The minority of three-game: an experimental and theoretical analysis

Chmura, T. ORCID: 0000-0001-7476-2030 and Güth, W., 2011. The minority of three-game: an experimental and theoretical analysis. Games, 2 (3), pp. 333-354. ISSN 2073-4336

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Abstract

We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player’s behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize.

Item Type:	Journal article
Publication Title:	Games
Creators:	Chmura, T. and Güth, W.
Publisher:	MDPI
Date:	9 September 2011
Volume:	2
Number:	3
ISSN:	2073-4336
Identifiers:	Number Type 10.3390/g2030333 DOI
Rights:	Open access: Creative Commons Attribution License 4.0
Divisions:	Schools > Nottingham Business School
Record created by:	Jonathan Gallacher
Date Added:	24 Apr 2018 13:30
Last Modified:	24 Apr 2018 13:34
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/33313

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