A threat to climate-secure European futures? Exploring racial logics and climate-induced migration in US and EU climate security discourses

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ABSTRACT

Whether formulated as a security risk, a form of climate adaptation, a legal dilemma, or an issue of (in)justice, the debate on climate change and migration draws upon multiple, oftentimes contradictory, discourses. This paper examines the role of racial identities in debates about the security implications of climate-induced migration (CIM). The paper proposes a reconceptualization of ‘racial logics’: a form of discursive construction that connects naturalized assumptions about racialized Others with possible outcomes in conditions of future climate insecurity. The paper argues that ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ migrant populations – in the context of possible CIM from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region to the EU – are racialized with a potential capacity for radicalization and terrorism. Constructed as racialized Others, ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ migrant populations could face exclusionary containment policies in climate-insecure futures. The article concludes with a call to challenge racial logics and the restrictive, unjust possibilities they suggest for future climate security politics.

1. Introduction

Human migration is a contested topic in climate change scholarship (Bettini, 2014; Farbotko and Lazzrus, 2012; Bierman and Boas, 2008). From alarmist accounts of ‘climate refugees’ and climate-induced migrants as a security threat (Bettini, 2013), to arguments that situate climate-induced migration (CIM) as an adaption strategy (Black et al., 2011), CIM raises a number of important issues. One of these concerns the role of cultural identities in CIM debates (Farbotko et al., 2016). How are populations, communities, or individuals ascribed identities in CIM debates? How do individuals or communities whose (im)mobility is framed in relation to environmental stresses understand their sense of Self? Adger et al. (2011) argue that these concerns – nonmaterial, material and place-based understandings of identity – are underrepresented in environmental decision-making. Similarly, as Baldwin et al. (2014) note, CIM debates are characterised by a future-conditional relation, about what could happen in conditions of climate insecurity. Building on an emerging literature on the racialization of CIM (Baldwin, 2013a, 2013b, 2016, 2017; Methmann and Rothe, 2014), this paper’s contribution is to theorize the construction of cultural (in particular racialized) identities in CIM’s future-conditional tense. How are populations racialized in a securitized CIM discourse, and what does this suggest for how they could, might, are likely to, or will act in climate-insecure futures?

In particular, I propose a reconceptualization of ‘logics’ – grounded in Hall’s (1986; 1996) reflections on logics and ideology, and Anderson’s (2010) account of logics and anticipatory futures – as a framework to explore racialized identities in future-oriented CIM discourses. These constructions are examined in the context of possible CIM from the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region to the EU (European Union). I argue that, in particular moments of US and EU climate security discourses, ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations, when framed as potential climate-induced migrants, are racialized as potentially prone to radicalization or terroristic violence. Imbeded in unequal power relations, racialized populations could then be subject to unjust outcomes in climate-insecure futures (e.g. containment policies). To explore these implications, this paper documents research from an in-depth textual analysis of three publications from US and EU climate security contexts (grounded in Fairclough’s (2003) model from critical linguistics). To begin, however, I outline the field of ‘climate security’: a significant backdrop for securitized understandings of CIM.

2. Climate security

An extensive critical academic literature has developed that explores the security implications of climate change (McDonald, 2013;
Dietz et al., 2016). Scholars have interrogated the power relations of climate security discourses (Dietz and Betsill, 2009; Oels, 2013; McDonald, 2013; Von Lucke et al., 2014), securitized dynamics of CIM (White, 2011; Boas, 2015), biopolitics and climate security (Grove, 2010; Baldwin, 2013b; Dalby, 2013), and links between climate security, complexity and resilience (Boas and Rothe, 2016; Rothe, 2016). Broadly put, ‘climate security’ is concerned with the security implications of climate change impacts, e.g. territorial loss from sea-level rise, resource scarcities and the potential for conflict, and how climate change impacts affect energy security outcomes (Barnett, 2003). In 2003, a Pentagon-commissioned report first outlined the consequences of climate change for US national security: Schwartz and Randall (2003) construct an abrupt climate change scenario (patterned on a similar 100 year event which occurred 8200 years ago) and speculate on its potential security implications, e.g. conflict and resource scarcities. Then, in a 2006 speech former UK Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett is believed to have used the term ‘climate security’ for the first time (Trombetta, 2008). Under Beckett’s leadership, the UN Security Council (UNSC) debated climate change in April 2007 (UNSC, 2007a and b). A further UNSC debate was held in June 2011 at the behest of the German government (UNSC, 2011a and b). Two Arria-Formula meetings (confidential sessions held by Council Members with other invited parties (UNSC, 2016)) were also held by the UNSC in February 2013 and June 2015 (Werrell and Femina, 2015).

Climate security has been conceptualized in a variety of ways (McDonald, 2013). For example, climate change is the subject of a number of reports from national security oriented think tanks (e.g. Center for Naval Analyses, 2007) and is referenced in several national security strategies, for instance the 2010 and 2014 Quadrennial Defense Reviews from the US Department of Defense. A discourse of ‘human security’ has also gained traction; for example, the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (2014) contains a chapter on human security. This is defined (in the context of climate change) as ‘a condition that exists when the vital core of human lives is protected, and when people have the freedom and capacity to live with dignity’ (Adger et al., 2014: 759). The authors argue there is ‘high agreement’ that climate change poses human security risks and that adaptation measures could minimize these risks (Adger et al., 2014: 777–778). As McDonald (2013: 49, original emphasis) states, ‘discourses of climate security matter ... they serve to define who is in need of protection from the threat posed by climate change; who is capable of providing this protection; and ... what forms responses to these threats might take.’ In support of McDonald’s (2013) critique, I argue that national security responses are limited because they can suggest exclusionary outcomes in conditions of climate insecurity. Campbell (1998 (1992)) contends that national security depends upon the protection of nation-states from external ‘threats’ or ‘enemies’; it posits binaries of ‘Self/Other’, ‘inside/outside’, and ‘domestic/foreign’. The paper explores these questions with the case of racialized Othering (of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations) in representations of CIM from the MENA region to the EU. Given the exclusionary outcomes these representations suggest, e.g. fortressed bordering practices or discrimination against migrants, I argue it is especially important to examine racialization and Othering in relation to climate-insecure futures. Prior to an elaboration of ‘racial logics’ as a concept to investigate securitized climate-induced migration discourses, I outline the methodological framework employed in this paper.

3. Methodology

To highlight processes of racialization in US and EU climate security discourses, this paper draws upon three examples from a specific empirical context: representations of CIM (of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations) from the MENA region to the EU. In particular, I draw upon a textual analysis of three documents from earlier EU and US climate security discourses. These are formative, early examples from the emergence of climate security discourses (the ‘2007 turn’ (Liberatore, 2013)) and their dissemination (Campbell et al., 2007; German Advisory Council on Global Change (WGBU), 2007; National Intelligence Council (NIC), 2009). They include a publication from two US think tanks (the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Center for a New American Security (Campbell et al., 2007)), a report from the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WGBU) (WGBU, 2007), and a regional geopolitical report from the 2009 US National Intelligence Council Estimate (NIC, 2009). These examples are pertinent because they crystallize specific identity constructions: they represent important moments of racialization of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants in relation to future possibilities of climate insecurity. Each example highlights a particular association of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ migrant populations with naturalized traits, in these cases a propensity towards or vulnerability to radicalization and acts of terrorist violence. I examine these examples to explore how racialized identities – in the particular empirical context of CIM from the MENA region to the EU – are constructed in relation to multiple climate-insecure futures (e.g. possibilities of exclusionary containment policies). In other words, in these cases, how does a racial logic orient ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants’ agency in future conditions of climate insecurity?

For each example, I conducted a textual and contextual analysis (Dittmer, 2010). The textual analysis involved reading through each document and ascribing descriptive codes (e.g. ‘Othering,’ ‘history-context,’ ‘geopolitics,’ ‘migration’ and ‘radicalization/terrorism’) to highlighted sections of text. Highlighted, coded sections were subjected to a textual analysis using Fairclough’s (2003) approach derived from critical linguistics. This analysis involved several lines of examination. For example, I explored the grammar (sentence structure, tense, propositional choices, etc.) used in these sections, semantics (word meanings and their contexts), and each excerpt’s possible pragmatic and subtextual relations (underlying assumptions and meanings, inconsistencies and contradictions, and implicit statements). Underlying assumptions could relate to different value systems, assumptions about ‘truth’ in the text, or about what is ‘possible’ or ‘necessary’ (Fairclough, 2003). In a discussion about possible futures, modality is also an important grammatical dimension, e.g. use of modal verbs (‘might’, ‘would’ or ‘could’) and modal adjectives (‘possible’ or ‘probable’). My interpretations of these linguistic features were informed by both the concepts that inform the paper’s analysis – e.g. racialization, naturalization, terrorism and radicalization – and the political contexts that underpin each document. For the contextual analysis, I adopted Waitt’s (2010: 255) technique of familiarization. This included conducting background research on each of the texts, their authorship, technological medium, audience and reception. The contextual analysis also operated across multiple scales. Alongside analysis of the production and reception of the three texts themselves, these documents were situated in relation to broader political debates, e.g. on histories of CIM, ‘climate refugee’ and ‘migration-as-adaptation’ discourses (Bettini, 2014), and on the geopolitics of the War on Terror. Importantly, however, whilst I argue that these examples illustrate racial logics that naturalize populations, racialization in this context works at the scale of underlying assumptions and associations. This paper utilises the concept of ‘logics’ to explore how racialized constructions of populations (built on underlying assumptions and associations) are framed in relation to

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4. Racial logics and climate security

This paper’s central contention is that assumptions about what ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations are, of what they represent, or what have the capacity for, are held in chains of association with assumptions about what could, might, or will happen in climate-insecure futures (for example rising sea-levels and coastal erosion, increased frequencies of extreme weather events, etc.). Racial logics are thus predicated upon the connections drawn between naturalized populations (‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants) and what these naturalized assumptions suggest for outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures. The theorization of logics I employ draws upon Hall’s (1986) conceptualization of ‘ideology’ and Anderson’s (2010) account of anticipatory action and future geographies. Whereas Hall (1986) argues for an anti-essentialist, non-deterministic ‘Marxism without guarantees’, Anderson’s (2010) conceptualization is based on a Foucauldian analytic of how uncertain futures are governed. For Hall, before ideological consensus stabilizes, it is at the scale of premise and assumption that particular statements are naturalized as ‘true’. Although Anderson’s (2010) piece draws upon a wider assemblage of ‘elements’, of which ‘statements’ are a particular component of ‘styles’, discursive signiﬁcations are important for his account. Therefore, although Anderson’s (2010) and Hall’s (1986) theorizations are from radically different schools of critical thought and cannot be simplistically equated, I argue there are some instructive points of intersection.

Hall (1986: 29, original emphasis) highlights the problem of ideology. This is how, within a materialist Marxist framework, ideas arise and are contested within social formations. Hall (1986: 26) defines ideologies as ‘the mental frameworks – the languages, concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, deﬁne, ﬁgure out and render intelligible the way society works.’ Makus (1990) writes that, for Hall, critical studies of ideology should investigate ways in which ideological meanings are implicated in unequal systems of power: political, economic and technological structures (e.g. education systems) that confer ideological consensus in societies. Hall (1996) argues that meaning is socially constructed: contestations over meaning contribute to broader sedimentations of an ideological consensus, claims to universal validity for partial worldviews, or what Makus (1990: 498) describes as ‘that part of the truth which takes it for the whole truth.’

Ideological constructions tend whole ‘logics’ as the ‘common sense’ of a culture: they depend on a series of taken-for-granted assumptions about reality, the ‘reality effect’ of ideology (Hall, 1996: 141). As Makus (1990: 499) states: ‘Losing their propositional status, premises are transformed into narrative statements that are resistant to alternative interpretations of events.’ As such, these premises – and the ‘logics’ they comprise – are naturalized as narratives and truths (premises work as a chain of reasoning to produce statements as natural, essential or inevitable) (Hall, 1996). Crucially, ‘logics’ in this sense are not a chain of valid, necessary premises, but are only one possible form of discursive arrangement. Hall’s (1996: 140) deﬁnition of ‘logic’ is ‘an apparently necessary chain of implication between statement and premise’. The ‘apparently’ is fundamental: it is not the case that premises must pass logical rules of validation to afﬁrm the statement, but rather that they are reiﬁed as naturalized narratives or ‘truths’ that, when ordered as this chain of reasoning, represent the ideological consensus as ‘reality’. This conceptualization, of logics as socially constructed and not necessarily attached to fundamental rules, is an important facet to the understanding of ‘logics’ deployed in this paper.

I argue Anderson’s (2010) account of logics supplements Hall’s account in productive ways. Anderson (2010) theorizes the assembling of various elements – statements, affects, programmes, material objects and so forth – as modes of ‘anticipatory action’ to govern uncertain futures and protect valued lives in liberal democracies. He (2010: 779) distinguishes between ‘styles’ (statements through which the abstract notion of ‘the future’ is disclosed and related to), ‘practices’ which give content to speciﬁc futures through acts of performing, imagining and calculating, and ‘logics’ that legitimize and enable action. ‘Logics’ are ‘a programmatic way of formalizing, deploying and justifying action in the here and now. Logics involve action that aims to prevent, mitigate, adapt to, prepare for or pre-empt certain futures’ (Anderson, 2010: 778-9). Anderson (2010) locates three anticipatory logics. ‘Precaution’ acts upon a threat once it has been identiﬁed, in the face of uncertainty but before it reaches a point of irreversibility. ‘Pre-emption’ can act on a threat that has not yet appeared and is immersed in its conditions of emergence. Finally, ‘preparedness’ is about adapting to the aftermath of a threatening episode and dealing with its effects (Anderson, 2010). For Anderson (2010), logics need not have a primary agent, target or spatial form; they coexist across contexts (e.g. climate change or terrorism); and can exceed any one case. However, they are not totally detached and ‘are continually being reassembled in attempts to govern different domains of life’ (Anderson, 2010: 778). To summarize, ‘logics’ in Anderson’s (2010) theorization involve two constitutive elements: interventions to mitigate, avoid or adapt to a future that has – through styles and practices – been ‘rendered actionable’, and rationalizations that value some lives over others in liberal democracies.

Working from Hall’s and Anderson’s accounts, logics are deﬁned as contingent, discursively constructed series of essentializing propositions, assumptions or associations that rationalize and legitimate possible future outcomes or interventions. Although constructed in context-speciﬁc power-knowledge relations, ‘logics’ are also cross-contextual. They are not grounded in an a priori agency, but are differentially constituted through unequal power relations and formed from associations and propositions (about naturalized ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants) in climate security discourses. Following Anderson, I argue that logics are not only oriented towards historic or present signiﬁcations, but also towards possible futures and the outcomes and interventions legitimized in these futures. This temporality is a central point of intersection: logics represent a point at which discursively rendered series of associations and assumptions (historic and present signiﬁcations of naturalized populations) are framed in relation to multiple, possible climate-insecure futures.

Moreover, racial logics are discursively constructed. Following Bialasiewicz et al. (2007: 406), discourse refers to ‘a speciﬁc series of representations and practices through which meanings are produced, social relations established, and political or ethical outcomes made more or less possible.’ Discourses’ capacity to direct conditions of possibility are important for US and EU climate securities: to mediate between historic/present signiﬁcations of identity and what these meanings render possible in climate-insecure futures. Thus, Bialasiewicz et al. (2007: 406, following Butler (1990)) argue that imaginative geographies in US national security strategies are performative: they perform the effects they name and constitute the subjects and objects of which they speak. Through processes of iteration and citation, constrained by historical and present meanings and realities, discourses give rise to new possibilities and formations (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). In this ‘performative geopolitics’, previous articulations are reworked to ‘provide the conditions of possibility for current and future action’ (Bialasiewicz et al., 2007: 417). Related to the concept of ‘racial logics’, a ‘performative geopolitics’ suggests that present and historic signiﬁcations of racialized identities work to delimit conditions of possibility for climate-insecure futures. Racial logics are performative in that current and historic signiﬁcations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants condition possibilities for what might happen in climate-insecure futures.

Racial logics represent a conceptual crossroads between presents and possible futures, with racialized Othering an important constituent of these crossroads. As security analysts have considered climate change as a ‘threat multiplier’ that exacerbates existing security issues,
e.g., ‘conflict’ (Buxton and Hayes, 2016), this does not mean that human subjects considered as Others are necessarily the direct, first-order ‘threat’ (Methmann and Rothe, 2012) around which security institutions mobilize. As racial Others, I utilize Goldberg’s (1992: 553) definition of ‘race’ as a ‘fluid, transforming, historically specific concept parasitic on theoretic and social discourses for the meaning it assumes at given historical moments.’ Race espouses multiple, context-specific meanings (based on biological (e.g. skin colour) and cultural (e.g. religious affiliation) traits) and naturalizes these to particular populations. Racial logics explore the role that naturalized assumptions about ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations play in demarcating outcomes and interventions in possible climate-insecure futures.

Importantly, racial logics are not only explicit statements about what a particular population ‘is’ and how that population ‘might’, ‘would’, ‘could’, ‘is likely to’ or ‘will’ react in climate-insecure futures. They also contain underlying assumptions that associate groups – possible ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants – with particular traits, e.g. a latent capacity for terrorism. As a form of discursive construction, racial logics are formulated in context-specific moments of US and EU climate security discourses. Specifically, in moments of US and EU climate security documents where scenarios of future climate insecurity are introduced (e.g. extreme weather events or reduced agricultural yields), racialized assumptions underpin how particular populations (‘Muslim’ and ‘African’) might act in such climate-insecure futures. These moments – interpreted as racial logics – are the focus of this paper’s empirical analysis. Grounded in the context of possible CIM from the MENA region to the EU, I argue that racial logics not only delimit assumptions about ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ migrants’ actions, but also suggest potentially exclusionary outcomes (e.g. contested border practices) in climate-insecure futures.

5. Climate-induced migration from the MENA region to the EU

Migration from MENA countries to the EU has been especially prominent since the 1950s. Numbers increased after Algerian independence (1962) with a series of bilateral recruitment agreements: Morocco signed these with West Germany and France in 1963, Belgium in 1964, and the Netherlands in 1969 (White, 2011). After the OPEC embargo and oil crisis (1973–4), European states and the EU have increasingly sought to restrict migration and, from the 1990s onwards, drafted readmission agreements for irregular migrants (El Qadim, 2014). However, despite increased securitization of the EU’s external borders – enabled by the 1985 Schengen Agreement and establishment of FRONTEX (the EU’s border agency) in 2004 – migration from MENA countries to the EU has continued. An estimated 300,000 Tunisians were living abroad in 2003, alongside 800,000 Algerians (by 2000) (Baldwin-Edwards, 2006). As a transit country, Libya has become increasingly important to the EU. The Libyan and Italian governments signed an agreement (in 2003) whereby immigration liaison officers would be exchanged between the two nation-states and immigration centres commissioned in Libya (Lutterbeck, 2009).

These histories of migration became intertwined with climate change discourses from the mid-late 2000s. Theories connecting environmental drivers and migration stretch back to the 19th century: writing in 1891, Ravenstein argued that environmental factors (e.g. climatic changes) were among many causal variations that could influence migration (Piguet, 2013). Essam Al-Hinawi brought the term ‘environmental refugee’ to the fore in a 1985 UNEP report to grapple with the problems of individuals forced to leave their homes due to natural disasters (Weinthal et al., 2015). ‘Environmental refugees’ were also cited in the influential Brundtland Report (1987) (Boas, 2015). Norman Myers (2005) predicted the existence of 200 million climate-induced migrants by 2050, but Methmann and Oels (2015) identify that this figure assumes every person resident in an area with predicted climate change impacts, e.g. coastal erosion, would be forced to move (Myers concedes that his estimate, though based on the best available data at the time, relied on flawed extrapolations (Brown, 2008)). The figure takes no account of the complexities of migration (mediated by social, economic, political and cultural dynamics), or the range of adaptive strategies (e.g. livelihood diversification) available in affected areas (Methmann and Oels, 2015).

From the mid-2000s, CIM received increased attention from security institutions: Boas (2015) contends that the 2007 and 2011 UNSC debates on climate change are key contributors to this securitization. In 2008, the EU’s High Representative Javier Solana and the European Commission produced a report that notes the possibility of CIM from Africa to the EU. They (2008: 8) write: ‘In Southern Africa, droughts are likely to intensify … Migration in this region, but also migration from other regions through Northern Africa to reach Europe (transit migration) is likely to intensify.’ This report represents one of the EU’s first statements on climate security and CIM (Trombetta, 2014). It is paralleled by a series of US publications (see, for example, Campbell et al., 2007, discussed below) that speculate on CIM from Africa to the EU. In her analysis of CIM debates, Oels (2016) proposes three discourses. First is ‘climate refugees’, a discourse disseminated by security institutions and NGOs and which casts CIM as a security threat that justifies harsh measures, e.g. strict border controls. Oels (2016) second discourse is ‘human security’: this looks ‘to save’ climate-induced migrants and directs attention towards risk management strategies, international development and humanitarian intervention as possible solutions. Finally, CIM is presented as an adaptation strategy; individuals are encouraged to utilize migration to build resilience and economic opportunities (Black et al., 2011; Oels, 2016). Similarly, Bettini (2014) differentiates between securitized ‘climate refugee’ and ‘migration-as-adaptation’ registers in his account of the biopolitics of CIM. The ‘security’ register locates a potentially dangerous, ‘pathologically unfit’ migrant engaged in ‘bad circulation’, whilst the ‘migration-as-adaptation’ register (linked to human security) promotes a resilient, adaptable and entrepreneurial migrant engaged in ‘good circulation’ (Bettini, 2014: 191).

Summarizing the security, threats-based CIM discourse, Oels (2016: 192) states that ‘the discourse spreads fear about climate refugees’ and is ‘undeniably racist’. She (2016) draws upon Baldwin’s (2013a) analysis of Michael Nash’s 2010 film Climate Refugees and points out that it touches upon racist stereotypes of Western experts assisting poor victims of climate impacts in a ‘dangerous’ Global South. Baldwin (2012: 627) identifies a range of modes of alterity in CIM discourse, e.g. ‘indigeneity, ‘the Muslim’ or ‘the terrorist’, but centres on a form of postcolonial alterity oriented to the future. Instead of a dialectical different-from relation critiqued by postcolonial theorists, Baldwin (2012) argues that the Other in CIM discourses is conceived of as yet-to-come. Baldwin (2013a) expands his analysis to argue ‘the climate migrant’ is racialized through three tropes. ‘Naturalization’ is the way in which climate migrants are represented with nature idioms (e.g. the assertion that they move due to natural forces and not internal reason). ‘Loss of status’ refers to depictions of climate migrants as an excess of the territorialized, international political order. Finally, ‘ambiguity’ refers to portrayals of climate migrants as indeterminate: a product of multifactorial, indefinable and incalculable relations (Baldwin, 2013a). Building on these concerns about racialization and xenophobia in a securitized CIM debates, I explore how a racialized ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other is constructed in US and EU climate security debates.

6. Radicalized climate-induced migrants?

Through an analysis of racial logics in three EU and US climate security publications (representations of CIM from the MENA region to the EU), I argue that a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other is constructed with a potential capacity for radicalization and terrorism. Hall (1996) contends that logics – grounded in premises and assumptions – naturalize ideological statements as the ‘truth’ about ideologies and cultures. Similarly, racial logics naturalize particular characteristics to ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations. ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced
migrants are not inherently prone to radicalization or terrorism, but are socially constructed as such; they are not ‘grounded in nature, but producing nature as a sort of guarantee of its truth’ (Hall, 1996: 141). As racialized Others, they are constituted from naturalized assumptions. As Anderson (2010) attests, logics are a programmatic means, part of a broader anticipatory politics, which mobilise future in liberal democracies. Racial logics, on the basis of naturalized assumptions, delimit ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants’ future possibilities in conditions of climate insecurity. I argue that naturalized assumptions about ‘Muslim and ‘African’ migrant populations are mobilised to speculate on potentially unjust future outcomes, specifically possibilities for securitized bordering practices and a ‘sedentary bias’ against migration to the EU (Bakewell, 2008).

I start with the report The Age of Consequences: The Foreign and National Security Implications of Climate Change (Campbell et al., 2007). Published by the Center for Strategic Studies and Center for a New American Security (two US think tanks), this publication is one of several moments in what Liberatore (2013) terms the ‘2007 turn’ of climate security discourses. Alongside the first UNSC debate on the security implications of climate change, a series of international publications emerged which discuss climate change and security (e.g. from the Center for Naval Analyses (2007) and the European Commission with Javier Solana (2008)). In a study of media coverage in 9 countries (the US, UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, India, South Africa, Thailand, and Singapore), Schäfer et al. (2016) note that overall the number of articles on climate change which use securitizing language (as a proportion of the total) jumps from 0.09% between 1996 and 2006 to 0.57% between 2007 and 2010. Writing about the possibility of climate-induced migration from South Asia and Africa to the EU, Campbell et al. (2007: 59) note (Fig. 1):

In this excerpt, Campbell et al. (2007) speculate on an increase to Europe’s Muslim population in response to climate insecurities. The language used to describe the consequences of migration is consistently negative: ‘suspicion’, ‘exacerbate existing tensions’, ‘internal political tension’, ‘attack’ and ‘homegrown terrorist’. Campbell et al. (2007) also make several assumptions about cross-border migration, including a ‘degree of instability’ generated by an increase to Europe’s population. Associations between Muslim climate-induced migrants and a possible capacity for terrorism are repeated several times in the report. Campbell et al. (2007) assert that a ‘surge in the number of Muslim immigrants … could increase the likelihood of radicalisation’, and that the ‘suspicion with which Europe’s Muslim and immigrant communities are viewed by many would be greatly intensified by an attack from a “homegrown terrorist”’. Elsewhere in the document, Campbell et al. (2007: 86) state: ‘Many of Europe’s Muslim minorities, including Russia’s, are not well-assimilated today, and the stress of major climate change and sea-level rise may well foster social disruption and radicalization.’ Campbell et al. (2007: 106) also stress that an ‘influx of Muslims into Europe … could lead to new tensions over foreign policy priorities (e.g. Muslim countries and Islamist terrorism).’ In all of these quotations, Muslim populations are linked to possibilities of radicalization and terrorism. It could be that repeated associations of Muslim populations with a capacity for or vulnerability towards terrorism and radicalization naturalize these traits to Muslim populations and by extension produce a racial ‘Muslim’ Other. Modal verbs, e.g. ‘could lead to’, ‘would be’, or ‘may well foster’, orient ‘Muslim’ populations towards climate-insecure futures. As such, a racial logic is constituted which represents this temporal intersection of historic and current significations of racialized Others (‘Muslim’ populations and potential capacities for radicalization and terrorism), and how these significations inflect outcomes in different possible futures (terrorist attacks and political instability). A naturalized capacity for terrorism becomes an additional factor in climate-insecure futures: because Muslims are associated with latent possibilities for terrorism and radicalization, this could or may well foster such responses from a ‘Muslim’ Other in future conditions of climate insecurity. As such, a racial logic functions to delimit a racial ‘Muslim’ Other’s future possibilities in US and EU climate security discourse.

As Edward Said (1997 (1981)) documents, there are broader historical associations of Muslims and Islam with violence in US politics. Said (1997 (1981)) focuses primarily on 20th century political events, for example the 1973/4 oil crisis, 1979 Iranian Revolution, and the Iranian hostage crisis (1979–81) in which the American embassy in Tehran was unlawfully occupied on 4th November 1979. He (1997 (1981)) argues that the media scrutiny surrounding these events fuelled negative perceptions of Muslims and Islam as linked to fundamentalism and violence. Gregory (2004) also critiques the imaginative geographies through which Islam has been constructed as the inferior, violent Other to an advanced US in the War on Terror. However, such histories are only tendentiously intertwined with US climate security discourses. The connection is not direct, but instead a racial logic. It is therefore about how historic significations of what ‘Muslim’ populations represent (naturalized capacities for terrorism or radicalization) feed into limited, context-specific moments of EU and US climate security discourses and are reconfigured for a new discursive context. For a securitized CIM discourse articulated in the future-conditional tense, the racial logic orients a racialized ‘Muslim’ Other towards possible outcomes of radicalized violence in climate-insecure futures. Of this context, in a visual analysis of 140 US and EU climate security documents, Methmann and Rothe (2014) found that all images were people of colour, predominantly female, and depicted in passive roles that diminish their agency (as ‘victims’ and ‘climate refugees’). Methmann and Rothe (2014) contend that the European border regime (e.g. FRONTEX) is notably absent from these images. To develop these ideas further, I draw upon examples from the 2009 National Intelligence Estimate on climate change. The National Intelligence Council (NIC), an interagency group that supports the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), the President’s highest advisor on national security issues, produced this report. The NIC publish long-term analyses for the US intelligence community (e.g. Department of State and CIA) (DNI, 2015). For the Estimate, the NIC produced a series of regional reports and consultations about the geopolitical implications of climate change (to 2030). In a regional report and consultation on the geopolitical implications of climate change in North Africa, the authors (who do not represent the views of the US Government as the report is developed from consultations), note Fig. 2:

These quotes (NIC, 2009) draw upon associations of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations with possibilities of terrorism. This is not only the assertion that the ‘demographic ascension of Europe’s Muslim population’ is an ‘increasing concern’ because of the ‘threat from Islamic extremism’, but also assumptions about the ‘climate change card’ North African states might play to ‘garner Western aid’ as they have done with the ‘terrorism card’. It could be that repeated associations of Muslim and North African states and populations with the risk of terrorism naturalize this trait to these populations. Modal verbs (e.g. ‘could become’ or ‘might resort’) also suggest a racial logic that naturalizes the capacities a racial ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other is assumed to embody and frames this against what these capacities suggest for outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures. The racial logic draws upon associations of actors and populations with particular traits (of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants and North African states with the threat of ‘Islamic extremism’, the ‘terrorism card’, and the alteration to Europe’s ‘cultural, ethnic and religious composition’) and directs these towards outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures. These include North African states’ warnings of a ‘climate-induced regional crisis’ to ‘garner Western aid’, and of a ‘cordon sanitaire’ to prevent migration from Sub-Saharan African countries to the EU. As such, the racial logic is comprised of associations and assumptions about naturalized ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations and how these are held in relation to outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures, in particular exclusionary containment policies articulated as a ‘cordon sanitaire’.

Negative lexis also describes CIM and responses to it, e.g. ‘increasing
‘While most African and South Asian migration will be internal or regional, the expected decline in food production and fresh drinking water, combined with the increased conflict caused by resource scarcity, will force more Africans and South Asians to migrate further abroad. This will likely result in a surge of the number of Muslim immigrants to the European Union (EU), which could exacerbate existing tensions and increase the likelihood of radicalization among members of Europe’s growing (and often poorly assimilated) Islamic communities. Already, the majority of immigrants to most Western European countries are Muslim. Muslims constitute approximately 5% of the European population, with the largest communities located in France, the Netherlands, Germany, and Denmark. Europe’s Muslim population is expected to double by 2025, and it will be much larger if ... the effects of climate change spur additional migration from Africa and South Asia.

The degree of instability this generates will depend on how successfully these immigrant populations are integrated into European society. This process has not always gone well (as exemplified in 2005 by the riots in the poor and predominantly immigrant suburbs of Paris), and the suspicion with which Europe’s Muslim and immigrant communities are viewed by many would be greatly intensified by an attack from a “homegrown terrorist.” Given that a nationalist, anti-immigrant backlash could result from even a small or unsuccessful attack, the risk that such a backlash will occur is high.

If the backlash is sufficiently severe, the EU’s cohesion will be tested ... While the influx of immigrants from Africa — Muslim and otherwise — will continue to be viewed by some as a potential catalyst for economic growth at a time when the EU has a very low fertility rate, the viability of the EU’s loose border controls will be called into question, and the lack of a common immigration policy will invariably lead to internal political tension.’

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concerns’, ‘unimpeded flows’, ‘high-priority security concerns’, and ‘cordon sanitaire’. _Cordon sanitaire_ is originally a French phrase denoting a barrier erected to prevent the spread of infectious diseases and plagues, with the earliest references in 1826 and 1847 (Oxford English Dictionary, 2016a). It also refers to a ring of buffer states constructed to prevent the invasion of a protected political authority. Conceived of as a mechanism of disease control and prevention, or a geopolitical boundary to defend against external threats, a _cordon sanitaire_ is a negative vision of possible responses to CIM, one that could exclude potential climate-induced migrants. As Cisneros (2008: 591) notes, representations of immigrants as pollutants dehumanize migrants by denying their agency and reducing their status to that of a ‘dangerous substance’. In a seminal 2007 report by the WGBU (the German Advisory Council on Global Change, an independent scientific advisory group established by the German Federal Government (1992) in the run-up to the Rio Summit), the authors write of possibilities for repressive containment policies in response to CIM (Fig. 3):

In these excerpts, the WGBU express concern about disruptive effects of CIM in scenarios of climate-insecure futures. This is exemplified with ‘“Völkerwanderung”’, a German term used to describe migrations _en masse_, e.g. in Europe during the Roman Empire or Middle Ages (Oxford English Dictionary, 2016b). Consequences of migration are also
'North African immigrants form a major segment of Europe’s Muslim population, and North Africa is the primary focus of European concerns about immigration ... The demographic ascension of Europe’s Muslim population is an increasing concern to European governments, both in terms of the alteration of European cultural, ethnic, and religious composition and the threat from Islamic extremism. As a result, North African immigration is a high-priority security and foreign policy issue for Europe' (p.29-30)

'Europe seeks to build a cordon sanitaire against Sub-Saharan migration in North Africa. European states may be willing to turn a blind eye to North African human rights abuses of migrants as long as migration flows are kept under control' (p.31)

'Because of the direct threat it poses to Europe, the migration issue could become the strongest bargaining chip for North African states ... they might resort to outright blackmail, threatening to unleash unimpeded flows of migrants unless granted massive amounts of foreign aid. In a more general sense, they might play the “climate change card,” citing the threat of climate change-induced regional crisis to garner Western aid, as they have done with the “terrorism card”' (p.34)

Fig. 2. Quotations from NIC Report (2009).

associated with possibilities of radicalization and extremism. This includes the claim that ‘immigration from North Africa’ could allow the infiltration of more and more members of extremist groups into Europe’, but also that immigrants could turn to ‘radical religious groups’, a choice informed by the ‘huge popularity’ of these groups in immigrants’ home countries. These images are also gendered, with the WGBU’s observation that migrants could be ‘predominantly young men’ and that ‘many young people see Europe as their only opportunity’. Possibilities for violence are also articulated with reference to the ‘youth riots in France in 2005’ (an example also used in the Age of Consequences report (Campbell et al., 2007: 59)). These representations construct an image of young, male North ‘African’ migrants who, in scenarios of climate stresses and xenophobic backlashes, are especially vulnerable to the influence of ‘radical religious’ groups and have a capacity to embrace extremism in the face of these vulnerabilities. Such images reinforce a racialized image of young ‘African’ males as prone to radicalization and terrorism, and of ‘North African’ populations as vulnerable to the threat of migration issues will therefore become increasingly sensitive’, or ‘there is increased ghettoization of North African immigrants’. The racial logic does not suggest how naturalized assumptions delimit future possibilities, but narrows this to probabilities of high likelihood or near certainty. As such, whereas racial logics in previous examples configure assumptions and associations (which naturalize ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ climate-induced migrants) towards multiple – if delimited – outcomes in climate-insecure futures, the racial logic in this case is more deterministic to reflect the severity of the climate change scenario.

Interestingly, the WGBU (2007) do not name migrant populations as ‘Muslim’ in the above excerpts. This could be because they recognize that repeated associations of Muslims with extremism or terrorism could naturalize these traits to such populations and wish to avoid this possibility. It could also be that (although this stills risks a naturalization of ‘African’ or ‘North African’ populations with extremism) the authors are making a factual point that not all African migrants would be Muslims. This observation highlights a ‘politics of naming’ (or ‘non-naming’) in the WGBU excerpts. Focusing on the labels ‘terrorist’, ‘bandit’ and ‘rebel’, Bhatia (2005: 6-7) posits that ‘the politics of naming is about … examining how names are made, assigned and disputed, and how this contest is as affected by a series of global dynamics and events.’ Naming is an exercise of power and continent assignations about what can be known about a subject, place or group (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah, 2005). The practice of naming carries implications for which populations are associated with particular capacities in possible futures, e.g. ‘Muslim’, ‘African’, and ‘migrant’ and possibilities of ‘radicalization’, ‘terrorist activity’ and ‘extremism’. As such, although it could be that the WGBU excerpt is associated with deterministic racial logics that associate particular populations with a potential capacity for radicalization, these underlying assumptions are not necessarily predicated on the explicit naming of these populations.
7. Strategies of containment?

Racial logics are not only concerned with naturalized identities, but also how these direct possible outcomes and interventions in climate-insecure futures. The logic – constructed from naturalized associations and assumptions about ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations – thus directs and delimits what such outcomes may be in conditions of future climate insecurity. In this sense, the racial logic is performative: it performs the effects it names. These effects are that the associations and assumptions the logic is based upon (of ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations as endowed with a potential capacity for terrorism and radicalization) can work to direct outcomes in possible climate-insecure futures. In both the NIC (2009) and WGBU (2007) reports, strategies of containment are suggested as possible outcomes in scenarios of climate insecurity. In the NIC report, this is expressed as a cordon sanitaire (2009: 31), and as ‘Fortress Europe’ in the WGBU’s (2007: 126) words. Duffield and Evans (2011) situate containment policies as part of a global biopolitical life-chances divide. Whereas the mobility of those in developed countries is facilitated, problems in the Global South are to be solved locally: ‘what could be called ‘underdeveloped life’ has been routinely geographically contained’ (Duffield and Evans, 2011: 94, original emphasis). Bakewell (2008) labels this phenomenon the ‘sedentary bias’ of development policy and locates it within European histories of interaction with African populations. Early European colonizers controlled migration patterns to provide labour for mineral extraction, colonial administration, and most horrifically the Transatlantic Slave Trade (Bakewell, 2008). Attempts to control migration continued into 20th century development policy, e.g. the promotion of remittances as a development strategy (Bakewell, 2008). White (2014: 835) notes that a ‘fortress mentality’ can exacerbate environmental insecurities and policies of containment could produce exclusionary outcomes in conditions of climate insecurity. This is despite an academic consensus suggesting…

‘With no prospects in any of the countries of the region, many young people see migration to Europe as their only opportunity … Towards the middle of the 21st century the northwards migration of predominantly young men from the countries of the Sahel takes on the proportions of a “Völkerwanderung”, i.e. mass migration such as was seen in Europe during the Dark Ages. Every year hundreds of thousands of people from the Sahel and the tropical areas of West and Central Africa arrive in the North African coastal regions. As a result, enormous slum settlements housing stranded migrants arise in the urban agglomerations of the Maghreb’ (p.125)

‘Because illegal immigrants are not integrated into society, there is increased ghettoization of North African immigrants. Xenophobia increases, and the immigrants react to their dangerous circumstances by turning in large numbers to radical religious groups (a choice favoured by the huge popularity of these movements in migrants’ home countries). European countries fear that immigration from North Africa will allow the infiltration of more and more members of extremist groups into Europe, and they take steps to strengthen ‘Fortress Europe’ (p.126)

‘The risk of destabilization applies not only within these countries [Maghreb countries]; the situation can have consequences for the stability of the entire region. One result of climate change will be further emigration from rural areas to cities and migration via the countries of North Africa to EU countries. Migration issues will therefore become increasingly sensitive; in Southern Europe this could trigger potentially violent conflicts (e.g. the youth riots in France in 2005)’ (p.136)
that climate impacts are more likely to be linked to localized, internal displacement, not international or intercontinental migration (White, 2011).

In a 2013 European Commission paper to accompany the EU’s strategy on adaptation to climate change, the authors recognize the difficulties of pinpointing environmental factors in migratory decisions. The Commission (2013: 13) submits that ‘the impact of climate change on migration flows to the EU is unlikely to be substantial’. Similarly, a 2011 FRONTEX report of future migration scenarios notes that climate change is expected to cause displacements globally and some “environmental refugees” may arrive to the EU, but this is not articulated in terms of disruptive, mass migrations. However, in relation to climate adaptation strategies, as Scheffran et al. (2012: 122) contend: ‘European states have the tendency to use development strategies to achieve immigration control following the adaptation-to-prevent-migration path’. They (2012) cite a 2002 bilateral programme between the Malian and French governments in which co-development projects (e.g. education and electrification schemes) were funded in the Kayes region of the Senegal river valley. In 2009, the French government withdrew its support for the programme when the Malian government refused to sign an agreement enforcing repatriation of irregular migrants (Scheffran et al., 2012). Furthermore, White (2011: 74) documents how transit states ‘began to amp the idea of climate refugees as a threat in the late ’00’s’. For example, in September 2009, Morocco hosted the meeting of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population; at this event, King Mohammed VI gave a speech that directly references CIM and its links to food security, desertification and sea-level rise (White, 2011). Although these examples are disparate, they indicate the involvement of national governments (transit states and EU Member States) in CIM narratives and the possibilities this could suggest for exclusionary containment policies in climate-insecure futures. Fundamentally, they affirm the notion that racial logics are not only speculative discursive constructions about how naturalized populations will respond to conditions of future climate insecurity. They are also intricately intertwined in the political interventions suggested by such logics: possibilities for exclusionary bordering practices and a ‘sedentary bias’ against CIM (Bakewell, 2008).

8. Conclusion

This paper has explored the role of racial logics in constructions of a ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ Other in specific examples from US and EU climate security discourses (three publications with a national security emphasis published from 2007 to 2010, part of the ‘2007 turn’ in climate security discourse (Liberatore, 2013)). ‘Muslim’ and ‘African’ populations are represented with a latent capacity for radicalization and terrorism in possible climate-insecure futures. Delimited future possibilities can carry exclusionary implications, for example Fortressed border policies and discrimination against climate-induced migrants. Given that naturalized identity constructions remain understudied in critical CIM and climate security scholarship – and the future-conditional character of CIM debates (Baldwin, 2012) – ‘racial logics’ provide a useful analytic to examine present-future relationships and their possibilities. Discussing the category of ‘the Other’, Sara Ahmed (2002: 560-1) writes: ‘To negate or give up on the particularity of others would involve its own violence: the transformation of others into the figure of the other involves its own betrayal of the future, as the possibility that others might be other than ‘the other’ or as the possibility of being faced by other others.’ Although Ahmed (2002) argues it is impossible to ever fully know the other – each other with its own histories of determination, sociality and power relations – she cautions against its figuration as the Other, a figuration which negates these differences. An important dimension to racial logics is that they, through constructions of a naturalized Other, limit Muslim and African populations’ histories of determination. Importantly, racial logics are also about how these closures affect outcomes in climate-insecure futures. Ahmed (2002: 560-1, my emphasis) writes that the Other involves a ‘betrayal of the future’, closing down possibilities of knowing others or being faced by ‘other others’. Thus, racial logics not only neglect histories of determination, but also delimit possibilities for multiple future socialities to emerge in climate-changed futures.

It follows that, in critiquing naturalized racial identities, this affords opportunities to challenge the delimited future possibilities such identities suggest. This raises the requirement to think about more just future possibilities. This is especially resonant in a context where ‘the large numbers of deaths in the Mediterranean and the push to securitize borders within and around Europe are a warning against the conservative responses that could emerge against those ‘disfranchised’ by the impacts of environmental and climate change’ (Bettini et al., 2016: 8). Bettini et al. (2016) argue that in a field punctuated with multiple discourses, the exclusionary implications of securitized CIM require an affirmative politics of climate justice. This paper echoes this call. If exclusionary, containment-based approaches to CIM are to be challenged, this requires both critical analysis of the naturalized assumptions that racial logics are constituted from, but also further examination of what pluralistic, just climate-secure futures would look like in practice.

9. Declaration of conflicting interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interests with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article

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