NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT: THE INFLUENCE OF LIBYAN INTERVENTION ON THE DURATION OF THE DARFUR CRISIS

ASHRAF ALI O. HAMED

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

May 2014
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This thesis lies in the broader topic of the impact of external intervention on the interstate crises and conflicts and each one's duration. The purpose of this study is to address the gaps and contradictions in the related literature. This study achieves this purpose by investigating the factors that drive the duration of intrastate conflicts, and understand why and how the duration of such conflicts may be affected by the role of regional third-party interveners. It focuses primarily on understanding the factors underlying the duration of the Darfur crisis in Sudan by analysing the Gaddafi regime’s role in that crisis during the 2003–11 period. This dissertation investigates the association between the long duration of the crisis and Libyan involvement as a major regional third party, as a form of crisis management and as an aspect of the international management of internal conflicts.

In doing so a number of questions were asked regarding the causes of the Darfur Crisis and how they impacted on its duration: what were key Libyan national incentives and agenda behind the Gaddafi regime involvement in the Darfur Crisis; how did the scale of Libyan involvement effectiveness relate to the duration of the crisis in addition to Libyan mechanisms and techniques used; and how might the regime change in Libya affect the resolution of the crisis? In this respect, a new theoretical model was developed from the literature to show the theoretical relationship between external/regional third-party intervention in internal conflicts and the likelihood of ending these conflicts in shorter or longer time. Hypotheses were developed and tested based on the relationships identified in the model.

It has been found that the causes of the rebellion in Darfur are multiple and complicated, internal and external, political and economic, social and environmental. All these factors have had a significant impact on the eruption of the Darfur Crisis and its continuation. Thus, any attempts to end this crisis without taking all these dimensions into consideration would be quite meaningless and ineffective. Each regional and extra-regional actor significantly sought to guide the violence in the direction which would allow them to gain certain outcomes. The major research finding was that when an external state becomes (in)directly involved with military, economic or diplomatic manoeuvres with a separate agenda that is independent of the motivations of the domestic fighters, parties, in an intrastate conflict that involves ethnic and tribal societies,
and where there are multiple opposition armed groups with independent preferences, the likelihood of prolonging the duration of the conflict is greater. These developed hypotheses were tested and explained by utilising a qualitative case study of Libyan involvement in the Darfur Crisis. This thesis then shows how the Libyan intervention (under the Gaddafi regime), exactly in line with our developed model, has prolonged the duration of the Darfur Crisis in Sudan. This thesis demonstrates that the Gaddafi regime has its own agenda, interests, and ambitions in the Darfur region, and its involvement was a key factor in prolonging the duration of the crisis there. The key incentive behind the Libyan strategy of interference in the Darfur crisis over the past decade or so was founded on the basis of Gaddafi’s desire “to gain from the conflict, not to resolve the conflict.” It is found that Gaddafi appears to have played one of the most complex and ambiguous roles in the crisis as it was dual in nature, and at different times showed how the Libyan leadership influenced the parties to the crisis in Darfur in different ways and levels.

The originality of this thesis lies in both what is studied and how it is studied. This study simultaneously combines and employs two different types of literature: material focusing on the Crisis’ historical roots, its domestic, regional, and international implications; and distinguished studies relating to the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis that address the impact of external intervention on the internal crises and conflicts and who long they last. This a comprehensive technique of looking at and analysing primary and secondary data is, to the best of our knowledge, new and has not been used in any other study in the literature. In short, this study contributes to our understanding the causes of the outbreak of the Darfur Crisis and factors underlying its continuation, as well as why the crisis has been prolonged for over ten years. Furthermore, the study analyses the strategies variability to advance knowledge in the field of crisis management. This study attempts to address a gap in the literature which, broadly speaking discusses the impact of outside third parties on the expected duration of intrastate conflicts. This study concludes that the adoption of this particular model would increase the probability of domestic and international dissension-makers and mediators of minimising the worst negative effects of external state intervention on the possibility of making internal crises and conflicts last longer. Both the limitations and the implications of this research as well as recommendations are given, along with possible directions for future research.
Dedication

This thesis is lovingly dedicated to:

the greatest and the most beautiful and kind woman in my life, my mum.

the spirit: my father and my brother Faraj, the endless love, may Allah forgive them and have mercy upon them.

my loving wife, for her support, encouragement, and constant love have sustained me throughout each step of the way.

my children, Ala, Anas and Aws whose love and confidence is a constant source of inspiration and encouragement.

my brothers and sister for their love, endless support and encouragement.
Acknowledgements

Acknowledging all the people who provided assistance to me in this academic adventure is, in itself, a very daunting task, as one always runs the risk of forgetting to put a key name in this acknowledgment.

I would like to thank my co-supervisors Dr Imad El-Anis and Dr Roy Smith for their generous support during the PhD process and for their critical comments on earlier drafts and for inspiring me to form the theoretical and conceptual basis of this thesis, and for their helpful suggestions on the development of this thesis. I want to thank my Director of Studies, Dr Imad El-Anis for his full support and dedication. Dr El-Anis was the academic guide that with enthusiasm, energy and professionalism helped me to walk to the end of this road. Dr El-Anis worked long hours on this project and was always available for critical discussion. I would also like to thank my second supervisor Dr Roy Smith for his useful advice, particularly during the confirmation process.

My academic and PhD colleagues were invaluable in helping me to test the various arguments in this thesis to strengthen and deepen it. And, of course, for the support through the ups and downs of undertaking such a demanding piece of research. I am grateful to the administrative staff of the School of Graduate Studies for their unending patience and help. Particular thanks go to all those individuals who agreed to share their time, experiences, feeling and knowledge with me in interviews or who helped me at various stages of the field research to complete this thesis. My thanks and appreciation goes also to Dr Adam Mohamed Ahmed, director of the Centre for Sudanese and International Studies in Khartoum, Sudan, who facilitated carrying my field research and access to research respondents in Sudan.

I would like to thank all my family for their generous support and for helping me get this far, beginning with my dad and my brother Faraj, who passed away last year after impatiently waiting for this moment and before seeing this achievement. Special thanks to the exceptionally wise women who inspired my life through her gritty strength, enduring faith, and boundless love, my mum for her infinite giving and support, which made the PhD process that much easier. I also would like to vive my surest thanks and appreciation to my dear brothers who shared my emotions and have followed their own with me on every step of this work from beginning to end.

I would like to acknowledge my wife, and kids, Ala, Anas and Aws, who have endured my physical and often mental absence for too long and I thank them immensely for their love and patience. They have been endlessly patient and the unwavering force behind my motivation to complete this thesis.

Finally, thanks and appreciation to all my friends for their inspiration, positive influence, love, motivation and support.
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUPD</td>
<td>African Union High-level Panel on Darfur</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAQDA</td>
<td>Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis System</td>
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<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSPA</td>
<td>Council for Security and Peace of Africa</td>
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<td>DIF/A</td>
<td>Darfur Independence Front/Army</td>
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<td>DLM</td>
<td>Darfur Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Darfur Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICID</td>
<td>International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur</td>
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<td>IDF</td>
<td>Israeli Defence Force</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
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<td>IHL</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Law</td>
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<td>JEM</td>
<td>the Justice and Equality Movement</td>
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<td>JEM-CL</td>
<td>JEM-Collective Leadership</td>
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<td>JEM-WFP</td>
<td>JEM-Wing for Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAAICO</td>
<td>Libyan Arab African Investment Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAFICO</td>
<td>Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company</td>
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<td>LJM</td>
<td>Liberation and Justice Movement</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
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<td>NFSL</td>
<td>National Front for the Salvation of Libya</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>National Islamic Front</td>
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<td>NMRE</td>
<td>National Movement for Reform and Development</td>
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<td>NRF</td>
<td>National Redemption Front</td>
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<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council</td>
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<td>NTU</td>
<td>Nottingham Trent University</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAU</td>
<td>Organization of African Unity</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>R2P</td>
<td>Responsibility to Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>SLM</td>
<td>Sudan Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>SLMHL</td>
<td>Sudanese Liberation Historical Leadership</td>
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<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People's Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM/A</td>
<td>Liberation Movement/Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCDP/PRIO</td>
<td>Uppsala/ Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset Armed Conflict Dataset</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Union - United Nations Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UP</td>
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Introduction

Historical analysis has shown that both domestic and international political crises have always been amongst the most fundamental factors in motivating change and development within and between states. States that have adopted effective strategies for crisis management tend to be more stable and capable in domestic and international relations. On the other hand, states that employ non-systematic management styles have suffered from instability (Fars 2005). Moreover, developing states that practise ineffective methods of crisis management are usually more severely affected when an emergency occurs. In the contemporary era, internal conflict has become more volatile, possessing greater potential to destabilise domestic politics, due to the uneven implementation of improvised crisis management methods.

Today’s world is characterised by increasing levels of complex interdependence, in the political, economic and socio-cultural spheres (Keohane and Nye Jr 2000). As a result, there is greater potential for national friction to have an international effect and vice versa. This suggests that it is increasingly important to use rationalised approaches to crisis management at the domestic and international levels (Conteh-Morgan 2001). Crisis suppression is a principal organisational function of both state and non-state legislators. Failure in this area can result in serious harm to stakeholders and losses for the parties involved – including individuals (Coombs 2011). The civil war in Sudan (1955 – 1972 / 1983 – 2005), which took place mostly in the southern parts of Sudan, which is known today as State of Southern Sudan, is one of the longest wars in the modern era. At one level the conflict exemplifies the problem of national disunity, which is broadly characterised as a conflict between the Arab Muslim north and the non-Muslim south.

In early 2003, a time when the majority of analysts and scholars assumed that an end had come to the problem of southern Sudan – which had lasted for more than two decades and led to considerable losses on both sides, upset the political and social stability in neighbouring countries and complicated relations between Sudan and its neighbours – a new conflict commenced in Darfur in western Sudan (Niama 2005). The hostilities were associated with two main parties. Firstly, the Sudanese military
using the Janjaweed militia represented one side. The second main faction comprised two armed, non-Arab groups: the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement. The crisis emerged as an internal Sudanese dispute, concerned with tribal land possession, between settled tribes/communities resident in the area (the Masalit, the Fur, and the Zaghawa) and nomadic tribes that rely on the grazing of livestock for their livelihood. Climate change and limited resources of fresh water, which the Darfur region has witnessed for some years, represent key contributing factors to the hostilities (Quach 2004).

The government of Sudan (GoS) and its allied Janjaweed militia have been accused of perpetrating consistent and widespread violations of human rights, such as murder, rape, torture, unjust arrests, theft, the burning of villages, and the deliberate destruction of crops and livestock (Amnesty International 2010). In addition, the Janjaweed has been accused of attacking people who are not Arab to force them to relocate (IRIN 2003). The rebel groups have also been accused of committing serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law which may amount to war crimes (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005, p. 4). This armed conflict has left more than 300,000 dead. An estimated 2.7 million civilians have been internally displaced and an estimated 300,000 have fled over the borders to neighbouring countries, such as Chad (Aljazeera net, 2014; Better World Campaign, 2014).

This situation led to a humanitarian catastrophe in the Darfur area which reflects the fragility of the GoS and the inability of the authorities to deal with the crisis. However, the intensity of the conflict and its development have dramatically escalated. The brutal conflict, atrocities, and ensuing humanitarian disaster have come to be seen by many observers as an ethnic conflict between Arab and African tribes, in which the Arabs seek to carry out ethnic cleansing against the non-Arab population in the region, with the support of the GoS. By mid-2004, the crisis had taken a central place in global media and political discourse. Following the failure of national conflict resolution methods, international efforts to end the crisis and to address the underlying causes of the dispute increased (Hassan 2010).

It took a long time before the GoS and the rebel movements agreed that a peace process should go ahead. Urgent action was needed in order to reduce opposition to
humanitarian relief efforts and to stop the slaughter of innocent civilians (especially women and children), to prevent the destruction of property, and of course, to eventually end the crisis (Abiodun 2011). Over a decade has passed since this peace process began. Unfortunately, neither the international community represented by the United Nations (UN) nor regional actors, such as Chad, Libya, and Egypt, have been able to persuade the GoS and the rebel groups to engage in a process of dialogue and a peaceful settlement (Hassan 2010). One begins to be apprehensive as to whether there can be an end to the crisis in the near future. The continuous war in Sudan portends a gloomy future for the whole of the region. Therefore, analysis of this particular crisis offers an opportunity to explore an existing crisis situation and relevant armed conflict management literature, and to offer conclusions on the quality of different management approaches.

Often in international relations, states can be categorised as either winners or losers in any given moment of an event or issue. In this respect, crises can be regarded as presenting an ideal opportunity for change, whether for better or worse. Therefore, states tend to have or seek to have well-organised crisis management strategies and systems, and are able to take advantage of such crises to maximise their benefits. From the crisis management perspective, scholars should not ignore the fact that the actors involved in crises may resort to creating a crisis atmosphere during their attempt to stop or interrupt key activities, or to destabilise normal activity in order to change the situation to preserve their interests (Mickler 2009, p. 3). These can be called pseudo-crises (Rosenthal 1997). The modern crises often do not recognise national borders, and can be more frequent and costly, both financially and socially in some regions (Del Rio 2007, p. 9).

In this context, the Darfur Crisis can be regarded as a model case in the investigation of internal crisis management within an international context. The interest lies in the diversity of its dimensions and the discrepancies between domestic and international mechanisms and resolutions (Niama 2005). Recently, scholars have begun focusing on the influence of external third-party interventions on the duration of civil conflicts, instead of limiting their analyses solely to the diplomatic instruments and their effectiveness in ending the internal conflict efforts (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008). The basic expectations of outside intervention, whether diplomatic, military or economic, are that it would shorten the conflict’s expected time-span and
the key motivation of this intervention is to manage the civil armed conflict effectively (Gates and Strand 2004).

Given the wide variation in the duration of intrastate warfare, understanding why and how some end within days or months, while others last for years or decades, is a significant issue (Fearon 2004). The debate also includes the final formula employed to end the conflict, whether it is via negotiation or a decisive victory by one side. Civil war literature indicates that third-party interventions are a vital strategic action, regardless of whether the interveners are benevolent or malevolent (Cunningham 2010).

Several studies have referred to the variety of roles that can be played by external state participants during a civil war, from urging the parties to sit down at the negotiating table, offering incentives to groups to communicate, hosting mediation, deploying peacekeepers or peace enforcers, providing economic or military support to either side, to sending military forces to participate in the conflict (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan 2007; and Gleditsch 2007 cited in Cunningham 2010). While some external protagonists might seek to end the Darfur crisis for humanitarian considerations, other third parties may have their own motives in prolonging the conflict, perhaps with a view to plundering the natural resources of the state, or draining the resources of a rival intervening participant (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline 2000).

This thesis has developed out of an attempt to understand the factors that drive the duration of intrastate warfare as well as analysing why and how the duration of such conflicts can be affected by the role of regional third-party interveners. In addition, it employs a particular understanding of the impact of external intervention on the termination of intrastate wars. To provide a better understanding of the factors underlying the continuation of the Darfur Crisis, and why the crisis has been prolonged for over ten years, this study explores the impact of regional third-party intervention. On this basis, the influence of Libyan involvement under the Gaddafi regime on the Darfur crisis and its historical development, its specific dynamics, and its duration are examined. This area of investigation is important since Libya has been one of the key external/regional third-party interveners that have played a very significant role over the course of the armed conflict in the Darfur region, from the
eruption of the crisis in 2003 until 2011 when the Gaddafi regime in Tripoli collapsed. Libyan intervention involved various methods, especially on the diplomatic level, in an attempt to find a shared strategy that could be accepted by all the parties to the dispute. However, the role of Gaddafi’s regime in the Darfur Crisis was also characterised as ambiguous and complex because it was dual in nature (Ronen 2011).

**Rationale, Aims and Research Questions**

The analysis that is offered is intended to help to broaden the approach which is currently taken by the international community. The underlying rationale is to build on work done previously on the principles regarding the effectiveness of third-party interventions on the termination of internal violent conflicts. It is hoped that this will assist the international community to pursue effective crisis management in cases of prolonged intrastate conflict. More specifically, the aim is to assess the underlying causes of the continuation of the Darfur Crisis. In particular, how improvements can be made to the governmental crisis management techniques used by groups within Sudan as well as the Libyan government as a third party player is looked at. Additionally, the internal and external factors affecting the paths and courses of governmental crisis management in Darfur are explored.

In the course of this analysis, four research questions have been addressed. The first question considers the causes of the Darfur Crisis and how they impact on its duration. The second question asks what the real Libyan interests and motivations have been that led it to be one of the key external actors in the conflict. The third research question then asks whether the Libyan role/intervention influenced the duration of the crisis, and if so, how. Finally, considering the efforts of the GoS and external actors, how might the regime change in Libya affect the resolution of the crisis?

The central hypothesis tested in this thesis is: Libya (under the Gaddafi regime) was both directly and indirectly involved in the Darfur crisis in pursuit of its own agenda that is separate from the agendas of the domestic combatants in Sudan. This
intervention prolonged the crisis and represented a key obstacle to its resolution. Furthermore, this thesis argues that the underlying incentive behind the Libyan strategy of interference in the Darfur crisis was founded on the basis of Gaddafi’s desire to gain from the conflict, not resolve the conflict. Gaddafi’s Libya was deliberately keen to ensure any attempts at resolving the conflict in Darfur failed until his regime’s overall national goals had been achieved.

Theoretical Approach and Framework

Overall, this study is situated in crisis management and conflict studies, and employs an interpretive theory as a theoretical approach within the discipline of International Relations (IR). Analysing the underlying Libyan incentives and agenda in Darfur makes it easier to understand the relationship between the long duration of the crisis and the Libyan involvement as a key regional third party intervener, as a form of crisis management. For the purpose of addressing the research questions raised in this thesis, a new theoretical model has been developed to guide the theoretical analysis of this thesis. This model combines some of the theoretical assumptions found in the works of David E. Cunningham (2010) and Patrick M. Regan (2002).

Cunningham argues that the duration of an armed civil conflict is longer when the key incentives of external interveners are driven by the pursuit of an independent agenda which differs from the agendas of the domestic combatants. Regan’s theoretical argument shows that outside intervention, whether military and/or political-economic, does not contribute to a prompt conclusion of the conflict and such interventions cannot be regarded as meaningful instruments of conflict management. Military, political and economic external interventions tend to reduce the likelihood that the intrastate conflict will be terminated in a short period. It is very noticeable that Regan’s work focuses on the type of intervention (military and economic) and the direct ways and strategies for intervening that either decrease or increase the likelihood that conflict will end in a short or long time. While Cunningham investigates what happens to conflict duration when an external third party state with an independent agenda becomes directly involved in internal armed
conflict. Therefore, I have observed that both Regan and Cunningham concentrated merely on direct third-party interventions and have ignored indirect interventions. Thus, this thesis explores mechanisms for indirect intervention alongside direct mechanisms. Moreover, this thesis does not generalise: it differentiates between the regional and the extra-regional state interveners which also was done by neither Regan nor Cunningham. The thesis argues that there is a broad difference between the two kinds of interveners.

Since this thesis explores the major aspirations behind the Libyan involvement in managing the conflict in Darfur, as well as identifying how the techniques and mechanisms used by Gaddafi’s regime effected the attitudes of the internal parties in Sudan towards the peace process. It is found that combining both Cunningham and Regan’s theoretical assumptions is still an insufficient theoretical approach to cover all the aspects in order to answer the questions and test the hypothesis of this study. The further development of the theoretical model used here includes the use of Cunningham’s entire model, fused with some elements extracted from Regan’s approach, while adding theoretical assumptions about “diplomacy” and different forms of “indirect” intervention and the nature of regional external interveners. This theoretical matter is illustrated in more detail within the Theory and Methodology chapter.

Methodology

This thesis, given the nature of the issue under examination within this study and its diversity of dimensions, solely adopts the qualitative research strategy combined with an interpretive epistemological approach. This selection was driven by the fact that the study is an attempt to describe and understand social phenomena, rather than seeking to theorise from such phenomena, for an introduction to the differences between understanding and explaining international relations (see Hollis and Smith 1991). Imad El-Anis (2008, pp. 88-89) asserts that methodological approaches that
are qualitative in nature, are fundamentally used to understand the dynamics of the relationships between the variables of the social phenomena. Bevir and Rhodes (2005) argue that an interpretive approach to political science provides accounts of actions and practices that are interpretations of interpretations. In addition to that they believe that interpretive techniques mainly focus on meanings, beliefs, and discourse, as opposed to laws and rules, ties between social classes, or deductive models (Ibid).

Interpretive techniques, beside qualitative strategy research, were employed in this thesis because the underlying analytical aim is to understand why certain actors have formulated certain intervention policies in their responses to the Darfur Crisis. This thesis attempts to understand the normative context within which one actor in particular (Libya under the Gaddafi regime) was operating – how it shaped its understanding of the nature of the conflict, interests and motivations, and mechanisms and the behaviour of this regional actor. The types of phenomena with which this study is concerned – norms, motivations, actions, and interests – cannot easily be examined using positivist predictive theories or mathematical formulas because of the agency of the actor under investigation to construct its own meanings.

The core of this thesis is centred on a case study, namely, Libyan intervention and the duration of the Darfur Crisis. It is expected that this case study of Libya, which has not been considered in the context of the impact of outside third-party intervention on the duration of intrastate conflicts in other academic investigations, will yield interesting insights into the process and practice of crisis management in internal conflict. The case study is particularly attractive and worth studying because it displays many of the classic elements of the impact of external intervention on the duration of internal conflicts, especially in Africa, as mapped out in chapters five and six. However, the major challenge to the decision to base a study of this nature on a single case is the tension (or apparent tension), between the general and the particular: to what extent can a single case study, which necessarily displays certain idiosyncrasies, form the basis for the formulation of a general theory?
The Originality of This Project

The originality of this study emerges from early discoveries and from the literature relevant to the Darfur Crisis. It is realised that in addition to suspected external involvement, which might be the fundamental issue that have significantly prolonged the conflict, could be the role played by regional actors, such as Libya. The literature review of this thesis has been able to establish that the Gaddafi regime’s involvement in Darfur is not sufficiently covered in the existing literature relating to the Darfur Crisis. Previous studies, such as works by Flint and de Waal 2005; Young et al 2007; Behrends 2008; Mamdani 2009; De Maio 2010; Aral 2010; Abiodun 2011; Olsson and Valsecchi 2010; de Waal 2008; Boateng 2011; Ntsios 2012 – these sources are discussed in more detail in the literature review chapter – have significantly highlighted that the influential role played by Gaddafi’s Libya in the course of the events in the Darfur region is crucial to an understanding of the rebellion in Darfur and its longevity. However, this thesis investigates further the actual agenda, motivations, and mechanisms adopted by the Gaddafi regime in its interference in the Darfur conflict. It also assesses the Gaddafi’s influence on the parties of the conflict to pursue his agenda and ambitions in the region which have not been deeply discussed within the existing literature concerned with the Darfur Crisis. Instead, existing studies have addressed the problem by looking at one or perhaps two aspects in the Darfur region, whether it is political, economic, ethnic, environmental, or international interventions within the framework of civilian protection. Therefore, there is every reason to believe that this aspect of knowledge is still not fully covered and more investigation is still needed. Evaluating this study’s findings could provide a solid foundation from which to either improve many of the claims and assumptions made by previous studies or to refute them. This study presents an overview about how the direct and/or indirect external interventions and the regional interventions in particular, increase the tension between the internal combatants contributing to the continuation of intrastate conflicts, which could be a threat factor to the territorial integrity of the state where the conflict takes place.
The Structure of the Thesis

To develop the argument of this study, the thesis is organised around six substantive chapters divided into three main parts. The first part of which is the introduction plus chapters one and two. This part establishes the context out of which the analysis in the other parts emerges. It establishes the disciplinary framework within which the study takes place presenting the subject and the primary focus of this thesis.

Chapter one outlines and reviews the important range of existing literature related directly to the Darfur Crisis (causes, domestic, regional, and international implications). In short, the literature used for this study was divided - according to its nature, focus, dimension, and scientific foundation - into five categories: Studies with political dimensions, studies with economic dimensions, studies with ethnic and social dimensions, studies with international and humanitarian law dimensions, and studies concentrating on the Libyan involvement in Sudan. This chapter evaluates the relative literature on the internal and international factors (political, economic, ethnic, environmental and/or international involvement) are seen to have an important role in the emergence of the crisis in Darfur in 2003, plus the domestic, regional, and international implications of this crisis. The central argument of this chapter is that, despite a high range of research on the crisis in Darfur already conducted, an essential investigation into the impact of external third-party intervention (particularly Libya as a regional actor) on the duration of the conflict is omitted, which means that an essential gap in knowledge is not considered. Chapter one concludes with the literature review framework, which shows the structure, themes, and components of this thesis.

Chapter two serves as the theoretical and methodological chapter. This chapter develops the conclusion of chapter one and is presented in two sections. The first section provides the theoretical approach employed in this thesis. In order to test the hypothesis and to address the core questions of this study, a new theoretical model is used. Together the hypothesis and the questions focus more on Libyan involvement in the conflict in Darfur, thus this theoretical model allows the researcher to pursue this research project in a well-organised, coherent and valuable way. This theoretical approach is grounded on the theoretical arguments of David E. Cunningham (2010)
and Patrick M. Regan (2002). The model developed in this thesis argues that when an external state becomes (in)directly, militarily, economically, and/or diplomatically involved in an internal armed conflict to pursue an agenda, which is separate from the agenda of the domestic combatants, it substantially tends to prolong the duration of the conflict.

The second section of this chapter establishes the methodological approach used in this study. This section outlines the research design for this study and defines the methodological techniques employed for collecting and analysing data. This research project relies primarily on qualitative research founded on the interpretation approach. The single case study technique was chosen to enhance generalisation and theory development. A developed discussion of the benefits and weaknesses of qualitative, quantitative and a combined method approach is presented in this chapter. The qualitative strategy adopted in this thesis is rationalised.

*Part two* (chapters three and four) examines the important contributing factors in the eruption of the crisis in Darfur, as well as those factors that have an important impact on its continuation.

**Chapter three** presents a discussion of the historical development of the rebel movement in Darfur. It provides an investigation into the key factors behind the eruption of the crisis and how they have influenced its development. It considers whether the conflict is an ethnic struggle, or a conflict over natural resources due to environmental factors. Furthermore, it explores regional and international factors that have played a significant role during the various phases of the conflict. The chapter argues that the Darfur Crisis is caused by a combination of different internal and external factors, such as political, economic, ethnic, and environmental issues. Additionally, the instability in the region caused by the armed conflict as well as the international involvement cannot be ignored. The Darfur Crisis cannot be resolved by addressing just one or two aspects, only by exploring all aspects together. This is because every factor has a different impact and implication at different stages of the crisis.

**Chapter four** identifies the major Sudanese factions and the mechanisms they have adopted to end the conflict. It aims to understand the impact of intra-rebel deviation and the differences in their perceptions, attitudes, agendas, approaches towards the
conflict and the final form of settlement they are pursuing, on the duration of that conflict. This chapter also explores the impact that external interventions may have on the duration of intrastate conflicts. The discussion in this chapter is grounded in the theoretical assumption of Cunningham (2010). In this regard, a special theoretical model is developed to serve and achieve the goal of this chapter. This chapter therefore argues that when external states intervene with a separate agenda in an intrastate conflict that involves an ethnic and tribal society, and where there are multiple opposition armed groups with independent preferences, it decreases the potential of resolving the crisis sooner.

The third part of the thesis (chapters five and six) focuses on the dimensions of internationalising the Darfur Crisis and how it has become an internationalised issue. This part exams the impact of outside involvement on direction and duration of the crisis. It explores the extent to which the termination and the peace building process of such conflicts can be influenced by external intervention, especially the involvement of a regional third party.

Chapter five outlines the major internal and external factors that have significantly contributed to fuelling the internationalisation of the crisis. This chapter is largely an account of why and how Libya under the Gaddafi regime, as a regional third-party intervener, became gradually involved in the Darfur Crisis since 2003. This chapter explores the motivations and mechanisms used by the regime in Tripoli to handle the crisis, as well as the ways in which Tripoli intervened.

Chapter six assesses the impact of Gaddafi’s Libya involvement as a key regional power, which is chosen as a case study to test the validity of the theoretical model used here, on the path of the crisis and its termination. It explores the truth about the hidden agenda that Gaddafi was seeking to attain through his involvement in the management of the Darfur Crisis. Also, the chapter examines the Gaddafi's ability to influence the domestic parties to the crisis. Analytical perception is given for the expected scenarios about the future of the Darfur Crisis beyond the collapse of the Gaddafi regime. This chapter argues that the Libyan involvement and the policy of the Gaddafi regime towards managing the crisis in Darfur were a key factor of instability and the long-duration of the crisis.
The concluding chapter draws together the themes, strands and analyses of the previous six chapters into a series of conclusions. It presents an overall set of answers to the core research questions that this thesis is based upon. A confirmation of whether the original hypothesis tested in this thesis was correct or not will be offered. In addition the conclusion reflects an assessment as to whether the theoretical and methodological approaches adopted worked or not and whether they could be applied to other studies. The potential for further study within the framework established in chapter two will also be offered. Overall, the conclusion summarises the findings of the thesis and discusses their boarder significance for scholarly knowledge in the field of IR in general and national and international crisis management in particular.
Chapter 1

Literature Review

Introduction

Undertaking a review of a body of literature assists researchers in acquiring an understanding of the topic which is under study, what research has been conducted, and what the key issues are. Furthermore, this helps researchers to develop theories that have already been employed in investigating similar research topics (Hart 2006). Two different types of literature related to the Darfur crisis have been reviewed in this thesis: the first are articles directly relating to the crisis as a case study. A significant number of studies have been conducted on the crisis. By analytically concentrating on the crisis’ historical roots, as well as to ascertain its domestic, regional, and international implications, much of this body of research seeks to find a permanent solution rather than a temporary remedy. Secondly, a number of distinguished reports about the theoretical framework underpinning this case study have also been reviewed and will be discussed in the theory and methodology chapter. This includes investigations by Patrick Regan (2002), Ibrahim Elbdawi (2000), and David E. Cunningham (2010, 2006) on the overall success of crisis management. This literature encompasses analysis conducted on external third-party intervention and its influence on the duration of political crises, internal armed conflicts, and civil wars.

Regarding the crisis itself, numerous scholars and specialised research centres have approached the Darfur Crisis by studying and analysing it in different ways, in an attempt to define the crisis scientifically and analytically. Their aim tends to be to uncover its historical background and the domestic, regional and international factors that have contributed to the deterioration of the situation in Darfur. Studies related to the Darfur Crisis have been reviewed to provide the reader with a more
comprehensive view. The existing texts that have been reviewed can be classified, according to their nature and scientific basis, into five categories as follows: those that analyse political dimensions, economic dimensions, ethnic and social dimensions, international and humanitarian law dimensions, and the dimensions of Libyan involvement.

However, this study does not deal only with one specific field of literature or discipline such as IR, conflict resolution, or crisis management studies. The researcher has engaged with a range of different bodies of literature from different disciplines. Since this study looks at a certain type of relationship and specific case study that tells us about said relationship, the researcher does not restrict himself to one field of study or one body of literature. What it is dealing with is an eclectic body of literature. Therefore, this research project is an interdisciplinary project.

Studies Focusing on Political Dimensions

A large part of the existing literature relating to the Darfur Crisis has noticeably focused on the political dimensions of the problem. Most of this research has concluded that the essence of the crisis is existing power struggles and the government’s failure to achieve an equitable distribution of power. Many scholars believe that the crisis primarily erupted as a result of political conflict between Sudanese actors seeking power. This implies that the Darfur Crisis is a domestic political issue. In contrast, other scholars have gone beyond the domestic level, attributing the complicity of the crisis to the competitive nature of the key external actors in their relations and their hidden conflict for protecting their own self-interests. Research conducted to examine the Darfur Crisis, including these concerns will be highlighted in this section of the thesis.

Kelechi A. Kalu (2010) addressed the civil war in Darfur within the broad context of Sudan’s crisis of governance at the national level. The author contends that the major difficulty in ending endemic crises in African countries, like that taking place in Darfur, is an inability to generate sustainable solutions and institutionalised strategies for effective governance. In Kalu’s perspective, for example, the key cause that has
fundamentally contributed to the instability in Sudan (and Darfur in particular), is the neglect and marginalisation practiced by successive central governments in Sudan, following the independence of the country in 1956. The poor political, developmental, and social policies executed by central authorities and the lack of strategic vision for building a truly nationalistic Sudanese state, has led to the formation of different ethnically-based political groups, such as the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), who endeavour to realise their demands by force. Kalu also argues that the GoS’s strategy in Darfur seeks to end the conflict on its own terms, represented in the homogenisation of all the ethnic groups consistent with the cultural, linguistic and ethnic consciousness of the ruling northern elite. Kalu states that the GoS’s violent reaction to the Darfur rebel groups might be a deliberate strategy to discourage other potentially marginalised and neglected groups from taking up arms against the GoS. The GoS’s reasoning for following this manner of handling the crisis is that it was already engaged in a peace negotiation process in 2003 with southerners, and it did not want to repeat the process with other marginalised groups and regions in the future (Kalu 2010, p. 16).

Similar to Kalu, Isiaka Badmus’ view (2009) posited that the major reason for the longevity of the crisis in Darfur can be attributed to weak and unaccountable governance in Khartoum and its lopsided politics towards various ethnicities, not only in Darfur, but across the entire country. He revealed that GoS politics is designed to promote Arabism and an Islamic state in order to export its radical ideology and revolution to other countries. He believes that for Sudan to surmount the current political problems, it must abandon its lopsided politics and deal with all people on the basis of equality, irrespective of their ethnic or religious background. Badmus argues that Khartoum’s reconsideration to its unequal policies, followed by ameliorating the socio-economic conditions, is essential. Sudanese authorities should be transparent and equitable in the distribution of national wealth and in the use of the revenues it exports to sectors such as education and health. Additionally, to accelerate Sudanese economic growth, sources of economic support to Sudan from African partners and the international community is very much needed (Badmus 2009). In this respect, Badmus’ view rather supports the argument of Abdel Monseif (2007), and this author strongly agrees with the argument that there should be
national and international support for the GoS to jettison its problems. The GoS should not be dealt with as a part of the problem only; it can also be a part of the solution.

A study by Al-Said Omar (2008) concentrated on some defined actors and how they have dealt with the crisis in the Darfur region. He has categorised these actors into two different teams, according to the mechanisms and strategies each actor has used, or followed, to manage the crisis. Omar has determined three actors which manage the crisis through *manipulating crises*. These are: rebels, Western civil society actors, and international mass media. Omar also found that the actors mentioned above have significantly contributed to the inflation of the Darfur Crisis. He points out that these actors have deliberately resorted to the use of power, diplomatic coercion, and have applied pressure on international public opinion with a view to shaping the orientation of international circles of decision-making. Second, a further four actors have been classified as those who have managed the crisis in accordance with their efforts to deal with the problem effectively, and are concerned with finding an appropriate end to the crisis. These parties are the GoS, the UN, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID), and the African Union (AU). The author has also attempted to reveal the key actors whose actions have resulted in the escalation and growing complexity of the situation. Additionally, they have increased the gap between the main parties of the conflict, which has led to the transfer of the issue from the domestic to the global level. The author’s argument can be agreed with to some extent, especially in terms of the contribution of implemented strategies and techniques employed by those actors to aggravate the crisis. In this context, it can also be argued that the author has only addressed non-state actors (if we exclude the state of Sudan). There are, however, limitations to Omar’s work. Perhaps the most significant is that he has referred to the causes of the internationalisation of the crisis, instead of investigating and analysing the impact of this process upon the crisis itself, as a crisis management mechanism. Hence, this academic effort does not give the most comprehensive picture of this very complicated problem.

An article by De Maio (2010) has drawn attention to the trans-nationalisation process of conflict in Darfur through understanding if war is contagious or not. The author believes that the Khartoum regime manages the Darfur conflict by extending the violence across boundaries and destabilise neighbouring states. He argues that
threatened regimes deliberately resort to the shifting of the conflict from inside to outside of their jurisdiction, by pushing internal tensions across the borders to neighbouring countries, in order to undermine stability in those countries (De Maio 2010, p. 25). The opinion of De Maio is that a civil war becomes a proxy war between states. Following such a strategy of political crisis management and conflicts, threatened regimes perceive that they can achieve several political benefits. For instance, they can be fortified against the charge of having committed atrocities or human rights abuses, as their proxies will be accusable. This tactic, in turn, is used to bolster the legitimacy of these regimes internally and externally as well as helping them to maintain power. From our perspective, De Maio rightly points out that the civil war can be contagious; yet, he did not reveal the key political, economic, and social conditions that assist in exporting the crisis across borders effectively. However, De Maio erroneously states that, due to its concern with regime survival and its belief that regional stability is vital for that survival, the GoS has transferred the conflict from Darfur to Chad. The Darfur conflict is not applicable in this case. The main point of argument here is that the regime in Khartoum was forced to be involved in this trans-nationalisation, particularly after the opposition’s attack on Omdurman.¹ (Human Rights Watch, June 2008). Neither it is not wise to open a new front of conflict. The best proof of this is that once the interests of both regimes have been met, they raced to sign an agreement to end the rift in the relationship that resulted from the rapid developments in Darfur. De Maio’s point of view is contrary to Omar’s (2008). While the latter argued that the GoS was one of the actors managing the crisis, De Maio argues that the Sudanese regime manages the crisis in Darfur through promoting crisis.

Regarding the peace process, Oluwadare Abiodun (2011) declares that peace initiatives have significantly prolonged the duration of the crisis, instead of bringing it to an end. The continuation of the impasse has led to the production of yet more dissident groups, with shifting positions, due to disagreements and discrepancies in their views towards the conditions of peace. Alex de Waal (2007a) reinforces this viewpoint when he refers to the differences and competition between the leaders of opposing groups, which has prevented the Darfur rebels from uniting to achieve their

¹ On the 10th May 2008 the Darfur rebel group, the JEM, launched an armed assault on Omdurman area, one of the three towns that form the capital city of Khartoum.
political demands. Each faction has its own territorial ambitions. The diversity of the rebels’ agendas has resulted in a lack of coordination and acted as a significant impediment to achieving noticeable progress towards a real peace agreement in Darfur (de Waal 2007a, p. 1039). Given this evidence, one can argue that division inside the rebel movements in Darfur is one of the factors that has weakened these groups and their position against the Khartoum regime. Furthermore, this position has undermined the efforts of the international community to support the peace process in Darfur. On this basis, it may be inferred that if the opposition movements continued to be non-uniform, the crisis cannot expect to see the light at the end of the tunnel and Darfur might not see peace in the foreseeable future.

Internationally, research by Berdal Aral (2010) examines how the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has become an instrument at the hands of a handful of states seeking hegemony, inter alia, through this body. The Darfur Crisis has been taken as a case study to investigate to what extent the UNSC has been a motivating factor towards the politicisation of the crisis (Aral 2010, p. 163). Aral demonstrates that the Sudanese case is a model instance to illustrate how - since the end of the Cold War - the UNSC has been employed by powerful states, led by the US, in order to exercise their hegemony and to control energy resources in the non-Western world. These powerful states have pushed the international community to adopt many UNSC resolutions against Sudan (such as 1556, 1564, 1590, and 1706) to force it to adopt a certain political approach to the management of the Darfur Crisis. However, actions have been taken by these states to approach other crises in other parts of Africa (Rwanda in 1994, Burundi in the 1990s, and the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1998, and Sierra Leone in 1998), which failed and so were ineffective despite high levels of violation and crimes against humanity (Aral 2010, pp. 164-165). While it is strongly acknowledged that the transformation of the UNSC can be a means employed by the permanent members to achieve their strategic interests, due to the problematic structure of decision-making in the UNSC, and the policy of double standards adopted by them according to their perspectives of global peace, Aral did not draw attention to whether or not these policies contributed to the extension of the duration of the Darfur Crisis.

Alex de Waal (2007a) examines the international response to the Darfur Crisis by highlighting how the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Darfur has been
adopted by the international community in order to manage the Darfur Crisis, and how this has influenced the crisis. He observes that the employment of this concept in Darfur has failed to accomplish the main objective, which focus on civilian protection. De Waal goes on to note that this failure owes much to incorrect calculations, and the exaggeration of expectations that civilian protection can be achieved by dispatching international forces with limited equipment to Darfur (de Waal 2007a, p. 1054). From de Waal’s perspective, bringing better-equipped international troops to Darfur may not achieve positive progress towards the end of the civilian struggle there. He claims that thinking that such actions can protect the people of Darfur is erroneous. The author has realistically mentioned several internal and external reasons and territorial points of view which are behind this failure. de Waal reports that “The responses of the UNSC and the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) consisted chiefly of ad hoc steps rather than a systematic or strategic plan” (de Waal 2007a, p. 1041). He expressed a similar view to Aral’s perspective, which argues that the UNSC has been affected by the US government’s decision that genocide had been committed in Darfur (Aral 2010). This decision was taken in response to advocacy organisations, and congressional pressure, which believes that describing the situation in Darfur as genocide would commit the USA to intervene. de Waal’s work asserts that the approach taken by the UNSC and the PSC to manage the Darfur Crisis and save civilians lacks a definitive and systematic strategy, but that these are steps taken in reaction to events and developments. De Waal went further and reported that the UNSC has failed even to monitor the implementation of issued resolutions as part of the crisis management process (de Waal 2007a, p. 1041).

Regarding the importance of determining the priorities that effective management requires, de Waal notes that the multiplicity of the international community’s demands and goals to enhance the situation on the ground in Darfur has impeded effective and coherent mechanisms to containing the humanitarian crisis. It can be argued that focusing on political and diplomatic efforts, as well as increasing pressure from the international community to persuade all the parties of the conflict to provide more concessions, could result in a radical solution to the problem. In a disagreement with de Waal’s work (2007a), a study by David Lanz (2008) does not support the assumption that the international response to the Darfur Crisis has massively failed. Lanz argues that there has been a far-reaching and multifaceted
response to the Darfur crisis such as humanitarian aid, peace negotiations, enforcing peace, justice promotion, but it has not been effective. Lanz found that “those involved in the grand scheme of managing conflict Darfur must realise that they are in essence projecting their morals and a Western political agenda and that, consequently, their good intentions may not be perceived as such, especially in the Arab world”. (Lanz 2008, p. 7). Lanz believes that in order to improve our ability to manage conflicts in Darfur, moving from self-centred and self-righteous dogmatism to a pragmatic assessment of causes and consequences is essential.

Yuri S. Fuchs (2011) argues that a mixture of domestic and political influences, geopolitical impact, and self-interests are the primary motives behind the escalation from humanitarian intervention to military intervention. Fuchs indicates that though the situation in Darfur merits intervention, due to its high levels of violence and that it may be in dire need of foreign military intervention for stabilisation, such intervention would not be forthcoming. Given the unclear scenarios in the Darfur Crisis and a lack of trusted partners on the ground who could assist a military intervention, it is unlikely to occur. Military intervention led by great powers in such circumstances would not give the interveners many chances of success in ending the crisis (Fuchs 2011, p. 79). However, this argument is contrary to several scholars’ arguments, such as Fake and Funk (2009) who assert that there has been a serious scramble for Africa between major world powers such the USA, China, France, and the UK, for access to valuable resources including oil and diamonds (Fake and Funk 2009, pp. 2-9). Fuchs’ argument is also contrary to the argument of Mahmood Mamdani (2010) who believes that “interest in oil is an important dimension of US involvement in the Darfur-Chad region and the US-China contention in Sudan” (Mamdani 2010, p. 20). Mamdani adds that economic interest are a key factor in understanding Powerful Western States’ handling of problems, particularly on the African continent (Kristof 2006).

Understanding of the political dimension of the Darfur Crisis is essential in order to evaluate the course of the crisis and its duration. However, the limited focus on this approach alone is the work of a minor and weak. The Darfur conflict is compound and intertwined in it many local, regional and international factors with dimensions of political, economic, ethnic and foreign intervention. Addressing the political dimension can only illustrate the political polarisation and employment of the
conflict whether by local, regional, and international actors. Thus, besides looking further at the political dimension, this project will also engages with discussions and analysis the other factors symbiotically in order to establish a comprehensive outcome which has not been done by the above reviewed studies.

**Studies Focusing on Economic Dimensions**

Many sources indicate that the underlying causes of the disputes in Darfur are economically-driven. Some scholars believe that these sources have domestic or international dimensions. At the domestic level, many academics focus on, and maintain, that the Darfur Crisis is a reflection of agricultural and alimentary insufficiency, together with a deterioration of living conditions into further poverty, illiteracy and disease. Intellectuals also highlight the marginalisation suffered by the Darfur province, which has been badly treated by successive regimes, in terms of modern industrial and agricultural development, despite the major contribution of the province to the national income (Nixon 2005, p. 123). From an external perspective, however, several researchers have reported that a set of international factors led to the complexity of the Darfur catastrophe. The fierce competition between the major, powerful, states to access energy resources in Africa generally, and in Sudan in particular, has contributed significantly to the uprisings in the Darfur region.

In light of the domestic context, a number of researchers have studied the problem by concentrating on the relationship between climate change and the conflict in Darfur. It is said that global warming is primarily to blame (Faris 2007). A study by Salah Hakim (2011) shows that, while political, socio-economic, and ethnic factors cannot be lessened during an investigation of the key factors behind the problem, climate change remains the root cause of the Darfur Crisis. He identifies that repeated bouts of drought, caused by a dramatic decline in rainfall, have resulted in a desertification phenomenon (Hakim 2011, p. 818). Furthermore, over the last ten decades, the deterioration of natural resources in the Darfur region has contributed considerably to tribal warfare in the area. This has led to tension/conflict between sedentary farming groups and nomadic, pastoral tribes. The resident tribes own the land, while other,
migratory, tribes have the right to use and benefit from the common rangeland. These issues will be discussed in more detail later in chapter three. For precisely this reason, numerous tribal conflicts have erupted due to strong competition for access to natural resources between the settled farmers and nomadic herders (Hakim 2011, p. 818). Hakim goes beyond this to assume that a political solution is not enough to solve the problem. It could terminate the hostilities and so avoid humanitarian catastrophe, but it cannot approach the fundamental cause of the Darfur Crisis, which is driven by climate change.

According to Hakim, the optimal solution for the crisis is seeking to develop the Darfur region through the adoption of strategies that fit with climate change. These kinds of strategies should provide the Darfurians with new, alternative, livelihoods that are more rewarding financially, such as encouraging them to do all economic activities, which tends to reduce the level of poverty and reduce the pressure on natural resources that have already been overused. In addition to the robust development of Darfur, Hakim suggests that there should be an awareness campaign which goes hand in hand with the implementation of the development plan to help people to understand how to rationalise their consumption of natural resources in preparing for drought and confronting the drastic implications of climate change. This can be done by adopting a new agriculture policy that must be mainstreamed by central and local governments. Adoption of the native administration is also called for in Darfur. Likewise, Mohamed Yonis (cited in Schlein 2011) the Deputy Joint Special Representative of the African United Nation Mission in Darfur, has stated that “Water is one of the main root causes of the Darfur crisis” (Schlein 2011). He believes that water can be the main means for peace. Well-managed and distributed water can contribute to building peace among the people of Darfur. He also argues that a political solution is needed, but that it remains elusive. Yonis concludes that there should be projects that aim to rebuild the water infrastructure with new technologies and systems that enable the people to adequately manage water and to face climate change.

This view has been supported by Robin Bovey (cited in Schlein 2011). Bovey suggested that if we wanted to solve the Darfur Crisis we should effectively manage the freshwater resources. He believes that additional droughts will occur due to climate change, and he confirms that a prolonged and abnormal shortage of rainfall
occurs naturally in cyclical patterns. Nils Kastberg, the representative of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) for Sudan, moreover states that “getting access to water requires peace. And peace can best be achieved at the local level” (cited in Schlein 2011). The access to freshwater issue could be used to establish a dialogue between the different groups in the region. Freshwater distribution discussions could assist the existing mechanisms to manage the freshwater supply and to unite the opposing interests of the conflicting parties. A number of influential figures, such as the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, former US Vice President Al Gore, staff at the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Jeffrey Sachs and Mahmood Mamdani, and the authors of the Stern Report on the economics of climate change, have emphasised that the hostilities in the Darfur area are a climate crisis, caused by long-term drought since 1997 (cited in Kevane and Gray 2008, p. 1). Therefore, all these points of view support the perspective that argues that the solution to the Darfur crisis can only be achieved from inside, not outside.

However, a related argument is made by Michael Kevane and Leslie Gray (2008). It reports that diminishing resources, or scarcity of freshwater, caused by declining rainfall due to climate change cannot be considered a root cause of the Darfur conflict. Data on rainfall has significantly not reflected a decline in rainfall patterns across the thirty years immediately prior to the eruption of the conflict in 2003. A challenge is that those who argue that climate change, resulting in an important decline in rainfall in Darfur, which led to a lack of freshwater resources, is a major reason for the Darfur conflict rarely provide accurate data on rainfall patterns to support their arguments. They tend to rely only on a general understanding that Darfur is part of the Sahel, an area where rainfall has been low, variable, and in decline. They do not necessarily present evidence to show that there was a significant change in rainfall that directly intensified the civil war in Darfur. Instead Kevane and Gray (2008) attribute the crisis to the regime in Khartoum’s willingness to eliminate the political opposition and perceived threats from the peripheral regions of the country, even by using large-scale violence against civilians. Whilst it might be feasible to agree with Kevane and Gray that many commentators have not presented accurate data to validate their claims, it cannot be fully concluded that the crisis is a political conflict resulting from the GoS’s willingness to crush political opposition.
(Kevane, Gray 2008). Nevertheless, Kevane and Gray also fail to present clear explanations to support their claims.

Iana Brown (2010) expressed a similar view, Brown's investigation was conducted mainly in two regions, Western Darfur and Northern Darfur. She found that the worsening of eco-scarcity in both areas as the underlying cause of the conflict at the outset cannot be proved. On the contrary, she observed that in the years prior to the start of the conflict the growth in average vegetation was significantly better than in the previous twenty-five years (Brown 2010, p. 2513).

A handful of scholars have focused on development in the Darfur state. A study conducted by Issam Mohamed (2011) assesses the economics of freshwater resources in the Southern Darfur region, and their role in developing the region which, in turn, is a positive reflection on the continuation of the Darfur Crisis. Hence, Mohamed’s study refutes the assumption that there was a shortage of freshwater sources in Darfur. Mohamed claims that there is sufficient freshwater in the region. The sources are of several different kinds due to topographical variations, rainfall, and drainage volume and underground water storage in the province. Furthermore, Mohamed notes that the freshwater resources in Darfur are not only abundant, but could also be a key factor in concluding the conflict and the humanitarian struggle there, together with the development of the region. In addition, Mohamed correctly argues that this can only be achieved if the GoS makes more efforts to effectively benefit from these resources. The writer makes it clear that development is possible, with the proper financing and honest efforts to exploit existing untapped freshwater resources, and that it would suffice for all economic projects. Thus, it is strongly agreed that focusing on development in Darfur would significantly, and positively influence stability and peace there. However, development should not only be limited to freshwater resources, but necessitates making significant efforts to developing all aspects of life as well as the elimination of financial and administrative corruption, which is a problem not only in Sudan but all over the African continent.

Ola Olsson (2010b) developed a general model of relations between natural resources (land, in particular) and market integration in vulnerable environments, especially a community primarily inhabited by farmers and herders who can either equally share land in a market economy or in an autarky. Olsson argues that
decreasing resources can damage mutual trade between the two groups, which in turn makes each group’s welfare interdependent. According to Olsson, increasing resource scarcity is likely to cause more social tension between groups populated in the same location. He contends that in Darfur market integration has collapsed, partly due to the diminishing effectiveness of land resources in the region. The author also argues that ineffective land resources have declined drastically since the 1970s due to a 20% decline in rainfall. Such observations may allude to reasons for the disintegration of a market-like economy and the onset of appropriative conflicts since the 1980s in Darfur (Olsson 2010b, p. 2). In Darfur the relevant natural resource is land and the majority of the population are divided between either farmers or pastoralists, sharing communal land where there are no strong individual ownership rights to land. If we assume that Olsson’s model can be applicable to any context with a heavy reliance on natural resources, it is noteworthy to mention that decreasing resources can lead to a collapse in trade between groups that are heavily dependent on natural resources, but that this is not permanent or likely to create social conflict. There are several assisting factors that would have to be present for such an outcome. Groups in Darfur are from different ethnic backgrounds and each has different political agendas. In addition, regional actors might also play a key role and exploit resource-scarcity to trigger a social conflict.

In light of the external context, work by Andrea Behrends (2008) addresses a case of fighting for oil when there is no oil yet. It concentrates on the role of major local actors directly involved in the conflict across the Darfur-Chad boarder (rebel groups and militias); national actors (Sudanese and Chadian governments) and international actors (multinational companies, the USA, China, and the UN). This study tries to illustrate how oil can have drastic consequences, even when reserves have not yet been proven, with regard to the future possibility of stability in the country. Behrends (2008) sought to answer two main posed questions. Firstly, how has oil, both as a local possibility and a national reality in Chad and Sudan, influenced the continuation of fighting on the border region between Darfur and Chad? Secondly, to what extent are the actors involved in this fighting motivated by the oil factor? He declares that while the insurgency in Chad is evidently linked with oil revenues, there is no evidence to confirm that the conflict in Darfur is directly associated with the presence of natural oil, but evidently has become part of the conflict’s
continuation. While, for the combatants in Darfur oil was not a reason to reach a negotiated settlement and agreement to end the fighting in the area, in Chad oil was the reason to continue fighting and acted as a motivation for securing power. In contrast, for the government on both sides of the border, oil has become the underlying reason to not let the rebels win. According to Behrends (2008), oil has influenced the continuation of the Darfur Crisis with different dynamics. In the course of the fighting, oil has gained significance as a narrative to justify the continuation of the rebellion (Behrends 2008, p. 52). Behrends concludes that although oil was not the main reason of the breakout of warfare in Darfur and Chad, fighting for oil has become part of the conflicts' continuation. In this respect it may be inferred that the evidence suggests that oil has significantly influenced the duration of the Darfur crisis. But the question is how can the GoS and international actors use oil as a means to halt the fighting and end the crisis?

Helen Young et al (2007) examined the influence of the recent Darfur Crisis on the patterns of Darfurian migrant workers to Libya and their remittance flows. How this civil conflict impacted the livelihoods of Darfurians in Libya was also investigated. The study focuses on the ways in which continued changes in Libyan political and economic policies affect migration for Sudanese workers from Darfur to Libya in the opposite direction. In general, the authors found that despite Libya relying heavily on foreign migrant workers, particularly Darfurian workers, work opportunities for Sudanese in Libya have been significantly influenced by upturns and downturns in the Libyan economy. This unstable economic situation was the result of Libya’s politically volatile relations, since the 1980s, with the international community as well as changes in world oil prices. More importantly, the study reveals that the closure of national boundaries between Libya and Sudan in May 2003, due to the eruption of armed conflict in Darfur, led to the prevention of thousands of Darfurian workers being able to return, and even created difficulties for them to communicate with their families and send back their remittances. The number of Darfurian migrant workers traveling from Darfur to Libya has also been restricted. For geographic and economic reasons, Libya is an attractive place for Darfurian migrants, particularly during periods of drought and famine (especially the 1970s and 1980s). The

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2 Official estimates of Darfurian migrant workers in Libya were unavailable but were estimated to be between 150,000 and 250,000 (Young, Osman and Dale 2007, p. 826).
economic and social marginalisation, practiced by the central GoS upon peripheral areas like Darfur, is another motivation. Remittance flows are a prime source of livelihood for Darfurian income (Young, Osman and Dale 2007, p. 826).

Helen Young et al (2007) posit that any international attempt to respond to the Darfur Crisis and its implications requires a deep understanding of the patterns and mechanisms of migration of the affected population and their remittance flows. In both the short and long terms, a number of policies that could lead to an improvement in conditions for the Darfurian migrant workforce in Libya, to facilitate their traffic, and to ease the flow of remittances, are recommended. Young, Osman and Dale concludes that, until a resolution to the crisis, and thus peace, is achieved, Libya will remain an attractive destination for Darfurians. Therefore, the Darfur Crisis’ implications are not only seen as domestic, and damaging merely to the economy of Darfur, as Olsson (2010) expresses. They extend beyond the national frontier to directly or indirectly affect the economies of neighbouring countries, such as Libya. From another angle, and given the evidence, a big question emerges here: has the continuation of the civil conflict in Darfur affected the Libyan economy and how have the Libyan authorities used this issue in their strategy to resolve the crisis?

Research carried out by Tanner Young (2009, pp. 14-18) has offered an argument that economic incentives are driving current events in Darfur. He pointed out that the underlying causes and events that led to Darfur’s genocide are that the country’s government followed a repeated pattern of violence for the sake of economic interests, through the armament of ethnic militias who in turn used force to defend foreign petroleum operations violently, such as Chinese oil installations, in order to secure access for oil companies to begin exploiting oil (Fake and Funk 2009, p. 58).

It is clear from the existing literature that has addressed the economic dimensions of the Darfur Crisis, which the conflict between different groups and tribes in the region is not primarily ethnic or religious (yet) it might be a result of the region’s struggle in relation to food and agricultural insufficiency, deterioration in living conditions, poverty, ignorance and disease. These are problems which the different regimes that have ruled Sudan have failed to solve. Imbalances in development among the regions over the entire territory of Sudan, especially Darfur, are regarded as among the key causes leading to the eruption of the crisis. Darfur has existed in a condition of economic backwardness, weakness in resources, execution of infrastructure, and high
unemployment. The worsening of these conditions has dramatically increased with the increase in conditions of desertification that the region has witnessed since the 1980s. This has led to a decline in agricultural production, which importantly contributes to feeding the conflicts between the groups and the tribes that mainly rely, for their living, upon natural resources, such as land and water. However, adopting the economic approach to investigate the crisis in Darfur is very useful as the most of the previous literature state that the absent of the development and effective economic policies by the Sudanese successive governments in Darfur has fundamentally led to the instability there. However, the economic approach is insufficient to look at, but may be able to give us only a part of the Darfur Crisis scene not the whole.

Studies Focusing on Ethnic and Social Dimensions

Sudan is one of the most diverse countries in the world. It is endearingly labelled as the small model of Africa. Darfur is characterised by ethnic and cultural diversity given its size, and diverse climate and vegetation. The environmental variety contributes to increased mobility between tribes and ethnic groups in the region. This integration has resulted in an extended variety of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups. Darfur consists of two main components: African residents (mostly farmers), and Arab herders (mostly nomadic). Although there is homogeneity and intermarriage among Arabs and non-Arab African people, each side largely sticks to its ethnic origins and culture. However, they live in peace, with the exception of some frictions between pastoralists and farmers that are often addressed within the framework of the civil administration, tribal laws and customs. The Darfur Crisis has attracted wide attention in social science literature. This section will discuss contemporary literature that explores the Darfur Crisis and will focus on the ways in which the ethnic, cultural, and social factions have affected the eruption and continuation of the crisis. Many studies primarily focus on ethnic variety as the chief cause of violence in Darfur. While other research emphasises other, more harrowing, themes, such as the genocide and ethnic cleansing issue. The international
community, which has a responsibility to protect human rights, has responded ineffectively to these issues.

A study by Mahgoub El-Tigani (2004) reveals that the ethnic component of the Darfur Crisis cannot be refuted. He believes that the Darfurian insurgency emanates from the Arab-oriented central government’s biased policies towards the non-Arab African groups in the region. El-Tigani has drawn his argument from the work of Sudanese writers. Many of these authors are related to the indigenous groups in Darfur. According to El-Tigani “the crisis is political and State-made. It results from the misadministration, abuse of authority, and economic greed of the governing elite, committed against the powerless Africans of Darfur” (El-Tigani 2004, p. 3). Furthermore, he posits that the crisis is a reflection of an Arab-dominated Khartoum government’s disrespect for human dignity and human rights. The author argues that the main responsibility for the bloodshed lies with the Khartoum government and that it should be blamed above all other participants, whether they be internal or external protagonists. El-Tigani, however, believes that the final resolution to ending the Darfur conflict is internal and lies predominantly with the Sudanese people (El-Tigani 2004, p. 3). While it can be argued that the GoS has significantly contributed to an escalation in tensions in the region, as a result of its policies vis-à-vis the region, it is difficult to confirm that Sudanese authorities are primarily responsible for the crisis.

Olsson and Siba (2009) declare that the conflict in Darfur is essentially a clash of ethnicities and should fundamentally be regarded as a deliberate ethnic cleansing campaign. They argue that the conflict in Darfur is driven by GoS attacks, in conjunction with the government’s allies the Janjaweed, which have been primarily targeted at the three major African tribes of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa in the Darfur area, who proclaimed their opposition to the GoS in 2003. In contrast, Arab-dominated villages are very rarely targeted. Although resource variables and a local struggle over dwindling natural resources have also played a certain role and have had some interpretive power in the conflict in Darfur, their importance is still limited. Additionally, the authors assert that the central aim of the GoS can only be considered as ethnic cleansing or an attempt to capture peripheral lands with good access to freshwater and fertile soils. Consequently, a vast number of Darfurians have been internally and externally displaced. Furthermore, the major reallocation of
land has been from the three rebel tribes to non-rebel Arab and African groups. It is in total disagreement with writers that argue that the underlying motivation of GoS /Janjaweed attacks in Darfur is an ethnic cleansing campaign targeted against people who are non-Arabic. Much literature indicates that the Janjaweed militia consists of both Arab and African fighters. There have also been many Arab civilians that have also been displaced (Ollson and Siba 2009, p. 23).

The work of Ollson and Valsecchi (2010) revealed that ethnic cleansing is essentially multi-dimensional. It is not just (and not necessarily) about mass murder, but also forced migration, as well as destruction of property and infrastructure. Furthermore, in the empirical application of their methodology to specifically sample 530 villages in south-western Darfur, Ollson and Valsecchi found that ethnic cleansing has extensively and intensively occurred in Darfur. This, Ollson and Valsecchi argue, has largely affected the ethnic composition of the region, redistributing the population density in chosen villages. Ollson and Valsecchi argue that a segregation strategy may have been employed by the GoS to make it relatively easy for the government-supported Janjaweed militia to target rebel groups. Furthermore, such a strategy would assist in the survival of the rebellion, which is considered to be a very serious threat for the stability of the political regime in Khartoum. An additional increase in the regional ethnic diversity is illustrated by the data3 - which is already very high - after the eruption of the conflict. In contrast, the degree of ethnic diversity at the village-average, which was already low before the 2003 crisis began, is very low even after, because of the high degree of segregation. Ollson and Valsecchi argue that there is a clear correlation between the extent of cleansing and the high level of segregation (Ollson and Valsecchi 2010, p. 18).

John Hagan and Rymond-Richmond (2008) focus on the mechanisms that are used by the GoS when targeting black African villages in Darfur. They suggest that the GoS deliberately instigated a collective framing process that dehumanised its victims from only three black African targeted groups: the Zaghawa, Fur, and Masalit. The GoS, according to Hagan and Rymond-Richmond, motivated and encouraged local Arab Janjaweed militia toward ethnic cleansing. In their empirical analysis of 1,136 interviews, they found 932 who reported hearing racial epithets, such as “you are

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3 Given the current security situation in Darfur this data was not available during our study. However, a significant range of date have been provided by Ollson and Valsecchi (2010, p. 12).
slaves, kill the slaves”, and “this is the last day for blacks” (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008, p. 876). Hagan and Rymond-Richmond’s assumption is that the concentration and aggregation of racial epithets during attacks have played a fundamental role in creating a collective effect that intensified the severity of organised violence which led to genocide. Ideologically, Hagan and Rymond-Richmond claim that Arab-Islamic supremacist ideology is the major contribution which has motivated both the GoS, and its local Arab allies, to reconfigure the political demography of the Darfur region by organised cleansing and an assault on non-Arab and non-Islamic traditional culture (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008, p. 880). It can be agreed that racial epithets can transfer an individual’s motivation into collectively organised dehumanisation and violence.

A similar study, conducted by Olsson (2010a) examines two major issues for post-crisis; patterns of population growth and land redistribution that have emerged as a consequence of the crisis. The study is based on examining data from 542 villages in south-western Darfur (hosting a population of roughly 786,000 people), which has been collected by international organisations operating in the area. His analysis demonstrated that about 300,000 people, mainly from the three rebellious Zaghawa, Masalit, and Fur ethnic groups, have been displaced from their villages since the onset of hostilities in 2003. Meanwhile, these villages have been squatted by Arabs and other African non-rebel groups. The findings of Olsson’s investigation also reveal that the total population of the targeted area has declined by about 30 percent to approximately 525,000, while the percentage of the population belonging to the rebel tribes has dramatically dropped by roughly two thirds. Conversely, this considerable decrease has been followed by an increase in the population of Arab and non-rebel African groups in the same region (Olsson 2010a, p. 7).

In addition to this, the analysis clearly suggests that this wide repopulation has mainly occurred in peripheral villages where soils are relatively high quality and with close access to freshwater. The analysis further indicates that squatting has taken place and thousands of rebel tribe households have fled. When displaced people return to their villages they find their lands have been taken. This enormous land redistribution, according to Olsson, can negatively affect the stability of the peace in the post-crisis period, if there are no affective mechanisms for cooperation between farmers and herders (Olsson 2010a, 16).
On the other hand, the findings of Olsson (2010a), Olsson and Siba (2009) and El-Tigani (2004) are challenged by others. Jehron Muhammad (2010), for instance, criticised the argument posits that the GoS, with its allies from the Janjaweed militia, is involved in a civil war against insurgent groups in Darfur, which has developed into genocide against the ethnic African tribes that inhabit the Darfur area. Muhammad stresses that “focus[ing] solely on the Muslim and Arab north—when Darfur is nearly 100 present Muslim—being engaged in genocide against the Black population of Darfur is suspect” (Muhammad 2010). He argues that other assisting circumstances include rebels crossing the border from Chad, the distribution of weapons and the opening up of an illegal economy, should also be considered as factors that gave rise to the conflict.

Farouk El-Baz (cited in Muhammad 2010), the director of the Centre for Remote Sensing at Boston University, confirmed that the conflict in Darfur cannot be considered a genocide because the populations in the Darfur region are of the same ilk. He believes that “Both populations are Africans. Both populations are Black. Both populations are Muslims, and both populations speak Arabic and some regional languages” (Muhammad 2010). Furthermore, El-Baz does not support Olsson and Siba’s (2009) argument. He proclaims that the origins of the problem lie in the diversity of the demographics of Darfur. The region is populated by two kinds of inhabitants. “The first category consists of sedentary farmers who grow food and raise cattle, therefore they congregate around water sources. The other community comprises nomadic tribes, who depend on access to available water sources as they travel” (Muhammad 2010). According to El-Baz, the nomadic population naturally depends on access to freshwater and markets, which has become increasingly difficult to obtain. Additionally, the profit margin gained from livestock cultivation has been critically undermined by the occupation of the farming faction (Muhammad 2010).

Zaki Beheiri (2010) does not support Olsson’s view. Beheiri deliberates that it is very difficult to distinguish between the Arab tribes and non-Arab tribes involved in the Darfur Crisis, as insurgents consist of both. Some rebels who attacked the southern areas were Arab. For example, rebels who attacked Bram city that was inhabited by an Arab tribe (Bno Halba), were also from an Arab tribe (Rezigat). He states that the disaster in Darfur is not due to the ethnic cleansing or genocide of non-
Arab people, as westerners claim. Looting, killing, and murder have historic roots, and guerrilla activities in Darfur are documented in the courts, going back a long time. While Beheiri rejects the view that the conflict in Darfur is ethnic, he argues that it is due to poor economic and social conditions especially in recent years as the region has witnessed a series of droughts and intense desertification that has led to hunger and underdevelopment. This has contributed to the continuity of warring traditions in light of the absence of the central state’s control (Beheiri 2010, p. 48). Consequently, the conflict in Darfur is a conflict between shepherd tribes and farmer tribes, regardless of their origins.

There is no doubt that a component of tribal and racial differences cannot be overlooked in the ongoing conflict in Darfur where these aspects still constitute a political and social reality in the region. The evidence from the reviewed literature on these ethnic and culture aspects seems to indicate that the GoS’s failure to manage ethnic and cultural diversity decisively was a significant reason for the intensification of the crisis. The various political forces in Sudan were keen to employ this property in their political conflicts by attracting groups and tribes with different races and religions to support their political orientations and win votes in elections in return for some concessions, such as political positions and/or participation in the formation of the government. In light of the political polarisation of the tribes and civil administration’s endeavours to shift them to rival political entities for power locally and centrally, the conflict has transitioned from a professional and productive conflict to a political and ethnic conflict, whereby tribes have become a basic component in the process of rule, in Sudan generally and in Darfur in particular, and the distribution of the constitutional and executive positions. As a consequence, those who have political aspirations in all areas of underdevelopment have come to cling more to their tribes and ethnicities, in order to reach positions of influence or benefit through their tribal affiliations. Thus, the role of civil society organisations, which do not recognise the tribe and its restrictions, has been reduced and the logic of the tribe remains to govern Darfur.

Undoubtedly that we make a serious mistake if we exaggerate the tribe and ethnic differences as a major criterion for studying the conflict in Darfur as well as to find mechanisms and proposals to resolve the conflict as it means a case of isolationism and retreat to the self. Additionally, we will be in an even worse mistake if we ignore
the dimension of tribal and ethnic diversity of conflicts in Sudan, including Darfur, where the tribe continues to be a social and political reality cannot be ignored during studying of the Darfur Crisis in addition to other factors.

Studies Focusing on International and Human Law Dimensions

The conflict in Darfur has created a humanitarian catastrophe. The humanitarian conditions in the region have become a pivotal issue during the negotiations between the key parties of the crisis, supervised by external actors, such as the UN, the USA, and other governmental and non-governmental organisations. The GoS has been accused of committing human rights abuses against Africans in the region, using its Janjaweed militia as a means to quell the uprising, thus resolving the difficulties. These crimes have been mainly classified within four categories: killing, burning villages, sexual violence, and forced displacement. Moreover, the Bush Administration and a number of civil organisations working in the humanitarian field went further, and classified the situation in Darfur as ‘genocide’ (Daly, M.W. 2007, p. 295), though this has been challenged by the UN and the European Union (EU).

In contrast, the GoS has refuted these charges and this description of the situation in Darfur. Simultaneously, it admitted a humanitarian catastrophe. In July 2008 the prosecutor for the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued a petition charging Omar al-Bashir with 10 war crimes against humanity and responsibility for genocide in Darfur (Wall Street 2008). A crisis between the regime in Khartoum and the ICC has arisen. Sudan has refused to comply with the ICC because it has not ratified the Rome Statute which created the court. However, the ICC stuck to its jurisdiction on the grounds that the file was referred to the court by the UNSC. A number of studies have been carried out on the Darfur Crisis in terms of its internationalisation, importance for international law, and humanitarian dimensions.

Babiker (2010) examined the Darfur Crisis in terms of its legal aspects and their impacts on both the peace and justice processes in Darfur. He addressed the capability of the Sudanese state to prosecute international crimes, such as human
rights abuses, war crimes, and genocide through assessing Sudan’s military and
criminal laws from the substantive and procedural aspects. Additionally, he
examined the key strengths and weaknesses of the recommendations in the report,
issued by the African Union High-level Panel on Darfur (AUPD). Babiker affirms
that Sudan cannot conduct this type of criminal prosecution, as its laws (whether
criminal or military) do not meet international legal standards. Thus, the country
cannot engage in such legal procedures. This position will ultimately lead to a supra-
national criminal prosecution, when the Darfur matter is referred to the ICC (Babiker
2010, p. 82). Babiker importantly highlighted that shifting the Darfur issue to the
ICC is not only an unfeasible step to peace, but that it may reduce the possibilities for
achieving peace. Thus, it is argued by many that internationalising the Darfur matter
and its referral by the UNSC to the ICC is purely driven by a political agenda,
backed by superpower states, as an approach to put more pressure on the GoS and
encourage it to accept a negotiated settlement that meets their national self-interests.

It is Alex de Waal’s (2008) conviction that referring the Darfur issue to the ICC
through the UNSC is a victory in itself. The GoS has not cooperated to permit
investigations or prosecutions to be thoroughly conducted. De Waal argues that the
major cause for this non-cooperation is the deterioration in the relationship between
Sudan and the west, due to the position of a near-complete collapse in confidence
amongst them. The author observes that the Darfur issue has become highly
politicised globally through the UN and several other means, such as the ICC, with a
view to spurring the GoS into providing more political concessions (de Waal 2008, p.
34). De Waal arguably concludes that in light of the lack of trust between Sudan and
western states, it is unlikely that the ICC would be able to proceed with
investigations of war criminals (Waal 2008, p. 35).

Indeed, it can be strongly agreed that the Darfur Crisis has become enormously
politicised, which has created real obstacles to progress towards a solution. However,
the inability of the ICC to conduct a successful prosecution does not result only from
procedural inability but also from a lack of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the ICC might
be deliberately disrupted by its users, who are aware of its implications for global
stability, whereby it cannot be used as a political instrument beyond that. Despite the
need for harmonisation between political sensitivity and legal complexity relating to
the Darfur issue, confusion between the constraints of legal and political interests
threatens international stability. As Al-sharif (2009) states, the inadequate approach which targets narrow self-interests without regard to the implications, will lead to chaos and threatens security and stability of global “law to be applied not to be employed” (Al-sharif 2009).

In contrast, the work of Mary T. Reynolds (2010) rejects the calls for delaying the prosecution of President al-Bashir, with the justification that allowing the prosecution to go further would serve to undermine the peace process in Darfur. Instead, the international community should allow the prosecution, under the UN umbrella, to move forward which would then legitimise the ICC and strengthen international criminal justice. If prosecution did not go ahead, the ICC’s international reputation and credibility might be irreparably damaged. This can only occur through supporting the ICC in holding President al-Bashir accountable for his crimes, which will be a beneficial lesson for future leaders. Reynolds asserts that Omar al-Bashir is criminally responsible as a direct perpetrator and is involved in crimes against humanity in Darfur, and any delay in prosecution will send the wrong message to future leaders that there is a great possibility the ICC will hesitate in promoting future international criminal justice (Reynolds 2010, p. 179). Thus, it can be argued that the Reynolds’ contention contrasts with those who say that referring the Darfur issue to the ICC itself is essentially the wrong action.

Kwame Boateng’s view (2011) does not support the arguments presented by de Waal (2008) or Reynolds (2010). Boateng believes that the ICC is currently a meaningless instrument to deter killing in Darfur. He has drawn attention to the fact that the international community miscalculated when they perceived that issuing the arrest warrants, for Omar al-Bashir and his associates, would be an effective factor in preventing the continuation of criminal violence. Boateng states that the most effective action to end the massacre in Darfur would be to follow a policy to compel constraint, which could halt such actions. This type of policy could be achieved by deploying humanitarian military intervention to Sudan, authorised by the UNSC. He adds that if consensus between UNSC permanent members has not been obtained, consequently, the USA must consider unilateral intervention to forcibly disarm the Janjaweed militias, protect civilians in Darfur, and arrest members of the GoS, such as President al-Bashir, who refuse to comply with the ICC. Due to non-possession of the court to the proper coercive power that is able to halt the genocide in Darfur and
its inability to enforce its jurisdictive authority, the USA has unique capability to end the conflict in Darfur (Boateng 2011, p. 38). The ICC will not be able to end the conflict in Darfur, particularly in light of the US statute towards the legitimacy of the ICC. There is disagreement with Boateng’s belief in humanitarian military intervention as a solution to end the crisis, whether collective, by the international community, or unilateral, led by the USA. However, it is clear that in light of the USA’s aversion towards legitimising the ICC for fear of political motivations against its citizens, the USA would never lead such a humanitarian military intervention and undertake a policy of compelling actions to solve the problem in Darfur.

Zray Yihdego (2009) expressed a similar view. He concentrated on the criminal dimensions of the Darfur conflict through studying International Humanitarian Law (IHL) related to the process of protecting civilians and their possessions in Darfur. The author investigated the nature of the conflict, the applicable rules, and to what extent those rules are compliant, and the weaknesses and strengths of the responses of the international community in providing physical protection to civilians. He found that despite the gains that might be achieved from putting a great responsibility on all parties of the crisis as well as relying upon the regional approach to prevent violence and humanitarian abuses against the civilian population in Darfur, further and timely global action must be taken by the international community. Yihdego declares that urgent global action is necessary from the international community. He maintains that besides Sudan’s failure to react appropriately, the international community has also not done enough to respond adequately to the crisis. The author claims that to prevent further atrocities in Darfur concentrated, adequate and timely international action is necessary (Yihdego 2009, p. 1). Thus, Yihdego, on a small scale, focuses on the IHL and its applicable rules in the Darfur case. While the IHL could be rightly applicable to Darfur, especially those related to crimes against humanity, Yihdego did not beneficially address the impacts and implications of referring the issue of Darfur to the ICC on the conflict’s duration.

An article by M. Rafiqul Islam (2006) addresses another angle of the problem. He highlights the international legal position of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within the framework of the humanitarian crisis taking place in Darfur. Through this study the author has attempted to examine the development of international legal and institutional frameworks for IDPs by addressing the problem through its legal
identity, rights, humanitarian assistance, and protection in international law. Islam upholds that the provision of basic needs and aid to victims, following enforced displacement, is meaningless and not an effective approach to overcoming the issue. He adds that responding to the needs of the displaced does not succeed in crisis management. The author states that the Darfur Crisis can be settled in a political or diplomatic manner, but that this can only offer a short-run solution to stopping an internal displacement crisis. Also, Islam attributed this to a lack of appropriate international processes of legal accountability for the artificial creation of a massive human tragedy in Darfur and the failure of Khartoum to contain and end the crisis. This failure will continue to challenge the wisdom inherent in the UN protection of human rights for all and solicit world attention to uphold the elementary consideration of humanity. Islam concludes with emphasising that the issue of internal displacement should be addressed as an integral part of the international protection of human rights and the enforcement of humanitarian law (Islam 2006, p. 354).

With regard to the complicity that has been made by referring the Darfur issue to the ICC through the UNSC, Mohamed Abou El-Fadl (2009) notes that many neighbouring countries are development obsessed, whether they have direct interests in Sudan or fear the repercussions of their neighbour's inner turmoil. This is especially the case if development refers to a new pattern of international interactions in dealing with the internal and regional issues that would lead to more difficulties and obstacles that reduce the likelihood of a resolution. Abou El-Fadl highlights the fact that the GoS has committed a number of grievous errors which have impacted the ICC’s operation. These are not only related to the human rights abuses committed against the people in Darfur, but also to some political actions (see Abou El-Fadl 2009, p. 236). The complexity of the crisis dramatically increased after the UNSC referred the issue of Darfur to the ICC in decision number 1593 issued on 31st March 2005, to consider charges of war crimes against humanity committed by the Bashir regime in Darfur. The crisis worsened while Sudan refused to be subjected to, and to responds to, these resolutions. On 14th July 2008 an arrest warrant was issued by the ICC’s Chief Prosecutor Luis Ocampo for President al-Bashir – the first arrest warrant against a serving head of state. This development might significantly influence the expected duration of the crisis.
Given the existing body of literature concerning the international and humanitarian law dimensions of the Darfur Crisis, it is clear that there are differences among the scholars in their perspectives regarding the impact of the ICC on the path of ending the crisis. While some view referring the Darfur issue to the ICC itself as a victory, others believe that the Darfur and its resolution is an internal affair. In addition to that, they argue that referring it to the ICC through the UNSC is an attempt to politicalise and prolong the conflict. Seemly, the crisis between Sudan and the ICC is a clear reflection of the extent of the impact of external actors on the development of the Darfur Crisis. Furthermore, it reveals a lack of agreement among all involved parties on the priorities required to close the Darfur file. However, the approach of the international and human law dimensions has limited benefit in terms of having a comprehensive understanding. This approach is relatively useful for gaining a clear view about the international intervention and the different attitudes of some important international actors towards the crisis, as well as how the Darfur Crisis has become highly politicised internationally, with a wide range of instruments being deployed by the UN and other western states to put pressure on the GoS and to promote an array of policy objectives. However, it is unlikely that this approach will be able alone to provide a full perception to the impact of the dimension of the external intervention of the crisis.

**Studies Focusing on the Libyan Involvement in Sudan**

Few studies have profoundly addressed this side of the Darfur Crisis. William D. Brewer (1982) investigates the implication of Gaddafi's arrival to power in Libya as well as historic, regional, and religious factors that have a bearing on the Libyan-Sudanese relationship – but long before the Darfur Crisis emerged. According to Brewer, the relationship between the two countries is characterised as unstable. While there has been good Libyan-Sudanese collaboration since the military coup, led by colonel Gaddafi in Libya in 1969, which led to Gaddafi’s support of Numayri against communist plotters in 1970, these relations deteriorated quickly later on. The Libyan regime in Tripoli has been accused of being behind several anti-Numayri
coup attempts. Brewer demonstrates that these events significantly contributed to increased tension in the relations between Tripoli and Khartoum, especially since they share an adjacent corner of the same desert. He believes that the fundamental threat to Sudanese stability originates from, or via, the sensitive Darfur region. Brewer argues that Darfur's strategic importance stems from its size and remoteness from Khartoum, as well as its independent past in addition to its conservative religious population, which would render the province an inviting target for Libyan ambitions and machinations.

Within this context, a study by Yehudet Ronen (2011) assesses Libya-Sudan relations by tracing their chronology during the period of 1969–2010. It discusses Tripoli’s essential interests and involvement in its broader geo-strategic neighbouring region. Additionally, the work investigated Libya’s perceptions and alliances as far as they had affected Tripoli’s policy toward Khartoum during the post-Cold War era, concentrating on key issues relevant to understanding Libya’s involvement in Sudan. Yehudet Ronen also highlights the dramatic strategic change that occurred in Tripoli’s regional policies, abandoning the Arab world in favour of Africa. This study interestingly found that Sudan was a key factor in Libya’s perceptions of volatility in its foreign policy towards the region. Yehudet Ronen contends that Gaddafi has viewed Sudan exclusively through a pragmatic view, shaping his relations with Khartoum according to Libyan perceptions of national interest alone. The author argues that Sudan was perceived by Gaddafi as an important asset in promoting his strategy to limit threats upon the Libyan regime’s interests, in addition to his desire to implement his vision of the United States of Africa (Ronen 2011, p. 13).

This analysis is confirmed by Elvira Sanchez Mateos (2005) who has proved that the Gaddafi regime's policies are pragmatic and opportunistic, aimed at survival, and also with the aim of achieving maximum credit and changing its image abroad. The writer argues that Gaddafi has had an international agenda, using the regional arena as an approach to achieve his foreign (and even domestic) ambitions. Gaddafi’s regime defined itself as Arab, Islamic and, more recently, African. He also found that Libya's Gaddafi continuously attempted to demonstrate its capacity to act as an effective regional power. Noteworthy, the author argued that within the context of Libya seeking regional power, especially after the relations between Libya and Egypt
worsened due to the Egyptian realignment with the USA; Gaddafi formed an axis with Ethiopia and South Yemen to counterbalance Egyptian influence in Sudan in the 1970s. Furthermore, the war with Chad, related to the dispute on the border area of Auzu, is another instance of the Libyan struggle to play a leadership and influential role in its neighbouring areas (Mateos 2005, p. 439). Similarly, Patrick Berg (2008, p. 79) argues that Libya and Egypt were trying to present themselves as hegemonic powers in the region through torpedoing one another’s peace efforts. In pursuit of this strategy they also undermined the joint efforts of the UN and the AU regarding bloody conflicts taking place in Chad and Sudan for instance.

Asim Elhag (2013) contends that Libya, under the Gaddafi regime, has played a significant role in Sudan, contributing to the destabilisation of the country. The key approach used by Gaddafi throughout this period was a policy of intervention in the internal affairs of Sudan by supporting the political opposition as well as the rebel movement in different areas of Sudan. Elhag posits that Tripoli armed the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), led by the late Colonel John Garang, which later led to the secession of southern Sudan in July of 2011, forming the state of South Sudan. The Gaddafi regime supported rebel movements in the Darfur region, which also had greater ambitions in the western part of Sudan. Libyan intervention in Sudanese affairs has essentially influenced the course of Sudanese-Libyan relations. Interestingly, Asim Elhag found that Khartoum was fully aware of the political approach of Gaddafi. Despite this the GoS was fully keen to crack the relationship with Tripoli, as Sudanese authorities were also fully aware of Gaddafi's ability to harm Khartoum. Nevertheless, the policy of intervention pursued by Gaddafi has created a gap in the relations between the two countries, rather than strengthening good neighbourly relations and collaboration. This argument is confirmed by a number of governmental and opposition sources who were interviewed, including Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013), Hassan Trabi (14/01/2013), Sadiq Al Mahdi (10/01/2013), and Ahmed Derije (18/03/2013).

On the other hand, Asim Elhag (2013) emphasises that the influential role was exchanged among the two regimes in Khartoum and in Tripoli. Due to the increased concerns and fears of the GoS towards Libya’s suspicious activities in Sudan, the

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4 For more details about their job title, see Techniques of Analysis and Data Collection in Theory and Methodology chapter.
Inqad regime adopted a strategy of neutralising the impact of Gaddafi’s intervention in Sudanese internal affairs by pursuing a similar policy of trying to intervene in internal Libyan affairs by supporting Libyan opposition groups. The aim was to keep Gaddafi busy with internal troubles, until Khartoum could find a suitable opportunity to remove the threat of the Gaddafi regime. According to Asim Elhag the intelligence organs of the Libyan regime were working constantly in order to create instability in Sudan, as authorities in Tripoli were worried because of the Islamic orientation of the Inqad regime, which seized power in 1989.

This development was considered by Gaddafi to be a significant threat to his regime. These fears increased after the coup attempt (Bab al-Azizia attempt) against Gaddafi’s rule in the early 1980s. Gaddafi accused Islamic groups governed by the Inqad regime for preparing and planning the coup. The author also stresses that all indications were clear that the Gaddafi regime had been involved in the war in Darfur since its eruption in 2003, by providing finance to the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and JEM, along with weapons and other military assistance, as well as providing the Darfur rebel movements with training bases inside Libyan territory. Nonetheless, Khartoum has constantly tried to avoid involvement in any confrontation with Gaddafi through a policy of restraint, based on Sudanese officials' understanding of Gaddafi’s volatile personality. Instead, Sudanese leaders did their best to persuade Gaddafi that he was a key factor for stability in Sudan.

However, this diplomatic approach failed to deter Gaddafi from supporting the movements involved in the Darfur conflict, especially the JEM, and the active and influential Libyan role in the development of the Darfur Crisis continued up until the Revolution of 17 February 2011, which toppled Gaddafi from power. In this respect Andrew S. Natsios (2012, pp. 122 - 126), the US former Special Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan in 2005, and Special Envoy to Sudan from October 2006 to December 2007, confirms Asim Elhag’s argument. Natsios reports that Gaddafi had a great and direct influence on the course of events in West Sudan. According to Natsios Libya was the original source of weaponry for rebel movements in Darfur, which were regularly sent across the Chadian territory into Darfur. Natsios believes that Gaddafi sought to create a Libyan empire, essentially to expand the sphere of his influence in North Africa. Natsios notes that the key approach to achieving his ambition was economic influence.
Historically, Darfur has had closer economic ties to Libya than Khartoum, and while authorities in Khartoum were ignoring the western part of the country, Gaddafi was bringing the region into his sphere of impact using Libyan oil revenues to build and/or modernise roads through the desert in order to expand his influence southward. For the same purpose, according to Natsios, Gaddafi had based seventy security agents in Darfur since the eruption of the crisis in 2003, using money, weapons, and logistical supplements to back insurgents against the regime in Khartoum and its allies. Natsios importantly highlighted three prime themes that formed Gaddafi’s foreign policy and served his vision and desire in the sub-Saharan arena in general, and Darfur in particular: first, Gaddafi’s attempt to expand the influence of the Arab race and culture; second, Gaddafi’s interpretation of Islam; and third, the creation of a Libyan state across Africa (Andrew S. Natsios 2012, pp. 123-124). The approach of investigating the Libyan impact on the Darfur Crisis, in addition to the previous approaches together could offer a clear vision about the influence of regional third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts, which may help in understanding the factors impacting the termination and solving of the crisis and maintain the peace in a short duration as this has direct relevance for decision-makers. This combined approach has not been used before which what differentiate our study from the others.

Conclusion

It is the researchers’ desire to address the Darfur crisis with discerning analysis of the literature to fully comprehend the essence of the crisis and to identify the real causes, as well as the domestic, regional and international repercussions. Furthermore, to offer solutions that assist in overcoming the crisis in the short, intermediate, and long-term. The existing body of literature on the Darfur Crisis reviewed in this thesis has been divided into five main categories: firstly, political dimensions, which include studies that argue that the Darfur Crisis is mainly political, and focus fundamentally on the political causes and internal and external actors, as well as the domestic, regional, and international political repercussions of the interstate war in Sudan. Secondly, studies that have economic dimensions: many scholars have
primarily addressed the economic aspects of the crisis as they argue that the key factors that led to such a situation in Darfur are economic. This theme is divided into two components: 1) studies that have attributed the crisis to internal causes, such as the local impacts of climate change, unequal wealth distribution and development within Sudan, agricultural insufficiency, and deterioration in living conditions, poverty, illiteracy, and disease. 2) Research that considers international economic factors as the causes of the crisis. These shed light on the competition between the major powerful states, such as the USA and China, to access energy resources (in particular oil). These international actors have considerably contributed to the deterioration of the situation in Darfur. The third theme that has been identified is ethnic and cultural aspects. This body of literature includes studies conducted essentially on ethnic, cultural, and social factors that have contributed to the eruption of armed conflict in the region and formed its outcomes. These studies contain those that describe the conflict as an Arab-African conflict, genocide, and/or ethnic cleansing.

The fourth theme covers those academic efforts that directly or indirectly relate to international and humanitarian law. A number of research endeavours have been carried out on the implications of internationalising the Darfur issue by referring it to the UNSC and the impact of this action on the paths of the process of resolving the problem. In addition to this, several other studies have focused on the resolutions of the UNSC issued against Sudan, the concept of the responsibility to protect, and how this has affected the peace process in Darfur. The final theme concerns with the investigations related to issue of the impact of external intervention on the crisis, the Libyan intervention as centre focus. Analysis reveals that the Darfur Crisis is much more complicated than initially perceived. When considered carefully, each aspect, whether it be political, economic, ethnic, environmental, or international involvement, has an important impact at different times and in different ways. Each aspect has significant implications, whether internally or externally which often reinforce one other.

Overall, the existing literature can be categorised into two fundamental themes. The first subject involves the causes of the crisis, plus their domestic, regional, and international implications. The second area of concern is the internal and external involvement in the intrastate wars. In addition to the topics that have already been
discussed in the existing literature, this study will also investigate the duration of the Darfur Crisis as a further theme (see figure No: 1).

The examination of this protracted crisis raises important questions of why the crisis has not ended, and why there seems to be no clear path to its resolution. This research was selectively fine-tuned to focus more deeply on the management of the Darfur Crisis, through a thorough appraisal of how Libyan intervention (as a very important regional/external actor), has influenced the duration of the Darfur Crisis. Furthermore, a number of important studies on related topics, such as civil wars, the duration of civil conflicts, the impact of third-party intervention on the duration of civil unrest, and the overall success of crisis management have been also reviewed. This body of literature has been highly influential, generating a clearer overview to direct the research more effectively. These will be discussed in the following Theory and Methodology chapter. Despite the importance of exist literature on the Darfur Crisis as well as on the impact of external intervention on the intrastate conflicts, it was clear that this literature needs to be developed further.
Exist literature on the Darfur crisis

Political Dimensions
  - Domestic Causes and Actors
  - External Actors

Economic Dimensions
  - Domestic Causes
  - External Factors

Ethnic and Social Dimensions
  - Arab-African Conflicts
  - Socioeconomic Impacts

International and Humanitarian Low
  - Responsibility and Possibility to protect

The Causes of the Crisis and its Domestic, Regional, and International Implications

Internal and External Involvement in the Crisis

Libyan Involvement and the Duration of the Darfur Crisis

Figure No: 1 the Literature Review Framework of the Study
Chapter 2

Theory and Methodology

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the existing literature related to the Darfur Crisis. This includes studies that have been conducted to explore the crisis through investigating its underlying causes and domestic, regional, and international implications, as well as internal and external involvements. As mentioned in the introduction of the literature review chapter, a good number of important pieces of literature on civil wars and the involvement of external third parties will be discussed in this part of the thesis. Partly because these studies are more concerned with the conceptual framework developed and employed in this research project. These types of studies are very relative to the issue of the management of the Darfur conflict, which is necessary to be reviewed in order to coherently achieve the aims of this thesis.

After intensively reviewing the existing literature and documents relevant to the Darfur Crisis, the main topic being investigated in this thesis, and after determining the main focus and tasks of this study, it is essential at this point to establish the conception of theory adopted here. Alan Bryman (2012) summarise the importance of theory as follows: “Theory is important to the social researcher because it provides a backcloth and rational for the research that is being conducted. It also provides a framework within which social phenomena can be understood and the research findings can be interpreted” (Bryman. A 2012, p. 20).

The methodological strategy employed to collect, analyse and present information will be addressed in this chapter. It is contended that the major task of the research
methodology is to provide an appropriate technique for conducting, in advance, all the necessary steps of the research, from defining the problem to collecting and analysing data, to the writing-up of the research. Peter (1994) offers a useful overview on the research steps of methodology, which allows us to grasp the meaning of research methodology and how it is used. He argues that research methodology is an essential instrument not merely to constitute an overall research design, and to delineate clearly the purpose of the research, but also to precisely ascertain the appropriate type of research that should be conducted to serve its key purpose, and to select the methods and techniques best suited for that type of research.

**Existing Studies on External Third-party Involvement and the Duration of Conflicts**

The literature into civil wars indicates that civil wars last longer than international wars by more than six times (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004, p. 253). While some state that the upsurge of civil wars was strongly associated with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, others report that on-going civil conflicts had been steadily, almost linearly, rising from the end of World War II (Fearon 2004, p. 275). The importance of sophisticated management in handling domestic armed conflicts has dramatically increased since the end of the Cold War. It is assumed that external interventions are a form of crisis and conflict management (Regan 2002, P. 55). Useful material, which allows the author to ‘test’ both the Cunningham (2010) and Regan (2002) models, is explored, providing a further justification for this research project in addition to exploring the Darfur Crisis. In this section, the literature on the role of third parties in internal armed conflicts, including factors that affect their expected duration, will be elaborated upon.

After reviewing existing literature, it is noticed that studies conducted to investigate the duration of armed conflicts have been separated into two main categories. Firstly, studies concentrated on the key internal factors that lead to the eruption of any civil war, including the attributes of the societies where the armed conflict occurs, and the
economic, political, and geographic factors, as well as the internal conflict parties and their capabilities to wage war and achieve military victory or reach a negotiated end. In the second category studies focused on the impact of external involvement in internal wars. Types of interventions (whether political and diplomatic, economic, or military) and their effects on the duration of the civil conflict have been also addressed. Understanding the factors that control the duration of civil conflicts is crucially vital in examining how the duration of those conflicts can be affected by the role of external third-party intervention, the Darfur conflict in particular.

Existing literature into the factors that impact the expected duration of civil wars examined this topic from a variety of angles. Wagner (2000, p. 449) and Cunningham (2010, p. 116) similarly argue that the duration of warfare is driven by factors that affect the ability of one side to achieve decisive military victory and/or affect the willingness of each side to reach a negotiated settlement. Those factors can be significantly affected by external actors within the existing approach of external interventions in civil wars. In other research Cunningham (2006, p. 876) indicates that there are three approaches to understanding factors that can affect war termination. Firstly, the economic dimension, which focuses on the costs of warfare. Secondly, the military dimension that examines how military position on the battlefield can be the key element of determining demands and form the final outcome of negotiations. There is also the diplomatic approach that addresses incentives that motivate parties to engage in a serious settlement process (Cunningham 2006).

Recently, scholars have begun to focus on the influence of third parties on the duration of civil conflicts as a main approach instead of limiting their analysis solely to the diplomatic instruments and their effectiveness in ending the internal conflict (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008). The basic expectations of outside interventions, be they diplomatic, military or economic, are that they would shorten a conflict's expected length, and the key motivation of these interventions is to manage the civil armed conflicts effectively (Gates and Strand 2004). Studies that have been conducted on the duration of internal wars have revealed that once a civil war starts, its duration depends critically on the balance of power and military capability between the rebels and the government (Elbadawi 2000).
While a few studies have directly shed light on the duration of civil war, a handful of scholars have examined how it can be affected by outside regional or international actors. Some external interveners might seek to end the Darfur Crisis for humanitarian reasons. Other third parties have their own incentives to prolong the duration of the war with a view of plundering the natural resources of the civil war state, or draining the resources of a rival intervening actor (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). Several studies have concluded that a variety of roles can be played by external state actors along the civil conflict's development, from urging the opposition to sit down at the negotiating table, offering incentives to groups to negotiate, hosting negotiations, deploying peacekeepers or peace enforcers, and providing economic or military support to either side (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; Salehyan 2007; Gleditsch 2007).

Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis (2000) developed a formal theoretical framework to explore the basic determinants that contribute to the expected duration of civil wars. They tested the duration of intrastate conflict by examining the role of two different variables, external interventions and the degree of ethnic fragmentation of society, to predict the length of internal wars. The results of Elbadawi and Sambanis’ research show that ethnic wars tended to last longer and were harder to resolve than other types of internal wars. Moreover, like Patrick Regan (2002) they revealed that long war duration is positively related to outside interventions. Other authors have found that external interventions that support rebel movements against extremely autocratic governments typically would lead to a growth in rebel forces over time; furthermore, rebel mobilisation would be easier, which would have a significant impact on the duration of civil wars. Additionally, Elbadawi and Sambanis argue that to reduce the expected duration of internal wars there should be appropriate initiatives or strategies that are compatible with each case separately (Elbadawi 2000). Arguably, if it is agreed that outside interventions in ethnically diverse societies would not shorten a conflict’s duration because of a high level of rebel mobilisation. Intervening in other types of civil conflicts when driven by ideology, concerns for poverty, and political marginalisation would, however, be shorter because the rate of rebel mobilisation in those conflicts will be lower.

Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004) investigated the factors that might account for the onset of civil conflict and its duration within the estimated hazard functions
model, using a large-scale dataset on wars over 40 years between 1960 and 2000. They empirically explored how the course of civil wars is systematically determined by two main different factors from their onset: structural circumstances prevailing prior to war and/or the conditions during conflict duration. They report that long civil war duration basically results from three major factors: low per capita income, high levels of inequality, and ethnic divisions. By contrast, a decline in the prices of exported primary commodities, and outside military intervention towards opponents are factors that have the most fundamental influence to end internal war in a short period. In general Collier and Hoeffler suggest that civil war is more likely to occur in countries where national income is largely dependent on the exportation of primary commodities (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004).

The above review indicates that the authors attributed the key factors leading to the beginning of any civil war to economic determinants. The types of natural resources that countries have and the size of national revenues coming from those resources could make those countries more prone to civil war. Accordingly, it can be argued that the onset of civil wars depends on external considerations, precisely because the prices of primary commodities that countries export are directly associated with the international markets. In such a case, war duration would be related to the international economic circumstances during the internal conflict. Focusing mainly on the effect of natural resources and national revenue from exportation of primary commodities on the duration of internal wars results in the more reasonable argument that there is a great likelihood that the duration of civil war that breaks out in countries that have significant natural resources would be longer than in countries that do not. This is because those resources constitute easy sources of rebel finance. Thus, access to these resources by the opposition implies that the risk of rebellion will be increased.

James D. Fearon (2004) investigates the expected duration of civil wars in terms of how long they last, and the possible obstacles that could undermine reaching a long-lasting negotiated settlement using a game-theoretic model of credible commitments. He argues that a lack of military capability for either side to disarm the other is the key factor prolonging civil wars, leading to military stalemate. Conversely, they can be shortened when conditions favour a decisive victory. Fearon found that internal wars are shorter than those arising out of coups or popular revolutions. He reasons
that these types of approaches for change usually favour decisive victories. More specifically, he argues that taking state power requires a quick process to achieve objectives which basically rely on defections that occur within the security and military apparatus. Leaders of such change movements are very often not willing to negotiate deals with government, as this would threaten their ability to bargain and even their lives (Fearon 2004). Nevertheless, civil wars related to land or natural resource disputes between state-supported migrants from a dominant ethnic group and peripheral ethnic minority are usually long-lived. These types of wars are mainly seen as military competitions as each combatant attempts to render the other unable to continue fighting, or seeks to exact more losses that force the other side to accept a negotiated settlement. An imbalance of military capabilities is vital for a decisive victory. Fearon shows that the state has numerous influences on the likelihood of a long-running stable peace. Negotiated settlements are quite achievable when the military capacity of the state is stronger than that of the rebels.

The state's military capacity and its ability to eliminate any rebellion tend to reduce the chances of a conflict lasting for a longer period of time. On the other hand, the military weakness of the state motivates rebels to continue fighting and increase their demands, undermining the efforts of a negotiated settlement and thus prolonging the duration of war. Furthermore, Fearon suggests that the expected duration of internal military conflict will be longer when the financial capability of insurgent groups is based primarily on contraband goods resources, such as diamonds and illegal drugs. Rather than examining the impact of outside intervention in the determination of the crisis as Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) and Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004) did, Fearon looks at different angles where he studies the duration of civil wars through particular internal factors.

Cunningham (2006) offered a theoretical framework for understanding how the duration of internal wars, and the negotiation processes to end them, can be affected by the involvement of multiple parties in the conflict. He argues that the duration of internal wars with more actors is expected to be longer, and attributes this to the fact that actors can only accept a settlement that meets their own interests. The potential to end the conflict through the negotiated settlement is therefore less. Hence these 'veto players' tend to be a part of the problem instead of a part of the solution. The author found that the termination of internal wars is significantly associated with the
number of actors who are veto players. He explains that whenever the number of conflict parties is more than two it is much more difficult to reach an end, because the differences in information, and shifting alliances and incentives to hold-out make a negotiated settlement more difficult. This brought him to emphasise that to have a good understanding about the duration of civil wars and their termination, it must be recognised that the hypothesis that civil war is a two-party phenomenon is no longer valid.

Cunningham provides three suggestions for policymakers who are directly involved in responding to internal conflicts. Firstly, reducing the number of primary veto players (external actors in particular) involved in civil war is vital. This can be done through looking for ways to remove the actors who are the major barriers of a negotiated resolution. He perceives that multi-party conflicts are less likely to be resolved than those involving two actors. The other suggestion is that the external parties who are involved in contributing to halting internal wars must indicate a strong willingness to reach an agreement that includes all fighting parties. Furthermore, the main insurgents should be included in the peace process by encouraging them to participate in negotiations that ultimately lead to an end to civil war. Cunningham found this is a significant approach for achieving long-term stability. Finally, he revealed that if reaching a comprehensive agreement between veto players was not possible, international actors should attempt to make a domestic peace agreement among the government and the strongest internal opposition groups, and then seek to integrate the smaller groups. This tends to increase the chance of serious negotiations leading to a feasible and successful settlement (Cunningham 2006). Thus, if the main international actors have not successfully reached an agreement regarding the mode of dealing with the situation in Darfur, or have not successfully removed and/or isolated the major barriers to taking a decisive decision to end the conflict, the expected duration of the conflict will be longer.

According to Aysegul Aydin and Regan (2011) while researchers of peace-building in civil wars have paid a good deal of attention to the influence that collective intervention – in the framework of international and regional organisations – might have on the termination of civil war, some mechanisms within the conflict process that affect the expectations of civil war duration have not yet been fully explored. Investigators have paid less attention to the role that unilateralism plays in the
duration of internal wars through focusing on how this duration can be impacted upon by unilateral interventions undertaken by third party states, without prior coordination with these organisations. They contend that unilateral interventions by third-party states have a cumulative influence on conflict resolution depending on the interveners’ interrelations. Aydin and Regan believe that regardless of the self-interests of third-party interveners, unilateral interventions undertaken by state actors that have critical cooperative relations creates potential to facilitate the war’s end in a short period.

The writers’ network approach has highlighted the dependencies between third-party states’ unilateral efforts and modelled interveners’ roles through their interrelations. Aydin and Regan offer a new model of civil war intervention that regards the degree of interactions among the intervening states and their coalitions as essential as the interventions themselves in shaping combatants’ preferences. This is import because the disagreement between the interveners creates new conditions of bargaining and results in intense competition between interveners for influence over the competing factions. This in turn encourages the opposition to escalate their initial demands, because a decisive action to end the war is not expected to be undertaken by external interveners, which makes the period of civil war longer (Aydin and Regan 2011). It is agreed that whenever the intervening states have less capability to act collectively to force a certain course of ending civil wars, these wars last longer, and vice versa.

An article by Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce (2008) considered the influence of third-party interventions on civil wars during the period 1816-1997 within the historical framework of competing risks, relying upon the competing risks approach. They argue that third-party interventions must be regarded as central to the interstate war process, a process that is characterised by the duration of hostilities and the outcome. Their analysis reports that distinguishing between the lengths of time to different civil war outcomes is vital. They posit that two dimensions of civil war duration and outcomes are observable manifestations of the civil war process and are causally interdependent. Throughout this process, the probability of different types of outcomes is a function of various political, economic, and social factors.

The research results suggest that third-party intervention can be the key factor that plays a decisive role in the development of internal wars, as it has different effects on
civil war duration to different civil war outcomes. The authors argue that while third-party intervention increases the potential of the supported opposition groups achieving military victory, third-party interventions that are biased increase the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. Yet, third-party interventions on both sides reduce the probability of a negotiated settlement and make civil wars last longer (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline and Joyce 2008).

The authors’ work sheds light on the significant differences in the dynamics of civil wars, and emphasises that civil war is a dynamic process. Relatedly, Karl R. DeRouen Jr and David Sobek (2004) offer new contributions to the existing literature on civil wars. They find that state capacity has a great impact on the outcomes and the duration of civil wars. According to these authors, the involvement of state capacity can be observed in two different ways: the type of state, and governmental army size. While an effective state bureaucracy reduces the chances of rebel victory, regime type and the strength of the government's army do not appear to significantly increase the likelihood of governmental victory.

On the other hand, other results outside the state’s influence are also generated. They show that UN involvement greatly underpins the probability of a truce or treaty. In terms of time, the involvement of the UN in civil wars tends to prolong the expected duration for both government and rebels to achieve victory, while shortening the period of time needed before reaching a negotiated settlement, whether in a truce or treaty form. In addition, the researchers’ analyses show that rebels have less capability to achieve a decisive victory in ethnic, identity, or religious wars, especially in those extremely heterogeneous countries (Karl and Sobek 2004).

A study carried out by Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala (2005) probes the potential influence of geographical factors and the strategic ambitions of rebels on the duration of armed civil conflicts. Their central themes are determining the strategic motivations of the rebel groups to reveal their fundamental aims, including whether the conflict is being fought for territorial secession or conquest of the government. This is because the rebels’ goal type will impact the course of the civil conflict, where it is fought, and the possibility of one party achieving military victory. They found that drawing on a simple dummy variable for assessing whether the strategic
ambitions of the rebels has a significant influence on the duration of civil conflicts does not provide sufficient information with regard to territory.

In order to examine how the duration of conflicts can be affected by geographic factors, the writers argued that the location of the conflict is importantly associated with the period of time, especially in terms of location of natural resources that can be seized. Proximity of the conflict zone to international borders also sustains armed civil conflict. Furthermore, in their attempt to assess the capability of rebel groups to sustain civil conflict, the results report that if the rebel groups have access to resources, particularly to alluvial diamonds and gemstones, armed conflicts are not expected to end in the short term, as rebels would be able to exploit these resources for recruitment and retention of manpower, thereby prolonging the conflict (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2005). There are many reasons to agree with this statement, especially with the claim that proximity tends to be strongly associated with duration. The civil wars fought in south Sudan, Darfur, and Syria are clear examples of this.

The work of Buhaug et al. (2009) underscores that identifying the dyadic interaction in relationships between the geographical characteristics of the conflict zone and rebel military capability itself would considerably help to improve our understanding of the dynamics of conflict, in turn, to simplify determining the length of civil wars. The study’s results indicate that the duration of a conflict directly relates to geography. The authors argue that the location of governmental and rebel forces plays a fundamental role in increasing, as well as decreasing, the duration of a civil war. Civil conflicts in areas located at a considerable distance from the centre of governmental influence, and along remote international borders, as well as being rich in diamonds, would lead to an increase in insurgents’ military capacity, which vastly reduces the likelihood of ending militarised conflict quickly (Buhaug, Gates and Lujala 2009). Thus, their contribution is to connect between rebel military capability and geographic factors, such as location of the conflict zones and the attributes of conflict areas (terrain and natural resources), and how these two major variables together play an important role in defining the duration of the civil conflict. This can easily be seen in the context of two very clear examples that can prove this: first, the long conflict in Darfur is located a considerable distance from the main government stronghold, as well as along the remote borders with three countries (Egypt, Libya, and Chad). Another case is a relatively long civil war that occurred in Libya in 2011.
where the rebels’ stronghold was located a considerable distance from the centre of
government power and along international boundaries (Egypt in the east and Tunisia
in the west), and also in regions with valuable natural resources. Undoubtedly, these
factors have crucially influenced the combatants’ military capacity and then
prolonged the duration of both intrastate conflicts.

Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) assessed the impact of third-party interventions
on civil wars from different angles. They believe that considering the interdependent
relationships between the external parties is essential to understanding the influence
of third-party involvement on the duration of civil wars, rather than concentrating
solely on the impact of each individual third party upon the evolution of a particular
civil war separately. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline indicate that each intervener has its
own incentives, and these often differ. While some external interveners are
couraged to act by their desire to end internal conflicts for humanitarian reasons,
other third parties have their own incentives to prolong the duration of internal wars,
and these interests may be to plunder the natural resources of the civil war state, or
drain the resources of a rival intervener. In addition, they argue that instead of
concentrating only on analysing the characteristics of these internal wars, it is crucial
to assess the geopolitical factors in which civil war occurs. Thus, in the case of
Darfur the major reason behind the longevity of the crisis might not only be the
external global powers' intervention but also the regional involvement by
neighbouring countries, such as Libya.

To test their hypotheses they relied on historical analysis and a sample of 152
intrastate wars for the period of 1820-1992. The study’s results indicate that third-
party interventions are central to civil wars. Additionally, they found that the
influence of third-party interventions on the duration of civil wars is a function of the
interdependent nature of these interventions, as long civil war duration is associated
with the equitable or inequitable distribution of third-party intervention across the set
of interstate parties. An equitable distribution of third-party interventions by
supporting both parties of the conflict would create a balanced intervention, thereby
increasing the potential of ending the war later rather than sooner. The findings also
show that separatist civil wars are strongly associated with longer conflict duration
(Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000).
According to the authors, civil warfare is significantly impacted by the strategic ambitions of each intervener, albeit to a lesser degree than third-party intervention. In other words, the degree of effectiveness of third-party interventions in the armed civil conflicts is partly linked to the actions of other interveners. Events and crises in various parts of the world differ according to their causes and the severity of their impacts. They also differ by degree of incidence that proves the need for strategic management of political crises – which is increasing continuously, especially after the events of 11 September 2001. Whilst certain features of crisis management used in the post-Cold War era have remained, others have changed (Youngson 2001).

Although the influence of external intervention on the duration and termination of armed conflicts and crises has been addressed, investigation into the factors that drive the duration of intrastate conflicts is still sparse and needed. The focus of this study is on the impact of outside interventions specially those undertaken by regional state actors on the expected duration of internal armed conflicts as a form of conflict management. Examining properly the effectiveness of Libyan intervention (under Gaddafi regime), as a case study of a regional intervention form, on shortening or prolonging the Darfur Crisis duration will, therefore, provide a basic understanding of how different types and ways of external interventions can influence the expected duration of civil wars. Covering the gab of this aspect of knowledge will provide a new addition to the previous research on the broader topic of the duration of intrastate conflicts especially on the role of external/regional interventions in the duration of internal conflicts.

Theoretical Framework

The analytical approach used in this thesis to understand the relationship between the long-duration of the Darfur Crisis and Libyan involvement, as a major regional third party, will be adopted by interpreting the underlying motivations of why and how Libya has been involved in the conflict. Furthermore, this approach will be used to determine whether the strategy adopted by Libya to deal with the crisis has been passive or active, as well as to identify how this has adequately effected the phases of the crisis. In other words, to ascertain whether the real incentive behind the Libyan
strategy derives from the desire to resolve the conflict or to win the conflict? Interpretive theory will be discussed in the third section of this chapter.

To address the main research questions, a new theoretical model has been developed. This model has been employed to guide the analysis throughout this project. Initially, a theoretical model by Cunningham (2010) was selected. Cunningham argues that the duration of an armed civil conflict could be extended when the key incentive of external state intervention is driven by pursuing an independent agenda that is different to the goals of the domestic combatants. The author spells out that third-party state intervention in this form is likely to lead to long internal civil conflicts for two main reasons. First, foreign state intervention with a separate agenda means that involvement by a new actor must be part of any settled negotiation to end interstate war. Second, often external state interventions in civil conflicts are not enthusiastic about negotiating as they have less incentive to do so than the domestic actors as their costs of fighting are lower. Their expectations to gain significant benefits from negotiating are not higher than for the internal actors. These two primary implications can hinder conflict resolution by lowering the likelihood of ending the fighting quickly (Cunningham 2010).

Cunningham proposed two necessary mechanisms that the international community should follow to overcome these barriers. Firstly, reassessing external state intervention is essential. If foreign states become involved and are associated with independent objectives, the international community must force these states to withdraw as an absence of this pressure decreases the potential that involved states will leave before achieving their full goals. Another technique is that if the international community fails to convince these states to withdraw, beginning negotiations with these states to resolve the separate dimensions of the conflict are essential. Cunningham, however, contends that conflicts where the international community fails to address this dimension can become substantially prolonged.

This analysis also allows the researcher to interpret the transition of peace negotiations, between the GoS and the rebel leaders, from Tripoli to Doha in Qatar. This was a transition forced by the international community following the conviction that Libyan intervention was a major barrier to the resolution of the crisis, and finally to what extent this transition has influenced the development of the peace process.
and the duration of the Darfur Crisis. In his empirical study, Cunningham utilised Version 3, 2005 of the Uppsala/Peace Research Institute Oslo Armed Conflict Dataset Armed Conflict Dataset (UCDP/PRIO). This covers all conflicts that have taken place between 1945 and 2004 and classifies these conflicts into three categories: extra-systemic wars (such as anticolonial conflicts), interstate wars, and internationalised civil war. In his research, Cunningham included all conflicts from the last two categories.

Cunningham found that there have been 12 cases where the external intervener had a separate agenda from those of the internal parties. These include, for instance, the cases of Libya in Chad and Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola in the DRC in addition to that of Tanzania in Uganda in 1979 and South Africa in Angola (Cunningham 2010). The assessment process is aimed at determining the extent to which Cunningham’s theoretical model suits this research. Cunningham’s approach has its limitations in that it only applies to cases of direct military intervention. Cunningham omits an important set of cases where external interveners are heavily involved in armed conflict, even if they are not direct military participants, of which the Darfur case is a very good example.

Despite the fact that military action is the most evident form of intervention, other types of external state intervention also exists. Furthermore, there is another obvious weakness in Cunningham’s model. Cunningham’s model does not separately scrutinise the internal factions’ relationships with the external intervening state. Furthermore, this model does not explain what happens to the length of the conflict, when an internal party has an agenda which is different from another group of internal combatants. With these limitations in mind, it would be unwise to rely solely on Cunningham’s theoretical model, as it is not compatible with this project’s research goals. To avoid these obstacles, another theoretical model is needed, thus Regan’s theoretical framework was analysed (Regan 2002).

Regan (2002) argues that foreign intervention whether military and/or economic does not contribute to a prompt conclusion of conflict and such interventions cannot be regarded as meaningful instruments of internal conflict management. Both military and economic foreign interventions are associated with longer conflict duration. Furthermore, Regan notes that biased external intervention towards one side of the
conflict, either the government or opposition, tends to increase the likelihood of shortening the hostilities. This can result in a shifting of the balance of power, which accelerates the cessation of internal war. In contrast, Regan believes that neutral external interventions, which manage both sides equally, are less likely to end civil conflicts or even diminish their expected termination date (Regan 2002).

As such, Regan’s work primarily addresses whether outside involvement in internal civil conflicts, as a form of conflict management, contributes to a swift ceasefire. Or do the international protagonists extend that war? Regan also inspects which strategies effectively influence the expected duration of intrastate conflicts. It is clear that Regan focuses on a different perspective of the impact of external players, on the longevity of the conflict. While Cunningham’s investigation (2010) focuses on how the duration is influenced when external third-party states with an independent agenda become involved in internal armed conflict. Regan concentrates on diverse types of intervention and strategies for action that either decrease or increase the length of war, which Cunningham does not comment on.

While Regan rightly points out that opposing intervention can reduce the expected period of conflict, it could be argued that it is not always necessarily that third-party intervention (of any type, or for any purpose) will increase conflict duration. Looking closely at the international multilateral intervention in Libya in 2011, for example, under resolution 1973 issued by the UNSC, we will find that it led to hastening the end of that conflict rather than prolonging it. This intervention was military and economic within the framework of protecting civilians by NATO. The stated goal of this intervention was to safeguard civilians in Libya, but facts on the ground suggest otherwise and it was intervention in favour of the rebels against the Gaddafi regime. It is clear from the literature that Regan concentrates on the type of intervention (military and economic) and the direct ways and strategies for intervening that either decrease or increase the expectation that conflict will end in a short or long time. Cunningham focused on the impact of direct external intervention on the duration of the conflict from another angle. The researcher has noticed that both works by Regan and Cunningham have not touched the indirect ways of intervening in intrastate conflicts. Instead, they have merely focused on the direct approaches of external interventions. This thesis, therefore, looks further at indirect alongside direct intervention.

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This study not only looks at the impact of external state interveners on the duration of armed conflicts, but also determines the types of those interveners. It differentiates between regional and the extra-regional interveners which was not done by neither Regan (2002) nor Cunningham (2010). The thesis argues that there is a broad difference between the two kinds of interveners. Therefore, the differentiating between the types of external interveners is crucial to understanding the type of impact that external interventions may have on lengthening the expected duration of intrastate conflicts. Although both types of interveners fall within the framework of external intervention, neighbouring countries are more likely to be directly impacted by and involved in intrastate conflicts on different levels and in different ways compared with extra-regional states.

This is due to several factors such as shared borders, tribal overlapping, and the interaction between people who live in the border areas and have historical, social, economic, and cultural relations. Additionally, the national security of regional states is very likely to be threatened by regional instability, for example in terms of a large influx of refugees. This, for instance, would result in significant security and economic burdens on the countries receiving these refugees which in the best circumstances will be obliged to provide humanitarian aid to these refugees, such as building camps and supplying food and water. The roles played by Jordan and Turkey in the civil war in Syria are examples here (see Phillips 2013, Ya Libnan 2013, Al-Rashed 2012). These considerations can be key motivations for regional state actors to be the first external interveners in internal conflicts that take place in neighbouring countries.

On the contrary, extra-regional interveners are not necessarily directly influenced and threatened to the same degree by the same warfare, precisely because they are relatively far away. To illustrate further, Libya as regional intervener in the Darfur Crisis perhaps has more incentives to intervene in the course of the conflict there than extra-regional countries such as Australia (Del Rio 2007), Germany, Italy, Ecuador, Bangladesh, and Thailand that participate as part of the African Union/UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (African Union – United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 2014). For this reason, the methods and the mechanisms adopted by each type of intervener to end the crisis are very likely to be different which may form an essential factor that hinders and undermines efforts to achieve peace. This
thesis, however, focuses more directly on the character of the regional intervener rather than generalising by referring to the character of the extra-regional intervener.

In conclusion, the combination and employment of both Cunningham and Regan’s theoretical models, is still not enough to cover all the aspects of this study. To give this model more explanatory power and to create further credence to this debate, a new academic model has been employed. This combines both models with new concepts. Cunningham’s entire model will be amalgamated with some elements extracted from Regan’s. The diplomatic external intervention (diplomacy approach) as a form of conflict management, and the “indirect” way of intervening, as well as the type of external intervener (regional) will be included as a new components (see Figure No: 2). This model assumes that:

when external/regional third parties become (in)directly involved with military, economic and/or diplomatic manoeuvres in an internal armed conflict to pursue their own agenda, which is independent of the motivations and goals of the domestic combatants, it tends to substantially prolong the duration of conflict.

Methodology

Marsh and Furlong (2002, p. 17) highlight that political researchers’ orientations toward their subject is always formed by their ontological and epistemological positions. Those positions are usually implicit rather than explicit. They shape the approaches to theory and methods. Marsh and Furlong believe that students of political science must ascertain and clarify their own ontological and epistemological positions because they determine whether the researcher’s aim is to test or generate theory (Ibid). Therefore, they can be able to defend these positions against criticisms from other positions, which require an understanding of alternative positions on these major questions. While there are essential differences between ontology and epistemology, both positions are vital for any social or political researcher and cannot be ignored.
Figure No: 2 The Theoretical Framework of the Thesis
A considerable variety of methodological approaches are available for social scientists and political researchers in particular. Choosing methodological approaches to be employed in any type of research project is directly influenced by ontological and epistemological foundations. Historically, social research has mainly relied on either qualitative or quantitative approaches. These are considered as easy alternative methodological approaches to apply when conducting social research (Pierce 2008, p. 22). Nonetheless, it is also possible to combine these two methods and employ them in one research project to gain more beneficial findings.

Taking this route, however, is not easy and needs to be carefully used in order to conduct research leading to coherent findings. The main reason is that both qualitative and quantitative approaches are associated with different ontological and epistemological positions (El-Anis 2008, p. 85). According to Roger Pierce (2008) ontology is philosophy that considers the nature of being by adopting the base of thinking about existence, it concerns such questions as: is there a real world? Does the mind exist? Epistemology is associated with theories of knowledge. They are regarded by some practitioners as general concepts that control the relationships between the underlying variables in the studied social phenomena (Ibid).

Colin Hay (2006, p. 83) provides a distinction between ontology and epistemology: “ontology relates to the nature of the social and political world, epistemology to what we can know about it and methodology to how we might go about acquiring that knowledge”. Marsh and Furlong (2002) argue that qualitative data are linked with a researcher from within the interpretivist tradition that tends to be concerned with understanding, not explaining, focuses on the meaning that actions have, and offers results as one interpretation of the unobserved relationship between the social phenomena studied. While quantitative analysis is primarily associated with research from within the positivist approaches, such as Realism, and positions that look for causal relationships. Quantitative methods can solely be used to analyse those relationships that are directly observable (Furlong and Marsh 2010, p. 186).*
Qualitative research strategy is typically concerned with addressing matters to comprehend or understand how and why a political institution, event, issue, or process has occurred. In contrast, if the issue in question centres on numbers, then quantitative or statistical methods that are mainly represented in the form of graphs, figures, and tables would be the preferred strategy (Kirk and Miller 1986, p. 9). Ariadne Vromen (2010, pp. 249–266) indicates that qualitative methods encompass a variety of techniques which can be employed to achieve the aims of the enquiry. These refer to a set of techniques, such as observation, participant observation, intensive individual interviews and focus group interviews. All of these qualitative procedures seek to decipher the experiences and practices of key informants and to locate them firmly in a context. It is very often the case that researchers utilise more than one of these methods - usually referred to as ethnographic research or ethnography (Devine 2002, pp. 197–230).

It is clear from the methodological literature, however, that the divide between quantitative and qualitative research strategies remains highly pronounced (John 2002, p. 216). They are keen to distinguish between quantitative and qualitative research, because each method has its own different strategy and approaches to collecting and analysing data. While quantitative research as a methodological strategy is concerned with emphasising quantification in the collection and analysis of data (Glesne and Peshkin 1992, pp. 6–7), qualitative strategy is seen as a research method that focuses on words rather than the quantification of data (Bryman 2012).
It is pointed out that “qualitative and quantitative methods are more than just differences between research strategies and data collection procedures. The approaches represent fundamentally different epistemological frameworks for conceptualising the nature of knowing, social reality, and procedures for comprehending those phenomena” (Pierce 2008, p. 41).

The Collection and Analysis of Data

“When we seek to understand or explain how and why a political institution, event, issue, or process came about, we are necessarily asking questions that can be answered using qualitative methods” (Vromen 2010, p. 249).

The choice of the most apt research procedure depends upon its validity and suitability to address the particular research question that a particular study attempts to solve (Bryman 1988).

Since this research project is in the process of investigating the impact of Libyan intervention as a regional state actor on the continuity and longevity of the Darfur Crisis, the basic type of information wanted was explanatory information that deals more with experiences and interpretations those empirical facts. The type of information that the researcher looked for was often historical and contains personal experience constituted through participations in the political issues or events that are being researched. This research fundamentally focuses on interpreting and understanding the meaning that shapes actions and policies of Libya in its relationships with the key internal warring parties, the Sudanese regime and the rebel groups in Darfur, as well as the mode which they did so to respond to the crisis there. Therefore, the researcher preferred to largely rely on qualitative methods to collect and analyse those methods that enable the researcher to gain an in-depth understanding of a single or small number of events (Silverman 2011, p. 21).

Thus, the main object of utilising the qualitative research methods is to explain the outcomes of individual cases (Libyan involvement in Darfur, for example), why and how that event happened in that specific time and that particular place. Answering
the core research questions, and meeting the objectives of the research project required the gathering of information on the three different actors: the Libyan government as the regional state intervener, the Sudanese government and rebel groups as the internal actors. The researcher looked at information about how each of these three sides view and interpret the role and behaviour of each other. For example, the researcher wanted to understand how the Sudanese government and the rebel groups as domestic players see the Libyan involvement in the Darfur Crisis, the role played by Gaddafi, how the regime in Tripoli has influenced the complexity of the crisis, and what type of strategies and policies they have adopted to deal with this regional third party.

In contrast, the researcher here wanted to gain information that allows us to interpret how Libya under the Gaddafi regime understood the conflict in Darfur and what Tripoli wanted and anticipated to achieve by its intervention there. This led the researcher to use lots of different types of existing literature that contains relevant data, and to find access to those actors searching on information, that might answer raised questions in this thesis which would cover the essential gap of relevant knowledge. This also led the researcher to target certain individuals who either participated in the process of discussion making in each side or largely qualified and acknowledgeable about the issue being investigated to be questioned. This will be discussed in more details later on in this section.

Although, there are other types of information sources that show - as has been looked at and addressed in the literature review chapter - there are other variables, such as environmental issues, political and economic factors, ethnic and social issues, and domestic and external factors, that have impacted the duration of the Darfur Crisis. This project though has taken a different route and looked at just one aspect. This thesis sees the Libyan involvement as more important than other factors and other interveners. This research project focuses on third-party intervention and does not try to answer what is impacting the duration of the Darfur Crisis, but only tries to look at how third-party intervention impacts the duration of that crisis as a way of conflict management.

Information collected for this research project is distinguished by its provenance (source), primary and secondary data. Primary data is original, unedited and ‘first-
hand’ whilst secondary data is ‘second-hand’ edited and interpreted material. The main sources of primary data used in this thesis are: recorded interviews with key individuals and ‘actors’, and contemporary documentary (written) records including minutes, organizational research reports and diaries that reflect the position of an actor and do not have analysis in them. By implication, data that is not primary must be secondary - second-hand. Secondary information is data collected for other work includes data gathered from a number of separate primary sources and may contain authoritative commentary and analysis, like a scholarly journal article. In this research project the relationship between the primary evidence and secondary information is supplementary where the primary evidence confirms the secondary. Therefore, the gathered data for this thesis was collected in accordance to its validity, relevance and appropriateness to the research questions and the directness and strength of its association with the concepts and the theoretical framework under scrutiny. Given the nature of the issues being investigated here, the type of questions, and the data that answer these questions the study solely adopts the qualitative research strategy aligned with an interpretive epistemological approach (see Figure No: 3).

Although the general research strategy adopted for this project is mostly a qualitative associated with interpretative approach, some quantitative methods have been used in little places throughout the research project, not necessarily in this thesis, to deal with and collect a certain type of empirical information, which was helpful for interpreting actions and events under investigation. Quantitative methods have been used only for collecting factual information, represented in the form of figures that deal with empirical data, but not for analysing information in the thesis. Therefore, this reflects, in somehow that a mixed-methods approach, in a dominant/less dominant mode where qualitative methods for collecting information were the dominating approaches used. In a mixed-method approach design researchers can rely on one dominant method concerned with a particular paradigm in addition to a small component of the overall study associated with another paradigm, which is less dominant. The benefit of this approach is that it depends on a single consistent paradigm. Simultaneously, using this approach allowed me to collect other types of

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5 Newspaper article and organizational research reports can be exceptional in qualitative use as they contain analysis but can also become the object of text analysis by studying the meaning they give to the political context they originated from, see Vromen 2010, p. 263.
data, which are drawn from an alternative paradigm according to which methodology is dominant (Bryman 2012, p. 627; Creswell 1994, p. 177).

Methods are about three stages: collecting, analysing and presenting, not just one thing overall. Researchers can use a type of method, for example a qualitative method, to collect, analyse and present evidence. Or they might use a qualitative method to do one or two those phases, may be to only analyse information. Researchers might collect information in one way and analyse it in another way. For example, researchers may also use some kind of quantitative means of survey literature and find empirical information and collected it in that way. Then, that information can be analysed and presented by using qualitative approaches (Johnson et al. 2004; Teddlie 2009; Creswell 1994, 173).

Fundamentally, in this thesis, qualitative methods were used for collecting and analysing information from primary and secondary literature sources. Qualitative methods are fundamentally used to describe and analyse detailed, text-based answers, not broad, numerical generalisations. Therefore, in qualitative research generalising these findings over other cases is rarely required (Vromen 2010; Schofield 2002). In this setting, Mahoney and Goertz (2006) demonstrate that major differences between the quantitative and qualitative approaches are evident in the model in which quantitative and qualitative researchers formulate their research questions.

In this respect Beck (2006) provides a good example. While quantitative researchers would question ‘what is the effect of the economic development on democracy? Qualitative researchers might formulate questions such as ‘was economic crisis necessary for democratisation in the Southern Cone of Latin America from 1982 to 1995? These two forms of questions illustrate the interests of the researcher, whether he/she seeks to find a general law-like statement or to explain a particular event (Ibid). Thus, according to the type of research question, researchers can determine the type of data needed and can answer that particular question. Vromen (2010) argues that the major trade-off among the quantitative and qualitative research strategy is mainly associated with the goal of conducting that research – whether it is for generalisation or particularity. Mahoney and Goertz (2006) noted that qualitative researchers choose individual/few cases because of the importance of investigating them in detail.
Several scholars have addressed the features and strengths of qualitative research strategy. Uwe Flick (2009), for instance, determines four main essential features of qualitative research: (1) appropriateness of methods and theories. This means that the researcher should emphasise the suitability of the themes or assumptions under study. In other words, they should conduct research on merely ideas that can be investigated and avoid those that cannot, such as philosophical ideas (the meaning of life, for example); (2) the perspectives of the participants and their diversity. In qualitative research strategy, the potential of examining participants' knowledge and practices is great. The qualitative method can be used to study the interactions and ways of dealing with the issue under study. It does not ignore the difference between viewpoints and practices in the field that tend to derive from the difference in subjective perspectives and people’s social backgrounds; (3) the reflexivity of the researcher and the research project. Instead of playing down the importance of the researcher's communication with the field, as quantitative research does, the qualitative strategy regards it as an essential element of producing knowledge; (4) the variety of approaches and methods in qualitative research. Qualitative research strategy is founded on a variety of theoretical and methodological approaches leading to a different kind of knowledge (Hoepfl 1997, p. 47).

This variety enables the qualitative researchers to design an appropriate framework of discussing and analysing effectively during the research (Flick 2009, p. 16). Pierce (2008) demonstrates that this strategy of research is considered as the most appropriate methodological model to understand and explain the complexities of the social world. Therefore, the main strength of this method emanates from its unique capability, through conducting in-depth interviewing and observation, which enable researchers to learn and understand the underlying values of individuals and groups. This allows building new theoretical knowledge related to the subject under study. The other strength is that qualitative methods enable researchers to shift their concentration from the individual(s) to the group(s) and make comparisons and distinctions between information collected from individuals in the privacy of a personal interview and in a group.

Qualitative researchers tend to collect data through conducting field work where the participants experience the problem under study. The researcher is the main instrument for data collection and analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994, p. 7). He or
she does not bring individuals into a laboratory (Creswell 2009, p. 175). Data are mediated through this human instrument, instead of through inventories, questionnaires and/or machines (Creswell 1994, p. 145). A further advantage of adopting the qualitative research strategy is that it does not only provide researchers with a variety of opportunities for participant observation and access to the group, but it also enables them to investigate the minorities who tend to be missed by sample surveys due to their small number or their unwillingness to identify themselves. Lastly, qualitative methods also assist researchers in focusing on the linguistic side through analysing verbal conversations recorded by sophisticated devices, which allows researchers to share data (Pierce 2008, p. 5; Strauss 1987, p. 45). However, the qualitative research strategy involves some criticisms and weaknesses. First, it has been argued that qualitative data not only vastly tends to be anecdotal or exaggerated, but also is not as accurate as data acquired through quantitative methods, which significantly harms the reliability of the data and findings (Pierce, 2008, p. 46). A second concern of using qualitative research is about the issue of representativeness and reliability. Qualitative researchers have been criticised in terms of their inability to focus as much on generating a sample of data as quantitative researchers, as representativeness is not often a concern to qualitative research (Devine 2002, p. 205; Miller 1986, p. 9).

Another weakness in qualitative research is that it lacks objectivity. This weakness is apparent when conducting interviews. The impact of the relatively close relationship between an interviewer and interviewee during the interview process is important, especially when the issue discussed and the data collected are of a personal and/or sensitive nature. Consequently, the effect of bias in the field cannot be ignored (Devine and Heath 1999, p. 13). Further concern is about the interpretation of qualitative data. Unlike in quantitative research (Golafshani 2003, p. 597), the analysis and interpretation of the qualitative data frequently proceeds from the personal perception of the researcher (Silverman 2004). Michael Quinn Patton (1990, p. 372) highlights that although it is frequently argued that there is no precise technique for ensuring that qualitative research is valid and reliable, there are guidelines. Scholars have developed extensive criteria for demonstrating the rigor, legitimacy, and trustworthiness of qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln 2011,
Qualitative researchers are advised to adopt strategies of honesty, openness, and reflexivity” (Hagey 1997, pp. 1–4).

Qualitative researchers should at least offer a reasonable interpretation to all empirical data and a context that enables the reader to assess the truth of their interpretation. The process of analysis in qualitative research entails continuous reflexivity and self-scrutiny (Pyett 2003, pp. 1177–1179). In addition, reflexivity has been described as encompassing continual evaluation of subjective responses, intersubjective dynamics, and the research process itself (Finlay 2002, p. 532). Lastly, the inability to generalise findings has been considered as one of the major reasons that qualitative research is often dismissed. The findings of qualitative research can merely provide a useful explanation and good understanding of other similar cases rather than being applicable to all cases. Qualitative researchers tend to ignore the function of generalisability in the qualitative research strategy as they believe that this is unimportant and unachievable. However, many give it a very low priority to see it as essentially irrelevant to their goal (Schofield 2002, p. 171).

The findings of particular case studies in qualitative research can only be beneficial when compared with other research findings in order to determine the similarities and the differences among the two cases rather than providing broad general statements about social phenomena under study to facilitate the understanding of other cases. Flick (1999) says that the problem of generalisation in qualitative research is that its statements are often made to describe a particular context or specific cases through a specific expressiveness. Nevertheless, when attempts are made at generalising the findings, this context link has been given up in order to find out whether the findings are valid independently and outside of a specific context. Like other research strategies, qualitative research has its own weaknesses that should be taken into consideration. In the past, quantitative and qualitative methods were employed as different methodological approaches to investigate different hypotheses and to answer different types of questions (Bryman 2004, p. 452). The use of this methodological strategy is motivated by the fact that this research project seeks to analyse and understand social phenomena (Hollis and Smith 1991). Understanding the principle of research design, in reference to a structure or framework within which data are collected, is very important as a research design
provides the structure that will enable the researcher to answer the research questions that the investigation started out with (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 186).

De Vaus (cited in Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 186) highlights that “The function of a research design is to ensure that the evidence obtained enables us to answer the intimal questions as unambiguously as possible”.

The topic in hand primarily investigates the impact of external interventions on the duration of the Darfur Crisis through examining the involvement and policies of Gaddafi’s Libya towards managing this crisis. This research project entails collection of qualitative data within the framework of a case study. The case study design is the appropriate research structure that provides the framework for addressing the research questions behind this study. Case studies are often associated with in-depth qualitative study of human experiences by instruments such as fieldwork observation, interviews, and document analysis (Ibid). However, the case study approach is not confined to merely studying a single phenomenon because it tends to generate a multitude of qualitative/interpretive information, within-case observations reflecting, for example, patterns of interaction, organisational practices, social relations, routines, and actions (Ibid).

The case study typically refers to the detailed and intensive examination for one or two small cases. A case could be an individual, event, community, organisation, geographical region and/or even decision and its impact on the implementation of a policy (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 194). Becker and Bryman (2004, p. 194) suggest that although the case study is mostly linked to the qualitative research strategy, it also can be involved in the collection of quantitative data either entirely or as part of a multi-strategy research design. Additionally, they suggest that a case study is contrasted with other types of research design, such as social surveys and the experiment, by using the case study design a large amount of data about one or two cases can be gathered (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 254). However, this thesis does not claim that the chosen case is representative and, therefore, can be generalised to other cases. Rather, the theoretical arguments for this case study aim to reach findings that are capable of being tested and applied to other cases. The outcomes of this investigation can be used by other researchers either to extend the findings (for
example exploring further implications) or to study other cases to explore if the same outcomes hold there (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 195).

After reviewing and analysing the relevant literature, this discourse proposes to present in an orderly fashion, gathered secondary data relying on the content analysis approach, as well as primary information on the existing narratives relying on semi-structured interviews. The NTU library and e-journal facilities, as well as libraries and archives from other universities in the UK and the British Library are used here. Due to the nature and level of attention given to the literature on the impact of Libyan intervention on the duration of the Darfur Crisis as outlined in chapter one there are only limited sources of information and analysis which are relevant to this project that deal with Libyan involvement there. In order to collect information for this study which is both reliable and essential to the analysis presented here, primary research is essential as a means of gaining a deeper understanding and collecting information on the influence of third-party regional intervention which is represented in the Libyan case study on the continuation of the conflict there.

Within this qualitative study, three techniques for collecting data are employed: semi-structured and unstructured interviewing; documents – both historical and contemporary; using the internet for collecting information. Interviewing is the main approach employed in this study to gather information. The key technique for political researchers whose work is concerned with the study of decision-makers is elite interviewing or the purposive sampling approach (for more details about the elite interviewing technique (see Burnham et al. 2004, p. 205). Elite interviewing can be employed whenever it is suitable to treat an interviewee as an expert about the topic under investigation (Leech 2002, in Burnham et al. 2004, p. 205). In this respect, the most effective data collecting technique for obtaining information about decision-makers and the decision-making process is semi-structured interviewing.

Semi-structured and unstructured interviews are regarded as a superior mode for social science researchers to deal with non-factual phenomena, such as eliciting people’s views, opinions, attitudes and experiences (May 2011, p. 134). Such non-factual phenomena are often complex and multidimensional due to the difficulty in conducting survey questionnaires or fully structured interviews (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 268). Semi-structured and unstructured interviews might be conducted on a
one-time basis, or repeated over time. Moreover, they can be done with one person or
with a group (Seymour, Dix and Eardley 1995; Arksey 1996). Also, they can be
conducted in face to face encounters, and/or over the telephone, for fuller
information about telephone interviews, (see Chapple 1999), and this is what this
study dose.

Both techniques use open-ended questions but they mainly differ in the degree of
standardisation and the amount of latitude accorded the interviewee. Employing both
these types of interviews would help the researcher to generate rich in-depth material
that allows the researcher to fully understand the informant’s perspective on the topic
being investigated (Becker and Bryman 2004, p. 268). Consequently, this project
employs the semi-structured technique more than the unstructured style. I decided on
a semi-structured interview in which the open-ended questions mainly relied on gave
the respondents latitude to articulate fully their responses. This requires great
attention from the interviewer since such an interview has a more conversational
quality to it than the typical highly structured interview and questions may, therefore,
be more easily breached in a manner that does not follow the exact order of the
original interview instrument. El-Anis (2008, p. 93) noted that simply selecting the
questions to ask and the sources to address in search of answers risks neglecting
other areas of questioning and other sources that have not yet been considered.

Thus, four field research trips were carried out in Libya, Sudan, and the UK. In the
case of the former, a one-month field research trip was conducted to Tripoli, Libya
carried out in December 2011 while a second one-month trip was carried out in April
2013. Prior to the second trip to Libya a two week-long trip to Sudan was completed.
Finally, a number of interviews for this project were undertaken inside the UK at
different times over 2012 and 2013. During the field research trips a number of
intensive individual interviews were undertaken. In total some forty interviews were
held. Some of these interviews were designed to contain guided and organised
discussions with set questions (usually between twenty and fifty questions)
pertaining to the key relevant areas and some were designed to be rolling discussions
with open-ended questions to allow for the interviewees to talk in detail about the
issue in question. Semi-unstructured interviewing with open-ended questions
customarily allows interviewers to probe and/or prompt for more detailed responses,
specific examples, and clarification. Employing this method, thus, gained further
important information on the questions that should be addressed. Furthermore, this gained information is not available in relevant literature. This is a method that has been suggested and employed by other scholars (Devine 2002, pp. 197–200; Becker, and Bryman 2004, pp. 268–273).

The purpose of using the elite interviewing technique was to gain more information around the key areas being investigated that were to some extent not covered in previous research. The gathered data for this thesis was collected in accordance to the validity, relevance and appropriateness to the research questions and the directness and strength of its association with the concepts and the theoretical framework under scrutiny. During interviews the investigator was keen to ask questions that allowed for the collection of information and answers that cannot be found in any published sources, by encouraging interviewees to talk in–depth and to probe for information. Respondents were also given maximum flexibility in structuring their responses through utilising open-ended questions, and showing familiarity with the subject matter and asking well-informed and penetrating questions. Interviews were conducted in order to know what a set of relevant decision makers and knowledgeable individuals think, or how they interpret an event or series of events, or what they have done or are planning to do. Beside existing literature, conducting elite interviews was necessary as in this study, respondents are selected on the basis of what they might know to help the researcher fill in the pieces of the puzzle or to confirm the proper alignment of the information found in literature already in place. Instead of providing generalities about the topic being investigated as answers, the respondents engaged in wide-ranging discussions in a fruitful dialogue with the investigator (Burnham et al. 2008, p. 238).

The type and the sources of the information gathered during the field work trips are very high value as those that were interviewed are inherently significant. This importance derives from both, the level of the interviewees’ positions and the timing of conducting the interviews. In terms of the level, those interviewed are decision makers at the highest level, whether on the side of the Sudanese government, the Libyan government, or the rebel movements, who were either (in)directly involved in the process of managing the crisis and peace building in Darfur through participating in the events and making the decisions that significantly influenced the course of the conflict and its continuity, longevity and outcomes.
Those interviewed are more informed and aware with the minor details concerning the conflict and the dynamics of the Libyan involvement in the crisis in particular. This is because of either their participation or their high level of knowledge of the subject matter under discussion and their general intellectual and expressive abilities. This means that the resources of the information are the most informed which could be more accurate and reliable compared to the information sourced from published primary and secondary sources of information which is not necessarily reliable as it might have been changed and lost some of its coherency due to its transition through many different sources. Therefore, much information collected to answer the basic research questions of this project cannot be found in published material and/or with the ordinary people but often with decision-makers and small groups of highly qualified and knowledgeable individuals. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of those respondents is that they count more than others in terms of their influence on the decision-making process.

From the interview timing perspective, conducting these interviews in the time after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime provides another important value to the thesis as it encouraged the respondents to provide vast amounts of information related to Gaddafi’s policies and techniques in response to the crisis in Darfur which was highly unlikely to be provided in the era of Gaddafi. Interviewing those individuals in this time represented a golden opportunity and enabled the researcher to explore the true impact of the Libyan intervention in the Darfur Crisis and to eliciting those important peoples’ views and experiences in this context. My goal was to explore the respondents’ political attitudes, values, and beliefs. A major aim was to examine the important parameters that guide the elite's understanding of the Libyan role in the Darfur Crisis. This meant that we had to draw representative samples of members of these elites and use an interviewing technique that would enable us to gauge subtle aspects of elite views of the world.

Elite interviewing was tailored to the purposes of this study and in order to bring the researcher as an academic and the world of the practitioner together in a fruitful mutual dialogue and discussion to offer a comprehensive understanding. In addition to utilising a combination of methodological approaches and other sources and techniques such as archival research, governmental and private sector material available on the internet, the elite interviewing approach was used to serve as a
supplementary technique and deepen the research findings. On the personal level, furthermore, interviewing those elite respondents was very crucial. I was in an advantageous position to research this topic due to my personal background, language skills and access to key decision makers at the highest levels. Researching this topic at PhD level will help with my longer-term career ambitions. Elite interviewing is a technique whose exercise benefits from the accumulation of experience, but it is also accessible to students starting out on their research careers.

Information was gained from a lot of different sources on all sides, whether from the conducted interviews or other types of sources. This information was analysed and then interpreted according to my theoretical framework and presented in the way in which the researcher thinks is the best conclusion. The framework acted as a guide for the researcher to collect and analyse data, and then to interpret the research findings. The information used in this study was collected to test all aspects and components of the theoretical framework. For example, when we look at the element of an independent agenda it was necessary to gather information about the real motives behind Gaddafi’s involvement in Darfur, the techniques and mechanisms adopted by Tripoli to manage the crisis, the extent and type of influence that Gaddafi practiced on the domestic parties to the conflict in Darfur, and finally how that impacted the continuation of the crisis there. In addition to that I have had to determine what form of Libyan intervention took.

In terms of deciding and arranging interviews, initially, reading secondary sources and visiting websites gave the researcher some ideas about who is included and who is excluded (May 2011, p. 139). Drawing a sample of respondents who were at a level where they might have a say in policy making was quite straightforward. Lists of individuals are easily accessible and drawing them random, stratified into three groups representing different perspectives as follows: the Sudanese government, the Libyan government, and the rebel groups in Darfur (a requirement for the comparative aspect of the study), was a simple process. Further, I wanted to make sure that we covered all parties’ views.

Approaching and gaining access to relevant individuals within government organisations, especially decision-makers, tends to be a great challenge. Because such individuals are usually very busy. This problem was to a certain extent
addressed by adopting the snow-balling approach (the practice of asking interviewees to nominate others for interview) on the field research trips in order to utilise networks of relevant individuals, especially with those are in high governmental position as well as with the rebel movements leaders. With snowballing or chain-referral sampling the researcher determines a small group of people relevant to the research questions of the existing study subject, and these sampled participants suggest and/or refer to other persons who have had the experience or characteristics relevant to the topic under investigation (May 2001, p. 132). Having identified my targets, I began contact by email or with a telephone call. Interviews sometimes obtained by using various personal contacts to intercede with the target. I did not find any difficulties and it did not take significant efforts and ingenuity to get access to the targeted factors. I provided a concise and honest account of what the research is about, what I am seeking to achieve, and why I wished to interview the particular person approached. I was flexible in my timetable as some interviews were arranged more than twice, and I was patient as some interviews were cancelled at the last minute. In practice, the researcher started out with a few key informants whom had been identified from relevant literature and internet search, and determined by the objectives and purposes of my study. I then asked them to name other key individuals I should see who are relevant to my study. My snowball technique thus expanded as I gained access to a network of individuals, representing different parties in the area being addressed in this thesis. As a result of using this technique a number of additional interviews to those that had been planned were conducted and further information sourced.

However, the source’s interpretations and bias are important – especially with evidence of how events were interpreted at the time and later on, and the moral relativism of value-judgement. There was a danger of becoming over-reliant on ‘key respondents’ who are offering their own particular interpretation of events, which may ‘capture’ the researcher. The source’s interpretations and bias are important – especially in regards to evidence of how events were interpreted at the time and later, and the moral relativism of value-judgement.

From the perspective of the extent to which we could rely on the reliability of the source data and, therefore, the data itself is important. Reliable data is dependable, trustworthy, unfailing, sure, authentic, genuine, reputable. Indicators of reliability
include proximity to events, (whether the writer was a participant or observer), and likely impartiality. In this regard, politicians often, have their own agenda to justify their actions or to criticise others, while very few politicians admit to real failing. Consistency is the main measure of reliability. So in literary accounts, the reputation of the source is critical. Therefore we cannot take the interviewee’s responses as fact always even if the information was gathered from the president or the prime minister or the head of a rebel group because the information is not necessarily factual but instead is about them as individuals and their views, interpretations, experiences and the knowledge they have about this crisis or this conflict or relationship between the Libyan involvement and the conflict in Darfur.

To avoid this challenge of bias, where snowballing technique might lead to the same ideas, views and interpretations being expressed by connected interviewees, the researcher snowballed interviewees on each side: the Sudanese government, the Libyan government, and rebel groups to collect information valid to the research project. Empirical and interpretive information was snowballed from respondents who represent all those parties. For example, this thesis argues that Libya as a regional actor is the most important external actor in the region. This hypothesis was demonstrated by respondents were interviewed and who reflect the perspectives of the Sudanese government and rebel groups and Libya. All said that Libya was the most important regional intervener and in particular that importance comes from the Sudanese government and the rebel groups (For more details about methods and the problems associated with snowballing see Burnham et al. 2008, p. 244 and May 2001, p. 132).

The researcher was able to be realistic about the number of interviews that were undertaken in one day. I was able to manage to fit a maximum of two interviews into a day (this was during the Sudan field work trip in particular). The point of stopping interviewing was reached where each additional interview yields diminishing returns. The researcher stopped conducting interviews when it was recognized the saturation point was reached in a series of interviews where each interviews was adding relatively little to the stock of information or understanding. This must be taken into account and justification of one’s sampling strategies must be made to resolve this issue. The interviews conducted for this study can be categorised into three main
groups. Firstly, information was sourced from some key politicians representing the GoS including:

- Mustafa Osman Ismail, the former Sudanese Foreign Minister and current Minister of Investments.
- Hassan al-Turabi the head of the Public Congress Party.
- Sadiq al-Mahdi, Prime Minister of Sudan from 1966 to 1967 and again from 1986 to 1989, the head of the National Umma Party.
- Ghazi Salahuddin, the Adviser to the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir of Peace Affairs, and responsible for the Darfur file and as well as the former head of the governmental negotiation team 2008 – 2010.
- Abdullahi AlAzreg the Former Ambassador of Sudan to the UK, and currently the Undersecretary of the Sudanese Forging Ministry.

Secondly, information was sourced from leaders and individuals representing rebel movements in Darfur including:

- Ahmad Ibrahim Diraige the former governor of Darfur region and current head of the National Redemption Front alliance of rebel groups in the Darfur conflict.
- Gabriel Belal the spokesman of JEM.
- Hussein Minnawi the Director of Administration and Management in the SLM.
- Osman Ibrahim Musa the Head of Sudanese Liberation Historical Leadership (SLMHL).

Thirdly, a number of Libyan politicians and individuals were interviewed including:

- Mahmoud Jibril, the former executive board of the National Transitional Council (NTC).
- Ibrahim Dabashi, the Libyan Deputy Ambassador to the UN.
- Abd Alhamid Nami, President of the Wasat Democra ti Party (Democratic Centrist Party).
- Mohamed Sola, Libyan Ambassador in Sudan.
- Mahmoud Nacua, Libyan Ambassador in UK.
These interviews were designed to contain guided discussion with set open-ended questions (approximately 20) meant to start a conversation. This technique is fairly flexible, and guided the interview to a rolling discussion to allow the researcher to gather people’s views, opinions, attitudes, and experiences. Besides the fact that this method allows the respondents to talk in detail, it also allows the researcher to pursue interesting comments about the topic in question. The majority of questions were developed during the interviews, allowing both the researcher and the interviewees the flexibility to probe for details or discuss pertinent issues. This technique allowed interviewees to raise up issues that the researcher has not considered. The advantage of the technique is that it leaves the investigation open to new and unexpected information (Daugbjerg, 1998, p. 15). All interviews were conducted with a single respondent and were confidential in nature. All interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes except five which lasted for around 120 minutes.

All the interviews were tape-recorded (back-up notes were also taken) and subsequently transcribed in order to facilitate the use of a conversational style and to minimize information loss. Permission to do so was obtained at the beginning of the meeting. A tape recorder gives a complete record of any meeting. No respondent refused to be taped, and almost all quickly lost any inhibitions the recorder might have induced. In broad terms, questions or topics were classified as ‘essential’, ‘necessary’ and ‘desirable’. Essential questions are those that, if they are not answered, would mean that the interview is a failure. Necessary questions are those that are important to the project and should be covered if at all possible. Desirable questions are those that can be inserted if time permits. Early questions dealt with matters that respondents certainly knew about and felt good discussing. For example, some questions start with ‘What were the real causes of the Darfur Crisis?’ and ‘Why has the crisis been prolonged for over ten years and has not ended yet?’ Opening questions did not challenge the interviewees too much, but provided an opportunity to steer the interview by indicating what the interviewer knows about already and what the researcher wants to explore.

As the interviews progressed, the researcher moved into the more central questions. For example, ‘Why and how has the crisis in Darfur been internationalised?’ and ‘How do you assess the involvement of Gaddafi’s Libya in the conflict in Darfur and its longevity?’ As the interviews progressed further and rapport developed, the
interviewer moved to more difficult and sensitive questions. For example, the interviewees were asked ‘Was Gaddafi’s motivation to intervene to resolve the conflict or to gain from the conflict?’, ‘Did Gaddafi have a different agenda to those adopted by the internal parties of the crisis, and if so, what were they?’ and ‘What type of influence, support, and pressure did Gaddafi practice on the domestic warring parties?’ At the end of the interviews, respondents were given an opportunity to say whether there were any aspects of the topic being discussed which were not covered and which they think are important.

Overall, all the interviews held were an extremely valuable part of the primary research as they provided new and unpublished information, and more insight into motivations, feelings, values, attitudes and perceptions towards the issue in question. It was very clear that those interviewees were not only willing to be participants, but also very enthusiastic to talk confidently in detail about the thesis topic which assisted us to have a better view and understanding about the national and international crisis management in Darfur. My judgment is that the interviewees were frank in their answers.

Historically, qualitative methods are aligned with an interpretive epistemology that concentrates mainly on the dynamic of social phenomena (constricted and natural) to generate knowledge that cannot exist independently from the beliefs, values and principles created to grasp the world (Devine 2002, p. 201). An interpretive approach premises, first, on a philosophical analysis of the constitutive relation of meanings to actions which allows understanding actions properly through examining the beliefs embodied in them. This leads us to provide interpretations of interpretations. Additionally, an interpretive approach rests on a philosophical analysis of the holistic nature of meanings rather than tied individually to referents, so it allows us to understand beliefs properly only as part of the wider webs of which they are a part. Thus, it would assist us to spell out beliefs by reference to webs of belief and traditions (Bevir and Rhodes 2005; Bevir and Rhodes 2006).

Since this thesis examines ideas, actions, institutions and other intersubjective aspects of the influence of external third-party states on the duration of civil armed conflicts in general, as a way of crisis management, and the impact of the Libyan involvement on the duration of the Darfur Crisis in particular, interpretive methods
are the most useful techniques of analysis. Interpretive approaches to political studies concentrate on understanding the meaning that shapes actions and institutions as well as the modes in which they do so. While epistemology addresses the question of ‘how do we know what we know about political science? As discussed above, interpretive theories represent one set of answers to that question. In other words, interpretive approaches do not solely focus on norms, beliefs, and discourse, they also examine beliefs as they perform within, and even shape, actions, practices and institutions (Bevir and Rhodes 2003). The thesis attempts to understand the normative context within which Libya’s strategy is operating – what is the nature of beliefs and preferences that Libya has in regard to dealing with the Darfur Crisis? How have these beliefs and preferences shaped its policies and actions to respond to the Darfur Crisis? And how has this affected the paths, courses, and the duration of the crisis? This type of phenomenon, which is the main topic of this study that considers ideas, interests, and actions, cannot be easily examined utilising positivist predictive theories or mathematical formulas because of the inherently indeterminate nature of social life and because of the agency of actors under study to construct their own meanings (Groom 1994).
The Methodological Framework of the Study

Amis of Research

Research Paradigm

Research Questions

Interview

Qualitative Research Strategy

Content Analysis

Structure and Wording of Interview

Determining the Sampling Units

Pilot study of the Interview

Determining the Content Categories

Revision in Light of the Pilot Study

Determine the Recording Unit

Conducting Interview

Assessment of Reliability and Validity

Elite Interviewing

Snowing Ball Approach

Analysing and Interpreting Data

Findings and Recommendations

Future Research

Figure No: 3 the Methodological Strategy of the Thesis
Chapter 3

The Nature and Causes of the Darfur Crisis

Introduction

The Darfur Crisis is one of the most important crises that the modern state of Sudan has witnessed. Its main importance lies in the nature of its causes and the range of actors involved, not to mention its outcomes and the diversity of effects that it has had at the internal, Sudanese, level as well as at the regional and global levels. Exacerbation of this crisis and its continuation would threaten the structure of the Sudan and its political system. The widening of the conflict by increasing the number of players could lead to increased racist tendencies in a country composed of a multitude of ethnic minorities, diverse cultures, and multiple languages and religions (Cunningham 2006, p. 876). Furthermore, this would strengthen the separatist ideas that threaten the territorial unity of Sudan, especially after southerners obtained independence. It has become more complex as a result of the involvement (direct or indirect) of many regional and international players in the course of the crisis, which ultimately have internationalised that crisis with a variety of dimensions and implications. There are also other significant crises elsewhere on the verge of explosion in the east, far north, and other regions of Sudan that could lead to the fracturing of the state into smaller states/communities which may lack security and stability (Al Ddla 2007, p. 8).

Africa as a whole suffers from the armed conflicts and disputes, with varying levels of intensity, actors, causes and phases of development, duration and outcomes. Sudan is a good example of a state that suffers from these problems (Niama 2005, p. 321). The phenomena of conflicts and disputes in Sudan in general, and Darfur in particular are not recent, rather they coincide with the historical development of the
communities that exist in this region (Tar 2006, p. 10), especially with the emergence of African countries, which led to the stability of some nomadic tribes in the region as well as a diversity of cultures, religions and ethnicities (Abdul Fattah 2009). It is often seen that violent conflicts exceed the scale and control of the state, especially in light of the fragile environment, as they do not erupt suddenly. It comes as a result of a set of accumulations that the state has failed to manage, treat/mitigate, or contain the repercussions, which generate at first dissatisfaction and then chaos (Braithwaite 2010, p. 311). Given that the origins of the Darfur Crisis are old, and the factors that affect the course of political and security events, it has become one of the Sudan’s most important problems. The complexity of the causes and the number of parties, not to mention the complexity of its dimensions and the conflict’s implications, have contributed to the internationalisation of the crisis and so intervention by external parties (Natsios 2008, p. 77). This chapter analyses the key causes and the nature of the Darfur Crisis. It also explores the inflammatory side-effects of the conflict in the region. The chapter argues that despite the similarities in factors and circumstances that lead to domestic conflicts they differ in different areas throughout the world in general and in Africa in particular. Each conflict has its own unique nature, emanating from social and economic structures as well as the cultural development of each individual society. Likewise, each conflict has its different course of development and different dimensions; the Darfur Crisis is no exception.

The Nature and Significance of Darfur

Darfur acquires great importance due to the fact that it contains areas with both agricultural and pastoral potential that provide support for a range of livelihoods and ways of life. Geographically, its location controls trade routes between the north and south (Road 40 from Mosul to Egypt) on the one hand, and roads heading from west to east, including the route to the holy sites in Saudi Arabia to perform the Hajj, on the other hand (Maqlad 1985). It is estimated that the area covers over half a million square kilometres (190,420 square miles), and represents approximately 20% of Sudanese territory, which is equivalent to the size of Spain (Olsson 2010a, p. 4) or France (O’Fahey 2006, p. 24). Darfur is bordered by three countries: Libya, Chad, and
the Central African Republic, and stretches from uninhabited desert areas in the north, to a Sahelian semi-arid area in the centre and more fertile savannah landscape in the south. Darfur is made up of a plateau, some 2,000 to 3,000 feet above sea-level (International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur 2005).

The importance of the region stems from several factors that feature in the area more than in other regions. For example, Darfur is regarded as the largest productive livestock province in Sudan. This is attributed to the diversity of the climate in the region and its appropriate nature, in addition to an abundance of pastures which enable Darfur to play an important role in Sudan's exports, including an estimated 60% of camels and sheep to Egypt and Libya. In addition, there is huge mineral wealth in the ground, distributed in different areas in the province (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). These include iron, gold, zinc, nickel, lead, copper, bauxite and the recent discovery of large quantities of oil. Darfur is also characterised by the availability of fertile soil and a favourable climate, which makes the region one of the largest agricultural production areas in the world for crops, such as gum Arabic and agricultural grains, including sesame and peanuts (Musa 2009, p. 77).

It is also mostly a plateau which includes the volcanic Marrah Mountain range, which has very fertile land. The Marrah Mountain range covers an area of approximately 9,000 square kilometres, and has a maximum height of about 10,000 feet above sea level. Darfur is Sudan’s largest region in terms of landmass and population (Tar 2006, p. 412). Administratively, the province has been divided into three states since 1994: North Darfur and its capital at the city of El Fasher, South Darfur and its capital at the city of Nyala, and West Darfur, with its capital at the city of Al-Junaynah (see map No: 1). The Darfur province is inhabited by approximately 6.5-7 million people, which is roughly 26% of the country's population (Al-Mashaqbeh and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 47; Suleiman 2011, p. 4).

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6 Also, for more descriptive information about Darfur see Suleiman 2011.
The population of Darfur consists of two main different ethnicities: Africans and Arabs. African tribes rely on a stable life style – agricultural and pastoral – such as the Fur, Masalit, Zaghawa, Dajo, Altama, and Tunjur tribes in addition to other groups of Arabic nomadic Arab tribes that move from place to place like the Abbala, Alzbidat, Mahamid, Mahariya, Bani Hussein, and Rizeigat. The majority of these tribes speak their own local languages in addition to Arabic. The second, the Arab
tribes, of which the most important are the Rizeigat, Bani-Halba, Habbaniya, and Ta’aisha, are pastoralist tribes who depend on the movement and grazing of camels and cows. They are from candid Arab roots and speak Arabic. Furthermore, most of Darfur’s population are Muslim (Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 10). Acknowledging the causes that led to civil conflict is essential for conflict resolution, as well as to evade a future repetition of the conflict. Civil conflict is often grounded in an accumulation of complex factors, rather than a single grievance or factor (Flint 2010, p. 45).

Determining and understanding these complexities facilitates recognition of the key issues that have contributed to the conflict. Like other African conflicts, the Darfur Crisis seems to be more complex than merely concentrating on one side of the crisis demonstrates. It is hard to attribute it merely to one or two factors, simply because of the overlapping factors and the combination of past with present. As is mentioned above, the current crisis is not new. It has deep historical roots that extend decades into the past. Therefore, looking back to the mid-1980s, before the violence between Africans and Arabs began to simmer, helps us to truly understand the current crisis (Faris 2007). This chapter does not aim to discuss the historical account of Darfur or its conflicts, rather it seeks to address a set of different and overlapping factors that significantly contributed to the creation of the environment which led to the deterioration in intra-Darfur relations, and which ultimately fuelled the conflict in the region. The instability and current emergency in Darfur can be attributed to several integrated factors. A number of internal and external factors that considerably affect one another have led to an argument that the conflict taking place in Darfur can be seen basically as a domestic conflict. These factors include political, economic, environmental, and social issues, which greatly contribute to insecurity across the whole region.

Domestic Factors of the Crisis

- Environmental Degradation and Conflict over Resources

As already mentioned, Darfur is a wide area bordered by three other countries, which has contributed to the existing diversity in the demographics of the region as a result of tribes spilling across borders. This demographic diversity has influenced the kinds of human relationships with nature which overlap throughout the region (settled agricultural, pastoral, and nomadic) (Al Malool 2005, p. 50). Likewise, one of the most important features of the region is that it has a diversity of vegetation. While in the north there are thorny plants that grow in dry climates, the south has tropical forests. There is also in region also diversity in terms of soil quality and plant height, as a result of the wide range of temperatures and rainfall (Al Ddla 2007, p. 10).

The region has suffered for more than three decades from increasing cases of security, economic, and political instability. Like many parts of Africa, it has experienced successive periods of drought and desertification, which have led to three major famines in 1973, 1985, and 1992 (Raafat 2004). This deterioration in weather conditions has had a significant impact on the restructuring of demographic structures and on economic developments in the province, both having played a pivotal role in provoking the conflict between the pastoral and sedentary tribes. The north and central regions have turned to desert and semi-desert areas due to desertification, which has stretched from the north to the south at a rate of three kilometres a year (Cockett 2010). This has caused large losses in cattle, which has reflected negatively on the standard of living, especially among the pastoral tribes that depend on this style of farming and the grazing of cows and camels. Ultimately this has increased the rates of poverty and generated issues of security, such as armed robbery (de Waal 2005c, p. 8).

Darfur is divided into four different climatic regions. First, the desert region which is characterised by a shortage of rainfall and higher temperatures, particularly in the summer. This area is virtually unoccupied and therefore it has no human activities
that use water or land for agriculture or grazing. The second area is the arid region that covers the middle of the northern parts of the province. The average rainfall in this zone is low with high variability and ranges from 100 to 300 mm. The third zone is the poor savannah area which covers the middle of the Darfur region with an average annual rainfall of between 200 to 400 mm, and a rainy season ranging from 3–4 months a year. The fourth zone is located in the southern part of Darfur where the savannah is rich and rainfall average is approximately between 500 mm to 800 mm a year, with a rainy season that lasts for about 5 months per year (Fadul 2006, p. 33).

According to the ecological habits of the respective tribes, Darfur is divided into three main regions or Diar: the first region contains Camel Nomads, while the second, middle, region comprises settled farmers, and the last region contains Cattle Nomads, see maps No 2 and 3 (cited in Suliman 2008, p. 9). Deteriorating climatic conditions of drought and freshwater scarcity have pushed a lot of northerners towards the forested areas in the south of the province, where the most fertile areas of savannah and freshwater resources are found. For this precise reason, several tribal disputes have erupted, due to the competition for access to natural resources between sedentary farmers and nomadic pastoralists (Hakim 2011, p. 815). In addition, there has been a shortage of food and fuel, resulting from climate change in the province and the deterioration this has brought to the environment in Darfur (Brown 2010, p. 2514).

This has contributed to provoking collisions and a high frequency of conflicts between sedentary tribes and newcomers in southern Darfur. These conflicts have been violent, bloody and armed battles that have often led to many deaths and casualties (Kiernan 2007). Given the ecological and demographic transformation, overall, it can be observed that the lack of rain and desertification have negatively influenced the relationships between the tribes in Darfur in general and in particular in the middle and southern areas (Sunga 2011, p. 70).

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8 Darfur, linguistically, in Arabic means the homeland of the Fur. The Fur is the main indigenous tribe of the region. Each Dar has own special political, social, and cultural identity and prestige.

9 Diar is the plural of Dar. Dar is locally known as a sub-territorial tribal area or the homeland of each tribe.
Map No 2: The Ethnic Structure of Darfur

Map No 3: population distribution by mode of living in Darfur
Darfur accounts for over 85% of the tribal conflicts that took place in Sudan, especially in the 1970s and 1980s (Hassan and Ray 2009) (see Table No: 1).

Table No 1: The key tribal conflicts 1957–2006: the parties, causes, and places\(^\text{10}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conflicting tribes</th>
<th>Year(s)</th>
<th>Key causes of the conflict</th>
<th>Province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meidob and Kababich</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Theft of camels</td>
<td>North Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizeigat and Almaalaa</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Pastures, theft of cattle</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaghawa and Rizeigat</td>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Grazing and water, theft of animals</td>
<td>North Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaghawa and Birgid</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Grazing and water, theft of animals</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizeigat and Bani-Halba</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Grazing and water, theft of animals</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizeigat against Fur and Beja</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Grazing and water, theft of animals</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ta’aisha and Salamat</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Grazing and water, theft of animals</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kababich and Alquahlp against Meidob and Alberti and Ziadiyah</td>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Grazing and water, theft of animals, and land occupation</td>
<td>North Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaghawa and Misseriya</td>
<td>1984 - 1987</td>
<td>Grazing and water, theft of animals</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{10}\) For more details see Musa 2009, p. 93.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>ETHNIC GROUPS</th>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>ISSUES</th>
<th>REGION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Fallata and Al Comor</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Grazing and water, theft of animals</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Fur (Kbkabia) and Zaghawa</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Entry areas, theft of animals</td>
<td>North Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Fur against 27 Arab tribes</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>The occupation of the territory, and political and racial motivations</td>
<td>Whole Darfur region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Al Comor and Zaghawa</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Entry territory and theft of animals</td>
<td>West Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Rizeigat and Zaghawa</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Political and racial motivations</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Rizeigat and Almaalaa</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Grazing and water, and land</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Dajo and Misseriya</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Rebellion</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Rizeigat and Rizigat</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Rebellion and land</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Fallata and Habbaniya, Masalit</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Rebellion and land</td>
<td>South Darfur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to this, the increasing migration of nomadic groups from Chad has placed greater pressure on Darfur’s natural resources and worsened living conditions overall (Sudan Watch 2006). The link between land degradation and desertification and the conflict in Darfur is very strong (Sunga 2011, p. 64). Waves of environmental degradation have resulted in deep imbalances in the local environment and Darfurian
society. Furthermore, these extreme environmental conditions have exacerbated other phenomena that have significantly contributed to the outbreak of the Darfur Crisis. In order to understand in more detail the role of environmental degradation, it is useful to discuss the most important of these accompanying phenomena.

**A - Conflict of Marahil**, Tracks and Pastures

Amongst the most important and frequent conflicts in Darfur are those that arise between the pastoral tribes and sedentary tribes that practise agriculture. They are a result of competition for the resources of scarce fresh water and arable land due to drought and desertification since the late 1960s (Brown 2010, p. 2513). This, in turn, has led to a decline in the scope of pasture, freshwater resources and fertile soil. These disputes were traditionally addressed and resolved through tribal councils and customary laws agreed by all the tribes (Hakim 2011, p. 816; Sunga 2011, p. 4). In Darfur there have been 11 Marahil since the 1950s, stretching from the northern region to the south; their size varies between 250sq. kilometres and 600sq. kilometres, and the longest Merhal is Alokaim in North Darfur stretching to Um Davouk in South Darfur, with a size of 606sq. kilometres. The shortest Merhal is Kazan from the north of El Fasher to Dar Rizeigat in the south (Fadul 2006). The areal width of a Merhal ranges mostly between 6 and 10sq. kilometres in populated areas, expanding to become Merhal and pasture in the free areas of the population and farms (Regulation Act for pastures and Marahil, 1999, p 9). Some Marahil continent (the path of cows), others Abala (the camel path). However, due to environmental degradation and agricultural expansion that have prevailed on those Marahil – where there are freshwater wells – the Baggara’s Marahil faded, forcing most Baggara to flee to the south and south-west of the province (Alawad 2007, p. 202). Darfurians have made a compromise formula for peaceful coexistence among

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11 Marahil (the plural of Merhal) are animal tracks used by camel and livestock herders in Darfur. These are “areas between the farms plots designated for nomads to pass through during their movements from south to north during the rainy season and from north to south during the dry season” (Fadul 2006, p. 39). This helps herders to access places rich with grass and fresh water, without violating the rights and property of farmers and with respect for customs and traditions (El-Tigani 2005, p. 67). Merhal is an administrative and social place well known to everyone and has certain limits in terms of latitude and longitude, named Merhal because it connects the two points at the departure of people from one place to another.
pastoral and agricultural tribes. One of the most important laws, for example, is not to arrive during the harvest seasons so giving farmers a chance to secure their food and livelihoods. Other than at that specific point for watering their livestock, herders do not enter these areas until they are authorised to do so. In addition to this, one of the main rules here is that nomadic herders should notify the heads of local administrations of the region through which they are to pass well in advance of their arrival in order to facilitate their passage (El-Tigani 2005, p. 67).

Although the Marahil system has existed as a formula for coexistence, changes in climate conditions in Darfur, in recent decades, have led to the erosion of the effectiveness of this system. First, drought and desertification have changed the map of the old agreed tracks. Second, increasing numbers of camels and cattle, as well as newly emerging villages across these tracks, have significantly contributed to the inability of the nomadic communities to honour the commitments to move within the selected tracks. Third, agricultural expansion into the territory that the nomadic tribes walk through. Fourth, blocking roads that lead to the freshwater sources and the spread of the phenomenon of burning grass, under the pretext of land ownership, around villages and farms to keep nomads away from the region. Fifth, neglect by the local authorities monitoring the seasonal movement of nomads and determining tracks before the arrival of nomadic tribes to agricultural areas in the south of the province, as well as non-compliance with the specific dates for the movement of pastoralists (Beheiri 2010, p. 94).

It should be noted that the transmission of pastoral groups from north to south in agricultural areas, especially after the drought of 1971, has formed a high-pressure breach of the natural environment, due to the vast number of human and animal groups that came with new patterns of behaviour, leading to the reluctance of the people of the settled areas to expand to accommodate the new arrivals. Government authorities failed at nomadic administration in the required form, such as the establishment of semi-regular forces for nomadic insurance, where farmers accused them of being forces loyal to the shepherds to protect them and fight with them. This has challenged the credibility of the government's attempts to resolve the tracks problem. As a result, all the tribes resorted to the use of civil military systems, depending on them for protection, as well as in raids (Musa 2009, p. 88). All these factors have pushed pastoral tribes to commit numerous abuses as a result of moving
cattle into farmland and the destruction of crops, which was one of the most important factors leading to the collisions that inflamed the conflict between shepherds and farmers in the region.

**B - Conflict on Hawakeer and Land Ownership**

The system of land ownership of Hawakeer, or what is known as a system of tribal home lands, has significantly contributed to tensions and armed conflicts between the tribes inhabiting Darfur. This is due mainly to the nature and specificity of this system, which has been run since ancient times by inherited traditions. Under this system individuals and tribes could acquire large tracts of land for many years to engage in agriculture (Abu Salim 1975). With the passage of time these Hawakeer became acquired rights and an important part of the cultural heritage and economy for their owners, as in recent years and before the outbreak of the crisis in 2003, they acquired very significant social and political dimensions (Beheiri 2010, p. 90).

In contrast, there have been other tribes who do not have Hawakeer for two reasons, either because they were small tribes or because they are nomadic tribes (mostly Arab) and their pattern of living depends entirely on movement, where they were merely claiming guaranteed access and the right of traffic through specific corridors and at specific times (Abdul-Jalil, Azzain and Yousuf, 2007, p. 41). However, the Hawakeer system has begun to break down. Deterioration in climatic conditions in the region has resulted in a decline in the pastures and fertile land suitable for cultivation in Darfur. In addition, the emergence of the modern state, as well as an increase in some economic freedoms, has pushed these tribes, driven from their homes, to settle in other tribes’ lands, changing their lifestyle and resorting to agricultural work and settlement.

This, in turn, led to a change in the balance of populations and the old tribal system. For instance, of the most important tribes displaced due to the deterioration of

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12 Hawakeer is the plural of the word Hakorh. Literally, Hakorh means monopoly, but idiomatically it refers to a patch of land granted by the Fur sultans to an individual or a tribe – they are mostly African and non-Arab – as owners to practise agricultural activity within the bounds of specific geographic features.
pastures and freshwater scarcity are the Zaghawa, Alberti, Almidoob and the Northern Rizeigat tribes and other Arab tribes of North Darfur (Al-Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 88). These tribes entered into bloody tribal conflicts whenever they headed south, as tribal competition increased over agricultural and animal resources as well as scarce freshwater sources. For example, Dar Zaghawa, the geographic area of the Zaghawa tribe which is the largest of the pastoral tribes in the region, is known as Barbie. Its population before the drought in 1970 was about 255,000 people. But because of the droughts between 1970–1984, this number decreased to 40,000 inhabitants (16% of pre-1970 population). Zaghawa have been a party in 11 out of 22 conflicts in the period 1986–2001 (Haggar 2012, p. 102; Musa 2009, p. 91). Nomadic tribes believe that the Hawakeer system is unfair, as Hawakeer are not inclusive, and they demanded the abolishment of the system and equality among citizens in accordance with the principle of citizenship. On the other hand, these calls were met with strong opposition by the owner tribes of Hawakeer. They refused to be compromised as the Hawakeer represent inherited gains from their ancestors (Beheiri 2010, p. 90). Furthermore, they are willing to go to war against any attempt to grab their land under the pretext of modernity (El-Tigani 2005, p. 65).

The problem with the Hawakeer system is that it has contributed to the loss of state prestige and reduced the state’s ability to provide security for its citizens in Darfur. A clear example of this conflict is that which occurred between the Zaghawa and Rizeigat in 1996 in the Daein Province. The Rizeigat tribe replaced the banner of the Council in the Daein Province with the banner of the Council of the Dar Rizeigat Area. Furthermore, the Rizeigat (a non-Arab settled tribe) issued a decision, in writing, to the county government ordering the expulsion of five Zaghawa citizens from the province of Daein, including the judge, who had judicial immunity, under the pretext that they were undesirable because of their influence on the rest of the tribe and for inciting violence against the Rizeigat. The local authorities, therefore, decided to call the mentioned citizens and asked them to leave Hakorh (Haggar 2012, p. 94). In recent years, these differences have fuelled racism and ethnic tensions between the conflicting parties that strongly contributed to the deterioration of the situation in the region (Abdul-Jalil, Azzain and Yousuf, 2007, p. 56).
The proliferation of weapons in Darfur is considered one of the main problems contributing to armed clashes between the tribes in the region. This is attributed to several reasons including the length of the boundaries that the region shares with three neighbouring countries (Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic). Also, a number of tribes in the region flow through both sides of the border in these countries, in addition to inadequate security reinforcements to monitor and secure the border. Another reason is that the harsh conditions of the Bedouin community in Darfur, and the region's history of wars and tribal conflicts, build the foundations of a culture of war and the inevitability of Darfurian men carrying weapons as an expression of their manhood and ability to defend themselves and their families (Sudanese Centre for Press Services 2004).

Furthermore, the failure of the GoS to control this phenomenon and control the sources of arms has greatly contributed to the region instability and the use of weapons, as well as the emergence of armed gangs and organised robberies in the province (Nurain 2008, p. 194). Some sources confirm that the first extensive entry of the modern weapon in Darfur was in the mid-1970s, by the National Front led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, when stockpiling arms in Darfur in order to oust Jaafar Nimeiri. But after the reconciliation that took place between Nimeiri and Sadiq Al-Mahdi in 1977, the National Front ceded its arms to the GoS army. When the GoS wanted the captured arms, it found that large amounts had leaked to the people in Darfur (Beheiri 2010, p. 98).

Likewise, the governmental authorities’ way of handling armed robbery, through immediate reactions to the incidents, represented in the response of the security, political, administrative and also media bodies, together with the lack of a deliberate plan to combat it, drastically led to its escalation. Just as governmental forces and official bodies moved to contain one incident, they would be surprised by another (Haggar 2012, p. 130). The border dispute between Libya and Chad during the 1970s and 1980s was of great significance because it led to the spread of weapons into Darfur. Libya armed Arab tribes in Darfur in their war against Chad over what
is known as the region of Aouzo. The disintegration of the Central African Republic's army resulted in most of its personnel entering Darfur, where the majority belong to Sudanese tribes (Al-Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 139).

The influence of the armed robbery phenomenon on raising hostility and reprisals between different tribes in Darfur has been emphasised by many Darfurians. For instance, when armed looting was committed against one tribe by a gang belonging to another, the victim tribe usually tried to trace the perpetrators to punish them (Flint 2004). However, the perpetrator's tribe often refused to hand over their people and insisted on protecting them, which led to the outbreak of further armed clashes and the increased frequency of incidents of armed robbery and mutual revenge (Al-Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 140). Incidents of armed robbery have increased since 1984 as a result of climate change and desertification in Africa's Sahel region which has led to the elimination of more than 80% of livestock for some pastoral communities (Hassan 2003, p. 278). This has prompted these communities to flee to other areas less affected by the deterioration in climate. Some people initiated the practice of armed looting to make up for what was lost from camels and cattle due to the drought. Armed robbers move from one area to another in Darfur, and the practice of armed robbery in the region is not merely associated with a certain tribe.

Furthermore, there have been some other factors that have increased the spread of this phenomenon in Darfur. These include: firstly, high rates of poverty, illiteracy, unemployment and low levels of awareness as well as the absence of religious morality, especially among younger generations. Secondly, the state’s inability to adjust to the security issue, which has encouraged many people to adopt armed robbery as a livelihood (Hakim 2011, p. 815). Nora Hassan (2003, p. 279) also adds, the absence of developmental projects, alternatives for employment, and the weakness of the private sector.

- Ethnic Diversity and Tribal Intolerance

While Sudan has been acknowledged as one of the most diverse and versatile countries in the world, Darfur can also been seen as a small model of Sudan (Flint
This diversity stems from the important geographical location of the province as it neighbours three countries, and links western and central Sudan. Mixing between Arab immigrant groups to Sudan¹³ and local tribes of African origin has importantly contributed to the culture in the province, which is characterised by a high degree of diversity and assimilation (Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 10). Whereas intermarriage between the Arab and Negro tribes has changed certain tribal characteristics, habits, and traditions as well as leading to the emergence of new tribes which have stretched their assets as far as the Arabian Peninsula, there has been peaceful coexistence among these tribes for hundreds of years. Even distinguishing between the tribal or ethnic affiliations of Darfurians, according to the language or skin colour, has become a difficult task. Despite the existing classifications between Arabs, Fur, and others, historically, tribal leaders were keen to dissolve racial barriers between the different groups in the region (especially in areas of tribal contact) through mating, intermarriage, and by creating double affiliations between members of different tribes to achieve peaceful coexistence. It is often argued that Darfur is characterised by an extremely complex tribal combination, and is, at the same time, indeed marked by peaceful coexistence between individuals and groups, where there has been mixing and tolerance (Salih 2005, p. 2).

A number of scholars refute the assumption that the Darfur Crisis is propelled by absolute competition between pastoralists and farmers over limited natural resources, such as fresh water, agricultural land and pasture, caused by climate change. It is claimed by many that the Darfur Crisis is essentially a conflict of ethnicity and should fundamentally be considered a deliberate ethnic cleansing campaign. According to Olsson and Valsecchi (2010), ethnic cleansing has extensively and intensively occurred in Darfur, and has largely affected the ethnic composition of the state through the redistribution of the population in chosen villages. The GoS and its allies, the Janjaweed militia, argue that their attacks have mainly targeted the three major African tribes of Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa. Nevertheless, Arab-dominated villages are very rarely targeted (Olsson, Siba 2009, p. 23). Hagan and Kaiser say “The evidence presented . . . is of a pattern of racialised, state-led attacks on food, livestock, and water supplies, indicating the intent by the political leadership of the

¹³The Arab migrations came to Sudan in general and to the Darfur region in particular through outlets and different routes such as: Bab el Mandeb, through the Red Sea, the Isthmus of Suez and Egypt, and North Africa.
Government of Sudan to eliminate the collective livelihoods of Black African groups in Darfur” (Hagan and Kaiser 2011, p. 20).

Other studies – which have already been discussed in the literature review chapter – by Flint and de Waal 2008; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008, p. 875-880; Mahgoub El-Tigani 2004; and Olsson 2010a, p. 16 argue that the ethnic component cannot be denied as a key factor in the Darfur crisis in 2003. They contend that cultural variation between tribes makes the social atmosphere ready for the outbreak of armed conflict between the people of the province. The GoS has utilised segregation strategies to make it relatively easy to subdue the rebellion stability in Khartoum, as well as to motivate both the government and its allies of local Arabs to reconfigure the political demography of the Darfur region by organised cleansing and an assault on their traditional culture.

Nonetheless, as discussed also in the literature review chapter, some academics (Muhammad 2010; El-Affendi 2009; Shaw 2011) disagree with these points of view. They believe that the insurgency in Darfur cannot be considered genocide or ethnic, or even ideological. In the current Darfur crisis, it is difficult to differentiate between an Arab tribe and a non-Arab tribe in the conflict. It is said that the former US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, during his visit to Darfur in 2004, was talking about the distinction between Arabs and Africans in the region and trying to differentiate between them. He failed in his first six attempts. Whenever he pointed someone out as an Arab he or she turned out to be African, and vice versa, then he stopped (Beheiri 2010, p.152).

Ammina Kothari (2010) found that the western media coverage of Darfur tends to be episodic, favours Western values and is not homogeneous. Additionally, some human rights organisations and movements like the Save Darfur Movement14 have exploited and taken advantage of the clash of events in Darfur (Hamilton and Farrow 2011, p. 47). Armed conflict, looting, and fighting between the tribes of the region is not new; they have historical roots (Shaw 2011), which have always been handled according to the traditional reconciliation system or what is locally called Traditional

14 It is considered as the brand for the Darfur anti-genocide movement. To understand how it has been founded see Mamdani, M. 2010, Saviors and survivors: Darfur, politics, and the war on terror, Doubleday Religion.
Councils of Mediation the *Judiyya*\(^{15}\) (see El-Tom 2012, p. 108). The conflicts within the Darfur region, especially between 1975 and 1997, on the whole, account for 19 conflicts, including five conflicts between Arab tribes, eight conflicts between African tribes and six conflicts between Arab and African tribes (Al Ddla 2007, p. 32). This indicates that the conflict does not appear to be a purely racially and ethnically motivated crisis.

**Economic Factors**

Darfur’s economy is mainly based on variations in productive patterns between pastoral and agricultural activities, which has led to tensions and clashes between Darfur's tribes, due to the growing number of economic disputes. The evolution of Sudan’s economic reality has led Darfurians to rely on livestock more than traditional agricultural crops, for reasons related to the global economy and international trade. This has forced them to focus more on the export of animal resources, rather than agricultural exports, which has contributed to the deepening of differences between farmers and pastoralists (Niama 2005, 323). This may indicate that the root causes of the conflict in Darfur are economically driven. Although Darfur is considered wealthy in Sudan (Cockett 2010), based on its major contribution to national income, the province has suffered a lot from marginalisation in terms of modern industrial and agricultural development, due to being badly treated by successive regimes. Traditionally, Darfur has been relatively ‘rich’ in terms of agriculture, particularly before the increased environmental degradation that the province has suffered since the 1970s. Darfur in general is characterised by multiple sources of natural minerals, surface and groundwater, livestock, and agricultural sources. The region essentially depends on rain agriculture, as opposed to cultivation, which is dependent on irrigation by water streams such as rivers and canals, as agriculture in the first instance is associated with the rainfall season (Abdel Monseif 2007, p. 52).

\(^{15}\) Abdullahi Osman El-Tom acknowledges the *Judiyya* as “It is a grassroots system of arbitration that focuses on reconciliation and resurrection of social relationships in the community. Unlike other judicial systems, such as government and Shariat courts, the *Judiyya* is distinguished by the impermanency of its membership, informality and accessibility to all in the community.”
Each state of its three mandates has its own economic characteristics which together constitute the economic value of the region as a whole. Arable land in northern Darfur is estimated at eight million acres. It also possesses a large amount of ground and surface fresh water, with annual rainfall ranging between 100-600mm. These two factors (land and water) essentially contribute to the provision of vast tracts of natural pasture, estimated at approximately seven million acres. Forests in this state are estimated at one million acres, which has led to an enormous growth in animal wealth in the region, estimated at 12 million cattle: this is almost equal to 10% of the total animal wealth of Sudan. In western Darfur, agriculture is also the main economic activity. The estimated use of arable land is merely about three million acres out of eight million. The highlands of the Mura Mountain range are the most important of these agricultural areas.

Livestock in this state is significant and represents approximately 11% of the national economy. Western Darfur has better freshwater resources, with an average annual rainfall ranging between 200-1200mm. There are many valleys extending from the heights of Jebel Mura, which represents a lifeline for fertile agricultural land, with the presence of groundwater basins rich in fresh water, such as the Wisa Basin. Freshwater resources are estimated at about three billion cubic metres per year. In western Darfur, forests cover about 75% of the total area. Finally, in southern Darfur, agriculture and fertile land are estimated at approximately 24 million acres, and represent 12% of the total arable land in Sudan. Livestock is also diverse and constitutes about 10% of Sudan’s total animal wealth. The total area of land used for grazing in this state is 22.7 million acres, and many forests cover large areas of the region. Southern Darfur is also rich in various freshwater sources. The average annual rainfall ranges between 200-1000mm. There is an abundance of rainfall and groundwater basins, such as Al-Bagara, that are not fully utilised (Al Ddla 2007, p. 37), (see Table No: 2).
Table No 2: The economic resources of Darfur region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Agricultural Resources</th>
<th>Water Resources</th>
<th>Pastures and Forests</th>
<th>Animal Wealth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Darfur State</strong></td>
<td>Arable land is estimated at 8 million acres</td>
<td>Groundwater and surface water, at annual rates ranging between 100-600 mm</td>
<td>The natural pasture estimated at about 7 million acres</td>
<td>Livestock is estimated at 12 million head of ruminants including cows, camels, sheep and goats almost equalling 10% of the total wealth of animal wealth in Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>West Darfur State</strong></td>
<td>The estimated arable land is 8 million; about 3 million acres are used</td>
<td>Water resources are estimated at about 3 billion cubic metres per year. Rainfall ranges between 200-1200mm</td>
<td>Natural pastures and forests cover around 22.7 million acres</td>
<td>Livestock represents about 11% of Sudan national economy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Darfur State</strong></td>
<td>Fertile land is estimated at 24 million acres, representing 12% of the total arable land in Sudan</td>
<td>The average annual rainfall ranges between 200-1000mm</td>
<td>The areas of grazing and forests cover about 22.7 million acres</td>
<td>Livestock is also diverse and constitutes about 10% of the total animal wealth in Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the other hand, Darfur contains several important mineral resources which are used in various fields of industry. For instance, metals like iron and lead, marble, and chrome are located in northern Darfur, while the southern territory comprises metals such as copper, iron and phosphate, and limestone. Moreover, Darfur contains oil fields, located in Abugabrh and Scharf, in the eastern parts of the province. Darfur contributes about 45% of Sudan's exports – excluding oil exports – including 22% of exports of sesame, 15% of exports of livestock and meat, 5% of the exports of gum Arabic, and 9% of exports of hibiscus and watermelon (Dala 2007, p. 16). Despite
this, there are no real development projects in Darfur aimed at agricultural and industrial advancement, despite the fact that these two sectors represent the most important aspects of economic activity in Darfur in addition to the space of the region, which represents 20% of the total area of Sudan (Dala 2007, p. 16).

Nonetheless, it is noticeable that despite the richness of Darfur and the availability of these natural resources, the Sudanese state has failed to effectively employ these economic potentials in the manner that best serves the region and its people on the one hand, and Sudan in general on the other. It is argued that the Darfur Crisis is a reflection of a deterioration of living conditions and greater poverty, illiteracy and disease (Nixon 2005, p. 324). Darfur exists in a state of default, economic weakness and underdevelopment. It has suffered from a significant decline in infrastructure due to the absence of developmental assistance and key services, such as potable fresh water, electricity, education, health, schools, hospitals, and roads linking the region to the rest of the state. Unemployment totals 1.5 million citizens. Many scholars have attributed these factors to the policies that have been adopted by successive governments (Omran 2005, p. 168).

Undoubtedly this economic downturn has had a negative impact on the population and on the possibility of securing necessities, which has increased poverty and illiteracy rates and spread diseases. Unbalanced development between the regions of Sudan has also led to the deepening deterioration of the economic situation in Darfur, which is one of the largest states in Sudan (for more details see the Black Book16 in El-Tom 2011, p. 281). Since 1991 the Inqad government has worked on the establishment of some development projects to raise the quality of life in the region, including building some international airports, increasing the number of schools, developing the road network, and building some health facilities. Most of these projects have not been completed, however, due to the instability in the region, which has resulted in the re-direction of financial resources to meet security requirements. This has stunted development in Darfur. The GoS has failed to establish industrial projects that would encourage farmers to increase their production capacity, provide markets for their produce, and provide new job

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16 The Black Book shows information illustrating the extremely narrow base from which Sudan's governing class has all long been drawn, starting with the first government in 1954; for more details see Mamdani, 2010, p. 199.
opportunities for the people of the region (El-Tigani 2005, p. 78). Researchers vary in their diagnoses of the main reasons that have led to the lack of development in Darfur, despite the availability of diverse natural resources and economic potential in the three Darfur provinces. The rapid growth and increase in the rate of population in the last five decades before the crisis erupted, alongside an acute shortage of basic requirements of life, was also a factor and cannot be ignored: see Table No 3 (cited in Fadul 2006, p. 35). This is likely to be a cause of more social tension between groups in the same location (Olsson 2010b, p. 15).

Table No 3: The population density changes in Darfur (1956–2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Density (Person/Km2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1,080,000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>1,340,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>5,600,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>6,480,000</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: population figures, Department of Statistics. Area 360,000 Km2 below parallel 16:00 North)

Also, it is argued that the failure of development in Darfur is basically a natural result of the political competition between Sudanese political parties. The major parties that formed governments in the past relied on votes of certain circuits over all past parliaments. However, often these governments tended to develop services for other regions that were far removed from those secured, in an attempt to secure the voters of those departments, so obtaining members in parliament. This has significantly restricted the development of areas like Darfur. Many of the rebels from different areas of Sudan emphasised that the conflicts in the country are the result of regional marginalisation, not of racial or religious tensions (El-Tom 2003, p. 25).

In this respect, data in the Black Book of Sudan stressed this view by showing a pattern of political control (by the north) which has been unbroken since independence in 1956 (Cobham 2005, p. 463). Others believe that the Southern Sudan War, which lasted for more than two decades, also had a negative impact on the developmental process in Sudan in general and Darfur in particular. The GoS was
pre-occupied by the war, rather than trying to industrial and agricultural projects, not to mention the high costs that were incurred by the state during the war (Abo Fars 2004). Under these difficult circumstances, caused by the neglect of agricultural, industrial, and human development, and high rates of unemployment, many Darfurians (particularly young people) have resorted to drifting and practising looting. They have also been joining different armed organisations fighting against the government and demanding improvements to living conditions after losing hope in the government's promises.

- Political Factors

In addition to the environmental and ethnic–tribal factors, issues of a political nature have been seen by many as the most important and decisive factors in the outbreak of the recent conflict in Darfur. Since its inception, the crisis was confined to developmental demands and the lack of services in the region that has existed since the National Union in Sudan. Then it turned into armed movements with a political agenda, because of the deterioration in economic and security conditions that were afflicting Sudan. Political factors played a significant role in the emergence of armed action against the GoS. These can be divided into three very influential key axes:

**A – The Abolition of the Native Administration System and the Absence of State Prestige**

Darfur has been ruled by a unique social-political-governance system since British colonial control in 1916. This was based predominantly on so-called Civil Administration, or Native Administration (Hamilton, 2011, p. 6). Sudan’s successive governments continued to adopt this system in the conduct of public affairs in Darfur even after independence in 1956, until it was repealed in 1971 during the Numeiri government, leaving a vacuum that resulted from the negativities that affected Sudanese political life. This political pattern was a factor for stability and a sponsor of moral values in a community consisting of more than 100 tribes, some of Arab
descent and others of African descent, which are spread across a wide area where economic interests intersect and overlap one another. Civil administration performed the sensitive and regulatory functions, which would adjust political, economic, and social stability in the region.

For example, civil administration was a sponsor for contacts between different tribal leaders to coordinate the migration of tribes affected by climatic conditions under the legal authority vested in them by the central GoS and the social status among the tribes (Abdul-Jalil, Azzain and Yousuf 2007, p. 39). The Numeiri government abolished civil administration replacing it with a popular local system of government which is, theoretically, based on a system of elected local councils. In practice it supports the system of central governance of the ruling party, which is the Sudanese Socialist Union (As Usual 2012). Implementing this new system has been difficult to relate to tribal and ethnic diversity, which was one of the most important attributes of society in Darfur. The regional governance system failed to implement the same roles that had been carried out by the Native Administration System in the past and at the same level of efficiency and effectiveness (Abdul-Jalil Azzain and Yousuf 2007, p. 60).

There have been repeated views that the decision to cancel civil administration has negatively affected the civil political and social scene in its entirety in Darfur. It is believed that the system has contributed to an increase in competition for leadership positions and regional parliamentary elections on a purely tribal basis. Politically, for instance, the local governance system has led to the perpetuation of the dominance of the ruling party in all aspects of life across the state. The other important issue is the abolition of the Hawakeer system of land tenure, which granted the leaders of the civil administration powers to act on the land (Mamdani 2010, p. 166). The central government has restricted these privileges by issuing law devolution whereby all unregistered land in official property records automatically reverts to state ownership and state eligibility. This has created serious problems as most of the land was not registered (El-Affendi 2009, p. 54). As a result, tribal conflicts have spread in light of the vacuum caused by the absence of the civil administration. However, despite attempts to restore conciliation conference systems as a mechanism to resolve disputes, it has not achieved any important successes (Al-Nahas 2005). Although there were attempts carried out by governments that followed the Numeiri
government to revive the civil administration system, they failed because of the developments in, and complexity of, real events (El-Affendi 2009, p. 54).

**B – Tribal Conflict over Power and the Political Polarisation of Some Tribes**

According to several political analysts and observers, the Darfur Crisis is a reflection of domestic political conflicts between internal Sudanese actors seeking power (Kalu 2010, p. 12). A large segment of interested tribal and political anthropologists argue that the underlying causes of conflicts and tribal wars that frequently break out in Darfur are political conflicts based on an increased tendency toward tribalism. The desire to obtain constitutional positions and the keenness of some intellectuals in Darfur to achieve their personal political aspirations and ambitions have fed tribal conflicts, and politicians have failed to attract people on the basis of party loyalty. Instead, they rely on tribal affiliations to run the political race for gaining constitutional positions as the only available option (El-Tigani 2005, pp. 72-74).

This has led to the fuelling of tribal conflicts and the shrinking of the role of the state and its institutions in extending its prestige and providing the necessary protection to its citizens. Thus, tribal affiliation has become the standard of political competition, rather than competence, programme or thought, which has contributed to the instability and the weaknesses of Darfur’s tribal structure (Idris 2006, p. 49). One of the most important movements of partisan polarisation that occurred in Sudan, in the period 1986 – 1989 during the Sadiq al-Mahdi’s rule is the framework of competition between the Umma Party (UP), led by Sadiq al-Mahdi. This focuses its activities on attracting Arab tribes stationed in the western Sudanese region, and the Democratic Unionist Party (led by Mohammed Merghani) who sought to win the loyalty of African tribes in the region (Mans 2004, p. 291). This competition polarised the loyalties of the tribes and different social groups – especially in times of elections – in exchange for political positions in the government if successful. This has deepened the differences between the political and social components in the region. It has also contributed to the increase of tribal strife in the absence of opportunities for real development to address the economic problems afflicting the region (Al-Nahas 2005).
As a consequence, tribes and civil departments evolved from social entities to political entities competing for power. Therefore, the conflicts in Darfur have turned from professional and productivity conflicts into ethnic and political conflicts. The tribe has become a major focus in the process of distribution of constitutional and executive positions. This, in turn, has encouraged aspirants to conduct political work in Darfur to affiliate more solidly with their tribes and ethnicities in order to gain positions through tribal and ethnic affiliations. Thus, the role of civil society organisations has been reduced. Instead, the tribal factor that is inconsistent with the developed civil societies has been activated (Beheiri 2010, p. 51). The tribe is a social entity which supports its members in difficult times, as well as defending and recovering their rights, even if it leads to tribal hostilities. This led to the inability of the state and its institutions to provide the necessary protection for its citizens. The tribe has become a sanctuary, in place of the police or judiciary, and thus, an appropriate environment to worsen the bilateral problems between tribes which led to the deterioration of state control and the transformation of tensions into armed conflicts (Mans 2004, p. 292).

However, many specialists in GoS political affairs believe that the differences and internal divisions that occurred in the National Islamic Front (NIF), the ruling party in 1999, have had a significant impact on the course of the worsening political situation in Darfur, due to the influence of al-Turabi on rebel groups. Most of the leaders in the ruling party, as well as some tribal leaders, were already a part of the Islamic movement and its spiritual leader Hassan al-Turabi (al-Turabi 14/01/2013). The New Islamic party, named the Popular Congress, was formed and led by al-Turabi (de Waal 2005c, p. 18). Al-Turabi has been accused by the authorities in Khartoum, and many observers, of fermenting the crisis and inciting groups to rebel against the GoS (Hoile 2006, p. 18).

Furthermore, the split within the ranks of the NIF, which occurred in 1999, contributed to the deteriorating political situation and the outbreak of armed hostilities in Darfur against the GoS. Several political leaders of the NIF come from Darfur. Some leaders of the political opposition to the current regime are also from

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17 The disputation over the issue of multiple references decision-making in the state led to the split of the ruling party into two parties: the National Congress Party headed by Omar al-Bashir, and the Popular Congress Party led by Hassan al-Turabi.
this region and their influence there is clear (Diraige 18/03/ 2013). Therefore, the political-military dimension is evident in the Darfur problem (Shnan 2005, p. 300). In support of this Mahmood Mamdani (2010, p. 198) argues that the split of Daoud Bolad (which occurred in 1990) was an important juncture in the region's conflicts. That split highlighted the division between settled and nomadic factions within Darfur that had important national and political implications. It was due to Bolad's awareness of the racial discrimination that the Sudanese elite made against him (Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 21).

Boland believed that the Islamic National Salvation government was tilting too much in favour of nomadic Arab tribes. Likewise, El-Affendi (2009, p. 12) argues that the Daoud Bolad split was due to disputes that erupted within the NIF within the Darfur sector where Yahya (Boland’s former student leader) was chosen as president of that sector in the mid-1980s. Nevertheless, Bolad was ruled out after the takeover of the military wing of the NIF, led by al-Turabi, on 30 June 1989 after financial, political and regulatory disputes which incited Bolad to rebel against the existing power at the time. This prompted a leading Fur member of the NIF, headed by Hassan al-Turabi, to defect from the movement with large numbers of the Fur and Zaghawa joining the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Sudan led by John Garang (al-Turabi 14/01/2013).

This act can also be represented as one of the root causes of the crisis. They received logistical and military training to demand that Khartoum grant the Darfur region its share of power, wealth and development. However, negotiations in Naivasha to resolve the problem of the south may have also played an important role in fuelling the crisis in Darfur. Another factor that further exacerbated the western rebellion was the SLA/JEM exploitation of the Naivasha Peace Accord18, which occurred at the same time to end the war in South Sudan and which was brokered by the international community (Tar 2006, p. 408). It was the appropriate time for each party to put more pressure on the GoS. In this context, a report issued on 24 August 2004 by the International Crisis Group demonstrates that:

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18 This was the agreement that ended more than twenty years of war between the GoS and the SPLA/SPLM in the southern Sudan.
“The Darfur situation poses an ever greater threat to the nearly finalised peace agreement to end the larger and older civil war between the government and the insurgent Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)” (Deadline 2004, p. 23).

“As long as Darfur festers, the chance remains for political forces in Khartoum opposed to the concessions that have been made in that negotiation to turn government policy back toward war” (Deadline 2004, p.23).

On the other hand, some scholars argue that this transformation from an agenda of demands to a political agenda is not the result of a natural evolution but rather reflects a political issue with specific features worth struggling for. Furthermore, there are those who see the Darfur Crisis as being driven, or instigated, by actors outside the region, specifically the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), which aims to weaken the position of the government negotiator in Naivasha.

C – Political Marginalisation of the Region

“The crisis is political and State-made. It results from the misadministration, abuse of authority, and economic greed of the governing elite, committed against the powerless Africans of Darfur” (El-Tigani 2004, p. 3).

A large part of the existing literature relating to the conflict in Darfur contends that what brought Darfur to humanitarian disaster in 2003 was mainly political marginalisation. According to this literature the key factors that created instability in Sudan, and particularly in Darfur, were the neglect and marginalisation practised by successive central governments since its independence in 1956. Scarcity of resources and uneven development policies and strategies have caused Darfur to become the most neglected region (Kalu 2010, p. 12). A prevailing idea is that the northerners have dominated power in Sudan since its independence in 1956. All significant positions, such as presidential and sovereign ministries, have never been given to anybody from Darfur (Abdulkarim 2005). Many scholars believe that the GoS has failed to achieve justice in the distribution of power. Political exclusion towards large parts of Sudan’s political components has been practised, so that they cannot fully participate political processes (Miller 2007).
In the absence of real democracy and clear politics, through which the rebels could effectively express their grievances, the rebels concluded that continued resistance by force was their only viable option (Miller 2007). The Darfur region has suffered from poor political, developmental and social policies executed by successive governments. The key problem for Sudan is its failure to create a strategic vision for building a truly nationalistic Sudanese state based on principles of equal citizenship (Deadline 2004). This failure has contributed to the spirit of sub-identities, based on ethnicity, religion or tribal affiliation, and their evolution to become political identities rather than remaining in the circle of cultural diversity within the community. As a consequence, different ethnic groups, such as the SLM and the JEM were formed. These rebel movements try to realise their demands by force (Mamdani 2010, p. 249).

The founding statement of the JEM, the biggest armed movement in Darfur, states that the movement aims to end racial discrimination in the curriculum of governance in Sudan, and to divide the portfolios and management of governmental and non-governmental institutions. It also commits to the distribution of all important functions in the state evenly between regions on the basis of population density, efficiency, and equal opportunities. Furthermore, it promises to choose the head of state and province governors through direct elections on the basis of the principle of one vote per person, taking into account the social balance in the states, including the state of Khartoum19. Importantly, details which contain some statistics that clarify how Sudan has been controlled by northern people and parties since independence are provided in the Black Book of Sudan (Yongo-Bure 2009). The authors state that, “This tiny population of the north contains several marginalised ethnic groups, such as the Manseer and the Mahas. The former represent the marginalised – Sudanese – Arabs while the latter the marginalised Nubian tranche. These and others are dominated by just three ethnic groups within the northern region, i.e., the Shaygia, the Jaalieen and the Danagla” (El-Tom 2011, p. 291).

The Black Book stresses unequal discrimination and how Sudan’s political and economic life, since independence, has been dominated by small ethnic groups from the three tribes Shaygia, Jaalieen, and Danagla, against the black African majority

19 See Founding Statement of the Justice and Equality Movement, Sudan http://www.sudanjem.com/sudan-alt/arabic/jemintern/basic_explanation/beyen.htm
This shows the skewed power in political and economic imbalances between Sudan’s Arab population, which is largely based in the north of the country, and its African peoples. The long-term crisis in Darfur is caused by the weak and unaccountable governance in Khartoum and its lopsided politics towards various ethnicities, not only in Darfur, but across the entire country (Badmus 2009).

Gabriel Bilal (22/10/2012) the spokesman of the JEM, states that the crisis erupted as a result of the existence of an imbalance of wealth and power prevalent since independence in 1956. He added that the main motivation for the outbreak of the crisis is to claim, and seek to restore, balance in the distribution of power and wealth not only for Darfur, but also for other regions. Bilal stresses that the JEM does not seek to make the Darfur province dominate the presidency, or the financial and personnel aspects of the state, or exclude other regions. Therefore they demand rights for Darfur as well as rights for others at the same time. Thus, all these factors led to the worsening of the situation in Darfur and the spread of violence and war. These factors have led to a transformation of the conflict from the level of the armed opposition to political movements against the central government to the level of civil war between the people of Darfur, both Arabs and Africans, where foreign hands play a subtle but important role.

**Foreign Factors of the Crisis**

The analysis of the various causes of the Darfur Crisis in the previous sections suggests that the Darfur Crisis is essentially a local crisis that has some external dimensions. The phases of the crisis have dramatically evolved and escalated, turning Darfur into a new flashpoint in Sudan. Continuation of the crisis and the inability to contain it in its early stages led to the transmission of the crisis from its local context to regional and international horizons. The involvement of regional and international powers, either directly or indirectly, has fuelled the crisis (O’Fahey 2006, p. 29). In this section, the external factors that have contributed to its escalation in western Sudan will be addressed, classified mainly as regional and international causes.
Regional Causes of the Crisis

Regional factors here specifically refer to those factors associated with geographic proximity to Darfur, embedded in countries with shared borders with the region, namely Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic. These factors can be addressed in the following key points.

First, social interactions with neighbouring countries: Many analysts believe that among the important factors that increase the complexity of the conflict in the region is the interaction of Darfurian tribes with other tribes living in the areas adjacent to the territory's neighbouring states (Libya, Chad and the Central African Republic), as a result of the joint ethnic roots shared by these tribes (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti 2010, p. 7). One of the most significant tribes to have extensions into neighbouring countries is the Zaghawa tribe. It is spread across Darfur, Chad, and Libya. The Albargo tribe, which is one of the Negro tribes, is also spread across Sudan and Chad. This situation helped to ease the transition on both sides of the border from one country to another (Al Ddla 2007, p. 44). Due to instability in the political and economic circumstances in Chad, more than three million Chadians have settled in Sudan, half of them in Darfur, specifically in the south-western border areas and eastern part of South Darfur. On several occasions these tribes from the Chad border are accused of being behind a lot of cases of lawlessness and the deterioration of stability in the region (Carmody 2009). They do not comply with or respect the restrictions and tribal customs applicable in Darfurian society. They are also accused of not being subject to the authority of the local administrations especially relating to land and the Hawakeer system (Haggar 2007, p. 115). Moreover, they often resort to the power of arms. This hostile behaviour by the intruders has often dragged the Darfurian community into violence and counter-violence. This then develops into conflicts which affect all the tribes of Darfur as a result of alliances and ethnic blocs, of which the most prominent are the Zurga and Arab alliances. These tribes are willing to provide all kinds of support to each other during their disputes against other tribes (El-Tigani 2005, p. 80). Thus, they are always affected by political interactions in neighbouring countries, especially in the cases of Libya and Chad, where Darfur was always a rear base for their conflicts. This, in turn, led to the presence of large quantities of weapons and military
equipment which some tribes on both sides used to strengthen their political and military position (Suliman 2008).

**Second, political instability in neighbouring countries:** Political instability in countries neighbouring Darfur has significantly contributed to the lack of security and instability in Sudan. It is argued that a mixture of domestic, political, and geopolitical issues are amongst the most important factors influencing the outbreak of the conflict and the continuing crises in Sudan, the Darfur Crisis being one of them. Additionally, at the same time, geopolitical factors can also be a factor to support efforts to find suitable adjustments to the crisis (Fuchs 2011, p. 9). Three important countries that may have had significant influence in the recent aggravation of the crisis in Darfur (Chad, Central African Republic and Eritrea) are investigated.

**a – The Conflict in Chad**

Internal conflicts between factions in countries that neighbour Darfur have fed the instability factors within it (Marchal and Bawtree 2006, p. 467). For instance, civil conflicts that Chad has witnessed, since the era of President Tmpelbaa, have left obvious marks in Darfur. The region became a scene of fighting and conflict among many regional and international powers (Libya, Egypt, France, and the USA) on the one hand, and internal factions on the other, that took shelter in Darfur (El-Affendi 2009, p. 43). Khartoum and N’Djamena have been engaged in an on-off proxy conflict using one another’s rebel movements since the Darfur conflict began in 2003. Khartoum has attempted, on multiple occasions, to destabilise or even overthrow the Déby regime through support of Chadian rebel movements (Tubiana and Walmsley 2008, p. 20). The conflict in Darfur is a reflection of the continuation of the civil war in Chad, not the opposite. The regional dimensions of these two crises, to some extent, are responsible for the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur (Marchal 2008, p. 429).
**b – The Political Relations of the Central African Republic (CAR) and Sudan**

Political instability in the CAR has negatively reflected on the stability of Darfur, especially with the presence of tribal stretches between the two sides (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti 2010, p. 2). The collapse of the African army, as a result of a recent coup that toppled President Ange Patassé, led to the escape of large numbers of his men, with their weapons, into Darfur – many of them were from Sudanese tribes (Debos 2008, p. 239). The CAR fears the impact of the events in Darfur and the GoS’s support for the followers of Patassé existing on its territory to recover the former regime, which was toppled in 2003 by a military coup led by current President François Bouziri (African Strategic Report 2006-2007). The CAR’s relations with France and its proximity to Chad and Darfur increase the likelihood of its involvement in international competition with Darfur as its theatre (Debos 2008, p. 240).

**c – The Eritrean Factor**

Despite the lack of a shared border between Eritrea (which gained independence in 1993) and Darfur, instability in Sudan-Eritrea relations has also importantly contributed to fuelling the conflict in Darfur. The regime in Asmara is accused by the Sudanese regime of supporting the armed movements and the escalation of the crisis (Morrison and de Waal 2005, p. 165). On the other hand, the GoS has been accused by Asmara of intervening in Eritrean affairs by supporting the opposition, represented by the Eritrean Islamic Jihad. This support comes in the form of an attempt to export the Islamic revolution and overthrow the government in Asmara, which led to the severing of relations between the two countries in 1994 (Mahmoud 2004, p. 9). Despite the resumption of relations in 1999 they quickly soured again after an attack on the town of Hameshkureb (located on the eastern border) in 2002. Sudan accused Eritrea of financially and militarily supporting the Free Lions and the forces of Beja tribes stationed in the eastern region of Sudan, as well as supporting the rebels in Darfur against the GoS. There are those who believe that Eritrea tried to
exploit the government's preoccupation with the tense situation in Darfur. It sought to convert the eastern province into a buffer zone to avenge the Eritrean opposition backed by Khartoum (Habib 2004). Other observers believe that Asmara has hidden interests and ambitions, particularly relating to agricultural land in the Sudanese areas (Beja and Kassala), which appeared in the secret plan issued by the Eritrean government in 1996 (Abul Khair 2006, p. 121). For details of Eritrea’s involvement, see Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 84.

**Third, Libyan-Chadian war and the dilemma of weapons proliferation:** Many academics argue that external actors have provided arms to tribes in Darfur to one or other of parties that are loyal (Libya and Chad). Libya has armed Arabic tribes in Darfur, while Chad and France have supported African tribes with money and arms (Behrends 2007, p. 99). Sudan under Jaafar Nimeiri, and Egypt during the era of Anwar Sadat, entered into an alliance against the alliance of Tripoli-Addis Ababa-Aden, which was an extension of the conflict between the two superpowers, the USA and USSR, during the Cold War (Marchal 2007, p. 183). In 1981 Libya supported the government of Gokony Oweidi against Hissene Habré who was forced to flee with his troops to Darfur and used it as a base for their military operations (Marchal and Bawtree 2006, p. 469). Habré also received support from Sudan and Egypt and their allies enabled him to reach power in Chad in 1981. Libya continued to support the oppositional Democratic Revolutionary Council in Chad, which used the border areas with Darfur as a launching point for military operations against the regime of President Habré (El-Affendi 2009, p. 43).

On the other hand, differences between Gaddafi and Nimeiri pushed Gaddafi to attempt to destabilise Sudan. To do so he supplied some tribes in Darfur with large quantities of arms. Despite the collapse of Nimeiri’s government in Sudan in 1985, as well as the defeat inflicted on the Libyan army by Chadian troops with the assistance of French troops in 1987, Libya continued to support opposition against the Habré regime via Sudanese territory (Marchal and Bawtree 2006, p. 468). This was with the consent of the new government, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, who was closely aligned with Gaddafi.20 Following their withdrawal from Chadian territory

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20 The alliance between Gaddafi and Sadiq Al-Mahdi is embodied in the establishment of the Islamic Legion in the eighties, which was considered the spearhead of Gaddafi’s strategy to spread Arab
(Aouzou Strip), Libyan forces left huge amounts of additional weapons and military hardware in Chad, especially in areas bordering Darfur. Darfur has been a rear base in Chadian internal conflicts. Most of the political and military coups that succeeded in Chad were launched from Darfur with the help of the GoS (El-Affendi 2009, p. 42). All these factors have helped in the spread of weapons and the increase of frictions between tribes, which developed political conflicts later evolving into clear ethnic conflicts (de Waal 2005).

Both geographic and historical tribal and political linkages between Darfur and surrounding areas have led to the dominance of tribalism and weakened the sense of national identity for Darfurians. During their conflicts, both Arab and African tribes have been associated with third parties who provided money and weapons which were later used in rebellions against the GoS. For example, the conflict that broke out between Arabs and Masalit in West Darfur in 1998–2001. The main armed movements that declared rebellion against the central GoS were mainly from tribes that have extensions in Chad, Libya, and the CAR (Prunier and Ababa 2008, p. 9). Giroux, Lanz, and Sguaitamatti (2009) argue that “the conflicts in Darfur, eastern Chad, and north-eastern CAR have become so interwoven that they are scarcely separable from one another and actually form one regional conflict system rather than three distinct conflicts” (Giroux, Lanz, and Sguaitamatti 2009, p. 1). All these regional factors, along with the internal factors dealt with previously, contributed to the outbreak of the crisis in 2003.

- **International Causes of the Crisis**

Some see the presence of another contributing factor that has external dimensions and has led to the aggravation of the crisis. This factor is represented in the ambitions and foreign interests of influential states in the international community such as the USA, UK, China and France and their role in the Darfur Crisis, which has been interpreted as putting pressure on the GoS in an attempt to marginalise it in the region and involve themselves instead (Mamdani 2010, p. 22). However, it is nationalism and Islamic Africa. It explains Gadhafi's association with the establishing of Janjaweed in Darfur and supporting them with money and weapons.
difficult to say that the Darfur Crisis was caused by foreign parties, whether regional or international. It can be argued that external actors (such as the USA, Libya, and others) took advantage of the events and employed them as justifications for intervention and influence in the crisis (Fuchs 2011, p. 54). Deterioration in the humanitarian situation in the region was the main argument used to justify intervention and to put pressure on the parties of the conflict in line with the strategic interests of these external actors (Fawole 2004, p. 300).

Due to the development of events, and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation on the ground, more obstacles have emerged leading to an increase in difficulties to contain and resolve the problem (Kamel 2009, p. 21). This has had a significantly, negative impact on the stability of Sudan and neighbouring countries. Some international powers have become effective actors in the crisis. In general, external interference has aggravated the situation in Darfur and its continuity as well as its transition from the local level to the international level (Al Ddla 2007, p. 129). This is represented in the reactions of these parties towards the crisis and the policies that they pursue.

These practices mostly flow into the scope of insisting on intervention and influence in events on the ground which would undermine the peace process and serious attempts to ending the crisis. Western powers have regarded the Darfur Crisis as the worst humanitarian catastrophe in the twenty-first century. This pushed the USA and some of western Human Rights organisations to describe the reality in Darfur as genocide and ethnic cleansing of the African race in the region by the GoS and its supporters from Arab tribes, or Janjaweed. Despite the main focus of this study is not on the role of the major powers such as the USA, UK and China in the Darfur Crisis, which has a significant impact on what is going on in Darfur and is very important to look at, this will be highlighted in more details in chapter five.
Conclusion

Previous analysis has focused on the internal and external factors that have significantly contributed to the exacerbation of the Darfur Crisis. It seems that it is difficult to attribute the causes of the crisis to just one or two elements, since it has multiple and varied dimensions. Past and present political, social, and economic dimensions both domestic and international are all dimensions that have influenced this crisis. The Darfur Crisis has historic accumulations and the region has witnessed several such tensions since ancient times. Given the evolution of the economic reality of Sudan the importance of Darfurians’ focusing on pastoral activity has become more than focusing on agricultural activity and crops. This has led to many frictions and differences between the tribes, who often adopt a different lifestyle.

The social aspect has also played an important role in raising the tensions that led to the crisis. The tribal environment that characterises the region in particular and Sudan in general, often generates feuds, loyalties, and biases to certain authorities and opposition to others. Likewise, ethnic divisions and different social identities have contributed to the complexity of the situation in the region, especially at times of tribal crisis. The central government in Khartoum also bears a great deal of responsibility in the deterioration of the social and political reality in Darfur. Successive governments have used their power to secure support for policies against their opponents, whether in Darfur or in other parts of the country, especially in facing challenges of the war in the south. Conflicts between political parties have played an important role in influencing the social groups from different races and affiliations, which has had a negative impact on the social fabric and unity in the province. Furthermore, the absence of developmental policies has decreased the opportunities available for overcoming the economic dilemmas as well as the deterioration of living conditions for the people of the province.

The inability of the state in Sudan to extend its control and influence over all components of the society has often led to an increase in violence and resulted in the collapse of official institutions of the state. Instead, it promotes social institutions and
tribal formations, which tend to resort to the language of arms in addressing problems and disputes arising from that environment. This environment is exacerbated by the failure of the state to broadcast the feeling among its citizens that it is able to protect them, along with the central government’s adoption of particular social components in facing growing problems by arming them in the form of bodies such as the People's Defence and the national police (Appiah-Mensah 2005, p. 8). This has encouraged other social groups to seek various means to protect themselves, with arms being the main instrument. For warring groups access to weapons is not difficult, especially in Darfur.

Similarly, external factors have played an important role in escalating and developing the stages of the Darfur Crisis. Domestic conflicts have been characterised in Africa by resorting to the adoption of armed resolutions and leaving the peaceful political alternatives within constitutionally legitimate channels (Niama 2005, p. 325). The inability of central governments to deal crucially with conflicts in the early stages gives the opportunity for these differences to move from their local circles to regional and international ones to achieve equilibrium in the balance of power. This is precisely what has happened in Darfur. Thus, any attempts to resolve the crisis without considering all these factors together would be both an ineffective and indecisive.

The following chapters will also attempt to understand and foresee the key internal and external influential actors that have contributed to the prolongation of the war in the region. The political strategies of rebel leaders and Khartoum, as well as interventions by foreign powers such as Libya, will also be addressed, for a better understanding of the interplay of the most prominent actors’ interests, mechanisms and actions, and how they have impacted on the termination of the violence. The social and political dynamics which fuel the ongoing crisis will also be taken into account.
Chapter 4

Intra-Rebel Divergence, Third-party Intervention and the Duration of the Darfur Crisis

Introduction

Chapter three showed how multiple internal and external factors have exacerbated the humanitarian situation and caused the eruption of the Darfur Crisis in 2003. It opened up new perspectives for determining the key domestic actors involved in the conflict in Darfur, as well as analysing different key mechanisms which have been adopted, and how they have impacted the course, duration, and opportunities for peace-making in the region by the relevant parties handling the crisis. This chapter examines the conflict in Darfur by analysing the impact of divergence in the domestic combatants’ views, attitudes, goals and interests upon conflict resolution. It also investigates the effect of external intervention on the duration of intrastate armed conflict as a form of crisis management. Cunningham (2010) argues that external state intervention in interstate armed conflict in the pursuit of a specific agenda which is separate from the goals of the internal combatants inhibits conflict resolution. Furthermore, external states usually do not have the same incentives as the insurgents to negotiate. Their anticipation of gaining from such negotiation tends to be less than that of domestic insurgents. This chapter answers the question of what happens to the duration of warfare that involves ethnic and religious diversity and tribal societies, and when domestic combatants (whether rebel movements or the government) have agendas which are different from one another. In this regard, an additional theoretical model is developed.
This model shows that: *when external states intervene with a separate agenda in internal armed conflicts that involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are multiple armed opposition groups, the likelihood of prolonging the duration of the crisis is higher.* (see figure No: 4).

Figure No: 4 the theoretical model of chapter four
The overall argument in this chapter is that when an armed conflict contains more than one armed group active against the government, there will be a plurality of agendas, leadership figures, insights and mechanisms among the rebel groups to end the conflict. These are very likely to be affected by the interests of their ethnic groups or tribes and, occasionally, by personal goals. Additionally, this type of intrastate war often causes intra-insurgent conflicts leading to an emergence of still further armed groups with new goals, insights, and mechanisms of resolution. This in turn allows external actors to intervene to achieve particular interests or ends which can substantially prolong the armed conflict. To verify the applicability of this theoretical model and to give it more explanatory power, it is applied to the internal combatants in Darfurian society. To achieve this task the key internal parties of the Darfur Crisis, their adopted strategic mechanisms, and the influence of divisions between them on the duration of the crisis are considered.

The Key Domestic Actors to the Conflict in Darfur

Given the worsening conditions in the region caused by the different factors mentioned in the previous chapter, particularly those linked to the political competitions between the political parties, the rebel movements in the region have clearly emerged. Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013), the private peace consultant of president al-Bashir and responsible for the Darfur file and the former head of the governmental negotiation team from 2008–2010, emphasises that there is no doubt that the high degree of awareness that occurred amongst the youth of Darfur – because of higher education, which has not been matched by the equivalent availability in jobs – has created a layer of educated and aggrieved Darfurians who aspire to certain rights. This brought about a suitable environment for the insurgency and revolution.

The main theme that has prevailed among these elites in Darfur is that the dominance of small groups from northern Sudan, who have ruled Sudan since independence in 1956, was the primary reason for the deteriorating situation in the region and the current crisis (El-Tom 2011, p. 231). They were dissatisfied with this dominance
especially with the absence of development in their region (Salih 2005, p. 7). The political competition between the two largest sectarian and traditional political parties in the late 1980s – The Umma Party (UP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) – dominates the political scene and the executive branch. The focus on achieving their partisan interests to the neglect of the development of the region has led to their failure to rule the country democratically and equally. The UP and the DUP are accused of caring less about the marginalised tribes in provinces such as Darfur than focusing on winning votes in Darfur (El-Affendi 2009, p. 56).

These reasons and others that led to the eruption of the rebellion in Darfur were discussed previously in Chapter three. The beginning of the military rebellion in Darfur 2003 was initiated by both the Darfur Liberation Movement (DLM) (changed later to Sudan Liberation Movement) and the JEM from the Jebel Marra (the highest plateau in Sudan). The rebels took the mountain as a base from which to launch their armed attacks on government forces and carried out attacks on police forces, positions, vehicles, and government institutions. Despite the multiple opposition movements and the tangle of internal parties in the conflict in Darfur, two categories of domestic parties, which are directly responsible for the aggravation of internal armed conflict and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Darfur, are identifiable. These are the GoS on one side and the rebel movements on the other. There are three key activist insurgencies in the territory. These are the SLM, led by Abdul Wahid Nour, the SLM/A (the armed wing of the SLM), led by Minni Arco Minnawi, and the JEM, led by Jibril Ibrahim, who assumed the leadership of the movement after the death of its leader and founder, his brother Khalil Ibrahim (Minnawi 10/11/2012).

- The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)

This movement emerged in July 2002 in the area of Golo in Jebel Marra after a series of sporadic military operations carried out against the Sudanese army under the name of "the Darfur Liberation Army". It officially declared itself in February 2003 under the name of "the Sudan Liberation Movement" (Salem 2004). Different sources suggest that the adoption of the new name was on the recommendation of John
Garang, leader of the SPLM in the south, and suggests the shared relationship and nationalist visions that combine the two movements (de Waal 2005a). This movement is formed of individuals belonging to three major non-Arab tribes, the Fur, Zaghawa, and Masalit, in addition to some groups that belong to other tribes. In March 2003 the general conference of the SLM was held in the Jebel Marra area to form an agreement regarding the distribution of leadership positions within the movement. Under this agreement the post of head of the movement and political leadership was given to the Fur tribe, led by lawyer Abdul Wahid Nour. The military leadership was given to the Zaghawa tribe, led by Abdullah Abkar and then by Mini Arco Minnawi after the former's death in 2004. While the position of vice president was given to the Masalit tribe, represented by Mansour Arbab, he was later replaced by Khamis Abdullah. Most of the movement’s leaders were military officers in the Chadian and Sudanese armies (Ahmed 2007).

The formation of the armed movement was a result of the policies of marginalisation and racial discrimination, exploitation and division, which have been practised by the successive Sudanese governments, both civil and military, towards the region. The SLM believes that governments have strengthened tribal ethnic factors when they recruited some Arab tribes to fight non-Arab tribes. This was worsened further, sometimes to the extent of ethnic cleansing, in some areas of Darfur in what was once a safe and stable region – according to the allegations of the leaders of the movement who emphasise that these policies culminated in the arrival of the Inqad government to power in 1989 (Minnawi 10/11/2012).

The movement’s main demands are the prevention of the nomadic militias from carrying out armed attacks against settled tribes. The GoS's refusal to implement this requirement has led the movement towards armed action and raising the ceiling of its demands (Willemse 2005). Further calls for the removal of marginalisation of the region and its development, equitable political representation in the central government, and abolition of the division of Darfur into three states in favour of one province, have become the key demands of the movement. The SLM is regarded as one of the most active movements in Darfur, especially at the military level (Minnawi 10/11/2012). Most of the military actions which have been committed against the government army in Darfur are ascribed to the SLM, because of the power and effectiveness of its military wing (Brooks 2008). This efficiency was not
equalled by the same level of political effectiveness, which was the main factor that led to the movement’s later split into two factions (Minnawi 10/11/2012). The aim was to disavow any intention to separate Darfur from Sudan and, secondly, an assurance that the embryonic SLM would declare itself a political movement and not an anti-Arab militia (Flint and de Waal 2008, p. 82)

Flint and de Waal (2008, p. 86) have demonstrated that significant disputes between Abdul Wahid Nour and Minnawi appeared when the government surrounded Abdul Wahid’s forces in the south of Jebel Marra early in 2004. Minnawi refused to send reinforcements to aid the Fur leader who had to resort to the SPLA, which airlifted them to Nairobi. This event negatively affected trust and caused deterioration in relations between the two leaders and their tribes, leading to fierce fighting between the former allies, as happened on 15 January 2009. A general congress of the movement, held 29–31 October 2005, resulted in the split into two factions: the political led by Abdul Wahid Nour (Flint and de Waal 2008), and the military led by Minnawi (Ahmed 2007, p. 18). On 5 May 2006 the SLA signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with the GoS in Abuja. Whereby, Minnawi became the senior aide to the Sudanese president as well as president of the transitional authority for Darfur (Jooma 2011, p. 1). While Abdul Wahid Nour refused to sign (Flint 2006). This refusal was also a result of the same differences in perspectives among the leaders during the negotiations (discussed in more detail below).

- The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)

The JEM is classified as an Islamist movement whose Islamic orientation has strong local support among the Zaghawa tribe (de Waal 2005a, p. 128). It is reported that the founder, former regional health minister in Darfur during the 1990s Khalil Ibrahim, is an Islamist which indicates that religious diversity in Darfur is not an issue (Suleiman 2011, pp. 6-8). However, Khalil Ibrahim’s theological orientation has been regarded as one reason for defections within the JEM (Bechtold 2009, p. 151). The origins of the JEM are controversial. The GoS and others believe that the JEM has been a “stalking horse” for Hassan Al-Turabi, the godfather of the NIF, since the split in 1999 (Suleiman 2011, p. 34). Khalil Ibrahim, now chairman of the
movement, insists that it is an entirely independent movement, deeply rooted in all regions (de Waal 2005a, p. 88). Many of the movement’s leaders still believe that Islamic values can be the model solution to many of Sudan’s problems. Thus, the JEM has attracted members from across the political spectrum (de Waal 2005b, p. 89).

The JEM was established after the split occurred in the Islamist-reference ruling National Congress Party (NCP) in 1999 (Al-Turabi 14/01/2013). It is believed that this armed opposition group is comprised largely of non-Arab, black African members from Western Sudan, mostly from the ethnic Zaghawa tribe. It also has some others from non-Arab tribes like the Masalit who believe that the regime in Khartoum backs the Arab tribes in the province. Unlike the SLM, the JEM has a powerful political agenda. It provides its own perceptions about the possibility of how the political regime should be. Its vision is founded on a united Sudan within a federal formula. According to JEM leaders, Sudan should be divided into seven federal states: Khartoum, Darfur, the South, East, North, Kordofan and the Centre. The post of the president of the country should be rotated between the seven states (Salih 2008, p. 8).

On the other hand, Gérard Prunier (2008, p. 5) states that several splits have emerged within the JEM, forming new movements: The Darfur Independence Front/Army (DIF/A); The National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD); The National Redemption Front (NRF); JEM-Wing for Peace (JEM-WFP); and JEM-Collective Leadership (JEM-CL). These splits have been caused by varying political visions among the leaders of the rebel movements in Darfur towards a comprehensive solution that should be adopted to end the catastrophic situation. This has importantly influenced the paths and courses of the peace process. The impact of this phenomenon on the mechanisms adopted by domestic parties to end the crisis, as well as on the duration of the crisis, will be discussed in more detail below.
The Mechanisms of the Sudanese Government to Solve the Crisis

Internal crises management policies of African countries, especially in those with a high incidence of disputes and conflicts, are often characterised as resorting to military options before peaceful and legitimate ones to deal with such conflicts (Kalu 2010, p. 10). Thus, the rebel parties in light of the inability of the central government to deal effectively and peacefully with the crisis, and their inability to achieve military success, results in the potential for the development of complex crises. Therefore, expectations to end the crisis within a peaceful framework seem weak (Niama 2005, p. 327). Because of various countries' failures to reach a comprehensive settlement with rebel movements, this often leads them to resort to the military option. Moreover, rebels usually start searching for external parties to support this trend and maintain its continuity to obtain the objectives of the insurgency (Niama 2005, p. 325). In its quest to eliminate the rebel movements and end the Darfur Crisis, and in an attempt to contain the local, regional, and international fallout of the crisis, the Sudanese government has adopted – since its acknowledgement of the crisis and the existence of political opposition – various mechanisms which are marked with some overlap and complexity. This part of the study focuses on the mechanisms and methods that have been adopted by the regime in Khartoum. It attempts to answer two main questions: does the GoS manage the crisis or manage the crisis by developing counter-crises? Then, how has that contributed to the duration of the crisis? In order to understand this it would be useful to identify the key mechanisms adopted by the GoS to maintain the developments and changes that have accompanied the crisis since its early stages.

It is difficult to differentiate between the parties who manage the crisis for ending the crisis and those who manage the continuation of the Darfur Crisis, because of the overlap between the two behaviours of all local parties in particular (Omar 2008, p. 185). However, despite the difficulty in distinguishing this, it is possible to approach the asymptotic description and to determine the attributes of the style of management of each party through the mechanisms adopted for managing the crisis. Each party tries to influence the crisis in accordance with its own agenda and its strategic
objectives that essentially are aimed at winning the conflict. The regime in Khartoum has described the crisis as part of an international conspiracy which seeks to break up Sudan, accusing opposition movements as in-house tools to implement this and provide political cover for it (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). On the other hand, the major rebel armed movements in the province have described the crisis as a turning point towards ending the marginalisation suffered by the province, and the equitable sharing of power and wealth, taking advantage of the human dimension of the crisis to use pressure through the concepts of ethnic cleansing and genocide, as well as deliberate abuses of human rights (Omar 2008, p. 185).

It is noteworthy that this radical difference in describing and understanding the causes and dimensions of the crisis significantly contributed to determining a different method of crisis management by each party of the conflict, which has essentially affected the continuation of the civil war. Furthermore, it has resulted in the adoption of various mechanisms which have had a great impact on the inability of the warring sides to clearly control the crisis and reshape reality in Darfur, in ways that serve the goals and interests of each party. Additionally, it can be contended that relying on the dominant features of the standard behaviour of each internal party to the crisis works to put the GoS on the side that runs the crisis. To address the effectiveness of these mechanisms and their impact on the long duration of the crisis – despite the strong overlap between the mechanisms that the GoS has resorted to in the management of the Darfur Crisis in all its dimensions – this analytical part will focus on the key adopted governmental mechanisms, which have been classified into three main categories: militarising the solution; Sudanisation of the solution; and then Khartoum’s insistence on addressing the crisis in the African context.

- **Militarising the Solution**

The rebellion in Darfur has been considered an expression of the struggle of the Darfuri people against the inequality in the distribution of power and wealth in the hands of a small group – from tribes that do not have the weight of a large demographic base – in controlling the country. The GoS's first reaction was negative.
The Khartoum government initially played down the importance of the rebellion in Darfur, considering it an attempt to undermine the peace process that was going on in Naivasha in Kenya to end the civil war in the south, supported by the USA and the EU. It had ignored the rebel movement’s demands, refusing to recognise them as an opposition movement, and refused to negotiate with these groups (Tar 2005, pp. 107-108). This contributed to an increase in the congestion of rebel groups which led to an escalation in their attacks. These assaults became more dangerous to Sudanese national security and territorial integrity – especially after the SLM and the JEM united their military operations and initiated a series of successful attacks on governmental institutions and forces in El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, in April 2003 (Ismail 13/01/2013). This resulted in significant damage to state property, police stations and military infrastructure, as well as significant military losses for the government (Young, Osman and Dale 2007, p. 827).

In this context of a series of mistakes made by the GoS that contributed to fuelling the crisis in the region, is the dealing with the insurgency as a concern of security breakdown. The central government's refusal to open up dialogue with the rebels and to recognise them as an opposing movement but rather to consider these rebel groups as bandits, led it to adopt the military solution to resolving the crisis (Kamel 2009, p. 16). It seems that the Khartoum regime wanted to eliminate the rebellion quickly with minimal losses through a military solution.

This view is confirmed by Sadiq Al-Mahdi (10/01/2013) who claims that one of the reasons that led to the continuation of the crisis is that the GoS had not committed to peace and made significant concessions to the rebels, fearing that could accelerate a change of the composition of the regime in Khartoum. President al-Bashir has been told that the government will crush the rebels and the rebellion by using all military measures. This reaction has reduced the possibility of access to peaceful solutions to address the issue and opened the door to all armed options (Kamel 2009, p. 17). Another blunder committed by the government in its management of the crisis is its mobilisation of different tribes. The GoS has armed the Janjaweed militia, using it as a counterweight in putting down the insurgency (Young, Osman and Dale 2007, p. 827).
According to Abdel Aziz Mahmoud (16/01/2013), a Sudanese journalist and academic at Alzaiem Alazhari University in Khartoum, the government has merged these militias into so-called People's Defence Forces, which are treated as regular forces and provided with arms and money. Furthermore, it is reported that the GoS has employed some elements of the Chadian armed opposition on Sudanese territory (Al Ddla 2007, p. 93). The Janjaweed has become the military arm of the government, with advanced weapons, in Darfur. As a consequence, the Janjaweed transformed from small groups – previously relying on looting, armed robbery and fighting in Jebel Marra to acquire local influence – into an organised and trained militia, under the control of the official Sudanese army (Tar 2005a, p. 109).

Additionally, the government’s response is considered an expression of ethnic strategy and the central government's hidden agendas instead of working to ease ethnic tension, when the Khartoum government armed the Janjaweed at the expense of stable agricultural groups from non-Arab tribes (Tar 2005a, p. 106). Although Sudan has repeatedly insisted that there are no systematic and deliberate assaults against civilians by its regular and other armed groups operating under its control (Olsson and Siba 2009, p. 3), it is widely argued that the measures taken to counter the insurgency in Darfur have been in blatant violation of international law, and Sudan has failed to protect the rights of its own people (Yihdego 2009, p. 12).

So it seems, in light of the above, the GoS has chosen a military solution to crush the rebellion in order to pave the way for a peaceful settlement in the framework of a national conference. Despite military success, Khartoum failed politically, which significantly increased the gap with the rebel groups. With the deterioration of the humanitarian and security situations in the province, the Khartoum government realised the ineffectiveness of its military strategy in ending the insurgency. This has redirected the government and pushed Khartoum to soften its line and adopt greater political and diplomatic options as mechanisms to manage the crisis, as well as opening a dialogue on Darfur with most of the rebel parties, whilst keeping the military option available whenever necessary. The recognition of the existence of political opposition was the first feature, which forms a significant shift in the GoS's attitude towards the crisis and its mechanisms for resolving it.
Sudanising the Crisis

After the Darfur issue became highlighted in western media, the main technique of the GoS became its keenness to prevent the internationalisation of the crisis. The GoS has always been assiduous in its attempts to keep the crisis within the domestic Sudanese framework, in order to maintain its ability to control the course of the crisis and the possibility of imposing its vision for a political solution on the rebel parties to address the problem. In this context, the government took a number of measures to bring together the views of both sides to contain the crisis. The GoS initiated a series of talks with rebels in the border town of Abeche in Chad on 3 September 2003. At the end of these talks, a cease-fire agreement between the government and the SLA aiming to settle down the situation in Darfur was signed (Al Ddla 2007, p. 180). This was the first time that the GoS had dealt politically with the armed rebel movements under the auspices of the Chadian government (Musa 2009, p. 131). Neither side abided by the cease-fire agreement, which encouraged the rebels to seek international observers. This was the first indicator of armed movements seeking to internationalise the crisis (Raafat 2004, p. 93).

In an attempt to confirm the GoS's principle of good faith and to maintain the peaceful and political option, President al-Bashir launched an initiative for self-containment of the crisis (Abul Khair 2006, p. 72). Although many domestic and international parties welcomed the initiative, it was rejected by the rebels. They insisted on entering into serious negotiations with the government under international auspices outside Sudan, which is a key party in the conflict (Al-Hayat 10 February 2004). However, the government justified its refusal by emphasising its desire to solve the problem within the framework of the National Conference of the Whole, called the Bashir Initiative (Omar 2008, p. 189).

On 18 February 2004 President al-Bashir issued a presidential decree for the formation of a national committee to prepare for the National Conference for Development and Peace, formed of 80 people and chaired by Izzedine Al-Said. The Preparatory Committee was exposed to many criticisms from the political forces involved. For instance, the UP, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, announced its withdrawal from the Preparatory Committee and challenged the nationalism and neutrality of the
committee; he described it as an advisory committee to the ruling regime (Al-Mahdi 10/01/2013). Furthermore, al-Bashir allowed the commission direct contact and dialogue with the rebels (Raslan 2004, p. 158). However, the JEM announced its boycott of the conference and insisted that their demands be negotiated on neutral territory and under international auspices (Habibullah 2004, pp. 204-205). Despite the GoS’s attempts to address the crisis at home emphasising that it is a domestic issue, it has failed to do so.

In contrast, rebel groups have succeeded in exporting the crisis beyond the borders of Sudan (Raafat 2004, p. 93). This is addressed in more detail in the mechanisms of rebel parties to manage the conflict. The GoS has continued to take several peace measures and formed a number of committees that reflect the government's desire to end the crisis. First was the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry formed by the Sudanese National Council on 1 December 2003, which was tasked with the promotion of peace, security, and development in Darfur. Secondly, the Sudan National Investigation Commission was formed as a result of a decision by al-Bashir on 8 May 2004. Its mission is to collect information on cases of violations committed by armed groups against human rights in Darfur, and to determine the causes and the effects of such violations if proved. Thirdly, the Committee Against Rape was formed by the Minister of Justice on 28 July 2004, to verify the claims of rape and sexual assaults (Omar 2008, pp. 190 – 194). Fourth, the Sudan People's Initiative for a peaceful settlement to end the conflict in Darfur was announced by President al-Bashir on 22 January 2009 (Al Ddla 2009-2010, p. 295). Finally, in August 2010 the Sudanese President called for another initiative: the New Strategy for Darfur Peace. This strategy centred on tribal reconciliation to push forward the development and peace processes in Darfur (Salahuddin 15/01/2013).

Despite numerous attempts made by the GoS to demonstrate flexibility and responsiveness through several mechanisms and by the launching of initiatives to resolve the Darfur Crisis, the effectiveness of these efforts has been limited. These initiatives have not exceeded the phase of political slogans and conference rhetoric. Moreover, they did not turn into effective programmes capable of changing the reality, which shows the extent of the government's inability to contain the crisis locally (Al-Ddla 2009-2010, p. 280). There is no doubt that the GoS is primarily responsible for this national crisis, but the responsibility does not fall on the GoS
alone. Rather, it is shared by non-united factions in Darfur. The loss of trust between the two sides has had an important impact on all negotiations and agreements that are reached between Khartoum and the rebels, and this was clear from the changing demands of the armed movements. The intransigence of negotiation teams led to delay in finding a solution. In contrast, rebels demanded that Darfur should be considered as one province and that they should be given one vice president and a percentage of the ministries according to the proportion of the population of the region. These demands were not approved by Khartoum. This clearly shows that there are radical differences between the agendas of every party to the conflict behind handling the crisis.

- **Africanising the Solution**

Besides coordination between the GoS and the Arab League on many occasions to find a way out of the Darfur dilemma and to prevent its internationalisation, the GoS has sought vigorously to limit the scope of Darfur Crisis management in the African context. Khartoum has adopted mechanisms of coordination with neighbouring African countries (Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, and Libya). Another important mechanism is to accept African mediation under the umbrella of the AU. Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) has said that Sudan is still convinced that it is a crisis which can be dealt with locally. But the inability to keep away foreign hands has forced Khartoum to accept the regional role of the international peacekeepers already deployed in Darfur, UNAID and African leadership. Africans are more familiar with the conflict and can prevent Western intervention in the conflict. The AU has played a pivotal role in dealing directly with the Darfur Crisis as a regional organisation dealing with issues of peace and stability in Africa. This crisis has featured at several AU Summits (Haddad 5 December 2012).

A trend of the AU on the Darfur Crisis has centred on prioritising an African solution with a call to the international community to assist in the effort to end the humanitarian tragedy in the region and to reach a political settlement. During the three years from 2004 to 2006 the AU was heavily involved in the Darfur Crisis, either by adopting the peace negotiations in Abuja and Addis Ababa, or by holding
mini-summits, or the composition of and sending in of military force to Darfur. The most prominent result of the AU effort and mediation was the establishment of an international commission to monitor the ceasefire in 2004 (Bergholm 2009, p. 114).

However, it seems that the parties to the conflict were not enthusiastic enough about the AU mediation. The GoS was keen to tackle the crisis domestically, or at least within the framework of the AU, as Khartoum believes that Africans have enough experience in dealing with such conflicts. The GoS also want to avoid any Western intervention that would threaten the security and unity of Sudan. Armed movements questioned the integrity of the African mediator and his ability to act impartially. Jibril Bilal (22/10/2012), the official spokesman of the JEM, confirmed that the GoS and its military intelligence were able to influence the African mediator.

This has prompted the AU to address each successive international resolution issued by the UNSC and international peace in Darfur by condemnation and rejection or lack of recognition, especially regarding decisions trying to address the Darfur file under Chapter VII resolutions of the ICC. Because the AU did not have a clear alternative resolution, its efforts have faced a lot of difficulties in achieving its mission (Kalu 2010, pp. 20–21). The absence of strong international support and the lack of AU logistics, capabilities, and modern communication tools has also contributed to the continuation of atrocities in the region, as well as to the refugee camps (Raslan 2006b, p. 184).

- **Managing the Dimensions of Internationalising the Crisis**

After the GoS had been exposed to considerable international pressure – especially after the issuance of UNSC Resolution 1564, adopted on 18 September 2004 – to send a mission from the UN to Darfur to investigate human rights abuses, the government realised that the internationalisation of the crisis could not now be prevented. Thus, the GoS resorted to the adoption of a number of political tactics to handle the international dimensions of the crisis as follows:
1) The Prevarication and Diplomatic Manoeuvre Method

While it is clear that the GoS showed an important flexibility in the approval and acceptance of some of the decisions of the UN, at the same time it did not commit to the application of those resolutions (International Crisis Group 8 Mar 2005). For example, the GoS did not fulfil its obligation under UNSC Resolution 1556 to disarm the Janjaweed (De Waal 2007a, p. 1050). Although the GoS agreed to this resolution it highlighted the need for more time, financial aid and technical support in order to disarm the Janjaweed militia. However, Khartoum did not act immediately to disarm and disband the militias and bring those responsible for their crimes to justice (Gberie 2011, pp. 2–8). Also, Sudan complained that resolution 1706 gives the international forces powers and functions for using all forms of military force. It also gives them the right to monitor and evaluate the performance of government agencies, which means complete disregard for the GoS as a genuine party to the solution. Khartoum saw this as the occupation of Darfur and as a step on the road towards the division of Sudan. This reflects the government's desire to gain more time to end the conflict and enter into negotiations and arrangements with the UN and the international community (Bellamy and Williams 2006, p. 152).

2) Questioning the Intentions of Some Members of the International Community

The government adopted a method of waiving risks that threatened the Naivasha agreement and the peace process in the south, in response to increased international pressure. The central GoS often maintained that the exertion of pressure on it over Darfur and Naivasha concurrently increases the possibility of deposing President al-Bashir and unravelling the security structures in Sudan, thus jeopardising the Naivasha negotiations (Ramuhala 2011, p. 45). Sudan's government sought to promote the idea that some international powers wanted to repeat the Western intervention in Iraq under the pretext of human rights violations in Darfur, in order to overthrow the ruling regime in Khartoum. This was clear from the reaction of the
GoS to UNSC Resolution 1556, which outlined economic and diplomatic sanctions without resorting to the use of armed force. The GoS viewed the decision as a declaration of war on Sudan and a move to pave the way for US-British aggression. Furthermore, Khartoum considered resolutions 1564 and 1706, which dealt with the crisis in the framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as steps towards escalation, and as being against the GoS's efforts to resolve the crisis (African Strategic Report 2006-2007, p. 152).

3) Mobilising Internal and External Public Opinion

The GoS adopted a method of mobilising Sudanese and Islamic public opinion into the belief that Sudan is the victim of an international conspiracy which seeks to fragment Sudanese unity. The ruling party organised demonstrations which denounced the international resolutions. Military presentations have also been organised to demonstrate the ability of Sudan to address any military intervention which violates the sovereignty of the state (SudanTribune 2012b). The GoS succeeded in mobilising Islamic support around the world to defend the adopted Islamic political project (Al Ddla 2007, p. 175).

4) Showing Flexibility towards International Positions

The GoS has been accused of complicity to liquidate African tribes using the Janjaweed and also of being unable to protect ethnic minorities in Darfur and extend state authority (African Strategic Report 2006-2007, p. 183). Khartoum authorities announced trials for the elements involved in the violence in Darfur (Al-Ddla 2007, p. 146). Moreover, the central GoS showed a positive attitude towards the deployment of French troops on the border between Chad and Sudan in August 2004 (Renaux 2012). The GoS recognised – under international pressure, especially from the USA – the scale of the problem and asked the international community for relief support for refugees and displaced people. However, Khartoum refused to recognise the causes which had led to their displacement (Al Ddla 2007, p.115).
5) Rejecting the Resolutions of the International Criminal Court

The GoS has refrained from responding to the arrest warrant issued by the ICC on 31 March 2005, to arrest some governmental officials, such as Ahmed Haroun, State Minister for Humanitarian Affairs in Sudan and Ali Abdel Rahman Kushayb, field commander of the Janjaweed (Reynolds 2010). It has also refused to comply with the arrest warrant issued against President al-Bashir for the accusations against him of committing crimes against humanity (Sharif, p. 240). Khartoum has denied committing those crimes in Darfur and has stated that the responsibility is shared between the government and rebels alike (Abou El-Fadl 2009). The GoS considered these resolutions as blackmail by some international powers and an attempt to politicise the issue in order to pressure the government to achieve political and economic interests and security (Boateng 2011, pp. 24-29). It justified its position by suggesting that the credibility of the majority of the reports which the ICC’s views were based upon was questionable. The humanitarian organisations that prepared these resolutions are believed to have a hidden agenda supported by world powers seeking to target Sudan (Abou El-Fadl 2009, p. 236).

6) Negotiating Approaches

One of the methods used by the GoS to contain the international dimensions of the crisis in Darfur is to negotiate with all domestic and international parties, such as the rebels and the UN, the AU and the specialised agencies of the civil society and other parties involved (Omar 2008, p. 202). This has led to a number of negotiated agreements signed with different parties to the conflict, such as the mid-October 2006 Darfur Peace Abuja Agreement and March 2010 Doha peace agreement (Anonymous 2011). According to Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) the mechanisms of government are still within the local treatment through reconciliations and through the people of Darfur themselves, with African and Arabic support via Doha to stop the predominance of Western organisations. This is
because they want to address the problem within the framework and to settle scores with the regime in Khartoum. Sudanese authorities accuse Israel of supporting the rebellion in Darfur as Israel believes that the Islamic government in Khartoum threatens it existence (Rashid 2009). Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) accuses Israel of intervening in the Darfur issue by training many tribal leaders in Darfur, and Khartoum has documents that appear to emphasise Israel’s involvement in the instability in Sudan (Musa 2009, p. 290). In fact, Sudanese affairs have not been exempt from the strategy of the Israeli policy-makers since the 1950s (Shlaim 1999, p. 188). This was clearly expressed by Gen – Amos Yadlin, the outgoing president of Israeli military intelligence (Aman), during a ceremony held at the time he handed over his duties to his successor General Aviv Kokhvy (Nafaa 2010).

In reviewing the most important achievements of the intelligence apparatus during the four and a half years he spent as its head, Yadlin listed a long list of achievements including activities that had been practised in Sudan. According to Yadlin, Israel supplied the rebellion in the South and the East of Sudan with weapons and logistical aid. This became evident during the first visit of the foreign head of state Salva Kiir of South Sudan after independence in 2011. He revealed that the Aman had trained many rebels to help them, and it developed networks in the south and in Darfur which are still at work. The Israeli minister added that for the first time Israeli institutions at home and its arms abroad could agree on a single policy towards the crisis in Darfur (Nafaa 2010).

In the same context, in 2007 Israel announced that it was donating about five million dollars for the homeless in Darfur. Then it followed this, in the same year, by announcing its willingness to grant Israeli citizenship to about 600 refugees from Darfur, and allowed them to settle within its borders (Rashid 2009). At the same time the Khartoum government announced that the number of Sudanese refugees reached 3,000 who had infiltrated into Israel via Egyptian territory, 40% from South Sudan, 35% from Darfur, and 25% from the Nuba Mountains (Musa 2009, p. 291). More than that, Israel's Haaretz newspaper published a report on the visit of Abdul Wahid Nour, the leader of the SLM, to Israel in early February 2009 to discuss the situation in Sudan with a senior official in the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).
Abdul Wahid Nour declared however that his movement was then working on opening an office in Tel Aviv (Rashid 2009). According to this statement, Israel's policy towards Sudan is based on the need for Sudan to live in a permanent state of crisis, because if it achieves a long-term state of stability and development its wealth and power will become similar to those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Nafaa 2010). This would support the interests of Arab national security which are counter to the interests of Israel. During the interview, Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) stressed that Israel was behind the Darfur Crisis and continues to support the rebellion in Darfur. He stated that it had also highlighted the Darfur issue as an ethnic issue between Arabs and Africans through its presence in the USA, such as the “Save Darfur” institution.

The Mechanisms of Rebel Movements to Solve the Crisis

Through the key features of the mechanisms being used by rebel groups to deal with the developments of the crisis and the techniques to address them, armed movements can be classified as the parties that handle the crisis by creating new crises, either intentionally or unintentionally. The key features of those mechanisms are the resorting to the use of force, and depending on coercive diplomacy represented in the adoption by those movements of conditions which are impossible for the government to adopt. Also, another feature is adopting strategies to pressure and influence the international powers concerned, by influencing international public opinion and decision-makers. The mechanisms of the armed movements in general can be classified as the follows:
• **Keenness on the Unity of Sudan**

The SLM and JEM have adopted a unionist discourse as a key mechanism in their dealings with the government and the other Sudanese forces. The SLM changed its name from the DLM, which launched itself in the middle of February 2003 in reference to the movement's unitary approach and non-separatism. The founding statement of the movement focuses on the idea of unity, democracy and secularism, and equality of all citizens regardless of their origin, religion or culture, to build a united democratic Sudan based on decentralisation and political pluralism (International Crisis Group 6 October 2005). The story is similar for the JEM. In an interview conducted with Jibril Adam Bilal, the spokesman for the group, he assured us that the orientation of the JEM is the nationalist defence of the rights of all Sudanese in all territories of the state, not only confined merely to Darfur. According to Bilal, the movement does not seek to attain power and wealth at the expense of other regions. However, the movement does seek the dissemination of justice and equality in the political and economic rights of all Sudanese wherever they are without discrimination, not to the hegemony of one group (Bilal 22/10/2012).

• **Coercive Diplomacy and the Push in the Direction of the Internationalisation of the Crisis**

Despite efforts made by the GoS to contain the crisis through traditional mechanisms, tribal conferences and social mediation, all these attempts have failed to achieve any peaceful settlement. This is because of the positions of the militant movements and their insistence on the continuity of armed conflict as a means of achieving their goals. The armed movements in Darfur have been keen to militarise the crisis since 2003, in attempts to involve external parties in the peace talks with the government in order to achieve internationalisation of the crisis. Although the rebel movements frequently announced the adoption of the option of a peaceful negotiating mechanism, a policy of boycotting settlement conferences and talks inside Sudan was clearly
adopted by them particularly in the first phase of the crisis. For instance, they refused to attend the Chadian efforts in the Abeche talks in September 2003. They also boycotted the combined conference of the people of Darfur in December 2005 called by President al-Bashir, arguing that the GoS is a key party in the crisis and thus cannot negotiate with it inside Sudan. The Sirte summit in 2007 and the first round of negotiations in Abuja in August 2004 are also good examples (African Strategic Report 2004–2005, pp. 108–194).

The rebels' justification is often that the mediators have failed to submit serious and practical proposals which could be the basis of a draft for a comprehensive and just peace. Instead those proposals expressed the bias of mediators in favour of the GoS (Bilal 22/10/2012). The GoS, on its side, has objected to the involvement of international observers in the negotiations or in forces ensuring the ceasefire agreements and peacekeepers in the region, in order to prevent the internationalisation of the crisis. Rebel groups have escalated their demands for international involvement especially by the USA and UK (Raslan 2004, p. 198). The opposition believes that the internationalisation of the crisis and the involvement of international actors is vital to urging the GoS to enter into serious talks and to offer more concessions (Bilal 22/10/2012). Perhaps one of the most prominent indications of rebel desires to internationalise the crisis is a request sent by Minni Minnawi, the commander of the SLA, on 11 August 2004 to the US President and British Prime Minister asking them to lead an international intervention in Darfur to protect the millions of displaced persons (Awad 2005, p. 52). To achieve this, the rebel movements in Darfur have used several tactics:

1- Escalating Military Operations against Government Forces

Hassan Bashir (25/09/2012), one of the leaders of the JEM, states that the rebel movements believe armed action is the only effective way to achieve a just solution to the crisis, and to push the GoS to meet the demands of the rebels. For example, armed movements have escalated their military operations during the negotiations that took place in October and November 2004 regarding the problem in Darfur, to demonstrate the lack of credibility.
of President al-Bashir's announcement that GoS troops managed to quell the rebellion there, in an attempt to put pressure on the GoS. On 8 March 2005 in Asmara the capital of Eritrea, along with the Free Lions and Beja movements in eastern Sudan, the JEM signed an agreement intended to unify political, media, and military actions (Al Ddla 2010, p. 303). The report of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General documented that the violence in the region peaked with the attack of the rebel SLA on large areas in North Darfur. This report accused the rebels of violating the ceasefire and military escalation (Ahram 26th October 2004). Moreover, the coup attempt that occurred on 10 May 2008 (Omdurman attack) by the JEM to control Sudan and establish an Islamic state (according to governmental sources), can be included in the context of the military dealings of the opposition groups in the crisis (Al Ddla 2010, p. 303). A wide range of political-national opposition parties and other external actors have expressed their condemnation and rejection of the principle of violence and military coups. The JEM was considered a “terrorist movement” by the Arab League (African Strategic Report 2007-2008, pp. 81-82).

2- Exploitation of Humanitarian Aid for Political Purposes

The mechanisms used by the rebels to push forward the direction and complexity of the crisis and its internationalisation include preventing humanitarian access to Darfur and war-affected areas which are, or pass through, areas controlled by rebels. The armed movements have also prevented the arrival of the international community to areas they control (International Crisis Group 23 May 2004). It is reported that the SLA has attacked humanitarian aid convoys and killed some of their employees including Abdulrahman Mohamedain, one of the traditional leaders of the Zaghawa tribe, in April 2004. The SLA rejected the charge, instead accusing the Janjaweed (Al Ddla 2007, p. 100). It seems that the rebels attempted to employ the issue of relief to urge the international community to put pressure on the GoS. Undoubtedly, this has undermined humanitarian aid access to remote areas in Darfur, which means the continuation of the humanitarian
crisis in those areas as well as maintaining pressure on the GoS (International Crisis Group 23 May 2004).

3- Stimulating International Concern by Circulating the Claim that Genocide Has Taken Place in Darfur

Leaders of the rebellion in Darfur have exploited the humanitarian situation resulting from the military operations carried out by governmental forces to quell the revolt. They issued several statements describing the types and sizes of crimes committed against civilians in the region, accusing the government of planning genocide against non-Arab tribes in an effort to mobilise inner and outer public opinion against the Khartoum government (Bashir 2012). In this regard, the rebel movements have adopted several mechanisms including firstly, employing Sudanese living abroad, who have foreign links. These have directly intervened to defend their people through the media, the ICC, fact-finding, and documenting the crisis. They aimed to alert the international community that war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide have been committed in Darfur. This in turn has led to regional and international interference (Bilal 22/10/2012). Secondly, rebellious groups are accused of exaggerating the losses in Darfur to expand the scope of their issue, maximise their gains, and put the regime in Khartoum under constant pressure to force it to recognise their demands (Abou El-Fadl 2009, p. 236). Thirdly, although the attitudes and reports of several parties of the international community, like the UN, the Arab League, AU, EU, and humanitarian NGOs operating in Darfur (such as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) or Doctors Without Borders (DWB) and others), have emphasised that there had been massive violations of human rights, yet it does not rise to the level of genocide. Armed movements have sought to exploit the description of former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, in September 2004, of the events in Darfur as comprising genocide (Hoile 2006, pp. 73-79). They have circulated reports issued by Western non-governmental organisations (especially American) that accuse governmental forces and Janjaweed militias of ethnic cleansing and mass rape in Darfur (Mamdani 2010, pp. 22-23).
Omar Al-Saied (2008) has noted that the rebel movements were eager to undermine almost all peaceful settlements taking place during the negotiations in Sudan to resolve the crisis, aiming to escalate and internationalise the crisis. Nearly all interviewees from the rebel side, such as Jibril Bilal (22/10/2012), Hessen Minnawi (10/11/2012), and others confirm that they are convinced that the intervention of the international community (particularly the USA and the EU) is the only way to force the government to make important concessions, as happened with the PMLS in the south. According to the opposition, the USA and Europe are able to provide large financial and logistical aid to push development in the region (Raafat 2005, p. 96).

Splits in Rebel Movements and Their Effect on the Duration of the Crisis

The most important challenge that has been faced and still faces completion of the peace process in Darfur is the phenomenon of splits within the rebel movements into numerous factions. Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013) the leader of the Sudanese Liberation Historical Leadership (SLMHL), reveals that while opposition movements were initially confined to the SLM and JEM, the number of factions has increased to more than 100. He adds that divisions among the rebel groups have squandered international efforts to find a common framework for both the GoS and the opposition to conduct serious negotiations until a peaceful solution, that satisfies all parties of the conflict, is achieved. Instead, the efforts of the UN and the AU have been doubled to focus on reaching a unified negotiating position and agenda which carries the demands of rebel factions in its confrontation with the GoS (Shafie 2006, p. 183).

Defections and disputes inside the insurgent groups have weakened their negotiating position against the government. This in turn has resulted in the absence of a real local partner who can ensure the implementation of any agreement (Musa 16/01/2013). Furthermore, this has frequently led to the postponement of the right

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21 The SLMHL is a rebel faction which split from the SLM in Darfur.
moment for the settlement of the dispute (African Strategic Report 2004-2005, p. 183). It is also believed that successive splits within the ranks of the opposition movements are attributed to the indulgence of the key countries involved, including the major states, with those armed movements and factions, by providing financial, political, and military support. In contrast, these major countries have exercised more pressure on the GoS on the basis of responsibility for the events in Darfur without putting similar pressure on those movements (Kamel 2009, p. 23).

While this argument is convincing, it can also be contended that it remains a supportive and secondary factor. In my estimation, the absence of a united leadership, the tribal structure of the armed movements in Darfur, and the different agendas which emanate from the objectives and interests of the leaders of these movements and factions – which often are non-convergent and sometimes rise to the level of narrow personal interests – could be the main reasons for the proliferation of the Darfurian insurgencies. This was evident in the escalating conflict within the SLM and the JEM whenever they were close to reaching a political settlement.

- The Absence of the United Leadership

Unlike the rebellion in South Sudan, led mainly by one leader in John Garang, the leadership of rebel groups in Darfur are distinct and not united. The absence of a united leadership is not only between the SLM and JEM but also within every other rebel group, and clearly reflects the desires of these groups to individually achieve the greatest possible gains. The most prominent of the leadership conflicts is that which erupted between the Chairman of the SLM, Abdul Wahid, and its Secretary-General, Minni Arco Minnawi, during the Tripoli Conference 2004 (Musa 2009, p. 102). Given the early military successes achieved by the movement at the beginning of the crisis, especially after the internationalisation of the Darfur issue and its description by the USA as genocide, internal differences started to grow and emerge among the political leadership in the SLM (Raslan 2006a, p. 209). Arco Minnawi
intentionally disabled and postponed negotiations by calling for a general conference of the liberation movement (Haskanita Conference).22

According to Raslan (2006a, p. 208), the apparent aim of this invitation was the restructuring of the movement and its institutions and resolution of internal differences to unify their positions before entering into any negotiations. This would enable the movement to be committed to reaching outputs. However, the hidden objective of the conference, it seems, was to try to exclude Abdul Wahid from the presidency of the movement and to replace him with Minnawi. The Haskanita Conference embodied tensions of internal disputes regarding the leadership of the SLM. This clearly emerged before the seventh round of negotiations in Abuja in August 2005, which was under the auspices of the AU and other regional and international mediators. During this conference for the first time a proposal to isolate Abdul Wahid Nour, head of the movement, was discussed (Musa 2009, p. 102).

This has led some field commanders to object to, and withdraw from, the conference as it did not fully represent the movement. It was regarded as an attempt to circumvent the leadership of the movement: 270 of the 800 members withdrew from the conference after the opening session (Tijani 2007). The commanders expressed their dissatisfaction with the organisational structure within the movement and its Chairman, Abdul Wahid. They showed clear concern over the lack of institutionalisation and the emergence of the tendency of the dictatorship to make unilateral decisions, which has significantly delayed an insurgency victory. Delegates decided to isolate Abdul Wahid from the presidency of the movement due to his lack of institutional commitment and his decision-making. Furthermore, he was also involved (according to the final statement of the conference) in both financial corruption and raising money for his own benefit. Abdul Wahid is accused of stirring racism within his military leadership. Attendees also agreed to appoint Arco Minnawi as Chairman of the movement over Abdul Wahid, Mustafa Teerab as Secretary-General, and Juma Haggar as the Forces Commander of the movement. On the following day of the conference, Abdul Wahid issued a statement emphasising that the final statement of the Haskanita conference represents a utilitarian and racial group which has its own agenda in seeking personal gain (Musa 2009, p. 385).

On the other hand, Juma Haggar, the new military leader of the movement, responded with a statement showing the involvement of Abdul Wahid in racist crimes within the Zalingi area (hijacking students and killing them), as well as the issuance of orders for the robbery of relief vehicles in different parts of Darfur. Furthermore, Haggar’s statement stated that Abdul Wahid had issued orders for military operations against civilians around the Jebel Marra (Musa 2009, p. 386). Since then, both leaders have proceeded to work with Haggar's group of followers, which makes decision-making within the movement more difficult (Hoile 2006, p. 72). Haskanita has resulted in the separation of the military wing led by Minni Arco Minnawi, composing the SLA, demonstrating the emergence of a third party in the negotiation process.

• The Tribal Differences

The tribal factor and its impact on unity between rebel movements is vital. The effects of this tribal factor are indicated in the mechanisms adopted by rebel groups to manage the crisis against the GoS. Alex de Waal (2005a) stresses that "internal differences in each group are perhaps most serious of all; the mechanisms for debating political issues and establishing a consensus are very weak. This is one reason for their reluctance to set up technical committees; every senior member needs to be consulted on every issue" (de Waal 2005a, p. 131). Escalating tribal tone was one of the main reasons behind the escalation of the dispute between Abdul Wahid Nour and Minni Arko Minnawi. The intensity of the conflict between the two men can be recognised through the mechanism of tribal affiliation used to rally supporters.

It is argued that Minnawi’s invitation to the general conference for the SLM was a reflection of the differences in tribal ambitions in Darfur. Nour's acceptance to participate in the sixth round of negotiations in Abuja as the legitimate representative of the movement was a result of his concerns regarding the Zaghawa tribe, led by Minnawi, and its ambitions to control the movement. Nevertheless, Minnawi announced that the negotiating team in Abuja did not represent the movement. He and his group would not abide by any agreements which would be reached (Raslan
The Zaghawa tribe has unlimited ambitions and is a well-organised and coherent tribe at the political, economic, and security levels. Zaghawa rebels led by Minnawi have seen themselves as the main cause behind the victories achieved against the GoS. They feel that Minnawi works a great deal in the field among the soldiers, unlike the movement’s leader Abdul Wahid Nour, who lives in Europe, and snatches the limelight, ascribing it to himself (Abdul Sattar 2010, p. 46).

Minnawi was very successful in attracting support for the movement at the local and regional levels, especially in the Zaghawa tribe which has extensions in Chad. In contrast, Abdul Wahid Nour has failed in this task, which has caused retreat in his leadership position as a result of his removal from the battlefield and his stay abroad, as well as to other reasons connected with his relationship with external parties such as Israel (Minnawi 10/11/2012). Minnawi signed a peace agreement with the government on 5 May 2006, which approved the basic formula to stop the fighting in the region while Abdul Wahid Nour refused to do so. Several gains to the signatory movements have been achieved, which is considered to be a major shift in the evolution of the crisis (Arabic Strategic Report 2005-2006, p. 353). The main point of contention, according to Hussein Minnawi, which led to the signing of the Abuja Agreement with the Minnawi faction, is related to power-sharing. While Abdul Wahid Nour was stuck on the post of the First Deputy President of the Republic, Minnawi and his team accepted the Assistant to the President position which was approved by the government negotiator. They were convinced that there was no difference between the titles as the references are almost identical. The only difference is in the label.

- **The Ideological Differences**

Ideologically, there are obvious dogmatic and ideological disputes between the two key armed movements of the SLA and JEM and their leaders. The difference in the political culture and the ideological aims is one of the most important factors that prolonged the duration of the Darfur Crisis. Simply because this ideological difference had necessarily led to an important difference in the agendas of, and the solutions offered, by these movements to end the conflict. This would allow foreign
parties to intervene using this difference in line with those of their own interests which had pushed them to intervene, which will be discussed in detail in chapters five and six. External state intervention in such a fashion must lead to the exacerbation of differences between rebel movements and even within the movements themselves in terms of their strategies – this in all probability results in more obstacles to any solution.

Disputes over the identity and religion of the state are significant issues, and are the key axis for rebel movement agendas. The backgrounds of both leaderships are entirely different. Khalil Ibrahim, the founder of the JEM, adopts an Islamist approach and vision for the state and resolving the crisis. In contrast, Abdul Wahid Nour adopts liberal and secular ideas (Abdul Sattar 2010, p. 38). Ibrahim Khalil was a senior leader in the Islamist movement between 1989 and 1999. He was also a commander in the Popular Defence Forces set up by the Inqad Revolution which are militias popularly used by the government to suppress the southern rebellion. Ibrahim Khalil was titled at that time "the Prince of Mujahedeen in the South" (Al-Turabi 14/01/2013). After the split that occurred in the Islamic movement at the end of 1999, between Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi, Khalil joined al-Turabi. Many observers believe that the JEM is the only military wing of the Popular Congress Party headed by Hassan al-Turabi, although this has always been denied by Hassan al-Turabi (Al-Turabi 14/01/2013).

In contrast, Abdul Wahid Nour is both secular and a liberal. He does not believe in islamising the state and he opposes the ideological orientation of the JEM. His position and image among the Sudanese, the Arab, and Islamic nations are destabilised however by his declared openness to the West and Israel, as well as his preference for residence in European capitals (Paris in particular) away from the battlefield (AlAzreg 16/10/2012). This argument is supported by Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013). He contends that Abdul Wahid Nour is keen for a relationship with the West and Israel without limitations, with evidence that he is the only politician since the independence of Sudan to not only opens an office in Israel, but to also be proud of it. There might be other movements that have established such relations with Israel, but they recognise the political price that will be paid, so they have not advertised it; this perspective is also confirmed by Abdul Wahid Nour himself (Asharq Al Awsat 2009). The opening of the office for the movement of Abdul
Wahid Nour in Israel has caused great shock in political and media circles, both inside Sudan and across the rest of the Arab and Islamic worlds.

Specialists such as Professor Hassan Saori (14/01/2013) believe that this act violates the orientations of the people of Darfur who embrace the Islamic religion and are historically biased towards the issues of the Arab and the Islamic nations. The orientations and ideas of Abdul Wahid Nour that are biased in favour of the Western countries' agendas have significantly contributed to the loss of the SLM’s important and influential sanction of its mass base in the region. It was also a major reason for the defection of many factions which either formed new ones of their own or joined the JEM (Musa 16/01/2013). In this same regard, Hani Raslan says that opening a new office for the Abdul Wahid Nour movement in Israel is a very dangerous development on the path of the Darfur issue. It embodies a strong shift for some Darfurian movements to become tools manipulated from abroad. He adds that some leaders of these movements lack the minimum awareness needed to manage their cases in the most appropriate direction to achieve the objectives covering their basic issues, such as political marginalisation or equality in development (Raslan 2006a, p. 42). This ideological difference has clearly affected the management of the crisis and the mechanisms used by the rebel movements. It has also had a considerable impact on external actors trying to determine appropriate mechanisms for handling the Darfur conflict in ways which best serve their own interests and visions regarding its resolution (Al-Mahdi 10/01/2013). This will be discussed in greater detail in next chapters where the mechanisms and the Libyan intervention method to manage the crisis and how it influenced its duration are investigated.

• **Personal Interests of Leaders and Their Conflict over Power (Positions or Financial Gains)**

Besides the power and wealth struggle between the centre and Darfur, it is clear that there is a third type of conflict which is no less significant. This conflict is between the Darfurians themselves over political positions and financial gains. Instead of resorting to the popular mandate and democracy as a method of governance and accepting the principles of the peaceful exchange of power in Darfur, political action
is still controlled by tribalism and regionalism (Azzain 2009, p. 156). Thus, the conflict over the narrow political gains of the tribe represented by the armed movements and their leaders is an essential factor in prolonging the conflict. Adam Azzain (2009) adds that the defects of the Darfur Peace Agreement include the reality that it has approved the principle of appointing those in charge of the implementation of the terms of the agreement instead of a popular mandate. This has significantly contributed to the phenomenon of the fragmentation of the armed movements, and repulsion between the leadership incumbents on behalf of the province, where these divisions have come to be formed on ethnic and tribal lines.

Consequently, these rifts have intensified disputes between various movements, as well as causing fragility within them. In this situation, the central government is forced to negotiate with multiple parties, none of which has the ability and influence to be the legitimate representative of the people of Darfur (Abdullah 2009, pp. 9–11). Abdul Wahid represents only the Fur tribe. Although it is the largest tribe in Darfur, it does not represent all Darfurians. Additionally, Abdul Wahid's relations with Israel and the West are strongly rejected by the GoS, as well as by the rest of the people of Darfur.

The JEM is a part of the Zaghawa tribe which is the second or third largest tribe in terms of population in the province. Thus, the people of Darfur will not agree to be led by such a faction in their negotiations with the government. Other movements that adopt a secular orientation will also not accept it (Ismail 13/01/2013). The JEM is accused of being the military arm of Hassan al-Turabi, which was rejected by the ruling party, as it is their political opponent. Minnawi has failed experiments in Abuja and political partnership. He is no longer convincing for either the people of Darfur or the GoS. Politically, Minnawi is weak and does not have the ability to convince anyone to adopt an agreement (Musa 16/01/2013). It seems that most rebel leaders are keen on continuing the crisis and that it is not in their interests to stop the war. This is because they are beneficiaries in terms of spoils and funding. This argument is put forward by many scholars and different rebel leaders, such as Sadiq Al-Mahdi (10/01/2013), Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013), and Bushra Omar (Musa 2009, pp. 385–389). They believe that the reason behind the splits is the sense of individual opportunism of some rebel leaders driven by personal ambitions and desired positions.
Abdul Wahid is accused of not being serious and of having become a businessman rather than the owner of a political project. According to some rebel leaders, Abdul Wahid collects money from the international community, supportive countries, various international organisations, and others on behalf of the revolution in Darfur. However, this money goes to his investments. As a result the international community has become largely unconvinced by him. A number of other rebel leaders have also become businessmen (Musa 2009, p. 102). Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013) reveals that when Minnawi signed the Abuja peace agreement he took millions of dollars on behalf of the Transitional Authority in Darfur to set up development projects in the region. During his time in power, Minnawi did not build a single school or start any development projects. Rather, it was found that the money went to investments managed by his companies abroad.

In this regard Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013), the Peace Adviser of President al-Bashir and Chairman of the governmental panel for the negotiations during the period between 2008 and 2010, underscores that what unites the armed movements in the Darfur conflict is simply self-interest. The controlled political, moral, and humanitarian discourse is used perfectly by the rebels. For example, statements and documents of the armed movements are written very carefully and are fully compatible with the standards of the contemporary discourse in talking about rights; however, this is not the intended purpose. Ghazi Salahuddin said that “when I went to negotiate, I found people who are only interested in positions and personal gains, and this is fad of the era means you can embrace the issue of trafficking in children and give it a moral dimension” (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). He added that due to the availability of these privacies, the GoS had great success in the strategic dispersal of the armed movements and their leaders. Taking advantage of ethnic contradictions in Darfur, financial destitution, and the authoritarian aspirations of members of the armed movements has necessarily resulted in the defection of most of those movements.

Many observers, such as Salah Eldoma (09/01/2013), Professor of Political Science at the Omdurman Islamic University and a member of the Supreme Committee for the implementation of items relating to higher education in the Abuja and Doha agreements, have noted that the reason for these defections is the temptation of money and positions and racial rising amid those movements. Adam Abdullah
(18/01/2013) the head of the International Centre for Sudanese Studies in Khartoum, states that on several occasions during the Abuja negotiations and beyond, the GoS resorted to the creation of fake leaders inside these movements which have achieved nothing on the battlefield. These rebel leaders aim to extort money from the government, driving luxury cars and residing in luxury hotel accommodation at the expense of the state and the funds of the Sudanese people.

With the passage of time and the continuation of the crisis, clear major differences between the main interests either of the armed movements in Darfur or the Sudanese state have emerged. This has been confirmed by analysis of the internal behaviour of the parties to the crisis, particularly the armed movements. Conflict over privileges, and searching for the political and financial gains between the leaders of the rebellion have significantly contributed to the series of divisions within the armed factions and the outbreak of some conflicts between those groups themselves. As a result, the legitimate claims and demands of those factions that claim legitimate representation of Darfur have been lost. Furthermore, the rebels’ previous objectives of securing a resolution to the conflict no longer exist and have been replaced by simply finding a way to unify the movements and their visions in the face of the GoS.

Conclusions

This chapter examined the conflict in Darfur by looking at the key internal actors, the GoS from one side, and the two main anti-government armed movements, the SLM/A, and JEM on the other. Moreover, the key mechanisms and techniques that have been adopted by each domestic party of the conflict, and how those strategies have influenced the continuation of the Darfur Crisis are investigated. On top of that it highlights and analyses the impact of divergence in the domestic combatants’ views, attitudes, goals and interests, and how these have impacted the conflict's duration and resolution. The evidence indicates that the Darfur Crisis is a reflection of a trust crisis among the political class in Sudan. Among the outcomes is that the visions of the internal parties to resolve the crisis are completely different. On this basis it may be inferred that the GoS is seeking to employ all efforts to resolve the
crisis within a national framework. Rebel movements on the other hand believe that armed action and addressing the crisis within an international framework are the best ways to manage the crisis and to achieve their goals. It is found that the political positions, ideology, and leadership of rebels are non-uniform.

Given this evidence, it can be seen that the negotiating positions of the two main factions suffer from significant weakness due to the lack of uniformity in their visions and their political and military agendas. While the SLM aims to establish a confederation (autonomy), the JEM is designed to maintain a united Sudan and the establishment of a genuine democratic system. The SLM stems from a secular reference and is often touted as a regional movement which seeks to achieve gains for the western Sudanese region. The JEM on the contrary has declared itself as a nationalist movement aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state in Sudan.

It is also clear that unequal political and diplomatic experiences between local parties to the conflict have contributed to the delay in achieving a peace agreement to resolve the Darfur Crisis. At the same time, the NCP controls the governmental delegation negotiating on all occasions, and negotiating with a clear strategy. The delay in reaching a comprehensive and permanent solution to the crisis since the beginning of the armed conflict has importantly led to widespread splits inside the rebel groups. Thus, it could be concluded that the increasing divisions and the continual shifting alliances of rebel groups have not helped them to make any progress at the negotiating table in their confrontations with the governmental professional delegation to end the civil war in Darfur. Difference in the compositions and the doctrines of the armed movements has allowed for external third parties to intervene in an attempt to achieve the greatest possible strategic interests, whether inside or outside Sudan, by funding local arms to achieve their different agendas.

It is indicated that the internal conflicting agendas have significantly led to international efforts being an important factor that has contributed to the continuation of the Darfur Crisis. This is due to interests of the regional and international parties involved in the crisis in addition to those of the disputing domestic parties. This inconsistency in each domestic party's agenda has led almost all effective external actors to adopt different strategies and mechanisms to each other. Some of them have sided with the government while others have chosen to side with one of the armed
movements as a technique for achieving their agendas. This has increased the complexity of the crisis and assisted in internationalising the Darfur issue, especially in light of the nature of the conflict in Darfur and the ideological differences involved, as well as the tribal compositions of the armed movements.

The absence of a unified leadership across the Darfur rebel movements has also significantly contributed to distracting the international community's efforts to contain the crisis in a short time. As a consequence, the attitudes of external interveners, such as Libya, have been hesitant because of the lack of sufficient guarantees to enable them to rely on a certain movement or specific person to promote the implementation of any agreement or settlement which can be agreed with the GoS. Khalil Ibrahim was not a trusted person for a lot of external actors due to his Islamic orientation. Abdul Wahid Nour is also mixed up in his positions and does not have a clear political vision. He is accused of non-seriousness and of turning into a businessman not only by the international community but also within the SLM itself. Abdul Wahid's relationships with the West and Israel have massively contributed to undermining the confidence of many effective foreign parties in his intentions. This argument will be analysed in more detail during the next two chapters.
Chapter 5

The Internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis and the Libyan Involvement

Introduction

The main task of this chapter is to investigate why and how the Darfur Crisis was internationalised, as well as testing the applicability of the theoretical model developed for this thesis. It will be undertaken by investigating the case of Libyan involvement in the Darfur Crisis in detail. Internationalising communal conflicts has become one of the most important features of crisis management in the post-Cold War period. Analysts and observers believe that the crises of third world countries, especially those that have erupted in Africa, are the most vulnerable to internationalisation (Niama 2005, p. 336). This is attributed to the reality of third world countries’ internal policies on the one hand, and the reality of changes in the international environment on the other. Many scholars argue that the new world after the collapse of bipolarity at the end of the Cold War has led to the emergence of one superpower, represented by US dominance of the structures of the distribution of power globally. In other words, “a unipolar system” (Fuchs 2011). The USA is keen to prevent any other power (or group of powers, or even the international community) to disable its options to use force in order to maintain its strategic national interests. Internationalising intrastate conflicts, as happened with the USA involvement in the former Yugoslavia and Libya 2011 (within the NATO framework), Somalia and Darfur (Ghali 2008), is also among its options (Fuchs 2011, p. 15).

Internationalisation can be produced by one party as long as it does not have to rely on others for the purposes of international legitimisation of its interventions (Niama
2005, p. 335). Despite the optimism that pervaded the world that the UN would play an active role in the formulation of international policy and determine its course, it turned out that international organisations are subject to the influence of whatever power has managed to recruit them to serve their policies or interventions. Berdal Aral (2010, p. 163) argues that the main problem lies in the problematic structure of, and decision-making in, the UNSC and in its instrumentalisation at the hands of states seeking hegemony, inter alia, through this body.

The occupation of Iraq in 2003 and the Darfur and East Timor cases taken up by the UNSC after the Cold War through a series of resolutions, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, are taken as test cases indicating the extent of politicisation in this organ. It seems that it is not legitimacy that is important (although it is good to have it), agency (power capabilities and policy interests) is more important—and in a unipolar system hegemony tends to rely on military and economic power more than anything else. For example, the USA did not have the luxury of international legitimacy when it invaded and occupied Iraq in 2003. Indeed, it committed the most significant crime under international law when it did so—but it did not matter: it is the world’s only superpower after all. However, when internationalisation is supported by the international community under the umbrella of the UN, it will gain international legitimacy and then will be authorised to resort to several alternatives, beginning with mobilisation of pressure to impose sanctions and military action (Aral 2010, pp. 68-69; Cockett 2010, p. 226). This was clear in the case of NATO intervention in Libya 2011.

The post-Cold War mobilising world opinion in favour of certain international policies through local and international media and intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations has become much easier. These organisations and institutions have come to play an important role in showing what is happening on the ground and often in a manner which serves their interests and the interests of their financers (Kotharia 2010, pp. 209-222; Cockett 2010, p. 227). They often call for international action and push in the direction of internationalisation through influence on the political decision-making centres and public opinion to clarify the serious dimensions of the crisis (Fuchs 2011, p. 13). Furthermore, these means have become involved in determining priorities and resolutions. Some of these authorities
deliberately intimidate and misinform in order to create a climate of opinion to intervene within local and international public sympathy (Mamdani 2010, pp. 19–21).

Internationalisation provides legitimacy to the advocates of external interference either from local, regional or international parties to settle the dispute through international administration, which serves the strategic interests of the intervening parties. However, in the post-Cold War era the possibility of determining the dividing line between legal legitimacy and the legitimacy of power has become extremely difficult. International legitimacy in many cases does not comply with the rules of international law and/or the UN Charter. The major powers have become capable of overcoming the obstacle of legal legitimacy, as happened in the occupation of Iraq with the recognition of the UN Secretary-General. For instance, on 13 July 2004 the US Congress issued a resolution urging the US administration to take all available options for intervention, whether collectively or even intervention of one party, to prevent genocide in Darfur, in the case of a failure of the UN to stop such violations (Straus 2005, pp. 123-124).

On the other hand, attempts to internationalise the crisis may come from regional parties, particularly those adjacent to the state in crisis. Perhaps African crises and conflicts are the most common in the shift from internal to external, and of their implications reaching neighbouring countries and the region. This is mainly due to the overlap of ethnicities, cultures, and tribes between African countries across their borders, as addressed in the third chapter of this dissertation. This in turn reduces the possibility of resolving internal crisis and conflict within the borders of one state: Sudan is arguably the best model to support this (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti 2010, p. 2; Niama 2005, p. 341; Apsel 2009, p. 241).

Regional parties, especially those that have a common border with the home state of the crisis, have many varied motives for involvement in the crisis. Regional actors may interfere to support the armed movements and the rebels against the government for reasons of ethnic, tribal or economic gain, or to prevent the transmission of the dispute into the state, or to avoid effects that may accompany a mass exodus due to the outbreak of hostilities, or to improve its negotiating position for political gains that can be realised in normal times. Thus, rebel armed movements receive financial, political and logistical support from neighbouring countries. This is how African
national crises quickly take on regional dimensions and become more complex due to the multiplicity of agendas and conflicts of interest (Apsel 2009, p. 241; Boggero 2008, p. 15).

The Internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis

Since the early stages of the Darfur Crisis, the USA administration has promoted the view that what is happening in Darfur can only be described as ethnic cleansing and genocide (Goldstone 2007). These allegations have found supportive attitudes from the UN. Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, has warned the international community of the frightening situation in Darfur. He described it as a prelude to a humanitarian disaster (Almustaqbal 2004). In addition to that he called – in his recommendation to the UNSC – for the need for international intervention to end the crisis, citing the failure of the GoS to achieve a peaceful settlement, and for a lack of commitment by the parties to their commitments given to the international community (Hansen and Wolfhagen 2012).

The tragic humanitarian situation in Darfur has raised international interest. The fact this has pushed it into the international arena less than a year since the outbreak of the conflict in the region has been noteworthy (El-Affendi 2009, p. 59). Especially if it is compared to the international silence regarding the civil war in South Sudan, which lasted for more than two decades, and resulted in two million people killed, and four million displaced. These are much larger numbers than those in the Darfur Crisis (Alsaouri 2010, p. 45).

Likewise, international actors (countries, governmental and non-governmental organisations, media, and others) have not presented the same attention and enthusiasm when dealing with similar conflicts and civil wars which have broken out elsewhere, such as in Rwanda. This leads to the argument that, beside humanitarian motivations, there are other motives which underpin calls for the internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis, as there are mechanisms that have been used to dramatise the conflict in Darfur and to impose it on the international agenda with such enthusiasm.
Factors that have significantly contributed to fuelling the internationalisation of the Darfur crisis can be distinguished as follows:

- **Internal Drivers for the Internationalisation of the Crisis**

  *Civil war between north and south Sudan* was one of the key factors contributing to the intensification of the conflict in Darfur and thrusting it into the international arena (El-Affendi 2009, p. 54). The SPLM has provided technical and military support to the rebel movement in Darfur since the beginning of the 1990s (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012, p. 53). For example, a safe haven and military support were provided for the military campaign led by Yahya Bolad, although Khartoum succeeded in defeating Bolad’s forces and killing him (Natsios 2012, p. 129). Nevertheless, Garang wanted to invest in the rebellion and lawlessness in the region to gain more concessions from the GoS during negotiations which led to the Nifasha peace agreement between the GoS and the SPLM (Berg 2008, p. 31; Hassan 2010, p. 24). John Garang has been engaged in providing international platforms for the Darfur rebels to deliver their cause to the world. He has made several trips to Western and African countries to highlight the Darfur Crisis, which has significantly contributed to the creation of the position of the GoS with regard to these countries (Dagne 2005). The impact of the SPLM model and strategy on rebel movements was clear in Darfur. This has been shown by the way in which it sought to deal with the crisis; choosing a revolutionary approach and adopting almost the same demands and tactics. So the insurgents relied on arms and a military escalation policy against Khartoum instead of politics to achieve their demands, similar to the approach adopted by the southerners (Mamdani 2010, p. 250). The SPLM did not view the issues between the North and the South as a geographic problem but as being between Arab and non-Arab elements. In this sense it is seen as an ethnic problem and for this reason it supports the SLM in Darfur (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013).
- Armed movements in Darfur have adopted mechanisms that seek to internationalise the crisis. After they obtained internal recognition from Khartoum, they then sought to gain external recognition so as to use international forces as a second weapon with which to deal with the GoS. In addition to the adoption of the movements on the military option and the blockading of all negotiating efforts to end the crisis in a peaceful manner due to their demands, the leaders of the rebellion sought to sensationalise international concern about human rights abuses, raising them to the level of genocide (El-Doma 09/01/2013). Leaders of the rebellion promoted reports issued by international human rights organisations (particularly in the USA) that describe what is happening in the region as genocide and ethnic cleansing, committed by the GoS and the Janjaweed militia against ethnic non-Arabs (Idris 2006, p. 65). One of these, for instance, is an Amnesty International report issued in July 2004 entitled "Rape as a Weapon of War by the Janjaweed and some Government Soldiers". Also, the US-based non-governmental organisation, Human Rights Watch (HRW), reported concerns with human rights in May 2004 in a document entitled "Darfur destroyed, ethnic cleansing by government and militia forces in western Sudan" (Human Rights Watch: May 2004). Furthermore, the rebel movements in the region have opened offices in European capitals which have participated in encouraging hostile groups in Sudan as well as international pressure groups to urge the UN to intervene in the Darfur Crisis. This was aided by participation in media campaigns funded and supervised by groups such as the USA Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM)23 (Omar 2008, p. 129). On the other hand, leaders of the rebellion in Darfur believe that there has been collusion of some countries and international institutions with the regime in Khartoum. Jibril Bilal (22/10/2012) argues that the USA and the EU could impose solutions as happened with Libya on 19 March 2011 in accordance with UNSC resolution 1973, when there were indicators for committing a real

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23 The USHMM is the United States’ official memorial to the Holocaust. It provides for the documentation, study, and interpretation of Holocaust history. It is dedicated to helping leaders and citizens of the world to confront hatred, prevent genocide, promote human dignity, and strengthen democracy.
massacre in Benghazi by pro-Gaddafi militias. The international community made the decision in less than a month and stopped this crime.

- **People from Darfur who live in Diasporas** have led a marketing campaign for the Darfur issue at the UN and UNSC in particular. They package what is happening in Darfur as an ethnic conflict, genocide and ethnic cleansing against the non-Arab African element. Moreover, diaspora Darfurians were able to coordinate with the leaders of the armed movements in Darfur to employ international media campaigns through the establishment of symposia, seminars and demonstrations in front of embassies to gain international and regional sympathy (Bilal 22/10/2012; Ismail 13/01/2013; Musa 16/01/2013; Minnawi 10/11/2012). This marketing campaign has found significant support from some European organisations and pressure groups in the USA and the pro-Israel lobby by providing opinion and thought, and holding seminars. Abdullahi AlAzreg (2012, p. 3) says that the USHMM created an alleged section about "genocide" in Darfur to distract attention from its occupation of Palestine and from the massacres in Gaza, and to state that Arabs and Muslims are murderers. These activities have contributed to the integration of the role between the rebel movements and their leaders abroad on the one side, and between international organisations and countries abroad on the other (Diraige 18/03/2013).

- **Political parties in Sudan** are another local factor that has significantly contributed to the developing stages of the crisis and its internationalisation (such as the People's Congress led by Hassan al-Turabi, the UP led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, and the National Democratic Alliance led by Merghani). Some rebel leaders in Darfur are prominent leaders in these parties and political movements. Khalil Ibrahim, before founding the JEM, was the most prominent leader in the Popular Congress Party, as well as Tijani Sisi – a leader in the UP – and both are from Darfur (Al-Turabi 2013). However, the extent of their contribution in fuelling the conflict and its internationalisation
is dependent on the impact of the political party on events in Darfur, and the extent to which they are in line with the GoS. Perhaps political maliciousness was the general characteristic for some of these parties towards addressing the crisis. It is considered that internationalisation will contribute to a weakening of the government and so may lead to a change in the Inqad rule in Sudan. The political discourse of these parties has contributed to the promotion of descriptions of the events in Darfur as humanitarian disasters that require international intervention (Al-Mahdi 10/01/2013). The UP and the JEM drew surprise by announcing the signing of an agreement in Cairo regarding the parties' support for the decision to refer the case of Darfur to the ICC. The ruling National Congress Party in Sudan criticised the agreement, viewing it as a challenge to the legitimacy of the regime (Al Arabiya 2009).

**External Drivers for the Internationalisation of the Crisis**

Besides internal factors that have contributed to the internationalising of the Darfur Crisis, there are also external factors that have played an important role in this regard. The crisis in western Sudan is considered by some international actors, including the USA, France, and China, to be an opportunity that can be exploited to exert pressure on Sudan for future gains, whether political or economic (Fuchs 2011, p. 67). Others see it as an opportunity to break up Sudan because internationalisation means opening the door to foreign interference in its internal affairs (Al Ddla 2007, p. 62). Given the economic and strategic importance of Sudan, the key external drivers for the internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis are economic.

However, political dimensions cannot be neglected (Kalu 2010, p. 28). In light of a unipolar international system dominated by the USA, Washington has led the efforts of international actors of the crisis (states and organisations) towards internationalisation. From this point of view, US motives will be addressed in the next step, and can be classified into three major groups:

Political Motives

Some believe that key US political motives for the internationalisation of the Darfur issue are to seek to liquidate the Inqad regime in Khartoum, due to its Islamic orientation and support for international terrorism (Hoile 2006, pp. 17-20). Washington and other Western think tanks consider the regime in Khartoum to be radically Islamist, and it is the only African regime within the sub-Saharan area to provide support and a safe haven for terrorist organisations, such as al-Qaeda, since 1991 (Cockett 2010, p. 143). They see Sudan as a rogue state that should be punished because it undermines the USA agenda in the region (Massoud 2013). However, Hassan al-Turabi considers this view invalid and confirms that the Inqad government has completely retreated from its Islamic and religious slogans (Al-Turabi 14/01/2013). Furthermore, electoral pressure and the outbreak of the crisis coinciding with the USA presidential election in 2004 between Republican President George W. Bush and Democratic Senator John Kerry have played an important role. Due to electoral rivalry both have engaged with internationalisation of the crisis in order to gain the votes of citizens of black African descent (Heinze 2007, p. 377). They have labelled the Darfur conflict as a clash between Arab and African tribes and exploited the humanitarian consequences resulting from fighting in the region (Haggag 2008, p. 195).

Interestingly, the former USA representative to the UN, John Danforth, has revealed that the use of the term "genocide" to describe Darfur was intended for "internal consumption", mainly by the Christian right (The Independent 2 July 2005). El-Affendi (2009, p. 62) stated that among the main outside motivations that contributed to raising international public opinion awareness is the synchronisation of the explosion of the Darfur Crisis with the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan massacres, where the international community is accused of failing to respond to the crisis. For this reason, there was a feeling among world public opinion of the need to double efforts to avoid a repeat of what tragedy. Moreover, the USA also wants to divert the attention of the USA public from what is going on in Iraq, and the opacity to USA casualties and the USA failure to establish a democratic regime there (Hoile 2006, p. 98).
Economic Motives

Besides political motives, economic motives behind the internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis are essential (Abramovici July 2004). Fake and Funk (2009, p. 9) argue that the main reason behind the war in Darfur is oil. They contend that the continuation of the GoS in prospecting for oil, while the Darfur conflict was at its height, was a real spark for the internationalisation of the crisis. This has increased the ambitions of the rebels, raising the pace of war between the government and the rebels, and also contributed by attracting the attention of the major powers competing for control of the region. Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013) contends that the main motivation for the great powers for interfering in the problems of Sudan and Darfur is precisely the discovery of a large inventory of oil, specifically in the area stretching across the province of Bahr el Ghazal between Chad and Cameroon. These sources are characterised as much closer to America and safer to access.

For instance, the USA pushed for the internationalisation of the conflict in the region in an attempt to deprive the rest of the other major international powers and oil companies, such as the Chinese (Large 2007), of the opportunity to access these resources (Fake and Funk 2009, p. 55; Musa 2009, p. 271). Some official American quarters believe that access to the new sources of oil, especially in Africa, provides additional power for the USA regarding its oil strategy, as Gulf States begin to fail to do so either because of the high prices, or the instability of the region (Engdahl 2007, p. 5; Al Ddla 2007, p. 64).

The expiration of the US Aramco monopoly in the exploitation of Saudi oil over the past fifty years has represented a pressure factor which has urged the USA to seek a foothold in West Africa, and create new paths, safer in the long run, away from the waterways of the Arabian Gulf and the Suez Canal and Mediterranean threatened by Islamist groups and Iran (Musa 2009, p. 268). Furthermore, US-Chinese competition for oil concessions in Africa, Sudan, and Darfur in particular, works to increase that interest (Ahmed 2008; Engdahl 2007). The USA will never forget that Sudan's oil, and the South Darfur privileges enjoyed by Chinese companies, were discovered by the USA Chevron company in 1974, which spent more than a billion dollars before
leaving in 1992 on the instructions of the USA government as a result of their exposure to attacks from insurgents (Fake and Funk 2009, p. 30). This could result in USA intervention, whether on the basis of international legitimacy or unilateral ambition, as was the case with regard to Iraq, conducted under the pretext of humanitarian intervention (Mahmoud 2007, p. 101).

Strategic Motives

Seemingly, the USA also sought to internationalise the crisis in Darfur to achieve long-term strategic goals. Sudan, for example, enters into the framework of the so-called new Middle East project, as well as the Horn of Africa project (as part of the Bush Doctrine)\(^{25}\), which aims to disassemble and re-install regional politics in accordance with USA interests and priorities in the region. This project does not allow the existence of large influential entities that could pose a threat to Israel or that are outside USA domination and subordination. It is clear that the USA policy towards Sudan is based on two overlapping factors: the USA strategy towards Africa in general and the USA approach towards the Middle East to confront the arc of crises stretching from Iran, Iraq, Yemen, and Sudan to Libya. This strategy includes mechanisms of containment and economic sanctions, and/or the direct presence of USA forces in the region (Heinze 2007, p. 370).

Moreover, the USA interest in the Darfur Crisis stems from factors related to the strategic matters of the USA in the African continent, such as terrorism and energy resources (Fake and Funk 2009, p. 55). Sudan has a significant geographical location that can act as a base to access the heart of the African continent to achieve USA military and economic objectives in the new world order (Shurkin 2005; Fuchs 2011, p. 63). The other strategic dimension is to circumvent Chinese interests not only in Sudan, but also in various other African countries, especially in light of China's candidacy to be the first contemporary strategic rival to America, as a result of its

\(^{25}\) The Bush Doctrine declared that the United States could launch first strikes to defend itself from terrorists and countries that support terrorists in order to prevent possible attacks before they occurred. The gist of this defence strategy is centred upon the US security strategy to promote democratic regimes – by force if necessary in order to prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world (see Heisbourg 2003, p. 75).
high rates of economic growth (Goodman 2004). China's policies towards African countries are characterised by investments and non-interference in internal affairs (Chan, Lee and Chan 2012, p. 423). This is at odds with the USA approach in dealing with these states (Engdahl 2007). Furthermore, grabbing the Darfur region from Sudan's sovereignty helps to increase penetration in Africa and rob France of post-colonial influence on the continent, in the same way as was done through intervention in Rwanda and Burundi after massacres took place there (Berg 2008, p. 36).

However, it seems that the USA is seeking to intervene in Darfur to evangelise and control the region given the historical and religious importance of the Darfur region in the spread of Islam into Africa (de Waal 2005b, p. 10). It is also believed that the West wants to separate the Muslim African world from the rest of the African continent due to fears of expansion of the Islamic religion to the entire African continent (Hamilton and Farrow 2011, p. 6). Hassan Alsaaouri (14/01/2013) states that children who were born in the refugee camps, which are fully subjected to the supervision of Western relief organisations, have been influenced by the vacuum of ideas and the religions of the workers of those missions. There is doubt that this has had an impact on their religious and intellectual learning, which will have a significant effect on the Islamic society in Darfur.

Besides the different motivations of key internal and external actors to internationalise the conflict in Darfur, a number of mechanisms have been adopted by those actors to take the Darfur issue from the domestic to the global level. Western media (such as The Washington Post, The London Sunday Times magazine, CNN, the New York Times, BBC World) have played an important role in agitating events in Darfur, describing it as a humanitarian crisis, and portraying the issue as a conflict which is based on Arab tribes’ attempts to enslave the African people of Darfur. The international press coverage focusing on the war in Darfur has succeeded in representing the Darfur Crisis as a global crisis and one of the most often-repeated cases in the news, given the huge number of affected civilians in Darfur (Kothari 2010, p. 221; Sidahmed et al. 2010, p. 52; Amman Community Net 2009, p. 45). In addition to international media, Western Research Centres (Think

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26 For more details about the role of Western media see Hoile 2006, pp. 128-151; El-Affendi 2009, p. 59; Sidahmed et al. 2010, pp. 69–70; Mamdani 2010; de Waal 2005).
Thank) and International Human Rights Organisations\(^{27}\) (such the HRW), Amnesty International and Save Darfur Movement) were other external mechanisms that have largely contributed to internationalising the Darfur Crisis (see Lefkow 2004; de Waal 2004; Hamilton and Farrow 2011, p. 47).

**Libyan Intervention in the Darfur Crisis**

Studies of civil wars emphasise an insurgency’s external support as a key factor that influences duration and determines the outcome of the civil warfare. External assistance, such as safe havens in neighbouring states and the provision of military or economic aid have been deemed especially crucial for the duration of counterinsurgency wars as well as insurgent success (Lyall and Wilson 2009, p. 82). During counterinsurgency wars rebels often seek sanctuary in neighbouring states to hide behind the shield of sovereignty that prevents local authorities from crossing national borders to pursue them. In addition, longer counterinsurgency wars may increase the incentives for neighbours or patron states to fight proxy wars through the provision of cheap arms to insurgents in the hopes of destabilising an enemy from within (Regan 2002; Salehyan 2007). Undoubtedly, the interactions and reactions of neighbouring countries to the Darfur Crisis in attempting with influence the development of the crisis are configured and formed in accordance to furthering their own interests. Gaddafi’s Libya has played a pivotal role in attempts to settle the conflict (El-Affendi 24/02/2012; Al-Turabi 14/01/2013; Salahuddin 15/01/2013; Al Mahdi 10/01/2013). Almost all Sudanese scholars and politicians who have been interviewed during the field work for this study, from both the government and the opposition, state that Libyan interference in Sudanese internal affairs was the key feature in the relations between the two countries since Gaddafi rose to power in September 1969. They believe that to play down this fact or to try and neutralise the Darfur Crisis is a kind of illusion. The Gaddafi regime has played one of the most complex and ambiguous roles in the crisis. The role of Libyan diplomacy in the

\(^{27}\) Generally these centres or so-called “repositories of ideas” play an influential role in decision-making, and perhaps even greater than those played by lobbyists themselves. They seek to influence the elites, policy-makers, academics, the media, and interest groups which form public opinion, especially in the USA (Abul-Enein 2007, p. 145).
Darfur Crisis has grown and, at different times, shown the Libyan leadership’s ability to influence the parties to the crisis, especially armed groups, urging them to participate in many negotiating events. Simultaneously, it provided diplomatic cover for the GoS, allowing it to resist international pressures and efforts aimed at the internationalisation of the crisis (Al kbashi 2010). Nevertheless, the Libyan leadership's attitude towards Darfur and its crisis was characterised by vagueness and inconsistency (Ismail 13/01/2013; Hamilton and Farrow 2011, p. 15). This is caused by the influential association of Libya with all parties to the crisis, despite the significant differences which divide those parties (Giorgis 2007).

Libya has also appealed, more than once, to adversaries not to internationalise the crisis and so turn it into an international political conflict. Gaddafi was keen, from the onset of the conflict, to classify it as an African problem requiring an African solution (Hassan 2010, p. 24). It is widely believed that the Libyan proposal to resolve the Darfur issue does not deal with the root of the problem, and that the Libyan leadership had its own agenda, interests and ambitions (Rockro 2011). This belief was also confirmed by several leaders and political officials from both the GoS and the rebel movements in Darfur, such as Sadiq Al Mahdi (10/01/2013), Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013), and Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013).

As we mentioned earlier, this chapter tests the viability of the theoretical model developed for this thesis. This model shows that when outside actors become (in)directly involved with military, economic or diplomatic manoeuvres in an internal armed conflict to pursue their own agendas, which are independent of the motivations of the domestic parties, it tends to substantially prolong the duration of the conflict. This section principally addresses questions of why and how did Gaddafi’s Libya become involved? And to what extent has the Libyan involvement influenced the duration of the crisis? Two key issues relating to the Gaddafi regime’s interference in Darfur will be investigated: first, the motives behind Libyan intervention; and second, the mechanisms adopted by the Libyan leadership in the management of the Darfur Crisis.
• Gaddafi's Motives for Intervening

There is no doubt that Libya is one of the neighbouring countries most directly affected by the repercussions of the armed conflict between the government and rebels in Darfur, because of many overlapping historical, geographic, political, and economic factors. As a result, Libya was one of the first actors to influence the course of the Darfur Crisis, since the Libyan leadership was concerned about the seriousness of this crisis, not just with regard to Libya and the region, but also in relation to the entire African continent. The Libyan leadership in Tripoli was eager to be a major player in its management. Libyan moves towards the Darfur crisis are embodied on more than one level: locally, regionally, and internationally, and this is attributed to several motives. They are addressed as follows.

The Neighbourhood Factor

Libya shares a border with Darfur. Therefore, in the understanding of the political leadership in Libya, Darfur represents an important strategic interest. This is especially important since Darfur is close to the areas of south Libya which contain energy resources ranging from oil and gas fields to freshwater aquifers. In addition, the tribal and historical ties between the two countries were vital factors in the Gaddafi regime's assessment of the Darfur Crisis and its repercussions. Ibrahim Al-Sanusi (14/01/2013), the deputy of Hassan al-Turabi, the Secretary-General of the Sudan People's Congress, has confirmed this. Sanusi confirms that the relationship between Libya and Darfur is concerned with the ancient area of Fezzan since the Fur Sultanate in the fifteenth century and the Kingdom of Dai in the sixteenth century, where the populations were engaged in various activities, most importantly trade.

Libya was a conduit for Darfur towards the Mediterranean. In addition to the overlap produced by the border between the two countries, there also exists a tribal and social overlap. A number of Sudanese tribes extend into Libyan territory and vice versa, such as the Zaghawa, Mahamid, Fazzan and Al Zwai tribes. Pressure was exerted by
some Libyan tribes from southern Libya on Gaddafi to intervene in the problems in Darfur and so to protect their relatives from the civil war and displacement there. Al-Sanusi (14/01/2013) emphasises that this pressure was led by Libyan citizens who are related to some of the Darfur tribes and have old alliances, such as Abu-Bakr Yunis Jabr, the Libyan Minister of Defence under the regime of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. Also, the Libyan intervention might have been due to the pressures exercised by Osman Al Bushra and other members of the Revolutionary Committees including members belonging to the alliance of the Tabu, Bideyat, and Zaghawa as tribal cousins (Ahmed 2013, p. 44). Consequently, Gaddafi became involved in the conflict (Al Ameen 2011). Gaddafi perceived the rebellion as an opportunity to extend Libyan influence into Darfur (Natsios 2012, p. 145; Marchal 2007, p. 181). From another point of view, the Libyan authorities feared the exodus of these tribes into Libya, and the turning of their territory into refugee camps which might lead to the conflict leaking into Libya, and therefore threatening the stability and the security on its southern border, which would act as an indirect threat to the effectiveness of the Gaddafi regime in the region.

Security

As mentioned earlier, Darfur represents strategic depth for Libyan national security, and the continuation of the armed conflict there poses a direct threat to the political regime in Tripoli. Therefore, Gaddafi developed a security obsession with Darfur, especially with the presence of tribal extensions for a number of tribes in the south of Libya. Importantly, a second fear for Gaddafi’s Libya was that the escalation of the conflict in Darfur would create an excuse for foreign intervention, which would restrict the movements of Libya in the Sahel and Sahara regions, which include Sudan, Chad and the CAR (Mamdani 2010, p. 213). In order to maintain influence over the development of the crisis and its implications for Libya, Tripoli made great efforts to prevent the entry of international forces into Darfur, despite the urgent need for these forces to protect civilians there (Rockro 2011). This Libyan attitude was evident when Foreign Minister Abdul Rahman Shalgam stated that any defect in the geo-politics and humanitarianism in Sudan would be reflected on the countries of the
region as a whole. He pointed out that sending foreign troops into Darfur would be an insoluble disaster which would encourage radical Islamists to come from all over the world for Jihad with the people of Darfur, and that Darfur would become another Afghanistan or Iraq. So it had to be a solution provided by the AU and the Arab states so as not to give extra-regional actors an excuse to intervene (Ahram 12 Augustus 2004).

Gabriel Bilal (22/10/2012) confirmed that the Libyan regime had considered the Darfur Crisis from one angle only, which was that if the crisis was internationalised and international intervention occurred, then the existence of regional and international forces was likely to be seen as a siege on the Libyan regime. Furthermore, during the same interview, Bilal also revealed that the Gaddafi regime were rejecting any USA or European intervention, whether in the form of direct military intervention or the presence of international forces to keep the peace. This rejection was not motivated by a desire to protect the people of Darfur, but through fear of turning this troubled region’s border with Libya into an international security threat to the Libyan regime. Libya has always been concerned about the potential presence of the USA in its backyard. Therefore, Libya was an active actor in the whole of Africa to protect its national security in sub-Saharan Africa. To do so, Gaddafi supported liberation movements in many places in Africa, where several regimes have changed, such as Chad in December 1989 (Ismail 13/01/2013).

**Economic Motives**

Darfur is an important market for Libya. Each border tribe in southern Libya is heavily dependent on Darfur for trade, as Libya exports a wide variety of goods to this market. Darfur also exports all kinds of livestock, such as camels and sheep, to Libyan markets. Therefore, we find along the road from El Fasher (the capital of Darfur) to Khartoum, there are so-called Libyan markets which deal in a variety of Libyan goods, from petrochemical crafts to food commodities and petroleum products. Most of the goods that exist in the domestic market in Sudan come from Libya via Darfur. Goods that come from Europe across the Mediterranean also enter Darfur through Libya. The open-air markets of Darfur today feature more goods
from Tripoli and the Libyan coastal plain than from Khartoum and Port Sudan (Natsios 2012, p. 123; Ibrahim 2011, p. 9).

From another angle, the characteristics of the geographical and tribal border areas between Libya and Darfur, in addition to the economic and social marginalisation practised by successive GoS’s on peripheral areas, such as Darfur, have made Libya an important market to absorb the people of Darfur as part of the Libyan economy in the form of workers (for more details see Young, Osman and Dale 2007). Azhari Tahir Ahmad (10/01/2013), the Commissioner for Voluntary Repatriation and Resettlement in the Darfur Regional Authority, spells out that more than 80 per cent of Sudanese workers in the Libyan market are from the different tribes of Darfur, and depend on Libya for improving their living conditions. They represent a significant percentage of the labour force in Libya. Thus, Darfur is important for economic growth in Libya and vice versa (for useful details see Young, Osman and Dale 2007). Studies conducted by Helen Young, Abdalmonium Osman and Rebecca Dale (2007), and Ola Olsson (2010) summarise that Libya will remain an attractive destination for the people of Darfur as long as peace is not made and the Darfur Crisis is not resolved. They argue that the effects of the situation in Darfur cannot be seen as only economic in relation to the local context. The continuation of the crisis directly affects the Libyan local economy, allowing Libyan authorities to use the issue in its dealings and strategy to solve the problem.

Searching for the Peacemaker Role

After Libya's re-alignment towards Africa rather than the Arab world during the 1990s, Libya began to play an active role in resolving African conflicts. Tripoli has tried to mediate in a number of African conflicts, such as the Ethiopian-Eritrea boundary conflict 1998, Eritrea and Sudan 1994, Sudan and Chad 2006 (Huliaras and Magliveras 2011, p. 172) – through peaceful means within the framework of the AU and the Community of the Sahel and Saharan States, drawing on two basic mechanisms: personal diplomacy and financial capacity (Ronen 2011, p. 9).
Furthermore, Libya sent envoys to the peace talks on Sierra Leone that took place in Togo in 1999, and in the same year brokered a peace accord between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as sending peacekeepers to Uganda (Solomon and Swart 2005, p. 476). In 2001 Libyan military forces were deployed in the CAR to support President Ane-Felik Pattase after a failed coup. It has been widely recognised that Libya most significant role as peacemaker was in its former enemy state Chad (International Crisis Group 2010).

Gaddafi’s Libya sought to secure African political support as a means of resisting the domination of imperialism and USA hegemony in the international system. This was also utilised to create an appropriate environment in Africa to help Libyan foreign policy-makers to achieve their goals in the post-Cold War era, including the strengthening of African unity and African integration (Solomon and Swart 2005, p. 479). It is worth noting that Gaddafi wanted to exploit the Darfur Crisis to enhance his peace-seeking image. Gaddafi wanted to prove that the new Libyan policies towards the continent were compatible with the desires of the UN and African regional organisations to create peace, as well as to bring stability and renounce violence and armed conflicts in Africa, as he was the main financier to them (Al-Turabi 14/01/2013).

From this standpoint Gaddafi’s regime was keen to be a crucial actor from the beginning of the conflict in Darfur. The motive behind Libyan efforts was partly related to Gaddafi’s desire to be a strong regional intermediary for conflict resolution and crisis management in Africa. However, the proximity to Libya of the conflicts in Chad and Darfur, and their local and regional dimensions, ensured a more committed Libyan involvement than in other African conflicts (Giorgis 2007). However, this role was always characterised by double standards (Huliaras and Magliveras 2011, p. 167). While Libya has shown, at different times, its relative ability to influence rebel groups in Darfur and has urged them to participate in broader political processes, Tripoli provided the Khartoum regime with a political margin within which that regime was able to resist all local and international efforts aimed at strengthening the peacekeeping operation through international mechanisms.
• The Gaddafi Regime’s Mechanisms for Managing the Crisis

As mentioned above, the Gaddafi regime was forced to intervene, both directly and indirectly, at all levels to monitor the development of events on its southern borders in an attempt to contain the fallout and effects of the crisis. Although the most important motives and reasons behind the Libyan rush to intervene in the course of the Darfur Crisis have already been highlighted. This section considers what type of intervention Libya pursued and what types of mechanisms were adopted by the Gaddafi regime in order to serve its main goals. Those mechanisms can be categorised as two key types: ‘declared mechanisms’ and ‘hidden mechanisms’. The apparent, or declared, mechanisms primarily represented political and diplomatic approaches, including Presidential Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy, while the hidden mechanisms related to military and financial support, changing alliances, and revolutionary committees or “Alligan Althawria”.

• The Apparent Mechanisms

Diplomatically, Gaddafi's Libya played an active role as a third party in attempts to reconcile the fighting Sudanese parties in most stages of the Darfur Crisis. It tried to find an acceptable compromise to the conflict, investing in Gaddafi's political position, gained after his success in founding the AU, and its efforts in solving some African conflicts, where he became label himself as the patron of peace in the Community of the Sahel and Saharan States (Niama 2005, p. 333). In addition, Tripoli has tried to unify the positions of the armed insurgencies that stand behind and fuel the continuity of the crisis, persuading them to uphold peace and halt military operations. For a while, Tripoli represented a link between the GoS and the rebel movements, exploiting the historic tribal links between the Libyan tribes and the tribes of Darfur (Beheiri 2010, p. 215).

Initially it seemed to Khartoum that Gaddafi was a person who could play the role of mediator in resolving the crisis and bringing peace to Darfur, especially in light of
the deterioration of Sudanese relations with Chadian President Idriss Déby who was in a close relationship with Gaddafi. The poor relationship between Khartoum and N’Djamena is a key factor in the continuation of the armed conflict in the region, particularly as a result of mutual accusations between the two capitals that each provides support for opponents of the government in the other country (Al-Nour 2011). Politically, Libya has invested in the crisis through its attempts to converge the views of Sudan and Chad in an attempt at reconciliation between the presidents of the two countries as an important step to containing the armed conflict, as happened in the Sirte Summit in October/November 2004 and Tripoli in May 2006, and the second Sirte Summit in April 2007, in addition to countless meetings and conferences. Libya has wanted to achieve, from this diplomatic activity, some political successes either in resolving this issue or at least giving it tighter control over the potential outcomes of any negotiation processes (Al Khashi 2010). Thus, Libya has moved diplomatically at all levels, using multiple tools, to intervene in the Darfur Crisis.

**Summit Diplomacy (Presidential Diplomacy)**

In an effort to find a way out of the Darfur Crisis, Libya used small and larger presidential summits alongside other suitable mechanisms. Tripoli has hosted a series of presidential summits, such as the Quintet Summit, which was held in Sirte on 17 October 2004 and which brought together the heads of five countries: Libya, Chad, Egypt, Nigeria, and Sudan, as well as the presence of Alpha Oumar Konare, chairman of the AU Commission (Al-Hayat 18 October 2004). Tripoli also called on the Darfur rebels to meet with Gaddafi, but they did not participate in the summit. Moreover, the summit dealt with the humanitarian, political, economic, and security situations in Darfur. It also succeeded in confirming the regional African and Arab framework to address the crisis, rejecting any foreign interference in this ‘African matter’ (Al-Taweel 2006, p. 215).

The main importance of the summit was to show the willingness of regional powers to intervene in the crisis (Al Ddla 2007, p. 190). The summit also called for the rebel movements in Darfur to sign a humanitarian protocol to secure the arrival of food
and medical aid for the displaced. The five presidents also agreed to a follow-up to the conflict in the region, and the development of connections among them, as well as a commitment to regular meetings under the auspices of the AU. They agreed to delegate Gaddafi as the official contact for all relevant parties to the conflict to narrow the gaps between them in order to reach a final and permanent solution to the crisis. In addition, the meeting also encouraged the GoS to comply with the implementation of UNSC Resolutions 1556 and 1564 (Asharq Al Awsat 18 October 2004; Ahram 19 October 2004).

On 16 May 2005, Libya hosted a summit with the participation of the heads of states of Libya, Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria, Chad, Eritrea and Gabon to stop the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, in the presence of Amr Moussa, then Secretary-General of the Arab League. However, the most important results of this summit were an agreement on the resumption of Abuja peace talks between the government and the rebels, and to the commitment to exert more effort to resolve the crisis (SudanTribune 2005). Mustafa Osman Ismail, the Sudanese Foreign Minister, stated that the decision to resume peace talks was the most important decision in the leaders' meeting. He added, "We have prepared a roadmap more clearly to resolve the problem in Darfur to reach a comprehensive peace" (Al Ddla 2007, p. 195). Likewise an attempt to confirm the support of Africans for Sudan's refusal to deploy international forces in Darfur was embraced by Tripoli at the 21 November 2006 summit with the participation of six presidents: then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, Chad's Idriss Déby, Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki, and the Central African Republic President François Bozizé, in addition to Colonel Muammar Gaddafi (Al Ddla 2007, p. 2008).

During the meeting the Libyan leader stressed the need not to allow foreign intervention in Sudan because this involved risk to Sudan and its neighbouring countries, noting that if NATO deployed its troops on the borders, this would be a disaster for Sudan and neighbouring countries (Al-akhbar 22 November 2006). After the failed attempts to unify the armed movements, the JEM and the SLM refused to sign the Abuja agreement on 5 May 2006. The Libyan regime continued its diplomatic efforts through summits mostly held in Libya. The recent important attempt to reviving the political process to resolve the conflict was on 27 October 2007 when several movements agreed to negotiate with the government. This was
conducted under a joint UN and AU committee to unify opposition factions on a common negotiating position in preparation for the final negotiations for a peace agreement (El-Affendi 24/02/2012). This summit failed to unify the position of the armed movements, to persuade the two main factions, the JEM and the SLM, to attend the summit. The summit was also considered a failure of Libyan diplomacy which was trying to show impartiality in dealing with the parties to the conflict in Darfur, especially after the description by Gaddafi in his meeting with the leaders of the rebels that the Darfur Crisis was a brawl over a "camel" (Bilal 22/10/2012). Furthermore, the strained relationship between the two partners, the NCP and the SPLM, at the time was another of the factors that encouraged the rebel movements in Darfur to be absent from the meeting (El-Affendi 2009, p. 83).

**Public Diplomacy**

Libya focused on the process of internal reconciliation to create the atmosphere required for the completion of important progress at the political and humanitarian levels. It held a number of tribal conferences, as well as regional and international meetings, on the Darfur issue, including many tribes and public delegations from inside Darfur region and from the border areas between Chad and Sudan (Institute for Security Studies (ISS) 2007). The most important of these forums was the third meeting for the people of Darfur, which was held in Tripoli in October 2004, and attended by representatives of the JEM, the SLM, and representatives of the civil administration in the region, as well as the presence of deputies from the Sudanese parliament, civil society, and political and partisan leaders from inside and outside Sudan to discuss ways to resolve the crisis (Raslan 2005, p. 32-33).

In May 2005, Tripoli hosted a further meeting with the civil administration in Darfur, in the presence of tribal leaders and civil society groups in Darfur, which set a precedent for Darfurians: providing an independent forum gave them an opportunity to meet and discuss the conflict away from excessive pressure. The civil administration demanded transferring negotiations between the GoS and the opposition from Abuja to Tripoli and to play a prominent role in addressing the issue of Darfur under the personal supervision of Gaddafi (Ahram 18 May 2005). In
December 2005 Tripoli hosted another meeting, attended by hundreds of participants from Darfur including politicians and tribal members, which concluded it was necessary to reunite Darfur into one region within the boundaries of 1956 (Giorgis 2007).

The Libyan political leadership also sponsored the signing of the protocol for implementation of the Abuja Agreement between the GoS and the SLA in Tripoli on 18 November 2006. In the same vein, another forum was held for the people of Darfur, which included more than 65 leading figures and partisan and political activists from the region. This conference was organised in order to develop a standardised view for the Conference of Sirte, ahead of a peace conference on Darfur between the GoS and rebel movements, held under the auspices of the UN and the AU on 27 October 2007. The goal of this event was to bring together the demands of the people of Darfur in a single document for submission to the conference. The most important item in this document is the formation of the Office for the Coordination of the Mass of People of Darfur in order to achieve the purposes for which the war initially broke out (Daily Al Bayan 21 October 2007).

These efforts by the Libyan political leadership culminated in the convening of an international conference on the situation in Darfur in Tripoli on 29 April 2007. In addition to Libya, several actors attended this conference: Sudan, Chad, Egypt, Eritrea, China, France, Russia, Britain, the USA, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, the AU, the EU, the League of Arab States, and the UN. The conference reaffirmed the support of the findings of the consultations at Addis Ababa in November 2006, which were adopted later by the Peace and Security Council of the AU and the UNSC. The conference also stressed upon participants the importance of the need to speed up the formulation of comprehensive solutions to the Darfur Crisis (Al Ddla 2007, p. 208).

Despite the large number of presidential and public summits hosted by Gaddafi since 2004, in order to normalise relations between Khartoum and N'Djamena, and then to reach a peaceful settlement to the Darfur Crisis, none of these diplomatic efforts have led to positive results. These efforts achieved no significant change in the hostility between the two sides or a definitive end to the crisis. The value of these diplomatic efforts has been limited due to the ambiguity of the Libyan attitude towards the crisis.
Many in the GoS and rebel factions, as well as the international community, have been suspicious of the seriousness of Libyan efforts, as well as its claims to being a neutral mediator (Giorgis 2007). As has been the case in other parts of Africa, the motive behind these Libyan efforts of mediation was partly due to Gaddafi’s desire to be a player and a strong regional mediator. But the conflicts in Chad and Darfur and their effects were sustained in Libya more than anywhere else (International Crisis Group 26 November 2007).

- **Unexpressed Mechanisms**

Many observers of the role played by Gaddafi to resolve the Darfur Crisis emphasise the duality of that role, suggesting that the way in which it attempts to tackle the crisis reflects the existence of a wide gap between the ambition of Gaddafi’s agendas and the agendas that internal feuding between parties seek to achieve. This is confirmed by both the government and the rebels. Opposition leaders confirm that the Libyan diplomatic moves were not serious attempts to resolve the crisis and did not provide any clear map accepted by all parties to stop the bloodshed. Gaddafi used to meet with rebel leaders in Tripoli and present them with hours-long lectures describing what was happening in Darfur as fighting over "camels", without offering a scientifically conceptualised, thoughtful resolution to the crisis (Al-Turabi 14/01/2013; Bilal 22/10/2012; Minnawi 10/11/2012).

Similarly, a number of senior governmental officials, such as Mustafa Osman Ismail, Ghazi Salahuddin and Abdullahi AlAzreg, the Sudanese Ambassador in London, suggested that the government was always uncomfortable and did not trust Libyan moves towards the crisis. This was an important concern which led to Khartoum's agreement on the transmission of the negotiation platform to Doha (Salahuddin 15/01/2013; Ismail 13/01/2013; AlAzreg 16/10/2012). In spite of the convergence witnessed by the relationship between Tripoli and Khartoum since the arrival in power of al-Bashir, the situation quickly changed and became volatile. Support for Sudan fluctuated, particularly following the outbreak of the rebellion in Darfur in 2003. The armed movements in Darfur have played a major role both in deteriorating and improving the relationship between the two countries. These rebel movements
have become a key element that controls the improving and the worsening of the relationship through accusations of Libyan support for these movements along the lines of support given to the SPML in the 1980s (Ezerg 2010).

**Military, Logistical and Financial Support for Insurgents (Carrot and Stick Policy)**

Many observers believe that the Gaddafi regime was closer to the rebels in Darfur than the government. This belief is, in part, influenced by the fact that a number of the leaders of the rebellion were mainly members of the Revolutionary Committees Movements, the political establishment and operation that adopt the promotion of the ideas of Gaddafi published in the Green Book\(^{28}\), and were also residing in luxurious hotels in Tripoli. The ambiguity of the Libyan role often caused discomfort for the GoS, which was dealing with Gaddafi with a great deal of caution because of the active role he played in the Community of the Sahel and Saharan States and as an important member of the AU (Musa 2009, p. 117).

The Libyan role in Darfur is complicated and difficult to understand, with roots stretching back to the early 1980s. Some analysts believe that Libya played a big role in what happened in Darfur. The Darfur Crisis – in addition to the wrong internal governmental policies – was a victim of the vagaries of Libyan politics, and the disparate orientations of the Libyan leadership from Arabism to Africanism. Gaddafi played an important role in supporting the movements of armed opposition groups in Darfur, which has been confirmed by a number of sources, whether governmental or rebel, who believe that all logistical support and sometimes military aid comes to the rebels via Libya, whether in favour of the SLA, led by Minni Arco Minnawi, or as a last resort for the JEM, led by Khalil Ibrahim (Al-Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 282; Ismail 13/01/2013; Musa 16/01/2013).

The policy of supporting the Sudanese opposition is not new for the regime in Tripoli, it is a continuation of the Libyan intervention in Sudan's internal affairs since Gaddafi came to power in 1969 (Marchal 2007, p. 178). After a short period of

\(^{28}\) The Green Book is a short book setting out the political philosophy of the former Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi. The book was first published in 1975.
cooperation and normalisation of relations between Gaddafi and Numayri their relationship deteriorated. The key reason for this was Numayri’s signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972 with Southern Sudanese rebels (Ibrahim 2011, p. 5). This convention obliged Sudan not to interfere in the neighbouring affairs of African countries and granted southern Sudanese autonomy (Collins 2006, p. 35). In response, Numayri prevented Libyan military aircraft crossing Sudanese airspace on their way to Uganda, which was on the verge of war with Tanzania29 (Ibrahim and Amira 2011, p. 4). Numayri ordered these aircraft to return to Libya, and Gaddafi considered that action as a betrayal of the revolutionary and unitary principles held by the revolutionary regimes in Libya and Sudan, which were also consistent with the revolutionary ideas of Nasser in Egypt (Natsios 2012, p. 54).

This incident made Gaddafi embrace the leaders of the opposition to Numayri, such as the forces of the National Front consisting of the UP and the DUP, led by Sadiq al-Mahdi, as well as the Islamic Legion, to overthrow Numayri’s rule. Gaddafi supplied these groups with weapons and funding, which helped them to invade Khartoum in 1976, known as the Battle of Mercenary Forces (Marchal 2007, p. 180). Numayri’s reaction was to adopt the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL)30, the opposition to the Gaddafi regime, led by Mohammed Yusuf Maqrif, and to assist the group in what was to be a failed attempt to topple Gaddafi in the attack on the Bab al-Aziziya in 1984 (Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013). When the Sudanese regime adopted Islamic slogans at the end of the 1980s and invited the leaders of global and regional Islamic movements to Khartoum on various occasions, Gaddafi was apprehensive of a coalition of Islamic leaders’ intent on toppling his regime (Alintibaha 2011).

With the outbreak of the rebellion in Darfur, Libya exercised clear influence on the direction of the crisis in order to keep the events on its southern border under control.

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29 In September 1972, during Idi Amin’s first confrontation with Tanzania, Libya intervened with equipment to airlift Ugandan troops, justifying this action as a support for the Ugandan struggle against colonialism and Zionism.

30 The NFSL was a political opposition group formed in 1981. It was active during the rule of the Gaddafi regime in Libya. NFSL called for major liberalising reforms such as democratic elections, practising the general freedoms, and the separation of powers. However, during the 1980s, the group made several coup attempts against the Gaddafi regime; the most notable was the 1984 armed assault on Gaddafi’s Bab al-Aziziya compound in Tripoli. In 2005 and after the failure of several coup attempts the group abandoned the armed methods, and instead used peaceful tactics to promote reform in Libya. This continued until the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 when the NFSL participated in forming the National Conference for the Libyan Opposition in 2012.
This was because of the security concerns of the Libyan regime, and its desire to appear as a strong and effective regional actor. In order to achieve this, the Libyan regime kept its relations open with all parties of the crisis at the same time. It supported the armed movements in Darfur, regardless of their ideological orientations, and dealt with the regime in Khartoum in an attempt to convince them that Tripoli was an unbiased mediator (Haggar 2012, p. 132). The main mechanism that Gaddafi used in dealing with the main parties to the crisis in Darfur was the ‘carrot and stick’ approach. Gaddafi used the carrot less than the stick with the Inqad regime. Politically, this was obvious when Gaddafi gave some positive statements (that Khartoum wanted to hear) describing the war in Darfur as a conflict over “camels” (International Crisis Group 2007), stating that it was going to be the cause of the advent of global imperialism in the region.

Economically, Gaddafi in a few cases gave Sudan some grants and loans (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). Observers who follow Libyan movements in Sudan generally, and Darfur in particular, will see that there are many contradictions in the economic behaviour of the Libyan leadership towards Khartoum. For instance, at the beginning of the rule of Numayri, Libya awarded Sudan about $8 million. Nonetheless, after tension grew in relations between the two countries, Libya demanded Khartoum return this sum (Ezerg 2010). The Gaddafi regime went even further, supporting the SPLM in southern Sudan for years during the rule of Numayri. In the first years of the Bashir regime, Libya donated generously to Darfur, for example for the establishment of a land route between El Fasher and Kufra. Nevertheless, this road was cancelled because of differences between the two regimes. Furthermore, Tripoli donated to the establishment of a university in Darfur in February 1991 under the name of "The University of Al-Fateh September". It was officially opened in El Fasher, the capital of the Greater Darfur, and lasted for four years, funded directly by the Libyan regime. But when Sudanese authorities changed the name of the university to Al Fashir University, Tripoli withdrew its funding (Rockro 2011). Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) stated that in the recent period, after the success of Saudi mediation between Sudan and Chad, Gaddafi repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of the amounts contributed to the financing of AU forces in Darfur.

Furthermore, Sadiq Al-Mahdi (10/01/2013) has said that the current regime in Sudan had tried to appease the Gaddafi regime in order to prevent Libyan interventions in
Sudan, especially in the affairs of Darfur. The cooperative relationship between the two regimes reached the point where the regime in Khartoum came to rely on Libyan oil for a period of time, at preferential prices, and on credit. Moreover, the regime in Khartoum also adopted Gaddafi’s ideas, when the Sudanese political regime became a “Jamahiriya” similar to that in Tripoli. Al-Mahdi added that al-Bashir called Gaddafi to Khartoum and that, together, they demolished the walls of the political Kober prison, as Gaddafi did with the central prison in Tripoli on 3rd March 1988. It is clear that Gaddafi was embracing the regime in Khartoum as long as it corresponded to his anti-US position. It turns out that when the USA bombed the Al-Shifa factory and the Sudanese leadership in 1998, Gaddafi led a demonstration in Tripoli to support the Sudanese position (Al-Mahdi 10/01/2013).

Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013) confirms that there are no significant Libyan investments in Sudan: Gaddafi sometimes adopted small projects, but not large-scale signature projects. Tripoli did not have a financial impact on the Sudanese economy and government. Economic relations between the two countries witnessed considerable tension in the first year of the Inqad government, where Gaddafi frequently claimed that Sudan took Libyan money and did not give it back. The practical result was that Gaddafi had no important influence on the GoS in terms of financial support. As for the use of the stick, Gaddafi was betting on the knowledge of the government that he could be harmful, because the leadership in Khartoum was well aware that Gaddafi was a 'mad' and dangerous man, and had the potential to threaten the stability of the regime in Khartoum. Gaddafi was able to aggressively seek revenge on his victims. He hinted to the GoS that if the regime was not with him on the same line he would open his weapons stores, supporting Sudanese opposition movements with arms, money and fuel (Eldoma 09/01/2013).

Ghazi Salahuddin, the Chairman of the Intergovernmental Panel negotiations, confirms this view by saying that “I, as an administrator on the Darfur file, have dealt realistically with Gaddafi, because I realised that he could do bad things in Darfur that are difficult to face and stop” (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). The GoS was largely trying to secure what could be useful from Gaddafi and at the same time trying to address what could be harmful. Khartoum has only had diplomatic means at

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31 Such as The Burj Libya hotel (former The Burj Al-Fateh) in Khartoum (Cockett 2010, pp. 8-9).
its disposal; it does not have the strength or the financial and moral potential to fight a war with Libya. Sudan has had enough problems in Darfur, as well as the south and east of the country. In contrast, Gaddafi has used the carrot more than the stick with the rebel movements. Gaddafi had provided a safe haven for insurgents and combat training centres for them, in addition to financial aid and logistical and intelligence support. Tripoli also provided them with a large area which enabled the armed movements to access secure treatment of persons wounded in battles against the government’s army (Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013; Minnawi 10/11/2012). It is worth mentioning that although this claim has been confirmed by interviewees from both the governmental and rebel sides, there are no accurate figures and/or statistical data available to corroborate these statements.

**The Policy of Changing Alliances**

Gaddafi’s Libya was biased to certain movements who were given larger amounts of money and weapons, although they differed ideologically from the Gaddafi regime. For example, in the first years of the crisis Gaddafi supported the SLA. Gaddafi was generous with the SLA, supplying the necessary fuel and spare parts for vehicles. Tripoli also provided many SUV vehicles and large amounts of nutrients that the SLA needed in the fight against governmental forces (Musa 2009, p. 116). After Minnawi’s signing of the Convention of Abuja in 2006, Gaddafi switched alliances and became a supporter of the Islamic-oriented JEM (Al-Mashaqbah 2012, p. 182). But at the same time he did not lose contact with Minnawi, and the delegations of the SLM's Minnawi wing visited Tripoli asking for financial aid. Other movements were provided with money and political support but did not receive arms support (Eldoma 09/01/2013). Azhari Tahir Ahmad (10/01/2013), one of those who regularly visited Tripoli within the delegations of the Darfur opposition movements, confirms that there is not a faction in Darfur that went to Libya that had not received financial support according to its size and effectiveness. Even Abdul Wahid, who disagreed with the Libyan government, was supported and given large amounts of money, very specifically through Abdullah Senussi who was the intelligence chief in Libya. Some say that Abdul Wahid was given more than €5 million. Gaddafi adopted the tactic of
changing alliances with the armed movements in Darfur according to their strength and effectiveness on the ground.

Gaddafi had a clear standard in his support for movements and in identifying movements that could be relied upon, which would subsequently receive more attention than others. The criterion was the extent of the movement's ability to continue in the struggle and resistance to the government's army and its ability to implement whatever was asked of it to destabilise, if not topple, the regime in Khartoum. The SLA and the JEM movements sometimes had more power and influence in the field, and therefore received Gaddafi's support in spite of the ideological differences between the movement's Islamist ideology and the secular Gaddafi regime. Gaddafi suspected that these movements might be the most likely to gain power and thus they would subsequently be indebted to the regime in Tripoli should Gaddafi sponsor them. Gaddafi thereby sought to ensure that this new leadership would not work against his interests (Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013). Thus, Libyan intelligence worked to determine the strongest movements and supported them in order to serve Gaddafi’s agenda.

Osman Ibrahim Moussa, the head of the SLMHL, dissident Abdul Wahid Nour says, was always meeting with Gaddafi to crystallise and unify the visions of the people of Darfur. Moussa added that “Gaddafi enthusiastically supported us morally, logistically and with arms. Gaddafi’s position was good at the beginning of the crisis, but he recently responded coolly as a result of the dispersion of our positions as armed movements” (Moussa 16/01/2013). It seems that the main reason for the disagreement that occurred between Nour and the Libyans was that the former wanted to be independent in his decisions, which was inconsistent with the desire of the Gaddafi regime (Azzain 11/01/2013). Gaddafi offered a peace initiative to contain the dispute between Minni Minnawi and Abdul Wahid based on the principle that rivalry between the leadership weakens the opposition.

On this matter, Abdul Wahid considered the intervention as interference from Gaddafi. He refused any external pressure for reconciliation as well as rejecting the principle of Gaddafi as an intermediary. As a result, the Libyans considered Abdul Wahid Nour to be outside their influence and so incapable of being a partner in the future. So they put their trust in Minnawi because he was more closely aligned with
the regime's thinking (Tahir 10/01/2013). Besides, Abdul Wahid had refuted Gaddafi’s description of the Darfur problem as a "camel problem". He considered this to be an abuse of the people of Darfur, and therefore refused to go to Tripoli. Since then, Gaddafi’s support turned to strengthen the JEM, supporting it politically and militarily, a situation which continued until the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 (Musa 16/01/2013).

On the other hand, Gaddafi succeeded in using these movements as a card to achieve tactical objectives during his handling of the crisis. This was clearly visible after an attack by the JEM on 10 May 2008 in Khartoum, which occurred after the transfer to the Doha negotiations. Governmental reports accused the Libyan authorities of being involved and supporting the attack, which was aimed at toppling the Bashir regime. These reports stated that the extensive military force used by the JEM, estimated to be more than 400 armed cars, had to have been supported by neighbouring countries (Al kbashi 2010). Mustafa Osman Ismail stressed that Khalil Ibrahim arrived in Khartoum using Libyan weapons, and that the GoS verified this with the Libyan authorities. He revealed that Sudanese authorities required Tripoli to provide explanations about the Libyan weapons found with the JEM elements that attacked Khartoum. The Libyan authorities denied this, stating that they gave the arms to Chad, and that Chad gave them to Khalil (Ismail 13/01/2013).

This was also confirmed by Andrew Natsios, the former USA Envoy to Sudan, when he mentioned that most of the rebels' arms came from Chad and Libya, with most of these weapons entering Sudan across the Chadian border, but that their origin was Libya (Natsios 2012, p. 145). It seems that Gaddafi used these actions to realise his desire to move the negotiations from Doha to Tripoli again, which would enable him to affect the outcome of any possible settlement, and this was contrary to Khartoum's wishes. The Gaddafi regime thought that strengthening the JEM movement would mean more pressure would be put on Khartoum on the ground which might force Khartoum to go into peace negotiations, regardless of the location, be it in Doha or Tripoli.
By tracking the performance of the Gaddafi regime in the Darfur issue, it transpires that the initiatives of the Libyan authorities, presented to resolve the Darfur issue, contain a kind of discrimination between the Darfur tribes and clearly demonstrate a policy of divide and rule. Gaddafi was keen to polarise certain influential tribes within the armed movements at the expense of other tribes in Darfur. He also sought to revive old relations with some branches of Darfurian tribes using Libyan assets such as some Zaghawa branches (Al kbashi 2010). Added to this, Gaddafi relied on some of those tribes which had become a shield and protection for the Gaddafi regime after it had been weakened as a result of the international embargo imposed on Libya for more than a decade 1992 – 2003. Given Gaddafi’s doubts concerning the loyalty of the tribes of eastern Libya and other parts of the country, he resorted to the southern shared tribes between Libya, Sudan and Chad, such as the Tabu, Bideyat and Zaghawa, to strengthen his regime and impose his vision on his era and the era of his sons after him. So Gaddafi resorted to encouraging the migration of Africans to Libya, which was against the desire of the Libyan people themselves (Migration News 1996).

This arguably resulted in deadly assaults (known as Zawya events) in 1996 by Libyan citizens on these immigrants (Young, Osman and Dale 2007, p. 833). These killings were a strong indicator of the rejection by the Libyans of Africans being increasingly present in large numbers in their land who intended to protect the Gaddafi regime from a coup. His idea was to lure these Africans (mostly from Darfur, Chad, Mali and Niger), with funds, to fight on his side against the Libyan people (Al Ameen 2011). This is what happened in the revolution of 17 February 2011 which toppled Gaddafi.

Additional evidence that the Libyan regime sought to break up the tribes in Darfur appears when it confirmed the split in Darfur movements by initially pulling Minnawi from the SLM and the establishment of the SLA across the Haskanita

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32 In 1996, an estimated 300 to 400 of Sudanese migrants were shot and killed; for more details and figures see Young, Osman and Dale 2007.
Conference, which was funded by Libya (Flint 2007, p. 158). It seems this strategy had been planned by the Libyan regime to weaken the Fur tribe, which is the only tribe that has the ability to influence developments in Darfur. In addition to the rejection of Libyan intervention by Abdul Wahid, especially with regard to the issue of the settlement of nomads in the area of Wadi Saleh in West Darfur, the Libyan people refused to accept international forces in Darfur (Rockro 2011).

The Fur tribe and its allies tended to resist the Arab presence, particularly Chadian Arab tribes that had been in opposition to the regime in N'Djamena since the founding of the Islamic Legion in 1988 under the leadership of Sheikh Ibn Umar, and were supported by the Libyan authorities to topple the regimes in Chad, Sudan, Niger and Mali. These regimes were targeted because they represented the main obstacles to Gaddafi’s scheme for an Arab belt created in North Africa and extending to Central Africa (Haggar 2007, p. 122). Gaddafi found, in the rebellion in Darfur, an opportunity to support the Zaghawa tribe and so extend Libyan influence within Darfur (Natsios 2012, p. 145).

**Revolutionary Committees (Allegan Al Thawria)**

Many Darfurians belonged to the Libyan Revolutionary Committees who have had offices that promote the Jamahiriya system – the ideas of Gaddafi's Green Book – and had strong links with the regime in Tripoli. When they returned to Darfur they joined the rebel movements and thereby came to have a double political membership, which served the interests of the Gaddafi regime in targeting the loyalty of the ruling regime in Khartoum or influencing its internal and external policies (Alsaouuri 2010, p. 92). Gaddafi embraced the rebel movements in Darfur, especially after it appeared that many elements of the revolutionary committees were affected by the Green Book, such as Abdullah Zakaria Mahmoud Abdeen, Adam Shogar, and Osman Bushra. These are some of the most important political leaders in the rebel movement in Darfur, particularly within the SLM.
Gaddafi hoped that these movements, and their allies, would be able to attain power. Thus, he supported these movements and provided safe corridors to deliver aid and supplies. According to some reports, the Society of the International Gaddafi Foundation charity – run by Colonel Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam – Gaddafi was active throughout the world in humanitarian crises and represented the Libyan regime as an instrument of its foreign policy. This continued throughout the period of 2003–2004, with assistance provided to areas controlled by the rebels and often without the knowledge of the GoS (Ministry of Defence of Republic of Sudan 2013).

The role of members of the Revolutionary Committees Movement in Sudan was evident in the Haskanita Conference incident which separated Minnawi from Abdul Wahid Nour. Many observers confirm that this conference was fully funded by the Libyan government (money and supplies) through the Gaddafi Foundation which has now been closed down now.

The most crucial result of this was that this conference was set for prominent leaders among the members of the new leadership of the SLA wing, essentially belonging to the Libyan Revolutionary Committees who fought with Gaddafi in his war against Chad. Amongst these was Osman Bushra, who was appointed Secretary of the Office of Movement, (Wing Unity) in Libya, in addition to Mustafa Tirab who spent more than 20 years in the service of the Revolutionary Committees in Libya. It seems that the Libyan regime brought him in as Secretary-General of the Movement to control it (Musa 2009, p. 116). After the peace agreement for Darfur in Abuja, Tirab also was appointed as Minister of State at the Ministry of the Federal Government from 2006 to 2010, followed by Minister of State at the Ministry of Culture 2011-2012, and then Minister of State at the Ministry of Culture and Information.

Nonetheless, after signing the Abuja Agreement, all these men have turned their backs on Gaddafi and have indulged in their conflicts and struggles over their own interests. After that, the Revolutionary Committees proceeded to adopt other movements, such as the SLM/the Collective Leadership, led by Abdullah Yahia (Mahmoud 16/01/2013). Thus, the regime in Tripoli was always looking for leaders belonging to the revolutionary committees to manage the crisis, but it seems that tribal associations have always been more powerful than political associations.
Conclusion

It is clear from the above discussion that internationalising the Darfur Crisis was due to a lack of confidence between the GoS from one side and the Darfur rebels, the neighbouring countries and the international community from the other side. Significant local factors have increased the possibility of intervention in and the internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis. At the level of the rebel groups, Khartoum failed to contain these factions because of the rebels’ distrust about reaching a solution without external intervention. Additionally, the internal environment in Sudan and the political nature of interactions have colluded to set the stage for foreign intervention and created a climate that allows others to use excuses to further their own interests. Sectarianism and the adoption of narrow agendas revolve around the power conflict and political maliciousness by most Sudanese political actors, which does not give priority to supreme national interests. This is also an essential cause for external interventions.

Regionally, the exchange distrust between the regional countries, such as Libya, has led Sudan to engage in internal conflicts in these countries, and therefore the response of these countries was to support rebels in Darfur and to facilitate the smuggling of weapons and logistical support to them. Furthermore, lack of confidence by the international community, both in either a Sudanese or African solution, helped to increase in the push towards the international solution, which the GoS does not trust.

Foreign intervention has now become one of the most important factors impacting attempts towards a solution. Black and Williams (2009, p. 9) argue that in diplomatic negotiations concerning Darfur, and other regions in Africa, it consistently “punches below its financial weight”. Most influential major powers may effectively serve as a ‘humanitarian cloak’, obscuring the deep, neo-colonial continuities in relations between them and their regional allies. Certainly, many local actors will be suspected, and accused, of playing such a role by complicating their collective efforts to influence events in Darfur and elsewhere. This seems evident from the confusion caused by the multiplicity of influential actors on the trends and tracks of the Darfur Crisis, and then the multiplicity of agendas for each of these key actors. This justifies
the chaos and confusion that increases whenever the relevant parties get closer to the start of a serious political negotiation process, geared towards a solution. Regional and international actors are significantly keen to guide the conflict along a specific path in order to attain specific interests. Gaddafi's Libya was certainly at the forefront of these parties.

This chapter demonstrates that the Gaddafi regime has adopted a dual policy of cooperating at the same time with the ruling regime in Sudan and the opposition to avoid disturbing its balance of interests in Sudan. Therefore, Gaddafi wanted to ensure the balance for Libya's continued presence and influence on Sudanese politics with any rebel group. It is also obvious that the overall strategy of the Libyan regime wanted the stability of Sudan because this promoted Libyan security, and at the same time, Libya was uncomfortable with the Islamic regime in Khartoum and would support any attempt to change it. Therefore, Gaddafi supported the Sudanese opposition, providing it with arms and money and tracts of land to move through. Although he used various mechanisms in achieving his ambitions, the main instruments adopted by Gaddafi were predominantly money and arms. Thus, the duration of the Darfur Crisis would be prolonged as long as it found weapons, financial and political support from Libya, this in total largely support the assumption of the theoretical model designed for this study. How Gaddafi’s Libya as a key regional actor had an influence on the duration of the Darfur Crisis will be assessed in the next chapter.
Chapter 6

Assessing the Influence of Libyan Involvement on the Duration of the Darfur Crisis

Introduction

To assess the applicability and validity of the theoretical model developed in the literature review chapter with the Libyan case, understanding the truth about the Libyan role in the Darfur conflict is essential. Therefore, this chapter principally addresses the extent of Gaddafi’s impact on the expansion of the conflict, and on its duration. It explores the hidden role of Gaddafi and the agendas that he was seeking to achieve through his involvement in the management of the Darfur Crisis. Whether those agendas were different from those of the rest of the domestic conflicting parties is also discussed. Could this lead to a clearer understanding of whether Gaddafi really was willing to end the crisis? Was he able to influence the combatants and impose a fast and lasting solution to the conflict? And how did this affect, lengthen, and widen the circle of conflict or war containment for the benefit of all parties? Additionally, the impact of the regime change in Libya on the future of the Darfur Crisis will be investigated. It is difficult to accuse the Gaddafi regime of being behind the outbreak of the crisis, as certainly there were local factors and historical accumulations, which all led to the explosion and the shifting of the crisis from the local scope to a global one, as has been explained in the literature review section and chapter three. It was to be expected that the Gaddafi regime found itself to be strongly present and a major player since the beginning of the crisis until the regime's fall in 2011, since Darfur represents an important strategic space in Libyan security accounts (Al-Nour 2011, p. 6).
Gaddafi’s Hidden Agendas in Darfur

The diplomatic performance of the Gaddafi regime, as well as the Libyan solutions and proposals to resolve the Darfur Crisis, were too far from the roots of the problem and its implications in general. Likewise, it clearly reflected the interests and ambitions of the Libyan leadership, especially in Darfur.

• Ensuring Regime Survival

Gaddafi and his security aides feared that trouble in Darfur could turn into an international threat to the Libyan regime (Bilal 22/10/2012). Any American or European intervention whether in the form of direct military intervention or the presence of international peacekeeping forces could have placed limitations on the active movement of Gaddafi's policies in Africa (Tahir 10/01/2013). Gaddafi believed that if these forces entered Darfur they would not leave quickly and that Western countries might also request cooperation from Libya, using its territory to monitor the security situation in Darfur and eastern Chad (in fact this had already been requested by Britain in September 2006). The Libyan regime had reservations about UN forces in Darfur. It knew that international forces, if allowed to enter into Darfur, would have a significant impact in the region surrounding Darfur, which could lead to the imposition of democracy on the region. Libya was one of the dictatorial countries in the region which might become obliged to meet with its people (Rockro 2011).

The other issue relates to the hidden and undeclared ideological conflict between the secular Gaddafi regime and the Inqad Islamic regime. This had been dormant for a long time, but each party was aware of it. The Inqad regime sought to establish an Islamic state and sharia law, which Gaddafi saw as a risk which could be transmitted to Libya (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). Thus, he wanted to ensure the non-transmission of the ideology adopted by the Islamic regime in Khartoum to Libya. Gaddafi had not forgotten the coup attempt in the 1990s, led by leaders from Islamic backgrounds who received their training in Sudan and set off from Sudanese territory with the
support of the Numayri regime (Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013). In addition, it can be said that the desire of the Gaddafi regime to play a negative role in the Darfur Crisis was clear after the Americans and Europeans approached the issue of Southern Sudan in Machakos 2002 with the proposed partition of Sudan. The regime in Tripoli realised that the stability of northern Sudan, with its ability to extract oil and other natural wealth, as well as to the return of Sudanese emigrants, would mean that major developments would occur under the Islamic government. This would threaten the existence of the Gaddafi regime; particularly as in Libya most people adopt conservative Islamic orientations (Al Ameen 2011, p. 6).

Libya was present at every negotiation platform, as a member of the observer team for the peace process, in attempts to influence the outcomes. Gaddafi was deliberately keen on several occasions, to exit from the general framework of the case. This was a result of his own understanding of the nature of the conflict in Darfur as a tribal dispute with its roots in, and parties to, the "camel problem". Therefore, others should understand Gaddafi’s methods of handling the crisis. Thus, the Libyan leadership was keen not to give the Darfur Crisis a political nature and would not admit that it was a struggle for power and rule of the country. The issue of Libya as a third party playing the role of mediator to resolve the crisis and its unwillingness to change this understanding significantly increased the complexity of the problem (Bashir 2009, p. 170).

This tactic of the Libyan leadership in the management of the crisis had a negative impact on its credibility and commitment to neutrality for some parties to the conflict, particularly the armed movements in Darfur who accused Gaddafi of playing down the importance of the Darfur issue. In fact, maintaining the conflict in its tribal framework, in addition to its consequences, tended to be of interest to Khartoum. Gaddafi’s remarks in this context supported the position of the GoS in the crisis, not the insurgency. The leaders of the rebellion in Darfur were political bodies with material and moral interests, so they insisted on making the conflict political. This was important because without politics the conflict would have remained confined to a narrow, geographic constituency, so strengthening the negotiating position of the GoS, while the politicisation of the issue would help the rebels to expand it regionally and internationally (Bashir 2009, p. 170). Furthermore, among the tactics adopted by the Gaddafi regime in its handling of the crisis to serve its security
agenda was creating a state of distrust between the armed movements. The Libyan mediator did not succeed in maintaining its position as a neutral intermediary standing at an equal distance from all sides. This has negatively affected the possibility of the presence of the leaders of the main armed movements, the JEM and the SLM, at the negotiations in Libya. Gabriel Bilal (19/10/2013) stresses that the Libyan mediator failed to appreciate the views of the conflicting parties as well as not providing a suitable negotiating environment without any bias to either party. This failure does not seem accidental, but deliberate, and it appears that the Libyan leadership was not seeking to accelerate the end of the issue according to the interests of the Sudanese warring parties, but according to the vision and agenda of the regime in Tripoli, which contributed to the extension of the crisis.

- The Pursuit of Leadership

A strong tendency toward leadership and the temptations of power entrenched Gaddafi since he came to power in 1969. He saw himself as an inspiring or unusual leader, and looked to expand his influence and leadership. He always introduced himself as a political leader, internationalist thinker, philosopher and the leader of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa, and the Imam of Muslims who can provide solutions to the problems of the whole of humanity. Libyan oil revenues enabled him to buy influence through supporting rebel and separatist movements and oppositions in different places in the world (Natsios 2012, p. 123), especially in Africa, including Chad, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Ibrahim 2011, p. 4; El-Kikhia 1997, p. 116). Gaddafi sought leadership of the Arab world by adopting Arabism and nationalist orientations, trying to replace Jamal Abdel Nasser in the leadership role of the Arab world, which required that he had an influence in different Arab countries. However, in light of the conditions that followed the setback in 1967, the refraction of the Nationalist Project,33 and the emergence of a new political class in the Arab world

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33 The Nationalist Project of Egyptian President Jamal Abdel Nasser held the central premise of radical Arab nationalism that the peoples of the Arab World, from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Sea, constitute one nation bound together by common linguistic, cultural, religious, and historical heritage. One of the primary goals of Arab nationalism is the end of Western influence in the Arab World, seen as a “nemesis” of Arab strength, and the removal of those Arab governments considered to be dependent upon Western power.
against the Arab national project, Gaddafi found himself unable to achieve this goal, forcing him to move towards Africa to search for new fields in which to follow his obsession with leadership. This is what lay behind Gaddafi's idea of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013). For this, Gaddafi paid huge amounts of money to buy the loyalties of heads of states and governments, tribal leaders and communities to become one of the largest economic supporters of many African countries (Ismail 13/01/2013). Much of this was done through the Libyan Arab African Investment Company (LAAICO) and the Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO) (Ibrahim 2011, pp. 9–10). Gaddafi's efforts resulted in the establishment of the Community of the Sahel and Sahara in February 1995, which paved the way for the establishment of the African Union (instead of the OAU) in March 2001 (Ministry of Defence of Republic of Sudan 2013). Ghazi Salah al-Din (15/01/2013) says that "there is no doubt that Gaddafi was behind the creation of the African Union and, proposed it in order to lead it. He wanted Sirte to be the capital of the African Union. Thus, he had to find allies and supporters in African countries, especially in Chad and Sudan."

Gaddafi's obsession with leadership directly affected Libya's biosphere and involvement with neighbouring states, where he remained present throughout the years of his rule, interfering in the internal affairs of Chad and Sudan in order to make them affiliated countries, and subject to his influence. In 1981 Gaddafi announced the formation of an empire to implement the idea of a desert Arab belt in North Africa, which would extend to Central Africa. To carry out this scheme, the Libyan regime trained mercenaries from different countries, forming the so-called Islamic Legion (Haggar 2007, p. 121), which was used to support the Arab nationalist orientation of the Libyan leadership before his repudiation of Arab nationalism and embracing of Africanism.

These militias were from pastoral tribes, including the tribes of Mahamed in Sudan and Mauritania, the Touareg in Mali and Niger, and the Bideyat in Chad. Gaddafi armed them with modern weapons, which later formed the largest security issue to hit Darfur (Haggar 2007, pp. 121-130). These militias were considered a natural extension of the Janjaweed forces that had committed atrocities in the region. According to Gaddafi's revolutionary spirit and his ambition to expand militarily, and build on the illusions of exporting the revolution, Libya invaded Chad in 1987 to join
the Aouzo Strip in Libya, using Darfur as a rear base where he built camps for Libyan forces in the Jebel Moon region of Sudan. Nonetheless, the Libyan army suffered a major defeat in the Aouzo Strip and the Dome Valley by Chadian troops, with the help of French forces (Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013). As a result, Gaddafi sought to secure Libya's southern borders by creating a certain presence in Darfur. This presence was provided by the citizens from Darfur through their emigration to Libya via the open land borders with Sudan. Darfur was, for Gaddafi, a field of experiments for his dreams in the context of his diligent quest for leadership. Darfur was also a theatre through which to extend his influence in Sudan and for fabricating and fuelling the conflicts in Darfur and the south and other areas in Africa (AlAzreg 16/10/2012).

The juxtaposition and overlap between the communities of Darfur and Libya, and intensive migrations towards the latter, especially after the discovery of oil, encouraged large numbers of Darfurians to adopt Gaddafi's ideas and beliefs and to join the so-called Revolutionary Committees in Libya. Later, many elements of the revolutionary committees appeared in the leadership of the rebel movements in Darfur, allowing Gaddafi to hope that these movements, and their allies, would be able to attain power. Despite the weakness of indicators and evidence, Gaddafi preferred to support these movements and provide safe corridors to deliver aid and supplies at the expense of good relations with the GoS (Ministry of Defence of Republic of Sudan 2013). His role and motives in becoming involved in the Darfur Crisis are closely linked to the main problem related to the mental image of himself. Gaddafi believed that he was greater than Libya's leadership alone, and that the limits of his powers should be beyond the limits of the powers of the head of state. He was acting as a prophet who carries an important message that exceeds the task of the head of state. On several occasions he rejected the ceremonies and protocols that are practised for and by the heads of states, where he refused to be treated as a head of state, saying “I am the commander.” Gaddafi believed that he had a natural right to interfere in the internal problems of Africa, and in particular in neighbouring countries’ problems, such as in Chad and Darfur, and this could be explanation of the story of the 'king of kings of Africa' (Salahuddin 15/01/2013).

In this context, Gaddafi was able to gather all the traditional symbols in Africa (Ashanti, Albaguenda, and Zulu) to support himself and his position among African
peoples. But the irony here is that Gaddafi turned against the Sanusi monarchical regime in Libya, and at the same time sought to be the king of kings of Africa. It seems that this was also part of the mobilisation of the position of the Libyan and African people for the benefit of Gaddafi's African leadership, constituting a kind of pressure on the leadership of the AU to be the best candidate for the title of the father of the AU (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013). Although some believe that Gaddafi was behind the establishment of the AU, which he first initiated during the thirty-fifth summit of the OAU held in Algiers in July 1999, others remain both sceptical and cynical.

They believe that Gaddafi did not always inspire trust and he was engaged in ‘cheque book diplomacy’ in Africa with a view to increasing his influence and achieving his passion for global leadership. It seems that ‘leadership’ in whatever way (e.g. of the Arab world, or of Africa) was a central pillar (or perhaps the central pillar) informing all Gaddafi’s external policies. He seemed to be obsessed with leadership in order to gain power and security for his regime's continuation. He sought to achieve regime survival, driven by psychological factors that reflected his personal interests in seeing himself as pan-Africanist and calling to himself the Father of Africa, through establishing strategic depth (Natsios 2012, p. 122). Thus, Gaddafi used the Darfur Crisis to put pressure on Khartoum and N'Djamena believing that the more the regime had influence on African countries, the more easily it could achieve its ambitions for Africa's leadership.

• **The Resources Conflict**

Darfur is very rich in many types of natural resources (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). Its soil contains large amounts of copper ore and gum Arabic. More importantly, the region is rich in uranium ore, the lifeblood of nuclear programmes. Notably, there has been the discovery of a huge amount of uranium in a copper pit (named the uranium pit) in South Darfur (see Figure No: 5) bordering the territory of Bahr el Ghazal, or Big South Sudan, making this region one of the largest uranium stocks in the world (Al-Badri 2004). Above all, oil discoveries have been made in Darfur since the 1990s (Al-Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 72; *Global Witness* 3rd June 2010),
as well as more recent discoveries of gold mines (ToTheTick 2013) in the area of Mount Amer (Salahuddin 15/01/2013; Eldoma 09/01/2013). For more empirical information see Sharaky 2005, p. 41–52.

![Geographic distribution of mineral resources in Darfur (Sharaky 2005, p. 50).](image)

On the other hand, the presence of a huge freshwater aquifer has also been discovered in northern Darfur (Robinson, et al. 2006, pp. 229–240, Ghoneim and El-Baz 2007, pp. 5001–5018), which is large enough to meet the needs of Darfur and Sudan as a whole, and could contribute to the development of Darfur (see Figures No: 6 and 7 (cited in Ghoneim and El-Baz 2007). This lake has been monitored by satellites of the US space agency and there is likelihood of the availability of large quantities of oil in the same area (Kamel 2011, p. 81).
Although a lot of specialists have confirmed that this information has been known for more than 50 years (Osman 2008), the announcement of this discovery remains an important indicator of what is going on in this area of undeclared and hidden conflicts internally and externally (American Bedu 2008). The Libyan regime has spent billions of dollars on the Great Man-Made River Project to transfer groundwater from the southern deserts of Libya to the northern coast. However, this raises the question of whether Libya was aware of the existence of underground freshwater in Darfur. The answer is perhaps yes, and the huge amounts of money spent by Libya on this vital project despite its questionable feasibility when based solely on Libyan freshwater resources, as well as its being designed by Gaddafi personally, could be evidence of this (Rockro 2011). Several international studies confirm that many future conflicts will be over fresh water (El-Anis and Smith 2013,

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34 For more details: size, cost, time to build etc. see Salem 1992, p. 270.

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This may reflect the desire of the Gaddafi regime for continuing the conflict in Darfur and keeping the region unstable in order to prevent the development of Darfur’s mineral wealth, especially in the presence of the Islamic regime. Migrant workers from Darfur to Libya are estimated at about 500,000 and Sudan benefits from its own natural resources, as development and exploitation of these resources will, typically, encourage these workers to return to Sudan and thus reduce this figure significantly, which could have a negative effect on the Libyan economy (Al-Mashaqbah and Al-Taieb 2012, p. 181). Moreover, this may mean that Gaddafi could lose a very important card which can be used in negotiations. The threat of the expulsion of Sudanese labour from Libya could be a bargaining factor between Libya and Khartoum and the rebels, as well as with the international community.

- **The Desire to Play a Role in the International Political Arena**

Gaddafi tried to exploit the course of the Darfur Crisis to play a pivotal role in the international and political arenas. He wanted to make the Darfur Crisis a valuable opportunity for the further normalisation of relations with Western countries, especially the USA. Also, Gaddafi tried to use the crisis to find more opportunities to create a cooperative relationship, which could confirm his desire to create more effective political and economic relationships in the long run. This, in turn, imposed on his regime the need to avoid the anti-policy interests of the West in the region (Beheiri 2010, p. 214). Tripoli was enthusiastic about this trend after the restoration of relations with the West. This occurred after Tripoli paid a heavy price for the victims of the Lockerbie case and the issue of a French airliner that exploded in 1989 over the deserts of Niger, known as Aluota, in addition to the announcement of the abandonment of Libya’s nuclear programme, and the release of Bulgarian nurses accused of infecting children with AIDS in Benghazi. He committed to open

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35 The case of AIDS victims in Libya is an issue involving five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor who were working in the Children's Hospital in Benghazi, Libya, on charges of infecting 426 Libyan children with HIV-tainted blood. The case lasted 8 years from the year 1999 to the year 2007, and ruled over the settlement of the release of the six defendants after the Libyan judiciary had issued a death sentence on them. It is believed that their release was the result of intense pressure and interventions by the European Union (Aljazeera.net 2006).
investment in the field of energy for Western companies to gain economic benefits (Mateos 2005, pp. 439-445).

On the other hand, Gaddafi wanted, through this crisis, to ensure the growth of good relations with the USA and the EU, in preparation for getting their support and

Figure No: 7. Geographical distribution of the Northern Darfur Mega-Palaeolake
acceptance for him to be succeeded by his son Saif al-Islam, who adopted a liberal tendency that was more acceptable to the West (Ronen 2008, p. 135).

In this context, Libya sought to play an important role in the field of humanitarian relief, providing humanitarian supplies to the displaced people of Darfur. Tripoli agreed to use its territory as a humanitarian corridor and to allow international aid convoys (especially those from the USA) to pass overland, from the Mediterranean Sea to the refugee camps in Chad (Thomas and Mizushima 2005). At the same time, Tripoli promoted these efforts, providing humanitarian aid relief in July 2004 through the Gaddafi Foundation, headed by Saif al-Islam (Zine El Abidine 2011). On this basis, it was incumbent on Tripoli to remain close to the security zones and to areas of unrest on its southern border with either Sudan or Chad because of the serious implications of this international involvement for the national security of Libya.

The incident at the Third Africa-EU Summit, held in Libya from 29-30 November 2010, is further evidence of the Gaddafi regime’s attempt to use the Darfur Crisis to repair its relationship with the West and polish the image of Gaddafi globally from the first sponsor of terrorism in the world to the first sponsor of the peace process. President al-Bashir was formally invited by Gaddafi to participate in the conference. After al-Bashir sent confirmation of his participation, Abdullah Sanusi, head of Libyan intelligence, surprisingly informed the Sudanese authorities that the participation of President al-Bashir had been cancelled as Gaddafi froze permission for a plane to be sent to transport him to the conference.

Mustafa Osman Ismail (2013) confirms that the excuse was that al-Bashir’s participation in the conference meant the non-attendance of the German Chancellor, the British Prime Minister and the French President – this has to be considered against the backdrop of the memorandum of the ICC to arrest al-Bashir (Reynolds 2010, Boateng 2011). President al-Bashir did not attend the conference, although it was not a bilateral visit, but was an African conference, and Sudan is a member of the AU which rejected the charges against Sudan, including the ICC memorandum. Gaddafi cancelled a visit permit and apologised to al-Bashir, keen to secure the attendance of the heads of government of Germany, Britain and France. This
demonstrates that he was keen to appease the West. Ironically, these European leaders did not attend the conference either.

This position was contrary to the position of the Prime Minister of Malawi, Joyce Banda, when she announced on 4 May 2012 that Malawi would not be able to receive al-Bashir at an African summit, which was scheduled to sit in Malawi, under the pretext of avoiding a deterioration of relations between her poor country and its major donors. She announced that the economic implications of hosting President al-Bashir had to be taken into serious consideration, as Malawi suffers from unprecedented economic problems, and it would not be wise to risk allowing someone to come and attend the summit despite strong opposition from donor partners and collaborators (BBC News Africa 2011). Consequently, the AU transferred the summit to Addis Ababa, while Gaddafi insisted on holding the Third Africa-EU Summit in Libya after dispensing with the presence of al-Bashir.

Was Gaddafi Able to Influence the Parties to the Conflict in Darfur?

There is no doubt that Gaddafi’s Libya played an influential role in the direction of the crisis and its duration. Perhaps Gaddafi genuinely wanted to be a mediator for peace on the grounds it was a crisis within the space of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) – at least initially – and his success in solving it would enhance his role in the region and the African continent. However, the accelerated pace of the internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis and the direct intervention of the international community formed an early warning to Gaddafi that he would lose the most important card he had to play in the region and expose his strategic rear (Al-Mahdi 10/01/2013; Al-Sanusi 14/01/2013). He therefore rushed to be a hidden party in the conflict, besides playing an apparent mediator role, providing support to various armed groups in the region to ensure his continuity in the game (AlAzreg 16/10/2012). He sought to own papers which could make him the last word in any potential settlement, by controlling the positions of the rebel groups or even subdivide them to facilitate control. This had made the task for Gaddafi one in which
he had to play a dual role in the Darfur Crisis: the role of mediator between the parties as well as the agitator of the conflict at the same time (Al-Mahdi 10/01/2013). Nonetheless, the question that arises is, was he actually able to influence the warring parties in Darfur?

- **The Extent of Gaddafi's Impact on the Sudanese Government**

The Gaddafi regime’s relationship with the Inqad regime in Khartoum was bizarre. The Khartoum regime was convinced that Gaddafi was supporting Chad in its conflict with Sudan, and that he was also supporting armed rebel groups in Darfur. However, Khartoum preferred silence and overlooked the bitter reality, not disclosing it publicly, though some Sudanese newspapers reporting on the Bashir regime sometimes referred to the Libyan role in fuelling the conflict in Darfur. There were complex calculations to be made and Khartoum was forced to take precautions in dealing with the influential Libyan actor in the Darfur Crisis. The most important of these caveats was that Sudan's relations with Chad were tense going as far as estrangement and proxy-war by opposition groups in the two countries.

The GoS was not able to afford the consequences of engaging in a public feud with the Gaddafi regime, because that would mean the expansion of its direct war with rebel groups, and indirect war with Chad. It would also mean the loss of its two most important neighbours in Darfur. So Khartoum opted to prevent "Gaddafi's evil", perceiving that he would not hesitate to support the rebels in Darfur publicly if he was himself accused by Sudan of supporting them secretly. No one in Khartoum could predict the extent of Gaddafi's damage to their regime, in the case of open hostility. So Khartoum consented to the lesser of two evils: it turned a blind eye to Gaddafi's support for rebel groups in Darfur, and appeared at the same time to be relying on his role as a mediator of peace, which might reduce the extent of damage he could cause (Salahuddin 15/01/2013; Al-Nour 2011).

Many Sudanese politicians believe that the continuation of Sudanese-Libyan relations, connected for the duration of the Inqad regime, is evidence of the efficacy
of their diplomatic style in dealing with Gaddafi and his volatile diplomacy. On the other hand, observers do not attribute it only to diplomatic tact, but also to the balance of interests between the two countries. Almost all through this era, Libya was living under the conditions of Western sanctions, implemented since 1992 against the backdrop of the Lockerbie disaster. This was at a time when Sudan was living under similar conditions against the backdrop of the Western position towards the Sudan’s national salvation government, and the circumstances of the war in the south and Darfur. Despite the fact that the GoS knew of the hostile actions to it, Khartoum worked to harness Gaddafi’s influence, within the corridors of the AU, to serve and support the interests of Sudan, both politically and diplomatically (Salahuddin 15/01/2013).

According to observers, Khartoum succeeded in this task, especially in that Gaddafi was trying to present himself as the wise man of Africa (Ministry of Defence of Republic of Sudan 2013). In contrast, Sudan played an important role in breaking the Western sanctions on Libya when the first Sudanese plane landed at the airport in Tripoli in 1998, as this interdependence between the two countries was necessary (Salem 2004). As soon as Gaddafi realised that the Darfur Crisis was no longer a regional game and had quickly turned into an international issue, he wanted to have a recognised role in international efforts to resolve the crisis. But he was not able to stand by Khartoum when he considered of the UNSC resolutions which accused al-Bashir of committing war crimes and violations of IHL as referred to the ICC, and its implications to issue an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir himself (Al-Nour 2011).

Mustafa Osman Ismail (13/01/2013) stated that the Gaddafi regime was secular, and that Gaddafi himself was historically hostile to the West but he had recently started to draw closer to Western powers, which was inconsistent with the orientations of the Islamic regime in Khartoum. It looks as though Gaddafi found, in the Darfur Crisis, an opportunity to settle accounts with Khartoum's Islamic regime. In this context, it was revealed that Salva Kiir, First Vice-President and Prime Minister of the south and Chairman of the SPLM, met Gaddafi on 1 July 2009, at which point Gaddafi assured him of Libya's support for South Sudan if they decided to secede from the north, in the 2011 referendum. Moreover, Gaddafi told Salva Kiir that it was wrong to keep the south united with the north: it should be either an independent state or
join with another country in East Africa. Furthermore, he promised to send Libyan experts to South Sudan to help with the reconstruction of infrastructure and the development of agriculture (Asharq Al Awsat 2009).

This position was not new: Libya was one of the most important sources of support for the SPLM in the south, led by John Garang in the mid-1980s, a time when Gaddafi was at the height of his nationalist orientations. No doubt it reflects the lack of good faith from Gaddafi towards Khartoum, as well as the bad relationship with al-Bashir's regime (Al kbashi 2010). It seems that Gaddafi’s policy was based on maintaining the insurgency in Darfur, since it would oblige Khartoum to comply with him. Consistent with to the conflict in Darfur, Gaddafi also wanted the West to deal with him by sending humanitarian aid through Libyan ports, making Libya a key hub in resolving the Sudan and Darfur problems. Thus, the West, in order to deal with the problem, would be forced to mend its relationship with Gaddafi. He wanted to put Khartoum and the opposition under his influence, sending a message to the West that they were dealing with the Darfur Crisis and a solution would only be achieved through Libya (Ismail 13/01/2013).

Therefore, Khartoum sought to circumvent the role of Gaddafi and pre-empt his influence by conducting direct reconciliation with Chad in May 2007 under the auspices of Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, which meant a loss for Gaddafi who thought of the move as a "ridiculous diplomatic" step (Al kbashi 2010). Khartoum also encouraged a platform for Doha and Qatar's role in the Darfur peace negotiations. This, of course, did not live up to Gaddafi’s expectations, who found his role to be shrinking. He did not publicly oppose the Doha Forum, but he was not enthusiastic about it (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). Sudan's government officials confirmed that Khartoum did not have much trust in Gaddafi and believed that any solutions to come from Tripoli might be a discount on the sovereignty of Sudan in Darfur, and possibly in Khartoum itself.

Abdullah AlAzreg (16/10/2012) revealed that Gaddafi was fickle and that his positions were not trusted by the Sudanese authorities; he could change them at any moment. AlAzreg stated that Khartoum did not want to give him the opportunity to be the main sponsor for Darfur peace negotiations, because there were no guarantees on Gaddafi’s part. The GoS was convinced that Gaddafi dealt with the conflict in
Darfur as a means of putting pressure on them to adopt his contradictory positions towards the final settlement of the crisis in Darfur rather than finding a solution (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013). Gaddafi was betting on the fact that the GoS knew he could be harmful. He exercised his influence through the political role he had made for himself in Africa, where he thought of himself as an influential African figure who could thus have an effect in Sudan (Nacua 16/05/2012). Another effect was the establishment of relationships with tribal and political classes in Sudan, and most importantly, establishing relations with the armed movements in Sudan (Salahuddin 15/01/2013).

In certain cases, however, Gaddafi was able to exert pressure on the government and this was evident in the issue of Khartoum’s acceptance of the principle of compensation for those in Darfur. Initially, the GoS refused to talk about compensation but Libyan and other international pressure led the government to accept this principle (Eldoma 09/01/2013). At first, Khartoum accepted the collective compensation and refused compensation of individuals and they signed the Abuja Agreement on this basis. Later the GoS approved the compensation of individuals at the Doha agreement (Eldoma 09/01/2013). It seems clear that Gaddafi failed to subdue the Bashir regime and therefore maintained the crisis as a way of exerting pressure on Khartoum. On the other hand, some believe that the regime in Khartoum, with its relations with major Islamic organisations (such as the Muslim Brotherhood), had the ability to exert pressure on Tripoli.

Al-Bashir's regime revealed the truth about his relationship with Gaddafi and his regime when Khartoum was the first to supply the Libyan rebels with military support to topple Gaddafi in 2011. Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir stated that his country armed the Libyan rebels who overthrew Col. Muammar Gaddafi (AlAzreg 2012; James 2011). This is evidence that the two regimes were not in sync, each having plans against the other without announcing them. The Libyan position during an AU summit, held in Addis Ababa in 2007, is another indication of the hidden conflict between the two regimes as well as the competition to play an important role on the African continent. Sudanese diplomats received a painful defeat for the second time in the race for chairmanship of the AU, and the Libyan attitude was not supportive of Sudan. Some argue that Gaddafi pitted North African countries at the
The regime in Khartoum has the same expansionist vision as Gaddafi had (Al-Turabi 14/01/2013). It holds an Islamic ideology that was incompatible with the secular Gaddafi regime. However, it may be still too early to determine the nature of the new political regime that came to power after the February 2011 Revolution in Libya. Therefore, the Bashir regime is unwilling to support the continuity of the Gaddafi regime because of the clash on ideological and intellectual levels of both regimes (Al-Turabi 14/01/2013). On the other hand, perhaps Gaddafi believed that the end of the Darfur Crisis might push Khartoum to threaten the security of Tripoli in the future, and that case he may have thought that the continuation of the crisis could preoccupy Sudan against adopting such a vision. The lack of harmony between Khartoum and Tripoli on a common vision for a solution and security has had a negative impact on the duration of the Darfur issue.

- **The Extent of Gaddafi's Influence on the Armed Movements in Darfur**

Gaddafi's deal with the parties to the conflict in Darfur has always been characterised by contradictions and his positions have always been characterised by duplicity. Gaddafi was dealing with the armed movements on the basis that he was an internationalist, revolutionary leader and that all revolutionary movements in the world had to be within the circle of his influence or under his care in exchange for promises of assistance (Bilal 19/10/2013). Sadiq al Mahdi (10/01/2013) pointed out that while Gaddafi was cooperating with the Inqad regime, he also deliberately cooperated with the rebellion in Darfur in order to gain influence in the Darfur movements for two reasons: 1) to apply pressure on the Sudanese regime, and 2) to ensure that any settlement was reached under the auspices of the Libyan government. However, the question that arises is, to what extent was Gaddafi able to influence the positions of the armed movements in Darfur throughout the stages of the crisis while he was in power?
Azhari Ahmed Tahir (10/01/2013) mentions that Libya did not have significant influence on the armed movements particularly the SLM and the JEM, and perhaps the main reason for this was the multiplicity of these movements and the differences in their agendas. Tripoli dealt with rebel movements in different ways. Some were dealt with honesty and some that were dealt with more strategically. Many leaders from the armed movements in Darfur believe that they did not benefit from the support of Gaddafi to the extent by which they could achieve the goals of the rebellion. Gaddafi was unable to put pressure on the leaders of the rebellion. However, they did not deny that as Gaddafi was able to put some pressure on the GoS, he also could put some pressure on the armed movements at different times, forcing them to modify their activities on certain occasions.

Gaddafi saw the movements as tools to achieve his own agenda and the irony is that most of the movements were aware of this (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013; Musa 16/01/2013; Minnawi 10/11/2012), but they were also trying to exploit his support to continue their rebellion against Khartoum. Gaddafi had significant tools that allowed him to influence the armed movements through financial and military support. Furthermore, the leaders of the armed movements had a special bias towards Libya more than any other country. They considered Libya to be their second home as a result of historic, cultural and economic factors. Nevertheless, Gaddafi did not employ these tools in the right way to end the crisis according to Sudanese visions, but instead to serve his own agenda. Gabriel Bilal (22/10/2012) says that there were no formal negotiations in Libya to end the crisis, but there were attempts to gather all parties to the crisis in one place as happened in Tripoli in 2004, the so-called Conference of the People of Darfur. This is the greatest diplomatic achievement that Gaddafi was able to accomplish within the framework of the Libyan regime seeking to tackle the crisis. All Gaddafi’s attempts to unite the movements and persuade them to enter into serious peace negotiations failed. For example, all the bets that were on the Sirte Summit in November 2007 to include the participation of all rebel movements, and to unite their delegations to negotiate with the government, failed (Nami 18/01/2012).

That happened when Gaddafi surprised the world by declaring the failure of the summit, which was called for and hosted by himself, arguing that the absence of the leaders of the JEM and the SLM made the summit pointless, prompting the African mediator, Salim Ahmed Salim, to propose to hold another attempt to unite the rebel
movements which suffered from splits in Arusha, Tanzania, in 2008. This also did not succeed in achieving its desired goal (Ministry of Defence of Republic of Sudan 2013). Hussein Minnawi (10/11/2012) and Jibril Bilal (22/10/2012) contend that the lack of seriousness and impartiality of the Libyan mediator helped to prolong the crisis. Libyan mediations had no serious proposals or clear plans to end the crisis. The Libyan regime could not impose a specific vision on the government and revolutionary movements, and the reason for the SLM and the JEM not attending the Sirte conference was their realisation of the lack of any genuine interest in resolving the crisis on Gaddafi’s part.

Several sources from the rebel movements, including the JEM and the SLM, confirm that despite Gaddafi’s being able to put pressure on the warring parties, he did not have any desire to solve the problem. They even accused him of being behind the opposition to the AU and UNSC resolutions regarding the Darfur Crisis due to his direct influence on the decision of the Council for Security and Peace of Africa (CSPA). This ability to influence the CSPA was driven by both political influence and physical effects achieved through its financial contributions to organisations. Libya prevented the issuing of any resolution of the CSPA against the GoS due to Gaddafi’s impact on all African presidents, without exception. Whether avoiding his problems or coveting his money, there was no African regime ready to confront Gaddafi (Bilal 22/10/2012). Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013), one of the founders of the SLM and the head of the historical leadership movement, confirms that Gaddafi supported Abdul Wahid Nour in the early stages of the crisis, and that he was dictating the terms in exchange for his support. Mousa reveals that Gaddafi tried on several occasions – in the presence of Mousa – to convince Abdul Wahid to adopt his vision, which was the secession of Darfur as a separate state and establishment of a partnership with Libya, in the sense of becoming a state in Darfur under the tutelage and patronage of Libya in the form of a paternalistic relationship. Interestingly, Osman Moussa said that Gaddafi offered them a set of incentives to embrace this idea in 2005, represented in a railway belt which would run from Tripoli to Darfur and South Sudan linked to communication networks.

Gaddafi used to say that South Sudan would become an independent state. He promised them that he was ready to build Darfur in just five years, with all the basic facilities, creating economic partnerships, commercially based on trade, as well as in
many other fields, such as oil and metals. Gaddafi used to give the SLM aid in the form of military vehicles and light weapons, and promised, if they adopted his vision, that he would provide them with heavy weapons (Musa 16/01/2013). When Abdul Wahid refused to fall in with his ideas, Gaddafi accused the rebellion of not having a clear goal in view, and that the issues were simply "grazing and camels". A number of officials in the SLM contended that Abdul Wahid Nour refused to do so because they were not separatists and that they, as Darfurians, saw the whole of Sudan as their territory. Abdul Wahid believed that control of the centre was the goal by all parties in the west, the east and the south, and this was the cause of the dispute between him and Gaddafi.

In this regard, Ghazi Salahuddin (15/01/2013) confirms that the people of Darfur expressed their political problems through pressure on the centre and not by peripheral pressures alone. Rebels in Darfur did not call for secession, unlike Southerners who were always trying to solve their problems by separation. Instead, Darfurians called for a change in the composition of governance and rule at the central level, and the attack of the JEM was evidence of this trend. It seems that Gaddafi, after the failure of the Darfur separation project, began to think of toppling the regime in Khartoum through support of the JEM, which basically amounted to attacking Khartoum with Libyan weapons in the hope of reaching power in Sudan through a partnership with the Gaddafi regime. Osman Ibrahim Musa (16/01/2013) also confirms that Gaddafi was seeking to end the Darfur Crisis only by either the secession of Darfur or the toppling of the regime in Khartoum. He was trying to pressure the rebels through military and financial support, giving a lot of money to the leaders as well as providing weapons, vehicles, leadership training and logistical support. This support was granted via Abdullah al-Senussi, the intelligence chief (Musa 16/01/2013; Tahir 10/01/2013). A number of Libyan military leaders also used to come to Darfur to provide military support; this is confirmed by sources from both the GoS and the rebels (AlAzreg 2012).

As explained in chapter four, the Gaddafi regime deliberately prolonged the crisis by creating differences and distracting positions between the Darfur movements instead of uniting them. This also clearly appears evident in the incident to configure the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) as well as the incident of the detention of Ibrahim Khalil in Tripoli. In its reaction, Tripoli sought to bring the Darfurian camp
directly under the auspices of Libya. It seems that the Libyan regime deliberately supported the formation of a new group, creating a fake revolutionary movement (the LJM led by Tijani al-Sisi, who was brought from Darfur as an alternative to Abdul Wahid Nour) (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013). Some observers, besides officials in the SLA and the JEM, accused the Gaddafi regime of inviting various factions that claimed resistance in Darfur (Minnawi 10/11/2012; Bilal 19/10/2013). These groups were gathered under the auspices of the Libyan intelligence and Libyan funds, and many were virtual and default resistance movements which did not really exist on the ground and so could not influence the crisis in any way (Bilal 19/10/2013).

Tijani Sisi was not part of the armed operations in Darfur, but a political figure who was governor of the Darfur region on behalf of the UP, before the arrival of the Inqad regime; he also was of the UN staff. Sisi became the leader of all Darfurian factions that cooperated with Libya and that did not support the factions of Abdul Wahid or Khalil. A closer look at the name of the new movement, the "Liberation and Justice Movement", shows that it is a quotation from the SLM and the JEM, which may show the spirit of political spite used by the Gaddafi regime with Abdul Wahid and Khalil Ibrahim configuring the new Darfurian body as a substitute for them. Leaders of the SLM and the JEM go further, accusing the Libyan security service of cooperation with the Sudanese security apparatus in creating the movement (Bilal 22/10/2012; Minnawi 10/11/2012).

However, government sources have rejected this, confirming that Sisi cannot be counted as the government (Salahuddin 15/01/2013). When Doha, encouraged by the GoS and Arab and international support, called for new negotiations, the Libyan regime pressured the Qatari mediator and the rest of the parties to accept the LJM as a key partner in the negotiations. The Libyan regime realised that the SLM and the JEM would not accept a movement that did not have any military presence on the ground, and through this act the peace negotiations were impeded. Thus, it can be argued that this action was one of the negative roles played by the Libyan regime in prolonging the Darfur Crisis.

Also, through this act it transpires that Gaddafi’s imposition of a fake movement was an attempt to delude the world that his political and diplomatic efforts achieved some success in the peace process in Darfur. In reality, this intervention created a large
split among the Darfurian revolutionary forces. It was clear that this work, in the first place, fell within the framework of the general Libyan trend of tackling the crisis – that the solution should be Libyan, without taking into account the real interests of the Sudanese. Through all this, the Libyan regime failed to maintain its relationship with Tijani al-Sisi, who turned his back on Gaddafi and signed the Darfur Peace Agreement with the GoS in Doha on 14 July 2011 (Haggar 2012, p. 311). Libya realised that all the webs woven in Darfur were lost, so it worked to strengthen its relationship with the JEM, without ideological considerations (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013).

However, the framework agreement signed between the GoS and the JEM in Doha in March 2010 was seen by the Libyan regime as a step in the right direction towards a final settlement and also as a blow to Libya. But after the JEM delegation went to Tripoli on the pretext of displaying the contents of the Framework Agreement and to consult with the Libyan leadership, signs emerged of the JEM leader trying to wriggle out of the agreement, as well as his convictions of trying to continue fighting. For example, the JEM threatened to withdraw from the Doha negotiations in the event of the signing of the framework agreement with other armed movements that existed in Doha, with reference to the LMJ. Khalil Ibrahim, head of the JEM, pointed out that movements that were in Doha were members of civil society, not armed movements, and were/would not be in the fighting field in Darfur (Masress 2010). This is what actually happened when the JEM boycotted the Doha negotiations, accusing Khartoum of violating the cease-fire in May 2010 (Ramadan 2010).

The JEM froze negotiations with the GoS in Doha on the grounds of governmental violation of the Convention and in protest at the involvement of the LJM. Subsequently the GoS ordered the arrest of Khalil Ibrahim, on charges of involvement in the invasion of Omdurman in May 2008. Sudanese diplomatic moves affected the presence of Khalil Ibrahim in Egypt so that he fled to Chad in May 2010, but Chad also prevented him from crossing their territory and using it as a base of operations against Sudan (Ministry of Defence of Republic of Sudan 2013). Khalil Ibrahim was compelled to go to Libya, which welcomed him warmly (Alintibaha 2011). His arrival there after being prevented from entering Chad was a golden opportunity for Gaddafi to influence the course of events and the Darfur peace negotiations (Al-Nour 2011).
Gaddafi sent a private jet to N'Djamena to transfer Khalil to Tripoli and grant him political asylum, which caused tension in the relationship between Tripoli and Khartoum. This forced the GoS to close the border with Libya and to deploy military units. Observers believed that such a move on the part of Gaddafi was an indication of a serious escalation in attempts to be influential in the Darfur issue (Rockro 2011). He was not satisfied with the intervention of Qatar and the Sudanese acceptance of the initiative of the Qatari government and the neglect of the Tripoli initiative. Diplomatic mediations sent by President Omar al-Bashir to Libya did not succeed in persuading Gaddafi to retreat from hosting Khalil Ibrahim, who also failed to comply with al-Bashir’s personal requests over the phone. Mustafa Osman, the former Sudanese Foreign Minister, who was appointed Presidential Advisor after stepping down as Foreign Minister (he is currently the Sudanese Investments Minister) revealed that in the last meeting between Gaddafi and President al-Bashir, al-Bashir asked Gaddafi to expel Khalil Ibrahim from Libya, because Libya is Sudan's neighbour, and there were many Sudanese in Libya who might be affected by the presence of Khalil as well as relations between the two countries. Gaddafi agreed that an alternative country should be found to harbour Khalil Ibrahim.

As a result, Khartoum conducted intensive contacts with some countries, such as Benin and Burkina Faso, and all agreed to host Khalil to permit for better relations between Khartoum and Tripoli (Ismail 13/01/2013). To start the order required al-Bashir to send the Sudanese intelligence director to coordinate with Libyan officials to complete the transfer, but Khartoum was surprised by Libya’s refusal to eject Khalil Ibrahim, the justification being that Khalil had given Libyan hospitality. Khalil remained in Libya with his group until the revolution of 17 February 2011 (Ismail 13/01/2013). Gaddafi's containment of the Darfur rebel movements and the presence of the leader of the JEM led to strained relations between the two countries and the Sudanese closure of all borders and corridors with Libya in July 2010.

On the other hand, the JEM demanded many regional and international actors, led by the USA, to persuade Gaddafi to allow Khalil to return to Darfur, but all such mediations failed (Bilal 22/10/2012). The JEM considered the presence of Khalil Ibrahim in Tripoli under house arrest (for approximately 19 months to prevent him from attending to his troops in Darfur) as undermining the activity of the movement and providing great moral support for the Bashir regime’s agenda (Dosa 2013, p
It is clear that Libya did not want Khalil to participate in the Doha peace round, but rather to remain in Tripoli, establishing a new alliance with Libya and so serving as a new card in the hands of the Libyan leadership to thwart the Doha reconciliation. It seems that Tripoli wanted to send a message to all parties that peace had to come from Tripoli and not via Doha, emphasising the continued Libyan influence in Darfur, in addition to its pressure on the regimes in Khartoum and N'Djamena, considering that the JEM had become a hostile party to them in the hands of the Libyan regime (Al Mahdi 10/01/2013).

The Future of the Darfur Crisis after the fall of the Gaddafi Regime

Although this thesis uses an analytical and interpretative approach for certain events and actions rather than a predictive research project, the researcher finds presenting an overview about the continuation of the warfare taking place in Darfur beyond the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Tripoli gives additional value to the thesis. Although it is too early to predict the stability of the situation in post-Gaddafi Libya, undoubtedly the fall of the Gaddafi regime will have important implications for regional and international paths (El-Anis and Hamed 2013, p. 188). After more than four decades of relations between Libya and Sudan, marked with much mistrust and instability, the fall of the Gaddafi regime could be a crucial transitional point in reshaping the future of relations between them, especially in regard to the future of the Darfur Crisis. This was also expressed by Muhamed Sola, the Libyan ambassador to Sudan (Sola 06/01/2013).

Regarding the impact of the Libyan revolution in February 2011 on the future of Darfur, there are two expected scenarios that may be seen, pessimistic and optimistic. The first track centres on the capability of the new governors controlling the state and establishing a state of stability. The failure to completely eliminate the pockets of potential resistance of the remnants of the Gaddafi regime, and imposing military and security control throughout the country, especially in the desert areas bordering Sudan and Chad, would lead to chaos and a wave of disputes and deep divergence.
harming the components of the Libyan society, and revolution. In particular, the tribal factor is still dominant and plays a key role socially in light of the absence of the experience of practising the democratic process due to the prevention of establishing political parties during the Gaddafi era. The continuation of any influence of the elements belonging to the remnants of Gaddafi's regime in the region would destabilise the new situation in Libya and could be a resource supply of arms to Darfur.

If some armed movements reject engaging in the peace process, the chances of a continuation of the conflict will inevitably be enhanced. Especially in light of many existing stories about the smuggling of large quantities of Libyan arms into Darfur following the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime with Khalil Ibrahim’s move from Libya to South Sudan in September 2011 (Hsabo 2011). Furthermore, there were several reports accusing rebel movements in Darfur of supporting Gaddafi forces against the revolutionaries in Libya. This also formed a factor of pressure on the rebellion movement in Darfur, and a factor of convergence between Tripoli and Khartoum as this issue negatively impacted the relationship between many Libyans and Darfurians.

The other main concern is the reaction of the international community towards such instability in Libya and the likelihood of its being exploited it to intervene in Libya and then in Darfur. Escalating the tension and instability as well as the eruption of the civil war, or even the outbreak of armed violence between different components of the Libyan people, would negatively affect the stability that has prevailed recently in Darfur. Particularly if heavy weapons poured into Darfur, as has happened since the 1980s, deteriorating conditions to form a humanitarian crisis, which would encourage a NATO and Western intervention in Darfur's affairs. The proliferation of weapons in the hands of citizens, regional divisions in Libya, divisions in the elite and political class between secularists and the Islamists who have important influence on Libyan society politically and socially, besides their role in the military operations against Gaddafi's armed militias, are other essential variables.

Theoretically, and from an ideological view, the West tends to support secularist political parties that are established on the Western vision, and to prevent the emergence of a party or faction adopting an extreme Islamist or a national orientation.
Western countries, such as the USA, France and Britain, effectively participated in the operation of ‘Fajer Odessa’ within the framework of implementation of Resolution 1973, issued by the UNSC in March 2011, which authorised the use of force by NATO to prevent Gaddafi from committing massacres against civilians in Libya. Western powers are worried and reluctant to arm the new authorities in Tripoli under the pretext that the weapons might fall into the hands of extreme Islamists or terrorists. These concerns are compounded by several reports which talk about the presence of Islamic extremist groups belonging to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State of (IS) in different parts of Libya, especially in some of the eastern cities that threaten Western interests in the region. The attack on the USA consulate in Benghazi by unidentified armed men that led to the death of Chris Stevens, the USA Ambassador to Libya, along with three of his American staff (BBC News Africa 2012; The Washington Times 2013), was an important indicator which cannot be ignored.

In this respect, some Western parties that already have tense relations with Sudan may push towards the continuation of instability in Libya. This could provide justification for their intervention under the pretext of the protection of civilians, which requires the continuation of a NATO presence on Libya and Darfur’s borders. Through its existence in the region, NATO may move a step further to attempt to establish closer cooperation with UNAMID claiming that the human goal is the same and that success in Libya may lead to other successes, especially in Darfur. This will be regarded by Khartoum as a threat to the national security in Sudan.

The other variable relates to the nature of the new political regime in Libya. Yes, it seems that Sudan was involved in the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime and many Sudanese officials stated that Khartoum was the largest beneficiary of this event. However, this collapse led to the removal of one of the greatest threats against national security in Sudan, but not all of them. For instance, the continued tense relations between Sudan and some Western countries such as the USA, due to the situation in Darfur may influence post-Gaddafi Libyan foreign policy, particularly towards Sudan. It is undeniable that the victory of the Libyan rebels was a result of the role played by the USA, France, and Britain through NATO, as well as essential

36 For more details about who is the terrorist? What is terrorism? see Gorry 2004, p. 85.
support provided by the international community to the Libyan revolution which led to the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime. Due to this influence, Libya may change its policy towards the Darfur issue and its rejectionist attitude to the international intervention in the Darfur region to become a part of military intervention in order to protect civilians. This will all have an impact on the future relations between Sudan and Libya (Al-Nour 2011).

In a similar setting, important Sudanese officials, such as Gazi Salahedden (15/01/2013) and Sadiq Al Mahdi (10/01/2013), confirmed that with the fall of the Gaddafi regime just one important factor of the continuation of the Darfur Crisis was removed from the equation, as the element of Libyan exploitation was removed, but the fear of the involvement of other significant external actors still remains. They emphasise that the crisis may be exploited by other external parties, such as South Sudan and the CAR (Eldoma 09/01/2013), which would be a positive transitional point in favour of the armed movements in Darfur. All these factors actually represent a serious challenge that bear out dangerous implications and threatens the stability of Sudan, and Darfur in particular, beyond the fall of the Gaddafi regime. Thus, with this scenario the possibility of increasing the complexity of the Darfur Crisis and prolonging its duration will likely be higher.

The second expected scenario, in regard to the future of peace building in Darfur after the Gaddafi regime's collapse, is centred on the political realism and the shared interests of both the Libyan and Sudanese sides. Establishing a democratic regime of governance in Tripoli (El-Anis and Hamed 2013, p. 174), as the Libyan revolution has aimed for (Ashor 26/12/2011; Nami 18/10/2012), will reassure Khartoum that the new Libyan state will adopt peaceful policies in the context of good neighbourliness. Likewise, it sends a message that Libya will not support or embrace the rebel movements in Darfur.

Several factors and developments are still interacting and findings can play a crucial role in reshaping a new reality for Sudanese-Libyan relations, which would cast a positive impact on the Darfur issue. The most important variable is that the fall of the Gaddafi regime weakens the armed movements opposed to the government in Darfur, especially the JEM and the SLM and some of the movements established by Gaddafi.
himself, who permanently provided safe havens and principal resources for their political, financial and logistical support.

Despite this, there is a high likelihood of the new political regime in Libya seeking closer relations with the West. This is not only because of their support for the revolution, but also for the Libyan national interests in its new era given the need for the support of Western countries to help Libya through its transition in all aspects and facing the nation-building challenge in Libya’s post-Gaddafi transition (Chivvis, et al. 2012). It is likely that this factor, at least in the short term, will push Tripoli to be less keen to establish close relations with Khartoum, which to a degree may adversely affect, or be a reduction of, interests with the West, even if not exposed to Western pressure directly. What increases the likelihood of this trend is that the new political regime in Libya would not be keen to retain the legacy of Gaddafi and his agenda in Africa, including Sudan, due to the complexity and cost of the political and economic consequences, which formed a significant burden on Libya (Jibril 24/12/2011; Dabashi 17/01/2012). The end of Gaddafi is going to be an opportunity to break free of the adventures of Gaddafi’s Africa in all its forms. However, Gaddafi’s absence will at least put an end to instability in the Libyan position and accounts of its interests towards the relationship with Sudan, which should provide an opportunity for a serious dialogue on building a new foundation for future relations between the two countries.

Regardless of the impact of the factors mentioned above as delimiters for the future of relations between Libya and Sudan, as well as its implications on the Darfur Crisis, Sudan is among the biggest beneficiaries of the fall of the Gaddafi regime, which removed one of its biggest direct security threats (AlAzreg 16/10/2012; Ismail 13/01/2013), even if that did not immediately and dramatically affect the equations of the current situation in Darfur or other areas of conflict in Sudan. Nevertheless, it accounts for a long-term strategy; the exit of Gaddafi, who was leaving involved in fuelling conflict in the region, will contribute to strengthening the process of searching for a peaceful political solution to the Darfur Crisis and other regions of Sudan.
The regional equation has changed in recent times, and reflected positively on the Darfur Crisis, due to the fall of Gaddafi’s regime, besides the improved Sudanese relations with both neighbouring Chad and Southern Sudan (Ismail 13/01/2013; Aljazeera.net 2013). In the absence of internal and external support, the rebel movements in Darfur will be forced towards peace or they will be significantly weakened and undermined due to the support that they took advantage of during the Gaddafi era becoming less. Therefore, these new developments in the region provide a good opportunity to implement the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (African Union – United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 2011). Given the fall of Gaddafi, his continuing attempts to pull the rug out from under the Qatari efforts to resolve the Darfur Crisis were already stopped. Gaddafi repeatedly attempted to make Tripoli or Sirte the headquarters of the talks, under his personal administration, to be the main actor in any possible settlement to the Darfur Crisis (Salahuddin 15/01/2013).

On other hand, Libya and Sudan particularly in this phase are both desperately looking for stability. The necessities of the security of both countries, in the first place, require the development and strengthening of bilateral relations based on good neighbourliness and regional peace to safeguard common interests. For this reason, some important cooperation within the military and security fields between the two countries was undertaken, and there is likely to be more in the future. For instance, Colonel Abdul Razzaq al-Shihabi, the spokesman for the Department of Libyan Defence, stated that the Libyan Defence Ministry agreed with the GoS in November 2013 to form a joint force to protect the border between the two countries (African News 2013). In the same context, the chief of staff of the Libyan Air Defence Forces, Brigadier General Juma Hussein Alabani, announced the existence of military cooperation between Sudan and Libya to develop a strategic plan. In this regard the Brigadier said that Sudan and Libya are coordinating to adopt a solid plan and to form strong security and military relations at the operational level. He stated that Libya sought to control a large proportion of the spread of weapons and the effective control of the borders with Mali, Chad and Sudan for the benefit of regional security.

This cooperation also included various military fields, such as training and the development of the capabilities of the two armies to confront all the challenges facing the two countries under the regional and international changes. One of the
fruits of this cooperation was the graduation of a new batch of Libyan students in the Sudanese Military Academy in October 2013, to be the nucleus of the Libyan army (Al Mubarak 2013). This collaboration represents a factor of pressure on the rebel movements affecting their capability to continue their rebellion. It seems that the implications of this pressure quickly start to appear. The split of Suleiman Sandal, a leading figure in the JEM and former official Popular Congress in August 2012, who received political asylum and was granted permanent residency in Norway, is an important indicator of the weakness and fragmentation of the movement as a result of pressure faced internally and externally, especially after the change of the political regime changed in Tripoli (Sudansafari 2012).

Similarly, and in the long term, it is also very likely that a social, cultural, security, political and economic cooperation between Tripoli and Khartoum may be seen. This would undoubtedly contribute to greater stability for both countries and the whole region, especially in Darfur. It is noteworthy that the rise of the political powers based on the "Islamic movement", particularly the Brotherhood party, would be a significant cause for the establishment of strong Libyan relations with the regime in Khartoum with its "Islamic" background and old ties with the Brotherhood party (Al Trabi 2013). The existing case of stability would enable the GoS to implement the Doha agreement and address a number of political and developmental issues in Darfur, which would accelerate the end of the crisis. Regardless of all factors cited above, and given the historical, social, cultural, and even economic ties, this thesis nominates the second scenario because of the common strategic and security interests between Libya and Sudan, especially in the near future.

**Conclusion**

All the evidence suggests that Gaddafi possessed the tools, capabilities and sufficient capacity that enabled him to influence the GoS and all armed movements in Darfur – whether by carrot or stick – to end the crisis in the early stages. However, he did not employ these tools instead adopting policies to serve his own personal ambitions and
achieve the goals related to the continuity of his regime, as well as to gain a place for himself on the map of international politics.

Gaddafi’s Libya did not address the crisis through a dedicated team, according to basic rules for crisis management, but through a person who makes the decisions without studying the goals and policy setting of the expected outcomes. Libyan initiatives and decisions were usually issued as random reactions formed by Gaddafi himself. There was a lot of gathered information that was relative to the head of state dealing with Libya as one state actor and really the centre of that was Gaddafi. The evidence showed that in order to understand how Libya behaved as a state the focus should be on just one man, Gaddafi. This is because the Gaddafi regime was a totalitarian dictatorship entirely based on Gaddafi’s autocracy. The decision making process in Libya in that era was really dominated by Gaddafi himself. The absence of professional diplomacy and institutionalism in Libyan efforts has been the key cause of Libya’s position on the Darfur Crisis. Officials of the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, such as Abdul Salam Triki, have not played any effective role, and this is confirmed by all the parties to the conflict.

Libyan mediation efforts were run by intelligence officers, led by Abdullah Sanusi, and they often focused on the aspects of security and military solutions. The primary motive for their dealings with the crisis relates to security, thus they adopted the ‘quick fix’ approach. This situation generated influential elements in the Libyan leadership that created their own special interests behind their dealings with the armed movements. The Darfur Crisis had become a source of money because of the presence of these elements as a liaison between Gaddafi and the leaders of the armed movements in Darfur (El-Affendi 24/02/2012; Dosa 2013, p. 381). Tripoli has not yet provided a clear plan to address the root issues in order to bring together the views of the belligerents and so avoid a humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur.

The lack of a clear vision by the Libyan leadership is another negative factor that has impeded any achievement in Libya, and thus the continuation of the crisis. Libya was not eligible, in terms of its institutions and its ability to develop a strategy that would enable it to play a leading role in Africa, because this role needs policy-making institutions that can both plan and follow-up on decisions. Gaddafi’s Libya did not have a clear strategy for its foreign policy in accordance with necessary political
criteria, due to the absence of the real meaning of the state as well as exporting the policy of one man from inside Libya to outside Libya, according to the dictates of that leader. Thus, the conclusions of this chapter demonstrate that the Libyan involvement in the Darfur Crisis was in pursuing an agenda which was different from the internal parties’ agenda and this in turn significantly prolonged the expected duration of the crisis. This strongly underpin the applicability and the validity of the theoretical model used for this thesis.
Conclusions

Contributions to Knowledge, Limitations and Further Research

In general, the main task undertaken in this thesis lies in the field of knowledge that is concerned with understanding factors that influence the expected duration of intrastate conflicts. This study contributes to the answer the broader question: why do some intrastate conflicts last so much longer than others? More specifically, do external third-party interventions tend to shorten or lengthen the duration of civil wars, and do particular strategies for intervening have different effects on the expected duration of such types of wars? Chapters five and six examine the impact of the Libyan involvement under the Gaddafi regime as a key external/regional state actor on the duration of the Darfur Crisis as a method of crisis management and conflict resolution in Africa and elsewhere. Libyan intervention in the Darfur Crisis was used as a case study for this research project to determine the relationship between the regional state intervention and the duration of civil wars, if any.

We started our research project with the aim to meet the following objectives:

First, to examine the key causes of the continuation of the Darfur Crisis. Second, to explore the improvement in the governmental crisis management techniques used by Libya to address this crisis. Third, to determine the internal and external factors affecting the paths and courses of governmental crisis management in Darfur. Finally, to ascertain the optimal alternative for handling the crisis, as an analytical framework for management of other political crises.
and with the aim of addressing the following four central analytical questions.

The first question asked what the causes of the Darfur Crisis are and who do they impact through its duration? The second question has sought to answer the query of what are the key Libyan interests and motivations that have led to Tripoli being one of the major actors? A third central question asked how has the Libyan involvement influenced the duration of the Darfur Crisis? The final question considered how the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in Libya might affect the termination of the Darfur Crisis.

We could neither find an answer to these questions nor meet our objectives from the literature review as no comprehensive research had been done to establish the link between the Libyan intervention as a regional player and the length of the duration of the conflict in Darfur. These research questions were followed with theoretical assumptions.

The central hypothesis of this thesis holds that Gaddafi’s Libya was (in)directly involved in the Darfur Crisis in pursuit of its own agenda that is separate from the agendas of the domestic combatants, which therefore lengthened the duration of the conflict. The intervention of Gaddafi’s Libya was associated with prolonging rather than reducing the duration of the conflict in Darfur. In order to answer the research questions and to test the hypotheses, a theoretical model was developed and tested in this investigation. The theme running throughout the study is that crisis management and conflict resolution must take into account the impact of the regional third-party intervener when it becomes (in)directly involved, in a certain fashion, in adopting specific mechanisms to achieve its goals behind such intervention. The research outcomes provide the evidence necessary to answer the four key research questions. Nevertheless, there are three types of conclusions for this thesis. The first type relates to the nature of the Darfur Crisis itself and the internal and external factors that have had a significant contribution to its eruption and termination. The second type relates to the theoretical model developed and the evaluation of the central hypotheses of this thesis. The third type of conclusions are reflections on the work in this thesis and the strategy adopted for the research process and writing.
The answer of the first core research question lies within the framework of the first type of conclusions. It has asked *what are the causes of the Darfur Crisis and how do these influence the duration of this crisis?* In order to answer this question, chapter three has analysed the internal and external causes and essential factors feeding into the crisis. It also evaluated how these elements have influenced the course of the conflict alongside considering the domestic and the foreign implications of the crisis.

The evidence in chapter three suggests that there are multiple factors with domestic and forging dimensions that have significantly contributed to the eruption of the armed conflict in Darfur. These are political, economic, social, environmental, and entirely interdependent, and their impact on each other cannot be separated. The evidence in this thesis shows that the Darfur Crisis erupted as a tribal dispute over the natural resources between the pastoralists (who are mostly from Arab) and farmers (who are mostly non-Arab), and these conflicts were passed on tribal alliances linked to the access to resources, especially after the drought and desertification witnessed by the region during the last two decades as a result of changing climatic conditions. However, the emergence of a class of highly educated and knowledgeable individuals in Darfur is a vital factor. This elite has realised that the conflict over the resources is a consequence of the absence of development policies in Darfur, as well as the marginalisation and the carelessness of Khartoum towards the peripheral areas of Sudan. Therefore, they transferred the conflict to the next phase of confrontation with the Khartoum government.

In response, the central government resorted to the armed option for addressing the rebellion in Darfur instead of responding to the rebels’ demands. Khartoum was not only unable to benefit from the early warning to handle the problem via improving the economic conditions in the region, but it largely contributed to creating a state of polarisation by recruiting tribal and political loyalties for supporting its policies against its opponents, and arming them in order to crush the rebellion. This pushed the other rebel social components to seek arms to protect themselves from the brutal reaction by Khartoum, as well as resorting to the neighbouring countries, such as Chad and Libya to gain bases to launch their military operations against the governmental forces from. This was followed by these opposition groups resorting to Western countries to obtain political, media and financial support, which was the transitional point from the local to the global circle for the crisis.
Chapter three also demonstrated that some external factors have played a significant role in the deterioration of the security and stability in Darfur and militarising the conflict. This thesis does not suggest that regional factors like the social interactions between Sudan and the neighbouring countries, the political instability in these countries, the Libyan-Chadian relationship and the dilemma of weapons proliferation were the key causes to the conflict. Instead, they were factors that have fundamentally increased the complexity of the crisis by exacerbating and militarising the conflict.

With regard to the ethnic dimension of the conflict, the element of tribal and racial tensions cannot be overlooked throughout the course of the Darfur conflict. However, this thesis did not demonstrate that the eruption of the crisis caused by the issue of racism and discrimination between Arab and non-Arab. This study found that this matter was raised due to the failed policies and strategies undertaken by Khartoum to respond to, and manage the problem, which led to the growth of the feeling among the African components that the central government was supporting the Arabs to exterminate them. The failure of the GoS to prevent the outbreak of conflict and to manage the local disputes decisively and professionally in the early stage provided the opportunity for this problem to be transferred from the local to the outside level.

Chapter four was also acting to answer the first research question. This chapter identified the key domestic parties of the Darfur Crisis and then examined their key perceptions, agendas, mechanisms, and techniques employed to manage and end the crisis. How these elements have impacted the method of third-party intervention and the duration of the conflict, was also addressed. Chapter four sought to understand the impact of the mutability in the rebel factions, as well as intra-rebel divergence in Darfur on the opportunities of peace-making. To achieve this task, a theoretical model has been developed to guide the analysis during this chapter. This theoretical model argues that:

*when external states intervene with a separate agenda in intrastate conflicts that involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are multiple opposition armed groups with independent preferences, tend to exacerbate an insurgency and extend expected duration of civil warfare rather than shorten it.*
One of the central findings of this study is that the conflict ongoing in Darfur is a clear reflection of a trust crisis among the political and elite classes in Sudan. The perceptions of the key internal combatants about the form of the final resolution are completely disparate. The evidence indicates that the GoS is keen to handle the problem within the local framework, by GoS mechanisms, while the two key intra-rebel groups, the JEM and the SLM, believe that involving the international community and simultaneously adopting the armed option are the best ways to achieve their demands. It also found that the negotiating positions of the two main factions suffer from a significant weakness due to the lack of uniformity in their political visions and military agendas.

Another interesting outcome is that the inability in resolving the crisis in its early phase and the continuation of the conflict has vitally contributed to the widespread phenomenon of differences inside the rebel groups in Darfur. With the passage of time, and the absence of a solution, the possibility of further rebel groups with different agendas emerging has been growing. The ethnic and tribal variety in Darfurian society, the multiplicity in the rebel armed groups, and the absence of a united leadership for the rebellion have all led to an emergence of various strategies and a separation in the goals of the internal combatants in the Darfur conflict. As a result, an ideological and intellectual collision between the armed groups themselves was undertaken. This in turn has deepened the gap between the insights of the domestic conflicting parties regarding the best form of settlement and to halt the catastrophic situation in the region. As a consequence, further splits inside the rebel movement have occurred. This led to an emergence of additional armed groups with varying credibility in Darfur and other Sudanese regions.

This study also reflects that the fundamental motivation behind the splits among the rebel groups is the individual opportunism of some rebel leaders, driven by personal ambitions and the enthusiasm for obtaining financial gains and political posts. Some of the rebel leaders in Darfur are keen to prolong the crisis. This is because they are beneficiaries in terms of the gained spoils of financial funding from the continuity of the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur. The conflicts over privileges and searching for political and financial gains between the rebel factions, which are basically founded on ethnic and tribal fundamentals, have caused, at different times, the outbreak of violent armed clashes between the rebel groups themselves. This caused
further splits which were usually influenced by the ethnic and tribal motives and priorities.

In light of these fragmented and conflicting interests within the rebel factions, the initial legitimate claims and demands that were adopted by the rebel groups and were behind the eruption of the rebellion in Darfur, were lost. This thesis proves that the political privileges and posts demanded by some rebel leaders were the decisive factors that led to the failure in reaching a comprehensive agreement for making peace, which in turn greatly prolonged the Darfur Crisis. The Abuja negotiations in 2006 are a clear example. All internal and external efforts made to find a common ground combining the government and the opposition to reach a swift and meaningful outcome and resolve the crisis in a short period were undermined. Efforts were then doubled to unify the rebel factions and their demands.

Moreover, this study proves that the frequent splits in rebel groups, as well as the phenomenon of the diversity in the insurgents’ agendas, led the internationalisation of the crisis and lengthened its duration. The tribal composition of the Darfur community, the narrow sectarianism agendas, the power conflict and the political maliciousness practised by some Sudanese political actors – who do not give priority to supreme national interests – provided an opportunity for outside actors to become involved in different forms, adopting the appropriate mechanisms for managing and/or exploiting the crisis by creating a climate that allowed external players to use excuses to pursue their own interests. In this respect, the study concludes that these outcomes strongly confirm the theoretical hypothesis tested in chapter four.

The overall answer to the first research question must, therefore, be that the causes of the insurgency in Darfur are multiple and complicated, internal and external, political and economic, and social and environmental. That being the case, it is not at all simple to identify one or two factors that have had a major effect on the outbreak of the Darfur Crisis. Thus, any attempts to manage this crisis without taking all these dimensions into consideration would be quite meaningless and ineffective. Each regional and extra-regional actor significantly sought to guide the violence in the direction which would allow them to gain certain outcomes. In order to demonstrate these results, chapters five and six investigate the effectiveness of external intervention on the duration of intrastate conflict as a form of crisis management.
The second research question addressed by this thesis considered what are the key Libyan interests and motivations that have led it to being one of the major external players? To answer this question, chapter five examined the internationalisation of the Darfur Crisis by addressing the internal and external motives were behind calls for the internationalisation the Crisis. The key mechanisms that have been used for exaggerating the description to the conflict in Darfur and to impose it on the international agenda have been highlighted.

Additionally, to test the applicability of the theoretical model developed for this thesis, Libyan involvement in the Darfur Crisis as external actor has been deeply investigated. The variables of the incentives and interests of Libyan involvement, and how the mechanisms adopted by Gaddafi’s regime have impacted the continuation of the crisis, were discussed. This thesis demonstrates that external players do not create internal crises, but instead they take advantage of the opportunities of their existence and the failures of local attempts at resolution. They intervene under various claims and offer solutions. Usually these solutions are consistent with the orientations of some local forces and vary with the orientations of others, which deepen the dispute. An ongoing conflict between the internal and the external remains until one of the parties wins. It is found that the existence of the strategic interests of the great powers in the targeted areas for intervention is a crucial condition for completing the international scenario for that intervention. The Darfur Crisis does not depart from this general scenario: the national interests of the major powers and other regional powers such as Libya have been the main motivation for their enthusiasm for intervention in the course of the conflict.

The study concludes that the national interests of these involved states were the central incentives to intervene throughout the course of the conflict. For instance, the competitive state between the USA and China over the natural resources, especially oil in Sudan, from one side, and caveats and security considerations of the Libyan regime along with the Gaddafi aspiration in Sudan and Africa from the other side, have been the major reasons for the internationalisation of the Darfur issue. This competitive situation generates a state of multiple and conflicting regional and international agendas which aim to achieve the objectives of divergent interests, not necessarily consistent with one another. This in turn contributes to the complexity of the crisis and its possible solution (for both foreign and internal actors). This
investigation reflects that the rivalry has extended the duration of the conflict. The longer it takes, the more opportunity the crisis has to move up from one stage to the other. This is because the conflicting regional and international agendas seek to achieve divergent interests, which are not necessarily consistent with those of the domestic combatants. These external actors are all keen to manage the Darfur Crisis in peaceful ways. They not aiming to protect civilians and end the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, but to preserve their national interests through maintaining influence in Sudan.

The conclusions to the second research question also demonstrate that the Libyan role played under the Gaddafi regime had a critical influence throughout the course of the Darfur Crisis and its duration. This thesis was able to identify and then classify the key Libyan national interests behind the involvement into national, regional, and international levels. Generally, this thesis reflects that these incentives were mostly driven by the Libyan national security interests. These were primarily embodied in the Gaddafi regime’s wish to survive and achieve Gaddafi’s personal ambitions which were saturated by the desire to lead the Sub-Saharan area and Africa in general, as well as gaining an important position globally.

On the local level, the political leadership in Tripoli was worried about the seriousness of the armed conflict in the neighbouring region of Darfur, and the likelihood of the transition of this tribal conflict into Libya turning Libyan territory into refugee camps, which could increase the possibility of the conflict’s leakage into Libya. This scenario would affect the security and economic stability in Libya and might threaten the Gaddafi’s regime survival.

Regionally, the Gaddafi regime also had concerns relating to both the region and the entire African continent. The key Libyan motivation to intervene stemmed from the fear that escalating the security deterioration in Darfur would provide a large opportunity for direct external military intervention, which would limit the active Libyan movements in the Sub-Sahara area. Libyan attitudes were always reflecting the rejection of any form of international forces existing on the southern border of Libya. This was regarded by the Libyan authorities as a direct threat to the Libyan national security. This thesis demonstrates that Darfur represents a strategic depth for Libyan national security due to the overlapping borders, and the historical, tribal, and
economic relationships between Libya and Darfur. Therefore, Gaddafi’s involvement may have been due to tribal pressures practised by some tribal figures belonging to ally tribes that extended over the borders, such as the Tubu and Zaghawa. The evidence seems to be strong that Gaddafi sought to use the insurgence in Darfur to strengthen his political influence there not to stop the humanitarian catastrophe but to exploit the region as a base for the legal and illegal activities required for achieving his goals in Sudan and the African region in general.

Internationally, this thesis concludes that Gaddafi had sought to use the bloody conflict in Darfur to change the mental image that formed around him in the international community. He wanted to change from being a sponsor of political instability in Africa and other parts of the world and a financier to many liberal groups, as well as a supplier for terrorism, to being the sponsor of global peace and stability. He wished to demonstrate that Libya was not a rogue state. After Libya’s return to the international scene when Gaddafi gave up his weapons of mass destruction programme in 2003, his policies proved to be pragmatic and opportunistic with the aim of achieving maximum credit abroad.

The third core research question considered how did Libyan involvement influence the duration of the crisis? Conclusions of chapter five reflect that the overall strategy adopted by the Libyan regime in dealing with the Darfur Crisis was founded in conformity with the policy of double standards and playing a double game in order to pursue these national interests. This investigation explored that Gaddafi used various both apparent and unseen approaches and mechanisms.

While Tripoli’s apparent diplomatic role since the eruption of the conflict seemed to aim to end the crisis, it was clear that Gaddafi’s policies towards that crisis deliberately sought to prolong its duration. Gaddafi provided some diplomatic and political support to the regime in Khartoum in order to preserve stability in the region. At the same time, however, he supported the opposition’s attempts to change the Islamic regime in Khartoum, clearly reflecting the hidden ideological conflict between the two regimes in Tripoli and Khartoum.

This thesis demonstrates that Gaddafi had used a number of unexpressed mechanisms to resolve the Darfur Crisis. These were primarily embodied in providing weapons, money and other logistical support to different rebel groups
active against the GoS. Each rebel group was treated differently according to its importance and strength as required by the Libyan interests at each stage of the crisis. In this sense, it could be observed that Gaddafi was exploiting the various fragmentations among the rebel groups whether based on ethnic, tribal or ideological polarisation. These intra-rebel divergences, the differences in the rebels’ agenda, and the personal aspirations and ambitions of some rebel leaders allowed Gaddafi to play with, and change, alliances in accordance with the requirements of his interests, using the carrot and stick policy. The major tools he used to pursue his purpose were to leverage individuals who were social activists in Darfur and belonged to different tribes, at the same time belonging to the ‘Allegan Al Thawria’ in Libya, or in other words; groups with dual loyalty.

The other important result is that the Gaddafi regime’s policies towards the crisis were not made within the corridors of the Libyan Foreign Ministry in accordance with the rules of real diplomacy and transparency, or by the assets of crisis management and armed conflict. But, the Libyan actions and reactions were taken purely according to security considerations under the direct supervision of Gaddafi himself, with the implementation by elements from Libyan intelligence headed by Abdullah Al-Senussi. The absence of the institutional diplomatic work on the Libyan side was one of the vital reasons behind the complexity of the Libyan role and the lack of clarity of its objectives. Hence, this in turn caused a crisis of confidence, not only between Tripoli and the Sudanese parties, but also between Libya and other intervening external state actors, which contributed substantially to obstructing efforts to accelerate a settlement and an end to the crisis.

In the same context of answering the third core research question, chapter six assessed the influence of the Libyan intervention of the duration of the Darfur conflict. It probed the hidden role of Gaddafi and the agendas he was seeking to achieve through his involvement in the management of the Darfur Crisis. Whether these goals were separate from the goals of the internal combatants’ agendas was examined. Moreover, the scope of the Gaddafi’s influence on the domestic parties to the conflict in Darfur and the effectiveness of Gaddafi’s Libya, as an important involved regional actor, on the duration of the Darfur Crisis, also have been addressed.
This thesis found that Gaddafi was a fundamental factor that undermined a quick end to the brutal conflict. He was keen to maintain influence throughout the course of the crisis over its parties and outcomes by employing the bloody conflict in Darfur in a way which served his own agenda, and to liquidate the political calculations and personal aspirations even at the expense of the efforts of peace and the continuity of the conflict. Despite the fact that Gaddafi had the capability to influence the internal parties of the conflict and to push them towards a just solution, he was not keen to employ this ability to end the crisis. This study found that there was a crisis of mistrust between Gaddafi and the Sudanese parties in Darfur (both government and rebels) as they were well aware of the lack of sincerity of Gaddafi’s intention to resolve the crisis in accordance with the vision of the Sudanese parties. Furthermore, they were convinced that Gaddafi was exploiting the crisis to achieve his personal objectives. For these reasons Gaddafi’s influence over the GoS and the key rebel groups was limited. Therefore, this vitally contributed to the longevity of the crisis duration in Darfur instead of ending it quickly.

The next interesting route explored was that despite Gaddafi’s apparent and frequent attempts to prevent the internationalisation of the crisis, he had essentially and intentionally contributed to internationalising in order to maximise the possible international political gains. This was because of Gaddafi’s unbalanced policies and conflicting attitudes about the crisis and its different parties. Also, the discrepancy between his agenda and vision for the final solution and those of the rest of the parties involved, whether internal or external, disrupted the peace efforts. Gaddafi used the conflict in Darfur to settle his political scores with his opponents, bpth with the Inqad regime ruling Sudan and with his other regional and international opponents. The conclusions of the thesis demonstrate that the core motivation behind the Libyan interference in the Darfur Crisis was founded on the basis of Gaddafi’s desire to “gain from the conflict, not to resolve the conflict”.

The fourth research question examined here considered how the collapse of Gaddafi regime in Libya would impact the resolution of the crisis? The overall answer to this question is that the fall of the Gaddafi regime will definitely have important implications for the continuation of the Darfur Crisis. Chapter six provides two
predictable scenarios to the future of the armed conflict in Darfur beyond the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. The first scenario is pessimistic. With this scenario the potential of the density of the crisis growing and OF prolonging its duration beyond the fall of the Gaddafi regime is higher. This is because several factors can be major barriers to resolving this conflict and threatening stability in Sudan and Darfur in particular. The second scenario is optimistic. With this scenario there are several factors that could significantly raise the likelihood of resolving this conflict in a short time. In this regard, the major factor is that the absence of Gaddafi as a key player from the equation of the management of the Darfur Crisis would weaken the two main armed groups, the JEM and the SLM, and other movements established by Gaddafi himself.

These groups will lose the major source of support that was permanently provided by Gaddafi, such as safe havens and principal resources for political, financial and logistical support. Furthermore, the new relationship between Tripoli and Khartoum, as well as the important political and military cooperation established during the course of the Libyan revolution in 2011 and after the Gaddafi regime collapsed, could be another decisive limitation for the continuation of the rebellion in Darfur. Given the factors discussed here, and taking into account all the developments and events that followed the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, whether on the level of the relationship between the new rulers in Libya and the ruling regime in Sudan, and/or the level of decline in the insurgents’ activity in Darfur after Gaddafi’s death, this thesis nominates the optimistic scenario as more likely than the pessimistic.

Thus, the original hypothesis tested in this thesis has been proven to be strongly correct in the form outlined in the introduction. The conclusions of this thesis demonstrated that Gaddafi’s Libya was (in)directly involved in different forms of diplomatic, economic and military activity in the Darfur crisis to pursue its own agenda that is separate from the agendas of the internal combatants. As result of that, the Libyan involvement made the duration of the Darfur Crisis substantially longer.
Theoretical approaches

A further set of conclusions must be made regarding the original theoretical model developed and employed in this thesis. By examining the key motivations behind the Libyan interference in the Darfur Crisis and the Gaddafi’s policies and attitudes towards the crisis, as well as his major used strategic mechanisms, the preceding analysis demonstrates the validity of the original theoretical model of this thesis. This study confirms that the model developed to guide the theoretical analysis throughout this thesis shows that:

when external/regional actors become (in)directly involved with military, economic or diplomatic manoeuvres in an intrastate armed conflict to pursue their own agendas, which is independent of the motivations of the domestic fighters, it tends to substantially prolong the duration of conflict, is very strong model.

Moreover, the evidence seems to indicate that the theoretical model used here is a reliable and valid instrument to be used for predicting relationships between the long-duration of intrastate conflict and the external state diplomatic, economic, and military interventions with the availability of the factor that external states become involved in intrastate wars to pursue their own agenda, which is independent to the domestic combatants’ agenda.

This thesis also proves that the insurgents’ external support is a key factor that determines the outcomes of intrastate conflict. Three types of external assistance – diplomatic cover, safe havens in neighbouring states and the provision of military or economic aid – have been deemed especially crucial for insurgent success. In turn, the increasing number of countries intervening over time may well have increased the incentives for neighbours or patron states to fight proxy wars through the provision of cheap arms to insurgents in the hopes of destabilising an enemy from within.

The other interesting theoretical finding presented in this thesis is that conflict duration is strongly associated with the type of local society (as an additional
variable to the existing model) where the armed conflict occurs. It is clear from this thesis that longer conflicts generate more rebel groups with more varied agendas. This is very likely to happen when the type of society where armed conflicts take place is tribal and multi-ethnic, with multiple ideologies. Therefore, the mechanisms and methods adopted by such multiple rebel groups for managing the conflict tends to be different due to the inevitability of conflict between perceptions of the final solution and then delayed peace.

These outcomes were demonstrated by the additional theoretical model generated in chapter four during the research process to act as guide for analysing the information gathered during the research phases of this project. This theoretical model shows that:

\[
\text{when external states intervene with a separate agenda in intrastate conflicts that involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are multiple opposition armed groups with independent preferences, it makes the likelihood of prolonging the duration of the conflict higher.}
\]

This study also demonstrated the validity of this model and confirmed that it is a very strong instrument to explain what happens to the length of the conflict duration when external states intervene in intrastate conflicts that occur in such types of societies and where these circumstances exist. The results of this thesis have been interpreted to mean that:

\[
\text{the more agendas there are, the longer duration will be, and vice versa. The long duration of conflict, the more varied and increased agendas are.}
\]

**Suggestions**

The findings of this study have some important implications for policy-makers interested in resolving intrastate conflicts and crises. First, failing to address the dimension of diplomatic, military and economic forms of external intervention in the pursuit of their narrow national agendas would considerably lower the probability of resolving these conflicts, leading to substantially longer intrastate conflict. In this
respect, conflicts appear not to be ineffectively managed as the interventions themselves will be a major barrier to the resolution.

This is very likely to happen if the external intervener is a neighbouring country that shares borders and historical, economic, social and culture ties with the country where the civil war takes place. As a consequence, the policy-makers and parties participating in negotiations, and the international community, should verify the real motivations and goals behind any external state intervention. The international community should work hard to isolate external states that intervene in this way. This can be done by practising a series of political pressures to force them to withdraw from the process of managing the conflict, as it is not easy to induce these states to leave prior to achieving their full goals. Intrastate conflicts with high degrees of outside involvement cannot be resolved until the external dimensions are addressed. This was very clear in the case of Libyan involvement in Darfur.

When the internal conflicting parties realised the risks of Libyan intervention, they accepted the transfer of the peace negotiations from Tripoli to Doha, preferring the Qatari peace initiative for Darfur and neglecting that of Tripoli. This was because they did not trust Gaddafi and believed that solutions that might result from the Tripoli process would weaken the Sudanese authorities’ sovereignty in Darfur and maybe in Khartoum itself. As a result, an important breakthrough happened in the path of negotiation when an important number of rebel movements signed a framework agreement with the GoS in March 2010, which took direction of the final settlement of the crisis. In addition, this détente was reinforced by the absence of Gaddafi in 2011.

Second, if the international community failed to isolate the external veto players by practising political pressure, a serious negotiation with these external third parties to address the independent dimensions of these civil wars must be undertaken. The case of the Syrian conflict which began in 2011 and the impact of the external veto players involvement, such as the USA, Russia and Iran, on the continuation of the civil war there is also a very good example.

Third, this study suggests that if external third-party states are indeed seeking to resolve the political crisis or intrastate conflict, where armed opposition movements are multiple and different in their ethnic, tribal and/or ideological composition, in the
short term they should deal firmly with the rebel movements and not provide them with a large margin to manoeuvre. This thesis suggests that external actors should apply pressure on the leaders of the movements to urge them to negotiate earnestly and responsibly in order to reach a unified and consensual agenda which can bring them together to face the government's agenda. This can be done, for example, through discontinuing political support for them, discontinuing the provision of a safe haven for logistical aid, and undermining their movements and activities in neighbouring countries. Foreign parties should do this before announcing their attitudes towards the crisis and the rebellion.

The Originality

The originality of this thesis lies in both what is studied and how it is studied. First, this research project contributes to different bodies of literature. This study uniquely makes contributions to the field of both the study of conflict resolution and external intervention and the history of the conflict in Darfur more specifically. Existing literature on the Darfur Crisis appears to focus mainly on one or two aspects of the crisis, and mainly looking at one or perhaps two angles of the scene in Darfur. The prior studies on the topic being addressed here in general deal with the causes of the crisis, whether political, economic, ethnic or environmental, or exclusively with the international intervention within the framework of civilian protection. This gap in knowledge has been dealt with by engaging with discussion and analysis all these factors together as well as to the international involvement to establish compound outcomes and also exploring and build a coherent picture of crisis management in Darfur.

Unlike previous studies (addressed in the literature review chapter) that investigated the conflict in Darfur by focusing separately on certain aspects whether with political such as Kalu 2010; Omar 2008; Abiodun 2011; Waal 2007a; Fuchs 2011, or economic such as Hakim 2011; Brown 2010; Olsson 2010b; Behrends 2008; Young et al 2007, or social and ethnic such as El-Tigani 2004; Olsson and Siba 2009; Hgan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Olsson and Valsecchi 2010, or international and
humanitarian law dimensions within the international organisations such as Babiker 2010; Waal 2008; Mickler 2009; Reynolds 2010; Boateng 2011, this thesis addressed all these aspects together at the same time as well as how these interact with each other, which fill in the gap and extend prior studies. This research project demonstrates that the crisis in Darfur is an internal issue that should be addressed domestically among the Sudanese themselves, not globally. This study emphasises the point that to decisively and effectively resolve this crisis we should take into account all these mentioned factors together within the national Sudanese framework.

On the other hand, the great complexity of the problem in Darfur has led to limited accurate and reliable information. The diversity in its dimensions has resulted in a lot of differences among many analysts and researchers about the underlying causes of the crisis, its description, and the manner of its management. Therefore, getting access to calibre of interviewees sourced and the information that was gathered for this study (as discussed in the chapter two; the Collection and Analysis of Data section) in total offers further value to the thesis which in itself makes a considerable contribution to our understanding of the political phenomena being investigated. A further important contribution is that this study is perhaps the first PhD research project that has been conducted on the Darfur issue and the Libyan involvement after the death of Gaddafi and the collapse of his regime in 2011.

A further contribution relates to the strategy of collecting and analysing primary and secondary data during this study. This study simultaneously combines and employs two different types of literature; material focuses on the Darfur Crisis’ historical roots, its domestic, regional, and international implications, and literature related to the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis which addresses the impact of external intervention on the internal crises and conflicts and their durations. This comprehensive technique, to the best of our knowledge, it is new and there is no other study in the literature that has used it.

Second, this study provides further contribution to the literature of the management of political crises and the intrastate conflicts subject as well as armed conflict dataset. Understanding the relationship between external (the regional in particular) state intervention and the expected duration of the intrastate conflicts in general and in the Darfur Crisis in particular, as a way of crisis management, has been a topic that is
largely overlooked. This topic is one of the most important for the development of these fields in the next decade. This study covers this essential gap in knowledge by evaluating the case of the impact of Libyan involvement under the Gaddafi regime on the duration of the Darfur Crisis.

This study contributes towards the objective of addressing the lack of studies focusing on civil war duration that might be effected by the role played by regional third-party intervener in internal armed conflicts which take place in neighbouring countries as most of the studies identified in this field are broader studies which lie within the framework of the wider concept of the external intervention whether politically or economically and/or military in civil war.

This study provides new insights on how to manage an intrastate conflict event effectively based on the necessity “as pro-active measures” of understanding the real intents and motivations of the third-party interveners when they involve in intrastate conflicts as well as ensuring whether they seek to end the crisis or employ the crisis to achieve some gains that cannot be gained in normal time.

This thesis is an important contribution to the academic interests in the field of the management of the political crisis and intrastate conflicts. The study contributes to the literature by identifying key practices that could result in better crisis outcomes. This study is a further investigation to the work written by David Cunningham (2010, 2006), Patrick Regan (2002), and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) where each one of their studies has investigated the expected duration of the intrastate conflicts by exploring the impact of one or two certain form of external intervention on the course and the longevity of civil war. For example, Cunningham (2010) inspected the duration of civil war through addressing the variable of third-party intervener’s independent agenda which is different to the goals of the internal fighters. Work by Regan (2002) focuses on how external military and economic interventions contribute to intrastate conflict management.

This thesis is an extension to these prior studies where the main contributions made by this study to the crisis management and civil war fields in general and the studies by Cunningham and Regan in particular are; first, in propose of achieving the aims and answering the core questions of the research project, this thesis combines and uses both the Cunningham and Regan’s theoretical models amalgamated with one
another and the diplomatic and the type of society, where the intrastate conflict take
place, approach, as well as the indirect forms of intervention rather than focusing
merely on direct ways.

Moreover, this study is a new contribution in the sense that it differentiates between
the types of third-party state interveners, regional and extra-regional actors, and
focuses directly on the role that can be played by a certain regional player in an
armed conflict into another country rather than generalising by referring to the
characteristics of extra-regional state actors.

All these factors were adopted as further variables to form the theoretical model
developed and used in this study, and which was the theoretic framework that guided
the researcher to address the question of what happens to the termination of intrastate
conflict when regional third parties are involved in certain positions and particular
statute. And this was done by testing the validity of this model through applying it to
the case of the Libyan intervention under the Gaddafi regime in Darfur in order to
understand the relationship between regional intervention and the expected duration
of the intrastate conflicts.

The study contributes to the conflict management’s understanding of the importance
of reducing the negative impact generated by regional third-party intervention in
intrastate conflict (in certain forms and particular ways) and the dimensions and
variables involved in advancing towards the solution for this conflict. This study is
original in the sense that three theoretical models were developed from the literature
and gathered information that is a valid instrument for managing intrastate conflicts
and predicting their durations, during the research process.

The first theoretical model defined in chapter two and illustrated in Figure 2 shows
that:

when external/regional actors become (in)directly involved with military,
economic or diplomatic manoeuvres in an intrastate armed conflict to pursue
their own agendas, which is independent of the motivations of the domestic
fighters, it tends to substantially prolong the duration of conflict.
The second was defined in chapter four and clarified in Figure 4, which shows that:

- when external states intervene with a separate agenda in intrastate conflicts that involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are multiple opposition armed groups with independent preferences, make the likelihood of prolonging the duration of the conflict higher.

The third emerged here by combining the two above theoretical models and is illustrated in Figure No: 8, which shows that:

- when an external state become (in)directly involved with military, economic or diplomatic manoeuvres with a separate agenda, which is independent of the motivations of the domestic fighters parties, in an intrastate conflict that involve ethnic and tribal societies, and where there are multiple opposition armed groups with independent preferences, the likelihood of prolonging the duration of the conflict is higher.

However, this study does not aim to generalise its findings across other cases. Rather, it provides a theoretic framework and information that has been collected in a specific way, in order to explore the case of Libyan intervention in the Darfur Crisis, for the purpose of reaching a useful explanation and better understanding of other similar cases instead of being applicable to all cases studies. This study contributes to existing literature by an offering analytical framework that can be tested and applied to other cases. This study does not argue that this is the conclusion to any other case studies, but it claims that third-party intervention will always result in prolonging the duration of intrastate conflict when they intervene in the same fashion of the Libyan involvement in Darfur. The developed theoretical framework can be employed by other researchers to study other cases’ similarities and differences, examining the same theoretical variables and approaches that formed the theoretical framework designed for this study, either to confirm the findings gained as a result of this study or to extend them through exploring further implications and crucial variables - or even to disprove these outcomes.

This study examined the role of regional third-party intervention in intrastate conflicts by way of management processes of internal conflict via exploring the case of Libyan intervention in the conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan as this has not
deservedly received significant attention in mainstream discourse. In doing so, it has adopted an analytical framework that takes into account the diverse contexts within which such conflicts are manifested, and in which they should be analysed and managed.

In terms of IR, this study contributes to the current literature by drawing the attention of all policy makers and research centres that are involved and/or interested in managing political crises and intrastate conflicts to the importance of exploring and identifying the roles of regional interveners or "regional powers" in escalating, ending or prolonging the intrastate conflicts rather than focusing mainly on the major power states (such as the US, China, and Russia) and/or the main international organisations (such as the UN, AU, EU and their agencies as well as other international players). In other words, exploring whether the involvement of the neighbouring countries in managing armed conflicts take place into other countries that share boarders would lead to increasing the complexity of the intrastate conflict course or acceleration of the ending of the conflict and building peace, which is essential in managing intrastate conflicts effectively.

Internationally, many scholars have limited their investigations, focusing merely on the role played by the primary state actors (which have been referred in chapter two as extra regional actors) in the field of international relations and seeking global peace, especially their effects on the intrastate conflicts. They mostly argue that the key motivation of these international (state) actors to intervene in intrastate conflict is to preserve their own national interests.

For example, work written by Fake and Funk (2009), Peter K. Bechtold (2009a, p. 10), and Mahmood Mamdani (2009) studied the role played by the US in the Darfur Crisis. Authors argue that the US intervention in the Darfur Crisis is a part of the Bush administration’s “grand strategy” which aims to maintain the American dominance of the ‘global chessboard’ by diminishing the influence of the only other significant players, China and Russia. Fake and Funk comment that the key motive, which determines the form and the way - choosing the direct humanitarian not a decisive military intervention - of the Washington involvement in Africa in general and to resolve the Darfur Crisis in particular and end the suffering, is to consolidate its global control over a key natural resource (oil in particular) – fundamental to
deferring independent development in China and other rising economies (Fake and Funk 2009). Authors argue that the US policies undertaken to respond to the crisis were stuck with the US agenda in Africa more broadly and in Sudan specifically which is independent to the goals of domestic fighters. Therefore, these policies have deteriorated the situation in Darfur by fermenting the war in Darfur, exacerbating a long-running conflict for survival in the region.

According to Bechtold, America’s interests are above democracy, and the world press in dealing with the Darfur issue always fails to mention the fact that oil is the root cause of US intervention in Darfur. Mahmood Mamadani (2009) the US has failed, consistently, to employ its capacity to lead international and regional efforts to attain peace and security missions in Darfur either because Russia and China have material interests in Sudan and/or the US has a verifiable national interest in working with the al-Bashir government whose support for rooting out terrorists compels the US to be diplomatically lenient with its allies.

Other scholars Pak K. Lee, Gerald Chan and Lai-ha Chan (2012) and Rose Macfarlane (2013) focus on China and its policy on the Darfur crisis. Rose Macfarlane (2013) explored how Sino-Sudanese relations have become synonymous with the Darfur conflict. He also examined how and why China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, has been accused by Western countries of impeding peace in Darfur. According to Rose Macfarlane “the western vilification of China occurred because of the perception of Beijing as both the solution and the problem to the crisis, caused by its close links with Sudan through economic (primarily oil), military and diplomatic relations.” Rose Macfarlane interpreted China’s strategy in Darfur as being motivated by China’s national economic interests, specifically oil, oil being important for energy security and associated with geostrategic competition with America. Therefore, China’s original position on Darfur reflects the Chinese national agenda of protecting its economic interests above all. While Rose Macfarlane did not exonerate China’s actions, this work further highlighted the importance of roles played by other extra regional actors (Russia, Malaysia, India and South Africa). Rose Macfarlane argued that the roles of these extra regional actors significantly hindered solutions to the Darfur Crisis as well as contributing to prolonging its duration, but they have largely been overlooked. Macfarlane added that China’s actions in Sudan are not unique, either compared to China’s actions
elsewhere in the Africa continent or compared to other actor’s involvements in Sudan. In contract, Pak K. Lee, Gerald Chan and Lai-ha Chan (2012) examined Chinese perspectives on humanitarian intervention and national sovereignty. They argued that Beijing’s interests are so multiple and complex that concern about the implications of humanitarian intervention for national integration is more crucial than oil in determining its policy towards Sudan.

In light of growing competition amongst various countries (especially superpower states) for political and economic influence in the region has led these state actors to adopt different agendas and mechanisms to manage the Darfur Crisis that added further factors to the complexity of the conflict rather than the acceleration of ending it. The thorny questions arose regarding how best to seek an end to the violence in Darfur without furthering the hegemony of wealthier nations, particularly the world's superpower. Outside intervention would surely be undertaken for less than saintly motives – generally in order to take control of Sudan’s significant oil resources and establish another outpost for Western interests in the region.

On the other hand, several studies have focused on the failure of the UN Security Council’s non-intervention in Darfur, Sudan to protect civilians. For instance, studies by Bedal Aral (2010) and David Mickler (2009) explained how the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the key international organisation established for preserving peace for all the world’s nations, has become an instrument at the hands of a handful of states seeking hegemony, inter alia; through implementing their own national agenda via this global body especially in the Darfur case.

Bedal Aral’s work looked at the Darfur Crisis as case study to explore to what extent the response and the intervention of the UNSC as an international (non-state) third-party intervener was a motivating factor in ending the conflict in Darfur. Aral concluded that the international crisis management of the Darfur case was a model instance which shows that the UNSC has been employed by powerful states (such as the US, Russia, and China) in order to exercise their hegemony and to control energy resources in the non-Western world. In this regard, David Mickler (2009) conducted a similar study and demonstrated that effective and successful intervention by the UNSC has been precluded by the national agenda of its permanent members, including a lucrative economic relationship between China and Sudan, and because
of valuable Sudanese intelligence cooperation in Western counter-terrorism operations in the region. According to the findings of David Mickler’s work, the Council’s members chose to preserve these national interests at the expense of protecting civilians in Darfur.

Also in the context of the international crisis management in the Darfur Crisis, a study by Al-Said Omar (2008) studied certain actors’ responses to the crisis in Darfur and how their involvement impacted the determination of the war. He has divided selected actors into two different categories, according to the mechanisms and strategies each actor has adopted and used to handle the crisis. First, Omar argued that three actors; rebels, Western civil society actors, and international mass media manage the Darfur Crisis through manipulating crises. Omar demonstrated that these actors have significantly inflated the problem by their policies towards the conflict, including deliberately resorting to the use of power, diplomatic coercion, and have applied pressure on international public opinion with a view to shaping the orientation of international circles of decision-making, which led to the escalation and growing complexity of the situation as well as leading to the internationalisation of the issue. Second, another four players; the GoS, the UN, the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (ICID), and the African Union (AU) have been classified (in accordance with their efforts to deal with the problem) as those who attempt to manage the crisis effectively, and to find an appropriate determination to the crisis shortly. Despite agreement with the author, Omar’s argument has limited his investigation to the involvement of non-state actors (if we exclude the state of Sudan). Perhaps the most significant is that he has referred to the causes of the internationalisation of the crisis, instead of investigating and analysing the impact of regional involvement (neighbouring states) as external players on courses of the crisis, as a form of the crisis management.

Hence, this project contributes to the body literature of civil wars and international relations. This literature, as a whole, is rather western-centric in nature focusing mainly on the influential role that can be played by western major power states in intrastate conflicts taking place in the MENA region. Hence, this study brings Libya, as a model of the regional intervener in the intrastate conflict in Darfur, to civil wars and international relations literature as a form of international crisis management. Therefore, the locale in which this study is anchored is the MENA region and its
internal conflicts which, like those elsewhere, are becoming internationalised at an increasingly early stage. The locality does not however suggest peculiarity, or endorse an idiosyncratic view of the conflicts of a particular region. But it suggests the vastness of the conflict management field, and the commonality of problems of the tempest-tossed human beings whose lives are lost or thrown adrift.

This thesis contributes to the scarce studies that have been written about the Libyan-Sudanese relationship during the era of the Gaddafi regime (discussed in chapter one, the literature review). For instance, this thesis represents a new addition to works by William D. Brewer 1982; Helen Young et al 2007; and Yehudet Rone 2011. Brewer (1982) examines the Libyan-Sudanese Crisis of 1981 and implication of Gaddafi's arrival to power in Libya on Darfur’s strategic significance for both countries, Libya and Sudan. Moreover, Brewer investigates some historic, regional, and religious factors bearing on the prickly Libyan-Sudanese relationship – but long before the Darfur Crisis emerged. Brewer found that the relationship between the two countries was characterised as volatile. Brewer argued that the Sudanese problem with Libya’s Gaddafi was political and long-term, not military and immediate. Brewer argues that Darfur's strategic importance stems from its size and remoteness from Khartoum, as well as its independent past in addition to its conservative religious population, which would render the province an inviting target for Libyan ambitions and machinations. Brewer demonstrates that these properties would significantly increase tension in relations between Tripoli and Khartoum, especially since they share an adjacent corner of the same desert. He believes that the fundamental threat to Sudanese stability originates from, or via, the sensitive Darfur region. This thesis then contributes to the Brewer’s work by examining the Libyan-Sudanese relationships, focusing on Libyan ambitions and machinations in the Darfur region after twenty years’ time.

Helen Young et al (2007) studied the impact of the eruption of the Darfur Crisis in 2003 on the patterns of Darfurian migrant workers to Libya and their remittance flows. How the intrastate conflict in Darfur impacted the livelihoods of Darfurians in Libya was also examined. Additionally, the authors focused on the ways in which continued changes in Libyan political and economic policies affect migration for Sudanese workers from Darfur to Libya in the opposite direction. From an economic perspective, Helen Young et al (2007) suggested that understanding of the patterns
and mechanisms of migration of the affected Darfurians who work in Libya and their remittance flows is vital for any affective international response to resolve the crisis. In both the short and long terms, a number of policies that could lead to an improvement in conditions for the Darfurian migrant workforce in Libya were recommended. Until a resolution to the crisis and peace is achieved, Libya will remain an attractive destination for Darfurians. The authors focused on the implications of the volatile Libyan economic policies on the stability of the Darfur region. This thesis, however, contributes to the Young, Osman and Dale study by looking at another aspect of the picture, answering the question of how the Gaddafi regime in Tripoli employed this economic approach in its strategy to manage the Darfur Crisis, which has not been done by Young, Osman and Dale (2007).

Study by Yehudet Rone (2011) explores Gaddafi regime’s essential interests and involvement in its broader geo-strategic neighbouring region. It also traces the chronology of Libya’s relations with Sudan during the period of 1969–2010, focusing on Libya’s interests in Sudan in the post-cold war era. Moreover, Rone highlights the dramatic shift that had occurred in Tripoli’s regional policies, abandoning the Arab world in favour of Africa. Therefore, this thesis is different to Rone’s work. While Rone addressed how Gaddafi viewed the regime in Khartoum as well as how Gaddafi was trying to employ Sudan as a neighbouring state, in general, to boost his diplomatic and political position in Africa and in Libya’s international arenas. This thesis more deeply explores how Gaddafi has used the instability and the war in the Darfur region in particular, which first erupted in 2003, as card to achieve his strategic ambitions in Sudan and then in Africa and in Libya’s international arenas. This thesis highlights the aspect of how Gaddafi was presenting himself as a neutral third-party mediator between Sudan’s government and Darfur’s strongest armed rebel groups. While he was playing “a dirty game” by adopting the strategy of a double standards policy in his dealings with the two fighting parties in Darfur. This aspect of knowledge, therefore, has not received sufficient attention by Rone’s investigation.

From the IR theory perspective, this study then adds weight to the international argument regarding what effect a third-party state might have on the evolution of civil wars? This thesis contends that intervention by regional third parties is central to the civil war process. This study demonstrates that regional third-party
interventions could be decisive in the evolution of civil war and its duration. Furthermore, third-party interventions have a different effect on civil war duration and then different outcomes. The results show that regional third-party players, especially those who have a common border with the home state of the crisis, could prolong the intrastate conflict duration until the supported group achieves military victory. Likewise, third-party interventions, on both the government and opposition sides, decrease the likelihood of a negotiated settlement shortly.

One of the interesting findings of this thesis is that the Libyan intervention as a regional player under the Gaddafi regime was the most important factor that prolonged the duration of the crisis in Darfur and the key obstacle for ending the bloodshed and the humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur, and building peace in Sudan. The international community’s duties towards Darfur is not only one of arranging peace talks, but it is one of ensuring that the key motivation of involved third-party regional interveners in the crisis is to help the conflicted domestic parties to end the conflict and reach a permanent peaceful settlement, not to gain advantages from the conflict and achieve their own interests.

This study contributes, therefore, not only to the crisis management and conflict resolution field and/or the history of Darfur Crisis literature, but to a range of different bodies of areas of study, as this project has engaged with lots of different literature and information from other disciplines adopting an interdisciplinary approach. In general, the researcher engaged with different fields from international relations, conflict resolution, crisis and conflict management, and international political economy. Those bodies of literature were categorised and put together according to their theme, analytical focus, and conclusions. This research project was conducted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for gaining a PhD degree in IR, but IR in the researcher’s view is seen as an interdisciplinary field of study to an extent, and as such it does not focus on one body of literature and ignore others, but can in fact draw on a wide range of literature. The researcher used literature and sources of information, where relevant, from a range of fields of study according to their utility. What has been conducted, therefore, is an interdisciplinary project. This researcher has looked at this particular case study and tried to analysis it in a broad way by employing information, methods, theoretical ideas, and literature from different disciplines. Hence, the outcomes of this study could provide a solid
foundation to improve many of the claims and assumptions or even refute them. This research project is incredibly valuable because it has what might be termed “policy impact”. The perception it offers may help decision-makers in reducing the negative impact generated by the involvement of external states, solving the crisis and maintaining peace in a shorter time-frame.

**Limitations and Future research**

There are a number of limitations which could be addressed in future study. While this research will provide greater understanding of how the duration of the internal armed conflicts can be influenced by the type and the method of the external state involvement, further research is encouraged. The theoretical model developed in this study, should be tested further and continuous improvements made for the best outcome possible for resolving the political crises and intrastate conflicts in a shorter time. Although the validity of the theoretical model here in this thesis is strong and seems to be applicable to other cases elsewhere in the world, there is room for improvement. Further research could focus on other factors which could more accurately reflect the influence of the external state intervention on the expectation of the duration of the intrastate conflicts, and which would hopefully achieve higher validity scores.

Further independent variables, such as the type of political regime ruling the intervening state, are warranted to be considered for developing the construct of our model. A new version of the original model of this thesis could be completed by adding the type of the political regime as another dimension. To do so, we classified the type of political regime as being totalitarian. The following propositions are recommended for future research:

- *The external interventions by states governed by a democratic political regime have a limited influence on prolonging the intrastate conflicts for a longer-duration.*
• The external interventions by states governed by a totalitarian and dictatorial political regime have a strong influence on prolonging the crisis for a longer-duration.

The type of the external state player also warrants future research. Investigating the influence of the extra regional state intervener on the expected duration of the intrastate conflicts is encouraged, as this investigation might reflect different significant outcomes. Remote countries could have agendas that do not encourage them to be heavily involved like neighbouring countries, and therefore their adopted mechanisms and the impact on the continuity of the war for a longer period would also be different.

Investigating media coverage as a mechanism of conflict management also warrants future research. This study will cast light onto the debate on how the media coverage used by the external state interveners (the hostile media effect) can impact the termination of civil conflicts and their expected duration.

Further international research on the impact of external state intervention on the expected duration to the intrastate conflicts is needed under the same methodological framework used by this research. This research should include other case studies, such as addressing the impact of external states’ involvement (such as the USA, Russia, Sudan, Iran) in the Libyan 2011 and Syrian 2011 intrastate conflicts to compare results internationally and to test the findings of this study beyond its geographical scope. Moreover, to establish a truly international practices benchmarking index in relation to the impact of external intervention on the duration of intrastate conflicts.
Figure No: 8
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