A response to Coren's objections to the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for moral responsibility

Young, G. ORCID: 0000-0003-0628-0931, 2017. A response to Coren's objections to the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for moral responsibility. Philosophia, 45 (3), pp. 1365-1380. ISSN 0048-3893

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Abstract

In this paper I respond to Coren's argument against my 2016 paper in which I present a case for the principle of alternate possibilities as sufficient but not necessary for the ascription of moral responsibility (PAP(S)). I concede that Coren has identified aspects of my original position that are vulnerable to counter-examples. Nevertheless, through a simple amendment to my original argument I am able to respond to these counter-examples without undermining the foundations on which my 2016 paper was built. Moreover, it is my contention that the main challenge Coren presents to my original paper involves making explicit that which is already implied within PAP(S). Therefore, while I acknowledge that my argument for PAP(S) requires further clarification, this can be achieved (as I demonstrate here) without undermining my original position.

Item Type:	Journal article
Publication Title:	Philosophia
Creators:	Young, G.
Publisher:	Springer
Date:	September 2017
Volume:	45
Number:	3
ISSN:	0048-3893
Identifiers:	Number Type 10.1007/s11406-017-9819-y DOI
Divisions:	Schools > School of Social Sciences
Record created by:	Linda Sullivan
Date Added:	26 May 2017 14:41
Last Modified:	19 May 2022 15:13
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/30817

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