When David fights Goliath: a two-level explanation of small-state role-taking

Simon, E. ORCID: 0000-0002-1174-8650, 2019. When David fights Goliath: a two-level explanation of small-state role-taking. Foreign Policy Analysis, 15 (1), pp. 118-135. ISSN 1743-8586

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Abstract

Why do small states sometimes defy the behavioral expectations of powerful allies? Realism would suggest that they would not only ally themselves with more powerful states to ensure their security but would maintain that security through an accommodative strategy toward their protector once an alliance had been formed. Yet, this does not always happen; and the present article, building on Harnisch's (2014) pioneering effort to integrate role theory and the two-level game metaphor, investigates why. It offers and tests the hypothesis that, when small states prioritize their domestic role conceptions in formulating their foreign policy, they defy the behavioral expectations of more powerful allies. The 2014 visa revocation crisis between Hungary and the United States is used to illustrate this process: and contrary to what the literature suggests, the finding is that ego-dominated role-taking in international relations remains possible today even for small states.

Item Type:	Journal article
Publication Title:	Foreign Policy Analysis
Creators:	Simon, E.
Publisher:	Oxford University Press
Date:	January 2019
Volume:	15
Number:	1
ISSN:	1743-8586
Identifiers:	Number Type 10.1093/fpa/ory002 DOI
Divisions:	Schools > School of Social Sciences
Record created by:	Linda Sullivan
Date Added:	13 Aug 2019 11:19
Last Modified:	13 Aug 2019 11:19
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/37262

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