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This thesis is submitted in part fulfillment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent University for the Degree in Doctor of Philosophy

December 2016
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Abstract

This dissertation is a study of the “policy trajectories” followed by those national governments which, at one point or another over the course of the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 period, were the targets of “successful” Washington-backed regime change campaigns.

My analytical focus is on determining if the “successful” occurrence of a Washington-backed regime change in a non-US country appears to serve as an inflection point in the “policy trajectory” that is pursued by the target country’s national government. I review those policies and policy stances which provide insights into the basic “line” that a given non-US national government adhered to with regard to economic matters, foreign affairs as well as the domestic, non-economic sphere. I make determinations as to whether, after the occurrence of a Washington-backed regime change, the targeted national government became either; 1) more committed or less committed to implementing policies consistent with the principles of a “free-market” capitalist economy; 2) more committed or less committed to making “its own” country hospitable to specifically American private foreign investment; 3) more committed or less committed to aligning its geopolitical stance with that of Washington; 4) more committed or less committed to making “its own” internal political system more genuinely democratic (as opposed to authoritarian;) 5) more committed or less committed to respecting fundamental human rights.

The first three research questions in this dissertation reflect my own ideological inclinations, influenced as they are by certain foundational principles of Marxism. The other two research questions in this dissertation are based on the “mainstream” liberal and neo-conservative outlooks in contemporary western politics. Liberal and neo-conservative intellectuals and public figures generally claim that Washington’s foreign interventions are based on an enlightened and progressive desire to spread the ‘blessings’ of liberal parliamentary democracy and decent human rights practices as widely as possible outside the borders of the US. Three non-US regime changes provide the raw data from which the validity of all five research questions can be evaluated.

A portion of this dissertation is devoted to better understanding critical realism and to explaining how it can serve to provide an important “conceptual-philosophical” support for the Marxist and World-Systems Theory perspectives. The elaboration of the various ontological and epistemological assumptions that critical realism shares with the Marxist and World Systems Theory outlooks takes on is significant given that these outlooks served as the ideological and intellectual well-spring from which I drew the inspiration for the formulation of the three research questions which I am advancing as my own in this dissertation.

Furthermore, I provide explanations for why the utilization of the case-study method not only flows logically from an acceptance and an application in the study process of the central principles of critical realism, but why it may well be compatible with Marxist and World Systems Theory-influenced attempts to understand complex socio-historical phenomena and processes. Critical realism, which emphasizes the vital importance of identifying the existence of particular potential causal factors in the sphere of human affairs, as well as Marxism, with its rather comprehensive and well-rounded vision of what constitutes the sources of exploitation, power and weakness in the modern world capitalist economy, can all see their own explanatory powers being enhanced via the careful elaboration of the kind of detailed historical accounts that constitute positive examples of how the case-study method should be applied for the in-depth analysis and ever-better comprehension of the social world.
Acknowledgments

My ability to successfully complete this work has been to an extraordinary extent contingent upon the varied forms – and considerable amounts – of assistance that people all over the world have accorded me. The exclusion here of the name of anybody who provided me with help at one stage or another during the carrying out of the key research for and then during the actual writing of this dissertation is wholly unintentional and I apologize in advance for any such possible slight.

That having been said, I want to express here my gratitude for the enormous degree of help that, over the course of seven-plus years, my professors, Dr. Roy Smith and Dr. Christopher Farrands, have provided to me every step of the way during the often arduous “journey” from the beginning to the end of this project. Their help has been absolutely indispensable and, for this, I want to let both of them know just how sincerely appreciative I am for all that they have done for me over the course of the period that I have been enrolled as a graduate student at Nottingham Trent University.

Neglecting to mention the help – in the form of finances, encouragement and otherwise – that my Mother, Margaret Weinstein, has provided to me for the purpose of finally arriving at the end of this nearly eight-year academic “marathon” would simply a genuinely unforgiveable “oversight,” and that is why I want to, indeed absolutely must, here extend a heartfelt “Thank You !” to her for her truly essential role in enabling me to this dissertation’s “finish line.” My Aunt, Lauren Diamond, has similarly been extremely supportive all through the “thick-and-thin” of the process of working on and then finally completing this dissertation, and I also want her to know just how grateful I am to her for all that she has done to contribute to the realization of this dream – my receipt of a doctorate.

Similarly, I want to thank my half-sister, Laura Knight, for the yeoman’s work that, over the course of a number of months, she rather efficiently performed in substantially reducing this dissertation’s word count. The hours and hours that she put it have resulted in this dissertation not exceeding this university’s “word-total” regulations and I am formally handing it in today in large measure because of this “labor of love” of hers.

Again – it is entirely possible that I may have neglected to mention the assistance that, at one point or another during the course of “working my way through” this dissertation, one or another family member, friend, colleague or associate, etc. granted me. To those people whose contributions to this dissertation I may have neglected to discus in this section, I want both to apologize and also to assure that, I have not forgotten you or what you have done for me.

To everyone – explicitly mentioned in this section or otherwise – who stood by me in my time of need while working on this project, I would simply like to say: “Thank You !, Thank You !, and Thank You Again !”
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List of Abbreviations

ACP – Albanian Communist Party
BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
BCP – Bulgarian Communist Party
BSP – Bulgarian Socialist Party
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency (of the United States of America)
CNN – Cable News Network (primarily based out of the United States of America)
CSCE – Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DA – Democratic Alliance (in Albania)
DC – District of Columbia (in the United States of America)
DLK – Democratic League of Kosovo
DOS – Democratic Opposition of Serbia
DP – Democratic Party (of Albania)
DPS – Democratic Party of Serbia
DP – Democratic Party (Serbia)
EBRD – European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EU – European Union
FDI – Foreign Direct Investment
FEC – Federal Election Commission (of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)
FISA – Federation of Independent Student Associations (in Bulgaria)
FISS – Federation of Independent Student Societies (in Bulgaria)
FRY – (former) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP – Gross Domestic Product
GPE – Global Political Economy
ICJ – International Court of Justice (in the Hague, the Netherlands)
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IFIs – International Financial Institutions
IMF – International Monetary Fund
IRI – International Republican Institute (from the United States)
KFOR – Kosovo Force (NATO-led)
KLA – Kosovo Liberation Army
KVM – Kosovo Verification Mission
LAPMB – Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja, and Bujanovac (localities in ex-Kosovo Serbia)
MFN – Most-Favored Nation (status for country-trading partners of the United States of America)
NAM – Non-Aligned Movement
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI – National Democratic Institute (from the United States)
NED – National Endowment for Democracy (from the United States)
OPEC – Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
US OPIC – United States Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PfP – (NATO’s) Partnership for Peace
PLA – Party of Labor of Albania
PBS – Public Broadcasting System (in the United States)
REC – Republican Electoral Commission (in Serbia)
RP – Republican Party (in Albania)
RTS – Radio Television Serbia
SDP – Social Democratic Party (of Albania)
SFRY – (former) Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SPA – Socialist Party of Albania
SPP – Serbian Progressive Party
SPPM – Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro
SPS – Socialist Party of Serbia
SRP – Serbian Radical Party
SUSM – State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (successor state of FRY)

UDF – Union of Democratic Forces (in Bulgaria)

UHRP – Unity for Human Rights Party (in Albania)

UK – United Kingdom (of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

UN – United Nations

US – United States (of America)

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WB – World Bank

YUL – Yugoslav United Left
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This dissertation explores the role of the United States in promoting regime change in post-Stalinist Europe after 1989. It examines in depth three regime changes, those in Albania, Bulgaria and former Yugoslavia/Serbia, which, with Washington’s critical support, successfully unfolded between January 1, 1990 and September 10, 2001. In this period, there were seven such regime changes, two in Haiti (in 1991 and 1994), one apiece in Nicaragua (1990), Afghanistan (1992), Bulgaria (1990), Albania (1991-1992) and Serbia (2000), but for reasons that I will briefly mention in this introduction and elaborate in more depth in the Literature Review, this study concentrates primarily on the three last mentioned cases. My decision about which cases to explore was not principally based on the fact that Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia are all located in the same basic geographic region, and it was still less a product of the rather pragmatic and banal realization that it simply would not have been possible to provide equally painstakingly detailed accounts of the four other, no-less complex regime changes; a critical factor that actually did lead me to focus on the three separate Washington-backed regime changes that unfolded in Bulgaria (1990,) in Albania (1991 – 1992,) and in Serbia (2000) came from the understanding that, over the course of the period from the end of World War II until late 1989 or late 1990, the respective Balkan countries’ political leaders – notwithstanding the significant differences that then existed between them -- neither embraced the capitalist model of national economic development, nor did they basically align “their states’” geo-political posture with that of the US government.

It also is worth pointing out here that, of the three respective Balkan-region regime changes, two of them (Bulgaria 1990 and Albania 1991 – 1992) have hardly been subjected to serious study up to this point, thus making their analysis one of the dissertation’s original features.

The thesis is organised around five research questions, three of which are my own and two of which derive from the western (neo)-liberal and (neo)-conservative mainstream. My own three questions ask whether and how the governments of the case study countries: a) oversaw an increasing role for private as opposed to some form of collectively owned capital in their own national economies; b) oversaw an increase in levels of specifically American private FDI; c) adopted a more pro-Washington geopolitical stance. The other two research questions concern whether, in the aftermath of these regime changes: d) the human rights situation in the targeted country improved; and e) whether the targeted country’s political system became more democratic, as opposed to more authoritarian.

Throughout this text, I will present evidence that suggests that Washington not only wanted these regime changes to take place, but that, via various open and more covert means, significantly
contributed to their unfolding, and that these regime changes did result in outspokenly ideologically anti-communist forces taking power that, in comparison with their immediate predecessors, at least relatively clearly indicated that they favoured a pro-US geopolitical line as well as a “freer” capitalist market in which foreign (and American) investment would be welcomed. The evidence presented will also be useful in determining whether the Washington-favored post-regime change governments were meaningfully more democratic and committed to improving human rights conditions than were their immediate predecessors in power.

My research questions – and especially a) and b) – should be viewed as referring to a larger “package of neoliberal reform” that includes policies that facilitate the privatization process and that would eliminate a number of protectionist trade and foreign currency measures as well as state subsidies and price controls. My research question c) refers to whether the post-regime change government took concrete steps towards NATO membership and/or demonstratively embraced different US-led military operations, up to and including foreign wars.

If “yes” answers were generated via the application of my three research questions to those (immediate) post-regime change governments in Bulgaria, Albania and ex-Kosovo Serbia which I have focused on in this study, said governments could typically also be expected to have emphatically publicly rejected both “communism” and also their countries’ then recent non-capitalist pasts.

There was significant opposition within the target countries to this agenda, but the support for it by Washington was quite clear (if usually not loudly publicly proclaimed), and I have sought to determine if, after these regime changes, the implementation of its key provisions was carried through or not.

This dissertation should fairly be considered as an original work which makes a number of contributions to the existing body of knowledge in the field. These contributions are summarized in the following points:

1.) There have been few investigations into the foreign policy course that Washington charted in Eastern Europe between 1990 and 2001. This dissertation defines this period as one which begins with the end of the Cold War and which concludes with the start of the “War on Terror.” Furthermore, this dissertation is more sharply focused on the regime changes that Washington worked to help actually “successfully” unfold.

2.) This work’s primary goal is to explore and analyse the basic course and consequences of three different Washington-backed regime changes in Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia; for the most part, serious efforts to study the historical course and various policy consequences of
these regime changes are rare, even in comparison with investigations of the other four Washington-backed regime changes to which I have accorded some space in this dissertation. There is virtually no systematic study of the regime changes in Albania or Bulgaria in the primary languages of those countries, in English or in any other language that the author has been able to use.

3.) The three regime changes on which this study primarily focused resulted in the toppling of political parties and politicians who not only presided over the basic transformation of their countries’ political systems from the one-party dictatorship to the multi-party parliamentary model, but who also manifested an interest in and oversaw the implementation of some policies which moved their countries’ national economies to some extent away from the previously existing non-capitalist and somewhat closer towards the capitalist model.

4.) The initiators of fundamental political democratization and (perhaps relatively tentative) moves towards a capitalist free market model were, in each of the Eastern and Central European countries under review, the “democratic” successor party to the Stalinist party that had been fused with the state and that had been the only one allowed. Thus, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) democratized the Bulgarian political system towards the very end of 1989, changed its name to the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP) in early 1990, won the multi-party elections slightly later that same year and carried out some “reforms” in the direction of the capitalist free-market. The exact same process was carried out in Serbia in 1990, and in Albania in 1990-1991 with the trivial difference that Albania’s ruling Stalinist state-party was known from 1948 – 1990 as the Party of Labor of Albania (PLA).

5.) In Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania, the “Socialist” successors to the formerly ruling Stalinist state parties faced their greatest electoral challenges in the form of political parties or alliances that called themselves “democratic” and that for the most part openly called both for a still faster and more thoroughgoing transition to a modestly regulated capitalist system as well as for the speedy forging of a close geopolitical alliance with Washington.

6.) While the “democratic” forces lost in all cases the first multi-party elections to the ex-Stalinist socialists, the former were consistently and rather openly supported by Washington and succeeded, sooner or later, in taking control of the national state apparatuses. Here I have endeavoured to determine if these regime changes – which unfolded in conditions of (imperfect, but overarching) political pluralism – were followed in short order by the implementation of various neo-liberal economic measures and by the new
governments’ moves to demonstratively support Washington’s fundamental geopolitical agenda.

7.) In the relevant literature, the changes of government that took place in particular in Bulgaria in 1990 and in Albania in 1991-1992 are almost never described as “regime changes” and the notion that Washington may have played a significant role in their successful unfolding is, if not completely ignored, then certainly significantly downplayed. These changes of government not only have drawn relatively little attention from scholars but also -- to the extent that they have been covered at all – are often portrayed as representing a full break away from communism and towards democracy. Here it will be demonstrated that these countries’ (and Serbia’s) imperfect but overarching transition to multi-party democracy was overseen by the former Stalinist ruling parties’ “socialist” successor parties; evidence will also be presented concerning the question of whether the latter parties’ eventual loss of power was an objective that Washington consciously sought to realize and actually played a significant role in helping to bring about.

8.) In the writing of this dissertation, I have utilized numerous sources, many of which are primary sources, including in (but not only) all three of the principal languages (Bulgarian, Albanian and Serbo-Croatian) of the countries in which there unfolded those regime changes which are analysed in depth. The author has also, of course, examined a wide range of sources in English, as well as some in Romanian, Spanish and in other languages, as well.

The terminology used here is important. Key terms – specifically, “relatively right-wing,” “relatively left-wing,” “regime change” and close variants thereof – will be frequently used throughout the thesis with particular meanings which need to be elaborated. This is clarified in the literature review (Chapter Two). Similarly, I’ve decided that the term “regime change”, which has unquestionably been both a key component of Washington’s foreign policy posture for decades and which also serves as the primary subject on which I’ve focused my analytical energies in this dissertation, will also be discussed and defined in the Literature Review.

Many authors have suggested (from varying perspectives) that the end of the Cold War was a decisive break in global politics and in US foreign policy. The starting point for this thesis is a scepticism towards that claim. Between January 1990 and September 2001, did US foreign policy shift fundamentally, or did it continue to pursue regime changes in similar style to previous decades? I began the process of doing the research for and then writing this dissertation with the view that the
economically and geostrategically-based objectives that are contained within the three first-listed of the research questions in no way ceased to shape the conduct of American foreign policy after 1989.

The research questions that I have developed and which I have put forward as my own in this dissertation (the three first-listed ones) are broadly orientative in nature; that is, in this dissertation, the core focus has been on the process of unfolding and the domestic non-economic, geopolitical and economic policy aftermath of the regime changes in question.

One must acknowledge that one’s own values shape the process and questions of any piece of research. Thus, my underlying ideological tendencies include the belief that the global spread of (a relatively) deregulated version of capitalism, the penetration of specifically American foreign investment into as many corners of the planet as possible and the alignment of more and more non-US governments with the overarching geopolitical stance of Washington are today and have been for quite a number of years central to the formulation of US foreign policy. This general belief, in turn, led me to craft my own three research questions in this dissertation; but these research questions have, it is important to reiterate, a considerably narrower remit. In short, my central objective is to determine whether these research questions do or do not offer a plausible account of what happened in the aftermath of the three Washington-backed regime changes that took place in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania during 1991 - 1992 and in Serbia in 2000.

One may perhaps make theoretical leaps projecting the results of the application of the five research questions to other examples; but I do not here make any such ambitious claims. This, in straightforward language, is mainly a study of the policy consequences that followed shortly after the unfolding of the three separate Washington-backed regime changes already identified. Reflections on their meaning and significance follow in the conclusions chapter.

After the formal conclusion of World War II on September 2, 1945, the two most difficult conflicts faced by the US were the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Both these wars can be understood as clashes in which at least rhetorically anti-capitalist organizations and governments found themselves engaged in life-and-death military struggles against US-led forces. Other crises and conflicts also witnessed confrontation between the US and its capitalist allies against those that they defined as opponents (not all of them allied to the USSR). One of my central aims in writing this dissertation is to advance a coherent argument about the “identity” of the key driving motivations that triggered the policy decision whereby successive US administrations sought to overturn a series of foreign governments. One of the respective motivations was, according to various analysts, to eliminate to the greatest extent possible all obstacles to the operation on the global level of the capitalist system. Thus, throughout the writing of this dissertation, I have examined the argument that most, if not all, of the US backed regime changes that Washington played a significant role in helping to successfully take place would end up facilitating the world economy’s movement (perhaps only slightly) closer to the
theoretical “ideal” of minimally regulated, laissez-faire capitalism. Again, the background literature to this question is explored in the next chapter.

This dissertation, however, does not suggest that nothing changed with the end of the Cold War at the end of 1989. That was in many respects an epochal event. However, over the course of 1989, the collapse of non-capitalist Stalinist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe did constitute a significant step towards the ever-freer operation of global capitalism. This does not appear to have materially changed or “softened” the US government’s drive to remove in Eastern and Central Europe any obstacles to the activities of large-scale private firms and exceptionally wealthy individual capitalist investors. That fundamentally unchanging drive can be seen clearly by examining how Washington contributed to the successful unfolding of regime changes in Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia proper. The three last-mentioned countries had, give or take a few months, non-capitalist economic structures over the entire course of the Cold War period. At most, eighteen months after the end of the Cold War, the Bulgarian, Albanian and Serbian governments had not only already carried out profound political reforms towards democratization, but had also moved their own economies closer to the “free-market” capitalist model.

While changes towards multi-party representative democracy and free-market capitalism did indeed begin in Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania relatively quickly after December 31, 1989, the historical record as presented in this dissertation leaves little doubt that the processes towards both political democratization and the steady “liberalization” of the economy were not allowed by the US government to run their “natural” or “organic” course. A review of the relevant, available data reveals various quite significant similarities between the three separate regime change campaigns that Washington promoted in Bulgaria, Albania and ex-Kosovo Serbia. Within the three last-mentioned states, relatively left-wing forces lost their grip on state power as a direct consequence of the successful unfolding of regime changes that Washington had tirelessly worked for.

The fact that virtually all the non-capitalist Stalinist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe that had come into being in the mid-1940s collapsed over the latter half of 1989 through 1990 was quickly seized on by the US government in an aggressive and opportunistic fashion. The evidence presented in the Bulgaria, Albania and ex-Kosovo Serbia case studies (below) shows that those transitions from one-party dictatorship to multi-party parliamentary democracy were not greeted with unalloyed enthusiasm by Washington precisely because they were not very swiftly followed by the fundamental replacement of the non-capitalist economic model with the basically “laissez faire” or neoliberal capitalist model. The US government was not satisfied with a shift towards democracy and open markets of some kind; the US government wanted to see the installation of a very specific type of economic structure, rejecting other models such as the German, French or Scandinavian versions of welfare capitalism.
The collapse of the majority of the Eastern and Central European regimes transformed and ultimately ended the Cold War. The Soviet Union played a central, indispensable, role in the mid-1940s establishment of Eastern and Central European countries’ ruling regimes on both non-capitalist economic principles and also a generally anti-Washington geopolitical orientation. The East European implosion of 1989 quickly called into question the continued existence of the Soviet Union itself. However, its formal 1991 dissolution, which since 1917 had been run on non-capitalist and anti-imperialist ideological values—did not occasion an end to Washington’s interventionism and attempts at regime change in Central and Eastern Europe (or anywhere else in the world, for that matter). Thus, in this dissertation I posit that after December 31, 1989, Washington’s policy orientation on the international arena, including attempts at regime change, partially morphed into a “cleaning up extension” to the Cold War. This extension was not only based on eliminating as many of the remaining hindrances to the operation of the capitalist system globally and regionally, but also to further diminish Moscow’s geopolitical sway.

Thus, after it formally came into existence on a fundamentally capitalist basis replacing the USSR, the Russian Federation (commonly referred to just as ‘Russia’) would not immediately become a close ally of the US (North and Schwarz, 2014). And the Russian Federation was from its official creation on December 25, 1991 a considerably geopolitically less influential state than the USSR had been. While from its late December 1991 birth, Russia may have had a basically capitalist economic foundation, this does not mean that its government lost interest in the political and military developments taking place in its near abroad, for example, in Afghanistan during 1992, or from 1992 - 2000 on the territory of the successor states of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) from 1992 - 2000. That by late 1991 Russia ceased having a non-capitalist economy did not make its interests safe from US-backed regime change operations that took place in Afghanistan in 1992 and in ex-Kosovo Serbia in 2000 (Editorial Board of the World Socialist Web Site, 1999; Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006: 16-7; North, 2012; North and Schwarz, 2014).

Thus, this dissertation’s analytical core rests upon a unique “intermixing” into a broader historical, political and ideological narrative of a number of distinct arguments; one of the last-mentioned arguments is the notion that December 31, 1989, the end of the Cold War, in no way can be regarded as either the starting point or the trigger for a fundamental reordering of the conduct of Washington’s foreign policy. The collapse over the latter half of 1989 of a number of Eastern and Central European regimes that had since the mid-1940s both kept their own national economies on non-capitalist foundations and also maintained a generally hostile geopolitical stance vis-à-vis the US government certainly should be regarded as an at-least partial though still significant triumph for the last-mentioned government. This triumph can be understood as one side of a largely zero-sum game in the global political order which shifted economic and geostrategic power balances radically in favour of the United States and away from the USSR and subsequently Russia. Compared to the situation
that, over the course of the Cold War, prevailed in the Eastern and Central European region, the last-mentioned region was during the post-Cold War period considerably more vulnerable to effectively being transformed into one of Washington's diplomatic-political, economic and military spheres of influence. Thus the end of the Cold War becomes the occasion for a broadening, not a beginning, of a number of potential targets of Washington-backed regime change campaigns in formerly Stalinist-ruled Central and Eastern European states. Furthermore, this seems to have been the case even though only a minority, if indeed any, of the “target-governments” subject to these regime change campaigns can be said to have pursued an anti-Washington geopolitical line.

No later than one year after the December 31, 1989 end of the Cold War, the basic foundations of multi-party parliamentary democracy were established in Bulgaria, Serbia and Albania. To understand how, no later than December 1990, “bedrock” democratic-political and legal institutions were established. It is important to be aware that over the entire course of Cold War period, each of the three last-mentioned countries was governed dictatorially by its own Stalinist “state-party” (Blum, 2004B: 55-7 and 314-9; Blum, 2005: 203-4; Gibbs, 2009: 63-4). The Stalinist “state-parties” were, by February 1991 at the very latest, simply no longer present in any of these countries. These three state-parties were purposefully dissolved and simultaneously transformed by their final leaderships into nominally “centre-left” supporters of both capitalism and multi-party parliamentary democracy.

Thus, various individuals who occupied key leadership positions within the then non-capitalist and dictatorial state systems of Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia became among the primary architects of the processes of democratization and capitalist restoration. Shortly after December 1990 at the latest, a number of those architects were directly involved in the processes whereby the governments of their own countries formulated a relatively pro-Washington geopolitical line.

Soon after these nominally center-left parties took state power in Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia by triumphing in basically democratic country-level elections held in the very early 1990s, they were targeted by Washington in what ultimately turned out to be successful regime change operations. Despite undeniably being the “offspring” of the dictatorial, single-party Stalinist party-states, these outwardly center-left parties repeatedly promised to support a relatively liberal parliamentary democratic system in their election campaigns (Blum, 2004B: 314-6; 318-9). In fact, during the first and subsequent democratic, multi-party elections in Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia, all the relatively large right-wing and left-wing forces in those countries repeatedly claimed to be convinced advocates of democratic political and electoral institutions and procedures.

Of these Washington-supported regime changes, the three that took place in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania from 1991 – 1992 and in ex-Kosovo Serbia in 2000 provide the evidence from which this dissertation’s principle conclusions are drawn. A detailed review of the three respective regime changes enables me to arrive at some conclusions that are novel in comparison with the views
expressed not only by generally pro-Washington liberals and (neo-)conservative scholars, but also by self-described "leftist" and Marxist academicians.

The belief advanced by various self-proclaimed “leftists” or “Marxists” that elites from capitalist-imperialist countries in general and from the US government in particular often find “center-left” governments, both domestically and abroad, useful for the socio-political stabilization of a perhaps crisis-ridden capitalist system does not find particularly strong confirmation in the regime changes that constitute this dissertation’s main evidentiary base (Arthur, 2007: 25-6; Blum, 2004B: 375-6 and 380; Regis and Regis, 1998: 39-42 and 55-62). The information gathered indicates that over the course of the post-Cold War period, Washington had a “supportive” hand in the successful unfolding of seven foreign regime changes; of these regime changes, two took place in Haiti, while one "apiece" unfolded in Nicaragua, Bulgaria, Albania, Afghanistan and Serbia. A key question addressed in this dissertation concerns Washington’s aims in promoting or supporting regime change: what was the US government (through various agencies) trying to achieve? Was it in fact aiming (as it often claimed) at a broadly liberal economic and political consolidation of state and society? Or was it in fact promoting a much more specific kind of political social and economic model which above all served its own interests, and which was not necessarily consistent with either genuine democracy or the promotion of human rights?

The three main case studies need to be understood in a wider context of Washington’s promotion of relatively strongly right wing governments in seven examples during the January 1, 1990 - September 10, 2001 post-Cold War period. The Haiti case is illuminating. Haiti had two regime changes, one like the other countries with right-wing political consequences and one with a relatively easily-identifiable and at-least apparent "slant" to the political left. In 1991, the first of these two regime changes—which occurred when the popularly-elected and often rhetorically pro-poor and anti-Washington Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown in a coup organized primarily by colonels and generals in alliance with various traditional economic elites—unquestionably quickly generated inside Haiti socio-political and economic consequences of a right-wing nature (Arthur, 2007: 26-7; Blum, 2004B: 381-2; Blum, 2005: 202-3; Regis with Regis, 1998: 105-6). The second successful Washington-backed regime change took place in 1994 when Aristide once again became Haiti’s head of state, now replacing the military junta. Between Aristide's initial and thoroughly democratically-founded assumption of control over the office of the Presidency of Haiti in 1991 and his reinstallation—with Washington's relatively unenthusiastic and grudging backing—in 1994, his policy agenda and even public political discourse changed. Central to these changes was Aristide's seemingly overnight adoption of the relatively right-wing positions of endorsement not only of free-market capitalism but also of the continuation of Port-au-Prince's historical legacy of near-total subordination to Washington (Blum, 2004B, 380-2; Kempster, 1994; Kempster and McManus, 1994; Shogren, 1994). In first backing the 1991 removal of Aristide, and then subsequently pushing for his
1994 restoration, Washington appeared to pursue an internally contradictory policy. Washington's backing for Aristide’s return to the Presidency was made explicitly contingent on his jettisoning any remaining vestiges of the left-leaning, reformist economic program that he had once at least rhetorically endorsed. Thus, a compelling case can be made that the 1991 and 1994 Washington-backed regime changes within Haiti could be legitimately regarded as two sub-component events in a sustained consciously ideologically-driven campaign. The evidence suggests clearly that Washington put this campaign into motion as a means of ensuring the historical period commencing in January 1990 would not witness any meaningful shift towards the left, meaning a reasonably easy to observe movement away from relatively unregulated capitalism and a pro-Washington geopolitical stance, on the part of Haiti’s government.

This author’s decision to cover in particular detail the three Washington-backed regime changes in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania from 1991-1992 and in ex-Kosovo Serbia in 2000 was based on a number of carefully-considered factors. One had to do with the length of this dissertation. However, a “thematic logic” served as the most central trigger for my decision to choose these three counties. The respective logic was certainly based in part, though not exclusively, on Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia (with or without Kosovo) all being located in Eastern and Central Europe. Furthermore, it is absolutely critical that ex-Kosovo Serbia / the former Yugoslavia (ex-Kosovo Serbia, Serbia and the former Yugoslavia will be used as more-or-less interchangeable synonyms throughout the rest of this dissertation), Albania and Bulgaria all adhered, from the mid-1940s until at least September 10, 2001, to broadly similar economic policy regimes.

In the mid-1940s, the fundamental economic policy regimes of the entire former Yugoslavia, as well as of Bulgaria and Albania all underwent a qualitative transformation away from capitalism and relatively sharply towards a non-capitalist model (Gibbs, 2009: 70-2 and 75). The non-capitalist model remained in place in the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania from the mid-1940s until the very early 1990s. Finally during 1991 they started to undergo a sweeping transition away from the non-capitalist model and back to a (relatively undeveloped) capitalist structure broadly comparable in various ways to the one existed in the three last-mentioned countries immediately prior to the mid-1940s (Blum, 2004B: 314-5 and 319-20; Gibbs, 2009: 65-6, 69-72, 75, 99, 101-2 and 104-5). These changes were qualitative and not only quantitative. They can be summarized as constituting, on the one hand, the replacement of a one-party dictatorship with a multi-party parliamentary democracy in the political arena, and, on the other hand, the decisive laying of the foundations “for the process of "capitalist restoration” in the economic sphere (Blum, 2004B: 315-6 and 318-9; Gibbs, 2009: 65-6, 69-72, 75, 99, 101-2 and 104-5).

Here it is critical to emphasize that each successful Washington-backed regime change in Bulgaria, Albania, and in Serbia took place in the respective state entities only after the critical initiation at the
very end of the 1980s or during the very early 1990s of the processes of political democratization and “capitalist restoration” (Blum, 2004B: 314-20; Elich, 2006: 231-2, 237-8, 240 and 246-7; Gibbs, 2009: 65-6, 101-2, 205-6 and 211). In supporting these three separate but equally successful regime changes in Eastern and Central Europe, Washington ended up revealing its actual, though generally not publically-articulated, attitude towards the processes of globalising political democratization and capitalist restoration.

It is vital to examine closely the historical-political and economic moment in which each separate Washington-backed regime changes to which I have devoted a full country case-study occurred. These regime changes did not come as sudden jolts to shake up statal entities that had beforehand been marked by relative socio-political and economic quiescence. In 1989 or, at the very latest, in 1990 and 1991, Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia all started—largely without any powerful impetus from Washington—on a policy pathway to both political democratization and capitalist restoration. It is fair to add that their future trajectory was not mapped with great clarity, but from late 1989, the mass of the evidence presented in this dissertation suggests that the economic structure of all these states did indeed acquire a fundamentally pro-capitalist character. Furthermore, the bulk of the relevant and available data makes it apparent that Washington, in no small measure in attempting to promote the spread of an ever “freer” form of capitalism, did endeavour to ensure the successful completion of each of the three regime changes that constitute the primary foundations for this dissertation’s conclusions: Bulgaria in 1990, Albania from 1991-1992 and Serbia in 2000 (Blum, 2004B: 319; Chossudovsky, 2000; Elich, 2006: 231-2 and 246-7; Angjeli, 2011: 28-9; Gibbs, 2009: 51).

Two other non-US regime changes that, with massive backing from Washington, successfully unfolded between January 1, 1990 - September 10, 2001 period, Nicaragua in 1990 and Afghanistan in 1992, should also receive a brief mention in this introduction. These two regime changes manifest both certain similarities as well as differences in comparison with the three separate regime changes from which this dissertation's primary conclusions are drawn.

The regime change that, with Washington's absolutely indispensable backing, successfully unfolded in Afghanistan during 1992 did not directly contribute to any meaningful pro-capitalist “reformation” of Afghanistan’s economy (Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006: xv and 17; Rashid, 2001: 21 and 96). Mohammad Najibullah assumed the post of President of Afghanistan in 1987 but was obligated to step down in 1992 (Blum, 2004B: 347 and 350; Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006: 13-17; Rashid, 2001: 1, 5, 21, 24, 96 and 198). Over the course of the nearly five years during which Najibullah served as President, he sought in vain to achieve a decisive military victory against a Washington-backed and relatively right-wing Islamist insurgency; in April 1992, control over the office of the Presidency finally ended up formally passing from Najibullah’s hands those of Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (Blum,
Mojadeddi, who at least in comparison with Najibullah was also relatively right-wing, officially served as President from April 28-June of 1992 (Gladstone, 2001: 8; Runion, 2007: 116). Immediately after Mojadeddi’s two month-period as the President ended, he was replaced by Burhanuddin Rabbani (Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006: 18).

If measured against Najibullah, both Mojadeddi and Rabbani were clearly advocates of a comparatively right-wing worldview predicated on the tenets of political Islam. A fair reading of recent Afghan history demonstrates that during the April 28-June 28, 1992 period during which he served as the President of Afghanistan, Mojadeddi headed, for all intents and purposes, a caretaker type of government. In fact, well before Mojadeddi’s two-month presidency ended, his limited and essentially transitional-type powers were already being effectively diminished by Rabbani (Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006: 19-21 and 23; Rashid, 2001: 26, 29, 33-4, 36 and 43-4).

Rabbani’s official term of service as the President of Afghanistan lasted from June 28, 1992 until September 27, 1996, though at no point during this period was he able to exercise anything even approaching effective political-military control over the entirety of Afghanistan (Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006: 4, 6, 8, 11-3, and 15-8; Rashid, 2001: 11, 84-5, 175 197 and 208). In truth, during his period as the de jure President of Afghanistan, Rabbani rarely exercised real military and political control over anything more than a few key sectors of Afghanistan’s capital city of Kabul. Over basically the entire course of Rabbani’s overwhelmingly nominal term as President, Afghanistan was the scene of seemingly endless and frequently bloody military clashes. Thus, Rabbani did not have the opportunity to implement any kind of coherent economic policy.

The transfer of control over the Presidency of Afghanistan from Najibullah to Rabbani proved to be, from a geopolitical standpoint, favourable for Washington and a setback for Moscow. This setback can be better understood by gaining a familiarity with the patterns of economic and political development that Afghanistan has followed since 1978. After the “Saur Revolution” in late April 1978, the government in Kabul had become closely allied to Moscow (Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006: 13 and 17), but the passing of the Presidency from Najibullah to Rabbani served to end Kabul’s overwhelming geopolitical loyalty to and dependence on Moscow (Blum, 2004A: 173; Blum, 2005: 191). However, Rabbani's period as President could not possibly satisfy a key economic objective of Washington: the implementation of more measures consistent with the doctrines of “free-market” capitalism. This had no way of becoming a reality in Afghanistan during Rabbani’s Presidency.

The regime change that, with undeniably essential backing from Washington, successfully unfolded during early 1990 in Nicaragua served to trigger significant economic and geopolitical consequences. This regime change worked to end the development whereby since mid-1979 the relatively left-wing Sandinista movement had exercised effective control over Nicaragua’s central government. The February 25, 1990 popular, multi-party election for the Presidency of Nicaragua saw Daniel Ortega,
head of the Sandinista movement, defeated by relatively right-wing candidate Violetta Chamorro (Guillermoprieto, 1995: 39). In the campaign period leading up the presidential election, Chamorro benefited from various forms, open and covert, of Washington-provided assistance (Blum, 2004A: 173-4; Blum, 2005: 191; Jauberth, Castaneda, Hernandez, and Vuskovic, 1992: 34).

The formal April 25, 1990 start of Chamorro's Presidency served as a trigger for Nicaragua’s central government to quickly pursue a relatively right-wing orientation in regards to foreign policy and domestic economic measures (Tickner, 1995: 40; Prevost and Vanden, 2002: 116; Walker, 1997: 49). Although important for Nicaraguans, these developments had somewhat less significant geopolitical ramifications than the Bulgarian, Albanian, and Serbian regime changes which are the primary subjects of study in this thesis.

Washington did achieve a geopolitical and economic “advance” when the Presidency was transferred in April 1990 from Ortega to Chamorro. This event clearly further consolidated Washington's geopolitical standing in Central America. However, between July 1979-April 1990, during which the central government of Nicaragua was effectively run by the Sandinista movement, that movement was not particularly closely allied to Moscow (Blum, 2004B: 296-7). Rather, it maintained an independent and broadly leftist posture. Thus, there is herein at least implicitly advanced the notion that a geopolitical “victory” for a particular state more-or-less invariably translates into a geopolitical setback for some rival state. A powerful state in particular can achieve a geopolitical advance especially when another reasonably powerful rival state experiences a deterioration in its own international position. The three successful non-US regime changes covered in-depth in this dissertation can be understood as generating potentially significant geopolitical triumphs for Washington over Moscow. However, while the April 1990 non-US regime change from Ortega to Chamorro undeniably did provide some geopolitical advantages to Washington, these advantages were overwhelmingly not taken in a “zero-sum” manner from Moscow's stock of power and influence on the international arena.

In the present study, I have sought to utilize a critical realist methodology in conjunction with a case study dependent method of research. The respective methodology and method have both proven to be useful complements to the broadly Marxist vision of contemporary world affairs on which this dissertation's theoretical foundation rests. Indeed, one of the ontological premises of critical realism—the notion that there are certain objective realities about the universe whose existence is not in any way contingent on whether they are observed by someone or not—is a basic structural element of Marxist philosophy dating back to the writings of Karl Marx himself (Easton, 2010: 119; North, 2007: 17; Sayer, 1992: Sayer, 2000: 14).

Furthermore, central to critical realist methodology is the concept that it is wholly natural or proper to utilize language denoting causation in the description of sundry phenomena in the domain of the
social sciences (Easton, 2010: 120). In non-academic settings people commonly employ causal language as an integral element of attempts to put forward maximally-encompassing and plausible explanations; critical realism legitimizes the adoption of causal language if said language is used together with the carrying out of a rigorous process of research based on the objective of elucidating currently inadequately understood phenomena (Ibid: 118 and 122). If applied diligently, the case-study method can, according to critical realist philosophy, prove valuable in unearthing those otherwise difficult-to-discern causal forces that were and are at work within complex historico-social processes. The theory and approach of the thesis is further explained in chapter three; but the reader might note from the outset that I have treated critical realism as a mainstream approach to case study work and do not claim to have added anything original to it here.

One of the foundational positions of critical realism is the concept that myriad serious attempts to understand the world more profoundly in either its physical-natural or social component-aspects will invariably indicate that every newly approached truth will be revealed to have a multi-faceted and essentially complex character. Inquiries based primarily on an attempt to better understand currently inadequately comprehended socio-historical processes will invariably demonstrate that said processes do not consist merely of particular discrete (and, perhaps, continuously occurring) events, but also certain objects or, somewhat more broadly put, entities (Ibid: 120) including structural causes and factors. These structural factors are in principle no less important as possible sources of behaviour and outcomes than the more evident immediate factors on which an empirical enquiry might focus. In the sphere of social phenomena, the “event-generation” capacity of entities is, according to a corollary of one of critical realism's defining assumptions, no less real despite always manifesting itself at-least somewhat uniquely in varying settings. Structures, in the language of critical realist-based studies of social phenomena, can be individuals, groups of people, institutions, relationships between individual people or groups of people, concepts about political affairs, but also phenomena including trade and financial structures and the ideologies which might accompany them (Ibid: 118 and 120-1).

Thus while in analyses based on relatively traditional methodologies, variables play a central role, these variables are frequently replaced in critical realism by the structures which may not be immediately observable but which are manifest in their ultimate outcomes. This can be plausibly asserted in both quantitative and qualitative research, although it should be noted that this present study is primarily qualitative. Thus, studies predicated on the underlying assumptions of critical realism deemphasisize focusing merely on the potentially superficially measurable phenomena in the research and instead stress the vital importance of acquiring an ever better comprehension of the essential characteristics, capacities and liabilities of the structures that, through careful study, one can come to perceive. A “liability” in the critical realist lexicon may mean the susceptibility of a given entity to be significantly influenced and thus modified by some other entity (Easton, 2010: 120; Sayer, 1992: 104).
Although critical realism is not necessarily Marxist, Marxism is generally critical realist, and critical realist scholars in the social sciences and history have built on Marxian thinking while attempting to offer a more precisely formulated methodology. One key assumption of this type of approach is, of course, that human social affairs are open to rational explanation through the combination of detailed examination of evidence from a range of sources with an ontological approach which recognises the important of both evident and underlying structural causal factors, and that rejects both naïve empiricism and overly postmodern approaches, as Patomaki and Wight have argued (Patomaki and Wight, 2000; Sayer, 1992).

My starting point is the view, expressed in part through “my own” three research questions, that Washington has for many years consistently maintained an overarching policy orientation predicated to a great extent on “making the world safe for capitalism.” Washington has pursued this objective via a number of distinct policy means, including through the promotion of regime change in diverse countries.

A wide array of sources in a total of nine different languages (English, Romanian, Spanish, Bulgarian, Serbian, Portuguese, Albanian, French and German) that touch to a greater or lesser extent on the three main primary case-studies have served as my principal data-pool. My aim throughout has been to test (not merely to confirm!) the five research questions, although I do not conceal that the first three research questions themselves are rooted, legitimately, in my own values and world view.

In this introductory chapter I have set out the main issues of the study that follows. I have offered a summary of the approach taken as well as the case study method. Chapter two provides a context for the core ideas and arguments of the thesis and it includes a discussion of literature both which the thesis dissents from and which it draws on. Chapter three develops the theoretical framework briefly summarised here, elaborates the methodology and case study methods as well as the core theoretical ideas. Chapters four, five and six explore the individual case studies. Chapter seven offers a set of reflections and arguments drawing those conclusions together but also making contrasts between the cases. One core claim in the thesis as a whole is that while very often similar processes were at work in each case, we cannot understand them well without also recognising and explaining key differences between them, and so a detailed unwrapping of the processes in each case helps one to understand the complexities and conflicts at work in Eastern and Central in the post-Cold War period.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

This literature review is divided into seven parts. In the first part, some key concepts are explained and placed in context. In the second part, the place of national interest and nationalism in the debates which follow is located in key literature. In the third part, the chapter examines the relationship between regime change and policy making in relevant literature. In the fourth section, the writing of liberal and neo-conservative scholars is considered, and this focus is also developed in section five. Section six examines the work of the writers who have been most influential in shaping this author’s work, and on which this thesis builds in making its original contribution. The final section examines work of similarly minded authors who have also influenced this writer, but more obliquely. The reader is reminded that while theoretical and methodological questions arise quite naturally in this chapter, they are mainly addressed in the next chapter.

2.1 Defining Terms: (Relatively) Right-wing, (Relatively) Left-wing and Regime Change

This dissertation uses a set of terms which are relatively well-established, but often used ambiguously in political science and historical writing. It is important to clarify their meanings. They include “relatively left-wing,” “relatively right-wing” and (probably still more critically importantly) “regime change”. When used in the context of this dissertation, the term “relatively right-wing” refers to political forces that in comparison with their rivals manifest a rather high degree of enthusiasm not only for the capitalist free market, but also for the pursuit by Washington and the other major (and primarily Western European) capitalist powers of an interventionist foreign policy. This does not necessarily imply a political/social liberalism: right-wing movements may be either socially conservative or socially libertarian. I use the term ‘liberal’ in an American rather than a European sense insofar as there is a difference, but because of its problematic ambiguities the term is not used extensively or without further explanation.

The labels “right” or “right-wing” (“left” or “left-wing”) are, again, applied partly on the basis of the tendency of various scholars, political movements and prominent political actors to favor (oppose) an economic system which operates primarily on the basis of private profit maximization and the private ownership and control of the large-scale production, service, natural resource extraction and financial concerns. Thus, the thesis tends to classify as “right-wing” those intellectuals and political figures and organizations that are known to be supportive of a relatively modestly regulated economy in which private (and almost invariably quite wealthy) individuals and parties own the bulk of the
particularly sizable companies that produce goods, extract and sell natural resources and similarly offer services, including financial services, on the market. The term left wing’ refers to a tendency to the opposite views.

This labeling of the basic ideological worldview of academics, politicians and political movements can be regarded as “orthodox” and finds support in, for example, Andrew Heywood’s Political Science textbook Political Ideologies: An Introduction, as well as in a number of different chapters that appear in the text Contemporary Political Ideologies, edited by Eatwell and Wright. (Heywood, 2003: 16-17; in Eatwell and Wright, 1993: see, for example, Bellamy: 37 and O’Sullivan: 69 and 73)

Furthermore, many individuals and organizations that openly identify themselves as being “left-wing,” “right-wing” or broadly “centrist” agree that support for (opposition to) an economic system in which private individuals and parties are allowed or encouraged to seek to maximize their profits via their ownership of the large-scale means of production and finance is basically a right-wing (left-wing) position. This vocabulary originally derives from the horseshoe-pattern form in which the French Revolutionary Assembly was organized. It has always been harder to apply straightforwardly in US or British institutions, but it remains in common usage.

Self-styled “libertarians” maintain that, both in the sphere of economic life as well as in the realm of “social,” non-economic affairs, “the government that governs least governs best.” (Block, 2014: passim) These “libertarians” themselves allow that at least their economic positions – for the virtually total “freedom” of private individuals and parties to seek to maximize their own profits without being meaningfully obstructed by an interventionist state – are fundamentally right-wing.

Other sources which either endorse fundamentally different worldviews or which don’t make explicit their own ideologies have also identified as being situated on a right-wing-left-wing spectrum where support for or opposition to a larger role for the state in the economy is the main criterion of position. (for example, see the website politicalcompass.org)

The term “Stalinist” and a number of close variants thereof (including ex-Stalinist, Stalinism) also appear in quite a few places in this dissertation, and they should be defined more precisely. I have utilized these terms in this analysis mainly as a useful shorthand to describe the broad, overarching politico-economic systems which, from about the mid-1940s until late 1989 or late 1990, were in place in Bulgaria, Albania and the former Yugoslavia.

As I have opted to utilize them, these terms (with the obvious exception of ex-Stalinist) owe a considerable deal to the famous Marxist revolutionary and theoretician Leon Trotsky who was apparently the first person to develop and popularize them. While Trotsky used the terms “Stalinism” and “Stalinist” to describe the underlying ideology and central political practices of the regime that Josef Stalin worked aggressively, beginning in the late 1920s, to consolidate and exercise absolute control over, Trotsky’s followers asserted that the Central and Eastern European regimes that were
established in the wake of the defeat of Nazi Germany were largely smaller-scale models of the then-existing politico-economic system in the Soviet Union (USSR). (for example, Ingram and P, 2000; Schwarz, 1998)

By the final days of World War II in Europe, Kimon Georgiev, Enver Hoxha and Josip Broz Tito – all three of whom were at that time strongly loyal supporters of Stalin – had assumed de facto control over the central governments of Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia respectively. The effective establishment in the mid-1940s of intensely pro-Stalin governments in Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia meant that there would be very rapidly installed (or imposed) politico-economic regimes which fundamentally resembled the one that was then in place in the Soviet Union. (Ingram and P, 2000; Schwarz, 1998)

In other words, certainly from the late 1940s until sometime between late 1989 and late 1990, private ownership of the large-scale manufacturing, service, resource-extraction and agricultural companies and banks and financial institutions was essentially non-existent in Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia. While from the 1960s through the 1980s, the state stopped directly owning various firms in Yugoslavia and it (at least officially) placed them under the control of their workers, this new model, to the extent that it became the central form of economic organization in the country, certainly did not have much in common with the underlying principles of the capitalist system. (Ingram and P, 2000)

Regardless of the number of years following the end of the World War II that there existed amicable relations between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia, each of the three last-mentioned countries was, from the mid-1940s until sometime between late 1989 and late 1990, governed by a single hegemonic “state-party” which did not permit any political-electoral organizations to develop independently of and in opposition to it. Thus, just like the Stalin-era Soviet Union, the period from the mid-1940s until 1989/1990 was characterized by the complete lack of formal political pluralism in Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia.

Furthermore, besides the fact that, during the Cold War period, no formal political opposition to the ruling “state-party” was permitted in the Soviet Union and the Eastern and Central European states (including Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia,) it is also apparent that there was exceptionally little real democracy and ideological-political debate even within the framework of the single permitted party. While Yugoslavia’s complex federal structure may have resulted in the dispersal of some decision-making authority (mainly regarding the allocation of funds and the determination of secondary administrative responsibilities) to “sub-central” government units, the pattern in that country – and certainly in Albania and Bulgaria – was for the national government’s fundamental geopolitical, domestic non-economic and basic economic policy line to be established by the dictator himself, perhaps in consultation with a small handful of other leading party functionaries. (Flera and Klansjek, 2014) Thus, in that the critical policies of the central government were largely formulated,
decided on and imposed by a very narrow and essentially shut-in and insulated grouping (or even a single individual) at the pinnacle of the party-state apparatus, the Cold War-era governmental systems in Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia bore a great deal of resemblance to the model of rule that, certainly by the very early 1930s, Stalin had firmly set in place in the Soviet Union.

In short, the regimes that were established in Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia near the final days of World War II in Europe and whose very creation owed a great deal to the loyalty that their leaders showed at that time to Stalin were indeed broadly modelled on the governmental system and state structure that he presided over in the Soviet Union. Political dictatorship – with some variation as to the degree of state repression employed – was common to all of them, as was the absence of private (i.e. capitalist) ownership over the large-scale means of production, agricultural lands and financial institutions.

In this study’s Introduction, I briefly suggested that, beyond their geographical proximity to one another and the fact that they were indeed the targets of “successful” Washington-backed regime campaigns at different points during the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 period, Bulgaria, Albania and the former Yugoslavia had also pursued, during the preceding 1945 – 1989 (herein roughly defined as constituting the Cold War) period geopolitical “lines” which, while certainly being distinct from one another, did not correspond to the international policies that Washington was then committed to. In this dissertation, it will become apparent that despite the distinct economic orientations and, somewhat more so, geopolitical lines that the governments of Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia pursued during the Cold War, they were all targeted in the post-Cold War period in more-or-less “one size fits all” (and “successful”) Washington-sponsored regime change campaigns.

Over the course of the Cold War, Bulgaria was probably in net terms the most consistently and solidly pro-Moscow of all the (non-Soviet) states in Eastern and Central Europe; in fact, during the early-mid 1960s, the then leaders of Bulgaria and the Soviet Union apparently discussed in at-least semi-serious manner the prospects for the former state to become the latter’s latest (16th) republic. (See, for example: Baeva, 2014; Brown, 198; Janos, 2000: 320-4; Kifner, 1984) While this never did occur, over the course of the Cold War Bulgaria not just economically but certainly also geopolitically mainly seemed to exist as a sort of (much) smaller extension of the Soviet Union.

While for essentially the entire 1945 – 1989 period (and in particular from 1945 – to Enver Hoxha’s death in 1985,) Albania’s economic model was based on the top-down bureaucratic non-capitalist “command” system that Stalin had largely pioneered, Tirana’s foreign policy during the Cold War period followed a unique course which, at one point or another, put it sharply at odds with all of the then major world powers, including the Soviet Union.

While for the first two years or so of his period as leader of Albania, Hoxha had good relations with his then counterpart atop the government of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and the latter state even
provided considerable economic assistance to the former; certainly by 1948 this relatively happy state of affairs had come to a rather ignominious end. (See, for example: Banac, 1988: 214; Swain, 2011: 84-6) In that year, Tito broke politically from Stalin and, in the ideological and geopolitical aftermath, the former individual was portrayed -- via the use of the most charged rhetoric -- by Hoxha as being one of the very most dangerous foes of the international communist movement on the planet. (see, for example, Hoxha, 1979 and Hoxha, 1982)

Without abandoning in any way his intensely anti-Tito line, Hoxha broke with Moscow by 1960 at the latest. The cause for that geopolitical zig-zag was that then Soviet leader Khrushchev had, albeit in a relatively guarded and partial manner, criticized certain of the excesses that had been committed by his predecessor in the Kremlin whom Hoxha had for years held up as the embodiment of revolutionary communist ideals. (see, for example, Hoxha, 1960; Hoxha, 1963)

Turning away from Khrushchev, Hoxha then allied Tirana with Beijing, but these friendly political, ideological and commercial-economic ties also fizzled out by the early 1970s; the Albania – China “divorce” was, as was the case with the preceding Tirana – Moscow split, triggered by Hoxha’s repeated open denunciations of Mao and his associates for having failed to adhere to a genuinely pro-communist (in Hoxha’s view, that meant unflinchingly pro-Stalin) international policy. (Hoxha, 1979) By publicly issuing, in his time-honored tradition, acidly critical polemics, Hoxha had managed to alienate all of the main self-proclaimed “communist” states, thus leaving him with little choice but to adopt, starting in 1978, a policy of (at-least near) autarchy for Albania. This policy of near autarchy and diplomatic isolationism remained, with perhaps an extremely modest easing, in place up until Hoxha’s death in April 1985 at which point his position as dictator was assumed by his longtime loyal political ally Ramiz Alia. While over the course of the April 1985 - December 1990 period, Ramiz Alia served as the head of state in conditions in which absolutely no political opposition to his rule and that of the Albanian Party of Labor (APL) was permitted, during said period, he allowed for a further, and, it is important to make clear here, very modest relaxation of the country’s policies of virtual autarchy, internal police-statism and defiance in relation to the rest of the world. (Stokes, 1987)

Geopolitically, Yugoslavia followed – at least over the course of the 1948 to 1989/1990 period – a course that was somewhat different from (if not diametrically opposed to) the international policy “lines” that, during the respective period, the leaderships of Bulgaria and Albania adhered to. In 1961, the founding conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was held in the capital of Yugoslavia, Belgrade, and from that moment up until early 1991/1992, Yugoslavia would serve as one of that movement’s most active and prominent member-states. As its name suggests, the NAM served to unite, at least on paper, states which did not regard themselves as followers of the geopolitical lines that were then being pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, a few countries that portrayed themselves as being steadfast proponents and opponents of Marxism (like, for
example, North Korea and Pinochet-era Chile, respectively) had, at least nominally, full membership rights in the NAM, so said movement’s ideological consistency -- outside of its supposed independence from both of the then-existing Washington and Moscow-led blocs – was close to non-existent. (Armstrong; Dhawan, 2016) Playing a prominent role in the NAM allowed Belgrade (for all intents and purposes, Tito until his death in 1980) to at least symbolically assert its geopolitical independence from both Washington and Moscow; in the context of this dissertation, it is worth pointing out, even if only in passing, that neither Bulgaria nor Albania have ever belonged to the still officially-existing NAM. (see, for example, the Non-Aligned Movement, 1979; the Non-Aligned Movement, 2012)

The three regime changes mainly focused on in this dissertation were, as a careful review of this dissertation’s relevant chapters should make quite clear, to a great extent the result of Washington’s determined, even single-minded, pursuit of what it perceived to be its key interests. Washington steadfastly endeavoured to push through regime change (“one apiece” in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania in 1991 – 1992 and in the former Yugoslavia from 1990 up through 2000) and it applied – and for largely the same economic, geostrategic and ideological reasons – many of the same basic policy tools towards the realization of that critical end.

Thus, the choice that I made to focus in this dissertation primarily on the three Washington-backed regime changes was certainly not based solely on pragmatic considerations regarding the length of this study, nor was it simply a product of the fact that the three countries happen to be located in relatively close geographical proximity to one another. The preceding brief overview of the specific historical paths that, from the end of World War II until late 1989 or late 1990, Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia followed should make it clear that between said countries there then existed in the economic, geopolitical and ideological spheres not only significant similarities but also “undeniable differences. Despite their distinct economic, geopolitical and ideological legacies, Bulgaria, Albania and the former Yugoslavia were, at least during the very early stages of the post-Cold War period, all regarded by Washington as being insufficiently “decommunized,” with ultimately “successful” regime change campaigns quickly becoming the prescribed “remedy.”

Thus, through the prism of three Eastern European states which, during the Cold War, had certainly not been precise economic, geopolitical and ideological “carbon-copies” of one another, it is possible to gain a better purchase on the common objectives that, in the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 period, Washington aimed to achieve by the medium of promoting foreign “regime change” campaigns.

While this vocabulary raises more difficult questions in some contexts, it is still more straightforwardly used in post-Stalinist Eastern Europe, including in the three country case-study chapters (Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia) that I have presented here. In these cases, in different ways
and over varied time scales, power passed from self-professed parties of the left which denominated themselves as “socialist” to parties and leaders which proclaimed themselves as not only anti-communist but also partisans of a generalized reduction of the state’s role in the economy. Scholarly and popular literature and opinion are broadly in agreement that, following the end of 1989, “progress” was made in many different parts of the world, and perhaps most rapidly and extensively in Eastern and Central Europe, towards the replacement of basically non-capitalist national economies with ones whose “cores” were based on the principles of private profit-maximization and private ownership of large-scale capital. It is therefore fair to say that, throughout Eastern and Central Europe, the period from January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 was marked by a meaningful shift to the right; this is the case in the spite of the nationalist rhetoric that some of the then new governments utilized. The electoral statements, formal political platforms and actual – once in power – policy records of, for example, the BSP, the SPA and the SPS and also of these parties’ primary electoral rivals make it very clear that the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 period witnessed a sea-change towards the right in the sphere of economic life. (see, for example, Milosevic, 2000 and Seddon with Davey and Grellier, 1996)

As will quickly become apparent, the term “regime change” and some other closely related and more-or-less synonymous ones, will appear with considerable frequency throughout this entire dissertation. In particular, that the term is used so much in this dissertation is, of course, an indication of its centrality to the analysis developed here. Given that the answers to the dissertation’s research questions are drawn primarily from the data presented in the three country case studies, it is vital that the term is defined carefully. Regime change, as the term is most frequently understood is utilized to refer to the replacement, whether by democratic or less-than-wholly democratic means, of a given country’s principal political-statal leadership. But it also refers to shifts in institutions, in legal structures, and in economic structures including the ownership of basic resources. Often, such a shift is captured in the figure representing the state’s proportion of total national economic production (GDP.)

Regime change is a qualitative transformation and not a minor shift. But it may count no less as regime change if it occurs over a period of time: regime change is not only regime change when it occurs in a revolutionary movement such as France in 1789, Russia in 1917, or Iran in 1979. Indeed, one might argue that these revolutions were initially kinds of “lightning overturns” which only became genuine transformations when they were consolidated over some longer time period. In each case studied here, as the detailed case chapters demonstrate, the executive branch of government changed, but so did core institutions and economic structures and policy. Whether or not the former constitution was replaced, its meaning and interpretation in practice changed radically. The more detailed discussion of the significance of these changes, which were different in detail in each country studied, will follow later in this thesis.
Regime change may even involve cases where personnel in government remain if the old guard is superintending radical qualitative changes: one example might be Haiti in 1991 and 1994. But more usually, including the three main cases here, significant policy changes were accompanied by an intake of new individuals and a new elite and were connected to a new relationship between the state and the newly emergent private sector economy.

Thus, the term “regime change” as it is most frequently utilized in this dissertation means a process whereby formal control over a country’s central government passes from the hands of one individual or political organization to the hands of others who then implement substantially different economic and geostrategic policies. Washington’s role in these changes is always open to question and is the most significant “independent variable” which the thesis aims to test and assess.

Thus, certainly from the standpoint of the key figures in Washington who worked to back them, the regime changes analysed in the present work were successful insofar as they placed the “targeted” national governments on a significantly different economic and international “policy trajectory.” The thesis aims to give an account of these changes which assesses how far the US government played a hand in them.

Finally, it is worth stressing here that the term “regime change” as utilized in this study also signifies that, once carried out, the fundamental revamping of the targeted national government’s overarching economic policy orientation and geopolitical posture then will not be, and effectively simply cannot be, “undone” or reversed in the short or even medium-term. More concretely, once the successor government in a targeted country passed legislation or took meaningful policy steps towards, for example, significantly more cooperative relations with NATO or the privatization of theretofore collectively-owned assets, said legislation or policy steps would prove to have, whatever the prevailing national political will, an enduring and even quasi-permanent character.

The main political parties (in whose names the word “socialist” prominently featured) pushed out of power in the three regime changes studied here in detail all returned some years later to assume control over at least “their countries’” Presidency or Prime Ministership if not both simultaneously. However – and this helps in more precisely defining the term “regime change” as it is used in this study – they generally did not seriously endeavour to, still less succeed in, undoing the neoliberal economic and pro-Washington geostrategic policy consequences that followed their earlier loss of power. Their initial loss of power resulted almost immediately in a neoliberal economic and pro-Washington geostrategic policy “cage” being erected that, even had they wanted to, they only with the greatest of struggles could have seriously damaged or dismantled. Thus, to have been labelled as “regime changes,” the political-administrative and resulting strongly pro-“free market” and pro-Washington international policy renovations that are the main subjects of this work’s three country
case-study chapters had to have demonstrated a character of virtual irreversibility, at least in the medium-term.

Throughout the Washington-backed regime-change processes which between January 1, 1990 and September 10, 2001, eventually deprived them of the ability to continue effectively controlling their own countries’ national governments the BSP, the SPA and the SPS were consistently portrayed by their electoral and political rivals as being essentially “unreconstructed communists.” (see, for, example, Abrahams, 2015: 134-5; Los Angeles Times, 1991B; Rilindje Demokratike, 1993; Strauss and Laguardia, 2000) From the perspective of their main domestic electoral rivals, the fact that, once in power, the BSP, the SPA and the SPS had in fact implemented various measures moving their countries’ economies away from the non-capitalist model and towards a basically capitalist one seemed to have minimal significance: the BSP, the SPA and the SPS were all sharply criticized by their opponents for not being sufficiently committed to carrying out the rapid-fire transition to a capitalist system i.e., for not being sufficiently ardent defenders of a (relatively) right-wing economic policy orientation.

Again, the authors, prominent political figures and statesmen and political and military organizations focused on here are not described as being “left-wing,” “right-wing” “liberal” or “neoconservative,” etc. solely on the basis of the economic policy positions they advanced. Indeed, the staking out of some position vis-à-vis Washington’s foreign policy is, given the undeniably massive impact that (for better or for worse) said policy has had and continues to have on myriad non-US countries, a fundamental element of definition of position on the political spectrum.

2.2 National Interest and Nationalisms

While it may be true that there is no single ‘objective’ national interest which drives foreign policy, as some scholars in the 1950s suggested, the national interests that political elites define as important continue to shape foreign policy and provide a benchmark for analysis. This is as consistent with a broadly Marxian approach as it is with a more conservative ‘realist’ one, as the still influential work of E.H. Carr, both a leftist and also a classical realist, suggested (see, for example, Carr, 2001). The notion that national interest no longer matters is a central illusion which shapes liberal thinking in our age as it did in Carr’s. Political leaders gain support for foreign intervention by building solid backing for their state’s presumed national interests. From this standpoint, endorsing (standing against) the foreign military interventions initiated by the Great Power states is at least implicitly understood as meaning that said states’ often aggressive attempts to advance their “national interests” are simply more (less) worthy of support than all other relevant considerations including, for example, a desire for world peace or the welfare of residents of the countries under attack. Backing (repudiating) the
militarism of the Great Power states may thus be seen as an alignment with (hostility to) the nationalism of the given states, and there exists a rather broad consensus among social scientists and historians that this type of nationalism in particular has a rather clearly right-wing character (see, for example: Scheck, 1998; Stargardt, 1994).

The views of, for example, early-to-mid 20th century Italian Fascist dictator Benito Mussolini lend support to the notion that, given the fulfillment of one or two particular conditions, extreme rightists from one or another Great Power state would likely and perhaps enthusiastically endorse many of the aggressive wars initiated by their national governments. Extreme right-wingers from a given “Great Power” state will largely solidarize themselves with their own national government in the event that they come to believe that that government will focus above all – including via the initiation of foreign wars – on the promotion of “the national interest.” (Mussolini, 1932; Price, 2004).

Conversely, Marxists who come from one or another of the capitalist leading states have, at least since the opening days of World War I, adopted a position of unequivocal revolutionary defeatism, i.e. opposition to their governments’ involvement in foreign wars. The main grounds for this opposition has remained the idea that participation is invariably driven by imperialist objectives which are diametrically opposed to the fundamental interests of workers and impoverished peoples from all countries. (see, for example: International Committee of the Fourth International, 2016; Van Auken, 2014; Van Auken, 2015) Thus, people on the left of the political spectrum generally adopt a stance of implacable opposition vis-a-vis the interventionist and aggressive foreign policies of the capitalist Great Powers states, and especially the most powerful. Just as determined endeavours by capitalist Great Power states to aggressively prosecute their interests on the international arena are widely regarded by students of politics and international relations as having a relatively (as compared to an alternative policy orientation) right-wing character, nationalism is, in a generic sense, usually assessed in broadly similar terms.

In other words, while even “orthodox” contemporary Marxists who proudly hold up the banner of “proletarian internationalism” may, in a qualified and partial manner, allow for at least the theoretical existence of “left-nationalist” regimes and movements, the partisans of sundry and ideologically distinct or even opposed schools of thought largely agree that nationalism in a “generic sense” -- and especially when it is counterposed to visions of international socialist revolution and / or is associated with the mistreatment of ethnic, national, religious or “racial” minorities in a given state – is a basically rightist standpoint. (see, for example, Vann, 2002; von Mering and Wyman McCarty, Eds. 2013)

In this dissertation, key political actors from the states where the regime changes in focus unfolded have been characterized as being “relatively” left or right-wing less as a function of how nationalistic their public statements and overall political posture may have been and more due to an appraisal of
their views not only about economic policy, but also concerning the desirability (or lack thereof) of various Washington and / or EU-led foreign – including military – interventions.

In the case of the Washington-backed regime change that unfolded in Bulgaria during 1990, the leading figures from, on the one hand, the BCP / BSP and, on the other, the UDF, did not significantly resort to strident Bulgarian chauvinism (directed against, for example, ethnic Turks and Roma) in an attempt to broaden their bases of support; on the contrary, during said year, the then-leaders of the BCP / BSP and the UDF clashed in a considerably more “visible” manner about, for example, the “proper” conduct of economic policy and just how vehemently and rapidly there needed to be repudiated the multifaceted and overarching ideological and politico-economic legacy that the 1945-1989 Stalinist period had left in Bulgaria.

Similarly, during the Washington-backed regime change that “successfully” unfolded in Albania over the course of the period from very early 1991 into April of 1992, that country’s then principle political forces did indeed openly and heatedly clash with one another over various policy and ideological matters, but considerably less so with regards to the question of (Albanian) nationalism.

Far more than the “proper” stance to adopt vis-à-vis the matter of Albanian nationalism, in 1991 and 1992, the disputes that raged between then DP and PLA / SPA-aligned politicians in Albania concerned, for example, how quickly and how radically said country’s economy should be restructured along pro-capitalist lines.

To the extent that Albanian nationalism (and, in particular a form of it that was significantly directed against the minority of ethnic Greeks in Albania) was an even semi-significant political phenomenon in the last-mentioned country during 1991 and 1992, the primary responsibility for this lay with various then relatively high-level members of the DP. It should be pointed out that, at the very same time that this anti-Greek, Albanian nationalist campaign was being advanced by certain then high-ranking figures within the DP, that party was being backed to the hilt by Washington.

Due to the fact that, over the course of his 1989 – 2000 period in office as the de facto head of state of (at least) ex-Kosovo Serbia, Milosevic was widely viewed within Western countries as being a promoter of a firmly (Serbian) nationalist political line, various commentators have seen fit to designate him as a right-winger or even as a fascist. (see, for example: Lebor, 2003; The Communist League, 2000; The Independent, 1993)

In this dissertation, terms such as “right-wing” or “left-wing” will almost always be preceded by the adverb “relatively,” as the ideological character of particular political positions can only be determined by reference to the positions that are (contemporaneously) being put forward by other individuals and institutions. That critical standpoint has also served as the basis for my decision to characterize as relatively right-wing the fervently Washington-backed regime change which “successfully” unfolded in Serbia during the last three months of 2000.
The first – and decisive -- element of that regime change took place when Milosevic was compelled in early October of 2000 to cede control over the Presidency of the FRY to Vojislav Kostunica. Besides being a long-time and vehement critic of “communism,” Kostunica also was -- again, in comparison to Milosevic – considerably more favorably inclined towards various economic and “regional security” policies whose implementation was a *sine qua non* for Serbia’s eventual future incorporation into the EU (and NATO, as well.) (see, for example, Kostunica, 2000) It appears that, at least in accord with the definitions of the terms (relatively) “right” and “left-wing” that I have laid out in this dissertation, Kostunica was – and all down the line – to the right of Milosevic.

It is essential that I state at this point of my analysis that there is no absolutely no evidence whatsoever that would suggest that Kostunica was somehow “less nationalistic” than was Milosevic. (see, for example, Tanner, 2000) For example, while the Bosnian Civil War of 1992 – 1995 was raging, Kostunica both gave clear rhetorical support and also paid a very friendly visit to Bosnian Serb militiamen who were then engaged as combatants in the respective (and quite bloody) war. Similarly, over the course of the Kosovo War of 1996 – 1999, Kostunica took (at least one) trip to Kosovo in order solidarize himself with the forces that were then fighting on behalf of the Serbian central government; during one such trip, Kostunica allowed himself to be photographed while he was smiling broadly and holding an automatic (or semi-automatic) weapon in his hands. (see, for example: Gutman, 2000)

By way of contrast, while Milosevic was widely (and probably at least partially correctly) regarded as being a proponent of Serbian nationalism, he also gave at least quite a few public speeches in which he made statements such as: “Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can survive only under conditions of full equality for all nations that live in it,” (Milosevic, 1989) and “We must respond by offering our hand, living with them [the Kosovo Albanians] in equality, and not permitting that a single Albanian child, woman or man be discriminated against in Kosovo in any way. … we must, for the sake of all Serbian citizens, insist on the policy of brotherhood, unity and ethnic equality in Kosovo.” (Milosevic, 1992; see also Clark, 2005)

Furthermore, at least in the case of the three regime changes studied here (Bulgaria in 1990, Albania in 1991-1992 and Serbia in 2000) as well arguably, probably to a lesser extent, the regime change in Nicaragua in 1990 key actors in those countries and in the US government fairly openly acknowledged that the last-mentioned government’s foreign policy motives were significantly based on ensuring that the relevant non-capitalist economies would subsequently become fundamentally capitalist in nature. In doing so, the US promoted not any version of liberal capitalism but the more radical ideal of “pure” neo-liberal capitalism. Using the definitions deployed here, this move to neo-liberal capitalism counts as right wing and not merely centrist or neutral (whether or not they were associated with parallel political or social changes).
2.3 Literature Critical of the Approach Taken Here

This thesis engages with the work of a range of prominent scholars whose fundamental views differ from those of this author. This means not simply giving an account of other literature, but also explaining critically how it relates to the project of this thesis and how that critique grounds the analysis to come. Liberal analysts believe that, whatever its actual driving motivations may be, Washington's foreign policies generally democratize and improve human rights in foreign countries. (see, for example, Teson, 2003) Keeping in mind that the label “liberal” is a broad one, it will be applied here to those International Relations scholars and others whose fundamental views are fundamentally consistent with those of the US government's key foreign policymaking authorities and which accept that Washington's policy initiatives improve human rights conditions and democratize political systems.

One relevant scholar within the broad “liberal” ideological camp is Samantha Power. Power believes that, especially during the 1990s, US leaders were strongly disinclined to commit military power to parts of the world plagued by humanitarian crises. However, after being pressured by sections of the US media and civil society, as well as by allies, to engage in military intervention, policymakers undertook what they saw as morally necessary military interventions. (Power, 2002: 504, 514-5)

While not US military interventions per se, US-backed foreign regime changes between 1990 and 2001 constitute the thematic core of this dissertation. Both Power’s remark that “Because America’s ‘vital national interests’ were not considered imperilled by [an alleged] mere genocide, senior US officials did not give genocide the moral attention it warranted …” and her question “Why does the United States stand idly by?” have relevance to the key research questions here because the thesis devotes a chapter to the US-backed removal from power in 2000 of one of the key players in the 1992-1995 Bosnian Civil War—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic. (Power, 2002: 504)

Power’s view that Washington was reluctant to intervene militarily for the ostensible purpose of putting an end to the atrocities that raged in the former Yugoslavia would appear difficult to reconcile with the evidence that Washington actively contributed—sometimes by combining military interventionist means with diverse tactics in the economic, diplomatic and covert spheres of activity—to no fewer than seven different “foreign country regime changes” in six different countries over the course of the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 time period. Thus, the sheer number of foreign country regime changes in this period suggests that the hesitation which Power asserts holds the US government back from pursuing interventionist foreign policies is actually not of decisive importance. (Blum, 2004B: 290-305, 314-20, 338-52, 370-82; Elich, 2006: 237-47; cf. Albright, 2013; Clinton, 2005; and Holbrook, 1999)

The preceding discussion about Power’s view that Washington at least initially displayed a reluctance
to intervene in former Yugoslavia because of the humanitarian crisis and alleged genocide taking place there from Spring 1992 through early Summer 1999 brings to the fore a key concept underlying the three primary hypotheses here: whatever hesitation Washington may have had about intervention in former Yugoslavia, its key foreign policy officials did ultimately intervene openly. The evidence demonstrates that they took action in 2000 that directly contributed to regime change in Serbia (Elich, 2006: 237-47). The notion that the US foreign policymakers are rational and that, from 1990 through 2001, they backed different successful regime changes precisely because they thought that these would promote the interests of the US government underlies the three hypotheses presented as distinctive here. (Blum, 2004B: 290-305, 314-20, 338-52, 370-82; Editorial Board of the World Socialist Web Site, 1999; Elich, 2006: 237-47; Gibbs, 2009:11, 16-7; Martin, 2014A; North, 1999; Parenti, 1999; Parenti 2003) Thus this dissertation builds on the notion established in these latter authors that the promotion of freer capitalist systems and greater opening up of foreign countries’ economies to US investors, together with an expected maximal support by foreign governments for Washington’s broad geopolitical agenda, are Washington’s key interests. Washington will promote regime changes to the extent that it feels that they will be consistent with the realization of these three objectives or interests. (Parenti, 1999; Parenti, 2003)

Yale Law Professor Amy Chua concurs with Power: “… concerted efforts, heavily U.S.-driven, to implement [in foreign countries] immediate elections with universal suffrage.” (Chua, 2004: 14) This directly raises the question whether it really was the consistent interest of Washington to promote the democratization of foreign countries and whether democratization typically materialized as a real consequence of Washington-sponsored regime changes. If the historical data presented later demonstrates that following Washington-sponsored regime changes, the political system of the “targeted” countries did not become more genuinely democratic, or whether it actually became more overtly authoritarian, the liberal argument falls. Chua's liberal view of the “democratizing imperative” of US government dealings with the rest of the world, did not, at least in the case studies examined here, actually occur.

Many liberals hold that, following the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991, but also of the non-capitalist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe in 1989-90, Washington’s basic foreign policy course changed. The nature of this alleged change in US foreign policy was spelled out by Charles W. Kegley, who remarked in March 1993 that: “[A]s the Cold War has ended, the emergent conditions in this ‘defining moment’ (Serfaty, 1992) transcend the realpolitick that has dominated discussion of international affairs for the past five decades … [and] have created a hospitable home for the reconstruction of realism inspired by Wilsonian idealism …” (Kegley, 1993: 131-132) Kegley advanced the argument that the virtually simultaneous fall of the regimes in the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern and Central Europe closed the Cold War, and precipitated a US turn to a more genuinely humanitarian and democracy-promoting foreign policy. While Kegley, and comparable
liberal writers put forward the view that the rigors imposed by the Cold War against the threat allegedly posed by “Moscow-led world communist movement” led Washington to pursue a less-than wholly humanitarian, democracy-promoting policy during the Cold War, they believe that the end of the Cold War enabled Washington once again to focus on its ostensibly core human-rights and democracy-boosting values worldwide.

Kegley and others who share his assumptions about Washington’s motivations in adopting specific foreign policies during both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods push the notion that Washington returned to its “traditional”, pre-Cold War orientation of consistently supporting democracy and the self-determination of nations. In this liberal conception, the support that, during the Cold War, Washington gave to, for example, bloody and explicitly anti-communist coup d’etats by right-wing figures (for example, General Suharto’s 1965 coup in Indonesia against Sukarno’s regime and the Pinochet-led coup in Chile in 1973) is either ignored altogether or excused as the admittedly high price that US government policymakers had to pay to “save the world” from the supposedly greater evil represented by the Moscow-headed world communist movement. (Blum, 2004B: 193-8, 206-215; Dinges, 2004) In contrast, my view is that humanitarian and democracy-promoting considerations did not constitute the key factors undergirding the major foreign decisions taken by US government during the Cold War and post-Cold War: the notion that a fundamental continuity in Washington’s foreign policy during these periods tended to find its concrete expression in Washington’s support for regime changes that led to establishing non-US governments which, in comparison with their immediate predecessors, were dedicated to supporting Washington’s broad geopolitical and economic line. Furthermore, another key argument here is that during the post-Cold War period, improving human rights and promoting the advance of democracy did not constitute key driving factors that led Washington to support regime change.

Francis Fukuyama has been variously labelled a neo-conservative and a liberal (the label he would use himself). Fukuyama argued that the spread of capitalist economic practices and a capitalism-friendly juridical foundation would tend to accompany the ever more profound penetration of various countries’ politico-legal orders by liberal democracy, and that these transformations were both historically inevitable and desirable. In that 1992 book, The End of History and The Last Man, he argued that because the Cold War had ended, the world was moving towards “the end of history,” in which more and more countries would accept that capitalist free-market systems were more efficient than non-capitalist ones. Similarly, democratic systems would be more compatible than authoritarian ones with the capitalist free market economic order. So the world would naturally gravitate towards a society marked by the dominance of capitalist institutions and practices and democratic principles and institutions. (Fukuyama, 1989; Fukuyama, 1992) Fukuyama’s central argument regarding the supposed desirability and inevitability of globalization consolidates the combined liberal-democratic capitalist model seems to sharply conflict with a multiplicity of actual historical processes, including
The economic history of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is worth briefly comparing to the central predictions flowing from the application of Fukuyama's “end of history” hypothesis. From 1979 through 1989, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), operating largely in concert with Washington, successfully imposed round after round of pro-capitalist austerity measures in the SFRY. (Beams, 1999; Beams and Maurice, 1999; Chossudovsky, 1996; Gibbs, 2009: 55-8; Woodward, 1995: 7, 15, 18, 106-7; Zoakos, 1993) The majority of ordinary working people in the SFRY suffered grave declines in their material living standards because of these measures. After being formally accepted in the UN in 1945, the SFRY existed uninterrupted until mid-1992. If the SFRY’s violent dissolution in the early 1990s is excluded from the analysis, it is evident that its worst economic period in terms of rates of real GDP growth and external trade and financial balances commenced in 1979 and ran through the end of 1989. In other words, the first 10-11 years during which significant progress was made towards establishing a fundamentally capitalist economy coincided with a step-by-step descent into a harrowing economic (and political, social, ethno-national and indeed existential) crisis. (Beams, 1999; Beams and Maurice, 1999; Chossudovsky, 1996; Gibbs, 2009: 55-8; Woodward, 1995: 7, 15, 18, 106-7; Zoakos, 1993)

The overarching policy stance, which, from 1980-1989, Washington maintained vis-a-vis the SFRY, can fairly be interpreted as contradicting a central, explicitly-stated element of Fukuyama’s “End of History” hypothesis. For example, the available, relevant data largely confirms that Washington aimed throughout the 1980s to accelerate and deepen pro-capitalist “reforms” that already gotten underway in the SFRY. (Beams, 1999; Beams and Maurice, 1999; Chossudovsky, 1996; Gibbs, 2009: 55-8; Woodward, 1995: 7, 15, 18, 106-7; Zoakos, 1993) Washington generally remained convinced that the pro-capitalist “reform” process would most likely gain momentum in the SFRY if less-than-wholly democratic laws and state institutions were installed. (Beams, 1999; Woodward, 1995: 106-7) Also during the 1980s, Washington maintained and generally supported Milosevic on the basis of his then at least perceived commitment to establish a relatively pro-capitalist and authoritarian government in Yugoslavia. Describing in detail the nature of the views that Washington maintained vis-a-vis Milosevic through the 1970s/1980s, author and Balkans expert Susan Woodward wrote: “Milosevic's victory over the Serbian League of Communists is often cited, because of the war [in Bosnia and Croatia, from 1991 - 1995] and Western policy in 1991-1994, as the beginning of the end of Yugoslavia. But this view was not shared by Western banks and governments, or by other departments of the US government. They supported him because he appeared to be an economic liberal (with excellent English), who might have greater authority to implement the reform. Although Western governments were later accused of complicity, or foolishness in the extreme, Milosevic was an economic liberal (and political conservative). He was director of a major Belgrade bank in 1978-82 and an economic reformer even as Belgrade party boss in 1984-86. The policy proposals
commissioned by the 'Milosevic Commission' in May 1988 were written by liberal economists and could have been a leaf straight out of the IMF book. It was common at the time (indeed into the 1990s) for Westerners and banks to choose 'commitment to economic reform' as their prime criterion for supporting East European and Soviet leaders (as well as in many developing countries) and to ignore the consequences that their idea of economic reform might have on democratic development.” (Woodward, 1995: 106-7)

Thus, in contrast to some prime constituent tenets of Fukuyama's “End of History” hypothesis, from the late 1970s into the late 1980s, Washington believed, at a minimum, that political authoritarianism would almost certainly be a key element in ensuring that the “desideratum” of pro-capitalist “reform” would advance relatively quickly within some Eastern and Central European countries (Beams, 1999; Beams, with a reply to the question of Maurice, I., 1999; Woodward, 1995).

2.4 Critical Thinking on Liberal/Idealist Accounts of US Foreign Policy

In the mid-1930s, Smedley Butler, by then a retired US General, offered extraordinarily revealing information about what he argued were the true (if virtually never openly mentioned) objectives that from approximately 1898-1931, Washington sought to achieve through its foreign policy. In the November 1935 edition of the left-wing American magazine Common Sense, Butler's article “Time of Peace” appeared; in that article, Butler spoke about the core purpose of his own formal career in the US Marines and made the unprecedentedly candid admission that he had “...spent 33 years and four months [1898 - 1931] in active military service and during that period I spent most of my time as a high class muscle man for Big Business, for Wall Street and the bankers. In short, I was a racketeer, a gangster for capitalism. I helped make Mexico and especially Tampico safe for American oil interests in 1914. I helped make Haiti and Cuba a decent place for the National City Bank boys to collect revenues in. I helped in the raping of half a dozen Central American republics for the benefit of Wall Street. I helped purify Nicaragua for the International Banking House of Brown Brothers in 1902-1912. I brought light to the Dominican Republic for the American sugar interests in 1916. I helped make Honduras right for the American fruit companies in 1903. In China in 1927 I helped see to it that Standard Oil went on its way unmolested.” (Butler, 1935)

From August 1915 until September 1916, Butler served within Haiti as the commander of relatively small units of US marines charged with the “pacification” of Haiti. For over a year, Butler was directly responsible for the often violent subjugation of Haiti. (Military Times, 2014; Schmidt, 1998: 80, 92; Schmidt, 1995: 81, 85; United States Marine Corps: History Division)

Butler’s candid statement flatly contradicts any assertion that a rather noble desire to spread democracy outside the borders of the US undergirded the 10 or so military interventions that
Washington carried out in Haiti from 1888 to 2004. His memoirs expose the character of these military interventions. These were, Butler makes clear, quite plainly predicated on Washington utilizing its military resources to lend extra support to the “bottom line” and the broad global interests of US-rooted corporations. The eclectic and non-Marxist character of Butler's overall political outlook is not of central import; rather it is that Marxist theoreticians would be hard pressed to dissent from Butler's assertion that promoting the interests of US-rooted capitalist entities critically undergirded those military interventions that, from 1898 into 1931, Washington effected in Mexico, Haiti, Cuba, China, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua and elsewhere. (Butler, 2003: 39-45, 49-57, 61-66)

Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilizations*, which was first published in 1996, can fairly be categorized as a proponent of the Realist school in International Relations. From that theoretical position, he envisioned that following the end of the Cold War, the West and the US government would interact with the other states /civilizations through conflict rather than through a ‘liberal peace’. How far do those forecasts correspond with my historical case studies about Washington-supported regime changes? Of note is that unlike some “liberal” or “neoliberal” International Relations experts from the United States, Huntington, while unquestionably firmly committed to promoting what he considered to be Washington’s essential geopolitical interests, did not believe that Washington’s position of substantial relative power in the world was necessarily based on the government’s promotion of human rights and democratic political systems in foreign countries but instead on its “efficient” application of violence. Huntington’s view about the oft-decisive and central role that violence had played over the long sweep of international relations is exemplified by his remark that the “West won the world not by the superiority of its ideas or values or religion, but rather by its superiority in applying organized violence. Westerners often forget this fact, non-Westerners never do.” (Huntington, 1996: 52) Furthermore, Huntington is a realist in that although he shares the view of other scholars from the liberal and neoconservative ideological camps that promoting Washington’s fundamental interests was a “good thing”, he was also aware that these very interests could be jeopardized by Washington’s pursuit of an aggressive, “total global hegemony-seeking” foreign policy. In general Huntington is relatively pessimistic, while liberals such as Fukuyama are (or were before 2006) much more optimistic about the ease of changing global politics in US interests. Huntington remarks that “Hypocrisy, double standards, and ‘but nots’ are the price of universalist pretensions. Democracy is promoted, but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalists to power; nonproliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq, but not for Israel,... Double standards in practice are the unavoidable price of universal standards of principle [and] … in the emerging world of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; … it is dangerous.... Imperialism is the necessary logical consequence of universalism.” (Huntington, 1996: 184, 310) Similarly, in a 1993 article, “Why
International Primacy Matters,” Huntington makes clear that he sees the United States government as a “net-benevolent” force on our otherwise unstable planet: “The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the … future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world.” In The Clash of Civilizations he identifies the primary foe of the allegedly democracy, freedom and stability-generating US government as being “not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam, a different civilisation whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.” (Huntington, 1993: 83)

Thus, according to Huntington, during the Cold War, the always rhetorical but sometimes also violent ideological dispute about the best economic and social model served as the main factor that separated the non-capitalist countries with the USSR at their fore from the capitalist countries that were organized under the leadership of the US. In Huntington’s conception, however, this ceased to be the primary driving force underlying interstate conflicts in the post-Cold War period. Thus he held that the clash of ideologies was replaced by the clash of civilizations and the primacy of identity and religiously-rooted conflicts. These new conflicts would be unavoidable, and would demand a new willingness to intervene globally by the US and its allies.

One author straddles the neoconservative and neo-liberal divide. In The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Zbigniew Brzezinski (1998) indicates his support for liberal democratic principles that supposedly served as foundational elements of US foreign policy after the Cold War’s end. Brzezinski also maintains correctly that, at the least from 1990 to 1998, Washington was more or less united with various western European countries in a geopolitical alliance that existed because they shared a broad commitment to the principles of liberal pro-capitalist democracy. The Grand Chessboard asks how Washington could maintain and extend its global primacy. (Brzezinski, 1998: 7-26) The subtitle of The Grand Chessboard reflects Brzezinski’s belief that there does indeed exist today between states an entirely “natural” struggle for the achievement of global hegemony. (Brzezinski, 1998: 51-52)

In Brezezinski's conception, “global “primacy” (translated as “global hegemony” in a Romanian edition of The Grand Chessboard) mainly rests on dominance over the entire Eurasian portion of our planet. (Ibid: 51-2) Explaining quite frankly his views on what constituted the fulcrum of geopolitical power, and thus of potential global primacy, Brzezinski wrote that: “Today, the problem of geopolitics is no longer what geographic part of Eurasia is the point of departure for the domination of the continent, nor if power on land is more than that on water. Geopolitics has progressed from the regional dimension to the global dimension, with the preponderance [of power] over the entire Euroasiatic continent as a central basis for global supremacy. The United States, a non-Euroasiatic power, now wields global supremacy … However, on the most important playing field of the world, Eurasia, there could appear at a given moment a potential rival of America. In this way, a focus on the principal players and the correct evaluation of the terrain need to be the points of departure for the
formulation of the geostrategy of America in the administration in the long term of its geopolitical interests in Eurasia.” (Ibid: 51-2)

The Soviet Union’s collapse in late 1991 and the emergence of the Russian Federation constituted a major historical turning point in the system of international relations. Russia quite obviously was geographically smaller and less populous, but also less geopolitically powerful than had been the USSR. In Brzezinski's view, the degree of internal democracy allowed within the Russian Federation after late-1991 would critically impact the way in which that country’s government would conduct foreign policy. More specifically, the evolution towards liberal-democracy within the Russian Federation 1991 would push its central government not only towards friendlier relations with the US, but also towards adopting a relatively restrained foreign policy. (Ibid: 57-64) Logic dictates, and Brzezinski explicitly states, that Washington’s and Moscow’s respective foreign policy stances are likely to intersect or overlap most intensely, most frequently in Eurasia. Here, Brzezinski evidently views Washington's hegemony in Eurasia as being “natural” and desirable. Brzezinski nowhere mentions how the degree of respect for individual freedoms and democratic-constitutional principles and practices within the United States might suffer if that government opted to pursue ever-more interventionist policies in Eurasia. Thus, an evident double standard exists at the heart of Brzezinski's understanding of this interaction: he recognises that Moscow’s pursuit of its foreign policy interests are likely to trigger deteriorating basic rights and freedoms inside Russia itself, but makes no mention of how steps towards a police state within the US may be facilitated by Washington's interventionist foreign policy. These views suggest an aggressive understanding of world politics as a zero sum game. (Ibid: 64-5)

Huntington and Brzezinski held opposed views about what constituted the key foundation-blocks of the system of international relations. For Brzezinski, Washington's 1979-1992 policy of supporting radical Islamist militants in Afghanistan was justifiable because it facilitated the Soviet Union’s collapse (Brzezinski interviewed by Le Nouvel Observateur, 1998,) even though Russia continued to exist as a potential obstacle to Washington's hegemony in Eurasia. Huntington stressed, especially from 1990 until his death in 2004, that the West would face its most irreconcilable geopolitical foe in “global Islam.” (Huntington, 1996: 189-197) Despite advancing essentially opposed views about the relationship between “global Islam” and Washington, Brzezinski and Huntington were indeed united by an unshakeable commitment to ensuring Washington's hegemonic rule over the entire planet.
2.5 Gowan, Kinzer and Blum: the Critique of US Foreign Policy and Regime Change

In this sub-section, I explore in some detail three important accounts of US foreign policy relating to regime change in contemporary international relations. They form the most important literature from which this study draws (others are discussed separately later). But while they are important building blocks from which this study starts, it will then diverge in some important respects which form part of its original elements. Most important, this body of work forms an effective refutation of the mainstream liberal or neo-conservative literature just discussed.

Peter Gowan’s 1999 book *The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for Global Dominance* is one of the most important sources for this discussion of how Washington gave significant backing to a number of regime changes. These regime changes were viewed positively by Washington to the extent that they were followed shortly by the targeted governments’ adoption and consolidation of a relatively right-wing orientation in the spheres of both economic policy and international affairs. In *The Global Gamble*, Gowan speaks of how Washington’s conscious application of considerable pressure significantly contributed to the “restructuring” along “neoliberal” and “globalizing” lines of various primarily European states. Such a restructuring meant the reconfiguration of key institutions and the placement in them of figures favourably who publicly promoted a substantially different (i.e. anti-communist) ideological discourse and who were favourably disposed to neo-liberal economic policies and to the US foreign policy and military agenda. This amount to fundamental qualitative changes in the “subject” states’ overarching policy orientation, Gowan notes. Thus, in short, a particularly “complete” or really “full-fledged” regime change generally means not only a transfer of control over the Executive Branch of the central government and that government’s relatively rapid adoption of substantially different economic and foreign policies, and possibly its public promotion of a new and fundamentally distinct basic ideological discourse, but also the virtually irreversible consolidation for quite some time into the future of the last-mentioned policies and discourse.

(Gowan, 1999: 187 – 259 and 292 – 319)

In his 2006 book *Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change From Hawaii to Iraq*, Stephen Kinzer explains the motives that would explain why Washington has adopted aggressive postures towards other less powerful countries. He also describes what he sees as having been the results for Washington of these regime changes that it “assisted.” He does this first by asking “Why does a strong nation strike against a weaker one?” and then by answering this question: “Usually because it [the stronger country] seeks to impose its ideology, increase its power, or gain control of valuable resources. Shifting combinations of these three factors motivated the United States as it extended its global reach over the past century or more. … [The 2003 invasion of Iraq] was the culmination of a 110-year period during which … [the US government] overthrew … governments that displeased them
for various ideological, political, and economic reasons. Like each of these operations, the ‘regime change’ in Iraq seemed for a time—a very short time—to have worked. It is now clear, however, that this operation has had terrible unintended consequences. So have most of the other coups, revolutions, and invasions that the United States has mounted to depose governments that it feared or mistrusted.” (Kinzer, 2007: 1)

Kinzer’s statement that a powerful state “strike[s] against a weaker one … to increase its power” does, as far as it goes, seem quite plausible. He then writes: “the 110-year period [1890-2003] during which …[the US government] overthrew … governments that displeased them for various ideological, political, and economic reasons” both happen to be too vague to here warrant an in-depth analysis and comparison with the five research questions I seek to focus on. His conclusion that “most of the … coups, revolutions, and invasions that the United States has mounted to depose governments that it feared or mistrusted … ha[ve] had terrible unintended consequences [for the US government itself]” is one that I also explore below implicitly and extensively. Those charged with crafting Washington’s foreign policy were largely satisfied with the economic and geopolitical consequences generated by those Washington-backed regime changes which are covered through this dissertation’s different country-case studies. (Abrahams, 1997: 2-3, 16; Blum, 2004B: 319; Elich, 2006: 246; Feulner, 1994; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 87-8)

In other parts of Overthrow, Kinzer seeks to explain what he thinks constitute the “real” motivations that play the largest role in leading Washington to support regime change campaigns. Starting from an attempt to elaborate on the fundamental values that have undergirded Washington’s foreign policy since 1893, and then offering his view of how they have driven particular regime changes ever since then, Kinzer states that: “George Washington wrote that for nations, as for people, self-interest is always ‘the governing principle’ and that no country, specifically including the United States, should be ‘trusted further than is bound by interest.’ When the United States acts in the world, it acts, as other nations do, to defend its interests. Americans, however, sometimes do not like to hear or believe that their government has such self-centered motives. Generations of American leaders have realized that they can easily win popular support for their overseas adventures if they present them as motivated by benevolence, self-sacrificing charity and a noble desire to liberate the oppressed. The blessings of freedom that McKinley said he wanted to bestow on Cubans, Puerto Ricans and Filipinos, that Taft said the United States would bring to Central America, and that later Presidents claimed they were spreading from Iran to Grenada, are the same that George W. Bush insisted his 2003 invasion of Iraq would bring. ‘If the self-evident truths of our founding are true for us,’ Bush declared soon after the Iraq invasion, ‘they are true for all.’ More sophisticated defenders of the regime change idea make a better argument. They recognize that the United States considers principally its own interests when deciding whether to overthrow foreign governments, but insist that this is fine because what is good for the United States is also good for everyone else. In their view, American power is intrinsically
benign, because the political system it seeks to impose on other countries will make them richer, freer and happier. In the process, this creates a freer and more peaceful world. For most of the 1893-2003 period of managed regime change, the US did little to promote democracy in the countries whose governments it deposed. Presidents McKinley, Theodore Roosevelt, and Taft claimed to be interested in doing so but were willing to support any governing clique so long as it did America’s bidding. Later, in Iran, Guatemala in the 1950s and in China in the 1970s, the United States paid little attention to the non-democratic nature of governments it encouraged. During the George W. Bush era, however, the United States began taking its democratic rhetoric more seriously. It tried ….. to guide Afghanistan along the road toward a new [and relatively democratic] political system. In Iraq, it threw itself into the task even more rigorously, devoting huge resources to the most ambitious ‘nation-building’ project America had ever undertaken. ….. They dared to hope that besides giving the United States a new strategic platform in the Middle East and a reliable source of oil, such a regime would become a beacon of democracy for the entire region. These goals were so tantalizing that the Bush administration refused to assess coldly and realistically the chances that they could be achieved.” (Kinzer, 2007: 315-317)

Kinzer is acknowledging that, from 1893 until at least the start in 2001 of George W. Bush’s Presidency, Washington-sponsored “foreign country regime changes” had at best little to do with, and may actually have been hostile to the objective of “democracy promotion” that Washington’s leading politicians have almost ritualistically invoked. Thus Kinzer indicates agreement with the idea that Washington was driven less by a concern to promote democracy throughout the world than to advance the (less idealistic) geopolitical and economic interests of the US’s politico-economic elite. (Kinzer, 2007: 316) Taken in its entirety, Kinzer’s quotation also supports the hypothesis that, neither during nor immediately prior to the 1990-2001 period was Washington’s foreign policy stance predicated on some imperative to spread democracy for its own sake. Although Washington’s post 9/11 foreign policy will not be a focus of the dissertation, I acknowledge that I am highly sceptical of Kinzer’s assertion that after that date the Bush administration did indeed more genuinely seek to globally spread democracy and human rights.

Though many contemporary “mainstream” International Relations experts might object to Kinzer’s book Overthrow being categorized as having been written from either the liberal or neoliberal vantagepoints, there is at least one important similarity between the views expressed in Overthrow about Washington’s foreign policy and the opinions expressed in the books of Powers, Chua and Kegley. Even though Kinzer focuses on historical instances from the early 1890s through 2003 whereby Washington played the key role in successfully promoting regime change, and despite the fact that he openly acknowledges that Washington’s aims were “usually [based on] … seek[ing] to impose its ideology, increase its power, or gain control of valuable resources”, he also implies in this book that, at a particular moment, the relative importance of such motives declined at least somewhat,
and gave way to such driving factors as the desire to eliminate “tyranny [and replace it with] … peaceful [and] democratic … regime[s] via … the most ambitious nation-building project[s] America had ever undertaken.” (Kinzer, 1997: 1, 317)

In the gathering of information about regime changes that took place during the period from 1990-2001, and in whose successful unfolding US government policy apparently played a “supportive” role, books written by William Blum were of considerable value. Among Blum's different books, *Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II* has been most useful here. In *Killing Hope*, Blum largely avoids offering broad explanatory hypotheses regarding the root causes of the 50+ US foreign interventions that, at one point or another during the period which stretched from the end of World War II through 2003, took place. He cites the “Pentagon's Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999” which states: “Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere, that poses a threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. ... [W]e must account sufficiently for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order. ... [W]e must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role. (Blum, 1995; Blum2004B: 383-4; *The New York Times*, 1992B) This point must be remembered specifically when assessing US motives and methods in the three case studies here. Blum also cites the relevant remark of the well-known Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano whereby regardless of the country in which they reside, capitalist elites are more or less indifferent to whether or not “politics [are] democratic, so long as the economy is not.” (quoted in Blum, 1995) These ideas have helped to frame the main research questions, which aim to test how far these arguments might apply in the three specific case studies.

Blum’s book *Rogue State: A Guide to the World’s Only Superpower* shares a good number of similarities with *Killing Hope*. A key difference is that, while in *Rogue State* Blum accorded each particular post-1945 intervention by the US government somewhat less space or attention, in *Killing Hope*, Blum provided greater coverage of many of those interventions and sought to analyse their underlying causes. *Rogue State* was published after *Killing Hope*, and during the time that passed between the publication of these books, Washington engaged in other foreign interventions. In the “Author's Note” of *Rogue State*, Blum says that the book's first edition “... was inspired by the brutal US bombing of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1999.” (Blum, 2005) Blum’s assertion can be regarded as a rebuttal of the argument of virtually all sections of the US’s political and media mainstream, according to which the Spring 1999 US-NATO bombing of the former Yugoslavia was an operation in pursuit of humanitarian goals. Blum then asks: “What is it, then, that I mean to say here -that the US government does not care a whit about human life, human rights, humanity, and all those other wonderful human things?” and then proceeds to answer, explaining, “No, I mean to say that doing the right thing is not a principle of American foreign policy, not an ideal or goal of policy in and of itself.
If it happens that doing the right thing coincides with, or is irrelevant to, Washington’s overriding international ambitions, US officials have no problem walking the high moral ground. But that is rarely the case.

A study of the many US interventions detailed in the 'Interventions' chapter [of Rogue State.] shows clearly that the engine of American foreign policy has typically been fuelled not by a devotion to any kind of morality, nor even simple decency, but rather by the necessity to serve other concerns, which can be broken down to three imperatives:

1) the care of American corporations: making the world open and hospitable for neoliberal globalization; enhancing the financial statements of defense contractors who have contributed generously to members of Congress and residents of the White House;

2) preventing the rise of any society that might serve as a successful alternative example to the capitalist model;

3) expanding the empire: establishing political, economic and military hegemony over as much as the globe as possible to facilitate the first two imperatives, and to prevent the ascendancy of any regional power that might challenge American supremacy.

To American policymakers, these ends have justified the means, and all means have been available.”
(Blum, 2005: 15-16)

The presentation of this extended quote enables me to lay out both the commonalities and the distinctions that exist between these arguments of Blum and my own conceptions as they are expressed in this dissertation’s first three research questions and also in certain of its claims to originality. Blum repudiates the claims that human rights concerns have come to drive US foreign policy interventions, although he does not rule out that they might be a coincidental factor. (Blum, 2005: 15-16)

Thus, Blum’s assertion that the promotion of more democratic political systems in foreign countries “is not a principle of American foreign policy, not an ideal or goal of policy in and of itself ... [and] “is irrelevant to, Washington's overriding international ambitions” clashes “head-on” with, for example the argument of liberal foreign affairs analyst Chua whereby “'democratization,' [meaning] ... concerted efforts ... to implement immediate elections with universal suffrage” is “heavily U.S.- driven.” (Blum, 2005: 15-6; Chua, 2004: 14) I have decided to make Chua’s assertion the foundation of one of this dissertation’s “counter-hypotheses,” in asking if, in the countries where the US “successfully” pushed forward regime changes in the 1990-2001 period, the political systems of the target countries moved more towards multi-party parliamentary democracy and thus farther away from the kind of authoritarian regimes than had been the case previously.
Interestingly, despite their apparent disagreement about whether the US government genuinely seeks to promote democratic forms of government in as many foreign countries as possible, both Blum and representative liberal Chua see the promotion of capitalism as a key pillar underpinning US foreign policies. In this regard Chua’s statement from 2003 whereby “Today's global economy [was] ... to a large extent the triumph of five decades of American foreign policy. After the Second World War to promote capitalism and contain 'Communism' [quote marks are my own] America drove the creation of the World Bank [and the IMF] ... In the 1960s the U.S. Agency for International Development and private organizations like the Ford Foundation poured millions into 'modernization' projects aimed at .... [facilitating] the export of capitalist institutions. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1989 ... [i]n the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, the IMF and World Bank pushed through privatization programs and foreign investment ... liberalization by conditioning desperately needed loans on these market reforms. As of the late nineties, more than eighty developing and post-socialist countries were privatizing. Pro-market ... investment codes, and securities laws, often drafted by American lawyers and academics, proliferated from Peru to Bulgaria to Vietnam. In the new millennium, globalization and the worldwide spread of free markets continue to accelerate, with America at the helm” can properly be understood as conveying many of the same ideas as Blum's statements that among the “imperatives [which underlie Washington’s foreign policy course are the] care and feeding of American corporations[,] making the world open and hospitable for neoliberal globalization ... [and] preventing the rise of any society that might serve as a successful example of an alternative to the capitalist model.” (Blum, 2005: 16; Chua, 2004: 20-21)

One apparent difference between Blum and Chua is that, in arguing that one of the motives which underlies the broad foreign policy course taken by Washington is an interest in, “the care and feeding of American corporations” Blum makes explicit the notion that, in its relations with the rest of the world, Washington not only attempts to bring about the spread of capitalism per se, but also strives to advance the specific interests of large private companies rooted in the US, a view that Chua does not entertain at all. (Blum, 2005: 16)

Furthermore, it is incumbent to acknowledge that Blum's statement that “the care and feeding of American corporations [has for many years served as an] engine of American foreign policy” certainly served to “inspire” me in the formulation of my second research question in this dissertation.
2.6 Alternative Critical Accounts of US foreign policy and impact on regime change

In this sub-section, literature which is broadly relevant to the thinking in this study but which is not the most important source of its arguments and methods is reviewed.

Among the critical scholars whose work shapes the broad approach of this thesis (but which does not provide the specific foundations,) Immanuel Wallerstein’s book *The Decline of American Power: The United States in a Chaotic World* serves as a representative text of the “World Systems Theory” approach. *The Decline of American Power*, which was first published shortly after the start of the 2003 US war on Iraq, approaches international affairs, the internal politics of the US and the US’s relations with the rest of the world from the standpoint of the main assumptions of this theory. These include that there exists a world capitalist economy passing through a fundamental crisis, and that while the United States still occupies a hegemonic position within this world capitalist economy, there is no doubt that the position of the United States is in an irreversible decline, at least in relation to other states, if not also in an absolute manner. (Wallerstein, 2005: 7-8, 11, 15, 19-20, 24-25)

Wallerstein comments that: “The reality shows that the modern world system, the world capitalist economy, is that of a hierarchical, unequal, polarizing system whose political structure is that of an inter-statal system in which some components are openly more powerful than others. In the unfolding of the ceaseless accumulation of capital, the more powerful states constantly impose their will over the weaker states, up to the limit at which they can do it. This thing was named imperialism and it is inherent to the structure of the world system. Yet, imperialism always had a moral justification: ‘the civilizing mission,’ the presumed moral necessity of forcing the others to conform the norms prescribed by the universal values. It seems to be a curious coincidence that the values considered to be universal are always the ones respected, in the first place, by the imperial power.” (Wallerstein, 2005: 106-7) Here Wallerstein suggests clearly that the moralizing rhetoric that different imperialist powers have resorted to in attempting to rationalize their meddling in weaker states’ internal affairs should definitely not be taken at face value. Wallerstein’s suggests that the public invocation by leaders of the Great Power states of noble moral ideas is primarily a cynical method by which they put an idealistic gloss on their interventions in other, less powerful states. This is useful here in that it gives another perspective from which one can study the campaign in 1999 whereby Washington - claiming a desire to improve a less-than-ideal human rights situation in a part of Serbian territory - first bombed Serbia and then in 2000 substantially contributed to the overturn of the Milosevic regime.

Trying to provide at least part of the politico-economic context which set US foreign policy after 1989, Wallerstein remarked: “In the world economy [during the 1970s,] the United States felt its competitors from Western Europe and Japan hotly breathing down its neck, but it also faced the
apparent success of the policies of development of a large part of the rest of the world, policies specially created for limiting the capability of the countries from the central zone [of the world capitalist economy] of accumulating capital on the account of the ones from the periphery. The 1970s witnessed the two famous OPEC oil-price spikes which provoked panic in American public opinion. The position of the United States with respect to all these [economic] attacks was either of an ambiguous discomfort or of open opposition. On a global level, there was launched a counterattack. This implied the aggressive promotion of neoliberalism and of the so-called Washington Consensus ... and the spreading of the concept of globalization with assumption that there was no alternative. In essence, all these combined efforts led to a break-up of the policies of development in the whole world, especially in the peripheral zones of the world economy. In the short run, that is in the ‘80s and ‘90s, this counteroffensive of the American administration seemed to have a successful fate.” (Wallerstein, 2005: 165-6)

In the last four books he wrote, the late Chalmers Johnson focused attention on how, as a consequence of changes over time in US relations with other countries, American society was undergoing an overwhelmingly negative process of internal transformation. While my primary focus here is on the ways in which Washington promoted regime change outside the US, Johnson, while certainly critical of the USSR, sought to seriously explore the reciprocal impact of domestic American political phenomena and Washington’s foreign policy. (Johnson, 2005: 285)

In the prologue of The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy And The End Of The Republic, Johnson sees American territorial expansionism as a process started around 200 years ago and that reached ever higher peaks over time. This growing tendency towards external expansionism has not only powerfully shaped the character of inter-state relations today, but also the social, political and economic conditions within many individual nations (including in the United States itself). According Johnson, this process become more intense after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C, but it has longstanding roots in the two previous decades (Johnson, 2005: 3-4). Offering his opinion on the “catalytic” role that the terrorist attacks played in modifying both the US government’s broad policy orientation both internationally and domestically as well, Johnson wrote: “It would be more accurate to say that the [September 11, 2001 terrorist] attacks produced a dangerous change in the thinking of some of our leaders, who began to see our republic as a genuine empire, a new Rome … no longer bound by international law, the concerns of allies, or any constraints on its use of military force. … A growing number of Americans finally began to grasp what most non-Americans already knew and had experienced over the previous half-century – namely, that the United States was something other than what it professed to be, that it was, in fact, a military juggernaut intent on world domination.” (Johnson, 2005: 3-6)

However, such an analysis begs the question: if the United States “crossed the Rubicon” and became
an “empire” after September 11, 2001, where was it in immediately prior to the date? The question matters all the more in the light of Johnson’s observation that, over the last 200 years, the US government had been more or less continually engaged in territorial expansionism and military campaigns of one kind or another.

In a passage that touches more directly on the historical time-frame at the centre of the present dissertation, Johnson also writes: “In the first post-Cold War decade, we mounted many actions to perpetuate and extend our global power, including wars and ‘humanitarian’ interventions in Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Colombia, and Serbia, while maintaining unchanged our Cold War deployments in East Asia and the Pacific. In the eyes of its own people, the United States remained at worst an informal empire. After all, it had no colonies and its massive military forces were deployed around the world only to maintain ‘stability,’ or guarantee ‘mutual security,’ or promote a liberal world order based on free elections and American-style ‘open markets.’” (Johnson, 2005: 3)

While I find it difficult to disagree with much of what appears in the last-cited quote of Johnson, his remark that during, “the first post-Cold War decade, … [Washington sought to] promote a liberal world order based on free elections” is inconsistent with the conceptions on which I developed “my own” three hypotheses in this dissertation. In fact, the notion that, whatever its other interests, the US, via its foreign policies and overall stance vis-à-vis the world’s other countries, generally endeavours to spread democracy is at the root of one of those two other hypotheses in this dissertation which at best are not in direct conflict with my own three. Thus, given the consensus opinion among Western international relations scholars from all but the most extreme fringes of the political spectrum that “democracy” with its requisite “free elections” is preferable to authoritarian, undemocratic types of state regimes, Johnson seems to accept the notion that, while also committed to the patently selfinterested goals of expanding its power and global, Washington has as one of its consciously-held objectives the spreading of democratic political systems in place of authoritarian or totalitarian ones. Thus, Johnson, like Chua, argues that Washington believes it is simultaneously in its own interest to impose on the rest of the world free-market capitalist economic arrangements from which American multinational concerns benefit, an open and controlling American political-military presence and also democratic electoral-political institutions.

Up to this portion of the literature review, I have analyzed the works that eleven different authors—Samantha Power, Amy Chua, Charles Kegley, Francis Fukuyama, Smedley Butler, Samuel Huntington, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Stephen Kinzer, William Blum, Immanuel Wallerstein and Chalmers Johnson—have written concerning Washington’s foreign policy orientation. A careful reading of this literature review will demonstrate that my views as expressed in my own three research questions are more-or-less wholly at odds with the opinions which Power, Chua, Kegley,
Fukuyama, Huntington and Brzezinski have advanced about the fundamental foreign policy orientation that post-Cold War Washington has adhered to. Of the seven last-mentioned scholars, five - Power, Chua, Kegley, and Fukuyama - stress that a desire to spread increasingly democratic governance and improved human rights conditions outside the borders of the US has been a key driver of Washington's foreign policy. These scholars, regardless of whether are labelled liberal, conservative or otherwise, accept the ideological assumptions of those two research questions which, while not my own, are formally also addressed in this dissertation.

Huntington, for his part, largely downplays the notion whereby Washington's basic foreign policy orientation came, certainly by the start of the post-Cold War period, to be primarily driven by selfless, noble considerations. Instead, he argues that in the period from January 1, 1990 - September 10, 2001, a largely irrepressible conflict whose origins go back centuries increasingly would come to dominate international politics. In this conflict, a largely Washington-led “West” would find itself pitted not merely against fanatical Islamic holy-warriors, but against the Islamic religion and the entire associated “civilization.” (Huntington, 1993: 83; Huntington, 1996: 277)

In many ways, Huntington stands alone among the twelve authors whose works I reviewed and subjected to analysis in this literature review. Huntington's “Clash of Civilizations” hypothesis is clearly incompatible with the Marxist paradigm that has provided the broad conceptual undergirding for the three research questions advanced as “my own.” On the other hand, the “Clash of Civilizations” perspective cannot genuinely be reconciled with those outlooks—generally liberal and conservative vantage points constituting the mainstream Anglophone world’s ideology—that have provided the theoretical-philosophical basis for those two research questions which, while certainly not “my own,” are examined and subjected to formal testing in this dissertation.

Brzezinski’s understanding of the manner in which, during early 1990 into early 1998, Washington quite energetically interacted with and influenced and was itself in some way influenced by the system of international relations, sets him apart in significant ways from the other 11 analysts. Brzezinski asserts that, at a minimum during the period from the early into the late 1990s, Washington and the western European states' capitals were effectively united in a fairly close geopolitical alliance that was largely grounded in a supposedly solid and shared philosophic-ideological and also practical-political advocacy of the values of liberal democracy (Brzezinski, 2000: 70 and 72). Thus, Brzezinski, in common with other Anglophone liberals and conservatives, is clearly a partisan supporter of Washington’s overarching strategy to actively to spread as much as possible liberal-democratic values and actual practices in various (non-US) parts of the globe. (Brzezinski, 2000: 37-41)

Brzezinski, however, parts ways from generally liberal or conservative Anglophone figures who portray Washington's foreign policy as being primarily or largely predicated on fundamentally
altruistic desire to spread the blessings of liberal democracy and relatively decent human rights conditions as widely as possible outside the US. Brzezinski suggests that the promotion throughout the non-US world of liberal democracy and relatively enlightened human rights practices is more-or-less a happy and incidental by-product of Washington's foreign policy; this policy, avers Brzezinski, mainly is and should properly be focused on promoting the ever-further consolidation into the indefinite future of the globally hegemonic position that Washington first attained during the early 1990s. (Brzezinski, 2000: 42-3, 47 and 51-2) Global hegemony in Brzezinski's conception is primarily a function of geopolitical, as opposed to economic factors. (Brzezinski, 2000: 47-52)

Thus, one of the three research questions that I am advancing as my own through this dissertation—Washington’s promotion of its own geostrategic interests through backing various non-US regime changes that “successfully” occurred at different points in time over the January 1, 1990 - September 10, 2001 period—is, apparently, something that Brzezinski finds difficult to disagree with. Furthermore, I have also advanced the notion that geopolitical “success” for Washington also means “rolling back” Moscow's degree of influence within or upon the system of international relations. In Brzezinski’s view, global hegemony for the US government depends on said government’s achievement of de facto geopolitical dominance over Eurasia; Washington's “success” in geopolitically dominating Eurasia, Brzezinski in my mind sensibly implies, will quite possibly be opposed by Moscow in at-least a relatively determined manner. (Brzezinski, 2000: 57 and 115-9)

My understanding of the key underpinnings of the fundamental foreign policy course, which from the late 1800s straight through the post-2000 period, Washington pursued, puts me in partial agreement with the conceptions constituting the theoretical core of Stephen Kinzer's 2006 book Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change From Hawaii to Iraq. In Overthrow, Kinzer looks at various non-US regime change campaigns that, at different points over from 1893 into 2003, Washington initiated. The respective campaigns, Kinzer notes, were justified by Washington in large measure on the basis of a supposedly selfless desire to spread “democracy” outside the borders of the US. Kinzer asserts that the last-mentioned “desire” almost never really materialized as a more-or-less direct consequence of the “successful” non-US regime change campaigns that Washington carried out. (Kinzer, 2007: 315-7)

I part ways categorically with Kinzer in his analysis of the foreign policy course that Washington pursued after the 9/11 attacks. This course, in which the late-2001 successful regime change campaign in Afghanistan and then the similarly successful early-2003 regime change operation in Iraq both played key roles, is portrayed by Kinzer as being based on a suddenly sincere attempt by Washington to democratize various non-US countries’ internal political systems. Kinzer does not offer a compelling explanation as to why the September 11 attacks would be immediately followed by Washington's adoption of a genuine commitment to spread democracy.
Wallerstein’s portrayal in *The Decline of American Power* of the “big picture” of inter-state political and economic relations is one with which I largely find myself in agreement. Wallerstein first argues in that book that Columbus’s “discovery” of the “New World” in 1492 set in motion an irreversible, secular tendency towards economic globalization that continues to this day. (Wallerstein, 2005: 42, 69, 85-88) The process of economic globalization took place, he holds, simultaneous with the development of momentum towards the construction of capitalism within various nation-states. Concomitant with the creation of an ever more tightly interconnected capitalist global economy arises a clearly inegalitarian hierarchy, maintained in no small measure through the application of violence and gross economic exploitation. (Wallerstein, 2005: 70-71, 86)

Wallerstein also argues that the conclusion of World War II was immediately followed by the US’s assumption of the position of the planet’s preeminent capitalist power. (Ibid: 30, 42-43) However, he argues that during the 1970s, the US's status as the world’s preeminent capitalist power began to face various significant threats. (Ibid: 20, 26-27, 104-105) One of the respective threats came from the move in the 1970s by still relatively poor (“peripheral” or “dependent”) countries to pursue economic “national-development.” (Ibid: 165) That implied a certain degree of retreat from the world capitalist sphere, largely dominated as it was in the 1970s by elites based in Japan, Western Europe and the US.

Wallerstein asserts that countries that sought that greater independence in the 1970s became in the 1980s and 1990s targets of Washington’s more aggressive and interventionist foreign policy. The data on which this dissertation is based is not entirely consistent with the notion that relatively poor countries that in the 1970s sought to lessen their dependence on the world capitalist economy later became sites of Washington-supported regime change.

The three successful Washington-backed regime changes in Bulgaria (1990), Albania (1991 - 1992) and Serbia (2000) occurred not long after the respective Eastern and Central European states had already taken steps in the process of capitalist restoration. (Blum, 2004B: 315, 318-9; Curtis, 1992: 36, 42, 47; Muco, 1997; Parenti, 2003) Otherwise put, these regime changes came relatively shortly after the countries in which they unfolded had already begun to be re-incorporated into the world capitalist system. Thus, the three non-US regime changes that I’ve subjected to a particularly detailed analysis in this dissertation can be understood as historical instances in which Washington sought to rather opportunistically help the world capitalist system further extend its geographical reach and actual economic sway.

I broadly agree with many of Blum’s central points concerning the character of the foreign policy orientation that, from 1918 at the latest and then continuing to the present, Washington has maintained. In his books *Killing Hope*, *Rogue State* and *Freeing the World to Death: Essays on the American Empire*, Blum analyses several competing explanations regarding the reasons why, especially from the early 20th century into the 21st century, Washington carried out so many different
interventions of varying kinds. These interventions, Blum asserts, were absolutely not predicated on any sincere desire on Washington’s part to see liberal democracy and relatively decent human rights conditions take root. Blum does not argue, I should stress, that an underlying hatred for or opposition to liberal democracy and good human rights practices motivated Washington to carry out such interventions. The spread of liberal democracy and good human rights practices outside the borders of the US is, and here I concur with Blum, simply not something on which Washington has any kind of principled position.

Thus in Blum’s conception, a fundamental rationality underlies all of the non-US interventions that Washington has carried out. Through these interventions, Washington sought to further bolster its own already massive global political and military clout, but also to promote the hegemonic economic aspirations of extremely wealthy US citizens and corporations. Throughout the 1990s, the US maintained a geopolitically coherent and rather aggressive anti-Moscow foreign policy line, even though the ‘Russian threat’ had very considerably declined. However, Blum does not, as far as I can tell, explicitly mention in any of his works that I’ve herein accessed that Washington maintained, and even after the formal late-1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, a geopolitical line based to no small extent on an overarching opposition specifically vis-a-vis Moscow and its influence throughout Eurasia and the world as a whole.

It seems fair to assert that Johnson and Kinzer’s viewpoints probably do not fit too well into contemporary Anglophone world's “orthodox” perspectives on US foreign policy. In some of the recent works, Johnson and Kinzer argue vigorously that at various points over the last 115-120 years, Washington has engaged in a largely amoral drive for ever-expanding geopolitical clout, significantly undergirded by many foreign interventions. Johnson and Kinzer do make significant - in my view, somewhat factually and theoretically deficient - concessions to the contemporary Anglophone world's liberal-to-conservative mainstream as regards the fundamental nature of the foreign policy agenda that Washington has carried forward. These concessions include the view that from the 1890s to the present, Washington did sincerely attempt to promote liberal political democracy.

In my view, Johnson also errs in neglecting or significantly underestimating the vital importance that global capital accumulation played in ensuring that Washington would intervene (militarily or otherwise) in the internal affairs of many different countries. My argument here is in broad agreement with Wallerstein and Blum regarding Washington’s foreign policy agenda after 1945.
David Harvey is another contemporary scholar whose analyses of the world economy and its historical roots justify placing him within the broad camp of Marxist and World Systems Theory-influenced intellectuals. In recent works such as *The New Imperialism* and *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, he tracks the evolution of the global system and especially stresses how state power has been deployed so as to facilitate a maximally corporate-friendly form of globalization. Harvey is far from alone in regarding the last decades in the world economy as being powerfully marked by the phenomena that he and numerous other scholars often collectively assign the name “neoliberalism” to.

In relatively straightforward language, Harvey says: “Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.” (Harvey, 2005: 2)

Thus, Harvey theorizes that, under a neoliberal economic policy regime, the state must at least “initially” and also more-or-less paradoxically carry out the task of being as activist as necessary so as to set the stage for a situation in the relatively near future in which its importance as an economic “actor” will be diminished in comparison with both the role played by private parties like investors and corporations and also by private mechanisms such as the (maximally “free”) market. Thus, lightly- or even less- regulated markets in which private corporations compete for ever bigger sales and thus for the greatest possible profits do not, according to Harvey, always organically emerge from the “natural” interaction of inherently interested private parties, such as consumers and the aforementioned large corporate entities; such markets must be, and these days ever more frequently are, “put together” or established via the purposeful action of states that, in the current epoch, quite rarely dare to deviate from the “logic” of neoliberalism. Explaining in somewhat greater detail the pivotal role that the “neoliberal” state may be called upon so as to effectively create the “free” or virtually “free” markets in which profit-maximizing private corporations can be left to pursue the ends for which they were first created, Harvey writes that: “It [the state] must also be set up those military, defence, police and legal structures and functions required to secure private property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture. State intervention in markets (once created) must be kept to a bare minimum …” (Ibid, 64)
Like other Marxist and World Systems Theory-influenced thinkers, Harvey sees the continuous accumulation of ever-greater capital as being perhaps the central constitutive of what is, in the present day and age, the world capitalist system. Thus, any serious impediments to capital accumulation encountered within, for example, certain larger regions of the planet or particularly economically central countries or, of course, at the international level must be overcome if the global capitalist system is to continue functioning in a relatively “crisis-free” manner. Capital accumulation had, on the international plane, proceeded relatively smoothly and without too-many particularly serious disruptions for several decades after the end of World War II. The relative stability and generally upward trajectory that marked economic conditions in the majority of the “advanced” capitalist countries during the two-plus decades that followed right on after the conclusion of the Second World War co-existed (and, according to Harvey and numerous other analysts, not by chance) in many places with theretofore unprecedentedly generous welfare-state programs as well as regulations that, at least within quite a few markets or economic sectors, fairly significantly reduced large corporations and financial concerns’ potential freedom of action. The relative success in many countries including, generally, in the “advanced” capitalist states, of this relatively welfare-statist and interventionist capitalist model (which Harvey entitles “embedded liberalism”) would not, however last forever; by the early 1970s, said model – which, ever since the immediate post World War II period, had been carefully and painstakingly “embedded” in and bolstered by an international financial and politico-economic and industrial regulatory “architecture” – was strained to the breaking point by, for example, the manifestation and stubborn persistence of stagflationist (simultaneously high unemployment and high inflation) tendencies.

In the conception of Harvey and various other left analysts of contemporary international political and economic affairs, the respective stagflationist tendencies co-existed with, were an expression of and were largely caused by a broad, systemic crisis in the global processes of capital accumulation. Explaining how widespread economic crisis in the first few years of the 1970s served to facilitate the international shift from relatively highly-regulated, welfare-state capitalism to neoliberal capitalism, Harvey stated that: “The embedded liberalism that had delivered high rates of growth to at least the advanced capitalist countries after 1945 was [, by the early 1970s,] clearly exhausted and was no longer working. Some alternative was called for if the crisis was to be overcome. … But [again, in the early 1970s] the left failed to go much beyond traditional social-democratic and corporatist solutions and these had by the mid-1970s proven inconsistent with the requirements of capital accumulation. The effect was to polarize debate between those ranged behind social democracy and central planning (who, when in power, as in the case of the British Labour Party, often ended up trying to curb, usually for pragmatic reasons, the aspirations of their own constituencies), and the interests of all those concerned with liberating corporate and business power and re-establishing market freedoms on the other. By the mid-1970s, the interests of the latter group came to the fore.
But how were the conditions for the resumption of active capital accumulation to be restored?” (Ibid: 12 – 13)

Harvey therefore conceives of capitalism as a system as being fundamentally predicated upon the ability and success of the owners of large businesses of various kinds to make substantial and growing profits, i.e. to accumulate more and more capital. Whenever the world capitalist order, or at least countries like the US, Western Europe and Japan which have played a central role in it, comes to confront a situation marked by stagnant or even declining profits, said order can fairly be regarded as being in crisis.

Harvey shares with Marxist and World Systems Theory-influenced thinkers the core concept that the political and intellectual elites within capitalist societies are capable – perhaps not immediately, but certainly eventually – of formulating both broad policy outlines as well as specific measures that are relatively likely to promote their own particular interests. This concept is, as shall be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, certainly also consistent with and supported by various core elements of critical realist philosophy. According to Harvey, the virtually total “triump” of neoliberalism as the “default” policy-making position in, to give two prominent examples, the US and the UK, only occurred in the 1990s. However, in a world capitalist economy buffeted by a seemingly chronic crisis of capital accumulation, the policy regime that was chosen as the only viable solution, neoliberalism, by governing elites in Washington and London inevitably had to be spread, including by force, as widely as possible. Furthermore, the generalized “triump” during the 1990s of neoliberalism in a number of the most “central” or systemically critical capitalist states did not mean that efforts by said states to spread it far and wide outside their own national borders and quickly move to resuscitate the global process of capital accumulation would always result in unalloyed, contradiction-free “successes.”

Describing the process whereby neoliberalism, once it was ensconced in the 1990s in most ‘developed’ economies, could not immediately and effortlessly be imposed by Washington policymakers, Harvey has written that: “The capitalist world stumbled towards neoliberalization as the answer through a series of gyrations and chaotic experiments that really only converged as a new orthodoxy with the articulation of what became known as the ‘Washington Consensus’ in the 1990s. By then both [US President Bill] Clinton and [UK Prime Minister Tony] Blair could easily have reversed [US President Richard] Nixon’s statement [that ‘we are all Keynesians now’] and simply said ‘We are all neoliberals now.’ The uneven geographical development of neoliberalism, its frequently partial and lop-sided application from one state and social formation to another testifies to the tentativeness of neoliberal solutions and the complex ways in which political forces, historical
traditions, and existing institutional arrangements all shaped why and how the process of neoliberalization actually occurred.” (Ibid: 13)

Harvey’s work covers very much the same period this thesis explores, and so is directly relevant to this analysis. Harvey and, again, many other Marxist and World Systems Theory-influenced thinkers would argue that neoliberal policy measures were not just, and really could not have been, applied just within the borders of the most economically central capitalist states (first and foremost, the US) but had to be extended as far and wide internationally as was possible. The alternative to the adoption and, if need be, forcible imposition of neoliberal policy regimes in countries that theretofore had “inadequately” capitalist economies (such as was the case with the Central and Eastern European states certainly than the late-1940s until 1990 or so) was, Harvey and various other like-minded scholars suggest, a steady worsening of the crisis of the entire global order of capital accumulation. But precisely how could neoliberalism’s spread to theretofore “insufficiently” capitalist sections of the planet potentially “kickstart” the massive and ever more tightly interconnected global machinery of capital accumulation?

In certain important regards, this key element of Harvey’s analysis recalls Luxemburg’s work about the dynamics of capital accumulation under imperialism or even Marx’s work on the early critical stages of capitalist development. Harvey argues that the neoliberal policy regimes that the imperialist powers impose on, again, theretofore “inadequately” capitalist foreign countries seek to resuscitate the global machinery of profit generation in part by means of the processes of “accumulation through dispossession.” Processes that Marx entitled “primitive accumulation” were responsible in the first place for the very creation of the necessary foundations on which “modern” economic activity of the capitalist and “market” type then subsequently unfolded. Marx indicates that “primitive accumulation” took place through rather varied means, and Harvey includes among such means: “the privatization of the land and the ejection [from it] of the peasant populations; the conversion of the varied forms of property rights (common, collective, state-owned) in exclusively private-property rights; the suppression of the rights of the land found in common use (pasture land and the commons); the transformation of the labor force into a good and the elimination of the alternative (indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial and imperialist processes of appropriation of goods (including of natural resources); the monetization of trades and of taxes, especially of those concerning the land; the slave trade; usurious interest, indebtedness and, in the end, the loan system as radical means of primitive accumulation.” (Harvey, 2003: 135-136)

After enumerating various mechanisms through which, in Marx’s view, a capital base was initially built up and could thus serve as the launch pad for the onward march of capitalist activity, i.e. further rounds of capital accumulation, Harvey argues that all of the respective mechanisms are being applied
today and essentially for the same end: trying to ensure that the motor of capital accumulation will run on and at an acceptable rate of speed. In his book *The New Imperialism* Harvey quotes, for example, the classical Marxist Rosa Luxemburg, who asserted that the large-scale accumulation of capital has two conceptually distinct, but virtually always in practice closely intertwined component-elements. According to Luxemburg, “on the one hand, it [the accumulation of capital] refers to the market for goods and to the place where the surplus value is produced – in the factory, in the mine, in the agricultural domain. Looked at in this light, accumulation is a purely economic process, having as its principal phase a transaction between the owner and the wage-worker. … The other aspect of the accumulation of capital [has as its] predominant methods … colonial policy … a policy of the spheres of interest – and war. Force, fraud, oppression and plunder are shamelessly posted and you need a serious effort to discover in this mix-up of political violence and competition between powers the strict laws of the economic process.” Furthermore, as Harvey notes, for Luxemburg, the two last-mentioned component elements of the accumulation of capital are “organically linked [and] the historical evolution of capital can only be appreciated by analyzing them together.” (Harvey, 2003: 129, 135-136; Luxemburg, 1915)

Harvey regards as being particularly insightful Marx’s explanation of how, once the coercive and often brutal actions, carried out more-or-less directly by the state that paved the road towards “original” or “primitive accumulation” have supposedly come to an end, capital accumulation can still continue in a legal framework characterized by the absence of overtly state-imposed coercion. The formal putting of an end to lawless, coercive and often violent state (or state-sanctioned) action and the complementary and subsequent establishment by the very same state of an entire legal code in which the open application of brute force, coercion and violence is proscribed constitute the framework in which “normal” capitalist activity can then unfold, Harvey cites Marx as arguing; however, Harvey asserts that Marx was correct in arguing that even “normal” capitalist activity will invariably produce financial instability, periodic (and sometimes particularly grave) recessions, enormous and growing inequality and unemployment, poverty, and misery for large portions of the populace. (Harvey, 2003, 135)

Describing Marx’s view how even the post-“original” or “primitive accumulation” stage of capitalism will be marked by all manner of crises and that the consequences of the neoliberal measures (a clear step towards a relatively “pure” and uninhibited version of capitalism) that are increasingly being implemented all around the world are themselves testament to the organically unstable nature of capitalism, Harvey argued that: “The Marxist theory of the accumulation of capital is constructed through the prism of some initial factors which in large measure correspond to the ones advanced by classical political economy. These factors are: competitive markets, functioning freely on the basis of the institutional accords of private property, juridical individualism, the freedom of contracts and
fitting legal and governmental structures, guaranteed by a state which facilitates these rights and also ensures the integrity of money as a store of value and as a means of exchange. The role of the capitalist as a producer of use-values and a seller is already well-established and the labor force itself becomes a good that sells its own value at a suitable price. ‘Primitive’ or ‘original’ accumulation has been produced already and now accumulation acts as a ‘developed reproduction’ (even if through the exploitation of the workforce in the framework of the production process) in conditions of ‘peace, prosperity and equality’ [Rosa Luxemburg’s words]. These conceptions allow us to see what could happen if the liberal projects of the classical analysts of political economy or, in our days, the neoliberals projects of the economists are realized. The strength of Marx’s dialectic method was to show, as Rosa Luxemburg recognized unequivocally, that the liberalization of the market -- the head belief of the liberals and the neoliberals -- will not produce a harmonious state in which each and every person is to find his or her maximal level of well-being. On the contrary, it will generate a more accentuated level of social inequality (how, moreover, the global tendency of the last three decades of neoliberalism has abundantly demonstrated, especially in countries like Great Britain and the United States, which were the closest to this political line). And it shall produce, as Marx predicts, serious and always growing instabilities culminating with the outbreak of chronic crises of over-accumulation (of the type that we are witness to now) [this book was published by Harvey in 2004].”

(Harvey, 2003: 134-135) This tendency towards crisis that capitalism manifests even in its (supposedly) “peaceful” and “non-coercive” stage means that, in Harvey’s view, the coercion, plunder, violence, up to and including wars of aggression, that Marx described as constituting some of the primary means of facilitating “primitive” or “original” accumulation are necessarily a recurrent feature of capitalist development including, certainly, in the current period.

Ellen Meiksins Wood is another contemporary Marxist influenced scholar who has written fairly extensively – and in a critical manner – about capitalist-imperialism and various of its more recent manifestations. While similar to Harvey in her willingness to quite openly label imperialism and, for instance, various post-Cold War examples of imperialist foreign policy as being fundamentally driven forward by the most base motives, Meiksins Wood differs from him in what she identifies as constituting perhaps the most pivotal of the respective motives.

Though indicating that he tends to disagree with Luxemburg regarding a relatively immediate cause (Luxemburg’s emphasis on “under-consumption” versus his stressing of “overaccumulation”) of the capital accumulation crisis that, in turn, serves to trigger the initiation of imperialist foreign policies, Harvey makes it clear that he sees a good deal of truth in her seemingly paradoxical argument whereby the continued existence of non-capitalist sections of the world economy is a necessary condition for the potential future economic expansion of the main capitalist-imperialist states.

(Harvey, 2003, 130-7)
In an article published contemporaneously with the unfolding of the 1999 US-NATO War against the former Yugoslavia, Meiksins Wood argues that, by the time of the respective war, the historical epoch in which the continued existence of non-capitalist swaths of the world economy constituted a vital source of potential capital accumulation for the great capitalist-imperialist powers had already come to an end. In the article in question (“Kosovo and the New Imperialism”) Meiksins Wood states that: “In the old days, capitalist imperialism was based on a division between a capitalist and a non-capitalist world. … But the story today is different. Today, imperialism is not really about the relation between a capitalist and a non-capitalist world. It has more to do with the relations within a global capitalist system. Imperialism today is taking place in the context of what we have been calling the ‘universalization’ of capitalism. It is not now a matter of capitalist powers invading non-capitalist territories in order to bleed them dry directly and by brute force. Now, it is more a matter of … manipulating those [capitalist] market forces to the advantage of the most powerful capitalist economies and the United States in particular. It is not just a matter of controlling particular territories. It is a matter of controlling a whole world economy and global markets, everywhere and all the time.” The modest differences between the views of Harvey and of Meiksins Wood regarding the possible continued existence of significant non-capitalist sectors of and areas within the world economy and the importance of said sectors and areas to the growth and power into the future of the capitalist-imperialist states are, given the time-period on which I have mainly focused in this dissertation, worth exploring in a somewhat more in-depth manner.

Meiksins Wood’s paper “Kosovo and the New Imperialism”, which was published in Spring 1999, is relevant. There is no doubt that the post-Cold War period (beginning January 1, 1990) saw the demise of various non-capitalist economies, but also the steady spread of ever “purer” or, alternatively, neoliberal versions of capitalism. Thus, it is clear that during the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 period which I have chosen to devote the most attention to in this dissertation, capitalism was indeed, to paraphrase Meiksins Wood, “universalizing.” A reading of Meiksins Wood’s article “Kosovo and the New Imperialism,” could reasonably lead one to infer that she is suggesting that the “universalization” of capitalism occurred as some sort of organic socio-historical phenomenon.

In the case study chapters which follow in this dissertation, however, considerable attention is devoted to carefully assessing precisely whether there were at least proximate linkages between the occurrence of Washington-backed regime changes in the “target countries” and a possible nearly immediate ulterior neoliberal “remodeling” of those countries’ economies.

Wars or direct military interventions launched by the leading contemporary capitalist-imperialist powers are tellingly described by Harvey in The New Imperialism as constituting “just the peak of the imperialist iceberg” and in the context of this dissertation, bombing campaigns carried out by the US-
led NATO alliance in the mid and then late-1990s, especially the one in 1999 against the then-existing Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) can arguably be regarded as constituting a fairly important aspect of the heavily Washington-backed regime change process which “successfully” culminated in Serbia in the last three months of 2000. Thus, in Harvey’s conception, direct military interventions are distinct from other policies in the “capitalist-imperialist powers’ toolkit” primarily due to their openness and visibility to the general public. That is, regardless of whether they are openly launching aggressive wars, engaged in more indirect forms of military interventionism or employing measures which don’t have any kind of direct or indirect military component, the imperialist powers seek through their overall foreign policy stance to achieve the same essentially predatory ends.

Describing the aims that, ever since the opening days of the 20th century, different leading capitalist-imperialist states have sought to realize through their initiation of foreign wars, Harvey wrote in “The New Imperialism” that: “When Joseph Chamberlain threw Great Britain into the catastrophic war with the Boers through the annexation of the territory of Witwatersrand at the beginning of the 20th Century, it was clear to everyone that the true reason for the aggression lay in the monopolization of the immense gold and diamond resources of the region. As I remarked earlier, Chamberlain’s conversion to the imperialist logic of power was produced because of his inability to find solutions internally to the grave problems of over-accumulation that Great Britain confronted at that time. This inability was due, to a great extent, to the structure of social classes, which blocked any large-scale unfolding of the capital surpluses in social reforms or infrastructure investments on British land. The campaign led by the [George W.] Bush administration for a military intervention in the Middle East is motivated in the first place by the desire to ensure that the Americans will have full control over the oil resources of the region. The necessity of the extension of this control was made clear a few decades ago when [US] President Carter enunciated for the first time the doctrine according to which the United States needs to be ready at any time to make use of force in order to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil from the zone of the [Persian] Gulf to the world economy. Ever since there started the recession of the world economy, correlated with the increase of the price of oil, its later general decline can be seen as a working tactic in the attempt to counteract the effects of the chronic problem of over-accumulation that has appeared during the last three decades. Just as happened in Great Britain at the turning point of the 19th – 20th centuries, the same is happening now, especially in the last three years, as the blocking of the internal reforms and of the infrastructure investments by the specific configuration given by the divergent interests of the social classes has played a crucial role in the changing of the policy of the United States towards an all the more pronounced imperialism.” (Harvey, 2003: 165 – 166) Thus, according to Harvey, a recurring feature in the history of the imperialist powers for well over one hundred years has been their turn to the launching of aggressive wars as a means of counteracting the recessionary consequences which flow from the accumulation of capital surpluses whose absorption is impeded by the absence at home of the kind of social and
political conditions that would allow for the implementation of “reflationary” Keynesian-style macroeconomic policies.

Thus Harvey suggests that two tendencies (one strictly economic and one at least partly political in nature) often emerge under capitalism and can subsequently serve to undermine capitalism: the generation of large capital surpluses and the development and coagulation of potent and very wealthy domestic political constituencies which are opposed to even modest limits on their “freedom of economic action” mean that the resolution to the economic problems that the capitalist-imperialist states confront can relatively directly be found in the initiation of wars that, once successfully concluded, will lead more-or-less directly to the plundering of foreign countries. (Harvey, 2003: 165-7)

In her article “Kosovo and the New Imperialism,” Meiksins Wood, quite evidently mainly focusing on the 1999 US-NATO War against the former Yugoslavia, strongly implies that it is probably incorrect to portray the respective war as based on an attempt by Washington to plunder another country so as to alleviate the chronic economic problems that American capitalism confronts. In the period of the “universalization of capitalism” which, in Meiksins Wood’s conception, had certainly started before the 1999 NATO intervention in the former Yugoslavia, it becomes more difficult to pinpoint the particular material interests that the capitalist-imperialist powers, and first and foremost the US, seek to achieve through the medium of aggressive war. Explaining how she broadly conceptualizes the nature and role of imperialism in this period of the “universalization of capitalism,” Meiksins Wood states in “Kosovo and the New Imperialism” that: "It [imperialism] is not now primarily a matter of territorial conquest or direct military or colonial control. It is not now a matter of capitalist powers invading non-capitalist territories in order to bleed them dry directly and by brute force. Now it is more a matter of ensuring that the forces of the capitalist market prevail in every corner of the world (even if this means marginalizing and impoverishing parts of it,) and of manipulating those market forces to the advantage of the most powerful capitalist economies and the United States in particular. It is not just a matter of controlling particular territories. It is a matter of controlling a whole world economy and global markets, everywhere and all the time.” (Meiksins Wood, 1999) This suggests also a shift in modes of US domination from direct intervention towards the kinds of less obvious but no less impactful intervention in elections, civil society and economic structures that seem to characterize a number of the US’s post-Cold War interventions.

Meiksins Wood’s contention that by the time of the 1999 US-NATO war against the former Yugoslavia, imperialism had already “graduated” from “merely” aiming to control “particular territories” and had already shifted towards attempts to achieve hegemony over the “whole world economy and global markets, everywhere and all the time” should virtually immediately lead all those
analysts who encounter it to seriously and simply ask “how or by what means can the attaining of such a grandiose objective become a reality?” The answer to such a question becomes all the more intriguing given that Meiksins Wood’s view (which, as she openly acknowledges, was influenced by the analysis that Harry Magdoff had earlier developed in relation to the Vietnam War) is that, in the period of the “universalization of capitalism,” pinpointing the specific material objectives that a capitalist-imperialist state is pursuing via the launching of a particular war is rather difficult, if not completely impossible. (Ibid)

Meiksins Wood holds that in the post-Cold War period, the US, as the world’s pre- eminent imperialist power, engaged in military interventions (such in NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign against the former Yugoslavia) that, from the standpoint of reasonably clearly identifiable economic and geostrategic interests, didn’t appear to be particularly rational. Yet this is not, Meiksins Wood avers, proof that US military interventionism after 1989 was devoid of some kind of compelling logic. Her standpoint is that in the epoch of the “universalization of capitalism” Washington’s oft-belligerent foreign policy stance “finally comes down to a naked display of force, just for the sake of it, just for the sake of asserting U.S. hegemony. Sabre-rattling has, of course, always been part of imperialist strategies, but massive displays of force have a new importance in the new imperialism. The point is that, in today’s conditions, we won’t necessarily find any specific and concrete objective to military action, because the object of the exercise is not necessarily direct control of territory or even resources. This is something that even some military men can’t quite get their minds around. For instance, a few years ago, General Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, enunciated what has been called the “Powell Doctrine,” laying out the basic conditions for the use of military force: there must be some clear and vital national interest, there must be a clear goal, there must be sufficient force to achieve that goal, and there must be a clear exit strategy. When Madeleine Albright was the U.S. ambassador to the UN, she challenged Powell on these principles. “What’s the point of having this superb military that you’ve always been talking about,” she is reported to have said, “if we can’t use it?” The idea seems to have been that U.S. military should be used more flexibly, even where none of those conditions are present, where there is even no clear, or clearly attainable, objective and no clear exit. The United States, in other words, should use its military power when, and because, it can. Whatever deliberate strategies are being pursued by Albright and Clinton, then, Albright’s irresponsible attitude at least makes some kind of sense in the context of the new imperialism.

This policy aims to make it clear to the world at large that U.S. power can be deployed anywhere at any time. And, to cite a principle enunciated by Henry Kissinger, part of that strategy is unpredictability—some would say irrationality. ... [T]he aim is a display of military force and of the naked power to destroy at will. At any rate, it seems reasonable and in keeping with a long and
consistent record of U.S. military actions to accept what its perpetrators themselves have said about it, that it is about U.S. global hegemony.” (Ibid)

Thus, there exist significant differences between how Harvey and Meiksins Wood conceptualize the role that the launching of aggressive wars plays for the capitalist-imperialist powers in the post-Cold War period. For Harvey, while the imperialist states have other, less openly belligerent policy “tools” that they tend to resort to first to arrest the chronic crisis of capital accumulation, war is a “reserve measure” that may need to be utilized to counteract the effects of that crisis. In this view, war is a crude instrument that may not succeed but that, once successfully applied, is likely to result in the plundering of the targeted country.

For Meiksins Wood, the post-Cold War period chronologically overlaps quite closely with the modern epoch of economic globalization, which could more precisely be named the era of capitalist globalization or, alternatively, the era of the “universalization of capitalism.” The time in which capitalism has been spreading and attaining the status of a “universal” system has also been largely coincident with the consolidation by the US of its position as the most unquestionably powerful capitalist-imperialist state. Central to Meiksins Wood’s argument is the idea that the near-total disappearance from our planet of more-or-less non-capitalist territories and significant spheres of economic activity means that incorporating and subordinating said territories and spheres into a world capitalist economy that is ever more under the sway of the imperialist states hasn’t served as a driver for the foreign military interventions that, in the post-Cold War period, Washington has carried out. She goes somewhat further still and argues that even seemingly critical multi-national and perhaps even multi-continental economic and political considerations – such as control of oil and the pipelines through which it is transported and ensuring that Russia will not be able to (re-)emerge as a major Eurasian Power – are, while certainly not unimportant, inadequate in and of themselves for the development of a proper understanding of the larger guiding “logic” behind the various foreign military campaigns that, after the conclusion of the Cold War, Washington opted to launch.

In this way, Meiksins Woods seeks to make the case that during the post-Cold War period, the US has initiated foreign wars not primarily due to the “necessity” of “establishing sovereignty over territory—a specific, clearly identifiable territory with known boundaries, … [but rather due to the ‘imperative’ of] establishing sovereignty over an anarchic global economy.” Focusing still more not only on the broader and, indeed, global politico-economic context in which the US’s post-Cold War foreign military interventions unfolded, but also the overarching and, presumably “coherent” strategy which has underlain the respective interventions, Meiksins Wood stated that: “We also have to keep in mind that the universalization of capitalism, which is the context of this kind of imperialism, is still going on in a world of nation-states. So the effort to establish sovereignty over global markets, no less
than the sovereignty over specific colonial territories in the past, is a project pursued by state powers, and by one state power above all. The question is how this kind of boundless hegemony, this sovereignty without territory, this imperialism without frontiers, can be achieved.” Meiksins Wood reminds her readers that willingness to use violence is a fundamental element of US policy even when the fist is gloved.

Thus, for Meiksins Wood, after the Cold War Washington most frequently sought to use indirect or informal forms of domination as foreign policy tools as opposed to directly and openly coercive military-based approaches. Domination through direct military means would in many cases be less useful to the extent that various “global south” states have disintegrated or been highly penetrated by other powers. However, despite conditions of the (near) “universalization of capitalism” in the post-Cold War period as well as the considerable impracticality of engaging in certain open military interventions, Meiksins Wood avers in “Kosovo and the New Imperialism” that Washington’s interest in consolidating its hegemonic position within the framework of the global capitalist system actually does seem to require that it periodically engage in brutal and terroristic and seemingly irrational shows of force, including the launching of wars against non-US states.

Peter Gowan, who passed away in 2009, was another left-wing scholar whose analysis of the ways in which, during the post-Cold War period, capitalist-imperialism functioned is worth exploring in a reasonably in-depth manner here. The fact that Gowan does indeed accord a significant degree of attention to the various ways in which, during the 1990s, imperialism came to much more meaningfully shape the economic and, indeed, political trajectories of, for example, sundry countries in Eastern and Central Europe constitutes one of the main reasons why his perspectives – elaborated in, among other places, books like *The Global Gamble – Washington’s Faustian Bid for Global Dominance* – are of particular relevance to some of the main historical, political, economic, diplomatic and also military questions which I’ve sought to seriously examine in this study.

Washington’s status during the Cold War as the *de facto* hegemon over the world’s capitalist states was at that time, Gowan fairly uncontroversially maintains, largely accepted, and in good measure, out of rational self-interest, by those states, including the Western European imperialist powers. Over the course of the Cold War, there were, in Gowan’s conception, two key factors that loomed large as at-least potential threats to the essential interests of the ruling layers within various non-US capitalist states, including in Western Europe: “communism” as represented by the Soviet Union in the Moscow-Washington conflict that served as the “centerpiece” of the Cold War and domestic left-wing forces which themselves were often ideologically motivated by some form of “revolutionary communism.” Seeing that the alternative may well have been (perhaps violently) losing their ability to continue effectively controlling “their own” countries’ political life, ruling circle from various and
relatively “major” non-US capitalist powers tended to regard, at least for the duration of the Cold War, their geopolitical subordination to Washington as being a significantly lesser evil. (Gowan, 1999: vii)

As regards the question of whether economic globalization and imperialism are “natural” phenomena that emerged “organically” out of the long-term historical evolution of the capitalist system, it is clear that, without overstating the case, there exists a divide between, on the one hand, Marxists like Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky who were politically active in the first half of the 20th century and, on the other hand, Gowan (and others). In arguing that, at the very least all throughout the decade of the 1990s, the process of globalization unfolded due in no small measure to the impetus that it received from economic policies that Washington labored mightily to impose, Gowan clearly appears to be suggesting that the intensification of that process after 1999 (the year in which his book The Global Gamble was published) is not inevitable. If “policy”, understood in the broadest sense as the crafting of a global financial “architecture”, has served as the “prime mover” ensuring, from the 1990s and then continuing into the new millennium, the accelerated forward march of globalization, then it stands to reason that that “policy” and its rather colossal global political-implications can be reversed, if at all, with great difficulty.

In contrast both with contemporary analysts who can be regarded as either “orthodox” Marxists such as, for example, Nick Beams and with those like David Harvey who have at least been influenced to some reasonably significant degree by Marxism, Gowan openly acknowledged that when his The Global Gamble was published (1999), he had concluded that the early 1970s breakup of the Bretton Woods international monetary system did not signal or by itself hasten the decline of the global position of American capitalist-imperialism. In fact, far from being either a contemporaneous sign of the deterioration of the global standing of the American capitalist ruling class or serving as an independent trigger in the immediately subsequent historical period for just such a deterioration, the collapse of the Bretton Woods international financial-monetary order was, Gowan eventually came to believe, a process that Washington effectively orchestrated as a key element within its larger strategy of seeking to exercise de facto hegemony over the planet for as long as possible.

In comparison with, say, Beams, Gowan tends to portray the difficulties that, during the early 1970s, Washington confronted in its interactions with the world economy as being relatively modest in nature; in playing, again during the first years of the 1970s, the central role in dismantling the post-World War II Bretton Woods international monetary system, Washington was not, in Gowan’s conception, reacting to a fundamental crisis which emerged from the fact that said monetary system could only properly function as long as the US was able, in broad terms, to continue to occupy a position of effectively unchallengeable industrial and economic leadership over all of the planet’s
other capitalist states. Precisely what kind of turning point the world (capitalist) economy passed through during the period of the early 1970s is a question that serves to separate Gowan not only from “orthodox” Trotskyist-Marxist political economists like Beams, but also from certain Marxist and World Systems Theory-influenced scholars such as Harvey and Wallerstein. Beams is insistent – and on this matter, Harvey and Wallerstein, for example, would not too sharply disagree with him – that in the early 1970s, not only American capitalist-imperialism, but also the entire world capitalist economy of which it was a central part faced something approaching an existential crisis. The claim that this “dual crisis” (of the world capitalist economy as a whole, as well as the US’s once-dominant role) has continued up to the present remains a central element in many interpretations of Washington’s foreign policy and its position in the global structure of power.

Various of the most central elements of the overarching economic strategy that Washington was to follow after 1989 in Eastern Europe were, according to Gowan, made explicit when, on January 13, 1990, the British Economist magazine published an article that had been written by the prominent American economist Jeffrey Sachs. In giving this article of his the same title as that of the well-known short book about Marxist tactics and strategy that Lenin wrote in 1902 (“What Is To Be Done,?”) Sachs was seeking to convey as clearly as possible his belief that it was of the utmost necessity that there be implemented virtually overnight in Eastern and Central Europe far-reaching reforms so as to facilitate the introduction of a minimally-regulated, freely import-absorbing model of capitalism.

Reviewing Sachs’ article, Gowan asserts that the former, like the US government as a whole, had become intensely committed to ensuring that in a new continent-wide, EU-centered European economy, the Western European states would constitute the “hub,” while the Central and Eastern European states would function as the “spokes.” In using the metaphors of the “hub” and “spokes” to describe the economic positions that Washington sought to create, Sachs invoked (and almost certainly unwittingly) the language of world systems theory. (Gowan, 1999: 187 – 215, 229-230 and 238-242; Sachs, 1990) Gowan was far from being the only analyst who believed that, following the conclusion of the Cold War, Washington consciously pushed to facilitate the further eastward expansion of the EU on the basis of the de facto (though publicly unstated) aim of locking the Eastern and Central European states into positions of relative poverty and economic and political subordination within the structure of global power.

Sean Gervasi, who was an economic adviser to President Kennedy and an expert on Yugoslav affairs, held views which, in the main, were quite similar to Gowan’s. Gervasi suggested that the end of the Cold War would be followed by the Eastern and Central European states’ effective transformation into semi-colonies which, geopolitically and economically, would be held at the semi-periphery of the continent would function to further enrich and enhance the global clout of the US and the Western European countries (and in particular Germany).
One, albeit rather modest, difference between the analyses of Gowan and Gervasi regarding the steady post-Cold War expansion towards the East of the EU (as well as of NATO) concerns the role that Berlin played. Within the context of pan-European economic, diplomatic and, arguably, even military affairs, Berlin’s “specific gravity” increased significantly, Gervasi implies, more-or-less immediately after the late-1989 development whereby the state of Germany was once again created via the merger of West Germany and East Germany under the *de facto* control of the pro-capitalist figures who were then heading the West German government (Gervasi, 1996: 27, 29-30, 33-6). Once placed on fundamentally capitalist foundations, the new, reunified *Bundesrepublik* would, according to Gervasi, serve as Washington’s more-or-less equal partner in moving most countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards membership of both NATO and the EU. Gervasi believed that, along with their American counterparts, the members of the German capitalist-imperialist ruling class were not only among the main drivers of, but also major beneficiaries of NATO and EU enlargement towards Russia’s western borders. (Ibid: 29-30, 33-6) While Gowan makes it clear in various of his works, including in *The Global Gamble*, that at least relative poverty and the assumption of the broadly unfavorable economic roles that colonized countries were historically obligated to assume would constitute, upon the eastern expansion of the EU, the broad outlines of the fate that awaited the Eastern and Central European states, the respective expansion was, he argues, a process that Washington was both the primary initiator as well as the inevitable predominant beneficiary of.

Thus, Gowan argues that simultaneous with the unfolding of the EU’s steady expansion towards the East, there was registered a definite further increase in Washington’s ability to rather effectively dictate not only the basic kinds of economic policies that all of non-Russian Europe would adhere to, but also (albeit perhaps to a somewhat lesser extent) the fundamental foreign policy line that Berlin and also London and Paris would eventually end up adopting.

Robert Brenner certainly numbers among those relatively left-wing intellectuals who have attempted to articulate a reasonably comprehensive analysis regarding various key features of the broad international strategy that, both during the Cold War and in the immediately subsequent historico-political period, Washington developed and put into effect. Brenner argues that the history of the conduct of American foreign policy in the post-World War II period can probably be more fully understood if it is further broken down into three or, at most, perhaps four or five sub-periods. From the end of the Second World War until the 1970s, Brennan argues, Washington’s policy on the international arena was based on the use of what he has chosen to label as “coercive methods.” Such methods were, in Brennan’s conception, employed as central elements in Washington’s fundamentally “rational” campaign “… to secure capitalist property, strengthen capitalist prerogatives, and extend capitalism’s territorial scope, most especially where it was most threatened, viz. the Communist bloc and in a developing world riven by nationalist and socialist movements; second, to secure, the smooth functioning of capital accumulation
system-wide, while simultaneously promoting the interests of US corporations, especially by lending them support in their increasingly intense international rivalries …” (Brenner, 2004: 6)

Brenner implies that, over the course of the period from 1969 – 1977, (during which Henry Kissinger was first US National Security Adviser, then Secretary of State), there occurred a modest “downshifting” in the level of aggressiveness with which, ever since the conclusion in 1945 of World War II, Washington had conducted its foreign policy. In any case, the respective downshifting (which, in his above-quoted article “A New Imperialism ?,” Brenner opted to call “détente”) did not come about as some kind of fundamental reorientation in US foreign policy or in its underlying, driving motives; the (relatively brief and partial) “détente” associated with Kissinger’s occupation of high-level positions with the US government’s foreign policy establishment was wholly conjunctural and took place, to once again quote Brenner, because of “significant foreign policy reverses.” (Ibid: 2)

In any event, the Kissinger-era period of (relative) détente, which probably lasted from around 1969 into or until the end of 1978, definitely came to an end, Brennan opines, during the years from 1979 through 1981. Interestingly enough, the conclusion of the Kissinger-era period of relative détente unfolded, according to Brennan, not only over the course of the last two years of Jimmy Carter’s Presidency (1979 – 1980), but also during the first and immediately subsequent year (1981) of Ronald Reagan’s first term as the President of the US. What Brennan does not explicitly state in his draft article “A New Imperialism?” but what he certainly was aware of and what particularly relevant to this dissertation, is that Washington’s “successful” regime change operations against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and the “Saur Revolution”-based government in Afghanistan both commenced in 1979. In Brennan’s view, shortly after the conclusion of the (again, very partial and conjunctural) Kissinger-era period of “détente,” there unfolded from around 1979 to 2000 or 2001 another key historico-political stage in which Washington once again began to more frequently carry out aggressive and often military-based interventions into different non-US countries.

Interestingly enough, while Brennan certainly implies that he regards the definitive end of the Cold War as a significant historical event for the global politico-economic order, it does not, in his mind, occasion a significant change in Washington’s international posture. Thus, in this regard, Brennan’s understanding does not radically diverge from my perspective, whereby between 1990 and 2001, Washington devoted considerable resources to “definitizing” or to “tying up the loose ends” from its triumph in the Cold War. Brennan wrote that: “To put the icing on the cake, over the course of the 1990s, especially through its interventions in Yugoslavia, the US had reasserted its primacy in geopolitical affairs with respect to its allies, as symbolized by the extension of both NATO and the EU to the borders of Russia.” (Ibid: 7)
While there is much to recommend in this (draft) analysis that Brenner advanced, it -- perhaps in some measure due to its brevity – more-or-less completely overlooks a tactic that in this dissertation I have sought to demonstrate was often significant, interventions in and manipulation of the electoral process of the target states. The thesis will ask whether this was not also a not insignificant factor in the eventual outcomes of all three regime changes which this dissertation focuses on most intensively: (Bulgaria in 1990, Albania from 1991 to 1992, and Serbia in 2000).

From the end of World War II through to 2000, Washington’s international stance rested, in Brenner’s conception, on the utilization outside the US of both military force and economic measures, not least those policies (often collectively referred to as “The Washington Consensus”) that were effectively imposed by the largely US-led financial institutions the IMF and the World Bank. But, and especially in the decade after the end of the Cold War, the US government was arguably also somewhat more opportunistic than Brenner has suggested. The coincidence of motives and opportunism, as well as happenstance, such as the sometimes unpredictable outcomes of non-US electoral contests, may have served to set the stage for the situations in which Washington contributed to various regime changes.

This chapter has sought to ground the discussion and analysis that follows in a range of literatures including both the main influences on the author’s work and those of the scholars and commentators with whom he disagrees. These various discussions provide an account which helps the reader to understand the significance of both the case studies and of the reflections and analysis on them which follow in the Conclusions chapter. What this chapter has also done is to contextualize some of the main ideas which shape the framework and methodology of the thesis. It is to the elaboration of these that the next chapter now turns.
3.1: Introduction

This dissertation draws on the theoretical and methodological vantage points of critical realism. It sets critical realism in a Marxist framework and uses case study analysis. In this chapter, these core ideas are explained. I will first stress the foundations of the Marxist paradigm which constitutes the basic ideational foundation for the research questions. After describing core elements of the Marxist perspective, I introduce several key terms like capacities and liabilities as elements in causation that are widely used in critical realist literature, and which deal with the processes whereby there are both transmitted and received influences that can generate change in social relations.

There are many different critical realist positions: the thesis draws especially on work by Sayer (1992 and 2000) and Archer (see for example 2002), as well as on work in international relations and international political economy, for example the writing of Christopher May (2000), Robert Denemark (1999), Bob Jessop (1991) and Heikki Patomaki (discussed in detail below). It is not committed to, and does not take a position on, the more metaphysical versions of critical realism advanced by scholars who follow Roy Bhaskar’s recent quasi-religious writing which is arguably committed to a form of critical realism incompatible with Marxism. Instead, it follows Elster (2007) and the various authors of Critical Realism and Marxism (Brown, Fleetwood and Roberts, 2002), together with earlier scholars at Nottingham Trent University who have also written doctoral theses on specific cases drawing on critical realism. (May, 2000; Walia, 2005)

This chapter will next address the materialist foundations of the Marxist worldview. Marxism’s entire theoretical “superstructure” rests critically upon two distinct forms of materialism: one, ontological materialism, meaning that all natural and physical elements known to exist not only together form the indispensable foundations for the ‘real’ world, but also cannot but be the source for all ideas that humans have ever had, have now and will continue to develop into the future; two, materialism as active structural cause, in the sense that the material or economic base constitutes the single most potent influence determining the contours, composition and basic nature or structure of a given society in its totality. That is not to say that material causes have an unmediated direct effect on events with no other factors to be taken into account (such a position is criticized by more serious Marxian
writers as being “naïve” or “vulgar”), but these material causes clearly are – in this view- of great significance in shaping events and outcomes.

In the subsequent section, I discuss how the capitalist mode of production as well as the corresponding capitalist relations of production have existed in an uninterrupted fashion in the US, Europe and across the world system through (and since before) modernity. (Denemark, 1999) From the very late 1800s straight on through to the present day, the US has had a fundamentally capitalist economic structure. I then proceed to describe certain basic outlines of the Marxist view of how the state in a given capitalist country tends to operate.

The thesis then turns to how the process of social causation is set in motion. In this chapter, I go beyond merely discussing how the processes of social causation are understood by Marxists, and stress that the careful analysis of such processes stands at the core of research approaches that are grounded in critical realism. In other words, critical realism can help to further focus Marxian thought. One might also note that while many critical realists are Marxists, some aren’t; but pretty much all academic Marxist scholarship is in some distinctive ways critical realist. These points are developed and explained below.

Here there is a rift over a question of nuance. This concerns exactly how “determinant” a role the economic “base” and economic phenomena in general play in shaping and influencing the structure of society as a whole, and also in generating all manner of key macro-social processes. To the extent that such individuals even exist, the “vulgar” Marxists tend to argue that the impulses or influences that are ultimately responsible for shaping the contours of a given society virtually all come from society’s economic “base.” More serious and well-read Marxists will argue that a given society’s character and fundamental nature are generated via a complex series of interactions between the respective society’s two most basic constituent elements -- its economic “structure” and its class, legal, political and cultural superstructure. These more genuine Marxists will tend to argue that while there certainly are myriad “influence transmission belts” running back and forth between the structure and the superstructure, the former’s capacity to generate change in the latter must, at least in the majority of the relevant macro-social outcomes or processes ultimately be of decisive importance. In their understanding of causation, critical realists accept this second view and aim to provide an epistemology and ontology as well as a methodology which make sense of these complex interactions, while simultaneously rejecting naïve empiricism and what they see as the vagaries of postmodernism. Again, these ideas are explained further in this chapter.

The chapter then turns to explain the principle concepts which make up the core of critical realist philosophy. I proceed by contrasting the respective ideas with the largely opposed ones of postmodernist philosophy. Post-modernism and critical realism, while sharing certain points of contact,
are shown to advance fundamentally different conceptions of the basic character or, indeed, very existence of, social reality; they also differ on the degree of accessibility of social reality to conscientious researchers. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the case study approach that the thesis uses, including its scope and specific methods.

3.2: An Overview of Marxism’s Role in the Thesis

A relative handful of (self-proclaimed or more-or-less genuine) Marxist revolutionaries have either come reasonably closer to governing or actually managed to govern countries on the basis of Marxist theory, but Marxism as a philosophy and a form of analysis is here looked at in isolation from various acts that at least nominally Marxist regimes have carried out. Thus, Marxists – whether you agree with their outlook or not – strive through the intelligent application of various core principles of their worldview, to advance maximally comprehensive and detailed descriptions about the external manifestations and interior constituent elements of the most diverse past and currently unfolding events and processes. Those descriptions are generally utilized in the interest of developing a narrative predicated on a serious attempt to identify and then explain the “methods of operation” of diverse “entities” (this term will be defined later in this chapter) with potentially causal social capacities.

Socio-economic class is unquestionably one of the most vital sociological categories in Marxist theory. Marxists see class as being a function of the nature of one’s relationship to the means of production (i.e. capital); class, according to contemporary and more-or-less “orthodox” Marxism, constitutes in a direct and indirect manner the principal source of a given society’s inequalities as well as its main political and social formations.

By definition, the existence of capital is an absolutely indispensable prerequisite for the creation of a modern business. Thus whoever owns the capital associated with a particular business entity not only owns, but also is legally “entitled” to control said business entity. As long as they are at their jobs, the workers at a particular business are subject to the control of that business’s owners. Thus, for as long as they happen to be working “on the clock” at the companies that have employed them, workers, who by definition do not own a significant amount of capital, are in a position of formal subordination vis-a-vis the people (the capitalists) who own the bulk or the entirety of the these companies’ underlying capital. (Marx, 1867: Chapters 6-12)
Massive inequalities of power and wealth do not, in the Marxist worldview, remain geographically, politically or generally sociologically limited or isolated. The control that is exercised by the capitalist over the worker at the former’s business or financial concern “replicates,” broadens and extends itself into such activities, for example, as the meaningful influencing of state policy.

In the language of critical realism, that will be discussed later in this chapter, it can be said that there inheres in capitalism the process whereby the most wildly disparate social capacities and liabilities are constantly generated and then subsequently distributed among all the different layers of a given population. So long as a particular capitalist society is not presently in a state of revolutionary turmoil, Marxists hold that the wealthiest capitalists are the possessors in “their” society of some of the most telling capacities, including the state apparatus, while workers and the poor tend to be net possessors of social and political liabilities.

Marxism is a materialist philosophy. (Marx, 1992) Marxism’s materialist core refers to two separate directions of analysis. On the one hand, Karl Marx himself sought to fundamentally distinguish his philosophical outlook from that of Hegel (and Kant) who, Marx would always readily acknowledge, exercised a powerful and lasting intellectual influence on him. (Ibid) One of the key ways in which Marx’s philosophy contrasts with that of Hegel’s is that Hegel advances the argument that the ideas that humankind has not only have some sort of independent existence, but also are the essential source or wellspring of reality, of the world in its social and physical totality. Marx inverts Hegel’s idealist formulation, and holds that the world – the real, the substance, the material – necessarily constitutes the “zone of origination” of all thought, of all the ideas and ideological outlooks that we have, develop and may well seek to spread among as many others as possible. (Marx, 1873) Thus, Marxist materialism is indeed partly based on the argument that the “real” world – everything outside of our thoughts – exists prior to any thought or analysis, and indeed cannot but be the actual womb of thought. Our brains not only serve as the physical site or location from where all our thoughts emerge, but also invariably serve as the real material progenitors of those thoughts.

Critical realism starts with an ontological critique and accepts the existence of a real world external to and independent of the observer of that world. It shares this understanding with Marxism, which represents a repudiation of both liberal idealism and postmodernism. The other key materialist element of Marxist ontology posits the primacy of a given society’s “productive forces” (i.e. material base) in “giving birth to” the political and legal institutions, cultural customs, ideological concepts and class divisions which may prevail in a given society at a particular stage in development. During Marx’s lifetime, he already regarded the productive forces, defined as human labour operating in a reasonably rationally coordinated manner together with the technology, machine apparatuses and organizational and actual physical structures within which economic activity takes place, as being
sufficiently well-developed and sophisticated as to provide for the existence and functioning of the capitalist mode of production. That mode of production, not only the broad legal, political and even cultural institutions that are specific to it, but also the particular class structures, patterns of relations between the different classes and tendencies in income and wealth distribution, tend also to generate differences in power and influence between countries, regions as well as within societies.

In the context of this dissertation, the core Marxist conception (initially articulated by Marx and Engels and expanded on by theoreticians such as Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg and others) regarding the basic type of state that emerges within a certain territory in which the capitalist mode of production prevails takes on particular significance. (Marx, 1992) That capitalist mode of production includes the OECD developed world before and after the end of the Cold War, and the continued existence of the capitalist mode of production on the territory of the United States all throughout the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 period means, certainly for Marxists, the concomitant maintenance of the fundamentally capitalist nature of said country’s state. (Socialist Equality Party, 2010) State, society and institutions relate closely to the form of economy, even though there may also be scope for variations between each.

In the section next, attention is drawn to some of the differences -- largely though certainly not exclusively of a normative character -- between, on the one hand, critical realist philosophy and, on the other, the worldview of contemporary western liberalism. The global spread of both “enlightened” human rights practices and democratic political systems has served as a justification for the development of governments’ foreign military interventions. The utilization, over the course of the last two decades or so, of “humanitarian” intervention rhetoric by western governments intent on legitimizing their foreign policies can only generate heightened levels of skepticism from critical realists. The contemporary western liberals’ embrace of “their own” national governments’ agendas, although supposedly well-intentioned, would likely appear to a social scientist accepting of the core tenets of critical realism as having a thoroughly ahistorical character. To a scholar of International Relations sympathetic to critical realism’s most foundational precepts, the oft-brutal measures that, for example, western governments carried out in colonizing other states are not mere historical curiosities, but of an exceptional relevance to any coherent analysis of the contemporary international political system. Critical realism, with its emphasis on the moulding character of historically-conditioned social structures, cannot but encourage the taking of an oppositional stance vis-a-vis the ahistorical and socially abstracted moral pretensions advanced by traditionally powerful states and ruling classes intent on once again following the path of aggressive war. Critical realism in this sense shares its values and axiology with critical Marxism. (Gruffydd Jones, 2003: 228-9 and 231-7)
Marx and Engels insisted that the state, far from being a neutral arbiter between the interests of a given society’s contending social classes, inevitably serves as the legal and political instrument through which the wealthy and dominant classes maintain and consolidate their dominance against the other and invariably less affluent and more oppressed classes. (Engels, 1884: 210; Marx and Engels, 1848: 15) Thus, Marx and Engels affirmed, the state in capitalist society first and foremost serves the interests of the most powerful, privileged and potent class—the capitalist class—in the clashes that must arise between the interests of that class and the interests of other less influential and less well-heeled classes. (Engels, 1884: 210; Marx and Engels, 1848: 15)

What Marxists see as the absolutely central essence of the state—the most indispensable institutions of the state as well as the functions which all states seek to fulfil—was made explicit in 1884 with the publication of Friedrich Engels’ book *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. Engels asserts that at the state’s core, what is present in a state which was not present in those situations from earlier stages of human history when a given population simply sought by force of arms to defend itself—was a “[special] public force, ... [which] consists not merely of armed men, but of material appendages, prisons and repressive institutions of all kinds.” (Engels, 1884: 209) In this book, Engels not only explained what the defining and invariably present aspects of a state were and distinguished the state-specific “special public force” from the endeavouring of populations from a still-earlier, pre-state stage of history to arm and defend themselves (likely from an exogenous threat), but also identified the origins of the state and this state-specific special public force within the real, historically observed process by which class divisions emerged in a given human collectivity or clearly-defined population group. (Ibid: 200-11) Thus, according to Engels, besides the fact that the state’s existence in a clearly-defined human population group can be demonstrated via the presence of varied, inter-related and repressive institutions including, prominently, a “special public force,” this “special public force” is necessary because a self-acting armed organization of the population has become impossible since the cleavage of society into classes.” (Ibid: 209)

According to Marxist theory, the state and the varied “repressive institutions” invariably are integral components of the state and all function coherently to service a given society’s dominant class; the dominant class in capitalist society must be made up of and dominated by the bourgeoisie, or the capitalist class itself. The precise manner in which, according to Marxists, the state in capitalist society serves the capitalist class was first made explicit in late 1848 by Marx and Engels when they stated in *The Communist Manifesto* that “the executive of the modern state is nothing but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” (Marx and Engels, 1848: 15)

Lenin’s *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* signified a key moment whereby Marxist theory was broadened and rigorously, yet creatively, applied towards attaining a more complete
understanding of conditions that increasingly began to characterize and shape the world economy and international politics. In *Imperialism*, Lenin posits that imperialism is not so much a policy orientation that the most economically prosperous, militarily powerful and politically influential capitalist states can choose to adopt or reject, but is instead the general, overall course that these states must invariably pursue given that they likely confront generally challenging intra-national and fiercely competitive international economic conditions, as well as international political-military realities. (Lenin, 1972: 111-3 and 115-7)

The inevitable scenario whereby relatively poor countries will find themselves being placed, violently or otherwise, under the direct or indirect domination of wealthier capitalist countries with comparatively well-developed financial and industrial sectors is explained by Lenin as being based on the relationship between the states of the dominant countries with the “categorical capitalist imperative” of profit maximization for their leading multinational firms. In this perspective, capitalism should be understood as a system of production not just for profit, but for the greatest profit possible, and the state in a capitalist economy is the indispensable legal-political instrument of a given country’s capitalist class. Lenin proposed the idea that massive financial and non-financial companies can, with the assistance of the state apparatus in their own relatively wealthy capitalist country, boost their profits by plundering other poorer and weaker countries. (Ibid: 127-31 and 160) Lenin firmly believed that the single world capitalist economy was gradually created via the forceful incorporation of poorer and underdeveloped countries that increasingly became the destinations where giant private financial and productive concerns invested their surplus capital. He wrote “as long as capitalism remains what it is, surplus capital will be utilised not for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses in a given country, for this would mean a decline in profits for the capitalists, but for the purpose of increasing profits by exporting capital abroad to the backward countries. In these backward countries profits are usually high, for capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, raw materials are cheap. The export of capital is made possible by a number of backward countries having already been drawn into world capitalist intercourse; main railways have either been or are being built in those countries, elementary conditions for industrial development have been created, etc. The need to export capital arises from the fact that in a few countries capitalism has become ‘overripe’ and ... capital cannot find a field for ‘profitable’ investment.” (Ibid: 77-8)

Leon Trotsky also published numerous Marxist analyses of various critical historical and economic phenomena in which he argued that, over the historical long-term, not only would the one world economy exercise a dominant influence over economic, political and diplomatic developments in each locality across the planet, but that the attempt of individual countries to develop their own economies in relative isolation from the rest of the planet would eventually bring them into a position of even greater dependence. (Trotsky, 1934) Trotsky explains first that in places such as Holland in the late
16th century, France and Britain by the late 18th century, and continuing through the 19th century in Italy, Germany and the United States, the nation replaced the locality or province as the essential geographical and political locus for key economic processes. In the 20th century, this locus moved from the national to the world level. Trotsky wrote in his influential 1934 article “Nationalism and Economic Life” that “... all the movements of liberation in modern history, beginning, say, with Holland’s struggle for independence, had both a national and a democratic character. ...The French nation was consolidated in the storms and tempests of democratic revolution at the close of the 18th century. The Italian and German nations emerged from a series of wars and revolutions in the 19th century. The powerful development of the American nation, which had received its baptism of freedom in its uprising in the 18th century, was finally guaranteed by the victory of the North over the South in the Civil War. ... But the economic development of mankind which overthrew mediaeval particularism did not stop within national boundaries. The growth of world exchange took place parallel with the formation of national economies. The tendency of this development—for advanced countries at any rate—found its expression in the shift of the center of gravity from the domestic to the foreign market. The 19th century was marked by the fusion of the nation’s fate with the fate of its economic life; but the basic tendency of our century is the growing contradiction between the nation and economic life.” (Ibid)

Lenin, Luxemburg and other Marxist revolutionaries who were politically active during the 20th century’s first decades expressed their basic agreement with Trotsky’s view that, over the course of the 19th century, not only did the primary geographical and political-legal locus of economic activity gradually shift from the locality and the province-level to the national level, but by the last 30 years or so of the 19th century and into the 20th century, another step-by-step shift to the level of world economy occurred. This second shift was indissolubly linked to the eruption of World War I, not to mention other international conflicts. In more recent analysis of globalization, scholars such as Sassen and Mittelman have developed similar themes on the integration of the world economy and its impact on local communities.

In the years following the deaths of Luxemburg and Lenin, Trotsky remained politically active and argued not only that World War I had not put an end to this fundamental tension between the legal and political structures inherent in the world’s rival nation-states and the development of a single world economy, but that the persistence of tension would inevitably lead to the outbreak of another world war. Trotsky said: “Needless to say, the war did not find the solution to this problem. On the contrary, it atomized Europe even more. It deepened the interdependence of Europe and America at the same time that it deepened the antagonism between them. It gave the impetus to the independent development of colonial countries and simultaneously sharpened the dependence of the metropolitan centres upon colonial markets. As a consequence of the war, all the contradictions of the past were
aggravated. One could half-shut one’s eyes to this during the first years after the war, when Europe aided by America, was busy repairing its devastated economy from top to bottom. But to restore productive forces inevitably implied to reinvigorating all those evils that had led to the war. The present crisis in which are synthesized all the capitalist crises of the past, signifies above all the crisis of national economic life.” (Ibid)

Besides serving as valuable Marxist analyses of the dual phenomenon whereby modern capitalist imperialism develops simultaneously with the movement toward the creation of a single world capitalist economy, Lenin’s book Imperialism, Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital, and Leon Trotsky’s many works, including the 1934 article “Nationalism and Economic Life”, have proved useful to more recent scholars who have developed Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory. Within the discipline of international economics, the creation of the perspective entitled “Dependency Theory” is often traced by scholars to the empirical and theoretical work carried out, apparently independently, in 1949 and 1950 by German economist Hans Singer and Argentine economist Raul Prebisch. (Correa, 2009: 33-4; United Nations Department of Economic Affairs -- Economic Commission For Latin America, 1950: 8-10; Westra, 2010: 8-10) Their observation that, over a long sweep of history, a secular shifting of export prices towards the further disadvantage of the already relatively poor countries and the further advantage of the then wealthier countries, in no way fundamentally conflicts with the analyses of imperialism that were developed by Marxist theoreticians from earlier in the 20th century such as Lenin, Luxemburg and Trotsky.

This observed reduction in the prices of exported primary commodities relative to the prices of exported secondary manufactured goods would be injurious to the economic well-being of the relatively poor countries, because both during the period immediately preceding World War Two’s outbreak and during the years immediately following the end of the war, the relatively poor countries were exporting far more primary commodities than secondary manufactured goods. (Caputo and Pizarro, 1982: 33-4; United Nations Department of Economic Affairs -- Economic Commission For Latin America, 1950: 8-10; Westra, 2010: 19) For Prebisch and Singer, the fact that the prices of primary commodity exports had for years been falling in relation to the prices of secondary manufactured goods had fairly clear implications in regards to the kinds of trade policies that the poorer countries would need to put in place. If the one world economy would keep on operating on the basis of the principles of free trade, there was every reason to believe that the decline in the prices of primary commodities relative to the prices of manufactured goods would continue and exacerbate still further the already considerable gaps in income and wealth that existed between the wealthier and the poorer countries. (Caputo and Pizarro, 1982: 33-4; United Nations Department of Economic Affairs -- Economic Commission For Latin America, 1950: 8-10; Westra, 2010: 19)
One far-reaching conclusion that could be derived from Prebisch and Singer’s work, which many later academics also accepted, was that the very structure of the one world economy was systemically generative of ever-increasing inequalities in income and wealth (and thus power) between the relatively affluent, mainly manufactured goods-exporting countries and the poorer, mainly primary commodities-exporting countries. (Caputo and Pizarro, 1982: 33-4; United Nations Department of Economic Affairs --Economic Commission For Latin America, 1950: 8-10; Westra, 2010: 19). Thus, barring the successful unfolding of anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist revolutions within the relatively affluent countries, the only hope for the positive future economic development of the relatively poor, mainly primary commodities-exporting countries appeared to lie in a policy of relative autonomy which could isolate them from the rest of the world economy. (Toye and Toye, 2003: 438)

Dependency theory thus constitutes one of the influences on which the present dissertation and its three research questions draws. One of the most basic insights provided by Dependency Theory is that in the modern world capitalist economy, there exists a clear division between the relatively wealthy, dominant countries and the poorer, dependent countries, and that if that fundamental division of labour ceased to exist, the breakdown of the world capitalist economy would occur. In other words, this is a fundamental structural basis of global relations, not merely an accidental feature. Though closely related theoretically, and despite their support coming from much of the same empirical data, Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory differ conceptually in at least one important regard. While Dependency Theory tends to posit the existence of a bipolar world made up of the exploited or “dependent” countries and the relatively wealthy (dominant) imperialist countries, scholars who identify their work with World Systems Theory typically place the world’s countries into three or four politically and economically-defined categories. (Beaud, 2001: 268-77; Caputo and Pizarro, 1982: 33-4; United Nations Department of Economic Affairs --Economic Commission For Latin America, 1950: 8-10; Westra, 2010: 19)

World systems theorists hold that the capitalist economy exists as a hierarchically organized system, and that within it some countries are dominant, other countries are dominated, and still others occupy some type of intermediary, semi-peripheral place. This hierarchy is the product of long-term historical processes. Depicting the relations and structures that were in place between the world’s capitalist countries in the 1970s, Michel Beaud, a French economist known for his alignment with World Systems Theory, asserted that the United States was the (capitalist) world’s dominant imperialist power; other large western economies were certainly dominant, but the totality of their influence was less than that of the United States. Beaud suggests that dominated countries were located in various parts of the world such as Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. (Beaud, 2001: 268-77) Similar arguments have been made by critical realist scholars close to Marxism such as Saskia Sassen (Sassen, 2006). Beaud placed the United States at the “top tier” of the world and imperialist powers
including Japan and Western Europe on the second tier (from the top); the third tier is made up of geographically widely dispersed countries that largely served the United States and the second-tier imperialist powers, while the highly penetrated and dominated countries located in the global south are situated on the fourth tier.

This analysis leads one back to *The Accumulation of Capital*, where Luxemburg developed the essence of a historically-verifiable relationship between relatively wealthy capitalist-imperialist countries and poorer, oppressed countries. (Luxemburg, 1915) Luxemburg emphasizes the dynamic nature of change within global capitalism: “accumulation is impossible in an exclusively capitalist environment. Therefore, we find that capital has been driven since its very inception to expand into non-capitalist strata and nations, ruin artisans and peasantry, proletarianize the intermediate strata, the politics of colonialism, the politics of ‘opening-up’ and the export of capital. The development of capitalism has been possible only through constant expansion into new domains of production and new countries. But the global drive to expand leads to a collision between capital and pre-capitalist forms of society, resulting in violence [and] war … Capital accumulation progresses and expands at the expense of non-capitalist strata and countries, squeezing them out at an ever faster rate. The general tendency and final result of this process is the exclusive world rule of capitalist production.” (Ibid)

In this thesis, Marxist conceptions of inequality, global structure and material power play a central role in shaping the specific approach used. Marxism provides the axiology of the thesis – the framework of values which also shape the research. Marxist thinking also shapes the ideas of how change takes place and what structures and mechanisms matter in explaining change and continuity. The more specific methods and methodology derive both from Marxism and from critical theory. The discussion now turns to one specific idea within Marxism, the nature of causality.

### 3.3: Marxist Conceptions of Causation

The US is and has been for many decades a fundamentally capitalist state. This truism is important because it means that Washington can properly be viewed in critical realist terms as a “structured entity” endowed with significant capacities for action. The regime changes studied in this dissertation can be identified as (social) events. To endeavour to identify such events’ primary, secondary or even tertiary causes or triggers constitutes the key objective in critical realist research, including in historical case studies. (Sayer, 2000: 241-251) Again, Marxists have long asserted the fundamental
primacy of the economic base (itself comprising both the totality of the relations and the forces of production) in broadly determining the key contours of human society in its ensemble. Marxists, along with mainstream critical realists, believe that social reality – especially in terms of the more significant underlying catalysts for the occurrence of key “events” -- is far more complex than a study of surface-level appearances would suggest. The Marxist view is that the economic structure is ultimately responsible for at-least broadly shaping and influencing the form and content of those catalysts. When properly applied it does not, however, argue that the economic base mechanically determines the outcomes of social relations. Thus, not only for serious Marxists, but also for critical realists, the question of the manner by which one macro-social entity acts upon and triggers change in another assumes paramount importance. Efforts to identify and better understand the mechanisms by which “influence and change transmission belts” actually function occupies a central place in the varied social science inquiries that are carried out by the adherents of critical realism and of Marxism. Joseph (2002) elaborates the links between critical realism and Marxism on causation and explanation and shows how a critical realist methodology can make Marxist approaches more precise and more strongly grounded.

Raymond Williams (1980) is one of a number of recent writers from a broad ‘western marxist’ spectrum who have challenged the relatively economically determinist approach that was characteristic of some earlier leading figures, more often activists than scholars. Williams argues that while the material conditions of society play central roles in shaping political and cultural evolution, the relationship between the base and superstructure is more complex than the supposedly crudely deterministic analysts might suggest. Indeed, he points out, to say otherwise would be to deny the dialectic between culture and economic formations. However what is important here is the existence of a tradition of establishing causation which is relatively nuanced and which recognizes the gradations of causality and the ways in which different manifestations of structure and agency-based influence “intertwine” to “birth” most social events. It is this understanding of causation which critical realism grounds, and to which the thesis now turns.
3.4: Critical Realism in this Dissertation

This section sets out the core ideas of critical philosophy, including its ontological and epistemological foundations, but also its fundamental differences from ‘crude’ Marxism, crude empiricism and post-modernism.

Sellars suggests that “the guiding principle of critical realism is to keep as near to natural realism as the relevant facts permit.” (1939: 415) Critical realism has been defended as a form of sophisticated common sense rooted in a more methodologically developed approach to understanding which does not get locked into epistemological tangles without first clarifying ontology. The weasel in Sellars’s words lies in the last five words: how close do the relevant facts permit? Critical realism rejects naïve realism and hence empiricism. The ‘facts’ are not only those that present themselves directly to sense experience, and in any case what sense experience detects may well be unreliable. The same complaint was made by Hume and more recently by Quine (who owes much to Sellars). Sellars and his intellectual heir (and son) Wilfrid Sellars are two of the main influences on Roy Bhaskar, who took what the two Sellars understood as primarily a philosophy of science and reformulated it as a social science.

Bhaskar’s work is the starting point for much contemporary critical realism, but it has become increasingly metaphysical. Among other things it is not so clearly reconcilable with Marxism. However the critical realism of some of Bhaskar’s associates, notably Jon Elster, has been designed to be integrated with a Marxian approach to understanding society, and it is this line of argument which has been developed in the work of other critical realist scholars including Bob Jessop, Robert Denemark, Christopher May and Andrew Sayer. The collected volume Critical Realism and Marxism (Brown et al, 2002) and the work in critical international relations theory by Heikki Patomaki (with and without Colin Wight), as well as case study analysis by scholars such as Walia (2005) are testament to the resilience of critical theory in international relations and history. These different authors suggest a range of possible ontological positions instead of dogmatically “decreeing” the association of a select few with critical realism.

Here I follow Patomaki’s useful distinction (itself derived from Sellars and Elster) between the “actual,” what empirical evidence immediately suggests exists, the “concrete,” what appears from day-to-day to be a social reality, and the “real.” To rely only on the actual or the concrete expressions of reality, what sense data and common sense tell us might exist, misses the underlying causes, including structures and mechanisms, which are real and evidently real in their consequences. Some elements of the real are not immediately available to sense experience, but the use of sense experience
coupled with reason and the checking of evidence and assumptions enables one to assert the existence of realities not evident to sense experience alone. One obvious example in a Marxist context is the idea of class. One cannot “see,” never mind smell or taste, class. But there is plenty of evidence that many mainstream liberals would accept regarding the ways that class operates as the cause of, say, difficulties for individuals in labour markets. In international relations the structures of dominance and dependency are understood to be barriers to development almost as widely by liberals (although not neo-liberals) as by Marxists or advocates of world systems and dependency theory. Critical realism clarifies this idea of realism which not only can justify particular methods and methodology in research, but which can also be found in almost all of Marx’s writing from the early *1844 Manuscripts* to the last volume of *Capital*.

Examining post-modernism’s central conceptions can be helpful in grasping the nature of critical realism’s philosophical core through the contrast that it offers. In summarizing some of post-modernism’s foundational tenets, Bhaskar -- himself broadly credited with having laid the essential groundwork for the development of critical realist philosophy in social science -- has written that: “The postmodernist says that reality as such, the whole of reality, is a social construct; it is conceptual. Rom [a philosopher of science who adheres to certain of the basic, underlying postulates of post-modernism] says that social reality is basically conceptual ... What the post-modernist essentially wants to do is ... to deny ontology. ... What is the discursive status of the act whereby the reality of being is denied? Does the statement exist? What post-modernists normally say is that they are not denying that things exist but merely asserting that we can’t say anything about these things.”

(Bhaskar in Harre and Bhaskar, 2001: 28-9)

In asserting that the critical realist and post-modern perspectives are, at root, fundamentally incompatible, Bhaskar is not, however, also arguing that they don’t have any points of contact. Scholars such as Bhaskar, who hold that penetrating insights can be generated through the creative application of a critical realist approach, argue also that said approach “is people dependent; but it is not concept exhaustive; it is not people exhaustive; it is not exhausted by human beings as powerful particulars; it is not exhausted by discourse or the text.” (Ibid: 28-9) Patomaki and Wight similarly accept that critical realists need to accommodate some of the distinctive foundations of post-modernist theory. Describing how critical realism in some ways “meets up” with, and in other ways sharply diverges from post-modernism, Bhaskar has stated that: “The critical realist position is to say of course social reality is concept dependent, of course it is people dependent; but it is not concept exhaustive; it is not people exhaustive; it is not exhausted by human beings as powerful particulars; it is not exhausted by discourse or the text.” (Ibid: 28-9) The importance in this dissertation of critical realist philosophy lies in its capacity to establish and justify the framework within which attempts can
be made to isolate, understand and identify the causal mechanisms that, in a “subterranean manner,”
may have been at work in a chosen social development.

Various of the core philosophical precepts of critical realism -- as the first word in that term would
indicate -- can fairly be interpreted as counselling the adoption of a relatively oppositional attitude vis-
a-vis the behaviour (in this study, the foreign policy) of key actors. Said precepts also suggest a direct
link to the large body of critical theory in international relations. (Devetak, 2009) In other words, the
“critical” component of critical realist philosophy refers not only to the methodological, but also to
the political sphere and to the inequalities and exploitation which it identifies. The notion that
profound inequalities and relations between dominant and dominated parties exist in the global
political order is not necessarily unique to critical realists and could, in certain circumstances be
accepted by some contemporary western liberals. However, unlike liberals, critical realists do not shy
away from identifying the development of the world capitalist economy over the course of the last
500-plus years as constituting one of the primary sources for the undeniably sharp power imbalances
and relations of dominance/submission that characterize the modern international order. Thus, in
critical realism, normative opposition to what many would regard as the unjust nature of
contemporary inter-state relations rests on a serious study of the history of the world capitalist
system’s development and this system’s exploitation-generating mechanisms.

3.5: The Place of Critical Realism in this Research Process

Holding aside, for the time, being normative considerations, one could argue that a perspective on
international relations that is meaningfully informed by critical realism has its origins in a critique of
some of the principle ontological and theoretical assumptions on which the entire edifice of
“orthodox” economics and liberal political economy rest. The term “orthodox economics” means the
essentially conservative consensus among contemporary elites who hold that a minimally-regulated
capitalist market system will, in comparison with all other conceivable alternative orders, generate the
highest levels of aggregate social welfare at the national and global levels. Describing the ontological
premises which are generally consistent with these assumptions, there emerged the theoretical models
which purport to show the superior aggregative efficiency of a laissez-faire capitalist economy. Of
these, Patomaki has remarked that: “If we assume that only sense-perceptions and the mind are real,
as [David] Hume did, what will be the resulting social ontology? Society is reduced to individuals
(recipients of sense-perceptions and recorders of constant conjunctures), and these individuals become
atom-like, constant in their constant structure ... The other side of the coin is, paradoxically,
voluntarism. Since there are social arrangements and institutions, such as private property and the sovereign state, they must be explained as outcomes of voluntary actions of individuals.” (Patomaki, 2003: 201; Bhaskar, 1978: 16, 57; Bhaskar, 1986: 250-9 and 287-308)

Patomaki further suggests that the progressive development of neo-classical economics and liberal political theory over the course of the 19th and 20th centuries, served in a step-by-step but evident manner to compartmentalize and isolate those theories from each other and from all the other fields of inquiry into social relations. In other words, contemporary non-critical social theory underpins some of the key ideas of global capitalism. (Patomaki, 2003: 203) Commenting on the emergence of the strong research program of neo-classical economics, Patomaki also states that: “explanatory irrelevance, stemming from the impossible, contradictory and untrue assumptions, was very well compensated for by the certainties of ‘science’ and a rather fundamentalist belief in the orthodoxy. Furthermore, and in particular since the late 1950s, this situation has benefited from abundant funding and increasing political influence. Thus began the transnational and transdisciplinary imperialism of neo-classical economics. After having first isolated economy from society, the neo-classical economists were soon unable to see anything but quasi-formal systems of atomist, calculating transactions everywhere. The positivist approach of neo-classical orthodoxy, according to which atomist economic men make utilitarian, standardised transactions in closed systems, was subsequently claimed to be ‘applicable to all human behaviour.’” (Patomaki, 2003: 203-04; G. Becker, 1976: 8; Archer and Tritter, 2000)

It should be mentioned here that various prominent contemporary western liberals who have maintained for years a hostile stance vis-a-vis revolutionary left-wing anti-capitalist ideologies have come to embrace not only a number of Western and (often) Washington-led foreign military interventions, but also a fundamentally neoliberal standpoint on economic questions. Effectively acknowledging that “free-market capitalism” is not some kind of self-organizing system, but that its smoother and smoother functioning requires the utilization on its behalf of state power and, sometimes, the mass violence that only the state can bring to bear, the liberal New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman stated in a March 28, 1999 article that was partly based on his support for the then-ongoing US-NATO war against the former Yugoslavia that: “The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist -- McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps. ..... The global system cannot hold together without an activist and generous American foreign and defense policy. Without America on duty, there will be no America Online.” (Friedman, 1999)

While his intent was clearly otherwise, Friedman here also lends support to some of the intellectual sallies that partisans of broadly left-wing tendencies have launched against many foreign policy
initiatives that prominent liberal intellectuals have favored. Thus this prominent western liberal Friedman apparently does not believe that the emergence and then consolidation of the capitalist “free-market” can somehow be considered a “natural” process. What he here acknowledged is generally denied by academic theoreticians of orthodox liberalism. In other words, the capitalist free market system’s very existence is contingent upon the presence and functioning of all manner of social, cultural, legal and political institutions, including ones which unleash deadly violence. In its acceptance of the notion that a given state’s (and particularly an imperialist state’s) foreign policy cannot be somehow “extracted” from either the historical process of which it is an integral part, or from the broader juridical, cultural, ideological, political, and economic context in which it is enacted, critical realist philosophy meshes well with the Marxist approach. (Yalvac, 2010; Yalvac, 2012; Yalvac, 2014)

In regards to International Relations, as with various other spheres of human social activity, critical realism posits that there exists a deep and real interdependence between structure and agency (Patomaki and Wight, 2000). The social structures that we humans are born into, which are the product of previous human endeavours and which are far “larger” and more powerful than any one of us are not immune to action initiated either by particular (rather well-situated) individuals or, more likely, by groups of people pursuing collective aims (including corporate interests).

Social structures are real, they exist outside and beyond just the sphere of “discourse”. They act upon and influence us and, as just pointed out, they are “vulnerable” to the purposeful action that people engage in. More specifically, the social structures that play a role within the sphere of contemporary international relations are national states (each one possessing wildly divergent capacities for triggering macro-social events and processes,) productive forces, the military apparatuses of different national states, representatives of class interests and of multifarious resistance movements. (Cox, 1981; Cox, 1983; Joseph, 2002; Creaven, 2002; Patomaki and Wight, 2000; Yalvac, 2010; Yalvac, 2012; Yalvac, 2014)

Gaining a better understanding of the differential capacities of varying social structures, such as, for example, a relatively new and nominally social-democratic Albanian party of government in comparison with a much older and more openly conservative governing party from the US, can perhaps best be facilitated by an analysis of a long sweep of history, and not merely through a study of recent political events. The elements that are central to the entirety of critical realist philosophy thus provide a useful, guiding theoretical framework within which a detailed account of episodes in US foreign policy can be fruitfully developed.

Explaining the role that the thoughtful application of critical realism’s methodologies can play in the construction of a coherent, overarching and critical analysis of the contemporary, pro-status quo orthodoxy in the west, Patomaki has argued that: “… critical realism can work as a philosophical
‘underlabourer’ for GPE [Global Political Economy, which is to the left of and certainly at odds with the neo-classical school] by deepening basic ontological concepts such as causality, action, structure, power and open systems; by clarifying the epistemology of explanatory modelling and the role of explicit hypotheses and empirical evidence; … Critical realism enables both theoretically informed empirical research and practical interventions. Fully-fledged critical realism deems systematic causal modelling and transformative practice as aspects of a larger whole, an integrated set of practices.” (Patomaki, 2003)

Advancing the “frontiers of knowledge” in relation to this dissertation’s subject matter is not contradicted by any of the theoretical premises of critical realism (as all the contributors to Brown et al. 2002, also assert). Critical realism holds that terms such as “truth” and “falsity” may well be inadequate to the task of describing the relationship that exists between knowledge and ‘on what the respective knowledge focuses. Furthermore, critical realism maintains that what we know about our objectively real world is invariably colored by human-developed and imperfect theories, but that, if the processes of theory formation and its human psychologies are better understood, something which can be called objective knowledge is possible (meaning knowledge which is as objective as possible in given circumstances).

Thus, while critical realism harbors a certain and perhaps rather healthy skepticism towards the prospect of humans developing a truly better, richer and more complete understanding of the world, this skepticism should not be mistaken for an overarching pessimism vis-a-vis our capacity to acquire more and more genuinely valuable insights about complex phenomena. Properly conducted research is, according to the core of critical realism’s underlying philosophy, certainly justifiable and useful, and enlightening, if not the holy grail for the complete uncovering and wholesale, multi-faceted elucidation of currently insufficiently comprehended truths. (Easton, 2010; Sayer, 1992: 5-6)

The distinction between realism and critical realism is also significant. As Easton remarks: “Critical realists propose an ontology that assumes that there exists a reality ‘out there’ independent of observers. A naïve realist epistemology would assume that this reality can be readily accessed. This is a view often espoused by researchers in the natural sciences because of their ability to measure accurately and their access to controllable and / or closed systems. However these conditions rarely occur in social systems.” (Easton, 2010: 120) Acceptance of the veracity of critical realism’s central precepts entails acknowledging that there exist significant, though not insuperable, obstacles to the development of a genuinely enhanced understanding of social reality.

A key tenet of critical realism’s underlying philosophical tenets affirms that attempts at interpretation are a more-or-less direct by-product of the acts of observation, study and analysis of the social world. Critical realism also advances the rather uncontroversial argument that the creation of concepts is
absolutely indispensable to all even quasi-serious efforts at understanding one or another aspect of social reality. Thus the conscientious study of the social world can only take place through the prism of evidently human-created and invariably at least somewhat abstract conceptual frameworks. In other words, though our selection of one or another competing conceptual framework will largely shape what we understand to be the essential meaning and significance of myriad social entities, events and processes, said entities, events and processes’ objectively real existence cannot in any meaningful way be altered by scholarly pursuits like physically detached observation or abstract theory formulation.

The theoretical approach that is employed by researchers will shape the outward “appearance” of the social world. This dissertation opts to focus analytical attention primarily on those regime changes which, with Washington’s “vital” backing, “successfully” unfolded during the January 1, 1990-September 10, 2001 historical timeframe. Thus, these regime changes manifest themselves in the form of actions, structural shifts and changed processes for which evidence can be found and tested.

To understand the social world, the advancing of interpretations is virtually inevitable, though not also necessarily proof of an unscientific, tendentious subjectivity. For conscientious historians and social scientists, the production of analyses untainted (or at most minimally tainted) by ideological bias is a prime desideratum. The achievement of this may be facilitated by making the case-study method a central component of any serious inquiry into historical and social phenomena. A dedication to the careful application of the case-study method can serve as a particularly useful mechanism by which social scientists can force themselves to examine their own analyses’ evidentiary foundations in a relatively dispassionate and ideologically neutral manner. The accumulation and relatively well-organized presentation of as much data, qualitative and quantitative, as is reasonably feasible is perhaps the single most essential requirement for the fruitful utilization of the case-study method in analyses of the social world.

The five research questions formally addressed in this dissertation are all examined and tested on the basis of the same evidentiary standards, derived from the three Washington-backed regime changes—Bulgaria in 1990; Albania from 1991 into 1992; and Serbia in 2000—each of which has its own country case-study chapter. Thus, the three country case-study chapters serve as short histories for the testing of all five research questions addressed through this dissertation, and for comparison and contrast of the results.

Another central proposition of critical realist theory, which, in the context of both doing the necessary preliminary work for and then writing this dissertation, manifested itself with some consistency and force, concerns the process by which researchers acquire data and then develop and further elaborate on key analytical concepts. Critical realism holds, in simple terms, that while the radical and sudden alteration of theoretical frameworks generally does not constitute in the social sciences and history an
efficacious means for facilitating the process of knowledge acquisition and broad concept development, that process also is generally not maximally facilitated by the strict adherence to one or another fixed, inflexible and eternally unchanged analytical standpoint.

The social scientific aspirations of critical realism are entirely compatible with those of an academically grounded Marxism (as scholars such as May, Elster and Sayer, cited above, among others, have demonstrated). As already noted in this dissertation, during the first decades of the 20th century, intellectuals such as Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg, Bukharin and others considerably extended the topical reach of Marxism as it was first developed by Marx and Engels. Marxist theory evolved largely in step with the historical development of the world system whereby economic activity increasingly shifted its primary locus from within individual nation-states to the multi-national, continental and even global levels. (Arrighi, 2010; Bukharin, 1929; Chirot and Hall, 1982; Lenin, 1972; Luxemburg, 1915; Trotsky, 1934) Lenin, for example, drawing on Hobson, did not modify Marx’s understanding of how profits are generated even in conditions of a competitive marketplace characterized by the presence of multiple relatively small firms, but instead “expanded” on that understanding with an attempt to explain how “super-profits” can be earned by oligopolistic business entities. The view articulated by Lenin in his 1916 book *Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism* whereby aggregate profits will be disproportionately high within an industry marked by the dominance of large corporations that sometimes compete against and other times collude with one another is accepted well beyond the school of Marxist economists. (see, for example: Floyd; Povey)

In this dissertation, the “realist” perspective in International Relations is of not inconsiderable value. This perspective is frequently identified with figures such as Samuel Huntington, who saw Washington as a perhaps imperfect but still supportable backer of the values of “capitalist democracy” against the supposedly socialist Soviet Union and other supposedly “totalitarian” movements such as global political Islam. The realism endorsed by Huntington, among others, holds that some of the interests of a powerful national government almost certainly can only be meaningfully acted on outside the territory over which that government formally exercises sovereignty. It thus follows that it is normal and proper for national governments such as Washington to seek to secure outside the borders of “their own” countries what they perceive to be their own vital interests.

Modern day Marxists accept the “realist” assumption that, certainly no less than the heads of less powerful national governments, the leading figures within the US government approach foreign policy as an indispensable tool through which they can potentially realize their own state’s presumed vital interests. (see, for example: Marsden, 2009; Marsden, 2014) Both Marxists and the Anglophone world’s almost entirely pro-capitalist foreign policy realists would contend that it is evident that there is no actual meaningful overlap between Washington’s presumed vital global interests and the human rights conditions facing various peoples outside the US. Thus, both the advocates of the Marxist
outlook and the Anglophone world’s pro-capitalist proponents of foreign policy “realism” end up, albeit by following entirely different ideological paths, at a common conclusion. That is that Washington’s interventionist foreign policy is simply not based on altruism and a humanitarian concern for the miserable life conditions currently plaguing countless people in much of the world. Reiterating again that Marxist analysts of international relations believe that for capitalist-imperialist national governments promoting the profit interests of “their own countries’” massive and “globe-trotting” corporations, banks and financial concerns necessarily constitutes the central goal of foreign policy does not mean that this goal is always and everywhere pursued by the most direct route. Washington’s foreign policy “toolkit” does not consist solely of covert meddling in and the launching of aggressive wars against various other countries so as to facilitate the unfolding of “regime changes. US-based multinational corporations and banks operate and generate massive profits in various non-US countries whose national governments maintain friendly and cooperative relations with Washington. However, the principle focus in this dissertation is on how, at different points during the January 1, 1990-September 10, 2001 period, Washington significantly contributed to the successful unfolding of three different regime changes. There have been earlier studies of Washington inspired regime change and other interventions before the end of the Cold War; one of the distinctive claims to originality of this thesis is that despite widespread suggestions that American foreign policy changed after 1989, case study research suggests (at least in the three examples here) a much higher degree of continuity than is usually recognized. The three regime changes that I have primarily focused on in this dissertation can best be studied via the application of a case study method. The case-study method’s potential utility to the social-science researcher depends on the degree of quality of relevant data that is obtained and coherently presented. That there occurred one “full-blown” regime change each in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania in 1992 and in Serbia in 2000 is relatively easy to demonstrate. That behind each of the three regime changes stood, to no small degree, Washington requires a well-constructed and sound interpretation of the accessible and relevant data. Furthermore, if it is established that each one of three regime changes here was indeed at least partly the result of Washington’s machinations, the question concerning the motivations which underlie those machinations still remains very much open and unanswered. As explained earlier in this chapter, the primary original sources of changes in the social world are, in the lexicon of critical realism, generally referred to as “entities,” many of which can also simultaneously be classified as “structures.” As understood by critical realism proponents, those structures, which can be thought of as agglomerations of individual, atomistic entities, have greater or lesser “capacities” to generate events within the social sphere. The massively variant “event-generating capacities” of different social structures can be the consequence of each one of those structures having its own specific composition. Social structures are not just made up of entities, but
of other and necessarily smaller social structures. Thus social structures undeniably join together to some extent generating larger social structures and more complex structures which have a relatively heightened “event-generating” potential. (Easton, 2010: 120)

In the context of this dissertation, the CIA and the Defense Department may certainly be thought of as large social structures, which themselves are of the product of the fastening together of other, smaller social structures or networks. However, in this dissertation, I do not principally focus on state institutions like the CIA or the Pentagon, but rather on those institutions’ “uniting umbrella” or common, structural parent, the US Government. The US government is, in the Marxist conception, a rational agent. Therefore, Washington is capable of working purposefully as a unified whole towards the formulation of objectives and then towards their realization. Thus, in this dissertation, social events are depicted as being triggered or facilitated mainly by particular and conscious, and not “blind” and “randomly acting” entities or social structures.

The case study method, with its detailed, step-by-step coverage of the unfolding of complex processes and events, has provided an opportunity to better understand the primary sources and basic nature of the causal forces that stood behind the three regime changes studied here. These regime changes’ actual occurrence is not, it should be pointed out, seriously in dispute. But the interpretation-based questions of “how?” and “why?” are.

Following quickly after the Washington-supported “regime changes” that reached their successful apogee in Bulgaria and Albania during 1990 and 1992 respectively, their central governments pursued not just economic and foreign or geostrategic policies, but charted fundamental economic and foreign or geostrategic courses that could largely have been predicted via application not only of the central underpinnings of the theoretical standpoints of Dependency Theory and World Systems Theory, but also of Luxemburg’s Marxist model on the nature of the relations that will invariably ensue between a capitalist-imperialist country and a relatively poor country that, for one reason or another, does not currently have exclusively capitalist internal or domestic economic arrangements and institutions.

The process after 1990-2 whereby Bulgaria and Albania’s Washington-supported regime changes came to be controlled by capital from the capitalist-imperialist countries certainly serves to provide evidentiary backing for Luxemburg’s explicitly Marxist theory on imperialism. Furthermore, the years immediately after the Washington-backed regime changes in Bulgaria and Albania, seem to conform to predictions which flow naturally from an understanding of the fundamental concepts underlying Dependency Theory. Neither showed any inclination to become significant exporters of relatively costly, sophisticated, secondary manufactured goods. Finally, as adherents of World Systems Theory might point out, in the period immediately after these Washington-aided regime changes, not only did the economic gap or the gap in development levels between, on the one hand, Bulgaria and Albania and, on the other hand, the major capitalist-imperialist powers remain enormous, but Bulgaria and
Albania became geopolitically loyal points of support for the major capitalist-imperialist powers in general, and especially for the United States.

3.6: Methods and Methodology

This dissertation is in large measure a product of my utilizing the case study method. Because of the nature of both the broad primary themes as well as specific research questions I have sought to seriously address, this dissertation could only fruitfully go forward on the basis of utilizing the case study method. The case study method, which involves conscientiously identifying and then in detail describing the most central driving agents and sub-components of certain chronologically well-defined events or processes, is, within the social sciences as well as historical research, a valuable alternative to more statistically and quantitatively-based analyses. If the primary subjects studied in the framework of a particular social science inquiry are not numerous enough to qualify for a “proper” statistical analysis, then the case study method emerges as another potentially viable research pathway. Descriptions of various historico-social processes often morph rather seamlessly into efforts at explanation predicated in large measure on the supposed causal, triggering capacities of particular forces, people, institutions or, more broadly put, entities. Within the framework of complex social, economic and political phenomena, the search for the manner of functioning of potential causal factors and processes demands scrupulous attention to detail and the inclusion of as many seemingly central data points as possible. Thus, a case study-based analytic work that seeks to understand not only what event or process in the social realm transpired but also why the respective event or process unfolded as it did must necessarily be rather comprehensive in nature. Here, critical realism provides a conceptual framework which allows causal explanation but avoids naïve empirical traps.

The three regime changes studied here should not be understood exclusively as single discrete politico-historic events taking place at a given moment in time; instead, the three non-US regime changes can all be conceived of as constituting the logical culminating moments of historico-political, economic, social and military processes understood within a context (which needs to be explained) over many years. Thus the case-study chapters explore the causes, but also the consequences, of Washington-backed regime changes.

Five research questions were examined in the framework of this dissertation. Each research question had to be, in the case of every single country case-study chapter, coupled, on the basis of the vital presented data, with a simple “yes” or “no” answer. The case study method is, I firmly believe,
sufficient for the generation of solidly evidence-backed “yes” or “no” answers to the five research questions posed through the historical experience of each of the regime changes studied most closely in this dissertation. However, the formal articulation and subsequent testing of research questions were not carried out in this dissertation merely to the end of generating simple “yes” or “no” answers; in fact, the advancing of a “yes” or “no” answer to the different research questions in this dissertation almost invariably leads to the posing of the questions precisely “why” as well as “how” did “yes” or “no” responses get generated. Questions in social science research such as “how?” and “why?” are, quite evidently, of an explanatory nature; it is precisely these questions’ explanatory character that makes them particularly well-suited to being addressed and by the proper application of the case study method. Conducting the necessary research for and then writing a case study-based study entails flexibility in frequently moving back and forth between and also not hesitating to re-analyze the sundry aspects of the subjects under investigation.

Critical realism, as well as its realist theoretical forebears, rests upon certain, key defining philosophical assumptions that, we must note, are certainly not fundamentally alien or hostile to Marxism. Of the respective assumptions, the most foundational is clearly the assertion that, as Andrew Sayer rather succinctly puts it, “the world exists independently of our knowledge of it.” Thus, critical realism affirms there is indeed a real world whose objective existence is not critically influenced by whatever conceptions we humans may happen to harbor in our minds.

Another integral component of critical realism is the philosophical view that the world is not uniform, but instead made up of diverse entities that either serve as the “protagonists” or the subjects of particular events and processes. Entities constitute a conceptual category into which “structures” may also properly be placed. Structures, in the terminology of critical realism, may be conceived of as conglomerations of either primarily event-generating or influence-receiving entities. (Easton, 2010: 104) Marxists and World Systems Theorists are convinced that the global political-economic system and also inter-state military relations have acquired, at the very least since the last 30 years or so of the 19th century, the structure of a rather multi-tiered hierarchy. (Denemark, 1999; Van Auken, 2013) This hierarchy should have, at least theoretically, a level for each and actor in global politico-economic and military relations. Various Marxists and World Systems Theorists contend that there are almost incomprehensibly large power differences—in the language of critical realism, capacity and liability disparities—between actors situated at different strata of the contemporary global politico-economic and military hierarchy.

This dissertation and the five research questions addressed through it represent a serious attempt to investigate and better understand certain, concrete politico-historical episodes, the three Washington-backed regime changes during the January 1, 1990-September 10, 2001 period, which previously have
not been subjected to sufficient scholarly treatment. Both the entire historico-political timeframe and the specific historico-political events examined in this dissertation have been largely passed over by other social science researchers. The case-study method employed in the framework of this dissertation thus not only facilitates the concretization of the abstractions that flow from critical realism’s conceptual apparatus, but also furnishes the data needed to test and answer explicitly the research questions.

Another integral element of critical realism is the philosophical construct whereby the world is not uniform, but instead made up of entities that serve as the “protagonists” or as the subjects of particular events and processes. Entities, sometimes termed “objects” by critical realists, constitute a conceptual category into which “structures” may also properly be placed. (Easton, 2010; 120) Structures, in the terminology of critical realism, may be conceived of as conglomerations of either primarily event-generating or influence-receiving entities. A key underlying principle of critical realist philosophy holds that not only entities, atomistic in their essence, but also structures are no less real for their inability to mechanically generate, especially though not exclusively in the social sphere, identical and fixed, perfectly predictable outcomes (i.e. events or processes). Where critical theory steers Marxism in a different direction is partly to qualify the tendency to optimism shared by many (not all) naïve Marxists.

A key tenet of critical realism’s underlying, philosophical structure affirms that attempts at interpretation are a more-or-less direct by-product of the acts of observation, analysis and study of the social world. Critical realism advances the rather uncontroversial argument that the creation of concepts is absolutely indispensable to all even quasi-serious efforts at understanding one or another aspect of social reality; thus, the conscientious study of the social world can, in truth, only take place through the prism of particular, and evidently human-created and invariably to some degree abstract, conceptual frameworks. In other words, though our selection of one or another competing conceptual framework will largely shape what we understand to be the broad meaning or essential significance of myriad social entities, events and processes, those social entities, events and processes’ objectively real existence cannot in any meaningful way be altered by such scholarly pursuits as physically detached observation or abstract theory formulation.

Washington’s foreign policy “toolkit” does not consist solely of covert meddling in other countries or the launching of aggressive wars so as to facilitate the unfolding of regime changes. Other actors, including US-based multinational corporations and banks operate in these countries, as well as public foreign policy actions. Although their interests do not invariably coincide with those of Washington, they maintain generally close relations with the Administration (whichever party is in power). Critical realism’s main practical claim is that its ability to deal with complex patterns of causation and
interaction enables a study of foreign policy of the kind intended in this dissertation which is more rounded and more complete than other ‘models’.

3.7: Case Study Methods

The case study method involves identifying and then describing in detail the most central “driving” agents and sub-components of certain well-defined events. (Gerring, 2007) This is, within the social sciences as well as historical research, a valuable qualitative alternative to more statistically and quantitatively-based analyses. If the primary subjects studied in the framework of a particular social science inquiry are not numerous enough to “qualify” for a “proper” statistical analysis, then the case study method forms another potentially viable research “pathway.” (Ibid: 37ff) Case studies enable a kind of comparison between examples. But they also allow studies which bring out the differences and distinctiveness of each case. The choice of three cases here is partly related to claims to originality: there is very little written on these three cases, in English, but also in the languages of the countries concerned (the author, although not fluent, has some ability to work in Serbian, Romanian, Albanian and Bulgarian). They also help understanding of how the United States has intervened in the transformation from communism in Eastern Europe. And they throw light on the motivations as well as the structures, processes and mechanisms of US foreign policy implementation. In this thesis, it has been decided not to look at the decision making process in the US, which would be a separate and potentially quite different topic. But inevitably, the study of regime change in Bulgaria, Albania, and Kosovo/Serbia sheds some light on US foreign policy making.

The case study method, with its detailed, step-by-step unfolding of complex processes and events, has provided an opportunity to better understand the primary sources and causal forces that shaped the three regime changes studied. Sayer (2000: 250-1) suggests that case study analysis is one of the most effective approaches for "unpacking” complex realities which are distinct from the kind of regularities which natural science seeks to explain. It is not seriously in doubt that each regime change took place; what is at issue is how they occurred, why they happened when they did, and how the regional and national context after the ‘collapse of communism’ as well as the influence of US policy and practice shaped them. Burnham et al (2008: 63-66, 87-93) also suggest that case studies can provide a strongly grounded set of methods. In this study, case research means, as already noted, the detailed qualitative analysis of primary and secondary sources together with a critical reading of the existing literature (a limited body of material). The reading strategy adopted necessarily means the identification of the main structures, processes, entities/actors and mechanisms which a Marxist critical realism posits as key factors in change and continuity in foreign policy.
The primary “original sources” of changes in the social world are, in the lexicon of critical realism, generally referred to as “entities”, many of which can also simultaneously be classified as “structures.” (Sayer, 2000: 85-87, 103-113) As understood by critical realists, those structures can be thought of as agglomerations of individual, atomistic entities which “capacities” to generate “events” within the social sphere. The massively variant “event-generating capacities” of different “social structures” are the consequence of each one of those structures having its own specific composition. Social structures are not just made up of “entities,” but of other social structures; thus social structures are seen as joining together in complex causation to have a relatively heightened “event-generating” potential.

The case study method assumes that US policy is more or less rational in intention, if not always in effect, and that the mechanisms of policy implementation reflect intentions in important respects. It also builds on the idea that evidence can be found for these policies. That evidence lies in the primary and secondary sources. The thesis has used a wide range of primary and secondary sources, including news outlets in print and online. As far as possible, the author has sought to inspect as wide a range of sources as possible, and the research has thus also involved a process of selection.

Five research questions are examined in the framework of this dissertation. Each might yield a simple “yes” or “no” answer with respect to each country case. But the cases are analysed more to discover “why” as well as “how” did “yes” or “no” responses get generated. In other words, the research uses its critical realist/Maxxian framework to seek more nuanced answers to the main questions, including questions about the way specific mechanisms worked and the extent to which events reflect one or other of a set of complex causes all of which are potentially influential in each case differently. These questions are quite evidently of an explanatory nature; it is precisely these questions’ explanatory character that makes them particularly well-suited to being addressed and “broken down” by the proper application of the case study method. The conscientious search for what R.K. Yin calls “operational links” represents a seemingly quite important modality towards the advancing of holistic answers to “why?” and “how?” questions in historical and social science research. (Yin, 1989: 18; Yin, 2003: 6) Conducting the necessary research for and then writing a case study-based study entails flexibility in frequently moving back and forth between and also not hesitating to re-analyze the sundry aspects of the subjects under investigation.

This chapter has set out the main ideas and conceptual bases for the thesis. It also demonstrates what the thesis is not: it is not ‘crude’ Marxism, nor is it naïve empiricism; it is not postmodern or constructivist, however fashionable those positions may be. It is pragmatically critical realist. It seeks to discover new knowledge through a case study method drawing on the main intellectual roots and values identified here. That approach draws on a qualitative approach to interrogate a wide range of available sources. There is no claim to use these methods originally; plenty of other scholars have
used the same outlook and the same methodologies. However, both the methodology and the methods that I have utilized here have allowed the case study analysis to proceed within the framework of the main research questions. The case studies have served as the means through which I have been able to “uncover” new knowledge and generate an original analysis.
Chapter 4: Bulgaria 1990

A general understanding of the ending of the Cold War in the Eastern Bloc Stalinist regimes might have predicted that with their 1989 collapse, Washington's principal policy goals would have shifted away from encouraging regime change because those goals were fulfilled. But there was no marked “clean break” from the Stalinist past in 1989. Though the political earthquakes of the Berlin Wall’s collapse had immediate reverberations throughout Europe, the post-1989 transformation did not occur in these countries as a preordained, overnight process, especially in their economies. The eventual total collapse of the Stalinist regime in Bulgaria was a gradual, non-linear process whose eventual denouement was certainly encouraged, indeed helped along, by leading US policymakers.

A critical moment was the removal of Tudor Zhivkov, the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) head and, as Chairman of the State Council, de facto dictator since 1954. This followed a meeting of BCP’s Politburo on November 10, 1989 (Sebeytsen, 2009; Thompson, 2008). Petar Mladenov, a high-ranking official in the state and BCP apparatus for decades, who served for almost 20 years as Foreign Minister under Zhivkov, replaced him, taking both his main roles (Sebeytsen, 2009; Thompson, 2008). However, in a move apparently designed to demonstrate that, under his leadership, the BCP would no longer play the dominant, all-powerful role within the state that it had during the entire post-World War II period, Mladenov resigned as head of the party in February 1990.
Furthermore, in one of the transitional-type political reforms carried out when Mladenov was head of the government, he and other important figures from the old BCP and state apparatus invited leaders of Bulgaria’s rapidly developing and relatively right-wing oppositional forces to participate in round-table negotiations in the hope of reaching some compromise regarding the country’s political future. In April 1990, those who participated in these round-table discussions jointly came to two key decisions: the State Council should be abolished, and Mladenov should be named President. (Vatahov, 2003)

Another step in Bulgaria’s transition towards a democratic political system came with the formal announcement that the initial round of Bulgaria's first multi-party national elections in over 40 years would be held on June 10, 1990. However, this change of the political system was viewed by leading
US government officials as just as an opportunity to promote their own government’s “national interests” in Bulgaria. Evidence that officials from Washington regarded the outcome of the first multiparty Bulgarian election as being just as important as the organization itself of a democratic vote is rather overwhelming. For example, US Secretary of State James Baker visited Bulgaria in February 1990 as the highest-ranking US official to do so since the end of World War II. When he was asked what the purpose of his visit was, he replied that it was “to meet with opposition leaders as well as government officials,” a statement which prompted The New York Times to note that [the order of events in such a diplomatic trip usually] “...is listed the other way around.” (Friedman, 1990) Baker and other US government officials who travelled to Bulgaria in the period before the June national elections didn't try to conceal their preferences about the outcome. Baker not only engaged in lengthy discussions with the leaders of the right-leaning opposition about what electoral tactics they should use; he also addressed a political rally that they had organized, indicating that he backed their electoral campaign as well as overall plans for the country. (Ibid)

The attempt of leading US government officials to influence Bulgaria's new democratic political process to generate results that they regarded as favorable did not stop at Secretary of State Baker's supportive appearances at opposition political rallies: various official branches of the US government also directed large sums of money into the right-leaning opposition groups they viewed most favorably. For example, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a taxpayer-funded organization considered something of a spin-off from the CIA, poured some $2 million into Bulgaria to help sway that country's populace into supporting the "right" electoral candidates: $233,000 of this money was provided to those working at Demokratzia, a newspaper published by the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), Bulgaria's largest right-leaning political grouping, to expand its coverage in the pre-election campaign period. Another $615,000 went directly to the UDF itself so as to finance its transformation into a more cohesive movement capable of effectively expanding its role. (Blum, 2004B: 315; National Endowment for Democracy, 1990)

To the dismay of the leaders of the right-wing opposition groups, as well as of their backers in the West, the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), previously the BCP, took a lead in the pre-vote polls. (Blum, 2004B: 315) Seeing that the BSP maintained an advantage in the pre-election polls despite an economy that seemed perched on the precipice of a significant downturn, US government officials stepped up their criticism of the government, claiming that it had denied resources especially to those relatively right-wing newspapers that criticized it. The BSP-led government's assertions that it had not only granted the UDF use of a building housing a printing plant to produce Demokratzia, but also accorded it newsprint and access to other forms of broadcast media in keeping with an agreement reached between the parties through their roundtable discussions, made no discernable impact on the US government, whose members continued to make clear their interest in seeing right-leaning
Politicians take power.

To the chagrin of the opposition and its backers in Washington and other Western capitals, the 47% share of the vote that the BSP won in the election entitled it to 211 of the 400 seats in the country’s parliament (the Grand National Assembly). Yet supporters of the UDF, including, prominently, many students belonging to The Federation of Independent Student Societies (FISS) (sometimes called The Federation of Independent Student Associations or FISA), a group formed only shortly before the election, refused to accept the results. They organized a wide array of demonstrations claiming that the BSP leaders, whom they variously referred to as “Reds” and the “Socialist Mafia,” had triumphed only by means of fraud. Aptanas Kirchev, FISS’s leader, promised to publicly present evidence demonstrating that the BSP had stolen the elections, but he never did so. These claims of fraud lacked merit: hundreds of electoral observers from the US and Western Europe, including conservative and unquestionably anti-communist members of their countries’ ruling establishments agreed that the ballot results had not been manipulated in any significant way and, as such, were representative of the will of voters. (National Democratic Institute for Democratic Affairs and National Republican Institute for International Affairs, 1990: iii-iv; Warrick, 1990; Williams, 1990B)

The only electoral observers who dissented from the Western Europeans' view hailed from the US. Further evidence that US officials wanted to see the BSP-led government fall and be replaced by some more right-wing movement --probably the UDF with its “shock troops” among the students who belonged to FISS / FISA-- comes from the $100,000 that FISS / FISA was granted by the NED, with the money being earmarked for the acquisition of "faxes, video and copying equipment, loudspeakers, printing equipment and low-cost printing techniques" as well as for hiring experts and advisers from Poland, the US and elsewhere. On July 6, less than a month after the BSP’s success, its control over the government began to crack. President Mladenov resigned, succumbing to the pressure of demonstrations including week-long hunger strikes outside of the Parliament which had all been called on the release by the UDF of a tape recording of Mladenov seemingly asking other governmental officials “Shouldn't we bring in the tanks?” when dealing with anti-government protests held during December 1989. (Blum, 2004B: 316; Times Wire Services) Through a vote in the Parliament to which there was no opposition on August 1, 1990, Mladenov was replaced by UDF leader Zhelyu Zhelev. (The Times Higher Educational Supplement, 1990) The success of Zhelev, the UDF's top figure, did not fully satisfy the supporters of the right-leaning political forces, as they continued to make still more extreme demands. For example, their protesters demanded the removal from government buildings of those symbols, like the hammer and sickle and red stars, associated in the public mind with the country's fading non-capitalist regime. That the government began to meet this demand just several weeks after Zhelev replaced Mladenov as President apparently was not enough; just a few days after this, some 10,000 rightist demonstrators in Sofia surrounded and then set
fire to and ransacked the BSP’s national headquarters. (Judah, 1990A; Judah, 1990C; Searle and Power, 1990)

Members of the police as well as witnesses declared that Konstantin Trenchev, a right-winger who occupied an important UDF post and was the leader of the "independent" trade union Podkrepa, had personally encouraged the most aggressive demonstrators involved in the attack on the BSP’s headquarters to storm the building. He was also on record calling for the dissolution of the BSP-controlled parliament and the institution of Presidential rule over the country. (Blum, 2004B: 318) Reeling from these seemingly accusations, Trenchev temporarily went into hiding. (Traynor, 1990)

That Podkrepa was led by such a figure did not dissuade Washington from financing it; Podkrepa’s very existence as a relatively right-wing political formation is attributable in no small measure to the $327,000 it received from the NED over the course of the October 1, 1989 – September 30, 1990 period. (National Endowment for Democracy, Annual Report, 1990; Williams, 1990A)

The UDF, Podkrepa and FISS / FISA continued to put pressure on the BSP-led government, organizing all manner of strikes and rallies demanding ever more difficult-to-swallow concessions. For example, in July of 1990, the rightist forces demanded the resignation of all important politicians in the BSP-dominated government who had previously served within Zhivkov’s regime, demanding that those politicians be criminally prosecuted. (Blum, 2004B: 318) Prime Minister Lukanov seemingly went out of his way to accommodate his more right-wing foes, overseeing the criminal prosecution of Zhivkov, offering to set up a broad coalition government in which the UDF would occupy some of the most "choice" cabinet positions and agreeing to a set of arrangements whereby the BSP would return to the Bulgarian state some 57% of the assets that its predecessor, the BCP, had taken in subsidies from the national budget when Zhivkov was the country’s ruler. (Blum, 2004B: 318) However, none of this mattered to the right-wing opponents of the BSP-led government. The rightist groupings were intent on achieving one goal: toppling the BSP-headed government and replacing it in power with the UDF. Towards this shared end, they were willing to resort to any and all available means. They then attempted to force Lukanov from office through a no-confidence vote held in the country’s Parliament on November 23. Seeing that their initiative for Lukanov’s removal was set to fail, albeit by a narrow margin, the parliamentarians belonging to the UDF walked out of the legislature. Unable to achieve their objective through "normal" democratic means, the sundry rightist factions decided once again to take to the street. Podkrepa’s leaders called on November 26, 1990 for a general strike aimed at precipitating Lukanov’s removal from office. While less than half of the country’s workers participated, the so-called “general strike” did eventually gain some traction, as it was joined by many of those—in this case, a good number of workers in the media, educational and medical sectors—who were suffering from the economic crisis which was shaking Bulgaria to its roots, sharply reducing material living standards. (Blum, 2004B: 318) Finally, Lukanov stepped
down as Prime Minister on November 29; he justified his decision with the assertion that a sufficiently large portion of Bulgaria's population did not support his economic reform plan, which entailed a relatively gradual transition towards capitalism. (Judah, 1990B; Stevenov, 1990)

There is considerable and, it would appear, more-than-sufficient evidence to support the argument that during 1990, not only were there differences between the economic positions that the BSP and the UDF endorsed, but also that within the framework of these BSP-UDF economic policy clashes, Washington endeavoured – and indeed “succeeded” – in playing an influential and perhaps even quasi-decisive role. This finds backing in, for example, the entire politico-historical episode surrounding what came to be known in Bulgaria as the “Rahn-Utt Plan.” Said plan, informally but widely named as such due to the fact that its two principal (out of tens) of authors were the fiercely pro-“free market” American economists Richard Rahn and Ronald Utt, was drawn up during the middle months of 1990 in order to serve as a comprehensive and practical “policymaking guidebook” for the intended and radically “laissez-faire” transformation of the Bulgarian national economy. (Binder, 1990; Independent Institute, 1990; Lakov, 2014; Rahn and Utt, 1990)

It should be mentioned here that the “Rahn-Utt Plan” was never, in formal terms at least, advanced or officially endorsed by the US government. In fact, during the time that the implementation of the plan’s various provisions was being seriously discussed and partially carried out, neither Rahn nor Utt were employees of the US government. Less than two years before the elaboration of the “Rahn-Utt Plan,” Utt who, along with Rahn, was one of the two Co-Chairmen of the US Advisory Team of the plan that (informally, at least) bore their names, had served as the Associate Director for Privatization in the Office of Management and Budget during the administration of then US President Ronald Reagan. Various other members of the “US Advisory Team” for the “Rahn-Utt Plan” were, at the time that the respective plan was being prepared for implementation, formally working for the US government (invariably for an agency or department that dealt with some aspect of economic affairs.) (Independent Institute, 1990) Those figures – including Rahn and Utt personally -- who were not formally employed by the US government during their terms as members of the “Rahn-Utt Plan’s US Advisory Team” were during the respective terms invariably working for large US-based multinational corporations, or lobbying organizations or think-tanks that were financed by such corporations. (Ibid) Thus, the “Rahn-Utt Plan” can fairly be described as a semi-official initiative whereby during 1990 Washington – and in particular elements which were generally supportive of the administration of then US President George H.W. Bush – sought to radically restructure the Bulgarian national economy along free-market capitalist lines.

A Bulgarian translation of the roughly 600 page-long “Rahn-Utt Plan” was presented to the Bulgarian Parliament in early October of 1990. (Binder, 1990; Independent Institute, 1990) At that time, then
Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev was one of the most prominent and openly committed Bulgarian supporters of the “Rahn-Utt Plan” and its sundry and comprehensive pro-“free market” economic policy prescriptions. (Binder, 1990) Zhelev’s collaboration with the authors of the “Rahn-Utt Plan” as well as remarks of his regarding certain of its possible political ramifications suggest that it consisted not merely of a series of (radically “neo-liberal” or, in a term that was more frequently used, “supply-side”) economic policy proposals, but that it also served as another element in Washington’s attempts during 1990 to facilitate a relatively right-wing regime change in Bulgaria. At the time of the elaboration and imposition of the “Rahn-Utt Plan,” both Rahn and Utt were among the most high-ranking members of the United States Chamber of Commerce, the most well-known pro-business lobbying organization in America. In early October of 1990, then Bulgarian President Zhelev attended a press conference that was held at the Washington, DC headquarters of the US Chamber of Commerce. During the respective press conference, Zhelev sang the praises of the Rahn-Utt Plan (which was actually formally known as the “Action Plan for Bulgaria”) and also quite revealingly said that: “They [meaning then Prime Minister Lukanov and the BSP] will be eager to proceed [with the implementation of the plan in focus] because otherwise the government will fall.” (Ibid)

It is appropriate to mention here that, roughly 40 days after Zhelev made those remarks at the Chamber of Commerce headquarters in Washington, DC, Lukanov yielded to intense political pressure and stepped down from his post as the Prime Minister of Bulgaria.

Lukanov was replaced by Dimitir Popov, who had previously served as a judge and who didn't belong to any of Bulgaria's then-existing political parties. The administration that he headed is generally regarded as transitional, organizing the next set of popular multi-party elections in the country. While in power Popov presided over the passage of a new national constitution and initiated measures to start the privatization process for state-owned companies. (European Commission, 1991) Evidently pleased with Popov’s accession, Washington certainly did not undertake any measures to finance groups that were from a left-wing position opposed to his new administration. In fact, Trenchev, who by the time of Popov's rise came out of hiding, stated that US officials had promised leaders of the country’s more prominent right-wing organizations that, if they succeeded in replacing the BSP, they could expect to receive even more financial support from Washington (Williams, 1990A). The definitive end of the BSP's control over the national government came in early 1991, when it was narrowly edged out by the UDF in parliamentary elections. While its members had participated as cabinet-members in Popov's administration, the early-1991 parliamentary elections marked the first time in history that a figure belonging to the UDF—Phillip Dimitrov—occupied the post of Prime Minister in Bulgaria. In power until near the end of 1992, Dimitrov, as expected, implemented measures allowing the private sector to take control of much agricultural land as well as companies previously had been owned by the state.
Left-wing analysts from the Anglophone world are not the only ones who have argued that, in the months that directly followed the November 1989 collapse of Zhivkov’s Stalinist regime, Bulgaria’s internal political life would be more and more shaped by a broad foreign policy orientation that Washington had chosen to embrace. This orientation was translated into specific, concrete policies towards Central and Eastern Europe. Robert Hutchings, who from 1989 to 1992 held the position of the Director for European Affairs within the US’s National Security Council, certainly played a key role. In 1997, Johns Hopkins University Press published Hutchings’ book *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War: An Insider’s Account of U.S. Policy in Europe, 1989-92*. (Hutchings, 1997) Here, he acknowledges how from 1989 – 1992, he and other key figures like James Baker sought to influence the economic and geopolitical orientations that the different Central and Eastern European states would embrace. Hutchings leaves little doubt (though does not explicitly state) that Washington as a whole as well as he personally contributed to the anti-BCP/BSP regime change that unfolded step-by-step in Bulgaria.

A further example is the paper “The European Question, Revisited -- The vision of a continent whole and free is unfulfilled” that Hutchings published through the solidly pro-US government / pro-NATO German Marshall Fund of The United States in March 2009 as part of its “Brussels Forum Paper Series”. In the paper, Hutchings wrote that: “The gravitational pull of the EU, NATO, and other European and transatlantic institutions was … a powerful force that helped these countries on the path of democratic transformation. There were enough gifted political and economic leaders, especially in Central Europe, but also farther south in Romania and Bulgaria, to offset the demagogues and warmed-over apparatchiks in keeping their countries mostly on the right track. It was not always pretty, but it was for the most part heading in the right direction. The EU’s accession process, actively supported by the United States, helped ensure a step-by-step process of legal and regulatory harmonization. By 2004, most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had joined both NATO and the European Union, with the remaining ones lined up to join. Given all the challenges this region faced in 1989, it would have been hard then to imagine a more successful evolution in so short a period.” (Hutchings, 2009)

Hutchings is therefore suggesting the kinds of geopolitical, economic and, indeed, even state-staffing changes that, during the period from mid-to-late 1989 into at least 1992, the US government (of which he was part) desired to see carried out. Hutchings also identifies “the EU, NATO, and other European and transatlantic institutions” as collectively constituting “a powerful force that helped these countries on the path of democratic transformation.” Furthermore, among the respective path’s most noteworthy opponents figure, according to Hutchings, demagogues and warmed-over [Stalinist or ex-Stalinist] apparatchiks. Hutchings not only openly acknowledges that the “EU’s accession
process [was] actively supported by the United States,” but also labels as a “successful evolution” the development according to which “[b]y 2004, most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe had joined both NATO and the European Union, with the remaining ones lined up to join.” Hutchings also notes that whereas in what he calls central Europe, the balance of domestic forces was more favorable to the United States, it was more problematic, more shaped by “political demagogues and warmed-over apparatchiks” in transition in Romania and Bulgaria. (Ibid)

Thus in American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, Hutchings directly acknowledges that Washington played a significantly activist role in seeking to guide the unfolding of key political and economic events and processes during the course of the period which commenced about one month prior to the collapse of Zhivkov’s Stalinist dictatorship. Hutchings does not, In American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War, merely make it clear what was already quite evident – that Washington had distinct preferences and opinions regarding its preferred outcomes for the political and economic changes that would occur in Bulgaria. He also indicates how those changes would actually unfold and through what means. Hutchings demonstrates the central objectives which Washington sought to achieve from 1989 concerning Bulgaria and the region. The US took advantages of various key politico-economic events that transpired in Bulgaria 1989-1991. It may be that these objectives were opportunistically “pushed forward” by Washington, but there was also an underlying strategy. Hutchings revealingly writes: “Partly by design and partly through sheer luck, U.S. policy was a step ahead of the major political turning points in Bulgaria’s rocky road toward democracy in 1989 and 1990. Already in 1989, U.S. and other support for Bulgaria’s ‘Ecoglasnost’ protestors during the CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe which on January 1, 1995 was formally renamed the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, or OSCE] environmental conference in Sofia strengthened the nascent democratic opposition that led to the peaceful revolution [the inner-BCP coup that led to the collapse of Zhivkov’s regime] a month later.

This pattern continued in 1990, as U.S. initiatives anticipated by precisely one month each subsequent breakthrough. The March roundtable agreement that created the framework for new elections was signed a month after [then US Secretary of State James] Baker’s visit to Sofia. UDF (Union of Democratic Forces) chairman Zhelev ascended to the Presidency [of Bulgaria] a month after Baker led the call for Bulgaria’s admission into the G-24 [Group of 24 developing countries]. Finally, a broad-based coalition government replaced the Socialist [BSP] government in November-December, a month after Zhelev visited Washington and signed a comprehensive U.S.-Bulgarian trade agreement. It would be too much to suggest that U.S. policy caused these events, but neither were
they purely coincidental. Our reading from the beginning was that democratic progress in Bulgaria would have to be pushed from below, with public (and we hoped peaceful) protests obliging the regime to make concessions it otherwise would have withheld. Given the enormous influence of U.S. policy during this period of Cold War triumph, we needed to provide incentives for further progress, rewarding the regime for each step in the right direction, however ambiguous the purpose, and emboldening the opposition to continue pressing its case. In this sense, our approach resembled the ones we had taken toward Poland and Hungary in early 1990 and, as will be seen, in Albania in 1991.” (Hutchings, 1997: 254)

Hugh Kenneth Hill served as the US Ambassador from September 1990 into September of 1993. In his specially focused memoirs Memoirs Of Two Diplomatic Assignments in Bulgaria (from 1982 – 1984, Hill served as the second highest-ranking American official in the US Embassy in Bulgaria,) he acknowledged that when, on August 13, 1990, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings to vote whether or not to confirm him as the US Ambassador, he briefly spoke before the committee about his intention “to pursue US interests in Bulgaria, and to promote a transition to democracy and economic reforms in a country that had emerged from 45 years of Communism less than a year before.” (Hill, 2006: 165)

Several weeks separated Hill’s formal August 1990 confirmation as US Ambassador to Bulgaria and his September 9, 1990 arrival there. During those several weeks, Hill met (apparently only once) with US Secretary of State James Baker. At the respective meeting, he records, “Secretary Baker stated his view, with which I concurred, that Bulgaria could successfully make the transition to democracy and assured me that America would support Bulgaria's transition to democracy and a market economy.” (Ibid, 166) During his term as the US Ambassador to Bulgaria, Hill did not hesitate to intervene in various important and often contentious policy debates then raging between key factions within the political establishment.

In September 1990, Zhelyu Zhelev, then the leader of the UDF and new President of Bulgaria, became the first serving President to make a state visit to the US. After Zhelev’s trip, during which he was received by President George H.W. Bush, he returned to Bulgaria where the political (and economic) situation remained unsettled. Upon his return from the US to Bulgaria, Zhelev continued to face significant opposition and criticism from the BSP which, until December 7, 1990, maintained control (in the person of Lukanov) over the office of the Prime Minister. Describing an event which would not only serve to describe his basic political orientation, that of the government that he was representing, the governments of various NATO member-states, but also that of Lukanov and the UDF as well, Hill wrote in his memoirs that: “The president’s [Zhelev’s] boost from the trip
to New York and Washington did not last long, however. A few weeks later, one of his assistants telephoned me on a Saturday morning and asked if I could invite the president [again, Zhelev] and several other NATO ambassadors to dinner at my residence [in Bulgaria] the next evening, Sunday, to show NATO support for him in the face of strong political opposition [mostly from the BSP]. I happily agreed, of course, and invited the British, French and German ambassadors [to Bulgaria] to join me. When the president’s motorcade arrived Sunday evening, we ambassadors met him and two of his aides at the front door, and I read a statement of support for the president and Bulgaria’s transition to democracy. The statement was immediately passed to journalists and the dinner and my statement were front page news the next morning.” (Ibid, 176)

In the period which immediately followed the collapse of Todor Zhivkov’s Stalinist regime in Bulgaria, the BCP / BSP generally avoided direct criticism of the U.S., and adopted a largely conciliatory, non-critical and relatively friendly tone towards Washington. That having been said, it is also evident that, during this period there existed a fairly clear distinction between the “public lines” of both Washington and the BCP / BSP as regards economic policy preferences for Bulgaria (in Eastern and Central Europe more generally). For example, during 1990, the BCP / BSP-affiliated newspaper Duma (“Word”) published numerous articles taking a rather critical stance towards the kind of pro-capitalist economic “shock therapy” policies which Washington, as well as specialists such as Jeffrey Sachs sought to implement as part of transition to a market economy.

In early December 1990, Dimitar Popov formally replaced Andrei Lukanov as Prime Minister of Bulgaria. This led the BSP to step up its previously almost limited criticism of how the country had been subjected to a Washington-backed regime change campaign. That such a campaign existed and that Washington had indeed played a “supportive” role in pushing it forward was asserted – probably more directly than ever previously – in a December 5, 1990 article in Duma that was entitled: “The UDF has received financial support from the CIA.” This article made reference to a piece that was entitled “Hope of US Aid Helped Inspire Bulgaria Revolt” and which appeared under Carol Williams’ byline in the December 3, 1990 edition of the Los Angeles Times. Both this Duma piece, as well as the one by Williams that it cites discussed the paradoxical situation whereby Lukanov had been pushed out of the office of the Prime Minister despite his seemingly quite strong commitment to an agenda of pro-capitalist “reform.” In the article “The UDF has received financial support from the CIA,” it is further pointed out that once Lukanov had been forced to cede control of the Prime Minister’s office to the broadly pro-UDF but officially “non-partisan technocrat” Dimitar Popov, the last-mentioned political organization would be compelled, largely by Washington, to push ahead with the implementation of a pro-free market agenda. Reading the article in question, one gets the distinct impression that the BSP was disappointed that, despite its own best efforts to get onboard the pro-market reform bus, it had been viewed as insufficiently reliable by Washington, which had been
willing to commit funds to ensure that the aggressively anti-communist and pro-western UDF would be in charge of the Bulgarian state. Its purpose: to shift away from the non-capitalist and strongly pro-Moscow orientation adhered to since 1945.

Also published in *Duma* on June 5, 1990, a lengthy article written by the social-democratic Keynesian economist John Kenneth Galbraith entitled “The Welfare State and the Changes in Eastern Europe”. It presents in some detail Galbraith’s views about the preferred economic “policy map” that should be followed by those countries whose national economies had, ever since the mid-1940s, been fundamentally non-capitalist in nature. Galbraith quite clearly signaled his disapproval for the kind of “shock-therapy” measures that, as mentioned earlier, figures like Jeffrey Sachs had promoted as being virtual panaceas for all the Eastern European countries’ economic ills, and which were already being followed in Poland. These measures were described by Galbraith as resembling “capitalism in its original, primitive form [which] could not survive.” (Galbraith, 1990) However, after this criticism and, by extension, the overnight introduction in the early 1990s of “free-market shock therapy” policies, Galbraith stressed that not only was he not opposed to capitalism *per se*, but also that he would regard as unfeasible and unrealistic any kind of determined effort to push through in these countries genuinely radical and far-reaching measures of a socialistic nature. In the article in question, Galbraith develops the argument whereby the careful construction of a “third way” welfare-statist capitalist model within Central and Eastern Europe was probably the goal that policymakers needed to realize. Although in its “original, primitive form,” Galbraith argued, capitalism was a fundamentally dysfunctional and unsustainable system, it “was able to adapt itself” [to significantly changed economic, political and social conditions.] This reference of Galbraith to the ability of the capitalist system to “adapt” should indeed be distinguished from the way that system’s “evolutionary capacities” are perceived by neo-liberal partisans of the relatively minimally regulated “free-market.”

Galbraith, true to a Keynesian view, does not accept the notion – an article of faith for free-market enthusiasts – that, as long as the capitalist system is left to its own devices it will adapt to changed economic conditions, form a self-balancing system, and bring about an enhanced overall level of prosperity. Galbraith also (presumably meeting here with the agreement of a significant number of the key figures who, during 1990, held leadership positions in the BSP) advanced the argument that capitalism’s ability to “adapt” was not inherent to it, but was instead a positive consequence of government interventions.

Galbraith’s criticisms of the potentially catastrophic inability of the capitalist “free market” to “regulate itself” notwithstanding, this article of Galbraith’s is by no means a jeremiad in favor of countries like Bulgaria carrying out a sudden leftward shift towards revolutionary socialism. In his article, Galbraith also takes care to assert that: “In the beginning, socialism [by which he apparently meant the economic system which began to take root in late 1917 in the Soviet Union and in other
Central and Eastern European countries in and after 1945] was successful, but it couldn’t adapt.” (Ibid) In Galbraith’s conception, then, “adaptation” means transforming both the unregulated capitalist “free market” as well as at-least officially radical and revolutionary non-capitalist national economies into some kind of hybrid, middle-ground order in which a still basically capitalist economic core and generous welfare provisions and state regulation of and interventions into the private economy harmoniously co-exist.

Other articles in Duma through 1990 take a similar line. Among them, one revealing piece appeared titled “The Shock Therapy in Poland” (June 8, 1990). It aimed to differentiate the stances that Washington and Jeffrey Sachs on the one hand and the BSP on the other hand maintained with regards to the kinds of economic policies that would have been the most appropriate for Bulgaria. According to this article, Poland’s radical “shock therapy” economic plan (widely known as the “Balcerowicz Plan” after the Polish Finance Minister who authored it) formally went into effect in 1990. In the plan’s formulation, Jeffrey Sachs played an official and central role. The Balcerowicz Plan served as a “poster child” for the kinds of fundamental economic change that Washington desired to see implemented throughout Eastern and Central Europe, including in Bulgaria.

Robert Hutchings’ article “The European Question, Revisited” supports the argument that from the very beginning of 1990 at the latest, and more likely already during the second half of 1989, Washington came to view the economic measures being taken by the Polish government as a “model” to be applied across post-communist Europe. Hutchings certainly sought to portray in a positive manner those political figures who, probably already towards the end of 1989 and then certainly during the first half of 1990, were responsible for ensuring that the government of Poland (as well as the government of Czechoslovakia and that of Hungary) would not only [seek to] relatively quickly and decisively adopt “at home” the key foundations of a relatively unregulated capitalist market system, but would also pursue a path leading more-or-less directly to said three countries’ formal incorporation into largely western-run multi-national institutions such as NATO and the EU. To reiterate what was mentioned earlier in this chapter, Hutchings believed that such figures were in relatively short supply (though he certainly does not claim that they were altogether absent) in Bulgaria.

Thus, by highlighting a number of the disastrous social and economic consequences which “The Balcerowicz Plan” quickly generated in Poland, the June 8, 1990 Duma piece “The Shock Therapy in Poland” served to indicate that the BSP had not yet been fully won over to the Washington-Sachs economic agenda for Bulgaria. Duma’s “The Shock Therapy in Poland” piece undeniably accurately identified the implementation of “The Balcerowicz Plan” as being the immediate trigger for a collapse in the value of Poland’s national currency, the zloty, as well as for the associated skyrocketing of
prices and joblessness in the last-mentioned country.

Furthermore, a detailed and patient search suggests that there does not appear to be any kind of readily available evidence that Washington came to regret the support that it gave to the anti-BSP regime change process which successfully took place in Bulgaria in 1990. On the contrary, the successful completion of regime change birthed a relatively right-wing Bulgarian government which Washington was intent on publicly and vigorously supporting.

An open demonstration of Washington’s commitment to back the “BSP-free” government headed by Zhelev and Popov came on June 7, 1991, when US Vice President Dan Quayle appeared at a public rally in Sofia. (Los Angeles Times, 1991B) At this outdoor event were, reportedly, over 20,000 people who were overwhelmingly aligned with the relatively right-wing UDF. The rally demonstrated how the UDF could count on the support not only of its particularly committed members, but of Washington itself. This rally, according to the next day’s Los Angeles Times, was attended by “more than 20,000 Bulgarians waving American flags, shouting ‘U.S.A.!’ and chanting ‘We don't want communism.’” (Ibid) In response to the respective shouts and chants, Quayle told the attendees that: "America is with you” and that "America never forgot Bulgaria during the long, dark years of totalitarianism after World War II.” Upon hearing this, the crowd noisily repeated in unison the slogans: “Down with communism!,” "Red rubbish!” and "Communists are mafia!” For his part, Zhelev told the people who were there that: "The Communists failed over the decades of their rule to implant hatred against the land of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln." These critical references to ‘communists’ and ‘reds’ were as much attacks on the current BSP as on the earlier BCP. Thus, even after losing control, without having been defeated in any elections, of both the office of the Presidency and the post of Prime Minister, the openly reformist and social-democratic BSP continued to be portrayed by the UDF as being just as economically non-capitalist and politically dictatorial as the BCP.

Zhelev’s term in office as the President of Bulgaria continued into January 1997. Throughout this term, he remained an enthusiastic supporter of the geopolitical line of the US government, as well as of a maximally rapid, thoroughgoing transition to a minimally regulated capitalist free-market, enjoying strong support from Washington. Thus the public papers of US President Bill Clinton include a fairly detailed, frank summary of the topics that the two men discussed during Zhelev’s February 13, 1995 visit to the White House. From these public papers, we see that during Zhelev’s visit, he and Clinton discussed such matters as: “the value of the close cooperation established over the past five years in … supporting Bulgaria’s … market economic transformation.” During the meeting, Clinton and Zhelev apparently not only discussed how Washington and Sofia – and the latter to no small degree in the person of Zhelev himself – had worked during the first half of the 1990s to back the “market economic transformation” of Bulgaria, but also
about “the importance of continued implementation of Bulgaria’s market economic reforms.” Clinton, 1995: 199)

This formal summary of the Zhelev/Clinton talks at the White House is extraordinary in the number of times that in just over a page of text it stressed a pressing “need for Bulgaria” to carry out “market economic reforms” as a comprehensive “market economic transformation” that would facilitate the establishment of a full-fledged “market economy.” The creation of such an economy in Bulgaria was apparently an integral element of efforts by “[t]he two leaders [Clinton and Zhelev] to encourage and promote trade and investment between their countries, based on market principles.” (Ibid, 199-200)

4.1: Economic Policy Under the BSP-dominated Government and After

The economy inherited by leaders such as President Mladenov and Prime Minister Lukanov after Zhivkov was forced to step down was based on state ownership of large industrial enterprises, retail companies and financial concerns as well as the agricultural land (through collective farms.) (Curtis, 1992: 35, 29-40) Lukanov, for his part, was considered a member of the pro-capitalist “reform” faction within the BSP, and the package of measures that as Prime Minister he proposed be implemented within 100 days was, according to no less an official source than the U.S. Library of Congress, based on "major parts of the … program …advocated by the UDF" (Ibid: 46). However, Lukanov stepped down as Prime Minister on November 29, 1990. In his speech to the nation he said his failure to gain support for the enactment of his economic program from a large enough portion of the population made it “useless to continue in office.” (Blum, 2004B: 318-9) A more “effective” transformation of the Bulgarian economy into a fundamentally capitalist one was then carried out by Lukanov’s successor, Popov, whose government was not targeted by any Washington-supported destabilization campaign. (Cook, 2001: 166) Although Popov’s government was widely regarded at the time as having a transitional character, it was also seen by leading officials within the US Administration as clearly advocating the construction within Bulgaria of a capitalist economic order. The steps taken by Popov’s government to privatize both some state-owned companies and agricultural land managed under the collective farms system coincided with the decision by the Bush administration and the US Congress to grant Bulgaria Most-Favored Nation (MFN) status in its trade relations with the US. (Pregelj, 2000) It seemed that Washington had achieved the goals it had set for itself through these changes of government, of state, and of the economy.
4.2: American Foreign Investment in Bulgaria During the BSP-Dominated Government and After

One obvious corollary of the limitations of capitalistic economic activity before 1990 was that foreign investment in Bulgaria, and especially by non-state owned firms, was close to zero. (Botric and Skuflic, 2005) The very nearly non-existent levels of private foreign direct investment (FDI) during Zhivkov's reign continued for some time after his departure from power. The pro-capitalist “reforms” enacted by Popov during his roughly 13 months in office, while appreciated by the US government, did not extend to measures allowing affluent individuals and private corporations from outside of Bulgaria to expand their investments in the country: the legal foundation for a major expansion in private FDI only came during 1992. A law pushed through the country's parliament by Popov's successor as Prime Minister, the Washington-backed UDF leader Dimitrov, changed that. From 1992 on, gradually at first, private FDI—including from American companies and citizens—began flowing into Bulgaria. (Botric and Skuflic, 2006) Given the just-mentioned record, Washington's stance towards Bulgaria in 1990 and 1991 did not evolve at all in relation to any changes in Bulgarian laws that would have potentially impacted private FDI originating from individual American citizens and/or American-owned companies, as the different administrations based in Sofia did not implement any such measures until 1992. While hypotheses may be formulated concerning the links between possible later changes in Washington's stance towards Sofia and any laws implemented vis-a-vis private American FDI in Bulgaria, such an approach essentially amounts to guesswork and cannot possibly satisfy the evidentiary threshold that I have established and utilized in all of this dissertation’s country case-study chapters.

4.3: Sofia's Foreign Policy Stance vis-a-vis Washington during the BSP-Dominated Government and After

The governments of Bulgaria and the US were of course not in the same geopolitical camp prior to 1990. (United States Department of State, 1944) In fact, a broad consensus holds that during the 44+ years from the defeat of the Nazi regime in 1945 to the collapse of the Stalinist regime at the end of 1989, the Sofia regime was clearly closely allied to the Kremlin. During the period of broad political pluralism from December 1989 – July 1990 in which Mladenov and Lukanov (both associated with the BSP) occupied the President’s and the Prime Minister’s office respectively, some pro-Washington and pro-EU geopolitical shift on the part of Sofia could definitely be observed. However, this shift definitely began to gain further momentum only after the July – early August of 1990 development
when the Presidency was transferred from Mladenov the then de facto UDF leader Zhelev; the shift in question was formalized – at least in part – with the August 29, 1990 decision of the Bulgarian national government to establish formal (and cooperative) relations with NATO. (Giatzidis, 2002: x)

Over the course of his February – December 1990 term as the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, then BCP / BSP-member Lukanov sought, in the sphere of geopolitics and international relations, to improve Sofia’s relations with the EU and Washington. For example, in mid-September of 1990, Lukanov, together with President Zhelev, indicated that Sofia was eager to join the US-led coalition which was just preparing for the military assault on Iraq undertaken in early 1991. That coalition would formally decide to incorporate Bulgaria into its ranks in March of 1991; it is probably not coincidental that the respective decision was taken several months after the “successful” completion of the regime change whereby the BSP ended up yielding to relatively right-wing figures control over first the office of the Presidency and then of Prime Minister.

Broadly along the same lines, on December 22, 1990, the Bulgarian Parliament voted for the first time in favour of eventual future integration into the European Union. The date of the respective vote was – and, again, this may well not have been entirely coincidental – just 15 days after Lukanov formally ceded control over the office of the Prime Minister to Popov. Bulgarian membership in the European Union was a US objective continuously from 1990. Thus, over the course of 1990 and into the first few months of 1991, Sofia’s geopolitical posture vis-à-vis Washington gradually evolved, it could fairly be argued, from being supportive and “friendly” to being still more supportive and eager to please.

The collapse of Zhivkov’s Stalinist regime in late 1989 set in motion a process whereby Sofia began to reorient its geopolitical stance away from Moscow and towards Washington. From very shortly after a November 1989 intra-party (BCP) coup forced the resignation of Zhivkov and put an end to the Stalinist regime that had been in place since the mid-to-late 1940s, the Bulgarian national government (which until mid-1990 was more-or-less entirely under the control of the reformed BCP-BSP) manifested a clear pro-EU and pro-Washington orientation in the sphere of foreign relations. This orientation slowly but steadily became, the evidence suggests, more and more unequivocal in parallel with each stage of the process whereby, during the second half of 1990, the BSP ceded control first over the office of the Presidency and then over that of the Prime Minister to relatively right-wing figures.
4.4: On the Nature of Bulgaria’s Internal Political System during the BSP-Dominated Government and After

The Zhivkov regime was a Stalinist-style dictatorship in which in de facto, though not de jure terms, no other party existed besides the BCP. (Curtis, 1992: 42) During Zhivkov’s regime, absolute political control wielded by the BCP was manifested among other means through its monopoly on the nomination and election of all who aspired to hold a position in the executive, legislative, judicial branches and in local government. The toppling of Zhivkov’s regime came without bloodshed via an announcement made by his Prime Minister Georgi Atanasov at the November 10, 1989 meeting of the Central Committee of the BCP at which nothing out of the ordinary had been expected. Although Atanasov attempted to give the impression that Zhivkov had decided of his own volition to step down, by January 1990, the latter was expelled from the BCP and arrested for the crime of "abuse of power", which suggests the opposite. (Ibid: 45)

Zhivkov’s successor Petar Mladenov, Bulgarian Foreign Minister for the prior 18 years, immediately legalized anti-government political protest, removed all official privileges that BCP officials had previously enjoyed, granted the media a heretofore unknown degree of freedom from state control, and announced that national multiparty elections would be held within six months. Given these changes, it is fair to assert that the beginning of Mladenov’s leadership constituted the start of a new era of political democracy. Mladenov further consolidated the transition away from a one-party dictatorship and towards multi-party political organization by eliminating in January 1990 Article I of the 1971 Bulgarian Constitution, which previously assured the BCP’s total political dominance. Then in April 1990 he abolished the institution of the State Council and had his own title changed from “Chairman of the State Council” to President. (Ibid: 46) Another key step in the thoroughgoing transformation of Bulgaria’s political order from a “garden variety” Stalinist dictatorship to a “Western-style” standard parliamentary democracy came in the first few months of 1990, when the leading figures of the BCP (the name of this party would be changed to BSP in April, 1990) met with their rivals in the newly formed UDF in a series of “round-table” discussions. These were not merely changes in government or government rules; they were deeply embedded changes in the nature of the state. Until multi-party parliamentary elections were held, these discussions constituted the basis for formulating and implementing laws defining the country’s future course; they replaced the nearly absolute centralization of governmental authority under Zhivkov with a system based on the division of political powers between the “co-equal and independent” legislative, executive and judicial branches of government. (Ibid)

Although it benefited significantly from its role as the direct descendant of the BCP, the BSP’s
triumph in the multi-party parliamentary elections in June 1990 served to significantly reinforce its democratic credentials. Though the figures in the BSP’s forefront in its first days clearly had used the less than wholly democratic method of secretly conspiring within the BCP in order to force Zhivkov to step down, once in power they fairly scrupulously respected the norms of parliamentary democracy. The two most senior BSP officials during that organization’s first year of existence, Petar Mladenov, President, and Andrey Lukanov, Prime Minister, gave up their government positions voluntarily and without violence during the wave of protests and strikes launched by the UDF, FISS / FISA and Podkrepa.

Mladenov’s resignation in early July 1990 was followed by the election in the Parliament, with few dissenting votes, of leading UDF-figure Zhelev as the country’s next President, a set of events essentially in conformity with established procedure in countries with longer traditions of democratic politics. Similarly, after Lukanov’s decision to step down from his position as Prime Minister, the Parliament decided via a majority vote to replace him with Popov; as in countries with democratic political systems, the Prime Minister’s resignation means his/her entire cabinet must be replaced, and this also occurred in this situation. (The New York Times, 1990A) Given this review of the relevant history, once can justifiably assert that the collapse of Zhivkov’s regime meant the end of a dictatorial political system in Bulgaria, and of the Leninist practice of the ‘leading role’ of the Party. Starting from June 1990 at the latest, all the different governments, whether headed by BSP or UDF-affiliated figures or even by nominally non-partisan individuals, have been fundamentally democratic in nature.

4.5: On Basic Human Rights During the BSP-dominated Government and After

Evaluating its record in comparison with those of other authoritarian or totalitarian governments, Zhivkov’s dictatorial 1954 - 1989 reign over Bulgaria was by no means the worst abuser of citizens’ human rights, although it hardly had entirely clean hands either. Outside its suspected responsibility for the assassination of Bulgarian author Georgi Markov in London, the Zhivkov regime is not believed to have engaged in many targeted high-level killings. That having been said, it is also evident that the regime perpetrated widespread violations of human rights. The overwhelming majority of abuses came in the context of its campaign to bring about, by terror if necessary, the total cultural assimilation of Bulgaria’s ethnic Turkish population (Kelly, 2013; The New York Times, 1989). The first serious attempts in the post-World War II period to eliminate any sort of distinct Turkish identity in Bulgaria began in 1984; initially these attempts were relatively restrained and had little basis in law. In 1985, however, the central government enacted measures that both intensified and formalised
the persecution of the country's ethnically Turkish minority. (The New York Times, 1989) The central elements of this “forcible assimilation” campaign were the national government's decisions to end all educational opportunities in the Turkish language within Bulgaria and, even more alarmingly, to intensely pressure all ethnically-Turkish to change their names from “Turkish-sounding” to “Bulgarian-sounding” ones (Ibid). Members of the state militia were charged with going to these citizens’ residences. These “visits” usually took place late at night, forcing the generally male heads of the households to sign pieces of paper which “Bulgarized” their family members' “Turkish-sounding” first and last names. If the members of the militia did not get a “satisfactory” response, they would then engage in violent acts, sometimes of a lethal or sexual nature, against the (generally male) head of household as well as other family members. These measures, considered collectively, were intended to coerce the Turks living in Bulgaria into disabusing themselves of the notion that they constituted a distinct ethno-national community. They did not remain in effect for very long after the November 10, 1989 collapse of Zhivkov’s dictatorial regime. The new government of Petar Mladenov worked towards the elimination of these discriminatory anti-Turkish provisions. In this regard, one key positive break from the past took place on December 29, 1989 when the new transitional national government following Zhivkov's fall rescinded the coercive measures for the assimilation of Bulgaria's Turkish minority. (Partos, 2000; W.C. Thompson, 2013: 157) Furthermore, the discriminatory laws that forced ethnically Turkish citizens to change their names were annulled in March 1990 (Kucukcan, 1999), ending a period of state managed civil violence. (Petkova, 2002) The government headed by Prime Minister Popov was the first during Bulgaria’s post-Zhivkov era not headed or led by members of the BCP or BSP. Popov, who did not belong to any political party, led an administration that, like the immediately preceding one of BSP-member Lukanov, generally refrained from violently violating human rights, regardless of whether they were ethnically Turkish or involved in peaceful protests against the policies embraced by Bulgaria’s government.

The chart on the following page serves to summarize the results that have been generated via the application of the five formal research questions to the case study presented in this chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did the proportion of private, capitalist ownership over Bulgaria’s GDP increase quickly following the occurrence of the Washington-backed regime change there?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the flow of specifically American foreign investment into Bulgaria increase quickly following the occurrence of the Washington-backed regime change there?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Sofia’s geopolitical line become meaningfully closer to that of the US government quickly following the occurrence in Bulgaria of the Washington-backed regime change?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Bulgaria’s internal political system become significantly more genuinely democratic (i.e., meaningfully less authoritarian) quickly following the occurrence in said country of the Washington-backed regime change?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the central government of Bulgaria meaningfully improve its respect for basic human rights quickly following the occurrence in said country of the Washington-backed regime change?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.6 Core Findings Regarding the Long-Term Irreversibility of the 1990 Bulgaria Regime Change

In this chapter I have provided a considerable amount of data which strongly indicates that a “regime change” supported by Washington successfully took place in Bulgaria through 1990. In a narrow sense, the regime change was marked by changes in government and political personnel, including the BSP-affiliated Mladenov’s resignation as President in July 1990 as well as by the December 1990 decision of BSP member Lukanov to step down as Prime Minister. But more fundamental changes of state underlay these developments, and regime change was almost immediately followed by the new, relatively right-wing government moves to implement free-market economic reforms, and to move decisively to alliance with the EU and with Washington.

Even though the post of Prime Minister in the first “BSP-free government” was held by the nominally non-partisan technocrat Dimitar Popov for 11 months, the government’s economic policy, geopolitical orientation and overall ideological message would have lasting and effectively irreversible repercussions. Popov, with the accord of then President (and UDF leader) Zhelev, pushed through privatization measures (for agricultural land as well as some state-owned businesses,) and policies that simultaneously triggered a sharp rise both in interest rates and prices of basic goods and services. In parallel with the imposition of key elements of the economic shock therapy policies, Popov also oversaw the national Parliament’s formal declaration that the government intended to move the country into the EU; around the same time, the IMF granted – subject to the implementation of various “free-market” austerity measures -- a loan totalling hundreds of millions of dollars to the Bulgarian government.

Thus, without winning any elections, the relatively right-wing forces that, in the person of the President and UDF leader Zhelev and the nominally non-partisan “technocratic” Prime Minister Popov, were assisted by Washington in taking power during 1990 quickly managed to lock the Bulgarian state into policy-constraining relationships with the US government, as well as the IMF and the EU. Popov would hold the post of Prime Minister for 11 months, to be succeeded by Filip Dimitrov, a UDF member. Dimitrov became Prime Minister four weeks after the UDF scored a narrow victory in parliamentary elections in mid-October of 1991. He largely succeeded in further consolidating the pro-western geopolitical and firmly neoliberal policy regime change that Zhelev and Popov had initiated first in late 1990 and early 1991.

That the regime change described in this chapter was both durable and in the medium term effectively irreversible is suggested by free-market enthusiast Simeon Djankov, who served as Finance Minister from 2009 – 2013 in a right-wing government headed by Prime Minister Boyko Borisov. In The
Great Rebirth: Lessons from the Victory of Capitalism over Communism, Djankov wrote that: “The government of Philip Dimitrov (1991-1992) initiated large-scale restitution of property to its rightful owners, creating a class of Bulgarians interested in the protection of property rights. …. Reforms continued in the next government, [after the end of Popov’s period in office as Prime Minister] led by Prime Minister Dimitrov, who focused on the restitution of land and buildings nationalized under the communist regime and the disbandment of agricultural collectives. The restitution, together with the creation of new private firms, was the primary reason for the increase in the share of the private service sector from 20 percent in 1991 to nearly 50 percent in 1994. … In 1992, Parliament adopted the first Privatization Law.” (Djankov, 2014: 138) Djankov’s assertion serves to bolster this dissertation’s most central arguments. It also acknowledges the accuracy of a key element of the definition here of the term “regime change”. In short, the regime changes that analysed here created domestic and international politico-economic dynamics that served to increase the likelihood that they would continue to survive well into the future, deeply embedded in both state and society as well as economy and political life.

Besides simultaneously increasing Sofia’s linkages to and dependence on Washington, the IMF, the EU, NATO, and the interests of associated economic elites like wealthy foreign investors and massive transnational corporations, the pro-western geopolitical and neoliberal economic agenda would create a strongly supportive and relatively prosperous constituency for itself within Bulgaria.

When then Prime Minister and UDF leader Dimitrov called and lost a parliamentary no-confidence vote in December 1992, the Prime Ministership transferred to Lyuben Berov. Immediately prior to beginning his term as Prime Minister, the supposedly non-partisan Berov had been an economic adviser to then-President Zhelev. Berov’s 22 months in power as Prime Minister coincided with the further consolidation of the economically neoliberal and geopolitically pro-Washington and pro-EU regime change. (Berend, 1993: 333; Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 101) Facing growing protests from broad sections of the population that had been impoverished by the ceaseless application of neoliberal “reforms,” Berov resigned as Prime Minister in favour of Reneta Indzhova. For two years prior to becoming Acting Prime Minister, Indzhova had served as head of the country’s Privatization Agency as well as a financial adviser for the UDF. Thus, while widespread street protests against the continued imposition of neoliberal “reform” measures were taking place, President Zhelev was able to appoint a diehard supporter to the Prime Ministership.

The next parliamentary elections in mid-December 1994 which the BSP won likely constituted the most significant threat to the long-term durability of the regime change so far since 1990. In winning by a margin large enough to directly control more than 50% of Parliamentary seats, the BSP also was able to ensure that Zhan Videnov would become by late January 1995 the country’s next Prime
Minister. But Videnov did not use his status as Prime Minister to pursue anything even approaching an anti-capitalist or anti-western agenda. Videnov not only pursued a jumble of free-market and somewhat interventionist economic policies, but also a mixed geostrategic orientation based simultaneously on the cultivation of better relations with Russia, China and Vietnam, as well as on the pursuit of EU (but not NATO) integration. (Ganev, 2013: 211; Petrova, 2009: 114-5)

As evidenced from a diplomatic cable of late January of 1995 sent by the American Embassy in Bulgaria to the State Department, Washington had a “lukewarm” attitude to the Videnov-led Cabinet just taking office. The cable in question was entitled: “It Could Have Been Worse: Bulgaria’s Socialist Party Cabinet Includes Some Moderates.” (United States Embassy in Bulgaria, 1995) Sizing up the incoming Cabinet and its different members, the cable states that “the best news is that it [the cabinet’s composition] clearly signals a desire to work with the International Financial Institutions and therefore to continue a path of economic reform.” In relation to Videnov himself, the cable states that: “The Resident World Bank Rep[resentative] considers him to be ‘someone we can work with.’”

The cable’s comments about the economic perspectives of Rumen Gechev, who became Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Development in the Videnov-led government, are similarly useful in showing how, when that government was set in place, Washington regarded even quite modestly interventionist economic policies. Immediately after describing Gechev as “a proponent of state subsidies to increase subsidies”, the cable then says that he “was a Fulbrighter in Economics at the University of Illinois from 1987 – 1988 [and that b]y all accounts, the experience did little to enlighten his views on Economics.” (Ibid) But once in power, Videnov pursued economic measures which were largely consistent with “free market” orthodoxy. In December 1995, the Parliament passed the “Mass Privatization” bill that the Videnov government had formulated and heartily supported. The bill, while supposedly allowing Bulgarians who weren’t extremely wealthy to participate in the purchase of companies previously owned by the state, established the legal framework for the privatization of over 1,000 medium and large-scale enterprises.

The one economic policy that the Videnov government supported that conflicted with the precepts of the free market was in placing a number of prices, many of which were “liberalized,” i.e. allowed to explode upwards, during 1991–1994, back under state control. However, there was no return to anything like the conditions prior to 1990 of state control over nearly all prices, and, as mentioned above, privatization continued under the Videnov-led government.

After 1995, a year that saw that inflation – while still at 62% -- fall from its year-before levels and a modest economic recovery that had commenced in 1994 gained more steam, the Videnov-led government began to confront increasingly severe macroeconomic problems. It appears evident that, among those macroeconomic problems’ underlying causes, the privatization of and lack of state
oversight of the banking and financial system introduced during the early 1990s, played a prominent role. (Pavlova and Sariiski, 2015: 66-8) With only the most scanty regulatory oversight and control mechanisms in place, private banks and other (in many cases quite shadowy) financial institutions came into existence. These banks and financial institutions competed with one another by offering depositors high interest rates and the loans that they extended were frequently improperly collateralized and had little prospect of being paid back. (Ibid)

As the Bulgarian economy confronted the looming disaster of a massive overhang of bad loans, lack of public confidence in the banking system, increasing payments on the foreign debt, capital flight from the country, the diminution of the Central Bank’s hard currency reserves and its consequent inability to support the national currency, all pushed the Videnov government to decide in May 1996 to seek a loan from the IMF. Faced with an economic crisis that was primarily a product of the privatization and near total deregulation of the banking and financial system pushed forward from the 1990 regime change to late 1996, the Videnov-led government quickly went cap in hand to the IMF and World Bank. While the government stressed its willingness to more quickly push forward various privatizations and it did indeed receive the first agreed-to loan tranche from the IMF, that first one was the last ever granted to it. For example, the second loan tranche, which was due to be paid out by the IMF in September 1996, was not granted, even though during that very month Videnov and his Finance Minister, Dimitar Kostev, had, to quote the latter, publicly pledged to commit to “[a] dramatic speeding up of cash privatization … which would necessitate amendments to the privatization law providing for simultaneous cash and voucher privatization.” (Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 1996)

Try though he did during the last months of 1996, primarily by promising more radical neoliberal-type “reforms,” including the institution of a monetarist-endorsed and profoundly contractionary “currency board”, Prime Minister Videnov could not get the IMF to loan money while he was still in office. There is a considerable amount of evidence which suggests that, in cutting Sofia’s access to credit, the IMF was not only acting in accordance with the will of Washington, but also with that of Zhelev, who at the time was serving simultaneously as the President of Bulgaria and as the leader of the UDF.

Her quite clear opposition to anything that even appears to take a somewhat critical stance vis-à-vis “free market” capitalism and the “West’s” geopolitical line notwithstanding, the analyst Tsveta Petrova demonstrated in her article: “A Postcommunist Transition in Two Acts: The 1996–7 Antigovernment Struggle in Bulgaria as a Bridge between the 1989–92 and 1996–2007 Democratization Waves in Eastern Europe” that, in late 1996 and early 1997, Washington saw sweeping Videnov and the BSP from power as essential to the “desideratum” of ensuring the solidity
and future staying power of the 1990 Bulgarian regime change. After detailing how, during late 1996 and early 1997, the two main relatively right-wing (and at that time anti-BSP and thus opposition) forces in Bulgaria – the UDF and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) – received all manner of support from Washington, the EU and different Western European capitals, Petrova goes on to rather matter-of-factly state that: “U.S. diplomats … firmly opposed further IMF loans while Videnov was in power.” (Petrova, 2009: 128)

In refusing to loan Sofia more money and thereby ensuring that Bulgaria’s economic crisis would become considerably worse, the IMF was, the relevant and available data indicates, willing to greatly weaken and also effectively topple the Videnov-led Cabinet, seen by Washington as well as by the UDF as being both too friendly towards Moscow and also as insufficiently fervently pro-EU. (Petrova, 2009: 118; 124; 126-7; 129-33)

In short, when Videnov took office as the Prime Minister in early 1995, he did so in a country which four years earlier had already effectively become dependent on, and relatively easily controlled by, the IMF and shaped by the US government and by EU policies.

Even had he wanted to challenge the “Washington Consensus” head on – and Videnov evidently did not – the consensus was already well embedded in Bulgaria, in its national economic structure and in its financial-economic relations with the IFIs, Washington and the EU. In the eyes of Washington, Videnov’s cardinal sin appears to have been his insufficient zeal to push Bulgaria into the EU, which was clearly connected to his attempts to cultivate closer relations with Russia (as well as China and Vietnam), and also his open opposition to Bulgarian membership in NATO. (Pond, 2006: 44-5)

The early 1997 collapse of the Videnov-led Cabinet was due in no small measure to a sizeable, chaotic and even a slightly violent protest; many of its participants at one point rushed and then ransacked and set fire to parts of the Parliament building. (Ibid) The UDF would, along with its continued control of the Presidency, once again be able to lead the Cabinet and choose the Prime Minister. On July 1, 1997, under newly-installed UDF Prime Minister Ivan Kostov, the currency board-scheme that, under intense IMF pressure, Videnov had already agreed to impose, was formally instituted in Bulgaria. (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 108; Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, 1997; Synovitz, 1996)

Parvanov would end up serving as Bulgaria’s President for exactly ten years (from January 22, 2002 – January 22, 2012). During that time his country not only officially joined NATO on March 29 2004, but also the EU on January 1, 2007. (Rombach, 2011; Salzmann, 2006; Salzmann, 2007B) To this day, the BSP leadership supports Bulgaria’s continued membership in both the EU and NATO (as evidenced, for example, by statements made by Rumen Radev, the BSP-backed candidate who won the decisive November 13, 2016 run-off election for Bulgaria’s Presidency). (Salzmann, 2016)
As seen in the Bulgaria case-study, the end of the Cold War did not result in the US government somehow losing interest in influencing the broad political direction of Eastern and Central European countries. The fall of the Berlin Wall not only served to indicate that the end of the Cold War was imminent, but also triggered moves towards political democratization throughout the region, including (albeit with a relatively long 13-month lag) in Albania. There was however no guarantee that these political reforms would either trigger the systemic transformation from being basically non-capitalist to fundamentally capitalist in the national economy, or even if they would precipitate (partial) move in that direction. Roughly paralleling events in Bulgaria 12 – 18 months earlier, the step-by-step 1991-2 collapse of a democratically-elected government in Albania as well as that government’s immediate replacement by an outspokenly pro-neoliberal and pro-NATO administration were developments that enjoyed the firm, conscious and unceasing support of Washington.

Prior to the early 1990s, Albania had never had any democratic political system in place, but was instead ruled by a succession of different authoritarian regimes. Prime among these regimes were a reactionary monarchy from 1928-1939, which was then followed by occupation by forces from Mussolini’s Italian Fascist dictatorship until mid-1943, at which point the Italian Fascist regime was replaced in the country by the German Nazi one. (Iwaskiw and Zickel, 1992: 26, 32) In November 1944, Albania finally regained its national sovereignty. (Ibid: 35) Albania’s occupation during World War II had never been uncontested, and local left-leaning partisan groups filled the power vacuum. Playing leading roles in the left-wing partisan militias, Enver Hoxha and Mehmet Shehu established themselves as virtually unchallenged political leaders, with Shehu accepting as absolute Hoxha’s authority in all key questions. (Ibid: 134)
Head of state from November 1944, Enver Hoxha remained absolute political leader until his death in April 1985. During Hoxha’s rule, not only was the economy made into a non-capitalist one, but the political system remained wholly dictatorial, with the Albanian Communist Party (whose name changed in 1948 to The Party of Labor of Albania or PLA) being the only one permitted. State institutions however remained relatively less developed, and government was highly personalised. Once Hoxha died in April 1985, his position was occupied by Ramiz Alia. While he initiated cautiously and hesitantly some partial reforms that modestly diminished the totalitarian character of Hoxha’s dictatorship, Alia did not take fundamental steps to democratize the Albanian government until late 1990. Finally, clearly feeling pressured by the several thousand university students who had marched through Tirana calling for the end of dictatorship, Alia and the PLA Central Committee announced (December 11, 1990) that rival political parties would be allowed to form and compete in national elections scheduled for February, 1991. (Ibid: 150)
In a sign that the PLA’s announcement was real and not just a sly subterfuge intended to give the appearance of democracy while maintaining the substance of the pre-existing dictatorial system, on December 12, 1990, there was formed the Democratic Party (DP,) whose leaders took an anti-PLA platform and who announced their intention to participate in country-wide elections whose first round was to take place in February 1991. (Chicago Tribune, 1991; Iwaskiw and Zickel: 165) A new draft interim national Constitution published on December 31, 1990 pushed the country’s political system closer to the “ideal” of “standard” western-style parliamentary democracy. This Constitution completely eliminated the legal provisions that from 1944 to1990 inextricably linked the PLA to the Albanian national state itself. (Iwaskiw and Zickel: 166) In January 1991, five other relatively important political parties were formed to compete in national elections. All six were considered to be to the right of the PLA.

The 1991 national elections would determine the government’s composition in three different stages: the initial balloting in February, the holding of run-off elections on March 31, and the final ballots in April. This was all overseen by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). It is critical to note that the CSCE declared that, minor irregularities notwithstanding, it considered the elections to have been consistent with standard democratic norms.

Extreme and prolonged economic difficulties did not ebb during the elections; however, during the election cycle not only did 98.9% of the eligible citizens exercise their then newly-attained right to vote, but also a majority did not choose to take out their frustration over grave economic problems on the incumbent PLA. The PLA was awarded slightly more than two-thirds of the 250 seats in Albania’s single national-level parliament, “The People’s Assembly.” This enabled the PLA’s members of Parliament to select Ramiz Alia to serve in the then just-created office of the Presidency.

The new constitution that was approved in 1991 formally put an end to the system of one-party rule. For example, one provision required that Alia, on assuming the Presidency, immediately resign from all other high-level positions within the PLA. (Ibid) Though without incident and providing a clear result, the 1991 parliamentary elections did not quickly stabilize Albania’s political and social situation. Immediately after the new government was formed, political tensions such as unrest in the streets grew dramatically. (Blum, 2004B: 320; Iwaskiw and Zickel, 1992: 166; Montgomery, 1991)

Shortly after these protests started, a general strike was called. Both political actions had the same goal: ensuring that President Alia and Prime Minister Nano, who himself was a PLA member, would relinquish power as soon as possible. (Iwaskiw and Zickel, 1992: 167)

In reporting its costs and expenditures during fiscal year 1991, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a US-government financed institution with origins in the CIA, acknowledged that in that year, it awarded $103,000 to certain organizations within the Albanian political system. The Albanian labor movement, which received $80,000, was the major recipient, the going to what the NED called “party training and civic education programs.” (Blum, 2004B: 320; National Endowment
for Democracy, 1991) It is hardly a coincidence that these beneficiaries were most prominent in organizing mass demonstrations and a general strike against the PLA in the immediate aftermath of Albania's multi-party, countrywide vote.
In May 1991, PLA member and Prime Minister Fatos Nano pushed through a package of economic measures that called for the privatization of many large state run businesses. Through Prime Minister Nano, the PLA was evidently embracing \textit{at least some of} the pro-capitalist policies favored by the six different, relatively right-wing parties formed after 1990. These latter did not, however, adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the PLA. Indeed, the continuation of the street protests and the general strike only exacerbated the economy’s ongoing slide, a situation which made Nano realize that whatever popular support he once had was rapidly evaporating. On June 4, 1991, after just three-and-a-half months as Prime Minister, Nano and the entire Cabinet resigned. (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 67)

Albania's new Constitution stipulated that in such circumstances the President must choose and the People's Assembly then subsequently approve a Prime Minister. Apparently sensing the gravity of the situation, a number of politicians refused the offer when President Alia asked them to serve as Prime Minister. Finally, Ylli Bufi, a PLA member who had been Minister of Food in Nano's cabinet, accepted the Prime Ministership. Because the PLA had an absolute majority in the the People's Assembly, Bufi’s approval as Prime Minister was a mere formality.

Bufi’s replacement of Nano did not constitute a continuation of the PLA’s hegemonic political authority in Albania. Bufi’s ascension to office was accompanied by an arrangement which saw half the 24 cabinet positions going to opposition parties. The DP was granted seven, while the remaining five were divided between the Republican Party, the Agrarian Party and the Social Democratic Party. Meanwhile, the leaders of the PLA decided in June 1990, to hold a key direction-setting meeting for their party. The highest-ranking PLA officials opted to imitate the ruling political layers in other post-Stalinist countries in adopting broadly similar pro-capitalist economic measures. In a move of undeniable symbolic significance, delegates at the PLA's June 1991 10th [10th] Congress decided that their party would henceforth be called the Socialist Party of Albania (SPA). This change in name coincided with SPA leaders adopting a platform that called for the transformation of the economy into one based on the principles of the mixed capitalist welfare-state model.

During the second half of 1991, Prime Minister Bufi’s “National Stability Government” put into effect a law that officially sanctioned a partial privatization of agricultural land. In the successful passage of this law, the individuals who headed up Albania's “National Stability Government” clearly aimed to further push forward the reconstruction of the country’s economy along fundamentally pro-capitalist lines. While the leading members of the “National Stability Government” certainly moved towards that objective, it is less certain if they knew that the aforementioned law would also play a significant role in aggravating the economic recession and in intensifying the overall social chaos and
misery that were then gripping Albania. (Ibid: 72) The passage of this land privatization law was followed in short order by an increase in hunger and joblessness in the country. In August 1991 some 10,000 mostly unemployed and starving Albanians, who attributed their disastrous situation to the breakdown of any semblance of local order, tried to board and take control of ships docked in the port city of Durres to flee to Italy. (Ibid: 70) In addition, later in 1991, violence approaching civil-war intensity spread as the rapidly growing ranks of Albania’s penniless masses were locked in battles with police and security forces. The chaos and misery gripping Albania further undermined already flagging support for both the SPA and any politician seen as representing the earlier Stalinist system. With more and more Albanians reduced to conditions of utter desperation the SPA, the largest party in both the Parliament and the government and widely regarded as being the most left-leaning of all the major parties, witnessed a steady decline benefitting the most openly right-wing political organizations, including the DP. This descent into disorder and poverty made DP founder and leader Sali Berisha see an opportunity to undermine the ruling coalition as the SPA declined. During early December 1991, Berisha ordered all DP-backing or DP-oriented political figures to cease supporting the Bufi government. This meant that the seven cabinet posts previously allocated to DP members were abandoned. While the seven political figures did as Berisha demanded, his command generated dissent at the highest levels of the DP. Specifically, while Gramaz Pashko obeyed the order, he also criticized it and made it clear that it required him to come back to Albania from London, where he had been negotiating an International Money Fund (IMF) loan.

The next stage in the collapse of the SPA-headed, multi-party coalition came when, on December 10, 1991, Bufi stepped down as Prime Minister. SPA member and national President Ramiz Alia extended an olive branch to his more right-wing political adversaries by selecting Vilson Ahmeti, a political figure who did not formally belong to any political party, as Bufi’s immediate successor. (Ibid: 73) The winter of 1991-1992 was marked by continued chaos and ongoing social disintegration. Most residences were without access to electricity for days at a time and only had running water for a few hours a day. (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1992; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 73) From late December of 1991 through February 1992, no newspapers were printed in Albania because of a general paper shortage. In certain parts of the country, the central government ceased to function and, as a consequence, mafia structures played a more substantial role in the economy, selling the logs which thousands of increasingly desperate people needed for heating (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 75). The near-disintegration of Albanian society was reflected in and encouraged further social conflicts: in late January 1992, peasants who lived near Albania’s southern border attacked food storage buildings which mine-workers had access to.

William Ryerson figures prominently among those who have openly acknowledged that Washington did indeed steadily push forward the regime change described here. A more complete understanding
of the role that Ryerson himself played in support of regime change can be obtained by citing comments that he made publicly during DP rallies in the immediate buildup to the March 22 and 28, 1992 two-stage parliamentary elections. Ryerson not only opted to be present at a February 1992 public meeting that the DP organized in the southeastern Albanian city of Korca, but also told the audience there that: “… as for the Communists [the politicians from the SPA], I wish them a long life, good health and unemployment after the March [of 1992 Albanian Parliamentary] elections !”

(Abrahams, 2015: 109; Ryerson interviewed by Morgan, 1992)

In short, regarding the rivalry between the DP and the PLA / SPA, Ryerson’s term as US Ambassador to Albania (1991-4) was marked by unconcealed support for the former and open hostility towards the latter. That Ryerson’s opposition towards the PLA / SPA was of a visceral and intensely ideological character can be seen quite clearly in the transcript of an interview that he accorded to William D. Morgan on 26 June 1992. Ryerson – after repeating the remark that he made in February 1992 whereby he wished “the Communists [in the SPA] …. unemployment after the March elections !” – proceeded to not only say that “…they [the leading figures in the SPA] are really stupid,” but also that the SPA’s newspaper [probably Zeri i Popullit – “The Voice of the People”] is a “rag.” (Ryerson interviewed by Morgan, 1992) During his period of service as US Ambassador to Albania, Ryerson’s biases in favor of Berisha and the DP and correspondingly against the SPA were so blatant as to attract (generally relatively restrained) criticism even from figures whose pro-Washington and anti-Communist credentials could not seriously be questioned.

One such figure is Fred Abrahams, an American citizen who lived in Albania for some time, who learned Albanian, and who worked for years for the US-based organization Human Rights Watch. When asked by Abrahams why Berisha had been the recipient of virtually unqualified support from Washington, Ryerson ended up saying that: “Maybe I was used by Berisha, but only to promote democracy and the free market.” (Abrahams, 2015: 109)

Once March 22, 1992 was established as election day, the different electoral formations that wanted to qualify for ballot status had to collect signatures. While the relatively high hurdle of needing at least 400 signatures in every parliamentary circumscription meant that only 11 political groupings succeeded in getting on the ballot, of these 11, just six, the DP, the SPA, the Republican Party (RP), the Unity for Human Rights Party (UHRP), the newly-formed Social-Democratic Party (SDP) and a recently reconstituted Albanian Communist Party (ACP), were considered to have realistic chances of sending at least one representative to the Peoples’ Assembly. Excluding the ACP, the ideological visions and policy proposals of the other five parties cannot be said to have been radically different from one another. However, while all five indicated their backing for at least some of the “reforms” that had not only started to transform Albania’s economy into a basically capitalist one, but that had also begun to shift Albania’s geopolitical orientation towards alliance with Western Europe and the US. But there did exist differences regarding the extent and especially the pace with which these
economic and geopolitical changes should occur.

For example, while there is no question that in 1991-1992 the SPA did favor the (inevitably job-destroying) privatization of certain companies previously owned by the Albanian state, the party’s leaders also promised, in the words of Vickers and Pettifer, to “…ease the pain of the transition back to capitalism by giving decent welfare benefits to those out of work, and maintaining the value of pensions.” (Ibid: 77-8) In writing that these proposals “…became familiar throughout Eastern Europe [after 1990]” and that “[t]he 60 per cent of normal wages paid to those unable to work through no fault of their own would also continue, an element of the Socialists’ programme that was particularly objectionable to the international financial community,” Vickers also made it quite apparent that the leaders of Western-dominated lending agencies such as the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) were paying close attention to Albania’s internal economic policy debates. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, 2009; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 77-8)

For his part, Sali Berisha, DP’s Presidential candidate, placed a greater rhetorical emphasis on the total destruction of all remnants of the Stalinist regime. Interviewed at one point during the campaign, Berisha made clear what he felt that he and his DP had already accomplished, stating that: “We are much better organized than before. We are present everywhere and the role of the communists is diminishing day by day. We have destroyed the traditional power troika consisting of the chairman of the agricultural cooperative, together with the village mayor and the secretary of the regional [PLA or ‘Communist’] party organisation, which was closely related to the state security apparatus.” (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 77) The electoral campaign demonstrated that Albania had not yet made a full transition towards a smoothly functioning parliamentary democracy, and that a willingness to resort to an aggressive, exclusivist, rights-limiting nationalism as a power-consolidating tactic was shared among Albania’s main political parties.

This increasingly discriminatory nationalism manifested itself most glaringly in the chauvinist, anti-Greek agitation that Abdi Balletta, a member of Parliament and the DP hierarchy, pursued for two months before the elections. Balletta encountered very little opposition from the then leadership of the SPA. The elections, in which slightly over 90% of the eligible population voted, saw 62.3%, 25%, 4.3% and 2% of all the valid ballots cast go to the DP, the SP, the SDP and the ACP, respectively. This demonstrates that in the months since the last national elections in spring 1991, thousands of Albanians had lost their willingness to back the largest relatively left-wing party in their country.

One of the principal political consequences of those elections was DP member Sali Berisha’s accession to the Albanian Presidency on April 4, 1992. A week after taking office, he further consolidated the DP’s control over key institutions by offering Aleksander Meksi – a member of the DP – the post of the Prime Minister. In a clean break from all preceding national governments, not a single cabinet post was offered to an SPA member. Fourteen of the 18 Ministries were given to high-ranking members of the DP while control over the remaining four Ministries was distributed to two
“experts” who did not formally belong to any political party, as well as to one figure from the SDP, and one member of the Republican Party. Berisha was getting his way. (Ibid: 78)

Within a few weeks of assuming the Presidency, Berisha, implemented further measures reshaping Albania’s political and economic course. Those in the economic sphere were felt most immediately and powerfully by the largest number of ordinary citizens. For example, while from 1947 through mid-1992, the central government kept the price of bread constant at the low level of 5 lek, the Berisha-headed government on July 1, 1992 generated a five-fold increase in this price. (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1992; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 84) At the same time that it decontrolled bread prices, Berisha’s government also passed legislation that immediately cut all unemployment benefits that former employees of the Albanian national government had been receiving. (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1992; Muco, 1997: 16; Muco and Minxhozi, 1992; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 85)

By these measures, President Berisha and his allies in the Peoples’ House guaranteed that the ongoing collapse in Albania’s level of real production (GDP) would continue throughout 1992, and that a further upward spiral in the already high rate of inflation would occur. (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1992; The New York Times, 1992A; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 81) The combination in 1992 of a massive 7.2% drop in real GDP and an annualized rate of consumer price inflation well above 200% was largely generated by the policies of Berisha and his supporters in the DP (McNeilly and Gachnung, 1998; Muco, 1997), intensifying a widespread instability and chaos characterizing social life in Albania (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 81; Chossudovsky, 2000)

Besides these measures, Berisha and his supporters accelerated the land and company privatizing efforts that President Alia and Prime Minister Nano’s SPA-dominated administration had started in mid-1991. The privatizing of agricultural land proved powerful contributors to a further destabilization of life in Albania’s countryside, as Cohen noted: “Privatization of agricultural land was carried out in a spontaneous and sometimes violent fashion. … In many cases, the peasants simply seized land (along with the livestock on the land). The resulting disorder adversely affected Albanian agricultural output in 1991 and 1992.” (Cohen, 1995: 581; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 84) Berisha, also sought to stimulate foreign investment into Albania by means of pushing company-privatization. The failure, at least until the beginning of 1993, of the new privatization laws to achieve this is made clear by Vickers and Pettifer: “Berisha had now to satisfy the high expectations he had raised in the election campaign by claiming that foreign investment would increase dramatically if the remaining Socialists were ejected from government. … However, there was virtually no change in the attitude of any foreign power towards Albania as the result of the [March 22, 1992] election [of Berisha’s DP]. … Even the warmest of political relationships with the United States resulted in little or no increase in the aid budget, or any rush of foreign companies to invest in Albania. Ironically, it was Greece and Italy, traditionally hostile neighbours, which continued to invest on a small scale.
The internationally known Italian Benetton company announced the opening of a manufacturing facility for shoes and woollen goods in Shkoder [, Albania ].” (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 85)

Within the first few months of his Presidency, Berisha successfully established laws making clear which political system he wanted to adopt; in not only having his loyal allies in the Justice Department ban what Vickers and Pettifer described as “the tiny and politically irrelevant Albanian Communist Party [ACP,]” but also by getting the majority of the members of the Peoples’ House to make illegal any political formation regarded as promoting a “Stalinist or ‘Hoxhaist’” standpoint, Berisha showed his unwillingness to tolerate what he considered to be "extreme" forms of opposition to his government. (Cohen, 1995: 580, 583) But the wave of relatively heightened enthusiasm that the DP and Berisha rode to an overwhelming victory in March – April 1992 parliamentary elections quickly dissolved given the continued deterioration of conditions in the national economy that year.

A careful comparison of the results of Albania’s March – April of 1992 parliamentary elections and the country’s late August of 1992 local electoral races provides clear evidence that, shortly after the former elections took place, popular support for the DP began to decline. When the DP received 62% of ballots cast in the March – April 1992 parliamentary elections, this occurred in the context of a voter turnout rate of 90.7%. The DP’s share of valid ballots cast in August 1992 local elections fell to 50%, and voter turnout declined to 70%. (Cohen, 1995: 580; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 85) In comparison with its rather poor performance at the March – April 1992 parliamentary elections, the SPA saw its share of votes, though due to the sharp drop-off in overall turnout not its vote total, increase in August 1992 local elections. (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 84-5)

Pettifer and Vickers offer possible, sociological explanations for the shift in political attitudes that over this roughly five-month period swept over a good portion of Albania: “In the local elections held on August 27 [1992,] the DP saw its share of the vote plummet from approximately two-thirds to half. The turnout of 70 percent … the third time [that a countrywide vote had been held in Albania since the definitive late-1990-early-1991 collapse of the dictatorial Stalinist regime that had been in place since the mid-to-late 1940s denotes] the lack of enthusiasm for a process which seemed to bring no positive results. The Socialist Party [SPA] was the surprise beneficiary, capturing several key DP strongholds. A prime reason for this dramatic turnabout was the social hardship caused by the government’s tough economic reforms. The Socialists promise to slow the reform process down was seen by many as their only defence against the huge job losses and social deprivation they were experiencing.” (Ibid: 87)

Economic and broad social conditions continued to deteriorate until at least the end of 1992 and the government itself increasingly took actions that called into question its ostensible democratic character. The DP-headed government’s deviations from the principles on which stable, established western-style parliamentary democracies were governed grew steadily more numerous, including
The first prominent political figure who Berisha’s DP-led government decided to arrest was Ramiz Alia. (Ibid: 91) The broader social context of Alia’s arrest suggests that besides becoming less concerned about adhering to legal norms, Berisha’s DP-led government felt that only through the resort to fundamentally authoritarian measures could it weaken the movements of ordinary people’s resistance. Describing the overarching social, economic and political context in which the mid-September 1992, launching of formal criminal charges against Alia took place, Pettifer and Vickers wrote that: “Initially, Albanians had expected quick returns from their investment in democracy. However, their growing political maturity was turning to frustration as the promised job prospects and improvement in living standards failed even marginally to materialize. There was already nostalgia among some older people for the [period, from late 1945 through late 1990, when Albania was a one-party Stalinist dictatorship]. As the country sank further into economic ruin … the [DP-dominated] government [of President Berisha] turned to the settling of old scores. On 12 September [1992] the former President, Ramiz Alia, was placed under house arrest, accused of corruption; he was detained in his daughter’s apartment in Tirana by policemen originally stationed outside it for his personal safety. Members of the DP, in particular the Party leader Eduard Selami, had repeatedly demanded his arrest … His sudden arrest could be traced to outspoken articles [such as one entitled "Why they want to arrest me"] he had published in the Socialist newspaper 24 Hours, in which, sensing his arrest was imminent, he criticized the government [of President Berisha] for lowering the standard of living since it had come to power. …[Prior to Alia’s arrest, the pro-DP newspaper] Rilindje Demokratike [Democratic Renaissance] had published several articles asking why [he] was still at liberty and not in prison along with other ex-communist leaders.” (Ibid: 91-2) The embedding of DP control as unchallengeable ensured the foreign and economic policy orientations which both the US and EU preferred.

From October of 1944 to April 1985, Hoxha’s absolute and particularly rigid, austere and idiosyncratic Stalinist regime effected radical shifts in basic foreign policy orientation; from its first days into 1948, Hoxha’s regime served as basically a client state of Titoist Yugoslavia. After that, it oriented closely to the Soviet Union, before breaking with it in the early 1960s in favour of an alliance with China which it repudiated in the 1970s to pursue a basically autarchic course. When Hoxha died in April 1985, his place was taken by Alia who, for the next five-and-a-half years or so, only cautiously altered his predecessor’s policies, including by gradually making symbolic diplomatic overtures to western European countries, and the EEC and EU. There followed the period of roughly 16 months to April 1992 when the PLA/SPA continued to be the principal, albeit steadily-weakening political force in Albania’s government under a form of democratic pluralism.

The available evidence shows that during the last-mentioned period, Tirana began developing closer
and closer links with NATO in the sphere of military activities. (Ibid: 217) The ascent of Berisha and the DP in April 1992 clearly shifted Tirana’s military agenda and geopolitical posture still more closely with that of Washington. Thus Pettifer and Vickers pointed out that: “the decisive problems of military equipment were not addressed, and the Berisha government sought assistance from the United States for this soon after taking office. As a result, a number of [US] military advisers were appointed to the Albanian Ministry of Defence; most were specialists in communications, logistics and military transport.” (Ibid: 218) Though certainly cognizant of Albania’s instability following Berisha’s attaining the Presidency, leading American officials from the civilian-governmental and military sectors continued to strengthen ties with Tirana. Berisha received backing from diverse American policymakers, and this support was attributable to their view that Berisha’s regime was likely to pursue a line consistent with what Washington desired. Pettifer and Vickers argue that: “There seems little doubt that … [Washington’s Ambassador to Tirana William] Ryerson strongly advised the United States [government] to back Berisha all the way and to marginalise the more moderate leaders … The rationale for US policy in Albania … could be a serious planned attempt to counter the political influence in the region of Serbia, with its Russian links. … In the spring of 1993, the US Central Intelligence Agency took over the largely disused border military airfield near Lezha [Albania] as a base for unmanned observation flights … in May 1994 the United States government … signed a second military agreement which included a provision for equipment transfer [to Berisha’s Tirana-based national administration.] … Just as Russia has given increasing material support to Serbia, the United States has done the same with Albania.” (Ibid: 89, 218, 220)

The downward economic spiral after the 1992 aggressively pro-capitalist measures ended in late 1992-early 1993, giving way to three years of consistent, fairly rapid real GDP growth. While Berisha’s turn towards arguably authoritarian, police-statist measures largely coincided with the mid-1992 worsening of economic conditions and the deepening of inequalities, the economic recovery taking hold in early 1993 did not lead him to reverse his undemocratic actions. In short, Berisha worked to undermine many of the pro-democratic, anti-totalitarian measures that previous SPA governments had enacted.

The claim that the Berisha-headed regime began to engage in significant anti-democratic backsliding is supported by the unfolding and immediate aftermath of Albania’s May 1996 parliamentary elections. By those elections, the living standards of a great majority of Albanians remained – despite some economic growth in the preceding three years -- very low. These persistently low living conditions contributed to growing hostility to Berisha and his regime. In a bid to keep power, Berisha opted to govern in an increasingly autocratic manner. Michel Chossudovsky’s article “The Criminalization of Albania” cited representatives of the non-profit group the “Committee to Protect Journalists” who described how various figures in the DP and government used heavy-handed, undemocratic measures against anyone critical of Berisha and his methods: “During the months
leading up to elections [for positions in "The Peoples’ House,”] officials in Sali Berisha’s ruling Democratic Party [DP] impounded delivery trucks servicing Koha Jone, a leading opposition newspaper, and made sweeping arrests of Koha Jone’s staff for tenuous connections with a bombing in Tirana. After the bombing, government authorities arrested another journalist who had written for another daily Populli Po [The People, Yes !.] on the suspicion that an article she had written in November 1995 was related to the incident. On election day, May 26 1996, the Albanian government cut regular programming by a German news agency and continued to bar the broadcast for one week.” (Abrahams, 2015: 136-8; Committee to Protect Journalists, 1997; Chossudovsky, 2000; Koha Jone, 1993A; Koha Jone, 1993B; Koha Jone, 1994)

The evidence suggests that not only nominally “apolitical” state officials who, in fact, supported Berisha, but also mid- and high-ranking DP members successfully manipulated the May 26, 1996 parliamentary elections. Pointing to the specific methods of ballot fraud and vote-rigging various that Berisha loyalists used, the Albanian-studies specialist Nicholas Pano noted that: “Based on reports of official monitors and journalists, it is apparent that … the [May 26, 1996] Albanian parliamentary election were marred by fraud and misconduct in the recording and tabulation of the vote. An Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] report notes that this organization’s observers had determined that thirty-two of the seventy-nine articles of Albanian election law had been violated. Among the most egregious of these violations were the casting of more ballots than voters assigned to a polling station, counting of opposition ballots for DP candidates, depositing of pre-marked ballots in ballot boxes. … These abuses … seem to have contributed to the magnitude of the Democrats’ parliamentary majority.” (Pano, 1997: 342)

The DP emerged as the overwhelming winner. Albania’s Central Election Commission said that the DP received 55.53% of the 1.65 million ballots. The DP earned 122 of the 140 seats, while the SPA, with 20.37%, the 2nd-largest vote, was awarded just 10 seats.

The fraudulent result meant that the DP could do what it wanted without fear of effective opposition in the next session of parliament. Furious, on May 28, 1996, some 800 people organized a peaceful protest in Tirana’s main public square. These protesters, most of whom were committed backers of the opposition parties, were violently attacked by riot police. (Pano: 342) Subsequently, in yet another demonstration of its non-democratic character, the Berisha-led government banned political demonstrations that were organized by parties in opposition or not officially allied with the DP. (Iwaskiw and Zickel, 1992: 167)

Whether one agrees with his political worldview, Elez Biberaj had a considerable knowledge not only about the sweeping political and economic changes that Albania experienced in the 1990s. He also understands how these changes were influenced by Washington’s policies. Biberaj, whose parents were from Albania and who speaks Albanian fluently, spent his fifteen years in former Yugoslavia
until 1968, when he emigrated to the US. Biberaj became a journalist at the taxpayer-funded US government radio station (and now multi-media institution) “Voice of America” (VOA) in late 1980 and, with the exception of a stint from 1982 - 1986 at the US government United States Information Agency (USIA) has been there ever since, becoming in 2006 head of VOA’s Eurasian Division. (Voice of America, 2012) On March 14, 1996, Biberaj (then Chief of the VOA’s Albanian Service) gave revealing testimony to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, also known as the Helsinki Commission,) a bi-partisan, US government agency, whose approximately 17 members are drawn more or less equally from Democratic and Republican Party members of both the House and Senate. In his testimony (given just a few months before the DP’s “success” in the rigged 1996 parliamentary elections), Biberaj articulated quite clearly the ideological and practical considerations that shaped the political posture that he individually and Washington as a whole opted to adopt vis-a-vis Albania. That posture was predicated on granting strong support not only to the DP that Sali Berisha had founded, but also unqualified support to Berisha himself. This is clear from the statement that, on March 14, 1996, Biberaj gave to the members of the US Helsinki Commission. Biberaj heaps effusive praise on the Berisha-headed government, describing it as having "made significant progress in ensuring respect for human rights, building democratic institutions, establishing the rule of law, and laying the foundations of a free market economy.” (Biberaj, 1996)

Biberaj lauded Berisha personally for having “strong leadership qualities” and for being “an effective president.” He also asserted that “Albania is a staunch United States ally” and he clearly implies that this state of affairs was positively linked to Berisha’s supposedly “strong leadership qualities.” Explaining in more concrete terms what being “a staunch United States ally” actually meant, Biberaj pointed out that Albania had both “forged close bilateral military ties with the United States [and also] … placed at NATO’s disposal its air and port facilities.” In this testimony, Biberaj stated simply that Washington’s position vis-à-vis Albania’s then-upcoming April of 1996 Parliamentary elections would be based on a clear and maximally openly expressed and understood “preference for a result that will advance democracy [and] a free market economy ...” (Ibid)

In the testimony on March 14, 1996, Biberaj made quite explicit his view in economic policy the DP and Berisha on the one hand and the SPA on the other embraced significantly different orientations. Biberaj stated that: “It [the SPA] rejects Berisha’s policy of shock therapy and massive privatizations, advocating instead gradual economic reforms and [a] continued state role in the economy.” Biberaj also asserted that, in sharp contrast to the DP, “the Socialists [SPA] are also wary of Albania's growing military relationship with the United States and NATO.” In his appearance before the US Helsinki Commission, Biberaj reaffirmed that he and the US government recognised significant differences between the DP and SP economic and foreign policy positions, portraying the SPA in fairly black terms whose relation to reality was debatable. Biberaj asserted that: “The party leadership [of the SPA] is dominated by conservative [i.e. hardline Stalinist or “Hoxhaist”] communists and its
claims of renovation are disingenuous. Since its humiliating defeat in [the Parliamentary elections in spring] 1992, the Socialist Party has displayed little commitment to democratic practices and values and has attempted to block the process of transition every step of the way. In recent months, in a bid to prove that they are a moderate force, the Socialists have toned down their anti-Western, and particularly anti-American rhetoric. But there should be no doubt that an election victory by the former communists will pose a significant threat to Albania’s democratic future. … If they return to power … the Socialists’ mere attempt to roll back or retard such moves as mass privatization … would be fraught with great instability.” (Ibid)

Christopher Hill was another key American figure who played a significant role in the process leading to US led regime change 1991-1992 that saw the PLA / SPA steadily yield its previously unchallenged control over the government to the DP. After a break dating back to mid-1939, diplomatic relations between the US and Albania were formally reestablished on March 15, 1991. When, on October 1, 1991, the US Embassy to Albania opened for business in Tirana, Hill became the Chargé D’Affaires ad interim. Following Ryerson’s December 1991 promotion to US Ambassador, Hill continued to work closely with him as his Deputy. When, in February 1992, Hill went to the city of Kucova to attend a DP rally held six weeks before the pivotal Albanian parliamentary elections, he stated that: “I believe that neither the US nor any European state is interested in building socialism in Albania.” That sentence is the entirety of his answer to the question whether or not Washington would give Albania aid if the respective parliamentary elections were won by the SPA. (McDowall, 1992) Hill also acknowledged in visits around the country during the election campaign that he was always accompanied by DP members. So transparently biased was Washington’s intervention into the political process of the March - April 1992 Parliamentary elections that, when he was asked some years later by Fred Abrahams if the respective intervention “had gone too far,” Hill said that: “You could argue you shouldn’t go [so far]. Yes, we’re being accused, but you’d have to be kind of a curmudgeon not to [go so far].” (Abrahams, 2015: 109)

Thus Washington’s overall policy stance 1991-1996 could, in broad terms, be summarized as resting on constant, generous and open support to Berisha and the DP, but also on portraying in a deeply negative manner nearly everything associated with the PLA / SPA.

This policy stance found reflection in, among other manifestations, the cables that Ryerson sent back to the US. Describing the leading figures in what was already known as the SPA, Ryerson wrote in early March of 1992 that: “As they see their political fortunes waning, the Socialists all ‘former’ communists schooled in the works of the dictator [Enver Hoxha] seem to have reverted to what they know best—manipulations of statements, appeals to xenophobic fears and attacks on the US.” In these diplomatic cables as elsewhere, Ryerson adopted a basically fawning tone towards Berisha, who he stated was: “charismatic, able to communicate well with any group from any strata of society, with a keen sense of judgment.” (Ryerson, 1992B)
Fatos Nano, who served as Prime Minister from late February to early June 1991, and who, with the occasion of the formal founding of the SPA on June 12, 1991, became that party’s official leader, was something of a hate object for US officials at least until 1996. During the early period of Nano’s SPA leadership, Ryerson labelled him in a cable as “an ineffectual leader who cannot make major decisions on his own.” (Ryerson, 1992C) His open repudiation of any fundamentally non-capitalist form of economic organization and his espousal of the supposed virtues of a mixed economy notwithstanding, Fatos Nano was, again from at least very early 1991 until well into 1996, viewed quite negatively not only by Berisha and the DP, but also by Washington.

While his “leftism” was of a decidedly milquetoast nature, Nano – precisely when he was pushed up against the proverbial wall – proved willing to name not only his domestic, but also his foreign political opponents: for instance, he desperately “pushed back” when in late July 1993 the then DP-dominated government prepared to arrest him for crimes of corruption allegedly committed when he had served as Prime Minister. On July 27, 1993, aware that his time as a free man was quickly running out, Nano opted to attend and give a speech at an extraordinary meeting of a key leadership body within the SPA, the “General Steering Committee”. In his speech, reproduced in full next day in Zeri i Popullit (“The Voice of the People,” a newspaper closely aligned with the SPA) Nano identified those individuals who he regarded as being responsible for his impending arrest and stated that “… a revanchist clan led by Sali Berisha [was acting against him, as were] diplomats like Hill and Ryerson [, who …] after making their careers in the CIA and Belgrade, put the scenario on Berisha’s desk.”

On the very day that this speech appeared in Zeri i Popullit, his immunity from prosecution was lifted by the Parliament, then firmly under the DP control. Just one day later, he was arrested. When, two days later, the SPA organized a large rally at which Berisha and the DP were subjected to criticism and Nano’s then-imminent arrest was repudiated, Ryerson sought to downplay the degree of support the rally received from ordinary Albanians. In a cable sent to Washington on August 2, 1993, Ryerson claimed that “many pedestrians stopped at the square to watch and listen [to the proceedings of the rally which is here in focus] but were not participants. Those taking part were for the most part older PS [SPA] members, former Sigurimi [Stalinist-era state security, intelligence and secret police service] employees and their families.” (Ryerson, 1993)

Ryerson’s account of that rally has been contradicted by other witnesses (including by those like Fred Abrahams who were not partisans of the SPA). Describing the events, Abrahams wrote that: “[after this rally, t]he crowd filed into the street, onto the main boulevard, and down to Skanderbeg Square [Tirana’s main square]. Uniformed police watched from the periphery, but men in civilian clothes, probably from SHIK [the post-Stalinist security, intelligence and secret police service] intervened with batons. Government supporters jeered the crowd and threw stones.” (Abrahams, 2015: 129)

Observers who had impeccable anti-communist and right-wing credentials acknowledged that Nano’s
subsequent trial did not proceed in accordance with standard procedures in democratic countries, and that its outcome (in April of 1994, Nano was convicted, sentenced to serve 12 years in prison and obligated to pay $720,000 back to the state) had effectively been determined in advance. For example, the British *The Economist* magazine, which is well-known for its advocacy of a nearly “intervention-free” capitalist market system, named the respective trial: “the last great political show trial in Europe”. (*The Economist*, 1994) Furthermore, Eduard Selami, who was from 1992 through 1995 President of the DP, and who supported Nano’s arrest, and who believed that he was guilty, stated that: “they [Berisha, media institutions which he effectively controlled, and Berisha loyalists in different parts of the state apparatus] convicted him [Nano] and then pressed the judiciary.” (Abrahams, 2015: 129)

But Washington did not criticize Berisha and his DP for so openly repudiating bedrock principles of democratic governance and the rule of law. When, in April 1993, media institutions and politicians affiliated with the DP began to claim (in an informal, unofficial manner) that Nano was guilty of corruption, Ryerson argued in a cable to Washington that the accusations that Berisha was steadily moving towards a repressive autocracy in Albania were baseless inventions of the SPA. Ryerson not only baldly dismissed the (well-founded) assertions that Berisha was purposefully working to undermine the foundations of the newly-established democratic, law-based state, but also suggested clearly that he didn’t hold the SPA in particularly high regard: “Claims that Berisha is superceding legal authority, instituting a police state and not respecting human rights have been a standard part of Socialist [SPA] rhetoric for over one year now and have no basis in fact.” (Ryerson, 1993B) Later, when asked by Fred Abrahams if he individually had ordered Tirana to arrest and charge Nano with criminal offenses, Ryerson denied this, though in the same breath he also volunteered his political opinion whereby both he as well as his Deputy Christopher Hill “were persuaded that Nano was a crook.” (Abrahams, 2015: 129)

5.1: Economic Policy Under the PLA/SPA-led governments and after

When, in May 1991, Fatos Nano used his powers as Prime Minister to promote the first set of laws starting the privatization of Albania’s financial, industrial, resource-extraction and service-sector enterprises, he belonged to the PLA. Despite its past, the PLA had, by the Spring of 1991, become committed to implementing some quintessentially pro-capitalist economic policies. (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 64) In June 1991, Fatos Nano was replaced by Ylli Bufi as Prime Minister. The political party name PLA was then changed to SPA, which served, if anything, to generate more “forward momentum” for the pro-capitalist economic transformation, not least because 12 of the 24 cabinet positions under Bufi were allocated to political parties widely viewed as on the right.
During the roughly six months of its existence, the Bufi Government of National Stability not only decontrolled the prices of some non-essential consumer industrial goods and permitted the official exchange of the national currency (the lek) to decline against the dollar by 68%, but also implemented a pro-capitalist set of land privatization measures. (McNeilly and Schiesser-Gachnang, 1998: 7-8; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 72) In December 1991, when party leader Berisha ordered them to do so, DP members holding cabinet positions in Prime Minister Bufi’s government all resigned. This “resignation en masse” prompted Bufi to vacate the office of Prime Minister. This vacancy had to be filled, and President Alia chose to fill it with Vilson Ahmeti, a transitional figure who, at that time, did not belong to any political party. During his four months in office as Prime Minister, Ahmeti did not reverse any of the (relatively gradual) steps towards neoliberalism in place, and also oversaw an increase in the state-controlled prices for drinking water. (McNeilly and Schiesser-Gachnang, 1998: 8) Ahmeti’s direct successor, DP member Aleksander Meksi, took over as Prime Minister shortly after the DP’s overwhelming victory in the March–April 1992 parliamentary elections. Given the DP’s stance, no-one was surprised that following those elections, the incoming national government, headed by DP members President Berisha and Prime Minister Meksi, maintained and aggressively succeeded in establishing further elements of the neoliberal program, including privatizing more state-owned assets. (Chossudovsky, 2000)

From mid-1992 to mid-1997, when Berisha and Meksi served as the President and Prime Minister respectively, they implemented a great number of measures which had the direct result of substantially – perhaps even radically – reforming the country’s economy along neoliberal or free-market capitalist lines. During the very same period, however, the influence of criminal practices and criminal organizations, including Albanian and international Mafias, over the Albanian economy also grew by leaps and bounds. Describing the dual process whereby that portion of Albania’s economic output that was produced by private agents grew steadily simultaneous with a surge in criminal elements’ take from and control over the respective output, Economics Professor Michel Chossudovsky wrote: “Under the IMF/World Bank-sponsored reforms initiated since the outset of the Berisha regime in 1992 … the most profitable state enterprises were initially transferred to holding companies controlled by members of the … nomenklatura [the one-party Stalinist dictatorship]. State assets within the portfolio of these holding companies were to be auctioned off to foreign capital, according to a calendar agreed upon with the Bretton Woods institutions [i.e. the IMF and the World Bank.] The privatization programme had led virtually overnight to the development of a property-owning class, firmly committed to the tenets of neoliberalism. In Northern Albania, this class was associated with the Guëguë ‘families’ linked to the Democratic Party. … In turn, this rapid accumulation of private wealth had led to a spurt of luxury housing and imports, including large numbers of shiny Mercedes. Tirana has one of the largest per capita concentrations of Mercedes automobiles in Europe, a large share of which are stolen vehicles, smuggled in; almost every second
car in the capital is a Mercedes. The import of cars had of course been boosted by the influx of dirty
money.” (Ibid)

5.2: American Foreign Investment in Albania From 1991 through 1997

While in mid-1991 the Bufi-led “National Stability Government” in Tirana passed measures that
facilitated the privatization of what had up to that point been exclusively collectively-owned
agricultural land, foreign investment into Albania remained essentially zero until about mid-1992. The
failure of various relatively cautious and piecemeal pro-capitalist measures implemented through
1991 to encourage foreign industrial and service companies to put capital into Albania can be
explained in part by the profound internal instability that still prevailed until early 1993. As economic
and social problems became more serious during the latter 1980s, and became genuinely catastrophic
1989-1992, foreign investors became ever more cautious. Much of the private capital that American-
based multinational corporations and individuals sent to Albania after the start of 1993 was
underwritten by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), an institution
founded in 1991 in which the US government always held a major share. (Feulner, 1994)
The US officials responsible for crafting policy towards Albania 1992-1997 were considerably more
enthusiastic about the policy orientation of Berisha’s DP-dominated regime than the immediately
preceding SPA-dominated administrations. These US government officials were also committed to
staking virtually all of Washington’s political capital in Albania on Berisha and the DP. Pettifer and
Vickers support this view: “As the principle of reasoned debate was increasingly disregarded, a
climate of intolerance developed. The progress of democracy was being hampered by [President
Berisha’s] obsessive desire for power, regardless of the cost, and an absence of moderation in DP
circles, often encouraged by the relationship that had grown up between Berisha and the hardline anti-
communist US Ambassador William Ryerson. … The new party, [the Democratic Alliance (DA) was
a center-right formation which broke away from the DP in September 1992 and the DA] was against
the revanchism and the fundamentalist nationalist tendencies of the trend which it considered
characterized the majority of the DP membership. … In this period [late summer and fall 1992] there
was a marked increase of the direct and indirect influence of the United States over the Albanian
government and over Berisha in particular. Ambassador Ryerson--a powerful personality with a long
career in … State Department postings, mainly in Latin America–developed a strong emotional
commitment to Albania and to the DP. In turn his strongly interventionist concept of US diplomacy
appealed to Berisha …” (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 87-8) Ryerson’s strong diplomatic activism in
favor of Berisha and his government was wholly consistent with the overall stance of Washington’s
economic agencies, investors and multinational companies after Berisha became President in April
1992. All this aimed to make Albania more open to investment from the US. Thus, not only did Fred Abraham write that “[t]he United States kicked in $236 million [in economic ‘aid’ in the five year period which started in] 1991, two thirds of it dedicated to promoting private enterprise and financial reform,” but Edwin Feulner also pointed out in mid-1994 that: “[a] Coca-Cola bottling plant, which will serve the entire Balkan area, was just about to be opened when I was [in Albania] recently.” (Abrahams, 1997; Feulner, 1994)

5.3: American Foreign Policy Towards Albania during the 1991-1996 Period

The PLA / SPA-headed administrations which held power in the immediate wake of the December 1990 collapse of Stalinism in Albania succeeded in substantially improving Tirana’s relations with Washington (Chossudovsky, 2000). In April 1990, during Alia’s Presidency, eight months prior to the December 1990 collapse, PLA Prime Minister Adil Carcani stated that he favored the national government’s participation in the Conference on European Cooperation and Security; this would constitute a necessary (though quite preliminary) step towards an eventual end of joining NATO and the EU (Ibid). Furthermore, diplomatic relations between Tirana and Washington, which had ceased in late 1946, were re-established in March 1991, and, just three months later, Secretary of State James Baker visited Albania in a move to demonstrate that the two governments were now moving to developing a diplomatic and geopolitical alliance. (Chossudovsky, 1996; Iwaskiw and Zickel, 1992: 134)

When, as a direct consequence of the March-April 1992 multiparty elections, the DP won and installed the Berisha administration, the already-existing pro-Washington stance of Albania’s most influential political figures received a further boost. The DP-dominated government of April 1992 was even more aggressively committed to a geopolitical alliance with the Western European capitals and with Washington. In December 1992, it made a formal request for Albania’s accession to NATO. During the five years mid-1992 to 1997, President Berisha maintained a geopolitical orientation favourable to the Western European capitals and particularly strongly pro-Washington. For this he was rewarded via the 1994 decision to become a participating country in NATO’s so-called “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) military exercises. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2012)

Another indication that Berisha put his government’s alliance with Washington above all other regional political and geopolitical considerations comes his stance that, via coaxing and pressure from US policymakers, on Kosovo and Macedonia. Since becoming a leading political figure, Berisha had promoted Albanian nationalist positions, including favoring the secession of the mainly Albanian-populated Kosovo from Serbia. (Callahan, 1998: 119) With Washington’s focus in the Balkans in the 1990s being the wars in former Yugoslavia, US policymakers were worried that they would not have
the faintest chance of stabilizing the Balkans if still more nationally-rooted conflicts were to break out between Albanians and Macedonians in Macedonia and between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo. US officials worked successfully to get Berisha to alter his intensely nationalistic backing for “fellow Albanians” who in Kosovo and Macedonia. Focusing primarily on the methods used by Washington to effect these changes, David Callahan wrote that: “Having amplified its message to Serbia, the Clinton administration began devising a message to Albania and a strategy for delivering it. During the early 1990s, the Albanian government had helped stoke the flames of the Kosovo crisis by loudly supporting the claims of the secessionists there. It had also contributed to instability in Macedonia, whose population was 30 percent Albanian, by backing [Albanian] nationalist politicians. … The Clinton administration’s goal in this volatile environment was to induce Albania to temper its nationalist rhetoric and become a proponent of moderate behavior among the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia. This was no easy task. Albanian nationalism … the dream of creating a single state that included all six million Albanians in the Balkan region, was a powerful force in Albanian domestic politics. In 1993 and 1994, there were strong incentives for Sali Berisha, the Albanian President, to support Albanian militants in Kosovo and Macedonia. The United States sought to counter these incentives by offering Berisha foreign aid and closer ties with Washington in exchange for moderating his behavior. In early 1994, the United States established a military presence in Albania, using a base there to fly spy missions over Serbia. Top U.S. military officials visited the country regularly, and the U.S. Ambassador to Albania, William Ryerson, became an influential figure in [the] circles [of Berisha’s] government. By spring 1994, Berisha had significantly altered his position. Dropping his strong support for Kosovo’s secession, Berisha began calling for talks between local Albanian leaders and the Serb government in Belgrade. He and Ibrahim Rugova, the Kosovo Albanian leader, issued a joint statement on May 27 [1994] announcing this new concession. Berisha also met with Kiro Gligorov, the Macedonian President, and promised to support the moderate, integrationist wing of the main Albanian party in Macedonia. Previously, Berisha had backed a militant faction. In July 1994, [US] Defense Secretary William Perry arrived in Tirana to discuss U.S. military assistance and closer security cooperation with the West. While dangling these carrots, he reiterated the message that Washington opposed support for Albanian nationalists in Kosovo and Macedonia. Throughout the remainder of 1994 and into 1995, U.S. officials continued to stress this point as they built closer ties to Albania.” (Callahan, 2001: 144-5)

Thus however intense Berisha’s nationalist sentiments may have been, he ultimately chose to subordinate them to his still larger geostrategic interest in making his own regime a maximally loyal regional partner of Washington.
5.4: On the Nature of Albania’s Internal Political System during the PLA and SPA-dominated Government and After

In comparison with the previous totalitarian one-party PLA dictatorship before 1990, the PLA- and SPA-dominated governments in which first PLA and then SPA member Ramiz Alia served as President were, from the standpoint of Western parliamentary democratic norms, a clear improvement. Nonetheless, President Alia’s democratically-validated post-December 1990, largely PLA and then SPA-run national governments themselves engaged in practices that contravened those norms. While assuming state power in a new and democratic legal and political framework and then holding onto power via a triumph in the two-staged, multiparty and free election cycle held in February and March 1991, the PLA-SPA of President Alia was not averse to supporting laws and regulations with the intended effect of reducing certain citizens’ right to participate in the electoral process. New elections laws in part based on the chauvinist, anti-Greek demagogy of DP member Abdi Balleta during the lead up to the March-April 1992 elections were put into effect due to the fact that they either weren’t firmly opposed by, or they actually met with the backing of the SPA. (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 87-8) The electoral code modifications that were enacted shortly before the March-April, 1992 elections included such provisions as the one that made it difficult for small, underfinanced parties to qualify for ballot status and another that denied ballot status to “Onomia,” an organization whose principal focus was defending the interests of Albania’s ethnically Greek citizens. While these two democratic rights restricting modifications to the electoral code eventually met with lukewarm support from SPA members, they were both proposed by the Albanian chauvinist, virulently anti-Greek DP member Balleta and received enthusiastic support from the entire DP. (Ibid: 77-8) Whatever the deviations from “perfect Western-style” democratic procedures that the Alia-led, largely PLA and SPA-headed governments may have been guilty of, the DP-dominated government of Berisha repeatedly demonstrated that it was still less committed to upholding democratic norms and procedures than had been its immediate predecessors. The available evidence strongly supports the conclusion that in comparison with the Alia-headed, largely PLA and SPA-run governments in power before March 1992, the Berisha-led, DP government conducted itself in a less rigorously democratic and more authoritarian fashion.

Furthermore, after gaining control of the Albanian state and government, the Berisha-led DP took more steps to limit citizens’ democratic rights than anything during the 16 months when the Alia-led PLA/SPA held power. Within three months of assuming office, Berisha’s government opted to ban “the tiny and politically irrelevant Albanian Communist Party, a hardline splinter group from the SPA” as well as all other parties deemed to be “fascist … [or] communist … [or] Stalinist or ‘Hoxhaist’” and thus showed that its dedication to the principles of liberal democracy and political pluralism was wanting, even when compared with Alia’s PLA/SPA-headed administrations (Ibid: 85-
Finally, most analysts acknowledge that Berisha and his officials engaged in numerous forms of political manipulation, trickery and fraud to ensure that his DP emerged as the dominant party from the 1996 elections. Thus, even compared to its predecessors, Berisha’s DP-dominated government 1992 – 1997 engaged in a heightened anti-democratic “backsliding.” (Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, 2013; Perlez, 1996; Phillips, 1996; Tarifa and Lucas, 2006)

5.5: On Basic Human Rights During the PLA and SPA-dominated Governments and After

However intense the socio-economic decline during the 15 months from December 1990 to March 1992 when President Alia, backed by largely PLA- and SPA-headed state administrations, governed Albania, the available evidence indicates that Alia and the PLA/SPA administrations committed very few grave abuses of human rights. On the other hand, while not nearly as systematic or brutally severe as the human rights abuses during the 45 years from 1945-1990, the human rights abuses perpetrated by the DP-dominated Berisha government were more serious than those of the preceding (and democratically-validated) PLA and SPA-led governments.

That government’s deviation from the basic principles that underlie fundamentally democratic modern political systems can be seen, for example, in its moves to arrest, and then try, convict and imprison Ramiz Alia, who had served as President immediately before Berisha. As regards these moves, the Albanian studies experts Vickers and Pettifer, who don’t have any detectable left-wing or pro-socialist biases, were moved to remark that “his [Alia’s] sudden arrest could be traced to outspoken articles he had published in the Socialist newspaper 24 Hours, in which, sensing that his arrest was imminent, he criticized the [Berisha] government for lowering the standard of living since it had come to power.” (quoted in Vickers, 2001: 235) Both Nexhimije Hoxha, who had had been married to Enver Hoxha from the mid-1940s until his death in 1985, and Alia were sentenced to nine-year jail terms, eventually reduced to three and five years, respectively. (Imholz, 1995) Berisha’s DP-dominated national government arrested, tried, convicted, and imprisoned on less than secure legal bases far more relatively left-wing political opponents than just Nexhimije Hoxha and Alia: it also arrested most of the higher-level figures from the former Stalinist dictatorship. That it effected a comprehensive, politically motivated series of arrests against its political adversaries is confirmed by Pettifer and Vickers, who remarked that: “By then [December 1992] almost the whole former Politburo was under arrest and awaiting trial charged with stealing from the state.” (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 92) The 1993 arrest, pre-case imprisonment, trial, conviction, and sentencing to a 12-year jail term of the PLA and then SPA member and former Prime Minister Fatos Nano was one of the more transparently political actions of the Berisha government after April 1992 (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Partito Radicale Massimo, 1995). In 1993 the DP government accused Nano of engaging in corrupt and fraudulent business practices during his February – June 1991 term
in office as Prime Minister. (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Partito Radicale Massimo, 1995) By 1995 it was demonstrated that these charges against Nano were false, though he remained in jail until 1997. (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Partito Radicale Massimo, 1995)

Not only did it seek via politically motivated and legally dubious procedures to silence and weaken prominent opposition figures, but the Berisha-fronted DP regime also engaged in repressing groups of "ordinary people" whose pursuit of their own social and economic interests was viewed as incompatible with DP’s programs. Thus in spring 1991, trade union workers took an oppositional stance regarding the democratically “PLA and SPA-heavy” regimes in which Alia served as the President of Albania; Berisha and his DP had passively and indirectly, though significantly, benefited from this. But by late 1992, a number of these workers began to engage in strikes and other protests, these various actions put them in conflict with the DP-dominated government. That Berisha viewed radicalized, striking workers as a boon to his DP only when in opposition is clear by the harsh, police-statist measures that his government took against these workers in the second half of 1992. Pettifer and Vickers noted that: “…the fact that the trade unions were still an independent force … appears to have influenced government[s] thinking on the labor front and may well have led to the bitter dispute in December [1992] when the workers at the Bulquize chrome mine near the Yugoslav border, who had been engaged in a prolonged hunger-strike and mine occupation, were intimidated back to work by the use of paramilitary units directed from Tirana. The forces of ‘order’ laid dynamite around the top of the mine shaft and threatened to detonate it if the underground hunger-strike continued. As part of a plan to establish [a] strong central government and restore ‘order,’ the trade unions, which had played such a vital and honorable role in the final demise of communism in May 1991, had to be virtually crushed as a serious bargaining force only [18] months later. Similar tactics were used the next year when striking workers at Kukes, in the north-east, protested at the government’s failure to honor land compensation promises made during the [late March and early April 1992] elections. Paramilitary units were sent into the town and it was made all but impossible for either Albanian or foreign news reporters to discover what was happening and report on it.” (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 86)

The apparent threat of the growth of an independent civil society led the Berisha government to threaten and in some cases use brute force and potentially deadly violence against protesting and striking workers.

Besides organizing nearly evidence-free, legally unfounded show trials against prominent oppositional figures, the Berisha-led government of 1992-1997 also resorted to diverse forms of fraud in order to guarantee its victory in the May 1996 parliamentary elections, and then oversaw the beatings that riot police administered to people peacefully protesting against the election results. (Perlez, 1996)
Thus a thorough review of available evidence demonstrates that in comparison with the essentially democratically legitimate Alia-fronted, PLA and SPA-heavy administrations from December 1990 to March 1992, the Berisha administration had a relatively poor human rights record.

The table on the following page summarises all five of these key findings.
### Albania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did the proportion of private, capitalist ownership over Albania’s GDP increase quickly following the occurrence of the Washington-backed regime change there?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the flow of specifically American foreign investment into Albania increase quickly following the occurrence of the Washington-backed regime change?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Tirana’s geopolitical line become meaningfully closer to that of the US government quickly following the occurrence in Albania of the Washington-backed regime change?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Albania’s internal political system become significantly more genuinely democratic (i.e., meaningfully less authoritarian) quickly following the occurrence in said country of the Washington-backed regime change?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the central government of Albania meaningfully improve its respect for basic human rights quickly following the occurrence in said country of the Washington-backed regime change?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5.6 Core Findings Regarding the Long-Term Irreversibility of the 1991 - 1992 Regime Change in Albania

As has been reiterated in the immediately preceding sub-chapters, in 1991 – 1992 there did not merely unfold a “personnel-political party” regime change in Albania, but there were also laid the foundations for a significant revamping of said country’s basic economic “policy-pathway,” its central foreign policy orientation and even its state’s quasi-official ideology. The relative weakness of developed state institutions also encouraged personal rule.

By early April 1992, the DP had assumed control over the Presidency, the office of the Prime Minister (in the person of Sali Berisha and Aleksander Meksi), but also over the national Parliament. There was a significant right-wing revamping of the Albanian state’s economic and geostrategic orientation, as well as its overarching ideological vision. Many more formerly state-controlled prices were “liberalized” (i.e., allowed to explode upwards), much agricultural land was “de-collectivized”, and various businesses and financial institutions were sold off to wealthy, primarily foreign parties. (Chossudovsky, 2000; European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1996: 11; Kajsiu, 2010: 236; Trimcev, 2005: 126) This full-speed-ahead approach to price liberalization and asset privatization across various economic sectors was implemented in close consultation with, and to the satisfaction, of Washington, the EU, the IMF and the WB. These bodies all regarded the DP-headed administration as a model pupil for its steadfast determination to speedily implement their policy prescriptions.

Just as was shown in this dissertation’s chapter on the Bulgarian regime change, the de facto quasi-irreversibility (at least in the medium term) of the 1991 – 1992 Albanian regime change was based on the cultivation of a domestic socio-economic layer which was fiercely committed to defending the benefits that it derived from these neoliberal policies, including, first and foremost, privatization and agricultural decollectivization. (Kajsiu, 2010: 241) These individuals included both DP and SPA political figures in the mid to late 1990s. (Ibid)

While there certainly was a small minority domestic constituency for the country’s drastic neoliberal restructuring, it is hard to argue that this restructuring was not primarily pushed forward at breakneck pace by western governments and western-run multilateral lending institutions. The particular character of many of the privatizations 1992-1997 that the Berisha-headed government carried out increased the government’s foreign debt at the very same time that it gave up control over businesses that previously nationalised.

Describing how multilateral, western-run lending institutions were part of the often profoundly
corrupt process by which valuable state-owned assets were transformed into the private property of wealthy interests, most frequently from the US and the EU, Chossudovsky wrote that: “Making the SOEs [state-owned enterprises] (including state-owned public utilities) ‘more attractive’ to potential foreign investors had predictably contributed to fuelling the country’s external debt. This ‘strengthening of SOEs in preparation for privatization’ was being financed from the gush of fresh money granted by multilateral and bilateral creditors. Ironically the Albanian state was ‘funding its own indebtedness’ by providing financial support to SOEs earmarked for sale to western investors. Moreover, part of the foreign exchange proceeds generated by the overseas remittances and dirty money into the ‘foundations’ [essentially, pyramid-like investment funds that the DP-headed Albanian government was involved in and gave support to from 1992 – 1996] was also being used to prop up the state’s debt-stricken enterprises, ultimately to the benefit of foreign buyers who were acquiring state property at rock bottom prices.” (Chossudovsky, 2000: 292) The growth of private interests in the sell-off of state assets only increased the irreversible nature of the process.

In adhering to an unreservedly and sometimes rather zealously pro-Washington and pro-NATO line, the Berisha-headed government was only – and in a quite rational manner – complementing its steadfast, uncompromising pursuit of a rather aggressively pro-“free market” economic policy pathway of which relatively privileged elements in Albania, as well as elite investor interests in the West were fervent supporters.

As in Bulgaria (though more rapidly still than was the case there) and, as shall be seen, in ex-Kosovo Serbia, as well, the introduction, from 1991 and increasing through 1992, of neoliberal measures like privatization effectively locked the country into dependency on Washington, the EU, the IMF, the WB and NATO. This position of dependency was consciously supported or at least accepted by those who then controlled the Albanian state, as well as by a large portion of the relatively well-off sections of the Albanian population. The long-term durability and effective irreversibility of the Washington-backed regime change in Albania during 1991–1992 would confront their most serious test in the period from late 1996 into 1997.

In late 1996, the Albanian economy which, since the installation in early 1992 of the Berisha-headed national government, had been largely restructured in accordance with a quite radical and IMF and WB-supported “free-market” agenda, began to collapse, seemingly with little forewarning, and particularly violently so. This economic meltdown was, in retrospect, the predictable consequence of the emergence of frequently criminal, fundamentally completely reckless new policies, notwithstanding their support by the western-backed International Financial Institutions’ (IFIs) for the agenda of undiluted neoliberalism. (see, for example, Gumbel, 1997)

Well into the second half of 1996, the “foundation”-pyramid scheme “investment funds” were
attracting a larger and larger portion of the savings of ordinary Albanians, due in no small measure to the DP-led government’s endorsement of them. (Kajsiu, 2010: 240) Finally, during January of 1997, these “foundations” – following the path of all such Ponzi schemes – began, one after the other, to collapse. Losing overnight their life-savings in investment funds whose safety the DP-led government had vouched for, many, especially in the southern half of Albania where the DP’s level of popularity was lower, took to the streets in angry protests. Battles broke out between citizens who were enraged about how they were defrauded of their life savings and the police and Special Forces troops. This situation came to resemble a full blown civil war. Washington and the EU began to change their tack, albeit essentially only in a political party-personnel sense and primarily so as to consolidate the changes in geopolitical orientation, basic economic policy line and even fundamental ideological standpoint that had followed quickly after the conclusion of the 1991 – 1992 regime change in Albania.

The first key steps of this change of tack in early 1997 came with DP member Aleksandr Meksi’s resignation as Prime Minister on March 2. Some ten days later, Berisha’s accepted the formation of a so-called “Government of National Reconciliation.” Berisha would continue to serve as President; control of the office of Prime Minister transferred to SP member Bashkim Fino; positions in the Cabinet were accorded to figures from the DP, the SPA as well as other parties. This “Government of National Reconciliation” was cobbled together in large measure as a consequence of pressure from Washington and the EU on the still DP-dominated state apparatus in Tirana and, in particular, on Berisha himself. (Chossudovsky, 2000: 305) By late February 1997, Washington and the EU came to the conclusion that Berisha and the DP’s continued regime threatened any semblance of basic social, political, economic or even military stability within Albania. Washington and Brussels came to see their geostrategic and economic interests vis-à-vis Albania were heavily compromised by Sali Berisha and his DP remaining in power. But Washington clearly believed in the early months of 1997 that the regime change achieved could be safeguarded by Berisha’s removal, whatever he had done for them earlier. (Ibid)

For Washington, putting an end to the respective stranglehold and simultaneously preserving the essential economic policy and geopolitical consequences of the 1991–1992 regime change in Albania would, during early to mid-1997. be carried out by ensuring that the country’s central government would be headed by figures from the SPA who could be relied on to continue pursuing both an aggressively neoliberal agenda as well as an unflinchingly pro-western international course. (Ibid: 304-5) To this end, as “The Government of National Reconciliation” was formed in March 1997, Berisha granted an amnesty to various political prisoners including, prominently, the SPA leader Fatos Nano, who began to win Washington’s favour for the first time. (Ibid: 305) In the eyes of Washington, Nano’s near 180 degree change to “someone we can do business with” was clearly
connected with the letter that, in late July or early August 1996, he sent from prison to the 2nd SPA Party Congress. (Nano, R., 2008: 389-93) In the letter, he requested Congress debate his proposal to remove from party leadership all those who played important roles in the PLA including during the brief period from 1990-1991 when it initiated the fundamental democratization of Albanian politics. In their place, Nano proposed that leading roles should increasingly be given to figures like Rexhep Meidani, Kastriot Islami and Pandeli Majko; the three figures in the party widely regarded as “pragmatic,” i.e. essentially non-ideological intellectuals, accepting the transformation of the recent regime change. (Ibid)

Through the letter, Nano also requested that the official platform of the SPA be significantly modified to make it clear that the party was committed to undergoing a further, substantial rightward evolution. Nano asked the delegates to 2nd Party Congress to eliminate all positive references in the platform to Marxist concepts, to Lenin and his legacy, as well as to the potential benefits that may be associated with state ownership of large businesses, financial institutions and the land. (Ibid: 390-2) Those references’ absence from the platform, Nano said, should be “compensated” for by, in part, a “rehabilitation” of the 2nd International of social democratic rather than communist parties. (Ibid: 408-9) In relation to the political crisis that had emerged in Albania as a consequence of the DP’s openly, gross manipulation of the results of the national parliamentary elections in late May and early June 1996, Nano also wrote in his letter that it was imperative that the 2nd Party Congress officially endorse the positions that had been taken by the US State Department, the European Parliament and the European Council. (Ibid: 390-2)

The fact that Nano’s letter and all of the key ideological and policy-oriented requests that he made in it were accepted by the majority of delegates to the SPA’s 2nd Congress indicates clearly that, certainly by late-July and early August of 1996, the party’s leading lights had opted to openly jettison any kind of association, even if purely rhetorical, with an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist line. In other words, by the end of the 2nd Congress, the SPA leadership made it clear that it was ready at any time to work to promote the essential interests of Washington and the EU in Albania and in the broader region as well.

Simultaneous with their moves in February-March 1997 to pressure Berisha both to release Nano from prison and to accede to the formation of the “National Reconciliation Government,” Washington, NATO and the EU also promoted the despatch of a UN-sanctioned mission of nearly 10,000 armed peacekeepers to Albania. At the time that the respective mission took place, all the countries that participated by sending peacekeepers were either already NATO members or about to join. Its ostensible task of ensuring that shipments of humanitarian aid would reach their intended destination notwithstanding, the mission, staffed in a proportion of 70-plus percent by Italian forces,
focused a great deal on disarming the anti-DP salvation committees which had managed to effectively take control of a number of the most important cities and towns in southern Albania after the collapse of the Ponzi scheme ‘foundations.’ (Albanian Telegraphic Agency, 1997B; Chossudovsky, 2000: 303-4)

It was intended that “peacekeepers” would be deployed to Albania in mid-April 1997 so as to ensure that the country’s future would not be determined by the “salvation committees”. This interpretation is bolstered by a resolution issued then by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, or PACE. PACE had been joined back in 1995 by an Albanian delegation. (Albanian Telegraphic Agency, 1997B) The Assembly was seeking to delegitimize any opposition to the “National Reconciliation Government” which Washington and the EU had guaranteed and mandated the formation of early in 1997. The resolution which is here in focus referred to the then newly-installed “National Reconciliation Government” as the “legitimate power,” and demanded that the “salvation committees” relinquish the power that they had de facto seized. (Albanian Telegraphic Agency, 1997A)

The “peacekeepers” eventually managed to successfully facilitate the disarming and the self-liquidation of the salvation committees due largely because the committees’ leaderships lacked cohesiveness and a coherent, overarching left-wing worldview. Regarding the composition, and political party sympathies and global ideological perspectives (or lack thereof) of the leaderships of the various salvation committees, Chossudovsky forthrightly stated that: “The 1997 protest movement did not identify the role played by international financial institutions and Western business interests in triggering the collapse of the Albanian economy. The salvation committees were made up of people from different sectors of Albanian society, including not only members of the various opposition parties, but also members of the Democratic Party who were opposed to Berisha. They did not have a clear political position on the macroeconomic reforms that had served to destroy the national economy and impoverish the Albanian people; neither did they question the role of the West in the implementation of these reforms.” (Chossudovsky, 2000: 304)

Ensuring that the SPA would at least nominally be in control of the national government in Tirana was a key tactical element of the basic strategic line that, from roughly February into at least July of 1997, Washington, the EU and NATO pursued vis-à-vis Albania. Much like had occurred with the BSP in and then after the waning days of the Videnov-led Cabinet in Bulgaria, in mid-to-late 1996 the SPA, under its then leader Fatos Nano (who was serving a politically motivated prison sentence at that time), opted to fully “domesticate” itself. In other words, with the holding of its 2nd Congress in mid-to-late 1996, the SPA, following the advice of its then leader Nano, formally adopted a still more fervently pro-capitalist and pro-western platform. (Nano, R., 2008) Given this firm shift to the right
in 1996, it is no surprise that the SPA not only supported the mid-April of 1997 deployment to its own country of nearly 10,000 foreign “peacekeepers,” but also their role in disarming and helping the auto-liquidation of the salvation committees. (Albanian Telegraphic Agency, 1997A; Albanian Telegraphic Agency, 1997B; Chossudovsky, 2000: 303-4)

In this broad context, the holding of Parliamentary elections in two stages in late June and early July 1997 served a critical role. These elections served as the vehicle by which Washington successfully endeavoured to sweep the DP and, in particular, Sali Berisha from power.

Given the fairly open support that it had been receiving from Washington in the preceding four months or so, the SPA’s triumph in the mid-1997 parliamentary elections was unsurprising, just as was its decision to ensure that its leader Nano would quickly assume the Prime Ministership. In fact, the decisive character of the DP’s loss in these elections was, when combined with Washington’s clear moves during the preceding four months to turn its back on him, sufficient to convince Berisha to leave the Presidency in late July 1997 in Nano’s favour. From Washington’s standpoint, the SPA’s control at this point over both the Presidency and the Prime Ministership was a key desideratum in the consolidation of the geopolitical, economic and ideological ramifications of the regime change begun during 1991–1992.

From the very start, in late July of 1997, of his term as the Prime Minister, Nano (along with President and fellow SPA member Reixhep Meidani) endeavoured to push considerably farther forward the free-market economic policies and pro-Washington geopolitical measures imposed in Albania in the wake of the regime change of 1991 – 1992. An international conference that, simply enough, was entitled “The International Conference on Albania” and that was held in Rome during the last days of July 1997 demonstrated the effectively total genuflection of the then newly-installed SPA government towards the West in general and Washington in particular. Nano himself spoke at the conference, which had been convened by the then Foreign Minister of Italy, Lamberto Dini. It was attended by the representatives of more than 20 countries and by various multilateral institutions. In an address to the conference, Nano stated that: “These organizations [the IFIs] have put their conditions to help Albania … These conditions are fully possible and this asks good political will from us … The agreements with the IMF are under a green light for each programme. … [A]nd we are decided to realise that.” Furthermore, Nano told those individuals who were present at the concluding portion of this conference that: “Our [government] has not only received a [parliamentary] vote of confidence, but today it has received a vote of confidence from the international community.” (quoted in Chossudovsky, 2000: 307)

In claiming at the conference that the government which he led had already begun to move forward with the domestic, economic and broader geostrategic agenda that the West had developed for his
country, Nano was, in point of fact, speaking the truth. While they were in attendance at the “International Conference on Albania” on July 31, 1997, the then representatives of the Albanian government presented a document which, on July 28, 1997, they had put to the national Parliament. The document advocated, among other things, the: “disarmament of the civilian population [i.e. for the foreign ‘peacekeepers’ to disarm the ‘salvation committees’].” “assistance coming by international structures of security and defense, based [on] agreement with Western countries” [for the bolstering and raising of the Albanian military’s standards to prevailing Western levels] and, not least, an “intensive partnership and a full membership in NATO.” (Albanian Telegraph Agency, 1997A; Chossudovsky, 2000: 306; Nano, 1997: 6)

Radical through they were, this document’s economic policy prescriptions actually did not constitute the totality of the changes in the economic-financial sphere that, during late 1997, Washington and the IFIs effectively obligated the SPA-dominated government to implement. In fact, at a meeting of IFIs and Albania’s “donor-states” that was held in Brussels in October of 1997, the SPA-dominated government reaffirmed its commitment to carry out all the economic policy prescriptions that the WB had put forward in its economic action plan. If this plan, the “Strategy for Recovery and Growth,” was not implemented in full, the Albanian government could not expect to receive any further loans from the IFIs. The strategy obligated the Albanian government to lay off thousands of public sector workers (especially teachers and those who worked in health care), to freeze the salaries of all but the already best paid workers in that sector, to slash state investment spending, to keep broader measures of the national money supply constant, and to pay western accounting firms to take over and sell at bargain-basement prices the foundations’ remaining assets. (Chossudovsky, 2000: 308 – 310; Majko, Angjeli and Kani, 1998; World Bank, 1997A; World Bank, 1997B: 22, quoted in Chossudovsky, 2000: 308)

In short, while from 1991 to 1996, Sali Berisha and the DP had been the US government’s preferred vehicles for the carrying out and further consolidation of a pro-Washington and radically pro-free market regime change, by early 1997 they could no longer be reliably expected to fulfil their roles any more. Detested by a large portion of the population that held them responsible for the economic implosion that suddenly struck Albania in early 1997, Berisha and the DP were simply unable to progress the right-wing economic, geopolitical and ideological agenda any more.

When, after four years of DP rule, a terrible economic downturn struck Albania in early 1997, that country found itself effectively irretrievably linked and subordinated to the EU, Washington, the IFIs, and NATO. The early 1992–early 1997 period of DP rule had, in every conceivable way, transformed Albania into a de facto dependency of the West and, in particular, of Washington.

Thus, when in early 1997 the so-called foundations imploded, bringing the entire national economy
down, Tirana’s status as a *de facto* dependency of the West and, in particular, of Washington was called into question. In a context marked by economic, social and even state implosion, that dependency, Western policymakers quickly came to believe, could not be maintained if the DP and Berisha continued in government, and they sought an effective alternative. In early 1997, the EU, the IFIs, NATO and Washington settled on Fatos Nano and the SPA as junior partners who could be more reliably counted on to push further forward the geostrategic and economic policy changes initiated in the wake of the regime change of 1991–1992. The West in general and Washington in particular looked very positively on the 1996 development whereby imprisoned Fatos Nano urged the SPA to incorporate into its party platform a number of right-wing stances on economic policy, international affairs as well as on histories of the Marxist and social democratic movements. The SPA did not then disappoint in its implementation of a radically neoliberal economic policy, as well as an unequivocally pro-Washington geopolitical line, after July 1997.

Since that late July 1997 change whereby Meidani and Nano assumed control over the government, state power in Tirana has shifted back and forth between the SPA and the DP. However, as regards key questions of economic policy and Albania’s relations with the EU, with the IFIs and with Washington and NATO, one would be very hard pressed to find substantive differences between the positions that were embraced by the different SPA and DP Presidents and Prime Ministers.
Chapter 6: The Former Yugoslavia 2000

This chapter explores how far the evidence seems to suggest that US policy towards the former Yugoslavia, and in particular what became Serbia, was directed towards regime change after 1989. That is to say, not only a change in government, but also changes in the nature of the state, in political organisation both in organised parties and civil society, and in economic structures as well as economic policies. Those economic policies were refocused towards a much more neo-liberal, privatisation friendly, inward investment friendly orientation. To achieve this, the chapter shows, the US government and a wide array of its agencies used a combination of methods including suggestions and advice, the encouragement of particular elite groups, but also direct intervention in civil society and in elections, and not stopping at the fermenting of outright violence on the streets. The evidence used here will include a synthesis of primary and secondary sources including US official documentation, congressional papers and interviews conducted by senior figures in the administration. The main story is carried by the primary evidence deployed. As in the other case study chapters, this evidence will be organised in a chronological narrative which establishes a mosaic of details. The conclusions thread together the pieces to draw out the overall narrative as clearly as the evidence supports.

The government of the United States, with the agreement of many other NATO countries, had first taken a hostile stance to the Milosevic-led Yugoslav government in the very early 1990s. Milosevic opted to run in Presidential elections in the Republic of Serbia in December 1990. These elections, which Milosevic won easily, also mark the beginning of an anti-Milosevic campaign in various Western press sources and governments. (Gibbs, 2009: 63-5) The first significant criticisms of Milosevic in Western press sources were largely predicated upon the idea that Milosevic was, in his own words a “socialist” and, still more ominously according to various of his critics, some type of “communist.” (Ibid: 65) It is important to point out here that, some five months before the December 1990 multi-party Serbian parliamentary and Presidential elections, Milosevic founded the Socialist Party of Serbia, or SPS, and that the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, which from 1945 had been the single legal party throughout the entire Yugoslav Federation, disappeared. Milosevic led the SPS until his death in 2006).

Blaine Harden’s article “Yugoslav Political Turmoil Broadens,” which was published in The Washington Post on March 8, 1991, constitutes one example of how, shortly after his landslide victory in the multi-party December 1990 Presidential elections, Milosevic became the target of anti-Communist criticism in Western press outlets. Harden said that Milosevic not only advances a message that is based in part on “rigid communism,” but also that he heads a “Marxist government” that presides over “Serbia’s state-controlled economy.” Two weeks after that, The Washington Post
article entitled “Sliding Toward Civil War in Yugoslavia” similarly sharply criticized Milosevic, in large measure due to his presumed communistic ideological and practical political inclinations: Milosevic was said to head a “hardline Communist government in the province [sic, republic] of Serbia which, to reiterate, “retained its Communist hardliners in voting last December [of 1990].” In the same piece, Milosevic is referred to both as “the Communist president of Serbia who has manipulated the news media” as well as “the Serbian Communist Party chief.” In a February 4, 1991 piece in the conservative German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Johann Reissmuller labelled the Milosevic-led Serb Republic as constituting “the last bastion of Leninism in Europe” which, in time, might be transformed into a “fortress of communism, out of which it would be possible one day, with the cooperation of a resurgent Soviet Union, to spread Leninism-Stalinism throughout the eastern half of Europe once again.” Similarly, a May 24, 1991 piece that appeared in the liberal French newspaper Le Monde contrasted the “unreformed socialist authoritarianism of the Serbs” [under then-Serbian Milosevic] with “the democratic pluralism established in Slovenia and Croatia.” [sic] (Le Monde, 1991)
The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)

The former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)

Washington’s retained a firm commitment to remove Milosevic over the entire period of four large-scale armed conflicts (the Croatian Civil War of 1991–1995, the Bosnian Civil War of 1992–1995, the Kosovo War 1996–1999 and the Presevo Valley War 1999–2001). While in the first two armed conflicts, Milosevic did not play any formal role, certain of the combatant parties (Serb nationalist militias and, in Bosnia, allied Bosnian Muslim militia units) were the recipients of at least unofficial backing from the Milosevic-headed Serbian government. These erstwhile junior partners of Milosevic were, in 1994 and then more so in 1995, subjected to withering military assaults largely coordinated and to no small extent actually directly carried out by Washington. The conclusion, in late 1995, of the Civil War in Bosnia and in Croatia effectively ensured that the respective two countries’ governments would, with Washington’s firm and none-too-subtle guidance, continue to serve as bastions of irreconcilable opposition to the Serbian state as long as Milosevic continued to be its leader. It is therefore important to stress here that hostility to Milosevic in mainstream Western media was reflective of attitudes that key US (and other Western European) governmental officials had towards the civil wars developing in the early 1990s in an already fractured Yugoslav Federation.

To reiterate, relatively quickly after the Croatian and Bosnian Civil Wars began in 1991 and 1992 respectively, Washington adopted a policy of seeking to ensure that Slobodan Milosevic would no longer be able to head the government of Serbia. Evidence in this regard can be found, for example,
in a piece that was entitled “U.S. Is Backing Serbian President’s Internal Foes” and that appeared under David Binder’s byline in the November 19, 1992 edition of The New York Times. Here, Binder forthrightly stated that: “[h]aving failed to budge President Slobodan Milosevic from his position as Serbia’s strongman with economic and political sanctions, the United States is now trying to increase the pressure for his ouster by supporting Serbian opposition to him, especially on Yugoslav television. … Senior [US] State Department have said privately that the ousting of the Serbian President [Milosevic] is a basic policy goal …” (Ibid)

Thus, Milosevic’s removal from power remained on the geopolitical agenda of Washington throughout the 1990s and into 2000. This assertion is also supported by Paul Beaver, Ed Vulliamy and Chris Bird’s article “Clinton tells CIA to oust Milosevic,” which was published in the British newspaper The Observer on 28 November 1998. In this article, Beaver, Vulliamy and Bird stated that: “President Clinton has given the go-ahead for a secret bid to topple the regime of Slobodan Milosevic and shatter what is left of federal Yugoslavia.” Slightly further on in the same piece, Beaver, Vulliamy and Bird tell us (again, without making much attempt to utilize nuanced or diplomatic language) that: “...the destruction of Milosevic’s regime has been discussed by Clinton’s national security team, including the CIA and its opposite number in the Pentagon, the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA). One former senior DIA official, who has been involved in the Balkans for several years, told The Observer that: ‘As of the past few days, the activation of a policy of the end of Milosevic and his power in Yugoslavia is very much on the table.’” (Beaver, Vulliamy, Bird, 1992)

In this article, Beaver, Vulliamy and Bird point to the incorporation of new elements in Washington’s policy and write that: “The focus is now on helping Montenegrin efforts to break away from Belgrade and on aiding the [relatively right-wing] Opposition within Serbia. … Both [Momcilo Perisic and Jova Stanisic, who Milosevic had shortly before this article’s printing sacked from their positions as the FRY Army Chief of Staff and the head of the FRY’s spy agency, respectively] are seen as likely opponents of Milosevic with real influence compared to Belgrade’s weak and disparate opposition politicians. They are also close to Montenegrin leader Milo Djukanovic, who is seen as pro-western and a possible contender to replace Milosevic. Djukanovic, who runs Montenegro as his personal fiefdom, has loudly criticized Milosevic …” (Ibid)

Washington led the NATO alliance during the bombing campaign carried out from March to June 1999 against targets that were located throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), a statal entity that then comprised Serbia proper, Kosovo and Montenegro. Thus, NATO’s bombing of the FRY, which caused thousands of civilian and military casualties, constituted a direct attack on Milosevic’s political and military authority. On April 15 1999, President Bill Clinton strongly implied in a speech in San Francisco, California to the American Society of Newspaper Editors that the NATO bombing campaign against the FRY was indeed driven by a desire to ensure that Milosevic would no longer be able to serve as the head of the Serbian government. Clinton said that it was
imperative that there take place a: “democratic transition in Serbia [away from Milosevic], for the region’s democracies will never be safe with a belligerent tyranny in their midst” (Clinton, 1999).

During NATO’s March – June 1999 bombing of the FRY, Gregory Schulte held a position on the US’s National Security Council through which he engaged in diplomacy to boost international support for bombing. Given Schulte’s experience in diplomacy and military affairs, it is relevant to review various statements that he made in an article entitled: “Regime Change without Military Force: Lessons from Overthrowing Milosevic” that appeared in March 2013 in Volume 4, Number 2 of the specialized periodical “PRISM: a Journal of the Center for Complex Operations.” Its title notwithstanding, the article serves as a clear admission that the March–June 1999 NATO bombing of the FRY constituted an element of a comprehensive plan that Washington developed for an anti-Milosevic regime change in Belgrade. Schulte’s article makes it apparent that, well before the NATO bombing commenced, Washington had concluded that it had to develop a comprehensive strategy to put an end to Milosevic’s control over the Serbian government. Describing how by the end of 1998, the Clinton administration began to elaborate the different elements of the “blueprint” for the eventual (and speedy) regime change in Belgrade, Schulte wrote that: “The people of Serbia ousted Milosevic [in early October of 2000], but they had help [from the US government]. Even before NATO’s [March – June of 1999] airstrikes [against the FRY], President Clinton and his foreign policy team had decided that Slobodan Milosevic, while a signatory of the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia, was an obstacle to peace throughout the [Balkan] region. In September 1998, in the face of violence in Kosovo [that Schulte claims was] instigated by Milosevic, the U.S. administration agreed to develop and implement a strategy to weaken his rule. In December 1998, the basic strategy was approved. ...

The third element [of the respective strategy] was to undermine Milosevic’s pillars of power. These were identified as his security services, finances and control of the media. This basic strategy, adapted as necessary to changing circumstances, remained in place throughout the 1999 air campaign, which helped set the conditions for Milosevic’s removal, and through 2000 when Milosevic was removed from power.” (Schulte, 2013) Schulte emphasizes that, concurrently with the air campaign, US allies were also putting into effect a wide array of meticulously crafted measures of an economic, diplomatic, and political and propagandistic character.

Thus, for example, the April 23, 1999 air strike on the Belgrade headquarters of Serb Radio and Television (SRT) should properly be viewed as one element in Washington’s broader anti-Milosevic regime change framework. Schulte points out that simultaneous with its air strikes throughout the FRY in the Spring of 1999, NATO also worked to construct [a] ‘‘Ring Around Serbia’ of radio stations [that] broadcast [sic] truthful information into the country, undercutting Milosevic’s efforts to squash reports of defeats and defections. NATO aircraft dropped leaflets reminding the Serbian people of the luxurious lifestyle of Milosevic’s son while their own were being sent to Kosovo to fight.” (Ibid)
Following the conclusion of the Spring of 1999 air campaign, 50,000 armed, NATO-led “peacekeeping” troops began to occupy Kosovo, where they replaced civilian government functionaries and military, police and security units that were then under Belgrade’s authority. From June 1999, a de facto regime change took place with control over Kosovo’s security and policymaking effectively being transferred into the hands of leading NATO powers.

During that air campaign, NATO was informally allied with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was then carrying out armed operations within Kosovo. The KLA was ideologically animated principally by a fervently anti-Serb and anti-Milosevic form of Albanian nationalism. It was present on the ground in Kosovo when, in mid-June of 1999, that territory was occupied by 50,000 well-armed and NATO-led peacekeepers. These peacekeepers’ arrival in Kosovo served to further consolidate and deepen the already preexisting de facto alliance between NATO and the KLA. The relevant and available data indicates that Washington in particular had the closest relations with the KLA. From the beginning of mid-June 1999, the NATO-led occupation of Kosovo resulted in control over eastern portions of Kosovo being allocated to the US military. There is a considerable amount of evidence that suggests quite clearly that the US military contingent occupying eastern Kosovo allowed KLA fighters to carry out military operations in southern ex-Kosovo Serbia known as the Presevo Valley. (see, for example: BBC News, 2001D; Oliver, 2012: 329) These military operations were usually directed against targets that were regarded as being subordinate to or associated with the Belgrade-based Serbian government.

Statements by a European officer who participated directly in the NATO occupation of Kosovo from mid-1999 provide further support for the argument that the KLA and the LAPMB functioned essentially as Washington’s military proxy as part of a concerted campaign to ensure that Milosevic would fall. An article that appeared in the British Guardian newspaper on March 3, 2001 referred to the respective European officer as “a European K-For battle commander” (K-FOR or Kosovo Force was the official name of NATO forces) and quoted him as saying that: “The CIA has been allowed to run riot in Kosovo with a private army designed to overthrow Slobodan Milosevic. Now he’s gone, the US State Department seems incapable of reining in its bastard army. Most of last year [2000], there was a growing frustration with US support for the radical Albanians” (Beaumont, Vulliamy, Beaver, 2001).
Kosovo
Following not only the conclusion of NATO’s bombing of the FRY, but also the immediately subsequent beginning of the LAPMB’s armed insurgency in the Presevo Valley, the Washington-led campaign to bring about Milosevic’s political downfall in Serbia came to revolve around the FRY Presidential and legislative elections that would end up being held on September 24, 2000. These elections took place throughout the territory of Serbia and Montenegro, including relatively small areas of Kosovo, and would eventually provide the essential backdrop for the end of Milosevic’s control over the central government. In fact, the Parliamentary and Presidential elections were subjected to an extraordinary degree of manipulation, due largely to a conscious campaign carried out by Washington and its NATO allies. (see, for example, Elich, 2006: 238 – 245)

By closely focusing on the campaign in his article “Regime Change without Military Force: Lessons from Overthrowing Milosevic,” Schulte makes it clear that, certainly by December 1998, Washington had already crafted a multi-faceted plan to carry out anti-Milosevic regime change in Belgrade. In the
article Schulte stated that: “The first element [of the Washington-led plan to carry out an anti-Milosevic regime change in Serbia] was to strengthen democratic forces in Serbia, including the political opposition, student movements and independent media.” (Schulte, 2013: 47)

Providing some concrete details about the kinds of support that Washington provided to various political parties, ‘civil society’ movements and media organizations which all opposed the Milosevic-headed government of Serbia, Schulte wrote that: “In July 1999, a month after the successful NATO intervention, the President’s [President Bill Clinton’s] foreign policy team agreed to pursue an aggressive democratization program for Serbia. The program continued efforts to undermine Milosevic’s sources of power, including through support for independent media. It also put increased emphasis on building a cohesive and effective opposition. President Clinton publicly announced additional funding to support democracy [especially in Serbia]. Using that funding, non-governmental organizations like the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI) began providing advice and support to independent civil organizations and opposition parties. … NDI used polling data to help opposition candidates understand Milosevic’s political vulnerabilities and the importance of unifying behind one candidate.” (Ibid: 48-9)

Various sources support Schulte’s statements that, certainly at least from late 1999, Washington (along with the EU) poured sizeable sums of money into political parties, civil society movements and youth organizations in an attempt to ensure that the September 24, 2000 elections for the legislature and the Presidency of the FRY would result in Milosevic losing his position. For example, on September 29, 2000 (five days after the last-mentioned elections, but roughly a week before Presidency of the FRY would formally shift out of Milosevic’s hands,) there appeared in The Washington Post newspaper an article entitled: “U.S. Funding Yugoslavian Reformers.” This article’s author, George Jahn, stated directly that: “The United States funneled $35 million to opponents of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in little more than a year as part of efforts to weaken him that culminated in his apparent electoral defeat.” (Jahn, 2000) Explaining that Milosevic’s eventual fall from power in Belgrade in early October of 2000 was the “successful” end result of a ten-year joint campaign to which both Washington and the EU contributed, Jahn also wrote that: “The money [the $ 35 million that Washington gave to various of Milosevic’s political opponents in the period of slightly over a year which immediately preceded the September 24, 2000 elections] was part of a long-term Western effort to strengthen anti-Milosevic forces over the past decade. The European Union has spent close to $140 million since 1991 on projects as diverse as providing energy last winter to opposition-run cities in the main Yugoslav republic Serbia, to paying for benches and other equipment for schools there. U.S. diplomats in the region say … [the Washington-granted] funds even paid for a rock band that played at events to mobilize voters ahead of the September 24 [2000]
Support for the Serbian “youth movement” that was called “Otpor” (“Resistance” in Serbian) also became an increasingly central element of Washington’s campaign to oust Milosevic in 1999-2000.

The figures who, during late 1998 in Belgrade, founded and served as the first leaders of Otpor, were at that time eager and open (and relatively young) advocates of collaborating with any foreign government or Serbian political force that shared their goal of removing Milosevic from power. After first endorsing, from late 1998 onwards, that goal, the leaders of Otpor would be in attendance at meetings outside Serbia that officials from different US government and quasi-government agencies organized to promote plans for regime change. The leaders of Otpor did not merely attend these meetings, but also received a very considerable degree of financial support from Washington. In an article “Who Really Brought Down Milosevic” by Roger Cohen in The New York Times much evidence indicates that Otpor, the subjective motivations of its leaders notwithstanding, functioned from the latter half of 1999 into October 2000 as Washington’s well-compensated assets in the ultimately successful anti-Milosevic regime change campaign (Cohen, 2000). Cohen quoted “… Paul B. McCarthy, an official with the Washington-based [and US government-funded] National Endowment for Democracy [or NED]” as saying that: ‘from August 1999 the dollars started to flow to Otpor pretty significantly.’” Cohen, clearly directly relaying what McCarthy had told him, also states that the sum of “$3 million [had been] spent by his [McCarthy’s] group [the NED] in Serbia since September 1998.” Out of the respective sum, McCarthy is cited as admitting that: “Otpor was certainly the largest recipient.” (Ibid) Over the course of Washington’s 1999-2000 drive to topple the Milosevic-headed central government of Serbia, Slobodan Homen served as one of the principal figures in Otpor. In Cohen’s article “Who Really Brought Down Milosevic ?,” Homen is quoted as acknowledging that: “We [the figures who led Otpor during late 1999 into October of 2000] had a lot of financial help from Western nongovernmental organizations. And also some Western governmental organizations.” (Ibid)

Whatever its thinly-veiled pretensions to be an indigenous, totally Serbian or Yugoslav-run (and “non-ideological”) political youth group, by late 1999 Otpor was receiving substantial support, financial, but also logistical and organizational, from Washington. The assertion that, from then till October 2000, Otpor served as a political proxy force for Washington in Serbia is supported by Cohen, who wrote in “Who Really Brought Down Milosevic ?” that: “At the International Republican Institute, another nongovernmental Washington group financed partly by USAID, an official named Daniel Calingaert says he met Otpor leaders ‘7 to 10 times’ in Hungary and Montenegro, beginning in October 1999 (Ibid). Some of the $1.8 million the agency spent in Serbia in the last year was
‘provided direct to Otpor,’ he says: ‘By this fall, Otpor was no ramshackle students' group; it was … backed by several million dollars from the United States’. But other American help was as important as money. Calingaert's organization arranged for a seminar at the luxurious Budapest Hilton from March 31 to April 3. There, retired United States Army colonel Robert Helvey instructed more than 20 Otpor leaders …” (Ibid). Immediately after he played a central role in Otpor’s formal October 1998 founding, Srdja Popovic took up a critical role in Otpor that lasted to the end of 2000; during this period, Popovic also continued to serve as a senior member of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS).

Acknowledging the critical, direct role Washington played in helping Otpor to develop as an even more significant anti-regime force, Popovic was quoted in “Who Really Brought Down Milosevic ?” as saying that: “We thought it was stupid to organize a revolution in a luxury hotel [the Budapest Hilton] but the Americans chose that place.” (Ibid)

The article “U.S. Anti-Milosevic Plan Faces Major Test at Polls” published in The New York Times on September 23, 2000 lends further backing to this interpretation. This article, which was authored by Jane Perlez, contains detailed information supporting the argument that between later 1999 and September 2000, Washington and the EU pushed a coordinated, multi-faceted plan including various financial measures to undermine the Milosevic-headed government. Perlez cites Donald Pressley, who was then the Assistant Administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID), as openly acknowledging that, from the second half of 1999 into September 2000, Washington was pouring millions of dollars into different programs in an attempt to facilitate regime change in Serbia. (Perlez, 2000) Pressley is quoted as saying that: “Two groups here, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, were allocated $4 million to help groups in Serbia campaign door to door and to develop other get-out-the-vote techniques.” (Ibid)

In his previously cited article “Regime Change Without Military Force,” Schulte openly made the claim that: “With U.S encouragement, neighboring countries [to ex-Kosovo FRY] provided a safe place for the opposition [to Milosevic] to meet, strategize and train.” (Schulte, 2013: 49) This claim is further elaborated in Perlez’s article where, once again citing information from Pressley, she wrote that: “Because American officials are barred from Serbia, a satellite embassy, under the direction of [US Ambassador to Serbia] Ambassador William Montgomery, was established in Budapest in the summer [of 1999] to be the fulcrum for the effort to build democracy in Serbia. From Budapest, conferences have been organized in southern Hungary to bring Serbs together with turnout experts from Central Europe. The [US] Agency for International Development has given contracts to establish nongovernmental organizations like Freedom House and the German Marshall Fund, which give grants to Central European groups that have access to Serbia, Mr. Pressley said.” (Perlez: 2000)
Schulte’s mention in “Regime Change Without Military Force” of “neighboring countries” as well as the references to “Budapest” and “southern Hungary” that Pressley is quoted as making in Perlez’s “U.S. Anti-Milosevic Plan Faces Major Test at Polls” are useful insofar as they indicate the coordinated international or regional character of the planning that Washington engaged in towards the end of deposing Milosevic. (Perlez, 2000; Schulte, 2013: 49)

That planning was seriously further developed in an unpublicized and secretive meeting which, under the aegis of the NDI, took place in October of 1999 in the luxurious Marriott Hotel in Budapest. At this meeting, there were 20 relatively prominent Serbian Milosevic opponents who shared strongly pro-“free market” and pro-Washington views. The meeting’s core component was a data presentation and analysis session in which those people who were in attendance were made aware of the results of a political opinion poll which just shortly beforehand the NDI had successfully organized and carried out on Serbian territory. The session focused on the tactics that Washington was insistent would have to be applied so that the then upcoming 2000 FRY Presidential and legislative elections would facilitate an anti-Milosevic regime change in Belgrade. During this session, Schoen told the audience that: “If you take one word from this conference, I urge it to be unity.” (quoted in Dobbs, 2000)

The just referred to meeting and the intimately connected ones which followed it in the subsequent weeks and months were covered in considerable detail in an article entitled “U.S. Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition” by Michael Dobbs in The Washington Post on 20 December. That article suggests that from the early 1990s through October 2000, Washington maintained a fundamentally consistent policy towards Belgrade: Dobbs wrote: “[Doug] Schoen … had provided polling advice to former Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic during his unsuccessful 1992 campaign to depose Milosevic.” (Ibid)

When, during his October 1999 presentation in Budapest’s Marriott Hotel of the polling data that the NDI had then just finished gathering on the territory of ex-Kosovo Serbia, Schoen used – and emphasized the importance of – the word “unity,” he was quite directly referring to the tactical stance that he wanted the relatively right-wing political forces to adopt vis-à-vis the elections on September 24, 2000. As Dobbs notes, the polling that the NDI had carried out in Serbia right after the end of the NATO bombing not only demonstrated that: “Milosevic had a 70 percent unfavorable rating among Serbian voters. But it also showed that the big names in the opposition--men such as Zoran Djindjic and Vuk Draskovic—were burdened with negative poll ratings almost as high as Milosevic's.” (Ibid)

In the context of the buildup to the September 2000 FRY Presidential elections, Schoen, the NDI and Washington more generally insisted upon the unity of Serbia’s leading relatively right-wing forces behind a single anti-Milosevic candidate. As a result of the polling which is here in focus, Washington would come to the conclusion that, all things considered, Vojislav Kostunica – who in
“U.S. Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition,” Dobbs called “a moderate Serbian nationalist” – was best positioned to serve as “its (anti-Milosevic) man” in the FRY’s 2000 Presidential elections. (Ibid)

The polling initiative that the NDI carried out in the late Summer and early Autumn of 2000 also generated at least one rather counter-intuitive explanation for why adult FRY citizens living in Serbia were more inclined to vote for Kostunica as opposed to Milosevic. Many FRY citizens held the view that Kostunica was not serving as a stooge of Washington and NATO. (Ibid) The relatively high levels of popularity of Kostunica can be attributed to a number of different factors. One such factor was the categorical oppositional stance that Kostunica at least seemed publicly to take vis-a-vis NATO’s spring 1999 air war against the FRY. (Ibid) Once it had settled on Kostunica as its ideal figure to defeat Milosevic in the 2000 FRY Presidential elections, Washington did not spare any effort (or expense) in convincing and pressuring the bulk of Serbia’s then leading relatively right-wing figures and organizations to come to support him.

It is in precisely this regard, Dobbs strongly suggests in “U.S. Advice Guided Milosevic Opposition,” that Djindic’s role in the FRY’s 2000 Presidential elections can best be understood. Before these elections, Djindic was serving as the leader of the Democratic Party which at that time was, in Dobb’s words, “the largest best-organized opposition party.” However, much to Washington’s satisfaction, Djindic decided to forego running in the September 24, 2000 FRY Presidential elections and, in the period which directly preceded them, served, to quote Dobbs, as “coalition campaign manager … in favor of a less polarizing candidate [Kostunica].” (Ibid) In any event, approximately three months after Kostunica took office from Milosevic, Djindic (without being popularly elected) would become the Prime Minister of Serbia, a position which he would continue to hold until his assassination in March 2003; over the entire course of Djindic’s January 2001 – March 2003 period in office, Kostunica continued to serve on as the President of the FRY.

The bulk of the available evidence strongly supports the notion that US and EU policies from 1999 to the end of 2000, were not solely based on facilitating the transfer of the office of the Presidency of the FRY away from Milosevic personally; they collectively constituted detailed and carefully worked-out regime change plans to weaken his bases of support within the executive, legislative and even judicial branches of the central government of the FRY as well as that of Serbia. The existence of just such plans is supported by the EU’s formulation and publication of the “Message to the Serbian People” about a week before the September 24, 2000 legislative and Presidential elections in the FRY. (Elich, 2006: 242; European Union, 2000) That message advanced what could charitably be called a “carrot-and-stick” financial policy towards different groups in Serbia and Montenegro. In unusually direct language, it clearly suggested that the results, and not merely the fairness of process of the September 24, 2000 elections would dictate the kind of relations that would follow between the EU and the
Serbian state. This “message” of the EU included this remarkably blunt statement that: “The elections will give the Serbian people the opportunity to repudiate clearly ... the policy of Milosevic, which consists of political manipulation, deprivation of liberty and impoverishment of the population. It is that policy which led the FRY to war, isolation and deadlock. These elections will give the Serbian people a chance for democratic change. It is up to them to seize the opportunity by turning out to vote.” (European Union, 2000) Interestingly enough, Kostunica’s officially DOS-sanctioned response to the EU’s “Message to The Serbian People” presented the message in a largely favorable light.

In this response, Kostunica asserted that: “In what they called a message to the Serbian people, EU foreign ministers unequivocally pledged to lift the sanctions against Yugoslavia if the September 24 election results led to a democratic change, thus furnishing compelling evidence that Europe's policy towards Yugoslavia has changed for the better. Of course, it would have been much more useful for Serbia's democracy hadn't the ministers made the lifting of international sanctions conditional, but this gesture of goodwill will no doubt mean a lot to the Serbs, particularly given the fact that we have already fulfilled their sole condition - readiness for democracy.” (Kostunica, 2000)

Thus, for all its equivocations, Kostunica’s response to the EU’s “Message to the Serbian People” can properly be interpreted as having a “net-favorable” character. For example, in this (DOS-approved) response of his Kostunica stated plainly that: “Europe's policy towards Yugoslavia has changed for the better.” In another part of this respective response of his, Kostunica also asserted that: “… [T]his gesture of goodwill [the EU’s offer to remove sanctions on ex-Kosovo Serbia in the event that Milosevic was removed from power in the wake of the FRY’s September 24, 2000 Presidential elections] will no doubt mean a lot to the Serbs, particularly given the fact that we have already fulfilled their [the EU’s] sole condition – readiness for democracy.” (Ibid)

The last remark of Kostunica’s just quoted is reflective of how he, the DOS and, more broadly, the EU understood the meaning of “democracy”. Given that numerous multi-party elections had been held in Serbia ever since late 1990, it would appear that the country’s “readiness for [clearly imperfect] democracy” had been established almost 10 years prior to the holding on September 24, 2000 of Presidential and legislative elections in the FRY.

In short, the response that Kostunica issued in connection with the EU’s “Message to the Serbian People” constitutes further evidence that for him, the DOS, the EU (and also Washington) Serbia’s “readiness for democracy” meant, in practical terms, that more-or-less immediately after September 24, 2000, he would officially replace Milosevic as the President of the FRY. Unsurprisingly, the
publication of the EU’s “Message to the Serbian People” virtually immediately elicited a very
different response from Milosevic’s allies and supporters.

For example, the September 18, 2000 edition of the Podgorica, Montenegro daily newspaper Dan
(“Day” in English) contained a piece which stated that: “The European Union directed yesterday 'A
message to the Serbian people' on the occasion of the forthcoming [September 24, 2000 FRY
Presidential and legislative] elections that showed a complete scorn towards the mental capabilities of
the people it was directed to. By this message, those who claim to be the representatives of democracy
are directly interfering with the internal affairs of our country, which, fortunately, has its legitimate
mechanisms according to which the elections are carried out. And again we have a complete ignoring
of the attitudes of the United Nations, which only nine months ago, last December, adopted the
resolution by which they forbid the interference with the internal affairs of a state during the pre-
electoral process.” (Dan, 2000)

From early March 1998 until July 1999, the US government, the EU and the governments of
individual member-countries of the EU, NATO or both simultaneously levied additional rounds of
economic sanctions against the Milosevic regime. From July 1999 through October 5, 2000, they
continued to implement new sanctions specifically targeting Milosevic’s de facto control over the
territory, statal structures and economy of ex-Kosovo Serbia. (International Crisis Group, 2000;
United Nations, 1998) The very manner in which, from early March 1998 through October 5, 2000,
they applied sanctions against particular territories and political-statal institutions within Kosovo and
ex-Kosovo Serbia demonstrates said sanctions’ economically devastating and patently political
character. Describing some of the economic sanctions that the EU in particular enforced, a firmly pro-
NATO and categorically anti-Milosevic US-based think-tank called the International Crisis Group
(ICG), wrote that: “On 1 May 1999, the Council of the European Union adopted a regulation
prohibiting the sale and supply to the FRY of petroleum and of certain petroleum products. This ban
was eased in the autumn of 1999, when the EU’s Fuel for Democracy’ program began to supply
municipalities [which at the historical moment in question were controlled by relatively right-wing
foes of Milosevic] with heating oil.” (International Crisis Group, 2000)

From roughly mid-September through October 7, 2000, every sphere of public life —political, socio-
economic and military—within both Serbia and Montenegro experienced an extraordinary degree of
tension. However, this tension was not solely attributable to the September 24, 2000 elections;
tensions were also significantly exacerbated by the presence of warships from the US and UK navies
in the Adriatic close to the FRY coast (at the moment in question, the only FRY republic that had any
coastline was Montenegro, and not Serbia.) (Robson, 2000) On September 22, 2000, the UK Ministry
of Defence quite revealingly stated that the reason why at least one of those warships (specifically, the UK aircraft carrier *HMS Invincible*) happened at that moment to be situated near the FRY coast was to “send the right message to Belgrade.” (Ibid)

A direct consequence of these relatively problem-free elections for the Chambers of Citizens and Republics was that President Milosevic was entitled to command absolute majorities of 50%+ of all the seats in both the Chambers. These majorities were based to a large extent on the fact that, within the framework of these parliamentary elections, the seats that were allocated to Montenegro were won in an overwhelming landslide by the exclusively Montenegro-based and then Milosevic-supporting Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro, or SPPM. (Elich, 2006: 244; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2000A; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2000B; Mijovic-Tadic, 2000) Thus, the results of the FRY legislative elections that took place on September 24, 2000 served to reinforce the majority control that Milosevic had also exercised over the Parliament of Serbia ever since December 1991 (Elich, 2006; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2000A; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2000B; Mijovic-Tadic, 2000)

While five candidates formally participated in the September 2000 Presidential elections, they effectively turned into a contest between two men, Milosevic and Kostunica. The organizational foundations for Kostunica’s strong performance were laid when the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) was established. The DOS’ official creation on January 10, 2000 came about through the political and electoral alliance of 18 different parties and one trade union which all opposed the Milosevic government from a more right-wing position. A few months before the September 24, 2000 elections, Kostunica accepted the role as the DOS Presidential candidate. At the close of the polls on election night, as ballots were counted by the Federal Election Commission, or FEC, Kostunica’s DOS also issued its own “parallel” vote count.

From September 25–October 5, the FEC and the DOS issued different vote counts for the September 24, 2000 FRY Presidential elections. The differences largely hinged on whether Kostunica had won more than 50% of the valid votes. From September 25–October 10, the DOS revised multiple times its estimates regarding the portion of the vote that Kostunica received. The DOS claimed on September 25, 2000 that Kostunica had taken some 57% of the valid ballots; however, the very next day, the DOS – claiming that it had processed 97.5% of the ballots that had been cast – stated that precisely 54.66% of the valid votes had gone to Kostunica. Subsequently, on September 27, the DOS said that it had tallied 98.72% of the votes cast and that 52.54% of the valid ones had gone to Kostunica. (Elich, 2006: 242-3)

The DOS’s day-by-day rolling vote counts suggesting a decisive, first round triumph for Kostunica making any second round unnecessary were sunk when, on September 27, the FEC announced the former had received 48.96% of the valid votes. The FEC’s declaration that neither Kostunica nor
Milosevic had received more than 50% of the valid votes cast required that a run-off election be held on October 8, 2000.

Asserting that the various figures that the DOS released did not accurately reflect the actual results of the September 24, 2000 FRY Presidential election, the leftist analyst of international affairs Gregory Elich wrote that: “According to the figures given … on September 26 [2000 by DOS spokesperson Chedomir Jovanovich] 5,093,038 ballots out of a total 5,223,669 were processed for a percentage of 97.5. Based on his total, that would have meant less than 64,000 ballots were counted the next day, when he claimed a total of 98.72 percent. Even claiming Koshtunica lost every single one of those votes, his percentage would have dropped to 52.75 percent, higher than the announced 52.54 figure. The DOS disposed of this awkwardness by issuing significantly different vote totals. On September 26 Jovanovich announced that Kostunica led with 2,783,870 votes yet on the next day he said that when all votes were counted, ‘Kostunica will have 2,649,000 votes.’ Four days later [October 1, 2000] Jovanovich claimed 2,424,187 votes for Kostunica, and then on October 2, [DOS] spokesman Zoran Shami lowered the total to 2,414,876, for a 51.34 percentage share. In the end [by October 10, 2000, the same DOS spokesman] Shami claimed the final result showed 2,377,400 votes and a percentage of 50.35 for Kostunica. DOS intentionally excluded from [its own …] final count votes that were cast in Kosovo and by refugees from Kosovo, precisely the constituencies that heavily favored Milosevic.” (B92, 2000; Elich: 243)

In publicly rejecting the FEC’s figures, the DOS unsurprisingly received the full-throated endorsement of Washington and also the EU. In the immediate aftermath of the official, published results of the FEC whereby Kostunica had won a plurality but not an outright majority of the valid votes cast, the DOS launched two different formal legal challenges. The first went to the FEC while the second and final one went before the Supreme Court of the FRY. The legal challenges revolved around the DOS’s assertion that there needed to be formally nullified all of those votes for the Presidential elections that were either cast inside Kosovo or that were cast by official residents of Kosovo who weren’t there at the time. (B92, 2000; Elich 243-4) The DOS’s legal argument was, in turn, based on the rather curious logic that because poor security conditions required the relatively early closing of the polls inside Kosovo, at 4 PM instead of 8 PM, all votes cast by residents of Kosovo (regardless of where those people happened to be at that particular moment) were somehow illegitimate. (B92, 2000; Elich, 243-4)

The DOS’s two legal challenges were rejected by the FEC and the FRY’s Supreme Court, and the FEC’s official results stood. But a few days after, on October 7, 2000, a regime change ended up occurring at the level of the Presidency of the FRY anyway. Given that the last-mentioned results credited Kostunica and Milosevic with 48.96% and 38.62% of the votes respectively, the second,
decisive run-off electoral round scheduled for October 8 would have seemed like a mere formality, with Kostunica’s victory being all but guaranteed. However by September 27, when the FEC issued its official report on the first round of the elections, Kostunica and the DOS had already declared their categorical opposition to the holding of a second electoral round. Although Kostunica could have expected to win the run-off election on 8 October, he would have had a weaker position in both the Parliament of Serbia and of the FRY at least through to late 2001 if not until late 2004. A more fundamental regime change, to which Washington and Kostunica were committed, could only be realized via methods completely at odds with the Constitution and the rule of law in ex-Kosovo Serbia (prior to being occupied by NATO in mid-June 1999, Kosovo was governed in principle on the basis of the same legal-constitutional order as was the rest of Serbia).

The events that triggered Milosevic’s decision on October 7 to stand down as FRY President cannot be viewed as having conformed with norms that are accepted in modern democratic states. Among the respective key social-political events were the particularly open and incendiary remarks made on September 28 by Zoran Djindic, the campaign manager for Kostunica; just hours after, the FEC made its announcement about the necessity of holding a run-off election, Djindic said that: “We [leading members of the DOS campaign] call everyone onto the streets [and] shall seek to paralyze all institutions, schools, theaters, cinemas, offices.” Djindic stated publicly and in no uncertain terms that the only outcome that the DOS would accept would be one in which Kostunica immediately replaced Milosevic as FRY President (and the scheduled October 8 runoff election be called off.) (Savic, 2000)

The DOS leadership was clearly committed to taking power via street action. From September 28-October 5, the DOS, backed by Washington, NATO and the EU, took a number of concrete steps to realise regime change. On October 5, tens of thousands of people gathered in Belgrade to participate in a mass political rally headed by the DOS leadership; the evidence indicates that thousands—perhaps as many as 10,000—people had weapons on them while participating. (Agence France Presse, 2000; Bodreaux, 2000; Elich, 2006: 245; Sandford, 2000; Steele, Judah, Sweeney, Sandford, Carroll, and Beaumont, 2000)

The storming of two key buildings in Belgrade -- the FRY’s Parliament and the national headquarters of television and radio centre RTS -- constituted the culmination of the mass rally that was under the general direction of the DOS. Describing this mass rally’s denoument, Elich wrote that: “The assault on the ... Parliament [of the FRY] and Radio Television Serbia was led by a group of specially trained squads of former soldiers and paramilitary thugs. Not a few of the latter had been responsible for atrocities in Bosnia and Kosovo. Velimir Ilic [who, on October 5, 2000, was the relatively right-wing Mayor of Cacak, a town in central Serbia] led the assault.” (Elich, 2006: 245) Ilic’s own history
speaks volumes about the regime change’s driving ideological core. At the time of the creation of a multi-party political system in Serbia in 1990, Ilic joined the brand-new, right-wing, pro-monarchist Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) and quickly became the SRM leader in his hometown of Cacak; in 1998; he left the SRM and founded New Serbia (NS,) a party more-or-less ideologically identical.

Some pro-Washington bias notwithstanding, the article “A Mayor’s Conspiracy Helped Topple Milosevic” by Richard Boudreaux (Los Angeles Times, 10 October, 2000) allows for a more complete understanding of the ideology of Ilic’s personal ideology, as well as that of the NS and the DOS as a whole. In the respective article, Boudreaux quotes Dragos Kovacevic (identified as the then “regional leader [Cacak region, apparently] of Ilic’s New Serbia Party”) as saying that “[SRM chief Vuk] Draskovic was content to talk and talk and march and march. He was dissipating the people’s energy. We wanted concrete action. We needed professionals not amateurs.” That the NS was a relatively radical right-wing formation is indicated by Kovacevic’s – and by extension Ilic’s – suggestion that Draskovic’s opposition to Milosevic wasn’t sufficiently intransigent. For example, in 1990 and again in 1997, Draskovic had run, unsuccessfully, for the Presidency of Serbia; during each those campaigns he had opposed whoever the SPS put forward as candidate (in 1990 Milosevic; in 1997 Zoran Lilic). Furthermore, the Draskovic-led SRM had participated in the Serbian Parliamentary elections of 1990 and 1992-1993, as well as in the FRY Parliamentary elections of 1992-1993 and 1996, each time as an opponent of the Milosevic-led SPS. Thus, in criticizing Draskovic for being “too soft” in his opposition to Milosevic, Ilic’s NS was demonstrating that its own political line was one marked by (relative) right-wing radicalism. In the September 24, 2000 FRY Presidential and legislative elections, both the NS and the SRM were integral members of the DOS.

In regards to his role and that of the NS during the DOS-led mass rally which took place in Belgrade on October 5, 2000, Ilic later said that: ‘Our action had been planned in advance. Our aim was very clear; take control of the [Milosevic] regime’s key institutions, including the parliament and the television.’ Providing some more details about the actual nature of the respective ‘action,’ Elich has asserted that: “Ilic capitalized on prior contacts and arrangements with turncoat policemen, who assisted his armed group. It is probable that the CIA was involved in the planning of the well-coordinated attacks.” (Elich, 2000: 245)

Although Milosevic’s ceding of the Presidency to Kostunica was the most politically contentious element of the “wholesale regime change process,” key DOS leaders regarded the transfer of control over the Presidency as insufficient to satisfy the criterion of “wholesale regime change. The period to the end of 2000 served as an essential political prelude for the development whereby the DOS established its own de facto one party rule over all the key fulcrums—executive, legislative, judicial, military and police —of state power in Serbia. This political prelude was, in all essential regards, defined by the unfolding of a not entirely bloodless political war.
The DOS waged a political war to completely destroy the largest of relatively left-wing political forces in Serbia. This meant that the DOS proceeded to carry out a well-calculated plan to politically emasculate the SPS and the YUL at every level—municipal, provincial as well as central. Among the violent and non-democratic elements of the plan were, according to Elich “...[a]rmed squads [that] forced their way into the ... Parliament [of the FRY on October 5, 2000, and] followed by a drunken mob of DOS supporters, who rampaged through the building, ... setting [it] ablaze. Police were beaten and drunken gangs, many armed with guns, roamed the streets. Ambulances taking injured policemen to hospitals were stopped by DOS activists, who demanded the patients be turned over to them. After Radio Television Serbia was seized [on October 5, 2000 by DOS affiliates,] it too was torched. Throughout [ex-Kosovo] Serbia, offices of the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Yugoslav United Left [YL] were demolished. [Various people still members of the SPS] were beaten ... [and also the recipients of] death threats over the telephone. In Kragujevac [on October 5, 2000,] ten [SPS members] were tied and abused for hours. [On October 6, 2000,] DOS thugs forced their way into the home of Zivojin Stefanovic, [then both] President of the Socialist Party in [and also the Mayor of] Leskovac. After looting and smashing Stefanovic’s belongings, they set his house on fire. While [on October 5, 2000 throughout Serbia,] roving gangs overturned and burned police vehicles, vandalized buildings and beat people, [Vojislav] Kostunica announced, ‘Democracy has happened in Serbia. Communism is falling. It is just a matter of hours.’” (British Helsinki Human Rights Group, 2000; Elich, 2006: 245; emperors-clothes.com, 2000; Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS,) 2000)

Between the September 24, 2000 FRY Presidential and legislative elections and his formal October 7, 2000 ceding of the office of FRY President to Kostunica, Milosevic continued to play an active role in political life. For example, while in Belgrade on October 2, 2000 Milosevic spoke via television and radio. In the speech, Milosevic argued that Serbia was in that very moment in danger of being transformed into a country with “[a] puppet administration …with a status of limited sovereignty … under the influence of foreign powers.” This potential future for Serbia, Milosevic warned, was the outcome of “efforts [that] have been underway for a whole decade to place the entire Balkan Peninsula under the control of some Western powers.” The speech was an attempt by Milosevic to argue that the redoubled efforts that, from September 24 – October 7, 2000, the DOS engaged in to force him to cede the Presidency to Kostunica were, in fact, all elements of well worked-out plans that, going back at least to the early 1990s, Washington and NATO had carried out in the interests of making themselves the de facto neo-colonial hegemons over all of Eastern and Central Europe. Milosevic predicted that if forced to relinquish the Presidency of the FRY, the DOS would simultaneously assume effectively total control over the central government of Serbia, and that state managed “public and social property would quickly be transformed into private property, but its owners, as demonstrated by the experience of our neighbors, would be foreigners. Among the few
exceptions would be those who would buy their right to own property by their loyalty and submission [to the Western Powers] ...” (Milosevic, 2000)

Thus Milosevic attempted to tie together the autumn 2000 DOS-headed regime change not only with US and western European attempts to exercise effectively total de facto control over Serbia, but also with the severe social and economic problems that, ever since 1990, the imposition of “neo-liberal” economic measures had caused for millions of people throughout Eastern and Central Europe. Thus, according to Milosevic, “All countries finding themselves with limited sovereignty and with governments controlled by foreign powers, speedily become impoverished [and there is produced a] great division into a poor majority and a rich minority [and] this has been the picture in Eastern Europe for some years now that we can all see. That picture would also include us. Under the control of the new owners of our country [the DOS and its Western sponsors] we too would quickly have a tremendous majority of the very poor, whose prospects of coming out of their poverty would be very uncertain, very distant.” (Ibid)

In this speech, Milosevic tried to argue that Kostunica was actually not the principal Serbian figure in the DOS. Milosevic was advancing the view that the DOS was actually led not by Kostunica, but by Djindic. Asserting quite clearly in this speech of his that Djindic was a “Quisling-type” figure who had effectively supported NATO during its March – June of 1999 bombing of the FRY, Milosevic said that: “he [Djindic] has collaborated with the military alliance that attacked our country. He could not even hide his collaboration. In fact, our entire public knows that he appealed to NATO to bomb Serbia for as many weeks as necessary to break its resistance.” For Milosevic, Kostunica and the DOS were simply “Trojan horses” for the imposition of de facto NATO suzerainty over ex-Kosovo Serbia. Milosevic also said: “For a long time there has been a grouping among us which, under the guise of being pro-democratic, have in fact represented the interests of the governments attacking Yugoslavia, especially Serbia. During the elections that group called itself the 'Democratic' Opposition of Serbia [DOS]. Its boss is not its presidential candidate [Kostunica]. Its boss is the president of the Democratic Party [Djindic]. … [T]he 'democratic' grouping organized for these [late September and early October of 2000 FRY] elections represents the armies and governments which recently waged war against Yugoslavia.” (Ibid)

Once the office of the Presidency of the FRY had been transferred from Milosevic to Kostunica, the DOS imposed its own virtually unchecked and uncheckable rule, most frequently via wholly undemocratic means, over virtually all governmental, media and non-profit institutions, and over public enterprises as well. Describing some of the immediate “trigger actions” for and some direct consequences of the DOS’s essentially unchallenged and impossible to challenge control over every critical aspect of social life in Serbia, Elich wrote: “Establishing their democratic credentials, DOS activists systematically seized Left-oriented media throughout Yugoslavia. Left-wing newspapers,
radio and television stations were placed under the management of DOS supporters and reoriented in support of the Right. A formerly rich and diverse media culture, representing the entire political spectrum, overnight took on a hue of uniformity, churning out praise for DOS. Gangs of DOS thugs forcibly removed management at state-run factories and enterprises, universities, banks and hospitals in towns and cities. Government ministers [who served Milosevic immediately prior to his resignation] were confronted by violent groups and pressured, often at gunpoint, to resign, and DOS established a crisis committee to perform governmental functions, [and] circumventing the Federal Parliament [which, throughout the October 5 - December 23, 2000 period, still was dominated by relatively left-wing forces] … DOS officials openly threatened to call for more street violence as a means of pressuring [what was, from September 24 through December 22, 2000, the still relatively left-leaning] Serbian Parliament to agree to a new election one year ahead of schedule and in that effort they were successful. The [Serbian] parliamentary election was moved up [to December 23, 2000]. In an environment of violence and intimidation, it was not surprising the DOS dominated the ... results [of the election].” (Elich, 2006: 245)

In support of this statement, it is important to point out that, right up to the October 7, 2000 ceding of the office of the FRY Presidency to Kostunica, neither formal plans nor indeed any constitutional-legal requirement existed for the holding of an election for the Serbian Parliament before 2001. Furthermore, the September 21, 1997 elections for the Parliament of Serbia resulted in the creation of a three-party majority coalition between the SPS, the Yugoslav United Left or YUL and the Serbian Radical Party or SRP that supported Milosevic, whose term as FRY President would end up running from July 23, 1997-October 7, 2000.

As indicated above, the DOS engaged in a systematic (and successful) campaign of violence, intimidation and thuggery both to massively weaken if not completely destroy the SPS, the YUL and, to some extent even the SRP, but also to ensure that – in the midst of such a chaotic and actually undemocratic political climate – the elections for the Parliament of Serbia would be moved from late 2001 to some point before the end of 2000. That occurred with the actual unfolding of this election on December 23, 2000. These new elections capped the wholesale regime change, resulting in an overwhelming victory for the DOS. The Republican Electoral Commission (REC) that had served as the official body for overseeing, monitoring and regulating multi-party elections in Serbia since late 1990 issued a report stating that 64.7% of the valid votes had gone to the DOS. (B92, 2007; Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2001) The REC’s report on the final results of the election served to confirm that the DOS now held an overwhelming majority of seats -- 176 of 250 -- in the Serbian Parliament. This completed the regime change campaign which the US government had set in motion against the President Milosevic and his government. It also triggered significant economic policy and indeed
structural economic changes in rightward directions. This meant that private market forces would increasingly come to assume functions and roles previously the province of the public or state sector.

For example, on October 13, 2000, an article entitled “Yugoslavia Scrambles to Save Its Economy” was published under Paul Watson’s byline in the Los Angeles Times. Watson quite matter-of-factly notes that: “One of the ways Milosevic tried to buy support among his impoverished people was by using price controls to keep down the cost of basic foods such as milk and cooking oil. But when Kostunica supporters forced out most managers in state-owned shops and factories and put their own people in charge, that system of controls collapsed and prices immediately shot up. The cost of cooking oil has more than tripled since last Friday, when Milosevic announced that he was stepping aside.” (Watson, 2000A)

On November 26, 2000, the Los Angeles Times carried another Watson-authored article, “Milosevic Dons Mantle of Fiery Opposition.” In this article, too, Watson acknowledges that the early October of 2000 replacement of Milosevic by Kostunica nearly immediately “also meant the abrupt lifting of price controls and subsidies that he [Milosevic] used to buy voters' support. The price of milk has shot up 75% during the last two months. The cost of prescription drugs almost doubled when the government eased price restrictions Thursday.” (Watson, 2000B) The reduction or outright elimination of state-financed and state-imposed price subsidies and price controls clearly just constituted one element of the economic transformation that followed the anti-Milosevic regime change in late 2000.

Belgrade then purposefully endeavoured to reduce – by means of the implementation of measures facilitating privatization – the portion of the GDP of ex-Kosovo Serbia that it formally owned. On June 29, 2001, for example, while Kostunica was President of the FRY and Djindic Prime Minister of Serbia, the “Privatization Law” went into effect throughout Serbia. (Pavlovic, 2003) The respective law was then reinforced by successful moves of central government to implement precisely 10 ancillary, privatization-facilitating measures (Ibid). The purchasers of the companies that were privatized under the aegis of the DOS regime were both domestic (i.e. from Serbia) and foreign, primarily West and Central European business entities. However, out of those companies in Serbia whose privatization was “successfully” presided over by the DOS regime of late 2000 – late 2003, the largest were, essentially without exception, bought up by foreign business concerns, most of which were headquartered in Central or Western Europe. (Ibid)

Private foreign investment flows into Serbia grew significantly over the next three years from late 2000 to late 2003 during the DOS government. (Lazic, 2013) The rapid growth of private foreign direct investment in the same period cannot, therefore, be viewed as an incidental by-product of the Privatization Law and the 10 related privatization-encouraging measures. Interestingly, the explosive
growth of private foreign investment inflows 2000-2003 occurred even though they do not appear to have received more favorable treatment in the Privatization Law and its ancillary statutes than did private Serbian capital. The wholesale anti-Milosevic regime change would also serve as a trigger for a “rush” into Serbia of private foreign investment, whose net levels increased from just $ 50 million in 2000 to $ 1.37 billion in 2003; most of this investment surge originated in different Western European countries. (Lazic, 2013: 47 and 52; Pavlovic, 2013) In this regard, it is worthwhile examining a report titled: “Progress In The Balkans: Kosovo, Serbia, and Bosnia And Herzegovina” sent on February 9, 2001 to the plenum of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The report was by Joseph Biden, the leading Democratic Party member of the Committee (in other words, he was then the Committee’s “ranking member”). Biden explains in the report that he spent January 9 -15, 2001 traveling through Bosnia, Kosovo and Serbia proper, and that while in Serbia proper, he met (in Belgrade) with, among others, Kostunica and Goran Svilanovic (the Foreign Minister of the FRY), as well as Djindic, who would shortly thereafter be confirmed as Serbia’s Prime Minister. (Biden, 2001: iii) In “Progress In The Balkans,” Biden informs the Committee that during the trip to the Balkans, he was told by Svilanovic that there existed “the need to guarantee … a privatization of the state-dominated economy, attracting foreign investment.” (Ibid: 7) Indicating quite clearly that the new governmental leaders both of that statal entity as well as of the FRY would pursue a strongly pro-western geopolitical orientation, Biden noted that: “President Kostunica, Prime Minister Djindjic, and Foreign Minister Svilanovic all stressed that their country's future ‘lies in Europe.’ Djindjic set as a goal Yugoslavia's membership in the European Union within ten years.” (Ibid: 7)

Upon its publication, Biden’s report undoubtedly reflected, at least in broad terms, attitudes of a large portion of the Washington establishment towards ex-Kosovo Serbia and the Balkans more generally. In “Progress In The Balkans” Biden, soon to Chair the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, equates “progress” with movement “toward … free-market economies in the Balkans”. He also unequivocally supported the already under way moves of the ex-Yugoslav republic of Slovenia to enter both NATO and the European Union. (Ibid: v) In the report, Biden did not mince words or seek to hide his views on the qualities of various politicians from the Balkans region or the proper orientation that Washington should adopt. Biden briefly refers to the fact that he traveled to Belgrade in 1993, where he held discussions with Milosevic. During the respective discussions, Biden claims, Milosevic engaged in “deception” and told “outright lies.” (Ibid: 9) Elsewhere in this report, Biden plainly labels Milosevic as a “criminal tyrant” whose early October of 2000 loss of control over the Presidency was a “popular ouster” that the Serbian people presumably carried out without any help from Washington or any other foreign capital. Biden makes it clear that he did not view as absolutely ideal the DOS regime which replaced Milosevic and his key allies in power. However, Biden also asserted that “I believe that we can do business with the new Yugoslav and Serbian governments” which, after all, he clearly believed represented “progress” (in comparison to the previous period that
was marked by Milosevic’s effective control over the Belgrade-based central government of Serbia and the FRY. (Ibid: 9)

6.1: Economic Policy in Serbia and the FRY During and After the End of the Milosevic Era

The analysis in this chapter concludes that while Milosevic’s term as FRY President ended up officially lasting from July 23, 1997 to October 7, 2000, the date should not be regarded as the end of the “Slobodan Milosevic era” in the politics of Serbia and the FRY. Over the entire course of Milosevic’s term as FRY President, he was able to rely on a politically supportive majority within the Parliament of Serbia which only ended on December 23, 2000. Kostunica’s replacement of Milosevic was a critical and necessary but not by itself sufficient step towards the final, decisive end of the “Slobodan Milosevic era” in the politics of Serbia and the FRY. But that came to a definitive end when the DOS won decisively the December 2000 elections for the Serbian Parliament. One of the most politically weighty consequences was that by very early 2001, the DOS had the power to implement all manner of key policies. Not only was the DOS-backed Kostunica serving as the FRY’s President, but the DOS also had under its direct control more than 70% of the seats in the Serbian Parliament, control it held until late 2003.

Particularly from an economic standpoint, June 29, 2001 was a turning point. On that day, the DOS-dominated government of the FRY and Serbia implemented “The Privatization Law” (Pavlovic, 2003; Vujacic and Vujacic, 2011) which would subject many of the publically owned companies and assets in Serbia to a process of privatization. Over the course of the Milosevic era, that portion of Serbia’s GDP that was generated by private companies showed a substantial increase. (Lazic, 2013: 44; Uvalic, 2001: 17-19) Thus, during the respective era, there is little question that privatization was already undertaken, and with Milosevic’s blessing. However, the paper “Privatization In Serbia: The Second Run” that was authored by Dusan Pavlovic and published in March 2003 constitutes clear evidence in support of the notion that enthusiastic proponents of a relatively modestly-regulated capitalist market did not look favourably on the privatizations that Milosevic had overseen. From the standpoint of partisans of a much more laissez-faire capitalism like Pavlovic, the privatizations that Milosevic made were problematic in large measure because they were carried out only in the case of a few enterprises which, in any event, were overwhelmingly just “smaller firms.” (Pavlovic, 2003: 11)

The available, relevant data indicates clearly that privatization was significantly deepened in Serbia by the DOS-dominated regime from very early 2001 until 2003. (Lazic, 2013: 49) Furthermore, it is evident that in this period, the portion of the GDP of ex-Kosovo Serbia that was at least formally
under private capitalist ownership, as opposed to some kind of public or collective employee ownership, tangibly increased. (Lazic, 2013: 54)

6.2: American Foreign Investment in Serbia and the FRY During and After the End of the Milosevic Era

Easily identifiable foreign economic policies of the US government and the EU undeniably played the key role in ensuring that from mid-1998 through October 7, 2000, no new American foreign investment in ex-Kosovo Serbia was allowed. One policy was a prohibition that, starting in early June 1998, the US government applied to all potential US foreign investment in the FRY. From early June 1998 through October 5, 2000, the prohibition only applied to “Serbia proper” and not to either Kosovo or Montenegro. (Krieger – Editor, 2012: 116) In late July 2001, the prohibition that the US government had applied to the inflow of private US foreign investment into ex-Kosovo Serbia was effectively lifted. On July 21, 2001, Washington put into effect a new policy of subsidizing private American-owned capital into ex-Kosovo Serbia. Washington and Belgrade signed a key bilateral agreement that allowed, under relatively broad conditions, capital owned by US citizens and institutions to stream into Serbia; the bilateral agreement included, and was first implemented partly on the basis of a provision, that directly benefited US citizen George Soros. The bilateral agreement served to provide potentially lucrative economic opportunities to the Soros-owned Southeast Europe Equity Fund (Reuters, 2001). The US government agency the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) played a key role in the official July 21, 2001 “re-opening” of ex-Kosovo Serbia to American FDI.

The bilateral agreement permitting private US foreign investment to enter Serbia could potentially have amounted to next-to-nothing. The agreement itself was produced in part via the imposition of definite policy conditionalities on the DOS-dominated government of Serbia proper and the FRY. These revolved to a great extent around ensuring that after July 21, 2001, the portion of the GDP of Serbia coming from privately-owned as opposed to publicly-held entities would significantly and irreversibly increase. But in fact most actual inward investment that followed originated not from the US but from western and central European sources. But there was a trickle of private US FDI from the point when the DOS took power in Belgrade.

Backing for this assertion can be found in a descriptive article that the US Overseas Private Investment Corporation or OPIC released on November 5, 2002 regarding a conference in Belgrade on that day and the day before and that was attended by representatives of the Serbian government and the US government, and also of sundry US-based corporations. This article explains that, by the
time of the conference, “OPIC ha[d already] committed tens of millions of dollars in political risk insurance and financing for a variety of projects in Serbia, primarily in the tourism, manufacturing, banking, services, and agricultural sectors.” In the piece the then executive vice president and chief operating officer of the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), Ross Connelly also indicated his approval for what he termed the central government of Serbia’s “sustained efforts to create a good investment climate,” with the investment that he referred to coming predominantly from non-Yugoslav sources. (U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation, 2002)

That shortly after the DOS’s assumption of state power, foreign investment began slowly flowing into ex-Kosovo Serbia, is confirmed by this press release, which notes that: “OPIC concluded a new bilateral agreement with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in July 2001, a milestone event in OPIC’s efforts to support investment in Yugoslavia and southeastern Europe. Historically, OPIC has committed $98 million in political risk insurance and financing to 18 projects in Serbia, primarily in the tourism, manufacturing, services and agricultural sectors. Currently, OPIC has committed $8.8 million in political risk insurance to Hyatt International for the Hyatt Regency Belgrade hotel, the site of the conference. In addition, the OPIC-supported $200 million Soros Investment Capital, Ltd. Fund has acquired a controlling stake in Eksimbanka, a private commercial bank in Serbia which provides a broad range of commercial banking products, including trade and term financing to small and medium-sized enterprises …” (Ibid)

As forms of support, investment insurance was a political rather than a substantial economic support, especially where the risk in the insurance was as low as the funding of a new Hyatt hotel.

6.3: The Foreign Policy Stance of Serbia Proper and the FRY vis-a-vis the US During and Directly After the “Slobodan Milosevic Era”

Belgrade significantly altered its policy stance vis-a-vis Washington shortly after the October 5-December 23, 2000 period concluded. December 21, 2001 would serve as a key turning point in the evolution of the relations between Washington and Belgrade. Between May 1989 and October 2000, Milosevic had not taken any significant steps to forge a geopolitical alliance with Washington. Shortly after the transfer of power, Belgrade’s relations with NATO began to improve significantly. On June 20, 2003 there began a formal friendly association between NATO and Belgrade asking that the then-existing state of Serbia and Montenegro be admitted to NATO’s “Partnership for Peace” (PfP) program. (Kosanovic, 2003; European Dialogue, 2011) The application did not come out of the blue. Relations between NATO and the government of Serbia improved immediately after the DOS took power. The DOS immediately initiated a policy-implementation agenda to prove its bona fides to
NATO. This served rather efficaciously for the application of political pressure. Very shortly after assuming office, the DOS sought to manage this pressure by effectively genuflecting before NATO, intending to lead to NATO membership.

DOS’s application to the PfP should be understood in the context of NATO’s Spring 1999 air campaign against the former FRY conducted while Milosevic was FRY President and de facto head of state in both Serbia proper and Kosovo. In early May of 1999, representatives of the government of the FRY had formally challenged the war’s legality at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Hague, charging at least right NATO member-states (specifically Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom) with “illegal acts,” “a violation of human rights,” and “genocide,” among other abuses (BBC News, 1999C; Jankovic and Gligorijevic, 2004). The Milosevic-headed government’s formal legal arguments before the ICJ were predicated on the idea that NATO’s bombing and missile attacks against the FRY constituted particularly grave war crimes. These arguments were still before the ICJ, requiring formal investigation simultaneous with the DOS’s consolidation in very early 2001 of control over the government.

It is no surprise that the formal and unconditional rejection of these legal arguments was one of the orders of business which awaited a satisfactory resolution when, in very early 2001, the DOS took control over the government of Serbia proper as a condition of joining PfP. The essential parameters of the process that resulted in Serbia’s admission into NATO’s PfP program were set by NATO itself. The distribution of the benefits—diplomatic, legal, military and political—that the process generated was skewed in a number of different ways: from early 2001 into 2006, this process yielded meaningful diplomatic, legal and political benefits exclusively for NATO and not for Serbia proper.

6.4: On the Nature of the Internal Political System of the FRY and Serbia During and Directly After the “Slobodan Milosevic Era”

Western analysts of international affairs have most often portrayed Milosevic as an authoritarian despot utterly lacking in democratic credentials. (Chesnoff, 2000; Glauber, 2000) Many thus regarded the October 5, 2000 transfer of power from Milosevic to Kostunica as a clear advance for democracy. (Chesnoff, 2000; Glauber, 2000) To reassess this one must examine the whole of Milosevic’s leadership from May 1989-October 2000, including his Presidency of Serbia (May 1989-July 1997) and his Presidency of the (now reduced) Serbia (July 23, 1997-October 5, 2000). Any evaluation of how democratic or inclined to authoritarianism Milosevic may have been must focus on the entire course of these periods. The SFRY’s collapse in 1991 and 1992 was critically prepared by political events occurring during 1990.
The SFRY, whose independence was officially proclaimed in late November 1943, existed as a formally independent country until late June of 1991. Thus, from late November 1943 until late June 1991, six constituent republics—Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia—existed within the SFRY. At different points over 1990, multi-party elections were held to form the legislative and executive branches of the governments of each one of the six republics. On December 9, 1990, Milosevic participated, along with 31 other candidates, in a multi-party election for Serbia’s Presidency. He was credited with 65.34% of valid votes cast, and same month the Socialist Party of Serbia, which Milosevic founded in June 1990 and continued to head until his death in 2006, would from very early 1991 into 1994 control between 77 and 78% of the seats in the Serbian parliament. These events provided some solid democratic legitimacy to the control that he had exercised.

On December 20, 1992, a popular, multi-party election took place in which at least six other candidates sought to challenge the control that Milosevic was still exercising over the Serbian Presidency. Milosevic was officially credited with 53.24% of the valid votes cast. While Milosevic’s initial May 8, 1989 assumption of control over the Presidency of Serbia was not a product of any kind of democratic process, he did continue in the office by directly participating in and winning the two fair and legitimate popular multi-party elections on December 9, 1990 and December 23, 1992 respectively.

Claims regarding Milosevic’s supposedly “totalitarian” manner of exercising state power not being driven purely by the underlying ideological biases of Western or pro-Western establishment liberals and (neo-)conservatives may have some basis in the unfolding and aftermath of the municipal and local elections that took place in Serbia proper during November 1996. These municipal and local elections were a contest between Serbian President Milosevic’s SPS and the relatively right-wing “Zajedno” (“Together”) electoral coalition. The elections had the potential to serve as the foundation for the exercising of significant influence into 2000 over the local policy agenda of every one of Serbia’s cities and reasonably-sized towns. Here it is important to mention that, in a somewhat less politically charged atmosphere, considerably less controversy and political conflict would almost certainly have been generated by the first release of official tallies of all the votes cast in both rounds of Serbia’s November 3 and 17 of 1996 municipal and local elections. The first official counts of voting in Serbia proper’s November 3 and 17 of 1996 local and municipal elections showed that Zajedno’s performance had been reasonably strong in relation to expectations about how it and the SPS would fare.

Zajedno’s relatively strong performance in Serbia’s November 1996 local and municipal elections implied, of course, a relatively weak performance by the SPS. At this time, Milosevic was not only the President of Serbia but also the head of the SPS. In short, once there were published the tallies of all the votes cast in Serbia proper’s November 3 and 17 of 1996 local and municipal elections, the legal validity or legitimacy of many of said elections was subjected to formal challenges by the SPS.
Certainly by the last week of November 1996, the SPS had developed a strategic response based on the rather cynical use of legal technicalities so as to alter and even reverse the results of many of those individual town and city-based elections which took place throughout Serbia in November 1996. For example, the first official complete count of the votes cast in the framework of the November 3 and 17 of 1996 election for the city council of Belgrade, indicated that a majority of the council seats had been fairly won by Zajedno. However, as a result of the success of the legal appeals which, by the last week of November of 1996 at the latest, the SPS made to various levels of the judicial system, including the Supreme Court, Zajedno’s victory had been reversed. (Chakravorti, 2012; The Balkan Peace Team, 1996-1997)

Milosevic was deeply complicit in and, more likely, engineered the virtually groundless 1996-1997 campaign for the legal nullification of the SPS’s defeats in many individual town and city-based elections throughout the territory of Serbia. After all, Milosevic was not only the formal head of the SPS but also the President of the government of Serbia (including Kosovo.) In the face of large protests, Milosevic did eventually, in February 1997, cede to Zajedno all the city and town council seats that that coalition of political parties had fairly won in the elections. For the roughly 12 weeks immediately following the conclusion of the elections, the SPS head and Serbian President Milosevic was deeply involved in the campaign for minimizing the successes that Zajedno had legitimately attained.

Thus, over the course of his terms as the President of Serbia and throughout his subsequent tenure as FRY’s President, Milosevic exercised political power neither as a wholly unaccountable despot, nor as an entirely committed advocate of all democratic principles. In other words, over the course of his career as a head of state, from May 8, 1989 to July 23, 1997 as Serbia’s president, and from July 23, 1997 to October 5, 2000 as FRY’s President, Milosevic governed between the two theoretical extremes of pure representative democracy and absolute dictatorial rule. This notion is supported by Gibbs, who wrote that: “It has become commonplace to refer to Milosevic as a dictator in the mould of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein or North Korea’s Kim Il Sung, but such views exaggerate. In fact, Milosevic combined repression and pluralism, using the two in combination to a significant degree. Opposition parties and media were from time to time harassed and intimidated, but they were not banned outright. There is no doubt that Milosevic rigged certain elections during the course of his rule. But such rigging was an intermittently used technique of rule, not a consistent one. Up until his overthrow from power in 2000, Milosevic operated with some degree of legitimacy and public support. ...[L]et us consider the 1998-1999 country report from Freedom House, a think tank with close ties to the US policy establishment. The Freedom House report is scathingly critical of Milosevic’s Serbia. The overall country scores on political and civil liberties are only slightly higher than those for North Korea. Yet, if one reads the narrative discussion, one finds a good deal of information that does not fully accord with the negative rating. The Freedom House report
acknowledges that opposition parties existed, and that ‘Serb parliamentary elections were generally free and fair.’ Overall, the most accurate characterization of Serbia under the Milosevic regime would be an authoritarian democracy, which incorporated elements of both authoritarian and democratic rule. The result was hardly Jeffersonian – but it was not North Korea either.” (Gibbs, 2009: 63-4)

The statements and formal legal arguments that, from September 25 up until October 10, 2000, the DOS was making vis-a-vis the election results excluded, either implicitly or explicitly, the votes of thousands upon thousands of citizens who had participated in the September 24, 2000 election for the FRY’s Presidency. The overwhelming majority of these citizens had in common a presence and, presumably, a residence, inside of Kosovo at the beginning of NATO’s March 24-June 10, 1999 air war against the former FRY; virtually all the respective citizens were either still present in Kosovo (generally though not exclusively its northernmost portion) or living as refugees in Montenegro or ex-Kosovo Serbia at the time of the September 24, 2000 election for the FRY Presidency. (Elich, 2006: 243-4)

The complete, official October 10, 2000 report about the election for the FRY Presidency credited Kostunica with 50.24% of the votes cast, a mere 11,844 votes more than needed to attain an absolute majority of at least 50% + 1. The election for the FRY Presidency was most definitely not boycotted by everyone who was residing in Kosovo at the start of NATO’s March 24-June 10, 1999 air war against the FRY. Furthermore, those people residing inside Kosovo at the beginning of NATO’s campaign who subsequently opted to vote in the election were, by and large, not of Albanian ethnicity or nationality and indisputably formed a relatively strong “bloc” of support for Milosevic.

The vital retroactive, juridico-political significance of the official October 10, 2000 report about the election for the FRY Presidency is crucial. Legal protocol demanded that there be some formal, after-the-fact validation for Kostunica’s replacement of Milosevic; this validation was provided, of course, by the October 10, 2000 report. Thus, the report in no small measure fraudulently and unjustifiably nullified many thousands of votes of those who had been present in Kosovo on March 24, 1999. On October 5, 2000, a regime change in favour of the DOS took place at least at the level of the FRY Presidency; it was managed by legalised electoral fraud and then formally legalized in an ex post facto manner by the publication of the official October 10, 2000 report.

Similarly, the report that was released on September 27, 2000 by the FEC of the still then Milosevic-headed Serbian government also clearly contained various numerical errors and inconsistencies. The respective “errors” and “inconsistencies” were portrayed by elements that were close to the DOS as being clear proof that electoral fraud had been consciously perpetrated -- and first and foremost by Milosevic himself -- very shortly prior to the formal October 7, 2000 conclusion to his term in office as FRY President. (see, for example, B92 2000)
It is not absolutely vital to make a simple “yes or no” determination as to whether the Milosevic-headed Serbian government injected elements of fraud into the report; instead, there is an obligation to assess such elements’ gravity in relation to the (apparently less than wholly democratic) arguments and tactics that the DOS had employed in order to claim that Kostunica had indeed won more than 50% of the vote in the September 24, 2000 elections for the FRY Presidency. In sum, the evidence suggests that during the time which immediately followed on the September 24, 2000 FRY Presidential elections, the politico-electoral conduct of both the Milosevic-headed Serbian government and the DOS fell somewhat short of being perfectly democratic. One might also note that the use of legal objections to electoral outcomes by all parties is standard in many western countries, not least the US.

6.5: On Basic Human Rights in Serbia and the FRY During and in the Period Immediately Subsequent to the “Slobodan Milosevic Era”

From 1989 to October 2000, when Milosevic managed the government of Serbia, the country was involved in no fewer than four major armed conflicts: the Croatian Civil War (or the War for Croatian Independence), the Bosnian Civil War (or the War for Bosnian Independence), the Kosovo War and the War in the Presevo Valley (not including the brief conflict in 1991 over Slovenia). The Croatian Civil War of 1991–1995 and the Bosnian Civil War of 1992-1995 also occurred simultaneous with Milosevic’s period in office as the President of Serbia. Unquestionably, during Milosevic’s Presidency of Serbia, his government was at least indirectly involved. However, it is also clear that there was essentially no direct involvement of any military units of Serbia’s Milosevic-headed government. Instead, most of the people of Serbian ethnicity who fought in the Croatian conflict had been living in Croatia for quite a few years prior to its outbreak; similarly, the majority of Serbs who took part in the Bosnian struggles 1992–1995 had been Bosnian residents for years prior to the war’s beginning. In neither war did forces formally subordinated to the Milosevic-headed government of Serbia play any discernible, direct military role, although it is impossible to deny the government was indirectly involved in a number of different ways in both conflicts. Militia forces, in the great majority of cases led by ethnic Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia, certainly did fight (and committed atrocities). They also received varied forms and levels of assistance from the Milosevic-led government of Serbia, including arms, advice and technical support. (see for example, US Department of State, 1997: 76, 92, 98 and 135)

By contrast, the Kosovo war 1996–1999 directly involved the Milosevic government. For approximately three years prior to NATO’s air war against the FRY, a relatively low intensity war had been unfolding in Kosovo. Various atrocities were committed in the civil war in Kosovo.
Responsibility can, in all fairness, be attributed to both the KLA and the Milosevic government. Furthermore, NATO’s spring 1999 air raids war against targets across the FRY served to exacerbate the war-related violence that plagued Kosovo.

Finally, one can turn to the June 1999-June 2001 Presevo Valley conflict in southern Serbia. This war pitted the Milosevic’s Serbia against the “Liberation Army of Presevo, Medveda and Bujanovac” (LAPMB). The October 5, 2000 development whereby DOS leader Kostunica replaced Milosevic in the FRY Presidency was followed in May 2001 by the LAPMB’s formal shift away from armed attacks against targets associated with Belgrade. Thus, within six to eight months of wholesale regime change in Serbia, the new central government no longer had to contend with any kind of relatively large-scale armed opposition force. When, in May/June 2001, all significant forms of organized, armed opposition to the then DOS-dominated Serbian government ceased, that government was no longer involved in military operations which risked also producing new atrocities.

Thus, the improvement in Belgrade’s human rights record that occurred with a relatively short lag following Milosevic’s ceding of control over the FRY Presidency to Kostunica appears to be a largely conjunctural development that was triggered mainly by the LAPMB’s mid-2001 decision to put an end to the insurgency that, since about June of 1999, it had been carrying out in the Presevo Valley region. The respective insurgency began, it appears, with at least the acquiescence if not the full-fledged, enthusiastic backing of Washington. Once it concluded – and likely in no small measure as a result of Washington’s application of pressure in this regard to the LAPMB – the Serbian central government no longer felt obligated to engage in the kind of counter-insurgency actions that invariably generate at least some human rights abuses.

The table on the following page summarises the findings of this chapter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Did the proportion of private, capitalist ownership over Serbia’s GDP increase quickly following the occurrence of the Washington-backed regime change there?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the flow of specifically American foreign investment into Serbia increase quickly following the occurrence of the Washington-backed regime change there?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Belgrade’s geopolitical line become meaningfully closer to that of the US government quickly following the occurrence in Serbia of the Washington-backed regime change?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did Serbia’s internal political system become significantly more genuinely democratic (i.e., meaningfully less authoritarian) quickly following the occurrence in said statal entity of the Washington-backed regime change?</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Did the central government of Serbia meaningfully improve its respect for basic human rights quickly following the occurrence in said statal entity of the Washington-backed regime change?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of the three regime changes that I have mainly focused on in this dissertation, the one which unfolded in Serbia in 2000 has arguably faced – at least up to the present day – the fewest problems in its path towards consolidation and long-term at least quasi-irreversibility. Unlike what happened roughly four years after the conclusion of the 1990 regime change in Bulgaria, the SPS, which was forced to cede power in Serbia towards the end of 2000, has never since managed either to once again become the largest party in the country or even to serve as the leading party in a governing coalition. It seems apparent that definite policy stances that the West in general and Washington in particular unrelentingly pursued worked to ensure that the late-2000 regime change in Serbia would be followed by a prolonged period in which the SPS as well as various of the political formations that sometimes collaborated with it from the 1990s and into 2000 would remain weak.

Prime among such policy stances was the insistence that no loans would be granted by the IFIs, the EU or Washington to Belgrade if the last-mentioned national capital did not hand over Milosevic (and any other figures who may have collaborated with him at some point in time over the course of the period from 1990 into 2000) to the Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, or ICTY. (BBC News, 2001B; BBC News, 2001C) While after a tense – and armed – standoff around his Belgrade villa that lasted for nearly a day-and-a-half, Milosevic decided to give himself up to the Yugoslav and Serb authorities on April 1, 2001, his transfer to the ICTY was (at least rhetorically) opposed by then FRY President Kostunica. (BBC News, 2001B; BBC News, 2001C) While favouring arresting and trying Milosevic (on charges such as corruption and abuse of power) in a court inside Serbia, Kostunica argued that the extradition of criminal suspects was in violation of the FRY’s Constitution and thus, impermissible. (BBC News, 2001B; Bothe and Kondoch, 2001: C73) However, the then Serbian Prime Minister Djindic, widely regarded as being a de facto puppet of the West and of Washington, convened an emergency session of the government to issue a decree that would have mandated Milosevic’s rapid-fire extradition to the ICTY. (BBC News, 2001B) In a June 2001 case, Milosevic’s lawyer formulated and formally requested be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the FRY, asserted that the country’s Constitution simply did not permit his (or anybody else’s) extradition. When the Supreme Court ruled that it needed two weeks to rule on the merits of the case (during which time Milosevic was not to be extradited,) Djindic sprang into action on June 28, 2001 and secretly gave the order for the former to be hauled off to The Hague to face trial on war crimes charges. (Ibid) While simultaneously overriding the authority of the FRY’s Supreme Court and also directly running counter to the views that then FRY President Kostunica had publicly expressed on the matter, Djindic’s secret move to bring about Milosevic’s extradition to the ICTY in
the Hague was followed, with a lag of about one day, by the WB, the EU and Washington’s decision to provide Belgrade with loans and grants with a total value of slightly over $1 billion. (BBC News, 2001C)

Following the tumultuous end in late 2000 of the Slobodan Milosevic era in Serbian politics, as well as the subsequent developments in 2001 whereby Milosevic was arrested and then extradited to The Hague, more than ten years would pass before the SPS could even hope to take control of at least one of the two leading positions in the national government (the Presidency and the Prime Minister’s office). But in the complex political conditions which prevailed in mid-to-late 2012 in Serbia, the post of Prime Minister was offered to (and accepted by) Ivica Dacic, who was then and who still is now the head of the SPS. However, it is effectively impossible to make the argument that Dacic’s two year term as Prime Minister marked the overturning of the regime change of late 2000.

First of all, Dacic only became Prime Minister in mid-late 2012 because that position was offered to him by the then-newly installed President of Serbia Tomislav Nikolic. While in 1991 Nikolic not only became the Vice President of the intensely Serbian nationalist SRP, but also began what would turn out to be a roughly 21 year term as a member of Parliament, in late 2008 he both broke from the SRP and, along with other SRP “dissidents,” founded a new party called the Serbian Progressive Party (SPP.) The basis of Nikolic and his allies’ break from the SRP and their immediately subsequent founding of the SPP (in which he served from the beginning as President) was the belief that the former party promoted a message in which open and fervent hostility to the EU and the West as a whole clearly constituted the core. A good argument could be made that Nikolic, who had lost the Presidential elections of mid-2004 and early 2008 by fairly small margins to the openly pro-EU, pro-western (and even relatively pro-NATO) politician Boris Tadic, saw by late 2008 that, for one reason or another, the commanding heights of political power in Serbia would likely be unattainable for those domestic politicians who would to continue utilize stridently anti-Brussels and anti-Washington rhetoric.

The “existential” geopolitical ramifications of the late 2008 move by Nikolic and 20 other then members of Parliament from the SRP to abandon that party and create the SPP were commented on (and portrayed in the most negative manner possible) by Vojislav Seselj. Seselj had founded the SRP in 1991 and has ever since then been at least its nominal leader. Upon hearing in late 2008 that Nikolic and 20 other then members of Parliament had abandoned the SRP, Seselj sent a letter from the Hague in which, besides accusing the former figures of being “traitors” and “western puppets,” he also called for his party’s remaining members to maintain their loyalty to a perspective founded on: “Serbian nationalism, anti-globalism and Russophila.” (Seselj, 2008)

Thus, nearly four years before he became the President of Serbia, Nikolic opted to publicly promote a
(relatively) pro-EU position in place not only of the “anti-globalism” but also, and perhaps more importantly still, of the “Russophilia” that he had previously articulated. Dacic’s political-ideological trajectory not only parallels in a number of ways that of Nikolic (who, again, appointed him to the post of Prime Minister,) but also provides still more substantiation for the argument that the essential economic, geopolitical and even ideological ramifications of the regime change that unfolded in late 2000 in Serbia only became still more entrenched and seemingly irreversible over the course of the following years.
Chapter 7: Conclusions

In this concluding chapter I reiterate the particular areas of inquiry that I have chosen to examine. I will also distinguish the conclusions that I have generated from those advanced not only by “mainstream” western (neo)-liberal and (neo)-conservative scholars and analysts, but also by relatively Marxist-influenced contemporaries.

Not only the principle politico-historical matters that I have endeavored to closely examine and subject to a painstaking analysis, but also the results that have been generated via the application of the five formal research questions to the primary case-study chapters -- Bulgaria in 1990, Albania from 1991 – 1992 and Serbia in 2000 -- serve to distinguish this study from sundry other works which can be characterized as having either a broadly (neo)-liberal or (neo)-conservative (contemporary western “mainstream”) perspective or, alternatively, a more-or-less modern and Marxist-influenced one.

In the claims to originality (or at least the first seven of them) that I have articulated in Chapter 1, it should be at-least implicit – though, at the same time sufficiently evident – that this dissertation’s underlying ideological assumptions and foundations place it quite fundamentally outside of the (neo)-liberal and (neo)-conservative “camps;” the rather fundamental and clearly articulated differences between the core ideological conceptions that served as inspiration for the carrying out of this study and, on the other, the central precepts of (neo)-liberal and (neo)-conservative thought in the sphere of international affairs are bolstered by empirical findings, some of which I have elaborated on at considerable length in Chapter 2. These findings certainly explicitly sharply conflict with and also call into question the empirical validity of (at least particular important elements of) the worldviews of contemporary western “mainstream” analysts such as Chua, Power, Kegley and Fukuyama (again, see Chapter 2.)

Similarly, while it is apparent that the arguments that he formulated in his later works were not particularly consistent with the central articles of faith of contemporary western mainstream thinking as regards the US government’s overarching foreign policy orientation, Johnson’s view that said government has – among other and considerably more sordid objectives – sought for quite some time to promote outside “its own” national borders (presumably relatively liberal forms of) democracy has not been supported in any meaningful way by the mass of relevant data that I have presented in this dissertation.
To the extent that an at-least tenuous direct link can be drawn between, on the one hand, the (three) historical case studies that serve as this dissertation’s principle formal “data pools” and, on the other, works that I chose to examine in Chapter 2 precisely because they were authored by the relatively contemporary and more-or-less Marxist-influenced academicians Harvey, Meiksins Wood, Gowan and Brenner, there appears to be a certain “core” of support within the empirical findings for, in particular, the arguments that have been put forward by Gowan and perhaps by Harvey, as well

The at-least apparent “core” of support within my empirical findings for Gowan’s works is almost certainly a function of the fact that he – and certainly in comparison with Harvey, Meiksins Wood and Brenner – also produced detailed analyses that focused quite explicitly both on politico-economic phenomena which were transpiring in different Eastern and Central European countries during the 1990s, as well as the role in said phenomena that Washington and the EU were shown to have played.

By way of contrast, while Harvey’s analysis (which he acknowledges is rooted in part in the work of Luxemburg) about the “need” of imperialist-capitalist states and elites to constantly find and “move into” either new non-capitalist or perhaps “inadequately” capitalist territories and economic sectors is intriguing and may fruitfully serve in the future as a perspective from which one can approach the historical case studies on which I have mainly focused on in this dissertation, his work in this regard still has a primarily abstract-theoretical, as opposed to also practical-empirical character.

7.1 On The Use of Primary Sources In The Dissertation

The utilization was of primary sources was a sine qua non condition for the construction of coherent and comprehensive narratives regarding the three Washington-backed regime change that took place in Bulgaria during 1990, in Albania from 1991 – 1992 and in Serbia in 2000. Some of these sources were “on-the-ground” reports or newspaper articles that in many cases were penned in “real time” by Western journalists.

The statements that were made by “insiders” who, in the case of the regime changes that I studied most intensively, were working directly or indirectly for the US government were, perhaps, still more critical for putting this dissertation’s informational foundations in place. The respective “insiders” – among whom one can count a President, a Secretary of State, a leading Voice of America official for Southeastern Europe, senior functionaries for USAID, the NDI and the US military, etc. – often
spoke or wrote with considerable candor about their role in contributing to the “successful” unfolding of the three regime changes which have served as my primary subjects of study and analysis.

In the piecing together and coherent presentation of this dissertation’s evidentiary foundations, I also saw to it to utilize various texts as well as verbal statements that were made by key figures – (relatively right-wing) opposition politicians and activists, as well as comparatively left-wing members of the then ruling regimes – who were from the countries where the analysed regime changes took place.

I also found primary sources that were written in the principal languages of the countries where the three regime changes occurred which I have focused on to be helpful towards amassing key data points necessary for the construction of well-substantiated, plausible and convincing “big-picture” historical narratives.

7.2 The Case Study Method and The Critical Realist Methodology In Conclusion Formation

My decision to use in this dissertation the case study method that has provided me with answers to the five research questions that I have studied was attributable to no small extent to my embrace of at-least a significant number of critical realist philosophy’s core tenets. In subsections 3.6 and 3.7 of the Theory, Methods and Methodology Chapter of this dissertation, my focus on the question of how economic, domestic non-economic and foreign policies may have significantly changed in different non-US countries shortly following the occurrence of Washington-backed regime changes obligated me to employ a research method which had some prospect of identifying potentially potent causal social and, more specifically, geopolitical forces.

Within the framework of this dissertation, there exists a “functional similarity” between, on the one hand, various secondary sources and, on the other hand, works which either fit into the critical realist philosophical tradition or a broadly Marxist worldview. Critical realism provides the theoretical-philosophical foundation for advancing the notion that there do exist “structured social entities” with potential (and perhaps very significant and real) causal capacities. As was the case with the secondary sources used in this dissertation, critical realist theory allows in an important way for the “filling in of the spaces between” or the more rational ordering of the various data points presented. By arguing that there do indeed exist structured social entities (sometimes referred to as either “structures” or “social structures) that have differential capacities for either receiving or imparting influences for
macro-social change, critical realism establishes the conceptual framework through which a researcher can connect the dots presented in their study. Socio-historical, economic and cultural “events” and processes are presented as the more-or-less likely “offspring” of the evolving interactions between myriad social structures. Thus, in terms of its analytical standpoint, critical realism is concerned primarily with identifying and better understanding the nature of social structures and their potential causal powers as the *sine qua non* for better grasping the likely or possible origins of various contingent social events and processes. (Gruffyd Jones, 2003: 226-7, 234 and 236)

The Marxist ideological perspective which I acknowledge to having been influenced by while doing the preliminary research for and then in actually writing this dissertation receives, at the level of certain foundational-philosophical conceptions, an important support from critical realism. Core to the Marxism is the notion that social structures -- which may well be difficult if not impossible to empirically detect -- are the real and more-or-less currently influential products of historical processes of economic, political and cultural development and evolution. According to many (at least self-proclaimed) Marxists, the development over the last five hundred-plus to even approximately eight hundred years of an increasingly integrated global capitalist economy has provided the essential basis from which there have emerged all manner of potentially powerful transmitters of “social change impulses” such as the world capitalist market, national state apparatuses, imperialist countries and their state apparatuses, colossal business and banking enterprises, with more and more of them being transnationally organized, etc. (Arrighi, 2010: 5-6; Braudel, 1982: 433; Gruffyd Jones, 2003: 233-4)

7.3 On The Role of the Secondary Sources Used

A number of the secondary sources that I utilized while carrying out the necessary research for this dissertation had the character of interpretive histories. Blum’s book *Killing Hope* is one of the first works that argues that the changes of government that occurred in Bulgaria during 1990 and in Albania during 1991 – 1992 were actually significantly Washington-backed regime changes. In subsequent books of his, such as Rogue State, Blum reiterates the assertion whereby Washington had a major hand in these regime changes, though – and in particular as concerns the one that took place in Albania from 1991 – 1992 – the evidence that he marshalled in defense of his thesis would very likely not, in the absence of further supportive research efforts and data, be regarded in academic and scholarly circles as being either qualitatively or quantitatively sufficient.
However, Blum does not claim to be a scholar of, for example modern Albanian political history. Instead – he, and various other authors whose significantly polemical secondary source publications (such as those written by Gowan, Harvey, Butler, Meiksins Wood, Wallerstein etc.) are seeking to sketch broad and theoretically and ideologically-grounded narratives about US foreign policy.

Thus, my research process first started by familiarizing myself with the broad ideologically-driven secondary source narratives penned by figures like Blum and Wallerstein. After the formulation of the research questions, primary sources then necessarily acquired an ever-more central importance for this study’s completion.

This dissertation’s “evidentiary core” is made up of histories concerning the processes whereby, at different points during the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 period, Washington substantially contributed to a total of three “successful” regime changes outside the US (one apiece in Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia.) This evidentiary core is supplemented by discussions and analyses concerning Washington’s backing for four other non-US regime changes which, at different points over the course of the January 1, 1990 - September 10, 2001 time-period, also happened to successfully unfold (in Nicaragua in 1990, in Haiti in 1991, in Afghanistan in 1992 and in Haiti again in 1994.) “On-the-ground” reports that were issued in “real time” by “western” journalists certainly helped me in better understanding the sequences of key events that took place in Bulgaria during 1990, and then in Albania from 1991-1992.

The respective reports provided me with many data points regarding the order of occurrence and basic features of various sub-events which enable the construction of a broader picture concerning the unfolding of these regime changes. Primary sources have indeed provided me with an absolutely indispensable base from which I could better “tie together” those sub-events which occurred as constituent elements not only within the two last-mentioned Washington-backed regime changes that I have here been particularly focused on, but also within the other Washington-backed regime change (which took place in Serbia in 2000) that I devoted a particularly lengthy country case-study chapter to in this dissertation.

It is important here that I discuss the various conclusions that can be said to “flow” from the five research questions that I have addressed. I formulated the research questions in such a way that there should be very little controversy regarding what the “correct” (“yes” or “no”) answer should be. The five research questions in this dissertation, besides being relatively easy to answer, also address well-defined economic and socio-political outcomes. Thus, focusing solely on offering (objective and data-based) answers to this dissertation’s five research questions will not directly translate into the drawing of broader, domestic-political, economic and geopolitical conclusions. I would submit that I have included in this dissertation a considerable amount of data from which one can draw broader
conclusions about the fundamental nature of the foreign policy stance that, at the very least during the period from January 1, 1990 to September 10, 2001, Washington maintained.

In the introduction to this dissertation, I clarified the relationship between the five research questions which I applied to the non-US regime changes studied and the Marxist-inspired conceptions of US foreign policy ever since the 1898 Spanish-American War. An adherence to Marxism leads one to believe that, from the Spanish-American War of 1898 if not even somewhat before, Washington’s foreign policy has been driven by the fundamentally imperialist objective of promoting capital expansion. Thus, someone influenced ideologically by Marxism would be inclined to believe that success for the US government in achieving – in particular geographically and temporally-defined circumstances – its principal foreign policy goals – its principal (and, again “broad”) foreign policy goals would tend to result not only in the respective government enhancing to some extent its degree of geopolitical clout, but also in the further spread and the deeper penetration around the world of relatively “pure” capitalism as well as of specifically American private investment.

All five research questions serve as broad predictors to various key consequences of significant foreign policy “successes” for Washington. In this dissertation, “success” for Washington means meaningfully contributing to the eventual replacement at one point or another during the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 period of non-US governments.

The evidentiary core of this dissertation is made up, as I have already stated several times, by numerous data-points which show the course and then the diverse policy consequences (primarily geopolitical, economic, domestic non-economic) of, in particular, three separate non-US regime changes which Washington played a significant role in helping “succeed:” one “apiece” in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania in 1992 and in 2000.

These three regime changes – even if Washington did manage to achieve its objective in helping them to “successfully” take place – tended to be less single discrete events whose occurrence can be associated with a particular moment and date than complex socio-historical processes that unfolded over considerably longer periods of times. The inevitable complexity of said processes means that they were susceptible to myriad intervening influences and that their occurrence as well as their geopolitical, economic and domestic non-economic policy consequences cannot be portrayed as simply resulting mechanically from actions taken by a supposedly always omnipotent Washington.

However, this dissertation’s primary focus is on the possible geopolitical, economic and domestic non-economic policy consequences of three separate regime changes that, with a significant degree of “support” from Washington, managed to “successfully” unfold at different points in time during the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 period. Both my own three, Marxist-inspired research
questions, as well as the other two (largely liberal and neo-conservative-influenced) that I have applied for an examination of the relevant data are used to largely in an attempt to determine the broad policy orientation that the case study governments sought to follow in the spheres of foreign affairs, economics and domestic non-economic matters. They also constitute broadly orientated predictions as to what kinds of foreign, economic and domestic non-economic policies would be likely to follow on the “success,” of a Washington-backed “foreign” (i.e. non-US) regime change that occurred at one point or another during the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 time-frame.

Thus, the research questions can be looked upon as predictions as to broad trajectory of the possible geopolitical, economic and domestic non-economic policy changes that, depending on one’s overarching ideological proclivities, would be regarded as relatively likely to occur in the near-term aftermath of a Washington-backed regime change that occurred in a non-US country at one point or another during the January 1, 1990 – September 10, 2001 time-frame.

As has been pointed out in the corresponding case studies, the broad geopolitical, economic and domestic non-economic policy forecasts that are embodied in “my own” three research questions in this dissertation have conformed more closely to the aftermath of the three Washington-backed regime changes than was the case with the general policy forecasts that constitute the core of the other two research questions.

In this concluding section I provide overarching responses to the five research questions. Thus, the five research questions are analyzed and “answered” by carefully looking at the data presented in the framework of three country case-study chapters. Therefore, I carry out a “tallying exercise” regarding the three separate and “successful” non-US regime changes.

7.4: State Economic Policy During and After The Three Regime Changes

The evidence demonstrates that all three successful Washington-backed regime changes were followed relatively quickly by the adoption of pro-”free market” capitalist policies by the central governments where the respective regime changes occurred. (Chossudovssky, 2000; Robson and Bond, 2002; S, 2013; Thompson, 2001) That is, the Washington-backed regime changes “successfully” unfolded just months before these statal entities’ central governments began implementing more and more relatively right-wing economic measures. All three of the Washington-backed regime changes followed, at least in regard to economic policy, the same basic sequence of
events: a regime change and then the purposeful and speedy implementation of measures largely consistent with the dictates of “free-market” capitalist ideology.

7.5: Receptivity to Inward Flows of American Foreign Investment During and After The Three Regime Changes

One important conclusion I reached is that the successful completion of a Washington-backed regime change in Bulgaria during 1990 did not directly lead to an inflow of specifically American foreign investment, but it did begin to flow to some significant degree only after the 1992 development whereby Bulgaria’s central government fell under the control of still-more openly right-wing, pro-capitalist forces. However, in the relevant “country case-study chapter,” I focused on the Washington-backed regime change that successfully unfolded in Bulgaria during the latter half of 1990; this regime change cannot be regarded as having more-or-less directly triggered a flow of specifically American foreign investment into Bulgaria.

Evidence indicates that the other successful, Washington-backed non-US regime changes within the former in Albania during 1992 and the latter occurring in Serbia in 2000—certainly did serve to spark inflows of specifically American foreign investment into these statal entities. Here it is important to point out that, immediately prior to the successful completion of the Washington-backed regime changes that together constitute this dissertation’s informational core the three case study countries hosted within their boundaries only a negligible degree of American investment.

7.6: Foreign Policy Stances Towards the United States Immediately Before and After the Three Regime Changes

The development whereby, from early July to early August 1990, Petar Mladenov ceded to Zhelyu Zhelev control over Bulgaria’s office of the Presidency cannot reasonably be considered as a catalyst for said country’s central government to adopt a more openly pro-Washington foreign policy line. Similarly, shortly after the late November to early December 1990 event through which control over Bulgaria’s post of the Prime Minister was formally transferred from Andrey Lukanov to Dimitar Popov, Bulgaria’s central government did not noticeably alter its basic geopolitical posture.
(Handley, 2003) The available, relevant data indicates the last six months or so of 1990 be treated as a key period in modern Bulgarian history as Mladenov and Lukanov were then widely regarded as being relatively left-wing, at least in comparison with Zhelev and Popov (Blum, 2004B: 317). However, the development in late 1990 whereby relatively left-wing figures were compelled to hand over to relatively right-wing politicians control of Bulgaria’s central government’s key executive posts—the office of the Presidency and the post of the Prime Minister—did not lead said central government to quickly shift its geopolitical stance to being even more pro-Washington.

Albania’s parliamentary election on March 22, 1992 served as a trigger for Albania’s central government to adopt not only a more aggressively pro-“free market” capitalist policy agenda, but also to openly utilize a relatively right-wing ideological discourse based on both Albanian nationalism and anti-communism. However, whether this election for all the seats in the Albanian Parliament would end up leading the central government to adopt an aggressively pro-Washington line in international affairs is not immediately evident.

The March 22, 1992 parliamentary election throughout Albania was decisively won by the relatively right-wing Democratic Party (DP;) on April 9, 1992, the DP would- in the person of Sali Berisha—formally assume control over the office of the Presidency. (Iwaskiw and Zickel, 1992: 135 and 150-3; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 67)

Berisha, who served as Albania’s President from April 9, 1992 to July 24, 1997, pursued a strongly pro-Washington geopolitical line. From April 13, 1985 until April 9, 1992, Alia had been Albania’s head of state. (Iwaskiw and Zickel, 1992: 135 and 150-2; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 81) The April 13, 1985-April 9, 1992 period should be divided into two sections; without question, from April 13, 1985 until mid-December 1990 or at the latest, mid-February 1991, Alia was the dictator of Albania (Iwaskiw and Zickel, 1992: 135 and 150-2). Roughly 14-16 months before the key date of April 9, 1992, Albania’s political, legal-constitutional, and electoral system were all fundamentally democratized. Thus, in these months immediately preceding the important transitional date of April 9, 1992, not only did democratic constitutional-juridical, electoral, and political conditions exist inside of Albania, but Alia also formally headed Albania. (Iwaskiw and Zickel, 1992: 135 and 150-2; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 81)

The evidence demonstrates that certainly by mid-1991, the Albanian state headed by President Alia was working on developing friendly and meaningfully collaborative military and diplomatic ties with NATO and, through NATO, Washington (Chossudovsky, 2000: 285-6). Thus for at least the last 10 months of the April 13, 1985-April 9, 1992 period during which Alia served as the President, Albania’s central government labored to present itself as Washington’s loyal junior geostrategic partner.
The April 9, 1992 development whereby Alia formally transferred to Berisha control over the Presidency of Albania did not lead Albania’s central government to adopt a radically different geopolitical posture vis-à-vis Washington. Instead, during the first two to three years immediately following Alia’s formally ceding to Berisha control over the Presidency, Albania’s central government opted to pursue a geopolitical orientation based on unequivocal loyalty to Washington. (Chossudovsky, 2000: 285-6 and 288; Republic of Albania: Ministry of Defence, 2012; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2012) Thus, with a rather minimal lag in the wake of the April 9, 1992 regime change in Albania, its government clearly modified its basic geopolitical line from being “merely” evidently pro-Washington to being effectively maximally pro-Washington. (Chossudovsky, 2000: 285 and 288; Republic of Albania: Ministry of Defence, 2012; North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2012)

7.7: The Internal Political Systems of the Subject Countries Immediately Before and After Experiencing Washington-Backed Regime Changes

A comprehensive, objective review of the relevant data demonstrates that shortly after the unfolding of the Washington-backed regime changes on which I have focused these states’ internal political systems did not become meaningfully more democratic (Blum, 2004B: 314-20; Gibbs, 2009: 63-4).

Immediately prior to the successful completion of these Washington-backed regime changes, these states had broadly democratic internal political systems. The respective political systems in no case became more genuinely democratic in the historical time-periods immediately following the regime (British Helsinki Human Rights Group, 2001; Curtis, 1992: 46; Elich, 2006: 245; Emperors-clothes.com; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 85-6).

Following the successful occurrence on April 9, 1992 of a Washington-backed regime change in Albania, the country’s internal political system started to become somewhat less democratic (Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 85-6).

In the direct aftermath of the Washington-backed regime changes in Bulgaria during 1990 and in Serbia during 2000, their internal political systems did not experience significant changes in the direction of either intensified authoritarianism or more thoroughgoing democracy.
7.8: Human Rights Conditions within the Subject Countries Immediately Before and After Experiencing Washington-Backed Regime Changes

Following the success in 1990 of a Washington-backed regime change in Bulgaria, said country’s internal human rights situation manifested few significant changes and remained, in broad terms, more-or-less satisfactory. (Blum, 2004B: 316; Kucukcan, 1999: 57-8; Petkova, 2002: 8-9)

In the immediate wake of the success in 1992 of a Washington-backed regime change in Albania, the respective country’s internal human rights conditions experienced some deterioration.

In the months and years following Serbia’s 2000 regime change, its internal human rights situation became, in net terms, somewhat better. In two different subsections of this dissertation – specifically, subsection 6.5 of the Serbia chapter and subsection 7.7 of this chapter – I identified the underlying causes for the development whereby the late 2000 regime change at the level of the central government of Serbia seems to have served as a trigger (albeit with a fairly short lag) for an improvement in the government’s human rights record.

7.9: More General Conclusions

This dissertation also has shed quite a bit of light on other aspects of the three generally inadequately studied (and largely unacknowledged) Washington-backed regime changes that took place, one after the other, in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania from 1991 – 1992 and in Serbia in 2000.

Of the three regime changes, at least two and arguably all of them, had a thoroughly “stagist” or step-by-step character. For example, the replacement of a “Socialist” Party Prime Minister – even one whose “socialist” credentials were seriously in question – by a figure who was not formally associated with any political party certainly constituted another “forward step” for the two separate Washington-backed regime changes that unfolded first in Bulgaria in 1990 and then in Albania in 1991-1992. While the development whereby control over the Prime Minister’s office was transferred from the hands of a member, albeit more-or-less nominal, of the Socialist Party (Ylli Bui) to the hands of an officially non-partisan individual (Vilson Ahmeti) served as “just” an (important) transitional step in the regime change process in Albania, in Bulgaria the respective development (the transfer of control
over the Prime Minister’s office from Andrey Lukanov to Dimitar Popov) actually constituted the “cap-stone” of a regime change process.

Furthermore, the Washington-backed regime change process that “successfully” unfolded over the course of 2000 in Serbia cannot be said to have concluded when, on October 7, 2000, control over the Presidency of the FRY was officially transferred from Slobodan Milosevic to Vojislav Kostunica. Its undoubted symbolic (and also real political) significance notwithstanding, the transfer of control over the FRY Presidency from Milosevic to Kostunica did not immediately or directly trigger the break-up of pro-Milosevic majorities in the legislative bodies of both the FRY and the Republic of Serbia.

Intimidation and targeted attacks on sundry perceived allies of Milosevic were consciously engaged in by the Washington-backed DOS in order to ensure that elections for the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia which were scheduled to take place in the latter half of 2001 would actually unfold in December of 2000. In an environment in which the relatively left-wing and effectively pro-Milosevic forces (the SPS and the YUL) were under (including physical) attack, said forces’ suffering of a sweeping loss in the December 23, 2000 elections for the Parliament of Serbia was essentially a foregone conclusion.

Once it had scored an overwhelming victory in these elections, the DOS was able to ensure that one of its principal then-leaders – Zoran Djindic, who was viewed in a particularly favourable light by Washington – would become the Prime Minister of Serbia in January 2001. Approximately six months after Djindic begins to serve as the Prime Minister of Serbia, said country’s Parliament passed legislation that significantly pushed forward one of the central elements of the “free-market” economic agenda – the privatization of what had been collectively-owned (either by the state or by the respective firms’ workers) assets.

It should be noted here that, by late 2000 and late 2001, the institutions of the Serbian as opposed to Yugoslav state were of primary concern to the key figures who were then responsible for the crafting of Washington’s policy stance towards the Balkans. This stance arguably became more “Serb-centric” as opposed to “Yugoslav-centric” because, certainly by early 1998, then Montenegrin President Milo Djukanovic (who had been Prime Minister of Montenegro from 1990 – 1997 and who, after his 1998 – 2002 term as the President, would once again serve for years as Prime Minister) had geopolitically aligned himself with Washington and carried out numerous pro-neoliberal economic measures.

The available data largely confirms that the three Washington-backed non-US regime changes that constituted my prime objects of study in this dissertation took place in a “stagist” or gradual manner not only as concerns the identity of the individuals who occupied high political offices, but also as
concerns the nature of key state economic policies. That is – and in particular as concerns the Washington-backed regime changes that unfolded in Albania from 1991 – 1992 and in Serbia in 2000 -- not only were the relatively right-wing forces at least initially unable to simultaneously assume control over both the office of the President and of the Prime Minister, but these forces also were only able to push through their overarching neoliberal economic policy agenda in a step-by-step manner.

For example, the November 1991 decontrol of some prices in Albania occurred while the then effectively SPA-allied Ramiz Alia was still serving as President and just a few short weeks after the SPA politician Ylli Bufi had ceded control over the Prime Minister’s office to the nominally non-partisan figure Vilson Ahmeti. Considerably more price “liberalization” had to wait until DP’s April of 1992 assumption of control over both the President’s and the Prime Minister’s office.

Within a few days of Kostunica’s October 7, 2000 replacement of Milosevic in the office of the Presidency of the FRY, various price subsidies and controls were eliminated in ex-Kosovo Serbia in a development that immediately exacerbated Albania’s problems with inflation. In December 2000 and January 2001, foreign trade is liberalized and ex-Kosovo Serbia’s currency, the dinar, is made fully convertible with other national monies.

However, privatization – the “centerpiece” of the neoliberal agenda – only significantly goes forward in mid-2001, five to six months after the formal beginning, on January 25, 2001, of Zoran Djindic’s term in office as the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia (said term would end when Djindic was assassinated in March of 2003.)

An argument could be made that, out of the three Washington-backed regime changes that I have covered the one that took place in Bulgaria was perhaps somewhat less (politically) “complete” had somewhat less far-reaching (in particular, economic) consequences than the other two.

Over the course of 1990, the BCP / BSP lost control first over the Presidency and then over the office of the Prime Minister of Bulgaria. In the case of the Presidency, control over it passed in early July – early August of 1990 (in between there were two different acting Presidents who served for a total of roughly three and a half weeks) from leading BSP member Petar Mladenov to UDF head Zhelyu Zhelev. The Washington-backed regime change that took place in Bulgaria concluded with the December 7, 1990 transfer of control over the office of the Prime Minister of Bulgaria from the hands of then key BSP figure Andrey Lukjanov to the hands of Dimitar Popov. While at no point during his political career was Popov ever a member of the BSP, at the moment that he became the Prime Minister he was not officially a member of any of the political parties that then existed in Bulgaria.
While Zhelev would remain as President straight on through into early 1997, Popov’s term as Prime Minister only lasted for 11 months (into November of 1991, at which point control over the office of the Prime Minister was transferred to then UDF-member Filip Dimitrov.) Thus, for 11 months (December 1990 – November 1991,) Bulgaria was jointly governed by the UDF in the form of President Zhelev and by a formally non-partisan figure in the form of Prime Minister Popov. During the respective 11 months, far-reaching price liberalization was carried out (in particular in early 1991) and, in large measure owing to the then still critically influential position that the BSP held in the Parliament, the privatization of key state assets proceeded, albeit not as quickly as, say, Zhelev and the US government officials who backed him would have preferred.

It is also worth making explicit here the fact that the BSP’s loss of control during 1990 over both the Presidency and the office of the Prime Minister of Bulgaria occurred without there being held in said country any kind of popular or national elections.

The Washington-backed regime change that unfolded in Bulgaria over the course of 1990 would in some sense remain without a definitive “capstone” until October or November of 1991; as a more-or-less direct consequence of the fact that Parliamentary elections which were held in Bulgaria in October of 1991 resulted in a narrow victory for the UDF over the BSP, the country’s next Prime Minister (Philip Dimitrov) would end up coming from the UDF.

During his November 1991 – December 1992 Premiership, Dimitrov collaborated with then-President and fellow UDF-member Zhelev towards the end of pushing through policy measures that led to the privatization of assets and companies that ever since the mid-to-late 1940s had been owned by the Bulgarian state. Thus, while the evidence supports the contention that a Washington-backed regime change did take place in Bulgaria over the second half of 1990, a compelling argument can be made that this regime change was further “consolidated” in October and November of 1991. It is important to state here that my more-or-less intensive focus in this dissertation on seven different non-US regime changes does not have the character of a “conspiracy theory.”

Throughout this dissertation, I have purposefully labelled all seven of the non-US regime changes that I have examined as being “Washington-backed” or as having been “helped by Washington to take place,” etc.

My choice of terms and expressions like “Washington-backed” or “non-US regime changes whose unfolding was assisted by Washington,” etc. was intended to convey the idea that these regime changes were not entirely a US government-directed opera. Indeed, Washington’s “assistance” for the ultimately successful non-US regime changes that I have covered almost certainly would have all
come to naught if the respective regime changes did not have significant backing within the countries
in which they took place.

Thus, the non-US regime changes cannot be considered as examples of situations in which a foreign
power imposes its system of rule on another state without having any kind of “indigenous” support. I
have, however, explicitly argued that the ultimately “successful” unfolding of the non-US regime
changes that I have analysed did “benefit” from Washington’s backing, which was considerable.

Furthermore, while (political) “conspiracy theories” are based, at least in large measure on key
economic and political or state agents engaging in secret and presumably illegal acts, the reasonably
conscientious researcher would have been able to determine that Washington was indeed intent on
“pushing forward” the seven different “successful” non-US regime changes that I have covered in this
dissertation. While those representatives of one or another agency of the US government (most
generally the Executive Branch) who crafted measures that were designed to facilitate the
“successful” unfolding of the regime changes that I have focused on rarely spoke openly or directly to
the American public about the respective regime changes, that does not mean that they never spoke or
wrote about them. Even in the case of the Washington-backed regime changes that unfolded in
Bulgaria during 1990 and in Albania from 1991 – 1992 (as opposed to the somewhat more publicized
ouster of Milosevic in Serbia in 2000,) “responsible parties” from the US government certainly did
express their views – in Congressional testimony, in documents that they wrote and presented to the
US Congress, in speeches that they gave and in cables from the US embassies where they were
posted, etc. – about the kinds of political and economic changes that they wanted see take place in the
“targeted” countries.

The budgets of institutions like the NED, the IRI, USAID, etc. also are, it should be mentioned here,
quite revealing as to the policies that the US government was carrying out with regards to these
regime changes.

The US government officials who consciously played an active role in facilitating the seven regime
changes that I have more-or-less intensively studied in this dissertation only infrequently explicitly
acknowledged that they played such a role – that is, that they worked to ensure that control over key
positions atop the apparatus of the central government (in most cases at least the office of the
President as well as that of the Prime Minister) would be transferred from the hands of particular
figures to the hands of others.

Instead, key US government officials – up to and including the sitting President -- much more
frequently indicated that they were strong supporters of the further spread of “the market,” “the free
market,” “market institutions,” etc. to the countries where the seven regime changes took place.
Various high-level US government officials also more-or-less openly conveyed their viewpoint that steps towards NATO and EU membership were definitely complementary to the implementation of the “free market” agenda.

Key US government officials typically did not seek to completely conceal their own preferences regarding the ideal policy consequences or ramifications of the seven “successful” regime changes. Officials from Washington were reasonably open about their desire to see the “target national governments” not only carry out comprehensive “free market reforms,” but also adopt a clearly pro-NATO and pro-EU foreign policy orientation. All that having been said, if a regime change is here defined as the transfer of control over key Executive positions in a central government (the office of the President and / or that of the Prime Minister, for example) from the hands of particular individuals to the hands of certain other ones, those then gradually unfolding regime changes that have constituted the thematic core of this dissertation only considerably more rarely received direct and public endorsements from US government officials.

A review of the results presented in the first subsection of this chapter reveals that “my own” three research questions were, in a broad sense, more consistent with the key, accessible and presented data than were the other two research questions addressed in this dissertation. “My own” three research questions’ relation to the other two research questions can be summarized by stating that my own three research that are “tested” against the germane data in this dissertation were, in the “best case” scenario, not in direct conflict with those other two, which I have here similarly subjected to a process of critical examination.

Even a cursory review of the first portion of this concluding chapter reveals that “my own” three research questions have—at least in comparison with the other two research questions similarly studied—a relatively high degree of support from the accessible and most pertinent data points. These questions could credibly be portrayed as having their roots in the neoconservative and liberal ideologies that clearly constitute the bulk of the Western world’s “political mainstream.” The fact that my own three research questions appear to have, when compared with two other research questions of neo-conservative or liberal origins, a relatively greater correspondence with the accessible, relevant data points certainly should not discontinue discussions regarding the character of the foreign policy stance that Washington maintained throughout the January 1, 1990-September 10, 2001 the period. This foreign policy stance, as well as the role within it played by Washington’s backing for the ultimately “successful” unfolding of certain non-US regime changes, is the subject of a wide-ranging analysis.

From January 1, 1990 through September 10, 2001, Washington contributed to the successful occurrence of no fewer than seven different non-US regime changes. (Blum, 2004B: 290-305, 314-
In other words, over the course of this period, one Washington-backed non-US regime change successfully took place, on average, every 18 months. Any time one country’s government or multiple countries’ governments contribute to a “successful” regime change in another country, said regime change’s historico-political significance certainly should be carefully assessed. The historico-political significance of a development whereby one country’s government or multiple countries’ governments meaningfully contribute to a successful regime change in another country is not, I would assert, merely a function of the last-mentioned country’s population or geographic dimensions. Furthermore, and as concerns the norms of inter-statal behavior, it is hard to imagine one state or multiple states engaging in any more brazen manner of interfering in the internal affairs of another state than by actively seeking the replacement of that state’s current legal-political heads with other figures.

In pursuing foreign regime changes Washington, one can safely assume, was seeking to attain certain foreign policy objectives.

The fact-based and plausible identification of the last-mentioned objectives, was, of course, one of the primary goals that I sought to achieve by doing the different types of work—initial concept formulation, research and writing—necessary for this dissertation’s satisfactory completion. The data presented and evaluated certainly generally suggests what factors did not play a particularly important role in leading Washington to back, during the January 1, 1990-September 10, 2001 period, ultimately successful regime change campaigns in various non-US countries.

Washington’s support for regime changes that successfully unfolded in different non-US countries was not, the data presented and evaluated in this dissertation tends to indicate, principally based on any attempt to make said countries’ central governments more inclined to respect human rights and adhere to genuinely democratic forms of rule. (Curtis, 1992: 46; Elich, 2006: 243-4; Gibbs, 2009: 63-4; Vickers and Pettifer, 85-6)

All five of the respective research questions that are addressed in this dissertation are “united” in that they are capable only of generating either a “yes” or a “no” answer. The simple “yes” or “no” answers yielded by each research question serve, I have come to believe, a useful and broadly orientative purpose in terms of assessing different competing, ideologically-grounded explanations (Western “mainstream” (neo-)conservative and liberal outlooks, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Marxist-inspired viewpoints for why Washington did indeed seek to push through regime changes in various non-US countries.)

However, I have also concluded that answering research questions in a simple “yes” or “no” manner may not always prove adequate to the task of describing and comprehensively understanding various
key political and economic consequences that more-or-less directly flowed from Washington-backed regime changes that took place in a number of non-US countries.

The development whereby one country’s central government or multiple countries’ central governments manage to contribute to the successful unfolding of a regime change in some other country is almost invariably the spring-board for a relatively long-term process in which the last-mentioned country’s central government meaningfully changes its economic policies and geopolitical orientation. Those Washington-backed regime changes in non-US countries virtually always appear to have “stimulated” the countries’ central governments to carry out—in a seemingly almost irreversible fashion—a significant reorientation of their policy agendas. (Blum, 2004B: 319; Chossudovsky, 2000: 285-313; Cook, 2001: 156; Elich, 2006: 231-2, 245-7)

This reorientation generally manifested itself most concretely in the largely “successful” efforts of a given country’s central government to significantly alter—especially when viewed from a somewhat longer time-frame than was always investigated through this dissertation’s country case-study chapters—both its economic policies and its overall posture on the international arena.

Thus, these regime changes that with Washington’s “vital” backing took place in various non-US countries throughout the January 1, 1990-September 10, 2001 period, served to effectively ensure that these countries’ central governments would adhere—and in a seemingly quasi-permanent fashion—to a relatively right-wing economic and foreign policy line. (Blum, 2004B: 319; Chossudovsky, 2000: 285-313; Cook, 2001: 156; Elich, 2006: 231-2, 245-7)

My main focus in this dissertation is the course and more-or-less immediate policy aftermath of those significantly Washington-backed regime changes that unfolded in various non-US countries at one point or another over the course of the January 1, 1990-September 10, 2001 period. These Washington-assisted regime changes directly shifted control over these countries’ central governments to particular individuals and political forces that pursued policy agendas that I have analysed in this dissertation.

These figures and political forces would not, however, exercise political power over “their own” countries’ governments forever. In researching this dissertation, I discovered that country’s governments would be powerfully influenced for quite a long time as a consequence of being targeted by successful Washington-backed regime-change campaigns. Thus, the Washington-aided regime changes that successfully took place in non-US countries, served as “triggers” whereby the last-mentioned countries’ central governments shifted their economic and foreign policies to the right. However, the respective countries would, in the wake of experiencing Washington-backed regime changes, all eventually be the site of still further regime changes, which were not, it is important to
state, meaningfully helped along by Washington. Yet after Washington managed, at one point or another during the January 1, 1990-September 10, 2001 period, to help push through a “successful” regime change in a given non-US country, that country would—whatever largely internally-generated regime changes would still occur in it—certainly continue to be governed by forces committed to maintaining a fundamentally right-wing economic and geopolitical line. (Arthur, 2007: 25-8; Blum, 2004B: 319; Blum, 2005: 191 and 233-4; Chossudovsky, 2000: 285-313; Cook, 2001: 156; Elich, 2006: 231-2, 245-7; Kolhatkar and Ingalls, 2006: 13 and 17-38; Rashid, 2001: 21 and 96-7; Regis with Regis, 1998: 30, 39-42, 55, 57-62, 71-2, 83-8, 95-6, 103-6, 113-4, 121-4 and 133-4)

The Bulgarian regime change did push, and rather quickly, Bulgaria’s central government to adopt various measures representing significant concessions in the direction of the ideology of “free-market” capitalism. (Blum, 2004B: 319; S, 2013) However, the Washington-assisted regime change that, over the course of the second half of 1990, successfully took place would not serve to immediately transform Bulgaria into a significant destination for specifically American foreign private investment. Economically significant volumes of specifically American foreign investment would first appear in Bulgaria in 1992. (Botric and Skuflic, 2005) A meaningful pickup of the “flow-rate” of American foreign investment into Bulgaria occurred only after the last-mentioned country experienced a mainly internally generated regime change in late 1991 (Ibid). This regime change—which, it is important to note, that Washington did not have a key role in supporting—directly led to the development whereby Filip Dimitrov became Bulgaria’s Prime Minister in early November 1991. It is no coincidence that over the course of November 8, 1991-December 29, 1992 during which Dimitrov served as Bulgaria’s Prime Minister, said country’s legal-legislative foundations became progressively more aligned with the principles of the system of “free-market” capitalism. During the November 8, 1991-December 29, 1991 when Dimitrov was Prime Minister, he was widely (and, it appears, rightly) regarded as being a supporter of the central principles of the ideology of “free-market” capitalism. Thus the measures that Dimitrov pushed forward so as to further “liberalize” Bulgaria’s economy did indeed fairly quickly trigger into Bulgaria a flow of specifically American private foreign investment.

The Bulgarian regime change that, with Washington’s vital support, took place during the latter half of 1990 indeed served to further accelerate Bulgaria’s path towards a relatively deregulated form of capitalism. As mentioned above, another regime change took place in Bulgaria during November 1991. Clearly, the Washington-backed regime change that “successfully” took place in Bulgaria during the latter half of 1990 served as the foundation for the occurrence of this second, though largely internally-generated, regime change. In fact, since the first Washington-backed regime change in Bulgaria in late 1990, Bulgaria’s central government has maintained, with minimal deviations, both
an emphatically pro-NATO geopolitical line and also a clearly pro-capitalist orientation in the sphere of economic policy. (Blum, 2004B: 319; S, 2013)

In various parts of this dissertation, I discuss at length the course and various immediate political and economic consequences of the development whereby in the first half of 1992, a successful Washington-backed regime change unfolded in Albania in which the last-mentioned country’s central government fell more-or-less completely under the control of relatively right-wing forces. (New York Times, 1992a; Vickers and Pettifer, 1999: 81) For nearly five straight years following Albania’s Washington-backed regime change, Albania’s central government would be under the near-total control of political figures and forces known to support with particular fervency not only Washington’s broad international role, but also the majority of the most critical foundational tenets of “free-market“ capitalist ideology. (Chossudovsky, 2000: 285-313)

From late March to late July 1997, formal control over Albania’s central government was transferred in a phased and mainly internally-generated manner away from the relatively right-wing Democratic Party (DP) and towards the relatively left-wing Socialist Party (SPA.) (Chossudvosky, 2000: 305-6) The SPA’s ability to exercise effectively unchallenged control over Albania’s central government ran from mid-1997 until mid-2005. (Salzmann, 2007; Salzmann, 2011) It is important to note that over the entire course of the mid-1997 until mid-2005 period, the PS not only maintained a position of essentially categorical backing for Washington’s international agenda, but also adhered to an economic policy line predicated on support for the clear majority of the most central principles of the “free market--capitalist ideology. (Salzmann, 2007; Salzmann, 2011)

In this final part of the concluding section of this dissertation, I must address several matters related to the historical development whereby in late 2000 Serbia was the site of a heavily Washington-assisted regime change.

I should explicitly acknowledge here what is obvious from even a cursory review of this dissertation—I have devoted a large degree of coverage to that successful Washington-backed regime change which unfolded in late 2000 in Serbia. In comparison with the other two non-US regime changes that both have their own country case-study chapters in this dissertation, the regime change that successfully took place in Serbia in late 2000 was the culmination of a long, multi-faceted and complex historical process.

Slobodan Milosevic served as the de facto head of state of, at an absolute minimum, ex-Kosovo Serbia from early May 1989 until early October 2000. As I have demonstrated in the relevant country-case study chapter, Washington was profoundly supportive of the early October 2000 development whereby de facto control over the executive branch of Serbia’s central government
passed from Slobodan Milosevic to Vojislav Kostunica (Marsden, 2000B; Marsden, 2000D). It is important that I stress here that the key early October 2000 historico-political event in which Kostunica replaced Milosevic atop the executive branch of Serbia’s central government was immediately subsequent to a period of at least 8 if not 10 years in which Milosevic had incurred the wrath of Washington (Marsden, 2000B; Marsden, 2000D). Thus, well before the mid-point of the early May 1989-early October 2000 period during which Milosevic uninterruptedly served as the at least de facto head of Serbia’s central government, he had already come to be regarded in a highly unfavorable manner by Washington. Over the course of Milosevic’s uninterrupted de facto control over at least of Serbia’s central government, he had a significant and at-least indirect political and military involvement in the Croatian Civil War of 1991-1995, the Bosnian Civil War of 1992-1995, the Kosovo War of 1996-1999, and the armed clashes of 1999-2001 in southern ex-Kosovo Serbia. In each and every one of these wars or armed clashes, Washington adopted, in at least de facto terms, a policy of either direct or indirect military and political opposition to Milosevic. (Beaumont, Vulliamy, and Beaver, 2001; Becker, 1998: 112, 114-8, 120 and 122-127; Blum, 2005: 2, 7-8, 24, 99-104, 133-4, 210-12 and 322; Chomsky, 1999: 93 and 116-20; Elich, 1998: 131-2, 134-5 and 137; Marsden, 2001B; Pilger, 2002: 143-5; Roppel, 2005: 243-4)

Thus, in comparison with the two other Washington-backed regime changes covered in this dissertation, the similarly Washington-assisted regime change which unfolded in Serbia in 2000 can be described as the culmination of a relatively long, complex and violent or militarily-based process. Simultaneous with the October 5, 2000 transfer from Milosevic to Kostunica of control over the Presidency of the FRY was the continued unfolding of significant armed clashes in southern ex-Kosovo Serbia. (Beaumont, Vulliamy, and Beaver, 2001; Marsden, 2001B)

These clashes, which took place in southern ex-Kosovo Serbia that is adjacent to the eastern section of Kosovo (specifically in the Presevo Valley, Medvedja and Bujanovac) unfolded officially from June 12, 1999-June 1, 2001. (BBC News, 2001D; Holley, 2001) Thus, the Serbia regime change which took place over the last three months of 2000 was immediately followed by a period of at least five months of continued warfare in the Presevo Valley, Medvedja and Bujanovac.

The data indicates that Washington deserves no small share of the responsibility for the development whereby from June 12, 1999 through June 1, 2001, southern ex-Kosovo Serbia would be the scene of more-or-less continuous armed clashes. (Beaumont, Vulliamy, and Beaver, 2001; Carroll, 2001; Marsden, 2001B) These clashes were largely triggered by the provocative and essentially terroristic actions of the so-called “Liberation Army of Presevo, Medvedja and Bujanovac” (LAPMB.) (Udovicki, 2000 -- Kosovo Chapter) Over the period lasting from around June 12, 1999 until the end of 2000, especially the US but also to a lesser extent other NATO member-states gave the LAPMB a
de facto “green light” to carry out terrorist and military-style operations in the Presevo Valley, Medvedja and Bujanovac. (Tyler and Marsden, 2001B)

The successful unfolding, during the last three months or so of 2000, of a regime change in Serbia was more-or-less immediately followed by a change in the relationship between Washington and the LAPMB (Petersen, 2011: 206-212). The development whereby the central government of Serbia fell, certainly by the beginning of 2001 at the latest, under the firm control of the relatively right-wing political coalition called the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) more-or-less directly led Washington to become significantly less supportive of the LAPMB. (Marsden, 2001C) From Washington’s standpoint, the LAPMB was useful so long as the central government of Serbia was still effectively controlled by Milosevic and his erstwhile political allies; surely by the very beginning of 2001 at the latest, the consolidation of the DOS’s control over Serbia’s central government very quickly translated into a move by Washington to greatly rein in the LAPMB. (Ibid)

Thus, Washington can fairly be seen as a de facto “puppet master” behind the beginning, unfolding in stages, and then conclusion of the June 12, 1999-June 1, 2001 campaign of the LAPMB to wage a (perhaps relatively low-intensity) war against Serbia’s central government. (Beaumont, Vulliamy, and Beaver, 2001; Marsden, 2001C)

The regime change which successfully unfolded during the last three months or so of 2000 in Serbia apparently led said country’s central government to manifest a relatively high degree of concern for fundamental human rights. The notion that this regime change somehow pushed Serbia’s central government to be more attuned to the importance of respecting basic human rights is somewhat questionable. In short, the development whereby in the last three months or so of 2000 Milosevic and his-then political allies in the SPS, the YUL and the SRP ceded to the DOS effective control over Serbia’s central government saw said government reduce—in fairly short order—it’s involvement in the commission of human rights abuses and war crimes.

The historical time-period in which the DOS exercised essentially total control over Serbia’s central government certainly got underway by early January 2001 and continued in an uninterrupted manner until the middle of November 2003; thus, from the very early 2001 until mid-November 2003 period during which the DOS exercised more-or-less complete control over Serbia’s central government, said government was only involved in the commission of a relatively small number of war crimes and human rights violations and had only a rather modest direct involvement in military conflicts of any kind.

The development whereby during the last three months or so of 2000, Slobodan Milosevic and his then political allies in the SPS, the YL and the SRP were compelled to cede to the DOS effective
control over Serbia’s central government served to quickly and rather radically modify how the last-mentioned government was perceived and treated by Washington. In short, the DOS’s assumption in very early 2001 of essentially total control over Serbia’s central government quickly transformed said government from being a targeted foe into a client of Washington. (Tyler and Marsden, 2001B)

Thus, roughly five months or so after the DOS’s very early 2001 assumption of basically complete control over Serbia’s central government it would finally cease coming under direct military attack from either the LAPMB or from any other armed unit or state. (Agence France-Presse, 2001; Beaumont, Vulliamy, and Beaver, 2001; Tyler and Marsden, 2001B)

7.10 Claims To Originality

A review of the data that is available and that concerns this dissertation’s claims to originality shows that these claims were indeed broadly consistent with the historical record that has been presented. Any one of the first seven claims could – if applied in a particularly focused manner – probably serve as the basis for a serious inquiry into real historico-social processes in an individual country like Bulgaria, Albania or the former Yugoslavia or certainly in a country in an entirely different part of the world.

As I have demonstrated, regime changes (one apiece in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania from 1991 – 1992 and in Serbia in 2000) that generally have not previously been the subjects of any kind of serious and systematic investigations and analyses did indeed – and with Washington’s conscious, unceasing and significant backing – “successfully” unfold.

Despite the fact that, up to now, extraordinarily little investigative and analytical work had been conducted vis-à-vis these three regime changes, it has been a key objective of mine in this dissertation to demonstrate that they did indeed occur, that Washington was a major sponsor of them, that they were more than mere “garden variety” changes of government and that they powerfully influenced the future policy trajectory – even up to this day – of the countries in which they unfolded.

The review and analysis of the data that is relevant to the three regime changes which I have studied most intensively also suggests that the orthodox – at least in various Anglophone and western European countries – interpretation of the actual unfolding of the end of the Cold War is, if not completely erroneous or fabricated, then at least significantly open to serious criticism. The mainstream narrative whereby democracy and the market economy – much to the pleasant surprise of
the supposedly uninvolved US government and the EU – simultaneously emerged overnight as replacements for dictatorship and the “command economy” in Eastern and Central Europe does not, for example, correspond to the historical record for Bulgaria in 1990, Albania in 1991 – 1992 and Serbia in 2000.

In these three historical episodes, the leading figures within the old Stalinist “state-parties” themselves not only eliminated the political-legal provisions which undergirded their status as the unchallengeable and unaccountable heads of “their own” countries’ national governments, but they also moved to implement within those countries significant – even if not the most far-reaching under consideration – pro-capitalist “reform” measures. Even though they were initiating key democratic and pro-capitalist economic “reforms” and simultaneously changing their party names from “Communist” (or in the case of Albania, “The Party of Labor”) to “Socialist,” the first key ex-Stalinist political figures in Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia could never win the backing – or even tolerance – from Washington. The ex-Stalinists’ recent political past, their continued at-least rhetorical support for something along the lines of a “mixed” capitalist economy with meaningful regulations and social protections, as well as their relatively heightened reluctance to quickly “enrol their own countries” in organizations like NATO certainly did not endear them to key Washington policymakers, who spared no effort in having them replaced with more open and firmly committed backers of the US government, its foreign policy and “free-market” capitalism.

These regime changes did, again, go through and, by and large, they produced what were – from Washington’s perspective – the desired results. Following their occurrence, Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia became neither substantially more democratic or, with perhaps a modest and qualified exception in the case of Serbia, protective of human rights, but they did embrace with more fervency and rapidity the free-market capitalist agenda as well as Washington’s regional (in Eastern and Central Europe) and also global foreign policy stance.

The data that I presented in this dissertation has served several key aims including, prominently, the generation of defensible and well-supported answers in the case of the application of the five principal research questions to the three regime changes that have served here as my principle subjects of investigation. Furthermore, besides enabling me to make serious and well-founded assessments about the validity (or lack thereof) of various of my own claims to originality, the data presented here has also given me the opportunity to make determinations about the possible strengths and weaknesses of the broad perspectives that numerous other scholars have advanced about the basic foreign policy orientation that – and principally in the post-Cold War period – Washington has adhered to.

The chart on the following page serves to summarize the results that have been generated via the application of the five formal research questions to three country case studies that have served as this dissertation’s most central data sources.
### Aggregative Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Did the proportion of private, capitalist ownership over the GDP increase quickly following the occurrence of the Washington-backed regime change here?</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Albania</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yea</td>
<td>Yea</td>
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| Did the flow of specifically American foreign investment increase quickly following the occurrence of the Washington-backed regime change here? | No | Yes | Yes |

| Quickly following the occurrence of the Washington-backed regime change, did the “subject” statal entity’s central government pursue a significantly more pro-US geopolitical line? | Yes | Yes | Yes |

| Quickly following the occurrence of a Washington-backed regime change, did the “subject” statal entity’s internal political system become significantly more genuinely democratic (i.e., meaningfully less authoritarian)? | No | No | No |

| Quickly following the occurrence of a Washington-backed regime change, did the “subject” statal entity’s central government meaningfully improve its respect for basic human rights? | No | No | Yes |
7.11 Core Findings Regarding the Long-Term Irreversibility of the Three Main Regime Changes Studied in this Dissertation

From an economic, geopolitical and ideological standpoint, the three separate Washington-backed regime changes that unfolded in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania from 1991 – 1992 and in Serbia in 2000 had long-lasting and effectively irreversible consequences.

While the desired (from Washington’s standpoint) personnel-political party aspect of these three regime changes took place at a particular point in time, they have massively “outlived” the first governmental administrations which assumed power in their immediate wake. These first post-regime change administrations both implemented an array of pro-“free market” economic policies and also altered “their countries’” geostrategic orientation in a manner that was favourable to Washington and NATO.

Depending on how a governmental administration’s life-span is measured, the ones that assumed power in the immediate wake of the three regime changes that I have mainly focused on continued to exist more or less in their initial form for roughly 11 months in the case of Bulgaria, to slightly over two years in the case of Serbia, to almost five years in the case of Albania.

During the period of four-plus years which immediately followed on the “successful” conclusion of the 1990 regime change in Bulgaria, no fewer than four different figures served as said country’s Prime Minister. While three of these four figures were nominally non-partisan (the other – Dimitrov - was a UDF member during his period in office as Prime Minister), the initiatives that, at that time, they put forward in the spheres of economic and foreign policies certainly did not meet with any kind of principled or ideologically-rooted opposition from the then Bulgarian President and leading UDF member Zhelev. (Europa Publications, 2004: 906-7; Lansford, 2014: 189)

Thus, from late 1990 through late 1994, Sofia – in conditions of considerable political instability marked at least in part by the BSP’s substantial residual influence in Parliament and in the population – doggedly pushed forward a firmly neoliberal economic and also pro-Washington geopolitical line. (Dimitrova, 2001: 49-52; Djankov, 2014: 138; Europa Publications, 2003: 147) The imposition, from late 1990 through late 1994, of various relatively aggressively pro-“free market” economic measures in Bulgaria would temporally overlap with and, it appears evident, largely trigger the severe economic downturn that said country was then experiencing.
The desperate economic conditions that, quite clearly, were greatly exacerbated by the broad adherence of the first post-1990 Bulgarian regime change governments to the neoliberal agenda produced, as was noted in the relevant chapter, a political backlash in the form of the BSP’s clear victory at the mid-December of 1994 national Parliamentary elections.

As this victory was by a margin large enough to provide the BSP with more than 50% of the seats in the next Parliament and, consequently, the ability to choose one of its members as Prime Minister (Zhan Videnov turned out to be that figure,) the results of the mid-December of 1994 parliamentary elections in Bulgaria seemingly could have served as a political “pivot point” to basically overturn the policy consequences of the regime change that took place in said country during 1990. Yet, this was not to be.

When they came to power in early 1995, Prime Minister Videnov and the figures whom he had chosen for his Cabinet did not “merely” face political foes in the form of then President Zhelev as well as the members at that time of the Bulgarian Supreme Court, but also lacked a coherent and internally consistent program for reversing the policy consequences of the regime change that had taken place in “their country” in 1990. (see, for example, Ganev, 2013: 211; Petrova, 2009: 118; 124; 126-8; 129-33; Pond, 2006: 44-5; United States Embassy in Bulgaria, 1995) In 1995 then Prime Minister Videnov not only simultaneously endeavoured to privatize more state-owned assets and to place some (though far from all) prices that consumers paid back under state control, but also to push Bulgaria farther along the path to eventual EU membership while also developing stronger commercial and diplomatic-geopolitical ties to Moscow, as well as to Beijing and Hanoi. Furthermore – and this certainly was noted and not looked on particularly positively by Washington and the EU – the Videnov-led Cabinet more-or-less openly opposed indicated that it had no interest in seeing Bulgaria “moving down the pathway” towards eventual membership in NATO. (see, for example, Ganev, 2013: 211; Petrova, 2009: 114-5; (Pond, 2006: 44-5; United States Embassy in Bulgaria, 1995)

While it evidently had no intention whatsoever of seeing Bulgaria’s national economy “re-transformed” into a non-capitalist one, the Videnov-led Cabinet, for its at least rhetorical inclination in favour of some kind of “Third Way” or welfare-statist, mixed-economy model, was never regarded in a particularly favourable manner by “the West” and Washington. (see, for example, United States Embassy in Bulgaria, 1995) The respective Cabinet’s simultaneous attempt to chart a geopolitical middle course between “the West” and “the East,” in particular Moscow, was likewise viewed by then-policymakers in Washington and Brussels as representing a more-or-less intolerable (even if only partial) deviation from the foreign policy orientation that the government of Bulgaria had
definitely begun to more determinedly pursue in the wake of the regime change that unfolded in the last-mentioned country during 1990.

The entire experience of the Videnov-led Cabinet serves as evidence indicating that, once the Washington-backed regime changes that I have herein analysed took place, they simply could not be peacefully “legislated out of existence” or overturned by governments that may have had “Third Way” economic (i.e. liberal-Keynesian or modestly reformist social-democratic) as well as geopolitical (“non-aligned”) sympathies.

The rather radical neoliberal measures of near wholesale privatization and immediately subsequent virtual non-regulation that were applied to the banking and the financial system shortly after the occurrence of the 1990 regime change in Bulgaria can be seen as a key underlying cause of the grave recession that, as it began to develop in that country during 1996, certainly worked to gravely undermine the standing of the Videnov-led Cabinet. (Pavlova and Sariiski, 2015: 66-8)

Paralyzed by indecision in the face of an economic downturn that very rapidly took shape and deepened and having no intention of pursuing any kind of consistent anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist line, the Videnov-led Cabinet quickly appealed for the IFIs to accord to it their standard conditionality-linked loans. The Cabinet quickly made clear its willingness to push forward with further privatization measures and, on this basis, it was granted a loan tranche by the IMF in mid-1996. (Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 1996)

The rapid deterioration of economic conditions not only “blew apart” the (too-optimistic) projections that the IMF and the Videnov Cabinet had based the loan agreement on, but would also serve as a justification for denying said Cabinet future loan tranches. In fact, there is ample evidence that Washington brought considerable pressure to bear on the IMF so as to discourage it from lending any more money to Sofia while Videnov was still serving as Prime Minister. (see, for example, Petrova, 2009: 118; 124; 126-8; 129-33)

Try as he might, including by promising to further accelerate the pace of privatization and also institute a “tight-money” and monetarist-“inspired” currency board regime in the country, Videnov simply could not either appease or receive any more loan tranches from the IFIs. (Synovitz, 1996)

The Washington-encouraged and IMF-exacerbated economic crisis in Bulgaria that developed over the course of 1996 certainly contributed to the rather lopsided loss that the BSP suffered at the hands of the UDF in the two-stage Presidential elections that unfolded in late October and early November of that year.
As the economy continued to spiral downwards towards the end of 1996, Videnov announced on December 21 of that year that he would step down as head of the BSP effective immediately and that, pending the formation of a new government, he would also cede the post of Prime Minister.

Because the BSP still had a majority in the national Parliament when Videnov made his late 1996 announcement that he would soon step down from the post of Prime Minister, said announcement did not seem at the time to be terribly “pregnant” with significant political implications.

However, while an internally-divided BSP scrambled to pick a successor to Videnov, various protests, including more than a few which in which impoverished working-class people were present in large numbers, increasingly spread throughout the country. A mainly UDF-dominated one which was held outside of the national Parliament turned violent as demonstrators broke inside, set fire to sections of the building and forced members of Parliament (MPs) from the BSP to flee with police protection out the back door. This chaos (which took place in early-to-mid February of 1997) more-or-less immediately led to Videnov resigning from his position as Prime Minister and said position being accorded (on an interim basis) to the then UDF member Petar Stoyanov. (Pond, 2006: 44-5)

The relatively right-wing forces’ de facto total control over the Bulgarian state was then confirmed and consolidated with the occasion of the holding in mid-late April of 1997 of Parliamentary elections, which the UDF won by a large margin. The UDF’s victory in these elections directly resulted in its then-member Ivan Kostov officially assuming the office of the Prime Minister in late May of 1997 and then using said office to ensure the institution in Bulgaria of the strongly IFI-favored currency board regime. (Bideleux and Jeffries, 2007: 108)

The collapse of the Videnov-led Cabinet did not merely pave the way for the UDF’s return to a position of supremacy within the Bulgarian state again, but it also coincided with and further facilitated the shift of the BSP itself further to the right. As noted in the corresponding sub-chapter, when Videnov stepped down in December of 1996 as the head of the BSP, his position was assumed by one Georgi Parvanov. Already at that time Parvanov was associated not only with a particularly firmly pro-EU orientation but also – and perhaps even more significantly – with that political current that openly favoured Bulgaria’s eventual integration into NATO. (Salzmann, 2006)

As mentioned in the relevant sub-chapter of this dissertation, Parvanov would end up serving as Bulgaria’s President over the course of the period from January 22, 2002 until January 22, 2012; it is not at all a coincidental that, during said period – that is, over the course of the Presidency of the supposed “socialist” Parvanov – Bulgaria formally joined NATO (on March 29, 2004) and the EU (on January 1, 2007.) (Salzmann, 2006; Salzmann, 2007B) As of this writing, Bulgaria is still a member in good standing of both NATO and the EU and is virtually certain to continue being one into the
foreseeable future, notwithstanding the “landslide” victory of the relatively pro-Moscow and BSP-backed candidate Rumen Radev in the November 2016 Presidential elections. (Salzmann, 2016)

In short – and I will do seek to do so again here in relation to the aftermath and lasting consequences of the regime change that took place in Albania during 1991 - 1992, as well as to the regime change that transpired in Serbia in late 2000 – the evidence presented makes it apparent that the regime change that successfully unfolded in Bulgaria over the course of 1990 generated lasting and, at least up to the present day, effectively irreversible economic policy, geostrategic and even ideological repercussions.

Much like the other two regime changes that I mainly focused on in this study, the one that took place in Bulgaria during 1990 “opened the floodgates” for the effective and, again, quasi-permanent, more-or-less irreversible transformation of the last-mentioned country’s state along economically neoliberal and geopolitically strongly pro-Western and pro-Washington lines; one could easily argue, in fact, that in the wake of the last-mentioned regime change the Bulgarian state was more or less was quickly transformed into a dependency of the IFIs, the EU, NATO and Washington.

While the precise avenues by which this end was reached were, of course, different, it is apparent that the regime change which “successfully” unfolded in Albania over the course of the period from 1991 – 1992 similarly had the effect of turning the last-mentioned country into a de facto dependency of the IFIs, the EU, NATO and Washington.

The completion of the 1991 - 1992 Washington-backed regime change that brought Sali Berisha and the DP that he then headed to power in Tirana did indeed serve to push the last-mentioned capital into rather fervently endorsing an agenda whose prime elements were vehement anti-communism and support for the “free market” and for Washington’s regional (Balkan-area) and global strategy.

The “victory” that Washington registered when, in April of 1992, the then Sali Berisha-headed DP took control over the Albanian national government would prove to have something less than an eternal character. The vehemently Washington-supported radical neoliberal “reforms” that, from mid-to-late 1992, the then DP-dominated government of Albania set about implementing with considerable zeal constituted, the historical record leaves little doubt, the basic catalyst for the severe economic crisis that, during the first few weeks of 1997, suddenly began to envelop the last-mentioned country. (see, for example, Chossudovsky, 2000)

The respective crisis threatened – but, of course, did not end up overturning – the basic geopolitical and economic policy consequences of the regime change whose personnel-political party component
element had, with Washington’s intense support, “successfully” concluded in Albania in late March to early April of 1992.

“The West” spared no effort in ensuring that that the economic and socio-political breakdown that “gathered momentum” in Albania in early 1997 did not end up reversing the basic geopolitical and economic policy consequences of the regime change that had “successfully” unfolded in the last-mentioned country in 1991 – 1992. In attempting to save – in a context marked by conditions resembling those found in countries experiencing civil wars – the basic foreign and economic policy ramifications of the 1991 – 1992 Albanian regime change, “the West” as a whole and Washington in particular increasingly came during the early and middle months of 1997 to view the SPA as a vital ally and local partner.

That is, while the 1991 – 1992 Albanian regime change had, of course, critically involved sweeping the SPA from the halls of power in Tirana, said party increasingly sought throughout 1996 – 1997 to demonstrate that it was unconditionally and inalterably committed to safeguarding and aggressively promoting the “West’s” vital geostrategic and economic interests.

The evolution between about 1991 and 1997 of the relationship between SPA politician Fatos Nano and Washington demonstrated that, for said capital, the securing and advancing of what it perceived to be its vital interests was far more important than any vehicle that, temporarily or otherwise, it may have utilized in pursuit of said interests. Furthermore, by mid-to-late 1996, Nano had effectively adopted a maximally obsequious position vis-à-vis Washington even though (or perhaps even precisely because) that national capital had, during the five preceding years or so, endeavoured to utterly destroy his political career, if not his life itself. Washington did not, it is important to reiterate, utter a word of protest when during 1993-1994, the then Berisha-headed government arrested and, on the basis of thoroughly dubious charges in a patently politicized trial, ended up sentencing Nano to a 12-year prison term. (see, for example, Abrahams, 2015: 129; Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Partito Radicale Massimo, 1995; Ryerson, 1993B ) Despite – or perhaps because of – the fact that, back in 1993 – 1994, Washington had manifested its utter indifference or even hostility to Nano’s basic democratic rights, by mid-to-late 1996 he was already (while in jail) doing his best to demonstrate his unquestioning fealty to said national government. (Nano, R., 2008)

The letter that, in mid-to-late 1996, Nano sent from prison to the SPA’s 2nd Congress and whose key policy and ideological said Congress accepted in toto, shows that certainly by that time, he had concluded that only through the open and enthusiastic endorsement of a unconditionally pro-“free
market” economic and pro-“West” geopolitical stance could he and his party ever hope to return to power in Tirana. (Ibid)

Indeed, it was precisely by advancing just such a stance that Nano and the SPA were effectively allowed (and indeed greatly assisted) by the EU, NATO and Washington to assume more-or-less unchallenged control over the Tirana-based national government during 1997.

Thus, as was the case with the 1990 regime change in Bulgaria and, as shortly I shall once again stress here, with the late 2000 regime change in Serbia, the 1991 – 1992 regime change in Albania set that country on a fundamentally new economic and geopolitical (and to a certain extent, also ideological) course from which turning back was and still is today close to impossible. In 2009, for example, Albania (then once again governed entirely by the DP with Bamir Topi serving as President and Sali Berisha being the Prime Minister) officially joined NATO and today, with the SPA controlling both the office of the Prime Minister (in the person of Edi Rama) as well as a majority in the national Parliament, the country is continuing its slow steady march towards eventual EU membership, as well. (see, for example, Reuters, 2016)

The regime change that unfolded during late 2000 in Serbia generated, directly and indirectly, vast economic, geopolitical and even ideological consequences that, with the passage of time, have not only not been reversed, but significantly further consolidated.

As I stressed in the relevant chapter, the 2000 regime change in Serbia was not limited “merely” to ensuring that Milosevic would no longer serve as the President of the FRY, but also included a more-or-less immediately subsequent and coordinated (and likewise “successful”) set of measures so as to quickly shift majority control of the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia out of the hands of figures who were still then loyal to him and into the hands of pro-Western individuals. Once (by December of 2000,) the “Slobodan Milosevic era” in Serbian politics had come to a definitive end, “the West,” with Washington in the lead, made it patently clear that Belgrade would only receive much-needed loans if Milosevic himself was extradited so as to serve trial at the Hague-based ICTY on charges relating to the commission of war crimes in Bosnia and Kosovo.

Milosevic’s late June of 2001 extradition to the Hague not only rather obviously conflicted with the legal codes that at that time were in place in the FRY, but it also was opposed by then FRY President Kostunica, who had already made it clear that he wanted to see the former individual put on trial within Serbia on corruption and abuse of power charges. (BBC News, 2001B; BBC News, 2001C; Bothe and Kondock, 2001: C73)
As pointed out in the relevant sub-chapter, less than 24 hours after this extradition (which was the consequence of an order that then Serbian Prime Minister Djindic gave) went forward, the WB, the EU and Washington granted Belgrade loans and grants totalling slightly over $1 billion. (BBC News, 2001C)

In broad terms, it is evident that, following the late-2000 regime change in Serbia said country’s political leaders adopted, and to no small extent under pressure, a policy that was characterized by strong fealty and submissiveness towards “the West.”

This submissiveness can be gleaned in part by reviewing how the figures who took control of the Belgrade-based central government in the immediate aftermath of the “successful” conclusion of the late-2000 regime change in Serbia sought – and quite quickly and purposefully – to push “their own” country into NATO’s PfP program. As mentioned in Chapter 6.3, on June 20, 2003 the then still-existing DOS-led government of Serbia formally requested that said country be allowed to participate in PfP exercises; while this request of the DOS was another demonstration of its bona fides towards “the West” in general and Washington and NATO in particular, Serbian membership in the PfP would still not be immediately formalized.

As indicated earlier in this dissertation, the late 2000 sweeping of Milosevic from power did not result in the instant annulling of the war crimes charges that, during late April of 1999, the FRY government that Milosevic then headed formulated against eight NATO member states (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom) did not simply “disappear” immediately following his ouster from power in late-2000. These charges – which related to the death and destruction that were attributable to the bombing campaign that, in late March of 1999, NATO had begun to carry out against the FRY – still hadn’t been ruled on by the ICJ at the time that the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro (SUSM, the formal successor to the FRY) applied in mid-2003 for the “right” to participate in PfP exercises.

While the post-Milosevic leaders of Serbia were deadset on pushing “their” country into PfP, this had no way of happening – and NATO officials had made this patently clear – so long as the last-mentioned charges still had to be ruled on by the ICJ.

Incredibly, Milosevic’s successors atop the national government in Belgrade had made clear their willingness to formally withdraw these charges, with the condition that war charges against “their” national government that had been advanced by the Bosnian and Croatian regimes would simultaneously be withdrawn. (Jankovic and Gligorijevic, 2004) However, this never happened, but
while the ICJ ruled -- on the basis of the incredibly narrow technicality that the SUSM was not a UN member state at the time of the 1999 NATO war against the FRY – that it “had” to reject Belgrade’s case against the eight above-mentioned NATO member-states, it did agree to allow the “anti-SUSM” cases of the Zagreb and Sarajevo governments to go forward. (Bekker, P.H.F., Levine, J. and Weinacht, F., 2004; International Court of Justice, 2007, 2008, 2015)

The ICJ’s late 2004 move to reject – and on the narrowest of legal grounds – the accusations of war crimes that had been levelled against eight NATO member states by the Belgrade-based national government would indeed eventually “help” that national government become a member in “good standing” of the PfP. Thus, while in late 2006, it was indeed accepted as a participant-state in NATO’s PfP program, Serbia (the SUSM ceased to exist in mid-2006, thus resulting in the creation of the two formally independent states of Serbia and Montenegro) would effectively have to accept that thenceforth it would never have any legal recourse whatsoever vis-à-vis those legal-political entities – NATO and its member states – that had waged war against it back in 1999. (see, for example, Gorka, 2016; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia; New York Times, 2006)

The progressive “domestication” – whether clearly principally externally imposed or otherwise – of all political forces which had not enthusiastically joined in the Western and Washington-backed regime change which took place in 2000 in Serbia can also be seen, as suggested in Chapter 6.6, in various aspects of the SPS’s ulterior political evolution.

While not explicitly stated above, it is true that, by very late 2003 or certainly by early 2004, the SPS had already come to play an auxiliary role in helping to prop up a national government in Belgrade whose commitment to both the implementation of “free-market” economic measures as well as to the pursuit of a firmly pro-“Western” geopolitical line was beyond question.

The respective government was formed in the wake of the largely inconclusive late-December of 2003 elections for the Serbian Parliament; the inconclusive character of these elections was in large measure a product of the fact that some 40 days or so before their unfolding, the then-ruling DOS alliance formally splintered.

The tabulation of the results of the elections which are here in focus showed that three constituent elements of the by-then already defunct DOS (the Democratic Party of Serbia or DPS, the Democratic Party or DP and G-17 Plus) had together come up with 124 out of the 250 seats in the Serbian Parliament. (UK Government Web Archive, 2008) In March of 2004, those three parties managed to form a coalition government in which Milosevic’s immediate successor as FRY President Kostunica would end up assuming the post of Prime Minister of Serbia (the constitutional reforms that went into effect in March of 2003 not only pushed Kostunica out of his post as FRY President, but which also
decreed that the FRY would formally cease to exist as a state and would be replaced by the SUSM.)

The DPS, the DS and the G-17 Plus – all parties whose at least relatively pro-“free market” and pro-
“Western” geopolitical credentials could not seriously be called into question -- were able to establish
a governing coalition and select Kostunica as Serbia’s next Prime Minister purely because, in a de
facto sense, they were assisted in doing so by the SPS and its (relatively small but in that instance,
decisive) parliamentary faction. (UK Government Web Archives, 2008)

As in Bulgaria and Albania, so in Serbia; one of the most critical longer-term consequences that were
seen in the aftermaths of these three regime changes (and, for sure, in the majority if not all of the
other four regime changes which I also subjected to a certain degree of analysis in this dissertation)
was the eventual – and generally pretty quick – disappearance of any kind of consistent opposition
with the national elites to the overarching neoliberal economic and pro-Washington geopolitical
agenda.

Political organizations and politicians in Albania and Serbia who had been pushed out of power and
perhaps even subsequently persecuted through the legal and prison system would – and not too
terribly long afterwards – end up effectively, and sometimes even enthusiastically, backing the very
foreign government (Washington) which had previously acted so aggressively against them. Once a
Washington-backed regime change had occurred in a given country and there was quite quickly
imposed there the neoliberal, pro-“Western” geopolitical and anti-communist and broadly right-wing
ideological agenda, even the most modest and halting deviations from said agenda would prove – as
the experience of the relatively short-lived Videnov Cabinet in Bulgaria would show – to be, in
practice at least, effectively impossible to carry out.

Thus, while the three regime changes that I have mainly focused on in this dissertation occurred
between roughly 16 to 26 years ago, the fundamental policy ramifications have not only not been
overturned in any one of them, but in all cases have indeed been significantly further consolidated
over time. In other words, the three separate regime changes that, one at a time, “successfully”
unfolded in Bulgaria in 1990, in Albania during 1991 – 1992 and in Serbia over the course of the last
few months of 2000 have served as an inflection point signalling the fundamental – and ever more
actual – rightward reorientation of these countries’ basic economic policies and geopolitical posture.
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