Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: evidence from an experimental coordination game

Chmura, T ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7476-2030, Kube, S, Pitz, T and Puppe, C, 2005. Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: evidence from an experimental coordination game. Economics Letters, 88 (2), pp. 214-220. ISSN 0165-1765

Preview

Text PubSub10823_Chmura.pdf - Published version Download (106kB) | Preview

Abstract

We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which two players can coordinate either on an equal distribution of payoffs or on a Pareto superior but unequal distribution of payoffs. We find that the higher the difference in individual payoffs, the less likely is a successful coordination on the Pareto superior distribution. While this is well in line with the recent models of inequity aversion, our results are best explained not by a preference for equality per se but rather by the belief that the opponent has such a preference.

Item Type:	Journal article
Publication Title:	Economics Letters
Creators:	Chmura, T., Kube, S., Pitz, T. and Puppe, C.
Publisher:	Elsevier
Date:	August 2005
Volume:	88
Number:	2
ISSN:	0165-1765
Identifiers:	Number Type 10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.009 DOI
Rights:	Copyright © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Divisions:	Schools > Nottingham Business School
Record created by:	Linda Sullivan
Date Added:	25 Apr 2018 09:48
Last Modified:	25 Apr 2018 09:48
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/33321

Actions (login required)

Edit View

Statistics

Views

Downloads