US Foreign Policy Towards West Africa after September 11 Attacks

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Abstract

The United States foreign policy towards West Africa experienced a significant shift after the terrorist attacks of US strategic institutions in September 11, 2001. This was marked by the securitization of US foreign policy beyond the military-security context of security into other aspects of US security strategy after the Cold War. In that context, political, economic and environmental sectors became part of US security agenda, as reflected in the post-9/11 US War on Terror in global regions. The United States therefore securitized West African states through the policies of aid, trade and military assistance.

Within West Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) had restructured the security pattern of West Africa since the end of the Cold War. The United States policy therefore coincided with ECOWAS’ regional security efforts. Among other things, ECOWAS’ policy of regional integration was revived with pragmatic approaches to securing West Africa from threats of terrorists, smuggling, poverty, corruption and state collapse. The challenge for ECOWAS had been how to securitize successfully against these threats within the context of a sustainable regional security planning without the need for external assistance.

Whether the United States and ECOWAS could cooperate to maintain security and stability in West Africa depended on US agenda and ECOWAS capacity as a regional security complex. The question is, why and how did the US securitize in West Africa if indeed the region had a security complex such as ECOWAS that had the capability to do so? Secondly, were the security issues resolved in the process of US securitization? The methodology adopted in this research is wide-ranging, including the use of qualitative content analysis for exploring theoretical texts of scholars and empirical cases of speeches, official pronouncements and policy documents.

An analysis of the philosophy of Jurgen Habermas was undertaken to appraise the influence of his critical theory on explanations of social inclusion, community, security; his ideal speech act theory, which suggests approaches to resolving crises through inclusive dialogues, was considered. Although Habermas based his philosophy on communication, justice, and ethics, his speech act resonates with the idea of securitization and the interactions between a powerful state and Third World regions. But it was not found to be as helpful in explanation as initially proposed. Using qualitative content analysis, it was possible to combine elements of regional security complex theory (RSCT) of the Copenhagen School with a pragmatic approach to the reconceptualization of the audience in the process of securitization.

The result of the research shows that, first, the United States policies had success in a few areas, whereas in majority of the cases, the security situation in the region had been largely the same or worsened. The US Congress was willing to legitimate the securitizing claims of the core executive without challenging it. Secondly, ECOWAS Member States depended on external powers for survival and this hindered their capacities to integrate at the regional level. ECOWAS elite considered the organization to be instruments for maintaining personal political control in their states.
Thirdly, in terms of US West African cooperation, the lack of sufficient security interaction rendered ECOWAS a weak security complex thereby making it vulnerable to external intervention. The intervention of the US and other external powers in the region challenged the reality of the sovereignty of ECOWAS Member States and further constrained ECOWAS ability to construct regional security architecture for West Africa.

The complexity of the nexus of issues and institutions addressing security agendas including human and developmental security also undermined many of the goals: at least to a significant measure, the way security was pursued by key actors were self-defeating, although other factors also always influenced outcomes too.
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Chapter One

Securitization and US West Africa Relations after September 11

1:1 Introduction

The terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 transformed the US’ view of the international system and its foreign and security policies. The US was motivated to change its foreign policy objectives towards West Africa in its new security plan for the ‘War on Terror’, prompted by both the September 11 attacks and other incidents. The attacks influenced US foreign policy towards West Africa in a way that suggested that the United States recognized the human security needs of the region as well as its own interests. Policy makers perceived the need to halt the possibility of West Africa serving as a haven for terrorists in the future. Emphasis was now placed on a broader security framework at the regional level of “possible threats from the zone of conflict to the zone of peace” (Buzan and Hansen, 2009, p. 177).

Thus the US came to re-conceptualize security issues beyond the realm of state security. To be able to respond to the security threats within West Africa, the United States had focused on democracy promotion, economic assistance and trade through US policy of energy diversification to West Africa. This led to the securitization of the political, economic and security affairs of West Africa in the US foreign policy priorities. The United States was forced to reprioritize its strategic planning towards the region and made West Africa a priority in its War on Terror (WoT).

The terrorist attacks were an indication of the vulnerability of the United States (Devetak 2008) to states and non-state actors which American policy makers intended to engage with, within a wider framework of decision-making in US policy processes. The challenges of post-Cold War security dilemma in West Africa contributed to the perception of West Africa as a region in urgent need of security policy. There had already been a shift in
security discourses towards emphasizing the importance of regions for the maintenance of international security (Buzan et al 2003). States became more aware of the threat potentials of their neighbours and the United States had the capacity to influence security affairs of distant regions. The emerging patterns of security relations at the regional level accorded the US as superpower which possessed not only military power, but preponderant economic and political power (Waltz 2008) the assumption of a new role in West Africa. It was indeed possible for the United States to securitize security and development issues in West Africa (Buzan et al 2003).

West Africa had its challenges which ECOWAS had managed since the end of the Cold War and could have found US efforts through aid, trade, democracy promotion and military assistance worthwhile.

Since the end of the Cold War, the security structure of West African states had been restructured through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (Akindele 2003). The regional organization had shifted its emphasis away from development issues into maintaining regional security due to the crises which engulfed the region in the post-Cold War era (Olonishakin 2009). The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the regional security complex in the post-Cold War era, had strategically expanded its securitizing role beyond the political-military domain of security. For ECOWAS, the regionalization of security included ensuring that obstacles to regional integration were identified and contained for the realization of the dreams of ECOWAS founding fathers (Hutchful 2004). This apparently required the commitments of the regional actors whose responsibilities included using all the instruments of security, securitization and regionalism in the decision making process (Francis 2006). Making regional policies on economic development, political progress and securing the region from threat were part of the different range of articles, protocols and other issues daily engaging the regional actors. The
US understanding of the relevance of ECOWAS to the enhancement of regional security in West Africa did not foreclose its representation of West Africa as a threat.

To be able to securitize in West Africa, the United States executives needed the acceptance of the Congress, of its securitizing claims (Gagnon 2006) about West Africa as a region with such security concerns which could become a breeding place for future terrorists (Harmon 2008). This study has attempted to assess US role in West Africa in the post-9/11 era, with the aim of understanding the why and how of US securitization in the region. One of the major emphasis in US policy in the post-Cold War era has been the United States promotion of democracy in regions with previously authoritarian regimes.

West Africa had struggled in the past with the democratization project but with the assistance offered by the United States the post-9/11 era had witnessed the realization of this goal (Ewoh 2008). However, the United States actors had to use their pragmatism to persuade both the Congress and the ECOWAS member states on the rationale for military assistance and aid provision for the West Africans. This would include the use of the right language by the US securitizing actors, making claims about the threats which lack of policy in those areas meant. This is why the adoption of securitization theory for the theoretical and empirical explanations of US securitization and the policy interactions between the US and ECOWAS actors become relevant for this study.

1:2 Problem of Research

The US is a hegemonic power that has been in relationship with the states in West Africa since the independence of these states. The securitization of the political, economic and security affairs in West Africa was predicated on assumptions and perceptions about what constituted threats to stability in West Africa. ECOWAS Member States certainly had problems realizing their objectives, due to the nature of post-Cold War politics in Africa.
When one declares that there is a threat to its security in West Africa, there is need to put this in perspectives. As Buzan et al (2003, p. 300) argued, “…since September 2001, the scenario with internal fragmentation and absence of external securitisation has become less likely. This is linked to the representation of West Africa as “a democratically weak region and in need of US assistance…” (Jourde 2006, p. 198). According to Buzan (2006), US grand strategy is much wider, involving more traditional concerns about rising powers, global energy supply, the spread of military technology and the enlargement of the democratic/capitalist sphere”. US involvement in West Africa is construed to be part of its “grand strategy” and the imperative of using America’s capacity to move from “specific threats” to “scenarios-based” in US national security agenda within (Buzan et al 2003).

Buzan et al (2003, pp. 300-301) argued, “in academic analyses this is known from the debate about what can explain the persistence of unipolarity against basic balance of power logic. The liberal version that stresses institutionalization, self-binding, and openness is not the basis for current policy; instead, it is the (totally contrary) argument that unipolarity is stable, because the United States is so dominant that no one will dream of trying to counterbalance”. Buzan et al (2003) perceived US policy in terms of pre-emption of the intention of the enemy’s determination to attack its interests. This to them had been the pervasive attitude of US policy makers in their dealings with the rest of the world reinforced by the September 11 attacks. However, the results has been “a narrowly conceived equation between US military power and world order” (ibid, p. 300)

Buzan et al (2003, p. 301) also argued that “it is a basic realist case for the world being a dangerous place, for enemies lurking out there, and that today, when they have the weapons of WMD, the United States is under fundamental threat and needs to act accordingly”. Thus he concluded that “it is possible to handle security problems without knowing them, without measuring specific threats. Whatever the problem, the answer is
always the same: maximise US military power”. To Buzan et al “11 September may therefore
lead to less clear and distinct securitisation, but the whole political climate is marked by an
underlying tone of insecurity” (ibid, p. 301). This insight that 9/11 promoted a stronger
attention to securitization will be a major theme in this thesis. Hozic argued that the reality of
US intervention in West Africa could be summed up as an attempt to insist that there was a
security challenge that needed to be removed as characteristically, the Bush Administration’s
consciously engaged in the “manipulation of images” (2006, p. 64). The United States
interest in West Africa was considered to be strategic, with oil diversification as top of its
priorities (Obi 2009). This includes the deployment of the US troops to the Gulf of Guinea
(Ismail 2008, p. 374) due to the “emerging potential of the Gulf of Guinea as an alternative
source of energy needed to reduce overdependence on the Middle East”. ECOWAS Member
States had since the end of the Cold War been consciously articulating and coordinating
“ideas and strategies” (Fawcett 1997; Akindele 2003). ECOWAS boasts the most advanced
conflict prevention and management mechanism devised by any subregional grouping
anywhere in the world (Obi 2003, p. 17).

But ECOWAS’ post-9/11 policies reflected a different pattern in the securitization
dynamics, by its reconstitution of every threat for achieving its goal of regional integration.
The US foreign policy makers must therefore, have a full grasp of the realities of the security
threats in the region and attempt to integrate this into the new US security framework for
regional stability in West Africa. ECOWAS had taken on board the new concerns about the
concept of human security, the social roots of conflict and the prioritization of regional power
over national solution to conflicts (ibid, p. 17). The nexus between economic integration,
good governance, democratic peace and regional security had been recognized by ECOWAS
and this formed the core of its efforts at institutionalizing peace and security in West Africa
between 1998 and 2001 (ibid, p. 18) and beyond. Africans had designed their own security
frameworks through regional institutions, to enhance the indigenous capabilities of Africans to maintain security effectively on the continent (Ate 2001). The research problem therefore focuses on those issues which shaped the post-9/11 US ECOWAS relations in West Africa and the why and how of US securitization policy in the region. Thus, US concerns came to overlay and overtake local and regional priorities in the security affairs of West Africa, depending on the degree of security interaction among ECOWAS members and the extent to which US ECOWAS cooperation could help construct a reliable security architecture for West Africans in the post-9/11 era.

1:3 The Research Question

Any thesis asks a question which is more general at the outset and which is then refined into a specific research question which the methodology and methods seek to address. This dissertation will ask four main questions, which follow in logical order from each other. First, how can the US reprioritization of its foreign policy in West Africa be best understood, given the already existing foreign policy contexts which focused on development and security in West Africa? Second, to what extent were the United States’ efforts at securitization successful, and how did this shape the security of the referent objects of security, that is to say West Africa? Thirdly, how did ECOWAS act as a securitizing agent in the light of the challenges confronting the organization in the post-Cold War era? Finally, what is the relationship between the referent objects and the securitized threats in the context of US perception of West Africa as the imagined source of terrorism in the post-9/11 era? These questions use a vocabulary of security and securitization studies which is explained in the next chapters and tested through the whole work. The thesis is, naturally enough, also enquiring into the relationships between the answers to these questions: how did the complex assemblage of security discourses and practices represented by the policies of the United States regional organisation and individual states interact to shape the security environment
and development prospects of West Africa after 2001? For practical reasons, including the availability of sources and the timing of PhD dissertation writing purposes, the thesis covers the time period up to 2001/2011, and some of the more recent very important events and changes in the region do not figure in this narrative.

1:4 The Aims of Research

The aims of spell out how these research questions are to be answered in more details. They are:

i) to consider the overall context within which the United States securitized in the post-9/11 era. That is, an overview of US foreign policy in West Africa bearing in mind the changes effected by the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks. The United States perceived terrorism as a threat that needed to be confronted. The fact that global threats could emerge from any part of the world and threaten US national security forced its policy makers to put the West Africa region within that context. In other words US’s perception of what its national security entailed was beyond attempting to undertake an adequate scrutiny of what it implied to label a region as security threat thus in the thinking of US policy makers there was the need to redraw the geopolitical, geo-strategic map of the international security system to counter the scourge of terrorism.

ii) to examine the decision-making processes in US ECOWAS securitizations in West Africa. The decision processes of US foreign policy and ECOWAS security policies are applied to regional security in West Africa. The US decided to cast new security threat as military security issues by the process of securitization. This includes a process within which the legislature and executive interacted to
formulate urgent policies in the spheres of political, economic and military security for dealing with those threats in West Africa. ECOWAS’s decision making processes are also examined bearing in mind its understanding of threats to West African security.

iii) to assess the implications of post-9/11 United States policy process and ECOWAS policies on regional security. That is, to evaluate the impact of US securitization in West Africa and ECOWAS securitization at the regional level. Both the United States and ECOWAS approached security crisis in West Africa from different perspectives resulting in different outcomes. However it is worthy to note that securitization required winning coalitions either from the perspective of the US securitization process in which ECOWAS actors were required to play vital roles, or where ECOWAS was confronted with the need to involve the US actors. Therefore the integration of the two sets of actors in the policy arena also requires closer examination for practical purposes in the securitization process.

1:5 Critical Investigations of US West Africa Relations after the 9/11 Attacks in West Africa

The main issue here is to know the extent to which US securitization was successful in West Africa as well as the ones of ECOWAS Member States which manage the security of the region. There are four issues that emerge in this discourse, which are discussed separately in the next sub-sections.

1:6 US Foreign Policy towards West Africa
The first is the context within which US securitization set the agenda for regional security in West Africa. The end of bipolarity has removed the significance of Cold War perceptions and divisions which led to the collapse of distance between the United States and the rest of the global regions (Devetak 2008). Also, the United States no longer adopts an antithetical position towards regional co-operation. Put more properly, “the US is no longer hostile to certain forms of regional organization that either include the as a member or promote an agenda reflecting neo-liberal views conducive to American thinking.” (Breslin, Shaun Richard Higgott and Ben Rosamund 2002, p. 16). Devetak (2008) further argued that the collapsing of distance “is crucial in understanding while the ‘failed state’ and rogue states discourses have become so central to defence and foreign policy discussion today in the North”.

Thus, “the distance between the US and the rest of the developing world narrowed considerably since September 11” (ibid, p. 128). This implies that it is possible to examine post-9/11 politics within the framework of US reprioritization of its security objectives towards West Africa. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, “the US government’s understanding of politics in the developing world has somehow changed. However in the post-9/11 era, “Anti-Americanism expressed in the language of Islam, major civil wars, humanitarian crises, democratization and the provision of new natural resources constitute the new language through which US foreign policy makers talk about and interpret events in Africa” (Shaw 2002, p. 181). Thus, the end of the Cold War brought new issues to the stage of political discourse. Campbell (1999, p. 171) referred to this as “new discourses of danger (such as AIDS, “terrorism”, and the general sign of anarchy and uncertainty”.

As Buzan and Hansen (2009, p. 12) argued, conceptions of ‘National Security’ developed in a political climate where the United States and the West more broadly understood as threatened by hostile opponents. That reality is demonstrated more practically
in the dynamics of US foreign policy towards Africa which was for long described largely as isolationist towards the continent. Secondly, there is a sense in which the post-9/11 era was implicitly a security dispensation. US experience of 9/11 terrorist attacks shaped the reality of its ‘new’ security agenda and this is an attestation to the idea that as a superpower could influence the security dynamics of far-flung regions (Buzan 2003). US representation of West Africa as a region with potential security threats to American national security necessitated the removal of the ‘facilitating conditions’ and regional level vulnerabilities. This was predicated on the assumption that “Africa is incapable of giving adequate voice to its own security agenda” (Buzan et al 2003, p. 252).

According to Hozic, (2006, p. 64) “Security itself is difficult to represent…without representations of threat and danger. The production of security always depends on the production and reproduction of insecurities—enemies, fears, known and unknown perils.”

According to Taylor, (2008, p. 41) perception-reality relationship is a constant and unavoidable feature of security issues, with an important element after 2001 being how governments in the West should present the realistic possibilities of terrorist attack. Contemporary Western societies are far too concerned with risk avoidance and safety, and that perceived risks are often greatly exaggerated. But Obi argued that “the view that Africa harbours conditions and potential targets for terrorist attacks has heightened its strategic importance in the view of the United States post-9/11 global security paradigm. This concern is further accentuated by the linking of oil to the terrorist threat to the US national security…” (Obi 2009, p. 132) Alden posits that “the narrow pursuit of resource diplomacy is best exemplified by the United States…which has sought out access to energy and strategic minerals through minimal investments in development assistance programming”(Alden 2009). This position is corroborated by Ewoh (2008, p. 255) who argued that in the twenty-
first century, US policy toward West Africa is being driven “almost entirely by geopolitical and economic interests, principally interests of oil and other natural resources”

The US focused on dealing with those threats through persuading the Congress and the American public of the urgency which democratization, provision of development assistance and trade, represented to the overall war on terror in US foreign policy priorities. To widen security in US foreign policy Buzan et al, listed the “new security issues” which entered US official policy planning in different degrees. Securitization of new threats became formulated first, as environmental security, epidemics/global infectious diseases—The Clinton administration—and Clinton after the end of his presidency—regularly pronounced HIV/AIDS in Africa an international security issue. (p. 296). Organised crime and drugs were also under the first category. The second category included geo-economics in which President Clinton “phrased the priority of economic policy with an urgency bordering on securitization” in his early policies. The second threat was identified as terrorism while the administration placed issue of proliferation, ‘rogue states’ and WMD in the US foreign policy priorities. Terrorism as a separate issue had been securitized but did not lead to dramatic specific measures, until the 9/11 attacks. After the September 2001 attack, President Bush created a department to deal with issues relating to terrorism. Internationally the War on Terror became “an organising principle for overall foreign policy and was very much securitised…. ” (Buzan 2006)

As Buzan and Hansen (2009, p. 12) argued, that “National Security” is conceptualized in a sense in which “the United States and the West more broadly understood themselves as threatened by a hostile opponent”.

RSCT is aimed at people working empirically on specific regions. The theory offers the possibility systematically linking the study of internal conditions, relations among the units in the region, relations between regions, and the interplay of regional dynamics with globally
acting powers…structural logic (that) the hypothesis that regional patterns of conflict shape the lines of intervention by global level powers (Buzan et al 2003, p. 52). According to Buzan

Standard RSCs do not contain a global level power and therefore in such regions…clear distinctions can be drawn between inside, regional level dynamics outside, intervening global level ones. (Buzan et al, p. 55)

1:7 West Africa as a Discursive Region

West Africa is examined as a discursive region and attempt is made to establish the link between the states, substate actors and the regional institutions and their regional level characteristics. In this context, the regionalist approach of Buzan et al (2003) and the regional security community (RSC) discourse place West Africa at the centre of the security analysis in understanding post-9/11 US relations with West Africa. West Africa has fifteen states which presumably, pull together for confronting security threats. By virtue of having three linguistic groups, that is, the francophone, Anglophone and the lusophone, that is, Portuguese speaking states (Akinterinwa 1999), West Africa is placed at the heart of the international system. Taylor et al (2004, p. 1) captured this relationship in a broader sense when he linked the African continent to world politics. To Taylor (ibid, p. 1) “in practice, Africa cannot enjoy ‘a relationship’ with world politics because Africa is in no sense extraneous to the world’; the two are organically intertwined” Scholars have studied West Africa, with a view to understanding how regional security vulnerabilities such as war, militarism, famine, poverty, natural catastrophes, corruption, disease, criminality, environmental degradation and crises of governance (Taylor et al 2004, p. 2) often defied the capacity of states.

The question is, why did states in a region such as West Africa struggle to form a formidable union to confront the challenges to security? The attempts of the actors of the
region to regionalize their development objectives, under ECOWAS in 1975 was perceived as the solution to the culture of dependency and underdevelopment in West Africa (Adedeji 2004). However, the creation of parallel economic and customs union such as the UEMOA and the BCEAO in the francophone states as well as the Manu River Union, were some of the visible challenges to regionalism in West Africa (Asante 2004). It was not surprising that the end of the Cold War exposed West Africa’s vulnerabilities to regional security threats, thereby necessitating the need to strengthen ECOWAS in the maintenance of security in West Africa.

The focus on West Africa helps to provide the necessary background for understanding the roles of the other regional institutions and the associations mitigating the functioning of ECOWAS. However, whether ECOWAS could use its influence as a broader security complex to foster regional security depended on the multiplicity of factors which influence regional level securitization in the post-Cold War world.

1:8 ECOWAS and the Regional Security Complex

ECOWAS is the regional organization and a supranational institution saddled with the responsibility of security management in West Africa. The role of ECOWAS is explained more broadly as a stabilizing agency in the struggle for security and stability in West Africa. ECOWAS securitizing role and the speech acts of the ECOWAS actors in the political, economic and the security sectors are examined and the extent to which their securitization reflect on regional integration. ECOWAS post-Cold War security agenda had been to switch attention from the original objective of a regional organization, which was based on economic development of the region to a security complex. “Most African states remain committed to regionalism as part of the response to their profound and growing economic, political and social problems” (Armstrong et al 2004, p. 215). ECOWAS securitization was
based on a different kind of experience, in which the West African region was perceived to be threatened by a horde of security challenges such as poverty, state collapse, coups, ethno-religious crises which required the instrumentality of seasoned regional officials, bureaucrats and technocrats to confront. ECOWAS securitization was based on the local understanding of the threats to regional security in West Africa.

ECOWAS had taken a step in this direction, introducing more protocol agreements into its statutes books as well replacing the Treaty of the organization with more updates. The leadership of ECOWAS had to concede at many forums about the indispensability of tackling security for achieving regional development. Also, US post-9/11 policy was largely security–centred and it was not surprising that it took this form in US-West Africa relations. The use of qualitative content analysis for explaining US relations with West Africa in the post-9/11 era resonates with the view of Balzacq (2011, p. 51), who argued that “securitization studies have something to learn from content analysis” With content analysis, it is possible to combine the Copenhagen School regional security complex theory (RSCT) with the relationship between the securitizing actors and the audience who legitimate the act. This lends credence to the securitization process and makes confronting insecurity through the speech act, a more pragmatic endeavour (Balzacq 2005).

1:9 US ECOWAS Cooperation and Regional Security in West Africa

The management of regional security between the United States and ECOWAS actors is aligned with the aim of determining why and how US security intervention was the reflection of depth of the security concerns in West Africa. US expression of concerns about insecurity in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire showed the enormity of the threats to security in West Africa. It was also expected to show that the US security interaction with the West African actors was placed at the right domain, which
was to assist the regional actors maintain regional security. To what extent did the US securitizing actors persuade the American publics in the process of securitizing against US national and regional interests in West Africa? How did ECOWAS respond to the same threats and what did the ECOWAS Member States do to assume their responsibilities as the legitimizing actors against threats to security in West Africa?

The emerging historical, cultural, socio-economic, and political patterns of external intervention as typified by the British and French in Sierra-Leone and Cote d’Ivoire for conflict and security management had become an attraction for US policy makers. Idris (2008, p374) contended that this emerging pattern of partnership between regional and extra-regional actors in active regional deployment for conflict management represented a guiding principle “that could be adapted to American national interest and peculiarities in conflict management in West Africa”. (Idris ibid, p. 374)

1:10 Conclusion

The challenge of terrorism spurred the US policy makers into action and this resulted in the new securitization of US foreign policy strategy. From the post-9/11 era the United States policy makers mapped out regions which they considered to be threats to American interests. West Africa was incorporated into the new US security agenda. Despite the assumptions about the region as having weak states and therefore could naturally breed poverty and help the neglected to flourish in violent terrorism, the ECOWAS actors had different perceptions of the threats to security in West Africa. One of the main challenges of West Africans actors was to persuade the United States policy makers to think more strategically about US policy in the region, bearing in mind the limits placed on the region by virtue of its position in the order of things at the international system. Nevertheless the United States had its programme structured and engaging with the regional actors, that is the state
and the sub-state actors required a strategic foreign policy. On the other hand, ECOWAS main concern was to ensure that regional development continued to be high on the agenda of the policy makers and also building regional architecture on regional integration.
Chapter 2

Literature Review: The United States and Regional Security in West Africa

2:1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to classify the writings about US foreign policy and regionalization in West Africa under the post-Cold War and post-9/11 categories. The reason being that the changes in the direction of US foreign policy towards West Africa was during the transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era. One significant aspect of US foreign policy after the Cold War was the reality about the lack of relevance of West Africa and indeed Africa in the foreign policy agenda of Washington. The fact that US financial aid was reduced during this period was the clearest proof of US neglect and Isolation from West Africa affairs. It was therefore not difficult to see the extent to which the post-Cold War violence took effect in the region, resulting in the loss of many lives during the immediate post-Cold War era. This apparently explains why the Copenhagen Schools securitization is crucial for the analysis of security challenges in West Africa. It helped to signpost what has been missing in the writings of most authors about regional security in West Africa. Securitization theory has also been useful for expanding security theories beyond the political-military dynamics. Most African writers tend to emphasise the relevance of the other security sectors in their analyses of security crises in West Africa and indeed across other regions. What they failed to do successfully has been offering a clear analysis of why securitization and desecuritization matter in the resolution of regional security dilemmas in West Africa.

2:2 US Policy in Africa after the Cold War

The post-Cold War US policy-making process on Africa is characterised by the isolationism of the Cold War era. This was evident in the collapse of states on the continent. In particular, West Africa went through a period in which the withdrawal of Western interests
on the region created room for internal crises within the states, with the clearest evidence in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In the Cold War era, the US foreign policy was security-centred. While this was the main concern of the United States, post-independent thinkers in Africa had other things in mind. Zartman traced the history of African politics and argued that Africans had always considered their independence tied to the total economic liberation of the continent. No less personality than former president Kwame Nkrumah led the effort to actualize his dream of uniting Africans. With his enormous charisma, Kwame Nkrumah engaged African leaders of his time in debates, arguments and discourses about the future of Africa’s political economy in the early 1960s (Zartman, 1987).

US policy in the post-Cold War era has been security centred as the Cold War one in Africa. Successive US administrations were concerned first, with preventing Africa from falling into the hands of the Soviets during the Cold War. After the Cold War, the continent did not receive adequate attention, and the effect was the prolonged wars that broke out in some parts of the continent, such as the one in the Horn of Africa and in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars in West Africa. The US has two important national security interests in sub-Saharan Africa: possible terror threats that might emanate from the region and growing US dependence on African oil and minerals (Bah and Aning). As Clapham argued:

The end of bipolarity was overwhelmingly greeted by African rulers with regret. The opportunities which it had given them to impose the project of monopoly statehood were abruptly removed, and African states were exposed instead to the monopoly diplomacy of a triumphant Western alliance (Clapham, p. 159).

The end of the Cold War in 1989, and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union, then definitively removed the global conditions which had encouraged the massive oversupply of armaments to Africa. In the aftermath of the Cold War, “majority of African countries lacked the capacity to deal with any large scale security crisis, whether domestic or external, without the direct support of foreign military forces” (Gambari 1996, p. 159). There may be a revising of this part because the argument is that the end of the cold war reduced the
influence which the dictators enjoyed and this went a long way to determine the security landscape of West Africa after the Cold War, especially in the post-9/11 era. Africa is at a crossroads in the emerging new world order. As Gambari further argued,

The de-ideologization of international politics and the consequent rapprochement between the two superpowers are likely to have both positive and negative consequences for Africa, which should work to enhance the positive and minimize the negative factors. Similarly, the democratization and liberalization of the politics of many of the world's regions may have a demonstrative effect, but this is likely to take the form of social upheavals and political instability (Gambari op cit p. 33)

Van der Veen suggested, that Africa could easily provide for itself, even if the population in each country were to double (Musambachime et al 2004). He argued that Africa is still premodern and there is not yet any keen incentive and well developed plans to develop. Among the reasons he gives for Africa s woes are that, for too long, some African states have been "non-functioning," and that power sometimes rested on "a small, Western educated elite." He also points out that ethnicity and tribalism were a problem, that conflict became endemic, that there was an involvement of the military, that there was the duality of "'benign' patronage and 'malignant' repression," and, recently, the implosion or disintegration of some African states (Musambachime et al 2004).

The immediate post-Cold War era confirmed the point that Africa ranked less than others in US foreign policy priorities. The isolationism was the continuation of the US Cold War policy agenda in sub-Saharan Africa. During the Cold War, the United States policy in sub-Saharan Africa was based on achieving its immediate goal of US security and economic interests. As Schraeder argued, “all presidents (although in varying degrees) traditionally have looked upon Africa as a special area of influence and responsibility of the former European colonial powers. Therefore, presidents generally have deferred to European sensitivities” (Schraeder 1994, p. 14). This implied that the United States acknowledged the pervasive influence of the Europeans in Africa during the period. As Elliot claimed, “America’s military and strategic interests in Africa would scarcely have merited a paragraph
in anything other than an ambitious naval officer's dream book” (Skinner 1986, p. 43). The “black voice” in US Africa policies has historically been very weak and non-influential and lack proper organization (ibid, p. 42). The US was caught up in the Somalian crisis where American soldiers were killed in 1993. In 1994, the US regretted not getting involved in the Rwandan genocide in which a million people died. The failed mission of the US in Somalia discouraged further involvement in Africa (Taylor 2004, Pauly Jnr 2011). The significant drop in US foreign assistance to the African continent during the 1980s and 1990s constitutes one of the most vivid examples of Africa’s declining fortunes relative to other regions of the world, as well as its declining salience in US foreign and security policies. Thus, the perception among US policymakers that Africa is less important relative to other regions of the world in the post-Cold War era led to significant budgetary. One of the most vivid examples of post-Cold War decline in African influence was the budgetary cutbacks in some program offices related to Africa. In relations to the other regions of the world, Africa was ranked low by the US policy makers in their policy priorities. This was evident in the drop in US foreign assistance to the African continent during the 1980s and 1990s (Schraeder 1994, p. 250). When compared with other regions of the world, Africa’s share of US foreign assistance dropped from roughly 10.3 percent ($1.87billion) of an overall budget of $18.13 billion in 1985, to approximately 7.5 percent ($1.18billion) of the $15.73billion budget for 1990. From 1986 US military aid was cut to the African continent. Other security assistance, such as Economic Support Funds (ESF), similarly dropped from $452.8 million to $58. 9 million during the same period (ibid). Despite the final two years of the Bush administration, Washington’s preoccupation with the end of the Cold War reinforced Africa’s traditional low standing within the aid hierarchy. In addition to responding to a growing sense among the US public that foreign assistance should be invested in a lacklustre US economy, the Bush administration trimmed US foreign assistance to the African continent in order to free up
funds to reward the transition to democracy in other regions of the world, as well as to pay for the enormous costs associated with the US military operation against Iraq in 1991 known as Operation Desert Storm (ibid). In a January 1990 budget address, for example, Bush informed Congress of the administration’s intention to reduce aid to Africa specifically in order to free up larger amounts of aid for Poland. Although the African Affairs constituency in Congress was somewhat successful in reversing Africa’s marginalisation within the aid hierarchy, the policymaking establishment’s growing concern with other regions and interests in an altered Cold War environment ensures that proponents will be hard pressed to maintain, let alone increase, Africa’s share of the foreign aid budget. According to Chester Croker, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “Africans could end up paying for the expanding frontiers of freedom everywhere else. That would be an obscene response to the African crisis” (cited in Bah and Aning 2008). Between 1990 and 2000, sub-Saharan African countries have reached an average of 10% of the MDGs instead of the 40% needed to be on the right track. He also mentioned that the MDGs often conceal major disparities between different groups of the same company or parts of the country. However, these requirements at the international level are not without effect on the evolution of African societies. The challenge to combat poverty through development in Africa, Fall argued, became the pervasive agenda of stakeholders on the international scene for fifteen years (1990-2005) (Fall 2007). Fall (2004) also identified the challenges created by dependency and underdevelopment for Africa’s security. He argued that although colonialism ended, states in the southern hemisphere still lack economic development and the required technological advancement to accelerate growth, in comparison to the developed countries in the northern hemisphere. This he attributed to imperialism and the systematically unfavourable international environment. Although the author based his analysis on the Marxist approach, it provides the background required for post-Cold War security discourse in Africa. On causal
emphasis on tension in Africa, structural theorists, including the Marxist perspectives on Africa, link inequality and violence (Deg et al 1999). Le Vine puts this more poignantly by arguing that two sets of scholars perceive the relationship between the French and their francophone African counterparts differently. The softer argument is that France no longer wields the big stick. Francophone Africans periodically pick fights with their French friends (Le Vine 2004, pp. 3-4). The other perspective is the one that is more critical of France’s role in the region. Bunduku-Latha (2010) recognized this as a challenge as he explained in his book about the excitement which heralded the election of President Barack Obama in November 2008. There was a perception that a heavy burden rested on President Obama due to his African connection. It was clear that what Obama wanted from Africans as he preferred to visit Ghana where there had been a willingness to pursue good governance and democracy. According to the author the new administration created a compelling emotional link between the White House and Africa. As the author argued, Obama was unequivocal about the need to transform this relationship, within a multilateral framework. He however expressed concerns about the capability of the Obama administration to align American agenda with the current realities of the post-9/11 global security concerns. The control of threats to security in Africa and their securitizations has equally attracted the interests of African scholars (Cheru and Obi 2010). The US government had expressed concern about the increasing rate of radical Islam in the Sahel. Miles explained with a detailed understanding of how radical strains of Islam have emerged in the Sahel. He sees the rise of hardline Islam in Mali as a threat to the global struggle against Islamic fundamentalism. He claimed that fifteen mosques had been built in Timbuktu alone (Miles 2007, p. 55). Nigeria’s position within the region has been analysed in various works by scholars who try to show the salience of Nigeria’s domestic stability to regional security. In the post-9/11 era of security in West Africa, Nigeria has become both the main actor and the threat in resolving the regional security challenges in the region. Zartman
(1997, p. 199) prescribed the development of an enduring and legitimate links between a strong state and a strong civil society, and “a broader look at three other modes of governance as well—elite power sharing, radical populism, and state corporatism”.

2.3 ECOWAS and Political Regionalism in West Africa

Deng (1998, p. 70) noted the Cold War removed the “aggravating external factor” in African conflict but also removed the moderating influence of the superpowers. State building is inherently the responsibility of a given country and usually can be influenced only on the margins by neighbouring states, regional organizations, and the international community. These insecurities and vulnerabilities of a state in the making, however, interact with regional processes that often complicate the creation of responsibly foreign states. Deng suggested that

The mixing of domestic insecurities and interstate antagonisms creates an autonomous dynamic of regional conflict and therefore the potential for regional actions to either increase or reduce security and cooperation that in turn will either facilitate or inhibit the construction of more legitimate and effective states. Effective regional organizations are based on strong states… regional organizations failed in their original goals (p. 70).

He linked the lack capacity for regional economic development with persistent conflicts

All began as organizations designed to promote regional cooperation on economic issues and resource management. They became more engaged in promoting better governance and more responsible sovereignty in the late 1980s and early 1990s as internal conflicts threatened to destabilize large parts of Africa and make economic development impossible (p. 71).

Adedeji (2004) chronicled the history of the formation of ECOWAS and the challenges the organization confronted at inception. According to Buzan et al (2003) until the formation of the ECOWAS in 1975, there was insufficient security interaction to call this even a proto-complex. ECOWAS linked together the whole block of coastal states from Nigeria to Mauritania, and the three interior landlocked states Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, sixteen in all. In 1978 ECOWAS agreed a Nonagression Protocol, and in 1981 a Protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence. In
1990 a Standing Mediation Committee was established, which generated ECOMOG, the Nigerian-led peacekeeping force that intervened in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars (Buzan et al p. 239).

Regional hegemons are defined as “states which possess power sufficient to dominate subordinate state systems”. (Adoghame 2006, p. 123) As these definitions illustrate, hegemony requires both capability and power to exercise primacy or leadership. It is argued that Nigeria can best be described as an aspiring or potential hegemon based on its lack of military and economic capability (Adebajo 2002). Detailed case studies of countries before generalizations could be drawn, so also does the study of regional interventions in Africa’s civil wars in the 1990s and beyond. Rothchild et al. assess the regional security characteristics of West Africa during the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars and the interplay of the local, national and the non-state actors’ activities on the regional and the global levels of security (Rothchild 1994). Zartman argued that for nearly four decades of independence the sixteen states of West Africa avoided wars among themselves with very few exceptions. Despite the lack of external threats to state and regional security, the states in the region “have been subject to many different internal conflicts—social, factional, civil-military, ethnic, religious, and others. A few of these conflicts have nearly torn apart their countries and have been managed primarily through military means” (Zartman 1997, p. 10)

The 1990s witnessed the phenomenon of child soldiers in West Africa, with the attendant brutal and horrific manifestation of human tragedies in Africa. The states involved in civil wars included Nigeria, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau. Civil conflict destroyed the social fabric of their societies, while extra-continental interests and regional, economic, political, and ideological imperatives, as seen in the hegemonic presence France in Francophone West Africa. Explaining these conflict-developments therefore, involves a critical appraisal of both the structural conditions and psycho-cultural factors, which sustain the scale and intractability of the conflict vortex in the West African sub-region, especially in
the 1990s. The reason why this is discussed here is to lay the foundation for the post-9/11 security politics. The immediate post-Cold War politics greatly impacted the post-9/11 era. The challenge of child soldiers and other challenges preceded the democratization of the 2000s. Africa is part and parcel of the international system (Taylor 2004; Shaw et al 2001). Thus, African security challenges cannot be isolated from the global system. The pioneering efforts of Africans at independence commenced the struggle for regional unity. Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, the torchbearer of African independence, implored African leaders to work toward continental unity. Zartman used his work to trace the history of African unity and the issues which the demand for continental unity generated after the independence of African states in the 1960s. He wrote about the debates which started the idea of uniting Africans and the political economic strategy appropriate for the new continent. There were competing political and economic visions which manifested in the interactions and tensions of three camps — the radical pan-Africanist “Casablanca” group; its conservative antithesis, the nationalist “Monrovia” group; and the Franco-African “Brazzaville” group — during the period before the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963 (Zartman 1987). In the post-9/11 era, West Africa’s regionalism is faced with the impediments of globalization which structure global political economy against West Africa (Obi 2001, pp. 168-190). Hutchful et al (2004) differed with the views of Paul Collier about causal factors of the security challenges of Africa and the West Africa, by dismissing the economic misery index position taken by the latter, as the cause of instability in Africa. Also Obi criticized Kaplan’s prediction about the likely collapse of West Africa as untenable. Huntington’s clash of civilization was also dismissed as lack of understanding the reality in the heterogeneity in the identity and culture of the international society. Huntington’s work was critiqued as inadequate for explaining the security challenges of West Africa. Most post-Cold War authors focus on the nexus between state failure and regional disintegration, or lack
of security and development at the regional level (Zartman, 1996, Francis 2007, 2010). The original project of unity in ECOWAS was geared towards unifying the states in the region for economic and monetary purposes (Adebayo 2004). Subsequent events refocused ECOWAS as a security complex. Francis (2006) undertook a historical survey of the attempts of the regions to foster unity across Africa. He however lamented the intractable crises of regional security which made this unity agenda of the regional organizations impossible. But the main issue in ECOWAS as a development agency for the region is that it is historically aimed at helping to build a new regional constellation in West Africa after the end of colonialism. This has been said in many ways by several authors such as Ojo (1980), Stephen Wright (1986), Akindele (2003), Akinrinade and Sesay (1997) and Sesay (2003). ECOWAS’ capacity for building a strong regional architecture has however been an issue of contention in regional security discourses, as those just cited authors demonstrate. Kandeh (2008) explicitly described how the people of Sierra Leone work in tandem with the state to produce a system which favours the sit-tight syndrome in Sierra Leone, and also encourages the perpetual under-development of the state. He identified the problem of patrimonialism, clientelism, and institutional syncretism as endemic in the nature of Sierra Leonean politics. Ferguson (2005) also devoted his work to explaining how the state failed the society in the region. He attempted an anthropological and sociological overview of the state society dynamics in Africa. Ferguson believes that there is a complex relationship between the external dimension of the state in Africa and the domestic social life of the people; local social life is highly porous to external influences and pressures. To him, the wholesale importation of the western cultural style of administration into African rural and traditional systems limits the capacity of the Africans to evolve political systems that will enable them to respond to the needs of modern life. Literature on the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars has not only attempted to study the causes of the crises, churning out empirical evidences of the cataclysm of the
wars (see Sesay 2003, Reno 2000, Zartman 1995), but they have also enabled researchers to conduct interviews with the participants (Sesay 2003). There have also been attempts to offer solutions to the various crises in West Africa such as Akinrinade 1997, Akindele 2003, and Akindele and Ate, 2001. What is common to all the works is the fact that West Africa is understood as simultaneously experiencing both security and development crises (see Adekeye 2002, Adekeye et al 2004). Part of the problem of the region is the unresolved issues of the post-colonial era, which is evident in the nature of the state that has been described as ‘overdeveloped’ (Vincent 2008). Thus, the state in Africa is difficult to tame. Vincent compared “hopeful” Chad and contrasted the Chadian state with Nigeria in the area of combating corruption in the two states. He argued that the Nigerian state had created and developed “a system of rent collection” and “a power base” that made combating corruption impossible.(p434) Thus, embedded within the African state systems are impediments, such as corruption that prevent the state from realizing its objectives. Clearly, ethnicity stands out as one of the impediments, but as Forrest (2004) would argue, ethnicity was a construct. This fact is emphasized by Terrence Ranger et al (1996). It therefore implies that other challenges that emerged from that reality were subsequently constructed as Obi (2001) had also argued, in his analysis of globalization and environmental crises in Africa. There is also the problem of parallel French organizations from the francophone states which the French had established in collaboration with the French speaking states in the region. These were CEAO (1967) UDEAO, UEMOA, all in a bid to challenge Nigeria’s leadership in the region (Akindele 2003, Asante in Adebajo et al 2004) the French UEMOA that has been credited for being more effective in the economic integration of the francophone states(Adedeji 2004).

Francis listed the following as contributory factors to the African security malaise: wars of national liberation (p. 72), cold war proxy wars, (p. 73), and secessionist wars (p. 74), as well as interstate /conventional wars (p. 75), identity based wars, (p. 76) and resource-based wars
Francis (2006) argued that combining military strategy with developmental objectives is essential for driving development and peace in a troubled region. He wrote:

> Developmentalists see a positive correlation between conflict and the nature and dynamics of underdevelopment, hence the only way to prevent and reduce armed conflict and its associated pathologies of crime and terrorism is to respond with development programmes to remedy the underdevelopment malaise (p. 69).

2:4 ECOWAS Economic and Security Regionalisms in West Africa

Without any willingness of the regional actors to build internal political structures which the region needed for viable regional politics, ECOWAS struggle with monetary and economic union became a threat to the security of West Africa. Akindele (2003), Sesay (2003) and Fawole (2005) traced the root of lack of economic development in West Africa to the post-independent politics of West Africa. Fawole argued that the fact that the regional level lacked any coherent agenda towards unity was not surprising as the states were hardly prepared for any form of unity. Akindele linked the palpable lack of vision of the regional actors to existing underdevelopment at the regional level. Asante (2007) advocated for the establishment of the African Centre of Regionalism to “provide organized and institutionalized support at policy technical and intellectual levels to African governments, regional economic communities and all other parties involved in furthering regionalism in Africa (p. 91). In ‘the fifth wave of Pan-Africanism’, Landsberg concurred that the Omega Plan for Africa which was initiated by Senegalese president Abdoulaye Wade in 2001 was a plan which informed

> the belief that Africa must, in order to keep pace with globalization, pursue a new strategic development vision based on a comprehensive and realistic program which clearly sets out the priorities and resources to be mobilized for strong and sustainable growth which benefits all strata of its population and the rest of the world. Omega was presented as an attempt to find an original approach (p. 127).
However, the Omega plan has yet to position ECOWAS for advancing the cause of West Africa’s sustainable growth and development, due to lack of a coherent policy at the regional level.

Collier was criticized for his economic grievance arguments as the main cause of violence in Africa. It was argued that apart from Collier’s “lack of process”, he failed to use sufficient empirical evidence. The authors further argued that most of the “evidence” used to support Collier’s arguments is obviously anecdotal and is often employed to support predetermined aims or conclusions. (Hutchful and Kwesi Aning 2004, p. 199) Hutchful and Aning argued that “the growing rule of resources in conflicts is global rather than simply “African” problem, and in the politics of rebel movements does not simply stem from greed, though greed cannot be discounted” (Adebajo 2004, p. 200). Hutchful and Aning suggested that it is the pessimism towards African emancipation that should worry everyone. African discourses are framed around “primordial African culture”, “nothing can be done”, “no structured intervention can be made” and so on. They argued that “despite lip service to the need for African “partnership” and even “ownership” of these discourses, the reality remains that the African input has been disappointingly underdeveloped” (p. 201).

Adebajo expressed concern at the manner in which troops were contributed to the Liberian and the Sierra Leonean wars and concluded that future troop-contributing contingents must be diversified to include both ECOWAS and non-ECOWAS members as this would go a long way to prevent the charges of Nigerian or Anglophone domination (Adebajo, p. 308). Bach asked the question; “Is development integration still ECOWAS primary function?”. He argued that “the revival of regionalism was conceived as an economic project of neoliberalism and neoregionalist policies” (in Adebajo p. 85). According to Bach (in Adebajo 2004, pp. 69-91), the literature on regionalization was once stigmatized for its lack of clarity in the use of the notions as integration and cooperation or the interactions between regional
organizations and regional systems. Bach offered the definition of New Regionalism
developed by Hettne as apposite for understanding the concept of the “new” in regionalism.
Hettne conceived “new” regionalism as “a multidimensional form of integration which
includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects and thus goes far beyond the goal of
creating region-based free trade regimes or security alliances” (Bach in Adebajo et al 2004, p.
90). It was this which prompted ECOWAS review of its integration strategies and
programmes in the 2000s (Bach 2004, p. 85; Van Lagenhove et al 2003). To Whiteman and
Yates (2004, p. 359), Africa was merely the realm of great powers pure realpolitik and “not a
traditional Cold War theatre” (p. 360). The authors also explained the historical link of
Liberia with the United States and the importance of Liberia to the United States. They
argued that “Liberia is the only country in Africa which has enjoyed a sustained relationship
with the United States over a period of more than 160 years.” (p. 375) They argued that
Washington sometimes gets directly involved in the security matters of West African states
because of the need to impose the right kinds of security controls it desires, especially in the
wake of the 9/11 attacks. They argued that both the major states such as Nigeria, Senegal and
Cote d’Ivoire may be at the frontlines of the” war on terror” , states like Mali, Niger and
Burkina Faso may be equally unstable. The authors concluded that “Africans should be wary
that their collective security may be sacrificed on the altar of “Yankee” realpolitik”. (ibid, p.
375)

In West Africa, governments and bureaucracies have been concerned with “regime
security” (Ero and Muvumba 2004, p. 227). One of the reasons why ECOWAS has not been
able to serve as a guarantee for regional security in West Africa was highlighted by Ero and
Muvumba, who argued that “high levels of insecurity, lack of institutional consensus, and
limited human and financial resources have undermined the potential role that the ECOWAS
moratorium and PCASED (Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and

40
Development) had helped to play in curbing the spread of SALWs in West Africa” (p. 240).

The authors insisted that “High intensity and low intensity armed conflicts in West Africa have placed arms and weaponry in the hands of the nonstate and state, legitimate and illegitimate, democratic and nondemocratic forces” (p. 227).

The challenge of Africa includes the strategic withdrawal of Africans who were left to fend for themselves after the Cold War (Deng and Zartman 1999). As the authors claimed 

two factors combined to provide the context for the creation of a normative framework for Africa: the breakdown of world order and the increasing marginalization of Africa. while the defeat and disappearance of one of the parties in the bipolar confrontation left international relations without any clear shape and purpose, it also eliminated the remaining superpower’s concern for many regions and their issues, lifted restraints on previously submerged conflicts, and removed support for governments held in power by more foreign than domestic backing (p. 2).

The post-Cold War era brought about a situation in which African socialism was weakened by the notion of democracy as the key to governance. Loyalty depended on the party system and those who did not belong to the governing party were excluded from the largesse of office. This tendency created the principle of political and economic competition, and privatization.

The end of the Cold War brought an end to the dominance of one party rule across Africa. it was the era in which African states attempted to introduce structural adjustments and change their styles of governance in which the notions of accountability, political and economic competition, and privatization replaced the ideological commitment to African socialism (Deng and Zartman ibid, p. 2).

This did not imply that lasting change had come to the continent as the “post-Cold War adjustments provided further causes of grief for Africa” (ibid, p. 2). With the existence of warlords and rebel movements, African politics became more endangered in the post-Cold War era than during the Cold War era.
One of the consequences of the development challenges in the region is that of Trans-Atlantic migration. The post-Cold War challenge had its impact on Africans in several ways. In Nigeria, many intellectuals and successful entrepreneurs had to flee Nigeria for fear of political persecution, imprisonment, and death, combining primary and secondary archival research to make compelling comments on the connection between Abacha dictatorship, exile, and the struggle for democracy in Nigeria. As Okeke (2008, p. 119) claimed:

Some survivors in war-torn countries, both skilled and unskilled, look outside of their countries for a better life. Worsening economic conditions in many African countries have uprooted many of its people from their home countries, voluntarily and involuntarily, in search of the “golden fleece” abroad. This has led to brain drain, brain gain and brain circulation.

Kwame Nkrumah argued in his book ‘Africa Unite’ (1963) for devolution of leadership responsibility on the basis of ability. Verdiere-Christophe et al (2009, p. 21) listed three major institutions which were created with the objective of economic integration of their member states as, L’Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA) also known as West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)(8 countries), the Mano River Union (MRU 4 countries) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS, 15 countries). The authors insisted that regional cooperation deserves special attention because it is sometimes more efficient carrier and gain economic, social and democratic. Strengthening regional governance may involve the harmonization of policies, resource management and risk sharing or the defense of common interests in the multilateral negotiations. States must also decide, in each case, what mode of regional cooperation is the most appropriate (p. 43).

African states which already lacked development capacities had to be drawn into the Global War (GWoT) of the United States and Europe in the post-9/11 era. The author believed that this could only bring more sufferings for Africans. Its “survival in the global economy was beginning to be threatened” (Muyeba 2008, p. 5). One of the major challenges...
of the Cold War era in sub-Saharan Africa was the extent to which dictatorship defined governance in many of the states on the continent. Most states during that period lacked legitimacy (Englebert 2000, Fawole et al 2005). They were undemocratic and they flagrantly committed human rights abuses (Ake2000) and the people were poor even in the face of rising prices of export commodities (Akude 2009, Falola et al 2008). The post-Cold War era marked the transition from being pampered by foster parents to being orphaned. Some of the theories introduced into Africa succeeded and others failed as the continent became a laboratory for development theories (Musambachime et al 2004). Musambachime et al further argued that Africa felt like an orphan and with few exceptions, the outside world considered Africa as irrelevant and insignificant. The combination of patronage, all-encompassing power and the pre-modern workings of the economy with weak, western-style state institutions have led to what was called the "failed state". In spite of the new awakening of interests within international development agencies towards Africa, there is agreement that Africa may not meet many of its Millennium Development Goals in 2015. Indeed the lack of incentive for development strategies could have been due to the premodern nature of the political economies of African states (Musambachime et al 2004).

2:5 Post-9/11 Discourses of US Securitization in West Africa

The concern with West Africa’s stability was at the heart of the United States policy agenda in the region. The United States was aware of the implications of not using the hegemonic power it had acquired in the course of serving as the policeman of the global system (Waltz 2008) after the unfortunate event which happened on American soil. But how this policy was executed would go a long way to determine US’ understanding of the core issues in West Africa. In the post-9/11 era, the Bush administration’s strategy in combating terrorism in Africa served to deepen American interests, private investment and official grants to Africa (Aderemi in Smith 2011, p. 188) The United States was also active in
guiding most of the states in adopting democracy, due to the global vision of the US for
democratization. Conteh-Morgan (2000) based his work on the analysis of West Africa’s
security concerns on the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. This spanned the pre and
post-independence era West Africa. He highlights the impact of the détente on US West
Africa relations and the foreign policies of the successive regimes that were sometimes
accused of corruption, in Nigeria, Togo, Ghana, Ivory Coast. The author also discussed the
assistance rendered by the US in the civil wars in Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote
d’Ivoire, noting specifically the influence of the former colonialists such as Britain and
France in the region.

Scholars with realist or liberal orientations such as Mearsheimer, and Walt have dismissed
cultural norms as unscientific (Schaffer 2006). It is not surprising as Ferguson argued that
most Western literature fail to include Africa in their explanation of the globalization process.
That is, “no place for most contemporary African social realities”. (Ferguson 2005, p. 27) In
the 1990s, “a plethora of works appeared in the mainstream international relations
publications that set up culture as an independent variable and used to explain a number of
foreign policy choices”. (Schaffer op cit, p. 1) This can only be achieved through an
interpretive method of explanation or critical analysis (Smith 2011). Although Shaw et al
(Shaw 2001) offered a comprehensive assessment of how the realist and liberal approaches
work in the context of African politics, their explanation was based on ideas which do not
favour the inclusion of Africa in the regionalist discourses. This explains why McSweeny
(1996, p 81) calls for “a “more human” concept of security”. Waever (2007) discussed the
nature of contemporary security which is fitting for the understanding of the security
requirements in West Africa. By moving a theme into security field, it is possible to relate
them to securitization and desecuritization, which is relevant for contextualizing regional
security in West Africa. According to Ruane (2008), post-9/11 policy worldwide has been terror-centric.

2:6 US AFRICOM and Regional Security in West Africa

Since the establishment of AFRICOM, some writings have examined the extent to which the US intended to take the securitization of West Africa far into the military sector of security (see Francis on AFRICOM 2010, Melinda Smith 2011, Pauly Jnr 2011). What perhaps makes the study of AFRICOM interesting is the fact that human security is part of the US AFRICOM agenda. This implied that the United States policy makers intended to incorporate human and societal security into the operations of AFRICOM. (Francis 2010. See also Smith 2010) Francis (2006) had previously written broadly about the challenges confronting West Africa and indeed the African continent, suggesting that the lack unity of the continent created the vulnerabilities of the states to crises. He contended that ‘complex political emergencies’ and ‘fire next door’, characterized the security dilemma of the Africa and of West Africa. Pham (2010, pp. 64-77) for instance, based his argument on African development crisis and the US security strategy as depicted in the creation of AFRICOM. The overall objective of AFRICOM was “focused on the nexus between security concerns, including terrorism prevention, as a prerequisite for development, and development as a bulwark against insecurity, including the “root causes” of extremist ideologies.”(Pham ibid, p. 70) Hackbarth (2008) made reference to the policy of the Bush administration and the leadership of the president and sustained commitment to high-profile initiatives. The initiatives had a heavy or predominant focus on Africa. They were, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), and the US Africa Command (AFRICOM). Cooke et al (2009) argued that the US commitment to Africa not only trebled but it received favourable opinion from the states to
which it made greater commitments. The US reputation in Africa “remained better than in other regions of the world”. This is to underscore the extent to which US policy “approaches on counterterrorism, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, allegations of torture and prisoner abuse, and climate change, among other issues, undermined US standing”. (ibid, p1) The authors believe that the symbols of the US soft power in Africa such as, PEPFAR and MCC over time, became symbols of the value of the US investments in Africa and, “in the case of PEPFAR, became commonly regarded as among the most positive of Bush-era legacies”(ibid, p. 1). From the new regionalism perspective, political, economic and identity issues have become a unique aspect of the globalization and regionalization discourses. As Soderbaum et al (2003) have argued, to establish regional coherence, New Regionalisms go beyond creating free trade regimes, to identity based regionalist project carried out by committed actors. According to Waever(2007) the discourses of “securitization and desecuritization, demonstrate the importance of moving a theme or issue into the field of security, and thereby framing it as a “security issue”.” Lavergne(1997) and Bach (2004) provide a broader understanding of the challenges of security in West Africa. Lavergne argued that ECOWAS institutional approach will not assist regional integration if efforts at regional integration were not stepped up. He argued that “in the two years since trade liberalization was launched, there has been no growth recorded in intra-community trade”. This is even more obvious as “ECOWAS seems to have tried to position itself to do the things it was incapable of”. In his analysis of the causes of poverty in Sierra Leone, Kandeh rejected the Jeffrey Sachs economic assistance approach. This approach suggests that with more financial aid, Sierra Leone’s problem will be solved. Using Sierra Leone as his case study, Kandeh (2008) argued that the dependency on insufficient aid merely helped corruption to spread within the state without alleviating the problem of underdevelopment in Sierra Leone. Kandeh concludes that it is only a heavy injection of financial resources to the
region is the only panacea for development (ibid). Olawale (2008) argued in favour of a coherent US policy in West Africa based on cooperative intervention of states. He also warned against US militarization of security in the region as this would have counter-productive consequences. According to Duignan and Gann (1981, p991) The West should assist Africa with aid, military equipment, and the training of security forces. This implies that African states have always needed aid and this is even more urgent today as Kandeh (in Falola et al, 2008) argued in favour of more aid for Sierra Leone after the devastation of the civil war. To the authors

we should devote more aid and military assistance to Africa. We should respond positively to request for security assistance when the states requesting it act in our own interests. Instead of criticizing the French for maintaining regional security, we should praise them and better their example. (Diugnan et al 1981, p101)

Duignan et al further argued that

there cannot be a single rule of thumb for US foreign policy in Africa as a whole. There are many African countries, the US accordingly needs many different African policies. We need flexibility, realism and avoidance of others. (p100)

To Copson (2007) “aid, trade, and Development: policy improvements less than advertised. Promoting long time economic development, reducing poverty, and increasing per capita incomes should be the centrepiece of a fair and just Africa policy”. (p17) The “proportion of people living on less than $2 per day remained essentially the same—75 percent in 1990 compared with 74.9 percent in 2002. From 1981 thru 2002, the number of Africans living at this level of extreme poverty rose from 288 million to 516 million, and continued increases seemed inevitable”. (ibid, p17)

Obrien et al (2000, p180) pointed to the efforts of the IMF to help drive development at the global system. This is in line with the global body’s expectations of the states in Africa. This is because the IMF has expanded the scope of conditionality with explicit attention to governance issues. It also makes effort through its Sustainable Global Growth agenda to
promote good governance in all aspects, including by ensuring the rule of law, improving efficiency and accountability on the public sector, and tackling corruption. (O’Brien et al, ibid)

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has been able to show the extent to which security became the main concern of the regional actors in West Africa. It examined the issues in US West Africa relations and ended with the role of ECOWAS and the assistance rendered by the United States in the immediate post-Cold War era when the states of Sierra Leone and Liberia experienced state collapse within the Manu River Union area. It also showed the absence of this logic in previous works and importance of theorizing security in West Africa within the context of securitization and regionalism. While securitization is a term adopted for explaining US foreign policy, regionalism is the regional framework adopted by the ECOWAS actors to confront the various crises of cooperation, integration and development. In the post-Cold War era, security discourses have gone beyond state security and it has also included the other sectors which have been categorized as security. As a region, West Africa has had its share of security challenges which were exacerbated by the lack of vision of the regional actors and an examination of the interests of the external actors. This background is necessary in the literature for explaining the relevance of ECOWAS for practical empirical understanding of regional security in West Africa. This review examined the history of US relationship with the states in West Africa, but in terms of understanding how ECOWAS actors and the Member States regionalized security and development through securitization, there has not been much work done in that area. This is why this work is relevant because as it shall be discovered, securitization and desecuritization are new concepts which have gained currency in post-Cold War discourses of security. It is important that the concepts or theories
of securitization and desecuritization are used to underpin US foreign policy in West Africa on the one hand, and US-ECOWAS relations on the other. This study shed light on how military security is redefined and reconstituted to mean more than state security. It also shows how security and development have taken strategic positions in the explanation of post-Cold War security discourses.
Chapter Three

Theory and Methodology: Securitization and Regionalism in the Post-Cold War era

3:1 Introduction

Habermas was from the critical theory tradition, spanning the social science in his philosophical approaches to the political life. His study of the political community has resonance with the study of international relations and with the way the lifeworld is constituted in human community. He was concerned with order and peace. He was concerned with the processes of debate and argumentation in a group for the impact this has on the ideal speech situation. The idea of Habermas finds relevance in decision making situations and in particular, Habermas ideas has strong foundation in organizing and streamlining of the social system and his argument about the performatve speech act is an important addition to the theory of securitization. This methodology section pays attention to how Jurgen Habermas characterize discourse, interpretive and critical methodology in developing an understanding for the peaceful coexistence of people in social groups. The next part of the chapter attempts to link the Copenhagen School’s regional security complex theory to the security structure of regions. Buzan and Waever provided a systematic explanation for how regional security came to occupy a strategic place in post-Cold War international system (Buzan et al 2003). Their approach is both liberal and realist, but it is complemented by the intersubjective and interpretive explanations offered in the works of Adler et al (2004) and Young (1990) who studied security communities and the importance of understating how “difference” relates to an inclusive social order. This implies that the threats to human security can be removed as people interact with better understanding of the political context within which the Other exists. The third part deal with the theoretical framework, which focuses on the relationship between securitization and regionalism within the context of
regional security complex. Whether a regional security complex is strong or weak is determined by the amount of an external actor’s penetration or overlay. The Copenhagen School’s regional security complex theory (RSCT) is further expanded in this work to examine two levels of security interactions, first between the securitizing actors and the audiences within the policy circles of a great power. The second is the interaction between those who make securitizing claims within an RSC. This implies that both the external actor and the actors within an RSC securitize. Securitization and regionalism throw up all kinds of dynamics about the securitization process, regional integration and the attitude of the external actors to security in far flung states, as well as the motivation of the actors at the regional level for supporting the existence of regional organizations. All these are intended to provide an understanding of how security issues get resolved when the region is threatened.

3:2 Habermas and Critical Discourses of Security

The political climate within which Habermas grew up shaped his thinking. According to him, that political climate “was marked by a bourgeois adaptation to a political situation with which one did not fully identify, but which one didn’t seriously criticize, either”. (Detlev Horster and Willem van Retjen, Interview with Jurgen Habermas 1979). Habermas found it a great experience to relate systematically to the “Marxist Tradition” which Horkenheimer and Adorno utilized in developing their philosophies. Habermas was publicly called a Neo-Marxist for the first time by Apel, his friend. In Habermas’ words, “I value being considered a Marxist”. (p. 33) to Habermas, being a Marxist is based on being able to relate intentional action to interpretation. This implies that in his search for the truth, it is not only interpretation that is important but being able to make validity claims “on an argumentative basis” (p. 33, ibid). Habermas also argued in favour of the emancipation of the society, and
explained the link between emancipation, pragmatic ideal speech situation and the “discursive theory of truth” (*Diskurstheorie der Wahreit*).(ibid)

Recent efforts of ‘interpretive’ theorists, and the debates around their work, “have not only reintroduced a number of diverse methodological ideas, philosophical traditions and theoretical issues in IR”. (Moore et al 2010, p. 7) The interpretive theories are based on the notion of “sensitivity to the cultural underpinnings of political power “ and “the persistence of cultural politics in the structuring of quotidian life” (ibid, p. 7). Linklater argued that normative international theory has been “concerned with the reason for and against giving priority to the exclusionary state, as opposed to a more inclusive society of states or cosmopolitan community of humankind”. These are “critical theory, postmodernism and now feminism” (Linklater 1992, p. 1634). This is also concerned with the need to “break down past structures of exclusion in response to Third World claims for justice”(ibid, p. 1637). It also includes the emergence of discourses around non-Western cultures and the need to “shake off moral assumptions and cultural symbols which do not contribute to a more just world order”. (ibid, p. 1637) Linklater argued in favour of a political community which makes “political possibilities” possible (Linklater 2004, p. 5) Linklater was concerned with the notions of ethical progress which do not exclude cultural differences and moral universality and the method of emancipation, as the foundations of critical social theory. This is his main concern in the post-Cold War era. (Linklater, ibid) To Linklater “sceptics believe that critical theory may be strong on vision but has nothing profound to say about the strategies of transition that would lead to a new world order” (Linklater in Booth 2005, p. 124). There is “no political theory, realism included, that offers an instruction manual for dealing with the most intractable forms of ethnic or ethno religious communal conflicts”.

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Frankel undertook an exploratory view of the work of Habermas, noting the link between his epistemological assumptions and his clarity of analysis in the explanation of objectivism, positivism and scientism. He debunked the claims of the critiques of Habermas with respect to his attitude towards Marxism, pointing to the fact that Habermas probed the epistemological assumptions of Marx’s work with the intent of making explicit “that which has been implicit and to eradicate or make unambiguous that which is objectivistic and scientistic (in the positivist and naturalist sense)”. This is the very opposite of what his critiques had assumed about his attitude towards Marxism, which proved that Habermas desired to debunk Marxism and make it obsolete. (Frankel’s Interview with Habermas 2004, p. 38)

Habermas’s theory structures developed from a core of insight into the current historical situation, its dilemmas and possibilities. His work is centred on problems on social rather than literary theory. Also Habermas “writes in forbiddenly dense philosophical prose—in sharp contrast to the allusive, rhetorical and ‘polyphonic’ style of much poststructuralist work” (Habermas and Dews 1986, p. 4) In the thinking of Habermas, in order to obtain “what is practically necessary, and objectively possible within a political situation”. (cited in Held p. 22) There is need for knowledge to provide “practical orientation about what is right and just in a given situation, without the need to relinquish the rigour of scientific knowledge, which modern social philosophy demands”.(Held ibid, p. 22) According to Horkheimer, “Science and interpretation are two different things”(in Gebhardt 2002, p. 372), “Scientific procedure is never itself a guarantee of truth, and the progress of science, therefore, not necessarily identical with human progress”(ibid, p. 372) The aim of critical analysis is to challenge state-centric thinking in IR (Chan et al 2009). Critical international theory offers insight into the sociology of moral community in world politics. (Neufeld 2002, p. 5) The Critical theory is progressive, emancipatory, post-positivist, post-Marxist, open-ended about human possibilities, Enlightenment-inspired, and epistemologically self-conscious (Williams et al 1997). Empirical investigations “come out strongly against the idea
that all adult members of a society, even Western modern western societies, have acquired
the capacity for formal-operational thought or for post-conventional judgements” (Habermas
1986, p. 165). Discursive studies of knowledge/power nexus in IR are a form of critical
theorizing. (Miliken 1999, p. 225). Discourse study and discourse analysis “reject
methodological and research design criteria which constitutes attempts to silence alternative
experiences and criteria”. (Miliken ibid, p. 227)

The study of communicative practices in the Habermasian logic views discourses as
“reasoning processes of challenges and counterchallenges to arguments and justifications”.
(Habermas 1987, p. 45) Individual identity is conceived in communicative action not as an
origin but as “a product of linguistic and practical interaction” (Habermas 1987 ibid, p. 45)
According to Habermas, “The communication theory which I see before me is based on a
type of action oriented toward understanding. On the basis of this action the people involved
can use criticisable validity claims to gain an orientation.” (cited in Horster and van Retjen
1979, p. 33)

Writing about the approach of Foucault, Risse argued that “The Foucaultian line is
one other way by which the discursive construction of meanings as a process by which power
relationships are established”. (Risse 2004, p. 36) To Foucault, discourses of power are
related in the sense that they make us “understand certain problems in certain ways, and pose
questions accordingly “ (Risse 2004, p. 36) Attention is drawn to the

implicit underpinnings of human knowledge and action, thus shifting the level of
analysis from contingent occurrences to the transcendental or quasi-transcendental
“conditions of possibility”. The theoretical commitment of discourse productivity
directs us towards studying domination or hegemonic discourses, and their structuring
of meaning as connected to implementing practices and ways of making this
intelligible and legitimate. (Dallmayr 2009, p. 266)
Habermas developed communicative rationality in his discourse ethics, “the gist of which is that validity—including normative validity—is discursively determined” (Thomassen p549). He is also concerned with how an intersubjectivist and procedural conception of ethics and rationality locates normative validity in discursive structures rather than in an individual subject (ibid, p. 549). Habermas was “initially mobilised in the critique of positivism, and in particular, neorealism” in IR theory. The interest in Habermas and IR must be located in the first instance within the context of the fourth debate (Diez 2005). Thus, the Habermasian discourse ethics is a departure from the positivist approaches. Discourse ethics “takes up the intersubjectivist approach of pragmatism and conceives of practical discourse as a public praxis of mutual perspective-taking” (Habermas and Nielsen 1990, p. 89). Habermas called for negotiations or discourses of self-understanding, to resolve the challenge of the failure to reach an agreement after argumentation. (ibid) The reconstruction of critical theory requires a far greater understanding of the part that moral learning has played in the development of the human race. Following a Kantian theme, Habermas argued that “human societies have evolved by learning how to use universal moral principles to resolve the conflicting claims about the organization of social and political life. Morden challenges to class, ethnic, gender and racial forms of exclusion, challenges which stress the principle of self-determination, illustrate this social evolution” (Linklater, p. 1633). Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action depicted modernization as a tension-laden movement occurring simultaneously in the fields of instrumental-technical and communicative-cultural rationality. The motor of development was located in the process of “rationalization”, seen as the advancement of rational reflection” (ibid p. 1633).

Habermas’ critical theory has its roots in distinctly Western idioms which have become seemingly attractive to many Third World intellectuals. (Diez and Steans 2005) Habermas’s strong commitment to emancipation and liberating critique is an aspect of his
theory that resonates with persistent struggles against colonial and post-colonial elites as well as against entrenched forms of stratification. Another motive is Habermas’s (relative) attention to culture and to the legacy of human or cultural sciences—a feature that seems amenable to cross cultural comparisons. Habermas, expects a “critical theory to perform the task of making possible enlightening interpretations of situations, which affect our self-understanding and orientate us in action. Even social theory would overstep its competence, however if it undertook to project desirable forms of life into the future, instead of criticizing the existing forms of life”. (Thomassen 1974) Habermas advocates for the “revitalization of cultural-normative concerns, and especially the strengthening of practical discourses through which prevailing interests can be screened, rendered transparent, and perhaps even transformed”. (Thomassen ibid) Habermas suggests the need for “a nominalistically conceived objective world” in which we always already find “ourselves as the members of a linguistic cooperative community” (Habermas and Thomassen, ibid) As Habermas argued, Practical discourse is a procedure which allows everyone the right to influence an outcome by either agreeing or disagreeing; it is a procedure therefore which takes account of an individualistic understanding of equality (Habermas and Nielsen, p. 98).

Habermas believed that people are free to agree and disagree in a situation of practical discourse because this strengthens social bond and creates more awareness for the prevalence of an “unlimited communication community”(ibid, p. 98). Thus, “everybody is stimulated to adopt the perspective of all others in order that they might examine the acceptability of a solution according to the way every other understand themselves and the world” (ibid, p98).

Critical theory argues that knowledge about society is incomplete if it lacks an emancipatory purpose (Linklater 2007, p. 47). Habermas seeks to reclaim the “freedom or autonomy of the individual from the technocrats of social power “(Dallmayr 1996, p. 162 ). This use of critical is indebted to Marx who argued that among the tasks we face as intellectuals is a necessary engagement in a “ruthless criticism of everything existing” as well as “the self-
clarification of struggles and wishes of the age” (Smith 2010, p. 27). Wendt identified cultural forms in the role structure constituted by representations of Self and Other as particular kinds of agents related in particular ways (Wendt 1999)

Habermas conceive identity and interaction as products of communication, as he posits, “under the pressure for decisions (a frequently used phrase) proper to the communicative practice of everyday life, participants are dependent upon agreements that coordinate their actions” (Coles 1995, p22). Nyquist (2004, pxi) supports this claim with the view that “Most philosophers do not hold the pejorative Hobbesian view that human beings are naturally enemies at war with one another”.

The members of a particular social group are able to reflect on their experiences by using them as guide to deal with their social conditions. According to Held (1980) “an interest in emancipation necessarily drives inquiry toward the investigation into possibilities for positive change that may contribute to the improvement of the conditions of human existence” (p. 22). This implies that there is a link between the desire to know why things are the way they are this eventually contributes to the freedom of those who may have been impeded by the effects of lack of interest in the search for the truth. This has partly been the reason for Habermas’ s interest in the discourses of ethics, communication and argumentation.

Habermas argued that “actors who are willing to engage in open dialogue, respect other's differences and avoid coercion possess psychological qualities to enter what Habermas referred to as “domain of postconventional morality” (Linklater 2005, p. 126) To comprehend discourse ethics, we must begin by analyzing Habermas’s understanding of everyday “normal” communicative action, for discourse, or “argumentative speech”, is but “a special case—in fact, a privileged derivative—of action oriented toward reaching
understanding”, and only by conceiving of the former in terms of the latter “can we understand the true thrust of discourse ethics”.(Coles 1995, p. 22)

argumentation is a reflective form of communicative action and the structures of action oriented toward reaching an understanding always already presuppose those very relationships of reciprocity and mutual recognition around which all moral ideals revolve in everyday life no less than in philosophical ethics.(Coles ibid, p. 24)

Crawford (2002) explained Habermasian dialogue this way

Only when [a] decision emerges from argumentation, only when it comes about in accordance with pragmatic rules of discourse, do we consider the resulting norm justified. One has to make sure everyone concerned has had a chance to freely give his consent. argumentation is designed to prevent some from simply suggesting or prescribing to others what is good to them…[T]he rules of discourse themselves have normative quality, for they neutralize imbalances of power and provide for equal opportunities to realize one’s interests.(p411. See also Habermas 1990, p. 71)

Habermas is committed to rational insight in the pursuit of “infinite task” and “comprehensive grasp of the world unfettered by myth and the whole tradition” in line with Schutzian phenomenology and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School (Dallmayr 1996, p. 156).To Habermas, principle of discourse ethics contain valid norms which enable all to participate actively in a “practical discourse”(Coles 1995, p. 22). This emphasis on communicative ethics has contributed to “interrogative framework” (p. 24), “ethics and dialogue” (ibid, p. 19) Coles suggests that this ideal presupposes that “it is possible to justify a norm, and this possibility rests on the principle of universalization, which is a rule of argumentation” (ibid, p. 24) Thus

All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects general observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests (and the consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation) (ibid, p. 24)
Habermas claimed to have embarked upon a new way of doing social philosophy, one that begins from an analysis of language use that locates the rational basis of the coordination of action in speech. He associates this new approach with a more general shift in philosophy called the ‘linguistic turn’. (Finlayson 2005, p. 201) As Habermas (2005) had said,

even in the most inclusive community, there remains first, an unmediated difference between the social world we intersubjectively share and the objective world we have to cope with; and there remains second, an unresolved tension between our contestable view of what is rationally acceptable “for us” and the assumed impartial view of what is unconditionally valid “in and for itself” what is rationally acceptable …is not necessarily what is objectively true. Even if it is guided by the idea of unconditional validity, finite spirit remains caught in its present and past and is thus ignorant of future and better knowledge. (p. 201)

Habermas (1986, p. 193) believed that linking social theory to emancipatory interest and the concept of communicative rationality is best suited to explaining why modern societies cannot be held together exclusively or even primarily through money and power” (ibid, p. 127) Habermasian discourse ethics is based on the understanding that there is a link between discourse and moral principles. As Finlayson argued, “discourse ethics stands and falls with the plausibility of Habermas’s elucidation of moral standpoint” (Finlayson 2005, p. 87) Finlayson addressed the context in which discourse and moral principle perform sociological functions in the dialogical process. He submitted that discourse principle (D) is weaker and less controversial than the moral principle (U). This has been made plausible by Habermas theory of communication. (U) is a stronger principle which has to be established by means of an argument that makes use of (D) as a premise. The essential point of Habermas’s theory is that discourse can fulfill its sociological pragmatic function all the better because it is a dialogical process, a process that draws people together into meaningful argument. The process of justifying a norm always involves more than one person, since it is a question of one person making the norm acceptable to another. (ibid, p. 87)

Wyn-Jones believed that Habermas ideas influenced thinking in contemporary IR, showing the relationship with his critical theory and the “development of a critical theory of security” (Wyn-Jones 1999, p. 76). Previous effort to define the contours of international security has come in various shades of explanation. In the language of Kant, this is termed
enlightenment, in the language of Hegel, it is the spirit of history, and in the language of Marx, it is emancipation. Held suggested that

the core concerns of Lukacs’s writings, such as the interplay between theory and history, the use of theory to promote the development of the masses, the relations of production to culture, and the ‘possibility of unravelling the social whole or totality’ were retained in critical theory (Held 1980, p. 22).

Thus, it is essential to take into cognizance the relevance of people and humanity and how the idea of promoting human development generally reflects on their wellbeing in the social world.

3:3 Habermas Critique

Habermas is seen as an idealist whose work is sometimes misleading and this has oftentimes led to his work being confused and accusations thrown at him by critiques. Habermas once devoted a large part of his work to the critique of “bourgeois sociology, linguistic philosophy, systems theory and various forms of neo-positivism”. (Frankel 1974, p. 38) Frankel argued that it appeared as if Habermas had nothing more than basing his academic work on this approach of scholarship. This has been the main cause of the contention, suspicion and the hostility of the Left to Habermas’ Communication Theory of Society. They argued that Habermas undertook a “non-conventional approach” to “historical materialist analysis.” (ibid, p. 38). The argument is based on the premise that Habermas took a peculiar position of confronting “contemporary Marxism not merely with the German-Continental theoretical tradition, but also with an intimate knowledge of Anglo-American philosophy. (Frankel ibid, p. 37) Frankel stated further that

…one almost immediately has suspicion about any so-called “Communication Theory”. The concept is somewhat confusing. …or else one thinks of Habermas as just another idealist working in the sociology of language, phenomenology, or symbolic universes, etc, which are becoming dominant in the bourgeois academic world (ibid, p. 38)
Habermas' work was critiqued as being an “idealist aberration which seeks to reduce all problems to that of problems concerning the language of communication”. The implication, as Frankel argued, is that Habermas diverted attention away from “the historical analysis of class struggle, imperialism, and capitalist forces of production”. Habermas replied to this criticism by insisting that “nothing could be further from the truth or the intention” of his work (ibid, p. 38).

3.4 Regional Security Complex and Inclusion in the Political Community

Habermas' philosophy is also consistent with the idea of security and the importance of security to community and group interaction. This is also consistent with Habermas’ ideas about tolerance and inclusion and his discourses of communication within the security community. Buzan et al defined a security complex as “a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot reasonably be considered apart from one another” (2003, p. 44). According to Buzan et al,

One of the purposes of inventing the concept of regional security complexes was to advocate the regional level as the appropriate one for a large swath of practical security analysis (ibid, p. 43).

The state framework itself is “coming apart at the seams, giving prominence to substate and/or super state actors”. (Buzan 2004b, p. 69) The operation of the global market, and its securitising effects both on the environment and on patterns of identity, also took some regional focus. The work of Habermas lays the foundation for the discourses of inclusion which makes the discussion of regional security relevant in the post-Cold War era. As encapsulated in the words of Waever, there is “real assurance” that the members of that community “will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some way” (Wendt 1999, p. 299). It is in “the nature of security practice” as Buzan and Waever (2003) argued “as a prioritising and thus implicitly comparative move that actors themselves
integrate and hierarchise security issues” (p. 49). Having identified the background of the actors and what motivates them to cooperate for the purpose of collectively confronting existential threats, it is relevant to consider the connection between the Habermasian discourse and regionalism. The aim is to contend that regionalism has its philosophical roots in the Habermasian discourse. It is the need to prevent existential threats through integration, cooperation, communication, argumentation that makes the idea of Habermas resonate in the discourses of regionalism. Regionalism in this sense implies that states which occupy the same geographical area tend to confront the same security challenges and would be faced with the need to cooperate to deal with the threats. Regional security complex comprises of the constellation of the nonregional actors influencing security dynamics at the regional level, and the regional actors making efforts to maintain security and development. (Buzan et al 2003) The securitization of the regional actors can only be successful if there is inclusion through regionalism. As Habermas has pointed out inclusion is an indication that the regional actors are willing to set aside their differences in order to pursue a common agenda. The ability of the regional actors to deal with threats therefore goes beyond whether they have the military capability. It includes agreeing on shared norms and whether they want to use their shared norms to protect themselves against existential threats.

These factors have far reaching strategic importance for understanding the conception of security complex in post-Cold War era.

3:4:1 Inclusion and the Framework for Regional Security Maintenance

Defining security in terms of what Weberians conceptualized as “Verstehen” or understanding, is a hermeneutic theme which means that “actions must always be understood from within”, and thus, that social meaning is a function of “what is in people’s head” (Fierke, 2007, p. 171) is critical for dealing with the importance of human security within the
context of regional security in the post-Cold War era. Regional security complex is conceptualized within the framework of security communities and the link between the well-being and the security of people in groups. Security communities are those regions where national differences have been minimised in favour of peaceful coexistence. (Linklater 2005 p. 126) Habermas’s discourse is derived from his understanding of justice which is itself a part of the idea of John Rawls (Finlayson 2006). The Habermasian discourse provides a tool with which to understand the power of community and the context within which such a community coexists for security reasons. Habermas wrote, “a theory of communicative action conceives individual identity not as an origin but as a product of linguistic and practical interaction” (Habermas 1987, p. 45). Violating the norms of regional level communication in the explanation given by Habermas is an indication of unwillingness to cooperate. This has implications for the degree to which the region lends itself to vulnerability. As Linklater (2004) argued

the most effective means of honouring this obligation is to create institutional frameworks which widen the boundaries of the dialogic community. The transformation of political community would constitute a revolution in the areas affected because societies would no longer confront each other as geopolitical rivals in the condition of anarchy (p5). Kant and Marx developed a critical-theoretical approach to political community which is superior to the neo-realist thesis that competition and conflict between states will endure as long as international society remains anarchic. (p. 9)

As Young argued “Identity is constituted relationally, through involvement with—and incorporation of—significant others and integration into communities.”(p. 123). To Campbell (1999), “identity is constituted in relation to difference”(p. 9) Thus, “Identity is a socialized sense of individuality, an internal organization of self-perception concerning one’s relationship to social categories, that also incorporates views of the self-perceived to be held by others” (Young op cit, p. 123). According to Adler et al (1999, p. 63) identity can be
defined in many ways. Identity is often defined in terms of one’s relationship to others. The essence of their position is to understand how identities “are not only personal or psychological, but also social, defined by the actor’s interaction with and relationship to others”. The authors argued that although identities help political actors to foster collective interests, there is no guarantee that threats to security will be clearly defined by the actors. They believe that collective identity must be worked for in order define threats by gauging the “not only the quantity but also the quality of transactions” (p. 47). Thus, the determination to deal with threats is linked with identity and the answer to the question of “who am I” (and who I am not)” (ibid, p. 47). By so doing the “members of a loosely coupled security community…have a fairly proximate understanding of “what makes them thick” ”. (ibid, p. 47) In furthering her explanation about identity, Young referred to a social group in the same sense that “a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices or way of life” (p. 123). This indicates that there is a place for mutual understanding of the issues and the challenges which confront the members of the community that they need to agree upon and construct either as opportunities or threats simply because they belong to the same community. These social groups are a “specific kind of collectivity, with specific consequences for how people understand one another and themselves” (Young ibid, p. 123) To Young, when political theorists discuss groups, “they tend to conceive them either on the model of aggregates or on the model of associations, both which are methodologically individualist concepts” ” (Young 1990, p. 43)A social group is a collective of persons differentiated from at least one other group by cultural forms, practices or way of life(ibid).Given the normality of its own cultural expressions and identity, “the dominant group constructs the differences which some groups exhibit as lack and negation. These groups become marked as Other”.(ibid, p. 59) Linklater took the argument further to highlight the issues of inclusivity and exclusivity in normative international theory where
priority should be given to “a more inclusive society of states or cosmopolitan community of humankind…”(Linklater 1992). This implies that states are more effective when they cooperate and work towards the same goal, rather than when they are excluded from the other states in the international community. The role that identity plays in security relations is vital. It is the identity of a society, its sense of “we-ness” that is at stake and not military or political security in the traditional security conception (MacDonald 2008)

According to Linklater

While community-regions possess a territorial dimension, they are not merely a physical place. Instead, we may view them as cognitive regions or cognitive structures that help constitutes interests and practices of their members, whose meanings, understandings and identities help keep the region ‘in place’. (Linklater1992)

Interhuman society is largely about collective identity (Linklater 2005) Growing numbers of people “have begun imagining that they share their destiny with people of other nations who share their values and expectations of proper behaviour in domestic and international political affairs” (Adler 2007, p. 342) as Buzan (2004a, p. 209)suggested “the sub-global level is thickly occupied and the global level is reasonably well developed only in the interstate domain”. Krause et al, advocate for an epistemological shift in the conceptualization of the state in international security discourse. We move away from objectivist rationalist approach to subjective practices, structures and self-reflective ontology (Krause et al 1997)

The need for paying closer attention to a new security agenda was reinforced by the end of the Cold War, when a range of non-military issues and actors became more visible than ever before. It became more realistic to pay attention to more issues which hitherto were not part of the security debate and regions were to become critical in this paradigm shift from state actors to multisectoral conceptions of security. Thus, regional security complexes (RSCs) became security regimes or ‘security communities’(Adler et al , 1998) The “operation
of the global market, and its securitising effects both on the environment and on patterns of identity, also took some regional focus” (Buzan et al 2003, p. 39). For many modern states, “the price of economic and political relations with the postmodern core is exposure to demands for openness and ‘standards of civilisation’ that amount not just to an assault on sovereignty, but in some cases (most notably Islamic ones) to an assault on identity”. (Buzan ibid p. 39)

Buzan et al argue that if security is expanded from state to human security there is an opportunity to create an intersubjective understanding of social attitudes, security and the “process by which those attitudes are maintained or changed, and the possible future direction of security politics” (1998, p. 39). This is contrary to the idea that security “should be about the state, with the emphasis on military and political security” (1998, p. 37). Moving security into a broader debate means adopting “an approach which creates room not on a strict focus on the security of the state(national security) but the security of the people, either as individuals or as a global or international collectivity “ (Waever 1996, p. 67). As Waever further argued

The security of individuals can be affected in numerous ways: indeed, economic welfare, environmental concerns, cultural identity, and political rights are germane more often than military issues in this respect….alternative concept of security, based on four sets of positive goals related to human needs: survival, development freedom and identity (ibid, p. 67)

3:5 Theoretical Framework: Securitization and the Challenges of Regionalism in the post-Cold War Era

Securitisation is the discursive construction of particular issues as security threats. This conceptual framework has been variously applied to issues such as immigration, health, political dissidence and minority rights, terrorism. (Buzan 2003) Wibben (2011) identified three processes of securitization as "(1) threats that locate danger; (2) referents to be secured;
(3) agents charged with providing security; and (4) means by which threats are contained, and security provided” (p. 7). The Copenhagen School defined securitization as “the use of extraordinary measures to deal with threats to security, usually, by bypassing the normal political processes” (Buzan et al 1998, p. 26). The issue must have a degree of emergency and exceptionality requiring ‘the breaking of normal political rules of the game’.

Desecuritization according to Buzan et al is seen as an ideal, that is, “the optimal long range option” (Buzan et al 1998 p. 29). Being an intersubjective discourse, securitizing moves has taken on a broader understanding, with interests in market, the environment. Therefore, threats are located across the political-military sector and also within the economic, societal, and environmental security sectors. Also, in the discourses of regionalisms, it is necessary to contextualise integration not only along the economic lines but across a range of political, military-security and cultural issues which underpin the identity of the regional level. Buzan et al characterized weak regions as “protocomplexes”, using this term to distinguish the regions from the security complexes of the more advanced geopolitical systems. A protocomplex in the description of Buzan et al is an RCS that has not been fully formed (2003, p. 485), and where “low interaction capacity” makes it difficult for the RSC to be fully formed (ibid, p. 64). To Buzan et al (2003) there is a proto-complex

When there is sufficient manifest security interdependence to delineate a region and differentiate it from its neighbours, but the regional dynamics are too thin and weak to think of the region as a fully-fledged RSC (p. 491)

The existence of an RSC is not in terms of the discursive “construction of regions” (p. 47). RSCs can have overlapping memberships. They are geographically coherent but not necessary geographically contiguous regional (subglobal) clusters, although physical proximity facilitates and contributes to their formation and deepening. Distinguishing between referent objects and securitising actors makes it possible to formulate a general theory of the
conditions under which an actor successfully ‘securitises’ some threat on behalf of a specific ‘referent object’. For contingent, empirical reasons this is more easily done on behalf of limited collectivities (states, nations, religions, clans, etc.) than on behalf of individuals or humankind, but there is no absolute necessity to this, and ‘universal’ principles are now beginning to take on some importance as referent objects in the political and the economic sectors (free trade, human rights, non-proliferation) (ibid, p. 39)

Regional security complex is defined by Buzan et al (2003) as “a set of units whose major processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one another” (p. 49). The securitization discourse perspective “removes the objective ground from the dominant discourse, opens the possibility of problematizing both actual securitization and the absence of securitization” (p. 39). Discourse of securitization creates room for an ontology compatible with the basic idea of “security as a specific social category that arises out of, and is constituted in, political practice” (p. 40). To Waever, “by uttering ‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it” (cited in Buzan and Hansen 2009, p. 67). By naming a certain development a security problem a security problem, “the “state” can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites. Power holders can always try to use the instrument of securitization of an issue to gain control over it. By definition, something is a security when the elites declare it to be so” (1995, p. 73). Waever (1995) insisted that there is need to develop useful ways of conceptualizing security in such a way that both security and non-security issues enter the discourse of securitization. It is then easy to address the issue of what or who is threatened
and who is to be secured. Balzacq also argued in favour of widening security to the regional level. He posited that

When widening takes place along this axis, it is possible to retain the specific quality characterizing security problems: Urgency; state power claiming the legitimate use of extra-ordinary means; a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty, thereby preventing the political “we” from dealing with any other questions. With this approach it is possible that any sector, at any particular time, might be the most important focus for concerns about threats, vulnerabilities, and defense (Balzacq 2011, p. 71).

Buzan et al (2003, p. 19) stated further, “a superpower has the capability to operate globally, and it must see itself as having that status and be accepted by others (p. 19). The abilities of the great powers is best understood in their extensive global military reach and the capacity to project force “over some portion of the globe’s surface”. (Lemke 2002, p. 70) They have the ability “to project force around the globe, and as a result, they can intervene in any regional security complex whenever it suits their interests.” (Buzan et al 2003, p. 69) Thus “superpowers are “fountainheads of ‘universal’ values” of the type necessary to underpin international society” (Buzan 2003, p. 69) supports “claims to exceptionalism and special rights” (Buzan and Waever 2009) Campbell (1999, p. 199) argued that “security and subjectivity are intrinsically linked, even in conventional understandings”. Thus, foreign policy sometimes functions to serve the interest of the policy maker. Securitization is perceived as the extension of “the old register of security” to cover the “new domain signified by the appropriation of “war” to a new problem”. (Campbell 1999, p. 203) According to Larsen (1997) ”in policy-making, what matters is how the policy-maker imagines the milieu to be, not how it actually is”. As Boulding (Cited in Larsen, p. 161) argued, hardly are objective facts the determinants of the “policies and the actions” of those who make policies for other nations. Such policy makers are more concerned about their own perception of the situation which inspire their decisions. This is in line with the view of Boulding (1969, p.
who believed that “We act according to the way the world appears to us, not necessarily according to the way it is”. This is to them “mechanical” and does nothing to deal with the “immensely complex truth”. Foreign policy is then “an identity-making tool that erects boundaries between the self and the other, defining in the process what national interests are” (Messari 2001, p. 227). As Young (2001) argued the real differences between oppressed groups and the dominant norm, however tend to put them at a disadvantage in measuring up to these standards, and for that reason assimilationist policies perpetuate their disadvantage” (Young ibid, p. 164).

3:5:1 Securitizing Actors and the Audience in Policy Process

The Copenhagen’s securitization theory lacks adequate attention on the speech act and the audience which are directly linked to the securitizing claims of the actor and how this requirement is crucial for successful securitization (See Balzacq 2005, also Vuori) Williams (2003) argued that, “the framework of securitisation is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats.” The role of audiences is under-specified. As Leonard and Kaunert (2011, p. 60) argued, “the lack of attention given to audience indicates that the Copenhagen School lean towards self-referentiality, rather than intersubjectivity.” As Balzacq (cited in Macdonald 2008, p. 16) insisted, “The speech act is only one part of the securitising process: that it relies upon the acquiescence, consent or support of particular constituencies”. Katznelson et al (2002, p. 14) stressed that Habermas’s communicative ethics power of intersubjectivity looked beyond singular, universalistic guidelines of discursive processes and the contraction of claims by the public sphere to a “defensible, consensual minimum “.

Habermas (1986, p. 291) posited that “…relations of mutual recognition, of reciprocal perspective-taking, a shared willingness to look at one’s own tradition through the eyes of a
stranger, to learn from one another and so on. Ingram expanded Habermas’ postulations about “will constitutive of truth for all times and all societies” (Habermas 1985, p. 270) to posit that a strategic speaker who “raises” claims to “sincerity and truth does so, not because she intends to justify them but only in order to get the addressee to draw his conclusions from what the speaker indirectly gives him to understand” (Ingram 2010, p. 86). Thus, “Every society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true”. Williams argued that the Copenhagen School securitizing act has methodological ambiguity (2010, p. 213) and “sceptical towards interpretivism within the tradition of hermeneutics” (ibid, p. 215). As a speech act, the securitizing actors must not be silent over threats to security as they often do. This is a critique of Copenhagen School’s securitization by Hansen (cited in Macdonald 2008). Securitization is implicated because it “has little to say about the plight of the most vulnerable in global politics and their experiences of- and engagement with security and threat” (ibid). There is need for what Young described as an “ontological integrity” in having a grasp of the basic security system of the Other as this has predominantly to do with “basic level of identity security and sense of autonomy” (Young 1990, p.145) In her view, for a norm to be just, “everyone who follows it must in principle have an effective voice in its consideration and be able to agree to it without coercion”. (1990, p.34) Williams argued that “the Copenhagen School is “sceptical towards interpretivism within the tradition of hermeneutics” (Williams 2011, p. 213). To Williams, the “Copenhagen School securitizing act has methodological ambiguity…which has less to do with the specific understanding of security proposed by Buzan and Waever and their collaborators” (p. 213). Williams argued that Waever was more concerned with the “privileging of discourse over social structure” and has “a narrow concern with language” (2011, p. 215). Williams concluded, “There is need for
a detailed analysis of the securitizing act if it were to have pragmatic accomplishments” (p. 212).

The implication is that the relationship between the securitizing actors and the audience are under-theorised. Balzacq (2005) argued that “(i) an effective securitization is audience-centered; (ii) that securitization is context-dependent; (iii) that an effective securitization is power-laden. The insights gleaned from the investigation of these assumptions are progressively integrated into the pragmatic act of security, the value of which is to provide researchers in the field with a tractable number of variables to investigate in order to gain a better understanding of the linguistic manufacture of threats”. Balzacq related the processes of securitization to the question of power, the audience and the question of the context. This implies that security interactions extend beyond the limited conceptualization of security as speech act in the Copenhagen School’s framework. The audience of securitization are those within the policy making units deciding on what action is necessary to take in the light of the security threats requiring urgency. Gebrewold posited about the constructivists; “we do not ask whether a certain issue is in and of itself a “threat”, but on the question of when and under what conditions who securitises what” (Gebrewold 2009, p. 41) The referent objects are the security issue to which the securitizing move is directed. Buzan and Waever (2009, op cit) further threw light into the issue by using the idea of macrosecuritisation to consider an “enlarged dimension to the relationship between the securitising actor and the audience, raising the possibility of multiple audiences across many units”. Austin widely regarded as the father of speech act theory laid the foundation for the way speech act could be relevant to idea of securitization. (Kaunert et al 2011). MacRae et al. (1997, p. 4) Austin believed that “we must consider the total situation in which the utterance is issued—the total speech-act—if we are to see the parallel between statements and performative utterances, and how each can go wrong” (Austin 1975, p. 53). As Habermas
also insisted “to understand an expression is to know how to use it in order to reach understanding with someone about something…we understand a speech act when we know the conditions and consequences of the rationally motivated agreement that a speaker could attain with this speech act” (p. 165). In other words, according to Habermas, “one cannot understand the meaning of an utterance without in principle knowing the reasons for accepting it” (p. 83). Habermas’ communicative action is a “rule-governed activity—one that demands the maximum inclusion, freedom and equality of all partners” (Ingram 2010, p. 85)

The listener must know the meaning of the speech acts and what the speaker’s reasons for uttering them are. For Habermas, “all speech acts have what Austin called perlocutionary effects, or effects the speaker intends to have on the listener that could be achieved without recourse to language” (Ingram p. 83). According to Regh (1997) “in the ideal speech situation, there is no sufficient dialogue and attempts to remain open to alternative considerations. In ordinary dialogue, the participants are simply trying to persuade their audience so as to bring about some immediate or future action…”. Thus the ideal speech situation depends on the understanding gained from the dialogue for bringing about the necessary change with respect to the issues which inspired the dialogue. There is need for consensus, and universal agreement and argumentation required to convince “a universal audience” (Regh 1997, p. 241). To Regh, “the institutions and procedures that link the outcome of local discourses in a definite decision binding on all” (ibid, p. 241). Outhwaite outlined Habermas’ acts of linguistic communication, through which he raised four validity claims, liking this to the fact that “what we say is comprehensible, that it is true, that it is right, i.e. that there is a normative basis for the utterance, and that it is a sincere (wahrhaftig) expression of the speaker’s feelings”. Outhwaite (1994, p. 40). For these claims to stand, the speaker’s background is helpful in convincing the hearer and implicitly making and justifying the claims, if necessary. Thus, “we can ask the speaker, ‘What do you mean?’, ‘Is what you
say true?’, ‘Are you entitled to say that?’ and ‘Do you really mean it?’ In other words, at the
back of every act of communication is the implication that we could reach a consensus on the
validity of these claims…” (Outhwaite 1994, p. 40). Distinguishing, as a matter of principle,
between a genuine and a false consensus is necessary for underpinning the ideal speech
situation. This implies that there is “the possibility of an unconstrained dialogue to which all
speakers have equal access and in which only the “force of better argument prevails”. This to
Outhwaite, is what Habermas called the “ideal speech situation”. Outhwaite argued that
Habermas never meant to turn the ideal speech situation to “concrete utopia which would
turn the world into a gigantic seminar” (p. 45). Thus, “Individuals involved in discourses are
from the very start not oriented by the search for knock-down deductions that would
eliminate all opposition” (Regh 1997, p. 41).

Vuori stated that “the speech act leaves room for disagreement, i.e., the audience has
the opportunity to reject the legitimacy of the future acts of the speaker”. (Vuori 2008) Salter
proposed that the success or failure of a securitizing move be measured “by ranking the
degree to which policies, legislation, and opinion accords to the prescription of the speech
act” (Salter 2011, p95) Salter posited that analysts and activists alike, “regardless of their
normative stance, must probe securitizing moves that do not receive their audience
acceptance.” He further stated that failed securitizing moves “are not desecuritizing moves
that do not receive audience acceptance” (p. 95). The speech act is the “uttering of certain
words by certain persons in certain circumstances”; (ii) an executive condition to determine
whether the procedure has been fully executed by all participants; (iii) a sincerity condition
that posits that participants in this conventional procedure must have certain thoughts or
feelings, and must intend so to conduct themselves; (iv) a fulfilment of the condition which
determines whether participants actually so conduct themselves subsequently” (MacDonald
2008). Buzan et al, identified three parts to the speech act theory, the form of speech act, the
role of the securitizing actor and the history of the link between the conditions and the threat (Buzan et al 1998).

3:5:2 Securitization and Regionalism

The interdependence of states facilitates cooperation which makes the maintenance of security between regional and nonregional actors possible (Buzan et al 2003). Buzan “applied the security complex idea to include nonmilitary areas and to marry the resulting construct to constructivist methodology” (Varynen 2003) As Waever argued that “the familiar logic of the security dilemma, albeit a particularly acute one, which is a “dilemma” only because states are better off cooperating”(Wendt 1999, p. 265; see also Robert Jervis 1978). Regionalism is theoretically astute for engaging with the idea of regional integration. As Coskum insists that, “the regional security complex as a type of regionalism. Regionalism refers to…region building, regional coherence and identity” (p. 91). Regional integration is based on intensification and institutionalization of economic interdependency, is the most outstanding form of regionalism. To Coskum, the concern with regional security and stability has been one of the main focuses of regionalism (Coskum 2008, p. 91) Part of the reason for this has been the failure of neo-liberal regionalism to go beyond “conventional approaches” and explore human development discourses characteristic with the more “participatory conception of the ‘new regionalism’ ” (Soderbaum and Grant 2003, p. 88). Depending on the region, weak regions or protocomplexes have challenges with failed state syndrome, democratization, poverty, corruption, child trafficking, child soldiers, availability of small arms and light weapons (SALWs) regional disunity (Ero 2004, Francis 2006). To achieve security and development, the global level actors work with their regional partners. In order to drive economic development, political progress and social harmony at the regional level, it takes more than the securitizing moves of the regional actors in a protocomplex. In other words, the global actor dynamism and its capacity to project its power into far-flung regions
naturally ally them to the regional level for collective maintenance of regional security (Buzan 2003). The assumption is that this enables the global actor to maintain peace and security at the regional level characteristic of the Cold War era. As was characteristic of the Cold War era, the global actor perceived the maintenance of peace and security at the regional level as indispensable for global security (Miller 2007). Soderbaum et al (2003) for example conceived of “transformative regionalism” (p. 9) as ideal for resolving the challenges of communities at the regional level. In other words, regionalism can be used as a theoretical basis for initializing the discourses of development of the security complex if the regional actors policies are directed towards that goal with serious commitment. The explanation of region and its place within the discourses of regionalism is necessary as a precursor to the understanding of “New Regionalism and human society and development” (Soderbaum et al, 2003, p. 178). Therefore in adapting “regionalism as a regional project”, (p. 34) there is need for making a clarification that “regions are not given units. They are always in the making; they are constructed, de-constructed and re-constructed through social practice and discourse” (Soderbaum and Grant 2003, p. 34)

To Fawcett (p. 433)

regionalization is a term that is sometimes confused or used interchangeably with regionalism. The distinction to be made is that regionalism is a policy or project. Regionalization is both project and process. ‘Like globalization, it may take place as the result of spontaneous forces. At its most basic it means no more than a concentration of activity at a regional level.’ Regional actors and their networks can also be a source of disorder: of terrorism and other crimes. Just as terror and crime can be regional problems, they also invite regional solutions. Fawcett Louise p439)(Fawcett 2004)

Thus, regionalism therefore constitutes the set of objectives that have been defined for a regional development aspirations of the regional and global actors. For example, Campbell’s critical assessment of the Western perception about the Other showed that what
may be normal in the Third World sense may be different in the more advanced societies. In other words, Third World identity is carved differently. (Campbell 1999) This also has much to do with the carving of Third World identity. The Western interpretative tradition conceptualizes the “Other” as “the barbarian who stands in opposition to the “civilized” self (Campbell, 1999, p. 89).

Hozic (p. 64) argued that “actors usually engage in the (re)production of threats and security options as a way of reproducing social order, their own power, sense of self or identity, boundaries of statehood, inside and outside of sovereignty. The threats that they speak about and the images or metaphors that they rely on come from available cultural and material repertoire; rarely are they completely invented. In short, representation of (in)security is a window into practices and subjectivities that would otherwise be difficult to grasp or destabilize.”

At one time or another European and American discourse has inscribed women,…blacks, the Third World, terrorists,… have written their identity as inferior, often in terms of others being a horde (sometimes passive, sometimes threatening) that is, without culture, devoid of morals, infected with disease, lacking in industry, incapable of achievement, prone to be unruly, inspired by emotion, given to passion, indebted to tradition or, whatever “we” are not (p. 89) Also Caldas-Coulthard (2003) analyses discourses of the media which purported to assess the perception of the others existing in the world that lack the civilized tendencies of the West. He stated that in the discourses of the media, the politicians refer to ‘we’, the civilized world, the ‘free democracies’, the ‘West’, ‘the free world’, in contrast with ‘the other’…where terrorists may come from…One element…stands for another entity—a supposed collectivity labelled the ‘free democracies,’ whose real world reference however is not determinate, but excludes or classifies negatively with the ‘others’ (p. 272).
The idea that this form of representation exists serves to underpin the reality behind the formation of regional cooperation to enable states within the same geographical domain to treat challenges with common agenda. This is based on the need to reject the “archaic worldviews” (Edgar 2005, p. 122) which produce generalizations which often makes the understanding of the choices and preferences of the states in the Third World. The usual attitude of the external powers has always been one of the “short-term and particularistic responses to increasingly long term and generalizable responses.”

Regionalism is traditionally understood to mean “an organized form of interstate cooperation between neighbouring states. The establishment of regional organizations was seen to reflect the concerns and ambitions of national leaders” (Varynen 2003). Miller (2005) dwelt on the relationship between regional states and the external powers, demonstrating the dynamics which exist between the weak states and the more powerful external ones. He developed five arguments around regionalism which include the fact that most states worry about their neighbours, great powers do intervene in regions, however, “local partners exploit external patrons to pursue local opponent” (Miller 2005). Elites promote and restrain cooperation on the basis of its impact on their domestic power positions (Vavrynen 2003). In line with this argument, Miller (2005) insisted that “overlay is not a one way process, as clients can blackmail, flip flop, hedge, or otherwise strategically manipulate patrons”. The fear of being labelled imperialists or colonizers, in the age in which “de-colonisation and the collapse of bipolarity have set the regions free” and the populous politically mobilised people in the Third World make the cost of penetration unbearable for the great powers. This argument provides the background for understanding the shifts in the discourses of regionalism, and how to assess the relationship between the great powers and the regional complexes, in the Third World. The complex relationship between strong states and the regional security institutions is evident in the difficulty created on the one hand by the
question of sovereignty and the necessity for the strong states in the region. More often than not, the strong states have been depended upon within the regional level and they have often helped to stabilize the regions and served as instruments for conflict resolution in the Third World.

3:5:3 Regionalism and the challenge of State Sovereignty

Fulvio Attina (in Kelly 2007) saw a regional ordering continuum that peaks in a “regional security partnership”. Proximate states with analogous security dilemma—similar set of centrifugal pressures—are likely to co-align to jointly repress and buttress claims of sovereignty. If the central local security issue is not interstate war but state fragility then regional security effort are more likely to turn on the suppression of internal decent than interstate conflict management. Regional security organisations do not pool sovereignty so much as amass it for joint, coordinated repression. Weak-State regional IOs are mutual sovereignty reinforcement coalitions, not integrationist regional bodies like the European Union. The joint strategy regionalises not sovereignty but domestic conflict and elite pushback. Ayoob stated that weak states “obsessed” about sovereignty, even their IO’s reflect this concern. In Third World security state strength determines the extent and nature of regionalism. Regional security complexes are used by elites to bolster one another’s security. They are ostensibly created for security or economic purposes, yet their real purpose is to collectively resist similar internal enemies. In the traditional external security dilemma security externalities wash across borders, generating shared security concerns. Because so many states in Third world regional security complexes share common internal challenges, the constituent state’s elites collectively have little interest in exploiting them internationally. According to Regh (1997)
“what looks like a perfectly reasonable expectation at the participant level ends up generating endemic misery and inequality” (p. 48) most real disputes concern finer specifications and interpretation…additional mediations that are contestable at each step. Add to this the need to assess likely future consequences, and we have what would appear a sure recipe for irresolvable differences. For if such assessment divide experts, even at the empirical level, then an evaluation of their acceptability should prove even more controversial (p. 239).

3:6 Conclusion

This chapter attempted to combine the discourse of Habermas’ critical theory with the theory of securitization, with special emphasis on the interactions that exist at the regional level between external actors and RSCs. The nature and dynamics of the regional security complex (RSC) and the processes of securitization and the audiences were explored to produce a theory of security which accounts for how and why threats to security are securitized and removed in the post-Cold War world order. Not only is it possible to develop a framework which recognizes the process of securitization in the ideal speech act, it can also be transferred to the theory of regionalism, whereby it is possible to see problems through regionalism, the processes through which regionalism can serve as policy and the idea that cooperative regionalism is the incorporation of the idea that regional actors cooperate with the great powers for confronting threats to security and integration in a given region. Regionalization is the process through which the problems in regionalism are confronted.
Chapter Four

Securitization and US West Africa Relations

4:1 Introduction

In this chapter three main issues are explored. The first is that the basis of investigating regional security in West Africa is based on the attitude of the United States in the post-9/11 which was evident in US foreign policy. The second is that there are processes of policy making that reflected US securitization of the security issues in West Africa. The third is to understand what the regional organization—ECOWAS did to maintain the security of the region and its attitude towards US policies. Analysing this work involved the use of content analysis for its reliability and validity of the research process. It helped in the outlining of the variables under each category of policy such as US foreign policy and the main threats and the action taken to deal with them. The second is the variables used in explaining ECOWAS policies, that is, how and why ECOWAS securitized after 9/11. The third set of variables are the ones under the discussion of US ECOWAS cooperation in the post-9/11 era. By the same token, the chapter set out to use the Copenhagen variables of threats, referent objects and the measures taken to remove the threats as the basis for constructing the research. This is followed by linking the three variables to the three Ps originally developed by Kingdon (2011) and further applied in the works of Durant et al (1989) and Kaunert et al (2011), for clarifying the role of the audience in the process of securitization. Thus, how and why US actors persuaded the American audience to make policy towards West Africa is explored with the use of problem, policy and politics, as guides. Using the same typology the question of how and why ECOWAS actors securitized in the predecision stages are considered. The third aspect of this deals with how and why the two actors interacted to remove threats to US security and regional security in West Africa is considered.
4:2 Content Analysis and the Dynamics of US Foreign Policy and ECOWAS Policies

First it is relevant to posit that it is now possible to apply the method of content analysis to securitization studies (Balzacq 2011, p. 51). It is useful as this work has done in “drawing conclusions from a set of texts” (Balzacq 2011, p.51). Balzacq goes on to show how content analysis used in this work is used to convey meaning from data and seeks to explain the securitization process by examining the degree to which “securitization frame affects the trust in government”. “Analysis involves breaking data down into smaller units to reveal their characteristic elements and structure. Content analysis involves the making of inferences about data (usually text) by systematically and objectively identifying special characteristics (classes or categories) within them. Structuring content analysis—materials might be rated according to dimensions on a scale. Content analysis might be used in hypothesis testing. (Gray 2004, p. 327) as Wilkinson claims, “the results of the qualitative content analysis are presented as illustrative quotations” (Wilkinson p. 171) Content analysis helps to define the research problem, to decide how to identify the categories or features, and identify sample documents from the sources previously defined. It also facilitate the measurement of the occurrence of the pre-established categories (Gray 2004, p. 327). Insight into meanings can be obtained by examining profile of ideas and contextual information contained in text. McTarnish and Pirro (2007) referred to “text” as a transcript of naturally occurring verbal material. Included here are conversations, written documents, such as diaries or organization reports, books, written or taped responses, media recordings, and verbal description of observations. Hesse-Biber et al contended that we can “learn about our society by investigating the material items produced within it (p. 227). With content analysis, the data are “not influenced through research interaction” and the data are “naturalistic” (p. 228). Content analysis could be used to systematically analyse the content of “a vast
repository of representations” (p. 228). As Hesse-Biber et al further argued “the primary advantage of working with nonliving data is that it allows us to go beyond the subjective perceptions of individuals, which while very important, are not the only point of departure for knowledge building. By interrogating texts from a variety of epistemological and theoretical positions, we can continue to ask new research questions and offer new insights about social reality” (p. 253).

The three main components of securitization identified by the Copenhagen School (CS) such as “existential threats”, “referent objects” and the “extraordinary measures” taken constitute the variables in this research for analyzing the processes of securitization in US and ECOWAS policy communities. The Copenhagen School’s regional security complex theory (RSCT) is useful for working empirically on specific regions. (Buzan et al 2003) The Copenhagen School’s RSCT “offers the possibility systematically linking the study of internal conditions, relations among the units in the region, relations between regions, and the interplay of regional dynamics with globally acting powers” (Buzan et al 2003, p. 52). Two sets of scholars studied Kingdon’s policy process, basing US foreign policy process (Durant 1989) and the reconceptualization of the audience in securitization on three Ps, that is problem, policy and politics (Kaunert et al 2011). Their studies provide the framework for the analysis of US securitization and ECOWAS regional policies in the post-9/11 era in this study. Understanding the dynamics of US securitization and ECOWAS policy making processes depends on responding to the following hypothetical questions. Who were the securitizing actors? Why and how did the US executive convince the congress? What were the impacts this had on the success of US securitization in West Africa? How did the ECOWAS actors persuade the regional partners in the securitizing process? How and why did ECOWAS securitized issue become a concern for US actors? How did the US intervene to remove the threat in conjunction with ECOWAS actors? To what extent did US and
ECOWAS policies resolve the security crisis in West Africa? In order to be able to analyse this work, emphasis are placed on the secondary documents, statements, speeches, interviews, and internet sources.

4:3 US Securitization

4:3:1 Problem: The Securitizing Claims and Threats to US National Security in West Africa

Hypothesis 1 The US foreign policy was framed around the “War on Terror” and other threats to US national security and the need to remove these threats was a major priority in US security strategy towards West Africa.

Successful securitization begins with moving a particular development into a specific area through the utterance of the securitizing actor (Waever 1995) Buzan et al consider “domestic vulnerabilities, not domestic politics and society in all its complexity” (2003, p. 79) as causal factors of security in their analysis. US national security objectives embraced the terrorism as one of the major issues of concern in US foreign policy agenda. George Herring (cited in Sewell et al 2011, p. 6) had insisted that " A set of assumed ideas and shared values have determined the way Americans viewed themselves and others and how they dealt with other peoples and responded to and sought to shape events abroad". These assumptions partly helped the US actors to frame US foreign policies towards others in the international system and accounts for the nature of post-9/11 US foreign policy towards West Africa. According to Hozic, (2006, p. 64) “Security itself is difficult to represent…without representations of threat and danger. The production of security always depends on the production and reproduction of insecurities—enemies, fears, known and unknown perils.” Lyon (2007) “as global relationships have become increasingly dynamic and complex in a dual process of integration and fragmentation, policy makers must acknowledge the interaction and interconnectedness of broad globalizing trends with such localizing issues as nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and anti-Americanism”. As
Taylor (2008, p. 41) argued, “while people may disagree about the extreme extent of security, they concur that malicious acts of violence against the physical wellbeing and existence of human beings and against the integrity of property lie at the heart of security. Protection of citizens and organizations, including their assets, against the hostile intent of other states, and against the violence of criminals, are long-standing functions of the state and are accepted as definitely within the security domain.” How “conditions become policy problem by capturing the attention of decision makers” is essential in understanding what to categorize as a problem in the securitization process (Kaunert et al. 2011, p. 65). Jourde (2007) insisted that “in ways very similar to the representation of “security” as discussed by critical theorists and by the Copenhagen School, stability is a social construct, not an objective descriptor of reality.” McInnes et al.’s (2008) for example, argued that combating HIV/AIDS by the US policy makers in 2000 started the processes of securitization in Africa and this is useful for understanding the post-9/11 dynamics of security discourse in West Africa. The Clinton administration had, in 2000 cast HIV/AIDS as security issue and the US government opted for a conceited action to deal with the scourge. There is need for monitoring some activities which may be indicators for understanding that there are problems. However, such activities only become security issues when the securitizing actor constructs it as such and is accepted by the audience. Although “there are no security issues in themselves but only issues constructed as such by securitizing actor and accepted as such by the audience”, (p. 66) indicators can draw the attention of decision makers towards certain problems and therefore they find the essence of them”. (ibid, p. 65) In the post 9/11 era, the main threat was terrorism. Other threats such as poverty, diseases, failed states, drug trafficking became part of the security issues which the United States securitized in West Africa in the post-9/11 era. Buzan itemised the other security issues in US policy planning. Then there is need to broaden my arguments into other books to have a concrete guide. The issues and the arguments I have
raised at the moment in the problem part needs further clarification. It should also be stated that national mood has a lot of role to play in the problem identification of the policy in the sense that the president himself is working on the fact that the people wanted a change. They must find the appropriate words to convince them not only that he and his executive are well able to deal with the problem and they have read the situation it as they should, but also that the solution they are proposing is the best panacea for dealing with the security problem.


Hypothesis 2: The US executive and the Congress selected policies which they considered useful in removing threats to US security in West Africa after deliberations on what the policy makers saw as predominantly in US national security interests.

At this stage of predecision in US securitization, the question of how, when and why comes to play. Usually it is the interaction between the executive and the legislature that determined the issues that would get the attention of the policy makers. In the policy stream, the selection process involves engaging in speech act between the core executive and the Congress to for the legitimation of the threat. US Foreign policy prone to “randomness, spontaneity and simultaneity” and it naturally tends “to be more sporadic, episodic, and unanticipated given this domain's propensity for wild card events such as military coups, terrorist acts, and natural disasters”. (Durant et al 1989, p190) As Lyon (2007) claimed policy makers respond to immediate domestic pressures from public opinion, mass media, legislators and bureaucrats, and the circumspect demands of a particular case. In addition, they are sensitive to other levels of pressures including changing international normative contexts, and legal opportunities as well as unobservable entities such as historical memory and framing of past successes and failures. As in the natural world, policy makers must contend with feedback processes within their domestic and international political environments. Before any government can intervene in domestic or international affairs it
must have a good grasps of the issues. A policy maker selects a particular method to achieve a particular objective in a particular situation (Peter 1998, p. 158). Kingdon (cited in Durant 1989, p. 180) contended that predecision policy process must select the “set of conceivable alternatives available for addressing each problem”. This is the “single most important step in presidential policy process.” (ibid) In the process of selecting the policy to be taken forward for technocratic and bureaucratic and argumentation and debates, Kaunert et al compared the process to “biological natural selection” (2011,p. 66), of evolutionary process theories where the policy makers were “seemingly bent upon establishing the primacy of its own phenomena and its own insights.”(Durant, p. 190)Kaunert et al further linked the policy process to “the origin of ideas”, within which “tracing of the origins of a specific idea leads to infinite regress”. (ibid, p. 66) Only ideas that “fulfil the following criteria tend to survive technical feasibility, value acceptability for the policy community, and successful anticipation of future constraints.”(ibid, p. 66) According to Salter (2011)”a condition of success or failure for the securitizing move will be how the move or message is made, how it is received, how the prime mover then changes the messages, and how it is a dialogical or relational process, but one that takes place within already existing bureaucratic, social, economic and political structures”. The policy community includes the Congress that is often considered to operate “from a position of overwhelming strength in its relationship to administrative agencies” through its use of a variety of method to keep its bureaucratic agents in line through – hearings and investigations- mandatory report – legislative vetoes – committee and conference report” (Kernel and Jacobson 2006). In practice, “the use by Congress of its budgetary powers has been a more forceful means of containing the presidency in matters of foreign policy” (2008, p. 61). Lindsay (cited in Houghton, p. 65) noted in relation to foreign policy, “the executive and the legislative branches continue to enjoy the exercise of formidable powers in relation to one another.” The participants in the political process share
“the same frame of reference, argue about the norms, values and causal relationships in policy choices” (Peter 1998, p. 128). Within these bureaucratic contexts, governments try to be efficient and cost-effective—even in security matters—and so try to use risk management to make choices about what threats and dangers to prioritize. As (Wittkopf 1990, p. 2) argued, “Questions about the nature and purpose of American foreign and national security policy…nonetheless, have been the subject of a continuing and often vigorous debate.” The technical feasibility, value acceptability for the policy community and successful anticipation of future constraint (such as budget constraint)” (Kaunert et al p. 67). The policy environment is an arena for one group attempting to win over another, such that “the contest for successful securitization takes place within a bureaucratic field in which many agencies, ministries, or action are all seeking executive attention, public imagination and the public purse”(Salter 2011, p. 116) Kingdon contested that policy making is “a process of creating intellectual puzzles, getting into intellectual binds, and then extracting people from these dilemmas. Even if argumentation is nothing more than rationalization, it is still important”(Kingdon 2011, p. 128). There is also the need for a systematic assessment of the cost and benefit of the proposal and the best possible way to convince the audience, that is, the specialists and technocrats “by arguments based upon knowledge, rationality and efficiency”(ibid, p. 67). In other words “the substance of the ideas and political pressure are often important in moving some subjects into prominence and in keeping other subjects low on governmental agendas”.(Kingdon ibid, p. 127) In the policy stream, representations of a foreign political reality influences “how decision-making actors will act upon that reality” (Jourde 2006, p. 183). In other words, “interpretations of reality, representations constrain and enable the policies that decision makers will adopt vis-à-vis other states; they limit the courses of action that are politically thinkable and imaginable, making certain policies conceivable while relegating other policies to the realm of the unthinkable” (ibid) The
meetings between the US executive and the Congress are examined to understand the position of the Congress on the issues presented and the measures to deal with them within the context of isolating the security issue for urgent attention. The policy process involves discourse when the decision makers take decisions as “discourse coalitions”. (Peter 1998, p. 158) Thus, “a public problem takes the form of story, with a beginning, middle and an end with the end being successful government intervention” (p. 157). To Charles-Phillipe (2006, p. 219) “US power is, first and foremost the outcome of the interplay between political and bureaucratic perceptions and forces. The constellation of bureaucratic atoms and political electrons is constantly shifting. Consequently it is difficult to find an overarching purpose in US foreign policy, for it is the result of unpredictable, immediate interests…”

Secondly, the issue of aid also has to be properly explained to the audience in the US policy community. This is due to the fact that development assistance has always been on the agenda of US towards other states. The US securitizing actor will need to explain why and how economic assistance to West Africa would help remove the threats to regional security. This includes the need for the executive to explain the modalities for providing economic assistance and what it would do in the region. The speech of President Bush of 2002 analysed included some of the reasons why poverty and diseases have been part of the security problems in West Africa. However other actors within the US policy communities also made appearances at the Congressional Committees with the intent of securing the financial and material support of the members of the appropriate committees. Thirdly, US military assistance also spanned the 1990s, with the promise of the Bush administration to launch the African Command (AFRICOM) in 2007. The rationale behind AFRICOM launch is explored. This includes an explanation of the modalities for the implementation of US AFRICOM’s agenda. Jourde (2006, p. 183) believed that identifying “how a state represents another state or non-state actor helps to understand how and why certain foreign policies have
been adopted while other policies have been excluded. In sum, the way one sees, interprets and imagines the ‘other’ delineates the course of action one will adopt in order to deal with the ‘other’.

What amount of power did the Congress have to influence presidential decision?

“Cameron developed hypothesis about when vetoes should occur and about the nature of policy outcomes under various configurations of preferences”. “Cameron’s study of the presidential veto and the bargaining between the US president and Congress unfolds given that Congress can propose a bill and the president can veto them, and supermajorities can override a veto” (Gamm et al 2002, p. 328). The chairman has enlarging powers within his increasingly crowded committee, upon whose room, with its conveniences, he has the lion share of claim and control…yet the place to behold him in his largest influence is in the arena of striving interests, with its competition growing sharper and sharper—in the daily assembly of all Representatives. (McConachie 1973)Matthews et al (1970, p. 21) were concerned with how congressmen make up their minds, and how they went about playing their congressional role. In the presidential leadership model of American government policy integration was made the responsibility of the presidency. …Whether or not it has always performed that function well, the executive branch is at least well designed for that purpose. At the top is an authoritative Executive Office of the President where policies can be looked at in relation to one another and their conflicts reconciled. With its hierarchical structure, it can represent diverse views in the many departments and agencies but reconcile them in the Executive Office of the President, with a point of decision in the chief executive himself (Sindquist 1981, p. 427) “But presidential leadership surely, does consists … of defining national objectives, goals and policies that “arouse, engage and satisfy” the majority of the country.” In the presidential leadership model, it is the president who sets the direction for the country, who proclaims the policies and programs he contends will move the nation towards its goals.
He does not do this arbitrarily, of course. He gets advice from a huge executive establishment and from a circle of close associates. He is sensitive to public opinion, he has the benefit of sophisticated polling data, and he tries to give the public what it wants. He listens to the members of the Congress and to his own particular constituency. Sometimes he is more follower than leader. But in any case, it is he who in the end must announce where he means to take the country, and how he means to get it there. Lack of leadership becomes a campaign issue and a president’s challengers seek to displace or succeed him by promising a greater measure of the leadership the people want. All he needs to do is to “say “This is it” and command his subordinates to fall in line with his decision.” (p. 428) If on a given policy situation the executive flounders in indecision on end, if its ultimate product is badly compromised and sloppy, all those weaknesses are likely to remain partially or wholly concealed. (Sundquist 1981, p. 428) The senate has benefited from the growing importance of foreign affairs, not solely because of its unique constitutional role in this area, but also because statewide elections provide Senate candidates with the incentive and opportunity to look beyond narrow local questions to national and international issues. (Carmines et al 2012, p. 126)

4:3:3 Politics: US Securitization and Policy Legitimization by West African Actors

Hypothesis 3 US actors met with ECOWAS actors to facilitate the completion of the policy process in the political, economic and military security sectors thereby achieving success in the securitization process.

The third aspect of Kingdon’s policy prescription is the “politics stream” (Kaunert et al 2011, Kingdon 2011) which implies that the US securitizing actors and the audience had formed a “winning coalition” (Salter 2011) on the policy proposal and it had been accepted as a policy. Policy acceptance meant the legitimization of the claims and that action could be taken to deal with the security threat. Thus, the acceptance of the securitizing claims by the Congress and policy implementation implicitly depended on the success of the interaction
between the US executive and the Congress on the one hand and the US officials and ECOWAS actors in West Africa on the other. The polices included aid, trade, including US investment in West African oil and military aid, and the US African Command (AFRICOM) which was launched in 2007 to confront insecurity in Africa generally and West Africa in particular. These were reflected in President Bush’s Emergency Plan for Aids Relief (PEPFAR), Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) and African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) II and III, which are analysed in this research. Other policies which brought the US officials and West African states together in the process of maintaining stability within the region included the Liberian crisis of 2002-2003, the Ivorian crises of 2003 and 2011 and the need to deal with the challenges posed by Nigeria as a security partner and a threat in the post-September 11 era. Other states which were securitized in the post-9/11 era included Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Togo and Niger. The speech made at the NSA in 2002 was the first part of the process which commenced US securitization in the post-9/11 era of US West Africa relations. The testimonies of the state department officials, speeches, documents of the US state department and the activities of the officials as reported in the newspapers and in the World Wide Web, form part of the analysis of data in US securitization in West Africa. Buzan (2004b) affirmed that US presidents considered global security as an urgent policy of the United States. He referred to the American policy makers as the self-appointed regional policeman. (Buzan et al 2003, p308) This understanding is required to help in the underpinning of US securitization and what, why, when and how US and West African states interaction helped in the maintenance of regional security in West Africa.

4:4 ECOWAS Securitization
Buzan referred to West Africa as a proto complex. The challenge within ECOWAS Member States was that there were “facilitating conditions” such as coups (Hutchful 2004), or “complex political emergencies” (Francis 2006). These were claims in ECOWAS securitization process. This study therefore explores and investigates how and why ECOWAS securitized in the post September 11 era through the adoption of the three Ps, that is, Problem, policy and politics.

4:4:1 Problem: ECOWAS Securitizing Claims and the Challenges of Regionalism

Hypothesis 4 ECOWAS actors were faced with security concerns which required securitizing claims and the sensitization of the West African people to the threats posed by the security challenges

Confronting insecurity through the spread of small arms and light weapons (Ero et al 2004) in West was one of the main challenges confronting ECOWAS Member States. Factors such as weak states and institutions, lack of enabling environment for West African citizens to meet their economic and political needs, the challenges of globalization, and intrastate conflicts (Ero et al 2004, p. 227) justified the need for ECOWAS intervention in West Africa. In other words, most of the factors associated with the proliferation of small arms, namely, “the collapse of the rule of law and the proliferation of crime—in essence, bad governance, the intensity and impact of intrastate conflicts, underdevelopment, and the absence of an effective state and public welfare infrastructure—are rife in West Africa”. As Rashid (2004, p. 169) had stated, whether it was “bloody coup d’etat, rebellions, violent separatist projects…no West African country has escaped armed intervention in its politics”. The challenges of child trafficking, drug trafficking, HIV aids, and money laundering (Jaye 2008) have been noted as some of the post-9/11 challenges in West Africa which required the intervention of ECOWAS Member States. One of the main concerns of scholars is how to ensure that the region is stable “with regional security and stability” as “one of the main
focuses of regionalism”. (Harders and Legrenzi 2008, p. 91) Miller (2005) argued that “most regimes in Africa have faced major domestic legitimacy problems because they preside over artificial colonial constructs that are quite vulnerable to internal challenges”. Other facilitating conditions for securitization include terrorism (Davis 2007, 2010, Buzan et al 2003, Obi 2006) poverty, (Collier 2002) coups (Hutchful 2004), rebel movements (Rashid 2004), and irredentist movements (Obi 2001). The post-Cold War era was also influenced by the need to reconstruct regionalism to accommodate the changes at the regional level (Francis 2006). West Africa suffers from a wide variety of diseases that show no respect for political borders. Among the biggest killers are malaria and HIV/AIDS (Williams and Haacke 2008) Kelly (2007) argued that

A region populated by weak states will be structurally different from strong states systems—predominantly weak states systems will focus on the ‘internal security dilemma’. During the cold war, communist guerrillas stressed weak states across this same global south! Today, Islamist insurgencies threatened states in the Muslim world.

Kelly’s argument has to do with the challenge weak states confront and the reality of regional cooperation as a bulwark against regional collapse.

Jaye’s (2008) approach West Africa’s challenges through the culture of West Africans by focusing on ECOWAS’s decisions and policies and how they influenced regional security culture. The effectiveness of the decision process can be tested by analyzing how it had “responded to transnational security challenges”. Despite all positive effort there is still a gap between the willingness of ECOWAS states to address the problem and their capacity to do so. Miller posits that “regionalism is a policy”, and it involves “technical elites and international bureaucrats” (Miller 2005, p. 249) According to Miller (2005, p. 251) “there is a qualitative difference between democracies and authoritarian regimes with respect to integration, because the latter type of regime is itself a major obstacle to regional integration”. The discourses of democratization, regional integration and security
management in West Africa ad through ECOWAS has relevance to the discussion of regionalization. For example, regional integration based on “intensification and institutionalization of economic interdependency, is the most outstanding form of regionalism”. (Harders and Legrenzi 2008 op cit, p. 91) New Regionalism incorporates not just states, but also companies and communities. (Taylor 2003). ECOWAS shifted focus to politics and security, from the initial economic development agenda of the regional institution. Nonetheless, ECOWAS members continued to reiterate their interest in economic development of the region in the post-9/11 era. ECOWAS (2008, 2009) policy for confronting the effects of global economic recession outlined the long term economic development agenda of the Member States of ECOWAS. Regionalism is occurring within a variety of formats—collective, bilateral and unilateral, formal and informal, regional and sub-regional (Hutchful 2000, pp. 217-218) The organizational structure of ECOWAS is contained in the Treaty of ECOWAS and it gives an indication to what to expect from the regional bureaucrats and technocrats who were responsible for policymaking. ECOWAS officials, state actors and the affected ministries were involved in “assessing costs and benefits and the most cost efficient alternative that will be chosen”. (Kaunert et al p. 211)

4:4:2 Policy: The Dynamics of Regional Policy Making and Regional Integration

Hypothesis 5 ECOWAS main focus was on the Member States and the various substate actors whose expertise and acceptance of the claims would facilitate regional integration in the political, economic and security sectors

To make securitizing claims the regional actors needed to be convinced that such a security issue in the economic, political, military and societal sectors threatened regional security. ECOWAS Member States were aware of the importance of democratizing the processes of decision making for regional security. The success of securitization therefore depended on the extent to which democratic states in the region could take collective
decisions to remove threats to regional security. To Fawcett “regionalism may thrive better in a democratic environment, where civil society is relatively advanced…” (Fawcett 2001, p. 156)

Also

it is appropriate to think of ways to build regional capacity, to make regions more effective actors in systems of global regulation, whether in the area of development, peacekeeping or good government. (ibid, p 156)

Akindele (2003, p. 162) posited that in West Africa or globally, “so much depends on the vision and mission of the leaders and their capacity to serve their different ‘publics’ in a transparent and incorruptible manner”. In other words, regionalism can have a positive, regulatory and even transformative role” and (Fawcett 2001, p. 151) and “regions and regional actors do perform some tasks well”. (ibid, p153) ECOWAS may rightly be described as a “society of states which has its own rules, norms and institutions” (Buzan 2004b, p. 3)

Nieuwkerk (2001) contended that formal regionalism as “the outcome of state policies and involves the transfer of national state powers to a supranational body or a hegemonic state, or it can result from the more modest desire to co-ordinate sectoral policies through an intergovernmental body”

Varynen (2003) related political regionalism to concerns about “the stability of the region”. These include the security of the member states of a regional organization such as ECOWAS “its contribution to the current global order, and the relationship of the member states in the global system”. To Varynen, “the process of regionalization fills the region with substance such as economic interdependence institutional ties, political trust, and cultural belonging”(ibid). This understanding of the speech-act process is essential for the process of dealing with the actor-audience relationship in the securitization process. This is vital for conflict prevention, the management, resolution, peacekeeping and security as entrenched in the ECOWAS protocol of 1999. ECOWAS agenda in West Africa is important for
appreciating the process of building an “effective peacekeeping, humanitarian support and peacebuilding capabilities”. (Kabia 2011) To this end, the ECOWAS Security Mechanism established a number of “institutions, arms and strategies which include the Mediation and Security Council, an early warning system, and a stand-by force”. (ibid) The sub-region’s conflict prevention, management and resolution capacity, as well as build effective peacekeeping, humanitarian support and peacebuilding capabilities. How were democratic principles upheld at the regional level? This question raises an important point about the place of civil society in the democratic processes at the regional level. As Akindele (2003, p. 353) argued, “it is unquestionably on the vibrancy of the civil society that that sustainable democratic governance can and must be anchored”.

The aim is to examine why and how ECOWAS set out its plan in the framework. ECOWAS documents such as documents on Common Investment Market (2003), set out the parameters for achieving a free trade area, common external tariff (CET) and economic union. The ECOWAS Regional investment Policy Framework’s (2007) opening section revealed the intention of ECOWAS countries, which were “…at the margin of the process of the expanding global investment flow”. The Energy Protocol, (2003) and the press releases of ECOWAS available on the World Wide Web show how ECOWAS prioritized regional security in the post-9/11 era. The 35th Summit of the Heads of States of ECOWAS designed a roadmap for the implementation of the ECOWAS single market economy. ECOWAS Member States agreed to implement policy on electoral system at the regional level. A handbook on election observation. (ECOWAS, Handbook 2008) as well as the protocol on democracy and good governance (ECOWAS Protocol 2001) identified democratic elections, constitutional convergence principles and the mandate of ECOWAS in elections. These principles were considered to be necessary for shifting the region towards viable representative democracies within the framework of regionalism in West Africa. This is
important in grasping the context within which democratization was constituted as an inclusive regional security objective in the post-9/11 era in West Africa.

4:4:3 Politics: ECOWAS and US Cooperation in Security Management in West Africa

**Hypothesis 6** ECOWAS cooperation with the US actors was based on mutual understanding of the urgent need to confront the security threat at the regional level in West Africa.

In the politics stream, the decision makers and the general public constitute the two different groups that made up the audience. (Kaunert et al 2011) According to Salter (ibid, p. 122) the “failure of securitizing moves may be politically-desirable…”. This could be part of the agenda of the securitizing actors and the audience(s) in West Africa for “normative commitment to desecuritization” (ibid, p. 122). Sewell (2011, p. 6) argued that US foreign policy can be influenced by other nations, thereby challenging the notion that only America influence others. He believed that American policy is guided by give, in day-to-day diplomacy. This was true of the post-9/11 era where US intervention was offered in the regional crises. This background is provided to underscore the role the United States played in West Africa as the depth of the relationship between ECOWAS and US actors is determined in the resolution of some of the crisis in West Africa.

In line with the explanation offered by Buzan et al (2003), it is possible to determine whether a region is weak or strong by the degree of security interaction. This implies that there is need to determine the extent to which the security interaction of the regional actors in West Africa could sustain the regional stability efforts of the actors and the implications of this for external intervention or overlay. How did the successful or failed securitization contribute to regional security policy in West Africa? The policy section has indicated that if the policy selection process (Kaunert et al 2011) was effective, the likelihood is that there will be successful policy The success of the interactions of ECOWAS actors, through democratization of the processes of decisionmaking, willingness to embrace the core values
of regional integration as spread out in the policy documents of ECOWAS, the respect for the
rule of law and human rights principles, as well as press freedom within the states, all
contribute to successful securitization. If these variables were lacking, ultimately, this implied
that the region is a protocomplex, with a potentially weak RSC, (Buzan 2003) necessitating
external intervention. To what degree did the US officials take into account ECOWAS
securitizing process in US policy? If the regional integration programme is faulty, this could
result in a weak RSC and consequently render the region vulnerable for penetration. (Kelly
2007) Mobilizing regional actors around a cause is crucial for security management and this
went a long way to shape the various ECOWAS securitizations in the post-9/11 period.
There could be issues around “linguistic, historical and affective contexts that facilitate or
impede securitization” (Salter, p. 118) especially the different organizational and bureaucratic
cultures and “differing opinions within national publics” (ibid, p. 119) The different settings
in the securitizing actors and the audience(s) in West Africa often determined the outcome of
the processes of securitization. Salter described this as “different basic power dynamics,
different linguistic rules, and different local knowledge structures” (Salter 2011, p. 117) due
to the existence of multistate system in the region. This research, among other things, seeks to
understand the processes of securitization that resulted in success or failure of the securitizing
claims of ECOWAS actors. Why and how did the ECOWAS members confront the security
challenges in their respective states within the framework of a collective effort at the level of
ECOWAS? Were they helped or impeded by the integration process? How did ECOWAS
harness the advantage of the stronger states in the region to securitize threats? What were the
contribution of global dynamics to successful securitization in West Africa and how did this
help ECOWAS attempt to end the Ivorian crisis in 2011. Understanding this is useful for
grasping the role of external actors in the Ivorian crisis and the benefit derivable for the
overall securitization process in US West Africa affairs in the post-9/11 era.
4:5 Conclusion

This chapter relied on qualitative content analysis as the tool for analysing US securitization process in West Africa, as well as ECOWAS processes of policy making for combating the challenges of regional security in West Africa. Qualitative content analysis is relied upon for reliability and replication of the research work. It enhanced the possibility of designing questions about who what and why and how around US securitization of political, economic and security affairs in West Africa, with emphasis on policy as the end product of securitization. Secondly in the understanding the processes of ECOWAS securitization, the question of who, what, why and how help to shape the issues around the problem security in the region, the policy adopted, and the politics of policy legitimation. Finally, it is important to highlight the point of policy convergence between the US actors and their ECOWAS partners. This chapter attempted to project into the empirical cases by positing that the US actors needed the audiences on both sides of the policy proposal. In other words, successful securitization required that not only must the Congress legitimate the claims, ECOWAS actors must also accept the specific US policies channelled towards removing the threats in West Africa.
Chapter Five

The History of US Relations with West Africa

5:1 Introduction

As a continent, the history of Africa is a broad one, encapsulating its political, economic, social and cultural development of the regions of the continent. The United States is the world hegemonic leader. Its history is not easily ignored when offering an analysis of African politics. The United States is economically, politically and militarily strong, while African states are yet to have a clearly defined agenda on how to attain these as goals. The effect is that African states did not reap much benefit from their relationship with the United States. In the context of US West African relations, US first major link with the region started with Liberia. It then gradually established diplomatic relations with post-independence states in the region.

5:2 The United States in the World

The US foreign policy has always been essentially targeted towards reflecting the ‘American Dream’. The history of the United States in the world is one which proves unequivocally that the Americans aimed to dominate the world. Rooted in ‘American Exceptionalism’ is the idealism/liberalism and internationalist agenda of the American policy makers.

Understanding the United States of America is usually required in order to derive useful lessons for its role in the world and in the West African region. It has been labelled rightly or wrongly over the years by scholars with different appellations. The “superiority of America” and its gradual global domination were made possible by its political, economic,
and military dominance which crystallized in the aftermath of the World War II. (Eschen 1997, p. ix) From the end of the Second World War the US began to make such impacts in the international system making it, “a model for the world” and “constable of the world” (Waltz 2008, p. 33) “the nation of human progress” (Hietala 2006, p. 157), to underscore America’s domineering influence in the promotion of universal values. In Emerson’s words (cited in Perkins 1993, p. 176), “in every age in the world, there has been a leading nation, one of a more generous sentiment, whose eminent citizens were willing to stand for the interests of general justice and humanity…Which should be that nation but the States?...Who should be the leaders, but the Young Americans?” . Woodrow Wilson, in enunciating his Fourteen Points for American war aims in World War I, said that what the United States wanted was "that the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace loving nation" (Panchyk 2009, p. 173). Idealists did not place the safety of the world ahead of the safety of the United States but rather saw U.S. safety closely tied to that of the world. The realists shared the idealist belief that human reason was a possible source of order in the international arena (Harbour 1999). In the words of Hietala (2006, p. 157), the domestic political parties in the US were frontrunners of the US global vision. The Democrats “formulated their domestic and foreign policies to safeguard themselves and their progeny for a potentially dismal future”. Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower shaped the foreign policies of the US through debates about what should be the national interest aspiration of the US. This was later projected into the domain of US foreign policy. Thus from inception, these leaders had rationalized that the US ought to act like the “great powers” because no nation could ignore the increasingly global scope of the world polity. Successive leaders had weighed the impacts of “internationalism”, and “isolationism” on international stability and the pursuit of US interests.(ibid) To Ruggie;
the core lesson that drew from this experience was not only that isolationism is “bad” and internationalism “good” for the sake of, but, more subtly, that unilateralism had opened the door to isolationism. In a manner of speaking, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were theorists of international relations in their own right. In contrast, Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a tinkerer—“the juggler,” as he once gleefully described himself (Ruggie, 1998, p. 210)

Stivachtis highlights the currents in the US policy of engagement with the world. The Hamiltonian the Wilsonian, the Jeffersonian and the Jacksonian traditions he believes, are implicit in US foreign policy making. Schivatchis used this as analytical framework to examine “competing American visions” (Stivachtis 2007, p. 39) by addressing the weaknesses in the existing literature on US foreign policy. His conclusion is that the US foreign policy is a dynamic process that is influenced and determined by developments in American society (Stivachtis 2007, pp. 39-63). Taylor et al (2004) identified similar patterns of US foreign relations with Africa. They described US policy orientation as Realpolitik, Hamiltonianism and Meliorism. The United States hegemonic leadership in the world is one that reflects its might in political, economic and military capabilities. After World War II, the US became the virtual inheritor of European civilization, emerging as the strongest and richest country in the world. American influence was transmitted through soldiers, officials, and businessmen who were scattered throughout Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The US expansionist course was calculated and coherent, fuelled by a thirst for territory, foreign markets and investment opportunities, and ultimately Great power status. As Waltz argued, “The United States in the early 1960s undertook the largest strategic and conventional peacetime military build-up the world has yet seen”. (2008, p345) This explains the reason for the military dominance of the United States in the post-Cold War era. The processes of internationalizing of the American economy and building a set of international institution, “gave American decision-makers potentially decisive leverage over a wide range of decisions in Western nations”(ibid, p. 345) Skinner believed that the United States was “pushed both by
force of circumstance and by shrewd calculation of American interest”(Skinner 1986, p. 47)

He argued further;

These nations and their overseas dependencies were drawn into an international regime based on open economies and comparatively free trade United States military pre-eminence provided both subtle pressure and a protective umbrella under which the Western nations, and eventually Japan, entered an American-centred world capitalist economy.(p. 47)

The US found itself far removed from the continuous jostling of European power politics, protected by vast oceans on either side while adjoined by relatively weak and usually friendly neighbours to the north and south, largely self-sufficient in raw materials, able to expand into continental scale, and a magnet attracting a steady influx of newcomers eager to break with their past and make a fresh start. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has performed political, military, and economic roles which point to its historical role at the global level. Accordingly, the United States, before the turn of this century, luxuriated in the posture, as described by John Quincy Adams, of being “the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all… the champion and vindicator only of her own” (John Quincy, 1821, p. 32. See also Dyer 2011, p. 33. Mayers 1990, p. 279) War hostilities shaped politics in the post-1945 era of America in world politics. During the Cold War, the United States major adversary was the Soviet Union. The world was pitched in two ideological camps of communism and capitalism, with each superpower striving to convince the rest of humanity of the relevance of each ideological orientation. According to Hunt (1987) the Truman administration helped to define the role of the US in the world as a great power US, after the Second World War. Thus, the US was comfortable with its unilateral interventionist role and was undeterred by the multilateral function of the United Nations. The American economy recorded gross earnings for decades and placed it in an enviable position within the global political economy. Several states in Europe and in the developing states of Africa Asia and Latin America rely on America for trade. With a successful
American economy, the US dollar was pegged against the major world currencies and the US had a major influence on the UN, and major financial institutions of the world, such as the World Bank (IBRD) and IMF. This implied that the demise of the communist bloc was a matter of time (Ruggie 1998). Post-war international economic order was multilateral in character. This was a departure from the economic nationalism of the thirties. The United States multilateralism was predicated on the interventionist character of the modern capitalist state. The United States universalism and exceptionalism is a project of world domination embedded in its foreign policy plank as “The American Way” which “all others would do well to emulate” (Scott 1998, p4). Scott believed that for America to universalize its values, there must be commitment to the values of democracy and constitutional government as this had been part of the agenda of the United States since the post-war era. He stated:

Universalism essentially means that commitments to democratic liberalism, constitutional government, and the like are superior preferences, suitable and desirable for all people and countries. Americans widely believe that values such as those outlined above are universal public goods to be maximized in other nations (1998, p. 4)

Furthermore he stated that the United States aim of remaking the international order in line with American precepts was conceived with the alignment of national aspirations and the foreign policy objectives. Ruggie (1998) argued that

structural and functional precepts become national interests only when they tap into, and resonate with, ideas, principles, and norms rooted in the nation’s sense of self, second, unless it is counteracted, public opinion will reinforce this tendency(ibid, p. 203)

This logic resonates with the view of Leffler (2006, p. 21) who posits that “the history of American foreign relations is not about the struggle between power and ideals, as it is … but about intermingling. America’s ideology has been tailored to correspond with its quest for territory and markets. Power, ideology and interests have always had a dynamic and unsettled relationship with one another.”Leffler et al (2008) also argued that although the global
system has changed as there are radical Islamists in the world, globalisation has caused backlash democracy “has stalled and begun to tip precariously”, of American responsibilities remain the same. (p. 59)

5:3 Limits of American Power

Drawing on the quadrennial foreign policy polls conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, William Schneider (1997, pp27-28) found that in the survey, conducted in October 1994, most measures of public support for American international engagement were at all-time lows since immediately after Vietnam—including “defending our allies’ security” and “protecting weaker nations against foreign aggression.” In a Times Mirror survey taken in June 1995, the view was that the United States should “mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own” was rejected by just 51 percent of the public while 41 percent agreed was at the highest level of agreement since the survey’s inception in 1974. Moralists/idealists argue that the United States should involve itself in international affairs "only for sufficient ethical reasons" i.e., that foreign policy “should be motivated by moral principles”. (Scott 1998, op cit, p. 4) According to Scott, moralists/idealists tend to believe that a peaceful and prosperous world can be created to universal i.e., US moral principles. This implied that there were those who saw the US moralism and idealism as a “sense of duty” necessary for saving the world. This is due also to the belief that the United States had the mission to serve as the custodian of humanity. (ibid) According to Hunt (1987), the world is complex and slow to change. This means the US does not necessarily have to conceptualize the world as simple and pliable, and easily controlled if the states intending to control the world thinks has the right strategy. But this is what the US has always done in its conception of the globe as a chess board which is neatly demarcated for the imposition of American will. Buzan (2004b) has argued that although the United
States remains a superpower, the growth of China in this century has been a source of concern in the international system. Professor Sakuji Yosimura of Waseda University (cited in Waltz 2008) expressed his distress this way

America is a mighty country—and a frightening one…for better or worse the Gulf war built a new world order with America at the head…this will be fine as long as the rest of the world accepts its role as America’s underling (p. 373)

In early September of 1991 foreign minister of France, Roland Dumas remarked that “American might reigns without balancing weight”, and Jacques Delors, President of the European Community Commission, cautioned that the United States must not take charge of the world. Both of them called on the United Nations and the European Community to counterbalance American influence. Even the Philippines foreign minister asked whether the role of the United States as the “constable of the world” was necessary (Waltz 2008, p. 347)

A second important feature of current international relations is US’ frustrated struggle to translate its material preponderance to desired political outcomes. This is mainly due to the resistance the US faces from both friends and opponents who all view American hegemony as increasingly troubling. Not only is the American position a direct threat to states whose interests and values clash with American ones, but even US allies now worry about the concentration of military strength in American hands(Stivachtis 2007, p. 41)

Over the past years, they also became increasingly alarmed by the ways that the US policy makers have chosen to use that strength. While Americans debate how they should use their power, “the rest of the world is preoccupied with what to do to tame American power”(ibid p. 41)

5:4 US and Decolonization in West Africa
The United States first portrayed itself as an anti-colonial power, urging decolonization in Africa and Asia. During the decolonization era, the US president had been unequivocal about what the United States considered to be a free world. This policy was directed particularly at Britain, over the question of retention of British colonial possessions after the war. The British West Africa was the most formidable colonial power in Africa. These include independence for the colonized states of Africa. The United States had no overseas colonies of its own to lose. It permitted the decolonisation even of such microstates as The Gambia after the Second World War. Indeed, by consistently warning Britain that America was not fighting to preserve the British Empire the president and other high-ranking Washington officials deliberately irritated London, its major ally. Roosevelt proposed an international territorial trusteeship for the areas inhabited by dependent peoples, referring to the idea that they were not ready for independence as “harsh” (Sebrega1986) Sebrega noted that during Roosevelt’s conversation with Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov on 1 June 1942, he asserted that the "white nations" could not expect to hold on to their colonies. Thus, under the “supervision of the Big Four,” the dependent peoples would be guided to eventual independence. (Sebrega 1986, ibid) The “four policemen” were the United States, Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. (Louis 1985) The African nationalists were impressed and encouraged by American anti-colonial rhetoric. The anti-colonial rhetoric was further strengthened as a result of the declaration of the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill who declared that the Atlantic Charter, a joint British-American statement that called for national self-determination after the war, did not apply to African dependencies. Churchill maintained that the Atlantic meeting had been held to examine European, not colonial problems. In defence of British policy, Churchill argued that; “At the Atlantic meeting, we had in mind, primarily, the restoration of sovereignty, self-government and national life of the States and nations now under the Nazi yoke ... So it is quite a separate problem from the
progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown.” (in Twitchett 1969)

Roosevelt categorically stated that the “Atlantic Charter applies not only to parts of the world that border the Atlantic, but to the whole world”. (Oyebade et al 2008, p. 26) Roosevelt believed that Churchill’s attitude towards decolonization was based on the fact that he did not want to see the empire fall apart under his premiership. (Dulles and Ridinger, 1955) This encouraged journalists in the region and politicians to bombard London and to ask for a constitutional reform, including a post-War order based on a system of representative government. Although America’s disapproval of European colonial rule in Africa helped to raise the hope of the colonized towards self-determination, it was not willing to back up its anti-colonial rhetoric with action. Decolonization only went at a rapid pace in the 1950s and early 1960s, resulting in the independence of several African states, including those of the West African region. (ibid)

American motivations were as concerned with political and strategic factors as with economic. Skinner (1986) argued cooperative local elites replaced and undertook a direct control previously exercised by the former colonial rulers which America replaced to institutionalize a formal empire. This was the case in Africa where American commercial and investment interest was minimal. The US strategy was therefore to support the clamour for independence in Africa. By the end of the Second World War the British would face a nationalist movement which even sophisticated weapons could not indefinitely suppress (Louis 1985)

During this period of decolonization, the Soviets capitalised upon the decolonisation process to win influence in a series of states, such as Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the Sudan and Somalia. By the early 1970s former allies such as Mali and Ghana were reorienting toward the West, was due less to US action than to the internal dynamics of a fragmented continent.
struggling to adjust to a post-colonial world. Once Kennedy was dead and Johnson became obsessed with Vietnam, Africa largely disappeared from US concerns. However there was a pervasive growth in the African interests of the African-American community at that time. (Jalloh et al. 2008) Also African-American intellectuals often looked askance at Africa. As Nwaubani put it, even when independence came, very few African-Americans identified with their motherland most black leaders again narrowed their horizons and once more defined their problems within the domestic context (Nwaubani 2001, p. 233). The “black voice” in US Africa policies has historically been very weak and non-influential, especially when compared to the strength of other ethnic groups in support of their “homelands”, most notably Jewish Americans. One of the primary reasons for this lack of influence was the absence of an organized constituency capable of effectively working within the US policymaking establishment (Schraeder 1994, p. 42). The postindependence era also witnessed the era of Peace Corps volunteers, who came largely from Britain, Canada and the United States. They all paralleled one another remarkably. The volunteering was successful in Ghana, apparently due to the influenced of Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana who was the leading spokesman for African nationalism. US volunteers provided a chance for the Americans to know the existentialist “Other”. (Hoffman 2006)

With the onset of the Cold War, after World War II ended in 1945, the United States no longer urged its European allies—Britain, France, Portugal, and Spain—to surrender their African possessions, but came to regard the ubiquitous presence of France in Africa as a useful way of keeping the Soviets out of the continent. France’s neo-colonialism in Africa included establishing economic, military, and political relations with its former colonies—a strategy that allowed it to send troops to prop up or oust puppet regimes, tied the currencies of these countries to the French franc, and allowed French officials undue influence over the decisions of supposedly sovereign countries. In West Africa, aside from the activities of the
American rubber company, Firestone, in Liberia, the United States’ economic interests was insignificant.

Apart from the strategic and manpower assistance provided to Britain during the war, West Africans made significant contributions of raw materials and funds to the war effort. (Ibhawoh 2007) The Second World War brought the continent, particularly West Africa, into the United States’ strategic planning in both military and economic terms.

As Oyebade and Falola put it,

this drastically changed during World War II when the United States was forced to turn to the region as a source of strategic raw materials, agricultural, and minerals, needed to fuel the war effort. A replacement for critical strategic commodities were found in mineral-rich and agriculturally productive West Africa (Oyebade et al 2008, p. 23)

Until 1975, the United States refrained from substantial involvement elsewhere in black Africa so long as French or British influence appeared adequate. (Chazan et al 1999, p. 443)

5:5 US Foreign Policy after the Cold War

US policy after the Cold War was largely isolationist, despite contacts between Africa and the US that had been of ancient origin. (Duignan, and Gann 1984, pxiii) The 1963 American Assembly publication once claimed the “political shape of Africa is becoming clear. The colonial era is rapidly drawing to a close and the continent is now largely made up of independent states”. (1963, p. xiii) During the Eisenhower administration, less than 2 percent of American foreign aid went to Africa. Most of it went to “North Africa or to the white regimes”. (Deroche 2006, p. 107) Nwaubani argued that distinction must be made between American “rhetoric and reality” in its dealings with the independent African states. To hum, “the emerging black states in West Africa got virtually no concrete support from the United States”. (cited in Deroche p. 107) American diplomats perceived no Soviet threat and
relatively little strategic value in West Africa, so they deferred to European preferences and proffered little aid to states such as Ghana. On an unofficial trip to Ghana in 1956, Louis Armstrong played before lively crowds of 100,000, which prompted the State Department to hire him as one of their “jambassadors” in 1957. In both Ghana and Nigeria between 1960 and 1977, the Peace Corps was the only part of the overall US policy toward the continent that Africans viewed favourably. (p. 107) Vice President Richard Nixon visited several African countries, and attended the independence ceremony in Ghana on March 6, 1957. Upon returning to Washington, Nixon submitted a report that stressed the importance of Africa in the Cold War struggle against the Soviets. In August 1958 the State Department formed a separate Bureau of African Affairs. (p. 107) The newly independent Ghana under Nkrumah posed a threat to the United States such that President Kennedy wrote a letter to his Ghanaian counterpart, complaining about the Ghanaian subversion of Africa. A paper prepared 1962 stated that “Nkrumah’s overpowering desire to export his brand of nationalism has unquestionably made Ghana one of the foremost practitioners of subversion in Africa. Ghana’s influence or interference is felt in all sections of the continent.” (Howland 1995, p. 373) To address the issue of Ghana’s influence or interference “felt in all sections of the continent”, President Kennedy wrote to Nkrumah in December 14, 1961, . ”I asked Mr Randall to explain to you the serious concern which American people and government have regarding certain political and economic policies of your government.” (Howland 1995, p. 373) The relationship between the US and the independent states in Africa was described in terms “of relations between centre and periphery: imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, dependencia, cultural imperialism, anti-hegemonism, and suchlike” (Buzan et al 2003, p. 8)

When in the course of a presidential debate with vice president Albert Gore, George W. Bush was questioned about United States’ foreign policy towards Africa, he responded
that America did not have any vital interests there. Bush merely reiterated the reality of the US involvement in Africa since the end of Second World War. Prior to the war, except for episodic intervention in Liberia, the African continent hardly featured in America’s foreign policy (Oyebade et al 2008, p. 22) The main ideals in America’s framing of its foreign policy are associated with the spread of western capitalism. US aid programmes in particular were geared towards sustaining the bases of democracy by supporting the development of 'civil society’ in African states. The US defence of the ‘free world’ against international communism had previously involved it in uncomfortable alliances with states which could not in any way be described as free. Unlike the economic conditionalities imposed by the World Bank, political conditionalities were often not directly linked to aid, but formed part of the normal business of diplomatic relations. United States aid to Kenya, for example was negligible by the mid-1990s, and all of it was directly allocated to non-governmental groups (Clapham 1996, pp. 194-198) There was a turn around after the Cold War as Scott posits, “the post-Cold War world a more benign environment for foreign policy choices the changing international context of the post-Cold War environment requires adaptation to face the new issues and problems it raises”( Scott 1998, p. xi) Africa is well down the list of American priorities. (Taylor et al 2004, p. 23) There is also evidence that the Kaplan and Homer-Dixon analyses have contributed to policy- making in many Western capitals, but most notably during the Clinton administration in the US and its policy towards Africa.(Dannreuther 2008, p. 71) The pressure to trim already reduced levels of economic and military aid and the perception among US policymakers that Africa is less important relative to other regions of the world in the post-Cold War era has led to significant budgetary cutbacks in some program offices related to Africa (Schraeder 1994, p. 250). The significant drop in US foreign assistance to the African continent during the 1980s and 1990s constitutes one of the most vivid examples of Africa’s declining fortunes relative to other regions of the
world. When compared with other regions of the world, Africa’s share of US foreign assistance dropped from roughly 10.3 percent ($1.87 billion) of an overall budget of $18.13 billion in 1985, to approximately 7.5 percent ($1.18 billion) of the $15.73 billion budget for 1990. From 1986 US military aid was cut to the African continent (ibid, p. 250) Other security assistance, such as Economic Support Funds (ESF), similarly dropped from $452.8 million to $58.9 million during the same period. During the final two years of the Bush administration, Washington’s preoccupation with the end of the Cold War reinforced Africa’s traditional low standing within the aid hierarchy. In addition to responding to a growing sense among the US public that foreign assistance should be invested in a lacklustre US economy, the Bush administration trimmed US foreign assistance to the African continent in order to free up funds to reward the transition to democracy in other regions of the world, as well as to pay for the enormous costs associated with the US military operation against Iraq in 1991 known as Operation Desert Storm (ibid) In a January 1990 budget address, President Bush informed Congress of the administration’s intention to reduce aid to Africa specifically in order to free up larger amounts of aid for Poland. After being criticized by his party, the Republican Party for “his cautious, wait-and-see attitude towards changes in the Soviet Union”, Bush was forced “to increase his aid request several times” (Ripley and Lindsay 1993, p. 225) Although the African Affairs constituency in Congress was somewhat successful in reversing Africa’s marginalisation within the aid hierarchy, the policymaking establishment’s growing concern with other regions and interests in an altered Cold War environment ensures that proponents will be hard pressed to maintain, let alone increase, Africa’s share of the foreign aid budget. As Homer-Dixon (2000, p. 278) put it, violence occurs in developing societies most, policymakers and citizens in the industrialized world ignore it at their peril. After 2000, the United States committed itself to assisting Africa on the War on Terror (Cox et al. 2010) Taylor et al (2004) identified three major planks in the
post-Cold War US-Africa relations, these are, Realpolitik, Hamiltonianism and Meliorism. Taylor et al (2004) quoted an official of the Clinton administration Susan Rice, who argued that US policy in the post-Cold War era had changed. Rice said

there was a time not long ago when Africa was the exclusive domain of the understaffed bureau at Foggybottom…but now, virtually every government agency is building the capacity to implement new programmes that support our policy of comprehensive engagement with Africa (p33)

Taylor and Williams went on to argue that the most concrete commitment the US has made to African security is the ACRI. To them, “The ACRI is about military security, stability and establishment of order. It is viewed as Hamiltonian ideal. The building of a liberal world economy, which is a consistent American objective since the end of WWII” (ibid)

5:6 Post-Cold War Impediments to Regionalism in West Africa

Different ethnic militia and tribal warlords rose up to challenge the legitimacy of states in West Africa. Added to this challenge was the ease with which small arms and light weapons circulated in Africa and in West Africa. Jet fighters, AK47 and other small arms and weapons were supplied into Africa during the era of détente in which the US and USSR were engaged in ideological warfare. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons that became evident in post-Cold War Africa was therefore as a result of decades of procurement. Ero (2004) described the small arms and light weapons as used in fighting the type of wars that were proliferating across the region. Small arms and light weapons as weapons such as submachine guns, hand held portable antitank guns, portable launchers of antiaircraft systems. They are small and effective, but they can also be carried by young children. The domestic violent crises in the post-Cold War West Africa were fuelled by weak state, or the collapsing state(Zartman 1997). The existence of small arms also facilitated the rapid
growth of intra-regional violence. A case in point was the decline of the Manu River Union area into total collapse. The countries in this region are Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea. The inability of the states in West Africa to effectively mount cross-border security also meant that these crises had interstate characteristics (Akude 2009). Bassey (in Sesay 2003) referred to the insecurity of that era as the ‘vortex of violent crises’ in West Africa. ECOWAS was forced to act, in order to bring the crisis to a bearable limit. The protocols which were signed enumerated the mechanisms required for bringing peace to West Africa in the post-Cold War era. (Akindele 2003)

5:6:1 Liberian Crisis and the Effect on Security in West Africa

Liberia became a republic in 1847. Since 1822, the American Colonization Society had been transporting black American settlers, largely freed slaves from the antebellum South, to Liberia. Abraham Lincoln and other American politicians who supported the repatriation had naively hoped that this resettlement might resolve their own country’s racial problems. An Americo-Liberian oligarchy, constituting only five percent of the population, held power by repressing the indigenous Liberian population. Political and educational reforms enacted by Liberian presidents William Tubman and William Tolbert between 1944 and 1980 failed to heal the resentment felt by indigenous people against settler domination. Their spontaneous jubilation following a bloody coup in 1980 by low-ranking soldiers, led by Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe, symbolized the level of hostility that had welled up against the ruling elite. Over the next four years, Doe eliminated potential rivals through exile and assassination. His tactics, typified by blatantly rigged, American-condoned elections in 1985, closed off peaceful avenues for dissent and resulted in several military challenges to his regime, which culminated in a bloody seven-year civil war between 1989 and 1996. The United States was Doe’s strongest external supporter. Largely for strategic Cold War
calculations and fears of Liberia’s falling into the Soviet camp, it backed Doe, whom it rewarded with a state visit to Washington in 1982. Ronald Reagan described the Liberian autocrat as “a dependable ally—a friend in need” (Adebajo 2002, p35). The Reagan administration rewarded Doe with Half a billion dollars as a demonstration of its support for the junta’s transition to democracy programme. Doe supported America’s anti-Libya policies and helped smuggle arms to UNITA (União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) rebels in Angola. After the rigged 1985 elections, American officials rushed to justify this farcical charade. Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, described the vote as “a rare achievement in Africa and elsewhere in the Third World” (ibid, p35). As Adebajo argued, “In an era of Cold War, America’s strategic interests in Liberia appeared more important to Washington than niceties about human rights and democracy. The Reagan administration sank over $500 million into Liberia in the 1980s.” (Adebajo 2004)

5:6:2 ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia

In late 1989, a small band insurgents claiming allegiance to Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia invaded Nimba County, Liberia from neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire. The insurgents were trained by Muammar Ghadafi’s forces in Libya. Within six months of its initial attack, the NPFL expanded rapidly, controlling most of Liberia outside of Monrovia. It also spilled across borders, expanding its rear base into south eastern Sierra Leone and parts of Guinea. (Johnston , 2005, p293) Elmer Johnson, a subordinate commander to Charles Taylor, trained by the American military was allegedly killed by Taylor’s soldiers (Johnston ibid, p294). This episode recounts the beginning of the terror unleashed by the Charles Taylor’s forces during the Liberian War. The Liberian leader, Sergeant Samuel Doe was eventually killed by the rival forces led by Prince Yormie Johnson in 1989. The death of Doe was followed by a civil war, which ended in 1997. The rebel
movements ended the myth of political stability in Liberia. Prior to the Liberian crisis, Doe, in 1981 had executed Sien and Kwinwopah. These men had earlier been members of the inner circle but plotted a coup against the government of Samuel Doe. Subsequently, Doe made peaceful change through the ballot box impossible. The dictatorial tendencies of Sergeant Doe further weakened the Liberian state. The effect of the Cold War era on the regimes in Africa was the tacit support enjoyed by dictators from the United States by the dictators willing to uphold Western values. Having rejected communism and embraced liberal democratic values, the United States was prepared to overlook Samuel Doe’s misrule.

Despite the failure of Kwinwopah’s coup, he had fired the first salvo of the Liberian civil war. The NPFL acquired weapons and overran most of Liberia. There was a flood of refugees into neighbouring countries. ECOWAS under the leadership of Nigeria deployed the ceasefire monitoring group ECOMOG. At different locations within the country, Taylor and other group leaders of the other rebel factions declared themselves the President of Liberia. At least five new factions emerged with the Charles Taylor's faction as the most prominent. Taylor was strongly supported by Libya and Burkina Faso. The NPFL expanded rapidly to include orphaned children, women and child soldiers and the ‘small boys’ unit. These youth and children were notoriously brutal and rapacious (Adebajo 2004). Taylor was able to administer Liberia during the Liberian crisis form Greater Liberia, a territory outside Monrovia the capital. Administratively, Taylor relied on some of the former members of the Sergeant Doe government who helped with different aspects of the rebel government day-to-day administration. The Liberian crisis continued until 1997 when Taylor became President of Liberia through a general election in which Liberians massively voted for him in order to end the prolonged war. The two ECOWAS protocols on Conflict Prevention (1999) and Democracy and Good Governance (2001) constitute the major framework for the peace
negotiations and the return to democratic rule in Liberia. There were tense moments in the road to peace and elections in Liberia. General Abdulsalami Abubakar displayed commendable diplomatic negotiating skills to break the deadlocks and get the feuding parties back to the path the peace agreements and democratic elections. Understandably, the ECOWAS special mediator was awarded the highest national honour in the country by the elected president of the country, Ellen Sirleaf Johnson (Adejumobi et al 2009, p389)

5:6:3 Sierra Leonean War and the Threat to Security in West Africa

The United States was aware of the danger which warlord politics had on its security just as it was aware of the threat posed by terrorism. Acting to prevent West Africa from exploding was implicitly part of the US security agenda in West Africa. Throughout 1998 AFRC and RUF rebels committed numerous egregious abuses, including brutal killings, severe mutilations, and deliberate dismemberments, in a widespread campaign of terror against the civilian population known as "Operation No Living Thing." (Denov 2010, p74. See also Gberie 2005, p121. See also Dobbins et al 2001, p131. Pauw 2006, p200) One particularly vicious practice was cutting off the ears, noses, hands, arms, and legs of non-combatants who were unwilling to cooperate with or provide for the insurgents. The war was prolonged because of the insecurity of the elite. They lived lavish lifestyles while the war continued on the countryside. The RUF caught the APC regime off-guard and the rebel were poised to attack. Momoh was only too willing to hand power over. The rebels were given access to the diamonds by the villagers. The RUF took control of Sierra Leone. These youth became doggedly loyal to their commanders. These rebel were accountable to their commanders including ‘papei’ that is, Foday Sankoh. (de Zeeuw 2008, p92) The popular belief about the military superiority of the RUF could be found in the sobels (soldiers by day rebels by night) phenomenon. (Denov 2010, p68) See also Pham 2005, p94. Lezhnev 2006, p30) Rebels employed terror tactics and Sankoh become the omnipotent patriarch of the
youth who did nothing to check his rebels that he encouraged to help themselves to the ‘sisters’. (Abdullah and Rashid in Adebajo et al 2004, p188. See also Denov ibid, p95) With the support of the ECOMOG, the discredited AFRC military junta was forcefully ousted from power in February 1998 and the exiled but democratically elected President Kabbah was installed. (Akindele 2003)

In Jan 1999 Sam Bokarie, the rebel leader of RUF when Sankoh was detained in Nigeria, gave orders for the slaughter of civilians in ‘operation help yourselves’. As Abrahamsen and Williams later admitted,

“In Sierra Leone, the symbolic power of the public is of crucial relevance in the security field and has interestingly ambiguous effects. On the one hand, the power and authority of private security actors, as well as bargaining power of foreign capital, is in important respects strengthened by the legacy of state weakness and the lack of a public monopoly of violence” (Abrahamsen et al 2010, p. 167)

5:7 Conclusion

The important thing here has been to see how US and Africa emerge in the international system. While Africa is part of the agenda for Western politics of globalism, the United States stands on its own as a superpower in the world. The African continent and the United States are linked intricately by the post-independent politics and the politics of development which still determine the contours of African quotidian life. While the New Regionalism discourses in Africa has recognized the challenges facing African states, there are wider implications of the impact of failure of the African states to regionalize. The United States influence at the global level started after the Second World War. But there had been evidence of US global ambition long before the post-War era. In the Cold War era, the United
States relationship with most African states was defined by the imperatives of the détente, when the two superpowers struggled for power at the international level. African states were not excluded from the superpowers’ ideological war. Many of the states in Africa became victims of the superpower struggle for influence. In particular, the Democratic Republic of Congo crisis in the 1960s offered an insight into the effect of US Africa policy and explained the reason for the subsequent neglect of Africa by the United States after the Cold War. Despite independence and the sovereign status of the state in Africa, nation-building remained a challenge and this resulted in a much more complex attempt to regionalize security and development in Africa. US foreign policy was critiqued for not having sufficient human security agenda, especially with the evidence of such a need in post-independent Africa. Instead, the United States concern was with its national interests with the consequent state failure which is the hallmark of post-Cold War Africa. The Cold War era defined the character of political and economic security patterns of Africa and West Africa. This was the reason for the Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars in the immediate post-Cold War era. The security crisis in West Africa had become so humongous that the regional body, ECOWAS formed the military unit, the ECOMOG. The Liberian and Sierra Leonean wars were ended with the active participation of ECOMOG. However, in spite of the success of ECOMOG, the reality of the security challenges of West Africa required the strategic planning of the US policy makers with regional actors where human security is prioritized as the only enduring regional security strategy for achieving the United States objectives of security in West Africa and global stability in West Africa.
Chapter Six

Regional Governance and ECOWAS Securitizations in West Africa

6:1 Introduction

The securitizing acts of the ECOWAS actors was dependent on whether there was crisis in the region or not. ECOWAS did have the sophisticated instruments of security used in the advanced states to identify a security problem. Although there was early warning signal, still this did not help in anticipating most of the security challenges confronting the region. As Salter (2011) argued, and pointed out in chapter four, different actors securitize differently. ECOWAS no doubt securitized differently from their US partners. This chapter attempts to assess the challenges facing ECOWAS and the modalities adopted in dealing with them. It applied the three Ps of Kingdon, to the theory of securitization by Kaunert et al. (2011) Critical securitization explores the problem of regional security, the policies that were applied to the regional problems and the extent to which those policies confronted the security concerns in West Africa.

6:2 Regional Security Concerns in West Africa

6:2:1 Democratization and the Challenges of Political Progress

Since the end of the Cold War, a number of West African countries have undertaken a series of political reforms, including the sovereign national conferences instituted in at all-party conferences, notably held in Benin, Mali, Niger and Togo. (Akindele 2003, p. 289). The culture of support for dictators was waning. West Africans appeared to have turned the corner with their multifarious problems after the unsavoury military rule of the decades until the end of the 1990s. The Cold War era witnessed the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The relative peace of the era produced a semblance of peace in West
Africa. In the event of any internal conflict, military rule of the Cold War era in West Africa dealt with security threats (Adejumobi et al 2009).

Democratic consolidation laid emphasis on the development and the cultivation of the critical behavioural and attitudinal underpinnings that were necessary foundations for a viable democratic system, that is, “deepening and organizing democracy” (Oche 2003, p. 193). New constitutions were rapidly approved and the processes of electioneering took off. Most West Africans accepted that the newly elected state officials were not the perfect choices of the people, but they were better than having the military dictators run their affairs. Vanhanen (1997) observed that “Democracy in Africa is a tender plant which may prove difficult to maintain in the longer term” (p.129). As Ake (1996, p. 137) argued, “authoritarian state structure remain and accountability to the governed is weak and the rule of law sometimes nominal”. Elections “in most of Africa are like preparations for civil war”. (Guardian Nigeria 2010) Harrison (2002) noted that Africans’ battle for liberation had not yet ended as it became clear that African presidents and their cronies inherited the state mainly for personal interests. He argued that despite the end of colonialism, the citizens were yet to profit from governance in Africa, with the feeling that postcolonial rule had merely perpetuated stagnation and the repression of the people. West African states “continued to pay greater attention to fortifying vertical relations of dependence on, and subordination to their departed colonial master” (Akindele 2003, p. 272). Many African states have been ruled by regimes with very narrow bases of support and, as such, possess little or no legitimacy. (Oche 2003) believed that democratization could either be a “source of threat” (p. 77) or “a source of relative security”. (p. 81) Instead of looking at national security in inclusive terms to cover the security of the nation and its citizens as a whole, it is narrowed down to the interests and the survival of that particular regime. Thus, the protection and self-preservation of the regime are interpreted as core values” (Oche ibid, p. 78)
Englebert et al (2008, p. 253) used the governance data from the US Millennium Challenge Account originally coordinated by Jeremy Weinstein and Milan Vaishnav to conclude in 2006 “that 75 percent of the “worst performers” and 90 percent of states “struggling on many fronts” were Africans”. As Schwab (2004, p. 139) stated, “West Africa seemed to be in a permanent state of either volcanic eruption or desperate economic crises “. Sierra Leone and Liberia were ravaged with many years of civil war such that they required some rebuilding from scratch (Zartman 1997). It is this situation that has warranted the debate about the real causes of conflict in West Africa. Five of the ten lowest ranking countries on the UNDP Human Poverty Index are in West Africa. Health and education indicators are as expected closely correlated with income levels. The incidence of infectious disease is high, especially malaria which is endemic over the region. In the states where political stability is the norm, the economic development of those states remains a contested issue. Since the 1980s, oil boom and oil price collapse have shaped the discourse on democracy and development (Yates 1996). at the base of the struggle for power at all cost is the rentier state characteristic of the African state system (Clarke 2008).

The greed and grievance theory of Collier et al had been the basis of debate about regional security across the African continent and indeed within the West African region. According to Collier et al, “primary commodity dependence increases the risk of conflict”. Dependence on primary commodity is also ”associated with poor governance and increased exposure to economic shocks “. (Collier et al 2002) Hutchful et al (2004) dismissed the claim by Collier et al (op cit 2008) about grievance caused by the lack of economic opportunities in West Africa. First, the authors interest in Collier’s analysis was based on the importance given to the greed and grievance theory “in influential policy circles in which a nuanced understanding of African issues is important to informing policy debates and
decisions. Secondly, and in response to the argument raised by Collier, Hutchful et al argued that Collier’s article for not explaining why and how some counties, using the same criteria avoided crises which consumed the others. The authors insisted that Collier’s work had “methodological flaws” (p. 199) and lack sufficient evidence to substantiate the claims about greed as the cause of conflict in Africa. Such an evidence, the authors argued, could be employed to support predetermined aims or conclusions. (ibid, p. 199) Hutchful et al insisted that “the “reward” for participating in acts of violence cannot be seen narrowly in financial or material terms, but may also be psychic in character”. (Hutchful et al 2004, p. 199) To Zartman (1997, p. 8), “the most striking characteristic of state collapse is that it is not a short term phenomenon, not a crisis with a few early warnings: nor simply a matter of a coup or riot. State collapse is a long term degenerative disease”.

6:2:3 Regional Crises as Causal Factor for Post-Cold War Security Challenges in West Africa

The global powers placed democracy and the rule of law on the region as a condition for aid. The shifting focus of Western powers to the former Eastern bloc exacerbated state crisis in West Africa as funding dried up. The attempted military coup in Côte d’Ivoire of September 2002 which resulted in a full-fledged civil war and de facto partition of the country between government and rebels, shattered illusions about West Africa’s peace (Hutchful 2004) Different ethnic militia and tribal warlords rose up to challenge the legitimacy of states in West Africa. Added to this challenge was the ease with which small arms and light weapons circulated in Africa and in West Africa. Jet fighters, AK47 and other small arms and weapons were supplied into Africa during the era of détente in which the US and USSR were engaged in ideological warfare. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons that became evident in post-Cold War Africa was therefore as a result of decades of procurement. Ero (2004) described the small arms and light weapons as used in fighting the
type of wars that were proliferating across the region. Small arms and light weapons as weapons such as submachine guns, hand held portable antitank guns, portable launchers of anti-aircraft systems. They are small and effective, but they can also be carried by young children. The domestic violent crises in the post-Cold War West Africa were fuelled by weak state, or the collapsing state (Zartman 1997). As Zartman et al argued, threats to social cohesion, economic and domestic political stability threaten the development of states in Africa at all levels including the national as well as at the regional one (Deng and Zartman 1991). The availability of small arms also facilitated the rapid growth of intra-regional violence.

Over the last decade, Africans have been subjected to an extraordinary variety of sources and forms of violence: civil wars, ethnic pogroms, religious conflict, political repression, forced migrations and the upheaval associated with structural adjustment. The end of the Cold War has thus sharply undermined existing security paradigms and practices, intensifying the security dilemma of some African states (Hutchful 2000, p. 216).

Ironically, “the end of the Cold War, in concert with other factors has led in some respects to a renewed saliency of force—driven, however, by domestic contradictions rather than Great power manipulation”. (ibid, p. 217) Hutchful further argued that “as the hegemony of the state crumbled, it has precipitated rivalry among warlords, visionaries, adventurers, ethno-nationalists, and big power interests to manipulate the vacuum, appropriating and shaping new force structures as well as the nature of the developing geopolitical pace”.

According to Obi (2006, see also Davis 2010, p. 37) “West Africa has a substantial Muslim population, as high as 40 per cent in some estimates”. Furthermore, “owing to the linkage being drawn between al-Qaeda and radical/militant forms of political Islam that are clearly anti-American/Western, many strategic thinkers and analysts are of the view that Muslims in West Africa may provide a sanctuary for terrorists” (ibid, p. 37). This accounts for the reason for the growth of Political Islam in West Africa. The “Taliban” in north-east Nigeria, particularly in Borno and Yobe states (ibid, p. 67) had raised concerns about the growing
threats of terrorism in West Africa. Obi distinguished between Islam as a political ideology and as a religious or theoretical construct, using the characterization of Ayoob. The terms “political Islam” and “Islamism” interchangeably by Ayoob who defined Wahhabism as a strain of fundamentalist Islam that derives from the Wahhabi movement of mid-eighteenth century Arabia, founded by the reformist Sunni cleric Mohammed Ibn Abd al-Wahhab. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab demanded rigorous purification on the model of the Rashidun age, the age of the Prophet and his companions, and sought purely Islamic remedies to contemporary problems (Obi 2010, p. 69).

Obi believed that the spread of Islamism could be linked to the desire of the followers of Ibn Abd al-Wahhab “to purge Islam of all modern accretions and return to reliance only on the original texts of the faith, the Qur’an, and the hadith, the collected sayings of the prophet” (ibid, p. 69). These groups exploit the grievances of the poor, unemployed and the youth. In Nigeria, the ‘Taliban’ attacked police stations and government offices. This group also struck during the Miss World beauty pageant in Abuja in 2002 (ibid). However, there are both moderate Muslims and radical fundamentalists in West Africa (Miles 2007). John Brennan, Senior Advisor to the President of the United States noted that when governments provide not the welfare of their citizens, “people become more susceptible to ideologies of violence and death” (Harsch 2009)

these fan the embers and “ethno-religious wars” (Francis ibid, p. 67) and are complex conflict rooted in the political, socioeconomic and historical context of the regional polities (Francis 2006, p. 79)

According to Miles (2007) West Africa epitomised ethnic diversity within Islam. The new threat to security in Nigeria actually started in the 1980s with the emergence of a fringe Islamist group which confounded the Nigerian state even under the military. After the return of Nigeria to civilian administration in 1999, Sharia was introduced to the governance of a state called Zamfara. But the fallout of the launch of Shari’a was felt in other northern states
such as Kaduna, Kano and Borno states where the Shari’s law was rejected and this resulted in the death of thousands across northern Nigeria. The crisis of fundamentalism became a full-blown one in 2009 after the leader of Boko Haram was murdered. This has continued to put Nigeria’s security in jeopardy and the need for convening a national conference returned into the national agenda. The various security challenges have necessitated the creation of a regional body that would be able to respond to all the different security issues confront the West Africans. As Francis (2006, p. 69) suggested, “A distinctive feature of the new wars is not only how they are financed, but also their regionalisation. The contagion effects or the ‘fire next door’ dynamics have led to the spreading of armed conflicts into neighbouring states, warranting regional interventions”.

6:3 ECOWAS Securitization and Strategies for the Maintenance of Regional Security

Ojo et al (1985, p. 181) once observed that ECOWAS was “the bright star of African international relations”. At the end of the 1990s, there was a “greater collaboration among donor countries to find coherent approaches to security and development challenges” in crisis-prone areas (Olonishakin 2009, p. 351). Some of the declarations adopted and combined with mediation missions in West Africa produced the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace Keeping and Security, 1999; and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, 2001. The 2001 ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance bears some affinity with that of the AU Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, 2007 (Akindele 2003, p. 135)

ECOWAS, the regional was concerned with intraregional trade than quelling violent dissents (Olukoshi et al 2009)

The Vision of ECOWAS was to create:

- a sub-region without frontiers, where the people have access to the enormous
resources and enjoy them, by creating opportunities of sustainable production and jobs, in the framework of equitable distribution systems;

- a space within which people ply their business and live in peace in the Rule of Law, good governance and a healthy environment setting;
- a zone that is an integral part of the African continental space (ECOWAS 2008)

The Revised Treaty covered issues such as ‘cooperation in food and agriculture’ (Article 25, p. 16), ‘cooperation in industry, science and technology and energy’ (Article 26-28, pp17-23) ‘cooperation in environment and natural resources’ (Article 29-31, pp21-22), ‘cooperation in trade, customs, taxation, statistics, money and payments’ (Article 35-53, pp25-34), ‘establishment and completion of economic and monetary union’ (Article 54-55, p34), ‘cooperation in political, judicial, and legal affairs regional security and immigration’ (Article 55, pp. 35-36).

After the tragic events of 11 September 2001, many countries felt compelled to adopt stringent anti-terror laws and sign new agreements on military cooperation with the United States and European countries. In line with this objective, the ECOWAS member states worked with the African Union to bring about conditions for economic development and progress in an environment of peace and stability. There are three major arms which pursued the objectives of the regional body. These were

(a) The Committee of Ambassadors of the nine elected Member States of the Council meet each month to review issues of peace and security.
(b) the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Internal Affairs and
(c) The nine-member Heads of State of the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council meets at least twice a year and has the authority to make final decisions on the appropriate measures, policies and mandates to be taken with regard to situations under consideration with a two-thirds majority vote of the Members present.

(ECOWAS Profile)

The Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD) was signed in Freetown, Sierra Leone on 29 May 1981 but it did not become effective until five years later.
ECOWAS member states were committed through PMAD to a collective defence treaty which was to enable them defend members of the Community against acts of aggression. Its power is delegated though Article 7 of the revised ECOWAS Treaty to the Mediation and Security Council. According to Agbu (2005) “this is an innovative approach not very common with other regional bodies”. (p. 71) The Council is composed of Ambassadors, Ministers and Heads of State. The Council takes decisions which affect the peace and security of Member States. The nine elected Member States of the Council meet each month “to review issues of peace and security in the sub-region”. (cited in Agbu 2005, p. 71). The Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs and Security Committee meet “to review the general political and security situations in the sub-region”. (ibid, p. 71) The highest decision making body of nine Heads of State meet “to take final decisions on appropriate measures, policies and mandates to be taken with regard to situations under consideration with two-thirds majority of the votes of members present”. (ibid) Where there is any internal conflict against the member states, the Protocol is used to support the member state through the mutual aid assistance for defence. ECOWAS Heads of State and Government signed the Protocol on the Mechanism for Conflict Management and Resolution, Maintenance of Peace and Security. Its “legitimacy is enshrined in Article 58 of the Revised Treaty on Regional Security”. The “Mechanism” is based on the specific processes of dealing with tension within the region. One of its provisions is the Early Warning System for the daily collection of information within each Member-States. There are Zone Offices where the information is trimmed, scaled down “with appropriate options for a rapid decisions”. (ECOWAS 2007) This decision “may take the form of a specific mandate linked to initiatives of preventive diplomacy, as in the case of Liberia, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire, the good offices, mediation by the Heads of State themselves, their emissaries, special envoys or the services of the members of the Council of Wise Men” (ibid). Other issues which the Protocol mandated
ECOWAS to tackle are cooperation between public security services, trans-border cooperation, the fight against fraud, money laundering, proliferation of small arms, and anti-personnel mines. There is also the mandate for fact-finding missions on elections and the creation of Human Rights Institutions in West Africa. The main concern was to “strengthen the capacities of the institutions, Governments, associations for an enhanced preservation of the rights of citizens” (United Nations 2007). The Supplementary Protocol was developed in 2001 “as an expression of a new, collective political resolve of ECOWAS Member States to take the process of preventing and resolving crises and violent conflicts forward, and to achieve peace and security through the development of democracy and good governance” (Diallo 2005)

As Meyer (2009) argued, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution Peace-keeping and Security was an attempt “to put future ECOWAS interventions on better ground” (Meyer) The Protocol marked an important stage in the sub-region’s political development, which was characterised for long periods by “the armed forces’ deep involvement in political decision-making”. As of 2001, it provided an emphatic statement of the “incompatibility of democracy and good governance with military-run government and the military’s involvement in politics”. (Diallo 2005) In the same vein there were calls for a two-fold approach in tackling the regional crises through the management and resolution of conflicts and facing the challenge of democratization and good governance (ibid).

6:4 ECOWAS and Regional Economic Integration in the Post-9/11 Era

The first aspect of ECOWAS policy process in the post-9/11 era was concerned with how ECOWAS Member States responded to threats of the global economic collapse. This was the pervasive economic dilemma at the global level, particularly from 2008. The Chairman of ECOWAS argued in favour of regional economic integration as a bulwark
against external threats. Gbeho, the then ECOWAS chairman advocated for “the creation of an enabling environment for peaceful economic activity and inward investments”. (Gbeho 2011b) Thus, The persistence of the adverse effects of the crisis, the natural catastrophes and the challenges facing regional peace and security, made it “imperative to deepen regional integration as a response to the global crisis”. (ECOWAS 2009, p. 11) The 2009 work programme of the Commission was articulated around five priority areas, namely

- Completion of work on the creation of customs union:
- Negotiations on the economic partnership agreement (EPA):
- Regional infrastructure:
- Agricultural and Environmental policies
- Peace and security

West African economy experienced an increase in GDP from $215.6 billion in 2006 to $261.7 billion in 2007. Economic growth in West Africa increased from 3.6% in 2002 to 5.6% in 2007 (ibid) ECOWAS launched the policy of monetary integration code-named West African monetary Zone (WAMZ) to be coordinated by IGOs such as WAMI and WAMA. The aim of WAMZ was to assist in the creation of a second currency in the West African region. However, the vision or goal ECOWAS monetary integration policy was not to find a replacement for the CFA franc, but to complement it.

ECOWAS report indicated that GDP growth in 2008 in West Africa “was strong in most countries due to accelerated recovery in Liberia (8.1 percent), increased oil production and prices and growth in non-oil sectors in Nigeria (5.1 percent each)” . The report further put the reasons for growth in 2008 to “high FDI inflows and remittances in Cape Verde (2.9 percent), and expansion in mining activity in Sierra Leone (5.6 percent), Ghana (7.0 percent) and Burkina Faso (2.5 percent). Growth in construction and tourism together underpinned high growth in the Gambia (3.4 percent). Growth also remained high in Benin (3.4 percent)”. (ECOWAS 2009) This was an indication that the global economic recession of the same year did not affect West Africa (Gbeho 2011)
Also, as a percentage of the world economic output between 2006 and 2009, “West Africa’s share was 5.1 percent, 5.6 percent, 5.1 percent and 4.7 percent respectively”. (ECOWAS 2008) The implication was that West Africa surpassed the advanced economies with their growth statistics averaging 2.7 percentage within the same period, that is 2006-2009.

Table 1—World Economic Output Annual Variation (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Output</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advanced economies</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source World Bank (cited in ECOWAS 2009)

The table above shows that the growth rate in ECOWAS Member States was stable between 2006 and 2009 when the advanced economies witnessed their GDPs stagnate. The reason for ECOWAS’ relative economic stability was given as strong fiscal discipline across the sub-regional economies.

There was continued improvement in the economic performance of the Wet African region. In spite of the high oil and food prices, regional economic growth rate remained above 5% in 2008. The 2009 projection showed a slight decline to 4.7%. (p. 22) ECOWAS Member States maintained internal and external balance in their fiscal and monetary policies, while the organization also consciously recognized the other challenges constraining ECOWAS economic policies, two of which were “the inflation rate and fiscal deficit/GDP ratio criteria”. (ECOWAS 2008, p. 23)

Consequently, the thirty-sixth ordinary session of the Authority of ECOWAS Heads of States and Government “reaffirmed the commitment of Member States to the deepening of the regional integration process by means of accelerated reform measures…in favour of
economic and social in West Africa”. (ECOWAS 2009, p. 10) In 2008, real GDP for the ECOWAS region was $136 billion. That year, ECOWAS projected that the growth rate in the region was potentially higher than the economic growth rate at the global level. (ECOWAS 2009, p. 16) The ECOWAS Commission chairman reported that the region “achieved an estimated growth rate of 6.2 percent, even though this figure masks significant disparities between the States and remains below the minimum 7 percent economic growth rate required for the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)”

The efforts by the ECOWAS to promote regional integration showed in the collaboration between the Central Bank of Nigeria with UEMOA and the BCEAO in institutionalizing policies such as Common External Tariffs (CET) for the harmonization of trade and development. ECOWAS Commission Reports (2008) was projected towards 2020, and stated that

Our Vision 2020 is that of moving from an ECOWAS of States to an ECOWAS of people through the creation of a single economic space in which the people transact business and live in dignity and peace under the rule of law and good governance (ECOWAS Commission Annual Report 2008)

Nigeria used the ECOWAS platform to encourage regional economic unity. The Nigerian Central Bank Governor, Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, offered a panacea which denounced “national approaches to trade reforms”, and the “unhealthy competition between member states, maintenance of multiple regulatory and administrative bottlenecks” as hindrances to economic and trade integration of West Africa. The Nigerian actors believed that development in the region would not occur by chance. Through ECOWAS, Nigeria wanted West Africa to develop into “a major player in global food and agriculture markets” (Guardian Lagos 2010). Ashante (2007, p. 71) argued that “ECOWAS integration could be derived from the projected West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) with a central bank and common currency”. The region, he believed, would benefit from stable exchange rate,
common currency, and goods and services acceptable within the proposed West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) (Ashante 2007 ibid, p. 71). Also activities aimed at regional integration through seminars, workshops across Member States formed part of the agenda of ECOWAS for promoting development across West Africa. Such meetings were organised to facilitate the harmonization of standards for poultry, hotel accommodation and catering establishment, democratic policing and West African finance system (Ninsin 2009) The protocol on visa free travel for ECOWAS citizens one of became the visible symbol of the existence of ECOWAS amongst community citizens. Under this agreement, community citizens can reside in any ECOWAS state for up to 90 days without entry permit of visa requirements have been abolished in all member states. (Kabia 2009, p. 64)

Achievements in this regard also include the finalization in 2010 of a logical framework and a regional agriculture investment plan amounting to US$900 million for the implementation of ECOWAP for the 2011-2015 period; and commitment by the ECOWAS. Commission to contribute US$150 million over a five-year period towards the implementation of the regional agricultural investment plan. (Gbeho 2011b).

The region recorded a GDP growth rate of 6.1% in 2006, an increase over the 5.5% for the preceding year. They observed that the high prices of petroleum products continue to threaten the economies of the region and called for a study of the international oil market with a view to making proposals on how to mitigate the adverse effects. (ECOWAS Press Release 15/06/2007) in terms of attempting to improve the performance of the energy sector among the member states, a protocol on energy (Energy Protocol 2003) was implemented to establish “a legal framework in order to promote long-term co-operation in the energy field, based on complementarities and mutual benefits, with a view to achieving increased investment in the energy sector, and increased energy trade in the West African region”. (p. 9) For energy efficiency (a) Contracting Parties shall co-operate and as appropriate assist
each other in developing and implementing energy efficiency policies, laws and regulations.

(c) Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve full benefit of energy efficiency throughout the Energy Cycle. To this end they shall, to the best of their competence, formulate and implement energy efficiency policies and cooperative or coordinated action based on Cost-Effectiveness, economic efficiency, taking the due account of environmental aspects.

(Energy Protocol 2003, p. 49)

6:5 ECOWAS Political Policy and the Pathways to Regional Security

In Article 45, Chapter 11 of the protocol on good governance, Member States agreed that if sanction was imposed on any Member State, “during the period of the suspension ECOWAS shall continue to monitor, encourage and support the efforts being made by the suspended Member State to return to normalcy and constitutional order.” ECOWAS (2008) made it clear in its “constitutional convergence principles” that free and fair transparent elections are “the only legitimate means of accession to political power.” Other principles enshrined in the ECOWAS handbook are

- Zero tolerance of power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means
- Strict adherence to democratic principles
- Respect for human dignity and fundamental rights
- No discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion, or region
- Popular participation in decision making
- Politically neutral armed forces (including the police) that operate under the command of a legally constituted political authority

The Heads of State and Government noted that “elections were becoming the norm in Member States and directed that ECOWAS continue to promote the sharing of experiences in the reform of the electoral systems and processes and the promotion of electoral good
practices in the region” (ECOWAS Press Release 15/07/2014). The Chairman of ECOWAS linked peace and security in West Africa to the promotion of democratic governance, as he claimed; “ECOWAS has been scaling up its normative instruments and institutional arrangements to anticipate and confront challenges to peace and security in the region” (2011a) Gbeho believed that ECOWAS made a remarkable progress in the area of good governance. As he argued, through the “adoption and effective application of the ECOWAS Mechanism (1999) and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001), ECOWAS has been able to progressively and incrementally pacify the region and promote democratic governance”.

According to Chairman Gbeho (2011b), “The adherence to the constitutional convergence principles of ECOWAS with respect to democracy and good governance yielded relatively peaceful, transparent and credible outcomes in the conduct of the recent presidential elections in Guinea, Niger, Benin, and Nigeria.” The organization set up a machinery such as the ECOWAS election observers. It is also able to achieve success in some states, e.g., Ghana (2008), Liberia (2007) and Senegal (2000). Also during the period, there were a number political crises in some states, such as …some as a result of electoral failure, and others due to the rejection of leaders.

6:5:1 ECOWAS and the Crises of Democratization in West Africa

The protocol on democracy and good governance, article 2, section 2 states that all the elections shall be organised on the dates or at periods fixed by the constitution or the electoral laws. Also article 6 section 2 states that the preparation and conduct of elections and announcement of results shall be done in a transparent manner. Article 9 states “the party and/or candidate who loses the election shall concede defeat to the political party or candidate finally declared the winner following the guidelines and within the deadline stipulated by the
law”. Article 10 “all holders of power at all levels shall refrain from acts of intimidation or harassment against defeated candidates or their supporters.

Government forces in Guinea were alleged to have “committed crimes against humanity on September 09, 2009” by interrupting a “peaceful political protest in a stadium in Conakry and opened fire on civilians”. To deal with the crisis, ECOWAS embarked on a rapid regional response by placing arms embargo on Guinea on 17 October 2009, and the AU implemented travel bans and asset freezes on junta members on 29 October. The crisis in Guinea attracted international condemnations, one of which was the insistence by the Amnesty International that the Guinean authorities must stop extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and torture. This was due to the fact that the Guinean post-election crackdown resulted in several deaths and more than 50 people arbitrarily detained. (Crisis in Guinea 2010) In Guinea Bissau, series of political crises since the 1999 general elections culminated in the assassination of president Vieira in 2009. (Guinea Bissau: Timeline 2010)

The political and military tensions in Guinea Bissau gave the ECOWAS the opportunity to put to test, its Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution of conflict for peace and security, of 1999 completed and amended by the Protocol of December 2001. (Yabi 2010) However, countries with relatively advanced democratic consolidation such as Cape Verde, Ghana, Benin, Senegal lacked the viability of the stronger states such as Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire which both exert tremendous influence on ECOWAS. Whenever there is instability in these two states, regional security is threatened. (Yabi 2010) The two Guineas, that is the Guinea Republic and Guinea Bissau had their share of the problem, as Burkina Faso and Niger had to confront dissenting groups at different levels. Guinea Bissau attracted the attention of the international community for becoming the transit point for narcotics in West Africa. (Guardian UK March 2008) O’Regan (New York Times, March 2012) argued that since 2007 Guinea Bissau had plunged “more than any other country” on the “Failed
States Index”. In Nigeria, Human Rights Watch reported cases of post-election violence in 2003 and 2007. It established a direct link between violence and election fraud in the 2003 general elections. The Human Rights Watch described the 2003 Nigerian general elections as an unfortunate scenario in which

The largest number of deaths during the elections occurred when opposing bands of political thugs, in some cases armed on both sides, fought each other for physical control of a locality, attempting to displace supporters of the opposing party. (Human Rights Watch 2004)

The subsequent 2007 and 2011 elections had the same patterns of electoral fraud and violence that marred the 2003 elections. (Human Rights Watch 2011) Also, since 2009, the Boko Haram insurgents had been a thorn in the flesh of Nigerian security agencies. This had great implications for President Jonathan ECOWAS role, especially as he was the incumbent Chairman of ECOWAS during the Ivorian crisis. Despite these challenges in the domestic politics of the member states of ECOWAS, the region was in dire need of ECOWAS intervention in the maintenance of regional stability in West Africa. The escalation of the Ivorian crisis failed to produce the consensus required by ECOWAS to move the Cote d’Ivoire forward and prevent the subsequent massacres of the post-election period of 2010/2011 (Guardian UK, 02-2011).

The Revised Treaty specified the different levels of relationships between ECOWAS and other actors in the international system. This is important for indicating the position of ECOWAS in international affairs. That is, “relations between the Community and the African Economic Community” (Article 78, p44), “relations between the Community and other Economic Communities”(Article 79, p44), “relations between the Community and Third Countries and international organizations” (Article 80-82, p45) and of “relations between Member States, non-Member States, regional organizations and international organizations” (Article 84-85, p. 47).
Since the death of President Felix Houphouet-Boigny in Cote D’Ivoire had plunged into constitutional crisis into another until the escalation of the crisis in 2010/11. President Gbagbo assumed office in the midst of the Ivorian crisis which had claimed several high profile personnel, including the assassination of General Robert Guei in 2000. Gbagbo accused Burkina Faso and Liberia of fomenting a rebellion which culminated in a coup aimed at overthrowing President Gbagbo. Liberian and Sierra-Leonian fighters were reported to be fighting on the side of both the government and the rebels in the Ivorian conflict. There was a spill over of over 125,000 Ivorian refugees into Liberia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Burkina Faso. By early 2003, 1,288 troupe from Senegal, Ghana, Niger, Togo and Benin known as the ECOWAS Peace Force for Cote D’Ivoire (ECOFORCE) had been deployed. (Adebajo 2004). The United States intervention in the earlier Ivorian crisis was informed by its commitment in Iraq the previous year, that is 2003. ECOWAS intervened in the crisis by encouraging Mr Laurent Gbagbo to quit office for Alassane Ouattara, the man presumed by the international community to have won the 2010 elections. Despite intervention from the AU and the warning of military force by ECOWAS to effect the removal of Laurent Gbagbo, he refused to quit.

Laurent Gbagbo “claimed the presidency after the Constitutional Council overturned Mr Ouattara's victory”(BBC 2011) Gbagbo sued ECOWAS at the regional court of justice.(Jeune Afrique 2011) and declared as illegal the legitimization of Ouattara by ECOWAS Heads of State as the president-elect. Gbagbo argued that this was as a “clear violation of the ECOWAS treaty which respects sovereignty of ECOWAS Member states”. (CEDEAO 2011) Gbagbo had his camp made up of armed forces and militia, including gangs from Liberia in combat readiness(Le Monde 2010) The Ivorian president also made
efforts to retain the control of the country’s finances, despite the embargo placed on his ability to do so as an outgoing president, by the francophone regional bank, BCEAO. (Acule Financierement 2011). Not all the regional leaders agreed with the position of ECOWAS. In the past Compaoré had previously been a staunch supporter of Ouattara. He was accused of being a key mover behind the initial insurgency in Ivory Coast in September 2002. Senegal’s Abdoulaye Wade was also widely viewed as partisan. Wade hosted Ouattara between the two rounds of voting in 2010 and he was fiercely criticised for it by Gbagbo, the then incumbent president. (GuardianUK 11/01/2011) The late President Atta Mills supported Laurent Gbagbo and was opposed to his forceful removal (BBC 07/01/2011) The Ouattara camp was concerned about the role of Pires, of Cape Verde who was accused by sections of the Ivorian press that he diluted the message of Goodluck Jonathan of Nigeria, taking a softer approach than his peers over the continuous stay of Gbagbo in power. (Guardian UK 11/01/2011)

President Goodluck Jonathan, the then ECOWAS chairman had said, "starting today, we suspend Côte d'Ivoire from all our activities.” The chairman of the AU, the head of state of Malawi Bingu wa Mutharika also said that “Alassane Ouattara “is the winner the election. Gbagbo should respect the will of the people expressed through the ballot box and therefore must withdraw to avoid another bloodbath in Africa."(Jeune Afrique 08/10/2010)

The lack of cooperation by the regional actors affected an early resolution of the crisis. As General Petirin stated

Even if ECOWAS leaders have the political will to push for intervention, there are numerous challenges to address. In principle, ECOWAS has a 6,500-standby force to draw on. “Most countries in ECOWAS have already contributed troops to this force”. (IRIN 2011)
ECOWAS had limited logistics and funding to successfully intervene in the crisis of the proportion presented in Cote d’Ivoire. Thus, ECOWAS reliance on external assistance was perceived to be a surrendering of its independence and lack of ECOWAS concerns for the member-states interests and concerns (ibid) Gbagbo was nicknamed “the baker” for his shrewdness in the game of politics. He sought to free Cote d’Ivoire from its economic independence on France. (Le Monde 03/12/2010 Côte d’Ivoire : les ingrédients de la crise) A security analysts argued that “France wants a poodle that will ensure that they get contracts where they will not be subjected to the rules of contracting which are things that Gbagbo changed”. He also argued that France’s strategy was predicated on making the Ivorian market a market for cheap products as well as ensuring that the Chinese threat as a major investor in the Ivorian economy was halted. The intervention of the UN and France underscored the limitation of ECOWAS to decisively deal with major issues in the region. Susan Rice, US ambassador to the UN, also holding the presidency of the Security Council for the month of December, 2010 and Choi Young-jin, the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN in Côte d’Ivoire recognized the victory of Alassane Ouattara (54.1%) against the incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo (45.9%).

6:6 Conclusion

The international dimension to the security crisis in the Cote d’Ivoire. Not only were both Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo contending for the same office, the fact that they took opposing camps exposed the weakness of the constitutional system in Cote d’Ivoire. The split within ECOWAS on the modality for resolving the crisis also placed ECOWAS in the limelight as an organization that was not respected by the members. The lack of francophone and Anglophone cooperation was partly responsible for the prolonged crisis, not only in Cote d’Ivoire but also in the other states, such as Guinea Bissau where the breakdown of law and
order was a commonplace. However, ECOWAS regional policies differ in the political, economic and security sectors with respect to how and why the regional actors securitized. As already shown and with subsequent chapters explaining in details, ECOWAS leaders relied on the documents of the organization produced through adherence to the provisions of the ECOWAS Treaty. The aim of ECOWAS remained the same with that of the United States, which was to maintain stability and security. Cooperating on that basis was therefore part of the discourses of securitization both in the US policy environment and within the ECOWAS policy making institution.
Chapter Seven

US Foreign Policy and the Dynamics of Political and Economic Securitization in West Africa

7:1 Introduction

This chapter is the main policy analysis of US securitization in West Africa. It tests the first three hypothesis in chapter four by examining how and why terrorism became securitized in US foreign policy after the 9/11 attacks. This includes the Bush administration's response to September 11th and the speech acts and interaction between the president, the congress and the American public. It explores the contours of US West Africa relations, both at the bilateral level of the states and at the level of ECOWAS. The president and the core executive engage in the process of selecting policies which are then debated on the floor of the congress before approval. The policy areas examined include US Policy on overseas development, ie, aid and economic assistance, trade, and military assistance. Binding all these policies together is the policy of democracy promotion primarily aimed at ensuring that states complied with the criteria of democratic principles for enjoying US attention. Politics the acceptance of the policy is based on a coalition both within the US policy community and across West Africa. The concern of the US policy makers on the Liberian crisis has been examined to reflect the process of US pragmatic approach to confronting threats to security. The fact that Nigeria was considered to be an important partner in maintaining security in West Africa is discussed against the backdrop of the implication of regional crisis which might result from Nigeria’s political instability.

7:2 US Foreign Policy Decision Making Process on the War on Terror
Reflections on the terrorist attacks of September 2001 was a national security affair in the United States. This was demonstrated through surveys which showed that Americans fear of terror from actors beyond the borders of the United States ranked at the top of security concerns. The four major American networks (ABC, CBS, NBC and FOX) spent up to five days after the fall of the Twin Towers in total devotion to terror related programmes (Walker 2012). To Lyon, “the domestic and international political forces that influence U.S.-led humanitarian interventions evolve in response to changing events and adjust to broad evolutionary dynamics. As Lyon (2007) argued, strategic interests, public opinion, and media coverage of humanitarian crisis, such as the attacks on the United States helped determine the degree of US intervention. This could be asserted in explaining US-Africa policy in the post-9/11 era. It was therefore not surprising that President George Bush made his 2002 National Security Speech reflect the change that Americans expected from his administration with respect to combating terrorism. Consequently, the War on Terror became the cardinal policy of the Bush administration after the 9/11 attacks.

Hook (2009) contended that:

Agency design in foreign policy with its global orientation to interest groups than domestic policy is more likely to be driven by the president than congress. As the caretaker of national rather than parochial concerns, and compelled by reformulated principled and causal beliefs regarding development aid, the white house was in a politically advantageous position to set the agenda on this issue and to take the initiative in carrying out the program change.

The first the public at large hears of a policy decision is normally when the president announces it. Then he speaks with decision and authority, and his presentation is so well organized that his policies appear to flow from a systematic, balanced and orderly consideration of the public interest—and only that. (Sundquist 1981, p428) The fact remains that the executive branch does have the capability of being more decisive than the legislative branch when it has to be, and of bringing its policies into a more consistent whole, simply
because it is a hierarchy. (ibid) despite this, Charles-Phillipe argued that “American foreign policy seems to be riddled with contradictions, constantly swinging back and forth between the ‘imperial temptation’ and the ‘refusal of empire’.”(2006, p. 219)

In his Monterrey speech in 2002, President Bush linked the prosperity and freedom of the “rest of the world” to America’s security. He stated in his remark

A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty. (NSS 2002, p. 17)

Although the president believed that governments should be responsible for running their affairs without the intervention, Bush promised that the United States would “offer more opportunity to the poorest continent, Africa” (ibid). he outlined these in several areas of economic assistance, including working with the IMF to “help merging markets”, through which the US “will continue to work with the IMF to streamline the policy conditions for its lending and to focus its lending strategy on achieving economic growth through sound fiscal and developing countries in all regions of the world”.(ibid) This chapter considers the US policy in the non-military area of securitization in West Africa. The region’s economic condition had always been expressed in the challenges of poverty which placed West Africa among the poorest regions in the world. In terms of the GNP of states in West Africa, in line with the percentage of the poor, this is abysmally low. It was not surprising that the United States during the Bush administration was inclined to addressing the regional economic challenge as a security issue. The Monterrey speech was clear about the intention of the United States plan for economic engagement with the rest of the world.
According to Wittkopf and Kegley (2003, p. xxxi) “the US emerged by the end of the twentieth century as the world’s unchallenged preeminent power—a hegemon…a substantially expanded foreign policy bureaucracy designed to pursue America’s new role”. Bill Clinton, the former US President claimed that “the Constitution of the United States created a system of government in which the highest trust is placed not in the hands of top officials, who are hemmed in by an ingenious system of checks and balances, but in the people as a whole”. (Albright 2006, p. x) In the foreign policy process, decision makers operate within a decision system that has its own dynamics. Decisions are made by individuals, each with a distinctive personality (Wittkopf 2003, p. 531). As Wittkopf et al stated, “We have classified George Bush as active-positive president” (Wittkopf ibid, p. 531). Circumstances often dictate priorities and the roles needed to address them. Thus Bush found himself “pursuing to fight to save the civilized world and values common to the West and Asia [and] to Islam” (ibid, p. 533). Quinn argued that the Bush administration strategy was like those of its internationalist forerunners which was “idealistic and optimistic” (Quinn 2009 p. 175).

President Bush made it clear in his 2006 national security address that the United States was a force for good in the world. According to him,

it is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world. The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system (Armitage 2002)

The President considered the role of the United States as one in which conflicts at any region in the world would hurt the national security interest of the United States. He believed that if
the United States got involved in ending conflicts globally, the ordinary Americans would be safe. The United States, President Bush believed, must:

- Champion aspirations for human dignity;
- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;
- Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;
- Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;
- Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centres of global power;
- Transform America’s national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the 21st century; and
- Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of globalization. (Bush 2002)

The broad priorities and main themes of U.S. Africa policy were to:

- support the spread of political freedom and strengthen democracies
- reinforce African initiatives to end conflict and fight terror
- address the unique challenges of HIV/AIDS, TB, and Malaria
- expand economic opportunity and growth (Bush 2002)

Lyon (2007) contended states may intervene to bolster a state or assist an ally, block a regional hegemon or counterbalance an internal power situation when another outside power has intervened. Some cases may revolve around efforts to prevent violence from escalation and spillover whereas others may revolve around economic factors, such as protecting financial interests, promoting market stability and safeguarding industries and commodities

7:4 The Composition and the Role of the State Department Bureaucracy in West Africa

During the eight year tenure of President George W. Bush, “US policy towards Africa underwent a dramatic transformation characterized by an expansion of U.S. interests, a high-
level diplomatic push on Sudan, unprecedented resource flows, and the establishment of several historic initiatives” (Cooke et al 2009, p.1). These changes came about “in an era in which security, energy and health emerged as new, near-strategic US interests in Africa and in which US Africa policy ascended to a position far closer to mainstream foreign policy than ever before” (ibid, p. 1).

The authors argued that

Paradoxically, the Bush era revealed that in a period of significantly enlarged US engagement in Africa, US influence actually declined. This situation came about because US policy contains significant weaknesses because Africa has become a far more intensely competitive political and economic marketplace and because a number of African states have embraced a problematic and defiant mode of malgovernance and found other external partners to support them. US sway on the continent has become objectively less than it was in the Cold War era. (ibid, p. 1)

The nominal chief of foreign policy operations in most states is the foreign minister. This was the Secretary of State. However, the President sometimes takes a special interest in the foreign affairs of the state. (Hill 2006) This was evident under the Bush administration especially after the 9/11 attacks. However, the Department of State has the lead in the conduct of US foreign relations and the National Security Council is charged with diplomatic responsibility. As Campbell argued,

Often personality differences combined with mutual suspicion between career professionals and political appointees were more important than disagreement over policy. Other agencies include FBI, agriculture, commerce, health and human services, justice, drug enforcement, administration and USAID(Campbell 2011, p. 79)

Campbell had been an Ambassador in Africa for several years and he wrote about the manner in which US foreign policy bureaucracy was set up to administer West Africa. He asserted the strategic importance of Nigeria to the United States and listed the names of US senators and congressmen who had special interest on Nigeria and by extension on West Africa. One of such senators was Ross Feingold (Democrat of Wisconsin) responsible for African affairs.
He “had a wide range of experience on Nigeria and other African states”. (Campbell ibid, p. 120). He and his staff “followed Nigerian and African development closely” and the senator regularly spoke out on humanitarian issues and in support of democracy and the rule of law in Nigeria (ibid, p. 120). Also, Congressman David Payne (Democrat New Jersey) was of the US House subcommittee on foreign affairs and global health. Congressman Ed Royce (Republican of California) Payne’s predecessor was chair of the subcommittee on Africa. Working on Africa was part of Senator James Heinhoff’s oversight responsibility in the house (ibid, p120).

The Defense Department is one of the national security bureaucracies which recognize the importance of Africa. Its Office of International Security Affairs (ISA) has a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence heading the Office of African Affairs (1994). The Departments of Commerce and Treasury, with their emphasis on strengthening and expanding the US economy, seek inroads for trade and investment in the continent (ibid). Schraeder argued that involvement in policymaking related to Africa “has been sporadic, most notably during times of crisis and extended humanitarian crisis” (Schraeder Nordic Journal of African Studies 10(2) pp131-147 2001) One important result of what can be referred to as bureaucratic dominance of the policymaking process is “the tendency toward promotion of the status quo in favour of existing policies, even after a new administration takes office”(ibid) Members of the Clinton administration’s foreign policy team prided themselves on their ad hoc approach to foreign policy problems. The Bush administration “had ambitious policy goals, but failed to develop the plans and policies necessary to achieve them” (Drezner 2009, p. 4)

The United States has the most developed system of legislative participation in foreign affairs. Hill identifies seven main expectations of foreign policy as,
- Protecting citizens abroad
- Projecting identity abroad
- Homeostasis, or the maintenance of territorial integrity and social peace against external threats
- Advancing prosperity
- Making decisions on interventions abroad
- Negotiating a stable international order
- Protecting global commons (Hill 2006, pp. 44-45)

7:5 Discursive Shifts in the Bush and Obama Foreign Policies and West African Security

The individual policies of the two presidents towards West Africa portrayed them as combative and rhetorical. In reality, there was not much difference in Bush and Obama approaches to the region. While President Bush was compelled to engage West Africa after the terrorist attacks, President Obama continued where his predecessor had stopped, without adding anything new.

Under President George W. Bush U.S. foreign policy promoted a democracy agenda championed free markets, and risked if not relished unilateralism. When he came to office President George W. Bush had little knowledge or experience of foreign policy. Under Bush, there was a clear leaning towards unilateralism and selective engagement with international issues. (McKeever and Davies 2005). Thus, George W. Bush trumpeted democracy, military force, markets, and assertive U.S. leadership. On the other hand, President Obama took on problems as he inherited them. Obama saw the world as a complex system in which everything was interconnected. Obama believed that problems had to be addressed comprehensively, or, like squeezing a balloon, progress in one area will only distort progress in others. He thought and acted systematically, puzzling about how things fit together. His style was oriented toward “fixing” the world, rather than “shaping” it. (Smith 2011). Obama avoided topics that he believed divided nations — democracy, defense, markets, and
unilateral leadership — and toward topics that he believes integrate them — stability, disarmament, regulations, and diplomacy. He had been called a president for the post-American world, but “he may actually be a president for the post-sovereign world” (Nau 2010). As Nau further argued,

Obama has a coherent world view that highlights ‘shared’ interests defined by interconnected material problems such as climate, energy, and non-proliferation and deemphasizes ‘sovereign’ interests that separate countries along political and moral lines. He tacks away from topics that he believes divide nations—democracy, defense, markets, and unilateral leadership—and toward topics that he believes integrate them—stability, disarmament, regulation, and diplomacy (Nau 2010, ibid)

Obama’s policy pragmatism responded to a worldview of shared community interests that transcend sovereign national interests. According to Nau, the four areas in which American foreign policy swings, and at where Obama applied his strategy were, ‘Security not democracy’, ‘Force and diplomacy’, ‘Markets and regulation’, ‘Unilateralism and multilateralism’ (Nau 2010, ibid)

During his 2001 security address, President Bush said

The United States will stand beside any nation determined to build a better future by seeking the rewards of liberty for its people. Free trade and free markets have proven their ability to lift whole societies out of poverty—so the United States will work with individual nations, entire regions, and the entire global trading community to build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity. The United States will deliver greater development assistance through the New Millennium Challenge Account to nations that govern justly, invest in their people, and encourage economic freedom. We will also continue to lead the world in efforts to reduce the terrible toll of HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases. President George Bush (Bush 2001)

Mculley quoted Barack Obama as using a rather more persuasive approach to underscore the importance of promoting democracy as one of the first principles in US engagement abroad.

We do not seek primacy for a specific democratic construct -- democracy is as diverse as the global community -- but we are convinced that advancing democracy has demonstrable dividends. And strong democracies are more likely to secure peace,
deter aggression, expand markets, promote development, combat terrorism and crime, uphold human rights and the rights of workers, avoid humanitarian crises, protect and improve the global environment, and protect human health. (McCulley 2011)

The care with which Obama used language represented a change from the approach of the Bush administration. The Bush administration used more combative language and resorted to the use of “language almost in an aggressive sense” (Reuters 2009) The Bush administration’s “war on terror” discourse and the aggressive lexicon that it deployed were seen as offensive not just in a military sense, but also culturally and politically. Shortly after he assumed office, Obama dropped the “war on terror” based on the belief that it was associated with “spurious justification on a range of human rights and humanitarian law violations, such as arrests, indefinite detentions and enhanced interrogation techniques”. (Smith 2011, p. 196) The difference between Bush and Obama policies has not been at the level of policy or practice but, instead, at the level of packaging argumentation, symbol and rhetoric. (ibid) The American foreign policy penchant for mobilizing against the ‘evil’ states and form an alliance with the ‘good’ ones’ motivated the Bush administration in the global war on terror. As Jhazbhay argued,

This is in line with broader US geo-strategic and geo-economic objectives. The overall impact has been to inject a sectarian dimension into the regional dynamics of political Islam at the expense of finding common ground with governments in combating the specifically jihadist tendencies seeking to exploit Islam (Jhazbhay 2010, p. 69)

In the post 9/11 public consciousness Cheney’s views had indeed come to symbolize what was most contentious about the Bush administration’s policies. Cheney was referred to as the Darth Vader of the Bush administration due to his ruthless counterterrorism approach. He defended himself by arguing that “to go after and capture or kill those people who are trying to kill Americans.” Cheney believed that was not a pleasant business. “It’s a very serious business. And I suppose, sometimes, people look at my demeanour and say, ‘Well he’s the Darth Vader of the administration’ ”(Smith 2011, p. 193). Others believed that
President Obama was not radically different from the Bush administration, except in rhetoric. Cheney argued that Obama later distanced himself from a range of policies of the Bush administration which he had supported as an Illinois senator. Byman and Waxman (2002) argued that US foreign policy of the Bush era had coercive force as its critical element. One of the common appendages of the Bush administration was the recognition of some members of the defence policy groups as neo-cons (coined from neo-conservatism). It was 9/11 that turned a neoconservative agenda into the foreign policy of the United States. According to McKeever et al (2005) argued that The post-Cold War international system opened the United States to more influence as a superpower with a prime position to impose its will on others. The September 11 attacks intensified the need for the US to be more global oriented and this shaped the Bush administration attitude to policy making in that regard.

The neoconservatives of the Bush administration recognized the importance of moral clarity in world politics, the idea of the United States as a benevolent hegemon, and the military reputation and might of America. But the neoconservative ideals were poorly executed, resulting in the sacking of some of its prominent ideologues, such as Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld from the Defense Department. The realpolitik, less values-based and less ideological approach to American foreign policy symbolized the style of the Bush administration second term. In the words of Foong Khong

The administration’s willingness to strike a deal with North Korea, the restarting of the Middle East Process, and Condoleezza Rice’s frequent visits to Europe to repair ties with old allies are all signs of movement away from the moralistic, big-stick, unilateralist approach favoured by the neoconservatives. It seems increasingly clear that realpolitik, the approach that guided Bush’s father, George H. W., has replaced neo-conservatism as the main guidepost to American policy (Foong Khong 2008, p. 265)

While the Bush and Obama administrations may differ, mostly on rhetoric and style, this is less the case on substantive policy issues and actual counterterrorism practices.
Wittkopf et al (2003, p. 533) believe that the foreign policy situations often dictate the preferences of the US presidents. George Bush’s interest in West Africa was dictated by the terrorist acts of 2001. This event combined with George Bush predecessor’s policies in West Africa forced him in the direction of West Africa. Former President George Bush in his memoir (Bush 2010) gave an indication of the motive behind his West African region, and indeed in Africa generally. Bush used the memoir to restate his commitment to using the generosity of the Americans to relieve the world of despair. He admitted that US foreign policy programmes in Africa had a “lousy record”. Bush wrote further:

Most were designed during the Cold War to support anti-communist governments. While our aid helped keep friendly regimes in power, it didn’t do much to improve the lives of ordinary people (this is interesting because the neglect of the people America claimed to be helping by their leaders is the reason for their poverty in the first place, and not the lack of resources that American leaders are claiming to be providing for them). In 2001 Africa received $14billion in foreign aid, more than any other continent (Bush 2010, p. 335)

Rumsfeld (2011) was one of the anti-terror officials in the Bush administration argued in favour of a proactive Muslim community that were prepared to publicly condemn the actions of a tiny minority. To Rumsfeld the best way to communicate that message was not for American political leaders to do it, but to find ways to get more Muslims around the world publicly speaking out against them. The United States and other Western countries have been notably unsuccessful in encouraging Muslim political, religious, and educational leaders to take a stand against Islamism and the preaching of violence and terror (Rumsfeld, p. 723).

Bush, like all of his predecessors, discovered that his ability to move in new directions was restricted by his predecessors’ prior commitments and policies, “the actions and preferences of the individuals already in position to implement policy, his own conception of how he was expected to perform the role of president, and external challenges and threats over which he has no immediate control.” (Dickerson 2003) President Bush tour of Africa meant to show
the softer side of Bush's foreign face. (ibid) Bush visited Senegal first, amid protests, but his visit nonetheless attracted large crowds of onlookers who watched his motorcade pass by. Since 9/11 it was impossible for Bush to expose himself to his audiences the way his predecessor did (Dickerson 2003) President Obama’s West African approach was strategically different. The President's visit to Ghana in July, 2009 was the earliest visit made by a U.S. president to the continent after assuming office. He also had a meeting with African Youth in the White House, to underscore US commitment to Africa in the post-9/11 era.

7:6 US Economic Policy in West Africa

To begin with, the response of the United States to the terrorist attacks was based on military security strategy. This justified the claim by Buzan et al (2003) that post-9/11 security discourses took a form in which non-military issues emerge in US security agenda. The United States president used a military platform for making his performative speech act in 2001. The United States policy covered its aid, trade and energy policies in its economic security agenda. The political security aspect of US foreign policy had a military element to it, as shown in its intervention in Liberia and in its bilateral agreement with Nigeria for maintaining peace across West Africa. The challenge of US-China rivalry is also examined against the background of their mutual interests in African resources which became more pronounced in the post-9/11 era.

7:6:1 Aid and Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)

During the tenures of Presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush, U.S. interest in Africa increased and the focus began to shift away from solely humanitarian interests. (Dagne 2011) In March 14, 2002 President Bush announced the Millennium Challenge Account(MCA), the goal of which was to increase foreign aid worldwide by $5 billion per year over three years,
starting in FY2004. The account was aimed at providing additional aid to countries whose
governments promoted good governance, invest in people through education and health care,
and promote open markets. Under President G.W. Bush aid to sub-Saharan Africa tripled
from $2.3 billion in 2001 to £6.6 billion in 2006 and pledged to increase to nearly £9 billion
in 2010. MCA was also aimed at the regional actors becoming “actors rather than passive
recipients of aid” (Guardian 21/09/2010). It is believed that “aid for trade enables developing
countries to participate more actively in the international economy”. Thus, the US committed
$199 million in 2005 for trade capacity building in Sub-Saharan Africa (International Centre
for Trade 2006)

The Bush administration’s Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), continued by the
Obama team, specifically linked extensive new bilateral development aid funds to the
removal of barriers to investment and trade. To become eligible for MCA funding, countries
must prove

demonstrated commitment to economic policies that encourage individuals and firms
to participate in global trade and international capital markets, promote private sector
growth and the sustainable management of natural resources, protect private property
rights (and) strengthen market 65 per cent of the MCA’s funds have gone to Africa,
and the Obama administration has requested US$1.125 billion for the MCA in the
2012 budget forces in the economy. (Raphael and Stoke 2011)

7:6:1:1 The Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)

The president’s emergency programme for aid (PEPFAR) was aimed at achieving
much in developing overall strategy for trade policies in Africa to the benefit of both Africa
and the US. As of late 2009, however, countries such as Ghana ($547 million), Mali ($460.8
million), Benin ($307 million), Liberia ($15 million), Burkina Faso ($480.9 million), Niger
($23 million), Sao Tome and Principe ($8.6 million), Senegal ($540 million), had signed
Compact or Threshold Program agreements. (Dagne 2010) The objective of the Threshold
Program was to assist a country in becoming compact eligible by supporting targeted policy
and institutional reforms. Although the promise of increased aid won praise from many observers some worried that most countries in sub-Saharan Africa would not be able to meet the fund’s eligibility criteria. (Dagne op cit) In a June 26, 2003, speech to a meeting of the Corporate Council on Africa, President Bush spoke of a “partnership” with Africa, including U.S. help in establishing peace and security, making advances in health and literacy, and developing free economies through aid and trade. (Copson 2005) The signature global aid initiative of the Bush administration PEPFAR and the MCC were heavily focussed on Africa (Lyman 2009, p. 113). The United States development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa went from $2.3 billion from 2000 to $6.6 billion in 2006. Of the $6.6 billion $5.4 billion was in bilateral assistance and $1.2 billion in multilateral aid. Over time, PEPFAR and MCC became symbols of the value of investing substantially in soft power in Africa and, in the case of PEPFAR, became commonly regarded as among the most positive of Bush-era legacies. Under PEPFAR, the Bush administration released funds for the treatment of HIV/AIDS which had already been officially designated by the previous Clinton administration as “a threat to international peace and security in Africa” (Elbe 2003). In some African armed forces HIV/AIDS prevalence rates were estimated to be between 40% and 60%, raising concerns about their combat effectiveness (Pharaoh and Schonteich 2004, p. 121). The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) - the landmark $15 billion, increased to $48 billion of treatment program. They were created by Presidents Clinton and Bush, respectively. “Both dramatically reshaped the discourse and the depth of U.S.-Africa policy” (Payne 2010). Both the USAID and the National Endowment for Democracy were engaged in efforts to strengthen parliaments, boost civil society organizations, and encourage free and fair elections.
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), of which the MCA was a part, was linked to
democracy promotion in West Africa, as Linda Thomas-Greenfield, indicated in her
testimonial to the Congress

it is strongly in the interest of the United States government and other Western
governments to help the young democracies of West Africa prosper economically. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was created with just that purpose in mind, on a global scale, and roughly half of the compacts signed thus far have been with West African democracies, including some of the largest ones (Thomas-Greenfield 2006)

The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) used 17 independent, transparent
indicators to measure “countries’ commitment to democratic governance, investments in
people, and economic freedom. One of those indicators measures performance on the rule of
law, which among other things, measures the effectiveness, independence and predictability
of the judiciary; the protection of property rights; and the enforceability of contracts”
(Williams 06/2011). Specifically, Thomas-Greenfield listed mother and child health,
education, infectious diseases and hunger as priority areas in the MCC, arguing that attention
to these issues “is a necessary prerequisite for economic development, for a healthy and
educated workforce is necessary for long-term economic prosperity and for the growth of
democratic institutions”. The US administration under President George Bush thus,
underscored the relationship between democracy and development. Thomas-Greenfield
believed that the incentives provided by the MCC, as with the traditional assistance
programme, would enable states within the region to join the likes of
Senegal, Ghana, Benin and Mali and strife-torn nations like Sierra Leone and Liberia . These
states, according to her were shining examples of democracy in West Africa. (Thomas-
Greenfield 2006)

Garland (2007) further made the link between democracy and development with the
MCC programme by arguing that only the country willing to fight corruption, “implement
democratic reforms, invest in health and education, and promote economic freedom. African governments -- not Americans -- must come up with ideas, a change in our way of doing development.” Having these in place was essential for succeeding in the global economy, “where free market, banking system and a good business climate within the domestic economy, were needed for state and regional level prosperity”. Africa makes up over half of MCC’s portfolio; two-thirds of MCC’s $8 billion in investments is in good performing African countries” (Fine, 05/2011). Other initiatives of the MCC in West Africa included also agricultural and financial services, community development, and social services and land rights in Mali. (Anderson 12/2010), human resources issues within MCA-Burkina Faso, (Moorosi 11/2010) and technical training for recognizing corrupt acts in Senegal. (Sanjak, 02/2011). Also, in Liberia, the MCA programme introduced trade policy to facilitate Liberia’s future development (Butt 07/2011) while Cape Verde received $110 million MCC compact (Yohannes, 02/2010) while in Ghana, MCC invested “$547 million into making agriculture more productive, building schools, and paving roads” (Yohannes 02/2010)

7:6:2 Trade Policy

One of the fundamental challenges of US West Africa trade relations was the lack of interest in African investments by United States’ major corporations. The Bush Administration indicated the direction of US foreign economic policy towards Africa when the President pointed to partnership as its goal and not paternalism. Jendayi Frazer’s “transformational diplomacy and the US Agenda in Africa” (in Fisher-Thompson 2006) was aimed out outlining President Bush’s PEPFAR programme and the debt relief initiative as well as helping poor African states to confront the challenges of globalization. As Fisher-Thompson indicated, more than “98 percent of African imports now enter the United States
duty-free under AGOA, the trade preference program that is reducing barriers to trade and helping to spur the continent's trade and manufacturing sectors.” (ibid) US export and import increased by 2008 to 28.0 per cent to $18.5 billion driven by growth in “several sectors including: machinery, vehicles and parts, wheat, non-crude oil, aircraft, and electrical machinery”, which included telecommunication equipment. In the same year, US imports increased by 27.8 per cent to $86.1 billion. (International Trade Administration 2009). Under the AGOA program, the exports to the United States from AGOA-eligible countries increased in the energy sector from $42 million in 2007 to $52 million in 2008. (Africa’s Trade Profile, 2011) The 2008 export was the highest in the 2007-2011 period. There was a sharp decline in 2009 in the total export from AGOA eligible countries to $28 million. In 2011 alone, energy export stood at $41 million, compared to $3 million worth of export in minerals, mining, apparel, textiles and footwear exported between January and October of the same year. (ibid) Energy export therefore constituted more than 90 percent of the total AGOA export to the United States. The implication was that a reduction in energy export often had an effect on the total value of export from AGOA-eligible countries to the United States. As Arief et al. (2010) indicated the value of “total U.S. trade with Africa increased by about 29% between 2007 and 2008. After at least three years of continuous growth, however, the value of Africa’s exports to the United States decreased in value by about 57% in the first six months of 2009 in comparison to the same period in 2008”

Thus, crude oil imports alone was significant in US total imports from Sub-Saharan Africa (Kimenyi and Schneidman 2012). At the heart of AGOA, were apparel and textile products and “an estimated 300,000 jobs were created in the African countries that manufacture shirts, blouses and pants for the U.S. market” (ibid). Chronicling the benefits of AGOA through trade to Africa, Florizelle B. Liser testified that in 2003, two-way trade
between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa increased 36 per cent over 2002, to just under $33 billion, which signified a relatively small gains in African access to the U.S. market but substantial on the African side. She argued that the increased market access provided by AGOA “helped to boost U.S. imports from Africa by 43 percent to $25.6 billion, with over half of this trade covered under AGOA” (Liser 2004).

Also Nigeria (47.7 per cent) and Benin Republic (19.24 per cent) were two of the top five states that were prioritised by the United States as destinations for US products in 2008 (ibid). Nigeria was one of the top five beneficiaries of the US AGOA in 2008. According to the World Bank Report, the world economy decelerated in 2008 with an estimated 2.5 percent growth, compared to 3.7 percent growth in 2007. This was due to the intensification of the global economic crisis of 2008. The US trade profile placed the “cause of the decline on declining equity markets and capital flows, and a sharp rise in inflation due to an increase in commodity prices which helped lower consumer spending Economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2008”. The document further used to argued that “a decline in resource flows to Africa in the form of private capital, remittances, and even aid” (US-African Trade Profile, op cit). According to Stephanie Hanson, the global economic downturn did not prevent the Bush administration from funding from programs like the President's Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). This meant that Africa received most funding from these schemes. (ibid) The enactment of AGOA, sub-Saharan Africa has been one of OPIC’s (Overseas Private Investment Corporation) stated priorities. At the end of 2005, 15% of OPIC’s total portfolio was in the region. As of September 2006, OPIC’s exposure in the region was over $1.8 billion. By September 2007, the U.S. had negotiated Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, and with COMESA and WAEMU regional arrangements. (Langton 2008). The original AGOA legislation was amended to extend benefits to 2015.( Hanson 2008)
AGOA was described as “US’ most significant and important trade policy document aimed at promoting greater trade between the United States and Africa. The US believed that it was only through investment, trade, economic activity generated by the private sector that Africa would be able to “realize its enormous economic potential”(AGOA Forum 2011). The AGOA Trade Act of 2002, signed by President Bush on August 6, 2002 substantially expanded preferential access for imports from beneficiary Sub-Saharan African countries. These modifications were often collectively referred to in the region as AGOA II. The AGOA II Act clarified and narrowly expanded the trade opportunities for Sub-Saharan African countries under AGOA and encouraged more investment in the region (International Trade and Administration 2002). AGOA was available to African countries if they were determined to have established, or are making continual progress toward establishing the following: market-based economies; the rule of law and political pluralism; elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; protection of intellectual property; efforts to combat corruption; policies to reduce poverty, increasing availability of health care and educational opportunities; protection of human rights and worker rights; and elimination of certain child labor practices.(International Trade and Administration 2000)

The US Assistant Secretary of State on Africa, Carson stated

The U.S. Government is committed to expanding trade and investment in sub-Saharan Africa and the numbers show our commitment. U.S. trade to and from Africa has grown significantly in the past ten years. U.S. exports to sub-Saharan Africa tripled from just under $7 billion U.S. dollars in 2001 to over $21 billion dollars in 2011. (Carson 2012)

Carson further stated that

One of the things that we are doing is not going out and simply talking to and lecturing to Africans about trade. AGOA provides an opportunity for us to hear from Africans, as Ambassador Marantis pointed out, what they’ve learned as well as what we’ve learned. This is a discussion, it’s a dialogue, it’s a conference, and we want to be able to benefit from their observations so that our observations and our actions are more meaningful moving ahead(Carson ibid, 2012)
At the 2005 AGOA Forum in Dakar, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced the establishment of a satellite office in Dakar. The West Africa Trade Hub had also worked in 18 other countries in the region to establish AGOA “resource centers.” These centres, located in different host government facilities, consist largely of terminals and software that provide information on accessing the U.S. market. (Schenidman et al, 2012) Imports into the U.S. under AGOA increased by 500 per cent, from a value of $8.15 billion to $53.8 billion since 2001. In 2006, USAID established the $200 million, five-year African Global Competitiveness Initiative (AGCI) as a follow-on to the Trade for African Development and Enterprise initiative. Through USAID’s three Trade Hubs, ACTE (African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion (ACTE) Initiative, announced in 2011) focused on the role African governments, businesses, and civil society played in advancing regional and international trade, increasing the international competitiveness of key value chains, and promoting trade and investment between the United States and Africa and within Africa. (Gast 2012) It was reported that the West Africa Trade Hub facilitated more than $100 million in exports from the region between 2007 and 2011 and trained more than 7,000 people. (Schneidman and Lewis 2012) USAID’s African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion initiative worked to increase exports of non-petroleum products, especially unique high value-added agricultural products. This was aimed by the US to help to increase food security and create jobs.

Schneidman and Lewis argued that

The 21 resource centers created throughout West Africa by the hub in Accra have not only increased USAID’s ability to provide technical assistance, but also have the potential to strengthen U.S. commercial diplomacy, especially in accessing local markets, buyers, suppliers and entrepreneurs. The hubs, to their credit, have “contributed significantly” to two-way trade between the U.S. and AGOA beneficiaries, empowering African entrepreneurs—especially women—and contributing to regional integration.

However, as a 2010 assessment concluded that the trade hubs’ priorities “have more often than not been driven by political and financial, rather than programmatic imperatives”
(Schneidman and Lewis ibid). In an interview with Yaya Sidibe, Moussa Diarra, Chairman of the Committee on AGOA in Mali suggested that AGOA had two main advantages:

The first lies in the export of African products. Thus, 6,000 African products can be exported to the United States through AGOA without paying customs duties on entry into the United States, or quota, i.e. no quantity limitation. So that products are cheaper on the market and can therefore be sold quickly. Second big advantage of AGOA is industrial investment on African soil, i.e. create factories, workshops or production systems on African soil.

7:6:3 Energy Policy

When the Bush administration assumed office in January 2001, one of the main concerns of the United States was energy security. The US was facing shortages in natural gas and periodic electricity outages in some major states like California. One of the main challenges the neoconservatives felt needed to be addressed was energy security by identifying and securing oil reserves in West Africa, the Central Asia republics and elsewhere. In May 2001 Vice President Dick Cheney and his group presented a report to the President on “Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America’s Future.” (Chouala 2010, p. 145)

US Vice President Dick Cheney in the National Energy Policy Report, reinforced the centrality of West Africa in the energy plan for the Gulf of Guinea (Morrison 2004), asserting that “West Africa is experiencing the fastest-growing sources of oil and gas for the American market” (Dumbuya 2008, p. 388). The report identified West Africa as an important area in which the United States must accord great interest. A vast portion of the African continent, in this case, the Gulf of Guinea, was characterised by Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Walter Kansteiner, as a “strategic area of interest vital to the United States’”, and its resource, wealth, especially oil, was treated as a priority for the United States national security post 9-11. The United States’ extension of “vital strategic interest to
the Gulf of Guinea fit within the evolving strategy to secure the region’s oil reserves and was necessary to consolidate it as the world’s unrivalled superpower”. (Chouala op cit, p147) As Raphael and Stokes (2011) put it “The US interest in securing access to West African oil is translating into an enhanced strategic presence in the region”. They further contended that initially, “it was the islands of São Tomé and Principe, at the centre of the Gulf of Guinea and within easy striking distance of the oilfields of West Africa, which received most attention from US planners” (Raphael and Stokes ibid,).

Thus, West Africa occupied a strategic position in the overall US energy policy in the post-9/11 era. As Chouala asserted,

The conceptualization of West African oil as a United States “national security interest” was combined with a legitimization strategy based on wedding discussions of the aim aims and objectives of oil exploitation with the national aspirations, development goals, and the collective well being of African states (Chouala 2010, p. 147)

Chouala believed that the likelihood of a rise in oil investment and easy access to African oil for supply to the American market is the source of hope to American “oil evangelists”.(ibid, p49) This is however seen as the “new scramble for Africa” in a context involving China, Japan, India and the United States. To Jhazbhay,

the threat of Africa becoming a proxy battleground in the global scramble for Africa’s resources that raise the stakes of strategic one-upmanship among African powers seeking to stake their economic and resource claims on the continent. (Jhazbhay 2010, p. 76)

According to Chouala, (op cit, p. 147) these countries’ aims were primarily at meeting the needs of capital and domestic constituencies at home, rather than enabling sustainable African development. U.S. imports from the oil producing countries grew in every case with imports from Nigeria growing by 16.2 percent, Petroleum products continued to account for the largest portion of AGOA imports with a 92.3 percent share of overall AGOA imports.
With these fuel products excluded, AGOA imports were $5.1 billion, increasing by 51.2 per cent (Cooke et al 2009, p. 63). According to the Energy Information Administration of the Department of Energy, the US will import close to 770 million barrels of oil from the Gulf of Guinea in 2020. In 2010, Nigeria exported over one million barrels per day (bbl/d) of crude oil and petroleum products to the United States (980,000 bbl/d of crude oil), representing 9% of U.S. total crude oil and petroleum product imports and over 40% of Nigerian exports. (Energy Information Administration 2011)

The ‘light, sweet quality of Nigerian crude makes it a preferred gasoline feedstock.’ (ibid) The Bush administration identified Africa’s rising potentials in energy production, but there was in general, a low priority interest in transparency and governance. High oil prices led to resource nationalism in several African countries with reduced access. Harsher terms for access onshore has led to increasing offshore exploration. This has removed investment from land based capital and dramatically worsening risks in the Gulf of Guinea. In OPEC, Nigeria production rose but produced one of the global economies shocks with reduction in the 2006 production level due to violence in the Niger Delta. In the Niger Delta, Equatorial Guinea became a major oil and methanol producer and a provider of liquefied natural gas, LNG. The bi-national commission ended the US African energy ministers’ partnership which was launched in the mid-1990s. (Cooke 2009 p. 64)

According to Clarke Nigeria accounted for the bulk of the US’s Africa oil imports, followed closely by Angola and Equatorial Guinea. Given the qualities of “sweet crude” produced which “closely matched US refinery slates and the demand for gasoline inputs”. (Clarke 2008, p. 405) Nigeria is one of the several African states that have reshaped their national oil companies to enable them to participate in African exploration and development beyond their home countries. In Nigeria, there is NNPC/Napcon (Clarke 2008, p. 377)
Official statistics indicated that 15.3 percent of U.S. oil imports come from Africa and that an estimated $10 billion in U.S. oil production investments would flow into West African fields by 2003. At 1.5 million barrels per day, the amount of West African oil flowing to the United States approximated or exceeded the volume of the U.S. imports from Saudi Arabia. Nigeria as the world’s sixth-largest oil exporter and fifth-ranked provided of crude to the U.S. at over 900,000 b/d (Schutz&Wihbey January 25, 2002)

7:7 US ECOWAS Relations and Interest in Nigeria and Liberia

Nigeria and Liberia were important in post-9/11 era for their importance in regional security discourses in West Africa. Both states engaged the attention of the US policy makers for the same reason, of ensuring that West Africa remained stable, and was void of chaos which characterized the immediate post-Cold War era of West Africa. Nigeria is considered the most important partner of the US in the war on terror. On the other hand Liberia had gone through a period of instability, which had caused destabilization within the Manu River Union area. It was the recognition of US geostrategic interest in the post-9/11 era that defined the nature of US policy making both bilaterally and for the prospects of regional security in West Africa

7:7:1 US-Nigeria Relations and West Africa’s Security

The United States had always designed its policies to respond to the immediate security concerns in West Africa. In the post-Cold War era, securing West Africa became the priority of the US, as most states in the region faced collapse. However, in the post-9/11 era, the US became more concerned with getting the regional actors involved in West African security. It also created AFRICOM. As explained in chapter four, US securitization is aimed at the referent objects of security which include the state. This does not reduce the importance of state security, as most security challenges continue to originate from state failure in West
Africa. Africa’s contribution to the incidence of instability worldwide far exceeds its weight
in the global system more political instability than any other part of the world. To this end the
United States considered partnering with Nigeria essential in order to limit the impact of
instability on its security and reduce the threats of terrorism emanating from West Africa. As
Carter III argued, “both states could use their combined diplomatic, economic, and military
power to shape the continent” (Carter III 2009). Carter III further pointed out that
The U.S. understood that there were new, rising strategic powers around the world, including
Sub-Saharan Africa. Nations such as South Africa and Nigeria used their diplomatic,
economic, and military power to shape the continent for the better. Mali, Mozambique,
Liberia, Ghana, Botswana, Benin and many other African countries were leading the way as
examples of the power of democratic rule of law. (Carter III, 2009)
The United States sent US soldiers to Nigeria to train up five West African battalions, at a
cost of $90 million in the fiscal year 2000 and 2001 for deployment in Sierra Leone. Cooke
and Morrison (2009) believed that this was a signal that the United States was willing to
engage directly with Nigeria, by providing robust training for, and maintaining direct
engagement with one of the most capable militaries in Africa. This was considered to be an
evolution in US foreign policy at the end of the Clinton administration (ibid). The authors
however were not fully enthusiastic arguing that as significant as such an engagement might
have been, Nigeria’s competence in West African peace operations would require more US
active engagement. (ibid) The United States had always been unequivocal about Nigeria’s
need to be committed to democracy. But Nigeria faced challenges that put the partnership at
risk. Nigeria was characterized as “the largest failed state in the Third World” with the “tell-
tale signs of decay, corruption and erosion of civic institutions that presage the final stage of
dissolution” (Hailu 2010, p. 38). Nigeria’s relations with the United States in the post-9/11
era continued to be defined by the events within Nigeria. One of such events was the third
term elongation plan of the Obasanjo administration. The United States was opposed to the plan, and would prefer a smooth transition to the next democratically elected government. Opposition to the third term ambition was championed by leading Nigerian political figures, U.S. officials and U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan, who also criticized the effort of the Obasanjo government. (Timberg 2006) Campbell (2011) argued that the Third Term plan was possible in Nigeria due to the nature of domestic politics between the Nigerian political class and the wider society. He argued that Nigerian politicians distrusted participation in Nigeria’s government by the people, whom they often characterized as “not yet ready”. (p. 176) This reality is perceived in the manner in which the State had perennially distanced itself from the society and could do practically whatever it wished. (ibid) In any case, Campbell argued that “African political elite often used the cover of Western alliance to guarantee their survival in office” (ibid, p. 176). This was why President Umaru Yar’Adua, during his December 2007 visit to Washington, DC, promised the United States about Nigeria’s partnership with AFRICOM. (ibid) The second event was the Abdulmutallab failed bombing plan in Detroit, USA. This happened during another period of political uncertainty in Nigeria. President Yar’Adua was ill, but he had failed to hand over as constitutionally required to the Vice President, Goodluck Jonathan. Campbell referred to Abdulmutallab as “a young Muslim from northern Nigeria who tried to destroy Northwest Flight 253 as it approached Detroit”(2011, p13). The US government made attempts to contact the Nigerian government with little success and consequently the United States listed Nigeria, “a country of interest.” (Abati, Guardian Nigeria 09-01-2011). The fact that the United States reacted harshly towards Nigeria attracted the interest of a Nigerian diplomat, Akinjide Oshuntokun who exclaimed, “Thank God nobody asked Obama to bomb Nigeria!” (Oshuntokun 2010) In order to restore Nigeria to the path of friendship with the United States, Jonathan met with US President Barack Obama at the White House, Washington DC, as Acting President in April 10, 2010.
Jendayi Frazer had been clear about the position to the necessity of Nigeria becoming a strong democracy. This was a statement made earlier during the visit of President Yar’Adua who paid an official visit to President Bush in the White House. Frazer reiterated the need for a deep and immediate reform agenda, both to re-build legitimacy in the wake of the fundamentally flawed April elections and to assure Nigerians that their voices will be respected well in advance of the next national elections. Corruption undermines democracy and prosperity. Good governance and accountability build trust in the democratic system and elected officials. (Frazer 2007)

Frazer also listed other areas of collaboration between the United States and Nigeria:

We have offered Nigerian officials a network of sensors, radar, and communications gear to enhance their control of territorial waters. We wish to provide train/equip programs for a Nigerian riverine unit that could address fisheries violations, oil theft, piracy, smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and environmental degradation. We have further offered to help Nigeria institute and manage stockpile security and destroy collected/surplus weapons, and to assist in tracing the origin of weapons seized from criminals and insurgents. (Frazer 2007, ibid)

As the successor to the Yar’Adua administration, the Jonathan administration was prepared to ensure that US made Nigeria a trusted ally. During his interview with CNN’s Christiane Amanpour, Jonathan promised Nigerians and the rest of the world that the 2011 elections in Nigeria would be credible “This is our time. Either we continue with more of the same or our change begins”. (cited in Abati R. Guardian Nigeria ‘The Jonathan Presidency (8)’ June 2011). Indeed the reception given to Acting President Jonathan in the White House attracted the interest of some Nigerians who saw Jonathan as ‘Obama’s boy’ (ibid)

7:7:1:1 Nigeria’s Peace Programme in West Africa

Nigeria is a significant and powerful state in the region, with the necessary military power and recognised financial clout which makes it powerful enough to exercise its influence in Africa and West Africa (Adogamhe, 2006, p. 125)
At the continental level, Nigeria had indicated its interest in the maintenance of peace in Africa. Nigeria was made a partner in the war on terror. An agreement which ushered in the US-Nigeria Bilateral Commission was signed on February 2010 between the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and Nigeria’s foreign minister Olugbenga Ashiru. According Clinton

The U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission is our flagship agreement for bilateral cooperation on the entire African continent...Nigeria has also played an important role on global issues through its seat on the UN Security Council and has been a leader in helping to improve stability in West Africa...Economic development is key; Nigeria is one of the fastest-growing economies in the world, with the largest population in Africa and strong trading relationships. (Clinton 2011)

During the Obasanjo administration, there was a revival of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), which was made a major point of the Nigerian foreign policy. The CSSDCA (the Kampala Document) was a framework for providing a comprehensive and integrated continental response to the challenges of peace and development in Africa. The CSSDCA was an acknowledgement of the link between security and stability on the one hand, and development and cooperation in Africa. (Adoghamhe 2006, pp. 112-115; see also Deng and Zartman 1999)

7:7:2 US-ECOWAS Cooperation in the Resolution of the Liberian Crisis

The Subcommittee hearing on Liberia was convened to deal with the Liberian crisis of 2002. It was an opportunity to “identify some of the characteristics of Africa’s weakest states that make the region attractive to terrorists and other international criminals...” (Senate Hearing 2002, p. 1). Other reasons given for the need to intervene in Liberia were offered by the Assistant Secretary of State, Walter Kansteiner, who listed greed and lack of good governance, narrow-interest governance, and Taylor’s regional destabilization as necessitating the intervention. (ibid, p. 4) At the same hearing, Senator Feingold argued that
it would be immoral to regard an old friend of the United States like Liberia “a permanently failed state” (p. 57). But he argued that there was need to awaken Members of Congress and policymakers to the fact that “to allow such situations to persist is not only immoral but dangerous for the United States” (ibid, p. 57). Feingold further stated that dealing with the Liberian crisis was an essential aspect of the war on terror which brought about the September 11 event. This was particularly instructive given the alleged link of the Liberian government under Charles Taylor to Hezbollah and al Qaeda. The government officials recommended that the “containment and increasing isolation of Liberia” should not be left solely to ECOWAS. The state officials argued that “regional politics combined with tribal and ethnic affiliations, will continue to have negative impact and effectively undermine actions by ECOWAS” (ibid, p. 49). Consequently, the berthing of the US Navy ship, Iwo Jima on the shores of Monrovia signalled the end of the Liberian crisis 2002-2003. The US Navy did not intervene directly, but offered indirect assistance to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The United States had refused to intervene militarily fearing a repeat of Somalia (The Case For Immediate Intervention In Liberia). Charles Taylor, suddenly disappeared from the Calabar, Nigeria residence where has was offered asylum, while President Obasanjo was on his way to Washington to meet his US counterpart, George W Bush. Charles Taylor responded to the claims that he was escaping from Calabar, arguing that Obasanjo masterminded his arrest and removal to the World Court. Meeting with US president in 2006, Obasanjo of Nigeria said “The areas that I would call the areas of concern, by the time I arrived here last night, seemed to have been definably dealt with by this morning, particularly the issue of Charles Taylor. And as I said to you about a minute -- a few minutes ago, Charles Taylor should be landing in Liberia by now, which should start putting the issue of Charles Taylor behind us.”(US Dept of State, 29/03/06)Taylor insisted that
Obasanjo betrayed him, despite his regard for the latter, “as a brother and a friend”. (BBC 2009)

Taylor claimed he was a victim of an intelligence plot involving the British and US governments that supplied weapons to the region in an attempt to topple him - as part of a plan by Washington to gain control of West African oil reserves (BBC 2009). At the Hague, Taylor defended his human rights record and argued that he could not have allowed his rebel forces to kill civilians since he was father of many children and grandchildren himself. This was not how many observers saw the Charles Taylor saga. Taylor had been accused of fuelling regional conflict with the trade in diamonds for arms. This is what had been referred to as the Blood Diamonds. (Massimino 2010) As Masimino argued

The case against Taylor underscores the point that perpetrators of atrocities don’t act alone. They depend on third parties who, knowingly or unwittingly, enable them by providing the means to carry out their crimes. Identifying enablers and disrupting their activities can hamper or halt a perpetrator (Massimino, ibid)

Naomi Campbell, the model, testified about how she was given the gift of diamonds by Charles Taylor’s men. Campbell called the diamonds “dirty looking stones”, which she eventually gave away to be used for a “good cause”. (Legal Aid 2010) It has been argued that the link between diamonds and the conflict in Sierra Leone and Liberia is irrefutable. (Weaver 2010)

Thus, Liberian warlords stimulated regional instability in West Africa that threatened American foreign policy and security interests. Historically, Americans made Liberia and Liberia has been loyal to America since the 19th century. It is not surprising that Liberia was the base of the AFRICOM initiative of the United States in 2008.

7:6 Conclusion
The post-9/11 policy of the United States has been discussed, against the backdrop of the securitizing claims of the core executive about threats to US national security in West Africa. Also analyzed were hypotheses one to three, which included the variables on terrorism, foreign policy, congressional response to the executive claims, and the policy choices of aid and trade. Also discussed were the relationship between Nigeria and the United States due to the salience of US Nigeria cooperation for regional stability in West Africa. In line with the quest for security in West Africa, the role of the US in ending the Liberian crisis and removing the potentially threatening impact it had on the region.
Chapter Eight

AFRICOM and US Military Securitization in West Africa

8:1 Introduction

This chapter offers an analysis of the statements of the US officials and the response of the regional actors in West Africa towards the creation of the African Command (AFRICOM) initiative. AFRICOM was not specifically launched by the United States solely for the West African region, as it was formed more due to the growing terror threats emanating from the Horn of Africa, but its usefulness as a continental initiative became part of the priorities of the foreign policy objectives in the post-9/11 era. The ‘three Ps’ used in chapter four can be used in the analysis of problem, policy and politics here too, three essential predecision processes before policy success. Applying this to the discourse of AFRICOM implies that the US officials made securitizing claims about terrorism, as a major threat to US national security interest in Africa and indeed, in West Africa. The approval of the Congress was important for the adoption of the policy in Africa. The US officials also needed to convince ECOWAS Member States about the relevance of AFRICOM to the stability and the development of the West African region. There had been US military assistance in West African states in the past through initiatives such as ACOTA and ACRI also served as a factor for including West Africa in US military security strategy. This chapter attempts to consider US role though AFRICOM by examining the origin of US military initiatives after the Cold War, and the extent to which AFRICOM represented US agenda for maintaining stability in West Africa through a military means. AFRICOM was considered to be a product of necessity in the US officials circles due to the hope that its launch would help deal with prevailing political, and human security crises in Africa and West Africa. Thus, the conditions in the West African region dictated US official action,
expressed mainly by the officials saddled with the responsibility of using AFRICOM as a tool of regional securitization. This chapter intends to underscore the extent to which AFRICOM was a product of US determination to underpin its strategic involvement in West Africa from the perspective of military securitization. The militarization of security policy, it will be argued, undermined both human security and human development in some important respects. The launch of AFRICOM was therefore based on the post-9/11 understanding of regional security in West Africa where the US considered West Africa as one of the regions with the potentials to serve as a security threat to its global security interests. The US worked with ECOWAS in 2003 to end the Liberian crisis, which could have been much more challenging for ECOWAS military efforts alone.

8:2 The 9/11 Attacks and the New US Policy

The ‘new’ in US military arrangement in West Africa is based on the assumption that the creation of AFRICOM heralded a wholly different direction in US West Africa relations. AFRICOM was launched as a by-product of previous military arrangement. The United States had always cast the West African region in security terms. The last chapter dealt with the non-military aspect of US securitization. It underscored the direction of the United States foreign economic policy after the 9/11 attacks. It also showed that the United States intended to engage the international system with a degree of urgency. The speeches of the US president after the attacks were largely based on US national security interests, which were in line with achieving greater security in the American soil. It was therefore not surprising that all the speeches made by the US president between September 2001 and September 2002 were linked to the economic, political and military security sectors (NSS 2002).
President Bush used his National Security Strategy to argue in favour of America’s preparedness against “shadowy networks of individuals” who were capable of bringing “great chaos and suffering to our shores”. By describing others as possessing the capacity to harm Americans at home, President Bush believed that the preponderant economic, political and military power of the United States was insufficient in deterring dangerous people. (ibid) He believed that there was need for a strategic response which was both economic and political. This explains why George Bush ‘war on terror’ was encapsulated in security strategy which transcended the state and included the United States championing “the aspiration for human dignity”. (ibid) The creation of AFRICOM was part of that broad US regional and global strategy. Although AFRICOM was conceived to confront insecurity in Africa and West Africa, it was strategic in Africa for the US official claims that human security was part of the objective of the US AFRICOM initiative.

8:3 The Ungovernable Areas in the West African Region

The West African region has vast lands which sometimes remain out of the governance orbit of the state and the regional actors. Hyden (2005) believed that African states have the challenge of being able to govern the entire geographical areas over which they have sovereign control. This explained why many countries in the region such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria in the trans-Saharan belt of the immense and uncontrollable Sahara desert became a refuge and channels for conflicts and for groups identified as terrorist. Part of the post-Cold War challenges of security in the region was that the ungovernable areas constantly served as networks of transnational organized crime, including trafficking in human beings and drugs connecting the region to the drug lords in South America. As a result, the most powerful terrorist group in the region, Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been responsible for numerous terrorist acts in the relevant trans-Saharan region (La CEDEAO discute à Dakar de sa stratégie de lutte contre le terrorisme). The Al Qaeda in the Maghreb changed its name from Groupe salafiste pour la prédications et le combat (GSPC) (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat) in January 2007. The AQIM’s operation covers states in North Africa, the Sahara and the Sahel countries: Algeria, Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and to a lesser extent, Senegal and Burkina Faso. (Courrier International 2010) Mohamed Yusuf created Boko Haram in February 2002 with the aim of encouraging his followers to reject Western education. By August 2009, he was killed in a military operation which left more than 700 people dead after prolonged fights which started in July of the same year in northern Nigeria (Courrier International 2012). West Africa and Sudan have various Sufi orders regarded sceptically by the more doctrinally strict branches of Islam in the Middle East. The Tijani the most popular Sufi order in West Africa, had a large following in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Gambia (Hassan 2008). Goita believed that:

If more energetic steps are not taken to confront AQIM’s new Sahelian strategy, the eventual establishment of sanctuaries, mini “Waziristans,” in the region is a real possibility. AQIM already operates across a region of several hundred thousand square kilometers. Northern Mali, in particular, is becoming a central redoubt (Goita 2011)

8:4 The Legitimization of AFRICOM and Post-9/11 Security Dynamics in West Africa

The creation of AFRICOM was part of US national security strategy. It was aimed at securing Africa in the based on the belief that if the region was secure and stable, the United States would gain from stability in West Africa. The AFRICOM initiative was implicitly the continuation of that strategy as US cooperation with states in the region and with the
ECOWAS as a regional institution. Johnnie Carson stated at a public hearing that “the creation of AFRICOM was to help African militaries to be more professional and not to go into politics. We want professional armies, the armies that recognize the constitution, democracy and the rights of the people” (Carson 2010). He said further that the US administration was committed “to working with our African partners to bring about a more peaceful, stable and prosperous Africa”. He went on to indicate the assistance which the US government was providing states in West Africa, such strengthening of their border security, and improving their customs, “to enhance their intelligence collections with the external terrorist forces, and reduce the risk at the airports across the continent” (Carson 2010). The US government’s National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, contended that terrorists exploited failed states, using them to “plan, organize, train and prepare for operations”. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said of weak and failing states that they served as global pathways that facilitate… the movement of criminals and terrorists”. An assortment of civilian and military officials and experts outside the US government worry that …West Africa …would “become ungovernable areas where terrorists will recruit, plan and operate” (Simmons and Tucker 2007).

These were among the activities of the US government in West Africa and they also showed the extent to which the United States had gone to facilitate the security of West African states. They also include the justification for AFRICOM in the post-9/11 era.

8:4:1 Before AFRICOM

ACOTA began in 2002 and replaced the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) which was launched by the Clinton administration in 1997. ACOTA succeeded the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) which, in 1997, began the U.S. peacekeeping training
program in Africa with four countries. ACRI’s demise came in 2000. The Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) trained and equipped African peacekeepers and enables African partner nations to be self-sufficient in the long term by training African peacekeeping trainers and helping to develop peacekeeping training facilities. Of the 19 African countries that participated in the ACOTA programme, 7 were from West Africa. They were Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. in 2004, ACOTA became part of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the Bush administration’s budget for FY 2008 was persuaded to increase funding for ACOTA activities to more than $40 million (Voldman 2010, p. 49).

Ayittey (2004) argued that very few African leaders participated in the programme. Most “needed their troops to crush their own people’s aspirations for freedom at home”. (Ayittey ibid) The Clinton administration, with Congressional approval, allocated $35 million for ACRI’s start-up costs. But few African leaders participated in the programme. Ironically, the Ivorian soldiers were trained by ACRI at a cost of $1.7 million, but in October 2000 the country imploded, coinciding with “the last time the US State Department posted an update on its ACRI web site” (ibid). The ACOTA program which replaced ACRI enjoyed “the highest profile of all US-Africa military assistance arrangements” (Stimson Centre 2005). With an annual budget of $15 million, ACOTA trained over 17,000 African troops from 10 countries (ibid). The ACOTA program had five main objectives:

1. Train and equip African militaries to respond to peace support and complex humanitarian requirements
2. Build and enhance sustainable African peace support training capacity
3. Build effective command and control
4. Promote commonality and interoperability
5. Enhance international, regional and sub-regional peace support capacity in Africa (Stimson Centre 2005)
According to Ismail,

the US has been able to avoid a significant presence in Africa, in support of shifting sets of priorities and interests, powered by unexpected and intermittent requirements to intervene. However, since September 11, 2001, events have changed the strategic importance of SSA (especially West Africa) in the context of the War on Terror (WoT), given SSA’s geographical location as a back door to the Persian Gulf; and the emerging potential of the Gulf of Guinea as an alternative source of energy needed to reduce overdependence on the Middle East (Ismail 2008, p. 374).

U.S. officials signed a cooperation agreement with nine African countries (Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia), signed at the Conference called "war against terrorism ". (Bleitrach 2008) Under the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Programme created in 1983 by the State Department Bureau of Diplomatic Security aimed at providing training, equipment, and technology to countries all around the world, sub-Saharan Africa received $9.6 million in ATA funding in FY2006. ATA programs were also used to train and equip police, internal security, and military forces in a number of countries, including Niger($905,000), Senegal (800,000), Mali ($564,000) Liberia ($220,000).

Training courses provided to these countries included topics such as “Investigation of terrorist organizations”, “Rural border operations”, Anti-terrorism instructor training”, “Terrorist crime scene investigation”, and “Explosive incident countermeasures”(Voldman, op cit, 2007)

One operation was called "Flintlock 10" (2010), launched from Ouagadougou Burkina Faso. Nine African countries (Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Chad and Tunisia) and five European countries (Belgium, Spain, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom) took part in the operation provided by the United States and Burkina Faso.(Ouedraogo 2010). The Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa was formed in 2002 to provide military training and conduct civil-military operations. Its stated mission in 2005 was “to wage peace across the region, to deny the enemy a safe haven, to increase
the capacity of host nations to provide services for their people and combat terrorism.” (Davis 2009) The Pan-Sahel Initiative provided training to the military forces of Chad, Niger, Mauritania, and Mali between 2002 and 2004 (Davis ibid). The new US African Command was introduced at a time when the United States considered the struggle against terrorism as the Bush administration’s biggest challenge. However, the US had been part of other conflict resolution attempts in West Africa. Before AFRICOM, the US had been conducting a number of security cooperation efforts across Africa. In late 2002 the State Department launched the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI), a modest effort to provide border security and other counterterrorism assistance to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger using personnel from US Army Special Forces attached to the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) (Voldman 2010, p. 70). Through ACOTA, the US Navy steadily increased the level and pace of its operations in African waters, including the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups off the coast of West Africa as part of the “Summer Pulse” exercise in June 2004. In another significant expansion of US Navy operations in Africa, the USS Fort McHenry amphibious assault ship began a six month deployment to the Gulf of Guinea in November 2007. The USS Fort McHenry was accompanied by the high speed vessel HSV-2 “Swift”. This assault ship is capable of operating in shallow, coastal waters. There were also two maritime repositioning ships. The ships made ports of call in Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Cameroon Sao Tome and trained more than 1,200 sailors and other military personnel form these countries. (Voldman 2010, p. 54) Also, under the PSI, US marines were involved training and the Air Force personnel and they provided support such as “medical and dental care for members of the local units as well neighbouring residents” (Pham 2010, p. 70). In 2005, the TSCTI in an exercise dubbed “Flintlock 05”, was launched. Its goal was to help “participating nations to plan and execute command, control and communications systems in support of future combined humanitarian peacekeeping and disaster relief operations”.

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TSCTI enjoyed an increase in its funding steadily “from $16 million in 2005 to $30 million in 2006, with incremental increases up to $100 million per year through 2011” (Pham p.72). As Donald Yamamoto, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, pointed out we believe that AFRICOM has played an important supporting role in implementing this framework. It is doing this by supporting efforts to build professional, capable militaries that respect human rights and civilian control, which in turn supports efforts to resolve armed conflicts, address transnational challenges, and safeguard democratic institutions. In the realm of counterterrorism, AFRICOM plays a critical and central role in both the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) (Donald Yamamoto ‘AFRICOM: Promoting Partnership…’)

After the TSCTI was renamed TSCTP in 2007. TSCTP’s main elements

- Counterterrorism (CT) programs to create a new regional focus for trans-Saharan cooperation, including use of established regional organizations like the African Union and its new Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers. These programs include training to improve border and aviation security and overall CT readiness;

- Continued specialized Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) activities in the Trans-Sahara region and possible regional expansion of those programs;

- Public diplomacy programs that expand outreach efforts in the Sahel and Maghreb regions, Nigeria, and Senegal and seek to develop regional programming embracing this vast and diverse region. Emphasis is on preserving the traditional tolerance and moderation displayed in most African Muslim communities and countering the development of extremism, particularly in youth and rural populations;

- Governance programs that strive, in particular, to provide adequate levels of U.S. Government support for democratic institutions and economic development in the Sahel, strengthening those states’ ability to withstand internal threats;

- Military programs intended to expand military-to-military cooperation, to ensure adequate resources are available to train, advise, and assist regional forces, and to establish institutions promoting better regional cooperation, communication, and information sharing. (TSCTP 2008)

The Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) was part of the bilateral and multilateral joint training programme and military exercises that preceded AFRICOM. The
Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) links the United States with nine African countries: Mali, Chad, Niger Mauritania, Nigeria and Senegal. The TSCTP was created to replace the Pan Sahel Counter Terrorism Initiative (PSCTI), which was initiated in 2002. The TSCTP “received some $31 million in FY 2006, nearly $82 million in FY 2007, and $10 million in FY 2008” (Voldman 2010, p. 49).

USS Fort McHenry was stationed in the Gulf of Guinea on an extended 11 month deployment in late 2007 through the spring of 2008 for seven months “as part of a multinational maritime security and safety initiative that partners with West African countries”. The aim of TSCTP was to train teams from 11 African countries along the Gulf, “helping them to build their security capabilities, especially in maritime domain awareness” (Pham 2010, p. 72). Fort McHenry was joined by the Swift, and the collaboration produced an international interagency effort known as the African Partnership Station (APS). On board the ship were European and African sailors who joined their American counterparts, with the singular aim of enhancing regional and maritime safety and security in West and Central Africa through assistance in developing maritime domain awareness maritime professionals and infrastructure, maritime enforcement capabilities, legal and regulatory regimes, sub-regional cooperation, and public awareness of maritime security issues (Pham 2010, pp. 72-73).

The Bush administration “increased the value of US arms deliveries and military training programmes for Africa from about $100 million in 2001 to approximately $600-800 million in 2008” (Voldman 2010, p. 47). The end to military rule which facilitated post-Cold War crisis accounts for the creation of AFRICOM. This was very much the case such that after the return to military rule, in line with the US objectives demonstrated though ACOTA and later ACRI, the US entered into military pacts with states in West Africa. Aning argued that by October 1999, training had been “given to about 5,000 troops, comprising forces from...
Benin, Ghana, Mali, Malawi, Uganda and Senegal. Training enhances troop capacity to undertake peacekeeping activities in Africa and elsewhere” (Aning 2001 p. 49). By 2008, AFRICOM had become a necessity in the furtherance of US security interests in the region. US officials offered explanations for the creation of AFRICOM and attempted to justify the need for the military initiatives. Their contention ranged from the military to human security needs. Despite the creation of AFRICOM, the US officials believed that helping Africans to maintain their security at the regional level was the strategic goal of the United States in the post-Cold War world.

8:4:2 AFRICOM and New US Security Policy towards Africa

The US had considered the creation of AFRICOM as an indispensable tool for the security of the continent. In the view of Jhazbhay “no single country or even region can fight alone”. (2010, p. 90) he further stated,

The African militaries are under-resourced, and therefore more vulnerable than most to threats posed by terrorists, internal criminal networks, human and drug trafficking and money laundering. It is very difficult if not impossible for poor countries the majority of whose population live in absolute poverty to match the military capabilities and resources of AFRICOM.

To Jhazbhay African militaries needed to perceive their responsibility within a framework in which global threats such as terrorism, international crime networks, maritime piracy, “require globally shared responsibility” (ibid, p. 90). Moeller was present at the meeting which led to the formation of AFRICOM and he stated what the aim was at the inception, “we built an organization dedicated to the idea that U.S. security interests in Africa are best served by building long-term partnerships with African nations, regional organizations, and the African Union” (Moeller 2010). The creation of AFRICOM was considered to be a necessary step aimed by the United States to further its cooperation with African states on
both military and humanitarian grounds. AFRICOM is one aspect of the United States policy strategy to engage more productively with African states. As Ploch (2011) suggested:

AFRICOM is only one part of the U.S. government’s engagement in Africa, but it occurs at the critical point of military-to-military contact. AFRICOM also supported the U.S. humanitarian response that commenced on March 4, through the delivery of relief supplies and the evacuation of foreign nationals fleeing the violence.

Theresa Whelan, at a testimony to the congressional subcommittee, denounced the claim that “AFRICOM was established solely to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China” (Volman 2009). She used the opportunity to outline the reason for the creation of AFRICOM, stating that one of the major concerns of the United States was the need to” confront violent extremism” (cited in Volman, ibid). However, Theresa Whelan agreed that Africa’s natural resources was the source of future wealth for the continent which both the United States and China could benefit from. To her, this was only possible in “a fair market and secure environment” and AFRICOM would “help Africans build greater capacity to assure their own security”. (in Volman ibid) Theresa Whelan further added that “The United States spends approximately $9 billion a year in Africa, funding programs in such areas as health, development, trade promotion, and good governance”. (cited in Kruzel, 2007) This clarification was based on the criticism of the AFRICOM initiative that it was aimed at only US security interests in the region. She argued that “security-related programs receive only about $250 million a year. AFRICOM is about helping Africans build greater capacity to assure their own security”. ( Kruzel ibid, 2007) To Whelan, “AFRICOM is just one tool in DoD’s chest”. (Jim Garamone). The United States official position was that Africans needed to be able to go about their business “with a reasonable level of surety that they will be able to live their lives without being beset by some great calamity of war” (ibid). To Whelan,
We take for granted that we are going to go home tonight and we’re going to have a great meal and we’re not going to have some thug group come and bang the doors down on our house and burn it and pull us out. We see that stuff in the movies and on the news, but for Africans that’s a fact of life.(ibid)

Thus, the US intended to use the AFRICOM for both military approach and soft power, which Adogamhe (2006, p. 123) referred to as “US hegemonic carrots”. To deal with the challenges of the new international security order. Adogamhe argued that Congress provided $1 billion for African states in FY 2004, and the US held out the “olive branch of freedom to terror-stricken peoples of the globe” (p. 123).

The Pentagon had launched an “Ungoverned Areas Project” (Stewart 2010) and directed its Combatant Commands to build the capacity of fragile states to control their borders and territories. However, Stewart warned of the oversimplification of “the links between state weakness and transnational terrorism” as this “can encourage short-sighted policy responses that focus on the symptoms of state weakness instead of its underlying causes” (Stewart, 2010). The ungoverned safe havens can be a contradiction when it comes to physical sanctuaries. To him, “Terrorists can take advantage of these alternative political orders, brokering agreements with local leaders and entering into tactical alliances with illicit groups--from drug traffickers to insurgents to smugglers--to access secure locations, transport, and communications”(Stewart ibid) focused on the nexus between security concerns, including terrorism prevention, as a prerequisite for development, and development as a bulwark against insecurity, including the “root causes” of extremist ideologies, dictate that AFRICOM will focus on working with African nations to build their regional security and crisis response capacity.

According to Karang the 2008 US military presence in Africa through AFRICOM, with the exception of Egypt indicated
the strategic importance of Africa to the United States. It was the first US global reorganization of its military since 1946. The AFRICOM replaced the EUCOM which was launched in Stuttgart and was in operation between 1995 and 2005 (Karang 2010).

AFRICOM was the creation of the US Department of Defense (DoD) and the Pentagon. The Department of Defense worked closely with the State Department to implement broad security cooperation efforts. AFRICOM’s security sector strategy was aimed at ensuring that the U.S. national interests were “protected from potential threats on the African continent while contributing to the stability and security for the people of Africa” (Ploch 2009). The Joint Staff and senior generals at AFRICOM met on a biweekly basis with the State Department’s Africa Bureau to coordinate policies in cooperation with African states.

AFRICOM members include colonels, lieutenants, lieutenant colonels, commanders, and civilians are primarily concerned with ensuring that “the United States could no longer afford to place Africa on the periphery of national security policy”(Yamamoto 2011. See also Morrison 2007). 15 agencies and services of the American government and the US Chamber of Commerce for Africa were involved at the launch of the AFRICOM. The Command was positioned to be the US central link for controlling African military, as well as the politics and the economy of the continent (Busselen 2007). The Bush Administration’s motivation for the creation of a new unified command for Africa evolved in part out of concerns about the Department of Defense’s (DOD) division of responsibility for Africa among three geographic commands, which reportedly posed coordination challenges. Although some military officials had advocated the creation of an Africa Command for over a decade, more recent crises highlighted the challenges created by “seams” between the commands’ boundaries (Ploch 2009).

Two of the other US initiatives, the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Programme (TSCTP) offered training and helped to build regional coalitions across the African continent. PSI was a State-led effort to assist Mali, Niger, Chad,
and Mauritania in detecting and responding to suspicious movement of people and goods across and within their borders through training, equipment and cooperation. Its goals were to support two U.S. national security interests in Africa, that is, waging the war on terrorism and enhancing regional peace and security. (Pan Sahel Initiative 2002). TSCTP also built upon existing African regional coalitions such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) (see TSCTP 2008).

Also Volman (2010, p65) dealt with the subject of the formation of AFRICOM and what the organization was set up to do in West Africa. According to Miles (2007)

The US currently ranks the Sahel as number 2 in its war on terror. Radical strains of Islam have emerged in the Sahel. Hardline Islam is on the rise in Mali. 15 mosques have been built in Timbuktu alone. The US government had expressed concern about the increasing rate of radical Islam in the Sahel. (p.55)

Busselen gave an insight into the imperatives of the creation of AFRICOM in West Africa. He argued that “violent extremism by transnational terrorist organizations is a major source of regional instability”. (Busselen, ibid) Former Acting Secretary of State for African Affairs stated that “Through AFRICOM’s deployment of the African Partnership Station, we are building the capacity or West and Central African states to protect their territorial waters, respond to oil spills and other disasters, and patrol vital oil and gas platforms”(Carter III 2009) Theresa Whelan, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for African affairs, testified in August 2007 that,

unlike a traditional Unified Command, [AFRICOM] will focus on building African regional security and crisis response capacity. [It] will promote greater security ties between the United States and Africa, providing new opportunities to enhance our bilateral military relationships, and strengthen the capacities of Africa’s regional and sub-regional organizations (“Davis 2008)

She added that the US military engagement in Africa would remain primarily focused on building partnership capacities, conducting greater security cooperation, building important
counter-terrorism skills and, as appropriate, supporting U.S. Government agencies in implementing other programs that promote regional stability. According to Yamamoto, since its inception

AFRICOM has strived to be a collaborative combatant command with a core function of not just overseeing U.S. forces on the continent, but also preventing and resolving armed conflict through building partner nation capacity. For the past three years, the U.S. Department of State has coordinated and collaborated with AFRICOM as it worked to achieve the Administration’s highest priority goals related to democracy, good governance, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, and transnational challenges (Yamamoto 2011)

Yamamoto argued that AFRICOM has benefits for the African Union and the regional organizations, including the ECOWAS

The capacity that AFRICOM builds at the regional level improves the relationship not just between the United States and the AU, but between the African nations themselves, increasing overall cooperation exponentially. An example of this is AFRICOM’s Exercise African Endeavor, which assists African nations and their regional organizations in communicating with one another over a variety of spectrums, making greater regional cooperation possible. (Yamamoto 2011)

In an interview with General Ward of the African Command, he believed that Africans value the assistance that we can provide as they ask in helping them to professionalize their militaries and helping them to establish systems of efficiency within their structures. This command is only designed to affect the organization and structure of how we carry our Department of Defense activities on the continent of Africa in support of our U.S. foreign policy objectives… (Hanson Interview with General Ward 2008)

General Ward further explained the reasons for the formation of AFRICOM, as he claimed that one of our primary objectives, to help the Africans increase their capacity to provide for their own security as well as be able to help provide for the security of their regions as well as the continent through their organizations, the African Union…(DeYoung’s Interview with General Ward 2008)

AFRICOM’s creation coincided with the incoming administration of President Obama. It was therefore easy to use this as an opportunity to sell AFRICOM to Africans (Volman 2009).
With the creation of AFRICOM came the financial assistance to combat narcotics trafficking in West Africa “by directly providing $1.5 million in building the Counter-Narcotics and Maritime Security Operations Center (CMIC)” (Crawley 2009). The trade in narcotics had been on the increase in West Africa as narcotics crossing the Atlantic from Latin America had found their way into the region and then up into Europe (ibid). AFRICOM has five regional offices, installed by October 2008. Ten to twenty people work on each of these sites, and they are not combat forces. Pentagon spent $ 250 million a year on advocacy for Africa. (Jeune Afrique 21/11/2007)

It was the case that while the US was busy fighting insecurity in Africa, the people are interested in survival. As Beebe (2010, p. 97) argued, “should we shift our view of terrorism and WMD to HIV/AIDS, malaria, poverty, child labour deforestation, and the like how significant to security issues do they now become?” (Beebe 2010, p. 97) Beebe argued that Africans fear death from violence pestilence and diseases. They would rather be tactical and concentrate on daily survival rather than strategize on sustainable development. (ibid)

Salih stated that

The shift towards a military solution to the problems of West Africa came at a time when the living conditions of the people have deteriorated immensely. Africa’s fundamental problems are not caused by the lack of militarized notions of security but by abject poverty and destitution. Instead, peace and security issues have become the defining elements of the objectives of the regional organizations (p. 79). It privileges the punitive role of the internal security organs and their ability to punish the symptoms while leaving the social and the material root causes intact (p. 80).

He further suggested that

If military security refers to the ability to quell rebellion or defeat liberation movements on the battlefield, then it is not really the security priority of the African people. The security priority is human development (food security, health, education, clean drinking water, shelter, etc). Poverty, exclusion and destitution are major factors explaining the prevalence of conflict. The African states have abused their monopoly over the use of force and coercion to protect corrupt and oppressive state apparatus rather than protecting citizens’ rights (p. 89).
Beebe (op cit, 2010), recounted his experience with an African ambassador during a conference organized in Washington DC attended by most of the African diplomatic and military attaché community. The US government had admonished the African diplomatic community present at the meeting “to help the United States identify terrorists in Africa and locate potential elements of the WMD”. Beebe approached the ambassador, who in disbelief had shared Africans views of security by arguing that the Americans got it wrong. The African ambassador argued that the

Americans are always looking for terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. Yes, we have those things in Africa. We have terrorism. It is poverty, HIV/AIDS and malaria. We have weapons of mass destruction as well. It is an AK-47 usually carried by a child. All of this is played out in an environment we don’t even control (Beebe, 2010, p. 96).

In fact, Carson’s position on the relationship between the US and African states seemed to support this position, when he stated that

Most of the terrorism that we have seen was perpetrated in Africa and generated externally. Africa has very large and substantial Muslim communities whether they are in Nigeria or Senegal…These are all very moderate Islamic communities very much pro-West, and many of them are very close friends of the United States (Carson 2010).

Beebe further supported the position taken by the African ambassador by making it clear that Africans prefer to discuss security “in terms of security sector reform (SSR), health, poverty, and environmental shock caused by climate change as being their top security concerns” (Beebe, p. 97). There is need to understand security from the perspective of the Africans because it is only then that any attempt to deal with insecurity and terrorism will make sense. African insecurity has been linked to colonial history of the continent where the state that took over the rein of governance from the former colonizers could not extend its powers beyond the boundaries of the government. This implies that much of the rest of the country is ungoverned (Beebe, p. 100).
Beebe’s argument was based on the history of Africans states which had more to do with external intervention, which ultimately made the idea of African Command possible. Without the input of the Africans in the process of launching a military initiative, the likelihood was that its intention would be misunderstood across the continent and in West Africa. Thus, Beebe used the historiography of the state in Africa to contend that state weakness and the consequent regional instability had its origin in the Berlin Conference, where the continent was carved up in the late 1800s (Beebe, p. 100). Fawole (2005, 1999) contended that the nature of African state and the dynamics of post-colonial politics had overarching effects on state capacity and regional security maintenance. He argued that there were divisions on tribal and ethnic lines which influenced politics in the postcolonial era and contributed to the violent conflicts which characterised regional security affairs in West Africa. Both Beebe and Fawole based their African security themes on the potentials of Africans and their capacities to successfully identify their challenges and deal with them, given the right conditions. Even, General Ward, the chief of the US African Command, implicitly concurred to this view when he said that “African populations are able to provide for themselves, contribute to global economic development and are allowed access to markets in free, fair, and competitive ways, is good for America and the world...”. (cited in Karang 2010) . In line with this view, Woods et al insisted that the US interest was strategic, aimed at exploiting Africa’s resources. They submitted,

This military-driven U.S. engagement with Africa reflects the desperation of the Bush administration to control the increasingly strategic natural resources on the African continent, especially oil, gas, and uranium. With increased competition from China, among other countries, for those resources, the United States wants above all else to strengthen its foothold in resource-rich regions of Africa (Woods et al 2007)

They argued that

While the Bush administration endlessly beats the drums for its “global war on terror,” the rise of AFRICOM underscores that the real interests of neoconservatives
has less to do with al-Qaeda than with more access and control of extractive industries, particularly oil (Woods et al ibid, 2007)

However, Theresa Whelan testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 2007, pointing out that the mission of AFRICOM was misunderstood. She insisted that there was no need for the assumption that “AFRICOM represents a militarization of US foreign policy in Africa” and that “AFRICOM will somehow become the lead US government interlocutor with Africa”. She submitted that “this fear is unfounded” (Voldman 2010, p. 45). But Voldman argued that Washington had other interests in Africa besides making it another front in the GWOT, maintaining and extending access to energy supplies and other strategic raw materials and competing with China and other rising economic powers for control over the continent’s resources. Voldman (ibid, p. 45) continued

But while no doubt other objectives existed, it is simply disingenuous to suggest that accomplishing the former three objectives is not the main reason that Washington is now devoting so much effort and attention to the continent. Even General Ward claimed that he was under no illusion about the real aim of AFRICOM in the continent. This includes America’s growing dependence on African oil as a priority issue for AFRICOM (Voldman 2010, pp. 45-46)

According to Francis, “how do we understand the vulnerabilities and the challenges facing Africans and the continent? How are they different from traditional Western explanations and the dominant interpretations of African security challenges and predicaments?” (Francis 2010, p. 19) This is important because it points in the direction of the actual solution to the crises of security confronting the region and indeed the continent. To Obi, AFRICOM was created to hold West Africa captive by external security interests and projects that may undermine the long-term interests of the region and its people (Obi 2010, p. 61). Voldman further argued that US policy objective should be grasped within the purview of US multipronged approach in the process of engaging the continent of Africa. This approach included the War on Terror, as much as the US was poised to challenge China’s
emergence on the continent as an economic power. He asserted that “some people believe that we are establishing AFRICOM solely to fight terrorism, or to secure oil resources, or to discourage China… the US increased its arms deliveries and military training programmes for Africa from about $100 million in 2001 to approximately $600—800 million in 2008” (Voldman 2010, p. 47) Thus, AFRICOM’s overall objectives, focused on the nexus between security concerns, including terrorism prevention, as a prerequisite for development, and development as a bulwark against insecurity, including the root causes of extremist ideologies, dictate that AFRICOM will focus on working with African nations to build their regional security and crisis response capacity (Voldman, 2010). Beebe suggested that “Should the West continue to demand adherence to a traditional view of security, we risk becoming marginalised in the eyes of those who most need a sustainable definition for security” (Beebe p. 100). This is important for understanding the US approach to African security and how the US perceived AFRICOM as a tool for engaging regional security from military, political, economic and human security perspectives.

8:5 Discourses of Regionalism in AFRICOM – ECOWAS Cooperation in West Africa

The main thrust of this section is to explore the link between the objective of AFRICOM and the regionalization effort of ECOWAS.

Pillay insisted that “African countries should also change their approach to this subject by watching non-military subversive AFRICOM and by engaging in a strategic dialogue with the world’s biggest military power towards a win-win solution”. A conference was cosponsored by AFRICOM and the African Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) to facilitate the cooperation and “collaboration between the two Regional economic communities” of ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) (Cambardella 2003). The two bodies met in Garmish, Germany to deal with the issue of maritime safety.
and security. The conference decided that there was need for a strategic approach in confronting the “threats and vulnerabilities” of the African maritime domain with the evidence of “unlawful activities such as illegal fishing, drug trafficking” and other major concerns (Cambardella ibid).

More than 100 participants from 25 nations attended, including representatives from the International Maritime Organization, Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa, Gulf of Guinea Commission, U.S. Departments of State, Justice and U.S. Coast Guard. (Cambardella ibid)

Based on the agreements signed at the conference by the member states of the regional bodies, General Carter Ham concurred that “ultimately, it will be the African states who decide what the right way ahead is and it will be the African states who will be responsible for the implementation of the agreements and the memorandum of understandings” (cited in Cambardella ibid), developed at the conference. Donald Yamamoto, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, under the Bush administration testified to the Congressional Subcommittee about the capacity of the incoming AFRICOM to facilitate a smooth relationship between African regions and the United States. He pointed out that AFRICOM increased “cooperation and building trust bilaterally through its interactions with African regional organizations”. (Yamamoto 2011)

8:6 Conclusion

The main thrust of this chapter was to explain the why and how of US military assistance through the launch of the AFRICOM initiative. The sixth hypothesis in chapter four highlights the assistance that the United States offered to West Africa. This chapter argued that the US considered AFRICOM an answer to the security concerns in the region, due to the assumption in the US policy circles about the need for military security. The creation of the African Command (AFRICOM) was one of the major policy goals of the Bush administration in Africa. The Bush administration sought to bring African actors into the
frame of this new security agenda. Across the Sahel region, there were growing threats to regional security as most of the states in West Africa were characteristically engaged with terrorism in the ungoverned areas of the region. Part of the problem for the states in West Africa was the reality of internal governance crises which helped terrorism and other challenges to state security to flourish resulting in spillover effect across West Africa.

However, as the US officials admitted, the AFRICOM initiative might have been directed at the problem wrongly, as one of the African ambassadors invited to Washington insisted that African actors ranked development higher than military approach to regional and continental security crises. The discussion of AFRICOM in this chapter is a microcosm of the wider security debate in ECOWAS and West African circles. This implies that at the heart of the regional security concerns of West Africa is the development crisis of the region.

Consequently, the speech acts of the core executive justifying AFRICOM, and the Congressional acceptance reflected the sporadic nature of US policy on Africa. AFRICOM’s activities showed that the United States was willing to confront human security challenges in the region, thereby encouraging an overlap with the various agencies already involved in the economic and political sectors. Ultimately, the fact that the US intended to maintain stability in West Africa was a recognition of the weakness of the state and regional institutions which could be strengthened for effective functioning within the regional security sectors in West Africa.
Chapter Nine

Evaluation of Securitization in US West Africa Relation after 9/11

9:1 Introduction

This chapter attempts to show the results of the analysis of the securitization processes of the US policy makers and ECOWAS actors. It is based on the result of the hypotheses in chapter four responding to each of the hypothetical issue raised. The first hypothesis is based on US foreign policy and terrorism. The second and third hypotheses clarified the issues of congressional response to the securitizing claims and how the policies were designed along the political, economic and military security sectors to confront West Africa’s security challenges. Hypotheses four and five concentrated on ECOWAS securitizing claims, based on the security threats from Member States. The sixth hypothesis integrates US and ECOWAS to highlight the causal factors for US intervention at the heights of regional security crisis, such as the Ivorian crisis and whether US intervention was sufficient and why and how insufficient ECOWAS members’ security interactions necessitate such US intervention. For example, the successful securitization of terrorism in West Africa has not resulted in the security of the region.

9:2 Assumptions about Africa Serving as Terrorist Haven Remains Pervasive in US Foreign Policy Agenda.

The Bush administration, posited Quinn (2010, p. 157) “was chiefly associated with unilateralism, interventionism, militarism and an extremely forceful rhetoric of universalist democracy promotion”. This is what Sewell et al (2011, p. 6) implied when they argued that ideology “exerts a significant influence and shapes the way that US policymakers have viewed themselves and the world”. How exactly did the Bush administration make possible its own version of the war on terror (Hozic 2006 p. 61). There is really no doubt that the
Bush administration officials produced realities that suited them, but isn’t that the case with all power. The question may not be what did the Bush administration do make its security case(s), the question may also be why so many Americans go along with it. (ibid). It is difficult to find an overarching purpose in US foreign policy, for it is the result of unpredictable, immediate interest. This is America foreign policy seems to be riddled with contradiction, constantly swinging back and forth between the imperial ‘temptation’ and the ‘refusal of empire’ (Charles-Phillipe 2006). This implies as George Herring insisted, that Americans are blinded to the beliefs and principles of other nations, by “consistently measuring them and appraising them by their own imagined standards”(ibid, p. 6). The decision to toe this line of policy resonates with the view that “any strong power will be tempted to use its power for short term gain rather than to work collectively to institutionalize a long term vision” (Johnstone 2011, p. 220). This, the authors believed “ has led to an endemic failure by the US officials over the last one hundred years to negotiate the difference between American ideals and interests and those of other nations.” The authors further argued

Even during a moment when discussions and negotiations were the event, such an international conference or a summit, the US standpoint has often been rigidly defined and ideological. Some give and take might be necessary, but core American ideals and interests would remain unshakeable. In day-to-day diplomacy, this disparity has only widened as America's sense of itself governed the way it acted toward other nations. To be clear; This has not prevented other nations from influencing the US, but it has created a dichotomy between the theory of how the US sees its role in the world and the reality of the actual international system…. (p. 6)

This type of representation had permeated US foreign policy planners for as long as they related with West Africans. It is not an understatement to posit that Africa or indeed the West African region hardly registered as a serious strategic partner in US foreign policy. The post-9/11 era was not different, despite the protestations of some officials and commentators that policy in the region had been transformed. Also Campbell (1999), as was pointed out in chapter three, believed that the representation of the Other was one of the crucial issues that
needed to be understood in the making of US foreign policy towards the states of the Third World. The representation of the African Other in US policy was confused but always simplified and stereotyped – even if the stereotypes might have changed.

According to Beeson et al (2005) “the rise to power of the neoconservatives in America has reduced the power of the USA to responsibly use it and be trusted leading to waning trust in US power”. US grand strategy was essentially “unilateralism in the clothing of multilateralism”. Quinn argued that “Bush’s America was gripped by a version of imperialist ideology, fuelled by the nation’s immense hard power and universalistic impulses”. Critics have also “approached him from a constructivist and/or post-structuralist perspective, seeking to deconstruct the administration’s use of the concepts of ‘terrorism’ and ‘war’ to justify its policies” (Quinn 2010, p. 158). Contrary to the arguments of Daalder and Ikenberry, (in Quinn 2010, p159), “the Bush strategy represented a sharp break with the past—that there are thick strands of continuity from American history running through Bush.” Bush’s strategy “emerged out of long-standing patterns in the historical evolution of the culture of US foreign policy”. As Buzan et al have argued,

If regional security means ‘the rest of the world as seen from here’, ‘here’ is not a region. From June 2000 to early 2001 the term itself was replaced by ‘states of concern’. With or without the rogue term itself, the move is to construct certain states as irrational, irresponsible, and undeterrable (Buzan 2003 et al, p. 301).

Hentz (2001, p. 185) argued that a quantitative analysis of American policy statements showed that the mention of rogue states grew from zero in 1993 to a peak in 1997. Thus, US foreign policy for sub-Saharan Africa was “mired in the past and held captive by international relations concept lacking the analytical leverage to explain post-Cold War international politics.” Walker and Seegers (2012, p. 31) argued “the lack of Africa coverage maybe interpreted in many ways but strongly suggest continued indifference among Americans towards Africans”.
9:3 The Presidency and the Congress and the Legitimation of Regional Security Policies

From the issues raised above, US foreign policy was based on a type of representation which lead to a position taken by the president and legitimated by the Congress. Regh’s (1997, p. 241) discussion of Habermas and the experience of people in “real political discussions” showed that “arguments are not to be had except in exceptional cases”. Once it is clear that there was need for arguments and topics were up for discussion, it is healthy to bring reasonable arguments that are opposed to each other, “without surrendering the quest for validity binding decisions”. Regh (p241), contended that “this quest must be redefined as the attempt to bring different (initially opposed) particular audiences, each disposed to its own conclusion, supported by plausible arguments, mutually to shift their allegiances enough to converge on other plausible arguments striking a middle path between the various parties”.

This was not the case with the presidency and the Congress where most of the decisions were based on the president’s use of his power to compel the Congress to legitimate policy proposals, especially with respect to West Africa. Regh further argued that that “a degree of uncertainty attaches to those arguments, assuming the issue is a moral rather than an ethical one. This uncertainty should in turn motivate attempts to find a middle ground upon which a norm can be justified by those affected. No real consensus can ever exult itself as definitively right, however extensive the de facto agreement. This means that dissent always has its justified place in such processes, and that decisions must ever remain open to reconsideration”. (Regh 1997, p242) Matthews et al (1970, p21) argued that there has been a gross overestimation of the amount of information the congressman can have at his disposal and the ability to process and evaluate this information. Sundquist (1981, p247) contended that the lack of capacity of a “fragmented Congress” and the endemic weaknesses of the legislative branch led to the erection of the edifice of the modern presidency “brick by
brick.” For example, “the president, who may have temporized a year or more before making up his own mind, always presses the Congress for instant action” (p. 248). Sundquist contrasted what the president wanted, where he is going with “a Congress that cannot seem to come to grips with the agenda he has given it”. This, according to Sundquist was the perception of the public about the two actors. The Congress floundered in public and arrived hastily at compromises in the open (p. 248). As Senator Robert Byrd submitted ) ”…Senate debate is dying as a legislative art. I believe the Congress is held in low esteem today partially because of this” ( Meyer et al 1999, p. 152). Lindsay (1994, p. 55) argued that on paper, both the Foreign Relations Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee “occupy a central role in congressional decision-making on foreign policy. Their formal jurisdictions give them a say in almost every foreign policy issue. In practice, however, the two committees find themselves remarkably ineffective in shaping US foreign policy.” The reality of this to decision making on West Africa is best understood in the ways in which the executive testimonies to the congressional committee members was based exclusively on the understanding of the executive of the situation or the security threat. Although occasionally, some of the members of the Congress hardly made trips to Africa to gain first-hand knowledge of the issue at stake. This perhaps explained why Zelizer argued that , the Congress was “not an icon of efficiency”, and that the Congress was not “a factory of progressive policy” (2004, p. 166). Congressional members were often more concerned with their re-election and this often guided their interests and preferences , which limited them to parochial concerns (Ross 2003, p. 144). Cooper (2001, p. 352) argued that the president could only benefit from congressional weakness, given the increasing presidential power and prestige in the party system and public opinion. Given the president’s increasing pre-eminence in the party system, the sheer growth of government, party weakness in Congress, and the emergence of domestic and international conditions, “Congress had little choice but
to become an instrument for extending presidential power” (p. 353), the implication was that “Bush and his cabinet became almost entirely free to conduct US foreign policy the way they pleased, congressional requirements for executive accountability became almost inexistent” (Gagnon 2006, p. 114). To Walker (2012) for legislators, “the heightened sense of vulnerability among Americans created a clear cost/benefit ratio: if they opposed measures about security and terror, they would lose political capital. Political and indeed electoral interests drove their speech acts”.

9:4 US Policy was a Half-hearted Response to the Needs of West Africans

Matthews et al (1970, p. 21) pointed to the endemic failure by US officials in a “hundred years to negotiate the difference between American ideals and interests and those of other nations” which remained part of the challenges faced in US foreign policy towards West Africa in the post-9/11 era. The US standpoint had always been “rigidly defined and ideological” which “exerts a significant influence and shapes the way that US policymakers have viewed themselves and the world” (Sewell et al 2011, p. 6). It has created a dichotomy between the theory of how the US sees its role in the world and the reality of the actual international system (Sewell et al 2011, p. 6). As President Bush had contended during his speech at the NSS 2002 “America must stand firmly for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity”. On democracy, the President linked US policy of promoting freedom to mean that there would be “rewards” for the nations that moved forward in the direction of democracy. He also said that the US would “press governments that deny human rights to move toward a better future.” (Bush, 2002). These statements were supposedly the bedrock of the US relationship with West Africa and other regions in the continent. The main challenge has been the lack of effective coordination of policy between the US and the ECOWAS
partners, lack of coordination, that is, in goal setting and understandings of security, as well as in policy definition and implementation.

**9:4:1 Aid, Trade and Military Assistance**

Lyman (2009, p. 117) decried the conflicting aid system in Africa, and the overlapping of the aid agencies. Moyo critiqued foreign aid as “windfalls that envelop fragile developing economies” (Moyo, 2009b). Wiarda suggested that aids usually went to the wrong people

> “the funds were monopolized by the elite and never reached the poor rather than democracy, authoritarianism was the result”.

Wiarda’s observation was based on the claim of African states in need of aid for developmental purposes, arguing that this was never the result of the development assistance, developmentalism assumed that the leaders in these countries were public spirited and desirous of benefitting their people, but in too many cases the leadership has proved greedy, selfish and rapacious; instead of serving public interest, its main goal was to serve its own private interest or those of its family crimes, clan, community or tribe.(2005, p. 67)

Collins believed that

Democracy aids tend to be conflicted with election assistance and civil society aids. Democracy assistance program have a mixed record of success. Aid and technical assistance provided to legislative, judicial and law enforcement institutions- Democracy promotion from the inside- as largely failed to balance the skills away from executive dominance and has general done little to diminish corruption and enhance professionalism.

**9:4:2 Critique of the Millennium Challenge Account**

The criticism of the MCA was that many of the countries did not possess the money and political capital necessary to qualify for assistance from the MCA. (Notini 2007) The least developed nations with the most corrupt and poorly functioning governments will never reach that level of eligibility on their own. Notini concludes that the MCA “does not take into account local conditions, historical legacies and other special factors that may be present in
each eligible country, and therefore potentially inhibits development by limiting the range of choices available to policy makers.”

9:4:3 The Lack of AGOA Mentality in West Africa

The American policy of AGOA which enabled African farmers to export agricultural products to the United States failed to take into account the fact that the American farmers were heavily subsidized in the production of similar products. The US failure to reduce trade barriers and subsidies hold farmers in the developing countries back from penetrating the American market.

As Willoughby argued

AGOA, in other words, is designed to pry open new markets for U.S. goods while making it easier for the United States to extract oil and minerals. And since most of Africa’s oil and minerals are controlled by Western corporations like Exxon, Shell, and Anglo-American, this is hardly an arrangement designed to benefit African businesses. Africa does not have the productive capacity to take advantage of AGOA(2009).

Africa has suffered lack of growth on account of “structural impediments” and “resource outflows” as well as “unfavourable terms of trade”. The problem of African countries is about all round development rather than trade. The extensive liberalization of the external trade and investment policies of most countries in Africa imposed under the structural adjustment programmes have been the major factors in the deindustrialization, economic decline and social crisis in Africa (Keet 2009).

The disturbing conclusion of Willoughby was that

We need to cut through the deceptive rhetoric of US trade policy and ask the tough questions: Who really benefits from AGOA? Does AGOA enhance welfare and development, or facilitate extraction and exploitation?...It’s America’s turn now, and
it appears that the Obama administration – like Bush before him – is driven by a similarly disturbing vision: a new scramble for Africa. (Willoughby 2009)

In West Africa, according to Schwab (2004, p. 146) “more than 50 per cent lives on 50 cents a day”. Thus, Africa does not have the productive capacity to take advantage of AGOA.

President Bush equated growth in West Africa to a few success stories, as a result of the tariffs eliminated on most African exports to the United States. He wrote

And I saw its impact first-hand when I met entrepreneurs in Ghana who exported their products to the United States. One woman had started a business called Global Mamas. She specialized in helping women artisans find new markets to sell goods such as soaps, baskets, and jewellery. In five years, her company had grown from seven employees to about three hundred (Bush 2010, p. 351).

According to President George Bush

One vital economic initiative was the African Growth and Opportunity Act, which eliminated tariffs on most African exports to the United States. President Clinton signed AGOA; I worked with Congress to expand it. I think about the tens of thousands of Africans who lined the roadsides to wave at our motorcade and express their gratitude to the United States (Bush 2010, p. 351).

He added that in one year, one woman had started a business called Global Mamas specializing in helping women artisans “find new markets to sell goods such as soaps, baskets, and jewellery. In five years, her company had grown from seven employees to about three hundred”. (p. 351) This was not the case in the francophone West Africa. Diarra (2005) lamented the lack of “AGOA mentality” by most African traders and the challenges faced by the French speaking traders’ inability to communicate in English. Part of the challenge had been raising enough funds for the planning of the production of brochures in different national languages, especially in languages where Fulani artisans. Diarra stated that,

we never had money to do so. We planned to train people in business negotiations, to train people even in English to create sites, e-mail addresses. All this is contained in our activity program and all that is needed today. All our requests have gone unheeded.
In fact, Benin Republic “exported almost nothing to the United States since it became an AGOA member, but has imported some $600 million worth of US goods that have significantly undercut local producers” (Willoughby 2009) In line with the failure of AGOA policy in West Africa, Copson (2007) argued “US programmes are much overrated”. America, he argued “gives with one hand and take with the other.”(p. 37) Willoughby concludes

We need to cut through the deceptive rhetoric of US trade policy and ask the tough questions: Who really benefits from AGOA? Does AGOA enhance welfare and development, or facilitate extraction and exploitation?...It’s America’s turn now, and it appears that the Obama administration – like Bush before him – is driven by a similarly disturbing vision: a new scramble for Africa.

The failure of African traders to penetrate the American market did not only render the previous AGOA policies by former President Clinton weak, it also continued under the Bush administration.

9:4:4 AFRICOM and the Challenge of Militarization of West Africa

Singh believed that (2003, p. 64) “9/11 powerfully reconfirmed the Bush team’s approach: military strength as a necessary but insufficient condition of assuring the national security of a unique nation, political system and people...”. . LeMelle (2008) insisted that “oil was at the centre of the intersection between growing militarization and U.S. economic interests in Africa. The total amount of “U.S. military sales, financing and training expenditures for eight African countries considered particularly strategic for the “war on terror” “increased from about $40 million over the five years from 1997 through 2001 to over $130 million between 2002 and 2006”. General Ward who was one of the founding members of the AFRICOM refused to accept that US policy had progressively been militarized in Africa, even before the launch of the African Command. (AFRICOM).

Voldman believed that US interest in the African Command by the US was borne out of
America’s interest in the oil rich gulf of Guinea, “which they have been angling to take over.” (Voldman 2010)

The launch of AFRICOM in the war on terror complicated the perception of US objective for launching the initiative. As Miles stated “Many millions of citizens perceive WoT as war on Islam.”. In fact Islamic fundamentalism was “perceived to be an Islamic attack on Christian values” (p. 449). This further placed Washington Africa policy within the frame of a “terror-centric policy” (p. 451) in West Africa. Jhazbhay (2010, p. 76) argued that half of Rumsfeld’s regime change strategy was located in Africa. Also, Africa represented a threat to Western interests, but also had strategic value due to the availability of huge oil deposits. (ibid, p. 76) Seybolt argued that threats that most African governments and people face were not military in nature, yet, America expended too much efforts to strengthening security forces. He argued that in general, military activities raised suspicions and fears among governments had not requested such activities, even if they were intended to be helpful. African leaders’ response to AFRICOM, ranged from hostile to cautious, while militarized foreign policy ranked higher than interests in representative civilian rule, the rule of law and the protection of human rights in US foreign policy priorities.

9:5 West Africa’s Challenges were the Result of Bad Governance and the Failure of Regionalism

In line with the US policies discussed above and the lack of those policies serving as critical agency for regional security, West African states continued to have insecurity which render meaningless US intervention in the political, economic and security sectors. The intervention of the US in Liberia, for example, led to the problem being removed for a while, while the subregion continued to struggle with other aspects of insecurity characteristic of states in the region. Regional security concerns such as terrorism, state weakness, poverty, illegal oil bunkering, smuggling, drug trafficking and state corruption remained the major
threats to the stability of West African states and also continued to challenge ECOWAS Member States. The state actors did not exploit the channels of their direct with the American policy makers to make demands based on the reality of their needs at the state level. Part of the reason for this was the lack of consensus on what the needs of their people were. More often than not, it was the US actors who determined what the problems were and how to fix them in West Africa, despite sometimes claiming that the US was only helping Africans to solve their problems. The attitude of the state actors towards regionalism or regional integration was aimed at using regionalism to serve private ends. Sometimes, state actors repressed local opposition thereby preventing the resolution of crises that would have been nipped in the bud. Consequently the problem either continued to rage on as new ones developed in the course of time. At the other extreme the blame is placed on Africa’s leaders and their greed. …evidence of the massive embezzlement of the continent’s products, resources, and larger proportions of whatever comes from outside in the form of aid, to support it. Furthermore, African leaders were accused of lacking vision and commitment to move the continent forward. It is this lack of leadership that is blamed for the failure of the African integration project. (Adar et al 2010, p. 246) Consequently as ECOWAS (2006) admitted, quantitative analyses of the profile and determinants of poverty in West African countries have confirmed that poverty remains the worst “plague” in the subregion. Moreover, numerous studies on the progress of countries towards the MDGs indicated that advances in the fight against poverty remained modest, fragile, and fall far short of what was required to meet the MDG challenge. The region, plagued by a growing number of “ills” and transnational challenges such as infectious diseases (malaria, HIV/AIDS) and national conflicts, whose effects transcend national borders. This threat destroyed the little physical and human capital the countries of the region accumulated during four decades of development. Most conflicts in the subregion broke out either as a result of the inequitable
distribution of wealth (e.g. conflicts in oil-producing countries), or as a consequence of pressure from the renewed forces of multipartism and democracy (Okolo 2010, p. 112). Some leaders try to stem such pressure “by using various ploys (such as arbitrary amendment of the constitution for electoral purposes, blatant manipulation of the electoral process); while others opportunistically take advantage of the situation by playing on regional, ethnic, religious and other differences for electoral ends, thereby generating or exacerbating social tensions” (ECOWAS 2006). A United Nations report stated that the “combination of coups from the top and insurgencies from below render West Africa in the opinion of the UN the least politically stable region in the world (Raidt et al, 2010).

9:6 The Habermas’ Ideal Speech Act has Little Relevance in ECOWAS Actors Decision Making Process at the Regional Level

Habermas’ “ordering of discussion in time and space” dealt with “who can participate, in what order, and so on; ‘internal organization’ denotes the ‘universal pragmatic regulation of speech act sequences’ according to the principles of understandability, truth, rightness and sincerity” (Outhwaite 1994, p. 43). Also Outhwaite (1996, p. 188) distinguished between practical discourse that ethical discourse arguing that claims to truth could not be monological, but should help to shape the views of the actors and what they eventually agreed upon. Finlayson (2005, p. 32) linked ethical discourse to the evaluation of ends, by “assessing what is ‘good for me’ or ‘for us’”. What Habermas referred to as a “practice of reaching mutual understanding where subjects acting communicatively try to deal with their everyday problems together” (Habermas 1986, p. 285) was lacking in the workings of the regional organization.

The reason for this is due to the authoritarian disposition of the ECOWAS actors. Part of the reason is that there was no clarity in the process through which ECOWAS dealt with the security problems of the states at the regional level. At the most, each of the states continued
to manage their crisis on an individual basis, disregarding the policy agreements signed by each member of ECOWAS. West African democracies are elite driven lacking in depth. Over 60% of the populace in the countries live below the poverty line. As such, “the struggle for survival is very grim with a lot of people preoccupied mainly with the pursuit of existentially and living by the day. This feeds into apathy, lethargy and sometimes sheer indifference to broad social issues” (Obi 2003, p. 24). Obi further argued that it is noticeable that public expenditures and government budgets largely remain shrouded in secrecy, and are couched in highly technical and professional language. Very little space is offered to citizens to raise questions about expenditures, priorities and the investigation of corruption, wastage and misappropriation of funds. According to Vavrynen (2003) the interests of political elites remain primary in keeping cooperation going in organizations. Elites promote and restrain cooperation on the basis of its impact on their domestic power positions.

According to Bach (2004, p. 80), supranationalism, “whether based on common institutions or organized around core states, is neither a universal panacea nor the deux ex machine of successful regional policies.” The ECOWAS treaty of 1993 “represents a curious succession of shortcuts, since it endorses a pattern of decision-making typical of authoritarian rule”. (ECOWAS 1993) As Bach pointed out, Article 9 of the treaty stipulates that the powers of the Authority of Heads of State should “automatically enter into force…90 days after their signature.” Bach argued that this gives the impression that ECOWAS leaders are such omnipotent rulers who “commit their countries to agreements without a ratification process” (p. 80). The lack of legitimacy and participation through interaction in policy making was construed to be threatening to the survival of ECOWAS (Kofour 2006, p. 84). Without the inputs of decisionmaking structures and agencies of restraint like national parliaments and domestic courts, ECOWAS had failed “to promote faster implementation of ECOWAS decisions.”(ibid, p. 80) Thus, regionalism is used merely as a tool for the perpetuation of the
elite in power, instead of being used to reclaim the notion of finding “African solutions to African problems” (see Okolo 2010, p. 107) dependency, weak regional security complex, insecurity) and the wider implications for International law. Koffour (2006, p. 77) insisted that West Africa is challenged by a “supposedly ignorant population, under developed society, and rulers enjoying the glory of liberation from colonial rule produced the post-independence charismatic leaders in Africa. These factors help to create conditions for the national ruler to have virtually absolute control over decision making in general and foreign policy making in particular”. There was very little space for citizen participation in foreign policy matters within the Community (Kuffour 2006). Work published on foreign policy-making in West Africa indicated that there were generally accepted views that “public opinion was unnecessary on account of the assumption that the elites and the citizens share the same views on foreign policy” (p. 78) although Kuffour’s argument was based on state elite decision making which indicated that there was an elite-mass gap foreign policy decision-making (p. 78) in the states, it was a wider regional problem. This was backed by the argument of Bach (2004), who attempted to link the problem of ECOWAS to the state political structure. As Bach (p. 85) put it, “the frequently denounced lack of commitment of states to sub-regional integration is often a replication of patterns prevailing within their own borders”. States “do not have full control of their territories.” Not surprisingly therefore, there was “very little concern for the citizen input into decision-making on patterns relating to the community” (p. 79) To Katznelson et al (2002)“condition must be provided for unfettered communication to allow people to mediate among themselves through discussion and argumentation and to understand the hegemonic discourses in which they take part. Such full and free discussion is necessary if liberal democracy is to be more than a cover for the reproduction of inequality”

9:6:1 The Weakness of ECOWAS in the Integration of West African States
While UEMOA had been credited with running a successful regional economic system, ECOWAS has been burdened with structural economic and security difficulties. This explained why the citizens of ECOWAS Member States lacked the privilege of finding greater opportunities and to be more productive so that they can live better and longer lives”. (Moss 2007, p. 2) More than half of the population of West Africa lived below the poverty line (Schwab 2004, p. 146). Most states in the region did not meet the criteria of the UN human development index, which harnessing resources at the regional level could have helped to achieve (Moss 2007, p. 2). Lack of integration made ECOWAS incapable of helping the region to “share in the global gains of political and economic design” (Akude 2009, p. 313). By organizing a seminar in Washington for UEMOA Member States “to elaborate on plans for expanding trade and investment potentials between the two parties and to reinforce trade capacities in West Africa” (ECOWAS Press 26/11/2002) the United States further helped to widen the existing gulf between the Union economique et monetaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA) and ECOWAS. Akindele linked the problems of international cooperation and the management of conflict, to five reasons. The first was the tyrannical legacies of colonial rule which created the visibly permanent Anglophone, francophone divide. Second, France’s overwhelming post-colonial presence in, and control of, francophone West African states. Thirdly, the seemingly greater loyalty of the French speaking states towards metropolitan France. Fourth, the suspicion and fear of hegemonic domination by Nigeria as a regional “superpower”; and the fifth was the resurgence of democratic governance. (Akindele 2003, p. 322) Kabia (2009, p. 64) critiqued the intended free movement of persons across borders, contending that it remained difficult in much of West Africa. Most states “still maintain numerous checkpoints and ECOWAS citizens are subjected to harassment and extortion”. Reflecting on impediments to unity, Nigeria Guardian reported that trade among members of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS) remained very low, standing at about 11 per cent (Guardian Nigeria 08-10-2010). As Adebayo had alluded, “imperial rivalries have spoiled integration in Africa” (cited in Ojo et al, p. 175). Also Taylor argued that interdependence with a non-regional actor and the dependence on imperial powers were vital aspects of postcolonial West African politics. Despite the improvement of the percentage rate of GDP growth between 2001 and 2003 when it was 3.5, 1.8 and 6.7 percentages respectively, the impact on the economic growth at the regional level remained minimal. Although the region is an important source of oil export and energy resources, the overreliance on primary products is one of the impediments to the ECOWAS regional building efforts. Under Nigeria’s chairmanship at ECOWAS, there was gross neglect of the priority such as the completion of work on the creation of a customs union, negotiations on the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), the development of agricultural and environmental policies as well as the state of peace and security in the region (Adisa and Okeke Region Watch 2010) When the French created UEMOA in 1994 to replace the old organization, UMOA, the aim was to further integrate the fiscal and monetary policies of the francophone states. The CFA franc had been a crucial pillar of Franco-African postcolonial economic structures, this further exposed the division between the francophone and the Anglophone states in West Africa. African politicians accord French companies special access to markets and a competitive edge over investors from other countries. In return, France provides investment credit, development assistance, and guarantees of military protection in international conflicts. As Helibrum had contented, francophone African states lack a foreign policy autonomous of French wishes. (1998) Adedeji believed that the UEMOA could retard West Africa’s integration process. He believed that there remained a profound concern that West Africa’s position in Africa would be further weakened if there was no attempt by the region to integrate. This concern was prompted by the fact that the changes in world economy would put the sub-region in a
disadvantageous position. (2004, p. 55) He argued that the CEAO and UEMOA had trade liberalization schemes which were not realistically different from those of ECOWAS (Adedeji, ibid p. 56). In 1990, Cote d'Ivoire accounted for 75 percent of total intra-CEAO exports while it absorbed only 13 percent of total imports. Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria had respectively 42 and 30 percent of total intra-ECOWAS exports and 18 and 4 percent of imports (ibid). Cote d'Ivoire therefore stood closest to Nigeria in the region as a regional power. However, much of its strength was derived from metropolitan France, the former colonial power. Nigeria’s vision transcended the domestic political environment and ECOWAS served its purpose of regional ambition, which Cote d'Ivoire lacked under Houphouet Boigny. Massey contended that the creation of ECOWAS might be taken as a proof that West African States had “bridged the historic colonial 'francophone-anglophone divide', a residual suspicion remains between the anglophone bloc--Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Gambia and the francophone bloc--Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal, Guinea, Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger”. (Massey 2006, p. 89) He further asserted that at times “a francophone axis has also set apart Nigeria, the natural regional hegemon, as a specific rival. The effectiveness of ECOWAS in the area of conflict management has been undermined by this fundamental disunity” (p. 89).

Past French leaders, including Francois Mitterand acquiesced to the fact that Africa was an important source of strategic raw materials for the French economy. Since the 1994 devaluation of the CFA and the creation of the euro in 2002, there have been major adjustments in francophone economy. As Adedeji (in contribution to Adebajo et al, 2004) argued, UEMOA states did not gain from the creation of a strong euro. In the francophone zone, import remained the preferred option to exports. Balance of payments in the UEMOA states were thereby adversely affected, making their economies less competitive. The strategic thinking which was needed to boost export was limited, and there were intraregional
trade barriers, coupled with lack of measures to promote non-traditional exports (Cobham and Robson, 1997). This, no doubt had not offered prospects for a broader regional development agenda both within the UEMOA states and at the level of ECOWAS. This perhaps is what Boas means when he wrote that “The poverty of ECOWAS members, the undiversified structure of their economies, the economic, cultural, political and ideological differences between them as well as the political instability of many member countries have entailed that ECOWAS remains a “dead letter office” in international politics. (Boas 2001, p. 31) Francophone member-states tend to see the political progress in a French-speaking state as a sign of francophone economic security. The split in regional allegiance of the member states towards different allies, especially in the West continues to deprive the member states of ECOWAS of the much needed integration for prosperity and economic development. For example, the Senegalese have chosen the French consistently since independence. José Mario Vaz, Chairman and Finance Minister of Guinea-Bissau had expressed concerns over the impact of the “rise of food as well as petroleum products in most EU countries” and the Ivorian crisis as the contributory factor to the “disruption of distribution channels” and the “increase in the level of inflation” in the francophone community. Mr. Vaz was optimistic, saying that "The return of peace in Côte d'Ivoire is likely to improve the performance of our economies." (UEMOA 27/06/2011). UEMOA remained the economic institution which powered the economy of the Francophone states and is even considered as “superior” to ECOWAS (Akonor 2010, p. 72). Bach (2004, p. 85) contextualized this as a problem limiting the capacity of ECOWAS to meet the needs of its citizens. He argued that

the discriminatory treatment accorded to ECOWAS citizens from other countries often does not differ that much from the insecurity that ECOWAS nationals may encounter within their own borders on grounds of nonindigeneity, the political affiliation, or social status.
Adedeji (2004) also agreed that the organizational structure of UEMOA made it somewhat more efficient than ECOWAS. Thus, the lack of proper understanding of the meaning of integration (Ninsin 2009), “parallel integration schemes”, divergent goals and competing markets (Chazan et al 1999, p. 318) are characteristic of the economic structure of ECOWAS. Ben Okolo (2010, p. 112) claimed that “despite the independence of African state, there is noticeable links between most states and their formal colonial powers. These states maintain social cultural, economic, political and military links making them “appendages of neo-colonial outposts”. The relationship created neo-colonial dependence…. ” Gbeho (2011b) that in 2010, “the region achieved an estimated growth rate of 6.2 percent”. The chairman admitted that the figure masked “significant disparities between the States” and remained below the minimum 7 percent economic growth rate “required for the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)”


ECOWAS did not generate sufficient security interaction to merit the requirement of a security complex with the consequence of US overlay in the post-9/11 era. ECOWAS could not generate enough security interaction needed for a security complex to withstand the pressure of insecurity and regional threats. This is reflected in four issue areas. The first one is the absence of integration which Kelly translated to mean strong sovereignty. The second one is the cooperation which was often weak, whenever they chose to work together. The third one is the cooperation existing between the US and West African states aimed at removing a threat jointly. This was seen in the case of Cote d'Ivoire. The fourth dynamic is related to the US attempt to develop a long term approach to instability, leading to the creation of AFRICOM. Apart from AFRICOM, US had militarily cooperated with the states in the region, leading to the stationing of US troops in virtually all the states in West Africa between 1999 and 2009 (Kane 2009).
France maintained a strangled hold on its former colonies up to and until the late 1990s (Okolo 2010, p. 12) currently seven African countries still maintain legal frameworks for defence. Kelly’s (2007) approach of the crisis of regionalism and the external actors overlay at the regional level contrasted the domestic security challenges of the states with their lack of capacities to generate security at the regional level. He argued that “what might otherwise be externalities become internalities”. This implied that the states internalized their security challenge without the willingness to cooperate regionally in the resolution of the security threat. According to Kelly, “containing those internalities is hard to achieve alone. In the Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS), Nigeria neighbours are resisting its hegemonic efforts. These tension soften doom the organisation to irrelevancy. Thus regional conflict can only be brokered by hegemonic intervention” Kelly (2007, ibid) insisted that

There is need for overlay because ostensible local conflict managers are paralysed. As a result some regional organisations characterised by relative consensus have explicitly not sought to become regionally inclusive in order to maintain their efficacy.

Most of the intervention mandated by the West including those by the UN and unilateral interventions were launched when their interest were at stake, and not just because Africans were at the risk of death, rape. Adedeji (2004, p. 47) stated that “without a strong and sustained political commitment, regionalism will not take root in West Africa, let alone develop and prosper. Political leaders are therefore key factors to the success of regional cooperation and integration processes... successes have occurred only when political commitment was present. It is when such commitment is absent, or is very weak, that decisions are difficult to reach, that their implementation proves even more difficult, that no consistent effort is made to align national priorities with regional objectives, and that meeting financial and budgetary obligations becomes increasingly clear”
Despite democratic governance as earlier argued, the region remained strongly embedded in the culture of authoritarian decision making. The economic cost of conflicts was high and “regional” ECOWAS became particularly proactive and has acquired considerable experience in “Preventive Diplomacy and Mediation”, (ECOWAS 2006) Building a strong region when there is no willingness to part with state sovereignty. ECOWAS lacked the “resources and the will to soldier on self-reliantly”, ECOWAS leaders “abandoned their own strategies…” (Oyugi 2009, p. 163). According to Ninsin:

So far, Africa’s integration has assumed two forms—both of which have proved inefficient and inconclusive. The inconclusive experiments with the regional economic integration projects clearly reveal the poverty of their underlying assumptions. The idea of basing the arrangement of the regional economy on cooperative effort has equally been futile. (Ninsin 2009, p. 126).

Mohammed (2009, p. 63) argued that there were complications in the operations of ECOWAS and the AU due to the “overlapping mandates of AU and regional economic communities (RECs)”. Mohammed identified the problem faced by ECOWAS and the other subregional organizations within the African Union as one of “overlapping membership and confusing mandates” which resulted from the “complex landscape of sub-regional organizations” (ibid, p. 63). This compromised the effectiveness of ECOWAS as an agency of development security and stability in West Africa. So Mohammed concluded that, “some of Africa’s RECs are paralytic and are indeed wrecks”. (Mohammed 2009, p. 63)

The progress achieved by ECOWAS and UEMOA were largely externally driven due to the predominant role ascribed to external donors and foreign agencies of restraint in the field of development cooperation and integration. (Bach 2004) Shaw argued that the perception about Africa was that of “Africa as a democratically weak region in need of external support “(Shaw 2002, p. 181). Yet, as Ogaba (2003, p. 184) noted, the involvement of the US in the Liberian war was limited to the evacuation of American citizens at the beginning of the war. Some perceive intervention as a means of replacing entrenched rulers
in Africa with leaders more friendly to the West, and to Western economic interests, including opening up profitable opportunities for private sector actors. (Democracy promotion article) To Miller (2005) “yet, for the short run, democratization in weak states may further weaken the state and bring about its disintegration”. “Thus, regional integration/liberalization and regional conflict resolution/state-building constitute distinct and competing approaches to regional peacemaking”.

West Africa’s regionalization process exposed the “inability of African states to seek proper mandates or secure the implementation of policies within their own countries” (Bach 2004, p. 85). The recent the implementation of the exclusionary policy of Ivoirité (Bach 2004, p. 85) highlights the challenge in the region and the tendency of the different state actors to support one party against the other thereby complicating the crisis of security first in the subregion and later providing a greater challenge for the regional actors. This is to say that most of the states have domestic problems and yet they never surrender parts of their sovereignty to the regional institution. The natural consequence was for external actors to intervene. This was very evident during the Ivorian crisis in 2010/2011. The point being made here is that state sovereignty continued to be a hindrance to the capacities of the regional actors to utilize the regional level institution, that is, ECOWAS to confront their problems. The effect was that when a major crisis broke out, ECOWAS invited external actors for helping to resolve the crisis and remove the security threat. This perhaps explained why the United States found AFRICOM to be indispensable in Africa, leading to the castigation of the policy as the militarization of Africa. As Warkani had pointed out, there was an obvious lack of adequate regional cooperation within the ECOWAS that could generate enough regional security and economic stability.

9:7 Conclusion
This chapter has examined the outcomes of US foreign policy towards West Africa. It also showed the result of the hypothetical issues raised on ECOWAS securitization in West Africa. The result showed that US officials’ assumption of terrorism as a threat to US national security was (at the time) unfounded. It also showed that the Congress had not always been in the position to challenge the securitizing claims of the president about Africa. The Congress had to succumb to the president’s requests without adequately scrutinizing the claims despite the possibility that their constituents would not approve of the congressional rubberstamping of the president’s policy choices. Consequently, the economic, political and military security policies aimed removing the threats to regional security produced modest results. The result of ECOWAS indicated that security interactions were insufficient and this was partly due to the lack of regional integration in ECOWAS Member States. The states continued to hold on to their sovereignty. The idea of integration was necessitated by the state elite’s desire for self-preservation, and not based on any willingness to ensure the survival of ECOWAS as an institution. Consequently, the resulting crises in West African states required the involvement of an external actor such as the United States. The fact that the United States responded sporadically to security concerns in the region, further exemplified its lack of strategic interest in West African affairs. Institutional weakness was a factor; lack of understanding of the impacts of that institutional weakness on the implementation of policy and the consequent inability to address it was equally important.
Chapter Ten
Discussion and Conclusions: US and West Africa Relations in the post-9/11 Era in West Africa

10:1 Introduction

This dissertation has given a detailed account of the impact of US policy in West Africa. It has not ignored policy processes in Washington, but the main thrust of the argument throughout has been to explore the impact of US policy in West Africa on securitization, and on the US’ ability to achieve its own security goals alongside the ability of regional institutions and individual states to act effectively. The main argument has centred on the complexities and incoherences one can observe when asking how these different levels of security and securitization interact. At the same time, there have been very significant differences in security discourse, in intentions, and in definition of the situation. But key to the interpretation of events and processes, the core explanation offer in the thesis, is the more sophisticated conception of security and securitization deployed here. Buzan began the process of widening the conceptualisation of security by adding the categories of economic, societal, and ecological security to that of military/state security. These new issue areas embraced the discourses on global war on terror, anti-globalization, and clash of civilizations. But they also identified overlaps and intertwining elements of the dimensions of security – they cannot be boxed off from each other. Security analysts argue that “many different aspects of globalization now combine to increase the dangers of a variety of transnational threats from weapons proliferation, cyber-attacks, ethnic violence, global crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation and the spread of infectious disease” (Fagan and Munck 2009, p. 2). The referent objects of security are securitized by the regional and the nonregional actors within the context of US securitization and ECOWAS regionalism. Thus, the regional level is conceptualized “as the locus of conflict and cooperation for states and as
the level of analysis for scholars seeking to explore contemporary security affairs to understand better the emergence and variation of regional security order “(Farrell et al 2005, p. 7). This provides the ground for identifying and understanding “when and how great powers, like the United States, can best contribute to regional stability” (Farrell et al ibid, p. 7). Thus, “regional security complexes are major arenas of conflict and security affairs” (Lake and Morgan 1997, p. 27). And Linklater used a critical theory grounded form of discourse analysis to advocate for the inclusion of the Other or the subaltern in the analysis of international politics (Linklater 2006). These discourses include the “emergence of discourses around non-Western cultures” and the need to shake off “moral assumptions and cultural symbols which do not contribute to a more just world order” (Linklater 1992, p. 1637). Buzan et al (1998) identified levels of analysis, security sectors, that is societal, economic, political, environmental, and military security and linked them to regional activities as emblematic of post-Cold War developments in global security politics. Security interpretations in the post-Cold War era tends to “crystallize around referents marked as dangers” (Campbell 1998, p. 2). Campbell suggested an “understanding of the necessarily interpretive basis of risk” which have “important implications for “real” dangers in the world”. Security threats categorized as “infectious diseases, accidents, and political violence (among others) have consequences that can literally be understood in terms of life and death”. (ibid, p. 2) They are “a veritable cornucopia of danger” and risks which, to Campbell can only be interpreted “through an abundance of their dangerousness” (ibid, p. 2). To Waever (1995)

If we want to rethink or construct the concept of security it is essential that we keep an eye on the entire field of practice. ..so we can get at the specific dynamics of that field, and show how these old elements operate in new ways and new places. ( p. 51)

In describing the regional security complex (RSC), Buzan et al (2003, p. 491) posited a “set of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be analysed or resolved apart from one
another”. Lake and Morgan (1997, p. 347) argue that “there is often a strong sense that the states of a given region are all in the same 'regional boat', ecologically, strategically, economically; that they are not pulling together; but that, either explicitly stated or implicitly implied, they should put aside national egoisms and devise new forms of co-operation”.

Securitization involves actors and the audiences of securitization as well as the referent objects. The actors securitize by designating as threat some military, non-military objects as threatening to the existence of the people at the regional level. Such issues or concerns are considered too urgent within the policy domain to be left without an immediate military action. Securitizing actors could be the regional actors who decided to do smoothing about the security concern by taking steps to stop it from threatening the entire region. There is need for cooperation between the nonregional actor and the regional actors for a successful securitization. This is also a requirement at the regional level. Furthermore, the regional level actors need more cooperation to be able to see through their regional security plan evident through securitization and regionalism (Fawcett and Hurrell, 1995; Buzan and Waever, 2003; Lake and Morgan, 1997). There is still need for the clarification of issues such as the role of the non-regional actor in securitization and regionalism as well as the role of regional actors in regionalism and securitization. If the regional actors fail in their bid to securitize successfully, this will always attract the interest of the nonregional actors that have the capacity to help in successful securitization. The link between foreign policy and securitization as well as regional policy and regionalism is crucial for understanding regional security in the post-Cold War era. Securitization and regionalism are aimed at the transformation of the Third World regions in the post-Cold War era. The success of regional securitization is dependent on the securitizing actors and the audience of securitization (Balzacq 2010). Experience evidenced in earlier chapters has shown that nonregional actors securitize successfully in weak regions due to their capacities, in military, economic and
political power positions, while the regional actors often depend on external powers due to their limited capacities (Buzan and Waever 2003). In this case, regional actors sought to assert their own independent role in defining security issues while claiming the urgency of their need for external support.

10:2 US Securitization and West African Security

The United States foreign policy process was based on the assumption that regional security of West Africa would be the ultimate end. However the United States had been criticized for prioritizing its national security interests above regional security in West Africa. It has been argued that “the interests of foreign actors are unwittingly prioritized at the cost of developing the West African region” (Obi 2010, p. 183). According to the World Bank, poverty rates declined significantly in most of the developing world from 1990 through 2002, but in sub-Saharan Africa the proportion of people living on less than $2 per day remained essentially the same—75 percent in 1990 compared with 74.9 percent in 2002. From 1981 through 2002, the number of Africans living at this level of extreme poverty rose from 288 million to 516 million, and continued increases seemed inevitable (Copson 2007, p. 17).

This is despite the inflow of aids from the richer states, including the United States into the region since the 9/11 events. Copson further argued that many sub-Saharan countries experiences of positive GDP growth due to rising world prices for oil and other natural resources. But this did not translate into per capita incomes which remained at abysmal levels in most parts of the region (ibid). For example, the USAID’s strategies and priorities in West Africa are not aligned with ECOWAS’s efforts in improving the conditions of living of West Africans. This, is put more aptly by Lyman (2009) who argued that most of the aid agencies in Africa worked without proper coordination and lacked effectiveness (Howard 2009). This has led to a gestural politics of the Bush administration’s President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and emergency aid for refugees and for famines that is in the end far more expensive than sensible, proactive diplomatic development activities’ (McGovern,
The problem has never been that the United States presidents lacked the understanding of the challenges in the region, but there are constraints in addressing the ‘underlying factors’ which contributed, for example, to the many crises facing West Africans (Melito 2010). Foreign aid as a means of economic growth has been challenged on numerous fronts (Moyo, 2009). George Bush himself admitted that there is need to restructure the aid programme on the continent. Apart from acknowledging the positive impact of aid which he claims proves his critics wrong about the ineffectiveness of US aid programme in the region, he accepts the truth in monitoring US financial assistance in Africa. During the Obama administration, West Africa was less prioritised in the US global investment portfolio. Based on recent research findings, some capital infusionist scholars are realizing that the foreign investment aspect of the development equation is not working well for countries with unpredictable socioeconomic and political conditions like Sierra Leone (Kandeh, 2008). Kandeh (2008) defined ‘institutional syncretism’ as the assumption of institutional capacity in the poverty trap models which fail to address “the power of cultural elements such as values, norms, and expectations to impact and control social and response”. In other words, there are no mechanisms in the African state-system which could bridge the gap between the legal-rational criteria of economic development and “a society that is largely arranged according to syncretic modes of social relations” (Kandeh, 2008, p. 338) Thus, the resource distribution problem is an institutional problem that makes it difficult for aid to reach targeted populations and groups. This has been identified as a major difficulty with foreign aid and it is the reason why it has not served as a policy alleviation tool in West Africa. (ibid) Also AGOA had limited success in boosting US Africa economic relations. Non-African exports fell by 16% (due) to heavily subsidised agricultural export by 2006. Also 93% of AGOA imports were petroleum products between 2005 and 2007 (APF 9th Meeting, 2007). However as Aderemi argued, some of the initiatives of the Bush administration “far exceeded
initiatives of the Bill Clinton administration and helped to ameliorate Africa’s dwindling fortunes” (Aderemi 2010, p. 188). Adebajo (2010, p. 171) argued, “In this absolutist new world order there was no room for nuance of subtlety”. Copson (2007) believed that the Bush administration should have focussed on the real development challenges of the West Africans by dealing with US African policy on health, education and agriculture. This gap seemed to have been partly filled in some parts of Africa and West Africa where China had seized the opportunity of its growing economy to invest across the continent. According to Adebajo, “Beijing’s peaceful rise to great power status is breath-taking” (Adebajo 2010, p. 166)

The challenge of the often informal and always personal nature of state authority in the Sahel and the “varieties of illegal and illicit activities, from cigarette smuggling to carjacking to human trafficking” (McGovern 2010, p. 79) made terrorism enduring in West Africa and threatens the stability of the region. As Voldman (2010, p. 47) noted, “between 2001 and 2008 the Bush administration increased the value of arms deliveries by the American government for military training programmes for Africa from $100 million to approximately $600-800 million”. The creation of AFRICOM in 2007 was perceived as the militarization of US policy in West Africa which would merely worsen the security concerns of the region (Francis 2010). Copson (2007) believed that poverty must be reduced with the evidence of raised per capita incomes as part of achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) which is aimed at halving extreme poverty and hunger by 2015. Obi (2010) warned of the US military activities in the region and argued that it could be destructive to West Africa in the long run. According to Obi,

Attempting to relate African development “to the on-going international fight against terrorism will not only amount to distorting its development priorities”. There is need to distinguish between the “fight of terrorism in Africa and the civil strife in the
region which is a symptom of state-building”. These conflicts could be termed as “local terrorism” or “political terrorism” (Obi 2010, p. 183).

Obi argued further,

The source of the anger that appears to be giving birth to terrorism in Africa is foreign and the resultant terrorist acts and terrorist threats are primarily directed towards external interests rather than Africans and African governments per se. It is thus arguable that development, with all the associated welfare benefits, even if equitably distributed among a country’s population, will not necessarily deter committed terrorists from carrying out their plans. In other words, disenchantment within Africa’s Muslim communities is not a sufficient factor to dictate the direction of the region’s development agenda (Obi 2006)

10:3 ECOWAS Securitization and the Challenges of Security Management

The aim is to develop an argument around the process of securitization and the challenges encountered by ECOWAS actors. This relates to the fact that despite the awareness of the security concerns, at the end of the study, they remained the main security concerns in the region. Secondly, the policy process adopted in fixing these problems were rife with authoritarian tendencies which marginalised the stakeholders. This unsurprisingly produced the effects of policy failure in many instances, in the political, economic and security aspects of regionalism in West Africa. The third challenge is the reality of external intervention which was based on US strategic interest in stabilizing the region and not necessarily changing the security dynamics in West Africa. As Chairman Gbeho (2011a) admitted, “Despite the remarkable progress, ECOWAS itself is the first to admit that the security situation in the region continues to be characterized by fragility and unpredictability. Drug trafficking, Terrorism, money laundering and other forms of international organized crime also continue to undermine the security of the region and constitute a veritable time-bomb.”
Compared to the other regions of the developing world, Africa’s overall performance on the basic welfare indicators such as human development index, life expectancy at birth, maternal and infant mortality, food security, and per capita growth rates lags behind those of the rest of the world (Obi 2010). The African continent has regional institutions established for promoting the security and the prosperity of their respective regions (Ate 2000, Adejumobi and Olukoshi 2009, Chazan et al 1999). However, these institutions are bedevilled with security challenges that have not enabled them to achieve these goals (Mohammed 2009). Most African regions are still left behind in the scheme of development projections that their regional institutions set up for themselves in the twenty-first century (Akindele 2003). This is evident in the three indicators of institutional quality (i.e. control of corruption rule of law and regulative quality). The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, the “series of annual reports investigating the regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it” shows that (states in )West African states countries dominate the bottom for two consecutive years, 2009 and 2010 (Doing Business 2010). The lack of external support be it “from the ex-colonial master or from rival geo-political powers, add crucial factors to state collapse in sub-Saharan Africa” (Obi 2010, p. 199) Boas et al saw efforts to secure lasting peace in Sub-Saharan Africa as imperative and which must be “concerned with social justice, and combined with measures to fight poverty locally, and globally” (Boas et al 2000, p. 204). To Shwab, “Other regions of the world are not interested in what happens in Africa. Their strategic security interest is not there” (Schwab 2004, p. 147). Improvements in welfare indicators in some of the countries in West Africa has been closely linked to a few citizens, with many of the states having lower GDP per person, when compared to those in the southern part of Africa (Economist 03/12/ 2011). According to Gurr, most of Africa’s new states are institutionally weak and dominated by the personal rule of autocrats. They are “soft states”, limited in their control over society, constrained by the
unavailability of human and fiscal resources, and pressured by domestic and international demands (Gurr 1999).

The state remains a critical piece in the puzzle of Africa’s development project. Across the continent the state in Africa has thus remained external and lacks legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens (Korwa et al 2010, p. 248). Unless the current state weakness and fragility is addressed, progress will remain slow. Also democracy from the grassroots and good governance are needed to defuse tensions, strengthen social cohesion and effectively prevent conflicts (ECOWAS & UEMOA 2006). According to Asante there is no compatibility between the “pervasive political instability, crises of legitimacy, and civil strife” and “successful economic cooperation and integration.” ECOWAS member-states failed to honour the protocol agreement during the Ivorian crisis, despite all the actors being signatories to the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance of 2001. Chapter III, Article 46 of the supplementary protocol is an integral part of the agreement “Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention Management Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security”. In reality, the agreement of the protocol was not strictly followed during the Ivorian crisis of 2010, when the member states were split between whether to intervene or not in the crisis.

For West Africa’s many miniscule countries, there is no viable alternative to the type of regional cooperation and integration that inspired the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975. For West Africa, ECOWAS remains the obvious choice for fostering regional economic cooperation and integration. Adebayo insists that all “other integration arrangements in West Africa must be rationalized to eliminate duplication and rivalry.” He further argued that it is only by “achieving genuine economic integration in West Africa that economic cooperation and regional security can be properly linked and armed conflicts eliminated or contained” (p. 47). To Asante (2004, p. 66) the past experiences of regional economic cooperation in West Africa encouraged the “marginalization of ordinary people from the process of regionalism”. 
There was also “lack of democratization and popular participation” required for accelerated economic recovery. These issues remain relevant and in urgent need of resolution in the post-9/11 era within West Africa, despite the progressive movement towards the democratization of states in the region. The usual approach to confronting the challenges of integration and regional security with “empty rhetoric and fruitless debate” (p. 67) continued to hinder the performance of ECOWAS. Asante suggested that “West African countries must ensure the full participation of all sections of their societies in the process of developmental regionalism” (ibid, p. 67). It is not possible to assess exactly how far weaknesses in security policies were a function of popular discontent on the evidence available here – the question goes beyond the scope of this research – but there clearly is some indication here that government and regional policymakers were struggling against a current of popular suspicion when they boarded the US project for West African securitization after 2001.

Adebayo held that without an effective and dynamic ECOWAS, “West Africa’s security mechanism of (1999) will be ineffective and ineffectual” (p. 47). Okolo agreed that only Africans can secure themselves after suggesting that only Africans can secure themselves (Okolo, 2011). Regional peace is enhanced when the strong states help the weak ones and withdraw overtime, as the weaker states build their security complexes (Varynen, 2003): regional security requires levels of cooperation between institutions and governments which were not attained in the 2000s.

Akinkungbe’s (2010, p. 125) suggested African states can only improve if the level of trade along the lines of informal regionalism which had traditionally been a practice in Africa

Many observers of African affairs believe that this level of inter-Africa trade is too small and should be expanded further. It is worth mentioning that the informal cross border trade that remains a vital part of rural African economic activity and the visible integration has been neglected by African countries.
This type of trade benefits from the activities and social ties among same ethnic groups that spread across Africa’s border since it minimises language and cultural barriers (Akinkugbe 2010, p. 126).

10:4 US ECOWAS Cooperation on Demilitarization and Regional Security in West Africa

The contention of Matlosa that there is need for a politics of consensus through democracy holds true. Without development and peace, democracy will forever remain a hollow concept out of reach of ordinary people and understood only by the political elite and serving the partisan (at times self-serving political interests of a small coterie of the powerful elites) (Matlosa 2010, p. 12).

ECOWAS’ capacity to confront insecurity in West Africa often clashed with the challenge of state failure and the weakness of the regional actors to use ECOWAS effectively as a security complex. The United States securitization was therefore predicated on the need to help the regional actors maintain stability at the regional level. The securitization of the US is often based on a sporadic response to the security challenges of West Africa. ECOWAS member states put in place policy processes which often went beyond US security management approach. ECOWAS regionalism is based on confronting the challenges to regional development through political, economic and security regionalisms. ECOWAS regionalism is considered to be the policy approach of the organization to facilitate both the securitization and desecuritization of security issues in West Africa. Due to the lack of a developed security complex in ECOWAS, the capacity of ECOWAS to serve as the tool of emancipation and the organ for security and stability in West Africa remains elusive.

The lack of capacity of ECOWAS in dealing with major regional threats provided the excuse for US militarization in West Africa. ECOWAS member states need to cooperate for the management of security bearing in mind the need for strict adherence to the various
agreements of the organization. The respect of the agreements will usher inadvertently into
the community the era of peace which will lead to less emphasis on securitization which is
always a short term measure to dealing with the challenges of insecurity. This includes the
development of institutions that will promote stability and the removal of small arms and
light weapons (SALWs), used by terrorists and other criminals from the regional community.
The ECOWARN policy, and the fire next door principles must be adhered to in order to
anticipate regional crisis in West Africa.

US securitization should be an attempt to help maintain security and stability in West
Africa when all other options have been explored by the regional actors. This implies that
both the United States and ECOWAS should explore securitization and desecuritization as a
matter of urgency in the process of building a viable regional security architecture in West
Africa as a guarantee for global security. Securitization should also be linked to what Floyd
(2010, p. 6) described as “referent objects benefiting securitization”, which is the ultimate
goal of the external and regional level securitizing actors.

According to Carothers , (in Burnell, 2005 ) the US strategy for democracy assistance
has at best been partial, ill thought-out and inadequate. Ever since the fall of the Berlin wall,
there has been confusion or disagreement over the primary purpose(s) of political strategies
of external support for democratisation and their theoretical jurisdiction.

Miller (2005) argued that “democratization and liberalization in key regional states are
necessary conditions for this type of peace to be attained. During the initial stages of such
liberalization, the presence of a great power hegemon or concert may be necessary because
democratization may initially lead to greater instability and ethno-national conflict.
Following the completion of the liberalization process, however, the presence or leadership of
the great powers will be less needed”. Thus, “Cooperating great powers or the hegemonic
power can stabilize a region, prevent local wars, and advance regional peace…” (ibid) In African states, the exclusionary policies of ethnic discrimination and economic exploitation of the dominant ethno-national groups intent to maintain their control over political and economic systems and the militaries in numerous states” which render the state weak, leading to “high economic and security dependence on the Western powers” (ibid).

Collins (2009) argued that Democracy promotion from the bottom up- has been demonstrated to be the most effective approach to fostering change. Election aid and civil assistance provided by the United States has played a key supportive role in the democratic progress realised in several regions including Africa.

Murphy (in Johnstone 2011) argued that any “strong power will be tempted to use its power for short term gain rather than to work collectively to institutionalize a long term vision” (p. 220). “Debates about Empire, empires and imperialism among policy makers and scholars may have brought our attention to a world much richer in forms of governance and political authority than the state-centred world American realists, but they are still, possibly, just a roundabout way of addressing tremendous power inequalities and unrepentant exercises of military force in the international system….American unilateralism is not necessarily a product of American supremacy…rather, the unilateralism of the Bush administration may be a way of producing and securing that supremacy in the world full of potential power competitors, once power and supremacy are understood as being far more complex than just military. The US must demonstrate a clear understanding of the institutional weaknesses of the states in the region and help to build the political, economic and the societal institutions through the regional body, ECOWAS. The dichotomy which presently exists between UEMOA and ECOWAS needs to be bridged and the US must play a unifying role in the coming together of the two bodies under the umbrella of ECOWAS. The United States needs to reorganize the aid institutions in the region. So far, the aid institutions have performed overlapping responsibilities. This hindered the capacity of the United States to use aid as a
tool for assisting in the development efforts of the Member States of ECOWAS in West Africa. Also, in the post-Cold War era, other actors have emerged on the scene that challenge the power of the United States. Buzan (2004a, 2004b) argued that the global system is multipolar, and that this implied that the United States no longer enjoyed dominance. The EU, and China have as much influence in the international system as the United States in the post-Cold War era. This often confuses the perception of the real objectives of the US policymakers in West Africa. It has been argued that the US stepped up its activities in West Africa mainly to keep the Chinese away from Africa and from West Africa. What is indisputable is that both states have interests in African oil, and so far China has successfully wooed several African states in its drive for access to resources in the new scramble for Africa (Clarke 2008). Without commitment to the twin objective of security and development there is not much to expect at the regional level. US securitization devolves the US policymakers to maintain stability in West Africa. This unsurprisingly explains the reasons for its successful securitization, as Pauly (2011) argued that US operated an ad hoc policy in resolving African crises. The success of US securitization coincided with the urgent need by the ECOWAS Member States for US assistance. Ishmail (2008) argued that there is need for a “cooperative approach based on preventive action (democratization, good governance and the rule of law), cooperation with and support for multilateral institutions in conflict and security management”. (Ismail 2008, p. 392) This, among other policy options in US security agenda should be targeted towards regional security in West Africa. The regional actors should eventually take up the responsibilities of regional security construction in the long term. Emphasis should be placed on greater coordination of most the NGOs for greater coordination of aid and trade policies to meet African needs. Competing proposals for reorganization resulted in a breakdown of the argument between those who argued that “long term economic development must be raised to a higher priority in the US” (Lyman 2009, p.
116) policy making establishments towards West Africa. Also, there has to be broad range of foreign policy objective which include security and other areas of regional development. The resolution of the crisis in West Africa calls for a concerted effort on the part of the ECOWAS Member States and the US actors in a genuine cooperative framework. Assistance from Washington does not have to centre solely on military assistance. This is due to the neglect of human rights and the rule of law perpetrated by the regional leaders. There is need for the United States to work on a cooperative basis with ECOWAS Member States to remove the threats to regional security at the regional level.

10:5 Conclusion

This dissertation has offered an explanation of the weaknesses of US securitization policies and postures with respect to west Africa, but it has not sought to blame the United States alone for these weaknesses. It is clear from the evidence here that a combination of West African state actions, institutional weaknesses, mutual misunderstandings contributed to these processes. This begs the question of what kind of explanation this is. It explains these processes, debates and outcomes drawing primarily on a critical version of Copenhagen School security theory, emphasising in particular the insights offered by Buzan’s regional security theories. It supports that explanation with a detailed interpretation of secondary literature, but also with reference to primary sources which have been analysed to explicate the ways in which discourses have been structured and deployed. The evolution of security policies can be mapped through this kind of discourse analysis. However, the dissertation initially attempted to deploy more fully a version of security theory which related closely to Habermas’ work, but one finding of this thesis is that those theories are less useful in this kind of analysis than the author initially imagined, and Habermas’ role in the conceptual landscape of the thesis has been significantly reduced, but not wholly removed.
It might also be concluded that the thesis does not justify conclusions in terms of *absolute* success or failure. There are clearly elements of more effective security cooperation here, and security policies have not always undermined development. There has, in any case, been significant progress in development in the region in some respects, and other factors come into play which this thesis does not consider in making sense of weakness in development. But the thesis does provide good evidence that security policies at different levels and the achievement of human security in particular as well as prospects for development have been weakened or undermined altogether as a result of the securitization strategies and discourses of key actors, as well as due to their actions rooted in these strategies and discourses. The United States policy towards West Africa after the Cold War took a different direction due to the 9/11 attacks of the United States. The changing politics of the United States was reflected in the attitude of the US policy makers, starting with the president who spoke about a new dawn in US policy attitude towards the regions of the world. The United States should work with the regional actors to ensure that democracy, good governance, rule of law, human rights should be on the front burner of the state and regional building processes. In other words, for the referent objects to be free from threats, there has to be regional policies that recognize the threats and the regional partners must weigh the implications of their actions if there must be a genuine movement towards securing the West African region. Regional actors must differentiate between private interests and public policy and the national interest of the United States must not deny West Africans of benefiting from US securitization and desecuritization. In reality, ECOWAS member-states hardly reflect the spirit of the protocol agreements in their regional activities. It implies that the protocols were signed without any serious intention to realize the goal of regional security and development. The same could be said of the US actors who were content with maintaining stability in West Africa without any strategic plan for regional development. This, no doubt creates the avenue for a re-occurrence
of security crisis in West Africa, which necessitates the intervention of states such as France and the United States in maintaining stability, in the West African region. Securing West Africa in the post-9/11 era is an agenda of the United States policymakers as well as West African ECOWAS members. Whether these actors effectively deploy the resources available to them to realize this goal is crucial, not only for the security and stability of West Africa, but for global security in the post-9/11 era.

What the thesis has not considered at all are the more recent growing security crises in the region due to the spread of religious extremism in Mali, Nigeria, Cameroon and Niger, due to the fall-out from the 2011 conflicts in Libya (which of course continue) and due to the spread of epidemic diseases including especially Ebola and HIV/AIDS, but also older threats which have been renewed due to the impact of civil conflict and the disruption of health services (especially malaria and TB). This is a result of the time frame chosen for the research when it was begun. But the author suggests that an analysis of securitization processes and institutional interactions in shaping policy implementation in the region will be one key element in a future understanding of how these new and greater threats have been addressed. Future research opportunities are, unfortunately, going to be able to build on this research.
ABBREVIATIONS

ACOTA: African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
ACRI: African Crisis Response Initiative
African Competitiveness and Trade Expansion (ACTE)
African Global Competitiveness Initiative (AGCI)
AFRICOM: US African Command
AGOA: African Growth and Opportunities Act
Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
AQIM Al-Qaeda in Maghreb
AU African Union
BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etats de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (BCEAO)
CDA: Critical Discourse Analysis
CEDEAO: Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest
CFA: Coopération Financière d'afrique
CFR: Council of Foreign Relations
COMESA: Community of East African States
Counter-Narcotics and Maritime Security Operations Center (CMIC)
Counterterrorism (CT)
CSSDCA: Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and Cooperation for Africa
DOD: Department of Defence
ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG: ECOWAS-Monitoring Group
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI)
Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC)(Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat)
HIV/AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
MAP: Millennium Partnership for African Recovery
MCA: Millennium Challenge Account
MCC: Millennium Challenge Corporation
NEPAD: New Partnership for African Development
NOC:s (national oil companies)
NSA: National Security Agency
NSS: National Security Strategy
Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI)
PEPFAR: President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
PMAD: Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence
PSI: Pan Sahel Initiative
Small arms and light weapons (SALWs)
Special Forces attached to the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR)
Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs)
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP)
TSCTI: Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Initiative
UEMOA: Union Economique Monetaire Ouest Africaine
USAID: United States Agency for International Development
US: United States
WAEMU: West African Economic and Monetary Union
WAMI: West African Monetary Integration
WoT: War on Terror
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