Case Study on Coordination of Cybersecurity Risk Management in the UK Insurance Sector

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ABSTRACT

There have recently been significant and growing levels of government and regulatory interference affecting the cybersecurity risk and cyberrisk insurance practices in the UK financial sector. A short case study documents these efforts, based on the interviews conducted with relevant stakeholders, regulator representatives and other key gatekeepers as to most relevant areas and highlights efforts by the Bank of England to coordinate the industry’s resilience against cyber attacks.
1. Aims and Objectives-

London is currently the world’s leading financial centre within the increasingly integrated, technologically sophisticated and growing global financial system. Moreover the UK financial services sector provides a significant contribution to the overall wealth of the UK, and is therefore a key element of the nation’s Critical National Infrastructure (CNI).¹ Moreover, responsible financial service entities operating in the UK have recent years become increasingly sensitive to and concerned about cybersecurity risk.² It is therefore important to develop more integrated and timely monitoring systems that effectively communicate the associated information risk from the IT and operational risk areas to the board. However there are currently still no UK regulations that specifically address either the appropriate protocols for networks to mitigate against these threats, or to the reporting of such risks to the board, regulators and key stakeholders.³ There are also internal governance implications. Dutta et al. (2002) argue that cybersecurity risk management is a management issue, and not an IT issue. However these two issues have not been previously studied in a single paper.

Most recently the UK government has joined forces with insurers on cybersecurity, as part of its efforts to manage cyber risk within the UK government Cyber Essentials Scheme (UK Government, 2013) and more generally to implement its Cyber Security Strategy (UK Government, 2013).

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¹ Cybersecurity is the body of technologies, processes and practices designed to protect networks, systems, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access. CNI is defined as “certain ‘critical’ elements of infrastructure, the loss or compromise of which would have a major, detrimental impact on the availability or integrity of essential services, leading to severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life”.

² According to The Financial Times, cybersecurity attacks on companies has doubled in 2012-13 compared with the previous financial year (Financial Times, 21/10/13). The latest Lloyd’s (2013) risk index survey reveals that cybersecurity risk is now the third most important perceived risk faced by UK business, significantly higher than in 2011 when it was only ranked 12th.

³ In the US, the Securities and Exchange Commission requires registrants to disclose, as part of the management discussion and analysis part of their annual report filing (“10-K”) the risk of cyber incidents if these issues are among the most significant factors that make an investment in the company speculative or risky. However Ferraro (2013) argues that these SEC disclosure requirements are too vague and not sufficiently informative.
Government, 2011). However there is little or no literature evidencing the effectiveness of such coordination efforts to mitigate or prevent cyber attacks. The case study documents latest efforts by the UK regulators, firms and both professional and international bodies to coordinate with the insurance industry and key professional bodies to enhance resilience against cyberattacks.

2. Institutional Background

Key UK insurance firms trade-off the benefits of enhancing their business model through exploiting developments in cloud computing and big data, with the costs of investing in cyber risk management, and the strategies employed (e.g. via insurance, regulatory compliance and operational management). The case documents the dynamic and increasingly integrated threats from various sources:

- Frictional risks from increased direct and hidden costs of complying with existing and developing EU and UK data protection laws (Grady and Parisi, 2006).
- There are significant and material investment in cybersecurity resilience based audit and IT departments. Consultants regularly offer competitive and new digital security insurance and risk management solutions across the sector and best practices used by key insurance firms to identify fraud losses and potential theft of personal data held by organisations, related to both internal and external parties.
- The rapid growth of information technology-based solutions has facilitated globalisation of services and transformed business models.
- Current UK Protection laws and EU proposals for upgraded data protection laws and consider their likely impact on corporate responsibilities to comply with cybersecurity law, such as the international convention on cybercrime, human rights, national
security, as well as civil and criminal law related to money laundering, data collection and identify fraud.

The report focuses primarily on recent issues related to cyber risks affecting key insurance firms, regulators and professional bodies to help better understand how these developments inter-relate with best practices in information risk governance, data and information management arising from recent technological advances. It also informs the business and academic community generally about the nature and outcomes of regulatory efforts to coordinate resilience of insurance firms against cyberrisk.

UK insurance entities are particularly susceptible to cybersecurity attacks because the integrity of their business models involves inter-connected responsibilities for maintaining resilience of their systems to various gatekeepers (e.g. regulatory agencies), actors (e.g. other financial services entities), and stakeholders (e.g. shareholders, consumers) which create pressures to ensure best practices in information risk governance, data and information management. To achieve success in international markets, UK-based global service providers and professional attestation firms face challenges of moving towards competing on being able to offer unique, high quality assurance and innovative integration solutions to their financial services clients. Newly evolving EU and US based regulations impose complex risk-based reporting and capital adequacy rules, which requires firms to increasingly rely on complex web-based financial models for integrated data assurance and cybersecurity risk management.

A key challenge facing such firms is to demonstrate sufficient ethical management, and ensure high quality data integrity capabilities in order to meet increasingly stringent and complex requirements imposed by regulators. This however also requires firms to face the
need to trade-off investment in high quality of regulatory compliance monitoring mechanisms, with providing high quality value added services and performance to their clients and investors, respectively. However, the financial services industry generally, and the insurance industry specifically, particularly in globally exposed markets such as the UK, faces unique challenges in a changing regulatory environment. Enhanced infrastructure protection is also a key concern for financial service firms and their stakeholders. New Solvency II regulations and the proposed overhaul of existing Basle II regulations (where relevant) require greater reliance on complex financial models that require integration with existing financial, regulatory and customer databases.

3. Literature review

There is relatively little empirical, conceptual or analytical academic research specifically on cyber risk and/or cyber insurance that is of relevance to this study. Shackleford (2011) argues that firms should adopt a proactive approach to safeguard their assets against attack in a competitive environment. Biener et al. (2015) provide evidence of the insurability of cyber risk in a European and US context and find that there are significant problems in the market due to adverse selection problems, resulting from highly inter-correlated losses, lack of data and severe information asymmetry. They also provide evidence that there is a distinct lack of cyber insurance coverage available in the European context, in contrast to the US, possibly due to the lack of public policy engagement and reluctance of firms to disclose breaches.

The lack of literature bearing on this topic contrasts with the frequent and often contradictory financial press coverage of these issues. For example the Computer Weekly (2014a,b,c,e) contains frequently contradictory articles in the benefits and costs of cyber risk insurance, perhaps because the authors are seeking to publicise their own consultancy services in this area. The Financial Times provides regular articles on this topic, but mostly focuses on the

By contrast there are relatively few articles on the direct impact of cyber-attacks, or the incidence of cyber insurance (Gray, 2014a, b). More recently the Bank of England penetration testing or CBEST was launched in October 2014, with the intention of testing financial services firms’ systems resilience against “ethical hacking” by BofE staff, the existence of such practices were first documented in April 2014 (Fleming 2014). However there is no public announcement of such efforts apparently due to the confidentiality issues (Solman, 2014).

This situation contrasts with that in the US, where the Securities and Exchange Commission has issued guidance on disclosure of security breaches by US corporations. This in turn has facilitated empirical studies on the effectiveness of such disclosure requirements (e.g. Dutta den McCroban, 2002; Wang et al., 2013; Ferraro, 2014).

Despite the lack of evidence on coordination efforts, there are a number of studies sponsored by consultancies (e.g. the Ponemon Institute, 2013, 2014; Datamonitor Financial, 2013), insurance firms (e.g. Atlantic Council and Zurich, 2014; Marsh 2014) and professional organisations (e.g. AIRMIC, 2013; ICAEW, 2012 and Institute of Risk Management, 2014; World Economic Forum, 2013) on various issues pertaining to both cybersecurity risk management and cyber risk insurance. However none of these studies focus specifically on the insurance industry. Although there are regularly held conferences on this topic (e.g. Institute of Risk Management, Association of British Insurers) these have not resulted in contemporary publications that shed light in this area.
4. Key questions

Key gatekeepers, such as regulators, auditors, IT and risk management professional advisers play major role in determining the property rights and information production costs associated with assuring data and information integrity (Klumpes, 2013).

This is because dealing with cyber-attacks for both data and information management and broader reporting processes requires the close engagement and interaction of major actors in the UK financial services sector, their internal and external stakeholders and key gatekeepers. These include key industry players, both in terms of cybersecurity risk management and providers of cyber risk insurance, as well as BoE which has recently conducted research on the potential impact of cyberattacks jointly with the cabinet office, HM Treasury and the Financial Conduct Authority. Other professional bodies consulted included AIRMIC Ltd, and the Institute of Risk Management, which has recently published a report on risk resilience and tolerance issues within the financial sector (IRM, 2014), as well as the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, which has recently set up a working party on cyber risk management.

The key question addressed in this case is to examine the impact of key gatekeepers in influencing latest regulatory developments and the effectiveness of recent efforts to coordinate the ability of the UK insurance industry (e.g. via the BoE’s CBEST initiative) to assure the resilience of their systems against cyber attacks in the light of recent innovations in cloud computing and big data and evolving regulatory and societal pressures to assure integrity of these resources?
5. Who are the Key Gatekeepers, Participants and Stakeholders?

In this section, we briefly overview the major gatekeepers, industry participants and other stakeholders in the cybersecurity risk management of the UK insurance industry. This discussion is kept at a fairly brief level.

5.1. Key Gatekeepers

Bank of England and other Regulators of Cybersecurity in the UK

Operational and Cybersecurity Risk Management is a fundamental concern to all financial organizations in a digital economy and is an important subset of enterprise risk management. The use of the internet has significantly increased the vulnerability of financial organisations to information theft, vandalism, and denial-of-service attacks, thereby bringing information security issues to the forefront of the agenda for business innovators and corporate risk management executives. At the same time, there has been increased demand by regulators, shareholders and rating agencies and customers for credible and more sophisticated techniques for capital management and financial guarantees to meet new and developing IFRS, FSA-based individual capital assessment and Solvency II requirements. This in turn led to an increased demand for and the associated use of sophisticated computer systems and scenario stress testing models in the banking, finance, insurance and investment industries.

The UK Government (2011) has raised awareness about the importance of information risk and its link to corporate governance effectiveness.\(^4\) While issues of security, confidentiality,

\(^4\) Information risk is defined as the “guardianship and management of information in all its aspects (integrity, availability and confidentiality) that is crucial to public service delivery” (UK Government, 2008, 6).
integrity, availability, accountability, non-repudiation and reliability are the foundations of computer security generally (Gollman, 2011) there are specific issues for financial service providers, particularly related to the potential for loss or misuse of sensitive regulatory and consumer-related data. The UK Data Protection Act requires that “appropriate technical and organizational measures shall be taken against unauthorized or unlawful processing of personal data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data.”

Recently the issue of cybersecurity threats and its relevance to corporate governance effectiveness in managing information risk have received extensive coverage in the financial press. However an important issue is the trade-off between ensuring that ethical responsibilities to disclose cyber attacks and their financial consequences to stakeholders are met, and the potential loss of privacy and the information production costs associated with making effective disclosures in the public domain. However, there is also little research concerning the financial consequences of such trade-offs in cybersecurity risk management of insurance firms.

The UK government has already committed £650 million to the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) launched in 2010. However since then there have been increasing threats posed by state industrial espionage, and international e-crime committed for political or personal purposes (Home Affairs Committee, 2013). The Intelligence and Security Committee (2013) raised issues of potential ethical conflict between commercial imperative and national security as a result of increasing private ownership of telecommunications networks that are considered to be part of the UK’s critical national infrastructure.

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5 Latest statistics suggest that data theft by employees is pervasive, especially for financial services firms (Computer Weekly, 2 September 2013). The Financial Conduct Authority (2013) has reported receiving reports that fraudsters are using the name or other details of a genuine firm.

6 Schedule 1, Principle 7 of Data Protection Act (1998). However neither the Act nor the Information Commission Office charged with implementing the Act provide any specific guidance for financial services.

7 The Australian government established the Computer Emergency Response Team which annually surveys the impact of cyber crime and security issues affecting businesses comprise Australia’s CNI.
However, although the quality of investment in cybersecurity risk management processes is essential to meet regulatory needs and enhance the robustness and integrity of financial services firms’ data and information exchange, its impact on key external stakeholders and gatekeepers has not been previously systematically studied. There is also a lack of information sharing and engagement about these issues among firms and key gatekeepers.

On 17 September 2014, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) issued an updated version of its UK Corporate Governance Code including the related document Guidance on Risk Management and Internal Control and Related Financial and Business Reporting. The revised Code will apply to accounting periods beginning on or after 1 October 2014. The new code requires firms to disclose their principal risks, their policies for mitigating risks and the monitoring mechanisms used by the board to ensure effectiveness and risk culture. However there is no specific application to insurance.

The Bank of England’s Prudential Regulatory Authority, which was only fully effective in 2013 under the Financial Services Act, specifically is responsible for the predudential regulation of insurers and other financial service firms. It works together with the Financial Conduct Authority to provide a twin peaks regulatory structure. However the 2013 latest annual report of the PRA makes no specific mention of cybersecurity risks nor of the cyber risk insurance activities of the UK insurance sector.

Industry Players

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8 In March 2013 six South Korean banks were affected by a North Korean cyber attack, disrupting financial services worldwide and costing £500million to clear up (Guardian, 16 October 2013).
9 The Australian Strategic Policy Institute (2013) recommends greater geopolitical engagement on cybersecurity attacks, but did not focus distinctly on the financial system. The BBA (2013) recommended greater regulatory coherence in financial services but did not refer to cybersecurity issues specifically.
The major insurance companies are both part of the UK’s critical infrastructure and major players in the cyber risk market. A recent Geneva Association conference held in London highlighted the importance given to cyber risk management and insurance issues by key players such as Zurich, Aviva as well as smaller insurance firms. Most of the issues covered concerned the lack of coordination between regulators and the industry in addressing concerted cyber-attacks, notwithstanding the recent UK government consultation with the industry. Because of the competitive nature of the market as well as the lack of uniform mandatory disclosure of cyber breaches in the UK and/or the EU (in contrast to the US) there is a distinct unwillingness to voluntarily disclose breaches. This situation contrasts with the UK banking industry, where large UK banks regularly report such breaches and whose efforts to mitigate them involve active coordination by the relevant industry body (The British Bankers’ Association). By contrast, neither the equivalent industry body for insurance (the Association of British Insurers) nor that of insurance brokers (The British Brokers Association) currently (to the best of the author’s knowledge) have any active programme of consultation with the industry on such issues.

**Professional Bodies**

As mentioned above, both AIRMIC Ltd and the Institute of Risk Management issued publications on cyber risk management and insurance. However they did not specifically address insurance issues. The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries presently do not have an active research programme of publications in this topic, although it is currently under development.

**Consultants and Advisers**

Consultancy and advisory organisations specialising in cyber risk management and/or insurance produce annual publications in these areas (e.g. Marsh, Ponemon Institute)
although these tend to be US, rather than UK or EU oriented. The Big 4 accountancy firms occasionally issue reports to their clients on current developments although these lack specificity. It appears that a large number of consulting actuarial firms and other consulting firms have strong interest in the area although none were prepared to be interviewed and did not produce publicly available regular surveys, specifically in connection with the UK and/or EU insurance industries.

6. Discussion

A total of 10 interviews were conducted over a period of five days in London during October-November 2014. Of these, 3 interviews involved BoE and/or PRA officials, 3 interviews involved industry players and/or insurance brokers, and the remainder were held with Professional bodies such as the IFOA and IRM representatives. The major results of these interviews are discussed below. For confidentiality reasons, the names and affiliations of those interviewed has been withheld.

6.1 Bank of England and/or PRA

The BoE has three major areas of interest in cybersecurity risk management and insurance issues within its remit. First, it has a responsibility to ensure systemic risk avoidance through the coordination of cyber attack mitigation in coordination with key players of the UK financial services industry. Second, it has a specific responsibility, through its insurance division located within the Prudential Regulatory Authority department, over the audit and quality monitoring of cybersecurity risk management systems of major players. Third, it has a responsibility to monitor and supervise insurers offering cyber risk insurance. The interviews addressed issues related to all three of these areas, the major result of which are briefly outlined below.
The CBEST initiative was specifically instigated by the BoE to assure the integrity of standards of cyber risk management of the UK financial services industry, of which the insurance industry is a key component. It is also connected to the UK government’s policy on cyber risk as documented above. The Chief Information Security Officer of BoE had recently been interviewed on international and national efforts to coordinate defence of the banking industry to cyber attacks (Amar, 2014) but did not mention the insurance industry. He did not refer to any specific initiatives focusing solely on the insurance industry, however noted the recent consultation between the government and key industry players.

Other officials from the PRA were interviewed as part of a broader industry roundtable that was hosted by a key insurance broker. Some officials were responsible for supervising the cyber risk insurance market, while others monitored activities by key players with significant cyber security risk exposure. It became apparent that regular coordination between various officials within the PRA was lacking and an outcome of the meeting was to improve this. However the officials did not respond to further requests for interview to clarify these comments subsequently.

6.2. Industry key players

The industry sector has a strong interest in ensuring adequate monitoring of the cyber risk management systems. Additionally there are issues relating to how cyber risk insurance should be “priced” for soon-to-be-implemented European wide Solvency II capital adequacy requirements. The representatives of the two major insurance companies interviewed claimed to have sophisticated and regular monitoring of such attacks, but declined to name instances of such attacks. They also admitted that the design and implementation some of the relevant protection software was outsourced to third party consultants.
A further issue concerned the pricing of cyber risk insurance. An interview was held with senior managers and underwriters of a major insurance broker in this market. It was apparent that there is a lack of publicly available data on the instances and severity of recent cyber attacks on the UK insurance industry. The lack of such generally available data reduced the efficiency of the market but also created more opportunity to operate in what was regarded as a fairly lucrative market. The absence of any recently publicly known severe cyber attacks on key industry players (in contrast to the banks) contributed further to the lack of actuarially fair pricing of insurance.

Senior management representatives of both large and small insurance firms discussed the growing importance of these issues at a Geneva Association conference held in London in October 2014. However the author had only limited opportunities to follow up specific issues with the key speakers. It appears that cyber risk management is a key and major consideration for most of these firms. However by contrast the cyber risk insurance market is seen as being “high risk” and creates complications for both actuarial fair pricing and capital modelling purposes. There appeared to be a lack of consensus among speakers as to the growth potential of this market in the European context, although all agreed it was a significant and major issue for boards of companies.

6.3. Professional bodies and Industry Associations

Various industry bodies, including AIRMIC Ltd, IRM were interviewed but did not appear to have strong views on the topic beyond general concerns about the quality of risk management processes and documenting various descriptive issues concerning accessing cyber risk insurance policies. Both bodies have recently published guidance to members on these issues as noted above and plan to continue to do so in the near future as the cyber risk insurance
market develops. It was noted this was an area lacking regulatory oversight and guidance and that the professional bodies played an important role in education and in providing support to members.

Despite a number of its members playing key roles as senior management and/or consultants to the insurance industry, the IFOA has not published any definitive position papers or guidance on this topic. The author is an honorary fellow of the IFOA and has made presentations on this topic to IFOA working parties and to IFOA-sponsored conferences during 2014. The IFOA is currently in the process of setting up a working party on cyber risk management, of which the author has been invited to participate. It is expected that this working party will produce a literature review on the topic and generate some ideas for discussion within the UK actuarial profession in the early part of 2015.

7. Conclusion

This paper examines how regulatory officials, major industry players, professional bodies and consultants to the industry interact to coordinate efforts to secure key IT infrastructure in the UK financial services sector, focusing on the insurance industry. The case study provides a number of conclusions. First, it is apparent that this is a very sensitive and commercially valuable area for many participants. This may explain the relatively poor response rate to requests for interview, particularly by consultants. Further, high-level coordination between the UK government in seeking to implement public policy on national cyber security strategy and the industry is in very early stages. Further, relevant industry players appear reluctant to provide greater public transparency on cyber attacks, and appear to be hostile to efforts to sponsor publicly available databases on such incidents. The lack of engagement by key industry associations and other professional bodies on issues specific to the insurance industry also compound the issue. This situation is in contrast to that in the banking industry.
The consultants in particular seem wary of maintaining their competitive advantage in providing specialist services to the major players seeking to mitigate against cyber risk attacks.

From a public policy perspective, there appears to be a growing awareness by key regulatory supervisors such as the BoE’s PRA to hold more regular and detailed monitoring and coordination with key industry players. Further specialist professional bodies such as the IRM generally and the IFOA specifically are still the process of developing major thought leadership on such issues.

Further research is needed to identify and analyse the impact of coordination efforts on the pricing of cyber risk insurance. Currently existing models of pricing do not appear to consider the impact of public interference or oversight on the activities of major players. Further there is a lack of shared knowledge at the public level concerning the nature, incidence and severity of cyber attacks, relative to the US, which may lead to inefficiencies in the pricing of cyber risk insurance. This might explain the lack of current depth of this market relative to the US, although most industry players appear to recognise that this is a growing and increasingly significant market. Further efforts to develop such a public database of such incidents, and/or public regulatory demands for increased transparency by firms of such attacks as is already the case in the US, may assist in facilitating more general awareness of the issues, and facilitate more informed and rigorous academic research into this increasingly important topic.
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