The impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on Libya foreign policy
during the period from 1991 to 2003

By

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Abstract

One of the most notable events in world politics in the second half of the 20th century was the Soviet Union’s fall in December 1991 which profoundly changed the outlook of the global political scene and the balance of power among its key actors. This thesis studies the impacts and significance of the Soviet demise on Libyan foreign policy between 1991 and 2003. Libyan foreign policy was transformed; the thesis asks how, why and when this occurred and how the changes in foreign policy were managed. While so doing, a set of questions are raised concerning the emerging context and developments in world order which seemed to compel Libya to change its behaviour, changing its relations with the West in general and the United States in particular.

Three major questions are explored in detail in this thesis. The first question relates to how and why Libya aligned with the Soviet Union. The second question addresses how and to what extent these developments in international order appeared to have affected Libya’s foreign policy behaviour. Finally, the third question sheds light on the reasons and attitudes that led to these changes in Libya’s foreign policy orientations. This is also to engage with an important literature on the scope of foreign policy of small states. It also raises questions of the role of leadership, the continuing post-Soviet relationship between Russia and Libya, the decision making processes in Libya, and the agent-structure question in international relations as it bears on the forces which brought about change in this case. Finally, it asks how Libyan political leaders related to each other as well as to their domestic and international environment.

The Libyan case suggests that penal methods -i.e. coerciveness- can positively contribute to an entire overhaul of an outcast regime and to an alteration in its behaviour. But it also recognises that Libya’s leaders had some scope for choice and some freedom of manoeuvre; it asks how they defined and used those choices. This study helps to define the characteristics of the
governance of Libyan regime and their implications for policy-making and implementation. This in turn aids explanation of the nature and processes of Libya’s choices in its foreign policy orientation. Foreign policy appeared to some to be erratic and arbitrary, but it may in fact have had more reasonable grounds and processes. The thesis questions a common image that Libyan foreign policy was dominated by wholly irrational decision making, although no doubt it was primarily dominated by a single leader.

The theory of adaptive behaviour originally developed by Rosenau and Smith in the 1980s has continued to shape foreign policy studies, even though some of its features have been adapted or abandoned. Recent colloquia on the ‘state of the discipline’ in foreign policy studies point to the continuing importance of trying to give an account of foreign policy change. Starting with the theory of adaptive behaviour, the study examines the transformations of Libyan foreign policy and confirms the value of a version of this theory, at least as a starting point for enquiry, if it is modified and critiqued for the 2010s. It continues to offer deeper and more useful insights into foreign policy management in smaller as well as larger states, which allows for a new dimension to our considerations of the influences of a changed international system not only on pariah regimes, but also in relation to application on other cases. Furthermore, although the main claims to originality in the thesis turn on its contribution to knowledge in terms of the discovery of new information, the thesis makes an a modest additional contribution to knowledge in its theoretical development of arguments about how foreign policy change occurs.

Additionally, the originality of this thesis stems from using a new original material in the form of a range of important interviews. These were conducted with some of the key Libyan policy makers involved directly in the shaping and implementation of Libyan foreign policy during that period of time. That gives the study an opportunity to achieve a more sophisticated analysis.
The conclusions of the thesis are that Libyan leaders facing an enormous upheaval in their foreign policy context sought to limit the damage to their own position and to stabilise the regime in Tripoli. They did so first of all by the adjustment of foreign policy in consultation with Soviet leaders. But this proved to be inadequate, and a more radical response became necessary. Libyan foreign policy was, after some uncertainty and internal disagreement, turned towards a rapprochement with the West. So much is well known. The thesis shows how the process took place, how Libyan leaders responded to the crisis, how they tried to achieve wriggle room, sometimes but not always succeeding, and how they managed what came to be a relatively smooth transition to a pro-western orientation. In doing so, the fact that Libya was relatively a very small actor in a larger drama created opportunities for decision makers which they learned to take effectively. So the key themes of the thesis include the extent to which Libya had little choice, the extent to which decision makers recognised and used the choices they were able to find, the role of leadership and learning in foreign policy management, and the importance of domestic considerations in the external relations of governments, including the relatively small ones.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my father, to my beloved mother, to my wife, and to all my family.
Acknowledgements

All praise and thanks to Allah the Almighty, for giving me strength and ability to complete this study.

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and consideration as I have been leaving them on their own for several hours, whilst busy with the research at the university.

I am grateful for all the help I have received; however, the errors and omissions, as well as the judgements expressed here are the full responsibility of the author.
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## Abbreviations

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<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Anti-Ballistic Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSU</td>
<td>Communist Party of the Soviet Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CW</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons</td>
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<td>CWC</td>
<td>Chemical Weapons Convention</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPA</td>
<td>Foreign Policy Analysis</td>
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<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>(IR)</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>LIFG</td>
<td>Libyan Islamic Fighting Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations</td>
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<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OFAC</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Assets Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLO</td>
<td>Palestine Liberation Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Revolutionary Command Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDF</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALT</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks</td>
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<td>SALT II</td>
<td>Strategic Arms Limitation Talks II</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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Introduction

Two sets of factors seem to be essential in determining the foreign policy of states. The first group of factors are those linked to the outside environment within which they function; more specifically, the global political system and its subsystems. The second group are the internal environment, which involves the country’s geopolitical position, ethnic and religious structure, heritage, economic, military, and technological resources and needs, the type of the political systems, and philosophical/conceptual images and assumptions of decision makers.

There is no immunity for any state, regardless of its size or influence, from the effects of systemic factors. Nevertheless, smaller and less influential states are generally thought to be even more susceptible to systemic effects. This inconsistency in the degree of states’ vulnerability to systemic impacts can be ascribed to the fact that stronger and more influential states largely mould the rudimentary aspects of the international system and decide the underlying forces of regional struggle and collaboration, in addition to setting the rules that manage regional and global relationships.

However evidence from earlier work suggests that smaller and less influential states can perform better in a global system where there is a balance or rivalry between two or several larger states (Vital, 1967; Papadakis and Starr, 1987; Elman, 1995; Hinnebusch, 2006). However, these less powerful states may not perform well within a system either controlled by one key state or conjointly overseen by a limited number of major powers, which is particularly the case for those middle actors which, for geopolitical and economic factors, are of major significance to the key actor. These countries are particularly sensitive to modifications in the structure of the international political system, and the type of relationships bringing its key players together.
According to Gebril (1988) and Blackwell (2003), Libya can be classified as a characteristic example of a key middle power situated in a geopolitically sensitive region, which has been of particular importance to the major global actors, and thus Libya’s situation is extremely sensitive to alterations in the type of the global polity.

Despite the fact that the knowledge of foreign policy has received a significant amount of input from so many researchers, most consideration has been given to the study of foreign policy in the most developed and industrialised countries; however, the small countries including developing ones, like Libya, have not been widely taken into account (exceptions include Vital, 1967., Hey., 2003 and Ingebritsen 2006).

Recently, some of these countries have played a significant role in international relations. By way of illustration, the majority of post 1945 wars have taken place in those small countries, which provides clear evidence of their emerging role. The significance of the field of foreign policy has developed even further due to the new role of small states (Arab, 1988). Additionally, contrary to the conventional theory of those scholars in international relations who argue that small states do not have meaningful foreign policy choices and that they derive their foreign policy from a structure force in the global system as the noncore states (Waltz, 1979 is one example), Libyan foreign policy after the 1969 coup has raised significant questions about the constraints on smaller states. Notably, Libya has played a vital role in international relations, more than one might have anticipated from a smaller developing state. It does not show that the global structure’s impacts are unimportant; global structures clearly provide important constraints and limitations; but they do not wholly control states. States have the capacity for agency, and some countries such as Libya exploited the seams of international construction to play major roles in the global relations generally and its own region in particular (Sampson, 1994). This is not just a pragmatic issue relating to one case. It is at the same time one of the
major theoretical debates of the last generation, the agency-structure debate (Carlsnaes, 1992), a question which will be developed through the thesis.

The fall of the Soviet Union and the culmination of the Cold War clearly changed the nature of the global political system and regional relationships, and in the wake of such demise, the world was left under the dominance of the Americans, who clearly had an antagonistic approach to the Libyan leader (Interview: Dorda, 2010). As a result, Qaddafi was acutely aware of the United States’ intention to seek to take advantage of the emergent global conditions to deal a lethal blow to his status in and outside of Libya. Watching the impacting response of the United States to Iraq’s incursion of Kuwait in 1990 and the swift Russian tacit collaboration with the Americans, who led the anti-Iraq alliance, had a considerable effect on the Libyan regime. It was a distressful event for Qaddafi who started to realise how irrelevant the deep-seated Cold War patterns were becoming. Not only did the Russians disregard their obligation to their Iraq ally in its plight, but, even worse, they pursued a conflicting strategy of new political thinking that depended on global bodies reaching political resolutions to clashes before committing to military response. In fact, in the UN Security Council, the Russians endorsed the Americans’ vote to impose sanctions against the Iraqi regime. As for the Libyan president, this was seen as a catastrophic U-turn with the new Russian policy, given that Qaddafi’s political and military policies were based on the conventional Cold War situation.

In the meantime, Libya was concerned with other negative activities in its foreign policy, the most significant being the advent of fundamental Islam in the region. This phenomenon was increasingly threatening Qaddafi’s political influence. This thesis sheds light on the effect of these factors on the Libyan foreign policy orientations, which has perhaps been underestimated in other accounts.
More specifically, the general research aim of the thesis is to study the effect of the change which took place in the global order in the wake of the Soviet Union’s collapse on Libyan foreign policy, whereby the upshots of the change were that the global system was changed from bipolar to one that is (or perhaps was) to a certain extent unipolar (Wohlforth, 1999). In other words, it attempts to identify the variables which characterised the tendencies of Libyan foreign policy when faced with the international environment and the ensuing internal demands after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a dominant powerhouse in the international balance during the Cold War. Libya’s leadership held the objectives to change its relations with the rest of the world (especially in Africa and the Mediterranean) on the one hand and to maintain its grip domestically on the other.

Amidst international upheavals, Libyan foreign policy was interacting with its environment in accordance with the polarised duality, which was soon to dissipate by the implications causing the aforementioned collapse. Therefore, what could be the strategy prepared by the Libyan foreign policy in light of these implications and how did it deal with the new conditions causing this collapse? In other words what did Libya do to confront negative impact of this collapse?. This thesis investigates change in strategy or orientation, choice (agency) and diplomatic modes of negotiation and cooperation bilaterally and multilaterally. To answer this question this thesis has chosen to take as research hypothesis: The collapse of the Soviet Union produced new circumstances on the international stage which in turn directly impacted on the Libyan foreign policy represented in adopting new orientations to achieve its new goals such as the survival of its regime and its attempts to reintegrate positively in the new international order, and to keep its domestic society coherent. It has also adopted a new strategy which takes into account its inequality with its opponents while focusing on the importance of seeking moderation in foreign interactions due to the inequality aforementioned.
Chapter One: The Literature Review

There is a limited scope as far as a literature review of the Libyan foreign policy in the post-Soviet era is concerned because the existing literature is limited in scope and in quality. In fact, most research efforts have focused on the Libyan foreign policy during the Cold War period, with limited and in most cases insignificant reference or analysis of the period following the demise of the Soviet Union. Therefore, this thesis seeks to explore the entire impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on Libya foreign policy within the period from 1991 to 2003. The choice of this topic and its time scope, as well as the focus for this study can be ascribed to different reasons. Initially, the downfall of the Soviet Union left behind small, precariously positioned countries, including Libyans who considered the Soviets as their strongest allies during their most difficult conditions and thus depended upon their support and aid. Furthermore, the choice of the time scope refers to the date of the fall of the Soviet Union on the one hand and to the time when Libya started to succumb to the new international system and to adapt its policy to be compatible with that of the new system.

To achieve this aim, the thesis explores the existing literature on Libyan-Soviet relations in the Cold War era and on the entire range of Libyan foreign policy subsequent to that period, thus allowing the researcher to figure out the shortages and gaps in the subject that need to be considered throughout this study.

Libya is significantly strategic due to its important location within an envied area of the world. That strategic position contributes to its visibility and prominence on a global stage, in addition to assigning its foreign policy a further regional importance. Moreover, the interests and political aspirations of the two global forces had been cut across by the strategic position of Libya in the aftermath of the World War Two as they took into consideration at the centre of the then on-going struggle between them the enforcement of their authority on international
areas of influence and to create some power balance styles (Othman, 2006; Straw, 2011). This was a crucial reason behind the rivalry among the two power blocs after 1945 to apply their influence and control over Libya, which could have been a pivotal factor to allow Libya to seek independence as they did not reach a settlement on a trusteeship on the region in the 1940s (Lahwej, 1998).

There was a tenacious debate over the Libyan future soon after World War II, especially with the Soviet Union’s hopes pinned on increasing its presence and political influence in the Mediterranean Basin and Middle Eastern region. The strategic importance of Libya was acknowledged by the Soviet Union; therefore, it suggested gaining trusteeship on Tripolitania which the United States, Great Britain and France had declined (Lahwej, 1998, p. 19).

According to Blackwell (2003) and Kelly (2000), in the aftermath of the Second World War period, and during an anxious spell prompted by the Cold War, the Soviet Union pushed for the UN guardianship of Tripolitania in the Autumn of 1945. As such, there was a growing concern in the western hemisphere regarding the former global powerhouse’s influence on the African continent as it represented a major threat to their interests in the Middle Eastern and African region. For these interests to be protected, the Western allies were vehemently in support of Libyan sovereignty in the 1950s and 1960s.

Subsequently, the Soviet Union approached the King of Libya to establish friendly ties as the latter’s kingdom happened to be well placed in the Mediterranean region according to the Soviet Union’s foreign policy makers; however, diplomatic relationships only started around the 1950s because of the Libyan regime’s seemingly pro-Western orientations. As a result, the Soviet Union moved quickly to acknowledge and provide support for the Libyan coup which soon - on the fourth of September 1969 - brought Qaddafi to the helm. Within three days from the successful coup, the Soviets informed the head of the state through their embassy in Tripoli
that they fully support the Libyan revolution and that they are willing to offer any type of help for the ascending regime. In the meantime, the Libyan radio in the capital Tripoli pronounced that the existence of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean region stopped the Britain government from considering the return of the monarchy to the political life in Libya. According to St John (1987), an evident indication was carried in this radio report to the predisposition of the leaders of the council of revolution to gain assistance from the Soviet Union on the one hand and to also to safeguard itself from any external danger one the other.

Over the years, Libyan American relations have been going downhill due to numerous reasons including the distinctive ties of the U.S. with Israel, which made it hard to Libya to preserve friendly relationships with the White House. In light of the U.S. constant help offered for Israel to maintain its grip on the Palestinian lands (Al-Qaddafi, 1979). It is well documented that the American governments past and present have constantly provided Israel with huge economic assistance and military equipment, which included the most sophisticated artillery in the American military field (El-khawas, 1986). Another reason can be explained by Qaddafi’s opinion that the U.S. has intentionally left the Arabs’ military acquisition and armament at its lowest and weakest by denying them the purchase of advanced weaponry. Paradoxically, as El-khawas (1986) suggested, such a policy resulted in Libya shifting towards setting up friendlier terms with the Soviet Union. The latter was prepared to provide the arms Qaddafi requested to streamline his armed forces and reinforce their military competence to protect both Libyan and Arab sovereignties.

With regards the Soviet Union, Qaddafi as a Muslim, he is disposed to object to Marxism and its materialist ideology, which marked his early pronouncement to keep his distance from the Soviet Union, which he labelled an imperialist force (Ronen, 2008). In October 1973, for example, Qaddafi called the Soviet Union the bitter enemy of the Arab people by claiming that the Soviet Union boasting about the airlift of arms to Egypt and Syria in their October War led
the Nixon administration then to start its massive campaign to arm Israel; as such, in his opinion, Moscow had provided the Arab countries with defensive rather than offensive armaments, which made it impossible for the Arabs to triumph in an armed conflict (Ronen, 2008).

Given the role of Qaddafi and responding to the issue of who is in charge of the foreign policy decision making in Libya, there is almost a total consensus in this respect among critics. It seems that scholars following events in Libya have all agreed that the country’s foreign policy cannot be separated from the long standing leader Qaddafi himself, not only as he was the leader of the coup, but also due to the impacts of his beliefs and opinions on major stakeholders in deciding and implementing the Libyan foreign policy (Bearman, 1986; Blundy & Lycett, 1987; El-khawas, 1986; Harris, 1986; Parker, 1984; Sicker, 1987; Zartman & Kluge, 1983; Wright, 1982). Without a shred of doubt, Colonel Qaddafi is seen as the chief decision maker of the state when analysing the decision-making process in Libya.

Zartman & Kluge (1983) make clear that, Qaddafi is considered the major source of policy making in Libya, manifested to an even larger extent in his approach to foreign policy than to domestic affairs. It is him who has the authority to make important decisions and provide the ethical considerations for such strategic choices. In short, he has been the leading foreign policy character on the national and global stage.

As revealed by Wright (1982), the virtually unchallenged authority of the leader Qaddafi in terms of the Libyan policy making looked to turn the typical management of foreign policy into an individual operation conducted by the Colonel, or in his favour.

In spite of the emergence of the Jamahiriya (the state of the masses) which was established on the 2nd of March 1977 and the presumably stepping down of Colonel Qaddafi and the members of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) from their positions as the then leading
authority in the country, Colonel Qaddafi remains to be the major and exclusive source of foreign policy making.

According to El-khawas (1986), even though Qaddafi surrendered his formal governmental post, he has managed to stay at the helm as the head of state, mainly due to his impact as the leader of the coup, which earned him remarkable status and contributed to his on-going control of the political life in Libya. As such, he has indisputably become the man in total charge of top-level and crucial decisions.

Niblock (2002) makes clear that, Qaddafi has clearly been the central figure in the forming of the Libyan foreign policy. No major decision is likely to be taken unless it has been specifically approved by him.

Alexander (1981) is arguably the only writer identified as not conceding Qaddafi’s status as the major source of Libya’s foreign policy. He claims that the geography, history, and social forms of formerly Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and the Fezzan largely affected the foreign policy followed by the socialist people’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.

As for Solomon and Swart (2005), their research shows that Libya’s foreign policy resulted in the creation of at least two prominent schools of thought; with the first considering the issue from the viewpoint of the psychological factors of Colonel Qaddafi’s character, typically seeing in the Colonel an absurd and power-crazy individual, whose hegemonic determinations are boundless and who has no sense of reality. As for the second school of thought, it discusses Qaddafi’s ideological inclinations and considers him as a more balanced man who devoted himself to the pursuit of a number of principles such as Arab patriotism, Islamic reformism and utopian socialism which, according to him, stands for his third universal theory. In all fairness, there was a good deal of controversy and political bombshells in Qaddafi’s foreign policy. One could easily argue why for instance, Qaddafi, being an Arab nationalist, supported the
Ethiopians in their struggle against the Sudanese, knowing that the former were primarily Christians and the latter (under President Nimeiri) were Arabs with a Muslim majority in power.

Ideology and power in the Libyan foreign policy was largely debated with reference to Libyan-American relations by Lahwej (1998) in his research in which he gave his account in five major points as follows: Essential to the development of his charisma, Qaddafi adapted a number of moral values which emanated from the Muslim faith. According to Abdul al-Maniem al-Howni (1995), the former Libyan Foreign Minister and part of the previous opposition to the Qaddafi regime, the Islamic morals in Qaddafi had a deep impact upon comrades who became members of the Free Unionist Officers Movement. The same source claimed that Qaddafi was punctual when performing prayers and he was determined that the same applied to his followers.

According to Shembesh (1975), as opposed to the realist school’s supposition, the major factors of Libya’s changing foreign policy were the leader’s character, ideology and perceptions.

As for El-khawas (1986), he indicates that, the Libyan leader claimed that both the capitalist and communist ideologies have isolated the crowds away from any significant opportunities to have a share in the countrywide affluences and riches. According to Qaddafi, the failures of capitalism can be ascribed to the increased status of man at the expense of collectivity; whereas communism highlighted collective endeavours and neglected the human element. According to Shembesh, (1975) Qaddafi sternly believed that the Indian offensive on East Pakistan was deliberately schemed and executed by means of a conspiracy between India and the Soviet Union. At a time when the Soviet Union voted a cessation of hostilities (ceasefire) and a withdrawal resolution in the Security Council, India was engaged in overpowering East Pakistan. As a result, Qaddafi had started some relentless campaigns against both India and the Soviet Union as co-associates in the offence.
El-khawas (1986) shows that the North African state declared a policy of non-alignment and positive neutrality from the dawn of the Libyan revolution to protect the country from any external manipulation. It is Qaddafi’s ideological principles that determined his choice of a non-alignment policy, which is highlighted by Libya’s reiteration of its right to cope with any leading force, irrespective of its own beliefs or policies.

It should be noted that Bazamah (1975) shed light on how Colonel Qaddafi criticised the United States and its allies among the reactionary regimes in the Arab region for their contribution to the failed Arab unity attempts, for no reason other than fearing that such unity might hinder their global and political interests in the region.

Another claim is put forward by Gebril (1988) which defines Libya’s policy toward the Soviet Union as a critical one. Due to his strong faith, Qaddafi found in the Soviet Union place for disbelievers. As the Soviet Union is an imperial force in pursuit of dominating smaller states; therefore, it is cannot be distinguished from the U.S. imperialistic and colonial inclination.

Based on the foregone, Libya’s attitude was characterised by an anti-communist behaviour in many incidents. For example, Harris (1986) stated that Qaddafi was on the offensive regarding Sadat’s close links with the Soviet authorities in the 1970s and was in favour of expelling the Soviet military consultants in Egypt and the Middle East. Similarly, Heikal (1975) mentioned that Qaddafi assisted in the blocking of the Marxist coup d'état in Sudan in 1971 and contributed to a large extent in the retention of power by Numiri. As reported by Bearman (1986), Qaddafi recalled the Libyan ambassador from Bagdad in protest for Iraq’s settlement of a friendship arrangement with the Soviets in April 1972.

It was suggested that Qaddafi’s idea of the communist states which had no experience or effect on the Arab region at that time was fashioned largely around religious principles (Bearman, 1986; Blundy & Lycett, 1987; El-khawas, 1986; and Harris, 1986). For him, communist
regimes were based on atheist theories, which was intolerable to Qaddafi and for the Muslim population in Libya. Moreover, communism was considered as an imperialist power contending with western nations over the wealth and riches of the developing countries.

According to Amoretti (1984) religion, along with nationalism, vastly contributed to the shaping of Qaddafi’s character. There is a much more influential role of Islam over Muslims than any internationalist agenda, which justifies the claim of the Islamic faith to be halfway between capitalism and communism, while striving for progress, social justice and integrity. As such, class struggle becomes largely inadequate as an instrument to attain real justice.

However, in the early 1970s, Qaddafi was forced into modifying his views about the Soviet Union in an attempt to put an end to the embargoes placed on the political and economic activities and to gain Soviet Union support in terms of Libya’s military prowess. This took place soon after the U.S declined selling Libya arms, which was seemingly the turning point in the Libyan foreign policy as far as the Soviet Union was concerned (El-khawas, 1986).

As shown by El-khawas (1986), Qaddafi had to alter his approach toward the Soviet Union in an attempt to break the isolation that Libya was forced into and to gain the Soviet support for Libya’s military expansion, following the U.S.’s rejection to provide him with weapons. There was a clear frustration as Qaddafi was unable to persuade Egypt and Syria to engage into an all-out conflict against the Israelis in 1973 and to assume a key role in the Arab oil embargo against the U.S for its alliance with Israel during the armed conflict. After his disappointment to achieve union with Egypt, Qaddafi had to resort to a more flexible diplomacy in an attempt to promote his policy aims.

Seeking stronger ties with the Soviet Union, Qaddafi, who adopted anti-Soviet attitudes, offered to stand down from administration and dedicate full time to the revolutionary work, which was a tactical change intended to convince the Soviet leaders of the Libyan aspirations.
to enhance relationships and to offer Major Abdulsalam Jallud, who is the Libyan second most influential political personality (A member of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Prime Minister) an opportunity to come closer to Moscow. In fact, this was not difficult to achieve as both Moscow and Tripoli were antagonistic toward Egypt’s President El-Sadat. Not only Sadat had turned down Qaddafi’s proposal for a union between the two countries, but he had also ousted a few thousand Soviet consultants from Egypt in June 1972, resulting in better relationships with the U S. Moreover, both Libya and the Soviet Union were dedicated to playing down and challenging the American control and existence in the Middle Eastern region (El-khawas 1986).

To some extent, the Soviet Union gained from Libya’s offer. To begin with, this would compensate from losing Egypt, specifically the marine services in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, it would be worthwhile for the Soviets to find a new market for their weapons in Libya, which offered to exchange them for hard currency using the American Dollar.

Even though Qaddafi has fought back pressure to provide the Soviets with a naval base in the Mediterranean, which would compensate for their eviction from Egypt in 1972, the Soviets were gradually and silently pushing him toward surrendering them virtual basing rights in Libya. A result of this development there was a shift in the balance of power in the Mediterranean in support of the USSR.

As highlighted by Glukhov (1977), all round development and the consolidation of amicable and mutually beneficial collaboration with the Soviet Union was one of the major aims of the Libyan foreign policymakers. This was also shown in the decision of the Libyan General People's Congress, which had a meeting at the end of November 1976 and came to the conclusion that the solidification of ties with the USSR was a cornerstone of the Libyan foreign policy.
It should be noted that the Soviet Union found some benefits in Libya’s approach; first of all, it would make amends from the defeat in Egypt; second, it was thought that the armament deal would be lucrative for the Soviets in case they managed to impose their terms on Libya as the latter was willing to pay in hard currency for all weapon transactions, which in turn could supply the USSR with much-sought after foreign exchange to buy Western technology and equipment. Not only that, the Soviets could also count on Qaddafi’s willingness to contest the western existence in the highly strategic regions of the world due to a pledge to endorse radical changes through the employment of force in the pro-western states.

Reconciliation with Moscow allowed Qaddafi to receive Soviet artillery and to follow his revolutionary objectives. For almost three decades, Soviet Union and its allies have provided Qaddafi with a 20 billion dollar worth of weaponries which was far beyond his country’s security and peacekeeping requirements and the abilities of his military forces (Haley, 1984). As such, the military help made Tripoli and Moscow come closer to each other as Libya maintained its dependence on Soviet military experts to give training Libyan forces on how to use of Soviet weapons and equipment.

There have been many sources that claim Libyan foreign policy was for some time characterised by a number of policies deemed unacceptable for the Western hemisphere. Among these policies was the close links that Libya had with the then Soviet Union and the increasing role played by the former global superpower in the Middle East and parts of Africa with the help of Libya (Freedman, 1987; Cooley, 1981; Collins, 1974. Ogunbadejo1983 ).

Conversely, Libya’s audacious attempts to reinforce ties with the Soviet Union raised alarm bells both in the west and among pro-western governments in the Arab world. For example, the western and pro-western Arab mass media argued that Libya was placing its services such as land, air, and naval bases at the disposal of the Soviets. In fact, Libya refuted all such
allegations of using the USSR to counter the Western and American presence in the Middle East and other African nations. Still, the relationships between Tripoli and the Kremlin clearly had been growing from strength to strength according to the then most recent Soviet arms sales to Libya (El-kihia, 1997).

The year 1976 (6th of December) saw the first visit of Qaddafi to the Soviet Union where he declared that Libya’s friendship with Moscow was not to be considered short-lived but rather strategic, and his trip was a living proof to the strong and advanced level of the Libyan-Soviet Union ties (Alter, 2005). In the mid-1970s, the USSR-Libya collaboration was in fact at its peak, which impacted on the Middle Eastern and African policies of both states. In addition, the Libyan-Soviet alliance was not reliant or based on any communist agenda, and Qaddafi’s condemnation of communism notwithstanding, less vigorous than before as he had recognised that the country was in need for the Soviet Union after he dissociated his country from Western forces.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union benefited from intensifying Libyan-Egyptian disputes to strengthen its grip in Libya with the additional aim of improving its image as a reliable supporter of the Middle East and elsewhere far and near. As such, Moscow backed Libya in its conflict with the Egyptians in 1977 by providing a substantial amount of military help throughout the neighbouring countries’ conflict (Heikal, 1975).

Ronen (2002) stressed the political and military dependence that distinguished Libyan foreign policy from its Soviet counterpart ever since the mid-1970s. In point of fact, Moscow turned out to be Libya’s only foreign ally and a sizable counterforce to its Western threats. As such, the collapse of the Soviet Union and its ensuing disintegration as a global force was a turning point in Libyan foreign policy and international relations. Moreover, the 1990s witnessed a leading role for America in the new world order following the Soviet Union’s fall from grace,
thus forcing the Libyan policy makers to alter their foreign policy that became incompatible with the balance of power shifting towards the United States and its allies.

Similarly, Shearman (1987) claimed that the Soviet’s influence in the Middle East was confined to providing logistic support for the more fundamentalist Arab countries; namely, Syria, Yemen, Algeria and Libya. In both cases, the relationship was mainly limited to military equipment and deals, and this made the West adopt an attitude that classified Syria and Libya as supporters of global terrorism and radicalism. However, not on one occasion has Libya knowingly dissociated itself from terrorist acts, cooperatively disapproving of any terrorist behaviour for which the country was held responsible by the West. In the meantime, and in pursuit of some political gains and reinstated influence following the American air raids on Libya in April 1986, the Soviet Union responded very mildly. There existed no bilateral cooperation and friendship treaties between the Soviet Union and Libya, thus it could be considered an incongruity to classify Libya as a partner or ally to the Soviet Union. Libya’s external efforts were seen as eccentric at best; one reason that discouraged Gorbachev from expanding his country’s ties with Libya was that it could have undermined his overall strategy with the more important countries in the region if he became too closely associated with the unpredictable North African state.

However, Mendras (1987) indicated that changes in the Soviet Union’s policy were shifting towards regaining Soviet influence and to invigorate links with some anti-imperialist countries such as Libya. Accordingly, in the aftermath of the American strikes in 1986, the Soviet Union provided Libya with more political and logistic support in the sake of refreshing its influence. According to Hinnebusch and Ehteshami (2002), the prospect of the Soviet Union’s subsiding capability to back regional ‘friends’ had produced a tendency toward stronger inter-Arab ties.
As such, Libya was among the leading Arab forces to establish supportive relations with the majority of other Arab regimes so as to safeguard its interests and its regime’s lifespan.

Following some serious setbacks in his relations with the United States and neighbouring Egypt, Al-Qaddafi arranged another trip to Moscow in the hope of striking a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union; nevertheless, his second envoy did not make it past the preliminary arrangements to tailor a treaty of this magnitude, and no formal agreement had yet been reached (Laird & Hoffmann, 1986).

David (1986) indicated that the Soviet Union benefited from the military and non-military coups in the developing world and acknowledged that almost the only solution was for a pro-Soviet government to be at the helm in one of these developing regions which could only occur by resorting to violence. As such, the coups were the most common and recurrent method employed by countries wishing to win the support of the Soviet Union, such as the Libyan regime.

Some critics, such as St John (2008), mentioned that ideological similarity has never played such a significant role in the relationship between Libya and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, Qaddafi’s interests were well-suited to the Soviet interests, especially with regards to restricting Western intervention and its impacts in some regions.

Lahwej (1998), also stated that in the wake of the United States’ attack on the Gulf of Sidra and during Qaddafi visit to Moscow in 1981 The Soviets piled the pressure on the Libyan leader for naval amenities to react to the United States military strikes or at least to apply diplomatic pressure against the American strong-arm attitude against him and when Libya turning down such conditions, the Soviets and Libyans brought their differences into the fore. Therefore, The Leader of Soviets, Brezhnev mentioned that,
“Our states differ from each other in many ways. There are also certain difference of an ideological order between us. But this does not prevent us from being good comrades and brother-in-arms, in the struggle against imperialism, oppression and aggression” (Sicker, 1987. P, 107).

According to Menon (1982), the Soviet policy makers would have to guard against some consequences which might originate from their resolution to depend on weapon sales in comparison to economic assistance as a main tool of their third world foreign policy. An additional likely consequence exemplifying the Libyan Soviet ties here was that the enormous consignments of the Soviet weaponry augmented both the desire and the influence of Qaddafi to follow his regional aims such as his war in with Chad. Nevertheless, these weaponry shipments did not by any means add to the Soviet power to a level where it could ensure that the objectives selected by Libya and the ways employed to follow them were well-matched to the Soviet interests in the region.

Bienen (1982) states that, even though the Soviets claimed that they were the supporters and guarantors of the political independence of some countries, such as, Libya which adopted anti-western slogans. It could be argued that here are some elements of truth to this claim. For example, had it not been for the backing provided by the Soviet Union for Libya, Egyptian activities against Libya might have been more forceful.

The study by Metz (2004) shows that Libya was experiencing a few problems in acquiring arms from Western governments. Therefore, the Soviet-Libyan convergence was an expected outcome of these settings. The Soviet-Libyan links have been grounded principally on communal self-interest. While Libya needed a regular source of armament, the Soviet Union saw in Libya an important source of hard currency which was a valuable opportunity not to be missed. As such, Moscow provided Libya with enormous amounts of sophisticated weapons,
army training, and technical support, while Libya in return extended Moscow’s right which was just to use limitedly the Libyan military infrastructure, along with other packages such as oil for energy and hard currency.

According to Arab (1988), Libya consolidated ties with communist states go a long way to foreground the leader of Libya’s value on its relations as his strongest value is anti-imperialism.

A study by El-khawas (1986) and Gebril (1988) concluded that it was not until some political upheavals took place in the region; more specifically, the Israeli- Egyptian disengagement agreement in 1974 and the shift of Egypt into the Western camp that Libya recognisably built some strong ties with the Soviet Union. Included in these relations was essentially the enhancement of the Libyan military abilities, due primarily to the fact that Libya was turned down by the Americans and other western countries in respect to armament.

The Libyan supply of Soviet munitions raised some eyebrows that Libya might be employed as a regional force to back the Soviet ambitious plans in the Mediterranean basin and the African continent (El-khawas 1986). This inference can be ascribed to two major observations; on the one hand, the Soviet Union had participated diplomatic manoeuvres with the West in the 1940s with regards to the question of the Libyan independence and sovereignty. On the other hand, the existence of Soviet army consultants and experts along the Soviet weapons was projected to be in the range of 1,750 in 1978. Therefore, the Libyan assistance for national liberty groups and activities as well as its anti-West political stance convinced the Soviet Union to side with the Libyan authorities considering that these similar strategies and approaches worked well for them and allowed both countries to have a stronger influence and a wider presence in the Third World for a period that spanned from the 1970s to the late 1980s. Nevertheless, Libyan anti-Communist and Arab nationalist policies restricted the Soviet army’s specialists’ operation to a merely maintenance role and also to supervise the arms’
movement. Similarly, with the removal of British and American bases from Libya in 1970, this showed that there would be no negotiation and reconciliation over Libyan independence. As such, the Soviet Union was not permitted to use Libyan lands and airspace until 1986 with the visit of the Soviet navy to the Libyan port of Tripoli to show Soviet backing for Libya with the U.S. upping its pressure on Qaddafi’s regime.

Even though Egypt and Libya were members of the non-aligned movement and technically neutral states and did not supply military bases for either the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Forces (NATO) or Warsaw Pact armies, they however gained military access to those forces whether by means of naval visits in Libya or by arranging shared military exercises and entry to Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) in neighbouring Egypt. These activities were carried out as part of the Superpowers’ backing given to their client and to reinforce the range of their influence (Lahwej, 1998).

It is important to note that the Soviet anti-imperialism brought Qaddafi closer as a strategic ally to the Soviet Union. There were successive arms agreements in return for hard currency, which removed the barrier of ideology and established the cornerstone of Soviet-Libyan ties. As a final point, the regional competition between Libya and Egypt and the contribution of the global forces in the middle of their dissimilarities pressed Libya to pursue relationships with the Soviet Union.

Once the Soviet Union ceased to have any influence on the international stage, Libya no longer received the same diplomatic and military support as it used to since Qaddafi’s ascent to office in 1969. In the post-Cold War, for example, Libya played a low-key role during the Gulf war and was closer to Egypt in its foreign policy approach with the expectation that such a decision might enhance its image in the Western hemisphere. Libya was also hopeful that the adjustment of policy might impact on the Bush government to inverse its antecedent’s strong-arm
diplomacy against Libya and employ economic actions instead. The aim of economic procedures would be to weaken the mounting European trade with the Libyan government. As a result, a total of 48 state and global companies were banned by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) from dealing with Libya as they supposedly broke the Outstanding U.S. economic endorsements against Libya (Lahwej, 1998). The other concern was related to a spread of chemical weapons that might take place. In response, the U.S. interfered so that the West German company cut short its Rabta chemical weapons enterprise near the Libyan capital (Lahwej, 1998).

The Libyan–American relationships during the period spanning from 1969 to 1982 could be summed up in a number of points Gebril, (1988). Where a strong Soviet threat is perceived by the United States, along with an antagonistic policy from Libya toward the USSR, then the United States would seek a reconciliation with the Libyan authorities, in spite of the latter’s enmity and unfriendliness toward other U. S. regarding certain issues, including access to oil and the Israeli Palestinian conflict, as well as its radical activities against administrations allying with the Americans. If the United States notices a strong Soviet danger, with a moderate Libyan policy toward the USSR, the United States will as a result apply minimal force on the Libyan authorities (Gebril, 1988). If there is little or minimal threat on the United from the Soviet Union, alongside a friendly attitude from Libya toward the USSR, the United States will then seek reconciliation with Libya, providing that other variables are kept constant (Gebril, 1988). If the United States is faced with a potential Soviet risk, and where Libyan relationships with the Soviet Union are extremely friendly, the United States will consequently assume a hostile policy by applying more pressure and adopting an interventionist strategy toward Libya (Gebril, 1988).
Over the years, the cooperation between the Soviet Union and Libya in the economic, commercial, cultural among other fields had been growing, which could be largely due to the regular visits exchanged by the leaders of the two countries to strengthen these ties.

As rightly also pointed out by Zoubir (2002), the diplomatic ties between Libya and the United States continued to go downhill as Libya, which was not evidently aligned, made it clear that it was politically and militarily closer to the Soviet camp. On the other hand, the Americans took Libya’s reconciliation with the Soviet bloc as evidence of its acceptance to be a Soviet ally.

Mutual respect and meeting shared objectives characterised the Libyan-Soviet relations. This was shown particularly in their common views regarding many international topics and events, combined with a common interest to provide support for the nationalistic independence seekers in the Middle East and all over the globe, and to combat vigorously against colonialism, expansionism and discrimination. As such, consolidation of friendly ties between the Soviet Union and Libya was extremely significant for both countries.

Phillips (1984) correctly argues that, even though the Libyan leader adopted an anti-Soviet Union stance after taking charge in 1969, he nevertheless and rightly speaking grew closer and on the same wavelength with the Soviet camp; more specifically once they ironed out their policy differences, they expanded military cooperation among other fields. In spite of conflicting ideological tendencies, Libyan and Soviet decision makers had similar, if not identical, regional aims since both strived to challenge western presence and influence (American in particular) in the North African and the Middle Eastern regions. In addition, both the Soviet Union and Libya were firm in their endeavour to blockade a U.S. brokered solution of the Arab–Israeli war, as well as in destabilising prevailing pro-western governments in the region.
Around the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union started to be actively engaged in the building of a wide-ranging army infrastructure for the Libyan government, which was aimed first and foremost to serve the interests of the Soviets in the region. For instance, most of the airbases were updated to meet the Soviet guidelines, along with the installation of military docking amenities able to service Soviet naval vessels across the Libyan harbours. A total of $5 billion were invested between 1974 and 1980 by the Moscow administration to strengthen the Libyan military capabilities over and beyond arms sales, which had already been thriving. Despite the opposition shown by Libya to allow Soviet bases to be established over their own soil, it nevertheless accepted to grant the Soviets leave to fly Libyans from Libyan air bases to oversee and check NATO marine activities and military bases near Libyan borders. Access was also given to the Soviets to airfield and use supply facilities during Soviet airlifts to other African countries such as Mozambique and Angola (Harris, 1986).

Furthermore, after the Sirte Gulf incident took place in August 1981 when two Libyan jet armed forces were brought down following their attack on two U.S. jets, the Libyan leader expressed his desperate need to form any military alliance with anyone willing to withstand the Americans. As a result of this development, the Soviet-Libyan military collaboration reached new heights in November 1982 with mutual naval training being carried out, in addition to an exceptional Soviet submarine visit being paid to the Libyan Mediterranean port of Tobruk, which made the Soviet–Libyan cooperation grow stronger than ever during that period.

As rightly argued by St John (1982), ideological compatibility did not play much of a role in the developing Soviet-Libyan bilateral affairs. In reality, the early phases were regarded as being to a certain extent ideologically antipathetic since the views of the Libyan authority was totally the opposite to those of the Soviet Union. In 1975, and reacting to information that Libya had allowed the Soviet Union to use its soil to establish military bases, Colonel Qaddafi stressed that Libya had only commercial and not ideological association with the Soviet Union.
Apart from lack of ideological affinity, the Soviets did not show any intentions to ideologically influence Libya any more than they had done so in other African or Middle Eastern countries, which had made the governments of the two countries at that time emphasise the resemblance of many of their standpoints, thus ironing out their ideological dissimilarities. On the other hand, the Soviets find in their association with Libya an excellent opportunity to follow both strategic and political ambitions in the region, as in destabilising the western presence, and facilitating the logistical issues related to the support and maintenance of a seafaring force in the Mediterranean Sea. There are other Soviet motivations for this including a desire to gain hard currency and early domination over an oil source if they run short of national supplies. Lastly, the Soviet administration considered a close arms links with the Libyan leader as a way to recover some of the power and influence it used to have in Egypt upon the expulsion of the Soviet experts in 1972 by the president Anwar Sadat. Therefore, it can be argued that the seemingly closer relationships between Libyan and Soviet governments had been strengthened and nurtured as a result of the cold blood between the United States and Libya and the pressure exerted by the United States on selected leaders such as Qaddafi who moved further from the Western camp into the Soviet Union.

As indicated by McCormick (1987), the Soviet signed an agreement with Libya in 1975 that would allow the Soviet naval forces to utilise of the Tobruk and Bardia port amenities, in addition to Wheelus and El Adem, which were formerly used as bases for the American and British air forces. There was also an increased Soviet interest to gain access to Libyan coastal facilities with the Libyan-Egypt relations (1976-77) deteriorating and with the increasing Libyan participation in the uprising in north of Chad. It was this type of collaboration between the Soviets and the Libyans that had forced the Soviet to be indirectly implicated in the support of the Libyan authorities in 1985-86 against the American naval and air strikes in the Gulf of Sidra. Notably, the first strong indication of this Soviet involvement was in the aftermath of
the 1985 strike that befell the Rome and Vienna airports, which was soon to draw an unequivocal response from the Americans (McCormick, 1987). Expecting a likely U.S. attack against the Libyan leader, the Soviet naval army was positioned in the surrounding locality of the American carriers near the Libyan coastal area to be on high alert of any U.S. strike. It was largely known that any information on U.S. activities at that time was being communicated to the Soviet shore forces and in turn passed to the Libya authorities as and when thought necessary. Nonetheless, the Soviet impact over Libyan affairs was quite restricted despite the aforesaid. It is still believed that despite being generally a dependable tool for safeguarding short term interests, the Soviet military aid had surely not been confirmed to be a guarantee of policy control. Not only the Soviet relationships with Libya were based on some larger institutional or ideological premises, but their impact was also based on specific issues and on the principles of the market place rather than on the principles of command. In addition, the outcomes of this bilateral cooperation were not always entirely agreeable from a Soviet perspective, especially when it comes to the issue of basing rights. In spite of the fact that the Soviets were firmly established in Libya, they were not able to gain unrestricted and independent access to amenities aground, no matter how many times they had tried to do so.

As clearly indicated by Laird and Hoffmann (1986), being a major market for Soviet arms, Libya attempted to enhance its already solid relations with the Soviet Union in the aftermath of another slump in its relations with the American and the Egyptian administrations in 1983 by deploying the second most important figure in the then Libyan political scene Abdulsalam Jallud to Moscow to seek the establishment of a treaty of alliance and mutual aid with the Soviet Union. However, Jallud came back with just only a preliminary agreement to strike a deal of this sort (Freedman, 1991).

David (1986) correctly argues that the Soviet Union did indirectly and successfully defend its North African regime from overthrows through the East German ‘consultants’ who played a
decisive role in protecting Libya’s president Qaddafi from being brought down in 1980. Not only did Qaddafi go unscathed this time around, but he also survived major upheavals and failed uprisings threatening his rule in 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984 and 1985 respectively. Even though there is little evidence showing East Germany’s involvement in defending Qaddafi against these attempts; however, the existence of nearly 2000 East Germans in Libya overseeing the secret police and providing training for Qaddafi’s personal security guards goes a long way to point to that direction.

Similarly, Dawisha., and Dawisha (1982) indicates that while the Israelis were in the thick of action in Lebanon, the Libyan–Soviet relationship witnessed a shaky phase as the Soviet Union restricted their support to political and diplomatic efforts. As such, the Libyan leader, seen in the West as a firm protector of Soviet interests in the developing region of the Middle East and North Africa, sent for the Soviet representatives for an official warning. He threatened that the honeymoon period between the Arab progressive governments and the communist and socialist states was about to come to an abrupt end. There were considerable threats similar to those encircling the Palestinian struggle, and while Beirut was burning, so were the Arab-Soviet ties.

As pointed out by Menon (1982), in spite of the enormous deliveries of Soviet artillery which increased the Libyan leader’s aspirations and authority for more regional expansion, these consignments did not still augment the Soviet role to a level where the Soviet Union could ensure that the objectives sought by the Libyans and the tools utilised to follow them would be in keeping with the Soviet interests. The Kremlin could not disregard the option that a strike by Soviet-armed Libya on Egypt and Sudan which were supported by the U.S. would increase the latter’s presence, involvement and possibly hostility.

Freedman (1991) has indicated that, there was suggestion relating to the solid friendship ties between Libya and the Soviet Union when the source of the decision to deploy the SAM-5s to
Libya could have been ascribed to Qaddafi’s trip to Moscow in the mid-1980s. During that period, the Libyan leader was under increasing pressure from the United States, which forced him to seek increased military aid and, perhaps, an official agreement of friendship and collaboration with the Soviet administration. Even if Qaddafi sought to fulfil that aim, it was not possible for him to do so during the visit, in spite of an agreement being signed in terms of political consultation, a consular pact, and a long term package with the objective of developing and extending economic, scientific/technical, and commercial partnership. Even though Libya was a valuable economic market for the Soviet Union (this is in spite of the dropping oil prices resulting in more difficulties facing Libya especially when purchasing weapons), the constant skirmishes of Qaddafi’s with the Arab countries were not welcomed in Moscow, which was clearly highlighted in Gorbachev’s dinner speech with the latter stressing the importance of a united Arab front. Nevertheless, the mutual communique delivered after the conference was significantly warmer in tone than earlier statements which followed summits talks between the Libyan and Soviet administrations. In addition, it unveiled the strongest position yet signifying the Soviet Union support for Libya against the United States in particular, with the two parties denouncing the growing military and economic strains caused by the American administration and upon which Libya was the target of a defamatory campaign. There was a staunch opposition to the growing U.S. military influence in the region and a widespread condemnation of the offensive military manoeuvres taking place in the Mediterranean by U.S. forces. In relation to these reoccurring incidents, they specified that using or threatening to use force in international relations is unacceptable. An additional reason influencing the Soviet Union decision to deploy SAM 5s to Libyan soils was the revelation in early November regarding President Reagan’s approval of an undercover job by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to weaken Qaddafi’s administration. There was a quick Soviet condemnation of the American plan; however, Qaddafi expected weapons from the Soviets than he did rhetoric, resulting in
the deployment of the SAM 5s. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was risking so much by accelerating its support to Qaddafi and supplying Libya with the missile; thus by strengthening the Qaddafi regime, the Soviet Union had to run the risk of either confronting a superpower or being humiliated if a strike was to hit Libya, irrespective of the Soviets’ opinion. Having said this, the Soviet leader could have sensed that the Americans, who previously had pretentiously condemned both terrorism and the Libyan association with it but never taken any practical armed response (apart from the Gulf of Sidra incident of 1981 when they brought down two Libyan aircraft) to overcome or challenge either, would restrict its objection to the Libyan leader to verbal statements, such as that of the Department of State spokesman, Charles Redman. The latter stated that it was a momentous and perilous proliferation in the Soviet-Libyan arms cooperation. He continued by mentioning that the American administration had clear concerns about this acceleration and about the Soviet continued aid for a reckless and unpredictable leader, and if this was the case, it could be a major blunder, as there was no practical Soviet reaction to the American military strikes on Libya in 1986 (Freedman, 1991).

Herrmann (1987) states that, the Soviets increased their efforts to back up Arab regimes against American expansionist ambitions in the region in so far as it did not involve serious implications. As for Libya’s Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, his visit to Moscow in October 1985 earned him renewed assurances of support and more arms packages. Early in 1986, while Americans’ rallies of revenge against terrorism escalated, Moscow was involved in the shipment of a SAM-5 air defence missiles to Libya and in mobilising the flagship of its Mediterranean fleet into the Libyan capital. However, when it really mattered, the Soviet promises of protection against American attacks came to standstill and fell short of action. As usual, the Soviet Union was only prepared to provide aid and support and refrain from military involvement. As rightly thought, few political experts expected Moscow to fight for Qaddafi
and risk its military weight for his cause. As the Tripoli administration at the time did not have the best of relationships with its counterpart in the Kremlin.

On his part, Cooley (1981) clearly argues that at a time when the Americans were making a mess of the Libyan case, the Soviets were busy seeking to restore their own ties with the Libyan leader. It can be easily argued that oil was the primary factor for facilitating this rapprochement. The Soviets, in turn, began to encourage other East European states to purchase from a Libyan oil auction as early as January 1974, which resulted in some long-term contracts, some of which were to cover an annual figure of 3 million metric tons of oil or more. As for Qaddafi’s chief aid, Major Abdul Salam Jallud, he was given a lavish reception in Bucharest, Warsaw, and Budapest as a compliment for the deals. On the other hand, there was less and less aggression directed by the Soviet media towards Libya and Qaddafi, with a similar attitude shown by their Libyan counterparts. Qaddafi explained the roots of the developing Libyan-Soviet friendship on the 4th May 1974 by claiming that two countries had a mutual interest due to their objection of the American policies. Libya, for example, sought to protect the Arab world against the American diplomatic aggression beginning in the Middle East, while the Soviet Union strived to gain a strategic advantage over the United States due to their existing rivalry.

Wright (1981-82) reveals that, after Qaddafi’s trip to Moscow in April 1981 which aimed at rallying more Soviet military assistance and nuclear technology agreements, as well as providing experts in the Libyan oilfields and an official engagement to stand by Libya in the event of a foreign attack, the upshot was evident with the Soviet negotiators informing their western correspondents that the Soviet Union would not allow itself to be involved if Libya was to suffer an external military campaign. Similarly, there were reports that the first Soviet delivery of enriched uranium fuel for Libya’s nuclear programme had already arrived in Tripoli. On the 25th of July, two Soviet naval vessels had also accessed the capital’s port for the first ever Soviet port call on Libyan soil. However, American administrators alleged that the Reagan
pressure of 1981 did not force Qaddafi to sway in favour of the Soviet bloc as it had already been an alternative. There was also a unanimous disagreement among West European diplomats in Tripoli about the U.S; blaming American policies for the decision Qaddafi had taken during that year to become a close friend of the Soviet Union and its eye in the region.

Another point worth mentioning is of William (1982) whose work mentioned to Libya sanctioning of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 26 of May 1975 almost seven years from ratifying the treaty. In spite of recurrent efforts in the previous five years to buy nuclear-powered equipment and sensitive machinery, within four days the Tripoli and Kremlin administrations struck a deal in the form of an intergovernmental protocol on the use of atomic energy for peaceful goals. In the eyes of most westerners, these two incidents were linked, including the Soviet efforts to pressurise Libya into ratifying the treaty in return for meeting their pledge of providing nuclear aid. The Soviets’ motivation behind the nuclear agreement, including the delivery of a small research reactor that holds up to 10 megawatts, was still vague, nevertheless. It is possible that numerous factors impacted on the Soviet choice with the most evident one being political opportunism and power. This particular interpretation posits that the Soviet nuclear aid was solely a tool to attract Libya nearer the Soviet Union and for more of a Soviet role and grip in the region. In addition, it made other developing countries aware of the concrete benefits of having the Soviet Union as a friend. Furthermore, one can interpret the Soviet behaviour in terms of the Kremlin’s concern about Colonel Qaddafi’s nuclear aspirations but was willing to complete the research reactor agreement so that the sale of nuclear technology to Libya was pre-empted by less wary nuclear providers. Profit-making may have also been a major factor driving the Soviet Union to sell a nuclear reactor to Libya. During the mid-1970s, the Soviet Union started a fresh project by intensively promoting nuclear technology and services abroad. Therefore, the Libyan treaty may have been
considered by Moscow as a significant phase in proving its sustainability as a nuclear provider for a number of emerging countries.

Shearman (1987) has drawn attention to the fact that President Gorbachev attained a good deal of success with his diplomatic offensive in the Middle East in 1986. Having lost the Egyptians to the Western bloc in the 1970s, the Soviet influence in the Middle East was limited to supplying the fundamental Arab regimes of Libya and Syria, where the relationship was purely limited to arms contracts and intelligence cooperation. This restricted influence in the Middle East did not only sideline the Soviets in the Arab world, but also demonised Libya and Syria in the eyes of the west for being sponsors of global terrorism. The two countries also adopted an uncompromising stand against Israel, and generally played a major role in undermining the harmony of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Arab cause. Nonetheless, Gorbachev made some efforts to recover ground by means of a number of refined diplomacy and common sense policies. In return, he was successful in courting the more moderate Arab nations, and as previously mentioned, considerably enhanced relations with Cairo. On the other hand, he intentionally dissociated himself from terrorism, by publicly condemning those terrorism activities for which the western countries in general and the U.S. in particular holds Libya and Syria accountable. On the 7th of May 1987, the Soviet Union signed the international treaty against taking captives. As much as the Soviets sought to gain some political ground as a result of the U.S. air strikes on Libya in April 1986, their immediate response was mild and only restricted to diplomatic means of communication. As the Soviet Union did not strike a formal treaty of friendship and cooperation with Libya, it would be wrongly applicable to refer to Tripoli as a Soviet ally. Given Qaddafi’s eccentricity in international politics, it would be completely irrational for the Soviet Union to have its global reputation tarnished or undermined by having a closer association with an unpredictable regime as that of Libya; instead, it preferred expanding diplomatic ties with the more moderate states in the region.
According to Kanet and Kolodziej (1989), with Gorbachev’s new role as head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in early 1985, the Soviet Unions was urged to re-position itself in the Middle East as the latter was the third most important world region in terms of their long term security interests and oil reserves. For instance, in keeping with their prior agreement, they delivered new military aid to Libya.

Jentlson and Whytock (2005/2006) gave a strong argument that Libyan internal political and economic circumstances had altered in ways that led to make the United States coercive policy more effective. With the economic hardships that emanated in the 1980s growing more acute in the early 1990s, Libya’s gross domestic product saw a steep decline by 30 per cent in 1993 when compared to the preceding year, while the growth was in the region of less than 1 per cent per year from 1992 to 1998. As unemployment reached 30 per cent, inflation similarly was incontrollable, as it went up as high as 50 per cent in 1994; not to mention the per capita income which fell in real terms. A number of factors such as the deteriorating world oil prices, Qaddafi’s mishandling of the national economy, and the international sanctions combined to strike a heavy blow at the Libyan economic system (O’Sullivan, 2003). There is more to these figures with economic dissatisfaction starting to destabilise the country and fuel more political upheavals. As a consequence, the developments engulfing Libya’s political and economic life caused Qaddafi’s regime to be more vulnerable to external pressure. As the United States diplomacy was picking up momentum in terms of its aggression and coerciveness, the Libyan leader’s ability to challenge such policy was on the decline, thus threatening Qaddafi’s grip on power. Furthermore, the multi lateralisation sanctions imposed on Libya by the United Nations by way of multilateral coalition was successful in applying real pressure so that Libya could be forced to change its foreign policy and readapt to the new world order.

Woodward (2005) clearly indicates that the Soviet goals were assisted by Qaddafi’s anti-Western attitudes. In such circumstances, the Soviet Union managed to acquire a significant
amount of hard currency gained from massive arms deals with Libya, though Qaddafi was not seen as a pawn, on the one hand, and due to Qaddafi’s relationship with the Soviets thought to be far too close on the other.

It was also stated by Neumann (2000), being the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Department of State, that the preceding era to the Qaddafi regime had seen a generally warm relationship with the Libyan administration and the pursued policies had been focused on meeting its goals in operating at the Wheelus Air Force Base with its 4600 Americans, the significant U.S oil interests, and other strategic problems. Once Qaddafi came to power in 1969, the relationship soon turned sour with Libya’s foreign policies dominating the Soviet foreign policy and decision making. State sponsorship or support for groups for their opposition to Israel and the so called peace process were key concerns, adding to Tripoli’s failure to receive weapons of mass destruction; not to mention Qaddafi’s suspicious activities in adjacent African countries. From then on, the United States attitudes toward Libya had been focused on these issues (Friedlander et al., 1979).

The powerful political military obligation was clearly shown in the Libyan leader’s response to the Soviet 1979 assault on Afghanistan. He remained quiet soon after the Soviets had attacked. His neutral stance was clearly evident since he avoided siding with the Afghanis announcing that it was too premature to judge in spite of the incessant condemnations of the invasion coming from several countries and organisations (Becker, and Fukuyama, 1980).

It can be easily argued that Qaddafi could not politically afford to critique, let alone object to the Soviet attack on Afghani territories. During the early 1980s, Afghanistan and Iran had become the two dominant foreign policy concerns for the USSR; as such, Moscow was expected to secure staunch support from the leaders of partner regimes in the Arab region, especially Qaddafi, who was careful not to fail his ally in the Kremlin, more particularly not
with Libya engaged in a conflict with Chad on its southern front. What is more, the increasingly tense relations with Washington had become far too intolerable that the need to military backing from Moscow grew stronger and sharper. As a result, at the beginning of the 1980s, the Soviets took advantage of Libya’s complete reliance on the Soviet Union for political and military aid, and applied pressure on Qaddafi to increase their dominance both in Libya itself and in the broader Middle Eastern region. It was clear that Moscow aimed at reinforcing its presence in this geopolitically significant part of the world, from which it could influence and have a grip on the NATO’s southern backyard, as well as sustaining a strengthened Mediterranean armada, until then an Achilles’s heel in the Soviet accumulation of armed forces in the area.

Several claims were allegedly raised against the Soviet Union’s accessibility rights to Libyan ports around the mid-1970s period. One of these allegations had it that the Soviet Union established a naval base on the Libyan coastal area. Following these recurrent claims, Tripoli firmly resisted them, while declaring late in 1979 that not one Soviet military boat had stopped in a Libyan port or anywhere along a Libyan coast (Wright. Winter 1981-1982).

In response to the Libyan’s offensive on Chad and in the wake of an announced political union of Libya and Chad taking place on the 6th of January 1981, Libya came under fierce attacks and huge pressure from so many western and pro-U.S. Arab states and various African countries wanting to isolate Qaddafi for his arrogant and defiant attitudes (Ronen, 2008). This increasingly global pressure was thought to be one of the key issues raised during Qaddafi’s formal visit to the Kremlin on the 27th of April 1981, along with other issues that the Libyan leader wished to debate with his Soviet hosts such as more Soviet arms, a mutual agreement on a nuclear technology to be developed in Libya, provision of support in the Libyan oil domain, and an open direct and unprecedented support for Libya in the event of a foreign invasion. At the end of this visit to Moscow, the Libyan-Soviet joint communiqué released communication
highlighted unity with the Democratic republic of Afghanistan in its fight for freedom and independence and the standardisation of the situation in Chad, in addition to the positive attitude that has shown through the assistance provided to Chad by Libya, which then reflected not only the major problems and concerns on each of the latter countries’ plans but also the shared Soviet-Libyan interests and ties (Ronen, 2008. P, 93).

The writers and critics who closely followed the Libyan intervention in Chad could be pigeonholed into two categories, with the first group represented by those who perceive or consider the Libyan influence to be in line with the Libyan foreign strategy of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialist infiltration into the African continent, and equally as an assistance to the Muslims in that part of the world. As discovered by El-khawas (1986), the anti-colonial attitude of Qaddafi made him object to the French military existence in Chad, which has borders with Libya, given his firm opposition of great power involvement and interference in former colonies as well as to deploying foreign troops to African and Arab lands. Samura (1985) found that the Libyan role in Chad, in addition to being an anti-imperialist-colonial one, is a legal and humanistic move to reinstate peace and order following an official invitation from the Chadian President. According to Yost (1983), the president of Chad Goukouni signed a joint defence deal with Qaddafi in 1979, which made the support already obtained from Libya more evident and official, as well as creating a legal framework for the ensuing intervention. In addition, Yost (1983) noted another development which marked Qaddafi’s ambitious plans for a Libyan Islamic kingdom covering all of the Saharan states. It is possible that Chad was employed as a catalyst to Sudan and other countries.

A different opinion saw the Libyan interference as an economic enterprise driven by certain specific interests. It is easy to see the reasons and motives for foreign interference in the Chadian affairs. As far as Libya is concerned, Seddon (2004), mentioned about the regional prospect of accessing the unexploited mineral assets of Northern Chad. In addition, Libya
seized the opportunity of the Chadian circumstances to support its own interest to control the Aouzou strip (Bearman, 1986). Yost (1983) fittingly claimed that the Libyan involvement could be considered as promoting the success of a Chadian government that would concede the Libyan control over the Aouzou strip. The latter had been colonised by Libya since 1972 based on an unauthorised 1935 treaty between the French and the Italians.

On the other hand, in spite of the fact that the Soviet Union’s reaction to the Israeli assault on Lebanon in June 1982 was only as feeble, Libya informed Moscow that its bond with Arab armies was about to be destroyed while Beirut was under heavy attacks (Freedman, 1983). This was the first time when Libya openly questioned the integrity of the Soviet Union as a genuine ally of the Arab countries. It is worth pointing that these reproaches were the first indication that the then solid relationship between Moscow and Tripoli was beginning to wither. In the meantime, the hostility towards Washington and the White House’s policies was also steadily growing during that period with the latter already placing Libya as a military target and showing a firm resolve in its plans of restraining Qaddafi’s political action, which was perceived by Washington as threatening to key U.S. interests in the Middle East. For example, a U.S. aircraft nearly went into a conflict over the Mediterranean off the Libyan coastline in February 1983. Soon afterwards, Sudan threw an allegation at Libya claiming that Qaddafi conspired to dethrone Numaryi’s pro-U.S. government on the 16th of March 1983, followed by an issued warning for both Libya and the Soviet Union allies in the region. On the same day, the Libyan regime’s second powerful man Jallud was deployed to the Soviet Union with the purpose of clearing the mist surrounding the Libyan-Soviet relations and pushing the Soviets to recognise the direct potential threat to Libya as well as rallying renewed support to face up to the U.S. danger and so that Libya could keep its war in Chad going. What Jallud’s visit achieved was an agreement with the Soviet Union which supposedly aimed at re-establishing a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Libyan authorities (Ronen, 2008). Besides,
Soviet policymakers looked with increasing anxiety to Tripoli’s growing conflicts with Washington, and decided to purchase Libyan oil in exchange for arms as a means of generating leverage. This was important since Libya was experiencing economic troubles which impacted on its domestic affairs and started to threaten Qaddafi’s regime’s strong grip on the Libyan society (Ronen, 2008). Had it not been for Moscow’s pledge to take oil in return for Soviet military aids, Qaddafi’s regime would not have been capable of securing the necessary finance to sustain his army’s allegiance and to achieve basic military needs, which in 1983 was projected to be over U.S.$20billion according to an American report (Anderson, 1985).

Moreover, when Ronald Reagan came to power in 1981, a decisive turn in the U.S. Libyan relationships was witnessed. Reagan initially followed a policy of conflict toward Qaddafi, whose interests confronted with those of the American in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere. As such, Libya was selected by the Reagan administration as an example of his ruthless anti-communist attitudes, partly with Qaddafi keeping close links with the Soviet Union (Lahwej, 1998).

Relations with the Soviet Union continued to be reinvigorated by Qaddafi who visited Moscow in October 1985 and strived to officially conclude the terms of a friendship treaty which had been approved in principle during the earlier visit of Jallud to the Soviet capital. Furthermore, Qaddafi sought to persuade the Kremlin to provide more arms and military equipment, which Libya required to maintain its war in Chad. Qaddafi also requested Moscow’s help to construct the long–awaited nuclear power station. As pronounced in Moscow by Qaddafi “the defence of Libya’s national interests is in full accord with the Soviet policy. That is why we are convinced that our multifaceted ties have by no means exhausted their potential and will continue to develop and strengthen” (Ronen, 2008).
Despite Gorbachev’s emphasis on the importance of a unified Arab front, criticising in the meantime Qaddafi’s flawed foreign affairs with his Arab counterparts, which hindered the success of pro-Arab camp and heightened the American resolve to attack Libya; however, the joint statement delivered at the end of Qaddafi’s official visit was the clearest indication yet of the Soviet Union’s support of Qaddafi against the openly anti-Libyan government of President Ronald Reagan in the United States of America. The course of action taken by Libya to protect its sovereignty, territory and independence made Moscow declare its support and promise help for the Qaddafi administration. Also highlighted in the joint statement was that the two countries had similar opinions regarding wide-ranging global topics of shared interest (Ronen, 2008. P, 97).

However, this Soviet support did not materialise and failed to live up to the Libyan expectations since Moscow was neither involved in the development and promotion of a nuclear programme nor signed an official contract of alliance with Tripoli; in fact, it soon returned to its previous stance of denying Libya arms on condition that it did so in return for cash, which Libya was incapable of fulfilling (I bid. P, 97).

During the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union changed its strategy again and resumed the process of supplying sophisticated arms and consultants to Libya to establish an air shield that would prevent any possible U.S. raid. It was only Syria which had until then received such weapons and military equipment from the USSR. This change of policy may have been in response to the then fresh revelation of a U.S. conspiracy to weaken the Qaddafi regime, to which Moscow objected strongly (I bid. P, 98).

Moscow was again left in an embarrassing position when Tripoli acclaimed and supported terrorists who carried out an attack on airports in Vienna and Rome in December 1985. There was a growing Soviet concern in March 1986 with the American warplanes bombarding Libyan
military bases, which also included Soviet made artilleries, close to the Gulf of Sirte on the Mediterranean Sea. As a result, the Soviets risked either confronting with the United States or losing face in case it could not react swiftly to an attack on one of its allies in the region. In addition, on the 15th of April 1986, about a fortnight following the bombing of a Berlin night club, American warplanes began a raid on the Libyan mainland after condemning Qaddafi for his role in the attack of the German city, along with other terrorist activities. It should be pointed out that the U.S. attacks were not followed by any practical solutions or a reaction from the Soviets who only warned Libya a few hours in advance (Rabinovich., Shaked ,1987 and Interview: Az-Zentani, 2013).

Another clear stance was that the Soviet Union’s interests were in line with those of Libya; however, the Kremlin was similarly keen to ease tension with the United States. As such, Gorbachev was much less anxious about infuriating Qaddafi than jeopardising the promising U.S-Soviet agreement and reconciliation at a time when the Kremlin was preparing to sign a major arms control document. It is the lack of a joint defence agreement with Libya that facilitated Gorbachev’s decision not to come to the rescue of the Libyan regime. Generally, Moscow resorted to diplomacy as an answer to the air attacks, describing it as brutal and piratical but offering nothing more as an alternative (Ronen, 2008). In return, Qaddafi openly condemned the Kremlin’s statement while continuing to declare to Washington its intention to join Warsaw Alliance (St John, 2002).

With Moscow attempting to conclude an arms-control treaty with Washington, the relationship with Libya had become a political burden rather than a strategic gain. For Gorbachev, his multidimensional new thinking ascertained, as well as other issues, a need to have closer ties with pro-Western countries in the Middle East like Egypt and Israel, which conflicted with Tripoli’s own foreign policy agenda (Goldberg, and Marantz, 1994).
As for the 1991 Gulf War which completely flattened out military force of Iraq by the U.S. led coalition, it represented a historical turning point as the first major post-Cold War conflict in which Moscow collaborated with Washington against one of its former allies.

An important announcement constituted the major undermining of Qaddafi of the importance of what he continued to refer to as the Soviet Union, during and after the crisis, in terms of the superpower status it had and as a strategic ally of the Arabs. He states “why did the Soviet Union not say it was not permissible to crush Iraq and annihilate it once it left Kuwait, despite the fact that there is a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow”. For Qaddafi, he argued that such treaty “compels the Soviet Union to stand by Iraq if aggression is waged against it”. He concluded that “the Arabs have no ally apart from themselves” (Ronen, 2008). As such, Qaddafi’s statement was a clear message that the Soviet Union had stopped being a dependable ally for the Arabs.

It was stated by Lahwej (1998) that Libya has always deemed a part and closely linked with the former communist power, while hard currency in return for sophisticated weapons has characterised their major dealings. Strategically, North Africa and the Mediterranean basin had been key areas for the Soviet Union. Consequently, it established a policy aimed to penetrate this region by developing close ties with its nationalist regimes such as Libya in order to get counter balance to NATO forces in that area and empower it to endanger western oil targets. Furthermore, Lahwej also added that the instantaneous Libyan acknowledgment of the plot in the 1991 attempted coup d’état against Gorbachev had summed up the nature of Soviet-Libya ties during the Gorbachev era. Thus, the demise of Soviet supremacy would mean that the United States would enforce its political agenda over smaller countries, in particular the radical ones. In fact, America suggested and led the sanctions enforcement process on Libya, while there had been mounting pressure on Libya with regards to the terrorism issue.
Rightly claimed by Tsygankov (2013) was the fact that the refining of the Kremlin’s foreign policy in the years beyond the eventual demise of the Soviet Union was undeniable given its strides to engage more with the west by means of losing billions of dollars in arms deals in lucrative Third World markets and endorsing Western restrictions against some of the most lethal regimes, including Libya, Iraq and Yugoslavia.

It is clearly shown by D’Anieri (2002) that, in the period between 1991 and 1996, Russia was experiencing a dramatic flux in its social, economic, and governmental policy, including the foreign policy field, which was no exception. Given the demise of the Soviet State, there appeared to be an essential reconsideration of the pivotal themes of foreign policy, the state interests, the policy process, and the resources to reach the desired outcomes. As a result, the foreign policy of Russia was confined in terms of geographic boundaries, with its leader upholding as a principle of dealing that other states should not be involved in the near boundaries to the Russian hemisphere, and for that matter, Russia would not be interfering with other regions away from its surroundings.

Ronen (2002) rightly points out that, it could be reasonably sensible to enquire as to whether Libya would have regained its status within the Western community and earned its respectability on the global stage had the Soviet Union not crumbled down in the aftermath of the Cold War. The words of Haass (1998) indicates that, the end of the Cold War made enforcing sanctions on Libya a lot easier for the main Western states via utilising Security Council to serve their own interests. On other words the fall of the Soviet Union as a bloc deepened the isolation of Libyan regime from the rest of the world, which made collective acts against the Libyan regime less contentious than would have been considered even a few years before. One of the major anxious moments, as highlighted by Martines (2006), was the fear expressed by Libyan officials that the U.S. might occupy Libya, which became a likely outcome, thus aggravating their sense of uncertainty. For example, the swiftness with which
the Iraqi regime came to an abrupt end made the Libyan top statesmen question his own armies and their ability to respond.

St John (2008) asserts that, Neumann The Deputy Assistant Security emphasised that regime change was not a key concern for American policy regarding Libya. To prove this, the speech delivered by President Bush in 2003 asserted that U.S. policy would continue to vouch for enhanced human rights and more democratic reforms in Libya without having to change the regime. It actually means that the United States was prepared to tolerate the Qaddafi’s regime, probably because they did not see it as important and dangerous as it was in the period of the Cold War and due to its new policy which has become proportionate with the strategy of the United States.

A similar view was advocated by Alter (2005), who reveals that the non-presence of the Soviet Union affected global order, thus enabling the U.S. to take the initiative with a new international system via huge domination of the United Nations, so as to carry out its policies of the new world order on the one hand and monitor the rogue states on the other. In fact, Simons and Dalyell (1993) pointed out that the demise of the Soviet Union offered the United States huge control over the UN Security Council.

Schwartz (2007) points out that, the end of the bipolar era in global politics deprived Libya of any support from an existing powerhouse. As a result, the economy started to decline and its leadership was looking more at sea. The ground had been laid for a remarkable compromise.

The United States received support from the U.N Security Council for its campaign against Libya for sponsoring terrorist activities in the wake of the Libyan connection to the tragic 1988 Pan Am 103 and 1989 UTA 772 bombing incidents, which were followed by a series of resolutions in 1992 and 1993 by the Security Council compelling Libya to hand the suspects, admit charges made against its officials, recompense the incident, cooperated in all facts related
to the investigation, stop its endorsement of terrorist activities and support to terrorist groups, and finally publicly prove its rejection of terrorism. Air travel, as well as economic, and diplomatic sanctions were imposed against Libya by the Security Council, which were for years to come among the most effective multilateral sanctions against non-cooperating regimes (Calabrese, 2004). This indicates that the international upheaval emanating from the change from bipolarity to polarity did work in favour of the United States as it finally pushed the Libyan leader to comply with the Western demands in general and succumb to the American pressure in particular.

In a study by Kile and Hart (2005), the authors revealed that, during much of the 1990s and as a result of the new nature of the international system, Libya was reported to have shown an inclination to normalise its ties with Europe and the United States, in an attempt to enhance its reputation. As stated by a member of the U.S. National Security Council (NSC), in the early days of 2002, several ‘direct and indirect messages’ were sent by the Libyan government to the U.S. administration by the British government signifying its ‘eagerness to resolve differences’.

In the course of this communication, the United States highlighted that, on top of the Lockerbie bombing incident, two other key issues had to be given similar priority; namely, the provable termination of Libya’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and medium- and long-range missile technologies, in addition to rejection of the Libyan sponsorship of terrorist activities and groups.

As demonstrated in the Libyan example, the value of possessing a multidimensional body lies in that it can verify, and in reality legitimise, the nation’s statements and treaty adherence status. Libya’s obligations concerning WMD and Chemical Weapons (CW) were thus confirmed by means of a system of announcements and on-site assessments conducted by several international organisations.
As stated by the American Journal of International Law (2004) Libya, in its general understanding that the arms race would contribute nothing to either its own protection or to that of the region, and would leave the regime to contemplate on the serious repercussions of its own plight, and ambitions; namely, its strong desire for a secure and peaceful world, hoped, through these genuine efforts, to motivate all nations without exception to follow in its footsteps, beginning with Middle Eastern countries.

In addition, it is worth pointing out that Libya’s early aspiration to rise as a nuclear weapons country was entrenched in the Libyan leader’s regional determination and the revolutionary enthusiasm that typified Libya’s foreign policy for much of the 1970s and early 1980s. With Libya’s radical strategies causing internal dissatisfaction and confrontations with its neighbours and dominant Western states, the regime had to reconsider its main concerns and started to follow a more realistic foreign policy. In fact, Libya’s apparently unpredictable nuclear propagation plans in the 1990s revealed the regime’s hesitant obligation to the chase of nuclear weapons in the wake of its fast approaching demise to its reputation both domestically and internationally.

It was rightly argued that the key diplomatic issue encountering both the Libyan regime and the American administration was how to establish mutual trust (Alterman, 2004). This dilemma acutely felt by the Libyan government, with Qaddafi reaching the point where he could sense the strain of being at the mercy of an immeasurably tougher opponent. For more than two decades of American aggression and antagonism, it was extremely hard for the Libyans to believe that American actions were only a sham to undermine and eventually dethrone the Libyan leader. The latter was condemned by Undersecretary of State John Bolton in May 2002 as aggressively in pursuit of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, while also being decisively ensconced on the American list of leaders supporting terror. There was also a
problem of trust with the American administration suspecting the unpredictable and worrying activities of the highest authorities in Libya.

According to Boucek (2004), the 19th of December 2003 declaration was arguably considered an element of the Libyan policy to progress from American restrictions that started well in advance of the incursion of Operation Iraqi Freedom. In addition, these meetings were carried out in parallel to the Lockerbie talks involving representatives from the Washington, London, and Tripoli administrations.

Stottlemyre (2012) rightly argues that Qaddafi’s rhetoric could be the crucial factor for his charismatic power, which linked Libya’s foreign policy strategies to his own foreign policy vision and ambitions. On the basis of his charismatic leadership, Qaddafi expressed his foreign policy vision when he delivered his first major speech to the Libyan people at the end of the 1960s, which he kept referring to repeatedly when taking major Libyan foreign policy decisions. During a spell of 35 years, Qaddafi’s power drew extensively from beliefs and ideals linked to the early days of his revolt. Given this flexibility of vision, Qaddafi was capable of maintaining authority, whilst strategically fine-tuning Libyan foreign policy decisions.

According to Pargeter (2006), the reform process in Libya has been thwarted by a lack of political willpower at the top level, which could be ascribed to the regime’s preoccupation with ascertaining its own security that far outweighs any seeming desire to change. The dialogue of reform is essentially intended to send signals that real change is taking place, while in reality the foundations are the same.

As evidenced by Chorin (2012), because of a series of historical irregularities, the 2003 deal with Libya, apart from its context, provided an opportunity for Libya and the West to break with the past and remould the brittle relationship into a somewhat robust and potentially sustainable. Qaddafi’s decision not to interact with these developments came to surprise. In
the same way, the more stable, advanced, well-informed administrations of the West would have been expected to recognise Qaddafi’s intentions and strategies and thus safeguard their own interests. However, that did not happen. Fundamentally, neither side did really see the potential of the deal; realised what it meant to the other; or exerted any efforts to construe its significance for either. As such, historical determinants and other pressing policy issues led both sides to potentially discontinue their efforts to make the deal possible. Despite this, Qaddafi was not only momentarily startled by his accomplishment in relieving his country from the burden of economic sanctions, but he was also intent to prove that the future of the country would be brighter if he did in fact speed up the reform plan instead of adhering to the superficial makeover. As for the United States and the other western countries, they were too diverted by the seemingly low-cost media distractions and financial profits to contemplate beyond the short run.

Another argument put forward by Bowen (2006) who claimed that following a long nuclear weapons’ pursuit of more than 30 years, the Libyan regime decided to surrender its ambitions in this field as Qaddafi feared that his core interests were best protected by so doing. There had been a dramatic change in Libya’s economic and security picture over the preceding decade, while the process of pursuing nuclear weapons and other WMD had come to be seen as a major liability rather than a potential deterrent for the Libyan regime.

Also in relation to the issue of WMD, Indyk (2004) argues that the American administration at the time was deeply worried about the advances of Libya’s clandestine production and pursuit of chemical weapons. Showing a tendency for a multilateral forum, Libyan agents opted for joining the Chemical Weapons Convention and agree to the inspection of their sites. Following a summit in October 1999, Libya submitted another offer on chemical weapons and consented to participate in the Middle East multilateral arms control discussions held during that period. The reason why the Americans did not pursue the Libyan WMD offer then was due to the fact
that the Pan Am 103 issues were not resolved; as such, all engagements were put on hold until the fulfilment of that condition. In addition, since Libya’s chemical weapons programme was not seen as an impending danger, and given that its nuclear programme was hardly existent, ridding Libya of terrorism and acquiring compensation had to be on the top of the American administration’s agenda. Thus, the UN sanctions could only be lifted as soon as these conditions were met, while any sanctions imposed by the US would still be in place until the WMD issues were resolved once and for all.

According to Hochman (2006), three other aspects had an impact on Libya’s WMD setback. To begin, on top of the pressures applied as a result of the 2003 US incursion in Iraq, Qaddafi had reason to anticipate greater security gains in seeking closer relations with the American administration and other western countries. More specifically, Libya’s apprehension of al-Qaeda had a major impact on its intentions to ally with the White House. Second, amidst attempts to put an end to the enduring US and UN sanctions for economic reasons, Qaddafi was also adamant to bring the curtains down on Libya’s outcast image. Qaddafi was increasingly concerned about his preserving his own reputation and Libya’s international status and credibility inspired his decision. Finally, the Pam Am 103 deceased’s relatives and supporters on Capitol Hill exercised agenda-setting influence, reinforcing the negotiating position of the United States against the Libyan regime. These three factors best describe US foreign policy strategies adopted toward Libya since the late 1990’s.

As stated by Cigar (2012), what motivated Libya to its key decision on the nuclear program included a multifaceted fruition of a cost-benefit examination ending with a deep-seated belief among the senior management that nuclear weapons were not as beneficial in terms of meeting the country’s military and political targets. More specifically, the nuclear program was regarded as a vital contributor to Libya’s continuing international predicament.
According to Bahgat (2008), it is only in response to a worsening economic crisis aggravated by stationary oil prices and stifling economic sanctions that there was to a large extent a complete change in Libya’s status from an ‘outcast state’ to a responsible member in the international community. As Libya’s economy is heavily reliant on oil returns and is one of the least diversified economies in the Middle East, this made the country even more fragile in the face of economic sanctions, which could only be effective once the rest of the world stopped buying this one commodity. The Libyan case thus shows that the less diversification in the economy, the more likely sanctions are to be effective.

As indicated by Hart and Kile (2005), British and Libyan officials held a meeting in London on 16 December 2003 and issued a joint public statement on 19 December 2003, which was later agreed by Libya, the UK and the USA. British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi finalised the process following a telephone conversation.

Hegghammer (2008) and (2009) provided ample evidence on the reasons why the Libyan regime was keen on obtaining nuclear weapons and its perseverance towards this goal, which changed in light of growing domestic upheavals and an increasingly unstable relationships with major countries in the international community. More precisely, Libya’s declining relationship with key Middle Eastern countries and the United States resulted in a change of direction in its foreign and security policies.

As indicated in the words of Tanter (1999), Washington was more preoccupied with the Libyan regime’s actions regarding anti-subversion, counterterrorism, and non-proliferation. As far as the Americans were concerned, their objectives included first and foremost enforcing Tripoli to stop its rebellious behaviour toward neighbouring countries that happened to be on friendlier terms with the Washington administration. Second, the American administration wanted the Qaddafi regime to put an end to its support for global terrorist organisations and activities and
cease any ambitious intentions to acquire weapons of mass destruction or develop any related programmes.

Being a global force, the United States had been investing in a strategic interest in ensuring that it was not to be challenged in the post-Cold War period. However, with the Libyan regime standing up as an obstacle in the path of Washington and while behaving like a rogue state against the American interests, it soon started to pose challenges to the United States authority, resolve, and obligations. It was widely held then if a nation as Libya would pose such a challenge to Washington’s resolve, the possibility of failing to use the deterrence policy might go up in other parts of the world. If on the other hand that very country is an ally to another superpower, as in the case of Libya’s association with the Soviet Union, then it is more likely that the United States should not accept any other parties contesting its resolve.

How was Libyan foreign made in the period this thesis explores? The leadership of a central figure was very important, but Qaddafi was supported by aides and advisors. As Hill (2003, p. 63, 110) points out, even the more monolithic dictatorships need machinery of government. The Revolutionary Command Council in Libya fulfilled the functions taken by a number of separate committees in larger political systems. Key advisors as well as holders of key roles (head of intelligence, foreign minister) sat on the Council. Qaddafi held power successfully through informal networks, however, including having a very detailed knowledge of the interests and concerns of tribal and local leaders across the country, and these informal networks were central to his successful maintenance of office. They were also important sources of information, enabling the Tripoli government to form a relatively accurate assessment of local discontents across a large and not very heavily populated country. They also supplied information on the growing influence of Islamicist ideas which had their greatest impact in disaffected tribes in the centre of the country. Alongside the RCC, foreign policy was managed through key institutional frameworks. As in many small and developing countries,
the Embassy to the United Nations in New York was especially important because it provided a key point of contact with many other international actors, both states and organisations. The researcher was fortunate to have interviewed Mr Dorda, who was the UN Ambassador during most of the period of adaptation. This interview reveals that the Libyan leadership trusted the UN office, and that Dorda, who was close to Qaddafi before he went to New York was one of the close trusted circle. It is partly for this reason that the intelligence network became an important tool of foreign policy. That relates to external information and to the pursuit of Libyan exiles. But it also relates to exchanges with other governments, notably the UK. After the collapse of the Qaddafi regime, according to a number of Western news sources (Daily Telegraph, 3 and 5 September 2011; The Independent, 25 August and 5 September 2011), it became clear from intelligence papers which found their way into the public domain, that some key Libyan intelligence officials had a longstanding and apparently quite close relationship with officers of the British MI6, and that this channel was one of the means by which the adaptation of Libya’s foreign policy was managed. This is probably also related to a back channel to US policy makers, given that MI6 has generally been close to US intelligence institutions, although the interview evidence does not directly confirm that. The intelligence organisations were themselves managed through a national supervisory committee normally headed by the head of intelligence which managed the flow of information and sought to control bureaucratic competition between the separate internal and external agencies. The role of intelligence head, more recently taken by Mr Al-Sanusi, was a key role for Qaddafi; among other things, as several interviewees pointed out, this was always one of the few officials who was expected to tell the leader truths which otherwise he might not have wanted to hear.

To sum up, this chapter provided a general description of the literature on the reciprocal relations between Libya and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, as well as giving full
account on some issues that have been scientifically discussed with regard to the Libyan foreign policy in the period that following the demise of the Soviet Union.

It has already been mentioned in this chapter that Libya’s relations with the Soviet Union were strengthened as a result of its hostility to the Western hemisphere. In other words, because of the American foreign policy toward Libya, the latter turned to another global force at that time; one that was prepared to provide Qaddafi with the weapons required to upgrade and advance his forces, and to strengthen Libyan military competence and ability in order to protect Libyan interests in the region. These relations were reinforced by mutual benefit of both parties in which the Soviet Union obtained some strategic gains deemed attainable concerning Libya’s approach. On the other hand, Libya obtained some gains from its rapprochement with the Soviet Union allowing Qaddafi to purchase Soviet arms and to pursue his revolutionary agenda in Africa as well as in the Middle East. Despite this, there was always a level of mistrust between the Libyan and Soviet leaderships. Neither lived up to the expectations of the other, even if they kept to the formal letter of most of their agreements. And differences over religion and sub-Saharan African policy did not help. But the most important element framing these relations was the changing role of the United States and the renewal of closer détente relations between Washington and Moscow after 1985 (Interview: Az-Zentani, 2013).

This chapter reviews a range of literature and evidence which helps to set the context of the Cold War and détente in order to provide an important background for the developments in relations as the Soviet Union collapses. It does not claim in any way to be original. But it draws together a number of the main theoretical explanations of the evolution of the Cold War to provide a theoretical as well as a useful empirical/historical context for the later discussions.
Chapter Two: The Theory, Methodology and Methods of Exploring Libyan Foreign Policy

In this chapter, the core theoretical debates which inform the thesis are examined so as to establish the position which the empirical analysis will develop. This necessarily includes some intellectual history to set the theory actually used in the context of the development of relevant foreign policy theories. The chapter explains the methodological bases of the argument of the thesis, understanding methodology as ‘the philosophy of the research’, but also as the bridging link between the specific methods used in the study and the theory. Finally, the chapter sets out the ways in which specific methods are used, which include specific reading strategies and above all the grounding of the interviews which help to provide the thesis with some of its main distinctive and original results. The thesis will examine how foreign policy change in difficult circumstances can be explained drawing on ideas and arguments which include the role of leadership, the adaptive behaviour of elites and leaders, the way learning might be understood, and the impacts of internal and external policies within relatively small states.

Theory

The political process is permanently experiencing both continuity and changes. As foreign policy does not emanate from a vacuum, the environment within which it is formulated and carried out offers both motives and context to act upon. In addition, this environment provides ample opportunities and constant threats that in turn mould foreign policymaking as it offers an experimenting field for understanding the views and insights of policy-makers (Farrands, 1989; Neack, Hey and Haney, 1995, esp. Chs 4, 7, 8, 12; Hill, 2003). This means it is always in motion, and in continuous adjustment or change in response to both internal and external circumstances. To examine how the adjustments are undertaken and how alterations are made
and continuities preserved is to invoke the study of political adaption (Rosenau, 1981). This is the theoretical starting point for this thesis.

It has long been an interesting issue to contemplate how and why organisms acclimatise to their evolving environments. The explanation of change, rather than a focus on the enduring or universal aspects of life, has become a focus of enquiry in all fields especially since the nineteenth century: regardless of whether the organism is a single cell, a person, a small or a large number of people, it can be seen as endeavouring either to utilise or to resist its environment, a narrative packed with drama. In turn, the constantly changing environment threatens the very integrity and existence of the organism. Among the questions that need to be raised is whether the organism can adjust to changes; whether it can take advantage of these changes and thrive; or it will give in to them and dissolve into their environment. In addition, it is important to learn about what will happen to the organism in its pursuit of survival if it can remain distinct from its environment, including the fundamental changes that have to occur in its own internal structure. Similarly crucial is to identify whether the demands of the environment will be readily absorbed and adaptation will be easily achieved (Smith, 1981). Or alternatively, one might ask whether and how adaptation is difficult; or in some circumstances impossible.

Foreign policy change was a concern that Rosenau and Smith (cited above) tried to understand. But these concerns remain significant in the study of international relations and foreign policy. It is a recurring theme in Hermann, Kegley and Rosenau’s still useful edited collection New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (1987). Risse-Kappen (1995) argued that understanding change in policy and the specific forces which brought it about was one of the major challenges to foreign policy analysis, as did a symposium reviewing the state of the field published in International Studies Review in 2003 (Garrison et al, 2003). Charles Hermann had already established the continuing importance of understanding how governments changed.
course, suggesting that we should understand change management as a continuum from relatively small scale adjustments to the very large scale reinvention of foreign policy in response to specific conditions (Hermann, 1990). He identified the main sources of such changes as four factors: foreign policy leadership; adjustments initiated by bureaucratic change; transformation led by domestic pressures; and change in response to larger or smaller scale external shocks. This thesis follows Hermann’s characterisation as well as a critical reading of some of the core ideas in Rosenau and Smith. But these ideas set the agenda for a case study analysis rather than providing a more specific framework for analysis; they set a road map, but do not lay down tram lines. Yetiv (2007), in a review of a monograph by Welch (2005), accepts that foreign policy adjustment is often difficult and may be only ‘ponderously’ achieved; but unlike Welch, Yetiv is suspicious of the idea that foreign policy elites will not initiate changes in policy unless they seem to have absolutely no alternatives. The search for choices and room for manoeuvre when a policy elite finds itself in a tight situation is one of the main themes of this study, where the Libyan leadership was pressed hard to make radical adjustments in policy under the threat of extinction, but where at least some of the time, as the empirical chapters will argue, they were also able to find some scope for independent choice.

These questions are also at the centre of the understanding of foreign policy processes. However, it does not take much thought to acknowledge that their core comprises all the approaches and actions through which organised national communities strive to deal with and take advantage of their global surroundings. Indeed, this could stand as a definition of foreign policy itself. Therefore, other than their significance as issues of ethics and citizenship, it is possible to view foreign policy phenomena as a type of adaptive behaviour, whose understanding remains a fascinating and challenging process to the human intellect (Rosenau, 1980, p. 501; Rosenau, 1981). According to Holsti et al. (1982), adaptive behaviour in foreign policy occurs when a state embraces a fresh foreign policy approach systemically, abandoning
old forms of political, trading, cultural and military ties. In the case of some of these countries, adaptation may be imposed on them by means of boycotts, restrictions and exclusion of support channels.

In order to be able to understand the adaptive behaviour of any country’s foreign policy, the theory of foreign policy adaptation was first proposed by Rosenau as an attempt to sophisticate the study of foreign policy analysis. It was distinctively a theory of the bipolar Cold War period. The approach formed part of what has been called the second generation of foreign policy analysis, which depended on the mainstream analysis dominating that era. Petersen (1977) made some specific criticisms of the formulation of Rosenau’s Theory of Adaptive Behaviour. He claimed in particular on the one hand that its operationalization is uncertain because its core variables are too broad, covering the entire field of foreign policy, and making its specific application difficult. On the other hand, he suggested that it would be of little use for empirical analysis because its indicators cannot easily be measured or assessed. As well as this criticism, and as a consequence of the events that have taken place on the global stage in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the theory of adaptive behaviour has acquired a fresh importance, because so many countries’ foreign policies adapted during and after the Soviet collapse and subsequent shifts in the global power balances. But the theory needs to be, and can be, improved because of its inadequacies, and these beg the question how it can be changed to be a more effective means of understanding foreign policy change. Some of the challenges that have typified present-day politics encompass pressures from globalisation and economic liberalisation. As a consequence, more economies are opening up and more segments of economies are linked transnationally across nations. Moreover, pressures for democratisation have also been sweeping throughout the globe. While within countries, new groups and factions search for empowerment, outside of many countries, key global organisations such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, Amnesty International, and others are
adopting the stance that a state’s internal affairs and human rights activities are genuine concerns of the global community (Beasley et al., 2002). This changes both foreign policy processes and foreign policy agendas. These changes have only been accelerated by the ending of the Cold War. The competition between the United States and the Soviet Union had an impact on almost every aspect of global politics for the most part of the second half of the last century. Once this conflict came to an end, it has given rise to major changes and developments that have considerably transformed international relations and national policies. Studying foreign policy works as a conceptual bridge, examining the effect of both external (‘international politics’) and internal politics on countries’ relationships and links with one another. Since such changes have been taking place at the international relations as well as the domestic level, an approach which systematically links both is important, as Beasley et al. (2002) have also argued.

In its conservative formulation, foreign policy was associated with the notions of statehood, self-rule and the prevalence of the one state player in world politics. According to Kissinger (1966), foreign policy starts where domestic policy finishes. These notions were summarised in the key assumptions of ‘state-centric’ realism (White, 2004; 1999; Webber and Smith, 2002; Waltz, 2001). State-centric realists make assumptions which are focused on the notion of the clear-cut distinction between local and international policy-making and on the claim that foreign policy represents a system of government or a sovereign state, governed as a single entity, which pursues a ‘national interest’ which can be objectively identified. In this respect, national interest is closely associated with the independence and security of a state and is frequently pursued with little consideration for the interests of other nation states. As such, the global setting where states were trying to seek their interests was generally antagonistic and competitive (Wallace, 1974). Critics of this older and outdated approach to foreign policy reject the importance of the state at their peril: there is plenty of evidence that states and governments
are key players in global politics. The issue here is that they are no longer the uniquely
dominant actors assumed by older realist theories, and that global social movements, large
companies, religious movements and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) all also matter,
and sometimes have forms of authority (for example as containers of terrorism, distributors or
development aid or as sources of norms and values) as well as power. But states still have a
distinctive role in making and managing foreign policy. To give only one obvious example, the
Libyan government, which managed a relatively stable state, was overthrown by NATO
governments using state sanctioned force in 2011. But the consequences, which are still
unfolding, involved oil companies, banks, Islamicist movements and NGOs as well as
international organisations. Rosenau (1980) was one of the first mainstream scholars in foreign
policy studies to recognise the importance of a wider range of actors in explaining and
understanding the field.

In the opinion of realist or conservative theorists, the global community is often compared by
analogy to a system consisting of billiard ball countries in sporadic crashes (Groom, 2007;
Hudson, 2005). As such, foreign policy decisions are seen as being essentially reached by the
interaction of key global actors (White, 1999; Hill and Light, 1985). To be fair to ‘classical
realism’, the billiard ball analogy was never a model or theory. Most realist writers would
immediately add that the analogy is a ‘heuristic’, a helpful device to capture a picture of global
politics rather than an exact representation. According to Webber and Smith (2002), with these
assumptions in mind, it was not hard to create a theory of foreign policy associated with the
idea of the centrality of national security policy in which military security was at the heart of
policy making.

In fact, this left a tremendous impact on both the parties who made foreign policy and on how
foreign policy was formulated. In spite of the fact that realism was the best available approach
in international relations (IR) with which both experts and scholars have defined international
relations, it was not successful in terms of examining decision-making processes or any other domestic sources of international conduct (Hill, 2003; Rosenau, 1980). Even though the realist tradition was seen by advocates as the best approach precisely because of its state-centred emphasis, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) emerged in response to common realist assumptions that the state is a solid actor with strong and reasonably considered national interests (Groom, 2007; White, 2004; 1999). FPA in this context was a kind of compromise between liberal and realist arguments set up as a contrast to theories of international politics by scholars such as Morgenthau and Waltz (1979). As a consequence, work carried out in the case of FPA questions numerous concepts characteristic in realism, including rationality. With the development of FPA, despite maintaining the state as a crucial player, it increasingly hosted a number of other actors. From the 1950s onwards, FPA has developed and reacted by adjusting its analysis to the challenging task of changing politics all over the globe (White, 2004). Therefore, even though it has several shortcomings, FPA has been forceful and transformative as a tool of investigation. With this in mind, Manners and Whitman (2000), who claimed that there is no need any longer for an association between FPA and classical realism, introduced the idea of ‘transformational’ FPA; hence establishing a dividing line between conventional and existing takes on FPA (see also Alden and Aran, 2012).

Manners and Whitman (2000) see transformational FPA as diverse and improved, investigating several other additional features of foreign policy under its diagnostic perspective. The main scope of transformational FPA relates to the participation of a wider range of policy actors, including state and non-state, domestic and global, which promotes the search for associations between foreign and other fields of administrative policy-making and examines a much wider range of topics beyond high politics and their characteristic military and security implications. As a consequence, transformational FPA provides an informed opinion for a research agenda which relates to issues of intra-departmental collaboration; therefore revoking the insulation of
foreign policy as a distinctive governmental policy field and spreading to matters usually classified as internal policy areas.

According to White (1999), through the transformational FPA research agenda, the investigation is extended to area, including the impact of leaders on organisations involved in the foreign policy process, the contribution of domestic administrative structures, and cultures and the effect of outside influences on each member state.

Based on this, this research study seeks to improve and develop the theory of foreign policy adaptation to be able to face up to the emerging phenomena that has taken place in the international order, which the theory is encountering on one side and because of uncertainty about its appropriateness among its experts on the other.

In order to establish a beneficial theory and to measure its chances of success, the altered theory of the adaptive behaviour is supposed to come across numerous quantifiable standards as acknowledged by Manheim, Rich and Willnat (2002). For example, it should firstly be tested in terms of its application to the actual world so that its assumptions can be utilised in supporting or misrepresenting the anticipated behaviours of the observable phenomenon. Secondly, the mechanisms and expectations of the theory utilised should be logically linked together and compatible with each other without being inconsistent or irregular. Thirdly, the theory must be communicable. More specifically, other specialists in the field can comprehend and inspect its assumptions and hypotheses. Finally, it must be comprehensive by being applicable to various empirical and time situations. This is to give a definition of foreign policy studies as neither positivist nor designed to provide a ‘universal’ general theory. Rather, the study of foreign policy is seen as scientific in the sense that it is rigorous, grounded in careful analysis of data, rooted in an understanding of the history and context of specific cases of policy making, and rooted in a pragmatic research practice which is cautious in the claims it makes.
Such an approach also rejects the idea that a universal model of foreign policy has much value, and it is suspicious of general theory. But it does embrace the possibility that knowledge generated from individual cases can be useful for understanding others. Rosenau developed his version of the adaptive behaviour theory at exactly the same moment as he was moving from writing in a positivist ‘model building’ approach to a more cautious and critical mode, as his *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (1980) records. In particular, Rosenau came to argue that although national interests were always an important guide to foreign policy, they were not ‘natural’ or objectively fixed, but rooted in changing identities and images and perceptions, constructed by fallible individuals and groups (Rosenau, 1980, chapter 11).

Furthermore, Rosenau’s critique of traditional FPA put more emphasis on the question of who influenced (as opposed to *made*) decisions, incorporating groups and elites outside the traditional closed group of the foreign policy system. And he started to question the assumptions of rationality in decision making which remain very much in question between scholars who approach the field in different ways today.

In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the theory of adaptation has ever since been significant as a means of directing research questions and unpacking the motives and learning processes of decision makers and influencers. For example, the black box of the decision making process, which Allison had said was ‘ultimately unknowable’ (Allison, 1971), becomes available to be unfolded by scholars and analysts, while the complexity of the new international system compels them to pursue their analysis to new levels, taking into account the study of a wider range of specific actors, motives and psychological forces, as well as institutional processes, a new level of analysis (Hudson, 2007).

In the light of this, the individual (specific actor) is seen as the predominant figure of all foreign policy analysis since the lack of participation of an individual, there would be no policy either
domestic or foreign. According to Hudson (2007), it is of lesser importance whether to concentrate on single individuals or a group of people since, arguably, neo-realism which has for such a long time been the key concept in IR is no longer capable of offering answers to a number of issues, including the reasons why a country would act like it did and why it changed its stance.

The bottom line is that the ‘black box’ considering countries as unitary players in world politics may no longer be a convenient type of research as it leaves out a number of variables. As plainly explained by Hudson, the reason simply refers to the fact that the state is a construct, and only human beings as such can be considered as real actors as they are the only ones that are able to act.

In the light of the aforementioned, the revised theory of foreign policy adaptation has paid so much attention to the role of certain actors in the examination of the adaptation of Libyan foreign policy. This has taken place through the study of many actors such the role of Libyan’s leadership and by exploring how the Libyan leaders reacted to the crisis; how they attempted to attain scope for negotiation; and when and how they achieved what the fairly smooth switch to a pro-western state. Therefore, included as the major themes of the thesis are the extent to which Libya had limited choice, the extent to which policy makers acknowledged and utilised the options they could identify; the contribution of leadership and learning in foreign policy administration; and the impact of the local affairs on the country’s international behaviour.

The downfall of the Soviet Union left behind tiny and precariously positioned countries, including Libya which considered the Soviet as their strongest ally during their most wretched conditions as they had depended upon its backing in their own adaptations. Consequently, a number of small countries, in general, and the most of radical states, in particular, embraced the form of acquiescence adaptation for two purposes; the first one was to ensure the survival
of regimes as they had strained relations with the main superpowers mainly the United States of America; instead the country survived as it was no longer threatened from external states, particularly in the last few decades. The second purpose is to absorb the internal demands, such as the shift in people’s concerns from security issues to economic and social issues, which might be related to the emergence of the complexity of the real world and its correlation with stresses of specific actors.

The new version of the adaptive behaviour theory is used in this study to explore and investigate the changes in Libyan foreign policy behaviour in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s demise and the subsequent internal effects. This change was imposed upon Libya via a new international environment which surfaced after the collapse of the Soviet Union and due to internal pressurising factors following that collapse, stemming from various groups, people, and organisations. This made Libyan foreign policy revolve around a constricted space without any strategic alliance, such as that struck with the Soviet Union prior to its collapse, or a clear-cut internal structure. Furthermore, this situation forced Libya to follow a one-way route given the limited choices, which thus meant that there was not considerable scope for manoeuvre. As such, the Libyan foreign policy stakeholders had limited choices that were summarized in the ways to drop their adverse trends of the international environment, along with the internal ones, and seek to develop desirable orientations. This poses certain questions regarding Libyan foreign policy, such as: could it adjust itself to these unprecedented changes? What price would it have to pay for its existing system to survive? Can the demands of the external and internal environment be met or not? These questions will be at the heart of this investigation, while answering them will constitute the ultimate target of this thesis.

Decision makers always have several choices to select from regarding their actions toward the external environment through four fundamental strategies; these have been labelled promotive adaptation, preservative adaptation, acquiescent adaptation, and intransigent adaption
(Rosenau, 1981). After an intensive reading and analysis of the primary sources, the research found that the Libyan decision makers were compelled to adopt a new acquiescent adaptation strategy that did not embrace Rosenau’s adaptive behaviour theory as it stemmed from shared new global context and new internal pressures. Moreover, the new Libyan’s policy was not provided with sufficient time to be regarded as a major shake-up in the global system as it was not expected, which shows that the decision-making process was taking place in light of the day to day policy. Furthermore, foreign policy adaptation was required for the regime to survive; in other words, they had to fine-tune their external agenda to the pressures from the national and global goings-on.

It is important to note that all of the literature on adaptive behaviour cited in this chapter gives equal potential importance to domestic and external causes of change and policy adaptation. The theories do not suggest a priori that one is more important than the other. Both are at play, and may well interact with each other in different ways. Thus it is strictly an empirical question for research to identify in particular cases which forces are more significant in promoting or compelling adaptative behaviours. Despite Rosenau’s indication that the demands usually come from the nearest superpower or at least from one segment of the international environment, Libya was faced with huge demands which had come from almost the entire global community, through the United Nations’ policy adopted towards Libya from 1992 to 1998 as a consequence of the changed global order; in addition, new internal demands followed that alteration in the international stance.

There are all the same obstacles to adaptive change involving major policy innovations, for example in developing countries which previously lacked democratic institutions and which attempt to reach acceptable limits of democracy. It is clear that the role of the leader’s values and beliefs has a huge impact on the state behaviour. The leader’s role may often be more important in smaller weaker state structures than in more mature developed societies, which
can minimise the authority of the leader’s individual values and beliefs (Arab, 1988). In a similar vein, a country with a powerful centralised regime locally, yet with fragile status globally, is more inclined to streamline its foreign policy than one which is not centralised and exposed to resilient social interests domestically, but cherishes hegemonic control overseas (Skidmore 1994). This begs the question of how leadership in policy change is understood as part of the adaptive process.

Margaret Hermann has contributed a number of studies over a long career in foreign policy studies to the understanding of the role of leadership in policy analysis (Hermann, 1980, 1995, 1998, 2001). Together with work by Byman (2005) on leadership in the Arab world, this provides a starting point for an interrogation of evidence on the leadership style and leadership impacts, as well as how leadership addresses questions of structural change. Although some of this body of work looks more at examples of democratic leadership, it also facilitates the understanding of more authoritarian leadership styles. Qaddafi did not manage Libyan foreign policy without the support of an attentive elite of supporters. This small group were not mere courtiers. They advised, warned and negotiated. They also changed over time. Qaddafi could be arbitrary, unreliable and most certainly cruel. But he was generally speaking a leader who made rational calculations and who used advisors who were willing to speak to him about the limits of his power and the dangers of particular proposed courses of action. This was more the case at the start of his period in power, when he depended on the clique which came to office after the 1969 coup. In the 1970s, he eliminated some of those around him while other fled into exile, and his style of government was more arbitrary and less predictable, not least because he appeared also to invent his own ideology to justify his actions. But by the mid-1980s, as Soviet power was already declining, he came again to depend more on his small circle of advisors and emissaries. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, the leadership style was mostly cooler, more calculated, and more pragmatic. The policy elite in Libya was, as the later chapters will
show in more detail, wrestling with very difficult problems as best it could under considerable
domestic and international pressure, and with little idea of how much time they might have to
make the adaptations they started to consider. In these circumstances, theories of ‘democratic’
leadership might not be appropriate but theories of rational leadership are. Popular western
media have often presented the image of ‘mad dog Qaddafi’ (for example, Daily Mail, 23 August 2011), and this image was revived when the regime fell in 2011. But it was never an
image that would pass muster in a more academic context.

However, given that some countries were governed by authoritarian regimes, in general, and
the Libyan regime, in particular, during the Cold War period, the obstacles were not addressed
appropriately as a result of an ineffective internal structure during the Cold War spell that
tolerates the Libyan leader’s unlimited powers to decide on and implement Libyan foreign
policy without accounting for internal circumstances. Furthermore, the head of the state has
been the key figure in shaping Libya foreign policy with all major decisions related to Libyan
foreign policy being almost single-handedly taken according to the leader’s whims or interests
(Hinnebusch & Ehteshami, 2002). In addition, Libyan foreign policy in that era was dedicated
to reflecting Qaddafi’s values and perception about the external world through its
determination and execution (Arab, 1988). In this context, Wish (1980) rightly argues that the
structure of policy and the focus of policy change depends on the conception which leaders
have not just of their own role but also of their understanding of the role of the state and nation
in regional and global politics. The later discussion will chart how the Libyan leadership
changed its conceptions of Libya’s role under the pressures of the Soviet collapse as part of its
analysis. Byman (2005) suggests that regime change is a principle cause of policy reorientation,
and he identifies many of the characteristics of the Libyan leadership correctly. But he also
underestimates the capacity of centralised non-democratic states to re-make themselves and/or
their policies. There is a wide agreement involving some of the national role conceptions of
political figures and how they manage foreign policy behaviour of their countries (Wish, 1980). For instance, and unsurprisingly, countries whose leaders assumed dominant roles were more inclined to dominate the foreign policy decision-making process. In addition, those countries with highly communicative and charismatic leaders, including those driven by lust for power, were more predisposed to show aggressive behaviour (Albernawi, 2002).

Moreover, during the Cold War period, Libya attempted to be a strategic ally to the Soviet Union to capture the leader’s external revolutionary aspirations without paying any attention to the internal actors which stemmed from the prevailing international circumstances in that era. However, in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the international order was changed dramatically; thus liberating domestic actors from their old constraints that had been imposed by the previous international setting. Therefore, both sides compelled Libya’s decision makers to orientate Libyan foreign policy to be more cooperative with the external environment since each side is essentially in need of the other.

The vital location and oil resources of Libya have attracted superpower countries in the subsequent years of the end of the bipolar system. In return, many local individuals, groups, and institutions have been fascinated by developed countries. All of this caused huge mixed pressures upon Libyan decision makers to adopt this new version of adaptation.

Consequently, this new version of the adaptive behaviour theory attempted to explain how Libya modified its foreign policy behaviour to suit these new circumstances in order to ensure the regime’s interests and survival on the one hand and to achieve its new goals on the other.

When Rosenau and Smith first proposed their versions of an adaptive behaviour approach to foreign policy, there seemed to be two alternative kinds of explanation of change at issue. One was the adaptive behaviour model as already discussed. The other, which becomes more important in policy studies in the 1980s and 1990s, was the idea that institutional learning was
a key to understanding policy change. The institutional learning image has its origins in liberal institutionalist theories (Smith, Hadfield and Dunne, 2008), and perhaps before that in management theory. Leaders learn from their mistakes, but also from the day-to-day interactions with domestic and international policy environments (Farrands, 1989). Learning is in this conception a normal process of adaptation as well as a necessary one. It is not (pace Welch cited above) only a response to radical crises and sudden shocks. Radical shocks may produce learning, but they may also make it impossible (because learning requires time to assimilate and use what is learned). Levy (1994) formulates an account of foreign policy change as learning which is persuasive and applicable to case study research. Risse-Kappen (1995) also recognises the importance of learning processes in foreign policy change. Smith (2004) draws on the same idea in a study of the adaptation of European Union foreign policy. None of these authors is also using the specific framework developed by Rosenau and critically elaborated by Smith, but nothing in these more recent accounts of adaptation are incompatible with those earlier studies. In this thesis, the idea that learning and adaptation are separate explanations which focus on rather different aspects of the foreign policy process is systematically rejected. Instead, it seems logical to recognise how far these kinds of explanations overlap and enhance each other. Learning is –or can be- a part of foreign policy adaptation, but is unlikely to be the whole story in any example. But it is often a central part of how policy elites change course, and in the Libyan case, it will be empirical study of the evidence available which will determine the answer to the question of its importance here.

In summary, it would be worth pointing out that the framework developed by Rosenau has been subjected to some amendments in this thesis (that will be shown briefly in the following table) to be of utility in examining the evidence about Libyan foreign policy in the particular period of time in which a set of changes utilised to rebuild this formulation. The table identifies both elements of theory which have been adopted with only marginal changes and elements
which have been adopted but also adapted, where the thesis has made a small but significant original critique of the ideas of Rosenau and Smith in building on their work to make sense of Libyan foreign policy in this specific context.
Table 1: Summary of the theoretical approach taken in thesis.

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<th>The elements of the original theory used</th>
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<td>The theory of foreign policy adaptation was first proposed by Rosenau as an attempt to sophisticate the study of foreign policy analysis. It was distinctively a theory of the bipolar Cold War period. The approach formed part of what has been called the second generation of foreign policy analysis, which depended on the mainstream analysis dominating that era. The formulation of Rosenau’s Theory of Adaptive Behaviour got some specific criticisms in terms of its operationalization on one hand as its core variables are too broad, covering the entire field of foreign policy, and making its specific application difficult on the other hand, as its indicators cannot easily be measured or assessed. Even though, the formulation has been revised by Smith, the latter’s ideas just set the agenda for a case study analysis rather than providing a more specific framework for analysis; he set a road map, but do not lay down tram lines. Moreover, Smith’s contribution neglected that how the theory can be changed to be a more effective means of understanding foreign policy change. As well as this criticism, and as a consequence of the events that have taken place on the global stage in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the theory of adaptive behaviour has acquired a fresh importance, because so many countries’ foreign policies adapted during and after the Soviet collapse and subsequent shifts in the global power balances. But the theory needs to be, and can be, improved because of its inadequacies, and these beg the question how it can be changed to be a more effective means of understanding foreign policy change. Some of the challenges that have typified present-day politics encompass pressures from globalisation and economic liberalisation. It focuses on studying the external politics and their effect on countries’ behaviours as it believes that the demands for adaptation usually come from the nearest superpower or at least from one segment of the international environment.</td>
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<th>The revised theory as critiqued and adopted</th>
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<td>As the specific actor is seen as the predominant figure of all foreign policy analysis since the lack of participation of an individual, there would be no policy either domestic or foreign. According to Hudson (2007), it is of lesser importance whether to concentrate on single individuals or a group of people since, arguably, neo-realism which has for such a long time been the key concept in IR is no longer capable of offering answers to a number of issues, including the reasons why a country would act like it did and why it changed its stance. The bottom line is that the ‘black box’ considering countries as unitary players in world politics may no longer be a convenient type of research as it leaves out a number of variables. As plainly explained by Hudson, the reason simply refers to the fact that the state is a construct, and only human beings as such can be considered as real actors as they are the only ones that are able to act. In light of this, the revised theory of foreign policy adaptation has paid so much attention to the role of certain actors in the examination of the adaptation of Libyan foreign policy. This has taken place through the study of many actors such the role of Libyan’s leadership and by exploring how the Libyan leaders reacted to the crisis; how they attempted to attain scope for negotiation; and when and how they achieved what the fairly smooth switch to a pro-western state. Therefore, included as the major themes of the thesis are the extent to which Libya had limited choice, the extent to which policy makers acknowledged and utilised the options they could identify; the contribution of leadership and learning in foreign policy administration; and the impact of the local affairs on the country’s international behaviour. It focuses on studying foreign policy works as a conceptual bridge, examining the effect of both external and internal politics on countries’ behaviours and links with one another. Since such changes have been taking place at the international relations as well as the domestic level, an approach which systematically links both is important.</td>
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| 69 |
Methodology and Methods

The analysis of foreign policy also requires primary sources that underpin the research findings. A good research is one that is well prepared and includes a framework for data collection and analysis, generally in keeping with the key aims of the research. Also determined in the research design is how the research should be piloted, utilising a number of methods, approaches and tools, given their significance in terms of providing complementary data in support of the findings (Burnham et al., 2004, p. 31).

The use of theory and methodology needs above all to be appropriate for the research topic; furthermore, it is crucial that theory and methods are linked to each other and have some kind of compatibility with each other, as well as being used for a particular purpose for each investigator and each theme (Burnham et al, 2004, p. 276). As far as this research is concerned, elite interviewing will be utilised. In addition, examining and studying academic materials is considered as a key method in this thesis and is highly significant, since reading and perusing these materials is critical in terms of integrating and connecting different parts of the data with each other to acquire the necessary ground for the analysis of the topic (Dey, 2003). Eventually, this could lead to a mixture of diverse methods, which are thought to extend and enrich the findings of any research endeavour (Burnham et al., 2004).

One can describe the intertwining of the methodological aspects of this research with the theory and methods in the following context. First of all, given the qualitative nature of this research, it is aimed at attaining a holistic and in-depth awareness and knowledge of the repercussions of the Soviet Union’s fall on Libya foreign policy in the period from 1991 to 2003. In relation to the theory and methods adopted in this thesis, they are intended to account for the required data for the construction and analysis of the argument, which in turn would enhance awareness and understanding of the topic. According to Mason (2002, p. 62), it is crucial to note in this
respect that the interview instrument is widely accepted as one of the most important methods adopted in qualitative research studies.

Second, this research offers an empirical account on the effect of the fall of the Soviet Union on Libyan foreign policy, within a given period of time. In the meantime, the research is determined by a theoretical framework which was based on noticeable facts. According to Krippendorff (1982, p. 17), scientific research is a systematic process of acquiring knowledge; however, elite interviewing is an effective technique in the process of collecting knowledge and establishing facts about a specific subject and area (Marshall and Rossman, 1999, p. 113). In addition, whereas the understanding of a political issue has to be empirically verified (Mayer, 2002, p. 124), the research questions that are put forward in the elite interviews tackled the nature of the subject matters.

Accomplishing a strong interpretation of the reality of the topic is at the heart of utilising this theoretical framework. The need for explanation is also intended to increase knowledge and awareness of the topic under study. According to Marshall and Rossman (1999, p. 113), the best methods to provide the researcher with the required data to achieve a robustly structured research are the interviewing of those who are involved directly in the topic and in the process of reviewing secondary resources published by experts in the field. As a consequence, this piece of research is aimed at achieving a more holistic approach of this topic, which may lead to an ascertaining result to consolidate existing knowledge or even allow for a more precise finding different from that already available in the literature.

The research plan is significant as it enables the researcher to identify the most essential, valid, impartial and truthful data for the research questions by utilising the suitable and accessible approaches (Burnham et al., 2004). Consequently, the research methods are pivotal in the
process of identifying results in any political investigation and planning them is an indispensable component of political science on the whole (Burnham et al, 2004, p. 1).

Interestingly, the same feature is shared by most styles of a semi-structured interview, including their engagement in a communication and discoursed interaction between the researcher and the respondent (Mason, 2002). As pointed out by Marshall and Rossman (1999), interviews can be seen as “a conversation with a purpose”. As such, the ontological perspective of the researcher provides an account of the people’s opinions, understandings, explanations, and expertise, representing the key element of the social reality that the research would be committed to investigating (Mason, 2002: 63). Furthermore, there is a practical justification for selecting the qualitative interviewing technique, as the necessary data may be unobtainable through other tools. Moreover, interviews will assist the investigator to examine the research questions from various perspectives, in particular when the researcher is adopting other research methods. It is also worth noting that interviews can offer the researcher a large amount of data within a quite limited time scope (Mason, 2002, p. 66).

In terms of elite interviews, they focus on individuals who are seen to be prominent, well-informed and professional in the research topic and field. The benefits of this type of interview include the ability of the interviewee who holds a position in a realm linked to the research to give the researcher a comprehensive account of the issue under study, in addition to other important details and information. The kind of data collected might be associated with the past, present or even future developments in connection to the issues; therefore, they will be pivotal for the successful approach to the topic (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). When it comes to political research, elite interviewing is considered a major instrument, especially in terms of its efficacy in obtaining important information for the researcher about decision-making from informed people in the field. Given that qualitative interviewing is grounded on the postulation that knowledge is constructed more than excavated, the emphasis of the interviewer’s questions
should be on the interviewee’s understanding and practice rather than raising hypothetical questions and situations (Mason, 2002). Furthermore, the vast experience and intellectual skills of the interviewee in the topic will enable the researcher to be as neutral and restricted in their ability to impulsively employ the information and the issue under study throughout the interviewing process (Burnham et al., 2004).

Notably, there are some issues that interviews seem to be generally associated with. Therefore, the researcher using the interview method should be aware of these issues when preparing research plans and strategies. Due to the significance of the communication and collaboration between the researcher and the responding interviewee, the latter may be reluctant to collaborate with researchers or to reveal some useful material in response to the research question or sub questions. Interviewees may also be disinclined to support the researcher’s intention to delve into the topic for a clearer picture (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). Furthermore, the most significant elite individuals tend to have limited or no time to spare, which may lead to complications for the researcher in terms of the right to meet people and time constraints while the interview is taking place. More importantly, on certain situations, the researcher may have to adjust the interview and its structure, as well as the questions to respond to the wishes and tendencies of the respondent, in particular when taking into account the fact that they may have the capability to be in charge of the interview process and avert reacting to certain advanced and sensitive queries and questions (Marshall and Rossman, 1999, p. 114).

In spite of providing the researcher with the much needed information, elite interviewees may be eventually the source of some scientific problems, particularly when the researcher allows them to mould the researcher’s understandings and perceptions of the observables and the research process with their unacceptable viewpoints (Manheim et al., 2002). This is more likely to take place if the researcher is not aware of the facts, or if the respondents give limited or
inaccurate information in their answers to the questions, or they provide the researcher with misinformation when tackling ideological, personal or sensitive issues (Mannheim et al., 2002, p, 322). Nevertheless, these issues can be dealt with if the researcher has adequate and robust conceptualisation of the research problem and questions, in addition to a sound understanding of the subject matter under study (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). On the other hand, even though the researcher may not be in full charge of the interview, the researcher should not consider all the information revealed by elite people at face value since conceptualising political actions and behaviour necessitates a differentiation between what is factual and what is argued to be factual and right by members and elites in the political arena. As a consequence, the researcher should conduct interviews with more than one source of information, in particular when gathering data concerning extremely important activities or concepts in connection with the topic. The researcher should also compare the given information and undertake a careful analysis, using a comparative approach when also analysing with the data acquired through other techniques and approaches (Manheim et al., 2002).

The reason for utilising this kind of method (interview) in this thesis is that it has many advantages, such as a higher response rate and asking questions on several levels to obtain the most information on a subject. This has enabled the researcher to learn about the details of adapting Libyan foreign policy from officials who had already made this policy. That cannot be directly detected. Using this method has depended on intensive reading from secondary sources and consulting with the research’s supervisory team before the interviews were completed. The interviews contained several questions related to a number of sensitive issues regarding Libyan foreign policy in the chosen period of study. Furthermore, a semi-structured interview is considered a flexible method which allows a researcher to ask other questions that were not considered before the interview but emerge when it takes place.
This qualitative method which has been adopted in this study always utilises a realistic approach that endeavours to comprehend phenomena in a context, such as real situations, and produces findings from itself. This method seeks to illuminate, understand and extrapolate its finding to similar situations (Golafshani, 2003).

The findings of qualitative studies need to be tested to demonstrate their credibility, which with this kind of method rests on the ability and effort of the researcher, contrary to the credibility of quantitative studies which rely on instrument construction (Patton, 2002). Despite the advantages of using the case study method, there is some doubt regarding its reliability and validity. Hence, the examination of validity and reliability for qualitative data is essential to define the stability and quality of the data obtained (Andreas, 2003). The profound importance of the issues of validity and reliability in qualitative studies is not equally significant and thus their evaluation is commonly quite different. This stems from the fact that a qualitative study usually depends on the informants (Ambert et al., 1995). The validity of a qualitative research might be measured in terms of whether the findings can be generalised to other situations that are comparable to the situation the research focused on. However, reliability in qualitative research means that repeating the investigation will give the same results (Utne, 1996). Based on that, the validity of using the semi-structured interview method in this thesis exists in terms of the probability of practicing its findings upon other situation. However, the reliability of this thesis relies on interviews with a number of Libyan officials regarding the issues related to Libyan foreign policy which produced a set of answers that were seemingly objective. Any interviewer must always keep in his mind that an interviewee is not committed to being objective and informing them of the truth (Berry, 2002). Based on this, the research attempted to focus on making the interviews as good dialogues as well as to be guided questions to make this thesis more reliable. Furthermore, a comparative approach will be used when also
analysing the data acquired through other techniques and approaches. This was an attempt to overcome the methodological issues in elite interviewing, both issues of validity and reliability.

As this study is concerned with Libyan foreign policy in a given period, Libya was the location where this method was used. More explicitly, it was carried out in the Libyan Foreign Ministry in Tripoli and some institutions related to it, as well as resorting to the use of the Internet to communicate with people who could not be directly interviewed. The interviewees were some of the Libyan policy makers who had been involved directly in the shaping and implementation of Libyan foreign policy during that period of time. Although the number of interviews is not large, the interviews were lengthy and profound dialogues, as well as most of them were with high-ranking politicians. The researcher interviewed each one separately, and due to different time limitations, the interviews varied between 35 and 55 minutes. Furthermore, the process of interviewee selection was based on their expertise and knowledge about the topics pertaining to this thesis, and their direct involvement in these topics within the timescale of this thesis. Moreover, the researcher’s distinctive relationships with some of the top officials enabled him to gain deeper insights into this topic and to also facilitate the interviewing process. The researcher also studied a good deal of literature and other publications in different academic journals and articles. The aim of such extensive and wide-ranging materials published by various authors and experts in the topic was to ensure advanced information about members of the elite who were directly involved with this subject.

Nevertheless, there were some limitations for carrying out this type of field work in Libya. Given the sensitive nature of the regime and the tightened security on information in Libya and since some questions in this research touched on a number of sensitive areas, the tape recording was declined by the political leaders who were reluctant to have their views recorded for fear of being prosecuted for unveiling such sensitive material. In addition, the interviews were conducted originally in Arabic, and had been translated by the researcher into English. The
researcher successfully carried out these interviews during an academic trips to Libya in the Summer and Autumn of 2010 as well as Summer 2012, on which important official Libyan foreign policy makers were met. As a result a considerable amount of information was obtained, including constructive details regarding this period which related to the investigation.

These kinds of primary sources are subjected to an analytical process for extracting evidences which underpins the research hypothesis to achieve the study’s goals. In this context, the analysis of elite interviews will come about. In addition, an examination and use of academic materials is a key methodological process in this thesis, which is highly significant, as reading and understanding these materials can be a crucial step into integrating and relating various parts of the data to each other in order to attain the necessary ground for the analysis of the subject under study (Dey, 1993: 82). This would lead to a mix of a number of methods, which are considered to expand the outcomes and results of any research study (Burnham et al., 2004: 206).

In summary, this chapter looked into the interaction and intertwining between the relevant methodological features of this piece of research on one hand and the thought up theoretical framework on the other. This intertwining and interaction have formed the underpinning of this thesis, which is exemplified in the significance and underlying principle of the research questions. According to the research questions, they do not claim to provide an absolute understanding and knowledge of the effects of the Soviet Union’s fall on Libyan foreign policy within a set period of time, from an empirical or theoretical point of view; instead, they propose to offer a better conceptualisation of the aforementioned demise on Libyan foreign policy.

The intertwining between the methodological features of this thesis and the theoretical and methodological processes can be defined in the light of the following. To start with, this research study has a qualitative approach, aiming to obtain a complex and an in-depth
understanding and knowledge of the subject studied. In terms of the theory and methods used in this research, they are intended to provide the required data for building and analysing an argument in order to enhance understanding and awareness of the subject under study.

On the other hand, this research has an empirical background being concerned with the influence of the Soviet Union on the Libyan foreign policy within a particular period of time. In the meantime, the research is underpinned by a theoretical framework which itself was grounded on perceived realities. Furthermore, the theory adopted has contributed to the shaping and selection of the observables in this study. Even though scientific examination is a systematic process to gain knowledge (Krippendorff, 1982: 17), another effective tool is elite interviewing in terms of collecting knowledge and establishing facts concerning a particular subject matter or problem (Marshall and Rossman, 1999: 113). In addition, in spite of the fact that the understanding of a political phenomenon should be empirically verified (Mayer, 2002: 124), the research questions that are posed in the elite interviews dealt with the nature of the topic under study.
Chapter Three: The Nature of International Relations in Light of the Cold War

In the aftermath of World War II, countries came together politically and formed three groups. While the first included the industrialised capitalist countries, such as the United States and all of its allies, the second involved the communist nations under the leadership of the Soviet Union. As for the third group, it consisted of developing countries, including the newly independent ones that were not aligned with either global force. However, these nonaligned nations offered yet another area for rivalry between the Cold War power houses. These developing countries, which were situated in Latin America, Asia, and Africa, were economically impoverished and politically insecure due largely to a long history of colonisation. There were also ethnic conflicts and almost non-existent technology and education. With the Soviet communist style and the American free market democracy style as the dominant choices, each of these developing countries needed a political and economic system around which to build its society.

There were a number of approaches used by the United States and the Soviet Union to impose their style in the developing countries, including military support, economic help, and launching programmes to tackle poverty and destitution. As such, the aim of this chapter is to shed more light the nature of this system and to elucidate the place of Libya in this struggle of interests.

As proven to the observers, the effective experimentation at Alamogordo on 16 July 1945 had resulted in something immensely and enormously unprecedented, which would demonstrate to be highly more significant than discovering electricity or any other important events which had permanently transformed humanity. According to Sherwin (1975), as soon as the constant overwhelming rumble that sent shocking alarms of Armageddon was reiterated in the real
massacre of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, no one ever doubted the weapon’s devastating effects. As suggested by Friedberg (1983), the introduction of this weapon caused American decision makers to contend with many real concerns for the future by raising a number of questions, including how it would impact on traditional warfare; whether it would be used instantly at the beginning of war, or as a last recourse; what the repercussions or prospects are in terms of promoting larger and minor types of nuclear weapons; and if knowledge should be shared with others? In addition, it unquestionably boosted the already prevailing Soviet development of nuclear weapons as a result of Stalin’s adoption of the atomic programme as soon as Hiroshima was over (Garthoff, 1958). Despite the fact that the Soviet Union was clearly behind at that time, in the development of atomic and nuclear bombs, as well as their delivery process, they managed to draw very much nearer enough to their American counterparts. The USSR was much closer to the United States than they thought because of their effective espionage on the atomic bomb project. Within a few years following 1945, it appeared reasonable to accept that the American nuclear gains facilitated the achievement of a much sought after balance to the Russian dominance in traditional military prowess. However, as Larson (1981) argued, it did not seem too long, surely as far as the history of international relations is concerned, before Moscow started to pull alongside and, therefore, evidence its own statement that the United States’ control over this weapon had simply been a transient stage.

The final element which seemed to emphasise that the world must now be viewed, strategically and politically, as bipolar rather than in its traditional multipolar form was the heightened role of ideology.

The sensitive role of ideology was the final element which appeared to highlight the notion of the world having now to be seen in a strategic and political light as bipolar and not multipolar. However, within another year or two, the ideology nature of what was to be known as the Cold War between the USSR and the United States was all too obvious. The numerous signals
pointing toward the unwillingness of the Kremlin to allow democratic forms of government in Eastern Europe, the huge number of Russian armed personnel, the several wars taking place between socialists and their Greek, Chinese, and other rivals all over the world, as well as the rising concerns about the ‘red threats’, spy rings, and domestic mutiny resulted in an enormous shift in American feelings, and consequently to a swift reaction from the Truman government. Prompted by the alarming presence of the Russians and the likelihood of their taking over the British after the latter had withdrawn their guarantees to Greece and Turkey, the American President, in his “Truman Doctrine” speech of March 1947, depicted a globe forced into selecting from various sets of ideological doctrines (Kennedy, 1988).

The will of the majority is considered as one way of life, and is characterised by free organisations, representative forms of government, unbiased elections, and assurances of personal liberties, freedom of expression and worship and protection from political repression and persecution. Another way of life refers to how the will of a minority is forcibly executed upon the majority and how a policy of terror and tyranny, a biased press, non-transparent elections and the subdual of personal liberties is resorted to in order to maintain that will (Anderson, 1981).

As such, the foreign and national interests of the Cold War could feed off one another, equally capped by a call to ideological values; namely, liberalism and communism, which given their universal status, were commonly adopted (Lichtheim, 1972). Through this, each party was permitted to understand and interpret the entire universe as a field where the ideological wrangle could not be untangled from the power–politics race. It had to be either the United States /Liberal-led camp or the Russian/Communist bloc.
According to Kennedy (1988), this brought about a new strategic truth, with which not only the inhabitants of a fragmented Europe would have to live but also people in faraway places such as Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, among others.

**Aspects pertaining to the relationship between the two power centres**

Often perceived as an ideological tussle between two opposing political systems, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union is a clear sign of how the former can be intolerant of the morals, ideas and strategies of the latter, and vice versa. Their resentment can be ascribed to the obligations of safety in a radical and bipolar global structure and does not stem from the hatred or malice of either side toward the other. Even though their intents towards each other were originally benevolent, both superpowers were caught in a security quandary where measures taken by one side for protective purposes seemed as intimidating, hostile or imperialist in the eyes of the other side. The outcome is a number of self-fulfilling predictions by which protective activities produce countermeasures that consolidate and deepen the initial concerns (Williams and Spring, 1989).

The security problem is undeniably intrinsic in a radical global structure with no overruling power which has been found lacking. Despite the fact that the UN has been formed to help maintain the worldwide peace and security and also to preserve the global solidity, it has itself been pulled into the ideological struggle; thus, the ideological battle has slipped into the United Nations which, in fact, failed in its major role as a global establishment attending to all states’ affairs according to its values, by succumbing to the superpowers’ ideological interests when dealing with difficult situations (Donovan, 1973). Naturally, all the efforts of the United Nations and its agencies were undesirably affected during the Cold War period. In addition, there has been a strong emphasis on how the emerging balance of power would create certain difficulties for the United Nations. These difficulties included the production of a political environment so acutely in disharmony with key components of the basic ideal values of the
United Nations as to dictate wide-ranging adaptation in predominant attitudes and perceptions of the institution’s functions (Young, 1968). It questioned both the availability and the efficiency of supervisory tools in the global system separate from the context of the United Nations, in addition to bringing about a significant drop in the norm construction and shared legitimisation actions of the United Nations. Consequently, the dual arrangement caused extremely serious security problems, giving it acuity and intensity that were present when influence is more or less proportionately disseminated (Williams and Spring, 1989).

While dissimilarities in the cultural, political and economic structures of the two major global players were less important, nevertheless, they were surely not immaterial. In fact, they were on the whole significant in elucidating the trend of policy makers in the Kremlin and the White House to ascribe the Cold War entirely to the opponent. Whenever structural issues are covered by ideological aversions, the outcomes cannot be that promising. According to George, Farley, and Dallin (1988) and Kegley (1994), ideology severely aggravates these problems by constructing, among political leaders and their communities a highly respected image and an unpleasant image of the adversary. It is to those images that policy responds, they argue, at least as much as to any ‘objective’ factors.

Another outcome of ideology is that it makes policy makers and society less sensitive to the security issue and to fears of the other party, leading to the ignorance of the reasonable needs of the opponent and the reduced likelihood that it is acting out of fears for its own security. Thus, both sides are inclined to endorse strategic fundamentalism, which simply refers to the attribution of conflict almost exclusively to the malicious nature of the rival (Wheeler and Booth, 1987).

It is highly likely that such a pattern existed in Soviet-American relations during the Cold War era as the rivalry between the two has been considered among other things as an excess of self-
morality on both sides and an unwillingness to recognise that policy makers in both the Kremlin and the White House had construed Soviet-American relations in terms of being a conflict between the two blocs, light and darkness. Indeed, a more appropriate depiction is that of two influential countries with little empathy or awareness of each other’s perceptions, sensitivities, and issues (Williams, 1989). The security problem in that period has been aggravated by this lack of knowledge and understanding. Ideology also represented a vital instrument in terms of rallying national support for competitive strategies, resulting in that, for example, in certain situations decision makers could end up with less suppleness than they had wished for. To put it more simply, conceptual oppositions not only deepen the security quandary, but they have also protracted its impacts, making efforts at cooperation and relaxation more challenging and harder to maintain. Ideas and ideology cohere together to shape attitudes which reinforce the ‘spiral of international insecurity’ (Hill, 2003, p. 139-40; see also p. 334).

Since it is seemingly a key reason for the Cold War, the issue of ideology compelled both the Soviets and the Americans to be antagonistic towards one another, which was more obvious in the Soviet Union’s foreign policy directions than it was in that of the United States’, about which several senior personalities in the Kremlin have frequently made clear proclamations across many examples. One such example was the statement of Lenin when he highlighted the significance of this factor in his statement regarding the relationship between both parties by announcing that the presence of the Soviets as a global power alongside the imperialist countries for a long period of time is inconceivable (Burin, 1963). As for Stalin, he declared in a statement regarding the same issue that the aim is to support vigorously the absolute rule of the working class in one country, utilising it as a foundation for toppling imperialism all over the world (Kintner, 1962). On the other hand, it was to some degree unspoken in the United States’ policies where it had been concealed under the safeguarding of the United States’ wellbeing and security (Howard, 1972). The ascendancy of Reagan to power, however, seemed
to mark a change as US policy became more and more challenging, clearly showing the United States’ willingness to endorse unconditionally the strategy of supporting ‘freedom fighters’ in their tussle against Marxist regimes in the developing regions. According to McFaul (Winter 1989-1990), the so-called Reagan Doctrine accounted for one of the most important foreign policy inventions of the Reagan presidency. As such, it could be claimed that the ideological battle was the prevailing motive that fed and extended the Cold War for several years. Even though all other aspects or elements of that war are still continuing, it is the ideology factor whose own disappearance coincided with the end the Cold War. As indicated by Mueller (Winter 2004/2005), the essence of the Cold War was not essentially about socialism, as such, nor was it about the Soviet domination over Eastern Europe. It was not even about the Communist foothold in the Soviet Union or about armaments, authority balance and global supremacy. The main reason was the Soviet Union’s inclination to support and uphold an ideology (and the economic system that went with it) that constituted a major threat to the western hemisphere.

Despite having distinct ideological beliefs, the United States and the Soviet Union were not totally unprepared in a mental sense for the fresh development in their relationships. It is worth mentioning that the peoples of the two states did not share a tradition of enmity throughout history. While America continuously relished great admiration in the eyes of many Russians and even the Soviet communist administration, represented by Stalin, who once referred to the communist way at work being a mixture of “Russian revolutionary sweep” and “American efficiency” (Robert, 1967), Americans, nonetheless, might have been less predisposed to positive sentiments toward their Russian counterparts. However, during the Second World War, they mostly appreciated the Russians’ contribution in the war, and Russian nationals were more conscious of the American role than their administration ever recognised.
It is no surprise to suggest that Soviet-American political cooperation had a history dating back to that period. For example, during the early 1940s, the two superpowers unexpectedly started to establish a cooperative relationship of the most rudimentary type in a coalition war to survive in the face of a mutual foe. Due to those circumstances, several critics considered it natural that the two countries would continue their cooperative relationships in the post-war phase. According to Robert (1967), such a thought was embedded into the architecture of the United Nations as an organisation, and in particular the Security Council.

The rise of the United States as the most unrivalled power within the capitalist bloc came as a result of two elements; namely, a well-developed economic system that had been effectively and successfully promoted in the aftermath of the civil war, in addition to two world wars that both transfigured the United States’ economic situation and weakening likely opponents, notably the UK, China and France. Therefore, one can safely say that had it not been for its original head-start, the United States would not have gained a firm grip on the global stage, and certainly had it not been for both world wars, the Americans would not have turned that heavy presence into a position of absolute supremacy. As such, a process that started in 1915 with the financial control moving from London to New York put an end to thirty years leaving the United States comfortably ahead of others as the unchallenged force (Cox, 1990).

In 1945, the United States was in an exceptionally good position by controlling approximately more than 50 per cent of the world’s GNP, as well as the majority of global food surpluses and almost all economic assets. Furthermore, there was an industrial revolution in the aftermath of the war in the United States making it a leader in virtually all of the major technological fields. However, the United States was not, in fact, only in a situation of economic supremacy, but it also had huge military prowess (Gaddis, 2007). For instance, the United States single-handedly controlled the atomic bomb and the appropriate tools to supply it, with both nations formerly endangering the American interests (Germany and Japan) now succumbing unreservedly and
under military siege. Thus the Soviet Union appeared as the one nation which possessed the ability to contest United States’ dominance after 1945. Since then, the Soviets had been acknowledged as the main adversary in the Cold War up until the late 1980’s.

It has been suggested above that the Cold War was the result of an incompatible resentment between two inimical approaches. In spite of its obvious force, the relation was indeed not as dangerous as it might have been suggested; indeed it was more organised than it had seemed, especially after 1962. Apparently, a major factor for this was the awareness that an uncontrolled struggle would certainly bring about a conflict that neither side could decide in the end. However, another equally vital reason was the general impression both superpowers shared that a reasonably managed mutual resentment helped safeguard their own interests while uncontrolled hatred threatened them (Bell, 1977).

The well thought-out ties could be evidently understood in the subsequent period that ensued following the Cuban missile crisis. This period had been rooted in what has become recognised as the détente.

Throughout the détente phase, the talks were focused on nuclear propagation, leading to the 1968 NPT. In addition, during the early years of the 1970s, many significant and extensive agreements were finalised, including the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) as two of the most recognised accords (Wallensteen, 1985).

According to the Americans and Soviets, the aim of détente appeared to have been similar; namely avoiding nuclear conflict between the two global forces. Therefore, there were endeavours to enhance direct interaction between the two parties, including the Hot Line Agreement of 1963. Other treaties on decreasing conflicts, occurring by mistake, epitomised in the Naval Agreement of 1972, the Basic Principles Agreement of 1972, and the Agreement on Avoidance of Nuclear War of 1973; in addition to some actions to build confidence in
Europe, such as the Helsinki Final Act 1975. As argued by Tronnier (2010), the United States and USSR aimed to deal with the crisis without having to engage in an unplanned nuclear war; in other words, the two superpowers endeavoured to establish an anticipated relationship.

In relation to the abovementioned, yet in some measure less important, was the other aim of rapprochement: to restrict the rivalry for nuclear arms. Therefore, the Limited Test Ban Treaty was finalised in 1963, but with no high expectations of going ahead, since both countries still were adamant to keep their intentions to produce extra nuclear arms and to preserve their present weaponries. Instead of pursuing a nuclear disarmament policy, the aim was to control and guide the arms competition. In addition, the United States and USRR saw it necessary to avoid nuclear arms propagation (NPT, 1968). All in all, these actions would improve predictability and possibly lead to productive relationships. Another aim, probably less important than the other two, was the pursuit of economic gains, not only as a result of slowed-down arms competition, but also from direct economic relations and activities between the two, involving grain and technology as the two most significant goods needed in the USSR, in return for new markets which attracted the attention of the United States (Wallensteen, 1985).

One mutual interest determining the American-Soviet relations was how to prevent a nuclear war, with the majority of other aspects seemingly secondary in importance to this or used as a means to attain this aim. This common objective was to be accomplished along with the safeguarding of the prevailing social orders. Therefore, if the stage preceding the détente highlighted such social order ethics; i.e. American-type Capitalism vs. Soviet-type Socialism, détente made nuclear war prevention an aim of the same significance, but not superior as such. Both aims were to be achieved simultaneously. As a result, the end of détente signified a reoccurrence of the foregoing preference order, which again had the social order ethics at a higher level and with more significance (Halliday, 1986).
In spite of a number of events that pigeonholed the whole era from 1976 to 1985, including the demise and collapse of détente between 1976 and 1980, and the second cold war from 1980 to 1985, when the conflicting perceptions of détente assumed by the United States, and the Soviet Union more specifically, the arms competition which contributed much into the deteriorating relationships, alongside the economic rivalry between the blocs, in addition to the Soviet intervention in some African and Asian states, in particular Afghanistan, which was seen by Washington as breaching the essence of détente (Walsh, 2008), the consensus started to materialise in the last couple of years of the Cold War, which eventually led to the Geneva Summit and the ensuing talks (Halliday, 1986).

To begin with, it was somewhat obvious that the Cold War had significant national purposes. On the one hand, the pressures created by the battle facilitated the reinforcement of disciplines and unity within the United States and Soviet Union structures. Concerns about the Cold War were on the other hand utilised to vindicate the main policy initiatives. For instance, while referring to watersheds produced by the Czech overthrow and the Berlin blockade in 1948, Truman was capable of passing the Marshall Plan and NATO through the Congress and with the approval of United States citizens. A similar strategy was adopted by Stalin, who after 1946, for example, highlighted the issue that the Soviets were risking a likely war from the west so as to rally a weary and disheartened public into a rehabilitated economic cycle (Cox, 1990).

Second, the Cold War helped both adversaries make their respective social systems legitimate to impose a sense of legitimacy. In the western bloc, the public was continuously reminded that if they ever attempted to transform beyond the market, this would only result in the type of economic ineffectiveness and political suppression that was prevalent in the Eastern bloc. The public was informed that by exchanging the socialist ideals for capitalist principles, the same economic uncertainty would inevitably be experienced in a similar manner to that of workers in the opposite hemisphere. The contradictory outcome of this ideological battle was to make
the then prevailing socialist approach the most persuasive answer for the capitalist model and
the injustices and absurdities of the market as a significant underpinning for the most influential

Third, it should be pointed out that the United States and the Soviet Union profited from the
Cold War as it served their respective interests in the European zone. As such, the contest
strengthened European reliance upon the two global forces. In terms of the Russian threat, it
gave the United States more power and influence in Western European countries than it would
have had in any other way. Likewise, genuine doubts of the NATO and ‘German revanchism’
reinforced the Soviet influence within Eastern European states. Besides, by dictating a two pole
structure upon Europe, the Cold War efficiently involved, without entirely eradicating, the
disintegrative influence of patriotism; a crucial element that was as unique to the American
interests in the aftermath of World War II as it was to the Soviets.

Finally, and perhaps the most significant of all, by stalling the disintegration of Europe, the
Cold War offered a way out for the once unsolvable German issue. In consequence, Germany
was divided into two distinct parts and hence was incapable of contending with the concord in
Europe as it had taken place twice in the past during the twentieth century (DePorte, 1979).
One should also point out that the bipolar structure that emerged as a consequence of that
struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union contributed to the justification of their
particular global stances. Combatting the Soviet danger effectually made the global role of the
United States legitimate by the same token that anti-colonialism offered a valuable shield for
the Soviet Union’s overseas role. For that reason, the Cold War helped the interests of both the
Soviet Union and the United States. For this reason, neither side actually attempted to change
any aspect of the relationship as soon as it had been expressed. Their aims, hence, were not in
fact about gaining ground over the other as much as it was about maintaining a balanced
approach (Charles, 1964). According to Liska (1967), the Cold War was more of a wisely
managed game with mutually approved guidelines than a competition in which winners or losers could take part.

Arguably, the above can only show that the global forces had a number of possible tools at their disposal to avert political disagreements that could have serious implications and lead to war among other predicaments which, even though not as threatening as military conflicts, could have severe repercussions on the wider United States and Soviet relations. Therefore, a world power could have adopted a prevention policy to deter the other bloc or its followers from impinging on its interests. Equally, each bloc could have endorsed strategies intended at maximising the internal stability and safety position of an ally or impartial country. In addition, the superpowers could have also depended on third parties to arbitrate local clashes, which could in fact result in hostilities erupting between the two global forces. And in order to avoid crises, they might have also arranged to launch an impartial or buffer state, or approve each other’s main or special spheres of interests in a number of fields. During the period preceding the 1970s, the key issue that has been raised had been whether the two superpowers might agree to a number of broad ethics, morals, and standards of the rivalry game to restrict and normalise their global conflict. In fact, this idea gained popularity at the highest level of agreement in 1972 with Nixon and Brezhnev signing the rudimentary principles pact. The latter recommended that the United States and the Soviet Union had decided on the pressing need to manage efficiently their worldwide rivalry in order to avoid being drawn into the perilous situation of armed conflict. An in-depth investigation of the basic values of the Agreement in view of the events and developments in the American-Soviet relationships in the following years, nevertheless, showed that it was indeed a quasi-agreement, as it involved unsettled and ambiguous disagreements that were understood in a different way by the two parties. A more explicit agreement was signed by Nixon and Brezhnev to cope with situations constituting a risk of atomic war at their second round of talks in the summer of 1973. As argued by George
(1983), the commencement of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict in October 1973 surely put the Agreement on prevention of nuclear war under trial, with the United States questioning whether the Soviet Union had conformed to its requirements.

**Nature of competitiveness in the American-Soviet ‘game’: impacts on competition rules**

There was a considerable difference in terms of the balance of power between the United States and Russia from one geographical region to another. Based on the perspective of interests in the balance, the universal competition of the global forces is discerned. Where ground rules severely restrained a superpower’s participation in areas where it has low key interest, this could be accepted. However, the same severe bans could not be accepted by that superpower for domains where it has considerable or dynamic interests (Gilbert, 1988). Accordingly, the world in that era had been split indirectly in line with the interests of the global giants between the most influential players on the world stage, where each area of them is sorted in accordance to many implied standards to belong to the influence of either the Soviet Union or to the United States on the one hand, or to be a contested area on the other, in which the interests of both opposing blocs are unclear and according to the two poles’ behaviour in a few activities during the Cold War that were exposed to an implicit agreement between them so that any direct conflict is avoided. Consequently, the following description will follow the events and the impacts of great supremacies throughout the Cold War as they were seeking to achieve their interests in various parts around the globe.

**High-interest asymmetric regions favouring either the United States or the Soviet Union**

On the surface, as suggested by this approach, circumstances of this type should be appropriate for growth and approval of rules or customs that enable the avoidance of crises. To give an example as evidence, the global forces with prevailing interests in a specific region; such as the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the Americans in the Caribbean may effectively affirm a right to an unopposed range of interest. However, the other opponent may be reluctant to pull
out completely from the race in that area for a number of motives. Even though there is an acceptance that an asymmetry of interest exists in favour of its adversary, it may still argue to have particularly lesser interest in that field which it is overall disinclined to relinquish. It may also decline for ethical reasons to give up challenging in the other superpower’s arena of primary interests; in particular, if it regarded its international battle with the other opponent in something resembling zero-sum terms, it may be inspired to attempt diminishing its rival’s authority and supremacy in its domain of primary interests. What the Cold War history and the era following the detente stage have shown to those keen on this area, the global force with not much interests in their opponent’s field of predominant interests could opt to contribute there within specific parameters. These limitations may either manifest themselves in the objectives to be followed in that field and or the tools to be used so that those objectives are fulfilled (Gilbert, 1988).

In this case, it could be extremely challenging for a superpower to achieve either an appropriate level of awareness on the ground rules or on competition standards. Nevertheless, implicit standards and forms of control were expected to appear, which could aid to construct and regulate superpowers struggle in such a field. Undeniably, the United States and the Soviet Union had documented and significantly valued each other’s fields of principal interests, despite having done so mainly by means of implied norms and ad hoc voluntary limitations.

As such, since World War II, for instance, and throughout of the Cold War, the Americans have acknowledged the vital security interests of the Soviet Union in the Eastern European region and vice versa, in the Caribbean. Nevertheless, this has not prevented the United States from pressurising the Soviet Union into agreeing an open, rather than a closed, range security interest, according to which East European states would relish an amount of political liberty and contact with the Western hemisphere. According to Gilbert (1988), the aims followed by the United States in Eastern Europe have from, time to time, been variable in range, being to a
certain extent more motivated during the pinnacle of the Cold War era. As for the tools employed by the American administration in quest of its purposes regarding Eastern Europe, they have also been diverse; however, it has exercised stringent restrictions in the interests of avoiding a precarious skirmish or conflict with its Soviet counterpart. In fact, exactly for this purpose, the White House has followed specific crisis prevention policies on numerous key events. Therefore, it was possible for the United States in the case of Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 to identify methods of convincing the Soviet Union that this would not seriously complicate issues Moscow was experiencing in overcoming the rebellious activities in these East European states (Valenta, 1982).

There are a number of justifications which could be given regarding the Soviet Union’s strategy in general towards the Western side, an immense geographical expanse that has been in the past positioned as a no-entry zone to European authorities by the Americans. The area in general has not been of much interest to the Soviets and thus was unworthy of any likely venture with Moscow’s assets to contend for any kind of role alongside the United States; which could otherwise leave the country vulnerable in the face of numerous risks. It is for ideological among other reasons, however, that Moscow did not relinquish challenging completely in this scope of leading United States interest. As argued by Cohen (1981), the promotion of Moscow’s close partnership with Cuba’s Castro and its unsuccessful attempt to place strategic arms on that island represented the most offensive and daring example of this period. In subsequent years, the Soviet Union has been found to be infiltrating indirectly and very prudently in the Caribbean and Central America through Cuba and Nicaragua to determine at what low points of contribution it could provide a radical change in the region without inciting an American instant response.

The Americans had been uncertain and in disagreement with the Soviet plans in Central America, in terms of whether the Kremlin’s ambitions were quite modest or serious.
Interestingly, at times when an opponent’s intentions were suspected, the general reaction of policymakers had been to delineate the risk according to alleged or likely long term consequences of the rival’s performance instead of the confirmed or perhaps modest intentions. Consequently, a global force’s cautiousness procedure of somehow restricted means in the strategy it has implemented towards the other superpower’s region of high interest supremacy, did not itself offer a guarantee that the goals it was following were also somewhat restricted, either on a short or a long term basis. This does not only refer to the trouble United States policymakers went through in evaluating the Soviet strategy in Central America but also to the Soviets’ task in determining the risk posed by American policy in respect of regions, like Eastern Europe, that have always had a highly significant importance for Moscow (George 1983).

A number of assumptions may be adopted regarding the American-Soviet collaboration in averting crises in each other’s region of high interest of domination. Initially, neither was ever willing to consider ground rules or customs that would derail its attempt to defend vital interests in its region of high interest control. Despite the fact that each superpower was prepared to agree to some relaxation of its hegemonic influence and supremacy in such a region, it could be projected to vehemently object to this development if it was confirmed that the other pole was seeking to support or to manipulate such change so that its own grip on that area could be substantially strengthened (Winham, 1987).

Simultaneously, while the superpowers were doubtful in terms of approving ground rules for regions where either had prevailing interests, this did not prove, however, their possible reluctance or inability to collaborate, when required, like they did in several cases, so that they could avert any kind of clash. While performing low-key, limited rivalry in each other’s sphere of influence, both the Americans and Soviets were likely to carry on acting with great caution in each other’s regions of key interest. Discretion and self-control were expected to be
exercised especially by restraining the tools each would use in attempting to decrease the opponent’s impact on its sphere of influence.

Another type of control could have probably developed with both superpowers eager and striving to capitalise on any event which could weaken the other superpower’s presence in its region of major influence. Both superpowers had been shown to be willing to some extent to negotiate relaxing their power and impact in other developing areas in general, which also include their sphere of supremacy. According to George, Farley, and Dallin (1988), this act of relaxing superpower domination is expected to be stalled, not facilitated in case Moscow and Washington seek to actively accelerate and invest in each other’s misfortunes in this matter.

**Disputed symmetry regions**

It would seem even more challenging for both global forces to reach an agreement regarding ground rules or competition norms for other areas thought to be fraught with uncertainty and ambiguous asymmetry of interests. These areas included the Middle East and the Mediterranean, where, Libya holding a coveted strategic position and a key target to be dominated by both superpowers. The Soviet Union tried to claim superpower equivalence status with the United States for a number of years. However, the Eastern bloc was not successful in having its Western counterpart consider this region as one of high interest symmetry that necessitated a shared United States-Soviet attitude to its issues, such as the peace-making when it comes to the Arab-Israeli struggle (Allison and Williams, 1990).

Even though the American officials did not deny that the Soviet Union had some genuine interests in the Middle Eastern region, they did not seek to confirm what Moscow had allegedly put forward as its core interests in the area and to pressurise Soviet leaders to distinguish between primary and secondary interests. Rather, American politicians were inclined to associate Moscow with an arrogant ambition to extend its influence further without regard for
the United States and its friends in the region. To put it differently, the prevailing understanding in the United States for many years has been that the rivalry with the Soviet Union in the Middle East would almost expand the Soviet influence in the area and would further complicate matters in an already trouble-stricken region, as well as a weakened Western policy in the region (Gorge, A 1986). In this case, it would appear all the more indispensable for the two rivals to deal with the definitely challenging job of revealing what each understood its own, as well as the other superpower's, interests to be in the Middle Eastern region. Attending to their respective interests could not be a simple task, because there was no evident dividing break between the interests proclaimed by policymakers in Moscow and by Washington in the Middle East as, for example, in Europe and elsewhere. Instead, since declared American and Soviet interests overlaid in terms of the geographic distribution throughout this highly insecure part of the world, both parties were alert to the risks that their race in that area may again attract them, like it had done on many occasions, into pointless conflicts, if not physical confrontations as Gilbert (1988) suggested.

Even though the two states have not been successful in reaching an explanation or resolution regarding their conflicting views and positions in the Middle East, they had nonetheless been able to develop an implicit rule for adapting and controlling their influence and contribution in the Arab-Israeli conflict (Bell, 1996; Winham, 1987). In terms of this rule, it emerged from knowledge and expertise in overcoming a severe policy problem that poses itself for both global forces when war kicked-off between their international supporting countries (Allison and Williams, 1990). As such, Moscow and Washington had to support their regional allies, and in the meantime, strive to avert being drawn into a direct conflict with one another.

Both superpowers were able to deal with this strategy dilemma effectively in the war which lasted six days in 1967 and in the October conflict in 1973 (Allison and Williams, 1990). Their actions throughout the two wars demonstrated a form of constraint and could even prove some
kind of implicit awareness in respect to what a global force was and was not allowed to do to
back one or more global allies; and also what limits should be observed in terms of getting
involved. Therefore, each bloc knew that it should examine the possibility of the other
superpower interfering with its armed forces in one way or another to stop its local allies from
suffering a disaster against other local opponents. Jonsson (1984) argued that for such an
intervention to be avoided, the global force supporting the victorious regional ally should
acknowledge the need to force its ally to stop perpetrating a devastating rout on its foe.

Differences in this implicit ground rule could be observed in all Arab-Israeli conflicts. In the
October War of 1973, for example, when there was an infringement by Israel of the armistice
devised by Brezhnev and Kissinger in the Soviet capital with the Israelis threatening the
demolition of the Egyptian Third Army, a note was sent by Brezhnev to Nixon proposing
mutual Soviet-American military involvement to finish the conflict and declare a potential
likelihood of unilateral Soviet interference. According to Gilbert (1988), the message directed
by Brezhnev toward the United States was intended to firmly remind the latter of its
responsibility to negotiate matters with its ally in the region. Meanwhile, the United States
reacted to the Soviet warning to mobilise its forces into the war zone by alerting the American
army, and by immediately applying pressure on Israel to halt any further attempts to seize the
Egyptian Third Army. On another occasion, the Washington administration was equally
engaged in this implicit norm, when the Syrian army moved into Jordan in 1970, threatening
to overthrow the Jordanian king, Washington considered the Soviet Union in charge and
pressed the Soviet Union to force its ally to withdraw its forces from Jordan and uphold, this
demand with a threat of military involvement on behalf of Jordan (Gorge, 1986). Accordingly,
and in light of the tacit agreement, the Soviet Union was convinced by the United States to
restrain Syria and secure the withdrawal of its forces from Jordan (Garfinkle, 1985).
As shown in all these examples, the tacit norm could not be operational unless the regional ally of a superpower was in danger of an imminent attack or defeat in a war. Coinciding with this, the balance of interests evidently shifts on behalf of the superpower supporting the local player that is in need most, showing that it could be both appropriate and possible to interfere, if required, to protect an ally’s interests. In the meantime, it should be mentioned that the tacit norm that commanded a superpower to confine its triumphant local ally did not take place spontaneously; but instead it should be stimulated by a possible threat of engagement by the protecting global force. For a number of factors, thus, this tacit ground rule could not be seen as a steady, dependable tool for allowing the leading blocs to provide support for their local allies without being dragged into conflict with one another (Gilbert, 1988).

High interest symmetry regions

This type where both global forces perceptibly have very solid, if not key, interests ought to lend themselves more readily to increasing procedures to prevent crises. During World War II, an event took place and was acknowledged as such by both Washington and Moscow. As predicted by Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill, once allied forces demolished Hitler’s Germany and all other allies, a rivalry to take the lead would soon be established among the conquerors to fill the gap of supremacy in Central Europe which could well result in serious confrontations, if not armed conflicts (Gilbert, 1988). As such, the allied wartime leader devised, areas of domination in Europe for their own military convenience and announced guidelines and procedures for cooperative decision-making and shared management of war losing Germany. Identifying the countries of Central Europe as a region that could protect the key interests of all of the triumphant parties, the war partners agreed what may be suitably viewed at that time as an obvious crises prevention management. The supportive plan and established organisations that were created to apply them were not surely up to the task or prepared for the pressures of ensuing events (Gilbert, 1988). As this historical case shows, nevertheless, there
was potential for promoting clear rules and recognised arrangements in circumstances of high interest symmetry. There were also a number of cases where shared acknowledgement of high interest symmetry has resulted in clear arrangements, and not in the slightest did all of them fall through as did the allied deal to occupy and administer war stricken Germany. Therefore, it could be seen that the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, as well as the four power deals on the position of West Berlin in 1971, and the Helsinki Accord of 1975 yielded positive or somewhat effective contributions to push forward collaborative efforts to restrict rivalry in an area of high interest symmetry; i.e. Europe (George, Farley and Dallin, 1988).

**Low interest symmetry regions**

From the outset, it would seem that geographical regions where both Americans and Soviets had only low interests should accommodate rule-making for the sake of avoiding crises. Fundamental to this reasoning is the belief that as what is in danger for the two global forces in such regions fell far short of deploying key interests, it would be very sensible, and thus reasonably logical, to settle for ground rules that would on the one hand severely restrict the extent of investment in their rivalry, and the danger that such rivalry would intensify to equally unwelcome signs of war on the other.

However, by drawing from previous experience, this opinion is not always defensible. In general, as it has often been observed by Allison and Williams (1990), great powers with global interest are inclined to progressively extend the idea of their security needs. The defence of critical settlements or lines of communication would sometimes result in an inflated notion of security needs.

In addition, the basic rational idea is that the two global forces could find it somewhat easy to settle upon rule-making that surely limits competing in regions with low-interest symmetry and controls motivations and difficulties that may eventually come to the surface (Winham. 1987).
Indeed, a world power may find a different reasoning more tempting specifically in regions where one’s opponent has relatively low interests that firm strategies to upsurge one’s power, even at the expense of the rival’s interests, can be safely followed. To put it more simply, regions where there is low-interest symmetry may be seen as presenting openings not risks for marginal achievements, and such strategies were not judged to carry with them any considerable risk of intense acceleration of a war-threatening conflict against the opposite force (Alexander, 1986). Besides, in places outside the control of the respective superpowers, somehow, the greatest possibility of commonly constructive collaboration on conflict prevention could take place. According to Charles (1991), while such superpowers lacked involvement in these low interest regions, with not much directly at risk for them, they could still benefit from testing and trying out action plans that may not be as economically costly or as strategically hazardous as for conflicts nearby.

The rivalry taking place in regions of low-interest symmetry can additionally be seen as providing attractive prospects for following long term tactics for minimising the other opponent’s global presence. As such, one party may seek over time to achieve a number of peripheral accomplishments in a number of regions, each of which is undeniably of not much significance, but which otherwise would considerably diminish the other global force. This policy could also be seen as an increasing one’s own global security situation; hence any diminishing of the opponent’s presence and influence, even in marginal and low key regions, can cause distraction; lead one party to be on the defensive; and minimise threats and damages to the national interests. In a nutshell, any possible violation or offence in these regions can really have knock-on effects in terms of defending any of the two superpowers’ interests (Gorge, 1986).

With opponents increasingly adopting long term offensive policies of this type, this in fact caused an environment of distrust and misunderstandings with regards to particular and
restricted activities taking place in other low interest regions. Given that an opponent’s targets, specifically the long term ones, can sometimes be hard to determine, some are inclined to assess those aims not by what the adversary claims but more or less according to one’s beliefs of the potential long term outcomes of the opponent’s conduct. As argued by Gilbert (1988), the vagueness of the other party’s objectives and the greater importance in many cases of the likely outcomes of its conduct is the basis for much of the strain superpowers’ relations generally experience.

According to Allison and Williams (1990) the conspicuous leaning toward the nonconcrete ‘logic’ of controlled rivalry in regions of low-interest symmetry to be displaced by the somewhat dissimilar ‘meta-logic’ of international superpower contest. What was supposed to continue as a low key race in places where Washington and Moscow did not have potential interests is at times given exaggerated significance, as such races could not simply or consistently be detached from the higher-stake competition to which these superpowers committed themselves in other geographical regions (Gilbert, 1988). Drawing from the Cold War events, what are known as ‘grey areas’, with hardly any importance, was in fact alleged to have a substantially potential strategic significance in the eyes of one or the other superpower. Furthermore, the lack of any significant impact in these regions may at times have political effects on both the national and international levels.

Establishing ‘rules’ or strategies to stop the surge of low key competition can be further made complex by means of the fact that various grey regions were supposed to have various strategic and political weight. According to Gorge (1986), this assumption leaned toward being highly context-dependent and dependent on change, while the two global forces may function with various estimates in terms of the importance of one specific area to another.
It can be concluded that rivalry of superpowers in grey areas was fraught with several difficulties and indecisive moments that could not be easily predicted, which in fact increased the potential of misunderstandings and activities that could have led to escalation of the stakes and more superpower influence and presence. Moreover, the issue of ‘sunk costs’ might have been experienced by one or both superpowers in a region where efforts to enter the race have not been particularly successful. At a time when an originally low risk commitment on behalf of somewhat restricted aims suddenly does not bear fruits, it is hard to turn down the invitation to boost one’s participation somehow to avert a crisis and in the expectation of reaching a more positive result. Therefore, the sheer usage of sources by a country in a third region race improves its stakes in such a race and, as stated by Gorge (1986), ‘sacrifice creates value’.

Resource capabilities and commitment to prestige could also raise the stakes and lead to escalating events. In terms of prestige, it was frequently put on the line during public declarations and military campaigns that were expected to express steadfastness in order to impress the opposite superpower. However, as Allison and Williams (1990) suggested, the rhetorical claims highlighting what is at risk, which usually goes together with efforts to indicate solid and reliable resolve, do not go without any perceived costs and dangers. This is due to the fact that if this rhetoric does not have the expected impact, it will leave the disappointed superpower with no option but to either backpedal, make concessions to secure a compromise deal, or to intensify its commitment.

Theoretically, if both global forces did not reach consensus in advance regarding the ceiling to decide on the level of their participation in the developing world, they could probably collaborate to launch ad hoc ‘ground rules’ to minimise the threat of escalation after entering the race. Recognising ground rules, on the other hand, suggests a common intention to accept whatever consequence, no matter how unfavourable it was, of the rivalry occurring within those ground rules. If not, the only other option for more escalation by the unfavourable party as the
race developed was the inclination of its opponent to give a satisfactory compromising deal to the superpower with the lead in such competition (Allison and Williams, 1990).

The aforementioned analysis indicates that there were rules of competition between superpowers to run the global affairs, which actually prompted this study to raise the question of whether there was any stability in that time during the Cold War period. Under a bipolar system, four aspects encourage the restriction of violence in superpower and international relations. First of all, there were no margins in the existence of only two world powers. For the Soviets, the United States represented the preoccupying menace, and so were the Soviets for the Americans, as each could harm the other’s interests in such an irrecoverable manner. For example, whenever Moscow’s or Washington’s fortunes were threatened, this directly had left the interests of the other at stake (Williams et al., 1994). According to Waltz (1964), in the aftermath of World War II, there emerged no third power contesting the Soviet Union and the United States. As such, there were no margins in this bipolar structure and the range of issues involved in the rivalry was extended as the force of the competition grew more intense. Increased intensity was conveyed in an unwillingness to admit small regional losses and extension of range was ostensible wherever one looked.

The almost persistent existence of threats and the reappearance of crises can be considered as the third distinguishing factor in the bipolar balance. According to Williams et al. (1994), it would be irrational to state that recurrent pressures and recurring crises could in fact reduce threats and encourage stability. Similarly, one could be mistaken to proclaim otherwise, as apparently shown in Khrushchev’s statement that if the Americans frightened the Soviets with war, the latter would respond by doing so little by little. Also, if Washington threatened the use of nuclear arms, then Moscow would react by displaying its own weapons, which, according to him, were not only sizable but also more sophisticated. Thus, there was no point in using threatening language against the Kremlin when addressing the global audience (Waltz, 1964).
Being the product of a situation where interests and ambitions clash, crises are created by the resolve of one country to influence a change that is resisted by another state; as in the case of Moscow’s deployment of missiles to the Cuban government.

For the United States, in order to repel the change the Soviets had attempted to create, the efforts exerted to turn action into a crisis were justifiable. Considering that a conflict situation persisted, the lack of crisis became more unsettling that their reoccurrence. Thus, it was thought better to have a large crisis then than a sporadic war later, which was in fact a slogan adopted and implies that a superpower could avoid large scale wars in the future by means of fighting small wars in the present, as suggested by Williams et al. (1994).

On the other hand, given the nature of this bipolar relationship, crisis was taken into account by both of the superpowers, in particular by the defensive party. To avoid disorder and successively procure gains can be demanding, since, in a world fraught with confusion there is an obvious truth; namely, the awareness of who would compete with whom. A slogan worth using here is “push to the limit,” yet ‘limit’ should be highlighted as strongly as push, while cautiousness, control, and the management of crisis have acquired a large and evident significance.

Taken with each other, the above factors; namely, the lack of peripheries, the variety and intensity of rivalry, and the ongoing threats and crisis, they can be classified as the most important features of the Cold War period. Combined, the first three points create a strong rivalry in a wide area with a good deal of tools utilised. The steadiness of contribution of the two most influential players on the global stage, together with another factor, their preeminent authority, provided for an extraordinary capability of understanding and absorption within the bipolar systems of the radical political, military, and economic developments that had taken place. While the Soviet Union moved forward and was chequered, empires were disbanded,
and several new states emerge as a result. On the other hand, tactical nuclear-powered weapons systems were acquired by four different states. These weapons were promoted and to some extent disseminated. According to Herman (1960), an upheaval in military technology took place with an average of once every five years and at an unprecedented pace.

The impacts of United States and Soviet Union superiority were multifaceted. Nonetheless, one can still claim that despite the issue of dominance, it was stable provided that the stability originated from the idea that a stable system has to be described in terms of its robustness, in addition to the nonviolence of change attached to it. Besides, the dual notion as a descriptive tag continued to be suitable for the two dominant powers on condition that there was a considerable gap between the influence of the two key superpowers and the global presence of the next most emerging states, which actually drove the superpowers to take action while taking into account the stability of the order. In fact, this contradicts the argument that even though the Cold War had been seen in the light of an incompatible resentment between two antagonistic systems and despite its ostensible force, the relations were presumably far less risky and more organised than it seemed to be from the outside. A conspicuous explanation for this was the belief that an unrestrained clash would unavoidably result in a war that neither party were in a position to claim victory. By the same token, another significant reason was related to the acknowledgement of both parties that a carefully controlled conflict in fact served their corresponding interests. This was used by either party to serve and attain many objectives, such as using it for the local goals when it has utilised to reinforce the discipline and cohesion within the Soviet Union and the United States systems. Additionally, the Cold War concerns were also employed to vindicate major policies and strategic actions. Another point is that the Cold War contributed to the legitimisation of the two opposing poles of their own social organisms. Whereas states in the Western hemisphere, were continuously reminded that if they ever wanted to go beyond the market. This could ultimately result in the sort of economic
disorganisation and political suppression that was prevalent in the Eastern hemisphere (Cox, 1990). In the East, however, they were told that if they were ever to negotiate their communist principles for anything else, they would, unavoidably, succumb to the same economic uncertainty experienced by the workforce in the West. There was an absurd outcome of this ideological tussle, which involved making ‘actually existing socialism’ the most powerful argument for capitalism and the inequalities and absurdities of the market an essential underpinning for leaders in the Eastern hemisphere (DePorte, 1979; and Brzezinski, 1976).

On a similar note, it appears that both the United States and the Soviet Union profited from the Cold War situation. One might say that it has helped them meet their respective objectives as it secured their influence in Europe and elsewhere. Accordingly, the war reinforced European reliance upon the two key global forces, where the Soviet’s threats provided the United States with more motivation and power in Western Europe than they had ever imagined. Similarly, the actual concerns of NATO and ‘German revanchism’ reinforced the Soviet status in Eastern European countries. In addition, by placing a two pole structure within Europe, the Cold War was effectively contained, without entirely eliminating the disintegrating influence of nationalism, a force that was as unique to the United States’ interests as it was to the Soviets in the aftermath of World War II. Furthermore, the managed clash in Europe and its split-up between the power blocs helped the Cold War to offer a solution to the once unsolvable German issue. Consequently, the German state was divided into two distinct parts and thus was incapable of contesting the concord in Europe as it had been able to do so on twice before (DePorte, 1979). Globally, the bipolarity that has emerged as a result of the struggle between the Americans and the Soviets aided and defended their respective world positions. Combating the Soviet risk efficiently made the global status of the United States legitimate by the same token that anti-colonialism offered a valuable cover for the Soviet Union’s attacks overseas.
From a historical point of view, the Cold War helped maintain the American as well as the Soviet interests. As such, neither of these two powers attempted to change any aspects of the relationships once they had been created. As claimed by Liska (1967), their aims, then, were not as much about triumphing over the other and the preservation of a sensibly managed contest with usually agreed rules than a contest where there could be clear victors and losers.

Despite the aforesaid, the Soviet Union experienced more suffering than the United States throughout that period especially because of its economic circumstances as compared with that of its superior rival. Accordingly, the pressure of the Cold War was felt more than the United States, causing Moscow to be consistently under greater strain to decrease the overheads of the struggle with its opponent. According to Cox (1990), it can be argued that the Soviet authorities were keener on peace making than the American administration. In contrast, Washington had little tendency to change direction, with the battle against the opposite force had provided the United States with a clear-cut point of conflict around which to strategise the foreign policies of the United States. This sense of superiority made the American leadership of the capitalist world genuine and unified the Western states after decades of struggle. Furthermore, the post-war global system emanating as a consequence of the Cold War showed more stability than the one which fell at the end of the 1930s (Cox, 1990).

Since the global system throughout the Cold War period was more stable than the preceding one, this has prompted this study to raise the question of whether there was any prospect for the collaboration between the major global forces, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union during that era. In fact, there were several difficulties which were experienced in order to achieve genuine collaboration between the major leaders which will be examined in order. The first issue lying in the path of this cooperation referred to the fact that the two superpowers behaved with embedded hostility and distrust, and developed an attitude that saw the conflict against the other party as the ultimate proper issue in terms of national policy,
whereas mutual aid between the power blocs was perceived as pointless for security purposes or even unwelcome. It is important to note that these practices were unequally spread between both parties, with the majority of leaders in both global forces being more inflexible and more so disposed to depend on the armed risk in their perception of the other party, and even more persuaded that the only real route to dialogue is in the language of force.

Another serious hindrance to steady relations between the two global forces lies in the political rivalry between them to the point of intensity, since both Washington and Moscow had been dynamically tied in a political influence challenge, specifically, in the developing world, with the use of diplomacy, economic aid, weapons exports, as well as technical support. According to Robert (1967), experience had it that this race for political supremacy could produce situations that were likely to pressurise the very nature of Soviet-American relations.

The prominence of the two superpowers was apparent by projecting their powers into the world and playing a vital role in global affairs for more than forty five years. As such, the world witnessed a bipolarity which had been enforced by the influence of the two superpowers, causing serious implications for the whole global population. This, in fact, produced a complex and overlapped global environment, where the race and contest between major forces could not be understood unless the whole environment was taken into consideration. Similarly, the global environment could not be understood unless the great powers were taken into account.

Due to the relatively considerable power of the global forces, the military rivalry between them throughout the Cold War was reasonably managed so that any direct confrontation that might lead to catastrophic outcomes for the existence of both superpowers could be avoided. Therefore, the two most powerful states had a good understanding of each other and thus shared deep respect for each other’s status and capability even at the peak of that period of time. For outsiders, only the strains and uncertainties were obvious; however, for the contestants a set of
limitations on conduct and norms for race were quite evident and normal (Gaddis, 1987). For instance, even under the reign of Stalin, who was hardly disinclined to apply excessive force at home for political aims, there was unwillingness on the part of the Soviet authorities to take measures that would result in high risk diplomacy and the likelihood of a direct conflict with the American counterparts. Even the Soviet aid given by Stalin to the Greek communist regime after World War II was never carried out in a manner that would have necessitated a direct military clash with the Western hemisphere under the United States. Similarly, but not so with American leaders who had very strong feelings about personal human rights and the assets of a market economy, no intention was shown to interfere by using force in Eastern Europe. For example, during the 1956 Hungarian uprising, there was full awareness of this intention on the part of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, despite the fact that détente relaxed the statesmanship of the two global forces, and in spite of the arising ideological swings and the evident domestic concerns with policy issues in both states, the two major military supremacies had tremendous ability, requiring control of that military ability with careful stewardship. Both forces developed the skill to finish the other party and itself; both exerted far more influence and pressure regarding the activities of other states than they could have done otherwise toward each other. Therefore, very little scope for balance was ever existent in that global system in terms of the third or developing states; as such, the rationale of power relationships led to a divided international political emphasis when the interests of the superpowers did not completely overlap (Doran, 1991).
Chapter Four: Soviet foreign policy toward the Arab world and the Soviet-Libyan rapprochement

In this chapter, Soviet foreign policy toward the Arab world and the Soviet-Libyan rapprochement are examined. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to ascertain the Soviet ambitions in the Arab World during the Cold War and the Kremlin’s efforts to gain some allies in the region, including its rapprochement with the Libyan regime. Next, this chapter will elucidate the extent to which the ties between Libya and the Soviet Union were strong and how their interactions and respective roles and status were manipulated by both the other during this time period.

The death of Stalin in 1953 signalled the start of the entry of the Soviet presence in the developing world and the desertion of the two-camp theory. It was a growing debate then that the Soviet leader himself was considering such a move, with talks at the (CPSU) Congress in 1952 of the urgency to take advantage of the cracking Western hemisphere, which was considered a euphemism from the time of Lenin for collaborating with Western countries, ostensibly in order to sow divisions amongst them. Regardless of Stalin’s resolves, change was only introduced after he had died, when Malenkov and then Khrushchev successively took power. Therefore, rather than the two-camp approach, these leaders promoted peaceful coexistence with the capitalist world. According to Golan (1990), rivalry between capitalism and communism, and the eventual victory of socialism were not to be abandoned altogether; however, the idea of peaceful coexistence would shift this rivalry into less confrontational, less rigid, and more realistic terms.

An almost unanimous view holds that ever since the death of Stalin, the USSR had gradually had more of an active role in the Arab world and even the Western hemisphere had to recognise that role, and as a result the significance of the Soviet Union as one of the major forces in that
part of the world. However, even though there was a large agreement about the key role played by the Soviet Union in the region, no such accord was achieved with regards the Soviet Union’s targets and aspirations from such a presence. In spite of this, Freedman (1982; 1987) argues that the key purpose was an invasive one in order to control the Arab region so that the United States and its allies were blocked from any access to its primary sources, such as oil and gas, along with its strategic communication routes, and other resources. Contrary opinions assume that the USSR’s intention was principally self-protective, to stop the Arab world from being utilised as a starting point for a strike against the USSR (Liqueur, 1969). There are apparent policy inferences of this argument; namely, if the Soviet Union had an essentially defensive orientation and intention in the Middle East, thus it was not only likely but also appropriate for the United States to collaborate with the Soviet Union to resolve such on-going clashes, such as those between the Arab states and Israel (Lukacs and Battah, 1988). Equally, if the Soviet’s intentions were invasive, then it was inappropriate to attempt to involve Moscow into the peace-making process since the Kremlin leaders would only seize the day to diminish the Americans’ role (Olson, 1987).

Seeking to enhance the Soviet’s presence while diminishing and eventually eradicating the Western impact on the Arab region in particular, the Soviet Union’s leaders used a wide range of strategies, including as the most important the offering of military support to its allies in the Middle East and North Africa (Lenczowski, 1972).

In terms of economic support, this materialised especially in the economic aid offered to several Arab countries, including the construction of dams for the Soviet’s Syrian and Egyptian allies. In addition, the Kremlin pursued a policy to strengthen its presence through the conclusion of mutual support and friendship agreements, including those established with their Egyptian, Iraqi, Southern Yemeni, Syrian, and North Yemeni counterparts in 1971, 1972, 1979, 1980 and 1984 respectively. However, abandonment of the agreements by Cairo in 1976 showed that the
Soviet’s tactics did not often prove fruitful. The Soviet Union sought to take advantage of both the enduring recollections of Western pressures against manufacturers of Arab resources, such as oil, and intentionally employed it to scandalise and defame the American tactics in the region (Richard and Roy, 1984). The increasing quest of influence by the Soviet Union was also shown in the creation of relationships between the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union and other Arab counterparts, such as the Syrian Baath Party and National Liberation Front of Algeria. Nevertheless, a prominent strategy to establish a firm stronghold was manifested in the offering of security infrastructure aids to Arab allies like the South Yemenis. As a final note, the Kremlin leaders provided their Arab allies with military and diplomatic support in their struggle against their enemy in the region (Israel), even though that aid was restricted in scope since the Soviet’s continued backing Israel’s right to survive as an intact state (Freedman, 1982).

It should be pointed out that the Soviet Union’s employment of all these strategies was variably successful; therefore, it encountered a few serious problems when seeking to establish its influence in the Arab region, including some regional clashes between Syria and Iraq, as well as that between Algeria and Morocco. Interestingly, when the Soviets sided with one party, they risked alienating the other, and frequently losing it to their Western opponents (Donaldson and Nogee, 2005). On the other hand, the presence of the Arab socialist parties was shown to be a major hurdle for the Soviet Union, as these socialists’ actions caused, at times, a severe decline in ties between the Soviets and the state where the communist activists were located. In addition, the enormous riches that flowed to the Arab region, especially the Middle East, came to be associated with allowing the countries of the region to purchase high-tech equipment and expertise from the developed west; thus weakening the economic ties among the Soviet Union and its Arab friends. Moreover, there was a notable increasing authority of Islam throughout the Arab region in 1970s, which undermined the Soviet Union’s role as it
was identified in the Middle East and North Africa as an atheist country, in particular after its invasion of Afghanistan at the end of the 1970s. Furthermore, in the mediation circling the Arabs and their enemy in the region, there was no active role for Moscow as it did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. This was a reason that allowed the United States to be involved most in talks with both parties in the struggle. Finally, there were active efforts by the United States to object to the Soviets’ increasing attempts to attain a key role in the Arab world (Freedman, 1982).

In order to resolve these thorny issues, the Kremlin attempted to promote a general policy by supporting the anti-imperialistic mood of countries in the Arab region. More specifically, Moscow encouraged these countries to put their domestic conflicts behind to achieve its aspirations through the Arab collective pressure against Israel’s allies, in particular the United States. Also, in spite of the Arab states’ support for the conflict against Israel and also the warmly welcomed imposition of an oil ban against the United States and its allies in 1973 by the Soviets, this anti-imperialist Arab decision was not achieved by the Soviet Union’s endeavours; rather, it was the Arabs’ diplomacy in general and the Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat’s special efforts in particular. Therefore, when he changed his policies and inclination toward the United States, the Soviet Union’s aspirations of an anti-imperialist Arab unity broke down (Saivetz, 1989). In spite of the aforementioned, it appears that the Moscow’s ambitions in the Arab world shifted according to its interests and goals, which were placed somewhere in between two extremes, that was presumably due to the Soviet Union’s huge ambitions without any significant strategic policies.

In actual fact, there had been an active involvement of the Soviets in the Arab region for more than forty years up to the collapse of the empire. During that spell, Moscow’s ambitions in the Arab world had never been virtually regional since its actions had always been moulded and controlled by the country’s key international strategies and policies, which were put in place to
counter the strategic danger of the Western hemisphere and to destabilise or diminish the comparative political, economic and military prowess of the capitalist bloc while circumventing a direct clash in the process (Golan, 1990). As much as the influence in the developing countries, more specifically the Arab region, reinforced the power status and promoted the strategic abilities of the Western hemisphere, the Soviet Union attempted to block or curb that influence and replace it with its own or one it endorsed. To do so, it strived to gain political influence and allegiance from local parties and alike ideological movements in order to encourage their rejection of relationships with the Western hemisphere and turn instead to the Soviet Union for mutual cooperation. Considering the proximity of the Arab world in general, and the Middle East in particular, to the Soviet Union, one could infer how this factor played an important role in the latter’s foreign policy. There were even attempts on the part of the Soviets to launch a military base in the region to be able to respond to or curtail the military danger posed by the Western armies situated on their southern and south-western frontiers. For more than fifty years, and to facilitate the forward deployment of the Soviet naval forces, the Kremlin’s key interest in the Arab region was more in terms of securing naval and air presence to offer supporting services and air protection for its fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. Another aim was to fortify its influence in the Persian Gulf, which would allow the country, should there be a need, to protect or embargo Middle Eastern oil deliveries (Spechler, 1979).

For these objectives to be achieved, the Kremlin’s strategy was focused on seeking allies among regimes that were identified as somewhat radical in their foreign affairs by objecting to Western ideologies and the capitalist world’s political and economic structures forced or endorsed by Western powerhouses, such as the United States. Moscow’s reaction to these radical regimes was to encourage them in their anti-Western campaigns and orientations, by offering them financial and military aid, for example, to talk them into severing their economic and diplomatic relationships with the Western bloc. As such, the Soviets used this support to
encourage social and economic change in line with the Soviet approach; to such an extent that only those regimes adopting this theory or model would more likely benefit from cooperating with Moscow (Eran, 1979).

During the ten year pre-October War period, there were focused aid activities and attention paid to a few Arabic countries, such as Algeria, Syria, Iraq and the ruling party of South Yemen. However, the foundation stone of the Soviet policy in the Arab region was the Egyptian government because of its anti-Western and anti-Washington attitudes promoted primarily under Nasser as well as its large and significant actor (Ro’i, 1979).

As a result, there was a strong shared belief to establish close Soviet-Egyptian relations as the Egyptian President then needed a source of arms supply that could materialise his nationalistic dream or at least keep it alive; namely to extend his leadership of Egypt to involve an entirely united Arab world under one leader in the face of their enemies. Similarly, the Soviets would rely on Egypt’s strategic position to provide them with the required air and naval services, which would give them the perfect opportunity to launch into the Arab region both from its North African gate as well as its Middle Eastern one.

However, there were noticeable strains and pressures surrounding the relationships between the Soviet Union and its Arab friends (Spechler, 1979). For instance, the role of the communist parties in these countries was one source of conflict, as Egypt and Algeria were extremely unforgiving toward these parties, and in whose demise in those countries the Soviet Union was eventually compelled to accept. The enduring issue for Moscow at that point was the ignition of Egyptian and Syrian war against Israel, which the Soviet capital had technically endorsed initially when it had supported the Egyptian and Syrian militancy during the months preceding the June 1967 conflict. However, there was no desire for an eruption of military conflict on the part of Moscow, which was taken aback when it finally took place (Ro’i, 1979).
The inability and unwillingness of the Soviets to interfere had a considerable political impact on the country, as it was shown to have limited weight globally in comparison to the West. In addition, the USSR did not prove as completely loyal to the Arab regimes in the region. In addition, the Soviet leaders perceived that it would potentially dent their reputation and might be the nail in their coffin in terms of their ties with the Arab world if they failed once more to offer backing to their allies when conflicts erupted. Nevertheless, direct involvement could potentially also lead to the added risk of a superpower clash. Based on these fears, it was concluded after the Six Day War that the Kremlin would risk being on the losing side if the decision to engage into another full-scale conflict in the Arab region was taken. In spite of rearming Egypt and Syria, the Soviets also one-sidedly placed a number of constraints on their arms resupply package in an attempt to avert offering any Arab country the opportunity to amass weapons to be employed in a singlehanded challenge against Israel. In other words, no Arab country, as such, would be empowered to embark on its own a war where the outcome could not be guaranteed; a battle in which the USSR would be resorted to in a rescue operation. In addition, in spite of the political costs implicated, they enabled Israel to regain the decisive military edge over all Arab countries combined. Also, the Soviet Union resisted providing any two Arab countries the military aid thought sufficient to declare an all-out armed conflict against their fiercest enemy in the region (Sella, 1979). With both global powerhouses unwilling to allow their allies to lose in an all-out war, a United States-Soviet Union clash could then be avoided if one were to eventually erupt. In the case of an Arab vs. Israel conflict, in particular, such a war had to be avoided at all costs (Bell, 1996).

It should be pointed out that the implications of Nasser’s death in 1970 were extremely significant with a new leadership at the helm in Cairo, which was far less attracted to the Soviet Union as a result of firstly the latter’s arrangement with the Washington administration in 1972 to put their disagreements regarding the Middle East on hold and to preserve the status quo in
the area for the best interests of détente. Thus, the Egyptian president Sadat was later forced to wage war against the Israelis in 1973 so that the stalled process could be restarted. This could be done by generating a crisis of détente that would attract the two global forces into a regional clash and compel senior officials in the Soviet Union and the United States to give up the ‘no war no peace’ policy that had been created in the Middle East because of their expanding détente (Daigle, 2012).

Secondly, a strong view of the new President of Egypt Anwar Sadat had it that not only the Soviets’ presence in the region and their interference in his country’s internal affairs was as embarrassing and domineering as had been the colonial predecessors, but also impractical given their restrictions on his arms acquisition, finance, and technology programmes. As a result, he decided to oust the twenty thousand experts at the disposal of the Egyptian government by the Soviet administration in July 1972, which was considered a response to all the above grievances (Gamba-Stonehouse, 1987).

Within a few months from the expulsion of the Soviet nationals and the October War, there had been attempts by the Kremlin to regain its influence in Egypt at first and invest in alternative options in the Arab region in the hope of identifying new allies. However, the Soviets sustained the self-enforced constraints on arms supplies, which caused so many grievances to the country most valued to them and dented their reputation in the process. Nonetheless, Egypt remained a crucially important player for the Soviet Union’s Middle Eastern ambitions and the overall global framework as indicated by the Kremlin’s behaviour during the conflict (Dawisha and Dawisha, 1982). Thus, the Soviet Union’s endeavours to make the ceasefire a reality was initiated on the military circumstances of the Egyptian frontline and were coordinated with Egyptians only. By attempting to deliver Egypt with surface to surface missiles able to carry nuclear warheads, and announcing their willingness to engage militarily on Egypt’s behalf, Moscow experienced serious inconvenience in favour of its
Middle Eastern ally. The latter steps could have caused an all-out war to erupt against the Americans, which the Soviets least fancied (Golan, 1977).

There was a deep influence of the October War on the political life of the Arab region. During and soon after this conflict, the stakes of the political game there were altered in a dramatic fashion, as indeed were the relative roles of the key parties. As for the most significant development in the post-war circumstances, it was in fact the willpower of the Arab oil producers, when first shown during the conflict, to unify their efforts using the oil weapon as a pressurising means to gain political and economic advantage. Another equally crucial factor was the inclination of key non-Arab exporters to offer the Arabs at least partial support, as far as price policy was concerned, they enjoyed the flow of oil revenues that the sanctions brought without any of the political repercussions of participating in those sanctions (Falola, 2005). At the start, this fresh development appeared to clearly be in the best interests of the Soviet Union and to the disadvantage of the Western bloc. Since the Soviets did not export oil to the West, pricier oil would considerably enhance their terms of commerce and raise their hard currency revenues. As a result, Western interest in satisfying their needs of the Soviet oil would certainly increase, for fear of extended or reintroduced Arab oil restrictions. In the meantime, the problems faced in terms of acquiring oil would surely strain and shaken the Western economic systems, which would eventually lead to cracks within the Western alliance and cause social discontent in each of its member states (Goodman, 1991). The Kremlin anticipated no less than an entire shift in the correlation of forces between the developing Arab countries and the western hemisphere. In so doing, the Eastern bloc’s leaders presumed that this could only be an enormous advantage to the Soviet Union as it would lead these Arab countries to break loose of Western influence and decide for themselves as to whether they need to establish fresh relationships with their Soviet counterparts (Spechler and Spechler, 1979).
Yet, it shortly became apparent that the situation was far more complex, unclear, and confusing than it had appeared in the outset, as it was far from obvious who would profit and who would be at the losing end. In fact, a great deal would rest on the decisions the key actors might take and their capability to potentially use the new circumstances in which they found themselves to their advantage (Spechler and Spechler, 1979, p. 109).

The threat of an oil embargo increasingly drew the attention towards the region and the urgency with which the issues of oil Arab states had to be tackled. Unexpectedly, placating the Arabs and seeking to resolve the conflict between them and Israel became a major issue to be addressed by the whole Western world in order to reduce the chances of a possible re-imposed embargo. In the meantime, the exceptional upsurge in the price of oil ratified at the time of the war and the ensuing escalation prompted by that decision produced immense new riches in the Arab region, which signified that there were ample opportunities for all global powerhouses, in the West and the East, willing to engage in such profitable enterprises.

Given the growing significance of having to control the flow of oil and the ample opportunities presented in the newly established Middle Eastern markets, the two Western and Eastern superpowers realised the true potential of assuming a more active role in the Arab world by seeking to undermine the presence of the other bloc. Similarly, there was a strong determination on the part of the United States to embark on a massive diplomatic and economic campaign to attain this goal. Arguably, this was a time when America was more willing than ever to offer political support and economic aid to Israel’s rivals in the region. According to Spechler (1979), given the attractive economic incentive of supplying arms to the Arabs for the Soviet Union, the same policy attracted the United States and Western Europe who revealed their interest in hard currency and their willingness to revoke past policies to sign similar arms deals in exchange for hard currency.
As other options were then available to the region in terms of supplying arms, the conventional allies of the Soviet Union, such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq, would thus be much less engaged with the Eastern bloc, as might any other allies be.

In spite of all the uncertainty of the post-war period, there was a clear lesson for the Soviets to learn; that regardless of the initial benefits gained by the USSR in the Arab-Israel struggle, since it gave them easy access into the region, the Kremlin was unable to be fully in charge in this conflict and risked so much if it were to last longer. The leaders in the Kremlin thought it would be more appropriate for the Arabs to use political, rather than military options to regain the occupied territories they had surrendered in 1967 (Golan, 1977). However, as long as Moscow was obliged to provide the Arabs with military aid to ensure their friendship, it had very limited influence over their decision to avoid or to go to war, and could not keep them out of the conflict. Besides, self-constraint in the provision of weapons was not sufficient to keep the Soviets out of the conflict. No matter how meticulously skilled and prepared the Arab army was, it was constrained to instigating a restricted conflict for restricted goals; a conflict they fought and found themselves on the verge of annihilation, and thus could not be at any one point in time needier of direct Soviet assistance than that time. The conflict in the region provided much scope for a Soviet influence through its assistance, which no superpower could have easily withheld from any of its allies. According to Kanet (1982) and London (1980) there was almost a consensus in the Kremlin that the Soviet Union should find another way to maintain its influence in the Arab region which would keep the military option out of the equation, and thus, avert the confrontational element with their American counterparts. In order for this to take place, there was only one option; namely the conclusion of a dependable and established settlement of the enduring Arab–Israel struggle. Such a settlement would, however, aim to do more than merely reduce the chances of another armed conflict if it were to serve the Soviet interests. In addition, it would make the Soviet Union’s presence in the Arab region
formal and legitimate, as well as reinforcing its position as a superpower. For this to materialise, Moscow had to provide for a long term Soviet role as a promoter of a peace process, which would allow it to send troops and expertise to the hot spots in the region in the form of a peacekeeping expedition (Ro’i, 1979).

One of the key aims of the Soviet foreign policy in the aftermath of the war was to reach an agreement of this type that best suited the Soviet interests; was of benefit for the Arab leaders; and attained via Soviet intervention endeavours in their favour. As such, the Soviet Union collaborated with the United States in arranging the Geneva Conference in 1973 with this goal in mind. As this proved to be an opportunity for the Soviets to play a key role in the proceedings, similar to that of the United States, they showed particular interest in organising the event and in persuading all concerned participants to carry out the much needed negotiation efforts (Golan and Rabinovich, 1979).

The Moscow administration’s support for the employment of the oil embargo could be seen as tactically significant for the accomplishment of one of its major regional aims drawing a conclusion to the Arab-Israeli struggle, which might have appeared at first as also serving the Soviet Union’s larger global aspirations. However, it soon became known that these tactics were in conflict with Moscow’s key global goal in the aftermath of the war: promoting a policy of rapprochement. According to the Soviet leaders, Moscow’s behaviour during and after the war was a great deal in line with the essence of rapprochement. Not only did they then help to reach a ceasefire, in spite of its damaging political impacts, but they also offered the United States the chance to cooperate with them in a joint enforcement effort. However, the United States’ point of view was quite different since the recurrent Soviet air and sealift to the Middle East, more particularly to Egypt and Syria, as well as the Kremlin’s menace to interfere singlehandedly to protect the Egyptian Third Army persuaded the United States that the Soviet Union took the decision to desert rapprochement so that it could bolster its role in the Middle
Eastern region. It should be pointed out that the Soviet appeals to the Arabs to enforce and sustain the embargo were in fact, the last route to be followed. In the early years of the 1970s (November 1973), President Nixon requested congressmen to delay action regarding what was one of the Soviet Union’s key aims in pursuing rapprochement (détente) (Freedman, 1982).

Most importantly, the developments in the regional and global opinions were sufficient to persuade the Soviets to take a fresh reassessment of their Middle East and Arab region tactics. In fact, it was necessary for the Moscow administration to re-evaluate the whole issue relating to their interests in the region and the best way for their promotion in the region. More specifically, the Soviet Union had to come to the decision of which country would qualify to be its most probable and valued allies in the Arab world. It had to also establish what it should do to guarantee their allegiance, and at what cost this could be undertaken. Since these were issues not as swiftly and effortlessly dealt with, the process of a reassessment proved to be a tremendous task (Oded, 1979).

However, the issue at stake or with pertinence for the Soviet policy makers was what, if anything, the Kremlin should do about it and how it could be possible for the Soviets to persuade their allies in the Middle East to sustain such distinctive ties with them instead of being drawn into the American path. A similar concern was the Soviet reaction to failed attempts to convince the Arabs, which could threaten to loosen their grip in the Arab region. As far as Egypt was concerned, the course of action taken was similar to that following the July 1972 expulsion; i.e. applying pressure on the Egyptian regime. In the expectation to demonise Sadat in front of his people in particular, and the Arabs in general, the Soviets depicted Sadat as a traitor to Nasser’s values by broadcasting anti-Sadat criticism in the media. In addition, they put on hold all weapon supplies to Egypt at that time and declined Sadat’s urgent call to have his country’s enormous debts to the Soviet Union wiped out or at least deferred (Golan, 1977).
In the case of Damascus, the Kremlin upheld a totally different point of view as the former was much more restrained in terms of cooperating with the United States and more in favour of joining forces with the Soviet Union (Freedman, 1982). As a result, the Moscow administration had reason to consider that in Syria’s case a more effective approach was to use positive inducement. In addition, Moscow employed this strategy in the hope of alerting Sadat’s attention to the benefits he could reap should he change his policy toward the Soviet Union. During that period, Syria was delivered a large amount of arms, followed by a lavish ceremony in Moscow in celebration of the deal by Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, with even more promises of military aid to come (Golan and Rabinovich, 1979). In return, al-Assad offered his host the deal they could not afford to decline; namely to ascertain the significance of the Soviet contribution in all phases and in all steps of the peace-making process (Ro’i, 1979).

Nonetheless, the pressure applied on Egypt and incentives offered to Syria were not deemed sufficient in the view of the Soviet foreign policy shapers, and in the event both tactics would fail, the Soviet Union would ultimately lose its two key friends in the Arab region. As a result, the Kremlin sought to reinforce its ties with some other old allies and seek to achieve any lost balance. Once the embargo was lifted, the attention of Moscow turned towards the Iraqi leadership, with whom the Soviets occasionally had relished good relationships for more than a decade, and Libya, which was seemingly thought as hostile to both global forces. In other words, not being on good terms with either superpower might have had encouraged Libya to adapt its foreign policy and become a Soviet ally. The selection was dictated in the first place by the keenness showed by these two countries in establishing relationships with the Eastern hemisphere. As the Libyan and Iraqi regimes fell out of favour with most of their neighbours and lacking allies in the Arab region, they only had the Soviets to fall back on to break free of their solitary environment and in pursuit of diplomatic and material help (Freedman, 1982). In fact, the two countries were drawn to be closer to the Soviets as a consequence of their objection.
to the lifting of the oil embargo and equally were remarkably anti-Western sentiments. As such, they offered the Soviets the chance to build tactical coalitions on the basis of joint antagonism to the presence of the Americans in the Arab region. In addition, the relationships between Iraq and Syria gradually deteriorated during that period and so did relations between Egypt and Libya. The Kremlin seized the opportunity to invest in these two countries, which could serve as an implicit danger to Syria and Egypt. Thus, if the latter carried on responding to the American praise, the Soviet Union might show up in nearby Iraq and Libya.

There is also an important strategic factor to be taken into account, with Iraq and Libya proving as such to the Soviets. While Iraq is situated on the Persian Gulf, which could provide the Soviets with naval facilities and airfields that would be useful in case the Soviet Union wanted to sanction or threaten to sanction Western oil deliveries, Libya’s airfield and naval bases were within proximity to NATO’s amenities. Furthermore, both countries were on the wish list of the Kremlin given their potential resources, such as oil, a substantial supply of which the latter was able to secure for consumption by its East European allies or to be exchanged for hard currency in Western European states. In fact, after only a few days had elapsed following the removal of the embargo, the Soviet Defence Minister flew to Baghdad to table a Soviet-Iraqi military agreement, while the Soviet official Podgorny liaised with the Libyan Prime Minister Jallud to discuss mutual agreements in the French capital. Within a month, Jallud was welcomed in Moscow by the Defence Minister with whom he arranged to acquire Soviet weapons (Golan, 1977).

The new relationships the Soviets sought to establish with Iraq and Libya were a clear sign that the Kremlin was examining a new tactical approach in the Arab region. An obvious aim of this new policy was to render the Soviet Union’s influence in the Arab world less reliant on the outcome of the Arab-Israeli struggle and the Soviet’s implication in such a conflict. Arguably, the Soviets sought to transfer their rivalry with the United States to new territories, far from
the heart of the Middle Eastern region. Only there could they take advantage of the radicalness of anti-Western feelings of the local regimes eager to link up with the Soviet Union so that they could apply pressure on the United States in particular and the Western bloc in general. This adopted approach revealed some developments in the Kremlin’s global ambitions. According to Sella (1979), these developments were on the one hand the result of the growing significance of gaining access to Middle Eastern oil and gas following the October War, and also due to new strategic steps in terms of American weapons deployment on the other.

Interestingly, with their new policy, there was a determination on the part of the Soviets to exploit arising opportunities in the Middle East and to claim a share in them. Toward the mid-1970s, the Soviets’ interest in establishing relationships with states possessing exportable quantities of oil and natural gas as in the case of Libya and Iraq saw a notable upsurge (Ofer, 1979). It is worth also mentioning that changes in the Soviet-Arab global policy did not stop the Soviet Union from keeping an eye on the Arab-Israeli struggle, as it was still of paramount importance for the Soviets to reach a conclusion of that ongoing conflict. While fringe states in the Middle East had little to do with the conflict, it was still of crucial significance that the Soviet Union exerted a leading, if not exceptional, role when it came to the political affairs and strategies of Egypt and Syria to ensure that any further American presence there would be curtailed.

As early as 1975, the major features of Soviet-Arab global strategy in the post-war period were becoming all the more clear. The key aims of the Kremlin included consolidation of its then unstable role and diminishing that of the United States in the region, as well as shifting the peace talks from an American controlled setting to one where the Soviet Union would have a major input and could achieve the type of outcome expected. There were two ways through which these goals could be met; first by winning over allies who showed hostility toward the American diplomatic endeavours and those not likely to respond to American cajoleries; and
second by forcing Sadat, while providing military, economic and political support, into an alliance of forces that would both keep Egypt isolated and help establish a firm Soviet approach to the Middle East peace-making process.

However, this turned out to be a policy destined not to survive for long as it failed right from the off. In fact, Egypt and the other Arab countries found the American alternative more appealing, while there was incongruence in aims, priorities and viewpoints between the Soviet Union and its allies on the one hand and amongst those allies on the other (Ro‘i, 1979).

During the two years 1975-1976, there were increasing concerns that the Kremlin’s policies were not as effective in terms of establishing long term alliances with radical regimes in the Arab region. Even though they were financially tempting (Ofer, 1979), the role of the Eastern giant was almost fruitless in terms of the Arab–Israeli struggle. On the other hand, the Soviet Union did not achieve its desired outcome by applying pressure on the Egyptian regime. In fact, after being bolstered by American support, the Egyptians started striking back against the Soviets by limiting their use of key naval amenities. Ultimately, in March 1976, Cairo cancelled their fifteen year agreement of friendship and cooperation with the Kremlin, which was a serious blow to the Soviet foreign policy and the most humiliating setback to its foreign policy in the developing countries since the removal of its missiles from Cuba in 1962. That left the country with virtually no political ties with Egypt and no military presence either (Ro‘i, 1979; Weiss, 1980 and Daigle, 2012).

The alteration in the United States’ strategy in the early years of the Carter presidential term was vital for Soviet diplomacy when the Americans decided to endorse the Soviet Union’s acknowledgment of Palestinian rights. Entering into the peace talks again by no means resolved all the problems facing the Soviets in their dual search for a swift settlement to the conflict and a much more robust role in the Middle Eastern region.
Though there was no direct danger to the existence of Israel, Moscow was well aware that Arab recognition of Israel was essential for a settlement. In the wake of the war, they tried persistently to convince their friends to take this step; however, they did not have sufficient influence to achieve that aim. The only means of pressure available to the Soviets then was the provision of arms, which they could not utilise as they were concerned that a suspension of arms supply would not only risk them to lose valued hard currency but also divert the attention of their sole allies to different markets in pursuit of arms supplies (Ro'i, 1979). As such, this predicament in particular with the radicalised Arab allies very much undermined the Soviet Union’s role in the area.

In his endeavour to reach an overall Middle East peace settlement, and in light of the desire of both Superpowers to maintain the détente through preventing the region from direct confrontation between them, Carter was convinced to adopt that his Soviet counterpart would be an appropriate partner in this process, which culminated in the joint Soviet-American statement on the Middle East of 1 October 1977 (Daigle, 2012).

This statement announced, as well as other things, that the Geneva conference would recommence by the end of 1977. However, allowing Moscow to assume centre stage in the Middle East peace talks was considered a major achievement for the Soviet diplomacy. In so doing, Carter committed a major error of judgement since the Soviet conception of a Middle East peace agreement was very dissimilar to that adopted by the Washington administration (Naff and Wolfgang, 1985). Moscow’s views regarding the peace plans, which had evolved since 1973, comprised three key stages. These three components entailed Israel’s withdrawal from all lands occupied during the 1967 War, the announcement of an independent Palestinian state to be established on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as the official recognition of the right of existence to all countries in the Middle East, which included Israel. As far as the Soviet leaders were concerned, the major player to achieve such a peace agreement would be
a global forum, presided by the Soviet Union and the United States, in which all concerned parties involved in the struggle including the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) should participate. It is important to note that this peace plan clearly served the Soviets’ strategic objectives as it primarily defended the right of Israel to exist. Such a stance would surely consolidate anti-Western Arab sentiments with the antagonistic approach shown toward Israel (Freedman, 1985).

The Soviet approach would retain some underlying resentment in the Arab-Israeli relations and might force the Arab world to show at least a minimum degree of unity against the alleged Israeli danger. Clearly, the Soviet administration played on that aspect to exploit such frail unity to exert its own influence in the Arab region and diminish that of the United States if any tensions endured in the Arab-Israeli relationships, the Soviet Union’s position as a regular arms supplier to the Arab world could be strengthened (Naff and Wolfgang, 1985).

According to Marantz and Gross (1985) another advantage of the plan would be the end of the American influence as a negotiator in the Arab-Israel peace talks, which had been extremely vital to the Americans in the Arab world since 1973 War. For this purpose the Soviet Union proved to the Arabs that the influence of the United States was much stronger than that of the Soviet Union in securing Israeli withdrawals. And the Soviets leaders might have intended that this would drive to a reduction in United States prestige and influence in the Arab world. In addition to putting an end to the disputes within the Arab ranks over concluding peace talks with Israel; disputes that did hinder the Soviet intention to help establish an anti-Western Arab stance (Allison and Williams, 1990).

According to Marantz and Gross (1985), however, an additional benefit would be that by keeping Israel, the plan would not isolate the United States. Surely, with the robust emotional and political relationships between the United States and Israel, the Moscow administration
would endanger what had been left of the détente in case it followed a strategy to the
disadvantage of the Israelis. To this end, the Kremlin’s officials in their peace talks did take
into consideration the Israelis’ right to exist as a sovereign state (The Annuals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 1985).

In spite of the high expectations Moscow had behind the resumption of the Geneva conference
in December 1977 in terms of creating momentum for its peace plan, these opportunities were
not fully seized. In fact, the mutual Soviet-American peace declaration became controversial
after the shock visit of Sadat to Jerusalem in November 1977, followed by the ensuing Camp
David treaty, which transformed the entire Middle Eastern diplomacy. As a consequence, the
Soviet Union was again left disillusioned and in return expressed its apprehension that other
Arab states would follow in the footsteps of Egypt and sign what the Soviet Union referred to
as a single deal with Israel. Without a doubt, ever since September 1978, the Soviets had been
continuously concerned with the threats of a long-drawn-out Camp David process. As such,
one of the key thrusts of Moscow’s Middle East policy at the time involved attempting to
alienate the Sadat regime in the Arab region and thus foil any extension of Camp David.
Fortunately for the advantage of the Soviets during the period following the Camp David
agreement, there was virtually widespread Arab opposition toward the Camp David outcomes
and the ensuing peace agreement involving the Egyptians and the Israelis in March 1979
(Lukacs and Battah, 1988).

One could safely say that the Soviets were somewhat fortunate in that there was almost
universal Arab hostility concerning the Camp David settlements and the ensuing Egyptian-
Israeli Peace Agreement in the spring of 1979. In fact, Moscow hung high hopes on the large
Arab alliance that joined forces in Baghdad in November 1978 to condemn the Camp David
Treaty (Naff and Wolfgang, 1985).
Even though one could argue that these events were undoubtedly in favour of the Soviet Union’s zero sum rivalry with the United States to be dominant in the Middle East in particular, and the Arab region in general, the Kremlin encountered serious difficulties due to two key developments that were to have a very negative impact on its role in the region. These two events encompassed its occupation of Afghanistan and the eruption of the Iraq-Iran conflict.

No matter what the reasons for the Soviet invasion were, that act was to leave a very negative impact on the Soviet status in the Arab and Muslim world, with the majority of the Gulf Arabs again resorting to the United States as an offset in spite of the Camp David Treaty, and with the then anti-Camp David alliance enfeebled by repeated enmity between Iraq and neighbouring Syria (Allison and Williams, 1990).

In spite of the long standing Soviet-Afghani relationships which dated back to the nineteenth century, and with ties both in the military and economic domains becoming more and more strengthened after World War II. The deployment of more than 80,000 Soviet armed personnel to Afghanistan, which represented the first Soviet armed conflict of such scale outside of the Soviet hemisphere in Eastern Europe, was extremely disturbing and raised many concerns in the Middle East and predominantly among the oil manufacturers in the Arab region (Bradsher, 1983).

Additionally, it had serious repercussions on the relationships between Moscow and Washington, as the United States forced a controlled grain embargo, and then restricted the sale of high-tech equipment, followed by the withdrawal of the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty) from being ratified by the Senate. Worse still, the Americans pulled out of the Moscow Olympics, and took advantage of the invasion to incite the Muslim countries of the Middle East, especially those mistrustful of the United States for its role in the Camp David Treaty, against the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, the United States accelerated its military efforts
in the Middle East by setting up bases and speeding up the process of sending its military forces near the Persian Gulf, which the United States’ President Carter vowed to defend (Freedman, 1991).

In an attempt to deal with this Muslim reaction, which could be eventually exploited by the United States, Moscow sought to recover ground. First of all, its most reliable Arab friends, including Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO, who launched the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, arranged a summit meeting in Damascus in the middle of January 1980 and two weeks prior to the Islamic summit planned to discuss the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front seized the opportunity in this summit to denounce the United States and its activities in the region. In addition, it attempted to distract the Arabs’ attention away from the actions of the Soviets in Afghanistan by highlighting the American influence throughout the process leading to the Camp David Treaty (Freedman, 1982). Nevertheless, at a time when Moscow was trying to gain the backing of Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in the post-invasion period, there seemed to be serious challenges facing the Front itself. As well as the blame heaped by other Arab and Muslim states for the Front’s support of the Soviet attack of Afghanistan, several leaders in the Front were facing internal difficulties, while the Islamic states gathered at the summit which took place in Pakistan at the end of January 1980 denounced the Soviet’s invasion with a very heavy-handed response even though the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front on its part suspended the membership of Afghanistan. In response, the Muslim states taking part in the summit requested other Islamic states to break diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union (Freedman, 1991), which represented a serious blow to the Soviet Union’s Middle East foreign policy and interests at that time.

Between Leonid Brezhnev, who took charge in the Soviet Union from October 1964 to November 1982, and Mikhail Gorbachev, who was president in March 1985, there was a period
that had lasted twenty eight months. During that spell, initially Yuri Andropov followed by Konstantin Cherenkov took office as interim presidents of the Soviet Union; however, due to poor health, they were both unable to introduce drastic changes into the foreign policy of the Kremlin (Zhores, 1983).

Nevertheless, both interim leaders had some kind of impact on the Soviet policy toward the Arab region. More specifically, Yuri Andropov, who inherited a weakening Middle East state of affairs from Brezhnev, instantly tried to reinstate the Soviet influence in the area, but was challenged with three main issues. First of all, due to the inoperativeness and idleness of the Kremlin during the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and the blockade of Beirut in 1982, thus it lost much of its credibility as a strategic force for the Arabs, even for some staunch pro-Soviet leaders, such as Libya’s Qaddafi. Second, because the low performing Soviet Union made arms used by the Syrians, there arose the issue of quality as far as the Soviet military equipment was concerned. In fact, this was a niggling problem for the Kremlin, mainly as the supply of modern arms was the key factor of the Soviet significance for the Arab leaders, and since those regimes involved in the purchase of weapons provided Moscow with much sought after hard currency. There was a final problem for Andropov in the Arab region at the beginning of 1983 related to the United States. The Americans who at the start of January had launched a new central facility to supervise their Rapid Deployment Forces (RDF) in the Middle East clearly held the diplomatic efforts in the Middle East, as opposed to Moscow’s own peace initiative, which did not receive much attention. Moreover, as revealed in the Fez II Arab meeting, the key allies of the Soviet Union (Libya, South Yemen, Syria and the PLO) appeared to have little influence in Arab affairs. Furthermore, they had major differences among themselves, especially between the Libyan and Syrian leaders Qaddafi and Assad, who did not appreciate the public flirtation of PLO leader Yasser Arafat with Reagan’s recommendations (Freedman, 1991).
As a result, and given the deteriorating Soviet Union’s influence in the Arab region, Andropov took the initiative to reinstate the Soviet influence in the Middle East and North Africa. As for his first move, it comprised the deployment of numerous batteries of SAM 5 artilleries to Damascus, as well as the Soviet armed forces to manoeuvre and protect them. In fact, this Soviet initiative exceeded merely the resupply activity of tanks and planes to Syria, which had been the case in the wake of the conflict between Israel and Syria in 1982. With the provision of an arms system for Damascus that had never been shipped outside the Soviet Union, the Kremlin was attempting to prove to the Arabs that it was prepared to help its allies at all costs. According to Freedman (1986), this was clearly shown in strengthening the military status of the Soviet Union’s key Arab ally in the region, Syria, with modern artilleries.

After once again finding itself in a conflicting situation with the United States, Andropov tried to consolidate the Libyan role and status in the Arab world and beyond, especially as the latter had been a key ally in North Africa. In reaction to intelligence reports of a pre-arranged Qaddafi’s support to be given in favour of an overthrow against the Sudanese regime in February, the Americans deployed four AWACs aircraft to Cairo under the pretext of “training manoeuvres”. The United States also sent an aircraft transporter located in close proximity to Libya, even though it was far from the disputed Gulf of Sidra where the Americans had brought down a couple of Libyan aircraft in the early 1980s (Cannon and Wilson, 1983). As was the case in the 1981 Gulf of Sidra, Moscow did not play much of a role during the crisis itself. Realising that its influence in the Arab world was at stake, the Soviet leaders had to do more than simply condemn the policies of the United States. One of the immediate actions taken by the Soviet Union was to deepen relationships with Libya by agreeing to finalise an agreement known as the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Libya, which was only concluded in principle one month following the skirmishes between Libya and the United States. Thus, by
agreeing to this treaty even in principle, the Soviet Union sought to reinstate its image in the Arab region during those years (Freedman, 1991).

The Soviet Union’s procrastination to take any further steps concerning the concluding of the treaty, which could be due to the fact that the Kremlin leaders might have changed their mind about even seeming to provide a military assurance to Qaddafi. The latter was in fact famed in Moscow for his unpredictable activities, including his adventure in Chad, which was soon to cause the Soviets innumerable and undesirable complications (Freedman, 1991). There seemed to be no further progress toward the signing of the projected Soviet-Libyan Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation after the Chad crisis, which could only suggest that the Soviet leaders started, by then, to be more cautious of the Libyan leader’s erratic behaviour. Furthermore, given that its role in the Arab region was then reinforced by the loss of support for the Reagan Plan and the stalemate over the Israeli-Lebanese treaty, the Kremlin might have been less obliged to provide support for the unpredictable friend (Damis, 1983).

One of the major issues for Soviet foreign policy in 1984 was the Persian Gulf. Under Chernenko, who was old and ailing, Soviet foreign policy making was based more on reactions to events emanating from the Iran-Iraq War instead of articulating any new initiative of its own. Therefore, in order to curtail any probable survival of the Reagan Plan, the Kremlin leaders had to take more of an initiative (Freedman, 1991). An emerging personality in Soviet politics was Mikhail Gorbachev who came to office in March 1985. Not only was he the most energetic Soviet leader since Khrushchev, but also the keenest to assume domestic restructurings since Lenin introduced his own economic programme in the 1920s. With Gorbachev strengthening his grip on power in 1985 and 1986, he came to the realisation that the economic issues encountered by the Soviet Union were so numerous that a break was required in the arms contest with the Americans. In so doing, resources could be refocused to meet the civilian needs rather than the military ends (Gill, 1994). Nevertheless, one should point out that the new
philosophy adopted by the Soviet foreign policy makers did not actually start in 1985 with the arrival of Gorbachev to power. In fact, a number of hard-line strategies adopted in his early years in power, such as the escalated Soviet war in Afghanistan and the deployment of SAM-5 rockets to Libya caused several Western critics to state that his policy was similar to that of Brezhnev (Doder, 1986).

However, at the start of 1987, once Gorbachev had strengthened his influence in and out of the Soviet Union, the new philosophy in Soviet foreign policy making was formally under way. In actual fact, the new theory had five underpinnings, which included the following; firstly, the threat of nuclear war had forced the global force to recognise that human existence should be given priority over the narrow interests of countries and ideological stances. Secondly, ideas such as spheres of influence, key interests, positions of strength, and zero-sum game theory to the developing countries should be abandoned. Afterwards, in order to resolve regional conflicts, priority should be given to political means. A final underpinning was that an organic link exists between regional struggles and clashes between superpowers. Thus, a joint action was required from the two global forces to resolve the most niggling of regional issues as there would be no likely rapprochement in Soviet-American ties provided that the most serious regional conflicts, mainly that in the Middle East, have been addressed (Freedman, 1993; Gorbachev, 1987). A useful means to assess how much transformed Soviet foreign policy was and to classify the kinds of change that occurred encompasses utilising the distinctions suggested by Fukuyama (1989). On this basis, change in style is the most prominent stage, and is mostly present in the practice of diplomacy and the nature of propaganda. However, the more significant changes are related to tactics. Tactical changes would be echoed in the type of countries with which the Kremlin tried to establish diplomatic ties. These changes are also reflected in the financial costs and threats it is willing to assume to reach its goals. When ascertaining if the new policy should be taken seriously, however, the most significant stage to
inspect is the strategic change; in other words, have the long-term objectives been altered? Will there be a continued influence of the Soviet Union in the developing countries, and if so, will the continued influence be contingent on ideological underpinnings? (Fukuyama, 1989, p. 31-32).

There was an immediate change in the style of the Soviet foreign policy when new personnel assumed their roles in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Committee in 1985. As for the most notable feature of the new style, it was the renewed interest in using public relationships and the mass media factor to publicise the new political image and the new strategies followed domestically and abroad for foreign observers. However, this depicted merely an interest in using modern communications expertise and technology to deliver old messages, whose content had changed by becoming practically less ideological and more idealistic. With regards to the developing countries, not focusing much on the ideological message was intended to relegate the precedence attached to the developing countries of the southern hemisphere and the objective of preaching more nonpartisan strategies, differentiating less between communist-oriented and socialist countries on one side and capitalist-oriented developing countries on the other. The message also suggested a firm attitude to break free from any commitment to conflicts in the developing world. One can also notice the Soviet foreign policy makers’ changed style in how diplomats started to show more cooperation and far more outgoing approaches (Miller, 1989). It surely appeared as though the Soviet representatives abroad were being given leeway to be more independent and innovative, which showed the changes occurring in the Kremlin in view of foreign policy decision-making, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its minister assuming more authority and the Central Committee apparatus increasingly less significant. One can also note different indicators of a new style diplomacy, which involved the wide-ranging and recurrent personal diplomatic efforts carried out by Mikhail Gorbachev, starting with his position as General Secretary of the
CPSU and then in the Kremlin as President. In his pursuit to establish new diplomatic channels, to strengthen old and reliable alliances and to convince Western leaderships and audiences that perestroika and the new political thinking exemplified a sincere change of the Soviet Union, the Soviet leader and his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze undertook vast amounts of diplomatic missions abroad (Light, 1991).

For example, Soviet policy-making with regards to the Gulf crisis in 1990 revealed a distinctive tactical transformation, with the Kremlin finding itself in a difficult situation after Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait in August 1990. It should be pointed out that the Soviets have undoubtedly ignored the assault. Furthermore, indicating their support to the Western stance could work in favour of the Soviets being now considered as a dependable key player in the new world order. As already shown, the Soviet Union sought to strengthen its diplomatic ties with a number of Gulf countries and expand this new look policy. Therefore, there were solid grounds for it to vote for the United Nations resolutions denouncing Iraq's actions and demanding its immediate withdrawal and imposition of sanctions. Similarly, Saddam was an established Soviet friend in the region, especially after the signing of a friendship agreement in 1972. Despite the suspension of arms deliveries during the Iran-Iraq conflict, they had successively been recommenced with around 200 Soviet army experts in Iraq, in addition to 5,000 other Soviet nationals. Moreover, the existence of Western armed forces in the Gulf countries could draw them alarmingly within the proximity of the southern Soviet frontiers. Whatever the case may be, the invasion offered the Soviets the perfect opportunity to apply their new style of conflict management. Being in favour of using force, therefore, was a more difficult decision to make (Light, 1991).

In spite of its initial reluctance, the Soviet Union eventually went on to support the resolution to utilise force; however, there appeared to be no question of Soviet forces contributing to military efforts. Even though Shevardnadze indicated at one time that the Kremlin might
deploy its expertise in support of a United Nations force, Gorbachev intentionally avoided referring to this possibility in public. Based on the new constitution, the Supreme Soviet had to take the decision to approve or disapprove deployment of troops abroad, which in such a case was extremely unlikely. While the conservative Soyuz Group of Deputies opposed Moscow’s strategy in the Gulf, more radical deputies expressed their vehement rejection based on the lessons of the war in Afghanistan (Light, 1989, p. 279).

Another conspicuous change in Moscow’s foreign policy can also be shown in its ties with fundamental countries in the Arab region like Libya and Syria, with the Soviet Union’s only felt presence being limited to supporting them, which in fact caused the Kremlin a number of problems. The Soviet influence in the Arab world was not only limited and marginalised in supporting Libya and Syria, but the two regimes were also portrayed in the west as harbouring international terrorism, while taking a rigid attitude against Israel and weakening the harmony of the PLO and the Arab cause more specifically. Thus, the Soviet leader dissociated his country from radicalism and openly condemned the terrorist activities for which the West held Libya and Syria accountable. In so doing, Moscow sought to keep its overall policy of extending Soviet links with the more key states in the Arab world intact and thus alienate these unpredictable regimes, such as that of Qaddafi (Shearman, 1987).

A review of the Soviet policy towards the Arab countries in the later years of Gorbachev in power gives a clear indication that there were changes that extended well beyond the necessity of the Gulf War. Evidently, while the Soviet activities in the developing countries has been influenced by the urge for healthier East-West ties, the changes indicate an overall shift in Soviet strategy towards that region and are not merely a sign of East-West rapprochement. In addition, by reviewing the importance of the new policy, the change has been noticed in terms of style, tactics and strategy, which implies that the new political approach is not purely about pursuing old objectives by utilising fresher methods.
The Libyan Soviet rapprochement

There had been a number of tactical decisions considered by the Soviet Union to increase its presence in the Arab region, such as securing a spot in the Mediterranean Sea. In so doing, the Soviet Union would be on equal footing with the NATO forces, which thus would allow it to be a constant threat to Western oil routes. For this objective to be attained, the Soviet Union introduced a policy with the purpose of infiltrating the region not by using military prowess, but by strengthening interrelations with the autonomist and self-governing fronts in the Arab region. In fact, some of these ties included providing weaponry for these governments due to the then Arab-Israeli struggle and in response to the West’s denial to allow sophisticated weapons to be supplied to these regimes. As a result, the Soviets followed a strategy of upholding the defence of these nationalist parties (Lahwej, 1998).

However, the turning point in the Soviet-Egyptian relations had to be the Six Day war which took place in 1967. During that conflict, Israel demolished the Egyptian air force in the field, which led Nasser to resign and caused a strain in the Soviet relations with Egypt being as a strategic ally in the region. To compensate for the lack of intervention in the Arab war against Israel, the Kremlin expressed clear intentions to make up for the Egyptian losses and support an Arab resolution to recover their territorial losses incurred in their struggle to liberate Palestine. With the war intensifying following Israeli air strikes on Egyptian soil in the early 1970s, Nasser once again headed to Moscow in secret to secure an arms agreement, leading to the instant deployment of an air defence system and military experts to Cairo (Heikal, 1975). Consequently, weaponry assistance and political endorsement had allowed the Kremlin to assume a firm position at the centre of a heated Arab-Israeli struggle. Nevertheless, this only lasted until President Sadat’s decision to deport over 21,000 Soviet experts in 1972, resulting in a downhill Soviet-Egyptian relationship and in renewed interest in a different ally in the region. For this matter, Libya was the ideal alternative due to its strategic positioning near
NATO's southernmost point. The Libyan regime was similar in approach to Nasser's nationalist front and objected to a peace settlement in terms of the Arab-Israeli struggle. Most importantly, according to Lahwej (1998), a firm footing in Libya would provide maritime facilities, and would achieve an additional Soviet objective in the southern part of the Mediterranean.

Following the post-war argument regarding the future of the colonies formerly under Italian authority, Moscow showed its intention to maximise its military presence in the Mediterranean basin and its political stronghold all over the Middle Eastern counties. In recognition of the strategic weight of Libya, a proposal was tabled by the Soviets at the 1945 Potsdam conference where they expressed openly their intentions of a trusteeship over Tripolitania. However, upon the rejection of the United States, Britain and France of such an offer, the Soviet Union worked hard to safeguard a likely communist success in the Italian general elections and to promote an Italian trusteeship over Libyan territories. Soon after, in 1948, Moscow withdrew its support for Italy and started to promote a joint trusteeship, which was once in fact a popular demand by the other members making up the big four. Again, the Soviet offer was declined, leaving the issue unresolved and prompting a referral of the disputed case to the United Nations to take the appropriate decision. At the General Assembly, a final attempt seeking to divide Libya between Italy, France and Britain was also rejected by the Soviet Union, leading to the United Nations’ adoption of a resolution on the 21 of November 1949 giving birth to a new Libya now united and independent (Claudio, 1975).

There was minimal communication between Libya and the Soviet Union throughout the time of King Idris’ reign, with full ambassadorial formalities not conventionalised until 1955. From then on, diplomatic and business interaction started to slowly develop. For instance, the Soviet Union embarked on supporting the Tripoli trade fair held every year and accommodating a limited number of Libyan students on scholarship within Soviet universities. Additionally, Libyan parliament members were sent as part of a delegation to the Soviet Union in 1961 and
1968, and in return, Tripoli received a similar Soviet delegation in 1966. Notably, a trade agreement between Libya and the Soviet Union was signed in 1961; however, no practical measures were taken until two years later (St John, 1987).

Soon after the ascent of Qaddafi to power in September 1969, the Soviet ambitions of a grip or, at the least, a larger influence in Libya, were reinforced. It is worth pointing out that Qaddafi’s anti-Western strategy was shown in his decision to oppose any presence of Western military bases and to condemn their oil ambitions in the region, which in a way brought the Libyan regime closer to the Soviet Union. In fact, Qaddafi’s confrontation with the oil firms in the early 1970s was not taken lightly and his reaction caused the country to lose oil, Western technological support, research potential and skills. As a consequence, in 1971 and for Libya’s own interests, Qaddafi sought the Soviet Union’s technical aid. In fact, the Oil and Mineral Resources Minister, Izz al-Dean al-Mabrouk, paid a visit to the Kremlin in March that year to agree on how the Soviets could contribute with technical expertise into the oil plants. Later in May, a delegation of Soviet specialists was sent to Tripoli to take charge once a breakdown of the negotiation between Libya and the oil companies did take place. In 1972, a visit by Prime Minister Jallud to Moscow ensured the final enactment of the Soviet-Libyan oil co-operation deal, allowing as a result the Soviet Union’s importation of Libyan nationalised oil and further concessions in return for technical assistance (Lahwej, 1998).

There were two objectives leading to the Soviet interest in Libyan oil. On the one hand, Libyan oil could in the long run be utilised as a substitute to Soviet oil in case there were low supplies. On the other hand, Moscow used Libyan oil to ease its own load of oil provisions to the Eastern hemisphere. This is in fact what characterised the 1980s as the Soviet Union struck barter deals with the Libyan authorities allowing the former to pay for arms and settle outstanding debts in return for the latter’s crude oil. In spite of Libya’s direct involvement in the exportation of oil to Yugoslavia, Romania and Bulgaria in return for products and services, such as arms and
medical skills, the Soviet Union kept a close eye on the commercial activities as this could lead to a decline in the movement of Soviet arms imported by the Libyan authorities. More importantly, the Soviet keenness on Libyan oil emerged from a huge interest in oil strategies adopted by Middle Eastern countries. In the early 1970s, there had been a rising support shown by the Soviet Union for using the oil factor as a weapon and building upon the OPEC divergence over prices as early as 1983. According to Abir (1974), with the former, there has been a quickened global interest in the promotion of the fuel resources of Siberia. In actual terms, the West enhanced Russian exports of gas through the Siberian pipeline to Western parts of Europe. In terms of the latter, the Soviet Union brought its oil prices in line with OPEC's; for example, March 1983 witnessed the fall of Soviet oil prices to $27 per barrel, only one day following OPEC’s agreement to set oil prices at $29 per barrel for Saudi crude (Etzold, 1984).

Since 1969, an understanding that allying with the Soviets constituted a major asset for Libya seemed to characterise Qaddafi’s assessment of the political and military scenarios deemed in keeping with his country’s foreign and domestic aspirations. This view was strengthened by the Soviet Union’s involvement to support Egypt’s ongoing conflict with Israel; which in fact allowed Moscow to earn substantial credibility, as far as Qaddafi was concerned, and inspired the Libyan leader to play a regional role (Interview: Dorda, 2010; Ginor, 2002). However, as Ronen (2008) claimed, the Libyan leader maintained his political distance from the Soviet Union, especially because of a personal belief in the non-aligned movement and as a result of the tag attached to the communists being considered nonbelievers.

Nasser’s unexpected death in September 1970 led to Qaddafi’s radicalisation of Libya’s foreign policy. To start with, he dropped his active commendation of positive neutrality and nonalignment procedures. Afterwards, he radically decreased the then prevailing Western presence in Libya in a clear manifestation of his strong anti-imperialist attitudes; thus provoking the United States and Britain, which had key interests in Libya (St John, 2002). In
addition, because of this hostile perception of the western hemisphere, Libya’s relations with the Soviet Union were strengthened (Interview: Dorda, 2010). This new alliance or positioning gathered momentum in the mid-1970s and was largely seen as the rest of a practical re-examination by Qaddafi of his country’s national and international issues, as well as of the goals of his government at the time (Ronen, 2008).

One aspect worth highlighting in the Libyan-Soviet relationship was the arms links, which was given priority over other aspects. With the closure of Western bases along with the ensuing disagreement over arms contracts that Libya had already signed, especially those with Great Britain, it was thought necessary that alternative suppliers were identified to carry on the armament process. The British withdrawal came in response to Qaddafi’s rhetoric to resort to use of force against Israel in a mutual Arab operation uniting all Arabs. The British government, thus, invalidated a military deal signed during the rule of King Idris, including 188 Chieftain Tanks, as well as a $500 million air defence system due for installation. Whitehall highlighted the new antagonistic Libyan policy against Israel and the support given to Egypt’s Nasser (The Times, 4 November 1970). Britain had apprehensions regarding the tanks’ technology, which might be acquired by the Soviets if sold to Libya, which justified the British ban on the supply of Chieftain Tanks to Qaddafi’s government (Beevor, 1970).

This could be seen as an example of the strains and constraints characterising the Libyan relationship with Britain in particular and the West generally.

On the other hand, because of the American foreign policy regarding Libya, the White House refused to sell advanced arms and objected to the issuance of an export licence allowing the delivery of eight G-130 Hercules transport planes Libya bought from Lockheed. Even worse, the United States did not refund the $60 million Libya had spent in hard currency to purchase those planes (Kikhia, 1977). Also important to note were the special ties between Israel and
the United States making it hard for the latter to be on friendly terms with the Qaddafi regime (El-Khawas, 1986). In response, Libya turned to another global force at that time; one that was prepared to provide Qaddafi with the weapons required to upgrade and advance his forces, and to strengthen Libyan military competence and ability to protect Libyan interests in the region.

Even though there seemed to be a common anti-imperialistic approach upheld by Libya and the Soviet Union, both countries were set apart by another element of ideology. The religious and ideological disparities placed huge constraints on the Libyan-Soviet ties well beyond arms for cash agreements. Thus, the noticeable Libyan beliefs in Arab nationalism and Islam caused further strains on the Soviet-Libyan relationship. In spite of the commercial activities and cooperation in the oil and arms sectors, ideological differences and some disagreements related to quality aspects of arms provided by the USSR to the Arabs dissuaded Libya from engaging fully with the Soviet hemisphere.

By 1974, Qaddafi was compelled to change his attitude toward the Soviet Union, as a result of attempting, initially, to break free from the isolation that Libya found itself in and to gain Moscow’s support in the building of a strong Libyan military force. This is in addition to his failure to persuade the Egyptian and Syrian governments into waging an all-out war against Israel and his inability to contribute positively to the Arab oil embargo against the Dutch and the Americans who had provided full backing for Israel during the fight and his failure to reach union with Egypt also caused him to opt out of diplomacy as a means of endorsing his policy objectives.

It had been seen by the Soviet Union that there were some strategic gains deemed attainable concerning Libya’s approach. To start with, it would recuperate from the losses incurred in Egypt, especially the marine facilities alongside the Mediterranean Sea. Secondly, selling arms to Libya would be a money-spinning activity, particularly with the Libyan government paying
for the goods in hard currency. Thirdly, Qaddafi could provide support for the Soviet Union in terms of contesting the Western presence in highly strategic places in the world due to the Libyan leader’s pledge to endorse radical and revolutionary changes by resorting to force in pro-Western environments (El-Khawas, 1986, p. 123).

From a Libyan point of view, the rapprochement with the Soviet Union allowed Qaddafi to purchase Soviet arms and to pursue his revolutionary agenda in Africa as much as in the Middle East (Interview: Dorda, 2010). It is not so clear how inimical to soviet interests his aspirations in the region were; but it was always also the case that officials in Moscow viewed their inability to control the Libyan leader as straightforwardly dangerous.

From 1974 onwards, the Soviet Union and its allies have supplied the Libyan leader with a vast amount of arms well beyond the country’s requirements and the abilities of the armed forces (Haley, 1984). As a result, ties between the two countries strengthened and they came closer to each other, with Libya continuing to depend on Soviet military experts in the training and preparation of Libyan forces to be competent and knowledgeable in the use of Soviet-made arms.

There seemed to be an increasing reluctance on the part of the United States to answer the requests of the Libyan leader for weapons. On the contrary, the Soviet Union appeared keen on providing its services and aware of the valuable opportunity to have a strategic influence in the Mediterranean being a focal region between the Middle East and Africa, in addition to Libya’s willingness to pay for the goods in hard currency. While Libya carried on adopting an anti-communist perception of its ally, the Soviet Union’s interest was on increasing mutual collaboration by warmly receiving a senior Libyan delegation led by Abdulsalam Jallud, Qaddafi’s close assistant, in the Soviet capital for a period of a week in February 1972. Jallud was a highly prominent figure in the Revolutionary Command Council and was also Minister
for Industry and Economy. Because of this visit, concerns about Libya’s regional and international activities increased, causing the already strained relations with the Americans to crack. These concerns hastened the process of strengthening ties between Tripoli and Moscow administrations. Another significant boost was given to these ties after Jallud had visited Moscow in 1974, resulting in an arms agreement of up to $1.2 billion. A later three day visit was paid in return by Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin to Libya in May 1975, which made him the first senior Soviet minister to visit Libya. Another arms agreement followed suit, along with the deployment of Soviet military experts and personnel, with figures showing a significant rise in their total number from 100 in 1974 to 300 in the Spring of 1975 (Ronen, 2008).

It could be argued that the most significant year in the Libyan-Soviet relations was 1976. In which a truly interesting strategic alliance between the two countries started to be fostered with the relations growing stronger and appearing somewhat strategic, in particular the technical side of these relationships. Following the visit made by the Soviet Prime Minister in May 1975, an announcement came from the two governments that the Soviet Union accepted to offer Libya even its first nuclear reactor. According to St John (1987), the 10-megawatt amenity would be purchased to achieve peaceful activities only. Similarly, Western nuclear specialists later made it clear that the small size of the facility would restrict its functions to research purposes. Another step was later reported during 1977 with Libya signing a deal with the Soviet Union in order to build a 440-megawatt nuclear power plant like those Moscow had already supplied to Eastern European countries and Finland. Such expanding collaboration in the nuclear field brought about increasing concerns and various reactions in some of the major capitalist countries in the West.

In terms of arms transfers, and as a result of the July 1977 skirmishes with Egypt, Libya was provoked into another military build-up. An instant development comprised the signing of a
fresh deal with the Soviet Union, which allowed the MiG-25s to be delivered to Libya in 1978. With Libya claiming to be the first country to purchase these sophisticated fighter planes, the Libyan leader later bragged that Libya had access to Soviet arms not yet accessible in Warsaw Pact countries (Anderson, 1985).

Soon after the Libyan’s head of state paid a visit to the Soviet Union for the first time ever in December 1976. Political ties between the two countries saw further complication with the Soviets now backing the Geneva Conference on the Middle East and the Libyans’ growing concerns that the conference would result in a trade-off of Palestinian interests. The Moscow administration was also in favour of Egyptian interests in the Geneva Conference even with Qaddafi’s thorough disenchantment with the Egyptian leader. It was President Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem in November 1977 which led to reinforced political relations between Libya and the Soviet Union, since it offered the Soviet Union with a pretext to provide support for the Rejectionist Steadfastness and Confrontation Front set up in Tripoli late in 1977. Early in 1978, a second summit meeting of the Steadfastness Front endorsed further action to promote closer relations between the Arab world and the Soviet bloc, leading to additional expansion and development of the Libyan relations with the their global ally within one year from that announcement (Gebril, 1988).

As soon as the Camp David accords were finalised in September 1978, Qaddafi openly rejected his previous pledge to non-alignment. A month later, for instance, he delivered his threateningly outrageous speech to join in as a member in the Warsaw Pact. Not many critics budged as a result of that statement; least of them members of the Warsaw Pact. Nevertheless, this was an indication of how far Qaddafi had departed from the initial stance he adopted concerning positive neutrality. As well as proving Qaddafi’s declining associations with the Western ideology, the comment also exposed a mounting exasperation with his aspirations to contribute to moulding world affairs failing at every attempt. However, the political interests
bringing Libya and the Soviet Union together seemed to be converging even if Qaddafi was still not committed to the Soviet system (St John, 1987).

There was a noticeable increase in the Libyan cooperation with the Soviet Union in a wide range of sectors for many years to come. For example, Libya showed no opposition to the military occupation of Afghanistan in 1979 by Soviet forces. In addition, the two countries signed another major arms deal in 1980, thus increasing the size of equipment acquired by Qaddafi. In 1981, reports had surfaced that Libya had the highest rate of weaponry to manpower in the developing world. As for NATO organisers, they were alarmingly disturbed about the likelihood that the Soviet army might gain access to the bases established on Libyan soil if a crisis in the Mediterranean did take place. In fact, these apprehensions were intensified after the visit of two Russian frigates to Libya in the summer of 1981. On their part, and in order to contest the Western ambitions in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf, the Soviets backed the agreement involving Libya, Ethiopia and South Yemen to foster inter-state friendship and cooperation. Also important was the increase in economic activity, which involved joint projects to develop Libyan’s power generation, such as the oil and gas sectors. There was an expressively renewed interest by Qaddafi in seeking to tie-up a treaty of friendship and cooperation with his Soviet counterpart. Following some unsuccessful attempts, the two countries announced that an agreement in principle regarding, such a treaty, was concluded in April 1983 (Bailey, 1981).

As a result of strains stalling the smooth Libyan Soviet relations, including the Libyan’s failure to commit to cash payments for arms purchased from the Soviets, who needed hard currency, and the low-key role played by the Soviets in the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, Qaddafi tipped off the Kremlin’s administration that they would risk losing their Arab friends at a time when Beirut was being pounded by Israeli missiles (Legum, 1984). This was the first time that Libya started to raise questions about the integrity of the Soviet Union as a true and active supporter
of the Arab nationalist movements. In a later visit by Qaddafi to Moscow in October 1985, six months after the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev to power, he attempted to bolster ties with the Soviet Union by officially signing the friendship treaty reached in principle two and a half years earlier, which did not materialise in the end. Furthermore, Qaddafi tried to persuade the Soviets to up the much needed assistance of weaponry and military equipment to support Libya’s own war with neighbouring Chad. While addressing decision makers in the Kremlin, Qaddafi announced that the protection of Libya’s own interests is in full concurrence with the Soviet approach. As issued in the joint communiqué towards the end of Qaddafi’s visit, there was a clear indication yet of the Kremlin’s support of the Libyan leader against the openly anti-Libyan policy shown by the United States President Ronald Reagan. Accordingly, the Soviet Union gave its full support to the actions deemed appropriate by Libya in defending its independence and territory. Another point highlighted by the communiqué was the harmonious views shared by the two countries’ on a number of international developments and other issues where there was mutual interest (Ronen, 2008).

However, and following the United States air strikes on Tripoli and Benghazi in April 1986, Qaddafi openly condemned the Kremlin’s new standpoint because of its lukewarm reaction to these strikes, which was as a result of the Soviet Union’s seeking to grow closer to the United States and to bolster the new Soviet-American rapprochement. Furthermore, the lack of a formal joint defence treaty with Libyan authorities, which Libya sought many times to achieve in the 1980s, signalled both a certain distrust and a certain indifference from Moscow (Interview: Az-Zentani, 2013).

The attacks on Libya did not stop the outspoken leader from carrying on with his threats to Washington to join forces with the Soviet Union, especially in his reference that his country would join the Warsaw Pact and, thus, create another Cuba (Rabinovich and Shaked, 1986). After all this, and despite growing distrust between Libya and the Soviet Union, the letter kept
its ostensible alliance and support of Libya until its final days; however, it was an alliance characterised by indifference and reluctance (Interview: Az-Zentani, 2013).

In retrospect, the fall of the Soviet Union had significant impacts on Libya’s foreign policy. Upon the disappearance of a weighty force from the international arena, Libya had to contend with entirely new circumstances and developments being left to challenge singlehandedly the new world order led and protected by its opponent (the United States). Thus, the resultant Libyan foreign policy, or the new adapted policy emanating from these developments, was a result of the upheaval that occurred in the newly-established global system, will be the subject of discussion in the forthcoming chapter. When exactly did Libyan policy makers become conscious of the seriousness of the USSR’s situation? This is not easy to answer. One interviewee Tarbah (2010) suggests that it was only when the USSR was actually collapsing that the full force of the change hit Libyan foreign policy makers. Up to then, they clung on to hope that the USSR would remain powerful and an effective ally. By contrast, another interviewee (Interview: Az-Zentani, 2013) asserted that the Libyan policy elite were watching the difficulties the Russians found themselves with increasing alarm from the first signs of weakness, taking those to include the announcement of the policy of perestroika (reconstruction) from 1985 onwards. Az-Zentani agrees that the Libyan elite did not react very quickly although they were aware of the potential dangers. Tarbah said in his interview that there was ‘virtually no planning’ in response to the Russian collapse until the very last moment. Now these two accounts represent a difference of opinion even though on the strict wording quoted here they might be roughly compatible. It is also possible that the recollections of interviewees after 2011 are coloured by those events as well as by their memory. But it is also sensible to acknowledge that there were differences among Libyan advisors about how and when to respond to events in Russia when they came to know more exactly what was happening. That was only confirmed quite late on. There was also (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010) a view which seemed to be shared
among the policy elite that they could not raise the consequences of a possible collapse with Qaddafi himself until he raised it with them. This is a telling issue in suggesting how his leadership weakened the working of the policy group around him and made rational policy making more difficult. The first reaction to increasing Soviet weakness was uncertainty; but the actual collapse occurred very suddenly and for reasons completely unconnected with Libya or the region. The process of adaptation could be described as one of uncertainty reduction, but, as the following chapters also suggest, there was a period of instability when internal and external issues competed for attention and when the impacts of Soviet decline could not be predicted, which lasted some time until a new course started to be planned: however we understand its origins, the new policy did not emerge quickly or easily.
Chapter Five: The Emerging Post-Soviet International System and its Implications for Libyan Foreign Policy.

Several countries seemed to have been positively and negatively affected because of the shifts in global structure and process spinning off from the Soviet decline. In contrast, countries that were thought to show allegiance to the Soviet Union had a more painful feeling of the latter’s demise, including Libya, which was unquestionably no exception given its unfriendly approach and previous unstable relations with the West. As such, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate the effects of this emerging international system on Libya’s foreign policy.

The fall of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991 brought about a radical change in the economic and military fortunes of the West, tilting the balance to the favour of Western states, in particular to the United States. In so doing, the latter has become the most influential global force as well as the only established global superpower on the international scene. Furthermore, by proving communism as an infeasible approach for economically and politically organising and leading the world, the Soviet fall also apparently tilted the equilibrium of ideological influence in the favour of Western countries. For example, the Soviet system had ceased to challenge the pre-eminence of the western approach to economic and political liberalism; thus prompting its inevitable growth and dissemination into established territories and others gained in the wake of the Soviet collapse (Hunter, 2010).

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union’s demise had put an end to the post-World War bipolar global political structure, without leading to either an unchallenged unipolar or a multipolar system. What followed the Soviets’ collapse as a genuine opponent of American supremacy may not be seen as unipolar because, as argued by Huntington (1999, p. 35), a unipolar system refers to
“one global force, no significant major powers and many minor powers”. Similarly, it would not be adequate to identify the system at that moment as multipolar, even though we might well describe later developments as multipolar, since that would necessitate “several major powers of comparable strength that compete and cooperate with each other in shifting patterns. A coalition of major powers is necessary to resolve important international issues” (Huntington, 1999, p. 35-36).

In spite of the emergence of countries, such as India and China as developing giants, and the re-appearance of Russia, the present global system is still depicting a major difference in economic and military prowess where key countries are concerned; more particularly, when it comes to military strength and the potential to demonstrate that across long distances, the United States cherishes a massive superiority over other countries. Furthermore, a multipolar global structure needs some kind of competitiveness and challenge among the major players that would influence the strategic positioning within which other less influential countries are active, and therefore impact on their strategic decisions and options.

Huntington suggests that the post-Soviet system may be referred to as uni-multipolar, where one global force (the United States) exists alongside several other key powers. In order to solve the international issues in this system, action is required by the single global force, which has the ability to veto actions by other countries. However, this global force needs the support of a number of other key players in dealing with these international issues (Hunter, 2010).

There was a significant change in the type of interstate relationships with the demise of the Soviet Union at both the regional and global levels. Several denominators contributed to such approaches, with the absence of issues that might bring about a direct engagement between two or more key global countries to rescue another country in the non-ideological post-USSR context. Furthermore, the culmination of any concrete rivalry between the two global forces

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awarded key players, in particular those with military prowess, a wider degree of freedom to act in defence of their interests without having to worry about other states. It should also be pointed out that the power gap between the countries, as well as the absence of some kind of equilibrium or competition at all levels did have an impact on established norms of global activities. In addition, a change in the relative strategic importance of countries has been observed, and so has the approach of key actors vis-à-vis these countries.

There seemed to be a number of positive and negative impacts on some countries as a result of these shifts; however, countries that were supposed to be allies to the Soviet Union felt the latter’s fate more painfully. Libya was undoubtedly no exception because of the unfriendly approach and poor previous relations with the West (Interview, Anon, 2010).

The early jubilation about the drawing down of the Cold War was strengthened by the allied coalition’s spectacular success in the Gulf War in 1991, which had been set up by the endeavours and activities of the White House in resorting to the United Nations and using the organisation to meet its own interests in the region (Boaz and Crane, 1993). There was a general consensus that the collapse of the Soviet hemisphere nurtured, somewhat, a feeling of triumphalism in the Western bloc over its Eastern counterpart (Zubok, 2001). In the meantime, the Gulf War generated unrealistic prospects about the likelihood of a United Nations-based, American-led interstate security system to preserve the peace in the post-Cold War period. Nonetheless, not long after the Gulf War, the idea of a new world order was soon abandoned by the decision makers and was replaced by the much more hard-hitting reality in the Balkans, the newly formed East European states, Somalia, and other parts of the world (Ismael., Ismael, 1994; Litwak., Litwak, 2000; and Addicott, 2004).

One of the most serious challenges to the new world order originates from what former American President Clinton referred to as rogue states which constitute a major threat to
regional and global stability all over the world (Hyland, 1999). Litwak (2000) also showed that during the administration of President Bush there was a constant reference to the growing threats posed by renegade regimes, with the most conspicuous enunciation of the emerging rogue states policy have already been produced by Clinton’s National Security Consultant, Anthony Clarke. The latter claimed that being the only global force, the United States had a certain duty for setting up a policy to counter balance, contain, and by applying force, may ultimately change these renegade states into being useful members of the global community (Lake, 1994, p. 46). The majority of these states with their totalitarian approaches, aggressive noncompliant behaviour, and persistent incapability to engage positively with the outside world, as well as their ongoing quest to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proved their willingness to stay on the wrong side of history. By effectively ensuring that the Soviets had little strategic impact by the end of the Cold War, the Americans now had to contend with the less haunting prospect of containing the uprisings of these rogue states (Lieber, 2002).

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the rogue state challenge did not emanate from such a power as Nazi Germany or Stalin’s Soviet Union looking to remodel or capsize the prevailing global order. Instead, as suggested by Litwak (2000), it comes from an unrelated and incoherent group of isolated countries, including North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya, which were considered a danger to the stability of Western powers and their interests all over the world, even though they possessed minimal obvious strategic impact. The fear was not just of Libya obtaining WMD, but also of which other actors Libya might share them with if they were successfully developed.

The White House’s initial efforts to communicate such an idea in the aftermath of the Cold War came at the same time as the eruption of conflict in the Gulf region. The State of the Union Address in 1991, delivered by President Bush, proclaimed that what was in danger was more than one tiny state. Rather, it was the great idea of the New World Order, involving different
countries that are brought together to serve one common issue and to fulfil the universal ambitions of all people. As such, the globe could embark on such an opportunity to meet the sought-after dream of a new world order, according to which ruthlessness would not be tolerated and violence would be met by collective efforts and resistance. These ideas and arguments were very widely shared across Washington and elite groups within the United States; they were treated much more sceptically in both Europe and the Middle East (Luke, 1992).

In relation to Bush’s beliefs in a new world order, they revealed the prevalent feeling of triumphalism in the Western hemisphere existing in the aftermath of the Cold War. With the unprecedented series of events between 1989 and 1991, including the collapse of the Berlin Wall to the crumbling of the Soviet Union, the moral advantage and universal implementability of the Western approach of political pluralism and market economics seemed to have been confirmed. Even though Bush’s speech did touch on these political feelings, the most remarkable feature of his new world order model was its concern for promoting collective security entrenched in international law (Litwak, 2000). However, the importance of this aspect was less a result of the end of the Cold War than of the White House’s fruitful endeavours in organising a wider global alliance to oust Iraqis from Kuwaiti lands. In reality, this elevated the question of the range to which one could design the contingencies of the post-Cold War period by depending on the Desert Storm lessons and experiences from 1991 (Bennett and Lepgold, 1993).

The immediate reaction of the United Nations to the Iraqi offensive in Kuwait was based on one of the first tenets of international order, which is the illegality of interstate belligerence. Not only did this principle trigger such a response from the United States and other coalition states, but these countries were also largely driven in their support of Kuwait by the concrete and key interests endangered by Iraq’s control of this wealthy oil region. As a result, the Desert
Storm campaign emanated from a basic combination of principle and economic interests in the face of unambiguous violence. The speeches made by Bush could well reflect American uneasiness with an interests-based foreign policy, disposed to highlight the haughty principles for which the war was being declared and on which the White House attempted to start a “new world order” once the war was over (Litwak., Litwak, 2000).

In short, one could easily argue that the focus of the United States’ foreign policy and the new approach moved from seeking to contain the presence of the Soviet Union to regional strategizing aimed at responding to the troubles caused by rogue states. The change of policy pursued by the United States from globalism to regionalism could be noticed in the early years of the Bush administration, with foreign policy makers in Washington slowly willing to take the Soviet Union’s leader Mikhail Gorbachev as a serious political figure when it came to reform, along with the dwindling Soviet threat which had started clearly to retreat (Grenville, 2005).

It can also be argued that the contemporary rogue state category was an offshoot of realist ideas shaping the practice of American foreign policy as it was associated not with the internal establishment or national character of those countries, but rather to three standards of external conduct. First of all, the quest for WMD, which came as a result of the passage of the Cold War into its concluding phase and the dwindling Soviet risk. Secondly, the usage of global terrorism as a tool in the country’s policy. Thirdly, a foreign policy approach that actively sought to impede American partners or significant American aspirations in major strategic regions (Cronin and Ludes, 2004).

According to St John (2002), the immediate policy of the contemporary rogue states originated in the initiation by the State Department of a terrorist list including these countries. In fact, this policy witnessed an intensified American attention to states that endorsed terrorism under
Reagan well before 9/11. Identified in a key talk to the American Bar Association in July 1985 by President Reagan were Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua. These states constituted the alleged outlaw governments by supporting and even sponsoring global terrorism against the interests of the United States (Litwak, 2007). Secretary of State George Shultz, known for his hard-line policy regarding the issue of state-sponsored terrorism, which became a motto for his public diplomacy, claimed “states that support and sponsor terrorist activities have managed to co-opt and manipulate the terrorist phenomenon in pursuit of their own strategic goals. It is not coincident that most acts of terrorism occur in regions of significance to the West” (Shultz, 1984).

Tough action seemed to accompany and support the hard-line American rhetoric, as in the example of Libya in April 1986 when American military aircraft hit strategic targets in Libya in response to the Libyan authorities’ supposed contribution to the terror attack of a Berlin nightclub visited by American armed forces. According to Litwak (2000) and Blum (2003), the White House ascribed the Libyans’ calm approach and lack of activity in the aftermath of their assault on Libya in 1986 to its restraining and deterring policies. Similarly, as argued by interviewee Az-Zentani (2013), because of the American attacks, the Libyan regime had been placed under tight control for a short period of time before resorting to its former activities, which came as a result of reconsidering its ties and loyalty to the Soviets. The 1980s witnessed a shift towards support for external terrorist organisations among these ‘outlaw’ countries. Therefore, the outsiders of the 1970s were replaced by new ones, in particular Qaddafi, whose outlaw position was not ascribed to the intolerable treatment of his own people but to his foreign policy ‘antics’ that placed American interests under constant threat (Litwak, 2000, p. 53).

Consequently, with the emergence of the new world order, the United States was offered a unique position and earned a prominent role on the global stage, making it the sole country on
earth capable of projecting its authority all over the world. As such, the United States has, since 1990, been committed to deciding upon any external threats by using all means possible, even to the extent of exerting pressure on the United Nations to penalise and impose disciplinary actions on all the rogue states.

One should notice how the United Nations has been harnessed by the United States as a means to execute its foreign policy. The United States can be said to have succeeded in abusing the system; thus, the United Nations has been there to serve American interests by enforcing multilateral sanctions against its adversaries, including Libya which was targeted in 1992 as a reaction to the Libyans’ rejection of the requested deportation of two Libyan citizens involved in the 1988 Pan Am terror attack to be tried and sentenced (Crossette, 1998).

One can also argue that the predisposition of the United States to resort to multilateral sanctions against Qaddafi instead of a military action in the post-Cold War period stemmed from a number of reasons, with probably the most significant one being that the American interests were not considered as adequately important to vindicate casualties and high financial outlays. It was Libya’s relative unimportance which saved it from attack, in these estimations. Thus, sanctions might appear to be an alternative and a proportionate reaction to a challenge where the interests under threat were seen as less than vital. Furthermore, multilateral sanctions seemed to have every possibility of enforcing the Libyan regime to make the necessary changes into its broad foreign policy making (Haass, 1998).

It is possible to see Libya as an example of the method (coercive adaptation) that forced a rogue state to adjust its foreign policy for the object of keeping the regime’s grip on power. This was undertaken by yielding to a coordinated counter policy embraced by countries with high global presence. To put it more simply, active sanctions passed with the approval of the UN left Libya with limited choices as to how it reversed its policy with respect to terrorism. Later, this
collective strategy from the global community, especially the Western hemisphere had also been responsible for much of the changed policies of Libya regarding the acquisition of WMD (interview, Anon, 2010 and Schweitzer, 2004). The international alliance against Libya which the US succeeded in forming was also shaped by the disclosure of Libya’s direct association with the assassination of several nationals from different countries (Schweitzer, 2004, p. 3). Direct pressure from outside was certainly a major factor in shaping foreign policy adaptation; however, as this and the following chapter show, these were not the only factors, and the Libyan leadership had some small but significant modicum of choice greater than a determinist structural realist model would have predicted.

It is worth noting that the timing for the allegations against Libya was of certain significance for the White House, especially with the process of disintegration in the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s, as successive European communist governments faced a wave of demonstrations demanding the elimination of the Iron Curtain. Soon, the Berlin Wall collapsed in November 1989, the Cold War was seen to be ending. With this symbolic demolition, a new world emerged, as the Soviet Union disintegrated into separate countries that sought to alienate themselves from the Warsaw Alliance and to move closer to the western model of governance (Matar and Tahbit, 2004).

Furthermore, while encountering several issues inside and outside as a result of the disintegrating Eastern Bloc, the Soviet Union was still one country in 1990. However, due to these issues, which did contribute largely to its economic demise, it was seeking to coexist with the United States in an improved bipolar structure. Accordingly, the Soviets had to concede to the Americans, expecting, in return, to take economic advantage either from the United States or via the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other fiscal organisations heavily dominated by the United States. With that in mind, the Kremlin ignored attempts by the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to trigger another East-West confrontation, which did not materialise in the
end. Indeed, the Soviet Union refused to provide any support to these efforts, thus resisting anything that might have reignited East-West conflict and shaping a new east-west political and economic rapprochement. To signal its cooperation with Washington, Moscow supplied major military data concerning its long-time friends in the Middle East region (Matar and Tahbit, 2004, p. 70).

It is also possible to infer that Libya was considered an easy target by the Americans who seized every opportunity to attach the tag of terror to the country’s name, claiming Libya to be an enemy of the new world order (Interview, Anon, 2010; Hyland, 1999). During the Gulf War, Libya did not condone Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait; however, Qaddafi was very critical of the Desert Storm intervention, and pursued his policy of opposing the efforts made by the United States to start a new peace process in the Middle East. Not only this, but he also condemned the concept of a new world order for offering the United States the opportunity to be the global policeman, which at the time proved to undermine even further any chances of reconciliation with the United States (Interview: Alnafati, 2010). In response, Washington ensured it would have Libya isolated as much as possible in its continued efforts to rally the coalition to challenge the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Boyd-Judson, 2005). Unsurprisingly, the Libyan reaction was to feel victimised by the new world order’s keepers who would force them into the list of rejected states, along with Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba, among others, under the tag of “rogue states” (Matar and Tahbit, 2004).

A turning point in American strategy in the years following the Cold War was the introduction of a more measured but tough foreign policy in terms of proportionality and coercive credibility. When it comes to proportionality, the aim of the White House moved from regime change to the more restricted ends of policy change. Even though the Americans had firstly carried on with the Reagan administration’s secret endeavours to topple Qaddafi, by early 1991, it was not possible to go ahead with the operation, conceding that the Libya despot might have been
able to use such a policy as a publicity stunt (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005/2006; Boyd-Judson, 2005). The move to policy change from regime change had to be communicated and accepted by the Tripoli leadership, but it opened the door in turn to Libyan policy change. The move allowed the Libyan leadership a measure of choice while avoiding outcomes unacceptable to them.

In terms of coercive credibility, this originated from two key sources. As far as the first source was concerned, it was related to the threat of force against the Libyan’s project of WMD expansion; while the second source of coercive credibility referred to the multilateralisation of sanctions that were exemplified in enforcing three resolutions correspondingly (Interview, Anon, 2010). These resolutions started in January 1992 when the UN Security Council agreed on Resolution 731 accusing the Libyan authorities of the Pan Am bombing and demanding Libya to entirely and effectively meet the British and Americans’ demands. Three months after this, and with Libya failing to adhere to Resolution 731, the Security Council approved Resolution 748, which enforced the first in a number of multilateral sanctions against the Libyan authorities.

It should be pointed out that it was the first time in the history of the global fight against the so-called terrorism of rogue states that such a large multilateral and multinational coalition, supported by the United Nations Security Council, managed to dictate their own sanctions against a country publicly condoning terrorism and sponsoring such acts (Schweitzer, 2004). In addition, the Security Council tightened sanctions even further in November 1993 with the passage of Resolution 883 in response to pressure from the Clinton administration (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005/2006).

There are basically three key factors underpinning this change from the restricted multilateral cooperation in the American coercive policy to the broader multilateral cooperation in the
aftermath of the Cold War. To start with, Washington and its major allies shared a common
interest since the victims of the Pan Am bombing did not only include American citizens, but
also many British and some other casualties. Secondly, the primary policy aim was no longer
related to a direct change of regimes, since this stance was not much welcomed by many
European governments. The third factor was the superior prowess of the United States’
leadership in the early 1990s, which stemmed not only from the reputation harvested from the
end of the Cold War, but also the 1991 Gulf War, which if anything created a brief moment
when the US enjoyed genuine unipolar dominance (Huntington, 1999).

On the other hand, there were major difficulties faced by the Libyan authorities with internal
political and economic conditions altering in ways that caused less short-circuiting and a wider
spread of United States coercive behaviour. From an economic point of view, problems starting
in the 1980s spiralled out of control in the early 1990s with world oil prices collapsing,
Qaddafi’s failure to guide economic growth, and the tightened grip of global sanctions taking
their toll on the Libyan economic cycle (O’Sullivan, 2003). In fact, these economic turbulences
led to far more appalling repercussions, especially on overall political stability. In addition,
there was an agitated military reaction, most conspicuous in the obvious existence of a number
of challenges to the Qaddafi regime (Takeyh, 2001). Not only this, Qaddafi also encountered
rising Islamic dissidence and was forced to react to other radical movements, compelling them
into involuntary exile or forcing them underground. With the mid-1990s, further general
economic discontent took place, while the Islamic radical opposition to the regime gathered
momentum (Jentleson and Whytock, 2005/2006).

With reference to the abovementioned events, the changes affecting Libya’s national politics
and economic situation left the Libyan authorities more vulnerable to strong-arm diplomacy.
While the American coercive measures were increasing, the Libyan leader’s ability to fight
back was diminishing; in an explicit reference to the success of combinations of external and
internal pressures in shaping change, colleagues in discussion with Qaddafi argued that the repercussions were starting to undermine Qaddafi’s grip on the country in ways that made him think seriously about foreign policy change.

A brief overview of the historical context of sanctions

According to Gebril (1988), the friendly relations between the Libyan authorities and the Washington administration contributed to well-maintained interests of both countries for the first few years following Libyan independence in 1951. During that period, the United States had established air bases, which they managed to instate in return for much-needed financial support for the King of Libya in the aftermath of the Second World War. Additionally, once oil was discovered in Libya in 1959, several American firms hastened to the lead a primary role in the development of the country’s oil sector, which soon reached the number five position as one of the largest producers of oil in OPEC towards the late 1960s. As such, the interest-based ties bringing Tripoli and Washington closer encouraged the White House to reserve immediate judgment with the youthful leader Muammar Qaddafi coming to power by a military coup d’état in 1969.

Soon after the coup and during his early years in power, the new Libyan leader avoided any antagonising acts against the United States. Even though the Libyan regime requested that the United States surrender Wheelus Air Force Base in 1970, as had been arranged, and made several American and other non-Libyan oil interests nationalised in 1973, there was a muted response from the American officials, as they initially expected that the newly established regime would still spurn the Soviet presence in the region (Alikhani, 1995).

However, this tentative accord was soon replaced by antagonism as Libyan actions were constantly more in disagreement with American interests. There were growing concerns about Libyan support for terrorism, especially after claims that the Libyans had been involved in both
the assassination of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Olympics in Munich, as well as the 1973 murder of the American diplomat in Khartoum. Alarm bells grew even louder when Qaddafi offered his support for resistance fighters in Palestine and to the Irish Republican Army with Libyan oil money. What was striking about Qaddafi was his outrageous defiance when expressing his rejection of any peace efforts with Israel. Thus, all Qaddafi’s resources and vocal skills were employed against American endeavours to ease the Camp David Accord, in particular, and to support an Arab-Israeli peace process in general (O’Sullivan, 2003).

As a result of Qaddafi’s increasing radicalism and closer ties with the Eastern Bloc, the Libyan regime became a prime target of the Reagan administration once the Republicans came to power in January 1981. Eager to exhibit American strength following the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Iranian uprising and its aftermath, the Reagan administration was in favour of a more militant tactic toward Libya as an effective approach of establishing American command and the protection of key American interests in the Mediterranean region and elsewhere (Tanter, 1999).

As stated by Shalom (1993), in order to confirm such an approach, the Washington administration under the leadership of Reagan was unwavering and ruthless in its pursuit of reinstating the American reputation. In so doing, it was only appropriate that an enemy would be created and presented as a loathsome figure to the American population to be finally defeated in a restricted military campaign without infuriating the Soviet Union. In Libya, the American administration seemed to find their target; however, an issue then arose. Even though the Americans did not favour Qaddafi that much, they were not essentially proponents of military intervention. Therefore, support for such military action had to be gained through the provocation of Qaddafi to be involved in some terrorist activity (Interview: Dorda, 2010). In fact, President Reagan was adamant from his early days in the White House to do just that. For example, in August 1981, the American naval fleet and air force were sent into Libyan
international waters and airspace, which Washington justified by stating that it was simply proclaiming its right to utilise international waters and that the ensuing confrontation with Libyan planes was completely unintentional and unanticipated (Shalom, 1993; Stumpf, 1986).

The closure of the Libyan People’s Bureau in Washington in May 1981 was the first decision taken by the new American administration to set the stage for the following political and military escalation. The closure was justified by American claims that Libya was sponsoring global terrorism and subverting regional governments. Breaking of diplomatic ties was soon followed by the restriction of informal communication; and as a reaction to accusations that Libya had deployed secret agents abroad to murder senior American diplomats, Washington placed a ban on any business or leisure visits of American nationals to Libya and called on Americans residing in Libya to take the necessary precautions and depart the country (Davis, 1990).

Once in office, the Reagan administration soon started a secret programme to support Libyan political refugees in their attempt to intensify pressure on the Libyan regime. In so doing, the United States aimed to restrict Qaddafi’s intervention in Chad and to provide support for the Chadian regime against their neighbours’ military invasion. There was an allegedly greater momentum for these American covert activities after a CIA report had been released in June 1984 in which it was determined that only by ousting Qaddafi would the United States be able to restrain Qaddafi’s hostility and the danger he posed to American key interests in the region (O’Sullivan, 2003).

In addition to military pressure, economic sanctions were slowly introduced into the list of American procedures against the Libyan regime. Ever since the late 1970s, Libya had been placed by the United States on the latter’s list of states promoting terrorist activities. Some of the economic sanctions included a number of automatic penalties, such as controls on military
sales of dual-use items. Also, the Americans expressed their opposition to loans from international financial organisations to Qaddafi, in addition to a ban on most types of American bilateral aid (O’Sullivan, 2003, p. 176). It is worth pointing out that these penalties capitalised on other constraints on the purchase of military weaponries and aircraft that had been in place well before the United States placed Libya on the threat list of countries supporting global terrorism, showing how much United States national legislation could impact international markets (Niblock, 2001).

In his attempt to demonise Libya as a state supporting terrorism, the American President Reagan introduced another list of restrictions on Libya in March 1982 with the imposition of a ban on imports of Libyan crude oil. Such a step supplemented the tightened sanctions on American exports to Libya, thus banning Qaddafi from purchasing sophisticated oil and gas technologies and equipment that he could not easily find elsewhere (Alikhani, 1995).

As for the deadly assaults at the Rome and Vienna airports in the final days of 1985, these added to a further acceleration of American actions against the Libyan regime. Once these terrorist attacks in January 1986 were linked to Libya, President Reagan appealed to the global community and the Emergency Economic forces to end the majority of the remaining economic exchanges between Washington and the Libyan regime. What followed was that the newly-implemented commands had all Libyan overseas assets in the United States frozen. This in fact terminated practically all exports and imports between the two countries, for not only did it ban all loans and credits to the Libyan regime, but also placed an embargo on all other financial activities between American nationals and Libya (O’Sullivan, 2003).

In the following months, the United States negotiated a deal that basically halted, for three years, the assets of the five American oil firms based in Libya at that time in a reaction to appeals from these oil companies and on the understanding that their instant departure would
represent a victory to the Libya officials (Hufbauer et al., 2007). Specifically, the Washington administration reviewed the restrictions to permit oil firms to carry on with their activities in Libya on a provisional basis to evade loss of contracts or concessions that could lead to a considerable economic turnover for the Libyan regime. The new ruling specified that crude oil could be sold at Libyan ports; however, drilling, mining, supplying, or marketing Libyan oil would still be banned. Moreover, it was also expected that firms should discard their Libyan assets as soon as feasible on reasonable and suitable terms (Saleh, 2003).

To a certain extent, the Reagan administration made it a strategic policy to react to the Rome and Vienna airport attacks by imposing economic sanctions rather than opting to use its military prowess given its uncertainty that military raids would be enough to deter the regime, or even be able to target the intended strategic spots in Libya (Davis, 1990). However, more interestingly, the administration did not perceive these sanctions to be the right alternative for military initiatives, but instead it saw in them a means to more influential procedures. On the one hand, Reagan used these sanctions as a pre-warning for ensuing actions and in rallying multilateral support for economic sanctions against Qaddafi. Similarly, efforts to thwart economic collaboration and to demand that American citizens should leave Libya were deemed as essential preconditions to the enforcement of military intervention on the other (Hawley, 1986).

However, the reaction of the European countries was not to the liking of the American administration, as they generally rejected American requests to follow in their footsteps by enforcing sanctions on Libya. Despite Libya’s radical behaviour, a majority of countries in Western Europe did not raise any alarm bells and abstained from using collective actions that far exceeded an arms ban. The British, who had cut diplomatic ties with Libya in 1984 after the assassination of an English policewomen outside the Libyan diplomatic mission in London, were themselves unwilling to restrict economic relations with Qaddafi (O’Sullivan, 2003).
Another terrorist assault was also linked to the Libyan regime with the United States accusing Libya of plotting the bombing of a disco in West Berlin, where several American soldiers used to spend their nights out. It was only a matter of time before increasing tensions and sporadic clashes between Libya and the United States’ military in the waters of the Gulf of Sidra during the spring of 1986 finally gave way to air strikes on Tripoli as well as outside Benghazi in April 1986 (Schumacher, 1986-1987).

While aiming to demolish military airstrips, garrisons and alleged terrorist training sites, the raids could have in fact been targeting the Libyan leader at the very least, and were geared towards inflicting as much physical and psychological damage to the Libyan regime as possible (Interview: Az-Zentani, 2013). Even though these strikes did not succeed in deposing the Libyan leader, they at least demonstrated how serious the Americans were about dealing with Qaddafi and other countries harbouring or promoting acts of terrorism (Schumacher, 1986-1987).

According to one interview (Interview: Dorda, 2010), these fierce reactions and provocative approaches resulted in Qaddafi’s adoption of more terrorist activities as a clear and overt policy. This also coincided with his earlier more passive backing and infrequent words of sympathy for radical Arabs so that he could hit back at his own adversary. That refutes United States claims that terrorism had been Qaddafi’s explicit strategy in the era preceding those events. The United States acted in response to its own image of Qaddafi’s policy rather than to what he was actually planning. But if this was a fault on the US side, it is fair to add immediately that United States policy makers were persuaded first of all by Qaddafi’s own rhetoric; but the Libyan policy was nearly always much less antagonistic than that rhetoric.

It could be said that Libya’s extremist approaches seemed to be on the decline by the end of the 1980s, which could be ascribed to the frailties of its Eastern partners, in particular the Soviet
Union, with the latter beginning the restructuring of “the perestroika”, which proved to be a defining moment in Libyan foreign policy making (Interview: Az-Zentani, 2013).

Reviewing the domestic situation, Qaddafi requested better human rights conditions and authorised more private economic enterprises, notwithstanding these demands did not bring about fundamental changes to the Libyan system. However, from a regional point of view, improved relations with Egypt paved the way for more collaboration with Libya’s North African neighbours (O’Sullivan, 2003).

In addition to these actions, Qaddafi declared that Libya would no longer support radical movements and causes, which caused several critics to trust that Libya would soon assume a more respected role in the global community. Even though these changes did not lead to reconciliation with the United States, they still contributed to a reassessment of the American administration’s approach to the Libyan case (O’Sullivan, p. 180).

On the basis of Qaddafi’s change of policy along with the demise of the Soviet Union, which was followed by its weak influence on its allies, may have spurred the Reagan administration to adopt an isolationist approach toward Qaddafi, rather than trying to oust him (Rose, 1998). In fact, the subsequent George W. Bush administration adopted a similar, less aggressive approach that kept sustained pressure on Libya through rhetoric aimed at discrediting Qaddafi and boycotting Libyan companies allegedly linked to his ruling party (Spiers, 1994).

Libya’s promising initiatives to regain its international standing did not last long with fresh evidence being produced connecting Libya to the 1988 explosion of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, as well as the 1989 explosion of French airliner UTA flight 722 over Niger. Two years later in October 1991, a French judge ruled that four Libyan Intelligence officers, allegedly implicated in the UTA bombing, should be arrested. Within a few weeks, the United States and Britain pointed fingers to two Libyan security officers; namely Abdel
Basset al-Megrahi and al-Amine Fahima, for their suspected participation in the Lockerbie assault. As such, the Americans, British and French mutually demanded that Libya should hand to justice all those accused of the crimes and to cooperate with all imminent inquiries (Plachta, 2001).

These fast-paced events started to tighten again on Libya; however, this time the tightening process took place via the United Nations Security Council resolutions, which were heavily influenced by the United States being the dominating force in the organisation. As suggested by Interview: At-Talhi (2010), Interview: Dorda (2010), Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010), Interview: Al-Hafi (2010), Interview: Alnafati (2010), Interview: Kuti (2010), and Interview: Az-Zentani (2013), there would have never been any sanctions forced on Libya had the international order not been transformed. Therefore, the absence of the former Soviet Union, particularly in contrast to when it was in its heyday, could have been the key factor inspiring the placement of international restrictions on Libya. As a result, it was not much of an issue for the Washington administration to gather international momentum for more international economic and political pressure on Qaddafi (Interview, Anon, 2010).

Three resolutions were also passed by the United Nations Security Council between January and March 1992 and again in November 1993, with the first urging the regime in Libya to collaborate with the United States, the United Kingdom and France in their inquiries into the Lockerbie and the UTA bombings. The second went even further to impose air, weapons and ambassadorial restrictions on Qaddafi’s regime. Finally, the third set of sanctions involved some toughened restrictions aimed at the Libyan oil sector and the industry’s much sought after hard currency revenues.
**UN Sanctions against Libya**

On 30 December 1988, the Lockerbie incident was included in the Security Council’s schedule with a declaration by the Council’s president criticising the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing. Two Libyan officials were identified by Western Intelligence in 1990 as primary suspects in planting the bomb. This was followed by an American and British campaign to launch a legal trial of the two and to establish if others were also involved. So as to pressurise Qaddafi into collaborating, the UN Security Council passed two resolutions enforcing restrictions against the Libyan regime; the first one was Resolution No 748 issued in March 1992 and the second one was Resolution No 883 issued in November 1993. There was an earlier resolution (No 731) which stood as the background to these resolutions by setting out the changes in policy that Libya was expected to deliver. With Qaddafi not concerned with this first resolution, it was only natural that the United States would proceed with the imposition of sanctions. As noted in Resolution 731, four demands were first implied over two statements made by the United States, United Kingdom and France in November 1991, who later pressed hard to enforce Resolution No’s 748 and 883 respectively.

The abovementioned demands stipulated that the Libyan authorities would hand over for trial all those accused of the bombing incidents and admit total responsibility for the acts of Libyan suspects by revealing all the facts related to these crimes, such as the names of those accountable, along with the release of documents, and other material evidence, as well as allowing access to witnesses. The Libyan regime should also pay applicable reimbursements to the victims and commit to terminating all terrorist activities and practices in support of terrorist movements. While the first three requests were enclosed in a mutual American and British statement, the fourth was included in a statement by the three countries; namely the United States, United Kingdom and France (Hurd, 2005).
It is worth pointing out that the three resolutions of the Council did not specify these demands; however, a reference was made to the two statements followed by an expression in Resolution No 731 that it strongly condemns how the Libyan authorities had not yet reacted positively to the named requests to collaborate in full. Upon that, it was determined in Resolution No 748 that Libya’s continuous lack of attention and failure to fully and efficiently cooperate with the requests represented a danger to global peace and security efforts.

According to Resolution No 748, the sanctions imposed by the West banned air travel to or from Libya and placed an embargo on arms sales to Libya. A request was made to other regimes and world-wide businesses to decrease the volume of Libyan diplomatic representation. Not only that, Resolution No 883 ordered the freezing of some Libyan assets overseas and stopped the provision of oil technological support with Libya (Alikhani, 1995).

Indeed, the imposed sanctions incurred significant costs to both the Libyan regime and the local population, and had a massive influence on the position and reputation of the Qaddafi administration and his foreign policy with friends and rivals alike (Niblock, 2001). In response to such a dilemma, there seemed to be a tendency towards more reconciliatory efforts with Western countries, which thus led to a change in the principles of the Libyan foreign policy. As stated by Interview: Dorda (2010), the major theme of Libyan foreign policy during those years, especially as it had no support from the former Soviet Union, was to eliminate the restrictions and to resume more regular ties with the key Western forces. Given the severity of the sanctions and their magnitude on the Libyan population in particular, the Libyan policymakers were presumably compelled to acclimatise their foreign policy to be in keeping with the emerging global order. The interview evidence also shows how far this was achieved through an evolutionary process in Tripoli shaped by a series of sharp disagreements within the policy elite.
What begs the question regarding the imposition of the UN restrictions against the Libyan regime is in what sense the Lockerbie case was different from the other previous incidents. On numerous occasions before the Lockerby incident, the United States had requested other European and non-European allies to collaborate on anti-Libyan decisions; but why did they only respond on this occasion?

There were as many as six factors that crucially contributed to such a change of heart. First of all, with the end of the Cold War, it was much easier for the United States to dominate the United Nations Security Council and use it for its own interests, which was only possible with the collapse of the Soviet Union (Interview: Dada, 2010). Second, in terms of the magnitude of the attacks, the Lockerbie and UTA attacks were thought to be much greater than the preceding incidents involving Libya, with more than 400 people murdered instantly. This generated an enormous sense of popular indignation in Western public and a real community demanding compensation. The third factor was related to the victims themselves, involving a large number of British and French people, along with Americans, ensuring that these countries would cooperate with the United States in safeguarding a reaction of some sort to the bombings. Fourth, there was ample evidence of Libyan implication in these incidents, which proved more lethal than was the case for the previous Libyan terrorist assaults. The fifth reason could be ascribed to the American involvement in military operation in the Gulf War crisis, which the Europeans deemed imminent if they did not agree to the sanctions. Thus, their agreement to such sanctions may have been perceived as an alternative to a military escalation of events (Rose, 1998).

Finally, the late 1980s and early 1990s witnessed the fall of the Soviet hemisphere, the Gulf War, and some headway in the Middle East peace talks, which all but increased the isolation of the Arab rejectionist forces from the global scene and even at the regional level. As such, collective efforts against Libya seemed less contentious than it would have been not a long
time before then. Libya was more isolated, and more vulnerable, and her policy elites were acutely aware of this.

However, the abovementioned UN sanctions were adopted as countries involved sought to produce some practical measures to show their outrage, despite the fact that the European countries consuming Libyan oil were not in favour of more rigorous actions which would have had severe repercussions but equally higher financial overheads (Rose, 1998, p. 139).

An interesting point to raise is related to why the United States decided to follow a multilateral economic policy in the Lockerbie bombing rather than the expected unilateral military reaction adopted in 1986. In fact, the timing of the Lockerbie and UTA revelations had such an impact. Interestingly, the decisive links between Libya and the bombings appeared several years from the initial tragedies. Public passions had then cooled considerably with the attacks losing their urgency. According to Haass (1998), if these links had been established in the immediate aftermath of the bombings, a military reaction could have well ensued. In addition, in late 1991, Washington was very imposing in the Middle East, retaining its full backing for the repression and seclusion of Iraq, as well as guiding the developing Arab-Israeli peace talks. In the eyes of American officials, these were deemed as more immediate concerns than carrying out raids on Libya and decided not to risk straining the circuits of the Arab region by launching another war on the Libyan regime (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010).

**The Libyan response to the Sanctions**

With regards to Libyan foreign relations since the imposition of the sanctions, there were rigorous efforts to appeal to established global practices and associate them with the Libyan regime in pursuit of rendering the sanctions illegitimate in the view of leading countries and organisations. According to Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010), the Libyan regime sought to diminish the appeal of sanctions to other countries by means of rhetorical speeches, critiquing the
Council’s stance to be non-representative of the international spirit at large or the community’s stated beliefs.

It is worth pointing that Qaddafi did not claim that the Council’s decisions against him were inappropriate or trivial, or that the organisation itself was unlawful or should be overlooked. On the contrary, the Libyan leader adopted the language of liberal internationalism to offer a different justification of every legitimising claim by the Americans and the British, attempting to weaken the tendency of several countries to agree by default on the explanation offered by these two key players (Hurd, 2008).

Furthermore, Libya’s strategy throughout the period ensuing the early sanctions imposed by the United Nations in 1992 was to persist within the context of a proposal Libya had put forward prior to the sanctions. As stated by Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010), Libya continued to show its keenness to identify an approach that would allow a judicial investigation into the lawsuits against the two Libyan agents allegedly involved in the Lockerbie terror attack but emphasised that it should be in keeping with Libyan and international law and the suspects would not be sentenced in British or American courts.

The offers were further discussed in detail in February 1994, which could be due to the pressure of the sanctions. As suggested by the Libyan delegate to the Arab League, the accused should stand trial at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague under Scottish law in front of a panel of Scottish juries. He also highlighted that as shown in this proposal Libya was not seeking to avert the course of justice but rather was keen on a judicial process that valued sovereignty, one that had no political dimension (Niblock, 2001).

To persuade the global community of the integrity of its case and to avert the sanctions, a three-level campaign was carried out by the Libyan regime; first, it attempted to directly convince the Western countries to behave differently; second, it challenged the sanctions in international
courts; and finally, it strived hard to rally the support of countries in Africa and in the Arab world (Interview: Al-Obeidi 2010).

The focus of the first level was on altering the location and nature of the anticipated hearing of the Lockerbie defendants. Initially, the Libyan leader assumed that by acting in a way that would be well considered by the United States and Britain, the two superpowers might change their positions on the bombing (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010). For this to happen, towards the end of 1991, Britain was informed that the Libyan leader wished to offer his cooperation in terms of passing along information on Libya’s previous links with the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The instant reaction of the British government was to submit a number of queries, including details of the weaponries and financing provided to the IRA, delivery dates, and names of beneficiaries. According to a foreign office spokesman reporting in June 1992, had the Libyans offered satisfactory answers to the queries posed by the British regarding their connections, it could have been seen as a gesture of good will and a practical measure toward adhering to the UN Security Council resolutions. A number of meetings involving senior officers from Libya and Britain, in the presence of a UN Undersecretary–General, were accordingly held in Cairo and Geneva in 1992, which witnessed the submission of such information. As suggested by Niblock (2001), even though the British officials stated their appreciation for the information handed over, by describing it as encouraging and helpful, this did not seem to change their views on sanctions.

Regarding the second level of the campaign, it was mainly directed at the ICJ. With Libya unsuccessful in causing any concrete changes in the British and American stances, it had no other option but to turn to the ICJ in October 1997. In terms of the request of the Libyan lawyers at The Hague on 13 October 1997, they had to ask the ICJ to rule on the basis that Libya, under the 1971 Montreal Convention, was not in any way forced to hand over the two suspects to be sentenced in British or American courts (Schwart, 2007). In fact, the Libyan view on the
convention was that any acts of global terrorism in the sector of aviation could be taken to the
court of the suspect’s mother country (Niblock, 2001). Interview: Al-Hafi (2010), argues that
this interpretation was in reality reinforced by Libyan concerns that the Western countries could
utilise the Lockerbie bombing to gain a political edge in which adversative repercussions were
expected if Libya released the suspects to either the United States or Britain, which were
prompted to strike back against the Libyan leader.

However, on 27 February 1998, the ICJ gave its ruling in favour of Libya, allowing for Libyans
to contest their claim elsewhere, even though the United States and Britain did not approve of
this ruling as a technicality, since in essence the Libyan case was still to be heard (Niblock,
2001). It should be pointed out that this effort to delegitimise the international restrictions was
not successful because of the attempts of the United States and Britain, as well as those who
sought to enforce Libya to yield completely to their own requests (Interview: Dorda, 2010). On
a third level, the campaign attempting to rally Arab and African support witnessed steady
improvement; however, it was more manifest in Africa than in the Arab world (Interview: Al-
Obeidi, 2010; Interview: Dorda, 2010; Interview: At-Talhi, 2010; Interview: Dada, 2010;
Interview: Mansour, 2012; and Interview: Alnafati, 2010). For example, the Organisation of
African Unity (OAU) seemed slower in its support of the Libyan case but eventually offered
its help for Libya, which was far more conspicuous than the Arab League (Interview: Al-Obeidi,
2010). With its Resolutions in 1993 and 1994, the OAU Council offered general solidarity with
Libya; however, it was not precise as to how the issue could be tackled. As for Resolution 1566
adopted by the OAU Council on 27 January 1995, it proposed that the hearing of the two
suspects should be carried out in an impartial country and for the removal of economic
restrictions. Another suggestion was given in June 1997 during the conference of OAU heads
of states and governments, with three key alternatives to end the Lockerbie issue once and for
all. First of all, the two suspects should be tried in a neutral country decided by the UN Security
Council. Second, the trial should be held at the ICJ in line with Scottish law and run by Scottish judges. Third, a dedicated criminal panel should otherwise be launched at the ICJ. More importantly, however, the meeting saw the onset of a clear defiance by the OAU to the sanctions imposed on Libya, which alluded to the likelihood that OAU states might eventually resort to breaking the sanctions one-sidedly. In the meeting, there were calls to remove the sanctions, which were seen to be more as “imperative as the sanctions were having a progressively adverse effect on the people of Libya” (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010). It also advised that “continued imposition of the sanctions might lead African countries to devise other means of sparing the Libyan people future suffering” (Niblock, 2002). For his part, the OAU Secretary General was instructed to organise a useful plan of action (Organisation of African Unity, 4 June 1997).

The implied warning in the 1997 OAU statement was made explicit during the talks of OAU Heads of state and government, which took place on 18 June 1998 and decided that African states would cease applying UN restrictions on Libya unless the British and American governments approved of conducting the hearing in an impartial state (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010). Accordingly, the OAU Council of Ministers agreed at the end of that month that the resolution to cease the implementation of the sanctions would start by the first of September unless the UN Security Council had reacted positively to the neutral country suggestion (Niblock, 2001).

The position of the OAU could well be ascribed to a number of reasons, including the economic issues which had a major role to play in moulding the stance adopted. On the other hand, the Libyan regime had for long supported African liberation activities and the fight of these countries in the face of colonisation. Consequently, the heads of these movements and other activists, such as Robert Mugabe, the President of Zimbabwe, and Nelson Mandela, the President of South Africa, were unsurprisingly grateful for the Libyan support. By the 1990s,
numerous liberation leaders had arrived at the helm in their own countries. Nonetheless, all Libyan efforts to lessen the impacts of the sanctions came to no avail due to the weight and fierceness of these sanctions. As such, Qaddafi was forced to adjust his policies to be in keeping with the new world order in return for reinstatement into the international community (Interview: Dorda, 2010).

**Judging the effectiveness and utility of UN Sanctions on Libya**

For a wide-ranging examination of sanctions on Libya, a number of components need to be taken into account. It is essential to decide the level of damage caused to the Libyan regime, as well as the economic and political effects of these restrictions. Also significant to study is the level to which sanctions achieved the aims sought by politicians and the costs suffered by the United States and others, including Libyans themselves, as a consequence of the adoption of these punitive methods.

**The Economic impact**

As a result of the multidimensional UN sanctions, Libya went through a period of even larger economic downturn. Between 1992 and 1999, the growth of the Libyan economy amounted to only 0.8 per cent per year. Similarly, per capita income deteriorated rapidly and high rates of inflation continued (Vandewalle, 2008). As for commercial restrictions authorised through various UN resolutions, they had more lasting impacts. Even though the UN restrictions only included minor sets of exports to Libya, these losses were more expected to be endured by Libya in full, since the multilateral nature of the UN restrictions held up the regulation of trade arrangements that took place under one-sided sanctions enforced by the United States. Being unable to replace several of the banned items had serious repercussions on at least two sectors of the Libyan economy. On the one hand, the embargo on spare parts for airplane repairs pressed even tighter the aviation sector, as it had already been suffering from the American unilateral sanctions (Cortright and Lopez, 2000); in addition to the significant decrease in air
traffic, shortages of spare parts and the absence of specialised personnel led to a steep decline in this vital industry (O’Sullivan, 2003). On the other hand, the UN restrictions had crippled Libya’s downstream oil industry. For example, the sanctions on exported equipment required for the upkeep of oil refineries and plants, alongside other downstream activities pushed Libya into an exorbitant and wasteful pursuit of substitute parts. In addition, such sanctions deprived Libya of advancing its refineries to generate more gasoline for local consumption. Consequently, Libya was forced to set aside foreign reserves in order to import lighter fuel and to utilise some of its superior crude to produce gasoline rather than jet fuels or any similar substance (Gurney, 1996). In certain cases, Libya purchased the required equipment on the black market, even though it is suggested that Qaddafi was compelled to give at least four times the market rate for these parts (O’Sullivan, 2003).

On top of placing new restrictions on certain industries, UN actions had more widespread effects on the Libyan economy, with probably the most damaging being the indecision disseminated through these sanctions, especially in the first few years. Foreign and Libyan nationals alike observed closely the workings of the Security Council in the hope that the sanctions would be removed or if they would be increased with assessments that the United Nations was conducting every three months (Hindley, 1993). Tenacious Libyan endeavours to find a middle ground over the Lockerbie defendants, fading global cooperation with the UN procedures, and continuous American attempts to rally support for stricter sanctions all deepened the insecurity. Far from living inside an isolated box, the Libyan leadership were very sensitive to these pressures. While restrictions were in full force, people living or employed in Libya were obliged to cope with an inconsistent source of imports and, possibly, an unconfirmed “parallel” account structure, which enabled Libya to carry on with its international commercial activities in the oil sector, despite the freezing of its overseas assets (O’Sullivan, 2003). According to Interview: At-Talhi (2010), these issues were intensified by
concerns that the United States would resort to more unilateralist policies if there was a lack of wider multilateral action. Within an uncertain climate, Libya’s economy was damaged in many ways during the 1990s. Most noticeably, the Libyan currency was weakened and devalued, which in turn caused soaring inflation, since the country depended heavily on imported products for daily consumption including foodstuffs and most technology products. The pressures of inflation were aggravated by mark-ups levied on food and other consumer goods that had to be shipped to Libya by sea or long stretches of roads because of the ban on air travel into the country (O’Sullivan, 2003). The lack of more efficient markets inside the country helped middle-men to profit from these price increases, and in turn added some force to the popular opposition to the regime.

As a result of the sense of insecurity created by economic sanctions, there were direct and indirect financial issues for the Libyan ruling regime, with the population starting to agitate; adding to the woes of Qaddafi who started to lose support from within his own ranks (Interview: Dorda, 2010). Uncertain of whether or when UN restrictions would be increased, Tripoli sacrificed excessive resources to produce a wide array of reserves and assets to be depended on in case an oil export ban or other extra restrictions were imposed (O’Sullivan, 2003). This storing further restricted access to capital by freezing domestic supplied and weakening Libya’s ability to meet the daily needs of businesses large and small.

Even though UN resolutions imposed no constraints on multinational businesses operating in Libya, the indecision and uncertainty produced by the restrictions led to a hostile atmosphere for investing firms even beyond the practical complications they had to contend with as a result of the UN air travel embargo. The absence of global interest in contributing to the Libyan economy, unless it was related to the energy sector, could not only be ascribed to the these restrictions: the Libyan authorities had their own controls in place on such business ventures and there was a lack of international interest even before the UN resolutions were passed. The
increasing unwillingness of international companies to invest in Libya while it was undergoing UN embargoes was seemingly due to the higher costs for international businesses operating in the country. Sanctions also had a constraining effect on international investment in the energy sectors in the 1990s, even though there was some, mainly European investment, in its oil sector and to a much lesser degree, in gas. Even though they did not seriously affect the size of investment in the country’s energy industry, sanctions did have an impact on the type of overseas contribution into it, and over time the quality of capital declined leaving a significant need for new investment after 2003 (O’Sullivan, 2003, p. 200).

The Political impact

There were significant political impacts of the sanctions on Libya, particularly with these UN restrictions coinciding with the American measures already tightening the grip on the country. Similar to the economic impacts, the political effects were intensified by other factors to put momentous pressure on the Libyan leader. Most importantly, American and later UN restrictions strengthened international suspicion of the Libyan regime and contributed to the isolation of Qaddafi, restricting his influence globally and regionally. As for the other factors, such as the adoption of other policy tools and Qaddafi’s own antics, they also helped in Libya’s overall demise. Consequently, the Libyan head of state, a leader who had once aspired to a role far exceeding the day-to-day routines of managing the country, and who sought a far more prominent role in international politics, suddenly found himself politically on the sidelines (Lebovic, 2007). This contributed to a shift in his leadership role where Qaddafi found himself having to rely more on his close advisors and on discussions through the United Nations (Interview: Dorda, 2010).

It is possible to note that the political sidelining that sanctions placed on the regime appeared all the more hard to swallow, as it contributed to deepening the gap between Libya and much of the Arab region in the 1990s. Qaddafi’s ferocious objection to the Middle East peace talks
for much of the decade as opposed to increasing Arab support for it could be seen as strong factors for this widened gap. Multiplying Libya’s global political distancing was the physical inaccessibility of the country, as a result of the cut-off of air links between Libya and the countries flying to and from its territories (Otman, 2007). However, sanctions reshaped Libya’s strategic choices in subtler ways, with the country politically reorienting away from the Arab world toward the African region over much of the 1990s (Interview: Dada, 2010). Perceiving himself as a great Arab leader and an heir of Nasser’s image, Qaddafi was immensely disenchanted by the reluctance of the Arab League or individual Arab countries to disregard the UN restrictions against him or to attempt to lend a supporting hand (Interview: Alnafati, 2010).

On the other hand, African leaders stood side by side with Libya and offered their help where and when possible, which made Qaddafi change his mind about the long term obsession of a United Arab world and instead promoted a new vision of a “United States of Africa” (Huliaras, 2001).

The local environment in which the Qaddafi regime functioned was also shaped by the UN restrictions. Remarkably, the sanctions did not cause a persevering “rally around the flag” reaction in Libya. Even though the Libyan leader had some restricted achievement in representing Libya as a target of international hostility and in ascribing the problems of the country to the sanctions, these attempts had fading effects over time. As he had never achieved the prevalent support of Libyans or effectively rallied them to endorse his fundamental programmes and ideas, Qaddafi did not possess the political validity that could have enthused an upsurge of sympathy when he was apparently under Western threats (O’Sullivan, 2003). On the contrary, restrictions helped diminish a significant pillar on which Qaddafi’s regime was underpinned; namely economic welfare. Over the years, a compact had steadily been formed by the Libyan regime and its citizens since Qaddafi ascended to power towards the end of the
1960s. As the Libyan leader was mostly under no threat domestically in pursuing his radical programmes, the majority of Libyans expected the kind of income to have a reasonably contented and affluent lifestyle (Takeyh, 2000).

De Bona (2013) noted that the economic effect of sanctions combined with other aspects, such as Libya’s expanding population and the dwindling oil market, affected the regime’s capability to respond to the long-standing needs of the Libyan people for economic stability, as well as industry’s urgent need for investment and the re-equipping of worn-out capital.

With Libya’s economic situation hitting its lowest in the period of the sanctions, there were simultaneously rising political challenges to Qaddafi’s reign (Interview: Dorda, 2010). For example, dissatisfaction within the Libyan military ranks grew as a result of the economic decline, poor expertise, and the disgrace of the below-par intervention in neighbouring Chad (Zoubir, 1999). In addition, the military unrest in 1993 seriously endangered Qaddafi’s reign and necessitated a severe response to suppress. The Qaddafi’s regime was also threatened by Islamic mutinous activities that were not only under the influence of Islamic groups in Egypt and Algeria but also driven by the economic crunch.

It could be seen that the numerous sanctions endorsed against Libya were in place so as to fulfil a number of objectives either on behalf of the United Nations, or more discreetly for the sake of the United States. On several fronts, headway toward attaining these several aims is noteworthy. The effect of the restrictions along with the impacts of other local and global influences forced Qaddafi’s regime to acclimatise its foreign policy to be in keeping with the new international order as visualised by Washington in a clear reference to the coercive policy of the new world order (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010; Interview: Dorda, 2010; Interview: Az-Zentani, 2013; and Interview: At-Talhi, 2010).
There were two factors which had an enormous contribution on weakening the Qaddafi regime; first of all, the economic and political effects of sanctions strengthened independent domestic and international tendencies. As a consequence, sanctions amplified pre-existing issues rather than working against external trends and influences. For example, United States sanctions strengthened independent global views that Libya was a high risk venture, magnifying the unwillingness of multinational firms to invest in the country. Likewise, in an already perilous national political setting, the force of sanctions proved far too heavy for the regime to take.

The second factor is related to the multilateral nature of UN sanctions, which contributed much to the effective isolation of Libya for several years, not only at an economic level, but also at a military and political one. However, this multilateral exploit was never accomplished instantly as the United States put in huge efforts during the 1980s to ensure the collaboration of other countries in exerting similar pressures on Libya using economic restrictions. America managed to secure only a few multilateral supporters for its sanctions strategy during that decade, while in the 1990s, attempts to galvanise international support for curtailing steps against Libya seemed much more fruitful, with the eventual UN sanctions against the Libyan regime.

The procedures pursued by the United States after naming the Libyan suspects accused of the Lockerbie bombing were taken more positively by America’s friends. Rather than meeting the Libyan leader’s arrogance with military force, the American officials followed multilateral action through the UN. Even though the Lockerbie case entailed real disadvantages from a legal point of view, it did enable the achievement and preservation of a large global alliance (Rose, 1998). In search for a coalition for UN sanctions, it was important to bring American aims at least those explicit ones in keeping with the global views by concentrating closely on the resolution of the Lockerbie and UTA bombings and putting an end to the Libyan endorsement of terrorism. The anti-terrorism aspects of the resolution could be seen as another factor for paving the way to UN action (Rosen, 1992).
It is finally worth pointing to the significant contribution of Britain in fashioning the UN actions against Libya, which was critical in indicating to other countries that these endeavours signified an international urge to place sanctions, rather than a solo effort by the Americans.

Lastly, the directed nature of the UN sanctions ultimately decided that even if the actions were not warmly received by the United States, they still helped to ensure international backing, with many countries looking at them as more in keeping with the goals being set forth. Also, the limited scope of the sanctions also restricted the economic costs that the majority of countries were obliged to suffer as a result of their implementation, thus increasing the possibility of adherence. In addition, targeted sanctions constrained the philanthropic effect of UN actions, a factor that was extremely significant in preserving support for UN sanctions for a long time (O’Sullivan, 2003).

To the contrary, Calabrese (2004) argues that the impacts of American unilateral measures against Libya were less influenced to gain the success that Washington sought in terms of forcing Libya to cease its dissident conduct, end its support for global terrorism, and stop any procedures to develop WMD.

With respect to the rehabilitative impacts of the American sanctions, no significant changes in Libya’s conduct were observed, especially as it managed to purchase from other non-sanctioning countries. Similarly, seeking to implement a repression policy on Libya has inspired a resistance effort with Tripoli succeeding in drawing foreign ventures that have reinforced the regime. Furthermore, the antagonism between the two countries had stimulated and guided the Libyan leader to oppose any change in the Libyan foreign policy, which could be attributed to the American pressures.

In relation to the Libyan experience with either unilateral or multilateral sanctions, a number of inferences can be made in order to make these sanctions effective. First of all, the sanctions
would be effective in setting Libya as an example for other rogue states in the process of mutiny or about to show aggressive behaviour; nevertheless, these sanctions should draw the support of as many countries as possible and under the auspices of the UN (Calabrese, 2004, p.6).

Second, when corrective actions are adopted to set the scene for behavioural change in rogue states, these activities may need a state that had no superpower ally in order to gain the accord of the international community on the one hand, and lengthy periods of time for the sanctions to be effective on the other. Finally, not only may punitive action result in constructive behaviour change by rogue states, but also, and more importantly, the provision of suitable conditions, alongside a prudently designed engagement policy, in conjunction with pressure and disciplinary measures can achieve behaviour change.

Based on the above, it could be inferred that the accumulative impact of the American and the UN measures were to set the scene for Libyan behaviour change; however, the multilateral sanctions were much more successful than the unilateral ones in achieving this objective. As a result, Libya was compelled to take actionable steps to show a change in its policy with regards to both terrorism and WMD, which eventually brought about the desirable outcomes in Libyan foreign policy trends, which will be discussed in detail in the forthcoming chapter.
Chapter Six: New orientations in Libyan foreign policy: the acquiescent adaptation.

Following the dramatic developments in the international system during the early 1990s, with the Cold War coming to an end, many were left to ponder on whether the Cold War period had any influence on policies, such as deterrence, compellence, and engagement and their viability against any emerging threats. Considering that these policies are viable, how could they be then utilised to deal with the most imminent and pressing issues, such terrorism, pariah states, and weapons of mass destruction? As such, this chapter will focus on determining the potentiality of a successful application of a behaviour modification policy on pariah states. This analysis will shed light on the American efforts to pressurise Libya into stopping its funding and support of both international terrorism and the production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by examining the American influence strategy necessarily joint, at least, compellence (trying to stop an action under way) and deterrence (trying to prevent future action).

Even though the sanctions had been put in place in the early 1990s, the adaptation of Libyan foreign policy which had initially been formulated only began to be implemented towards the end of the 1990s, due to Libya's firm intentions to commit to a negotiation process that would essentially take into account the protected interests of the ruling regime (Interview, Anon, 2010). As such, and while negotiating, the Libyan officials were in pursuit of guarantees that the regime would remain intact even if policies were to change; meanwhile, it was equally important to restore the Libyan image and to some extent its influence on the regional stage (Interview: Kuti, 2010; Interview: At-Talhi, 2010; and Jentleson & Whytock 2005-2006). Although apparently quite tightly constrained, the government had choices and opportunities as well as constraints. It also had choice of modalities and options as to how it presented its policies and practices internally and internationally.
According to Pargeter (2006), there soon emerged a number of changes in Libya’s foreign policy, more specifically with regards to the West, which revitalised the regime’s efforts to tackle thorny issues thwarting the amelioration of ties with the Americans and the British. However the interview evidence contradicts this view. The key members of Libya’s foreign policy elite were aware of the increasing fragility of the USSR in 1987-8. They were all the same surprised by the collapse of the Eastern European balance in 1989, but it then became possible to envisage the transformation of the Soviet system, or at least a dramatic decline in Russian power. The transformation of the USSR into the smaller, more divided and weaker Russian federation in 1991 did not seem to come as a great surprise to the Libyan elite by then. But the members of the foreign policy making group were not prepared to do more than speculate about their own possible policy changes. They did not hang on hoping the USSR would be able to bail them out regardless of whatever happened. They knew they were not that important or that trusted in Moscow. But they waited for Qaddafi himself to initiate a redirection of policy and then followed his lead with a certain well prepared vigour, or so interview evidence from a number of key figures suggests. Of course, on this evidence one must be cautious. The interviewees have a measure of self-interest in presenting the evolution of Libyan policy in this light. But this is a consistent picture which fits some other evidence., and the interviewees were independent of each other and interviewed at different times and the remarks tend to point in the same direction. As a result, when Libyan official policy started to change, it was possible to move relatively quickly not only because dictatorships can sometimes transform foreign policy more easily than more accountable governments, but also because the policy positions which formed the detail of the changes had been well prepared. Libyan foreign policy, as this thesis has argued several times, may have seemed arbitrary, and it might often have been cruel or unwilling to compromise. But it was not irrational and it was
not incapable of learning from the steady application of pressure from a determined set of enemies who gave it some room to manoeuvre rather than just seeking its obliteration.

It has been argued that this has been supported by the fact that the Libyan leader’s main security concerns were less underpinned by ideological stringency. Therefore, the Libyan regime was progressing into what could be considered as a post-revolutionary phase, with both realism and pragmatism having a firmer impact on strategy than the radical approaches typifying Libyan audacious policymaking prior to the 1990s (Interview: Alnafati, 2010). In spite of Libya’s attempts to hold out against the American and British pressures, the Libyan regime started to feel the strain of isolation as a result of UN restrictions (Interview: Dorda, 2010). Not only that, during the same decade (the 1990s), the regime had to contend with one of the most agitating popular uprisings represented in some radical Islamist movements in the country. During the mid-1990s, the regime managed to discover a group linked to Al Qaeda under the name of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which had been developing and multiplying in number within different regions of Libya, especially in the East, but also in some urban communities. In response to these events, Qaddafi engaged in a ruthless and suppressive operation to exterminate the alleged militant threats (Schwartz, 2007).

Within three years, the regime had achieved what was hailed as an unprecedented victory against the LIFG as well as other Islamist groups; however, the events surrounding the whole issue left some clear scars on the shaken regime. As a result, Libya’s scope for manoeuvre had been significantly constrained, with the regime starting to search for an exit to reduce the pressures that had made the regime’s grip on power look vulnerable. It is likely that Western governments took advantage of these groups, even though their longer term interests were as much threatened by them as were Libya’s. There has been some post 2011 speculation about the extent of this involvement (Daily Telegraph, 5 September 2011; The Independent, 25 August 2011, 5 September 2011), but this is not something on which one can yet draw
definitive conclusions. As such, the aforementioned circumstances were seen as the bedrock that had forced Libya to reconsider its foreign policy to be in line with fresh developments at the global level, in an explicit confirmation of the theoretical assumptions adopted (Interview: Dorda, 2010; and Interview: At-Talhi, 2010).

Towards the end of the 1990s, a number of senior Libyan officials had eventually realised that in order to face up to these pressures, the regime would have to redirect its foreign policy so that it was in keeping with the emerging global order. Allowing Libya to redevelop itself locally and internationally evidently characterised the opinion of Qaddafi himself, who pumped a great deal of diplomatic and political resource into achieving a resolution that could decide at first the Lockerbie crisis in preparation for a culmination to the sanctions and later resolving all unsettled matters with Western countries. As a result, once the two Lockerbie defendants were finally detained to be tried in the Netherlands in 1999, Qaddafi had to act swiftly by delegating a picked team to try to resolve the subsequent compensation terms and other outstanding related issues with the Western countries (Interview: Dorda, 2010).

Participating in this formal delegation were the former Prime Minister Abdulati Al-Obeidi, and the former Justice Minister as well as the Libyan Ambassador in the United Kingdom, Mohammed Al-Zwai and the Head of External Security, Musa Kusa, who then came to be known to the external world as the reformist individuals in the regime. They provided Qaddafi with the opportunity to give a more friendly approach of what had previously proved to be a resilient and uncompromising foreign policy. This was in addition to attempting to resume Libya’s ties with the whole global community generally, and with a more reluctant United States more specifically (Interview: Dorda, 2010).

After many years of intermittent talks, the West had started to establish some wary trust, developing later into an accommodation of the Libyan’s reformist group as dependable
negotiators (Alterman, 2004). As a result, and although unsure in the beginning, the White House Administration and, in equal terms, its British counterpart, became more confident that the representatives of Tripoli were backed by Qaddafi himself, and that the latter would fulfil his pledges. In addition, Libya’s preservation of the same hand-picked group in the process of negotiation produced a communication channel to the highest Libyan authority, and slowly, trust in that particular link to the top leadership grew stronger (Interview: Dorda, 2010).

Not only was there growing confidence on the part of the West in the Libyan interlocutors, but also on the part of Libyans themselves. On the other hand, the mid-1990s also saw Britain successfully negotiating a termination to the Libyan aid provided for the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and assisting in the efforts to end the UN sanctions in 1999, following Libya’s handing over of the Pan Am 103 suspects to The Hague. While negotiations were taking place between the United States and the Libyan regime, the United Kingdom government played a significant role in testifying to the idea that confrontational relationships could be overturned, in addition to safeguarding (or perhaps one should say appearing to safeguard) that the United States would fulfil its obligations (Interview: Mansour, 2012).

On the other hand, the clearly defined and unswerving targets drawn by the American and British helped persuade the Libyan negotiators that the terms of their counterparts were focused on distinct objectives rather than a secret attempt to change the Libyan regime, this reassurance was an essential element of the talks (Interview: Dorda, 2010). United States policy did not give relations with Libya a high priority in the short run, but they did give it a high salience in respect of concerns about nuclear proliferation (Hyland, 1999).

According to Alterman (2004), rewards meticulously delivered for constructive Libyan performance resulted in raising more expectations about the negotiating process and the positive mood as drawn by the parties concerned. As also stated in the interview with Al-Obeidi
(2010), this phase has been assisted by two additional elements, that the Libyan leader was strongly conscious of the might of the Americans, both in connection with their intelligence ability and military prowess, and also by their blockage of a cargo carrying Malaysian-made nuclear centrifuges originating from Dubai to Libya in October 2003, which was a strong sign to the Libyans that they could not determine if the United States had any knowledge about their proliferation systems.

There was also a strong belief among this reformist group that Libya should start revolutionising its economy and enhancing the overall performance of some of its institutions so that it could come to terms with the emerging post-Cold War globalisation. In spite of the fact that their ambitious moves for a new look diplomacy for the Libyan regime had not been voiced openly at that time, Qaddafi seemed to be on a different wavelength as he was also exhibiting the same old antics, while appearing paradoxically in favour of the idea of restructuring his economic policies. As Pargeter (2010) stated, following the suspension of UN restrictions in 1999, Qaddafi on several occasions confirmed that Libya needed to shift away from its dependence on oil by committing to investment in other economic sectors both at the local and international levels. But this could only follow after a settlement of political differences.

One of the main motives behind the leader’s inclination to support such moves was obviously the pressing need for Libya to re-establish its ties with the Americans, including investors as well as energy companies. This would signal a measure of normalisation of relations, important symbolically as well as in concrete terms, but it also would bring technical know-how which was desperately needed. The Libyan leader clearly came to assume that it was vital to persuade the United States that there were serious intentions on his part to introduce reforms, which seemed to have been successful. In fact, even though this more liberal attitude did not stop
Qaddafi from castigating the West with anti-capitalist rhetoric, it proved decisive for many critics as they came to the conclusion that the regime had actually become resolute in thinking that it would be better off with a transformed policy which reflected not just rhetoric but a real transformation of the state and economy (Pargeter, 2006). It is worth pointing out that the strong American pressure persuaded Libya that this was the regime’s only chance of survival, but also an opportunity to renew a world role for itself (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010). This is also seen by Sawani (2003) as explaining the general trends of the Libyan leader’s foreign policy during that time. Grasping the ‘new world role’ aspect of policy change helped to make it acceptable and legitimate notwithstanding an element of humiliation (rarely admitted) in the sense of being forced to make such as drastic policy reversal.

According to Martinez (2007), Qaddafi’s reactionary speech delivered in the aftermath of the American bombing of 1986 demonstrated to some extent the old trends of Libya foreign policy. Qaddafi stated in a very strong tone that:

“If we had possessed a deterrent missile that could reach New York we would have hit it at the same moment. Consequently, we should build this force so that the United States and others will no longer think about an attack. Whether regarding Libya or the Arab homeland, in the coming twenty years this revolution should achieve a unified Arab nation this should be one homeland, the whole of it, possessing missiles, and even nuclear bomb, so we should have a nuclear bomb” (Martinez., King, 2007, P.5).

However, the regime was not successful in obtaining such a deterrent force, and was never near doing so. The withdrawal of Libya’s WMD installations showed that the Libyans were a long way from acquiring such equipment to develop their own nuclear weapon (Ross, 1999). Even with help from Pakistan, from the A.Q Khan organisation which was outside the government but operated with its approval, and (allegedly) from Iran, Libya had a small technological
capability to work on nuclear research. A much greater capacity in human skills and equipment as well as money would have been needed to get close to an effective programme, and without much more help from abroad than was ever available, it was a long way from successful WMD technologies—and the Iranian government trusted Qaddafi no more than the United States did, for reasons of religious as well as political interest. As such, and for the sake of averting the possibility of being a target to the world-wide criticisms that were being directed toward totalitarian regimes, the Libyan authorities anticipated the terms of the Western states by succumbing to them by choice. This appears to be an obvious indication of the success of the coercion policy adopted by the United States and United Kingdom to change Libya’s foreign policy (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010). But it can also been seen as a moment of recognition of a truth which public rhetoric had failed to conceal. In order that Libyan foreign policy would be well-suited to the rules of the new world order, the country was obliged to decide on the key issue in its reconciliatory efforts. That was the Lockerbie issue, which culminated in the handing over of the accused, named by western sources which may not have been trustworthy, to be tried in The Hague in accordance to Scottish law, and in compliance with the terms that the United States and the United Kingdom had specified (Neumann, 2000).

With the Americans and British terms not caring to specify a definite setting for the trial to take place, a Scottish court deciding the case in The Hague was ideally suitable. It could function according to British procedures and standards of proof (Andrews, 2004). Similarly, the Dutch authorities discreetly stated that they were willing to assist the extraterritorial Scottish court with the necessary logistical and technical equipment and support, and the United Kingdom authorities established that the court could operate as normal but with no jury required (unusual in an English case but not in a case heard under Scots law). The Netherlands also provided a location for the trial in Camp Zeist, a deserted United States air force base on the outskirts of The Hague (Schwartz, 2007).
Piling more pressure on Libya, London and Washington decided to suspend but not formally end UN restrictions once Libya handed over the two suspects, which did not indicate that they were about to relinquish their demands. In fact, Security Council resolutions demanded the reinstating of sanctions if Libya did not succeed in meeting those terms after the handing over of the Libyan suspects (Schwartz, 2007, p. 565). Following nearly eight months of diplomatic endeavours and strong global pressure, Libya at last approved to go ahead with the transfer of the two suspects from Tripoli to the Netherlands in April 1999. Once witnesses were invited to Camp Zeist, an official trial started on the third of May 2000, with Scottish prosecutors giving evidence of the actions that had given rise to in the destruction of Pan Am flight 103. Towards the end of January 2001, the Scottish court gave its ruling on one of the two suspects Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, who was sentenced for murder, while the other suspect was found not guilty, and as a result released (Knowles, 2004).

Once the two Libyan suspects were handed over for trial, the regime had by then only met one of the five terms communicated by the United States and the United Kingdom to the Security Council. Other demands included Libya’s renunciation of terrorism, acceptance of responsibility for the acts of its officials, payment of an adequate compensation, and collaboration in the Pan Am 103 inquiries. In spite of the suspension of the UN restrictions and the remoteness of further decisions from the Security Council, Libya sought as vigorously as it could to eliminate the Lockerbie issue from the Council’s schedule. Similarly, the United States made it clear that bilateral relations would not be enhanced, and the American unilateral sanctions were not to be lifted, until Libya dealt with the other demands in a satisfactory manner (Neumann, 2000).

To achieve this, a cautious dialogue was initiated by the United States and the United Kingdom with the Libyan agents to see how the rest of the demands could be fulfilled. As argued by one interviewee (Interview: Mansour (2012), these direct meetings between Libya and the United
States were hosted by the United Kingdom. These were not supposed to be planned meetings in the strictest sense of the word, as the idea was suggested by the British in whom the Libyans had rather more trust, and with whom the Americans agreed to proceed to talks to conclude the major outstanding issues.

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, hectic meetings involving the three countries were still taking place in October 2001. However, the attack came at the right time for the Libyans and constituted a pivotal event for the Libyan regime’s change of position (Stottlemyre, 2012). For all the long animosity characterising Libyan-American relations on the one hand and the reputation of the Libyan leader and his regime in the eyes of the local population as a constant challenger to the West on the other, a compromise would have been difficult had it not been for the moment of 9/11 (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010; Interview: Anon 2010). Accordingly, the Libyans seized the occasion by firstly hastening the change in Libya’s foreign policy approaches to be compatible with Western views. Secondly, they vindicated domestically the conversion in Libyan foreign policy by working closely with the White House administration to denounce terrorism as a mutual issue for Libya and the United States. The Libyan regime had many reasons, after all, to fear Islamist activity across the region as well as internally (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010).

On the other hand, Libya’s new image in the eyes of United States officials was also helped by the ‘war on terror’, as this had become the main strategy and the principle priority of the White House following 9/11. Hence, by readjusting to Libya becoming an ally, the Americans were capable of acquiring not only valued Libyan intelligence on the actions of Islamist movements, but also the needed help and understanding of the Libyan regime’s activities, in particular in Africa (Interview, Anon, 2010).
Though Al Qaeda assaults profoundly altered the underlying forces of the Bush administration and necessitated a fundamental re-orientation of United States foreign strategies. However, they only hastened the Libyan endeavours to acclimatise Libyan foreign policy to be in keeping with the global developments and the new world order (Chorin, 2012). The strikes were thus a pivotal event for Libya and were perfectly seized upon to show Libya’s willingness to reconstruct and revitalise its ties on the one hand, and to hasten the reconciliation with the United States on the other, by seeking to meet the requirements of the United States and showing support by denouncing the strikes and their consequential threats to the Libyan regime and global security including that of the United States (Schwartz, 2007; Otman and Karlberg, 2007).

Once Libya admitted its full responsibility for the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, it had to meet its obligation by paying US$2.7 billion to the families of the victims. This development intensified Libya’s need to formally lift the restrictions. However, the one-sided sanctions were still in place, with Libya’s quest for WMD being a major obstacle to standardising relations with the United States (U.S. foreign policy toward Libya, 2000). As such, in its continuous efforts to deal with this issue in order to establish normal relations with the United States the Libyan regime accelerated its diplomatic endeavours in early 2003 to achieve such a settlement with their American counterparts (Interview: Dorda, 2010).

The British government had a major say in terms of assisting the secret talks that led to the end of the Lockerbie crisis and in equal terms the WMD issues. As the Libyan regime could not directly resolve such issues with the United States, Britain proved to be a decisive back channel and an apparently reliable mediator (Interview: Mansour, 2012).

According to Bowen (2006), one of the motivating factors for the Blair administration in its collaboration with the Libyan leader lay in the potential opportunities offered in the wake of
the post sanctions revitalisation of the Libyan economy as a result of the suspended UN sanctions. An interesting point worth mentioning here is that Britain had maintained informal ties with Libya for at least 15 years before 1999, in spite of officially severing diplomatic relations in 1984. This role was led by the British intelligence organisation MI6, which already had very close ties to some members of the negotiating group (Viorst, 1999; The Independent, 28 August 2011). In addition, after the WMD decision was taken in December 2003, Britain and Prime Minster Blair were praised by the Libyan leader for playing the most significant part in ending Libya’s seclusion (St John, 2004). Nevertheless, even though the British government could have had a key role to play in the secret talks, in so doing offering Libya with a communication channel with the United States, agreement with the Americans was what Libya sought most as an agreement with them signified an end to the cumbersome sanctions and a reestablishment of formal and informal links with the then most powerful global force (Interview: Mansour, 2012).

The first set of undisclosed meetings included talks between May 1999 and early 2000 in both the United Kingdom and Switzerland, with Qaddafi showing consistency in the selection of Libya’s interlocutors dating back to the beginning of the 1990s (Fidler et al. 2004). While talks were taking place, the Clinton administration concentrated on reaching a decision regarding the Lockerbie issue. However, there were also talks to liaise efforts in counteracting Islamic and other fundamental movements. Also discussed in these two-sided negotiations was Libya’s willingness to surrender its chemical weapons and programs, even though these were not thought to be of utmost priority as deciding the Lockerbie issues was the main objective of the talks (Bowen, 2006). Nonetheless, Qaddafi was informed that the abolition of American sanctions and more commitment would ultimately depend on Libya’s treatment of the WMD issue (Interview, Anon, 2010). The suspension of talks in 2000 were ascribed to concerns in
Washington about possible leaks during the presidential election on a number of politically sensitive issues, including negotiations with Libya (Indyk, 2004).

The talks were suspended throughout the election period when George W. Bush was returned U.S. President. However, these negotiations were soon to resume as a result of the 9/11 attacks. As stated by Slavin (2004), a minimum of six meetings took place from October 2001 through to December 2003 between the Americans, including Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern affairs William Burns, with the Libyan negotiators. Similarly, Bowen (2006) reported that information started to be shared between the American, British, and Libyan governments regarding a number of Islamic movements, such as Al-Qaeda, along with other affiliated groups.

As for Leverett (2004), who was part of the Bush Administration’s National Security Council responsible for Middle Eastern policies, he stated that during two years of diplomatic talks the American and British governments relayed to the Libyans that UN sanctions would be lifted once and for all if they satisfied Security Council resolutions concerning Lockerbie; however, the U.S. related sanctions would only be removed once the Libyan authorities dealt with WMD issues more effectively, which could be seen as a further step to increase the pressure on Libyan regime in order to compel it to adapt its foreign policy.

It is worth noting that a potential liaison in the fight against terrorism took place during the first meeting of the resumed negotiations involving American officials and a Libyan team headed by Kusa in London in October 2001 (Bowen, 2006). It was this meeting that effectively paved the way for the final resolution of the Lockerbie issue and equally contributed to the long awaited settlement of Libya’s possessions of WMD.

There were several secret meetings and negotiations involving British Intelligence officials with Kusa and other Libyans in London and elsewhere after Libya had been approached regarding the issue of WMD in March 2003. Initially, the talks only included Libyan
negotiators and British intelligence (MI6) as well as the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (Evans, 2004). During the course of the WMD meetings, intense secrecy characterised the work of all three governments. The reason behind this high level confidentiality lay in an urge to avert any resistance to the idea emerging in Libya as well as in the United States, where there was concern that domestic opposition, especially in the Congress, might hamper the talks if they were publicly known. Aiming to establish trust between the three negotiating parties was another factor for the talks to remain a tightly held secret (Bowen, 2006).

On the other hand, the British and American officials informed Libya that they had to make more concessions on Lockerbie-related issues before any further steps could be taken in terms of WMD (Frantz and Meyer, 2005). In other words, due to the severity of external pressure along with the internal ones, the Libyan leaders were eager even to discuss the advanced issues in order to get an exit from its status quo. The most important development in this regard took place on 15 August 2003 after the Libyan authorities had contacted the Security Council expressing Qaddafi’s intentions to meet the remaining requirements on Lockerbie, most importantly assuming responsibility for the acts of Libyan officials and agreeing to compensate the Pan Am families for loss of their beloved ones (Bowen, 2006). Next, the British authorities drafted a resolution to remove United Nation’s sanctions, which was supported in the Security Council; however, the United States refrained from voting, with the Bush administration still bringing the issue of WMD to the fore (Bowen, 2006). In September 2003, Washington introduced what has been seen as the equal of an all-agency assessments’ in its relations with Libya to move into a new era of enhanced links with the Libyan regime (St John, 2004).

As for the concluding round in the negotiations, it involved political and intelligence figures from the United Kingdom and the United States who all met with their Libyan counterparts in London in mid-December of the same year. In this meeting, Libya consented to surrender its
WMD only if the U.S. sanctions were suspended and the Libyan regime was to be reaccepted as one that can be dealt with (Frantz and Meyer, 2005).

The several negotiations involving Libya, the United Kingdom, and the United States culminated successfully with the surprising declaration of the Libyan leader through his Foreign Minister Abdel Rahman Shalgam that Libya would immediately start the dismantling of its WMD on 19 December 2003 (Hochman, 2006). There was widespread cheering for this momentous declaration from all corners of the globe, especially from the United States, which was particularly intended by the Libyan decision, as it the country who led the international efforts to compel Libya to adapt its foreign policy (Interview, Anon, 2010). Accordingly, a statement was issued by the Libyan regime, in which it was declared that the country had been engaged in a number of talks with its American and British counterparts about WMD. As confirmed by the Libyan government, the decision to dismantle the illegal substances, equipment and programmes that could potentially lead to the production of internationally proscribed weapons was taken of its own free will (Jentleson, 2005-2006). Unequivocally, Tripoli promised not only to report all nuclear actions to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) but to also sign the Additional Protocol, according to which states have to make extended and exhaustive statements of all their nuclear substances and any other related activities. In addition, Libya would also commit to eliminating ballistic missiles beyond a 300 km range with a payload of 500 kg or more. Furthermore, the Libyan regime would eradicate all chemical arms, stocks and munitions by formally approving of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The last measure specified that the Libyan authorities should cooperate with international disarmament efforts by allowing immediate access to inspectors and following up to ensure the effectiveness of all these activities (Bahgat, 2008).

On the other hand, Beaumont et al. (2003) argued that a mutual public statement delivered on 19 December 2003 was drafted when the British and Libyan officials met in London on 16
December 2003. The negotiations later culminated in Libya’s subsequent agreement with the United Kingdom as well as the United States on the discussed terms. The telephone conversation that involved both the British Prime Minister Tony Blair and Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi facilitated the final approval of the document. Besides, the Libyan leader went as far as to declare his intentions to commit to free the Middle East and Africa from WMD in a genuine step to show his changed approach vis-à-vis WMD (Kile and Hart, 2005).

In spite of the above, the Libyan regime’s confirmation that it was aiming to generate chemical and biological, as well as nuclear, weapons was seen as a major move. For years, Tripoli had unambiguously denied that it was in possession of any such arms when confronted with Western accusations. In actual fact, Qaddafi announced in an interview in January 2003 that it was irrational to claim that Libya had ever possessed WMD of any type (Ronen, 2003).

In so doing, Libya did exert a final effort to ensure its return to the community where nations have to abide by one common law and to a ground where all humanity have to agree unanimously. The new developments in the Libyan leader’s approach followed years of being excluded from various international circles as a recluse, not only because of his vehement support of global terrorism but also due to his association with the production of non-conventional arms. According to Schweitzer (2004), it is not usually the case in international relations to witness such an extreme and apparently unexpected reversal in foreign policy when it comes to a rogue state. It is possible to infer that for this reason it is a predominantly constructive recommendation that rogue states are placed back on the corrective track without resorting to the use of military force, as demonstrated in the Libya’s case. Instead, they could be dealt with using coercion, sanctions and negotiation as well as a changing context, which have to be enforced and coordinated by many countries, in particular those states with potential international political and economic presence (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010).
In the subsequent years, the American and British governments’ engagement with Libya paid most attention to making these pledges a concrete reality. For example, Libya signed a number of treaties, including the applicable arms control treaties of which it was not previously a member (International Atomic Energy Agency’s Annual Report, 2004). In the meantime, the American and British specialists were clearly satisfied that Libya was not engaged in or hiding any WMD or missile programmes that they were not aware of (Schwartz, 2007).

Nevertheless, with the usual confessional spectacles, Qaddafi acknowledged to the global community that he had administered the launch of an active WMD package. Therefore, Qaddafi’s change of heart regarding WMD leaves one major unsolved question mark pertaining to why a rogue leader would decide to abandon a WMD programme that he had been chasing for such a long time. The international community, most importantly President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, immediately praised Qaddafi’s move to pursue reconciliation with Western states and resume diplomatic relations with those supporting the new developments in Libyan foreign policies (Hochman, 2006).

Furthermore, the Bush Administration and American allies argued that there were two major factors behind Qaddafi’s new look diplomacy. First of all, they indicated that the United States had delivered a strong message by occupying Iraq in 2003. In showing its preparedness to utilise coercive measures when dealing with rogue states in pursuit of WMD, Libya was thus warned while watching the demise of the Iraqi regime (Tyler, 2004).

On the other hand, as indicated in the work of Chorin (2012), Qaddafi the beginning of the process of the decision preceded the capture of Saddam. Similarly, Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010); Interview: Dorda (2010); Interview: Kuti (2010); Interview: Alnafati (2010); Interview: Az-Zentani (2013), and Boucek (2004) argue that the decision to surrender Libya's search for WMD was not in response to the Gulf War as much as it was a perseverant effort on the part
of Qaddafi to return back into the fold of the international community after feeling the strain that threatened the very existence of the regime; and for that matter, the negotiations, also involving the British and Americans, had been going on for the past several years. It is also worth pointing out that this announcement date was part of the Libyan strategy to set the country free from the American sanctions that had already begun well before the outbreak of the Gulf conflict. In addition, these talks were carried out at the same time as the Lockerbie trilateral negotiations were being held between the United States, Britain, and Libya (Interview, Anon, 2010). On the other hand, it was also argued that economic sanctions had effectively repressed Libyan economic activities. Thus, owing to the increasing population, and potential returns from undeveloped oil assets, Qaddafi might have realised that Libya’s economic survival needed to be a priority over the quest for WMD (Tyler, 2004).

As argued by Interview: Dorda (2010), Qaddafi’s announcement was motivated by a number of factors, including the internal commotion of the growing Islamic groups seriously endangering the established status quo, the declining economic circumstances, and the limited acquisition of WMD, which culminated in Qaddafi’s abandonment of his nuclear ventures. On the other hand, the economic restrictions forced the Libyan leader to surrender WMD and support for radical movements around the world for the sake of safeguarding the survival of his reign, particularly after he was left on his own with no superpower ally and with the tag of a rogue state attached to his regime for harbouring or participating in anti-American attacks. Furthermore, the considerable damage caused by these sanctions combined with numerous incentives, such as reintegration into the global community after a long period of isolation as a law abiding state (more of a policy rather than a regime change), was sufficient to influence the Libyan cost-benefit examination (Interview, Anon, 2010).

A number of motivations were involved in the final and crucial decision concerning WMD stemming from a complicated development of a cost-benefit examination encompassing
foreign security and domestic factors. This culminated in a rising sense within the Libyan leadership that WMD were not beneficial in achieving the country’s military and political aims. More importantly, the nuclear programme was increasingly regarded as the main factor behind Libya’s continuing international seclusion (interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010; Cigar, 2012).

Libya’s announcement that it would end its pursuit of WMD in 2003 as one last required step for it to redirect its foreign policy is notable for a number of reasons. First of all, it is an exceptional instance of nuclear rollback and possibly the only one not resulting from a change of regime or a drastic national political transition. Second, it contributed to exposing the level of the global nuclear black market and profit-making interests as main motives for nuclear propagation (Hegghammer, 2009). Nevertheless, this specific case involves a controversy that begs the question of why the Libyan leader came to the conclusion that the quest for nuclear weapons was a menace to national security after having been committed to the idea for more than thirty years. Within months of ascending to the helm, the Libyan regime pursued a policy of purchasing nuclear weapons, which even though it had been attempted on a number of occasions, was not successfully completed (Corera, 2006). As a consequence, doubts that the Libyan regime was in active pursuit of nuclear weapons began to concretise. With efforts to import nuclear weapons failing, it became evident to the Libyan leader that it would be an indispensable requirement to develop home-grown expertise so that the acquisition of nuclear weapons could materialise (Meyer, 1984).

As argued by Interview: Az-Zentani (2013), Qaddafi decided to lay the foundation for a Libyan nuclear weapons programme in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In addition, the upsurge in earnings following from the oil crisis made it possible for the regime to obtain funds that could be invested in exclusive and noteworthy ventures. Consequently, Libya sought to gain the expertise and material from overseas to prepare the right setting for a native nuclear infrastructure (Bowen, 2006).
In spite of the fact that any state wishing to develop nuclear weapons may be driven to do so by one motive, Libya in contrast had been motivated by several factors at different intervals. In its quest to obtain nuclear weapons, Libya was driven by prestige and status, national security, organisational politics, and pressures from abroad (Braun and Chyba, 2004).

The endeavours of the Libyan leader in terms of pursuing a nuclear weapons programme could be motivated largely by the idea that nuclear arms could make it possible for Libya to acquire such a regional and international standing that could match Qaddafi’s ideological ethics and aspirations. It is also worth noting as argued by Corera (2006) that Qaddafi’s personal determination to be acclaimed as an international figure was a driving factor. On the other hand, the political effects of the scientific gap between Israel and the Arab world and, more importantly, Israel’s development and acquisition of nuclear weapons, in the framework of the regional struggle seemed to have been a significant reason for the Libyan regime’s early nuclear ambitions. From the point of view of Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010), one of the most important reasons for Libya’s ambitious plans to acquire a nuclear weapon was to imitate Israel’s advances in the same field. According to El-Khawas (1986), Qaddafi’s resolve at that particular period to see the “problem of Israel” as a military one confirmed the regime’s efforts to change an entire foreign policy to suit a military aim.

In a similar vein, Hegghammer (2009) claimed that in obtaining nuclear arms the Libyan head of state hoped to act as an influential figure in the conflict with Israel and, in the meantime, lead Libya to assume a leading role instead of Egypt in the Arab world. Therefore, a nuclear programme could serve such an aim and allow Libya to achieve regional leadership in spite of Libya being found wanting of some of Egypt’s other leadership characteristics.

Increasingly, the Libyan ties with neighbouring countries in the Middle Eastern region and the West had come under pressure during the 1980s and 1990s, which caused the Libyan regime
to pose questions on the nuclear weapons programme. The curtailing of Libyan regional aspirations as a driving force behind the nuclear project was linked to the way Libya was perceived in the Middle Eastern region throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, in the mid-1980s, the Libyan regime came to the realisation that its quest for regional superiority was not backed by other states in the region. For that matter, the development of a nuclear programme no longer appeared to be a viable mechanism in Libya’s pursuit of an influential role in the regional conflict against the Israelis. As maintained by Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010), the role played by Israel in driving Libya to seek WMD was undermined by the early 1980s as a result of the 1979 Peace Treaty involving the Egyptians and the Israelis, which practically put an end to the spell of Arab military conflicts with Israel at the state level. Accordingly, what seems evident is that the aim to lead at the regional level in the framework of the Arab-Israeli struggle was no longer a main driving factor for the Libyan leader’s nuclear aspirations.

In the mid-1980s, Libya’s nuclear efforts were mainly motivated by concerns about national security, especially after the Americans’ launch of air raids on the two largest cities in Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986, in the wake of the La Belle discotheque bombing in Berlin of which the Libyan regime was a major suspect. In addition, confrontations between the American and Libyan air forces in the Gulf of Sirte on several instances throughout the 1980s confirmed how ineffective Libyan armed forces and military protection were when challenged by the American prowess. The aforementioned raids proved that Libyan forces were seriously incapable of protecting the country generally, and more particularly the regime’s headquarters. Consequently, nuclear programmes were mainly pursued for national security purposes (Hegghammer, 2009).

As also stated by Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010), the regime’s intentions to follow a nuclear policy to deter foreign and, more specifically, American offensives in Libya intensified even more after the 1986 raids. Thus, in the mid-1980s, there was a renewed interest in the
acquisition campaign in the nuclear programme, which was motivated less by leadership aspirations than by the need to ascertain the survival of the Libyan leader and his ruling regime.

However, qualms soon emerged in the early 1990s in terms of the costs and potential strategic advantages of the nuclear programme. Even though these concerns were finally dissipated by reinforced commitment, they can only reveal the major inconsistency in the Libyan regime’s pledge to gaining nuclear arms. A number of factors, including internal, regional and global factors ignited these fears. First of all, there was a rising popular dissatisfaction with the internal economic situation, which seemed to have triggered enduring discussions about the costly Libyan foreign policy adventures at the expense of the regime’s domestic policies. Second, as demonstrated in the 1991 Gulf War, the American military prowess was set against an Iraq which was at that time bombarded with global allegations concerning the use of WMD, chemical weapons stockpiles and a nuclear weapons programme that eventually necessitated an intervention from the United States and its allies (Hegghammer, 2009).

In the opinion of Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010), there were sharp arguments in the regime regarding the costs and benefits of committing to such a programme. Most important of all, the potential strategic utility of nuclear arms was at the heart of the discussion, and it was debated that nuclear weapons were not of any particular strategic use for Libya. It was recognised that possession of some small nuclear capability would quite likely be more likely to bring an attack than to prevent it

Libya’s willingness to consider abandoning the pursuit of WMD was communicated to the White House in the early 1990s (St John, 2004). Nevertheless, the George Bush administration rejected these acts of goodwill and requested that Libya would first abide by the United Nations resolutions before being allowed to take part in any further negotiations (Bowen, 2006).
Following Libya’s accusations of masterminding the Lockerbie bombings in 1988, the UN decided to impose heavy sanctions on the Libyan regime (Interview: At-Talhi, 2010). Two significant repercussions emanated from this development with respect to the nuclear question; more particularly, there was a change in the Libyan regime’s approach when it came to the acquisition of nuclear competencies and in the specific fears that informed the regime’s intentions and motivations. To start with, Libya’s increasingly lonely and hazardous position seemed to have deepened the regime’s pledge to develop nuclear programmes. Second, the intentions for acquiring nuclear weapons shifted away from the original focus on its regional status and leadership to a more traditional security-based emphasis. Furthermore, whilst the political weight of developing nuclear weapons waned, the potential advantages for national security became even more pivotal for the Libyan decision makers. Other spheres of domestic and foreign policy were also influenced by this development, in particular the suspension of Libya’s support for organisations and individuals implicated in global terrorism in the 1990s (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010).

Due to the increasing external (coercive policy) and internal pressures, it seemed that the Libyan leader’s only response was in following a two-track policy. According to Corera (2006) and Jentleson (2006), the regime’s key aim seemed to centre on the one hand around improving its relations with the West in general and the United States in particular, while on the other hand continuing to adhere to the development of a nuclear weapons programme as a preventative measure and bargaining tool, which could be utilised in the case of unsuccessful rapprochement in the former, and to enhance the conditions in the latter (Corera, 2006). Therefore, the Libyan regime continued its campaign to acquire nuclear weapons alongside multiplying efforts to deal with the root cause of Libya’s security issues; in particular the struggle with the United States, as well as the economic conditions under the UN restrictions.

According to the two-track policy, it was suggested that the unclear commitment of the Libyan
leader to the nuclear arms scheme continued in the framework of increasingly demanding global conditions throughout the 1990s (Interview: Az-Zentani, 2013).

A number of factors contributed to the Libyan regime’s resignation that nuclear arms could no longer offer the sought-after security, but rather the opposite. One of these factors was the root cause which over time caused concerns within the regime about the whole nuclear weapons venture. The second factor related to the facilitating causes, most importantly the overall development of relationships between the Libyan regime and the Western countries at the end of the 1990s and onwards. Another reason referred to the necessary causes, in particular the post 9/11 events, which made it vital for the Libyan regime to decide once and for all the issue of its nuclear programme. The increased fears about the acquisition of nuclear arms and the global alliance led by the United States as the main international force against Iraq forced Libya to accelerate the process of taking its decision whether or not it should carry on with its quest for non-conventional arms (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010).

According to Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010), the three above factors played their part in the decision to reverse the pursuit of nuclear weapons capability in various ways. Other, equally important, reasons leading to such a noteworthy pronouncement by the Libyan regime to abandon its nuclear weapons aspirations included the opportunity to deal with the major causes of the regime’s security concerns from 1999 and beyond, the growing risks linked to seeking nuclear armaments after the events of 9/11, and enduring issues within the regime concerning the actual advantages from a preventive measure against the Americans. Additionally, the Libyan leader’s fears about the knock-on effects of pursuing a nuclear programme were also entrenched in enduring national political and economic unrest, with the investments pumped into the nuclear programme perceived as missed opportunities, along with the absence of interest in improving the economic circumstances of Libyans, which could only further undermine the regime’s domestic image.
During the 1990s, Libya had to deal with a particularly challenging situation in terms of the international community and domestic upheavals. The ailing economy became more evident with the impact of sanctions, while falling oil prices and the growing effect of long periods of economic malpractice, as well as the high inflation rate all caused the regime to face its most significant popular insurgence, in particular a home-based Islamist resistance group that had not been kept at bay for three years (Pargeter, 2006).

The rise of such a significant armed resistance proved to be a sticky issue for the regime, and exposed its flaws to internal and external observers, thus undermining Qaddafi’s reputation at home and abroad. Faced with all these challenges, the regime decided that a positive shift in Libya’s relationships with the external world was paramount. During the second half of the 1990s, Qaddafi was determined more than ever to enhance Libya’s international standing in order to allow the country to revitalise itself in general and its economy in particular (Pargeter, 2006, p. 221).

There are two major factors that can contribute to an appropriate explanation of why the regime was accelerating the suspension of its nuclear weapons programme in 2003. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks of September 2001, it became evident that engaging in a nuclear weapons project was all the more a risky affair for countries deemed as not on the same wavelength as the United States. The commitment to non-conventional arms ventures impacted negatively on the regime’s security in a number of ways. While the incurred costs of the nuclear programme adversely affected the regime’s national status, committing to a nuclear deterrent might expose the Libyan regime even more by providing the Americans with a precious opportunity to intervene with the aim of overthrowing the Libyan leader as they had done in Iraq. As argued by Alterman (2004), the change of heart in terms of Libya’s commitment to a nuclear arms programme in late 2003 was as result of reconsidering its strategies, future programmes, international ties, and the significance of possessing nuclear weapons or WMD. Therefore,
Libya recognised that possessing these weapons will not ensure its safety and surely will not lead to a more affluent population (Interview: At-Talhi, 2010).

There had been a remarkable promptness characterising the process of the Libyan regime’s decision to suspend this effort and comply with any terms emanating from the trilateral negotiations that started in March 2003. A number of questions arise as to why Libya’s nuclear turnaround happened so fast and Libya’s policies were not moulded by path dependency, considering the amount of time and resources invested in the pursuit of nuclear weapons. Partly, this could be due to the nature of the Libyan regime and, precisely, Qaddafi’s exceptional status and resilient character. As mentioned by Interview, Anon, (2010), a number of factors contributed to the regime’s final resolve to proceed without nuclear weapons; however, the most important reason lay in the changed leader’s perceptions about the armament programme as the decision was ultimately his when dealing with issues of such magnitude, aside from the role of the close elite around him who clearly also favoured change by this time.

According to Bowen (2006), how the Libyan leadership came to perceive the costs and benefits of committing to a nuclear programme were radically and positively influenced by the trilateral talks and developments in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. For instance, the global alliance’s confrontation with Iraq in 2002-2003 might have accelerated Libya’s intentions to reach a decision on the nuclear programme at an unprecedented rate. Nonetheless, the Libyan leader had already been alerted to the fact that the WMD issue was also to be raised in the trilateral talks so that the American restrictions could be suspended (Bowen, 2006, p. 61). Therefore, while the decision and its application were prompt and definite, Libya’s willingness to overcome the WMD issue had been developing over time, with the Libyan leader expressing that cutting short Libya’s interest in nuclear weapons served Libya’s long term interests and was beneficial to the security of the regime. Therefore, Libya’s decision could be seen as a
calculated view of the global situation and the Libyan leader’s capability of rapidly changing the course of the country’s foreign policies (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010).

The prevailing mood within the Libyan authorities was that little could be achieved from tracking its nuclear weapons programme now that Libya was in the process of normalising its ties with the United States and the rest of the Western world. Consequently, the growing concerns of following a nuclear weapons policy led senior officials in the regime to assess its riskiness to the security of the whole Libyan political system. Additionally, the key reasons leading the regime to reach this conclusion centred on a number of developments in the international community’s growing fears about nuclear propagation after the demise of the Soviet Union and the implications of the nuclear weapons venture for the regime’s regional and local status. As argued by both Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010) and by Interview, Anon (2010), the Libyan leader decided to act promptly given his conviction that forsaking his nuclear aspirations could be the key to saving the regime’s image and his face in return.

Certain features of the Libyan regime were influential in smoothing this process, including the Libyan regime’s ability to discuss and review the nuclear project at various stages, in spite of the resources already pumped in this venture. Moreover, the nature of the regime allowed it to change its strategy and apply a completely different policy with a spectacular pace as soon as the decision had been taken, with the type of Qaddafi’s management suggesting that there were no such issues in suspending a long-going activity (Interview, Anon, 2010).

Clearly, a number of issues characterising the trilateral talks led to this successful finale. Building some trust between the different parties involved in the Lockerbie discussions was essential, while the sense of determination of all three countries in terms of resolving the WMD issue was seen as equally important. One factor for the Libyan regime worth mentioning was the awareness that regime change was not what the Americans sought or intended with regards
to Libya (St John, 2004., Interview, Anon, 2010). Overall, the value of committing to a wider process with tangible targets where all actors could be involved in pragmatic negotiations, instead of a regime change, appears evident where Libya was concerned. Likewise, the rigorous efforts exerted by Libya, the United States and the United Kingdom proved highly successful in overcoming thorny issues and the swift progression into the implementation stage. By ensuring the presence of a limited number of highly efficient negotiating officials, and the absence of bureaucratic behaviour in the form of international organisations, the meetings proved very practical. Similarly, the Libyan case showed the efficacy of establishing a balance between the use of force and diplomatic efforts (Jentleson, 2006).

As also argued by Interview: Al-Obeidi (2010), the decision to abandon WMD was ascribed to the growing costs and imminent threats of nuclear proliferation, as well as the resigned attitude that Libya could gain little and potentially lose everything by continuing to try to be a nuclear weapon state. Thus, rethinking the whole process was crucial for the regime’s long term survival.

It is worth noting that three sets of suppositions persuaded the Libyan regime that the gains of pursuing nuclear weapons would be well below the costs. First, there was no longer the initial political zeal behind following a nuclear scheme. Second, the strategic advantages that nuclear weapons could provide had to be reviewed in light of Libya’s varying requirements and aspirations. The third assumption referred to the expected repercussions of a nuclear weapons programme on the regime’s grip and eventual survival (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010).

It is possible to infer that after the Cold War the Libyan regime’s decision-making in the area of security and foreign policy was shifting towards more pragmatism by mainly focusing on how to maintain its grip on power. It appeared that Libya had finally started to reap the benefits of stopping its nuclear weapons project, especially in the years to come, with the Libyan regime
reforming itself from a global pariah to a partner by responding to all the terms that had been placed by the United States and its allies. This not only ensured the survival of the Libyan regime, but also paved the way to finalise the process of readjusting its policy to suit that of the new world order (Interview: Al-Obeidi, 2010). Whatever the sources of this greater pragmatism, its existence made adaptation more straightforward, and made a more clear-eyed recognition of difficult choices more straightforward too.

One can still argue that Libya was an example of a country where a policy change was conceivable in areas well-suited to the rogue state position. However, renouncing WMD and fighting terrorist activities did not resolve all issues surrounding Qaddafi’s international and local policies. Still, the policies pertaining to how to overcome these issues were largely a continuation of the approach that eventually caused the changed stance on WMD. Specifically, this was a pressure to force policy change, but not regime change, in addition to a number of coercive measures and incentives, including assurances to remain in power, which in due course proved to be a success in terms of convincing Libya to readjust its foreign policy to be in keeping with the rest of the world and in normalising United States-Libyan diplomatic relations, as one of the major Libyan foreign policy aims in the new look diplomacy endorsed by Qaddafi.

On the other hand, the example of Libya also demonstrated what could be gained when regime change is not prioritised over policy change. Repeatedly, the United States and the United Kingdom reassured Libya that policy change would not entail regime change, which was extremely important as regime change could yield counterproductive effects as opposed to policy change (Jentleson, 2006). Indeed, rogue states in their processes of adjustment may be required to recognise both that the enforcer is strong-minded about not agreeing to too little and also dependable about not insisting for too much. This conflicts with the view that
maintaining regime change as an option increases influence and enforcement measures (Yoshihara, 2012).
Conclusion

The bipolar nature of the global political system, characterised by East-West competition, offered some kind of security for Libya during the early two decades of Qaddafi’s ascendance. However, there was a drastic change in the situation following the Soviet Union’s demise, causing acute threats to Libya’s international stance. As a result, the fall of the Soviet Union dispossessed Libya of its key counterbalance to the Americans; in so doing, the Libyan regime lost the most significant political and military backing that it had been relishing since the early years of Qaddafi in power. In addition, the Libyan leader was exposed more than ever to the sort of unified global pressure that had once been very unlikely. Nonetheless, as has already been revealed in this study, Libya has mostly been successful in appreciating the dimensions of systemic change and in evading the adverse outcomes by adjusting its foreign policy to be so much in keeping with emergent global setting. This was a learning process, and not an even or uncontested learning process, but it did prove to be an effective one. Awareness of the new system and its underlying forces resulted in the Libyan regime’s pursuit of genuine changed policies instead of adopting extreme ones. In so doing, Libya was allowed to return to the fold of the emergent global environment and to contribute positively in the system.

A wide range of resources, including academic materials, news reports and elite interviews in Libya have been used in this study. Selecting that variety of resources was intended to offer the researcher a whole range of material in order to gather the most significant data needed to achieve a reasonable assessment and an overarching interpretation of the effects of the Soviet Union’s fall on Libya’s foreign policy making between 1991 and 2003. While so doing, the researcher had to depend on several wide-ranging resources and methods so that the researcher could attain the critiquing lenses necessary for carrying out this academic endeavour.
Hill (2003, p. 30) points out that the agency-structure question, although important, always involves the interaction of both agency and structure in an empirical study. The argument in this thesis has been that structures of power and the dominant actors in global politics created a highly structured environment for Libyan policy makers. It is therefore not surprising that when the USSR declined, Libya had to make rapid and sometimes rather improvised changes to foreign policy. What is more interesting is how this was done, what the timing was, and how the images and ideas of leading members of the policy elite changed as policy was adapted. This represents a set of choices which were sensitive to that environment but not solely dictated by it. The response of Libya’s decision makers may have been slow to realise and accept what happened, but they moved towards managing these pressures, adapting to the Lockerbie and WMD issues and trying to balance these external pressures with growing economic problems and growing security problems internally. Leadership styles also changed as policy changed, and as Qaddafi became rather more (one should not exaggerate it) dependent on his policy elite. Learning and leadership went together, although it is fair to add also that the main advisors, including those who were interviewed in the research, had more familiarity with the external world and the real issues that mattered for Libya’s antagonists. It may be going too far to say that Libyan foreign policy became pragmatic; but it certainly moved in a pragmatic direction. The fundamental security of the state was at stake, but so was the survival of the individuals who represented it.

Highly significant for the findings and originality of this piece of research are the interviews, which were conducted in Libya, as they provided the researcher with valuable material drawn from fresh practices and experience of high ranking politicians and political figures involved directly in the making and implementation of Libyan foreign policy during that period of time. That material has been studied in the context of other available sources in order to build a persuasive narrative. The interviews are important when they support common ideas or images
or priorities. But they are also significant where the interviewees differ. This provides more of a texture to the analysis of the evolution of policy in the 1990s up to 2003.

How significant have the events of 2011 and the collapse of the Qaddafi regime for the research? Certainly, they changed the ways in which the earlier period might have been seen. They may also have changed the ways in which interviewee justified themselves. But most of the research for the thesis was completed before the end of 2011, and the author has to offer his apologies if some of these interpretations have become out of date. A careful reader of the thesis will have seen that this has been taken into account wherever possible.

The main argument of this thesis is based on a theoretical framework that assumes the downfall of the Soviet Union left behind small and precariously positioned countries, including Libya, which had considered the Soviets as their strongest allies. Consequently, a number of small countries, in general, and radical states in particular, embraced the form of acquiescence adaptation for two purposes: the first one was to ensure the survival of regimes as they had strained relations with the main superpowers, notably the United States of America. Instead, the country survived as it was no longer threatened from external states forces. The second element of the argument is the analysis of how the internal demands and pressures in Libya were absorbed relating to concerns ranging from security issues to economic and social issues. These also reflect a great complexity and interdependence in international relations in the 1990s by comparison with the era before the Libyan 1969 Coup.

The new developed version of the adaptive behaviour theory used in this study explores and investigates these changes in Libyan foreign policy behaviour. This change was imposed upon Libya via a new international environment which surfaced after the collapse of the Soviet Union and due to internal pressurising factors following that collapse, stemming from various groups, people, and organisations. This made Libyan foreign policy revolve around a
constricted space without any strategic alliance such as that struck with the Soviet Union prior to its collapse, or a clear-cut internal structure. Furthermore, this situation forced Libya to follow a one-way route given the limited choices, which thus meant that there was not considerable scope for manoeuvre. As such, Libyan foreign policy stakeholders had limited choices, choices that were summarized in the ways to drop their adverse trends of the international environment, along with the internal ones, and seek to develop desirable orientations. The interview evidence in the thesis demonstrates that the leadership was a close knit group, but policy was not simply a sole individual dictator’s whims. The interviews show how choices were identified, how leaders sought to enlarge the range of choices where they could, how they used delays and how they exploited divisions between Western governments and between governments and economic interests (especially oil companies), and where they came to recognise that the room for manoeuvre they aimed for had reached its limits.

The main characteristic of this kind of adaptation is to adjust or alter one’s foreign policy behaviour to the demands emerging from both the external environment and domestic setting. Thus, any country resorting to this form does so with the aim to prolong its regime in so far as it lacks bargaining power with its interlocutors.

Using this theory was all valuable as it offered the researcher with the required tools to address the overall effects of the Soviet Union’s fall on foreign policy making in Libya.

It can be suggested that the implementability of this theory to the context of Libyan foreign policy in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union is demonstrated in the fact that it allowed the research to deal with the key issues of the topic studied, and in that it effectively offered the vital, wide-ranging and comprehensive argument and justification for a comprehension of the new Libyan foreign policy trends, as examined in the earlier sections.
Putting this theory under test, it was concluded in this research that the theory is sufficiently coherent to uphold that such a framework is offering an effective and in-depth critical analysis of the how a small country’s foreign policy was altered, adapted when it was left without any help from a potential global force, as opposed to when it had relied on a powerhouse ally in unipolar world; in the form of the Soviet Union before it was eventually brought to its feet.

It should be pointed out that this positive approach emerged because of the coercive measures initiated and reinforced by the consecutive American governments in the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s fall that helped alienate the Libyan regime politically and economically. In applying so much pressure through deterrent measures, the United States aimed at shaking the Libyan regime and compelling Qaddafi to relinquish his support for terrorist activities and to abandon his short and long-term programs to develop or purchase WMD using economic and political alienation.

By refusing to admit its implication in the bombings of Pan Am 103 and UTA 772, the Libyan regime did not stand any chance of having the imposed sanctions lifted. On the contrary, these acts fired up the international community against Libyan support to terrorist groups and activities. There was a constant Libyan reluctance at the outset to respond to the United Nations’ calls to admit providing support for terrorist groups in general, and the Pan Am and UTA bombings in particular, which in fact reinforced and lengthened UN sanctions, causing an eleven year period of multilateral alienation. Equally, the increasing impact of the United States and UN sanctions was to prepare for a change of behaviour in the Libyan foreign policy. This was evident particularly with the Clinton Administration’s announcement of restricted conditional engagement.

The handing over of the two prime suspects for their eventual trial constituted the start of a number of limited but tangible decisions taken by the Libyan regime in its attempt to reconcile
with the Americans and the global community. While taking advantage of Libya’s long period of isolation, Qaddafi’s positive reaction to provisional engagement, and British diplomatic efforts, the White House carried on the engagement in an unprecedented style. Supported by credible threats of military action, especially after the attacks of 9/11, the Bush Administration evidently explained the required procedures in order for the American sanctions to be stopped. These steps included admitting responsibility for the Pan Am 103 bombing and disbursement of compensation to the families of the victims, tangible evidence of a rejection of supporting terrorist groups, and abandonment and disclosure of weapons of mass destruction and any other related nuclear programs. Accordingly, the Libyan foreign policy elite decided to take concrete measures to show their good intentions to radically review its strategies with regards to both terrorist activities and weapons of mass destruction programmes. Having made the decisions to radically shift the basis of their foreign policy, there seem to have been no temptations to cheat or re-evaluate policy after its initial success. In the events of 2011, the Libyan government was shocked and surprised by the Western attacks precisely because they had committed themselves so thoroughly to a move to a pro-Western foreign policy for most purposes.

The basis for Libya’s transformed foreign policy came to the fore with powerful external and internal factors joining to endanger the Libyan regime’s most pressing need, its own survival. Similarly, the success of the UN sanctions was helped by a combination of international and local developments throughout the 1990s that had threatened the Libyan regime. Beside the emerging global environment and subsequent international sanctions, Qaddafi had to contend with countless crises at home, including a number of economic crises as well as the rise of Islamist fundamentalisms. Essentially, these issues were caused and also heightened by the global sanctions, although there were also serious domestic threats to Qaddafi’s regime both from rebellious cadres in his armed forces. However, the most significant menace to the security of the regime originated in the growing status of dissenting Islamic movements. In
spite of the ruthless suppression of the Islamic groups, the latter were viewed as a severe danger to the regime’s security, along the deteriorating economic conditions that jeopardised the established status quo and left the regime in a precarious position.

In the end, the Libyan leader acknowledged that the key to dealing with Libya’s domestic issues was to abandon his international outcast status, which in 1999 materialised with the secret trilateral discussions between Libyan, British and American negotiators. During these meetings, Qaddafi’s views were clearly reflected, especially concerning the September 11 attacks, which Qaddafi openly described as alarming and damaging. In so doing, he was offered the perfect opportunity to speed up the process of political reintegration.

Even though the Pan Am 103 incident concluded with the permanent lifting of the UN sanctions, no full normalisation of ties with the United States that Qaddafi pursued had yet been achieved as the United States aim rested on resolving the WMD issues, which had been first raised by United States and British representatives at the end of the 1990s. However, to everyone’s surprise, while Qaddafi placed his unconventional weapons programs to be discussed in detail, he seized upon the black market network for a new source of nuclear weapons. Apparently, this was a conflicting decision purchasing new technology while engaging in lengthy negotiations on nuclear disarmament with the United States, which could be seen as either a bargaining tool to resort to in negotiations or an additional step toward the attainment of nuclear programmes or technologies if discussions came to a dead end.

It is worth mentioning that Libya’s decision to act as it did was exceptional since it is one of those rare occasions that a country has exerted so much effort to eliminate its WMD programs. In addition, this is virtually the first time for a country supporting terrorist activities to abandon that without having to change the existing regime. Going to the heart of the causality issue is the fact that Libya had committed to abandon its WMD technology without forcing Qaddafi
out of power. For the Libyan regime, the main target was to survive in the face of international and domestic pressure: in practice, that main concern was interpreted into the continuation of the oil-funded system of supply and oppression that was the foundation of his internal policies.

As far as the United States was concerned, opposing interests within consecutive presidencies over whether the White House policy toward Libya should seek a regime change or behaviour change generated an enduring policy discussion. For example, the Reagan administration in the 1980s followed a unilateral policy of ‘full containment’, which involved infrequent demonstration of strength, such as the attacks of April 1986. In this case, the White House had in mind a comprehensive objective, namely regime change, but this objective was pursued with insufficient resources. Thus this ‘rollback’ policy was unsuccessful, because the one-sided American economic sanctions and military action did not have a sufficient effect on the main constituency groups, keeping the grip of Qaddafi’s regime on power intact. Without a doubt, the April 1986 air strikes enabled Qaddafi to use the patriotic role of his regime domestically to reinforce his position, and instead of preventing terrorist activities, it might have caused the retaliatory bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. In this sense it was a counter-productive policy. On the other hand, the George W. Bush Administration practically changed the main aim of the United States policy towards Libya from regime change to behaviour change, which forced Qaddafi to hand over the accused Libyan nationals to be tried in the Hague. The quest for this less expansive policy, evading the argumentative state sovereignty matter brought to the fore by regime change, simplified the administration’s efforts to earn broad global backing for multilateral Unite Nation economic restrictions. It was also, of course, more acceptable to the ruling elite in Tripoli. The Libyan regime was convinced by 2003, through a number of disciplinary actions and incentives used by the United States and the United Kingdom, that it ought to terminate its chase of nuclear weapons technologies, and to modify it enduring antagonism to the Americans in particular and the West in general.
In the eyes of the Libyan leader, there was a certainty that not much could be achieved neither from being antagonistic to the West or from acquiring nuclear weapons programmes, in case Libya was capable of standardising its ties with the west in general and the Americans in particular. Actually acquiring WMD would quite possibly invite attack, and certainly harm relations with others more than any benefit it could bring; but since Libya was a long way from doing getting WMD, the loss in giving up this goal was all the less.

It is worth pointing out that the final decision to relinquish the weapons of mass destruction was driven by several factors, as the interview evidence demonstrates. More precisely, three various developments convinced the Libyan leader that the drawbacks of taking on a nuclear weapons programme far outweighed the advantages. To start with, the initial political drive behind the long awaited quest for nuclear weapons soon dissipated. This was surely at least in part due to a realisation of the cost in resources and the possibility that with the available technologies it was not even clear nuclear weapons could be successfully developed in any reasonable timescale. Secondly, there was a review of the strategic position in light of Libya’s altering needs and aspirations. Finally, and most importantly, there were concerns about the repercussions of pursuing a nuclear weapons programme on regime survival. This shows that in the wake of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, Libya’s decision-making in terms of security and strategy had become all the more realistic or pragmatic, and essentially dedicated first of all to ensuring the Libyan leader’s unchallenged grip on power.

The growing global fears regarding nuclear proliferation after September 11 and the implications of the nuclear weapons enterprise for the regime’s global and local image stood as pivotal motivators influencing Qaddafi’s decision to abandon the programme. They certainly go a long way to explain the timing of the decision. Therefore, the Libyan leader was determined to respond immediately once he learnt that relinquishing his country’s nuclear weapons aspirations was essential for the regime to survive and avoid a similar fate to that of
Iraq. Among the main influences influential in expediting this disarmament process was Qaddafi’s ability to dispute and review the nuclear programme at various intervals, in spite of the enormous resources pumped into this programme. Moreover, the dictatorial type of regime allowed it to finalise its policy and apply a reversal of its strategy with spectacular speediness. In short, Qaddafi’s leadership style was influential, indeed decisive, in announcing that there were no issues or obstacles in halting a long-lasting programme.

Accordingly, Qaddafi’s decision to put an end to its nuclear weapons programme helped Libya ultimately in its short and long-term plans. For example, Libya started to lose the tag surrounding its reputation as an international pariah and was slowly welcomed back into the global community as a partner. In addition, the country gained tangible rewards allowing for the much-needed investment into the economy. However, Qaddafi’s regime benefited most, since reducing the existential internal and external threats to the regime’s survival was only possible on abandoning the nuclear programme.

The success of coercive policy owed so much to the several factors characterising trilateral talks involving the United States, the United Kingdom and Libya. One of these factors was the creation of some trust among the key countries during the Lockerbie talks, while the urgency with which the three parties approached the settlement of the WMD issue appeared to have had a significant impact. It is evident that there was more trust between the United Kingdom officials involve and the Libyan elite than between Libya and the United States officials, and it may be that British officials were pursuing interests that in some respects differed from those perceived by the United States. Another equally significant factor for the Libyan authorities – the significant factor- was the understanding that regime transformation was no longer the Americans’ objective. Generally speaking, it was evident in the case of Libya that engaging in a comprehensive process with tangible targets where all parties agree to commit to pragmatic discussions, rather than system change, was all the more worthwhile (whether the events of
2011 cast doubt on this conclusion is outside the evidence available here, and therefore outside the scope of this thesis). In addition, the serious commitment of Libya, the United States and the United Kingdom was extremely effective in addressing challenging issues and in acting on them. With the limited number of representatives involved in the discussions, the private nature of many of the talks, and the lack of well-known global organisations, the negotiations were extremely effective. As demonstrated in the case of Libya, the Qaddafi regime was quite successful in combining carrots and sticks and achieving a balance between strong-arming and diplomatic efforts.

In summary, it is possible to infer that Libya can be used as a key example to effectively implement a “coercive diplomacy” policy. The existence of greater potential complementarity between coercion and diplomacy in this case seems to have been particularly effective.

The major motivation of Qaddafi was always to stay in power; however, the way to do this was shown to be more functionally flexible than ideologically static. In fact, both internal pressures and coercive diplomacy policy combined to bring Qaddafi to the stage where his grip on power was very much helped by commitment to global issues rather than siding with global extremism. Besides, looked at from a western point of view, attempting to change a regime can have counterproductive effects in terms of achieving policy change, and often as in Iraq leads to unforeseen impacts. Equally, regime change rhetoric in itself can have such an impact.

On the other hand, the Libya example has demonstrated what can be achieved when regime change is kept unstirred by the negotiating parties. The several British and American reassurances during talks offered Libya the chance to consider policy change and dispelled fear of regime change intentions, which ultimately proved vital. To generalise from this case, it is therefore crucial to infer that rogue states need to be aware of the fact that the coercer can be
strong about not agreeing to limited cooperation and also dependable about not being too demanding.

However, this argument seems to contradict the idea that sustaining regime change as an alternative increases influence and enforcement actions. Additionally, economic restrictions can be used as an effective means of a coercive diplomacy policy whenever they are enforced multilaterally and maintained over time. Partakers in the undifferentiated discussion over whether economic restriction can or cannot be effective have to concentrate more on ascertaining the conditions according to which these sanctions are most likely to pay dividends. Similarly, it is also important to take into consideration lag time. Ever since the mid-to-late 1990s, sanctions have not been shown to be yielding much hope.

In a Libyan policy change. However, in the end, they proved to be a major element of the strong-arm policy that led to policy change. Besides, multinational support can be a deciding factor in a successful coercive diplomacy process. With the United States and Great Britain joining efforts, this proved to be a key factor in the variation in tough diplomacy actions, unlike the early stages of force-diplomacy toward Libya whose failure can be attribute to the absence of multilateral support. The successful efforts came as a result of combining diplomatic forces and extracted concessions from the Libyan regime, depending in so doing on the validity of Security Council sanctions. The proliferator has to be persuaded that it should not cause cracks into the coercer-led coalition, which indicates that the coercer’s potential supporters should be influenced to adopt a strong strategy, but not so far as to request too much out of them and thus divide their ranks.

**The Originality of the Thesis**

The originality of this thesis stems from achieving the key aim of this project which is to assess the applicability of the adoption of the theory of adaptive behaviour in terms of applying it on
a new case study and attempt to criticise and develop it to be keeping up with new generation of foreign policy analysis. In this context, the new version of the adaptive behaviour theory uses in this study to explore and investigate the changes in the Libyan foreign policy behaviour in the aftermath of the Soviet Union and the subsequent internal effects. This change was imposed upon Libya via a new international environment which surfaced after the collapse of the Soviet Union and due to internal pressurising factors following that collapse, stemming from various groups, and organisations. This made the Libyan foreign policy revolve around a constricted space without any strategic alliance such as that struck with the Soviet Union prior to its collapse, or a clear-cut internal structure. Furthermore, this situation forced Libya to follow a one-way route given the limited choices, which thus meant that there was not considerable scope for manoeuvre. As such, the Libyan foreign policy stakeholders had limited choices, that were summarized in the ways drop their adverse trends of the international environment, along with the internal ones, and seek to develop desirable orientations. In addition, this thesis is unique as a result of addressing the impact of the collapse of the Soviet Union on Libyan foreign policy through utilising a new original material (interviews) on one hand and through basing it on new literature or new readings of other sources on the others. In analysing these sources, special weight can be given to the interviewees who were some of the Libyan policy makers most involved directly in the shaping and implementation of Libyan foreign policy during that time. This then gives the researcher a chance to achieve a beneficial study rest on extraordinary data which have been studied with mentioning to other diversified materials. Moreover, the literature review research found that there is currently no full scale study of Libyan-Soviet relation in either English as Arabic to match what this study attempts to achieve. Therefore, the results in the thesis make it unique, and a valuable contribution to knowledge on this subject area, even though no doubt later authors will add further to that understanding.
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