PRACTICE, SUBSTANCE AND HISTORY: REFRAMING INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS

Alistair Mutch, Nottingham Trent University

Alistair.mutch@ntu.ac.uk

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have benefited from stimulating conversations with Roger Friedland and Roy Suddaby; I am solely responsible for my interpretation of them. Participation in the events organized by the standing working group on organizational history at the colloquia of the European Group for Organization Studies has helped shape my approach; my thanks to the participants over the year and, especially, the organizers. Associate editor Hugh Willmott and reviewers have pushed me with challenging but constructive responses for which I am grateful.

Keywords: institutional theory; history of management; organization theory
Abstract

The characterization by Roger Friedland of institutional logics as a combination of substance and practices opens the door to a more complex reading of their influence on organizational life. His focus suggests attention to feelings and belief as much as cognition and choice. This article uses history to develop these ideas by paying attention to the perennial features of our embodied relations with the world and other persons. Historical work draws our attention to neglected domains of social life, such as play, which can have profound impacts on organizations. The study of history suggests that such institutions have a long run conditioning influence that calls into question accounts that stress individual agential choice and action in bringing about change. Analytical narratives of the emergence of practices can provide the means to combine the conceptual apparatus of organization theory with the attention to temporality of history.

The concept of institutional logics has achieved considerable traction in the study of organizations. Patricia Thornton, William Occasio and Michael Lounsbury (2012) provide us with a comprehensive summary of the work so far done. For them, logics are the “socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals and organizations provide meaning to their daily activity, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and experiences.” (Thornton, Occasio & Lounsbury, 2012:2). They stress a focus on logics at the societal level, suggesting that a limited number of such logics – they list family, community, religion, state, market, profession, and corporation – provide resources on which actors draw to develop
practices and shape identities. In this process they point to the historically situated nature of such logics, giving some brief examples of, for example, the impact of religion on economic development through the influence of the Primitive Baptist sect on the formation of J. C. Penney in the nineteenth century.

This use of history, is, however, rather limited. The institutional orders in which logics operate are derived inductively from the organizational literature. By contrast, as this article will examine in more detail, historians working on a longer time frame might suggest other candidates for the status of institution which can enrich our study of organizational life. This opens the door to an approach to logics informed by anthropological considerations, in which the focus is as much on beliefs and feelings as cognitions and choice. As Roy Suddaby has argued, historians see institutions as more substantial social structures than organization theorists in terms of both time and space. Institutions exist and exert social influence over decades, if not centuries, affecting multiple generations. Similarly, institutions extend their influence more broadly than mere organizational networks, but extend deeply into the core fabric of society (Suddaby, 2016: 52).

Taking such a perspective suggests two related problems with much work in institutional theory, explored in more detail below: an excessive focus on agential choice and an exaggerated view of the pace of change and the ability of agents to influence this.

This article marries a focus on how historians have approached the nature of institutions with the formulations of Roger Friedland. His suggestion that logics are a combination of substance and practice brings questions of value and belief firmly into the centre of our discussions. Using this combination, a number of areas of social life, each possessing distinctive logics, are discussed through the examination of historical work. I
begin by exploring the derivation of institutional logics from the work of Friedland and Alford (1991), tracing the divergent paths taken by Thornton, Occasio and Lousbury, and Friedland. Drawing on both Max Weber and the Dutch art historian Jacob Huizinga, I present a number of spheres of activity that historians have suggested provide sources of value and meaning. These are derived from the embodied relationships that humans have with each other and with the natural world. Within the framework so derived, historical work is reviewed with a view to drawing out some implications for how institutional logics are conceptualized.

In the discussion section I consider some implications of these conceptualizations for organizational institutionalism. Formulating institutional logics at a high level of abstraction facilitates comparative analysis across time and place, reducing the tendency to universalize logics found in particular historical conjunctures. Historical work then suggests how these abstract logics play out in concrete situations, where different practices and organizational forms mediate the dominance of particular logics. It also suggests caution in the use of the term “institutional change”, drawing our attention to multiple temporalities. Play as institutional logic in particular is used to suggest some new directions for consideration. Finally, the conclusion casts some doubt on the value of ‘toolbox’ metaphors, such as the influential work of Ann Swidler (1986), in which cultural ideas are conceptualized as resources which can be taken up at will and combined. Rather, it is suggested that the toolbox approach underplays the often unconscious and unintentional introduction of logics thanks to the selection of practices. A toolbox metaphor also downplays the extent to which ideas and practices are linked in complex relational webs. Practices are not independent objects that can be taken up or put down at will. While these connections might not be apparent to actors at moments of selection or use, historical analysis can reveal the conditioning logics that shape the form and nature of practices. It indicates the restrictions that condition the range of choice
available to actors, suggesting the more or less constrained zones of manoeuvre available to them. In turn, practices themselves play a key role in reproducing logics.

COMPETING PERSPECTIVES

When we consider the use of the term ‘institution’ in the literature generated by new institutionalism, we can observe two effects of the different uses of the term. The first is that much of new institutionalism is about institutionalization rather than institutions (Jepperson, 1991; Lawrence, Winn & Jennings, 2001)). In contrast to much of the usage in other disciplines, such as sociology and economics, the term institution is used to refer to any practice which has become institutionalized (Rowlinson, 1997). Attention is paid to a wide range of practices and actions which become taken-for-granted. It is this taken-for-granted status which attaches to them the label of ‘institution’ and the focus is on, in particular, processes of change. Much of the literature examines how what are termed institutions come to be reproduced, challenged or fall from taken-for-granted status. This emphasis tends to rather underplay the enduring status of institutions and places considerable stress, as discussed below, on the active role of actors in processes of change (Weik, 2015). What this focus also tends to elide is the different pace of change at different scales of action (Spicer & Sewell, 2010). Local practices, that is, can be much more amenable to change than logics that have become sedimented over time, but the language of institutionalization tends to blur such differences.

The second concern is that much of the new institutionalist literature has been concerned with questions of agency. This arose in response to concerns that early formulations placed too much stress on the conditioning nature of institutions, with not enough consideration of how they might facilitate change. One response was to stress the social skills of particular actors in being able to instigate change, to be “institutional entrepreneurs” (DiMaggio, 1988; Fligstein, 1997). Another was to emphasize the
“institutional work” that was needed to bring about change, a perspective which emphasizes how taken-for-granted practices are changed by more or less conscious activity on the part of participants (Lawrence, Suddaby & Leca, 2009). The problem with this focus on agency is that it risks losing some of the power of institutionalist approaches, power which lies in the way that institutions provide not only resources for selection but shape the categories of agency that are available to actors. Institutions provide role specifications for positions such as ‘priest’, ‘general’ or ‘judge’, carrying with them powerful expectations about how roles should be conducted. While there might be degrees of freedom within such role specifications, they are powerful conditioning influences on action. The very term ‘entrepreneur’, for example, can be seen to be laden with value drawn from the institution of the economy. Failure to acknowledge this runs the danger, as Suddaby (2010) points out, of letting the rational actor of contingency theory back in. The combination of a focus on change and on the role of agents in enabling such change places too much emphasis on the ability to select items from a menu and not enough on the enduring and conditioning nature of the contexts in which actors find themselves.

It is because of these concerns that some scholars in the institutionalist tradition have turned to the notion of institutional logics as developed by Friedland and Alford in 1991. For Friedland and Alford (1991), institutions are combinations of symbolic constructions and material practices that give meaning to the ways in which people engage in their social and organizational life. They are few in number, operate at the societal level, and are enduring in character. Society, they suggest, consists of a set of institutions, each with their own logics and possessing relative autonomy. Institutions display a logic which gives meaning to the practices that organizations and individuals engage in, forming the “laws of motion” of a particular order. This article develops this perspective by arguing that institutions are each
derived from some aspect of the relations between people and their social and natural worlds, as demonstrated through the work of historians to be enduring features of human existence.

A focus on history is supported by the argument that any particular instance of organizational action is necessarily emergent from both pre-existing conditions and the actions of those who seek to work with or challenge those conditions. The work of historians enables us to specify the nature and development of the pre-existing conditions in which actors find themselves involuntarily placed. The circumstances in which actors find themselves condition their actions by providing situational logics which guide, but do not determine, their responses (Archer, 1995). For Friedland, the importance of history is that the explication of the impact of any particular logic needs to be located in a specific conjuncture of time and place. History does more, however, than simply explicate the immediate conditions for action. It also points to those features of social life which appear, from the evidence, to represent responses to the perennial features that human beings encounter as a consequence of their embodied relationships with each other and the natural world.

The focus here on perennial aspects of the human condition raises for some the spectre of essentialism. This is the charge that such relations are seen as fixed and unchanging, playing a determining role in human affairs. Such a position has come under fire from arguments that reality is socially constructed through language. However, as O’Mahoney (2012) argues, such arguments themselves posit, even if tacitly, the existence of a capacity for language. It is granted that such capacities manifest themselves in very different ways, but there are embodied features that make language a possibility. Further, Lakoff and Johnson (1980) have shown how features of language, such as metaphors, are themselves draws from embodied encounters with both other humans and the natural world. This can then be termed ‘weak’ essentialism, in which the recognition of certain embodied capabilities places some constraints on human activity, but of a conditioning rather than a determining kind. All social
theories contain assumptions about such embodied attributes. For the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1960 [1911]: 141) this was founded on two bodily capacities. Because bipedalism gave human beings increased mobility, they found themselves in novel situations, which demanded new solutions, rather than the instinctive responses of animals confined to familiar situations. This gave rise, he argued, to conceptualizations transposable across contexts. The capacity for language, meanwhile, gave rise to the ability to share, develop and transmit such conceptualizations. From these basic embodied capacities evolved a wide range of social structures; history helps us by attesting to those which seem to have been fundamental to the ways in which humans make sense of their world.

At this point it is worth distinguishing between institutional logics and institutionalized logics. The concept of a “logic”, a set of interconnected relations that condition activity, is a valuable one which can be used for a range of social situations. In the study of organizational strategy, for example, Prahalad and Bettis (1986) have used the term “dominant logic” to describe the sets of assumptions that govern organizational action, providing a sense of direction and appropriateness to organizational actors. The nature of such logics is often taken-for-granted, being brought to the fore, in their discussion, in the context of mergers and acquisitions. Here the logic of operations that shapes the major player is thrown into sharp relief when it comes into contrast with the logic of the target acquisition. The failure to merge or adjust the two logics can then lead to under performance. The word “dominant” also suggests the possibility of subordinate logics, as well as indicating the power relations that might lie at the heart of logics. When such logics within organizations become taken-for-granted we may claim that they have become institutionalized, just as we might make the same assertions when examining, for example, the field. However, for this discussion we need to distinguish such taken-for-granted logics from institutional logics. Just in the same way, these logics provide meaning to actions but at the scale of societies. They
provide the situational logics for action at the scale of the field or the organization, but are relatively enduring in character.

Friedland and Alford give us a list of institutions - capitalist market, bureaucratic state, democracy, nuclear family, and Christian religion – which they quite clearly label as features of “the contemporary capitalist West” (Friedland & Alford, 1991: 232). They do not, however, provide us with any criteria by which they selected these as institutions, preferring to elaborate on their notion of the logics which such institutions display. In their influential version of this discussion, Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012: 66) suggest an expanded list of institutions, ones which we have already seen in the introduction: family, community, religion, state, market, profession, and corporation. In developing this list, they quite clearly have in mind some criteria for definitions, if these are only presented in negative fashion, by drawing attention to what they see as weaknesses in the Friedland and Alford discussion. For example, in reviewing the Friedland and Alford (1991) formulation they point out that “The influences of the professions, which both Meyer and Rowan … and DiMaggio and Powell … so clearly laid out, are mysteriously absent” (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012: 66). What, however, makes this ‘mysterious’? There are clearly criteria for such a judgment being deployed, but they are not articulated. I return to this question of how we determine the institutions that we examine in the body of the article, but the formulation of institutional logics has been taken in a different direction by Friedland.

Friedland is a sociologist of religion who has used his work to suggest that we examine institutions as domains for religious action, each animated by belief and love. He has, in particular, placed considerable emphasis on the absence of the consideration of love and the erotic from our consideration of how institutions work. This focus on the centrality of a value-centred view of the internal life of institutions, draws on an Aristotelian notion of substance. In Friedland’s terms the substance is the essence of a particular form, something
which gives it its distinguishing character. In the context of institutional logics the substance is the animating force, the essence that gives meaning to practices. Derived from this he suggests that an institutional logic is “a bundle of practices organized around a particular substance and its secondary derivatives from which the normativity of those practices is derived” (Friedland, 2009: 61). Further, those practices are central to the creation and maintenance of substance, which cannot be directly observed but which is “immanent in the practices that organize an institutional field, values never exhausted by those practices, practices premised on faith” (Friedland, 2009: 61). In turn, Friedland (2014) has related these ideas to Max Weber’s notion of ‘value spheres’, giving a useful starting point for the identification of institutions and their associated logics. Weber’s essay on “religious rejections of the world and their directions”, first published in 1915, took as its starting point Indian religious forms, the most developed form, he argued, of religion rejecting the world (Weber, 1948). In order to do this, he suggested a number of ideal types of “life orders” or “value spheres” against which to contrast the claims of religion. These value spheres consisted of different ways of being in the world and Weber considered them in turn to explore the tensions between them and religion. These spheres of value were: kinship; economic; political; aesthetic; erotic and intellectual. Interestingly, in another essay published in the same collection, an extract from Economy and Society, our attention is drawn to the importance of the military in providing the template for the wider importance of discipline in the modern world. Weber’s value spheres inform the elaboration of Friedland’s discussion that is put forward in this article, which develops Friedland’s discussion in two ways.

One is that he does not propose a corresponding set of value spheres or institutions in which logics might operate. His discussion suggests, however, that belief is a central criterion. The motivating force for engaging in institutional life is belief in the central substance or value (and its secondary derivatives), be it love, accountability, loyalty or
honour. If belief is the key sustaining term in linking substance to practices, then we need to consider the nature of belief a little further. The theologian Graham Ward (2014) has argued that belief is primordial, based on our embodied engagement with each other and the world. Drawing on both neuroscience and literature, he argues that belief is anterior to knowledge and, indeed, to faith. Although the work of a theologian, this is not a theological argument. Rather an inbuilt orientation to believe provides the capacity for religious faith, but also for other forms of belief. Institutions, that is, are put in motion and endure because of belief, belief which gives meaning to and is manifest in practices. This suggests that belief is one criterion by which we can define institutions. It is not just that institutions are taken-for-granted, but that they involve a commitment to certain value-laden assumptions which animate action.

The second element that we need to add to Friedland is the organization. As a sociologist of religion, he is not concerned with the organizational dimension of institutional life. As organizational analysts we are interested both in how institutional logics might shape organizations across logics and how logics generate distinctive forms of organization. So, for example, Protestant sects such as the Primitive Baptists developed organizing models based on a commitment to the priesthood of all believers that then formed to-hand templates for business organizations. Churches are one distinctive form of organization: we will consider others below. While Friedland’s examples often operate with a direct connection between specific practices and the animating value, institutional theory would suggest the organization as a key mediating factor. We can view organizations as particular bundles of practices, practices which are given more stability by being attached to defined positions. Those positions carry with them certain performance expectations and can be associated with authoritative relations over both people and material resources. Accordingly, the discussion below will bring organizations into explicit consideration.
For Friedland and Alford (1991: 255) institutions are bound to particular conjunctions of time and space, and so history is important. William Ocasio, Michael Mauskapf and Christopher Steele (2016: 677) argue that, rather than viewing institutional logics as Weberian ideal types, they need to be seen as “historically constituted cultural structures generated through collective memory making”. They use the example of the emergence of the corporate logic in the United States between 1860 and 1920 drawing on a number of sources of memory. In this they provide an example of the use of history to provide content for the location of a particular logic. Historians supply us with valuable evidence about how institutions have developed and changed over time. However, as Rowlinson, Hassard and Decker (2014) have argued, “History” can have a dual sense; it is about both the past and about how historians have presented that past. What I am particularly interested in is how historians have conceptualized institutions and how such conceptualizations might help the analysis of contemporary institutional logics. Before looking at how historians have done this, it is helpful to remind ourselves about how Weber used historical materials in his discussion of “value spheres” (Townley, 2002: 164). He, of course, was not a historian, at least not in the sense of one who delved in the archives to unearth material that shed light on events and practices at particular times. He has, however, a good claim to be regarded as an originator of historical sociology, one who used the work of historians extensively in developing his arguments (Ghosh, 2008). It was only through the use of such materials that he could trace the long-term emergence and development of value spheres.

History is, of course, a broad category. The present discussion draws more on cultural and social historians than the business historians who often feature in discussions of history in organization theory journals (Rowlinson & Proctor, 1999; Godfrey et al, 2016: 592). As Suddaby (2016) argues, this is because cultural and social historians are not only concerned with a broader scope of social life but also that they tend to challenge existing theoretical and
philosophical approaches. Conventional economic and business historians, suggests Suddaby, tend to relegate questions of value and meaning to the sidelines, taking an objectivist view of historical “facts” as embodied in time series data. Cultural historians, by contrast, are more likely to give us insight into how values have operated and changed over time. The notion of a set of value-laden spheres of human activity animated by belief gives us one way of approaching the work of the historian Jacob Huizinga, whose work introduces our consideration of the resources of history for the definition of institutions.

THE RESOURCES OF HISTORY

Huizinga (1872-1945) was a Dutch cultural historian who produced a series of important books about European art, in particular in the context of the Middle Ages. Amongst these was *Homo ludens: A study of the play-element in culture*, published in 1944. He argued strongly for play as fundamental to human culture. This was a provocative and significant contribution, one which is being rediscovered given the attention being paid in some disciplines to the significance of games in modern culture. So the analyst of video games Miguel Sicart (2014: 2) draws explicitly on Huizinga to argue that “play is a manifestation of humanity, used for expressing and being in the world.” On this view, play is not just epiphenomenal, but one of the key sources of value in society, value manifest in distinctive practices. So Huizinga’s work has continuing relevance. For our purposes, what is intriguing is his observation that “while in the more highly organized forms of society religion, science, law, war and politics gradually lose touch with play, the function of the poet still remains fixed in the play-sphere where it was born” (Huizinga, 1949: 119). There is an echo here, although with a slightly different inflection, of Weber’s list of value spheres. The key departure, of course, is the inclusion of play. In line with our focus on the perennial features of our embodied relationship with the world, the sociologist of professions Eliot Friedson has made a persuasive case that medicine, dealing as it does with the human propensity to
succumb to disease and the inevitability of death, might also be considered as a primary institution. If we marry these suggestions with the proposition by Friedland that institutional logics are composed of a substance and distinctive practices, plus our desire to introduce organizations as an explicit component of our discussion, then we get the list outlined in table one. Institutions are each derived from some aspect of the relations between people and their social and natural worlds, as demonstrated through the work of historians to be enduring features of human existence. That such relations play out differently in specific combinations of time and place is accepted but, as noted above, these are deliberately at a high level of abstraction. This is presented as a guide for our discussion of how historians have approached institutions.

Take in table one about here

The choice of a single word to express the substance of each institution is fraught with difficulty. Friedland (2009: 61) refers to “a particular substance and its secondary derivatives”; a complete discussion would consider these derivatives. However, for the present argument the criterion is something which seems to motivate belief and give meaning to distinctive practices. In the final column I give an example of a representative practice which is distinctive in that institution. Intervening is a category which is not salient in Friedland’s discussion but needs to be for our purpose, that of the organization. Organizations are included because our particular interest, often neglected by historians, is how organizational forms mediate particular forms of logic. Again, the examples given are representative only.

One choice here deserves a little further discussion. The family as a form of collective relationship bound by ties of kinship rather than instrumentality is the institution in which the relationship between the substance and the practices seems at its most immediate, relatively
unmediated by other organizational forms, like platoons or congregations, which are proper
to other institutions. There are plenty of such forces from other institutions seeking to mould
the family, from law courts to church bodies, each claiming and contesting jurisdiction. But it
seems difficult to conceive of the family itself as an organization. At particular times in
history and in particular places, however, one could argue the household is a form of
organization, especially when it contains unrelated members, such as servants. This is
clearest in farming and craft environments, where workers and apprentices are housed under
the same roof and treated as members of an extended family. Again, in each case much more
could be said about the dimensions of each putative institution, but the discussion that
follows is of necessity compressed, picking up on some illustrative rather than exhaustive
aspects. It starts with a discussion of how historians have approached institutions, with a
particular focus on the nature of embodied relationships with the world that emerge and
solidify over time. It then shows how historical accounts can help us understand some of the
complexities of institutional change, pointing to ways in which such change can be
investigated.

**Conceptualizing institutions**

When in her history of domestic life in eighteenth-century England, the cultural
historian Amanda Vickery (2009: 193) refers to “the fundamental institution of society, the
male-headed household family”, you will search in vain for a definition of the term
“institution”. It is simply assumed, with the focus being on its elaboration through the
 provision of evidence which shores up the concept. This frustrates some historians. In the
words of the medievalist Chris Wickham (2011: 221),
Historians tend to avoid theorising; it is one of the most characteristic cultural features of the discipline, in fact. But it is also one of its major weak points, for the attachment of historians to the empiricist-expository mode only-too-often hides their theoretical presuppositions, not only from others, but from the writers themselves.

The suspicion of theory on the part of many historians, or certainly its overt explication, means that concepts are often woven into the fabric of the narrative. Indeed, the structuring of that narrative is in itself an important part of the conceptual labor that historians engage in. As one historian who does deploy concepts drawn from social theory to examine changing practices and their impact on identity says, in explaining why his conceptual apparatus is woven into his analysis, “[s]ome of the theoretical literature contains many historical mistakes, and it is probably best to use it as a jumping-off point, inspiring new questions, rather than regard it with too much respect” (Snell, 2006: 23). However, a historian who was not averse to debates in social theory, E. P. Thompson, provides intriguing support to the Friedland and Alford (1991) conceptualization of separate institutions, each powered by their own internal logics, when in his study of eighteenth century England he observes

The law may also be seen as ideology, or as particular rules and sanctions which stand in a definite and active relationship (often a field of conflict) to social norms; and, finally, it may be seen simply in terms of its own logic, rules and procedures – that is, simply as law. And it is not possible to conceive of any complex society without law (Thompson, 1977, 260: my emphasis).

Historians are also frequently suspicious of comparative work, immersed as they often are in the contingencies of particular historical conjunctures. This is especially the case when comparative work, as in some economic history informed by econometrics, is associated with
a positivist search for invariant laws (Steinmetz, 2014). However, there is another sense in which comparison is of value, and that is in making the taken-for-granted strange. As the historian of classical antiquity, Paul Veyne, observes, “if in order to study a civilization, we limit ourselves to reading what it says itself - that is, to reading sources relating to this one civilization - we will make it more difficult to wonder at what, in this civilization, was taken for granted” (Veyne, 1984: 7). This has a particular resonance for the view of institutional logics developed here, which sees them as tightly bound to particular practices, practices which are all the more powerful when they appear natural and obvious. Comparative work, as we will see, can challenge the taken-for-granted and help us see in new ways.

Institutions emergent from embodied relations with the world

In his analysis of the nature of professional work, Friedson examines its intersection with what he terms the ‘core disciplines’ of social life. He sees these as “bodies of knowledge and skill which address perennial problems that are of great importance to most of humanity” (Friedson, 2001: 161). “[M]edicine, law, and religion exemplify such disciplines,” he argues, “dealing as they do with relief from pain, illness, and disability..., the just resolution of disputes and maintenance of social order, and a comforting relationship to the perennial misfortunes of life and the inevitable prospect of death” (Friedson, 2001: 161). They are characterized by attachment to what he terms “transcendent values”, in this case “Health, Justice, and Salvation” (Friedson, 2001: 161). He goes on to examine other transcendent values such as “Beauty, Truth, or Knowledge” (Friedson, 2001: 167). These transcendent values and the associated ‘disciplines’ look very like institutions and their associated substances as Friedland discusses them. But how are they to be identified? Friedson’s use of the term “perennial” suggests that they are chronically recurring. Further, just as with play in Huizinga’s discussion, they are taken as being fundamental to the human condition. History is a way of tracing the existence and evolution of these responses to “perennial” aspects of
the human condition. We can group them into three categories. There are those institutions which arise from the struggle for embodied existence in the natural world, leading to solutions for reproduction, material existence and physical well being: family, economy and medicine. There are institutions arising from a desire to make sense of that embodied existence: religion, play and knowledge. Finally, human existence is a profoundly social one, albeit emergent from individual engagement with the natural world, and mechanisms have evolved for dealing with social interactions: dispute resolution by physical force, by regulation, or by debate: the military, the law and politics. What history demonstrates is not only the perennial nature of such responses but the complex and shifting nature of their manifestation in practices.

**Practices as carriers of institutional logics**

One institution which possesses distinctive practices and organizational forms, together with a belief in values which often set its practitioners off from civilian life, is the military. Indeed, some of those practices, such as intensive drilling, have precisely the purpose of engendering such a separation, taking their meaning from a military logic. That logic might be expressed in a number of words – courage, reputation, glory, loyalty, are all candidates – but honour seems to express best this animating principle. If practices take their meaning from the institutional logic in which they are embedded, this does not mean that they are necessarily engaged in because of formal belief in and commitment to that logic. While practices may have had their origins in a conscious design process, they may over time become detached from such origins. This, however, makes them no less powerful in expressing the substance at the heart of the logic. This is seen most clearly when practices become hardened into rituals. History is invaluable here in helping us to trace this process. The tendency to talk as if logics are selected by organizations neglects this long term
conditioning, conditioning which can only be indicated by the careful tracing of historical emergence.

As the analyst of religious ritual Harvey Whitehouse (2004: 69) has argued, “what it means to be a regular churchgoer is not to be part of a particular group but to participate in a ritual scheme and belief structure that anonymous others also share.” In order to participate in such rituals, it is not necessary to have formal knowledge of why rituals are as they are, but how to perform them. In turn, such performances reproduce the logic in which they are embedded, with consequences for identity. As Whitehouse (2004: 93) observes, “people who attend church regularly do not need to have quasi-theoretical knowledge of the links between standing and singing, kneeling and praying, and sitting and listening, such knowledge is bound to emerge over time.” That knowledge can then generate particular identities which are shaped more by the common performance of the ritual than by abstract theoretical considerations. In his study of the religious influences on the cities of Boston and Philadelphia, Baltzell (1979: 367) recounts the story of an eminent Boston Unitarian commenting to an Episcopalian friend, “Eliza, do you kneel down in church and call yourself a miserable sinner? Neither I nor any member of my family will ever do that!” (emphasis in original). These practices are at their most powerful when they appear “natural”. Comparative historical analysis of particular practices, setting them in the wider context of their emergence and development, is one powerful way to make such practices “strange” and so to indicate the logics that they manifest.

Practices change; logics endure

Friedland’s discussions of logics tends to focus on the relationship between practice and substance at a particular point in time. However, history, with its focus on multiple temporalities, suggests that, once emergent from particular practices, logics can endure while the detail of the practices they influence can change. An example of this in organizational
The specific difference that Smets, Morris and Greenwood draw our attention to is the construction of contracts. Contracts drawn up by German lawyers were sparse in form, resting on the specification of standard terms in legal codes. By contrast, English lawyers produced dense contracts with many clauses. This difference reflected the assumptions embedded in different legal systems, suggesting a more enduring logic. Lauren Edelman, Christopher Uggen and Howard Erlanger show how grievance procedures in US companies were modelled on perceptions of legal practice. “Grievance procedures appear rational,” they argue, “because they look like the system of appeals available in the public legal process” (Edelman, Uggen & Erlanger 1999: 416). These same grievance procedures come to be accepted over time as evidence of best practice by the courts and so changed the substance of the law. On their account this process took place over a period of some thirty years. However, what did not change (although they do not discuss this) was the underlying logic of a common law system, in which the interpretation of laws by judges depends in turn on cases being brought, results being published and precedents drawn on. This is a quite different logic
from the emphasis on codification in civil law systems, a logic which could be found in the royal academies of seventeenth-century France that Victoria Johnson (2007) examined. Here, royal academies, “an organizational form sponsored by the king and traditionally devoted to private discussion among academy members”, were seen as the to-hand template for the organization of the Paris Opera (Johnson, 2007: 104). In turn, those academies promoted a logic of centralized political control, in which the “main goal was codification of guidelines for production in an academy's given area of cultural or scientific specialization” (Johnson, 2007: 108). These examples suggest that we need to exercise caution in talking of institutional change. Practices may change readily, organizations more slowly but, history suggests, logics endure. That is not to say that they do not change, but these examples of contrasting legal systems mean that we need to be careful to contextualize institutions to particular conjunctures of time and place.

Historical narratives cause us to question the account of institutional change embedded in actor-centred conceptions such as the institutional entrepreneur. In her discussion of the evolution of the Paris Opera since its inception in the seventeenth century, Johnson (2007: 119) shows how “the recombination of models that led to the founding form of the Opera emerged not through the efforts of a single actor, but instead through the interactions of that actor with influential others in his environment.” Such historical accounts suggest that it took a number of actors, both individual and collective, over a long number of years to effect broader change. When the Liverpool, UK, brewer Andrew Barclay Walker employed salaried managers, rather than tenants, in his public houses in the middle of the nineteenth century, it is doubtful whether he had any intention of changing practices in the broader industry. Rather, he sought practices which made sense in his immediate context, but which were to-hand to him from his status as a Scottish migrant into an English context (Mutch, 2007). The company he developed, Peter Walker & Son, would indeed later
proselytise on the part of the merits of management. However, this met with little support until a collective movement of both social reformers and leading figures in the industry seized on the practice of direct management as part of their campaign to change the nature of drinking. It took over one hundred years and a succession of actors to cement the taken for granted status of the practice (Mutch, 2006a).

This represents change within one institutional logic. Massimiliano Tomba (2012: 175) has used the metaphor of geological layers to draw attention to the ways in which logics can develop at different paces. This is developed as a challenge to linear, sequential models in which there is a coordinated change between logics. Rather, he points out, ‘archaic’ elements, such as slavery, can combine with advanced economic development. Although the metaphors of strata and sedimentation have limits, because they do not account for dynamic connections across logics, they do point to different paces of change in logics. Economic practices, for example, may change with considerable rapidity, while religious practices are more enduring. It is this concern with multiple temporalities that characterizes much historiographical debate (Osbourne, 2015). This is not time as a variable, but history as irreversible. We can see the origins of this concern in the influential work of Bergson (1960 [1911]). He distinguished the linear time of science, characterized by its decomposition into interchangeable units, from the qualitative experience of time as duration. From this the French historian Marc Bloch developed the scheme that would be associated with the influential Annales school of historical analysis, with its focus on the longue duree, that is, the slowly unfolding structures of economics and demography that conditioned human activity (Osbourne, 2015: 40). This focus on the long term, almost glacial pace of change, emphasizes the need to recognize that different social phenomena operate at different temporalities.

Historically specific forms of logics and their relationships
We have seen in the above example that the law as a societal institution takes very different forms in England and Germany. We could point to other areas of social life where it is important to see institutions as differentiated, while still adhering to a central form of logic. If, for example, we take religion as in the words of one sociological definition, “any mythically sustained concern for ultimate meanings coupled with a ritually reinforced sense of social belonging” (Demerath & Schmitt, 1998: 382), then the logic inherent in that statement can be instantiated in a variety of forms. To take Western Christianity as a starting point, there was a time when, in broad terms, the institutional logic was consistent with an undifferentiated institution, in which the Catholic church provided both the authorized belief system and the approved practices, as well as the only legitimate organizational form. However, the Reformation saw the emergence of competing formulations in all these dimensions (MacCulloch, 2004). At least three major competing formations, each with their own formal statements of belief, their own distinctive practices and their own organizational form, came into existence: the Lutheranism that characterized much of Germany and northern Europe; the Calvinism of the Netherlands and Scotland; and the Episcopalianism of England. From this time, any consideration of ‘religion’ as an institution within Christianity has to consider the particular form that is under consideration.

This specific form then comes into relationship with the other institutions that constitute society. In some cases this forms a complementary relationship. In Scotland, for example, one can trace a mutually supportive relationship between religion, law and education (Mutch, 2015). Scots law drew heavily on a Roman law tradition, in which there was, by European standards, an early attempt to codify legal rules and promulgate these in written form. This in turn rested on widespread literacy in an educational system which featured the same focus on starting from first principles that characterized both the law and the particular religious form of the Church of Scotland. In turn, that church both monitored
and encouraged the growth of a basic education system and a higher education system. This
distinctive complex of institutional forms can be seen in sharper focus when contrasted with
the position in England, where a common law tradition and a state church featuring both a
nominal hierarchy and a strong element of devolved authority fostered the enduring influence
of custom and tradition. This was reinforced by an ad hoc and fragmented educational
system, whose pinnacles in the form of the universities of Oxford and Cambridge remained
profoundly shaped by and limited to particular religious traditions. The implications for
economic activity is that the distinctive complex of logics in Scotland gave rise to a particular
focus on accounting and accountability. This sheds light on the significant contribution of
Scots to the development of the accounting profession, indicating the value of setting
organizational developments in their broader historical context (Previs & Merino, 1997).

Another historical example of the different receptions of business practice across
different polities is supplied by Frank Dobbin’s (1994) examination of the response to
railways in the United States, Britain and France in the nineteenth century. “English political
traditions,” he argues, “gave sovereignty to elite individuals rather than to autonomous
communities, as in the United States, or to the central state, as in France” (Dobbin, 1994:
159). These different traditions in turn gave rise to very different responses to railways as
expressed in industrial policy. These responses, then, were produced by enduring logics that
were not necessarily articulated as such by participants in debates but that conditioned the
resources that were to-hand. Revealing such logics depends on accessing and deploying
historical work that examines the development over time of, in this case, political logics. If
we return to the observation about comparative analysis from Paul Veyne (1984), it is only
when we place these contrasting features next to each other that we appreciate that logics are
instantiated in very different forms.
Institutions emerging but shaped by their emergence

While the focus of history is on the endurance of institutions over long periods of time, this is not to say that they do not change. One particularly important observation from history is that institutions are carved out of founding institutions, but retain the marks of that emergence. The final value sphere that Weber considered was what he termed the ‘intellectual’ one; we noted above that knowing and philosophy were cardinal reference points for Huizinga as well. It is therefore mysterious, to use Thornton et al’s (2012: 66) word, why knowledge has not featured in accounts of institutional logics more prominently. After all, most of those who write on the topic hail from what are termed, in another discourse, ‘institutions’, and confront in their working activities questions of the boundaries between their world and those of the ‘real’ world (as in the debate on relevance). In addition, for some, such as John Meyer (2008), the spread and development of higher education is a key element in the rationalization of the modern world. It is also the domain which illustrates most clearly the carving out of significant areas of activity from the purview of religion. Indeed, this heritage is what gives added spice to the debates between science and religion. Ways of knowing the world, and their associated educational arrangements, start with control by a priesthood. As Weber notes

The priesthood, as the only agents capable of conserving tradition, took over the training of youth in the law and often in purely administrative technologies, and, above all, in writing and calculus. The more religion became book-religion and doctrine, the more literary it became and the more efficacious it was in provoking rational lay-thinking, freed of priestly control (Weber, 1948: 351).

From this emerged the universities, firstly as specialist centres of theological training and then as broader centres. In some places, such as England, this religious function continued to color the university curriculum for centuries; in others, such as Scotland, areas
of more practical application such as medicine and geology appeared much sooner (Carter, 1990). Clearly, this is an on-going relationship, with the imprint of religious origins still being evident in, for example, the persistence of universities with denominational attachments. How far such attachments shape the pursuit of knowledge within such organizations is a matter for empirical investigation.

We can apply this to what is often presented as the most ‘objective’ area of human activity, the economy. As presented by mainstream economics, this often operates with the assumptions of rational choice, uncolored by the influences of culture. However, it is the core of the institutionalist project that not only are there cultural forces at work in society that overflow the rational calculations said to be indicative of economic activity, but that economic activity itself is profoundly shaped by culture. The rationality of economic life, that is, is as much an artefact of the search for order by economists, themselves shaped by powerful myths, as it is a natural property of economic life itself. At the heart, just as with the other institutions, is belief. The philosopher of religion Mark Taylor has argued that in Adam Smith’s work, God becomes secularized: “God did not simply disappear but was reborn as the market” (Taylor, 2004: 6). The market then becomes the object of faith, in which practices, such as the granting of credit, take their efficacy from a belief in shared rationalized myths. This for Taylor then becomes a ‘confidence game’ in which economic activity is based not on real world production but on belief in future states. Emil Kauder (1965) in his History of Marginal Utility Theory takes this analysis of the impact of religion on economic thought still further. Noting the central place of work as a justified activity in its own right in Calvinist theology, he suggests that Adam Smith, bathed in the Scottish Presbyterian literature, put labor in the centre of his account of value creation. By contrast, he argues “moderate pleasure-seeking and happiness form the centre of economic actions” in Catholic traditions (Kauder, 1965: 9). This gives a contrasting emphasis on consumption
rather than production as the motor of economic activity. Such accounts suggest that the impact of the context from which practices emerged can be profound, even at a considerable distance in time.

**DISCUSSION**

From history, therefore, we can get a sense of institutions enduring while changing. That change can continue to bear the marks of foundational circumstances. It suggests that in considering institutional change we need to be alive to multiple temporalities, taking care not to conflate change in practice, organization or field with societal change. As we have noted, historians offer a significantly different list of institutions from those featuring in organizational theory, but do not discuss the criteria for selection. On the basis of their work, however, I have argued that institutions are each derived from some aspect of the relations between people and their social and natural worlds, as demonstrated through the work of historians to be enduring features of human existence. That such relations play out differently in specific combinations of time and place is accepted and it is the task of empirical analysis to locate these relations in their historical context. In this section I consider the implications for our views of change, followed by some consequences for organizational analysis.

**History, logics and change**

One concern with much of the work in new institutionalism is that it appears bound to phenomena that are typical of the global north, especially the USA. That debate happens in other spheres as well. The validity of the application of a concept like ‘religion’ has been brought into question when detached from what are seen to be its origins in the consideration of western religions (Asad, 1993). This remains an open debate, but one consequence is the need to specify the concept at a level of abstraction which makes it transferable across time and place. Thus in the sociology of religion an influential definition of religion, one which recognizes this need for portability across contexts, is “any mythically sustained concern for
ultimate meanings coupled with a ritually reinforced sense of social belonging” (Demerath & Schmitt, 1998: 382). Of course, such a conceptualization is also potentially transferable, as Friedland suggests, to other institutions. The idea of the outline in table one is that the institutions are potentially applicable across a range of temporally and spatially situated activities. Of course, the balance of each will be different and there is nothing in this formulation that suggests the primacy of any of them. In eighteenth century England, for example, Thompson suggested that it was the law that we need to turn in order to understand the nature of society, rather than the military, religion or the economy (Thompson, 1977: 262).

Thus it follows that any analysis has to consider the specificity of each institution in a particular time and place. To return to our focus on religion, Weber’s analysis of the relationship between religion and the economy covered, as we have seen, the major world religions. These had very different inflections, and these inflections changed over time. Religious belief generates distinctive forms of organization which mediate the relationship between substance and practice. The church is a way of organizing religious practice which is particularly associated with Christianity, but even here there are considerable differences in form, from the centralized control and hierarchy of Roman Catholicism to the local control of Congregationalism (Jeremy, 1998). This reminds us that there can be tensions and contradictions within specific instantiations of an overall institution. So not only are there different conceptions of what faith is taken to be between religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Islam, for example, but each tradition is itself internally divided. This points to the need to be specific about how a substance like “faith” is interpreted and mobilized. The outline presented, that is, can only be a broad sketch which needs to be populated for specific instances. It has been my contention that history is vital to this act of population.
What history also points to is the enduring nature of institutions in a way which should give us pause in using the phrase “institutional change”. If we conceptualize institutions as being enduring in the way that historians envisage them, then such change happens but slowly and over long periods of time. This means that we need to be careful in seeing fields and organizations as mediators for the impact of institutions. Over time, changes in practice can shift logics at the level of the field, as carefully traced in the legal sphere by Smets, Morris and Greenwood (2012). In time, such changes may shift the meaning of the central institution, but this is likely to be over a much longer timescale and involve collective actors.

Implications for organizational analysis

If we turn now to the implications for organizational analysis, consideration of values and beliefs engendered by our embodied existence in the world suggests a broadening of the spheres of activity that shape life in organizations. This provides an opening to richer, more complex readings of organizational life, informed by the broader resources of arts and humanities. It also suggests that institutional logics are not just experienced cognitively but are felt. This supports the idea that beliefs and emotions are as important as cognitions in the impact of institutions (Voronov & Weber, 2016). Perhaps the most distinctive suggestion is that we consider play as an institution. Huizinga, writing in the 1940s, was sceptical about the role of play in modern society. For him, “the sad conclusion forces itself upon us that the play-element in culture has been on the wane ever since the 18th century, when it was in full flower” (Huizinga, 1948: 2069). He saw developments such as the rise of organized sport as false play, because it was taken too seriously. An interesting suggestion made almost as an aside was “[b]usiness becomes play. This process goes so far that some of the great business concerns deliberately instil the play-spirit into their workers so as to step up production. The trend is now reversed: play becomes business” (Huizinga, 1948: 165). But if we take his
focus seriously then it draws our attention to the ways in which many areas of economic activity play is re-entering the workplace. From hi-tech offices to residential courses, play is promoted as a way of both attracting knowledge workers and of changing the nature of work. We can be skeptical about the “true” level of fun that is expressed in such pronouncements, but it perhaps indicates to us the wider place of play in contemporary society. After all, it cannot be said that in the pursuit of fun there are not significant practices and specific organizational forms, from art galleries to symphony orchestras, from jazz bands to music festivals, several of which have featured in influential new institutionalist accounts (DiMaggio, 1982; Townley, 2002).

It is not just a matter, however, of the direct impact of alternative meaning systems on business organizations. In his ethnographic investigation of the nature of the fandom associated with the music of Bruce Springsteen, Daniel Cavicchi argues that just as religion somehow stands "aside from the rest of life" and represents an alternative society based on the kingdom of God, fandom represents for fans a refuge from the turmoil of everyday life, an institution that exists above the ordinary and provides a steady and continual source of values, identity, and belonging (Cavicchi, 1998: 188).

In his case, fandom provided a source of meaning in which the efforts of the music business were seen as irrelevant. In other examples of logics derived from fun, the Liverpool football fans that Adrian Tempany (2016) studied drew on their construction of themselves as supporters, derived from a logic of play that emphasized both fun and loyalty to sporting tradition, to contest the desire of the owners of the club to cast them as customers. “If we are just consumers,” one group argued, “then we don't have an identity” (Tempany, 2016: 228). While institutions like the military and medicine deal with particular aspects of human existence, operating with distinctive practices animated by commitment to particular values,
it is perhaps those like religion and play that supply more general meaning systems, ones which can inflect or contest economic arrangements.

Using history to problematize the candidates for the status of institutions thus offers new considerations for the logics which might shape organizational life. Much of the focus of existing work has been on how areas of social life have been colonized by economic logics, which has tended to neglect the enduring impact of, for example, religious practices on economic life (King, 2008). A notable exception is the attention paid by Greenwood, Diaz and Li (2010) to the impact of family and religious logics on Spanish manufacturing companies. The direction of influence, that is, does not have to be all one way. Starting from the array of institutions in any particular conjuncture and specifying their influence on organizational life is an alternative to using logics as a to-hand tool to explain empirical findings. Accounts of institutional logics that frame them in inductive fashion based on the appearance of particular phenomena in the literature run the risk of narrowing the range of logics that condition organizational life.

We have noted that some organizations are specialized to particular institutions, but it is more likely that organizations stand at the confluence of number of competing institutions (Kraatz & Block, 2008). And certainly, organizational members are likely to have been formed in different institutional logics, giving rise to both tensions and to possibilities for innovation. The discussion of institutions here, based on the ways in which historians have used the concept and have provided evidence for the ways in which institutions change and conflict over time, has been presented in order to address some of the concerns about agency and change presented at the beginning of the article. In suggesting that institutions are responses to enduring relationships between humans and between humans and the natural world of which they are a part, history indicates to us the plasticity of arrangements which can be generated by these capacities.
Comparative historical work enables us to make practices ‘strange’. One valuable aspect of institutionalist approaches is the attention that is paid to mundane, everyday practices. However, the distinctive nature of such practices is often only apparent when set against contrasting examples. For example, the practice of drawing up contracts in common law as opposed to civil law jurisdictions produces significantly different artefacts. Within the boundaries of the logics that they instantiate, each practice makes sense and appears obvious and ‘natural’ to practitioners. It is only when set against each other that differences are revealed, differences which can in turn be related to the assumptions embedded in the logics of different legal systems. It is thus necessary to go beyond the performance of specific practices to set them in the context of the logics that they reproduce. Historical work is valuable in demonstrating the relationship between practices and enduring logics as they unfold and develop.

CONCLUSION

Animating this discussion has been a concern that much analysis in the institutionalist tradition has drifted away from the ambition of Friedland and Alford (1991) to ‘bring society back in’. While fascinating narratives of changes in practices have been produced, the nagging doubt remains that these are at best accounts of the process of institutionalization, rather than examinations of institutional change. Where institutions and their associated logics have been conceptualized as societal phenomena, they have been seen as composed of modular components which can be selected and combined at will, as opposed to a complex relationship of elements which cannot easily be teased apart. The work of cultural and social historians provides one way of directing our attention to the long run impacts of institutional logics. Historical work gives us the sense that practices are the bearers of logics, logics which might not be readily evident to participants but which are indicated by the adoption of a longer timeframe. Adoption of practices thus brings with it entanglements in complex
networks of relations which involve other material practices and cultural symbols. In turn, viewing logics as the connection between practices and an animating substance helps to focus our attention on the ways in which such logics emerge from the perennial problems that humans face. The result is a challenge to existing, taken-for-granted accounts of the institutions that shape organizational life. Historical work opens the way for a richer and more complex account of the logics that condition organizational action. It provides a stronger focus on sources of meaning, especially in relatively neglected domains such as religion and play.

Attention to the enduring nature of institutions forms a valuable counterweight to a dominant focus in discussions of institutional theory on process and agency. It directs our attention to the need to be cautious about the nature of change, recognizing the different temporalities at work at differing scales of action. Drawing on both the conceptualization of institutional logics supplied by Friedland and the resources of history, I have suggested that we view institutions as societal phenomena, animated by core values which are immanent in practices. Historical work suggests the importance of belief founded in some enduring aspects of the relationships between human beings and their natural and social worlds. These, I have suggested, can be grouped under three headings: embodied existence in the world, the attempt to make sense of that existence, and means for resolving disputes. Historical work indicates how these institutions change over time, but how core aspects of their logics endure. It suggests that we need to pay attention to how new institutions are carved out of existing ones, bearing the marks of their birth. We also need to consider how logics are manifest in particular conjunctures of time and place, with some aspects more prominent at certain times than others.

The framework outlined above should help in facilitating comparative analysis. Drawn at a level of abstraction which allows transferability across contexts, institutions are
released from assumptions grounded in one particular location in time and space. If, as argued above, practices are carriers of logics, then comparative work across contexts can reveal the extent to which practices are taken for granted. Comparison enables us to make practices strange and, in so doing, to reveal the logics that they instantiate. Comparison, of course, does not just have to happen synchronically; contrasting practices at different points in time can serve to indicate points of both continuity and change. Having a sense of logics as substances immanent in practices, yet not reducible to those practices, can help us identify such features.

Attention to history urges caution about the use of “toolbox” metaphors. These suggest that actors have a menu of cultural items which they can select from, which can lead to the idea that logics, or elements of them, are selected. Rather, it is practices that are selected without necessarily appreciating the ways in which they carry with them associated logics. Historical work would suggest that practices can become detached over time from their foundational logics, but retain the traces of that logic (Johnson, 2007). The tendency to talk as if logics are selected by organizations neglects this long-term conditioning, conditioning which can only be indicated by the careful tracing of historical emergence. Historical work indicates the importance of operating with multiple temporalities. Change in practices may well happen with relative ease, while broader arrangements are much slower to change. This is particularly the case with underlying logics. The work of historians forms a valuable resource for understanding the enduring nature of many of the logics which shape organizational action. Historical work enables us to “bring society back in” and so provide a richer content in which to seek understanding of organizational life.

Alistair Mutch (Alistair.mutch@ntu.ac.uk) is Professor of Information and Learning at Nottingham Trent University. He received his PhD from the University of Manchester. He
researches the application of ideas from the tradition of critical realism to the study of organizations, with particular focus on the use of historical materials and concepts.

REFERENCES


*Institutional patterns and organizations: Culture and environment:* 3-19.
Cambridge, MA: Ballinger.


Suddaby, R. Toward a historical consciousness: Following the historic turn in management thought, *M@n@gement*, 19: 46-60.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Relation</th>
<th>Substance</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>Reproduction</td>
<td>Love</td>
<td>Household</td>
<td>Marriage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td>Gain</td>
<td>Corporation</td>
<td>Transaction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>Embodied existence</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Existence</td>
<td>Faith</td>
<td>Church</td>
<td>Prayer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Play</td>
<td>Existence</td>
<td>Fun</td>
<td>Gallery</td>
<td>Game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Natural and social world</td>
<td>Curiosity</td>
<td>University</td>
<td>Experiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Intergroup relations</td>
<td>General interest</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Voting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Intergroup relations</td>
<td>Honour</td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>Drill</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Interpersonal and group relations</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>Court</td>
<td>Pleading</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 I use knowledge here in the sense of systematic enquiry, recognizing that forms of applied vocational knowledge are a central part of other institutions such as medicine or the law. The category of knowledge refers to the product of a distinctive logic of inquiry that is partially captured in labels such as “philosophy” or, more recently, “science”. The latter terms are not
used here as they have powerful connotations, such as detached, introspective contemplation in the case of philosophy or the methods and approach of natural science in the case of science. These connotations are reduced by adopting the more abstract category of “knowledge” which encompasses the associated endeavor of learning.