FIREARMS, TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE: 
RESISTANCE OF TAIWANESE INDIGENES TO 
CHINESE, EUROPEAN AND JAPANESE ENCROACHMENT IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 
CIRCA 1860-1914

Pei-Hsi Lin

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this dissertation is to explore the adaptation and the acculturation of foreign firearms amongst the indigenous people in Taiwan and the role of these firearms in resistance against the Western, Japanese and Chinese invasions in the period of 1860-1914. I argue that through the avenues of access to firearms and their absorption into indigenous cultures, the Taiwanese indigenes preserved some of their cultural and economic independence. The firearm did not only just serve as a killing weapon in the battles for the indigenes, but it also extended in purpose and meaning within indigenous cultures. To reveal the use of firearms by the indigenes and their firearms cultures, this dissertation has used various sources such as the British, Qing Chinese and Japanese official reports and documents, books, journals, and articles written by travellers, missionaries, consular officials, merchants, researchers, etc. in English, European and Chinese languages.

We begin with the fundamental complexities of the geographical conditions between the western plains and the eastern mountain forests of Taiwan, the cultures of indigenous people, and the nature of resistances of the indigenes against Dutch, Spanish and Qing colonists and Chinese settlers before 1860. Since Taiwan was forced to open its ports under the Tianjin Treaty in 1858, the Western nations were eager to secure their strategic positions in Asia and exploit important industrial materials – such as camphor and coal – and the flourishing tea industries in the eastern mountain areas of Taiwan where many indigenous tribes lived. Political and economic encroachments within Taiwan had moved further and further eastward. Numerous clashes between the indigenes and the Qing armies and Chinese exploiters were inevitable. Ceaseless skirmishes by the Formosan indigenes obstructed the progress of resources exploitation, especially camphor. The process of the “opening up the mountains and pacifying the indigenes” scheme greatly accelerated these conflicts. Further revolts of the mountain indigenes became greater and more brutal after the occupation of Japan and its attempts at indigenous management. However, the Taiwanese indigenes did not appear to lose their power entirely in the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, but defended their right to live in their territories in major episodes of resistance.
Understanding this, and addressing the questions of when and how they armed and why they so long resisted, required the examination of the sources and different scales of warfare or conflicts, disclosing the use of firearms by the indigenes in three phases: the traditional level (1860-1883), the traditional-modernised level (1884-1895) and the modernised-advanced level (1896-1914). Through the demonstration of warfare or conflicts that the indigenes were involved in directly or indirectly and the surveying of armaments among the Western, Japanese and the Qing military and Chinese civilians at each phase, we disclose the types of weapons the indigenes operated with and their procurements of firearms. This in turn helps in understanding the circumstances of indigenous people, the dispersal of firearms and their cultural-technological contacts in the different periods. Finally, firearms were not only applied by the Taiwanese indigenes within their hunting expeditions and fighting cultures, but also embedded within their lives and communities. Compared with the use and the management of firearms of the Qing and Japanese military, the indigenes appeared to succeed in technology transfer and adaption, which might have given them the capability to fight against the intruders. This claim (shown throughout the thesis but particularly arising from material in Chapter 7) leads also to the argument that major cultural-anthropological approaches concerning the historical relations between culture and technology (associated especially with the work of Peter Berger and Stephen Hill) need historical nuancing upon further consideration of extraneous factors, exact physical location, and precise temporal or sequential location of major events.
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A NOTE ON ROMANIZATION AND TRANSLATION

The Romanisation of indigenous languages in Taiwan has been widely used and recognized by the government, and has been applied to most of the names of places, people and certain customs. Due to the historical origins of the languages (mainly English and Chinese) used in this dissertation, some of the personal names might be different from contemporary ones. I kept the names retrieved from original references and identified them with contemporary resources. For those unidentifiable, I retained the pinyin Romanisation of Chinese words.

Historical Chinese names and names of places were not changed or revised, either, and have also been given their Hanyu pinyin. This standard is currently adopted both academically and officially, e.g. Bankimseng (萬金庄, Pingdong County) and Liu Yongfu 劉永福. All the names of places and people in the main body and references are presented in Hanyu pinyin, unless translation is provided.

The Chinese and Japanese names are presented in the East Asian order. That is, the surname comes first and the first name second, unless, in the English publications, an individual adopts the Western order.

The titles and names of authors and publishers of secondary sources in the Chinese language have been kept in their original Chinese characters and pinyin. This is because the translation into English or transliteration would not make it easier to trace the original source. Where provided, original translations from Chinese into English of the titles and names of authors and publishers of secondary sources, quotations, governmental titles, institutions, footnotes etc. have been kept. Such original translations are indicated in the text by the use of round brackets, that is ( ). This means, for instance, that in the several cases where the original source uses the term “aboriginal” or “aborignes”, I have left this without change, in order that the reader may trace the original. See for example pp 36-37. All other translations from Chinese into English are mine, and are indicated in the text by the use of square brackets, that is [ ].
Prologue

In June 2014, several Truku indigenes of the Knkreyan tribe in Mukumiqi Valley in Hualian County fired their hunting rifles to the sky next to a memorial for victims of Typhoon Ofelia in 1990. They ignited a smoke signal and closed the main road to their villages to proclaim their right and determination to protect their lands from Taiwanese tourists. Since Mukumqi Valley had opened to the public in 2006, at least 3,000 tourists had crowded daily into this exceptional natural landscape by scooters, cars and minibuses. According to the chairman of the Knkreyan tribal committee, Masaw, the Truku indigenes have been suffering from the crowds, the rubbish left by tourists, traffic jams, air pollution and the noise. The Truku indigenes of the Knkreyan tribe appealed to suspend all the tourists and that a license be imposed for entering the mountains and to give the mountains and forests some rest for one year. The acts of firing hunting rifles into the air, setting smoke signals (which was also a Truku ritual for delivering messages to their ancestors), and blocking the road were undoubtedly designed to raise awareness of the predicament of the Truku indigenes caused by tourists, the most modern of encroachers.

If we consider this incident as a form of resistance initiated by the Truku indigenes in response to tourists and to the Taiwanese government in contemporary Taiwan, then we might also place them against an historical background of many crucial resistances of the mountain indigenes to the Western nations, the Qing and Japanese governments, the Chinese and the plains indigenes. The mountain indigenes would fight against whoever entered their grounds without their permission and in many cases took the invaders’ heads as their trophies, seen as the most dramatic symbol of savagery and otherness. Luckily, the resistance of the Truku indigenes today did not cause any bloodshed. These scenes at most seemed to echo the past, the late nineteenth century, the period when the Western nations were actively seeking raw materials for their industrial states, profiting in trade and exploiting resources from their colonies. The mountain indigenes, who have been living in the central and eastern mountains for over one thousand years, were constrained to battle against any intruders since the opening

of four Treaty Ports in Taiwan from 1860. In turn, with a few exceptions – mostly missionaries – they were neglected and mistreated by the colonists, the Qing and Japanese governments, and the Chinese who settled in Taiwan. As a matter of fact, none of the colonial powers succeeded in achieving total control over the mountain indigenes. Even when they threw the most modern weapon at them, they all had major troubles in pacifying the resistance or in managing the mountain indigenes. This certainly manifests as an unusual feature in world history.
Part I Formosa as a Dynamic Context

Chapter 1 Introduction

This dissertation is about where, when and how the mountain indigenes of Taiwan successfully used firearms to repel invaders, who were driven by the resource exploitation and profits in the mountain regions, in order to protect their lands and hunting territories in the period of 1860-1914.

This is the period when the second industrial revolution in Western Europe and the United States was emerging as a new phase of industrial modernization. Based especially on novel innovations, the second industrial revolution was about to make a great impact on the rest of the world for better or for worse via its pioneering inventions in energy, new materials, chemistry, and communication technologies. The earlier innovations of the steam engine and improvement of water energy, which replaced the traditional hand production methods, were applied to the developments of textile and iron industries, to early mass productions and then extended to the locomotive and steam-ship transportation systems. Heavier and more technological industries became the ever-changing loci for the utilisation of physical and chemical sciences to a greater degree than ever before. These developments first emerged in Britain, but nodes of industrialisation spread throughout continental Europe and the United States from the 1830s under different modes. Particularly in the years around 1870, which could be considered as the critical period in world history, some new and powerful industrial capacities were created which clearly increased the military might of the Atlantic system, such as in the United States (steel) and Germany (chemicals). The dominance of a new military-industrial nexus in powerful and industrialized countries was proven in the victories in wars such as the Crimean War (1853-1856) and the Franco-Prussia War (1870-1871) in Europe, and the American Civil War (1861-1865). Such military and industrial development not only created competition among the Western nations for further technological progressions, but also

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allowed them to expand their markets as a collective group of great power industrialisers, to trade and invest into such civilisations as China, Japan, Southeast Asia, etc. Most of the time, these expansions were accompanied by military menace to traditional empires and societies by using – or postulating the use of – Western military and transport technologies such as rifles, cannon, warships, etc., which were the outcomes from the earlier industrial revolutions. The most obvious yet perhaps complex example of this was Britain. After recovering from the burdens of the Napoleonic Wars (1792-1815), Britain challenged China aggressively on commercial grounds and used commerce as its own excuse in the First Opium War (1839-1842). Other places also confronted similar situations - Germany in Africa, Netherlands in Indonesia, France in Vietnam, etc. where expansions in many instances incorporated an imperialist control over new territories. These may or may not have been of great benefit to the great powers, but for a time they did stave off both market invasions of the new territories by other powers (e.g. Britain and Germany in Africa) and the coming of actual large-scale war among themselves (which came in 1914-1918). So in the crucial period of this thesis the great powers expanded outwards and in doing so tested their developing technologies, gathered a greater variety of raw materials and dominated the new commercial pathways between Asia, the Americas, Africa and Europe. If not all technologies or adventures could be profitable, commercial and transport expansions generated profits in shipping, railroadisation, insurance and financial services for powerful groups and interests within Europe and America. Although the expansion of industrial revolutions of the West to some extent stimulated industrialization elsewhere, mostly colonies exhibited much more problematic results. The object of the Western nations as colonists was not only to exploit the resources and to profit from their colonies via deploying armaments and transportation systems, but also to compete with other Western nations outside of Europe in their colonies, which continued to accelerate the race to military technologies and industrialization. The exception of Japan which succeeded in industrialisation

7 See Inkster op. cit. 1991 for the exception of areas of recent settlement such as Australia, chapter 10; for imperialism in India and China and more generally Inkster chapter 8 and 9, Jeff Horn et al., Reconceptualizing the Industrial Revolution, MIT Press, 2010 chapters 13-15; Roy MacLeod et al. eds., Technology and the Raj, Sage, London, 1995, especially chapters 1, 2, 5, 7, 11; Franz Michael and George E. Taylor, The Far East in the Modern World, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, new York, 1975 Chapters 6 and 9, see also pp. 148-159.
largely by transferring Western technologies, especially military technologies and adopting Western scientific knowledge and ideas rapidly from the 1870s, is of special importance to this thesis, as it was the Japanese colonisation of Formosa/Taiwan from 1895 that so transformed the frontier between industrialisation and the indigenous people of the island. This is one of the major themes of the thesis. Colonialism was a technological phenomenon or process, not just a directly political or commercial phenomenon, which by spreading modern military technologies to places where there were no or ineffective military technologies to use against the industrialised countries, determined many complex world outcomes.

Moreover, beyond “the colonies”, there were the peoples of the frontiers, ethnicities within such colonies, which were “othered” or beyond colonisation directly – as in our case of Taiwan. These peoples of the frontiers were ultimately affected by colonialism, although in most cases the imperialists were not particularly interested in occupying these places, which they considered as especially “backward” and “primitive” outsider territories, troublesome at most. The problem of indigenous people in world history began to arise when they were forced to react and resist against territorial encroachments and resource exploitation from European or other settlements.

There are many such instances that could be listed: the resistances of Aborigines in the different regions of Australia with their primitive weapons such as spears and stick over the invasions and land appropriations of white settlement from the late 1780s to the 1930s; the series of battles the indigenous Maori fought against the British troops over their lands, forests, fisheries and resource ownerships in various parts of New Zealand from 1845–1872, the so-called New Zealand War or the Maori War; the resistances of African inhabitants over forced

10 For further information on the New Zealand War, see James Belich, The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict (Auckland, N.Z.; New York: Penguin Books Australia, 1998). According to Vayda, the guns Maoris first obtained from the European traders were flintlocks in the early 19th century when the trading and whaling ships were calling along the eastern coast of the northern part of New Zealand’s North Island. Muskets were used by the Maoris in tribal warfare such as the Musket Wars (1807-1842) before their armed conflicts against European settlers from 1830s. Andrew P. Vayda, ‘Maoris and Muskets in New Zealand: Disruption of a War System’, Political Science Quarterly 85, no. 4 (December 1970): 560–84. Rich historical material on the New Zealand War in various parts of New Zealand have been digitalised by the Victoria University. It could be useful for further comparative studies between the Maori and the Taiwan indigenes in the
labour, increased tax and land appropriations\(^{11}\), such as the Anglo-Zulu War in 1879,\(^{12}\) the Bambatha Revolt in South Africa in 1906\(^ {13}\), the Hereros revolt in Namibia in 1904-1907,\(^ {14}\) the Maji Maji rebellion 1905-1907\(^ {15}\), and so on; and the indigenous rebellions commenced by the Cree, Blackfoot, Blood, Peigan and Saulteaux tribes and their alliance with Métis militants led by Louis Riel against the Canadian government over their lands, which were relinquished in treaties and affected their bison herds and living, (also called the North–West rebellion) in 1885.\(^ {16}\)

Certainly, the causes of armed resistances initiated by indigenous peoples against the colonists varied by different circumstances and depended on their contacts or connections with others and the colonists. The sorts of weaponry the indigenes possessed or practised in life and operated in wars also varied greatly, and most importantly their access to modern weaponry and their adaptation or absorption of modern weaponry in their lives and in combats brought even more complex forces into account. And all these did not necessarily come into effect or function as benefits for indigenous peoples to fight against the European military, who were on the whole furnished with modern guns with sufficient ammunition and were well trained. For instance, the Aborigines used muskets only in hunting, if at all, instead of using them in warfare in Australia. The reason for this could be the deficiency of ammunition provision and the symbolic feature of the spear as signifying manhood in the Aboriginal societies, so the use of spears became indispensable for the Aborigines in warfare. In addition, the large mammals of Australia were not dangerous to the indigenous people, so there was little of any tradition or normal culture of using arms to defend life.\(^ {17}\) Another example can be found in the Anglo-Zulu adaptation of firearms in warfare. See ‘New Zealand Wars (1845–1872)’, Victoria University of Wellington Library, accessed 21 February 2016, http://nzetc.victoria.ac.nz/tm/scholarly/tei-corpus-newzealandwars.html.


\(^{15}\)Thaddeus Sunseri, ‘Reinterpreting a Colonial Rebellion: Forestry and Social Control in German East Africa, 1874-1915’, Environmental History 8, no. 3 (July 2003): 430.


War. The Zulu used firearms only as their subordinate weapons and failed to develop tactics with firearms effectively, even though there was evidence of firearms transferring to Zululand and 1,000 Martini Henry rifles and 500,000 rounds were captured by the Zulu at Isandlwana. Jack Hogan later emphasized the constraint of employing firearms and the importance of close combat and *assega* in the Zulu culture of warfare.

In the cases of Australian Aborigines and the Zulu, the problem seems to lie in the accommodation of modern firearms when fighting against the British military. These cases of indigenous resistances or rebellions in Australia, New Zealand, Africa, and North America have been widely studied and researched. The possession and application of firearms of the Taiwanese indigenes in armed conflicts against the invaders from foreign countries, the Qing and the Japanese governances and the Chinese settlers and within the indigenous communities has been far less discussed or researched. Here we construct a broad context for a noveler historical case, particularly one that allows for the difference between formal colonialism, and the phases of encroachment that were faced by the indigenes in Taiwan. Only Chen Zongren wrote a good academic article on the introduction, exchange and use of modern firearms by the indigenes in the late nineteenth century through historical images and literatures. Another Taiwanese historian Xu Yuliang discussed the establishment of the indigenes’ military, and briefly considered the use of firearms by the plains and mountain indigenes during the Qing governance in Taiwan from the late seventeenth to the late nineteenth century.

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19. A slender, iron-tipped, hardwood spear used chiefly by southern African peoples.


21. This refers to the Dutch colonialism, see Chapter 2, p45-48; the references here are to the brief Spanish attempts on the north of the island, see Chapter 2, p49-55; to the British factory briefly run by the East India Company during 1670–1685, see Chapter 2, p72.


1. Taiwan Scene

Taiwan or Formosa, the name given by the Portuguese mariners in the sixteenth century and commonly used later by European diplomats, visitors and travellers, was long neglected by the Qing government until the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, it had been regarded as a marginal state throughout Chinese civilization. This negligent attitude of the Qing government continued to exist even after the opening of the treaty ports of Taiwan at Tamsui, Keelung, Taiwanfoo and Takow to Europeans under the Tianjin Treaty in 1858, after the Second Opium War (1856-1860). To a limited degree the Western countries had extended their attentiveness and interests to the strategic position of Taiwan for trading with China while they were spreading their trading posts from Southeast Asia to East Asia with their military technologies. They had also learnt that Taiwan held some rich resources in its mountain regions such as camphor, indigo, coal, sulphur, which were to become amongst the primary materials in the second industrial revolution, and tea and sugar, which European consumers had consumed from much earlier times. Moreover, the locations of these resources were mostly in the mountain regions, where the Chinese sovereignty was very problematic and which were dominated by the mountain indigenes, the head hunters. Over time, Europeans were fully aware of these elements. Expeditions and investigations were sent to Taiwan by Western countries and merchants, who also employed the local Chinese in exploiting the resources and risking their lives in the mountains, under the increasing demand of the world market. Under this circumstance, the mountain indigenes were subject to the encroachments from the Chinese, whom they thus long hated and with whom they were in frequent conflicts, and ultimately from the West. It was only inevitable for the mountain indigenes to resist and protect their lands. Conflicts between the indigenes and the Chinese, who entered the mountains or operated close to the indigenous borders, had started to accumulate from the mid-nineteenth century. As we shall see, this situation was only going to get worse.

Despite all that, the Qing government did not develop any positive intention to exercise its control over the eastern mountainous districts, where the mountain indigenes lived, nor did the Formosan indigenes recognise its sovereignty in Taiwan.

It was only from the first Japanese expedition in southern Taiwan in 1874, which aimed to punish the Paiwan indigenes for murdering Ryukyan fishermen, that the Qing government
began to show real concern for Chinese coastal security and the management of indigenes in eastern Taiwan. Shen Baozheng 沈葆楨 was sent by the Qing government, and his policies on the “opening up mountains and pacifying the indigenes” 開山撫番 and modernising Taiwan and its military defence were formed and implemented subsequent to the threat posed by Japan. Later Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, who was primarily despatched to confront the French invasion in northern Taiwan in 1884, determined to modernise Taiwan and purposed to exploit and monopolise the resources in the mountains by suppressing the indigenes in Taiwan. The intervention of the Qing government only made the indigenes’ lives worse and diminished their living space, which resulted in even more conflicts and resistances from them. So, Japanese colonialism in Taiwan came on the back of a rise in frontier conflicts arising from both commercial and political forces. The new colonial element was the outcome of Japan defeating the imperial Qing in the Sino-Japanese War of 1895, where Japan resolved to profit from Taiwan as her outpost of Meiji industrial modernisation. Japan surged against the eastern frontier in her effort at solving the problem of indigenes by using her advanced and efficient communication systems and armaments in the indigenes’ territories. These not only penetrated into the mountain indigenes’ lands further than during the Qing, but also accelerated even greater resistances of the mountain indigenes in Taiwan.

The mountain indigenes in Taiwan appeared to execute a series of exceptionally prolonged resistances whilst they were also involved in mediating and utilising their networks with the Chinese and the Western foreigners, who acted as the operators of the economic or even political encroachments at the edge of the technologically modernising world economy. Robert Eskildsen has suggested that the participation of the Formosan indigenes in the frontier zone, which was created and maintained by them, “mediated interaction and exchange among the heterogeneous populations of the island in the context of rule by successive colonial regimes.”

Certainly, the indigenes managed to sustain themselves from or at times depended on interacting and trading with the Chinese and the others for firearms, gunpowder, knives, pottery, salt, wine, beads, clothes, iron, copper etc. There seems, then, to be a case for agreeing with Eskildsen that “the workings of this frontier zone ... reveal so much about Taiwan’s place in the history of East Asia.” Nevertheless, this frontier zone was never peaceful and soundless

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25 Ibid.
in the process of functioning and was full of clashes and battles. Eskildsen refers to a “striking competence” in resistance on the frontiers of Japanese colonialism and in this thesis we intend to bed this idea down into a precise chronology and a nuanced social, cultural and economic context.  

2. Approaches

Firearms were probably taken in by the mountain indigenes under the circumstances of encountering increasing encroachments and conflicts, while they also had access to firearms from their existing trading/exchanging networks to aid their prolonged resistances. This could be seen as a process of technology transfer for the purposes of warfare among the Formosan indigenes. Nevertheless, issues over technology transfer, which involved local technical, economic, political, social, cultural and psychological conditions, were often complex and could not be resolved in a short period of time or even could not be resolved at all. In world history, technology transfer has failed much more often than it has succeeded.  

Jeremy Black in his recent work, War and Technology, also noticed the complexities in adopting technologies for those men responsible for fighting and for those men who must use technologies in war. It is also highly possible that locals in the periphery reject such technology or cause conflicts in the process of technology transfer. Ian Inkster argues that where technology is transferring from the advanced global system into more indigenous or simple social structures, the chances of cultural or even political conflict is far higher than success. Peter B. Heller also suggested that the most difficult impediments in technology transfer were the "socio-cultural barriers", which comprised different norms and values that were prevalent or predominated between the two sides. He also emphasizes that in the process of technology transfer, the technology receiver and the suppliers too often never understand each other’s norms and values in general and

26 Ibid., 289.
these sociocultural barriers occurred concurrently and could be synergistic. However, in systems where technology develops in evolutionary fashion, as one outcome of cultural development, there is no necessary reason to fear any debilitating conflict between new techniques and existing social norms and values. As Dani Cavallaro has summarised, “technology should not be regarded as a malevolent power keen on robbing humans of their skills and creativity or indeed capable of autonomous creativity.” Stephen Hill also suggested that “social, political and economic negotiations are involved in bringing particular technological systems into existence ... the impact of technological change varies according to the social and cultural context into which new technologies are implanted.” From the cases mentioned earlier, the Australian Aborigines and the Zulu appear not to have managed to use firearms effectively when fighting against the British military. The character of the firearm as a destructive tool for defense or attack seemed to fail its primary function for the Aborigines and the Zulus in battlefields during this period.

How did the mountain indigenes of Taiwan contrive these resistances against the Chinese settlers, the Qing army and the Japanese army for such a long time, especially when the Qing and the Japanese governments both owned superior military technology, which they purchased, transferred and tried to adapt from the West? What were the character and conditions of weapons that the Formosan indigenes possessed and fought with against the invaders? How did the Formosan indigenes receive firearms as a foreign and fatal technology and operate it in combats, when the mountain indigenes did not have the material of iron nor the skills for forging or manufacturing firearms and making powder? Thus they could only obtain firearms and powder from outsiders. How did they acquire the knowledge and the techniques of firearms? Did they manage to adapt Western techniques and weapons or to negotiate them within their societies, political and economic systems, as Stephen Hill, has suggested as a necessary element in absorption?

In this dissertation, I would like to suggest that among the goods the Formosan indigenes exchanged or traded with the Chinese and others, the possession and use of firearms was critical in giving them the capacity to fight against any intruders of that time. Because of

their destructive power, firearms might have first appeared to the indigenes to merely strengthen or enrich their cultures and skills in hunting and headhunting customs. As time went on, through the application of firearms in warfare or resistance, they maintained independence while the foreigners and Chinese encroachers continued to interfere with their lands and their communities. Can we interpret these elements as a creatively induced “culture of firearms”, which was also given meanings in the social, political and economic contexts by the indigenes and the indigenous societies in Taiwan?

Peter Berger the sociologist has suggested that it might be possible to examine the roots of globalization and its impacts by reducing the problem to its elements, and here technology – the firearm – does emerge as being of importance. Berger firstly provided his “four faces” of global culture in order to give the term more meanings, particularly in relation to “locals”.

Most importantly Berger goes on to develop his notion in a manner useful to empirical, especially historical, enquiry. He provides a typology relating globalization to changes in local or indigenous cultures. Following a fairly loose relationship with his four original categories of potential processes:

1. Cultural globalization replaces local culture
2. Coexistence occurs between the global and local cultures
3. There is some combination of particular local culture with global culture
4. Local culture rejects the cultural globalization trends

These may all be seen as historical processes, and there is really on the surface little reason to believe that they occur extensively, permanently, or that any one is exclusive of the other. It seems obvious that in the real world it is possible that an “indigenous society” in contact with a more advanced system or permeated by global phenomena may at different points in time or place go through every one of such responses.

However, such notions need testing against some reality. In particular, my aim is to take

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33 He suggested 4 types of global cultures, which were ‘Davos Culture or International Business Culture’, ‘Faculty Club international or World Intellectual Culture’, ‘Mcworld Culture or Global popular culture’ and New Religious Movement or popular religious culture’, and invited sociologists from several countries such as China, Japan, India, Germany, Hungary, South Africa, Chile, Turkey and America to examine these countries and their interactions and responses. Peter L. Berger, ‘Four Faces of Global Culture’, National Interest 49 (1997): 23–29; Peter L. Berger and Samuel P. Huntington, Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3–5.

up Berger’s typology in terms of Stephen Hill’s *The Tragedy of Technology*, which points out that technology is “enframed” within cultures, and that its introduction or transfer into new, perhaps more primitive or elementary cultures, intrinsically involves cultural introductions thus resulting in cultural tension. Technologies seemingly represent Western industrial culture. Can we consider that in our case firearms were embedded and given meanings within the indigenous cultures and argue that the resistance of the indigenes in Taiwan depended on the culture absorption of modern firearms into traditional patterns of warfare and hunting and social status? More particularly, may we read the history of Taiwan 1861-1914 in terms of the Berger-Hill type of approaches? If neither of the Berger extremes of possibilities 1 and 4 fits our history, how and when was it that the possibilities 2 or 3 or 2/3 arose and were maintained? Did indigenous cultures adapt the gun or was the gun adapted into indigenous cultures? If the latter, then under what imperatives or external forces did such cultural adaptation occur, and how did it serve to prolong the independence of indigenous cultures? These sorts of questions seem to link anthropological and historical enquiry, but more importantly may help in the interpretation of the detailed history to be examined here.

3. Intention, Structures and Sources

Through examination of the Taiwan case, the purpose of the thesis is to uncover the underlying historical conditions and aspects of globalization which impact on indigenous societies most sweepingly (Berger 1 above) or least sweepingly (Berger option 4 above), or whether more commonly the relationship between external and internal cultural forces is somehow found at modes 2 or 3. If the latter, then what were the determining factors and how did they operate in different sub-periods and regions?

Chapter 2, aims to demonstrate the fundamental and really dramatic east and west dualism of Taiwan, a feature of the island until the present time and from before the 1860s. It begins with the description of the physical environment of Taiwan as one of the assets that the mountain indigenous people benefit from and which enclosed the plains and mountain indigenes’ cultural assets, which included their beliefs, socio-political organizations,

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35 Hill, *The Tragedy of Technology: Human Liberation versus Domination in the Late Twentieth Century*, 44.
headhunting customs, economic activities and warfare in Taiwan. These two assets - physical environment and culture - do not change in a short period of time, even until today. Then I will discuss the fall of the western plain to others over time, which is briefly traced back to the beginning of encroachment from the colonists and the Chinese immigrants from the seventeenth century under Dutch, Spanish, Zheng and early Qing regimes, and concentrate on historical problems relating to indigenous history, pattern of interaction with ethnic groups and different attempts at indigenous “management” and the varying attitudes of its “governances”, especially in the post-1860s. Finally, the chapter considers the emergence of resistance by the indigenes, mostly in western plains areas, through combining the physical assets and cultural assets of the indigenes, the intrusions of the Chinese and colonists and the use of primitive or undeveloped weapons in the plains indigenes’ hands versus those of the colonists before 1860. For the purposes of this chapter, I use mostly secondary sources such as published books, journal articles, and unpublished theses, which focus on the themes of indigenous cultures, the governances of the Dutch, the Spanish and the early Qing in Taiwan in both English and Chinese languages.

Chapter 3 then emphasises the acceleration of encroachments from the western plains toward the eastern mountain regions from the 1860s when the ports in Taiwan were forced to open to the Western nations under the Tianjin Treaty in 1860 after the defeat of the Qing government in the Second Opium War 1856-1860 and from 1895 when Taiwan was ceded to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895 after another defeat of the Qing government in the Sino-Japanese War. The mountain indigenes faced more frequent connections and greater clashes with the outsiders other than the earlier settled Chinese, due to the rise and expansion of Western power in Asia. In order to demonstrate these political and economic encroachments toward the mountain indigenes, I will present evidence of some substantial attempts of Western nations to dominate eastern Taiwan, some close and violent contacts with the mountain indigenes, the economic imperative for exploiting mountain resources such as camphor, tea, indigo, coal and other minerals, and the Qing and Japanese governments’ policies targeted at the mountain indigenes for pursuing ultimate control over the resources in the eastern mountains. These are the plausible factors explaining the mountain indigenes’ initiation of various scales of resistance for over half a century. It moves to explain the reason for choosing firearms in this thesis as a global technology and technology of resistance, and to why the mountain indigenous people in Taiwan did not appear to be mere victims when
modern technology arrived, unlike other technologically undeveloped cultures or colonies, but adapted and absorbed weaponry into their hunting and head-hunting culture to fight back instead, and so to reserve some of their independence.

From chapters 4 to 6 we focus on the sources of conflicts and use of firearms among the mountain indigenes in 3 different stages – traditional level (circa 1860 to 1883), traditional-modernized level (circa 1884- 1895) and the modernized-advanced level (circa 1896-1914). The aims of chapters 4 to 6 are to explore the level of firearms that the mountain indigenes possessed based on their types of firearms and to survey their access to or procurements of firearms in these 3 different stages. In each chapter, I will first examine the occurrence of warfare or conflicts that the mountain indigenes were involved in. Secondly, I will investigate the types of armaments, mainly firearms that the Western military, the Qing military, the Chinese militia settled in Taiwan and the Chinese civilians used or carried. This helps us to understand the circumstances of the mountain indigenes in different scales of warfare, which might have given them the feasibilities of knowing and experiencing something of the modern or advanced armaments their enemies operated. Finally, I will discuss the findings about the types of firearms that were used by the mountain indigenes and how they obtained the firearms directly and indirectly. The different levels of firearms that passed to the mountain indigenes could be the most significant reason that the mountain indigenes were enabled to fight against their enemies in varied resistances. These are the structures I would like to demonstrate in different periods that I selected for each chapter.

In order to support these different themes from Chapter 3 to 6, for Chapter 3 we investigate the literature on the foreign activities, which involved the mountain indigenes, the development of several industries in the mountain regions, and the mountain indigenes’ management under the late Qing governance and the early Japanese governance. For Chapter 4 to 6, I then focus on the warfare and conflicts in 1860-1914, which is the research period in this dissertation. This is the period when Taiwan was under the late Qing governance and the early Japanese governance after Taiwan was ceded to Japan in 1895. For the material in the late Qing (1860-1895), I use mostly printed local gazetteers and memoirs of the Qing governors, which are in the Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary collectanea on Taiwan), records of the Qing officials from the Ming Qing Taiwan Xinzheng Dang 明清臺灣行政檔 (Administrative Records on Taiwan in the Ming and Qing Eras) in Taiwan lishi shuwei tushuguan
Chapter 7 gathers the materials related to the possession and use of firearms of the indigenes from Chapters 4 to 6, and becomes an independent, interpretive chapter. This chapter suggests the nature of the acculturation of the firearms among the indigenes and their societies in the period of 1860-1914, which we now argue to have been crucial to answering the further question of how very successful the indigenous resistances were. I would like to outline and give traces of the failure of the Chinese troops in obtaining, maintaining and adapting firearms and how the Taiwan Japanese Sotokufu managed and regulated the indigenes’ firearms in Taiwan as a contrast to the more effective outcome of indigenes’ firearms cultures. Because the mountain indigenes did not possess their own written languages or have written historical records, to uncover their traditional cultures and how they used firearms, I use published books, journals, reports, and articles, written by foreign travellers, consular officials, merchants and missionaries, anthropologists, etc., who had a lot of experience of close contacts with the mountain indigenes and their communities. Most of them were written in English and some of them were in European languages, which were translated by Reed College, USA in the Reed Digital Collections. Some of them were used also in the previous chapters. During the Japanese colonization, several Japanese anthropologists were sent to the mountain indigenous districts by the Taiwan Sotokufu for assisting the Japanese officials and police to manage the mountain indigenes, such as Inō Kanori, Ushinosuke Mori and Torii Ryūzō, whose
works were translated by independent researchers. These are the sources for explaining the cultural embedment of firearms in the mountain indigenes’ societies, which might be the reason that the mountain indigenes were able to fight against invaders successfully and over a long period of complex change.

In this dissertation, I will use indigenes or indigenous as the terminology instead of aborigines or aboriginal for the indigenous people in Taiwan. According to the UN, the word “indigenous” is broadly applied to peoples, communities and nations who live in their original territories or regions and affirm their ownership on cultural patterns, languages, social and legal systems with historical continuity, before they are influenced by invasion or colonization. This term has been commonly used in a global context. Also I will use the terms firearms or small arms, which refers to various types of hand-held or portable gun, such as matchlock, musket, rifles, etc., instead of “guns” that refers to a projectile weapon, which was forced by the explosion of gunpowder in metallic tubes, and can thus include weapons from large cannon to small arms.

In accordance with the primary sources I use and translate from a wide variety of published and archival material, sometimes the words or characters do not offer clear indications or meaning about the types of weapons in Chinese and English languages. For instance, in the Chinese literature, the Chinese character qiang 槍 refers to an agricultural tool, spear or firearm although the Chinese character 鎗, also pronounced as qiang means armament, which could discharge gunpowder or bullets and shoot targets. The word yangqiang 洋槍 means foreign or Western firearms, which did not disclose the types of firearms, but might have also suggested modern types of weapons in the context of the nineteenth century; in the English or Western literature, words like “arms” or “weapons”, which were often used by the authors or appeared in the reports, did not always provide the specific types of

armaments. I shall try to select the obvious ones which gave clear indications in this dissertation, but I could not always identify the types or models of firearms even within the context. Moreover, in both Chinese and Western literatures, *qiangtang* 前膛 (muzzle-loader) and *houtang* 後膛 (breech-loader) were often recorded for the kinds of firearms or guns in accordance of course to the ways they loaded the gunpowder. Nevertheless, in terms of differentiating the level of firearms or small arm, I intend to distinguish them based on the methods of loading gunpowder or bullets: *qiangtang* 前膛 (muzzle-loader), which was mostly used before the mid-nineteenth century, will be considered as the traditional level; *houtang* 後膛 (breech-loader), which was a nineteenth century invention from the West, will be considered as the modernised or advanced level.  

Due to the complexity of relationships between different races in Taiwan during the period of this research (1860–1914), the terms West and foreigner mostly refers to the encroachment in eastern Taiwan by the industrialising powers until 1895. From that time, Japanese colonialism – fuelled by the tools of Western-style industrialism – dominated the encroachment process as the result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki. Prior to that time, it was really only in the 1874 that Japan joined the Western powers in disturbing the Chinese presence on the island. The Qing military generally includes the armies from mainland China, the Green Standard Army, the Chinese militia, which were formed by the local gentry settled in Taiwan, and the Chinese braves settled in Taiwan. *However, I will classify them for the different purposes in each chapter. Unless specified otherwise, all Chinese and other foreign quotations or terms are translated fairly freely by myself.*

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Part I Formosa a Dynamic Context

Chapter 2 East and West Dualism: the Chinese, the Foreigners, and the Indigenes in Taiwan

A people who showed various kind and amiable traits of character, but whose natural temperament, even were they disposed to work, seems unfitted for the systematic toils of civilised nations; whose ignorance and simplicity permit them to barter away their noble forests for a mess of pottage; who are steeped in poverty and ignorance--the constant dupes of unscrupulous and mercenary neighbors; the victims of strong passions; without friends, without help, without sympathy--children of the present hour.  

1. Geographical Condition of Taiwan: Physical Environment as an Asset (A)

Taiwan is situated in the middle of a series of islands in the West Pacific Ocean, between the Ryukyu Islands, Okinawa and the Philippines and to the southeast of China, encompassed by waters – the East China Sea to the north, the Pacific Ocean to the east which is more than 4,000 meters in depth, the Bashi Channel to the south and Taiwan Strait to the west which is less than 70 meters in depth. The nearest islands to Taiwan are the Ryukyu Islands which are less than 128,748 meters from eastern Taiwan and around 160,934.4 meters from mainland China. The total area of Taiwan is 22,487,363.7 square meters. It is approximately 394,289 meters long and 144,841 meters wide with 25 main rivers, mostly in the western plain of Taiwan. The west coast consists mostly of sandbars, shoals and lagoons in the south, which are in contrast to the precipitous and rocky cliffs which fall rapidly to the Pacific Ocean on the east coast of Taiwan. The most remarkable feature of Taiwan is a chain of steep mountains, up to 3,048 meters in height at least, occupying the most central and eastern parts of the island and accompanied by discrete and numerous hills up to 1,524 meters in height. The highest point is Yu Shan or Mt. Morrison (3,996.84 meters) which is situated in the centre of Taiwan. Mountain areas are mostly covered by exuberant forest up to a height of 914.4 meters consisting of palms, banyan, cork, camphor trees, tree ferns, dense thickets, gigantic Cryptomerias and

Chamaecyparis. Most of the land in the western plain area is less than 304.8 meters above sea level and is composed of the deposition of silt and alluvial plains where most economic crops were planted.² See Map 2:1 below.

An Estonian naval office, Pavel Ivanovich Ibis, visited Taiwan for a month in the year of 1875 after the Japanese expedition, and gave an interesting account of the east and west

geographical contrast of Taiwan as, “a ridge height of 8000 feet stretches for 115 miles in north-northeasterly direction, forms a strict divide, then quickly decreases in altitude to the south. But to the north it abuts an equally high, but only 15 mile long mountain range that is perpendicular to it (Dodd’s range), and ends in a chaotic jumble ... Moving westward, there are terraces of clay and sand layers with an almost imperceptible decline towards the east, and finally the plain, which contains almost all of the third part of the island, its west side; only slowly declining to the sea, it forms a shallow coast only accessible at a few places.”

Unfavourable coastal lines with rugged coast on the east and inadequate entry points, restricted outsiders from landing on the island. Yet some Chinese fishermen from the southern coast province sailed from time to time to Taiwan and traded with the indigenes who inhabited the west coast plain area, but indigenes could always expel them from the island. Indigenes living in the north and the east were protected by the range of lofty mountains and dense forest which served as natural fortifications. Every river, mountain, hill, ravine or forest could easily turn into their defence or ambush positions. Their understanding and comprehensive knowledge of terrains gave them great advantages in hunting expeditions or tribal warfare.

On the contrary, the location of Taiwan and its hazardous topography especially in eastern Taiwan, restrained the likelihood of searching for new residence or for land which could produce rich crops. Moreover, just as today unpredictable weather or natural disasters such as earthquakes and typhoons in summer and autumn which carried immense and incessant rain and strong winds often caused severe damage by floods or mudflows which might flush or blow away their dwellings, crops and animals. Some coherence can be found from an encyclopaedic Dutch work on China by Arnoldus Montanus in the seventeenth century, where “Formosa, especially the coast, suffers much storms and tempests; for often times the wind blows down whole trees and houses, rending both walls and roofs from top to bottom ... It also rains here very much; wherefore none can travel above two months, being December and January.”

Indigenous people in Taiwan have learnt to adapt to their physical environment; on the other

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hand, they were restrained by the geographical conditions and natural disasters from which they could not escape.

2. Formosan Indigenes and Cultural Assets (B)

Formosan indigenes will be mainly treated as a whole in this thesis as their cultures, economic activities and beliefs share similarity. Due to the early or later contact with outsiders and various levels of assimilation with Chinese culture, indigenes in Taiwan were commonly divided into two groups: mountain indigenes and plains indigenes. This also reflects on their experience of and access to technology therefore I will use mountain indigenes as the often called uncivilised or ferocious inhabitants in the mountains in both Chinese and Western literature, and plains indigenes and pepos as civilised or domestic inhabitants on the western plain of Taiwan. Specific groups of indigenes will be identified when necessary. Formosan indigenes did not have written records themselves, so we can only try to understand their lives and cultures from travellers’ journals, missionaries’ reports and governmental reports in Chinese and European languages and later from some anthropologists, governmental and police reports in Japanese during Japanese colonization (1895-1945). Their observations and descriptions of Formosan indigenes might suit their preferences due to their positions and their priorities of the time; however, it will be sufficient to give us a broad picture of how Formosan indigenes associated with others in the nineteenth century.

Formosan indigenes were firstly systematically studied by Inō Kanori, Torii Ryuzo and Mori Ushinosuke who were ethnographers and anthropologists sent by the Japanese government from 1896. From linguistic evidence, Taiwan indigenous people are Austronesians or Malayo-Polynesians who share the same language family in the Pacific Ocean and Indian Ocean areas such as Madagascar, Indonesia, the Philippines, New Guinea, Hawaii, etc.  

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5 Qing literati often called mountain indigenes—shengfan (生番 raw aborigines) and Plains indigenes shufan (熟番 “cooked indigenes”). Most of European writers refer Chin-huan as mountain indigenes and shufan as “Sek-huan” “Pepohwans” or “Plains indigenes” who were defined by their submission to Qing rules through their payment of head tax or the levels of cultural assimilation with Chinese. Later Japanese government maintained the categorization from Qing and later called mountain indigenes—takasago-zoku 高砂族 and plains indigenes - Pepo

6 Austronesian languages are the most extensive languages family in the world, which comprise over 1,000 languages and were spoken by 351 million people. Taiwan indigenes belong to the most northern region among the Austronesian languages family and the current hypothesis suggest that an origin of Austronesia languages was in Taiwan based on its linguistic evidence. David R. Thomas, ‘Asal Usul Orang Austronesia (Origins of the
However, the origin and the arrival of Formosan indigenes remain uncertain from different disciplines’ pursuits including archaeology, anthropology, linguistic and human genetic studies. Currently the Council of Indigenous People, Executive Yuan has recognized 16 groups based on their culture and language differences: Amis 阿美族, Atayal 泰雅族, Paiwan 排灣族, Bunun 布農族, Tsou 蘆凱族, Rukai 魯凱族, Puyuma 卑南族, Saisiyat 賽夏族, Yami 達悟族, Thao 邵族, Kavalan 噶瑪蘭族, Truku 太魯閣族, Sakizaya 撒奇萊雅族, Seediq 賽德克族, Hla'alua 拉阿魯哇族 and Kanakanavu 卡那卡那富族. Currently approximately 530,000 Formosan indigenes, also known as Yuanzhumin 原住民 live in the middle and eastern parts of Taiwan, except the Yami who live on Lan-Yu or Orchid Island. Indigines constituted 2.38% of the entire population of Taiwan in December 2013.

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8 Council of Indigenous People, Executive Yuan: http://www.apc.gov.tw

9 Yami 達悟族 will not be included in this research as of less occurrence in resistance and engagement with mainland Taiwan.

10 Hla'alua 拉阿魯哇族 and Kanakanavu 卡那卡那富族 were categorised as part of Tsou 蘆凱族, until June, 2014 when Taiwanese government legally recognised them as separated tribes.

11 Yuáinzhuměn 原住民 means native/indigenous residence in Chinese which is commonly used in Taiwan nowadays, but in this thesis I intend to use Indigenes or Formosans.
Formosan indigenous tribes were commonly divided into two major groups – mountain indigenes, who are Amis, Atayal, Paiwan, Bunun, Tsou, Rukai, Puyuma, Saisiyat, Yami, Thao, Truku, and Seediq. Distinguished from these were the Pingpu or Pepos or plains indigenes: the Kevalan, Ketagala, Taokas, Pazeh, Papora, Babuza, and Makatau. According to Formosan

12 Siraya was recognized by Tainan city
languages Professor Jen-Kuei, Li, Basay 馬賽, Luilang 雷朗 and Trobian 多囉美遠 belong to Ketaglan group; Taokas 道卡斯, Papora 巴布拉, Babuza 巴布薩/貓霧揀 and Favorlang 費佛朗 belong to Barburan 巴布蘭; Siraya/ Siraiya 西拉雅, Makattao 馬卡道 and Taivoan 四社熟番. (See Map 2:3) Most of the Pingpu reside in the northeast Lanyan plain, the Taipei basin, the west coast plain of Taiwan to the south plain, but mostly are not recognized yet by the Taiwanese government except Kevalan and Thao tribes. Pingpu or Pepos are also commonly known as having largely adopted Chinese culture and became assimilated to those Chinese who largely settled in Taiwan from the seventeenth century from Fujian Province and Guangdong Province.

Map 2:3 Distribution of Pingpu tribes
2.1. Belief and Socio-Political Structures

Most Formosan indigenes are Christians nowadays since Christianity was first introduced by Dutch and Spanish missionaries in the seventeenth century and were later largely converted by English and Canadian Presbyterian ministers in the nineteenth century. After years of hard work from medical missionaries, churches, hospitals, and schools were set up in indigenous villages from the late nineteenth century. Christianity remains in co-existence with Formosan indigenes’ original belief system – animism, which regards natural objects and phenomenon as having spirits. They believe these invisible spirits accompanied by their ancestors’ spirits are in mountains to protect their communities, agriculture, and hunting, and closely associate with their fortune and misfortune in daily lives and social-political structures. Their admiration and fear toward spirits, also called “Zuling” 祖靈 is demonstrated in various ceremonies which are led and interpreted by tribal sorcerers or sorceress or priests. Ceremonies were meant to entertain or please their Zuling and were held when planting crops, harvesting, hunting and head hunting, at weddings, coming-of-age ceremonies, funerals, and also when there were occurrences of disaster or spread of disease. Their awareness of spirits developed and maintained order within their societies through sacred law and old customs which they inherited from their ancestors in order to rejoin them after death. For instance, Atayal, Seediq and Truku call their ancestral spirits “utux” or “utux rudan” which is the driving force of complying gaga or gaya/waya – unwritten ethics and law interwoven within their societies since the day they were born. There are rules and traditional taboos covering marriage, death, sowing festival, ancestral spirits offerings, naming, hunting, headhunting, exchange ritual, life rituals, which are subject to the norms under gaga, gaya/waya. Gaga, gaya/waya

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specifications covers the entire tribe, and once someone breaches gaga, gaya/waya such as in betrayal, divorce or adultery, gaya groups or others apply utux tribal punishment, and it brings bad luck. This dependency of their beliefs in Zuling and their ancestral regulations when practising old customs not only forms strong tribal consciousness, it also defines their social-political structures.

From Japanese colonization until the present day, governments and scholars have been studying Formosan indigenous societies and their socio-political organisations. They could be approximately summarised into these types: (A) matrilineal societies with age-graded systems: Amis, Sakizaya, Puyuma and Pepos (B) amalgamative patrilineal societies: Atayal, Sediq, Saiyiat, Tsou, Bunun, Truku (C) dominate-based societies by aristocracy: Rukai and Paiwan. Each of their societies operated differently, sometimes sharing similarities relating to the distribution of power, classes and the social functions of females and males, etc. In matrilineal societies with male age-graded systems, females dominated domestic issues and simple agriculture, and inherited family properties; males monopolised political affairs and hunting. In Amis, Sakizaya and Puyuma, boys from the age of 12 had to live in a gathering house where they received training for hunting from senior male members and participated in tribal affairs until married. Male elders were highly respected and were responsible for supervision, guidance, education and trial within their age-graded system (Figure2:1). Amalgamative patrilineal societies, Atayal, Sediq, Bunun and Truku are egalitarian and acephalous. The chief or toumu is usually

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14 Allis Nokan 瓦歷斯諾幹 and Yu Guanghong 余光弘, Taiwan Yuanzhumin Shi -Taiyazu Shi Pian 臺灣原住民史-泰雅族史篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes: Atayal) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 2002); Hei dai ba yan 黑帶巴彥, Taiyaren de Shenghuo Xingtai Tanyuan- Yi Ge Taiyaren de Xianshen Shuofa 一個泰雅人的現身說法 (The Origin of Atayal’s Life Style: An Atayal’s Experience) (Hsinchu County: Hsinchu County Cultural Affairs Bureau, 2002).


17 No leader
elected and judged by senior members and is non-hereditary. The selection was based on his talent, courage in war, hunting and headhunting and moral reputation. The Atayal divided their society into different functional groups such as kinship, ceremonies, hunting, purification or conjugation, unlike the Bunun who divided into clans, each clan sharing equal responsibility for public affairs, territories, economic activities and so on. Both Saisiyat and Tsou were male dominated communities which depended on their totems or clans and male elders were also highly regarded and engaged within tribal affairs most of the time. Young males in the Tsou when they reached the age of 12 to 13 also had the tradition of living in a gathering house to receive training in tribal history, culture, hunting and living skills. The components of the Rukai and Paiwan societies were aristocracy—the dominant party, and commoner. Both of these were hereditary. The eldest child became chief or toumu and obtained the ownership of land, hunting territories, rivers and collected taxes and managed tribal affairs and ceremonies. The rest of the children and relatives of aristocracy spread into different ranks and obtained various rights and duties. The characteristics of aristocracy can be found in their head ornaments, leopard leather, clay pots, beads, bronze knife, and some rare articles and carving or pattern on their beams and poles (Figure 2:2 & 2:3). Single males in Rukia also had to devote themselves to the gathering house and oblige tribal rules. Later chiefs/ toumu were appointed by the Japanese government for easier management. Their social-political structures strongly depended on and fit tight with their belief system, which assisted in forming a strong consensus of obligation towards their communities. This gave them strength when encountering other cultures in order to protect themselves even if they died in battles. Their strict social structure gave them strong support and resilience during conflicts and resistance.

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Figure 2:1 Male Gathering House


Figure 2:2 Rukai noble woman and man
Figure 2:3 Paiwan Warrior with leather cap, ornament with leopard teeth and firearm


2.2. Headhunting

Headhunting represented a significant and glorious activity for male indigenes in their societies although it was the most savage marker for most outsiders from the seventeenth century. Zhang Xuyi suggests that the early investigators of headhunting like Inō Kanori first claimed that the headhunting ritual was the natural result of competition for survival which focused on the external pressure emanating from the Chinese. However, later Mori Ushinosuke revised this and suggested that indigenous headhunting was a congenital custom rather than behaviour as the result of competition with Chinese resettlement.²¹ For instance, Atayal and

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²¹ Zhang Xuyi 張旭宜, ‘Taiwan Yuanzhumin Chucao Guanxi Yu Zongdufu de Lifan Zhengce 臺灣原住民出草慣習與總督府的理番政策 [Aboriginal’s Headhunting Custom in Taiwan and The Taiwan Government-General’s Policy of Indigens Management]’ (MA, National Taiwan University, 1995), 6–7.
Seediq believed the spirit of heads they hunted became a protective spirit to maintain and expand individual and tribal spiritual energy which pursued their ancestor or “utux”. Atayal often called headhunting, “m3-gaga”, meaning practising old custom—gaga. Therefore, the more heads they hunted, the stronger and more powerful the tribes. Zhang used the view of Okada Ken on Tsou’ headhunting custom that it acted as mediator between tribes and god, the heads they hunted would expand their community spiritually and bring prosperous harvest and hunting to tribes. Similarity can be found with the Amis who considered heads would please their “malataw” (God of war) in order to bring good harvest. Head-hunters showed off and gained courage while dancing in front of the heads and pouring wine into the heads’ mouths in the ceremonies. This strong consensus of practising old custom meant to benefit their communities dominated every male indigene aiming at pursuing heads, which lead them to be closely engaged with and recognized by their ancestors as well as their communities. This somehow echoes what Steere remarked on in the late nineteenth century, “this custom is not founded upon a desire for revenge but upon a love for heads for their own sake.”

This unusual headhunting ritual and its significance among the indigenous societies was commonly narrated by visitors in the nineteenth century. For example, Taintor’s account during his trip in northern Formosa in 1869 showed how the head hunting ritual and skulls were valued and determined a person’s position within indigenous communities:

The savage has higher motives; his rank and character depend on his personal prowess and valour; and a savage who has not killed and beheaded a Chinaman is “of no use,” as it was explained to me. His word is not believed, he has no respectable standing in the community, and in general terms it may be said of him that he has not won his spurs. He rises in position and character according to the number of heads he can count, and those who get the most heads become, as it is in truth said,

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the head-men of the village.26

Professor Steere also noted, “Head taking an honor with them, young man cannot take a wife until (he) has taken a head.”27 A Chinese governor, Hu Zhuan 胡傳 also noted the heads that indigenous man hunted could be used as a betrothal gift, even if the indigenous woman did not wish to marry. Unless the woman’s brothers could hunt a head to return the favour, the woman had to marry the man.28 These both show that the possession of hunted heads was significant to indigenous men when pursuing a wife. Teenage boys were taught and witnessed the importance of headhunting during their stay in the gathering house and were lead by their elder male family members on headhunting expeditions. Guerin, the French Vice Consul visited Taiwan in 1868 and noted that, “when a boy is between twelve and fourteen years old, his father, brother or some relative takes him on a Chinese-hunting expedition.”29 Steere also described the indigenous boys as sleeping on the ground near many human skulls in the hut and he interpreted it as “perhaps to make them courageous and to give them a desire to possess the heads of their enemies.”30 Although plains indigenes seemed to give up practising the head hunting ritual for a long time, their reverence for human skulls could be noticed by Chinese officials in the eighteenth century such as Huang Shu-Jing and Lan Ding-Yuan, who were concerned with indigenous affairs and wrote about how skulls were decorated with gold or tinfoil and held as treasures by indigenes.31 By the nineteenth century, a similar respectful manner of plains indigenes could be seen. For instance, Ibis noted how they worshiped skulls by sacrificing something twice a month and how the skulls were involved at birth, wedding and death ceremonies as part of their religious customs.32 In 1897 in the The China Review, a former

27 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 190.
28 Hu Zhuan 胡傳, Taidong Zhou Caifang Ce 臺東州采訪冊 [Journal of Taidong], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 [Literary Collectanea on Taiwan] 81 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 49–50.
30 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 96.
31 Huang Shujing 黃淑璥, Tai Hai Shichalu 臺海使槎錄 [A Tour of Duty in the Taiwan Sea], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 [Literary Collectanea on Taiwan] 4 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1957); Lan Dingyuan 藍鼎元, Dong Zheng Ji 東征集 [Record of the Eastern Campaign], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 [Literary Collectanea on Taiwan] 12, 1958.
resident living in Taiwan for 5 years reported, how the “relics of their ancient religion, the deer’s and wild boar’s heads, are now in many houses supplantsed by the familiar joss.” According to these customs of plains indigenes, the heads they worshipped, or even the replacement of human heads by the animals’ heads, were valued by them still. Human skulls were also displayed proudly by the indigenes in their villages or huts, as described by Steere,

a little platform with twenty-four human skulls upon it. There had evidently been some ceremony over these recently, and they were decorated with little branches of bamboo and streamers of red cloth ... The central one evidently the most recently taken, had a little arbor built over it, as if it was worthy of some special honor.

The hair from the head they hunted then became the indigenes’ ornaments as in,

he appeared extremely proud, he showed us the tail of six Chinamen, tied up in a bunch, which he said had belonged to men that he had killed; each tail had a small piece of scalp attached to it.

This was shown to Captain Bax, by indigenous men from the south during his visit. The photos in Figure 2:4 and Figure 2:5 were taken during the Japanese period, but they reveal scenes that Steere and Bax tried to present in their narratives.

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34 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 51.

Figure 2:4 A Bunun man of the Kantaban group in the P’u-li areas carrying a newly taken head of an Atayal native of the Wu-she group.

Source: Sung Wenxun 宋文薰, 日據時代臺灣原住民族生活圖譜 (The Pictorial Life of the Taiwan Aborigines During the Japanese Period), 113

Figure 2:5 Skull rack of Paiwan near the entrance of Bogari village.
Tribal ceremonies were strongly linked with headhunting and some of them are still practised today such as djemulja (Stabbing ball 刺球) which represented the human head in the Paiwan’s Maleveg.36 Young boys in the Puyuma tribes at the age of 12-18 had to participate in “mangamangayaw” or “basibas” (Monkey ceremony 猴祭). During the ceremony, they killed monkeys as in the practice of headhunting and wished for success in headhunting expedition when they grew up (Figure 2:6). 37 The Sakizaya family would prepare a “lapid” (headhunting bag) for teenage boys, who were the lowest class of their age ranks before they entered the gathering house. (Figure 2:7) The inheritance of the “lapid” from the elders in the family not only represented entering the age-ranks system as in tribal tradition, but also symbolised male courage.38 Guérin also noted that “If hunting is successful, the child receives his first chevron, in this case a tattoo mark, when he brings the heads back to the village. But his chin is not decorated until he has slain a Chinese with his own hand. There is often a very brief lapse of time between the two.”39 Males’ facial or body tattoo in Atayal, Seediq, Truku, Sasiya and Rukai tribes distinguished their glories in headhunting (Figure 2:8).40 Most outsiders were disgusted by Formosan indigenes’ brutal behaviour of obsessing over human heads, however headhunting remained popular within indigenous societies because it had several cultural meanings and social functions.

36 Yang Nanjun 楊南郡, ed., *T anxian T aiwan-T orii Ryūzō de T aiwan Renleixue Zhilǚ 探險台灣-鳥居龍藏的台灣人類學之旅[Exploring Taiwan - Torii Ryūzō’s Taiwan Anthropology Tour]* (Taipei: Yuanliu 遠流, 1996), 290.
39 Guérin and Bernard, ‘Les Aborigènes de L’Île de Formose,’ 556.
Figure 2:6 Puyuma’s “mangamangayaw” or “basibas” – Monkey Ceremony

Source: Digital Museum of Taiwan Indigenous People

Figure 2:7 Atayal’s headhunting bag decorated with human hair

Source: Digital Taiwan-Culture and Nature
http://catalog.digitalarchives.tw/item/00/1b/35/b2.html?_legoryID=5&ClassID=16&TypeID=31&RaceID=6&PhotoID=1984
It is difficult to know when and how Formosan indigenes transferred their headhunting ritual to a resistance “asset” as their natural reaction when facing intruders, but it did give them protection for centuries. Most importantly it rewarded individual pride and status within their communities. The motivations and reasons for the headhunting ritual among different indigenous groups can be broadly summarized after studies by several anthropologists: (a) conflict resolution, (b) vengeance, (c) provability for courage or masculinity, (d) entry requirement into male initiation or power group, (e) eligibility for marriage, (f) disasters or disease elimination, (g) agricultural fertility, (h) emotional vent, (i) gain spiritual power, (j) obtain facial tattoo, (k) forgiveness of previous fault or sin. 41 Can some of these motivations and reasons be thought of as the assets of indigenous headhunting action triggered by the early Chinese settlers who occupied their lands and by later Westerners and the Japanese government who desired to exploit their natural resources? Qing and Japanese governments

41 Various reasons for headhunting were suggested by scholars from the Japanese regime such as Kojima Yoshimichi, Mori Ushinosuke, and contemporary scholars from the Atayal tribe - Masaw Mowna and Zhang Xu-Yi, however the clarification of headhunting reason will not be discussed further here.Kojima Yoshimichi 小島由道, Fanzu Guanxi Diaoacha Baogaoshu 落族慣習調查報告書 [Report on the Customs of Savage Tribes: Atayal Tribe]; Ushinosuke Mori, Shengfan Xingjiao: Mori de Taiwan Tanxian 生蕃行腳：森丑之助的台灣探險 [Explorations of Ushinosuke Mori in Taiwan], trans. Yang Nanjun 楊南郡 (Taipei: Yuanliu 遠流, 2012); Tadasu Suzuki 鈴木質, Taiwan Yuanzhumin Fengsu 台灣原住民風俗 [Customs of Aborigines in Taiwan ]; Mowna Masaw 廖守臣, Taiyazu de Shehui Zuzhi 泰雅族的社會組織 [Atayal Social Organization] (Hualien: Tzu Chi University Research Center on Aboriginal Health, 1998); Zhang Xuyi 張旭宜, ‘Taiwan Yuanzhumin Chucao Guanxi Yu Zongdufu de Lifan Zhengce 臺灣原住民出草慣習與總督府的理番政策 [Aboriginal’s Headhunting Custom in Taiwan and The Taiwan Government-General’s Policy of Indigenes Management].”
struggled to pacify and to persuade Formosan indigenes to give up their headhunting ritual, but usually failed. The headhunting ritual was supposedly forced into abandonment when firearms were confiscated by the Japanese government after several efforts at their prohibition after 1895.

2.3. Economic Activities

Formosan indigenes practised nomad cultivation, which has been regarded as the most primitive way of agriculture and the most effective way to maintain ecological balance: firstly selecting land, burning the land as a process of fertilising, growing rice, millet, sorghum, beans, sweet potatoes, etc for a few years and moving to another area. However, Xiao suggested in the Gazetteer of Zhuluo County 諸羅縣志 that another cultivation method of growing rice, where possibly plains indigenes covered up the land with straw so the weeds rotted and fertilised it, instead of burning the land, avoided destroying grass for deer and their living territory. Plains indigenes’ cultivation skill was of higher efficiency than mountain indigenes, using buffaloes which had been introduced by the Dutch for ploughing and pulling carts. This was maybe the result of earlier contact with Chinese and the gradual adoption of their agricultural techniques. A huge variety of plants and nuts could be found in the forest and used for different purposes in cooking, decorating and making nets for hunting or fishing. Women were mostly engaged with farming and men with hunting and fishing. When harvest periods arrived, women and men reaped together. Hunting was another major economic activity. They had wild boars, bear, deer, pheasants, squirrels, monkeys, tigers, hares, goats, serpents, and hedgehogs and preserved meat with salt. Other parts such as deer horn, penis, skin, gall were sold to the Chinese for medical purposes. Their plentiful experience of hunting wild animals

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42 Wang Songshan 王嵩山, Taiwan Yuanzhumin de Shehui Yu Wenhua 臺灣原住民的社會與文化 [Societies and Cultures of Taiwan Aborigines].
43 Zhou Zhongxuan 周鍾瑄, Zhuluoxian Zhi 諸羅縣志 [Gazetteer of Zhuluo County], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 55 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 96; Xiao Qiongrui 蕭瓊瑞, Daomín · fèngsù · huà : shǐbā shíjī TáiwānYuánzhūmín shēnghuó tǔxiàng 島民 · 風俗 · 畫：十八世紀臺灣原住民生活圖像 [People, Customs, painting: Lives and Pictures of Taiwanese Aborigines in 18th Century] (Taipei: Dong da 東大, 1999), 202.
45 Montanus, Atlas Chinensis Being a Second Part of A Relation of Remarkable Passages in Two Embassies from the East-India Company of the United Provinces to the Vice-Ray Singlamong and General Taising Lipovi and to Konchi, Emperor of China and East-Tartary: With a Relation of the Netherlanders Assisting the Tartar against Coxinga and the Chinese Fleet, Who till Then Were Masters of the Sea : And a More Exact Geographical
in mountains, combined with headhunting, offered them clear advantages in defeating invaders (See Figure 2:9 and Chart 2:1). The men of an entire village usually participated in hunting expeditions and each man carried two or three spears, sometimes two or three villages joined together to hunt too. According to Formosa under the Dutch, a rich primary collection of Dutch Reports during the Dutch occupation in the seventeenth century translated by Rev. William Campbell, they had great talents when setting up snares made of cane or bamboo in woods or in places where their target animals—mostly deer and pigs—often appeared in great numbers. Another way of setting up snares was in narrow paths or open fields tied with bent bamboos, secured by small piece of wood and covered by earth. When their target animal passed by, the bamboos sprung right up and caught its legs, then they killed it with their spears. They caught thousands of animals yearly by using these methods. The Dutch also relied on such indigenous hunting skill to obtain deer skins which were highly valuable articles exported from Taiwan in the seventeenth century. Domestic animals were also treated as their meat supply. It is noticed by Captain Bax that Pepo villagers bred pigs, fowls, ducks and geese. Dogs were treated as their company in households and used in hunting expeditions, and eating dog meat was prohibited. Almost all Formosan indigenous groups were good at fishing by setting traps, using nets, spears or baskets, poisoning and various methods (See Figure 2:10). Abundant natural resources in Taiwan offered Formosan indigenes independent and self-sufficient lives. Food supply should be taken into account during their prolonged resistance, as it can be seen as a supportive element. The intrusion from Chinese settlers, Chinese and later Japanese governments reduced the food supply in their territories, which provoked greater warfare.

Commerce was another important economic activity for Formosan indigenes. Articles that they commonly traded with the Chinese were mostly luxury goods which could not be found or produced easily by themselves such as firearms, gunpowder, knives, pottery, salt, wine, beads, clothes, iron, copper etc. In return the Chinese gained leopard skin, deer skin, antlers, venison, bear, and mushrooms and sometimes the right to exploit their border land for

References:


Ibid.


Wang Songshan 王嵩山, Taiwan Yuanzhumin de Shehui Yu Wenhua 臺灣原住民的社會與文化 [Societies and Cultures of Taiwan Aborigines].
The lack of iron and steel forced them to trade with the Chinese in order to produce primary weapons for defence. They could also receive goods from foreign visitors, especially from the late nineteenth century. For instance, as British consul Nevill Perkins noted, “They are with few exception, friendly to foreigners, and particularly appreciate gifts of soap, fancy coloured clothes, which they unravel for ornamental purposes, needles, steel implements, small mirrors, and the like. It is hardly necessary to state that arrack, powder, and shot are always welcome acquisitions.” However, the frequency of acquiring goods from foreign visitors like this were variable and unpredictable for the indigenes.

Figure 2:9 Indigenes’ hunting expedition

Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 134.

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51 TEPR 5/193-207, Report on Formosa by Mr. N. Perkins, Consul Nevill Perkins, 31/Jan/1895, 197
2.4. Warfare

Apart from periodic warfare between adjacent tribal groups, countless and various scales of warfare between Formosan indigenous tribes and Chinese settlers were frequently noted by visitors and later became major obstacles for Qing and Japanese colonization in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Conflicts originated mostly over hunting territories which did not have clear demarcation, sources of water and revenge of murder between tribes, but remained small scale and were resolved within a few days. Most of the tribes did not appear to annex other tribes or expand their territory intentionally. According to Taylor’s experience with indigenes in Southern Taiwan during his service as South Cape lighthouse keeper from 1882-1887, tribal warfare only took place when reimbursement required from a plaintiff could not be achieved in a murder case. The ones that then had the most casualties would be considered as in the wrong and to pay indemnity. He also noted “Bush fighting is the general mode of war,
and their engagements are not very sanguinary. Generally, all grown-up men possess a gun, but the bow and spear are also used, the arrow being said to be the most deadly weapon in the bush. As a general rule women or children are never molested, neither are houses fired, nor property plundered; to kill each other being the sole purpose of the warriors. Sometimes, if the two contending tribes do not adjourn, young children are taken captive, but never considered slaves, and become part of the captor’s family. The intention of battles between tribes seemed to be to act as the ultimate resolution for justice instead of slaughtering their opponents. In Xu Yuliang’s research, he discusses briefly the patterns of the Atayal and the Amis in war with other tribes: the Atayal tribe would send a neutral to the enemy tribe and confirm the time and location. The indigenous began to fight once they confirmed the enemy’s identity. The tribal chief would not join the fight. In the Amis tribes, the Amis elders would be the ones who made the decision for going to war, which normally would not last for more than 3 days and all the food would be carried by the warriors themselves. Nevertheless, these continuous tribal conflicts also sustained the capacities of indigenous in combats, which became part of the indigenous’ living style.

3. Pre 1860 Formosa

Formosan indigenous, mostly indigenous in the western plain area, first had limited contacts only from the sixteenth century, usually with fishermen or merchants mostly from Fujian Province or Chinese and Japanese pirates, who rarely settled despite being only 100 miles from southeast coast of China. This section will discuss the relationships and contacts of Formosan indigenous with other outsiders from the seventeenth century when the Dutch began to colonize this fertile island, the Koxinga regime and early Qing governance, before Taiwan opened its ports to European merchants under the Tianjin Treaty of 1858. From here I intend to emphasise the existence of indigenous conflicts or resistances over political, economic and

53 Hu Liangzhen 胡良珍, ‘Nantou Jingguan Saidekeren de Shehui Shenghuo Zhi Yanjiu 南投靜觀賽德克人的社會生活之研究 [Research on the Seediq’s Society and Lives in Nantou]’, Taiwan Wenxian 臺灣文獻 20, no. 4 (1969): 22–24.; Quoted in Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 75.
54 Wei Huilin 衛惠林, ‘Amis de Buluo Zhidu 阿美族的部落制度 [The Tribal System of the Amis]’, 臺灣文獻 9, no. 1 (1958): 8–9.; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 75.
cultural factors that have occurred under different regimes.

3.1. Formosa Before and Under the Dutch (1624-1661)

The Dutch East India Company actively sought trading ports in Asia and claimed its liberty to trade with China from the seventeenth century. After a few failures of occupying the Pescadores (Panghu islands) and defeated by the Ming navy between 1622-1624, the Dutch East India Company turned to Taiwan and established its entrepôt near Tainan in 1624.\(^55\) During 37 years of Dutch colonization, Formosa became a trading centre for gold, silver and silk in Asia while exporting sugar and deer skin to Japan. The Dutch exportation of deer skin and other fur products, from which they gained most of their profits, ranged from 20,000 to 150,000 skins in total from 1634 to 1660.\(^56\)

At first the company dominated the south-western plain areas and gradually spread its influence by using military power to the north, the mountain areas in the east being less explored until the late 1640s when the Dutch sent investigation teams to look for gold. In 1650 the indigenous population was estimated to be between 64,000 and 68,000 according to a Dutch census, with only 2,800 Dutch based in Taiwan, mostly soldiers.\(^57\) Records of Dutch earliest contact in Formosa and with its inhabitants began in 1623, when a Dutch Commander, Cornelis Reijersz, and his fellows investigated Tainan. The indigenes inhabiting Soulang 蕭壠 (Jiali District, Tainan City) and other southern tribes expressed their friendliness and invited his fellows to visit their tribes.\(^58\) However, this peaceful relationship did not last long. The Dutch

\(^{55}\) Under Ming governor’s suggestion and permission, Dutch gave up pursuing Penghu, sent investigation team to Taiwan with and established its garrison. Zhou Wanyao 周婉窈, ‘Shanzai Yaopo Bilangzhong-Zonglun Mingren de Taiwan Renshi 山在瑤坡碧浪中 - 總論明人的臺灣認識 (Ming Conceptions of Taiwan: From Silhouettes to Islands), Tai Da Lishi Xuebao 臺大歷史學報 (Historical Inquiry) 40 (2007): 135–37; Zhang Xiurong 張秀蓉, A Chronology of 19th Century Writings on Formosa: From the Chinese Repository, the Chinese Recorder, and the China Review.


subdued resistances, some of which were incited by Chinese traders who settled earlier, and pacified the indigenous tribes with their superior military weapons. The Dutch attacked plains indigenes in Ma-tou (Madou District, Tainan City) in 1635, burned down Takareiug village, which was the most powerful village in Pintung County, to punish the murderers of Dutchmen. In 1636 soldiers on horseback also attacked Hsing-kang villagers with their muskets. Troops were sent to pacify the Tung-lo and Favorolong several times from 1636 and, finally, in 1641, Tung-lo, Favorolong and other tribes within the region surrendered to the Dutch. 59 Hundreds of musketeers were sent by the Dutch to Sochel Sochel and Kakitapan in 1644 and the plains indigenes attacked the Dutch soldiers by surprise as in “when we marched along some narrow paths, which on both sides were overgrown with tall reeds and coppice, the scoundrels shot and killed two of our men and injured three or four of them suddenly coming out of the thicket and attacking us before we saw them and then immediately they ran off again.” 60 In the end villages and granaries were destroyed and plains indigenes were either killed or fled into mountains. The indigenes were affected by the Dutch firearms and cannon and their reaction was described as, “They immediately ran away, being unable to bear the whine of our bullets, and they were astonished when they saw one of their own lying still without seeing what had struck him.” 61 Due to the fear of the Dutch military prowess, later more and more indigenous tribes sent their representatives and complied with the company. The Dutch East India Company’s power expanded further to northern Taiwan to expel the Spanish after their 16 years of occupation in Tamsui and Keelung (1626-1642), and to explore for gold on the east coast of Taiwan. With superior weaponry like muskets in comparison with indigenous arrows, bows and spears, or by halting salt and iron supplies, the company conquered most of the plains indigenous tribes such as the Wulaowan tribe 武勞灣社 in the Taipei basin 62, the Patsiral, Vatan, and Talleroma tribes etc of the Amis in Hualien County during their gold investigation. Some plain indigenous tribes such as the Dorkop, Tarroboan, Borine submitted themselves with gifts.

of pigs, yam, rice, alcohol to the company or exchanged gifts - cangan, beads, mirror, etc. By 1650, expeditionary forces brought the Dutch effective control over 300 villages across the western plain and the east coast of Taiwan. Indigenous affairs management became one of the major tasks for the Dutch East India Company for easier management and missionary activities. Indigenous tribes originally resided in distant islands such as Lamey (Xiaoliuqiu Township, Pingdong County) and Bottol Tatchel (La-Yu) and mountains such as Sotimor 山豬毛 tribes (Sandimen Township, Pingdong County), Polti tribe 地社 and others were forced or encouraged to relocation or to affiliate with other tribes. However, some displacement did not take effect as the Dutch might have expected, most failed and sometimes lead to insurrection. Professor Kang suggested several other factors of the Dutch’s tribal consolidation which lead to deterioration in relations. He found it often due to the imbalance in power and resource distribution, and the different religions and social structures between original indigenous tribes and newly immigrated tribes.

Missionaries worked as intermediaries between the Dutch, Chinese and the plains indigenous tribes and their duties included: interpreting for civil officers when collecting tax, selling deer-hunting licenses and setting up Christian congregations within plains indigenes’/Chinese communities. A lot of plains indigenes became Christian at this time and later became allies of the Dutch authorities and even quelled rebellions led by Chinese farmers. However, Christian influence on plains indigenes was questionable. Extracts from the “Zeelandia Day – Journal” in 1661 from Formosa under the Dutch revealed how plains indigenes’ religion and customs were long suppressed by missionaries: “these fellows now speak with much disdain of the true Christian faith which we endeavoured to implant in their hearts, and

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65 Kang Peter. 康培德, ‘Helan Dongyindu Gongsi Zhi Xia de Taiwan Yuanzhumin Buluo Zhengbing 荷蘭東印度公司治下的臺灣原住民部落整併 [Tribal Consolidation of Formosan Austronesians under Dutch East India Company], Taiwan Historical Research 17, no. 1 (2010): 3.
66 Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, 63; Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800, 1993, 82.
are delighted that they are now free from attending the schools. Everywhere they have destroyed the books and utensils, and have introduced the abominable usages and customs of heathenism ... they murdered one of our Dutch people; and after having struck off the head they danced around it with great joy and merriment, just as they formerly did with their vanquished enemies.\textsuperscript{67}

With Dutch encouragement and protection, many of the Chinese along the coastal provinces began to migrate to the lower and fertile plains of western Taiwan and to assist with the company’s trading of deerskin and venison from the plains indigenes. Rice and sugar plantations also began in the rich western plain. Plains indigenes were often unfriendly towards the Chinese and attacked them sporadically, taking their heads as rewards when defending their villages, land right and hunting territories. The situation got worse when enormous numbers of Chinese immigrants rushed to settle in Taiwan due to famine and political turmoil in China in the 1640s. According to Shepherd’s estimation, by 1661 the Chinese population was about 35,000, but not more than 50,000.\textsuperscript{68} In 1652, a Chinese rebellion emerged, Guo Huaiyi gathered 4,000 to 5,000 Chinese farmers against the company’s heavy taxation. It was quickly suppressed in 2 weeks with the support of 2,000 “Christian Formosans” and 120 Dutch men with musket or cannon. Nearly 3,000 Chinese were slaughtered.\textsuperscript{69} Without the assistance of the large number of plains indigenes’, the company would probably not have suppressed this rebellion readily, given their limited number of soldiers and weapons.

3.2. Spaniards in the North (1626-1642)

While Spain established its colony in the Philippines, which had become the commercial centre of silver in exchange for Chinese porcelain and silk in East Asia from the 1570s, the need to prevent Dutch interference in their Japanese trade and easier access to trade with China impelled the Spaniards to occupy and build fort San Salvador in Keelung, northern Taiwan, after the Dutch had seized Tayouan in southern Taiwan in 1624. Spaniards also perceived Taiwan as

\textsuperscript{67} Campbell, \textit{Formosa under the Dutch}, 318.
\textsuperscript{68} Shepherd, \textit{Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800}, 1993, 86.
a fine relay point for Catholic missions to China and Japan, with its beneficial location, abundant natural resources and existing mercantile connections with Fujian Province. During the Spanish provisional occupation in Keelung in 1626, which later spread to Tamsui River and another fort, San Domingo in Tamsui in 1628, the plains indigenes, terrified by the Spaniard’s harquebuses fled. However, some returned to “Senar” (probably in the Tamsui area) under Dominican, Jacinoto Esquivel’s encouragement for the convenience of preaching in 1632. Shepherd noted that the natives were invited by Esquivel and some Spaniards to fireworks and sword dance performances to celebrate the return to Senar, however it might have been an occasion to demonstrate Spanish military superiority to the indigenes. Missionaries like Friar Jimenez, Dominican, Francisco Vaez and Luis Muro set up churches and schools in 1633 in Senar with Spanish military assistance, but three years later Father Vaez was killed, the church and houses were burned by indigenes because he had become involved in some tribal conflicts. A few months after the murder of Father Vaez, Muro, 20 Spanish soldiers and 40 workers were ambushed by 300 warriors during their journey to Senar to obtain grain.

Relatively peaceful encounters between indigenes, Spanish, Japanese and Chinese can be found, such as commercial activities or intermarriages in Quimarurri-Taparri and Tamsui. Esquivel documented indigenes trading fish, quarry, wood, salt and other goods with the Spanish, exchanging gold, silver, sulphur, rattan and deer pelts to the Chinese and the Japanese for brass bracelets, bells, clothes, beads and other Chinese products. Plains indigenes in the north interacted with the Spaniards differently in different regions; some adopted the Spanish

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70 Several advantages of establishing port in Taiwan were suggested by Domonican, Martinez, Bartolome in 1619 regards its location, resources, trade, and avoidance of tax and Chinese middlemen. Jose Eugenio Borao, *Spaniards in Taiwan (SIT)*, vol. 2 (Taipei: SMC Pub., 2001), 40–41; Jose Eugenio Borao, *The Spanish Experience in Taiwan 1626-1642: The Baroque Ending of a Renaissance Endeavor* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2009), 41–42.

71 Borao, *Spaniards in Taiwan (SIT)*, 2:73. Harquebus was the first infantry gunpowder firearms, which developed in the early 16th century in Europe. It was considered as an effective and accurate weapon, which required little training, but it took several minutes to reload. Clive Ponting, *World History: A New Perspective* (Pimlico, 2001), 574.

72 Dominican, Jacinoto Esquivel was one of the Spanish missionaries in Keelung and Tan-shui areas when Spanish first established forts in northern Taiwan from 1630-1633. Esquivel and other missionaries built churches and schools in the area, educated children to write and read, learned indigenous language and wrote a grammar and vocabulary books. In his report *Memoria de las cosa pertenecientes al estado de Isla Hermosa*, he gave valuable and rich descriptions of indigenous people’s lives and missionary work in northern Taiwan. Jose Eugenio Borao, ‘The Aborigines of Northern Taiwan according to 17th Century Spanish Source’, *Taiwanshi Tianye Yanjiu Tongxun* 27 (1993): 100.


75 Borao, *Spaniards in Taiwan (SIT)*, 2:168.
language and converted to Catholicism, but some murderous incidents also occurred including pillaging grounded ships and attacking foreign sailors. Unlike the Dutch who had strong military capacity in southern Taiwan, especially after 1636, the Spanish governor decided to reduce his garrison in Tamsui and withdrew to Keelung with 127 Spanish soldiers and some Pampangans to reduce its cost as the revenue did not reach the level they expected. The news of the Spanish withdrawal soon spread to the Dutch and thus began their plan to expel the Spanish with indigenes’ assistance. In August 1642, the Spanish surrendered to the Dutch after several days of siege and weaponry shortage. The Spanish base in northern Taiwan had only lasted 16 years, but local indigenes sustained rudimentary contact with the Spanish, mostly through Catholic missionaries and trade. The Spanish did not seem to have had effective control over the indigenes despite their superior weapons. When the Spanish sent a troop of soldiers to punish indigenes in Turboan after nearly 80 Spanish people were killed in a shipwreck incident in 1632, “since the natives outnumbered them, they could not do more, which made them even more arrogant, and scornful of the other natives who, out of fear of Spaniards, made friends with them.”

3.3. Zheng’s Governance (1661-1683)

Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga) 鄭成功 and his 25,000 men and 200 vessels reached Tayouan (Tainan City) in April 1661 after being defeated by the Manchus in Nanjing in 1659. Soon Zheng managed to find a grain supply in Sakam and beleaguered Provintia, the Dutch fort with Chinese residents’ assistance. Compared with Zheng’s military forces, the Dutch had less than 2,000 soldiers, 2 vessels, 3,000 pounds of gunpowder and other limited supplies in Zeelandia. After nine months’ siege by Zheng’s army, the Dutch surrendered to Zheng in Feb

76 At least three ship incidents occurred in 1628 and 1632 when grounding in northern coast, at least over 100 Spanish, Chinese and Japanese sailors were slaughtered by indigenes inhabited along the coast. Ibid., 2:163–64, 174.
77 Ibid., 2:163.
78 Yang Ying 楊英, Congzheng Shilu 從征實錄 [Veritable Record of the Punitive Expedition], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 7 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 185–86; Jiang Risheng 江日昇, Taiwan Waiji 臺灣外記 [Unofficial Record of Taiwan], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 60 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1960), 193–94; Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, 70–71, 413; Xu Wen-Xiung, ‘From Aboriginal Island to Chinese Frontier: The Development of Taiwan before 1683’ in Chinese Island Frontier: Studies in the Historical Geography of Taiwan (Taipei: SMC Pub., 1995), 22.
79 Campbell, Formosa under the Dutch, 413–14.
1632 and handed over Zeelandia Castle with artillery, war material, treasure and state property.\(^{80}\)

Soon after some chiefs of the plains indigenes made peace with Zheng Chenggong. Plains indigenes near Sakam (Cikan) in Tainan County such as the Xingang, Muchialiwan 目加溜灣 (Shan Hua 善化), Xiaolung, Matou, Taliwu 他里霧 and Panhsien 崩山 in central Taiwan welcomed his arrival and received clothes and tobacco from him during his tour of inspection with his soldiers.\(^{81}\) Meanwhile, many Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong flowed into Taiwan, Hsu estimated that the Chinese population reached up to 100,000 by the end of Zheng rule, twice as many as in the Dutch period. Some were families of Zheng’s army, but mostly the immigrants were peasants who sought to avoid Manchu’s maritime forbiddance and coastal population removal policies from 1656-1681.\(^{82}\) Zheng widely encouraged his troops and Chinese settlers to cultivate crops, mostly rice and sugar plantations and to open “new lands” to meet its provision.\(^{83}\) By 1681, Zheng’s reclamation had spread throughout most of the western plain area from Longkiauw 異嶠 (Hengchun Township, Pingdong County) to Keelung. Zheng also continued international trade, (mainly exporting deer skins to Japan) and adopted a Dutch taxation system in order to recover revenue after years of battling with the Manchus. Plains indigenes were heavily taxed via paying their head tax either by cash from deer hunting with a fixed rate or paying by grain\(^{84}\) and were required to contribute in corvée labour service and to be enrolled in Zheng’s military.\(^{85}\) Inevitably, this series of reclamation of lands and exploitations of indigenous tax and labour clashed with plains indigenes. Jiang Risheng 江日昇 noted in July 1661, how the plains indigenes of Tatu 大肚 (Dadu District, Taizhong City), lead by Adegou 阿德狗 were incited to revolt and slaughtered Yang Kao 楊高. Zheng sent military force twice, lead by Yang Zhu 楊祖 first and Huang An 黃安 and Chen Rui 陳瑞 later finally pacified

\(^{81}\) Ruan Minxi 阮旻錫, *Haishang Jianwen Lu 海上見聞錄 [A Record of What Was Seen and Heard on the Sea]*, Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 24 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 39; Jiang Risheng 江日昇, *Taiwan Waiji 臺灣外記 [Unofficial Record of Taiwan]*, 205; Davidson, *The Island of Formosa*, 50; Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800, 1993, 94.
\(^{82}\) Xu Wen-Xiung, ‘From Aboriginal Island to Chinese Frontier: The Development of Taiwan before 1683’, 23.
\(^{83}\) Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800*, 1993, 100.
\(^{84}\) Plains indigenes in Feng-shan area developed agriculture and less engaged with deer hunting.
\(^{85}\) Gao Gongqian 高拱乾, ed., *Taiwanfu Zhi 臺灣府志 [Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture]*, Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 65 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1694), 129–30; Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800*, 1993, 102.
Tatu fan 大肚番 and executed Adegou. 86 This was before Zheng defeated the Dutch. A severe revolt of plains indigenes in Shalu 沙轆 (Shalu District, Taizhong City) in 1670 was documented in Taihai shicha lu 臺海使槎錄 (A Tour of duty in the Taiwan Sea), Liu Guoxuan 劉國軒 commanded his arms and massacred a great number of the plains indigenes. 87 In another instance five to six hundred face-tattooed mountain indigenes of Touweilungan 斗尾龍岸 (probably Atayal living around upstream of Beigang River) fought against Zheng Jing’s 鄭經 (Zheng Chenggong’s son) three thousand men, but Zheng struggled to exterminate them, but only burned their huts as they escaped into mountains. Several disturbances aroused by the indigenes of Xingang (Xingang Township, Jiayi County) and Taokas groups in Zhuqian 竹塹 (Xinzhu City) in 1682 were noted by Yu Yungo 郁永和, but again the indigenes fled into the mountains after further battles with Zheng’s army. 88 With Zheng’s advanced weaponry such as arrows, crossbows, pikes with iron heads and matchlocks which had been used efficiently in defeating the Dutch 89 with sufficient military force, the indigenes were either repressed or escaped into mountains as most of them were familiar with local terrains which gave them some advantages in surviving battles. The weapons they held were still in a primary stage, not sufficient enough to fight against Zheng’s military forces. By contrast, the Chinese did not cause any insurrection under Zheng’s rule. Until Zheng surrendered to the Qing in 1683, most plains indigenous tribes in southern Taiwan were affected by Zheng, but not yet the mountain indigenes.

3.4. Early Qing Governance (1683-1858)

Zheng submitted to the Qing peacefully in September 1683 after Shi Lang 施琅—a former Zheng’s admiral who turned to the Qing later, attacked the Pescadores with 300 Qing war vessels and blocked Zheng’s food supply along the coast. An original plan of officials in China was to abandon Taiwan and return Chinese immigrants after conquest. However, Shi Lang insisted on retaining Taiwan for Qing maritime security, which reduced the cost of garrisons on

86 Jiang Risheng 江日昇, Taiwan Waiji 臺灣外記 [Unofficial Record of Taiwan], 204.
87 Huang Shujing 黃淑璥, Tai Hai Shichalu 臺海使槎錄 [A Tour of Duty in the Taiwan Sea], 128.
88 Yu Yonghe 郁永和, Bihai Jiyou 裨海紀遊 [Records of Travels on a Small Sea], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 44 (Taipe: Taiwan Bank, 1959), 56.
89 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, 37.
southeast coast and benefited from its deer, sulphur and other natural products. The following year, Taiwan became a prefecture of Fujian Province. The remainders of Zheng and his military forces were sent to China or merged with Qing armies. Many Chinese colonists without wives and property returned to China after being long hard-pressed under Zheng’s rule. Those who chose to stay were required to register with local officials. The Qing regime became now the longest regulating colonist in Taiwanese history.

3.4.1. Circumstances of the Plains indigenes

Indigenes went through various phases when interacting with outsiders under Qing rule. This is also the period when the western plains were largely dominated by the Chinese under Qing rule and plains indigenes were massively victimised and assimilated by them; in contrast, the eastern mountain areas were neglected by the Qing government and became places where plains indigenes relocated when the Chinese took over their lands, and were where the leaders of Chinese riots escaped to from Qing’s suppression. In early Qing governance of Taiwan (1683-1730s), partial quarantine was imposed by the Qing government in order to prevent any potential rebellion. The Qing regulated immigration by only giving licenses to male migrants, not families and restricted rice exports. They also continued the tax system from the Dutch and Zheng regimes and reduced 30 to 40 % of tribal tax quotas for indigenes and the Chinese head and land tax until 1737. Plains indigenes could have possibly gained their lives back slowly without much disturbance from the Chinese and with less burden of tax; however, from the 1700s lawless Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong began to cross the strait and claimed lands in Taiwan even without licenses. The Qing noticed the ecological pressure and ethnic conflicts that Chinese migrants might cause and proposed to protect plains indigenes’ land rights. At first, they only allowed Chinese to rent lands from the plains indigenes, renewed the contract every two or three years and forbade Chinese purchasing indigenous lands privately. They also made local officials draw and name borderlines to protect plains indigenes’ lands from local Chinese harassment. Plains indigenes could not escape from Chinese trespassing, not paying

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90 Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800, 1993, 106.
91 Ibid., 107, 111.
92 Ibid., 108-9.
93 Li Zuji 李祖基, Taiwan Lishi Yanjiu 臺灣歷史研究 [Historical Research in Taiwan] (Taipei: Haixia xueshu chubanshe 海峽學術出版社, 2008), 305–8. Further reading on the plain indigene land right, see Ke Zhi-Ming 柯致明.
rent, illegally occupying their land, and sometimes tricking illiterate ones into selling their lands. Plains indigenes were also heavily abused by Chinese tongshi 通事 who were responsible for collecting the tribal tax, assigning indigenous labour service, and monopolizing trade with them, although cases were often found showing that the fees they extorted from them were several times more than their original tax obligation. To avert extra burden from Chinese interpreters, some plains indigenes lived near Chinese settlers or the Chinese administration selected their own indigenous interpreters and helped in dealing with officials directly. Corrupted officials were often found to assist extortion in remote places by accepting bribes from Chinese interpreters to renew their licenses. Xu Yuliang also mentioned that from 1759 plains indigenes replaced Chinese and became tongshi 通事 in Tamsui, Zhanghua and Zhuluo Counties, but it was unclear if the circumstance of plains indigenes had improved or not. Moreover, local officials commonly imposed corvée service on plains indigenes: duties included carrying officials in sedan chairs, delivering documents, driving oxcarts for officials between villages undergoing inspections, transporting wood for shipbuilding and serving in military as porters. The plains indigenes suffered greatly as they were abused by Chinese interpreters under the Qing’s rule and were treated worse than under the Dutch and Zheng regimes.

Two plains indigenes resistances in northern Taiwan broke out in 1699 due to the unreasonable requests and labour abuse by Chinese interpreters. The most severe outbreak began in December 1731, when Lin Wuli 林武力 from the Dajiaxi tribe 大甲西社 gathered its
neighbouring tribes Dajiadong 大甲東社, Tunxiao 吞霄 and other Taokas tribes, and with over 1,000 plains indigenes attacked the yamen, murdered Chinese settlers in Shalu 沙辘 and burned their homes. A month later nearly 2,000 plains indigenes from the Papora 巴布拉 and Babuza 貓霧捒 groups in Zhanghua County allied with the Dajiaxi tribe, besieged Zhanghua city, destroyed military posts and killed numerous soldiers. Finally, it ended after the Qing authorities mobilised 3,000 soldiers from Fujian and plains indigenes from the Anli tribe’s 岸里社 for assistance. This entire rebellion lasted nearly 10 months and caused serious damage to the plains indigenes’ male population, who mostly died in battles or were captured by other submitted plains indigenes who were assisting the Qing government or who escaped into mountains.99 These rebellions eventually forced the Qing government to confront the Chinese abuse and extortion of plains indigenes as they saw the potential threat posed by plains indigenes once they formed affiliations. From 1737 the Qing decreed several policies which attempted to ease the tension between the Chinese and the plains indigenes including tax reduction, inspection of land contracts between them, and prohibition of intermarriage. With increasing numbers of Chinese migrants,100 plains indigenes’ circumstances did not improve, some suffered from losing their lands and were forced to relocate to the eastern mountains from the 1800s, and some gradually assimilated with the Chinese through mixed residence, intermarriage and adopting Chinese customs. The resettlement of plains indigenes might have caused further constraint on the mountain indigenes’ living and hunting space, which resulted in more conflicts.101 Map 2:4 shows the movement of the plains indigenes’ resettlements from the western plain into the mountain areas (See Map 2: 4).

99 Zhan Sujuan 詹素娟 and Zhang Sufen 張素玢, *Taiwan Yuanzhimin Shi-Pingpuzu Shupian (Bei)* 臺灣原住民史-平埔族史篇 (北) (The History of Formosan Indigenes - Pepo Tribes in North) (Nantou: The Historical Research Commission of Taiwan Province, 2001), 248–51.; Chen, Qiu-Kun 陳秋坤, Qing dai Taiwan tuzhu diquan 清代台灣土著地權 [ Taiwan’s Aboriginal Proprietary Rights in the Ch’ing Period] (Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2009), 27–29
100 Several tens of thousands Chinese with families settled in Taiwan in 1743 after Qing removed prohibition on family migration from 1732 to 1740. Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800*, 1993, 150.
The Qing also saw the importance of the assistance of plains indigenes in subduing rebellions. From the second half of the eighteenth century, they began to institutionalise their role of guarding the mountain indigenes’ border.\textsuperscript{102} Plains indigenes’ experience and skills in

\textsuperscript{102} Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800, 1993, 309; Huang Huanyao 黃煥堯, ‘Qingdai Taiwan Fanren Yu Difang Zhian Zhi Guanxi’ 清代臺灣番人與地方治安之關係 [The Indigenes and...
tribal warfare in mountains were indispensable in assisting pacification as they were stronger and faster than the Chinese and with tremendous skills in using spears and arrows in deer hunting. Most importantly, fighting in battles continued their headhunting and hunting customs as reasserting their social status and gaining rewards. Chinese accounts described indigenes’ hunting customs, “Before Taiwan joined Qing’s domain, indigenes hunted for a living, also named as “Chu Cao” 出草; this custom had been practised until now. At their age of ten or over, they were trained to use arrows and bows, catch what they aimed for within 30 to 40 steps away.” As the ethnic conflicts between Chinese settlers got worse, the Qing government often required their assistance in subduing Chinese rebellions or as trackers when they escaped into mountains, particularly in the two biggest Chinese rebellions in the eighteenth century - Zhu Yigui rebellion (朱一貴事件) in 1721 and Lin Shuangwen rebellion (林爽文事件) in 1787. The establishment of a plains indigenes military was developed under this circumstance in 1788 when the Imperial Commissioner Fu Kangan 福康安 suggested selecting plains indigenes and enlisting them in the Qing army. Xu has mentioned how 4,000 plains indigenes were selected, given lands and salary, which was the same as the Green Standard army in Taiwan, and exempted from corvee services. They participated in expelling Chinese pirates Cai Qian 蔡牽 in 1805-1806 and Zhu Fen 朱濆 in 1808 and quelled local revolt such as that of 1826 when the Chinese intermediate Huang Dounai 黃斗奶 initiated an uprising and affiliated with the mountain indigenes in Tamsui and the uprising of Lin Gon 林恭 in Fengshan in 1853. During

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Public Security in Taiwan in the Qing Era] (MA, Chinese Culture University, 1985), 149–53; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 85–91; Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ’Shiba Shiji Qingchao Taiwan Bianfang Zhengce de Yanbian: Yi Aizhi de Xingcheng Weili 十八世紀清朝臺灣邊防政策的演變: 以隘制的形成為例 (The Evolution of Qing Taiwan Border Security Policy in the Eighteenth Century: A Case Study of the Making of “Ai’ System), Taiwan Historical Research 22, no. 2 (2015): 1–44.

103 Fan Xian 范咸, ed., Chong Xiu Taiwānfu Zhi 重修臺灣府志 [Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture Revised], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 105 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1746), 477.

104 軍機大臣會同兵部等部議奏福康安等奏請臺灣設置番屯事宜摺 [A memorial from the Minister of Grand Council and Defence is sent to Fu Kan-An on the request of establishing indigenes military in Taiwan] in 20/07/1788 in Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi 臺灣銀行經濟研究所, ed., Taian Huilu Ren Ji 臺案彙錄壬集 [Taiwan Archives, Seventh Collection], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 227 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1957), 1–8.

105 Green Standard Army was a military unit under the Qing governance, which comprise mostly Han Chinese soldiers. For the development of the Green Standard Army in Taiwan, see Xu Xueji 許雪姬, Qingdai Taiwan de Lüying 清代臺灣的綠營 [The Green Standard in Taiwan during the Ching Dynasty], Monograph Series 54 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1987).

106 Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 85–91.
the outbreak of the Opium War in 1840, they were stationed at Luermen (Tainan City), Keelung and Tamsui. The fighting capacity of the plains indigenes after joining the Qing military should not be neglected. The role of the plains indigenes military and their armament in quelling resistances under the management of the Qing government after 1860 will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

3.4.2. Circumstances of the Mountain Indigenes

Mountain indigenes were less disturbed in comparison with plains indigenes before the nineteenth century, probably because the Chinese and the plains indigenes were terrified of losing their heads in the mountains. Knowledge of the Qing government of the eastern mountain area was limited and mostly gained from merchants, adventurers, Chinese interpreters and farmers who hungered for profiting from resources in the mountains. Most Qing governors described the eastern mountain areas as back mountains 後山 where “uncivilised barbarians” lived, and as covered by dense woods, undulating ridges without roads, uncultivated land and forestry. It was, however, planted with many betel nut trees and rich in gold, which motivated adventurers to risk their lives in further investigation.107 Most of the official Chinese impressions of the mountain indigenes was of their passion for killing, murderous behaviour and resistance to indoctrination which the Qing government found hard to control. For instance, a Superintendent - Fan Xian 范咸 noted in 1747,

The savage indigenes are fond of disorder by nature. When the resources are in shortage, they would come out to hunt and butcher the merchants and civilians ... killing is part of their custom and considered as bravery. They would take the heads of their victims, skin and remove the muscle tissues, and then boil to remove the remaining fat. The heads would then be painted in gold colour and stored in the high shelves in the hovels. The savage indigenes having the most golden skulls would be considered as heroes in the tribe.108

He also noted how the indigenes were scared of gunfire,

There is a tribe high on top of the mountain named Du-Guo. Its

107 Pan Jidao 潘繼道, ‘Qingzhengfu Dui Houshan de Tongzhi 清政府對後山的統治 [Governance of Qing in Eastern Taiwan],’ in Qingdai Taiwan Houshan Pingpuzu Yimin Zhi Yanjiu 清代台灣後山平埔族移民之研究 [Studies of Taiwan Pingpuzu Migrants in Qing Dynasty] (Taipei: Daoxiang 稻鄉, 2001), 25.

108 Fan Xian 范咸, Chong Xiu Taiwānfu Zhi 重修臺灣府志 [Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture Revised], 471.
indigenes have this wicked look from their short hair, protruded eyes and big ears. Their toes are thin as chicken claws and they climb trees like monkeys. They are known for archery and merciless. There are no roads connected to the tribe. They travel up and down the mountains via lianas to trade with more assimilated aborigines monthly. Even the savage aborigines are afraid of them. The Du-Guoeans fear nothing but the gunfire. They flee as soon as they hear the sound of it.\textsuperscript{109}

Teng has also noted how early Qing travel writers often mentioned mountain indigenes hiding themselves in the underbrush, taking over in the jungle, lurking to ambush those who wandered into the mountain forests.\textsuperscript{110} Numerous accounts describing the unknown danger in the mountain and their murderous inhabitants stopped the Chinese entering eastern Taiwan. For instance, in 1726 a Chinese \textit{tongshi} 通事 reported, how 11 plains indigenes from the Nanri tribe 南日社 were killed and headhunted by at least 50 mountain indigenes near Dongshi Mountain 東勢山.\textsuperscript{111} Another reason for the mountains area largely escaping from Chinese invasion was that the Qing government forbade Chinese from entering mountains from 1722 and began the building of an entrenchment from 1736-1761 (See Map 2:5, the red line is the indigenous border in 1750; the blue line in 1760). This boundary across Taiwan from south to north separated the Chinese and the mountain Indigenes, but later in 1790 it moved again toward the entrance of the mountain district. The purpose of setting up such a boundary was to avoid greater conflict between Chinese and indigenes and to protect Chinese civilians, but it also revealed the lack of interest of the Qing government in managing mountain indigenous affairs, especially as conflicts in the western plains kept local officials busy enough. Whoever crossed the boundaries would be flogged with sticks or sentenced to prison for 3 years.\textsuperscript{112}

However, mountain indigenes did not lose their linkage with the western plains completely, but limited contact remained, mostly through plains indigenes. Mountain indigenes often relied on plains indigenes’ supply of salt, iron and clothes in exchange for their mountain resources. This reliability of plains indigenes gave them easier access to mountain regions and

\begin{thebibliography}{10}
\bibitem{ibid} Emma Teng, \textit{Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683-1895} (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004), 132.
\bibitem{ibid} Suo Ling 索琳, ‘為奏臺地生番滋事’ (Report on trouble caused by the Mountain indigenes in Taiwan) in 17/11/1726 in ‘Gongzhongdang Yongzhengchao Zouzhe 宮中檔雍正朝奏摺’ (Court Reports in Yongzheng Era) (Taipei: 故宮博物院, 1977), 764–765. Quoted in Xu Yuliang 許毓良, \textit{Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會} (Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty), 78.
\bibitem{ibid} Lian Heng 連横, \textit{Taiwan Tongshi 臺灣通史} [A General History of Taiwan], Taiwan Wenhian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 128 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1962), 65, 445.
\end{thebibliography}
to deal with indigenes. The Qing government also relied on plains indigenes’ connection with mountain indigenes when Chinese revolt survivors escaped into the mountains. For instance, during the Lin Shuangwen rebellion, interpreters were led by the plains indigenes to mountain’ villages and convinced them that material rewards would be given if they captured and turned in Chinese rebels.\textsuperscript{113} Shipbuilders, who were authorised by the Qing government to obtain camphor woods from the mountains for ship repair, also required plains indigenes’ assistance as guards when entering into mountains.\textsuperscript{114} Some mountain indigenes such as the Sotimor in Fengshan, Ali 阿里 in Zhuluo 諸羅 and Shuishalian 水沙連 in Zhanghua became compliant through plains indigenes’ guidance or persuasion. However, this seeming submission was dubious as several Shuishalian groups revolted in 1725-1726, houses were burned down, 62 Chinese were murdered, and 140 oxen were killed.\textsuperscript{115} The geographical difficulties in mountain regions and headhunting rituals now became the mountain indigenes’ natural defence and the boundary preserved some independent space for them until 1874. From the seventeenth century, Taiwan appeared to have dual features geographically and culturally under Qing governance, however, the entire situation was about to change dramatically from 1860 with further encroachment and resource exploitation by the Chinese, Europeans and Japanese. Mountain indigenes were eventually forced to participate in this process of becoming modern from the mid-nineteenth century.

\textsuperscript{113} Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800, 1993, 325–26; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 70–71, 82–83.

\textsuperscript{114} Chen Guodong 陳國棟, ‘[Jungong Jiangshou] Yu Qilingling Shiqi Taiwan de Famu Wenti [軍工匠首與清領時期臺灣的伐木問題] Naval Lumberjacks and Tree-Felling Activities in Taiwan under the Qing, 1683-1875’, in Taiwan de Shanhai Jingyan 臺灣的山海經驗 [Mountain and Sea Experience of Taiwan] (Taipei: Yuanliu 遠流, 2005), 350–51.

\textsuperscript{115} Chen Zhesan 陳哲三, ‘Shuishalian Zhiyi Ji Qi Xiangguan Wenti 水沙連之役及其相關問題] Battle of Shui-Sha-Lian and Its Relevant Issues’, Feng Chia Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences 18 (June 2009): 88; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 68–70.
3.5. Western Countries’ Eye Taiwan Before the Tianjin Treaty of 1858

Western countries vastly expanded power with modern military technology over Africa, Australia, and Southeast Asia from 1750 a process accelerating after the Crimea war of the 1850s and the American Civil War of the 1860s. The establishment of European trade stations...
quickly spread from Southeast Asia to East Asia. European merchants continued their eagerness to purchase Oriental goods – silk, tea, jade, jewellery, etc and to trade with China more freely. Before the outbreak of the Opium War (1840-1842) when China was forced to open its ports to trade with the West, Formosa had caught Europeans’ attention again after the Dutch had set up their entrepôt in the seventeenth century, however, this time it was to take a different form. Europeans now had better understanding and knowledge of its resources, governance, populations, ethnic groups, internal conflicts and the separation of eastern and western Taiwan. A French naval officer- Jean-Francois de Galaup comte de La Pérouse noted in his memoir after his short stay outside Taiwanfoo during his scientific expedition around the world in 1787:

It is well known in Europe, that the eastern part of Formosa is inhabited by the aborigines, and does not recognize the sovereignty of the Chinese; but the western part is extremely populous, because the Chinese being too numerous, and greatly oppressed in their own country, are always ready to emigrate ... As these live in habits of labour and industry, this would be a further advantage to the conquerors. But it must ever be kept in view, that greater forces would, perhaps, be required to keep in subjection than to conquer a people, naturally very prone to rebellion ... I believe the produce of this island, would one day defray the expenses of its government; but I am persuaded, that the first years of its possession would be very expensive, and a ministry would see with regret, considerable sums of money pass over to this part of Asia, which promised but a very distant return.\(^\text{116}\)

Also in letters from two Spanish governors based in the Philippines in 1787, they notified how both the English and French had contemplated stationing in Taiwan as a nearby post to China, based on the decrease of English ships entering Bampu and observations from a French brigadier – Mr. Conde de Kergarion, who was the chief of a French division in India\(^\text{117}\), but the Spanish did not wish to interfere as they had control over the Philippines already.

Up to the early nineteenth century, European countries had experiences of colonizing Australia, Africa and Pacific islands and increasingly they understood the risk and the cost of managing/policing colonies that could become the motherland’s burden. This general sceptical attitude was fortified by the knowledge of the existing revolts in Taiwan. However, this was still before Europeans properly recognised the extent of the profitable resources that Taiwan could

\(^{116}\) Jean-Francois de Galaup, comte de comte de La Perouse, The Voyage of La Pérouse Round the World, in the Years 1785, 1786, 1787, and 1788, with the Nautical Tables, vol. 2 (London: Printed for John Stockdate, Piccadilly, 1798).

of coal in northern Taiwan drew Europeans’ attention again. Britain and America repeatedly sent investigation teams to explore the quality and accessibility of coal and to seek the possibility of purchasing or establishing coal stations despite the local Chinese authority having rejected and prohibited coal mining. Two American officers – Commodore Matthew Perry and U.S. Consul General in Japan Townsend Harris.

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120 The troop transport Nerbuda in September 1841 and the brig Ann in March 1842, survivors were imprisoned or murdered by the Chinese. George Williams Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa, 1841-1874 (San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1977), 25–27.

121 Disappearance of Kelpies, British opium clipper in 1848 and Sarah Trotman, contained tea in 1849. Later in 1850 the British ship Larpent wrecked in south coast, only 3 survivors. New York clipper Highflyer and Conquette lost in south coast Taiwan in 1855.Ibid., 69–70.
proposed to possess or purchase Formosa for coal and commercial interest in 1854-1856. As Perry noted,

This significant island, though nominally a province of China is practically independent. The imperial authorities maintaining a feeble and precarious footing only in isolated parts of the island; a large portion being in possession of independent tribes, and yet such as the productiveness in minerals, drugs and more valuable products of these genial regions, that at this time there is a revenue estimated at a million of dollars.\(^{122}\)

Whoever procured Taiwan could be seen as obtaining its current fruitful industries evolved by Chinese immigrants along with existing trade connections with China. In addition, Europe and America did not view eastern Formosa as part of any realistic Chinese governance. A complex and further disturbance and economic encroachment in eastern Taiwan commenced after the signing of the Tianjin Treaty in 1858.


Before the acceleration of Western encroachment from 1858, some features of Formosan indigenous habitat and traditional cultures might be able to explain the character of tribal warfare and its extension into resistance to the variety of intruders coming from the western regions. These features could be seen or classified as physical environment assets as in Block A in Chart 2:1 below, which provide indigenes with terrain advantage, but also create environmental constraints; and cultural assets as Block B in Chart 2:1 which include such elements as historical hostilities between tribes, the culture of headhunting and experience of hunting large animals. An initial analysis of Blocks A and B and some synergies between Blocks A and B is given below. Block C emphasizes the ill treatment of early potentates and disturbance from Chinese immigrants of indigenes, especially toward plains indigenes, before 1860 which triggered many indigenous revolts. Finally Block D is focused on weaponry. Formosan indigenes held weapons in the “primary stage”, which limited their ascendancy. Chart 2:1 suggests that

\(^{122}\) U.S., Congress. House Executive Document No. 97 (Francis L. Hawks, ed., Narrative of the Expedition of an American Squadron to the China Seas and Japan, Performed in the Years 1852,1853, and 1854, by Order of the Government of the United States, under the command of Commodore M.C. Perry, United State Navy, Compiled from the Original Notes and Journals of Commodore Perry and His Officers, at His Request and under His Supervision, 3 vols.) 33\(^{rd}\) Cong., 2d session, 1856, 177-178. quoted in Ibid., 77.
the combination of such elements contributed to the capabilities of indigenes in resistance before 1860.

Chart 2:1   General Relations between Physical Environment and Cultural Assets as the Context of Indigenous Resistance prior to 1860

Obviously, the geographical conditions gave Formosan indigenes advantages naturally when confronting intruders and hunting, especially for indigenes inhabiting the eastern and northern mountain areas. The natural defence secured them against harassment or attack by intruders or animals. Although indigenes residing in the western plains Taiwan did not enjoy much natural protection from the mountains, most indigenous men grew up and trained to hunt within their terrain which they were highly familiar with, therefore they could attack enemies without being seen, hide themselves or escape easily and catch animals. This following account of 1671 provides us with vivid ideas of how the indigenes manipulated their natural terrains as their defence:

The towns which war continually one against another, are fortif’d with
all manner of inventions for strength; and instead of walls, surrounded with great woods, planted on purpose, and much stronger than any walls, for the trees stand exceeding close, and above three hundred paces in breadth. The passage in and out are only little cross paths, with many turnings and windings, only wide enough for one man to walk, so that they much follow each other: on both sides of the narrow ways are some little out-lets, in which they may lie in an ambuscade, so that no man can pass by them.123

On the other hand, indigenes in Taiwan did not benefit from its geographical location where they were surrounded by waters as between the Pacific Ocean and the Taiwan Strait, carried with seasonal currents which enhanced their risks and difficulties in sailing out to search for new territories. Moreover, two thirds of Taiwan is covered by mountains and hills, but only one third consists of plains and basins. Its location and conditions of geography constrained indigenes’ space of living among animals and competing tribes and limited production of crops and agricultural technique development, which impacted on tribal cultures. To attain more space, hunting animals became an essential task when expanding their territories or moving to new land for cultivation. Meats from hunting were also one of the indigenous main food sources. All indigenous men were born to be dexterous and professional hunters. They were well trained from adolescence to hunt by senior members in tribes from setting up traps, using spears, bows and arrows efficiently and practising various hunting techniques during their stay in the “gathering house” or within clans. Joining hunting operations continued to strengthen their experiences and conversance with hunting fields.124 Ambiguous demarcation of territories with neighbouring tribes often prompted disputes which developed long rooted hostilities between tribes. Quarrels over hunting areas, use of water and murder cases did not appear to be resolved permanently. Indigenous headhunting culture became an ultimate solution to settle disputes when indemnity could not be agreed by both sides; meanwhile it allowed them to reassure or reassert their social status repeatedly by cutting off enemies’ heads.


124 Taiwan Sōtokufu Rinji Taiwan Kyūkan Chōsakai 臺灣總督府臨時臺灣舊慣調查會, Fanzu Diaocha Baogao Shu: Ameizu/Beinanzu 蕃族調查報告書:阿美族/卑南族 [Report on Savage Tribes: Amis & Puyuma Tribes]; LeBar, Ethnic Groups of Insular Southeast Asia. Volume 2: Philippines and Formosa; Pan Ying 潘英, Taiwan Pingpuzu Shi 臺灣平埔族史 [History of Plains indigenes in Taiwan].
As mentioned earlier in this chapter Section 2.1, through obtaining human heads in warfare, indigenous men began to procure their entitlement within their communities when pursuing brides, participating in tribal affairs, protecting the village, and most importantly fulfilling their Zuling in order to be accepted by their own ancestors after death. Their transferable techniques and experiences from hunting expeditions secured their predominant status when hunting human heads. The conjuncture of hostilities between tribes, wild-mammal hunting and headhunting practices, meant that indigenes not only got to assure their right over their dominant territories and independence but also kept themselves highly armed, alarmed and aware of any movement within their territories as they were frequently exposed to various types of threats. Here we consider all such environmental elements as their innate abilities or advantageous positions, which sustained their precedence when competing against intruders or enemies and which were to become major assets in fighting for survival after mid-century. These assets did not seem to fade away or weaken over time; indeed, indigenes continuously exerted these assets to counteract Chinese incursions, to reinforce ruling power or to conciliate ethnic conflicts.

Since the seventeenth century, indigenes in Taiwan never relinquished their independence to any rulers fully and the ambience remained in the state of highly disordered antagonism. Apart from the existing indigenous tribal warfare, strife between indigenes and Chinese immigrants, Chinese ethnic groups and countless uprisings against ruling authorities from both indigenous groups and Chinese gradually diffused into the western plains, but mostly on a small scale. Relations between indigenous groups and colonists had always been unsettled and fragile as described in The Chinese Repository, “On the whole they are a lawless tribe, who put the government and every human regulation at defiance, strictly adhering to their clans. Some of the country-born in the interior have never acknowledged the mandarins as their rulers.” As at Block C above, ill treatment of early potentates and disturbance caused by Chinese immigrants to Taiwan might be sufficient enough to explain this intensive and inimical circumstance before even larger encroachment from 1858. Early colonists like the Dutch, Spanish and Zheng Chenggong did not intend to stay in Taiwan for long, but were using it as a temporary base to trade with China and other Asian countries, or to recover from defeat by the Manchus in the case of the Zhengs. Both the Dutch and Zheng had a shortage of military forces

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and revenue for local pacifications and expenditure, hence searching for local resources to increase their revenue became their priority, but it appeared to forever generate disruptions with local indigenes. Profiting from the deerskin industry is a clear example here, despite the fact that deer hunting was originally one of the indigenous economic activities which only supplied their own communities, or provided goods for exchanges with the Chinese.

From the Dutch arrival, plains indigenes were requested to pay extra taxation on deer products, even on pigs and paddy followed with a poll tax and a farming tax which together burdened indigenes, especially as their traditional techniques of agriculture did not procure such rich production as that of the Chinese. Moreover, corvee service imposed on plains indigenes, which was primarily in Zheng’s military, continued to strain tension between the indigenes and Chinese, particularly in the early Qing governance. Local officials and Chinese interpreters demanded more labour works which infuriated some indigenous groups and lead to several indigenous revolts. Worst of all, numerous Chinese resettled in Taiwan under the encouragement and military protection of early potentates at first, but later these failed to regulate the Chinese migrants who moved to Taiwan. Later under the Qing government policy of “partial quarantine”, the growth of the Chinese population in Taiwan increased from 100,000 in 1684 to over 3 million in 1887. The indigenes’ environment was severely constrained by innumerable Chinese resettlers mostly in the western plains who replaced traditional agriculture with higher cultivation methods on rice and sugarcane fields. Much plain indigenous lands fell into fraudulent Chinese hands regardless of several indigenous land rights policies that were attempted by the Qing government to give plains indigenes protection and to minimise potential quarrels with Chinese settlers. However, there was no sign of termination of any sort of conflicts. Before Taiwan opened its ports to Europeans in 1858, most commerce, conflict or other forms of interactions with local indigenes took place on the western plains areas of Taiwan.

The weaponry indigenes held were mostly bows, arrows, shield, swords, spears or darts.

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126 Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800, 1993, 75.
127 Wang I-Shou, ‘Cultural Contact and the Migration of Taiwan’s Aborigines: A Historical Perspective’, 43.
128 Shepherd suggested the fundamental problem was the unclear recognition and interpretation of indigenous land by Qing government despite of Qing government inspected, drew indigenous lands boundary (1737-1738 and redrew in 1750) and punished Chinese who cross boundaries for cultivation from 1704 to 1790. About indigenes land right in early Qing regimes, see John Robert Shepherd, Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 301–7.
as in a primary stage of arms. 129 To obtain iron or other metals when needed for manufacturing their primary weapons, indigenes had to barter with the Chinese because iron was not produced in Taiwan and later the Qing government restricted Chinese merchants and fishermen from carrying iron and military weapons to Taiwan. 130 The weapons operated by the Qing military in actual warfare were primarily artillery and Chinese matchlocks (中式火繩槍 or 鳥 槍) 131 which were also extensively utilised and manufactured in late Ming and early Qing dynasties. 132 In 1730 and 1789, the Qing emperors Yongzheng 雍正 and Qianlong 乾隆 respectively manufactured 1,600 Chinese matchlocks, arrows, swords, spears etc for garrisons in Taiwan. 133 Despite the claims of adventurers such as Maurice Benyovszky, the appearance of matchlocks within indigenous communities before the nineteenth century was rare, they were mostly held and used to quell revolts effectively by the colonists. 134 Their earliest cognition of muskets and experience of lethality from the musket could be traced back to the early seventeenth century when the Dutch sent several expeditions to suppress indigenes who did not believe the sticks carried by Dutchmen between their necks and shoulders during marching could kill. 135 Meanwhile some evidence showed that muskets entered Taiwan from the early

129 Zhou Zhongxuan 周鍾瑄, Zhuluoxian Zhi 諸羅縣志 [Gazetteer of Zhuluo County], 162; Chen Wenda 陳文達, Fengshanxian Zhi 島山縣志 [Gazetteer of Fengshan County], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 146 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 82–84.

130 Although one of the components of gunpowder - sulphur can be found in Tamsui, northern Taiwan and was one of the goods that plains indigenes in north traded with Chinese and foreigners, but later sulphur mining was prohibited by the Qing government. Other gunpowder components - charcoal and saltpetre were easy to procure, but the production of gunpowder required a precise process and techniques which indigenes might not have. According to Xu, in 1728, Qing government permitted commercial and fishing vessel to East Asia and Southeast Asia to carry weapons like 8 matchlocks, 10 knives, 10 sets of bows and arrow and 20kg of gunpowder. Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shenhui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 190–93.

131 In Chinese literature in Ming and Qing dynasties, matchlocks are often called 烏槍, 烏銃, 鳥錐 or 火槍. Matchlocks were introduced to China in mid-16th century from Japan by Portuguese and from Turkey. Liu Xu 劉旭, Zhongguo Gudai Huoyao Huoqishi 中國古代火藥火器史 [History of Ammunition and Weaponry in China] (Zhengzhou Shi: Daxiang chubanshe 大象出版社, 2004), 153.

132 The matchlocks were largely replicated and manufactured largely by the Ming government and the militaries of Ming were extensively equipped with matchlocks. Especially due to the frequent warfare in the late Ming and early Qing regimes, emperors attached importance to the military technology and the development of weaponry innovation from the West. The emperors engaged the service of professional armament from the West while immense military technology were replicated and manufactured. Ibid., 255–56.

133 Hung, ed. 清宮宮中檔案奏摺臺灣史料 V.4, 2263-2268 and 台案彙錄庚集 (Taiwan Archive, 7th collection), 266-267 quoted in Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shenhui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 194, 202.


135 Kang Peter, 賴培德, 'Zhimin Jiechu - Dongyindu Gongsi Tanjindui Yu Zhumin de Hudong 殖民接觸-東印度公司與漢民的貢品'
seventeenth century as during the Spanish occupation an official inventory of goods list included muskets, harquebuses and a large number of bullets or shots sent from Manila. An agreement signed between Zheng and the British East India Company in 1670 stated that the Company should provide on every ship two gunners serving for Zheng for granadoes and other fireworks, one smith to make guns for Zheng and that the English should provide 200 barrels of gunpowder, 200 gunners with matchlocks and 100 peck of English iron at a fixed price. It is uncertain when and how the indigenes initiated actions to procure matchlocks, but some possibilities could be suggested here: plunder from the colonists in warfare, pillaging from shipwrecks such as when the Rarangus tribe and the neighbouring villages in east coast Taiwan seized a Spanish sampan with aids and supplies from Manila in 1628, killed 10 Spaniards and took two large bronze artillery pieces, 10 muskets, and two small caskets that might have contained money, or simply purchased them from the Chinese. The reports of Taiwan Yushi or Superintendent - He Shuose and Xia Zhifang in 1729 claimed that some Chinese had crossed the indigenes border illegally, sold indigenes salt and iron and taught them how to use Chinese matchlocks and gunpowder; and evidence was found from the plains indigenes’ uprisings in 1731-1732, when various types of weapons including matchlocks were captured. Dr. Xu stated that plains indigenes could regularly gain iron and gun powder from exchanging goods with the Chinese that were smuggled to Taiwan even though the Qing government had imposed strict control of armaments on the Chinese. But the Qing government clearly reached a predominant position in the quantity of firearms during early governance that determined and affected the quelling of revolts. Furthermore, plains indigenes of the Anli tribe received gunpowder and operated firearms proficiently in pacification of the Lin Shuanwen revolt which later led them to be officially permitted to possess firearms with

137 In Document No. 5. Contract for settling an English factory at Taiwan, 10 September 1670. Anthony Farrington et al., The English Factory in Taiwan, 1670–1685 (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 1995), 58.
138 Borao, Spaniards in Taiwan (SIT), 2:163–64.
139 Xu also suggested that it was important for Qing government to restrict plains indigenes using matchlocks, but Qing government maintain larger proportion than locals which determined the success in suppressing various revolts. Xu Yuliang, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui, 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 195.
140 Ibid., 199.
registered numbers.\textsuperscript{141} The \textit{Taiwan tongshi} 臺灣通史 (General History of Taiwan) also recorded that the plains indigenes military were furnished with Chinese matchlocks.\textsuperscript{142} This was the earliest stage and evidence of plains indigenes owning firearms with the Qing government’s acknowledgement, but again firearms did not gain wide currency because of the general limitation of the Qing government.

These assets gave the ability and incited indigenes to resist intruders in the western plain areas of Taiwan, where most exploitation took place before the nineteenth century. Plains indigenes originally living in the west of Taiwan seemed to be unable to repel colonists even though some plain indigenous tribes tried to resist. They mostly failed or received amnesty and gradually assimilated with the Chinese economically and culturally; yet more were forced to move to unrestrained eastern mountain regions. Nevertheless, the experience of witnessing the power of European and Chinese military technology might have influenced indigenes later when pursuing advanced weapons through different contacts. Mountain indigenes living in eastern mountainous Taiwan were left in peace without much disturbance until the mid-nineteenth century when groups of Europeans actively sought to make profit in Asia, and the Chinese exploited rich resources in Taiwan which facilitated further encroachment.

\textsuperscript{141} Ibid., 202; Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi 臺灣銀行經濟研究室 (Taiwan Bank), ed., \textit{Taian Huilu Jiaji} 臺案彙錄甲集 [Taiwan Archives, First Collection], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 31 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958).

\textsuperscript{142} Lian Heng 连横, \textit{Taiwan Tongshi} 臺灣通史 [A General History of Taiwan], 357–58.
We wished for our tribes an improvement of another sort. The cessation of the forced encroachment would quickly put an end to barbaric reprisals. The freedom of trade; the introduction of seeds, agricultural tools, and domestic animals; and the exploitation of forests, jade quarries, mines of coal, copper, silver and gold would drive the aborigines by imperceptible degrees toward the comforts of civilization. These simple wishes will probably never be realized. A terrible blockade tightening in a continuous manner, though slowly, imprisons the Formosan peoples between a sea on which they have lost the habit of taking chances, and a plundering and jealous race. The Chinese, masters of all the accessible exits, will never let anything enter nor leave.¹

Extensive threats to Formosa
Indigenes’ residence and lives dispersed and emerged throughout Taiwan particularly towards undeveloped mountain regions, followed the forced opening of four treaty ports – Tamsui and Keelung in the north, Taiwanfoo and Takow in southern Taiwan to Europeans under the Tianjin Treaty in 1858 after the Second Opium War (1856-1860).² From then indigenous tribes increasingly connected and clashed with outsiders apart from the early settled Chinese through trade, resource exploitation, and such varied channels. The first section of Chapter 3 concerns the encroachment of the West and focuses on the Western countries’ economic and territorial invasions in the mountain indigenes’ territories and the contacts foreigners had with them. The second section concentrates on the commercial imperatives of camphor, tea, indigo and other industries that threatened the mountain indigenes’ lives and territories. Our third section discusses the Chinese encroachment, which includes the political encroachment initiated by the Qing government and the contacts mountain indigenes made with the Chinese and plains indigenes as forms of intrusion. The fourth section gives brief descriptions of the policies of the Japanese government on mountain

¹ Guérin and Bernard, ‘Les Aborigènes de L’î Le de Formose.’, 568.
² United Kingdom, France, the United State of America and Russian Empire were entailed with Tianjin Treaty which permitted them the right of trade with their Vessels and Merchandise, residence, buying or leasing house and land and building churches, hospital and cemeteries in eleven more Chinese ports. Various conditions were applied such as Chinese government could not place restrictions on the employment by British subjects, interference with boats, and either limited number of boats nor monopolized, etc. Treaty of Tianjin.at http://www.chinoforeignrelations.net/treaties_overview
indigenes which escalated toward total occupation in the central and the eastern mountain regions.

1. Encroachment of the West after the Treaty of Tianjin

1.1. Economic and Territorial Intrusions

Under the protection of the Tianjin Treaty, merchants, missionaries, scientists and adventurers arrived one after another to explore and study this primitive island. Some interests of the West in Taiwan initiated in the first half of nineteenth century were outlined in Chapter 2 (see Section 3.5 p 41-43). Western merchants were actively seeking to profit from trading with China and anticipated that raw resources in Taiwan could lead them to a good prospect of fortune. First two American firms – Nye Bros. & Co. and Williams, Anthon & Co. proceeded with camphor and sugar exports in 1854-1857 and later obtained their foreign monopoly in camphor and other goods in exchange for an agreement with local authorities to protect Taokow from pirates, which later extended to Jardine, Matheson & Co. and Dent & Co. even before the treaty ports were open and consulates were established. 3 Lucrative export from Formosa soon attracted European and American merchants who founded their business near treaty ports close to raw materials. Major goods exported from northern Taiwan consisted of camphor, rice, tea, sulphur, coal, wood, indigo, rattan, and rice paper; in the south export goods were mainly rice, brown sugar, white sugar, ground nuts, turmeric, longans, peanuts and sesame oil. Imported goods were mainly opium, different types of cotton and woollen goods and other Chinese miscellaneous goods. According to a Comparative Table of the Export Trade from the Year 1869 to the Year 1874 in Tamsui recorded by British Vice – Consul Herbert J. Allen, there was some significant increase of export in tea, camphor, coal and hemp by Europeans. In 1869, only 729,232 lbs. of tea were exported by foreigners, the following year it doubled and by the year of 1874 increased to 3,281,346 lbs which made over four fold from 1869. Coal and camphor-wood planks export grew at least three times from 1869 to 1872. Average export on crystallised camphor was about 14,104 cwt and hard wood planks was about 8,216 pieces in

3 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions., 400–401; Carrington, Foreigners in Formosa, 1841-1874, 177.
these six years. Total sugar export from the south, both brown and white, more than doubled from 321,534 cwts to 816,929 cwts in the years 1869 to 1874. However these major export goods like tea, camphor, other woods, coal and sulphur were mostly planted or situated in interior hills or mountains in the north and east of Formosa, which were inhabited by mountain indigenous people, or close to the borders of mountain indigenous tribes. These border lines were constantly moving further east with the growth of exporting industrial crops. Lives of Formosan mountain indigenes were immensely harassed and threatened by the growth of exploiting and exporting natural resources. The opening of treaty ports allowed foreign merchants to participate in local businesses which stimulated a further and greater encroachment in mountain indigenes’ lands from the western plain areas in addition to the existing persecution from the older Chinese settlers.

Unforeseen threats also reached indigenous territories from the sea. With the progress of foreign trade in Formosa, more ships navigated by south and east coast Taiwan and foreign vessels sometimes were wrecked due to typhoons or hidden reefs. The arrival of unknown ships and visitors constituted a menace to local indigenes, especially as they had never witnessed European steamships and as weapons were commonly carried on board. According to Davidson, in excess of 150 foreign ships were wrecked and lost on or near the Formosan coast between 1850 and 1869, over 30 vessels were pillaged and burned by pirates and villagers, and more than 1,000 lives were lost. Between 1870 and 1885, 46 foreign vessels were wrecked along the Formosan coast and near Penghu islands and 7 foreign vessels suffered from pillage and attack by the natives. The nature of the term “natives” was unclear in Davidson’s reports, whether local Chinese or indigenes, and it also depended on where ships were wrecked, either near Chinese or indigenes’ areas, although mountain indigenes usually were the ones taking the blame. Loss of lives and goods alarmed European merchants and raised European governments’ awareness and concern even though some of these acts from the indigenes were meant for self-defence. European envoys were sent to Taiwan for investigation and warships were dispatched to Southern Taiwan to secure trading routes, to rescue survivors who might have

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4 TEPR 1/598-612, No. 4 Comparative Table of the Export Trade from the Year 1869 to the Year 1874 in Report on the Trade of Tamsuy nd Kelung for the Year 1874, Acting Vice-Consul Herbert J. Allen, Tamsuy, 22/Apr/1875, 607
5 TEPR 1/613-621, Trade Report for Taiwan (i.e. Takow and Taiwanfoo) for the Year 1874, Consul WM. Gregory, Takow May-Jun/1875, 615
7 Ibid., 216–18.
been detained in Taiwan and also to punish mountain indigenes, but not much success was had. For instance, the British warship *Inflexible* was sent by the British government in 1858 to circumnavigate Formosa and hoped to discover survivors, accompanied by an interpreter - Robert Swinhoe, who later was appointed as first Vice-Consul in Formosa. Two years later, a Prussian expedition landed in southern Formosa with its transport *Elbe and* encountered indigenes’ assaults and were commanded to annihilate indigenous villages after retreating to the ship. The most significant example was an American merchant ship – *Rover*, later in 1867 struck near Vele Rete rocks 七星岩 in southern Formosa. Captain Hunt, his wife and crew were attacked by Paiwan indigenes from the Koalute 龜仔角 (Pingdong County). A British gunboat - *Cormorant* led by Captain Broad soon aided, but being attacked by mountain indigenes retreated after they landed. Subsequently General Le Gendre, the U.S consul at Amoy, and Mr. Anson Burlingame, the U.S Minister (1861-1868) in Peking urged both the Qing government and Washington to punish the mountain indigenes’ behaviour. An expedition was composed of two American warships -*Hariford* and *Wyoming* - with 181 soldiers led by Admiral Bell, but the mission failed. Thereafter another expedition was sent by Japan in 1874 to punish the indigenes of Mudan after 54 Ryukyu fishermen had been murdered in southern Formosa in 1871 which also coerced the Qing government into an attempt to handle the mountain areas and people that she had so long neglected. Apart, then, from the 1874 case of Japan, a nation looking towards expansion after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, it might be said that these earlier forms of conflict with Westerners were fortuitous, rare and indeterminate.

They gave the eastern coast of Formosa a formidable reputation in the eyes of many Westerners; as early as the 1870s the *Nottinghamshire Guardian* casually reported a speech of the excursionist Thomas Cook, the first public speech on his trip around the world when he spoke of “that island of cannibalism, Formosa. A recent investigation has been going on there, with reference to cannibalism, three Japanese and fourteen of some other nationalities have

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11 Davidson, *The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions*, 115–16; Robert Eskildsen, *Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874: Western Sources Related to Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan* (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 2005), 49.
been eaten by the inhabitants of that island”. Indeed, as we see, any of these incidental events could blow up into warfare or threat by gunboat diplomacy – in essence what we might call in modern terms a repeated use of both soft and hard power on the borders of the indigenous peoples. Given that on their western frontier they faced periodic and endemic pressures from the Chinese settlers, it is not difficult to surmise that the indigenous eastern peoples of the island were already conditioned to outside threat.

Another small incident also showed the endeavour of the West in some part of Taiwan. An unsuccessful attempt of occupation in Dananao 大南澳 (Yilan County) was contrived by James Milisch, a German shipping and opium trader and his British companion, James Horn in 1869. They formed an alliance with plains indigenes by giving salt, clothes and feathers and by Horn marrying the chief’s daughter, and later established a fortress regardless of local Chinese official’s dissuasion. In the end, they were forced to evacuate the eastern valley after several condemnations from Chinese officials. However, before this incident, according to Yen’s research, disregard of the eastern part of Taiwan had brought some interests in the Western Europe in 1865 when a Berlin newspaper Die Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung publicized that a large part of Taiwan where mountain indigenes lived was “herrenloses land,” or a country without any recognized master and deference which could be tamed. The German’s endeavour of possessing a colony in East Asia was soon spotted by an editor from the London and China Express with an opposed response in its editorial column and duplicated copies in the British Foreign Office and Embassy in Peking. Various forms of contacts or encounters of Formosan indigenes with outsiders in the nineteenth century will be discussed in the next section. Active Western power began to penetrate into the interior, eastern regions both culturally and territorially. Henceforth, this was to be further and more brutal encroachment facilitated by potential exploitation and profit in the mountains.

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12 Nottinghamshire Guardian, 6 June 1873.
14 Yen did not succeed to obtain the exact date on this article in Die Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung from East Berlin Archive, but she identified approximate date between July 12 and 26, 1865. Yen Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874., 102–4.
15 Ibid., 104–5.
1.2. Contacts with Foreigners

Most mountain indigenous people appeared to be amicable and harmless toward foreigners when visiting their tribes and maintained peaceful relationships with them from the 1860s after the treaty ports were opened. Sometimes they even seemed to favour foreigners when they welcomed and received them in their communities, which was commonly remarked by foreigner travellers to Taiwan in the late nineteenth century. For instance, Robert Swinhoe who was appointed the first British consular officer in Formosa from 1861 to 1873, noted during his visit in April 1862 to the Chin hwan or mountain indigenes of the northwest coast, near Tamsui River, there the “savage had patted me on the head, and wanted to hug me to swear eternal friendship, saying that we were of the right stamp with themselves, and ought to be allied in driving the shaven-headed rascals out of the country.” 16 In another of his visits to Atayal indigenes from the Kweijings tribe (Taoyuan County), in 1863 he described the reactions of mountain indigenes when they first saw Europeans,

The meeting was curious enough. They stood and stared at us in astonishment, though with no sign of fear. The interpreter told them that we were also foreigners like themselves, and had come to visit them. They sat down again and examined us, and exchanged pipes of tobacco.17

Later, Swinhoe also recorded closely their facial tattoos, ornaments, clothes, men and women’s behaviour, their living styles, weaponry, etc. When Swinhoe squatted with them, one of the mountain indigenes put his arm around Swinhoe’s neck, pulled their face together and attempted to pour a bowl of rice wine into their conjoint mouths at the same time18, which expressed their sincerity and recognized him as a friend. From Swinhoe’s account, the mountain indigenes revealed unusual friendliness toward Westerners and by contrast a strong animosity toward Chinese. Thomas Francis Hughes, member of the Imperial Chinese Maritime Custom and negotiator to build a light house in Eluanbi (in furthest south of Pingdong County), wrote about the good nature and benevolence of mountain indigenes in the south toward foreigners during his short stay in southern Taiwan in 1872,

16 Shaven headed—the hair style Chinese had in Qing dynasty. Robert Swinhoe, Notes on the Ethnology of Formosa (London: Frederick Bell, 1863), 70.
17 Ibid., 6.
18 Ibid., 7.
Foreigners have more than once penetrated into the savage territory eastward in a direct line from Takow; farther north, the savages in some districts have now become quite accustomed to the casual visits of Europeans, and on three or four different occasions small exploring parties have visited the tribes who inhabit the hilly regions in the neighbourhood of the South Cape. In almost every case the savages proved themselves ready to meet kindness with kindness, and in a great many instances the hand of friendship and of hospitality was readily extended to the foreign visitor.19

Even when Japan sent expedition troops to southern Taiwan in 1874, the mountain indigenes who were not in hostile to the Japanese army established some sort of friendly contacts with Japanese and American officers near their camps for nearly a 6 months’ period. A Japanese official -Mizuno Jun 水野遵- and Lieutenant Wasson both noted they received hospitality, invitations to visit indigenous villages from mountain indigenes in the south who were not hostile and became acquaintances with them during their stay. They were also drinking, eating, singing and dancing together.20 On two dining occasions, Lieutenant Commander Douglas Cassel and Isa 伊厝, the chief of Shamali drank together and consented to “Friendship” between them.21

This affable demeanour of mountain indigenes toward foreigners was continuously reported by several British Consuls, who also revealed some advantages over the Chinese up to the 1880s and 1890s. For instance, in 1886 Consul Giles noted his and his wife’s experience with some mountain indigenes in the interior mountain areas when “strolling along in savage territory, accompanied by some half-dozen savages, men and women, who were delighted to see us ... One of them knew a few words of Chinese, but his vocabulary did not run much beyond “Chinaman bad man. You no Chinaman; you good man,”22 He later also mentioned how the Chinese authorities were jealous of foreigners visiting the mountain indigenes and tried to stop...
him and his party from visiting. Consul Nevil Perkins also had a similar or convivial experience with the mountain indigences in the south,

from personal experience it can be said that they are most hospitable and friendly to those who have the good sense to treat them as "brothers," and willingly take their part in any athletic exercises, especially such as are new to them. They will listen with evident pleasure to foreign singing, solo or otherwise, and will return the compliment with their own pathetic chants, consisting of solo and chorus, all in the minor key, and by a display of their war dances in which they eagerly invite the unpractised foreigner to participate.

There were also reports which claimed that foreigners could have easier accessibility to camphor with the mountain indigences than could the Chinese and were confident in dealing with the mountain indigences on good terms. This could be seen in Consul Pelham Warren’s report in 1891,

The forests deeper in the interior of the island and closely approaching the borders of the so-called savage districts are most abundant, and the camphor produced there is said to be of a superior quality. The monopolists are already working in these districts, the camphor-boiling being carried on chiefly by hakkas and semi-civilised aborigines, as the Chinese proper do not care to venture so far in. Foreigners, however, would have no difficulty in making their own arrangements, either with the pure aborigines or the semi-civilised ones, and could penetrate with perfect safety even further into the country than is now done. The aborigines have no dislike whatever to foreigners, but they cordially detest the Chinese who, they complain, are not fair in their dealings with them.

A similar claim could also be found in W. Holland’s report in Tamsui in 1892,

a solitary foreigner can safely venture with a Chinese interpreter into territory which the Government troops do not dare to approach. If this rich and lovely island ... were ever to fall into the hands of a civilised foreign power, there would be no difficulty in coming to friendly terms with the aborigines, who welcome a foreigner with the name of “brother”.

24 TEPR 5/193-207, Report on Formosa by Mr. N. Perkins, Consul Nevill Perkins, 31/Jan/1895, 197
However, these suppositions could not prove the foreigners would obtain permission for exploiting mountain resources simply based on their friendly terms with the indigenes and their unrestrained access to the indigenous territories.

With some plains indigenes’ and Chinese interpreters’ escorts, European missionaries, merchants and adventurers gained informal accesses to mountain indigenous tribes in the north and east regions without their heads being hunted. Can these contacts and irregular visits be regarded as moderate and “soft” encroachment from the west? This greatly contrasting experience itself indicates the enormous variety of situations in which each indigenous tribe or group found itself. To talk of “indigenous contact” too generally is simplicity, for different local environments, the pure chances of conflictual contact, and the prior experiences of local people all varied yet would have conditioned the attitudes of specific groups. This a theme taken up later in the thesis and in the conclusions. Also this notion of variability is true of the other side of the equation – “foreigners” came from a variety of places carried by a variety of motives. There is every reason to believe that the Japanese conflict was spurred by Japanese official interest in the island, similarly the Americans and Germans had complex motivations. Nevertheless, mountain indigenous people were not aware of serious menace from foreign visitors generally nor would they ever have predicted that these Westerners who they considered as their friends from the other end of the world, were to become the ringleaders of intrusions into their territories for commercially valuable camphor and tea.

2. Exploration and Exploitation in Taiwan from the West

The urge of European merchants, the Qing government and Japan targeted on exploiting and profiting from mountain resources in nineteenth century Taiwan and stimulated greater disputes between local officials, local and foreign merchants and indigenes, particularly with the mountain indigenes. For centuries, not only was the Qing government prohibiting Chinese settlers from entering mountain regions, but the Chinese also did not dare to risk their lives and set foot in the mountains; however, from the mid-nineteenth century, much more frequently European merchants, consuls and Chinese workers entered mountain regions and encountered indigenous people. This intense setting can be found in the report of B.C. George Scott in 1877,
The Chinese, had, and have had for many years, complete and secure possession of the whole country to the foot of the central range of mountains. These, from their ruggedness, and the dense forests with which they are clothed, afford secure retreats to the aborigines. On the western side of the mountains, however, they are gradually and surely being driven back. Year by year the Chinese advance further and further into the mountains, taking possession of hill after hill, cutting down the forests of camphor and hardwood trees, and cultivating the ground with tea, sweet potatoes, and other crops. Fights and raids along this ever shifting border is its normal condition.27

In this section, I intend to emphasize how the relevance and significance of industries such as camphor, tea, indigo, coal and other resources (see Map 3:1) emerged after treaty ports opened, accompanied by the increased number of Chinese settlers and European merchants and their commercial expansion toward the hills and mountain areas in Taiwan, and how this provoked multiple indigenous revolts as part of European mercantile and Chinese and Japanese colonial schemes in the late nineteenth century.

Map 3:1 Industrial Map of Formosa

2.1. Camphor

Camphor is a particularly good example for this thesis as it was a major input into the Western world’s second industrial revolution 1870-1914, led by new industries growing in Britain, the USA and Germany, industries increasingly based on specific scientific and technical advancements. These developments, especially in steel, shipping, chemicals and commercial services, coincided of course with the encroachment process in Taiwan. Led by the British, the expansion of Western industrialism was now to enter directly into the lives and cultures of indigenous peoples throughout the world.

Camphor is an organic compound distilled from camphor trees (*cinnamomum camphora*). In Taiwan, camphor trees are most found in the northern, central and eastern mountains and hills where the altitude is between 4,260 to 5,900 feet and which mostly overlapped with mountain indigenous terrains and were initially used as material for shipbuilding and construction in the early Qing regime. Before the second industrial revolution, camphor was widely used in medicine to ease pain, as an insect repellent and antiseptic in Asia and the West. Chinese settlers in Taiwan were aware of plentiful camphor trees in the mountains and were capable of producing camphor from traditional Chinese stoves; still procuring, producing and selling camphor was limited to Chinese craftsmen who obtained official permission to hew camphor trees in Fengshan 鳳山 (Kaohsiung City) and Zhuluo 諸羅 (Jiayi County) counties for repairing warships after the Yongzheng emperor authorised the establishment of military shipyards or *jungongchang* 軍工廠 in 1725. Chen suggested that since the foremen were the only legitimate loggers, as a matter of course foremen dominated most of camphor manufacture and trade which brought them major profit. Other illegal economic activities such as rattan trading, deer hunting, cultivation of crops and other mountain resources were also controlled by the foremen because of their strategic positions and expertise. It was not yet developed into a large industry for exportation or manufacture until the late nineteenth century.

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28 Inkster, ‘Review Article: Technology and Culture during the First Climacteric’, 356.
30 Lian Heng 連橫, *Taiwan Tongshi* 臺灣歷史 [*A General History of Taiwan*], 381; Antonio C. Tavares, ‘Crystals from the Savages Forest Imperialism and Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry 1800-1945’ (PhD, Princeton, 2004), 56.
31 Chen Guodong 陳國棟, ‘[Jungong Jiangshou] Yu Qilingling Shi Qi Taiwan de Famu Wenti [軍工匠首]與清領時
In the case of camphor and Taiwan, the real beginning as described by Inkster, was the work of chemist Alexander Parkes in the city of Birmingham, fast becoming a hothouse of global technological change. Camphor was the pivotal component conferring stability and malleability to the nitrocellulose in the process of manufacturing the first thermoplastic substance – Parkesine, the early form of celluloid, invented and patented by Parkes in 1856. 

Subsequently celluloid was invented and patented from a similar formula by an American -John Wesley Hyatt in 1869. Celluloid material was manufactured and extensively used in making “plastic”- billiard balls, buttons, dentures, toys, photography, movie films and safety glass in cars, ships and airplanes up to the early twentieth century before the invention of artificial camphor and development of the oil industry. Camphor was also added to incense, drugs, and smokeless gunpowder for military purpose. 

So the greatly increased demand for camphor for mass production of new industries arose when the celluloid industry began to flourish from the 1870s in the West.

Most of the natural camphor production in the world from late nineteenth to early twentieth century was conducted by Japan and Taiwan. According to Davidson’s camphor report from Chinese and Japanese customs reports, from 1891-1898, Japan and Taiwan exported a total of 65,869,696 lbs in world camphor production and in the same period Taiwan exported 40,572,320 pounds of camphor the result being that over 60 % of camphor in the world was from Taiwan. In addition, a great amount of the crystallised camphor exported from Japan was sourced in the camphor forests of Taiwan, especially after 1895. Moreover, Germany, America, Britain, France and India were the major camphor consuming countries developing the new technologies, and their average per annum consumption of camphor during 1893-1897 was 8,006,116 lbs. (see Table 3:1) The average of camphor exportation from Japan and Taiwan in world camphor production in the same period was 8,54 7,052.8 lbs. So, over 90% of Japanese and Taiwanese camphor for world production was purchased by the Western

期臺灣的伐木問題 [Naval Lumberjacks and Tree-Felling Activities in Taiwan under the Qing, 1683-1875], 331–34.


countries. An increasing production and exportation of camphor from Taiwan grew from 2,793,266 lbs in 1891 to 6,935,285 lbs in 1895; however, despite the increasing supply from Taiwan, the price continued to rise from $36 per picul in 1891 to $68.50 per picul in 1895.\textsuperscript{35} The price of camphor fluctuated due to the conflicts with mountain indigenes in camphor districts and the increasing demand for camphor in the celluloid industry from the 1890s. However, the significant rise in exports to these countries during 1898— for instance, for Germany the rise to 2.9 million from the earlier average of 2.2 million, and for the USA the rise from 1.8 million to 2 million\textsuperscript{36}— during an especially difficult and violent time on the eastern frontiers of Taiwan, suggests that even frontier violence might not always reduce exports from Taiwan. It did increase prices. This poses an irony of our historical story— pressure on the indigenous people to allow greater freedom of movement and the resulting increase in resistance and warfare, might not have been necessary in commercial terms— Western industrialists were willing to pay high prices for their camphor imports.

Table 3:1 Main Camphor Consuming Countries from 1893-1897

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Amount (lbs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2,240,917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>1,835,533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>1,722,644</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1,204,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,002,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,006,116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As seen above, foreign firms dominated the camphor trade for some years before the opening of the treaty ports, but foreign merchants only purchased camphor cheaply from local Chinese compradors at ports, near production areas. However, as Davidson noted local Chinese

\textsuperscript{35} 1 picul = 133 lbs \textit{Ibid.}, 442.
\textsuperscript{36} \textit{Ibid.}, 443. Leading camphor consuming countries, for the single year 1898
compradors soon took over the camphor business by bribing local officials and converting it into a government monopoly after a “temporary lull in trade” caused by the enactment of the Tianjin Treaty which limited foreign trade because it only opened ports in Tainan, Tamsui and Keelung, which increased the cost of portage from camphor production areas and restrained foreign workers. \(^{37}\) Competitive European merchants continued to pursue greater profits from the camphor trade after the opening of the treaty ports and to seek ways to break into camphor production and markets that were commanded by the local officials. A volunteer British surgeon and naturalist Dr. Cuthbert Collingwood surveyed the local camphor trade in a camphor production district on his visit in 1866,

The trade is at present of little value to any one, except those to whom a monopoly is granted by the Chinese Government. The camphor Mandarin pays 40,000 dollars per annum for this privilege, and he purchases the camphor at the rate of 5 dollars per picul (of 133 lbs.), which he then sells for 27 dollars. One dollar as duty and some other expenses increase the price he has to pay, and 10 percent of the camphor is lost in the transit by evaporation owing to imperfect storage, for with the proverbial conservatism of their nation they will not adopt the plan of stowing it in tin boxes, by which it might all be saved. Still, however, the profits are very considerable. I believe that an enterprising young German merchant, Mr. Lessler, of Tam-suy, is about to bring the question of legality of this monopoly to issue in a court of law, and I trust that this important trade will soon be open to competition by European merchants. \(^{38}\)

Tension and disputes between European merchants and local officials continued throughout to 1890, but especially in 1868, when the Qing government confiscated $6,000 worth of camphor that William A. Pickering, representative of Elles & Co. planned to smuggle in Wuqi 梧棲 (Taichung City). \(^{39}\) This incident aroused John Gibson, the British Acting Consul who sent a warship to Anping without consulting the British Minister in Peking – locally and in British diplomacy known as the Camphor War- and resulted in a “Camphor Regulation” which abolished the government monopoly and allowed foreign firms to apply for licenses for entering camphor districts to purchase and transport camphor without the Qing government’s

\(^{37}\) Ibid., 402.  
\(^{39}\) Tavares, ‘Crystals from the Savages Forest Imperialism and Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry 1800-1945’, 81–82.
It becomes clear that the changes in regulation were made under the commercial and fiscal pressures arising from technological change in the West and the resulting increase in demand for camphor.

After Taiwan became a colony of Japan in 1895, Japan controlled the majority of camphor production in the world until artificial camphor was invented in the 1920s. As soon as Japan occupied Taiwan, a proclamation was issued by the Governor of Formosa in 1896 and declared her ownership of lands, mountains, forests, re-examined the camphor licenses and regulated camphor manufacture, which affected the British merchants greatly as R.W. Hurst reported.  

And in 1899 the Taiwan Sotokufu (local colonial government) initiated the new camphor monopoly, which stated that the Japanese government would be the only purchaser from the producers and obtained the entire control over camphor manufacture.  

Liao suggested that 63% of world demand for re-export of camphor was from Japan in 1920-1928 and 77% of the camphor produced was from Taiwan. Even up to 1928 when new sources from Japan and elsewhere were coming into operation, approximately 46% of camphor production in the world was from Taiwan. It is for this reason, as well as the fact that camphor demand was newly dependent on world-wide technological change and grew especially in areas of forest bounded by Atayal and other head-hunting indigenous tribes, that it becomes an exemplary case of the frontier between the modernity of the second industrial revolution and the physical reaction of indigenous peoples. It can be seen as a microcosm of how commercial forces both united and divided the entire world. The procurement of camphor and government policies on camphor increasingly brought direct and great impact on indigenes’ lives and countless conflicts are to be explored in Chapters 4-6.

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2.2. Tea

Apart from camphor, tea was one of the substantial and profitable exports in late nineteenth century Taiwan, following the growing consumption of tea in the world. The tea industry commenced to thrive after treaty ports opened in 1860. A British merchant -John Dodd- discovered potential tea business while exploring the camphor district in 1865 and sold for a good price in Macao his first shipment of tea. Soon he made loans to farmers through his comprador Li Chungsheng 李春生 and imported saplings from Amoy to expand tea cultivation, fired his own tea in Banka, took larger premises in Twa-tu-tia and sold to America where Formosan Tea gradually established its fame. Other European merchants saw the prosperity of Formosan Tea and soon joined the Formosa tea trade. With more and more European merchants’ involvement, later local compradors and merchants’ participation and competition stimulated the growth of the tea industry in Taiwan from small and domestic to immense and worldwide production. Davidson’s report of Formosa Oolong export to America and Europe shows: in 1866 tea export is only 180,824lbs. and it continued to increase annually, by 1886, it reached 16,171,605 lbs and mainly was shipped to America. The growth of Tea export was nearly 90 times more in 20 years and it continuously grew throughout Japan’s regime. Moreover, Davidson pointed out the importance of tea export in northern Taiwan, by estimating that 86% of the annual export receipts were obtained from tea in 1897. Despite the fact that other tea production countries like India, Ceylon, Japan and China produced and exported more tea than Taiwan and possibly dominated most of European and American tea markets, the extensive development of the tea industry certainly reflected the vast scale of tea plantation development which had a great impact on indigenous territories. This is because the ideal environment for growing tea trees is situated on hills, close to or within indigenous areas in northern Taiwan where the temperature is between 20 to 30 degrees Celsius, average annual rainfall is less than

44 Raw tea divides into different types of tea in different processes of reproduction. Oolong 烏龍 and Paochung 包種 were the main types of tea exported from Taiwan from 1860 to 1895. Black tea production began only from 1928.
46 Liu Zhiyun 劉至耘, ‘Qing Mo Bei Taiwan de Chaye Maoyi 清末北臺灣的茶業貿易 [The Trade of Tea in Northern of Taiwan since 1865-1895]’ (MA, National Chi Nan University, 2005), 43–46.
48 Ibid., 394.
49 Ibid., 372.
1500mm, there is moderate sunlight, and loose and acid soil that contained at least 2% organic compound. A British Commissioner of Customs, Walter Lay, noted the expansion of tea plantations in the 1880 Tanshui Trade Report, “As fast as fresh territory is conquered from the savages, it is devoted to tea.” In Lin Mang-Hong’s analysis of tea production areas, tea production was very small in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century, only Shuishalian (Nantou County) grew the wild tea tree which was not easy to harvest within indigenous terrain and until 1850 only Shenkon (Shenkon) and Pinlin (Pinlin) regions (both in South New Taipei County) produced tea. The spread of tea plantations on hills from Shimen (New Taipei City) to Zhanghua County meant they gradually became major tea production areas after the opening of the treaty ports, though it did not extend to the south due to a higher temperature in Southern Taiwan and some unsuccessful plantations.

A report was made by a British Consul Thomas Watters, which gave more detail about the development of tea plantations in 1881 Taiwan,

The cultivation of the tea shrub is extending far and quickly in this island. The farmers seem to think the shrub will flourish in any kind of soil, and at any elevation, and with any aspect. Experience has, however, already taught some that there are situations and circumstances in which it will not thrive. Hence several plantations have had to be given up, at least for the present, and it is likely that several others will have to be abandoned. But as these are given up others are formed, and in several cases, sad and useless plants have been replaced by others, young and healthy. There are tea plantations now on many of the hill which only a few years ago were inaccessible to any Chinaman. The savages who then haunted these hills have been driven back to the higher mountains, but in some districts there are tea farms in dangerous proximity to savage settlements. It is not easy to give much attention to the crop in such circumstances, and, indeed, many growers seem to plant the young shrub, and afterwards take no further care of it. Others weed and prune, and generally expend much labour on their plantation.

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51 Huang Fusan 黃富三, Lin Manhong 林滿紅, and Weng Jiayin 翁佳音, eds., Qingmo Taiwan Haiguan Linian Ziliao 清末台灣海關歷年資料 (Maritime Customs Annual Returns and Reports of Taiwan, 1867-1895), vol. 1 (Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History, Academia Sinica, 1997), 451.
52 Lin Manhong 林滿紅, Cha, Tang, Zhangnao Ye Yu Taiwan Zhi Shehui Jingji Bianqian 茶、糖、樟腦業與臺灣之社會經濟變遷 (1860-1895) [The Tea, Sugar and Camphor Industries and Socio-Economic Change in Taiwan] (Taipei: Lianjing 聯經, 1997), 59.
Here is another clear case of exclusion of indigenous people because of commercial interests driven by European and Chinese Tea merchants. They were forced to move from their original lands to high mountains or other places where they probably had to fight or negotiate with other tribes for new areas in which to settle. Indigenous lands were ill-treated and sometimes abandoned after some failure of tea plantation by the Chinese tea growers. So, it might be that in many cases even if indigenous people had wanted to move back to their territories, the lands would not have been suitable for farming and few animals would roam in their old hunting field.

2.3. Indigo

The expansion of indigo plantations and production in mountain areas from the nineteenth century especially when spare lands were used after logging camphor and rattan, also repressed indigenous living space. Indigo was another valuable export good and a growing industry in the nineteenth century. As Davidson reported on the production of Indigo in 1880, “indigo occupied in tonnage the third place among junk export cargoes, rice and coal alone exceeding it, and it was frequently first in value. The yearly Indigo export by junk at this time averaged about 21,000 piculs, valued at some 150,000 yen.” Plantations of indigo were introduced by the Dutch East India Company from China and Southeast Asia in the seventeenth century, but the indigo plantations (indigofera 木藍) were always in the western plain areas in the south. Cai suggested that from 1800-1870, Chinese immigrants started to grow indigo (Storobilanthes flaccidifolius Nees or Assam Indigo), mountain indigo or 山藍 in the lower hills of the Xindian river valley, Jinmei River valley and Keelung River valley near Taipei basin toward the lower mountain field – Pinglin region, Shuanxi region, Dakekan River valley which were the mountain indigenes’ (Atayal group) regions, Yilan, Xinchu, Miaoli, Nantou and Jiayi mountain areas. By using Japan’s statistics in 1906, Cai suggested mountain indigo plantations could reach

55 Cai noted the old places name such as Dajinpu 大菁埔, Jinpuliao 菁埔寮 in Tainan indicated indigo plantation. Later in 18th century, indigo plantation gradually spread to north plain areas such as in Chuanghua 彰化, Huo 湖口 (Xinchu 新竹) to Linko 林口 (in New Taipei City) followed with the improvement of irrigation. Cai Chenghao 蔡承豪, 'Cong Ranliao Dao Ranfang - 17zhi 19shiji Taiwan de Landianye 從染料到染坊 - 17 至 19 世紀臺灣的藍靛業 [From Dyes to Dye Houses - Indigo Industry from 17th to 19th Century]' (MA, National Chi Nan University, 2002), 53, 55, 58, 84–89.
up to 500 acres and nearly 40,000 indigo growers worked and settled in other mountain areas.\(^{56}\) It is not difficult to imagine the numerous clashes between indigenous people and Chinese farmers who were much driven by profit. Moreover, in 1886, Liu Mingchuan established the Pacification and Reclamation Bureau (Fukenjue 撫墾局) in Daxi 大溪 (Taoyuan County) where foreign and local merchants purchased camphor, tea, indigo and other resources.\(^{57}\) Davison also remarked, “Indigo was largely cultivated in border districts, and the production was consequently much dependent on the temper of the savages. The mountain indigo, which grew mostly in the hilly district, was still more under the control of the savages, and not infrequently the production was so lessened owing to the border warfare ...”\(^{58}\) The complexity and density of northern mountain districts was seemingly unavoidable and continued to affect indigenes’ communities and the indigo industry.

2.4. Other Commodities – Coal, Gold, Sulphur, etc

Other natural resources like mining products - coal, gold, sulphur, copper and oil, etc, which again were mostly located in or close to hills and mountains that overlapped with or were near indigenes’ territories, were uncovered continually and turned into merchants’ and governments’ key development resources. For instance, the exploration of coal beds by Western interests in northern Formosa, in hills and mountain areas, led to the greater attention of Western countries as coal turned out to be a substantial energy opportunistic resource from the mid-nineteenth century when Western steam ships increasingly required coal and water supply stations through their trading routes in Asia after the Opium War. British and American groups continued to send teams to inspect the quality of coal in Keelung where the major coal production field was, and provided an ideal harbour for a stopping point, and urged authorities to obtain permission for coal mining\(^ {59}\) However, it was repeatedly rejected by the Qing

\(^{56}\) Ibid., 154–62, 165. An inclusive detail of suitable environment, season, methods for Assam indigo (山藍) plantation was given in p167-168.

\(^{57}\) Wen Zhenghua 溫振華, ‘Qingdai Taibei pengdi jingji shehui de yanbian’ ‘清代台北盆地經濟社會的演變 (Economic and social changes in Taipei Basin during Qing)’ (MA, National Taiwan Normal University, 1978), 137 quoted from Cai Chenghao 蔡承豪, ‘Cong Ranliao Dao Ranfang - 17 Zhi 19 Shiju Taiwan de Landian Ye’ 從染料到染坊 - 17 至 19 世紀臺灣的藍靛業 (From Dyes to Dye Houses - Indigo Industry from 17th to 19th Century)’ (MA, National Chi Nan University, 2002), 160.


\(^{59}\) Lieut Gordon was sent by British Navy in 1848 and later published, “Observation on coal in the N.E part of the
government as mining was forbidden from the Qianlong era (1735-1796) and was said to damage the dragon’s veins which was a superstition believed by the local Chinese.  

Nevertheless, illegal coal mining was commonly found and operated by local Chinese, and Western merchants could purchase from them. In the first few years after the opening of the treaty ports, coal export grew from 4,315 tons to 17,887 tons from 1864-1867 based on British Custom Trade Reports. Until 1870, the Qing government was no longer to uphold its coal mining prohibition because illegal coal mining became irrepressible especially with an increased demand for coal supply from Taiwan to the Fuzhou shipbuilding factory. Other valuable minerals such as gold in north and eastern Taiwan (Danau 哆囉滿 in Hualian and Gezainan 蛤仔難 in Yilan County) and sulphur around Datushun 大屯山 (Taipei City) were found in indigenous regions and had always attained the great interest of colonists from the sixteenth century. However most gold investigation failed and people sent for gold were expelled or killed by indigenes. Gold, sulphur and other minerals were only properly accessible to indigenes and commonly used as trading goods between the plains indigenes and the Chinese before the mid nineteenth century. Gold mining resumed in Keelung River in 1889 after a long prohibition on mining by the Qing government and attracted thousands of Chinese gold miners, even Chinese miners who had previously worked in California and Australia. Disparate destruction of river courses, and farm lands was caused by miners’ immature mining techniques and immigrants,

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*Island*” in *Royal Geographical Society*, which described the quality and locations of coal and also noted ongoing operation of private coal mining by local Chinese. Commodore of U.S navy Matthew Perry also sent a priest named George Jones to Keelung for potential coal mining during his expedition 1852-1854. Ino Kanori 伊能嘉矩, *Taiwan Sheng Wenhua Zhi* 臺灣省文化志 [Taiwan Province Cultural Record], vol. 2 (Nantou: The Historical Research Commission of Taiwan Province, 1991), 386.

60 Lin Chaoqi 林朝棨, *Taiwan Kuangyeshi 臺灣鑛業史* [History of Mining Industries in Taiwan], vol. 1 (Taipei, 1966), 571–72.

61 TEPR 1/153-159, Trade Reports, Vice-Consul Gregory to Sir R. Alcock, Inclosure in No. 18. Tamsuy, Formosa, 9/May/1867, 154

62 According to Danshui sub-prefecture gazetteer, there were 92 illegal mines: 48 mines were operating, 23 mines were abandon and 21 mines were rest in 1870. Chen Peigui 陳培桂, ed., *Danshuitingzhi 淡水廳志* [The Gazetteer of Tamsui], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 172 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, n.d.), 110–11; Lin Chaoqi 林朝棨, *Taiwan Kuangyeshi 臺灣鑛業史* [History of Mining Industries in Taiwan], 2:374–78, 395; Yu Yonghe 郁永和, *Bihai Jiyou 裨海紀遊* [Records of Travels on a Small Sea], 24.


64 In 1890, 176.58kg of gold were exported to Hong Kong and other places via Tamsui customs. *Taiwansheng Tongzhi: Jingjizhi Kuangyepian 臺灣省通誌 經濟志礦業篇* [Annals of Taiwan Province: Economy - Mining], 2:23; Davidson, *The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions*, 464.
sometimes hoodlums converged in the area and induced conflicts. Despite this, the Qing and Japanese governments established a gold mining bureau and provided licences to Chinese miners and merchants to try to regulate it. Sulphur mining also resumed in 1863 for military purposes and Liu Mingchuang enacted a new sulphur monopoly in 1887 along with a camphor monopoly to increase revenue and increase the defence budget for the mountain regions, which suggested some possible further expansion of sulphur mining. Oil was discovered in Chuhuangkeng (Miaoli County) in 1865 by British tea merchant John Dodd on one of his visits to the mountains, near indigenes’ borders, but his mining plan failed to proceed. He managed to extract some oil in wooden containers and dispatched these to a Cantonese shroff who was in Formosa at the time, whereat the Chinese government deplored his action and warned him about attacks from mountain indigenes. No further actions for obtaining oil occurred until 1877, when Fujian authorities hired two American engineers and purchased oil-well machinery. Nonetheless, this oil extraction project was mandatorily stopped after some limited result since the two American engineers refused to continue their contract after one year under difficult circumstances.

After openings of the treaty ports, many resources were rediscovered, effectively amassed with new farming or mining techniques introduced by foreign merchants and foreign investments continued to flow into these new developing industries. This also stimulated local Chinese merchants’ investment and local Chinese labourers’ involvement because of their experience in dealing with both plain and mountain indigenes and their eagerness for profits. Some resources did not extend and develop as much as the camphor and tea industries and it is difficult to measure the levels of disturbance caused by these new industries and how badly indigenous groups were affected, as some were driven out by the Chinese decades before or homogenised with them. It is certain that several scales of encroachment appended to these

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66 Ino Kanori 伊能嘉矩, Taiwan Sheng Wenhua Zhi 臺灣省文化志 [Taiwan Province Cultural Record], 2:396.
68 Shroff was noted by Davidson, who worked for foreigner. The duty of shroff seemed to be as a buyer.
70 American engineers were ill-accommodated and forced to live with Chinese soldiers, there was a woods problem, lack of support and preparation of extracted oil by the local authorities. Ibid., 494–95.
new industries, such as land exploitation which was often ill-treated or abandoned by the Chinese making it commercially difficult to reuse for cultivation; roads opening; more Chinese labour and immigrants stationed or resettled; all of which directly and indirectly limited indigenes’ movements, restricted their hunting and farming areas and caused disturbance of their livelihood. Fighting was the only way to declare their sovereignty and defence of lands. On the other hand, connectivity of indigenes with outsiders, whether it was mutual or hostile, enhanced and created opportunities for goods exchange, the spread of Christianity and knowledge and experience of goods and weapons.

3. From “Treaty Formosa” to Taiwan Province

3.1. Ignorance of Local Chinese Authority Concerning Foreign Affairs.

This section will briefly discuss the posture, the changes of policies of the Qing government as a colonist that affected both mountain and plain indigenous people while dealing with external and internal conflicts and engaging with some newly developed economic resources to rationalise its expenditure. The Qing government continued in its lack of attentiveness and its neglect in managing Eastern Taiwan, while European merchants, local Chinese merchants, landlords and farmers began to crave economic resources increasingly after the Tianjin Treaty was signed. However, the situation fluctuated after several incidents catalysed by Europe and Japan in Eastern Taiwan compelled the Qing government to re-evaluate the island’s substantive position for its coastal security from 1860-1894 after Zheng’s descendants capitulated to the Qing regime. As Professor Robert Gardella suggested, for this period, “For the first time since the seventeenth century, large sectors of Taiwan’s agrarian economy became closely meshed with the market mechanisms of international commerce.” He then continued, “For the first time since the late 1600s, Taiwan emerged as one of China’s pressing “national security” concerns.” 71 We see this in contrast to Formosan indigenous people, whose circumstances appeared to get worse and who faced greater pressure from the Qing government – the colonist who could never recognise or be respected by indigenous tribes.

Inexperienced local Chinese authority failed to contend with foreign affairs when foreign ships were wrecked and sailors were unaccounted for in southeast Taiwan, foreign missionaries and merchants suffered attacks or assaults, and commercial and taxation disputes arose with local officials in the inceptive period of signing and opening the treaty ports in Taiwan. The attitude of local authorities in Taiwan was often found to be lacking in attentiveness, perfunctory and inequitable, this resulting in remonstrance, military intimidation from the West and indemnification to the West. The Western powers soon imposed upon their favourable situation and trespassed on eastern mountain regions that had long been forbidden by the Qing government. For instance, when General Le Gendre sought the Chinese officials’ assistance in investigating and punishing the murderers of castaways from Rover that had been wrecked in southern Taiwan in 1867, the Chinese governor then refused to intervene and renounce his jurisdiction over the territories where mountain indigenes lived. Later in the same year, a Camphor Regulation was signed under the force of British military threat, nevertheless it was one of the British merchants who initiated the smuggling of camphor without licensing from the local Chinese authority. This regulation ensured the liberty of Western merchants and people to travel for business and leisure and missionaries held the right to reside and work in the island. Another provision was made by Qing official Zeng Xian-de and declared that on the occasion when Westerners entered a mountain region, were murdered by mountain indigenes, were indebted or deceived by camphor workers, similar problems were not allowed to be addressed to local authority. In other words, this provision officially relinquished Chinese

72 Wu Tang, “閩浙總督吳棠, 為合眾國羅妹商船至臺灣鳳山縣遭風上岸被生番戕一案現派文武委員會同鎮道設法妥辦” (Wu Tang, the governor general of Min and Zhe, now assigns the committee of civil and military and Dao Zheng to try to manage the case that the crews of The Rover of the US, grounded at the coast of Feng Shan county by strong wind, were killed by the aborigines) in 20/08/1867 in Tongzhichao Yuezhe Dang 同治朝月摺檔 (Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Tongzhi Era) (Taipei: National Palace Museum, n.d.), http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/; W.A. Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa: Recollections of Adventures among Mandarins, Wreckers, & Head-Hunting Savages (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1898), 179–80; Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 116.

73 Zeng Xian-de 曾憲德, ‘照錄赴臺辦結各洋案與領事往來文件清冊’ (The original records of the inventory of the tackled foreign businesses in Taiwan and the interactions with the ambassadors) in 05/04/1869 in Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Qingji Jiawu Jiaoan Dan 清季教務教案檔 [Documents on the Missionary Affairs in the Late Qing], vol. 3, 2 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1974), 1409–90, http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/.


75 Zeng Xian-de 曾憲德, ‘照錄赴臺辦結各洋案與領事往來文件清冊’ (The original records of the inventory of the tackled foreign businesses in Taiwan and the interactions with the ambassadors) in 05/04/1869 in Academia Sinica 中央研究院近代史研究所, Qingji Jiawu Jiaoan Dan 清季教務教案檔 [Documents on the Missionary Affairs in the Late Qing], vol. 3, 2 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1974), 1409–90, http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/.
jurisdiction over the mountain regions and welcomed any Westerners to freely enter and trade in Taiwan. In addition, the Chinese officials refused to acknowledge the governance of eastern Taiwan by not accepting and hearing cases beyond the interior mountain regions although this was foreseen in 1867 when Wu Dating 吳大廷, the Circuit Intendant of Taiwan (臺灣兵備道) recklessly proclaimed that the terrain of the “raw savage” was not part of the Qing imperial domain, where the Qing imperial prestige and civilization could not reach, and suggested not to cross the indigenes’ border to General Le Gendre, U.S. consul at Amoy. Although the chief of 18 tribes of Paiwan - Tooke-tok 卓杞篤 not only renounced the authority of the Qing government in Taiwan but also refused to conciliate with Qing officials, when local officials were sent to negotiate after the Rover incident. General Le Gendre came to Taiwan and sought negotiation and assurance for the safety and aid of shipwrecked American and European sailors with Tooke-tok. This not only gave foreigners direct access to confer with Formosan indigenes, but also reflected the negligence of local Chinese authority in eastern Taiwan, which then induced Japan to send an expedition in 1874, the so-called Mudan incident.

3.2. Indigenous Governance by the Qing Government from 1874-1895

From the late nineteenth century, the Qing government launched dynamic and varied programs of self-strengthening for Taiwan and commanded Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨 in office (1874-1875), a former governor and director of the Foochow Arsenal and Dockyard, to develop China’s first modern naval defence project after the Mudan incident of 1874. To reinforce Taiwan’s security for Chinese settlers, and to manage central and eastern divisions of Taiwan where mountain indigenes lived the dual policy of “opening up mountains and pacifying the

Affairs in the Late Qing], 3:1409–1490.
76Wu Tang 吳棠, ‘閩浙總督吳棠、福建巡撫李福泰奏，竊據臺灣鎮總兵劉明燈、臺灣道吳大廷稟稱，準合眾國住廈李領事照會，該國商船名羅妹，於...’ (Wu Tang, the governor general of Min and Zhe, and Li Fu-Tai, the inspector general of Fu Chien, reported. It was said in private by Ming-Deng Liu, Taiwan’s Garrison Commander, and Da-Ting Wu, a Taiwanese, that a note to Consul Li of the US, residing in Xiamen, states the US merchant marine named The Rover ...) in Wenqing 文慶, Guzhen 賈楨, and Baojun 寶鋆, Choubanyiwushimo 筹辦夷務始末 [Preparation on Managing the Foreign Affairs], vol. 7 (Taipei: Tailianguofeng 台聯國風, 1972), 1197–99, http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw.
77Le Gendre, C. W., “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 125; Steere, ‘Formosa’, 315.
78Yen Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874., 134–35; Zhang Shixian 張世賢, Wanqing Zhi TaiZhengce 晚清治臺政策 [Late Qing Policy on Taiwan], 2nd ed. (Haixia xueshu chubanshe 海峽學術出版社, 2009), 13–14.
"indigenes" were Shen’s priorities. Operations involved in opening mountain included building roads and fortresses from northern, central and southern lowlands toward mountains regions, clearing and burning woods and pastures, encouraging cultivators from China, providing them with military protection, establishing elementary administration and increasing military defences. 16,500 soldiers were transferred to Taiwan when Japan sent its expedition to southern Taiwan and later stayed on in “opening up mountains” operations. Placating the indigenes included setting up public schools, introducing Chinese languages, clothes, culture, and farming to indigenes. Nonetheless punitive expeditions were often sent against indigenes when disobedience was found. A later governor of Fujian, Ding Richang 丁日昌 in office (1875-1878) extended Shen’s operation on Taiwan’s naval and military defence and his policies on indigenes in central and eastern divisions with some adjustments, which he advocated to induce indigenes culturally and economically instead of through military subjugation. This consisted of not punishing indigenes who incited the previous revolts, introducing Chinese education and agricultural techniques, recruiting indigenes for mining and opening roads, albeit limited and in a few areas only. Without any doubt, Shen Baozhen and Ding Richang inaugurated and contributed to Taiwan’s naval military defence by purchasing and transferring large amounts of advanced and modern warships and weapons, funding early technological constructions such as railways, telegraph lines and development in central and eastern Taiwan. Varied disturbances and conflicts erupted when the Qing military and a great deal of Chinese immigrants or cultivators penetrated the interior mountain regions while logging camphor, rattans, planting tea and exploiting other valuable resources. Nevertheless, Shen and Ding’s
period of “opening up mountains and pacifying the indigenes” scheme did not last long, but indeed halted for nearly 10 years after Ding’s departure.

As mentioned earlier, since or even before the opening of the treaty ports in 1860, indigenous communities, especially mountain indigenes, started to face economic intrusions prompted by Western industrial progression and consumer cultures. Due to repeated dissensions caused by European, Japanese and indigenes in eastern and southern districts of Taiwan, the Qing government was compelled to recognize the importance of Taiwan and of managing indigenes in the mountain regions. The Qing government’s indigenous policies from 1874 accelerated and legitimized the pillage of natural resources in indigenous lands. Indigenous people not only had to cope with some erratic conflicts with the crafty Chinese who coveted their lands incessantly, but were also confronted with the Qing government’s invasions.

Pavel Ibis, an Estonian ensign, marked the strong sense of ownership of lands and antagonism amongst Formosan indigenes from his trip to Taiwan in 1875,

They, it is true, remain in trade relations with other tribes, who supply them with everything necessary second hand, but they themselves rarely leave the native forests, as if afraid to lose their independence through encounters with more developed peoples. The necessity to defend their homeland and freedom against a constant pressure from the Chinese caused by the shortage of land for such a dense population in western Formosa has caused them [the natives] to further withdraw from all others, and has made them secretive and suspicious, even toward other native tribes.85

Contacts and invasions increasingly confronted indigenous societies, at the same time, large amounts of armaments constantly flowed and transferred into Taiwan and were used to fight against them. Further investigation and analysis of how indigenes encountered conflicts and advanced military technology in warfare, and other contacts within indigenous cultures and societies, (at primary and traditional levels) under the pressure of the world economy filtered through the Qing government’s indigenous policies from 1860-1883 and will be the focus in Chapter 4.

The second phase of modernization in Taiwan which followed up Shen and Ding’s self-strengthening scheme, was resumed and enhanced by Liu Mingchuan when he was appointed

85 Ibis, ‘Ekskursiia Na Formozu’, 143–44.
as the first governor of the Province of Taiwan after separating it from Fujian Province in 1885. Liu Mingchuan was ordered to command the defence of Taiwan in July 1884 after the Sino-French War broke out in Vietnam in December 1883 and the later battlefield moved to northern Taiwan. During Liu’s command, the French failed to occupy Keelung and Tamsui, but imposed a blockade on Taiwan for over 6 months instead (October 1884-April 1885), and later retreated to Penghu. After the French blockade, Liu Mingchuan urged the consolidation of naval defences by reinforcing major seaports with advanced artilleries, and a lot of substantial achievements were made throughout Liu’s 7 years in position (1884-1891), which widely propelled Taiwan into one of the modernized provinces under late Qing governance. He actively bolstered a military force by purchasing modern warships and artilleries, recruiting the German Lieutenant, Baons to inspect cannon construction in Keelung and instruct Chinese soldiers and in establishing arsenals in Taipei, which were placed under a German engineer’s supervision for ammunitions manufacture and supply. To develop and strengthen communication systems and military mobility for potential foreign invasions and internal revolts, numerous roads were built in central and eastern regions, telegraph lines were constructed from Tainan to Tamsui and Keelung, cables were laid from Foochow and Tamsui, the railway from Keelung and Xinzhu was completed and a postal system was established through strong collaboration with foreign firms and engineers. He also determined the project of the second “opening up mountains and pacifying the indigenes” and appointed Lin Weiyuan 林維源, of the local gentry, to establish the Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 撫墾局 with 8 major offices.

87 Gordon, Confrontation over Taiwan, 142–48.
88 Before Liu Ming-Chuan was appointed as the first governor of Taiwan Province. He was one of the advocates for the self-Strengthening Movement with Li Hong-Zhang. He joined and led Anhwei Army, which were furnished with the modern weaponry and were the best army among the Chinese military force. He was also assisting in pacifying the Taiping Rebellion. Also see Gu Ruiling 顧瑞鈴, ‘Liu Mingchuan Xinzhe Zhi Yanjiu 劉銘傳新政之研究 [Study of Liu Mingchuan’s New Policy]’ (MA, Ming Chuan University, 2008).
89 Zongli Yamen 總理衙門, ‘德國教習巴恩士到台監造基隆砲台訓練有方加給寶星’ (Max E. Hecht, a German instructor, came to Taiwan to supervise the construction of forts in Keelung and Medal of Excellent Efficiency was conferred on him due to the constructors’ being well-trained.) in 31/08/1891) in Mingqing Gongcang Taiwan Dangan Huibian 明清宮藏臺灣檔案匯編 [Compilation of Archives in Ming and Qing Court Relating to Taiwan] (Peking: Jiuzhou chubanshe 九州出版社, 2009), 64–69, http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/.
and 18 branches throughout the indigenous frontiers from north to south and east. These branches mostly were operated by local gentry leaders with diverse activities to placate indigenes, including educating them in Chinese and Confucian classics, introducing medical services and farming practices, etc.\(^92\) although again the impact was limited. Military outposts and guards were extensively set up within indigenous domains to secure Chinese settlements, and punitive military forces were often used on indigenes especially against the Atayal and Amis tribes in the northern and eastern regions.\(^93\) George Taylor offered his observation on this scene, “Chinese settlers are yearly increasing; military district; nearly every savage village has a Chinese guard station, and at every little creek along the coast soldiers will be found, whilst the importation of gunpowder is a capital offence.”\(^94\) However, Chinese forces struggled to subdue indigenous tribes even with the latest purchased artilleries, and clashes resulted in great casualties. (see below pp. 175-181)

To sustain Taiwan’s revenue and expenditure on expensive military force and pacification and reclamation schemes (without Fujian’s subsidy) as an independent province, Liu enacted various reforms in Taiwan’s administration and finance, reforms that involved forming more administrative divisions, applying the camphor and sulphur monopoly\(^95\), encouraging tea plantation, raising a commercial tax revenue (lijin 釐金) from sugar export and foreign imports, which involved the local gentry’s participation as part of the self-strengthening campaign, in

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\(^92\) Tavares, ‘Crystals from the Savages Forest Imperialism and Capitalism in the Taiwan Camphor Industry 1800-1945’, 122.


\(^95\) Liu enacted the second camphor monopoly that raise oppositions of European merchants and diplomats as breaking the Camphor Regulation in 1869. Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 406–7; Gu Ruiling 顧瑞鈴, ‘Liu Mingchuan Xinzheng Zhi Yanjiu 呂銘傳新政之研究 [Study of Liu Mingchuan’s New Policy]’, 109. However, it was uncertain if the camphor monopoly did improve the revenue or not, which was questioned by the Consul Pelham Warren who mentioned the fixed rate for the camphor, which enacted by the Qing government, was much lower than the rate foreign merchants were willing to pay. Large revenues were almost certainly lost due to evasion by smuggling amongst Chinese junks, etc. See TEPR4/107-117, Foreign Office. 1887. Annual Series. No. 156 Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance. China. Report for the Year 1886 on the Trade of Taiwan (Formosa), Consul Pelham Warren. 28/Feb/1887, 113.
particular with the Lin families in Banqiao and Wufeng. Indigenous territories were subjected to greater political and economic encroachment on account of the enforcement of Liu’s indigenous policies and new policies on ruling Taiwan, and their communities were thus challenged even before it was ceded to Japan in 1895, although the then governor – Shao Youlian (邵友濂 1891-1895) after Liu retired - abandoned most of Liu’s plan.

As emphasised from the beginning of this thesis, this phase (1884-1895) is marked as the watershed in the history of Taiwan and indigenous history, as Liu’s modernization plan in Taiwan clashed intensively with indigenous societies. We shall see how advanced military forces of the Qing were defeated with mass casualty by Formosan indigenes who were heavily victimised and compelled to resist while Qing’s modern weaponry permeated Taiwan. Analysis will be made in Chapter 5 of indigenous conflicts with the Qing military and Chinese civilians and the engagement of weaponry will be demonstrated as representing a move of weaponry and warfare to a more modernised level.

3.3. Encroachment by the Chinese

The Chinese who settled in Taiwan certainly became the actual intruders or intermediators of these economic and political encroachments into the mountain indigenes’ territories. The Chinese persisted in depriving indigenes of lands unlawfully, as was frequently narrated by foreign travellers. For instance, Swinhoe noted in 1864, how

The lines of demarcation between the territory of the Chinese and that of the aborigines are at once observable by the fine timbered hills that mark the hunting-grounds of the original possessors of the island. The Chinese territory is almost entirely denuded of trees, and cultivated on these interior hills mostly with the tea-plant, introduced from China. The absence of the primitive forest has naturally wrought a vast difference between the flora and fauna of the two territories.”

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97 See in particular pp 9,89,91,96-97

French Vice Consul Mr. Guérin, who visited Taiwan in 1868, also talked about the deceptions the Chinese used on the mountain indigenes for obtaining lands, as he described,

The Chinese pioneer tries to obtain what he wants by buying it, and his favorite tactics are persuasion; but if he encounters an obstinate refusal, he will try other means, at his own risk, of course. Thus, wood choppers scatter through the forests singly or in small groups, and they are an easy prey to marauders ... if the savages refuse to make any concessions, the Chinese proceed in a large group, and half of them keep armed guard over the safety of the workmen. In this way there is no danger, and if the Chinese adopted this procedure all the time, the tribes would be condemned to retreat a little more each day.”

Mizuno Jun depicted an incident which occurred when he visited Dakekan 大嵙崁 (Daxi District in Taoyuan County) in 1873 (before Japan sent the expedition to southern Taiwan), where some Chinese ambushed and captured three mountain indigenes by lying to them about foreigners bringing presents. Mizuno Jun was told that other members of the indigenes then came to the Chinese residences for return of the hostages and gave the Chinese 14.5 to 29 hectares of lands in exchange.

Besides, some fairly friendly relations among the mountain indigenes and the Chinese were also discerned. Some observations and experiences of relations between mountain indigenes and Hakka Chinese were made by Pickering, that mountain indigenes in the south relied on goods and weaponry supplied by Hakka Chinese. General Le Gendre also noted that “many of their emissaries (Hakkas) have pushed far into the country of the mountain indigenes, where they have settled and are laying up the foundations for a more extensive intercourse and trade” when he followed an expedition to the south led by the local Chinese officials in 1874. Cases of mountain indigenes on friendly terms with Chinese and married to Chinese were common throughout the nineteenth century, and also known and noted in Chinese and English literature. In April 1847 Cao Shigui 曹士桂 – a subprefect of indigenous affairs in northern

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101 Hakka Chinese were the later Chinese immigrants settled on the hills in northern region (Taoyuan, Hsinchu and Miali County) and southern region (Pingdong County) of Taiwan from Guandong province in mainland China. Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 191.

102 Le Gendre, C. W., “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 75.
Taiwan noted in his diary that he met a Chinese man—Li Xiu 李秀 and one of his four indigenous wives, who belonged to the Atayal tribe. 103 Swinhoe also noted a Chinese man—Lin Bancheang 林萬掌- married to a Rukai indigenous woman from Kalees who conducted some trade with indigenes in southern Taiwan. 104 Chen Guodong also noted that the continuity of intermarriage between the Chinese men and mountain and plain indigenous women still existed up to the Japanese colonial period. 105 The cases of trade and intermarriage with the mountain indigenes might be as well regarded as another form of encroachment from the western plain. These cases of Chinese intruding into mountain indigenous territories and inveigling mountain indigenes were commonly found throughout the late nineteenth century. The Western countries and the Qing government were the ones who further manipulated behind these more domestic yet brutal operations.

Meanwhile, plains indigenes who desisted from the headhunting ritual and lost their lands in the western plains to lawless Chinese immigrants were situated in a complicated and hazardous circumstance. They were either forced into the mountains or to relocate to eastern regions (see Chapter 2, Map 2:4, p. 54), and then undergo attacks by mountain indigenes from time to time when they risked losing their heads from headhunting practices. Regularly they also conducted trade with mountain indigenes 106 and accessed mountain regions for logging camphor trees 107 and acted as middlemen for commerce or guides between Chinese and foreigners. 108 For instance, plain indigene or Sisheshoufan 四社熟番 in the Yuli basin 玉里盆地 (Tainan City) were known to trade clothes, ironware, sugar wine, salt, pigs with the mountain indigenes and this was recorded in the 1890s. 109 Nevertheless, a variety of relations of the plains


104 Swinhoe, Notes on the Ethnology of Formosa, 5; Xu Zonggan 徐宗幹, Siweixin Zhaizalu 斯未信齋雜錄, Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 93 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1960), 85.

105 Chén Guódòng 陳國棟, ‘Chinese Frontiersmen and Taiwanese Tushengnan 土生囝 in the Local Economy of Taiwan before 1900’, 368–69.


109 Anonymous, Anpingxian Zaji 安平縣雜記 (Miscellany of Anping), Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊
indigenes with Chinese immigrants also developed into a complex network over time such as intermarriages (even though the Chinese were forbidden to marry indigenes by the Qing government\textsuperscript{110}), mixed residence and so on, which assisted the movement and transfer of goods, ideas, information, weaponry, and so on. Several accounts of mixed residence of mountain indigenes, plains indigenes, half castes, and Chinese, especially Hakka Chinese, were reported in Pingdong County, in places like Liangkiau 琗崎(Hengchuan township), Tossupong 大樹房 and Sheomalee 射麻里 (Manzhou township).\textsuperscript{111} In some cases plains indigenes were hired as guards by them and given firearms to protect Chinese in the mountains, as noticed by a British naval surveying officer, William Blakeney when he arrived at the Southern Cape with Swinhoe in 1858\textsuperscript{112} and a German botanist, Dr. Warburg who visited a church in Suao 蘇澳 (Yilan County) with Dr. Mackay in 1888.\textsuperscript{113} T.L. Bullock, a British Acting consul also described the employment of “water savages” (Thao tribes live near Sun-moon Lake in Nantou), “they live by hunting, by working for Chinamen, and by cultivating the little land which they have cleared for themselves”.\textsuperscript{114} The continuous plains indigenes military scheme from the late eighteenth century, which was established by Imperial Commissioner Fu Kangan (also see Chapter 2, p. 55), served its function of security at the indigenes’ borders and to assist the Qing military in pacifying local raids and the mountain indigenes in the “opening up mountain and pacifying the indigenes” program. For instance, hundreds of plains indigenes military were sent to reinforce

\textsuperscript{110}Zhou Yuanwen 周元文, Chongxiu Taiwanfu Zhi 重修臺灣府志 [Revised Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 105 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 483.

\textsuperscript{111}Le Gendre, C. W., “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 75; Michael Beazeley, ‘Notes of an Overland Journey through the Southern Part of Formosa in 1875, from Takow to the South Cape, with Sketch Map,’ Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography 7 (January 1885): 13; George Taylor, ‘A Ramble through Southern Formosa’, The China Review 16 (1888): 142.

\textsuperscript{112}William Blakeney, On the Coasts of Cathay and Cipango Forty Years Ago: A Record of Surveying Service in the China Yellow and Japan Seas and on the Seaboard of Korea and Manchuria (London: Elliot Stock, 1902), 59.


\textsuperscript{114}TEPR1/394-400. Report of a Journey into the Interior of Formosa made by Acting Assistant Bullock, in company with the Rev W. Campbell, of the English Presbyterian Mission and Mr. J.B. Steere, Collector in Natural History for the State Museum of Michigan, United States, October and November, 1873. Acting Assistant T.L. Bullock. Taiwan, 26/Nov/1873, 399
the Qing army and stationed in the northern, central and southern division according to Xu’s analysis.\footnote{115}

There were relationships and intricate networks among mountain indigenes, plains indigenes and the Chinese communities when the chances of political, economic and cultural intrusions were higher from the late nineteenth century. Various circumstances and degrees of interactions of mountain indigenes with plains indigenes and Chinese mainly depended on the areas involved, and were more often triggered or accelerated by commercial imperatives, driving Chinese immigrants to exploit and profit from camphor, tea, indigo and other mountain resources, or by colonial governants’ intervention. So, nineteenth century Taiwan was enveloped in a highly strung predicament by several belligerent ethnic groups. Such patterns of interaction or relations like trade, intermarriage, mixed residence, etc also constructed routes for circulating goods, information, knowledge and technologies. These will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. The plains indigenes were the vehicles for this circulation or transfer and in some ways they might be the ones also who ensured the process of dissemination amongst indigenous societies through friends and foes alike and varied layers of relations.

4. Formosan Indigenes under Japan’s Colonization (1895-1914)

Traces of Japan casting her covetous eyes on Taiwan can be found in the early seventeenth century before Dutch colonization when Japanese pirates often used Taiwan as their base and made a few attempts to occupy Keelung.\footnote{116} However, apart from the thousands of tons of sugar and deerskin exported from Taiwan to Japan by the Dutch as noted in an earlier chapter, linkage between Japan and Taiwan ceased when Japan decreed the Sakoku (or isolation) policy in 1639. Two and a half centuries later, Japan obtained authority over Taiwan without using any direct local military force after gaining victory in the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895

\footnote{115} Viceroy of Min-Zhe, Qing Duan 慶端, ‘慶端片奏’ (Notes by Qing Duan) in Tongzhichao Yuezhe Dan 同治朝月摺檔 [Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Tongzhi Era]; Mingqing Gongcang Taiwan Dangan Huibian 明清宮藏臺灣檔案匯編 [Compilation of Archives in Ming and Qing Court Relating to Taiwan], 177–84; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 94–95.

\footnote{116} Zhou Wanyao 周婉窈, ‘Shanzai Yaopo Bilangzhong-Zonglun Mingren de Taiwan Renshi 山在瑤坡碧浪中 - 總論明人的臺灣認識’ [Ming Conceptions of Taiwan: From Silhouettes to Islands], 120–30.
while European countries led by Great Britain rivalled to exploited abundant resources in Taiwan through commercial means. By all means, Japan desiderated the rich resources of sugar, rice, camphor, tea, forestry, mining and mountain products in Taiwan. Thus, ruling Taiwan as Japan’s first colony and controlling intractable mountain indigenes proved to be vital tasks for Japan after its revolutionary transformation from a “rural” country to a capitalist and modernized society.\textsuperscript{117} This section is going to outline the stages and policies of the Japanese government in its attempts to manage and to have full control over the indigenes and the ways in which these accelerated infringements on their domains and communities.

At the early stage of Japanese indigenous management (1895-1902), Kabayama Sukenori 樺山資紀, the first viceroy of Taiwan Sotokufu 臺灣總督府, the highest organ of Japanese government in Taiwan, authorised military governance and a placatory policy towards indigenous people, in order to avoid uprisings in indigenous districts and the risks of forming alliances and rebellions with the Chinese, before repressing the remaining Republic of Formosa’s defiance (1895-1896). Fuji Shizue specified that apart from militarized concerns at the time, placatory policies also targeted exploiting mountain resources as in a mandate carried by Kabayama, “to develop Taiwan, to tame raw savages is the priority task”. In Taiwan administrative reports, mountain indigenes were listed under agriculture and forestry and the Japanese dismissed mountain indigenous rights, but mainly focused on evolving colonial industries.\textsuperscript{118} Taiwan Sotokufu soon regulated ordinances to restrict the procurement of coal, sulphur, gold mining and most importantly camphor that were largely found in indigenous territories, and restored most of the infrastructure left by the Qing to supply frontier resources. To acquire the dominance of camphor and secure its profits, command over mountain indigenes turned into Taiwan Sotokufu’s key commission and this involved assembling frontier guards inherited from the Qing era to protect camphor workers and stoves from the mountain indigenes’ attacks, followed by the establishment of the Taiwan Camphor Bureau in 1899.\textsuperscript{119} Meanwhile, to appease indigenes, particularly mountain indigenes, Japan followed approaches

\textsuperscript{117} For a paper which emphasises how Japanese imperialism especially searched for raw material and energy supplies, see Ian Inkster, ‘The Message and Massage - The Mythology of Japan’s Industrialisation’, in Japan’s Impact on the World (Canberra: Japanese Studies Association of Australia, 1984), 18–29.
\textsuperscript{118} Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, Taiwan Yuanzhamin Shi - Zhengce Pian 臺灣原住民史- 政策篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes - Policy Formulation) (Nantou: The Historical Research Commission of Taiwan Province, 2001), 2–3.
from the Pacification and Reclamation Bureau of the Qing government. Alcohol, food, cigarettes, clothes, utensils and medals were bestowed on many indigenous groups and Japanese authorities received indigenous chiefs in Taipei. A lot of research on indigenous cultures, lives, diseases, weaponry and local industries proceeded in this period before crucial subjugations began from 1902. Nonetheless, indigenous groups persisted with insurrections, especially the Atayal, Paiwan and Truku, and indigenous collaborations with Chinese rebellions in 1896-1897 manifested the failure of Japan’s early placatory policies. (See Chapters 6)

To pursue ultimate economic interests, policies on indigenes’ management were amended after the outbreak of the indigenous mutiny in Nanzhuang 南庄 (Miaoli County) in 1902 originated by Ri Agui 日阿拐, a chief of the Nanshiriki village of the Saisiyat tribe, who also owned hundreds of camphor stoves with Taiwan Sotokufu’s permission. Kodama Gentarō, the fourth viceroy of Taiwan Sotokufu, set up a Committee of Mountain Affairs 山地事務委員會 under the management of the Police Bureau in 1903 and repressed indigenes by using military force, threatening withdrawal of salt and ammunitions supply, constructing and extending guards lines from Yilan to Nantou that sieged and limited indigenous territories. Duties of guards involved in the defence and protection of camphor workers from indigenes’ assaults included patrols along guard lines, liaisons between guard camps, repair and improvement of roads and cable, etc. Landmines and electric wires were installed along guard lines and extended from Yilan, Xinchu, Taichung, Nantou, Douliu and Taitung, where the camphor trees were distributed and where experienced mountain indigenes’ attacked the most. Furthermore, from 1907 to 1914, the Viceroy of Taiwan Sotokufu, Sakuma Samata implemented

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120 Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, Taiwan Yuanzhamin Shi - Zhengce Pian 臺灣原住民史 - 政策篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes - Policy Formulation), 3–4, 24–25; Pan Jidao 潘繼道, ‘Riben Digup Tongshi de Jianli 日本帝國統治的建立 [Establishment of Imperial Japan’s Governance]’, in Gupjia, Quyu, Zuqun - Taiwan Houshan Qilai Diqu Yuanzhumin Zuquan de Lishi Bianqian (1874–1945) 國家, 區域, 族群 - 臺灣後山奇萊地區原住民族權的歷史變遷 (1874–1945) [Nation, Region, Ethnic Groups: The Historical Changes of the Indigenous Authority in the Region of Qílái Region in Taiwan] (Taitung: Dong Taiwan yanjiu hui 東台灣研究會 [Eastern Taiwan Research Association], 2008), 103.

121 Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, Taiwan Yuanzhamin Shi - Zhengce Pian 臺灣原住民史 - 政策篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes - Policy Formulation), 52–56.

122 Ino Kanori 伊能嘉矩, Riban Shikô 理蕃志稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 51 (Taipei: 臺灣總督府警务局理蕃課, 1918), 357–58; Pan Jidao 潘繼道, ‘Riben Digup Tongshi de Jianli 日本帝國統治的建立 [Establishment of Imperial Japan’s Governance]’, 104–5.

123 Here was a clear introduction of very advanced technology into border conflicts. Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, Taiwan Yuanzhamin Shi - Zhengce Pian 臺灣原住民史 - 政策篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes - Policy Formulation), 61–62.
twice the “Five Year Indigenous Management Scheme” (五年理蕃計畫), which included missions on quelling indigenous tribes by using advanced armaments and confiscating weaponry held by them. Multiple strategies were manoeuvred, from the building of roads inside the interior central and eastern mountains, expanding guard lines to propel mountain indigenes further and enticement with salt, matches, iron and medical service as prizes, and providing police and military forces with modern armaments, communication, and transportation. These provoked numerous insurrections initiated by indigenes, especially by mountain indigenes, guard lines and camps were attacked and hundreds of guards and Japanese policemen were killed as detailed in Chapter 6. To avert genocide, indigenous tribes finally surrendered against Japan’s advanced weaponry, they also at least nominally lost their lands and firearms and were required to relocate to places for easier management and to receive Japanese education that brought to a seeming close the violent and brutal indigenes management. In Chapter 6, multiple indigenous warfare will be researched as well as changes in weaponry that Formosan indigenes held at a more “advanced” level for it was this that sustained their resistance during stages of merciless encroachment.

5. Further Encroachment, Further Resistance after 1860

Formosan indigenous tribes and their living environment were put under pressure in these years, on the other hand, issues and management of the Formosan indigenes troubled egocentric and profit-seeking Qing and Japanese colonists. Here I would like to suggest that the components and capacities for indigenes to resist were transformed in the very process of fulfilling the demands of industrial developments in the West and world market from the second half nineteenth century. Therefore, this chapter emphasized the context and main features of the encroachment process in Taiwan, no longer just limited to Chinese agrarian interests, and the major impacts of economic interest, politics and policies on indigenes under late Qing and Japanese’s governances that further accelerated the encroachments from 1860. Until at last Formosan indigenous people succumbed to advanced military suppression in 1914, although we must also note that resistance to the Japanese went on until the outset of the 1930s. Economic interest in Taiwan and shipwreck incidents in eastern Taiwan firstly conspired

124 Ibid., 86–88.
Europeans’ and Japanese’s attempts at procuring Taiwan after four of the treaty ports were opened. Meanwhile indigenous people formed some friendly relationships with Westerners such as those who married Europeans and experienced meaningful cultural engagement. Essentially, the imperatives of commercial interests of both European merchants and colonists in dominating and manipulating camphor, tea, indigo, coal and other industries in the mountains or close to the mountains, escalated greater intrusions from the western plain to the eastern mountain districts. Here we also pointed out the importance of exploiting these resources in industrial production and in a market generated on the other side of the world, and the increased local government revenue that lead to massive environmental disruptions, contravening indigenous lives directly and indirectly. This disruption could be seen in the report of Consul T. Watters in Tamsui, “the camphor trees are being gradually cut down and no new trees planted, and that the distance between the place of manufacture and the port is yearly extending.”\(^{125}\) The stance of the Qing government altered as it regarded Taiwan as a strategic place for its coastal defence and was urged to modernise from 1874 after varied threats and incidents from European countries and Japan in the eastern regions. The late Qing government enacted major changes in Taiwan modernization and indigenous policies that legitimised impositions on mountain indigenous territories in the central and eastern mountain districts and stimulated the opposition of mountain indigenes. The Qing armies had little success in pacifying indigenes and struggled throughout the period. Japan experienced similar consequences as had the Qing government under conditions of far greater economic exploitation.

While the living and hunting space of indigenes continued to be compressed, they remained to withhold their geographical advantages from intruders. Such factor of terrain or climate were even more important in conflicts further north and east as expressed by Swinhoe, who emphasised the military significance of contrast in terrain:

\[
\text{they have struggled hard and are still struggling against the ever encroaching Chinese settler, to maintain their territory and independence. The Plains have been entirely snatched from them as well as the lower hill ranges, but where the mountains are sufficiently}
\]

covered with forest and of sufficient height to enable them to repel the usurper, they have succeeded in doing do.\textsuperscript{126}

This appears to have been be attained when the well-armed Americans of the \textit{Rover} incident (see Chapter 4, p. 136):

experienced immense difficulties in forcing a way through the thick jungle; the intense heat rendered it almost impossible to conduct operations in the middle of the day, and many of the party were attacked by sunstroke. The savages, who had taken up a position in the jungle behind rocks and other places invisible to the Americans, kept up a heavy fire whenever their foes appeared.... after a desperate engagement, the force was compelled to withdraw in some confusion to the ships, and soon departed from the island.\textsuperscript{127}

Again, we see variations between use of weaponry and effects of terrain in determining outcomes. Even where their arms appear not to have advanced far, groups of indigenous fighters could maintain effective resistance against such well-equipped forces as those of the Americans and the Japanese. House described how the Botans re-created natural advantage during the Mutan incident, forging an environment as

nearly impregnable as any strong-hold possibly can be. The sides of the “Stone Gate” are two rocky acclivities which rise at sharp angles, and often perpendicularly, to a height of nearly five hundred feet on one side and four hundred and fifty on the other. The distance between them, at the base, is about thirty feet, which is entirely filled by a rapid stream that dashes in foam over rough rocks through the greater length of the pass, and is waist deep at its only fordable point. Except under pressure of the most desperate necessity, no one would ever dream of attempting to scale these heights; and in fact no earthly power could accomplish such a task if any attempt, however feeble, were made to defend them. The crag on the right hand pillar is topped by sharp spires not unlike the needles of the Chamouni valley [Switzerland] in form – though of course much smaller- and certainly as forbidding in their defiance to intruders.\textsuperscript{128}

A very interesting estimate from ensign Ibis in 1877 refers to southern resistance on the small scale,

The tribes of southern Formosa are the most warlike and venturesome of all... Although they do not number more than 2,000 men, they still

\textsuperscript{127} Davidson, \textit{The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions}, 116.
\textsuperscript{128} House, \textit{The Japanese Expedition to Formosa}, 119–20.
have the advantage of the northern portion of the countryside, a raw, completely wild region, only accessible at a few spots, where every river, every mountain path and every canyon is in and of itself a stronghold. Also, they never engage in open battle that could put them at a disadvantage, but rather follow the enemy by foot, unseen, unsuspected, and then shoot at him from the bushes, or weaken him through surprise attacks, or lure him into their hiding places, from which retreat is not possible without substantial losses. When one considers, then, that energy, cunning, and natural advantages are on the side of the attacker, it is easy to conclude that, on average, ten Chinese soldiers will not be enough against one native.  

Yet even here we see clues as to use of weapon and tactics, the unexpected and exhausting manner in which the local environments were utilised by the Formosan indigenes. In this account, White noted the difficulty of crossing the forest and the importance of complete silence:

The intense silence of the forest, broken only by an occasional falling stone displaced in our way up the course, was very striking, and we could not help feeling how perfectly helpless the best drilled body of troops in the world would be, if left to their own resources in such a country, and opposed by merely a few poorly armed savages.

All the above does suggest that at most times, the point of conflict was associated with inherent advantages for the indigenous and achieved disadvantages for any outside antagonists. So, for the indigenous, local factors could not create victory where weapons were poor but they could militate against decisive victories for their opponents, however supplied and well-equipped technologically.


As infringement became stronger as presented in this chapter and Chart 3:1 shown above, features or assets of resistance of Formosan indigenes were greatly affected and amended from the mid-nineteenth century (Blocks A + C). In other words, the aptitude of indigenes to fight against intruders was converted and increased by extrinsic thrusts as at C. As mentioned earlier, the scale of natural resource exploitation spread from the western plains to central and mountain regions, new terrain might not be transmuted rapidly and indigenous people still gained some geographical defence and preserved some advantages when
confronting invaders. But then spaces were slowly constrained and this disrupted their ways of living and hunting. Mountain indigenes now faced predicaments like the earliest western plains indigenes – losing natural and geographical protection like hiding, guarding, setting up snares in forests and settings which they were familiar with, losing ownership of lands or territories now replaced by tea or indigo plantations and roads to transport camphor logs and other mountain resources. Damaging lands in such varied ways, this resulted in less surviving animals to hunt and suitable land to grow crops for indigenes’ self sufficiency and shortage of animal skins and meat to trade with the Chinese. Hostilities and tensions between neighbouring indigenous tribes augmented their already existing disputes over the unclear demarcation of territories, too. As their culture of headhunting remained to serve as insurance of prosperous harvests and hunting, as well as of their social status, and as a solution in disagreements, disasters elimination or revenge and to terrorize outsiders, then it followed that further commercial and political incursions could only embolden their customs. Lastly, the new arrival and the use of firearms (Block D) as relatively alien objects along with the opposition of indigenes to the colonists might have retained indigenes’ ascendancy and titles for lands.

6. Firearms and Culture: the Argument and Hypothesis

Heretofore, it becomes clear that from the mid-nineteenth century, Formosan indigenous people faced phases of comprehensive infringements from the western plain toward the central and eastern mountain areas under the combined pressure of new industrial technology and world market expansion and commercial colonists’ policies on developing eastern mountain districts, while Taiwan itself also encountered the external menace from the West which impelled Qing officials to initiate plans for modernizing Taiwan from 1874. The plans were influenced by the Self-Strengthening Movement in China itself and stressed the establishing of modern military technology, conciliating indigenous tribes and developing the rich resources in mountains.\(^{131}\) Nonetheless, commanding the truculent mountain indigenes became a primary issue for colonists. Hereafter, extending and transferring modern and

\(^{131}\) Self-Strengthening Movement (1861-1895) was a series of institutional reforms, initiated after the defeats by the Western countries in China under the late Qing governance. The Qing officials strongly advocated the development of industry by introducing and importing Western military technologies and adopting scientific knowledge and training. It is often compared with the Meiji Restoration in Japan, but it was proved to fail with the defeat of Sino-Japanese War in 1895.
advanced military technology to Taiwan was not only to consolidate the defence of Taiwan, but also to mollify plural Chinese ethnic and indigenes revolts.

Formosan indigenes showed distinctive characteristics in the second half of the nineteenth century when repelling unwanted visitors. As the historical record shows, indigenous people fought and resisted the Dutch and Chinese with their “primary” weaponry in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as noted in Chapter 2 - bows, arrows, shield, swords, spears or darts and later some muskets, possibly from trading with the Chinese. The sorts of munitions indigenes later possessed were not only limited to traditional weaponry, but also flintlocks, Chinese matchlocks, Snider rifles, Remington rifles, Mauser rifles and other breech-loading rifles were found and used in warfare by indigenes from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century. It is clear that these modern weaponries were not invented or manufactured by Formosan indigenes. How did they procure such modern weaponries? What types of armament did indigenes possess to withstand colonists and intruders? Contemporary material documented how both the Qing and Japan grappled with terminating indigenous resistance and attacks, particularly with mountain indigenes and their headhunting culture. Can we argue that the use of modern weaponry, particularly firearms, assisted indigenous people to achieve some successes in warfare? How did indigenous people encounter and compete with the modern and advanced weaponry operated by the Qing and Japan from the mid-nineteenth and twentieth centuries? What other factors were involved and combined with firearms that increased or maintained their effectiveness to fight against or attack interlopers? How did indigenous people perceive and respond to modern weaponry in their original cultures? How was modern technology applied and/or transferred into so-called “primitive” or even “savage” culture?

The hypothesis of this thesis is that the Formosan indigenes gained their access to modern firearms and developed and embedded firearms in their own cultures, which allowed them to resist effectively in the period of 1860 to 1914. Firearms were chosen as the major case study in this thesis because the indigenes of Taiwan did not appear to be merely “victims” for nearly one century from when modern technology interference arrived, unlike other indigenous cultures or colonies, but adapted and absorbed firearms into their hunting and head-hunting cultures to fight back instead and to preserve some of their independence. Firearms are also easier to carry and can be operated individually without much group discipline.
and coordination of people, unlike cannons or other large armaments. Xu’s book on the military and society of Taiwan under Qing governance explicitly identifies major features of the development of military force by Qing officials, Chinese civilians and indigenes in Taiwan by using large amounts of Chinese historical material. He also discussed the effectiveness of administration and jurisdiction of the Qing, and how collaboration with rewarded local militia or Yimin (義民) and restrictions on iron, saltpetre and sulphur were the latent factors of “social stability” in Taiwan. Evidence on modern weaponry – mostly firearms – indicates how they had permeated indigenous societies and been used in warfare, even though he suggested that the Qing officials were of predominant status in large military weaponry transfer from China and through the later establishment of a munitions factory in Taipei.  

Finally he examined and analysed the strength of the military and co-operation between Qing armies, Chinese civilians and indigenes in internal conflicts of Chinese ethnic rivalries and indigenes’ rebellions and external collisions with European countries and Japan. Another existing analytical treatment by Chen suggested that Formosan indigenes formulated their subjective choices of using firearms and composed their culture of firearms in order to retain their original hunting and headhunting activities, rather than under the imperatives of aggression, military expansion or attempt to construct a sovereign state. Nevertheless, the transformations/transition and adaptation of modern military technology by recipients/operators, (not devisers nor those who received any military training) like the Taiwan indigenes remain unexamined as a social or cultural process operating within dynamic altering commercial and international circumstances. It is important to identify and recognize the circumstances of the indigenous people of Taiwan, whose resources and knowledge of technological application were limited, in the late nineteenth century – a transmutation era toward modernization when procuring firearms, and which represented interaction between global technology and indigenous cultures, and how such weaponries were further applied in warfare within indigenous cultures. This is a significant aspect of our present treatment which also focuses more on the global and Chinese context of indigenous history and use of firearms. The next 3 Chapters will be focusing on firearms as a

132 Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 213–21.
133 Ibid., 1–11.
134 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, Jindai Taiwan Yuanzhumin Tuxiangzhong de Qiang 兼論槍枝的傳入、流通與使用 [The Aborigines with Modern Gun: An Historical Study of the Introduction, Exchange and Use of Gun in Aboriginal Society], 90–91.
modern and foreign military technology that engaged in most conflicts of the indigenes and as we shall argue, could only effectively do so through a process of cultural change and adaptation, which is the subject of more detail analysis in Chapter 7.
Part II 1860-1914: Conflict and Resistance of the Indigenous People

Chapter 4 Conflict at the Traditional Level 1860-1883: Clash of Cultures and Firearms

The strategic position of Taiwan and its rich resources soon caught upon European countries’ attention and later claimed their lucrative interests as evidenced by the compulsive Treaty of Tianjin. This acceleration of encroachment was launched from the western plains to the eastern mountain regions under the pressure of commercial imperatives from the West from the 1860s, to be followed later by the colonial government’s persecution of the mountain indigenes’ territories, resources and lives from the 1890s. Clashes between cultures and resistances from the mountain indigenes were inevitable. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to explore the circumstances of mountain indigenes when encountering intrusions or incidents and the nature of the weaponry that mountain indigenes held in the period of 1860-1883. This period will be designated the “traditional level” of conflict, when cultures of European, Chinese and indigenes clashed at the beginning of the modernity process. The definition of “traditional level” in this thesis symbolises that the types of weapon such as knives, spears, arrows, bows and even firearms were in a primary stage which Formosan indigenes inherited from previous centuries.

It is little known when matchlocks\(^1\) began to transfer into mountain indigenous societies, but the use of matchlocks became the popular armament among the Chinese military, the Chinese civilians and plains indigenes from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century. The mountain indigenes were seemingly influenced by and adapted to this trend from the mid-nineteenth century, therefore the use of matchlocks within mountain indigenes will be marked

\(^1\) Matchlock is regarded as the general term for Arquebus, Musket and Chinese matchlocks or 鳥銃, which were all muzzle loading types of firearms. They require a slow burning fuse to ignite the priming powder before loading the powder, which was wrapped by paper or cloth into a small ball, into the tubes. It was commonly used in Europe from the late 1400s to mid-1600s and in Japan from 1543 to mid-1800s. Matchlocks were introduced to China in 1500s, during the Jiajing era of the Ming Dynasty from Japan. For the development of matchlocks in China, see Chapter 2, p 48, and footnote 128-130. Although the parts of matchlocks were fairly simple and easy for repair, there were restriction and disadvantages of matchlocks, which effected the efficiency in warfare. For instance, the slow process when reloading, the safety of fuse when warrior usually carried gunpowder, the weather restricted the ignition or made the powder damp, difficulty in igniting outdoor, the smoke or fire could expose the warrior’ position, etc. Flatnes, *From Musket to Metallic Cartridge*, 28–29; Liu Xu 劉旭, *Zhongguo Gudai Huoyao Huoqishi 中國古代火藥火器史 [History of Ammunition and Weaponry in China]*, 118, 153–56.; Further information on the development of matchlocks and muzzle loading firearms, see Flatnes, *From Musket to Metallic Cartridge*, 28–75.
as an element of the traditional level of weaponry. The first section of Chapter 4 will focus on the collisions between mountain indigenes and foreigners, which resulted in military expeditions from the West and Japan and the growing conflict mountain indigenes mounted against plains indigenes, the Chinese civilians, and the Qing military, in order to assess the nature of the military technology of mountain indigenes in 1860-1883. The second section will discuss the armament, mostly firearms that the Western military, foreign visitors, the Qing military and Chinese civilians used, which provided the environment of firearms for the mountain indigenes. Our third section will give details of firearms that mountain indigenes possessed and their direct access and possible accesses to procurement of firearms.

1. Clashes with Westerners, Japanese and Chinese from 1860

This section will firstly discuss how the indigenes encountered collisions initiated by foreign nations—Western nations and Japan. It focuses on the involvement of the firearms that mountain indigenes possessed in warfare, and also the engagement, experiences and knowledge of foreign weapons gained from foreign soldiers from 1860 to 1883. Then it will move to consider the antagonisms that the mountain indigenes confronted with plains indigenes, the Chinese civilians, and the Qing military, who were dispatched for “opening up mountains and pacifying the indigenes” by the Qing government. These internal conflicts continued to increase and became intensive under the demand for resources from the mountain regions for the world market and as the Qing government determined to open up eastern regions of Taiwan.

1.1. External Conflicts

Rover Incident 1867

Contacts of indigenes with Europeans in the nineteenth century were also initiated as a series of violent incidents, which mostly took place in southern Taiwan. As referred to in Chapter 3 (pp. 72-74), a number of unanticipated Western ships were wrecked on southern coasts
where mountain indigenes lived. Instinctively, it was inevitable for Formosan indigenes to regard these unknown ships and uninvited castaways that survived and reached the shores as potential threats. These ships were often known or reported to be pillaged and survivors were abused or treated as slaves by the indigenes or the local Chinese, which concerned the Western countries and the security of their trading routes. Insistent military action was demanded of Peking by the U.S. after 14 people were killed from an American merchant ship Rover by the Paiwan indigenes from Koalute tribe (only 1 Chinese sailor survived and escaped to Takao) near Kwaliang Bay 南灣 (Pingdong County) in early March, 1867. The first British Warship Cormorant, which was detained at Takao at the time and commanded by Captain George E. Broad², was soon dispatched on 25th March to the scene to search for any possible survivors with Charles Carroll, Acting British Consul in Taiwan-fu and Dr. Patrick Manson.³ Indigenes naturally assailed any strangers and his troops were no exception. Without preparation for encountering any land combat, his troops were forced to evacuate back to the ship with 1 soldier injured. Quoting the China Mail of 6th April, 1867, Le Gendre’s note from 1874 recorded that,

The position of the foe being only indicated by the smoke from their muskets, and they themselves being quite hidden in the dense brush, Captain Broad wisely determined not to risk the lives of his men in the pursuit of an invisible enemy in a jungle, where every advantage would have been on their side. The boats were, therefore, ordered off, the retreat being covered by the cutter, from which was kept up a fire, which, from the cries of the savages, evidently told. Their bullets and arrows, however, now fell quickly around the boats, all of which were struck in several places, one ball passing right through both sides of the whaler, only a few inches below the seat on which were sitting Captain Broad and Mr. Carroll. In the same boat, the stock of one of the marines’ rifles was shot through as he was in the act of firing it.⁴

A few weeks later, the public in Europe soon read this outrageous news about how a British military expedition was forced to withdraw from the island and was driven out by indigenes who held muskets in Formosa, when The Illustrated London News also reported this mission

² Otness, One Thousand Westerners in Taiwan to 1945, 20–21.
⁴ Le Gendre, C. W., “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 80.
and gave a similar account on 15th June, 1867,

No sooner, however, were one or two of the party on shore than a sharp cross-fire from muskets was opened from two points, accompanied with a shower of arrows. The enemy being invisible and unapproachable, it was deemed advisable to withdraw, and orders were accordingly given. Though the mission had been intended for a peaceful one, yet, knowing the blood-thirsty nature of these savages of Formosa, Captain Broad had directed the cutter to lie about thirty yards from the shore, to keep a look out for any hostile demonstration; so that, while the crews of the other boats were re-embarking and shoving off, the cutter was enabled to return the fire of the natives, and, judging from their cries, not without effect.  

Both accounts show that indigenous people were using muskets very effectively in this action and managed to press intruders right at the shore with further harassments at the very beginning of our period.

General Le Gendre, the U.S consul at Amoy thereafter hustled and sought the Qing officials’ assistance in Taiwan, although the response he received from the Qing authorities in Taiwan suggested they were impotent. (Also see Chapter 3, p. 94) A few months later, on 1st June 1867 another retributive expedition was sent and accompanied by two American warships – Hartford and Wyoming under the command of Rear-Admiral H.H. Bell. In the reports of Rear-Admiral Bell to Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy in Washington D.C., he stated that 181 officers and privates and a few attendants such as William Pickering and British Consul Charles Carroll, who provided varied assistance, joined in this mission. On the 13th June, the Commander of the Hartford – G. E. Belknap and Lieut – Commander Alexander S. Mackenzie led men to Kwaliang Bay where victims of the Rover had been murdered. Admiral Bell then gave a vivid description of how indigenes fought in this battle:

The savages, dressed in clouts and their bodies painted red, were seen through our glasses, assembling in parties of ten or twelve on the cleared hills about two miles distant. Their muskets glistened in the sun, indicating the kind of arms they carried; their movements were visible to us on board during the most of the day. As our men marched into the hills the savages knowing the paths boldly decided to meet them, and

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gliding through the high grass and from cover to cover, displayed a stratagem and courage equal to our native Indians. Delivering their fire, they retreated without being seen by our men, who charging upon their covers frequently fell into ambush. From this passage, Formosan indigenes appeared to be well prepared with their muskets in combat position, albeit not wearing defensive accoutrements and soon demonstrated their strategic and tactical abilities to perplex and to muddle their adversaries. Another closer observation from Pickering who followed a skirmish with Commander Mackenzie,

> We could perceive no signs of any inhabitants, and progression was difficult; the country was covered with thick jungle, excepting a break here and there, where we came upon open spaces of grass and rocks. We had not penetrated a mile from the beach when our unseen foes fired a volley upon us, but did no harm ... the lurking savages began to fire upon us from all quarters, both before and behind whilst chasing them was difficult and futile.

This clearly showed that by firing at the U.S. soldiers, Formosan indigenes might have deliberately driven their enemies to a certain area where they could have obtained the predominant position of the enemies’ movement without killing and being seen or injured. Commander Belknap gave an account of how fast indigenes’ movement were,

> the wily foes had fallen back with wonderful rapidity and/ made known their escape by loud halloos from the thickets beyond. Only occasional glimpses of the enemy could be caught, their presence being generally discovered by sudden shots from the bushes and flashes of sunlight reflected from their bright barrelled muskets.

This tense and imminent motion of indigenes generated a lot of unpredicted and effective strikes. A sketch published in Harper’s Weekly on 7th September 1867 portrayed this expedition as below. (Figure 3:1) The appearance of indigenes in this combat seems shadowy, groups of

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7 The Pirates of Formosan: Official Reports of the Engagement of the United States Naval Forces with the Savages of the Isle.’ in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 50.
8 Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 181.
10 An expressive narration was provided with this sketch – “In order to avenge the murder of a number of shipwrecked seamen of the bark Rover by the savage Malays of Formosa, Admiral BELL, on June 13, made a descent on that island with a force of 181 men and officers. They advanced a mile into the interior, encountering a few savages, who continually ambushed them in true Indian fashion. After penetrating a mile into the jungle, Losing Lieutenant- Commander MACKENZIE killed, and a dozen or fifteen men prostrated by sun-stroke, killing none of the savages, and failing to destroy their huts, the troops returned on shipboard and abandoned the expedition. Rear Admiral BELL concludes his report with the recommendation that the Chinese authorities be required to occupy the island with a settlement of their own; and this is to be effected, he says through our Minister at
Western musketeers only shot aimlessly into the forest. Within a few hours, the indigenes succeeded in expelling their enemies out of their territory, not long after they had landed on the beach. The expedition failed, Lieut-Commander Mackenzie was shot dead in this fight, and a group of soldiers suffered from severe sunstroke. Commander Belknap pulled back the entire troop to their ship in the afternoon on the same day, not even finding out where the Koalute village was.\textsuperscript{11} As the first encounter of indigenes with Western armed forces after two hundred years when the last Western power was dominant on the island, muskets clearly assisted Formosan indigenes in the south to surprise and prevail over Western advanced military and thus maintain their ascendancy on land.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure41.jpg}
\caption{Expedition sent by the U.S. after Rover shipwrecked in 1867}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{11}Pickering, \textit{Pioneering in Formosa}, 182; \textquote{The Pirates of Formosan: Official Reports of the Engagement of the United States Naval Forces with the Savages of the Isle.}; Eskildsen, \textit{Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874}, 51, 55.
The second expedition commenced on 10th September 1867 under the command of Liu Mingdeng 劉明燈, the Regional Commander of Taiwan (臺灣總兵) from Taiwanfoo who was stationed at Fang-liao with General Le Gendre after General Le Gendre persuaded the Governor – General of Fujian and Zhejiang, Wu Tang 吳棠 to send military force to Taiwan. 12 Meanwhile Tooke-tok, chief of 18 indigenous tribes or Langqiao shiba she 琅嶠十八社, which comprised mostly the Paiwan and Puyuma indigenous tribes in southern Taiwan, had received news from the Hakkas that 8,000 men were being sent by the Qing government to Liangjiao to slaughter indigenes, and he had soon gathered 1,100 indigenes seemingly all armed with firearms and 15,000 Amis indigenes with bows and spears. 13 Mountain indigenes in southern Taiwan rapidly assembled their men and procured a large amount of firearms in some sort of readiness as soon as they got the information of an upcoming attack inland. However, according to Le Gendre’s note Commander Liu led 1,000 men in this expedition instead of 8,000 men as Tooke-tok was previously informed, only 750 men were equipped with good European rifles and were “inadequate to the task before them, and before taking the field”, and enrolled 1,500 local militias who were previously experienced in fighting with indigenes. 14 Fortunately, no actual confrontation or combat arose between Chinese troops and indigenes in this expedition. Le Gendre eventually made contact with Tooke-tok and obtained an agreement to secure castaways in the future through Pickering’s assistance and his private contacts with the local Chinese and the mountain indigenes in the south. 15 In accordance with Pickering’s record on the pre-war preparation of the Paiwan and the Amis indigenes, Tooke-tok demonstrated his capability of gathering large amounts of firearms and summoning a large number of men within

13 Pickering noted that the ‘Amias’ (possibly Amis) were servants or salves under Tooke-tok’s command. Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 190; Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 99, 103.
15 Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 190–93; Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 103–6.
his own vassal tribes and neighbouring tribes. Although the types of firearms that Tooke-tok’s men held were not clear, we could possibly presume their weapons were muskets as they were the same indigenes that the British and the American soldiers had encountered and were forced to retreat from in the previous incident. Besides, the number of Chinese soldiers and the local militia (2,500) was significantly less than the indigenous warriors (16,100) and the Chinese soldiers (750) seemingly had less “good European rifles” than the indigenous warriors. Although the Chinese soldiers carried some “good European rifles”, which were noted as insufficient by Le Gendre, it seemed to be very likely the Chinese troops would have been defeated by the indigenes if a war had broken out.

Mudan Incident - The 1st Expedition of Japan in 1874

However, the consensus between General Le Gendre and Tooke-tok did not continue when 66 Ryukyu castaways reached the south western coast of Taiwan and 54 survivors were killed by Mudan indigenes (Paiwan) in December 1871. Since the dominion of Ryukyu Islands between China and Japan was unclear at the time, Soejima Taneomi 副島種臣, Foreign Minister of the Meiji government of Japan went to Beijing in the spring of 1873 and requested that the Qing government be held responsible for this incident and to recompense victims’ families. But the Qing government once again denied its jurisdiction over mountain indigenous people’s territories in eastern Taiwan as in the previous incident of the Rover.①6 (Also see Chapter 3, p. 94) Japan demonstrated its attentiveness to Taiwan by sending out troops to punish the Paiwan indigenes from the Mudan 牡丹社 and Kusakut 高士佛 tribes in April 1874 despite strong opponents from some foreign envoys in Tokyo including the British and American ministers, Harry S. Park and John A. Bingham, and internal remonstrance within the Japanese government including the Minister of the Right, Iwakura Tomomi 岩倉具視 and Japanese Councillor, Kido Koin 木戶孝允, who later resigned on this matter.①7 The character of General Le Gendre was rather controversial because he not only encouraged Japan to send the punitive expedition to


①7 Yen Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874., 203, 205–7, 214; Lin Chengrong 林呈蓉, Mudanshe Shijian de Zhenxiang 牡丹社事件的真相 [Truth of the Mudan Incident], 42–45, 50–52.
Taiwan when he met Soejima but he also offered his consultant services to the Japanese government as a “second rank official” before and during the expedition after he left his position as U.S. Consul at Amoy regardless of Bingham’s objections.18

In early May, 1874, around 3,500 Japanese soldiers led by General Saigō Tsugumichi, several Japanese officers and two former American navy officers – Lieutenant Commander Douglas Cassel and Lieutenant J. R. Wasson – disembarked at Liangjiao 琵琶 and stationed at Sialiao 射寮 in southern Taiwan. (see Map 4:1) As soon as they arrived, Lieutenant Cassel arranged to meet with Isa 伊厝, the chief of Shamali, who General Le Gendre put Cassel in contact with, and chiefs from other tribes to express their wish at not causing conflicts with other neighbouring tribes, apart from punishing the Mudan and Kusakut tribes. 19 Still, according to Lieutenant Wasson’s report, indigenes living near the Bay of Tuilasok River, possibly the Koalut tribe (龜仔角社 or 社頂), fired on their boats several times while they were inspecting and examining the bay.20 On 17th, 21st and 22nd of May, 1874, Mudan and Kusakut indigenes commenced firing and fought against Japanese troops in several combats near Sekimon 石門 which resulted in the loss of 7 Japanese soldiers and at least 30 men wounded in total. 14 indigenes were killed, including the chief of Mudan – A lok 阿祿 and his son, and many were wounded.21 In fact, firearms were mostly used by Mudan and Kusakut indigenes to attack Japanese troops while they were hiding between rocks or in hills. Wasson reported afterwards that when a large amount of indigenes’ arms were eventually captured, including spear, sword and bows and arrows,

injuries among their [Japanese] soldiers were mostly from gunshot wounds, showing that the savages relied almost wholly on their firearms; which though only rude matchlocks, are quite effective at short range. Wounds, however inflicted by them unless in some vital part, are not so dangerous as would be the case of those from rifled guns, these being.

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of course, smooth bore.\textsuperscript{22}

Even though the chief of Mudan and his son were killed in the battle in May, the Japanese military determined to annihilate Mudan and Kusakut tribes and mobilised their troops to besiege Mudan tribes from three different routes (Hong kang 楓港, Sekimon 石門 and Chiksha 竹社) from the 1\textsuperscript{st} of June. Each platoon reported encountering some onerous assaults from the indigenes.\textsuperscript{23} Firearms were frequently operated by the hostile indigenes in attacks and ambushes on Japanese troops. For instance, Japanese soldiers encountered some shooting from vulgar fortifications next to Sekimon\textsuperscript{24}, a few shots were fired from the thicket as the soldiers approached the Mudan tribe\textsuperscript{25}, and there was sudden fire from an ambush on an attempt to enter Kusakit village, which took 3 Japanese soldiers’ lives and wounded 2 men.\textsuperscript{26} In the end, Mudan, Kusakut and some villages were taken and burned down by Japanese troops and the chiefs of the Tuilasok 豬朥束社, Mudan, Kusakut, Shamali, Koalut, and Mantsui 文率社 received flags and papers of protection from Japanese officials sometime later in June. The Qing government was unaware of the intentions of the Japanese government in occupying Taiwan and proclaimed its objections only late in April when Japanese military action began to take place in southern Taiwan.\textsuperscript{27} The Qing government soon assigned Shen Baozhen as Special Imperial Commissioner for Taiwan Affairs with soldiers, weaponry and ships to negotiate with the Japanese and to investigate regions of indigenes in southern Taiwan from mid-May.\textsuperscript{28} After several parleys between Chinese and Japanese officials with the coordination of Thomas Wade, a British diplomat in China, the Qing finally agreed to pay Japan 500,000 taels indemnity for the cost of the expedition and the compensation of victims’ families and to enforce its control over indigenes’ territories for future coastal security in exchange for withdrawal of Japanese military

\textsuperscript{22} Wasson, James R., ‘Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 236.

\textsuperscript{23} Wasson, James R., ‘Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) in Ibid., 242–48; Lin Chengrong 林呈蓉, Mudanshe Shijian de Zhenxiang 牡丹社事件的真相[Truth of the Mudan Incident], 65–67.

\textsuperscript{24} House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa, 120.

\textsuperscript{25} Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 147.

\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 148.

\textsuperscript{27} Gordon, Confrontation over Taiwan, 98–99.

\textsuperscript{28} Qingshigao Taiwan Ziliao Jiji 清史稿臺灣資料集輯 [Collections of the Drafted Qing History on Taiwan], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 243 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1970), 99–101; Yen Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874., 216–19; Lin Chengrong 林呈蓉, Mudanshe Shijian de Zhenxiang 牡丹社事件的真相[Truth of the Mudan Incident], 112.
garrisons in southern Taiwan before 20th, December, 1874.29

Map 4.1 Map of indigenous tribes in Southern Taiwan in 1870s

Source: Robert Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874: Western Sources Related to Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan (Taipei: Zhong yang yan jiu yuan Taiwan shi yan jiu suo (Institute of Taiwan History Academia Sinica), 2005, viii

Though the real skirmishes took less than two months, the usage of firearms by the southern indigenes signified their strengths across a range of battles against Japanese military

29 Yen Sophia Su-fei, Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874., 278–84; Lin Chengrong 林呈蓉, Mudanshe Shijian de Zhenxiang 牡丹社事件的真相[Truth of the Mudan Incident], 115–16.
forces. In the end Japan claimed victory in conquering the Mudan and Kusakut tribes only by burning down their villages, which indigenous might have abandoned or left behind before Japanese troops arrived, but they did not succeed in apprehending any antagonistic indigenous people or to annihilate the entire Mudan and Kusakut tribes. Instead, Japanese troops were confronted with serious gunfire from hostile indigenes when marching toward their territories and also suffered from the difficult climate, geographical conditions and disease. We shall return to some factors later in this thesis.

1.2. Internal Conflicts

Late nineteenth century Taiwan was like a hub of strife, which might well have allowed armaments to permeate every corner of mountain societies. The existent conflicts between indigenous tribes themselves, between indigenous tribes and different Chinese ethnic groups and between Chinese ethnic groups themselves from the eighteenth century, as indicated in Chapter 2, not only extended to the second half of nineteenth century, but became aggravated to various levels and complex warfare by peremptory exploitation of natural resources and the Qing government’s more interventionist policies on indigenous people in eastern mountain regions, which have already been described in Chapter 3. According to the lists of uprisings in Taiwan from Xu Yuliang and Xu Xueji’s research, there were at least 11 skirmishes initiated by the mountain indigenous that were recorded in the Qing official records and literature in the period of 1860-1883 although the actual number was higher than this. The distribution of these 11 skirmishes (red circles) will be seen in Map 4:2, which shows the beginning of encroachment from the western plains toward the eastern mountain regions. This section will focus on the conflicts the mountain indigenes had with the plains indigenes, the Chinese civilians, the Qing military in the “opening up mountains and pacifying the indigenes” scheme and the involvement of mountain indigenes in the Chinese uprisings in the period of 1860-1883.

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31 Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 561–64; Xu Xueji 許雪姬, Qingdai Taiwan de Lüying 清代臺灣的綠營 [The Green Standard in Taiwan during the Ching Dynasty], 106–8.
Map 4:2 Conflicts of mountain indigenes with foreign countries and the Qing military

1860-1883

Source: http://www.ezilon.com/maps/asia/taiwan-physical-maps.html

*The locations of conflicts of mountain indigenes with others were marked in red circles by Pei Hsi Susan Lin
The mountain indigenous people were the first ones to bear the brunt when boundaries and territories between indigenous tribes were cluttered by the plunderers of natural and economic resources and through the resettlements of Chinese from mainland China and the plains indigenes who commenced four major resettlements from the western plain to the central and eastern regions of Taiwan from the early nineteenth century. (See Chapter 2, pp. 53-54) The consequence of cluttered tribal boundaries and territories naturally impelled sporadic feuds among Formosan indigenes. Foreign visitors who travelled to varied parts of interior Taiwan independently recorded the occurrences of feuds between indigenous tribes in their journals or reports. Captain Bonham Ward Bax, British commander of the *H.M.S. Dwarf*, referred to the dissension of plains indigenes with their mountain indigene neighbours when he visited south of Sau-o-Bay (Yilan County) on the northeast coast of Taiwan in 1871.\(^{32}\) Bullock noticed that 10 to 15 plains indigenes of Posia (Nantou County) in central Taiwan were killed annually by the mountain indigenes in the forest or near the edge of forest.\(^{33}\) Similar experience was recorded by Professor Steere on his way to the west coast from Poisa in 1873: plains indigenes had to abandon their recent settlement with ditches and terraces for irrigation after being attacked by mountain indigenes.\(^{34}\) Pickering and General Le Gendre also wrote about the prolonged disputes between plains indigenes and mountain indigenes in southern Taiwan.\(^{35}\) Le Gendre noted that the provision of arms and ammunition of Tooke-tok’s family was due to the numbers of feuds with their nearby indigenous tribes and Chinese villagers, by which the family he heard, had of late years been much reduced in pecuniary circumstances by keeping a considerable armed force on hand, to settle differences between his own people, among who many feuds had broken out. He also had much fighting to do, both with the Chinese of Chasiang [Checheng 車城], and the savages of the north. In fact, there had been a general war in that region, which had lasted until all sides, having exhausted their resources in buying arms and ammunition, and in paying indemnities to the relations and friends of those who had been killed in battle, were forced to make peace.\(^{36}\)

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\(^{33}\) TEPR1/394-400. Report of a Journey into the Interior of Formosa made by Acting Assistant Bullock, in company with the Rev W. Campbell, of the English Presbyterian Mission and Mr. J.B. Steere, Collector in Natural History for the State Museum of Michigan, United States, October and November, 1873. Acting Assistant T.L. Bullock. Taiwan, 26/Nov/1873, 398

\(^{34}\) Joseph Beal Steere, ‘Letters from Formosa’, *Ann Arbor Courier*, 1874, Reed Digital Collection.


\(^{36}\) Le Gendre, C. W., “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, *Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874*, 103.
Charles Carroll in 1871 noted the indigenes were gathered in parties and equipped with firearms, spears and bows due to the ceaseless combats between tribes in southern Taiwan. A scene of tribal warfare was also drawn by a group of art students led by Zhang Sigui 張斯桂, a commissioner of a naval college, who was appointed by Shen Baozheng around 1875. (see Figure 4:2) The narratives next to this drawing could be roughly translated as,

Skirmishes usually occurred between two or more indigenous tribes. They so often killed their own race that the indigenes did not flourish. Firearms were the best among their weaponry, arrows and bows the second, and the knives and spears the basic.

In this drawing, it shows that firearms were one of their primary weapons in tribal warfare and they could keep themselves some distance from the other indigenes by using firearms like arrows and bows, instead of having direct contact with their enemies when using knives and spears. These cases of tribal conflicts were widely and frequently reported by foreign travellers and the Qing officials in Taiwan. These might have suggested that the essence and demand for weaponry among indigenes societies was likely continuous and fundamental.

38 According to Chen Zheng-Ren’s 習宗仁 research on the background of Zhang Si-Gui, he and William A.P Martin, who was a missionary in China and later became the chief instructor of Tongwen Guan 同文館 or school of combine learning were familiars. He was also the captain of Baoshun 寶順 ship, which was the first Western ship owned by the Chinese from 1850s to 1861 and served in Fooxhow Arsenal in 1872-1872. He was familiar with foreign affairs, Western knowledge and culture and worked along with Shen Bao-Zhen to Taiwan during the Mudan incident. He also visited the indigenous tribes several times, searched for coal and extract sulphur. See Chen Zongren 陈宗仁, ed., Wangqing Taiwan Fansu Tu 晚清臺灣番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 13–28.
39 It is unclear who were the mountain indigenes and plains indigenes because some indigenous men have tattoo in this illustration although Chen suggested this scene was drawn from the painter’s imagination. Ibid., 98.
Innumerable and relentless warfare between indigenes and Chinese were anticipated as the mutual antipathy intensified. Professor Steere spoke of “no day of the year in which there is no bloodshed between the two people” along the border of indigenes on several occasions and depicted the readiness of mountain indigenes to ambush the Chinese who once entered or approached the hills: “The savages are continually coming out and lying in wait for the Chinese, and the Chinese are in no way particular how they get the savages in their power and revenge themselves.” A small battle between two dozen mountain indigenes and a group of Chinese settlers broke out in 1877 in the interior of Toa-Kho-ham or Dakekan (Daxi District, Taoyuan County), which became the trading centre of camphor, tea, indigo and various mountain

Source: Chen Zong-Ren 陳宗仁, ed., Fanshi hudou tushuo '番社互鬪圖說' (Illustration of tribal warfare) Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 98.

40 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 150.
41 Steere, ‘Formosa’, 315.
resources later. Dr. Mackay witnessed this fight and recorded the scene vividly:

The band had divided into two companies and attacked different points. One company had already secured their prize and were making their escape with three heads … The savages fled beyond the cleared land, reunited their forces, then turned viciously upon their pursuers. A battle ensued. It was a wild and bloody scene. Both sides were armed, but the rapidity with which the savages dropped on their backs lifted one foot, steadied their levelled matchlocks between their toes, and fired was something marvellous … But the Chinese were no cowards, and at last fearless of death, dashed forward and drove the savages back into their mountain retreats.42

Mackay thus described an expert usage of the matchlock that was entirely novel, illustrating the manner in which Western weaponry had become embedded in indigenous fighting culture as early as the 1870s. This type and level of warfare among indigenes and Chinese settlers emerged in an endless stream, particularly the numerous raids of mountain indigenes who acted against Chinese camphor workers, tea and indigo growers and any exploiters near or in the mountain regions. Dr. Mackay recounted that the mountain indigenes often buried themselves behind the boulder, in the shrubbery, next to the solitary paths in the field, or at the gateway of mountains and assailed at the back of unguarded rattan and camphor workers or farmers who were exposed in nearby mountains.43 The production of camphor was affected greatly by several series of fights between mountain indigenes and the Chinese despite the seeming cause of fights being mainly elicited by the Chinese crossing the borders and exploiting the lands of indigenes. The evidence can be found in the Report on the Foreign Trade of the Ports of Tamsuy and Kelung during the Year 1879, where it is stated that the

Chinese who collect the camphor have to go further into the interior for it every year, and the supply is always uncertain, owing to the constantly recurring collisions with the aborigines. At present it can hardly be obtained at all, the savages having, rather more than a month ago, attacked a party of Chinese camphor gatherers on the borders of the savage territory near Tokoham, and killed twenty-eight of them, an act which has led, I am told to severe fighting in that neighbourhood, and has for the present put a stop to all production of camphor.44

43 Ibid., 270–71.
The equivalent incident that obstructed the process of collecting camphor was reported again in the year of 1881, when the consulate referred to the enhanced difficulty of obtaining and transporting the camphor. In the district from which mainly it is obtained the savages, last year, were acting on the aggressive. There were several serious fights during the year between them and the Chinese, in which the latter suffered severely. As the hills are cleared the difficulty of obtaining and transporting the camphor increases, and as matters are now the trade in this article is not likely to flourish.  

Besides, the dual policy of “opening up mountains and placating the indigenes” enacted by a former governor and director of the Foochow Arsenal and Dockyard – Shen Baozhen in 1874 (see Chapter 3, pp.94-95) - after Japan sent the expedition to southern Taiwan, obviously provoked even more rivalries with indigenous people. Following the project of opening up the mountains which included building roads and fortresses carried out in the north, central and south of the mountain regions from 1874 to 1883, there were at least 9 major incidents of turmoil involving several mountain indigenous tribes. This means every year one of the mountain indigenous groups initiated at least 1 rebellion against the Qing military, which give us sufficient ground for understanding the encroachment the mountain indigenes might have experienced. For instance, in the south division, the mountain indigenes of Paiwan from the Shitou tribe 獅頭社 (Pingdong County) killed Chinese villagers and attacked the Qing soldiers in 1875, which brought the Qing army to pacify the mountain indigenes of the Shitou tribe and its 12 allied tribes for a period of over 3 months. Chinese warriors were ambushed by thousands of Atayal mountain indigenes with firearms while opening roads in Dananao 大南澳 (Yilan Country) in northern Taiwan in 1874 and a Qing army led by Luo Dachun 羅大春 (the Commander of Fujian Province) who was charged with the opening of the northern mountain

46 An Estonian ensign, Pavel Ibis also reported that the mountain indigenes attacked and murdered several Chinese soldiers on the wild way to Long-kiau even though the reinforcement of over 2,000 men were sent could not save the situation in the middle of 1875. Ibis, ‘Auf Formosa: Ethnographische Wanderungen [On Formosa: Ethnographic Travels]’, 167–71; Chen Wenwei 陳文緯, Hengchun Xianzhi 恆春縣志 [Gazetteer of Hengchun County], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 75 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 287; Luo Dachun 羅大春, Taiwan Haifang Bing Kaishan Riji 臺灣海防並開山日記 [Journal of Coastal Security and Mountain Opening of Taiwan], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 308 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1872), 70–72.
47 Chen Yan 陳衍, Taiwan Tongji 臺灣通紀 [Chronicles of Taiwan], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 120 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 196–97.
regions, encountered resistance from the Truku tribes in 1876. Acting Vice-Consul A. Frater reported that the mountain indigenes attacked a large camp, upon which 1,000 foreign drilled soldiers were sent from Foochow for reinforcement. This suggests some really large scale battling. In the central mountain regions, the mountain indigenes of the Amis tribes rebelled against the Qing army led by Wu Guangliang, the Chief Commander in Taiwan in 1877. Acting Vice-Consul B.C. George Scott also reported on this feud and said,

> Since the arrival of the troops that state of things has entirely ceased. The aborigines have now established themselves lower down the hills than ever, and are bitterly hostile to the soldiers and civilians alike, attacking them both indiscriminately on every favourable opportunity... At the end of October or the beginning of November the savages surprised the fort at Hwa Lien Chiang, and slaughtered or placed hors de combat more than 100 of the garrison.

Plains indigenes of the Kavalan tribe also formed an alliance with the mountain indigenes of the Sakizaya tribe in 1878 to revolt against the Qing army because Chinese entered and cultivated plains indigenes’ land under the Qing government’s encouragement. Since the opening of treaty ports which were not determined nor acknowledged by the indigenous people in Taiwan, mountain indigenes were more largely forced to engage in different scales of combat. They strove against the oncoming Chinese who were avid for the profits from the mountain resources and fought against the Qing government and its military force that had so neglected the existence of the eastern regions of Taiwan for nearly 200 years. The distribution of internal conflicts or incidents expanded from the western plain areas to eastern mountain

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48 Luo Dachun 羅大春, *Taiwan Haifang Bing Kaishan Riji 臺灣海防並開山日記* [Journal of Coastal Security and Mountain Opening of Taiwan], 48–49.
49 TEPR 2/135-145, Report on the Foreign Trade at Tamsui and Kelung during the year 1876. Acting Vice-Consul A. Frater, Tamsui, 26/Feb/1877, 141
50 It is commonly called the Dagankou incident (大港口事件) by Taiwanese historians. Hu Zhuan 胡傳, *Taidong Zhou Caifang Ce 臺東州采訪冊* [Journal of Taidong], 68; Ino Kanori 伊能嘉矩, *Taiwan Fanzheng Zhi 臺灣番政志* [Chronicles of Indigenes Policy in Taiwan], 2:617–18; Pan Jidao 潘繼道, ‘Qingzhengfu Dui Houshan de Tongzhi 清政府對後山的統治* [Governance of Qing in Eastern Taiwan],’ 144.
52 As the result, both plain and mountain indigenes were defeated and were nearly annihilated by the Qing army. It is often called the Jialiwang incident (加禮宛之役) by Taiwanese historians. Lian Heng 連橫, *Taiwan Tongshi 臺灣通史* [A General History of Taiwan], 316; Pan Jidao 潘繼道, ‘Qingzhengfu Dui Houshan de Tongzhi 清政府對後山的統治* [Governance of Qing in Eastern Taiwan],’ 157–59.
areas, which increased the intricate level of battles within the tough conditions of geography and the involvement of multiple indigenous tribes.

Chinese ethnic groups did not keep themselves unoccupied, but continued their battles with each other and with rebelling against the Qing government. According to the research on the Green Standard Army and the disturbances in Taiwan of Xu Xueji, there were at least 15 “unrests” that involved Chinese in Taiwan from 1860-1884 and they included conflicts between Chinese ethnic groups, affrays amongst robberies or pillages and revolts against local officials and military. One of the mass uprisings and the longest during the reign of Qing governance, led by Dai Chaochun 戴潮春 in 1862 broke out throughout western central Taiwan and it took the Qing government nearly 4 years to appease this revolt. According to Dr. Xu's analysis of military force in Taiwan in the midst of the Dai Chao-Chun incident, the number of troops based in Taiwan and reinforcements sent from Fujian Province was questionable and insufficient. When the plains indigenes military force joined the Qing military this had great impact on the success of pacification, and the firearms held by the camp of Dai Chaochun prolonged this revolt.

These different scales of warfare did require armaments for varies parties and Taiwan did not produce iron and steel. However, the weaponry that was used by the mountain indigenes has rarely discussed and was rarely mentioned at that time. Under this highly belligerent environment in which mountain indigenes were vastly exposed and engaged, the requirement of weaponry would have been augmented and the weaponry would be further circulated. It is significant to try to uncover the types of weapon that mountain indigenes used and the possible access to military technology that mountain indigenes had in order to compete with foreign and Chinese invasions from 1860-1883. These will be demonstrated in the next section.

2. Firearms in Taiwan

53 For the Green Standard Army, see Chapter 2, footnote 105, p.55. Xu Xueji 許雪姬, Qingdai Taiwan de Lüying 清代臺灣的綠營 [The Green Standard in Taiwan during the Ching Dynasty], 106–9.
54 Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 274.
Increasing warfare explains the growing demand for armaments involving many parties. The occurrences of varied scales of external and internal warfare that Formosan indigenes confronted was also now situated in the era of modern military technology that was largely equipped by the Western nations, and in the primary phase of developing modern military technology as part of the Self-Strengthening Movement in China from circa 1861. Large amounts of armament were operated and transferred to Taiwan to quell all sort of revolts and fights. The mountain indigenes thus experienced diverse military technologies on numerous occasions.

This section will focus on the period of 1860 to 1883 and might be marked as an acceleration of the traditional level of conflict that mountain indigenous people contended with. Firstly, it discusses the firearms that foreign nations developed and foreigners carried into Taiwan, especially when the American and Japanese troops were sent to punish the indigenes in the Rover Incident in 1867 and Mudan Incident in 1874. Secondly it will give some examples of firearms that the Chinese army, local militia and Chinese civilians held for defence and when fighting against indigenous people. Regardless of what types of weapon that foreigners, the Qing military, local militia, Chinese civilians and the plains indigenes had, they all exerted of impact on the perceptions of mountain indigenes concerning weapons directly and indirectly.

2.1. The Firearms of Foreigners within Taiwan.

Disparate modern weapons carried by Westerners not only brought impacts on Qing military and Chinese societies, but also started to influence the culture of weapons in the warfare that indigenes engaged with and within indigenous societies. Vice – Admiral Sir H. Keppel described the rapidity of the Snider rifle in the operation of the camphor war in 1868 led by Lieutenant T. P. Gurdon, which made the Chinese believe that a much larger force was opposed to them.

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55 For the Self-Strengthening Movement, see Chapter 3, footnote 131, p. 111
56 Snider rifle or Snider-Enfield was designed by an American engineer Jacob Snider in converting muzzle-loading .577 Enfield rifle musket to metallic cartridge in 1866 after investigating a series of muzzle loading muskets in the British Board of Ordnance from 1864. It was patented in 1864 and served in British army. It was found superior to Dreyse needle-gun and introduced to Portugal and Japan. The Snider rifle could fire 21 rounds per minute, but the Dreyse needle-gun could only fire 7 rounds per minutes. John Walter, Rifles of the World (London: Arms and Armour, 1993), 261; Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 139–40.
57 TEPR 1/185-241. Correspondence Respecting Missionary Disturbances at Che-Foo and Taiwan (Formosa), Vice-
The “new breech-loading rifles” were used by the Prussians to chastise the offense of Formosan indigenes for the first time in 1858 when a group of Prussian sailors of the transporter Elbe landed on the southern Formosan coast and were confronted by the indigenes with firearms in accordance with Davidson’s claims. Davidson also suggests that it was the first ever application in battle of the new “Zündnadel” rifles (Zündnadelgewehr) or Dreyse needle-fire rifle, which had been recently launched by the Prussians, and the principle of Zündnadel rifles were later adopted by other governments. Disputes that Westerners encountered with Formosan indigenes were initiated with the series of shipwrecks from the first half of nineteenth century. Western envoys and nearby warships were sent to search possible castaways, but they did not reach many favourable outcomes or came under severe assaults from indigenes with firearms (see Chapter 3, pp.72-74 and Chapter 4, pp. 116-122).

Two American warships – Hartford and Wyoming were sent to punish the indigenes under the command of Rear-Admiral H.H. Bell on 10th June, 1867 after the occurrence of the Rover Incident in southern Taiwan. In terms of Western weaponry, 181 soldiers were armed with 40 Plymouth Muskets, 80 Sharps’ rifles and both warships were loaded with 40 rounds of ammunition. Furthermore, as we have seen in this chapter (pp. 122-127), in 1874 Japan sent Admiral Sir H. Keppel to the Secretary to the Admiralty. Inclosure 1 in No. 7, “Princess Charlotte,” Hong Kong, 6/Jan/1869, 204.


59 Dreyse needle-fire rifle was invented by a German gunsmith Johann Nikolaus von Dreyss in 1841. It was the first rotating bolt for loading a rifle at the breech. The unique design of bolt action rifle, which had higher rate of fire than muzzle-loaders, not only lead the later development of repeater and automatic weapons, but also help Prussia military to obtain its predominant position from its neighbouring nations for over two decades. It was widely issued until 1848 and the entire Prussian infantry was furnished with needle-guns by 1859. The method of loading could be lying down or kneeling behind cover. Smithsonian, Firearms The Illustrated History (DK, 2014), 108–9; Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 125–27.

60 Footnote 1. in Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present : History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 115.

61 In the original material, it said “Plumaith muskets”, which is believed to be the 1861 Navy Plymouth Musket. It is a single shot, 69 calibre muzzle loaded, manufactured by Whitney Arms. http://relicman.com/weapons/zArchiveWeaponMusketNavyPlymouth.htm

62 Sharps rifles are breech loading rifles, which were patented by Christian Sharps in 1848 and were improved by Richard Lawrence in 1850s. It was notified by the US Secretary of War as a valuable firearm for military service, but it was only largely purchased and employed by the US Cavalry in the outbreak of Civil War in 1861. Nearly 80 regiments were furnished with Sharps rifles. Among the best marksmen recruited from the New England and the Midwest during the Civil, each marksman could place 10 shots in ten-inch circle at 200 yards. Britain also purchased 6,000 .577 calibre Model 1855 Sharps in 1856-1858 and they were mainly supplied to cavalry regiments in India. They were frequently used in skirmishes and in front of regular infantry. Walter, Rifles of the World, 254–55; Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 123–24.

an expedition to southern Taiwan and claimed to punish the indigenes of Mudan for murdering the castaways from Ryukyu Islands. In the letter of Cassel Douglas to General Le Gendre and the report from Wasson to Okuma it is shown that Gatling guns were also transferred to southern Taiwan to prepare for battling with indigenes. Japanese soldiers impressed several chiefs in southern Taiwan who were not hostile to them with Gatling guns, and explained the use of the weapon in one of the meetings. To a certain level, this action might have been a chance for the Japanese soldiers to threaten the mountain indigenes regarding their superior military power over them. The Winchester rifle was carried by Douglas Cassel and other officers when visiting the village. As reported during the inspection of the Qing officials, the military of Japan were equipped with 8 big bronze cannons, 1 flying-wheel cannon (Feilunpao), more than 10 small bronze cannon and more than 80 boxes of Western firearms. Firearms held by the Japanese soldiers were mostly breech loaders. In the Gazetteer of Hengchun County, it is recorded that the indigenes were killed by breech loaders operated by Japanese soldiers who pretended to be drowned and lay prone in the water. American journalist Edward House, who accompanied the Japanese expedition, also reported that

64 The Gatling gun was patented by Richard Gatling in 1862. It was a reliable rapid-fire water-cooled weapon worked by applying multiple revolving barrels and manufactured during the American Civil War. Smithsonian, Firearms The Illustrated History, 138.


66 Wasson, James R., ‘Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) ibid., 248.

67 Winchester rifles were a series of rifles improved from Henry rifles by Oliver Winchester, who purchased New Haven Arms Compan in 1857 and changed its name to the Winchester Repeating Arms Company in 1866. The Model 1866 was used and marked as reliable rifle on the American frontier. It also played an important role in Russo-Turkish War as the Turkish government bought 40,000 Winchester rifles model 1866 and 4 million cartridge in 1871. The Model 1873, which was based on the Model 1866, was a great success in market and continued to work until the First World War. Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 147–48; Walter, Rifles of the World, 293.

68 Cassel, Douglas, ‘Letter from Cassel to Le Gendre’ (1874) and Wasson, James R., ‘Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 206.

69 Qing gong yue zhe dang Taiwan shiliao 清宮月折檔臺灣史料 (Monthly Court Report of Qing on Taiwan) Vol. 2, 1768, 1796, quoted in Xu Yuliang, 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 354; Wang Yuanti, 王元禌, Jiaxugong Duxiaocun 甲戌公牘鈔存, Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 39 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, n.d.), 150–52.


71 Chen Wenwei 陳文緯, Hengchun Xianzhi 恆春縣志 [Gazetteer of Hengchun County], 285–86.
American gentlemen demonstrated the capacities of the Winchester rifles to the indigenes they had friendly contact with and the Japanese officer also gave Snider rifles to three indigenous chiefs as presents. 72

Firearms were one of the most common items that foreign travellers carried with them when they travelled to unknown places. Chinese officials also noted that the Westerners carried Western firearms and took pleasure in walking and hunting, but they were required not to take firearms when traveling and to obtain hunting licenses from the consul or local governors. 73 Firearms sometimes functioned as “devices or tools” for foreigners to connect or to establish liaisons with indigenes on some occasions. Robert Swinhoe depicted the very first experience of mountain indigenes of the Kweijing tribe with his Sharps rifle and breech loading pistol when he first visited their village in 1863,

After expressing admiration at our guns, they wanted to rush out and see us fire them ... The elder savage ran to a distance, seized a plank, and put it up for a target, setting a leaf in the centre for a bull’s eye. I fired at it, and strange enough, though the shot scattered all around, yet not one hit the bull’s eye. The savage smiled, picked up his matchlock and took up his position at my distance from the mark. His match lock, -a Chinese one, - was loaded with ball. He fired as the Chinese do from the elbow, and hit the target about nine inches from the centre. The distance was about forty yards. The board was about three inches thick, ye the bullet went right through it. I loaded my gun with a cartridge and doubled the distance. The shot covered the mark. This astonished the savage somewhat, but he was much more taken with my Sharp’s rifle, at the breech loading process, and when I have the sight its full elevation and fired along the river the splash of the ball in the distant water, drew a cry of astonishment from both savages and Chinamen. They took a fancy for the rifle, and wanted to barter for it. The breech loading pistol also took their fancy, but they found great difficulty in pulling the trigger. 74

Pickering also noted that he was armed with revolvers and double-barrelled fowling-pieces when he first visited “the savage” (mountain indigenes) of the interior 75 and fired a six-shooter

73 Shen Bao-Zhen 沈葆楨, `標題: 附件三，附呈同知黃維煊條說’ (Appendix 3: A statement presented to Wei-Hsuan Huang) in 16/12/1867 in (18671216) in Zhang Zimu 張自牧, Jindai Zhongguo Dui Xifang Ji Lieqiang Renshi Ziliao Huibian 近代中國對西方及列強認識資料彙編 [Collections of Contemporary China’s Views toward the West], vol. 2, 3 (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, 1984), 753–54.
74 Swinhoe, Notes on the Ethnology of Formosa, 6.
75 The type of double-barrelled fowling-pieces carried by Pickering was unclear in Pickering’s description. Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 98.
Spencer’s rifle and a revolver before entering the Ban-tau-lang tribe of the Rukai group (萬斗籠社 or Wanshan 萬山 in Kaohsiung County). Professor Steere demonstrated his skill at using six-shooters to terrify fifty to sixty of the Buhwan 霧番 of the Atayal, who followed and surrounded them on their way to visit Bu-hwan in 1873, as Rev. Campbell reported,

In sight of us all he rose, picked up a few leaves, fastened them on a tree about twelve yards off, returned to the stone where he had been sitting, raised his six-shooter, sent all its bullets in quick succession through the pinned-up leaves, and then quietly sat down. The effect was as if the Bu-hwaners had suddenly received a galvanic shock, and I never saw a more amazed and cowed lot of warriors than those who now stood before us. They were all ordered to walk in front which they did, till they gradually slunk off ... 

Firearms were a major focus for interaction and barter. The increasing experiences of the indigenes of Formosa with different types and models of Western firearms through warfare with the Western forces and expeditions or some of their individual contacts with foreigners was obviously significant. This was bound to encourage or to influence their perceptions of modern weaponry in warfare and later affected their procurement of modern or advanced firearms and the integration of firearms within their communities. It also seemingly went hand in hand with their own growing experience with firearms and their increased ability to adapt a variety of handguns and rifles to novel fighting conditions.

2.2. Possession of Guns among the Qing Army, Militia and Civilians, Use in Internal Conflicts

The popularity of the Chinese matchlock among the Qing military and Chinese civilians lasted for a long time, especially the development of artilleries and firearms that had stagnated from the period of the Jiaqing emperor of Qing (清，嘉慶 1795-1820). However, the

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76 W. A. Pickering, ‘Among the Savages of Central Formosa, 1866-1867, The Messenger and Missionary Record of the Presbyterian Church of England 3 (1878): 69–71. Six-shooter is a type of revolver, which contains six chambers. This allows the shooter to fire several times without reloading. It was patented by Samuel Colt in 1835 in US. The famous model is the Model 1873 or the Peacemaker, which is in production until today, and it is widely used by civilians, police, and criminals in the US although it was originally made for the US Army. Ian V. Hogg, The Complete Handgun: 1300 To the Present, Reprint (New York: Gallery Books, 1986), 36–45.
78 In Chapter 2, pp. 66-68, I wrote about the primary weaponry like knives, arrows and bows and matchlocks were introduced and manufactured to Taiwan briefly in the 17th and 18th century. For more information about
armaments in China began to shift after the two defeats of the First and Second Opium War to the British and French in 1839-1842 and 1856-1860 and the subjugation of the Taiping Rebellion during 1850-1865. The weapons that Qing military and Chinese civilians carried, particularly the small arms that the Qing largely purchased, manufactured and supplied into the Qing army during the Self-Strengthening Movement (Ziqiang yundong 自強運動 or Yangwu yundong 洋務運動, 1861-1895), started to have effects on indigenous people due to the persistent conflicts with indigenous tribes and revolts in Taiwan.

Referring to Xu’s analysis of the use of firearms of the Qing military in Taiwan, the Qing government did not introduce any new armaments, but continued to use matchlocks in warfare until the establishment of the Ever-Victorious Army (Changshengjun 常勝軍) to fight against the Taipings. Despite the fact that the Ever-Victorious Army was the first Qing army furnished with Western rifles and cannon and trained by Western drill instructors that succeeded in subjugating the Taiping rebellion, Western military technologies were not popularised within the Qing army until 1880. The armaments in Chinese Taiwan also remained at a traditional level which can be seen in the Gazetteer of Tamsui which was edited in 1868. It recorded the armaments the Green Standard Army were furnished with, which included types of canon, Chinese matchlocks, knives, bows and arrows. In the report of Lieutenant Thornaugh P. Gurdon, who received a request in 1868 to seize Anping (Tainan City) from the British Acting Consul, John Gibson, due to the unsettlement over the camphor trade (see Chapter 3, pp.84-85), the Chinese matchlocks were in use and demolished, as he stated that,

I have the honour to state for your information that when captured by me the town of Amping had mounted on its fortifications forty-one guns, and there were in store ready for mounting no less than 101. The above-mentioned guns vary in size, but the greater number consisted of 18 and 12 pounders. I also destroyed while in possession of Amping about 4,000 stand of arms, consisting of gingalls, matchlocks, bows, and arrows, swords and spears.
This generally shows that the armaments the Qing army held at one of its most important fortresses and in treaty ports in southern Taiwan were backward and unchallenging. The most traditional of all, the destroyed weapons such as Chinese matchlocks, knives and rattan shields were reissued and carried by the soldiers to Taiwan by the Governor of Fujian Ying-Gui (英桂, 閩浙總督署福建巡撫) in the aftermath of the Camphor war after reviewing weaponry in 1870.83 The armament of the Qing military in Taiwan continued to remain primitive - using bows, arrows and gingalls or Taiqiang 抬槍84 which were rated as sturdy and strong according to the review of two Regional Commanders of Taiwan – Yang Zaiyuan 楊在元 in 1871 and Lin Yihua 林宜華 in 1872.85

However, the demand rose and a greater mixture of munitions started to flow into Taiwan due to the increased conflicts or warfare in the regions of mountain indigenous territories, especially in the course of the Mudan Incident in 1874 (see this chapter, pp. 122-125). Instead of sending 3,000 men of a foreign gun brigade from Beiyang Fleet (北洋水師) and 2,000 men of a foreign gun brigade from Nanyang Fleet (南洋水師) to transfer to aid Taiwan from the appeal of Shen Baozheng, Li Hongzhang 李鴻章, the Viceroy of Zhili and

Lieutenant Gurdon to Commodore Jones. Inclosure 5, “algerine,” Takow, Formosa, 2/Dec/1868, 202. However, the number of destroyed guns was reported differently from a Hong Kong newspaper, which translated by Zongli Yamen (總理衙門, a governmental organization that managed foreign affairs in late imperial China). According to the news, over 150 cannons, 11,000 guns and large amount of ammunition were destroyed by the British military. “抄付摘錄繙譯台灣中外相鬧新聞抄付摘錄繙譯台灣中外相鬧新聞”(A copied summarized translation of the newspaper of the conflicts between the inside and outside of Taiwan) in 05/02/1869 in Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Qingji Jiaowu Jiaoan Dang 清季教務教案檔[Documents on the Missionary Affairs in the Late Qing].

83 Ying Gui 英桂, the inspector general of Fujian 福建巡撫, ‘製補福建臺灣水師協標三營被洋人違約生事焚燬庫儲砲械摺’(Making and repairing the folders of the arms stored in the three camps of Xie Biao of Fu-jian Taiwan Navy which were burned up by the contract breaking westerners) in Tongzhichao junjidang E 同治朝軍機档 E (T ongzhi Military classified archives E) in Junjichudan zhejian 军機處档件 (Archive of the Grand Council) (Taipei: 故宮博物院, n.d.), No.102816. http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/.

84 Gingall or 抬槍 was a type of very crude large matchlock, which has the same ignition system like matchlock and required 2 to 5 people to operate. It was first used during the Ming Dynast and it was generally used by the Qing military until the late 19th century. Liu Xu 劉旭, Zhongguo Gudai Huoyao Huqishi 中國古代火藥火器史 [History of Ammunition and Weaponry in China], 120.; http://www.chinesefirearms.com/110108/history/jinglin.htm

85 Yang Zai-Yuan 楊在元, the Garrison Commander of Taiwan, Fujian 福建臺灣鎮總兵, ‘為巡閱全臺營伍地方情形恭摺奏祈聖鑒’(A memorial is sent to Your Majesty for the approval of the inspection of all the camps around Taiwan) in Tongzhichao junjidang F 同治朝軍機檔 F (T ongzhi Military classified archives F.) Junjichudan zhejian 軍機處档件 (Archive of the Grand Council) (Taipei: 故宮博物院, n.d.), No.106274. http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/; Lin Yi-Hua 林宜華, the acting garrison commander of Taiwan, Fujian 署理福建臺灣鎮總兵, ‘為巡閥全臺地方水陸營伍情形恭摺由騐親殿眷祈聖鑒’(A memorial is sent express to Your Majesty for the approval of the inspection of all the local army and navy camps around Taiwan) in, Tongzhichao yuezhe dang 同治朝月摺檔 (Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Tongzhi Era).
Minister of Beiyang of the late Qing government, authorised instead the sending of 6,500 men with foreign firearms led by General Tang Dingkui 唐定奎 from the Anhui Army. Professor Richard J. Smith suggested that the Anhui Army (Huai jun 淮軍), commanded by Li Hongzhang 李鴻章, largely purchased Western weapons and expanded from 1,000 rifles to over 40,000 thousand soldiers with 10,000 Western rifles in 1862 and employed a dozen Western drill instructors who were mostly from the Ever-Victorious Army. 87 Liu Xu also mentioned in his book – Zhongguo gudai huoyao huoqi shi 中國古代火藥火器史 [History of Ammunition and Weaponry in China] that the major firearms that the Anhui Army were equipped with were British manufactured Henry Martini rifles and German manufactured Mauser rifles. 88 Thereafter, battles with mountain indigenes during the scheme for the opening up of the eastern mountains from 1874 (see this chapter, pp. 132-134) also prompted the transmission of modern firearms to eastern Taiwan. For example, Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨 reported the arrival of the Anhui Army to assist in the “opening mountain” project 89 and foreign breech loader firearms were shipped to Taiwan to assist the subjugation of the revolt of the Shitou tribe 獅頭社 and several tribes in southern Taiwan. 90 Zeng Yuanfu, Regional Commander of Taiwan (曾元福, 台灣鎮總兵) recruited 500 local men trained by Westerners and equipped with foreign firearms in 1874. 91 Ding Richang, the Governor of Fujian (1875-1879), in 1877 requisitioned military reinforcement from Guangdong with Henry Martini rifles to Taiwan due to an unsure intended attack by Spain. 92

86 Wang Yuanti 王元穉, Jiaxugong Duchaocun 甲戌公牘鈔存, 97–100; Wenqing 文慶, Guzhen 賈楨, and Baojun 寶鋆, Choubanyiwushimo 筹辦夷務始末 [Preparation on Managing the Foreign Affairs], 7:2172–73; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 353. Anhwei Army were equipped with western canons, firearms and trained in western military strategy.
88 Liu Xu 劉旭, Zhongguo gudai huoyao huoqi shi 中國古代火藥火器史 [History of Ammunition and Weaponry in China], 200. Lu Fang-Shang also mentioned in Li Hong-Zhang’s letter to Zongli Yamen in 1874, how he purchased 100,000 Martini rifles and issued to several provinces and regarded the Maritini rifles as the best British manufacture firearms. The Remington rifles and Snider rifles came as the second. This showed the Qing court were not aware of the German military technology very well in the 1870s. Lǚ Fangshang 呂芳上, ‘Cong Renshi Dao Rentong :wanqing Zhongguo Chaoye Dui Deguo Junshi Nengli de Renzhi 從認識到認同:晚清中國朝野對德國軍事能力的認知, 1861-1890 [From Understanding to Recognition: The Awareness of the Qing Court toward the German Military Capacity in China]’ (MA, National Taiwan Normal University, 2011), 54–55.
89 Wang Yuanti 王元穉, Jiaxugong Duchaocun 甲戌公牘鈔存, 133–36.
90 Shen Baoshen 沈葆楨, Fujian Taiwan Zuozhe 福建臺灣奏摺 [Shen Baoshen’s Memorials on Taiwan], 26–28.
91 Wang Yuanti 王元穉, Jiaxugong Duchaocun 甲戌公牘鈔存, 97–100; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 112.
92 Liu Kun- Yi 劉坤一, the governor general of Guangdong and Guanxi 麗坤督, ‘總兵調署要缺請免赴臺灣’
reported on this matter and reported on some 4,000 or 5,000 troops drilled with English and French weapons and Chinese instructors. He also noted, “it is the thought that the Governor will use the troops against the aborigines, either as a means of awing them into good behaviour or in actual warfare.” If we look at the armaments of Hengchun garrison in 1879 in *Hengchun County Gazetteer*, foreign muzzleloaders, breech-loaders, Winchester repeating rifles, revolvers and Chinese matchlocks were furnished. In the year of 1882, the Governor of Fujian Chen Yuying (岑毓英, 福建巡撫) purchased 1,700 foreign breech loading rifles and ammunition in Guangdong and took them to Taipei for defence. Thousands of foreign firearms were transferred and carried by Chinese soldiers for reinforcement to Taiwan.

Matchlocks were also extensively used by Chinese militia, bandits, and civilians and in local uprisings in Taiwan, which together might have been of great significance. Despite the components of Chinese militia in Taiwan being rather complex, involving various Chinese ethnic groups, gentry, vagrants, in different periods of time and area, some weapons the Chinese militia used were given by the Qing officials and some were privately and illegally possessed, and in themselves contributed to the phenomenon of an overflowing of guns in nineteenth century Taiwan. As early as 1842, a British passenger named Robert Gully on the British brig and opium carrier *Ann* which was wrecked near Tamsui, wrote about the matchlocks that Chinese militia carried,

> the soldiers in many instances carried a very superior kind of matchlock to any I had seen in China before, and they were cut outside, six square, and as well as the bore were quite smooth and bright. Some again were wretched-looking beings with rusty spears, shields, and old caps, without any stiffening in the borders. These I conjectured were the militia, the others regulars.

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94 Chen Wenwei 陳文緯, *Hengchun Xianzhi 恆春縣志* [Gazetteer of Hengchun County], 88–89, 90, 95.
96 Xu also demonstrated brilliantly the development of 4 types of Chinese militia in Taiwan in Qing regime: civil corps (*Mintuan* 民團), guards near mountain indigenes’ territories (*Ai隘*), local groups (*Jiedshou結首*) and secret societies (*Huidang 會黨*). He also emphasised the importance of armed Chinese militia in assisting local uprisings. See Xu Yuliang 許毓良, *Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會* [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 98–144.
97 A Journal Kept by Mr. Gully and Captain Denham During a Captivity in China in the Year 1842. Edited by a
Chinese militia or *Yimin* 義民 were given firearms, weapons, tents, etc. by the Qing officials or recruited by local gentry to aid and quell local riots. In accordance with findings of Xu, firearms were operated by Chinese settlers in ethnic conflicts in the early 1800s despite the prohibition of using matchlocks under Qing regulations. Some affluent families like the Lin family of Lungjing (龍井林家) and the Lin family of Wufeng (霧峰林家) in Taizhong County collected and even forged firearms secretly. Matchlocks were also commonly utilised in the Dai Chaochun rebellion (1862-1865) and by Chinese local bandits in the 1870s. Hundreds of matchlocks, knives, spears and different sizes of cannon from comrades of Dai Chaochun were captured during the subjugation as reported by the Circuit Intendant of Taiwan - Ding Yuejian 丁曰健 (臺灣兵備道).

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99 Lin, Wencha 林文察 from the Wufeng Lin Family lead 2,000 men to Zhejiang and Fujian Provinces to suppress the Taiping Rebellion. Xu Yuliang 許穎良, *Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui* 清代臺灣軍事與社會 (Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty), 207–9.

100 *Taiwan Tongzhi 台灣通志*(Taiwan Gazetteer, Draft Copy), 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 130, n.d., 861; Shen Bao 貞, an officer in charge of Taiwan’s coastal defences and international affairs, reported the capture of hundreds of Chinese settlers in the late 1860s. In *同治朝軍機檔* No. 093059, an officer in charge of the Babuza regional defences, reported the extermination of Liao You-Chen 蔡顯 and his gang. Also, on success on the defeat of the proditors and the recovery of the Babuza regional defences, reported the arresting of mobsters in Bu Dai. In *Zhongguo Yue Dang*(Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Guangxu Era) (Taipei: 台灣不久震中學堂, 1906), 13,059; Ceng Yu-Ming 曾玉明, the Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣鎮總兵, Ding Yue-Chien 丁曰健, the School Governance and Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣道兼理學政, "for the approval of the complete destroy of the rebel bands of Jiatou-laochao and its elimination in the north of the Dadu River in Zenghua.") in *同治朝軍機檔 B* (Tongzhi Military classified archives B), 14/01/1864 in *軍機處檔案件* (Archive of the Grand Council), No. 114850. Local bandit led by Cai Xianlao 蔡顯老 and weapon included foreign guns, matchlocks, spears they smuggled were captured in Jiayi County by Qing Army in 1874.

101 Ding Yue-Chien 丁曰健, the School Governance and Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣道兼理學政, "for the approval of the realignment, recovery of Zhanghua county and capturing of the fraudulent Vice Marshal Jiang You-Ren and his gang. Also, on success on the defeat of the proditors and the recovery of the Babuza regional patrols and passes) in *同治朝軍機檔* (Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Tongzhi Era); Zeng Fu-Yuan 曾元福, the to-be Garrison Commander of Fujian Taiwan 署福建臺灣鎮總兵記名提督, Ding Yue-Chien 丁曰健, the School Governance and Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣道兼理學政, "for the approval of the complete destroy of the rebel bands of Jiatou-laochao and its elimination in the north of the Dadu River in Zenghua.") in *同治朝軍機檔 B* (Tongzhi Military classified archives B), 14/01/1864 in *軍機處檔案件* (Archive of the Grand Council), No. 093059; Ceng Yu-Ming 曾玉明, the Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣鎮總兵, Ding Yue-Chien 丁曰健, the School Governance and Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣道兼理學政, "for the approval of the complete destroy of the rebel bands of Jiatou-laochao and its elimination in the north of the Dadu River in Zenghua.") in *同治朝軍機檔 B* (Tongzhi Military classified archives B), 14/01/1864 in *軍機處檔案件* (Archive of the Grand Council), No. 093059; Ceng Yu-Ming 曾玉明, the Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣鎮總兵, Ding Yue-Chien 丁曰健, the School Governance and Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣道兼理學政, "for the approval of the complete destroy of the rebel bands of Jiatou-laochao and its elimination in the north of the Dadu River in Zenghua.") in *同治朝軍機檔 B* (Tongzhi Military classified archives B), 14/01/1864 in *軍機處檔案件* (Archive of the Grand Council), No. 093059; Ceng Yu-Ming 曾玉明, the Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣鎮總兵, Ding Yue-Chien 丁曰健, the School Governance and Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣道兼理學政, "for the approval of the complete destroy of the rebel bands of Jiatou-laochao and its elimination in the north of the Dadu River in Zenghua.") in *同治朝軍機檔 B* (Tongzhi Military classified archives B), 14/01/1864 in *軍機處檔案件* (Archive of the Grand Council), No. 093059; Ceng Yu-Ming 曾玉明, the Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣鎮總兵, Ding Yue-Chien 丁曰健, the School Governance and Garrison Commander of Taiwan 臺灣道兼理學政, "for the approval of the complete destroy of the rebel bands of Jiatou-laochao and its elimination in the north of the Dadu River in Zenghua.") in *同治朝軍機档* (Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Tongzhi Era).
Service in 1866-1867, wrote about the matchlocks that were used by local Chinese settlers which belonged to militia who lived near the mountain indigenes’ territory, but remained on friendly term with them in Lakuli 六龜里 (Kaohsiung City). As he described it,

Their matchlocks, which were kept in excellent order, were fitted with a stock much like that of a European gun, and the barrels must have been constructed of good metal, the charge of powder alone being more than a hand’s breadth. It is true they kick a good deal, but this appears to be no disadvantage, and they make very fair practice at a hundred yards, the target being a mark cut on the trunk of a moderate sized tree.\(^\text{102}\)

In fact, it was also generally known that even Chinese male civilians in Taiwan carried matchlocks for defence. Lieutenant Alexander Wylly Habersham, U.S. Naval officer on the *U.S.S. John A. Kennedy* first landed on the east coast of Taiwan in 1853 -according to Rev. Campbell, this visit might have been the first meeting of Westerners and East coast aborigines since the Benyowsky visit in 1771\(^\text{103}\) - and reported that almost every male Chinese was armed with matchlocks, arrows and bows.\(^\text{104}\) Before Robert Swinhoe became the first Vice-Consul in Formosa, he accompanied a British warship *Inflexible* in search of survivors from shipwrecks around Taiwan in 1858. When they reached Soo-au or Sawo 蘇澳 (Yilan County) he saw that the Chinese carried matchlocks to defend themselves, “from the savages they keep in pay a kind of a sharp-shooting militia who patrol the hills. These men, many of whom came to see us, were armed with very fine matchlocks, kept in splendid order, and with knives worn in their girdles.”\(^\text{105}\) In some areas, especially near the mountain indigenes’ territories, carrying matchlocks was essential for the male Chinese farmers to prevent or at least reduce the chances of getting ambushed by the indigenous people. Mr. Thomas Francis Hughes who was responsible for the negotiations to build the lighthouse at Olunanpi in 1872\(^\text{106}\), mentioned that the inhabitants in Chia-siang 車城 (Pingdong County), “from the sturdy peasant at his plough to the youngest herd-boy in the fields, were armed with matchlocks, spears, or bows.”\(^\text{107}\)

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103 Otness, *One Thousand Westerners in Taiwan to 1945*, 69.
106 Otness, *One Thousand Westerners in Taiwan to 1945*, 80.
107 Hughes, ‘Visit to Tok-E-Tok, Chief of the Eighteen Tribes, Southern Formosa’, 266.
Lances and firelocks\textsuperscript{108} were held by parties of Chinese men near the territories of mountain indigenes as Professor Steere observed in his trip from Jiayi County to Zhanghua County in 1873.\textsuperscript{109}

The technique of forging firearms was also brought by the Hakkas and large amounts of firearms were manufactured in southern Taiwan, as reported in \textit{The China Review}\textsuperscript{110} and by some foreign visitors like naturalist Cuthbert Collingwood. The Chinese who lived in Sau-o told them that their matchlocks were forged at Amoy and they “allowed us to examine their matchlocks, which we were told were manufactured at Amoy; and their ammunition, consisting of very coarse powder, with a finer grain for the priming, and bullets—some round, some oblong, and some rectangular.”\textsuperscript{111} General Le Gendre noted that gun manufactory was established and powder was stored and procured from the Chinese importers at Chasiang by the Hakkas in Poliac 保力.\textsuperscript{112} Kabayama Sukenori 櫻山資紀 stayed shortly in Fangliao 枋寮 in his second investigation from southern Kaohsiung to the Hengchun regions and witnessed that firearms were manufactured in Chinese villages to prepare for the upcoming warfare.\textsuperscript{113} A court case in 1878 also reveals that the Chinese manufactured foreign firearms, powder and bullets in northern Taiwan.\textsuperscript{114}

This all strongly illustrates that the existence and the practices of matchlocks and other primitive weapons like spears, knives, arrows and bows, were not only operated by the Qing army, but were also distributed and popularized among diverse Chinese groups or individuals—gentry families, militia, bandits, even peasants. Although several modern firearms

\textsuperscript{108} Firelock is a type of muzzle loading firearms.

\textsuperscript{109} Steere, \textit{Formosa and Its Inhabitants}, 29–30.

\textsuperscript{110} “The Hakkas – or, as they are called in Fukien dialect, the Khaelang — are not very numerous, still they have not been absorbed by the more numerous races they live amongst, for they retain their own language, peculiarities of dress and feature, and probably character. They till the soil like their neighbours, but are much superior to them as artificers in iron; they make guns and knives for the savages, and, if one can believe the country stories, are very handy at using their own manufactures.” From a former resident who lived in Taiwan for 5 years, A Gossip About Formosa in The China Review, Vol. 2, No.1, 40–47 Sep 1873 in Zhang Xiurong 張秀蓉, \textit{A Chronology of 19th Century Writings on Formosa : From the Chinese Repository, the Chinese Recorder, and the China Review}, 435.


\textsuperscript{112} Le Gendre, C. W . , ”Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, \textit{Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874}, 75.


\textsuperscript{114} ‘Danshui Xinzhu dangan 淡水新竹檔案 [Danshui and Xinzhu County Archive]’ (National Taiwan University, n.d.), http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw.16509/1, 12/03/1878.
or breech-loaders such as Henry Martini and Winchester repeating rifles were transferred by the decree of Shen Baozheng and furnished by the Hengchuan garrison (see p 31). These Western firearms did not seem to be prevalent among the earlier Qing military nor the Chinese groups or individuals. Apart from the modern firearms the Westerners brought, the foreign firearms like Henry Martini rifles, Mauser rifles, breech loader rifles that had been equipped and transferred by the Qing army began through various avenues to appear in the society of Taiwan. A great mixture of traditional and modern firearms started to penetrate the Chinese communities. These communities interwove through numerous contacts and countless conflicts over resource exploitation with the mountain regions of the indigenous people.

3. Types of Firearms in Plains and Mountain Indigenes’ Hands

In Chapter 2, Section 4 above, Armed, Alarmed and Aware: The Nature of Resistance (pp. 66-69), I described the “primary stage” of arms of the indigenes before the nineteenth century which consisted mostly of bows, arrows, shields, swords, spears or darts and some experiences of muskets, harquebuses, Chinese matchlocks, when confronting the earlier colonists and the encroachment of Chinese settlers from the seventeenth century. Even so, the impact of firearms and the possession of firearms was mainly limited to plains indigenes in the western plain of Taiwan. This situation remained the same until the early nineteenth century before the opening of treaty ports in Taiwan. For instance, plains indigenes of Alishi 阿里史 carried Chinese matchlocks and resettled to Yilan County in the year of 1820. There is recorded a complaint about mountain indigenes who attacked Chinese villages with Chinese matchlocks, made by a villager living in Dabeipu 大北埔 (Miaoli County) in 1849, which according to Xu’s finding might be the earliest record of mountain indigenes holding firearms. The use of firearms among the Formosan indigenes, mostly Chinese matchlocks, was also

115 Plains indigenes had bartered firearms and gunpowder with Chinese people illegally according to the governmental reports of Qing in the early 18th century. Plains indigenes were granted some rights to hold Chinese matchlocks when joining indigenous military to support Qing army on guard and in subjugations since the pacification of the Lin Shuanwen incident in 1787. See Chapter 2, pp.54-55
116 See Yao Ying 姚瑩, Dong Cha Ji Lue 東槎紀略 [Sketch of My Assignment to Taiwan], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 7, n.d., 69.
117 The Tam-Hsin Files 淡新檔案, Volume 1: Administration 第編行政, Category 7: Reclamation 第七類撫墾, Section 1: Tribal Affairs.第一款社務, Case Number: 17101-17115 案號: 17101-17115, National Taiwan University Library 台灣大學圖書館藏, 119558-119559 quoted in Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 208.
commonly recorded by foreigners around the 1850s, when the Western ships were active in trade with China between the First and Second Opium Wars. For example, *The Chinese Repository* and Davidson both reported the survivors of a British ship *Larpent*, which was wrecked in southern Taiwan in 1850, engaged in some gun fights and encountered fifty of the natives who were clearly armed with matchlocks.\(^{118}\) Another report about the weapons the Formosan indigenes carried, which included sword, matchlock, arrows and bows, was made by an American naval officer, Lieutenant Alexander Wylly Habersham, who landed on the east coast of Taiwan on a mission searching for stranded castaways in 1853.\(^{119}\) As we have seen above, a group of Prussian sailors from the transporter *Elbe* were assaulted by indigenes with firearms in 1858.\(^{120}\) Although these reports, which were written by Westerners, did not specify whether the indigenes they encountered were the plains indigenes or the mountain indigenes, these sources that indicated matchlocks were generally used by the Formosan indigenes for defence.

Nevertheless, when further economic and political encroachment accelerated toward the eastern regions of Taiwan, where most mountain indigenous people lived, and created conflicts or warfare that indigenes were forced to engage with, what types of weapon did mountain indigenes possess to fight against invaders? How did mountain indigenes obtain their weapons? Several journals and reports noted in Western and Chinese languages the firearms that both plain and mountain indigenes possessed after the opening of treaty ports in 1860 and before the French attacked northern Taiwan in 1884.\(^{121}\) Below, first, I would like to discuss the firearms that the plains indigenes possessed, briefly being due to the character of plains indigenes who often acted as middle men between the mountain indigenes and foreign visitors, the Qing Army and the Chinese civilians. (See Chapter 3, p 109-111). Secondly, I begin to focus more explicitly on the firearms that mountain indigenes possessed based on the record of

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\(^{119}\) Habersham, *The North Pacific Surveying and Exploring Expedition; Or, My Last Cruise.*, 159.


\(^{121}\) Especially the custom and lives of Formosan indigenes were largely recorded by foreign visitors and missionaries, this is probably because foreigners were not prohibited from entering mountain regions, unlike the Chinese.
foreign visitors and the Qing official records on warfare and conflict. Finally, I would like to suggest how mountain indigenes obtained firearms and the possible routes.

3.1. Firearms in the Plains Indigenes’ Hands

Matchlocks seemed to be commonly used by the plains indigenes. In fact, by the nineteenth century the plains indigenes were largely assimilated to Chinese and some plains indigenes were enlisted in the indigenes military under the Qing governance in Taiwan. This might suggest that the level of firearms among the plains indigenes might be the same as the Qing army, the Chinese militia, and Chinese civilian that is, on a traditional more or less level. It was unclear if the plains indigenes who enlisted in the Qing army were issued any modern firearms when the Qing government transferred them to Taiwan from 1874. However, there were traces of plains indigenes carrying matchlocks for general protection when they guided and guarded the Western visitors to the mountain areas. For instance, the Rev. William Campbell mentioned that 58 of Sek-hwan (also meant plains indigenes) who were furnished with firearms and long knives guarded them to Polisia 埔里社 (Nantou County) in 1872, which required passing through desolate and dangerous areas in which the “head hunting savage” loitered. 122 Professor Steere also described the Pepo-whans (also plains indigenes) of Bankimseng 萬金庄 (Pingdong County) armed with lances and fire-locks to protect themselves from attack when they went to their fields near the mountains. 123 Arthur Corner also narrated the matchlocks and knives carried by a party of Sek-hoan or plains indigenes who accompanied them through the woods when he visited Chipchip (集集, Nantou County) in 1876. 124 Although it is difficult to know to what exact extent the plains indigenes had conflicts or contacts with the mountain indigenes, the firearms that plains indigenes possessed might have had some impact on the mountain indigenes.

3.2. Firearms in the Mountain Indigenes’ Hands

122 Campbell, Sketches from Formosa, 37.
Weapons of mountain indigenes such as arrows and bows, swords, spears and matchlocks or other types of firearms were frequently noticed by foreign visitors in several accounts. For instance, Swinhoe described the bows and arrows used by the Kalees of the Rukai and Paiwan tribes.  

An English traveller Michael Beazley noted the apparatus southern mountain indigenes were armed with when he and his friends met on their way to South Cape (南岬, Pingdong County):

>A great many of them were armed with matchlocks, and they held their lighted port fires ready in their hands. The rest were armed with bows and arrows, and all had the disheartening long knives at their waists. I have never seen firearms kept in such beautiful order as these matchlocks. The barrels and locks were as bright as silver, and the stocks were of a wood as white and hard as holly.  

Matchlocks were used by the “savages” (referring to mountain indigenes) on the east coast occasionally as their weapons as described by an employee of the Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs service, E.C. Taintor, at Tamsui.  

The Pilam or Puyuma indigenes carried the matchlock rifle, “the barrel of which is four feet, and the stock is only one foot”. Firelocks were held by the Paiwan indigenes of the Sabaree tribe and Tsuiwhan or water savages from the Thao tribe. French Vice Consul Mr. Guérin described the firearms that Atayal indigenes carried in 1868,

>There is a long gun with a fuse, and in front of it two or three powder-horns are suspended from strings of false pearls. In back the man carries a coat which is folded into the net, a bag for balls, and a parchment case containing eight powder charges in eight bamboo holders. Then around his wrist is a cord, a lighter with a fire-stone, and some banana marrow instead of tinder.”

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126 Beazeley, ‘Notes of an Overland Journey through the Southern Part of Formosa in 1875, from Takow to the South Cape, with Sketch Map.’, 16.
130 Steere, *Formosa and Its Inhabitants*, 31–32.
131 Guérin and Bernard, ‘Les Aborigènes de L’Île de Formose.’, 555.
General Le. Gendre observed the muskets that Paiwan indigenes carried when he met Tooke-tok,

They all carried muskets, the barrels of which shone like mirrors. The locks were made almost exactly in the same manner as I have seen them in ancient Japanese arms; but the stocks were similar to those of our American pieces.  

The Paiwan indigenes in southern Taiwan from Sabari 射麻里 and Tuasók 豬朥束社 furnished themselves fully with muskets and other types of weapon when going to Chinese territories, as detailed by Ibis,

They have their weapons, like all of the tribes, similarly obtained from the Chinese. They are: 1. an uncomfortable musket of about 4 feet in length with a very short butt; 2 spears, usually a 6-inch-long blade attached to an 8 to 10-foot-long shaft; 3. a straight knife (about 2 feet long and 1 1/2 inches wide) in a sheath of wood, which only covers one side of the knife but is on the other covered with rope or wire; 4. a bow of about 3 to 4 feet in length, and along with that arrows of bamboo with iron tips (with or without barbs). The bullets, powder poured roughly into bamboo sticks, and lead-pieces are carried in a fine net on the back. A neat horn with fine powder for the pan hangs on a chain at the neck. The musket is wrapped around the upper body, the knife is always stuck under the belt, and the spear rarely leaves the hand, so that a troop of natives presents a rather picturesque image. Their travels into the Chinese settlements or even into a neighbouring village always occur in the full outfit.

Thus a British Custom officer William Hancock recorded that the mountain indigenes loaded their matchlocks and lighted their fuses when they conducted their expedition from Taipei into the southeast mountains in 1882.

Some accounts depicting the types of firearms and actions of firearms of mountain indigenes were documented in conflicts or warfare with indigenes that occurred from the 1860s, especially in Qing official reports in Chinese regarding the battles during the scheme of “opening up mountains”. Indigenes in the south were using muskets to fight against troops of

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132 Le Gendre, C. W., “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, *Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874*, 122–23.
H.M.S Cormorant\textsuperscript{135} and Hartford and Wyoming\textsuperscript{136} in the course of the Rover Incident in 1867 as reported by the participant officers, Admiral Bell and Commander Belknap. (See pp. 117-120) Large numbers of primitive matchlocks were operated by the Mudan and Kusakut indigenes of the Paiwan and later captured by the Japanese troops, which also caused the gunshot wounds among the injured soldiers in the punitive expedition by Japan in 1874, as Lieutenant J. R. Wasson noted.\textsuperscript{137} The Paiwan indigenes of the Mudan tribe carried better firearms than the mountain indigenes in the north, the barrels were forged by steel, which was similar to the Japanese matchlock, as report by Kabayama Sukenori 樺山資紀 in his investigative trip a few months prior to the Japanese expedition.\textsuperscript{138}

Weapons that mountain indigenes carried or which were captured in battles during the “opening up”, began to be reported on in Qing official reports. In 1874, Chinese matchlocks were carried by hundreds of “vicious indigenes”, who attacked Qing troops in Dananao (Yilan County) as the Qing Commander directing the opening of the north mountain region, Luo Dachun reported (also see p. 133).\textsuperscript{139} From the location, the indigenes were possibly from the Atayal tribes. In the course of subjugation of the Shitou tribe revolt in 1875, Qing troops were ambushed by hundreds of Paiwan indigenes when entering Nanshihu 南勢湖 (Pingdong County). Shen Baozhen described shots that were like rain fall and hundreds of firearms, swords, gunpowder were seized by the Qing army.\textsuperscript{140} Ding Richang stayed in Hengchun (Pingdong County) for one evening on one of his inspection trips in Taiwan in 1877 and recorded the firearms that the Paiwan indigenes of 18 tribes used in the area,

Shengfan (mountain indigenes) included olds and youngs, all carried rough guns and swords. Although they used matchlocks, they were quite accurate, shining and smooth as mirrors and were several times better in comparison with the old firearms that Qing troops possessed. Furthermore, chiefs of the tribes carried Snider rifles which were given

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{135} Le Gendre, C. W., “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 80; ‘H.M.S. Cormorant on the Coast of Formosa’, 599–600.
\item \textsuperscript{136} 'The Pirates of Formosan: Official Reports of the Engagement of the United States Naval Forces with the Savages of the Isle.', Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 54.
\item \textsuperscript{137} Wasson, James R., ‘Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 236.
\item \textsuperscript{139} Wang Yuanti 王元穉, Jiaxugong Duchaocun 甲戌公牘鈔存, 135.
\item \textsuperscript{140} Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨, Fujian Taiwan Zuozhe 福建臺灣奏摺 [Shen Baozhen’s Memorials on Taiwan], 29–32, 40–44; Chen Yan 陳衍, Taiwan Tongji 臺灣通紀 [Chronicles of Taiwan], 199–203; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 327.
\end{itemize}
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as gifts from the Japanese. I had ordered the officials of Hengchun Prefecture to investigate the origin of foreign guns and enacted interdiction. However, the interdiction became slack since the placating indigenes scheme, arms of Shengfan were more sufficient than before, supplied by crafty men without getting traced.\footnote{Ding, Richang, ‘為微臣巡查臺灣南路鳳山恆春等處並察勘旗後砲臺謹將沿途所歷情形恭摺陳明仰祈聖鑒事’ (A memorial sent to Your Majesty for the approval of my inspection of Fengshang and Hengchun in Southern Taiwan and survey of Cihou fort and its surroundings) in Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., Qing Guangxuchao Zhongri Jiaoshe Shiliao [Official Documents of the Guangxu Reign] (Taipei: Wenhui 文海, 1963), 9–10, http://thdl.ntu.edu.tw/; Cassel, Douglas, ‘Letter from Cassel to Le Gendre’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 207.}

This is verifiable, in a letter from Douglas Cassel, Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy to Charles Le Gendre in 24\textsuperscript{th} May, 1874. He noted that General Akamatsu Noriyoshi 赤松則良, Rear Admiral in the Japanese Navy, gave breech loading rifles to the son of Took-tok–Zhulei 朱雷, brother of A-lok阿祿 and Isa 伊居, chief of Shamali.\footnote{Cassel, Douglas, ‘Letter from Cassel to Le Gendre’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 207.}

3.3. Access to Firearms of Mountain Indigenes (1858-1883)

3.3.1. Direct Access

Mountain indigenes obtained firearms and the knowledge of firearms by commerce, mostly with Chinese, by being given as gifts from foreigners or possibly by plundering in warfare. These were the direct routes of getting firearms in the period of 1860 to 1883, according to some observations of foreign visitors’ journals or reports and the Qing official reports. Trade was one of the major economic activities of mountain indigenes in Taiwan. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (pp. 39-40), luxury goods and goods that could not be found or easily produced became items that indigenes bartered with the Chinese. Moreover, the material for forging firearms is iron which was not an available material in eastern Taiwan, and Chinese settlers were restricted in transferring or carrying iron and armaments, including matchlocks from China to Taiwan, although it becomes obvious that the effectiveness of these restrictions was another matter.

The truth it seems is that mountain indigenes could fairly easily purchase matchlocks and ammunition from their neighbouring Chinese settlers, especially from the Hakkas who in some manner forged firearms in southern Taiwan. For the nearby mountain and plains...
indigenes, Poliac, where mostly Hakka congregated, was the trading centre for firearms and ammunitions, which were apparently superior to those carried by the Chinese soldiers. General Le Gendre reported closely the involvement in firearms of indigenes in southern Taiwan as preliminary to the two punitive expeditions. The Paiwan chief of the 18 tribes in southern Taiwan rapidly purchased a large provision of arms, ammunition and a small iron gun from the Hakka, who also warned him to prepare for an incursion of the Chinese troops in 1867 after the Rover incident (also see pp. 121-122). The Rukai indigenes of Kalees exchanged powder, shot, articles of clothing and matchlocks with the people who lived in Chasiang, who were also engaged in the commerce of firewood. Mudan tribe also procured their supply of shot, powder and arms from the Chinese and half-castes of Ponglee or Fangliao枋寮, Chetongka 葉桐腳 and even Chasiang or Chechang 車城 during the punitive expedition of Japan in 1874.

This pursuit of firearms and the ammunition trade were also found in different parts of Taiwan in this period. For example, in central Taiwan, the Buhwan of the Atayal groups in Turu-wan, in the mountains east from Po-li-sia, told the Rev. Campbell that Chinese barterers supplied them with flint-lock guns to a limited extent, in return for skins, deer horns and other goods. An equivalent trading activity of firearms can also be found in northern Taiwan. Mountain indigenes in the north obtained matchlocks, blades, powder, shots and other articles for daily use from the Chinese in exchange for their hemp, venison, deer horns, skins, mats, and baskets. Equivalent interchanges between the mountain indigenes and the Chinese or plains indigenes could be seen in some Chinese literature or official records. For instance, around 10 Chinese bandits carried knives, firearms, bullets and ammunition to the tapangu tribe 達邦社 of Tsou groups and traded for velvet, venison, deerskin, bear gut and other mountain products in the 1870s. A court case on the illegal ammunition trade in Dan-Xin Archive 淡新檔案

143 Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present, 119; Le Gendre, C. W., “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 75. Pickering, Pioneering in Formosa, 180; Hughes, ‘Visit to Tok-E-Tok, Chief of the Eighteen Tribes, Southern Formosa’, 267.
144 Le Gendre, C. W., “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 99.
146 Le Gendre, C. W., “Notes of Travel in Formosa” (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 108.
147 Campbell, Sketches from Formosa, 60–61.
149 Anonymous, Tainan Hui Lu Ren Ji 臺案彙錄壬集 (Taiwan Archives, Seventh Collection), 臺文文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 227 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1957), 88, http://hanji.sinica.edu.tw. quoted in Chen Zong-Ren
recorded how *fange* 番割 sold mountain indigenes Chinese matchlocks, knives, spears, ammunition, bullets, nitre and sulphur in the area of Hualian in 1875. A drawing in one illustration of indigenes in the late Qing Taiwan displayed this scene also around the 1870s, although it is unclear if the firearms and other item were brought by the Chinese or plains indigenes. See Figure 4:3 where firearms can be clearly seen for trade on the extreme right handside.

Figure 4:3 Commercial Activity between Indigenes and Chinese

![Image of commercial activity between indigenes and Chinese]

Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, *Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan)*, 138–139.

150 *fange* 番割 were the Chinese who spoke indigenes languages, crossed indigenes’ borders, changes his hair and dress and married to indigenous women. They often traded with the plain and mountain indigenes and exploited and occupied their lands unlawfully. Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiushi 臺灣銀行經濟研究室 (Taiwan Bank), *Taian Huilu Jiaji 臺案彙錄甲集* (Taiwan Archives, First Collection), 119.

151 'Danxin Dangan 淡新檔案': 14407/1, 05/04/1875
Such exchange activities of firearms, gunpowder and other articles occurring between the mountain indigenes in the north and Chinese also involved obtaining consent for entering mountains for coal, camphor and other profitable mountain resources. This is noted by John Dodd,

Some friendly border tribes are not disinclined to allow squatting on new territory for a consideration, and a verbal agreement is often entered into, “signed, sealed and delivered” over the contents of a jar or two of samshu, called by the aborigines Poon-niek Ku Tsiah, literally meaning “firewater.” The terms are usually something of this kind: That in consideration of the Chinese providing them at certain periods of the year with a few necessaries such as rice, salt, and a few domesticated pigs, a quantity of Chinese gunpowder and perhaps a matchlock, etc., etc., with a jar or two of samshu [rice wine] thrown in, permission is granted to squat within certain limits – to fell timber, make charcoal and camphor-and to kill deer and other game in the immediate vicinity.\(^{152}\)

Another dispatch also evidently supported the notion that the access to firearms of mountain indigenes was connected with the Hakkas, also linked with the camphor manufacture,

The Hakkas, or Chinese immigrants, not being the agricultural Fuhkien men, form a strongly marked and important feature of Formosan population. It is they who carry on the barter trade with the savages, whom they supply with guns, powder, and knives, mostly of their own manufacture, receiving in exchange skins, hardwood, camphor, and the native cloth. They are the camphor manufacturers also, and have many thriving villages on these border marches, where they live independent of the Chinese administration.\(^{153}\)

Thus were clearly linked together the elements of camphor commerce, Hakka involvement and arms selling that have been suggested in this and earlier chapters of the thesis. It becomes clear that the internal “Taiwanese” story of arms use along the eastern borders cannot – then – be separated from the international commercial and industrial forces outlined in Chapters 1 and 2. Mountain indigenes procured some of their firearms and ammunition from the Hakkas who maintained the techniques of forging firearms whilst also being leading agents in the international trade and industry surrounding the whole system.


In this context it is well worth asking whether it was possible for the mountain indigenes to learn to forge firearms despite the limitation of lack of iron. The answer could be positive as Professor Steere recounted how the mountain indigenes of the Kale-whan, living in the mountains east of Takow, forged “a heavy and rude gun barrel and a hut in the village was used as a blacksmith shop.”

Although the gun barrel might be the cannon barrel and this might be the only evidence yet that suggests the existence of manufacturing a gun barrel amongst indigenes in this research period, it could be sufficient for us to judge that the indigenes in southern Taiwan could also have the skill for repairing or modifying firearms (e.g., by shortening stocks) for dense forest usage despite lacking skill in iron production themselves.

As we have already seen above, mountain indigenes also took great interest in the modern firearms carried by foreign visitors. An interesting account of the response of the mountain indigenes experiencing the Sharps rifle and breech loading pistol is described by Swinhoe in 1863 (see p.138). A similar experience also occurred to Pickering when the Rukai indigenes of Bantaulang were amazed by his rifles and revolver and eager to affiliate with him,

All the savages gathered round me, and we spent some time in trying my rifle and revolver at a mark. They seemed thunderstruck at the great distance the rifle would carry, and at the rapidity of loading and firing. They said that with one white man and such weapons they would soon rout the Sibucoons [施武郡社] and make themselves masters of the surrounding country. They asked me to live amongst them, and procure ammunition and arms from what seemed to them the greatest place in the world, Taiwanfoo. They all persisted in trying the gun.

Traces of mountain indigenes in the north attaining knowledge of firearms when making contact with Chinese at the borders was observed by John Dodd,

In the north and centre of the island, I have met savages belonging to inland tribes who have never seen a Chinaman, and only know from hearsay of their existence. All, however, of the border tribes have come in contact with the hardy Chinese pioneers, and have acquired thereby certain knowledge, such as the use of firearms, of gunpowder, of the beneficial effect of salt as a condiment, and of the soothing influence of

155 Swinhoe, Notes on the Ethnology of Formosa, 6.
tobacco (which plant seems to be indigenous like hemp, camphor-tree, &c. 157

The first two accounts show their attentiveness to the performance of modern firearms without fear and their willingness to know the power of modern firearms. Their understanding and recognition of modern firearms through their individual contacts with foreigners might be earlier than the general Chinese settlers in Taiwan in this period. This last account noted by John Dodd was rarely found. However, even if they did acquire some knowledge of firearms and ammunition from the Chinese, it would be of the traditional Chinese matchlocks generally held by the Chinese people in Taiwan.

Another form of getting firearms for the mountain indigenes was as gifts, which were mostly given by foreign visitors. “Modern” firearms were given as gifts to Tooke-tok by General Le Gendre after signing an agreement -although they could not function.

Having handed the paper to Tauketok and retained the rough copy for myself, I gave the chief one hundred and eighty yards of red camlet, a small pistol, a single barrel shot gun, (unserviceable) and a spear, presented by Messrs. Tait & Co. and Messrs. Elles & Co., both of Amoy; an ivory spy-glass and case, by Mr. I. Alex Man; some beads, and a quantity of rings, bracelets, and a case of gin, by myself. The only serviceable gun I had, a fine Enfield, 158 I gave to my faithful guide, a resident of Sialio, and a member of the militia forces enrolled by Chentai Lew, in 1867, for the defence of the district against the aborigines.” 159

In the letter from Douglas Cassel, he noted that General Akamatsu Noriyoshi, Rear Admiral in the Japanese Navy gave breech loading rifles to the son of Tooke-tok – 朱雷, brother of A-lok and Isa, chief of Shamali, to gain their trust and so as not to attack their boats and soldiers while they were surveying in South Bay and Tuillasock river,

 Upon going away [Admiral] Akamatz told me that he wished to give the chiefs a greater proof of our confidence in them, and therefore we would present to them the three breech loading rifles which were in the

158 Enfield rifles adopted the P-1853 rifle musket in 1853 and manufactured at the Royal Small Arms Factory in Enfield. Enfield rifles began to replace P-1851 Minie rifles in the Crimea War and operated in the American Civil War. Thousands of copies of the Enfield rifle muskets and short rifles were exported to the United State by the private English contractors in Birmingham and London. Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 92–95.
party, with all their accoutrements. He desired this so strongly that I acceded to it, and the guns were transferred to their new owners.\textsuperscript{160}

This was confirmed in the report by Wasson to Okum who also wrote that, “We remained some time longer talking of unimportant matters and showing them how to use the firearms that had been given them.”\textsuperscript{161} (see Figure 4:4)

Figure 4:4 Mudan Incident, 1874. Lieutenant-general Saigō Jūdō providing firearms to Paiwan Indigenes in the Mudan Incident, 1874.

Source: National Taiwan Museum, No. AH001396


In addition to trafficking in ammunition along with firearms that the Formosan indigenes practised with the Chinese, powder was also given as a gift by foreigners as when General Le

\textsuperscript{160} Cassel, Douglas, ‘Letter from Cassel to Le Gendre’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 207.

\textsuperscript{161} Wasson, James R., ‘Report from Wasson to Okuma’ (1874) in Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 208.
Gendren visited Tooke-tok in March 1872. The chief of Saprek 射不力, Taurang was given gunpowder, shots, and bullets by Pavel Ibis, the Estonian ensign after he had dinner and received a chunk of venison and some earth nuts from the chief with hospitality.

Other possibilities of obtaining firearms directly could have also occurred during warfare and being enlisted in Qing troops, as were some plains indigenes. Capturing enemies’ firearms during conflicts was one way of directly accessing firearms and experience of firearms for mountain indigenes. For example, carbines and the Springfield rifle were reported missing in an expedition led by Rear-Admiral H.H. Bell during the Rover Incident in 1867. Weapons were taken away from a dead Japanese soldier after some Japanese soldiers were ambushed by the “invisible assailants”. It was very likely these missing modern rifles were taken by the mountain indigenes after their successful skirmishes. However, it is rather difficult to trace the firearms missing in warfare or to enumerate them.

3.3.2. Possible or Indirect Access

Another possible or indirect route for mountain indigenes in obtaining firearms could be from plains indigenes, since they often traded with the Chinese. However, both plains and mountain indigenes do not have written historical records, therefore we can only presume that to some extent mountain indigenes might have obtained firearms from plains indigenes in trade or were influenced by plains indigenes based on the contacts and conflicts they had. If this is tenable, it is necessary to investigate the source of firearms of plains indigenes. An English photographer, John Thomson noted when traveling with Maxwell in 1871 that matchlocks, spear-heads, gunpowder, and cloth in use among the plains indigenes were Chinese.

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162 Other gifts include: gilt buttons with cut glass inserts, black buttons with silver, cut glass buttons (round, oblong) mother of pearl buttons, imitation silver buttons, assorted colored thread, assorted needles, round looking glasses, red cloth, imitation gold chain, musical boxes and lead. C.W. Le Gendre, Notes of Travel in Formosa, ed. Douglas L Fix and John Shufelt (Tainan: National Museum of Taiwan History, 2012), 315. footnote, No. 17

163 Ibis, ‘Ekskursii Na Formozu’, 137.

164 H.H. Bell’s Expedition to South Bay. Dispatch No. 53, Series of 1867. Reported by Geo.E. Belknap, Commander. Eskildsen, Foreign Adventurers and the Aborigines of Southern Taiwan, 1867-1874, 55, 60.

165 House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa, 90.

166 For the contacts and trade between mountain and plains indigenes, see Chapter 3, p 109-111. For the conflicts between mountain and plains indigenes, see this chapter, p 134-137
manufactured and traded irregularly with the Chinese in southern Taiwan.\footnote{John Thomson, \textit{Illustrations of China and Its People: A Series of Two Hundred Photographs, with Letterpress Descriptive of the Places and People Represented} (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Low, and Searle, 1873). Vol. II, Plate III, A Pepohoan Dwelling.} He also mentioned that the priming powder that plains indigenes used in the area of Kasanpo 甲仙埔 (Kaohsiung City) was English, which was supplied by the Chinese.\footnote{Herbert J. Allen, 'Notes of a Journey through Formosa from Tamsui to Taiwaniu', \textit{Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London} 21, no. 4 (1877): 260.} British Consul Herbert J. Allen also noted \textit{pepos} or plains indigenes living in Posia trafficked knives, matchlocks, and gunpowder with Chinese in his trip with Rev. Mackay and Rev. Richie in 1875.\footnote{Yen Sophia Su-fei, \textit{Taiwan in China’s Foreign Relations, 1836-1874.}, 106.}

Involvement of foreigners in the gun trade with the plains indigenes can be seen in the case of aiming to occupy Dananao (Yilan County). A Foreign merchant like James Milisch, who also acted as a consul for the Hanseatic Cities of the German Union and James Horn, a camphor dealer, who also married the daughter of a plains indigenous chief, reinforced a valley in the south of Su-ao with some Chinese settlers and plains indigenes furnished with firearms. Apparently Milisch and Horn provided much capital in buying firearms and sold them to the plains indigenes and Chinese settlers.\footnote{According to a visit of Robert Swinhoe, he dreaded the Chinese officers since the last expedition against him, “They sent an army of a thousand men to invade his territory; and when within short-range, Ban-Cheang himself loaded a gun and discharged it at the invaders, knocking over eighteen men at one discharge. The imperialists were bewildered and immediately made good their retreat!” Although the gun in this context might suggest it} It is also reasonable to assume that plains indigenes who enlisted as Qing troops might have possessed the firearms, especially more firearms were transferred to Taiwan to supress revolts, and plains indigenes aided the Qing troops to defend and to subjugate (p. 134). However, if we wish to estimate the types of firearms that transferred to Taiwan in this period, the firearms that plains indigenes might have been given would be most probably only Chinese matchlocks and at best a very limited number of more modern firearms.

Intermarriage between Chinese or foreigner and local indigenous women (see Chapter 3, pp. 74, 101-102) might have also contributed some supply of firearms to mountain indigenes indirectly, which can certainly be suggested. For instance, Lin Bancheang, who was married to a Rukai indigenous woman from Kalees, was known for owning weapons and trading with neighbouring mountain indigenes.\footnote{Although the gun in this context might suggest it was not owned by Lin Bancheang, the intermarriage between Chinese, foreigner, and indigenous women might have contributed to the supply of firearms to mountain indigenes indirectly.} Their descendants or so called \textit{Tushengnan 土生囡} (the
locally-born offspring of Chinese men and indigenous women) were intermediaries, who not only acted as interpreters, but also operated in trade with the Formosan indigenes. This makes increasing sense. A description about Tushengnan in Liang-Kiao shows they were known to be good with rifles, which were owned and treasured by everyone, and they also rarely missed targets. They could have possibly traded firearms with the mountain indigenes, introduced their rifles and influenced the perception of firearms of indigenes. Another possibility for mountain indigenes obtaining firearms is from those Chinese militias in Taiwan who were given firearms by the Qing officials to quell local riots and also lived near mountain indigenes’ territories.

4. Conclusion

Mountain indigenes in Taiwan possessed mostly matchlocks and other primitive weapons such as swords, knives, spears, arrows and bows in the period of 1860–1883 according to the findings for this chapter. It appears that the use of matchlocks from the eighteenth century for plains indigenes and from the early nineteenth for mountain indigenes extended to the second half of nineteenth century. Primitive weapons continued to be operated by the mountain indigenes along with the matchlocks in the late nineteenth century and all the evidence points to such matchlocks being kept in excellent condition and held in high status. Therefore, at this stage in our estimation, sources of conflicts and their level had remained at a broadly traditional level. Moreover, the mountain indigenes gained the matchlocks and ammunition mostly from trading with the Chinese who coveted the resources in the mountains or obtained their permission to enter mountains for exploitation. In some cases, firearms and ammunition were given by the foreigners as gifts and represented “friendship” between them. The actual number of firearms that mountain indigenes traded or received is difficult to trace or have been small, however, it reveals the fact that the activity of trading firearms was occurring among indigenous societies in many parts of Taiwan from the

was a large gun or cannon, which would be possible to kill 18 men in one load, he could have sold firearms to mountain indigenes since he owed the weapon and conducted trade with the mountain and plains indigenes in the regions. Swinhoe, ‘Narrative of a Visitor to the Island of Formosa’, 150.

172 Taiwanfu Yutuzuanyao 臺灣府輿圖纂要, 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 181 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1963) quoted in Chen, ‘Chinese Frontiersmen and Taiwanese Tushengnan 土生囝 in the Local Economy of Taiwan before 1900’, 361–362.
south to north. This reveals another paradoxical circumstance situated in northern Taiwan: Firearms that mountain indigenes bartered and experienced were obtained precisely from those Hakka and foreigners who were also most involved in camphor exploitation. Nevertheless, mountain indigenes were largely involved with matchlocks and other basic weapons, and started to increase their proximity to, their notions and experiences of modern firearms, through their various and broader contacts and increasing conflicts with invaders, directly and indirectly. In fact, the weapons that mountain indigenes held started to shift with the contacts they made and the combats they encountered, as we shall see further.
Part II 1860-1914: Conflict and Resistance of the Indigenous People

Chapter 5 Sources of Conflict 1884-1895 at Modernised Level

Formosa, under the civilized rule of China, has a grand future before her. The hills over which the savages are now sparsely scattered would grow thousands of tons of that delicate flavoured tea over which even now New York purchasers are writing in such hopeful terms. So the savages have to go. They can, if they like, take grants of land, paying no taxes for a certain number of years, and being all the time taught agriculture free of charge, through an agency specially established for that purpose. But if they do not like, and many prefer the old free jungle life and the excitement of daily chase, then it becomes a question between their unerring but scattered matchlocks and the bristling breech-loaders of half drilled Chinese troops.  

So, in the mid-1880s British Consul Herbert Giles saw the armed relations between Chinese and indigenes at a time when he genuinely considered Chinese reformed rule to be progressive and enlightening. He neatly captured the dualism of matchlocks and breech-loaders, not unexpected from the argument of the last chapter, but as that chapter also emphasised, the actual situation was more complex and the power relations more nuanced. In these later years of scaling-up of Chinese penetrations to the east and commercialisation under the modernising governship of Liu Mingchuan, how far could the force of arms support continued indigenous resistance in the face of increased Chinese numbers, more modern weaponry and the undermining effects of new commercial persuasions?

As such global forces built up, riotous striving continued to storm the eastern regions of Taiwan. The lives of mountain indigenes were persecuted from the ongoing encroachment of the commercial imperatives from the West and the second campaign of “opening up the mountains and pacifying the indigenes” of the Qing government from 1885. Ceaseless conflicts among mountain indigenes and Chinese, and the resistances of indigenes to the Qing military, became larger in scale. In the meanwhile, Taiwan encountered external crises when the French military attacked and later locked-in Taiwan by naval blockade from 11th August, 1884 to 29th April, 1885. This was, of course, to be followed by the far more devastating Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1895. The devices in warfare appeared to have improved to a more modernised

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level among all parties. How did mountain indigenes manage to contend with the superior weaponry which began to flow to Taiwan? Did those modernised weapons exert any influence on the firearms that mountain indigenes held and their cultures of firearms? The aim of Chapter 5 is to investigate the character of the impacts of modern armaments upon the warfare between mountain indigenes and external invaders in the period of 1884-1895.

This period may be marked as a more “modernised level” of conflict, based on the level of weaponry that operated in Taiwan and the scaling up of Chinese penetration and commercialisation under the governor of the new system, Liu Mingchuan. Particularly, the armaments that transferred to Taiwan were mainly the innovations of military technology from the Western nations and those that were purchased by the Qing government in the Self-Strengthening Movement. The first section will focus on the foreign invasions in Taiwan – the Sino-French War 1884 and the Japanese invasion 1895 and the worsened internal conflicts, particularly in the mountain indigenes regions or the back mountains (Houshan 後山) as the Qing officials called them. Types and various degrees of internal conflicts included those between indigenous groups, with the Qing military during the second phase of the “opening up” program from 1885, with the Chinese camphor workers, and with the Chinese farmers and settlers who often crossed the borders. The second section will demonstrate the weapons that the French, Japanese and the Qing militaries used and transferred and which the Chinese militia and civilians operated with in the wars, which might have had most direct impact on the possession and knowledge of firearms amongst the mountain indigenes. The third section will discuss the firearms and weapons that plain and mountain indigenes possessed during those years and their accessing of modern firearms directly and indirectly, particularly in the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and the Japanese invasion of 1895. This is probably the period when mountain indigenes captured and stored most of their modern firearms for the unknown and possible threats and intrusions later on.

1. A Tumultuous Decade

This section will firstly and briefly outline the influence of the Sino-French War, 1884 in Taiwan and the Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1895 after the Qing government ceded the sovereignty of Taiwan to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. These two foreign invasions determined the recognition of the importance of Taiwan to the Qing government and the
sovereignty of Taiwan as a colony to Japan later on. Although the battle fields were mostly in the north and the west of Taiwan, in the aftermath, mountain indigenes in central and eastern regions suffered from the ruthless militarized pacifications of the Qing and the Japanese governments. Here, I would like to focus on the possible involvements or responses of mountain indigenous people in such external warfare. It is not my prime purpose to discuss the cause of the warfare, the entire military actions or the development of diplomacy between France and China and between Japan and China during the wars. Secondly I would like to demonstrate the disarrayed state of affairs and the increasing resistance of mountain indigenes toward the end of Qing’s governance within Taiwan. As the result, numerous modern weapons were transferred to Taiwan to fight against foreign invasions and quell local resistances and at times these overflowed unchecked into eastern regions.

1.1. External Conflicts

The Sino-French War & French Blockade in Taiwan, 1884

Conflicts between France and China over the protectorate of Annam, now known as “Vietnam”, detonated in Tonkin during 1883. Chinese troops – the Black Flag Army, former rebels in the Taiping Rebellion now supported by the Qing government, led by Liu Yongfu 刘永福 defeated the French military in the battle of Paper Bridge in the Red River Delta in the spring of 1883 and in the battle of Langshan 谅山 at the border of China and Annam in June, 1884. This was despite the French Prime Minister Jules Ferry advocating control over Annam as a French colony and convincing the French parliament to sanction 3.7 million francs for the military campaign. In the course of negotiations between France and China, France firstly blamed the Chinese government for violation of the Convention or Tianjin Accord in May, 1884, which was not ratified by the Chinese government, after their defeat in Lang-shan. Later

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2 The Convention or Tianjin Accord was signed by Chinese diplomat, Li, Hung-chang and French naval commander, Captain François-Ernest Fournier. It acknowledged the protectorate status of France on Tonkin and the treaties with Annam, withdrawal of Chinese troops from Tonkin, establishment of trade arrangements across the border of southern China ‘under the most advantageous conditions possible for French commerce’, etc.
the new French envoy - Jules Patenotre ordered the impounding of Keelung and Tamsui in northern Taiwan and the blockade of Taiwan.³

Under the tension in Vietnam, the Qing government began to reinforce its military defence along its south-eastern coast regions, including Taiwan. Liu, Ming-Chuan was appointed as imperial commissioner of Taiwan for the preparation against a probable French incursion in July, 1884. To covet the coal supply in Keelung and the strategic position of Taiwan, French warships commanded by Admiral Courbet, firstly attacked Keelung on the 11th August, 1884. Taiwan began its nearly 1 year of French military menace. During this period, at least 7 battles were launched against Keelung and Tamsui from northern Taiwan and the Penghu islands respectively, and then French marines extended their blockade mission to southern Taiwan.⁴ Hundreds of Chinese soldiers and armaments tried to deploy at Taiwan from various regions of China.⁵ For instance, in one batch, 5,000 Mauser rifles and 500 Snider-Enfield⁶ and several Hotchkiss guns or rifles were transferred to Taiwan.⁷ The armaments of the French and Chinese army will be discussed in Section 2 in this chapter. Local militia led by several local gentries such as Lin Chaodong 林朝棟, Chen Xiaoling 陳霞林, Chen Xinian 陳熙年, Lin Weiyuan 林維源 and Lin Rumei 林汝梅, who also provided financial support to the Qing government, co-operated with the Qing army closely while fighting against the French army.⁸ In the end, the French military force never succeeded in occupying northern Taiwan after several defeats, but then retreated and occupied the Penghu islands in March 1885. An armistice treaty was signed in April 1885 after Sir Robert Hart, the British inspector-general of Chinese Maritime Customs mediated between France and the Qing government. It finally ended the French blockade of Taiwan.⁹ This campaign also prompted the Qing government to perceive the importance of

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³ Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, Maritime Taiwan: Historical Encounters with the East and the West (Routledge, 2009), 89–90; Gordon, Confrontation over Taiwan, 135–40.
⁴ Chen Yan 陳衍, Taiwan Tongji 臺灣通紀 [Chronicles of Taiwan], 209–16; Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, Maritime Taiwan, 91–100; Gordon, Confrontation over Taiwan, 142–48.
⁵ Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 215–16; Shih-Shan Henry Tsai, Maritime Taiwan, 91–92, 94, 96–97.
⁶ For the information on Snider-Enfield, see chapter 4, footnote no.56
⁷ Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 215.
⁸ Lin, Chaodong recruited 5,000 braves from southern Taiwan to assist the Qing soldiers for fighting against French invasion. Ibid., 366; Gordon, Confrontation over Taiwan, 142.
Taiwan in its coastal defence and declared an independent “Taiwan Province”, this in turn leading to much improved Qing governance under Liu Mingchuan.

However, the participation of the Formosan indigenes in fighting against the French army was less noticed or written of, only a little evidence was found in a journal report by the German Botanist Dr. O. Warburg, who visited at Christmas, 1887. He talked about how the deeds of the Chinese troops who vanquished the French troops might in fact be accredited to “the armed mountain and frontier population, the descendants of the aborigines, then the Hakkas, a tribe from south China ... The whole art of warfare, the scalping, the nightly cunning raids, the aggressive procedure, point to the share that the Malay-Polynesian blood of the former aborigines had in the defence.”

Though the involvement of mountain indigenes was probably minor or tends to go unrecorded in Chinese sources, the areas in Keelung and Tamsui where most of the battles took place were lived in by the plains indigenes of Ketagalan or were on the borders of the mountain tribes. In that the plains indigenes were immensely assimilated with the Chinese over time, it is possible that they would have been actively anti-French. This might go somewhere towards explaining Dr. Warburg’s narrative. Nevertheless, it generated the large flow of modern weaponry conveyed to Taiwan in the Sino-French War and later used in the second phase of “opening up the mountains and pacifying the indigenes” imposed by Liu Mingchuan from 1885.

**Colonisation - The Second Invasion of Japan 1895**

A decade later, Taiwan’s fate was disrupted by another and far greater external warfare of China with Japan, nominally over the control of Korea in 1894. It is known as the First Sino-Japanese War. The entire military actions took place in the Korean Peninsula, Liaodong Peninsula, Yellow Sea and Penghu Islands. Ultimately, Taiwan was victimised or sacrificed in this war when China signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on 2nd May, 1895 and ceded Taiwan to Japan as her first colony in Asia. Undoubtedly, it was a shock for the Qing courtiers and the officials of various provinces of China who were strongly opposed, as much as the same to the officials and the local gentry in Taiwan itself. Two weeks later, the former Qing governor – General, Tang

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10 Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’.
11 Zhan Sujuan 詹素娟 and Zhang Sufen 張素玢, *Taiwan Yuanzhimin Shi-Pingozu Shipian (Bei)* 臺灣原住民史-平埔族史篇(北) (*The History of Formosan Indigenes - Pepo Tribes in North*), 107–18.
12 Huang Xiuzheng 黃秀政, *Taiwan Gerang Yu Yiwei Kangri Yundong* 臺灣割讓與乙未抗日運動 (*Relinquishment...*)
Jingsong 唐景崧 established “The Republic of Formosa” in opposition to the coming Japanese occupation and became its President with the support of the local gentry in Taipei on 15th May, 1895. Liu Yongfu became the Grand General of the Army and conducted various resistances against the Japanese invasions in southern Taiwan.¹³

The Japanese military first landed in Cape San Diego, in northern Taiwan and Japan soon seized Taipei in around 10 days. The first president of the Republic of Formosa had already fled to China.¹⁴ The Japanese continued to fight against local rebellions led by local militia in Taoyuan, Xinzhu and Miaoli where most Hakka militia were fortified, and Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag army recruited in Taiwan in Zhanghua, Yunlin, Jiayi and Tainan and from the mainland. The entire military resistance to Japan lasted over 5 months and eventually many gentry and their families, even Liu Yongfu himself fled to China.¹⁵ Local Chinese militia and some regular army of Qing such as the Black Flag Army, Cantonese braves or Yueyong 粤勇, and the Anhui Army were the major armed forces in fighting Japanese troops.¹⁶ Numerous modern weapons were poured into Taiwan, many lost in Taiwan as there was much weapon robbery and abandonment, and a lot more besides under these disorderly circumstances. For instance, the American journalist, Davidson reported that a Chinese gunboat Chinghui arrived in Takow with treasure and 5,000 rifles and ammunition to supply the Black Flag and another 5,000 rifles landed in Tamsui around the 8th May.¹⁷ Discussion concerning the armament of the Japanese, local militia and the regular army of Qing will be presented in Section 2 of this chapter.

Nevertheless, the responses of the mountain indigenes to the invasion by Japan were

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13 However, Zhang has questioned the origin of the establishment of “The Republic of Formosa”, he suggested that the Qing government considered that Tang, Jingsong was forced by the local people to establish the Republic of Formosa. Zhang also referred to Davidson’s personal experience in Taiwan at this time and suggested the establishment of the Republic of Formosa was entirely organised by the officials in Taiwan. Taiwanese people were not aware of this change until the public notice revealed the circumstances. Zhang Shouzhen 張守真, Liu Yongfu Yu Taiwan 劉永福與台灣 (Liu Youngfu and Taiwan) (Kaohsiung: Gaoxiongshi wenxian weiyuanhui 高雄市文獻委員會, 2003), 38–39.

14 Weng Jiayin 翁佳音, Taiwan Hanren Wuzhuang Kangrishi Yanjiu 臺灣漢人武裝抗日史研究 (Study of Taiwan Chinese Resistance to Japan) (Taipei: National Taiwan University Press, 1986), 60–69.


16 Local officials such as Lin, Chaodong 林朝棟, Yang, Ruyi 楊汝翼 and Qiu, Fengjia 丘逢甲 fled to China with their treasure. Yi Shun-Ding 易順鼎, Hun Nan Ji 魂南記 (Diary of the southern souls), Taiwan Wenzheng Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary collectanea on Taiwan), 27 quoted in Zhang Shouzhen 張守真, Liu Yongfu Yu Taiwan 劉永福與台灣 (Liu Youngfu and Taiwan), 45.

rather problematic and can not readily be generalised. In the report of Davidson, who arrived with the Japanese troops in 1895, he wrote about how both the Japanese and Liu Yongfu attempted to gain the allegiance of the mountain indigenes in Miaoli, but the mountain indigenes seemingly refused to cooperate with the Chinese rebels. Indeed, according to Davidson, the mountain indigenes were “extremely anxious to join the warfare against the Chinese insurgents. Regardless of the fact that their request was refused [by the Japanese officers], a small party came down a few days later, fully armed and prepared to accompany the Japanese.” After the Chinese messenger Wu and a group of soldiers attacked them. The alliance between mountain indigenes in Miaoli and Japanese troops did not last, they could not even agree upon the killing of Chinese in the area. In the Tainan Intelligence Report written by Consul R. W. Hurst it was mentioned how Liu Yongfu was “cultivating friendship” with savages and “he expects to make use of them against the Japanese.” Another occasion when mountain indigenes showed their intention of assisting Liu’s troops was when “a band of savages from the south made a pretence of joining Liu. They were encamped in the city, and only received food in return for their service”, but they disappeared after two of their companions died which they took as a bad sign. Another Chinese source suggested that thousands of mountain indigenes were recruited and given military training by the plains indigenes, Lin Chaodong, Qiu Fengjia and Wu Guangliang and ambushed the Japanese troops on some occasions. If this was correct, the mountain indigenes were very likely to receive modern weapons and operate them in the war. Overall, the level of mountain indigenes involvement in this warfare between Chinese and Japanese troops is uncertain in various parts of Taiwan. Davidson also reported some amiable receptions of mountain indigenes in mid Formosa, which is the opposite of the Chinese sources. A formal meeting of mountain indigenes was held near Tokoham 大嵙崁 (Taoyuan County) with Kashiguchi, chief of the Agricultural and Industrial Bureau and Rear Admiral Tanaka, Prefect of Taipei in August. Mountain indigenes were given some presents of knives, red handkerchiefs, red woollen cloth,

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18 Ibid., 343.
19 TEPR 5/ 236 -258, Tainan Intelligence Report for quarter ended June 30, 1895, Military and Secret, Consul R. W. Hurst, Tamsui, 15/Jul/1895, 257-258
Moreover, an affiliation between Japanese and plains indigenes in southern Taiwan could be found again in a report by Consul R.W. Hurst in September 1895 when a Japanese transport Kobe-maru traveling northward by the forts of Anping, “landed a force of 200 men at Pangliao [Fangliao 枋寮, Pingdong County] a place about 25 miles south of Takow, with the object of communicating with and forming a Treaty of Alliance with a chief of the Pephoans whom the exactions of Liu had driven to rebellion.”23 Another partnership was formed by the mountain indigenes of the Puyuma and the Amis after Pan Wenjie 潘文杰, the chief of the Tuilasok tribe 豬朥束社 from the Paiwan group, joined the Japanese troops to battle with the remaining Qing troops led by Yuan Xizhong 袁錫中 and Liu Deshao 劉德杓 in Leigonghuo 雷公火 (Guanshan 關山, Taidong County) in 1896.24 If we could agree that the contacts that mountain indigenes made towards foreigners, Westerners in particular, were generally amicable, and linked this with the above evidence, it is highly possible that mountain indigenes were physically engaged and gained modern firearms from both the Japanese and the Chinese during the war.

1.2. Aggravated Conflicts within Indigenes’ Regions in Taiwan Province

The occurrence of combat between mountain indigenous tribes and the Chinese troops that executed the second “opening up” attempts, and battles with the Chinese civilians who desired to profit from the further mountain resources at the borders, increased in our period (1884-1895). The number of battles of mountain indigenes in the Qing governance reports reached around 20 (see the places where the conflicts took place in red circles Map 5:1), which nearly doubled that of the previous much longer period (1860-1883).25 Most battles happened...
in the central and eastern regions of Taiwan. These ceaseless conflicts generated the flow of modern weaponry, particularly those centred on warfare with the Chinese troops and civilians who gradually replaced and furnished themselves with modern firearms.

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and Xu, Yuliang. Xu Xueji 許雪姬, Qingdai Taiwan de Lüying 清代臺灣的綠營 [The Green Standard in Taiwan during the Ching Dynasty], 99–11; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 556–64.
Map 5.1 Conflicts of mountain indigences during the Qing military 1884-1895


*The locations of conflicts of mountain indigences with others are marked in red*
1.2.1. Conflicts between indigenes

Disputes between indigenous tribes were still frequent in this period. Reasons for the disputes between indigenous tribes were diverse and complicated, sometimes they fought over hunting territories, murder cases, or hatred from previous generations. Following the increasing economic encroachment and the mountain resource exploitation, the living space of mountain indigenes constantly shrunk, frictions between neighbouring tribes became greater as a result. The British lighthouse keeper George Taylor recorded a dispute between Tipun 知本社 and Nickabong 呂家社 of the Puyuma group Taidong County,

About three years ago, irritated no doubt by some act of more than ordinary superciliousness, they threw off their old allegiance and declared themselves independent. Bloodshed followed, and at present whoever gets the drop fires. Two days before our arrival they had fought a battle, the day and ground having been agreed upon in a very chivalrous manner. The result was most disastrous to the Nickabong who left 149 men on the field, the Tipuns losing only eight. This had embittered matters; the Nickabong accusing the Tipun Chief of treachery in the matter of an ambush, which, opening fire on the Nickabong flank, was the main cause of their defeat. Unceasing hostility was declared, and they threatened to carry fire and sword into Tipun itself if ever they got a chance.26

This was a huge loss of men for the Nickabong tribe. Ambush was still their major tactic in battles. Sometimes disputes between indigenous tribes attracted Qing military’s attention and drew military support from the mainland for pacification. For instance, in June 1885, Liu Mingchuan reported how three Paiwan tribes (Shuaimang 率芒, Dondi 董底, and Qijiashan 七家山, in Pingdong County) were at war and a Qing official intervened to halt the fights, however, the conciliation fell through and resulted in another fight. Apparent, this was due to the Qing official supposedly siding with one of the Paiwan tribe the Qijiashan, and the other two tribes, Shuaimang and Dondi, then turned to attack one of the Qing military stations with hundreds of indigenous men. In the end, reinforcement from the Qing military was sent to appease this rivalry.27 These battles did not seem to resolve disputes or end the hatred

26 According to Taylor, Nickabong was founded by the Tipuns long time ago. Taylor, ‘A Ramble through Southern Formosa’, 146–47.
between the tribes, but these perpetual hostilities between tribes might have sustained their fighting capabilities and their demand for weapons over the years.

1.2.2. Conflicts in the Second Phase of “Opening up the mountains and pacifying the indigenes” from 1885

Prolonged resistance of mountain indigenes was inevitable, particularly as Liu Mingchuan was determined to enforce the second opening up phase through and set up the Pacification and Reclamation Bureau (see Chapter 3, p. 89). Cases of mountain indigenes assaulting the Qing military troops and stations during opening roads in mountains and the expeditions of Qing armies that were sent to quell mountain indigenous tribes, arose at least two to three times every year in this period. Chinese local officials may have been loath to report all such cases, but foreign officials were a different matter, concerned as they were with the commercial impacts of such conflicts. British Consul Herbert A. Giles reported on the inception of the “opening up” project in 1886 that,

General Liu is carrying on operations against them which can only have one end; he is overwhelming them with numbers. Every now and again he sends in two or three thousand men, who come back minus one or two hundred, killed by the deadly fire of the savages’ matchlock, and having accomplished nothing.\textsuperscript{28}

The Qing armies struggled to fight effectively against mountain indigenes despite their large numbers and modern armaments.

Most affected mountain indigenous tribes mainly lived near the borders of indigenes areas in northern, southern and eastern Taiwan. Many mountain indigenous tribes submitted themselves to the Qing army although their compliance was indefinite. The Atayal tribes had incurred the brunt of most of the Qing military’s punitive expeditions in the period of 1885-1891. The Atayal tribes that distributed themselves over the border of the mountain areas of the entire northern Taiwan, were subjected to the Qing military pacification several times each year.\textsuperscript{29} In 1887, the Qing military led by Lin Chaodong fought against 500 Atayals from the Lileng

\textsuperscript{28} TEPR 3/735-740. Report on the Trade of Tamsuy and Kelung during the year 1885. Consul. Herbert A. Giles. 2/\textsuperscript{2} Mar/1886, 737"

\textsuperscript{29}Within the Atayal groups regions, the Qing military pacifications (1885-1891): In 1885, the Malai eight tribes (馬
tribe 裡冷社 and Baimao tribe 白毛社 in Taizhong City and captured several firearms and other weaponry. One of the officials was shot dead in this battle. Among these punitive expeditions within the Atayal groups region, the most severe battle which resulted in hundreds of dead Qing soldiers, was in 1889.

In September 1889, nearly 300 men were killed by the Atayal indigenes in Nanao Township, Yilan County including the Deputy General of the Anhui Army, Liu Chaodai 劉朝帶, who led 500 men to construct a road through the region. Liu Mingchuan himself later commanded 4,000 men to withstand and pacify the Atayal’s resistance for a period of 6 months. This is a very large number of men for a considerable time. The Paiwan in the south and the Amis, Puyuma and the Pepo of Siraya in the east and southeast also initiated several armed disturbances. The Dazhuan tribe incident (Dazhuangshe shijian 大庄社事件) in 1888 which involved 6,000 indigenes from the Amis, Puyuman indigenes and the Pepo of Siraya, was the largest resistance of indigenes in eastern Taiwan under the Qing regime in the late nineteenth century. The reason behind this increased resistance was the extractive land tax scheme in the eastern region which was enacted by Liu Mingchuan to raise Chinese revenue, together with the example of Hakka opposition. The Puyuma, Amis and the plains indigenes of Siraya formed a strong and powerful alliance and fought with firearms from within the bamboo forests, which caused great casualties. Troops furnished with foreign armaments and ammunitions and two warships from Beiyang Fleet (Beiyang jiandui 北洋艦隊) were despatched to reinforce the troops on the ground. As the result, the entire expedition lasted for 2 months and hundreds of plain and mountain indigenes were killed or escaped into the mountains.
In comparison with the 1st "opening up the mountains and pacifying the indigenes" scheme ordained by Shen Baozheng, certainly, mountain indigenes seemed to encounter relentless and greater suppression in the second, which was just prior to real search for profit from the camphor, tea, and other resources in the mountains, and designed to modernize Taiwan as an independent province under the late Qing governance. Chinese under-reportage, in such circumstances, may well have been, as indigenous resistance represented their inability to pursue wider modernization, something symptomatic of the entire Chinese empire.

1.2.3. Conflicts in Commercial Product Regions

Conflicts within industrial resource regions were especially widely reported by British Consuls in this period. In fact, the existence of raw and profitable materials was the major cause of the growing conflicts, particularly the hacking of camphor trees in the late nineteenth century. Cases of mountain indigenes attacking camphor stoves and murdering camphor workers and gold miners were extremely common. For instance, in 1885, an Atayal called Malaishimei 馬來詩昧 killed 19 camphor workers and assembled his neighbouring Atayal tribes into a resistance movement which required the Qing army to pacify.  In 1887, the Atayal in Sanxia District, New Taipei City killed several woodcutters and guards and one of the Atayal indigenes hanged the victims’ heads at the tribal entrance as though they were to symbolically as well as physically challenge the authority. British Consul H.A. Giles reported on the style of conflict during his service,

The wood cutter pushes venturesomely afield over the savage boundary ... the savages have made a raid, the extent of which is gauged by the number of missing heads. Then troops are moved rapidly to the frontier, and the work of pacification begins again. On one occasion during the past autumn the aspect of affairs was very serious. The savage succeeded in cutting off and surrounding a portion of the Chinese forces. Many of these were killed, and the general in command

33 Chen Yan 陳衍, Shiushi-ting Taipe Neishan Jiajiuan Ji 石遺室集-行抵臺北內山加九岸記 [Noted on the Trip to Taipei Jiajiuan], vol. 15, Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 [Literary Collectanea on Taiwan] 309 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, n.d.), 140; Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsiugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 215.
34 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsiugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 221–22.
was shot through the cheek; and but for the timely arrival of the Governor in person, at the head of a large body of troops, it is probable that not a man would have escaped.”

Mostly importantly, the production and the price of camphor both grew substantially from 1891-1895 (see Chapter 3, pp. 82-84). This measures a great demand for camphor in the world market which encouraged the camphor production. Meanwhile the difficulties of procuring camphor because of frontier violence in Taiwan raised the price of camphor. The major difficulty for procuring camphor was the mountain indigenes who maintained the ritual of headhunting and their strong consciousness of defending their lands (see further Chapter 7 below). The mountain indigenes seemed to obtain some predominance and certainly obstructed the camphor trade in these years. Nearly every year from 1891, British Consuls were actively reporting on the outbreaks of mountain indigenes and the damage caused by the mountain indigenes on camphor production. For example, in 1891, W. Holland reported,

In the autumn, when an outbreak took place among the savages, who unable to distinguish between the Chinese caretakers of the camphor stoves build with foreign capital and their usual foes, attacked the Chinese generally and destroyed numbers of stoves. Nothing could be done, the Chinese being quite unable to protect the stoves or punish the savages,

In 1893, the Acting Consul L.C. Hopkins described the risk of the camphor trade, as the “no advance, no camphor” system became dominant,

however, there may be plenty of advances without any returns, either in cash or camphor, if the savages should elect to come out of the grass, as it is locally termed, and raid the spot with fire and spear, leaving the stoves a heap of ashes with a fringe of Chinese corpses.

Until 1894 and 1895 before Taiwan ceded to Japan, the circumstances remained the same, as the Takekan 大嵙崁 - the collecting and distributing centre of camphor, woods and tea centre - was reported in a “disturbed and unsafe condition. Almost no camphor can be got from

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there”. Despite the Qing authority having levied the protection tax, to pay for the frontier guards who supposedly provided some protection of the camphor workers, this did not seem to stop the mountain indigenes attempting to destroy the camphor stills in 1895 in Chipchip or Jiji Township, Nantou County. Even gold miners were exterminated by savages in one of their head-hunting expeditions in the winter of 1895.

1.2.4. Conflicts between Mountain Indigenes and Chinese Civilians

Moreover, the ultimate antagonism between mountain indigenes and Chinese was perpetual, sometimes Chinese treated mountain indigenes in various crude ways once they entrapped and captured them. From time to time, Chinese civilians who lived near the borders were shot to death and their heads were taken by mountain indigenes. Liu Mingchuan reported that in 1885, 28 heads of Chinese plebeians, both male and female, were cut off and 4 were shot dead by the mountain indigenes in that year in Zhaolan Village (or today’s Zhuluan Township Miaoli County). The Paiwan groups in southern Taiwan were another example of bellicose indigenes who often quarrelled with their nearby Chinese. The Qing governance had to send punitive expeditions to quell indigenes’ revolts every year during 1889-1892. According to the Governor Shao Youlian (1891-1895), 300 Paiwan indigenes from the Sapetiq or Shebuli tribe (Fengshang Township, Kaohsiung County) sieged and fought against the Chinese villagers. Hundreds of plain indigenous soldiers were recruited as

38 TEPR 5/ 84-107, Tamsui Intelligence Report for June quarter 1894, Consul L.C. Hopkins, Tamsui 2/Jul/1894, 86-87
42 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuang Sugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 199.
guides to assist in pacification by the Qing officers and the Qing army also used cannon and modern weaponry to bombard the Paiwan villages. In the end, the Qing military conquered the resisting tribes, killed 80 Paiwan indigenes, and captured 17 foreign firearms and hundreds of spears and knives in 1892. British Consul Pelham Warren also reported on this incident and noted the Paiwan indigenes’ tactics in ambush and firing at Qing soldiers and concluded they could have defeated the Qing military,

There has been no actual fighting, but numbers of the soldiers and camp followers have been cut off by the aborigines and murdered. On several occasions when attempts have been made to advance into the hill country the troops have been fired on from ambushes and forced to retire without having seen the enemy ... It seems probable that the Chinese force will be withdrawn without anything having been accomplished and the district will once more be quiet and will remain so until some fresh act of treachery on the part of the Chinese again stirs up the aborigines.

On the contrary, conflicts between Chinese ethnic groups and the Chinese rebellions against Qing governance were relatively small, only a brawl in Balisha 八里沙 (Yilan County) over lands and a resistance of Qing government’s land tax led by a local gentry Shi Jiuduan 施九緞 in Zhanghua in 1888. There were 3 cases of local ruffians who resisted the capture of the Qing government with their firearms. Numerous gingalls and foreign firearms were confiscated when a gangster named Wu Jin 王金印 and his members were arrested. Nevertheless, the local bandits was another issue as they were armed and obstructed the trades, which was reported by the British Consul Pelham in 1890.

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43 Guangxuchao Yuezhedang 光緒朝月摺檔 [Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Guānxù Era]; Chen Yan 陳衍, Taiwan Tongji 臺灣通紀 [Chronicles of Taiwan], 241-42.
44 TEPR4/489-495, Tainan Intelligence Reports for the three months ending 31st Oct, 1891, Consul Pelham Warren, Tainan, 31/Oct/1892, 489-490. “The troubles with the aborigines in the Hengchiun district have been arranged temporarily and the troops withdrawn. The losses in the campaign were all on the Chinese side, and practically nothing was accomplished, the savages making their own terms. Some echo of troubles followed but not much.” TEPR 4/504-509, Tainan Intelligence Report for the three months ending January 31st, 1893, Consul Pelham Warren, Tainan, 31/Jan/1893, 504
45 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Lìzhuāngsūgōng Zòuyì 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 272; Jiang Shizhe 蒋師轍, Taiwan Tongzhi 台灣通志 (Taiwan Gazetteer, Draft Copy), 878-87.
46 The head of local bandit of Jiayi - Yan, Baicai 顏擺彩 and the head of local bandit of Changhua—Xu, Tianding 許添丁 opened fire and rejected the capture in 1885; Wu, Jinying 吳金印 led a revolt against the Qing government in 1886 in Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Lìzhuāngsūgōng Zòuyì 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 387-88, 389.
47 Ibid., 392.
In summary, Taiwan moved into an even more tumultuous decade in 1884-1895 when the battles between France and China in Vietnam diverted to Taiwan in 1884 and when Japan invaded in 1895. Mountain indigenes were not the causes of foreign nations battling with Qing government in Taiwan, but they were forced to be ruled by Japan without any choices in the end. Mountain indigenes had far less direct involvement in these two battles with France and Japan than in the earlier episodes covered in Chapter 4 although we have shown that the evidence is confused. Mountain indigenes refused to assist Liu Yongfu’s Black Flag, but some of the mountain indigenes chose to join or formed alliance with the Japanese army during the 1895 invasion. Also, due to the outbreak of war with France and Japan and a series of military, communication, and transportation modernisations urged by Liu Mingchuan (see Chapter 3, pp. 96-99), large amounts of modern armaments and troops were transferred from China to Taiwan, which will be discussed in the next section. Throughout the second opening up project, warfare of indigenes among themselves, with the Qing army and the Chinese at the borders in the north, east and south Taiwan became larger in scale and more frequent. Regions which combined commercial products and mountain indigenes territories turned into an unruly and violent state. Not only were the Qing troops furnished with modern guns from fighting against the French and the Japanese, instances of Formosan indigenes and Chinese civilians holding foreign firearms were increasingly common in battles. These frequent battles certainly escalated the demand and the diffusion of weaponry, especially as firearms were relatively small and did not require complex transportation by roads or railways. Mountain indigenes were also forced to engage in procuring more modern weapons in order to protect their own lands.

2. Firearms in Taiwan

Due to the numbers of campaigns in this period, plentiful weaponry was largely demanded by and transferred to various parties and individuals in Taiwanese society. These were the direct or indirect sources of firearms that flowed into mountain indigenes’ societies. This section will be discussing the types of firearms of the foreign troops, the Qing troops and the Chinese civilians or cultivators that transferred and operated in battles and conflicts in 1884-1895 Taiwan. I will also explore the weapons, particularly firearms, which emerged in Taiwan.

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from the Qing government’s purchase. I intend to show that the level of firearms became modernised among the Qing troops, Chinese civilians and plains indigenes and the large number of these modernised firearms largely dominated in conflicts and spread throughout Taiwan. This directly helped and influenced the mountain indigenes when possessing firearms and using them in battles.

2.1. Weapons Held by the Foreign Troops

Before the French and the Japanese invasion of Taiwan in 1884 and in 1895, some German crew were stationed in the South Cape following the completion of the lighthouse in 1883. According to Warburg (see above) who visited Taiwan in 1888, the lighthouse had “a crew of 16 men and two eighteen-pounders, two Gatling machine cannons and a 5-inch mortar, furnished with provisions and water tanks for three months” and was equipped and under the German military commander which cost over 300,000 dollars.\(^\text{49}\) It is uncertain when the German military began to station at the lighthouse in South Cape, the region where the Paiwan indigenes were living. There is no evidence that the Paiwan indigenes were in any sort of contacts with the foreign soldiers and no record of any conflicts between the Paiwan indigenes and the German military. However, if the Paiwan indigenes had remained on good terms or in interaction with the foreign soldiers as they did in the previous years with General Le Gendre, Pickering, the Japanese soldiers etc. (see Chapter 3, pp. 75-78), it is possible that the Paiwan indigenes obtained some knowledge of armaments that were furnished at the lighthouse.

\textit{The Sino-French War, 1884-1885}

The specification of weapons that the French military furnished during the Sino-French War in the battles fields of northern Taiwan was very little mentioned in the Chinese literature, although the Chinese officials reported how the French military used cannons and torpedoes in attacks during the war.\(^\text{50}\) However, there are descriptions of the small arms carried by the

\(^{49}\) He also noticed a Chinese detachment next to the German military station to protect the lighthouse although the Chinese troops did not do their job properly as he stated “but in reality the lighthouse, or the three unarmed Europeans protect the whole Chinese force.” Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa],’ 374–87.

\(^{50}\) Yang, Changjun 楊昌濬, ‘王詩正率部將抵台北’ (The Arrival of Troops led by Wang Shi-Zheng) in Mingqing Gongcang Taiwan Dangan Huibian 明清宮藏臺灣檔案匯編 [Compilation of Archives in Ming and Qing Court]
French soldiers during the war, when they were prowling the streets in Keelung with small arms\(^{51}\) and the “foreign firearms” were captured by the Chinese troops.\(^{52}\) Another way of finding the type of small arms that the French army were equipped with is to look at the Franco-Austrian War, 1859 and the Franco-Prussian War, 1870-1871. According to Oyvind Flatnes, the small arms that the French army possessed were Minié rifles or rifle muskets in Northern Italy in 1859\(^{53}\) and the French Model 1866 Chassepot rifles in the Franco-Prussian War, but later the French adopted the Model 1874 Gras rifle,\(^{54}\) which was a metallic cartridge version of the Chassepot in 1874.\(^{55}\) In addition, Lefaucheux revolvers\(^{56}\) were also carried by some French officers in the Franco-Prussia War.\(^{57}\) The Lebel repeating rifle replaced the Gras rifles amongst French military in 1886, therefore it is quite possible that the French army were equipped with Gras rifles in Taiwan during this period. John Dodd was probably the best spectator, who recorded the deployment of the French and the Chinese troops during the war. In August of 1884 he mentioned how the French navy used large guns such as Gatling or Mitrailleuse guns\(^{58}\) against the Chinese soldiers, who were working on digging entrenchments, but they did not

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\(^{52}\)Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liu Mingchuan Weni 劉銘傳文集 [Collections of Liu Mingchuan] (Hefei City: 黃山書社, 1997), 93–97; Fajun Qingtaidang Bubian 法軍侵臺檔補編 [Editions on the French Invasion of Taiwan], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 204 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1964), 71.

\(^{53}\)Use of Minié rifle involved the application of Minié ball, a cone-shape projectile which WAS smaller than the barrel bore for inserting in a muzzle loading rifle. When the powder in the barrel ignited, the powder gases forced rapid rifling. This was invented by the French Army captain Claude-Étienne Minié and later improved by the French Army captain Henri-Gustave Delvigne in the late 1840s. The Minié ball system improved the reloading speed and accuracy in muzzle loading rifles, which were then adopted and employed by the British and Americans in the 1850s. It was extensively used by the French and British troops during the Crimean War and by the American in Boshin war 1868-1869. Flatnes, From Musket to Metallic Cartridge, 88–92, 97–101.

\(^{54}\)Gras rifle was a conversion of Chassepot rifle from needles-guns to metallic cartridge, which could use the same bullet as the 11mm Mauser. It was an invention of General Basile Gras in 1874. Ibid., 143.

\(^{55}\)Chassepot rifle is breach loading rifle with a sliding bolt after an improvement of German Dreyse needle-fire rifle, by a French gunsmith Antoine Alphonse Chassepot in 1866. The bolt is connected with a rubber which would expand and seal the chamber for solving gas leak problem when firing a shot. Ibid., 13, 127–30.

\(^{56}\)Lefaucheux revolver is a pinfire system invention by Casimir Lefaucheux and applied by his son Eugenes in mid 1850s. The 11mm Lefaucheux revolver was the first metallic cartridge revolver with 6 round cylinder adopted in the French navy in 1858, but it never issued to the army. However, they were widely purchased and adopted by Sweden, Demark, Italy, and The Confederate State Army during the American Civil War. Ibid., 156–57.

\(^{57}\)Ibid., 157.

\(^{58}\)Mitrailleuse is a mechanically loaded machine gun with multiple barrels, which can fire multiple rounds manually. It was the invention of Belgium Captain Fafschamps in 1851 and improved by Belgian engineer Joseph Montigny in 1863. It was used in Franco-Prussian War (1870-18710 by the French artillery. James H. Willbanks, Machine Guns: An Illustrated History of Their Impact (ABC-CLIO, 2004), 32–38.
make much impact. On 8th October, 1884, he also reported that machine guns were positioned in the bows of the boats when the 500-800 French men made their attempt to land at Tamsui.

Numerous small arms and different models and manufactures of small arms were transferred to Taiwan for defence. Even though the French warships blockaded any reinforcement and weapons from China for several months, the Qing government managed to send reinforcement and weapons with the assistance of British and German ships and Chinese junks. British Consul W. Donald Spence in Takow reported the military supply during the blockade,

During the blockade, beside the junk trade with the west coast ports, on which I have written, communication was maintained between Formosa and the mainland by foreign steamers running to Peilam (Beinan, Taidong County), a port on the east coast, outside the blockaded line. By this route, throughout the winter of 1884-85, reinforcements of men, ammunition, and treasure were thrown, in great quantity, into the island, and it was not till April that the French discovered that their blockade was useless.

A British Consul, Alexander Frater at Tamsui sent to Harry S. Parkes, also direct to the foreign office, information that Germans and the British were definitely supporting the Chinese against the French and transporting armament for the Chinese officials, for instance,

the British Steamer ‘Ingeborg’ as having brought from Shanghai munitions of war, portions of which were intended to be carried on in her to Foochow. News having come on the 26th by a junk of a fight between the French and the Chinese on the 23rd at the Foochow, it was thought prudent to discharge the whole of the cargo here. It consisted of the following: 9 cases Krupp guns, 88 cases rifles, 12 cases accoutrements, 528 cases cartridges, and 43 cases dynamite.

60 Ibid., 96–97.
63 It is unclear which model of Krupp guns that the Qing government transferred. However, Krupp guns were a series of steel made artillery manufactured and largely purchase by the Russian, Austria and Qing China in 1860-1880. During the Sino-French War, Li Hong-Zhang purchased over 200 breach loading Krupp guns for the Anhwei Army and adopted by the Chinese navy. Lú Fangshang 吕芳上, ‘Cong Renshi Dao Rentong: wanqing Zhongguo Chaoye Dui Deguo Junshi Nengli de Renzhi 从認識到認同: 晚清中國朝野對德國軍事能力的認知, 1861-1890 [From Understanding to Recognition: The Awareness of the Qing Court toward the German Military Capacity in China], 48–50.
64 TEPR3/397-401. State of affairs at Kelung and Tamsuy. Officiating Consul A. Frater. 30/Aug/1884, 399
Another account from John Dodd also confirmed that the German steamer *Welle*, “arrived with a cargo of ammunition, torpedoes, telegraph wire, etcetera” in August 1884. He reported that the Krupp guns were moved from the fort in Keelung in August and employed to open fire on the French ships in Oct, 1884. In the Chinese official reports, thousands of reinforced troops, guns, and ammunition were transferred to Taiwan. For instance, 3,000 Mauser rifles and bullets were carried by Wang Guiyang, the Provincial military commander, and his men to Taiwan in July 1884. 1, 000 Lee rifles and 500 soldiers from Anhui troops were delivered to Taiwan by junk in November, 1884 and later in December, a thousand Winchester rifles were conveyed to Liu Mingchuan, ordered by Zeng Guoquan, the Viceroy of Liangjiang. The Viceroy of Liangguang, Zhang Zhidong purchased 2,000 Kentucky rifles and ten thousand pounds of ammunition and sent them to Taiwan to aid. Liu Mingchuan described the weapon supply and soldiers’ pay from China in 1885.

According to the correspondence, the Fujian Fleet Commander, Peng Chu-han had claimed the supplies most frequently. The supplies were mainly sent from Nanyang Fleet. The second was Beiyang Fleet which delivered more than 5,000 Mausers, 16 sets of Krupp guns, and more

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67 In 1884, Li, Hungchang also enjoined all the Anhwei armies furnished with Hotchikiss M1879 and Mauser M1871. If the troops were using Mauser rifles, the model should have kept consistent. Gu, Tinglong. 顧廷龍, *編*, '副總署復陳法越兵事' (Departmental Deputy’s reply to the war affairs between France and Vietnam) in 李鴻章全集-信函五 (Li Hongzhang Collection: Letters), 884, 33: 360; Liu Ming-Chuan 刘銘傳, ‘恭報自津起程日期並遵旨會商情形’ (Reports began after the departure of Tianjin and documents on the circumstances of discussion in accordance to the given instruction) in 08/07/1884 in Liu Ming-Chuan Wen Ji 刘銘傳文集 (Collections of Liu Ming-Chuan), 80-90.
68 The types of Lee rifles transferred to Taiwan were unclear mostly in our Chinese language sources. However, according to our reference *Rifles of the World*, the Qing government acquired substantial quantities (8,000-10,000) of Remington—Lee rifles and carbines in the 1880s. Remington Lee rifles is a designed by James Paris Lee and his employee Louis Diss and patented in 1884 for protecting a magazine that retained cartridge when detached from the gun. This feat was incorporated in an improved rifle. John Walter, *Rifles of the World* (Krause Publications, 2006), 243–45.
70 For the information on the Winchester rifles see chapter 4, footnote 67. Zhongguoshi xuehui 中國史學會 [Chinese History Academy], *Zhongfa Zhanzheng 中法戰爭* [The Sino-French War], vol. 6 (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 上海人民出版社, 1957), 205.
71 Kentucky rifle was first developed from a German rifle, the Jaeger, precision built, highly accurate hunting weapon. It was improved and designed by many men who use the Jaeger’s basic design. Kentucky rifle allowed hunters to carry powder and bullets for several days’ shooting and could be shot at amazing distances with great striking powder. Flatnes, *From Musket to Metallic Cartridge*, 52–54.
72 Zhongguoshi xuehui 中國史學會 [Chinese History Academy], *Zhongfa Zhanzheng 中法戰爭* [The Sino-French War], 6:139–40.
73 The model of Mauser the Qing government sent to Taiwan was unclear in our source. John Walter, *the author*
than 200,000 of taels financial aid. Guangdong sent 500 Sniders rifles, 3,000 Kentucky rifles, and 30,000,000 taels financial aid. These areas were all in an emergency and needed help. The supplies just arrived at the right time and saved the injured and the dying. From March (April, 1885), Zhang, Zhidong, the associate commissioner, continually brought more than 100,000 taels and 3,000 breech loading rifles.74

Modern armaments like Mausers, Krupps, Snider, Winchester, Kentucky and Lee rifles were largely transferred to Taiwan. Nevertheless, we do not know how many armaments stayed in Taiwan after the war, but it is very likely that a large amount of armaments stayed and were distributed in various parts of Taiwan for defence. Particularly the first governor of Taiwan Province, Liu Mingchuan strongly advocated the military modernization and a series of mountain indigenes revolts were about to break out during his project of opening up the mountains. Further discussion will be presented in Section 2.2 later.

_Weapons in the Invasion of Japan, 1895_

More than 15,000 Japanese soldiers and 233 warships which also included steam boats and boats led by General Kabayama Sukenori 樺山資紀 arrived at the Diaoyutai Islands in readiness for resistance on the occupation that was in fact part of the international treaty. According to Zhang, Japanese troops were furnished with modern accoutrements: Murata rifles75 were both carried by the infantry and the cavalry; Spencer rifles76 were carried by Impedimenta troops; the artillery included mountain guns or pack guns, field guns, machine guns 5 different styles and brass breech loaders. Also 11 Japanese warships all carried French steel cannons, quick-firing guns, British steel made cannon, quick-firing guns, Yokohama steel made quick-firing guns and machine guns, as well as Yokosuka arsenal (Tokyo) made cannon and machine guns and Onohama (Kobe) made cannons.77 The Japanese machine-gun made in

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75 Murata rifles were a series of bolt action rifles manufactured and modified by the Japanese for the first time after combining feature of the French Gras and German Mauser rifle, which were mainly purchased from Europe. It was developed rapidly after the Satsuma rebellion (1877) and used well into the Russo-Japanese War. Arsenals were built in Tokyo and Osaka. It was converted from French the Chassepot needle rifles and used by the Japanese Standard Army. Walter, _Rifles of the World_, 207–8; Shigeo Sugawa, ‘Japanese Weapons’, _Japanese Weapons_, accessed 19 February 2016, http://www.japaneseweapons.net/.

76 Sibicishi danfaqiang 司比瑟式單發槍 could possibly be the Spencer rifle as its closest pronunciation.

77 Huang Xiuzheng 黃秀政, _Taiwan Gerang Yu Yiwei Kangri Yundong 台灣割讓與乙未抗日運動 [Relinquishment of Taiwan and Resistance to Japan]_, 146–49.
Osaka was like the Maxim gun and Murata rifles made in Tokyo were used in battles in Taiwan for the first time, although the Japanese machine gun was often jammed according to Davidson’s description and observation when he accompanied Japanese soldiers in the war.

According to Huang and Li’s research on the Japanese invasion in 1895, at least 33,000 soldiers were in Taiwan to overturn the newly setup government of resistance – the Republic of Formosa. The components of the troops were from the Black Flags, the Xiang Army or Xiangjun (湘軍), Cantonese braves or Yueyong (粵勇) from the mainland China and local Taiwanese braves that were newly recruited and allocated in the various strategic points of Taiwan for the upcoming battle with Japan. Davidson in 1903 gave great detail of the defence disposition and installations in Keelung and Tamsui and the equipment. I will only summarise and focus on the Chinese armaments from Davidson’s descriptions. In Keelung, there were each 12 inch, 10 inch and two 8 and 6 inch Armstrong guns, 30 or 40 small Krupps guns (6 ½ centimetres) and some machine guns from the Nanjing Arsenal. In Tamsui, there were each 12 inch, 10 inch Armstrong guns, two 8 inch Krupps guns and another 8 inch and 6 inch Armstrong guns protecting a long trench along the mountain side, 3 miles from the river on the south bank. Small arms that were furnished to troops were the Winchester repeating carbines which were held by thousands of

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78 Maxim gun is a fully automatic gun invented by Sir Hiram S. Maxim in 1883. It was the first time the power of the cartridge was used to perform all the operation of extraction, loading and firing. Howard L. Blackmore, Guns and Rifles of the World (London: Batsford, 1965), 89.


80 Huang Xiuzheng 黃秀政, Taiwan Gerang Yu Yiwei Kangri Yundong 台灣割讓與乙未抗日運動 (Relinquishment of Taiwan and Resistance to Japan), 138–40; Li Weiyu 李瑋裕, ‘Lun Taiwan Minzhuguo Beilu Kangri論台灣民主國北路抗日 [A Study on Resistance to Japan in North Area for the Republic of Formosa]’ (MA, University of Taipei, 2012), 37–41.

81 Armstrong gun was the first breech-loading field guns, which rifled and fired elongated shell farther and more accurate than muzzle-loaders, designed by William Armstrong and manufactured by Elswick Ordnance Company and the Arsenal at Woolwich in 1855. Further information see Marshall J. Bastable, ‘From Breechloaders to Monster Guns: Sir William Armstrong and the Invention of Modern Artillery, 1854-1880’, Technology and Culture 33, no. 2 (1992): 213–47.
soldiers, Mauser, Lee, Remington\textsuperscript{82}, Spencer, Peabody\textsuperscript{83} and Martini-Henry\textsuperscript{84}, which were in use among European military. However, he also noticed some backward weapons from the Spanish, the Dutch and the early Qing governance which in ‘one uniform condition of rust and rottenness, were carried to the fortifications, some blunt Chinese long knives, pistols like horse pistols with single fire-percussion cap, some modern handgun handles carved as “American revolver made in Belgium” which were dangerous to fire off among the Chinese troops. Davidson gave some information on the weaponry that local Chinese braves carried; they were a great mixture which ranged from a contained blunderbuss without proper ammunition through to modern rifles that no one could use, even pikes and spears.\textsuperscript{85} Mauser rifles, Remington rifles and sufficient ammunitions were held by the Black Flag soldiers when they arrived at Takow in Feb, 1895.\textsuperscript{86}

Reinforcements began to be sent to Taiwan after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. Steamers like Arthur and Martha joined in transferring troops and ammunition to Taiwan.\textsuperscript{87} Liu Young-Fu recruited 2 battalions to Taiwan and was given 24,000 tael, 500 Mauser rifles and 200 Henry-Martini rifles in August, 1894.\textsuperscript{88} Governor Tang Jingsong purchased 20 Armstrong cannons, 0.2 million Armstrong cartridges, 13,200 Mausers rifles, 7.4 million Mausers’ rifles cartridges, 3,000 Remington rifles, 0.9 million Remington rifle cartridges, 2,000 Lee rifles, 2

\begin{itemize}
  \item The model of Remington rifles was unclear in our source. Remington rifles were a series of rifles with bolt-action, pump-action, semi-automatic, single-shot and automatic system, manufacture by the Remington Arm Co., Inc., which is one of the oldest gun maker until today. Remington Rolling block was developed by employees of E. Remington & Son, Joseph Rider and Lenoard Geiger Ridder and became perfect military firearms with strong, reliable and simple action. The production took place in 1865-1866 and contributed to the Civil War. Flatnes, \textit{From Musket to Metallic Cartridge}, 134–38.
  \item Peabody rifle is a breech-loading firearms, which was a pivoting-block action designed and patented by Henry O. Peabody from Boston, US in 1862. It had strong mechanism base on taking off the strain of firing on the rear inner face of the receiver. The pivoting-block prevented the action opening prematurely. A series of Peabody rifles were largely purchase by Canada, Fran, Romania, Mexico in the late 1860s. The Peabody Martini made good use for the Turks because of it was powerful and accurate at long range in the Russo-Turkish conflicts 1877-1878. Walter, \textit{Rifles of the World}, 210; Flatnes, \textit{From Musket to Metallic Cartridge}, 141.
  \item Martini-Henry rifle was a breech-loading single-shot rifle, which was named after Friedrich von Maritini, a Swiss-Hungarian weapon constructor and Alexander Henry, an inventor of rifling after combining Peabody’s mechanism. It replaced the Snider in 1871 and was adopted and used by the British Army from the late 1860s for over 30 years. Flatnes, \textit{From Musket to Metallic Cartridge}, 141–42.
  \item Davidson, \textit{The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions}, 285–89.
  \item F.O. 228/1199, Hurst to O’conor, 16/Feb/1895, P64–64, 68-74 quoted in Zhang Shouzhen 張守真, \textit{Liu Yongfu Yu Taiwan 劉永福與台灣 [Liu Youngfu and Taiwan]}, 28.
  \item Davidson, \textit{The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions}, 268.
  \item Tan, Zhonglin 譚鍾麟, ‘為遵旨籌辦防務情形恭稟陳陳仰祈聖鑒’ (A memorial sent express to Your Majesty for the approval of the planning and preparation of the military defence) in 25/Aug/1894 in Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, Qing Guangxuchao Zhongri jiaoshe shiliao [Official Documents of the Guangxu Reign], 339.
\end{itemize}
million Lee rifle cartridges, 600 Winchester rifles and 0.26 million Winchester rifle cartridges, and various powder and mines which cost 465, 309 tael.\(^8^9\) \(9,000\) rifles and 1 million cartridges, all landed at Tainan.\(^9^0\) Liu Young-Fu brought 1.6 million cartridges, 0.5 million percussion caps, 2,000 rifles, 960 shot, 160 bombs, 100 cases of gunpowder and 100 Winchester repeating rifles\(^9^1\) in late 1894, as British Consul R.W. Hurst reported. Liu Young-Fu also recruited 1,100 Black Flag army soldiers from Guangdong and transported 160 rifles and 146,000 rounds of ammunition on 7\(^{th}\) January, 1895.\(^9^2\) Foreign Customs seemed to be merciful to the Republic of Formosa and permitted foreign owners of vessels with European nations’ flags to transport troops and ammunitions from Guangdong, Fuzhou and Shanghai after the establishment of the Republic of Formosa.\(^9^3\)

A Chinese gunboat Chinghoi landed in Takao with some treasure and 5,000 rifles for the Black Flag army on the 8\(^{th}\) May and 50,000 rifles were landed in Tamsui around the same time.\(^9^4\) This could be verified and rectified in the British Consul R. W. Hurst’s report in Tainan in July 1895: 2,000 rifles and 400 boxes of cartridge brought by the Chinghoi on the 8\(^{th}\) May, and 412 cases of rifles and cartridges, 1,021 packages of cartridges from Tamsui.\(^9^5\) Regardless of much opposition from the Qing courtiers and officials in assisting the inevitable outcome of ceding Taiwan to Japan, weaponry and funds continued to be dispatched to Taiwan, particularly from the dedication of Zhang Zhidong 張之洞, the viceroy of Liangjiang. 10,000 foreign firearms and 300,000 tael were dispatched to Taiwan with the Qing courtiers’ implicit consent.\(^9^6\)

Davidson also suggested that the depository of weaponry in Taiwan was sufficient

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\(^8^9\) Qi Qizhāng 戚其章, Zhōngrì Zhànzhēng 中日戰爭 [Sino-Japanese War] (Beijing: Zhōnhuá 中華, 1989), S20–21.
\(^9^0\) TEPR 5/34-49, Tainan Intelligence Report for quarter ended 30\(^{th}\) September 1894, Consul R.W. Hurst, Tainan, 30/Sep/1894, 48-49
\(^9^1\) TEPR 5/50-66, Tainan Intelligence Report for quarter ended 31\(^{st}\) December 1894, Consul R. W. Hurst, Tainan, 2/Jan/1895, 58-66
\(^9^2\) F.O. 228/1199, Hurst to O’conor, 15/Jan/1895, P46-47 quoted in Zhang Shouzhen 張守真, Liu Yongfu Yu Taiwan 劉永福與台灣 [Liu Youngfu and Taiwan], 16.
\(^9^4\) Ibid., 349.
\(^9^5\) TEPR 5/ 236-258, Tainan Intelligence Report for quarter ended June 30, 1895, Military and Secret, Consul R. W. Hurst, Tainan, 15/Jul/1895, 257-258
\(^9^6\) Zhang, Zhidong 張之洞, ‘電諭署南洋大臣張之洞著解奧槍一萬枝務宜慎密免致藉口生事’ (Telegraph to the Nanyang Minister Zhang Zhi-Dong to supply 10,000 pieces of Austrian guns. The information should be handled with extra care and in confidentiality in case of unnecessary complications) in 13/05/1895 in Qi, 中日戰爭 [Sino-Japanese War]; Zhang, Zhidong 張之洞, ‘署南洋大臣張之洞來電’ (Telegraph from the Nanyang Minister Zhang Zhi-Dong ) 27/05/1895 in 清光緒朝中日交涉史料 [Official Documents of the Guangxu Reign]; Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present, 284, 351–352.
because the Taipei arsenal with modern machinery and powder mill continued running. However, this account was questioned by Huang in 1992, who argue that the weaponry supply to Taiwan was not enough or in great shortage based on Taihai sitonglu 壽海思痛錄 [Records of Taiwan Strait's Unforgettable Grief] written by Li Jingsong 黎景崧 who was one of the local officials and led the troops to fight against Japanese military and Dongfan bingshiji 東方兵事紀 [History of eastern military affairs] written by Yao Xiguan 姚錫光, a late Qing official. This might be a distinguished source, however, military supply would never be enough if we look at the predicament of Taiwan at this time. Taiwan was clearly in state of pandemonium. Davidson described the scene at the station in Keelung when the Japanese was approaching, “the place was strewn with guns, and ammunition, boxes, spear, banners, broken furniture.” The same thing happened when the Japanese military arrived at Takoham and fought in Yunlin. On the record of foreign residents referred to by Zhang, soldiers were generally ill-disciplined, they engaged in pillage, harassed and attacked foreign residents, etc. Lots of guns and ammunition were actually misapplied or destroyed by the soldiers. For instance, the powder magazine of the artillery battery exploded in Takow while the Xiang Army scrutinized the asset before consigning it to the Black Flag in Feb, 1895. 80 people died and the structure of the artillery battery was seriously damaged. The cause of this explosion was due to the soldiers who ignited the powder while they were smoking opium or tobacco in one of the powder rooms. Chinese junks and British ships were often fired at by Chinese soldiers from the Black Flag. Two British warships Tweed and Redbreast and a British tug were shot at several times by the station troops of the Black Flag when entering Takow port. Before Japanese occupied Taipei, the powder

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97 Both works were mainly about the defeat of Japanese invasion in 1895. Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present : History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 286; Huang Xizheng 黃秀政, Taiwan Gerang Yu Yiwei Kangri Yundong 台灣割讓與乙未抗日運動 [Relinquishment of Taiwan and Resistance to Japan], 141–42.

98 Ibid., 320, 359.

100 Zhang Shouzhen 張守真, Liu Yongfu Yu Taiwan 劉永福與台灣 [Liu Youngfu and Taiwan], 24–34.

101 Tang, Jingsong 唐景崧, ‘為旗后砲臺火藥失慎請將管轄營員分別議處事’ (Report on the careless handling of gunpowder at Cihou Fort and request on the reprimand instruction of the responsible soldiers ) in 13/04/1895 in Guangxuchao Yuezhedang 光緒朝月摺檔 [Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Guāngxù Era]; Zhang Shouzhen 張守真, Liu Yongfu Yu Taiwan 劉永福與台灣 [Liu Youngfu and Taiwan], 27–28; Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present : History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions, 346–47.

102 Tweed and Redbreast were shot on 8th April evening, British tug was shot on 14th April; Tweed was in the mission of protecting foreign resident was shot on 19th April. F.O. 228/1199, Hurst to O’conor, 15/April/1895, p123-129; F.O. 228/1199, Hurst to O’conor, 24/April/1895, P141-146 in Zhang Shouzhen 張守真, Liu Yongfu Yu
mill exploded and the Chinese soldiers were firing at the steamship Arthur which carried many Chinese officials and soldiers with their treasure.¹⁰³ Chinese soldiers were even selling their rifles in Taipei as Davidson describes,

> The several thousand Chinese soldiers, now engaged in a more profitable profession, were willing to dispose of their rifles for a few cents, and large numbers of old muskets were thrown into the rice fields outside the city as worthless. Brand new Winchester repeating carbines could be purchased for a dollar or less, and it is absolutely no exaggeration to say that cases of cartridges and ammunition were lying about the streets practically *ad libitum*, and could be had by anyone who cared to carry them away.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, once the Chinese officials abandoned Taipei, the local Chinese started to plunder the guns and powder from the Taipei arsenal and ammunition factory, which lasted for nearly 2 days.¹⁰⁵ British Acting Consul L.C. Hopkins reported on this occurrence on 6th June at Tatutia and Tamsui as he witnessed that Prism powder lay around and the Chinese villagers were walking through it and on it. They were carrying away everything they could move, wrenching pieces of brass, iron work, breech blocks or carriages. The large powder magazine at Dalongpeng 大壠塝 was blasted.¹⁰⁶ Davidson also noted the robbers were selling such weapons as a brand new Gatling gun to Chinese merchants for a few dollars and a Krupp breech–loading mountain gun was sold for two dollars.¹⁰⁷ We may conclude that supply of arms was not the principle problem: failure of military organization was the real problem, contra Huang (1992). This distinction is of some importance here as we are suggesting that the anarchy of those months served as a window of opportunity for the unofficial flow of arms throughout Taiwan (see Chapter 7, pp. 301-309).

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¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 303.

¹⁰⁵ ‘臺北府間諜土人報告’ (Taipei Prefecture’s Spy report on the Indigenous) in Research Society of Qiu Fengjia in Guangdong 廣東丘逢甲研究會 Guangdong Qiu Fengjia Yanjihui, *Qiu Fengjia Ji 丘逢甲集 [Collection of Qiu Feng-Jia]* (Changsha: Yue lu shushe 岳麓書社, 2001), 949.


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In summary, during the last year or so before Taiwan was ceded to Japan, we see an accelerated movement of modern weaponry pouring into Taiwan from the Japanese military and the Qing military. Not only was the Western model of weapons successfully adopted by the Japanese military such as Spencer rifles, British and French steel cannons, but also some weaponry manufactured by the Japanese appeared in the warfare such as Murata rifles from Tokyo, machine guns and cannon from Yokohama, Yokosuka, Onohama, Osaka, etc. The weapons that the Qing military held, as illustrated earlier, emerged as chaotic and a complete farrago such as Armstrong and Krupps guns from Nanjing Arsenal, Winchester repeating carbines, Mauser, Lee, Remington, Spencer, Peabody, Martini-Henry, some old Spanish, Dutch and Chinese firearms, knives and pistols, during the unstable condition in Taiwan when the Republic of Formosa was newly established and there were problems of supply from the Qing government in China. Such domestic anarchy must have accelerated the uncontrolled spread of weaponry in Taiwan.

2.2. Possession of Guns among the Qing Army

Apart from the substantial modern armament that the Qing government transferred to Taiwan to confront foreign armies, Liu Mingchuan urged to marshal the coastal defence and the military modernisation program in the wake of the Sino-French War. Since Liu was appointed the first provincial governor of Taiwan province, he imported new cannon and rifles, built arsenals, powder mills, railway, telegraph, etc mentioned briefly in Chapter 3, pp. 96-99). The amount of modern weaponry in Taiwan probably reached the highest point in this period. This also served to diffuse the availability of firearms in every part of Taiwan during the second opening up period and before ceding to Japan. Two British Consuls in Tamsui and Taiwan (Tainan) respectively reported the large scale of military expansion in 1885. \footnote{TEPE 3/ 741- 756. Report on the Trade of Taiwan for the year 1885. Acting Consul. WM. Donald Spence. 31/Jan/1886,746} Consul Herbert A. Giles commented that,

large guns have been purchased, and contracts for more have been made with a well know German firm. Troops have been landed in unusual numbers-many to fill up the gaps caused by the fever and dysentery of last season, but still many more than are in any way needed
at the present peaceful juncture.\textsuperscript{109}

Up to 1889, 31 Armstrong cannons were purchased and 10 artillery batteries were repaired and built in Keelung, Tamsui, Anping, Qihou 旗後 (Kaohsiung City) and Penghu under the supervision of a German engineer.\textsuperscript{110} In the inventory for founding the Taipei Arsenal and ammunition factory by Liu in 1887, a series of machines were purchased for repairing rifles and manufacturing bullets for Mauser rifles, Lee rifles, Hotchkiss rifles\textsuperscript{111} and Snider rifles which were left from the previous reinforcement. Liu purchased another 3,000 Lee rifles, 600,000 bullets for Lee rifles and 150,000 bullets for other breech-loaders.\textsuperscript{112} In 1892, the second governor of Taiwan, Shao You-Lian expanded the Taipei Arsenal and ammunition factory due to the increasing demand of ammunition for repressing the indigenes.\textsuperscript{113} Davidson also revealed how the modern Krupps, Gatling guns and some old Chinese jing-galls were also found in the arsenal.\textsuperscript{114}

So far, we know the small arms the Qing army possessed were mainly Mauser rifles, Lee rifles, Hotchkiss rifles and Snider rifles and the supply of ammunition was sufficient. However, it is uncertain how much modern armaments were used by the Qing soldiers in quelling the mountain indigenes revolts as such. If few, this might have restricted the possible access, the experience and the knowledge of modern firearms for mountain indigenes when they encountered the Qing army. In the journal of Hu Zhuan 胡傳, the inspector of garrisons of

\textsuperscript{109}TEPR 3/735-740. Report on the Trade of Tamsuy and Kelung during the year 1885. Consul. Herbert A. Giles. 6
\textsuperscript{110}Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Lizuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 264.
\textsuperscript{111}In our source, it is not always clear the type of Hotchkiss guns, machine gun or rifle that were transferred to Taiwan. Hotchkiss guns were a series of machine guns manufactured by the Hotchkiss Company in 1867, which was setup by an American gunsmith Benjamin Hotchkiss in France. Winchester-Hotchkiss rifle was a repeating rifle with a bolt-action and patented by Benjamin B. Hotchkiss and produced by the Winchester Repeating Arm Company and Springfield Armory from 1878. Bruce Canfield, ‘19th Century Military Winchesters’, American Rifleman, March 2001.
\textsuperscript{112}Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiu shi 臺灣銀行經濟研究室 (Taiwan Bank), ed., Qingji Taiwan Yangwu Shiliao 清季臺灣洋務史料 [Historical Source on the Foreign Affairs in Taiwan in the Qing Era], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 278 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1997), 58–62; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 216–17.
\textsuperscript{113}Shao, Youliang 邵友濂, ‘為臺北設立機器局製造槍砲子彈有備無患乞聖鑒事’ (A memorial sent to Your Majesty for the approval of the establishment of the Machinery Bureau to manufacture firearms and ammunition in Taipei ) Guangxu Chao Yue Zhe Dang 光緒朝月摺檔 (Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Guangxu Era), 24/Jan/1893; Xu, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in Qing], 217.
\textsuperscript{114}Davidson, The Island of Formosa, Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects. Tea, Camphor, Sugar, Gold, Coal, Sulphur, Economical Plants, and Other Productions , 286.
Taiwan Province from 1891, he reported that several garrisons in Taidong were furnished with old muzzleloaders, a garrison in Jiayi furnished with Lee rifles, the frontier army in Zhanghua, Dakekan and Su-Au furnished with breech-loaders, the garrison in Tamsui furnished with Mauser rifles, Lee rifles and Hotchkiss rifles in 1892. He also gave rewards to soldiers who performed well in target practices due to the low rate of soldiers hitting the targets.\textsuperscript{115} In the report of Shen Maoyin 沈茂蕆, the governor of Miaoli County from 1892, he gave account of 60 foreign rifles and 355 Chinese matchlocks among the military stock in the Miaoli County Gazetteer.\textsuperscript{116} It is uncertain if these foreign rifles and the Chinese matchlocks were also used by the Qing military in pacifying the Atayal resistances in 1885 and 1886 in the same Miaoli County, but they might well have had some influence on the mountain indigenes like the Atayal and the SaiSIyat indigenes who lived in these areas.

2.3. Possession of firearms among the Chinese militia and civilians

Chinese militia were largely recruited by the Qing officials in Taiwan in this period to fight against the French and the Japanese and to repress the mountain indigenes along with the insufficient Qing army transferring from China. These Chinese militias were equipped with firearms that they forged by themselves, powder, knives and spears and were given powder by the Qing government as in various accounts in the Qing official reports.\textsuperscript{117} Foreign firearms and breech-loaders were given to the Chinese militia by the Qing government for the defence in Keelung from French invasion. For instance, funds and foreign firearms were given to Wang Tingli 王廷理, a local gentry to recruit 300 local braves to reinforce the Qing army in Keelung.\textsuperscript{118}

\textsuperscript{115} Hu Zhuan 胡傳, \textit{Taiwan Riji Yu Bingqi 臺灣日記與稟啟} \textit{[Journal and Reports on Taiwan]}, Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 71 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1959), 22, 25, 36–37, 49, 51.
\textsuperscript{116} Shen Maoyin 沈茂蕆, \textit{Miaolixian Zhi 苗栗縣志} \textit{[Gazetteer of Miaoli County]}, Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1958), 169–70.
\textsuperscript{117} Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, ed., \textit{Zhongga Yuenan Jiaoshe Dang 中法越南交涉檔} \textit{[Negotiation Documents on Vietnam between China and France]}, vol. 3 (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1962), 1722–36; Taiwan yinhang jingji yanjiu shi 臺灣銀行經濟研究室 (Taiwan Bank), ed., \textit{Liu Mingchuan Futai Qianhou Dangan 劉銘傳撫臺前後檔案} \textit{[Documents on the Management of Taiwan around Liu Mingchuan]}, Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 276 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1969), 55–56; Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, \textit{Liu Zhuangsuong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議} \textit{[Memoir of Liu Mingchuan]}, 142.
\textsuperscript{118} Liu Ming-Chuan 劉銘傳, ‘’臺紳捐資募勇屢戰獲勝並各軍分守情形摺’’ (A memorial on the repeated battle successes due to the fundraising from the Taiwanese gentry for force recruitment and the current deployment of troops) in \textit{Liu Ming-Chuan Wen Ji 劉銘傳文集} \textit{[Collections of Liu Ming-Chuan]}, 107–110.
Zhang Licheng 張李成, a local recruited 500 local braves and was given 200 breech-loaders to assist the defence.⁸¹⁹ Old muzzleloaders were reported to be used by Lin Chaodong and his men and judged not good enough to fight against the French army.⁸²⁰ Xu suggested that tuanlian 團練 or generally-called Chinese militia, contributed and received orders to assist the Qing army during the outbreak of the Sino-French War, even though Liu, Ming-Chuan had some doubts about their effectiveness in combat and their capacity with weapons.⁸²¹ After the Sino-French War, the local gentry in northern Taiwan such as Lin Weiyan, Lin Chaodong started to engage with Liu Mingchuan’s reform. The Chinese militia led by the local gentry were regimented as a defence corps, which received Qing government’s orders, military training and modern weaponry.⁸²² Particularly, the Chinese militia led by Lin Chaodong, also called the Dong Army or Dongjun 棟軍 were active and became the major force in the second “opening up” phase and the Japanese invasion. If Xu considered the Chinese militia assigned to regiments as a defence corps furnished with modern armament, the Chinese militia could then have been equipped with Mauser rifles, Lee rifles, Hotchkiss rifles and Snider rifles. Rifles the Chinese militia held at stations near the indigenes’ territories were authorized by the Qing government and supplied with ammunition according to the British Acting Consul L.C. Hopkin in 1893,

It is requested that a preliminary issue of 15 rifles to each company be made [120 for 432 men?] together with ammunition, for use during the process of establishing posts. Later on, when the regular patrol of the mountains is in working order, a rifle to be issued to each member of the force, and 20 cartridges per rifle monthly.⁸²⁴

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⁸¹⁹ Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuang sugong zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 145.
⁸²¹ Xu also discusses the earliest Tuanlian should be traced back to 1721 when the Cantonese groups establish liudui (六堆) in Fengshang, but the earliest Tuanlian lead by the Qing government began in 1840. The meaning of Tuanlian represent farmers who were given military training and only participated when there was warfare. Tuanlian sometimes included vagrants and has its own regulations, but it was difficult to integrate various tuanlian in different regions even the later establishment of Tuanlian Central Bureau (團練總局) Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 107–8.
⁸²² Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuang sugong zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 37; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 110.
⁸²³ Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 66.
⁸²⁴ TEPR 4/572-593, Intelligence Report for Tamsui for December quarter 1893, Acting Consul L.C. Hopkin, Tamsui, 10/Feb/1894, 572-577
Another source through which the Chinese rebels procured their firearms in the Japanese invasion was reported in *The Japan Weekly Mail*, Aug, 8th, 1896,

having been instructed to watch the movements of Lui Chao-tung, Lin Toh-hsin, and U O-chin, we found, after continuous observation, that Chao-tung opened a shop by the sea-shore in Yen-hai-tsun, and that Toh-hsin and O-chin were despatched to Canton and Hongkong, where, in the course of month, they obtained several hundreds of pistols and carbines which they caused to be packed in boxes for purposes of transport. Their professed business being to trade in deer-skins with the native tribes, they caused three boats manned by natives to leave the island, for the purpose of receiving the arms, but what part of the coast they chose for landing, we have not been able to find out. It appears that they arrived from the south with the weapons towards the end of June, and succeeded in getting them transhipped at some Chinese port, the name of which all our endeavours have failed to elicit. They had procured 600 breech-loading carbines of German make and 300 pistols, together with a supply of ammunition.\(^{125}\)

Moreover, foreign firearms and old Chinese gingalls were also found and possessed among the local bandits in the Qing army suppression in this research period. Liu Mingchuan reported how many foreign firearms, powder, knives and weapons were seized when Yan Baicai 顏擺彩 and his 28 fellows - who gathered 500-600 people and were involved in looting, murder, rape, and resisting the Qing government in the areas of Zhanghua, Jiayi and Tainan – were eventually captured in 1885. The bandit chieftain Xu Tianding 許添丁 and his fellows were involved in a series of looting and murder near the border of indigenes, and opened fire at the Qing military when resisting being taken into custody in 1885. Several foreign firearms and gingalls were found with the bandit chieftain Wu Jinyin and his 7 fellows when they were caught in Jiayi, 1886.\(^{126}\)

Weapons were known to be possessed by the Chinese civilians, especially by the Hakkas and the types of weapon ranged from traditional ones to modern ones. Matchlocks were also commonly held by the bellicose Chinese villagers, as the Grand Secretary, Zhou Derun 周德潤 stated in his proposal of an expedient term within which firearms could be manufactured by the Tainan machine factory for the Chinese villagers to help save Taiwan from the French invasion.\(^{127}\) Dodd also noted the involvement of Hakkas in the Sino-French War,

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\(^{127}\) Zhou, De-Run 周德潤, ‘內閣學士周德潤奏摺’ [A memorial to Your Majesty from the Cabinet Minister Zhou
At Tamsui are to be seen a number of Hakka hill-men said to be employed by the Government to fight the French. These men are armed with their own matchlocks, which they prefer, in their ignorance, to foreign rifles. They are as a rule good at shooting at stationary objects within a decent range, and are very handy with their knives when victorious in all encounters with savages.  

Dodd also remarked on his view of the matchlock as “a very primitive description, [the Hakkas] are brave and inured to fighting” and described their fighting positions, as almost the same as those of the mountain indigenes Mackay had described (see Chapter 4, p. 131),

the hill-men’s mode of loading and discharging their guns, I may add that their ordinary method of taking aim is to place the lower end of the butt of their matchlocks against their right breast, high enough to enable the curved end to rest against the cheek and they eye to look straight down the long barrel, on which are no sights of any kind. They have a habit, too, of discharging their guns from their hip, and I have seen them make good practise at short distances. One of the most curious ways of taking sight and firing at an enemy can be witnessed any day up in the savage borders. The man lies on his back, raises his head sufficiently to be able to look along the barrel, places the muzzle between his toes, takes a deliberate aim, and makes as a rule better practise than by lying on his belly and taking aim in that position. The toes keep the long weapon steady, very little front is shown, and experts on a level piece of ground, covered perhaps with tufts here and there of rank grass, would puzzle European troops considerably on landing in a strange country, where an upright enemy would be looked for instead of a horizontal one.

In fact, the firing positions of the mountain indigenes and the Hakkas were exactly the same. It is unclear how to identify the origin of this firing position, but nevertheless it proved to be effective during warfare.

During the last civil rebellion of these years in 1888 led by Shi Jiuduan 施九緞, a large amount of firearms were held by the Chinese civilians and many open gunfights were held in

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129 Dodd also gave details on the appearance of matchlocks and how the Hakkas loaded their matchlocks. “This matchlock is a long barreled gun, fixed into a semi-circular shaped stock, with a pan for priming powder, and an armlet made of rattan worn round the right wrist, containing a piece of lighted cord, made till it burns out, if necessary. They pour a charge of powder down the muzzle, on top of that they drop two or three slug shot or long pieces of iron—no wads are used. They fill the pan with priming powder and pulling the trigger the light drops into the pan and off goes the gun, if it happens to be a fine bright, dry day; it. however, it is raining hard, they have some difficulty in discharging their weapons” Ibid., 107.
130 Ibid., 107–8.
resisting the Qing military. In the *Anpingxian Zaoji* [Miscellany of Anping], it was noted that the Chinese civilians were free to purchase knives, spears/rifles and sticks, that firearms and bullets were given by the government for the guards they selected in villages in the late Qing governance. Davidson also noted that the Hakka army who used to fight with matchlocks and defeated the French were hired by the Qing government and given modern weapons like single and repeating Mausers, Lee and modern repeating Winchester carbines in preparation against the Japanese attack in 1895. Winchester rifles and much ammunition was left with the Hakkas in southern Taiwan when Liu Young-Fu retreated to China.

We might generalise, then, that the types of weapon held by the Chinese militia and the civilians appeared to be mostly modernized such as Mauser rifles, Lee rifles, Winchester rifles, etc. in comparison with mainly matchlocks in the previous period (1860-1883). It is uncertain how many modern firearms the Chinese militia were actually given by the Qing government and particularly the number given to Chinese militia who were regimented as defence corps. However, the number should probably not be exaggerated as there were signs of matchlocks still in use among the militia and civilians, and the Qing government might have needed to take precautions from the previous Chinese rebellions and ethnic conflicts by lowering the effectiveness of a potential opposition.

The weapons foreign troops actually held might have had less influence on the mountain indigenes because the major battle fields of the Sino-French War and the Japanese invasion were not in the indigenes’ territories except for a short intense time in the latter case, and the mountain indigenes had less direct involvement or confrontation in these two warfares in comparison with the Rover incident, 1867 and the Mudan incident, 1874 (in Chapter 4), but more in the aftermath impact. However, military technology in Taiwan itself became modernised. Since the breakout of the Sino-French War extended its battlefields to Taiwan and the Sino-Japanese War, large amounts of the modern armament such as Mauser’s rifles, Krupps, Snider, Winchester, Kentucky, Lee, Remington, Spencer, Peabody and Martini-Henry rifles were all known to have been transported to Taiwan by various agents (see pp. 184-186, 188-189). We have strongly suggested (pp.187-192) that after the arrival, anarchy reigned in the

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131 Jiang Shizhe 蔣師轍, *Taiwan Tongzhi* 台灣通志 (Taiwan Gazetteer, Draft Copy), 879–83.
132 Anonymous, *Anpingxian Zaji* 安平縣雜記 (Miscellany of Anping), 49.
distribution and possession of modern firearms. In Liu Mingchuan’s modernization scheme for the new Taiwan province, modern firearms were not only transported to Taiwan, also arsenal and ammunition factories were established to secure the provision of modern firearms. Firearms that the Chinese militia and civilians held had a pervasive tendency toward increasingly modern models especially Mauser, Lee, Hotchkiss, Sniders, and Winchester rifles. This is due to the Chinese militia becoming increasingly regimented as a defence corps and given military training and modern firearms. This might counter-indicate that the prospect of modern weaponry transfer to indigenes’ societies was relatively high through an array of problematic transfer agents.

The Chinese militia were largely engaged in repressing the inimical indigenes in the second pacification period. The Chinese civilians had always had the contacts and conflicts with the indigenes. Besides, in the last two years under the Qing governance before ceding to Japan, Taiwan turned into an anarchic province and state where the ill-disciplined and negligent Qing soldiers sold their firearms cheaply and the Chinese civilians plundered whatever they could find in the arsenals and ammunition factories and sold them cheaply. For instance, in the Japanese official report, a Chinese bandit was known to hide hundreds of rifles and powder within varied villages and tribes before he surrendered in July 1896. We would like to suggest that in this period (1884-1895) Taiwan became a province where excessively large numbers of modern armaments were situated, transferred, and without much public order and security.

3. Firearms among the Formosan Indigenes

How did mountain indigenes respond or react to these developments when their territories were unceasingly sabotaged and infringed by the utilitarian and profit driven Qing government and Chinese with their modern firearms? As I discussed earlier in Section 1.2, there were increasing conflicts within indigenes’ regions between the mountain indigenes and the Qing military due to the second pacification program and the camphor commercial exploitation,

135 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘臺東北部巡迴日誌’ (Diary of the northern tour in Taitung), September 1896 (V04507\A021), Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization), 162.
which linked together, firstly, internal and secondly, colonial processes with, thirdly, global commercial ones. And I have also discussed the mass modern firearms transferred and operated by the Qing military, the Chinese militia and the Chinese civilians in battles in this period (in Section 2). What types of weapon did the mountain indigenes most likely hold to resist encroachments? Were their weapons influenced by the modern weapons? If they were, how did they have the access to these modern weapons and the knowledge of modern weapons usage?

3.1. An Assortment of Firearms – Plains Indigenes

Plains indigenes’ weapons appeared to have shifted toward a diverse and modern level. In Mackay’s narrative concerning the 40 plains indigenes who accompanied his party when visiting Toa-o (Daao 大澳) in 1890,

several of whom had Martini-Henry or Remington rifles, some carried old American muskets, the most swung over their shoulders Chinese matchlocks, and others held long spears in readiness.  

This could be affirmed in Dr. Warburg’s account that plains indigenes who acted as guards were furnished with “well-kept muskets and spears” when Warburg visited a church in Saobay with Dr. Mackay in 1888.  

Warburg also noted that the plains indigenes were equipped with muskets in their rice field for defence. Here we can see the mixture of traditional and modern firearms based on their different methods in loading powder or bullets, carried by the plains indigenes. However, it is rather difficult to find out from our sources the general or average level of firearms in plains indigenes’ hands because their characters and circumstances were varied and different due to their early assimilations with the Chinese settlers and their conscription to the Qing military in Taiwan. And most of the significant resistance occurred in the mountain indigenes’ territories in this period. Nevertheless, they did not seem to lose their connections with the mountain indigenes in both friendly and hostile terms.

3.2. An Assortment of Firearms – Mountain Indigenes

136 Mackay, From For Formosa: The Island, Its People and Missions, 236.
137 Warburg, ‘Üeber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa],’ 374–87; Otness, One Thousand Westerners in Taiwan to 1945, 163.
138 Warburg, ‘Üeber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa].’
Firearms continued to be the general weapon that mountain indigenes held and exerted in attacks in this period. Liu Mingchuan inspected the mountain indigenes and described how they “lived in interior mountains and exercised in combats and were extremely adept in marksmanship.” The Atayals of the Sulu tribe 蘇魯社 in Miaoli were reported to be talented in firing firearms and shot on their targets every time when they fought against the Chinese militia led by Lin Chaodong in 1886. Several Chinese official reports revealed that firearms were held by the mountain indigenes in assaults or firearms were seized by the Qing military in quelling the mountain indigenes. For instance, in 1885 at the beginning of this period the Paiwanese of the Shuaimang tribe and Dongdi tribe used their matchlocks against the Qing army and 12 men died. Numbers of firearms and weapons were caught and around 20 Atayals of the Lileng tribe 裡冷社 were shot dead by Lin Chaodong’s army. The battles lasted for nearly half a month and Lin, Chaodong lost over 30 men in 1887. The Puyuma indigenes from the lujiawang tribe 呂家望社 fired at the Qing military in 1888, Liu described how the bullets were fired like rain-fall and the indigenes prostrated themselves low in bamboo forest with their firearms. Another incident occurred in Suao and Hualian port division that was in progress of opening roads in 1889. 270 men amongst 500 men, including the assistant general of Yilan defense corps, Liu Chaodai were ambushed and shot dead by many Atayal indigenes from the nearby tribes – Laogoushi tribe (老狗社 or 留興社 in Nanao). Mackay also noted that the repeating rifles were carried by the “mountain savages”, next to the Amis tribe who also struggled from the “unscrupulous greed and destructive vices of the Chinese”. The Qing military captured 17 foreign firearms and hundreds of darts and

140 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liu Mingchuan Wenji 劉銘傳文集 [Collections of Liu Mingchuan], 139–46.
141 Liu, Mingchuan 劉銘傳, ‘為道員輕率用兵攻勦已撫番社查明辦理乘方之副將請旨懲辦以肅軍政’ (A memorial by Lieutenant Cheng Fang-Zhi in request of Your Majesty’s edict to investigate and reprimand officials for the reckless attack and destroy the assimilated aboriginal tribes so to restore order in the Military), 22/09/1885 in Guangxuchao Yuezhedang 光緒朝月摺檔 [Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Guāngxù Era]; Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liu Mingchuan Wenji 劉銘傳文集 [Collections of Liu Mingchuan], 374–79.
142 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 222–23.
144 He was a nephew of governor Liu Ming-Chuan Jiang Shizhe 蔣師轍, Taiwan Tongzhi 台灣通志 (Taiwan Gazetteer, Draft Copy), 904–8.
145 Mackay, From Far Formosa: The Island, Its People and Missions, 248, 251.
knives belonging to the Paiwan of the Sepediq tribe in a suppression in 1892. During the Japanese invasion, 3,000 Remington rifles were handed over to the indigenes’ representatives as the North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette and Hong Kong Daily Press reported successively.

These resources indicate that it is very possible that these modern weapons quite commonly flowed into indigenes’ hands. Traditional weapons such as musket, Chinese matchlocks, spear, knives, etc. appeared to be possessed by the mountain indigenes continuously and mundanely in this period. The Puyumas of the Tipun tribe or Katripulr used muskets to kill several Chinese who attempted to cut the trees as George Taylor, the lighthouse keeper, was told by the chief of Tipun in his trips during the 1880s. Edmund Hornby Grimani described how the mountain indigenes were, “a rough murderous-looking lot, extremely muscular and always armed, sometimes with spears, or bows and arrows, or even muskets.” Hundreds of primitive manufactured firearms or tuqiang were submitted from approximately 10 tribes from the Atayals of Dayegan or Thyakan in Xinchu County when Liu Chao-Dai and his men pacified the revolts in 1888. A survey was done in the 1890s and reported in the Draft for the Xinzhu Xian Gazetteer, the Atayal men from the 16 tribes of Beishi and Nanshi were all furnished with Chinese matchlocks and the numbers of the Atayal men were nearly 400 in total. The Paiwan chief – Pan Wenjie from the Tierasock tribe and 50 of his indigenous men all possessed firearms when inducing the Puyuma group to assist the Japanese troops to fight against the rest of the Qing soldiers in Taidong.

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146 Chen Yan 陈衍, Taiwan Tongji 臺灣通紀 [Chronics of Taiwan], 241–42.
150 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liu Mingchuan Wenji 劉銘傳文集 [Collections of Liu Mingchuan], 159–65.
151 Zheng Pengyun 鄭鵬雲 and Ceng Fengchen 曾逢辰, Xinzhu Xianzhi Chugao 新竹縣志初稿 [Draft Gazetteer of Xinzhu Xian], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 61 (Taipei: Taiwan Bank, 1959), 188.
152 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘恆春支廳長相良長鋼往台東地方出差之覆命書’ (Confirmation letter of the inauguration of Sagara Tsunashige, Hengchun branch director to the Taitung office, September 1896 (V00071\A05), Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究 [Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization], 65.
The Qing military also captured 17 foreign firearms and hundreds of spears and knives from the Sapetiq tribe from the Paiwan group after pacifying one of the resistances in 1892. Thus far, then, we see a mixture of modern and traditional firearms among the mountain and plains indigenes’ in and before this period. Plains indigenes’ characters and circumstance were varied and complicated. According to our material, it did not show exactly how widely the mountain indigenes’ weapons had reached the modern level and traditional firearms almost certainly remained, but the mixture of modern and traditional firearms might have also given them the best strength in combats as the Qing military appeared to greatly struggle in attempting to quash the mountain indigenes.

3.3. Access to Firearms of Formosan Indigenes (1884-1895)

The acquirement of firearms and the knowledge or experience of the firearms of the mountain indigenes certainly had direct and adjacent links to their contacts with the Chinese in this period. However, it seems there may have been less direct influence from the foreigners in Taiwan. This of course is probably due to their having far less conflicts with the foreigners, and their general civil contacts with foreigners were mostly limited to missionaries and travelers who they had been friendly with and had some barter with along the internal frontier. The process of getting firearms for the mountain indigenes was continued in their original trading connections with the Chinese regardless of their mutual hatred and constant conflicts and the prohibition of the Qing government. A good clear statement by Dr. Warburg noted how the firearms of indigenes were given by the Chinese who purchased their lands from the Qing government,

Although it is not clear what type of foreign firearms the Qing military seized, most of the foreign firearms held by the foreign troops and officers were breach-loaders. Guangxuchao Yuezhedang 光緒朝月摺檔 [Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Guāngxù Era]; Chen Yan 陳衍, Taiwan Tongji 臺灣通紀 [Chronicles of Taiwan], 241–42.

liquor, to rich Chinese. These then hire Pepohwans and Hakkas as colonists and furnish them with guns.155

Dr. Myers recorded the exchange of weapon between the Amis and the Chinese in his service at Imperial Chinese Maritime Customs Service in Kaohsiung and on the staff of the Mansion Memorial Hospital in Tainan in the 1880s,

Silver dollars and cotton fabrics, gunpowder, lead, arrow heads, firelock, knives, etc., are obtained from the Chinese in exchange for deer horns, rice, grated potatoes, barley, jerked deer flesh, dried fish, pork, pigs, fowls, etc.156

Hu Zhuan also disclosed how the knives, firearms, powder the mountain indigenes held in Taidong were all given by the Tongs 157 or exchanged with the Chinese for antlers, animal skin, horns or bear bile.158 He also spoke about the indigenes’ keenness on purchasing new types of foreign firearms,

In the past, fan only possessed iron pistol, knives and spear; now they have recognised the latest type and ingenious nature of foreign guns owned by the Qing military and purchase them with high price without hesitations.159

The procurement of firearms for the indigenes was often closely associated with the Chinese and the trading of camphor and other mountain resources. On the report of British Consul Lionel Charles Hopkins in 1884, the Hakkas, “carried on the barter trade with the savages, whom they supply with guns, powder, and knives, mostly of their own manufacture, receiving in exchange skins, hardwood, camphor, and the native cloth.”160 This exchange venture could also be seen in John Dodd’s notes on the camphor districts, which were mentioned in Chapter

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155 Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa].’
157 Hu Zhuan 胡傳, Taiwan Riji Yu Bingqi 臺灣日記與稟啟 [Journal and Reports on Taiwan], 31; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehu 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 220.
159 The original quote in Chinese: “往者番只有鐵銃與刀槍；今知官兵後門新式洋槍之靈巧，亦不惜重價以購之，則日強矣。” Hu Zhuan 胡傳, Taiwan Riji Yu Bingqi 臺灣日記與稟啟 [Journal and Reports on Taiwan], 159–60.
4 (pp. 156-158). Powder was also supplied by the Chinese. For instance, the Hakka rebel – Liu Tianwang 劉添旺 who joined a revolt with the plains indigenes of Siraya and the mountain indigenes of the Amis and the Puyuma in 1888, witnessed that the gunpowder was purchased from a Chinese – Shi Aman 施阿蠻 in Lugang, Changhua County. 161 Chinese villagers from Nanzhuan, Miaoli County (竹南一保田尾庄), included a Chinese civilian Huang Ati 黃阿蹄 who married an indigenous woman, all caught for trading gunpowder with the neighbouring indigenes in 1889. 162

Furthermore, several materials suggested that the modern firearms and ammunition had reached the hands of indigenes by the 1890s. Particularly so, from the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War to the Japanese invasion, when the state of affairs in Taiwan was unsettled and various weapons were accumulated amongst the Qing government, the newly founded Republic of Formosa, and the Chinese militia in the preparation of warfare (see pp.192-196). The mountain indigenes seemed to gain many chances of procuring modern weapons in this disorder and anarchic circumstance. In the Intelligence Reports of Tainan, written by Pelham Laird Warren in 1890 about how the Qing soldiers sold their rifles to the indigenes,

The troops are utterly demoralised and useless, their own officers are reported as supplying them with opium and keeping back their pay, they sell their rifles and ammunition whenever they get the chance, and the said rifles and ammunition ultimately find their way into the hands of the savages. 163

Rifles carried by 6,000 to 7,000 Chinese soldiers were also taken by at least a thousand mountain indigenes in an insurrection in 1891, which obstructed the camphor trade as reported by W. Holland, a British Consul in Tamsui,

Many Chinese soldiers have been killed, their rifles carried off, and it is said that a small mountain gun was captured by the savages, who are evidently well able to hold their own. Nor is this to be wondered at if the quality of the troops they meet is considered. 164

Davidson reported how the mountain indigenes joined Liu Yong-Fu’s troops in the name of repelling the Japanese invasion and carried off arms and ammunition from Liu after two of

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161 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuqhuangzong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 230.
162 Case no. 17112 in ‘Danxin Dangan 淡新檔案’.
163 TEPR 4/362-368, Tainan Intelligence Reports for the three month ended 30 April 1890, Warrant to Baronet, 9/May/1890, 368.
their fellows died, which they treated as a bad portent.  

Unknown indigenes’ representatives received 3,000 Remington rifles as mentioned earlier although the group of indigenes who received the rifles was unspecified and the source of these rifles was unnamed in the news. 

Over 1,000 soldiers of the Black Flags who were left in southern Taiwan and escaped “inland” after Japan took over Takow in 1895 were “cooped up in the town closely hemmed in on every side by savages who are eager to make very short work of them, and are reduced to the utmost straits for arms, ammunition and provisions.” This was reported by the British Consul Joseph H. Longford in Takow in May 1896.  

However, the indigenes did not appear to have the skill of forging their own firearms, except that there is a source from George Taylor suggesting that the Tipuns might have found an expert blacksmith to forge firearms and agricultural tools for them. 

Plains indigenes military or Fantun (番屯) capability might have also been furnished with the modern weapons transferred to Taiwan by the Qing government in this period (see also pp. 108-109, 192-193). In 2008 Xu suggested that the system of indigenes military, which was composed of the plains indigenes mainly, was transformed and operated as a defense corps, which replaced the original Chinese defense corps from mainland China, after the establishment of Taiwan as a province in 1885.  

As shown in his journal, Huang Fengchang 黃逢昶, propounded to recruit plains indigenes who were valiant and tough to assist the Chinese military in the French invasion. Liu Mingchuan also made remarks on the refined and courageous character of plains indigenes military and that their fighting capacity was far better than the Green Standard Army. The plains indigenes military also assisted the Qing

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169 Xu Yuliang 許毓良, *Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui* 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 95–98.
170 Huang Fengchang 黃逢昶, *Taiwan Shengshufan Jishi* 臺灣生番番紀事 [Event Record of Taiwan Indigenous People], Taiwan Wenxian Congkan 臺灣文獻叢刊 (Literary Collectanea on Taiwan) 51 (Taipei: 1960, n.d.), 1; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, *Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui* 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 95.
171 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, *Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi* 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 29; Xu Yuliang 許毓良, *Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui* 清代臺灣軍事與社會 [Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty], 95.
army in the second pacifying phase on several occasions such as in the 1886 the revolt of the Atayal of the Sulu tribe and the Manabang tribe 馬那邦社\(^{172}\) and in 1892 the revolt of the Sapetiq or Shebuli tribe (also see p. 179). If Xu was correct about how the development of plains indigenes military had integrated with the Qing corps and we also know that the plains indigenes military assisted in several internal warfare in Taiwan, it is distinctly possible that the plains indigenes military had increasingly closer access to the modern firearms.

We may summarise that the condition of armament of the mountain indigenes was in the diversified or mixed phase in the period of late Qing governance. This phase comprised the traditional weapons such as knives, spear, matchlocks or muskets and modern firearms such as Remington rifles, repeating rifles, etc. I have also tried to demonstrate how some traces of firearms flowed into the hands of mountain indigenes from trading with the Chinese soldiers, militia and civilians who were largely furnished with modern types of firearms as well as through instances of combat with Chinese and Japanese. This all contributed to the modernised level of firearms that Formosan indigenes possessed in this period and henceforth.

4. Conclusion

The period of 1884-1895 is the phase in which the mountain indigenes accessed a diffusion of modern military technologies, when numerous types and different sizes of armament were operated by the French and Japanese troops and also transferred to Taiwan by the Qing government during the invasions of France and Japan. Although the direct involvements of the mountain indigenes were probably limited, their exposure to modern military armament in Taiwan would have influenced their perceptions when procuring or operating firearms. Especially within the warfare between the indigenes, with the Qing military and with the Chinese civilians they continued their demand for weaponry. According to our material, the level and the types of firearms among the mountain indigenes appeared to follow the trend of firearms that the Qing military, the Chinese militia and civilians operated with a mixture of traditional and modern levels of weapon. It is uncertain how many modern firearms

\[^{172}\text{Lian Heng 連橫, Taiwan Tongshi 臺灣通史 [A General History of Taiwan], 450.}\]
went into the mountain indigenes’ hands. However, their connections in trade with the Chinese did not seem to stop, and the wars they fought against the Qing army and the disarrayed state of Taiwan before ceding to Japan seemed to provide their principal sources of firearms.
Indigenous societies and cultures were subjected to ultimate persecutions from 1895 when Japan began to colonise Taiwan as its first colony in Asia. Japan revealed herself as the first capitalist country in Asia, who not only escaped from the Western nations’ invasive colonialism, but also became a newly and aggressive colonist after defeating China in the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-1895 and Russia in the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905. Japan was like most of the Western nations – Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, who impulsively exploited economic resources and imposed their control on treaty ports from their colonies.¹

Inevitably Japan benefited from inheriting and continuing to develop the incomplete transportation and communication systems left by the former Qing government, which accelerated the entire process of exploiting and controlling mountains resources in Taiwan. Particularly the mountain indigenes’ territories and living encountered the utmost challenges that triggered more and extensive conflicts with the Taiwan Sotokufu, the highest organ of Japanese government in Taiwan. For the Formosan indigenes, whose inhabitants had fought against the Chinese settlers and the Qing military for centuries, this meant now having to contend with the efficiency and higher technology of Japanese governance. In the previous Chapters 4 and 5, I have given evidences of how indigenes first possessed traditional firearms and then maintained a mixture of traditional and modernised firearms, and also analysed the various possible routes of obtaining firearms for the indigenes under the Qing governance. Since the colonial government had now been replaced by Japan with its superior resources and armaments, how did indigenes battle with the Japanese police and military forces after 1895?

This chapter will be focusing on the source of conflicts for the mountain indigenes in the early colonization of Japan in Taiwan from 1895 to 1914. This period will be seen as the

¹ In fact, the Japanese were far more interested in securing basic natural resources from their colonies than was the case of the other powers. Generally, the Japanese state felt far more the pressures of time and circumstance. Attempting to catch up quickly with the existing powers the Japanese state put colonisation at the forefront of their national development project, especially from the late 1880s. See Inkster, Japanese Industrialisation: Historical and Cultural Perspectives, 64–67, 95–99, 122–25. And Chapter 5. K Yamamura, ‘Success Illegotten? The Role of Meiji Militarism in Japan’s Technological Progress’, Journal of Economic History 37 (n.d.): 113–35.
“advanced level” of conflict according to the level of armament operated at various levels of fighting in Taiwan. 1914 is selected to be the concluding year because it was the last year of General Sakuma Samata’s Indigenous Management Scheme, which wielded a strong project of military subjugation of the indigenous groups, and indeed most of indigenes’ firearms were seemingly confiscated (for qualifications to this statement see later in the chapter).

It is also the period of the First World War that saw territorial gains to Japan which would make that nation the most dominant state in east Asia. Firstly, I would like to begin with emphasising the greater encroachment of Japan toward indigenes’ territories by illustrating the construction of communication systems and the indigenes’ management structure, which was aimed to pursue total control of the mountain resources, in the early Japanese colonization scheme. These were the major causes of multiple rebellions of mountain indigenes. Secondly, I will discuss mainly the rebellions of mountain indigenous people against Japanese rule and the conflicts among indigenous people that involved the use of firearms. Thirdly I will discuss the weapon possessed by the Japanese police and military, the Chinese guards and the mountain indigenes and the access to firearms among the mountain indigenous people under the Japanese rule. The involvements of plains indigenes in conflicts or rebellion became far weaker and were also less recorded.

1. Critical Incursion into Mountain Indigenes’ Territories under Japanese Colonization

The remaining pressure of economic exploitation and the policies on mountain indigenes was brought into force by the Japanese government, as well as their full intent to develop communications and transport between the west and the east on the island, following on from the fact that Japan received Taiwan as its first colony in 1895 and was determined to make it pay and for it to be seen as an outpost of Japanese Meiji industrial modernisation. Japan played the sole role of encroacher and exploiter in the mountain indigenous territories, particularly in the central and the eastern mountains. This can be seen in the report of British Consul A.M. Chalmers in 1906,

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Strenuous efforts are being made by the authorities to enable Formosa, as the chief camphor producing country, to meet the world’s growing demand for this commodity. Active measures have been taken during the last two or three years to bring under subjection the head-hunting savages who inhabit the forest regions and terrorise the Chinese natives engaged in collecting the raw camphor. Except in the savage territory the camphor trees are nearly exhausted, but vast forests still remain unexplored in the mountains, and during 1906 it is estimated that 46 square ril (287 square miles) of forest and arable land have been wrested from the savages. From all directions the police cordon round the aborigines is being drawn gradually closer, and in a very few years there should be free access to all parts of the interior of the island. As we shall see, that last expectation was by no means fulfilled.

1.1. Implementation of Communication Systems

Indeed, Japan aimed to penetrate every corner of Taiwan by implementing her efficient communication systems such as railways, telecommunication and police systems and guard lines, which triggered various scales of conflict between the mountain indigenous groups and accelerated indigenes’ rebellions. A comprehensive map of Taiwan was placed within the British Diplomatic and Consular Reports by Consul Wileman for the year of 1908 and showed the completed railway on the western plain region and the projected railway on the east region. (see Map 6:1)

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In this map, we can see in 1908 how the indigenes’ territories and the mountain resources were planned to be enclosed by the completed and the projected railway system, which functioned in transporting mountain resources to the plains and sending reinforcement when quelling the
indigenous tribes was required by the Taiwan Sotokufu. Moreover, the savage frontier, redrawn by the Japanese authorities, also proved their infiltration into the mountain indigenous regions. Within 40 years, the Taiwan Sotokufu achieved and gained the absolute formal domination of mountain indigenous groups and mountain resources, which was never carried off under the Qing governance for over 200 years. This can be seen in another map which was made by the Taiwan Sotokufu in 1935. (See Map 6:2)

Map 6:2 Map of indigenous groups for 1935
In this map, the distribution of all the mountain indigenous groups has been drawn in different colours and all the tribes were located and named. Roads, where the red lines are, and railways were built and interwoven within the mountain indigenous terrains. To construct railways and roads, measuring the areas and making maps became an important task for the Taiwan Sotokufu. The inspections or explorations were sent and mostly led by the Japanese officials, police, technicians, and anthropologists such as Mori Ushinosuke, Inō Kanori, and Ryuzo Torii to investigate the landscapes, mountain resources and the mountain indigenous groups. According to Zheng An-Xi’s research on the advance and changes of guard lines in the mountain indigenes’ territory during Japan’s governance from 1895-1920, which is based on the rich material from the Taiwan zondufu gonwenleizuan 臺灣總督府公文類纂 (Taiwan Sotokufu official document redaction), Taiwan nichinichi shimpō 臺灣日日新報 (Taiwan Daily News), and Riju shiqi Yuanzhumin xingzhengzhigao 日據時期原住民行政志稿 or also called Riban shikō 理蕃誌稿 (Records of Indigenes’ Management), plenty of exploration teams were sent to the regions of the Atayal, Bunun, Tsou, Paiwan and Rukai. Particularly the Paiwan and Rukai regions were the most visited for the purposes of construction of roads and telecommunication and the investigation of the indigenes within those regions. He also noted how Mori Ushinosuke visited the Atayal and the Bunun 18 times each in the period of 1896-1915 for his anthropological research or to assist the Japanese official exploration or the indigenes’ pacifications, and exploration teams were sent to the mountain regions 146 times in total during 1896-1920. These explorations certainly caused some hostilities with the mountain indigenes and prompted conflicts with the local ethnic groups or some attacks from

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4 For the information about the maps on the indigenes’ territories made by the Japanese official, see Zheng Anxi, ‘Rizhi Shiqi Fandi Aiyongxian de Tuijin Yu Bianqian 1895-1920 日治時期蕃地隘勇線的推進與變遷 1895-1920 [The Propellant and Changes of Guard Lines in the Formosan Indigenes Territory during the Japan’s Governance from 1895-1920]’ (PhD, National Chengchi University, 2011), 66–68.
5 For the details of the times and the places of the Japanese’s mountain inspections, see Ibid., 30–85.
7 Ibid., 71–85.
the indigenes, although most of the exploration teams were accompanied by the indigenous
*tongshi* 通事 chiefs and indigenous fellows and sometimes welcomed by some indigenous tribes. For instance, in June 1909, two surveying technicians were assaulted by the mountain indigenes on their way to Luchangdashan 鹿場大山 (Miaoli County). In December 1909, two Japanese policemen were killed by the Chinese *tongshi*, who was later shot dead by the mountain indigenes of the Bunun group from Laipunuk 內本鹿 (Taidong County). In 1910 the Atayal indigenes from the Slamaw group 沙拉茂群 resisted the road construction, which forced the Commissioner of Nantou Province to terminate the plan. In June 1911, another measuring technician was attacked by the indigenes and seriously injured when land surveying in Madingkeliu Mountain 馬丁克留山 (Taidong County). Soft control was not easy to come by.

1.2. Mountain Indigenes’ Management during Early Japanese Colonialism

Chapter 3 (see pp. 103-106) described the mountain indigenes’ management by the Taiwan Sotokufu through authorising military governance and a placatory policy, which targeted the resource exploitations in the beginning. Later it changed to using advanced technology and proficient military force to pacify the rebellious mountain indigenes under General Sakuma Samata’s “Five Year Indigenous Management Schemes” 五年理蕃計畫 from 1907-1914. Indeed, Taiwan Sotokufu later gained total control over the mountain indigenes after numerous pacifications till the 1930s and conducted throughout numerous investigations on the mountain indigenous societies, something never achieved or attempted during the Qing’s governance. Taiwan Stotkufu was increasingly cognizant of the positions, the numbers, the names and the populations of mountain indigenous tribes, the relationships between mountain indigenous tribes and with the Chinese civilian, camphor workers and guards, the mountain indigenous

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8 Taiwan Nichinichi Newspaper 臺灣日日新報社, ‘蕃地測量’ (The indigenes land surveys), 臺灣日日新報(漢文版) Taiwan Nichinichi Newspaper (Mandarin version), 20/04/1909 version in Ibid., 60.
customs, the crops and temperatures within mountain indigenous territories, and so on. All this was rendered in detail in the *Taiwan Sotokufu official document redaction* and in *Records of Indigenes’ Management*.\(^{12}\) Taiwan Sotokufu established varied institutions for mollifying the mountain indigenes and investigating the mountain indigenous tribes and mountain resources such as: 11 Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus (bukonsho 縮墾署) and 17 branches (Chuzhangsuo 出張所) in remote areas in 1896-1898;\(^{13}\) the Indigenous Affairs Research Society (Fanqing yangjiuhui 蕃情研究會) 1898;\(^{14}\) the third division – Indigenous Affairs (Fanren Fandi 蕃人蕃地) in the 17 Provincial Affairs Bureaus (Banwushu 辦務署) in mountain regions and branches (Chuzhangsuo 出張所) or police stations in remote areas in 1898-1901; the Provincial Affairs Sub-Bureau (Banwuzhishu 辦務支署) was established under the Provincial Affairs Bureaux, which were conducted by the Japanese police,\(^{15}\) and the Committee of Mountain Affairs (Shandi shiwu weiyuanhui 山地事務委員會) in 1903, which was conducted by the Police Bureau.\(^{16}\) Through these branches and police stations, we can see that the Taiwan Sotokufu put out feelers to the mountain indigenes’ territories and inserted its policing systems into indigenes’ management. As a matter of fact, police forces were depended upon and at times considered indispensable by the provinces who wished to develop the camphor, mining, tea industries. An example could be found in the report of Yilan province in 1903,

Camphor and mining were the major industries in the province, but the location of these industries are all in the indigenes territories. Therefore, it is prior and essential to get the aid of the police force for thriving the industries.\(^{17}\)

One of the crucial methods in Japan’s mountain indigenes’ management was the

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\(^{12}\) Lists of investigation in indigenous regions included: the names, locations, populations of the indigenous tribes, the relationships between tribes, sizes of tribes, condition of the road between tribes, social classes within tribes, living status, cultivations, guns, ammunition, disease, exchange items, etc. This could be found in Chen Jintian 陳金田, trans., *Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿*//Riban Shikô 理蕃志稿//*[Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management]*, vol. 1 (Nantou: Taiwan Historica, 1977), 25–27.

\(^{13}\) Ibid., 1:19–20, 43.

\(^{14}\) Ibid., 1:73–77.


\(^{17}\) Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ed., ‘明治 36 年一至六月份宜蘭行政事務轄內概況報告’ [Administrative Reports of Yilan Jurisdiction from January to June 1903], (V04730\A005) in *Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization)* (Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 2001), 200–201.
elaboration of guard lines or Aiyongxian 隘勇線, which accelerated even further encroachments onto the mountain indigenes’ territories than ever occurred before. In the report of Counsellor Mochiji Rokusaburō 持地六三郎 to the viceroy of Taiwan Sotokufu Kodama Gentar 児玉源太郎 in 1902, he suggested,

To manage the mountain resources, solving the issues of indigenes should be the priority. It is to threaten them first and then assuage them. Threatening the indigenes is to make them frightened and flinch and assuaging them is to genuinely accept Japan’s superiority. Formosan indigenes remain in the primitive state and close to beasts. They have fallen behind the civilisation for several thousand years. Their thought and sentiments are in great differences ... The methods for threatening the indigenes are: to form guard squads [Aiyongdui 隘勇隊] and proceed on the offensive, to manipulate the indigenes to control the indigenes, to reward the Chinese when killing the vicious indigenes and the offices of local government conduct the acts of exchanging articles in order to control the lives of indigenes.¹⁸

Actually, these methods were to create more hostilities and turbulences among the mountain indigenous tribes and the Chinese ethnic groups rather than secure full control over the mountain indigenous tribes. Then, Taiwan Sotokufu established the regulations of setting the guard lines in 1904,¹⁹ which were under the management of the Police Bureau in 1902²⁰ and moved the guard lines forward. When Sakuma Samata became the Viceroy of Taiwan Sotokufu in 1906, he continued to push the guard lines eastwards in his indigenous management scheme.²¹ As the outlines of the policy of managing mountains described in 1907,

First, the developments of camphor, forest and mining in the northern regions were the main targets and later in the southern regions. Second, when expanding the guard lines in the northern regions, the officials should try to deliver the purposes and the promise of Taiwan Sotokufu to the indigenes. Unless it is necessary, the Taiwan Sotokufu would not send military force for pacification ... Fourth, within the guard lines in northern regions, there should be enough equipment to pacify and encounter the indigenes and placate the indigenes and for stopping disturbances. The indigenes living outside of the guard lines will be encouraged to move into the guard lines.²²

¹⁹ Ibid., 1:284–94.
²¹ Ibid., 1:400–404.
²² Ibid., 1:405.
In the research of Zheng Anxi, he noted how on the guard lines, the Taiwan Sotofuku also put up guard stations, guard roads, guard huts, electric and non-electric barbwires, landmines, fences, fortresses, searchlights, batteries, small power stations, telephone cables, etc. This advanced equipment on the guard line imprisoned the indigenes’ movement and put them in great danger, especially in erecting the deadly electric barbwires and landmines on the borders. He also calculated the number of times the guard lines were propelled further into indigenes’ territories: 9 times in Taipei region, 11 times in Taoyuan region, 29 times in Xinchu region, 8 times in Miaoli region, 8 times in Taizhong, 8 times in Nantou region, 16 times in Yilan region, 9 times in Hualian region and 3 times in Taidong region. This tells us that the guard lines were pushed forward where the camphor and other forestry industries developed and this was precisely where the indigenes were mostly like to revolt. Examples of indigenes’ aggression against camphor workers, guards and farmers will be discussed in this chapter, Section 2.

These series of measures were clearly designed to exploit the resources in the mountains without being killed by the mountain indigenes and to pacify the mountain indigenes in the longer term. However, in doing so, of course, the environments, the hunting territories, the farming areas and the right to reside of the mountain indigenes were limited, destroyed or lost under the management of the Taiwan Sotofuku and the measures implemented in the mountain indigenous territories. Although under the control or coercion of Japanese some mountain indigenous tribes assumed the good-will of Japan and showed them hospitality or formed alliances with them in fighting against the former Qing governance in earlier years. From what has gone before, however, it was inevitable for the mountain indigenes to initiate rebellions and resistances in such changed and accelerating circumstances. With the traditional and modern firearms possessed by the mountain indigenes from the previous years, it was a fateful choice to fight against the Japanese invasions and to cause problems and difficulties to the camphor and tea workers, miners, guards, the Japanese policemen and military in defence of their lands and their cultures.

23 He also discussed these facilities and the specifications of these facilities on the guard lines. Zheng Anxi 鄭安晞，‘Rizhi Shiqi Fandi Aiyongxian de Tuijin Yu Bianqian 1895-1920 日治時期蕃地隘勇線的推進與變遷 1895-1920 [The Propellant and Changes of Guard Lines in the Formosan Indigenes Territory during the Japan’s Governance from 1895-1920]’, 109–21.
24 Zheng also combined his historical research on the guard lines with actual field work and used the GIS system to draw the locations of guard lines in the contemporary areas of Taipei, Taoyuan, Xinchu, Miaoli, Taizhong, Nantou, Yilan, Hualian and Taidong. The details of propelling guard lines and the map of guard lines can be read in Zheng’s PhD thesis in Chapter 3 and 4. Ibid., 147–360.
2. Mountain Indigenes’ Resistance

Numerous rebellions originated with the indigenes when the Japanese military police and civil police were busy with pacifying the Chinese Republican rebellions in the early years. Although there were also many mountain indigenous tribes who chose to submit themselves, some of them could not tolerate any further encroachments or the confiscation of their firearms and were ready to withstand the Japanese throughout the period even to 1930. Based on the list of mountain indigenes’ rebellions against the Taiwan Sotokufu given in Ta:in taeboeh Sawan Kas’ames, there were 53 rebellions from 1896-1914 as I have shown in the red circles of Map 6.3. The number of mountain indigenous rebellions was nearly triple the 20 indigenous rebellions in the late Qing period 1884-1895. The sites where rebellions occurred were closer to central and eastern Taiwan and more frequent and repeated than in the previous Qing governance. In addition, among these resistances from 1896-1914, in accordance with Ta:in taeboeh Sawan Kas'ames’ list, the number of resistances for each group were: the Atayal revolted 28 times; the Truku 6 times; the Seediq 5 times; the Bunun 5 times; the Paiwan 4 times; the Saysiyat 3 times; the Tsou and the Rukai only once. It bears repetition to again point out that the resistance was by far the greatest in the camphor territories of the Atayal peoples who dominated the north-east of the island.

25 Ta:in taeboeh Sawan Kas’ames 達英. 拿答佛. 撒萬. 葛斯阿門, Taiwan Yuanzhuminzu Kangrishi Tuji 臺灣原住民族抗日史圖輯 [Collection of Historical Photographs of Taiwan’s Indigenous Peoples’ Resistance against Japanese Occupation 1874-1933] (Taipei: Taiwan yuanzhumin 臺灣原住民, 2010), 10–11.

26 Ibid.

27 However, in the period between 1915 to 1933, the Bunun revolted the most – 24 times; the Atayal revolted 5 times, the Seediq 2 times and the Paiwan only once. The region where the indigenes resisted the most in 1896-1914 has seemed to move from northeast, where the Atayal group lived to central eastern mountains, where the Bunun group lived.
Map 6:3 Map of indigenous rebellions 1860-1914

Source: http://www.ezilon.com/maps/asia/taiwan-physical-maps.html

*The locations of conflicts of mountain indigenes with others marked in red circles

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Nevertheless, it is highly possible that the actual number of indigenes’ revolts on varied sizes and scales was indeed higher than in these mapped revolts, which have been calculated and based only on the Japanese official and police reports. For instance, in Wang Xuexin’s research on Fanhai 蕃害 [damages caused by the indigenes] in Yilan region alone in the early Japanese colony, the number of Fanhai was 603 times, which included the indigenes’ headhunting, murders and cause of injuries in 1896-1903. He also quantifies that number of heads that the indigenes in Yilan region hunted in those years as 560, which were mostly from individuals entering the mountains (260 heads), night raids (105 heads) and camphor workers (50 heads). The places that the indigenes targeted for attack were in the field (163 times), as Japanese or Chinese individuals were entering or passing the mountains (151 times), in Chinese civilians’ houses (87 times) and around camphor stills (84 times).28 This shows that the indigenes’ resistances were far more than the “official” 53 rebellions as Ta:in taebôh Sawan Kas'amês suggested, and this is only in the Yilan area. In addition, their major targets were not just the camphor workers, but also whoever trespassed on their lands.

The Japanese army in Taiwan lost many men in quelling rebellions. There were 370 soldiers and military policemen who died in battle fields, which was 45.2% of men who died in casualty in the period of 1897-1902 as reported in the profile of hygiene in the army in Taiwan.29 Although this number also included men lost in quelling the Chinese rebellions, it shows that the sacrifice involved in controlling Taiwan was huge for the Taiwan Sotokufu and this was before the “Five Year Indigenous Management Scheme” which focused on the military pacifications. Another source from Zhang Xu-Yi’s research on the resource control for the Taiwan Sotokufu and the mountain indigenes’ headhunting custom, is a list of numbers of casualties for the period of 1896-1929.30 For the focus period in this chapter (1896-1914), 5,421 people died from the mountain indigenes’ assaults, which included Japanese policemen and

30 Zhang Xuyi 張旭宜, ‘Taiwan Zongdufu Ziyuan Zhangwo Yu Yuanzhumin de Shoushou Guanxi 台灣總督府資源掌握與原住民的首狩關系 [Control of Taiwan Sotokufu Resources and the Headhunting Customs of Indigenes]’ (Diwujie Taiwan xinshengdai lunwen yantaohu: Taiwan de guojia jiangou yu ziyuan fenpei 第五屆台灣新生代論文研討會: 台灣的國家建構與資源分配, Taipei: Taiwan yanjiu jijinhui 台灣研究基金會 [Taiwan Research Fund], 1993), 6.
administrator and civilians. In this section, I intend to exemplify the use of firearms amongst
mountain indigenes in conflicts between tribes, in assaults on the camphor workers and guards
and in some rebellions against the Taiwan Sotofuku in order to derive a more non-Japanese
dominated approach.

The reasons why the mountain indigenes initiated rebellions were mostly because of
the camphor, tea, mining exploitations, communication and transportation constructions, the
expansion of guard lines, inappropriate mountain indigenes’ management, etc. These together
resulted in restrictions and the contraction of indigenes’ living and hunting areas, which created
more tension between the hostile neighbouring tribes. Mori Ushinosuke, the Japanese
anthropologist once experienced the hostilities between the Rikiriki or Rarukruk tribe 力里社
of the Paiwan group and the Bongari tribe 望嘉社 of the Paiwan group during his research. He
noted that after a mountain indigenous man from the Rikiriki or Rarukruk tribe was beheaded
by the Bongari tribe on his way to deliver post,

both tribes are from the same group, but they were long at feud with each
other over the hunting and fishing territories for decades. It is very
common between tribes in the areas so they hunt each tribes’ heads.
Due to this incident, the Rikiriki or Rarukruk tribe have been preparing
for revenge. Everyone in the village carried the same hatred and noticed
every movement of the Bongari tribe.31

In 1911, the Rukai indigenes of the Raibuan tribe 泰埔安社 or 大武安社 shot the Bunun
indigenes of Laipunuk tribe 內本鹿社 in their sleep when they stayed together in their hunting
hut after both tribes agreed on sharing the hunting territories. This was ordered by another
Budain tribe 霧台社 from the Rukai group.32 Incidents such as these show the prolonged
hostilities and tensions between tribes when trespassing or hunting. Firearms were generally
used by the indigenes in their hunting and headhunting expeditions and often occurred in open
fields. For instance, in May 1898, 50 Truku indigenes hid near the Cikasuan tribe 七腳川社, shot
dead two indigenes and took their heads for revenge.33 Later in November around 10 Truku

31 Ushinosuke Mori, Shengfan Xingjiao: Mori de Taiwan Tanxian 生蕃行腳：森丑之助的台灣探險 [Explorations
of Ushinosuke Mori in Taiwan], 201–2.
32 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志
33 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ed., 3 ‘明治 31 年 6 月份臺東廳有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告’ [Reports on the
Indigenes affairs from Taidong County, June 1898], (VO4574\A12) in Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin
Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of
indigenes were engaged in a gun fight with the Amis indigenes from the Cikasuan tribe and the Amis indigenes of Fata’an tribe 马太鞍社 were fired at 4 times by the Truku indigenes of the Tkdaya sub-group 木瓜蕃 and lost 1 man when logging.\(^\text{34}\) Cases of indigenes being attacked by the other indigenes while working in the farm or fishing were regularly found in the Japanese’ official reports. For instance, in December 1898 in the Taiwan Sotofuku documents on eastern Taiwan affairs, around 20 Tafalong indigenes 太巴塱蕃 of the Amis group encountered several firearms assaults, which were believed as carried out by the Truku indigenes of the Tkdaya sub-group when fishing.\(^\text{35}\) In 1899, 32 indigenes from the Lanas na Kabalaen 加禮宛社 of the Kebalan group were shot and raided by 10 Truku indigenes and then had to fight back with firearms when working in their lands;\(^\text{36}\) a mountain indigene from the Amis group were shot dead and his head was taken while ploughing;\(^\text{37}\) 3 Amis indigenes were attacked by 7 indigenes of the Tkdaya tribe firing from the thatch,\(^\text{38}\) and etc. These incidents are frequently reported annually in different parts of the outlying mountain indigenes’ territories.

Mountain Indigenes’ attacks were usually called Fanhai 藩害, which means damages caused by the indigenes, despite the fact that the encroachments the colonists instigated were more truly the ones causing damages in mountain indigenous areas. The mountain indigenes’ headhunting custom continued to be the major issue concerning camphor production, as the British Consul E.F. Crowe reported in 1906,

There was a considerable shortage in the production of camphor last year, due to a certain extent to the fact that the more easily accessible trees have been nearly all cut down, while the head-hunting savages are still powerful enough to prevent camphor workers from advancing very far into the forests. Some camphor districts also shut down because the prices paid by the Monopoly Bureau did not cover expenses.\(^\text{39}\)
For example, camphor and tea workers were attacked by indigenes at various sites: in May 1897, a camphor still was raided by the Atayal indigenes of Shiyakaro 石加祿社 and 4 camphor workers’ heads were taken and one was injured by gunshot.\(^{40}\) In October 1897, a tea worker from Shigu village 十股庄 (Xinzhu County) was fired at and his head was taken by the indigenes. Wood loggers in Neiwuanchuan 内灣川上游 were killed by mountain indigenes, Japanese military policemen and Chinese in Shangpingzhuang nanwei 上坪庄南尾 were attacked by mountain indigenes;\(^{41}\) In December 1897, some were injured with gunshots, but most were shot dead and lost their heads;\(^{42}\) In 1898, camphor workers near Yangtianhu 仰天湖 (Miaoli County) were attacked by the Saysiyat indigenes and one of them was beheaded with 6 bullet wounds on his arm and back.\(^{43}\) Particularly, the Nanzhuang Incident (南庄事件) broke out in 1902 because camphor agents delayed and refused to pay rent or shangongyin 山工銀 to the mountain indigenes in Nanzhuang for exploiting and making camphor in their districts. A series of acute uprisings led by the chief of Pangasan tribe 南獅里興社 of the Saysiyat group – bası’ a bawnay or Ri Agui 日阿拐 with other Saysiyat tribes and Atayal tribes raided Japanese policemen and hundreds of guards, destroyed camphor stills, guard stations and cables, and besieged the Nanzhuan branch of Xinzhu Province. Several Japanese infantry companies, an artillery platoon, military troops, police forces and Chinese and plains indigenes guards were sent for pacification.\(^{44}\)

Guards at the guard lines or at the camphor stills also often became their targets and with the expansion of guard lines the situations sometimes became way out of control. For

\(^{40}\) Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 30 年 5 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, May 1897), (V00163\A021) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 103.

\(^{41}\) 明治 30 年 10 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, October 1897), (V00163\A024) in Ibid., 169.

\(^{42}\) 明治 30 年 10 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, October 1897), (V00163\A024) in Ibid., 240–41, 245, 246, 248, 250, 281–82.

\(^{43}\) 明治 31 年 4 月份五指山, 南庄, 大湖撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan, Nanzhuang, and Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus, April 1898), (V00323\A0119) in Ibid., 373–75.

example, more than 50 mountain indigenes raided the police station at Xiaonanze 小南澤 and 10 guards were struck by bullets in June 1903. 45 In 1907, the Atayal indigenes in Dakekan district attacked guards following an expansion of guard lines in Xishuikeng 洗水坑 (Taian township, Miaoli County) and Chatianshan 插天山 (Taoyuan County), which was also called the Zhentoushan Incident 枕頭山之役. Over 2,000 men, including soldiers and guards were deployed to reinforce, and more than 200 men died in this incident, which really is a misnomer as it lasted for 107 days. 46 In 1908, 19 indigenous guards of the Sikasoan tribe from the Amis group escaped from Japanese authorities due to bad labour conditions and unpaid wages, and caused the death of a Japanese policeman, which triggered another Japanese military pacification. The Sikasoan tribe gathered the Patulán tribe 巴托蘭社 and the Truku indigenes from the Tgdaya group to attack guard lines, police stations and to destroy telecommunications. As a result, most of the male mountain indigenes from the Sikasoan tribe were killed and the survivors were forced to relocate their entire tribe although their land and firearms were officially confiscated. 47 In 1912, the mountain indigenes of Atayal groups attacked the guard lines near Lidongshan 李崠山 (Qianshi township, Xinzhu County) with their firearms, and the Japanese artillery such as field guns, mountain guns, Gatling machine guns, etc were pushed over the cliffs, and ammunition was robbed from the guards and the storage. 48

45 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治36年一至六月份宜蘭行政事務轄內概況報告’ (Administrative Reports of Yilan Jurisdiction from January to June 1903), (V04730\A005) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yulan Shijian 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization), 200–201.
47 Lin also suggested the Sikasoan incident was an excuse for the Taiwan Sotofuku to expand railways construction in eastern Taiwan and increase the camphor exploitation for the camphor market in the world. Lin Suzhen 林素珍 and Chen Yaofang 陳耀芳, ‘Qijaochuan (Cikasuan) Ren Lishi Yishi Zhi Tantao –以日治時期七腳川事件為例 [Historical Consciousness of Sikasuan Indigenes Based on the Cikasuan Incident under the Japanese Governance], Taiwan Yuanzhumin Shi Kong 台灣原住民研究論叢 2 (December 2007): 118–25; Shizue Fuji 藤井治津枝, Taiwan Yuanzhamin Shi - Zhengce Pian 臺灣原住民史 - 政策篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes - Policy Formulation), 91, 95; Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhiga 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Ribon Shikô 理蕃志稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:652–88. Further reading on the Sikasoan incident, see Lin Su-Zhen 林素珍, Lin Chuan-Zhi 林春治, Chen Yao-Fang 陳耀芳, Yuanzhumin Zhongduishi shijian –Qijaochuan Shijian 原住民重大歷史事件－七腳川事件 [Major Historical Events on Indigenes-Qijaochuan Incident], Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣史文獻館, 2005
Such occurrences of mountain indigenes raiding the Japanese policemen, Chinese and plains indigenous guards and civilians with their firearms took place frequently. Among these incidents, as already sketched there are some drastic ones. In the Xincheng Incident in 1897, thirteen Japanese soldiers were killed by the Truku indigenes for showing their disrespect of the mountain indigenous customs. A garrison in Hualian port and a warship based in Penghu were sent to Xincheng and gathered 600 Amis indigenes’ assistance, but even with such large-scale help they struggled to pacify the Truku indigenes and retreated in May 1897. Ever since, the mountain indigenes of the area have called the Japanese “Murata” in general, meaning to emphasise the weakness of the Japanese soldiers, as Murata was the name of the Japanese-invented rifles that the troops used. 49 Again, the Beipu incident in 1907 began when a Hakka camphor worker Cai Qinglin 蔡清琳, ringleader in charge of the guard He Mairon 何麥

49 Ibid., 1:31.
and the Saysiyat chief of Say kilapa 大隘社 - taro’ a ‘oemaw 趙明政 formed alliances and assembled more than 100 people to assail Japanese police stations, where they obtained their ammunitions supply and in doing so killed 55 Japanese policemen, administrators and civilians. In the Dakekan Incident 大嵙崁事件 in 1910 Atayal indigenous tribes from the Dakekan group noticed signs of invasion from the Japanese in constructing roads and attacked the police stations. Eventually, nearly 3,000 men were sent to quell the mountain indigenes, bombarding them with advanced armaments like mountain guns, firing guns, mortars and repeating firearms. Not long after, 300 Amis indigenes carried their firearms, spears, bow and arrows and prepared to raid Chenguanao branch in July 1911, which is thus called the Chenguanao Incident 成廣澳事件. In addition, several significant incidents were originated by Truku indigenes in firing and killing camphor workers from 1895, and although several military expeditions were sent for pacification, mostly these failed. In 1914, more than 6,000 men, various types of firearms, machine guns, warship and aircraft were deployed to repress 2,000 Truku indigenes, which is commonly known as the Truku Incident 太魯閣事件. It seems clear that the scale, quality and intensity of conflict had altered measurably after 1895.

3. Firearms in Taiwan under the Japanese

The armament of Japan was certainly at the advanced level after Japan began to modernise her military forces with the assistance of France, Britain and Germany in the Meiji Restoration 1868-1912. Within the eastern context, the victories from the Sino-Japanese War

51 Allis Nokan 瓦歷斯諾幹 and Yu Guanghong 余光弘, Taiwan Yuanzhumin Shi -Taiyazu Shi Pian 臺灣原住民史-泰雅族史篇 (The History of Formosan Indigenes: Atayal), 155–56.
54 From 1862 and the next few years, over 13,000 Japanese troops were trained with the Western methods, including infantry, cavalry and artillery units. A series of military reforms were introduced by the Japanese government although they encountered several opponents and uprisings led by the Shogunate. They also
1895 and the Russo-Japanese War 1904 had corroborated the success of Japan in adapting Western military technologies. In this section, firstly I would like to discuss the firearms and other armaments the Japanese policemen and military used in attempting to pacify the mountain indigenes’ revolts in the mountain regions and the firearms the Chinese guards, camphor workers and civilians carried for defending themselves when working in or living near the mountain indigenous borders. However, I will not discuss the firearms that Chinese use in rebelling against Japan in Taiwan, but only briefly on the Chinese’ activities near or in the mountain areas. This is because the Chinese civilians were generally forbidden to enter the mountain areas, except camphor, tea, mining and other industries’ workers and guards in mountains. Also most of the rebellions originated by the Chinese had less involvement of indigenous groups, except perhaps in the Beipu Incident, and sometimes the mountain indigenes actually assisted Japanese police to catch the Chinese outlaws. Second, I will present some examples of mountain indigenes possessing firearms and the numbers and the types of firearms carried by the mountain indigenes based on the Japanese official and police reports in the period of 1896–1914. Finally, I will also discuss the access and the possible access to firearms for the mountain indigenes in these later years.

3.1. Weapons in the Japanese and the Chinese’ Hands

The majority of Japanese troops were furnished with modern armaments and instruments by the time Japan took over Taiwan. According to Edward Drea, Enfield rifles became the standardized armament furnished by the regular infantry in Japan by 1874, the old Snider rifles were used by the conscripts and some French bronze cannon and several Krupp steel guns were proved to be effective in the Satsuma Rebellion, 1877. Japan not only engaged French military instructors via the French minister, Leon Roches’ assistance in 1865 and established a military school in Yokohama in the end of 1866. Hyman Kublin, ‘The “Modern” Army of Early Meiji Japan’, The Far Eastern Quarterly 9, no. 1 (November 1949): 20–41.

55 For instance, when the Chinese bandits intruded on the mountain indigenes territory, the chief Daimomixian led 40 indigenes with knives and guns to assist the Japanese police to expel the Chinese bandits. Wang Xue-Xin, ed., ‘大嵙崁撫墾署長報告有關掃蕩及結餘蕃地之匪徒案’ (Reports by the Commissioner of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau on the raid result of mobsters in the indigenes territories, December 1896), (V00180A001) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期 臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一：理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 2011), 242–243.
commenced copying and modifying foreign weapons largely to Japanese requirements in order to gain independence from importing weapons from the West, but also required their engineers to improve roads and bridges for developing the national transportation network in Japan. A lot of Japanese types of modern armaments were produced under this circumstance. The wars that Japan encountered with China in 1895 and Russia in 1904-5 and the numerous resistances in her colony Taiwan, became the experimental fields for Japan in testing newly developed military technologies and for justifying the cost of the Meiji industrialization program.

Murata rifles seemed to be the small arms the Japanese soldiers generally carried. In the report of road exploration in the mountain indigenes’ regions in Nanao (南澳, Yilan County), a Japanese second lieutenant fired his Murata rifle two or three times in front of a group of indigenes from the Laogou tribe 老狗社 of the Atayal group and an indigene man tried to test fire with the Murata rifle. Other types of shotgun, repeating rifles and telescope or binoculars were shown to the chief of Gihen 宜亨社 (Wulai District, New Taipei City) by the Japanese officials who also told them they were the true efficient instrument from high civilization. By 1900, all the officials of Taiwan Sotoku, policemen, and guards were permitted to carry firearms when they were on duty although staff from the Camphor Monopoly Bureau were only permitted after 1913. In 1902, a record of requesting 3 Murata rifles and 300 shots was made to the Japanese administrator in Chuchi police station (屈尺派出所, Xindian District, New Taipei City) for their self-defence due to the location of the police station being near the indigenes’ borders. In the Japanese pacifications, the ammunition shop owner and camphor agency Kata

57 For the description of the Murata rifle, see Chapter 5, footnote no. 74.
58 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘叭哩沙署長提出南澳蕃地道路探險書’ (The Nan-Ao Expedition plan proposed by the Commissioner of Balisha, February 1897), (V04533|009) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian 9 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization), 339–340.
59 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 29 年大嵙崁撫墾署報告’ (Reports of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, 1896), Taiwan Nichinichi Newspaper 台灣日日新報 in 04/10/1896, p 2 in Rizhishiqi Taipe  第八章 東亞（日治時期朝鮮半島與滿洲） Separate from the Taiwan ROC: Policies on Indigenes Management), 12.
60 Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikō 理蕃志稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:129.
62 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘准予深坑廳轄內屈尺總務課員派出所配備村田式步槍及彈藥案’ (Approval of General Affair Division staff to the police station to carry Formula Murata rifle and ammunition in Neiquichi,
賀田組 was given 200 firearms for defence. Larger armaments and landmines which were newly introduced to the Police Department, were also transferred to the mountains for defence, such as mortar and mountain guns. In the notification of managing artillery and ammunition in *Riban shikô* in 1907, mortars, mountains guns, field guns, Gatling guns and Nordenfeild guns and various types of ammunition were required to be registered. Firearms, artilleries and hand grenades were used in pacifying the Atayal indigenes in the Zhengtoushan Incident of 1907. Mortars were used in pacifying the Sikasaoan incident in 1908. This gives us a general notion of large armaments installed in the mountain regions. There was another record concerning the 10 mortars, size 20m and 1000 ammunitions which were borrowed from the army, 4 mortars and 500 ammunitions given and installed near the mountains of the Taizhong and Miaoli Provincial Affairs Bureaus in April 1902. In the official documents of Xinzhu Province (Xinzhu County), Bofors guns were transferred to Taizhong, Miaoli, Xinzhu and Shenkong Provinces in March 1903 and mountain guns were requested by the chief of Xizhu Province and installed at Shangping (Zhudong township) and Neiwan (Hengshan township) in October 1903 because of several mountain indigenes’ headhunting expeditions.

Among these documents and reports, clear instructions in operating and maintaining the armaments were given. In the original resource, it is recorded as ‘Nordenfeild guns’, but it should be Nordenfelt guns. Nordenfelt gun had a row of multiple barrels, which was invented by Hjalde Palmcrantz in 1873 and named after a Swedish banker, Thorsten Nordenfelt, who supported his invention. It was adopted by the British Royal navy in the late 1870s and several countries. It could fire up to 1,000 a minute. Willbanks, *Machine Guns*, 156. For the detailed information on Nordenfelt machine guns, also see Thorsten Nordenfelt, *The Nordenfelt Machine Guns: Described in Detail and Compare with other Systems; also their employment for Naval and Military Purposes*. (The Naval & Military Press Ltd, 1884) [http://www.naval-military-press.com/pdf/1843428431.pdf](http://www.naval-military-press.com/pdf/1843428431.pdf)

伯勞牡懷爾山砲 was the name of ‘mountain gun’ from the translated resource from Japanese language. It is pronounced as ‘Burodoeru’, which could be Bofors guns, but the types or models of Bofors guns were unclear from our source. Nevertheless, Bofors guns were a series of artilleries manufactured by A.B Bofors, a Swedish arms company. For the history of the Bofors gun, see Terry Gander, *The Bofors Gun* (Pen and Sword, 2013).


Ibid., 1:460–62.

Ibid., 1:657.

Ibid., 1:137–38.

Ibid., 1:137–38.

Ibid., 1:137–38.

Ibid., 1:460–62.

Ibid., 1:657.

Ibid., 1:460–62.


armament and the regulations on registering and reporting faulty armaments and ammunition registration were enclosed. In 1908, 4 sets of 47mm quick firing guns \(^{72}\) with 4,000 ammunitions/shells and 4 Maxim guns with 200,000 ammunitions/shells were transferred to Keelung and installed on the patrol ship to bombard the Truku indigenes from the sea and to stop smuggling by junks. \(^{73}\) Landmines were also buried in Yilan, Shengkeng, Taoyuan and Miaoli near the mountain indigenes’ borders in 1904 after they were manufactured and improved in Taipei. \(^{74}\)

The Chinese guards and camphor workers were all furnished with firearms from the Qing reign. They seemed to be allowed to carry their firearms when they continued to do their duties as guards and camphor workers in the early Japanese colonization. For example, according to the Japanese investigation in 1896, 441 firearms were held by 420 guards and camphor workers and another 30 guards from Guangtaicheng agency 廣泰成墾號, who were employed by another camphor agent Lin Zhengfan 林振芳. \(^{75}\) And there were more than 400 camphor stills, where most stored firearms and ammunition, and hundreds of people claimed themselves to be camphor workers in the region of Shitoushan 獅頭山 (Miaoli County). \(^{76}\) In other words a good variety of modern firearms were available around the frontier and near indigenous settlements.

The types of firearms the guards carried on the guard lines and the Chinese civilians carried generally were varied, but overall they seem to have been at a modernised level. In the report on the affairs of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in 1896, it was recorded that 735 rifles were stored in guard stations, which included both older muzzle loading and new breech loading rifles and 184 guards were stationed in the areas of Dahu 大湖, Nanhu 南湖, Xinkaizhong 新開庄, Guizhulin 桂竹林, Bajiaolin 八角林, and Shitanzhuang 獅潭庄 in Xinzhu

\(^{72}\) 四十七密米保式重速射砲 was the original translation from the Japanese material. It could be 47mm Quick firing guns or 47mm boat gun, which were similar to QF 3-pounder Hotchkiss and possibly adopted by the Japanese navy.

\(^{73}\) Chen Jintian 陳金田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikō 理蕃志稿 [Gazetteer of Indigenes’ Management], 1977, 1:508, 646.

\(^{74}\) Ibid., 1:305.

\(^{75}\) Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 29 年 6 月份苗栗之廳機密報告’ (Confidential reports of Miaoli County, June 1896), (V00079\A012) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 44.

\(^{76}\) ‘明治 29 年 7 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, July 1896), (V00084\A011) in Ibid., 78.
Province. Their ammunition seemed to be sufficient and supplied by the state as in the survey on the guards of Beigang xi 北港溪 in Maoluo east fort 貓羅東堡 (Guoxing Township, Nantou County),
each guard obtained a gun, for the guards who used rapid guns, they would be given 30 shots; for the guards using rifles, they would take 302.4g of powder and 604.8g bullets. There were another 10,000 shots of bullets and ammunition that were stored in the guard stations for emergency. All the expended ammunitions on the defence of mountain indigenes would be provided on request.

Guards and camphor workers were supplied with firearms and ammunition, such as the guards in Taizhong County in 1898 and in 1899 the camphor workers at the Balisha Camphor Bureau. Advanced firearms were also carried by the Chinese brave regiments or Zhuangding tuan 壯丁團 such as in the organization of braves in Yilan, varied types and number of firearms were listed and given to the braves at 8 forts in Yilan Province for quelling any disturbances caused by the local bandits in January 1898. Based on my own calculation, there were in total 45 Mauser rifles, 22 muzzle loading rifles, 19 breech loading rifles, 14 Western firearms of other sorts, and in addition there were 1 Box cannon, 4 revolvers, 2 Martini rifles, 8 Gatling guns, 1 eight-shot rifle, and 1,877 items of ammunition. Snider-Enfield rifles were operated by the camphor workers in Sanjiaoyong 三角湧 (Sanxia District, New Taipei City) as a Japanese manufacturer representative Hirai Seizirou 平井勢次郎 applied for 150 Snider-Enfield rifles, 5,000 bullets and

77 ‘明治29年8月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, August 1896), (V00084\A002) in Ibid., 401.
78 ‘屬於林紹堂等三名麾下隘勇隘丁之傭使方法內訓’ (Internal instructions on the commission and training of the military and civilian outpost to the subordinates of Lin Shao-Tang group), (V00094\A006) in Ibid., 1242.
80 The establishment of Chinese braves was from 1898 in Hoko regulations which was adopted from the baojia system (保甲制度) from the Qing. The main function of local braves was to assist the Japanese policemen to stabilize public order and deliver other administrative works. By 1903, there were 1,518 Chinese brave regiments and 134,613 braves. To read more about the functions of the Chinese braves, see Cai Xiumei 蔡秀美, ‘Zhimin Tongziwang de Jianbing —paichusuo Yu Baojia 、zhuangdingtuan 殖民統治網的尖兵—派出所與保甲、壯丁團 [The Pioneers in Colonist’s Web - Police Station, Baojia and Braves]' , Taiwanxue Tongxun 臺灣學通訊 Taiwan Studies Newsletter, 2015, 15–17.
81 It was unclear what type of 8 shot rifle is in our source, however, Mauser 71/84, Lebel Model 1886, Murarta 1889 are all 8 shots.
82 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘宜蘭壯丁團編制’ (The establishment of Yilan braves, January 1898), (V00294\A007) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization), 443–445.
83 Snider-Enfield is a British made breech-loading rifle. See Chapter 5, footnote no. 6
other rifle accessories after camphor stills were attacked by the mountain indigenes in his region.  

Chinese civilians generally carried firearms and other weapons in fear of encountering any unexpected mountain indigenes' attacks as mentioned in the previous chapter on the late Qing. (see Chapter 4 pp. 143-147 and Chapter 5 pp. 194-199) Chinese civilians who carried firearms near the mountain areas were reported in the official documents, as in 1897 when a Japanese official visited a village near the camphor district in Nanzhuang 南庄 and reported on how the Chinese carried firearms for defending themselves from the mountain indigenes. In the same year, it was reported that Chinese farmers in Dakekan 大嵙崁 areas carried firearms and fired them from time to time using quilts to protect themselves when going to work in their lands every morning. Although, in these reports there is no specification of the types of firearms, the level of firearms seems the same as in the mixed traditional and modernised level of Chapter 5. Nevertheless, as soon as Taiwan Sotokufu obtained its dominance in Taiwan, the viceroy ordered a prohibition on the Chinese entering the mountains and official confiscation of the firearms and ammunition from the Chinese.

3.2. Firearms in Mountain Indigenes' Hands

Firearms appeared to be the normal, customary and habitual armaments that the mountain indigenes carried and possessed in accordance with the official records on the mountain indigenous regions of Taipei, Tawuyan, Xinchu, Miaoli, Yilan and Dongtaiwani diqu (which includes Hualian, Taident and Pingdong County). Apart from the use of firearms by

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84 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '核准平井勢次郎申請之貸與及攜帶槍械彈藥以防蕃案' (Approval of Hirai Seijiro’s application for borrowing and carrying guns and ammunition in defence of the indigenes, June 1907), (V05031\001) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huijianziyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management), 396–401.

85 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '台北縣知事提報巡視新竹支廳之所見概要' (The Governor of Taipei-ken’s summery and report on the inspection of Xinzhu Branch, April 1897), (V04518\A009) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 1159.

86 ‘有關新竹縣轄內警察分署派出所新設案永松瑞枝等兩名之覆命書' (Confirmation letter on two new recruitments including Nagamatsu Mizue in the police station in Xinzhu-ken), (V04529\A006) Ibid., 1296.

87 Chen Jin 維田, Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿 (Gazetteer of Indigenes' Management), 1977, 1:7.

88 Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huijianziyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas
mountain indigenes in conflicts between tribes, they were also important in attacks upon Chinese camphor workers and in rebellions against the Japanese governance (see Section 2, pp.219-227). Several scenes of mountain indigenes carrying and operating firearms in battles were often noted by the Japanese officials. For instance, the male and female Atayal indigenes of the Mosu tribe 墨宿社 and Siyanlaowashe tribe 四煙老瓦舍 from the Mnibu group 溪頭群 (Yilan County) carried their Chinese matchlocks, knives and spears when the Japanese officials and polices met them and offered propitiation in November 1895. The Japanese officials were also advised not to wear hats or they would be mistaken as Chinese and shot to death. 370 Amis indigenes who participated in fighting against the remaining Chinese troops in Leigonghuo 雷公火 (Guanshan Taidong County) in 1896, carried their firearms, swords and exchanged greeting with Japanese troops. The Japanese administrator had also encountered an intended attack in October 1896, that 15 or 16 Atayal indigenes were hidden behind the huge rocks and had laid their firearms, side by side, and were about to shoot at the Japanese administrators when visiting the Nanshi group 南勢群 (Miaoli County). The submitted mountain indigenes from the Nanzhuang group 南庄 (Miaoli County) of the Saysiyat group were reported to carry firearms on their shoulder, carried a knife at their waist, held bullet and powder, which was similar with the mountain indigenes in 1896. In 1897, some Japanese administrators also

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For some thoughts on female participation in headhunting cultures, see chapter 7, section 3.3

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For some thoughts on female participation in headhunting cultures, see chapter 7, section 3.3
reported witnessing a 15-strong party of an Atayal chief and his indigenous fellows from the Skaru group 石加祿群 who carried 5 short firearms and spears on a headhunting expedition in the evening94 and reported also on the case of a Atayal indigenes -Waishyutayai from the Klapay group- who fired firearms at Chinese and a firearm and daggers were found after some military police and Chinese chased after him.95 Further discussion of the occasions in which indigenes casually carried and possessed firearms will be analysed in analysing cultural context in Chapter 7.

3.2.1. Numbers of firearms among the Formosan Indigenes

Calculating the number of firearms that indigenous people held is very ambitious and must lead to uncertain results, especially during the late Qing period because the Qing government was uninformed and unconcerned about the mountain indigenes’ populations and the states of affairs in the mountain areas, and of course vice-versa was the case for most of the time. However, the number of firearms has been reported on after various incidents of pacification of the mountain indigenes and confiscations of their firearms under the Japanese governance after 1895, and numerous exploration teams and expedition were sent into the mountain indigenous regions. In the report of the Taipei Governor or Chiji 知事 – Murakami Yosio 村上義雄 in February 1899 on the indigenous affairs in Jingwei 景尾 and Sanjiaoyong 三角湧 (Jingwei and Sanxia Districts, in New Taipei City) where the Atayal groups lived, the military firearms were commonly used by the Shengfan 生番 or mountain indigenes and each family had at least 2 or 3 firearms, some up to 10 firearms.96 Some astonishing findings were reported in the 1900s and uncovered the large number of firearms possessed by the mountain indigenes. In the report of Kanokogi Kogorou 鹿子木小五郎 on his inspection in Taidong Province, he listed the number of firearms, household and male populations (see Chart 6:1)

December 1896), (V000163\A036) in Ibid., 473.
94 ‘明治 30 年 10 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, October 1897), (V0063\A024) in Ibid., 154.
95 ‘明治 30 年 10 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, October 1897), (V00163\A024) in Ibid., 162.
Chart 6:1 The number of the indigenous households, population, male population and the possession of firearms in 1906

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Groups</th>
<th>Number of firearms</th>
<th>Number of Household/population</th>
<th>Number of firearms owned by each household*</th>
<th>Number of male indigenes</th>
<th>Number of firearms owned per each male indigene*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tsarisan 傈儭蕃, Rukai</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>433/2,127</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>537</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siw-ku-Ian ’Amis 秀姑巒阿眉蕃, Amis</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>1,554/8,274</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>1,346</td>
<td>0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puyuma</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>1,273/6,675</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>1,256</td>
<td>0.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuan in Takbanuaz group 嶰社群, Sibukun in Isbukun group 郡社群, Bunun</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>522/5,263</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>0.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nan-Shih ’Amis 南勢阿眉蕃, Amis</td>
<td>1,363</td>
<td>1,298/5,361</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haian group 海岸阿眉蕃, Amis</td>
<td>690</td>
<td>897/5,673</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beinan group 卑南阿眉蕃, Amis</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>1,197/8,559</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1,453</td>
<td>1.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tkadaya group 木瓜蕃, Truku</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>125/425</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truku group 太魯閣蕃, Truku</td>
<td>3,747</td>
<td>1,402/5,474</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>1,901</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tjavualji 太麻里蕃, Paiwan</td>
<td>2,270</td>
<td>1,930/8,166</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>1,108</td>
<td>2.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>12,402</td>
<td>10,850/57,424</td>
<td>1.14</td>
<td>10,431</td>
<td>1.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* The Number of firearms owned by each household and the number of firearms owned by each male indigenes were both calculated by Chen Tsung-Jen, Taiwanese historian

This report, then, reveals that the mountain indigenous groups in eastern Taiwan obtained large amounts of firearms. Every household on average had 1 gun and each male indigene on average possessed 1 gun. The Truku indigenes from the Truku group and the Tjavualji indigenes from the Paiwan group owned the most firearms per capita. Another similar report in 1910 on the number of firearms of the Tauda sub-group of the Truku group also showed that indigenous households owned 1 gun on average and in this case we have detailed evidence of the type of armament. (see Chart 6:2) The fact that in several cases, especially in the last three groups of Chart 6:1, gun ownership per adult male was considerablybly over 1, suggest that either some male did use more than 1 gun of their own or that guns were also used, owned by others in the tribe – for instance young boys or even women. No direct evidence has been found on this possibility.
Chart 6:2 The number and types of firearms, households, population and male indigenes of the Tauda sub-group of the Truku group in 1910

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tribe Names</th>
<th>Busiyau</th>
<th>Kababann</th>
<th>Kabarahu</th>
<th>Mukowaisi</th>
<th>Bugaaru</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ブシヤウ</td>
<td>カババン</td>
<td>カバラフ</td>
<td>ムコワイシ</td>
<td>ブガアール</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firearms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauser 1898/ 5 shots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauser 1871/single shot</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese matchlocks</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snider</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murata hunting rifles</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murata military rifles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullets &amp; Powered</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauser 1898/ 5 shots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauser 1871/single shot</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>1,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese matchlocks</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Here, the data shows that at least every household had on average one firearm and 17.3 items of ammunitions among these 5 tribes from the Tauda sub-group of the Truku. 77% of male indigenes would have firearms with 13.1 items of ammunition. Also the highly modern Mauser single shot represented some 60% of the total and required approximately ¾ of the total ammunition possessed by the tribes. Amongst the Kababan of column 2, there were 0.47 Mauser single shot weapons per adult male.
Chart 6:3 The number of firearms possessed by the mountain indigenes in 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Groups</th>
<th>Number of firearms</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Ratio of gun/owner (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Atayal</td>
<td>10,841</td>
<td>29,149</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paiwan</td>
<td>5,901</td>
<td>21,224</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tsou</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>2,291</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puyuma</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>6,564</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ami</td>
<td>4,652</td>
<td>29,380</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunun</td>
<td>2,407</td>
<td>15,794</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rukai</td>
<td>1,791</td>
<td>1,3423</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saysiyat</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yami</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,667</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>27,288</td>
<td>120,254</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ibid., 2:7.

Chart 6:3 shows the Atayal group owned firearms the most and the Saysiyat group owned the least. Large distribution of firearms seems to be in the north where most of the Atayal group live and where rebellions were likely to occur; in the south firearms were held largely by the Paiwan group who were in far less conflicts – this suggests the incident of conflict depended more on the commercial and territorial challenges that we have outlined earlier in the chapter.

In accordance with Ta:in taeboeh Sawan Kas'amès’ list of indigenes resistance from 1896–1908, which ended in the same year as the figure above (although it did not include the number of firearms reportedly confiscated from the Truku and the Seediq groups), the Atayal revolted 13 times, with which we can compare; the Truku and Seediq 4 times each; the Saysiyat 3 times; the Paiwan 2 times; the Bunun, the Tsou and the Rukai revolted only once. Now if we compare this with the 1908 ratio of gun/owner in Chart 6:3, the Atayal owned the most firearms and also resisted the most frequently. However, the Saysiyat owned the least firearms and resisted 3 times, which was more than the Paiwan (2 times), who owned the second largest number per
capita of firearms among all the indigenes groups. The Paiwan as our example here were less challenged by the commercial force of camphor, tea, coal, etc than were the Atayal. *It would appear in this period that gun ownership allowed successful rebellion, but the firearms ownership did not itself determine the amount of rebellions.*

Moreover, in Chen Tsung-Jen’s research and findings, the number of the male mountain indigenes was 30,129 and the number of firearms that the Taiwan Sotokufu collected and confiscated was 31,579 in the much later year of 1928, which certainly indicates that if every male indigene is reported having had at least one gun, then the confiscation for the years 1910-1914, during the “Five Year Indigenous Management Scheme” (五年理蕃計畫) was not effected very fully, throwing some doubts on the Japanese confiscation figure and thus on all of the officially-generated figures. Shizue Fuji also suggested that by the year of 1929, most of the mountain indigenes did not possess firearms and only 354 firearms were confiscated. Nevertheless, there lies the central point that the number of firearms that were not seized by the Japanese police prior to 1828 and were clearly hidden by the mountain indigenes might be even larger than the number suggested here, as some mountain indigenous rebellions continued to break out to the 1930s. *So very clearly the armaments impact of pacification and confiscation was very low indeed, at the end of the period the mountain indigenes still held an enormous number of firearms, many of these appear to have belonged to an advanced category for that period, (Mauser, Snider) and a disproportionate number were in the hands of these headhunting and hunting groups that were causing most trouble for the Japanese throughout the whole period.*

3.2.2. Types of Firearms

The sorts of firearms in the mountain indigenes’ possession certainly rose to a modern or advanced level generally in comparison with the traditional and the mixed traditional and modern levels in the late Qing period shown in Chapters 4 and 5. Chinese matchlocks were less seen in the Japanese’ official reports. Of course in the first few years under Japanese

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colonization cruder weaponry dominated, such that in 1897 the director of Balisha Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 叭哩沙撫墾署 reported the Atayal indigenes of Laoguo tribe tribe used matchlocks and coarse powders which he had never seen. Of course, from what we have already seen, it is quite possible that this was either a false report or that tribal males succeeded in hiding their better modern weapons. The evidence above suggests that there was something of a military revolution in eastern Taiwan during the 1890s decade. A lot of Western and modern firearms were reported by the Japanese administrators, policemen and anthropologists. Various types of modern firearms were recorded in the Taiwan Sotokufu official document redaction, in the areas of Taipei, Taoyuan, Xinchu, Yilan, and eastern Taiwan generally. Mauser firearms that were possessed by the mountain indigenes, particularly in the Truku groups, were noted the most amongst these records, as we see clearly in Chart 6:3 and 6:4. Comparing these early figures from the table, we can see that modernity and frequency of gun showed a tendency – mountain indigenes modernised in the 1890s, remained modernised into the 1920s, and Japanese policy had not much impact on that trend.

In summary, expensive and bloody efforts by the Japanese ended with modern weaponry in the hands of mountain indigenous groups who were the mostly likely to oppose Japanese movement into the east, especially in the camphor and other commercially valuable regions. Moreover, according to our sources, the types of firearms were: Chinese matchlocks, repeating rifles, Mauser single shot, Mauser repeating 5 shots, Rolling block single shot, Spencer rifle, Mauser 1871 breech loading rifles, Enfield, Snider rifles, Murata rifles, Remington, and Winchester repeating rifles. Although the number and the exact model of these firearms in the mountain indigenes’ hands remain uncertain, the majority of these modern-to-advanced firearms were those also held by the Qing troops as I have shown in Chapter 5 and the Japanese military police in this Chapter Section 3. In the report of the director of the Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 大湖撫墾署, “the indigenes possessed varied types of firearms, there were old Chinese matchlocks to new models of repeating rifles, which were less than 4 models.”

In 1897, Mauser single shot, Mauser repeating 5 shots and Rolling Block single shot, which

100 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘叭哩沙署長提出南澳蕃地道路探險書’ (The Nan-Ao Expedition plan proposed by the Commissioner of Balisha, February 1897), (V04533\009) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization), 339–340.
101 The detail of each fire arms listed here were mostly in footnotes in chapter 4, 5 and 6.
102 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 29 年 9 月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, September 1896), (V00084\A003) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu
was manufactured just from 1862, were possessed by the Atayal indigenes of the Yaauewarii tribe 馬裡叭社 and branded with *Wufujian* 五撫檢, which meant “examined by the Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 五指山撫墾署 (Xinzhu County)” by the director of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in November. In 1898, the Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau reported, “most of the male indigenes [the Atayals from the Dahu group] must carry firearms, there are three types of firearms: Mauser, Spencer rifle and old typed Matchlocks” and the Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 大嵙崁撫墾署 (Taoyuan County) also reported that the Mauser repeating 5 shots and other military firearms from the late Qing period were mostly possessed by the indigenes in these regions under the Dakekan Fukenshu’s control (possibly from the Atayal group). There were also cases of the Atayal’s deputy chief of Dadahan tribe 打打罕社 from the Mnibu group requesting to exchange his silver coins, which were given by the Japanese, for the bullets for their Mausers and other Atayal indigenes from the Baiku tribe 擺骨社 (バイクッ), also from the Mnibu group sending their broken Mausers to the Tiansongbei Chuzhang branch 天送埤出張會所 (Yilan County) for repair. Such instances show how the Atayal indigenes owned modern firearms almost mundanely in some regions even in the 1890s. In 1900, Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau reported that most of the Mauser single shot were found in the indigenous tribes of the Atayal groups and only 2 or 3 Mauser repeating 5 shots in each tribe and the Atayal indigenes in Yilan County were reported to carry old model repeating rifles.

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*Yanju 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 421.*

103 明治 30年 11 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告 (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, November 1897), (V00272\A015) in *Ibid.*, 215–16.

104 明治 30年新竹縣轄各撫墾事務成績報告 (Reports of the Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus in Hsinchu-jen jurisdiction, 1897), (V00272\A001) in *Ibid.*, 681.

105 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, 明治 30年大嵙崁撫墾署事務成績報告 (Reports of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, 1897), (V00272\A011) in *Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigines Management), 34.

106 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, 明治 30年 11 月份叭哩沙撫墾署事務報告 (Reports of Balisha Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, November 1897), (V00163\A013) in *Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanju 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization), 125.

107 明治 30年 11 月份叭哩沙撫墾署事務報告 (Reports of Balisha bureau of Reclamation, November 1897), (V00163\A013) in *Ibid.*, 126.

108 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, 五指山撫墾署轄內中央分水嶺附近發現新蕃社報告 (Report on the discovery of new indigenous tribes near the drainage divide in the Central Mountain Range in the jurisdiction of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, July 1900), (V04574\A016) in *Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanju 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigines in
(5 shots), Mauser 1871 breech loading rifles, which was the rifle that the Anhui Army furnished,\textsuperscript{109} and so on, and the number of firearms was growing.\textsuperscript{110}

In Yilan County, one of the Atayal indigenes from the Slamao tribe carried a Mauser gun, engraved with the number 109 after examination by the Japanese administrator.\textsuperscript{111} The same year, the governor of Taidong reported that the Enfield and Mauser were possessed by the submitted Truku indigenes that were in shortage of bullets and powder.\textsuperscript{112} After the Beipu incident 北埔事件 1907, the Snider rifles, the Murata rifles and its bullets owned by the Saysiyat indigenes from the Daai group 大隘社 (Wufeng township, Xinchu County) were confiscated by the Japanese and taken in exchange for money.\textsuperscript{113} The Provincial Director of Shengkeng and the chief commissioner of police in 1909 made an agreement that only the bullets for Murata and Mauser rifles would be given to the mountain indigenes because of their diversity of firearms.\textsuperscript{114} Another documentation that showed the types of firearms and ammunition that indigenous tribes possessed was the survey framed by the Commissioner of Civil Administration (Minzheng Zhangguan 民政長官) in 1909. It listed the Mauser, Murata, Remington, and Chinese matchlock and requested to submit such a survey in June and December of every year.\textsuperscript{115} This way the Taiwan Sotokufu at least nominally had complete technical understanding and knowledge of indigenes’ capacities in armaments, but that seems to have been some way from actually doing much about such ownership. Winchester repeating, Mauser single shot, Remington rolling block and Murata single shot rifles were found in the exploration into Truku tribe territory in 1911.\textsuperscript{116} Remodelled Murata rifles were also given to

\textsuperscript{109} See Chapter 5, footnote no. 66&72
\textsuperscript{110} Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 33 年 1 月份宜蘭廳有關蕃人蕃地支事務及情況報告' (Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Yilan County, January 1900), (V04625\ V015) in \textit{Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究} (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization), 253.
\textsuperscript{111} '明治 33 年 2 月份宜蘭廳有關蕃人蕃地支事務及情況報告' (Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Yilan County, February 1900), (V04625\ A016) in \textit{Ibid.}, 256.
\textsuperscript{112} Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '臺東廳長太魯閣蕃巡視之始末及蕃況報告' (The Director of the Taidong County’s detailed report on the inspection of Truku indigenes and its current status, received on 25th April 1900), (V04625\ A25) in \textit{Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanju 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究} (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization), 390.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Ibid.}, 1:580.
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Ibid.}, 1:605–6.
\textsuperscript{116} Chen Jintian 陳金田, \textit{Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao 日治時期原住民行政志稿/Riban Shikô 理蕃志稿}.
the indigenes in Taipei, Xinzhu, Taizhong and Taidong provinces in 1911, but at least nominally
the rifles would be retracted within a week and restricted in terms of the number of firearms
and ammunition when borrowing them from the Japanese officials.117

In summary, the mountain indigenes generally held modern-to-advanced firearms in the
early colonization of Japan in comparison with the late Qing reign, and by the end of our period
around the 1920s they owned more firearms, which were modern and increasingly in the hands
of those who would use them against the Japanese. Matchlocks were less seen, only reported
in the first few years under Japan’s governance. Mauser rifles seemed to be the main
armaments that mountain indigenes used. Murata rifles which were manufactured and given
by Japan also appeared quite commonly in the reports. Overall, firearms that were possessed
by the indigenes or given to the mountain indigenes were generally modern and advanced
types which gave the increased capacity in fighting against the Japanese military, but getting
firearms may well have become extremely difficult for the mountain indigenes and increasingly
monitored by the Japanese police. The data for the 1920s illustrates that mountain indigenous
people were determined and successful in resisting Japanese colonisation on all fronts.

3.3. Accessing of Firearms among mountain indigenes

Taiwan Sotokufu took great notice over controlling and managing the mountain
indigenes for the purpose of exploiting mountain resources, but Japanese governance also
understood the obsession of indigenes coveting firearms from their early colonization. Here I
would like to discuss the problematic avenues of access to firearms and ammunition open to
the mountain indigenes in the early Japanese governance. As early as the Japanese ruling in
1896, Taiwan Sotokufu was aware of the mountain indigenes using firearms in hunting, was
concerned for the public order and urged to regulate, but Japanese also understood that
immediate control over firearms would cause some mistrust and suspicion amongst the
indigenes and take away their ways of hunting, and possibly were pragmatic enough to
understand that to pursue an impossible target was not good colonialism. Every director of the
Pacification and Reclamation Bureau was requested to report on the restriction of the firearms

and ammunitions\textsuperscript{118} and encouraged the mountain indigenes to use firearms for the purpose of hunting instead of killing people.\textsuperscript{119} One of the subject matters for every Pacification and Reclamation Bureau from 1898 was to attempt a milder regime of gun usage in indigenous areas.\textsuperscript{120}

3.3.1. Provision from the Taiwan Sotokufu

How did the mountain indigenes keep open the avenues of access to firearms and ammunition under the increased Japanese surveillance? Especially as we have stated, the Taiwan Sotokufu enacted several restrictions on firearms. In fact, the regulations on firearms were imprecise in the first few years of Japanese colonization because Taiwan Sotokufu considered hunting was one of the major economic activities of indigenes’ which they could not prohibit entirely.\textsuperscript{121} In the official report of the Taidong Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus in October 1897, it stated, “Although there was no enactment and methods yet on the firearms and ammunitions supply, the mountain indigenes in the mountain depend on their hunting activities. Thus ammunition should be supplied to some extent in order to save them from predicaments.”\textsuperscript{122} Therefore, firearms and ammunition were supplied by the Japanese officials. As an official report stated in 1897: \textsuperscript{123}

1. Authentication from the directors of Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus should be provided by the businessmen when supplying firearms and ammunitions to the mountain indigenes.
2. Authentication from the directors of Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus should be provided by the non-businessmen when supplying firearms and ammunitions to the mountain indigenes. Within limits a

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 1:15.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., 1:21.
\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 1:84–85.
\textsuperscript{122} Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 30 年 9 月份台東撫墾署事務報告’ (Reports of Taidong Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, September 1897), (V00164\A35) in \textit{Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huijian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization)}, 204.
supply of firearms, ammunition 11.25 kg and 500 detonators would be permitted by the police or military police. If the quantity is more than the limited amount, it should be permitted only by the local province.

3. Firearms and ammunitions should be handed over to the indigenes at Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus and the official administrator should keep a record.

4. The directors of the Pacification Reclamation Bureaus should report the firearms, types of ammunition and the quantity that are handed over to the mountain indigenes to the Police Department or Military Police Department monthly.

Nevertheless, the director of Puli Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 埔里撫墾署 suggested that these regulations only applied to the indigenes in the southern regions, below Puli province who were tame and reasonable, unlike the ferocious mountain indigenes in the north, and to the chiefs who had visited the Japanese as tourists.\(^{124}\)

Places for the mountain indigenes to exchange firearms, ammunitions, salt, clothes etc. were limited, as the *Records of Indigenes' Management* recorded in 1898: Doliu 斗六, Jiayi, Fanshuliaoz 蕃薯寮, Ahou 阿猴, Hengchuan and some restricted places in Taizhong, Nantou and Taidong Provinces could exchange freely; Shengkong, Xinzhu, Miaoli Provinces were run by the appointed business; Yiland and Taoyuan were run through the officials. However, the Sanjiaoyong, Dakekan, Xiancaipeng, Nanzhuan and Dahu Provinces were entirely forbidden to exchange any goods.\(^{125}\)

The Wuzhishan 五指山, Dahu and Nanzhuan branches began to examine and branded the mountain indigenes’ firearms when they visited the bureaus and strictly banned any gun importation.\(^{126}\) Even some Truku indigenes, who were famously rebellious and recently submitted themselves to Japan, could buy 10 shots of bullets, 75g ammunition (2兩), 10 detonators and less than 20 inflammation devices from the appointed Japanese businessman Kata in 1898. But this was under a condition of setting up schools for tribes as a policy of conciliation.\(^{127}\)

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\(^{124}\) Ibid., 1:38.

\(^{125}\) Ibid., 1:157–58.

\(^{126}\) Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治30年8月份新竹縣轄內各撫墾署(五指山，大湖，南庄)事務成績報告' (Reports of the Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus of Wuzhishan, Dahu, and Nanzhuan in Hsinchu-ken jurisdiction, August 1897), (V00163 A022) in *Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu* 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in JapaneseColonization), 106–107.

\(^{127}\) Chen Jintian 陈金田, *Rijushiqi Yuanzhumin Xingzheng Zhigao* 日治時期原住民行政志稿/ *Riban Shikō* 理蕃志
apply to every tribe, as some mountain indigenous tribes were refused any ammunition supply from the Japanese officials. For example, some mountain indigenes from Wuzhishan brought some rattans, bamboos, woods to exchange for pots, clothes, firearms and ammunitions in 1896, but they were refused. In 1897, 28 Atayal indigenes of the Mianduyou, including the chief, came to Shangpingzhuang branch of the Pacification and Reclamation Bureau and requested firearms and ammunition, but they were also rejected.

Supplying firearms to the mountain indigenes in the name of considering their dependence on the gun for hunting activities was seemingly to please and satisfy the needs of mountain indigenes for the purposes of opening Japanese accesses to the mountain regions – exploration, building roads, railway and telegraph cables, reducing the tensions between mountain indigenous tribes and the Taiwan Sotokufu, and ultimately exploiting mountain resources.

From 1905, several changes were made in the regulations of supplying firearms, which were stricter and more demanding on any the mountain indigenes who wished to obtain firearms and ammunition than in the previous years. The chief commissioner of police was also aware of the risk of provoking uprisings if the firearms and ammunitions provision suddenly stopped, so now only particular indigenous groups would be given concessions for supplying firearms. According to the firearms and ammunitions provision regulations in Taidong Province, as it outlines: the Puyuma group, the Amis groups and the Swa Tarumake of Rukai groups were permitted to be supplied with firearms, ammunition and replace useable firearms because they were being used against other indigenous groups; the Paiwan group should be prohibited a supply of firearms, but only ammunition allowed, and with restrictions such as withholding ammunition when mountain indigenous tribes did not obey; the Truku group would be given limited numbers of modern models of firearms, confined to the amount of ammunition but not given ammunition for older models so the old ones would be abandoned by the mountain indigenes naturally; low-graded ammunition, leads and detonators were be supplied, but not firearms, unless authentication was applied in advance; firearms and

128 Wang Xue-Xin, '明治 29 年五月份新竹之廳務及轄內概況報告' (Overview reports of the general affairs in Xinzhu County and its jurisdiction, May 1896), (V00079\A005) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 35.

129 '明治 30 年 9 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告' (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, September 1897 (V00163\A023) in Ibid., 128.
ammunition were all branded and the supply of new ammunition based on the number of the cartridges or case shells. The regulations of firearm and ammunition supply for the mountain indigenous groups in the south, which included the Nantou, Doliu, Jiaoyi, Fanshuliao, Ahou and Hengchuan provinces, were different, as it outlines: firearms holders were permitted to continue to use their firearms, but were limited in the provision of ammunitions and detonators; everyone was permitted to get 1.5kg powder (40 離) and less than 20 shots detonators but the amount was flexible with proper reasons; ammunition and detonators should be traded in cash and provided by the police stations who would keep the records; those showing disobedience, selling ammunition and detonators without permission and convicts were allowed to receive only ammunition supply. Meanwhile the Japanese officials encouraged and gave rewards to the indigenous tribes working in tillage. But these were not put into practice for the Tsou indigenes of Kanakanavu 簞仔霧社 or 卡那卡那富族 (Dapu Township, Jiayi County) and the plains indigenes from the Yujing basin (Tainan city) who did not have headhunting customs anymore, who enquired about getting powder, but the Taiwan Sotokufu did not permit it. The submitted mountain indigenous tribe could also obtain the firearms and ammunition supply from the Japanese official when they reported threats from other tribes. This can be seen in a case in 1913: the director of Taoyuan province gave firearms and ammunition to 100 Atayal indigenes of Kauiran tribe 卡宇伊蘭, who submitted to Japan when the Malikowang group 馬利克灣群 of the Atayal group threatened to start a war (this incident began with Atayal men from the Kweijings tribe 奎輝社 who live in the Kauiran tribe who ambushed and killed some Chinese civilians in the Malikowang group’s territory). Again, the Taiwan Sotofuku enacted the regulations of supplying and controlling firearms and ammunitions to the mountain indigenes in the south with the intentions of controlling the indigenes’ hunting customs gradually and eventually forcing the indigenes to give up their old customs by not giving them the firearms, gunpowder for the old models of firearms, lower-graded ammunition, or lead and detonators. Also the Japanese officials ordered the mountain indigenes to trade firearms ammunitions and detonators for cash, which mostly came from hunting animals.

131 Ibid., 1:348–51.
132 Ibid., 1:281.
thereby the mountain indigenes could not earn any or have enough cash from hunting prey for buying ammunition. Most importantly, they could easily manipulate their strategies of supplying firearms to certain mountain indigenous groups and setting certain locations, which might actually stimulate more original hostilities and fights between tribes.

In Eastern Taiwan, the mountain indigenes were required to obtain a proof or license for buying firearms or transferring the ownership of firearms from the Japanese officials. To obtain this license, they had to meet the requirements which included providing their names, address, ages and background check, and were limited in the amount of firearms and ammunition they could purchase. According to the records of the number of gun and ammunitions licenses for firearms and ammunitions from September 1899 to September 1900 in Taiwan Sotokufu official document redaction, licenses were given to 2,734 indigenes, that would have been the Paiwan, Rukai, Puyuma, Amis, Kavalan, Sakizayas groups in eastern Taiwan, and 106 Murata hunting rifles, 13,541.25g of ammunitions and 2,935 detonators, which included the old models in total, were given to the indigenous license holders. This seeming insufficiency of firearms and ammunition and the complicated process of getting firearms and ammunition would have limited their hunting and headhunting activities. It was this that the Taiwan Sotokufu wished for. This also reflects on the lesser tendency of mountain indigenes for purchasing firearms and ammunition from the agency despite the Japanese officials sometimes assisting the mountain indigenes to fill in the application form for purchase.

3.3.2. Firearms and Ammunition as Rewards

Another way of getting the firearms and ammunitions for the mountain indigenes were as rewards from the Japanese government. In the reports from the branches of the Pacification

134 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 31 年 12 月份臺東廳有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告' (Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Taidong County, December 1898), [V04596\A18] in Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization), 317–318.

135 '明治 32 年 9 月份 至 明治 33 年 9 月份臺東廳有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告' (Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Taidong County from September 1899 to September 1900), [V04600\A18, V04627\A06, V04625\A19, V04625\A20, V04625\A21, V04625\A22, V04625\A23, V04625\A24, V04623\A11, V04623\A12, V04623\A13, V04647\A03) in Ibid., 358, 366, 369, 372, 374, 377, 381, 410, 411-14.

136 '明治 32 年 7 月至 9 月份臺東廳行政事務及轄內概況報告' (Administrative Reports of Taidong County from July to September 1900), [V00384\A64] in Ibid., 335.
and Reclamation Bureau in Xinzhu County in 1897, exceptional rewards to the mountain indigenous tribes were listed and they were usually in the form of the ammunition, firearms, or Japanese sword, which they could only choose one of. In order to obtain this special reward, the mountain indigenes needed to fulfill certain behavioral conditions: a. strictly forbid headhunting, but work in cultivation with 1 year probation; b. spread such virtues to other tribes with positive results; c. allow opening roads within mountain indigenous regions; d. chiefs who accomplished a certain set of tasks, e.g., who convened more than 20 mountain indigenous men for particular missions. In 1899, some mountain indigenes received firearms as a reward from a Japanese officer Tanisige Dugurou, because “this nourishes in the mountain indigenes a notion of earning these honourable gifts when they do not do evil things [headhunting] and work on good virtues” as reported in the official document on indigenes’ affairs. Cases for the mountain indigenes getting firearms and ammunitions as rewards seemed to be very small and only occurred before 1900. However, the notion of headhunting in the Japanese officials’ view was completely different from the mountain indigenes’ in that the former regarded the headhunting as evil or immoral behaviour and forbade this custom, whilst as we have seen earlier the Formosan indigenes saw their headhunting custom and the heads they hunted as signs of inserting energy or spirit into the tribes, bringing good harvests, connecting with their god and ancestors, establishing status identities for the male indigenes among their tribes etc. (see Chapter 2 on the indigenes’ headhunting custom, pp. 30-38) and our analyses of cultural contexts for firearms in Chapter 7).

3.3.3. Smuggling

Smuggling was another method for the mountain indigenes to procure firearms and ammunition in the early Japanese colonization, which had been practised between mountain indigenous tribes and with the Chinese in Taiwan for a few hundred years. The Taiwan Sotokugu

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137 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 30 年新竹縣轄各撫墾事務成績報告'(Reports of the Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus in Hsinchu-ken jurisdiction, 1897), (V00272\A011) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shi liao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 687.

naturally paid great attention to any secret activities on gun and ammunitions trade and suppressed them. This can be seen in the Japanese’ official reports. In November 1897, Nanzhuang Pacification and Reclamation Bureau reported how the black market seemed to dominate the gun trade although the trade had been set up in appointed places. Camphor workers purchased firearms and powder regularly, but often not knowing the sellers. Bullets and powder seemed to travel easily within mountain indigenous territories where it was dangerous for people to enter. 139 In the same month, Japanese engineer Yanagimoto Michiyoshi 古田通義 visited Xinzhu and Taizhong provinces for investigating the expansion of Donshijia Pacification and Reclamation Bureau 東勢角撫墾 and reported on the Atayal tribes such as Mosibabarai tribe 馬以哇來社, Manapan tribe 馬那邦, Sumanhan tribe 司馬限社 and how they often attacked the indigenes in the Dahu and Nanhu areas, where they also obtained their ammunitions.140 In the report of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in 1898, new bullets for Mauser rifles were carried by the mountain indigenes or hid in their belts. 141 In Wang Xuexin’s research, he also found some evidence of how the Shilorao tribe of the Atayal group procured their firearms and ammunitions from the Puli tribe; their enemy the Truku indigenes of the Mkbaraw group 內太魯閣 procured their firearms, ammunition and agricultural tools from the Truki Indigenes of the Mkssiy group 外太魯閣 in 1902.142 During the “Five Year Indigenous Management Scheme”, the Taiwan Sotokufu decreed a fine or punishment on firearms and ammunition exchange. In accordance with another source reported in Records of Indigenes’ Management in 1912, several mountain indigenes from different tribes in A-Hou province and Taidong province were engaged with ammunition

139 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 30年10月份南庄撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Nanzhuang Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, October 1897), (V00163\A028) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miao Areas in Japanese Colonization), 665–666.; also ‘明治 30年新竹縣轄各撫墾事務成績報告’ (Reports of the Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus in Xinzhu-ken jurisdiction, 1897), (V00272\A011) in Ibid., 719.

140 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘柳本技師往新竹, 台中兩縣轄內出差覆命書’ (Confirmation of the engineer Yanagimoto’s the business trip to the jurisdictions of Xinzhu-ken and Taichung-ken), (V04519\A004) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miao Areas in Japanese Colonization), 1188.

141 明治 31年1月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, January 1898), (V00323\A012). Ibid., 285.; ‘明治 31年2月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus, February 1898), (V00323\A015). Ibid., 311.

exchange or trade with each other, but their ammunition was confiscated by the Japanese and the mountain indigenes were fined or punished by caning once they got caught. 143

Chinese Tongshi 通事 or interpreters were also involved in smuggling firearms and ammunition sometimes. In the report of Xinzhu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in 1897 and Miaoli Provincial Affairs Bureau in 1898 it was noted that the Chinese interpreters sold ammunition secretly to the mountain indigenes. But the Chinese interpreters did not seem to act as the only contacts through which the mountain indigenes obtained ammunitions. There was a case in 1899: some bandit entered the indigenes’ territories with Chinese interpreters’ assistance and carried off powders, ox, pigs, etc to please the indigenes in return for their temporary shelter.144 Particularly there is the case of Chinese interpreter Li Along 李阿隆, who had long provided firearms and ammunitions to the mountain indigenes in eastern Taiwan in exchange for mountain resources since the Qing. It has also been suggested that the fighting capacity of the Truku indigenes was upgraded because Li A-Long put pressure on the chief of Taidong Province Sagara Tyoutuna 相良長綱 to provide large amounts of ammunition and supply new types of armaments.145 Furthermore in 1911, a secret shipment of nitre was caught in Aligang Provincial Affairs sub-bureau to Isbukun group 郡社群 or 施武郡群 from the Bunun group, and the Japanese police had suspicions of the Chinese interpreter who might have been teaching the mountain indigenes to manufacture their own ammunition.146 Nevertheless, the Japanese officials also had suspicions of Chinese interpreters smuggling firearms and ammunitions till 1911 without getting much evidence.147

Indeed, it does seem that a lot of the modern rifles the mountain indigenes possessed earlier were from trading with the Chinese soldiers who served in the Qing army during the intense period of armaments anarchy in 1894-95 (see pp. 187-192 above), as many sources

144 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 33 年 1 月份台中縣苗栗辦務署有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs Miaoali Provincial Affairs Bureau of Taichung-ken, January 1900), (V04625\A006) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 1013.
suggested. For example, the Japanese officials in Eastern Taiwan reported on the armaments of Liu Yongfu’s troops, who were left in Taiwan and fled into eastern mountains in 1896, who possessed about 200 firearms, mostly single shot firearms and repeating rifles, 2 foreign cannons and at least 3 crude local made cannons in Leigonghuo. Similar accounts of the mountain indigenes trading with the Qing soldiers or Chinese near the borders or robbing from the Qing soldiers were found in the Japanese’ official reports in Yiland and Xinzhu regions. Another more unusual source is found in The National Geographic Magazine, March 1920, written by Alice Ballantine Kirjassoff:

At the time that the Chinese army of occupation left Formosa and the Japanese entered their new domain, firearms were at a premium. As the Chinese residents were not allowed to retain fire-arms, nearly all the rifles belonging to the departing army, numbering about 20,000, were sold by Chinese traders to the savages. It is this possession of the fire-arms that is dangerous to cope with.

Smuggling firearms and ammunitions from the Chinese into the indigenous communities was also seemingly inevitable, especially in those places where the indigenous tribes and the Chinese villages were mixed or near each other. In 1900, according to the report on the incident of pacifying the mountain indigenes in Dakekan regions, they received ammunition supply from workers, who used to work in manufacturing camphor and served in the punitive expedition military in southern Dakekan and exchanged some indigenous goods.

In the same year a Chinese civilian Lin A-Zhang who lived in the Talunas tribe (大崙坑社 or

148 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘恆春支廳長相良長鋼往台東地方出差之覆命書’ (Confirmation letter of the inauguration of Sagara Tsunashige, Hengchun branch director to the Taidong County, September 1896), (V00071\A05) in Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Yu Bian (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Eastern Taiwan in Japanese Colonization), 92.
149 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 29 年 9 月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, September 1896), (V000084\A003) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Yu Bian (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miao Areas in Japanese Colonization), 421–422.
150 Alice Ballantine Kirjassoff was the wife of Max David Kirjassoff, an American consul of Yokohama. She was also the sister in law of a famous American science fiction writer and comic book illustrator — Harry Harrison. They both died in the destructive earthquake in Yokohama in 1923. Information on Alice Ballantine Kirjassoff, see http://www.furukabe.com/negishibochi/fk_negishibochi.html
152 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘為膺逞大嵙崁生蕃之行軍狀況’ (Status report of the troops for the punitive expedition against the savage indigines in Taikokan, September 1900), (V00532\A014) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhi: Lifanzhengce (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management), 374.
too Lusin) in Pushige 璞石閣 branch (Yuli township, Hualian County) was about to get arrested for secretly selling ammunition, which was manufactured by the Bunun indigenes of the Talunas tribe, but he escaped and hid himself. Sources and evidence on the firearms and ammunition smuggling are now difficult to trace, but there were rumours of firearms and ammunition importation to the mountain indigenes in various regions such as Wuzhishan in Xinzhu in 1898, Neiwan 内灣 in 1899, Shimenzhuan and Sanjiaoyong in 1899, and at an illegal camphor-still in Nanzhuan and Neiwan village, which were reported by different local administrations.

Another conceivable smuggling route was through the guards at the guard lines or camphor sites who were given stored firearms and ammunitions for defence, but this was very difficult as all the firearms were branded and the guards were required to report regularly and were only able to obtain new ammunition from exchanging their old cartridges/shells. Nonetheless, snatching firearms and ammunitions during the combats could never be stopped, especially when there were numerous and different sizes of battles occurring every year. It was less reported in the Japanese’ official reports, although there was an interesting instance when indigenes attacked guards at the oil site and it mentioned how the mountain indigenes took firearms from the guards in July 1896.

Traces of mountain indigenes making their own ammunition could also be seen - as mentioned earlier a Chinese interpreter seemingly taught

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153 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治33年9月付臺東廳有關蕃人蕃地之蕃務及蕃務報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Taidong County in September 1900), (V04647\A03). Rijushiqi Dongtaiwandiqiu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanju 日據時期東臺灣地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Easter Taiwan in Japanese Colonization), 414.
154 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治31年3月付五指山蕃務署蕃務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, March 1898), (V00323\A016) in Riusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanju 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 325.
155 ‘明治32年1月付台北縣新竹蕃務署蕃務成績報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Xinzhu Provincial Affairs Bureau of Taipei-ken, January 1899 ), (V04594\A008) in Ibid., 796.
157 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘北縣技手飯島幹太郎等二名蕃地探險覆命書’ (Confirmation on the land of indigenes expedition of two Technicians including Iijima Mikitaro of Taipei-ken), (V04622\A001) in Riusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanju 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 1218.
158 ‘明治29年7月付大湖蕃務署蕃務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, July 1889), (V00084\A001).Ibid., 386–87.
the indigenes to make powder in 1911 and in *The National Geographic Magazine* in 1920, it is reported how “He related to us how the savages make bullets from the heart of a very hard wood cured by a special process. These bullets are only effectual when fired from a short range, and when they lodge in the flesh they explode like dumdum bullets.”\(^{159}\) Crackers were sold to the mountain indigenes as a replacement for the detonators and 122,411 crackers were apprehended by the Japanese officials in 1913.

It was extremely difficult for the mountain indigenes to obtain firearms under the Japanese governance and the Japanese officials were also fully aware or suspicious of any smuggling activities. However, mountain indigenes persistently used their firearms and sustained their capability of using firearms to make war against other hostile indigenous tribes, attacked the Japanese officers, the Chinese camphor workers and neighboring civilians and engaged in different scales of rebellions through to the 1930s.

4. Conclusion

Firearms may have been one of the several weapons of hunting for many years, but in our period they seem to have risen in status as the weapon of headhunting, warfare and resistance. It was this most important armament in mountain indigenes’ resistance which caused such a great impediment to the Taiwan Sotokufu in exploiting mountain resources and obtaining fully control over Taiwan, which none of any previous regimes did before them. Under the early governance of Japan, the possession of firearms among the mountain indigenes had generally reached to a modern or advanced level. The processes of producing firearms and ammunitions for the mountain indigenes were mainly from the Taiwan Sotokufu, but their attempts at control or confiscation were clearly ineffectual. The procurements for the firearms and ammunition became more complicated, arduous and sometimes dangerous for the mountain indigenes than in the late Qing reign.

Taiwan Sotokufu began to implement different methods to make mountain indigenes stop their headhunting rituals and their resistances. These methods included persuasion, giving them goods such as salt, clothes, matches, powder, wine, pigs, rice, etc., encouraging and rewarding them for work in cultivation, sending the mountain indigenes’ chiefs to Japan and

\(^{159}\) Kirjassoff, ‘Formosa the Beautiful’, 285.
Taipei for tourism, setting up schools in the mountain indigenous districts, and confiscating firearms and ammunition whenever possible. However, they all had limited effects on the mountain indigenes as their headhunting ritual and determinations of protecting their territories could not be removed or even easily reduced within their cultures. Eventually Taiwan Sotokufu initiated the Five Year Indigenous Management Scheme under General Sakuma Samata’s instruction, especially giving impetus to military and police pacifications against the rebellious mountain indigenes during 1910-1914. Warships, aircrafts, several advanced artilleries such as mountain guns, mortars, Gatling guns, and field guns were transferred to fight against the mountain indigenes as briefly mentioned in Section 2. Electric barbwirees were installed along the guard lines and landmines were buried near the mountain indigenes’ territories.160 Under these circumstances, the mountain indigenes were seemingly forced to give in their firearms and ammunitions after the military expeditions or submitted their firearms and ammunition before the military expeditions. Despite everything the Taiwan Sotokufu had done to supress the mountain indigenes with advanced military technologies and confiscating the mountain indigenes’ firearms and ammunition, the mountain indigenes did not stop fighting against Japan’s colonization and developed a unique gun culture. This gun culture among different indigenous communities assisted them in adapting firearms from the traditional level to modern and advanced level in battlefields and also sustained their customs.

The securing and re-securing of firearms across the frontier between mountain indigenes and Chinese is central to any story of how mountain indigenous people resisted Japanese colonialism so successfully for so long. Despite the regulations and confiscations and seeming hand-over of weaponry, the Japanese methods were expensive, costly in manpower and ineffectual. **Firearms did three things that we can generalise about for those years – they grew in number over time, they became more modern and effective, and they came increasingly into the hands of mountain indigenous groups who were habitually opposed to outside interference, whether that be Chinese or Japanese.** The final part of the story of resistance based on new technologies concerns the manner in which the mountain indigenes converted the gun, a foreign technique, into an essential technology of resistance and cultural integrity. Adaptation

160 Details on the installation of barbwirees and electric barbwire on the guard lines and the landmines near the indigenous border, see Zheng Anxi 鄭安晞, ‘Rizhi Shiqi Fandi Aiyongxian de Tuijin Yu Bianqian 1895-1920 日治時期蕃地隘勇線的推進與變遷 1895-1920 [The Propellant and Changes of Guard Lines in the Formosan Indigenes Territory during the Japan’s Governance from 1895-1920]’, 111–19.
was not of the gun itself or of the culture, but of the gun into the culture of the Formosan indigenous. This is the focus of Chapter 7 below.
Throughout the thesis, we have argued that the indigenous people of Taiwan mounted a very remarkable, even surprising resistance to the encroachment of the Chinese, the West and the Japanese in the years before 1914. The argument has clearly tried to show that such modern firearms were obtained from a great variety of sources as detailed in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. However, this itself, as we have also foreshadowed, does not explain the particular, even peculiar use and very effective use made of firearms especially from the 1890s, or perhaps even earlier. We have suggested very strongly that a culture of arms was beginning to operate from quite early years, involving emebedment of modern technology -firearms- in the existing cultures of indigenous people, particularly key groups, the Atayals and the others. In particular, in Chart 2:1 at the end of Chapter 2 (p. 63) and Chart 3:1 in the end of Chapter 3 (p. 110), we have shown that the cultural assets were building up that allowed an efficient usage of arms in the cultures that were not in fact even iron-using. Indeed, in many ways the cultures of indigenous people were as non-modern technologically as we could find in many other places. How was it that the Taiwanese indigenes resisted through using firearms for so long? The answer lay, we argue, in the nature of the cultures which allowed the technology of firearms to be embedded very naturally within the more raising value system of indigenous people. In Chart 2:x, we show that the cultural assets were not only existing, but also changing through time. This argument is made much stronger at the end of Chapter 3, where we argued that the culture of firearms was vibrant and was allowing the resistance to increase even as the Chinese, Westerners and Japanese themselves were using much more modern and advanced equipments. Despite the encroachments, the further pressure on eastern Taiwan from every advancement of the outside forces, there seemed to be an equal advancement of the indigenous forces. Yet we know they did not make firearms and we know they have no magic, but we do know also that the firearms became in technical part of their cultures. This is the story of Chapter 7. The resistance of Taiwanese indigenes could not be explained in terms of technological superiority or a high level of intelligence or so when compared with other marginal groups or indigenous groups that were often given very little opportunity or showed
very little evidence a series of long term resistances. So this chapter takes up in far greater detail the actual process and avenues of embedments, the ways that the firearms were brought into the cultures as was clearly show to be the case in all our examples of warfare from Chapter 4, 5 and 6 and in our suggested explaination at the end of Chapter 2 and 3.

The hypothesis is that despite the fact of having a non-firearms production/manufacture culture, the indigenes used the firearms to resist further encroachment after 1860s especially after 1880s through: first, obtaining the firearms and second, embedding the firearms within their cultures. This embedment of firearms was not a conscious activity, but natural to the cultures that existed in the mountains—the culture of warfare, the culture of hunting and headhunting and the tribalism—which were outlined in Chapter 2. We illustrated the place of this culture embedment amongst other possible factors at the end of Chapter2 and Chapter 3, where we wrote of cultural assets. This chapter will illustrate how the cultural assets were demonstrated through the embedment of firearms.

1. Firearms as Technology in Culture

_Frequently border disputes and disputes between two savage tribes last for years, or until the aborigines are so thinned and weakened that they are obliged to fall back and to abandon certain territory to the invader. Although the Chinese lose more lives than the aborigines, success in the long run invariably attends their arms, for almost every border the Celestial has a matchlock and plenty of ammunition, whereas few tribes can muster more than ten percent of matchlock men, the rest being armed with bows and arrows. Amongst the Hakka border men, who live a backwoodsman’s sort of life, are many good shots, but it is a difficult matter to get sight of the savage although the savages can see them. The aborigines have the advantages of the cover and knowledge of the country, and the fighting them in the forest is almost like fighting an unseen foe. The borderers, who become more grasping as they advance, are often checked by the study demeanour of the owners of the soil._

This account recording how the indigenes managed to resist the Chinese invasions

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1Dodd, John, ‘Extracts from Old notes on the Camphor Districts in North Formosa’ in Alsford, *The Witnessed Account of British Resident : John Dodd at Tamsui*, 291.
effectively by using firearms and obtaining firearms over time was written by John Dodd during his stay in the north of the island 1860-1890. After consideration of the types of firearms held by the indigenous people and the routes for them to gain the firearms and ammunition in the period 1860-1914, we might consider more broadly how firearms were important for Formosan indigenes in their cultural lives and the possible relationship of this to their effectiveness in warfare and resistance. In addition, we might move further and suggest that the acculturation of the firearm might have been crucial to answering the further question of how very successful the indigenous resistance was. When Formosan indigenes did not innovate the firearms, nor have the techniques of forging firearms from their original cultures how did the firearm become culturally naturalised? Was the cultural innovation of firearms of greater importance?

Chen suggested that the Formosan indigenes did not voluntarily select the types of firearms, which resulted entirely from the suppliers’ end. Although the Formosan indigenes were in a basically passive position when receiving firearms, they yet sustained some principal or notion of selectivity in the usage of firearms. However, he neglects the broader impact on Formosan indigenes of the economic and political encroachment upon their environment as described in earlier chapters here, and which was accelerating in this period. These factors may be considered as essential to Formosan indigenes’ motivations in approaching firearms and their seeming obsession with firearms actively in order to protect themselves from further invasions and warfare. How did they practice this technology in their hunting, headhunting and ritual activities? How did firearms represent (in a sense re-present) themselves in their cultures?

Firstly, I will give examples of how indigenes used or incorporated firearms in their hunting activity and in battle fields which demonstrated the implantation of firearms within their traditional hunting customs. Secondly, I would like to show how firearms were embedded within indigenes’ culture from physical attachment to ritual practices in various manners. Thirdly, I would like to illustrate how an involvement with firearms entered into the whole communities of Formosan indigenes from the headhunting ritual, which was dominated by male indigenes, in ceremonies, to female indigenes and children. These are the cultural associations of firearms, which not only enriched and solidified the Formosan indigenes’ cultures, but also gave them a capacity to resist encroachments from the western plain and the West, a

notion that we initially considered in Chapter 3, Chart 1. Fourthly, I would like to outline and give traces of the failure of the opposing Qing Chinese troops in obtaining, maintaining and adapting firearms as a contrast to the more effective outcome of indigenes’ firearms cultures. Finally, I would like to sketch briefly how the Taiwan Sotokufu or Japanese Authority on the island, seemed to be more efficient than the Qing government, in managing the police, guards and braves and in regulating the firearms and ammunition in Taiwan. Nevertheless, both Qing and Japanese governments did not manage to cease the rebellions of indigenes completely.

2. Firearms in Hunting, Attack and Defence

2.1. General Hunting Equipment and the Dependency on Firearms of Formosan Indigenes

Firearms were the prime weapons that every indigenous man carried on hunting and head hunting expeditions. The introduction of firearms did not seem to make Formosan indigenes over-dependent on their instant and destructive power or abandon their traditional weapons such as knives, spears, arrows and bows, but rather there was an accumulative incorporation within their hunting and head hunting tactics over time or through experience. A French Vice Consul in Taiwan in 1868 wrote about the paraphernalia indigenes carried in fighting or hunting,

The apparatus for fighting or hunting is more dignified. It consists of [these implements:] There is a bread knife, whose sheath is of wood that has been painted red, and this is slipped through the belt. There is a long gun with a fuse, and in front of it two or three powder-horns are suspended from strings of false pearls. In back the man carries a coat which is folded into the net, a bag for balls, and a parchment case containing eight powder charges in eight bamboo holders. Then around his wrist is a cord, a lighter with a fire-stone, and some banana marrow instead of tinder. Sometimes the hunter has a bow, and in that case he always uses it with consummate skill.³

This close observation illustrates vividly the readiness of indigenes when fighting or hunting in using firearms, powder supply, igniting fire, and auxiliary weapons and arranging these items

³ Guérin and Bernard, ‘Les Aborigènes de L’Île de Formose.’, 555.
in order to contend with any unanticipated ambush. This picture below was painted around the mid-1870s and portrayed the application of firearms in indigenes’ hunting.⁴ (Figure 7: 1)

![Figure 7: 1 Indigenes hunted with firearms](image)

Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., *Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖* (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 120.

Extensively, the firearms were implemented effectively in the raids and defence of indigenes which were often reported. Firelocks were furnished by the plains indigenes when marching through the mountain territories in large groups of 70 men, as noted by Steere,⁵ and matchlocks were carried for defence by the plains indigenes who were stationed as outposts of the villages, as Captain Bax detailed when entering mountain regions in the north.⁶

Ammunition and other required gadgets accompanied the matchlocks as co-joined on their bodies, and this was illustrated in Dodd’s observation of mountain indigenes living in hills in the northeast of Taiwan,

> Every man who possesses a gun (pâhtûs) wears round his neck curious-

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⁴ For the information on the background of *Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖* (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan), see chapter 4, footnote no.38.
⁵ LXXV (#74) Tamsui, Formosa, 01/Dec/1873 in Steere, ‘Letters from Formosa’.
looking priming-flasks full of powder, and over his shoulder, or round his waist, an oblong-shaped case, made of skin, often containing several cylindrical-shaped wooden receptacles full of powder. He has generally about him a small bag containing shot and long iron projectiles almost the size of the little finger, which are slipped down the muzzle of the long-barrelled matchlock on top of the powder without any wad between.7

The indigenes in northeast Taiwan seemed to have forged some collective manner of carrying firearms which especially displayed their proximity with them. They also collocated the firearm, the powder, the shot and other firearm-related assortments on their bodies perfectly well in order to react deftly to any sudden attack, ambushes or combats. Similar finding of the furnished firearms among the deputy chief of the Paiwans -Bunkiet and his 12 fellows- could be seen in Taylor’s account. Before entering the Tipun village of the Puyuma tribe in southern Taiwan in the 1880s:

Gun covers were taken off, and the barrels polished until they shone like silver; all baggage was transferred to the other members of the party; the ammunition pouches were hung in proper order, and lastly the white scarf, which denoted that the wearer is a warrior ready to encounter all comers, was donned. With guns loaded and a spare cartridge held between the teeth the band entered the village, and, savages as they are, they looked a gallant troop of lithe young fellows.8

Until the early Japanese reign, the Formosan indigenes continued to use firearms primarily for their hunting and their reliance on firearms in hunting seemed to escalate due to their more difficult circumstances. As the chief of the Shiron tribe from the Atayal group told a Japanese officer in 1896,

There is shortage of food, particularly in the mountains. The indigenes don’t have much money, nor store food, unlike the Japanese and the Chinese. If we rest for a day, we are short of food for a day. Thus male indigenes carried their guns to hunt for animals busily every day. All the olds and the young indigenes and women worked in farming or spinning and weaving. How would we dare to rest? We have no choice, but only devoted to farming. However, we were forced to move from time to time without a certain residence for our children and grandchildren and could not work in farming since the establishment of Pacification and

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8 According to the Aborigines of South Taiwan in the 1880s—in Hengchun xianzhi 恆春縣志 [Hengchun county gazetteer], Bunkiet 潘文結/杰 and Tsui Lui 朱雷 are both registered as chiefs of Tiersock (豬月勞束社) Taylor, ‘A Ramble through Southern Formosa’, 146.
Reclamation Bureau and the oppression from the Chinese and officials. We have now escaped to the mountain and can only rely on the meat of birds and beasts.⁹

This account not only shows that firearms became indispensable tools for them in hunting animals, but that they were also increasingly reliant on them to obtain essential food. And the photo Figure 7.2 displays explicitly this close attachment of indigenous man with his modern firearm in hunting.

Figure 7.2 Firearm in an indigenous man’s hand and his game

Source: Suzuki Hideo 鈴木秀夫, 台灣番界展望, p 28 in Chen Zong-Ren 陳宗仁, ed., Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 122-123

Another appeal made from the Atayal chief Taimomisseru to the director of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in 1897 also showed the requisite use of firearms, and as he said of his fellows, “the knives and guns are worn away and utterly useless. Hopefully the authority could render as soon as possible. Without knives and firearms, we would starve in mountains. How can they be seen merely as tools for killing people?” Later, the Atayal chief demonstrated his ingenious techniques in shooting by firing at a squirrel with a single gunshot as the director reported with praise. This explicit narration showed their dependency on firearms in hunting and his reassertion of this by shooting a squirrel with a single shot in front of the Japanese officials. Figure 7:3 from the Fengsu huabao 風俗畫報 (Custom Pictorial) drawn by the Japanese, symbolised the firearms used by the indigenes in hunting.

10 ‘大嵙崁撫墾署長巡視蕃社狀況報告’ (Reports by the Commissioner of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau on the inspection of indigenous tribe) in May 1897, (V04533\A026) in Ibid., 282.
11 ‘大嵙崁撫墾署長巡視蕃社狀況報告’ (Reports by the Commissioner of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau on the inspection of indigenous tribe) in May 1897, (V04533\A026) in Ibid., 285.
This dependency on firearms of the indigenes did not just apply in hunting, but also in their defence as we have shown in many instances in Chapters 4-6, and as generalised for the later years in this Japanese official report of 1897,

> The indigenes have the custom of possessing guns while trudging in mountains, which is to defend from the Chinese invasion and to hunt animals for food supply. Therefore, they regard their guns as their lives. If they were taken, it would be like taking their lives away ...

Moreover, in 1905 the director of Jiayi Province delivered a note to the chief commissioner of police about the impact of the ban on the supply of ammunition and detonators on the Tsou indigenes of Alishan group after 1903. The note reported that since the ban was introduced, not only could the indigenes not hunt to obtain nourishment and materials for clothes and daily goods, but they were also threatened by the neighbouring tribes, lost their hunting territories and their crops were destroyed by wild hogs whose numbers increased because of lack of hunting. This fully explained the significance of using firearms in hunting for the Tsou sustaining and maintaining their lives, their existence and the ecology system. This certainly applied to the other indigenous groups as well. Such evidence shows how indigenes incorporated firearms in their hunting activities and developed them as cultural assets, which assisted them in functioning effectively in any armed conflicts with others.

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12 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ed., ’明治30年8月份新竹縣轄內各撫墾署(五指山,大湖,南庄)事務成績報告’ (Reports of the Pacification and Reclamation Bureaus of Wuzhishan, Dahu, and Nanzhuang in Hsinchu-ken jurisdiction, August 1897), (V00163 A022) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization) (Nantou: Taiwan Historica 國史館臺灣文獻館, 2003), 106–107.

2.2. Styles in action

An amalgamation of their group hunting tactics and firearms was noticed in Francis White’s journal when he joined a hunting activity with the Pepos:

Between the bank and the mountains was a level space, some half a mile wide covered with long coarse grass reaching up to our middles; here, the greater part of us were placed in position forming a half circle facing inwards. The remainder with the dogs then ascended the hill side and commenced driving the game. One fine stag soon broke cover, and immediately fell victim to a well-directed matchlock ball.\textsuperscript{14}

This was another way to ensure hitting their targets when firing with accuracy in combining their knowledge of geographic conditions in groups, by half circling and driving their chases, to where they could easily fire upon them. A narrative that accompanied one of the illustrations in the \textit{Illustrations of aborigines in late Qing Taiwan} described the indigenes’ hunting tactic with firearms. Indigenous tribes would surround the mountain with other tribes and burn the forest. Some of them carried their firearms, arrows and bows and waited until the animals fled from the fire.\textsuperscript{15} See in the top left hand corner of Figure 7:4.

\textsuperscript{14} Francis White, ‘A Visit to the Interior of South Formosa.’ \textit{The Cycle: A Political and Literary Review} 17 (27 August 1870): 199.
\textsuperscript{15} Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, \textit{Wangqing Taiwan Fansu Tu 晚清臺灣番俗圖(Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan)}, 134.
Even a broken musket would be used in setting up snares, like the one Dr. Warburg nearly fell into as he described,

> They called my attention to a thread that was hidden in the grass, and was connected with a piece of lead, which, if I had walked against it, would have triggered a broken musket hidden in the bushes. A not very gentile, but necessary manner of village defense.\(^{16}\)

Here, then the snare merged their traditional primary techniques of trapping animals with the foreign muskets, which very precisely exemplifies the insertion of the musket inside the indigenous hunting cultures. The exercise of firearms, which provided rapidity and lethality was essential and satisfactory among the Formosan indigenes while hunting animals, therefore, firearms were instinctively used by the indigenes and then adapted into their hunting cultures.

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\(^{16}\) Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’.  

Source: 陳宗仁, ed., Fanshe fenlie tushuo ‘番社焚獵圖說’ (Illustration of indigenous tribe burned the forest for hunting animals) in Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 134
The indigenes also seemed to understand the importance of calculating the distance when firing their firearms in order to create the most potent results. Swinhoe, Pickering and Beazeley each mentioned that the indigenes often fired at their targets within a relatively short distance. In this way, they might have a much higher chance of shooting down their targets and then capturing their prey or cutting their enemies’ heads as their triumph as quickly as possible, although they also thus exposed themselves closely to their enemies and situated themselves in dangerous positions. This tactic of firing their firearms over short distances when initiating attacks did not seem to change into the early twentieth century. This was illustrated by Kirjassoff in *The National Geographic Magazine* when an indigenous man Kim Soan talked about his experience in a headhunting expedition. Kim Soan said, “my companions shot the guardsman through the heart from an ambush ten feet distant ... they cut off the woodman's head, and we returned home.” The mountain indigenes also innovated their own fighting position which was lying on their backs in the bush and using their foot to pull the triggers as Mackay described in Chapter 4, p. 131. This was completely different from the Western soldiers who were trained to lay on their stomach and aimed at their targets from a raised position. The indigenes’ posture would give far less exposure of their body to their enemies while hiding in the bush.

An interesting passage concerning a shooting competition between English officers and indigenes in southern Taiwan as early as 1875 was reported by Beazeley:

A party of English officers from a man-of-war landed on the island, and meeting a company of natives armed with matchlocks, challenged them to a trial of skill in shooting. Affixing a mark to a tree about 100 yards distant, the officers made what they considered pretty fair practise, without, however, astonishing the natives, who, when it came to their turn to fire, disappeared into the jungle like one man, and crawled on their bellies through the undergrowth to about three yards from the target, which, of course, from that distance, they all hit exactly in the centre. When the Englishmen protested that such a method of conducting the competition was hardly fair, the natives replied, “We do not understand what you mean by fair, but anyhow that is the way we shoot Chinamen.”

18 Kirjassoff, ‘Formosa the Beautiful’, 284–85.
19 Beazeley, ‘Notes of an Overland Journey through the Southern Part of Formosa in 1875, from Takow to the South Cape, with Sketch Map.’, 21–22.
This passage shows the flexible or guerrilla postures and braveness of the indigenes when targeting with their matchlocks in close distance, which was completely different from the English officers who received formal training. It seemed to atone for their backwardness and limited range of firearms. They had also exhibited familiarity and knowledge of their geographical environment and their physical flexibility while using firearms. Another entertaining account on the Pepos of the Kabalan group demonstrated their continual and highly developed vigilance when they were tricked by Dr. Collingwood’s party,

While some were thus engaged, the idlers allowed themselves to be amused by some of our party, who showed them little tricks, which caused hearty laughter, and which they tried their best to imitate. Seeing a revolver, they were very anxious to have it fired off, and stuck a leaf upon a door to be shot at, which was done twice, upon which there immediately appeared two or three men armed with matchlocks, who had evidently turned out at the sound of the pistol to protect the community in case of need. This little incident seemed to prove that they were always on the alert, and gave colour to the general report that they, like Chinese, are subject to the raids of the raw mountain savages, against whom they are always more or less prepared to defend themselves.20

This small incident not only reflected the conventional cautiousness and the speed in retort of the indigenes, but also revealed that even in the early years matchlocks functioned as their paramount weapon, instead of knives or arrows, in dangerous circumstances.

2.3. Firearms in Defence and Attack

British and American troops encountered various gunfire assaults from the indigenes in southern Taiwan in the 1867 Rover incident, and these ended in retreats (see Chapter 4, pp.116-122). Some hunting tactics with the application of firearms of the southern indigenes could be seen in battle with the American troops in 1867 (see Chapter 4, pp. 118-120) when they drove the American soldiers to their controlling position and fired at their enemies whilst hiding in grass and moving their positions without being seen. Mudan and Kusakut indigenes struck the Japanese military with firearms which caused mostly Japanese soldiers injuries

during the Japanese expedition of 1874 (see pp. 123-129). Shen, Baozhen reported that ferocious indigenes fired with firearms at Chinese braves in several ambushes whilst opening roads in the northern mountain regions in 1874, which forced the Chinese troops to withdraw.\textsuperscript{21} The Estonian military officer, Pavel Ivanovich Ibis remarked and recorded the actions of the southern indigenes in battlefield whilst shooting and he noted that,

\begin{quote}
they never engage in open battle that could put them at a disadvantage, but rather follow the enemy by foot, unseen, unsuspected, and then shoot at him from the bushes, or weaken him through surprise attacks, or lure him into their hiding places, from which retreat is not possible without substantial losses.\textsuperscript{22}
\end{quote}

These accredited tactics accompanying the utilization of firearms amongst the southern indigenes were reported on by professional and experienced military officers that validated the potency of indigenes fighting in battles.

A combination of primary weapon and firearms were furnished and carried by the indigenes, which could still be seen in 1886 when George Ede, an English Presbyterian missionary at Tainan from 1883, noted on his way to Palongui 巴塱衛 (Taidong County) that,

\begin{quote}
Shortly after our start I happened to be taking the lead of the party, and had got some distance ahead of my fellow-travellers when suddenly, just as I turned a bend in the road, there were two savages right in front of me -- one kneeling on the ground with his arrow on the string, and the other crouching behind with his musket levelled from his shoulder.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Both arrows and muskets were employed by the indigenes, possibly the Paiwans in this case, in their readiness for attack, which changed little over time. Ede also illustrated the indigenes in their prepared attack position which was rapid and apt to strike at unattended travellers, and their combat position with the combination of arrow and musket might well have given them advantage in shooting the enemy, which resulted in a seemingly high ratio of death to injury.

Moreover, Formosan indigenes appeared to be always in readiness, accompanied with their firearms for skirmishes even when working in the fields. The Rev. James Mackay himself perceived two dozen of the local tribes with their chief monitoring them at the border of two

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{21} Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨, Shen Wensugong Du 沈文肅公牘 [Correspondence of Shen Baozhen], 196–97.
\end{flushleft}
tribes and cropping up with their matchlocks equipped. 24 Papos who lived in Sua-sam-la (Shanlin district, Kaohsiung) were armed with matchlocks, knife, and hatchet as protection even when working in the field within accessible distance to unforeseen incursions from the inimical mountain indigenes or Hakka people. 25 Dr. Warburg also mentioned in the 1880s about how the Christian plains indigenes first fetched their firearms when they cultivated further afield. 26 Their use of firearms seemed to continue to serve side by side with their traditional knives, spears, arrow and bows in hunting animals. Firearms began to synthesize with the indigenous hunting cultures, and the indigenes even depended on the firearms to hunt for subsistence.

3. Embedment of Firearms among Indigenes’ Cultures

The deeper meanings of firearms were also reflected in various aspects of indigenous cultures. Thanks to the foreign visitors, including missionaries, scientists, anthropologists, military officers, businessmen, etc., who had been to the indigenes’ territories and recorded their close observation of the Formosan indigenes’ behaviours and cultures, we can penetrate into this level of cultural embedment. Here I am hoping to demonstrate the significance of firearms and the engagement with firearms, within indigenous cultures which was associated with their habits, attitudes, and customs and extended to their social systems and entire communities. These engagements may be interpreted as measures of the embedment of firearms as a new technology within the basic cultural attributes of Taiwanese indigenous peoples. Various narratives from foreign visitors and Chinese officials, who recorded and observed closely the lives of indigenous people in Taiwan will be a major source for this section.

3.1. Personal Necessity for Indigenous Men

Firearms were regarded by the indigenous men as a personal necessity and the ability to operate a firearm for an indigenous man was crucial to his livelihood, status and self-esteem. This was because the deadly force of the firearms determined the characters, social positions

24 Mackay, From Far Formosa: The Island, Its People and Missions, 260.
26 Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’. 
and authorities of their communities or even larger regions in hunting and headhunting activities, which were dominated by indigenous men. In some indigenous societies, the possession of firearms also represented what amounted to class differences. An account in the *Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu* (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan), which was dated around 187 by the Qing officials, noted the attitude of the indigenes toward firearms,

They regarded firearms as the most valuable, so they were perfectly polished. Those who could not afford firearms practised their skills of using arrows, bows, knives and spears. However, these were abandoned once they obtained firearms. They would not fire irrationally, but they always hit the target when firing. In order not to waste the powder, they had to be well-practised in using the firearms because the powder was rare.²⁷

Also, a few drawings demonstrated vividly how the firearms were carried by the indigenous people when joining the tribal war or going out. See Figure 7:5 and 7:6. Every single Tsui-Hwan male, from the Thao tribe could handle a firearm, but these were in the main only actually possessed by the rich as Bullock mentioned.²⁸ In John Dodd’s notes on the camphor district in north Taiwan, he mentioned the indigenes men shouldering their weapons, which might include firearms, but not helping to carry the household gear.²⁹ In the matrilineal indigenous societies, the ownership of firearms among indigenous male was rather significant and prominent. Hu Zhuan explained that,

Indigenous Men would carry his guns, knives and clothes and live in *Bailangguan* [the male gathering house] if the couple quarrelled. Their sons or daughters, property, and herd, all belonged to the wife.³⁰

*Bailangguan* is also called Palakuwan by the Puyuma indigenes. It is the place or gathering house where the Puyuma indigenous male discussed tribal affairs, defended the tribes, training etc. *Firearms signified the indispensable and fundamental tool and weapon for the male indigenes, and here they were clearly helping define and maintain the nuanced notion of a special privilege for males in the midst of matrilinearity.*

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²⁷ Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, *Wangqing Taiwan Fansu Tu* 晚清臺灣番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan), 98.
²⁹ Dodd, John, ‘Extracts from Old notes on the Camphor Districts in North Formosa’ in Alsford, *The Witnessed Account of British Resident: John Dodd at Tamsui*, 292.
Figure 7:5 Indigenes in Tainan carried firearms when joining tribal war.

Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Tainan fanmu juanhou tushuo '台南番目眷口圖說' (Illustration of Indigenous chief’s family in Tainan) in Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 74.

Figure 7:6 Indigenes in Taipei carried firearms when with their family
Source: Chen Zong-Ren 陳宗仁, ed., Taibe fanmu juanlou tushuo '臺北番目眷口圖說' (Illustration of Indigenous chief’s family in Taipei) in Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 78.

It was reported frequently that indigenous men went on to carry firearms commonly as their personal requisite well after the Japanese colonization of Taiwan. In the report of the director of the Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau (Dahu Fukenshu 大湖撫墾署) on the Atayal indigenous lives and customs in 1896, he stated “male indigenes in the age from 15 or 16 to 60s all possess firearms and carry the firearms wherever they go. If the guns have some damage or rust, they can take them apart, even with the latest guns.”\(^3\) In the report from the Jinwei and Sanjiayong Provincial Affairs Bureaus 景尾, 三角湧办事处 (Jingmei and Sanxia Districts, New Taipei City) in 1899, where the Atayal indigenes lived, “Almost every indigenous group possessed firearms and firearms were essential devices for the indigenes in their lives as armaments for the troops. Without these devices, the indigenes could not continue their lineage [to obtain a wife]. The male indigenes have to master in hunting.”\(^3\) In Mori Ushinosuke’s 森丑之助 investigation reports, the Tsou indigenes from the Tufuya tribe (Alishan township 阿里山鄉, Jiayi County) that they employed, all carried spear and firearms in 1900\(^3\) and in 1909 every Bunun indigene had a firearm among the tribes in the Fanshuliaoz Province 蕃薯寮廳 (Qishan District, Kaohsiung City).\(^3\) Most importantly, the way in which firearms shaped the identity of Formosan indigenous men was presented in a lecture, which was given by Shinji Ishii, a Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute (UK) to the China Society at Caxton Hall, London in February 1916. He said, “Now nearly every savage fighting-man has a firearm, which he holds only second in value to his life, just as our Samurai looked on their swords in

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\(^3\)Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 29 年 9 月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告' (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, September 1896), (V00084/A003) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 417.

\(^3\)Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 32 年 2 月份台北縣景尾, 三角湧辦務署有關蕃人蕃地至事務及情況報告' (Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Jingwei and Sanjiayong Branch of Taipei County, February 1899), (V04594/A009) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huihianzhizi 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management), 101.

\(^3\)Ushinosuke Mori, Shengfan Xingjiao: Mori de Taiwan Tanxian 生蕃行腳: 森丑之助的台灣探險 [Explorations of Ushinosuke Mori in Taiwan], 259.

\(^3\)Ibid., 400.
feudal times.”\textsuperscript{35} Here, he appeared to equate the necessity of firearms for indigenous men to that of swords for the Samurai. This notion of comparing to the swords of the Samurai never appeared in Japanese official documents or reports on managing indigenes in Taiwan. Some pictures of indigenes carrying firearms were also shown in the lecture. See Figure 7:7 and Figure 7:8

Figure 7:7 Bunun and Atayal indigenes with their firearms


\textsuperscript{35} Shinji Ishii, \textit{The Island of Formosa and Its Primitive Inhabitants} (London: Japan Society, 1916), 23.
3.2. Presentation, Maintenance & Decoration

The presentations or additional features of firearms also reflected the attitudes toward firearms which became implanted in the indigenes’ cultures. As firearms were valued highly by the Formosan indigenous men, their rifles were always very clean and seemingly the

matchlock owned by the chief of Sabaree, “had just come from the hands of the armorer”.

Taylor also mentioned how the Palangka (Pilam 卑南族) embellished their firearms with covers and the barrels were polished and glinted like silver. Men showed signs of their appreciation and pride while cleaning and polishing their firearms, and of how they valued (or hid or protected) their firearms with the covers. The firearm cloth could also be seen in the list of items which were collected from some indigenous tribes in northern Taiwan in 1897 by Jiyu Sho Min 竺紹珉, a Japanese army officer (see Figure 7: 9). According to Jiyu Sho Min’s note, this firearm cloth was made of animal skin and it covered the mechanism part of the firearm. This might have given some protection to the firearms from the rain to avoid getting damp or rusted. Again, this shows some carefulness amongst indigenes in maintaining the firearms they valued.

In addition, in the report of the Jinwei and Sanjiayong Provincial Affairs Bureaus in 1899, the Atayal indigenes did not appear to abandon their matchlocks even when they possessed some modern and efficient firearms later, but used the matchlocks as ornaments instead.

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Wang, ‘竺紹珉蕃地狀況報告' (Report from Zhu Shao-Min on the indigenous territories, June 1897), (V04534\A002) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao 津威與三嘉雍省郡庶民史料彙編之一: 理番政策, 300.
Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 32 年 2 月份台北縣景尾, 三角湧辦務署有關蕃人蕃地至事務及情務報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Jingwei and Sanjiaoyong Branch of Taipei County, February 1899), (V04594\A009) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huihianzhizi: Lifanzhenge 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策, 100.
Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策
[Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management], 303.

Ornamentations on the firearms possessed by the indigenes could also be noticed in Dodd’s narrative:

They often load their necks with metal trinkets, cuttle-fish beads, &c., to which they attach numerous little appliances connected with the priming and loading of their matchlocks, a motley sort of collection, which excites the curiosity of the beholder.\(^{41}\)

And Steere’s narrative:

The arms of these savages consist of a few fire-locks procured of the Chinese, and used principally in hunting, and lances and large knives used in hunting Chinese heads. They decorate these weapons with tresses of Chinese hair, and when upon the hunt for Chinese, carry highly ornamented red bags for carrying home the captured heads.\(^{42}\)

These assortments symbolised various meanings – relating to class differences, rewards, and sacredness, within different groups, which might have been served to assure or remind others of their success in hunting and headhunting expeditions when attaching them to their firearms. Parts of firearms sometimes became ornaments on their bodies. For instance, it was found that firearm cartridges were pierced on the ears of some Atayal indigenes from the Marikowan sub-group.\(^{43}\) Some brass or copper-made rings, which were used as a spile to protect the muzzle and barrel on the old firearms originally, were worn by the Atayal indigenes of Mashatan tribe from the Ma’aw sub-group.\(^{44}\)

Firearms were also placed with special care in the Formosan indigenes’ houses. As Dr. Steere described, the firelocks and other paraphernalia of war and hunting were displayed and hung on the central post or opposite the door with skulls of animals and human heads as ornament in the house of Thao indigenes.\(^{45}\) The position of the firelocks in the house and with animals and human heads which were the symbolic features from their hunting and

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42 Steere, ‘Formosa’, 308.
43 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 30 年 12 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, December 1897), (V00272A016) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 245.
44 ‘明治 29 年 10 月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, October 1896), (V00084A004) in Ibid., 440.
45 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 34.
headhunting, seemed to flaunt the triumphs and prestige of their owner. The chief of Sabari–Issek’s room where at one time Pavel Ibis stayed, was decorated with a “whole arsenal of firearms, knives, spears and other hunting gears” hanging on deerskins on the wall.66 These kind of scenes could still be found in the report or visitor’s journal in the Japanese period. For example, a group of Japanese administrators from the Yilan Province were sent to survey the Atayal tribes of the Mnibu sub-group in 1900 and reported that,

"A higher seat was put up in the indigenous house and some hair from the hunted-heads were hung on it. Guns, knives, arrows and bows were displayed next to the hair. They assumed it is the seat for worshipping their god and for the guests. Food, drink and dirty items shouldn’t place on it. They were rebuked by the indigenes when sitting on the seat with their straw sandals."

This shows that the hair from the hunted head and the firearms and other weaponry were valued equally and highly regarded by the indigenes according to the place where they were located – a higher seat where they situated these items. And when the Japanese administrator sat on the higher seat, the indigenes’ reaction or behaviour also show that the hair from the hunted heads and weaponries, which they regarded as their sacraments, would not be intruded upon. The indigenes near Tainan appeared to display their weaponries differently as Mrs Marjorie Landsborough noted in her visit in February 1911 when she wrote,

"Inside it was so dark that at first we could see nothing, but a savage put up his hand, and pushed aside one of the slates of the roof, which were only laid on, not fixed down. And then all I could see were knives, guns and spears, bows and arrows, some black, rusty, cooking pans, and rows and rows of animal’s jaw bones strung on to ropes across the hut."

The weaponries were situated at the most obvious place when entering the indigenous hut, along with their cooking pans and numerous animals’ jaw bones. Firearms appeared to represent the identities or essentiality of male indigenes and publicity for the achieved status

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67 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ed., ”宜蘭廳轄內溪頭蕃社踏查報告” (Field report on Xitou indigenous tribe in the jurisdiction of Yilan County, July 1900), (V04625\A026) in Rijusheqi Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 百據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization) (Nantou: Taiwan Historic 國史館臺灣文獻館, 2001), 355.
of prominent individuals with trophies, not only just in his family, but also among indigenes’ societies, their guests and even outsiders.

3.3. Etiquette

A number of accounts from foreign visitors related how Formosan indigenes fired their firearms or matchlocks on various occasions. The precise reasons or meanings of firing firearms amongst indigenes is at times obscure, therefore, some conjectures only drawn from the narrators’ descriptions. Firing their firearms seemed to integrate with the indigenous people’s manner of courtesy, sign of agreement or signal of exchange. In Bax’s trip in the north, he noticed how two parties of Pepos greeted each other and formed consensus by firing matchlocks,

We were here met by some Peppo-hoans from their camp, which was on the other side of the valley. The two parties saluted each other by firing matchlocks, shouting and dancing ... After deciding that we were friends this party also fired off their matchlocks in the air.\(^49\)

Plains indigenes in Posia also saluted Rev. Mackay, Rev. Ritchie and Herbert J. Allen, by firing their matchlocks in the air and shouting “Pahuria raki” (peace be with you) before returning to Posia.\(^50\) Dr. Warburg also experienced a similar practice of firearms when receiving salute shots on the field by the Christian Pepohwans or the Plains indigenes.\(^51\) This was like a continuation of the ritual of Pepos from the seventeenth century Dutch era: by firing of muskets or cannon as a signal when mustering church services as interpreted by Shepherd.\(^52\) Clearly this had become a stable tradition. For instance, General Le Gendre also mentioned this etiquette of indigenes in his usual grumbling manner,

Our tent was instantly struck, our baggage put in order, and, in less than fifteen minutes, we were away, firing guns on each side, as a sign of amity. Besides the firing of matchlocks, these aborigines have no other way to bid each other adieu. The same custom obtains from one end of


\(^{50}\) Allen, ‘Notes of a Journey through Formosa from Tamsui to Taiwanfu’, 263.

\(^{51}\) Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’.

\(^{52}\) In the case of such ‘blunderbuss Christians’ in Sinka at that time it was reported that ‘all the inhabitants, men, women and children, young and old, assembled in the Church. Instead of bells being rung, three muskets are fired as a sign to come together.’, and in Mattau and Bakloan two small cannon substituted for musketry. Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600-1800*, 1993, 66. And see Chapter 2, footnote: 105.

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the island to the other.\textsuperscript{53}

In contrast is the Rev. Mackay’ description, who seemed to really enjoy watching this firing ritual demonstration and signal exchange between indigenes:

When on the top of the first mountain range a piercing yell told of savages at hand, and at a stream in the valley below we met more than fifty of them. Salutations were exchanged. The wild mountaineers pointed their guns upward, fired a volley, and bade us follow them. They welcomed us to their mountain retreat, where we spent the night and they were entirely friendly.\textsuperscript{54}

Firing off firearms also was the method often chosen as a notification before entering the other indigenous tribes or parting. Foreign visitors like Pickering were ordered to follow this ritual before entering Banga village (Paiwan) and then wait to see the report of a firearm and smoke, which was like a permission to enter indigenous territories.\textsuperscript{55} Ibis appeared to interpret this firearm behaviour of the indigenes differently, as perhaps a trial of the hunting skill of their foreign visitor before entering the indigenous village:

One of them stuck a bamboo staff into the ground about thirty steps from me, and Karanbau invited me to shoot at it. With them, as with all highlanders of Formosa, there is a custom that forces every stranger to shoot at a target before entering a village. This is more, it seems to me, to make certain of his hunting dexterity, highly valued by them, than in order to unload his weapon.\textsuperscript{56}

Captain Bax noted that both plain and mountain indigenes were shouting, dancing and firing matchlocks when departing the camp in 1871.\textsuperscript{57} Evidence of how the indigenous men fired their firearms as a signal at the entrance of their village could still be found in Ishii’s lecture in 1916. This was seemingly to notify their tribal members and family of their success in obtaining a trophy from their headhunting expedition and to welcome them in their best clothes, although the headhunting custom was strictly prohibited by the Taiwan Sotokufu.\textsuperscript{58} Another form of greeting by shooting targets with firearms seemed to take place in the case of when

\textsuperscript{53} Le Gendre, ‘Reports on Amoy and the Island of Formosa’, 1871, 34.

\textsuperscript{54} Mackay, \textit{From Far Formosa: The Island, Its People and Missions}, 240.

\textsuperscript{55} Pickering, ‘Among the Savages of Central Formosa, 1866-1867’, 1878, 15–16.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibis, ‘Ekskursiia Na Formozu’, 133.

\textsuperscript{57} Bax, \textit{The Eastern Seas}, 116–34.

\textsuperscript{58} Ishii, \textit{The Island of Formosa and Its Primitive Inhabitants}, 17.
the chief of the Tipun tribe of the Puyuma met the chief of Paiwan and George Taylor. Both parties congregated, as described by Taylor, and

Grasping a gun and signing to several braves to do the same, the two parties began to chant somewhat as follows. 'Who are you of the shining muskets and jingling clothes?' "We are princes of the blood and warriors from the great confederation of the South.' 'If you are princes, you are Tipuns; if you are warriors, you can hit the mark. Prove your tale!' 59

Inevitably, Taylor amazed both the Puyumas and the Paiwans when he hit the sixty yards target they set, but it was unclear what types of firearms Taylor used. Taylor and the Paiwan indigenes were then treated as warriors afterwards. In this scene, firearms and the practice of firearms were considered and indicated as a form of rank or status among the southern indigenes. Despite the fact that we now cannot really know the exact meaning of firing firearms for Formosan indigenes, it seems certain that even from early in our period the action and the practice of firearms were integrated as part of indigenes’ customs or traditions.

3.4. Superstitions

Firing firearms was seemingly at times required to gratify their belief in indiscernible spirits or superstitions, especially when disaster occurred or something took place that the Formosan indigenes considered as bad luck. The Rev. Campbell encountered a few occasions like these when he visited a mountain indigenous village of the Bunun group in Posia:

They told me that one of their wells had been under evil influence for a long time, and had caused numerous deaths. They had been in the habit of firing into it in the evenings in the hope that the bullets from their long guns would dislodge the enemy. 60

An episode also occurred to Professor Steere with the Thao tribe:

As we were just leaving the little lake and valley of Tsuisia behind, and everything seemed progressing fairly, the savages suddenly dropped or crouched to the ground, and some began groaning, while others pounded with their great knives on the butts of their firearms. When we inquired the meaning of this, we found that a bird famed for its

foretelling powers had called out on the left hand side of the path, and this was considered an omen of evil. After a little stop they started on, but still groaning and beating their gun stocks. This bad omened bird stopped our march twice in the same way, but was then heard on the right hand, and we went on again.\(^{61}\)

It is difficult to know if this enigmatic manner of Formosan indigenes in firing or referencing firearms was due to the blasting sound of the firearms or the notion that the destructive power of the firearms might expel the evil spirit. The application or invocation of firearms pervaded the beliefs of Formosan indigenes.\(^{62}\)

Other firearm-related superstitions of the Formosan indigenes were the diverse interpretations of their dreams among the different indigenous groups. These were investigated and collected in the survey on the 526 indigenous tribes from 7 different groups by the Taiwan Sotokufu from 1931. For instance, if one dreamed about firearms as being broken, robbed or lost, it would be considered ominous by the Seediq Tgdaya 德克達雅 and the Seejiq Truku 德路固 from the Seediq group\(^{63}\), Paiwan group\(^{64}\), the Truku indigenes of the Tkdaya sub-group 木瓜蕃\(^{65}\), the Atayal indigenes from the Gaogan tribe in the Malepa sub-group\(^{66}\) and the Bunun indigenes from the Takivatan sub-group.\(^{67}\) If one dreamed about having a bath, it meant the firearms could not fire for the Tsarisian 傀儡蕃 of the Rukai group.\(^{68}\) By contrast, if one dreamed about obtaining firearms from others or firearms were damaged, it would be considered as good fortune by the Saysiyat group\(^{69}\) or as securing prey by the Tsarisian.\(^{70}\) Other interesting explanations when dreaming about firearms for the Tsarisian were: a dream of firearms during pregnancy indicated the baby would be a girl; a dream of firing firearms indicated good weather.\(^{71}\)

\(^{61}\) Steere, ‘Letters from Formosa’.
\(^{63}\) Ibid., 642.
\(^{64}\) Ibid., 646.
\(^{65}\) Ibid., 642.
\(^{66}\) Ibid., 639.
\(^{67}\) Ibid., 647.
\(^{68}\) Ibid., 645, 646.
\(^{69}\) Ibid., 643.
\(^{70}\) Ibid., 645, 646.
\(^{71}\) Ibid.
3.5. Firearms and Ammunition for Settlement

Firearms and bullets also appear to have been treated as one’s property, which could be used to compensate others when wrongs were committed and to settle conflicts. For instance, the one who hunted a head or obtained firearms from the enemy in the headhunting expedition became the winner in a conflict in the Saysiyat group.\(^{72}\) As reported by the Jinwei and Sanjiayong Provincial Affairs Bureau in September 1898, pans, firearms, ammunitions, clothes, millets, etc were items for compensating when wrongs were committed within the Atayal societies such as negligent homicide, intentional or deliberate injury, robbery, burglary and other type of crimes.\(^{73}\) In April 1899, the Miaoli Provincial Affairs Bureau also reported a survey of indigenous customs for the settlement for adultery – one of the terms was that all the firearms belonging to the adulterate husband would be confiscated.\(^{74}\) Similar cases of using firearms for compensation when one was considered unlawful could be found among other indigenous groups in the south of Taiwan. For instance, within the Bunun communities, if someone injured another person, which injury caused the death of that other person, he had to unload his clothes, firearms, knives, spears and put them next to the dead body of that person and return to his home naked.\(^{75}\) The murderer in the Tjavualji tribe of the Paiwan group had to provide two firearms, one pig and two pans and served hard labour at the chief’s house. The murderer had to provide these items until he repented of his action for at least one year.

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\(^{73}\) It also mentioned the monetary compensation was replaced. Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 31 年 9 月份台北縣景尾, 三角湧辦務署有關蕃人蕃地至事務及情況報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs from Jingwei and Sanjiaoyong Branch of Taipei County, September 1898), (V04574 A004) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一：理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management), 54.

\(^{74}\) Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 32 年 4 月份台中縣苗栗辦務署有關蕃人蕃地之事務及情況報告’ (Reports on the Indigenes affairs Mioali Provincial Affairs Bureau of Taichung-ken, April 1899), (V04595 A012) in Rijushiqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 920.

\(^{75}\) Taiwan Sotokufu 臺灣總督府警務局理蕃課 (Taiwan Government-General), Gaoshazu Diaoachashu-Fanshegaikuang 高砂族調查書-蕃社概况 [An Investigation of the Indigenes in Taiwan: The Overview of Indigenous], 570.
76 And the person who committed sexual assault in the Paiwan communities would have to submit a firearm and his clothes. 77 According to the Kasuvongan tribe 率芒社, each compensating item had different meanings: the pot was represented in repaying the head, a harrow stood for repaying the body, two firearms stood for repaying the two arms, two pigs stood for repaying the legs, 20 knives and axes stood for repaying the fingers and toes. 78 The items for compensating and the meanings were varied among the different tribes and indigenous groups. However, in these cases, the firearm was generally regarded as a significant item which served a function of regulating the indigenes and maintaining harmony within/between the tribes. It can be clearly seen that in matters of traditional compensation the firearm seemed to be the only modern item appearing in the list of culturally acceptable goods.

Exchanging firearms and bullets was also used in the Atayal custom when making promises or forming conciliation between tribes or with other ethnic groups, which was also adopted by the Japanese in several circumstances. The process of making a promise is called *Abao* in Atayal language or *Daqing* 打青 and following this a stone-burying ceremony - *moma watonafu* or *moma yamai* - in Atayal language or *Maishi* 埋石 would be held to acknowledge the promise. 79 For instance, two bullets were buried underneath the stones after the stones were buried by the chiefs from several Atayal tribes from the Ma’aw sub-group and the Director of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in 1896 in their promise of not killing anyone, harassing women, etc. 80 The chief of Swashake tribe 馬凹社 submitted one bullet after he made promise of not killing people with his fellows at the Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau in 1897. 81 The chief of Saheyan tribe and his 3 fellows also submitted a bullet each after

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76 Ibid., 572.
77 Ibid., 573.
78 Ibid.
80 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 31 年 3 月份大湖撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, March 1898), (V00323\A017) in *Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization)*, 467–469. also in a conversation between 大南勢社頭目 立石 烏榮 and Japanese official ‘明治 29 年 12 月份大湖撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, December 1896), (V00163\A036) in Ibid., 622.
81 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 30 年 4 月份南庄撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Nanzhuang Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, April 1897), (V00163\A025) in *Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Hui bian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization)*, 467–469. also in a conversation between 大南勢社頭目 立石 烏榮 and Japanese official ‘明治 29 年 12 月份大湖撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, December 1896), (V00163\A036) in Ibid., 622.
the chief vowed to the Japanese officials in 1900 never to kill people in the area. In the *Report on the Customs of Savage Tribes*, it also mentioned how the Atayal indigenes from the Mnibu sub-group and the Klesan sub-group were forced to bury their firearms by the officials, and vowed not to rebel. Atayal tribes exchanged firearms and bullets when they made vows together and one of the oaths could be translated something like this,

> Now we have completed the exchange of our firearms and bullets. If I cheated, these firearms and bullets would hit myself; if you cheated, these firearms and bullets would hit yourself.

Nevertheless, the effectiveness and the liability of these promises of not killing or revolting was problematic and questionable as there were many occurrences of murder, headhunting expeditions and rebellions throughout the early Japanese colonization. These cases illustrate rather the growing value of the firearm in indigenous material culture.

Through varied narratives and observations of visitors, firearms emerge as being closely associated with the indigenous men’s daily lives and practices. This was reflected in their dependent manners when carrying firearms, which also joined their bodies with other assortments, and their notion of firearm property as conferring some gender status in matrilineal societies. The presentations of the firearms and decorations on/with the firearms revealed their pride within their societies and to foreigners and Chinese settlers. Firing firearms did not occur only for killing, but also extended to diverse cultural functions and possible symbolic meanings such as sending signals to their people for guarding their territories, expelling disaster or misfortune, informing their triumph after headhunting expeditions, etc. Firearms and ammunition were considered as one’s property, which could be used to regulate their societies and to settle conflicts. *These are sure evidence of how the firearms were closely embedded within the indigenous customs and how the indigenes formulated different meanings*

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日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (*Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization*), 661.


for firearms in their own cultures, which will be seen as part of a notion of cultural assets as foreshadowed in Chapter 3, Chart 3:1.

4. Extent of Involvement of Whole Community

4.1. Head-hunting

It seems clear that firearms were extensively carried and valued by indigenous men in their hunting practice and their lives. The application of firearms also amplified and brought impact to whole communities of indigenous Formosa. Particularly, firearms were mostly used in killing animals and humans by the Formosan indigenes in our period. I have discussed the significance of the headhunting ritual among indigenous societies (see Chapter 2, pp. 30-38) and considered hunting as one of the essential indigenes’ economic activities (see Chapter 2, pp.38-41). The headhunting ritual was central to the cultures and lives of Formosan indigenes. Their belief concerning hunting heads was considered as a striving for communicating with their god, hoping for a good harvest and bringing sacred strength and energy to their tribes. As the Rev. Mackay emphasised at that time, of headhunting

they give themselves from earliest youth to decrepit age, following it with an ardour that never cools and a cruelty that never relents. The deer and the boar may lose their power to stir the old chief to enthusiasm, but to his dying day his right hand never loses it cunning; and to see his braves return with the spoils of a headhunting raid is as life to his bones. The last desire of the dying is that his sons may prove worthy of their sire and by stealthy step and certain thrust add to the trophies of the tribe.86

This account explicated their passion for the headhunting custom that measured and symbolised the ultimate and definite endeavour for every indigenous man to accomplish in his life time and dedicate to his tribe. Within the indigenous societies, all individuals of all ages and genders also embraced the headhunting custom and cherished and revered the persons who hunted heads. This scene could be seen in Pickering’s notes from talking to his indigenous friend from the Bangas tribe 芒仔社 of the Rukai group,

Chan-po told me his wife and children received him with the greatest joy and feasting when he had taken the heads of his enemies ... The

86 Mackay, From Far Formosa: The Island, Its People and Missions, 267.
young girls are anxious to marry a great warrior or expert hunter ... All the young men and boys are anxious to distinguish themselves in this manner, and will practise for hours merely aiming at a leaf placed fourteen or fifteen yards off, supposing it to be an enemy.  

Similar account can also be found in Steere’s notes, “Each warrior that has won the head of an enemy carries the trophy home on the point of his spear, and is everywhere joyfully received and entertained.” The drawing below of the Qing officials displayed the joy of indigenes’ communities after hunting a head. See Figure 7:10.

Figure 7:10 An indigenous man was gladly received by his community after his headhunting expedition.

Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Shengfan sharen yaowu tushuo '生番殺人耀武圖說' (Illustration of indigenes' triumph from headhunting) in Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 106.

88 Steere, Formosa and Its Inhabitants, 137.
The headhunting custom of the Formosan indigenes was still unabated in the early Japanese colonisation. Janet B. Montgomery McGovern, an American anthropologist who arrived in Taiwan in 1916, rendered her observation on the importance of headhunting for the indigenous societies,

That “head-hunting” should be included under the head of “social organization” … however, that anyone who has lived among a headhunting tribe will realize how closely this custom is interwoven with the fabric of their whole social organization. It regulates the social and political standing of the men of the tribe; it is directly connected with marriage—no head, no wife; and is reflected in the games, the songs and the dances of the people. Moreover, head-hunting is regulated by a code as rigid as the code of “an officer and a gentleman” in so-called civilized society— and is rather less frequently broken.89

She also mentioned how,

When a boy attains maturity he is supposed to celebrate this by going on his first head-hunting expedition which constitutes part of the puberty initiation ceremonies. Usually several boys of about the same ages go together on their first expedition, accompanied by older and more experience warriors of the same group, or sub-tribe.90

These comprehensive accounts clearly presented the role of the headhunting custom in different aspects of the indigenous lives and cultures into the 1920s. In another interview of Alice Ballantine Kirjassoff with an indigenous man, Kim Soan, he explained their belief of headhunting for eternity as “the bloody hand a passport to the savage heaven”; and went on to say that,

all my people believe that when we die we all must walk up the rainbow to the Land of After-Death. At the end of the rainbow the gateman stands, and when we come he will say to us, ‘Show me your hand.’ And he will look at our hand, and if he finds it is clean he will say, ‘Go to the right,’ and he will kick us into the dark nothingness below; but if he looks at our hand and finds it stained he will say, ‘you may enter,’ and he will allow us to pass within.91

These two accounts seemed to legitimate the custom of headhunting for pursuing statuses, capacities and eternities among the indigenous societies.

90 Ibid., 112–13.
However, many sources did not directly suggest a linkage of the use of firearms with the practice of headhunting. This is because the term “shot” in our sources could also be feasibly used to describe the act of using a spear in attack, which is unclear and difficult to distinguish in some cases. And the Chinese word Qian 枪 carries two meanings – spear and firearm. Nevertheless, the illustration of Shenfan fuyai zhensha tushuo 生番伏崖偵殺圖說 (Illustration of indigenes prostrating on precipice and getting ready to kill) from the Qing official might verify the application of firearms in the indigenes’ headhunting expedition (see Figure 7:11). It shows that one of the indigenes was holding a firearm (in the square box) aiming at people. The enlarged picture below of the section of the picture indicated by a square box gives another clear indication of the indigene holding a firearm.

Figure 7:11 Indigenes used firearms in their headhunting expedition.
Source: Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, ed., Shenfan fuyai zhensha tushuo 生番伏崖偵殺圖說 (Illustration of indigenes prostrating on precipice and getting ready to kill) in Wan Qing Taiwan Fan Su Tu 晚清番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan) (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Taiwan History, 2013), 102.

The description next to it says,

The indigenes are addicted to slaughtering, the one who beheads Han Chinese would be granted as the tribal leader. It is usually the case that the indigenes hide in the bushes of the side cliffs, await lonely Han Chinese traveller descending into the mountain, and then attack the Han Chinese with firearms, behead and take the head away with them.92

Another two descriptions from John Dodd and the Japanese official report from Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau appeared to render the application/action of firearms in headhunting expedition more precisely. In Dodd’s note concerning the northern district of Taiwan,

Round about the settlers’ outposts and clearings, savage headhunting skirmishers are thrown out ... older men in possession of matchlocks

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92 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, Wangqing Taiwan Fansu Tu 晚清臺灣番俗圖 (Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan), 102.
called *pah tus* prepare dry bark, port fire, prick the vent hole leading into the powder pan, and fill their ammunition bags with curious projectiles, and take up positions suitable for pot-shooting the tailed invader.  

Another account concerned an occasion when Japanese officers were invited by the Atayal indigenes from the Repai tribe to view some indigenous dance. Before the indigenous dance began, the deputy chief of the Repai tribe and one of his fellows put on an act of headhunting exercise, as described here,

Waatanpaiho, the deputy chief of Repai tribe carries a gun and knife. His fellow carries a bamboo-made gun and a knife. They walk to the centre of a courtyard and pretend for ambush. They make as if they were loading three bullets and shooting after murmuring and raising their heads from time to time. Then they shout and run about 10 meters to the enemy they shot earlier and cut his head off and return to their original position.  

These two accounts exposed the engagement of firearms in the headhunting operation specifically, which shows from very varying perspectives that firearms were adopted and adapted by the indigenes in their headhunting custom.

The availability of firearms amongst the Formosan indigenes and their adaptation of firearms from the late nineteenth century to early twentieth century as presented in Chapter 4 to 6, had certainly contributed to their effectiveness and successes in their hunting and headhunting expeditions. By firing their firearms in company with their other traditional armaments, the heads they hunted not only represented male indigenes' political and social status among their own people, but also the animals they captured fed their entire tribes. Besides, if we revisited some of the reasons that indigenes practised their headhunting ritual (Chapter 2, pp. 30-38) — conflict resolution, vengeance, disaster or disease elimination, pursuance of agricultural fertility, emotional vent, etc, - then it does seem that the practice of

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93 Dodd, John, ‘Extracts from Old notes on the Camphor Districts in North Formosa’ in Alsford, *The Witnessed Account of British Resident : John Dodd at Tamsui*, 297.

94 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, 明治 30 年 10 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告 (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, October 1897), (V00163\A024) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 165.

95 Taylor noted the Paiwan had headhunting ritual. “Head-hunting prevails more or less in all their communities. Among some tribes a warrior need look for little favour with the fair sex unless he possesses a skull or two as trophies of his valour. Among others heads are used as public offerings at seed-time and harvest; and yet others bury the heads, erecting over each a small stone tablet; each year a counting of tablet takes place and the village possessing the most is awarded a handsome prize.” George Taylor, ‘Formosa: Characteristic Traits of the Island and
headhunting was easily invoked and provoked by the Chinese settlers, the foreigners, the Qing and Japanese governments or ultimately the West throughout the late nineteenth century. These invaders frequently took indigenes’ lands by deceit and cut trees for gain, which created the hostilities between indigenous tribes and with Chinese settlers. They entered the indigenous tribes, possibly spreading disease (see Chapter 8 below) and often destroying their original ecology systems eventually. Although there is no direct link to prove that the enthusiasm of the headhunting ritual of indigenous people alone impelled them to obtain firearms, it was only seemingly socially natural for male indigenes to adopt the more efficient and the more destructive power of firearms in headhunting and general animal hunting. The application of firearms combined with their strong consensus about headhunting not only formulated even more powerful and destructive resistance, but also might have served the function of re-assertion of traditions and identities within indigenous communities and individuals. This is what I also call the cultural asset of firearms.

4.2. Ceremonies

The function of firearms also extended to ceremonials and rites in indigenous societies such as in weddings and funerals. Firearms or matchlocks were included as one of the wedding gifts that the groom was required to prepare and to give to the parents of his bride. Amongst the mountain indigenes of the Puyuman, as Rev. Hugh Ritchie noted in his visit to Pilam village

卑南 (Taidong County),

On the marriage day the husband brings a gift to the parent of his bride; — cloth, a gun and a pot; — a pig is killed and wine is handed round; and if it be the wish of the husband to take his wife elsewhere, she will not follow him during the life-time of her parents. 96

In the Draft for the Xinzhu Xian Gazetteer which was edited before the end of Qing governance in Taiwan, there was recorded the wedding customs of [probably] the Atayals:

sickle, snickersnee, Chinese matchlocks and other items were used as the betrothal gifts. Supreme gifts were sickles and Chinese matchlocks which were worth 200 silver tael ... 97

A portrayal was drawn by Qing official recording an indigenous woman marrying a Chinese man and demonstrated preparation of the wedding and the wedding gifts around the same period (see Figure 7:12), and a description next to it says,

Most of the indigenous women often have tedious lives; thus, the indigenous girls prefer to be married to the Hans. It’s common to see parents taking their daughters out of the mountains to search for potential matches. The situation applies all across the Puyuma, Xiuguluan region. The engagement presents from rich groom families would be two firearms, two swords, pig, wine, red clothes. 98

Figure 7:12 indigenous woman marrying a Chinese man

97 Zheng Pengyun 鄭鵬雲 and Ceng Fengchen 曾逢辰, Xinzhu Xianzhi Chugao 新竹縣志初稿 [Draft Gazetteer of Xinzhu Xian], 190.
98 Chen Zongren 陳宗仁, Wangqing Taiwan Fansu Tu 晚清台灣番俗圖 [Illustrations of Aborigines in Late Qing Taiwan], 148.
In the early Japanese rule, Ishii also noted how the value of the rifle was measurable in terms of beads and cloth, which were regarded as currency. The rifle could be used as a wedding gift, which was also called the bride-money or Naaze or Binajii in Atayal language, when the beaded cloth could not be obtained in Atayal custom.99

Firearms performed as precious gifts for the wedding and this appeared to be shared between such different groups as the mountain indigenes in the north and the south of Taiwan and in the matrilineal societies of the Puyumas, in the amalgamative patrilineal societies of the Atayals and the male dominate-based societies of the Paiwans. Journalist Edward House noticed how several shots were fired abruptly from Sialiao, a village of the Paiwans when a marriage festival was in progress.100 The joining of firearms could have represented the courage of the groom when marrying his bride, which was essential to show his parents-in-law. The sounds of firing firearms might have added some more joy and excitement for the couple and villagers.

Firearms also accompanied the deceased in some indigenes’ funeral customs. According to the description of Guérin, knives, firearms, and powder flasks were among the several items possessed by the dead for hunting and fighting that were buried in the tomb, which was under the beds in the indigenes’ huts, almost certainly Atayal.101 This was also often recorded in the Japanese’ official reports in such regions as Taoyaun, Xinzhu and Miaoli Counties, where most of the Atayal indigene lived in the first few years of Japanese colonisation.102 The Paiwans had

100 House, The Japanese Expedition to Formosa, 39.
102 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治 29 年大嵙崁撫墾署報告’ (Reports of Dakekan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, 1896), Taiwan Nichinichi Newspaper 台灣日日新報 in 14/10/1896 in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一: 理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization : Policies on Indigenes Management ), 16–17.; Wang, ‘明治 30 年 9 月份五指山撫墾署事務成績報告’ (Reports of Wuzhishan Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, Septeber 1897), (V00163\A023) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究, 3:125.; Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, '明治 29 年 9 月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告' (Reports of Dahu Pacification and
the same custom as narrated by Hu Zhuan and George Taylor in the 1880s, the dead were
wrapped in clothes (Taylor noted specifically in buffalo skin), lined with knife, firearms, bracelet,
beads and buried near their huts. Nevertheless, the custom of accompanying firearms at
weddings and funerals among different indigenous groups might vary or in some cases even not
exist: the Amis, for instance, did not bury firearms or any weapons with the dead, but only
ornaments, as Dr. Wykeham Myers noted.

Not only in the wedding and funerals, firearms were also used in other types of
ceremony. For instance, several knives, spears, plate and firearms were placed next to the
house with other items by the plains indigenes of the Siraya group in areas of the Yujing basin
in the practice of Zhuoxiang 作向. This practice was for the purpose of praying to their god,
drinking, eating, singing, dancing and hunting, according to the Miscellany of Anping County
in the 1890s. Rifles were also used in the performance of the purification ceremony by the
Atayal indigenes when there were occurrences of marriage, divorce, adultery, murder and other
acts, which countered the Atayal’s traditions. Firearms as foreign and alien pieces of
technology which were forged or transferred by the Chinese or foreigners, served as significant
and intimate objects in the major ceremonies of their lives. This is in itself a significant and
remarkable fact.

4.3. Women & Children

Involvements of firearms and their accessories amongst indigenous women and children
are also perceptible, despite the fact that hunting and head-hunting were not their normally
acceptable tasks in their societies. According to the survey of the indigenous groups conducted
by the Taiwan Sotokufu, in some indigenous tribes, women were strictly forbidden to involve
themselves in hunting or even to touch firearms. For instance, the Atayal indigenous women of

Reclamation Bureau, September 1896), (V00084\A003) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 421. ‘明治29年10月份大湖撫墾事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, October 1896), (V00084\A004) in Ibid., 442–43.
104 Myers, ‘Notes on the Aborigines of South Formosa’, 57.
the P'anoh tribe from the Tseole sub-group were prohibited touching firearms in order to avoid the risk of not obtaining any prey;\(^{107}\) the Paiwan indigenous women of Tjavualji tribe, who were in their pregnancy or menses, were not allowed to touch any armaments.\(^{108}\) But firearm primers were worn by the indigenous women as ornament on their necklaces with various colours of beads, tobacco pouches and shells, as Swinhoe noted as early as 1862 during his visit to mountain indigenes on the northwest coast, near Tamsui River.\(^{109}\) As mentioned before in Chapters 4 on the relationship of indigenes with the Chinese, indigenous women often acted as mediators between indigenous and Chinese villages, especially some who were married to Chinese settlers (see pp.100-102). Indigenous women seemed to recognize the rifle as better than a hand-gun or musket. On one occasion, an indigenous woman “recommended the mountain indigenes to only ask for the rifle” when a group of mountain indigenes were anxious to procure firearms from Swinhoe and his party.\(^{110}\) The character of indigenous women was critical, not only in connecting different ethnic groups, but also as they acted in the period of transition between traditional and modern firearms. Captain Bax claimed they met two guards who were elderly plains indigenous women and who were armed with matchlocks.\(^{111}\) However, this does not seem to strictly accord with cultural norms, because the tribal work that indigenous women conducted did not include hunting and headhunting, which were reserved as only male, although they were often involved in preparing festival and dancing after successful raids. The character of indigenous women was mentioned by Ishii, in accordance with his observation, that the indigenous women sometimes performed protests against trivial wars and restored harmonies between indigenous tribes.\(^{112}\) And during the wars, the indigenous women and their children were the ones preparing provision for the warrior and carrying them to the battle field.\(^{113}\)

It also seemed to be inevitable that boys were trained to use firearms in indigenous tribes. Particularly in Amis, Sakizaya, Puyuma, Tsou and Rukai groups, boys from the age of 12 had to live in gathering houses where they received training and joined hunting and

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\(^{107}\) Taiwan Sotokufu 臺灣總督府警務局理蕃課 (Taiwan Government-General), Gaoshazu Diaochashu-Fanshegaikuang 高砂族調查書-蕃社概況 [An Investigation of the Indigenes in Taiwan: The Overview of Indigenous], 614.
\(^{108}\) Ibid., 634.
\(^{110}\) Ibid., 70.
\(^{112}\) Ishii, *The Island of Formosa and Its Primitive Inhabitants*, 13–14.
\(^{113}\) Ibid., 16.
headhunting expeditions. (also see Chapter 2, pp. 30-38) Pickering remarked on this when he travelled to the Bangas tribe of Rukai groups in 1866-1867,

The first things put into the hands of a boy are a wooden knife and gun, or a bow and arrow. With these toys they play at lying in ambush and taking heads. On the victim falling, the other would rush out of his ambush, and pretend to cut off his head, holding it up with a proud look.\(^\text{114}\)

Moreover,

All the young men and boys are anxious to distinguish themselves in this manner (headhunting), and will practise for hours merely aiming at a leaf placed fourteen or fifteen yards off, supposing it to be an enemy.\(^\text{115}\)

George Taylor also noted how the young Paiwan males were with firearms, “the people seemed destitute of the common necessaries of life, yet each boy of twelve possessed a gun without which he never left the dwelling.”\(^\text{116}\) It seemed to be the case that indigenous boys and young men were situated in an atmosphere of headhunting and were trained to practise with firearms as deadly weapons in order to reach their ultimate goal and gain their positions in their tribes.

This scene was also reported in an earlier section on the early Japanese governance that all the 15 or 16 to 60 years-old male indigenes carried firearms in their hands.\(^\text{117}\) (See this chapter Section 2.1) However, the Atayal boys might have learned to use firearms even earlier than 15 or 16 years old under the father’s guidance. As Ishii noted,

When a boy attains the age of seven or eight, he is placed under the care of the father, who teaches him the brave deeds of his ancestors and other heroes of the village, in order that the boy may develop a warlike spirit. The father also teaches his boy the art of using a sword and fire-arms, and takes him out hunting.\(^\text{118}\)

If we revisit the earlier account on the involvement of indigenous boys in headhunting from McGovern (see p. 291), this account seems to suggest that the indigenous boys started to learn

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\(^\text{115}\) Ibid., 68.


\(^\text{117}\) Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ‘明治29年9月大湖撫墾事務成績報告’ (Reports of Dahu Pacification and Reclamation Bureau, September 1896), (V00084\)\(\text{A003}\) in Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 417.

\(^\text{118}\) Ishii, ‘The Life of the Mountain People in Formosa’, 127.
how to operate firearms at this early age in order to prepare and to celebrate their rite of passage by going on headhunting expeditions.

From the practicality side, Formosan indigenes appeared to adapt the firearms and incorporate them with their primitive weapons such as knife, spear, arrow and bow in their hunting and headhunting expeditions. Formosan indigenes also endowed meanings and values to firearms within their lives and cultures. From using the firearms as their primary weapon in hunting and headhunting, polishing their firearms, decorating their huts with firearms, displaying firearms in the tribal ceremonies, firing firearms to show how they demonstrated their courtesy or signaled delivery and kept evil spirits or bad luck away, the firearms were very much embedded within indigenous cultures. The use of firearms also assisted the practices of headhunting ritual and the participation of women and boys in it in some way, which enhanced existing traditions and identities among indigenous societies and individuals.

Such strong cultural elements in firearm use amongst the indigenous societies seem to be of even great importance when we both identify the contrast with the Chinese and acknowledge the acceleration of outside aggression on the indigenous territories through time, thus the growth of frontiers of exchange, in which firearms might pass to and fro as identified in Chapter 6 above. In comparison to indigenous cultures, apart from using firearms to fight in conflicts and the evidence of some Hakka forging firearms, this type of coalition between firearms and cultures did not seem to appear in Chinese societies. These cultural assets were also protracted and practised under the growing economic and political encroachment of the Western nations, the Qing and the Japanese government and the Chinese settlers, who also contributed the flow of firearms into the indigenes’ hands.

5. Negligence of Firearms in Chinese Soldiers’ Hands

Small, more or less profound excursions in more or less unknown and uncivilized countries are often made, but that a huge empire counting hundreds of millions, begins to allow European culture, modern facilities and modern techniques to enter, that can not be repeated often and is retroactive even for the European peoples. It is of such far reaching, in detail undeniable importance that I saw it as my duty to briefly draw up the specific symptoms and to swiftly sketch the first beginnings, as they
to this extent sure enough only have revealed themselves in a province lying on the outside. 119

Warburg’s strong suggestion in 1888 above, seems to reflect on the Qing soldiers who were given traditional matchlocks and modern firearms for battling in the external warfare and pacifying the indigenes’ revolts in Taiwan, as well as on the Chinese settlers who obtained firearms for self-defence – that is, they did not seem to develop any type of culture of firearms or to integrate the firearms within Chinese culture in a manner similar to the Formosan indigenes. Issues concerning the grades and conditions of weapon and the adjustment of firearms among the Chinese soldiers and the Chinese settlers were often reported by the foreigners, some of whom had experience in warfare, as well as the Chinese administrators. These predicaments seemed to linger over from the last thirty years under the Qing governance.

Firstly, the backwardness of weaponry of the Chinese soldiers was reported by foreigners who travelled to Taiwan and the Chinese officials of the Fujian Province in the period of 1860-1884. In the report of the Admiral of Fujian, Jiang Changgui 江長貴 after he examined several military bases in Taiwan and Penghu island, he found more traditional weapons like arrows and bows, Chinese matchlocks and rattan-made shields were commonly used by the battalions. 120 Ibis, the Estonian ensign who visited Taiwan in 1875, reported that,

The Chinese soldier is here, as in China, poorly disciplined, outfitted with sorry muskets, spears and similar antediluvian rubbish, and, as was frequently shown to be the case, easily gives in to the privations and hardships that a field march into the mountains against the natives brings with it. 121

Ding, Richang, the Governor of Fujian (1875-1879) suggested that the firearms and powder that China purchased were the surplus ones after being selected by other countries, when he managed the Machinery Bureau in Shanghai in the 1860s, and he urged the purchase and replacement of second-rate weapons with the finest weapons for the navy and the army and actual manufacture of weapons. 122 This problem was to an extent addressed after the Mudan

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119 Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’.
120 Jiang, Chang-Gui, ‘為親赴臺澎校閱營伍稽查地方情形及回抵泉州日期恭摺具陳仰祈聖鑒事’ (A memorial sent to Your Majesty for the approval of my personal visit for military and local inspection in Taiwan and Penghu, and my returning date to Quanzhou) in 12/09/1872 in Tongzhichao Yuezhe Dang 同治朝月摺檔 (Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Tongzhi Era).
122 Li Hongzhang, ‘為據情代陳仰祈聖鑒事’ (A memorial sent to Your Majesty on behalf of ... for the approval of ...) in Daoxiantongguang Sichao Suanjí 道咸同光四朝奏議選輯 (Selected Court Reports in Shi Qing Era).
Incident in 1874 when many modern weapons such as foreign breech loader firearms, Henry Martini rifles, muzzleloaders, Winchester repeating rifles (see Chapter 4, pp. 141-143) were transferred to Taiwan by orders of Sheng Baozhen and Ding Richang. After the partition of Taiwan from the Fujian Province, the renovation of armaments in the Chinese military was laggardly and straggly, though Liu, Mingchuan actively requested even more modern firearms such as Mausers, Krupps, Hotchkiss rifles, Snider rifles, Winchester rifles, Kentucky rifles and Lee rifles (also see Chapter 5, p 197-200 and 202-205) during and after the Sino-French War (1884-1885) from mainland China, and built ammunition factories in Taiwan. In the report of Hu Zhuan, the inspector of garrisons of Taiwan Province from 1891 it was stated that,

The ordnance and army camps should be told to shortly carry out the examination of the old guns like muzzle-loading rifles and rifles to see the exact numbers of the usable and unusable. The result needs to be reported in writing to verify the number, ask for an entire exchange, or exchange for the new ones a few times, it is necessary that every camp soldier has a workable gun in order that forewarned is forearmed. Furthermore, do inspect the damage in muzzle-loading rifles and rifles, etc., especially the muzzle and bolt; the barrel usually works well, the broken guns need to be sent to the machinery bureau for repair. It is believed that those should be able to work as a new gun. If those are repaired instantly and shortly, the guns in the ordnance will not rust. It seems also urgent to make sure that the soldiers in every camp use them properly.123

This clearly shows that the weaponry of the Chinese soldiers and braves was not only outdated, but also lacked repair in order to serve its full functions under the circumstances of erratic threats from the Western countries in Asia and ongoing conflicts between the indigenes and the Chinese settlers and the Chinese military in Taiwan. Wang Ermin, a modern Chinese historian specialising in imperial Chinese armament development during the late Qing period, has pointed out that the lack of technological innovation in the Chinese arsenals was the major problem for the armaments industry. He mentioned that the weaponry the Chinese manufactured was all copied from the Western models and the machines for manufacturing the weaponry had to be purchased from the ever improving innovation of the Western nations.

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123 Hu Zhuan 胡傳, *Taiwan Riji Yu Bingqi 臺灣日記與稟啟 [Journal and Reports on Taiwan]*, 44–45.
China could only follow the footsteps of the West since China did not develop heavy industries like the West and it became a huge burden for China to purchase new machines. 124 Although I suggested in Chapter 5 that the level of weaponry among the Chinese army in the period of 1884-1895 was modernized and pointed to the possibility of large numbers of modernized armaments being transferred to Taiwan, from here we also lay out another question on the level of weapon availability and ubiquity within the grasp of Chinese troops. In themselves, firearms do not a soldier make. Clearly Chinese armaments were merely borrowed from Western sources and were not integrated into the training and understanding of Chinese troops.

The transformation of the Chinese soldiers using modern and Western firearms became the second major issue. In fact, the Chinese soldiers struggled in adapting modern and Western rifles and relied on their shooting skills with bows, spears and swords. General Le Gendre commented on how the 500 Chinese soldiers “furnished with good European rifles, were inadequate to the task before them” when he and the Chinese troops were sent for the military operation after the Rover Incident. 125 An observation on Chinese soldiers in Taiwan depending on the traditional Chinese weapons was noted by Steere in 1874,

the Chinese soldiers carry firelocks, and, in some cases, are armed with rifles and sword bayonets; but their preferment does not depend upon skill in their use, but upon their skill in using the bow and the spear ... In an open park within the walls several military mandarins were practising with the bow and arrow, and military preferment in China, in this day of breech-loaders and rifled cannon depends upon skill in archery and in the use of the sword. 126

This might have been foreseen in the imperial Ever-Victorious Army who nominally adopted the Enfield rifle in 1860s, but “seldom drilled more than once a day and they concentrated on the use of traditional weapons—fireballs, swords, knives, spears, and a few gingalls” as historian Richard J. Smith suggested. 127 Shen, Bao-Zheng appeared to perceive the issue of adapting

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124 He also referred to the underdevelopment of steel making techniques, which heated up the barrel easily. The barrel had to cool down first before commencing another firing. The poor quality of steel was the general problem among all the Chinese heavy industries. Another problem he suggested was that the models of weapons were inconsistent among the arsenals, which used and purchased different machines from different countries.

Wang Erming 王爾敏, Qing Ji Binggongye de Xingqi 清季兵工業的興起 [The Rise of the Armaments Industry in the Late Qing Era], 134–138.


127 Smith, Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever-Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China, 92.
modern firearms, and recruited experienced foreign officers to instruct Chinese soldiers and local Chinese braves in Taiwan. In 1874, Shen reported that,

Fine soldiers were selected from every battalion and were taught foreign battle arrays with foreign firearms by several foreign instructors and more than 20 Chinese instructors, but it didn’t appear to have any effect and it brought many complaints. If there was no improvement after a few months, an order to dismiss will proceed in order to save the budget.128

Obviously the Chinese soldiers could not accommodate to the Western battle array which relied greatly on the Western firearms. In a letter of Shen to Prosper Marie Giquel,129 Shen spoke about how the local braves recruited in Taiwan could not drill as the foreign firearm squadrons could.130 This problem remained until 1885, even after the Chinese troops had repulsed the French troops in the Sino-French War (1884-1885) and was reported on in Liuzhuangsugong zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [The memoir of Liu Mingchuan] and Taiwan riji yu bingqi 臺灣日記與稟啟 [Journal and Report on Taiwan], which recorded the reviews of military camps in Taiwan. When Liu, Mingchuan examined the troops in Taiwan and reported concerning the conditions of the Xian and Anhui Armies in Taiwan,

Troops were not fine, weapons were not consistent, some drilled with breech-loading rifles and some drilled with muzzle-loadings [and] ... breech-loading rifles were mostly used by most battalions, which required intensive training and practising. If the markings of the rear sight were not clear, the soldiers targeted aimlessly without knowing the distance and height. Holding firearms would be equivalent as [being] without firearms.131

Further issues were divulged by Hu Zhuan who described in what manner the muzzle-loading rifles were held by the Chinese military and the Chinese guards when he inspected several camps based in eastern and southern Taiwan near the indigenes’ territories in the early 1890s. He noted how the braves exchanged their firearms frequently, which resulted in the troops

128 Shen Baozhen 沈葆楨, Fujian Taiwan Zuozhe 福建臺灣奏摺 [Shen Baozhen’s Memorials on Taiwan], 16.
129 Prosper Marie Giquel, a French naval officer, was an important character in the Self-Strengthening movement. He assisted the Qing government to form and train the Ever-Triumphant Army 常捷軍 for pacifying the Taiping Rebellion and involved in the establishment of Foochow or Fuzhou Navy Yard, where he served as European director from 1866-1874. He accompanied Shen Bao-Zheng to Taiwan in 1874 during the Mudan incident. Qingshigao Taiwan Ziliao Jiji 清史稿臺灣資料集輯 [Collections of the Drafted Qing History on Taiwan], 97, 819; Steven A. Leibo, Transferring Technology to China: Prosper Giquel and the Self-Strengthening Movement (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1985).
130 Shen, ‘致日軍門（日意格）’(To Prosper Marie Giquel) from 1874-1875 in 沈文肅公牘.
131 Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liuzhuangsugong Zouyi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 147.
being in asymmetrical array and most of the firearms were broken and unrepairable due to the low-quality skill of gunsmiths in camps. Moreover, he supervised the soldiers in practise of their shooting skills with muzzle loading rifles instead of breech loading rifles, claiming that the two type of rifles only had minor differences, to save the cost of breech loading bullets. 132 Although Hu Zhuan requested the examination of the operable firearms, to repair and replace firearms in every camp and commanded that all soldiers and braves should have firearms and be made ready for battles, the entire process would have taken some time. Meanwhile, endless battles were being fought and lives lost as the Chinese soldiers and braves encountered the indigenes. Also, the Chinese soldiers appeared to demonstrate poor and imbalanced performance in target practices when Hu inspected across the camps in 1892. This might also show more clearly the difficulties of the Chinese soldiers in adapting modern firearms. For instance, Hu stated that in battalions based in Anping, Tainan and Zhenghai Houjun 鎮海後軍, Taidong County, 60 to 70 percent of soldiers could hit the targets133 and 91 men could hit a perfect score of 3 shots amongst 500 men in the best performing battalion of Zhenghai Houjun.134 He also noted the number of men in some camps, the total number of hit targets and the number of men who hit perfect with 3 shots and 2 shots in southern and eastern Taiwan (See the Chart 7:1 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of military camps</th>
<th>No. Men</th>
<th>No. Shots (A)</th>
<th>Hit Target (B)</th>
<th>Page No.</th>
<th>B/A %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pingdong, Dashuling 大樹林</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>P16</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taidong, Balangwei 巴塱衛</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>P16</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hualien, Wuquancheng 吳全城 (Shoufeng township 壽豐鄉)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>P18</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

132 Hu Zhuan 胡傳, Taiwan Riji Yu Bingqi 臺灣日記與稟啟 [Journal and Reports on Taiwan], 44–45.
133 Ibid., 41.
134 Ibid., 14.
135 Ibid., 16.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid., 18.
According to our Chart, 4,500 shots were fired by 1500 men of which 25 percent hit the targets and with the variation of 21% as the lowest performance. Within the camps Hu visited, some men used breech-loading rifles and some used muzzle-loading rifles, but Hu only recorded this distinction in a camp near Sanzhiliao 三隻寮, Guoxing Town, Nantou County where 7 men gained a perfect score of 3 shots and 11 men gained 2 shots by using breech-loading rifles and only 3 men gained a perfect score of 3 shots by using muzzle-loading rifles. Another even more obvious evidence in Hu’s reports was that less than 30 percent hit the targets among a hundred men from the 3 battalions (1,500 men) who were selected in target practice using Mausers, Lee rifles and Hotchkiss rifles, for the men were also experiencing obstacles in loading, aiming, cocking the triggers which delayed the firing and failed to hit the targets. This is the performance from the selected soldiers, it could be known to the performance from the rest. After purchasing expensive armaments and paying highly to maintain the defence corps, which became one of the most important stations, this is the result of troops with a lack of drills. The troops will face difficulty in providing any defence, strength in wars or assistance to other stations in the future.

This is a damning judgement at any time and place and full indication that the Chinese troops had major, debilitating problems in most aspects involved in adapting modern firearms, very unlike what we know of the indigenes who so readily became well accomplished, incorporating the firearms within their traditional weapons in their hunting and headhunting customs.

The poor discipline of Chinese troops was another issue that can not be neglected. As I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hualian, Bazizhuang (Ruishui township)</th>
<th>200</th>
<th>600</th>
<th>166</th>
<th>P18</th>
<th>28%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hualian, Xinkaiyuan 新開園 (now Chishang Township 池上鄉)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>P19</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1500</strong></td>
<td><strong>4500</strong></td>
<td><strong>1146</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>25</strong>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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138 Ibid.
139 Ibid., 19.
140 Ibid., 36.
141 Ibid., 51–52.
discussed briefly in Chapter 5 on the ill-discipline of the Chinese soldiers and the misapplication and destruction of firearms and ammunitions caused by the Chinese soldiers (see Chapter 5, pp. 189-191) before ceding Taiwan to Japan. Nevertheless, this phenomenon was forecasted in the journals and the Chinese official reports even before the Sino-Japan War. This could be seen in Ibis’ journal when he commended the Chinese manufactured boat in Fu-chau in 1870 – the *Fooshing*, which resembled the English station ship with 80 horse power, 7 to 8 knots of cruising speed and armed with 4 copper weapons and 1 steel 6-inch which loaded from the breech end and the Chinese officers who seemed to receive a fair education in Fu-Chau marine college - he then immediately disparaged the lack of discipline and disorder of the sailor and officers,

The lack of discipline is striking: the sailors and officers sit on the quarter-deck and smoke. The beds are not made for the day on the sleeping deck, and off-duty men sleep and smoke in them. Clamor and chatter are noticeable at work, though they do work quickly. It is hard to distinguish an officer from a sailor by their clothes, in which complete freedom reigns: some walk around in Chinese, some half in European.\(^{142}\)

Obviously, Ibis, as an ensign, so however junior a professionally trained military officer, disapproved of what he saw and made seemly judgements that certainly reflected the lack of accommodation of modern weaponry. Another account of the poor condition of Chinese soldiers in the military camp was noted by George Ede, the English Presbyterian missionary at Tainan 1883 -1903,

Of the sixty soldiers at this camp only three did not smoke opium. The whole set of them were in a most plighty [sic] condition. Many were in rags, and not a few had their bodies covered with most offensive sores. On asking if the soldiers had not regular drill, I was told by a fellow-traveller that the only exercise they went through was with the "big gun", which is a name jocularly given to the opium-pipe.\(^{143}\)

Warburg also noted the distressed Chinese soldiers at the stations in the south, which were formed to guard at the indigenes’ borders, but in reality the Chinese soldiers failed their task, for of “the ten soldiers that are supposed to be stationed there, at least nine are on leave, for which they have to deliver three of six dollars of their monthly pay to the mandarin.”\(^{144}\) The inferior health and frequent absence of the soldiers (see Chapter 8 below) and the corruption

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\(^{142}\) Ibis, "Ekskursiia Na Formozu", 139–40.
\(^{144}\) Warburg, ‘Ueber Seine Reisen in Formosa [On His Travels in Formosa]’.
within the military system certainly affected the strength and the standards in drills. The Chinese officials – Liu Mingchuan and Hu Zhuan - also gave accounts of the poorly disciplined soldiers in their reports. Liu stated his dissatisfaction about the performance of the Chinese soldiers, including Xiang and Anhui Armies, and braves in Taiwan, who were mostly lacking in training, aging, addicted to opium or were bureaucrats, and where lower-rank of military officers led the drills instead of their leaders.\(^{145}\) He also revealed how some battalions did not drill all year, approximately 8 or 9 out of 10 battalions and only 2 or 3 out of 10 battalions drilled significantly.\(^{146}\) Hu Zhuan also reported how the garrisons based in mountain areas were mostly addicted to opium. After he examined 5 shao or companies, which consisted approximately of 500 men in total, only 85 men were not addicted to opium and most of the opium addicts were newly recruited. All opium addicts were given one month to quit, but none of them managed to quit or were reluctant to quit.\(^{147}\)

These poor qualities of Chinese soldiers and braves certainly affected the processes of adjusting with the modern firearms. It seems very clear and in stark contrast with Taiwanese indigenous groups that a culture of the firearm did not exist in the Chinese lives and traditions. In contrast, the indigenes appeared to have greater motivation and a deep desire of obtaining firearms and using firearms in their hunting and headhunting practices for the pride and prize of male indigenes and within indigenes’ societies.

6. Japanese Soldiers’ Proficiency in Modern Armament

So far we have known the success of Japan in modernising her military forces and adapting Western military technology from the second half of the nineteenth century as briefly discussed in the beginning of Section 3 in Chapter 6. After defeating China in the Sino-Japanese War 1895, Japan continued to apply her advanced military technologies to quell the remaining rebels of the Qing army and Formosan indigenes’ erratic revolts in the early Japanese colonization (see

\(^{145}\) Liu, Mingchuan 劉銘傳, ‘為台灣水師員缺並武職補署章程請旨飭部變通辦理以資整頓而免虛糜恭摺仰祈聖鑒事’ (A memorial sent to Your Majesty for the approval of the accommodation and adaptation of the military enlistment and replacement regulation for the shortage of Taiwanese Navy as a means of consolidation) in 30/12/1887 in Guāngxùchao Yuezhedang 光緒朝月摺檔 [Monthly Court Reports on Taiwan in Guāngxù Era].

\(^{146}\) Liu Mingchuan 劉銘傳, Liu zhuang su gong zuo yi 劉壯肅公奏議 [Memoir of Liu Mingchuan], 137.

\(^{147}\) Hu Zhuan 胡傳, Taiwan Riji Yu Bingqi 臺灣日記與稟啟 [Journal and Reports on Taiwan], 184.
Chapter 6 Section 2). This was in addition to the establishment of transportation and communication systems such as railways, roads and telegram (see Chapter 6 Section 1). These not only allowed the Taiwan Sotokufu to mobilise its troops and armament, but also to transport the camphor, woods, mineral, tea from the mountains to the plain areas.

Compared to the late Qing governance, the advanced military technologies seemed to be applied efficiently by the Japanese police and troops in pacifying uprisings along with their modern warships, whereas the Qing army continued to use backward muzzle loading rifles, which were either broken or insufficient. The Japanese police and troops, who were commissioned in managing/pacifying the mountain indigenes, did not seem to have many issues in adapting Western weapons according to the record of *Records of Indigenes’ Management*. 148 Except there were records about how the Japanese police serving in the north mountain regions performed poorly in a shooting competition in 1907 and were required to improve; 149 a notification to the police in Taipei, Taoyuan and Xinzhu provinces for not wasting ammunition in shooting to prevent the indigenes’ attack in 1911; and a report from the Miaoli Provincial Affairs Bureau about the absence of institutions to supervise the guards, the inappropriate deployment of guards, the addiction of guards to opium (8 or 9 out of 10 guards used opium), the lack of training and maintaining firearms for the guards, and the employment of guards, who did not receive sufficient assessments of their fitness, age and their capacities in combat. 150

More generally, the Police Bureau of the Taiwan Sotokufu appeared to train the Japanese police routinely and regulated the firearms and ammunition efficiently. For instance, in January 1904, several regulations on the firearms and ammunition management for the Japanese police and Chinese/indigenes’ guards were enacted and issued by the Taoyuan Province. As it outlines: proofs for receiving and returning firearms and ammunition should be submitted to the stations; firearms and firearm accessories should correspond with the account books and be recorded in the account book before handing them over; each police and guard could borrow 30 shots and

148 The outcome, the sufficiency and efficiency of Japanese troops, police and guards in Taiwan certainly require further investigation later. This also requires research from other sources, apart from *Riban Shio*, which was mainly focusing on the management of indigenes from 1895 to 1926.


150 Wang Xuexin 王學新, *Rijusheqi Zhumiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiiliao Huibian Yu Yanjiu 日據時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究/Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization*, 979–980.in 明治32年8,9月
each brave could borrow 20 shots, but they would not be restricted by this limit under some special circumstances or transportation inconvenience; each branch should have a sufficient supply of ammunition; when the firearm, firearm accessories and ammunitions were damaged or missing, further investigation should be made; firearms and ammunition among the police, guards and braves should not be mixed in use, but reasons should be provided if someone wished to change the regulated amount of ammunitions; types and number of ammunition and reasons should be recorded when the loaned ammunitions were exhausted or required supply; cartridges were required when requesting ammunition supply; reasons should be stated if one could not return the cartridges; and the section manager of police bureau and the Director of each branch should inspect and examine the status of firearms and ammunition every two months.  

In the same year in August, Shengken Province issued a list of duties for the Japanese police and Chinese/indigenous guards, who worked in the indigenous regions. This list included duties in the indigenous regions, guides for formality and uniform, instructions for operating the firearms and ammunition and for guard and defence. Similar regulations on the firearms and ammunition for the guards in the “List of regulations on the duties of the police in indigenous borders in Miaoli County” and for some Chinese brave regiments or Zhuangding in Yilan, and instructions for the camphor workers in using and maintaining snider rifles in Sanjiaoyong (Sanxia District, New Taipei City) in 1907 could be found

152 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ’深坑廳訊第 19 號番界警備員勤務細則’ (List of duties for the police in indigener borders in Shenkeng County, No. 19), (V0094\A129) in Rizhishiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhìyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時代臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一：理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management ), 427–429.
153 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ’台中縣增置隘勇寮之報告’ (Reports on adding the guard post in Taizhong County) in 29/03/1900 (V00537\A014) and ’苗栗廳蕃界警備勤務規程置定案’ (List of regulations on the duties of the police in indigenous borders in Miao County) in 24/08/1904 (V04791\A012) in Rijusheqü Zhunmiaodiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibianzhìyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期竹苗地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Xinzhu Miaoli Areas in Japanese Colonization), 1264–1265, 1310–1311.
154 Wang Xue-Xin 王學新, ’宜蘭壯丁團編制’ (The establishment of Yilan braves, January 1898), (V00294\A007) in Rijusheqü Yilandiqu Yuanzhumin Shiliao Huibian Yu Yanjü 日據時期宜蘭地區原住民史料彙編與研究 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Yilan Areas in Japanese Colonization), 436–437, 439, 441.
155核准平井勢次郎申請之貸與及攜帶槍械彈藥以防蕃案’ (Approval of Hirai Seijiro’s application for borrowing and carrying guns and ammunition in defence of the indigenes, June, 1907), (V05031\001) in Wang Xuexin 王學新, Rizhi Shiqi Taibei Taoyuan Diqu Yuanzhuminn Shiliao Huibian Zhiyi: Lifanzhengce 日治時期臺北桃園地區原住民史料彙編之一：理番政策 (Historical Collections and Study of Indigenes in Taoyuan Areas in Japanese Colonization: Policies on Indigenes Management), 396–401.
in the Japanese official documents. Moreover, according to the record of *Riban shikô* in 1908, a notification was sent and listed several requirements in live ammunition maneuvers\(^{156}\), such as,

1. Every man should take accurate position and posture during the firing training.
2. Every man should fire 5 shots each time.
3. Live ammunition maneuvers should be held four times annually.
4. Every man should comply with orders strictly.
5. Each shot is credited 5 points as a full score.
6. The distance and the size of the target for the firing training should be noted in the result table.

These regulations certainly must have obtained some control over the firearms and ammunition which were held in the hands of police, Chinese/indigenous guard and braves. This might have reduced the chances for the police, guards and braves to smuggle firearms and ammunition to the indigenes. The frequent ammunition maneuvers and shooting competitions also maintained the combat capacities of the police and guards in battlefields. These regulations on controlling firearms and ammunition and requirements in maneuvers clearly show the contrast with the ill-disciplined character of Chinese soldiers and guards, who were lacking in training as mentioned in Section 4 in this chapter. However, the Taiwan Sotokufu could not actually control and effectively halt the indigenous rebellions completely until the 1930s, and cases of smuggling between indigenous tribes, with *Tongshi* and Chinese civilians could still be found in the early Japanese colonisation (see Chapter 6, Section 3.3.3). *What presently remains unclear is whether the greater formality of the relations between modern firearms and soldiers in the Japanese case really matched the effectiveness of the cultural embeddedness of the firearm amongst Taiwan indigenous groups, especially of those who were still engaged in headhunting cultures.*

7. Conclusion

In this chapter we have suggested that cultural embeddedness of the firearm gave the indigenous a special edge in eastern conflicts by demonstrating different aspects of using firearms in their cultures. The applications of firearms in hunting activities represented the

practicality of firearms, which allowed them not only to obtain food and to commence in trade, but also to defend themselves and to attack invaders effectively. They had learnt to adapt the capabilities that the firearms could offer them and incorporate the firearms into their movement and postures in hunting field, in battle field or in any circumstances. Then their strong attachment of firearms with their bodies, attitudes, manners and beliefs represented the “spiritual” cultural role of firearms individually, which might construct and sustain their adaptation of firearms in their lives. The involvement of firearms in the indigenes’ headhunting custom, weddings and funerals also continued to reassert their identities and prestige in the indigenous communities and the indigenous boys were nurtured under this environment through their training in male clubs or joining hunting and headhunting expeditions. These were the novel elements of cultural embedment of firearms among the indigenous societies, which became their cultural assets, which in turn allowed them to most effectively fight against others in their prolonged resistance. In contrast to the backwardness of the Qing Chinese military equipment, issues in adapting modern firearms and poor discipline, and to the management of firearms of the Taiwan Sotokufu, who succeeded in manufacturing and adapting modern firearms, Formosan indigenes’ firearms culture empowered them to preserve some independence from the colonists, especially important given their limited supply of firearms and ammunition. For the plains indigenes who enlisted in the Qing military, the cultures of firearms they inherited might explain the reason why plains indigenes military became the major defence corps in late nineteenth century Taiwan as Xu Yu-Liang suggested (Chapter 5).¹⁵⁷ The fact that rebellions went on so long after 1895 is clearly some complex effect resulting from increased encroachment, increased exchanges of weapons across indigenous territories, contrasting advantages of local environmental factors (that is in brief the detailed knowledge of terrain held by the indigenous), and differences in the efficiency of weapon use between the indigenous, the Chinese and the Japanese.

¹⁵⁷ Xu Yuliang 許毓良, Qingdai Taiwan Junshi Yu Shehui 清代臺灣軍事與社會(Military Affairs and Society of Taiwan in the Qing Dynasty), 95–98.
Chapter 8 Conclusions

Summary of the Thesis

On the frontier in the eastern mountains of Taiwan, there seems to have been a close relationship between the possession of increasingly modern firearms, particularly from the 1880s and beyond, and the commercialization within those regions, where there were increasing contacts and increasing demands for raw materials. It is the importance of firearms at the points of continual or repeated conflicts, which we are trying to explain. The indigenes in Taiwan, especially the mountain indigenes, appear to have had increasing access to modern firearms and developed their firearms cultures at different levels during the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century according to our findings in this dissertation, detailed especially in Chapters 3-6. Most importantly, by adopting and adapting to firearms, the mountain indigenous people of Taiwan revealed an unusual case of a simple forest society that managed to fight in a prolonged manner against encroachment from both the Chinese civilization and the far more industrially developed military nations.

It is difficult to isolate the specific and major reasons for the indigenes taking up firearms on the one hand or using them so successfully on the other. What I have demonstrated in this dissertation is the circumstances of the indigenes and the warfare they were engaged in directly or indirectly in this critical period (1860-1914) in a broader context. In this way, we gain understanding as to why and how the indigenes took up firearms. I have then gone on to demonstrate why it was that the adoption of firearms was so successful as the essential aid to resistance in warfare over a fairly lengthy period. This demonstration has involved a variety of research and a fairly thick or dense description covering the character of armaments acquisition and use, the links between that and the nature of encroachment from various external interests and cultures (Chapters 2-3 and passim), the physical incorporation of the gun in fighting within the indigenous physical environment in contrast to the rather casual and ineffective use of firearms in the hands of Chinese and Japanese soldiery and police (especially Chapters 6-7), and the incorporation of modern firearms also within the traditional cultures of indigenous groups (Chapter 7) as a seemingly necessary condition of successful resistance. The nuances involved in all of this serve together to alter the more general views of cultural adaptation to modern
technologies that have been posited by such leading scholars as Peter Berger or Stephen Hill (Chapter 1 above).

It is seemingly obvious that the Formosan indigenes had developed some real capability of resisting the lesser intrusions before our research period. The location of Taiwan and the conditions of the terrains of Taiwan, especially the eastern regions - rivers, mountain, hills, ravine or forests - that the mountain indigenes lived in have been very much confined even until today (Chapters 1 and 2). The indigenous tribes have established their own beliefs and socio-political systems and have been practising their own hunting and headhunting cultures prior to the known written history of Taiwan. Clashes or hostilities between indigenous cultures were inevitable due to the geographical constraints and the cultural differences on the island. There were also existing tensions or conflicts and underlying contacts between the indigenes and the early Chinese settlers and the early colonists, although these primarily occurred on the western plains of Taiwan before the nineteenth century when commercial and associated demographic pressures were far less. Nevertheless, the weapons that the indigenes possessed and used were mostly bows, arrows, shield, swords, spears or darts as in a primary stage of arms. This might have provided them with the basic fighting capacities with which to address external threats when they began to escalate after 1861 (Chapters 1-2).

In the encroachments post-1861 the Formosan indigenes were forced to encounter or engage with various forms of aggression, not only from the early Chinese settlers, but also from foreign settlers, from foreign nations (the Americans in 1867, the British in 1868, the Japanese in 1874, the French in 1884-5), and the colonial government (the Japanese from 1895). The desire of industrialized nations to profit from extracting camphor from the camphor tree, growing tea and indigo, and mining coal, sulphur and gold, urged such foreign elements to obtrude into the mountain regions and to exploit the mountain resources. Meanwhile the colonializing governances of the great powers more generally imposed their political encroachments on the indigenous people by sending out their military troops with modern armaments throughout the Chinese maritime areas, including expeditions to the eastern mountain areas of Taiwan.

The weaponry the Formosan indigenes possessed began to change over several phases, which often accompanied the varying scales of persistent conflicts with invaders. This theme has been presented throughout Chapters 4 to 6. From the 1860s to 1883, as described in
Chapter 4, which is briefly categorized as at a traditional level, the weapons the indigenes used appeared to be knives, spears, arrows, bows and even matchlocks from the previous centuries. (see pp 156-163) Meanwhile, foreign troops were operating with modern industrial armaments such as the Snider rifle, Dreyse needle-fire rifle and other types of breech-loading rifles. (see pp 143-147) The Qing military were primarily, but only newly, furnished with modern Western style firearms as well as the traditional Chinese matchlocks, the latter of which were widely used by the local Chinese militia and civilians in Taiwan. This is also the period when the mountain indigenes began to increase their accessibility to, and their notions and experiences of, modern firearms through their various and broader direct and indirect contacts and increasing conflicts with invaders. In the period of 1884-1895, as described in Chapter 5, the weapons in the indigenes’ hands were of a more miscellaneous status, with both traditional and modern types of firearms such as the Martini-Henry rifle, repeating rifles, Remington rifles, etc as well as the spear and the matchlock. (see pp. 200-203) Although the mountain indigenes were less engaged with the French and the Japanese invasions in 1884 and 1895, large amounts of modern armaments were transferred to Taiwan for the provision of wars and pacifying the mountain indigenes by the Qing government. As a matter of fact, numerous modern firearms appeared to flow into the mountain indigenous societies, as our material showed, especially just before Japan took over Taiwan. (see pp. 205-206) This might explain the tremendous struggle demanded of the Taiwan Sotokfu in attempting to control the mountain indigenes during the early colonial period. During the early Japanese colonization (1895-1914), as described in Chapter 6, the majority of weapons of the mountain indigenes were now at a modernised-advanced level. By this time, they not only possessed the remaining modern firearms from the late Qing period, but had secured a variety of streams of access, and were even being given effective weapons by the Japanese officials themselves. Although the Japanese authority later tried to confiscate their firearms and to regulate their possession of firearms, the confrontations of the mountain indigenes with the Japanese governance did not appear to ease off and indeed became more recurrent and of a greater scale than in the Qing governance.

Chapter 7 then evolved another approach, one which suggested the factors behind the effective acculturation of firearms in the indigenous societies. This might help us to explain the prolonged rebellions of the mountain indigenes by studying their application of and
dependency on firearms, from their hunting and headhunting activities and their posture in
defence and attack. This reflects strongly on the third of the possibilities - some combination
of particular local culture with global culture - that Peter Berger suggested (p. 12) and also
reflects Stephen Hill’s notion of “technology enframement” within cultures. The effective
“possession” of firearms also appeared to be embedded through their ways of life, behaviour,
manners, and beliefs, especially among the indigenous men, and extended to the entire
communities as in asserting their status or identities. We show how this contrasted strongly to
the negligence of the Qing military in operating and adapting firearms (which were also, after
all, imported into China from the West mostly during and after the Opium Wars), and the
formalities or inflexibilities of managing firearms imposed by the Taiwan Sotokufu upon the
Japanese police, Chinese/indigenous guards and braves. In the end, such a regulatory
environment might have actually detained or restrained the fighting capacities of the Qing and
Japanese troops, and this in turn might have facilitated the mountain indigenes’ prolonged
resistance.

*The Numbers of Firearms as an Empirical Problem*

The definitive estimate of the number of firearms should remain problematic and
dubious at any time of our study, even in the later period of the Japanese colonization. This is
because there were many ways that the firearms could travel from one group to another or
from the west to the east of Taiwan. It is very likely that the Japanese might have under-
estimated the number of firearms remaining in the indigenes’ hands after they had tried to
confiscate them or to regulate them, as a large number would have suggested their inefficiency
as colonists. At other times, the individual Japanese might have exaggerated the number of the
firearms because they might want to claim that this was the reason that they could not defeat
the indigenes, rather than to admit their tactical or other mistakes. This was also certainly true
in the late Qing period regarding the inefficiency of the Chinese soldier, providing all official
commentators with the temptation to exaggerate the number of firearms the indigenes held.
As we suggested in Chapter 5 (pp. 176-180), especially in the year of Liu’s modernization
attempt, the resistance of indigenous peoples symbolized the failure of the Chinese empire at
its own frontier. The pressure to minimize data on resistance, firearms and the cost of the
suppression of conflicts must have been very high. In such circumstances foreign observers
might well be a better source of information, as every conflict – to them – was a threat to commercial profitability or viability.

The only way that we might circumvent such problems is through the method we have chosen, that of dense descriptions of a large variety of incidents which variably illustrate an efficient use of modernized armaments in the hands of indigenous people, as related throughout Chapters 4-6. It seems methodologically reasonable to assume that the number and usage of firearms as described in such incidents could be more reliable as evidence, as such evidence was given spontaneously, on the spot and through a very great variety of witnesses, instead of collected later and at distant points by officials with special interests to pursue, which could both compound mistakes and deliberately bias them.

In fact, as we have seen, firearms could move either way, through commerce, smuggling, rewards and battlefields. Particularly, many firearms were gained or collected by the indigenes from the battles they had won or from their successful headhunting expeditions. However, it is very difficult to find the balance of this. What we were trying to do from Chapter 3 to Chapter 6 is to accumulate the instances of particular incidents and try to collect some general estimation from an array of material. We hope the evidence we have given were stronger than that provided before because we are using a great mixture of sources from the Chinese, Japanese and foreigners such as consuls, adventurers, commercial agents and so on who often gave evidence in passing in their larger statements. In this way, we might have taken a better and more accurate picture than others who have considered this subject previously.

**Nuancing Culture: Back to Peter Berger**

It should be clear that the above material is our first formal modification of the Berger type of approach. As we foreshadowed in Chapter 1, the categories 2 - coexistence occurs between the global and local cultures- and 3 -There is some combination of particular local culture with global culture in some combination- above (p. 12) seem to best represent the history we have detailed. But even so loosely, it seems obvious that both or any of the outcomes as historical anthropology would be results of something more than the character of “culture” on the one hand – in Hill the degree of its “enframement”- or the nature of the technology on the other. Extraneous factors of environment, local knowledge and disease impinged upon the process whereby technologies
were perceived, utilised, embedded and thus made effective. In this thesis throughout Chapters 2-7 much stress has been laid on such extraneous factors, but as in Chart 2:1 (p. 63) and Chart 3:1 (p. 110) above it is possible to maintain that the greatest dynamic factor was that of improved armament. We might come to this general conclusion because that was the most changing factor and thus would have acted as the limiting edge of successful technological absorption and adoption in this case. We are not claiming that other factors were simply static through these years – for instance the aggressors changed, and so it is quite possible that the Chinese settlers, say, were more adapted to mountain conditions prior to the 1860s, so less susceptible of disease, than were Westerners or the Japanese after the 1880s. It also seems certain that a most dynamic process was increased population and associated commercialisation through our period. But we can conclude from this that the global complexity that generated greater intrusion, commerce and population was the same global context that provided firearms.

More importantly, perhaps, is that we are now in a position to argue that Berger and the general cultural anthropology approach cannot take sufficient account of the nuances of exact time and exact place. Even a small location such as Taiwan offered great difference of interaction between cultures and technique. These differences were mostly determined by variation of exact time and exact geographical location.

It may be that overall we can judge that the culture-technology relationship was some combination of possibilities 2 and 3 in Berger, with possibility 3 becoming the increasing trend, conditioned by variations in extraneous factors. However, even this degree of modification is nuanced further by local factors. For instance, in places where there were high degrees of camphor exploitation, tea and indigo plantation or mining, associated with the greater penetration and exploitation attempts by the Chinese and the Japanese, the increasing interactions or conflicts (revisited in Map 5:1 in Chapter 5, p. 173 and Map 6:3, p. 220) created greater availability of firearms through trade or warfare in exactly those districts, thus the more use of firearms and the more the adaptation of firearms both to resistance and to a greater practice of hunting and headhunting rituals. Again, the Paiwan and the Bunun groups, who lived in the southern part of Taiwan, might have suffered less from the generalised economic encroachment because most of the camphor resources and thus forest work and processing were in the north. They would not – for that reason alone - have had as many conflicts with the
camphor workers in comparison to the Atayal indigenes in northern Taiwan, regardless of
difference in culture or avenues of firearms access. For them to take up firearms could be the
result of political or cultural tension between tribes or with their neighbouring Chinese settlers.
In the Japanese period, some indigenous groups formed collaborations with the Japanese
authority for pacifying other indigenous groups. Even the firearm regulations of the Taiwan
Sotokufu were applied with variations according to the different groups of indigenes in
different regions. We have noted several cases of wholesale resistance where the proportion
of firearms held by male indigenous population was not especially high.

Resistance seems to have always involved a conjuncture of forces in which firearms
tended to figure more largely as time went on, with a real watershed occurring around the late
1880s into the 1890s, the years of high commercialisation. Berger’s typology – summarised in
notions of cultural replacement, coexistence, combination or rejection, between the global and
the local – can not be rejected in a study of this scope, but should now be seen as a typology of
outcomes between culture and technique that involve (possibly in all cases) varying and to an
extent independent elements of extraneous variables, variations of time, and variation of place.
To a historian this means taking the political, economic and cultural circumstances of the local
people into consideration through systematic thick descriptions of events. The reactions or
responses of the indigenous people towards firearms in Taiwan were actually more complex
and variable than the categories and technology enframement processes that Berger and Hill
have suggested as causes or outcomes. In our case, this is because of the fundamental
differences among the indigenous groups, cultures and customs, the different levels of political
and economic encroachments in different places and the varying management strategies and
resources adopted by foreign elements in different periods of time.
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