Stationary concepts for experimental 2x2-games

Selten, R. and Chmura, T. ORCID: 0000-0001-7476-2030, 2008. Stationary concepts for experimental 2x2-games. American Economic Review, 98 (3), pp. 938-966. ISSN 0002-8282

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Abstract

Five stationary concepts for completely mixed 2 x 2-games are experimentally compared: Nash equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium (Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein 1998), and impulse balance equilibrium. Experiments on 12 games, 6 constant sum games, and 6 nonconstant sum games were run with 12 independent subject groups for each constant sum game and 6 independent subject groups for each nonconstant sum game. Each independent subject group consisted of four players 1 and four players 2, interacting anonymously over 200 periods with random matching. The comparison of the five theories shows that the order of performance from best to worst is as follows: impulse balance equilibrium, payoff-sampling equilibrium, action-sampling equilibrium, quantal response equilibrium, Nash equilibrium.

Item Type: Journal article
Publication Title: American Economic Review
Creators: Selten, R. and Chmura, T.
Publisher: American Economic Association
Date: June 2008
Volume: 98
Number: 3
ISSN: 0002-8282
Identifiers:
NumberType
10.1257/aer.98.3.938DOI
Divisions: Schools > Nottingham Business School
Depositing User: Linda Sullivan
Date Added: 24 Apr 2018 09:06
Last Modified: 24 Apr 2018 09:06
URI: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/33302

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