An exploratory case study focusing on the creation, orientation and development of a new political brand; The case of the Jury Team
Introduction

Political marketing can be defined as the application of commercial marketing theories, concepts, orientations and tools to the political environment (O’Cass 2001; Speed et al. 2015). It has evolved significantly as a sub-discipline of marketing since the seminar work of Lock and Harris (1996) and now represents a sophisticated area of study “beyond the black arts of propaganda” (Harris and Lock 2010:297). Further, political marketing scholars have considered the marketing management process of intelligence gathering, objective setting and the implementation of political campaigns and programs to produce efficient and effective relationships between political entities and the electorate (O’Cass 2001; Ormrod and Henneberg 2011). However, despite progress made within the political marketing arena, more empirical understanding is needed as this will allow the sub-discipline to advance and continue to develop (Harris and Lock 2010). This includes a paucity of comparative studies within political marketing (Baines et al. 2011; Ioannides 2010; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Smith and Speed 2011). Political marketing can only develop it if continues to apply new concepts or reapply advanced theories and frameworks (Speed et al. 2015).

One area within political marketing that continues to offer a wealth of insight yet remains under-researched is the application of political branding (Harris and Lock 2010; Lock and Harris 1996; Nielsen 2016; Scammell 2015). Indeed, French and Smith (2010:460) argue that, “the concept of political parties as brands is now commonplace and part of a general dispersion of branding from its original, consumer marketing origins”. However, despite the advancements, further insights are required particularly how ‘new’ political brands are established, orientated and sustained overtime (Baines et al. 2014; Harris and Lock 2010; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Rutter et al. 2015). This would add to the wider debate that more research on political brands will ultimately assist political entities to understand their political offering and environment (Baines and Harris 2011; Dann et al. 2007; Ormrod 2011; Ormrod et al. 2007). This paper focuses on examining the creation, orientation and development of a ‘new’ political brand from the perspective of the party’s founder and leader. This in-depth case study will offer insight into a “relatively remote” phenomenon and provide guidance for future ‘new’ political brands (Lock and Harris 1996:3; Nord and Stromback 2009).
Conceptualising Political Brands

Political brands are complex and multifaceted entities (French and Smith 2010; Peng and Hackley 2009; Phipps et al. 2010; Pich et al. 2014). The application of branding to the political arena “has become a critical and priority issue for research” (Speed et al. 2015:130), and deserves more attention as there is still so much not understood in this area (Needham and Smith 2015; Peng and Hackley 2009; Pich et al. 2014; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Rawson 2007; Reeves et al. 2006; Smith 2009). However, a key obstacle facing the advancement of political branding research is debate within the field and contrasting conceptualisations of core constructs (Nielsen 2015; Scammell 2015). This has had an impact on potential comparative studies as it is difficult to compare studies with different conceptualisations so as to build on and develop the sub-discipline so as to address the gap in the body of knowledge (Nielsen 2015; Rutter et al. 2015; Scammell 2015).

A political brand can be seen as a ‘powerful tool’ for internal stakeholders [parties, politicians and candidates] to design and develop their political offering and enable external stakeholders [voters] to deconstruct and understand the political premise put forward by the brand (Ahmed et al. 2015; Scammell 2015). Political brands need to provide a clear, understandable message in order to be considered authentic and credible and represent a competitive asset for political brands (Gurau and Ayadi 2011; Smith and Saunders 1990; Speed et al. 2015). Further, strong political brands are those that are clearly identifiable and provide differentiation from political rivals (Nielsen 2016) and help voters connect with political parties (O’Cass and Voola 2011; Rutter et al. 2015). However, political brands can be challenging for example, established-traditional political brands find it more difficult to manoeuver or adapt their identities and positions compared with new political brands (Rutter et al. 2015). In addition, established-traditional political brands often have to manage and coordinate national-local campaigns to ensure consistency at the same time as addressing local wants and needs (Baines 2005; Pich 2012). Therefore, political brands are powerful, important devices which need to be understood to assess their orientation and positioning (Needham 2006; Rawson 2007; Van Ham 2001; Wring 2002).

It has been argued that “branding is the most appropriate way to understand the permanent campaigns” in modern political systems (Scammell 2015:11). However, exactly how do we deconstruct political brands? Political brands can be divided into a trinity of three elements including the party leader, political party and party policy (Butler et al. 2011; Davies and Mian
2010; Pich et al. 2014; Smith and French 2011; Speed et al. 2015). In order to generate a deep understanding and full view of political brands all three elements need to be investigated (Pich et al. 2014; Speed et al. 2015). However, the perspective or standpoint in which political brands can be investigated requires additional thought and justification. For example, according to Nielsen (2015), political branding research can be sub-divided into six perspectives such as; investigating rational economic theory, the relational perspective, the brand community standpoint, political brand personality, voter-centric perspective or the cultural political brand perspective. Nielsen (2016) also reaffirms the call for future research on political branding with a distinct focus on one of the six areas. This distinction will provide greater clarity and precision when conducting political branding research which allows the advancement of the sub-discipline (Nielsen 2016; Nielsen 2015). Further, this distinction will help shape future research as the focus will support future comparative studies and provide the much needed grounding that is called for across the political marketing literature (Nielsen 2015; Scammell 2015).

**Relational political brand perspective**

One of the six perspectives under-developed within the political branding literature is the ‘relational political brand perspective’ (Nielsen 2015; Nielsen 2016). The relational political brand perspective prescribes to the idea that *internal stakeholders* within the political brand attempt to convey the brand’s identity to the external environment (Nielsen 2015; O’Shaughnessy and Baines 2009). Further, a relational perspective primarily focuses on the creation and brand building process of political brands (Nielsen 2015). However, there are limited studies that have examined the *internal perspective* of political brands particularly in terms of how political brands are established and developed. Further, this highlights the challenging nature of how to pragmatically understand political brands from an internal perspective and frameworks that allow researchers to deconstruct political brands (O’Cass and Voola 2011; Speed et al. 2015).

The limited studies in this area have focused attention on concepts such as brand identity (Pich et al. 2014), brand equity (Smith and Spotswood 2015), positioning (O’Shaughnessy and Baines 2009) and business-orientation (Nord and Stromback 2009; O’Cass 2001; Ormrod and Henneberg 2011) of ‘established’ and ‘major’ political entities. However, the majority of existing studies that investigate political brands from an internal orientation achieve this by focusing specifically on secondary content or existing discourse such as published articles and speeches rather than first-hand accounts from political parties, politicians or candidates (Busby
and Cronshaw 2015; de Landtsheer and Vries 2015; Milewicz and Milewicz 2014; Nord and Stromback 2009; O’Shaughnessy and Baines 2009; O’Cass 2001; Ormrod and Henneberg 2011; Rutter et al. 2015; Smith and Spotswood 2015). Therefore, there are very few studies that manage to achieve a ‘relational political brand perspective’ from an internal standpoint (Nielsen 2015; Nielsen 2016).

Pich et al. (2014) was one exception and explored the internal political brand identity of the UK Conservative Party prior the 2010 UK General Election. Brand identity can be conceptualised as the internally created values, culture, relationships and tangible and intangible touch points communicated by the brand’s creator (de Chernatony 2006; Kapferer 2008; Pich et al. 2014). Further, brand identity signifies the reality of the organisation and focuses on the “central ideas of a brand and how the brand communicates these ideas” to internal and external stakeholders (de Chernatony 2006:45; Nandan 2005). However, the concept of brand identity is multifaceted and complex with very few mechanisms devoted to deconstruct the internal view of brands (Dahlen et al. 2010; Pich et al. 2014; Viot 2011). Therefore, there seems to be even less attention devoted to investigating how ‘new’ political brands are created and development of their identity and orientation, particularly from an internal perspective (Nord and Stromback 2009). This point seems to add to the wider calls for a more in-depth understanding of how political brands are created and positioned, and the strategy and tactics adopted by the perspectives of internal stakeholders (Baines and Harris 2011; Needham and Smith 2015; O’Cass and Voola 2011; O’Shaughnessy and Baines 2009; Speed et al. 2015). Therefore, this raises the question, how can we deconstruct the creation, identity and development of political brands?

**Orientation of Political Brands**

One way of attempting to understand how organisations, industries and brands design their product offering [identity] for consumers is to explore its business orientation (Ormrod et al. 2013). Exploring the *business orientation* can provide insight into an organisation’s culture, values, behaviour, relationships, and heritage and tangible-intangible cues communicated to internal and external stakeholders (Gainer and Padanyi 2005; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Maignan et al. 2005; Narver and Slater 1990). Business orientations can be divided into three approaches namely product-orientation, sales-orientation and market-orientation (Nasution et al. 2011). An organisation that adopts a *product-orientated* approach focuses attention on the actual product or commodity rather than communications and marketing of the product to
external stakeholders (Stromback 2008). Further, a product-orientated organisation believes external stakeholders will come to appreciate their offering and will not engage or interact with external stakeholders to develop or adapt products (Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Maignan et al. 2005). An organisation that adopts a sales-orientated approach accepts their product offering should be guided and developed by internal stakeholders [just like product-orientated] yet employ professional marketing strategies and tactics to persuade-convince external stakeholders of the virtues of their product (Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Maignan et al. 2005; Stromback 2008). In contrast, a market-oriented organisation focuses attention on desired external stakeholders from the outset, designs their offering based on market intelligence and adopts marketing strategies and tactics to interact and engage with their target market (Narver and Slater 1990; Stromback 2008).

This pragmatic framework has been studied for decades rooted in the commercial marketing literature as a mechanism to outline the focus of the organisation and highlights the relationship between the organisation and consumer (Gainer and Padanyi 2005; Kohli and Jaworski 1990; Maignan et al. 2005; Narver and Slater 1990; Ormrod et al. 2013). In addition, the application of business orientations to the political environment has received some attention and provides insight into the characteristics, behaviour and beliefs of political brands (Lees-Marshment 2001; Nord and Stromback 2009; O’Cass 1996; O’Cass 2001; Ormrod 2007; Ormrod and Henneberg 2011; Stromback 2008). However, there have been explicit calls to conduct more detailed empirical research to develop theoretical understanding and transferability of the three orientations (Ormrod 2007; Ormrod and Henneberg 2011; Stromback 2008). The defining characteristics of the three orientations applied to the context of political branding can be seen in table 1.

<table>
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<th>Product-Orientation</th>
<th>Sales-Orientation</th>
<th>Market-Orientation</th>
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<td>Political brands develop their own policies, agenda and direction and believe the electorate will be convinced the brand offers the best approach compared with political competitors. This will translate into votes. The wants and needs of voters are met by internally envisaged/designed offerings</td>
<td>Political brands develop their own policies, agenda and direction but understand the electorate will have to be persuaded or ‘sold’ to the ideas put forward by the brand. The electorate are encouraged to support the ideas of the brand via a professional campaign and targeted message.</td>
<td>Political brands use market research to identify the wants and needs of the electorate and design their offering based on this information. Policies, agenda and direction are consistent with the desire of the target market. The political brand is considered to be connected and in-touch with the electorate.</td>
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(Table 1: Developed from Nord and Stromback 2009; Lees-Marshment 2001)

The three orientations have served as a framework to understand the political offering of the UK Labour Party (Lees-Marshment 2001), political parties in Australia (O’Cass 2001),
Germany (Lees 2005) and Sweden (Nord and Stromback 2009). Furthermore, Ormrod (2007) developed the application of business orientations to the political setting by primarily refocusing and updating the market orientation to become a ‘political market-oriented’ approach. Political brands that adopt a ‘political market-orientated approach’ should consider competitors, internal stakeholders and the expressed and latent needs of external [voters] stakeholders (O’Cass and Voola 2011; Ormrod et al. 2013; Ormrod 2011). Despite the development of the business orientation framework in political marketing the main constructs remain the same and demonstrate the complexity of applying the framework to a political context (Ormrod et al. 2013). Further, the limited existing research continues to focus and develop the updated ‘political market-oriented approach’ (O’Cass and Voola 2011; Ormrod et al. 2013; Ormrod 2011) rather than develop insight into the three orientations of political brands. This seems consistent with the ongoing calls within the political marketing literature for more detailed research on the orientations of political brands (O’Cass 2001; O’Cass 1996; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Ormrod et al. 2013; Ormrod 2011; Robinson 2010). This deep understanding will not only complement the existing knowledge but it will also advance the topic area as it will support the strategic marketing management process of political brands.

Despite the limited work on the orientation of political brands (Lees 2005; Lees-Marshment 2001; Nord and Stromback 2009; O’Cass 2001), there is consensus that a political party or brand can use the business orientated framework to deconstruct its product offering and highlight the relationship with internal and external stakeholders. However, there is debate within the existing research as to which approach political entities should adopt for success at the polls (Lees 2005; Lees-Marshment 2001; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Ormrod 2006; Robinson 2010). Lees-Marshment (2001) argues that a market-orientated approach is vital for political brands to win elections as this stance is crucial to understand the wants and needs of voters and to develop this understanding into voter-centric policies and initiatives. Further, political entities must overcome barriers to ensure the successful implementation of a market-oriented approach such as the importance of consistency between internal objectives and voter needs, management’s vision and values are directed by voter’s needs and that there is clear communication across all stakeholders inside the organisation (O’Cass 1996). However, Ormrod (2006) disputes this and argues that a market-oriented approach is more appropriate for established-major political parties [brands] as they generally have more resources, an established organisational structure and a large number of activists. In contrast, Lees (2005), suggests smaller political parties should adopt a product-orientated approach for success and
gain niche votes on the dominant positions of the right-left axis of politics. Similarly, Ormrod (2006) reports that political parties with a low membership base and little identification may find a sales-orientated approach more appealing as it allows political brands to focus on specific values. In addition, Nord and Stromback (2009) found that a sales-orientated approach was successful for a new political party fighting for votes from established political parties.

This debate and complexity suggests that more research should be devoted to the application of the business-orientations to political brands, so as to generate a deeper understanding of the deconstruction process and highlight the focus of the brand offering. This fresh insight will address the continued explicit calls for more empirical research in this area (O’Cass 2001; O’Cass 1996; O’Cass and Voola 2011) and contribute to the limited empirical studies on the orientation of political brands (Ormrod 2007; Ormrod and Henneberg 2011). This reaffirms that research on ‘new’ political brands remains “relatively remote” (Lock and Harris 1996:3; Nord and Stromback 2009). Therefore, can the three approaches of business orientation deconstruct the creation and development of new political brands in terms of its identity?

**Orientation of Political Brands: The Case of Junilistan**

Nord and Stromback (2009) are one exception as they analysed the new Swedish political brand ‘Junilistan Party’; established prior to the 2004 European Elections. Nord and Stromback (2009) discuss the business orientation of the Junilistan brand and highlight how the party implemented political marketing techniques with the aim of securing success at the polls. They further highlighted that the new political brand had achieved surprising success at the polls despite little political experience and the short time the political brand had been in existence.

Part of the success of the Junilistan Party was attributed to its success during the 2003 Swedish Euro currency referendum. Many of the supporters campaigned as part of the ‘No to Euro’ vote and ultimately achieved 55.9% to 42% in favour of rejecting the Euro currency (Nord and Stromback 2009). Following on from the success in 2003, two leading campaigners for the ‘No to Euro’ campaign, with shared political ideologies of remaining as part of the European Union but with less political integration, decided to create a new political movement. The political movement (Junilistan) was positioned as a Eurosceptic party, distinct from the established political parties (anti-establishment) and appealed to both left-wing and right-wing candidates (Nord and Stromback 2009).

The Junilistan Party was founded in February-March 2004; 4 months prior to the 2004 Sweden EU Parliamentary Elections (Nord and Stromback 2009). The Party co-leaders found it difficult
to compete with the established political parties due to Junilistan’s limited organisational base, no active members to rely on (apart from ‘1000 party supporters’ from the 2003 Referendum campaign), and limited financial resources (Nord and Stromback 2009). This had a direct impact on day-to-day campaigning and challenging the existing party system and structure. However, Junilistan had the advantage that the ‘European issue’ remained fresh in the minds of the electorate, the growing awareness and popularity of its leaders and the political brand’s position as a non-traditional anti-establishment political party (Nord and Stromback 2009). The Junilistan brand embodied ‘social democrat’ values such as peace, equality, progressive tax policies and a generous welfare state (Nord and Stromback 2009). Nord and Stromback (2009:42) concluded that the Junilistan brand could be described as a ‘quasi-market-oriented party “in the sense that it was inspired by perceptions of unfulfilled voter needs, but at the same time it was rather uninterested in further marketing practices to increase knowledge in the field”. Further, “the campaign performance of Junilistan was rather unprofessional and had more in common with the behaviour of a product-orientated party, assuming voters would realise that the ideas of the party were better than the ideas of competitors” (Nord and Stromback 2009:42). However, the work by Nord and Stromback (2009) disputes Lees-Marshment’s (2001) proposition that most market-orientated brands win elections. Therefore, Junilistan had identified a continued trend that stemmed from the 2003 Referendum and the political brand set about positioning their offering based on this core issue (Nord and Stromback 2009). This raises the proposition, if other ‘new’ political brands adopt this quasi-market-orientated approach, does this lead to success?

The work of Nord and Stromback (2009) failed to provide an in-depth understanding of the creation and development of the ‘new’ political brand particularly in terms of leader, party and policy. Further, the study did not investigate the ‘new’ political brand from the perspective of its founders or leaders. Therefore, research on ‘new’ political brands from a ‘relational political brand perspective’ warrants further attention (Nielsen 2015; Nielsen 2016). Responding to this gap in the body of knowledge, this study explores the creation, orientation [identity] and development of a ‘new’ political brand from the perspective of the founder-leader. Further, this research will reaffirm the transferability of the three approaches of orientation to deconstruct the identity of a ‘new’ political brand and compare the findings with the work of Nord and Stromback (2009). In addition, the Nord and Stromback (2009) study offers the opportunity to act as a starting point for comparison, which will address calls for the advancement of the
sub-discipline of political marketing (Harris and Lock 2010; Needham and Smith 2015; Nielsen 2015; Nielsen 2016; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Scammell 2015).

**Methodology**

This study adopted a qualitative case-study approach to investigate the creation, orientation and development of a ‘new’ political brand. Qualitative research aims to build a comprehensive picture of the respondent’s background, attitudes, feelings and experiences from the respondent’s own words to address the research objectives (Malhotra and Birks 2003; Rubin and Rubin 1995; Warren and Karner 2005; Schutt 2004). Further, qualitative research is also useful for relatively unknown areas under study (Davies and Chun 2002). A case study approach “seeks to understand the particular rather than generate law-like explanations” (Welch et al. 2011:741). Further, a revelatory case study approach aims to capture rich contextual understanding of human experiences and adheres to particularisations rather than generalisations (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Welch et al. 2011; Yin 2009). Case studies can focus on an individual, organisation, campaign or location to capture unique experiences overtime and support inductive theory building (Creswell 2009; Rolls 2005; Yin 2009). In order to contextualise this study, the Jury Team was selected as an appropriate case to advance research on ‘new’ political brands.

The Jury Team was founded and developed by Sir Paul Judge prior to the 2009 European Elections. Sir Paul was the former Director General of the UK Conservative Party and solely established the new political brand positioned as a coalition for ‘independent’ candidates. The Jury Team was a completely new entity and was not a faction from an existing major-established political party. On its conception, the political brand had no membership, activists, or policies and was self-funded by Sir Paul Judge. Given that Sir Paul exclusively founded and developed the ‘new’ political brand, it was deemed appropriate to frame the unique case study from the perspective of its leader. This supports the wider call for more research on party leaders and parties (Davies and Mian 2010; Smith and French 2011).

This research adopted semi-structured, in-depth interviews and discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is an ideal technique to support primary data collection and focuses on the study of other forms of communication to generate insight into the problem at hand (Bryman and Bell 2015; Saunders et al. 2007). This approach was therefore adopted to review secondary research associated with the Jury Team political brand. Further, discourse such as the three Jury Team handbooks, and articles that focused on the Jury Team brand were analysed to compliment the
in-depth interviews, which can generate a deeper understanding of the topic under study (Foddy 2001; Saunders et al. 2007).

Semi-structured, in-depth interviews were used to understand the Jury Team brand from an internal standpoint. In-depth interviews are often seen as a ‘special conversation’ (Rubin and Rubin 1995:6), as flexible in terms of topic area development and spontaneous with the potential of creating “a Pandora’s box generating endlessly various and abundant data” (McCracken 1988:12). Open-ended questions were used as they allow the respondent to lead the interview, with the interviewer simply controlling the interview with the aid of prompts and probes (Gillham 2005; Foddy 2001). The interview guide/schedule was developed by following a process of ‘cyclical development’ (Gillham 2005:22) and covered all three elements of a political brand; party, leader and policy (Butler et al. 2011; Pich et al. 2014; Speed et al. 2015). Three interviews with the Jury Team’s founder-leader were conducted from September 2012 to September 2013. Each interview lasted between 1 hour and 2 hours. A copy of the interview guides can be seen in appendix 1.

In order to enhance the credibility and dependability of the findings, the process of methodological triangulation was adopted (Farmer et al. 2006; Saunders et al. 2007). Methodological triangulation involves the analysis and interpretation of discourse and content from several internal and independent sources so as to address the research objectives and improve the ability to draw conclusions (Easterby-Smith et al. 2015; Knafl et al. 1989). More specifically, methodological triangulation can involve the use of multiple research methods such as numerous interviews and/or focus group discussions, documents, archival reports and/or internal records (Jack et al. 2006; Lincoln and Guba 1985). Further, methodological triangulation strengthens the research findings as it “helps tap into different elements of the issue and provides more of a complete picture” by assessing the coherency of key themes and offering the opportunity to capture deeper insight and interpretation (Farmer et al. 2006:390; Scandura and Williams 2000). With this in mind, this study enhanced the in-depth interviews with secondary research and material such as the Jury Team’s published handbooks, manifestoes, and official website including social media platforms and published news articles. The variety of internal and independent sources provided greater corroboration into the phenomenon, which in turn strengthened the exploration of the political brand from a relational-internal perspective (Easterby-Smith et al. 2015; Scandura and Williams 2000).
Each interview was digitally recorded, fully transcribed and analysed by the researcher. To strengthen the consistency with the interpretive process, a pragmatic two-staged thematic analytical approach was adopted (Butler-Kisber 2010; Kvale 1996; Rubin and Rubin 1995). The course-grained phase focused on reviewing each transcript or source in isolation followed by the comparative fine-grained phase reviewing themes and patterns across the internal and independent sources (Butler-Kisber 2010). More specifically, thematic analysis involved the process of encoding the findings by “categorising or the comparing and contrasting of units and categories of the field texts to produce conceptual understandings of experiences and/or phenomena that are ultimately constructed into larger themes” (Butler-Kisber 2010:47). For example, the initial themes-codes were guided by the research objectives and supported by the key concepts outlined in the existing academic literature (Bird et al. 2009; Paskins et al. 2010). This included the conceptualisations of political brands; party, leader and policy, and the three orientations of political brands; product, sales and market oriented (Butler et al. 2011; Lees-Marchment 2001; Nord and Stromback 2009; Smith and French 2011). The initial themes-codes developed from the literature supported analysis yet were broad in nature to maintain the flexibility of the revelation of sub-themes and potentially new themes-codes (Butler-Kisber 2010; Paskins et al. 2010). For example, new sub-themes such as political disconnect, internal communications and conservative principles to name but a few were uncovered during the interpretative process, which remains consistent with thematic and exploratory analysis (Bird et al. 2009; Paskins et al. 2010). The additional sub-themes and original themes-codes were corroborated, expanded and/or refined by the founder-leader [participant] at the end of the analytical process. This process known as external validation addressed any concerns and provided verification (Warren and Karner 2005). Therefore, the analytical approach supported by the initial themes and sub-themes, and enhanced with external validation, strengthened the transparency and validity of the interpretive process (Bird et al. 2009; Butler-Kisber 2010; Warren and Karner 2005). The following section presents the findings and the discussion.

Findings

This research set out to generate a deeper understanding of the creation, and development of the new political brand the Jury Team; the findings are therefore structured in accordance with the three elements of a political brand. This includes the party leader, political party and party policy (Butler et al. 2011; Davies and Mian 2010; Smith and French 2011).
(Figure 1: The lifecycle of the Jury Team Political Brand)

**Party Leader**

The conceptualisation of the ‘Jury Team’ was created and developed by *Sir Paul Judge* in March 2008. Sir Paul started his career with Cadbury Schweppes before leading a buyout of their food organisations to form Premier Brands; a British food manufacturer with brands such as *Typhoo* tea and *Mr Kipling* ([www.paulrjudge.com](http://www.paulrjudge.com)). Following the sale of ‘Premier Brands’ in 1989, Sir Paul entered the world of politics and became Director General of the UK Conservative Party (1992-1995) before his appointment as a Cabinet Ministerial Adviser to Prime Minister John Major’s Conservative Government until 1997. After the 1997 UK General Election, Sir Paul returned to the world of business and became Director of WPP Group Plc (global advertising and public relations), President of the Chartered Management Institute (2004-2005) and President of the Chartered Institute of Marketing from 2008 to 2014 ([www.paulrjudge.com](http://www.paulrjudge.com)).

**Political Disconnect**

In March 2008, Sir Paul Judge recognised that there was a problem of disconnect between traditional UK political parties and the electorate. According to Sir Paul “all the parties had got so far distant from the electorate, we needed to think of a new radical way of dealing with things” (Judge 2012). Furthermore, despite being a part of the “government machine” in the 1990s, and years of experience of “government and Parliament” (Judge 2013), Sir Paul had...
become disillusioned and frustrated with three main political parties in particular the UK Conservative Party under the leadership of David Cameron. Many of Sir Paul’s concerns, such as opposition to highly centralised governance, the rise of the political class, high levels of distrust of politicians, low voter engagement, and little differentiation between the main parties, were reported to be the views of large numbers of the UK public (Judge 2009).

This political disconnect encouraged Sir Paul to conduct secondary independent research to explore key issues and ideas that would form the core argument for a new political party. This secondary research would eventually develop into a professionally published proposal and handbook, which would outline the key issues and intellectual argument of the Jury Team. His ‘wisdom of crowds’ philosophy (Bell 2001), developed from the core argument, was that Members of Parliament of traditional parties are ‘instructed’ or ‘whipped’ to support the argument projected by their parties leadership or parties ideological stance. Sir Paul’s dislike for the centralisation of politics and lack of political independence resulted in a proposition that a new political party should adopt a ‘jury’ like conceptualisation. Furthermore, Sir Paul (2013) revealed “we came up with the concept of having independent people” serving their own communities, making independent decisions together under one banner known as ‘The Jury Team’. This ‘non-party’ approach would provide a nationally co-ordinated group of independent candidates the opportunity to offer voters an alternative to the established parties and campaign to secure decentralised governance.

**Bureaucratic Development – Registration**

Despite the ease and simplicity of registering a political party with the Electoral Commission, the Jury Team was unable to secure representation in the media to clearly communicate the establishment of a new political party. The ‘Committee of Broadcasters’ include political directors of the BBC, Sky, ITN and Channel 4 who adhere to the set rules governing political communication and elections which restricts the support for new political brands (Judge 2012). Air time and coverage is calculated on the representation of political parties at the last election and this tends to favour traditional and established parties. Therefore, as the Jury Team was a new political party and had no representation at the 2004 EU Election, the traditional broadcasters were not obliged to offer coverage and publicity. Sir Paul argued that some members of the Committee of Broadcasters understood that the existing formula for calculating coverage is restrictive for new political parties and a new formula to represent new ideas politically is needed (Judy 2012). However, the change of formula would need an ‘Act of
Parliament’ something the traditional mainstream parties would be less supportive in offering to restructure the formula in favour of small or new political parties (Judge 2012). Further, “the problem the UK has is that new parties cannot get publicity. There has always been a closeness between the journalists and the politicians...it’s easier for the journalists to deal with the politician’s they know rather than the one’s they don’t” (Judge 2013). Therefore, this restrictive approach was a barrier for the Jury Team from the outset.

**Party**

As the Jury Team was a new political party, created and developed by its leader, there was no grassroots support, members or other co-creators prior its creation. According to Sir Paul “well the party was really only me in a way. I had one or two friends that I talked to but not in detail...I have to say modestly it was largely me” (Judge 2013). Traditional political parties develop overtime and encompass multiple different stakeholders and supporters including paid and unpaid volunteers and activists. This highlights the difficulty of establishing and creating a new political party particularly with little grassroots momentum.

**Open-Primaries**

In August 2008 Sir Paul hired an external company to design and build the £60,000 open-primary technology and review the open-primary process to select the Jury Team candidates (Judge 2013). The open-primaries were designed to capture the public’s attention and encourage independent individuals across the country to apply to become their areas independent representative endorsed and guided by the Jury Team. The open-primary process was advertised in many national newspapers such as the Daily Telegraph and the Times, via email and on social media platforms with the aim of raising awareness of the ‘Party’ and encouraging the public to stand as candidates for the Jury Team (Judge 2013).

Despite pursuing an independent agenda, candidates would have to pledge “to vote on conscience for the good of their constituents and the country and will not be required to obey a party whip” (Judge 2009). Candidates would also have to confirm “they agree not to support any policies discriminating on the basis of race, gender, colour, sexual orientation, disability or religious or other belief” (Judge 2009:97). Individual candidates were encouraged to build on the platform and promote their candidacy through traditional and non-traditional communication tools such as local newspapers, leaflets, posters, blogs, email and social media. Therefore, establishing awareness and recognition of local independent candidates was the
responsibility of individuals. Members of the general public were encouraged to vote for their preferred ‘independent’ candidate through their mobile phone.

In September 2008, 59 candidates in all twelve regions of Great Britain were selected to stand as independent MEPs under the Jury Team banner. The open-primaries attracted a diverse range of individuals to stand for election some seasoned and some new to politics. For example, candidates included former councillors, students, lollypop ladies, refuse-collectors, entrepreneurs, life-coaches and marketing/public relations specialists with a broad range of political opinions from pro-Europeans to Eurosceptics and those promoting single issues such as civil liberties and combating crime (Judge 2009). Following their selection as candidates, this non-traditional collection of individuals had eight months until polling day (June 2009) to create their own local identity and communicate this to voters across their regions. However, unlike traditional political brands, new Jury Team candidates did not have the luxury of regional campaign managers, local campaign infrastructure or grassroots volunteers beyond friends and family members.

Internal Communication

Since the Jury Team’s creation in March 2008 and until March 2009, internal communications and development of the political brand was under the control of and organised by Sir Paul and a small number of specialists and interns. The specialists (4-5 people) were brought in sporadically to advise the ‘Party’ on key issues such as structure, online communications, public relations, and open-primary process and to provide some pragmatic support to the newly elected candidates. However, Sir Paul believed a full-time in-house marketing and communications department would be beneficial in developing the Jury Team in terms of awareness, recognition and differentiation from the traditional Westminster parties. Despite difficulty in recruiting a full-time PR company to manage marketing and communications at a ‘corporate level’, a dedicated team of professionals were hired in March 2009. The new marketing and communications department brought a degree of ‘professionalism’, ‘strategic planning’ and tactical guidance to develop the ‘corporate’ side of the Jury Team including researchers and advisers to the party’s leader; Sir Paul Judge (Judge 2013). For example, the long-awaited proposal and handbook devised and written by Sir Paul in 2008 was finally published on 8th March 2009 at an official book launch in London. This ‘book-launch’ was communicated through traditional and non-traditional media to reveal the structure and direction of the Jury Team and outline the Party’s differentiation and identification for internal
and external stakeholders (Judge 2013). Further, the ‘book-launch’ was designed to generate media interest in the Jury Team and indirectly cast attention on individual candidates and regions, which candidates could utilise to develop and strengthen their local identities. Following the official book launch, additional researchers and communication specialists “most of the people were young people...interested in politics and wanted to do things” (Judge 2013) were brought in (March-April 2008) to join the marketing and communications team.

Official European Election ‘Party’ Launch

Following on from the ‘book-launch’ in March 2009, the newly appointed communications team set about using the final few months before polling day to strengthen the ‘corporate’ political brand. For example, the team conducted secondary research, organised press-releases and interviews with national newspapers and broadcasters, planned the billboard poster launch, and researched the practicalities and regulations linked to party political broadcasts destined for television and social media. Further, the team also liaised with candidates by offering some tailored support and guidance and planned a ‘candidate training day’ in London for May 2009. Many candidates had little experience of campaigning or the process involved. Further, the candidate training day was the first and only event that brought together all 59 candidates to review the Party’s proposals, offer campaign and media advice and introduce candidates to the Party leader and influential guest speakers including former independent Members of Parliament. However, the main role of the communications team was to provide support for the ‘corporate’ Jury Team rather than individual candidates who were expected to organise and develop their own localised communications strategy and tactics. However, the Jury Team project both nationally and locally were given a boost to their unique selling point in May 2009 with the release of the UK Members of Parliament Expenses through the Daily Telegraph newspaper (Winnett and Rayner 2010). This unprecedented political scandal was seen as an “amazing coincidence...we produced the book in February 2009 and the expenses scandal broke in May 2009 and I said the activities and attitudes of Members of Parliament would not be tolerated in any other part of society and a month later that proved to be absolutely true” (Judge 2012).

The Communications team also used their time to organise the ‘official European election Jury Team launch’ on 20th May 2009. More specifically, the official launch was delivered in Westminster London with main UK broadcasters such as the BBC, ITN and Channel 4 news in attendance. The launch was led by Sir Paul Judge who argued “when you vote for the Jury
Team you are voting for real change and not the staged and cosmetic change other parties offer” (Judge 2009). The launch was also attended by guest speakers such as former Independent MP; Martin Bell, and supporter of ‘independent politicians’ television presenter Dame Esther Rantzen (BBC News 2009a). This event was designed to utilise exposure across the country, raise awareness of the new political party, highlight the upcoming Party Political Broadcast and nationwide billboard launch, challenge the traditional political parties and provide individual candidates with a platform to develop localised campaigns. The nationwide billboard launch on 29th May 2009 in all twelve regions of the UK was attended by the party leader, several candidates and reported by the national press. Further, the Jury Team Party Political Broadcast was televised on 31st May 2009 on the BBC, ITV, and Channel 4 featuring Sir Paul Judge and testimonials from five candidates outlining why they had decided to stand for election and support independent politics. Alongside the traditional communications tactics, individual candidates organised their own events in their regions and focused on the local campaign. Apart from the ‘candidate training day’, and the ‘official European launch’ the majority of candidates did not meet again as a ‘party’ nor did they attend the billboard launch or board the ‘battle bus’ in London on polling day, on 4th June 2009. However, the communications department continued to support the ‘corporate’ political brand with daily tactics organised across London such as an activist rally with T-shirts, placards and leaflets, a daily blog with competitions such as ‘spot the gnome’ across iconic landmarks and organising media interviews and television appearances with the Party leader. The tactics were designed to strengthen awareness and continue with the recent exposure. The final event on 4th June 2009 (polling day European Elections), involved the communications department, party leader and several London candidates campaigning around London on an open-top London Routemaster bus emblazoned with banners, balloons and microphones with the aim of encouraging and remind citizens to vote, particularly for the Jury Team.

Policy

Apart from its founding philosophy of ‘wisdom of crowds’ and its key message promoting a ‘coalition of independent candidates’; the Jury Team had no pre-existing policies or manifesto pledges. The Jury Team was conceptualised by Sir Paul in response to his perception of the public’s political disconnect and disillusion with the traditional political party system. The Jury Team was solely created by Sir Paul and was not a faction of a traditional party, specific-single-issue party or grounded in political ideology. Therefore, the conceptualisation for the ‘Party’ preceded the formation of ‘policy’ and candidate selection.
Conservative Principles

After Sir Paul decided to establish the Jury Team and commit his own name and funding to the new project in March 2008, one of the first tasks was to research and personally write the Jury Team proposal and handbook entitled ‘The End of The Party’ (Judge 2013). This handbook, “all my own work” (Judge 2013), would act as the Jury Team’s grounding philosophy or constitution which would provide justification for the movement and also outline its proposals and principles. However, the development of Sir Paul’s core proposals and principles not only came from research but also originated from his own personal beliefs. Sir Paul politically identified as a supporter, later campaigner and ambassador of the UK Conservative Party. Furthermore, he was a self-proclaimed “Conservative voter for all of my career...I keep to those principles...so it wasn’t a matter of changing my principles but it was really trying to improve the way Parliament and the government governed and operated” (Judge 2013). Therefore, it could be argued that the principles of the UK Conservative Party such as ‘free enterprise’, ‘low taxation’ and ‘decentralisation’ were the grounding ideology of the Jury Team political brand. With this in mind, the Jury Team could be seen as a development or adapted version of the UK Conservative Party simply pursuing a different structure of governance rather than a distinct political philosophy.

Jury Team Principles

Between March-August 2008, Sir Paul personally continued to refine and develop the core issues of the Jury Team into twelve proposals (Judge 2009:8). The twelve proposals included:

- Letting MPs be Independent
- Making MPs Accept Normal Standards and Remuneration
- Policing the Politicians
- Legitimising the Funding of Political Parties
- Scrutinising the Government
- Ensuring European Legislation is Appropriate
- Limiting the Term for MPs
- Stabilising the Length of Parliaments
- Introducing Referendums
- Improving Departmental Management
- Reducing Spin and Deceptive Statistics
• Enhancing Other Jurisdictions such as the European Union, Local and Devolved Governments.

The twelve proposals and core issues were assessed through market research for ‘resonance’ and ‘appeal’ with a view to develop an alternative political system to the status quo (Judge 2013). For example, participants were asked to agree or disagree with statements such as ‘there should be a limit on social security’, ‘borrowing should not be more than 10% of expenditure’ or ‘we should not have more than the average of the other NATO countries’ (Judge 2013).

Over the space of two weeks (July 2008), the research was collated and analysed to form the core argument for the new political party. Sir Paul used the data to establish three over-riding principles, which all candidates would adhere to when campaigning under the Jury Team banner. For example, the principles argued that “Government should be run for the benefit of the people and not for the benefit of any political party. Elected representatives should vote according to their view of what is best for the country and their constituents and not at the direction of a political party” (Judge 2012). Finally, Jury Team candidates would also have to fully comply with the Nolan Principles of Public Life (selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and leadership) accepted as ethical standards and designed for individuals and parties seeking public office within the UK (Judge 2009:17).

Corporate and Local Proposals-Policies

Candidates standing for election at open-primaries and EU Election would also have to abide by the twelve proposals to be officially endorsed by Sir Paul and the Jury Team. The twelve proposals and Nolan Principles of Public Life published in the Jury Team handbook were the only requirements candidates would have to abide by to receive endorsement. Candidates were encouraged to independently develop their own policies and pledges designed to reflect their local constituent’s wants and needs and independently create a localised identity. Further, candidates were offered support and guidance of the campaign process from the corporate level of the Jury Team; however local policies and local campaigns were not the responsibility of Sir Paul and the corporate team. Many candidates managed to successfully raise awareness of their profile and local policies. However, some candidates were unsuccessful with their localised political brands due to their lack experience and knowledge of politics and the campaign process and candidates often found it difficult to manage other commitments alongside their election bid. Further, with limited party infrastructure in terms of volunteers and funding within all regions and the ‘perceived’ lack of guidance and direction from Sir Paul,
the corporate team added to the difficulties of raising the profiles and local policies of independent candidates.

The 2009 EU Elections – After Polling Day

On Friday 5th June 2009, the votes for the European Union Parliamentary Elections had been counted and the Jury Team secured 78,569 votes, which equated to 0.5% share of the UK vote (BBC News 2009b). Subsequently, no Jury Team MEPs were elected. Sir Paul attributed the failure to secure any representation in the European Parliament, to the lack of recognition of the Jury Team political brand and that its members would be a collection of independent candidates. Further, the limited success was also down to the dominance of the traditional Westminster political establishment and ‘Party machine’ that tended to be supported and courted by the UK media. These were seen as major issues for the lack of progress in the 2009 Elections. In addition, “we had the message, a very good message but getting it out there was the real problem” (Judge 2013).

Glasgow North East By-election

Despite losing all the personally funded candidate deposits for the 2009 EU Elections, Sir Paul continued to believe in his ‘Party’ which he perceived as a collection of independents and the ‘wisdom of crowds’ united under the Jury Team banner (Judge 2013). Sir Paul did not have to wait long to reapply the Jury Team concept. On 22nd June 2009 Michael Martin – Speaker of the UK House of Commons resigned in the aftermath of the ‘MP’s Expenses Scandal’ forcing a by-election in the UK Parliamentary seat of Glasgow North East. This provided another opportunity to ‘test-run’ the Jury Team before the 2010 UK General Election. In September 2009, Sir Paul invited a local candidate; John Smeaton “who became very famous in Glasgow and around the world because he was the one who tackled the guys who attacked Glasgow airport” in 2007 to stand under the Jury Team banner (Judge 2012). Sir Paul hired a new small team of researchers and marketing communications specialists and set up a constituency office in the Glasgow North East area in the run up to the by-election in November 2009. Further, Sir Paul launched and published an updated Jury Team proposal and handbook in September 2009. The updated handbook covered similar issues and principles as the original text however, it was redesigned for a UK Parliamentary context. The launch of the ‘second edition’ did not receive an official launch and would serve as the philosophical grounding for the Jury Team-sponsored by-election candidate (Judge 2009).
Between September-November 2009, the localised communications team was joined by family members and volunteers to canvas on behalf of the Jury Team candidate and supported by frequent appearances of Sir Paul in and around the constituency. In addition, Sir Paul continued to offer indirect support through traditional media such as appearances on local and national news platforms, organising press conferences and events and direct support to the candidate and constituency team. Nevertheless, the Jury Team candidate was not successful and polled 258 votes with a turnout of 33% of the local electorate – 20,595 (BBC News 2009b). Again, Sir Paul concluded that the Labour ‘Party machine’, traditional unsupportive media and a weak candidate contributed to the failure of the Jury Team in the Glasgow North East by-election (Judge 2012).

Alliance for Democracy Coalition

Undeterred, by the 2009 EU Elections and Glasgow by-election, Sir Paul decided that in order to progress in future elections, the Jury Team would be able to raise its profile and challenge the ‘Party machine’ if it allied with other small political parties (Judge 2012). In November 2009, Sir Paul approached the leaders of other UK small political parties that shared similar concerns and issues to discuss the possibility of forming an alliance of political brands to strategically not field candidates in the same UK Parliamentary constituencies (Judge 2012). The coalition of smaller independent parties such as the ‘English Democrats’ ‘Popular Alliance’ ‘Veritas’ and the ‘Christian Party’ would be known as the ‘Alliance for Democracy’ was officially launched in February 2010 to contest the May 2010 UK General Election.

The Alliance for Democracy shared the propositions of referendum voting, championing non-career politicians and challenging the traditional political establishment yet each Party would retain their own unique identity and could campaign on their own platform (Meyer 2010). “We met around this very table. We more or less agreed on everything apart from one or two things that were contentious but when we got it down to the ten items everyone agreed. It was trying to pull together the greatest strength” (Judge 2013). In addition, “A number of small parties had the same issues...The English Parliament was one of things we certainly identified that the people wanted and the Government wouldn’t give. And so we started talking and we got on well and sort of made an electoral pact” (Judge 2012). The ‘Alliance for Democracy’ also approached UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party) and had “long discussions” to join the coalition of political brands. Former UKIP leader Lord Pearson was keen to join the coalition and thought the ‘Alliance for Democracy’ was a “very good idea to have an electoral
“pact” (Judge 2012) and “could see the point that if we could all come together we’d be much stronger” (Judge 2013). A series of meetings were held between November 2009-February 2010 to discuss policies, strategy, tactics and development. For example, “we went through all the 600 constituencies, we got an agreement as to who would stand in which so there would be an Alliance for Democracy everywhere” (Judge 2012). The meetings-discussions lasted until February 2010 with the expectation of announcing the members of the Alliance for Democracy, including UKIP, through strategically placed press releases in national newspapers such as the Sunday Times. However, “UKIP pulled out so then the Sunday Times said it’s not really a story. Then the thing dissolved” (Judge 2013). Despite UKIP’s initial interest “his [Lord Pearson’s UKIP] National Executives turned it down over his head”. Therefore, UKIP did not join the Alliance for Democracy.

Abandonment April 2010

Without UKIP, the Alliance for Democracy failed to capture the public’s attention and failed to make progress in terms of awareness and publicity similar to the issues faced by Sir Paul and the Jury Team prior the 2009 EU Elections. With continued difficulties and limited publicity, in April 2010, Sir Paul decided not to contest the 2010 UK General Election. The Alliance for Democracy “clearly wasn’t going to work. Sadly I decided in the middle of April for the May election we didn’t have enough good candidates” (Judge 2012). Further, fielding candidates across the UK would cost a £500 deposit for each candidate and “clearly was going to be £300,000, so it wasn’t worth it. So we had to say no” (Judge 2012). Further, “by early April [2010] it was clear to me that it was a waste of money in terms of all the deposits...the English Democrats did put out a few candidates but it was on their own back” (Judge 2013). Regrettably, Sir Paul abandoned the Jury Team political brand in April 2010; one month before the UK General Election.

On reflection, Sir Paul argued “it [Jury Team project] seemed like a good idea at the time. I think it was a good idea at the time. It was right for the country. I don’t feel any embarrassment but I didn’t realise the sales and distribution problems and if I had really known those I wouldn’t have done it” (Judge 2013). Sir Paul disagreed with the idea that if the Jury Team had more time to establish and develop as a political brand before polling day then this could have had an impact on the political brand’s success. For example, “when one looks at the continental models the ones that have done very well, the Dutch and the Italians they’ve come out very quickly. In the modern world if you can get the communications you can get people on board.
Peoples’ political views change very quickly so you don’t need a long time and I thought that doing it for the European elections starting it in the February 2009 have some success however defined for the European election would put us in some position for the General Election in 2010. It was an 18 month programme theoretically there was plenty of time” (Judge 2013).

Subsequently, the Jury Team was created in March 2008 and abandoned in April 2010. Despite the rise of political disconnect and political scandals particularly the release of MPs expenses in May 2009, the context had little impact on the fortunes of the Jury Team. In terms of the timing of the MPs Expenses scandal and the development of the Jury Team brand, Sir Paul believed “I thought God was shining on me but even that didn’t allow enough to get through...we could have done more with the resources we had...the message was there, the journalists understood the message but there was nothing in it for them. It was too new an idea. The expenses scandal helped the cynicism of traditional politics but it didn’t help enough and the concentration was on the ‘duck ponds’ and things” (Judge 2012).

Discussion

This paper set out to explore the creation, orientation and development of a new political brand called The Jury Team. Further, this study aimed to generate a deeper understanding of the three elements of the political brand with a focus on the party, figurehead and policy all from the perspective of the political brand’s founder-leader. This paper compliments existing studies that have tended to focus on established-major political entities (Lees 2005; Lees-Mashment 2001; Lock and Harris 1996:3; Nord and Stromback 2009; O’Cass 2001). However, Nord and Stromback (2009) was one exception and analysed the orientation of the ‘Junilistan’ political brand during the 2004 Swedish European Parliamentary elections. The discussion will conclude by comparing the findings with the existing literature and highlight the implications of this study.

Creation

The findings suggest that the Jury Team brand were positioned as a product-orientated party focusing on party-established policies and beliefs that the electorate could be convinced that the political brand offered the best approach compared to political competitors. For example, the overall rationale and guiding principles were internally created and developed by the leader [Sir Paul] with a view that the electorate would come to realise their merits and value (Nord and Stromback 2009; Lees-Mashment 2001). Therefore rather than a political movement of
people creating and developing the political brand it was developed by an individual who harboured personal frustration and disillusion of the current political system, i.e a product-oriented approach.

Nord and Stromback (2009) and Nord (2006) argue most political parties are founded as popular movements developed from single-issues or factions from existing-established political parties. In terms of political origins, Junilistan was founded and developed from a political movement that campaigned for a ‘No’ vote in the 2003 Swedish Euro Referendum one year before the 2004 EU Parliamentary Elections (Nord and Stromback 2009). In contrast, the Jury Team was established as a completely new entity with no origins linked to a political movement or previous campaign-political event four months prior the 2009 EU Parliamentary Elections (Judge 2009). Despite the fact both political brands were officially established four months before polling day, the Jury Team was an unknown programme of change and a completely new political brand compared with Junilistan. Therefore, it could be argued that Junilistan’s origin and heritage as a political movement helped establish and develop awareness, identification and differentiation of the political brand in the mind of voters.

In contrast it could be argued that the Jury Team was not created out of a single-issue or faction of a former party and was the result of a perceived gap in the political market. Further, if the Jury Team had been the platform for independent candidates following rather than prior a scandal or politically sensitive issue driven by a movement of people, then this may have improved its electoral success. Further, the Jury Team was positioned as a coalition of independent candidates united and guided by its Party leader; Sir Paul Judge. Therefore, this paper highlights that Sir Paul had a clear understanding of the Jury Team’s core message and its competitive advantage (Gurau and Ayadi 2011; Smith and Saunders 1990; Speed et al. 2015). However this message failed to break through the ‘barriers’ of the established media and was not clearly communicated by candidates to differentiate and identify the political brand as an alternative to the status quo (Nielsen 2016). This had an impact on communicating a distinctive, authentic and credible ‘new’ political offering.

**Development**

Unlike the Junilistan political brand, the Jury Team had no party members or party supporters and no public recognition or awareness (Nord and Stromback 2009). The findings also reveal that the new political brand had a strong dedicated leader, founded on personally developed policies and key issues yet had a weak party element. Part of the rich appeal of the Jury Team
was the fact the Party was made up of independent candidates, who were not part of the existing political establishment. This highlights the challenging nature for new political brands particularly those not grounded in a political movement or existing campaign (Nord and Stromback 2009). Established-major political brands have vast experience and resources already in place to manage and coordinate national-local elections (Baines 2005; Ormrod 2006; Pich 2012). In contrast many Jury Team candidates did not have established networks or support-bases within constituencies, and did not have the time or resources to fully commit to the Jury Team project. Each candidate was encouraged to create and develop a localised identity yet support the principles and key issues set out in the Jury Team handbook. This suggests that candidates could adopt their own orientation, independent of the orientation of the ‘corporate’ political brand (Lees 2005; Lees-Marshment 2001; Ormrod 2006; Robinson 2010).

Similarly, Junilistan’s political leaders included two individuals [Nils Lundgren and Lars Wohlin] who were prominent ‘No’ campaigners in the 2003 Swedish Euro Referendum and had acquired a profile with the Swedish media (Nord and Stromback 2009). Alongside their leadership role; Nils Lundgren and Lars Wohlin stood as prospective parliamentary candidates in the 2004 European Parliament Elections and positioned Junilistan as Eurosceptic yet at the same time remain a member of a reformed European Union movement. However, Sir Paul Judge, leader of the Jury Team was virtually unknown to the UK electorate and did not stand as a prospective parliamentary candidate in the 2009 European Parliament Elections as he wanted to offer support, guidance and facilitation to candidates based on his previous experience as a businessman and former Director General of the UK Conservative Party [1992-1995]. The Jury Team was broadly developed from conservative principles and linked to Sir Paul’s personal ideological beliefs. However, the Jury Team position was complex and multi-layered as it combined the philosophy of wisdom of crowds yet encouraged the development of localised decentralised ideology and policy by individual candidates (Judge 2009). Therefore, the Jury Team was a coalition of independent candidates headed by a non-candidate-leader and not a faction or specific-single issue movement with clear positioning compared with Junilistan. As ‘new’ political brands have fewer resources in place to create and develop their offering in terms of activists, experienced candidates, and organisational structure and funding, a market-orientated approach is unsuitable for ‘new’ political brands (Lees 2005; Ormrod 2006). This supports the idea that a market-oriented approach that addresses the wants and needs of voters and develops a consistent tailored communication campaign on a national
scale is more appropriate for established-major political brands (Lees-Marshment 2001; O’Cass 1996; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Robinson 2010).

**Orientation**

The Jury Team was grounded as a *product-orientated* political brand which is consistent with the work of Lees (2005) who argued that smaller political parties should adopt a product-oriented approach and focus on gaining niche dominant positions and this would lead to success. However, a product-oriented approach did not transpire to ‘success’ for the Jury Team brand at the polls. In addition, the existing literature states that political brands with low membership and little identification may find a *sales-oriented* approach more appealing (Ormrod 2006). A sales-oriented approach is much more focused on the virtues of policies and values based on a professionally-targeted campaign (Lees-Marshment 2001; Nord and Stromback 2009; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Robinson 2010). However, the Jury Team was unable to adopt a professional campaign in the sense of ‘targeted’ messaging, ‘tailored’ communications and ‘continued’ market research due to a limited budget, a small internal communications team and limited organisational structure across all regions (O’Cass 2001; O’Cass 1996; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Ormrod et al. 2013; Ormrod 2011; Robinson 2010). However, the Jury Team did use a professional campaign, such as a party-political broadcast on television, which suggests that the Jury Team brand had adopted ‘elements’ of a sales-oriented approach and ‘elements’ of a product-orientated approach similar to the findings of Nord and Stromback (2009).

In terms of electoral success, in the 2004 European Elections, Junilistan secured 14.5% of the national vote which equated to three Members of the European Parliament (Nord and Stromback 2009). Hoping to strengthen their political standing Junilistan contested 2009 and 2014 European Parliament Elections however momentum subsided and the political brand was abandoned in June 2004 (www.scb.se). In contrast, following the 2009 European Elections the Jury Team secured 0.5% of the national vote and unsuccessfully secured representation in the European Parliament (Judge 2012). The Jury Team subsequently fielded a candidate in a 2009 UK by-election with little success and was abandoned in April 2010 (Judge 2013). Therefore, although both political brands had no official membership base, they were founded four months prior to polling day. Further both political brands were inspired by perceptions of disconnect between voters and the political establishment each political brand had a unique journey in terms of creation, orientation and development.
This study outlines the creation, orientation [identity] and development of a ‘new’ Jury Team political brand from an ‘internal relational perspective’ (Nielsen 2015; Nielsen 2016). Further, this research demonstrates the similarities and differences between two similar yet distinct political brands across contexts (Judge 2009; Nord and Stromback 2009). This study highlights the transferability of the three approaches of orientation which can be used as a mechanism to deconstruct the political brand identity of ‘new’ political brands. This is summarised in table 2 also known as the political brand development matrix.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Brand Dimensions</th>
<th>New Political Brands</th>
<th>Established-Major Political Brands</th>
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<tr>
<td>Political Brands</td>
<td>New - The Jury Team: 2008-2010</td>
<td>Established-Major Political Brands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Multiple Issues - The Jury Team: Independence</td>
<td>Ideological</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Single Issue - Junilistan Party: Euroscepticism</td>
<td>Considerable</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Limited - The Jury Team</td>
<td>Established networks</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limited - Junilistan Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisational Structure</td>
<td>Limited - The Jury Team</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Limited - Junilistan Party: 2003 Euro Referendum Movement</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Membership</td>
<td>Low-none - The Jury Team</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Low-none - Junilistan Party</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Activists-Volunteers</td>
<td>Low-none - The Jury Team</td>
<td>High</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Limited - Junilistan Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leader</td>
<td>Leader focused - The Jury Team</td>
<td>Mandate from Party</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Leader focused - Junilistan Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>Coalition Independents - The Jury Team</td>
<td>Coalition of Individuals</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Dominant Position - Junilistan Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policy</td>
<td>Internally Created - The Jury Team</td>
<td>Voter-centric</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Internally Created - Junilistan Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nature-Approach</td>
<td>Individual Focus - The Jury Team</td>
<td>Corporate Political Brands</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Individual Focus - Junilistan Party</td>
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</table>

More specifically, table 2 showcases the dimensions and examples of deconstructed ‘new’ political brands and contrasts dimensions of ‘major-established’ political brands all linked to creation, development and orientation (O’Cass and Voola 2011; Speed et al. 2015). This study has implications for political entities within and beyond political marketing. For example, the political brand development matrix [table 2] provides practitioners with a mechanism of how to deconstruct new or established political brands and understand their offering and make adaptations or changes to their identities if required. Further, the political brand development matrix provides a starting point for future comparative research across settings and contexts and to generate deeper insight into the orientation and development of political brands. In
addition, this study could guide future studies on the relationship between political brand identity and orientation to assess the usability of the political brand development matrix.

Subsequently, this study addresses explicit calls for future research that distinctly focuses on one of the six perspectives in political branding namely research that adopts an ‘internal relational perspective’ (Nielsen 2015; Nielsen 2016). Further, this distinction provides greater clarity and opportunity to develop a comparative study which in turn advances political marketing-branding research (Harris and Lock 2010; Needham and Smith 2015; Nielsen 2015; Nielsen 2016; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Scammell 2015).

**Conclusion**

This study therefore continues the debate within the field as to which orientation should be adopted by political entities for success at the polls (Lees 2005; Lees-Marshment 2001; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Ormrod 2006; Robinson 2010). Further, it suggests that elements of all three orientations may lead to greater professionalism and effectiveness with communicating, developing and sustaining political brands in the future. This case adds fresh first-hand insight into political branding research as it offers a deep understanding of the position and development of a “relatively remote” subject area (Lock and Harris 1996:3) by comparing its findings with the work of Nord and Stromback (2009). It also addresses the explicit calls for more empirical research within this area specifically on the orientations of political brands and offers grounding for future comparative research which will advance the wider sub-discipline of political market (Harris and Lock 2010; Nielsen 2015; O’Cass 2001; O’Cass 1996; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Ormrod 2007; Ormrod and Henneberg 2011; Robinson 2010; Rutter et al. 2015; Scammell 2015; Speed et al. 2015).

This case not only advances our understanding and debate within the topic area (Lees 2005; Lees-Marshment 2001; O’Cass and Voola 2011; Ormrod 2006; Robinson 2010), it also provides political stakeholders with an example and structure of how to deconstruct a political brand’s orientation and development. More specifically, the political brand matrix [table 2] offers ‘new’ and ‘existing’ political brands a framework to review their position and orientation, and a mechanism to deconstruct their political entities. This will support the development political brands in terms of policy formation, leadership approach and party management. This understanding will support the long-term strategic marketing management process of all three elements of political brands [leader, party and policy] (Butler et al. 2011; Pich et al. 2014; Speed et al. 2015) and reposition, refresh or maintain if required. Therefore,
this study highlights that political branding remains a “critical and priority issue for research” (Speed et al. 2015:130) and is an “appropriate way to understand the permanent campaigns” in political systems in different settings and contexts (Scammell 2015:11).
References


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