Angoulême was still alive, although he may have died by this
point. News of Peter’s death reached the pope in July 1208. See PL, 215, Cols 1428-1429, No. 110; Reg. Inn. III,
11, No. 105, pp. 164-165.

611-612.
his status as prince. Bohemond spent much of his time in the county of Tripoli and he needed to maintain the support of the commune, and the Antiochene populace more generally, if he was to retain control of his principality. Prawer argues that there was a strong Greek presence in the commune of Antioch and that Bohemond installed Simeon II in St Peter’s cathedral in order to placate them. There are other reasons, however, for thinking that the commune would be glad to see Peter of Angoulême replaced, aside from a desire to see Antioch served by a patriarch of the Greek Orthodox faith. Peter had been a firm opponent of the commune’s tallage on the churches and clerics of Antioch, and therefore the commune may have found it easier to raise cash if he was ousted from his position. More importantly, the Latin patriarch favoured Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality. He willingly negotiated with the Cilician Armenians after they had seized control of Antioch in 1203, but they were forced to withdraw from the city before anything was achieved. The commune was a firm supporter of Bohemond IV and could not countenance his replacement by Raymond-Roupen because this would give King Leon I enormous influence over the Latin state during his great-nephew’s minority. It was resolutely opposed to any Roupenid presence in the principality so Peter’s scheming was a direct threat to the aims of the commune.

In late 1207 there was a major rebellion against the rule of Bohemond IV in the city of Antioch. Peter of Angoulême was a key figure in the uprising, and Bohemond had the Latin patriarch imprisoned after quelling the revolt. Several sources indicate that the commune participated in this insurrection. However, it is almost inconceivable that the same members of the commune who had consistently opposed Leon’s attempts to increase Roupenid influence over the principality, and had given their full backing to the count of Tripoli in 1198 and 1201, could suddenly turn against Bohemond IV and try to overthrow him. Innocent III clearly believed that the mayor and consuls of the commune were supporters of the Greek patriarch Simeon II so it would be surprising if they plotted with the Latin patriarch Peter of Angoulême against the de facto prince. Cahen explains the situation by arguing that the Latin patriarch allowed exiled knights – presumably supporters of

21 Prawer, Crusader Institutions, pp. 69-73.
22 PL, 215, Col. 689, No. 119; Reg. Inn. III, 8, No. 120, p. 214.
25 PL, 215, Col. 1345, No. 9; Reg. Inn. III, 11, No. 8, p. 11.
Raymond-Roupen – into Antioch who overthrew the commune and took control of the city while Bohemond IV sought refuge in the citadel. The rebels then established a new commune, but its existence was short-lived as the count of Tripoli reassembled his forces and crushed the revolt.\textsuperscript{26} It is perhaps more likely that a faction within the commune, which had never been particularly supportive of Bohemond, decided to join forces with Peter when the Latin patriarch began planning the uprising.

The principality of Antioch remained under the control of Bohemond IV until 1216, and the commune was definitely still in existence at this point, so it would appear that its original anti-Roupenid members reasserted their dominance over the institution after the count of Tripoli had defeated his Antiochene opponents in 1207-1208. However, they were unable to prevent the Cilician Armenians from seizing Antioch in February 1216 and installing Raymond-Roupen as the new prince.\textsuperscript{27} Leon’s great-nephew was fully aware of the importance of the commune and of the potential threat it posed to his rule at Antioch because of its support for Bohemond IV. Nevertheless, rather than abolishing the commune, Raymond-Roupen tried to neutralise this hostile institution by infusing it with his own supporters. The first charter he issued after his investiture as prince in February 1216 was witnessed by Acharie, seneschal of Antioch, who is also described as the ‘mayor of the commune’.\textsuperscript{28} Acharie was a loyal vassal of Raymond-Roupen who witnessed two charters issued by Leon’s great-nephew when the Latin principality was still under the control of Bohemond IV in 1215.\textsuperscript{29} By occupying such a key role within the commune, Acharie would have been able to ensure that the institution supported the new prince, rather than working against him.

It is possible that Acharie the Seneschal was already a member of the commune when the Cilician Armenians seized control of Antioch in 1216, and that the institution had already transferred its allegiance from Bohemond IV to Raymond-Roupen. However, if the commune did switch sides during the succession dispute it could only have done so shortly before King Leon I’s troops occupied Antioch because it is highly unlikely that the count of Tripoli could have maintained his grip on the Latin principality for a substantial amount of time without the support of this institution. The commune had historically been an anti-Roupenid organisation

\textsuperscript{26} Cahen, \textit{La Syrie du Nord}, p. 613.
\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Acta Innocentii}, No. 21, pp. 589-590; ATS, p. 436; DSN, p. 260; Eracles, p. 318; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 483; KD, 5, p. 50; SC, p. 643; Smbat, p. 89.
\textsuperscript{28} ‘Acharias antiochie senescalcus maios comunie’. CCRR, No. 15, pp. 136-137; LIRG, 1, Cols 577-578, No. 516; RRH, 1, No. 885, p. 238.
\textsuperscript{29} See Appendices A and B.
so it would be unwise to insist that it had come out in favour of Raymond-Roupen before he was anointed as prince of Antioch.

A charter issued by Raymond-Roupen in March 1219 was witnessed by Robert Mansel, who is described as ‘constable and mayor of Antioch’.30 Robert’s name also appears on the charters of the young prince which were issued in the kingdom of Cilicia before 1216.31 It is surely not coincidental that the only two men known to have held the position of mayor of the commune between 1216 and 1219 were also longstanding supporters of Raymond-Roupen. The prince must have had some influence over their presence at the forefront of the commune – either through direct appointment or encouraging his supporters to join the institution.

The fate of the commune beyond 1219 is almost completely unknown because of the lack of evidence. Richard asserts that the commune ‘vanished’ after the conclusion of the war of succession and that ‘normal institutions reappeared’.32 The commune may have been abolished by Bohemond IV soon after he recovered the Latin principality in 1219.33 He may have decided that it served no purpose because the internal problems that plagued the kingdom of Cilicia after the death of King Leon I meant that there was little prospect of the Cilician Armenians seriously threatening his hold on Antioch. Alternatively, the commune may simply have slowly withered away after 1219, declining in importance once the Antiochene succession dispute had been resolved.

On the other hand, letters sent by Thomas Agni and Thomas Bérard in 1260 hint at the existence of the commune and suggest that it may actually have survived until the principality’s destruction in 1268. On 4 March, Bérard, the master of the Temple, wrote of how the ‘Antiochene people’ responded to the threat posed by the Mongols, who were campaigning in northern Syria at that time.34 Later, on 22 April, Thomas Agni, papal legate and bishop of Bethlehem, suggested that Bohemond VI was ‘following in the footsteps of the Antiochenes’, when he submitted to the Mongols.35 The fact that neither letter refers to a specific individual, but instead mentions the people of Antioch suggests that decisions in the principality were being taken collectively by a group of men. It cannot be confidently

30 ‘Mansellus, constabularius et maior Antiochie’. RRH, 1, No. 921, p. 245; TOT, No. 51, p. 42.
31 See Appendices A and B.
33 ATS, p. 437; Eracles, p. 318; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 484; OP, p. 235; Crusade and Christendom, pp. 190-191.
asserted that Thomas Agni and Thomas Bérard were referring to the commune of Antioch, but there is a strong possibility that they were alluding to the institution first established in c.1193. The commune may have governed the principality in the absence of the prince as Bohemond IV, Bohemond V and Bohemond VI spent a considerable amount of their time in the county of Tripoli.

**The Membership, Structure and Functions of the Commune**

In the late eleventh and twelfth centuries Antiochene princes donated properties to the Pisans, Venetians and Genoese which enabled them to form their own communities within the city of Antioch. The Genoese received the church of St John, a trading post and thirty houses in Antioch in 1098 as a reward for their role in capturing the city during the First Crusade. 36 The Pisans were originally given a neighbourhood in Antioch named Sancti Salvatoris in 1108, as well as their own quarter in the city of Latakia, 37 but according to Favreau-Lilie these possessions were confiscated by the regent of the Latin principality, Roger of Salerno, a few years later. 38 It appears that the Pisans had to wait until 1154 before they were granted new properties in Antioch and Latakia. 39 The Venetians were granted a trading post, a garden and some houses in Antioch by Prince Raymond in April 1143, 40 but they were not subsequently given any further property and this remained their only stronghold in northern Syria. 41 The Italian presence in the Latin principality was diminished by the loss of Latakia and Jabala in 1188, but the Pisan and Genoese quarters in the city of Antioch appear to have survived until the fall of the metropolis in 1268.

The Pisans, Venetians and Genoese were also granted various privileges by the princes of Antioch, such as a share of the revenues of a particular city or exemptions from customs duties. 42 Concessions of this kind continued to be granted to the Pisans and the Genoese after 1188, 43 but no charters in favour of the Venetians are extant for the period

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36 *Codice diplomatico della Repubblica di Genova*, ed. C. Imperiale di Sant’Angelo, 3 vols (Rome, 1936-1942), 1, No. 7, pp. 11-12; RRH, 1, No. 12, p. 2.

37 DCT, No. 1, p. 3; RRH, 1, No. 53, p. 11.


39 DCT, No. 4, p. 6; RRH, 1, No. 292, p. 74.


43 During the period 1188-1268, the princes of Antioch issued four charters in favour of the Pisans and six charters in favour of the Genoese, although some of these charters relate exclusively to the county of Tripoli.
1188-1268. Bohemond III and his successors clearly thought it was important to remain on good terms with Pisa and Genoa because the Pisans and Genoese sought and obtained new privileges in the principality after it had been devastated by Saladin, even though they had already acquired a number of special rights and their own semi-autonomous quarters in the city of Antioch. For example, Raymond-Roupen issued charters giving legal privileges to the Genoese and a wide range of concessions to the Pisans within three months of his investiture as prince of Antioch in 1216.44

Venice, Pisa and Genoa were part of the communal movement that flourished in northern Italy in the Central Middle Ages. Communes or proto-communes also existed in central and southern Italy,45 as well as other parts of Europe,46 but they were more numerous and more autonomous in the north of the Italian peninsula. Communes emerged in the cities of northern Italy in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries following the decline of the German monarchy’s authority over the region. Most German kings of this era rarely visited northern Italy and allowed local bishops to oversee the governance of Italian cities on their behalf. However, the ecclesiastical reform movement of the late eleventh century seriously undermined ‘episcopal lordship’ by calling into question whether bishops should have control over judicial and military matters. During this period, communes seem to have emerged in several Italian cities and over the course of several decades they gradually assumed the powers that had previously been exercised by bishops.47 This transfer of power did not happen overnight. Indeed, in cities such as Cremona the bishop retained a prominent political role throughout the twelfth century by closely associating himself with the commune.48

Cahen argues that the presence of the Italian quarters in the city of Antioch influenced the establishment and organisation of the Antiochene commune.49 This is highly likely considering that the communes of Lombardy and Tuscany developed similar political structures because officials from different cities shared ideas about governance with one

44 See Appendix B.
49 Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, pp. 653-654.
The Antiochenes certainly knew that Venice, Pisa and Genoa had their own communes. A charter issued by Bohemond III in 1169 refers to Lanfranco di Alberico as an ambassador of ‘the whole senate and the consuls’ of the Genoese ‘commune’. Many of the charters issued in favour of the Pisans or Genoese refer to the commune of Pisa or Genoa, but none mention the commune of Antioch apart from the one issued by Raymond-Roupen in February 1216, which describes Acharie the Seneschal as ‘mayor of the commune’. The analysis below demonstrates that the Antiochene commune had a number of similarities with the political bodies that governed many of the cities of northern Italy in the twelfth century.

According to Eracles, when Count Bohemond of Tripoli arrived at Antioch in 1201 to claim the Latin principality members of the commune assembled after the ringing of a bell. This was probably the bell of St Peter’s cathedral – the building in which the institution had been founded. In northern Italy, communal ‘assemblies were normally summoned by the ringing of bells’. Furthermore, many of them met in front of their city’s cathedral because it was a convenient location with the necessary space for large numbers of people. It is highly likely that the assembly of the Antiochene commune regularly convened in or close to St Peter’s cathedral and that it was summoned by the sound of bells.

A common feature of all Italian communes was an assembly, which was supposed to be attended by all the citizens of the city. In December 1199 Innocent III wrote to King Leon I about his dispute with the Templars over possession of Baghras. The pope stated that the Armenian king had encouraged the patriarch and prince of Antioch to speak at the ‘colloquium’ of the commune. This is the only time that the assembly is explicitly mentioned in the primary sources which record the existence of the Antiochene commune. It echoes the first reference to an Italian communal assembly in 1081 when the German king

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50 Coleman, ‘Cities and Communes’, p. 35.
51 ‘...Lanfrancus Albericus vir nobilissimus predicte civitatis eiusque totius senatus ac consulum venerabilis legatus pro se et pro comuni famosissime civitatis Januensium...’ LIRG, 1, Col. 250, No. 276; Genoa and the Twelfth-Century Crusades, p. 173.
52 ‘Acharias antiochie senescalculus maios comunie’. CCRR, No. 15, pp. 136-137; LIRG, 1, Cols 577-578, No. 516; RRH, 1, No. 885, p. 238.
53 Eracles, p. 313.
54 Cont. WT, p. 169.
58 ‘tu patriarcham ipsum et principem ad communie colloquium citavisti’. PL, 214, Col. 819, No. 259; Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 249, p. 476.
Henry IV issued a diploma to the Pisans which mentioned the *colloquium civium*. The suggestion that the patriarch and prince of Antioch addressed the communal assembly indicates that this was a body of importance where the principality’s leading secular and ecclesiastical figures discussed the future of Baghras in order to win the support of Antiochene citizens.

A citizen was not merely an urban inhabitant, but a person of privileged legal status. Coleman suggests that in twelfth century Italy the term ‘citizens’ (*cives*) may have referred to privileged non-noble groups such as merchants and notaries. The citizens who attended the communal assembly at Antioch were probably of a similar socio-economic background to their Italian counterparts. When Count Bohemond of Tripoli rang the bell of the commune in 1201, ‘*toute la gent, chevaliers et autres bons homes*’ subsequently assembled. The Old French term ‘*gent*’ may in this context correspond with the Latin word ‘*cives*’, while ‘*chevaliers*’ and ‘*bons homes*’ are almost certainly the equivalent of ‘*milites*’ and ‘*boni homines*’. Individuals described as ‘worthy men’ (*boni homines*) appear to have been civic office-holders who were particularly prominent in many Italian cities in the transitional phase from episcopal to communal governance in the late eleventh and early twelfth centuries. The consuls created by the communes of Lombardy and Tuscany seem to have replaced the *boni homines* to some extent and probably assumed some of the powers previously exercised by them. It is impossible to know with any degree of certainty whether a similar process occurred in the principality of Antioch.

Cahen highlights that the nobility of both northern Italy and northern Syria was, for the most part, located in urban areas and this affected the composition of the communes that were formed in these regions. Certainly the communes of Italian city-states were plutocratic institutions dominated by an urban elite of noble or privileged background. The nobles of the Levantine principality were predominantly based in the city of Antioch following the major territorial losses of 1188 and it would be remarkable if none of them joined the resistance against the Cilician Armenians in c.1193 and helped to establish the new

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60 Coleman, ‘Representative Assemblies’, pp. 207-209.
61 Eracles, p. 313.
commune. Some of the principality’s elite must have been opposed to a Roupenid takeover of Antioch because otherwise the city would surely have fallen while Bohemond III was in captivity. Thus, the Antiochene commune probably contained nobles who had lost their lordships to Saladin and saw the creation of this new institution as a means of increasing their power within the principality. It is highly likely that the ‘chevaliers’ who assembled in 1201 after Count Bohemond of Tripoli had rang the communal bell were men of noble background who were members of the commune of Antioch. Raymond-Roupen’s charters confirm that two nobles, Acharie the Seneschal and Robert Mansel, were definitely part of the commune.

As previously mentioned, a letter written by Pope Innocent III in March 1208 confirms that the existence of a mayor and a group of consuls at Antioch. This is the first time that these offices are mentioned and therefore it is possible either that they were formed at the inception of the commune in c.1193, or created later in a change to the structure of the institution. The description of Acharie the Seneschal as ‘mayor of the commune’ confirms that the mayor was part of the commune, while consuls were an integral part of Italian communes for much of the twelfth century so there can be little doubt that the consuls mentioned by Innocent were also part of the Antiochene commune. The number of consuls within a commune varied over time and between different cities. They appear to have been selected from distinct social groups to ensure that the consulate was representative of the whole commune. In most Italian communes, consuls were responsible for all the most important aspects of city governance, including justice, defence, and the public finances. In Genoa, for example, they were the leaders of the commune, which effectively made them the most powerful men in the city. The number of Genoese consuls fluctuated between four and eight, and they served for fixed terms, which after 1122 was usually one year. Unfortunately, none of the sources indicate how many consuls there were at Antioch, but it is highly likely that these officials were modelled on their counterparts in Genoa and Pisa.

The precise role of the mayor of Antioch is unclear. Innocent III clearly considered the mayor to be a powerful figure at Antioch because he was listed alongside the consuls and Bohemond IV as someone who should be excommunicated if he maintained his support for

66 Eracles, p. 313.
67 PL, 215, Col. 1345, No. 9; Reg. Inn. III, 11, No. 8, p. 11. See above.
68 ‘Acharias antiochie senescalcus maios comunie’. CCRR, No. 15, pp. 136-137; LIRG, 1, Cols 577-578, No. 516; RRH, 1, No. 885, p. 238.
the Greek patriarch Simeon II. Therefore, the mayor appears to have occupied a leading position within the commune, but the post does not seem to have been copied from the Pisans or Genoese. For example, there are no obvious parallels between the Antiochene mayor and the office of podestà that became popular in northern Italy during the late twelfth century when it was felt that factionalism was rendering the consulate ineffective. The podestà was ‘a single supreme official’ who was responsible for many aspects of governance that had previously been undertaken by the consuls. The Antiochene are unlikely to have appointed consuls after the creation of the commune if they intended to imitate the contemporary Italian trend of concentrating power in the hands of one individual. Therefore, the mayor of Antioch probably had considerably less authority than a podestà, unless the first mayor was installed some years after a consular commune had been established. The fact that Acharie the Seneschal and Robert Mansel are both identified as the mayor in the witness lists of charters issued by Raymond-Roupen suggests that it was a role of importance because otherwise this detail would not have been recorded. The mayor may have been the head of the commune, but there is simply not enough detail in the sources to know how his powers and responsibilities differed from those of the consuls.

The Italian communes differed from the one at Antioch because they did not operate under the direct rule of a prince. In many cities in northern Italy, communal officials were responsible for all aspects of governance and their decisions were unlikely to be challenged by the distant German king. At Antioch, however, the prince remained the most powerful secular figure, although Bohemond IV and his successors must have delegated power to their officers and to the Antiochene commune because they were often absent from the Latin principality. The commune may never have been founded if Bohemond III had not been captured by Leon in 1193. Nevertheless, this new institution remained in existence long after the prince had been ransomed and returned to Antioch. Therefore, either the commune had acquired so much power in a short space of time that Bohemond did not have the authority to abolish it, or he recognised the value of the institution and was content for it to oversee some aspects of administration with the principality.

Raymond-Roupen appears to have had some influence over the appointment of the mayor and it would not be surprising if the prince of Antioch gradually acquired the ability to

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71 PL, 215, Col. 1345, No. 9; Reg. Inn. III, 11, No. 8, p. 11. See above.
73 CCRR, No. 15, p. 137; RRH, 1, No. 885, p. 238; RRH, 1, No. 921, p. 245; TOT, No. 51, p. 42.
pick men to fill important communal positions. There is no evidence that the Antiochene mayor and consuls were elected, but in its earliest years the commune was a powerful institution that acted independently and therefore it seems likely that originally the prince had little say over the selection of these officials. Waley and Dean observe that ‘little is known of how the consuls were chosen’ in the communes of northern Italy.\textsuperscript{74} In most Italian cities, the consuls needed the support of the assembly, but that does not mean they were elected by it. Methods of election to important communal councils were diverse and even included sortition,\textsuperscript{75} but consuls were almost certainly not selected by a ‘free vote’ because as Coleman explains ‘a cursory examination of the early consular lists of any [Italian] city will reveal that office-holding was the preserve of a small group of families’.\textsuperscript{76} No Antiochene consul can be identified because of the paucity of the primary sources, but it would hardly be surprising if key positions within the commune of Antioch were dominated by men of privileged kin.

The commune of Antioch evidently had extensive administrative powers, although the prince may have been able to overrule its decisions if he disagreed with them. It had the ability to raise taxes and presumably it was also responsible for how the revenue was spent. Both the clergy and the laity were expected to pay the communal tallage, despite the traditional exemptions of the Latin Church.\textsuperscript{77} The consuls oversaw tax policy in Genoa, and it is highly likely that their Antiochene counterparts did the same in the Latin principality. The power to increase taxes and introduce new ones was particularly significant in a maritime trading city like Genoa because while the commune needed to collect money to pay for defence and administration the consuls did not want to inhibit the commerce that was so vital for the city’s economy by making it more expensive to do business in Genoa than Pisa or Barcelona.\textsuperscript{78} Trade was also vital to the prosperity of Antioch so high taxes on the buying or selling of goods could have been counterproductive. Instead, the only surviving evidence about the tax policy of the Antiochene commune is the tallage imposed on the clergy in 1198, which brought a different set of problems.

The commune of Antioch was also involved in the dispensation of justice, either by establishing its own court or introducing Byzantine procedures into the existing legal

\textsuperscript{74} Waley and Dean, \textit{The Italian City-Republics}, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{75} Waley and Dean, \textit{The Italian City-Republics}, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{76} Coleman, ‘Representative Assemblies’, p. 205.
\textsuperscript{77} PL, 214, Col. 474, No. 512; Reg. Inn. III, 1, No. 512, pp. 747-748.
\textsuperscript{78} Epstein, \textit{Genoa and the Genoese}, pp. 38-40.
The commune itself is not mentioned in the *Assises d’Antioche*, but the preface records that the authors of the legal treatise gave a copy to Robert Mansel, who was, as previously noted, mayor of the commune in 1219. The exact nature of the commune’s judicial role is unclear, but the Italian influence upon this aspect of the institution is evident. In many cities in northern Italy the commune was responsible for upholding the law. Thus, the consuls of Genoa swore to dispense justice equally to all Genoese citizens and served as judges in peacetime. It is possible that the Antiochene consuls played a key role in their principality’s judicial system.

Apart from taxation and justice, the sources are silent on the areas of governance that were overseen by the commune of Antioch. It was not formed, however, as merely an administrative body, but in opposition to a Roupenid attempt to occupy the city of Antioch. From the very beginning, therefore, it was a political institution with a military purpose. The founders of the commune violently expelled Cilician Armenian soldiers from Antioch in c.1193 and it is quite possible, as Cahen argues, that they maintained a militia to defend the city from invaders thereafter. The priority for any Italian commune was to defend its own city and secure control of the surrounding countryside. Thus, most of them spent a majority of their income on war and all maintained a communal militia to undertake the fighting, although the use of mercenaries became popular in the thirteenth century. The situation cannot have been quite the same at Antioch because the Antiochene commune operated under the direct rule of a prince. It is possible that Bohemond IV and his successors were content to let this institution finance and organise a militia to defend Antioch, but ultimately these soldiers must surely have had to swear their allegiance to the prince and obey his orders.

The Antiochene commune was also deeply involved in the internal politics of the principality. In theory, the commune should have followed legal custom and supported the succession of Raymond-Roupen, whom Bohemond III had designated as his heir. In practice, however, this institution rapidly acquired power and legitimacy within the principality, which it exploited by installing Count Bohemond of Tripoli as the prince of

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79 PL, 214, Col. 474, No. 512; Reg. Inn. III, 1, No. 512, pp. 747-748; Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, p. 76.  
80 *Assises d’Antioche*, p. 2.  
81 RRH, 1, No. 921, p. 245; TOT, No. 51, p. 42.  
82 Epstein, *Genoa and the Genoese*, p. 34.  
83 Cont. WT, pp. 166-169.  
86 PL, 214, Col. 811, No. 252; Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 242, p. 463.
Antioch in 1201. The description of this event in *Eracles* suggests that the communal assembly approved the Tripolitan count’s investiture as prince.\(^\text{87}\) The assemblies of Italian communes were often required to give their vocal backing to crucial decisions before they could be implemented so it would not be surprising if Bohemond needed the endorsement of the whole assembly before he could rely on the support of the Antiochene commune.\(^\text{88}\)

Both Prawer and Cahen agree that Greeks were part of the commune of Antioch and therefore its membership was not exclusively Latin.\(^\text{89}\) The main evidence for this belief is a letter written by Innocent III on 5 January 1199, which suggested that the commune was using ‘Greek customs’ when dealing with the possessions of the Latin Church.\(^\text{90}\) This implies that the commune’s policies – the imposition of a tallage on all churches, including those of the Latins, and the subjection of the clergy to the justice of the commune – were of Byzantine origin. No source specifically states that Greeks were part of the commune, but Prawer’s contention that this institution would not have adopted Byzantine customs and undermined the traditional privileges of the Latin Church without the influence of Greek members is convincing.\(^\text{91}\) The commune’s support for the Greek patriarch Simeon II, which led Innocent III to order the patriarch of Jerusalem to threaten the mayor and consuls of Antioch with excommunication in 1208,\(^\text{92}\) adds further weight to this argument.

While Prawer stresses the importance of the Greeks in the Antiochene commune, he appears to dismiss the possibility that Syriac Christians were part of the institution by asserting that ‘the Jacobites at no time became a political factor in the life of the Frankish capital’.\(^\text{93}\) However, Jacobite representatives were among the envoys sent by the Antiochenes to submit to Hulagu in 1260 in order to avert a Mongol offensive on the city of Antioch.\(^\text{94}\) This activity may be indicative of the Syriac Christian populace, but it is impossible to accurately gauge their level of political engagement because of their absence from much of the surviving primary source material. The commune had authority over all the inhabitants of Antioch – for example, in 1198 it imposed a tallage on Antiochenes regardless of their ‘status

\(^{87}\) *Eracles*, p. 313.

\(^{88}\) Coleman, ‘Representative Assemblies’, pp. 203-206; Waley and Dean, *The Italian City-Republics*, pp. 35-36.


\(^{90}\) ‘Possessiones etiam ecclesiasticas per judicium et consuetudines Grecorum tractare conantes’. PL, 214, Col. 474, No. 512; Reg. Inn. III, 1, No. 512, pp. 747-748.

\(^{91}\) Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, p. 71.

\(^{92}\) PL, 215, Col. 1345, No. 9; Reg. Inn. III, 11, No. 8, p. 11.

\(^{93}\) Prawer, *Crusader Institutions*, p. 69.

\(^{94}\) ‘Annales monasterii Burtonensis’, p. 492.
or language’ – and it is possible, therefore, that non-Greek “minorities” secured representation in the communal assembly.95

The Commune and the Cilician Armenians

For almost three decades the Antiochene commune had a major influence on the principality’s relationship with Armenian Cilicia. Indeed the institution was formed to prevent Leon’s troops from seizing Antioch. Without the intervention of those who founded the commune in c.1193, the principality of Antioch would probably have been absorbed into the Roupenid principality and ceased to exist as an independent Latin state. The commune certainly maintained an anti-Roupenid stance in the first decade after its creation – whether its position softened after that is a matter for debate.

In his study of the commune of Antioch, Prawer suggests that the institution was ‘anti-Armenian’,96 but this is a misrepresentation of the views of communal members. The founders of the Antiochene commune were not opposed to the Armenians as an ethnic group or religious minority – they opposed Leon’s attempts to capture and hold the city of Antioch because they wanted to preserve the Latin principality and prevent the Roupenids from annexing it. They were anti-Roupenid rather than anti-Armenian.97 The commune supported Count Bohemond of Tripoli’s claim to the principality of Antioch because it feared the consequences of investing his young nephew as prince. Both King Leon I, who had no sons of his own, and Prince Bohemond III named Raymond-Roupen as the heir of their territories shortly after his birth.98 There was, therefore, a strong possibility that the two states would have unified if Raymond-Roupen had succeeded his great-uncle and his grandfather. The commune was evidently opposed to such an outcome as it took the extraordinary step of forcing Bohemond III into exile and recognising the count of Tripoli as the heir to the principality in 1198.99

The commune’s decision to recognise Bohemond IV as their prince following the death of Bohemond III had a major impact on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. If Raymond-Roupen had succeeded his paternal grandfather as prince in 1201 then the ties between these two states would have been

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95 ‘Conditionis vel lingue’. PL, 214, Col. 474, No. 512; Reg. Inn. III, 1, No. 512, pp. 747-748.
96 Prawer, Crusader Institutions, pp. 69-70.
97 See Chapter Six: The Influence of Ethnicity and Religion on Antiochene-Cilician Relations.
considerably strengthened, although they would probably have remained separate entities initially. King Leon I would almost certainly have acted as regent for the young prince, who was only an infant at the time, and the principality would temporarily have fallen under Roupenid control. By supporting Bohemond of Tripoli, the commune consciously rejected this scenario. Having opposed Roupenid control of Antioch in c.1193, the behaviour of the commune in 1201 was perfectly logical.

The founders of the commune ultimately failed to prevent Raymond-Roupen from becoming prince of Antioch, but they did help to delay his succession until 1216. By the time Bohemond IV was ousted from power, his nephew had reached the age of majority and was able to rule in his own right. Furthermore, the impetuous young prince quarrelled with Leon and therefore Antioch’s relationship with the kingdom of Cilicia became distinctly cool during his short reign. Raymond-Roupen infused the commune with his own supporters after taking power, but he may also have won the support of some of the anti-Roupenid members of the institution by maintaining the Latin principality’s independence and not collaborating too closely with King Leon I.

**Conclusion**

The surviving evidence suggests that the commune of Antioch was a powerful institution which had a significant impact on the Latin principality in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Its founders repulsed a Roupenid army from Antioch in c.1193 and endorsed Count Bohemond of Tripoli’s claim to be the legitimate heir to the principality even before his father’s death. The commune’s support for the Tripolitan count in 1201 was crucial in allowing him to seize control of Antioch and establish his authority as prince. The revolt of 1207 suggests that some members of the commune opposed Bohemond’s rule, but the institution as a whole appears to have backed him until 1216. It is unlikely that the count of Tripoli could have held the principality for fifteen years without the commune’s support.

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100 BH, 1, pp. 370-371; Eracles, p. 347.
Chapter Three: The Military Orders in the Principality of Antioch and the Kingdom of Cilicia

The Military Orders had a significant presence in the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia during the thirteenth century, although the number of possessions under their control in these states increased and decreased at various points in time. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights acquired castles and a considerable number of estates in Cilicia, while the Templars dominated the frontier between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom, possessing several strongholds in the Amanus Mountains.

There are now a large number of studies examining the involvement of the Military Orders in these states. Some of this research does discuss the role of the Templars and the Hospitallers in the Antiochene succession dispute, but for the most part historians have concentrated on how the Orders developed links with the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia, and acquired lands and castles within them. This chapter provides a summary of the possessions of each Military Order in these territories, but the main focus is on how the Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic Knights influenced Antiochene-Cilician relations. Unlike previous studies, it analyses the diplomatic and military activities of the major military orders in both the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom from the late twelfth century until the fall of Antioch in 1268, and fully considers their influence on the relationship between these states. Other military-religious institutions which had connections to these states, such as the Orders of St Lazarus, Santiago, and Calatrava, have not been considered because their presence in this region was much too small to have had any meaningful impact on Antiochene-Cilician relations.

The Hospitallers in the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia

The Order of the Hospital began acquiring assets in the principality of Antioch from the very beginning of the twelfth century, long before it developed a military vocation. By

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1118 the Hospitallers had already received numerous houses and plots of land in donations from the Antiochene princes and their barons. Over the course of several decades the Order amassed dozens of estates within the principality, including a large number close to the Orontes River. However, as the Latin state decreased in size following the conquests of Muslim rulers, such as Nūr al-Dīn, the Hospitallers lost many of their possessions.

In 1186 the Hospitallers acquired the impressive fortress of Margat on the southern frontier of the principality of Antioch after agreeing to pay Bertrand Mazoir an annual rent of 2,200 bezants. With Margat, the Order obtained a large lordship which included the town of Valenia, the smaller castles of Brahim and Popos, and many estates in the south of the principality. The Mazoirs were forced to relinquish Margat because they could not afford to maintain and defend the stronghold in the face of increasing aggression from their Muslim neighbours. Bohemond III did not have the money and manpower needed for the upkeep of the castle so Bertrand turned to the Hospital, which did have the necessary resources. The prince of Antioch encouraged the Hospitallers to take the lordship by granting them a number of special privileges, including an exemption from the military service that the holder of Margat traditionally owed to him, thereby reducing his own sovereignty over the area.

The Hospitallers’ ability to retain Margat was tested just two years later when Saladin led a large army into northern Syria. During the summer of 1188 the Ayyubid sultan captured a large number of Antiochene towns and fortresses, including Jabala and Latakia in the south of the principality. However, Saladin avoided making a direct attack on Margat and instead marched straight from Tortosa to Jabala. Wilbrand of Oldenburg claimed that the Hospitallers kept enough provisions at Margat to sustain a garrison for five years so it is unlikely that the castle could have been taken after a short siege. The strength of the garrison and the abundance of supplies at Margat may, therefore, have played a key role in deterring Saladin from besieging the fortress because the Ayyubid sultan desired a swift campaign in northern Syria and the prospect of a lengthy blockade was distinctly unappealing.

Margat remained in the hands of the Hospitallers until 1285, but it was cut off from the rest of the principality of Antioch for most of the thirteenth century because Latakia was

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2 CDSMOG, No. 6, p. 6; RRH, 1, No. 86, p. 20.
3 CDSMOG, No. 77, pp. 77-81; RRH, 1, No. 647, p. 171; RRH, 1, No. 649, pp. 171-172. For a study of this castle after it was acquired by the Hospitallers see Burgtorf, ‘Margat’, pp. 11-50.
5 BDIS, pp. 83-87; IA, 2, pp. 345-353; IDI, pp. 127-144.
6 WO, pp. 121-122; Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, p. 70.
under the control of the Ayyubids between 1188 and 1260. Riley-Smith characterised the Hospitaller lordship of Margat as ‘semi-independent palatinate’, and it certainly appears to have had little effect on the course of Antiochene history during the thirteenth century. However, Burgdorf rightly points out that the Order must have had a substantial presence in Antioch itself because Raymond-Roupen entrusted the Hospital with the defence of the city’s citadel in 1219. The Hospitallers were able to influence events in the principality not only militarily and diplomatically, but also through their banking activities. The Hospital lent money to political leaders and safeguarded valuable possessions. For example, Peter of Ivrea, the Latin patriarch of Antioch, received items from the Hospitallers at Antioch in 1209 which his predecessor had given them to look after.

The Order of the Hospital was also granted land and property in Cilicia in the early twelfth century, when much of the region was under the control of the princes of Antioch. In 1149, Raymond of Poitiers issued a charter which confirmed earlier donations made to the Hospitallers by Antiochene barons and previous princes. The Order had been endowed with villages near Mamistra and Harunia. Chevalier asserts that such grants were ‘more charitable than strategic’, highlighting that the monastery of Notre-Dame de Josaphat also received estates in these areas. The initial existence of the Hospital in Cilicia was small and did not include any castles or fortified settlements because it was viewed as a religious institution.

The Hospitallers did not become a major force in Cilicia until after Leon II inherited the Roupenid principality in 1187. In the early thirteenth century, the Armenian king made several large donations to the Order. The Hospitallers received the fortresses of Silifke, Camardias, and Norpert in western Cilicia in April 1210. These castles and their appurtenances formed part of a powerful lordship which historians such as Cahen and Riley-Smith have described as a ‘march’ – a barrier between the Seljuk Turks of Anatolia and the Armenian kingdom. King Leon I also granted Laranda, which lay halfway between Silifke and Konya, to the Hospital in August 1210, despite the fact that the town was under Seljuk control at the time. The number of Hospitaller possessions in Cilicia was then swelled even

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7 Riley-Smith, *The Knights of St John*, p. 68.
9 CDSMOG, No. 93, pp. 97-98; RRH, 1, No. 840, p. 224.
10 CDSMOG, No. 25, pp. 27-28; RRH, 1, No. 253, pp. 63-64.
12 CCRR, No. 3, pp. 112-114; CGOH, 2, No. 1344, pp. 115-116; RRH, 1, No. 841, pp. 224-225.
14 CCRR, No. 5, pp. 115-116; CGOH, 2, No. 1349, pp. 118-119; RRH, 1, No. 843, p. 225.
further by the villages and their appurtenances which the Armenian king bestowed upon them in April 1214.\textsuperscript{15}

The Hospital became a major landowner in Cilicia during the reign of King Leon I, but it held the most important of these donations for less than twenty years. In 1226 the Order was pressured into selling Silifke to Constantine of Babaron, constable and baillie of the Armenian kingdom, in highly unusual circumstances. Isabel, the recently widowed queen of Cilicia, had sought refuge in the fortress after refusing to marry Constantine’s son, Hethoum. The baillie, however, was determined to forcibly wed the couple, and he led a cavalry contingent into western Cilicia in order to pursue the queen. The Hospitallers refused to evict her, but instead agreed to surrender the stronghold to Constantine while Isabel was still inside.\textsuperscript{16} They clearly considered Silifke to be an important fortress because all their assets in Cilicia were managed by the castellan that resided there.\textsuperscript{17} Molin, however, suggests that the Order may not have been ‘entirely unhappy’ about losing the castle because of the financial costs of defending it against Seljuk aggression.\textsuperscript{18} The Hospitallers retained most of their other lands and properties in the Armenian kingdom, but they did not receive any significant new grants of territory from King Hethoum I.\textsuperscript{19}

The Templars in the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia

Renaud Mazoir, lord of Margat, sold a gastina located in the mountains above Valenia to the Templars in 1160.\textsuperscript{20} Burgtorf claims that this information is included in the first surviving charter which records the transfer of property in the principality of Antioch to the Order of the Temple. However, he suggests that the Templars had established a presence in the city of Antioch much earlier.\textsuperscript{21} For example, in 1140 two knights of the Temple witnessed charters issued by Raymond of Poitiers, prince of Antioch.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, it seems likely that the Order was stationing men at Antioch and acquiring property in the principality in the first half of the twelfth century.

The Order also appears to have possessed four castles in the Amanus Mountains – on the frontier between Armenian Cilicia and the principality of Antioch – during the late

\begin{footnotes}
\item[15] CCRR, No. 9, pp. 124-125; CGOH, 2, No. 1427, pp. 165-166; RRH, 1, No. 869, pp. 234-235.
\item[16] BH, 1, p. 389; SC, p. 648.
\item[17] Chevalier, Les ordres religieux-militaires, p. 324; Riley-Smith, The Knights of St John, p. 432.
\item[19] Chevalier, Les ordres religieux-militaires, p. 192.
\item[20] CDSMOG, No. 163, pp. 206-207; RRH, 1, No. 347, p. 91.
\item[22] RRH, 1, No. 194, p. 48; RRH, 1, No. 195, pp. 48-49.
\end{footnotes}
twelfth century. Two of these strongholds are clearly identifiable – Baghras, which guarded the south-eastern entrance of the Belen Pass; and Darbsak, which stood further north, at the eastern edge of the mountain range. Latin and Old French primary sources mention two other fortresses which appear to have been situated in the Amanus Mountains and garrisoned by the Templars – La Roche de Guillaume and La Roche de Roissol. However, archaeologists and historians have only been able to locate one other contemporary castle in the area, known today as Chivlan Kale. This stronghold, which overlooks the Hajar Shuglan Pass, has been identified as La Roche de Roissol by Cahen, Molin and Boas, but Deschamps and Chevalier argue that it is actually La Roche de Guillaume.23

There is also some uncertainty over when the Temple acquired these castles. Riley-Smith argues that the Order had established a march in the Amanus before the area was conquered by Byzantine Emperor John II Comnenus in early 1138.24 Chevalier contends that this theory is flawed because of its reliance on the Armenian version of the chronicle of Michael the Syrian, which she claims has been incorrectly translated into French by Dulaurier.25 The Dulaurier translation states that during his time as prince of Antioch Renaud of Châtillon had a dispute with the Roupenid prince Thoros II ‘au sujet des forteresses que les Grecs avaient enlevées aux Frères (Templiers) et que Thoros avait reprises aux Grecs’.26 However, Chevalier has examined the original Armenian text and observes that it does not suggest that the brothers of the Temple held these strongholds before they were captured by the Byzantine army.27 The Syriac version of Michael the Syrian’s chronicle, translated into French by Chabot, records that ‘ces châteaux avaient jadis été enlevés aux Francs par les Grecs’.28 Therefore, it is quite possible that the Amanus castles were under Antiochene, rather than Templar, control during the 1130s and that the Order’s march in this region was created much later.

The idea that the Temple controlled a march on the northern frontier of the principality of Antioch in the 1130s is debateable, but there is no doubt that it obtained

24 Riley-Smith, ‘Cilician Armenia’, p. 93.
26 Michael the Syrian, ‘Extrait de la Chronique de Michel le Syrien’, *RHC Arm I*, p. 349.
fortresses in the Amanus Mountains during the 1150s. In c.1156 Renaud of Châtillon, prince of Antioch, forced Thoros II of the Roupenid principality in Cilicia to relinquish his control of the Amanus castles which he had taken from the Greeks. Renaud then conferred these strongholds upon the Templars.\(^{29}\) The Order appears to have held Baghras, Darbsak, La Roche de Guillaume and La Roche de Roissol by the late 1150s, although it is possible that one or two of them were acquired later as the sources do not specifically name the individual fortresses that were taken from Thoros.

The Temple briefly lost possession of some of these castles in the early 1170s due to the aggressive and expansionist policies pursued by Thoros II’s successor Mleh. However, the Templars appear to have regained their dominant position in the Amanus region after Mleh’s death in 1175.\(^{30}\) Certainly Darbsak and Baghras were in Templar hands when Saladin besieged them in September 1188. The sultan captured both these fortresses with relative ease and put them under the command of the emir ‘Alam al-Dīn Sulaymān.\(^{31}\) Darbsak remained under Ayyubid control for decades afterwards, but a major dispute was to emerge over the possession of Baghras.

In c.1191 Saladin ordered the destruction of Baghras, which suggests that he did not consider the castle to be particularly important. Lawrence argues that unlike Darbsak, which occupied a prominent position and controlled the traffic passing through the nearby mountain pass, Baghras had a restricted view of the surrounding area and its real value lay in helping to defend the city of Antioch.\(^{32}\) Saladin’s men did a considerable amount of damage to the fortress, but they abandoned the site before completely demolishing it after learning that the Roupenid prince Leon II planned to attack them. The Cilician Armenians subsequently secured control of Baghras and repaired the fortifications.\(^{33}\) The Templars hoped to recover the castle now that it was once again in Christian hands, but Leon had no intention of relinquishing it. As a result, the two sides quarrelled relentlessly over Baghras until the Armenian king granted the fortress to the Order after capturing Antioch in 1216.

The Templars acquired castles and estates in the Amanus Mountains and along the coast of the Gulf of Alexandretta, but there is no evidence that they ever obtained possessions

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\(^{29}\) Michael the Syrian, ‘Extrait de la Chronique de Michel le Syrien’, RHC Arm I, p. 349.

\(^{30}\) Chevalier, Les ordres religieux-militaires, pp. 106-111.

\(^{31}\) BDIS, p. 87; IA, 2, pp. 352-353; IDI, pp. 140-144.

\(^{32}\) Lawrence, ‘Baghras’, p. 37.

\(^{33}\) BH, 1, pp. 336-337; DSN, p. 264; Eracles, p. 136; IA, 2, p. 353; VE, p. 512.
on the Cilician plain or in the Taurus Mountains.\textsuperscript{34} The Order of the Temple wasn’t granted lands or fortresses in Cilicia during the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries because of its disagreement with Leon about Baghras. The Armenian king’s refusal to return the castle to the Templars caused a mutual antipathy to develop between the two sides and prompted the latter to support Bohemond IV in the Antiochene succession dispute. At the same time, Leon cultivated strong links with the Hospitalers and the Teutonic Knights. These military orders received many of their lands and properties in Cilicia during the period when the Armenian king and the Templars were feuding over Baghras. Thus, the Order of the Temple received nothing when Leon was making significant donations to Latin military and religious institutions. The monarchy of the Armenian kingdom appears to have made fewer grants to the military orders after 1216, when the conflict over Baghras was finally resolved. When King Hethoum I and his successors did make endowments they preferred to reward the military orders who already had a substantial presence in the Armenian kingdom and therefore the Templars did not receive any major strongholds or large estates in the heart of Cilicia.

**The Teutonic Knights in the kingdom of Cilicia**

The origins of the Teutonic Knights lie in a field hospital that was established by German crusaders in 1190 to care for those who were injured while participating in the siege of Acre. The founders of this hospital subsequently decided to found their own military order and adopt the Rule of the Templars, while also modelling their care of the sick on the practices of the Hospitalers. These decisions were confirmed in a papal bull issued by Innocent III in February 1199.\textsuperscript{35} The Teutonic Knights found a natural ally in King Leon I, who was crowned in January 1198 after accepting the suzerainty of the Holy Roman Emperor, Henry VI.\textsuperscript{36} At some point in the early thirteenth century, the Order delighted Leon by deciding to support Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch.

King Leon I rewarded the Teutonic Knights for their diplomatic support by confirming the donation of the castle of Amouda and several villages to the Order in April 1212.\textsuperscript{37} However, the Teutonic Knights may have already held Cumbethfort and Ayun as

\textsuperscript{34} Riley-Smith, ‘Cilician Armenia’, p. 107.
\textsuperscript{36} ATS, p. 435; Cont. WT, p. 195; Eracles, p. 215; GC, p. 662; HII, p. 479; KG, p. 426; SA, p. 458; SC, p. 634; Smbat, pp. 72-73; VE, pp. 511-512; VG, 211-212.
\textsuperscript{37} CCRR, No. 6, pp. 117-120; RRH, No. 859, pp. 229-230; TOT, No. 46, pp. 37-39.
these settlements are recorded in a document issued by Pope Innocent III in 1209 which lists the possessions of the Order.\textsuperscript{38} Less than fifteen years after their establishment as a military order the Teutonic Knights had obtained a fortress and a number of estates in Cilicia. Amouda was a small and unimpressive castle in comparison with Baghras or Silifke, but it was an important acquisition for such a new institution and for more than two decades it remained the Order’s primary stronghold in the Armenian kingdom.

The Teutonic Knights received their next major endowment in Cilicia in January 1236, when King Hethoum I bestowed the castle of Harunia upon the Order. In addition to this modest fortification, they were given a considerable lordship which included numerous villages and estates.\textsuperscript{39} Riley-Smith argues that Hethoum made this grant to the Teutonic Knights in order to help secure the eastern frontier of the Armenian kingdom so that he could concentrate on defending western Cilicia from the Seljuks.\textsuperscript{40} It is certainly true that Harunia’s location close to the Amanus Gates made it a key defensive stronghold. However, whenever the Mamluks invaded the Armenian kingdom from this direction in the second half of the thirteenth century the Teutonic Knights were unable to hinder the attackers so the castle’s importance should not be exaggerated.\textsuperscript{41}

**The Impact of the Military Orders on Antiochene-Cilician Relations**

The disagreement over Baghras meant that the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia were engaged in a diplomatic conflict even before the death of Bohemond III in 1201. In December 1199 Pope Innocent III wrote to King Leon I commanding him to return the castle to the Order of the Temple. The letter reveals that the patriarch of Antioch, Prince Bohemond III, Count Bohemond of Tripoli, and the Antiochene commune had all been pressing the Armenian king to give Baghras to the Templars.\textsuperscript{42} Thus, the Order encouraged hostility between the Latin elite at Antioch and the Cilician Armenians by seeking the support of the former in their quarrel with the latter.

The ownership of Baghras was not the only issue which caused animosity between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia in the late 1190s. It was at this point that

\textsuperscript{38} TOT, No. 298, p. 267.
\textsuperscript{39} CCCR, No. 18, pp. 141-143; RRH, No. 1060, p. 277; TOT, No. 83, pp. 65-66.
\textsuperscript{40} Riley-Smith, ‘Cilician Armenia’, p. 114.
\textsuperscript{41} Molin, *Unknown Crusader Castles*, pp. 176-177.
\textsuperscript{42} ‘Cumque dillecti filii... magister et fratres militie Templi cum nuntiiis venerabilis fratris nostri... patriarche et... illustris principis Antiocheni,... Tripolitani comitis et totius Antiochene communie supplicassent, ut castrum ipsum Templariis resingares’. PL, 214, Col. 819, No. 259; Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 249, p. 476.
the question of who would succeed Bohemond III as prince became a serious issue. In the winter of 1198-1199, Count Bohemond of Tripoli expelled his father from Antioch and took control of the principality with the help of the Antiochene commune. In a letter to Pope Innocent III, Leon claimed that Bohemond of Tripoli had plotted an attack on the Armenian kingdom with the Templars and the Hospitallers. He also asserted that these military orders later made peace with him and suggested that Bohemond III was subsequently able to regain power at Antioch with the assistance of a Cilician Armenian army. The implication of this information is that the Tripolitan count seized Antioch with the backing of the Templars and Hospitallers, but once they withdrew their support he was unable to hold the principality. These military orders appear to have been particularly influential in the principality at this time and it seems that their change of heart in 1199 delayed the outbreak of the War of Antiochene Succession between Leon and Bohemond of Tripoli.

The Tripolitan count took control of the Latin principality and was recognised as Prince Bohemond IV of Antioch by the Antiochene commune following his father’s death in 1201. When King Leon I led an army into the principality in the summer of that year and met with Philip of Plessis, the Master of the Temple, his proposals for an agreement over the future of Baghras were rejected. The Armenian king stated he was willing to cede the castle to the Templars and that both parties should send emissaries to Innocent III in order to allow the pope to settle the matter. Leon also promised to aid their attempts to recapture Darbsak and requested that he and Raymond-Roupen were made confratres of the Order. In return for these concessions the Armenian king demanded that the Templars supported Raymond-Roupen’s claim to Antioch.

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45 ATS, p. 435; DSN, p. 259; Eracles, pp. 313; Ernoul, p. 321; GC, p. 663.
46 ‘Post multas vero verborum nebulas rogavimus magistrum Templi ad supplendas preces vestras, ut ipse et dominus patriarcha Antiochenus et nos mitteremus nuntios nostros simul ad sedem apostolicam, quia per manus vestras ipsum Gastun, sopita omni occasione, Templariis reddere volebamus’. PL, 214, Col. 1005, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, p. 81.
47 ‘Nos itaque et puer, dilectus nepos noster, hac conditione fieri confratres eorum querebamus et ad acquirendum aliud castellum nomine Trapesac eis pertinens cum omni gente nostra et viribus nostris eis similiter auxiliari volebamus’. PL, 214, Col. 1005, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 81-82.
48 ‘...et Rupinum, dilectum nepotem nostrum, ad nutriendum et custodiendum bona fide et sine malo ingenio in ipso castello eis tradere cupiebamus; et ut deberent semper esse auxiliantes predicti pueri ad acquirenda
The Templars’ decision to rebuff Leon’s offer certainly aided Bohemond IV’s efforts to secure and maintain control of the principality of Antioch. Riley-Smith is probably correct to argue that they were not prepared to accept terms which implied that their claims to Baghras were doubtful and dependent on the arbitration of the pope. The issue of trust, however, was most likely the decisive factor which prompted Philip of Plessis to decline to co-operate with the Cilician Armenians. Leon had spent much of the previous decade refusing to relinquish Baghras despite incessant petitioning from the Templars and the Antiochenes, and clear instructions from the papacy. The Order probably did not believe that the Armenian king would actually hand over the castle. Philip did not want to pledge his support to Raymond-Roupen before Leon had given Baghras to the Templars. It would have been particularly galling for the Templars if they had helped the Cilician Armenians to expel Bohemond IV from Antioch and install Raymond-Roupen as the new prince in 1201, only to find that Leon subsequently ignored a decree from Innocent III to cede the castle to the Order. Philip appears to have judged that the Templars stood a better chance of recovering Baghras with Bohemond IV as the prince of Antioch.

The stance taken by the Order of the Temple in 1201 may have played a significant role in Leon’s failure to capture Antioch that year. The Templars seem to have backed Bohemond IV from the very beginning of the Antiochene succession dispute. They were clearly unwilling to aid the Armenian king’s endeavours to seize Antioch, but there is no evidence that they actually assisted the count of Tripoli in defending the city from the Cilician Armenians in 1201. Considering their alleged co-operation with him in the winter of 1198-1199, however, this is not an impossibility. Apart from refusing to support Raymond-Roupen’s claim and collaborate with his partisans, the Order also ignored Leon’s pleas to help defend the Armenian kingdom when Cilicia was invaded by the Seljuks. The Cilician Armenians probably withdrew from the Latin principality after three months of campaigning in order to defend their realm and prevent Rukn al-Dīn Süleymānshāh from conquering strategically important strongholds. Therefore, by rejecting Leon’s appeal to protect the Armenian kingdom in his absence the Templars may have forced him to prematurely end his campaign and prevented the Cilician Armenians from occupying Antioch in 1201.

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49 Riley-Smith, ‘Cilician Armenia’, p. 102.
50 PL, 214, Col. 819, No. 259; Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 249, p. 476.
51 PL, 214, Cols 1004, 1006, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 81-82.
The influence of the Templars on the Antiochene succession dispute in 1203 is quite evident. After the Cilician Armenians had succeeded in entering Antioch on a night in November, Leon began negotiating with Peter of Angoulême, the Latin patriarch of Antioch. However, before the Armenian king could secure full control of the city and have Raymond-Roupen invested as prince, his troops were attacked by the Templars. Bohemond IV’s Antiochene supporters were probably also involved in the offensive on the Cilician Armenians, but in his correspondence with Innocent III Leon focused upon the aggressiveness of the Templars. Shortly afterwards, the Armenian king and his men began to retreat back to Cilicia when an Aleppan army advanced towards Antioch and reached the Orontes. The intervention of al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s forces appears to have been crucial in forcing Leon’s withdrawal from Antioch. However, if the Templars had not attacked the Cilician Armenians and secured the city’s fortifications then the latter may have captured Antioch and established their rule over the metropolis before the Aleppans arrived. Thus, the Order played a pivotal role in maintaining Bohemond IV’s grip on the Latin principality, thereby extending the War of Antiochene Succession.

In later years it is more difficult to detect how the Templars aided the count of Tripoli in the military aspects of the Antiochene succession dispute. The Order clearly had a substantial force of fighting men based at Antioch in the early stages of the conflict because otherwise it would not have been able to make such a vital contribution in combatting the Cilician Armenians after the latter entered the city in November 1203. However, it is unclear whether this Templar force remained at Antioch and continued to help Bohemond IV’s garrison to defend the metropolis from the troops of King Leon I because the Templars aren’t mentioned in the primary source accounts of subsequent attacks on the city.

The Order of the Temple continued to cause diplomatic problems for King Leon I until it recovered Baghras in 1216. Shortly after the Templars helped thwart the Armenian

52 ‘Contigerat igitur nocte quadam ante adventum ipsius P(etri) cardinalis cum omni exercitu nostro vendicantes hereditatem nepotis nostri partes Antioch(ie) defectu iustitie infestantes, sicut Domino placuit, infra muros Antioch(ie) in manu forti intravimus, et si ad effusionem christiani sanguinis et incendium ipsius civitatis manus potentie nostre extendere vellemus, urbs Antiochena capta foret, sed pietate in Dei timore moti et christianitati miserando compatiens dominum patriarcham Antiochenum ad nos accersitum inter nos et Antiochen(os) rogavimus optate pacis esse mediatorem; et dum de pace tractaretur, ecce Templarii, quos precibus et mandatis vestris honorabamus et quibus in tota guerra deferebamus salvatis possessionibus et tenimentis illorum, quos amicos non adversarios tamquam viros religiosos habere sperabamus, sine diffiducia facta contra nos dentes acuerunt, turres munierunt, arma excusserunt, exercitum nostrum intus et extra muros civitatis Antioch(ie) sagittaverunt, vexillum Balzanum conta nos paraverunt et, quod gravius est, christianum effuderunt sanguinem postposito religionis ordine’. PL, 215, Cols 689-690, No. 119; Reg. Inn. III, 8, No. 120, pp. 214-215.

53 DSN, p. 258; KD, 5, p. 41.
king’s attempt to capture Antioch in November 1203, he retaliated by seizing their castles of La Roche de Guillaume and La Roche de Roissol.\textsuperscript{54} This hostile act, combined with the persistent refusal of the Cilician Armenians to relinquish Baghras, damaged Leon’s relationship with the pope and his representatives. The papal legate Peter of Saint-Marcellus excommunicated Leon and placed an interdict upon the kingdom of Cilicia because of his clashes with the Templars, who maintained a good relationship with the Apostolic See. The Armenian king came to an agreement with the Order in September 1204 and appears to have agreed to return La Roche de Guillaume and La Roche de Roissol.\textsuperscript{55} However, his initial decision to attack and occupy the fortresses can only have increased the Templars’ hostility towards him and entrenched their support for Bohemond IV. Furthermore, such behaviour probably discouraged Innocent III from becoming too supportive of Leon, even if the pope thought he had been excommunicated over a very minor incident.\textsuperscript{56}

Innocent III’s correspondence suggests that he was sympathetic towards Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch. The pope knew that Bohemond III had publicly designated Raymond-Roupen as his heir and ordered the Antiochene barons to swear allegiance to the boy in 1198.\textsuperscript{57} Innocent would surely not have taken such an active interest in the Antiochene succession dispute if he was content for Bohemond IV to rule the principality because the count of Tripoli was already in control of the Latin state. The interference of the papacy suggests a desire for a change in the governance of Antioch. However, the ongoing row between the Cilician Armenians and the Templars over possession of Baghras continued to harm Innocent III’s relationship with King Leon I. In March 1209 the pope wrote to Patriarch Albert of Jerusalem and asked him to try and persuade the Armenian king to give the castle to the Order. The patriarch was also to implement a new sentence of excommunication against Leon if the latter continued to remain intransigent over Baghras.\textsuperscript{58} Rather than obtaining the explicit support from the papacy for Raymond-Roupen that he sought, the Armenian king found himself facing a serious spiritual punishment from Innocent III for his reluctance to cede Baghras to the Templars.

Leon was later excommunicated for coming into conflict with the Order of the Temple. In late 1210 or early 1211 the Cilician Armenians captured Port Bonnel from the

\textsuperscript{54} PL, 215, Col. 504, No. 189.
\textsuperscript{55} PL, 215, Col. 691, No. 119.
\textsuperscript{56} PL, 215, Col. 557, No. 1.
\textsuperscript{58} PL, 216, Cols 18-19, No. 8.
Templars, before subsequently seizing all the Order’s possessions in and around the Amanus Mountains apart from two castles. A Templar force then marched towards one of these fortresses, presumably either La Roche de Guillaume or La Roche de Roissol, in order to resupply and strengthen the garrison, but it was attacked by Leon’s troops. William of Chartres, the Master of the Temple, was seriously wounded in this skirmish.\(^{59}\) After news of the Armenian king’s behaviour reached Rome Innocent III wrote to several senior clergymen in the summer of 1211 commanding them to publicise and enforce the sentence of excommunication against Leon.\(^{60}\) The pope also encouraged John of Brienne, king of Jerusalem, to assist the Templars in responding to this aggression from the Armenian king.\(^{61}\)

According to Eracles, John of Brienne supplied the Order of the Temple with 50 knights for the purpose of attacking the Armenian kingdom. Alongside troops from the kingdom of Jerusalem and the principality of Antioch, the Templars then invaded Cilicia before later making peace with Leon.\(^{62}\) If John did send 50 knights to participate in a conflict with the Cilician Armenians then this incident clearly demonstrates how Leon’s quarrel with the Order over possession of Baghras hampered his efforts to secure Antioch for his great-nephew. The Armenian king could not launch another attempt to capture the city if he was fending off an attack from the Templars and their allies. Furthermore, Leon’s clashes with the Order weakened his position when trying to persuade the papacy to explicitly support Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch. Therefore, the Armenian king sought reconciliation with the Templars, which persuaded Innocent III to lift the sentence of excommunication which had been placed upon him.\(^{63}\)

The Templars ultimately failed to stop the Cilician Armenians from capturing Antioch, but their opposition to King Leon I helped Bohemond IV to cling on to the city until 1216. The involvement of the other military orders in the conflict is less tangible. In 1207 a charter issued in the name of Raymond-Roupen granted the town of Jabala to the Order of the Hospital.\(^{64}\) The settlement was under Ayyubid control so the Hospitallers did not actually receive the donation. Nevertheless, the symbolism of the document is still important. By making this agreement the Order recognised Raymond-Roupen as the prince of Antioch and his right to donate land and property that was either currently or formerly part of the

\(^{59}\) PL, 216, Cols 430-431, No. 64.
\(^{60}\) PL, 216, Cols 430-432, Nos. 64-65.
\(^{61}\) PL, 216, Col. 432, No. 66.
\(^{62}\) Eracles, pp. 317-318.
\(^{63}\) PL, 216, Cols 792-793, No. 7.
\(^{64}\) See Appendix B.
principality. It is fairly clear, therefore, that by 1207 at the latest the Hospitallers had decided to support Raymond-Roupen in the Antiochene succession dispute.

There is no evidence that Hospitaller forces actually participated in Leon’s attacks on Templar possessions and the principality of Antioch. Instead the Order of the Hospital aided the Cilician Armenians indirectly. For example, in 1210 Leon bestowed the fortresses of Silifke, Camardias, and Norpert upon the Hospitallers.\footnote{CCRR, No. 3, pp. 112-114; CGOH, 2, No. 1344, pp. 115-116; RRH, 1, No. 841, pp. 224-225.} This endowment made the Order responsible for holding these key strongholds in western Cilicia. This meant that the Armenian king could potentially spend more time campaigning in northern Syria because he would not have to withdraw in order to defend the Armenian kingdom if castles like Silifke were attacked by the Seljuks. Leon seems to have been forced to cut short his offensives on the Latin principality in 1201 and 1208 because of incursions made into Cilicia by Rukn al-Dīn Sūleymānshāh and Kay-Khusraw I.\footnote{See Non-Christian Powers Chapter.} He probably hoped to avoid such a scenario after 1210 by relying on the Hospitallers to defend the western frontier of his kingdom and hinder any Seljuk invasion from that direction.

When King Leon I was arranging the marriage of his daughter, Stephanie, to John of Brienne, king of Jerusalem, the financial assistance of the Hospitallers was very important. On 23 April 1214 the Order of the Hospital gave 10,000 bezants to Leon in exchange for the village of Vaner and its appurtenances.\footnote{CCRR, No. 8, pp. 122-123; CGOH, 2, No. 1426, pp. 164-165; RRH, 1, No. 870, p. 235.} Furthermore, it loaned 20,000 bezants to the Armenian king, which was secured against the territory of Giguer.\footnote{CCRR, No. 9, pp. 124-125; CGOH, 2, No. 1427, pp. 165-166; RRH, 1, No. 869, pp. 234-235.} This money allowed Leon to pay a substantial dowry to John of Brienne, which he probably wouldn’t have otherwise been able to afford given that the Armenian king must have been spending a large amount of his tax revenues on maintaining an army in order to pursue the conquest of Antioch and resist the threat posed by the Seljuks. By facilitating this marriage the Hospitallers also helped Leon gain another ally in his quarrel with Bohemond IV.\footnote{Perry argues that the Hospitallers ‘may well have played the crucial role’ in forging an alliance between the two kings. See G. Perry, John of Brienne: King of Jerusalem, Emperor of Constantinople, c.1175-1237 (Cambridge, 2013), p. 79.} This was particularly important given that John had previously been asked by Innocent III to assist the Templars in recovering the strongholds and estates which the Cilician Armenians had taken from them in 1211.\footnote{PL, 216, Cols 430-432, Nos. 64-66.}
The Teutonic Knights also appear to have backed Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch. In June 1209 a member of the Order was in Rome acting as an envoy of King Leon I at the court of Pope Innocent III.\(^{71}\) The emissary was defending the behaviour of the Armenian king during the Antiochene succession dispute and articulating Leon’s concerns. This indicates that the Teutonic Knights had developed a close relationship with the Cilician Armenians. Yet a few months later, in September of that year, Bohemond IV gave three fortified towers in Tripoli to the Order.\(^{72}\) It is possible, as Molin suggests, that this was an attempt by the Tripolitan count to persuade the Teutonic Knights to weaken their ties with the Armenian king.\(^{73}\) However, it may simply be the case that Bohemond IV was unconcerned by the Order’s support for Raymond-Roupen and he thought it was unlikely to have any meaningful effect on his struggle against the Cilician Armenians. He probably wanted to develop close connections with this new institution and believed that the Teutonic Knights could be trusted to help defend Tripoli.

In April 1212, King Leon I confirmed in charter that he had granted the castle of Amouda and several villages to the Teutonic Knights. The Order was also given permission to buy and sell freely within the Armenian kingdom, without being subject to the taxes which Leon normally imposed on trade.\(^{74}\) At first glance, it is tempting to view this endowment in a similar manner to the donation which the Armenian king had made to the Hospitallers two years earlier. However, unlike Silifke and the other fortresses which the Order of the Hospital received in 1210, Amouda was located on the Cilician plain in the eastern half of the Armenian kingdom, but a long way from any frontier. Thus, Leon could not really expect the Teutonic Knights to inhibit a Seljuk offensive on eastern Cilicia simply because they had a garrison at Amouda.\(^{75}\) The Order did not aid the campaign to install Raymond-Roupen at Antioch by taking on a lot of responsibility for the defence and security for the Armenian kingdom, nor does it appear to have contributed men towards Leon’s attacks on the Latin principality. Therefore, the only real influence that the Teutonic Knights had on the Antiochene succession dispute was in the field of diplomacy, where Innocent III would have noted their support for Raymond-Roupen.

\(^{71}\) PL, 216, Col. 54, No. 45.  
\(^{72}\) See Appendix B.  
\(^{73}\) Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 80.  
\(^{74}\) CCRR, No. 6, pp. 117-120; RRH, No. 859, pp. 229-230; TOT, No. 46, pp. 37-39.  
\(^{75}\) Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 176.
None of the military orders are mentioned by the primary sources which record the Cilician Armenian occupation of Antioch in 1216 which suggests that they did not play a role of any significance in this event. If the Templars still had a large detachment based at Antioch then they were unable to prevent Leon’s troops from securing control of the city after gaining entry during the night. The Armenian king subsequently returned Baghras to the Order of the Temple. He must have hoped that this act would persuade the Templars to abandon their opposition to Raymond-Roupen’s claim to Antioch and recognise him as the legitimate prince. The strategic importance of the castle to Leon greatly diminished after he had captured Antioch because he did not anticipate further conflict on the Antiochene-Cilician frontier once Raymond-Roupen had been put in charge of the principality.

Over the following three years Leon’s great-nephew continued to cultivate good relations with the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights. When Bohemond IV reoccupied Antioch in the spring of 1219 Raymond-Roupen fled to Cilicia and left the Antiochene citadel under the command of Ferrand de Barras, the Hospitaller castellan of Silifke. The count of Tripoli then besieged the citadel and Ferrand was forced to surrender. The Order of the Hospital was evidently trusted by Raymond-Roupen, but the Hospitaller garrison he left behind was unable to prevent Bohemond IV from regaining full control of Antioch. The Tripolitan count ruled the Latin principality for the next fourteen years, while Raymond-Roupen unsuccessfully tried to claim the crown of the Armenian kingdom after his great-uncle’s death. Thus, despite the strong support the Order had given to Leon’s great-nephew for more than a decade, it was ultimately unable to help him retain power at Antioch when confronted by an opposing force.

The Hospitallers maintained a good relationship with Raymond-Roupen after his expulsion from Antioch and backed his attempt to win control of Cilicia. After arriving at Tarsus in 1220 in order to pursue his claim to the Armenian kingdom Leon’s great-nephew received the support of a number of Cilician barons, including the marshal Vahram. According to the Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad, Raymond-Roupen’s partisans advanced towards Mamistra, but they were attacked by the troops of Constantine of Babaron between that town and Adana. Constantine’s men subsequently pursued them to Tarsus where Raymond-Roupen appealed to the Order of the Hospital and

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76 Acta Innocentii, No. 21, pp. 590-591.
77 ATS, p. 437; Eracles, p. 318; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 484.
78 Eracles, p. 347; OP, pp. 278-279; Crusade and Christendom, p. 222; VE, p. 514.
79 Smbat, pp. 94-95.
Pelagius, the papal legate on the Fifth Crusade, for military aid. They responded by sending an army to Cilicia under the command of Aimery, nephew of the Hospitaller marshal Aimery of Layron. This force landed at Silifke, but under the incompetent leadership of Aimery it did not move swiftly to join Raymond-Roupen at Tarsus.80 During this delay Tarsus was betrayed to Constantine by a man named Vasil, which led to the capture and imprisonment of Leon’s great-nephew and his key supporters.81

Raymond-Roupen’s failure to successfully claim the Cilician throne despite having the total backing of the Hospital demonstrates the limitations of the Order’s influence on the Armenian kingdom. In the early 1220s the Hospitallers still controlled a large lordship in western Cilicia, including several fortresses. Silifke, which had its own castellan, is likely to have maintained a sizeable garrison in order to protect the castle and the surrounding estates from Seljuk attacks. Yet these men were unable to affect the outcome of the conflict between Raymond-Roupen and Constantine which predominantly took place further east in the heart of the Armenian kingdom. Furthermore, the reinforcements from Damietta were unable to have the impact that Raymond-Roupen desired. Aimery, whom Chevalier suggests was probably a Hospitaller, headed a substantial force, but his decision to land at Silifke and sluggishness in advancing to Tarsus meant that his troops were unable to prevent Constantine from capturing the city and effectively ending the succession dispute.82

The Hospitallers made little impact on the politics of the Armenian kingdom in the aftermath of King Philip’s deposition and imprisonment in late 1224. The coup d’état was led by Constantine of Babaron, with the baillie intent on installing his own son, Hethoum, upon the Cilician throne.83 After Philip’s murder his widow, Isabel, took refuge in the Hospitaller castle of Silifke. However, the Order decided to sell the fortress to Constantine, rather than defend the queen against the baillie of Cilicia.84 As mentioned earlier, senior figures within the Hospital may not have been ‘entirely unhappy’ about losing this stronghold, and the sources do not suggest there was much reluctance from the castellan about relinquishing Silifke.85 Nevertheless, the Hospitallers would probably not have vacated the castle unless

80 Eracles, p. 347.
81 ATS, p. 437; Eracles, p. 347; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 485; OP, p. 250; Crusade and Christendom, p. 199; Smbat, pp. 94-95; VE, p. 514.
82 Chevalier, Les ordres religieux-militaires, p. 171.
84 BH, 1, p. 389; SC, p. 648.
85 Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 182.
they had been pressured to do so by Constantine. It is significant that on this occasion the Order chose not to oppose the baillie and acquiesced to his demands. The Hospitallers may have calculated that Constantine and Hethoum were likely to gain full control of the Armenian kingdom whether Isabel married the latter or not, and it made little sense for the Order to antagonise the Cilician Armenian monarchy and put all its possessions in the realm in jeopardy.86

The Teutonic Knights do not appear to have involved themselves in the Cilician succession dispute following the death of King Leon I in 1219. Unlike the Hospitallers, there is no suggestion in the sources that they gave any explicit support to Raymond-Roupen, even though he received the backing of the papacy.87 Later, the Teutonic Knights assisted Constantine of Babaron by holding King Philip as a prisoner in the castle of Amouda. Philip’s last recorded location before his death was at Amouda so it appears that he was poisoned while being held at the castle.88 Therefore, the Order was probably complicit in the murder of Bohemond IV’s son.89 However, there is no evidence that the Teutonic Knights participated in Philip’s initial overthrow. The Teutonic Order would have wanted to stay on good terms with Constantine of Babaron after he had deposed Philip and was prepared to overlook the murder of the latter in order to avoid antagonising the most powerful Armenian baron in Cilicia.

The Templars had no noticeable impact on the politics of the Armenian kingdom between the death of King Leon I and the coronation of Hethoum I. The Order did not provide military aid to any of Leon’s possible successors and played no part in the deposition of King Philip and its aftermath. Significantly, the Templars refused to assist Bohemond IV when the he invaded Cilicia in 1225 following his son’s imprisonment,90 although as Riley-Smith and Chevalier have previously noted they did allow the Antiochenes to move freely through the Amanus Mountains.91 After regaining the castle of Baghras in 1216 the Order was no longer in direct conflict with the Cilician Armenians and since Bohemond IV had not helped the Templars in the recovery of the fortress they felt no obligation to provide him with troops on such a campaign. The prince of Antioch’s offensive on the Armenian kingdom ultimately ended in failure, without the capture of any strongholds or a victory in battle.

87 Chevalier, Les ordres religieux-militaires, p. 473.
88 BH, 1, p. 381.
89 Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 172.
90 IA, 3, p. 280.
against Constantine’s forces, but there is no guarantee that he would have been any more successful with Templar support.

There is relatively little evidence about the activities of the military orders in the principality of Antioch and the kingdom and Cilicia after Hethoum’s coronation in 1226. The political stability in both states provided fewer opportunities for these institutions to make a noticeable impact. However, the behaviour of the Templars in the 1230s must have strained the Order’s relationship with the Antiochene prince. In c.1235 Armand of Périgord, the Master of the Temple, agreed to launch an attack upon the Armenian kingdom with Bohemond V in order to avenge the deaths of several Templars who had been executed by Hethoum for stirring up trouble against him. An army comprising Antiochene and Templar troops appears to have assembled at Antioch and marched north into Cilicia, but before any real conflict took place Constantine sought to negotiate a peace agreement with Armand of Périgord. The Master of the Temple accepted the terms offered to him by Hethoum’s father and the Templars departed the Armenian kingdom soon afterwards.\(^92\) Chevalier speculates that Constantine may even have granted new lands to the Order in order to pacify Armand and his men, but other concessions such as a large monetary payment and recognition of Templar sovereignty over all the Temple’s possessions in the Amanus Mountains are just as likely.\(^93\) According to \textit{Eracles}, Bohemond V was particularly annoyed by the sudden withdrawal of the Templars, but the source does not record whether or not the Antiochene prince hastily followed Armand in leaving the Armenian kingdom.\(^94\) If Bohemond did try to continue his campaign in Cilicia after the departure of the Templars then there is no evidence that he enjoyed any military success. The reconciliation between the Cilician Armenians and the Order of the Temple seems to have scuppered the prince’s plans to inflict serious damage on his northern neighbour, although the expedition may have ended in failure even with continued Templar assistance.

Bohemond V may also have been unimpressed by the actions of the Templars a couple of years later. In 1236 or 1237 the Templar garrison of Baghras attacked a band of Turcomans that had settled in the Amouq valley and captured their livestock. In retaliation to this act of aggression, al-Mu'azzam led an Aleppan army into the Amanus Mountains and laid siege to the castle of Baghras. Bohemond intervened on behalf of the Templars and

\(^{92}\) \textit{Eracles}, pp. 405-406.
persuaded the Aleppans to negotiate with the Order. Eventually the two sides agreed a truce and the Ayyubid troops withdrew despite being on the verge of capturing the fortress.\textsuperscript{95} The Templars nearly lost their most important stronghold in northern Syria, but this did not discourage them from campaigning aggressively in the Amanus Mountains shortly after the siege of Baghras had been lifted.

In June 1237 William of Montferrat, the Templar commander of Antioch, led an attack on Darbsak from the nearby castle of Chivlan Kale. William appears to have assembled an army of some strength, including troops sent by Guy of Jubayl, but his assault on Darbsak would prove to be a disaster. The garrison of the fortress fought vigorously against the Templar force, which was subsequently overwhelmed when an Aleppan relief force arrived to help the besieged. William of Montferrat was among the many men who were killed during the fighting, with most of the rest being captured by the Aleppans.\textsuperscript{96} This defeat was ‘one of the worst military disasters in the Order’s history’ and was considered significant enough by the English chronicler Matthew Paris to be recorded in his \textit{Chronica Majora}.\textsuperscript{97}

The destruction of the Templar army at Darbsak may have had some impact on how the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia subsequently developed. If the sources are accurate in recording the death or capture of the vast majority of William of Montferrat’s men then the military presence of the Order of the Temple in northern Syria is likely to have been severely weakened. Therefore, the Templars would have not have been able to participate in any future campaign Bohemond V chose to launch against the Armenian kingdom because the few fighting men they had left in the region would have been needed to garrison their fortresses in the Amanus Mountains. Furthermore, the behaviour of senior figures within the Order would have discouraged the prince of Antioch from seeking military collaboration with the Templars because he would probably have doubted their reliability. Bohemond had been very annoyed when Armand of Périgord deserted him during the campaign in c.1235, while William of Montferrat chose to launch an offensive against Darbsak in 1237 just months after the Order had agreed a truce with the Aleppans following the intervention of the Antiochene prince. Without Templar support Bohemond does not appear to have had the necessary manpower to sustain a successful

\textsuperscript{95} DSN, p. 265; KD, 5, p. 95.
\textsuperscript{96} DSN, p. 266; KD, 5, pp. 95-96; MP, 3, pp. 404-406.
\textsuperscript{97} Molin, \textit{Unknown Crusader Castles}, p. 73.
invasion of Cilicia so these events discouraged him from attacking the Armenian kingdom despite his hostility towards Constantine and Hethoum.

The military orders appear to have had almost no influence whatsoever on the relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom in the three decades before the fall of Antioch in 1268. The Templars maintained control of their castles and estates in the Amanus Mountains, while the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights retained a large landed presence in Cilicia, but there was no physical conflict between the two polities which meant that there was little opportunity for the orders to support one side against the other. If these military-religious institutions had any influence at all it must have been through diplomacy. In May 1249 the Templar commander of Antioch Ferrandus Spagnolus was present in Cyprus helping King Louis IX of France to prepare for his crusade to Egypt.\(^98\) It is possible he may have encouraged or facilitated the truce which was agreed by representatives of King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond V under the supervision of Louis in June of that year.\(^99\) However, even if the Templars were involved in these negotiations it is unlikely that their intervention was crucial in bringing about peace between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. The insecurity caused by the Mongol incursions into Anatolia was probably a much more significant factor.

**Conclusion**

The Templars were significant participants in the Antiochene succession dispute and Bohemond IV may not have been able to retain control of the Latin principality until 1216 without their support. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights assisted King Leon I during the conflict, but they did not play a crucial role in helping him to capture Antioch. As the thirteenth century progressed the influence of the military orders on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia appears to have steadily weakened. The Hospital supported Raymond-Roupen both during his time as the prince of Antioch and when he tried to claim the Cilician throne, but on both occasions he lost out to his rivals despite the Order’s help. Thus, even when the military orders did try to intervene in the politics of this region they were usually unsuccessful in shaping events.

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\(^98\) RRH, 1, No. 1176, pp. 308-309.
\(^99\) Spicilegium, 3, p. 625; *The Seventh Crusade*, p. 76
Chapter Four: The Influence of the County of Tripoli on the Prince of Antioch

In 1201 Bohemond, count of Tripoli, arrived at Antioch shortly after his father’s death and was subsequently recognised as the new prince by members of the Antiochene commune and some of the principality’s nobility. Apart from Raymond-Roupen’s brief tenure, the principality of Antioch remained under the control of the counts of Tripoli until May 1268. Therefore, for more than sixty years the county and the principality were united under one ruling dynasty. This presented a logistical challenge for the counts because Antioch was located more than 120 miles north of Tripoli and in the first half of the thirteenth century much of the land between these cities was controlled by the Ayyubids.

In general histories of the Crusades it has often been asserted that the princes of Antioch primarily resided in the county of Tripoli when they controlled both states. However, these claims have not been backed up with detailed evidence, and thus this subject deserves closer examination. This chapter will assess the surviving primary source material and consider whether Bohemond IV, Bohemond V, and Bohemond VI spent more time at Antioch or Tripoli. The implications of this matter also need to be considered. If the princes of Antioch were frequently absent from their principality then this must have affected the manner in which the state was governed and the way it interacted with neighbouring powers, particularly the kingdom of Cilicia.

Travelling between Antioch and Tripoli

In 1188 Saladin captured numerous fortifications and settlements south of Antioch, including the cities of Jabala and Latakia. This dramatically reduced the size of the principality and ended the Latin dominance of the coast between Tripoli and St Simeon. As a result any traveller journeying overland from Antioch to Tripoli had to pass through Ayyubid territory. The situation remained almost unchanged until 1260 when Bohemond VI seized Latakia and much of the surrounding area. However, the Mamluks sacked the city of Antioch eight years later and the principality crumbled. The testimony of Wilbrand of

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1 ATS, p. 435; DSN, p. 259; Eracles, pp. 313; Ernoul, p. 321; GC, p. 663.
3 BDIS, pp. 83-87; IA, 2, pp. 345-353; IDI, pp. 127-144.
4 DSN, p. 45; IAZ, 2, pp. 646-647.
Oldenburg suggests that Latins preferred to travel between the county and the principality by sea rather than by land during the thirteenth century because they feared attack from the Ayyubids of Jabala and Latakia.\(^5\)

Pryor estimates that during the twelfth century it took Egyptian fleets seven or eight days to navigate 350 miles along the eastern coastline of the Mediterranean from Alexandria to the waters between Lebanon and Cyprus. This is based on the assumption that a ship would travel ‘at an average continuous speed of two knots’.\(^6\) If Pryor’s projections are correct then in theory the 120 mile voyage from Tripoli to Saint Simeon could have been comfortably completed in three days during the summer months. Thus, provided the weather was relatively calm, the sea journey between the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli was relatively short and the ruler of these two states could potentially have made several trips back and forth in the same year.

The Location of the Counts of Tripoli 1201-1268

Charters are an important source for establishing the location of a medieval ruler because such documents often record where they were written. However, unfortunately only nineteen charters have survived which contain agreements involving the counts of Tripoli between 1201 and 1268. Röhricht has identified where eleven of these charters were drafted: seven at Tripoli, three at Acre, and just one at Antioch.\(^7\) The other eight charters do not explicitly state where they were formulated, but in some cases it may be possible to make an educated guess about where they originated. In addition, Bohemond IV appears on the witness list of three charters, and Röhricht has established that one of them was composed at Acre.\(^8\)

Bohemond IV was the donor or recipient in ten of the nineteen charters previously mentioned. In the first of these documents, he extended the privileges of the Genoese in the county of Tripoli in December 1203 while in the city of Antioch.\(^9\) The prince later issued charters while at Tripoli in December 1204 and July 1205, and he also witnessed an agreement which must have taken place in the county of Tripoli because it was drafted in

\(^5\) WO, p. 122; Pilgrimage to Jerusalem, pp. 70-71.  
\(^7\) See Appendix B.  
\(^8\) RRH, 1, No. 1003, pp. 263-264.  
\(^9\) See Appendix B.
December 1204 on behalf of the Tripolitan constable.\textsuperscript{10} Towards the end of his life, Bohemond IV witnessed a charter issued by the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II at Acre in April 1229.\textsuperscript{11} The Antiochene prince was also at Acre when he made three grants to the Hospitallers in October 1231.\textsuperscript{12}

Röhricht has not been able to identify the location of the other four charters which contain agreements involving Bohemond IV. In 1206 and 1209 the prince made donations to the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights respectively. These charters concern land and property in the county of Tripoli, but that does not mean they were drafted there and it is possible that Bohemond made these arrangements whilst he was at Antioch. He later issued two charters in 1228 in relation to agreements made Hermann von Salza, grand master of the Teutonic Knights.\textsuperscript{13} Charter evidence demonstrates that Bohemond IV was at Acre in April 1229 and October 1231, while Morton has established that Hermann was at the coastal city in October 1227 and September 1228.\textsuperscript{14} Therefore it is likely, although far from certain, that Bohemond IV met the grand master at Acre in 1228 and the charters were drawn up there.

Only five charters issued by Bohemond V have survived. The agreements he made in 1236, 1241 and 1243 were composed at Tripoli.\textsuperscript{15} Röhricht has not been able to identify the location of the other two charters which Bohemond V formulated in March 1233, shortly after his father’s death. One of these charters confirms the privileges granted to the Pisans by Raymond III of Tripoli, but that does not mean the Antiochene prince was at Tripoli when the documents were drafted.

Bohemond VI issued just four of the surviving nineteen charters which contain agreements involving the counts of Tripoli between 1201 and 1268. The prince was at Tripoli when he granted land and property to the Hospitallers in 1255, and when he made a pact with the grand master of the Order of the Hospital in 1262.\textsuperscript{16} Bohemond may also have been at Tripoli when he formulated charters after negotiations with the Hospitallers in 1256 and 1259, although these documents do not explicitly state the location in which they were composed.

\textsuperscript{10} CDSMOG, No. 87, pp. 92-93; CGOH, 2, No. 1198, pp. 42-43; RRH, 1, No. 800, pp. 213-214.
\textsuperscript{11} RRH, 1, No. 1003, pp. 263-264.
\textsuperscript{12} See Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{13} See Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{14} Morton, \textit{Teutonic Knights}, p. 191.
\textsuperscript{15} See Appendix B.
\textsuperscript{16} See Appendix B.
The charter evidence alone does not reveal very much about the location of Bohemond IV, Bohemond V, and Bohemond VI. No documents concerning agreements involving the count of Tripoli have survived for the periods 1210-1227 and 1244-1254. Of the eleven charters involving the counts of Tripoli where Röhricht has been able to identify the location in which they were composed, only one was drafted at Antioch compared to seven at Tripoli. Of course, this data sample is very small and therefore its results have relatively little meaning, but it does support the idea that Bohemond IV and his successors spent more time at Tripoli than Antioch. Clearly, it is only by using the testimony of letters and chronicles in addition to the charter evidence that a more accurate understanding of their activities will emerge.

Count Bohemond of Tripoli arrived at Antioch soon after the death of Bohemond III in 1201 and was swiftly installed as the new prince by the Antiochene commune and some of the principality’s nobility. Bohemond IV spent at least three months at Antioch in 1201 and probably much longer than that as he established himself as the ruler of the principality. The Tripolitan count had to defend Antioch from King Leon I of Cilicia, who tried to seize control of the principality after he learned of the death of Bohemond III. These events are recorded by several sources, including a papal letter sent by Leon to Pope Innocent III and the Old French continuations of William of Tyre.17

In 1203 Leon led an army from Cilicia to Antioch and entered the city during the night. The Armenian king then began to discuss a peace agreement with the patriarch of Antioch, but his troops were attacked by the Templars.18 Leon and his men were then forced to withdraw from the city and retreat back to Cilicia when an Ayyubid army, sent by al-Zāhir Ghāzī of Aleppo to expel the Cilician Armenians from Antioch, reached the Orontes.19 Cahen asserts that the Armenians entered Antioch on 11 November 1203, but that Bohemond IV was not in the city at that time.20 It is true that the sources which describe these events do not mention the count of Tripoli, and thus he may not have been present. However, as previously mentioned, Bohemond issued a charter from Antioch in December 1203.21 Therefore, either Cahen is mistaken about Bohemond’s absence from Antioch or the Tripolitan count arrived at

17 ATS, p. 435; DSN, p. 259; Eracles, pp. 313; Ernoul, p. 321; GC, p. 663; PL, 214, Col. 1004, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 79-80
19 DSN, p. 258; KD, 5, p. 41.
20 Cahen, La Syrie du nord, p. 604.
21 RRH, 1, No. 792, pp. 210-211.
the city shortly after the Cilician Armenian army withdrew. He may have returned to Tripoli at some point between his investiture at Antioch and Leon’s occupation of the city in late 1203, but there is no evidence to confirm it.

Bohemond IV certainly spent a considerable amount of time in the county of Tripoli in 1205 after becoming embroiled in a conflict with one of his barons. Renaud of Nephin married the heiress of the lord of Gibelcar without the permission of the count. Bohemond could not allow the creation of such a large lordship in his county under the command of a man who had shown him such little respect and so he resolved to punish Renaud. The Tripolitan count eventually succeeded in capturing Nephin and imprisoning Renaud after several months of fighting. Chartier evidence confirms that Bohemond IV was at Tripoli in December 1204 and July 1205, while the *Gestes des Chiprois* indicates that he did not seize Nephin until 1206. It is unlikely that the count travelled to Antioch during his ongoing conflict with Renaud, particularly as the lord of Nephin threatened the city of Tripoli itself, and therefore it would appear that Bohemond remained in the county between late 1204 and early 1206.

Shortly after the conclusion of this secular power struggle, an ecclesiastical dispute erupted at Antioch. In 1206 the Latin patriarch of Antioch, Peter of Angoulême, was excommunicated by Peter of Saint Marcellus, a papal legate. Bohemond IV later installed the Greek patriarch of Antioch, Simeon II, in the cathedral of St Peter, thereby effectively replacing Peter of Angoulême. The Tripolitan count probably returned to Antioch in 1206 to oversee the appointment of Simeon II, although it is possible that he conducted Antiochene affairs from Tripoli.

Bohemond IV was definitely at Antioch to resist a rebellion against his rule, which occurred in late 1207. Peter of Angoulême tried to help a group of knights, who presumably supported Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality, to take control of the city. However, the rebels were crushed by Bohemond’s forces and the count had the Latin patriarch imprisoned. Peter of Angoulême was deprived of food and water whilst he was in prison, and he eventually died of thirst. There is a suggestion in the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable that Bohemond offered to release the Latin patriarch if he recognised that the

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22 ATS, p. 435; Eracles, pp. 314-315; GC, p. 663.
23 GC, p. 663; RRH, 1, No. 800, pp. 213-214; RRH, 1, No. 807, pp. 215-216.
count of Tripoli was also the legitimate prince of Antioch, but this proposal was refused. Thus, it would appear that Bohemond IV remained at Antioch in the early part of 1208 to oversee Peter’s imprisonment. It may also have been necessary for him to spend a few months in the city restoring order in the aftermath of the revolt.

Bohemond IV seems to have returned to Tripoli at some point before September 1210 because it is recorded in Eracles that after King Hugh I of Cyprus reached the age of majority Walter of Montbéliard appealed to Tripoli for boats to be sent to Gastria and ‘the prince, who loved him greatly, sent them to him’. This suggests that Bohemond was at Tripoli when Walter requested naval transport and that he personally ensured that it was dispatched to Cyprus.

The next recorded appearance of the Tripolitan count is in 1214 when he led an attack on the Assassin castle of Khawabi. His troops subsequently defeated an Aleppan force sent by al-Zāhir Ghāzī to relieve the besieged Assassins in November of that year. However, Bohemond IV chose to lift the siege of Khawabi and withdraw after he discovered that a Damascene army led by al-Mu’azzam, son of al-Adil, had begun pillaging the county of Tripoli. The proximity of Khawabi to the county of Tripoli suggests that Bohemond prepared for this campaign in his southern polity, and the evidence indicates that he headed south into the county after abandoning the siege of the castle.

The Tripolitan count was at Tripoli when King Leon I of Cilicia seized Antioch in February 1216 and invested Raymond-Roupen as prince. The Armenian king probably chose to launch another attempt to capture the city at this time because Bohemond was absent from the principality. It would certainly have been much more difficult for the Cilician Armenians to capture Antioch if the count had been there, particularly if he was accompanied by some of his Tripolitan vassals. Therefore, it is likely that Bohemond had been absent from his principality in the months preceding Leon’s occupation of Antioch and that prompted the Armenian king to act. The count may not have visited Antioch for several years prior to 1216.

The principality of Antioch was ruled by Raymond-Roupen until 1219, when he fled to Cilicia. Meanwhile, further south, Bohemond IV went to Acre in late 1217 and briefly

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26 Smbat, pp. 84-85.
28 KD, 5, pp. 48-49.
29 Acta Innocentii, No. 21, pp. 589-590; ATS, p. 436; DSN, p. 260; Eracles, p. 318; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 483; KD, 5, p. 50; SC, p. 643; Smbat, p. 89.
participated in the Fifth Crusade before returning to Tripoli with King Hugh I of Cyprus in January 1218. The Tripolitan count then married Hugh’s half-sister, Melisende, but shortly afterwards the Cypriot king died. According to Jacques de Vitry, Bohemond was later forced to defend the county of Tripoli from Muslim attacks. Clearly he was not in the principality of Antioch between February 1216 and March 1219 while the polity was under the control of Raymond-Roupen. Bohemond presumably spent most of this period in the county of Tripoli, although his only recorded appearance there was in early 1218.

In the spring of 1219 Bohemond IV travelled north with a small force and seized control of Antioch. When Raymond-Roupen realised that he had lost control of the city he placed Antioch’s citadel in the hands of the Hospitallers and fled north to Cilicia. The Order of the Hospital later surrendered the citadel to the count of Tripoli after a siege. Bohemond’s arrival at Antioch is likely to have occurred after Raymond-Roupen issued a charter granting trading privileges to the Teutonic Knights in the principality in March 1219, but before the death of King Leon I of Cilicia in early May 1219. It is unclear how long the Tripolitan count remained in the principality after capturing Antioch in order to re-establish his grip on the state.

Bohemond IV appears to have been present at Antioch at some point in the early 1220s, if the testimony of several Armenian chroniclers is correct. The count’s son, Philip, became king of Cilicia after marrying Leon’s daughter, Isabel, in 1222, but he was deposed and imprisoned in late 1224 after losing the support of the Cilician Armenian nobility. It is recorded in the Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable that Philip took the wealth of the Armenian kingdom to Antioch, while Kirakos and Vardan wrote that Philip sent the Cilician crown and other royal objects to his father. This would suggest that Bohemond IV was at Antioch during the early 1220s when his son was transferring this booty to the city from Cilicia.

The count of Tripoli also seems to have spent time in the principality of Antioch in 1225 and 1226. After learning of his son’s deposition and imprisonment Bohemond IV repeatedly sent ambassadors to the Cilician Armenians asking them to release Philip and

30 Eracles, p. 325.
32 ATS, p. 437; Eracles, p. 318; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 484; OP, p. 235; *Crusade and Christendom*, pp. 190-191.
33 Eracles, p. 318.
35 Smbat, p. 96.
36 KG, p. 428; VG, p. 213.
restore him to power. According to Bar Hebraeus, Constantine of Babaron, the leader of the baronial revolt, eventually agreed to release Philip and summoned Bohemond IV to Cilicia to collect his son. However, the deposed king had been poisoned and he died shortly afterwards. Ibn al-Athīr, on the other hand, recorded that the count of Tripoli invaded Cilicia in 1226 after the Cilician Armenian nobility refused to release Philip, but he later withdrew after an unsuccessful campaign. Either way, it is clear that Bohemond did enter into the Armenian kingdom during this period. It seems highly unlikely that he would have travelled straight to Cilicia from Tripoli without passing through his northern principality. Indeed, the testimony of Ibn al-Athīr supports the view that the Tripolitan count spent time at Antioch before invading Cilicia: ‘The prince assembled his troops to march into Armenian lands…nevertheless, others did obey the prince, who entered the fringes of the lands of the Armenians, which are narrow passes and rugged mountains’. Ibn al-Athīr does not mention sailing and instead suggests that Bohemond’s forces marched to Cilicia, which would indicate that they marched north from Antioch.

As previously mentioned, Bohemond IV may have been at Acre in the first half of 1228 when he was negotiating agreements with Hermann von Salza, grand master of the Teutonic Knights. Later in that year the count travelled to Cyprus to meet the Holy Roman Emperor, Frederick II. However, when Frederick asked him to swear an oath of fealty, Bohemond feigned illness and fled to Nephin in the county of Tripoli. He appears to have spent a considerable amount of time at Acre in the latter years of his life as charters confirm his presence there in April 1229 and October 1231. Bohemond IV’s last recorded appearance at Antioch is in 1226, and the surviving evidence suggests that he spent most of the late 1220s and early 1230s in the county of Tripoli and the kingdom of Jerusalem.

Bohemond IV died in the first three months of 1233, although the location of his death is not recorded. His eldest son, Bohemond V, issued his first charters as prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli in March of that year, but his whereabouts are also unknown. The evidence about Bohemond V and the two states that he governed is extremely limited, and it is quite difficult to locate him in the three years after his investiture as prince. His brother, Henry, participated in a Hospitaller attack on the fortress of Montferrand during this

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37 BH, 1, p. 381; IA, 3, p. 280.
38 BH, 1, p. 381.
39 IA, 3, pp. 279-280.
40 GC, p. 682.
41 See Appendix B.
42 See Appendix B.
period. According to Eracles, Bohemond did not take part in the campaign because of ‘the truce that he had with the sultan of Hama’, but he did give thirty knights to Henry so that his brother could join the Hospitallers for the offensive on Montferrand.\(^ {43}\) It is unclear if the new prince of Antioch was in the county of Tripoli in order to help with the preparations for this campaign as no source records his location at this time. This attack on Montferrand took place in 1235 or 1236 according to the Annales de Terre Sainte and the Gestes des Chiprois,\(^ {44}\) but historians such as Kennedy and Molin have asserted that it occurred in 1233.\(^ {45}\)

Bohemond V appears to have spent some time in the principality of Antioch prior to 1236. According to Eracles, he made preparations to invade Cilicia with the Templars, who wanted revenge after the Cilician Armenians captured and executed several of the Order’s knights. A large army assembled and advanced on the Armenian kingdom, but Constantine of Babaron, the father of King Hethoum I, ‘saw the army which was coming towards him…and he informed the master of the Temple that he wanted to reconcile with him’.\(^ {46}\) Bohemond was annoyed when he learned that the Templars had made peace with the Cilician Armenians, but it is unclear if he continued with the campaign after they withdrew.\(^ {47}\) The prince almost certainly prepared for the attack on Cilicia at Antioch. Bohemond was collaborating with the Templars who were based in the Amanus mountains, on the frontier between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom, so it would have made sense for him to gather his troops at Antioch and join forces with the Order before invading Cilicia. Cahen estimates that these events happened shortly after the attack on Montferrand (Ba’rin),\(^ {48}\) but the exact date is unclear.

The first primary source which unambiguously records the location of Bohemond V after the death of his father is the charter which he issued at Tripoli in January 1236.\(^ {49}\) However, unfortunately apart from two other charters there is relatively little evidence about the whereabouts of the prince thereafter. Events in northern Syria suggest that Bohemond may have been at Antioch in the first half of 1237. During that period, the Templars attacked a band of Turcomans that had settled in the Amouq valley and seized a great deal of

\(^ {43}\) ‘...et si i fu Henris li freres dou prince, a tout .XXX. chevaliers que son frere li princes li ot baillez ; car il n’i poeit aler por la trive que il avoit o le sodan de Haman’. Eracles, pp. 403-404.
\(^ {44}\) ATS, p. 439; GC, p. 724.
\(^ {45}\) Kennedy, Crusader Castles, p. 147; Molin, Unknown Crusader Castles, p. 71.
\(^ {46}\) ‘Quant Costans li peres le roi vit l’esfors qui venoit sur lui, si douta et manda au maistre dou Temple que il se voloit acorder a lui’. Eracles, p. 405.
\(^ {48}\) Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p. 652.
\(^ {49}\) RRH, 1, No. 1068, pp. 278-279; TOT, No. 82, pp. 64-65.
livestock. The Aleppans responded to this aggression by sending a large army to besiege Baghras. Bohemond V intervened on behalf of the Templars and persuaded the Aleppans to negotiate with the military order. Eventually the two sides agreed a truce and the Ayyubid troops withdrew despite being on the verge of capturing the castle.\(^{50}\) It is possible that Bohemond simply sent envoys to the Aleppans from Tripoli, but if he was as influential in the negotiations as the sources suggest then it is more likely that he was in the principality of Antioch at the time. If the prince was in his northern territory then he would have learned of the Aleppan advance on Baghras much earlier and been able to react quickly in order to broker a peace between the two sides.

Bohemond V was certainly at Tripoli in the autumn of 1239 when an army of crusaders encamped outside the city. The crusade leader Theobald, king of Navarre and count of Champagne, had travelled north from Acre in order to negotiate with al-Muzaffar of Hama after the Muslim ruler offered to cede his possessions to the Latins. These diplomatic discussions were ended when Theobald realised that al-Muzaffar had no intention of relinquishing Hama, and the crusaders subsequently returned to Acre.\(^{51}\) Jackson argues that these events ‘probably’ took place in late September 1239,\(^{52}\) and they certainly cannot have occurred any earlier because Theobald of Navarre arrived in the Near East that very month. Bohemond’s presence at Tripoli is confirmed by the *Gestes des Chiprois* and the *Eracles* and *Rothelin* continuations of William of Tyre. Indeed, the prince of Antioch is praised for his treatment of the crusaders by the authors of these texts.\(^{53}\)

Charters issued by Bohemond V confirm that he was at Tripoli in November 1241 and February 1243.\(^{54}\) The chroniclers are silent about the prince’s activities and location in the early 1240s so it is unclear if he visited the principality of Antioch during this period. The Khwarazmians devastated the county of Tripoli prior to their capture of Jerusalem in August 1244.\(^{55}\) A number of Tripolitan barons, including the constable of Tripoli, subsequently participated in the battle of La Forbie, in which the Latins suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Khwarazmians.\(^{56}\) These men presumably fought at La Forbie with Bohemond’s

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\(^{50}\) DSN, p. 265; KD, 5, p. 95.

\(^{51}\) Eracles, pp. 415-416; *Crusader Syria*, p. 124.


\(^{53}\) Eracles, p. 416; ‘Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr, de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin’, *RHC Occ II*, pp. 551-552; *Crusader Syria*, pp. 55, 124; GC, pp. 726-727.

\(^{54}\) See Appendix B.

\(^{55}\) Eracles, p. 428; *Crusader Syria*, p. 132.

\(^{56}\) Eracles, pp. 428-430; *Crusader Syria*, pp. 132-133.
permission, but the prince’s whereabouts are unknown. As his last recorded appearance was at Tripoli in 1243, it would be unsurprising if Bohemond V remained in his county throughout 1244 in order to defend his lands from the Khwarazmians.

Almost nothing is known about the actions or whereabouts of Bohemond V during the final years of his life. The Rothelin continuation records that Robert of Nantes, patriarch of Jerusalem, asked for military aid from the prince of Antioch in the aftermath of the setback at La Forbie. The source does not document Bohemond’s response or his location. The principality of Antioch was attacked by a group of Turcomans in the late 1240s, but there is no evidence that Bohemond V was involved in Antiochene attempts to repel the raiders or that he was present in the polity at this time. It is also unclear if the prince of Antioch participated in an ill-fated raid in 1250, when a Tripolitan army was defeated by their Syrian neighbours.

Bohemond V died in early 1252, but the location of his death is unknown. His only son, Bohemond VI, had not reached the age of majority at this point and so the young heir travelled to Jaffa later that year in order to be knighted by King Louis IX of France. This ceremony enabled the teenager to inherit the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli. Bohemond VI then travelled to Antioch after telling the French king that he wanted to aid the people of that city. However, Jean de Joinville did not record the length of the prince’s stay at Antioch so it is difficult to know whether he remained there for a brief period or much longer.

In 1254 Bohemond VI married Sibylle, daughter of King Hethoum I, but it is unclear whether the wedding took place in the kingdom of Cilicia, the principality of Antioch, or the county of Tripoli. However, the prince was certainly at Tripoli in March 1255 when he formulated an agreement with Hospitallers. According to the Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad, Bohemond journeyed to Cilicia in November 1256 in order to witness Hethoum’s eldest son, Leon, being knighted at Mamistra. Then in February 1258 the prince accompanied his sister and his young nephew to Acre to assist their claims to the

57 Rothelin, p. 565; Crusader Syria, p. 66.
58 Eracles, p. 435; Rothelin, pp. 623-624; Crusader Syria, pp. 108, 136-137.
60 ATS, p. 445; Eracles, p. 440; Crusader Syria, p. 139; JJ, pp. 258-259.
61 JJ, pp. 258-261.
62 ATS, p. 446; Eracles, p. 442; Crusader Syria, p. 140; Smbat, p. 98.
63 See Appendix B.
64 Smbat, p. 100.
Latin kingdom. King Hugh II of Cyprus was formally recognised as the heir to the kingdom of Jerusalem and it was agreed that Plaisance would act as the regent of the realm on behalf of her son. Bohemond returned to Tripoli after these negotiations had been completed and became embroiled in a conflict with the Tripolitan barons, who were led by Bertrand of Jubayl. The prince of Antioch fought these rebels near Tripoli and returned to the city after he was wounded in battle. He appears to have remained there until the following year, when he hosted King Hethoum I of Cilicia. Apparently, the Armenian king travelled to Tripoli in 1259 to meet with his son-in-law.

Bohemond VI appears to have personally submitted to the Mongol leader Hülegü in 1260 and recognised his suzerainty over the county of Tripoli. Letters written by Thomas Bérard, the master of the Temple, and Thomas Agni, papal legate and bishop of Bethlehem, suggest that Bohemond met with Hülegü in person and paid a large tribute to the Mongols. Hayton recorded that Hülegü summoned the prince of Antioch to meet him after the Mongols had captured Aleppo. However, none of these sources mention where the two rulers met. One Arabic chronicler recorded that Bohemond joined the Mongols at Baalbek in 1260, but he made clear that the Antiochene prince was in the company of the Mongol general Kitbuqa, rather than the Il-Khan Hülegü.

It is recorded in the *Gestes des Chiprois* that Bohemond and King Hethoum I of Cilicia participated in the Mongol occupation of Damascus in March 1260, and that after entering the city the Antiochene prince had a Latin mass celebrated at the Umayyad Mosque and ordered his men to desecrate other mosques. Jackson has cast serious doubt over this account of events by arguing that they are not mentioned in any of the contemporary sources, and that it is ‘inconceivable’ that Arabic chroniclers would have remained silent about these ‘outrages’. However, Amitai-Preiss points out that Bohemond visited Baalbek, and that if the prince had bothered to travel that far then he probably continued on to Damascus. The author of the *Gestes des Chiprois* may have fabricated the story of the Damascene mosques.

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65 ATS, pp. 447-448; Eracles, p. 443; Crusader Syria, p. 141; GC, pp. 743-745; Templar of Tyre, pp. 25-26.
66 Edbury, *Kingdom of Cyprus*, p. 86.
67 GC, pp. 748-749; Templar of Tyre, pp. 31-32.
68 Smbat, p. 103.
70 Hayton, pp. 170-171.
72 GC, p. 751; Templar of Tyre, pp. 34-35.
being defiled, as Jackson and Amitai-Preiss suggest, but that does not mean his testimony that Bohemond entered Damascus in 1260 should be dismissed. An icon depicting the Adoration of the Magi on an iconostasis beam at St Catherine’s Monastery on Mount Sinai provides supporting evidence that the prince of Antioch did meet with the king of Cilicia and a Mongol leader at this time. Folda convincingly argues that King Hethoum I, Prince Bohemond VI and the Mongol general Kitbuqa are represented as the three magi in the Nativity scene. He proposes that the iconostasis beam on which this scene appears was commissioned and painted shortly after the Mongol occupation of Damascus in order to ‘commemorate the triumphal entry’ of Hethoum, Bohemond and Kitbuqa into the city. If the iconostasis beam was created in 1260, as Folda suggests, then it provides persuasive evidence that Bohemond was present when the Mongols took possession of Damascus.

The prince of Antioch also appears to have campaigned in northern Syria in 1260. The Antiochene took possession of Darkush and a number of other fortresses in the Orontes valley, and they were also able to occupy and refortify the coastal city of Latakia. The testimony of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir suggests that Bohemond was personally involved in seizing control of these settlements. ‘Izz al-Dīn Ibn Shaddād recorded that it was the Mongols who conquered Harim and the surrounding area, before deciding to give several of these strongholds – including Darkush – to Bohemond. Therefore, these conquests must have been made after the Mongols arrived in Syria in December 1259, but prior to their defeat at the battle of Ayn Jalut on 3 September 1260.

In 1262 the Mamluks attacked the principality of Antioch, capturing the port of St Simeon and plundering the surrounding area. According to the Old French sources, Baibars’ forces besieged the city of Antioch itself, but their departure was hastened by the arrival of a Mongol army. The Mamluks returned to Cairo, entering the city in August 1262 with a lot

76 See icon in J. Folda, Crusader Art in the Holy Land: From the Third Crusade to the Fall of Acre, 1187-1291 (Cambridge, 2005), p. 318.
77 Folda, Crusader Art, pp. 320-323.
78 Folda, Crusader Art, p. 323.
79 DSN, p. 45; IAZ, 2, pp. 646-647; IF, p. 50.
80 Bohemond VI ‘was one of the most effective assistants of the Tartars and the most hostile amongst them to the Muslims. Of the fortresses and lands of the Muslims he had taken were Dair Küsh and Shaqif Kafar Dabīn with their districts and Shaqif Kafar Talmīs in the north. He had also occupied al-Lādhiqīya, building a new fortified tower in its port, and had seized several villages in Muslim territory’. IAZ, 2, pp. 646-647.
81 DSN, p. 45.
82 IAZ, 2, pp. 400-401, 423-424.
83 ATS, p. 450; Eracles, p. 446; GC, p. 755; Templar of Tyre, p. 40.
of booty and more than 250 captives.\(^8^4\) A charter issued by Bohemond VI confirms that the prince was at Tripoli in May 1262.\(^8^5\) It is difficult to know whether the Mamluk offensive on the principality took place before or after the charter was drafted, but it is highly unlikely that the prince journeyed to Antioch after concluding negotiations with the Hospitallers. There is no suggestion in the sources that Bohemond was in his northern principality when it came under attack, while the loss of St Simeon and the destruction of the ships in its harbour by the Mamluks would have made it extremely difficult for Bohemond to travel from Tripoli to Antioch after the incursion. Indeed there is no evidence that Bohemond returned to his principality prior to the fall of Antioch in May 1268.

In 1263 or 1264 King Hethoum I of Cilicia journeyed to Azerbaijan in order to ask Hülegü to stop the Seljuks from harassing his kingdom. The Armenian king later swore an oath of friendship with Rukn al-Dīn and made peace with the Seljuk sultan under the supervision of the Mongols.\(^8^6\) Vardan recorded that both Hethoum and the prince of Antioch were present at the court of Hülegü in 1264.\(^8^7\) This testimony is surely credible, even though no other source mentions that Bohemond VI travelled to Azerbaijan to meet the Il-Khan, because Vardan was an eyewitness. The Antiochene prince must have spent several months away from his county and principality, which left them vulnerable to attack from the Mamluks. Vardan does not report whether Bohemond returned to Antioch or Tripoli.

In November 1265 Bohemond VI led an army towards the city of Homs. The prince and his men were then confronted by Mamluk troops, who prevented the Latins from crossing a ford and then attacked them as they withdrew. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir made clear that Bohemond’s soldiers were from Tripoli.\(^8^8\) The chronicler’s description of this encounter suggests that the fighting began at a spot close to Homs and that the Mamluks subsequently pursued the Latins as they retreated into the county of Tripoli.\(^8^9\) The prince of Antioch presumably prepared for this campaign at Tripoli and remained there for at least a short time after its conclusion.

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\(^8^4\) IAZ, 2, p. 424.
\(^8^5\) See Appendix B.
\(^8^6\) IAZ, 2, p. 504; Smbat, pp. 111-112.
\(^8^7\) VG, p. 220.
\(^8^8\) ‘On the 8th of Safar in the year 664 A.H. the Sultan’s troops in Hims defeated the Franks at Tripoli, when Prince Bohemond, the son of Bohemond, collected an army and, seeking the help of the Templars and the Hospitallers, marched against Hims’. IAZ, 2, p. 576.
\(^8^9\) ‘The Muslims were encouraged and they crossed the ford and pursued him, whereupon he withdrew in defeat. They continued their pursuit, killing and plundering until they had penetrated into his territories’. IAZ, 2, p. 576.
In late April 1268, shortly after capturing the castle of Beaufort, Sultan Baibars led an army to Tripoli and pitched his camp nearby.\(^90\) After a short siege, he withdrew his troops and headed north.\(^91\) The Mamluks then attacked and sacked the city of Antioch in May 1268.\(^92\) A letter sent by Baibars to Bohemond VI, which is included in the chronicle of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, suggests that the prince was at Tripoli throughout these events.\(^93\) Bohemond certainly cannot have been at Antioch when the Mamluks stormed the city because he would have been killed or taken prisoner. The prince probably spent the whole of April and May 1268 in the county of Tripoli – initially defending his territory from the Mamluks, and then trying to repair the damage after they left. Although Latakia endured as a possession of the counts of Tripoli until 1287, and Qusair remained under Latin control until November 1275,\(^94\) most of the principality’s castles and settlements were captured or destroyed by the Mamluks after the fall of Antioch. Thus, Tripoli was almost certainly the primary residence of Bohemond VI after 1268 because his main priority would have been to defend the Tripolitan county from Mamluk aggression. The principality of Antioch had been destroyed and he did not have the military strength to restore it.

Even after all the available data has been examined, it is very difficult to discuss the location of the counts of Tripoli between 1201 and 1268 with any degree of certainty. The primary sources explicitly state or strongly suggest that Bohemond IV and his successors can be located in the principality of Antioch on nine separate occasions during this era, compared to eighteen occasions in the county of Tripoli.\(^95\) The counts are recorded in the principality just twice in the three decades before the fall of Antioch (1238-1268), but they appear in the county ten times during the same period in the source material. This indicates that Bohemond V and Bohemond VI were more active in their southern county than their northern principality. However, historians such as Runciman and Riley-Smith are too bold when they assert without qualification that Bohemond V ‘preferred’ to live in Tripoli.\(^96\) No statistician could confidently conclude that a person primarily resided in a certain city based on four recorded appearances in that location in nineteen years.\(^97\)

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\(^90\) IAZ, 2, pp. 647-648.

\(^91\) IAZ, 2, pp. 653-654, 656.

\(^92\) ATS, pp. 453-454; BH, 1, p. 448; DSN, p. 261; Eracles, pp. 456-457; GC, pp. 771-772; Templar of Tyre, p. 59; IAZ, 2, pp. 657-658; IF, pp. 121-126; Smbat, pp. 120-121.

\(^93\) IAZ, 2, pp. 658-663.

\(^94\) IAZ, 2, pp. 831-833.

\(^95\) See Appendix D.

\(^96\) Riley-Smith, The Crusades, p. 257; Runciman, A History of the Crusades, 3, p. 207.

\(^97\) See Appendix D.
The surviving evidence does support the idea that Bohemond V and Bohemond VI spent more time in their county than their principality, but there is not enough data to construct a robust argument that their main residence was at Tripoli. What is clear, however, is that the princes of Antioch were often absent from their principality during the thirteenth century. They travelled to Acre and Cilicia, Jaffa and Cyprus, as well as the county of Tripoli. According to Vardan, Bohemond VI even journeyed as far as Azerbaijan in order to meet Hülegü, the Mongol Il-Khan.\(^98\) This chapter will now analyse the impact which these absences had upon the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia.

**Absenteeism, the County of Tripoli, and Antiochene-Cilician Relations**

In the first fifteen years after the death of Bohemond III in 1201, the fact that one of the two claimants to the principality of Antioch was also the count of Tripoli undoubtedly influenced the approach of the Cilician Armenians in the Antiochene succession dispute. The sources suggest that Bohemond IV was not present in the principality to defend it from many of the offensives launched by King Leon I of Cilicia. The count of Tripoli did remain at Antioch in the months after his father’s burial in order to establish his control over the principality, and it was during this period that he repulsed the Armenian king’s first attempt to wrest the state from his control.\(^99\) However, there is no evidence that Bohemond IV was personally involved in resisting Leon’s subsequent campaigns against his northern territory.

For example, Kemal ad-Dīn recorded that in late 1204 or early 1205 Leon led an army to Antioch and ransacked the surrounding area.\(^100\) This caused a major famine in the city which the Armenian king presumably hoped would persuade the Antiochenes to surrender to him. However, al-Zāhir Ghāzī of Aleppo resupplied Antioch with vital provisions despite earlier agreeing to Leon’s demands to ignore the Antiochene succession dispute.\(^101\) It is highly likely that these events took place while Bohemond IV was at Tripoli. The count was certainly there in December 1204, when he issued a charter, and he remained in his southern state thereafter in order to settle his dispute with Renaud of Nephin. Kamāl al-Dīn does not provide a precise date for the Cilician Armenian campaign in the principality so it could have happened before Bohemond left Antioch for Tripoli. Nevertheless, the Aleppan chronicler’s

\(^98\) VG, p. 220.  
\(^99\) Ernoul, pp. 321-322; Eracles, p. 313; PL, 214, Col. 1004, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 79-80.  
\(^100\) Kamāl al-Dīn wrote that these events occurred in the Islamic year 601 (September 1204 – August 1205). See KD, 5, p. 41.  
\(^101\) KD, 5, pp. 41-42.
account does not mention that the Tripolitan count was caught up in the famine or hint that he was in any way involved.

It is quite possible that Leon deliberately chose to attack the principality when Bohemond IV was elsewhere in the Latin East, particularly when the Armenian king was planning to capture the city of Antioch itself. As the ruler of two states the count of Tripoli could not fully devote himself to either, and this meant he risked losing one of them through internal dissent or aggression from a foreign power. This eventually happened in February 1216 when Leon seized Antioch and invested Raymond-Roupen as prince while Bohemond was at Tripoli. The sources suggest that the Cilician Armenians took control of Antioch with relative ease and faced almost no resistance whatsoever. This would surely not have happened if the count had been there.

The Cilician Armenians entered Antioch during the night after the city was betrayed to King Leon I. The king of Cilicia quickly secured the gates and filled the streets with soldiers. This swift action put the Cilician Armenians in a strong position and it would have been extremely difficult to expel them from the city. Nevertheless, Bohemond IV and his supporters had previously thwarted two attempts to seize Antioch in situations which were arguably just as precarious as that of 1216. In 1203 Leon and his troops were attacked by the Templars after occupying the city, and they were eventually forced to withdraw in response to Aleppan aggression. Later, in 1207, the count of Tripoli personally oversaw the crushing of a rebellion which threatened to wrest Antioch from his control. Although Bohemond may not have been involved in the former case, both these examples demonstrate that troops hostile to the Tripolitan count could be defeated even after they had taken large parts of the city.

If Bohemond IV had been at Antioch in 1216 he would have been able to rally his supporters who took refuge in the citadel following the sudden arrival of the Cilician Armenians. He may have been able to expel Leon of Cilicia and his army from the city, depending on the size of their respective forces and the military tactics that both sides employed. It is, of course, possible that the Armenian king would have captured Antioch in 1216 regardless of Bohemond’s location and decision-making. However, the fact that the count of Tripoli was absent from his principality at this moment, and had left it for extended

102 HII, p. 483; SC, p. 643; Smbat, p. 89.
103 Eracles, pp. 313-314; GC, p. 664; HII, p. 481.
104 DSN, p. 260; SC, p. 643; Smbat, p. 90.
periods of time on several previous occasions, surely made it much easier for Leon to conquer the state and install Raymond-Roupen as the new prince. The Antiochene populace was probably rather war weary after fifteen years of conflict and they were evidently not prepared to offer serious resistance to the Cilician Armenians in order to preserve the rule of Bohemond IV, possibly because they did not want to risk their lives for a leader who was not fully committed to the principality and did not appear able to crush the relentless threat from Cilicia. If the Tripolitan count had spent more time at Antioch in the early thirteenth century he may have received greater loyalty from the city’s inhabitants. He may, therefore, have been able to assemble enough men to repel Leon’s army by enlisting the support of ordinary citizens and the Templars in addition to his own soldiers.

The commitment of Bohemond IV to the county of Tripoli contributed towards his neglect and loss of the principality of Antioch. However, he may not have been able to recover the latter without the former. Bohemond remained a wealthy and powerful ruler in the Latin East during the three years in which Raymond-Roupen governed the principality. The county of Tripoli provided him with status, a regular source of income, and a small army. Thus, a group of Antiochenes decided to turn to their former sovereign after overthrowing Raymond-Roupen in 1219 rather than seeking to place power in the hands of the commune of Antioch or anointing a new prince partly because of his standing and the resources at his disposal. Furthermore, the Tripolitan county provided him with a base from which he could launch his campaign to win back the principality and enough troops to do so. Bohemond may not have been able to undertake such an operation if he had left the Levant or obtained a small landholding in the kingdom of Jerusalem. By facilitating his return to power in Antioch, the county of Tripoli played a key role in Antiochene-Cilician relations. The Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom would probably have interacted very differently in the decades after 1219 if Raymond-Roupen had not been deposed and replaced by Bohemond IV.

There is no evidence that Bohemond V spent time in his principality in the 1240s, but it is highly unlikely that he was absent from the polity for the full ten years. The chroniclers who recorded the history of the Latin East were probably silent about the count of Tripoli’s activities during this period because he was not involved in any military campaigns or power struggles. He probably did visit Antioch during the 1240s, and may have resided there for long spells, but because the political situation was relatively stable none of the contemporary writers decided to include this information in their chronicles.
The principality of Antioch was not involved in a major armed conflict with the kingdom of Cilicia in the 1240s. On the contrary, the relationship between the two states at this time appears to have been characterised by almost total disengagement. Bohemond V was clearly hostile towards King Hethoum I and the Hethoumid dynasty but he lacked sufficient manpower to lead a successful campaign against the Armenian kingdom. In the 1230s he tried to launch such an offensive, but cancelled the operation when the Templars withdrew their support. The count of Tripoli also attempted to undermine the Cilician Armenian monarchy diplomatically. When these endeavours foundered Bohemond probably realised that he could not inflict any serious damage upon the principality of Antioch’s northern neighbour and consequently decided to focus his efforts elsewhere. The fact that he governed two states may have been an important factor. The county of Tripoli was threatened by the arrival of the Khwarazmians in southern Syria and it probably required more political and administrative attention than the principality because it was territorially larger and supported a larger number of landowners. It is, therefore, quite possible that Bohemond V devoted most of his energy to his county in the 1240s and this contributed towards the detached state of Antiochene-Cilician relations at this time.

The relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom was quite different during the 1260s, but the county of Tripoli continued to affect how they interacted. There is no suggestion in the sources that Bohemond VI returned to Antioch after the completion of his campaign in northern Syria in 1260. On the other hand, there is clear evidence that he was present in the Tripolitan county in 1262, 1265, and 1268. Bohemond’s seemingly prolonged absence from his principality coincided with a period when Antiochene-Cilician relations were characterised by an entente cordiale. The prince married Sibylle, daughter of King Hethoum I, in 1254, and the two dynasties became firm allies thereafter.

Mamluk aggression threatened all the Christian states in the Near East in the 1260s, including the kingdom of Cilicia. By the end of that decade the principality of Antioch had effectively been destroyed and the Armenian kingdom had been severely weakened by a damaging invasion. The two states would surely have had a better chance of preventing these catastrophes if they had assisted each other when threatened by the Mamluks. In the early twelfth century, the rulers of the county of Edessa, the principality of Antioch, the county of Tripoli, and the kingdom of Jerusalem joined forces on a number of occasions in order to form a larger Latin army which was capable of offering serious resistance to their common
enemies. Yet collaboration of this kind was quite limited in the years immediately prior to the fall of Antioch.

According to Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, 150 knights from the principality were sent to join Hethoum’s campaign in northern Syria in the winter of 1263-1264. This venture was unsuccessful, partly due to the weather, but the regular pooling of Antiochene and Cilician troops may have been effective in combatting the Mamluks. However, there is no record of any military co-operation between the two sides thereafter.

Previously, there had been one incident where the Cilician monarchy had intervened to defend Antioch. Apparently, King Hethoum I ensured that a Mongol army, almost certainly containing an Armenian contingent, was sent to relieve the Latin principality when it was attacked by Baibars’ troops in 1262. This endeavour may have prolonged the life of Bohemond VI’s northern territory as Eracles and the Gestes des Chiprois record that the Mamluks were besieging Antioch when the Mongol army arrived in northern Syria. Nevertheless, such activity was reactive rather than proactive – a risky strategy when facing an enemy capable of making swift and efficient conquests.

The fact that the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia were allies in the 1260s but there is only evidence of them joining forces on one occasion during this period must be at least partially connected to Bohemond VI’s dedication to the county of Tripoli. If the sources are in anyway indicative of what actually happened then the prince spent most of his time in the county after 1260, and very little or no time in the principality. Those who governed Antioch in Bohemond’s absence may not have had the authority to commit large numbers of Antiochene troops into the field without his permission, and even if they did such campaigns required strong leadership which few men could have provided.

There may have been a failure to regularly pool Antiochene and Cilician troops even if Bohemond VI had resided in the principality of Antioch for most of the 1260s. Furthermore, even if they had combined their armies during this period there is no guarantee that the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom would have had any success in hindering Mamluk aggression against them or preventing the fall of Antioch. On the other hand, medieval rulers played a vital role in defending their states from invaders, particularly

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105 For example, they collaborated in 1111 against Maudud of Mosul. See Asbridge, Principality of Antioch, pp. 121-122.
106 IAZ, 2, pp. 505-506.
107 Eracles, p. 446; GC, p. 755.
in a volatile environment like the Levant. If Bohemond VI had been a permanent presence at Antioch in the years after the battle of Ayn Jalut the principality would probably have pursued a more active defence policy, such as he employed in the county of Tripoli,\textsuperscript{108} which may have led to collaboration with the kingdom of Cilicia.

**Conclusion**

It is, of course, difficult to know how different Antiochene-Cilician relations would have been if Bohemond IV and his successors had not ruled the county of Tripoli as well as the principality of Antioch. However, it is clear that they were often absent from their northern polity during the thirteenth century, and that this had an effect on the aforementioned relationship. Bohemond IV spent much of his time at Tripoli during the Antiochene succession dispute, which must have aided Leon’s attempts to capture Antioch and install Raymond-Roupen as the new prince. The impact of Bohemond V and Bohemond VI’s absences from the principality is more questionable. Yet, the history of Antiochene-Cilician relations in the twelfth century demonstrates that engagement between the two sides was likely whenever an active prince controlled Antioch. Bohemond VI could have emulated Bohemond III – who joined forces with the Roupenid prince Thoros II in 1164 in order to confront Nur al-Din – by collaborating with King Hethoum I in the 1260s when both the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom were threatened by the Mamluks. Instead, Bohemond VI appears to have spent most of this period in the county of Tripoli which made any serious and sustained military co-operation between the two states improbable.

\textsuperscript{108} For example, in 1265 he led an offensive against the Mamluks who controlled Homs. See IAZ, 2, p. 576.
Chapter Five: The Impact of Non-Christian Powers on Antiochene-Cilician Relations

The principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia did not exist in a political vacuum, but rather a challenging and often hostile environment where diplomatic and military interaction between rival sovereign powers was critical and continual. In the early thirteenth century, the foreign policy of the Seljuk sultan of Rûm and the Ayyubid ruler of Aleppo had significant effects on the Armenian kingdom and the Latin principality. Later, both these Christian polities were affected by the arrival of the Mongols in the Near East and the aggressive expansionism of the Mamluks. This chapter will consider the extent to which Antiochene-Cilician relations were altered and influenced by the non-Christian powers of Anatolia and Syria.

Ayyubid Aleppo

Antioch’s geographical proximity to Aleppo made the rulers of the two cities natural rivals throughout the history of the Latin principality. Aleppo lay just 55 miles east of Antioch, with several strategically important towns and fortresses, such as Harim and Sarmada, situated in between. Asbridge has shown how the frontier between Antioch and Aleppo was fiercely contested during the early twelfth century.¹ Later, after the Antiochenes’ initial success at territorial expansion had stalled, the Aleppans came to dominate this region. Many of the conquests made in northern Syria by Zengi, atabeg of Aleppo, and his successor, Nūr al-Dīn, came at the expense of the Antiochenes – the principality of Antioch contracted as the Zengid empire expanded.

The city of Aleppo was captured from the Zengids by Saladin in 1183, and it remained under the control of the Ayyubid dynasty until it was conquered by the Mongols in 1260. Three years after annexing the city, Saladin conferred Aleppo upon one of his younger sons, al-Zāhir Ghāzī. The latter was just fourteen years old when he was given Aleppo, although his powers were initially somewhat restricted by two experienced emirs whom Saladin appointed to act as his guardians.² The young Ayyubid ruler gradually accrued more authority and was eventually able to remove these men from influential positions and replace them with his own supporters.³ At the time of his father’s death in 1193, al-Zāhir Ghāzī ruled

¹ Asbridge, Principality of Antioch, pp. 47-91.
³ Eddé, La principauté ayyoubide d’Alep, p. 48.
over much of northern Syria, including large swaths of territory that had previously belonged to the principality of Antioch. For example, Harim, Zardana and most of the other castles and fortified towns that lay between Aleppo and Antioch were held by men loyal to him. Furthermore, al-Zāhir gained control of the coastline which lay between the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli when the ports of Jabala and Latakia were ceded to him by al-Afdal in c.1194.\(^4\)

Shortly after his proclamation as prince in 1201 Bohemond IV appears to have persuaded al-Zāhir Ghāzī that it was in both their interests to prevent the Cilician Armenians from seizing control of Antioch. Eddé argues that al-Zāhir had formed an alliance with Bohemond III in 1197, and that Aleppan support for Bohemond IV after 1201 was simply a continuation of this entente.\(^5\)

In the following years, the Aleppans disrupted Leon’s campaigns against the Latin principality on several occasions. Al-Zāhir’s primary reason for intervening in the Antiochene succession dispute was almost certainly of a geo-political nature. He probably wanted to ensure that the principality of Antioch remained a small and weak polity which posed little threat to Aleppo and could potentially be conquered by an Ayyubid ruler at some point in the future. However, if Leon captured Antioch and appointed himself regent for Raymond-Roupen then the city and its environs would fall under the protection of the kingdom of Cilicia for at least a short period. Raymond-Roupen’s status as the heir of both the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom also meant that the unification of these states was a very real possibility. Al-Zāhir must have wanted to prevent such an outcome as a strengthening of the ties between his Christian neighbours could have threatened his dominance over northern Syria.

Al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s desire to prevent King Leon I of Cilicia from seizing control of Antioch was one of Aleppo’s key strategic aims in the early thirteenth century. The Ayyubid ruler pursued this objective using a variety of tactics including sending Aleppan troops to confront Armenian armies which entered northern Syria and resupplying Antioch when the city was short of food and other vital provisions. These interventions frustrated Leon’s attempts to capture Antioch on several occasions, but the Aleppans did not inflict a crushing defeat on their opponents in battle so the Armenian king retained the military strength necessary to launch future assaults upon the Latin principality. It is worth examining al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s role in the Antiochene succession dispute in detail in order to fully appreciate the

\(^4\) IA, 3, p. 16; KD, 4, pp. 206-207.
\(^5\) Eddé, La principauté ayyoubide d’Alep, p. 80.
true extent of Aleppo’s influence on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia.

Shortly after Bohemond III’s death Leon led an army to Antioch, and after discovering that Count Bohemond of Tripoli had already seized power and been recognised as the new prince by the Antiochene commune, the Armenian king laid siege to the city. It was at this point, according to one Old French continuator of William of Tyre, that Bohemond IV appealed to al-Zāhir for help and the Ayyubid ruler agreed to provide him with assistance. The chronicler also recorded that ‘the count could not have held Antioch’ without al-Zāhir’s protection. Cahen appears to have based his assertion that an Aleppan contingent was sent to the Latin principality in 1201 on this evidence. However, the co-operation between al-Zāhir and Bohemond described in the Lyon and Florence manuscripts of Eracles may be referring to later interventions by the Ayyubid ruler to prevent the Cilician Armenians from occupying Antioch. In his letter to Innocent III, written in October 1201, Leon did not mention the presence of Aleppan troops when discussing his campaign in northern Syria, although he explicitly stated that the Seljuk sultan Rukn al-Dīn Süleymānshāh had colluded with Bohemond IV and invaded the kingdom of Cilicia. This suggests that al-Zāhir may not have dispatched an army to protect Antioch in 1201, or that if he did the Cilician Armenians were far more concerned about the threat posed by the Seljuks than the force from Aleppo.

The actions of the Ayyubid ruler were much more important in late 1203 when Leon came very close to subjugating Antioch. The Armenian king led an army from Cilicia into the Latin principality and entered the city during the night. The Templars who were stationed at Antioch helped Bohemond IV’s supporters to defend the citadel and resist the Cilician Armenians. Leon and his troops were then forced to abandon the city and retreat back to Cilicia when an Aleppan army, sent by al-Zāhir Ghāzī to expel them from Antioch, reached the Orontes. On this occasion the military assistance provided by the Ayyubid ruler may have been crucial in preventing the Armenian king from gaining full control of Antioch. When Leon later wrote to Innocent III about his attempt to capture the city in 1203 he asserted that the Antiochenes had united with the ‘sultan of Aleppo’. The fact that the

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6 Ernoul, pp. 321-322; Eracles, p. 313; PL, 214, Col. 1004, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 79-80.
7 Cont. WT, pp. 176-178.
8 Cahen, La Syrie du nord, p. 600.
9 PL, 214, Cols 1004-1005, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 79-81.
11 KD, 5, p. 41.
Armenian king mentioned the Ayyubid ruler in relation to these events indicates that he considered the intervention of the Aleppans to be significant.

In late 1204 and early 1205 Leon plundered Aleppan territory, including the Amouq valley, and began rebuilding a ruined fortress near Darbsak. He then wrote to al-Zāhir Ghāzī and offered to return the booty he had taken during his raiding if the Ayyubid ruler would agree not to interfere in his attempts to militarily resolve the Antiochene succession dispute. After al-Zāhir had agreed to this proposal the king of Cilicia ransacked the area around Antioch and laid siege to the city, seemingly with the intention of trying to starve the garrison into surrender. However, the Aleppans hindered the blockade by resupplying Antioch, despite al-Zāhir’s earlier commitment to refrain from meddling in the conflict. The actions of the Ayyubid ruler appear to have been decisive in preventing the Cilician Armenians from capturing Antioch on this occasion because the Antiochenes were suffering from a famine before his supplies reached the city.

Leon evidently felt the Aleppans were seriously inhibiting his endeavour to conquer the principality of Antioch because his next military action in northern Syria was directed against the castle of Darbsak which had been under Ayyubid control since 1188. In December 1205 the Cilician Armenians attacked the people living just outside the fortress but withdrew after being confronted by a determined group of Aleppan soldiers. Leon’s troops then marched into the Amouq valley and massacred all the Turcomans they found living there. The Armenian king’s decision to target Darbsak and the Amouq at this point may have been motivated by a desire to elicit the offer of a new truce from al-Zāhir. Leon’s primary objective in the early thirteenth century was to secure control of the principality of Antioch and thus he probably hoped to pressure the Ayyubid sultan into agreeing to stop assisting the Antiochenes.

Al-Zāhir Ghāzī responded to this aggression by sending Maymūn al-Qasrī to confront the Armenian king. Maymūn divided his army into three contingents: some troops were stationed at Tizin, a large detachment of soldiers was sent to bolster the garrison of Darbsak, and the rest of the force camped at Harim. In the weeks that followed there was regular skirmishing between the Aleppans of Darbsak and the Cilician Armenians who had based themselves at Baghras. Al-Zāhir left Aleppo in the spring of 1206 and headed to Marj Dabiq

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13 KD, 5, p. 41.
14 KD, 5, p. 42.
15 IA, 3, p. 111; KD, 5, p. 43.
with another army, which was subsequently swelled by the arrival of troops sent to help the Aleppans by other Ayyubid rulers. Leon then took the initiative by leading an army from Baghras towards Harim and attacking Maymūn’s small force which they found encamped in the Amouq. The Cilician Armenians ambushed the Aleppans and a rather bloody battle ensued. Although Kamāl al-Dīn portrays the battle as an Ayyubid victory, Ibn al-Athīr provides a more balanced account which suggests that both sides suffered heavy casualties with Leon’s troops withdrawing after capturing the Aleppan baggage train.16 Al-Zāhir led his large army to the Amouq as soon as he learned of the conflict but the battle had finished long before he reached Maymūn’s soldiers.

According to Kamāl al-Dīn, it was at this point that Leon sent envoys to the Ayyubid ruler requesting a truce and promising to demolish the fortress that the Cilician Armenians had rebuilt near Darbsak. Al-Zāhir initially refused this offer but he later agreed to an eight year peace with the Armenian king after lengthy negotiations.17 Leon made a number of concessions to the Aleppans, including a commitment to leave Antioch alone. Cahen and Eddé, aided by the testimony of the chronicler Ibn Wasil, assert that the Armenian king sought peace because he feared that al-Zāhir would invade Cilicia.18 The Cilician Armenians had been severely weakened by the battle in the Amouq while the Ayyubid ruler had assembled a large force, and thus the former would have struggled to defend their kingdom against the latter and could easily have been militarily overwhelmed.

King Leon I may have sought a peace deal in 1206 when Cilicia was threatened by the Aleppans, but he did not abide by the agreement. The Cilician Armenians made further attacks on the principality of Antioch long before the eight year truce had expired, although the primary sources indicate that their activity was restricted to raiding the plains between the Amanus Mountains and the Orontes River, rather than besieging the city of Antioch itself. This could be because Leon realised he was unlikely to capture the metropolis as long as Bohemond IV maintained good relations with al-Zāhir. The Armenian king had failed to discourage Aleppo from assisting the Latins whenever he came close to conquering Antioch. Therefore, the Cilician Armenians needed the political situation in northern Syria to change if a serious attempt to seize control of the city was to be successful. Alternatively, Leon may have been waiting for Raymond-Roupen to reach the age of majority so that when he next

16 IA, 3, p. 111; KD, 5, p. 43.
17 KD, 5, pp. 43-44.
18 Cahen, La Syrie du nord, p. 610; Eddé, La principauté ayyoubide d’Alep, p. 81.
tried to conquer Antioch his great-nephew could swiftly be installed as the new prince, which would give legitimacy to a Cilician Armenian takeover of the city.

Cahen argues that Bohemond IV’s decision to besiege the Assassin fortress of Khawabi in 1214 damaged the relationship between al-Zāhir Ghāzī and the count of Tripoli. Bohemond’s eldest son, Raymond, had been murdered by the Ismaili sect in the previous year and he responded by attacking Khawabi. The Assassins appealed to Aleppo for help and al-Zāhir dispatched troops to relieve the garrison of the castle. The army of the Tripolitan count ambushed an Aleppan force in November 1214, killing many infantry and capturing thirty cavalrymen. Bohemond later decided to release these prisoners and retreat from Khawabi after al-Mu’azzam of Damascus, son of al-ʿĀdil, pillaged the county of Tripoli. According to Kamāl al-Dīn, the count then sent envoys to al-Zāhir to express his regret that his troops had come into conflict with the Aleppans, but this act of diplomacy was unsuccessful.

In February 1216 King Leon I of Cilicia led an army to Antioch and entered the city during the night. The Armenian king swiftly secured control of the metropolis by stationing soldiers throughout the streets of Antioch while most Antiochenes were still asleep. Raymond-Roupen was hastily invested as the prince of Antioch and within a few days Bohemond IV’s supporters, who had sought refuge in the Antiochene citadel, surrendered. Al-Zāhir Ghāzī appears to have made no attempt to prevent Leon from seizing Antioch, and there is no suggestion in the sources that the Ayyubid ruler sent troops to expel the Cilician Armenians from the city. This could be, as Cahen suggests, because Bohemond IV ‘alienated’ al-Zāhir during his campaign to capture the castle of Khawabi, and therefore the latter became less vigilant in his defence of Antioch. However, it may simply be the case that Leon’s rapid advance towards, and occupation of, the city caught the Aleppans by surprise. If al-Zāhir did not learn of the movement of the Cilician Armenians until after they had subjugated Antioch then he could not have prevented the investiture of Raymond-Roupen. The Ayyubid ruler may have then have realised that it would be extremely difficult to expel them from the Antioch once they had gained full control of the city, and thus he decided not to launch an immediate counter-offensive. Furthermore, Leon sought to avert

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20 KD, 5, p. 48.
21 KD, 5, pp. 48-49.
22 Eracles, p. 318; HII, p. 483; SC, p. 643; Smbat, p. 89.
such conflict by sending messages of good will to al-Zāhir and liberating the Aleppan prisoners whom he found at Antioch.

Al-Zāhir did agree to join ‘Izz al-Dīn Kay-Kāwūs I, the Seljuk sultan of Rūm, in an attack on Cilicia a few months after Raymond-Roupen had been invested as prince and while King Leon I was still at Antioch. However, the Ayyubid ruler was persuaded to change his mind by diplomatic pressure from his uncle, al-‘Ādil, who was on good terms with the Armenian king.\textsuperscript{24} Al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s death later in 1216 marked the end of an era in which there was close co-operation between Aleppo and Antioch. Shihāb al-Dīn Tughril, atabeg of Aleppo and regent for al-Zāhir’s son al-‘Azīz Muhammad,\textsuperscript{25} does not appear to have showed any interest in helping Bohemond IV to regain control of the Latin principality, and there was no resurrection of the Antiochene-Aleppan alliance after the count of Tripoli recovered Antioch in 1219.

In subsequent years Ayyubid Aleppo’s impact on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia was considerably reduced, mainly because there was relatively little warfare between the two Christian polities after 1216. It was the nature of the Antiochene succession dispute which allowed al-Zāhir Ghāzī to become so influential in shaping how the Armenian kingdom and the Latin principality interacted with each other. If the leaders of these states were at war with each other, then an Aleppan ruler could help to shape the outcome of the contest by assisting one side against the other. Al-Zāhir played a crucial role in prolonging the Antiochene succession dispute by aiding Bohemond IV’s supporters. The actions of the Aleppans between 1203 and 1206 were particularly critical – sending a relief army to Antioch when Leon was close to capturing it, resupplying Antiochenes when they were suffering from a famine caused by a blockade of the city, confronting the Cilician Armenians in battle, and threatening to invade the Armenian kingdom. Without the intervention of al-Zāhir, it is likely that Leon would have managed to gain control of Antioch before 1216 because of the support he had from some Antiochenes, as demonstrated by the fact that Cilician Armenian troops were able to enter the city during the night in 1203 and 1216.

There is some evidence that the Ayyubids of Aleppo directly intervened in the military conflict which arose between their Christian neighbours in the 1220s. Bohemond


\textsuperscript{25} Tughril ruled Aleppo as regent until al-‘Azīz took power at the age of seventeen in c.1230. See Y. Tabbaa, \textit{Constructions of Power and Piety in Medieval Aleppo} (University Park, PA, 1997), p. 29.
IV’s son, Philip, became king of Cilicia after marrying Leon’s daughter, Isabel, in 1222, but he was deposed and imprisoned in late 1224 after losing the support of the nobility. Ibn al-Athīr recorded that in 1226 the Cilician Armenian barons who had overthrown Philip appealed to Shihāb al-Dīn Tughril, atabeg of Aleppo, for aid when Cilicia was invaded by the count of Tripoli in retaliation for the treatment of his son. Tughril subsequently ‘supplied them with soldiers and weapons’. Bohemond IV later withdrew from the Armenian kingdom after an unsuccessful campaign in which he was unable to liberate Philip or conquer any settlements, but Ibn al-Athīr’s account does not suggest that the actions of the Aleppan atabeg were the primary cause of this failure. Eddé argues that even though Ibn al-Athīr is the only source for this information it is perfectly possible that Tughril chose to support the Cilician Armenians in order to weaken the Seljuks and the Antiochenes.

The assistance apparently given to Constantine of Babaron, who took power after Philip was imprisoned, and the barons of the Armenian kingdom by the leadership of Aleppo demonstrates the fluid nature of politics in the region. The Aleppan Ayyubids had previously helped to defend the principality of Antioch when it was under attack from King Leon I, but they came to the aid of the kingdom of Cilicia when it was invaded by Bohemond IV. This indicates that their central concern when dealing with their Christian neighbours was to stop one side from becoming too powerful at the expense of the other. The rulers of Aleppo were prepared to assist either the Antiochenes or the Cilician Armenians in order to achieve that aim.

The surviving primary source material suggests that the Aleppan Ayyubids had relatively little contact with the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia after the 1220s, and as a result their impact on Antiochene-Cilician relations was negligible. It may be the case that this evidence is inadequate and does not truly reflect the history of northern Syria at that time. However, it is more likely that the lack of combat between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom meant that there was little opportunity for Aleppo to have any real influence on their relationship. In 1237 Aleppan troops came into conflict with the Templars in the Amanus Mountains on a couple of occasions, but this does not seem to have affected the interaction between the two Christian polities. The conquest of Aleppo by the Mongols in early 1260 brought an end to a lengthy period when the rulers of that city had almost no impact on Antiochene-Cilician relations.

26 IA, 3, p. 280.
27 Eddé, La principauté ayyoubide d’Alep, p. 99.
The Seljuk Sultanate of Rūm

The Turks began their conquest of Anatolia in the eleventh century and by the time of the First Crusade much of the territory between Nicaea and Antioch was under the control of the Seljuk ruler Kılıç Arslān I. After the crusaders had helped the Greeks to recapture Nicaea in 1097, Seljuk sultans chose to base themselves at Konya. In subsequent decades, the Seljuks struggled to consolidate and expand their realm in the face of opposition from the Byzantines and the Danishmendids. The Seljuk sultanate contracted in size during a period of political instability after the death of Kılıç Arslān II in 1192. His chosen heir, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw I, was not universally accepted as the new sultan. During the 1190s Leon expanded the Roupenid principality by conquering towns and fortresses in western Cilicia which had previously been held by the Seljuks. Rukn al-Dīn Suleymānshāh emerged as the dominant Seljuk leader after gaining control of cities such as Kayseri, Sivas and Tokat, before seizing Konya from Kay-Khusraw I in 1197.

At the time of Leon’s coronation as king of the Armenians in 1198, he controlled almost the whole of Cilicia. The chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable includes a list of the Cilician barons, and the strongholds under their command, that recognised Leon as their new king. If this information is correct, then the Armenian kingdom stretched as far west as Manavgat on the Anatolian coast. Yildiz argues that in the early thirteenth century the Seljuks were concerned that their frontier with Armenian Cilicia was too close to Konya because several fortresses in the vicinity of the Saleph river (now known as the Göksu) in Cilicia Trachea were garrisoned by men loyal to Leon.

When Leon led an army into the principality of Antioch in 1201 shortly after the count of Tripoli had been recognised as Prince Bohemond IV by the Antiochene commune he left his own kingdom susceptible to attack. Rukn al-Dīn Suleymānshāh apparently exploited this vulnerability by invading Armenian Cilicia. In a letter to Innocent III, the Armenian king accused Bohemond of encouraging a Seljuk offensive on his kingdom. Leon is the only source to report this information, but a number of chroniclers agree that Rukn al-Dīn seized the city of Erzurum (known as Karin to the Armenians) in eastern Anatolia after capturing Malatya in June 1201. Nevertheless, the Seljuk sultan could have attacked the Armenian

28 SC, pp. 634-638; Smbat, pp. 75-80. See Appendix C.
30 PL, 214, Cols 1004-1005, No. 43; Reg. Inn. III, 5, No. 42, pp. 79-81.
31 IA, 3, p. 60; Smbat, pp. 82-83.
kingdom after making these conquests if his army was willing and able to make the long
march to Cilicia. Furthermore, the Cilician Armenians would not have withdrawn from the
principality of Antioch for frivolous reasons because Leon would have wanted to take control
of the territory as quickly as possible and avoid a prolonged conflict against Bohemond IV. It
is possible that the Armenian king and his troops encountered other serious difficulties while
besieging Antioch, but there is no reason to seriously doubt Leon’s claim that the Seljuks
invaded his kingdom. They certainly attacked Cilicia later in the thirteenth century after
negotiating with the Antiochenes. Thus, it is highly likely that the urgent need to defend
Cilicia and prevent Rukn al-Dīn from capturing any crucial strongholds was behind Leon’s
decision to withdraw from the Latin principality in the summer of 1201.

The next major Seljuk incursion into Cilicia took place in 1208 when Ghiyāṯ al-Dīn
Kay-Khusraw I, who had re-established himself as the dominant Seljuk leader, captured
Pertous, a castle near Marash, and a number of other fortresses in the region.32 According to
Kamāl al-Dīn, al-Zāhir Ghāzī of Aleppo sent an army to Kay-Khusraw I to assist the Seljuks
in this campaign.33 Leon contacted al-‘Ādil, the Ayyubid ruler of Egypt and southern Syria,
and asked the Egyptian sultan to protect the Armenian kingdom from the invading forces. Al-
‘Ādil persuaded Kay-Khusraw I to negotiate with the Armenian king, and a peace deal was
subsequently agreed between the two sides. The Seljuk sultan apparently stipulated that the
Cilician Armenians should return Baghras to the Order of the Temple and stop launching
aggressive military campaigns against Antioch.34 If Leon did promise to abide by these terms
then it demonstrates the effectiveness of Bohemond IV in building alliances with other
sovereign powers in the Near East. The Armenian king did not yield Baghras to the
Templars, and he later led expeditions into the principality of Antioch. However, it is clear
that the Seljuks were explicitly opposed to his attempts to seize control of the Latin
principality.

It is recorded in the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable that in 1209 the
Cilician Armenians devastated the countryside around Antioch and tried, unsuccessfully, to
force Bohemond IV to surrender the city to Leon and Raymond-Roupen.35 Considering this
text is unreliable in the dating of events,36 it is possible that the Armenian king’s campaign in

32 AAC, p. 165; HII, p. 481; KD, 5, p. 45; Smbat, pp. 85-86.
33 KD, 5, p. 45.
34 KD, 5, p. 45.
35 Smbat, p. 87.
36 For example, it places the Latin capture of Constantinople in 1207 rather than 1204.
the principality of Antioch began before the Seljuks captured Pertous. The previous Seljuk invasion of Cilicia, in 1201, had taken place while Leon’s troops were besieging Antioch. It would have been tactically advantageous for the Turks to launch an assault on Pertous while the Armenian king was pillaging the principality of Antioch because they would almost certainly not have been inhibited in their attempts to capture the castle by a large relief army. Of course, the dating in Sempad’s chronicle may be correct, but it is just as likely that Leon’s attack on the Latin principality began before the Seljuk incursion in 1208. This would explain why the Armenian king chose to return to Cilicia and why Ghiyāṭh al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw I required him to agree to stop attacking Antioch in their peace negotiations.

The Seljuks launched a third major offensive on the Armenian kingdom in 1216 when ‘Īzz al-Dīn Kay-Kāwūs I laid siege to the fortress of Gaban in eastern Cilicia.37 His troops were unable to swiftly capture the stronghold but they were able to defeat the Cilician Armenian relief force that Leon sent to confront them. The Etchmiadzin manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad records that the Armenian king sent two of his most powerful barons, Constantine of Babaron and Adam of Baghras, to relieve the siege of Gaban. However, these men were outmanoeuvred and easily defeated by the Seljuks, who captured several members of the Cilician nobility, including Constantine himself.38 This Turkish victory was somewhat tempered by a successful sortie made by the garrison of Gaban, which destroyed many of the Seljuks’ siege weapons. Kay-Kāwūs I was frustrated by his inability to capture the fortress and eventually decided to withdraw from Cilicia, but he took a large number of prisoners with him.39

The Seljuk siege of Gaban appears to have begun after Leon had captured Antioch and Raymond-Roupen had been installed as the new prince. Kay-Kāwūs I was presumably aware of the success of the Cilician Armenians in northern Syria and therefore his actions were almost certainly motivated by a desire to acquire new fortresses and territory in Cilicia, rather than any attempt to help Bohemond IV. The Armenian sources do not indicate that Leon swiftly returned to his kingdom to defend it from this Seljuk attack, but Ibn Bībī records that the Armenian king was part of the army that confronted Kay-Kāwūs I.40 If the Seljuk sultan had managed to enlist the military support of al-Zāhir of Aleppo then they may have been able to make major conquests in eastern Cilicia. In such a scenario, Kay-Kāwūs I could

37 IB, pp. 71-74; SC, p. 644; Smbat, p. 92.
38 IB, pp. 73-74; SC, p. 644.
39 IB, p. 74; SC, pp. 644-645; Smbat, p. 92.
40 IB, pp. 71-74.
have demanded that Antioch be returned to Bohemond IV in subsequent peace negotiations. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw I had previously demonstrated in 1208 that he was opposed to a Cilician Armenian occupation of Antioch, so it is possible that ‘Īz al-Dīn Kay-Kāwūs I could have tried to persuade Leon to relinquish the city in 1216. However, the Aleppans eventually decided not to participate in an attack on the Armenian kingdom and the Seljuk campaign of 1216 ultimately had no real impact on Antiochean-Cilician relations.

After the death of King Leon I in 1219 Cilicia became embroiled in a succession dispute of its own, with the Armenians divided as to whether Isabel or Raymond-Roupen should ascend the throne. This internal conflict left the Armenian kingdom susceptible to invasion and the new Seljuk sultan, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Kay-Qubād I, promptly took advantage of this vulnerability. In 1221 the Turks captured the coastal fortress of Kalonoros (now known as Alanya) and most of Isauria, thereby pushing back the western frontier of the Armenian kingdom. The decision of the Cilician nobility to marry Isabel to Philip, a son of Bohemond IV, and form an alliance with the principality of Antioch in 1222 was probably driven in part by concern about the threat which the Seljuks posed to their realm. They required a new king who could lead the Cilician Armenian army and prevent the loss of further strongholds to the Turks. The need to find a husband for Isabel also provided the perfect opportunity to ally with the Latins of Antioch and ensure they did not collaborate with the Seljuks against the kingdom of Cilicia. If Kay-Qubād I had not conquered Isauria in 1221 then Philip may not have been offered the queen’s hand in marriage because the Cilician Armenians would not have felt pressured into ensuring that they were on good terms with the Antiochenes.

The security of the Armenian kingdom was strengthened by the marriage alliance with the principality of Antioch, but the situation did not last. After a short spell as king consort of Cilicia, Philip was arrested and imprisoned by a group of Cilician Armenian barons in late 1224. As a result, Bohemond IV began negotiating with Kay-Qubād I and agreed with him that the Seljuks and the Antiochenes would co-operate in attacking the Armenian kingdom. The Seljuks invaded Cilicia in the second half of 1225 and captured several fortresses before withdrawing at the onset of winter. Bohemond occupied Cilician Armenian troops by raiding the south of the kingdom on several occasions, but the count of

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41 IB, p. 105; SC, p. 645.
42 Yildiz, ‘Reconceptualising the Seljuk-Cilician Frontier’, p. 106.
43 IA, 3, p. 280.
44 BH, 1, p. 389; IA, 3, p. 280; IB, pp. 140-142.
Tripoli ultimately failed to make any conquests or to rescue his son before Philip was murdered.

In 1226 Hethoum, son of Constantine, married Isabel, daughter of King Leon I, and was crowned king of the Armenians at Tarsus. The deposition and murder of Philip damaged Antiochene-Cilician relations for a generation and both sides appear to have remained hostile to each other for more than twenty years. There is no record of an alliance or co-operation of any kind between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia during this period. However, there was also relatively little military conflict between them, and there is no evidence of Hethoum besieging Antioch or pillaging the Latin principality for long periods as King Leon I had done. This may, to some extent, be explained by the Armenian kingdom’s relationship with the Seljuks after the conquests made by the armies of Kay-Qubād I in 1225.

In addition to securing complete control of much of the southern Anatolian coastline, the Seljuks were able to force the Cilician Armenians to recognise their suzerainty over Cilicia in the aftermath of Philip’s deposition. The Armenian kingdom had suffered serious territorial losses and faced the prospect of further invasions from two hostile and aggressive neighbours. Bohemond IV was unlikely to agree to a peace deal after his son had been murdered so Constantine of Babaron, who ruled Cilicia as the de facto regent in the early part of Hethoum’s reign, had little option but to recognise Seljuk suzerainty in order to ensure that Kay-Qubād I ceased his attacks upon the Armenian kingdom. The agreement lasted for around two decades, with King Hethoum I paying tribute to his Seljuk overlords, sending Cilician Armenian troops to fight in Turkish armies, and acknowledging his vassal status by issuing bilingual coins.45

Bohemond IV had collaborated with the Seljuks after the deposition of Philip, while previous sultans, particularly Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw I, had opposed King Leon I’s attempts to seize Antioch. Therefore, it is quite possible that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Kay-Qubād I had instructed Constantine and Hethoum not to invade the Latin principality. Even if the Seljuk sultan had not advised the Armenian king to leave Antioch alone, Hethoum may have feared that the Turks would take advantage of his absence from Cilicia if he spent a lengthy period of time campaigning in northern Syria. During the first half of Hethoum’s reign the main foreign policy objective was to maintain good relations with the Seljuks and ensure that the

Armenian kingdom did not suffer any further territorial deterioration. An attack on Antioch could have put this strategy at risk so the Cilician Armenians avoided any serious conflict with the Latin principality.

The expansion of the Mongols into Anatolia ended the dominance of the Seljuks over the region, which was to have a significant impact on the kingdom of Cilicia. In 1243 a Mongol army defeated the troops of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw II at the battle of Köşedağ. In the aftermath of this encounter some of the Seljuk sultan’s relatives, including his mother, fled south and took refuge in the Armenian kingdom. The Mongols subsequently sent a messenger to Hethoum demanding that the Seljuk refugees be sent to them. The Armenian king reluctantly agreed to this request, fearing the consequences if he refused, and swiftly dispatched Kay-Khusraw II’s mother to the Mongol commander Bayju. The Seljuk sultan was outraged by Hethoum’s behaviour and he responded by sending troops to invade the Armenian kingdom in 1245. The Turks later withdrew after an unsuccessful siege of Tarsus, but they returned in the following year and encamped before the same city. The death of Kay-Khusraw II prompted the Seljuk generals to seek a truce with Hethoum, who promised them the fortress of Bragana in exchange for their departure from Cilicia.

The sultan’s death in the winter of 1245-1246 marked the end of Seljuk suzerainty over the Armenian kingdom. In the period that followed, the Seljuks were preoccupied by their own succession dispute involving the three young sons of Kay-Khusraw II, and therefore they posed no real threat to Cilicia. Hethoum took advantage of Seljuk instability by recovering Bragana just two years after handing over the stronghold. Meanwhile, representatives of the Seljuks and the Cilician Armenians had travelled to Karakorum, paying homage to Güyük Khan in 1248. Thus, the Turkish sultanate was no longer the superior of the Armenian kingdom – both were now vassal states of the Mongol khanate. Thereafter, the influence of the Seljuks on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia rapidly declined.

The Mongols

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46 BH, 1, p. 407; IB, pp. 224-230; SA, p. 461.
49 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, p. 271.
50 SC, p. 650.
51 BH, 1, p. 411; SC, p. 651.
By 1206 Chinggis Khan had united most of the nomadic tribes who lived at the eastern end of the Eurasian Steppe. Known to posterity as the Mongols, Chinggis and his followers then embarked on a path of conquest and destruction that eventually led to the subjugation of northern China and Transoxiana. After the death of Chinggis in 1227, the Mongols maintained an expansionist policy and proceeded to forge one of the largest empires in human history. By 1260 the Mongols ruled over territory stretching from the Mediterranean in the west to the Sea of Japan in the east. As the thirteenth century progressed their activities began to have greater and greater influence on the political situation in northern Syria, culminating in the capture of Aleppo. After Kitbuqa’s defeat at the battle of Ayn Jalut, however, it was the Mamluks rather than the Mongols who had the biggest impact on Antiochene-Cilician relations.

The Mongols first appeared in the Caucasus in 1220, but it was not until the 1230s that that they began to systematically conquer the region. Their plundering of the Armenian cities of Ani and Kars brought them to the attention of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw II, who dispatched troops to capture and enslave those who had not been killed by the Mongols. In 1242 Bayju besieged Erzurum in eastern Anatolia for two months before retiring to the Mughan plain for the winter. The Mongols returned to Anatolia in the following year and were confronted by a large Seljuk force. In June 1243, Bayju won a decisive victory against Kay-Khusraw II at the battle of Kösedağ. The Mongols subsequently gained control of several important Anatolian cities, including Kayseri, Sivas, Melitene, and Erzincan (known to the Armenians as Erznka).

The success of the Mongols in Anatolia probably contributed towards the reconciliation between the Antiochenes and the Cilician Armenians in the late 1240s and early 1250s. After Bayju’s victory over Kay-Khusraw II at Kösedağ, Hethoum I quickly recognised the threat which the Mongols posed to the Armenian kingdom, and thus he decided to submit to the leader of these menacing newcomers. In 1246 the Armenian king sent his brother, Sempad the Constable, to Karakorum to recognise Mongol suzerainty over Cilicia. However, Sempad does not appear to have returned to the Armenian kingdom until 1250, predominantly because it took a long time to travel between the Near East and the steppes of Central Asia. Hethoum had taken short term diplomatic action to protect Cilicia

54 SC, p. 651.
by handing over Seljuk refugees to the Mongols and agreeing a truce with Bayju, but
Sempad’s expedition to Karakorum was critical because it confirmed Mongol vassalage over
the Armenian kingdom. Prior to his brother’s return, the Armenian king could not have been
completely sure of the Mongols’ intentions towards his realm, and he could not have relied
on them for military assistance if Cilicia was attacked. Thus, Hethoum’s attempts to obtain a
truce with the principality of Antioch may have been partially motivated by a desire to secure
the southern frontier of Cilicia so that he could focus on the volatile situation in Anatolia.

Shortly after King Louis IX of France had arrived at Cyprus in September 1248 he
was approached by Cilician Armenian envoys who informed him of the hostility that existed
between Hethoum and Bohemond V. The French king subsequently helped to improve
Antiochene-Cilician relations by bringing representatives of the Latin principality and the
Armenian kingdom together, and encouraging them to make peace.\(^{55}\) Louis, who was leading
a major crusade, undoubtedly wanted to ensure that there was unity amongst the Christian
states of the Near East so they could focus on fighting the Muslim enemy.\(^{56}\) The intervention
of the French king was probably crucial in sealing the reconciliation between the ruling
dynasties of Antioch and Cilicia. However, Hethoum’s eagerness for an agreement with
Bohemond V was partly provoked by Bayju’s exploits in Anatolia. The Antiochene prince
may also have been concerned about the Mongols and was perhaps willing to forget an
historic grievance against the Armenian monarchy in return for the added security that a truce
with Cilicia would bring.

Bohemond VI succeeded his father as the prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli in
1252, even though he had not yet reached the age of majority. The teenager had to be
knighted by King Louis IX in order to inherit Bohemond V’s possessions.\(^{57}\) King Hethoum I
used the opportunity provided by this change of leadership to strengthen ties between the
Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. In 1254 Bohemond VI married Hethoum’s
daughter, Sibylle, thereby cementing an alliance between the two states which would last
until the fall of Antioch in 1268.\(^{58}\) The truce agreed by both sides in 1249 appears to have
lasted without any difficulties and by the early 1250s the Armenian king had probably
abandoned the idea of major territorial expansion at the expense of the Antiochene prince,
and vice versa. Therefore, it made strategic sense for them to unite against their common enemies. However, a request from the Mongols also encouraged Hethoum to ally with Bohemond VI.

The king of Cilicia travelled to Karakorum in the early 1250s after being summoned there to submit to the leader of the Mongols. After Sempad the Constable had been made a vassal of Güyük Khan in 1248 he was sent back to the Armenian kingdom with a message for Hethoum, ordering him to visit the Mongol court personally.\(^{59}\) It was potentially very dangerous for the Armenian king to travel to such a distant destination because it would result in his absence from Cilicia for several years. The Armenian kingdom would be vulnerable to attack and political instability without Hethoum, who was the chief defender of the realm. Therefore, if the Armenian king was to undertake such a journey he needed to take precautions to try and prevent invasions and rebellions while he was away.

When Sempad the Constable returned to Cilicia in 1250 the Armenian kingdom was one year into a truce with the principality of Antioch. Hethoum could be reasonably confident that the southern frontier of his realm was secure in the short term. However, if the Armenian king travelled to Karakorum it was possible, although perhaps unlikely, that Bohemond VI could take advantage of his absence and attack Cilicia. Furthermore, even if the Antiochenes chose not to invade the Armenian kingdom, the Ayyubids or the Seljuks could have done. Therefore, in order to ensure that Cilicia would be secure while he paid homage to the Great Khan, Hethoum chose to pursue an alliance with the prince of Antioch. Although the primary sources do not record who proposed the match between Bohemond VI and Sibylle, it is highly likely that the Armenian king offered his daughter’s hand to the Antiochene prince. The marriage would bind the Armenian kingdom and the Latin principality together and guarantee peace between them. Hethoum appears to have embarked on his journey to Karakorum in 1253 so the union of Bohemond and Sibylle may have been agreed long before the wedding actually took place in 1254.\(^{60}\) The prince of Antioch had almost certainly promised to help defend Cilicia if it was attacked in the absence of the Armenian king. Of course, it is quite possible that Hethoum would have sought a marriage alliance with the Antiochenes even if he had not been summoned to the Mongol court. Nevertheless, the fact that he waited around three years after Sempad’s return before departing on this expedition suggests that he wanted to cement an Antiochene-Cilician alliance before he left.


\(^{60}\) Bayarsaikhan, \textit{The Mongols and the Armenians}, pp. 84-85.
Hethoum arrived back in Cilicia in 1256 after submitting to Möngke, who had succeeded Güyük as Great Khan, and strengthening ties between the Mongols and the Cilician Armenians. According to the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable, Bohemond VI attended a ceremony at Mamistra in November 1256 in which Hethoum’s eldest son, Leon, was knighted. Thereafter, the Armenian king and the prince of Antioch do not seem to have closely collaborated despite their alliance. In the late 1250s, however, the Mongols continued their western expansion, which ultimately altered the relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom even further.

Hülegü, the younger brother of Möngke Khan, embarked upon the conquest of Mesopotamia after crushing the Assassins who resided in the Alborz Mountains, south of the Caspian Sea, in 1256. The Mongols famously sacked the city of Baghdad in February 1258 and killed the Abbasid Caliph, thereby sending shockwaves throughout the Islamic World. Hülegü then sent troops to besiege Mayyafarqiyn before withdrawing with the rest of his army to Azerbaijan, where he remained for more than a year. In September 1259 the Mongol commander began advancing towards northern Syria, and by the end of the year he had captured most towns and cities in the Jazira, including Edessa and Harran. Hülegü’s army eventually reached Aleppo in January 1260.

This Mongol western advancement may have been one of the main reasons why Hethoum decided to travel to Tripoli in 1259 to meet with Bohemond VI. Considering subsequent events, it is possible that the Armenian king used this meeting to urge his son-in-law to submit to Hülegü and recognise Mongol suzerainty over the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli. Hethoum would certainly have been aware of the plundering of Baghdad and the sources indicate that he played an influential role in convincing his ally that a similar fate awaited Antioch and even Tripoli if Bohemond did not align himself with the Mongols, as the Cilician Armenians had done. Thomas Bérard, the master of the Temple, wrote a letter on 4 March 1260 in which he reported that the Antiochene prince recognised Mongol overlordship of the county of Tripoli after taking advice from the Armenian king. Thus, it is clear that Hülegü’s campaigning in the Near East prompted diplomatic discussions between Bohemond and Hethoum.

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61 BH, 1, pp. 418-419; GA, pp. 325-327; Hayton, pp. 164-168; Smbat, p. 98; VG, p. 216.
62 Smbat, p. 100.
63 GA, pp. 333-335; VG, p. 217.
64 Bayarsaikhan, The Mongols and the Armenians, pp. 136-137.
65 Smbat, p. 103.
The Armenian king participated in the Mongol capture of Aleppo and he is denounced by Arab historians for setting fire to the city’s Great Mosque.\(^67\) It has been suggested by Bayarsaikhan that Bohemond VI had also joined Hülegü’s army prior to the siege of Aleppo.\(^68\) Whilst such a theory is possible, there is no evidence which supports this claim. Several primary sources record that the Antiochene prince submitted in person to Hülegü, but Hayton clearly states that this took place after Aleppo had been taken by assault.\(^69\) If Bohemond did submit in person to the Il-Khan then it must have happened before Hülegü began his withdrawal to Azerbaijan. The Il-Khan left Syria in the spring of 1260 and reached Akhat in eastern Anatolia on 7 June. Hülegü took the vast majority of his troops with him, but he did leave a force of around 10,000 men to complete the conquest of the Levant under the command of the general Kitbuqa.\(^70\)

Although there is no evidence that the prince of Antioch travelled to Aleppo in 1260, he did join the Mongols at Baalbek. The Arabic chronicler Qutb al-Dīn al-Yūnīnī claimed to have personally seen Bohemond VI in the town:

> I saw him myself in Baalbec in the year 658/1260. He was in attendance on Kitbuqa Noyon and he went up to the Baalbec citadel and residency. He had decided to ask for it (Baalbec) from Hülegü and offer him what would please him for it.\(^71\)

This testimony confirms that the prince of Antioch did meet with Kitbuqa before the Mongol general was defeated and killed at the battle of Ayn Jalut on 3 September 1260. It thus lends credence to the notion that Bohemond VI and King Hethoum I of Cilicia accompanied Kitbuqa when he entered Damascus, as recorded in the *Gestes des Chiprois*.\(^72\) Furthermore, an icon depicting Bohemond, Hethoum and Kitbuqa as the three magi provides additional evidence that they did enter Damascus together in 1260.\(^73\) Therefore, Jackson, who originally cast real doubt over the idea that Bohemond accompanied Kitbuqa into Damascus by questioning the reliability of the *Gestes des Chiprois*, has somewhat revised his view and conceded that Bohemond ‘may have ridden into Damascus with the Mongol army’, although he maintains that the story of the prince of Antioch ‘converted the Great Mosque into a


\(^{68}\) Bayarsaikhan, *The Mongols and the Armenians*, p. 137.


\(^{71}\) Irwin, ‘The Mamlūk Conquest of the County of Tripoli’, p. 246.

\(^{72}\) GC, p. 751; *Templar of Tyre*, pp. 34-35.

\(^{73}\) Folda, *Crusader Art*, p. 318.
church is demonstrably apocryphal. 74 Sourdel is convinced that a Latin mass was celebrated at the Umayyad Mosque after the Mongols has taken Damascus because of Bohemond’s presence in the city, but argues that claims the mosque was converted into a church are excessive. 75

On 3 September 1260 a Mongol army led by Kitbuqa was massacred by the Mamluks at the battle of Ayn Jalut. 76 Prior to this encounter, Bohemond VI had taken advantage of Hülegü’s presence in northern Syria by seizing Darkoush and a number of other fortresses in the Orontes valley. He also regained control of the coastal city of Latakia. 77 Hethoum benefitted from the Mongol conquest of much of Anatolia, Mesopotamia and northern Syria. Hülegü ceded several towns and fortresses to him, thereby leading to a considerable territorial expansion of the Armenian kingdom, particularly on its eastern frontier. 78 However, Bohemond and Hethoum subsequently struggled to repulse the Mamluk attacks on their states in the 1260s.

The prince of Antioch and the king of Cilicia remained vassals of Hülegü after the battle of Ayn Jalut. Mongol overlordship encouraged these Christian rulers to maintain their alliance and co-operate against common enemies. When the Latin principality was attacked by the Mamluks in 1262 Hethoum encouraged the Mongols to send an army into northern Syria to prevent Baibars’ troops from capturing Antioch. The mere appearance of this Mongol force was apparently enough to prompt the Mamluks to withdraw without any serious conflict taking place. 79 Considering that Hethoum had taken part in the Mongol conquest of Aleppo and that Armenians fought with Kitbuqa at Ayn Jalut, it quite likely that the Mongol army which marched to Antioch’s aid in 1262 contained a contingent of Armenian soldiers from Cilicia. However, this is the only incident recorded in the primary sources where the Cilician Armenians took action to help the Latin principality when it was attacked by the Mamluks.

76 IAZ, 2, pp. 337-339; BH, 1, pp. 437-438; Smbat, pp. 106-107.
77 DSN, p. 45; IAZ, 2, pp. 646-647; IF, p. 50.
78 Cahen, La Syrie du nord, pp. 704-705.
79 Eracles, p. 446; GC, p. 755.
In 1264 King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI were present at the court of the Il-Khan in Azerbaijan. The Armenian king complained to Hulegu that the Seljuks were harassing his kingdom and sought Mongol assistance in helping him to negotiate a peace agreement with Rukn al-Din, a son of the deceased sultan Ghiyath al-Din Kay-Khusraw II. Apart from reaffirming his loyalty as a vassal to the Il-Khan, it is quite possible, and perhaps likely, that the Antiochene prince pressed his overlord to give more military support to the Latin principality. Hethoum requested diplomatic help from Hulegu so it is clear that other Mongol vassals felt able to make demands from the Il-Khan. Bohemond would not have spent months away from his territories travelling to and from Azerbaijan if he did not hope to receive something in return for his efforts. However, if the prince did ask Hulegu for military aid then he was to be disappointed because the Mongols did very little to defend the principality of Antioch or the county of Tripoli from the Mamluks.

There was one other occasion when a force comprising Mongol and Cilician Armenian troops was active in the vicinity of Antioch. However, this expedition was aggressive rather than defensive. After returning from Azerbaijan in 1264 Hethoum raised an army and headed south, attacking the towns of Ma`arrat Mesrin and Sarmin, which had been part of the Latin principality in the early twelfth century. The Armenian king later withdrew to Cilicia, but he reassembled his soldiers soon afterwards and marched towards Aintab in the winter of 1264-1265. After being attacked by Mamluks, the Cilician Armenians headed to Harim, where they were joined by 700 Mongols and 150 knights from Antioch, but they were forced to abandon the campaign because of the severe weather.

In the following four years the weakness of the alliance between the Antiochenes, Cilician Armenians and Mongols was exposed. Although they remained on good terms with each other, they did not collaborate in order to resist the Mamluk offensives on the kingdom of Cilicia or the principality of Antioch. Both these polities were targeted by the Mamluks in the 1260s partly because of their association with the Mongols. Furthermore, the Il-Khanate failed to provide either of them with the substantial military support that would have been necessary to repel the attacks of Baibars’ troops. Thus, although Mongol overlordship encouraged a co-operative relationship between King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI, it

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80 VG, p. 220.
81 IAZ, 2, p. 504; Smbat, pp. 111-112.
82 Smbat, p. 112.
83 IAZ, 2, p. 505; Smbat, p. 113.
84 IAZ, 2, pp. 505-506.
85 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, p. 54.
also damaged the Armenian kingdom and the Latin principality. The crippling of the former in 1266 and the destruction of the latter in 1268 can be partially blamed on the Mongol influence over these states.

**The Mamluks**

On 2 May 1250 the Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, al-Mu’azzam Turan-Shah, who had only assumed power a few months earlier, was murdered by the Mamluks of Cairo. The Mamluk emir Aybeg subsequently established himself as the new ruler by marrying Shajar al-Durr, the widow of former sultan al-Salih Ayyub. However, the first decade of Mamluk rule in Egypt was somewhat marred by political infighting. Aybeg had his main rival, Aktay, assassinated and exiled a large number of Bahri Mamluks who posed a serious threat to his leadership. Yet the Mamluk sultan was himself killed on 10 April 1257. One of Aybeg’s chief administrators, Qutuz, later took power and he was the man who led the Mamluks into battle against Kitbuqa’s Mongol army at Ayn Jalut on 3 September 1260.86

The decisive victory of the Mamluks at Ayn Jalut provided them with a clear opportunity to conquer the Levant. Kitbuqa lay dead on the battlefield and his army was destroyed.87 Hülegü’s decision to withdraw to Azerbaijan with the vast majority of his troops meant that the recent Mongol conquests in Syria were particularly vulnerable after Kitbuqa’s defeat. Within a matter of weeks important cities such as Aleppo and Damascus had fallen under Mamluk control.88 Then another change occurred in the Mamluk leadership as Qutuz was murdered by Baibars on 24 October 1260 while returning to Cairo.89 Baibars was subsequently recognised as the new sultan by all the Mamluk emirs that had been travelling with Qutuz.90 He later entered Cairo and firmly established himself in power.91 Baibars proved to be a strong and effective leader who spent much of his seventeen year reign vigorously attacking his enemies in the Near East.

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88 IAZ, 2, pp. 340-341.
89 IAZ, 2, p. 343.
90 IAZ, 2, pp. 344-345.
91 IAZ, 2, pp. 346-347.
Prince Bohemond VI and King Hethoum I remained allies throughout the 1260s, but the extent of their collaboration against the Mamluk threat was fairly limited in the years after the battle of Ayn Jalut. To some extent this can be explained by Bohemond’s long absences from the principality of Antioch and his focus on defending the county of Tripoli. Furthermore, it may be the case that at this point the Latin principality supported a relatively small number of troops, and therefore the Antiochene prince, or those who governed the state in his absence, may have been unwilling to commit them to battle and risk leaving Antioch defenceless.

The first serious Mamluk attack against the territories of Bohemond and Hethoum was the invasion of the principality of Antioch in 1262. After arriving at Damascus in the autumn of 1261 Baibars dispatched a military force to northern Syria in order to assert his authority in the region and oversee the appointment of a new governor at Aleppo. One of the sultan’s most trusted emirs, Sunqur al-Rumi, later invaded the principality of Antioch, capturing the port of St Simeon and destroying its harbour, after being put in charge of the Mamluk troops who had secured control of Aleppo. According to the authors of Eracles and the Gestes des Chiprois, the Mamluks then decided to besiege Antioch, but withdrew when a Mongol army arrived to relieve the city. Sunqur entered Cairo on 17 August 1262, where he was rewarded by Baibars for the plunder that he had taken during his raid of the Latin principality.

In 1264 Hethoum boldly invaded territory held by the Mamluks in northern Syria on at least two occasions. He led an attack on the towns of Ma’arrat Mesrin and Sarmin before withdrawing after the king himself was nearly killed. The Cilician Armenians marched towards Aintab later that year, which prompted Baibars to order troops from Hamah and Homs to confront them and conduct counter-raids. After being attacked by Mamluks, Hethoum asked the Mongols and the Antiochenes for reinforcements rather than deciding to abandon his campaign. Both his allies sent token forces which joined the Cilician Armenians at Harim, but any plans they may have had to besiege the castle were thwarted by heavy rain and snow. Hethoum’s army eventually withdrew and returned to Cilicia, but the Mamluks

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92 See Chapter Four: The Influence of the County of Tripoli on the Prince of Antioch.
93 IAZ, 2, pp. 400-401, 423-424.
94 Eracles, p. 446; GC, p. 755.
95 IAZ, 2, p. 424.
96 Smbat, pp. 112-113.
97 IAZ, 2, p. 505, 511; Smbat, p. 113.
98 IAZ, 2, pp. 505-506; Smbat, p. 113.
chose not to pursue the Armenian king. Instead they plundered the principality of Antioch and departed with many prisoners.99

It is clear that Mamluk advances into northern Syria in 1262 and 1264 prompted some co-operation between the Antiochenes and the Cilician Armenians, although Prince Bohemond VI does not appear to have been personally involved. By the middle of the 1260s, however, Hethoum appears to have recognised that his incursions into the region between Antioch and Aleppo had proved unsuccessful and that the Mamluks posed a major threat to his kingdom. At some point after retreating from Harim, the Armenian king sent envoys to Cairo to negotiate a peace with Baibars, but they were rebuffed by the Mamluk sultan.100 Diplomatic discussions were resumed at Damascus in 1266 after the Mamluks had captured the Templar castle of Safed, but the two sides were ultimately unable to reach agreement. Two Armenian chroniclers recorded that Baibars demanded that Hethoum cede several fortresses to him in return for peace.101 Amitai-Preiss persuasively argues that the sultan had already decided to invade Cilicia when the Armenian king’s envoys arrived at Damascus so he requested terms that he knew Hethoum would not agree to.102

In August 1266 Baibars ordered al-Mansur of Hamah to launch a major offensive on the Armenian kingdom.103 Under the leadership of al-Mansur, the Mamluks marched north and after travelling through the Amanus mountains they confronted a Cilician Armenian force near Marri. Hethoum had learned in advance that Mamluk troops were marching towards Cilicia and therefore he travelled to meet a Mongol commander in Anatolia to seek military assistance.104 The king entrusted his sons, Leon and Thoros, with the defence of the realm, but their army was no match for al-Mansur’s force. The Mamluks won a decisive victory, although very little fighting took place because most of the Cilician Armenian soldiers panicked and fled the battlefield. The troops of al-Mansur captured Leon and killed Thoros before advancing into the heart of the Armenian kingdom.105 They plundered the area around Til Hamdoun and captured the castle of Amouda on their way to Sis. Al-Mansur secured the conquest of that city, which was looted by his men for several days, before sending contingents of Mamluks to other parts of Cilicia in order to devastate the entire

99 IAZ, 2, p. 511.
100 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, p. 116.
101 Smbat, p. 116; VG, p. 223.
102 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, p. 116.
103 IAZ, 2, pp. 608-609.
104 BH, 1, pp. 445-446; GA, p. 357; Smbat, p. 117.
105 BH, 1, p. 446; GA, p. 357; IAZ, 2, p. 609; Smbat, pp. 117-118.
By the time they had returned to Syria in September 1266 Hethoum’s realm was severely weakened, both economically and militarily.

The Mamluk invasion of Cilicia demonstrates that although the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom were formally allied to each other, this diplomatic agreement rarely translated into military collaboration. The army of al-Mansur almost certainly marched through the former on their way to attack the latter so the Antiochenes must have been aware of the movement of the Mamluks, and yet they did not offer any assistance to their Cilician Armenian allies. It is unlikely that Antioch could have raised a large enough force to change the outcome of the battle near Marri, even if it had sent troops to join Thoros and Leon. Nevertheless, it is significant that those governing the principality in the absence of Bohemond VI did not seek to help the Armenian kingdom militarily. The two states had been in an alliance for more than a decade and both were threatened by the Mamluks, but this did not prompt the Antiochenes to try and defend Cilicia.

When Baibars personally led an attack on Antioch two years later, the Cilician Armenians did not rush to the aid of the Latin principality. In May 1268 the Mamluks defeated a small force outside Antioch and captured the constable, Simon Mansel. They then surrounded the city and ordered Simon to persuade the other leaders of the principality to surrender. After trying to negotiate a peaceful takeover for several days, Baibars became frustrated with the delay and ordered his troops to attack. The Mamluks easily scaled the walls of Antioch near the citadel and set about massacring the city’s inhabitants. On the following day, the Antiochenes who had sought refuge in the citadel surrendered and were taken prisoner. After almost 170 years under Latin control the city of Antioch fell to the Mamluks and the surrounding principality quickly disintegrated.

There are several reasons which help explain why King Hethoum I does not appear to have tried to prevent the Mamluks from sacking Antioch in 1268. First, the kingdom of Cilicia had been badly weakened by al-Mansur’s offensive two years earlier. Many Cilician Armenian soldiers had been killed in that campaign and Hethoum could not be confident that the remainder would achieve any success on the battlefield against the Mamluks considering the flight of his kingdom’s army when confronted by al-Mansur near Marri. If he had lost

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106 BH, 1, p. 446; GA, pp. 357-359; IAZ, 2, pp. 609-610; Smbat, p. 118; VG, p. 223.
107 IAZ, 2, p. 609; Smbat, p. 117.
108 IAZ, 2, pp. 656-657.
109 BH, 1, p. 448; Eracles, pp. 456-457; GC, pp. 771-772; IAZ, 2, pp. 657-658; Smbat, pp. 120-121.
110 IAZ, 2, p. 658.
large numbers of men trying to defend the principality of Antioch, then Cilicia would have been extremely vulnerable to permanent Mamluk conquest. More importantly, when Baibars attacked Antioch the Armenian king was still negotiating the release of his son, Leon, who had been captured by the Mamluks in 1266. Hethoum would have been extremely reluctant to antagonise Baibars before Leon was freed because the sultan could have executed his son in retaliation. Given the weak state of his fighting forces and the fact that the Mamluks were holding his son captive, it is hardly surprising that the Armenian king did not risk sending troops to Antioch’s aid when the Latin principality had not provided the Cilician Armenians with any military assistance two years before. However, it is possible that the real explanation for Hethoum’s failure to act in 1268 was simply a question of time. In early May 1268 Baibars and his army were raiding the county of Tripoli, but they then swiftly headed north and began besieging Antioch just days later. It would have been very difficult for the Armenian king to raise an army and hurry south to help the Antiochenes, unless he was extremely well prepared for a Mamluk attack. Baibars gave Hethoum very little opportunity to assist the Latin principality in its hour of need, although for the reasons set out above he would not have done so even if he could.

**Analysis of the Political Environment in Southern Anatolia and Northern Syria**

Before making a final comment on how the four non-Christian powers mentioned above affected the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia, it is worth analysing the geopolitical environment in which they operated and putting it in historical context. The ideas of Köhler are particularly interesting when trying to make sense of the alliances that were made in this region during the thirteenth century. His monograph, which focuses predominantly on the twelfth century, concludes that the Latin Christian states were fully integrated into the ‘political landscape’ of the Near East. Furthermore, he argues that the influence of ‘confrontationist ideologies’, such as crusading or jihad, ‘on the organisation of relationships between Syrian powers of differing religions is generally quite slight’.  

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111 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, pp. 118-120.

Köhler demonstrates that the polities of northern Syria in the early twelfth century cannot simply be divided between Christian and Muslim. Even at a time when the principality of Antioch was expanding in size in the 1100s and 1110s, it still allied with Aleppo when both sides considered such an arrangement to be in their interests. Tancred, who ruled Antioch from the winter of 1104-1105 until his death in 1112, collaborated with the Aleppan lord Ridwan against Count Baldwin II of Edessa and Jawali of Mosul in 1108. This is one of a number of cases where Latin Christian rulers made serious alliances with their Turkish Muslim counterparts and even fought alongside them.

Köhler uses the example of Tancred to illustrate that co-operation between Latins and Turks went beyond the occasional joint venture on the battlefield in the early twelfth century. Tancred employed Turkish troops in his service, and he may even have rewarded some of them with landed estates as opposed to simply paying them with money. Furthermore, when Ibn Tekish was forced to leave Mesopotamia by his cousin, Muhammad, the Seljuk sultan of Baghdad, he was able to obtain refuge at Antioch after being rebuffed by the rulers of Homs and Hamah. Ibn Tekish subsequently served under Tancred until the latter’s death. What emerges from the evidence is a picture or ‘religious indifference’ amongst the princes and emirs of northern Syria, who were primarily focused on preserving and extending their own power.

It is important to make clear that although Latins and Turks often interacted with each other collaboratively, they also clashed on a regular basis. Tancred of Antioch and Ridwan of Aleppo fought for control of towns on the frontier between their territories, such as al-Atharib and Zardana, and met on the battlefield near Artah in 1106. Köhler asserts that these military activities were ‘in no way different’ from the conflicts that took place between the Turkish lords of Antioch and Aleppo before the First Crusade. He implies that in many respects Ridwan treated Tancred as though he were just an ordinary Turkish rival in northern Syria, which explains not only why they formed an alliance in 1108 but also why Ridwan refused to support the Seljuk army which advanced towards the Orontes in 1111, under the command of Mawdud of Mosul. Despite the rivalry that existed between Antioch and Aleppo in the early

113 Köhler, Alliances and Treaties, pp. 65-66.
114 Köhler, Alliances and Treaties, pp. 68-69.
115 Köhler, Alliances and Treaties, pp. 69-70.
116 Köhler, Alliances and Treaties, p. 70.
117 Köhler, Alliances and Treaties, p. 67.
twelfth century, their rulers were prepared to co-operate with each other when they felt threatened by external forces.\footnote{Köhler, Alliances and Treaties, p. 70.}

One key component of Köhler’s hypothesis on diplomacy in twelfth century Syria is his observation that ‘the threat to the autonomy of the individual rulers from the advance of external powers always led to the conclusion of defensive alliances irrespective of ethnic and religious boundaries’.\footnote{Köhler, Alliances and Treaties, p. 145.} He labels this idea the ‘no place doctrine’ and explains how it led to the alliance of Christian and Muslim polities when both felt threatened by a ‘superior power’. Possibly the best example of this is the agreement made between King Fulk of Jerusalem and Mu'\textsuperscript{in} al-Din Unur of Damascus in the early 1140s. Both men wanted to prevent the aggressive Zengi, atabeg of Aleppo and Mosul, from occupying Damascus because they feared he would subsequently pose a substantial threat to the rest of southern Syria and Palestine.\footnote{Köhler, Alliances and Treaties, pp. 143-148.}

Some of Köhler’s arguments about northern Syria in the early twelfth century can also be applied to the same region one hundred years later, although there are a number of key differences. It is quite clear that religion had very little influence upon the relationships between the various polities of southern Anatolia and northern Syria in the thirteenth century. Bohemond IV allied with the Aleppan Ayyubids and the Seljuk Turks on several occasions. These agreements were made because both sides recognised that it was politically advantageous to collaborate with each other, despite their religious differences. The alliances were temporary and based upon self-interest rather than any notions of kinship or affinity.

During the Antiochene succession dispute both the Ayyubids of Aleppo and the Seljuks of Rûm tried to prevent King Leon I from capturing Antioch. This was not because they were concerned about the plight of Bohemond IV or thought that he had a stronger claim to the Latin principality than Raymond-Roupen. They simply recognised that the Cilician Armenians would be greatly strengthened by the acquisition of the city and its environs. If Leon had gained full control of Antioch in 1201 or soon afterwards then he would have acted as the regent for Raymond-Roupen, who would have been far too young to govern himself. Therefore, from the perspective of other powers in the region, the Armenian kingdom would effectively have been extended south of Cilicia into northern Syria, even if the principality remained a separate state in theory. Such an outcome would clearly have been
disadvantageous to the Ayyubids of Aleppo because a small and weak neighbouring state would have become part of a larger, expansionist polity.

One contrast between northern Syria in the early twelfth century and the same region one hundred years later is that there seems to have been far less conflict on the frontier between the principalities of Antioch and Aleppo in the early thirteenth century. The Latin principality suffered major territorial losses in 1188 and most of the towns and fortresses located between the two cities subsequently remained under Ayyubid control until 1260. Bohemond IV and his successors appear to have made very little effort to try and reconquer these settlements until the arrival of the Mongols in northern Syria. The course of the Antiochene succession dispute suggests that it was a struggle for the Latin princes simply to retain control of Antioch and that any attempt at territorial expansion would have been thwarted by the militarily superior Aleppan Ayyubids. Furthermore, in the thirteenth century the princes of Antioch were also the counts of Tripoli and therefore they were often absent from the Latin principality.

Al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s accord with Bohemond IV during the Antiochene succession dispute has some parallels with the alliance between Unur of Damascus and Fulk of Jerusalem in the 1140s. Fulk wanted to prevent Zengi from securing control of Damascus because he recognised the danger that the atabeg of Mosul posed to his kingdom. Similarly, al-Zāhir must have been concerned about the consequences for Aleppo if King Leon I captured Antioch. After succeeding his brother as the lord of the Roupenid principality in Cilicia in 1187, Leon had conquered a large number of town and fortresses, and obtained a crown from the Holy Roman Emperor. The Armenian king may or may not have been able to seriously threaten the city of Aleppo itself, but if he possessed Antioch then it is likely that this ambitious ruler would have tried to extend his control over the rest of northern Syria. Al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s decision to support Bohemond IV and hinder Leon’s efforts to seize Antioch was probably because he judged that the latter would be a more aggressive neighbour.

Bohemond IV’s agreement with the Seljuks was slightly different to his alliance with the Aleppan Ayyubids. The sultans of Rūm did not try to actively defend Antioch from the Cilician Armenians in the way that al-Zāhir did. Instead they invaded Cilicia in 1201, 1208 and 1216 while Leon was campaigning in northern Syria. Their primary goal was undoubtedly to capture fortresses and plunder the realm in the absence of the Armenian king. The Seljuks benefitted from this arrangement by seizing booty and conquering new territory,
but they were also aware that it helped Bohemond IV because it forced Leon to turn his attentions away from Antioch in order to defend his own kingdom.

The treaty made between the Seljuks and the Cilician Armenians in 1208 demonstrates that the former were concerned about the plight of the Latin principality. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kay-Khusraw I stipulated that Leon should stop attacking Antioch because he felt that it was in the Seljuk interest for the city to remain under the control of Bohemond IV. The Armenian king was one of Kay-Khusraw I’s main rivals, and therefore the sultan appears to have concluded that he was opposed to any avoidable increase in Leon’s power. The territorial expansion of the Armenian kingdom into northern Syria would not have had any direct impact on the sultanate of Rūm, but it would have strengthened the Cilician Armenians. The Seljuks, however, wanted their neighbours to be as weak as possible so they could pursue the conquest of Cilicia and gain control of the southern coastline of Anatolia.

The decision of the Ayyubids of Aleppo and the Seljuks of Rūm to oppose Leon’s attempts to seize Antioch was essentially motivated by a desire to preserve the status quo. For different reasons, both these powers concluded that it was not in their interests to allow the Cilician Armenians to gain control of one of the largest and wealthiest cities in the Levant. They wanted to ensure that the principality of Antioch remained under the control of Bohemond IV, but neither al-Zāhir Ghāzī nor any of the Seljuk sultans were close allies of the Tripolitan count. Therefore, an Aleppan army fought against Bohemond’s troops in 1214 after the latter laid siege to the Assassin castle of Khawabi, despite the fact that both al-Zāhir and the count of Tripoli had been co-operating to prevent Leon from capturing Antioch. The alliances made by Bohemond IV with the Seljuks and the Aleppans were simply marriages of convenience that did not last beyond the conclusion of the Antiochene succession dispute. These arrangements were slightly different from the alliances based on the ‘no place doctrine’ because the Cilician Armenians did not threaten the existence of the Ayyubid principality of Aleppo or the Seljuk sultanate of Rūm. The rulers of both states simply wanted to prevent the Armenian kingdom from becoming even more powerful.

There is more evidence of these rival powers making alliances with each other in the 1220s when the kingdom of Cilicia came under attack. After the arrest and imprisonment of Philip, king consort of Cilicia, by a group of Cilician Armenian barons in late 1224, the Seljuks and the Antiochens collaborated by simultaneously invading the Armenian kingdom. Shihāb al-Dīn Tughril, atabeg of Aleppo, subsequently aided the Cilician
Armenians who had overthrown Philip by sending them supplies and Aleppan troops. The willingness of Tughril to oppose the Seljuks and the Antiochenes, who had both previously allied with the Aleppans, provides clear evidence that diplomacy in this region was quite fluid and that states which had previously co-operated could easily turn against each other if their interests diverged. These events also demonstrate that Christian and Muslim rulers were prepared to unite against men of their own faith when it suited them. In that sense there are clear parallels between the alliances made in 1225-1226 and those formed in 1108 when Tancred of Antioch collaborated with Ridwan of Aleppo against Baldwin II of Edessa and Jawali of Mosul.\footnote{Köhler, Alliances and Treaties, pp. 65-66.}

In the 1230s and 1240s the politics and diplomacy of the region appear to have been quite different, although this could be explained by the paucity of evidence in the primary sources. Both the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia enjoyed a period of internal stability, with no revolts or succession disputes. This made them less vulnerable to invasion from one of their neighbours. Furthermore, in order to obtain peace and prevent further territorial losses Constantine and King Hethoum I were forced to accept Seljuk suzerainty over the Armenian kingdom, which lasted until c.1245. This meant that Seljuk incursions into Cilicia became very rare and for several years the relationship between the sultans of Rûm and the Armenian king was relatively peaceful. Overall, there seems to have been considerably less conflict between the Aleppans, Antiochenes, Seljuks, and Cilician Armenians in the second quarter of the thirteenth century in comparison to the first quarter. Thus, there was no need for them to make short term alliances with each other in order to protect the polity that was under attack.

The response of King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI to the arrival of the Mongols in the Near East was quite different to how Latin rulers had reacted to the advance of external powers into Syria in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries. Rather than allying with Ghiyâth al-Dîn Kay-Khusraw II against Bayju’s army in the early 1240s, Hethoum decided to submit to the Mongols and accept their suzerainty over his kingdom. The Armenian king evidently judged that resistance to the Mongols would be futile and therefore it was better to recognise their superiority and hope they would allow him to rule over Cilicia if he remained a loyal vassal. Bohemond VI later followed in the steps of his father-in-law by submitting to Hülegû and acknowledging Mongol suzerainty over the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli. There is no evidence which suggests the Antiochenes considered
allying with the Ayyubids of Aleppo to try and resist the Mongols. This approach was almost the antithesis of the ‘no place doctrine’ which operated in the Levant for much of the twelfth century.

Köhler neglects the geopolitics of northern Syria and southern Anatolia in the early thirteenth century because he fails to consider just how intertwined the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia were during this period. He asserts that there were no ‘proper’ alliances between Christian and Muslim rulers prior to 1240 in thirteenth century Syria, apart from the accord between Bohemond IV and al-Zāhir of Aleppo during the Antiochene succession dispute. However, the count of Tripoli was also on good terms with several Seljuk sultans who wanted to prevent King Leon I from capturing Antioch. Furthermore, the Antiochens collaborated with ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Kay-Qubād I after the deposition of King Philip of Cilicia in the 1220s. Whenever Bohemond IV found himself in conflict with the Cilician Armenians he sought to co-operate with the Seljuks or the Aleppans. If consideration is given to the whole of the Near East, rather than artificially focusing on Syria, it becomes clear that several alliances were made between the prince of Antioch and his neighbouring Muslim counterparts in the first three decades of the thirteenth century.

**Conclusion**

It is clear that the non-Christian powers of northern Syria and southern Anatolia had a significant impact on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia during the thirteenth century. This is most evident during the Antiochene succession dispute – it is highly unlikely that Bohemond IV’s supporters would have been able to retain control of Antioch until 1216 without the intervention of the Seljuks and the Aleppans. If King Leon I had not been hindered by al-Zāhir Ghāzī’s troops or distracted by Seljuk invasions of the Armenian kingdom then he would probably have conquered the Latin principality within a few years of Bohemond III’s death in 1201. Indeed, the Cilician Armenians seem to have been very close to subjugating Antioch in 1203, but they were thwarted by the advance of an Aleppan army. It is significant that Raymond-Roupen had reached the age of majority, and was therefore able to govern himself, by the time Leon captured Antioch because the relationship between the principality and the kingdom of Cilicia could have been very different if they were both governed by the Armenian king.

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The influence of non-Christian powers on Antiochene-Cilician relations was not always so evident. For more than two decades after the coronation of King Hethoum I in 1226, the two states remained hostile towards each other, but the sources suggest there was little or no conflict between them. The imposition of Seljuk suzerainty on the Armenian kingdom may have discouraged Hethoum from attacking the Latin principality, but clearly other factors were important, including the fact that the princes of Antioch also ruled the county of Tripoli and appear to have spent much of their time in their southern territory.

The arrival of the Mongols in the Near East played a crucial role in the forging of amicable ties between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. The reconciliation and truce agreed by King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond V in the late 1240s may have been prompted in part by Bayju’s campaigns in Anatolia. The subsequent summoning of Hethoum to Karakorum to pay homage to the Great Khan was almost certainly pivotal in persuading the Armenian king to seek a marriage alliance with Bohemond VI, in order to try and ensure that Cilicia would be safe in his absence.

The Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom remained in an alliance until the fall of Antioch in 1268. This was encouraged by the fact that after 1260 both polities were vassal states of the Mongols and both were threatened by the Mamluks. However, their military collaboration was somewhat limited despite the immense threat posed by Baibars’ forces. Throughout the thirteenth century the non-Christian powers of Anatolia and Syria undoubtedly helped to shape the conflicts and alliances between the Antiochenes and the Cilician Armenians, but the 1260s demonstrates the limits of their influence. The Mamluks campaigns of 1266 and 1268 devastated the kingdom of Cilicia and destroyed the principality of Antioch. On neither occasion did the two states combine their armed forces and attempt to resist the invaders. Non-Christian powers could encourage them to ally, but neither polity was prepared to risk a crushing defeat in order to try and help the other.
Chapter Six: The Influence of Ethnicity and Religion on Antiochene-Cilician Relations

When the First Crusaders arrived in the Near East at the end of the eleventh century they found a land populated not just by Muslims, but also a multitude of different Christian denominations. The Latins who established the principality of Antioch quickly became accustomed to living alongside an ethnically diverse range of peoples with their own distinct religious practices. This chapter will examine the way in which Latins and Armenians interacted during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in order to ascertain the extent to which their ethnic and religious differences impacted upon Antiochene-Cilician relations. This will be done by contemplating whether the Latins and Armenians of northern Syria integrated with each other, analysing the levels of intermarriage between Latins and Armenians, and considering why King Leon I of Cilicia faced so much opposition when he tried to take control of Antioch. The role of the papacy in the Antiochene succession dispute and the implications of the union of the Latin and Armenian Churches will also be assessed.

Latins and Armenians in the Near East

Historians of the Latin East have long been interested in the relationship between the Latin Christians and the indigenous people of Syria and Palestine. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, scholars such as Grousset and Madelin argued that newcomers and natives successfully integrated to form ‘une nation franco-syrienne’.1 This integrationist model, which posited that people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds blended together to form a cosmopolitan society, was rejected by Smail and Prawer in the second half of the twentieth century. Smail thought that

The basic feature of the Latin states was the imposition of a numerically small military aristocracy over the mass of the native population. This ruling class exploited the subject peoples economically by means of social arrangements which they found in existence, and which were akin to those they had known in Europe. Otherwise they made little difference to the daily life of the Syrians.2

Prawer argued that society in the Latin East was characterised by ‘apartheid’ between the Latin Christians and the indigenous people of Syria and Palestine.3 He also emphasised that

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2 Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 62-63.
native Christians were treated no better than Moslems, Jews or Samaritans’. This segregationist model has recently been challenged by the work of several historians, who argue that the Latins of the Near East did integrate with the local Christians. Ellenblum uses archaeological and textual evidence to demonstrate that Latins lived alongside Melkite Christians in many rural areas in the kingdom of Jerusalem, with both groups sharing churches for worship. This scholarship completely disproves Prawer’s argument that ‘almost the entire Frankish population was concentrated in the cities’ and undermines the segregationist model. Ellenblum claims that his findings represent a synthesis between the two earlier models – Latins did integrate with the indigenous Christians, although their relations should not be idealised, but they remained largely separate from the Muslims of Syria and Palestine.

Ellenblum’s view has been supported by Kedar and Murray, who both highlight examples of positive interaction between Latins and local Christians in the Near East. Kedar concludes his article examining relations between them by asserting that the Latins ‘were rulers who felt relatively at ease among their Oriental Christian subjects and maintained manifold relations with them’. Murray proposes a new hierarchical model for the relationship between the Latins and the indigenous peoples of the Near East – Muslims were at the bottom of the hierarchy since they were mostly excluded from the towns and cities of the Latin East, Jews and Samaritans were above them as they were subject to fewer restrictions, while the native Christians were the most privileged as they lived alongside the Latins in both rural and urban areas. He also differentiates between the Oriental Christians by arguing that the Arabic- or Syriac-speaking Melkites held lowly administrative posts in the Latin states, Greek-speaking Melkites held ‘important administrative and military positions’, while Armenians possessed fiefs and fought alongside Latins on the battlefield.

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MacEvitt argues that twelfth century relations between Latins and indigenous Christians, including Armenians, were characterised by ‘rough tolerance’. While there was violence between the two sides, it was not of a sectarian nature – ‘an attack on one group or individual was never interpreted as an attack on an entire community or class’, and the Latins never ‘systematically’ attacked the Armenians. However, MacEvitt suggests that the era of ‘rough tolerance’ came to an end in the late twelfth century because its most important characteristics – permeable boundaries between religious communities, and silence about the theological differences which divided them – gradually disappeared.

It is certainly true that from the late twelfth century onwards Latin texts are better at identifying subgroups within the indigenous Christians of the Near East. However, Jotischky argues that it was the Melkites rather than the Armenians that were singled out for criticism by writers such as Jacques de Vitry. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow that Latins and Armenians should become more intolerant of each other simply because the former developed a greater understanding of the religious beliefs and practices of the latter. The Armenian Church was theoretically in communion with the Latin Church throughout the first half of the thirteenth century, even though the papacy probably knew that Armenian clerics were ignoring its requests to align their religious practices and customs with their Latin counterparts. In 1239 Pope Gregory IX explicitly recognised the rites and customs of the Armenian Church which did not contravene the canon law of the Latin Church in order to maintain the union of the Churches. The papacy was unconcerned by the ethnicity of the Armenians and was even prepared to overlook their religious differences when necessary.

It is important to note that the Latins who settled in the Near East did identify the Armenians as an ethnic group that was distinct from the other peoples of the region. Bartlett has convincingly argued that medieval perceptions of ethnicity were based on descent, language, law and customs. Furthermore, some political leaders recognised that a nation or ethnic group with its own language should have its own laws and customs, although not

13 MacEvitt, Rough Tolerance, pp. 21-26.
14 MacEvitt, Rough Tolerance, p. 23.
15 MacEvitt, Rough Tolerance, pp. 26, 179.
necessarily its own state. Bartlett’s theory that language was a key identifier of ethnicity concurs with Murray’s research on the Latin East. The latter has found that Latin chroniclers tended to divide the Oriental Christians into three groups: Syrians (Suriani or Syri), Greeks (Graeci) and Armenians (Armeni). These distinctions were based on language, with the term ‘Syrian’ applying to Arabic- or Syriac-speaking Melkites, Jacobites and Maronites. In this case, people from different Christian denominations were considered to be one race. The Armenians were identified as an ethnic group on the basis of their language and while most Armenian-speakers also belonged to the Armenian Church, a minority of them were of the Greek Orthodox faith.

The Armenians were one of the most populous ethnic groups living in northern Syria during the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and their presence can be detected in many cities across this region, including Antioch and Latakia. Therefore, the Latins who settled in the principality of Antioch governed and lived alongside a substantial number of Armenians. The Antiochenes came into conflict with the Cilician Armenians on numerous occasions in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, but their relationship with the Armenian communities of northern Syria appears to have remained relatively peaceful and tolerant. There is no evidence that Armenians living in the principality of Antioch were persecuted or treated any differently by secular Latins after the polity was decimated by Saladin in 1188. In an account of his tour of the Near East in 1211-1212, Wilbrand of Oldenburg recorded that ‘Franks and Syrians, Greeks and Jews, Armenians and Saracens’ inhabited Antioch when he passed through the city. He also wrote that ‘the Franks are lords of all of them, and all of them observe their own laws’, which demonstrates a tolerant attitude towards non-Latins by the princes of Antioch and their vassals. Wilbrand’s testimony is supported by the fact that there are no references to Armenians or other Oriental Christians in the Assises of Antioch, and the legal treatise appears to apply only to the Latin inhabitants of the principality of Antioch.

The testimony of one primary source implies that the Latin population of Antioch had a negative view of the Armenians. According to the Lyon and Florence manuscripts of Eracles, the Antiochenes did not seriously begin to resist the Roupenid endeavour to annex

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22 WO, p. 123; *Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, p. 72.
23 WO, p. 123; *Pilgrimage to Jerusalem*, p. 72.
their city in c.1193 until after a sommelier decried that Antioch was being ‘handed over to so vile a people as the Armenians’. In this instance the word ‘vile’ probably implies ‘low born’ and is criticising the social status of the Armenians. However, Murray and MacEvitt have demonstrated that Armenian knights held fiefs in the Latin East and that Latin nobles and even kings took Armenian wives. This would surely not have happened if the prevailing view amongst the Latins of the Near East was that the Armenians were a low born race. The Lyon and Florence manuscripts of Eracles were produced in Acre in the 1240s so the author of this tale may not be accurately reflecting the views of the Antiochenes fifty years earlier.

**Intermarriage between Latins and Armenians**

A number of prominent Latins who settled in the Near East after the First Crusade entered into marriages with local Christian women. In fact, Baldwin of Boulogne, the first count of Edessa, married the daughter of an Armenian lord as early as 1098. Baldwin of Bourcq, Joscelin of Courtenay and Galeran of Le Puiset also took Armenian wives during their time in the county of Edessa. These men evidently had no qualms about marrying non-European women from a different Christian denomination when they thought that such a union would enhance their own career. The marriages helped them to win the support of the Armenians who resided in northern Syria and Mesopotamia while raising cash through dowry payments.

The early princes of Antioch did not marry local women from the Near East, but that was because they were less dependent on the support of the Armenians than the Latins of the county of Edessa. Bohemond of Taranto married Constance of France, daughter of King Philip I, after returning to the West and he also arranged Tancred’s marriage to Constance’s sister, Cecilia. These matches raised both men’s standing so it is hardly surprising that they seized the opportunity to form close ties with the French monarchy. Roger of Salerno and Bohemond II thought it more politically advantageous to marry relatives of Baldwin of Bourcq, one of the most powerful men in the Latin East, than the sisters or daughters of Armenian lords. However, that does not mean the princes of Antioch had any principled objection to marrying local Christians.

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27 MacEvitt, *Rough Tolerance*, pp. 77-78.
The testimony of a contemporary chronicler suggests that marriage to local women helped those who settled in the Near East to integrate into their new surroundings. Fulcher of Chartres, a clergyman who served as the chaplain of Baldwin of Boulogne and wrote about the establishment of the Latin states in the Levant, described how ‘some have taken wives not only of their own people, but Syrians and Armenians or even Saracens who have obtained the grace of baptism’. MacEvitt argues that many Latins ‘of a lower rank’ who inhabited the county of Edessa and the principality of Antioch are ‘likely’ to have married ‘local Christian wives’, but admits that there is ‘little evidence’ of such unions aside from Fulcher’s account. Ellenblum and Murray support this view.

Prior to the creation of the Armenian kingdom, several members of the Roupenid dynasty had intermarried with their Latin neighbours. Indeed, Rüdt-Collenberg’s data indicates that during the twelfth century the Roupenids were more likely to marry Latins than other Armenians. For example, Joscelin of Courtenay married Thoros I’s sister at some point before 1113, while Roupen III wedded the sister of Humphrey of Toron in 1181. The Roupenids evidently believed that it was in their interests to form strong links with powerful landowners in the Latin East. Furthermore, the number of marriages that appear to have taken place suggests that both sides were either unconcerned by their ethnic and religious differences, or not concerned enough by these factors to stop arranging politically advantageous matches.

Male members of the ruling dynasty of Antioch took Armenian wives on four occasions, with two of these matches being made before the creation of the kingdom of Cilicia in 1198. Bohemond III wedded his third wife, Sybil, in c.1181, and charters confirm that they remained married until at least 1199. Sybil is described as an Armenian by William of Tyre, but little else is known about her heritage. This union caused many problems for Bohemond – he was excommunicated, the principality was put under interdict, and many Antiochene nobles turned against him after he began plundering churches and monasteries – but his critics were not concerned by Sybil’s Armenian heritage. The match

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31 Rüdt-Collenberg, *Armeno-Cilician Dynasties*, pp. 32-34.
32 CDSMOG, 1, No. 1, p. 281; RRH, 1, No. 610, p. 162; MS, 3, pp. 388-389; WT, 2, p. 1012.
33 LIRG, 1, Cols 432-433, No. 424; RRH, 1, No. 753, p. 200.
34 WT, 2, pp. 1013-1016.
was condemned by the Latin Church because the prince had shunned his previous wife and remarried without first seeking an annulment. 36 After a delegation from the kingdom of Jerusalem had brokered a truce between Bohemond and the patriarch of Antioch, the prince exiled several of his prominent vassals, including his constable and chamberlain. However, these men headed north and gained service in Roupenid Cilicia. 37 This behaviour suggests that in the 1180s the Antiochene elite viewed the neighbouring Armenian lords and princes as legitimate Christian rulers whom they were happy to serve under.

Leon, who succeeded his brother, Roupen III, as prince of Roupenid Cilicia in 1187, married Sybil’s niece in 1189. 38 According to the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable, Leon hoped that by forming familial ties with Bohemond III he would discourage Antiochene aggression towards his lordship. 39 However, this match did not dissuade the Roupenid prince from imprisoning and torturing the prince of Antioch in the 1190s. Leon’s marriage to Sybil’s niece indicates that he considered Armenian Cilicia’s relationship with the Latin principality to be particularly important, but the violent manner in which he apparently disposed of his first wife in 1205 demonstrates just how weak her position became after the death of Bohemond III. 40

The second known marriage between an Armenian woman and a man from the ruling dynasty of Antioch occurred in c.1195 when Raymond, the eldest son of Bohemond III, married Leon’s niece, Alice. 41 The wedding took place around two years after the first Roupenid attack on Antioch was thwarted. Such a union would surely not have taken place if a large number of Antiochenes were as actively hostile towards Armenians as the Lyon and Florence manuscripts of Eracles suggest. Bohemond III may or may not have been pressured into assenting to this match in order to secure his own freedom – he was in captivity when the agreement was made – but he was evidently not totally opposed to a marriage between his son and the daughter of an Armenian prince. Despite Raymond’s early death in c.1197, the marriage did produce a son, Raymond-Roupen, whose birth appears to have been greeted by both Bohemond and Leon. 42 Even if the Antiochene prince had initial doubts about the

35 Hodgson ‘Conflict and Cohabitation’, p. 94.
36 MS, 3, pp. 388-389; WT, 2, pp. 1012, 1013-1014.
37 WT, 2, p. 1016.
38 SC, pp. 629-630.
39 SC, p. 630.
40 SC, p. 642, Smbat, p. 84.
41 ATS, p. 434; Cont. WT, pp. 176-177; Ernoul, pp. 320-321; SC, pp. 631-632; Smbat, pp. 71-72.
42 Eracles, p. 213; SC, p. 632; Smbat, p. 72.
wisdom of such a match, they did not prevent him from naming Raymond-Roupen as his heir in 1198.\textsuperscript{43}

Raymond’s premature death and the birth of Raymond-Roupen were two of the main causes of the Antiochene succession dispute, but it was not a conflict based on ethnic or religious differences and it did not discourage marriage between Latins and Armenians. In 1210 Leon married Sybil, the half-sister of King Hugh I of Cyprus. The Armenian king also arranged the marriage of Raymond-Roupen and Hugh’s sister, Helvis.\textsuperscript{44} These matches clearly demonstrate that Leon’s marital strategy was based largely on political considerations. He evidently hoped to get the diplomatic support of the Cypriot monarchy in the Antiochene succession dispute, although there is no suggestion that he expected or received any military assistance in the conflict.

The king of Cilicia further enhanced his links with Latin monarchs in 1214 when his daughter Stephanie, the only child of his first marriage, married John of Brienne, king of Jerusalem. Leon later arranged to marry his other daughter, Isabel, to the son of King Andrew II of Hungary, although the proposed match never came to fruition. Hodgson argues that these matches ‘underlined the newfound importance and heightened reputation of the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia’ amongst Latin rulers following Leon’s coronation and the union of the Latin and Armenian Churches.\textsuperscript{45} The marriage strategy pursued by the Armenian king isolated Bohemond IV diplomatically and ensured that Raymond-Roupen’s investiture as the prince of Antioch in 1216 was not opposed by other Latin rulers in the Near East.

The Antiochene succession dispute in effect prevented any marriages between the ruling dynasty of Armenian Cilicia and the family of Bohemond IV, but after 1219 there were new opportunities for the two sides to intermarry. When the conflict that erupted after Leon’s death had been quelled, the Cilician nobility and the catholicos of the Armenian Church decided that the young queen, Isabel, needed to be married to an adult husband who was capable of governing their realm. In 1222 she wedded Philip, son of Prince Bohemond IV.\textsuperscript{46} Although Constantine of Babaron hoped to pair Isabel with one of his sons,\textsuperscript{47} most of the nobility of Cilicia appear to have decided that a marriage alliance with the principality of

\textsuperscript{43} Pl. 214, Col. 811, No. 252; Reg. Inn. III, 2, No. 242, p. 463.
\textsuperscript{44} Smbat, p. 87.
\textsuperscript{45} Hodgson ‘Conflict and Cohabitation’, pp. 96-97.
\textsuperscript{46} ATS, p. 437; BH, 1, p. 380; Eracles, pp. 347-348; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 485; IA, 3, p. 279; KG, p. 428; OP, pp. 279-280; Crusade and Christendom, p. 223; SA, p. 460; SC, p. 647; Smbat, pp. 95-96; VG, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{47} BH, 1, p. 380.
Antioch was in the best interests of the Armenian kingdom. The marital union between Philip and Isabel was violently ended by the former’s deposition, imprisonment and murder just a few years after their wedding. Philip was deposed by a group of Cilician Armenian barons, but it is highly unlikely that they were concerned by the ethnic background of the men he appointed to key positions within the kingdom following his coronation.

Philip’s short reign in Cilicia and his subsequent demise cast a long shadow over Antiochene-Cilician relations. The next marriage between the ruling dynasties of the two states took place more than three decades after Philip and Isabel’s wedding. In 1254 Bohemond VI of Antioch married Sybil, daughter of King Hethoum I of Cilicia. Crucially, the match was arranged after the death of Bohemond V, who maintained a policy of hostility towards the Armenian kingdom throughout his tenure as prince. Bohemond VI was born long after the murder of his uncle and therefore he probably did not have a deep resentment of King Hethoum and his family, who had been instrumental in Philip’s deposition and death. The prince recognised that a marriage alliance with the kingdom of Cilicia was in Antiochene interests and agreed to wed Sybil.

The pairing of Sybil and Bohemond VI ultimately proved to be the most successful of the marriages between the ruling dynasties of Cilicia and Antioch. Medieval rulers would not hesitate to put aside their wife and seek a new bride if they thought the match was no longer in their interests. Bohemond’s union with Sybil helped to sustain a prolonged alliance between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom, but crucially the prince chose not to annul the marriage after the loss of Antioch in 1268. The fact that the couple remained in holy matrimony until Bohemond VI’s death in 1275 suggests that either the prince had genuine affection for his wife or he wanted to maintain an alliance with her family even though he did not have a principality in northern Syria to defend. Their son, Bohemond VII, inherited the county of Tripoli, although Sybil briefly ruled the polity on his behalf until he reached the age of majority.

King Hethoum I appears to have favoured non-Armenian Christians when selecting husbands for his daughters because Sybil was not the only Hethoumid woman to marry a prominent figure in the Latin East. Euphemia was paired with Julian of Sidon while Maria

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48 KG, p. 428; SC, p. 647.
50 ATS, p. 446; Eracles, p. 442; Crusader Syria, p. 140; Smbat, p. 98.
was married to Guy of Ibelin. These unions demonstrate that Cilician Armenians continued to value strong links with Latin Christians – a trend that dates back to the early twelfth century. After the destruction of the principality of Antioch, Hethoum’s successors arranged marriages with the Lusignan dynasty in order to maintain good relations with the kingdom of Cyprus.

The number of recorded marriages between Latins and Armenians is sufficient to demonstrate that neither people were seriously concerned by the ethnic or religious differences between them. The main consideration of Near Eastern rulers when arranging a marital union was the political advantage that it would secure. The ruling dynasties of Armenian Cilicia and Antioch intermarried on three significant occasions in c.1195, 1222, and 1254. Furthermore, if the city of Antioch had not fallen in 1268 it is likely that more matches between these families would have been arranged because a strong alliance would have benefitted both the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom as they attempted to resist Mamluk aggression.

Antiochene Opposition to King Leon I

The amount of intermarriage and the level of co-operation between Latins and Armenians in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries proves that these peoples did not view each other with an aggressive intolerance. Furthermore, there is no evidence to suggest that the princes of Antioch treated their Armenian subjects any worse than the other Christian denominations that lived in the Latin principality. Other than the presumably fictional tale of the sommelier in the Lyon and Florence manuscripts of *Eracles*, there is little reason to think that the resistance to the Roupenid endeavour to take control of Antioch in c.1193 was prompted by anti-Armenian prejudice. This episode was the first of several attempts made by Leon II of the Roupenid principality – who subsequently became King Leon I of Cilicia – to seize the city of Antioch.

In many respects the fact that Leon and his troops were Armenian was irrelevant. Any invader seeking to capture Antioch would have faced hostility from some of the city’s inhabitants. Bohemond III’s supporters tried to prevent the Roupenid army from occupying the metropolis because they hoped to maintain the principality’s existence and keep their leader in power. These men would have resisted any force that attempted to seize control of the city regardless of the ethnicity or religion of the attackers. Other Antiochenes probably fought against Leon’s troops because they wanted to preserve the Latin governance of

51 Cont. WT, pp. 168-169.
Antioch and feared the change that a new regime would bring. The commune of Antioch, which was established in c.1193 in order to prevent the Roupenids from capturing the city, probably contained non-Latin members, and therefore it is possible that some Greek Orthodox and other indigenous Christians may have joined the Latins who opposed Leon’s army.

Count Bohemond of Tripoli took possession of Antioch after the death of Bohemond III in 1201, even though his father had previously designated Raymond-Roupen as the heir to the Latin principality. The Tripolitan count was recognised as Prince Bohemond IV by the commune of Antioch, which suggests he had the support of many Antiochenes. Raymond-Roupen was only an infant when Bohemond III died, but his claim to the principality was backed by his great-uncle, King Leon I of Cilicia. The fear of political upheaval helps to explain why Bohemond IV was able to retain control of Antioch until 1216. Raymond-Roupen was a child during the early stages of the conflict and therefore he would not have been able to govern himself. Leon sought to seize the principality and rule as regent for his great-nephew, but this prospect was no more appealing to many Antiochenes than his attempted conquest in c.1193.

The suggestion by Boase that ‘anti-Armenian feeling’ played an important part in the Antiochene succession dispute appears to be based upon the assumption that this conflict was essentially a struggle for control of Antioch between Latins and Armenians. However, there is plenty of evidence that the supporters of Bohemond IV and Raymond-Roupen cannot be divided along ethnic or religious lines. Some Antiochenes supported Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch from the beginning of the succession dispute, including a number of barons who honoured the oath they had sworn in 1198 recognising him as the heir of Bohemond III. Sempad the Constable recorded that six Antiochene knights left the principality in 1201 and entered the service of King Leon I. These men presumably fled from Antioch shortly after Bohemond IV was recognised as the new prince by the Antiochene commune. They were willing to actively support Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality by serving under an Armenian king.

52 Eracles, p. 209.
53 See Chapter Two: The Commune of Antioch.
56 Oliver the Chamberlain; Roger of the Mountains; Juart; Thomas Maslebrun; Bohemond Lair; William of the Island. SC, p. 639; Smbat, p. 81.
Two charters issued by Raymond-Roupen in 1215, a year before he was invested as the prince of Antioch, confirm that at least ten other Antiochenes also pledged their allegiance to him during the succession dispute. While one or two of them may have had some Armenian blood in their veins they clearly came from Latin Christian families with European origins as names like Thomas, Walter, and William testify. The witnesses of these charters made a political decision to recognise Bohemond III’s grandson, rather than his second son, as the legitimate prince. They were evidently unconcerned by the ethnic and religious differences between themselves and the Armenian people because they were willing to fight alongside King Leon I of Cilicia in order to install Raymond-Roupen in power at Antioch. Some of these men may have been amongst the barons who pledged their allegiance to the boy in 1198 and their actions may have been influenced by the oath they made, but in all probability they chose to support Raymond-Roupen primarily because they thought it would be better for their own careers if he inherited the principality rather than Bohemond IV.

It seems highly unlikely that anti-Armenian prejudice was prevalent amongst the Latin elite at Antioch considering the number of Antiochenes who sided with Raymond-Roupen in the succession dispute. Those who pledged their allegiance to Bohemond IV did so for political reasons rather than because they did not like the Armenians as a people. Many of Antioch’s inhabitants, both Latin and non-Latin, were firmly opposed to Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality, even after he had reached the age of majority and there was no need for Leon to govern as his regent. Three of Raymond-Roupen’s four grandparents were actually Latins so his opponents in Antioch are unlikely to have been particularly concerned by his ethnic background. If Bohemond III’s eldest grandson had been raised at Antioch under the guidance of his Latin relatives then he would probably have faced considerably less opposition from Antiochenes. However, because Raymond-Roupen grew up in the kingdom of Cilicia under Leon’s supervision, many feared that if he ever gained power at Antioch he would marginalise those who held positions of power under Bohemond III and Bohemond IV, and favour those who were loyal to himself and his great-uncle. They would have felt similar concerns about any outsider who wanted to take control of the principality. Furthermore, Raymond-Roupen’s status as the heir to the kingdom of Cilicia

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57 See Appendices A and B.

58 His maternal Armenian grandfather, Roupen III, married Isabel of Toron, a lady from the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. His paternal grandparents were Bohemond III of Antioch and Orgueilouse of Harim.
during the Antiochene succession dispute can only have increased anxieties that his succession at Antioch would lead to major upheaval.\(^\text{59}\)

Several historians have described the Antiochene opponents of King Leon I and Raymond-Roupen as the ‘anti-Armenian faction’ within the principality of Antioch.\(^\text{60}\) However, the Latins who resisted Leon’s efforts to capture Antioch in c.1193 and during the Antiochene succession dispute were anti-Roupenid rather than anti-Armenian. They had lived alongside the sizeable Armenian population of northern Syria since the foundation of the principality, and there is no evidence that these Armenians were systematically persecuted by the Antiochenes. Nevertheless, the Latins did not want to be governed by a Cilician Armenian dynasty which might threaten their hegemony at Antioch. The anti-Roupenid stance amongst large sections of the Antiochene elite is perfectly understandable because a new ruler, who had been raised in a foreign court, would probably want to put his own supporters in positions of power within the principality at the expense of members of the existing regime. For example, after his coronation as king of Jerusalem in 1131, Fulk of Anjou bestowed castellanships and offices of the crown upon his Angevin supporters, thereby threatening the power of the established noble families. Mayer argues convincingly that Hugh of Jaffa’s rebellion against Fulk in 1134 was, in part, a reaction against this policy.\(^\text{61}\) The Antiochene opponents of Leon and Raymond-Roupen were not particularly concerned by the ethnic and religious differences between themselves and the Armenian people – they were worried that their powers and privileges would be threatened.

**The Role of the Papacy in the Antiochene Succession Dispute**

The papacy learned of the succession dispute in the principality of Antioch around two years before Bohemond III’s death. King Leon I of Cilicia wrote to Pope Innocent III in 1199 and informed the pontiff that the Antiochene prince had designated his newly born grandson, Raymond-Roupen, as his successor. The Armenian king also mentioned that in the winter of 1198-1199 Count Bohemond of Tripoli expelled his father from Antioch and was proclaimed the legitimate heir to the principality by his supporters.\(^\text{62}\) Bohemond III subsequently resumed his position at Antioch a few months later, but Innocent probably

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\(^{59}\) King Leon I recognised Raymond-Roupen as his heir shortly after the boy was born. SC, p. 632; Smbat, p. 72.


realised that conflict was likely to break out after the elderly prince’s death unless diplomatic steps were taken to resolve the issue of who should inherit the Latin principality.

The pope immediately responded to Leon’s letter by writing that he would dispatch papal legates to the Near East with a mandate to examine the matter and judge who had the stronger claim to succeed Bohemond III. However, when the Armenian king wrote to Innocent III in October 1201 he stated that he was looking forward to the arrival of the legates so that a judgement could be made. Furthermore, he requested that the archbishop of Mainz, who had crowned Leon king of the Armenians in 1198, was made one of the judges in the Antiochene succession dispute. Clearly the papacy had been slow in appointing legates to settle the quarrel because the process of consulting with the rival claimants and their representatives had not begun, even though Innocent had been made aware of the situation two years earlier.

The pope’s sluggishness meant that Bohemond III had died and conflict had erupted over control of the principality of Antioch long before papal legates began trying to settle the succession dispute. It would have been difficult to persuade Bohemond of Tripoli to renounce his claim to the territory in favour of Raymond-Roupen or convince Leon that the Tripolitan count was the rightful heir to Antioch in the period before the prince’s death. However, the papacy had a greater chance of influencing the succession during that time. Once war had broken out between the Armenian king and Bohemond of Tripoli a military solution to the quarrel was far more likely than a diplomatic one.

In the autumn of 1202 the first of two papal legates tasked with trying to resolve the Antiochene succession dispute arrived in the Holy Land. Soffredus of Santa Prassede entered Tripoli on 11 November, but Bohemond IV was absent from the city and did not appear until February 1203. Even after his arrival the Tripolitan count refused to discuss the fate of the principality with the legate on the grounds that he had been excommunicated by the patriarchs of Antioch and Jerusalem. Bohemond IV was predictably reluctant to recognise the right of the papacy to judge who had the better claim to the principality because Antioch was already under his control. After weeks of un成功fully trying to engage with the count, Soffredus departed for Acre.

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64 PL, 214, Cols 1004-1005, No. 43.
65 PL, 214, Cols CLI-CLIV.
The papal legate, accompanied by King Aimery of Jerusalem, the masters of the Temple and the Hospital, and an assortment of barons, sailed to the principality of Antioch later in 1203. This delegation met with Leon in northern Syria after he agreed to temporarily suspend hostilities in order to discuss the succession dispute. The Armenian king recognised the right of Soffredus and the barons to judge who was the legitimate heir of Bohemond III. Leon attempted to persuade them to support Raymond-Roupen’s claim by promising twenty thousand men for the service of Christianity if justice was obtained for his great-nephew. As these negotiations were taking place during the Fourth Crusade it would appear that Leon was offering military support for that enterprise. However, the barons rejected the Armenian king’s offer and when Soffredus departed for Acre later that year little progress had been made.  

In November 1203 a Cilician Armenian army entered Antioch during the night and came very close to capturing the city. Leon’s men were then attacked by the Templars and forced to retreat back to Cilicia when an Aleppan force advanced towards Antioch and reached the Orontes. This offensive is clear evidence that the papacy had failed in its early attempts to prevent military conflict between the two sides competing for control of the principality. Soffredus had tried to agree a peace and persuade both Leon and Bohemond IV to accept his judgement over who was the legitimate prince of Antioch. However, the Tripolitan count’s refusal to co-operate frustrated the Armenian king and convinced him that he was far more likely to obtain the principality on Raymond-Roupen’s behalf by force than waiting for the papacy to find a diplomatic solution.

Shortly after Leon’s troops had retreated back to the Armenian kingdom from Antioch another papal legate arrived in the Near East. Peter of Saint Marcellus journeyed to Cilicia and entered into discussions over the role of the catholicos following the union between the Latin and Armenian Churches. After these matters were concluded Peter turned his attention to the Antiochene succession dispute. Leon’s attempts to obtain the principality by military means had failed so he once again began to engage in the legal process in the hope that Peter would declare Raymond-Roupen to be the prince de jure. However, the Armenian king realised this was highly unlikely after holding discussions with the papal legate, the patriarch of Antioch, and the Templars and the Hospitallers at the Black Mountain in the Amanus Mountains.  

Leon became convinced that Peter was opposed to Raymond-Roupen’s claim to

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66 PL, 214, Cols CLIV-CLV.
67 PL, 215, Cols 687-689, No. 119.
the principality of Antioch and wrote a letter to Innocent III accusing the legate of conspiring with the Tripolitan count against him. The Armenian king labelled Peter an ‘adversary’ and demanded that he was not allowed to pass judgement on the succession dispute.  

The negotiations between Peter of Saint Marcellus and King Leon I became increasingly strained during the first half of 1204. The legate actually placed the kingdom of Cilicia under interdict after Leon refused to relinquish control of the castles that he had seized from the Templars in retaliation for their attack on his troops at Antioch in November 1203. When it became clear that the two men could not reach agreement Peter travelled to Acre and a council was convened by Soffredus to try and reach a compromise. The Armenian king sent an ambassador to Acre in September 1204, while the bishop of Tripoli also joined the conference on behalf of Bohemond IV. The Templars and the Cilician Armenians were reconciled, but no accord was made between Bohemond and Leon. Peter and Soffredus departed the Holy Land soon afterwards without giving explicit papal support to either side.

Around two years after Soffredus of Santa Prassede had first arrived in the Near East both he and fellow legate Peter of Saint Marcellus left the Near East having comprehensively failed to settle the Antiochene succession dispute. They were unable to bring peace between the supporters of Bohemond IV and Raymond-Roupen or even persuade the Tripolitan count to seriously negotiate. Crucially, the legates did not make a judgement on the case and openly state who they thought was the legitimate heir of Bohemond III. As he already controlled the principality of Antioch Bohemond IV was understandably wary of acknowledging that his claim to the polity was in doubt by debating the succession with Leon or the papal legates. If he had agreed to abide by the judgement of Soffredus and Peter on the matter then he risked losing his principality as they may have backed Raymond-Roupen. It was always highly unlikely that the legates would have been able to induce the Tripolitan count to give up Antioch, but they may have been able to influence the outcome of the conflict between Leon and Bohemond IV by supporting one of the claimants to the principality. Instead Soffredus and Peter left the situation unresolved which probably strengthened the count of Tripoli’s belief that he could ignore the papacy’s attempts to intervene in the succession dispute.

69 PL, 215, Cols 689-690, No. 119.
70 PL, 214, Cols CLVI-CLIX; PL, 215, Cols 690-691, No. 119.
71 PL, 214, Col. CLIX.
In March 1205 Pope Innocent III wrote to the abbots of Lucedio and Mount Tabor about the quarrel between Leon and Bohemond. He noted that Soffredus and Peter had been unable to find a solution to the controversy, despite working tirelessly. The pontiff ordered the abbots to travel to the Near East in order to convene a meeting between the Tripolitian count and the Armenian king, and to encourage them to reach an agreement over the future of the principality of Antioch. Innocent was clearly frustrated that the dispute was dragging on and that the two sides were fighting each other instead of the Muslims in the region. Therefore, he authorised the abbots to use spiritual sanctions against either side if they refused to co-operate and forbid other Christian groups in the Holy Land, such as the Hospitallers, from supporting the contumacious party. In fact, the pope suggested that if Bohemond or Leon tried to hinder the legal process then their opponent should be given military assistance.

The abbots of Lucedio and Mount Tabor were clearly no more successful in finding a solution to the Antiochene succession dispute than Soffredus and Peter had been since the Armenian king and the Tripolitan count continued to battle for control of the principality for another decade. Indeed it is unclear whether the three month arbitration suggested by Innocent ever took place since no letter recording the activities of the abbots has survived. Nevertheless, the pope maintained an interest in the quarrel and encouraged Patriarch Albert of Jerusalem to try and end the conflict between Leon and Bohemond. The Tripolitan count continued to make life difficult for those trying to legally settle the dispute. He even claimed that he held the principality of Antioch as a vassal of the Latin Emperor of Constantinople, and therefore he was only required to obey the judgement of the emperor. 72 The Armenian king also irritated the pope and his legate by repeatedly clashing with the Templars in the Amanus Mountains. 73 The behaviour of both sides discouraged the papacy from backing Raymond-Roupen or Bohemond IV and so the conflict rumbled on until Leon achieved a military breakthrough.

The Armenian king wrote to Innocent III in 1216 after securing control of Antioch and installing Raymond-Roupen as prince. The fact that Leon sent such a letter reflects his knowledge that the pope would want to be informed of any developments in the quarrel over the principality. By this point it was probably clear to all that the papacy was merely a

73 See Chapter Three: The Military Orders in the Principality of Antioch and the Kingdom of Cilicia.
spectator and had almost no influence on the conflict between Bohemond IV and King Leon I. Throughout the Antiochene succession dispute, Innocent refused to explicitly support Raymond-Roupen or the count of Tripoli. This meant that Bohemond’s possession of the principality was never seriously threatened in the diplomatic arena. The Armenian king did agree to abide by the judgement of the papacy and suspended hostilities on several occasions when asked by Innocent’s legates. However, he became frustrated by the inability of the Apostolic See to offer a verdict on who it deemed to be the legitimate prince and so he continued to lead military campaigns into the principality until he was finally able to capture Antioch.

The Union between the Latin Church and the Armenian Church

The Armenian Church had been politically separate from Roman Christianity since its establishment in the early fourth century, and this division was subsequently reinforced by the theological disputes of the fifth century which culminated in the council of Chalcedon in 451.74 The national character of their Church allowed the Armenians to use a vernacular liturgy, and they adopted distinctive positions on matters such as the celebration of Mass and the wording of the Trisagion. These differences made the Armenians heretical in the eyes of the Latin Church and they were condemned by Pope Gregory VII in 1080. There had been ‘little direct contact between the Armenian Church and the West’ prior to the second half of the eleventh century,75 but the permanent settlement of Latins in the Near East after the First Crusade provided the opportunity for increased understanding and engagement on both sides.

The origins of the union between the Armenian Church and the Latin Church are to be found in 1184 when Catholicos Gregory IV wrote to Pope Lucius III. Unfortunately his letter has not survived so the exact nature of the message is unclear. Hamilton argues that the papacy believed the Armenian Church was acknowledging the primacy of Rome and that the two institutions were subsequently in complete communion. However, the Armenians simply intended to form ‘closer links with a sister-Church’ and retain their own religious customs.76 It was not until 1198 that that a full union between the Churches was recognised by both sides. Before this unity was established between the Latins and the Armenians, the Byzantines had pursued a policy of reunion between the Armenian and Greek Orthodox Churches. Emperor Manuel I Comnenus was especially keen on a reunion and sent envoys to

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74 MacEvitt, Rough Tolerance, pp. 9, 31.
the Armenian catholicos in 1171 in order to try and resolve the doctrinal differences between them. However, these negotiations proved fruitless and Manuel’s death in 1180 provided the opportunity for the papacy to forge closer links with the Armenian Church.\textsuperscript{77}

The catalyst for the strengthening of the accord was Leon’s desire to make the transition from Roupenid prince to Armenian king. In order to obtain a royal crown he needed the approval of an emperor. Therefore, in the 1190s Leon contacted Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI and Pope Celestine III, who had crowned Henry and given the emperor his authority. The pontiff refused to sanction Leon’s coronation unless the Armenians agreed to adopt the practices of the Latin Church. The Roupenid prince persuaded twelve Armenian bishops to swear to comply with the terms of the papacy by implying that they would not have to abandon their religious customs despite pledging otherwise.\textsuperscript{78} Leon was subsequently invested as the king of Cilicia on 6 January 1198 and the Armenian Church remained in communion with the Latin Church throughout the first half of the thirteenth century.

The most significant effect of the decision of the Armenian Church to ally itself with the Latin Church on Antiochene-Cilician relations was Leon’s coronation in 1198. Before that date he was simply the ruler of the expanding Roupenid principality, while after it he was recognised as the king of the Armenians, and Cilicia became a kingdom. The elevation in status raised the profile of both Leon himself and the state that he ruled. Subsequently, the ruler of Armenian Cilicia was treated as the equal, and even the superior, of the prince of Antioch by his Latin contemporaries.

The union between the Latin and Armenian Churches had little direct impact on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. Although a number of traditional customs used by the Armenian Church were viewed as heretical by the papacy, this did not mean that prior to 1198 the Latins of northern Syria sought to persecute Armenians on a religious basis. During his long tenure as prince of Antioch Bohemond III both allied with and fought against the Roupenid princes of Cilicia. These actions were undertaken in order to secure the maximum political advantage for the prince and were not influenced by the religion of the Armenians. After 1198 the situation remained fundamentally unchanged. Unity between the Churches did not lead to unity between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom.

\textsuperscript{78} KG, pp. 422-423.
The Antiochene succession dispute demonstrates beyond doubt that the religious differences between different rulers had relatively little impact upon the politics of southern Anatolia and northern Syria. Little more than three years after the formation of a union between the Latin and Armenian Churches a major conflict erupted between Bohemond IV and King Leon I. The Tripolitan count was even prepared to form alliances with al-Zāhir Ghāzī of Aleppo and several Seljuk sultans in order to retain control of Antioch. The fact that Leon and Bohemond were both Christians and their respective Churches were in communion did not stop the latter from persuading Muslim leaders to attack Cilicia and the troops of the Armenian king.

The union of the Latin and Armenian Churches clearly had little or no effect on the attitude of King Leon I towards Bohemond IV or vice versa. However, it did influence the behaviour of the papacy during the Antiochene succession dispute. Innocent III wanted to maintain unity between the two Christian denominations and therefore he was keen to avoid unnecessarily upsetting the Cilician Armenians in order to avoid an ecclesiastical split. This attitude was one reason why the pope refused to acknowledge Bohemond IV as the legitimate prince of Antioch, even though the Tripolitan count had been recognised as such by the Antiochene commune and others within the polity. Innocent did not want to dismiss Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality because that would anger Leon and thereby potentially threaten the union of the Churches.

The papacy valued Christian unity, but that did not mean that the pope was afraid to admonish the Armenian king when he disapproved of the latter’s behaviour. Innocent criticised Leon on several occasions for seizing Templar possessions and refusing to return Baghras to the Order. Furthermore, in 1211 the pope confirmed the excommunication of the Armenian king after learning that the Cilician Armenians had attacked a Templar force in the Amanus Mountains. Such strong action could easily have led to the dissolution of the union between the Churches. Indeed, Leon responded provocatively to these papal sanctions by lending his support to the Greek patriarch of Antioch and expelling Latin clergymen from Cilicia. However, the Armenian king subsequently realised the importance of maintain good relations with the Latin Church and reconciled with the Templars. Innocent then agreed to lift Leon’s excommunication in 1213, but he remained neutral in the Antiochene

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79 PL, 216, Cols 430-432, Nos. 64-65. For more detail see Chapter Three: The Military Orders in the Principality of Antioch and the Kingdom of Cilicia.
80 PL, 216, Cols 784-786, No. 2.
succession dispute.\textsuperscript{81} These events suggest that Innocent was prepared to put ecclesiastical unity at risk when he thought the Armenian king was acting intolerably.

Pope Honorious III was even less willing to rebuke the Cilician Armenians than his predecessor because of his desire to preserve the union of the Churches. When Philip, a son of Bohemond IV who became king of Cilicia after marrying Queen Isabel in c.1222, was deposed by a group of Armenian nobles Honorious actually hindered attempts to help him. Ibn al-Athīr recorded that the pope initially ordered Bohemond not to invade Cilicia in order to rescue his son because the Armenians shared their faith. It was only later that the pontiff gave permission for the Tripolitan count to attack if the Armenian nobles continued to refuse to release Philip.\textsuperscript{82} Hamilton observes that Honorious ‘showed no attachment’ to Bohemond’s son and suggests that the pope did not support him because of the bad relationship between the Tripolitan count and the Latin Church.\textsuperscript{83} However, the papacy’s approach in this matter was probably determined more by a desire to remain on good terms with the Cilician Armenians than apathy towards Philip’s plight. Honorious wanted the Latin Church to remain in communion with the Armenian Church and he may have been worried that this would be put at risk if he supported an invasion of Cilicia by Bohemond IV. However, the continuous refusal of the Cilician Armenian barons to release Philip appears to have eventually persuaded the pontiff to give his consent to the Tripolitan count’s planned assault.

The importance placed upon the union of the Churches by the papacy is clearly demonstrated by the actions of Pope Gregory IX in the late 1230s. In April 1237 Gregory wrote to the archbishop of Nazareth and asking him to investigate whether the marriage of King Hethoum I and Queen Isabel of Cilicia should be annulled on the grounds of consanguinity. The pontiff suggested that he had been inundated with requests from the prince of Antioch to dissolve their union.\textsuperscript{84} Perhaps the annulment of his own marriage to Alice, dowager queen of Cyprus, inspired Bohemond V to argue that the match between the royal couple of Cilicia was invalid.

In June 1238 Gregory IX ordered that the catholicos of Cilicia and all Armenians that lived in the diocese of Antioch should obey the Latin patriarch of Antioch.\textsuperscript{85} Hamilton suggests that while it was Patriarch Albert who persuaded the pope that the Armenian Church

\textsuperscript{81} PL, 216, Cols 792-793, No. 7.
\textsuperscript{82} IA, 3, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{83} Hamilton, ‘The Armenian Church’, pp. 77-78.
\textsuperscript{84} Reg. Gre. IX, 2, No. 3597, p. 618.
should be subject to his authority, Bohemond V was the mastermind behind these ecclesiastical manoeuvrings. Gregory’s decision to inform the Armenians that they should recognise the supremacy of the Latin patriarch should be seen in the context of his policy of trying to get the indigenous Christians of the Near East to adopt Latin doctrine and customs. In 1237, Philip, the prior of the Dominican province of Terra Sancta, wrote to the pope and informed him that the Syriac Orthodox patriarch of Antioch, Ignatius II, had visited Jerusalem in that year. The Dominican prior reports that Ignatius had promised obedience to the Apostolic See and confirmed this in a written declaration. According to Philip, the Jacobite patriarch even decided to wear the Dominican habit. Gregory may have hoped that the Armenian catholicos would follow Ignatius in accepting the primacy of the Latin Church.

Hethoum fiercely protested both against the threat of annulment to the royal marriage and the decision that the Cilician Armenians should recognise the supremacy of the Latin patriarch of Antioch. Gregory IX was aware that the Armenians would simply break their union with Rome if he interfered in their affairs too strongly and therefore on this occasion he backed down in the face of determined opposition. Less than nine months after deciding to reduce the autonomy of the Armenian Church, Gregory instead awarded it new privileges, including the decree that no-one should be allowed to preach in the Armenian kingdom without a mandate from the pope, the catholicos or another senior Cilician prelate. The pontiff also acknowledged that the marriage of Hethoum and Isabel was legitimate. After a few years of uncertainty, Bohemond V’s strategy of undermining the Hethoumid dynasty through his correspondence with the Holy See was now obsolete.

The fragile union between the Latin and Armenian Churches appears to have disintegrated in the second half of the thirteenth century. Hamilton argues that the Cilician Armenians abandoned their accord with Rome in 1261, although there is no evidence that the union was formally abandoned. It was at this time that Catholicos Constantine I sent an Armenian theologian named Mekhitar to meet Thomas of Lentini, papal legate and bishop of Bethlehem. During this encounter Mekhitar attacked papal primacy and asserted that the

86 Hamilton, ‘Armenian Church’, p. 79.
Armenian Church had the authority to pass judgement on the Latin Church. These opinions were commonplace amongst the Armenian clergy, but had not been expressed to their Latin counterparts so boldly before.

The breakdown in ecclesiastical unity occurred during a period when there was a strong alliance between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia. Hamilton convincingly argues that the Cilician Armenians maintained formal ties with Rome primarily for ‘political and diplomatic reasons’. Therefore, King Hethoum I allowed Armenian theologians to be more open in their criticism of the Latin Church once he had established a good relationship with Prince Bohemond VI of Antioch and acknowledged Mongol suzerainty over his kingdom because this made the union of the Churches considerably less valuable to the Armenian kingdom. The accord with Rome did lead to some theological realignment within the Armenian Church, however. In 1243 a synod in Sis decided to adopt the Latin practice of giving extreme unction to the sick. Nevertheless, many Armenian clergymen were opposed to some beliefs and practices of the Latin Church, particularly the notion of papal primacy, and therefore there was little to hold the union together when the kings of Cilicia did not need it for political purposes. Unsurprisingly therefore, it was the diplomatic interests of the Armenian kingdom which prompted attempts to re-establish ecclesiastical unity in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.

**Was the Kingdom of Cilicia treated as though it were part of the Latin East in the Thirteenth Century?**

As all historians of the crusades know four Latin states were formed in the Near East either during or immediately after the First Crusade. The county of Edessa lasted for less than fifty years before it was overrun and destroyed by the Zengids, but the principality of Antioch, kingdom of Jerusalem and county of Tripoli survived into the late thirteenth century. Cyprus was conquered by King Richard I of England in 1191 while he was participating in the Third Crusade and the island actually remained under Latin control for far longer than the three mainland states in the Levant. Thus, during the period analysed by this

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95 Hamilton, ‘Armenian Church’, pp. 84-86.
thesis there were four crusader states in the Near East – four polities that were formed as a direct result of crusading activity and were subsequently ruled by Latin Christians.

The kingdom of Cilicia was founded and governed by Armenians, but it maintained links with the Latin West and East throughout the thirteenth century. When Leon II of the Roupenid principality sought a crown for himself in the 1190s he sent an embassy to Pope Celestine III and Holy Roman Emperor Henry VI. His coronation on 6 January 1198 in the presence of the papal legate Conrad of Mainz symbolised the incorporation of the Cilician Armenians into the Latin sphere. The Armenian king recognised a Western emperor as his suzerain, while the Armenian Church entered into a formal union with the Latin Church. These ties with political and religious leaders in western Europe distinguished them from the other Christian peoples of the Near East.

The attitude shown by the papacy towards the kings of Cilicia is particularly striking. Innocent III maintained a position of neutrality throughout the Antiochene succession dispute and refused to explicitly support the claims of Bohemond IV or Raymond-Roupen, despite the fact that during the early stages of the quarrel the latter was far too young to govern himself. If Bohemond III’s eldest grandson had inherited the principality in 1201 or soon after he would have required a regent and, as the boy’s guardian, King Leon I of Cilicia would have secured this position for himself. The pope was almost certainly aware of Leon’s intentions to rule the principality of Antioch on Raymond-Roupen’s behalf, yet he still declined to back Bohemond IV. To some extent this reflects the Tripolitan count’s difficult relationship with the Church, but it also demonstrates the esteem with which the Armenian king was held by the papacy. Leon was Armenian both ethnically and religiously, yet Innocent III and Soffredus of Santa Prassede were not opposed to the prospect of him governing Antioch instead of Bohemond IV. The union of the Latin and Armenian Churches meant that the counts of Tripoli, who claimed and ruled the principality of Antioch, could not rely on the support of the papacy when involved in a military conflict or diplomatic quarrel with the kings of Cilicia.

It was not only during Innocent III’s pontificate that the papacy took an interest in the affairs of the Cilician Armenians. Honorius III backed Raymond-Roupen’s claim to be the legitimate heir of Leon, both before and after the king’s death in 1219. The fact that the pope cared who ruled the Armenian kingdom suggests that the realm was viewed as an

96 Reg. Hon. III, 1, Nos 677, 2876, pp. 118, 476.
important part of Christendom by the Apostolic See. The papacy maintained this attitude even when the union between the Latin and Armenian Churches was disintegrating in the 1260s. After the devastating Mamluk invasion of Cilicia in 1264 Pope Clement IV wrote to rulers in the Latin East urging them to help the Cilician Armenians.\footnote{Hamilton, ‘Armenian Church’, p. 82.}

In many respects the Latins who lived in the Near East behaved as if the kingdom of Cilicia was another Latin Christian state. The Cilician Armenians did fight against Latins when their political interests diverged. For example, Bohemond IV clashed with King Leon I during the Antiochene succession dispute, and the former also invaded Cilicia in the 1220s. However, the Latins of this region also fought amongst themselves and therefore such conflict does not mean that the Cilician Armenians were treated differently. Indeed, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II and his supporters battled against the Ibelins for control of the kingdoms of Jerusalem and Cyprus in the late 1220s and early 1230s.\footnote{Edbury, John of Ibelin, pp. 34-57.}

The presence of the military orders in the Armenian kingdom clearly distinguishes it from other non-Latin territories. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights gradually acquired extensive landholdings in Cilicia and were granted several castles by the Armenian king.\footnote{See Chapter Three: The Military Orders in the Principality of Antioch and the Kingdom of Cilicia.} Their willingness to accept military strongholds in southern Anatolia suggests that they viewed the Armenian kingdom as a Christian realm that should be defended from Muslim powers in the region. Furthermore, these military orders did not simply accept donations in Cilicia – they tried to involve themselves in Cilician Armenian affairs. Both the Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights supported Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality of Antioch, and the former also backed his attempt to take the Cilician throne after the death of King Leon I in 1219.

The Templars had a difficult relationship with the Cilician Armenians until 1216 and clashed with Leon both on the battlefield and in the diplomatic arena, but their appeals to the papacy over these quarrels is instructive. The fact that the Order expected Innocent III to assist them by ordering the Armenian king to relinquish Baghras and return any Templar possessions that he had seized during the Antiochene succession dispute demonstrates that they considered the kingdom of Cilicia to be subject to the authority of the pope. Furthermore, this tactic was successful for the Temple because on two separate occasions Leon negotiated with the Order and reached an agreement with it after receiving
condemnation and spiritual sanctions from Innocent III or the papal legate Peter of Saint Marcellus.\textsuperscript{100}

The level of intermarriage between the Latin and Cilician Armenian elite undoubtedly demonstrates that neither side was seriously concerned by the ethnic and religious differences between them. It also suggests that Latin nobles and kings saw considerable advantages in forging familial links with the kingdom of Cilicia. For example, Perry argues that John of Brienne chose to marry Stephanie, the eldest daughter of King Leon I, in order to obtain a sizeable dowry and to form an alliance with the Armenian king. In 1214 John was searching for powerful new allies and considered Leon to be a formidable ruler.\textsuperscript{101} At this point the Armenian king was in conflict with Bohemond IV, count of Tripoli and de facto prince of Antioch, but the king of Jerusalem still pursued the match with Stephanie. John clearly saw nothing wrong in seeking to collaborate with a monarch who was fighting against another Latin ruler in the Near East. This indicates that he considered the kingdom of Cilicia to be part of Christendom and Leon to be a legitimate ally who could further the interests of the kingdom of Jerusalem.

The fact that Latin knights chose to serve under King Leon I and probably fought for him against the supporters of Bohemond IV strongly suggests that most Latins living in the Near East did not have a negative view of the Armenians. Furthermore, it could indicate that Latin knights saw little distinction between the kingdoms of Cilicia, Jerusalem and Cyprus. They were prepared to swear allegiance to any Christian monarch that would properly reward them for their military service. The willingness of some of these men to fight for an Armenian king at a time when he was in conflict with a Latin count implies that they viewed the Antiochene succession dispute as a struggle between two Christian rulers, rather than between a Latin and non-Latin. Knights who had recently arrived in the Near East from Europe also saw the conflict in this way. Some crusaders, such as John of Nesle, decided to fight for King Leon I and supported his attempts to capture Antioch.\textsuperscript{102}

The politics of the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia were deeply intertwined for much of the thirteenth century. It is hard to imagine the former developing such strong ties to another non-Latin state. Bohemond IV did ally with al-Zāhir Ghāẓī of

\textsuperscript{100} In 1204 and 1213 King Leon I of Cilicia settled some of his differences with the Templars after papal interventions. See Chapter Three: The Military Orders in the Principality of Antioch and the Kingdom of Cilicia.  
\textsuperscript{101} Perry, \textit{John of Brienne}, pp. 79-80.  
\textsuperscript{102} Eracles, pp. 256-257; Ernoul, pp. 353-354.
Aleppo and several different Seljuk sultans when it was in his interests to do so. However, the links between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom went far beyond short-term collaboration for political expediency. Intermarriage between the ruling dynasties of these two states meant that it was possible for Raymond-Roupen to be recognised as the heir to both states and for the prince of Antioch’s son (Philip) to become the king of Cilicia. The strategy of King Louis IX of France to improve the relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom indicates that he considered the latter to be part of Christendom. The French king probably recognised that an alliance was in the interests of both states and would further the Christian cause in the Near East.

The kingdom of Cilicia was not a crusader state in the sense that it was not a polity formed as a direct result of crusading activity. However, in many respects it was treated as though it were part of the Latin East in the thirteenth century. The papacy arguably showed just as much interest in the fate of the Armenian kingdom as it did in the affairs of the principality of Antioch or the county of Tripoli. The Hospitalers and the Teutonic Knights possessed numerous estates and fortresses in Cilicia, just as they did in other Latin states, partly because they considered it to be Christian territory which should be defended from the Muslims. Furthermore, the Latins who resided in the Near East engaged with the Armenian kingdom in ways which they simply did not with other non-Latin powers in the Levant.

Conclusion

Overall the ethnic and religious differences between Latins and Armenians had very little influence on Antiochene-Cilician relations. When it was politically expedient the ruling dynasties of the two states intermarried and made alliances. On the other hand, the fact that the Latins of Antioch and Armenians of Cilicia were both Christian does not mean that they were always co-operative and friendly neighbours. They fought against each other when their political interests diverged. In the thirteenth century Near East men of the same faith would fight each other and those of differing religions were prepared to collaborate. Indeed, there are many examples of the Latins of the Levant fighting amongst themselves or making alliances with Muslim leaders.

The Antiochene elite were willing to marry Armenians, but not Muslims, so their shared faith did have some effect on their behaviour. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that anti-Armenian feelings were widespread amongst the Latin population of Antioch. On the contrary, the Cilician Armenians were probably perceived as their Christian brethren by most.
Antiochenes. The opposition to Roupenid attempts to annex the Latin principality in the 1190s and to Raymond-Roupen during the Antiochene succession dispute was for political reasons rather than concerns about the ethnic or religious background of the aggressors.
Conclusion

The relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia was fundamentally important for both of them in the period 1188-1268, but particularly for the former. In the early twelfth century, the Antiochenes had sought to maintain possession of the Cilician plain and incorporate the region into their principality. Slowly but surely more and more of the fortresses and settlements in Cilicia fell under Armenian control. The expanding Roupenid principality became a significant neighbour of the principality of Antioch, with their rulers making alliances and coming into conflict at different points in time. The situation was transformed, however, by the territorial losses that Saladin inflicted upon the Latin principality in 1188. Thereafter it was a smaller and weaker state that could no longer easily assert its superiority over Armenian Cilicia.

All three of the Latin states in the Levant were seriously weakened by Saladin’s forces in 1187-1188. The kingdom of Jerusalem, however, was able to partially recover within five years because of the Third Crusade. As a result, by 1192 all the cities along the coastline between Tyre and Jaffa were back in Latin hands. The principality of Antioch did not benefit from the arrival of crusaders in the Near East during this period. Without external help, Bohemond III was unable to reconquer any of the towns and castles he had lost to Saladin in 1188. The Antiochene prince may have secured the recovery of Arzghan, but it was bestowed upon him by Saladin when he visited the sultan at Beirut in 1192. At the dawn of the thirteenth century the Latin principality remained a small rump around Antioch and was barely larger than it had been in the autumn of 1188. This was probably largely due to the shortage of manpower available to Bohemond III, which meant that he was unable to successfully overcome the Ayyubid forces in northern Syria.

The growing power and aggression of Leon II of the Roupenid principality also damaged the prospects of an Antiochene recovery in the 1190s. He captured Bohemond III in 1193 and imprisoned the prince of Antioch for several months. Bohemond was eventually released, but he returned to his principality diminished in authority and possibly in poor physical health after being tortured while in captivity. The Antiochene prince was not in a position to revive the principality’s fortunes in the late 1190s and the marriage alliance he forged with Leon during this period would lead to a conflict which prevented its potential reconstruction in the first two decades of the thirteenth century.
King Leon I played a crucial role in the succession dispute which engulfed the principality of Antioch between 1201 and 1216. Many Latins supported Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the territory, but the threat to Bohemond IV’s rule at Antioch would have been seriously diminished without the intervention of the Armenian king. The near constant pressure exerted on the Latin principality by the Cilician Armenians during those fifteen years ensured that Bohemond struggled simply to preserve his grip on Antioch. He was prevented from trying to recover some of the fortresses conquered by Saladin. The conflict between the *de facto* prince of Antioch and the king of Cilicia made any expansion of the Latin principality almost impossible in the early thirteenth century. Thus Antiochene-Cilician relations in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were a significant factor in the failure to rebuild the principality of Antioch in the period immediately after 1188.

This relationship was also amongst the underlying causes of the Latin principality’s deterioration and destruction during the 1260s. King Hethoum I of Cilicia recognised Mongol suzerainty over his realm in the 1240s and personally submitted to Möngke Khan in the 1250s. The Armenian king encouraged Bohemond VI to emulate him when the Mongols advanced on Syria. By aligning himself with the Mongols in 1260 the prince placed both of his states in grave danger, although the consequences of this decision would not have been apparent at the time.

After defeating the Mongols at the battle of Ayn Jalut on 3 September 1260, the Mamluks set about extinguishing the Mongol presence in Syria and attacking their principal allies in the Near East: King Hethoum I and Prince Bohemond VI. In the following decade they invaded the kingdom of Cilicia, the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch. The latter was the first to fall because of its size and Bohemond VI’s decision to spend most of his time away from Antioch in the 1260s. The Mamluks devastated Cilicia in 1266, but the Armenian kingdom was able to recover because Hethoum was devoted to preserving his realm, and because the Mamluk army subsequently chose to completely withdraw from the region, rather than garrisoning the settlements and strongholds they had sacked. In contrast, Sultan Baibars captured and permanently occupied several fortresses in the vicinity of Antioch after seizing and destroying the city in 1268. Thus, there was not a strong base from which to reconstruct the principality. Furthermore, Bohemond VI was in the county of Tripoli when the Mamluks attacked Antioch and he does not appear to have returned to northern Syria after the fall of the city. The prince was focused on defending his southern polity rather than trying to rebuild his northern principality.
Antiochene-Cilician relations undoubtedly played a key role in the downfall of the Latin principality. King Leon I’s actions, both before and after his coronation in 1198, made it extremely difficult for Bohemond III and Bohemond IV to try and recover the territory conquered by Saladin. In 1260 Bohemond VI did regain control of the coastal city of Latakia and a handful of fortresses in the Orontes valley. Nevertheless, when the Mamluks sacked the city of Antioch in 1268 the principality was small and weak because it had not properly recovered from Saladin’s invasion seventy years earlier. The Mamluks attacked the Latin principality on several occasions in the 1260s largely because Bohemond VI and the Antiochene elite had submitted to the Mongols – a move which was encouraged and facilitated by King Hethoum I. The prince of Antioch’s relationship with the king of Cilicia may not have been the principal reason for the principality’s destruction in 1268, but it was a key factor which should not be ignored.

Several different elements shaped Antiochene-Cilician relations between 1188 and 1268. In the 1190s and the first two decades of the thirteenth century, the commune of Antioch was an influential body which supported Bohemond IV’s claim to the Latin principality. If this institution had sided with Raymond-Roupen after Bohemond III’s death then the Tripolititan count would have struggled and probably failed to gain control of Antioch in 1201. The Antiochene succession dispute would not have evolved into a prolonged conflict if Bohemond IV had been unable to take power at that point. Raymond-Roupen’s investiture as prince in 1201 would have prevented conflict between some Antiochenes and the Cilician Armenians, and could have led to a much closer relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom. The commune’s decision to back Bohemond IV as the prince of Antioch had major implications for the future of their state and Antiochene-Cilicians relations.

The actions of some Antiochene nobles during the succession dispute show a different side to the relationship. Several Latins chose to serve under the king of Cilicia while he was at war with the de facto prince of Antioch because they supported Raymond-Roupen’s claim to the principality. Thus, conflict between the rulers of the two states did not prevent members of their elite from developing close ties. The Antiochene nobles who backed Raymond-Roupen helped to ensure a relatively smooth transition of power following his investiture as prince, and some of them also facilitated the Cilician Armenian capture of Antioch in 1216 by opening the gates of the city during the night. However, contemporary narrative histories hardly mention the Antiochene nobility after the conclusion of the
succession dispute in 1219 in so it is difficult to fully assess their influence upon the principality.

In the early thirteenth century, the Cilician nobility had a significant impact on the future of their kingdom and its relationship with the principality of Antioch. They persuaded King Leon I to designate his daughter Isabel as his heir in 1216, thereby disinheriting Raymond-Roupen, who had been in line to succeed his great-uncle as king of Cilicia. This probably angered the young prince and may help to explain why there appears to have been very little co-operation between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom during his brief tenure at Antioch. The barons of Cilicia were particularly influential between Leon’s death in 1219 and the accession of King Hethoum I in 1226. They forged an alliance with the principality of Antioch by marrying Isabel to Bohemond IV’s son, Philip. Constantine the constable then led a baronial revolt against their new king just a few years after his coronation and succeeded in overthrowing Philip. The restoration of a strong and authoritative monarchy in Cilicia under Hethoum appears to have reduced the influence of the Armenian kingdom’s nobility, but he would have been aware that his own position could come under threat if he upset too many of his barons. By ousting Philip from power the Cilician nobility damaged their realm’s relationship with the principality of Antioch for two decades as Bohemond IV and Bohemond V were reluctant to ally or co-operate with the Armenian kingdom, even if there was little conflict between the two states after 1226.

The military orders also exercised a limited influence on Antiochene-Cilician relations in the early thirteenth century. The Templars were uniquely positioned by possessing a number of castles and estates in the Amanus Mountains. Their presence on the frontier between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom benefitted Bohemond IV during the Antiochene succession dispute, but was less significant for his successors. The Order of the Temple aided the count of Tripoli during the conflict primarily by helping him to defend the city of Antioch, but also by resisting Leon’s forces in the Amanus. Thus, the Templars helped to extend the Antiochene succession dispute, although they could not prevent the eventual triumph of the Cilician Armenians and the investiture of Raymond-Roupen. The Hospitallers and the Teutonic Knights supported Leon and his great-nephew in the quarrel, but there is no evidence that they contributed much in the military aspects of it. Both of these orders struggled to translate their extensive possessions in Cilicia into real influence in the political affairs of the Armenian kingdom, particularly after King Hethoum I took power. The Templars were pivotal in averting a resumption of hostilities between the
two states in the 1230s when they belatedly withdrew their support for Bohemond V’s planned invasion of Cilicia, but in the final three decades of the Latin principality’s existence none of the military orders appear to have had much impact on Antiochene-Cilician relations.

The fact that the prince of Antioch was also the count of Tripoli for all but three years between 1201 and 1268 almost certainly had some effect on Latin principality’s relationship with the Armenian kingdom, but it is difficult to fully appreciate the implications of its impact without resorting to speculation on how things might have been different. Bohemond IV and his successors were often away from Antioch in order to oversee the governance of the county of Tripoli. These absences probably made it easier for the Cilician Armenians to capture Antioch in 1216 and install Raymond-Roupen as prince, although this may still have happened even if Bohemond IV had remained in the principality throughout the whole conflict. If Bohemond V spent most of his time in the county of Tripoli then it would help to explain the apparent lack of engagement between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom, either in terms of violence or co-operation, during the 1230s and most of the 1240s. Furthermore, Bohemond VI’s absence from his northern territory for most, if not all, of the 1260s is probably one of the reasons why there was relatively little collaboration between the Antiochenes and the Cilician Armenians against the Mamluks.

The behaviour of non-Christian powers in southern Anatolia and northern Syria had a significant influence on the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia throughout the whole period 1188-1268. The interventions of the Aleppans and the Seljuks prolonged the Antiochene succession dispute. After the conclusion of that conflict, Seljuk attacks on Cilicia encouraged the Armenian kingdom to make a marriage alliance with the Latin principality in the 1220s. That there was no collaboration or warfare between the two states in the 1230s and 1240s to some extent reflects the general state of peace in northern Syria and southern Anatolia prior to the arrival of the Mongols. The alliance between King Hethoum I and Bohemond VI during the 1250s and 1260s was entered into largely because of the uncertainty created by the Mongol advance into the Near East, and it was maintained partly in order to try and resist the Mamluks. Sultan Baibars and his army also effectively destroyed the principality of Antioch, which left the kingdom of Cilicia as the only Christian state in the northern Levant.

The ethnic differences between the Latins of Antioch the Armenians of Cilicia do not appear to have affected Antiochene-Cilician relations. Their common religious identity, on
the other hand, did influence their relationship in a variety of ways. Pope Innocent III remained officially neutral during the Antiochene succession dispute, while the Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights supported Raymond-Roupen. In reality, this meant that two military orders chose to give their backing to King Leon I, considering Raymond-Roupen was a child for most of the conflict. They would almost certainly not have adopted this position if the Armenian king was not a Christian. The shared religion of Latins and Armenians also allowed the ruling dynasties of Antioch and Cilicia to intermarry. No Antiochene prince would ever have married a Muslim so faith was clearly an important influence on the relationship, even though the two sides practiced different forms of Christianity. Nevertheless, warfare did occur between the Antiochens and Cilician Armenians, just as there was occasionally conflict between Latins in the Near East. Clearly, a shared faith did not lead to a consistently friendly and co-operative relationship between the Latin principality and the Armenian kingdom.

The relationship between the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch after 1187 is an interesting subject which merits further study. Sharing a ruler for more than sixty years must have had an impact on both states. However, the Latin principality’s most important relationship with a polity governed by a different ruler was undoubtedly with the kingdom of Cilicia. It encompassed several wars, marriages and alliances. There appears to have been a lull in the interaction between the two states during the 1230s and 1240s, although this may simply reflect the paucity of the primary source material. However, it is clear that the Armenian kingdom severely hindered any prospect of rebuilding the principality of Antioch in the four decades after it was devastated by Saladin in 1188. All attempts to unify the two states during this period ended in violence. A long-term alliance between them was finally established in the 1250s, but this ultimately led to the Latin principality’s destruction as Bohemond VI antagonised the Mamluks by replicating his father-in-law’s decision to align with the Mongols. The significance of the relationship between the principality of Antioch and the kingdom of Cilicia should not be underestimated as it had a major impact on both. These polities did not exist in isolation, however, and their relations were shaped particularly by the geopolitics of the region in which they existed. The Armenian kingdom survived for another century after the fall of Antioch in 1268, and it continued to interact with the Latin states of the eastern Mediterranean. However, the absence of a Christian principality on its southern frontier ensured that its foreign policy during this period was very different to what it had been before.
### Appendix A: List of Princely Charter Witnesses, 1188-1268

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Charters Witnessed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acharie, seneschal of Antioch</td>
<td>1215, 1216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aimery, bishop of Tripoli</td>
<td>1199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aimery de Lairom</td>
<td>1219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aimery Saleman</td>
<td>1228, 1241, 1243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amalric of the Cross</td>
<td>1216, 1219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americus de Rodanos</td>
<td>1216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anfredu of Margat</td>
<td>1216, 1219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angel Peter</td>
<td>1255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aubrey de Ranquerole</td>
<td>1228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin de Maimendon</td>
<td>1215, 1216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin of the Mount of Olives</td>
<td>1256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartholomew de Jaune</td>
<td>1215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartholomew Saxius</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartholomew Tirel (1), marshal of Antioch</td>
<td>1190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartholomew Tirel (2), marshal of Antioch</td>
<td>1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertrand of Jubayl (de Biblio)</td>
<td>1203, 1204, 1205, 1206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertrand Porcelet</td>
<td>1228, 1236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bertrand de Taisio</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemond Arra</td>
<td>1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohemond, lord of Batroun</td>
<td>1228, 1231, 1233, 1241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonacors</td>
<td>1228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eschivard, brother of Acharie the seneschal</td>
<td>1215, 1216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerard de Ham, constable of Tripoli</td>
<td>1203, 1204, 1205, 1209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gervase de Sarmenya, seneschal of Antioch</td>
<td>1189, 1190, 1193, 1194, 1199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guace de Ranis</td>
<td>1236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guy, lord of Jubayl (de Biblio)</td>
<td>1203, 1209, 1233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helyas the Monk</td>
<td>1205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry, brother of Bohemond V</td>
<td>1233, 1236, 1256, 1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry of Camardias</td>
<td>1241, 1255, 1256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry, lord of Jubayl (de Gibelet)</td>
<td>1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh de Curbulio, dux of Antioch</td>
<td>1190, 1193, 1200, 1205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Dalmas</td>
<td>1228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh Fermin</td>
<td>1233, 1236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh de Flauncurt, marshal of Antioch</td>
<td>1193, 1194, 1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh of Jubayl (de Biblio)</td>
<td>1203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugh de Logis</td>
<td>1190</td>
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<tr>
<td>Homodei</td>
<td>1203</td>
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<tr>
<td>James de Marasio</td>
<td>1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John of Angerville, baillie of Antioch</td>
<td>1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Arra</td>
<td>1233, 1236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John, brother of Oliver the Chamberlain</td>
<td>1190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Farabel, lord of Puy</td>
<td>1236, 1241, 1243, 1255, 1256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John of Flanders, dux of Antioch</td>
<td>1216</td>
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<tr>
<td>John de Flauncurt</td>
<td>1255, 1256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Hazart</td>
<td>1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Years</td>
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<tr>
<td>John of Jubayl (de Gibelet)</td>
<td>1241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Lombard</td>
<td>1262</td>
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<tr>
<td>John, lord of Maraclea</td>
<td>1233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John, marshal of Tripoli</td>
<td>1241, 1243, 1255, 1256</td>
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<tr>
<td>John Pascalis; Saxus de Tripoli</td>
<td>1189, 1199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Peter</td>
<td>1255, 1256, 1262</td>
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<tr>
<td>John de Rancherosles</td>
<td>1203, 1205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John de Salquino</td>
<td>1193, 1200</td>
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<td>John Saxius</td>
<td>1203</td>
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<tr>
<td>Julian Jalnus</td>
<td>1193, 1194, 1216</td>
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<td>Mansel de Busarra</td>
<td>1203, 1204, 1205</td>
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<td>Mansel de Gibel</td>
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<td>Meillor, lord of Maraclea</td>
<td>1255, 1256, 1262</td>
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<tr>
<td>Milo de Colovardino</td>
<td>1189, 1193, 1199</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicholas Farmac</td>
<td>1243</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nicholas Jalnus, dux of Antioch</td>
<td>1194, 1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Luain</td>
<td>1210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oddo de Maire</td>
<td>1190, 1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oliver, chamberlain of Antioch</td>
<td>1190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otto of Tiberias</td>
<td>1210, 1215, 1216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascal de Gibeau</td>
<td>1241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascal de Seona</td>
<td>1193, 1200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paganus, butler of Antioch</td>
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<td>Peter de la Gibroille</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter de Hazart (1)</td>
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<td>Peter de Hazart (2), seneschal of Antioch</td>
<td>1262</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter de Logisis</td>
<td>1190</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter de Ravendell</td>
<td>1189, 1199, 1200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peter de Scandalione</td>
<td>1228, 1236</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philip Tirel</td>
<td>1194</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plebanus, lord of Batroun</td>
<td>1203, 1204, 1205, 1206, 1209</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pontius of Lombardy</td>
<td>1215, 1216</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ralph of the Mountains, constable of Antioch</td>
<td>1190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph de Riveria, castellan of Antioch</td>
<td>1190, 1193, 1200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Raymond Arra</td>
<td>1228, 1255</td>
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<td>Raymond of Jubayl (de Biblio)</td>
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<td>Raymond of Maraclea</td>
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<td>Raymond de Scandalione</td>
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<tr>
<td>Renaud Faisant</td>
<td>1228</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richard of Angerville</td>
<td>1193, 1194, 1200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Richier d’Erminat</td>
<td>1190, 1193, 1194, 1200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Mansel, constable of Antioch</td>
<td>1207, 1210, 1216, 1219</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Tali</td>
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<td>Roger of the Mountains, constable of Antioch</td>
<td>1194, 1200, 1216</td>
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<td>Roger de Seona</td>
<td>1194</td>
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<td>Saisius</td>
<td>1203</td>
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<tr>
<td>Simon Burgevin, chamberlain of Antioch</td>
<td>1193, 1194, 1215, 1216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon Mansel, constable of Antioch</td>
<td>1262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socherus de Cozires</td>
<td>1216</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stephen Alexander</td>
<td>1203</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas Arra</td>
<td>1241, 1255, 1256</td>
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<td>Thomas de Ham, constable of Tripoli</td>
<td>1233, 1236, 1241, 1243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Maslebrun</td>
<td>1215, 1216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas, marshal of Antioch</td>
<td>1200, 1215, 1216, 1231</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thomas Saxius</td>
<td>1203</td>
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<tr>
<td>William, lord of Batroun</td>
<td>1255, 1256, 1262</td>
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<tr>
<td>William de Flechia, dux of Antioch</td>
<td>1219</td>
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<tr>
<td>William de Hazart</td>
<td>1215, 1216, 1219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William of the Island</td>
<td>1200, 1210, 1215, 1216, 1228</td>
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<tr>
<td>William of Jubayl (de Biblio)</td>
<td>1203, 1204, 1205, 1209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter of Laiitor</td>
<td>1215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William de Moinetre</td>
<td>1236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William of Saint Paul, dux of Antioch</td>
<td>1190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William, viscount of Tripoli</td>
<td>1236, 1241</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. Where charters simply list the names of witnesses, all names have been included. Where charters categorise the witnesses into different groups, only those described as the vassals of the prince or the barons of Antioch have been included. Charter witnesses categorised differently (e.g. as brothers of the Hospital) have been excluded.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Location</th>
<th>Summary of Agreement</th>
<th>References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1189 Tyre</td>
<td>Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, grants freedom from murder and theft, but not treason, to the Genoese.</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 680, pp. 181-182.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th March 1190</td>
<td>Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, gives the church of Saint Theodore and a street in Antioch to the Hospitallers.</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 210, p. 251; CGOH, 1, No. 906, pp. 574-575; RRH, 1, No. 689, p. 183.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st September 1190</td>
<td>Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, grants free trade in the cities of Antioch, Latakia and Jabala to the Genoese.</td>
<td>LIRG, 1, Col. 364, No. 379; RRH, 1, No. 695, p. 185.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1193</td>
<td>Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, confirms that 500 eels will be given to the Hospitallers every year.</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 80, p. 86; CGOH, 1, No. 948, p. 600; RRH, 1, No. 714, p. 191.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1194</td>
<td>Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, confirms the donation of old uncultivated land to the Hospitallers by Godfrey the knight.</td>
<td>CGOH, 1, No. 966, p. 613; RRH, 1, No. 719, p. 192.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1199 Tyre</td>
<td>Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, strengthens the privileges which the Genoese enjoy in the cities of Antioch, Latakia, and Jabala.</td>
<td>LIRG, 1, Cols 432-433, No. 424; RRH, 1, No. 753, p. 200.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20th March 1200 Antioch</td>
<td>Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, confirms the requests of the Pisans.</td>
<td>DCT, No. 50, pp. 80-81; RRH, 1, No. 769, p. 205.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1200</td>
<td>Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, grants free trade in the entire principality of Antioch to the Teutonic Knights.</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 772, p. 206.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1203 Antioch</td>
<td>Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, grants various privileges in the county of Tripoli to the Genoese.</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 792, pp. 210-211.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1204 Tripoli</td>
<td>Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, grants an annual payment of 1,000 bezants and houses which the count of Tripoli previously held in Latakia to Guy for his marriage to Bohemond’s sister Alice.</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 98, p. 103; RRH, 1, No. 799, p. 213.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1205 Tripoli</td>
<td>Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, confirms the rights and privileges which the Genoese hold in the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch.</td>
<td>LIRG, 1, Cols 522-523, No. 477; RRH, 1, No. 807, pp. 215-216.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1206</td>
<td>Geoffrey le Rat, master of the Hospital, confirms that he has received the land in front of Befania from Bohemond IV, but agrees to return it if the heir to the land, William Porcellet, refuses to consent to the grant when he reaches the age of majority.</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 175, pp. 217-218; CGOH, 2, No. 1231, p. 56; RRH, 1, No. 816, p. 218.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17th March / 22nd May</td>
<td>Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, gives the city of Jabala to the Hospitallers.</td>
<td>CCRR, No. 11, pp. 130-131; CDSMOG, No. 91, pp. 95-96;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1207</td>
<td>Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, grants land and three towers below the fortress of Tripoli to the Teutonic Knights.</td>
<td>CGOH, 2, No. 1262, pp. 70-71; RRH, 1, No. 820, p. 220.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th September 1209</td>
<td>Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, grants land and three towers below the fortress of Tripoli to the Teutonic Knights.</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 839, p. 224; TOT, No. 44, pp. 35-36.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1210</td>
<td>Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, gives the city of Jabala and the castle of Bikisrail to the Hospitalisers.</td>
<td>CCRR, No. 12, pp. 132-133; CDSMOG, No. 95, pp. 99-100; CGOH, 2, No. 1355, pp. 122-123; RRH, 1, No. 845, p. 226.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st March / 1st April 1215</td>
<td>Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, confirms all the privileges which he and his predecessors have granted to the Hospitalisers in the principality of Antioch.</td>
<td>CCRR, No. 13, pp. 133-134; CDSMOG, No. 101, pp. 106-107; CGOH, 2, No. 1441, p. 175; RRH, 1, No. 877, pp. 236-237.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31st March / 1st April 1215</td>
<td>Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, confirms that he has granted Jabala and Bikisrail to the Hospitalisers.</td>
<td>CCRR, No. 14, pp. 135-136; CDSMOG, No. 102, p. 107; CGOH, 2, No. 1442, p. 176; RRH, 1, No. 878, p. 237.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1216</td>
<td>Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, grants security and an independent court in the principality of Antioch to the Genoese.</td>
<td>CCRR, No. 15, pp. 136-137; LIRG, 1, Cols 577-578, No. 516; RRH, 1, No. 885, p. 238.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th April 1216</td>
<td>Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, confirms the privileges of the Pisans in the principality of Antioch.</td>
<td>CCRR, No. 16, pp. 138-139; DCT, No. 58, pp. 90-91; RRH, 1, No. 886, pp. 238-239.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st September 1216</td>
<td>Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, confirms that the brothers of the Order of Saint Lazarus will receive 1,000 eels from the city of Antioch in the month of September.</td>
<td>AOL, 2, No. 32, pp. 149-150; RRH, 1, No. 888, p. 239.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1219</td>
<td>Raymond-Roupen, prince of Antioch, grants free trade in the entire principality of Antioch to the Teutonic Knights.</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 921, p. 245; TOT, No. 51, pp. 41-42.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1228</td>
<td>Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, grants a mill near Antioch, with an adjacent vineyard and other appurtenances, to the Teutonic Knights.</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 979, p. 257; TOT, No. 61, p. 50.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 1228</td>
<td>Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, gives the Teutonic Knights an annual payment of 1,000 bezants, to be received from the Chaine and Fonde of Acre.</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 989, p. 261; TOT, No. 64, p. 53.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th October 1231 Acre</td>
<td>Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, confirms the gift and sale of uncultivated land at Cellorie to the Hospitallers by John Nicephore, his liege man.</td>
<td>CGOH, 2, No. 2003, pp. 429-430; RRH, 1, No. 1031, p. 269.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th October 1231 Acre</td>
<td>Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, gives an annuity of 873 bezants to the Hospitallers from his revenues at Antioch.</td>
<td>CGOH, 2, No. 2001, p. 428; RRH, 1, No. 1032, pp. 269-270.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Source(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27th October 1231 Acre</td>
<td>Bohemond IV, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, grants an annual payment of 316 bezants to the Hospitallers from his revenues at Tripoli.</td>
<td>CGOH, 2, No. 2002, pp. 428-429; RRH, 1, No. 1033, p. 270.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1233</td>
<td>Bohemond V, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, confirms the privileges of the Pisans in the city of Tripoli.</td>
<td>DCT, No. 68, p. 99; RRH, 1, No. 1041, p. 272.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1233</td>
<td>Bohemond V, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, confirms the privileges of the Pisans in the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli.</td>
<td>DCT, No. 69, pp. 99-100; RRH, 1, No. 1042, p. 272.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1236 Tripoli</td>
<td>Bohemond V, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, confirms Bertrand Porcel’t’s sale of the village of Arabiam to the Teutonic Knights.</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 1068, pp. 278-279; TOT, No. 82, pp. 64-65.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th November 1241 Tripoli</td>
<td>Albert, patriarch of Antioch and papal legate, confirms an agreement between Bohemond V and the Hospitallers. The Hospitallers renounce all their rights to Maraclea and Cameli, and in return they will receive an annual payment of 1,300 bezants from Bohemond.</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 118, pp. 129-133; CGOH, 2, No. 2280, pp. 594-596; RRH, 1, No. 1102, pp. 286-287.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1243 Tripoli</td>
<td>Bohemond V, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, grants various privileges in the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli to the citizens of Montpellier.</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 1110, p. 288.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1255 Tripoli</td>
<td>Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, gives the Hospitallers a canal so they can water their garden called Gloriette, which is situated by the gate of their house in Tripoli, and one tenth of the fish caught in the canal.</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 126, pp. 147-148; CGOH, 2, No. 2801, pp. 807-808; RRH, 1, No. 1229, pp. 323-324.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1256</td>
<td>Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, confirms that he has made peace with the Hospitallers and he renounces all complaints made against them by himself and his predecessors.</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 129, pp. 153-154; CGOH, 2, No. 2807, pp. 812-813; RRH, 1, No. 1248, p. 328.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21st April 1259</td>
<td>Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, confirms firstly, that he has made peace with the Hospitallers; secondly, that he will return lands and villages taken from the Hospitallers; thirdly, that he will give the Hospitallers 2,000 eels every year; fourthly, that arbitrators will be appointed to decide the rights of the Hospital at Antioch; and fifthly, that the Hospitallers are free to buy and sell in the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli.</td>
<td>CGOH, 2, No. 2917, p. 868; RRH, 1, No. 1284, p. 335.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st May 1262</td>
<td>Bohemond VI, prince of Antioch and count of Tripoli, and Hugh Revel, master of the</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 221, pp. 262-263; CGOH, 3, No. 3020, pp. 27-28;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Hospital, confirm that they accept the verdict of the three arbiters appointed to resolve the quarrel between them.</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 1317, p. 344.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C: List of Cilician Nobles present at Leon’s Coronation, 1198

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Lordship(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adam</td>
<td>Baghras (Bakras)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hostius (Otto of Tiberias)</td>
<td>Čker/Giguer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arewgoyn</td>
<td>Hamus (Çardak)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sempad</td>
<td>Servantikar (Savranda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leon</td>
<td>Harunia (Haruniye)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siruhi</td>
<td>Simanagla</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry</td>
<td>Anê</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aplgharip the constable</td>
<td>Kutaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin</td>
<td>Ǝnkuzut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen</td>
<td>T'ornika</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leon and Gregory</td>
<td>Pertous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashot</td>
<td>Kanč'/Gantchi (Findikli)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aplgharip</td>
<td>Fornos (Fırnus)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tancred</td>
<td>Gaban (Geben)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantine</td>
<td>Čanči</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geoffrey</td>
<td>Shoghakan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon</td>
<td>Mazotxač‘</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert (of Margat)</td>
<td>T'ıl Hamdoun (Toprak)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoros</td>
<td>T'lsap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasil the marshal</td>
<td>Vaner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George</td>
<td>Partzerpert (Tamrut)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantine</td>
<td>Kopitar (Meydan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azharos</td>
<td>Molovon (Milvan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sempad</td>
<td>Kuklak (Gülek)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hethoum</td>
<td>Lampron (Namrun)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shahinshah</td>
<td>Loulon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakuran</td>
<td>Babaron (Çandır)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasak</td>
<td>Askuras</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hethoum</td>
<td>Manash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael</td>
<td>Berdak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tigran</td>
<td>Braganac</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oshin</td>
<td>Siwil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simon</td>
<td>Korykos (Kızkalesi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantine</td>
<td>Silifke and Punar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanos</td>
<td>Sinit and Kovas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicephorus</td>
<td>Vêt and Vêrık (Fariske)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christopher</td>
<td>Lavzat and Timitopolis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halkam</td>
<td>Manion (Mennan), Lamos (Esentepe), Żermanik (Ermenek) and Anamur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henry the sebastos</td>
<td>Norpert and Camardias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin</td>
<td>Antchouzeda (Endişegüney) and Kupa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyr Isaac</td>
<td>Maghva and Sik (Softa) and Palapol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Míchael</td>
<td>Manavgat and Alara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constantine and Nicephorus</td>
<td>Lakrawēn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyr Vard</td>
<td>Kalonoras (Alanya) and Ayžutap (Aydap), Saint Sophie and Nallawn</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. This list is taken from Dédéyan’s French translation of the Venice manuscript of the chronicle attributed to Sempad the Constable (Smbat, pp. 75-80), although in many cases I have used different spellings. The Etchmiadzin version of the chronicle contains a shorter list (SC, pp. 636-638), which omits some of the nobles mentioned here but includes others that are missing from the Venice manuscript (Simon of Amouda, Joscelin of Sinida, Roman of Adaros). Where the ruins of medieval castles or settlements have been identified, their modern Turkish name is given in brackets if it is different to the name I have used. Throughout my thesis I have used the Turkish name ‘Silifke’ rather than the ancient Greek name ‘Seleucia’ so there is no need to use brackets in this case.
Appendix D: The Location of the Counts of Tripoli, 1201-1268

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1201</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Antioch</td>
<td>ATS, p. 435; DSN, p. 259; Eracles, p. 313; Ernoul, p. 321; GC, p. 663.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1203</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Antioch</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 792, pp. 210-211.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1204</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 98, p. 103; RRH, 1, No. 799, p. 213.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1205</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>LIRG, Cols 522-523, No. 477; RRH, 1, No. 807, pp. 215-216.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1210</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Eracles, p. 316.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1214</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>KD, 5, pp. 48-49.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1216</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Eracles, p. 318.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1219</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Antioch</td>
<td>ATS, p. 437; Eracles, p. 318; GC, p. 665; HII, p. 484; OP, p. 235.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.1222</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Antioch</td>
<td>Smbat, p. 96; KG, p. 428; VA, p. 213.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1226</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Antioch</td>
<td>BH, 1, p. 381; IA, 3, pp. 279-280.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1228</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>GC, p. 682.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1229</td>
<td>Bohemond IV</td>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 1003, pp. 263-264; TOT, No. 66, p. 54.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.1234</td>
<td>Bohemond V</td>
<td>Antioch</td>
<td>Eracles, pp. 405-406.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 1236</td>
<td>Bohemond V</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 1068, pp. 278-279; TOT, No. 82, pp. 64-65.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Bohemond</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1239</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Eracles, pp. 415-416; GC, pp. 726-727; Rothelin, pp. 551-552.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1241</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 118, pp. 129-133; CGOH, 2, No. 2280, pp. 594-596; RRH, 1, No. 1102, pp. 286-287.</td>
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<td>February 1243</td>
<td>V</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>RRH, 1, No. 1110, p. 288.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1252</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>ATS, p. 445; Eracles, p. 440; JJ, pp. 258-259.</td>
</tr>
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<td>1252</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Antioch</td>
<td>JJ, pp. 258-261.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 1255</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 126, pp. 147-148; CGOH, 2, No. 2801, pp. 807-808; RRH, 1, No. 1229, pp. 323-324.</td>
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<td>November 1256</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Mamistra</td>
<td>Smbat, p. 100.</td>
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<td>1258</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Acre and Tripoli</td>
<td>ATS, pp. 447-448; Eracles, p. 443; GC, pp. 743-745.</td>
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<td>1258</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>GC, pp. 748-749.</td>
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<td>1259</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>Smbat, p. 103.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 1260</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Damascus</td>
<td>GC, p. 751.</td>
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<td>1260</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Antioch (implied) and Latakia</td>
<td>DSN, p. 45; IAZ, 2, pp. 646-647; IF, p. 50.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1262</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>CDSMOG, No. 221, pp. 262-263; CGOH, 3, No. 3020, pp. 27-28; RRH, 1, No. 1317, p. 344.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1264</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>VA, p. 220.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1265</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>IAZ, 2, p. 576.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April and May 1268</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Tripoli (implied)</td>
<td>IAZ, 2, pp. 647, 658-663.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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