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No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institute of learning. No sources other than those acknowledged in the bibliography have been used.

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Abstract

This thesis will address the question `how has the concept of national security changed in 21st century Spain?’ It will account for the shifts in modern Spain’s approach to security policy and is based on an analysis of three recent administrations and their decisions, such as to support the US invasion of Iraq, as well as the responses to the economic crisis of 2008, and changes heralded in a process of national security strategies. To date, Spain’s security in a broader sense has been little researched and this thesis examines a number of themes including securitisation, the indignados movement and the role of ministries in national security strategy.

Case studies are used alongside Katzenstein’s constructivist approach to analyse the evolution of security policy. The thesis synthesises the Copenhagen School’s ‘sectors’ approach with a constructivist model to develop a concept of a culture of security in Spain supported by Clausewitz’s ‘remarkable trinity’ to address the role of Spanish Prime Ministers.

This approach has not been developed with regard to Spain before and, in conjunction with an analysis of the National Security Strategies of 2011 and 2013, it is argued that Spain’s executive, the Prime Minister, still exerts an excessive influence on national policy and institutions. Interviews with key stakeholders and policy-makers underpin the argument that security in Spain remains contested and that recent initiatives to promote a broader security agenda are not supported in organisational structure or policy.
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Introduction and Research Question

The aim of this thesis is to identify and analyse the dynamics and behind the construction, framing and delivery of Spain’s Security Policy.

I first became fascinated by Spain in the early to mid-1990s whilst studying at Liverpool. The country had taken up its role on the international scene again with a confidence and optimism we do not often witness in the UK. In 1992 the Barcelona Olympics, the Seville Expo and the creation of the Single European Market did not pass unnoticed in Liverpool, an international city with a long history of trade and the influence of globalisation. Benefiting from EU funding, students from Spain increased exponentially in the UK at this time, bringing with them ideas and opinions and sharing views with me on subjects as diverse as the collapse of Yugoslavia, the marking of the “discovery” of the Americas, relations with the US and inevitably the UK’s place in the world.

This thesis represents the next stage of that discussion as I endeavour to articulate what is meant by Spanish security and aim to analyse the dynamics behind the construction, framing and delivery of Spain's Security policy.

Like most states, Spain has a long history of flux and changing relations with the world. Over the last century it has experienced isolation, civil war, dictatorship and a renowned democratic transition. In the last thirty years, Spain has joined the European Community and made great strides in maturing its economy, particularly through the growth of Spanish financial institutions, most notably in Latin America. At the same time Madrid has also experienced the growing threat of international and domestic terrorism, both directly at home and in a global context, suffering one of Europe’s worst terrorist attacks during the election campaign of 2004.

Spain’s shifting position in the world is evident in the field of security and defence and, more so than many other similar-sized countries in Europe, it has traditionally been hesitant about how it should conduct itself in its relationships with NATO and the US, as well as in wider military interventions, although it has a strong record of peacekeeping under both the UN and the EU. The thesis proposal originally drew upon a broad agenda for security studies that was established in the 1990s and expounded by the Copenhagen School of Buzan and Waever (Buzan et al. 1998). There have since been a number of criticisms
of the School based on its rather state-centric focus, lack of rigour and a failure to address grassroots input to what are normally national or state-led debates and this is discussed further in the next chapter.

This has meant that beyond the initial basis for research, this thesis has had to develop a suitable framework that is more eclectic than the original Copenhagen School approach and includes drawing on Clausewitz’s approach to strategy, although this mainly involves aspects of Constructivism, particularly the works of Katzenstein (1993, 1996).

The approach has been to look at examples and cases that have emerged in Spanish policy-making in recent years and examine how the concept of national security has responded. This has been pursued through examination of the legislative and policy-making response by three recent Spanish Prime Ministers and their governments. I aim to analyse what makes up contemporary Spain’s national security policy drawing on a structure that combines the Copenhagen school approach with elements of Constructivism.

The literature review argues that there exists a range of approaches to analysing security and foreign policy that could be used to develop an analytical model.\(^1\) As in many other countries, how foreign and security relations are investigated remains the subject of debate both within and outside national boundaries. What initially needed to be addressed was the relationship between how the international system is viewed (namely International Relations (IR) theories) and then how this could lead to an analysis of security and foreign policy. Along with the entrenchment of the various paradigms between different interpretations of the international system, there also exists the debate over the level of analysis, concept and assumptions with regard to how the agency-structure approach could be used. In reality, international studies comprises a range of increasingly complex theories and paradigms. For the research on Spain to be valid, there

\(^{1}\) Texts on Spanish foreign and security policy written since the transition do not seem to have made any contribution to or evaluation of prevailing theories in IR, foreign policy analysis or security studies. Holman offers some recognition in Integrating Southern Europe but within the rest of the subject, theory is barely accorded any attention. An example would be Armero’s Política Exterior de España en Democracia or Pereira’s La Política Exterior de España, which stubbornly cling to a descriptive analysis as suggested by the titles. This is surprising when the advances in theory are considered, and even more so when the changes that have occurred in Europe’s and the international political landscape need to be understood.
needed to be a consistent theoretical framework and understanding of the international system.

A brief Introduction to Spain

Contemporary Spain is considered to have emerged following the death of the dictator General Francisco Franco Bahamonde in 1975. Spain’s celebrated transition initially generated little analysis of the foreign and security policy which reflected the Atlantic and European dominance of Spain’s economy at that time, as a consequence, Spain was seen to almost resume its expected place in the world.

With ETA (Euskadi ata Askatasuna- Basque fatherland and Freedom) as the main threat to the political process, the military shadow generated most interest in the challenges of transformation and reorganisation of a large, populated European nation-state. Preston’s Triumph of Democracy in Spain (1987) focuses on the internal dynamics of the successful regime change with only limited attention to the international picture, whilst Powell’s2 Dimensión exterior de la transición política discusses the international support of the then-EEC and NATO’s prominence with regard to Spain’s reinsertion into the international system. In sum, Spain’s international security during the transition was not an issue of major divisions, reflecting the notion that the domestic agenda overrode the international, something that changed during the years of democratic consolidation and continues to this moment in time.

Europe’s economic and political expansion along with a Cold War imperative of US and Atlantic integration for Madrid mean that it now appears difficult to believe that Spain’s international security could have evolved differently. As early as 1960, an overture to join the then EEC (in 1960) showed an early vocation by the Franco regime. One of the key ideas underlying the methodology of the research has been a wholehearted acceptance by Spain’s elites and citizens that European integration and Spain’s role as protagonist is a wholly positive phenomenon.

Domestically, the complexity behind Spain’s relationship with the US has been an underlying theme of the research, and it incorporates a scepticism among

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2 Preston’s The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (1986) and Powell’s La dimensión exterior de la transición política Española (1994) make the connection between reform of a backward military and overseas functional change.
Spaniards that has proved difficult for national policy-makers to reconcile. An effect of the 1953 Bases Agreement\(^3\) was recognition by the US of the Franco regime at a time of Spain’s acute vulnerability in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Literature reflects the impact of this tie, with works by Preston and Balfour (1999), Calduch et al. (1994) that explore Spain’s post-war posture and, although the US did not `save' the Franco regime, a narrative has developed that US security concerns prevented an opportunity to remove or significantly reform the Franco dictatorship during this period.

It is difficult to draw clear parallels between the Franco regime’s foreign policy and Spain’s security in the 21st century. However, one enduring feature has been the persistence of suspicion towards Washington and anti-Americanism within contemporary Spanish society. This has directly related to the Franco regime’s endorsement by the US, in spite of a norm among many elites that NATO membership was synonymous with Spain’s European project\(^4\), which was radically challenged when Prime Minister Aznar gave his whole-hearted support to the US Global War on Terror.

Deep splits over NATO membership in the 1980s indicate the schism that would continue to feature in Spain’s security and foreign policy in later decades. Sources at the time (*New Left Review, Preston and Smyth*) identify a division more complex than a left-right division, it drew on a tendency of *tercermundismo* (thirdworldism) within the Spanish intelligentsia and a tradition of isolationism that was in part a legacy of the Franco years, a matter discussed in the next chapter.

This thesis will discuss how Spain integrates emerging security matters with domestic and national concerns. Whilst there is significant data and evidence regarding the changes in national defence policy over this period, the process of identifying and analysing security policy in a domestic agenda has been little researched beyond a handful of case studies.

\(^3\) In return for strategic basing of US military forces, Spain received financial, military and diplomatic assistance from Washington that continued until the 1990s.

\(^4\) The NATO membership debate and referendum was perhaps the most pertinent example of Democratic Spain’s open division regarding US ties and foreign policy. Initially opposed by the PSOE Socialists, a U-turn in power by PM González was subsequently endorsed in a close-run referendum in 1984. Academic research on the topic is extensive but the issue is little referred to in contemporary Spain. Preston and Smyth, Heywood and Pollack among others provide a full discussion of this topic.
Although not a major focus of the thesis, the Barcelona (Euro-Mediterranean) summit of 1995⁵ marked a highpoint of Spain’s diplomatic activity as part of a broadening security agenda between the EU and its neighbours. Undoubtedly a success for Spain, it showed a commitment by the EU to supporting an ambitious programme of coordination and cooperation in a region not known for collaboration and understanding during a period of change following the end of the Cold War. Gillespie (1994, 2001) has devoted significant research to this theme, charting the Barcelona process’s evolution into the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which encompasses broad-based initiatives to reduce region-wide insecurities.

At the time of the Barcelona initiative, academic literature identified a convergence of new securities and the emergence of critical thinking in the Mediterranean region’s approach. The issue of ‘security’ blended hard traditional methods (such as that favoured by realists) with those that faced Spain and other Mediterranean states, such as migration, regional terrorist groupings and isolated or pariah states such as Libya. It was argued that, as events in the Balkans demonstrated, traditional security thinking was being challenged⁶ and in need of new responses.

Academic writing on Spain’s security in the 1990s identified three trends:

• NATO’s distinct Cold War deterrence was now ‘flexible’ and less politically sensitive for many Spaniards.
• Spanish security concerns were encompassed within a model of Europeanisation encapsulated by the role of a powerful Prime Minister (namely, Felipe González who promoted the idea of Europe being the solution to all of Spain’s ills).
• Institutionally, new international organisations and arrangements had emerged that suited Spain’s national and regional agenda. These included an active UN peacekeeping role that Spanish troops were well suited to⁷ and Spain’s neutral posture in the Israel-Palestinian conflict had won it plaudits for its significant role in the Middle East peace agreements in 1992.

⁵ This launched the Euro-Mediterranean partnership between EU states and all countries around the Mediterranean basin, nowadays known as the UfM.
⁷ Spain’s Guardia Civil have been hailed as relevant to modern peace support operations, this body blends civil policing with a military command and control capability.
In review, Spain’s security, per se tended to be grouped in with the foreign relations and external relations aspect of the EU accession process.

The *Regenerationists* and Contemporary Spain: The Impact of José Ortega Y Gasset.

The consensus in Spain of enthusiasm for European integration has an established history. In the 1980s keenness among the political elite, supported by the media, academics and businesses meant that entry to the European Community was generally uncontested. This enthusiasm drew inspiration from the works of the 1920s *Regenerationists*, whose ideas largely emerged at the start of the century. Following the 1898 humiliation of military defeat in Cuba, the Philippines and Puerto Rico (among Spain’s last colonies) at the hands of independence forces assisted by the United States, Spanish society and elites underwent a crisis of national identity coupled with a sense of despondency. This lent itself to isolation from Western Europe, and, with non-participation in WW1, this meant that Spain underwent an introspection that set it aside from other European nation-states. The impact of such seclusion (now more than 100 years ago) may appear academic, but Spanish thinker José Ortega y Gasset is (and remains) cited exhaustively for the assertion that “Spain is the problem, Europe is the solution”, which appear in numerous works on Spain during the accession process of 1985/6. Less known, but in a similar vein is Joaquín Costa’s “Europe is school, food store and hygiene”. Ortega y Gasset’s work in particular is emblematic of a widespread unwritten rule in Spanish politics that solutions to all manner of domestic problems can be found in European integration and identity. Today, Spain may have a more nuanced opinion of Europe, particularly after the economic crisis of 2008, but among voters, media commentators and elites, there is little appetite for the scepticism evident in other European nation-states. A product of this is that debates about European integration are generally one-sided in many areas of Spanish policy-making, generally accepting of the notion that solutions can be found and imported into Spain, particularly from the European Union.

The literature review encompasses two key areas: an analysis of works relating to Spain’s post-1945 foreign and security experience, with particular emphasis on

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8[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/316159116_The_United_States_of_Europe_and_Jose_Ortega_y_Gassetpolitical PHILOSOPHY_1 [accessed 01 Mar 18].]
the period of democratisation and the post-Cold War, and an in-depth discussion of the debates regarding international relations, security policy and foreign policy analysis. This goes on to establish a framework which can best be described as a synthesis of the Copenhagen School’s sectors approach and Constructivism.

Going beyond a superficial study of Spain’s security policy and IR, the review concludes that an approach that offers something more than mere analysis of states in the international system is required. In this context the emergence of Constructivism in international relations theory offers an analysis that goes beyond a structure which just focusses on relations between states. Whereas traditional approaches may appear an appealing option, the period coinciding with Spain’s reininsertion into Europe towards the end of the 1990s saw the emergence of works based on the Constructivist approach. Constructivist thinking identifies that shared values, ideas and culture are essentially key to understanding a state’s place in the world.

In analysing foreign and security policy, the way a nation-state like Spain has identified its security differs from that of other established EU member states. Francoist Spain’s understanding of security and threat, namely in terms of a mission to defend Christian Spain from Spain’s radical Left and national separatists (Preston, 1993), upheld a model of repression and dictatorship right through to the 1970s. Francoist Spain itself was a coalition of conservative Catholicism, nationalists and landed interests with a shared belief that the essence of this approach called for the very construct of security, threat and reaction to be built upon ideas, norms and values.

This association underwent a significant transformation after Francoism and, as the research explores, the formulation of foreign and security policy is significantly more intricate than a traditional model of ministries, nation-states and international systems. Drawing upon Wendt’s (1992) arguments, it is possible to identify that issues such as immigration, unemployment and also cyber-technology represent how interests and behaviours influence Spain’s policy to the present day. Finnimore (1996) found that outputs could be identified in ideational (imagined in some cases) as opposed to material concerns. A challenge therefore has been to find an approach that encompasses a means to analyse the key issues in Spain’s security, such as the decision by the Aznar
government to support the invasion of Iraq in 2003, as well as to scrutinise the role ideas, norms and change can play in security policy.

My research demonstrates that Spain’s process of security policy development reflects an organisational culture that is at significant variance to traditional notions of security and foreign policy, which consequently requires a theoretical framework based on a wider model of sectors influenced by changing ideas, norms and perspectives. Spain’s National Security Strategies, first published in 2011 and then again in 2013, provide evidence of the interplay of factors in policy formulation.

Within Spain’s academic community, the conceptualisation of security has not been widely examined or debated academically by a broad audience in spite of the wealth of evidence available. This thesis develops the concept of securitisation within the Spanish system and its relationship with norms, ideas and change. Discussion of how security is conceptualised in Spain has provided a good opportunity for establishing frameworks and eventually extending analysis to how this could relate to other countries in the Western Mediterranean and North African Maghreb.

The research amalgamates original primary research into the dynamics behind Spain’s security policy through interviews and state materials and develops a model for analysing security through an adapted Copenhagen School approach. Such a model offers the opportunity of developing a framework for use in other emerging security and foreign policy studies. As the literature review demonstrates, examination of countries and societies that sit outside a conventional Atlantic or European identity is often not done justice by applying the traditional models used in International Relations theories.

Contemporary Spain has endured one of the highest unemployment rates within the EU, and during the economic crisis suffered a level of youth unemployment among the highest in the developed world (Salmon, 2011). Its economic and recent political turbulence has been extensively commented upon and seen as a significant driver of a response in those areas but, as yet has not been analysed within the context of national security. The case studies demonstrate that Spain’s recent experience of articulating economic insecurity is a relatively new paradigm
that shows a security sector in a very difficult position by western national standards.

The other focus of the case studies, Spain's decision to ally itself with the US in the 'War on Terror' and support for the Iraq invasion in 2003, involves discussion of the rationale underlying domestic political concerns, which tend to suit a narrow economic elite or personalised opportunity for action within the executive. The thesis pays relatively limited analysis and attention to ETA (*Euskadi Askatasuna*) the Basque terrorist group. ETA to some represents a legacy of Francoist Spain in the modern democratic nation-state namely, a separatist movement united by a concept of nationhood that rejected Franco's centralist regime and in turn the democratic settlement of the 1970s, the movement's continuation into the 21st century continues to occupy research into its roots and support base, but also the Spanish state's response. As this thesis will argue more in chapter 3, its impact on both the political system but also the Spanish right has developed into less of a security threat (especially since the 2011 ceasefire) but a theme that raises questions about the Spanish nation-state and deeper ideas about national identity.

As a result, ETA is only looked at in passing in this thesis, as its evolution as a threat both predates and goes beyond the parameter of this research. This is not to downplay its significance, but rather to recognise that the theme deserves far more than the few paragraphs that this thesis can offer.

International terrorism has been met with an uneven and uncoordinated international response by EU nation-states. Much of the European legislative agenda linked to the EU has its origins in member states' policies — Spain is not unique in importing or copying policy (Ballesteros, 2016). The thesis also discusses how policy-makers (and other actors) have invoked an existential threat to justify extraordinary policy measures. While such a phenomenon has been documented in other countries, there has been little examination of securitisation in the case of Spain.

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9 ETA (Fatherland and Freedom) is synonymous with the Basque terrorist campaign for independence which began during the Francoist period. More discussion on the impact of ETA on Spain in this study is covered in chapter 3.
The emergence of Spain’s National Security Strategy relates to that of other similar-sized EU member states. The UK National Security Strategy of 2010 provides a useful model for comparison and a potential topic for further research. Both the UK and Spain face similar questions of identity and a contested conceptualisation of the state, although in Spain’s case economic insecurity remains a very tangible concept to its citizens and political players. This in turn presents an opportunity for research that can contribute to a wider knowledge of how states engage with their citizens on such matters.

Research Methodology

Contemporary Spain for the purpose of this research refers to the period from the start of 2000 until the summer of 2013. The time-frame begins four years after a landmark in the consolidation of its democracy, with the conservative Partido Popular ( Popular Party) entering its second term of government. That year also marked the start of the single European currency, probably one of the most ambitious EU projects since the end of the Cold War. My research period culminates with the publication of the Second Spanish Security Strategy in 2013. Following the economic crisis and defeat of the PSOE, I allocated a further year for the Rajoy government to offer any trends or outputs and, as anticipated, Defence and Security policies were updated early on among the administration’s priorities.10

The research strategy took a qualitative approach with regard to the process of interviews and policy analysis. Until recently, the open nature of Spain’s administration, particularly in Defence, meant that most sources were relatively accessible. The research has been based on a three-stage process. The first stage consisted of three elements, beginning with analysis of internet-available primary sources (government publications such as the Security Strategies, legislation and other official communications) and, given the policy-centred nature of this research, a significant portion of initial study focuses on the nature of security policy and strategies since 2003. The second element took the form of examination of the relevance and interplay of Buzan’s sectors, and considered criticisms of shortcomings in the Copenhagen School model.

10 The Arab Spring remained a pressing issue, along with ETA, the economic crisis and the indignados movement at that point in time.
Significant policy changes in the Spanish case and the impact of ideas and norms (in effect drawing on the constructivist model) will show the nature of the policy community within the country’s relatively open political system. Spain has been largely overlooked in the context of analysis from the Copenhagen School perspective, but bringing this to bear in conjunction with a Constructivist approach (which represents the third element) is viewed here as instructive in developing insight into discussion of national security even beyond Spain.

By way of a second stage, Interviews with policy-makers in Madrid (see Appendix 1 for a list) along with discussions with academics and policy practitioners enabled a qualitative approach to be developed as regards both the process and nature of security policy in Spain with a specific focus on the case studies. The third and final stage was to develop the two case studies, namely the decision to support the US war in Iraq, and also the emergence of economic security as a national policy agenda. These case studies are analysed in the context of a conceptual framework based on the notion of the Copenhagen School (developed in the first stage of the research) which has been expanded and honed by embracing input from constructivist models based on the impact of norms, ideas and notions in defining Spain’s needs.

Structure of the thesis

The thesis consists of eight chapters, and following this introductory chapter it tackles analysis of how Spain’s security and international standing have evolved since 1945. Chapter two includes an analysis of the main theoretical components behind International Relations (IR) theory given their prominence in academic analysis. The traditional divides of realism and liberalism have gone much further, and yet the chapter concludes by arguing that study of Spain’s international security is not sustained by the pillars of competing views over this intellectual divide. This tends to be supported by adherents and advocates of the Copenhagen school, which I devote some time to analysing by investigating the sectors approach to analysing security.

Chapters three and four look at two in-depth studies of contemporary security events in Spain. The thesis considers the divisive events behind the decision to support the US over the issue of invading Iraq, overhauling a long-standing distancing adopted by Spanish governments from supporting outright US military
intervention. This case study considers the impact of the 2004 Atocha train bombing in Madrid. This attack, happening at the end of a bitter electoral campaign perhaps brought the spotlight to bear on the contested nature of Spain’s security. The second case study (chapter four) looks at the impact of the profound and damaging economic slump that began in 2008 under the Socialist PSOE party. Using the two case studies the research will look at how security perceptions have influenced the idea of national security policy.

In 2011 and 2013 Spain published two National Security Strategies, which represent a significant policy development and cannot be seen in isolation from the two case studies. Drawing on a history of Defence Directives, chapter five examines security policy outputs in contemporary Spain and uses a Clausewitzian paradigm to explain the approach of the state, civil society and the executive, while it also discusses the impact of Presidentialism by the Prime Minister in Spanish policy-making. The chapter draws on significant primary sources in the form of interviews with military personnel, think-tanks, a former advisor to the PM and a Ministerial advisor in the Defence Ministry.

Chapter six will address the policy of the three most recent Prime Ministers in Spain; José María Aznar (1996-2004), José Luis Zapatero (2004-2011) and Mariano Rajoy (2011- present). I explore the Constitutional arrangements behind security policy-making and try to assess ways in which the idea of Presidentialism, first identified back in the 1980s, has evolved. The Zapatero government in particular attempted to shift away from this trend, and the consequences of this are also discussed on Spain’s security in this period.

The identification of what constitutes national security policy is discussed in chapter seven. National Ministries are briefly examined together with the idea of policy hierarchy. Chuter (2006) identified a tangled policy hierarchy which, when viewed bearing in mind the constructivist approach, illustrates how policy importance can be inconsistent in reflecting norms, values and the environment. Katzenstein et al. offer an approach of examining the culture of security (1993) that drives national security interests, and this is developed to explore the relevance of the Copenhagen School.

Appendix 1 at the end of the thesis outlines the interviews undertaken during the research phase of this thesis. In particular, access to sources within Spain’s
Ministry of Defence was granted due to confidence in my previous employment in the British Army, which appeared to open doors that were less open to a civilian researcher. As a result a loose relationship was built with a number of individuals. Other ministries were less accommodating, however think-tanks, particularly the Royal Elcano Institute did assist in a number of ways, and these in conjunction with other sources informed a range of issues discussed in the thesis. Only on the topic of Perejil Island, and particular criticism of ministers was I requested to withhold identities during the interview process.

**Summary and Key Research Questions**

My motivation behind this thesis is to answer the question of `how has the concept of national security changed in 21st century Spain'. I do this by following a methodology which assumes that the study of Spain’s security policy is overlooked within Spanish academia and a number of studies of Spain are used alongside a constructivist approach to analyse Spain and the evolution of its foreign and security policy. I synthesise the Copenhagen School’s sectors approach with a constructivist methodology to develop a concept known as a culture of security in Spain. This is then advanced to explain and interpret the events of the last two decades.

This is not to say that the traditional IR models of realism and liberalism are irrelevant; for instance, it is perfectly possible to conduct a study of Spain’s security policy from a realist perspective (focussing on state-to-state activity for example) but for the purposes of documenting the changes, constructed securities, opinion and interests at issue, then the Constructivist approach seems to position itself more effectively within a theoretical framework.

The study is brought to fruition by establishing a model that is essentially a synthesis of the Copenhagen School’s sector concept and Constructivism drawing on the approach of Katzenstein. Applying the model to Spain also opens up vistas for potentially extrapolating the model beyond Spain to the cases of specific countries across the EU and the Mediterranean, and the work opens further avenues regarding nation-state, security and the western Mediterranean.
Chapter Two

Theorising about Spain’s Security and Foreign Policy: The Contribution of Theory.

Any academic look at security has to acknowledge the challenges that International Relations (IR) theory presents in any academic study of a nation-state’s policy output. More than that of many other significant European nation-states, Spain’s external policy after the Second World War was one where the domestic national interest dictated foreign relations. Whilst this may appear a truism, the fact remained that Spain required a responsive balance between domestic and international politics after 1945, which continued until well after democratisation, (Pollack, 1987, p.12).

Although this thesis does not look at the 1945-75 period in significant depth, any research on Spanish foreign and security policy and the ensuing changes after the end of the Cold War and beyond (such as the impact posed by the September 11 attacks) requires analysis and debate regarding the construction of a theoretical framework. In common with other studies focussing upon how a country views its place in the world, theory concerning Spain’s foreign policy has traditionally been too narrow

In foreign policy terms, nearly all observers point to the considerable changes that have occurred since Spain’s transition to democracy, with this particular period inspiring a number of works (Pollack, 1987 and Del Arenal, 1992, Gillespie, 1995 and 2001).11 In spite of the range of analysis and output, there still lacks a systematic foreign policy analysis and accepted security policy theory that could be used to develop an analytical model.12 As in many other countries, how foreign relations are investigated remains the subject of debate, with analysis of US foreign policy, for example, having been produced by hundreds of academics on what is almost an industrial scale. What initially needs to be addressed is the relationship between how the international system is viewed

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11 There are many works, and more recently these have attempted to record and analyse Spain and its international security in the last century. They have been well complemented by the role of think-tanks, which are discussed further in chapter 4.
12 Texts on Spanish security and foreign policy written since the transition do not seem to have made any contribution or evaluation to prevailing theories in IR or foreign policy analysis. Holman provides some recognition in Integrating Southern Europe but within the rest of the subject, such theory is barely accorded any attention. This is surprising when the advances in theory are considered, and even more so when recent developments in Europe and on the international political landscape need to be understood.
(namely IR theories) and then how this can offer context for analysis for security (and foreign) policy.

With the entrenchment of the various paradigms among the different interpretations of the International System there also exists discussion over the level of the analysis concept and assumptions regarding how the agency-structure approach is to be used. However, even before these two topics are addressed, there should be a consistent theoretical framework and understanding of the international system (Burchill and Linklater, 2005, p.13). Once that is established, a discussion of the constructivist school (Wendt, 1992, Katzenstein, 1996) offers a useful method of exploring the issue along with a final examination of the Buzan et al. (1998) approach via sectors.

This thesis will address the traditional challenges of mainstream international relations (IR) theories in explaining Spain’s foreign and security policy and build a model based on social constructivism as a criterion for assessing foreign policy which can then be applied through a discussion of sectors.

**Spain’s Security and Modern History**

Spain as a nation-state for academic enquiry in defence and security has traditionally sat at the margins as a reference point, although works do exist in Spain on its foreign policy. This not only reflects Spain’s loss of power in recent centuries but represents Spain’s peripheral position in much academic thinking, this is also partly attributable to academic traditions within the country which have exhibited a tendency towards a historically-based analysis when looking at its own national experience.\(^{13}\)

Academic literature on Spain’s external relations and security reflects two traditions: one of Spain’s contemporary history (that stresses policy analysis, particularly on the foreign side), and more recently, security policy. Spain’s experiences in the twentieth century dominate works on its modern history, with the Second Republic, Spanish Civil War and Franco’s dictatorship eclipsing much other analysis of the Spain of the period. This means that anybody

\(^{13}\) Traditionally academic writing on Spain’s security and foreign policy has tended towards historical narratives. Academic research output tended to come in the form of weighty tomes of chronological description, Celestino del Arenal (1991, 1994, and 2011), although this is of some use to the undergraduate and students of Spain’s diplomatic history.
attempting to research literature on Spain in the period from the 1930s onwards is promptly struck by the heavy bias in favour of the key themes of state collapse, civil war and right wing dictatorship.¹⁴

Given this characteristic of the body of writing on Spain (with a generally strong accent on historical narrative) any investigation of broader issues therefore runs up against the challenge of having to sift through a literature overwhelmed by the Second Republic's drift into the Civil War and Francoist pre-eminence (including colonial conflicts in North Africa). The Crisis of 1898 is another example of events driving academic output. The loss of Cuba and major colonies are reflected in an academic tone of Spain being examined as a nation-state riven by internal events that overlap with overseas crises (normally involving failed, often imperial projects). In fact, anything more than a cursory examination of literature leads us to ‘the disaster’ (el desastre) of 1898,¹⁵ which some claim (Calduch et al, 1994) paved the way for dictatorship, the Second Republic and, of course, the Spanish Civil War. Even works that examine international relationships in this period are done so in the light of trauma or a Spanish exceptionalism.¹⁶ It is rare to identify anything resembling ‘mundane’ or banal policy unless some occasional insights into the Franco regime’s bureaucratic postures and behaviours are examined.

Cold War events overshadowed much of the period of the Francoist dictatorship, along with the contradiction of Spain’s rehabilitation (after 1945) of an open economy despite the authoritarian instincts of Francoism. A range of works on Spain’s relationship with the United States pointed to Spain’s Atlantic posture in embryonic form.¹⁷ These indicate post-Civil War Spain’s perspective of international security (Powell, 2007) and a number of concepts appear to inform analysis at this time.

¹⁴ In terms of a topic for conflict literature, the Spanish Civil War has allegedly been described as second only to the First and Second world wars. As a result, even today output on Spain’s civil war generates interest and output.

¹⁵ Más se perdió en Cuba (‘Far more was lost in Cuba’) like other works from the time, builds a narrative that Spain lost the final vestiges of confidence in its posture during this period and that this in turn set the scene for an introversion that existed up until the 1980s.

¹⁶ Preston’s works on the Spanish Civil War (1992, 2006, and 2011) focus on the trauma, destruction and roots of the conflict. One aspect less considered is the international security aspects of the period. Although Balfour (1999) does address some issues.

¹⁷ The Bases Agreement has been analysed on a number of occasions. Pollack, Preston & Balfour among others cite this as a starting point in the evolution of Spain’s place in the international system, notably through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Franscosim through to the 1980s.
1. Spain’s foreign, security and defence posture was disproportionately influenced by external pressures and less by domestic concerns (although, admittedly, the Civil War 1936-39 was unprecedented in its impact on Spain).

2. The insistence on strict internal regime security, which was such a distinctive feature of Francoism, fed off (or ‘securitised’) fears of the Civil War and the Republic’s failure.

3. Analysis of policy-making under Francoism was often based on areas such as the US, the Cold War and relative national isolation. More analysis could be undertaken that would add to an understanding of contemporary Spain.

The last years of the Franco regime were marked by two events in foreign and security policy, that of the failure of the nation-state to defend interests in North Africa\(^{18}\) and also the rise of Basque nationalism, a threat so spectacular that the assassination by ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna — Basque Fatherland and Freedom) of Franco’s Prime Minister (Admiral Carrero Blanco) in 1973 symbolised the depth of insecurity in Francoist Spain’s final years. As a consequence, the most significant security threats facing the Franco regime could be described as ETA’s political violence, and protracted decolonisation from North Africa, where a legacy presence of Ceuta and Melilla (two small communities) remains a security issue pertinent even now.\(^{19}\)

The proliferation of theories concerning the international system in the 1945-1990\(^{20}\) period tends to be overwhelming in breadth and complexity, even in the relatively focussed context of the Cold War. The reality is that two more conspicuous paradigms of the international system exist: that of the Realist school and, in contrast, the Liberal approach. On top of this, the Marxist/Critical Theorist model has been promoted, and broadened the legitimate scope to the emergence of Constructivism for some analysts. Nevertheless, for the purposes of analysing foreign and security policy the main debates still lie between the realist and liberal schools of IR theory.

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\(^{18}\) Throughout the 1950s and 1960s Morocco successfully challenged and gained territories held by Spain in North Africa to the point where only the Spanish Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla remained by the 1970s.

\(^{19}\) These contested territories pose migration problems given the borders with Morocco.

\(^{20}\) The period after 1990 saw a process of confrontation between the opposing blocs begin to fall down as the East could no longer sustain the Cold War. With the emergence of the post-Cold War world, new theories to explain the behaviour of the international system have gained credibility.
Realism and Neo-Realism

Realism offers an analysis of the international system where the thrust of the approach explains how states interact through looking at patterns of behaviour and policies between states. Realism views the global polity as a world of nation-states in perpetual conflict with one another, and an international system which lacks a supranational institution capable of adjudicating the range of conflicts (normally based on national interests) present at any one moment in time. Within the realist scenario, the role of the state is clear and unambiguous; it is to be the guarantor and arbiter of the national interest which would be served through the provision of security. The state is the focal point of expression within this model, it alone expresses national interest.

The simplicity of realism is given added weight by its established pedigree among western academics. Characterised by its utility in explaining a broad assortment of manifestations of state behaviour across what is a diverse range of nation-states in terms of sophistication and location, the roots of this framework are drawn from a long-standing tradition going back to ancient texts such as the work of Thucydides and his History of the Peloponnesian War. Written in the period of classical Greece it described the conflict between Athens and Sparta and adds a certain aura through its status as arguably the first piece of international relations analysis. Knutsen claims (1997, p.11) that there is a tradition from these roots whereby writers have identified a grounding of realist theory which gives the model a classical credibility in turn made popular by (mainly western) writers who have themselves been schooled in education processes driven by classical influences.

Another reason for realism’s pre-eminence was the discrediting of idealism in the inter-war years. Its failure by the 1940s was as much a factor in the predominance of realism in IR as were the strengths of a model which favoured security and rational models over inter-state relationships. Instead of trying to

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21 For example, in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff’s Contending Theories of International Relations they cite the forefathers of twentieth century realist theorists as being writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli’s The Prince and Thomas Hobbes, see also Snyder (1962, p.25).

22 E H Carr’s Twenty Years’ Crisis is an indictment of idealist thinking. Analysing the idealist assumptions at the end of the First World War, these were identified as a major cause of the instability that preceded the Second World War.
theorise as to how states should or could interact (as in the case of idealist or normative models), realism found favour more as a baldly descriptive approach regarding state behaviour.

Within a post-war Europe that rapidly evolved into a Cold War scenario, states had to be capable of confronting threats within a military-security paradigm that divided the continent into two camps (communism against capitalism). Considering the notion that states were perennially in conflict (in many cases militarily), the realist prescription was therefore to achieve an equilibrium or a relatively stable balance to maintain some form of international order. In the period of the Cold War and the concept of military deterrence, realism came to be a dominant theory with regard to explaining the behaviour of the US and other military powers.23

The realist model’s straightforwardness, which is perhaps its greatest virtue, is also the approach’s Achilles heel. The twentieth century exhibited far more inter-state activity than could be explained away in terms of a simplistic model of power rivalry. Emphasising ‘the state’ as the sole actor in international politics is too narrow and inaccurate a description in a world marked by economic blocs (the EU for example), organisations such as the UN and military-political alliances such as NATO. Economic relationships cannot be said to be under the control of individual states (even the US) and the concept of power in military terms alone is not consistent with broader notions of power, particularly with the presence of wealthy, yet militarily or physically weak, nation-states24, or even what has come to be known as “soft power”.

Realism is further challenged by globalisation and interdependence, which undermine state autonomy. In effect, the model of the powerful autonomous state offers little relevance in what is a global economy that relies on

23 Realism explained and justified the position of the Atlantic alliance’s members. Even small NATO members were exhorted to maintain a contribution to the military ‘balance’ and therefore ensure peace. However, just what this meant to countries that did not feel threatened by the Cold War, specifically those on the margin of Europe, or else facing different risks to those of NATO members, remains unclear. This is precisely what this thesis seeks to call attention to: Spain did not fight as a necessarily involved nation in the Second World War and, despite its anti-communist credentials, did not actively participate in NATO until the late 1990s.

24 Kuwait is the best example of a small state having power beyond its size in terms of population or military strength. Its 1991 liberation from Iraq’s invasion by a huge military coalition led by the US bore testament to its disproportionate influence within the international system, while there are also other small states who, despite their limited capabilities in a realist sense, enjoy significant leverage.
relationships and dependency upon the production or support of other nation-states. No state can be considered to be truly independent of other regimes.

Another debate regarding the realist model lies in its definition of power. While military power may be easy to envisage, in a wider sense however, power itself remains an ambiguous and much-debated concept. For a state to be powerful, the main requirement rests upon its ability to defend and promote its national interests (regardless of how these interests are to be defined). The realist assumption of power differs, not only in its emphasis upon the concept of military power, but also in its assumptions with respect to what constitutes the state and its ability to act in a uniform and autonomous manner. From a realist perspective, power is best summed up as being a measure of a nation’s capabilities. According to Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff:

“Power connotes the ability of one actor to influence another actor to do, or not to do, something desired by that actor. The actor exerting such influence does so by means of the capabilities that it has available” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1996, p. 66)

The debate over power’s definitions will always be ongoing; however, the extent to which power can gauge a nation’s influence is not disputed. Exactly where power lies within a state is the focus of academic interest. Power is fundamental to the agency-structure debate and is subject to a range of interpretations.

Yet recent developments have focussed on how military power has lost its potency in relation to contemporary security policy thinking (Luard, 1998, p.60). Recent experience of the US failure to secure its occupation of Iraq in 2003-10 in spite of deploying overwhelming military force against lightly-armed insurgents has been a striking manifestation of military power’s limitations, so the very concept of power and its applicability to how states can exert influence effectively remains obscure.

Given the inadequacies of a crude realist model for analysis, based in part on economic interdependence, the neo-realist response represents a school of thought where analysis of the international system remains focused on the state while recognising the need for a wider analysis of the state’s activities within a more integrated world economy. Trans-national actors take on a more prominent role in line with the increased awareness of the economic potency enjoyed by multinational corporations and in some cases NGOs. This offers a simplistic
view but the fact remains that the realist approach still subscribes to the view of a world governed by narrow power considerations managed by uncomplicated interpretations of the state.

While the globalising nature of economics and trade became acknowledged in the neo-realist school of thought, the process of analysing state behaviour remains fixated upon the system of nation-states. Therefore the method of interpreting national behaviour or policy has often been developed on political and empirical grounds that have focused on foreign policy output. In any analysis of Spain, using this model would see little attention to the input of domestic politics or economics. It is in the realm of understanding national decision-making that neo-realism does not provide a sufficient basis for the analysis of a nation-state’s policies. According to various interpretations, decision-making is the product of numerous dynamics, both within and outside a state.

**The Liberal Approach**

Returning to the theme of analysis that extends beyond nation-states, the liberal approach reflects domestic policy concerns motivated by economic and political priorities. These not only have ramifications upon the allies of more than a nation state, but also reflect the preoccupations and interests of the domestic population as well. In effect, the behaviour of states cannot be explained by policy output, but instead by the input from the interests and shared concerns of communities and organisations. Being influenced also by idealism, which implies that ideas and principles are more important than goals, this paradigm has roots in the post WW1 period when militarism was rejected in European politics.

The need to not just explain, but also to predict or inform foreign policy events or changes has been a driver for the emergence of the International Relations discipline. Because realism does not seek to offer a prescription, for the purposes of analysing security or foreign policy it is of limited use for understanding how countries like Spain have emerged as states in recent decades. Whilst the liberal approach may also lack a fully predictive aspect of foreign policy analysis, it does provide a model for understanding the influence of ideology and political thought in a manner wider than national interest. This development was then taken a step further when the subject of International
Relations became influenced by the need for a rigorous analytical approach, particularly during the Cold War where policy-makers saw a need for understanding the postures of rival military and political ideologies such as Communism and the post-colonial liberation movements.

Because realism attempted to avoid prescriptive or (normative) agendas, it is constrained by its reluctance to offer any understanding of potential eventualities. This coincided with the emergence of positivist and behaviouralist science. By offering different perspectives into the international system and the area of relations between states, including the use of modelling in an attempt to accurately predict outcomes or scenarios, the descriptive approach of realism could be criticised for not offering the academic rigour of scientific modelling.

A methodological approach of scientific analysis, while on first impressions is to be applauded, has not been without flaws. For example, in order to model across nations, values (of a variety of categories) need to be allocated in the construction of independent and dependent variables. Attempts at modelling that were evident in the Cold War in predicting Soviet actions, were at best so subjective as to render their objectivity near-worthless when it came to satisfying the demands of a wider academic audience. This problem is not confined to IR or foreign policy but could be said to hamper much wider contemporary academic debate.

While modelling’s failings in terms of objectivity have generally not been found acceptable, it is also apparent that theories that have emphasised different variables or approaches to examining relations between states offer an alternative approach to the study of IR. In particular, the identification of key factors offers the process of foreign policy analysis a basis upon which comparisons between policies and regimes can be made and, although not ground-breaking, this does provide some criteria for analysis. In addition to the progress this brought to analysis of foreign policy this was an opportunity that allowed a fuller explanation of the liberal approach or pluralist models of IR.

“Gone is the realist notion of a monolithic state pursuing national interests; gone is the idea, central to realists, of a clear analytical division between the domestic and international politic; and gone is the conception of a hierarchy of values with military issues being most important.” (Smith, in Carlsnaes and Smith, 1980).
Smith identified the benefit of a wider model in international relations, dismissing precisely the role of the state and military power as key concepts in understanding IR. Contemporary Spain, like the rest of the world, has experienced globalisation and economic interdependence as one of the major features of the last 100 years. Modern relationships between states are now conditioned by a wider range of factors other than simple power and also by the less tangible factors such as domestic societies within states. In effect, the separation of ‘domestic’ from ‘international’ remains more complicated than a simple split. Internal events (for example an overthrow of a government) have ramifications on the international system and the same can occur in reverse, when international events have major implications for seemingly disconnected countries.  

At the heart of the model, the case was argued that in an international system dominated by liberal states (namely democracies) war would become obsolete as a method of resolving conflict. A liberal approach in seeking to preserve peace therefore, could be to expand the number of liberal states to create an international system more disposed towards conflict resolution rather than war.

Often following a normative approach, the liberal argument in international security is based on the need to promote and support the processes of democratisation and interdependency. In the model of integration between the nations of Western Europe (such as Spain), the model of realism appears less relevant in recent decades. The Cold War may have been a binding influence in security terms upon Western Europe, but in analysing the process of European political integration, an alternative view to pure security is expressed. In essence, European members have, since the Treaty of Rome (1958), sought to strengthen ties between nations in a huge range of areas extending from economic integration, rather than solely along the lines of a security alliance.  

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25 One consequence of the behaviouralist approach of the 1960s was the shift of academic interest to wholly new areas of study in attempting to explain international policies. John Burton’s *World Society* articulated this shift away from the state-led model in the early 1970s, arguing that emphasising states was missing the real dynamic of domestic society.

26 This democratic peace notion has persisted to the present. In effect the argument promoted by many policy-makers (in the US in particular) is that the promotion of democracy helps to avoid global conflict – therefore for some, the outcome of ‘democratic’ state has been used to justify a range of military activities.

27 Europe’s integration process started through economic means (the European Coal and Steel Community being the first tangible step) and did not automatically include the United States.
It is not simply due to the construction of an alternative model along liberal/pluralist lines that realism is seen as inadequate in explaining a state’s foreign policy. In spite of the strength of the reaffirmation of neo-realism, the fact remained that the discipline of IR remains contested. Whilst it could therefore be argued that the liberal approach’s emphasis on values and shared ideals offers some explanations as to how states can and should behave, it does little to genuinely inform new debate as to how foreign and security policy is determined.

In spite of the shortcomings outlined previously, until the 1970s the realist model was vindicated by the experience of the US and its allies during the Cold War. The state effectively supported a peaceful international division by ensuring a powerful military capability that would not only deter enemy attack, but would also go to considerable lengths in upholding national interests. Relationships between states depended upon the power situation of the day; weaker states looked towards the leadership of superpowers, whose status was inevitably tied to the military aspect of power. Conservative and perhaps pessimistic in nature, the model of realism claimed to draw upon the experience of historical relations between states.

“The realist holds that politics is not a function of ethical philosophy. Instead, political theory, including realist theory, is derived from political practice and historical experience.” (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1999, p.65)

Neo-realism, a restatement of the main aspects of realism that acknowledged new approaches to social research, did go some way to improving the standing of this school of thought. However, the whole question of the state in international relations is central to any analysis and, indeed, to its role in the construction of foreign policy.

Alternative Interpretations of International Relations

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28 Waltz’s ‘structural realism’ placed the role of structures within states on the agenda. This raised the issue that states were not homogenous and, just as significantly, that the role of structures had to be considered, bringing the agency–structure paradigm into the realist debate.

29 The realist model appeared dated by the 1970s. Traditional realist models of the twentieth century were built upon the model of classical realism according to Carr’s Twenty Years Crisis and Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations. While they articulated a strong case for that particular model of analysis, transformations in the nature of social science research required changing, and in some cases more exacting styles, such as behaviourism and positivism.
At the same time as the emergence of behaviouralist sciences in looking at societies and how they progressed, the impact of analysing capitalism on theories explaining interactions between nation-states in the form of aspects of Marxist IR theory also evolved. The latter was joined by even more models, such as Green IR and feminist IR, which offered alternative strategies to understand how states and people relate in an international system.

In one way, structuralism as a way of explaining international interaction through dependency theory, articulated a school of analysis which struggles to help build a framework relevant to developed nation-states. Besides this, the discipline of International Relations has mostly overlooked North-South issues in favour of studying relations between countries of the developed world, which devalues wider relevance to any study of the foreign and security policy of a developing or peripheral nation-state. Even during this shift, which coincided with the latter years of the Franco regime, such notions of changing thought barely feature Spain and, academic output in Spain sat under Francoism’s shadow, social enquiry was firmly repressed and only a handful of works were produced often in the UK or US (with the works of Preston, Thomas and Payne being notable examples).

Earlier (pre-Second World War) Marxist thinking had seen the cause of the First World War as a product of a colonial scramble on the part of the European powers. While it saw capitalist states fighting each other, it identified domestic economic demands rather than the absence of order as the driver which had pushed states into conflict with each other (such as a scarcity of resources). Somewhat ironically though, the role of the state in this approach remained preoccupied with security in defending its interests (regardless of who or which class was to articulate these interests). This ambiguity about the role of the state undermines Marxist schools of IR. Traditionally Marxist theory saw states as being a function of elites; however, the capacity of states to mobilise or at least enjoy the acquiescence of the population as a whole is not clarified. To conclude that the state is irrelevant in international relations is mistaken, yet Marxist

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30 Lenin’s work Imperialism: The Highest State of Capitalism in 1917 articulated the case that the start of the twentieth century marked a phase in capital accumulation which would inevitably lead to conflict between the capitalist powers.
theoretical development continued to be held back by this weakness to provide a simple, widely-accepted model.\textsuperscript{31}

In the post-Cold War era some features of Marxism did play a more useful role through its contribution towards other disciplines in the form of the critical theorist approach. This emphasised a move towards understanding the dynamics of societies which compose nation-states and organisations. Nowadays critical theory has emerged as a school in its own right, with considerable sway in contemporary debate, and it presents a number of opportunities for further research. Critical theory has spawned the most useful analysis for the study of the internal dynamics behind foreign and security policy. Identifying the system of IR, national interests and even realism’s anarchy as ‘constructions’, this offers a number of useful avenues along which to analyse an individual nation-state’s foreign and security policy. One of the essential aspects of constructivism is its focus on national interest, which is

‘a political and cultural context in which foreign policy is formulated’ (Burchill, 2005, p.187).

Anything more than a superficial observation of foreign policy and IR leads to the conclusion that an approach that offers more than merely analysing states in the international system is required. The approaches of realism and the liberal schools had created an impasse in the methodology when examining Spain’s security. The thesis’s approach was ensnared in a binary division between two factions that appear as prevalent as the study of states and security. This deadlock or blind alley, as scholars have identified,\textsuperscript{32} had led to the IR approaches appearing rather like a cul-de-sac, with little scope for developing understanding, in this case Spain was no exception.

In this context the emergence of constructivism in international relations theory presents a more in-depth analysis than just a structure that focusses on relations between states. Increasingly, as IR debates appear less relevant to Spain, events, policy pronouncements and postures have been telling us that, within the

\textsuperscript{31} Halliday states that the Marxist approach has been reinvigorated by the effect of the ending of the Cold War upon IR analysis. While accepting that its shortcomings had hampered its evolution during the Cold War, the ending of traditional structures of understanding has opened up new opportunities since 1990 (Halliday, 1994).

\textsuperscript{32} There is no lack of analysis of the divide and its hindrance to research, Buzan writing in Collins (2007) and Katzenstein (1993) are relevant sources on this topic, however there is a multitude on this topic.
Partido Popular and PSOE administrations, the quest towards framing and analysing security in more effective ways has become more key as an underlying aspect of this research. The integration of the domestic sphere or environment (so important within Spain’s security in the context of the international picture) at the end of the 1990s has thus been applied through the medium of the range of ways offered by the works of constructivists such as Katzenstein and Wendt, among others, and this is developed in the following chapters.

Whilst traditional approaches may seem appealing for the purposes of analysis (an approach seen in many Spanish works), the period coinciding with Spain's reinsertion into Europe’s mainstream in the 1990s saw the emergence of works now identified as the constructivist approach. Constructivist thinking effectively identified that shared values and interests are essentially more helpful in understanding a state’s place in the world than traditional schools of analysis.

The thesis considers Spain’s emergence from the doldrums of Francoism’s international standing and the challenges of the transition years to coincide with the emergence of renewed thinking about security. This timely, albeit unconnected contribution, offers an approach to developing the research questions and ideas offered by constructivism, of which a lot of the works developed coincided with the election of the Aznar government in 1996. There is more to the concurrence than the passage of time, as IR’s evolution has emerged from the acceptance of the notion tied to the Westphalian system, and, in spite of the emergence of critical approaches, analysis tends to remain generally anchored to a model that struggles in the context of contemporary Spain. The departure from traditional IR offers new interpretations of Spain through new approaches (such as sociology, for example) and in turn may raise additional questions about the contemporary nation-state, the thesis also draws on the idea that Spain more than most EU member states has significant and unresolved questions about identity and society (Heywood, 1995).

In the case of analysing security and foreign policy, in the post-war period, how a nation-state like Spain identified a concept of security differed from neighbouring nation-states. In this context, the way that Francoist Spain identified security and

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33 This refers to the one of the first accepted moments when certain European powers were identified as having arranged itself into a system of states as a product of the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).
threat (namely from the radical Left with national separatists) propped up a model of repression and dictatorship right through to the 1970s, which reflected the dynamics of the regime, itself a coalition of conservative Catholicism and nationalism. The essence of this approach is that the very construct of security, threat and reaction is built upon ideas, norms and values. Spain differed under Francoism and as this thesis will explore this still has an effect on its security thinking today.

In this model of contemporary Spain the input from constructivist writers such as Wendt (1992) reveals that the formulation of foreign and security policy is significantly more intricate than in a traditional model of ministries, nation-states and international systems. Drawing upon Wendt’s arguments, it is possible to determine that issues such as immigration, unemployment and also cybersecurity represent how interests and behaviours influence Spain’s policy formulation to this day. Finnemore (1996, p.132) identified that policy outputs could be identified in ideational (imagined in some cases) as opposed to material concerns and this in turn opens up another avenue of research in the form of constructed threats and situations such through `speech acts’.

These topics reflect insights into Spain’s society and political elites in the period under study. Although the physical speech acts by Rajoy and Aznar are not analysed in depth, the contribution by traditional IR schools to this aspect of Spanish policy is somewhat limited and drawing on aspects of the constructivist approach offers different interpretations of the environment in which events have taken place. A theme throughout Europe after the Cold War and the 1990s is that rapid (and at times unpredictable) change has taken place. Spain, although separate from much of the Cold War’s progress, was bound up in the challenges of the decades of the 1990s, both by design but also by a European vocation that appears at times alien to a UK audience.

Constructivism offers a conceptualisation of how to analyse societies’ responses to transformations under a range of circumstances. Wendt34 makes the case that ‘people act towards objects on the basis of the meaning they have towards them’. What this thesis addresses is how security relates to Spain’s society and the idea of a culture of security. Through the research, Spain’s identity, both as a

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referent object but also as a factor or driver in its security is identified as a significant factor. Whilst national identity is part of the concept, what is impossible to ignore when looking at contemporary Spain is the impact that unresolved matters, precisely on the issue of national identity, have on the challenges facing the modern Spanish nation-state.

The concept of norms provides an analysis of Spanish shifts in posture during what were seen as divisive moments — one of the issues when looking at the early 21st century was the support offered by ideologically disparate governments to support Bush’s highly controversial invasion of Iraq on what were dubious legal grounds. This decision jarred somewhat with a number of norms that upheld the international legal system. Certain constructivists (Kratochwil, 1986) offer analysis into how to go about interpreting the depth of this significant act, but also assist in comprehending why apparently ‘irrational’ decisions can be seen as a more coherent choice.

Constructivist interpretations of norms in Spain’s security offer explanations for what are (in often traditional IR terms) contradictory modes of behaviour. The rise of the indignados, from a small protest movement to become a sudden global phenomenon resonated very differently in Spain in contrast with other nation-states such as the US or France, and the impact of this phenomenon is still keenly felt in Spain’s political culture. In addition to norms, constructivists also place value in understanding ‘rules’ within a nation-state’s culture. In Spain’s case, the concepts of hispanidad, tercermundismo and antagonism to US security overtures by many Spanish voters, all reflect Spain’s national culture, values and interests, which, although hard to define or measure with any degree of precision, continue to play a significant role in Spain’s security and overseas relationships.

Bringing constructivism to bear is not an attempt to articulate that Spain is somehow unique or exceptional, but rather an assertion that the approach of constructivism is relevant to social, political and policy-making aspects of security. As the thesis will demonstrate, it is only by analysing the impact of the domestic sphere on policy that Spain’s culture of security can be understood in terms of how it has evolved and actually reflects interaction within the Spanish political environment.
Although the constructivist school can be acknowledged as almost as broad-ranging as the liberal approach or that of the realists, in the case of Spain this diversity also offers challenges. As much as a strength, the diversity and breadth makes any coherent analysis exposed to reservations engendered by the very range of ideas and approaches in play. Katzenstein (1993) for example contributes a significant amount to the thesis’s approach with a concise and straightforward model which goes some way to simplifying what can be a broad school sometimes mired in different methodologies.

In the context of Spain, where analysis of the political and cultural context of democratisation, economic insecurity and ethno-nationalist terrorism has proved so significant in understanding its current ‘national interests’ and security structures, an analysis of how structures are formed socially is the approach most suited to the research. Wendt (1994, p.385) identifies the state as still the principle unit for analysis and, in the case of Spain, the state’s output is still the focus for the research. What is most important in all this is the process whereby the structure of a national interest is created. Shared ideas, the concept of ‘Hispanidad’, and even Spain’s place in the world are all socially constructed and how this arises and what this means as a ‘construction’ are all important in gaining an understanding of the process of analysing a nation-state’s output.

Given the significant transformations and changes within the political arena, in particular as regards the foreign and security policies of Spain, the constructivist school offers a genuinely alternative approach to that offered by the long-standing IR approaches of liberalism and realism. That is not to say that constructivism offers an ideal or perfect solution, as, in the same way that critics have focussed on realism, the emphasis on the state as being the central factor risks over-analysis of outputs and policies, as opposed to the society and populations that create the social constructions (in this case national interest). In effect, constructivism could be accused of emphasising the end-states of security or organisations rather than perhaps the role of individuals, elites or groups.

Looking at how language can be used to build an imagined international system, provides scope for understanding the process of change and how evolution has taken place in the areas of security, communities, or even national interests. In the context of Spain, which has gone through almost unprecedented change during the last 40 years, constructivism offers a framework for understanding the
process of change and allows for a synthesis of other theoretical frameworks as outlined by Buzan et al. (1997).

**Spain and Traditional International Relations Theory**

When analysing Spain, a number of observations can be made regarding the utility of traditional IR models. The main assertion of this paper is that Realism, Critical Theory/ Marxism, and to a lesser extent the liberal approach, do not appear central to a successful analysis of Spain’s security policy. With its own historical experiences and geographic idiosyncrasies in the context of Europe, Spain could justify an autonomous stance by pointing to the peculiarities of its contemporary history. The liberal approach offers greater opportunities for research through its contribution in explaining transnationalism and deeper relationships but it does not account for the competition and changes that can happen within international relations in the same way as realism and constructivism do.

The last forty years illustrate that Spain traditionally has, and at times continues to display, a relationship with both the developing and industrialised nations that is at odds with its status as member of the NATO alliance and European Union. The concept of the Ibero-American\(^{35}\) community for example, promotes a post-colonial relationship with Latin America in an area considered by the US to be its own back yard.\(^{36}\) The isolation endured during Franco’s period in office reflected hostility, not only from Western Europe, but also Spain’s own perspective towards Atlanticism and the rise of the US. Francoist Spain had not traditionally shown interest in embracing an Atlantic community, which in many ways (with the exception of anti-communism) did not accord with the dictatorship’s values. Therefore a model that adequately explains Spain’s foreign and security policy draws on a more sophisticated array of sources than just realism or the liberal approach.

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\(^{35}\) This encompasses the two Iberian nation-states of Portugal and Spain with that of the Latin American nation-states (including Brazil).

\(^{36}\) This has not been without problems, as Spain’s colonial experience and isolation during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries left the country looking out of kilter. Spain, which was the only NATO member to do so, condemned the US invasion of Panama in a motion passed in the United Nations. Yet less than 15 years later it had aligned itself with the US over the invasion of Iraq.
Looking at Spain’s own role in the international system, the most obvious shortfall of realism is its over-emphasis on the role of the nation-state as the key actor in understanding Spain’s security or national interest. Cold War aggression being directed at another is seen as not only an instance of US-led justification for the model of a North-Atlantic led alliance, but also as a failure in interpreting just what constituted a security threat. Spain’s experience of security since 1945 had not been conceptualised in terms of an incursion from Central or Eastern Europe but instead reflected its experience as a former colonial power and south-facing Mediterranean nation-state with territory in North Africa.

Spain, the Cold War and IR theory

With the height of the Cold War being an epoch of Western realist thinking, Spain’s isolation not only led to a divergence from the Alliance-led response to Eastern bloc threats since its relationship with the Atlantic alliance remained ambiguous, but also in being outside the ‘umbrella’ of nuclear or conventional protection Spain suffered no harm in any way. Whether Spain unfairly benefited is unclear but the fact remains that its security was never compromised by being outside the NATO alliance.

Spain’s non-participation in the NATO alliance (up until the end of the 1980s) did not disrupt Europe’s balance of power from a realist perspective. However, in spite of the realist model of the US-led alliances not having relevance for Spain (and other countries) in foreign relations after the 1960s, it is surprising to note that Spain’s integration into the world community should have come as a result of US pressure.

37 See Tickner, J ‘Revisioning Security’ in Booth and Smith (1995, p.176) where a good case is made for bringing in some of the debates about what constitutes security.
38 Even at the end of the Second World War, a time when Spain was arguably at its weakest, the Spanish empire in North Africa gave it a significant role in the Strait of Gibraltar and Atlantic approaches to the Mediterranean.
39 Pollack (1987) makes the case that Spain enjoyed relations with the countries of the Eastern bloc, which contradicted many interpretations of the Francoist authoritarian regime.
40 France’s withdrawal from the Integrated Military Command in 1966 left considerable repercussions in the NATO alliance that exist even today. The question of leadership within the NATO alliance and the role of the nuclear deterrent can be seen to have influenced French foreign policy in a manner similar to that of Spain, namely that French security concepts did not coincide with those of Washington. Withdrawal effectively destabilised NATO and yet did not harm either France or NATO in the longer term. This does not prove the invalidity of the alliance, as France remained a member, but it did undermine the claim that strong decisive leadership under the US was a prerequisite.
41 Cortada’s Spain in the twentieth century provides a review of Spain’s foreign policy before, during and after the Franco regime.
While Franco may have been eager to promote himself as a bulwark against Communism, the fact remained that his support for US policy extended no further than the Bases Agreement of 1953 (Preston and Balfour, 1999). The regime’s claims to pursuing an unaligned foreign policy not only ensured that Spain’s position in the Western sphere remained ambiguous, but also meant that some linkages were retained that transcended Cold War divisions.  

The realist perspective of power does little to explain Spain’s foreign policy during the Cold War. The military evolved according to an internal security paradigm and did not experience conflict outside the territories of North Africa or domestic terrorism. In some senses the North African territories would be considered internal disputes, as they remained colonies rather than states and were centred on the topics of poverty and decolonisation; areas of security overlooked by realism.  

Spain’s security and defence in the post-1945 period evolved in keeping with the internal security paradigm with little reference to international or wider events.

While Spain’s recent history drives much of its international posture, other countries in the Atlantic alliance have also espoused positions that contradicted much of the NATO alliance’s stance. For Greece the Cold War was much more about using US fears to bolster the national position towards Turkey rather than the strength of the Warsaw Pact in the Balkans. Meanwhile France pursued a clear national policy as opposed to NATO’s wider needs. Linkages and peculiarities of the South European member states (within both NATO and the European Union) have a greater impact upon their domestic and overseas security considerations than simply power enjoyed by the US and therefore

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42 Cuba and the Arab world during the 1960s were the ideal places for Spain to develop relationships that not only helped Spain to gain some prestige during the Cold War, but also allowed access to products and markets despite US pressure. One question remains unanswered, which is whether or not more tangible relationships existed than any of simple opportunism. Whatever the case, the fact remained that these were useful for Spain’s overseas agenda.

43 Morocco’s seizure of Spain’s last colony in 1975, now Western Sahara, reflected not just a desire on the part of Morocco to annex the colony, but also reflected internal problems within Morocco. This is basically Spain’s main security threat from the Maghreb; the vulnerability from sovereign nation states seeking to exploit relations with neighbours as much as from such states themselves.

44 France spent many years of its NATO membership outside of the Integrated Military Command and therefore provided an example to those in Spain uncomfortable about membership.

45 Kavakas in Does Size Matter? Referring to Greece’s role within European foreign policy-making he asserts that Greece felt barely threatened by its Eastern bloc neighbours (Bulgaria, Albania or Yugoslavia). This meant it viewed its security as being something very different from that of the North European NATO members (1997, p.5).
theorising about them in this period invariably dictates that internal matters were influential on national security.

Spain for much of the Cold War (1946-1990) was neither Atlantic-looking nor democratic. The weakness of the Spanish state meant that its foreign policy role was subordinated to domestic demands of an economic or political nature (although the opening up of Spain to tourism and Europe did represent a significant shift).

Traditional realist interpretations of global politics attribute too much capability to ‘strong’ states, and in many cases understated the contribution that could be made by non-state actors. In some cases, weak states were themselves subordinate to the power of non-state actors (it could be argued that the 1974 Portuguese Revolution of the Flowers was just such a case). While Spain’s regime may have not been a case of an impotent state, post-war economic policy was driven by the crucial imperative of modernising the Spanish economy following the devastation of Civil War and isolation. So important was this programme that it embarked upon an opening up of the economy that conflicted with the political (and in some cases security) needs of the regime.

Even with the emergence of neo-realism, and the understanding of the role of the state in dealing with non-state and global institutions within the traditional framework, there still remain questions about the role of realism in IR as a source of analysis of foreign policy. However, the failings that existed within realism, with the idea that security was the sole concern of the state, and even the terminology of “security” being disputed, leave the need for a viable explanation of the period still unaddressed. It is the assertion of this thesis that Spain’s security during the Cold War was dictated not by a realist model of states in perennial competition, but instead that its own internal integrity and foreign relations were maintained by its economic and political circumstances of the particular era in Western Europe.

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46 Preston (1993) portrays the later years of Franco’s regime well in this regard, whilst Powell (2010) addresses the role of economics in driving the relationship with Europe.

47 Traditional theory of International Relations addressed the results of the absence of world government, maintaining that some sort of theorising is required to understand the interaction between states that can often be seen as confusing or even anarchic. During the twentieth century considerable changes at the supranational level have made the concept of world government more tangible. The creation of the United Nations or even the League of Nations were attempts to bring about some ordering within global politics.
In order to reject the role of realism in this analysis of the international system the realist school needs to be viewed from a non-state perspective. Despite the emergence of neo-realism, the fact remained that the theory was wedded to the concept of the balance of power between states as the route to peace. Indeed Rosenberg argued that the idea of the balance of power was in fact ‘the major cause of the theoretical underdevelopment of international theory’ in this period (Rosenberg, 1996, p.5). Yet eventually an alternative to realism was to be supplied with the emergence of critical models and the rise of sub-national threats to nation-states during the 1960s.48

Realism or neo-realism lacks an approach for understanding Spain’s experience. First, the Franco years were a period of isolation, part and parcel of which was that barely any competition with another state, let alone a European neighbour, could be contemplated. Francoist Spain was technically an unrecognised state in the 1940s (thus further complicating sensible realist analysis). The Cold War was neither of pressing concern politically or even militarily to Spain and, if anything, it could be argued that it served the Franco regime’s best interest in the sense of being able to exploit Spain’s non-ideological characteristics. Practically speaking, although difficult to situate in theory, Spain has always had some dialogue with the nations of Latin America through the concept of *Hispanidad*, which in English it can best be described as ‘Spanishness’. A Third World-led foreign policy in combination with a form of non-alignment could be considered progressive and Francoist foreign policy, articulated initially by Castiella followed a tendency known as ‘Thirdworldism’ (*tercermundismo*) (Pollack, 1987, pp.47-49). In practical terms therefore, Spain was to devote a substantial effort to articulating a policy of support for interests of the Third World, often at the expense of its relationship with the US and other western allies. Ideologically, this policy can at its most paradoxical be said to have its roots in Marxist interpretations of international relations and yet was very much a staple of Francoist international politics. (Pollack, 1987).

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48 As decolonisation both overthrew former powers (France in Algeria and Indo-China for example) it also created newly independent states that faced internal threats to security as well as external national disputes. In Latin America, Asia and Africa states were overthrown or collapsed due to both internal and external pressures. The causes of these changes have been vigorously debated with regard to how they relate to economics, levels of industrialisation or even the superpowers. But the main consequence was that the international system grew significantly more complex at the same time as interdependencies entered strategic thinking.
Marxist international relations analysis divided the world into peripheries and cores of development. This model of uneven development was a cause of political disparity which in turn stirred political conflict between nations. The view from the Franco regime’s standpoint, however, was that the governments of states were an expression of society, not an ideological statement. From this it followed that the position which Franco adopted towards ideologically hostile nations (such as Cuba) was conditioned by his regime’s unwillingness to damage or jeopardise any longer term linkages between Spain’s Foreign Ministry and, for example, its Cuban counterpart. Spain’s engagement with the international system of the Cold War meant that a country which was a beneficiary of US military support and a right-wing authoritarian dictatorship could legitimately declare itself sympathetic to the interests of countries like Communist Cuba and even support the Algerian independence movement. At the expense of aligning the ideologically like-minded nations, Spain built upon its relationship with economies (such as food exporters) and populations (Cuba had been a colony until 1898) that were of significance to Spain. Francoist foreign policy was articulating a position closer to Marxist interpretations of international policies than realist analysis would suggest.\textsuperscript{50}

The third-world focus was so enduring after democratisation that Morán as the PSOE government’s first foreign minister pointed to it as one of the key tenets of the administration’s foreign policy.\textsuperscript{51} In this period, Spain’s foreign policy sought to carve out its own ground, which in turn raises questions about the role of its civil service.\textsuperscript{52} A mixture of hispanidad, tercermundismo and Franquismo combined to give the Franco regime a sense of autonomy and influence and yet Spain remained firmly tied to US defence interests in terms of basing and other sensitive topics such as the presence of nuclear weapons. Ideologically, and this is difficult to theorise, Francoist Spain sits outside the interpretation of (neo) realist security thinking. Tercermundismo with its obvious Marxist roots, looking back now sits very uncomfortably with the regime’s internal politics following the

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\textsuperscript{49} In 1953 the bases agreement was signed by Spain and the US. In return for Spanish ground and naval facilities, the US provided funding and equipment for the Spanish military.\textsuperscript{50} Pollack (1987) argues that the Spanish Foreign Ministry had adopted positions at odds with the Franco regime and this persisted well beyond the democratic transition.\textsuperscript{51} Fernando Morán was the first Socialist foreign minister. Notable for anti-Americanism and a pro Third World stance, it was no accident that he was a career diplomat under the Franco regime and represented continuity in policy beyond the transition to democracy.\textsuperscript{52} Pollack (1987) argues that the Spanish Foreign Service demonstrated a continuity in long standing approaches on issues from Francoism through to European accession.
Civil War and raises questions about the role of interests beyond a national coterie within the Spanish state.

Thirdworldism’s origins are interpreted according to the regime’s distribution of power. Pollack (1987, p.104) tends to emphasise the fact that continuity was a reflection of the Foreign Ministry’s professionalism, though the benefits (such as grain and energy) made the policy appear more akin to seizing upon an opportunity to obtain necessary supplies than purely an ideological decision. Despite the rhetoric of the policy towards the Third World (Tercermundismo), the fact remained that the economic and industrial direction of Spain was distinctly Atlantic and European-orientated. Holman argues that the real motor of Spain’s transformation was the process of Atlantic Fordism53 and advances the case that the state’s role in exploiting transnational flows was limited to being an internal arbiter, for which reason its role was not a crucial focus during this very significant time.

From the realist paradigm, what posture did the Spanish state pursue as a result of the Cold War? The Franco regime’s oppressive role within the internal dynamics of Spain did not alter the nation-state’s position as a weak European example of such. The regime’s outward orientation was inconsistent as a foreign policy, with, for example, Franco tying Spain’s security to the US through the 1953 military bases accord but at the same time pursuing a policy of goodwill to a number of US ‘enemies’ in the Soviet bloc and Arab world. One explanation of this could lie in how Franco’s regime was positioned during the Cold War in that, unlike other countries in western Europe, there was never any intent to deter a threat from the East, but instead, threats towards Spanish North Africa were more relevant to Spain (as was also experienced by France’s experience in post WW2 Algeria).

When analysing the Franco regime and its interpretation of international politics, there exists a divergence between the statements of intent and the actual nature of the regime’s posture. In spite of the fact that the realist analysis of European or Atlantic security did not apply to Spain, the regime had placed itself

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53 This was a variant of Fordism which Holman saw as a specific imported process into the economies of the Mediterranean Europe. It was a replication of the mass-production concept that Holman claimed made a unique contribution to the modernisation of society in the South European dictatorships, see Integrating Southern Europe, (pp 5-30).
economically within the Atlantic model by the end of the 1950s, and by the 1960s had applied unsuccessfully to join the European Community. Relations with Latin America through the concept of *Hispanidad* lacked cohesion\(^{54}\) but were consistent with a broad pattern of Spanish claims to a very limited form of influence.

Consistency in external relations during the Franco years through to the modern age is best seen in the areas of *tercermundismo* and *Hispanidad*. Whether the critical/Marxist interpretation of Spain’s global role was simple opportunism will forever be debated. Franco’s regime was politically isolated, and somewhat insecure with regard to Europe’s democratic nations, therefore the developing world offered it only limited credibility as a European ‘power’. Whether this reflected a more deep-seated tendency of ‘progressive’ policy is thrown in doubt if the sole objective of Spain was to develop a role for the advancement of its self-interest, which again is an underlying aspect of realism.

European integration was (and remains) an area that allowed Spain’s posture to display a greater constancy. While placing Spain on the edge of the Atlantic security camp, Franco’s regime was eager to cultivate the benefits of the Common Market. Spain’s failed application for membership demonstrated the clearest indication of the regime’s vocation. Despite being turned away from the EEC,\(^{55}\) the economic patterns of inward investment to Spain reflected an economic posture that was more welcoming to the benefits of Western markets than the existence of a progressive foreign policy indicated. The question of Spain’s apparent enthusiasm for the integration process has remained at odds with the more ‘Thirdworldist’ orientation of successive foreign policy interests.\(^{56}\)

**The Construction of Democratic Spain’s Contemporary Security**

\(^{54}\)This incoherence reflected the fact that Spain held very little tangible benefit for Latin America during the Cold War, and also that Latin America was not a homogenous group of nations but so politically diverse that continuity is hard to achieve in any sense of the post-colonial relationship.  
\(^{55}\)The European Economic Community was the title given to the body set up by the Treaty of Rome, also known as the Common Market. It later became the European Community after the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and, following the 1992 Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty), it was again renamed, this time as the European Union.  
\(^{56}\)Adolfo Suárez, the first democratic Prime Minister of Spain (also a former official of the regime) pursued a continuation of the Third Worldist stance while also remaining favourable to a Western alignment. He was also Prime Minister in a period when Spain’s application to join the European integration process was reactivated.
Democratic Spain’s decision to settle the issue of NATO membership through national referendum having joined in 1982 prior to the EEC accession preceded the end of the Cold War and facilitated its full integration into NATO’s command structure in 1997. However, from the perspective of literature regarding Spain’s security, debate focussed on analysis of the end of the Cold War rather than domestic matters and national security (Aldecoa, 1994 and Marquina, 1994).

For Madrid, the end of the Cold War did not herald the emergence of new challenges faced by those states which were more exposed to the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union (such as West Germany and the UK). For Spain, and Prime Minister Felipe González in particular, it represented an opportunity for Europe to rethink its security and offered a model of Europeanisation; (Rubio García, 2004, p.213). Works demonstrate that long-held concerns of Madrid on both the domestic and regional fronts could finally be addressed at the regional level. Gillespie (1995) and Arteaga (1999) argued that Spain could now assert a position of influence within Europe. An early indication was on the occasion of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, nine months after the fall of the Berlin Wall. This pointed to the issues that would confront Spain in future decades. Protests and demonstrations broke out among social groups and those opposed to Spain’s support for the military action. This demonstrated that for Spain ‘el fin de un siglo de aislamiento español’ (the end of a century of Spanish isolation) (Barbé in Gillespie, 2000, p.47) would not simply transform it into an activist military power but social and national interests would need to be accommodated.

Spain’s initial foray into military intervention following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (1990) may have been modest, the rise in protest groups and mobilisation of actors has yet to be fully analysed in the light of events in the 21st century. What can be taken from this time is that there existed an ambiguity in Spain’s policy — a close (albeit ambiguous) military relationship with Washington but one where activity would be strongly constrained by popular opinion. (Barbé, 1999, p.38)

Yugoslavia’s collapse offered a significantly difficult challenge and opportunity for Spain’s role in Europe. The Balkans, never traditionally a Spanish concern, represented a new problem to European NATO members. The PSOE’s enthusiasm for contributing peacekeeping troops generated both goodwill and

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57 Support was based upon a contribution to a multinational naval presence in the Gulf and some military transport aircraft, whilst US facilities in Spain were used extensively by Washington for bombing Iraq. No combat took place involving Spain, but for Madrid the contribution marked a significant departure from its usual policy of non-involvement.
credibility at a time when possible enlargement towards the East looked increasingly on the agenda, which was something articulated as a threat within Spain. Yet the security risks to Spain were typically presented as state threats of weapons proliferation and ethnic conflict (Spanish National Defence Directive 1996). Prior to the EU Maastricht negotiations in 1992, Spanish support for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was broadly welcomed, with 54% of Spanish voters in favour according to a Eurobarometer poll, Barbé (1999, p.49).

As will be discussed in later chapters, the 1990s are cited as Spain’s national debate being subordinated to the European project. In spite of the shifting nature of security, literature refers to Spain as not having a formal process but a gradual insertion of its security into the wider European imperative. Spain’s NATO membership was only partially resolved in 1986 and, although it was assumed to be settled with full membership in 1998, literature generally fails to address the formulation or process of security policy.58

Even so, Gillespie, Heywood, Arteaga and Barbé, among many others, cited a Spanish epoch of success in its international security. Former Foreign Minister Fernando Morán identified an appropriate role in his España en su sitio (Spain in its place) (1990), which had cited a role for Spain that was based on its relationship with the developing world, neutrality and support for a social democratic economy. Morán may have been overly optimistic but there was clear evidence that Spain had reached some sort of equilibrium at this point.

“as the century turned Spain had undoubtedly come a long way since the first moves of repositioning that took place in the early 1980s and its presence and achievements during the 1990s were notable in many respects” Gillespie and Youngs (2000, p.220).

Spain, the Copenhagen School and a Culture of Security

One outcome of the theorising behind this topic, and developed towards the end of the thesis is the concept of a Spanish `Culture of Security’ this in part draws on the approach of constructivism but also elements of the Copenhagen School. This synthesis comprises a significant aspect of the research and derives input

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58 The Partido Popular’s decision to insert Spain’s military into NATO’s Integrated Military Command in 1996 was not subject to significant academic debate or discussion. This was described an act of ‘seguridad común’ (common security) even though the security benefits were never clearly spelt out but was seen as a way of changing perceptions of Spain by its neighbours and allies.
from the Constructivist aspects of norms, culture and society but also recognises the value of sectors.

The Copenhagen Conflict and Peace Research Institute (Copenhagen School) emerged as offering an understanding of the security concept through the widening of the notion of security to encompass a range of sectors. It also developed the model of securitisation, and regional security. For the purposes of Spain, the use of sectors is perhaps the most pertinent. The original model identified five sectors for analysis:

- Military/state
- Political
- Societal
- Economic
- Environmental

Buzan et al. explain some of the shift by trying to marshal the study of security through the use of sectors, as opposed to a unidimensional aspect of the state.

“Generally speaking, the military security concerns the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states’ perceptions of each other’s intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions, for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend”.

(Buzan, 1983, p.20).

It is in the light of broadening security that the Copenhagen School offers useful input into how countries like Spain use a model of securitisation; by widening the source of threats and examining the issue of referent objects (namely ‘who’ or ‘what’ is to be protected) this conceptual step enables more comprehensive policy analysis.

In developing a more extensive referent object away from the narrow concept of the state’s own security, not only can the impact of threats be better understood, but also a nation-state’s capacity to meet its security needs. This broader
analysis which examines the impact on the referent object is helpful in explaining intent in the sense that a country’s reaction to a particular threat could potentially be predicted by examining the impact on a specific group within that particular nation-state. For Spain this means that a shift away from the narrow focus of military-related security towards one of wider security opens up the sphere of policy to include environmental, international aid and even economic considerations.

This process is not particularly new or innovative. The broadening of security at the end of the Cold War was a natural response to the idea that the conflict had placed unnecessary strictures upon policy and that non-traditional threats actually posed more of a threat to peoples and civil societies. Nowhere was more appropriate to appreciate this than in the developmental agenda. Therefore, security requirements (from the state, international organisation or NGO perspective) should address such security “gaps” accordingly by drawing upon the relevant sources of policy expertise and skill, as opposed to specific security specialists. Not that this indicates that there is no scope for the military, but rather that policy responses could be considerably more wide-ranging than was previously thought.

**Securitisation**

Figure 1 identifies three policy outcomes to an issue that emerges. It can be ‘non-politicised’, namely not debated or identified as being of significance. It can be ‘politicised’, which effectively means that it is dealt with in the normal manner of that state’s political system or, in the case of ‘securitisation’, it can be addressed as an extraordinary threat, or else, to use Copenhagen school terminology, identified as an existential threat. This can lead to all manner of specialised, and occasionally radical, policy outcomes.

**Figure 1: Securitisation**
The model of securitisation offers and interesting insight into the policies pursued by the Bush, Blair and Aznar administrations following the 9/11 attacks in the US.

Almost immediately, the NATO allies identified the terrorist attack under Article 5 of the NATO charter, which states that

“each member state is to consider an armed attack against one state to be an armed attack against all states”. NATO, 1949.

Securitisation therefore could be seen as explaining the capacity or willingness of groups within a nation-state to address and respond to unprecedented threats or demands upon that state. The Madrid bombings of 2004 enabled a securitisation to Spanish policymakers that offered them a certain licence to implement policies that they recognise are unlikely to elicit political support. However as the thesis will demonstrate this was not a clear-cut case as the PSOE embarked on a different approach reflecting the interests and values that underpinned the government at that time.

Spain’s `Culture of Security’.

One aspect arising from the research has been the identification of a `culture of security’ to explain the procedures behind the nation-state’s attitudes and values with regard to its own security. The words `culture’ and `security’ may appear to be antonymous at first, but there is evidence drawn from Katzenstein’s works.
that `security culture' reflects a deeper awareness of the nation and the state's approach to security.

Contemporary military operations have blended culture and anthropology, particularly in counter-insurgency conflicts in Afghanistan and the Middle East. This is based on NATO doctrine on understanding national and local environments, social structures and the needs of societies at grassroots level. This approach can also extended to national and international concerns, namely the `strategic level'. While still not wholly accepted as helpful to military capability, the application of sociological and anthropological approaches draws on constructions of societies, security environments and also threats. `Security' is less problematic from an academic standpoint as it already has an established (perhaps an entrenched) approach that is relevant to studying Spain. In these circumstances Katzenstein's contribution of *The Culture of National Security* (1996) offers an approach that also informs a constructivist approach towards Spain in the context of the thesis.

Spain's *culture of security* reflects a number of characteristics identified in the thesis.

1. A highly centralised `Presidential'-led approach to security — often framed in a personal, male-dominated manner.
2. A dichotomy where think tanks, academia and scholars tend to exert a limited impact, even while Clausewitz's concept of civil society's `primordial violence' highlights the possibility of spontaneous political action.
3. A highly securitised policy of domestic counter-terrorism, nominally a reaction against ETA's, but one that has positioned Spain's Interior Ministry robustly as regards domestic security policy.
4. An established history of importing security concepts and lexicon into Spain's policy-making process, but this with a particular sensitivity to US-related matters.
5. An incremental adoption of new securities through the varied methods brought to bear in National Defence Directives (DDNs) and Strategies.

Spain's security policy traditionally avoided party polemics until the deepening of ties between the Aznar administration and Washington at the start of his second term (with indications of this already much in evidence at the time of the Madrid Summit in 1997).
With this in mind Spain’s culture of security, evidenced by Buzan’s adapted model (1998) and further developed in Katzenstein’s paradigm (1996, p.53) in chapter 6, it is possible to identify deeper constraints and influences on future security policy. This thesis focuses on Spain’s processes and attempts to create a system of policy through National Strategies, culminating in the 2013 document. It is my contention that Spain’s culture of security reflects aspects of national identity in conjunction with features of Spain’s state model that was developed in the wake of its democratic transition. This in turn enables the framing of what constitutes the national ‘Culture of Security’.

Three concepts of Spain are explored: as Europe, the ‘State’ and the ‘nation’. This model can be seen as drawing on the Copenhagen school but synthesises with aspects of constructivism and critical theory.
Figure 2: Spain's Culture of Security (adapted from Buzan, Waever et al.)

Referent Object  Threats......according to.........Securitizing Actor

Spain as Society  The US & Americas  Elites/Government

Spain as State  The past (isolation)

Spain  North Africa

Spain as Nation  The EU (post enlargement)

The EU  Anti-EU interests

Foreign Culture

The historic Nations
(Autonomous Communities)

59 Adapted from Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998, p.172) which looked at France originally but for the purposes of this research certain sectors and groups have been amended to accommodate the interests and groups pertinent to contemporary Spain.
• **Spain as `Society' (European Society)**

The concept of Spain as `Society' (*European Society*) addresses the rise of modern Spain post-1986 (with the accession of Spain to the European Union). This encapsulates the concept of a country that is committed to European integration (on Spanish terms), has been a significant recipient of Development and Cohesion funds and has in turn enjoyed some prominence within EU institutions (Javier Solana as the EU representative on Security and Defence until 2009) and NATO Secretary General 1995-9.

This argument focuses on an idea of the Spain at ease with Europe, somewhat wary of further expansion but perhaps more driven by a fear of peripheralisation and/or demotion to the ‘second tier’ in Europe. An example of this fear could be seen with the accession of Poland to the EU in 2004, which competed with Spain as the EU’s fifth largest member state, a status that only failed to gel owing to the huge increase in Spain’s population as a result of immigration after 2000. This concept of a Spain at ease in Europe flagged markedly after 2005. Recent Spanish debt problems and economic legacies from qualifying for entry into the Euro have led to significant increases in Spanish indifference to EU membership. This model draws on the ideas of regenerationist writer José Ortega y Gasset that are developed in the thesis.

• **Spain as a `State’**

Related to the concept of *Europe*, the model of the Spanish state refers not only to the classical realist approach, but is also linked to the model conceived in the 1970s as a result of the transition to democracy. Spain is a country essentially European and modern, yet retaining some of the institutions and characteristics that have been problematic (and yet enduring) in its political system and civil society. In the 1980s it was traditionally unsure of military institutions, possessed a large public sector supported by strong trade unions and was also a corporatist model of social-democracy promoted by successive governments (Heywood 1999). This interpretation of Spain has stood the test of time as a result of its EU accession but is subject to constant change. This Spanish state could be considered capable of surviving come what may and with or without EU
membership (unthinkable though this appears), and it is this that drives much of Spain’s domestic policy.

- **Spain as a `Nation’**

The nation-state question is perhaps the most difficult interpretation for concepts of `Spain' and is the nub of the constructivist approach. Consisting of 16 nationalities `indivisible as one’, Heywood (1995, p.113), this reflects the perennial question regarding the future direction of Spain. A cause of Civil War, a recurring threat throughout the Franco-era and perhaps the most enduring legacy of the transition to democracy (in the form of the ongoing ETA problem). This concept of a country of nationalities, with some five different official languages and an institutionally decentralising country (with a complicated system of devolved powers and funding), means that this is perhaps the most critical area for future examination of how Spain or its autonomous communities address just how it sits in the world.

It is clear that there could exist more conceptualisations of Spain regarding such issues of civil society and critical thought. No observer can reasonably consider Spain without focussing on at least one of the three concepts though.

There can be overlap between the three Spains but they are perhaps best looked at in isolation as the three all pull in different ways. The concept of Spain as a nation clashes quite markedly with that of the Spanish state and therefore these models offer an alternative approach to examining Spain’s national interest and foreign and security policy.

**The Securitising Actors**

- **Elites and/or Government**

The most obvious securitising actors can be found within the state’s elites and institutions. This contention holds that political leaders, state officials and even the military can articulate the existence of the threat or, securitise the threat faced by the referent objects or civil society. This is reinforced by the influence of the media (or even social media), which often has a disproportionate impact
on the state. In the case of Spain the research will identify who the securitising actors are, and how they interact at the policy-making level. The role of Felipe González is regularly cited as key to Spain’s experiences and accordingly the thesis will develop the impact of the executive on the process.

- Anti-EU & Nationalist interests

A notable feature of Spain has until recently been the positive attitude adopted by national elites to support for the EU with all its attendant advantages and agenda. This does not mean that there are no securitising actors that would challenge the EU consensus; on the contrary there has always been a nationalistic streak on the Spanish Right. Recent trends by far left parties and other nationalist opinions challenge this consensus, with demands that test the Madrid government’s allegiance to EU commonality. The declaration of Kosovo’s Independence in 2008 (which was bitterly opposed by Spain) amply identifies how EU positions that increasingly enter the sphere of traditional (realist) security can affect internal relationships, with the consequence that, not just in economic terms but also politically, Spain must reconcile how these securitizing actors can impact on the relationship between Spain and the long-standing European project.

The approach derives from a notion of the nation-state in a broader sense than conventional realist thinking. Traditional security thinking would focus upon the foreign and defence ministries. In the securitisation model adopted from Buzan (1998, p.6), there exist three key referent objects that underpin the modern Spanish nation state, namely the European Spain, the “Nation” of Spain and the Spanish State. All of these reflect the modern Spanish nation-state but also identify the fact that more than one referent object can exist.

A multitude of threats exist to challenge these notions of Spain. A comprehensive list is impossible, though obvious examples would be threats such as those to the environment (climate change). However for the purposes of identifying how these threats are articulated, the model goes on to assert that nation-states pose a threat to the concept of Spain thriving as a European nation in that the traditional state elites perceive potential for a security threat to Spain’s European interests from around the world. Another interpretation could be seen
as stemming from the temptation to promote *hispanidad* — a concept of identity that has less to do with Europe and is built upon links with Spanish-speaking communities (the Constructivist approach). While not an immediate traditional threat to Spain, this concept, which is perhaps paternalistic, does distract from Spain’s model of European integration.

**Clausewitz and Spanish Security**

Karl von Clausewitz has dominated the focus of students and academics of strategy and conflict for more than a century, and his work “On War” (*Vom Kriege*), written in the mid-19th century, is one of the most cited sources on the analysis of strategy. This is developed in chapter five through his theory on the interplay of state, society and the use of force in relation to Spain’s national security policy.

A military writer at a time of momentous strategic change (the early decades of 19th century Europe), Clausewitz epitomised the development of military thinking and analysis of the relationship between politics, strategy and the application of organised force. Although unfinished,60 his work explored and has informed generations interested in the joining of the use of force and its context in state strategy. Although military success through study has been attributed to Clausewitz, he is best seen as a commentator on both the nature and character of conflict61 and the wider implications in the formation of strategy, which is where his work is most relevant to this research.

This thesis does not aim to dissect Clausewitz, but as Ballesteros identified (2016, p.25) there is a requirement to understand the methodology behind the ‘elaboration of strategy’ that not only applies to Spain but also to other models of national security or foreign policy.62 In order to inform the analysis, Clausewitz’s ‘Remarkable Trinity’ is examined. The Trinity has been exhaustively pored over and picked apart by generations of scholars of war and strategy, but not so in

60 Clausewitz died before his work was completed and his works were edited and achieved most fame some years after his death in 1831.
61 This a whole area of debate, i.e. about how conflicts have changed in character (the role of non-state actors, mass-media to name a few areas) but the fact that war itself (the actual fundamentals) have changed little, see Gray (2005).
62 Hill’s work on Foreign Policy processes, a good overall analysis by a UK academic, makes only the most passing of comments on Clausewitz (2003, p.143) in the context of policy.
Spain, where, with very few exceptions, his work has been barely touched upon by writers on Spain’s military relations or security policy.63

The Benefits of Identifying a Nation-State’s Culture of Security

By identifying the key components of a country’s security, the approach provides ways of identifying a number of fundamental issues in the policy-making by a nation-state or political system. These might be sorted into a number of categories.

First, this offers insight into the policy-making process in a nation-state’s political system such as that of Spain. In this case much of the traditional analysis is focussed on purely state-led models; for example a lot of FPA64 was based on this model. The contribution from constructivists however, directs attention towards society and the input of its norms and values in the process, thereby offering the probability of more certainty in anticipating outcomes involving civil groups, interests and society.

Second, policy responses are more predictable if there is greater understanding of the nation-state’s culture of security — hence Spain’s reaction to the conflicts since 2013 around the MENA have generally been predictable and consistent to those familiar with Spain. In turn, the evolution and development of ministries has reflected this broader stance on the part of the nation-state.

Furthermore, this offers the opportunity to anticipate and test the reaction and/or response to events within the political system. In this regard, one aspect of Spain’s economic crisis examined in Chapter 4 is that the response of state institutions became so difficult to anticipate and articulate given the open-ended nature of the crisis. Another example one could cite would be the near collapse of Spain’s monarchy in 2013, which itself was unexpected, reflected the pace and speed of events, and served up the unintended consequences it did. Finally, a nation-state’s vulnerabilities are better understood through the prism and structure offered by aspects of the culture of security. Spain’s difficulty over

63 As the literature review revealed, a cursory examination of Spain’s historic and contemporary writers reveals little or no recourse to Clausewitz or his concepts.
64 Foreign Policy Analysis, in the 1960s Snyder, among others, developed a deeply empirical method for analysing decisions made by the US government.
Perejil, tensions over the disputed state of Western Sahara and relations with North African states in general illustrates Spain’s long-standing frustrations with what it perceives as NATO’s disproportionate preoccupation with Russia.

Possible Caveats

Cultures by their nature are not static, nor fixed concepts. A substantial part of this thesis has evaluated changes in Spain’s culture of security, yet what can be seen is that particular ‘givens’ have endured and indeed the presidentialism, the securitisation of ETA, and the fact of a radicalised segment of the population exhibiting the Clausewitzean primordial passion all illustrate the depth of the challenge in this study.

The thesis will not examine threats in a broad sense. Literature on the evolution of threats reflects a different tradition. Research will instead focus on two case studies based on security: Spain’s decision to support the US invasion of Iraq and then also the impact of the economic collapse of 2008 on Spain. The approach offers a method that draws on how non-IR theory approaches relate to study of Spain’s security and foreign policy. Buzan’s sectors, now established and overlooked by academic commentators on Spain, can augment a constructivist approach in analysing Spain and the evolution of its foreign and security policy. This is not to say that the traditional IR models of realism and the liberal approach are irrelevant as, for instance, it is perfectly possible to conduct a study of Spain’s security policy from a realist perspective (focussing on state to state activity for example), but in order to capture change, constructed securities, opinion and interests, then the constructivist approach seems to position itself neatly within a theoretical framework.
Chapter 3
Spain and the Invasion of Iraq – A Security Case Study.

Spain’s integration and entry to the European mainstream has been well discussed and hailed as a successful process and example to the rest of the world (Gillespie, 2005, Heywood, 1995 and Pollack, 1987). Spain’s global outlook at the end of the millennium had been so keenly pursued during and immediately after the democratic transition. This chapter will analyse the decision taken by the Partido Popular government under Spain’s Prime Minister, José María Aznar, to implement a significant shift in Spanish security policy, that of supporting the invasion and occupation of Iraq in 2003. This initially delivered some prestige for Spain, with Aznar as PM briefly garnering the adulation of the Bush Presidency and some tangible support from other allies, yet it culminated in the Madrid train bombing of 2004. Subsequently voters widely identified the PP administration’s foreign and security policy with the motive for the attack. To this day, the events of 2001-4 still touch a raw nerve in Spain, and perhaps for the first time in democratic Spain’s history they demonstrate that security and foreign policy can prove transformational in a country where traditionally elections have been won and lost on domestic political issues.

Several aspects of the constructivist approach inform the analysis in this case study. The chapter’s approach draws upon ‘norms’ regarding the idea that Spain’s foreign and security policy would not countenance military action in the absence of a legal framework (namely the UN Charter). Also the impact of the cultural context of Spain’s support for military force is addressed with significant parts of civil society, certain political elites and parties being uncomfortable with the notion of backing US military intervention or posturing against states. Madrid’s condemnation of the invasion of Grenada (1983), Panama (1989), the bombing of Libya (1986) and on aspects of US policy towards Cuba had left an indelible mark on Spanish perceptions and reactions to US power.

65 In interview with Bardají, (who was an advisor to Aznar at the time) the US made unexpected and positive overtures towards Spain shortly after Bush’s election which gave an added momentum to the relationship.
66 Norms are described as “the concept of norms to describe collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a given identity…in some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having “constitutive effects” that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize that a particular identity”. Also, “norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In such instances norms have “regulative” effects that specify standards of proper behaviour”… Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behaviour, or they do both” (Katzenstein, 1996, p.5)
The foreign and security policy of the 20th century still features prominently in contemporary Spain’s security architecture, Spain is a full member of NATO, participates very actively in the EU and plays a significant role in the Maghreb within (and outside) the Mediterranean Partnership. 67 Much of this now constitutes ’rules’ within the Spanish conception of security, as constructivists argue, these effectively establish situations and explain behaviours. Prime Minister Aznar (1996-2004) is discussed at some length, with a study of his decision to bypass traditional rules through his decisions. The chapter argues that various motivations led to decisions that were motivated by a rejection of certain ‘rules’68, which in the opinion of the PP had undermined Spain’s international standing. This approach leads to a broad analysis of the stance taken by the Partido Popular (PP) government in supporting the invasion of Iraq to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime, as it has some roots in the attacks on 9/11 (Chislett, 2013, p.131). That said, a number of events and indications suggest that even before 2001, both the PP and Prime Minister Aznar were more willing to support US intervention than any preceding Spanish government had been and therefore, 2001 is perhaps less ground-breaking than some assume.69

In 1995, a failed assassination attempt on Aznar, leader of the Partido Popular opposition at that time, by Euskadi Ta Askatasuna70 (ETA) can be held up as a formative experience in moulding his decisions as a future leader. Consistent with Hill’s remarks that “leaders make a difference in foreign policy” (Hill, 2003, p.69), the attack could be seen as a determinant of Aznar’s intransigent attitude towards ETA once in power (Aznar, 2005 p.134). The fact that 22 years prior to the 1995 attempt ETA had successfully killed Franco’s Prime Minister Carrero Blanco71 using a similar modus operandi starkly illustrated the threat faced by Spain’s elites. ETA’s attempt on Aznar’s life may have failed, but it provided a reminder of the persistence of the terrorist challenge in modern Spain.

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67 Spain’s economic activity is of crucial importance to Morocco, migrant workers from across the region work in agriculture and services, whilst the EU imports significant amounts of food via ports and Spanish infrastructure.

68 According to Onuf (1989) ‘rules regulate aspects of the world but, from a constructivist point of view, they also constitute situations in the first place’.

69 A parallel can be made with the UK’s Tony Blair who conducted a series of military campaigns prior to Iraq and leading to the ‘Blair’s wars’ analysis that hubris was the eventual cause of the ‘failure’ of Iraq.

70 As at the time of writing no settlement has been reached although ETA has been on a ceasefire since 2011.

71 Carrero Blanco’s assassination in 1973 illustrated the threat posed by ETA in the final months of the Franco regime and compounded the difficulties faced during the transition. The fact that ETA could mount an audacious and spectacular attack in the heart of Madrid added to the aura of paranoia and uncertainty at this critical time.
Democracy may have been successfully established but, as Heywood argued in 1995, the failure to resolve ETA’s campaign reflected a long-standing threat to Spain’s democracy (Heywood, 1995, p.298). It is moreover the assertion of this thesis that security postures against global terrorism (such a distinctive feature of the Aznar government) impacted so significantly on Spain’s domestic and international security as to undermine Spain’s standing in the world following the 2004 Madrid bombing.72

The PP election victory in 1996 after 14 years of PSOE dominance presented a chance to review security policy. In effect this became an area that now allowed for greater ideological input after a long period of broad democratic consensus regarding European integration and wider foreign policy. Enthusiasm for the EU had been buoyed by the clear economic benefits, infrastructure improvement and access to jobs and commerce across the bloc, yet it offered only minimal latitude for distinct ideology within Spain’s domestic political system. Even so, a repositioning of security and statements offered an arena where the Aznar-led PP could deliver a programme that marked a contrast to that of the PSOE. The overall question of NATO membership, Atlantic integration and command within the Eastern Mediterranean offered scope for a policy position that could demonstrate a different approach to foreign affairs with potential gains to be had for national security and party prestige.

Within months of assuming power, the Aznar government had identified that the generally dormant issue of NATO membership would be a priority of his government (Lachmann, 2006, p.182). Whilst there was no clamour by Spain’s voters to integrate into the Alliance’s command and control structures, this offered a simple achievement that could demonstrate policy success for little cost in terms of political capital.73 France was also undergoing assimilation into NATO’s Integrated Military Command at a similar time, which could not have been more opportune for Spain as the PP could argue that any such move merely represented normalisation.

72 In interview, Bardaji, believed that avoiding a terrorist attack by Islamic extremists became an overriding concern of the PSOE government to the extent that a broader security policy was significantly undermined.
73 The lack of a majority in the Cortes meant that opposition from the PSOE and IU (Izquierda Unida) required that the minor parties from the Canaries and Galicia (in addition to the Basque and Catalan parties) had to be accommodated. Although not a significantly controversial vote this issue demonstrated something of a departure from the policy of the PSOE administration that had preceded the PP government.
NATO integration did not offer immediate status, as defence budgets at this time did not enable any significant boost but, as argued later, some organisational change was noted as being beneficial to Madrid. NATO integration and command restructuring in the region saw little immediate impact, as the main NATO structure command in Naples was generally unchanged. As it witnessed NATO flexing its power in the former Yugoslavia, Spain could see that its newfound commitment to integration meant that it could contribute to peace support operations, although its exclusion from bodies such as the Contact Group implied that its influence was proving harder to cultivate and press home, for which reason the 1997 Madrid NATO conference was at best cosmetic in the short term.

**Securitisation and Spain**

The decision by Spain to support the US-led invasion of Iraq is a good case study in securitisation. Coined by the Copenhagen school, securitisation explains the decision taken by governments to use a particular issue as a justification for extraordinary measures. Originally used to explain draconian political steps, it has a long established record. Even in the case of Nazi Germany, the enabling law of 1933 was used by the Nazi party to impose increasingly harsh measures that culminated in Hitler’s dictatorship, or in the US the perceived Communist threat led to a raft of hostile activities by the House of Representatives against suspected individuals. Spain’s situation at the start of the 21st century cannot be directly compared to such excess however, although the process that took place there does offer an insight into the political environment that provided the setting for Madrid’s security policy in this period.

In the particular context of Spain, this chapter argues that there were three main drivers behind the decision to securitise the US-led Global War on Terror. These originated from both domestic and international factors and came in the form of Spain’s experience of ETA terrorism, the security and defence vacuum within the western Mediterranean and, ultimately, the desire of the Partido Popular to develop a distinct posture from the centre left within the Spanish political system. An opportunity to do exactly this presented itself in the tense atmosphere of 2002

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74 In spite of enthusiastic participation in Balkans peacekeeping, Spain was not granted membership of the Contact Group, a body of influential states who coordinated policy. This was perceived as an insult to Spain by both the PSOE and PP, Bardají an advisor to Aznar and later Rajoy, argued in interview that Spain was not given any command and control functions in spite of significant participation which irritated Spanish policy makers.
immediately following the 9/11 attacks, when the United States was pursuing a unilateral approach to self-defence as espoused in the Bush doctrine\textsuperscript{75} and was actively looking for credible European allies. This was seized upon by the Spanish PM, who decided to use the occasion to implement a major shift in foreign and security policy.

**ETA Terrorism**

Within Spain, the 60-year history of ETA's campaign (with a toll of more than 800 deaths) provided fertile ground for rhetoric regarding the matter of anti-terrorism strategy. Decades of anti-terrorist policies had produced a population that was genuinely divided over how to solve the problem of terrorism. By the mid-1990s, 20 years after the transition to democracy, the ETA question had genuinely left the political system under considerable strain. All attempts to undermine the political expression of Basque nationalism in the form of legal (and in some cases illegal) methods\textsuperscript{76} had created a febrile climate that smacked of desperation and even led to state terror on the part of the national government (which only served to fuel support for ETA). The failed assassination against Prime Minister Aznar in 1995 and a foiled plot against the monarchy in 1996 clearly demonstrated the very real danger to Spain's elites and a sense of ongoing insecurity within the democratic system.

Subsequently, the election of the *Partido Popular* government in 1996, who promised a new way of delivering security (among other issues), showed that a publicly hard-line approach towards ETA could be pursued. While popular with the PP's constituency, this failed to deliver success though and, if anything, generated sympathy for the Basque nationalist movement.\textsuperscript{77} ETA's

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\textsuperscript{75} The Bush Doctrine was articulated in a right to pre-emptive military action and drew upon aspects of International Law (Article 51 of the UN Charter), while seeking to address emotions aroused by the terror attacks in 2001. Coupled with the “axis of evil” designation of certain states, there emerged a sense that states and groups could be exposed to a military response on even the slightest of pretexts.

\textsuperscript{76} *Grupo Antiterrorista de Liberación* (GAL) shook the Spanish political establishment with revelations in the mid-1990s that political direction at the highest levels had authorised and coordinated illegal death squads to assassinate suspected ETA activists in Spain and France. Although, never proved, this challenged the legitimacy of the PSOE’s security policy, with PM González implicated in the scheme. See Wordsworth, 2003.

\textsuperscript{77} In informal discussion with the President (Lehendakari) Juan José Ibarretxe Markuart of the Basque autonomous community in 2009, a contrast was made with Northern Ireland, whereby the Madrid position was clear in that there was to be no open negotiation with ETA during his time in office in spite of promises of ceasefire. Whilst this may not have been wholly true, in public the authorities took a hard-line stance and were generally supported by the centre-right’s voters on this matter.
intractability\textsuperscript{78} soon pressured the newly-elected PP into feeling the need for some sort of visible success that could not be brought about by conventional means yet, following the GAL case, had to remain within legal boundaries.

Regarding Basque terrorism, the PP government was under significant pressure to resolve this insecurity during its first term. A robust policing response had aggravated renewed attacks, and a frustration in dealing with terrorism on the part of EU institutions had also come to light.\textsuperscript{79} The end of the first ceasefire in 2000 coincided with the PP's second term in power, and a sense of frustration was evident. Javier Rupérez (at the time the chair of the Foreign Affairs committee in the Cortes) emphasised in strong terms that Spain's security (in the broadest sense) could not be guaranteed by the European Union alone and that other states and/or institutions should be considered.\textsuperscript{80}

In sum, ETA underlined the problems faced by successive Spanish governments in achieving domestic security. Efforts and initiatives had consistently failed, while the stubbornness of the Basque problem persisted. Taking the maxim that security is the “absence of threats to acquired values” (Wolfers, 1999, p.171), ETA's threat to Spanish democratic values and institutions lingered menacingly at a time of relative prosperity and success in the EU, in some ways undermining claims of Spain's success.

**Security and Defence Policy**

Given the achievements of Spain's democratisation and the relative consensus that became apparent over the impact and benefits of European integration, it is not surprising that the issue of NATO and more military-centred security was not at the forefront of politics following Spain's entry into the EU (1986). Although NATO membership was a divisive issue for Spain, the wider issue of security did not become politicised. ETA was universally accepted as a threat to the cross-

\textsuperscript{78} ETA's ability to endure was in part due to its cellular structure, the entrenched nature of the nationalist aspiration to independence and this overcame the impact of a conveyor-belt effect of leader arrests, deaths and shifting support. A ceasefire at the end of 1999 lasted only a few months after which attacks resumed against politicians and security personnel. Currently ETA is still on a cease-fire but dialogue with the central government is non-existent.

\textsuperscript{79} The European Arrest warrant was a cause espoused by Spain and other EU members, although attempts to promote it had foundered on issues of shared intelligence and judicial concerns. Its lack of progress in adoption was a source of frustration to many in Spain's security community.

\textsuperscript{80} A strong relationship with the United States was necessary according to what emerged in interview, and evidence from Northern Ireland was cited, where Clinton's efforts were seen as pivotal in delivering a successful settlement. Interviewed May 2000. This was further reinforced in interviews with defence officials in 2011 and also Rafael Bardají and Felix Arteaga (in 2015) who all made the case that Spain's 'security' depended on a good relationship with the United States.
party consensus and therefore generated some unity at the national level, although some point-scoring did take place.

Following 14 years of PSOE hegemony linked to its social-democratic model, the issue of NATO membership, which had been only partly resolved, was one of the only places where differentiation in policy could be asserted. After 15 years at the margins of power, the PP’s decision to promote full and active participation in the NATO Alliance was perhaps one of the few areas where it could strike out on a new course in policy. Therefore there was an argument (Holman, 2006, p.210) that Spain’s role in Europe remained incomplete at the end of the 1990s and incorporating Spain (but also France) into NATO’s military command structure could eventually strengthen the EU’s hand in defence and security.\footnote{The same arguments could be extended to aspiring members of the EU from the East, although in most cases, NATO membership preceded EU accession.}

“In the short term the integration of Spain into NATO would strengthen the ‘European pillar’ as a first step to the creation of a genuine European defence…from 1986 onwards issues of foreign policy and security coordination were subordinated to issues of economic and monetary integration” (Holman, 1996, p.210).

Prime Minister Aznar himself remarked that the decision to support the US in its war on terror had no shortage of precedents:

“la decisión española de apoyar a Estados Unidos en su lucha contra el terrorismo no supone un cambio en nuestra situación” (2005, p.191).\footnote{“Spain’s decision to back the United States in its struggle against terrorism does not represent any change in our position”}

Although much had been made of the Francoist roots of the PP, the fact is that once elected in 1996, they were well-placed to tap into a new emphasis of Atlantic-thinking that was entering Europe’s security architecture. The EU’s early failure in the former Yugoslavia had exposed a security vacuum that could only be filled by a credible military body such as the NATO Alliance. This was demonstrated following a settlement (the Dayton Accords) brought about by powerful military action by NATO in response to the outrage over the Srebrenica massacre of 1995.

Victory by the PP in 1996 happened at a time when the European project was focussed on the economic and political sphere. Security and Defence, a pillar `sketched over’ by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and outside the main EU process,
remained subject to national caveats. Other events, Blair’s victory in the UK (offering a positive shift in the EU’s third largest member), and in the UN, a proactive Security Council on Yugoslavia, coupled with an assertive NATO in the mid-1990s, meant that for Spain, it was appropriate to address the matter of its wider security beyond that of a simple EU model.  

Experiencing an incoherence (Buchan, 1993) in EU-led security (in contrast to the US-led NATO campaign which produced the Dayton peace process in Bosnia), the Aznar government took the perhaps rational step of affirming its commitment to a full participation in the Atlantic Alliance. This was matched by a confidence in Spain’s ability to meet its military commitments following some years of defence expansion, modernisation and operational success in the Balkans and UN duty. By 1999, some 3,500 Spanish personnel were serving on various missions around the world with aircraft, ships and troops deploying in theatres such as Bosnia, Central America and Cambodia. For much of the 1990s defence expenditure was historically high by Spanish standards, averaging around 1.2% of GDP, whereas since 2000 this figure has fallen back to closer to 0.9%.  

Within Spain, NATO membership had been a divisive topic. Whilst linking NATO to European security, as was borne out by the success in enforcing peace in the Balkans, for many on Spain’s left and inclined toward radical tradition, full integration into NATO represented a step away from their dyed-in-the-wool position (Barbé 1995, p.117). Nuclear weapons, US policy in Central America, and militarisation of the western Mediterranean were all issues that significant swathes of voters opposed. Yet few of these issues resonated with the traditional support base of the PP government, so they did not pose a challenge to full integration into NATO’s military command, which was confirmed at the 1997 Madrid NATO summit.

Spain’s status in NATO remained incomplete following the divisive referendum of 1986 (Heywood, 1995, Preston & Smyth, 1994). In order to satisfy both anti-US sentiments in Spain and also maintain the confidence of Washington a number of topics remained open that increasingly undermined Spain’s options to be

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83 The EU was reluctant to address issues that touched national sensitivities. Whilst agreement could be achieved on climate change (Kyoto in 1997) and energy security, topics such as post-colonial issues and contested borders were issues where it was hard to make any headway at EU level.

84 GDP and Defence expenditure is notoriously hard to interpret, however, the figure from the 1990s is higher than the period since 2003. Source www.nato.int [accessed 03 Jan 2017].
proactive as a power in the area of security and military affairs. In some ways, the status of the maritime boundaries off Gibraltar and the peninsula (known as GIBMED and IBERLANT) remained under NATO multinational control with limited Spanish oversight. Until 1997, Spanish forces remained outside NATO’s integrated military command, which situation had become an anachronism by the late 1990s, as by then Spain possessed a modernised command and control system that was capable of maintaining sovereignty. For a government drawing its support from the Spanish conservative centre right there was a pressing electoral and political need to remove this historical embarrassment, which would *ceteris paribus* provide political kudos for the new government.

Full integration into NATO held few risks for the PP government. After decades defending Europe from the USSR, NATO had successfully redefined itself by the end of the 20th century with a New Strategic Concept based around peacekeeping and a broader geographic focus. The humiliating status of the Canary Islands and Gibraltar as non-Spanish command mandates could now be reversed and brought under Spanish military control, with only limited loss of sovereignty, whilst giving Aznar credibility within international circles as a deliverer of change, ably assisted by Javier Solana, a former socialist foreign minister with impeccable international credibility.

A new defence and security posture offered the PP a new role in that area that did not exist in other policy fields. Although the Aznar government’s victory in 1996 promised change, the main domestic imperative for the new government was to prepare Spain for the Single European currency, which dominated much of Spain’s domestic political agenda at the end of the century. Viewed in this context, it is understandable that it was security and foreign policy that provided an outlet for a high profile policy shift. In effect, Aznar’s administration was constructing a new Spanish identity, framed not just in European Union affairs, but one what would see Spain gain a place in the world of international diplomacy and military power, something aspired to 15 years earlier under Morán.

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85 The new geographic zone for operations became known as a non-Article V area and permitted NATO to act outside the “North Atlantic area”. This meant that the Mediterranean, Middle East and Asia could be considered a region of operations so, with its territories in North Africa, Spain could evidently view this as a positive development when it emerged in 1999 with the New Strategic Concept.

86 Solana, who as Socialist Foreign Minister had developed Spain’s role in the González years, became NATO’s Secretary General under the PP and subsequently EU chief for foreign and security policy.
The Kosovo crisis in 1998/9 further epitomised the impasse in EU security and whilst a conflict unfolded in the Balkans, NATO effectively determined its response with active participation by the Atlantic-leaning states. Aznar’s government was quick to provide support, in spite of the significant awkwardness of backing separatism with overtones of the Basque country’s own claim to autonomy: even eight years after the declaration of independence by Kosovo, Spain refuses to recognise it as a self-determining state. Although not securitised, the intervention was a prelude to the decision to back US intervention in Iraq some four years later.87

Thus, by the start of the 21st century, having gained a second election victory and an overall Parliamentary majority, the PP government was able to be more active in creating and promoting a distinct security policy on its own terms. The ‘European project’, which had been invigorated by expanding membership, the single currency and the expansion of trade, meant that the PP could look to the start of the new millennium with some enthusiasm and its reinforced mandate in 2000 was matched by a new assertiveness. NATO membership had been resolved nominally in Spain’s favour and, most importantly for it, membership of the single currency was on the way to being ratified, perhaps demonstrating to Spaniards that they were finally among those at the core of the European Union (Salmon, 2000, p.40).

The political setting was favourable for the PP and Aznar to pursue a more ambitious programme upon entering power for a second term in 2000. The decision to support the war was not inevitable, but Aznar felt he had greater licence to pursue a more politicised and ambitious approach to Spain’s security. European Monetary Union was set on a course suitable to Spain’s national interest, and therefore foreign and security policy was the only avenue where the PP could act freely and in clearly in the party interest.

**The Events of 9/11: Spanish US Precedents.**

Aznar’s pursuit of Atlanticism had several roots and reflected a range of interests, the first of which lay in his party’s leanings in that direction and its clearer support for US military action in direct contrast to the PSOE. Indeed, the late 1980s had seen a number of key actions by the PSOE that ran contrary to

87 Although the PSOE did not oppose the mission, there were heated exchanges in the Cortes from the left wing Izquierda Unida grouping. The PP’s decision to support the action was emboldened by the repressive nature of the Belgrade regime.
Washington’s posture, as the González government refused to support Reagan’s bombing of Libya in 1986 and also condemned the US invasion of Panama in 1989. On the other hand, the PP was eager to reflect closer support for US political and, where necessary, military action. When President Clinton ordered military strikes against targets in Iraq over breaches of UN resolutions in 1998, this was again openly supported by the Aznar regime, which offered material support for such action, in spite of deep reservations by the Socialists and parties of the Left.

At the EU level, attempts by Spain to move ahead with arrest warrants and a counter-terrorist strategy had been thwarted by certain EU interests in the late 1990s. One of the few areas of success against terrorism had been in the form of cooperation with France in dealing with ETA activists outside Spain. An extension of this protocol across the European Union would have notched up a success for the Madrid government and PP in building on resolving the issue of ETA movement, but by the summer of 2000 this proved elusive as debate was stymied over the issue of judicial and human rights concerns.88

George W. Bush taking office in 2001 as US President implied further cooperation in the direction of Atlantic security was anticipated. Whilst domestically the attention of Spanish governments had been firmly pinned on the issue of Euro membership, wider Atlantic issues still offered an area for policy development. By early 2001, it was evident that the US was already looking to Spain for support. In what proved to be a major coup for the Aznar government, the first country visited by Bush’s in his five-day tour of Europe was Spain. During the visit, Bush and Aznar echoed a message of close support for Israel’s response to the renewed Intifada. More importantly, Spain openly endorsed the missile defence system that EU states generally opposed, and to quote Bush as he linked Spain’s support to an anti-terrorist struggle:

“Part of the missile defence dialogue is about fighting terrorism. If someone is able to blackmail free countries, it could prevent countries like Spain and the United States from being forward-thinking about terrorism…our government is committed to stand side by side with the Spanish government as it battles terrorism here in Spain.” (CNNonline.com, 2011).

88 Bardaji, an advisor to Aznar stated that French support for Spain’s anti-terror agenda had dwindled, in part due to personal factors between the French President and Spain’s PM, but also French suspicion of Aznar’s ambitions (interview February 2017).
To which Bush went on to add “I appreciate so very much our close cooperation and security arrangements with Spain.”

What is notable from the declaration is that Spain, and Aznar in particular, were reaping ‘benefits’ of the PP’s Atlantic posture. The decision by the Aznar government to support the US ballistic missile defence system now appears perplexing, but the fact that the Germans, French and the UK were hesitant about supporting the programme demonstrates quite how far the PP government was willing to go in supporting Washington even if this meant being at odds with EU partners.

At the same time, the emergence of a proactive UK government seeking European allies to coalesce support for the US at a time of deepening European ties offered an opportunity for Aznar to build closer ties with the UK and US. In spite of the long-running issue of Gibraltar, Blair, the UK Prime Minister, began to cultivate a useful relationship with Aznar that empowered his Spanish counterpart to adopt positions at odds with those of France and Germany. This closer relationship was further cemented by the leaders (including the then Italian PM) even holidaying together.

The Effect of 9/11 on Spain’s Security Outlook

The September 11 attacks, by their very nature, remain almost unprecedented to this day. The fact that on daytime global television lightly armed terrorists were able to temporarily overcome the World’s superpower to such great effect has been seen as marking a shift in the validity of military power and a challenge to the nation-state. Huntington’s Clash of Civilisation model was given a renewed discussion, as commentators came to view the event as heralding a reawakening of religiously inspired terrorism as a security threat.

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80 Blair’s optimistic posture to Europe was multifaceted with good relations with virtually all European powers in his first term. Although the PP was distinct from the British Labour party, Blair’s Atlantic tendency appealed and offered Aznar a posture that appeared to balance the poles. As both Madrid and London viewed the Berlin-Paris axis with similar sentiments, a consensus of sorts could be achieved, in addition both leaders appeared at ease with each other.
81 Anecdotally Aznar was reported to feel patronised by Germany’s Chancellor Kohl following his first meeting after coming to power. (Elordi, 2003 p.108)
82 Huntington proposed in 1992 that the world would come to see conflict rise above that between states and instead this would be based around civilizational cleavages (i.e. Islam and Christianity). In the immediate light of 9/11, with a US-led coalition seeking to attack Islamic terrorist groups, this gained some renewed currency. Even so, it is not considered to be an adequate explanation of the complexity of modern conflict.
For Spain, horrific though the attack was, the effect of terrorism is well known to the political system and, although ETA was never able (nor wanted) to mount a challenge on a par with that of Al Qaida, Spaniards were fully conversant with the threat and impact of violent extremism both on and outside Spain's mainland.

As early as 1995, the Barcelona Mediterranean Process had featured as one of its key pillars an initiative to reduce some of the harsher effects of free trade, population pressures and subsequent migration in and across the Arab world (such themes drove a sense of injustice among radicalised groups). Although unfashionable, the `thirdworld' or tercermundismo movement within the Spanish Foreign Ministry and Cooperation Agency, had been anticipating rising security issues within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and so for Spain, shocking although the attacks of 9/11 were, Islamic terrorism and conflict involving the West and MENA were not altogether unexpected.93

Aznar’s immediate and wholehearted support for the US response to 9/11 was matched by allies in NATO and the world alike, although for Spain the timing could be considered as somewhat propitious since the renewed focus on global terrorism by the US and NATO complemented the PP’s renewed efforts against ETA, it was of clear interest for Spain to align itself with the rhetoric and actions of Bush.

It was almost inevitable that Europe’s powers would rally to the support the US’s efforts to reduce terrorist activity and related criminal projects in the aftermath of September 11. Thousands of casualties included nationals from nearly all EU states and the impact was felt across NATO. European nation states had virtually all endured terrorism in various forms after 1945, yet a clear-cut solution to such threats remained elusive. The US drive to hinder fund-raising and choke off support for terrorism was not difficult to cooperate with. As a result of the globalised nature of banking, stopping transactions and movement of money was a low-risk, effective way of halting the spread and activities of groups. This also hit ETA where it hurt as, although the Basque country is relatively small, reported assistance and financing from France, Colombia and Ireland showed that

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93 CIDOB, the Barcelona think tank focussed a lot of work on the new threats to Spain from these topics. Although nominally publicly funded, it enjoyed a high profile due to its unusually strong relationships with external organisations, NGOs and patronage from certain elements of the Spanish Socialists.
international links were crucial to its survival, even though evidence of the extent of the setback it suffered is scant.\textsuperscript{94}

Perhaps the most vivid example of securitisation in the 21st century came immediately after the 9/11 attacks, when George Bush described his proposed response as a “War on Terror”.\textsuperscript{95} Coupled with the axis of evil designation of certain nation-states, some even uninvolved in the 9/11 attacks, the jingoistic atmosphere of the winter of 2001/2 was notable for generating a sense of global insecurity. For Spain, having already offered unconditional support for Bush prior to 9/11, the benefit to its own terrorist strategy was timely and offered a genuine fillip to its efforts to overcome ETA, in spite of misgivings among commentators regarding the US’s jingoistic tone.

In December 2001, US Attorney General John Ashcroft and Spain’s then Minister of Interior, Mariano Rajoy, declared “We will stand shoulder to shoulder in this fight against international terrorism and together our nations will prevail”\textsuperscript{96} this reflected the close ties being pursued by Spain. Later to become Prime Minister in 2011, Rajoy was echoing what Aznar had said in a speech prior to Spain’s assumption of the Presidency of the European Union (in 2002) when he stated:

“Spain counts on three anchorages in its politics of security and defence. The first one is the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; the second is the bilateral relation with Washington; the third, the emerging dimension of security and defence of the European Union, the Common Foreign Security Policy”\textsuperscript{97}

Aznar’s indication was that any actions arising out of the Global War on Terror would be in accordance with this stated posture. Whilst not quite the Aznar ‘doctrine’, such a statement would have been unthinkable under the PSOE and reflected a presidential style that was not typical in Spain (although in foreign and security policy, as will be argued in later chapters, a clear ‘presidentialism’ has since emerged in the policy process).

The time from 11 September 2001 up until the end of the Spanish Presidency of the EU in June 2002 was one of significant allying with US policy by Spain. This

\textsuperscript{94} Roller (2002) mentions the impact of 9/11 on ETA’s support and financial networks, although she argues the conflict was more an impasse at that moment in time.

\textsuperscript{95} Unattributed sources believe it was first used nine days after the 9/11 attacks. Fox news several months after the event displayed the “America at War” screenbanner in its broadcasting.


\textsuperscript{97} España y la lucha contra el terrorismo global GEES 6 Nov 2001. [www.gees.org accessed 23 Jul 11].
choice was not unique to Spain, and the Blair government in the UK as well as the countries identified in Rumsfeld's 'New Europe' quip\(^{98}\) showed that others had been willing to ally with the US in the build up to the war with Iraq (Australia and Canada, two close allies of the US, also went beyond what significant elements of their domestic audiences were comfortable with). Where Spain differed from other countries was that the period coincided with significant institutional opportunities for Spain, not only in the European Union Presidency but also the United Nations, where it took up a rotating seat on the Security Council at the end of 2002, providing almost unprecedented platform for Spain to assert a role.\(^{99}\)

The strategic distance travelled by Spain at the start of the 21\(^{st}\) century is significant. From seeking Bush's support in dealing with ETA in the spring of 2001 through to supporting the US invasion of Iraq in February 2003 represented a giant stride.

As result Spain's standing in the Atlantic community was considerably enhanced, with notable gains in both the EU and NATO, where two achievements in particular can be cited. The first was the approval of the European arrest warrant in 2002, which has been a long-standing tool in combatting transnational crime and terrorism. Then the second and perhaps more significant of these was the forging of the Defence Cooperation Agreement with the United States in April 2002.

This built a significant element of cooperation into the Spanish military. For decades, Spain’s relationship with the US had centred on the use of facilities and territory by the United States, but under this new arrangement Spain was now able to share intelligence and technology, with the AEGIS missile defence system being a part of the arrangement.\(^{100}\) Not only was Aznar able to bask in

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\(^{98}\) Rumsfeld argued that a 'new Europe' represented an innovation in international security of nation-states willing to act militarily in joint interests, the 'old Europe' (essentially France and Germany) represented nation-states unwilling to uphold values and interests of benefit to the developed world.

\(^{99}\) Spain has always seen membership of the United Nations Security Council as an opportunity for influence and credibility and thus in many ways a prize. For UNSC membership to be so tainted by the political proximity to the US push for the invasion of Iraq was reportedly met with deep unease in the Foreign Ministry. Bardaji (in interview 2017) argued that Spain’s UNSC seat was a pure coincidence, and in some ways forced Spain’s hand prematurely to support the US position.

\(^{100}\) AEGIS was a US area defence weapon that provided a response to the threat of missiles. Spain provided the use of Rota naval base and in return purchased AEGIS for its ships. Possibly for defence against Libya’s Gaddafi regime, AEGIS represents a traditional hard security weapons system and one with significant economic benefits for arms manufacturers both in Spain and the US.
the respect and gratitude of the US, but he had also managed to deliver tangible progress in terms of both Spain’s own campaign against ETA terrorism and the country’s regional military standing.

**Perejil: Spain’s `Almost War`.**

Spain’s sense of insecurity in the summer of 2002 was further heightened when in July that year a surprise gambit by Morocco saw a diplomatic crisis blow up. Perejil (Parsley) Island, a small uninhabited rock under Spanish sovereignty off the coast of Morocco was unexpectedly occupied by Moroccan troops.

Although only a token piece of territory, politically this represented a significant crisis for the Aznar government, since it posed two threats to Spain’s foreign policy, in the form of firstly a deterioration of relations with Morocco (potentially its most difficult neighbour) and secondly a traditional hard security crisis whereby a foreign military force occupies national territory, something which had not been seen in decades in western Europe.

A war or military conflict over Perejil was never a likely outcome, but an unsatisfactory ending for Spain would have been a protracted negotiation and an image of colonialism in North African media with echoes of the loss of Spanish Sahara in 1975. Spain’s wariness was exacerbated by the fact that France appeared sympathetic to the Moroccan cause (Alonso Marcos, 2013, p.70). putting its own interests over European unity on the issue. Fortunately, for Spain, another benefit of tightening links with the US was that Colin Powell lobbied actively for a peaceful end to the crisis, with an outcome that not only saved face for Spain, but appeared to downplay Moroccan claims. To quote PM Aznar

“In view of the failure of the EU, we requested assistance from the US, and thanks to their intervention the affair could appropriately be dealt with. This crisis was a small one, but the lesson learned as to who helps when we need it will not be easily forgotten”

Blair’s now infamous Crawford ranch meeting with Bush in 2002 has been much replayed throughout academia in the United Kingdom as the starting point for the latter’s involvement in the war in Iraq. From Spain’s standpoint, perhaps conscious of the less friendly media (at the time), Aznar made visits similar to

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101 A bill was presented in the US to offer Aznar a Congressional Medal in 2004, which was greeted with scorn by Spanish public opinion and the matter was quietly shelved.

102 Aznar, quoted in Portero F “Address to the sub–committee on transatlantic economic relations of the NATO Parliamentary assembly” June 2003 www.nato.int, [accessed 23 Jan 11]
those of Blair but kept away from the cameras and it could even be speculated that a parallel personal agreement might have been made between the two leaders (Elordi, 2003, p.165) and this is backed up in interviews (Bardaji, 2017). Meanwhile, the lead up to the invasion of Iraq was dominated by the UN’s machinations over a mandate for the invasion. As a rotating UNSC member, Spain was part of the diplomatic effort to secure a vote authorising military action and the role it took up in supporting the US was zealously championed by the PM, in spite of a party and a media that remained to be convinced.

Historically, there appears to be no clear ‘speech act’ with regard to Aznar’s government putting the case for war. Whereas the UK Parliament can point to a clear vote (18 March 2003) and a dossier provided by the government (with the now infamous 40 minute claim of an Iraqi weapon of mass destruction being activated against UK interests), in the case of Spain it is more appropriate to talk of a creeping securitisation. Initially this arose during the summer of 2001, when Bush visited Spain on his first European tour as President, at a time when ETA had reactivated its terrorist campaign in Madrid. But later, as the 9/11 response took shape within NATO, the language from the Aznar government became increasingly suggestive of an imperative to support the US, which appeared to fly in the face of figures that indicated that a mere 24% of Spaniards felt that the US was actively assisting against ETA in the aftermath of 9/11 (Alonso Marcos, 2013, p.38).

The issue of terrorism has long been politicised within the Spanish political system. In fact the Aznar government’s experience of ETA could even be argued to have become personalised as a result of the assassination attempt. Whatever the case, the atmosphere engendered by 9/11 meant that Spain’s security had become firmly framed by high-profile open alliance with the US.

In the specific instance of the interplay between NATO members and the fall-out from 9/11, the activation of Article V (the mechanism of response to an attack or threat in a collective manner) represented no great departure from the norm in the case of most NATO member states. But for Spain this signified a far greater

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103 The speech act is best described by Emmers’s ‘Securitization’ piece in Collins Contemporary Security Studies (2007, p.112).
104 During the period immediately preceding Bush’s arrival, there were a number of killings by ETA, creating an atmosphere that Madrid was unsafe and adding to the sense in creating a common front with the US.
105 Ever since its organisation in the early years of the Franco regime, the response to dealing with terrorism and separatism has been politicised within Spain, with the Interior Ministry and Police forces adopting a consistently robust position with regards to dissent from Basque nationalists.
step as, Spain had only entered NATO’s integrated military command four years previously and had already experienced real division at home over military participation in the US-led liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

Buzan’s model (Buzan, 1998, p.23) refers to three policy outcomes in response to a security issue such as the decision to support the invasion of Iraq. It can be non-politicised (not of any significance to the political system, it can be politicised (dealt with by normal behaviours of the political system, such as the campaign against ETA) or, in the event of securitisation, it can be identified as an existential threat and acted upon accordingly.

The UK’s Blair government identified the Iraq regime as posing an existential threat in a Parliamentary vote and in a dossier claimed to contain intelligence of a military capability, but in the case of Aznar and the PP this contention was questionable. It was certainly true that Aznar’s government framed the Iraq crisis as an existential threat to Spain, but only indirectly, pledging its support for the US and for a global commitment to “join forces to confront together the dangerous threats and challenges that humanity will face in the twenty-first century.” (Ambrosio, 2003, p.2).

The key analytical debate here is how this question was to be approached in Spain given the extent of public antipathy towards taking action. On the day of the outbreak of conflict more than 600,000 protestors took to Madrid’s streets to condemn it,106 being supported across Spain by a broad coalition of trade unions, political groupings, NGOs and religious groups. Evidently, the existential threat was not perceived the same way across Spain’s political spectrum. Whilst Aznar may have had the backing of his party (a secret party vote was held prior to the event), it was a considerably greater challenge to sell his choice of policy to Spanish voters, which is something that it could never be claimed he succeeded in doing.

Some (Del Arenal, 2011, p.372) see this period of ‘Atlanticisation’ of Spanish foreign policy (una vocación atlántica) as representing the emergence of a critical fault-line in any consensus over Spain’s external security relations. It could also be interpreted that the period and events of 2001/2 reflected the real end of the Cold War paradigm for Spain and, as the EU had systematically struggled to assert a foreign and security policy throughout the 1990s, the

decision by Aznar and the PP to adopt a more pro-US stance was perhaps a rational outcome (Hill, 2003, p.102).

There is little doubt that the decision to integrate fully into NATO bolstered the confidence of Spain’s military, and in the case of the Perejil Island incident may have helped secure its contested territories in North Africa, although the decision to wholeheartedly support the US in its invasion of Iraq, both politically (in the UNSC and the Azores summit) and practically, with the deployment of Spanish troops\textsuperscript{107} in the summer of 2003, can surely not be viewed as entirely warranted.

Buzan’s model of securitisation (1997) may not square completely with the timescale behind Aznar’s decision to securitise the US War on Terror (a matter of 24 months from the summer of 2001 through to the decision to deploy military troops to Iraq in August 2003), but the politicisation and subsequent securitisation could be seen in Spain’s unstinting support for the US at a time when it traditionally ought to have aligned its posture with that of the EU.

According to the model promoted by the Copenhagen school, securitisation enables policy-makers to imply that a specific danger to the state exists. Waever refers to the speech act:

“by uttering security, a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Weaver in Lipschutz, 1995, p.54).

It is contended here that the PP’s decision to support the US Global War on Terror so unreservedly (very few countries openly questioned the US posture) reflected a shift in security as this was perceived by Spain’s elites on the political centre-right. Whilst Aznar and the PP may have benefited from and possessed an ideological need to pursue \textit{una vocación atlántica}, the fact remained that the incorporation of Spain into NATO in the late 1990s did not fully meet Spain’s defence needs.

**European Security Institutions**

In interviews with Spanish Defence officials, a consistent theme has centred on the fact that NATO focuses a disproportionate amount of resources (from a

\textsuperscript{107} Spanish troops made up the bulk of a Brigade of troops from Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua as part of a Polish multinational division. Their role was ostensibly humanitarian and the UN had authorised such deployments subsequent to the invasion but, as events escalated during the year, both troops and Intelligence personnel (from the CNI) were to become casualties.
Spanish perspective)\textsuperscript{108} on Eastern Europe, the Balkans and the former Soviet Union. By 2000 (the second Aznar term) there was little evidence that Spain felt more secure as a NATO member and, if anything, ETA’s resumption of attacks pointed to no progress having been made at all in countering terrorism. There had certainly been a degree of recuperation of national sovereignty with NATO integration, but NATO’s preoccupation with the Balkans benefited Spain in very few tangible ways.\textsuperscript{109} Hence the significant diplomatic investment in the Mediterranean process, including organisations such as the 5 plus 5 process,\textsuperscript{110} only serve to illustrate how complicated institutional arrangements can sit uncomfortably outside the EU and NATO.

Europe’s integration and expansion, often focussed towards the East in the last 20 years, has not made Spain more secure in a traditional hard military sense. The decision to incorporate East European states into the EU, though supported by Spain, has implied some tangible threats to Spain’s economy, most notably via the increased competition for subsidies from the Cohesion Fund that their accession supposes. The fund, which has been one of Spain’s most significant ‘wins’ from the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (1992), has made Spain the largest recipient of EU financial assistance to date (200,000 million Euros) and as recently as 2016 Spain received 8% of resources paid out from it in spite of accession of far poorer member states.\textsuperscript{111}

The restructure of EU financing, along with reluctant anti-terrorist support, fisheries disputes and accession by the poorer and less developed countries of Eastern Europe, have all shown that in a number of cases, the EU was not helping to boost Spain’s perception of broader security. Monetary Union and the single currency in 2001 may have been a ‘win’ for Spain domestically, but whether in a wider sense Europe was set to make Spain more ‘secure’ was more doubtful. The Atlantic vocation may have had its roots in a strategy that sought to make Spain more secure, but as the events of March 2004 proved, it

\textsuperscript{108} This has been consistently alluded to in the literature and repeated in interviews by Spain’s defence ministry officials in 2011, 2015 and informally in 2017. This is also supported in interviews with Felix Arteaga and Rafael Bardají in 2015.

\textsuperscript{109} In 2011, the new headquarters near Madrid (Retamares) was closed following a restructuring within the Alliance, which may have related to the poor relationship between Madrid and Washington at the time.

\textsuperscript{110} The 5 plus 5 programme brings together the Maghreb countries with the South European Mediterranean countries of NATO along with Malta with the aim of improving dialogue.

ultimately set Spain on a path towards dangerous ideological division over security policy.

The events of 11 September 2001 tend to be mirrored in Spain by the Madrid train bombings of 2004. In those attacks, a series of bombs killed 191, injured more than 1,900 and generated a wave of fear across Spain and Europe. Coming some 72 hours before a General Election, the impact was incendiary on the outcome, with attempts to prematurely implicate ETA in the attacks in last-ditch crisis management by the PP being rebutted by well-placed media sources. In the ensuing heated public debate the PP were widely discredited for their stance, as it transpired that the attacks may have been linked to Spain’s support for the US in Iraq.

The election result, which had always seemed likely to favour the PP, swung sharply away from them, and as a result the PSOE won. To the dismay of the Bush presidency, the PSOE, now backed by an array of smaller parties, immediately went about the business of withdrawing troops from Iraq (a long-standing election pledge).

The attack remains shrouded in national sensitivity to this day. The PP decision to lend its support for the US remains divisive even in interviews, with some claiming that Spain had little choice but to ally itself with the US. What has tended to polarise the situation even more has been the PSOE’s arguable overcompensation for Aznar’s posture by adopting a radically anti-US stance. The PSOE’s time in government was marked by division with the PP in matters of security policy that almost exaggeratedly underlined their ideological split.

Summary

The diagram shows the main issues behind the decision to invade Iraq undertaken by the government of Aznar. Five key issues are discussed.
Spain underwent a profound securitisation in 2001-3 with ramifications that continued beyond the Iraq war period. Aznar’s decision to support the US war on terror still raises contemporary questions. Interviews with key advisors admitted it was a significant, almost lone act on Aznar’s part, substantial aspects of his own party were not convinced by the decision, and it is subsequently been determined as an irrational act on Aznar’s part. However, constructivism enables an alternative view to be discussed, as what was perhaps the defining decision of Aznar, reflected a logical continuation of his view of Spain’s (unfulfilled) place in the world, which itself was a product of the norm of subordinating Spain to European interests. 2001 was a period where a counter terrorist posture was being constructed based on alternative ideas about collective action.

The three factors behind the Partido Popular’s shift reflect a set of circumstances that produced an opportunity for activism and engagement with a US that, since the Francoist period, had been somewhat cool in its relationship with Spain on the military stage. Whether the 2001-4 period represents an exceptional time, or is an indicator of a more nuanced relationship that has been more receptive to change remains to be debated and the Spanish Security Strategies discussed in a later chapter will examine this issue.
The PP’s conduct as regards both its military support in Iraq and its immediate response to the terrorism of March 2004 had left it tainted in the eyes of many voters. While perceptions by their very nature can be difficult to gauge, Spain’s profile in the world changed in this period, while both parties can probably be held accountable over this matter for very different reasons. Although the repercussions of 2004 remain under discussion, those working on the policy of the PP government remain steadfastly loyal to the decision to side with the US. Bardaji, along with Aznar, points to this construct as the real driver behind the decision and issues in 2002 and 2003. What drove the relationship however, was more than ‘hard’ security as viewed by Spain’s centre right, and even involved an interplay with economic sectors, with energy problems and an ongoing security concern with the south (namely the Maghreb) an issue that still concerns Spain to this day. How these concepts are interwoven can be seen in the next section on Spain’s economic crisis of the Socialist years where the collapse of Spain’s financial sector, huge rise in unemployment and near fall out of European Monetary Union represented as significant a security threat as terrorism and war to Spain.

Aznar had endeavoured a securitisation based on a nexus between the Spanish state and nation. From the outset, the government’s support for the US War on Terror reflected an ideological aspiration to frame ‘Atlanticism’ through the prism of national security, and that the Spanish state’s pre-eminence would develop this focus. By framing security in this way, Aznar’s government favoured a referent object that was based on a traditional model of the Spanish nation supported by a romanticised, albeit vague idea of restoring Spain’s place in the world.

This aspiration was undeliverable, not only did ETA’s terrorism endure, despite international pressure, but the Atocha attack of 2004, launched by North African extremists demolished the credibility of the PP in providing security, particularly through military or traditional means, but furthermore, events demonstrated that the government and particularly the executive’s framing of security was flawed.
Chapter 4.
The Broader Security Challenges Faced By Spain – The Economic Crisis.

It [Spain] had joined the European Economic Community in 1986 and was a founder member of the euro zone in 1999. It seemed that nothing could go wrong. (Chislett, 2016, p.2)

This chapter introduces a newer aspect in looking at Spain’s security – that of an economy in crisis, based not only on national challenges, but one that was felt at the micro level and disproportionately, by certain groups in society. Traditionally, the social dimensions of economic hardship have been little discussed in security theory, it has traditionally looked at human security on these matters (Dent, 2007). However, addressing the impact of the crisis on Spain’s economy but also more specifically on the human cost to Spaniards offers a different perspective to understanding to Spain’s security.

The rise of the Indignados (the indignant, or outraged) is discussed using a constructivist framework offered by Katzenstein (1996), and in particular this chapter looks at how these disparate group of interests articulated a challenge to the Spanish state with implications that continue to this day. The chapter goes on to analyse the impact not only of the crisis, but in terms of how it impacts on a culture of security in Spain.

The success “story” of Spain’s economy in the period of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s needs little introduction and in some ways now obscures the depth of Spain’s current travails. Spain’s opening up to the European and then world economy in the 1960s under the Franco regime saw the national economy undertake a transformation that culminated in Spain joining first the Single European Market as an EC member state, and later the ambitious Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) programme outlined in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

Until then growth rates in Spain from the 1960s had been impressive, and in 1959-1974 Spain’s economy grew faster than any other OECD economy except Japan’s. (Powell, 2015, p.11). Rising incomes also contributed to significant social change with improvements in economic participation, urbanisation and a more outward looking society (Preston 1993, p.279). The political and social changes in Spain in the 1960s and 1970s demonstrate the impact that economics and wealth can have on a modern society and it is perhaps significant that Spain’s successful decision to modernise and liberalise was partly due to the economic boom before and after Franco’s death.
Buzan identifies economic security as `highly political debates about international political economy concerning the nature of the relationship between the political structure of anarchy and the economic structure of the market' (Buzan, 1998, p95 and 1991 p.230). However a constructivist approach would also draw on Spain’s cultural context – reflecting on the impact of previous economic crises such as that of the global financial crisis of the 1930s which was one of the drivers to Civil War, and that in contemporary Spanish culture youth unemployment and economic insecurity has been endemic in cities and regions for decades. This in turn has produced an environment that although accustomed to economic downturns, has the capacity to quickly politicise austerity measures and fiscal policy. Furthermore, another aspect of Spain is the persistence of a traditional corporatist model of active state intervention in national policy (Heywood, 1999), but also an additional level through the devolved model of Autonomous Communities. Therefore, a norm exists in Spain of active government intervention at both regional and national level that goes beyond North European or Atlantic economies.

It is the contention of this chapter that the economic slump (la crisis económica) arguably made a greater impact on far more Spaniards (both in real terms and perceptions) than the widespread fear following the terrorist attacks of 2004. That is not to say that ETA and international terrorism were minimal to the understanding of the Spanish people and their security in 2000-2013, but the depth of the economic crisis that began in 2008 shook Spain’s strategy and security thinking more than the Iraq war and bombing of Atocha rail station in 2004. In essence, Spain’s `political security' and perceptions of stability were far more threatened existentially by the economic collapse than from the quarter of the traditional model of terrorism or military threat to the Spanish state in 2008-13.

112 Economic crisis, unemployment and poverty was one of the causes of the polarisation in 1930s Spain that created the conditions for the Civil War of 1936-9 (Graham 2005, p.14).
113 Spain regularly tops the EU for unemployment rates and youth economic non-participation rate (Chislett 2013).
114 Although not the main topic under discussion, Spain’s relatively strong trade union movements wield influence and in conjunction with parties to the left of the Socialists Izquierda Unida – (United Left), provided a voice for the radical left prior to the economic crisis. Whilst the Socialists may have occupied a centre Social Democratic space, Spain’s left has always been heard whilst not enjoying significant power.
In addition, the issue of corruption\textsuperscript{115} and appropriate behaviour by elites would also become politicised in a country where groups would increasingly reject ostentatious wealth and excess. This sensitivity (real or imagined) would have a significant impact on Spain’s most visible elite institution, the monarchy, as the crisis evolved.

From traditional theory, the impact of a growing economy and social improvements are not well understood in conventional security terms. The Franco regime’s staunchest defenders (the Army) were considered to be among democratic Spain’s biggest threats for the first years after the transition. A coup attempt of February 1981 was supported at very high levels and only failed due to both the King’s firm rejection and a lack of widespread support from the broader Armed Forces (Serra, 2010, p.143).

After his harsh remarks on Spanish separatists in 2006, the sacking of Lieutenant-General José Mena Aguado exemplified the sensitivity of politicians towards military figures\textsuperscript{116} and the role played by the media in articulating tensions between political elites and those tasked with defending the nation state. Whilst Aguado may have been a lone voice, the incident touched on an aspect of Spain’s culture, one where politics and the military remain delicate. A recurring theme in this thesis is the less than clear relationship between the Defence Ministry, its personnel and broader notions of security, at a time of economic success, as this chapter will examine, the situation is even harder to comprehend at a time of economic downturn.

When the PP government came to power in 1996, certain indicators revealed that Spain was becoming arguably more secure than at any time in its recent history. It had undergone significant economic development (Salmon, 2010), had transformed its tricky state-military relationship into a `consolidated democracy’ (Serra, 2010, p. 244) and stood among those at the inner core of EU member-states.\textsuperscript{117} Elections had enabled a smooth transfer of power from the

\textsuperscript{115} In 2011, a Eurobarometer poll saw 88% of Spaniards cite that corruption was a major problem. This had risen from 83% in Dec 2007 (the equivalent EU rate was 74% (2011) and 73% 2007. Chislett (2016, p.11) charts the effect of media reporting of corruption on public perceptions.

\textsuperscript{116} Guardian 13 January 2006 `Spain's old guard defiant as general sacked' https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/jan/14/spain.gilestremlett, [accessed 24 Feb 17]

\textsuperscript{117} In interview with a confidante of Felipe González, it was argued that the former Spanish Socialist PM was considered to be one of the modern architects of EU integration among the bloc’s member states. One anecdote has him turning up unannounced at a dinner of the EU’s four biggest member states (Germany, France, Italy and the UK) to successfully fight a Spanish
centre-left PSOE, and by the summer of 1997, Spain was fully integrated into the NATO military alliance. Although it was true that ETA terrorism still posed a danger and Aznar’s experience (a close run attempt on his life), left Spain’s elites in no doubt that as individuals they lived under the shadow of a genuine threat, by the late 1990s separatist terrorism could not be seen as an existential threat to Spain’s integrity. At the same time, the Spanish economy was growing strongly and would continue to do so until the PP’s mandate had run its course in 2004. Spain was receiving significant economic transfers from the EU and had entered the full integration programme of the EMU, while the Mediterranean Agreement of 1995 (now known as the Euro-Mediterranean partnership) had created a region-wide arrangement that embraced security, human rights and economic development (Gillespie, 1997).

As it entered the 21st century, democratic Spain’s original fear of a military-backed anti-democratic insurrection now appeared inconceivable, whilst the concept of a marginalised economy with stagnating sectors also looked remote. Latin America, which had traditionally only been considered for its potential, was now a fully-fledged economic market open to expansion by Spanish multinationals. This process was further reinforced by a region that was opening up to global trade and investment118 underpinned by US free trade deals and an EU that encouraged the development of trading opportunities. Against this backdrop at the start of the millennium, by either measure of the traditional realist paradigm, or for that matter, approaches such as constructivism, Spain was perhaps at its most secure in that it was freer from threats than it had been for the previous century.

The analysis is divided into three parts, initially offering a short explanation of the collapse of Spain’s economy, then going on to examine the impact this had upon Spain’s security in terms of both the state and human factors (the so-called new securities) and concludes by assessing the response of Spanish policy-makers and society to these new challenges. In sum, I hypothesise that Spain has not reacted effectively to these new threats and, although the National Security Strategies (2011 & 2013) do go some way towards addressing these issues (to be discussed in the next chapter), Spain has not yet attended to such positions during pre-Summit discussions in the mid-1990s (interview with Jose Ignacio Torreblanca, 2015).

118 Latin America was quickly transforming into a region dominated by Spanish multinationals, so much so that in this period these behemoths had made Spain the world’s 10th largest international investor, a large proportion of their activities taking place across the Spanish-speaking world.
vulnerabilities with any great success, which has exposed it to both further economic crisis and a disintegrating party system, while this has also spawned alienation from significant segments of the population.

**Constructing Broader Security in 21st Century Spain**

This shift from a “secure” Spain at the end of the 1990s, to one challenged by securitisation of foreign threats (Iraq, Morocco), an Islamic terrorist threat and near-collapse of the economy tends to be viewed in literature as an ongoing linear process (Chislett 2013). In reality the shift reflects two forms (or sectors) of security, one of hard, state-focussed security with speech acts and statements, and then subsequently one of economic security at a micro level, that of individual or personal financial well-being perceived as being under threat. The concept has been little used when looking at Spain in this period, and yet offers some understanding of the shift in political participation under the PSOE.

It is useful to examine Dent’s definition:

> “micro-level economic security concentrates on ‘localized’ agents such as individuals, households and communities and is primarily concerned with safeguarding their livelihoods” (Dent, 2007, p.205)

In Spain’s case the micro-level security consists of households, individuals and even communities and is little discussed in Spanish academia on security. Levels of analysis below the nation-state tend to focus on autonomous communities and perhaps provinces. However, as a nation-state Spain is a society where villages and rural communities still hold influence (Navarro in Sellers, 2013, p.267) over many people’s lives and therefore represent closer-knit communities that traditional Anglo-Saxon models would overlook are relevant. These create a community environment (or culture) by which citizens would judge and perceive their security. In effect it security perceptions are constructed by individuals, those about them and their sources of information in the media.

Economic realities, benefits and ‘offers’ at the individual or micro level are part of the electoral package debated by parties to gain votes during elections, particularly on the Left, although generally speaking this ‘micro-level’ security has never been included as a national defence or security need, with neither recent Defence Directives nor the National Security Strategy of 2011 identifying it. A broader notion of security is still debated by academics around the world, an argument which also applies to Spain, where the development agenda and
dependency analysis have now been accepted with regard to human security outside Spain (by the Cooperación development arm of the Foreign Affairs ministry for example). However, as the chapter will show, until the crisis of 2008, in terms of the domestic political agenda however, broader notions or constructions of security had yet to gain traction in contemporary Spain and by considering the shifts under the PSOE in particular, this is evident by 2013.

Broadening the definition of security raises an alternative way of considering the context of Spain’s well-being in this period. To cite one source, “human security is concerned with the protection of people from critical life-threatening dangers …” (Thakur, referred to in Collins 2007, p.95).

In the context of Spain’s economy ‘life-threatening’ does not capture the impact of the crisis effectively. Alkisir however, takes the view that human security’s role “is to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that advance human freedoms and human fulfilment” (Collins, 2007, p.95). The collapse of Spanish incomes, wealth, employment119 and property ownership has seen some analysis in terms of the impact on ‘human freedoms and human fulfilment’ in discussion of Spain’s security, but the emergence of mass protests, collapses in electoral support for conventional political parties and the persistence of a significant black economy would challenge this narrative or construction of what constitutes the nation’s security.120

An initial deduction is that some scope does exist for drawing on the human security narrative and a microsecurity approach when considering Spain’s position and direction during la crisis económica, which will in turn be considered in the context of Spain’s national strategies in chapter seven.

Returning to the PP’s decision to make a sea-change in the nature of Spain’s relationship with Washington and with respect to involvement in the US’s War on Terror, this followed a process of securitisation that demonstrated that without a shared perception of insecurity, nor an environment that appeared existentially

119 By a range of indicators, the effect was drastic, the economy shrank 8.6% between 2008 and 2013 (Chislett, 2016, p.25). Whilst the OECD saw a fall in average incomes of 6% in Spain, but this was even worse among the poorest 10% of Spaniards who saw a drop of 13% (Velasco, 2015). Even in the latter days of the crisis according to figures from the Bank of Spain, among young households (under 35 years) annual household incomes had fallen by 9200Euros, whilst the over 65s had not changed (El País, 2017, p.37). Anecdotally the level of youth unemployment reached more than 50% in certain provinces (Chislett, 2016, p.25).

120 In interview with the UK military attaché based in Madrid at the start of the crisis, he commented that a barter economy (small but growing at the time) indicated one impact of the crisis among poorer groups as access to cash dried up (interview with Colonel Rabbit).
threatened, ultimately Spain’s state elites would fail to carry a consensus of national support.

Although Aznar’s decision to align with US interests had been endorsed by the PP as an organisation, there existed elements that remained unconvinced. The election defeat of 2004 was attributable to not only the PP’s handling of the terrorist bombing, but also wide-ranging opposition from other parties, former coalition allies and most of Spain’s media. On top of this was the fact that Aznar never carried more than a small clique outside his own political party, which was eventually his downfall and had consequences that are still playing out today in terms of Spain’s international standing.

“The Socialists inherited from the previous Popular Party (PP) administration a fast-growing economy whose fundamentals — inflation, the public deficit, and the level of public debt — were in good shape thanks to the PP’s success in meeting the macroeconomic conditions for Spain to be a founder member of the euro zone as of 1999.” (Chislett, 2013, p.17)

The 2004 PSOE government may have come to power under difficult circumstances (the Atocha bombing) but economic indicators were very favourable. However, from an international security perspective, Spain still had to contend with a challenging region to its South with the problems of North Africa’s Maghreb confronting it daily in the form of refugees, economic migrants, brutal conflicts such as Algeria’s civil war, and the policies of Gaddafi’s Libya also occupying security strategists and undermining a perception of peace.

However, while the regional issues tended not to worry most other EU member states, some allies appeared receptive and sympathetic to some of Madrid’s concern at this point. Whilst NATO maintained a posture more focussed towards the Russian federation and ex-Soviet republics, the Alliance’s New Strategic Agenda of 1999 made it clear that operations by the WEU, NATO or other allies of Spain could assist in solving Spain’s security needs through its non-Article V operations. Therefore, the turn of the century could be seen as a

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121 Bardaji in interview, argued that 95% of Spain was opposed to the war in Iraq, including significant parts of the Popular Party, he believes that this case was never successfully made to either the party or the nation.
122 Atocha refers to the Atocha central train station in Madrid. It is used to describe the attack in 2004 and is recognised as such across Spain as a site of remembrance.
123 According to Ross (2016, p.186) 40,000 North Africans were estimated to have crossed into Spain illegally from North Africa between 1999 and 2010.
124 Article V refers to the North Atlantic security area, which effectively protected NATO during the Cold War. A ‘non-Article V’ operation could extend outside NATO’s operations area into North Africa and elsewhere.
relative period of security for Spain with the Mediterranean Initiative among others helping to span some of the gap between North Africa and the EU, in addition to an economy, that although troubled by unemployment was seen as a European success story.

As previously argued, Aznar’s decision to adopt a more proactive US stance against terrorism and to long-standing US concerns did much to undermine the region’s unity that became ever more fragile after 9/11, but this chapter will discuss the economic “abyss” which opened up before Spain during the Zapatero governments of 2004-11 and which, for most of the PP government’s term in office afterwards, seemed stubbornly unbridgeable.

The Near-Collapse of Spain’s Economy – A New Insecurity.

Chislett (2013), Ross (2016) and Eklundh (2015) among many, all argue that Spain’s economy was initially shielded from the US sub-prime mortgage slump in 2007 before it spread to Europe. When it crossed the Atlantic, some of the UK’s biggest banks teetered on the brink of failure and Iceland’s outsized banking sector collapsed. Meanwhile in Spain, the unsustainable boom in housing came to an abrupt end. This bubble had attracted large numbers of migrants, generated a false perception of wealth and had been spurred on by low interest rates and cheap credit as a result of Spain’s adoption of the single currency (the Euro) which was reinforced by political elites and sections of the media congratulating themselves on Spain’s “success”.

The economy had grown 30% in the decade preceding 2008, a rate significantly higher than the OECD’s average of 20%. Much of this expansion was in construction, a highly visible sign of growth, where 2006 saw 865,000 new home-starts, a figure higher than France, Germany and Italy combined. Eight million jobs were created between 1995 and 2007 in a country of 40 million.

At the start of the 21st century, Spain had enjoyed a boom similar to that of the final years of the Franco regime (which also heralded social and eventually, political change), this was accompanied by a rapid expansion of small savings banks (cajas de ahorros) governed by the Autonomous Communities (CCAs). What went undisclosed the time was that these CCAAs were themselves guilty of significant overspending that ran up high levels of debt often pumped into white elephant projects, with at least two large airport construction schemes.

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125 Chislett (2016) writes a thorough insightful account of the onset and impact of the crisis.
epitomising the wild optimism of the era.\textsuperscript{126} Much of this was however based on cheap, plentiful credit that was to prove unsustainable and very damaging as Spain’s banks began to fail.

Spain had generated a bubble originating from its entry into the European single currency, which was exaggerated by low interest rates and fuelled by an expanding consumer sector, propped up by messages of success and wealth. Between 1996 and 2012 its population had increased from 39.6 million to 46.8 million, a rise of more than seven million. Combined with one of the lowest birth rates in Europe, virtually all of the population increase was due to immigration from within and outside the European Union.\textsuperscript{127} As unemployment rose, wages fell quickly due to an over-supply of labour, with homeless East European and North African migrants quickly becoming more and more visible. In a pan-European context this phenomenon was not confined to Spain, with nearly all EU member states witnessing a proliferation of parties standing on anti-immigration platforms and early signs of populist rhetoric.\textsuperscript{128}

Until 2007 Spain had enjoyed a decade of virtually uninterrupted economic expansion, a booming construction sector, and high levels of social expenditure that were heavily subsidised by the European Union to fund a cohesion and regional development programme worth billions of Euros. Whilst the previous part of the chapter has identified a frustrated securitisation initiative as regards terrorism and military action against Iraq, there were now to be profoundly different challenges for Spain as the 2008 slump took hold. Other sectors according to Buzan’s model (1998) were undergoing an unprecedented expansion in an economy already transformed by the paradox of Europe being centralised under a single currency, yet having a destiny simultaneously bound up with Latin America, the UK and other neighbours. It is my assertion that the impact of this sudden and dramatic decline was to be as profound on Spain’s national psyche and political culture as the Atocha bombing of 2004.

\textsuperscript{126} Both airports (Castellón and La Mancha) were found to be surplus to requirements once completed. Flights were not sustainable in practice and although the projects have now been mothballed, they are a political embarrassment and have come to symbolise the excessive exuberance of the decade 2000-2010.

\textsuperscript{127} Even the Spanish Military was forced to significantly increase its recruitment of Latin Americans and North Africans to fill unfilled military posts, offering a short-cut to citizenship for successful applicants.

\textsuperscript{128} Paradoxically, Spain has yet to see significant political momentum behind parties standing on immigration control platforms in spite of the huge number of arrivals over the last 20 years.
This thesis argues that the biggest challenges in the 21st century to Spain's structural, political, social and economic well-being have stemmed from la crisis económic. By most indicators and standards (Eurostat/INE) Spain's national economy and society suffered a major shock that not only affected the personal well-being of citizens, but also gave rise to huge second-round effects that will impact on Spaniards more than the Madrid train bombing of 2004 did and will extend well into the next decade. Such fall-out is most noticeably apparent in a significantly altered party system, a `damaged' political sector, a fragmented opposition, and a Spain that is significantly less secure than it has been at any time since the democratic transition began.

Spelling and Kirchner (Collins, 2007, p.209) identify two key issues as “(1) concerns of the state to protect the social and economic fabric of society and (2) the ability of the state to act as an effective gatekeeper and to maintain societal integrity” when discussing economic security. For Spain, protecting the social and economic fabric of society were ever present during the democratic transition129, even as the matter of Basque self-determination in particular raised significant questions about the identity of historic nationalities (Heywood, 1995). But, in the years following the democratic transition, issues such as unemployment and social integration were occasionally subordinated to the programme of modernisation130 under the European project as the narrative of Spain in Europe linked to the Ortega y Gasset mantra `Europe is the solution’ to be discussed in chapter 7.

A good example of this separation could be seen in the perennial issue of unemployment in Spain where, in spite of good growth rates since 1982, this has always stood at one of the highest rates in Europe. Its lowest rate was actually 7.9% in the late 1990s, a figure considered high by north European standards. But by 2010 it had risen to 19.9%, reaching a figure of 40% among young people (Salmon, 2010, p.49). By 2013 it had hit 26.9% (INE, the National Statistics

129 See Preston, The Triumph of Democracy in Spain (1986) for a definitive account of the process by which Spain's democratic transition was brought about, in particular consensus and cooperation were seen as fundamental to the success of the transition.
130 The PSOE government in particular disappointed much of its core base on numerous occasions, leading to overlooked, national strikes and frustration over employment rights and public sector issues.
Institute), a figure never seen in the post war economies of Germany, France or the UK.\(^{131}\)

Economic security needs, particularly those described by Spelling and Kirchner, had never been wholly satisfied (or delivered) under Spain’s democratic model, at best, these were glossed over, particularly as regards the phenomenon of endemic unemployment (Holman, 1996, p.212). Approval and support for national policies was generally consensual in what was an accepted facet of the political transition, and election results generally reflected this, with party political power tending to alternate after every two terms in government since the mid-1990s. It has to be said though, that individually, many Spaniards have not enjoyed being economically secure in terms of employment nor income. Perhaps cushioned by generous EU funding and free movement, by the late 1990s Spain’s society appeared extremely tolerant of the persistence of joblessness and inequality. In many cases the political system acted as a shock-absorber, where the pre-dominant PSOE was constantly under pressure from parties to the left (namely the legacy groupings from the Spanish Communist party) to serve as a go-to safe haven for the protest vote on issues of the environment and joblessness, among other matters. In effect, the issue of unemployment even above 10% was tolerated by a society and political system who based security on traditional norms of states and terrorism.

Madrid was not alone among EU governments in being slow to identify the model of human security. The UK Security Strategy of 2008\(^{132}\) did not address it within the UK, nor did the EU Security Strategy of 2003 (which was essentially created under ex-Spanish Foreign Minister Javier Solana). In the context of academic study human security’s is difficult to identify conceptually at the national level, and although academically it has a credible presence among a number of writers and analysts, it does not feature at a pan-European level, being more the preserve of the international development community, which has also embraced the female rights, peace and security agenda over other forms.\(^{133}\) Therefore,

\(^{131}\) Spain’s unemployment has dominated the political system since the transition to democracy. Numerous sources have discussed the issue. See Perez-Diaz (1999), Heywood (1995) and Ross (2010).


\(^{133}\) In particular, Spanish governments have championed women’s rights, and a peace and security agenda for more than a decade, where, in relation to the UN in particular, notable achievements were made and trumpeted by both PP and PSOE governments. See http://thediplomatinspain.com/en/rajoy-announces-more-spanish-funds-in-favour-of-women-at-the-un/ dated 14 Oct 2015 [accessed 15 Feb 17].
although human security may be accepted and adopted nationally by academics, think-tanks and even elements within governments, a pan-governmental approach has remained improbably fanciful. An initial attempt by Moratinos (a PSOE Minister) to articulate a pan-EU approach to development (Cinco Días, 2009) in the run-up to the 2010 Spanish Presidency of the EU turned out to be little more than a gesture in higher diplomatic circles, as later analysis will show.

In spite of the severity of the crisis in retrospect, it appears that politicians in power were unwilling to acknowledge or articulate the scale of the problem. This perhaps was due to an inability to sense the scale of the problem, or, more likely, fear of admitting failure where being in power was dependent on reinforcing messages and narratives of success.

Another explanation that explains the disconnect between high politics (diplomacy and inter-governmental activity) and grass-roots (or domestic) politics is Puttnam’s two-level model. Puttnam explains that higher level international politics (EU, UN, WTO level) are kept separate from an equally important domestic audience (whom governments may depend on at election time) where key issues of most concern may centre more on micro or human security aspects than state level decisions regarding strategy and this disparity exists in many attempts to explain states and security.

In Spain, the PP’s decision to offer unconditional support to the US over the issue of Iraq in 2003 against the wishes of around 90% of the population could be (and has been) explained in classical securitisation terminology according to which the rapid, practically unprecedented economic decline of 2007-13 defies the traditional models wherein a non-military or non-traditional security crisis generates a wave of anger, frustration and mobilisation against the political order hitherto unseen in democratic Spain’s history. This could explain the indifference to the growing threat to the domestic matter of political security, whilst the PM and executive actors pursued a traditional security policy based on UN, EU, NATO structures.

**Economic Security and the Spanish Nation-State.**

The economic slump at the start of 2008 represented a threat to the political system that now appears almost inevitable with the benefit of hindsight. Lying at

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134 https://www.ou.edu/uschina/texts/Putnam88Diplomacy.pdf [accessed 17 Feb 17].
the heart of the issue in Spain’s experience was the concept of political security, q.v.:

“political security is about the organizational stability of social order” (Buzan 1998, p.141)

In the case of Spain, over the 2008-13 period this ‘organizational stability’ of Buzan’s was perhaps the most significant vulnerability of both the PSOE and PP governments. The weakness that afflicted the Spanish economy and the impact on society of an almost unprecedented rise in unemployment and sharp drop in incomes perhaps constituted the greatest perceived threat to Spain’s democracy (in this case, the democratic system being the referent object for political security) since the 1981 coup attempt (which for younger Spaniards represented a previous generation’s era and was no longer a viable matter to concern them).

At the time of the PP’s election victory in December 2011, unemployment stood at 22.5%. It would continue to rise and there were very real concerns that Spain would be forced to withdraw from the Euro, or else seek a bailout similar to those seen in Greece or Ireland, which had been virtually inconceivable even a year or two before. Indicators, such as declining incomes and rising unemployment and repossessions represented a near complete absence of economic security for millions of Spaniards and here the debate surrounding how Spain’s economy and financial well-being could be described as a ‘referent object’ can shed some light, in effect, this was the biggest crisis to face Spain since its shift to democracy in the late 1970s and the language of crisis has taken hold.

It is useful to look at Spain’s economy as a referent object in two cases; the first in the context of the 1980’s and 1990s European project and then in that of the financial crisis of 2008-2013. This implies considering security within the framework of Buzan’s economic security (1998, p.95) and also how a nation-state examines its political security at a time of deep economic instability. As events across the Mediterranean have demonstrated, EU nation-states have increasingly interpreted economic challenges as threats to the nation-state, with Cypriot President Anastasiades even describing the Cypriot banking crisis as constituting “the greatest threat to the nation since the Turkish invasion of

135 Interview with Jose Ignacio Torreblanca (December 2011).
Across the EU Mediterranean states the economic slump that followed the US crisis marked the start of a prolonged downturn that, in the case of Greece and Cyprus among others, devastated the banking sector and led to huge unemployment.

As Cyprus and Greece showed, certain Mediterranean political elites have increasingly identified and articulated economic recession as either a threat to the security of the nation state or the regime’s own political security. In the case of Spain, its transition to democracy, which had in many ways been held up as the model for success across the EU and the world, meant that its economic crisis represented a real threat to the stability of the Spanish nation-state and its capacity to meet its citizens’ basic needs with respect to employment, well-being and housing. In essence, the state could no longer ‘secure’ its people.

Leaving the debate over nation and state within the Spanish constitution to one side, the actual ‘referent object’ is difficult to articulate and measure in Spain’s economy (although Buzan’s model does generate 3 such ideas – see chapter 2). Whilst nominal statistics such as GDP, incomes and unemployment figures exist, these are merely indicators of a process and do not reflect the tangible impact on individual human security. Just as with other elements of security, the referent object is dependent upon the levels of analysis applied.

For example, an individual’s conceptualisation of economic security may hinge upon their employment status or even whether they have been paid or not. The mismatch between an individual’s perception of security and the state’s situation perhaps lies at the heart of the problem of analysis, since national statistics do not relate to an individual’s situation when determining well-being. Buzan makes great play of the challenge of societal security (1998, p.119) and this generates further discussion.

Spain’s pluralist political system leads to a multi-layered approach with individuals, municipalities, provinces, autonomous communities and the nation-

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137 Greece and Cyprus were among the two most negatively affected but significant problems have been encountered in Italy and Portugal.
138 The Greek statesman Yanis Varoufakis represents a number of cross-national commentators articulating a position that sees Northern European economies pursuing an agenda that ignores the damaging impact in EU southern states.
139 According to Spain’s constitution the nation or the state are loosely worded with regard to the historic nationalities and for the purpose of analysing la crisis it is considered a single referent object.
140 See Theiller for a discussion of the merits of Buzan’s societal security in ‘Societal security and social psychology’ 2003.
state all candidates as a possible level of analysis. However, levels aside, for
the purposes of discussing Spain the analysis straddles the nation-state (the
national economy) and the sub-national (i.e. autonomous community), as a
consequence of the historical ambiguity surrounding the funding of the CCAAs.
What was clear though, was that insecurity in the broadest sense worsened as
rising debt obligations and unemployment numbers appeared unsustainable.

The Effects of the Economic Crisis

Spain’s crisis erupted between 2009-13, when its economy experienced sharp
falls in GDP, a spike in unemployment and huge austerity cuts, the corrosive
effect of these on families, communities and individuals led to gathering
momentum behind the swings in public support in 2011. The concept of
economic security for individuals may be difficult to see at a national level, but
this was most visibly expressed by the emergence of the Indignados movement of “outraged and disgruntled” citizens in May 2011 which led to the
eventual fragmentation of the traditional Spanish bipartisan system as a direct
result.

“Clearly, many people came to the view that existing channels of
communication and influence were closed, or provided little help, and they
were therefore looking for alternative ways of expressing their opinion.”
(Eklundh, 2015, p164).

Events thus took a rapid turn in May 2011, when mass movements took to the
streets using both traditional methods of protest (basing themselves in the
Madrid’s main square, known as the Puerta del Sol) and also using the internet
and social media to promote people’s assemblies articulating the need for radical
change. Whilst the Arab Spring was the bigger focus of global events at this
point, a movement with certain undeniable similarities was developing into a
groundswell in Spanish cities was not lost on commentators. Former PM Aznar
himself inadvertently hinted at the parallel by asserting “Madrid is not Cairo”
when responding to questions on the theme. Assisted by large numbers of
politically mobilised, socially connected younger people, the very demographic
worst hit by austerity, various movements meshed into a global “Occupy”
phenomenon that spread across North American and European cities, with

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141 This refers to those ‘outraged’ at the austerity programme of the PSOE government but with ire
also directed at the political elites of all parties. It reflected a sense of injustice at bank bailouts.
See Eklundh (2015) for further discussion on how this was articulated.
142 Figures point to a 26% fall in household incomes among the under-35s, while those above 35
and pensioners were seen to be far less affected. El Pais 26 Feb 2017.
Madrid acknowledged as the incubator for a campaign of protest that would spread across the industrialised world.

Constructing a message of anger, and rejecting traditional neo-market solutions social media and technology were a significant factor in the dissemination of the protest but also a source of frustration, as in 2011 controversial legislative measures had been put in place to control file-sharing and protect copyright on software and intellectual property. In other states (Sweden in particular) responses emerged in the form of legitimate political protest with the formation of the Pirate Party Piratpartiet, who won more than 7% of the vote in Euro elections in 2009 and, with 50,000 members, became the 3rd largest party in Sweden. Evidently, the reaction in Spain was different, but the capacity to mobilise activists over an issue such as internet freedoms demonstrated how febrile the atmosphere had become and how diverse messages about freedoms and insecurity could be adopted at speed by previously diverse unconnected groups.

Pablo Iglesias, the young founder and party leader of Podemos (We Can), the left wing party that emerged from the indignados movement, narrated that austerity was attacking individuals’ lives.

“The emergency policies to ‘save the euro’, imposed — and soon normalized — by the German-led bloc, have had disastrous effects in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain, where millions have lost their jobs, tens of thousands have been evicted from their homes and the dismantling and privatization of public-health and education systems has sharply accelerated, as the debt-burden has been shifted from banks to citizens” (Iglesias, 2015, p.17)

As the 2011 initial protest movement snowballed (to more than 80 cities and towns in Spain) few concessions appeared forthcoming from either of the two main parties. The pre-eminence of Frankfurt’s European Central Bank over national fiscal policy, meant that virtually no major shifts in policy could be undertaken using that particular toolbox, but this also was a convenient `body' to cite as a threat, an outside organisation making decisions to the detriment of citizens in Spain.

Another factor in building the claim of the indignados was the impression that politically mainstream political parties were indifferent to the concerns of the

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143 US media corporations, concerned at the loss of revenue from file-sharing pressured European regulators to limit the activities of illegal and unauthorised downloading of music, films and software. The PSOE government had acquiesced due to US pressure, a move not welcomed by web-users, who argued that costs were prohibitive. The Sinde Act (as part of a set of general intellectual property measures) has remained divisive.
protesters. The PP, whose voter base was less inclined to support such movements, was somewhat still discredited by its military and security strategy in 2003-4, along with a string of high-level corruption scandals, themselves a challenge to their legitimacy.\textsuperscript{144} On the other hand, the PSOE, traditionally the institutional party of democratic Spain, was identified as part of the problem too, with prominent party figures under scrutiny over spiralling public debt, over-ambitious infrastructure schemes and corrupt practices that made them no better than their PP counterparts in the eyes of the nascent movement.

**Interpreting the Indignados Movement.**

"the indignados challenge deliberative democracy by virtue of both their emotional character and their dispersed nature" (Eklundh, 2015, p.25)

The idea of national security and the indignados do not immediately co-exist when looking at Spain in this period. However Katzenstein (1996, p.2) makes the case that "security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors". The cultural phenomenon of protest articulated that unemployment, austerity and economic hardship were a matter for security. Castaneda (2012) charted the indignado's rise attributing it to spreading a broader movement of activism that swept major financial centres. New Social Movements are not new in social theory, and in Spain's case, where NGOs and lobby groups have traditionally been under-researched (Hughes, in Cantalapiedra, 2014), this powerful phenomenon represented an area that has only now started to be discussed and analysed. Whilst not the focus of this thesis, these global movements, nurtured in Spain epitomised a division between those who accepted (or could tolerate) the programme of austerity in response to the financial crisis of 2008, and others who could not, or sought to respond to the imposition of strict economic measures. Katzenstein et al.'s model demonstrates how norms, which derive from the environmental structure (this being in effect the national culture), shape national security interests and Spain's identity, which in turn influence policy. In the case of the indignados movement this can be represented below.

\textsuperscript{144} Rato, the former Spanish Deputy PM and IMF Managing Director, was embroiled in corruption charges both in Spain and overseas. His high-profile arrest at the height of the crisis reflected badly on the PP adding to a sense that elites had somehow stolen or benefited from the state before the crisis. The monarchy was similarly embroiled in accusations of cronyism with the husband of Princess Cristina facing serious corruption charges.
In the model above the *indignados* (among others) articulated that the crisis and its origins (the global financial system) constituted an elevated threat to the Spanish people (Ekhlundh, 2015, p.164), in effect drawing on the exceptional impact of the crisis to an identity in pursuit of radical measures. Katzenstein also identifies the impact of norms, he makes the case that:

"norms operate as standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In such instances norms have "regulative" effects that specify standards of proper behaviour" (Katzenstein, 1996, p.5).

Ekhlundh’s doctoral thesis *Indignation as dissent? The affective components of protest and Democracy* (2015, University of Manchester) provides a detailed and thorough analysis of *indignados* movement. Basing her approach on Laclau’s theory of hegemony,\textsuperscript{145} she details the emergence of an identity among the movements that composed the *indignados* in the light of Spain’s environment (to

draw on Katzenstein’s model) that enabled this identity to be created (along with the impact of social media).

Returning to constructivism, Katzenstein’s approach where norms, culture and institutions drive interests and security policies, this combination of outrage from the indignados in forming an identity in pursuit of redefining the response to the economic crisis is captured effectively by Eklundh in her work. Castells (2012) and Castañeda (2012) are among others in classifying the challenges posed by this meteoric phenomenon but needless to say, along with the collapsing Spanish economy in the period 2010-12, it was one of a number of threats to Spain’s security, but was barely noted let alone, addressed in the strategies of this period. What it did produce though, was an identity as Katzenstein et al argue

“Cultural or institutional elements of state’s environments – in this volume, most often norms- shape the national security interests or (directly) the security policies” (Katzenstein 1996, p.23)

Returning to Eklundh’s argument, the PSOE’s shift towards neoliberal austerity (Kennedy, 2013), with only nominal TU opposition represented an abandonment of voters and “created a space for new organisations and groups” (Eklundh, 2015, p.15) with the assistance of online activism that in turn established an identity of opposition to the austerity programme.

In this period of heightened political atmosphere the attitudes and behaviours of elites was subject to intense scrutiny, assisted by Spanish social media and more conventional outlets sympathetic to the Indignados message. As has already been discussed, this led to a sharp fall in party alignment by voters (see table on following page), but more visibly the monarchy (already embroiled in a corruption scandal) became subject to mounting criticism of their wealth and lifestyle eventually leading to King Juan Carlos’s resignation in an act to save the institution.

Returning to the model, in this period economic policies and fiscal shocks had a sudden, unexpected impact on Katzenstein’s ‘environmental structure’ in effect Spain’s cultural context, leading to policies and new structures which in turn impacted upon Spain’s norms regarding the state, public sector jobs, government support and a host of other aspects of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The indignados became a political voice of interests
responding to this process forming an identity of rejection to the economic measures and articulating a range of interests of austerity in Spain.

Economic security as a concept or message, is a product of the environmental (cultural) structure and this has implications on the environment (national culture). Thus continuities exist in national security policy and institutions that reflect policies, institutions and, of course, national identity. In the case of the economic crisis of 2008 new perceived threats that threatened the well-being of millions of Spaniards in turn challenged the Spanish state through a mass mobilisation of Spaniards whose interests no longer coincided with Spanish elites, in effect threatening aspects of Spain’s democratic consolidation.

What the indignados movement represented to the Spanish state was that it articulated a range of interests that could constitute an existential threat to the political security of the Spanish state. Granted, there had consistently been economic cycles of downturns and bouts of high unemployment, but the only ownership of these taken by the political parties had been as material to use as barbs to blame each other. Yet by 2011 the parties’ traditional ability to use such a ploy appeared unsustainable. Spain’s government was still trying to project credibility (in the face of fears over the country’s credit-rating and international confidence) and engaged in supporting more conventional security acts such as the international efforts to unseat Gaddafi in Libya,146 but the truth was that it was found wanting and unconvincing, and totally lacked the direction to offer a solution.

As the depth of Spain’s travails became clearer by 2011, the PSOE was increasingly hampered by credibility questions overseas and at home and could not respond to the dynamic messages calling for radical change that appealed to its traditional young and urban electoral base. The 2004 election pledge to withdraw from Iraq had been implemented but in a manner insensitive to Washington,147 which was seen as detrimental to Spain’s standing. Therefore, by the start of the financial crisis in 2008, Spain was already struggling to assert itself internationally (Joyce, 2007), and with a potential all-out collapse of the

146 The Cortes overwhelmingly voted to approve military action against Gaddafi’s regime at a time when critics from outside conventional politics claimed it to be a distraction from domestic issues.
147 Interview with (Bardaji) a senior security official from the PP during its term in office. That the PSOE also openly endorsed Kerry in the 2004 US presidential election also worsened the relationship with financial and political issues impact being felt in Spain (Interview with Arteaga Oct 2015).
The economy, the gravest of damage was as good as done and no messages or visions could compete with the demands of the protest movement.

It could be anticipated that Spain’s economic woes would have produced a shift of loyalties back to the PP but, with the emergence of the Indignados and support for bipartisan politics in total free-fall, the net result would be potentially terminal for the established order.

**The Threat Posed to Spain’s Political Security**

As has been articulated through the Katzenstein model, the *indignados* movement, with its anti-system messages and bringing together of interests, reflected a growing and fundamental dissatisfaction with the system of government. Coupled with brinkmanship by Catalan nationalists demanding referenda, there were a range of unprecedented threats to the survival of the existing party system and allegiances. This included the monarchy, and after a crescendo of criticism the abdication of King Juan Carlos in 2014 only served to underline the general uncertainty within Spain. The King, once hugely popular and synonymous with the democratic transition, had come to epitomise the impending threat of uncontrolled change, and a new norm of a ‘Republic’ was seen as a very real possibility.  

Chislett quantified the significant fall in votes for the two main parties during the previous two decades.

**Figure 6: Declining Shares of Votes Obtained by Spain’s Two Main Parties 1996-2015.** (Chislett, 2016, p.7)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>37.6%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>43.9%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>44.6%</td>
<td>28.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total in %</td>
<td>76.4%</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>80.3%</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>73.4%</td>
<td>50.7%</td>
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Comparison of the falling shares of votes for both main parties between the 1996 and 2015 elections is stark. The Socialist party’s share had fallen from 42.6% of

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148 The possibility of a divisive referendum was averted only through political will by the PP government. In interview, more than one analyst (Torreblanca) said that Spain came close to a dangerously irreconcilable split on this issue, with young people (those most affected by the crisis) making up a body that countenanced abolition of the monarchy. This was echoed by Chislett (in interview in February 2017).
the vote in 2004 (their victory following the Atocha train bombing) to 22% only 11 years later, just a little over half of their earlier percentage. Although slightly better, at 28.7% of the vote in 2015 for the PP, this had fallen from 44.6% only four years earlier, a decline of the best part of 40%. With a vote of only 28.7% for the victorious party there was no clear endorsement for a government, and in a system not well-equipped for coalitions this is still a developing situation.

It is perhaps most appropriate to consider the combined vote of the two main parties. Since the early 1980s the two main parties had achieved approximately 70-75% of the national vote, effectively offering voters a binary choice. By 2015, with the comparable combined figure hovering at almost exactly half the national vote, the Socialist PSOE in particular was in danger of becoming marginalised which, given its role as the institutional party of Spain’s democratic system, illustrates the decline in institutions of the state.

The emergence of new parties, particularly characterised by the emergence of anti-Capitalist Podemos (The Guardian, 2015)\textsuperscript{149}, and the pro-Business, anti-corruption (originally Catalan) Ciudadanos or Cs (citizens’ party) constituted the new threat to the bipartisan structure, although it is true to say that new parties are in some ways to be welcomed and point to a healthy democracy (Gunther et al. 2002, p.23). Yet in the case of Spain, one where the parties and the state are intertwined, this represented a fundamental shift towards new ground, where established parties, elites and institutions found themselves undermined by fast moving events, social media campaigns and a sense of anger fuelled by economic insecurity.

**Constructing ‘Insecurity’ and the Economic Crisis**

The emergence of the indignados movement, supported by significant swathes of Spanish public opinion, illustrated the declining capacity of the PSOE and later PP governments to address deepening economic and social divides within Spain’s civil society. Not only was the state unable to resolve long-term structural unemployment (this remains the case today), but to Spanish voters the widespread collapse of the Cajas de Ahorros (Spanish savings banks) illustrated a profound vulnerability of the Spanish economy’s finance sector.\textsuperscript{150} The threat

\textsuperscript{149} Originally Podemos articulated its economic message as anti-capitalist, nowadays its language has moderated slightly to a more traditional left posture.

\textsuperscript{150} In interview with Felix Arteaga (Oct 2015) this it was confirmed that the finance sector was informally identified as a major new vulnerability by the National Security Council. No formal policy has been published in the light of this.
this posed to the state’s stability, and in turn to living standards security, was further compounded by the ECB’s criticism of Spanish fiscal policy. In effect, national policy faced criticism from influential banking interests, the EU, and also mobilised street protests highlighting the human cost of the crisis.

Spain’s identity as a successful global trading economy, underpinned by a large corporate banking sector was at odds with a near failure of its banking system and haemorrhage of support and confidence in its political system by the spectacle of mass-protest.

Although Spain’s economic decline may not have been as precipitous as Greece’s, the vulnerabilities exposed such as the construction industry’s huge bubble, and the subsequent leap in unemployment highlighted the weakness and the viability its economy within the European Union’s EMU programme. This has been a long-term concern in Spain, and members of the European Commission speculated that Spain’s longstanding unemployment issue was incompatible with monetary union long before Spain’s integration into EMU at the end of the 1990s.151

Whilst the security impact of a declining economy usually relies on outputs such as defence infrastructure, equipment and the forces to maintain security,152 the relationship between economic resilience and a political system’s soundness is well understood, but in the case of Spain the unprecedented economic decline eroded national stability. This threatened not only the crafted and presented ‘success’ of the 1980s, 1990s and the early years of the 21st century, but the electoral balance between the political parties, and also constructed a very real social threat to the supposed permanence of the agreement around Spain’s democratic transition.

The perceived collapse in economic security created the conditions for a possible state failure in terms of maintaining political security.153 While this study

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151 Jacques Delors had as early as 1993 identified that a 20% unemployment rate in Spain was generally incompatible with entry into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) programme. The issue of high unemployment was never a make or break deciding factor but the sensitivities regarding the persistence of the matter still exist to this day. See Holman Integrating Southern Europe (p.212).

152 Arteaga, one of Spain’s leading analysts, cites the impact of the crisis as being couched almost wholly in traditional hard security terms, stating that “the economic crisis has worsened the chronic mismatch between the desirable military capabilities and the budgetary resources that are earmarked for them” Arteaga (2013, p.7).

153 The near fall of the monarchy at a time of economic crisis was cited as having a potential ‘domino-effect’ on an already battered political system. Interview with Jose Ignacio Torreblanca (Sep 2015).
ends in the period of 2013 (with the second Spanish Security Strategy), the political uncertainty still reigns, although in somewhat abated form. Socially constructed notions of wealth, national economic success and regional growth were quickly and effectively undermined by counter-messages of state failure, corruption and elite profligacy which lead to a narrative for change.

Paradoxically it was the fluidity and resilience of Spain’s popular culture that facilitated the anti-system desires to be channelled into new political movements such as the Catalan Left movement and the Ciudadanos or “Citizens” party, but perhaps the best known of these was Podemos (literally “We can”), the party who effectively threatened to supplant the PSOE’s electoral appeal with that of an anti-system power base.

Although this may demonstrate resilience on the part of the party system, it also showed how vulnerable governing institutions were. On the eve of the 2015 elections, only 12% of Spaniards expressed trust in national institutions (The Economist, 2015, p.78), demonstrating that political security in Spain remained at a low point. Fortunately (and here the concept of political resilience may be worth considering) it could be argued that Spain’s political security was saved by the ability of its civil society. It was this that generated or engendered the new movements and political parties and reached out to dissatisfied citizens. However, the political parties would not guarantee the security of the political system at a time of profound change. In this regard, the 2011 and 2013 National Security Strategies approach to the political system will be more closely examined later.

The election defeat of the PSOE in 2011 could be seen as a routine reaction by voters to austerity, since the phenomenon of a government losing support from its electoral base after seven years in power following an adjustment programme is likely in any democratic system. This chapter has argued however, that in the case of Spain, the economic threat to political security was so significant that, when considered in conjunction with the human and individual challenges of low wages, unemployment and the banking crisis, the very survival of the party system and certain institutions was put at stake. While it may have been possible to lay the blame at the feet of the Indignados for stoking anti-system feeling, in reality their emergence was purely a manifestation of a release or

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pressure valve effect on political behaviour that may actually have helped secure the democratic structure by developing new forms of participation.

Buzan argues that:

“all security is political. All threats and defences are constituted and defined politically…the idea of the state, particularly its national identity and organizing ideology, and the institutions which express it are the normal target of political threats. Since the state is an essentially political entity, political threats may be as much feared as military ones” (Buzan, 1998, p.142)

During Spain’s economic crisis when the economy shrank by 8.5% between 2008 and 2013 (Chislett 2016, p.25), the subsequent rise of the youth-dominated indignados movement, buoyed by disillusioned voters and fuelled by a media that increasingly focussed on reporting corruption\(^{155}\), mismanagement and cronyism, saw a de-legitimisation of Spain’s more tried and tested institutions that could have potentially had a huge impact on state or political security. Drawing on Katzenstein’s model, these political issues constituted a clear and direct threat to the political security and stability of Spain and should be considered as such. This was not a security challenge that could be deterred, prevented or defended against in the traditional sense, but instead by appealing to the concept of political security, itself erected upon on a European model of financial well-being (linked to the social democratic model). Meanwhile the prevailing instability and an immobile political elite meant that declining personal living standards had questioned the ability of the state to endure and survive. In circumstances such as these the final outcome would then turn on how resilient the Spanish political system proved.

Spain’s ability to identify and remedy the significant vulnerability brought about by the economic model of the late 1990s (reliant on construction sustained by cheap credit and flows of migrant labour) has clear echoes across the European Union. What made Spain different was that the economy was even more vulnerable as a result of structural unemployment, a reliance on funding from small savings banks (cajas de ahorros) and a system of cronyism at the local level. The crash was not confined to Spain, nor the Mediterranean economies, but what made Spain’s situation so much more precarious was the impact that the crash had on an economy already blighted by underemployment, which was

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then aggravated by the inability of the political system to deliver acceptable solutions to the millions that were affected, essentially the security of Spain `as a state' was threatened to use Buzan's analysis.

**Spain's `Culture of Security' and the Economic Crisis**

This chapter has argued that there has been a fundamental redefinition and understanding of security in Spain as a consequence of the events of the 21st century. As this thesis has argued, traditional notions of security appear increasingly dated. The notion of Spain developing a culture of security as a consequence of the economic crisis is best explained through the model of Katzenstein where the environment is utterly integrated with identity, interests and policy. In the case of the economy and individual well-being, Spanish norms implied that the state's relationship with its population depended on a social-democratic relationship. As the crisis deepened, these norms and expectations were challenged as cuts, income falls and austerity hit home to such an extent that some sort of expression was inevitable as the state failed to articulate its approach. In some case, the emergence of the *indignados* represented the mobilisation of interests in defence of their `security' and interests, traditionally this had been on issues of foreign policy and terrorism but in this case, the actions of the government were seen at fault in a domestic sense.

The economy and its relationship to individuals had become the referent object to many Spaniards, threats from the global financial system and large corporate interests were interpreted by social groups as forming the threat. As in the case of the protests over supporting the Iraq War, and even the mass protests during the NATO membership referendum of 1986, Spanish society showed a remarkable capacity to mobilise in defence of norms and interests. Also demonstrable was the inability of Spanish institutions to respond to these pressures, in a sense, Spain was perilously insecure as a state, nation and perhaps even the European vocation.

This chapter has focussed on the unclear relationship between economic security and that of the political system. Economic security has proved elusive as a tool in analysing contemporary European societies and much of the literature has focussed on national levels of security. Dent (2007, p. 219) describes it as “increasingly discussed but still much under –theorized”, and this accurately captures its contribution when no understanding of the events of
2008-13 are possible without appreciating the impact of the slump. It is because of this that the aspects of constructivism have been used to inform the debate.

In Spain, constructivist notions about norms, the cultural context of the state’s relationship with unemployment, and the relationship between identity and interests come together in explaining the volatile rise of the *indignados*. Norms about the role of the state at various levels of government, the ability and capacity of the state to protect individuals well-being all undermined the PSOE government and the state with significant consequences for the political system.

Spain’s society, politics and security in the period 2008-13 can only be understood through the social impact and reaction to the economic challenges millions of Spaniards faced. What has emerged is a political system ravaged by *la crisis económica*, a significant reordering of Spain’s economy and renewed thinking about what a secure Spain means to different interests or groups. Younger voters in particular, were hit disproportionately more by the measures undertaken by the Spanish state and it is not surprising that the indignados movement reflected this, and demonstrated the impact of new technologies and methods to communicate their message.

Whilst the crisis was unfolding in Spain, the next chapter looks at the response of the Spanish state to the changing security panorama with a study and discussion of two key documents published by both the PSOE and PP governments at the time, the National Security Strategies of 2011 and 2013. Throughout *la crisis económica* Spanish policy makers and elites had failed to frame security in a way that was relevant to Spain’s citizens with drastic consequences. The ‘framing’ of an alternative narrative grew exponentially at the hands of the *indignados* which in turn, highlighted the shortfall of the state to provide or deliver meaningful security to many Spaniards. An alternative model offered by the *indignados* was never fully framed (or delivered), but the message was clear: traditional models were found wanting, and that many citizens did not see an outcome where their own economic and personal notions of security were being delivered.
Chapter 5.
Spain’s National Security Strategies

Whilst the previous chapters have been focussed on events, policies and actions in their relationship to Spanish security, this chapter is concerned with accounting for changes in policy through the process by which the state produced two National Security Strategies in 2011 and 2013.

`National security is the state action aimed at protecting the freedom and well-being of its citizens; guaranteeing the defence of Spain and its constitutional principles and values; and contributing together with our partners and allies to international security in compliance with the commitments undertaken’ (Government of Spain, 2013, p.8).

The constructivist approach in the context of Spanish states that interests, norms, identity and culture have all had an impact on Spain’s security during the period. The National Security Strategies of 2011 and 2013 represent the culmination of a number of the years’ analysis and input from a range of state and non-state actors and offer a snapshot of what constituted strategy under two different governments. This chapter will address the impact on the framing of national policy (in the form of the two Strategies) of identity, interests and norms.

Traditional literature has suggested that during democratisation, Spain has played a ‘catch-up’ or normalisation of its relations. (Heywood: 1995, Smyth & Preston, 1987; Gillespie, 2001) and, by 2011, Spain could be considered to have been tardy in the process of developing a National Security Strategy. But, in the case of this study, I argue that Spain was well-placed to adopt a new posture at the start of the 21st century, as much of its external relations had been ‘normalised’ during the previous decade as a result of the Europeanization strategy (Torreblanca, 2004).

By the mid to late 1990s Spain was essentially a mainstream European nation-state, with a defence and security institution that resembled those of its European neighbours and NATO partners (in effect reflecting its European vocation). Through the system of National Defence Directives (DDNs in Spanish) it demonstrated that during the consolidation of democracy it had put in place some capacity for generating strategy and national response to a changing global security picture. The challenge at this stage is to look at the idea of

156 Arteaga (2003), also interview with Bardaji (2017).
national security as a cultural phenomenon, and in particular, the impact of shifts in identity and perceptions have had on the process.

The analysis draws heavily on Katzenstein’s model from his 1996 work which synthesises the impact interests, identity and the cultural environment have all had on Spain’s attempts at building a strategy. Examination of the National Defence Directives that were introduced following the transition from the Franco dictatorship after his death in 1975 offers evidence to suggest, albeit in piecemeal fashion, Spain had already adopted ‘new’ and innovative thinking during the post-Cold War period, and whilst the impact of the 9/11 attacks on the US did come as a shock to the Spanish political system, combatting and enduring terrorism was already ingrained within Spain’s national culture (Roller 2002). The fact that the military’s role was restricted in the struggle against ETA (it was essentially an Interior Ministry-led strategy) showed that a broader concept of security was already evident in Spain, with non-military institutions taking a lead, albeit in the case of terrorism reflecting a relatively hardline response at times.

As discussed later, the then Prime Minister Rajoy made an audacious claim in 2015 that Spain was now one of the safest countries in the European Union. His methodology was unclear, but was essentially aimed at a domestic audience (the Cortes and Spanish opinion). By examining the concept behind the emergence of a security strategy in Spain, in particular how a national strategy has been created at a moment when many European and western powers have undergone significant and far-reaching changes, it will examine the changing narratives in the field of security and defence policy (issues which have often been contested concepts) by looking at the impact of the two Security Strategies launched in 2011 and 2013. The strategy process is a culmination of an approach begun more than 20 years earlier, reflects earlier documents and offers a useful insight into the process of change, the role of institutions and also interests.

In comparing Spain’s experience with that of other nation states, such as the United Kingdom (a country facing similar challenges), I argue that Spain’s

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157 Spain at that point had enjoyed falling crime rates which were referred to in the same announcement.
158 In a number of interviews with policy-makers (Bardaji, Artega, Torreblanca) it has been expressed that foreign and security policy has been one of the areas where there has been a distinct difference between the main political parties.
process in security policy has not been that different from that of other nation states and that successive governments achieved significant progress in furthering Spain's own national understanding by elites in a wider security sense in a number of policy areas. The two countries’ strategies occurred following similar controversies over their military adventures in Iraq, both experienced major terrorist attacks, and finally, these took place in the context of major economic recession. The intention is not to overstate the similarities between the countries however, instead it concludes that Spain has some distance to go in creating an effective security policy, not least in its ability to identify the means (resources) and the process (ways) of delivering physical security.

A short discussion of strategy draws on Clausewitzian theory\textsuperscript{159} and, in conjunction with the Copenhagen school's sectors the thesis will analyse the key issues in the shift from a defence policy-led process to security strategy within Spain, and conclude that, although the 2013 Strategy went some way to remedying some of the shortcomings of the original effort in 2011, there remain areas of inconsistency in the creation of a security policy. As is ever the case when analysing defence and security matters, analogously to many other western countries, military and security policy have been deeply entwined, with a loosely interpreted security policy being traditionally the remit of national military forces and, by implication, defence ministries and the usual state actors such as Armed Forces chiefs, Defence Ministers and senior civil servants. This said, one area that has been little examined to date has been the input of non-governmental organisations and think tanks in the security policy process and this will also be considered.

**Traditional Security Policy in Spain**

Spain’s programme of Defence Directives (DDNs) introduced under the democratic government in the early years of the transition, were and remain, the best barometers of issues facing the traditional defence sector. Issued by the Ministry of Defence at four-yearly intervals under the direction of the executive (signed by the Prime Minister), a comparison of directives from the end of 1990s to the 2011 Security Strategy show a clear continuity, with issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), international terrorism and

\textsuperscript{159} Paret’s *Makers of Modern Strategy* is used to provide the main reference to Clausewitz and this offers a new focus on the topic of security policy-making in Spain.
even the impact of climate change appearing in the narrative of threats to the nation-state.

Defence Directives are useful in identifying relevant activity and output, but have also had the additional effect of directing the modernisation of Spain’s military and contributed to transforming the institution itself. For example, the momentum towards engaging in peace support operations in the 1990s heralded a new model for military activity in an institution that had historically been prone to political interference. (Serra, 2008). In sum, although not exhaustive, as an indication of security thinking directives offer useful policy outputs for academic research and depict Spain’s national response to international and domestic changes.

By their very nature, directives aim to direct responses to threats and risks through defined military activity, specifically through using and adapting military resources capable of responding to challenges to the state’s territorial and political integrity. In this case the key military threats to Europe at the end of the 1990s of terrorism, organised crime and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, accompanied by weak and failing states and then resource conflicts\(^{160}\) perhaps explain the emerging security architecture that was evident in the first years of the millennium. However, where Defence Directives provide guidance is in identifying or providing security in a defence or military context. In sum, the programme and role of Defence Directives, still extant to the present, remain fundamental for the military security in Spain as the main source of policy direction and guidance.\(^{161}\) As will be discussed later in the chapter, this poses another challenge for the strategy at lower policy levels where DDNs and the National Strategy are at risk of collision and even fail to offer security.

### The EU, Member States and NATO Security Strategy

The process of redefining and delivering security has not been unique to contemporary Spain. The institutional reordering of defence and security across the world can be dated back to the end of the Cold War in 1990, however that is

\(^{160}\) These were the main issues outlined in the 1996 Defence Directive, a pivotal moment in Spain as it heralded the end of the PSOE’s 14 years in office and the start of the Popular Party’s eight years that would culminate in the Madrid train bombing and shock election defeat.

\(^{161}\) When researching the impact of the 2011 and 2013 security strategies within the Spanish military, it is apparent that in the initial years of 2011-2014 there is little evidence of engagement down the line in the single services, for example the Chief of Staff of the Spanish Army in 2015 referred to the National Defence Directive when outlining their main mission, not the National Security Strategy.
not to say that the process was a precise science or at all even. The experience of many nation-states of the European Union and UN’s early failures at peacekeeping in the former Yugoslavia demonstrated that an ad hoc and multinational peacekeeping approach to delivering regional security by national armed forces was inadequate.

NATO, the EU (and WEU as it was then known) had to go through a number of processes to arrive at the point today where they are able to engage in humanitarian and interventionist roles, which is something that had been barely envisaged only a decade earlier and learnt through a step process of operational experience and failure. In Europe’s sphere it was the 1992 Petersberg Tasks (undertaken by the WEU) that began transforming military activity to meet international security changes. In NATO’s case, after a period of adjustment and expansion to include some previous members of the disbanded Warsaw Pact, it was the launch of the 1999 New Strategic Concept, which only became formalised by the Atlantic Alliance at the end of the 1990s that saw a post-Cold war strategy finally emerge.

"The risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multidirectional, which makes them hard to predict and assess." (NATO, 1999).

Within the EU, somewhat focussed on its economic drive with the Single Market as its centrepiece at the start of the 1990s, change appeared with the aspiration of a Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP) as part of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. After more than a decade of negotiation and further treaties, the European Union meanwhile established its own security strategy in late 2003, in spite of being somewhat embattled by divisions over Iraq. It is noteworthy however, that this was driven in large part by the efforts of former Spanish foreign minister Javier Solana as EU High Representative (and former NATO Secretary General). Solana, perhaps after González, remains to this day one of the highest profile Spanish figures in EU circles and, as will be discussed, played a fundamental role in the creation of the 2011 Strategy.

In response to the events of 9/11, approaching expansion of membership and treaty developments, the EU adopted a Strategy in 2003 that centred on five strands:

- Terrorism
- Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
- Regional conflicts
- State failure
- Organised crime.

Whilst creation of strategy was relatively quick by Brussels’ standards, EU strategy was not clear about how it would deliver security with regard to these threats. This is identified as a recurring theme as regards both Spain and the UK’s own attempts at security strategies later in this chapter: threats are easy to identify, and in some cases to quantify, but the response and measurement of success remain unclear. It was apparent that, even by the late 1990s within policy circles, a process was being undertaken that saw comprehension of threats to states and international organisations significantly broaden.

The general response to the EU’s security strategy was muted (Cornish, 2005; Kaldor, 2007) it had virtually no policy impact on member states or the international environment. One factor here may be that the launch of the strategy coincided with the divisions over the invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition. From the perspective of Spain, or even the UK, the EU’s first foray into a broad security strategy was not a significant moment. This is perhaps due in part to the fast-moving turn of events and national responses, all of which differed at this time, and this is a recurring theme in the sense that the importance of establishing a security strategy is often undermined by international or domestic events, which require more attention than a document of (in the eyes of some actors) questionable utility to an elected politician. This issue is discussed with regard to the 2011 Strategy.

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163 Tickner’s Gender in International Relations marked a significant shift in understanding a broader shift in the definition of security at a time when a whole new sector was being redefined.
164 According to the Spanish MOD’s Strategic Studies Institute the EU Strategy lacked political will and resources from the outset (2011, p.8).
Whereas the US had begun a process of developing a security strategy some decades before European states and the EU, the events of 9/11 drove a new urgency over how western nation-states could respond to the changing strategic environment. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 may have marked the most obvious spur to action, but actually the ending of the Cold War was perhaps the initial driver in galvanising a shift in national security postures. The new era witnessed a transformation in the role of the UN Security Council, a sudden rise in peacekeeping and, for Europe, the emergence of problems from the collapse of Yugoslavia and break-up of the Soviet Union. In spite of significant deployments by UN and EU missions involving many EU and NATO states, prior to the 9/11 attacks in 2001 only the US had adopted a formal security strategy process (Ballesteros, 2016, p.14).

Reflecting on NATO, EU Security and Spain’s ‘National Strategy’

At this point, change had taken place in how security was being perceived, paradoxically this had occurred in two organisations somewhat more distant from national cultures than members or national institutions. These shifts in language and threat perceptions on the part of NATO and the EU showed little evidence of this being driven upwards from civil society, but reflected hard operational experience from the Balkan conflicts and the compromises over terrorism and Iraq (in the EU’s case). Therefore it is difficult to detect more than a change of emphasis or language on the part of these institutions.

Following 9/11, the first decade of the 21st century led to the EU, UK, France, and the Netherlands, among others, formally undertaking a structural appraisal of the precise nature of the security environment that their societies faced a decade after the end of the Cold War in the light of the rise in global terrorism. For states such as the UK and France this was effectively their first attempt at articulating what their strategy and its security requirements were away from a purely Defence-led model. As outlined earlier, Spain was part of a trend that was followed by not only the EU but also the NATO alliance members and even Chile (although Chile never formally adopted its own strategy). Most nation-states have never undertaken this transparent process. According to Ballesteros (2016), this development:

165 The US has a model of quadrennial security reviews, with a long standing National Security Council role within the Executive. This combined with the Separation of Powers where Congress has significant input into expenditure, military deployment and procurement means that a more formal process is well established.
Spain’s undertaking may (according to Ballesteros) have sounded progressive, but generally mirrored that of the UK. This could be attributed to the experience after decisions by both Prime Ministers in 2003 (Aznar and Blair) and was intrinsically marked by intervention in Iraq with the notorious implications for policy and debate in each political system soon after the events of 2003/4. Both Aznar and Blair articulated the need for a broader documented security strategy, although in Aznar’s case electoral defeat following the Madrid terror attacks in 2004 saw the project postponed, Spain’s political class did not appear ready for the political implications at that point of documenting and engaging with wider society in establishing a national strategy.

The eventual timing of both the UK and Spain’s security strategies indicates that the process was undertaken in a similar scenario. It was not until 2007 that the UK took on its first formal security strategy and even this was in the context of Blair having stepped down as Prime Minister. In Spain’s case the process was underpinned by the decision outlined previously by the PP Prime Minister to conduct, though not commence, a security review. At this stage it is worth recalling the polemic surrounding foreign and defence policy that had marked Spain’s relationship with NATO and the west, with Spain’s membership of NATO taking almost 15 years to resolve following accession in 1982 (accompanied by the divisive referendum in 1986) and it was only settled by the Popular Party (PP) government in 1997.

It is useful to focus on the concept of a national strategy in a security context. The actual term strategy is unclear, and the word features in a broad gamut of policy contexts, as in economic strategy, through to industrial strategy and more. This all points to the fact that the term is either misused or has evolved to make it almost meaningless in a longer term or broader study. Leaving the vagaries of Francoist foreign policy to one side, more contemporary writers (Simón, 2013, Colom, 2016) appear pessimistic regarding the capacity of to
create a strategy able to horizon-spot, prioritise and respond to change and this supports the idea of importing a strategy as a solution.

Arteaga (2007, p.4) writes “national security strategies are a new process’, going on to describe Spain as having “no strategic culture. Ballesteros meanwhile, argues that strategies:

“resulta imprescindible definir el concepto de seguridad nacional, teniendo en cuenta que no existe una definición universalmente aceptada”(Ballesteros, 2016, p.14).

This was accompanied by the fact that by the time of the period leading up to the creation of 2011 Strategy there were few positive portents that Spain was entering a period of improved international standing, and this at a time when the PSOE was still recovering from a difficult relationship with the Bush presidency in the highly charged atmosphere that ensued after Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq.169

In spite of Spain’s difficult international situation in agreeing policy at a national level, let alone engaging with civil society on the topic, influential commentators (Bardaji 2003, Arteaga 2005, and Ballesteros, 2016) pointed to a clear need for an outcome in Spain where “que se inspiren y encuadren las estrategias de cada ministerio, de forma que todas ellas estén alineadas para alcanzar los objetivos fijados por aquella.”170 This represented a move shared by nation-states after 9/11 to understand and construct what security meant in the changed security environment. In the immediate aftermath, these outcomes tended to be knee-jerk reactions, and some pointed to the fact171 that little actually changed for Spain’s security.

From the perspective of vocabulary and rhetoric Bardaji & Cosido (2003) identified a repositioning of national priorities, using language and terminology that implied change, but on the whole literature and evidence from the time is scant. Given the position of both sets of writers (both of whom have contributed to government policy in the past) it is subsequently clear that there existed some capacity to deliver a strategy beyond a single defence view almost a decade

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168 “appears essential to crystallise the concept of national security, bearing in mind that there is no universally accepted definition”.
169 In interviews with policy advisors it was stated that Zapatero was personally blamed by the US administration for the rhetoric and nature of the withdrawal from Iraq.
170 “…the strategies of every ministry are inspired and framed in such a way that they are in step on the way to achieving the goals marked out by them” (Ballesteros 2016, p.15).
171 Comments made in a seminar on Spain’s foreign and security policy held at the University of Liverpool 2002, attended by the author and led by Spain’s Foreign Minister Dastis (2012-17).
earlier, yet in interview (Bardaji) the delay was identified as being the result of bureaucratic politics that have been a perennial feature of the modern Spanish state (Heywood, 1999).

**The Sanedrín Process – a Possible Forerunner to Strategy?**

Another little known predecessor from the 1990s was an *ad hoc* coordination arrangement between the Defence and Foreign Ministries (Cosido & Bardaji and Pitarch)\(^{172}\), cited as the “Sanedrín” process, whereby policy-makers, military personnel and ministers would coordinate matters of defence, security and foreign policy, although this was seen to collapse and stop at the end of the PSOE government in 2011. There is little reference to the Sanedrín in formal publications or analysis, but Pitarch argues it was a useful and functional way of resolving policy differences in an informal manner. It is difficult to read much into the rise and fall of the Sanedrín process, but overcoming the bureaucratic stove-piping\(^ {173}\) that exists in defence and security is easy to discern. Further (very recent) developments in relations between the Foreign Affairs and Defence ministries seem to indicate reduced cooperation between these two significant actors in Spain’s national security policy, which may be in part a product of the shifts currently ongoing in Spain.\(^ {174}\) In spite of the divisions over Iraq, there were grounds within ministries to believe progress could be made.

Effectively, the period after 9/11 witnessed a surge in militarised activity in response to perceived threats from global terrorism and on the part of the US, the main protagonist in the struggle, symbols of military power, securitisation of borders and a media message of America at War. Across the Atlantic, there was inevitably a different impact as although sympathetic and affected by the events of 9/11, European societies, which were affected in a different way by the attacks responded in similar ways (with securitised borders, identity policy and immigration controls) but the shift in security is less apparent in national policy. In effect, whilst citizens may have felt less secure, in Spain’s case, apart from the

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\(^{172}\) Internet discussion groups such as *el blog de Pitarch* offer a useful Spanish forum for debating and understanding policy in the area of defence, security and foreign affairs.

\(^{173}\) Stove-piping refers to the vertical nature of information flows in security and intelligence where material and analysis is not shared effectively leading to fragmented and ineffective decisions.

\(^{174}\) At the end of 2016, the re-election of the PP government was accompanied by a closing of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Ministries to external researchers such as myself. This included the ending of inter-ministry exchange posts between the two Ministries. This was discussed in interview and was seen as a domestic political concern rather than a strategic necessity and would lead to less sharing of information.
push to war in Iraq by the Aznar government, national security policy did promptly change its general language and purpose in the immediate term.

National Defence Directives: the Predecessors to Security Strategy

As has been the case in other states (such as the UK and France), it is in defence policy that the antecedent to broader national security strategies can be traced. These offer useful insights into the changing perceptions, language and content of defence and security prior to the research period under study. Instituted back in the early 1980s, the oversight of Spain’s Defence through National Defence Directives (Directivas de Defensa Nacional DDNs) was a product of the prevailing political situation, in that civilian control was incrementally exerted over what had been a Francoist military institution. In this model, which was reliant on a strong executive (in this case the PM), and with a relatively constrained civilian defence minister, Spain established a programme of quadrennial Defence statements.

Distributed openly, DDNs marked a gradual democratisation and reform of defence policy, some aspects reflecting Spain’s long history of isolation and neutrality, as well as its geography. In many ways, this meant that traditionally, and to some extent today, Spain’s international posture reflects domestic political and practical concerns. This situation is not so unusual with regard to foreign policy in many nations, where foreign policy is normally driven by domestic concerns (Hill, 2003, p. 219). In this case, DDNs chart a programme of gradual liberalisation, capability enhancement and improvement from a base of significant political and military uncertainty.

Defence Directives follow a routine process, a focus on an identification of threats and possible risks, with the subsequent response by the organisations of the Ministry of Defence, endorsed by the executive. Whilst there may have been little of a far-reaching security strategy within this model, as previous sources have indicated, Spain has never favoured strategies, and outputs such as the Libro Blanco176 (White Book) and the DDN of 2000, 2004 and 2008 all set the scene of what I argue is a gradual process towards a national strategy. The

175 Even subordinating the Armed Forces to a civilian was seen as controversial in the early days of the transition. This created a legacy where subsequent defence ministers have tended to be subordinated to the executive within the political system (Bardaji, 2003, p.2).
176 The Libro Blanco (White Book, published 2000) was an interim publication produced by the Defence Ministry in the light of the re-election of the PP (with a majority) that year, it sits somewhat uneasily alongside the DDN that same year.
quadrennial DDNs offer a snapshot into Spain’s emerging postures. A summary evaluation identifies a similar structure to DDNs as an identification of the main changes or events in the world, a summary of any extant threats, and the policy outcome for Spain’s Armed Forces and Defence Ministry. Examining DDNs since the 1990s, there has been an emerging picture of threats, risks and national interests over the last 20 years that chart aspects of Spain’s particular experience of security which clearly reflect aspects of the constructivist interpretation.


“La concepción estratégica española, en la que se inscriben la acción exterior y la defensa de los intereses nacionales, representa la manera global que los españoles tenemos de entender nuestro papel en el mundo, de afirmarnos como nación en el tablero internacional y de definir nuestra vocación a partir de nuestros condicionantes geográficos, razones históricas, realidad política y proyectos de futuro”. Libro Blanco de Defensa (2000)177

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177 “The Spanish strategic viewpoint, which embraces action abroad and the defence of national interests, represents the global way we Spaniards have of understanding our role in the world, of asserting ourselves as a nation in the international arena and defining our outlook based on our geographical influences, historical reasons, political facts and future projects”. Spanish Ministry of Defence, Defence White Paper 2000 http://www.resdal.org/Archivo/d0000128.htm, [accessed 17 Feb 17].
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main theme(s)</th>
<th>2000 DDN</th>
<th>2000 <em>Libro Blanco</em> (White Paper)</th>
<th>2004 DDN</th>
<th>2008 DDN</th>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping missions</td>
<td>Globalisation, Defence cooperation</td>
<td>The Use of Force</td>
<td>Directed need for security strategy</td>
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<td>International Security Organisations</td>
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<td>Threats: 1. WMD proliferation 2. General conflict 3. Inequality between nations</td>
<td>Recognition of human security aspects (basic needs, climate)</td>
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<td>Threats: 1. Internal conflicts</td>
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<td>Threats 1. Terrorism 2. WMD</td>
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<th>Spain's National Response</th>
<th>Shared security and collective defence</th>
<th>’Conceptualisation’ of Spanish Strategy</th>
<th>Pre-eminence of legality</th>
<th>Response with non-military actors</th>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>'Vital' &amp; 'Strategic’ interests</td>
<td>EU Defence cooperation endorsed</td>
<td>EU and NATO subordinate to UN</td>
<td>Pan-governmental support role for military</td>
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<td>A ”culture of defence in society” promoted</td>
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<td>Parliamentary approval for action reinforced</td>
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| Background to the document | Culmination of NATO integration, Fully professional military EU more active in foreign and security | Professionalisation of military¹⁷⁸ Election of PP in 2000 with own majority in the Cortes for first time | Promulgated after the Iraq invasion & subsequent vote after Madrid attack Emphasis on 'changing mentality' of defence | Re-election of PSOE government |

| Further Remarks | This year was the culmination of a 1990s modernisation of Spain’s Military (*Plan Norte*) | The *Libro Blanco* and the DDN 2000 sit uneasily together in this year; they technically compete with each other. | This DDN was produced launched following the Madrid train bombings and electoral defeat of PP | This was the most recent DDN before the launch of the 2011 Strategy. |

¹⁷⁸ Under the PP, the decision was taken to end compulsory military service. *La mili*, as it was known, was universally disliked by participants and the decision that was taken to end it prematurely as part of cost savings and a modernisation programme and was popular with young voters. The changing role and official language behind conscription can be charted and appreciated in official publications such as the *Revista Española de Defensa*.  

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An immediate impression of timeframe is that there was no shortage of initiatives to reform Spain’s defence and security posture. One aspect is the aspiration to assist international security in this period. Even as far back as the 1990s, the requirement for international missions was evident. For example, in 1996, some months before the election of the PP government, the Directive that year identified new issues in the form of the emergence of non-state actors, the requirement for a formalised peacekeeping role for Spain’s Armed Forces, and the ability to provide:

 “…a deterrence, readiness and response in order to permanently guarantee its sovereignty and independence, its territorial integrity and its constitutional order, as well as to protect lives, peace, liberty, and the prosperity of Spaniards and national interests wherever they are found.” (Government of Spain, National Defence Directive, 1996).

As early as 1996’s Directive there is evidence of a process that broadened beyond a military strategy, where there is a focus on liberty, prosperity and national interests among others. Therefore, with Defence Directives, security in its broadest guise was already being discussed at the national policy level, albeit within the confines of a traditional defence model. This was not unique to Spain, but in effect reflected that a capacity to transform Spain’s security perspective was not new and demonstrates some ability by national institutions to adopt a more pre-emptive approach than a simple defence-based model, in effect, paving the way for a broader more nuanced approach to security.

The observations to be drawn from DDNs (and other initiatives) is that a short analysis identifies the significant broadening of security at the end of the Cold War. In effect, the capacity of Spain’s defence policy-makers to appreciate and construct broader security norms is greater than some would imagine. The process, may have remained an internal process (with plans, directives and reforms) but, as the table shows, the state’s comprehension of security had undergone change. It is unclear however and a topic for possible future research as to the input of groups, interests and norms at this time.

**The Impact of 9/11**

Formal Spanish strategy in the 21st century remained weak or opaque at the start of the millennium, what can be drawn at this point is that the relationship between strategy and Katzenstein’s *environment* (the cultural context) is
uncertain, there is little evidence of engagement on the part of Defence interests with non-state actors or non-traditional interests.

For Spain, having endured decades of ETA terrorism, a traditional threat of domestic terrorism was now supplanted by international terrorism following a low-tech, highly visible attack on one of the world’s most powerful nation-states. Islamic terrorism until then, was little known in Spain’s popular perceptions, but one considered relevant since the end of the Cold War by elements within the Spanish security community. With the emergence of Al Qaida and related groups from the mid-1990s, the threat from terrorism had become more nebulous, with a message, not about a specific political change but instead one that aimed to terrr disseminate Western audiences and paradoxically would benefit from the globalisation of finance and the movement of people in this period. (Burke 2004). As the 2011 Strategy states:

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`International terrorist organisations, especially Al Qaeda-type Jihadist movements, benefit from certain features of the new global society'
(Government of Spain, 2011, p. 41)
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The Strategy offers little insight into the global society identified, in particular what the `certain features’ were. How this then relates to changes from the previous decade which supported the invasion of Iraq, or even the evolution from intervention in Kosovo in 1999 is unclear. Yet it is worth noting that Rajoy (the Partido Popular’s PM 2011-8) was Interior Minister at the time of the 9/11 attacks and had in fact found himself at the forefront of Spain’s domestic response to the unexpected new developments.

Al Qaida’s propaganda message had had a significant impact on popular perceptions in Spain, where hostile narratives by terrorist groups had not been either pre-empted or considered in DDNs, or in any other security policy for that matter. The group’s concept of the `Caliphate’ referenced a historic Islamic empire which had actually taken in Spain, and was well-understood in a country’s education system which celebrated its greatness with the rule of

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179 Defence Directives since the mid-1990s have referred to international terrorism, while in addition publications such as the Revista Española de Defensa among others have documented national efforts by Spain’s security forces to support multi-national efforts since the early 1990s.
180 The 1999 NATO Operation Allied Force divided many European societies. For Spain, with echoes of the demands of Basque separatists, a US-led mission that appeared to support Albanian Kosovars’ demands for separation from Serbia was domestically difficult for Madrid. The fact that it also lacked clear UNSC authority concerned policy-makers and would serve to create the precedent for supporting the US over Iraq.
181 Burke’s Al Qaida (2003) explains the emergence of this concept and the rise of the Al Qa’ida group.
Ferdinand and Isabella of Castille, the monarchs who oversaw Imperial Spain, the recapture of significant tracts of territory from the Moors, and the recuperation of Christian Spain.

Domestic events also played an impact, in 2000 a large scale outbreak of racial tensions and violence in El Ejido (in the South’s Almería province) had generated national debate over the treatment and status of migrant African workers. Coupled with a series of terrorist attacks against western visitors in Tunisia and Morocco (two countries with which Spain has very close ties), the threat of terror and the reference to Caliphates were increasingly taken up by Spain’s media who, in the early part of the decade, had proved pivotal in developing narratives regarding the Bush Presidency, Perejil Island, and of course the invasion of Iraq. Therefore, the events of 9/11 were a huge shock to Spain’s polity, the assertion of this chapter is that Spain was vulnerable to shocks of this kind\textsuperscript{182}, it had a history of tension with unstable southern neighbours, in popular culture Islam was not well understood and the Al Qaida message of Caliphates touched upon a national psyche with cultural associations.

By the time of the infamous Azores summit (March 2003), where Aznar joined Blair in committing his country to supporting the US invasion of Iraq, events such as 9/11 and a number of developments (terrorist and other) had rendered the assumptions of the 2000 DDN and the \textit{Libro Blanco} antiquated. As chapter 3 outlines, what was most pertinent in this period in the wake of the Madrid bomb attack of March 2004 was that security as a policy goal in itself had become contested. Whilst the EU convergence programme and NATO integration policy of the PP had delivered some institutional change, in reality, Spain perhaps appeared less secure from violence at the level of the individual citizen than at any point in its modern democratic history as a result of the decisions of the PP government to pursue domestic security through foreign policy decisions. This was further complicated by a disconnect between the culture and policy as outlined in the Katzenstein model.

The 2011 National Security Strategy – \textit{la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional}

In retrospect, the publication of a strategy offers an opportunity to identify the key narratives, interests and norms in Spain’s security thinking. Prior to the launch of

\textsuperscript{182} Interviews with Defence officials (Juan Moliner, Dec 2011, Enrique Fojon Sep 2015) and also the events of the Atocha bomb in 2004 demonstrated that Spain was both unprepared and vulnerable to a mass-casualty terrorist attack.
the 2011 Strategy there already existed a system of National Defence Directives
that had identified vital and strategic interests, while also acknowledging threats
to the Spanish nation-state. The 2011 National Security Strategy was an attempt
at broadening security through the above approach but by tackling this based on
the risk posed by threats. This section will address the approach taken by this
strategy with a look at the structure and methodology, which incorporate a
number of shortfalls that appear to have been addressed following analysis of
the 2013 Strategy. It must be made clear that the Strategy was an internally
generated document with only limited input by aspects of civil society.

Some eight years after the first attempt under the Aznar government to frame a
national security strategy, the creation of the 2011 Strategy was the culmination
of eight years of uneven, and at times ponderous, activity. Aznar’s aspiration
of a bipartisan and enduring approach had succumbed to the damaging divisions
following the Madrid terrorist bombings and impact of the election defeat a few
days later in 2004. Highlighted as a future requirement in the 2008 Defence
Directive, along with commentaries by advisors to both the Socialist and Popular
Party, the Strategy’s emergence in 2011 not only represented the shift in thinking
that had happened some 10 years earlier (if not before) with the Sanedrín
process, but also reversed a decades-long trend of the gradually declining
influence of Defence ministers.

When looking back on events and Madrid’s diplomacy, many celebrate the
achievements of Spain’s insertion into the world (Gillespie, 2000; Story, 1996;
and Ross, 2007) and frame it as a normalisation of relations, but the fact remains
that Spain approached the process only tentatively, with a government in later
years under siege from protest movements and the depths of the worst
recession seen in modern Spain. Furthermore, the later period was marked by a
difficult relationship between the PSOE government and Washington. The
election of Barack Obama at the end of 2008 enabled some progress for Spain
but in essence, as the strategy began to be formed, the ties to the US remained
poor and in some ways still remain a work in progress. Published in the summer
of 2011, in the last few months of the PSOE administration and during a period
of significant upheaval, the Strategy opened with a confident tone:

183 Interviewees on this topic (Bardají, Arteaga and within the Defence Ministry) refer to the PSOE
government as not making the Strategy a policy priority, and ultimate events were attributed as
occupying more of policy-makers’ time and attention than writing a strategy.
“This strategy has been conceived with a national, European, international and global perspective, and from the standpoint of Spain’s standing as a medium-sized power with a specific profile and important comparative advantages”. National Security Strategy (2011, p.1)

Consisting of 81 pages, 21,000 words addressed through six concepts, the document was published simultaneously in both Spanish and English and is structured in a methodical, functionalist manner. It outlines the aim of the Strategy in a brief executive summary and then devotes a significant proportion to the challenges and issues facing the Spanish nation-state. The response (strategic lines of operation) relates directly to an identified threat or risk. The most appropriate way to highlight some key aspects of the Strategy is by condensing the contents into the tabular format below.

Analysis of the 2011 Strategy is divided into two parts; a look at policy or strategic outcomes followed by a discussion of risks, threats and `multipliers’. It is worth considering that Spain’s was the last in a line of strategies articulated by the US, the UN, the EU, NATO’s strategic concept, the UK, France and the Netherlands.

**Figure 8: Overview of the 2011 National Security Strategy**

(compiled by author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) Product or feature</th>
<th>(b) Outcome</th>
<th>(c) Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naming of vital interests</td>
<td><strong>Vital interests</strong> — fundamental rights of life, liberty and democracy. Welfare and development of Spanish people and state Sovereignty, territorial integrity, constitutional order and economic security</td>
<td>It is unclear as to the difference between the <code>vital’ and </code>strategic’ interests. These are also drawn from DDNs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naming of strategic interests</td>
<td><strong>Strategic interests</strong> — Peaceful and safe environment Consolidation and functioning of EU International order Freedom of exchange and communication Constructive relations with neighbours</td>
<td>See above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>`Six concepts of security policy’</td>
<td>• <strong>Comprehensive approach</strong></td>
<td>The UK adopted a `comprehensive approach’ back in the late 1990s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Encapsulating the content is not straightforward, yet there is an evident attempt by the Strategy to meet national interests, responses and organisational outcomes through a structure similar to that of the UK and other western nations. The use of ‘vital’ and ‘strategic’ interests demonstrates a continuation of concepts from the Defence Directives and whilst much of the language appears to be from the hard security school of analysis, there is evidence of broadened conceptualisation as the next section shows.

The definition of interest in the Strategy document, although not clarified, differs from Katzenstein’s model, however the content of vital interests (column b)

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184 See chapter 7 of the thesis for a discussion of Katzenstein’s discussion of interests.
names certain issues. These point to a broadening of security such as `welfare and development', `economic security' and liberty and democracy. When considered in the context of Spain's cultural context of austerity, huge jumps in unemployment, continuing terrorism then there is evidently a flow between the context and the Strategy.

**The Identification of Threats, Risks and Responses**

By its very nature, a Strategy is a response or policy towards a situation or problem (whether military or not). Spain's approach identifies 10 categories of risk and threats, although how they split out from each other is not immediately apparent. In conventional terms, a risk relates to the possibility or likelihood of a threat occurring, whereas the threat is the actual event or act in question. As the Strategy then outlines each threat and risk, these are then accompanied or reacted to by a response or *line of operation*. The very term "line of operation" is a NATO mission word to describe an activity or response, showing again the idea that Spain has imported aspects of its security Strategy from other military-related themes both inside and outside Spain and this a key to interpreting the Strategy approach, although there is clear evidence of broadened security, the main approach is still, largely military themed, in spite of the political context of the Zapatero government.

**Figure 9: Threats and Risks in the 2011 Strategy**
(compiled by author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat and Risk [strategy fails to explain how these relate to interests]</th>
<th>Response or Strategic Line of Operation [these are inconsistent in their response]</th>
<th>Risk Multipliers [this relationship is unclear]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Armed conflict</td>
<td>Peace-building with conflict anticipation, prevention and management</td>
<td>1. Globalisation’s ‘drawbacks’ Demographic imbalances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Institutional and organisational reform as part of counter-terrorism strategy</td>
<td>2. Poverty &amp; inequality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organised crime</td>
<td>Organisational reform and coordination</td>
<td>3. Climate change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial &amp; economic insecurity</td>
<td>Promoting economic development Mitigating market imbalances Combating criminal activities Financial Stability Committee</td>
<td>4. Perils of technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Radical &amp; non-democratic ideologies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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185 The 2011 strategy claims “neither ETA nor Jihadist terrorism has the capability to destabilize the rule of law or democracy in our country”, which could be construed as a statement of hope rather than fact, and also recognises that terrorism does have some limits.
The briefest analysis of the threat-risk approach identifies a response that offers what appears to be a rational, achievable policy reaction. No threat or risk appears insurmountable, perhaps reflecting the need to reassure Spanish society, in that the state has a need to be seen as able to guarantee security.

Another element, which offers some confusion is the impact of risk multipliers. According to the Strategy these have an effect on the threats and risks that exist, but lack an adequate explanation as to how they directly impact on that threat (or risk) to Spain. In summary, certain aspects of the Strategy are not explicit.

The impact of the threat from a cyber-attack or failure is a useful example of how the Strategy has delivered in innovative areas. Although dating back to the 1990s, the impact of a cyber-threat (as it is known in the document) is a clear example of a non-military response to a non-traditional security threat. In this case, a range of solutions are proffered through legal, judicial and institutional means, and to the benefit of measurement, a method of quantification is provided.

**Observations of the 2011 Strategy**

The 21,000 words of the 2011 Security Strategy, coming in the dying months of the PSOE administration and at a time of social challenge from the Indignados, persistent economic problems and fragmentation of political support for the governing party, meant its launch was not heralded with significant fanfare or much publicity. The document was promulgated in the mid-summer (always a quiet time in Spain’s political culture and policy administration) and was not covered extensively or analysed in depth.\(^\text{186}\) Spain’s Cortes, the key instrument

\(^{186}\) Some output was disseminated routinely by think-tanks and there were also some column inches in the national media, but generally the coverage was restricted, one theory could be that the lack of interest was intentional.
for scrutinising the executive, only addressed the Strategy’s publication some months later, and this in turn largely went unnoticed in the ferment of the election campaign that autumn which heralded the fall of the PSOE.

According to Katzenstein’s model, a policy (or strategy) reflects interests, identities and the cultural environment. As outlined in chapter 7, Spain’s Constitution does not facilitate clear institutional accountability in any clear approach to defence (or security), and, as will be discussed later, the relative weakness of Spain’s legislature in the security policy process makes the input of elected representatives on behalf civil society, or interests less effective.

The Strategy’s risks and threats model, similar in scope to the UK approach, bears out a continuity in policy, with the traditional or hard security threats being most prominent. In a number of ways there appears to be a continuous thread that runs from the DDN structure where vital/strategic interests, the risk/threat approach and the underlying military theme are discussed. These constitute the state-led threats that a national security policy would address, such as terrorism and armed conflict.

Where there is a shift towards a re-think is with respect to natural disasters and catastrophes. Whilst these are nothing new, they are embodied in the experience of the 2004 Christmas Tsunami in Asia, Hurricane Katrina’s impact in New Orleans in 2005 and, closer to home, the 2011 earthquake in Spain (Lorca), all of which demonstrated the vulnerability of human security and in some cases called for significant state (military and non-military) assistance, and the impact that these can have on particular communities or groups in a society.

Perhaps of most significance is the suggestion that economic insecurity is a threat worthy of consideration in a national strategy. In Spain’s case this is a reflection of the times (see the previous chapter) and the awareness of the impact of recession perhaps articulates the new thinking that has emerged, with national security and economic well-being being seen in the same context for the first time. As the 2011 Strategy states:

“Economic security is integral and essential to national security. A sustainable economic model is the basis of social stability and provides the resources necessary for security” (Government of Spain 2011, p.48)

The creation of a financial intelligence organisation is another reflects changing attitudes and responsiveness to new securities, with a body whose remit is to
“…analyse and provide relevant timely and useful economic, financial and business information to support the actions of the State and enable better decision making… it will contribute to State security tasks by helping to identify and prevent actions that are contrary to Spain’s economic, financial, technological and commercial interests in strategic sectors” (Government of Spain, 2011, p.51).

However, as will be discussed later in the chapter, this capacity to ‘prevent actions’ was unclear and in some ways remains politicised as an issue, the impact of the economy on people’s individual livelihoods, essentially being securitised by the *indignados* movement demanded more than a state led response to actions contrary to the state’s interest. One of the arguments about the *indignados* (Ekhlund, 2015) was that the state was too responsive to the interests of bank and finance groups in contrast to the needs of its individual citizens.

Factors in the Strategy that exacerbated the threats to Spain are less innovative, or have been previously anticipated in DDNs. Globalisation, wealth distribution and technological proliferation are more long-standing, having roots in Spain’s agenda of the 1990s or even earlier, as works broadening the definitions of security have demonstrated, and so on initial impression the 2011 Strategy has an incomplete or rushed feel to it. There are similarities to the UK’s first attempted NSS of 2008 which coincided with the transfer of power from Blair’s resignation to Brown’s assumption of office in 2007. That document itself only lasted a little over two years, whereupon a more rounded and considered product was launched following a change of government in 2010.

Whilst a thread can be seen to continue from DDNs (and there were certainly new topics in terms of threats and risks), the empiricism behind the threats is unclear (see Fig. 3). For example, there is little consistency behind the assumptions of the relationship between risks, threats, lines of action and risk multipliers.187 Although a technical observation, the questions raised by such categorisation imply that there is a lack of completeness to the analysis.

Strategy tends to be driven by a balancing of accepted risks and associated costs, and according to Gardner (2009, p.74), who made a study of risks and fear in policy-making:

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187 Conceptually a passing reference is made that risk multipliers can influence and transform risks and threats (but to what end remains uncertain).
“If it costs little to protect against a low probability/high consequence event, it’s worth paying up. But if it costs a lot, we may be better off putting the money into other priorities — reducing other risks, for example — and taking our chances.” (Gardner, 2009, p.74).

The lack of a measurable assessment of probability or consequences makes the process appear less transparent. Such attempts at empiricism are admittedly difficult but do highlight a route to arriving at certain decisions. The 2010 UK Strategy has a very clear, unambiguous model that is easy to interpret and assists in understanding why cyber-threats, for example, are prioritised.

The 2011 Spanish Strategy does not offer an explanation or prioritisation of threats that could have been expected of a national document. Strategies, by their very nature require informed analysis, and this would aid national policy in choosing among competing options with finite resources. According to Edmunds (2012, p.272), in this process Spain was not alone in taking on ‘increased use of risk assessment and management methodologies…one of the most striking features of contemporary western defence and security thinking.” However, in the case of the 2011 Strategy, the approach appears incomplete. This was also a criticism levelled at other countries’ experiences of quantifying risk and remains an issue of debate beyond the period and scope of this study.

With regard to an emerging idea of a `security culture’ the rises of `new’ security matters of energy vulnerability, uncontrolled migration, critical infrastructure, financial and economic security, and emergencies/natural disasters. These represent a broadening of security in the 2011 Strategy and, in terms of Buzan’s sectors (1998), can tally with the issues of energy security, human security, environmental security and economic security. In this context, military and traditional security responses have very little place in delivering a result and, as argued earlier, while such approaches were not new and Spain’s response in the form of institutional and organisational methods offers a very state-led feel, the input of non-governmental and third sector actors is less evident. The intention to deliver security through the private sector is passingly referred to as “crucial…[it] can provide important capabilities, such as global presence, technological expertise and economic, material and human resources” (Government of Spain, 2011, p.49).

Organisational Restructuring and the 2011 Security Strategy
Given the pressures and expectations raised by the launch of a new process and methodology for delivering national security, the executive functions are a natural point to start and an attempt at innovation can be seen with the creation of the Consejo Español del Seguridad (Spanish Security Council). This was to be nominally chaired by the King but located within the Moncloa, the seat of the Prime Minister, and in turn further influenced by the Executive Secretary coming on board from the role of Director del Gabinete de la Presidencia del Gobierno (Chief of Staff of the Prime Minister’s Office).

In effect, the structure nominally places the responsibility for security with the Prime Minister’s power base at the Moncloa. This reinforces executive control by the PM of the process and undermines individual activities such as stove-piping. Interviews with officials in the Defence Ministry expressed disappointment with centralisation of control away from what was traditionally an area of Defence’s interest.

**Figure 10: The Organisational Structure of Spain’s National Security Strategy**

(Taken and adapted from Spain’s 2011 Security Strategy)

The creation of the National Security Council (NSC) is perhaps the single biggest organisational innovation of the 2011 Strategy. With a similar body created in the UK in 2008, and the long-standing US equivalent having a high-profile role in international politics, there is evidence of policy import, which is a relatively new concept in Spain. The 2011 Strategy is ambiguous about Spain’s new NSC, perhaps anticipating a period of ‘bedding in’ or at least in response to the
direction of an incoming government, but as the next section shows, the Strategy would be subject to some reform. The location of the Support Unit within the Prime Minister’s Office indicates that the executive is firmly in control of the activities of the Security Council. While the position may be adequate from a functional perspective, the fact that the Council is both presided over and located within the Prime Minister’s domain points to a strongly centralised policy process. This matter will be discussed in the final chapter.

Aspirations to drawing in a broader range of actors in drawing up the Strategy shows a wish to consider non-state contributions from non-state organisations. Spain’s think-tanks have been credited with a significant amount of input into the NSS writing process. Javier Solana, perhaps Spain’s most prominent figure in NATO and the EU’s security policy, also played a very significant role. In many ways, the output has the hallmarks of both the EU and UK Security Strategy, and in interview this was confirmed. The UK, being a former colonial power, facing a domestic terrorist problem and having a strong tendency to look outside the EU can provide some useful indicators, but it is very much through a Spanish lens that analysis is best achieved.

The Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) and the Royal Elcano Institute (Real Instituto Elcano, RIE) are among the two most prominent think tanks within Spain and represent the input that non-governmental organisations are able to contribute, having played a contributory role in the 2011 Strategy. Both are well-established, internationally recognised NGOs with strong research in the fields of Spain’s overseas relations. The RIE could be considered closer to the established actors given that it receives funding and patronage from the Spanish state, whilst CIDOB is Barcelona-based and has links to both the Catalan administration and the Catalan party equivalent of the PSOE. Discussion of the role think tanks can and do play in Spain will be discussed in the concluding chapter, but in this case the limited role NGOs have traditionally played in policy appears to be changing positively, in that a more mature approach is settling in.

188 CIDOB.org and realinstitutoelcano.org offer a useful overview of the work, activities and roles of both organisations. Other NGOs do exist but are considered of lesser importance. A future area of study would be that of the role played in foreign and security policy-making by Spanish NGOs.
In summary, the chapter’s conclusion as regards the 2011 Security Strategy is that it should have been better considered. A decade prior to it, academics such as Arteaga or Bardaji were echoed by Aznar, the PM, in calling for a national strategy. The polemic nature of Spain’s foreign, defence and security policy perhaps explains why its creation was slow to materialise. Interviews had indicated that, although the aspiration existed to conduct the strategy process, it was never treated as a priority, as among other factors, ministerial rivalry dictated inaction, which was compounded by the fact that Zapatero, the PSOE Prime Minister, had never been a strong advocate of a national strategy.\textsuperscript{189}

It is therefore the contention of this chapter that the 2011 National Security Strategy, the first formal Security Strategy in contemporary Spain, represented a radical break with previous models of security planning and strategy. The launch of the process, which had been intended to have a duration of five to 10 years before further review, mirrors some of the experiences of other countries when undertaking such an activity (such as the UK) and in many ways subsequent reviews have occurred far quicker than had been anticipated at the outset. Interviews with a number of individuals expressed some irritation that their input as ‘traditional’ deliverers of defence and security had not been heeded. This was recently reinforced in interviews with other officials who felt that both the 2011 and 2013 strategies represented a “loss” for the Defence Ministry.

**Spain’s Security Following the 2011 Strategy**

2011 was unlikely to be an opportune time for Spain to formally produce a national strategy. Global events, domestic matters (so important in gaining the support and backing in such a contentious area) and the anticipated end of the PSOE/Zapatero government indicated that what could have been a leap forward in strategic planning, policy making and resource allocation was unlikely to be either well received or achieve its aim of delivering a safer Spain for the next five to 10 years.

In spite of the length of time it took to produce Spain’s first formal security strategy: from originally being an aspiration of PM Aznar in 2003 to reaching fruition in 2011 after seven years of PSOE rule, the first attempt was flawed from its inception in the summer of 2011. As has already been argued, the rise of

\textsuperscript{189} According to Bruneau (2009, p.260) and interviews with Arteaga and Bardaji, Zapatero’s indifference to foreign and security policy was a key reason for the delay in producing the Security Strategy.
political mass-mobilisation, the near economic collapse of Spain’s economy after 2008 and a PSOE government on the defensive in the face of defeat in 2011 all meant that any meaningful attempt at a strategy with a scope of “one decade…reviewed every five years” (2011, p.1) appears nowadays as optimistic.

Criticisms were based on assumptions that it was short term, and lacked broad popular support. Furthermore, its publication in the last summer of the PSOE administration meant that its relevance could be questioned given that the government was in its last months. As the Arab Spring extended out from Tunisia to envelop the Maghreb, Mashreq and Gulf states during what was already a tumultuous year for Spain and the EU’s Mediterranean states, what was a rather academic document that also lacked support from a broad political base seemed to be of questionable relevance when the whole context was in such a state of flux.

As Colom states “…[it] received a lukewarm welcome because of its strategic indefinition, conceptual ambiguity and limited applicability…ineffective, neither framing Spanish security policy nor guiding a military transformation” (Colom, 2016, p.9)

By the end 2011, as the Arab Spring became a serious challenge to regimes across the Arab world, and with the PSOE’s credibility in sharp decline, Spain was literally at ‘a time of acute domestic crisis, certainly the worst since the end of the Franco dictatorship’ (Molina, 2013, p.3). Domestic instability was not unique to Spain and across the EU the Arab Spring was accompanied by significant rises in illegal migration and a rekindled fear of Islamic terrorism. In response to the lacklustre enthusiasm for the 2011 Strategy and the ongoing seismic issues in the Arab world, it is unsurprising therefore that the new PP government was keen to indicate that further strategy was in the pipeline.

A new Defence Directive (DDN) launched in the early months of the PP government (in 2012) maintained some commitment to the process but pledged the incumbent government to a further Security Strategy, and also highlighted the strength of the four-yearly DDN system. In effect, the ongoing approach of Directives can provide direction or indication in the absence of a new formal

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190 By the end of 2011, Gaddafi had been overthrown and killed in the Libyan civil war and Mubarak had been toppled in Egypt, while Ben Ali in Tunisia was also removed. The vulnerability of long-standing Arab regimes had been exposed and in a number of cases had produced violent civil unrest and war — notably in Syria — whose war which is now synonymous with producing global terrorism.
strategy. As will be discussed there are some reasons to be optimistic with regards to future direction within Spanish security policy.

The success of the PP in the 2011 General Elections meant that in the area of policy it was able to move ahead relatively smoothly, with a renewed National Security Strategy being published in the summer of 2013. In this case, cross-party support was achieved (mainly from the PSOE) and although it appeared to be a different product, as examination will show, the 2013 Strategy is essentially drawn from the 2011 document. Of note here is the move towards a more consensual approach, and in the Spanish Parliament (the Cortes) the endorsement of the 2013 Strategy by the Socialists lent gravitas and consent to a process that had traditionally been polarised. Socialist support was perhaps unsurprising, as closer examination reveals that the two documents show significant continuity.

The 2013 National Security Strategy

The intervening period between the 2011 and 2013 strategies is briefly discussed in chapter 6. However, the most significant output after the 2011 document was its successor the PP’s 2013 publication.

“a strategy that orientates the state’s action towards responding to current challenges by using the available resources flexibly and efficiently; a strategy that enhances our prevention, protection and response capabilities in an increasingly complex environment like today’s…" (Government of Spain, 2013, pp. II & III)

At 58 pages and approximately 20% fewer words than its predecessor Strategy of 2011, Rajoy’s call for a “new National Security System” represents much of what had been achieved two years previously. It is still essentially a risks and threats-based strategy, highlighting security as a ‘public service….constantly updated and periodically revised” (Government of Spain, 2013, p. 4).

Figure 11: Overview of Spain’s Security Strategy 2013
(adapted and compiled by the author)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter and title</th>
<th>Content</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister’s Foreword and Executive Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td>PM demonstrates ownership of document.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter one:  
**A Comprehensive Vision of National Security**  
- Broad definition of “national security”  
  - Four basic principles  
- “orientates the state’s action towards responding to current challenges by using the available resources flexibly and efficiently”

Chapter two:  
**Spain’s Security in the World**  
- Lists actors and regions of significance  
- There are no unusual insertions.

Chapter three:  
**Risks and Threats to National Security**  
- Lists twelve risks & threats; and five threat multipliers

Chapter four:  
**Strategic Lines of Action**  
- Lists twelve areas of action and seventy nine lines of action
- Seventy nine lines of operation is a considerable number (see next page).

Chapter five:  
**A New National Security System**  
- Lists eight principles and outlines structure  
- Some significant institutional ordering is evident.

Unlike his PSOE predecessor, the then Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy demonstrated a clear commitment to the second NSS through the foreword written in his name. In turn, leadership by the PM is identified as a key principle in the fifth chapter and the role of the new Government Security Department is also expanded.¹⁹¹ The significance of the need for an amended Strategy is barely touched upon (cited as a ‘revision’ of 2011), although the assertion that “the dynamism of the environment and the national situation will require the National Security Strategy to be constantly updated and periodically revised” (2013, p.4), which is indicative of an aspiration to be responsive to events.

24 months after the publication of the first Spanish National Security Strategy, the 2013 document follows a broadly similar direction with the same method developed in Defence Directives and the 2011 Strategy. The content (namely the *risks, threats* and *multipliers*) had changed only slightly, reflecting validation of preceding work. It could be argued that, although Spain’s foreign and security

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¹⁹¹ Although indicated as a new response and commitment to the process of national security that included a ministerial appointment in government, it later transpired that there was no new funding for this initiative, and in fact cuts were made to security agencies to produce a new capability. (Interview with Felix Arteaga, Feb 2017).
policy is somewhat polarised, in the context of the need for a strategy there is consensus between the PSOE and the PP on this matter of security policy.

**Observations on the 2013 Strategy**

Whether Spain warranted a genuinely new strategy in 2013 remains open to interpretation as no significant international or domestic event had occurred to justify one. Having disseminated the first attempt two years previously, analysis comparing the two strategies does not reveal any significant deficiencies (although the increase to 79 *Lines of Action* in chapter 4 is a significant quantitative leap). What had developed was the impact of the Arab Spring and the rise of conflict in the affected countries, but to suggest that a significant reordering had taken place is unproven. This study therefore concludes that it is in spite of both the change of government and the impact of the Arab Spring on Spain and the Mediterranean EU member states that the two strategies do not sit in isolation but are in fact an ongoing process — not dissimilar to the process of the Directives.

This offers few surprises or innovations in the conduct of the PP government’s security policy in this period. NATO, the EU and the UN remain key organisations, whilst the Mediterranean and Latin America feature heavily in the areas of interest. Risks, threats and risk multipliers similar to the 2011 Strategy reflect more contemporary thinking on security, with significant emphasis on human security aspects of risk multipliers. Where there is some change in the content of the two strategies is in the institutional response. In effect, the second Strategy does not indicate any major change in the priorities or content of the strategies but rather a shift in how the PP viewed the institutional response.

The PSOE’s support (as opposition party) for the second Strategy in 2012/13 is a positive omen, as parts of Spain (as in other European countries) had become polarised following the economic downturn that beset EU states. In this sense, security policy within the Strategies was less polarised than it had been for some time in Spain’s contemporary history and, although the rise of new parties threatened some of the consensus, this represented a new opportunity for harmony in foreign and security policy between the centre left (PSOE) and centre right (PP). Considering the discord prompted by Aznar’s support for the

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192 Climate change, demographic imbalances, poverty, inequality, ideological extremism and the misuse of new technology are seen as the six risk multipliers. These reflect a departure from the traditional threats model and are relatively new factors in the context of wider national security strategies.
Iraq war, the debate over full integration within NATO in the 1990s and disputes over the US role in Latin America, Spain could now be regarded to have entered a period of some harmony in its security policy.

Whilst on an initial level, there is little divergence between the content, direction and aim of the two Strategies, further investigation reveals indications of some change in the aim of strategy ‘that orientates the state’s action towards responding to current challenges by using the available resources flexibly and efficiently; a strategy that enhances our prevention’ (Government of Spain, 2013, p.III). In effect, Rajoy appeared to be aiming for a clearer prescriptive approach, with a focus on prevention as well as identification of threats and risks.

Examining aspects of the 2013 Strategy, it becomes apparent that, not only is there a ‘presidential element’ in the Strategy, but there are also indications that the PP saw the publication of strategy as an opportunity for a national system that supported foreign and economic policy. At a time when the global-focussed *Marca España*\(^{193}\) policy was launched, this was felt to justify the insertion of comments such as

> “the counterterrorism practiced by Spain for decades has allowed it to gain considerable experience that is also valuable in addressing new terrorist threats. The effectiveness of the Spanish model for managing terrorist threats gives our country prestige abroad….places it in an ideal position to provide considerable added value to international collaboration in counterterrorism” (Government of Spain, 2013, p. 26)

This observation represents a controversial departure from the tone adopted by a Party that had struggled so patently with terrorism only a decade earlier. Quite how Spain can acquire prestige from its experience in dealing with terrorism is potentially questionable, but does demonstrate that the PP identified an opportunity for national advancement through its anti-terrorism posture, one area that had been noticeably securitised compared to the PSOE approach.

It is in the aspiration to promote Spain through strategy where there is also divergence from the 2011 document. Coupled with the *Marca España* programme, and the export-led approach initiated at the end of the PSOE term, this means there is some convergence in the notion of security policy supporting broader objectives in national foreign policy. Even though this may appear

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\(^{193}\) Launched in 2012, the *Marca España* concept supported an export-led policy of branding Spain both in terms of not only tangible exports, but also tourism, national influence and sporting success. This was effectively an attempt to raise Spain’s profile overseas and promote its products and appeal as a place to do business and visit.
uncontentious, it can be interpreted as a formal hierarchy of policy with elements of security being led by national priorities. While the Security Strategy deals with national security, in this case it is also subordinated to an agenda that pushes Spain’s soft power and the economic agenda of the Marca España initiative.

In these circumstances the logic behind a second security strategy might seem baseless from a PP standpoint, given the continuity between the two documents. Yet the insertion of comments on the opportunities presented by success against terrorism, and the idea of projecting Spain as very much a front-runner by claiming that

`Changes and trends in the security environment, its dimensions, and the responses required to preserve it are factors that influence the vision of National Security. Spain is among the most advanced countries in this field.`

(Government of Spain 2013, p.6)

…illustrates that there is an attempt by the PP to draw a line under the events of Iraq and the train bomb attacks and develop a forward looking vision of security.

It is certainly true that the terrorist attacks have undoubtedly had a lasting impact on Spain’s national culture, psyche and identity, and the detrimental effect on the PP was unprecedented. Hence the attempts by Rajoy to draw a line under the impact of the Madrid bombing by acknowledging Spain’s success, although this also provides an insight into his own personal convictions that the PP deserved recognition having made Spain `more secure’. The personal dynamic of Mariano Rajoy’s role in pressing this line is less well-documented, but, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the input of Prime Ministers during the last 20 years has been fundamental to an understanding of how the Strategies have evolved, and the institutions with them.

The creation of a National Security Council in the 2011 Strategy, albeit identified from a decade previously, requires more analysis. Chaired nominally by the Monarch, but in practice by the Prime Minister, this forum brings together Ministries, the Head of the Armed Forces and in certain cases autonomous communities and other areas of the public sector. This National Security Council...

194 Although beyond the remit of this thesis, the National Security Law of 2015 that was approved by the Cortes bore the personal stamp of Rajoy. Writing about the controversial law in El Mundo he argues “Spain is the third safest country in the European Union, seventh in the world”. Although this was not backed up in the article with official figures, there is an attempt to build a narrative around security delivered by the PP. El Mundo (2015, p6).

195 One of the quirks of the transition to democracy in Spain has been the role of the monarchy in military and strategic institutions. Although nominally ceremonial, Juan Carlos, who was King until 2013, chaired Defence Councils among other security duties and this continued with the developments in the National Security Strategy.
is quite an innovation, but how it delivers security is very much at the behest of the Prime Minister.

Clausewitz’s `Remarkable Trinity’ and National Security Strategies

Prussia’s 19th century military strategist appears an unlikely tool in analysing Spain’s Security Strategies and subsequent activity within a body such as the National Security Council. Clausewitz’s most famous concept, his `Remarkable Trinity’ (wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) explains the enduring way in which war can be explained through violent emotion `primordial violence’, chance — `the play of chance’ and rational calculation `war’s subordination as an instrument of policy’ (Howard and Paret, 1976) (see Fig. 1 below). With three overlapping tendencies, the hypothesis behind the Trinity illustrates that force is not explained with one single dimension of a nation-state (which is often the case in a neo-realist construct). It is an interaction where the decision behind the use of force (or war) is the product of interplay between society (the `primordial violence’), the military (the `play of chance’) and the rational state (`war’s subordination as an instrument of policy’).

The idea of `primordial violence or passion’ reflecting mass-opinion often escalates the conduct or outcome of rational decisions by states or leaders to the point where they almost inevitably lose control or direction as a result of the ensuing public mobilisation. Furthermore, the Trinity could also be applied to enemies (state or non-state), allies, or even factions within an alliance. In the modern environment, this Trinity of forces means that those committing force (assumed to be the executive) understand themselves the Trinity and its impact within their own nation-state and those of other actors or stakeholders in a given conflict.
A perfunctory look at any modern nation-state in a range of conflict-type situations shows the attraction of what is a simple model. Whilst realism focusses on the state, the actual interplay between state and non-state actors with its impact on ‘primordial passion’, and to a lesser extent the military, are increasingly conditioned by the role of national media and global information networks, as has been acknowledged by critical analysts such as Fierke (2007), among others. In Spain, on a number of occasions public opinion and passions can be inflamed under certain conditions with a direct consequence for national policy (such as via the indignados movement).

In the context of a security strategy, an approach of directing the apparatus of the state towards meeting threats felt most pertinent to the state, and the ‘passion’ of its people is a useful tool for understanding the essence of broadly promulgated security strategy. In sum, the Trinity helps to account for policies and a strategy process that match expectations of a civil society, along with its resources and tools within the confines of its rational leadership’s (the PM’s) priorities. Clausewitz further adds that this is further complicated by the presence of uncertainty and the difficulty of decision-making with incomplete
information\textsuperscript{196}, which is again something else touched upon in the two Spanish Strategies.

\textbf{Clausewitz's `Primordial Passion' and National Security Strategy}

In considering Spain's security, the Trinity can provide a simple analysis of how Spain's security policy process has advanced in the 21\textsuperscript{st} century. More so than other societies in much of the European Union, Spain has a population that is in some ways politically engaged in national politics. In a country where large-scale political demonstrations have actively expressed opinion on issues of terrorism, austerity and foreign policy (for example, the Iraq invasion mobilised millions of Spaniards who demonstrated on the streets during a visit by President Bush) the `primordial passion' can be seen quite easily. As previously argued, popular mobilisation such as in the case of the \textit{indignados} has had a profound effect on politics in Spain and mass opinion continues to influence the debates over separatism and identity.\textsuperscript{197} Therefore, in providing an understanding of the Clausewitzean \textit{passion} of a nation-state's citizenry, Spain represents a clear example of how opinion or Clausewitz's \textit{primordial passion} can play a role in policy. Clausewitz's model may have been about the conduct and nature of war\textsuperscript{198}, but as the concept of war itself has changed (towards being more a reflection of a situation of insecurity), it is by no means a significant departure from it to take the view that the conduct of policy and strategy around a wider security paradigm is itself subject to the unpredictability of the Trinity and incomplete nature of information available to the policy-maker.

\textbf{Uncertainty, Risks, Threats and Multipliers in Clausewitz's \textit{Trinity}.}

Clausewitz's `play of chance', whilst generally associated with the conduct of military campaigning, with its inherent uncertainty, opportunity and risk, also has a function in explaining national policy. By adjusting away from the traditional focus on military depending on the interplay of chance, towards one of uncertainty and risk it is possible to capture the essence of hazards and

\textsuperscript{196} The Clausewitzean concept of `friction' helps to account for information gaps, uncertainty and misinformation. In other words, strategy and the use of force are inevitably subject to unpredictable factors.

\textsuperscript{197} Mass demonstrations over NATO membership, the Gulf War of 1991 and the invasion of Iraq are all cited examples of foreign policy and the `primordial passion'.

\textsuperscript{198} There is a major debate within circles over the changing character of war. To summarise, UK academics (Gray, 2005) have argued that war itself is changing whilst conflict has enduring features. In the context of Spain, the nature of the range of threats is considered the most significant driver of security policy and in this case change has been inevitable.
uncertainty as envisaged in ‘On War’. As Spain’s 2013 National Security Strategy states:

“today’s globalised world is constantly changing, owing to factors such as the constant shifting of power centres with the rise of new powers; the consolidation of new international actors; the greater ability of individuals to influence… and there are new risks and threats to address…and adding complexity to the risks and threats of the current strategic context are their cross-cutting impact on different State and social structures and actors” (Government of Spain, 2013, p.6).

It is this complexity and uncertain change that are captured in Clausewitz’s notion of ‘chance’. The concepts of risks, threats and multipliers — all addressed in both Strategies — illustrate the challenges of constructing a strategy which by definition requires “lines of action capable of providing comprehensive responses to current challenges” (2013, p.6), and in many cases this response could be undertaken by the Spanish state’s military or civilian (police) forces, although also, given the broadening of the concept, state agencies complement the role of military forces.199 ‘Play of Chance’ deals with those organisations involved with uncertainty such as the state’s military, police and other organisations who possess recourse to force. These have to prepare for the uncertainty of risks and threats and be prepared to mitigate the effects of multipliers, often without having to resort to military acts or violence200 but while still retaining a dissuasive and traditional hard security function. As the 2013 Strategy states:

`The use of our Armed Forces can prove essential in conflicts…Spain must maintain a credible and effective defence capability of its own” (Government of Spain, 2013, p.24)

National Security Strategies of other states (such as the UK) offer little detail on the achievement of security through force or violence unless it relates to the most significant political or strategic requirement (a different example could be the UK’s nuclear deterrence). In Spain’s case though, alongside the Strategy but subordinate to them, appear the Defence Directives, effectively the response by the relevant Ministries. In Clausewitzean terms, Spain’s most recent Security Strategy aims to reduce the uncertainties faced by the state through identifying (being clear about) what the threat is, how it could be exacerbated (or multiplied)

199 The UME, a unit tasked with delivering emergency response to civil disturbances, military attacks or natural disasters is an example of nascent security organisations in Spain.

200 The Perejil (Parsley Island) incident of 2002 is a recent example of implied force (troops and military equipment) deployed in support of territorial recovery to achieve the political aims of recovering the disputed territory without bloodshed.
and what the state, its allies or agencies can do to mitigate or minimise the impact of this event. This model is not specific to Spain and recent studies of the UK’s Strategic Defence and Security Review have also focussed on the risk aspect of managing national security, albeit not through the concept of Clausewitzean risk (Cornish and Dorman, 2013).

The `Rational Actor Executive' and Spanish Strategy-making

Clausewitzean theory sees the `instrument of policy' as a rational actor playing an executive function (Howard 1976, p.89) within the modern state. This actor determining national security policy is an extremely widespread concept in contemporary analysis. Realists for example, see the modern state as still the referent object headed by a national decision-maker (Hill 2003, p.56). In the case of Buzan, who looks at the role of sectors in a national security context, this rational actor model appears an appealing way of analysing how a state (such as Spain) articulates a response to a range of sector-based threats and reflects modern political systems such as Spain’s, which is essentially pluralist.

By drawing on the idea of the traditional rational actor (in the 19th century, normally a monarch), the notion of the executive captures the idea of rational policy-making. Nowadays of course, the rational monarchy has become replaced by modern executives in elected governments, in Spain’s case by the Presidente del Gobierno (the Prime Minister), who, as argued in the final chapter of this thesis, very much determines the outputs of national security policy from his or her position in the Moncloa Palace. (Carnero Fernández and Frías in Pereira, 2010) Spain’s foreign and security policy is in effect a product of this political arrangement and is little different from in other western democratic models, where centralisation has been a feature in spite of a pattern of devolution in many other areas of policy, such as health care, welfare and education provision (Heywood, 1999, p.119).

A centralised (modern) state where successive Prime Ministers have sought to expand influence in security policy (and generally succeeded) means that the role of the Trinity’s rational actor is helpful in understanding the part played by executives in democratic security policy. In nearly all modern societies, strategy has tended to come from an executive, and this is often required by, or directs,

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201 Most analysis of national foreign and security policy inevitably focuses on the role of the executive and central foreign ministries. This reflects the realist tradition in much of the academic work in this field.
the military and state institutions. Indeed, the role of the rational actor in security policy is reinforced by the modern nation-state and the global environment as well as subject to the whims of public opinion. How this has been influential and developed in contemporary Spain is discussed in the next chapter.

Clausewitz’s ‘passion’, synonymous with citizenry and the impact of the reporting of events on broad swathes of opinion, is more than just reflected in modern Spain’s experience. This was demonstrated on the occasion of Aznar’s decision to support the US invasion of Iraq, when popular opinion was bitterly opposed to this, but there was no outpouring of enthusiasm or passion for the war, which in Clausewitzean terms undermined the PP government’s involvement. This current reached its climax with the political impact of the terrorist train bombing, where opinion turned against the PP in an unprecedented manner, which led to a politicised security policy within Spain that has persisted for almost a decade after the event and only seems to have abated somewhat with the passage of time and the cooperation seen in the production of two national security strategies.

In contemporary security policy terms, the relationship between the executive (the ‘rational’) and civil society (the ‘passion’) remains a useful tool for analysing the conduct or reaction of policy in the context of perceived threats and risks in an age of information and rolling media. The concept of the ‘speech act,’ (Carlsnaes et al., 2004) a rational, albeit cynical, attempt to generate popular political support drawing on the force of ‘passion’ is a good example of how Clausewitz’s ideas can influence present analysis in spite of the intervening space of some hundred and fifty years between the two concepts. Whilst the construction of national strategies has little to do with the more ambitious aspects of the ‘Speech Act’, the identification, selection and language relating to specific threats or risks could be seen as part of a narrative for preparing for possible future invocations of the process.

With the exception of the support for the US war in Iraq, ‘speech acts’ have not featured significantly in Spain in response to terrorism. Even so, with the increasing relevance of the issue of separatism in recent years a new threat to the integral model of Spain could see this matter looked at more closely. As regards Spain’s regional position, the delicacy of relations with Morocco and North Africa, which are the most fraught of all Spain’s bilateral exchanges, mean
that avoiding escalatory language appears to be a norm at the national level. Both the 2013 and 2011 Strategies barely mention Morocco, and ignore the troubled nature of Madrid-Rabat nations on issues such as trade, immigration and territorial disputes. Instead, Mali is given prominence, with only opaque references to the sensitive issue of the Spanish territories of Ceuta and Melilla.

In all these cases, the concept of ‘Clausewitzean passion’ in its incarnation as violent emotion is definitely not invoked with regards to regional sensitivities.

In Spain’s 2013 National Strategy, the calls for the `involvement of civil society and fostering of a security culture’ (2013, p.54) can be seen as a way of bridging the chasm between the passions of popular opinion and the realities of modern security policy. Arteaga argues that a knowledge gap on the part of Spanish citizens explains the contrast between “the desire to intervene in public opinion and aversion to assuming the costs needed for this” (2013, p.27). In interview he goes further and sees this as a reason for Spain’s sometimes inconsistent support for international intervention. In 2011, during the overthrow of the Libyan regime, Spain’s support for the US-led coalition to overthrow Gaddafi contrasted with public opinion where military involvement was not seen to be popularly supported. The 2013 Strategy goes further in this this regard, and a Strategic Line of Action was to `Foster defence awareness and culture as the basis for Spanish society’s support for National Defence, paying special attention to young people` (2013, p.40). In a society where young voters in particular flocked to `new’ parties and appeared disenchanted with established parties, attempts to engage what is a volatile group of voters will be difficult to measure, but this indicates the apprehension of policy-makers in dealing with public opinion and security policy.

**What do National Security Strategies Tell Us about Security in Spain?**

Returning to the Constructivist approach of Katzenstein, who identified strategy [policy] as reflecting interests, identity and the cultural environment is that interests, identity and the cultural context feature prominently in the two

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202 This differs from sub-national and regional narratives which, particularly in the south of Spain are at times hostile towards Moroccan and North African labour and agricultural products, have occasionally impacted at the national level.

203 This contrasts with the issue of Gibraltar, which the 2013 Strategy unambiguously describes as an “anomaly [that] poses security problems to Spain and Europe” (2013, p.14), indicating a political security emphasis on the issue of the disputed territory.

204 Military assistance focussed on military aircraft playing a supporting role in attacks on Libyan regime targets. Madrid’s contribution was not extensive, being more political than military, and was not publicised widely in Spanish media as the PSOE government was wary of arousing political protests.
strategies. Social factors appear to take on to challenge the traditional interstate approach of security. However, the role of actors – which interviews and research identified as being undertaken by a rather closed circle, generally remained separate from broader society (see Fig 13).

Fig 13: A return to Katzenstein’s model.

According to analysis of the Strategies (and in passing the DDNs) interests remain focussed on traditional matters, and this reflects the fact that although economic security, the welfare of society and environment degradation are addressed, few tangible outputs are provided to achieve the security in these non-traditional areas. If we take the indignados as an ‘interest’ in the sense of the Katzenstein model, then these interests feature in strategy, but not policy. Of interest in this debate is what has enabled interests and norms to change, and in this case, the impact of the economic crisis cannot be understated. In effect, the cultural shifts that occurred in the 21st century, do feature in the two published NSS.

Through the three components of strategy within the Spanish nation-state, Clausewitz’s model offers a way to understand the process in its contemporary security policy. The role of the Prime Minister has become increasingly powerful, as reinforced by the 2013 Strategy, where the ‘rational actor’ role played by the executive is reinforced throughout the document as a final arbiter. This reflects the position played by the PM at the time Mariano Rajoy who, as a former deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, drew on his experience in previous functions in his career to underpin his accumulation of expertise within the

Spain’s Interior Ministry has traditionally been a powerful body. Covering a number of key functions it is perhaps the most significant actor in domestic counter-terrorism and therefore security.
Moncloa and create a strong central ‘rational’ and calculating figure in the establishment of security.

That the executive plays such a significant role in foreign and security policy is not confined to Spain and the experience of a whole swathe of developed nation-states has seen a centralisation of foreign and security policy (Hill, 2003, p.56 and Carnero Fernández., A & Martín Frias, 2011, pp. 641-649). While this relates less closely to the Clausewitz theory, the utility of the model of a rational actor interacting with the forces of ‘chance’ and ‘primordial passion’ offers a framework in understanding this interaction.

It is through the interaction between the ‘passion’ and the ‘rational’ aspects of the Trinity that Clausewitz makes his most useful contribution to an understanding of process behind Spain’s national security development. The emergence of widespread and profound economic insecurity in the decade after 2007, and the subsequent indignados movement of 2011, expanded a national domestic agenda in Spain that was captured in the zeitgeist or ‘passion’ embodied by organised social protest. So effective was this mobilisation that subsequent policy-making and strategy recognises the importance of managing the impact of austerity and disenchantment in contemporary Spain. The 2013 Security goes so far as to state:

‘economic and financial insecurity is currently one of the main risks and threats, not only because of the political and social unrest it causes, but also because it fuels and reinforces other existing risks’ (Government of Spain, 2013, p.27)

The practical nature of the risks, threats and multipliers approach in the Strategies offers a framework for the role of the state (or the ‘rational’ in Clausewitz’s Trinity) in allocating resources to address the demands of uncertainty, risk and threats. The difficult transformation undertaken by security agencies in modernising Spain’s ability to improve understanding can be seen through the reorganisation of national intelligence gathering.206 Although not the topic of analysis in this section, the need for the rational actor to be informed properly, as well as to limit damage from uncertainty and imperfect knowledge being channelled through actors in dealing with events, develops the idea that

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206 See Arcos (2016) for an account of reform and restructuring of Spain’s intelligence service, where 2003-2013 is cited as a difficult decade for the Spanish intelligence agency. Its impact is discussed in the final chapter on policy-making.
the Trinity’s aspect of chance resonates strongly in contemporary security policy in Spain.

**Summary. Spain's Strategy Process and Spanish Security-making?**

Spain’s strategy begins from a progression of ‘security’ that began with the Defence Directives in the 1990s and culminated in the Rajoy government’s publication of the second strategy in 2013. The content of the strategies points to a significant reordering of security to include welfare, economic security and institutional restructuring to create a number of new bodies tasked with reporting to the Prime Minister, most notably a national security council, and a centralised and strengthened executive, who went on to claim later that Spain had become one of the most secure member states of the European Union.

To understand constructivism alongside Clausewitz within Spain’s strategy process, it is necessary to consider the initial premise of the chapter which centred on the establishment of the current Spanish Security Strategy. Whilst in hindsight the creation of the Strategy could be seen as a natural progression, previous attempts at articulating strategy in Spain (such as Gonzalez’s Decalogue on the NATO question in 1984) were highly divisive across the political spectrum, and also within political parties. This was also influenced by the prevalence of the view articulated by Arteaga (2003) that Spain did not possess a ‘strategic culture’ and a body of traditional literature focusses on the normalisation of Spain’s place in the world, based on interests and actors that adopted and moderated norms over a period of decades but did not generally engage with citizens, all this was underpinned by the prevailing norm articulated by Ortega y Gasset’s ‘Europe is the solution’.

As argued previously, the economic crisis established a new economic security agenda (or constructivist *interests*) in Spain which reflected trans-national impacts and, in Spain’s case in particular, mobilised large numbers of voters and citizens in ways still playing out in Catalonia, the party political system and the centralised nature of Spanish policy making.

Clausewitz’s ‘violent emotion’ or the ‘passion’ element of his Trinity encapsulates the force of popular opinion as an interest, and mobilisation is reflected strongly in the Spain’s security ‘environment’. The willingness of its
citizens to mobilise on interests contrasts with countries such as the UK\textsuperscript{207}, and in this sense, his model of three forces where the government strives to deliver rational, measured outcomes in the face of impassioned public opinion while its agencies face risk, threats, uncertainty or chance is an attractive model that can sit alongside constructivist approaches of Katzenstein et al.

National ability to ‘strategise’ is reflected in the Security Strategy process. The initial draft of the 2011 Strategy was, according to interviewees, an open and transparent process involving think-tanks, retired senior politicians and government staff. Whatever faults the Strategy may have had, the attempt to draw in outside agencies was innovative and reflects a maturing of the think-tank sector in Spain. A constructivist interpretation identifies this as not really addressing wider social issues or interests, and organisations that were accessed did not fully reflect the cultural environment.

That the first Strategy (2011) was replaced in less than two years is not unusual. The PSOE under Zapatero was less enthused about a formal strategy than may have been imagined, and the domestic economic focus of the government perhaps proved a bigger issue for the state than originally anticipated. Exactly as happened in the UK, the first Strategy was short-lived, and did not survive a change of Government. It is this paper’s view that the 2011 Strategy was not so much a failure, but instead succumbed to the extraordinary events that impacted on Spain’s economy, political system and the Arab world in 2011. In this sense, the fact that the PP adopted the process and produced its own Second Strategy along the same lines is perhaps testament to the relevance of the 2011 Strategy and Spain’s capacity to strategise.

Of ultimate interest is whether Spain is any more secure as a result of the national strategy process. This is a matter beyond the thesis, but what can be observed from research in Spain is that the entire process in the formulation of security policy is little known, understood or written about in Spanish academia. Literature and references are barely known about in the wider context and a recent review of Spain’s literature on foreign and security barely mentions the two documents.

\textsuperscript{207} The Iraq war did mobilise huge numbers to call for peace in the UK, but generally mass mobilisation is not seen as often in the UK when compared to Spain. Protests in support for the anti-capitalist movements were nowhere near the scale of Spain or even other European countries.
This lack of engagement perhaps represents the most significant take-away where security policy in Spain is concerned. As an elite-led activity, DDNs offered an approach as to how the Spanish state used to frame security, it remained barely understood outside actual policy-making circles with broader interests and norms only playing a part-peripheral role. As in other nation-states, there is little public debate and one of the great constraints on Spain achieving any sense of an appropriate role in the world reverts back to its citizens having a particularly distant engagement with its foreign and security policy. Even the state itself draws on the need to engage younger Spaniards in policy (as identified in the 2013 Strategy), but as research has encountered, scholars tend to shy away from in-depth debate on Spain’s security, potentially a reflection of the distance between Spain’s traditional security deliverers (the military, the police, the intelligence agencies) and civil society, perhaps, to draw on a tired cliché, a legacy of the Franco era. Until there is a fuller engagement by broader interests, groups and actors in creating security then the culture of security remains a constricted focus, too centralised and at the whim of Prime Ministerial power to genuinely deliver security on behalf of the nation state.

The interaction with the Spanish Parliament, the role of the NSC, and the input from traditional and non-traditional actors in the Strategy will all be key to understanding the development of strategy in Spain. The following chapter addresses the process behind security and strategy in Spain.
Chapter 6

In the light of examining Spain’s National Security Strategies of 2011 and 2013, the thesis argues that Spain’s security appears to have undergone a centralisation towards the executive, with only a fragmented and disjointed contribution on the part of civil-society, interests and even culture. This section deals with an examination of the three Prime Ministers during the period of study, and includes a discussion of the institutional arrangements and a ‘culture of security’. I conclude that by looking at the period from a constructivist model, Spain’s evolving culture of security points to a reordering of norms and interests that will continue to define how Spanish society evolves its perception about its role in the world.

“We have lived in isolation, and it is very difficult to change the psychology of isolation” (Felipe González in Zaldivar & Ortega, 1992, p. 127).

Until the late 1990s any study of Spain’s security policy would have focussed on the withdrawal of Spain’s military from decision-making and politics in a society that had been dominated by its experience of civil war, dictatorship and separation from Western Europe. By the end of the 1980s, Spain’s transition had evolved into a process of successful democratic consolidation, and in that sense it represented a model to emulate (Preston, 1986). In contrast with Latin America’s regime transitions at this time, this was a particularly attractive notion across the Spanish-speaking world, but in many ways the studies obscured understanding of how security policy was viewed and constructed at this time.

Works (Linz and Stepan (1996), among others) undertake detailed examination of the sociological aspects of Spain’s democratic process and the military’s return to the barracks, whilst those more concerned with the specifics of actual policy-making in Spain were fewer in number and rarely touched on foreign and security policy.208 The Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) took much of the credit for the consolidation after the transition of the late 1970s. Following its 1982 election, the PSOE deepened the process of normalisation of foreign policy (and by implication security policy) with the attainment of EU membership,

208 The literature review in chapter one discusses much of the literature arising from the challenges in looking at Spain’s security and foreign policy, most political science works on Spain until the mid-1980s focussed on its democratic transition.
settled the question of NATO policy and opened up debates about the relationship with the United States.

In terms of managing the military, Spain’s democratic consolidation is well documented. While there is some study of the institutions that played a part in this role (particularly the detail behind reform of the Defence Ministry), among other works a broader look at the policy-making process has been less evident. Among the other institutions, the monarchy’s role should not be underestimated during this process either. While the relationship between Franco and the monarchy was certainly well documented, the role of Juan Carlos in the 1970s remained a topic of debate even into the 21st century. Even so, as will be discussed later, there are still some aspects of the monarchy’s role that warrant closer inspection as regards policy-making.

The 1978 Constitution and Spanish Security

Although almost 40 years old, Spain’s constitution is useful as to the origins and fundamentals behind its prevailing political culture and in this case, guides the notion of the nation’s culture of security which effectively means that perceptions and beliefs about security have their roots in national culture. (Katzenstein, 1996). Ratified and approved by referendum three years after Franco’s death, the Constitution of 1978 has been seen as a cornerstone of Spain’s political settlement and consolidation of democracy. The document codifies Spain’s security policy-making, making it an appropriate place to start, given its role in lending form to processes and structures.

In the case of post-Francoist Spain, the Constitution was not merely an attempt to draw a line under the previous dictatorship and political polarisation, but also sought to reflect the contemporary world and environment that Spain was emerging into: the Cold War was blowing up again following a brief respite in the 1970s, the then European Economic Community was starting to become a more significant global presence and, with Greece’s application to join it in the Mediterranean, the EEC was extending towards Spain in Europe’s south. In short, this was a world that was very different from that which had seen Spain’s previous democratic era in the 1930s.

209 Former Socialist Defence Minister Narcis Serra (2010) and Preston’s Spain the EEC and NATO (1984) among others offer detailed discussion of the implications on Spain’s internal ordering of its military and society as part of the democratic consolidation.

Transition heralded a new generation of political activists and elites who had not endured the events of the 1930s or 1940s, and were receptive to the new overtures made by Brussels, Paris and Bonn. This European influence associated with a social democratic template was not lost on Spain, where a model of borrowing policy and structures has even now withstood the test of time (Security Strategy is one example). Heywood (1995 and 1999) argues that Spain’s Constitution was based on the post-war West German equivalent, with an emphasis on stability and consensus, although other features indicate a French or UK model of policy-making. Whatever lay behind the dynamics of the 1970s that drove Spain’s transition, the long-term security and stability of Spain in the 21st century was evidently impossible to anticipate that far back. Even so, the political arrangement of the 1970s has certainly influenced the policy process today, yet despite this a lot of the literature focuses on the journey and positivist notions rather than the particular features of policy.

The 1978 Constitution remains fundamental to the functioning of foreign and security policy, whereas in other areas there has been significant evolution away from the model of a centralised Spain towards the autonomous communities, particularly with regards to health, education and regional development. In the case of security and foreign affairs, Spain’s model is essentially unitary (see Heywood, 1995, and/or Ross, 2017). Although on some issues (sub-national governance) the Constitution has become rigorously questioned, in matters pertaining to foreign and security policy, the constitutional provisions have remained unchanged.

There are six articles in the 1978 Constitution that deal with the issue of security or foreign policy.

**Figure 14: Spain’s Constitutional Articles related to Security**
(Annotated and created by author.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Constitutional Article</th>
<th>What the Constitution says/indicates</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Article 56</td>
<td>The King(^{211}) is the Head of State.</td>
<td>This is similar to other European monarchies (UK, Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{211}\) The King is always referred to in the Constitution rather than the Monarchy or the Crown.
The King can declare war or make peace following authorisation from the Cortes. This reinforces the role of the monarchy over the use of military force.

The government directs domestic and foreign policy, civil and military administration, and the defence of the state. It exercises executive and statutory authority in accordance with the Constitution and the law. A reinforcement of the executive, but also maintains the pre-eminence of the Constitutional and legal process.

The government holds the competency to conduct international relations. Whereas other areas of policy have seen the input of Autonomous Communities into policy, this remains the sole competency of the central state.

The Spanish nation desires to establish justice, liberty and security, and to promote the well-being of all its members. Whilst relatively innocuous and common, this provides for aspects of the human security debate of the Zapatero government 2004-11.

Every person has a right to freedom and security.

The prominence of Spain’s monarchy in recognising and celebrating the military’s role in Spain’s stability and security reflects the sensitivities of Spain’s political and conservative groups in defence of the nation-state. Article 56 of the Constitution reinforces the role of the King as Head of State and Article 63 also stipulates that it is the King who declares war or makes peace following authorisation from the Cortes. This effectively secures a more than ceremonial role for the Monarchy in Spain in the post transition period and points to a role in defence and security, as was borne out by events in February 1981’s failed coup attempt.212

The actual term security features on two occasions as a distinct concept in the Constitution: the preamble where we have “the Spanish nation, desiring to establish justice, liberty and security, and to promote the well-being of all its members”, (BOE, the Spanish State Gazette 1978, p.7). In turn, Article 17.1 underscores this by stating that “every person has a right to freedom and security” (BOE 1978, p.12).

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212 The coup failed, in part due to the prompt actions of the King, who denounced the action on TV and refused to countenance any support for it. (Preston 1986, p.201)
In sum, Spain’s 1978 Constitution projects the prevailing atmosphere of the nation-state transitioning to democracy on a European social democratic model of the state’s functions. The role of the Prime Minister appears to be somewhat glossed over (perhaps reflecting the tensions over the executive’s powers at that moment in time). As Muñoz-Alonso argues:

“la distinción entre aprobar, que es la competencia del Congreso de los Diputados, y la de acordar, que corresponde al Gobierno, se nos antoja poco elaborado, discutible y hasta contradictoria” (Muñoz-Alonso, 2010, p.669)

Nevertheless, in line with other developed nations and their democratic development, the centralisation of power and the assertion of the Prime Minister’s role has been a commonly-seen phenomenon around the world, where executives have generally centralised power, most notably in security and foreign policy. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the role of institutions with regard to policy, response and accountability is a recurring theme in security, foreign and defence policy.

**Presidentialism in Spain’s Foreign and Security Policy**

“The Spanish Prime Minister has actually the status of president...he occupies a powerful position and is placed hierarchically above his ministers” (Soetendorp, 1999 p.61).

As previously outlined, one of the key aspects of Spain’s ‘culture of security’ is the persistence of Presidentialism in security and foreign policy making (see chapter 2). Whilst the Constitution offers a decreed outline for the arrangements for power distribution in security (and other) policies within the political system, many commentators and sources have reinforced the idea of successive PMs asserting power following the Spanish transition Van Biezen, (2007). Pereira (2010, p.698) identifies the dismissal of Foreign Minister Morán by the PM González in 1985 as an early indication of excessive subordination of Spain’s Foreign Ministers to the Executive. Furthermore, the 1986 referendum on Spain remaining within the NATO alliance saw González as Prime Minister...
perform a spectacular U-turn on the matter. In spite of deep misgivings within his own party, the Spanish left in general and contrary to his own earlier positions, this successful volte face by González demonstrated the leeway that a Spanish Prime Minister could deploy at that time (Camiller, 1986). As will be shown, similar latitude was seen in the adoption of a staunchly Atlanticist approach by Aznar in 2001, demonstrating that Spain’s political system can be susceptible to significant and often unexpected shifts in strategy.

An able and charismatic PM such as González showed it to be possible to make far-reaching shifts in policy with limited recourse to his own party or the institutions of government, often in the short and even medium term. EU membership, after Spain’s accession in 1986, also deepened this autonomy as, institutionally, the European Council (effectively the Heads of Government) grants significant power to individual executives in EC (now EU) decision-making, and in a political system such as Spain’s, which is devoid of Eurosceptism, EU decision making and Treaties are generally accepted and endorsed by voters and parties with very few problems in contrast to what occurs in other EU states. EU membership can therefore be said to sustain the centralisation of power in the Spanish executive.

EU summits, treaty negotiations (such as Maastricht in 1992) and deal-making were an unparalleled opportunity for González to demonstrate his skill as a voice for Spain and the Mediterranean. As Southern Europe’s second largest EC/EU member-state González developed significant respect for his ability and length of time in office to gain the confidence of powerful European leaders. Spain’s experience of transition and consolidation of democracy was furthermore promoted as a selling point following the collapse of the Eastern bloc and its opening up to the West, as was argued by the proliferation of think-tanks and academics who promoted a Spanish model. As Prime Minister, González achieved significant gains in cachet for Spain’s profile in the early 1990s, while also not only committing Spain to UN peacekeeping missions around the world (with the added prestige this brought with it for Madrid in the Americas and Africa), but also making tangible gains for Spain during the Maastricht Treaty discussions on the European Union that have continued to reap benefits even well into the 21st century.
The previously-cited example of Spain’s direct transfers from the Cohesion Fund\(^{216}\) led to increased EU funding as part of an arrangement whereby Mediterranean member-states did not oppose pre-accession aid for the former Eastern bloc countries and discussions with them, which demonstrated some of the paradoxes of Spain’s posture.\(^{217}\) However, González was able to exploit his personal authority (and popularity) by conducting policy outside the constraints of power (Kennedy, 2013).

However, the 1990s showed that, after a decade in power, González and the Socialists had begun to expose the limitations and downsides of an inadequately constrained executive. The highly controversial GAL case (GAL meaning *Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación* – *anti terrorist freedom groups*) demonstrated perhaps the greatest abuse of power by the PSOE administrations and, coupled with a number of corruption scandals and sharp economic recession, saw the bridling of the government’s lack of restraint following the inconclusive Parliamentary elections of 1993, where the PSOE was forced into coalition with nationalist groupings. Whilst this may have tempered the activities of González’s ambitions and even threatened his legacy, it demonstrated that a Spanish PM can abuse power when supported by a strong Parliamentary party. Apart from one or two measures taken at the time, little was done to alter the institutional arrangements of executive Presidentialism and this remains a recurring feature of Spain’s security and foreign policy model.

This thesis is not the place to explore González’s legacy for Spain, however, his role as a successful PM depended on his personal authority, charisma and weakness of constraints upon him.\(^{218}\) Spain’s Constitution is not the sole reason for this Presidentialism, as much of it reflected the personal characteristics of González and Spain’s successful integration into Europe, combined with an environment that supported the PSOE’s actions. In short, the Socialists under González facilitated the contemporary ‘culture of security’ – that of a strong executive in some ways constrained by an incoherent mobilisation by interests on issues of foreign and security policy. The PSOE’s defeat in the 1996 election

\(^{216}\) See chapter 4 with regard to the importance of the Cohesion Fund. This still constituted a vital part of Spain’s public infrastructure investment 25 years after its inception.

\(^{217}\) There was a threat to Spain’s financial benefits of membership (as a poorer EU state) as a result of enlargement to the former Communist east. Traditionally poor, relatively backward, but enjoying political influence in Germany, meant that for Spain, EU enlargement presented a zero-sum game where wealth transfers, investment and EU aid would be diverted from the EU’s existing Mediterranean member states to funding the integration of Eastern Europe.

\(^{218}\) Even 20 years after retiring, Felipe González is accepted as a powerful, influential, even divisive figure in Spain’s politics, holding enormous sway within the PSOE, the media and the nation-state.
led to an expectation of a different approach by the Popular Party’s José María Aznar, but, this ‘culture of security’ was mobilised by the PP’s actions, showing that although a leader can shift the direction of national agenda, in conflict with entrenched interests and passionate (almost Clausewitzean) opinion carries significant risk.

José María Aznar, The Partido Popular and Spain’s Security 1996-2004

“The Popular Party has successfully strengthened Spain’s influence and weight on the international scene. Spain today enjoys a prestige and international credibility which corresponds to the effort which has been put in” (Partido Popular 2004 election flyer cited in Kennedy, 2013, p.181)

The electoral success of the Partido Popular (PP) in 1996 under the leadership of José Maria Aznar would inevitably change the socialist presidentialism of the previous 14 years. Following the departure of González from Spain’s political system, it was only inevitable that change would occur, but it was hard to identify what form this might take at the outset. The first four years in office (1996-2000) revealed a dual approach and, according to some, was marked by underachievement (Gillespie, 2002, pp 28-29). Aznar adopted a significant change in posture as regards international security and alliances, while forging ahead with an enthusiastic pursuit of integration into the European Monetary Union (EMU) programme. However, despite the lack of a clear Parliamentary majority, this period was notable for Aznar’s style of leadership and subsequent events that would shape Spain’s security stance in the new millennium. Spanish society in this period did not undergo radical change, nor did the international scene radically shift in any marked way prior to 9/11.

The pro-US Atlantic posture adopted by Aznar’s PP, before, and on assuming office, articulated that international security could be achieved by promoting a position at odds with the PSOE’s European-led approach (Arteaga, 1999, p.83). By developing a security approach that ran counter to the EU-led consensus of deepening foreign and security policy (namely through the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty), Aznar followed the approach of Tony Blair’s government: Spain not only could identify with European economic security (through trade and prosperity), but also embrace an Atlantic security model that underpinned the nation-state through proximity to US military power. This approach however paid

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219 The 1997 Amsterdam Treaty made significant progress in developing the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, this in itself was a product of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.
only lip service to deeper Spanish concerns about aligning more to the US and appeared to have little support among wider interests in Spain.

Aznar’s new Atlanticism relished a closeness with Washington in the form of summits, US Presidential endorsement and media events. In spite of the EU’s progress in developing treaties and adopting a more tangible security posture (such as its Common Policies and later Security Strategy), for the PP government, a public image of Aznar enjoying close ties to the USA was as important to Spain’s security as the single currency was in helping to assure Spain’s economic security, not to mention in generating significant benefits from investment, job creation and wealth transfer (see Arteaga, 2009).

In addition, the EMU project demanded changes in economic governance, with reinforcement in the form of the Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda (MEH, or Ministry of Economy and Finance, see Heywood, 1999, p.113). The so-called Maastricht Convergence Criteria required rigorous management of debt and public spending that would eventually curtail the activities of previously high-spending ministries. Heywood (1999, p. 113) argues that this meant significant sway over ministries was now exerted by the all-powerful Ministry of Economy and Finance in support of the executive. This executive dominance appeared vindicated, as Spain successfully joined the single currency as a founder member in 1999, cementing its aspiration to join the European inner core which, coupled with consistent growth, meant a second term for the PP was achieved on a platform of financial and economic success and not Atlantic-foreign and security policy.

The second PP term under Aznar, like that of other leaders of the time, has become judged on his stance over support for the US War on Terror and invasion of Iraq in 2001-2003. Much has been written about the decision of the PP government to support this war (see chapter 3). In some ways Aznar’s decision has been depicted as unprecedented and an abuse of power by political opponents (particularly with the benefit of hindsight). Yet in retrospect his first

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220 The Maastricht Convergence Criteria demanded inflation reduced to a strict margin above the best-performing member states, Debt to GDP ratio of no more than 60% and lower interest rates (no higher than 2% above the lowest member state rates). In effect this was a fiscally conservative programme designed to reduce debt and spending by weaker economies prior to monetary union. It was never popular with labour movements, Unions, and many on the left due to its strict targets on public spending, in some ways this was the start of the ‘disconnect’ between monetary union’s demands and public opinion.
term in office from 1996 indicated that his approach and method was not so out of the ordinary.

A sign that the Spain’s security posture was to shift under Aznar came with the formal negotiation and accession of Spain into NATO’s Integrated Military Command (IMC) relatively quickly after election in 1996. Rapidly, frustration with the Paris-Berlin axis soon emerged, while the PP leadership wholeheartedly supported nearly all of the European agenda, on issues of the Franco-German cooperation, antiterrorism, and relations with the US and Latin America, Aznar’s PP quickly established a different stance, removed from that of the EU members, but also distinct from Spanish political culture.

It is the assertion of this thesis that Aznar’s personality was a fundamental factor in the state’s shift away from long-standing tendencies in its security posture. Although the PP government supported monetary union, Aznar and his circle were simultaneously seeking positions with the US that were more Atlanticist in outlook. Policy towards Cuba was an area where Aznar hardened Spain’s attitude in favour of Washington. Communist Cuba had traditionally been an area where Spain had sought a more progressive foreign policy at odds with the Franco regime’s clear anti-communism. The US Helms-Burton Law (1995), which was designed to dissuade trade away from regimes Washington considered hostile, provides us with a good example of the PP’s shift: while for Spain’s left, Helms-Burton represented US diplomatic aggression, the issue of Cuba’s human rights (and US benevolence) was seen by the Aznar government as overriding longer term concerns of Hispanidad (Spanishness) that resonated among a number of (often younger) Spaniards.

The PP government’s support for US bombings in Iraq in the winter of 1998 was also indicative of this shift. Whereas France, Germany and other EU states had significant reservations about the action, Aznar’s administration supported it and allowed the use of Spanish airspace and facilities for the attacks. This would have been impossible a decade earlier and reflected the prevailing interests of Spain at this time. While the US and UK drew on UN Security Resolutions,

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221 Spain’s military would come under command and control of NATO allies in certain circumstances and committed Spain to maintain and uphold roles within the Alliance.
222 This tended to focus on the direct interests of France and Germany, such as enlargement towards the East, north European agricultural matters and central European military security.
223 In 1986 Spain refused to support US airstrikes against Libya and in 1989 voted against US in a UN motion. There is a long documented history of Spanish autonomy in the face of US military activity.
which other major powers in Europe opposed, this was not lost on Spain’s opposition parties, who saw this as a fissure in Europe’s hesitant attempt at a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) that was further underlined by the tensions over NATO’s divisions and US posture towards the Balkans.

Therefore, as previously discussed (Chapter 3), Aznar’s proximity to Bush (elected at the end of 2000) was not without precedent. Backing for the Republican Helms-Burton Law against Cuba, political and logistic support for attacks on Iraq in 1998 and a cooling towards the Franco-German axis indicated that, nationally, the state was positioning itself in favour of a more transatlantic alliance. This was as a consequence of both Aznar’s personal outlook and the experience of terrorism, though also a sense that Europe was not actively concerned with Spain’s security needs, while tangible gains such as missile defence offered by US programmes such as AEGIS\textsuperscript{224} meant that, not only was there an ideological affinity, but there were also practical hard security (mainly military) benefits to be had for Spain but these would be difficult to square in Spain’s security culture.

**Hard Security vs Civil Society’s Perceptions**

In terms of domestic security, for the PP at the start of the millennium the persistence of ETA was clearly the main security threat within Spain, whereas the greatest risk would be failure to join the single currency as a founding member. Whilst these were not controversial for Spanish society and reflected broad opinion, security in Spain during the eight years of the Aznar government was represented by hard security, along traditional, military lines, combined with the promotion of national economic success through membership of the EMU and other European institutions, neither of these were popularly challenged, and it was only with Bush’s inauguration and subsequent escalations of 9/11 that the disconnect with Spanish public opinion became apparent.

Aside from the terrorist attack, the election defeat of the *Partido Popular* in 2004 can be attributed to policy positions adopted as a consequence of the style of Aznar’s governance. While shifts in security and foreign policy are to be expected with a change of government, with the exception of full NATO

\textsuperscript{224} AEGIS was a ship base system that can defend against ballistic missiles. Long a concern in the Maghreb with Algeria and Libya possessing missile systems and Libya occasionally launching them towards Italy. Spain witnessing SCUD missile use against Saudi and Israeli cities in 1991 felt itself vulnerable (and still does) with large Spanish cities in the reach of such weapons (interview with Juan Moliner (Defence official) 2011).
integration in 1997, most of the significant changes of position lacked widespread support.\textsuperscript{225} In the case of the US’s war on terror this meant disregarding a mass-mobilisation of Spanish public opinion in a political system where suspicion of the US and its military is a norm.\textsuperscript{226} Even within the Partido Popular, whilst many welcomed Aznar’s closeness to Bush, elements within the PP required evidence of benefits from the arrangement.\textsuperscript{227}

Although an important trading partner of Spain, few Spaniards were unlikely to witness the benefits of closening to Washington, US commerce was dwarfed by Spain’s trade with EU countries. The 2002 Defence Agreement (see Chapter 3) may have held some tangible gains for Spain, but these were still in specific areas such as technologies and infrastructure. Traditionally, the PP had at times looked beyond Europe for political and financial inspiration, and some were drawn to the US economic model, which contrasted with that of Europe or Spain, in a country where the number of Spanish speakers outstripped even those living in Spain, therefore interests in a closer relationship with the US were not unreasonable from certain perspectives.

Evidence shows little enthusiasm within the PP’s membership for Aznar’s posturing over the support for Bush in the build up to the invasion of Iraq. Whilst Spain’s opposition had mobilised against the war (see Chapter 3), the PP’s support base was less eager to express its backing for such controversial policy.

In foreign and security policy, Aznar continued the trend of Presidentialism. Intergovernmental summits, so attractive under his predecessor González, were continued and in some ways expanded, with a prestigious NATO summit in his first term followed by bilateral summits with countries such as France, Italy and the UK, extending through to very high profile summits under European Presidency in 2002 and, most notoriously, in the Azores, where Aznar stood alongside Blair, Bush and his Portuguese counterpart prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Sources (Elordi, 2003) and interviews point to Aznar having a close focus on personal relationships, with Blair and Bush in particular, which contrasted with the less cordial arrangements with Germany’s Schroeder and France’s Chirac respectively. In effect, Aznar’s personality and face to face

\textsuperscript{225} Even at the time of the 1997 full integration, opinion was more indifferent to NATO than positive or negative on Spain’s membership.
\textsuperscript{226} See Chapter 3, for an explanation of the mass mobilisation on this matter.
\textsuperscript{227} Interview with Rafael Bardaji, Feb. 2017.
relations as in many countries foreign and security policy (Hill, 2003, p. 53) played a significant role in the PP’s strategy at this time.

On balance, the PP and Aznar’s approach, of security delivered through Atlantic ties, contrasted with the more visible economic security opportunities offered by EMU and closer monetary integration. This contrast was brought into relief by the Perejil dispute of August 2002, where Europe’s institutions were not seen as effective in assisting Spain’s case.

The 2002 Perejil Crisis – An Analysis

As identified during chapter 3, the North African coast has Europe’s last few territorial enclaves, consisting of the Spanish Autonomous Communities of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as islets such as Perejil. In spite of EU membership, there was limited security provided in the traditional sense. In particular, French interests were seen as being at odds with Spain’s, with suggestions that Paris tacitly backed Morocco’s claim. With Perejil physically in the hands of Morocco’s military, which posed a clear situation for Spain, the occupation of its uninhabited territory was not a direct matter for NATO, as the territories were not included in Article V of the Alliance charter.228

Aznar’s reaction was conditioned by two key audiences—Spanish public opinion229 that was almost Clausewitzean in its response (see Chapter 5) and that in Morocco, external to Spain’s cultural environment, where elites and public feeling rallied against a European former power (Larramendi 2003). Morocco has traditionally struggled diplomatically (and economically) with Spain, having had a long history of intervention, colonisation and regional disputes including a fractious argument over fishing and agricultural goods entering the EU through Spain. In Andalusia, where tensions have been most evident, the rioting and unrest in El Ejido (see chapter 3) inflamed tensions even further. In effect, Perejil represented an unprecedented security challenge for Spain at the start of the millennium, with implications for international standing, domestic stability and future policy direction.

228 Article V of the 1949 NATO treaty commits members to defending each other’s territories in the North Atlantic area. This did not extend to territories outside a clearly defined area which meant that the Spanish territories were not included (and fuelled Spanish indifference to the Alliance).
229 According to El Mundo newspaper, 92% of Spaniards supported the military operation by Madrid. www.news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/21342365.stm; [accessed 15 August 2009].

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Returning to the constructivist focus on the cultural environment, Spain’s troubled withdrawal from its North African colonies after 1945 has had direct relevance for 21st century security. Military-led campaigns to liberate Spanish territories were a humiliation for the Franco dictatorship, with the last territory (Spanish Sahara) being ceded while Franco lay on his death-bed in 1975. In spite of Madrid’s assertions that Ceuta and Melilla have had links to Spain from the end of the 15th century, to Morocco the territories represent colonial vestiges. Perejil demonstrates the challenges to former colonial powers under European collective security. Whilst EU membership technically offered Aznar’s Spain security and credibility in financial markets, as well as cooperation in foreign and security policy, in the matter of Perejil (and Morocco), historical sovereignty disputes were a challenge not regularly experienced by the EU membership.

Spain’s EU status did not deter Morocco from its non-violent seizure of Perejil following a sharp deterioration of diplomatic relations after 2001. Although only a short-lived confrontation, Spain’s handling of the Perejil dispute indicated the Aznar administration’s style and realistic culture of security at that time. That the EU’s role was downplayed indicated a nationalist approach, reflecting popular opinion which mobilised quite rapidly against Morocco’s incursion. Drawing on confidential interviews indicated a crisis management approach taken by Aznar, with a hard line taken against Morocco as well as the French government for its alleged support for Morocco’s actions.

Re-elected with a majority strengthened Aznar’s hand in his security model, his dependence on nationalist parties within the Chamber of Deputies (the lower House) was removed, offering enjoy leeway in day-to-day governance, reinforcing a model of Presidentialism. It is hard to predict what would have been different if Aznar had relied on coalition support in 2002, but the events of 2003-4 are fundamental to perceptions of Spain’s approach to security in the modern era. A combination of Aznar’s resolution to support the Iraq invasion, the groundswell of public engagement against the decision, and the subsequent

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230 This consisted of a series of military skirmishes and occupations by Moroccan troops over a number of decades. There is little written on this matter, as it has been viewed as a humiliation for Spain’s military and government under Franco.

231 The 1982 Falklands War between the UK and Argentina offers a very similar parallel although the physical fighting was a significant escalation from the Perejil example.

232 Interviewees requested not to be cited on this matter, but highlighted the executive’s role in key decisions and how certain ministries were marginalised in favour of Aznar and a small coterie of Ministers, tensions with France were a notable (and sensitive) feature on this matter.
handling of the Madrid train bombing undermined the Presidential model of policymaking in Spain, with effects still being seen today.

Aznar’s legacy did not just weaken a Washington-focussed security model, but also that of the strong executive. Not only was the outcome of such policy a failure, but also the way in which Spain became fundamentally aligned towards the US in defiance of public opinion, was responsible for such a shift. In hindsight ruptures with long standing norms in Spain’s international standing offered little to broad swathes of voters or groups but reflected an over-centralised executive; many ‘interests’ in Spain had been unconvinced by the PP’s approach, and whilst this may not have led to the PP’s defeat in 2004, which was due to the handling of the Atocha bomb, the connection in voters’ minds with Iraq seriously impacted Spain’s standing as a credible presence on the military and peacekeeping agenda.

José Luis Zapatero and the PSOE Approach to Security 2004-11

“An accusation made about Rodriguez Zapatero is that he not only failed to increase Spain’s profile on the international stage, but also appeared to have little interest in the foreign policy sphere” (Kennedy, 2013, p.179)

For a government elected after one of Spain’s most traumatic election incidents in modern history, the terrorist attack and bitter recriminations led to the unexpected victory by the PSOE and overshadowed almost a decade of security policy. Their platform of immediate withdrawal from Iraq meant that the perception of security remained contested between the main parties, and this, marked the debate for the first decade of the millennium. Zapatero and the PSOE conducted a significant shift away from the PP’s enthusiastic embrace of Atlanticism, but it was less apparent what this entailed, as Kennedy argues.

By politicising the Iraq conflict, Zapatero identified advantages in harnessing significant elements of Spanish popular opinion. Zapatero’s first well-publicised act in power (the day after assuming office) was to order the return of Spanish troops from Iraq. Later, during a fractious debate in the Spanish Parliament, he went on to denounce the PP’s posture, claiming it infringed international law and lacked a UN Resolution, this also reiterated public opinion’s vocal opposition and alleged that Parliament’s consensus had been broken. (Revista Española de Defensa, 2004, p.34)
Politicisation of Spain’s withdrawal from Iraq by Zapatero\textsuperscript{233} meant that, just as the Atlantic posture of the PP government had marked Spain’s security after 1996, Spain’s security under the PSOE was dominated by a European and multilateral model, and what some argued was an unclear agenda.\textsuperscript{234} However, the most striking outcome was the implication for Spain’s relationship with the US, which took grave offence at the nature of Spain’s withdrawal from its coalition. It is the contention of this section that Zapatero’s approach to security was more than a simple politicisation of the PP’s disastrous intervention with the US, in that it also offered a more domestic human security agenda that perhaps afforded society protection in a way that traditional models do not recognise. Whatever the case, the government reiterated a commitment to international legality and legitimacy.

“Spain will assume its international obligations to defend peace and security. This we will do always, with just one condition: actions must be based on a prior decision by the United Nations or another competent international body” PM Zapatero (Kennedy, 2013, p.185).

It is the PSOE government’s approach after its election that conditioned analysis of Spain in this period. The cooling of ties with Washington received most attention. What is overlooked however,\textsuperscript{235} is that a different emphasis was adopted by the government, which went on to focus on domestic and broader aspects of ‘security’. This is not to contend that there was no external security focus on the part of the Zapatero government, but instead a different emphasis emerged. This meant adopting aspects from the human security agenda, while also shifting away from the state as being the referent object towards a focus on individual or citizen-oriented aspects of security.

It is more appropriate to view Zapatero’s (2004-2011) term in office as drawing on a domestic approach as its security agenda, with the government pursuing a social justice model centred on entrenched social problems within Spain, such as youth unemployment, and on innovative ideas relating to issues such as sex and gender equality. These reflected a renewed preoccupation with social and human aspects of security but, given Spain’s strong Catholic conservative constituency, such an approach was not to be taken lightly, and whilst not the subject of this thesis, the bitter ideological battle over gender and sex equality

\textsuperscript{233} Interview with Rafael Bardaji, Feb 2017.
\textsuperscript{234} Interview with Felix Arteaga, Feb 2017.
\textsuperscript{235} For the most part, analysis centred on traditional military aspects of the relationship. The Elcano Institute’s Global Presence Index sees Spain’s military as traditionally not a multiplier of influence.
perhaps explains why the issue of ‘security’ has been less prominent a topic among commentators on the Zapatero years.

Whereas some (Joyce, 2007, Arteaga 2017) have argued that Zapatero did not have a coherent approach to a security strategy, the 2004-8 period actually represented a significant reordering of ‘broader’ security priorities that more closely reflected Spain’s cultural environment. As argued in the previous chapter, civil society or aspects of the ‘Clausewitzian passion’ (primordial violence) in Spanish society were a product of a political disdain for the foreign policy ventures in Iraq and the occasional difficult moments in the mission in Afghanistan that challenged Spain’s civil society.236 The aspiration for involving Spain in overseas security military missions had become conditioned on a complicated raft of moral and legal issues underpinned by the vagaries of public opinion. Yet Zapatero’s broad support base, traditionally indifferent to arguments requiring support for the US, meant there was leeway to pursue an agenda distinct from the González years, but one that reflected some of the significant social changes that had taken place in Spain since the late 1980s.237

**Zapatero’s Progressive Security Paradigm**

Through applying a broader understanding of security Zapatero’s approach can be analysed, with one approach relating to an agenda based on justice theories, particularly those of Pettit, Rawls and Barber,238 in a way that had been seen in other countries (such as the UK’s ‘Third Way’) and which emphasised a radical aspect of the PSOE’s domestic agenda. Coupled with a number of longer term tendencies within the PSOE’s intellectual core, this articulated a social domestic security model that extended beyond the notion of just the State as the referent object, to one that would reflect social change and embraced society and revisited the idea of Spain as a European society.

Campaigning in 2004, the PSOE had committed itself to a revitalised social programme on reducing domestic violence, citing it as a threat affecting substantial numbers of Spanish citizens). This was subsequently approved by a

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236 The 2003 ‘Yak’ incident saw a unit of 62 Spanish Army Engineers killed when an (obsolete, low cost) chartered aircraft crashed when returning troops from Afghanistan The issue became an ongoing embarrassment for the MOD with difficult questions regarding the equipping and funding of troops on operational duty discrediting military commanders and the minister.

237 Spain’s significant social changes included female participation in the work place, educational achievement, and increase in Spain’s ethnic diversity, much of which challenged the patterns of work and behaviour of preceding decades.

238 Kennedy cites Pettit’s *Political Philosophy in Public Life* as a dominant influence on Zapatero’s approach (Kennedy 2013, p.167).
considerable majority in the Cortes later that year alongside a platform of support and funding by the central government. Not only was this policy a reflection on a radical tradition within the Spanish Left, but it also mirrored security thinking regarding feminist and sexual identity, which started to emerge in Spanish academia from the 1990s with a subsequent impact upon the Spanish Socialists’ agenda.

“The elimination of discrimination was presented as being a key concern for a government engaged in building a stronger, more democratic society” (Kennedy, 2013, p.170)

Commitment to a more liberal social agenda through the legalisation of same sex marriage (in 2005) illustrated further radical engagement with a more socially liberal agenda (a role not traditionally pursued in Spain) and drew on the 1978 Constitution to back this up. Same sex marriage, a programme of combating domestic violence and the establishment of an ‘Equality’ ministry reflected an ambitious articulation of a domestic security agenda. It is the assertion of this chapter that Zapatero’s PSOE was moving Spain’s security focus onto human security as the referent object, and in turn a more equal and resilient society in spite of entrenched conservative and Catholic opinion.

While it is possible to credit the PSOE and Zapatero with a development-led security model, the international community had already identified a relationship between security and development. The international Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were already a feature of Spain’s commitment to human security.

Returning to Spain’s international security however, the state’s commitment to honouring its adherence to the millennium development goals, particularly the spending of 0.7% of GDP on development aid and a reinvigoration of the Cooperation Agency, has its roots in the International Development Cooperation Law of 1998. However, as Hughes argued (1999, p.182), the institutional structures were clearly ill-equipped to meet Spain’s aspirations, particularly at a time when sophisticated and interconnected NGOs were emerging and playing an increasing role in Spain’s political landscape.

Zapatero’s broadened security strategy, poverty reduction and assistance programmes were reinforced as a component of foreign and security policy in his first term (2004-8). This reflected not only a focus on the human dimension of security, but also Spain’s wider global strategy to strengthen the non-Atlantic dimension of security. One aspect here was the integration of the Cooperación
(Development Cooperation) Agency into the Foreign Ministry in 2004, as outlined by the Government’s Master Plan:

“… to make Spain an active “peace-maker”, as the hallmark of a project for foreign, security and cooperation policy…Spanish Cooperation can draw on a large cast of players, from the General State Administration — particularly the Defence and Interior Ministries, the State’s Armed Forces and Security Forces — to NGOs and the private sector, and taking in the various autonomous and local administrations." Government of Spain (2005, p. 69).

Furthermore, the 2005 Master Plan outlined that the approach of preventing and resolving conflict would establish a “wider, long-range and inclusive overseas action strategy.” Government of Spain (2005, p. 69).

Aid funding and increased support for debt relief, poverty reduction programmes and the active pursuit of the MDGs were a feature of Zapatero’s second term, where, in spite of the early indications of the financial crisis, there was a clear attempt to create a different foreign and security policy agenda. This was not without criticism, and one observation is that the approach was not well communicated to wider Spanish opinion, engagement with Latin America in particular did create some controversy.

“For Zapatero, pulling Spain out of its former alliances was not compensated by entry into any other alliance. For this reason and because of his childish left-wing tendencies, Zapatero’s policy led Spain to seek alliances with any anti-American leader who crossed his path” (Bardají, 2006, p.26)

Spain’s significant armaments industry was implicated in sales to Venezuela where, after significant criticism from Washington and pressure from the US State Department, a humiliating climb down over export licences reflected badly on the PSOE government. Whilst Bardají’s language may have overstated the government’s approach, a warming of relations with Cuba reinforced an impression that the PSOE sought confrontation with the US on foreign policy matters.

Latin America, a perennial priority for Madrid’s overseas relations and a source of influence and security, was paradoxically a victim of the development success of most economies within the region as they became middle-income countries with the subsequent loss of aid from Europe. Therefore, for Spain, although its traditional priorities of Latin America and North Africa have at times featured in wider security efforts, there was a cost from ‘Europeanising’ or escalating matters of concern in international fora with tangible consequences on other
Areas of policy. Relationships with third parties (such as the EU) inevitably impacted upon Spain’s traditional bilateral strengths, as was shown a number of times in Spain’s Latin American policy.

Zapatero’s premiership had two key international security policy priorities: effective multilateralism and a refocus on European institutions. Although part of these two priorities related to Spain’s broader national mood in the period 2004-11, in reality it reflected the desire for a more consensual approach reinforced by the 2005 Organic Law that underlined the need for Parliamentary approval for the use of force. Whether multilateralism reflected Zapatero’s personal values is unclear, but evidence suggests that later events, which witnessed increased troops in Afghanistan, support for the challenging UN mission in southern Lebanon and military support for the coalition against Gadaffi, meant that Spanish society and the PSOE would still undertake military operations without language of existential threats, including the speech act.

By focusing policy on a more institutionally-European approach through the medium of CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy), there were clear priorities that differed from those of his Partido Popular predecessor, although also a reassertion of the European vocation that dates back almost a century among Spain’s liberal thinkers in the form of the regenerationists (see chapter two). Whether this is a crucial aspect of the PSOE’s vocation is unlikely, but it does indicate a tradition that sets out a model of integration that predates the European project.

Zapatero and the United Nations Alliance for Civilizations (UNAOC)

Sources (Arteaga & Bardaji) have portrayed Spain as having retreated from an overseas posture, but there are examples of this not being the case, with a more nuanced approach. Zapatero’s ‘Alliance for Civilizations’, launched in 2004, was an ambitious attempt to create a cross-civilizational movement for interaction in conjunction with one of Spain’s closest allies in the Middle East, Turkey. This approach did not achieve much prominence among western states and the UNSC but it was well-received by Arab states and gained some early traction at

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239 Europeisation’s impact on national policies is a central theme in Europeanisation and National Foreign Policy Towards Latin America, Ruano, L. (2011).
240 The Spanish relationship with the Communist regime in Cuba underwent a number of challenges after the 1990s as formerly Communist states increasingly questioned the EU’s posture in Cuba. The Czech Republic in particular demanded a harder EU line on Cuba’s human rights abuses which contrasted with Spain’s engagement.
the UN General Assembly’s membership with the backing of Kofi Annan the then Secretary General.

UNAOC represented a determined push by Spain to promote a forum of engagement between the Islamic and Western states, focussing on civil societies. Drawing on a good working relationship between Turkey and Spain (Madrid supported a possible Turkish EU accession), the initiative’s support at UN grassroots level generated some momentum, but a lack of concerted support by more influential countries has, like a number of initiatives in the UN, never fulfilled its potential, which is perhaps less a comment on Spain’s role in the process than an illustration of the reality of the UN’s structural deficiencies.

The Alliance for Civilisations has endured, and remains a preoccupation of the Foreign Ministry within ongoing backing from the UN. It retained some support from the PP, which shows that some bipartisan continuity endures from the Zapatero era, but UNAOC cannot be described as a significant success of the government of that era, but more a reflection of the PSOE’s approach to framing security and foreign relations differently.

In backing ambitious multinational peace support operations, the support for international legal sanction by the PSOE showed a desire to promote Spain within the United Nations, and to a lesser extent NATO, in spite of some portraying Zapatero as lacking a policy. During his tenure, Spain undertook significant troop deployments to the UN mission in Lebanon, increased forces in Afghanistan and wholeheartedly supported EU missions (in the Balkans), thereby challenging the view that a retrenchment by Spain was underway.\(^{241}\)

Whereas the Bush administration cooled towards Spain following its withdrawal from Iraq, the PSOE’s adoption of a more European stance to promote Spain and its previously more progressive posture offered some alternative structure, than just anti-Americanism. The PSOE’s 2004 National Defence Directive (DDN) reinforced Spain’s participation in international missions only under conditions of compliance with international law and Parliamentary approval in the Chamber of Deputies, further reinforced by the 2005 Organic Law. This has underpinned Spain’s intervention in a number of successive missions to this day and marks a feature of contemporary Spanish security.

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\(^{241}\) This was reiterated in interview with a Juan Moliner (MOD official) in December 2011.
The 2005 Organic Law\textsuperscript{242} was passed to prevent a repeat of the Iraq war decisions and reflected the prevailing cultural environment at this time. Aznar had been accused by PSOE politicians of deploying Spanish military forces with the US prior to its invasion of Iraq despite there being a questionable legal basis. Although Spanish troops did not attack Iraq militarily, the Navy Frigate \textit{Álvaro de Bazán} supported the US Navy in the Persian Gulf during the attack and invasion phase. Technically, even though Spanish troops deployed into Iraq after the invasion (and once a UNSC Resolution had been passed) to assist with Iraq’s reconstruction, humanitarian mission and rebuilding, the legitimacy of Aznar’s decision has never been completely accepted. This has been ossified by the events of the March 2004 Atocha bomb attack. In the minds of many Spaniards (Dannenbaum, 2011, p.307; Jordan, 2006, p. 227) the bombing was a direct outcome of Spain’s involvement with the US. Hence the publication of a DDN and an Organic Law which allocated power to the Congreso de los Diputados (Chamber of Deputies) to “acordar la participación de las Fuerzas Armadas en misiones fuera del territorio nacional” (Muñoz-Alonso, p.699).\textsuperscript{243} This has subsequently become a norm imprinted on Spain’s security that exists to this day.

Deliberation on publishing a national security strategy emerged in Zapatero’s first term. Aznar had originally called for such a strategy in his final year in office, but the issue was reinforced in the 2008 Defence Directive, which explicitly endorsed the publication of a strategy. Anecdotally,\textsuperscript{244} there was no enthusiasm for a strategy by the Zapatero administration, despite PSOE figures such as Javier Solana, the ex NATO secretary general and EU foreign affairs representative, pushing for such a process. One explanation is that there appeared to be no capital for the PSOE in re-awakening the spectre of issues that had dogged their PP predecessor (nor the 1980s rows over NATO). In the absence of the Strategy until the very last months of the PSOE period in office (publication was in the summer of 2011), no clear position emanated from the PSOE beyond what was contained in the Defence Directives. It was only at his swearing in as Prime Minister for his second term in 2008 that Zapatero acknowledged the need for a

\textsuperscript{242} Organic Laws are a long-standing feature of Spain’s political and legal system and are endowed with an additional semi-constitutional status.

\textsuperscript{243} “...resolve on the participation of the Armed Forces in missions outside Spanish territory”.

\textsuperscript{244} Various interviewees (Bardají and Arteaga among others) reinforced this point when pressed.
strategy, which was subsequently reaffirmed by Defence Minister Carme Chacón before the Parliamentary Defence Committee (Arteaga, 2009).

Chacón’s appointment as Spain’s first female Defence Minister aimed to indicate further change. A relatively young Socialist politician, her appointment signalled a change about gender and security that represented a symbolic shift. While a gesture, Chacón’s conduct demonstrated that women could play a role in Spain’s security, and while her legacy is not outstanding, the fact that the PP appointed a female Defence Minister in 2016 upheld such an agenda.

Therefore, although there is a rather mixed record on the PSOE’s approach to security in its period in government, the period did witness notable change and modernisation. In policy terms, the 2004 Defence Directive and 2005 Organic Law were the start of a process of change and organisation that culminated in the 2011 Security Strategy and the system that now exists. Less obvious was any reduction in the power of the executive, and in particular, Presidentialism appears little affected by the legislative changes of the decade, meaning that in effect, the Cortes and its constituent parts continued to play only a minor role in determining policy or the accountability of the executive, and that the influence of interests remained unclear.

The PSOE Government’s Approach To `Traditional’ Security.

In terms of traditional, ‘hard’ security (Alliances, state relationships, foreign policy and defence among others) the PSOE aimed to return to a European-led approach to Spain’s security relationships. Within 12 months, the PSOE witnessed the EU’s accession of the 10 East European states comprising some 74 million people. This European focus indicated a return to a longer-term Europeanisation-style approach of previous PSOE years but which, coupled with the ambitious internal social programme of equality and empowerment, reflected a dual strategy of continuity within Europe’s institutions with a simultaneously more radical social model of citizen-centred domestic strategy that drew on a long progressive tradition of thirdworldism (Pollack 1987, p.158). It is the argument of this thesis that the PSOE’s approach drew on long standing

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245 Chacón’s visit to Spanish troops in Afghanistan while visibly pregnant was reported around the world with mixed reaction. Zubeldia cites Chacón’s ‘inexperience’ as a major feature of her tenure (2014, p.28).

246 Another legacy was Spain’s promotion of a female-led agenda in the UN in an initiative that was to be continued by the PP’s Rajoy (El Mundo 30 Sep. 2015, p.6).
aspirations to assert a more progressive security model, drawing on its interests within its support base and intellectual tradition.

A traditional defence-security paradigm of the PSOE’s approach appears less coherent. As relations with Washington deteriorated to an all-time low following the withdrawal from Iraq, this did not necessarily lead to a more or less secure nation-state in the following years. As the suicide attacks in London the following year (2005) demonstrated, many civil societies made the connection between the war in Iraq and an increase in domestic terrorism and insecurity, which was irrelevant to traditional military power.

In 2006, the Foreign and Defence Ministers endorsed the difficult UN Peacekeeping mission in Lebanon with a sizeable Spanish contingent, which would prove costly with a number of soldiers killed. Spain’s record of support for peacekeeping served as a counter to those claiming that Spain had withdrawn from the PP government’s ambitious plans for an active, specifically middle tier status, given developments in the Zapatero government’s Mediterranean policy. However, as the withdrawal of Spain’s forces from the Kosovo mission would indicate in 1999, the national priority (reflecting the idea of Spain as a ‘nation’) of not supporting separatist movements would trump support for wider regional and international institutions.247

The Security Posture of the PSOE 2004-11 in Review

In hindsight, Zapatero’s governments are now judged by the near collapse of Spain’s economy that coincided with the government’s second term in 2008. Literature regarding the security (and foreign policy) of the period mainly focusses on the state’s rejection of the PP’s Atlanticist model and a shift towards the multilateralism espoused by Zapatero, whose influence over the policy process differed from his predecessors. However, the impact of the issues of historical memory248 and social justice ensured that a broad security concept of Zapaterismo did exist, but had fewer roots in a security model with ‘the state’ as

247 Spain’s 2009 withdrawal from peace support roles in Kosovo was expected following the territory’s unilateral declaration of independence in 2008. Spain had always been troubled by NATO and UN intervention in Kosovo but felt obliged to support European allies. The declaration, however, was impossible for Spain to support and remains so (interview with high ranking Defence advisor, Oct. 2015).

248 Spain’s Law on Historical Memory was designed to shed light on aspects of repression, violence and suffering during the civil war and Franco’s dictatorship. It unearthed difficult and troubling aspects of the period, and whilst the government could claim it helped reconcile and develop a narrative of the time, others viewed it as politically inspired.
the referent object and was more about social and human security reform based on society and to a lesser extent nation.

This period represents an example of constructivist interpretations of ‘interests’ to explain change. Whereas the Aznar model implemented a change in policy reflecting a top down approach (driven by the PM’s own agenda and personality), under the PSOE after 2004, the progressive shift reflected aspects of the contemporary development and human security thinking that were in vogue among certain parts of its support base. In this case, the model of Katzenstein (1996) emphasises the importance of interests (from the Spanish development community and the Left) to explain the shift towards a different ideological approach, whilst not immensely popular from an electoral basis, such an agenda represented the persistence of aspects of third worldism among the Spanish left.

The PSOE’s domestic security shift was less about a process of securing the state, but more concerned with a vision of securing a different referent object. In Spain’s case this focussed at that time on diverse groups such as domestic abuse victims, gay and transgendered citizens, and immigrants (who had entered in record numbers and where attempts to legalise them were a policy priority). From the perspective of this thesis, the 2004-2011 period can only be seen in the context of before and after the financial crisis of 2008 (chapter 4).

Before 2008, there existed a genuine attempt to redefine security, the relationship of the citizen and the concept of security, based on a model similar to that of interests, values and the cultural environment, yet the economic crisis of 2008 was so profound that it irrevocably undermined the PSOE’s notion of the state, and overturned political allegiances within Spain.

The events of the 2008 financial crash, the rise of the indignados, the Arab Spring and the election of the PP government in 2011 abruptly ended the Zapatero government’s hopes of establishing a different paradigm of security. In some ways, interview with a senior official249 in the Defence Ministry gave the impression of it being a time of business as usual as Spain was set to return to more traditional policy making.

The three key security themes of the Zapatero government, multilateralism, a renewed concept of human (or citizen) security and the withdrawal from a model

249 Juan Moliner, Spanish MOD December 2011.
of Atlanticism, were challenged by the Arab Spring, but most of all by the impact of the economic crisis of 2008. From a constructivist approach, the words, rhetoric and policies of his first term were not enough to make a long term meaningful shift in Spain’s understanding of security, nor its cultural environment. Zapatero’s paradigm of a Spanish security culture marked by consensus and multilateralism, in tandem with a return to the Europeanisation model meant that there was a continuity with the aspiration of Spain achieving its appropriate place in the world,\textsuperscript{250} the challenge lay in defining it and more importantly embedding it in within cultural environment of national security something that eluded both Aznar and Zapatero.

Spain’s approach to finding its place implied membership of the EU’s inner circle, the G20, NATO and serving as Europe’s interlocutor with Latin America. Key state institutions and the economy survived the events of 2008-11, but Zapatero’s vision did not and the humiliating defeat for the PSOE in 2011 not only wrecked the vision of \textit{Zapaterismo}, but also set in train political disenfranchisement from the PSOE’s support base that were to have implications for years to follow.

While some describe Zapatero as having a “poor record as a chief foreign policy actor” (Gillespie, 2011, p 74) the reality is more complicated. Zapatero inherited a highly politicised foreign and security policy scenario, a legacy of a mobilised segments of civil society and a cultural environment that encouraged interests to compete for influence. Katzenstein’s approach reinforces the importance of interests and political elites have sought to accommodate their needs. Zapatero’s boast (2008) that Spain was the world’s 8\textsuperscript{th} largest economy some weeks prior to the crash demonstrated the fragility of the imagined state. Unlike the case of his predecessor, Aznar, defeat is difficult to attribute to Zapatero’s security stance, but paradoxically Spain’s economic insecurity, which found expression in unemployment, slowdown and banking failures, was very much a cause for losing power. This period offers a valuable insight in interpreting change in security, and the capacity of the Spanish state to recognise and act on

\textsuperscript{250} This was reinforced by Spanish academics’ (the Royal Elcano Institute) attempts to measure Spain’s position in the world. Using a sophisticated formula that tracks Spain’s influence and insertion into the world, the Elcano Global Presence index has charted the country’s place in global rankings, traditionally 11\textsuperscript{th} the world, this dropped to 12\textsuperscript{th} as a result of the financial crisis. See \url{www.globalpresence.realinstitutoelcano.org/en}. 
sudden shifts in interests, ideas and norms. In both the cases of Aznar and Zapatero they were incapable of achieving this.

Return of the Partido Popular — Mariano Rajoy’s Approach 2011-3

At his third attempt, PP leader Mariano Rajoy became Prime Minister in November 2011, following an electoral victory that reflected the profound economic crisis as well as political disenchantment with the previous government. There was no huge outpouring of popularity for the PP, but more a reflection of a desire for change. As was argued previously (see chapter 4), the perception of economic security (for both the individual and the state) had become so challenging for the PSOE in its final months of government that the defeat for the Socialists was never in doubt. What was also apparent was the frustration made clear the interests of younger voters (the indignados), in particular because their security needs and voices were ignored by Spain’s elites.

Under the Partido Popular (PP) government, it was quickly apparent that there was to be no major alteration in security policy in the mould of 2001. This was due not only to the profound economic problems that the government found itself in, but also an awareness that shifting foreign and security policy risked polarisation.\textsuperscript{251} Instead, the first months saw speculation over a possible banking collapse, and potential ejection from the Single European Currency, which had become the chief concerns for Spain’s policy-makers.\textsuperscript{252} There rapidly developed a convergence across the political spectrum at the end of avoiding this fate, so by 2011/2 national economic instability security at state or macroeconomic level was key to its perception of an existential threat, while broader conceptual debates about security posture and international relations had to take a backseat. The executive in this period was under pressure to communicate an atmosphere of normality.

“In June 2012, after Spain’s Popular Party (PP) government requested up to €100 billion in European aid for the country’s banking sector, Prime Minister Rajoy refused to even use the word ‘bailout’ when informing the population” (Hare, 2012, p.463)

Within less than 12 months after election, five different austerity programmes had been launched by the PP government in Spain, underlining the impact of the

\textsuperscript{251} Interview with Rafael Bardaji February 2017.
\textsuperscript{252} Interview with José Ignacio Torreblanca (European Council on Foreign Relations) December 2011.
early reaffirmation of the 2011 Security Strategy, and persisting with the policy process led to both a handful of institutional changes following the 2011 election and publication of the 2013 Strategy (chapter 5). Given the profoundness of the economic crisis, Rajoy’s focus on domestic economic security, was both an imperative (financial competence was a recurring message on the altar of maintaining confidence) and about shielding the Spanish state from the danger of ejection from the single currency. Thus the first years of the Rajoy government were in effect a ‘hidden’ crisis response, as the financial recession evolved from a global problem requiring multilateral efforts and initiatives (such as under the 2010 Spanish Presidency) to one where the referent object to be secured was the economic viability of the Spanish state. Much of this centred on the centrality of membership of the Euro. Fortunately for the PP government, Greece, Cyprus and Italy provided even more dramatic failings than Spain, so international interests were less focussed on Madrid, but the impact was nonetheless severe.

The construction of a response to the depth of the economic crisis was accompanied by a return to a traditional threat, that of ETA. Rajoy’s former career in the Interior Ministry influenced a decision in reasserting the harder line that accompanied the PP upon its return to power. ETA’s fundamental weakness had been exposed by less effective attacks and apparently dwindling support, yet dealing with ETA was one of those areas of Spanish policy strategy where a bipartisan divide between the PSOE and PP was still maintained, which will be discussed in the final chapter. Needless to say though, the return of the PP to power saw no significant change in posture from the efforts of previous robust PP administrations. The difference was that ETA remained substantially weaker and decreasingly effective. In the wider scheme of security, 2011-13 saw ETA remain marginal as a threat to the existential well-being of the Spanish state and its citizens, with a ceasefire being declared and ETA increasingly undermined by arrests and political isolation.

**The Arab Spring and Spanish Security**

Whilst not central to national strategy, Spain’s perspective of the Arab Spring illustrates the pressures within the Katzenstein model. Given the proximity of Spain, and the presence of a significant diaspora workforce, the interaction between a national approach (drawing on EU and NATO members) with that of Spain’s cultural environment inevitably reflects domestic interests, norms and ideas. In this case, where the nation-state’s security is influenced by ideas and
prejudices, Spain faced both domestic pressure to maintain a secure nation-state but at the same time, articulate a response based on its norms of promoting peaceful change.

Relationships with Maghreb nation-states such as Morocco are best understood in the context of Katzenstein’s cultural environment where the interplay between interests and identity is deeply ingrained within public consciousness, populist anti-immigrant posturing and economic/diplomatic necessity of a functioning relationship. On dealing with North Africa, the PP traditionally faced more difficulties in bilateral relations with Morocco than its predecessor, the PSOE. However a continuity emerged based on summits, personal relationships and mutual respect between the monarchs\textsuperscript{253}. The Arab Spring crystallised matters for Spain’s progressive interests,\textsuperscript{254} who welcomed opportunity for change and the possible removal of authoritarianism. But, as events progressed, these prospects were countered by increased instability, migration and new threats such as the emergence of Islamic State group, and the expansion of Al Qa’ida related factions in the Maghreb. Paradoxically, the Arab Spring created more insecurity than had the predecessor regimes, and crystallised a debate between Spanish interests seeking a more radical posture by Madrid in support of change, and those traditional economic interests which feared financial upheaval, conflict and uncontrolled change.

Rajoy’s new PP government also inherited Libya’s post-Gadaffi chaos and Syria’s civil war, these demonstrating that peaceful change were very unlikely in many cases. In the case of Syria, although Damascus was never politically close to Spain, the humanitarian aspects of the conflict did lead to calls for support for intervention (Arteaga, 2013). Even so, in several interviews with Defence Ministry officials in 2011 and 2015, it was made clear that involvement by Spain would not take place without a clear international mandate from the United Nations, and even then this would not be major priority at the time.

Arteaga (2013, p.27) argues that Syria reflected the difficulties of articulating a regionally active approach in accordance with Spanish popular opinion; there would be vocal calls for involvement in the media and from opposition parties,

\textsuperscript{253} Spain’s monarchy has featured heavily in diplomacy with Arab rulers in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE among others.

\textsuperscript{254} Spain has long hosted interest groups, human rights organisations and movements such as the Saharawi government who are unable to operate under more repressive regimes. This has occasionally created some tensions with North African governments but also points to some influence on the part of Spain, and adds to a mosaic of links below the level of inter-state relations.
but not an opinion or voice that would authorise Spanish leadership or military assets. This gave the impression of a reactive approach to international and domestic security problems, in spite the two Security Strategies published in this period.

Whereas Spain had traditionally seen a role for leadership, activism and influence in the region of North Africa and the Maghreb, the 2011-3 period would not see significant success for Spain adopting a leadership role. This was in effect due to the cultural environment as much as regional pressures, but the fact was that the international community itself was poor in articulating a coherent response due to the myriad national and economic interests that related to historical, political and religious connections with the region at a time when even the US was criticised for not playing an active part.

Summary. Security Culture and the Executive

Following victory in November 2011 and through to 2013 it is the contention of this thesis that the executive power used by Rajoy appeared notably more ‘presidential’ in contrast to Zapatero, his predecessor. Backed by a majority in the Cortes, and assisted by a weakened opposition demoralised by defeat, in Parliamentary terms the political threat now seemed to reside in the growing number of nationalist MPs, particularly from Catalonia. Although the complex problems from the Arab Spring faced Spain’s South, with Europe focussing on the recovery of its economies and NATO increasingly concerned with Russia’s renewed interest in former Soviet republics, it was in the domestic economic sphere that Rajoy’s priority in security can be found, reflecting the realities of Spanish influence after a number of years of austerity and political divisions.

The 2008 financial crisis, with a spate of bank failures in Spain’s regions (partly due to the regional devolution of preceding decades), facilitated significant centralisation, increased control and oversight by the Bank of Spain (Chislett, 2012, p.129). This has had the effect of consolidating further powers to the executive. Additional measures such as the creation of a Financial Security Intelligence unit (again answerable to the PM’s Moncloa power base) meant that, institutionally, Rajoy’s premiership had more control than predecessor

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255 Russia’s intervention in Georgia (2008), and then increasingly in the Ukraine and former Baltic Republics was of less concern to Spain than perhaps to Germany or Poland. One interviewee stated that NATO’s main concerns (Russia) were not Madrid’s, leaving Spain more vulnerable to what Madrid actually perceived as threats.
administrations particularly given the ongoing nature of the crisis, perhaps reflecting his experience and close relationship working under PM Aznar.

The financial crisis’s impact across the country undermined the ability of the Autonomous Communities and municipalities to deliver services and governance, thereby reinforcing Madrid’s pre-eminence in a system that had become heavily devolved over years previous to this. Coupled with a Security Strategy process (see previous chapter) that legitimised centralisation, this meant that Rajoy’s first years in office were a concentration of authority and power unprecedented since the time of the PSOE under González. Whilst much of this arose from the crisis management nature of policy-making, requiring swift action, it was also indicative of a certain style of leadership and an emerging security culture based around Presidentialism.

As argued in the previous chapter, 2013’s Second Security Strategy institutionalised this centralisation in Spain’s Security policy process. Although brief, the two years of the PP’s return to power gave few indications of any polemic shift from the PSOE’s previous term in office. What was evident in 2011-3 was that the Zapatero/PSOE model of multilateralism was little changed.

A global economic crisis, the lack of a single (international) response to the Arab Spring, and the EU’s single currency predicaments, all meant that, for the PP government in 2011-3, the security issues facing Spain required a domestic crisis management response to Spain’s financial problems that posed an existential threat to the country. Whilst the Security Strategies offered the reassurance of a broad-based multi-agency approach, the emergence of a ‘national security’ concept, with a department directly answerable to the Moncloa, has led to a strong ‘Presidential’ executive for the purposes of dealing with the matter at hand. With no clear Ministerial lead, a fragmentation of responsibilities, and the National Security Council initially sitting under the PM, centralisation and Presidentialism have come to characterise Spain’s institutional and organisational policy response.

During interviews, it was acknowledged that since 2011 the PP had embraced the concept of a centrally-controlled security strategy process under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister. This was further reinforced by the appointment of an under-powered Jefe de Gabinete to oversee the routine management of the National Security Council (NSC). One criticism that arose was that the position was filled by too low-ranking a civil servant. In comparison
with the UK, where its NSC was headed by a senior, highly-experienced civil servant with cross-government experience. Rajoy’s Jefe de Gabinete was felt to be too junior to achieve effective coordination.

Given the responses to Spain’s financial crisis, the impact of the Security Strategies of 2011 and 2013, the institutional changes to policy control of the financial sector and the historical role of Prime Minister Rajoy in dealing with (predominantly ETA) terrorism and fiscal intelligence oversight (again answerable to the PM), it becomes evident that the Security Policy process remains distinctly in the hands of the Executive within the Moncloa palace and that, following a brief interregnum under the PSOE, Presidentialism has returned to Spain’s security culture, with a marginalisation of interests and identity due to austerity, a weakened civic identity with regard to foreign affairs and a fractured opposition, this led to controversial legislation in restricting the ability of groups to protest.

The period 2000 to 2013 saw three separate premierships that offer a number of insights into Spain’s strategic culture. Katzenstein’s simple, yet effective model demonstrates how ideas and identity come together to create within the cultural environment, a space for a national security culture to emerge. All three case studies of the successive governments have reflected an interplay of interests, demonstrating a Spanish identity, and a security culture focussed on a medium sized power, that is integrated in, (or perhaps dependent on) powerful international organisations. Whilst there has been (and remains) a profound domestic polarisation between the elites and civil-society regarding relations with Washington in security, overall Spanish strategic culture is marked by a powerful executive, perennially mindful of a readily-mobilised politically motivated population but more constrained by the need to act in conjunction with major powers under a clear international legal mandate.

Constructivist approaches with an emphasis on shifting identities, powerful financial interests and a fractured domestic political system, demonstrate that simply producing national strategies has yet to produce a more convincing and

256 The appointment of Peter Ricketts, a very senior and respected career civil servant as chair to the UK National Security Council reflected the contribution required and expected from a state civil servant. Furthermore, as the NSC has evolved in the UK, the role of a powerful Civil Servant has remained fundamental to the model’s success. In interview, the UK’s NSC was seen as a template that Spain should have followed.

257 In December 2014, the Ley Orgánica de Seguridad Ciudadana (Citizen’s Safety Law) was passed by the PP government that significantly restricted laws of association, assembly and demonstration
integrated policy making approach within a culture of security. Instead, there persists a `Presidentialist' style dominated by a powerful executive articulating a vision that is not adequately countered by Parliamentary opposition, but by rising interests (such as Catalan nationalists) outside of the main political system which is likely to lead to further disputes.

Spain’s security has traditionally lacked a strategic approach, and has, on too many occasions reflected politicisation whilst impromptu crisis management has underlined this trend. The events of 2004 and the subsequent economic slump of 2008 mark a change as to what security in Spain actually meant. In spite of a documented process of strategy-making, the existential threats have not been accepted or defined clearly enough. The traditional definition of security: the ‘absence of threat of violence, or use of force’ (Buzan, 1998) does not help clarify the matter as, given the broadening of security, so evident since the end of the Cold War, the 21st century has significantly increased the range of security issues in Spain.

Since 2011, security culture in its broadest term has come to embody two policy strands. The first has been to keep Spain’s position within the Single Currency and European Monetary Union to maximise economic and political benefits from EU membership (this further accords with the concept of Spain as an essentially European society). The second aspect focusses on a more traditional security, namely to secure Spain from threats to Spain’s integrity and interests (in accordance with the Security Strategy). This has meant support for allies wherever possible, but at minimal risk or cost to Spain’s own domestic stability. Hence, military force would support the overthrow of Gadaffi’s regime but, under national caveats, combat missions would not involve military attacks. Syria would not witness the same engagement due to risks of following the US against domestic public opinion, so in effect security would be pursued in the context of blended diplomacy via NATO and the EU, which would see a policy of engagement with both institutions, but with an acceptance that both were inadequate for Spain’s needs.258

258 Following Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008 and subsequent interest in Ukraine and the Baltic states, Spain argued that its traditional security concerns (the Maghreb) were again not receiving the required level of serious attention. In effect, it would have to demonstrate and lobby for security issues pertaining to its interests. This has parallels with the late 1980s and early 1990s (before the Barcelona process/UfM) where González and his foreign ministers argued for a security forum for the Mediterranean.
Whilst proximity to Washington could have conferred some benefits to Spain, as Arteaga stated previously (2005) there was no clear model for security in the event of realignment from a Washington-centred approach. This dilemma is an issue that has challenged Spain since the very first Defence Agreement of 1953: in the absence of a close alliance with Washington what would Spain’s security posture look like? Zapatero perhaps came the closest to articulating an alternative vision, but the effects of the economic crisis (and Zapatero’s failure to frame a strategy) in 2008 meant that the vision never bore fruit.

**The Shaping, Framing and Delivery of Spain’s Security**

During the three administrations of Aznar, Zapatero and Rajoy, Spain witnessed significant and lasting challenges to Spain’s political system, economy and global influence. The millennium marked a sense that Spain had reached a highpoint in its international standing (Gillespie, 2001, and Pereira, 2011), which was almost on a par with the ebullience noted in 1992. But in security terms, as this thesis has argued, a centralisation has remained evident, particularly in the framing of security as institutional shifts, the constitutional settlement and challenges to devolved administrations have been evident. Strategy is still shaped by an overcentralised bureaucracy and at the behest of a Presidential executive, this is itself a product from the transition to democracy. Security policy remains only loosely subject to institutional checks according to the Constitution, which on the issue of strategy making and policy delivery remains ambiguous at best.

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259 1992 marked the Barcelona Olympics, the successful Seville Expo, the opening of the high speed AVE train and a relatively high profile role in orchestrating the Arab-Israeli peace process, while the Ibero-American summit process was also developed and Spain celebrated the 500th anniversary of the ‘Discovery’ of the Americas.
Chapter 7.
Spain's National Security: an Appraisal.

This thesis has developed a constructivist analysis drawn from Katzenstein’s model of post-war Japan to consider the approach undertaken by three separate Spanish administrations in responding to unpredictable and significant shifts in Spain’s domestic and international security. In conjunction with the Copenhagen School’s sectors approach, the Katzenstein paradigm of a culture of national security has offered a tangible methodology in understanding Spain’s contemporary situation based around three referent objects that of Spain ‘the nation’, the Spanish ‘state’ and that of Spain as a ‘(European) society’.

The evolution and production of Directives and Security Strategies in chapter 5 offers some insight from the standpoint of an empirical analysis, but their value as indicators of a real national security situation is less apparent. I have attempted to examine the relationship between the executive, civil society and the state through using Clausewitz’s ‘remarkable trinity’, with the executive playing the role of the rational actor, but this does not address ‘national interests’, hence the use of the Katzenstein model to consider identity and culture. In this chapter, the thesis looked at policy outcomes under the three premierships, and in particular focussed on the role of the executive in what were quite distinct directions in policy, which in turn raises the idea of a culture of security.

Throughout the research, the Constitutional arrangements outlined in the 1978 Constitution underpin process and, in effect, democratic Spain has a record of almost 40 years of security policy-making under a variety of governments. The Clausewitzean trinity based on military strategy does not help explain the process whereby successive Spanish executives (i.e. the rational actor) have determined what constitutes national security policy and how this is then framed, nor does it consider the concept of ‘national interest’ which can be considered through the concept of a ‘culture of security’.

The Presidentialism model (Heywood 1999, Pereira 2010) enables Spanish Prime Ministers significant leeway in determining how security is articulated. And, as I have argued, the limited ability of the Spain’s legislature to hold the executive to account, as well as its impact on policy, is also seen to have remained marginal within the National Security Strategies. Wider discussions
have focussed on the model of the Agency-Structure debate (Carlsnaes and Smith, 1994, p.16, or Hill 2003, pp.25, 57), which offers a different approach in foreign policy, and could be used to frame security policy. This chapter will explore the impact of constitutional and institutional arrangements, but recognises that they alone do not completely explain the inconsistency in Spain’s culture of security, Presidentialism and contemporary policy this is discussed as part of the thesis.

**Security Policy: A Definition.**

Security Studies, like International Relations theory, is fragmented as a discipline, but it is useful to consider an amended definition or description of security, for the purpose of this research, as ‘the absence of threats to acquired values’ (Luttwak, cited in Terriff, T., et al. (1990, p.17). Advancing this, I would argue that Security Policy encompasses ‘those policies and actions taken to maintain an absence of threats to a nation-state’s values and well-being’. This has challenges, for, as this chapter will demonstrate, the concept of values and norms as inferred from Katzenstein’s approach and the idea of national interest advance the analysis but do not always offer simple explanations. The concept of ‘national interest’ is often seen as playing a central role in understanding foreign and defence policy, yet in security policy this relationship is less clear, given the vagaries in defining not only national interest(s), but also the model of more than one referent object. Nearly all works, however, assume national interest to be a significant determinant of security policy when considering nation-states.

In this case of Spain, earlier chapters identify that a lack of bipartisan agreement over what constituted Spain’s ‘Strategy’ meant that national policy responded to events only reactively and could be driven by personalities in the executive. It is also the contention of this thesis that there exists little agreement between elites and academics over what constitutes ‘security policy’ in Spain, which has contributed to a gap between Spain’s security policy and national interest.

Furthermore it is useful to identify and separate foreign, defence and security policy. As was outlined in the literature review, the understanding of security is dominated by International Relations theories and schools of thought that divide along profound and often ideological lines. As a result, one approach is to view the three policy areas as consisting of interrelated overlaps, with a hierarchy. In
some models, security policy consists of defence policy and elements of foreign policy along with other aspects of interior policy, among others.\textsuperscript{260}

Cleary and Chuter (2006) identify a hierarchy of ‘government’ policy, where foreign policy is the most significant policy area. Having its own Ministry, network of embassies and missions, and the cachet of representing the country and state, this pre-eminence is simple to visualise. In nation-states such as Spain, France and the UK, the position of Foreign Minister is a prestigious post, often only subordinate to the Prime Minister. In Spain, Foreign Ministers have not made the transition to Prime Minister, although in the case of Javier Solana, he did progress to NATO Secretary General and also the EU’s head of Foreign Service. In effect, foreign policy is considered to be the overarching coordination of a state’s external relations and often the representative of a country and its civil society with regard to key allies, hostile states but also within global institutions.

**Spain’s Foreign Policy — the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (and Cooperation)**

Literature on the modernisation of Spain’s external relations has informed the development of a significant part of this thesis. It is evident that in the eyes of many, despite the broadened agenda in research, security policy often remains synonymous with defence. However, as Chuter argues (2006, p.47) there exists a tangled policy hierarchy which is little analysed, with defence policy sitting beneath security policy, which is in turn actually subordinate to foreign and government policy.\textsuperscript{261} Constructivism’s approach, focussing on interests, ideas and identity offers a clear view on not the policy, but the issues behind it. In Chuter’s model, (for the purposes of analysing defence admittedly) defence is a product of national foreign and security policy, with a Ministerial determination of how national interests should be turned into policy objectives. The same is assumed in this thesis, that security policy is subordinated to foreign policy (although there is greater prominence of the Interior Ministry), with Ministries

\textsuperscript{260} UK military doctrine explains security policy as consisting of over-lapping ‘ovals’ of defence and foreign policy (with foreign policy being the all-encompassing sphere). Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Military Analysis Module B – International Security (Department for International Affairs, 2004).

\textsuperscript{261} Chuter also explains that there is a more tangled hierarchy in which input and decisions are more complicated and non-linear, which reflects the true nature of policy-making (p.49), but he generally omits the merit in adopting models such as Katzenstein or broader theories in policy making.
arbitrating the final aspect of national policy within the context of Cabinet government.

Spain’s Ministries and Security Policy: the Interior Ministry (Ministerio de Interior)

Traditionally the cornerstone of the Spanish state in domestic affairs, and more so with the emergence of a modern nation-state, further than any other Ministry, Spain’s Interior Ministry is the least researched by academics looking at security. However, its size, breadth of activity and resources mean that the Ministerio de Interior should invite further research. With a vast number of employees, an annual budget of 12 Billion Euros and an organisational structure that actually has a “Ministerio de Seguridad”, then it is here that perhaps the process of ‘securing Spain’ is most relevant. In particular, the relative climate of peace (or rather, the decline of armed conflict or terrorism within the Spanish nation-state) has elevated the Interior Ministry to a key function in determining how Spain’s security is maintained.

The broadening of security — to encompass economic security, energy security and even now human security implies that a number of national Ministries determine policy in these areas and in turn strategies. For example, energy dependence on hydrocarbons has been a preoccupation of Spain for more than 20 years. Successive energy ministries, in conjunction with the Foreign Ministry, have endeavoured to maintain a consistent energy supply from unstable supplier countries such as Algeria and Libya. At the same time, in the context of the development agenda and the security threat posed by large scale immigration from less-developed African countries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation’s lead in determining Spain’s external needs is fundamental to national policy.

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262 Interior Ministries are often of little interest to foreign states, businesses or International organisations. Interior policy takes place within a state’s borders, focussing its impact on a civil society within a nation-state. As a result, such ministries are powerful, with large numbers of staff, and influence lives in ways that other ministries do not. They are, however, little researched regarding security, except by those focussing on aspects of domestic policy such as crime, policing or the judiciary.

263 More than 220,000 police officers alone (source Ministry of Interior), plus hundreds of thousands of civil servants across Spain, between those directly under the control of Madrid and the autonomous communities.

264 At the turn of the millennium, a significant success by Spain was the creation of a cross border gas pipeline of Algerian gas through Morocco to Spain. This is one of the only cross-national agreements on energy between Algeria and Morocco.
The Interior Ministry’s role is somewhat different, in that it deals perhaps more directly with Spain’s population or civil society more than any other Ministry. The Lorca earthquake of 2011 saw the Interior Ministry respond through coordination of the national effort with the autonomous community and the local government council. It is this interface with blue light response\textsuperscript{265} and the newly created Military Emergencies Unit (\textit{Unidad Militar de Emergencias}, UME) that places the Interior Ministry at the forefront of civil society’s security, alongside the traditional role of policing. It is here that day to day security is coordinated.

Furthermore, the fight against ETA terrorism in Spain has been the Interior Ministry’s major success, it successfully dealt with a prolonged, violent terrorist threat. The Ministry oversees agencies delivering law and order along with the judicial and penal systems that coordinated the national response to ETA’s campaign. Prime Minister Rajoy, a former Interior Minister himself, related his role as a former Interior Minister to the constancy of the PP’s robust stance against ETA.

\textbf{Figure 15: The Structure of Spain’s Ministry Of The Interior}

![Structure of Spain’s Ministry Of The Interior](Source: Spanish Ministry of the Interior: organigram translated and annotated by the author).

With the exception of terrorism (essentially the ETA threat prior to 2004), academic literature pays very little attention to the role of the Interior Ministry in national policy on security. Spain’s Interior Ministry is perhaps an area for future research, given its size and importance in dealing with the aspects of security.

\textsuperscript{265} Blue light response would be those services responding in an emergency such as fire services, paramedics and health workers, in conjunction with the law and order agencies.
discussed in this thesis. That the State Secretariat for Security is included under the Ministry is indicative of the ostensibly ‘central’ position enjoyed by the department within national security.

**The Contemporary Foreign Ministry – The Ministry Of Foreign Affairs And International Cooperation (MAECI - Ministerio De Asuntos Exteriores Y De Cooperación Internacional)**

Initial examination of ‘security’ in academic literature relates to the idea of international policy, and Spain’s standing in the world, its external relations with international organisations, and other nation-states, and focus vis-à-vis global phenomena have been reviewed and discussed. In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs\(^{266}\) assumes a coordinating role for both Spanish national policy and that of other governments and supra-national organisations (such as NATO and the UN).

It would be reasonable to expect Foreign Affairs to have increased in activity to reflect Spain’s reinsertion in international organisations and increased overseas relations since the 1970s. Yet in 2002 *El País* newspaper identified that the size of Spain’s diplomatic staff had not increased since the transition to democracy, in spite of a significant expansion in government and, more recently according to analysts, that it suffered from a ‘lack of political relevance and insufficient resources’ (Molina et al. in Hocking (2005, p.273). Certainly, from the perspective of a researcher attempting to find access to the MAECI, it was found to be closed and rather curt in dealing with approaches, giving it the impression of being more inward looking.\(^{267}\)

It is the assertion of this thesis that from an initial examination, MAECI is not up to the task of delivering or articulating an effective security policy, especially when one considers the impact of the broadening of security as a concept. Although prestigious and high profile in media and presentation terms, Spain’s foreign ministry appears unable to offer more than an outward appearance of Spain’s security, even given the significance of its role in this and the relative

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\(^{266}\) The Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores (Foreign Affairs) became Asuntos Exteriores y Cooperación Internacional (MAECI) in 2004, reflecting an attempt to formalise and coordinate Spain’s aid programme with its external relations. This not only reflected the need to have more joined-up programmes, but critics also saw it as a politicisation of the aid budget.

\(^{267}\) As many as four separate approaches to the Ministry were rebuffed over a period of years. Access to the Ministry Archive was restricted.
size of its staff and resources. Its somewhat limited role in a broadened security agenda is furthermore overshadowed by the impact of EU membership on Spain, and significant effort by diplomats and overseas staff focusses strongly on Brussels and other institutions.

**The Spanish Defence Ministry (Ministerio de Defensa de España)**

The Defence Ministry would traditionally have been considered the most appropriate place to articulate Spain’s security as a consequence of the historical emphasis on hard, military security. As should be evident from the research focus on defence matters in the preparation of this thesis, security is regularly commented on as synonymous with defence, but what has been identified during this research is that the Defence Ministry is not the key institution in either determining or delivering security in Spain.

In-depth access to the Defence Ministry has uncovered an institution that is steadfastly focussed on purely defence matters rather than broader areas of security. The intersecting relationship between defence institutions and security is commonplace and extensive throughout research in other states. In the UK, the Quadrennial Review integrates defence and security as a policy outcome, whereas in Spain the policy structure of NSS makes the distance between defence and security perhaps more noticeable, and also reflects the political nature of the institutional arrangements of the autonomous communities, who have traditionally had an almost non-existent relationship with the Defence Ministry and yet, are often the local institutions brought to bear in dealing with events, risks and threats to security such as the Lorca earthquake in 2011 or illegal migration.

While chapter 5 broadened the concept of security through Defence Directives at a national level, and, in a number of ways Spain’s military forces have indeed developed a broader role in defining national security through participation in

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268 In 1996 the Foreign Ministry had 5,637 employees, which compared to 125,000 non-military staff in Spain’s Ministry of Defence. The context of such a disparity becomes even more evident when one considers the size of the Interior Ministry, which has in excess of 650,000 staff.

269 The focussing of defence and security on the same context has long been a tradition on the part of academics in Spain. Rodrigo’s chapter ‘Western alignment’ in Gillespie (1995), and more recently Navajas Zubelda’s piece, ‘Security and Defence policy in Contemporary Spain’ (2014), are examples that illustrate a long legacy of overlapping research between the two areas.

270 The Defence Ministry proved the most accessible of all Spain’s government institutions in the research phase of this thesis.

271 This was forcefully put to me in interview with a Defence Ministry official who expressed frustration at the uncoordinated and politicised nature of relationships with autonomous communities in civil defence matters.
peacekeeping and military reform, the research nevertheless demonstrates that, given the multitude of security threats identified in the 2013 Security Strategy, the inevitability of a multi-agency approach (starting from a range of ministries) has become more apparent. Indeed, despite initial reticence, more than one official has stated\textsuperscript{272} that the Defence Ministry has relinquished a role in articulating security policy.

**Spain’s National Security Council, Ministries and the 2013 Spanish National Security Strategy**

It is evident that institutional and constitutional arrangements do not provide a full explanation as to how changes and shifts in security perceptions are reflected through interests, identity and norms. This tension is explained through applying a constructivist approach with a focus on culture, as the process exemplified through the Strategies remains at odds with the realities of modern civil society.

Within the National Security Strategies, and in particular the role of the National Security Council, the latter was created to oversee the national response and contribution by Ministries to security policy. The strategy itself is ambiguous about how the NSC is to function, although it was assumed that the Ministries represented would deliberate over the circumstance under discussion.

While Spain’s system of Defence Directives was evidently the remit of the Defence Ministry, and in some ways the Prime Minister’s office (the Moncloa), the system of National Security Strategies launched in 2011 and updated in 2013, does not provide a clear direction as to the responsibilities of articulating security at Ministerial level. The 2011 Strategy (see chapter 5) was Spain’s first formal strategy and, as stated, did not assign a specific Ministry to any tasks emerging to consider them on an ad hoc basis. However, the 2013 Strategy instigated some changes and identified a role for Ministries, amending the body to a National (not Spanish) Security Council. However, in spite of the 2013 Strategy’s amendments in favour of a National Security Council, the role of the Interior Ministry remained yet to be distinguished from that of other ministries, suggesting significant scope for an evolutional development whereby broadened security reflects this.

\textsuperscript{272} Interviews and emails with officials in 2011, 2015 and 2017.
In the sphere of Defence, Spain’s policy is subordinated to the National Security Strategy. This accords with the UK model, where Defence’s direction derives from the NSS and is a response to strategic direction. Research within the Spanish Defence Ministry indicates that policy is driven by Defence Directives, which themselves reflect the priorities of national government (and the National Strategy).

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273 This is reinforced by announcements on the Ministry of Defence (www.mde.es) website, and also in internal publications and journals.
Figure 16: The Composition of Spain’s National Security Council. (Source: Government of Spain (2013)).
The relationship of the Security Strategies to foreign policy is less clear. The mission of Spain’s foreign ministry is to ‘plan, direct, implement and assess Spain’s foreign policy and development cooperation policy […] following the principle of unity of external action’,\(^{274}\) it is not the guarantor of state sovereignty, nor does it have the resources or manpower to respond to significant matters or deliver security policy. In this case, Foreign Policy is simply the output of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MAECI) and it is perhaps more pertinent to relate policy to external relations. Story (1995, p.2), proposed that external relations (his preferred concept to Spain’s policy) always have an internal dimension, in effect arguing that you could not distinguish external relations from the domestic orbit. This could be said to apply to security policy where external and internal aspects of security cannot be treated separately in a liberal democratic system such as in Spain.

Spain’s Strategies of 2011 and 2013 demonstrate that no single ministry possesses overall control. It is this situation which leads to the analysis, supported in the case studies and interviews that the Spanish Prime Minister retains a powerful role, and whilst it might be necessary for security policy to be so fluid to confront a multitude of threats by using a range of ministries and sub-national governments, given the historic Presidentialism within Spain’s political system, this issue should not be accepted as a wholly positive outcome.\(^{275}\)

Although examination of ministries is beneficial in comprehending disparities, sizes and capabilities in delivering security policy, it is the contention of this thesis that ministries are less relevant in identifying and delivering security policy than traditional or ‘hard’ security approaches. From the perspective of an empirical analysis, ministries offer useful input, but in qualitative terms, interviews and literature indicate that examining security policy \textit{per se} is not served by analysing ministries alone, in spite of the attractiveness of the context but by considering wider social factors as Katzenstein states:

>`Security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors’ Katzenstein (2006, p.2).

\(^{275}\) In interview with Bardaji, a former senior advisor to the PP, it was emphasised that this ambiguity that deferred decision making to the PM reflected Rajoy’s need for control over the policy process at a time when the economic crisis overruled a lot of daily political decision-making.
And in turn, what constitutes this notion of security interests is not fixed, the Spain of 2011 has different national security from the Spain of 2001. Therefore, the contention of this thesis is that contemporary Spain has (like other nation-states) witnessed an evolution of the concept of security, and that this in turn has seen a wholesale transformation of what comprises security policy. Most literature, however, reinforces a misguided concept of security policy as being inextricably linked to the government’s external relations and the well-being of the nation-state within the international system, and something unfortunately much less about civil society or individuals. In contemporary Spain, as chapter 6 identified, whilst Zapatero attempted a redefinition of how the State would define and deliver security, the government was defeated due to the impact of the banking crisis and rise of economic insecurity. In effect, in spite of the efforts of existing works, security policy has still not been defined adequately with regard to modern Spain’s civil society and nation-state. It is at this point that the impact of constructivism requires analysis.

**Constructivism, National Interests and Spanish Security**

“I define the national interest as the objective interests of state-society complexes, consisting of four needs: physical survival, autonomy, economic well-being, and collective self-esteem” (Wendt, in Burchill p.185)

Spain’s political institutions, structures and interests are key to identifying and explaining national security policy. Traditional studies focus on Ministries, executives and other bodies to explain policy outcomes such as directives and national positions. Spain’s Defence Directives and the case studies under discussion, as well as its more recent national strategies, have all pointed to a political structure that has produced mixed success in policy outcomes (such as the invasion of Iraq) driven by what at first appear as never-ending variables. However, by drawing on the idea of culture, identity, interests and norms, then some semblance can be presented in the form of a Spanish security culture.

The impact of culture draws on the paradigm offered by constructivism in emphasising how domestic politics affects security policy. The case studies of the Iraq war and Spain’s economic crisis illustrate the role social events (or determinants) have on Spain’s security agenda and policies. Constructivists would argue that Spain’s security is a product of its political culture and environment. The Spanish nation-state’s experience of the last century, even pre-dating the Franco regime, do actually influence how domestic society comprehends its security. Using Katzenstein’s paradigm, the ‘state’ is a
reflection of the nation’s social identity — the heated debates about Catalan and Basque nationalism and devolved powers illustrate the politically charged nature of Spanish national identity and its difficult relationship with the State.

Katzenstein asserts that “norms, identity and culture contribute to national security” (1996 p.54) and that the roles played by society, actors and interests are fundamental to this process. He goes on to add “norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment, and about how these particular actors will behave” (1996, p.54).

Observing that ministries have a less than uniform input to security, constructivists offer a view that something much more than ministries alone provides the focus for understanding domestic inputs into policy. Returning to the brief occupation of Perejil (Parsley Island) by Morocco in 2002, true to character, Spain’s media responded by looking at the military and diplomatic dimension to the crisis, reinforcing a norm that in Spain any territorial dispute with North Africa would demand a military-centred response, with public opinion playing a Clausewitzean-type of escalatory role. The initial actions by Morocco may have surprised Spain (as did France’s response) but the outcome was not unpredictable since Madrid despatched military personnel and peacefully recovered the contested territory. Morocco may have challenged a contemporary norm of not challenging the boundaries of an EU state, but examination of Spain’s loss of the Spanish Sahara under similar conditions in 1975 reveals that there was a historic link between the two acts, in many ways reflecting Morocco’s political environment from the standpoint of the constructivist approach.

Katzenstein’s approach (see figures 4 and/or 13) identifies a process where interests, identity and policy relate to the culture or ‘environmental structure’, he argues that a state’s identity reflects its cultural environment, therefore Spain’s democratic consolidation in the 1980s created a security model based on its cultural environment.

Spain’s model of democratically controlled Armed Forces was promoted to the Eastern European transitions in the 1990s, but much more widely around the world to include the Ibero-American international community. This was

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276 Initially Katzenstein drew upon the example of Japan to develop his argument. There is a useful parallel with Spain, given its relative marginalisation from typical western academic thinking in spite of a relatively globalised economy and society not dissimilar from western nation-states.
consolidated via high profile summits, as well as the endorsement by Spain’s monarchy of a national programme of cultural assertiveness based on language and the arts using the Cervantes Institute (*Instituto Cervantes*). This reflects a Spanish identity of a crafted regional and cultural power that was promoted by successive governments and became a norm to follow in the 1990s generating a sense of development, perhaps explained by the ambition of both Aznar and Zapatero of seeing Spain fulfil a politicised destiny, but despite some measure of success in promoting a positive image of Spain, exactly how such branding relates to national security is less clear, this reflects the perennial issue of measuring security.

Significant research into Spain’s identity exists, as it does (aside from this) on Spain’s security after EU accession in 1986 and at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s (chapter 2). Identity and security have remained as areas of study that are distinct from each other though. Successive governments were generally supportive of all aspects of the European programme, with only the Aznar period reflecting a desire (or ideological drive) to embrace a Washington-focussed model of security. In studies of Spain’s foreign, defence and security policy, there has been little mention of culture, but almost an unwritten acceptance that Spain’s histories, its nationalities and location all contribute to its identity and in turn its policies. This is perhaps the significance of Katzenstein’s model, and in the absence of IR theories that might offer an understanding or explanation regarding Spain’s experience, the concept of identity and culture is arguably most significant in the case of Spain’s actors, institutions and policy outcomes.

One of the recurring criticisms of contemporary Spain has been the fact that it lacks a strategic culture. Sources (Arteaga, Torreblanca and Simón) talk of policy-making lacking a multi-agency or strategic approach. The strategic deficiency is exemplified by a number of phenomena, such as periods of intermittent relations with Morocco and a failure to assert leadership in the

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277 The Cervantes Institute is probably the best example of the attempts by democratic Spain to promote a model of Spain that is effectively a cultural export. Spain’s significant success as the third most visited country by tourists reflects not only an economic, but also a cultural achievement. The establishment of the *Marca España* in 2012 is another good example.

278 There is no shortage of works on the nature of Spanish society, social profiles and other aspects of its civil society. How these relate to its security is a theme identified as part of this research.

279 Arteaga makes an early case in his work in 2003, but as far back as 1987 Pollack’s work identifies a flexibility and inconsistency to Spain’s international relations that imply a lack of strategy. Torreblanca also argued (2001) that Europeanisation offered a suitable alternative to constructing a national strategy.
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), and best through the polarisation of the debates over relations with Washington. This deficiency is an impediment to effective policy-making, and even the 2013 Strategy identifies the need to imbue a strategic culture.

Arteaga’s criticism (among others) reflects a distinct interpretation of the security policy process. Elites and institutions may lack a strategic culture as he claims, but his models generally do not embrace notions of broader security identity. In this case, security identity is not only shaped by national culture, but also encapsulates interests and what are perceived as threats. The separation between Spain’s security policy, its national culture and civil society which undermines policy is a theme which this thesis pursues. In a decentralised nation-state that contains historical nationalities pressing for autonomy and is geo-politically dispersed, the capacity of Madrid’s political elites and Ministries to construct a coherent approach to security through the paradigm of culture has been rarely addressed in research. In this case, an adapted model of Buzan’s captures the notion of referent objects, securitising actors (or interests).

Buzan and the Copenhagen School’s model was originally intended to analyse aspects of France’s security policy in the 1990s, the amended approach developed as part of the thesis develops the idea of three Spains, that of the `nation’, the `state’ and Spain as a `European society’. The amended model then identifies threats to these referent objects. Whilst it could be highly subjective, the approach helps to articulate the notions of security that prevail within the idea of a security culture in Spain.

Spain as `Society (or as a European society), this notion draws on the fundamental idea of the norm in Spanish political culture and discourse derived from the idea of the Spanish regenerationists (based on the work of thinker José Ortega y Gasset) that the solution to most of Spain’s challenges and deep-seated problems can be found within Europe. The obvious model is that of a liberal nation state, integrated and based on shared values with nation-states such as France and to a lesser extent Germany. Such an interpretation has proved deeply attractive to Spanish politicians, elites and opinion-formers in the media and underpinned much of the discourse towards European

280 Union for the Mediterranean is the institution evolved to represent the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, established by the EU and regional states in 1995.
accession and integration since the 1980s, 1990s. In nation-states such as the UK, such European enthusiasm is difficult to identify and is drowned out by voices that argue that a pre-EU accession period is a golden age and that a sceptical voice is often the norm.

Spain as `nation', is perhaps one of the more enduring models of security and one that reflects aspects of the realist school that is so prevalent within security studies, that of sovereign nation-states seeking to maximise benefits and well-being within a competitive system. In the case of Spain, with clearly defined borders, history and culture, conflict in recent decades has regularly centred on national questions of identity and culture. Whilst the 21st century has seen fewer disputes of this type, the occupation of Perejil by Morocco in 2002, and contemporary demands of national separatism clearly define issues of significant magnitude in modern Spanish security policy and in modern Spain among younger voters the idea of nation is sometimes seen as an idea tainted by Francoism’s rhetoric and ideology.281

Spain as a `state' within the model reflects the emergence of a contemporary Spanish political system that is a product of the Francoist regime’s transformation into a democratic modern nation-state. In this model, Spain’s transition to democracy, based on a European social democratic model282 is interpreted as possessing institutions, structures and norms that reflect the practices of European nation-states.

281 Many Spaniards are uncomfortable with the idea of nation as having a Francoist tinge. The emergence of the 1930s Republican flag in recent years as a badge of identity, represents an alternative, at times radical rejection of the Spanish nation at rallies and political meetings.

282 Heywood 1995 and 2000 argues Spain’s policy making model is based on West Germany’s Constitution.
Figure 17: Spain’s Culture of Security

(adapted from Buzan, Waever et al.\textsuperscript{283}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{spains_culture_of_security.png}
\caption{Diagram illustrating the referent object, threats, and securitizing actor in Spain's culture of security.}
\end{figure}

\textit{Referent Object} \hspace{2cm} \textit{Threats} \ldots according to \ldots \textit{Securitizing Actor}

- Spain as Society
- The US & Americas
- North Africa
- The EU (post enlargement)
- The EU (Foreign Culture, historic Nations, Autonomous Communities)

- Spain as State
- The past (isolation)

- Spain as Nation
- Anti-EU interests\textsuperscript{284}

\textsuperscript{283} Adapted from Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998, p.172) for the purposes of this research certain sectors and groups have been amended.

\textsuperscript{284} Anti-EU interests are almost negligible within Spain. Occasionally elements of the Spanish far-right (Francoist supporters) and far-left have occupied this ground. As securitizing actors these occasionally manifest themselves within protest groups, such as elements of the indignados, or anti-immigrant voices which are currently few in number.
From this study, Spain’s policy-makers remain pressured to resolve perennial issues regarding Spain’s place in the world (such debates are often veiled behind the EU’s relationship with Spain) though also to engender a sense of security in Spain. The reality is that security policy is undermined by the Spanish political system’s failure to reflect and address its culture of security with the three distinct referent objects being framed by elites whose norms and behaviours are at odds with the nation-state’s security environment and in turn this does not reflect the cultural aspects and identities prevalent in contemporary Spain.

The prevailing presence of the Presidentialism concept in policy demonstrates that the executive remains the focal point for analysing security policy (as illustrated in the previous chapter). Elected at the end of 2011, Rajoy showed little appetite for shifting the current institutional arrangements away from the executive-centred approach and, if anything, his centralisation of the finance unit and proposed national security law demonstrated an even further accumulation of power in the PM’s Moncloa power-base. The two National Security Strategies are a useful starting point for examining the relationship between national policy and Spain’s security culture, but are no panacea for what is contested by institutions, social movements, national ethnic identities and actors.

**Spain’s Security Culture, National Interest and the National Security Strategies (NSS)**

The thesis argues that the two National Strategies contribute little to securing Spain *per se* and offer little more than an institutional snapshot. History is marked by many efforts at documenting security and defence being overtaken by events and the 2011 Strategy was a good example, its publication coinciding with the Arab Spring some weeks prior to the final drafting of the Strategy.

The 2011 Strategy was not created as a positive policy step with a clear end-state and goal as chapter 5 argued, and it was not received in an appropriate manner. The PSOE’s elites had not proved clear advocates of a national strategy and it was by no means certain what these would provide for successive Spanish executives who had traditionally benefited from Presidentialism’s *ad hoc* approach to policy. Norms had evolved from the late 1980s of a civil society that had embraced European integration, a confident United Nations at the end of the Cold War and a US superpower that appeared
unchallenged from a national policy perspective until the events of the 21st century into a less unified vision as the security agenda broadened.

By 1999, the norms from that period were significantly challenged, Spanish peacekeeping had become less positive and, in the case of Kosovo, detrimental to Spain’s national interest, as NATO’s intervention raised difficult questions about the use of force, and separatism. EU and UN peacekeeping had not been a panacea for international security and the US appeared at significant odds with allies. As discussed, Aznar’s decision to support the US in Iraq was an attempt to redraw the changing norms in a way that sat more comfortably with his own vision of Spain’s security identity, rather than that of its national interest as defined by Wendt (1999, p.8).

Aznar’s decision to support the Iraq war was a step too far given Spain’s prevailing security culture and identity, its national interest was evidently at variance with Spanish military action supporting the US. Spain’s military and elites were unprepared for this intervention, and as events turned against the operation, the Spanish security environment deteriorated to a point of near-collapse, division and loss of faith in institutions following the Atocha train bombings in 2004. Returning to Katzenstein’s model: policy is a product of interests in conjunction with an identity emerging from Spain’s security environment. The events of 9/11, exceptional though they were, did not reflect a long-term change in the norms which made up Spain’s security environment. As has been argued in this thesis, Spain’s existential security was not challenged by 9/11, and therefore the securitisation and speech acts were undertaken inappropriately given the shift in Spain’s political and military posture it implied.

National Security Strategies seen as a statement of higher government policy after Chuter’s model should reflect Spain’s norms, identities and interests, and the production of the two documents in 2011 and 2013 would be a reflection of events and the environment of the preceding years. Certainly, whilst the 2013 Strategy did reflect the direction, and in many ways the priorities, of Spain’s PP government, whether it genuinely reflected the national security environment is not apparent, as there is an ambiguous relationship of interaction by the policy-makers with the wider security environment of civil society, NGOs and local autonomous communities.
By its very nature, a strategy document represents a snapshot of what a state seeks to achieve and, while not the same as policy, a strategy outlines the ways in which security can be delivered. Ballesteros identifies that the US and NATO approach of ‘ends, ways and means’ explains the initial intent of the Spanish National Security Strategy process. ‘Ends, ways and means’ is a US military doctrinal term to outline the objective (the ends), through methods and actions to accomplish the objective (the ways) in conjunction with the resources required (the means). This approach, which was initially encapsulated in 2005 by the US Department of Defense, has subsequently been adopted by many NATO states as a military planning tool. How it relates to Spain’s process and civil society remains unseen (there is little on this topic beyond the Ballesteros work of 2018) but it does reinforce a traditional notion of an overlap of security and defence matters.

**The Copenhagen School and Spanish National Security Strategy**

The Copenhagen School’s model, analyses security through sectors and there is a more appropriate accommodation of how security policy and strategy relate to each other through five different national sectors (Buzan et al., 1998, p.7). Buzan’s five sectors draw on broadened notions of security, which transfer the referent object to be secured away from the nation-state towards the fundamental referent object of each of them. So in the case of the environmental sector, security extends beyond national boundaries towards issues such as climate change and desertification in North Africa and in turn articulates threats to Spain in a more regional or cross-border context.

At the outset, the research methodology needed to identify and adopt an approach to understanding Spain’s security beyond the conventional divide between realism and the liberal approach. As outlined in the literature review such debates do little to inform an approach to Spain’s security and this led to the paradigm offered by the Copenhagen School, where the Spanish nation-state marked shifts in the three referent objects, driven by changes across a number of sectors.

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286 See chapter 2, but these consist of the military/state, political security, societal security, economic security and environmental security sectors.
Katzenstein’s model offers an analysis based on security and national cultures that applies well in post-1945 Japan, but is less clear in the context of contemporary Spain. The 2015 claim by then Prime Minister Rajoy that Spain was the most secure member of the EU was a domestically pitched message, it was not repeated significantly as a national statement but more a justification for his party’s approach towards protest and domestic political dissent. Particularly in response to the perceived threat of indignados.

The Copenhagen School’s approach lies in its appropriateness for a systemic analysis which offers a straightforward approach in understanding contemporary Spain. In the context of this thesis, the relevance of the economic sector to Chapter 4’s case study of the impact of the financial crisis. This dimension of the nation-state’s security argues that the near collapse of Spain’s economy challenged the referent objects of Spain’s security culture as much as, if not more, than the terrorist attacks of ETA or the Atocha bombing of 2004.

Environmental security has proved one of the least problematic issues for national security, as well as the broadened agenda, given the prominence accorded to environmental degradation and climate change in the national consciousness and norms by both public opinion and policy-makers. In Spain’s case, this matter was embraced by the NGO community, as were aspects by military analysts, given the fact that the relationship between African migration, poverty and environmental issues impacts on Spain. Literature and awareness regarding the security implications of climate change is commonplace and, although the threat or impact is often articulated in national terms, the fact that the Spanish MOD has identified it as a threat going back more than two decades in its defence directives is not lost on academic analysis. The sectors approach can thus be applied to a methodology in analysing the impacts of threats on Spain’s NSS.

287 Rajoy’s claim was made in El Mundo a centre right newspaper which generally supported the Popular Party and was not challenged or questioned at the time, and although subsequent to the period under review, reignited the debate about security and state response to legitimate protest. In 2015 I was able to undertake a short visit to Mauritania and met informally with Spanish diplomats working on the problem of migration. The issue was spelt out clearly with a visit to Nouakchott’s vast fishing fleet manned by migrant Senegalese workers, many indentured in slave-like conditions. The push factors of poverty in West Africa were spelt out forcefully during the trip and Spain is often the first EU country to receive and try to mitigate the high levels of migration.

288 As early as 1996, Spanish Defence Directives had identified climate change as a factor affecting national security.
Comparison of the sectors approach with the two National Security Strategies brought to light a correlation in the approach and response, although one observation in connection with the Copenhagen School is that it does come back to the state as the starting point (and generally the end point) for the analysis. Therefore the relationship between the sectors approach of Buzan et al. and that of Spain’s Strategies, with their emphasis on ministries and segmented response, means that there is a certain affinity as regards these issues. Ballesteros (2015) echoes this view with a useful discussion on national strategies, but does not make the explicit link with Buzan and the Copenhagen School.

**Figure 18: The Relationship between the Copenhagen School’s Sectors and Spain’s National Security Strategies.**
(Source: author’s annotation of existing sources)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Copenhagen School Sectors (Buzan et al.)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011 Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013 Strategy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The above table identifies how the Copenhagen School’s sector’s approach offers some interpretation of the 2 national strategies of 2011 and 2013, in this case it offers a synthesis of the shifts in state or military security with an acknowledgement of the environmental sector, the economic sector and also some link of societal security in the 2013 Strategy.

Economic security, as has already been argued in this thesis (Chapter 4), highlighted the importance of non-state referent actors (individual citizens) in determining a government’s viability and consent. The rise of the *indignados* movement alongside mass youth unemployment, wage falls and a spike in
business failures devastated the Spanish PSOE’s support to the point of the party facing an existential crisis. On the environmental security side, as has already been argued the emergence of an accepted climate change security agenda at the start of the period under review, along with acceptance in the model of illegal migration, amply shows that the broadened security agenda has emerged. How this approach of sectors however transforms into a strategy is less clear and it is in this that the Katzenstein model offers some explanation.

**Societal Security and Political Security, the Challenges of Constructivism**

Societal and political security, perhaps among the two most significant aspects of constructivism, appear the least considered aspects of the Spanish National Security Strategy process, this is in spite of the evidence indicating that support for Spanish institutions, the democratic process and the integrity of the nation state faced major challenges, in addition to the three referent objects previously outlined. By its very nature as a national security strategy, the concept of Spain as a nation-state is a given. The Copenhagen school identifies societal security as ‘ideas and practices that identify individuals as members of a social group. Society is about identity (Buzan _et al._, 1998, p.119), and in this case society in Spain is both inherently served by Spain’s constitutional and power structure, but also the idea encroaches upon the sensitive matter of identity and nation in Spain. Buzan was writing at a time when the Balkan conflict (among others) was apparently fuelled by identity, and is less concerned with a nation-state’s constitutional arrangements, and so this idea of society and identity sits less comfortably within his model when applied to Spain.

Katzenstein focuses on a nation-state’s society, particularly in terms of it competing with the state in articulating values, norms and culture in creating a security environment (which Buzan _et al._ do not deal with). But when analysing Aznar, for example, his model would point to the impact of contested security norms leading to rigidities (inflexibility) in policy, which, in Spain’s case, ended in policy fiasco and damage to its most important relationship (with the US) outside Europe following Zapatero’s politicised withdrawal. However, a constructivist approach with an emphasis on interests, ideas and identity suggests that Aznar’s action was not wholly irrational, he himself identified closely with Bush, drew inspiration from a concept of Atlanticism that Blair also promoted and did not comfortably identify with a model of Europe-led security that the PSOE’s González had bequeathed him.
Nonetheless, the Security Strategies themselves can meet both paradigms. The sectors approach of the Copenhagen School is generally embraced by both Spanish Strategies (which themselves draw on a threats model of the DDNs). In the case of the Katzenstein model, this thesis argues that for the Security Strategies’ process to function effectively in Spain, an interaction between Spain’s vibrant civil society and political culture, and the strategy process needs to take place.

The Copenhagen School’s sectors approach offers a model that is generally simple to analyse. However, applying the sectors’ approach to national security in Katzenstein’s model does not immediately converge. The NSSs mark institutional responses and reflect the broadening of security and its impact on Spain’s state or national reaction and less about the idea of interests and cultures.

Ballesteros (2016, p.62) identifies strategy as “a public compromise between the political system and its peoples” and he acknowledges the Copenhagen School but sees the role of an NSS as ‘contributing to social development’ (2015, p.18) rather than responding to it.

Constructivism can provide an insight into how the two Spanish NSSs engage with the policy process by interacting with the interests relevant to the sectors. That the Spanish 2013 Strategy subsequently (after 2014) produced specific strategies on cyber threats and maritime security illustrates a way in which sectors can impact on national security. This in turn draws us back to the model offered by Katzenstein earlier in the chapter.

Whilst the two models are evidently not inter-related, when considering Spain’s contemporary security policy the role of sectors is helpful in identifying the interests that converge on or influence national policy or the ‘national interest.” In 2005, Spanish arms sales to Venezuela became a diplomatic matter with Washington in an issue that dogged Zapatero’s government and underlined the importance of economic interests, jobs and the technological sector, but this also clashed with interests that demanded a good relationship with the United States. Both interests were of a similar vein and more nuanced issues such as

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290 Ballesteros makes reference to the role of family, community, institution or ethnic group to provide security to individuals, drawing on an unpublished thesis (p.110).
291 These strategies were subsequently published later (2015) and do not fall within the remit of this research.
ideology and politics entered the debate, culminating in a climb-down by the PSOE as one set of interests and values gave way to another.

The Copenhagen School articulates a way in which (sectoral) interests impact or play a part in the constructivist approach of Katzenstein where these interests coalesce around issues on a case by case basis. Dynamic change to norms and values often appear within a ‘sector’ context before that of the national agenda. The impact of climate change emerged in the environment sector and was adopted by NGOs, and by the end of the 1990s it was being acknowledged in Spain’s Defence Directives. Such a shift in norms and identities witnessed the development of environmental NGOs, which in Spain joined the mainstream debate from a position where traditionally such actors had been relatively marginal when compared to those in other EU states.

Looking at the argument behind the economic sector, out of the bank failures of the 2008 financial crisis, political identities in Spain shifted relatively quickly as the practice of major political parties of clinging to an economic orthodoxy faltered and, as chapter 4 argued, this led to sudden support for new parties and an existential crisis for the PSOE, even though it had once been perceived as the institutional party of democratic Spain.

**Culture and National Security: Final Remarks.**

As the thesis has argued, until recently, Spain’s national security has been difficult to identify and interpret, being claimed by institutions and invoked for the speech acts underpinning the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This is because the concept of security is a contested norm, based on contested values in a nation-state that although stable, has exhibited upheaval due to events that have challenged the idea of Spain as a state and nation. Attempts by the executive to redefine Spain’s identity since the 1990s (by Aznar and Zapatero) have failed in at times spectacular fashion, not just culminating in electoral defeat but appearing to inflict medium or long term damage to their parties and standing.

The context in cultural and institutional terms is of a nation-state where the centre’s (itself a somewhat challenged idea) relationship with its devolved administrations of historic nationalities and developed autonomous communities have contributed to the modern failings of the nation-state. Domestically, and in a Westphalia-sense of the state central government is undisputed, however, in reality the central nation-state’s approach to national security is incomplete. The emergence of new political parties, the
reawakening of Catalan nationalism and the stubbornness of both the current government and Basque nationalism to end the ETA problem illustrates that domestic divisions exist over norms that do not exist elsewhere in similar EU states. The two NSS in their current form focus more on unitary nation-states, with solutions that can be delivered under the direction of a prominent executive from the Moncloa palace as opposed to a dynamic process that heralds strategic change.

The Copenhagen School’s approach and Ballesteros both acknowledge (2015, p.65) that both the state and society should be considered as referent objects, and as chapter 4 illustrates, Spain’s society is not always acknowledged in the process than might be imagined. In the case of Iraq, this disconnect led to contested norms and identity which culminated in shift to the PSOE’s approach. Security strategy in Spain has never been so extensively documented as in the last two decades. Two national strategies, numerous of quadrennial defence directives, in addition to summits, position papers and agendas, ranging from the EU presidencies to Mediterranean Union events, have generated an impression that the Spanish state is an effective ‘medium-sized’ power. However, by focussing on the constructivist paradigm where the idea of national security is the reflection of identity, interests and the environment (national culture), Spain’s executive is too often the main determinant

This chapter has attempted to identify the challenges regarding what comprises Spain’s national security and where it is determined. With Spain’s transition to democracy in 1976, and the ending of the Cold War in 1990 followed by the global war on terror in 2001, Spain’s approach to national security has been dominated by shifting certainties, ideas and norms. State structure, and social, legal and political norms demonstrate that a presidential-style of policy-making sit awkwardly alongside a civil society that possesses deeply-held views and interests as to how the Spanish state should respond on a number of key topics.

Spanish defence policy, at one time proactive in meeting new legal and social norms, has retrenched since the 2004 withdrawal from Iraq, and this has accompanied new political considerations enshrined in subsequent legislation. Since then, while the military have responded to peacekeeping in what has at times been an expeditionary manner, this has been subject to constraints and
political considerations that interviewees have cited as obstructive to Spain’s standing.

Domestic structures and partisan perspectives still account for the comprehensive character of Spain’s security policy, where traditional military concerns sit within broader economic and political notions. But the distribution of decision-making power, skewed towards the PM’s power base in the Moncloa palace and key ministries, has diminished not only the prevalence of military perspectives, but also the wider input of academic research and debates. Katzenstein (1993) acknowledges that domestic and normative context do not closely track rapid changes in the international system. In Spain’s case certain norms explain some inconsistencies in how it deals with global shifts and the subsequent events outlined in the research.

Buzan and the Copenhagen School explain risks, threats and security through sectors and normative agreement (such as that of the centrality of the European project), which allows for policy adjustment (such as engagement with ETA by the PSOE), whilst contested norms also explain the intransigence by the centre-right towards ETA’s peace proposals.

As is well documented, the virtues of military relations with the US are hotly disputed in Spain and such issues will continue to feature regularly on the political agenda. On the other hand, EU relations are rarely questioned, and have enabled outcomes that more often than not benefit Spain to flourish while scepticism rarely appears in national dialogue.
Chapter 8.
Conclusion

This thesis set out to identify and analyse how contemporary Spain has created, framed and delivered its national security in the 2000-2013 period. Entering the new millennium, Spain was trumpeted as one of Europe’s success stories, given that it had emerged from a repressive right wing military dictatorship in the 1970s to become a core member of the European Union. Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, as the EU’s fifth largest economy, Spain appeared confident and eager to spread its influence, its economy and fiscal measures having met the convergence criteria for the Single Currency and with Spanish multi-national corporations having cultivated a major expansion of Spanish interests around the world, most notably in Latin America. With the exception of ETA’s ongoing campaign, it was difficult to anticipate what could challenge Spain’s national security at the start of 2000. The Partido Popular government had been re-elected with an increased mandate, a good relationship had developed with Washington, and Spain’s military had been transformed by a modernisation programme that had both embraced the ending of the widely disliked national service requirement (known as “la mili”) and led to Spain becoming a full member of NATO’s Integrated Military Command.

Within a decade, the certainties of the new millennium had disappeared, Spain’s economy had entered its worst downturn in decades, with record unemployment, huge numbers of business failures and a banking sector, once a key engine of growth, on the brink of spectacular collapse. On top of this, Spain had suffered one of Europe’s worst terrorist attacks when Islamic extremists bombed four commuter trains at Madrid’s Atocha station, killing 193 passengers and injuring more than 2,000.

The reasons for the bombing are complex but in the minds of many Spaniards it was attributable to the Aznar government’s support for the US invasion and occupation of Iraq. Conversely, it is easy to understand the effects of the Atocha train station attacks in March 2004. Not only did the world’s media cover the event exhaustively, making an explicit connection to the violence in Iraq, but the effects of terrorism on western audiences have become an accepted aspect of modern life. Less easy to comprehend was the impact of the economic crash of 2008 where, in spite of economic indicators and social
repercussions from the events, the effects on broader aspects of contemporary Spanish society have been just as significant, if not more prolonged. This thesis did not originally set out to capture the events of the financial crash but during the research it became increasingly apparent that they were wholly germane to gaining a proper understanding of Spain’s security.

Although Spain’s economy has recovered somewhat, and it has outwardly found its feet again in the wake of the Atocha bombings, how civil society has evolved from the events of the decade is another topic in itself. This thesis has explored the idea of security being driven by an ever broadening range of issues (such as individual economic well-being) drawing on the idea that the Spanish nation-state’s traditional role continues to change.
Figure 19: The Shifting Nature of Spain’s Security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
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| **How is Security Created?** | 1) Based on a securitisation model of three referent objects: state, nation & society.  
2) Drawn from a shifting notion of security, loosely on a sectors approach, but also a declining notion of traditional or ‘hard’ security.  
3) Dominated by an Executive ‘Presidential’ style in a state still marked by a consolidating democracy |
| **How is Security Framed?** | 1) Framed (by different interests, elites and groups) in terms of the referent objects.  
2) Challenged by a fluid model of economy and nation, driven by shifts in interests and organisations as a result of the financial crash and regional nationalism. |
| **How is Security Delivered?** | 1) Via a changing approach where security is less identified through the preserve of the military or state apparatus, but one where different ministries, non-state actors, interests and sub-national government operate.  
2) Through an uncoordinated environment which drives a centralising ‘Clausewitzean’ function on the part of Spanish Prime Ministers through a nascent National Security Strategy process. |

Limitations in existing literature and research.

In reviewing the literature on Spain’s security, it was apparent that the external relations model promoted by Spanish and foreign academics did not address the shifts and societal changes that impacted on Spain’s security and institutions. The European Union, NATO and other international bodies (such as the Union for the Mediterranean) have proved important to Spain in its overseas strategy but do not wholly explain the perception of threats, the impact of change on society and the role of individual effects on a nation’s response to security challenges.

Outside Spain, research on the country does not feature prominently in any literature on security, states and strategy. There is a dearth of studies on what is in fact a considerably large member state of the EU, and home to more than 45 million people. Even within the country, research on Spanish security, defence and foreign policy is limited, and much of the research produced often narrates a perspective that is politicised or not widely distributed. The input and role of theories and institutions has proved inconsistent and somewhat narrow, reflecting the lack of a broad school on the topic of Spain’s security and external relations. This is not to say that no quality output exists, as research bodies of some standing, such as the Elcano Institute and C’IDOB for example

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do contribute to a certain insight, but their output compared to, say, a nation state such as the UK, or even the Netherlands for example, is limited and not widely disseminated beyond specific audiences.

Security studies, in a broader sense characterised by even the briefest of reviews, have traditionally been dominated by the realist approach and focussed on major powers such as Russia, the US and Europe’s bigger nation states. In the case of Spain though, despite being its size, research on security and the issues facing Spain number only a handful. The broadening security agenda is, and has been, of assistance to the research process, yet within Spain itself, the field is still somewhat narrow and introspect.

The research undertaken has attempted to resolve some of this shortfall by drawing on three components

(1) An in-depth examination of the process of security policy outputs (Defence Directives, National Strategies) through investigation into primary sources on the topic, such as the documents in question

(2) Interviews with those advising and constructing security over the period in question; within Spain’s defence community in particular the research benefited from sessions with a number of staff and both named and unnamed individuals who were willing to offer observations on the delivery of the strategies, Spain’s response to the incursion at Perejil and the conduct of external relations during the period.

(3) Accessing a body of literature, sources and information leading up to and during the timeframe of the study, including conferences and meetings.

What the research contributes to knowledge

My findings in the early part of the study show that the paradigm of the realist and liberal approach are inadequate in assisting an analytical framework. Although there are some helpful aspects to be found in realism’s focus on the state and the liberal approach to institutions, I found that an explanation encapsulated in a theoretical approach that fused Clausewitz and the Sectors approach of the Copenhagen school within a Constructivist framework (based on the Katzenstein model) lent a great deal of support to my analysis.
Moreover, this approach does not have to be confined to Spain and I consider it as applicable to other nation-states or case studies, particularly those that are less-researched such as in Asia or other non-EU states.

My approach is summarised through the following diagram that demonstrates the contribution from the three paradigms.
Whilst constructivism and the Copenhagen School’s sectors approach were undertaken as part of the proposal and question process, it was only mid-way through the research that the Clausewitzean ‘remarkable trinity’ began to feature in the analysis. A recurring theme in the study proved to be the distribution of power in favour of the Spanish executive. This has not significantly altered, the executive (the Prime Minister) has been described as pre-eminent in the policy process since the 1980s (Heywood, 1989). The thesis analysed this allocation of a dominant role by reflecting on it with the use of Clausewitz’s ‘remarkable trinity’, which identifies a rational actor directing strategy and managing the state’s resources (such as the military) to respond to ‘chance’ or uncertainty, while simultaneously responding to, or communicating with the primordial violence or passion of public opinion and society.

Clausewitz’s works are more complicated than the thesis would suggest, but it is the inherent simplicity of the ‘trinity’ that has proved suitable for explaining the executive’s role in the Spanish strategy process. There do exist shortcomings in the Clausewitzean model, as it is essentially a 19th century paradigm that does not account for the role of interests or groups for example.

In 21st century Spain such actors are crucial to understanding the way security has emerged and been identified, as well as organisations in the mould of environmental NGOs, social movements such as the indignados and even multi-national corporations (MNCs) like banks and industrial concerns, which all play a key role in modern Spanish security. It is Katzenstein’s constructivist
model built on his baseline of identifying Japan’s security as a nation-state which elucidates that particular country’s interests in a very different way from many Anglo-Saxon models. It is thus along similar lines that I have made the same arguments about Spain in that its distinctive positions both internationally and domestically are products of its environment, norms and structures.

Taking approaches from the Constructivist school, I have argued that the nation-state’s response has been largely institutionally-focussed, whereby initiatives begun with the Ministry of Defence have led to a process that includes importing policy (from the UK among other areas). Furthermore, the executive’s role has been augmented in spite of exhortations to add more accountability to the strategy process. This phenomenon is not confined to Spain and, globally, the centralisation of power within the executive has been commented on in all manner of regimes and governments. Although in Spain, as PM Aznar discovered in 2003/4, this does not imply a blank cheque granting PMs untrammelled freedom to act as he or she may choose and, although I see parallels with the Rajoy administration, the shadow of Iraq continues to sit around the use of military force by the Spanish nation-state. On the other hand, whilst peacekeeping as a tool is identified during the Zapatero years, its role and place within the understanding of Spain’s security remains to be defined more clearly.

The research also provides an analysis of the Zapatero government’s approach to security, a number of works have identified an incoherence to the PSOE’s term in office but, drawing on a broadened notion of security, the thesis argues that the period was perhaps more ideologically driven and reflects the narrowness of the analysis prevalent when looking at the Socialists in this period. Although not a key aspect of the thesis, further research into the Socialist government’s approach to development and external relationships is another area that I would like to have undertaken, given the innovations that were dismissed by a number of commentators at the time.

The study of the National Strategy process itself has barely been undertaken within Spain, and certainly there is very little written about these initiatives outside Spain. I draw some loose comparisons with the UK process and identify some convergence in both method and outcome from the two nation-states. Whilst the UK has much more written about its Strategies, Spain’s attempts in some ways echo the efforts undertaken by EU members in
particular, and hypothetically a more longitudinal approach could be of interest as a further research topic in this field based on the approach undertaken with regard to the system of Directives and Strategies incorporated in Spain’s security.

A minor discovery, but a nonetheless insightful one, was the usage of the word resilient in the vocabulary of policy makers. In English resilient means “The capacity to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness.” In effect, in a national security context it means to withstand and overcome threats or impacts. Studying the UK’s 2010 National Security Strategy, it alludes to resilience on a number of occasions, particularly in the context of local communities and sub-national authorities (local government), with the UK’s Cabinet Office now taking the lead in resilience planning and reviews of sectors.

During interviews with officials in Spain, a directly equivalent word was found not to exist. In interview with an official (who contributed to Spain’s NSS) it was acknowledged that there have been discussions that have sought to hit on a word that might successfully encapsulate the concept of resilience. It is not the place of this thesis to embark on a fully-fledged investigation of the implications of vocabulary shortcomings, but even so, it is symptomatic that Spain, its institutions and actors do tend to turn to a different vocabulary in attempts to convey exactly what is signified within the Anglo-Saxon tradition of writing about international security.

**Constraints and Further Research Directions**

Spain as a nation-state has emerged from its economic crisis and indeed been badly buffeted by various impacts, yet a number of constants have endured. In spite of the damage inflicted on its economy, it still retains a coherent voice within the inner core of the EU and remains one of its most prominent members in the field of peace support operations. Spain can lay claim to have actively participated in all of the missions and operations under the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) arrangement, making it the only member state to have done so. A detailed study of its support lent to the EU’s

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293 It is claimed (Arteaga in interview 2017) that Resiliencia in its loan-word sense will start to be adopted in future works, but many Spaniards have expressed confusion at the use of the word and the concept.
PESCO and UN missions was considered as part of the research but this was not considered applicable at the time of writing, thereby offering the chance to study this at a future moment in time. Spain’s commitment to regional security demonstrates a real achievement on the part of its international security cooperation approach and this offers further areas for investigation.

The emergence of loud Catalan demands for separation and independence mean that the idea of securing the Spanish ‘nation’ is likely to be a future area of debate both within and outside Spain. Within the state institutions themselves, it is highly likely that the Prime Minister (drawing on the model of Clausewitz’s ‘rational actor’) will remain the focal point for crisis response, short term reaction to events and the driver of security in contemporary Spain. Nascent institutions such as the National Security Council, the financial markets warning unit and other innovations and strategies remain to be tested and, in the opinion of this research will be at the behest of the powerful Spanish executive.

Nation-state security has evolved from being a concern of the Defence Ministry’s Defence Directives (and Interior Ministry’s counter-terrorism policing function) to a broader state-wide policy objective articulated through the NSC (National Security Council) within National Security Strategy of 2013. Although still nascent, the NSC appears competent both in delivering a strategy at the national level to guide policy, but also in offering a coordinating function in response to events where required. At the time of writing, there remains a sense that both the NSC and the NSS have yet to be properly tested by a crisis in the traditional meaning of the word and this could offer further avenues for future research.

Implications for Policy. The Future of Spain’s Security

The concentration of power within the office of Prime Minister (Presidente del Gobierno) is a recurring theme of the research. Since the events of 2004 and the publication of the two National Security Strategies the likelihood is that the executive will continue to dominate security policy. Although the establishment of the National Security Council offers some indication of timely input from other bodies into strategy, only further examination will be useful. Security perceptions in this sense, imply a two-level game where, on the domestic front, security will relate to grassroots matters such as crime, economic well-being, housing and local environmental issues, while on a national level global matters
such as climate change, international terrorism and state-conflict will represent the stage.

Discussion of whether the Copenhagen School sits within the neo-realist, constructivist, post-modernist tradition was not the aim of this thesis. What emerged though, is that significant aspects of the research came to look at how Spain responded to security issues based on a definition proposed by the Copenhagen School. What the research has identified is that the concept of what security actually means is perhaps more relevant than empirically-based policy outcomes.

It is only by returning to the model/paradigm of constructivism, where Spain as a ‘European society’ is articulated, that an alternative (regenerationist) approach is seen. Drawing on the idea that Europe is a solution to the security issues facing Spain’s civil society, this model identifies an emotional attachment to hispanidad and a sense of separateness (from Europe) as undermining success in a range of measures such as economic indicators of employment or national incomes. The model of Spain’s European vocation representing something to be secured is a challenge for those seeking to analyse security, as a referent object has traditionally been something more tangible such as a national asset (oil, fishing rights) or even territory such as Perejil.

In this situation, where securing the European vocation of Spain associated with the philosopher Ortega y Gasset’s dictum of “Spain is the problem, Europe is the solution” cannot be done through ‘state’ security, as its roots are in Spanish society. Attempts by politicians and elites to secure Spain’s place within Europe has been uneven to say the least, often in part due to political or personal reasons, but as chapter 4 argued, the economic crisis that beset Spain created conditions that significantly undermined Spain’s place within the EU, and constraints imposed by the ECB in Frankfurt engendered significant social reactions. Fortunately for this critique as a ‘European society’, major political parties have remained supportive of the European model, although it has not escaped criticism, further research could be undertaken on changing Spanish attitudes towards the European Union.295

`All security is political’ wrote Buzan (1988), and in Spain where the social division, political cleavage, dictatorship and democratisation feature so distinctly

295 The Podemos Party injected a sense of criticism into the Spanish Left’s relationship with Europe, citing the role of big business in the EU’s economic model and its corporate nature.
makes it perhaps the most exciting and challenging case-study facing a nation-state in the shaping of its security. Its politics, society and people will continue to demonstrate that being secure as a state is not the same as being secure as a citizen, and that the interplay of institutions, peoples and ideas is so much more than a series of dry policy documents.
## APPENDIX ONE:

### INTERVIEW MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>INDIVIDUAL</th>
<th>TOPICS</th>
<th>REMARKS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 2000</td>
<td>Cortes (Spanish Parliament)</td>
<td>Javier Rupérez</td>
<td>US – Spain relationship</td>
<td>Ambassador to US (research for previous academic postgraduate study)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 2011</td>
<td>Madrid – European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)</td>
<td>José Ignacio Torreblanca</td>
<td>Spain’s economic crisis, the monarchy, indignados movement</td>
<td>Commentator/academic on contemporary Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2015</td>
<td>Madrid Defence Ministry</td>
<td>Juan A. Moliner González</td>
<td>Defence and Security Policy</td>
<td>Director General – General Security Policy Ministry of Defence (Director Gabinete Técnico SEGENPOL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2015</td>
<td>ECFR</td>
<td>Ignacio Torreblanca</td>
<td>the monarchy, indignados movement</td>
<td>Commentator/academic on contemporary Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2015</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Unnamed Defence Ministry official</td>
<td>Spain’s security Policy</td>
<td>Serving Military officer (did not want to be identified/cited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 2015</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Felix Arteaga</td>
<td>Spain’s Security Policy</td>
<td>Advisor on Spanish Security/Foreign/Defence policy (Real Instituto Elcano)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan 2017</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Javier Rupérez</td>
<td>Spain’s overseas relations</td>
<td>Ambassador to US (former)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2017</td>
<td>Telephone</td>
<td>Colonel A Rabbit (British Army)</td>
<td>Spanish security policy</td>
<td>UK Military Defence Attaché to Spain (2006-9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2017</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Rafael Bardají</td>
<td>Spanish security policy</td>
<td>Security Advisor to PM Aznar (1996-04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2017</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>Former Spanish Defence Attaché to UK</td>
<td>Spanish security policy</td>
<td>Serving Military officer (did not want to be identified/cited)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb 2017</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>William Chislett</td>
<td>Spain’s financial crisis</td>
<td>Commentator on Spanish economic policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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In addition, casual conversations/conference presentations have been utilised with input from A Dastis (Partido Popular Foreign Minister until 2017), Juan José Ibarretxe Markuart (Basque leader) several unnamed military personnel. None of these have been directly cited in the thesis. A number of individuals requested not to be cited due to their position and employment terms which barred them from discussing matters with outside individuals. These sources have not been named at their request.
APPENDIX TWO:

Abbreviations.

BOE = Boletín Oficial de Estado (Official State Bulletin)
CFSP = Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIDOB = Centre d'Informació i Documentació Internacionals a Barcelona (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs)
DDN = Directiva Nacional De Defensa (National Defence Directive)
EC = European Commission
ECB = European Central Bank
EMU = Economic and Monetary Union
ESF = European Social Fund
ETA = Euskadi Ata Askatasuna (Basque fatherland and freedom)
GAL = Grupo Antiterroristas De Liberación (Anti Terrorist Liberation Groups)
IMF = International Monetary Fund
IU = Izquierda Unida (United Left)
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
PP = Partido Popular (Popular Party)
PSOE = Partido Socialista Obrero Español (Spanish Socialist Worker’s Party)
UfM = Union for the Mediterranean
UME = Unidad Militar de Emergencias (Military Unit for Emergencies)
UNAOC = United Nations Alliance of/for Civilizations
UNSC = United Nations Security Council
WEU = Western European Union
APPENDIX 3

Websites and Online Resources

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www.cidob.org/es
www.defensa.gob.es
www.elmundo.es
www.elpais.es
www.interior.gob.es
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