Lewisian quidditism, humility, and diffidence

Curtis, BL ORCID: 0000-0001-8433-9201, 2016. Lewisian quidditism, humility, and diffidence. Philosophical Studies, 173 (11), pp. 3081-3099. ISSN 0031-8116

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Abstract

In ‘Ramseyan Humility’ Lewis presents the Permutation Argument for quidditism. As he presents it the argument is simple enough, but once one digs beneath its surface, and attempts to understand it in strictly Lewisian terms, difficulties arise. The fundamental difficulty is that, as he presents it, the argument only seems to be sound if one rejects views that Lewis explicitly holds. One aim of this paper is to clarify the argument to show that one can make sense of it in strictly Lewisian terms. In so doing I clarify Lewis’s view, clearly lay out the commitments that Lewis has, and define quidditism in strictly Lewisian terms. However, I also have a secondary aim. Lewis accepts that quidditism entails a form of scepticism, that he calls ‘Humility’. However, by an extension of the permutation argument I show that quidditism entails a form of scepticism, that I call ‘Diffidence’, that is far more wide-reaching than Humility.

Item Type: Journal article
Publication Title: Philosophical Studies
Creators: Curtis, B.L.
Publisher: Springer Netherlands
Date: 12 March 2016
Volume: 173
Number: 11
ISSN: 0031-8116
Identifiers:
NumberType
10.1007/s11098-016-0651-1DOI
651Publisher Item Identifier
Divisions: Schools > School of Arts and Humanities
Depositing User: Jonathan Gallacher
Date Added: 16 Jan 2017 13:30
Last Modified: 09 Jun 2017 14:11
URI: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/29714

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