Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents

Biermann, F.M. ORCID: 0000-0003-2594-7551, Naroditskiy, V., Polukarov, M., Nguyen, T.-D., Rogers, A. and Jennings, N.R., 2014. Task assignment with controlled and autonomous agents. Mathematical Social Sciences, 71, pp. 116-121. ISSN 0165-4896

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Abstract

We analyse assignment problems in which not every agent is controlled by the central planner. The free agents search for vacant tasks autonomously, guided by their own preferences. The central planner, aiming to maximise the total value of the assignment, must take into account the behaviour of the uncontrolled agents. We model this situation as an n + 1-player game played between n free agents and the central planner. We show that it is a weakly dominant strategy for the free agents to choose tasks according to their true preferences. Contrarily, the strategy of the central planner in the resulting Nash Equilibrium is highly complex – we prove that it corresponds to the solution of a mixed integer bilevel optimisation problem. Finally, we demonstrate how this program can be reduced to a computationally much more manageable disjoint bilinear program.

Item Type: Journal article
Alternative Title: Runaway task assignment
Publication Title: Mathematical Social Sciences
Creators: Biermann, F.M., Naroditskiy, V., Polukarov, M., Nguyen, T.-D., Rogers, A. and Jennings, N.R.
Publisher: Elsevier
Date: September 2014
Volume: 71
ISSN: 0165-4896
Identifiers:
NumberType
10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.04.007DOI
S0165489614000468Publisher Item Identifier
Divisions: Schools > Nottingham Business School
Depositing User: Linda Sullivan
Date Added: 27 Sep 2017 10:28
Last Modified: 18 Nov 2019 09:28
URI: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/31715

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