Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: evidence from an experimental coordination game

Chmura, T. ORCID: 0000-0001-7476-2030, Kube, S., Pitz, T. and Puppe, C., 2005. Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: evidence from an experimental coordination game. Economics Letters, 88 (2), pp. 214-220. ISSN 0165-1765

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Abstract

We report experimental results on a simple coordination game in which two players can coordinate either on an equal distribution of payoffs or on a Pareto superior but unequal distribution of payoffs. We find that the higher the difference in individual payoffs, the less likely is a successful coordination on the Pareto superior distribution. While this is well in line with the recent models of inequity aversion, our results are best explained not by a preference for equality per se but rather by the belief that the opponent has such a preference.

Item Type: Journal article
Publication Title: Economics Letters
Creators: Chmura, T., Kube, S., Pitz, T. and Puppe, C.
Publisher: Elsevier
Date: August 2005
Volume: 88
Number: 2
ISSN: 0165-1765
Identifiers:
NumberType
10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.009DOI
Rights: Copyright © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Divisions: Schools > Nottingham Business School
Depositing User: Linda Sullivan
Date Added: 25 Apr 2018 09:48
Last Modified: 25 Apr 2018 09:48
URI: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/33321

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