A measure to compare matchings in marriage markets

Biermann, F.M. ORCID: 0000-0003-2594-7551, 2011. A measure to compare matchings in marriage markets. Jerusalem: Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.

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Abstract

In matching markets the number of blocking pairs is often used as a criterion to compare matchings. We argue that this criterion is lacking an economic interpretation: In many circumstances it will neither reflect the expected extent of partner changes, nor will it capture the satisfaction of the players with the matching. As an alternative, we set up two principles which single out a particularly disruptive subcollection of blocking pairs. We propose to take the cardinality of that subset as a measure to compare matchings. This cardinality has an economic interpretation: The subset is a justifed objection against the given matching according to a bargaining set characterization of the set of stable matchings. We prove multiple properties relevant for a workable measure of comparison.

Item Type:	Working paper
Description:	Discussion paper # 575
Creators:	Biermann, F.M.
Publisher:	Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Place of Publication:	Jerusalem
Date:	June 2011
Divisions:	Schools > Nottingham Business School
Record created by:	Linda Sullivan
Date Added:	27 Sep 2017 14:38
Last Modified:	27 Sep 2017 14:41
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/31725

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