Policing in Partnership

Are organic police partnerships more effective than mandated police partnerships?

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of Nottingham Trent University
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

June - 2019
Abstract

This thesis adopts a broad qualitative standpoint. It examines police involvement in partnerships before and after the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998, legislation which mandated the police to work in partnership. A case-study of Staffordshire Police explores experiences of officers working in partnerships pre and post 1998. The research is used to provide insights into the complexity that is partnership, which has wider applicability beyond policing. The thesis examines also the concept and specific mechanisms of policing in partnership that have, in the main, been championed by successive government administrations since New Labour in the late 1990s and are now largely assumed as being an ‘effective and efficient’ way of working.

The thesis identifies an important hitherto strangely underexplored fact, namely: that the foundational policy document, which framed the Crime and Disorder Act mandating police-partnerships, the Morgan Report (1991), produced zero-evidence as to the efficacy of the partnership approach it advocates. Despite being unevidenced, the Morgan Report set in motion a national framework, bureaucratization and professionalization of partnerships. Consequently, there now exists a complex web of professional clustering’s around pre-defined problems. Significantly, the research identifies, that the formality of partnership has encouraged the police to withdraw from elements of their pre-Morgan service and care functions. Equally, partnership has little or no connection to current policing strategy. More recently Police and Crime Commissioners provide a new dynamic to partnership governance and their increasing ‘influence’ is being felt. However, government fiscal austerity has shifted contemporary partnership discourse with evidence presented of organizations withdrawing support and re-entrenching core activity. The thesis concludes by framing a new conceptualization for assessing partnership effectiveness.

Key Words: partnership, crime and disorder, Morgan Report, multi-agency, governance, austerity
Acknowledgements

I am indebted to past and present members of Staffordshire Police and their partners who so willingly participated in this research, and in particular Mike Cunningham, former Chief Constable, for granting permission to allow the force to be used as a case-study.

Personal thanks are also extended to key contributors, namely: James Morgan, Professor Gloria Laycock and Alan Wright, whose contributions greatly enhanced the research.

Sincere thanks go also to my PhD supervisory team, comprising Dr Mike Sutton, Dr Matt Long and more latterly Dr Tom Vickers, all of whom have provided invaluable guidance, support and ‘stretch’ throughout. I have learnt so much from you all.

It should be noted, Dr Mike Sutton continued to provide personal support post his retirement from NTU, in September, 2018.

More personally, I would wish to thank my wife Jo for being there for me, allowing me the space and freedom from competing tasks to complete this work, and for her love and encouragement throughout. Thank you for believing in me.

Finally, thank you to my parents, Jim and Barbara, for providing me the ethical value system and thirst for knowledge that have subsequently informed both my personal and professional life.

I owe you all so very much.
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**Abbreviations**

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Constable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APCC</td>
<td>Association of Police and Crime Commissioners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASB</td>
<td>Anti-social Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCU</td>
<td>Basic Command Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Crime and Disorder Act, 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRP</td>
<td>Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP</td>
<td>Community Safety Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMIC</td>
<td>Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HO</td>
<td>Home Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOCPU</td>
<td>Home Office Crime Prevention Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>Integrated Offender Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSNA</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Needs Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAA</td>
<td>Local Area Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LSP</td>
<td>Local Strategic Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPU</td>
<td>Local Policing Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MASH</td>
<td>Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIM</td>
<td>National Intelligence Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPCC</td>
<td>National Police Chiefs Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPT</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Policing Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCC</td>
<td>Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Police Constable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police and Crime Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAG</td>
<td>Responsible Authority Group of the Community Safety Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBB</td>
<td>Staffordshire Strategic Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSCSG</td>
<td>Safer and Stronger Communities Steering Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSP</td>
<td>Safer Schools Partnership</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Foreword

The author of this thesis was a former senior police officer serving within Staffordshire Police (1979 - 2008). He was directly involved in the partnership arrangements made by virtue of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998. Indeed, he was to become the chairperson for three Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships operating at that time.

Whilst the primary objective of this thesis is to make an original and significant contribution to academic knowledge about police involvement in partnership, it has been as much a journey of self-exploration, with the author wishing to personally reconcile and indeed better understand their ‘own’ confusion of having worked and been responsible for police-partnerships.

Upon leaving the police in late 2008, the author became a senior lecturer in criminology at Birmingham City University and then more latterly at the University of Derby, his current place of employment, where he is also a Deputy Director of the University’s International Policing and Justice Institute.
Chapter One: The background to partnership and theoretical perspectives

Chapter One: Introduction and theoretical underpinnings

The foundational logic of partnerships appears to be premised upon the hypothesis that the ‘whole is greater than the sum of its parts’ (attributed to Aristotle, Metphysica). The concept has come to represent an accepted knowledge belief, namely that individuals and organizations working in ‘co-operative’ partnership will accomplish more than the same individuals and organizations working independently. A more contemporary framing of the concept might be the term synergy – ‘an interaction of two or more elements that has a combined effect, greater than the sum of their individual effects’; synergy deriving from the mid-19th century Greek word ‘sunergos’, meaning ‘working together’ or combination of forces (Oxford Dictionaries, 2013). Altruistically, and in accord with human nature, the desire to connect with others is a topic of considerable research by psychologists (Bowlby, 1969; Ainsworth, 1969 and Winnicott, 1965, amongst others). The author argues that human society is based upon associations; humans by their very nature are collaborative creatures and that partnership, therefore, is aligned to a manifestation of this desire. Societies are framed by organization and structure, within which collaboration, alliance and working together is exemplified. Equally, Aristotle’s statement appeals to our rationality and logic; partnerships by their very nature are good things, things to be encouraged.

Such a position ‘assumes’, however, that partnerships are rational constructs, clearly defined, consistent and understood, and are capable of delivering upon their intended outcomes. Relatedly, partnerships, particularly under the New Labour government administration (1997-2010), came to represent notions of ‘effective’ practice and underpinned a fundamental restructuring of the administrative structures of British governance (Gilling, 2005; Hughes et al., 2002; Hughes and Edwards, 2002; Pease, 2002 amongst others). Equally, Crawford (1998:169) poignantly observes ‘The acceptance of the appropriateness and proliferation of a "partnership" approach has been one of the most dramatic developments in crime control policy, not only in Britain but also across Europe.’ But to what extent, if any does the apparent orthodoxy of partnership have foundation?
This thesis provides an exploration of the concept of partnership against the backdrop of policing. The Crime and Disorder Act (CDA) statutorily mandated the police to work in partnership with other prescribed organizations. However, prior to 1998 there exist examples of the police in England and Wales working in partnership through choice and voluntary association i.e. where partnerships developed organically, rather than being required by statute. We therefore have two positions - a) pre-1998, where police involvement in partnership was a voluntary activity and b) post-1998, where police involvement was mandatory. This provides an opportunity to compare and contrast different approaches to police engagement in partnerships. The central question posed in this thesis is: "Are organic police partnerships more effective than mandated police partnerships?" More broadly, the thesis will examine both the effectiveness and indeed willingness of the police to work in partnership, against the backdrop of the role, function and occupational culture of the police organization.

A beginning - definitional issues

The generally accepted dictionary definition of the word partner is: ‘A person who shares or is associated with another in some action or endeavour; sharer; associate.’

And the term partnership: ‘a) A contractual relationship between two or more persons carrying on a joint business venture with a view to profit, each incurring liability for losses and the right to share in the profits; b) the deed creating such a relationship; c) the persons associated in such a relationship or; the state or condition of being a partner’ (Collins Dictionary, 2013).

A partnership is more commonly considered to be an arrangement in which parties ‘agree’ to cooperate to advance their mutual interests. Within a legal context, there is a requirement that the formation of a partnership, for example between two businesses, is premised upon a ‘voluntary association’ of persons who co-own the business (www.Legal Dictionary, 2013). However, it is absolutely possible for different organizations to work together collaboratively without forming formal partnerships. Collaboration in this context,
suggesting a less formal framing of the relationship, defined as: ‘a) The act of working with another or others on a joint project; b) something created by working jointly with another or others.’ (Collins Dictionary, 2013)

In examining the definition of partnerships, a broad distinction can be drawn between the uses of the term within the private business sector, as distinct from the public sector. For example, within the business environment, partnerships have increasingly become a common way to find and maintain competitive advantage. In this context, Mohr and Spekman (1994:135) define such partnerships as ‘purposive strategic relationships between independent firms who share compatible goals, strive for and acknowledge a high level of mutual benefit’. Nonetheless, increasingly in the uncertain world of business, partnerships and collaborations have become common place practice as a means of spreading commercial risk (Powell, 2003). However, the concept of partnerships, particularly within the public sector has largely been adopted to represent multi-agency working, where the autonomy of the partners has been to some extent constrained by political interpretation and missives on ‘joined-up thinking’, lead partner (agency) and powerful encouragement of government interdepartmental collaboration, particularly under the ‘New Labour’ government from 1997-2010 (Clark, 2002).

In line with the public and private sector distinction, partnerships within the private and business sectors are fundamentally based upon ‘voluntary agreements’ underpinned, where it is deemed necessary, by legal and contractual frameworks. Conversely, partnerships within the public sector can and are often prescribed by legislation and government directives and hence are not solely premised upon independent voluntary action and desire. This is not to suggest that the private/public sector differential is mutually exclusive and a defined differential line, but rather describes a broad but fundamental generalization based upon the ingredient of voluntary participation. Equally, it is acknowledged, that partnerships’ may transcend different sectors i.e. public, private and voluntary.
An examination of the term partnership within the broader academic literature, particularly pertaining to the public sector partnerships, identifies a distinct lack of clarity and agreement of what it is that partnerships actually are, and to some extent the term has become a somewhat nebulous concept. Interestingly, the Audit Commission in acknowledging that partnership is a ‘slippery’ concept, attempted to provide some clarity by offering the following definition:

‘Are otherwise independent bodies; Agree to co-operate to achieve a common goal; create a new organizational structure or process to achieve this goal, separate from their own organizations; plan and implement a jointly agreed programme, often with joint staff or resources; share relevant information; and pool risks and rewards’.

(Audit Commission, 1998:8)

Whilst the Audit Commission’s definitional framework is helpful, uncertainty and ambiguity remains as to what is meant by ‘agreeing to cooperate’ and whether or not this can and is premised upon the voluntary nature of the relationship. Furthermore, in much of the literature, partnerships are presented as one dimensional and constant constructs, however such a premise is challenged by Gelsthorpe, 1985 (in Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994) who identified that partnerships/inter-agency co-operation can take a variety of forms:

**Fig 1. Gelsthorpe (1985) partnership variance model**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication model</th>
<th>Agencies recognize that they have a role to play in relation to each other, but do not go beyond communication. The communication may be one or two-way, and involve full or partial disclosure of information.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-operation model</td>
<td>Agencies maintain separate boundaries and identities, but agree to work on a mutually defined problem. May involve joint action, or involve one agency (or more) consenting to another taking the initiative to act.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter One: The background to partnership and theoretical perspectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coordination model</th>
<th>Agencies work together in a systematic way; there are defined agency boundaries but agencies may pool resources to tackle mutually agreed problems.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Federation model</td>
<td>Agencies retain their organizational distinctiveness but also share some central focus, operating integrated services.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merger model</td>
<td>Agencies become indistinguishable from one another, working on a mutually defined problem, forming a collective resource pool.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What can be deduced at this early stage is that seeking to define partnerships is problematic because, ambiguity and uncertainty as to what they are remains. That said, Gelsthorpe’s definition helps to identify potential styles and approaches of partnership working depicted along a continuum, ranging from ‘agreeing to communicate’, to ‘merger’.

The Audit Commission (1998) in a review of partnership working by public sector authorities interestingly drew a distinction between setting up a partnership (the formal process) with that of a ‘style of working where organizations behave to one another as partners regardless of the formal links between them (informal partnerships)’ (Audit Commission, 1998:16). Whilst the Audit Commission’s primary analysis was seeking to draw a distinction between formal and informal partnerships, they, by default, suggest that the concept of partnership and partnership working might just be as much about an attitude of mind that seeks to be embracing, externally focused and alive to opportunity and connectivity.

A policing perspective – the politics of partnerships

The backdrop to any discussion about police strategies, styles and approaches (specifically in this case, the concept of partnership policing) immediately and to some extent inevitably leads to questions about the role, function and purpose of the public police. The two are inextricably linked. All too often policing finds itself subject to the simplicity of ‘sound bite’
politics but, despite political rhetoric to the contrary, policing and the role and function of ‘the police’ in a modern democracy are deeply complex and multi-facetted. That said, politicians are not alone in their partial understanding or representation of policing; indeed, the formal institution of the police has struggled to clearly articulate its own purpose (Bittner, 2005; Klockars, 1985; Waddington, 1999; Reiner, 2010). And whilst various attempts over the years have been made to define policing’s role and function, on all too frequent occasion such attempts have fallen short of fully embracing the breadth, depth and complexity of what it is that the police do. However, during 1990 some consensus and support was achieved for the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) Statement of Common Purpose, which read ‘the purpose of the police service is: to uphold the law firmly and fairly; to prevent crime; to pursue and bring to justice those who break the law; to keep the Queen’s Peace; to protect, help and reassure the community.’

However, the limitations of this, and other contemporary descriptions of the police function, all too frequently lead to recourse to Peelian concepts and principals that framed and informed the origins of the ‘new’ police in 1829; and in particular, the absolute necessity to gain and maintain public support, in order to establish legitimacy (Emsley, 1996; Rawlings, 2002; Critchley, 1978; Newburn, 2008).

Neyroud and Beckley (2001:19) interestingly, provide a more contemporary commentary upon the ‘purposes’ of policing and deliberately use this term to embrace not only the role and function of the police, but importantly ‘the intended outcomes of policing’. In particular they draw attention, amongst other dimensions of policing, to Locke’s (1960) concept of a ‘social contract’; a contract that exists between government and society. Within this relationship, individuals consent to being governed by a legislative, a judiciary and an executive, in exchange for protection of their life, liberty and property. Such a contract is premised upon a balance, particularly between state power and citizen freedom. As an arm of government, the police are symbolic of the state’s authority and as Waddington (1999) articulates, the relationship between the police and the citizen is the cornerstone of democracy and embedded in the philosophy of ‘policing by consent.’ Chief
Constables have variously interpreted this concept within their respective force areas, but Alderson (1979, 1998), former Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall police, in particular, very much championed the notion of a ‘social contract’ between the police and the public, in order to secure public consent (see Chapter Two).

Policing and politics are inextricably linked but Reiner (2010) thoughtfully distinguishes between the role of the police, being by its very nature political, dealing with power relationships between the state and the community, based upon notions of order and control (including the use of force); as distinct with that of being ‘politicized’, which Reiner argues occurs when policing becomes the object of dispute or conflict. Other writers on policing, for example McLaughlin (2007), Savage (2007) and Newburn (2008) argue that in the main there appeared to be considerable political consensus between the main political parties up until the 1960’s. It was not until the Conservative regime of Margaret Thatcher, from 1979 which sought to monopolise the ‘law vote’, adopting the mantra “we are the party of law and order”, that underpinned the 1979 Conservative manifesto did circumstances change. That manifesto claimed, ‘The most disturbing threat to our freedom and security is the growing disrespect of the rule of law. In government as in opposition, Labour have undermined it...The next government will spend more on fighting crime’ (www.conservativemanifesto.com). Subsequently, the police and policing have very much been at the centre of political debate and made subject to reform and political influence of the competing and contrasting ideologies of successive governments’ (see Chapter Four).

More broadly at this time, previously endorsed and accepted Keynesian economic influence to political governance was waning, undermined by structural failings in Britain evidenced by soaring inflation, rising unemployment and considerable industrial and social conflict (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003). The Conservative government ideology, under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership (1979-1990) was premised upon a clear shift to the Right. A belief existed that crime could both be ‘prevented and controlled’ through sufficient police numbers, with requisite powers, supported by a harsh and tougher sentencing and penal regime (Hughes and McLaughlin, 2002). During this period, police involvement in the
miners strikes of the 1970’s and 1980’s; civil unrest experienced in Brixton, Toxteth, Moss Side (Manchester), Handsworth and Tottenham during the early and mid-1980’s, combined with unparalleled levels of escalation in recorded crime, brought into question police effectiveness and broader government policy (Hough and Mayhew, 1983, 1985; Reiner 2010; McLaughlin 2007; Savage 2007, Scarman, 1982). The increasing fragmentation and polarization within British society, between the ‘haves’ and ‘have not’s’, particularly as a result of the encouragement of home ownership, entrepreneurial stimulus to the aspiring working-middle classes, created ever increasing distinction between the economically and socially marginalised with the rest of British society (Lea and Young, 1984; Young, 1999). The politics of the market, individualism, and self-interest, rather than collective representation and rigid social conformity, were all characteristics optimised within the doctrine of Thatcherism (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003).

Post Thatcherism, New Labour (1997-2010) in line with neo-liberalist philosophy, sought to individualise the relationship between citizens and the state, very much against a backdrop of consumerism. The changing focus of Labour government policy was increasingly channelled through partnership working, although partnership was a feature of urban regeneration throughout the 1970’s and 1980’s (Lever, 2011). In reaction to the left-wing politics of nationalisation and right-wing politics of the market, New Labour introduced the ‘Third Way’ (see Chapter Four).

From a policing perspective and against the backdrop of the Morgan Report (1991), the introduction of the CDA, 1998, proved to be a watershed in changing the perception of the police’s monopoly on responsibility for crime and in particular the crime problem. Tony Blair’s political mantra was "tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime", bringing the concept of social crime prevention to the fore. The complexity of crime and its links to broader social policy were acknowledged by the government of the day and appeared to represent a paradigm shift in criminal justice (Tuck 1988). ‘ The emerging paradigm emphasises "partnership", "community" and "prevention", and in doing so places decreasing emphasis upon the role of formal criminal justice agencies and on the power of
the "sovereign state" to solve the problem of crime’ (Garland, 1996, cited in Newburn, 2003:102). Equally, under the umbrella of ‘citizenship’, rather than the ‘problem’ resting with the police and other criminal justices’ agencies, the responsibility of preventing crime rests with everyone, what Crawford, (1997:25) referred to as ‘shared property’.

New Labour’s collaborative discourse was premised upon moving away from silo functional government to a more ‘joined up’ approach, embedded through the practice of partnerships. Therefore partnerships, in their various forms, represented a vague ideal for a new enlightened way of not only working, but of governance, optimised by a closer working together between statutory, voluntary and independent organizations. Equally, in 1998, New Labour introduced Voluntary Sector Compacts which reconceptualised the voluntary sector as ‘partners in governance’ (Zimmeck, 2010). In this context, partnerships in their broadest sense were seen to best operate in community settings where local ownership and social control operate (Skogan 1990a). As Crawford (1999:44) notes, ‘appeals to community across diverse fields of public and social policy have been commonplace... community has become a policy buzz word’. Community oriented welfare, and in this instance, the concept of community-based crime prevention proved popular, albeit according to Crawford (1998) such approaches are often implemented without consistent theoretical underpinnings.

Interestingly from a policing perspective, whilst localism and devolved decision making through partnership structures were being championed, under New Labour, we witnessed increasing powers attributed to the Home Secretary to set ‘national policing priorities’, reforms to the constitution of police authorities to include independent members, increased monitoring of police performance, strengthening of HMIC and an overall growing influence and direction from central government over policing. Indeed, a central feature of the Labour regime was a thirst to hold state institutions and departments to account through heavily bureaucratized mechanisms and performance frameworks (Savage, 2007; Newburn, 2008) (see Chapter Four).
Theoretical perspectives

Whilst there is no obvious theoretical framework in which to analyse the emergence of partnerships (particularly within the public sector), Foucault’s (2011) seminal governmentality studies appear helpful in order to understand the growth of politically constructed partnerships. Foucault, in opposing traditional accounts of the centrality of an all-powerful state, provides an alternative perspective of government and the manner and context in which it operates. To help frame the notion of governmentality, Foucault used the backdrop of the economic philosophy of liberalism to articulate how government balances the need to govern with that of individual’s personal liberty, choice and moral autonomy (Lever, 2011). Foucault (2011) describes a three-part definition of governmentality, ingredients that he argued were necessary for maintaining a well ordered and happy society. The first element he termed the ‘apparatuses of security’ which embraces the approach it uses to create a feeling of economic, political and cultural well-being. The second, refers to broader transition of governance, particularly within the Western world, witnessed over many decades, from sovereignty and discipline to modern administrative states with complex bureaucracies. And thirdly, the ‘strategies and tactics’ employed by government to ‘maintain a content and thus stable society’. Combining these elements is the ‘art of government’ (Foucault, 2011).

Governmentality also develops our understanding of power. It encourages us to widen our understanding to encompass power as forms of knowledge; which in turn can lead to more efficient forms of social control and where the acquisition of knowledge allows the population to better govern them. Through such institutions as schools, hospitals and so forth, knowledge and certain discourses get internalised and guide future behaviours and conduct. In furtherance of governmentality, the importance of knowledge, Rose and Miller (1992) suggest that expertise and knowledge are central because ‘knowledge coordinates, and secondly because experts form nodes around which issues and explanations can be organised. Government, on the other hand, establishes the rules, frameworks and ‘centres of calculation’ necessary to govern ‘at a distance’ (Lever 2011:87). In terms of the tendency
for ‘experts to form nodes’, Crawford (1999:22) observes that since the late nineteenth century, ‘the subsequent history of crime control has been one in which established criminal justice agencies and professional groups have pursued their often organizational interests through their claims to specialist expertise.’ And Garland (1990:182) comments ‘Legitimacy for many institutions within this criminal justice complex, therefore, was defined often in terms of their administrative and utilitarian aims.’

In parallel vein, Weber (1864-1920), from a sociological perspective of the study of organizations, developed a theory of ‘rationalization’ that draws attention to the strength and power attached to any bureaucracy, describes them as the ‘ultimate model of rationale supremacy’. Bureaucracies are forces that operate to declared ends and attempt to influence and determine the means to the ends. Weber argues, bureaucracies by their very nature are predisposed to focus upon the quantity of production rather than upon its quality (Gane, 2004). A more contemporary interpretation of Weber’s work is provided by Ritzer (2011) in his application of the rationalisation theory to contemporary fast food chains and in particular the global brand MacDonald’s (MacDonaldization). By most yard sticks MacDonald’s is seen as a very successful global company judged by market share and declared profitability and a company symbolised for their efficient, predictable and controlled brand. Ritzer in his analysis however questions the extent to which the company, in striving for efficiency and profit, primarily through quantity has actually compromised the aspect of quality. He goes on to describe how the company has presented quality through marketing, emphasising low price, greater quantities of food, and the need for predictability and consistency in the products and services offered. However, Ritzer alternatively argues that the rational systems created by MacDonaldization are not actually cheaper or indeed efficient but more broadly, the fast food industry has played a significant part in creating obesity and nutritional problems, excessive waste, particularly through packaging and has negatively impacted upon family lifestyles.

Central to both Weber’s and Ritzer’s analysis is the tendency for large scale bureaucracies to strive for orthodox consensus, i.e. ‘sameness’ in terms of streamlined processes and so
forth, and inherently resist plural diversity or difference or to put it more succinctly, they encourage and foster corporatism. The notion of corporatism and its relevance to government is developed by Pratt (1989, in Burnett and Appleton, 2004: 35).

Commentating upon youth justice during the 1980’s Pratt defines corporatism as, ‘the centralisation of policy, increased government intervention, and the cooperation of various professional and interest groups into a collective whole with homogenous aims and objectives’; the language of management. Under both the Conservative, Thatcher and New Labour, Blair governments, modernisation of public services was underpinned by managerialism and business principles and philosophy and in particular New Public Management (NPM). NPM was premised upon consumerism, performance, efficiency and effectiveness, quality and value for money (Pollitt, 2002). In essence public services were being encouraged to adopt management styles and approaches more in line with those observed in the private sector and where greater emphasis was now being placed upon fiscal accountability and demonstrable organizational outputs and outcomes. Under New Labour, partnerships represented a paradigm shift in the police monopoly of crime. More significantly, partnerships were a method of power redistribution and appealed to the notion of citizens as ‘consumers’ of such services. Furthermore, New Labour emphasised engagement with a ‘localized’ consumerist public as a central and necessary feature to gaining public support and ‘active citizenship’ (see Chapter Four).

Post New Labour, successive governments sustained the concept of partnership and, initially at least, emphasized their importance through David Cameron’s and the Conservative Party’s use of the term ‘Big Society’. Albeit the funding and oversight of partnerships, previously administered through regional governance offices, has been removed. The stated aim was to create a climate that empowers local people and communities, building a ‘Big Society’ that will take power away from politicians and give it to people. The conservative emphasis here was upon seeking to withdraw from what they labelled a ‘disempowering’ and ‘nanny state’ inherited from the previous regime. The Times newspaper (14th April, 2010) described the policy as ‘an impressive attempt to
reframe the role of government and unleash entrepreneurial spirit’. Entrepreneurialism in this context was a desire to redress the scale and influence of the state, sponsored by taxation to creating a greater role for private enterprise and voluntary activity i.e. small state, big society. Critics of the ‘Big Society’ however, accuse the government of seeking to hide the necessity of reducing public sector spending, against the backdrop of austerity and dressing it up as reinvigorating civic society.

Crawford (1999:25) argues that ‘our current conception of crime control and criminal justice practice, since the late eighteenth century, has become detached from a broader concern with political economy and notions of rational governance of the population’. In accord with Foucault, Crawford views governance in its very broadest sense, embracing all forms of social control, both formal and informal:

`...in the past two decades we have seen a growing rejection of what Manning (1977) refers to as the impossible mandate of central government responsibility for social order. Where once the state was expected to hand down an authoritative answer for the problems and needs of society, now we are increasingly witnessing a situation in which those same problems or needs are rebounding back on society, so that society has become implicated in the task of resolving them`. (Crawford, 199:25)

Crawford’s observations appear consistent with the localism agenda under New Labour i.e. where locals were to be given a stake in local governance and encouraged to participate in local civic life (Evans, 2011), but also with the emergence of ‘Big Society’, albeit both perspectives are underpinned by polarised political philosophical belief systems. As previously mentioned, the current government’s austerity measures provide backdrop to ‘here and now’ public sector reform and rationalisation (Chapter Four).
The other side of the coin - problematic relationships

Findings from the literature and discussion above suggest that partnerships appeal to notions of rationality. Indeed, partnerships are perceived to present advantages for inter-agency co-operation and within a managerialist context are aligned to the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness. From an economic and fiscal outlook, the synergy of partnerships ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’ has a comfortable fit with notions of ‘best value’ or against the current strive for austerity, ‘doing more with less’. Indeed, from the public’s and consumerist point of view ‘joined-up’ government and ‘seamless service provision’ between the different facets of government and public services, is an aim that appeals to intuitive common sense (Unisys, 2016).

This same persuasive, intuitive, rationality argument can be witnessed all too clearly within the sphere of criminal justice and in particular within the state’s response to ‘managing’ crime. The rationality argument frames the complexity of crime and its multifaceted causations as beyond the remit and influence of a single organization, namely the police, and suggests that a multi-agency response will create better outcomes. In addition, inefficiencies or definitional gaps between state agencies, often experienced by consumers, can be caught and resolved. Skinn’s (2008:312) observes, ‘In this sense, partnerships also offer the opportunity to enhance the legitimacy of the criminal justice system’. However, despite this orthodoxy, there exists a growing literature that highlights barriers, tensions and inefficiencies, evidencing partnership to be problematic.

Barriers, tensions and inefficiencies

Pearce and Hillman (1998) and Geddes (1997) in their analysis of multi-agency working draw attention to the inflexibility of organizations; ingrained organizational ideologies and outlooks; resource constraints compounded by budgetary inflexibility and the competitive nature of bidding for funds. Secker and Hill (2001) in their study of inter-agency partnerships, found such arrangements problematic for all. In particular, they observed lack of information sharing, role boundary disputes, as well as conflicts based upon
organizational and inter-professional perspectives. Additionally, Maguire and Brookman (2005:530) noted of multi-agency partnerships: ‘...getting agencies to work together with the necessary degree of shared purpose, harmony and effective communication is a major task.’

Criminological research in the main in this area is disproportionately focused upon formality, structure and declared policy within partnerships, however, a growing corpus of literature indicates considerable interaction between declared policy and how partnerships are realised on the ground (Pearson et al, 1992). Doz (1988) highlights that despite the strategic alignment and agreement between organizations, often declared at a policy making level, partnership aims can be undermined by parochialism of organizational subunits and middle management who can be less enthusiastic towards cooperation. Kemshall and Maguire (2001:256), in a review of multi-agency public protection partnerships, found that in practice, ‘agencies were often unwilling to move beyond a certain of level to partnership work.’ And as Liddle and Gelsthrorpe (1994) poignantly observe, the informal responses and other complexities of working in partnership are often underestimated. Blagg et al (1998) and Sampson et al. (1998), further highlight that inequalities of power between organizations within multi-agency contexts can underpin disputes premised upon control, ownership, resources and management between the respective participants. And from a crime reduction perspective Bradley et al. (1998), Meijlaers (1993) and Goris (2001) question the extent that multi-agency initiatives can be egalitarian, whilst the police remain as the dominant stakeholder in the curriculum of crime.

Multi-agency partnerships may offer the potential for enhanced and integrated outcomes (Poxton 1999; Kinder et al. 2001) but such outcomes are not certain or indeed guaranteed. Powell (cited in Handel, 2003:315) found that ‘cooperative arrangements are not necessarily easy to sustain, nor do they always entail success’. A more recent Home Office (H.O.) report, Berry et al. (2011) in seeking to establish whether partnerships were more effective in achieving crime-related outcomes than alternatives, concluded, little or no
research had been conducted in this country, and the limited research that did exist, in the main, emanates from the USA; its applicability to the British setting cannot be assumed. Equally, and importantly, the report notes that ‘none of the studies could be described as solely testing the efficacy of partnership working’ (Berry et al. 2011:03).

Framing of the research inquiry

Inevitably, any discussion on police engagement with partnership, poses a fundamental question as to the ‘willingness’ and indeed ‘ability’, given the police role and function, to fully participate and engage in the ‘spirit of partnership’. Much has been written about the culture of the police; culture being as much about attitudes and mind-sets (see Skolnick, 1966; Reiner, 2011; Chan, 1997; Muir, 1977, Manning, 1977, Holdaway, 1983 amongst others). Reiner (2011) in particular articulates a typology of police culture that has as its core the characteristics of a sense of mission; suspicion; isolation/solidarity; conservatism and pragmatism; characteristics that are variable, premised upon the role and power relationships that the police have with the different elements of society. The eyes through which the cultural perspective of policing may view the world has the potential to operate at both a relational level when dealing with other partners, but also to value laden the priorities of the police function itself. Therefore, the thesis will include a cultural appreciation of police-partnerships.

Fundamentally, this research aims to provide an original and significant contribution to academic knowledge about police involvement in partnerships with other key statutory organizations, at both a strategic and operational level, before and after implementation of the CDA 1998.

The overarching aim of this research is to address the question: "Are organic police partnerships more effective than mandated police partnerships?"

In order to achieve this aim, three objectives are defined:
1. To research the history and development of both informal i.e. non legislated and formal i.e. legislated policing partnerships, and to seek to identify potential strategic relationships between such partnerships and various policing models.

2. To undertake an in-depth case study of an English police force currently engaged in partnership activity in order to: (a) compare and contrast its partnership activity before and after the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998; (b) identify and understand the impact partnership activity has had on policing practice and attitudes towards crime; and (c) to examine the implications of ‘shared ownership’ of crime, as a result of the requirements of the Act.

3. To uncover the complex processes involved in partnership and inter-agency collaboration; identifying key components of successful partnership working with an aim to critically examine and possibly improve upon existing typologies, which can have impact on practice.

**Thesis structure**

Chapter Two explores the embryonic development of police-partnership which occurred long before the Morgan Report (1991), during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. Such partnership development was led by police visionaries who directly linked police-partnership activity to policing strategy and specifically community oriented outlooks. Chapter Three provides unique insight and critique of the Morgan Report, a report attributed with providing the policy foundation for the partnership requirements of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 (CDA). Chapter Three is informed by an interview with Morgan, the first to have been recorded since the report’s publication (at least to the author’s knowledge). Chapter Four examines police-partnership development post the Morgan Report, detailing a critical examination of police responses to government policy develop under the New Labour administration (1997-2010) and subsequent political administrations (2010-to the time of writing). Chapter Five, on methodology, outlines the broad qualitative standpoint adopted. Staffordshire Police provides a case-study, where focus is being giving to interpretations and meanings. Principally, semi-structured
interviews of past and present police officers and staff, together with partners are conducted. Additionally, the chapter contains a reflective account of the research ‘experience’ and outlines the limitations of the study. Chapters Six and Seven present the results of the primary research within a thematic context; Chapter Six details the pre-1998 sample and Chapter Seven, the post-1998 sample. Chapter Eight provides critical discussion, informed by primary research, wider academic literature and detailed analysis. Finally, Chapter Nine draws the debate together, providing an overall conclusion and identifying future opportunities for future research, together with potential policy consideration.
Chapter Two: Police legitimacy and competing policing philosophies

As mentioned previously, the 1979 Thatcher led Conservative government was elected on a political manifesto underpinned by a ‘law and order’ mandate. Against this backdrop rested a growing unease within Britain’s cities and perceived concern of the erosion of moral standards and values within society which, it was argued, had occurred whilst the UK had been governed by the previous by left wing Labour administration (Dunleavy and Husbands, 1985). From a Conservative Party perspective, was a sense that the streets needed reclaiming and where the police were seen as central in helping to re-establish order. To this extent, police numbers were increased by 16,500 between the period 1979 and 1987, representing a 13% increase upon previous years (www.conservative-party.net, 2014). Additionally, police pay, terms and conditions were improved considerably following implementation in 1979 of the Edmund-Davies Commission (1978) recommendations into police pay; a review ironically commissioned by the previous Labour government.

Combined with the notion of a free economy and the strong state, manifestations of the state’s need for ‘control’ and a re-establishment of ‘authority’, were played out, in part, during the large scale rioting of the early 1980’s that occurred in many parts of the country’s urban areas, including the Brixton and Toxteth. And four years later, 1984, the government dispute with the National Union of Miners, brought policing into a direct political arena and as a result, many authors have argued, compromised the longstanding position of perceived political neutrality of the police, and in particular, police claim to operational independence (Reiner, 2010; Savage, 2007; McLaughlin, 2007; Newburn, 2008 amongst others).

As will be argued throughout this thesis, policing and police activity need to be viewed against the political ideology and social policy making of the government of the day. Ultimately policing is an arm of government; despite the political rhetoric and a desire from the police themselves to be viewed as politically neutral, often in support of their quest for perceived ‘legitimacy’. Jackson et al (2012:115) observe, ‘Institutions, practices and arrangements must, in order to develop, operate and reproduce effectively, be seen as
right and proper by those who are subject to them.’ In relationship to the police, Tyler (2011) argues that legitimacy is the foundation of police authority. Citizens acquiesce to the rule of law and its enforcement through the police institution, provided both are perceived to be fair and just, as part of what Alderson (1979) referred to as a ‘social contract’. As Reiner (2000) observes, the introduction of the New Police in 1829, was a heavily contested and contentious political and public debate, yet by the mid 1900’s the police had become an embodiment and ‘symbol’ of Britain’s cultural identity. However, during the 1980’s and 90’s the position had changed ‘to move to a new stage of development, reflecting a profound restructuring of state, society and culture...characterized as post legitimacy’ (Reiner, 200:47). The principle of policing by consent however, still appears to remain central to police ideology, underpinned by the strategy of ‘minimum force’. Sir Robert Mark, former commissioner of the Metropolitan police (1972-77) once famously stated, ‘The real art of policing a free society or a democracy is to win by appearing to lose’, an approach designed to engineer public sympathy and support rather than recourse to ‘stronger tactics’, albeit in this context, he was referring to the policing of public disorder (Reiner, 2000:53). Nonetheless, Sir Robert’s observation exemplifies an apparent balancing act policing treads.

I would also argue, that the struggle to maintain police legitimacy is absolutely central to the emergent story of police-partnership. However, the literature in the main, appears to contextualise partnership solely through the lens of crime prevention and crime prevention policy (Gilling, 1997; Tilley, 2005; Laycock, 2005 amongst others), therefore missing this important and fundamental strategic context. In situating partnership within this broader framework, I argue that policing philosophy, styles and strategy are therefore pivotal to the debate.

**Authoritarian v consensual models of policing - a shifting balance of power**

Discourse pertaining to policing models and approaches need to be framed within broader debates about the police role and function, and consequently, the relationship between
the police and the state. Questions directly relevant to this thesis include: (a) whom do the police, police? And (b) how do the police, police?

Whom do the police, police? The answer is that the state holds a clear responsibility for ensuring the safety and wellbeing of its citizens and therefore seeks to control and regulate society in order to provide this function. In these terms, I am using the term ‘state’ to refer to the ‘apparatus’ of government in its broadest sense. Heywood (2015:68) usefully provides the following definition of the state as ‘comprising the various institutions that are recognizably ‘public’ in that they are responsible for the collective organization of communal life and are funded at the public’s expense it can be identified with the entire “body politic” ’ (Heywood, 2015:68). Therefore, the state encompasses all ‘public’ financed institutions, including the police, judiciary, military, education, welfare and so forth.

The development of policing within the UK draws competing historical interpretations. The Wig historians or orthodox view (Reith, 1938, 1948; Critchley, 1978; Ascoli 1979) understands the introduction of the New Police in 1829 as a neutral government solution to a ‘shared’ society concern about crime and where criminals were are viewed as separate from mainstream society (Emsley, 1996, 2007). In this interpretation it regarded the ‘New Police’ as distinct from the ‘Old Police’, as marking the juncture between the previous informal local policing and parish watch systems to that of a regulated and uniformed service first introduced in the Metropolis in 1829, bringing universal benefits for ‘all’ of society. Conversely, the revisionist histories, for example Storch (1975, 1976) have situated the emergence of the New Police within a class divided Georgian and early Victorian society and which regards the police as a controlling and disciplining instrument, having been developed by the ‘establishment’, in order to respond to a ‘burgeoning, and increasingly self-confident and non-deferential, working class’ (Elmsley, 2007:72). Crowther (2012), in developing the notion of state control recognises that neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian perspectives, whilst being different in their theoretical orientation, shares a common analysis, which positions the police role and function as maintaining existing political and economic structures and as a consequence, therefore, involves ‘policing’ the
‘lower’ echelons of society, including the socially disadvantaged. The outcome of policing in these terms is to criminalize the poor (Hirst, 1975; Campbell, 1993). That said, within the academic discipline of criminology, there has been the emergence of a more sympathetic understanding of crime upon those it directly affects; namely the ‘left realist’ school, (late 1980’s and early 1990’s). Whilst recognising the power differentials and class considerations of politically left interpretations, left realists draw attention to the ‘realities’ and ‘impact’ of crime upon the working class, rather than seeing the police and working class solely entwined in struggle with each other (Young 1986, 1992). However, generally, the political ‘left’ views policing as disproportionately focusing its attention on policing the marginalised and ‘oppressed’ fragmented sections of society.

More recently, criminological studies, argue that there is a broader diversity agenda operating, including the issue of race and diversity, rather than class being perceived the sole differential by way of explanation of where the police focus their attention. For example, Hall et al (1978) in their seminal work ‘Policing the Crisis’ explore in-depth the interplay between government and mechanisms of state control, including policing, examining the topic through the medium of the ‘mugging crisis’ that dominated the government agenda during the mid-late 1970’s. Consequently, the framing of the ‘mugging crisis’ (Hall et al, 1998) created organizational responses from policing (creation of squads with specialist functions) which in turn heavily impacted upon police belief systems and approaches to combat the ‘moral panic’, particularly impacting negatively upon police-black relations, and where mugging was perceived to be disproportionately a black problem. Police targeting and the criminalization of minority ethnic communities has attracted increasing academic scrutiny (Bowling et al 2007; Webster, 2004). Scarman, (1981) discussed more fully below, also recognised that a range of socio economic factors can be overlaid to the situation and analysis of the crisis during the early 1980’s inner cities within the UK that led to large scale rioting. However, the MacPherson Report (1999) into the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence drew specific focus upon relations between the police service and Britain’s ethnic communities, labelling the police as ‘institutionally
Many have argued that the Lawrence case marked a watershed in police-public relations (Rowe, 2007; McLaughlin, 2007; Bowling and Philips, 2002, 2007). However, Cantle (2001) in his review of public order disturbances in the north of England concluded that many black and ethnic minorities felt ‘problematised’ by the police and other state agencies and called for greater community cohesion and cultural appreciation. And despite government intervention and guidance, the contentious issues of police ‘stop and search’ continues to impact disproportionally upon black and ethnic communities (Stenson and Waddington, 2007; Yesufu, 2013; Hargreaves, 2018).

Turning to the question as to ‘how’ communities are policed? Weatheritt (1983); Butler (1992) and Hall et al (1978) have all commented upon the drive for police efficiency and effectiveness that occurred during the late 1960’s and 70’s and in particular the implementation of the Unit Beat Policing (UBP) model which made greater use of motorised transport and radio systems in order to more promptly respond to public calls for service. However, as a consequence, this resulted in changes to the traditional ‘independence’ of the officer on the beat, the officer’s contact and style of relationships with their communities and; to accentuate the shift in the perceived role of the police from ‘peace keeper’ to ‘crime fighter’. Morgan and Newburn (1997) endorse this analysis of UBP reinforcing aspects of police culture which sought ‘action’, resulting in ‘crime fighting’ aspects being highlighted and a devaluing of the police service role. As one commentator put it: ‘The "British Bobby" was recast as the tough, dashing, formidable (but still brave and honest) "crime-buster”’ (Morgan and Newburn 1997:45). And Hall et al (1978:46) observed as to the changing nature of the police officer, ‘He is more "car bound", less "beat-bound", less likely to live on-the-spot, and with the coming of the ubiquitous "walkie-talkie" and car radio his contact with superiors, and hence dependence on them’. These same authors also note, ‘This trend towards greater professional routinisation of the individual policeman’s role... has been further affected by increasing specialisation within the force: the growing tendency to set up special squads to deal with particular areas of crime’ (Hall et al 1978:46).
Chapter Two: Police legitimacy and competing policing philosophies

An example of specialisation was Special Patrol Groups (SPG) within the Metropolitan Police, an ‘elite’ group of officers who acted as a response unit to support local policing and directed to towards serious incidents and high crime activity areas, patrolling in units and within mobile vans. A model replicated across many parts of the UK. Whilst this maybe an over simplification of the police developments which occurred during the 1960’s and 70’s, the trajectory of travel however, is uncontested, and as a result of the changing social context, combined with police operating practices, resulted in a distancing of the police from the public (Sharpe, 2006).

Against a changing social context, notions as to what the police function actually represented arose, premised upon whether they, the police, are to be regarded a ‘force’, with emphasis given to authority and control, or were they to be regarded a ‘service’, premised upon Peelian principles of "citizens in uniform", locally appointed, facilitating and working alongside and with the community. Implicitly, policing contains an inherent tension between its ‘service roles’ with that of ‘crime fighting’ (Reiner, 2000). Within this context, protagonists, representing these polarized and indeed competing perspectives were James Anderton, Chief Constable, Greater Manchester (1976-1991) and John Alderson, Chief Constable, Devon and Cornwall (1973-1982). Anderton argued in support for authority and control, sometimes referred to as ‘hard’ policing; conversely, Alderson championed ‘community’ or ‘proactive’ policing, regarded as ‘soft’ policing. The discussion came to represent a fundamental power struggle and philosophical tension within police leadership that went to the very core of debate as to the role and function of the police within a modern democracy, at that time.

The influence of Alderson

In his seminal work, Policing Freedom (1979), Alderson raised concern that policing within western democracies was in crisis, and that tensions existed between the state’s responsibility for social control, with that of citizens who demand ever more freedom. As mentioned above, in seeking to reframe policing, Alderson proffered a community-based
policing or ‘proactive policing’ model, where emphasis was given to strengthening public trust in the police and stimulating the community toward ‘self-policing’. In this regard, Alderson argued that integral to the police function was a requirement for policing to provide humanitarian and community leadership in order to help and encourage communities in addressing the ‘social conditions giving rise to crime’. These were radical and contested concepts at that time. Importantly, his model was premised upon an ‘active’ community participation in policing, a theme we will return to in due course.

Specifically, and more directly linked to contemporary notions of police-partnership, Alderson highlighted an interconnectivity of the police function with the responsibilities of other state agencies. However, he also accepted partnership might present difficulties and conflict arising from the differencing philosophical premise upon which each of the state’s agencies are built. Desirous of negating such conflict, he argued for a new and appreciative understanding of each other's role together with a holistic vision regarding the state’s responsibility to safeguard citizen welfare and obligations towards preventing crime (Alderson, 1979). In support, Alderson advanced a need for ‘joined-up’ government, and ‘inter-ministerial co-operation’, outlining a requirement for a national strategy against crime that should begin with joint ministerial plans and initiatives; concepts some 20 years ahead of their time!

Savage (2007:131-135), in critiquing Alderson's legacy, emphasises: (1) his challenge of a post war drift towards ‘reactive’ policing based upon notions of efficiency and rapid response; (2) restating the principle of preventative policing and restating that the sources of crime are inextricably linked to underlying social causes, and therefore must be addressed through social strategy; and (3) calling for a framework of police-community consultation or ‘people power’ premised upon the concept of policing by consent, but redefined and renegotiated through a form of ‘social contract’ between the police and their communities.
However, as mentioned above, Alderson’s vision for ‘community policing’ was not shared by all. Within police leadership, an emergent debate suggested distinction could be drawn between the policing of more rural settings, as distinct from the challenges and issues presented by multicultural inner cities, which may require alternative solutions to community models that are more appreciative of their unique and changing social contexts (McNee 1983). Additionally, Alderson’s views were at odds with the Conservative government of the day. Indeed, upon his death in 2011, The Independent newspaper (17th October 2011) commented ‘his brand of uncompromising liberalism meant he was probably the Prime Minister’s, (Margaret Thatcher’s), least favourite cop. She did not like his obvious suspicions of the security services or his emphasis on community policing’.

However, albeit Alderson’s view was not shared by all at that time, The Scarman Inquiry (1981) was to provide support for Alderson's community policing approach.

**The influence of Scarman**

1981 remains within public consciousness as the year of unprecedented civil unrest within contemporary UK policing history and marked a watershed in police-race relations. Rioting had occurred within Brixton, north London, between the 10-12 April. The rioting in Brixton involved considerable numbers of young men, many of whom were black, but not exclusively, who battled with the police leading to a fundamental collapse of law and order within the area. However, the tone of an increased tension between the police and populations elsewhere, particularly within inner cities that shared many of the same social contexts as Brixton were themselves to witness subsequent serious disorder, including Toxteth, Liverpool. Lord Scarman, conducted a ‘local’ Inquiry into the disorders granted by virtue of Section 32 of the Police Act, and as he records: ‘...the British people watched with horror and incredulity...violence and disorder in their capital city, the like of which had not previously been seen in this century in Britain’ (Scarman, 1981:1).

As to the cause of those riots’, two primary views were expressed, firstly ‘oppressive policing over a period of years’ and in particular the harassment of young black males; and
secondly, the riots being viewed as a ‘protest against society by people, deeply frustrated and deprived’, who were seeking to air their grievances in a very public way. Whilst Scarman resisted the over simplification of these two positions, both themes remained dominant throughout the Report (Benyon, 1984).

Dealing with the latter issue first. Scarman, constrained by the Inquiry remit, nonetheless felt compelled to make a link between the underlying social grievances being expressed with that of government social policy. Although not ‘able’ to make recommendations in these terms, he did however, comment upon inner city decline; lack of joined up government thinking; lack of local consultation and involvement in dealing with inner city problems; and more broadly, upon the experiences of black and minority ethnic populations with the UK, highlighting central issues of housing, education, employment and discrimination.

As to the relationship between social deprivation and policing, Scarman stated:

‘The police do not create social deprivation, though unimaginative, inflexible policing can make the tensions which deprivation engenders greatly worse. Conversely, while good policing can help diminish tension and avoid disorder, it cannot remove the causes of social stress’. (Scarman 1981:100)

Scarman lay open a debate as to the policing needs of a contemporary and multi-racial society, resulting in focus being drawn to the policies and methods of policing itself.

The Scarman Report published on 25th November 1981, whilst receiving general police acceptance of the analysis and recommendations, not all police chiefs and politicians were immediately so accommodating; particularly those who dismissed the idea of ‘social excuses’ for criminality or who argued for even greater police powers and equipment as the necessary response. For example, Kenneth Oxford, Chief Constable, Merseyside Police, continued to champion ‘enforcement’ and ‘control’ as being essential to maintain public confidence in policing inner city Britain (Oxford 1984; Benyon 1984).
It should be noted also that the notion of police-public relationships was already being explored within the Metropolitan Police at the invitation of Sir David McNee, the then Commissioner, who in 1979 commissioned a comprehensive research project, which was to last four years, conducted by the Policy Studies Institute (PSI). The research examined the relationships between the Metropolitan Police and the communities of London. The PSI (1984) produced four related survey reports: (i) a survey of Londoners; (ii) a survey of young black people; (iii) a survey of police officers and (iv) a final report entitled ‘The police in action’. The findings revealed further evidence of a growing divide between the police and sections of society within the more acute and deprived London boroughs and particularly those boroughs with high BME populations. Despite the general public’s confidence toward the police being reported as ‘reasonably high’, young people tended to be more critical. However, the survey of young black people (study II) somewhat disturbingly reported: ‘The attitudes currently expressed towards the police by the group are highly unfavourable; the police force is viewed with much bitterness and resentment...People felt the police lacked respect for black people generally, that they were prejudiced against them and treated them differently from other groups’ (PSI Study II, 1983:161). In particular, confidence amongst young people of West Indian origin was regarded ‘dangerously low’ (PSI IV, 1983:337). It is of note that the survey reports were published some two years after the Scarman Report, suggesting that responses to the Scarman recommendations had yet to have significant impact on ‘attitudes’ towards the police.

The central issue that both Scarman and Alderson were raising was a concern for police legitimacy. Both shared a view that the police had become too isolated and distant from the public (Rowe, 2008) and as Alderson acknowledged, there was very real danger that the police had come to regard themselves as distinct and apart from society (Alderson, 1979); a position at odds with Peel’s 1829 original concept and definition of a constable as a ‘citizen in uniform’. That said, the very real issue of street crime within Britain’s multi-racial inner cities did require response, but one-dimensional robust policing might not hold
the answer (McLaughlin, 2007). Scarman, concluded that the inner-city crisis arose from a complex social, political and economic cocktail in which policing is situated. As a result, policing was now being encouraged, together with local communities to operate in cooperative and jointly participative ways in order to address local concerns. Equally, Scarman challenged central government to recognise its responsibilities for the situation and advocated ‘crime problems’ to be increasingly seen as social problems to be dealt with in a far more ‘joined-up’ way.

The riots marked a watershed in UK policing and the Scarman Report profoundly influenced future police strategizing.

**The influence of Newman**

Sir Kenneth Newman became Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police in October 1982. His appointment was ‘widely believed both inside and outside police circles to signal a new kind of approach to police management and to the relationship between police and community in London’ (Metropolitan Police, 1987 unpublished). He was charged with implementing Scarman’s recommendations. He also had cognizance of the emerging findings of the PSI survey of Londoners, previously referred to above. Newman, influenced by the professionalization and New Public Management (NPM) agendas, sought to reframe police ‘strategy’ and its delivery through the mechanism of Policing by Objectives (PBO); an approach influenced by the work of Edgar and Lubens (1979). PBO had its origins within the global private business sector, drawn from Management by Objectives (MBO).

PBO was premised upon rational and evidence-based management, requiring a need to consult both with the consumers of policing services i.e. the public, and also and importantly with other agencies and stakeholders. The model focuses upon meeting ‘community expectations’, introducing internal and external accountability publication of actions plans. Each of the policing boroughs were required to produce ‘Borough Plans’, which in turn fed into an overall force plan; to which Borough Commanders were held to account. In arriving at the ‘local’ plan, encouragement was given to ‘engage’ with local
communities and other agencies, in order to ensure that police activity was aligned to meet public expectations and resolve the problems identified. It is of note, that shortly after the introduction the PBO system, the H.O. issued Circular 114/83, requiring all Chief Constables to specify policing objectives and the resources to be deployed in support (Chapter Three). As an important adjunct, the managerialist approach sponsored by Newman and others was to influence H.O. thinking and circular 114/83 and subsequent circulars, as Sharpe (2006:194) observes: ‘set in motion the development of policing over the next 20-30 years dominated by the demands for performance, target and league tables’, a theme discussed more fully in Chapter Four.

Newman sought also to reverse the trend towards specialization and committed to increasing local foot patrols in order to enhance police-community contact, modelling a concept of an omni-competent local officer, capable of dealing with a wide range of community problems. Importantly, and central to partnership development, but in line with a rational management approach, he introduced holistic problem-solving. Rather than using ‘single case’ activity, which had hitherto been the norm, Newman used the vehicle of multi-agency to ‘develop solutions which address the root causes rather than the symptoms of crime’ (Newman 1984:8 in Leishman et al 1996:105-106).

Buck (1992) observed, however, that whilst all forces had responded to H.O. circular 114/83 and set annual objectives, in the pursuit of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, the extent forces could demonstrate an improved quality of life for their communities, was ‘very limited’. Rather than embed the process of PBO fully and systematically, many had paid lip service to it. Whilst Newman, Buck and others championed PBO as a holistic organizational philosophy, it became evident nationally, that cultural resistance, at all levels in policing, to this apparent ‘business-like approach’, was underestimated. Nonetheless, under Newman’s leadership as Commissioner, policing was required to shift from a largely reactive state, where focus had been upon dealing with the ‘here and now’ or short-term demands, to a longer term focus and where local problems were to be
solved by cooperation, in the full sense of the word by police, other agencies and the public working together (Metropolitan Police, 1987 unpublished; Newman, 1985).

**Chapter conclusion**

Contrary to popular police studies rhetoric, this chapter identifies that the foundations of police-partnership activity occurred long before the Morgan Report (1991). As though nothing similar happened before it, that report is frequently cited as the foundational literature upon which the CDA 1998 was premised and enacted as the legislation that mandated the police to work in partnership with other key agencies (Chapter Three). In reality, both Alderson and Newman sought to create a new and systemized approach to their hitherto reactive police organizations and that was congruent to the police mission, or at least how they interpreted it. In this regard, Alderson and Newman can be regarded as police visionaries, whose influence and contribution to the ‘coming of partnership’ should be a matter of record.

However, it remains a matter of conjecture, that had it not been for the 1980 riots and Lord Scarman’s subsequent analysis, whether the voice of Alderson and his community policing model would have gained the subsequent support history records. The Scarman Report fundamentally influenced police reform, a service which hitherto remained relatively unscrutinised. As Gilling (1994:234) notes: ‘only by the beginning of the 1980’s, when the police experienced a crisis of legitimacy did they become seriously willing to countenance alternative preventative roles and practices’. In turn, Newman, building upon the work of Alderson, framed a ‘multi-agency’ approach within a managerialist context, utilising PBO, which demanded holistic and joined-up thinking solutions to community problems.

The concept of ‘partnership’ is traditionally examined through the lens of crime prevention and in particular situational crime prevention, championed by the H.O. during the early 1980’s (Chapter Three). However, this analysis has sought to reframe the development of police-partnership activity within emergent concepts of ‘community-policing’ and a desire
to ensure police legitimacy. However, the high hopes for ‘community-policing’ were to be challenged by significant industrial unrest, in particular, by the miners’ strike of 1984 and in London, by ‘The Times’ dispute in Wapping. These disputes served to underline the ethos of ‘action’ based ‘reactive’ policing once more. Finally, as Bennett (1994) poignantly observes, policing is primarily organised around the priority of ‘control’ and therefore creates a ‘tendency for more innovative caring functions, such as community policing to be ‘bolted-on’ or ‘transplanted’ on the existing and traditional control systems. This can generate a conflict between the policing system and the policing paradigm’ (Bennett, 1994:123), a tension explored more fully in subsequent chapters.

We now turn to the Morgan Report.

Background and context - a changing narrative and use of language

There had been during the 1980’s, a growing acceptance amongst politicians, evidenced through H.O. sponsored research, such as the classical study by Clarke and Hough 1980, 1984 and Morris and Heal, 1981 that numbers of police officers and how the police officers were deployed was having little impact on either the prevention of crime or indeed its detection. As a direct consequence, alternative approaches to crime and crime prevention were now being considered and explored. Appeals to ‘community’, against a growing recognition and acceptance that the state and its institutions, including the police, cannot solely prevent crime, started to gain traction.

The simplest concept of the term crime prevention, as opposed to the general crime reduction concept, when taken at face value, appears to have a relatively straight-forward premise i.e. it is better to stop the crime from happening in the first place, rather than having to deal with the consequences of it once it has occurred. Conversely however, the role of the criminal justice system (of which the police are part) has and continues to be largely focused upon detecting and punishing those who commit crime (albeit is argued that this in itself has a preventative effect). Importantly though, during the early 1980’s the police ability, as an agent of the state, to ‘control’ crime, as evidenced by the recorded year-on-year increases in crime, was now being openly questioned (Savage, 2007; Reiner, 2010; Loader and Mulcahy, 2003).

The notion of crime being a shared responsibility between the state and its citizens, led to a growth in ‘community-based approaches’ being explored. In parallel, policing styles and police legitimacy, as previously discussed (Chapter Two) against the backdrop of the Scarman Report, drew focus, together with the perceived disconnect between the police and sections of the public, particularly within the inner cities and specifically with racial minorities. To this end, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, now seen as a major
policy shift in framing police powers, including stop and search, was informed by the Home Office (H.O) Working Paper on Criminal Justice (1984), which had the stated aim to ‘develop legislation, with the objective of encouraging effective policing with the consent and cooperation of society at large’ (H.O. 1984:15 in Brake and Hale, 1992).

Equally, during the mid-1980’s Sir Kenneth Newman, amongst others, argued that various types of crime were becoming increasingly difficult for the police to ‘control’. Newman (in Lea, 2007) in particular made reference to an increased ownership, of what he termed ‘mass private property’ (electrical goods and so forth) and the difficulty of unique identification following theft. In addition, the increase in ‘opportunist crime’, committed by nonprofessional criminals, and therefore outside the knowledge and scope of police intelligence gathering, may be impossible to detect, for example house burglary and minor theft. Hence Newman asserted, there lay a responsibility upon all citizens to ‘take care’ of their own possessions and property (Lea, 2007). At the same time ‘there was also a more general concern with the decline of the process of ‘informal social control’ by which communities discouraged criminality. Economic deprivation, family breakdown, rapid population turnover in some of the poorest council estates (public housing projects) led to areas where few people knew their neighbours, and the old collective processes of social control were weakened’ (Lea, 2007:2). Interestingly, ‘responsibilization’ of crime strategy is in accord with Foucault’s (2011) theories of govern mentality (2011), where government can distance itself from crime control policy failures and equally ‘responsibilization’ evidences an influence of neoliberalism operating, where emphasis is upon deregulation and support for individualism and entrepreneurial enterprise (Harvey, 2005) (see Chapter Four).

From a theoretical perspective, ‘situational crime prevention’, which viewed crime as an opportunity, informed by rational-choice theory, (including- target hardening, opportunity reduction, use of technology and so forth) dominated both academic and police perspectives, up until the late 1980’s. At this time, the UK witnessed the birth of a new and emerging conceptual framework for understanding crime prevention, commonly labelled ‘social crime prevention’; where focus was upon ‘community’ and social responsibility for
crime (Clarke, 1981; Cornish and Clarke, 1986). Such thinking also conveniently dovetailed with a Conservative leaning to generally want to keep public expenditure low, whilst transferring, as much personal responsibility, and in this instance crime prevention, to citizens (Brake and Hale, 1992).

This change of outlook proved critical in influencing the British government and influencing recognition of the growing importance of the increasing focus upon the crime prevention. The H.O. in 1983 launched its Crime Prevention Unit (HOCPU), in part to seek to collect independent evidence as to the effectiveness of various interventions and initiatives, in a general absence of evaluation and monitoring within the crime arena. Evidence of the increasing acceptance within government of a ‘shared’ responsibility for crime can be found in the government inter-departmental circular 8/1984, which went on to declare:

‘A primary objective of the police has always been the prevention of crime. However, since some of the factors affecting crime lie outside the control or direct influence of police, crime prevention cannot be left to them alone. Every individual citizen and all those agencies whose policies and practices can influence the extent of crime should make their contribution. Preventing crime is a task for the whole community’. (H.O. 1984)

During this period, Neighbourhood Watch started to flourish, with the first scheme being introduced in 1982, and national roll-out from 1983 onwards. By 1989, there were 81,000 schemes. However, once again, due to an absence of monitoring and evaluation, their effectiveness was unclear (Brain 2010).

In 1986 the importance of the ‘new’ crime prevention agenda was further exemplified by the government hosting two seminars on crime prevention in Downing Street, chaired respectively by the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher and the Home Secretary (Newburn, 2003:74). Interestingly, Gilling (1994:239) observes that ‘at this point some sort of paradigmatic shift appeared to occur within the H.O. and key personnel within the HOCPU evidently expressed a desire to see a combination of situational and so-called social
measures in future preventative projects (Heal and Laycock, 1986), so that projects addressed both opportunities (situational) and motivations (social). Gilling (1994) accepts however, that the reasons for such a paradigmatic shift remain unclear and are in need of further research.

Against this backdrop, it is revealing to examine the political beliefs and imperatives held by the Conservative Party, neatly exemplified in their 1987 general election manifesto:

‘Crime has been rising steadily over the years...The origins of crime lie deep in society: in families where parents do not support or control their children; in schools where discipline is poor; and in the wider world where violence is glamorised and traditional values are under attack...Government must give a lead: by backing, not attacking the police; by providing a tough legal framework for sentencing; by building the prisons in which to place those who pose a threat to society...and by encouraging local communities to prevent crime and to help the police detect it’. (Conservative Party, 1987:32)

Whilst the statement underlined a traditional Conservative ‘hard line’ view of crime control, it is interesting to note the sympathetic appeal on behalf of the police, together with a ‘softening’ and recognition as to the influences of more ‘social’ causes of crime. In this latter context, the H.O. Crime Prevention Unit (HOCPU) sought to pilot new and holistic approaches to crime and crime prevention, through a series of initiatives, detailed below.

**The Five Towns Initiative**

During 1986, the HOCPU initiated five local crime prevention projects, located in Bolton, Croydon, North Tyneside, Swansea and Wellingborough, formally named ‘The Five Towns Initiative: A Community Response to Crime Reduction’ (H.O. 1988). The projects aim was to seek to demonstrate: ‘crime and the fear of crime could be reduced by coordinated action by a variety of relevant local agencies’ (H.O. 1998:01). The role of the coordinator was
considered central in helping to ensure ‘joined up’ local responses, and to aid the project.
The underpinning rationale of the initiative is outlined in the (1988) H.O. overview report:

'It is now widely recognised that preventing crime is not just a matter for the police
and central government: the cooperation and support of others in the community is
essential to reduce opportunities for crime. Local authority departments, local
businesses and commercial interests, voluntary organization's and the individual
citizen all have a part to play. It is equally recognised that solutions to crime need to
be firmly based on a sound knowledge of local problems and need. (H.O. 1988:1)

Three key themes are identified: (1) The collective social responsibility for crime and crime
prevention; (2) the need for schemes to be ‘local’ in character; and (3), the need for
coordination of response. In addition to the role of coordinator, each scheme had a
steering committee that oversaw the direction of the project, with representatives at a
reasonably senior level from relevant local agencies. In terms of methodology, the schemes
were required to evidence the crime profile of the respective area from information and
data sources drawn from a range of different local sources, including local police crime
data. Local crime surveys were conducted of local residents to help identify the levels of
unreported crime and levels of the fear of crime. At the end of the first twelve months, all
schemes proclaimed considerable crime reduction successes for example, North Tyneside -
claimed that residential burglary was down by 23%, other burglaries by 51%, thefts of
vehicles down by 23% and criminal damage down by 18%. Similar successful crime
reductions were recorded in the other projects, but equally high levels of the fear of crime
were also recorded (H.O. 1988). However, it is of note, that none of the schemes were
formally evaluated by the HOCPU, although Liddle and Bottoms (1994) retrospectively
analysed the initiative. Whilst Liddle and Bottoms (1994:7) primarily focused upon issues of
process rather than outcomes, nonetheless, they concluded ‘that by the canons of rigorous
research methodology, claims for a crime reductive effect could not, in most cases, be
adequately substantiated ‘i.e. any apparent reductions could not be positively linked to
the direct impact of the project.
Whilst H.O. funding lasted only 18 months, continuation of the schemes was assured through either local agency financial commitment and/or the securing of additional government grants. Significantly, the H.O. (1988) report alluded to the importance of the role of the local authority and the shifting focus away from the police, declaring:

‘As the agency responsible for delivering a number of essential services to the community and for maintaining the quality of the local environment, the local authority has a key role in projects of this sort and in any longer-term approach to local crime prevention strategies. It is essential, therefore, that any project carries with it the full support of its local authority’. (H.O. 1988:14)

Albeit the title Five Towns conjures up notions of broad strategic crime prevention applied to wide geographic areas, in reality most of the initiatives were more narrowly focused, targeting specific localities and problem areas rather than whole towns. Nonetheless, the initiative provided the bedrock and momentum for the launch of the Safer Cities Programme in 1987.

**The Safer Cities Programme**

Against the backdrop of continuing concern for the social, physical and economic challenges faced by many of the major conurbations in England and Wales, the H.O. launched its Safer Cities Programme (1987), aimed at reducing crime and the fear of crime, in support of a wider programme by government entitled Action for Cities. The Safer Cities programme mirrored itself upon the coordination and delivery frameworks identified in the earlier Five Towns initiative. In announcing Safer Cities, the then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd declared:

‘Crime concerns us all. Responding to it, on behalf of society, is a primary task of the police service. But crime will not be tackled effectively if it is regarded as solely a matter for the police. Effective action against crime requires the police and all sections of the community to work together in partnership’. (H.O. 1989b:4)
It is interesting to note, the Home Secretary using the word ‘partnership’ to help frame a new collaborative concept between the state, local government and its citizens, relative to crime prevention.

It is also interesting to observe, that at the same time as the launch of the Safer Cities Programme and against the backdrop of increasing public concern about crime and the fear of crime, 1988 witnessed the birth of Crime Concern; an independent, not for profit charity with a declared aim to help reduce crime and create safer communities.

During this same period, the H.O. reconstituted its Standing Conference on Crime Prevention, and a second H.O. Interdepartmental Circular, 44/90 entitled, ‘Crime Prevention the Success of the Partnership Approach’. Circular 44/90 updated Circular 8/84 and was issued together with the H.O. advisory booklet on crime prevention ‘Partnership in Crime Prevention’ (H.O. 1990), a document endorsed by the Minister of State for the H.O. John Patten MP.

The booklet asserted:

‘We have seen for example, a growth in the number of Crime Prevention Panels, Watch Schemes and other local crime forum; the increasing involvement of commerce and industry in local crime prevention work; and a greater awareness among the public that opportunist crime can be prevented. But the most significant advance has been the widespread adoption of the partnership model, the inter-agency approach to crime prevention’. (H.O. 1990b:4)

The booklet also profiled a number of apparent ‘successful’ schemes, including the Five Towns Initiative, the Staffordshire Police Space Scheme (Chapter Six) and other exemplars, together with ‘analysis of apparent reasons for their success’, describing six key elements that were deemed necessary to any crime prevention project programme or policy, namely: (1) Structure (2) Leadership (3) Information (4) Identity (5) Durability and (6) Resources. Disproportionately, it was the latter of these elements, resourcing,
compounded by politics that was to underpin subsequent discourse on future crime prevention policy, discussed below.

**The Morgan Report - Part I**

Within the voluminous literature presented on crime prevention, the Morgan Report (1991) marks a watershed, being generally regarded to be the foundational research and policy rationale that underpinned the CDA, 1998; legislation which mandated that the police, together with other agencies, and specifically the police and local authority to share responsibility for crime and crime reduction. Therefore, the importance and influence of the Morgan Report in the development of both government thinking and subsequent policy development, should not be underestimated. Whilst Morgan’s report is central, little appears to have actually been written about the report itself, about how the resultant recommendations were reached, or indeed upon what theoretical premise the report was or wasn’t framed. In order to correct this fundamental gap in the literature, the following critique is informed, in part, by an interview the researcher conducted with Morgan, at his Warwickshire home, on Monday 18th August, 2014. The interview, digitally recorded, comprised a single event, with Morgan consenting to be quoted ‘on record’.

**Who was James Morgan?**

James Morgan was born in South Wales and upon leaving school completed his national service with the RAF and going onto university to study engineering and subsequently working for the industrial manufacturer, Massey Ferguson. He later undertook post graduate study in manufacturing and production engineering at Birmingham University and after initially returning to engineering he quickly moved into management consultancy, at the Coventry based Institute for Operational Research (IOR); an organization that existed to specifically extend the use of operational research into the public sector. As part of Morgan’s work for the IOR, he was seconded to government Treasury and Civil Servant Departments and as a result became known in civil service circles. He later joined Arthur Young management consultants, where he was to become a
partner of the firm. During his time at Arthur Young, Morgan was the lead consultant charged with responsibility for public sector and government sponsored commissions. He also served as a district counsellor within Stratford on Avon and became an audit partner for as number of local authorities, experiences that were to give him insight into local authority working.

Whilst at Arthur Young, Morgan recognised that little work was being done by consultants with the police service and to aid this initiative, the firm recruited Sir Kenneth Newman, now retired as Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, as an advisor. Morgan's view of the police service at this time was:

"...very much of a disciplined service ... my real impression was that it had got a get out of gaol free card from Margaret Thatcher, so where as almost every other public service, including the military had been forced to take a lot of measures to increase efficiency, none of these had really bitten in the police service...pretty unreformed and actually fairly much getting the resources the chief constables asked for; there wasn't a lot of pressure on funds. Chief Constables were very much their own person; they weren't really accountable to police committees. Their relationships with the chairman of the police authority were pretty one sided...Chief Constables rigorously resisted any attempt to interfere in what they saw as their discretion, which crimes to investigate and what to do... and once you've done that, very few of the local authorities were in a position to actually question the way the police service was spending money or what it was spending it’s money on. I am the Chief Constable and I will decide what to do - thank you very much! "

Morgan’s broad analysis of the position of policing is generally borne out in the literature (for example, Savage 2007; Reiner 2010). It is of note, that it wasn't until the publication of H.O. Circular 114/83 did an element of evidence-based decision making, form part of the requirement for Chief Constables’ to account for the effective use of current resources; a
requirement now made before the H.O. would accede to any requests to further increases in establishments (H.O. 1983).

In 1989, Arthur Young merged with Ernest and Young, the now well-known international management consultancy; but as a result, Morgan decided to leave in order to become an independent consultant. And, in his new capacity, during early 1990, Morgan was approached by John Chilcott, later to become Sir John Chilcott (more popularly known for chairing the inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the invasion of Iraq, announced in 2009) who at that time was the Deputy Under Secretary at the H.O. in charge of the Police Department. Morgan had met Chilcott in his previous dealings with the civil service, and Chilcott invited Morgan to act as an ‘independent advisor’ and support to Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) who were then being led by Sir John Woodcock. Morgan (1991) quotes: “almost the first day that I was there, an Assistant Secretary in the H.O. rang me to say that they were thinking of establishing a Working Group on crime prevention and that they hoped that I would become the chairman”. When asked as to why he was chosen, he said:

"I think probably, that it (crime prevention) was a bit of a knotty issue. I think people in the H.O. weren’t quite sure how to make progress on this, and I think looking back on it, there was a bit of a view that they needed someone who would be reasonably resolute in the face of ministers views on the matter and would be quite robustly independent on it. I think it was seen as important by the H.O. that it should be seen as independent - I suspect that the civil servants, who several I had met at that stage, were keen to have somebody who would understand all the parties involved; someone who would understand a little bit about police work and who understood how local authorities worked and came again from a background of asking questions about whether this was the best way of doing things".

During mid-1990, Morgan was formally appointed as chair by the Minister for Policing John Patten MP, who continued in a tradition of Working Groups (WG’s) set up by previous
regimes, the first lead by Alec Gordon Brown who reviewed the economic effect of crime and the second by Michael Grade who had examined the impact of the fear of crime. The Home Secretary at that time of the Commission of Morgan was David Waddington, who had taken over from the previous incumbent, Douglas Hurd in October 1989 (whose tenure as Home Secretary was only to last thirteen months). The quick succession of Home Secretaries marked a turbulent time within the Conservative Party and much soul searching as to whether they were on the right course under Thatcher’s leadership. However, as the themes of the WG’s indicate, it was clear that within the Conservative government that an ideological focus shift was occurring, based around the need for investment in crime prevention, rather than as hitherto been the case, retrospective reliance on the criminal justice system, which involved substantial costs and apparent ineffectual impact upon rising crime rates i.e. an economic imperative underpinned the conversation, together with a desire to give greater responsibility to the citizen.

Morgan’s Team

In furtherance of the desire by the H.O. for ‘independence’ of the WG, and indeed much to Morgan’s own surprise, he was given the latitude of picking his own team. Team members were personally selected by Morgan, save with the exception of the H.O. nominees (see Morgan, 1991 for further detail).

Morgan’s Terms of Reference

Morgan's terms of reference were set by the Minister, John Patten, as follows:

1. To consider and monitor the progress made in the local delivery of crime prevention through the multi-agency or partnership approach in light of guidance contained in the booklet "Partnership in Crime Prevention";
2. To consider how the exchange of information and exchange of good practice might be encouraged;
3. To promote discussion and conferences for the purpose;
4. To make recommendations for developments in the future.

(Morgan, 1991:10-11)

Whilst no specific time scales were proscribed, there was a general expectation that the work should be completed within one year.

**Morgan’s Approach**

Morgan (1991) in selecting his team sought to embrace a diversity of representation and in his words wanted the “brightest and best” to help advise and guide him in his deliberations. He also sought to visit Michael Grade and take personal counsel following Grade’s chairmanship of the previous WG. It is also important to reflect upon the political climate at that time (1990), a period where there was a growing unease as to Mrs Thatcher’s premiership within the Conservative Party and indeed Morgan recalls that on the day he visited Michael Grade (1st November, 1990) at his offices in London, Geoffrey Howe, Deputy Prime Minister, was giving his televised resignation speech. Three weeks later, Mrs Thatcher was replaced as Prime Minister by John Major. With a change of premiership came an inevitable cabinet reshuffle, consequently, Kenneth Baker replaced David Waddington as Home Secretary. Morgan (1991) recalls:

“One of the persons I got on extremely well within the Ministerial team was Steven Norris (Parliamentary Private Secretary to Kenneth Baker, the Home Secretary), who was given a particular road on this, but just as the police in my view had been given at get out of jail free card by Mrs T, so the entire Tory government at the time had a complete down on local authorities and again don’t forget this was even in the aftermath of all of the worst doings of the then Liverpool City Council, in the early 80’s - the time that Neil Kinnock described as riding round in taxis in Liverpool delivering redundancy notices. So that was pretty much the political climate. You know, very strong view that local authorities shouldn't be doing anything that they weren't specifically told to do, let alone empowered to do".
The context to Morgan’s commentary needs to be viewed against the backdrop that during the 1970’s and 80’s witnessed the rise of left-wing Labour councils, sometimes referred to as the “Loony-Left” who regarded local councils and town halls as a mechanism of opposition. Increasingly some Labour councils during the Thatcher government became more radicalized (by left wing ideology) ignoring central government curbs on local taxation and spending (Brivati and Heffernan, 2000). Post the 1987 general election, Neil Kinnock leader of the Labour Party, in seeking to re-establish Labours credibility, encouraged the expulsion of militant members in an effort not to further marginalize sections of the electorate (Blunkett, 2001; Davies, 1996; Shore, 1993).

In terms of the reality of the day to day workings of the WG, whom met on a three to four weekly basis, Morgan (1991) states:

"We had a variety of examples of schemes the H.O had sponsored, put on the table in front of us, so there a great deal of sort of background literature and things which all seemed quite varied in nature, from things which were really quite well specified and controlled rather like the Safer Cities and the Five Towns Initiative, through to odd bees in the bonnet of odd police officers from around the country; some of which for example...one or two diversionary activities...were when you looked at them, they weren’t actually getting to grips with difficult teenage children - they were actually providing play facilities for younger children, in a sort of agreeable way for the police service to be out in the community. I’m sure that looking back, it was something that had to be done, but it didn’t really have any great connection with reducing crime. So, we fairly quickly asked the question...was there any evidence that any of this stuff actually works?"

In order to aid the WG, Professor Anthony Bottoms (Cambridge University) was requested to review the literature and underpinning evidence available and presented his review back to the Group; However Morgan recollects that whilst the Group found the presentation interesting, it was "fairly quickly dismissed, in particular by the Chief
Executives (Councils) of the Working Group, as difficult research that doesn't really add anything very much."

In the published report, Morgan (1991) discloses that:

`One of our first tasks as a WG was to visit a number of the projects featured in the "Partnership" booklet in order to see at first-hand what was happening on the ground. The experiences of the Group were mixed. Some of the projects featured in the booklet impressed members of the Group, whilst others did not live up to expectations. In a number there appeared to be an absence of any structured framework of crime analysis, monitoring and evaluation. Many of the successful projects seemed to depend excessively upon committed enthusiasm from key individuals, usually a coordinator`. (Morgan 1991:11-12)

As a consequence, the WG determined that they would devise their own survey of the "here and now" initiatives and requested that Chief Constables and Chief Executives of Local Authorities report on ‘the nature of current and projected activities and the commitment of resources to crime prevention’, and specifically in their reports to address eight questions:

1. How the crime or fear of crime problem is identified and quantified in the first place?
2. The size and form of crime problem, both past and present?
3. The resources (money and manpower) being devoted to crime prevention?
4. What crime prevention activity has been taking place?
5. What is currently being done and what is planned for the future? giving if possible, a separate analysis using the six elements (structure, leadership, information, identity, durability and resources) as identified on page 4 of the booklet?
6. The monitoring and evaluation process which are used or planned: what are the results so far?
7. The mechanisms which ensure that your strategic plan coordinates with other such plans in your area?
8. The cross-boundary and cross-interest conflicts which have arisen, and their solutions? (Morgan, 1991:11)

As a matter of record, 102 responses to the WG’s request were received and are listed by name within the appendices of the published report, which noted that ‘Many reports were joint submissions involving a number of different agencies, and almost all addressed the questions we had put to them’ (Morgan 1991:12). However, the individual detail of the responses was not made public. In terms of process, Morgan stated that upon receiving the reports "they were divided up amongst members of the team; we formed little sub-groups, each to look at these responses. We went out to visit some of the places who had sent the responses in, to question them about it and to discover what they were really doing, as opposed to what they said they were doing...we discussed them all within the WG, so that a lot of the meetings were the going through the reports, saying what we found there and then drawing some conclusions from them and sweeping all of that up into overall views." What is clear however, is that the WG identified a general lack of rigorous evaluation and monitoring, or alternatively overly proclaimed outcomes of schemes, a recurring theme within the crime prevention arena (Berry et al, 2011). Finally, the WG canvassed the views of other stakeholders, including representatives from the public and voluntary sectors, including the Associations of County Councils (ACC) and District Councils (ADC), Metropolitan Authorities (AMA), Probation (ACOP) and the Police (ACPO).

The Morgan Report - Part II: A Critical Perspective

Whilst Morgan was rightly critical of the lack of rigorous evaluation of projects, equally it remains unclear as to what methodology or evaluative framework Morgan’s WG chose to analyze and assess the 102 responses received, other than the broad process outlined above. Apart from replicating the eight questions posed, which might allow some degree of comparative analysis between various projects, no other mention is made of methodology.
In turn, this raises the question as to how any assessments or judgments were being made, and importantly against what criteria.

Morgan’s report has received little critical assessment from the academic community, indeed Crawford (1998) and others treat Morgan with great reverence, appearing to accept without question the legitimacy of Morgan’s recommendations and yet Morgan himself acknowledged that ‘the case for the partnership approach stands virtually unchallenged but hardly tested’ (Para 3.14). Nonetheless, Morgan was influenced by the un-evidenced, yet compelling claims of the perceived benefits that the supporters of the partnership approach champion, suggesting ‘The contribution of agencies...will inevitably be enhanced by working in a multi-agency setting ’(Para 3.16). However, the report chooses to ignore or remains silent on the potential problems associated with them. It is also of interest to note that the framing of the Morgan Report, mirrors the apparent critical success factors to effective partnership working as identified within the H.O. (1990) ‘Partnership in Crime Prevention’ booklet i.e. Structure, Leadership, Information, Identity, Durability and Resources, again criteria unchallenged by Morgan.

The parameters of where crime prevention begins and ends, and what it does or does not include, has long exercised academic minds (for example, Crawford, 1998; Hughes, 1998, 2007; Sutton et al 2008; Tilley 2005, 2009). Therefore, and not surprisingly, recorded responses to the Morgan questionnaire, revealed a lack of definition, but also evidenced a burgeoning vocabulary of ill-defined concepts and ideas, including reference to ‘crime reduction strategies and policies’, ‘situational crime prevention’, ‘social crime prevention policy’ and ‘community safety’. However, The Association of District Councils response to the WG did comment upon its view of the scope of crime prevention and stating:

‘More and more the phrase crime prevention is understood to be about promoting community safety and examining wider social issue’ (Paragraph 3.2-2.3)

The WG were clearly influenced by the broader reading of what crime prevention embraced and within the final report emphasised:
It is the view of the WG that the social aspects of crime prevention, which seek to reduce those influences that lead to offending behaviour, and the fear of crime, need to receive attention at least equal to that given to the situational aspects of crime prevention, in which efforts are made to reduce opportunities to ‘harden’ potential targets for crime. (Paragraph 3.4)

The acceptance of the social context in which crime pervades, in turn provided legitimacy and encouragement for a wider collective responsibility for crime and the prevention of crime. In this regard, Morgan appears to have laid emphasis upon the importance of language in order to create a paradigm shift in policy making:

The term “Crime prevention” is often narrowly interpreted and this reinforces the view that it is solely the responsibility of the police. On the other hand, the term “community safety” is open to wider interpretation and could encourage greater participation from all sections of the community in the fight against crime. (Para 3.6 and 3.7)

Whilst ‘community safety’ was a term that competing philosophical approaches to crime prevention could rally around, Morgan’s report was less clear upon the language of ‘collective responsibility’ as envisaged within the term ‘community safety’, referencing ‘multi-agency’ and ‘partnership’ interchangeably throughout the report. One might argue that multi-agency is a more restrictive term, primarily limited to public authorities and that partnership, in this context, representing a more inclusive term that would encapsulate voluntary groups, the business sector and the broader public. Such subtleties appear to have been ignored.

Morgan was, however, adamant about the requirement for strategy and structure:

A successful multi-agency approach to community safety requires the formulation of an overall crime reduction strategy and structure within which agencies can cooperate as well as deliver their own particular contribution. (Para 3.10)
The report went on to declare:

‘At present crime prevention is a peripheral concern for all the agencies involved and a truly core activity for none of them’. (Para 3.15)

The WG’s research also revealed that multi-agency structures had not ‘taken firm root’ in most areas, in consequence to Circular 8/84, but Circular 44/90 had provided a ‘further stimulus’, generating increased coordination and multi-agency engagement. Morgan, however, concluded that:

‘Many current activities are essentially ad-hoc initiatives either by the police or by enterprising and highly committed individuals in other organizations’. (Para 4.29)

The lack of a ‘joined-up’ approach is exemplified by Morgan who drew attention to (a) the various models of delivery that existed; (b) the lack of "common purpose" between central and local government; (c) confusion between tiers of local government and most significantly (d) the lack of statutory responsibility for local government to fully play its part (Para 4.30-4.34). More broadly, Morgan emphasised the need for effective leadership and continuity in staffing and resourcing, in order to allow partnerships to mature. A total of 19 recommendations were tabled, including:

1. The local authority, working in conjunction with the police should have a clear statutory responsibility for community safety. In the shorter term, a ‘code of practice’ should be developed and circulated to encourage engagement.

2. The highest tier of local government should be responsible for developing a community safety strategy.

3. A local consultative action group be formed.

4. A coordinator with seniority and with administrative support be appointed in each local authority.

5. The availability of central government funding for key activities, which at the very least should cover the cost of the coordinator and support staff.
6. Government should examine ‘strengthening the existing organizations or whether new arrangements are required’.

7. Central government should provide a community safety impact assessment for all new legislation and major policy initiatives. (Morgan, 1991)

Morgan’s view of the need for structure to a large extent endorsed the concerns previously raised in the H.O. advisory booklet issued alongside Circular 44/90, a booklet which stated:

‘Effective crime prevention is essentially local. It is frequently small scale and depends much upon the enthusiasm of individuals. This is bound to lead to problems with continuity and co-operation. But these problems are made worse in many areas by the lack of a focus for crime schemes and an organization to support them. This suggests that there may be a need for local structures which can take an overview of crime prevention in the area, coordinate existing activities and initiate and maintain new schemes’. (H.O. 1990:5)

What the H.O. document didn’t comment upon was who should fund such structures, a central issue that later came to haunt Morgan.

**Political Influence**

In terms of reporting back to government, the WG comprised H.O. civil servants who would informally update central office and Morgan declares that he had no real direct contact with the Policing Minister, John Patten, who had commissioned the work, but did have occasional contact with Steven Norris, the Home Secretary’s (Kenneth Baker) Parliamentary Private Secretary "I did talk to Steve Norris once or twice but I didn't really talk to John Patten at all ... and I became very angry  that,  Steve Norris said to me ‘what's going on in your working group, because John Patten’s been told that it's been taken over by the Trotskyites, so ridiculous". Morgan surmises:
"What had happened is that, first of all Jonathan Rosenhead and Helen Edwards were both sort of fairly active members of the London Labour Party, at the time, Jonathan had been a parliamentary candidate for the Labour Party, somewhere in there and we had had sight on, not through them, but actually through the H.O, civil servants, a Labour Party Paper which looked at crime prevention...the other thing in all of that was what should be the role of the police. Should the police be the leading part in this or not? And actually, both the Chief Executives from local authorities said, if you keep us out of it and you say that this is entirely a matter for the police, nothing will actually happen in the local authorities; it would be really a recipe for making sure that nothing moves, to give prime responsibility for doing this to the police service".

Morgan’s comments, and the response of Minsters is maybe not so surprising given the previously well documented disputes between central government and some of metropolitan local authorities (Brivati and Heffernan, 2000). For example, the 1987 Conservative Party general election manifesto openly referred to:

‘...the abuses of the left-wing Labour councils have shocked the nation. The Labour Party leadership pretends that this is a problem in only a few London boroughs. The truth is that the far Left control town halls in many of our cities...The extremists have gained power in these areas...’ Elsewhere in the same document reference is made to reaffirming continued increases in police numbers and a pledge to ‘maintain the operational independence of the police and resist pressure from Opposition parties to politicize the police by letting local authorities decide policing priorities’. (Conservative Party, 1987)

Morgan’s recollection was that the Minister absolutely resisted wanting to give local authorities anymore ‘power’ and felt that the police should be solely responsible as the lead agency in this regard. Morgan, however, was adamant that local authorities were key and central to making things happen. He also recognised that the language of ‘community
safety' and 'multi-agency' had started to appear in Labour Party documentation, so advised government that by endorsing his recommendations: "You have now got the perfect opportunity to shoot the Labour Party's fox. Why don't you get on and just do it? However, this advice was ignored". In addition to an aversion to further empowering local authorities, politically there was an underlying imperative from the central government that there would no new money made available; Morgan recounts "local government had been under really, really, strict instructions not to spend money that they were not instructed to do so by government."

When nearing completion of the WG's task, a draft report was compiled that went through an iterative process with civil servants. Morgan recollects some degree of debate, in particular as to the recommendation to provide part funding for secretariat and coordination support to the partnerships. From Morgan's perspective, costs were minimal when considered within wider public sector funding "there was a lot of huffing and puffing, saying you can't do this; so I said well we’re doing it...the instruction came down from John Patten - you can't spend any more money, so I ignored that!"

Morgan is absolutely clear however, that whilst an 'iterative' process took place in the drafting of the report as published, it remained in accord with his and the WG's findings, and all recommendations remained intact, despite the obvious political pressure previously alluded to. The report was published in August 1991 and presented to the H.O. Standing Conference on Crime Prevention, after which Morgan returned to his private consultancy business. Morgan also reflects that "the Standing Conference on Crime Prevention was fairly swiftly then given the coup de grace by the Conservative Party and told it wouldn't be needed any more, thank you very much". Subsequently a formal government response to the Morgan Report was to follow, framed within an official H.O. response report (1992) which proffered the view that progress in the crime prevention field could be achieved without the necessity for creating a new statutory requirement (Liddle and Gelthorpe 1994 paper 52 - p27).
Little or no direct further contact took place between Morgan and the H.O. although he maintained some contact with Steven Norris, but Morgan was invited by various police forces and conferences to discuss the report and its recommendations post publication.

Morgan comments:

"What I said to Steven Norris was, you just could overtake the Labour Party on this. At that stage the H.O. Minsters had said, `we won’t authorise this` - they gave then, a sort of free kick to the Labour Party, which allowed Jack Straw (Shadow Home Secretary) to keep standing up and saying `when are you going to do something about the findings of the Morgan Report`.”

The general tenet to all this was that, whilst there was a warmth and recognition within the Civil Service that Morgan’s recommendations and findings were in accord with a general acceptance that crime could not be left to policing alone and that the complexities and causation of crime required more holistic ‘joined-up’ solutions. However, the political and economic climate was such, that further empowerment of local authorities was deemed a step too far. As Brain (2010) insightfully observes, if Morgan’s recommendations had been accepted in full then not only would the police have had to share power with the local authorities, but so too would the H.O. a position then seen as untenable. Equally, and against the backdrop of the contentious Poll Tax (Collings, 2000), Morgan’s recommendation for local authorities to ‘match fund’ might signal permission to raise local taxes; again deemed politically unacceptable at that time.

**A growing body of evidence and support for Morgan**

The H.O. (Civil Service) in their quest for ‘evidenced-based’ practice formed the H.O. Police Research Group (PRG), (1992) which worked collaboratively with the HOCPU, H.O. policy divisions and the police service.

Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994) of the PRG produced three papers in the Crime Prevention Unit Series of papers - No’s 52 and 53, plus a supplementary paper. Paper 52 entitled
‘Inter-Agency Crime Prevention, Organising Local Delivery’ focused on matters concerning structure, leadership and coordination of multi-agency crime prevention together with examining statutory responsibility. The second Paper, No.53 reviewed ‘Inter-Agency Co-operation’ and the relationships that exist between agencies. These same authors regarded the release of Circular 44/90 and the publication of the Morgan Report as being of ‘special relevance’ to their research and acknowledged that Morgan’s work and recommendations’ continue to act as a point of departure for much of the current debate in the field (Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994a:2). Their work ran in parallel to Morgan’s review (but also continued beyond it), the project commencing in September 1990 with H.O. funding for two years. The aim of the research was:

‘To generate a sample of areas where multi-agency crime prevention work was underway, and to investigate and assess approaches to crime prevention in these areas in a more detailed and focused manner than most previous research had allowed for’. (Liddle and Gelsthorpe 1994a:2)

It is also important to acknowledge, that early stage investigations of this project (conducted by Nellis and Enterkin, 1991), relative to organizational and strategic issues, fed into the Morgan review.

Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994a:4), in their reports, were sensitive to language and observe the terms ‘inter-agency’ and ‘multi-agency’ are used interchangeably i.e. to signify agencies working in some form of collaborative or co-operative activity. However, they declared preference for the latter term i.e. ‘inter-agency’ when discussing ‘relations’ between different organizations. The term partnership is reserved for reference to ‘specific planning or working agreements’ between two agencies and the term ‘the partnership approach’ to represent a ‘more general corporate style of multi-agency work.’ In this context, their use of the term ‘partnership’, infers a more formal arrangement between participants. Liddle and Gelsthorpe’s (1994a) subsequent analysis, was supportive of the Morgan’s findings, endorsing a need for structure, coordination and clarity of leadership, in
order for inter-agency working to be effective. They also highlighted that a lack of clarity of central government policy in crime prevention, and in particular, which agency or agencies should be responsible, was leading to a variable picture of interest and cooperation being given to the topic. That said, their analysis also drew attention to many of the difficulties that participating organizations faced, for example, organizational hierarchy (perceived power); communication; sharing of data; resource commitment and ownership - issues that the Morgan Report remained silent upon.

Although the Morgan Report was largely ignored by government until 1997, the Safer Cities Programme, referred to above, continued for a period of eight years and ultimately operated in twenty cities or boroughs (all of which were in receipt of an urban programme grant or other government support). Sutton (1996) in conducting an early H.O. evaluation of the scheme sought to determine the decision-making processes that prioritised where money was spent and on what type of crime prevention. Sutton’s findings identified considerable variations between projects and highlighted variance of emphasis given to: ‘rational’ crime prevention methods or the partnership approach; assessments of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving schemes’; the difficulty of problems addressed, and the levels of funding applied. In particular, Sutton (1996) drew focus upon the lack of development of local crime prevention policy, observing:

‘...as a consequence of the innovative nature of the programme, in setting up new local roles, coordinators and their steering committees appear to have been plunged into a kind of policy vacuum which they had to fill in their own way, by extemporisation’. (Sutton, 1996: ix)

Sutton arguing for a more systematic approach to decision making and consistent practice - a position in accord with Morgan.

*Whose idea was it again?*
Upon publication of the Morgan Report (1991), Morgan returned to private consultancy, developing his own private consultancy business and formed a new consultancy partnership, Morgan, Harris, Burrows. John Burrows of the partnership had previously worked with Morgan when engaged CBI project. At that time, Burrows had been a senior member of the H.O. Research Group and therefore was well known in the Civil Service. More significantly, Burrows had been the project coordinator for the Five Towns Initiative, which together with the Safer Cities Programme had significantly influenced Morgan’s thinking and recommendations contained within the published report. Through John Burrows, Morgan and the consultancy conducted several discrete projects on behalf of the H.O. and the Audit Office. They examined the way in which community safety programmes had been implemented in the local authority context.

Morgan was also engaged from time to time within the conference arena which gave him a platform to try and push forward his ideas as contained with his report. He recalls:

"I can remember going to one, somewhere in London, to talk about all of this and a variety of people from the Labour Party saying, you know, the Morgan Report ideas are all the Labour Party’s ideas (laughter). Nancy Steer, who was an old friend, a Liberal Peer, said well I can’t see how that is, because James Morgan was to my certain knowledge, been a member of the Liberal Party for the past twenty years!"

Morgan confirmed that he was not personally approached by the Labour Party post publication of his report and that its subsequent influence upon the CDA, 1998 was not an issue with which he was directly involved. Morgan felt that the broad adoption of his recommendations by the New Labour political regime: “reflected ideas that they had earlier anyway and also it was a free hit - something that the Tories were against”.

Finally, from the chronology of events presented, the Five Towns Initiative appeared to provide the initial impetus for further and broader developments inclusive of social crime prevention that culminated in the Morgan Report. However, Stenson and Cowell (1991) argue that the Five Towns Initiative was not as innovative as is generally presented. Rather,
NACRO’s estate improvement programmes (operating late 1970’s - early 80’s) significantly informed the Five Towns model and incorporated both situational and social crime prevention perspectives. In part, this assertion is supported by Gilling (1997:136), who cites Whiskin (1989), Chief Executive of Crime Concern, and a subsequent member of Morgan’s WG, who describes the four stage problem oriented and consultative methodology adopted by the NACRO model: stage (1) a multi-agency steering group is convened; (2) residents are encouraged to participate; (3) public meetings are held; (4) an action plan is drawn up, implemented and monitored. In this context, Gilling (1997:136) observes, NACRO set up its own Crime Prevention Unit in 1979 and Safer Neighbourhoods Unit in 1980 embracing this methodology and ‘it is within NACRO’s work that one finds the earliest references to community safety.’

Chapter conclusion

In sum, the Morgan Report represented an endorsement for multi-agency collaboration, which was problem oriented, operating within a coordinated strategic framework. Attention was drawn to a new paradigm, ‘community safety’, challenging the hitherto narrower concept of ‘crime prevention’; predominantly regarded the responsibility of the police alone. The new holistic outlook was to embrace social crime prevention underpinned by theoretical perspectives of crime causation. Significantly, Morgan reduced hitherto disparate policies into a single coherent framework, upon which future crime prevention/community safety development could be built. However, Morgan produced zero evidence that multi-agency or partnership working might lead to more effective outcomes.

The thesis now explores partnership beyond Morgan.
Chapter Four: Beyond Morgan – the coming of partnership

Introduction

This chapter exemplifies that policing police’s the consequences of government policy making, which is, of course, government policies informed by political belief systems. Despite the police organization seeking to represent itself as politically neutral, inevitably the police are brought into direct contact with the harsh realities and contradictions that social policy creates on the ground; not only through their law enforcement and peace maintenance functions, but also through their broader crime prevention mandate.

Additionally, the police are a state service, ‘required’ to respond directly to government direction setting, overseen by the Home Secretary, de facto, the H.O.

Against the political backdrop, the chapter explores the concept of partnership, a flagship policy of the ‘New Labour’ government (1997-2010) and framed within a communitarian governance model. The Morgan Report, ‘initially neglected, became increasingly influential’ (Maguire, 2006:215), was central to the framing of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998; legislation representing a watershed in police-partnership working. Hitherto, police-partnerships were a ‘voluntary’ activity, but as a result of the 1998 Act, the police were ‘mandated’ to work in partnership with local authorities and other bodies. New Labour sought to reposition itself around a flag of ‘collectivism’ and ‘community’, as opposed to the individualism associated with the previous Conservative regime. So doing, they were to set policy development within a communitarian context but framed within a heavily bureaucratic framework.

Conversely, within a change of government in 2010, a Conservative led Coalition and since 2015 a majority Conservative government have been underpinned by neoliberalist ideology. Central to this political outlook, lay a desire to create a new democratic, empowering the ‘local’ and reducing the hitherto reliance upon central government. Against this backdrop, a radical change to police governance, Police and Crime
Commissioners (PCC’s) was introduced in 2012. Equally, the period from 2010 and the time of writing, represented a fundamental change to government economic policy and the introduction of fiscal austerity measures. Indeed, fiscal austerity continues to provide the central ground of current political discourse and the framing of the public service reform, including that of the police.

It is against these two competing political paradigms that police-partnerships are examined in detail below:

**New Labour - A ‘new’ beginning**

Following defeat for Labour at the 1992 general election, Neil Kinnock stood down, replaced by John Smith, but Smith died suddenly in May, 1994 and Tony Blair went on to win the Party leadership contest. Blair continued in the spirit of Kinnock and Smith, seeking to further modernise the party, challenging tradition, and in particular “Old Labour”, a phrase which was used to encapsulate the more left-wing elements, or those with strong trade union affiliations amongst the membership. In rebranding the party, the term “New Labour” first appeared in a draft manifesto “New Labour, New Life for Britain” in 1996, a document that informed the 1997 Labour manifesto. Whilst education and tackling social inequality, in its various guises, formed a central tenant, Labour’s position on crime read:

‘We believe in personal responsibility and in punishing crime, but also tackling its underlying causes - so, tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime, different from the Labour approach of the past and the Tory policy of today’. (Labour Party, 1997:4)

New Labour’s crime agenda gave emphasis to youth crime, conviction and sentencing, disorder, drugs and victims. However, reference was made also to prevention and a declaration that if elected, Labour would place a new responsibility on local authorities to develop statutory partnerships to help prevent crime, a position very much in accord with the recommendations contained within the Morgan Report 1991.
As history records, the 1997 electorate rejected the Tory government of the day and both Tony Blair as Labour Party leader and the Party’s manifesto contents, were endorsed in what has come to be regarded as a landslide election victory. Blunkett (2001:15) observed, underpinning New Labour was a new ‘social democratic imperative’ ... based upon individual empowerment and active citizenship within strengthened communities'; and where the language of "mutualism", "co-operation", "partnership", "democratic dialogue", "social capital", labels used to champion, from their perspective at least, a more consensual, tolerant and less fragmented society.

Jack Straw, Home Secretary, charged with overseeing the Party’s mandate on crime, sponsored a consultation document, ‘Getting to Grips with Crime: A New Framework for Local Action’ (H.O. 1997a). The document openly and directly acknowledged the Morgan Report (1991), extolling Morgan’s contribution and further endorsed the un-evidenced claim of partnership: ‘more can be achieved working together than in isolation’ (para, 10). However, whilst New Labour accepted the broad recommendations of Morgan, they were not so persuaded by Morgan’s view that the local authority should be the ‘lead’ agency in this regard. Instead, the government sought to develop the concept of ‘shared’ responsibility or that of ‘equal stakeholders’; arguing that to do otherwise would in itself to be against the very ‘principles of partnership’ and in particular, ‘collective responsibility’ (para,14). Therefore, the government recommended that ‘joint’ responsibility, or the ‘duty’ rested equally with both ‘the district/unitary authority (or London Borough), the chief officer of police and, where the two-tier structure still exists, the county council’ (para,14). Furthermore, the consultation document highlighted, that despite many impressive examples of wider of partnership engagement, the relevance of the crime and disorder agenda for some agencies, was not clear. Consequently, the government mandated that, the probation service, health service, police authorities, local schools and education/training institutions, and Crown Prosecution Service and youth services ‘must’ be involved in developing the local Crime and Disorder Strategy.
Interestingly, the commitment to a partnership approach had also been endorsed by both the Local Government Association (1997) and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO sub-committee on Crime Prevention 1996 in Gilling 2007:67). It is of note, however, that ACPO’s ‘conditional’ endorsement was based upon the proviso of the police retaining ‘the most prominent place’ within the partnership, a position that both Morgan (1991) and Labour, albeit from different standpoints, would contest.

‘Joined-up’ government, governance and crime

Many authors have argued (for example, Hughes 1996, Hughes and Edwards 2002; Crawford, 20001 and Evans, 2011), New Labours ‘joined-up’, community governance approach drew inspiration from the communitarian philosophy of sociologist Amita Etzioni (1995). Etzioni proposed a rebalancing of the rights and responsibilities of individual private citizens with that of their broader collective and public interest duties as contributors to wider society.

More broadly, Hughes and Edwards (2002:3) suggest, ‘communitarianism’ and New Labours community governance model, were evidence of ‘the struggle for political authorities to religitimate their powers’ against a backdrop of perceived crisis and disconnect between citizens and the state. Stoker (2000) suggests that ‘Third Way’ politics, in seeking to encourage personal responsibility, combined with requisite devolvement of authority and power, sought to impact upon all strands of government, including for example healthcare, education and so forth. Conversely, Coleman and Sim, 1998 argue that this rather benevolent interpretation of the politics of the ‘Third Way’ and community governance, is challenged when viewed through the prism of Neo-Marxist philosophy. Rather, they suggest, Neo-Marxism interprets community governance as a ‘means of reasserting sovereign authority but with a particular focus on the political-economic of this authority in advancing the interests of capital’ (Coleman and Sim, 1998 in Hughes and Edwards 2002:3-4).
However, beyond the conceptualisation and theoretical interpretation of New Labour philosophy, we should be reminded that the hitherto welfare, paternalist model of an interventionist state accepted sole responsibility for crime and the protection of its citizens. Indeed, the state had done so since the inception of the New Police in 1829. However, from 1984, this position started to fragment and witnessed what Garland (2001) terms the ‘demonopolisation’ from police control of crime prevention, following the issuing of H.O. Circular 8/84. The circular underlined the then government’s belief, that crime and the responsibility for crime was a whole community issue and indeed a collective responsibility; a position also endorsed by New Labour.

Equally, with the paradigm shift from situational crime prevention to that of social crime prevention (Clarke, 1981; Cornish and Clarke, 1986; Tilley, 2005) with its inevitable links to the ‘root causes’ of crime, including both social and economic causes, in turn led to greater calls for ‘joined-up’ and ‘inter-linked’ government; a position ultimately espoused as policy by New Labour. Additionally, the broader backdrop of New Labours policy was framed a business management context; particular recognition being given to cost to the public purse and needs for efficiency, effectiveness and ‘best value’, together with a desire to reduce duplication of effort and apparent bureaucratic waste.

However, Stenson and Edwards, 2001 (in Hughes and Edwards, 2002:8) argued that rather than the situation (referring to crime prevention) being viewed as the state ‘letting go’, it should be interpreted as:

‘The means by which the national state seeks to reassert its sovereign authority over hard to reach groups, socially excluded populations that were benignly neglected under successive Conservative administration post -1979’.

In these terms, community governance can be considered a means of ‘joining-up’ local strategies for the reduction of crime and disorder together with other programmes aimed at the social and economic regeneration of excluded populations, such as the New Deal for Communities, Neighbourhood Renewal Programme, Sure Start and Connexions etc (Social
Exclusion Unit 1998; Neighbourhood Renewal Unit 2001’ (Hughes and Edwards 2002:8). Social exclusion was viewed as an ‘intractable and multifaceted entity that would require a sustained multi-agency response’ (Coaffee and Deas 2008:171 cited in Evans 2011:29). Consequently, the setting up of the Social Exclusion Unit in 1997 Unit was seen to mark a departure from previous administrations and was evidence of a new approach, which encouraged joined-up government. However, as previously mentioned, the realities of the economic challenges facing New Labour meant that they too were committed to financial restraint for their first two years of office.

One of the difficulties particularly from a crime perspective, was definitional. The boundaries as to where crime prevention began and ended were not clear and room lay for interpretation and debate. Nonetheless, the overarching concept of collaboration and interconnection was apparent and in turn influenced all aspects of social policy development at this time. In these terms, the CDA (discussed below) represented as much a structural and administrative response to the ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ mantra as well as ideological belief. As the foreword by Jack Straw, Home Secretary, in the Draft Crime and Disorder Bill, 1997 read:

‘In many ways it (the Bill) represents the culmination of a long-held ambition to empower local people to take control of the fight against crime and disorder in their area. The Crime and Disorder Act will provide the framework for this empowerment’. (H.O. 1998a:1)

Following significant parliamentary debate, the Crime and Disorder Bill received Royal Assent on the 31st July 1998. It is to the critique of the CDA that the thesis now turns.

**Crime and Disorder Act, 1998**

Section 5 of the Act, places a duty on local authorities and the police, as being ‘jointly’ responsible for the formulation of crime and disorder strategies in each district, borough or unitary authority; where county councils exist, the duty also falls upon them. Additionally,
the legislation creates a legal ‘obligation’ upon police, probation and health authorities to fully co-operate. The Home Secretary was also given power to extend the ‘obligation’, to any person or body; consideration was being given to opportunities to involve local businesses, voluntary sector and others deemed appropriate.

In order to oversee the crime and disorder ‘responsibility’, a leadership group, comprising the most senior representatives of the above mentioned parties, was to be formed, known as the ‘Responsible Authority Group’ (RAG). In practical terms, RAG’s were required to produce three-year local crime and disorder reduction strategies, adopting the following process:

- Conduct a review of the levels and patterns of crime, ‘the crime audit’, consulting widely;
- Produce an analysis of the review;
- Draft a strategy in response, consulting widely;
- Publish details of the entire process, including ownership of targets and performance;
- Strategies were to run for three years but kept under review.

In essence, a rigidity of both the structure of the partnership and how the partnership was to go about its business was centrally determined, leaving little, if any, room for local interpretation and context. The ‘controlling’ nature and trajectory of central imposition by the New Labour administration, is discussed below.

As an aside, the Act also introduced a range of new orders pertaining to: anti-social behaviour, sex offending; parenting and child safety and created the concept of ‘racially aggravated’ offences (section 28-32). Lea (1997) argues that this ‘tough on crime’ stance evidenced a more authoritarian form of crime prevention, particularly focusing upon the criminalisation of anti-social behaviour and the use by local authorities of civil injunctions.
in order to control movement of people. Many of the new orders were deliberately focused around children and young people.

In subsequent chapters, the theme of young people, and specifically, police-partnership engagement with young people, forms a central strand of the thesis's primary research (see Chapter Six).

**Empowered local governance and community involvement**

Returning to the requirements of the Act, as part of the crime audit, a stipulation of consultation and public engagement with the planning process was demanded. Evidence had to be provided centrally that surveys were conducted with the resident community, the business community, young people and ‘hard to reach groups. Appeals to community and an enforced requirement to ‘consult’, was seen as significant in order to encourage a shared ‘ownership’ of crime i.e. a model of community governance. Whilst not the primary focus of this thesis, it is important to note that the conceptual legitimacy of ‘community’ has drawn considerable academic discourse and debate, for example Hughes (2007), Little (2002) and Bauman (2001), amongst others.

Whilst the rhetoric and branding of party policy was about devolvement and empowerment to local communities, at the same time, there was also a strong emphasis on national lead and coordination, albeit with local implementation. The resultant tension and interplay between the national and the local was a dichotomy that contained considerable contradiction and discourse. Indeed, Hughes (2007:64) fundamentally seeks to contest the realities of networked community governance, suggesting a more accurate assessment of the realities on the grounds of: ‘this type of communitarian participation, never mind community leadership, remains a lofty and often righteous aspiration that is very rarely realised in practice in the work of partnerships’.

Additionally, this new form of ‘empowered’ local governance was informed by managerialism, with stipulation for ‘strategy’, ‘audit’, ‘targets’ and ‘accountable’ decision
making, all of which were required to be supported by monitoring and evaluation frameworks. Conversely, Gilling (2007:70) argues, that rather than being solely viewed through the prism of managerialism, such an approach was as much about a requirement for ‘evidence-based’ decision making and in line with policies championed by Hough and Tilley (1998), Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994a, 1994b, 1994c) all of whom had been involved in H.O. policy development. However, if that were so, there appears to be scarce evidence-based research subsequently published.

From a police perspective, it was envisaged that there would be asymmetry between the local ‘Community Safety Strategy’ and the ‘Policing Plan’. The Police and Magistrates Courts Act 1994 authorised the Home Secretary to set national policing priorities and cognizance of which had to be taken of when drafting the Policing Plan; further evidence of a continued centralist influence. It is also of note that whereas Morgan (1991) presented what appeared to be a paradigm shift from ‘crime prevention’ to that of community safety, reference in the Act was only made to ‘crime’ and ‘disorder’, neither of which were defined.

Albeit centrally imposed, the structure and process constituting the new partnership had at least some initial clarity and framework. However, Section 17 (1) of the Act required all sections of the local authority and the police:

‘...to exercise its various functions with due regard to the likely effect of the exercise of those functions on, and the need to do all that it reasonably can to prevent, crime and disorder in its area’.

Moss and Pease (1999) and Moss and Stephens (2006) note, that the full extent of Section 17 with its broad reach across all aspects of local authority provision, including planning for example, was initially underestimated or ignored by many authorities. As for the police, Section 17 sought to mainstream crime prevention as a core activity of policing in an attempt to address the hitherto marginalization of prevention work within the service.
Partnership, in this context, was given clear prominence. However, the implementation of the Act’s requirements proved somewhat troublesome. That is discussed next.

**A ‘rushed’ implementation and a denial of the complexity**

In an effort to aid implementation, and in advance of the 1998 Act receiving Royal Assent, the H.O. (1998b) issued its ‘Guidance on Statutory Crime and Disorder Partnerships’. A substantial document running to some 122 pages that declared itself to be guidance based upon the: ‘accumulated understanding of what makes crime reduction partnerships work... built up over the last decade’. The advice was both broad and varied, covering for example, recommendations as to the scope and role of agencies to be involved; the level of organizational representation required; issues of co-terminosity, organizational and geographic boundaries; through to processes issues, including the formulation of strategy, conducting consultation and highlighting exemplars/case studies of perceived good practice.

As identified previously, a number of localities had already developed models of partnership working premised upon community safety and indeed had been encouraged to do so by various government circulars in advance of the CDA. Therefore, and not surprisingly, implementation of the duties under the Act inevitably represented different challenges to the different authorities i.e. based upon their starting point and previous experience in partnership working. As Hughes and Gilling (2004:138) identified, a large proportion of community safety practitioners post 1998, were previously employed by local authorities and had prior community safety experience. Nonetheless, these same people were now being required to work within the constraints and missives of the new legislation, and it is not known how adaptive or receptive they were to the new mandate. Little or no research appears to have been conducted in this regard (Hughes, 2007:87). Put simply, the issue of professional competence at the local level appears to have been assumed. Homel (2006:112) quotes a senior policy and research manager involved in the development and implementation of a number of crime reduction initiatives:
'In recent years we have proceeded to raise the program delivery standard and then put amateurs in charge of delivery.'

Adding a further layer of complexity, Crawford 1998 draws distinction between ‘multi-agency’ and ‘inter-agency’ relationships, suggesting that multi-agency exemplified agencies coming together to address an issue without necessarily changing the way they work; whereas ‘inter-agency’ represents a more integrated response between the agencies, resulting in internal organizational practices being modified. And as Hughes, McLaughlin and Muncie (2002: 109) observe: ‘Given the result-oriented nature of the CDA the pressure will be on the police service to become involved not only in collaborative but in interdependent activity.’ In addition, to what extent crime was to become a ‘shared responsibility’, as envisaged by the Act, and to what extent the police were willing and indeed able to let go of their monopoly on crime, remained unknown. Little if any ‘official regard appears to have been given to organizational cultures. And yet, one would and could have anticipated that the bringing/mandating together of a variety of professional ideological, organizational and occupational cultures would present its own unique challenge and dynamic. To emphasise this point Rogers (2012:28) comments:

‘Perhaps the biggest barrier to delivering community safety is not national government or local politicians, the law or local people; it is the difficulty of changing organizational values and culture in local authorities, the police and, other local partnership agencies’.

From a policing perspective much has been written about police culture, being as much about attitudes and mindsets (see Skolnick, 1966; Reiner, 2011; Chan, 1997; Muir, 1977, Manning, 1977, Holdaway, 1983 amongst others). Reiner (2011) in particular articulates a typology of police culture that has at its core the characteristics of a sense of mission; suspicion; isolation/solidarity; conservatism and pragmatism, characteristics that are variable, premised upon the role and power relationships that the police have with the different elements of society.
Chapter Four: Beyond Morgan – the coming of partnership

The eyes through which the cultural perspective of policing may view the world has the potential to operate at both a relational level when dealing with other partners, but also to value laden the priorities of the police function itself. In this context, crime prevention traditionally occupied a marginalised position within policing and yet the CDA, was seeking to make crime prevention and crime reduction the central tenant of its approach. More fundamentally, such an approach now asked questions of the police in terms of their broader strategic response and potential reorientation towards concepts of ‘service’, ‘community’ and ‘problem oriented’, all of which had previously met cultural resistance (Barton, 2003).

Many authors, for example Hughes, McLaughlin and Muncie (2002); Douglas (1986); Hope and Murphy (1983); and Laycock (2006) to name but a few, comment upon the potential ‘problems of partnership’, identifying that one might anticipate differential power relations existing between partners relative to access to resources, information, expertise, legal powers and so forth. Overlaying this differential, is a potential for the blurring of organizational roles, responsibilities and boundaries, together with a possible loss of organizational autonomy, compounded by a potential danger of confusion as to responsibility and accountability (Crawford 1999).

In sum, the CDA represented a structural and procedural response to crime and disorder reduction, but to what extent the complexities of partnership working were fully recognised or alternatively simply ignored, together with the fundamental challenges presented of cultural and organizational reformation, required of ‘partnership working’, remained at best uncertain. However, what we do know for certain is that authorities were given just eight months to both formulate the partnership, conduct the various audits and produce the three-year crime and disorder strategy. Initially at least, no new monies were to be made available by government in support, a topic that will be discussed next.

As a matter of record, post the implementation of the Act, 376 statutory CDRP’s were established across England and Wales (Phillips et al 2002).
The thorny Issue of funding

Whilst the Act placed a legal duty upon ‘Responsible Authorities’ to implement local crime and disorder strategies, the government remained silent on the issue of funding. Indeed, it must be remembered, Labour had fiscally committed itself to continued restraint of public spending for the first two years of office (Gilling, 2007:69). Rather, governments’ view was that partnership was to be regarded a main stream activity, to be financed within the participatory agencies core funding, albeit limited ‘pump priming’ monies were to be made available via grant. The difficulty with this model was the lack of formula and understandable reluctance of agencies to release monies to an uncertain investment, particularly for agencies other than the police, for whom crime and disorder is not their core function. Equally, CDRP’s represented new ground for the business sector, but many saw their financial contribution as having been already paid through high business taxation (Tilley, 2005) and the voluntary sector by definition, was, and remains, financially ‘light’ in terms of funds (Jones et al, 2015).

However, post the government’s initial fiscal spending constraint, CDRP’s were later able to make application for grants from an allocation of £400 million provided by the broader H.O. Crime Reduction Programme (CRP) (HMIC 2000: x). The CRP was an inter-government departmental commitment aimed at delivering a sustained reduction in crime, framed within an evidence-based context. Initiatives that showed promise were supported and subject to research, monitoring and evaluation, with a view to becoming main streamed as part of a ‘what works’ agenda (Tilley, 2004). Additionally, central government sponsored a number of ad hoc and discrete grant funding streams, but which involved additional significant bureaucracy and bid writing by the new partnerships. However, by 2004, the H.O. had rationalised the main grants available from fourteen to three and during 2005-6, into one single source - the ‘Safer Stronger Communities’ grant, which remained a key source of funding for partnerships (H.O. 2004a).
The National Audit Office (H.O. 2004a) review of H.O. spending/grants established, £927 million had been distributed to police BCU’s, CDRP’s and CSP’s between the period 1999-2004. This should be seen, however, in the context of overall H.O. funding of £5.5 billion in 2003-4, a large proportion of which was directed to the police (H.O. 2004). Whilst the total of the various funding streams was significant, the process and distribution of the funds was questioned. The National Audit Office review (H.O. 2004a) identified that half of the projects examined were delayed by up to one year, in part due to late notification and distribution of monies by the H.O. Other factors leading to delay included, uncertainty as to how much grant would be received, which led to partnerships having to wait before they could finalise project plans and recruit staff. Equally, projects were delayed because of difficulties in retaining skilled staff (H.O. 2004a).

Impact

As to progress made, reviews undertaken by HMIC and the Audit Commission (HMIC, 2000) and the H.O. (2002), acknowledge, whilst the Act had been ‘universally applauded’, there existed:

- Tensions and variance of apparent power between agencies;
- Unequal commitment and buy-in;
- A reluctance by some agencies to share data; with an over reliance on police data;
- Variance and interpretation as to the approach between partnerships;
- A technical skills deficit - analytical, programme management;
- A lack of knowledge and awareness as to the possibilities of Section 17;
- Concerns about financial resourcing and sustainability; And
- Strong leadership existing in some localities, but not others.

Despite systematic structures and performance frameworks having been adopted, HMIC (2000) observed, little had been done to ‘identify or evaluate current activity to reduce
crime’ (HMIC 2000:02). A recurring theme within partnership and contrary to aspirations for creating an evidence-base as to ‘what works’ (Hough and Tilley, 1998; Liddle and Gelsthorpe, 1994a, 1994b, and 1994c).

Given the extent of the implementation issues identified, the effectiveness of partnership governance and oversight is questioned.

**Increasing layers of governance, oversight and control**

Under New Labour, H.O. Directors (formerly known as Crime Reduction Directors) operated in each of the nine Regional Government Offices and who were responsible for crime reduction, drugs misuse, active community and race equality issues within their regions. Each Director was in turn supported by a H.O. Crime Reduction Team, charged with responsibility for overseeing and improving CRDP performance, administering HO funding programmes and ensuring delivery of targets, together with providing oversight and local accountability (Homel, 2006:123). What wasn’t clear however, was whose responsibility it was to resolve partnership implementation problems and difficulties (Homel et al 2004). Interestingly, regional government appeared to be more performance focused, but had no statutory power to impose targets or impose sanctions for poor performance, other than to hold back grant funding streams. That said, their ‘influence’ over funding was not to be under-estimated.

In furtherance of the central governments quest for greater joined-up local governance, the government launched its Neighbourhood Renewal Unit, sitting within the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. The Unit oversaw the introduction of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSP’s) for eighty-eight of the most deprived (based upon an index of multiple deprivation) and who received Neighbourhood Renewal Fund monies. Formulation of an LSP was a condition of funding and the LSP was designed to encourage joint working across departments, agencies and communities, with a central focus of ‘regeneration and renewal.’ LSP’s were subsequently extended nationwide and into whose structure CDRP’s were to be ultimately relocated within an expanding hierarchy and
bureaucratization of partnership frameworks; an aspect discussed more fully in subsequent chapters. Additionally, the Police Reform Act 2002 extended the breadth of ‘Responsible Authorities’ to now include the police authority, fire and rescue authority and primary care trusts representatives for their respective areas i.e. the organizational oversight bodies.

Given the high priority and political mandate aligned to the crime agenda by Labour, frustration clearly lay within central government as to the disparity in apparent success or otherwise of partnerships. A resultant review, undertaken jointly by the H.O., Local Government Association, ACPO and the Association of Police Authorities, published its findings in January, 2006 and which in turn, informed the subsequent Police and Justice Act, 2006.

The general tenet of the review was premised upon the partnership landscape having changed substantially since CDRP’s were created in 1998. This coupled with the introduction of Local Area Agreements (LAA’s), overseen by LSP’s and the changing role of local government, combined with police reform, created a need for community safety and crime and disorder arrangements to be revisited. The view was CDRP’s were now being asked to face: ‘some complex questions now about who they engage with, on what, and how’ (H.O. 2006:6). In summary, the review found that despite ‘encouraging progress’, CDRP’s still evidenced difficulties in ensuring agency representation; securing engagement from, for example, social services and youth services; reluctance to share data, and disproportionate focus upon crime (H.O. 2006); issues that echoed the earlier findings of the HMIC (2000) and H.O. (2002) reviews (discussed above). Moss (2006:1) is equally disparaging in her assessment of CDRP’s at that time:

‘The rhetoric is good; the reality is that it has not worked well thus far. Poor articulation and a lack of guidance upon implementation has contributed to this’.

The H.O. (2006) report, additionally endorsed the police National Intelligence Model (NIM) as an effective strategic planning tool and stipulated its use as a mechanism that all partnerships must adopt (the NIM is discussed more fully in Chapter Eight). The Report also
informed the resultant Police and Justice Act, 2006, legislation which acknowledged: ‘it was more important that partnerships were accountable to their local communities than to central government’ (Explanatory Memorandum Para 7.3 - 7.4). The 2006 Act repealed the requirement to produce triennial audits and plans, together with the requirement of an annual report to the Home Secretary and recommended closer relationships between drug and crime agendas; as a result, some partnerships subsequently merged with their Drug Action Teams. The Act mandated that each local authority have its own crime and disorder committee to which local counsellors could deal with certain issues, in effect acting as scrutinisers of the local arrangements (sections 19-22 Local Government Act refers). A position in itself evidencing a hitherto deficit of local accountability.

However, whilst the government had been persuaded that a degree of ‘letting go’ was required, central influence was to continue through a revised approach - national standard setting.

**A new form of accountability - standard setting**

The Crime and Disorder (prescribed Information) Regulations, 2007 followed, which presented the first national outline of minimum standards for partnerships, including formulation of a strategic assessment based upon six monthly intelligence reviews; production of partnership plans (a rolling three-year community plan) and a demonstration of meeting new standards for community consultation and engagement. In addition, these regulations introduced what the government described as the ‘strengthening’ of existing obligations to share information between agencies, building upon section 115 of the 1998 Act, which gave a power to ‘any person to or body to share information with partners for the purposes of reducing crime and disorder.’

The new standards were intended to better synchronise the relationships between local CDRP’s, within the broader district level activity where county structures existed. The link between local and district level was further developed during 2004/2005, when the Labour government piloted Local Area Agreements (LAA’s) previously discussed above. In brief,
the LAA’s allowed councils (local, district and unitary) and their local partners to define their own priorities and select 35 of the most appropriate targets from a suite of 198 National Performance Indicators, which included, for example, indictors relative to crime, harm caused by alcohol and drugs, violence and terrorism. As a result of the Local Government White Paper ‘Strong and Prosperous Communities’ (2006) and the subsequent Local Government and Health Act 2007, LAA’s were financially incentivised by the rewarding of delivery of central government objectives and priorities by introducing Public Service Agreements (PSA’s) that were mapped across to the National Indicators. Whilst LAA’s were a response in support of a better interconnection between aspects of the states’ various responsibilities and delivery, the LAA’s introduced a new and further tier of local governance/partnership arrangements and hierarchy that now consumed the previously standalone CDRP’s.

The notion of standards and compliance was further endorsed by the Police and Crime Standards Directorate (PCSD) of the H.O. in their publication Delivering Safer Communities: A guide to effective partnership working (H.O. 2007b). The report alluded to an apparent disconnect between crime reduction and re-offending within CDRP’s and sought to recognise the changing performance landscape and one that was now very different from that which existed in 1998. In part recognition of the lack of interconnection, from 31st July 2007, Registered Social Landlords (in England) were named ‘co-operating bodies’ with the Responsible Authorities and the Environment Agency became an ‘invitee’ to participate. And in 2009 the Policing and Crime Act amended the 1998 CDA to add a further statutory duty to reduce re-offending onto the list of duties responsible authorities must carry out; thus broadening the role and scope of CDRP’s in what was already a confused and inconsistent environment, as previously outlined.

In an attempt to re-emphasise the ‘importance’ and belief in partnerships, but equally evidencing a still fragile and inconsistent picture across the country, the H.O. launched a National Support Framework at an annual CDRP/CSP conference in May 2009, attended by the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown. The framework emphasised ‘self-help’, established
through a ‘self-assessment’ processes. Subject to ‘evidence of need’, further central help, for example advice, guidance, mentoring and peer-led support were offered (H.O. 2009b). It is of note that the language here is far more conciliatory than had been previously apparent by the Labour administration.

Note: During 2010 CRDP’s in England were also re-branded Community Safety Partnerships (CSP’s) aligning with their Welsh counterparts who had used the title CSP’s since their inception (H.O. 2010).

The cumulative effect of the multiple layers of oversight, defined structures, process stipulation and performance measurement frameworks, created not only a complex and bureaucratic environment, but one where only limited room lay open for local determination. Implicitly, such a position created tension between central and the local; New Labours polices were centrally enforced. Consequently, the espoused mantra of localism and communitarianism, underpinned by a desire for devolvement of responsibility to the local, had significant conditions attached. Rather, the period witnessed a growing power, control and influence by central government. Equally, police-partnership considerations, during this same period, operated against the backdrop of the government’s police reform agenda. Whilst police reform is not the main focus of this thesis, a brief overview of the police-partnership performance frameworks operating during this period provides context.

**A focus upon performance**

Under the previous Conservative government administration (1979-1990), police reform had begun in earnest, framed by concepts of efficiency, effectiveness and economy (Newburn, 2007; Reiner, 2014; Savage, 2007). During this period, tensions occurred between the government and the police, premised upon an apparent intransigence and reluctance of police to reform, and where the police saw themselves as ‘different’, and apart, from the other public services.
The central tenet of the ‘difference’ debate was framed around the notion of the ‘doctrine of constabulary independence’ i.e. the perceived need of police leadership for ‘operational independence’, to be free from direct political interference (Jefferson and Grimshaw, 1984; Savage, 2007; Brain, 2010). However, under New Labour, the theme of perceived political incursion into the chief officer’s operational domain was to remain.

The New Labour government continued in the vein of the initial Conservative performance initiatives. Fundamentally, police reform was ‘driven’ by a strengthening of a target regime, the setting and enforcement of standards, increased central intervention and indeed increased powers of intervention. It was a period where compliance was ‘required’ and overt central pressure brought to bear to evidence for both delivery and result (Gilling 2005, 2007; Newburn 2003, 2007; Savage 2007; Brain 2010). Underpinning these reforms was a new Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) launched in April 2004 and linked to an economic perspective of business analysis termed activity-based costing (ABC). PPAF consisted of a series of performance ‘domains’ or clusters based around the labels of ‘citizen focus’, ‘reducing crime’, ‘investigating crime’, ‘promoting public safety’, ‘providing assistance’ and ‘resource utilization’ and ‘organizational capacity’. PPAF was fundamentally an internal and inward organizational view of performance, but in 2005/6, in order to facilitate an external perspective to the process, ‘customer’ surveys were added.

However, whilst some cognizance was given to elements of the partnership contribution to the various performance domains, primarily PPAF was a police ‘only’ assessment framework, therefore with inherent limitations. Subsequently, in recognition of the growing crime reduction and community safety agenda, and the absence of but need for a more joined-up assessment, the Analysis of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) performance measuring framework was introduced in 2009. ACPACS was marketed as a way of simplifying national and local performance arrangements, joining up the wider performance management frameworks of community safety partners and broadening the scope of performance to take account of important community safety work. APAC’s clustered performance around five domain areas - ‘confidence and satisfaction’,
‘promoting safety’, ‘tackling crime’, ‘serious crime and protection’ and ‘organizational management’ and beneath each heading sat a number of performance indicators, for example ‘promoting safety’ embraced anti-social behaviour, anti-social use of alcohol, street drug use, arson, low-level offending and road safety.

Building upon these performance developments, the 2008 Policing Green Paper, announced new performance inspection arrangements developed jointly by HMIC and the Audit Commission and integrating the various frameworks pertaining to local government (Comprehensive Area Assessment - CAA) and the criminal justice agencies, working in partnership and linked to LAA’s. The Green Paper also introduced a Policing Pledge (a statement of service level and standard the public could and should expect from their local police), together with a new requirement for the publication of local information on crime and police activity, in an attempt to make police performance more visible to the public. The pledge sat against the backdrop of the government having introduced its community policing model, Neighbourhood Policing, in 2007 a programme which was to become associated with police reform (Quinton and Morris, 2008). Neighbourhood policing and partnership-policing models are discussed in Chapter Eight.

In summary, police reform under New Labour, as with reform of other public sector organizations operating at this time, witnessed notions of ‘performance’ and ‘effectiveness’ moving to the forefront of the political agenda. However, 2008 witnessed a world economic recession, linked to the banking crash of that same year, and as a result, political focus and priority was to change. Against the backdrop of world recession, Labours popularity had diminished and in the 2010 General Election Labour recorded their biggest loss of parliamentary seats (91) since 1931, bringing to an end thirteen consecutive years of Labour governance (Mandelson, 2010).

**A Time of Austerity and New Governance (2010-2018)**

11th May, 2010 marked the beginning of a new coalition’, Britain's first for thirty six years. The newly formed government comprised the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties,
led by David Cameron, Prime Minister (Conservative). Whilst it was described as a coalition, de facto this was a Conservative majority, driven and policy led coalition; the Cabinet comprising sixteen Conservatives and five Liberal Democrats. The financial crisis led the UK government to bail out banks estimated at £141 billion, with exposure to liabilities in excess of £1 trillion (National Audit Office, 2013). Against this backdrop, there appeared a general consensus amongst the main political parties of the need for austerity, and in particular, the need to reduce the burden placed upon the public purse. However, the scale of reform and speed of ‘cuts’ to public services was contested; albeit the Conservative politics of the ‘New Right’ presents itself as ‘there is no alternative’ (Clarke and Newman, 2012; Hall 2017).

In developing the austerity theme, Cameron championed what he termed ‘Big Society’ and the often forgotten, second part of the phrase ‘Big Society - little State’ i.e. an ideological commitment to small government. Conservative ideology was premised upon, and as it has traditionally been, a free market economy; support for private enterprise; ‘traditional’ values, including that of family and of limited state interventions. The approach was presented as an antidote and a polarised alternative to what the Conservatives perceived Labour to represent i.e. society as state dependent; an almost paternalistic model of state provision. Equally, the Conservatives were scathing as to what they concluded to have been an inefficient, autocratic and bureaucratic run Labour administration, that sought to micromanage at the local level. In their view such an approach had been largely ineffective.

George Osbourne was appointed as Chancellor, and immediately set in motion the conservative manifesto pledge to reduce public expenditure. This aim sat alongside a desire to give confidence to the markets and therefore create economic growth (Conservative Party, 2010). Indeed, the projected cuts to state spending were seen as the biggest since the 1920’s (Crawford, 2010 in Oxfam, 2013). Policing was to be no exception and the treasury demanded 20% plus reduction plans, from the various ministries, including the H.O., leading to a reduction in the police budget of £100 million in 2011 and a projection of £545 million by 2014/15.
A fuller analysis of the impact of austerity measures upon policing and partnerships is discussed in greater depth below.

**Conservatives and the desire for police reform**

Prior to an economic imperative dominating the agenda, police reform had already been considered a priority by the Conservatives. On becoming Party leader in 2005, Cameron appointed Nick Herbert as Shadow Minister, with mandate to head a Police Reform Taskforce, which delivered a midterm policy review, ‘Policing for the People: Interim report of the Police Reform Taskforce’ (Conservative Party, 2007). The principal tenet of the document was that in spite of record spending on law and order and on the police (25% increase between 2002-2005), crime levels remained far too high.

Within this same report, disproportionate emphasis was given to the perceived success of policing and reducing crime within New York, ‘driven’ by an elected Mayor and an ‘inspirational’ police chief. Better police performance in this context was attributed to a very real increase of police officer numbers, ‘robust’ community policing, broader police reform measures and enhanced accountability. The central tenet was of a perceived need for strong and charismatic leadership, in order to shatter this kind of bureaucracy. Additionally, central to Conservative ideology, was a belief that existing police authorities, who were charged with overseeing policing in each of the 43 forces, were ‘invisible’ and that directly elected individuals should be appointed in order to provide democratic control.

The interim report clearly laid the bedrock for the police and crime agenda contained within both the 2010 Party Manifesto and the subsequent Policing White Paper, ‘Policing in the 21st Century: Reconnecting police and the people’ (July, 2010); a document the then Home Secretary, Theresa May described as detailing the ‘most radical change to policing in 50 years’. Her judgement was that as a result of the New Labours bureaucratic and target setting regime, the police had lost their focus. Three main pillars of reform were announced: (1) The introduction of directly elected PCC’s; (2) A transfer of responsibility
back from government to ‘police professionals’, rather than the hitherto ‘micro
management by central government of local policing’, together with a scrapping of central
targets; And (3) The creation of a National Crime Agency to better deal with national issues
(Conservative Party, 2010).

Referencing partnership, Chapter Five of the White Paper, ‘Tackling crime together’, links
empowering ‘Big Society’ with a need to reform the approach to cutting crime:
encouraging active citizen engagement and ensuring the wider criminal justice system,
together with CSP’s and the voluntary and community sectors, are fully involved. The
general tenet being to replace ‘bureaucratic accountability with democratic accountability’.
At the same time, the notion of personal responsibility of citizens was underlined,
referencing crime prevention is a ‘shared responsibility’; A position very much in accord
with Garland’s (1996) assertion of civic ‘responsibilization’.

In December 2010, the Home Secretary, together with the Justice Secretary Kenneth
Clarke, wrote to all the chairs of CSP’s, heading the letter, ‘Cutting Crime Together’ (H.O.
and Ministry of Justice, 2010). The document endorsed the government’s support for CSP’s
and of their need to remain on a statutory footing. The letter announced what it termed, a
‘freeing from unnecessary UK Government reporting burdens and prescriptions.’ The letter
encouraged collaboration between CSP’s and Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJB’s).
Endorsing much of the political thrust contained within the Conservative manifesto, the
central focus of the correspondence set a new expectation of ‘doing better with less’ and a
desire to ‘limit’ any impact that the tightening constraint upon the public purse, might
have. Against a backdrop of fiscal austerity, the H.O. announced that it would make ‘an
additional contribution’ to local government funding, in recognition of their projected
diminishing budgets for the period 2011/12. The letter went on to announce the terms of
the new funding and endorsed the importance of local partners working together.
Out with the old, in with the new

The desire to reduce bureaucracy and an abandoning of regional government was seen as central in transferring power back to the local. As a result, on the 13th October, 2010 the Local Government Secretary, Eric Pickles announced the dismantling of the remaining eight regional government offices’ and the abolition of all LAA’s, previously introduced by Labour. The broader theme of devolving power and changes to the local political landscape, is contained within the Localism Act, 2011.

In line with the 2010 White Paper, and in support of the Conservative drive to reduce perceived ‘unnecessary bureaucracy’, the H.O. (2011) published its Crime Strategy ‘A New Approach to Fighting Crime’, in which the Home Secretary announced:

‘The Policing Pledge, the national targets, the initiatives, the diktats and the red tape are all going. In their place I have set the police one simple mission, to cut crime’.

(H.O. 2011c:1)

Taken at face value, this was a significant shift and riposte to the tightly controlled performance management regimes that had previously existed under New Labour. As to the Home Secretary’s views of partnerships operating within the crime reduction field, she underlined her belief that they had been ‘hindered by reporting burdens, unnecessary rules and lack of discretion’. Her message to CSP’s was direct:

‘They have made a significant contribution to making communities safer - at best, they can be dynamic, setting clear priorities and leading to real action. But at worst, they can be little more than talking shops, hindering the fight against crime rather than helping it. Partnership working is not an end in itself’. (H.O. 2011c:8)

This was a significant showing of the Home Secretary’s hand. As with much political commentary, the evidence-base for the Home Secretary’s mixed efficiency claims, was not revealed.
In addition to the anti-bureaucracy drive, at the heart of the Coalition’s strategy lay a desire to address what it saw as a disconnect between the police and public. By making the police more democratically accountable, through the election of PCC’s, together with the aim of making government more transparent, through publication of accessible data, including crime data, the Coalition set in train its agenda of police reform (H.O. 2011c). The censure of the former police authorities and the introduction of PCC’s is discussed next.

The new politics of the police? New directions in democratic accountability and political interference

Inevitably, within the balance between state power and individual freedom lie questions as to what checks and balances exist? How tension in the relationship is managed? Who arbitrates? And importantly how government and its agents are held to account and by whom? Models of police accountability have traditionally focused upon the control of the constable (Brogden, et al 1988; Lustgarten 1986) and in requiring retrospective explanations for police action (Stenning, 1995). Under both the Thatcher led government and New Labour, emphasis had increasingly been given to bureaucratic or managerial accountability, including fiscal scrutiny, performance achievement and broader issues of efficiency and effectiveness (Berry et al, 1995; Savage, 2007; Renier, 2010). However, within the relationship between the state and its citizens, the context of policing appears to be changing with national government under increasing pressure from a critical and consumerist informed public.

Within central government, and irrespective of partisan politics, there appeared to a political consensus that the relationship between the police and the public had become distant, with the police being far too removed and disconnected from its public. Whilst political concern has been raised about this disconnect, the relationship between the police and central government itself has also witnessed increasing tension. Lying at the heart of the debate, was a fear of direct political intrusion in the ‘day to day’ or ‘operational’ policing arena. Prior to 2012, the arrangements for police governance were
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framed by the Police Act, 1964 that introduced the ‘tri-partite system’ of accountability and acted as an interplay between the Home Secretary, representing the national interest, the Chief Constable being responsible for the ‘direction and control’ of local policing and the Police Authority, who oversaw the ‘efficiency’ of the force and represented the local public interest. It was as a direct result of criticism of the ability of police authorities to represent and in particular be ‘visible’ to ‘their’ public that justification for PCC’s were being introduced by virtue of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011 (H.O. 2011b).

**Politicization of policing**

At this juncture, it is important to contextualise the political backdrop to debates on police reform, including the introduction of PCC’s, within a new governance structure. In helping frame the debate, Reiner (2010:9) thoughtfully draws distinction between the role of the police, being by its very nature political, dealing with power relationships between the state and the community, based upon notions of order and control (including the use of force); As distinct from that of being ‘politicized’, which Reiner argues occurs when policing becomes the object of dispute or conflict. From that cause, the current debates on police governance, and indeed this chapter, are very much concerned with the context of politicization of policing.

From the 1970’s until the time of writing, irrespective of which administration was in power, there has been a consistent focus on New Public Management (NPM) and managerialism as a primary accountability and reform mechanism (see Chapter Four). But it is interesting to note that the Coalition government sought to distance itself from these previous managerialist focused regimes and marketed current police reform as an antidote to the bureaucracy that the police and in particular ‘this’ political administration ‘inherited’ from New Labour.

The politicization of policing is clearly demonstrated in the extremis by observing the various political manifestos, a succession of policing White Paper’s and political party
sponsored report’s that have been generated, particularly in the last ten years. The lack of ongoing political consensus over policing, including the lack of consensus over governance arrangements has led, in part at least, to calls, particularly from the police themselves for a Royal Commission into policing (Blair, 2009); however, such calls, to date, have fallen on deaf ears.

The introduction of PCC’s, is clearly driven by political ideology, influenced and informed by party colour. The Home Secretary, Teresa May, described the introduction of the Commissioners’ as the most ‘radical’ reform to policing for some time (White Paper, 2010) but the reform has generated nervousness over the potential for direct political interference into police decision making (Sampson, 2012).

What does more local democratic representation look like?

PCC’s have been given far ranging powers that include: appointing and, if necessary, dismissing the chief constable, setting the police budget, consulting the public, writing and implementing crime plans, working with partners on community safety, monitoring performance and monitoring how the police deal with complaints made against them. They serve for four-year periods and may be re-elected. A Police and Crime Panel, made up of elected representatives from authorities, including district councils have been created to hold the PCC’s to account (although at this stage there is little evidence as to their effectiveness in doing so). At the time of writing, PCC’s salary’s range from £60,000 to £117,000 dependent on the size and scale of the force and population covered.

Prior to November, 2012 the question posed was who will want to undertake such a task? Interestingly, The Times Newspaper headline of the 23rd September, 2012 read, ‘Hangers and Loonies go for the new police job’. The article highlighted that the government was allegedly ‘despairing of the quality of the people who have so far entered the race...’ and goes on to state that ‘ Nick Faith, of the Policy Exchange think tank, said “If you looked at our polling of the public they clearly say they don’t want ex-politicians or even local politicians. Trust in politicians is still pretty low. So the public will be disappointed”, those
elected being in the main Party representatives. Equally, as a result of the extremely low electoral turnout, 15.1% in 2012 and 27.3% in 2016 (www. The Electoral Commission), questions as to PCC’s democratic legitimacy, in some quarters, remain (Brain 2014; Chambers, 2013; Joyce, 2011; Lister and Rowe, 2013).

A loosely defined role premised upon relationships

To some extent it is not unreasonable to assume, that like policing itself, the role of PCC will be an organic process, shaped and developed as a result of hindsight and experience. In an attempt to more clearly articulate the function and importantly ‘manner’ in which PCC’s carry out their responsibilities, section 79 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011 required the Secretary of State to issue a Policing Protocol, which came into force on the 16th January, 2012. The Protocol whilst principally seeking to add clarity to the role and function of the PCC, interestingly draws significant attention for the need and indeed importance for ‘professional’ relationships to exist between the Commissioners’ and Chief Constables’. The extent to which emphasis is placed upon relationships within the document would tend to suggest that at the very least, concern rested in the minds of the legislators about the potential for tension and conflict that the new role may bring to police governance and in particular to the way in which police chiefs’ operate their command.

The need for ‘robust oversight’ in any governance arrangements is to be encouraged, but the lack of clarity between the roles and responsibilities of the PCC and that of the chief constable, particularly around what does or does not constitute ‘operational matters’ at the very least, is likely to lead to confusion, misunderstanding and tension. The Policing Protocol, rather than assisting or shaping the boundaries of ‘operational independence’ merely cautions PCC not to ‘improperly’ interfere. In underlining governments ‘will’ in this regard, in August, 2012 the Policing Minister, Nick Herbert announced that PCC’s would, upon taking up office, be required to swear and sign an oath of impartiality, similar to requirements placed upon judges and police officers upon taking up office (Gov.uk, 2012).
Within the Oath we see specific reference being made to Commissioners’ pledging ‘not interfere with the operational independence of police officers.’

Interestingly, dissenters to the new governance arrangements often cite incidences of failings drawn from United States and the all too clear examples of political interference. However, Sampson (2012) suggests, this misunderstands the ‘democratic’ nature that is founded upon ‘majority’ public will and articulated in the close relationships that exist between electoral processes (mayoral system) and policing in the US. Whilst others point to the inherent dangers in making the police democratically rather than bureaucratically accountable, suggesting there is little evidence from abroad that such models of an elected official holding chief police officers to account for the delivery of police plans and priorities, actually achieving their purpose (Mawby and Smith, 2013).

Irrespective of their merits or otherwise, PCC’s are now a reality and only time will tell if concerns about political interference are justified. What we can say with confidence is that the change in governance creates a new dynamic and context for the ways the police in England and Wales are held to account.

Note: The PCC’s remit was subsequently extended by virtue of the Police and Crime Act, 2017 which allows PCC’s to submit proposals to the Home Secretary to assume governance of Fire and Rescue Authorities in their area. At the time of writing, six PCC’s nationally have chosen to do so.

PCCs and community safety partnerships

It is interesting to note, that within the emergent literature devoted to the role of PCC’s, little or no reference is made to their responsibilities and powers relative to partnerships (Joyce, 2011; Raine and Keasey, 2012; Mawby and Smith 2013; Sampson 2012). However, by virtue of the 2011 Act, PCC’s and CSP’s are required to ‘have regard to’ each other plans, albeit there is lack of clarity as to what ‘have regard to’ actually means in this context. That said, there is an expectation that each will share their plans with the other at
an early stage of their planning cycles and active encouragement is given for shared priorities, where appropriate, in order to best support joint-working. PCC’s have further power, to call a meeting of CSP’s in order to discuss strategies and they can request a written report, if they feel that the CSP is not carrying out its duties in an effective and efficient manner. Equally the legislation allows the PCC to approve mergers between CSP’s and not to, as some authorities might have feared, dictate them; hence the drive or desire for any mergers in theory should originate from within the partnerships themselves.

However, and significantly, PCC’s have the ability to make grants for the reduction of crime and disorder to anyone they see fit. This could include CSP’s but might also include other authorities or groups. The decision regarding how and to whom grants are distributed rests solely with the PCC. Therefore, their influence and authority, via the mechanism of funding distribution upon the landscape of partnership working within a locality, should not be underestimated.

A more detailed examination of the funding of CSP’s, reveals that their activities are resourced in variety of ways. Each agency involved has its own budget and resources, aligned to tackle priorities, for example police, local authority, health and so forth. An alternative model offered is where some CSP’s have what is termed ‘pooled funding’ into which the agencies contribute (and contributions can be variable), creating a central and joint ‘commissioning’ fund and through which activity is targeted. The concept of commissioning is described as ‘a process of understanding need or demand, planning response, evaluating impact and responding to change if necessary; it is not just a procurement’ (Local Government Association, 2012).

Irrespective of the funding model adopted locally, partnerships had been augmented by a variety of government grants and in particular the Community Safety Fund (CSF). However, against a background of austerity the (CSF) fund was reduced by 60% during 2010-11 to a net £28.8million for England and £1.2 million for Wales, and then formally dissolved in March, 2013. Ministers consolidated other funding streams, including Drug Intervention
Programme grants, and channelled these to the PCC’s, from which they could either
‘commission’ their own services directly or alternatively share with CSP’s or indeed any
other bodies. More succintly put, the PCC’s were now given grant making powers and by
default, significant authority to shape and influence both the agenda and service delivery
of local CSP’s. The Coalition government had devolved the responsibility and issue of
partnerships, and their perceived value was now being left to the vagrancies of the PCC’s
individual outlooks. Such an position could be used to argue that devolvement was
consistent with the ‘localism ‘agenda, or could be viewed within a wider context and
viewed more negatively as a sign of abandonment. In support of the latter position,
Loveday (2013) observes, the rather loose responsibility given to PCC’s to only ‘monitor’
the work of local CSP’s ‘demonstrates rather less than full commitment’ within the
Coalition government, in power at that time.

The financial Imperative - a changing landscape

In a period of austerity, one might argue that the need for partnership and integrated
services in order to achieve economic efficiency was never greater and that mutual
organizational benefit may be achieved by partners seeking even greater collaboration and
cooperation. However, there is also a danger that in these same circumstances,
organizations, rather than seeking opportunities to ‘share’, might alternatively choose to
adopt less strategic and more entrenched ‘self-protectionist’ positions and where the
language is one of realigning resources to ‘core’ functions at the expense of functions or
services deemed ‘non-core’. As will be discussed in the thesis primary research (Chapter
Seven), this situation has the potential to lead to more short-term or organizational
myopia. Equally, organizations in determining where ‘cuts’ and ‘efficiencies’ are to be
found demand an ‘evidence-base’ in order to help inform economic decision making and
utilisation of resources, but as previously outlined in this thesis, both policing and in
particular partnerships do not have access to a voluminous library of prior evidence as to
what works and at what cost.
Whilst the Coalition government sought not to change the general arrangements for partnerships envisaged by Morgan (1991), and framed by the CDA 1998, the hitherto financial underpinning and support via government grant transferring to PCC’s, together with more fundamental challenge presented by austerity to public services represented in partnerships and in particular within CSP’s, created a new and fundamental dynamic. Namely, the ‘localised-reorientation’ of partnership.

The police response to austerity

During 2013 HMIC published its thematic inspection ‘Policing in Austerity: Rising to the Challenge’ reporting that the overall police service response to the financial challenges had been ‘good’ and that most forces had plans in place to be able to balance their accounts by 2014, the end of the government spending review period. However, the report also cautioned that some forces had chosen to make savings by broadening the remit of neighbourhood policing teams (a central pillar of New Labours crime prevention and partnership agenda) and to now require neighbourhood officers to undertake activities previously associated with response policing. And, as a result, ‘Neighbourhood policing thus risks being eroded in some places’ (HMIC, 2013:18). In terms of the opportunities to achieve economic advantage through inter-force collaboration, the report declared: ‘HMIC is deeply disappointed with progress...Despite the potential for efficiencies...the pace of collaboration is too slow’ (HMIC, 2013:15). The report also highlighted, five forces were at ‘risk’ and would find it difficult to cope with further budget cuts beyond 2014/15.

Turning to the issue of how forces had responded to the managing the reduction in budgets required, HMIC predicted that between March 2010 and March 2015 there would be a total reduction in staffing of 31,600 (13%) comprising 15,400 police officers, 13,400 police staff and 2,900 PCSO’s. In terms of the effect on the ‘front line’ now defined by HMIC as ‘crime-fighting’, predicted that although the overall workforce is shrinking, the percentage engaged in ‘front line or crime fighting’ would grow from 74% in March 2010 to 78% by March 2015. An interesting way of presenting an overall net loss! Finally, within the
HMIC report, credit was given to the service for the development of centralised support services e.g. HR and finance; merging units; revisiting staffing shift patterns and streamlining services.

Despite the cuts, in line with the general "crime drop" across the western industrialised world, recorded crime as a whole fell by 13% between 2010/11 and 2012/13 in England and Wales. Moreover, victim satisfaction remained high. However, performance in responding to emergencies had diminished, although exact data is not presented and HMIC’s public surveys found that respondents had not noticed a major change in policing in their area as a result. The latter point here might be as much about the public having given up on policing or whose expectations were already low. Whist neighbourhood policing (discussed more fully in Chapter Eight) is referenced within the HMIC report, it is interesting to note that partnerships and external collaboration do not feature at all, indicating a rather introspective view of the impact and opportunities that austerity might present. Equally interesting, is the recourse to militaristic language throughout HMIC’s report, for example, ‘front-line’ and ‘Crime-fighting’ as though analogous to war and I would argue, consistent with adopting ‘entrenched’ ‘self-protectionist’ and ‘inward’ looking positions. Overall, the approach to austerity adopted by the police would also tend to infer a lack of ambition and appetite to seize the opportunity to create new thinking and/or to deliver organizational transformation. Disappointingly, the conversation remains at the rather superficial level of what can no longer afford to done or by whom.

The real danger being presented here is that rationalisation and economy is being put ahead of conceptualising and theorising as to the purpose, function, contribution, value and the ‘how’ of policing within a modern and future democracy. As a consequence, a rather narrow centralist/rationalist perspective, whilst appealing in its simplicity may intentionally or unintentionally, dependent upon one’s viewpoint, seek to undermine local delivery and provision of local variance, as required by the ‘local’. If this is the response of policing, it might not be unreasonable to assume that other organizations and public services might also adopt similar inward-looking perspectives. In these terms, public
service responses to austerity, including the police, may actually be undermining the
government’s desire for localism and the ability of the public to influence local service
delivery as envisaged and championed by central government.

**A wider context - neoliberalism and austerity**

As outlined above, since 2010, the Coalition government has embarked on a fundamental
reform of public services, welfare and local governance, against a backdrop of fiscal
austerity. Both the Coalition in particular and Conservative Party, have very much been
aligned to a neoliberalist economic policy, resulting in an expansion of deregulation,
encouragement to support entrepreneurial enterprise, privatization and fundamentally a
reduction in the size of the state.

In exploring the philosophical underpinnings of ‘neoliberalism’, one finds it to be a
contested concept. Harvey (2005) in seeking to define the term, states:

‘In the first instance it is a political theory of political economic practices that
proposes human well-being can best be achieved by liberating individual
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterised
by strong private property rights, free markets and free trade. The role of the state is
to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices’.

(Harvey, 2005:2)

Harvey further develops his analysis of the term to now represent neoliberalism as a class
based political initiative to create capital accumulation. In developing this analysis, Jessop
(2002) and Peck (2004) (both cited in Newman 2014) seek to reframe the emphasis of
neoliberalism as the role of the state securing conditions that enable the expansion of the
scope and reach of capital. In either interpretation, the notion of state architecture
providing the entrepreneurial environment is also in accord with Foucault’s (2011) theories
of governmentality (previously discussed in Chapter One) and might be more accurately be
described neoliberal governmentality.
Equally, for states to have the confidence to deregulate, decentralise and make austerity budget cuts, they must be powerful. Austerity is not an easy concept to sell to state citizens who witness ‘cuts’ to services that may directly impact upon their lifestyles and quality of life and hence the need for the state to be powerful in order to be able to ‘drive’ the measures though. Bockman (2013) asserts that Foucault:

‘...agreed that neoliberalism brings together markets and powerful states, but he argues that what makes these states truly neoliberal is using the market to govern, distributing services and benefits according to the market logic of efficiency, competiveness, and profitability. With these new “technologies of governance” the state ensures that citizens mange themselves’. (Bockman, 2013:14-15)

In this context, the ‘convenience’ of the perceived need for fiscal austerity might be better understood as providing a ‘mask’ or ‘smoke screen’, behind which more deep-rooted neoliberal ideology operates and driven through by the current political mandate and dominance of conservative doctrine. From a policing perspective, such narrative can be used to explain the drive and expansion of outsourcing and encouragement for privatisation of functions, once the sole domain of the public police, for example the dismantling and privatising of the Forensic Science Service in March, 2012; the recent proposal by some forces to outsource much of its back office and administrative functions; private control of police custody provision and so forth, with a dominance of private corporations such as A4e, G4S, Serco and others (Williams, Goodwin and Cloke, 2014; Lawless 2011). As Brogden and Ellison (2013:1) poignantly comment:

‘Desensitized, neoliberal economics, ‘seizes the day’ to expand the doctrine of deregulation, of privatization (and the forked tongue discourse of ‘outsourcing’) of state utilities and partisan technological innovations’.

Translating the discourse and impact of neoliberal economic policy to partnerships is made more difficult by a lack of research. What literature that does exist, predates the period of the Coalition government; but which highlights the vacuum of the private sectors
engagement with the crime reduction and community safety agenda’s and in particular with CSP’s (Gilling, 2007; Hughes, 2007 amongst others). And, this has occurred despite the private sectors significant involvement with the broader security and crime prevention within commercial arenas (Steden and Sarre, 2007). If one accepts the neoliberalist outlook, the nature and structures of delivery of crime reduction and community safety could well be open to even greater ‘private’ and entrepreneurial influence, particularly against the redefining of public service and potential withdrawal, underpinned by austerity. Equally, the same environment lays itself open to greater scope and reach of the third sector, including volunteering, a theme at face value at least, consistent with Cameron’s vision of Big Society. The voluntary and community sectors economic and social impact within the UK is significant. Kane et al, 2014 (in Jones et al, 2015:2) suggest that there are approximately 161,000 voluntary sector organizations, attracting some 800,000 people and adding value to the sum of £11.8 billion. However, Jones et al, (2015:3) go on to observe that contrary to the rhetoric, between 2011-12 total central funding to the voluntary sector fell by ‘£1.3 billion or 8.8% in real terms’. Arguing in support of this position, William et al, (2014) assert that whilst funding cuts to public services have resulted in volunteers ‘stepping in’, the central disinvestment to the voluntary sector was undermining their capacity to do so. Despite the rhetoric of Big Society, ultimately a lack of central support and financial underpinning has served to undermine the concept. Austerity was to affect all, including the voluntary sector. A theme explored in detail during the thesis’s primary research (Chapter Seven). Notably, however, the Conservative led Coalition government’s overall fiscal record was endorsed during the general election of 2015, and Cameron’s leadership and the Conservative Party obtained an overall majority to govern.

2015 - A change of government, but more of the same

The Conservative Party manifesto (2015) entitled ‘Strong Leadership, a clear economic plan: A brighter, more secure future’ was premised once more upon relatively traditional conservative territory: economics, jobs for all, reduced taxation, education, health, family
and security. In terms of the latter, the mantra of ‘fighting crime’ and ‘standing up for victims’ predominated. Despite being five years on, censure of New Labour continued:

`Crime is down by 20% since 2010... And is at its lowest point since records began...Labour didn't trust our brilliant policemen and women, probation staff and prison officers to do their job, but tried to micromanage every police force from Whitehall, doing serious damage to officer morale, police discretion and forces’ performance. And Labour failed to provide sufficient prison places: tens of thousands of prisoners were released early; putting the public at risk`. (Conservative Party, 2015:58)

The manifesto went onto declare progress ‘in turning around the situation’ they had inherited and alluding to reforms to policing, rehabilitation and victims’ rights. The manifesto promised, that under a future Conservative government, emphasis would be given to ‘finishing’ the job of police reform; to developing a modern crime prevention strategy; investing further in prisons, toughening sentences, encouraging the use of new technologies and reforming human rights law. All of these proposals sat within an economic plan, at the centre of which lay further austerity and ambition during the next term of office to not only eliminate the country’s deficit, but to actually go further. The Conservative aim, despite any rhetoric to the contrary, was and is to continue to shrink the size and over reliance upon the state, thereby transforming the relationship between the state and its citizens, very much in line with the neoliberalist doctrine, as discussed previously.

Conversely, during the election period, Labour pledged to reduce the national deficit, but to do so in a less severe manner and with a view to still maintaining ‘strong’ public services. Their 2015 manifesto, ‘Britain can be better’, in common with the Conservative approach, focused upon the central issues of the economy, health and education, together with reform to government and appeal to community empowerment. Labour promised to: ‘protect neighbourhood policing’; ‘abolish PCC’s’; ‘create an additional 10,000 police
officers’; ‘strengthen CSP’s’; And ‘give local people a say over the appointment of local police commanders’, amongst other considerations (Labour Party 2015:51).

Interestingly, Labour were not alone in their distain of PCC’s with other parties, including the Liberal Democrats and UKIP, suggesting that PCC’s were undemocratic and ought to be replaced by varying models of governance arrangements presented. However, the position of PCC’s has remained and May, 2016 witnessed the second round of PCC elections.

Following the 2015 general election, Cameron as part of his leadership pledge sponsored the national referendum on whether the UK should or should not leave the European Union. The referendum, held on the 23rd June, 2016 fundamentally changed the course of political focus. Cameron subsequently stood down as Party leader and following an internal leadership contest, Theresa May, then Home Secretary was elected Prime Minister (July, 2016). Mrs May was charged with overseeing the nations exit from the European Union. Albeit a further snap election was held in June, 2017, at the time of writing, the Conservative administration and policy making remains with both Brexit and austerity dominating current political discourse.

Chapter conclusion

The chapter exemplifies, policing police’s the consequences and manifestations of political belief systems, framed by government policy. Equally, the chapter evidences tensions, contradictions and confusion as to partnership policy interpretation and implementation on the ground. Partnership, initially a flagship policy of New Labour, was intended to provide integrated, joined-up and seamless service delivery between state agencies. However, from the evidence presented, arguably it blurred boundaries as to organizational responsibilities and accountabilities.

New Labour’s social democratic imperative directly shaped government policy between 1997-2010 and, in particular, a fundamental belief of a relationship between economic and social policy, with a resultant significant investment in and reform of public services.
Empowered local government, together with ‘community’ engagement, were central features. Morgan’s (1991) conceptual framework for partnership was overwhelmingly endorsed by the Labour government and embodied within the CDA 1998, legislation that introduced the first statutory framework for partnership. Consequently, ownership of the crime problem shifted from the previous monopoly and responsibility of the police, to that of a ‘shared’ responsibility and ownership with both the public and other state agencies. At the same time, there was strong emphasis on bureaucratic governance and central and assertive control. National lead and coordination were emphasised, informed by managerialism, with its stipulation for strategy, audit, target setting and accountable decision making. And in line with this managerialist approach, and indeed considered central to public service reform and delivery, lay concepts of performance and effectiveness.

Demonstrating individual organizational contribution within partnership and overall collective partnership impact proved elusive, despite recourse to a range of performance frameworks being adopted. Nonetheless, the hypothesis that partnerships are intrinsically good things which result in enhanced outcomes, remained central to New Labour’s rationale. The construct of partnership was, in part at least, was championed by New Labour as laying claim to reductions in levels of crime recorded during their administration.

Post New Labour, successive governments’ have continued to reduce both the physical apparatus and central influence of the state. However, the explanations and arguments that surround the political motivations and the extent and rate of the state’s ‘shrinkage’, remain contested. Fiscal austerity and cuts to the public purse direct current discourse, within which a neoliberalist economic and philosophical policy underpins current government responses.

The Conservative government’s drive and desire for a new democratisation and devolution of governance to the ‘local’, from a policing and partnership perspective, has been heavily influenced by a new form of governance in the guise of PCC’s.
commentary relative to PCC’s has in the main focused upon issues of democratization and the potential for political interference of the police, however, little prior attention has been paid to their impact within the partnership arena, a void this thesis seeks to occupy.

Whilst austerity and reduction of public sector funding provides a significant refocusing and a changing context within which police-partnerships exist, it is also of note that the partnership structures and legislation implemented by New Labour endures. However, the dismantling of the previous bureaucratic performance management regimes, together with a promotion, externally at least, of a delegation of authority from the centre, to both the ‘local’ and public service ‘professionals’, remains the current narrative. Within this new environment, partnership has, in the main, been left to local interpretation. However, whilst successive governments’ have sought not to change the general arrangements for partnerships, framed by the CDA 1998, the hitherto financial underpinning and support via government grant transferring to PCC’s, together with the challenge presented by austerity to the public services represented within partnerships and in particular CSP’s, creates a new and fundamental dynamic; a dynamic I term the ‘localised-reorientation’ of partnership. A dynamic explored in detail in subsequent chapters.

The thesis now turns to the primary research methodology.
Chapter Five: Research Methodology

A broad qualitative standpoint is adopted. Staffordshire Police provides a case-study, where focus is being given to interpretations and meanings. Principally, semi-structured interviews of past and present police partnership members, together with partners are conducted, combined with examination of documentation, including policies, administrative records and reports.

Theoretical Context - Epistemological Issues

The context of any methodological research inevitably brings into question one’s primary beliefs and assumptions (ontologies), which frame and inform the way that we view the world. Within a broader philosophical context, resting at the heart of debate lays fundamental assumptions that we hold about the theory of knowledge (epistemologies) i.e. is the pursuit of ‘truth’, a search for that which exists and is definitive and therefore is to be obtained by way of scientific exploration? Or is ‘truth’ or meaning given to things, socially constructed and therefore ‘variable’ dependent upon one’s outlook or perspective? (Sanders and Wilkins, 2010). Against this backdrop, academic debate has sought to focus upon what actually counts as knowledge and how should we acquire it? In this context we have witnessed the development of relatively new disciplines, including the social sciences, where an examination of human behaviour has been central to scrutiny and inquiry. In these terms, social research has been contrasted with the natural sciences whose influence in the early development of social research is well documented (Gilbert, 199; May2011; Hughes and Sharrock, 1997 amongst others). Today however, within the social science arena, there is considerable contention about the extent the world can be viewed in the same manner as the natural world, with those who argue that bespoke methods of research are required in order to more appropriately explore the social world. The kernel of this debate can be found in the two broad paradigms, positivism and interpretivism.
Positivism takes the view that the social world can and should be studied as per the natural sciences, for example, using experiments, and there is an emphasis on reliability based upon rigour and precision. At the heart of this approach is the belief that knowledge is premised upon observing phenomena as facts. Explanations are understood by developing general laws or law–like generalisations, and where emphasis is given to testing theory. As a consequence, quantitative research methodologies, framed by such an outlook and approach, tend to seek the ‘objective’ collection of data and infer detachment from the researcher with the respondents. Subsequent analysis of the data gathered is based upon statistical testing of chosen theories. Therefore, the approach favours quantitative measuring techniques including experiments, questionnaire surveys, and content analysis (Burke, 2009; Hale et al 2005; Henn et al, 2006; Hughes and Sharrock, 1997; Tierney, 2010; Walklate, 2003).

Conversely, the interpretivist school of thought, challenges the positivist proposition of an objective reality and argues that people’s subjective understanding is of greater importance when studying the social world as opposed to the natural world (Hughes and Sharrock, 1997; Noaks and Wincup, 2004; von Wright, 1993). As a result, an empathetic understanding is adopted premised upon the notion that human consciousness allows us as humans to formulate responses to situations on the basis of our interpretations and thoughts; therefore focus should be placed upon understanding such concepts as intentions, purposes and values of those performing the action. Consequently, the methodologies associated with this approach seek to understand the world in its natural state and encourage the use of such methods as participant observation, in-depth interviews, focus-groups, open ended questionnaires, life history taking, storytelling, and personal documentary analysis, to name but a few. Unlike the positivist approach, such methods encourage a closeness between the researcher and respondent in what might be regarded as a ‘joint enterprise’, albeit there is still an emphasis on reliability and objectivity within the research. From a qualitative methodological perspective, in terms of theoretical exploration, rather than seeking to directly test theory, analysis is based upon the
description and observation of actions, which creates data from which theory is then generated (Henn et al, 2006; Walklate, 2003; Tierney, 2010; Burke, 2009; Hale et al 2005; Hughes and Sharrock, 1997).

We can immediately deduce, therefore, that there is a clear relationship between the epistemology and resultant methodology and any analysis or critique must clearly take account of this relationship. In broad terms, positivist (quantitative) methodologies generally emphasize controlled conditions; require standardisation; emphasize structure; tend to be large scale; use statistics and measurement; and encourage a detachment between the respondent and the researcher. Conversely, interpretative (qualitative) methodologies have a different philosophical premise and seek to inform what is seen as the inquiry of naturally occurring phenomena. Qualitative methodologies are generally: unstructured; use flexible data sources and methods; tend to be small scale; and encourage a relationship between the respondent and researcher in order that meaning can be understood (David and Sutton, 2004; May, 2011). To some extent, it could be argued, that potentially, the advantages of each method are dependent upon what question the researcher is seeking to answer, and also upon one’s ontological basis. But rather than seeing things in such polarised terms, the thesis’s author takes the view that the debate could and should be more focused upon which methods are most appropriate to the researcher, given the specific question they are seeking to address.

Equally, Robson’s (2002) observations about ‘real life’ or ‘real world’ situations not necessarily being replicable within a sterile laboratory setting resonated with the researcher and that the context of the research being pursued needed to be respected. Robson, sees the role of a researcher not so much as constraining or seeking to control an event, as in an experiment, but rather seeking to say ‘something sensible about such complex, messy, poorly controlled ‘field’ situations’ (Robinson, 2002:xv1). Against this backdrop, we witness increasing use by researchers of what is termed a ‘mixed methods’ approach or more broadly labelled ‘methodological pluralism’ (Garland, 2012; Thalia and Cunneen, 2008: Kraska and Neuman, 2008). Such an approach seeks to triangulate findings
by examining the issue through a number of different prisms and does not exclude the acquisition of data or method based on what is all too often seen as mutually exclusive positions, as outlined above. That said, ‘mixed method’ approaches are themselves not without critics (see Guba and Lincoln, 1994).

Creswell (2003:4) however, suggests that ‘the situation today is less quantitative versus qualitative and more how research practices lie somewhere on a continuum between the two’. In developing a more pluralistic view, Kvale and Brinkmann (2009:55-56) note, rather than the legitimacy question of whether a study is scientific or whether the knowledge it generates is ‘true’, now tends to be replaced by the pragmatic question of whether it provides ‘useful’ knowledge? Once again, we find the term ‘usefulness’ in itself a problematic term, but more broadly the pragmatic approach seeks to derive its legitimacy ‘from enabling us to cope with the world in which we find ourselves’ (Robson, 2002). Such an outlook has a great deal of sympathy and consistency with the ‘realist’ perspective within the discipline of criminology, which holds at its core, the desire and aspiration to ‘reflect the realities of crime’ (Young, 1992). Equally, the thesis’s researcher has been influenced by the development of critical criminology and recognition that power and politics can and does shape peoples lived experiences (Garland, 2012; Hogg and Carrington, 2002). Interestingly, a position that is not in itself at odds with Foucault’s (2011) governmentality studies (Chapter One) but rather one which lays emphasis upon the individuals ‘lived’ experience and the ‘impact’ of government, as opposed to the ‘process’ of government.

It is very much in this pragmatic, critical realist vein, that the researcher approaches this study, advocating a multi-methods approach in order to answer the specific research question: "Are organic police partnerships more effective than mandated police partnerships?"
Research Design/Methodological Framework

As stated above, the researcher is drawn to both a qualitative research philosophy and to methodological pragmatism, be it methods commonly associated with positivist or interpretive paradigms. Initially, the researcher was unsure as to what data existed, what degree of access and co-operation could be gained and so forth. Consequently, there was a very real need to be both pragmatic and flexible. As Robson (2002:6) notes ‘such designs are necessarily interactive, enabling the sensitive enquirer to capitalize on unexpected eventualities.’

More broadly Jupp et al (2000) poses the question, what is the purpose of research? Applied social research, such as ‘action research’, sees its role as supporting and engineering change, whereas others might take the view that their responsibility stops at the point of achieving some understanding of the situation and making that information accessible. Against this backdrop, the context of research evaluation is relevant in that further questions arise, such as should the evaluation be restricted to the researcher or should it be collaborative, participative and so forth. My own stance is in part pragmatic, but also seeks to recognise the ‘real world’ of the police organization that is varied, reactive in focus and culturally views its own police area ‘context’, unique. As a result, the researcher entered into a collaborative relationship with the case-study force but also intends to make the information accessible to the wider academic community and for any police organization or interested body to consider for itself.

Methods employed

A multi-methods approach was adopted. Within the overall context of a case-study, semi-structured interviews of past and present police officers and staff, together with interviews with police partners are conducted. The interviews are combined with an examination of partnership documentation and a reflective journal/diary was kept throughout. By combining these broad categories of data collection, it allowed the researcher an
opportunity to overlay and in part triangulate the different data sources, with a view to answering the research question posed (McNeil, 1985; Jupp, 1989; Hammersley, 1993).

**Case-Study**

Case-study has become a recognised and effective approach in order to investigate complex issues within real world settings (Harrison et al, 2017). Aspect of strengths include: it facilitates multiple sources of evidence, thereby enhancing rigour, and also it has potential to generate greater insights within the area of inquiry (Houghton et al, 2013; Yin, 2014). However, definitional dispute arises as to whether case-study is best regarded a methodology, the lens through which the researcher approaches the study or a method, the procedure or technique employed within the study (Mills, 2014). Equally, application of case-study can take varying forms, demanding on the one hand a rigidity of process, for example Yin (2014), as opposed to a more relaxed application, where emphasis is upon given to ‘what’ is studied as opposed to ‘how’ it is studied (Stake, 1995). In this instance, the researcher adopts the use of case-study in order to (1) help frame the research inquiry; (2) aid facilitation of multiple sources of information: and (3) to provide a real world context.

**Interviews**

The principle method used was semi-structured interviews. The researcher considered alternative methods e.g. questionnaires or structured interviews, but felt the chosen method best drew out the empathetic understanding of the participants’ experiences. Primarily, the interviews were conducted on a one-to-one and face to face basis, augmented by focus groups, where appropriate. Copy letters of introduction, consent forms and interview schedules are appended (Appendices B-E). All interviewees consented to being voice recorded, following which interview notes were transcribed. After each interview the researcher ‘immediately’ recorded their reflections in a diary (see below).
To some extent respondents, particularly during the pre-1998 survey sample, were asked about their own personal experiences of police-partnership working (oral histories). This was considered important in order to establish respondents’ own views, rather than to rely on documented history or ‘orthodox accounts’ or trace histories (Bloch, 1954 in Brookman et al 1999:131). As Cockcroft (1999:132) notes: ‘the evolution of oral history is characterised by an on-going struggle against the assumption that ‘facts’ gained from trace history may be seen as objective and oral histories as subjective. Increasingly oral histories are like qualitative research in general, viewed as a valid account of social reality. However, oral histories also create difficulties from an interviewee perspective, which according to Seldon and Pappworth (in Brookman et al 1999), include such issues as memory susceptibility, distortion, hindsight influences and self-consciousness.

Offering caution, Westmarland (2011), warns researchers against the apparent simplicity and attractiveness of interviews, recognising that they can be a time-consuming method of data collection and that potential participants might not share the level of importance the researcher attributes to the study. Westmarland goes on to observe: ‘It is an artificial social encounter, with a conversational style that is not necessarily natural’ (Westmarland, 2011:99). Equally, interviews within the police environment operate within a different context that has its own conventions and which may influence officers/participants expectations and approach (Gudgjonsson, 2003).

Central to any interview or conversation is question construction and style. Interviewing is an art form and clearly faults in question construction may lead to faulty information. By design, the questions used were open-ended, with a view to encouraging a discursive response. Questions that invited ‘yes-no’ answers were avoided. As David and Sutton (2004:89) acknowledge:

‘Language is the key to the interview. It is the medium through which data is collected/generated. It is essential that questions be asked in a language that the
interviewee can make sense of, and which is understood in the same sense that the interviewer intends`.

This rather obvious point can all too easily be assumed and therefore the researcher saw benefit in piloting the questions to not only ensure ‘question understanding’, but also to help identify leading questions or the potential for bias (Kvale and Brinkman 2009). The ‘limited’ pilot comprised three officers and two police-partner representatives, selected via convenience sampling. As a result, the broad interview schedule was confirmed as appropriate, albeit two questions were amended to help aid clarity. Piloting also has a number of advantages to it in that it offers a rehearsal type environment, an opportunity to learn about yourself, your style, interview conduct, how long the interviews will take, preferred settings or environments and to address any emerging problems (Bryman, 2004). In these terms, the researcher was grateful for the opportunity to test and practice their technique.

It is also important to recognise and acknowledge the potential power asymmetry or dynamic between the researcher and interviewee that can work both ways. For example, where respondents express what they believe the interviewer in authority wants to hear or alternatively people of seniority in organizations, particularly such an organization as the police service may seek to control of dominate the interview or want to keep ‘researchers in their place!’. The skill and experience and indeed style of the interviewer has an important part to play here and judgements of when and to what extent the researcher is overtly empathetic, supportive, directive, probing and prompting, pacing and so on should not be underestimated. Gilbert (1993) also highlights the individual impact of researchers on the quality of the responses that they achieve, quoting the studies of Hyman (1954); Sudman and Bradburn (1974) and Shapiro and Eberhart (1947) ‘It has been shown that response rates and extensiveness of response are different between experienced and inexperienced interviewers’ (Gilbert, 1993:145). It was also acknowledged that the researcher’s previous existence as a senior police officer with the case-study force in itself had the potential to create issues based around power dynamics. Brown (1996) refers to
such a researcher as an ‘outside insider’. At a personal level, the researcher was conscious that they are no longer a police officer and very much see themselves as an aspiring academic and criminologist. However, the researcher’s past is their past and their previous position and status had potential to impact upon respondents. Conversely, their knowledge of the organization, of how it operates, its broad processes and protocols, together with an understanding of what being politically savvy in the organization looks like, held significant advantages and opportunities for the researcher.

Focus groups or group interviews have been used by social scientists since the 1940’s, having originally been taken from the world of market research. The whole purpose of a focus group is to use the interaction/stimulation between the participants to add depth and richness that might not be gained from one to one interviews. Pragmatically, they are also a very time efficient and cost-conscious method. However, whilst there are advantages to the method there are also disadvantages. Difficulties can be encountered with such groups that include the potential for certain members of the group to dominate, numbers of questions that can be asked is generally more limited, and the potential for conflict within the group, issues of confidentiality and the degree of expertise it takes to manage such groups. That said, the context in which the researcher sought to use focus groups was part of a broader multi-methods approach, rather being seen as a distinct method in isolation (David and Sutton, 2004; Kitzinger and Barber, 1999; Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990).

**Documentary research and analysis.**

Throughout the history of social science, documentary search has been an important and established research tool (Macdonald and Tipton, 1993). Both the nature and context of this particular study lent itself to data triangulation obtained from the interview process with that of examination and analysis to be gleaned from official memos, minutes, records, archive materials and indeed media reports. It was anticipated that much of the sought after documentation would be a matter of public record but it was also anticipated that
some records might be deemed ‘private papers’, requiring appropriate authority in order to access. In the main, selection of relevant documentation/material was driven by its accessibility and the inquiry direction setting, adopting an organic and responsive approach. The vast majority of documents subject to analysis were ‘official’ publications for example, policing plans, published strategic documents, or H.O./HMIC publications. However, research participants also provided a rich source of historic material, for example press cuttings, minutes of meetings and promotional literature from their own personal libraries and collections.

**Journal/ diary keeping**

As stated above, throughout the duration of the study the researcher kept a journal/diary within a single A4 bound book, in order to facilitate the ‘reflexive’ or ‘reflective’ recordings of the researcher’s thoughts and details about issues or observations raised. In terms of process the researcher conducted a ‘hot debrief’ after each and every interview and meeting, recording their immediate thoughts, feelings and identification of emergent key issues, together with any potential future lines or linkages that might be made. Also and significantly, the journal/diary acted as an aide memoir and helped plan and record events as the project progressed as well as aiding in the writing up phase (Westmarland 2011; Robson, 2002).

**Research objectives**

In order to aid the methodological framework, three primary research objectives were declared (Chapter One).

**Ethics**

The research was conducted under the auspices of Nottingham Trent University and was bound by the University’s Research and Ethical Governance Document (2008). Ethics Committee approval was granted on 4th June, 2013. Equally, this research sits within the
field of Criminology and therefore also complies with the British Society of Criminology’s Code of Ethics for Researchers. A copy of the ethics application is appended at Appendix A.

Independently, the formal research proposal had also faced prior scrutiny from the University’s Post Graduate Research Degrees Committee, whose approval was required before research commenced.

**Confidentiality/duty of care**

All participants were ‘volunteers’ and the researcher fully recognized and accepted their duty of care responsibilities to participants. All names and identifies of participants remain anonymous, unless otherwise stated. In these ‘exceptional’ circumstances, explicit permission is granted, where named, and are only cited after due ethical consideration Irrespective of the willingness of many of the research participant to go on record, foremost in the researcher’s mind was their ‘duty’ to protect participants from possible harm. Indeed, even where explicit authority was given in these terms, the researcher only selectively named individuals where the research location and/or their unique role/rank/contribution may have led to identification of the individual and importantly, there was benefit in so doing in terms of the overall integrity of the inquiry (Moore, 2012).

The Data Protection Act 1998, subsequently amended by the 2018 Act and the European Union General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), specifies the purpose personal data can be used as well as the manner in which it is stored. In line with this legislation the personal data/interviews collected were kept locked away and where information was stored on computers, the files were password protected. Immediately following recording transcription, all digital files were destroyed. A cross referencing coding system was used in order to anonymise the transcripts.
Sampling

Whilst there are 43 ‘independent’ police forces in England and Wales there is considerable research to indicate all are subject to national policy, H.O. direction and statute, including the CDA 1998 (Savage, 2007; Reiner, 2010; Blair, 2009). What is not known, is the full extent of partnership activity that took place prior to 1998 across the 43 forces. It is accepted, within the limitations and scope of this study, that the researcher was unable to examine this. However, by examining a single force, in-depth case-study (Staffordshire Police), the research findings provide a comparator upon which subsequent research has the potential to be benchmarked against it.

During the late 1970’s and 80’s Staffordshire Police conducted a programme of youth activity, branded the Staffordshire Police and Community Enterprise Scheme (SPACE). The programme’s intention was to productively occupy young peoples’ time during school holidays and therefore limit opportunities for them to commit crime (Chapter Six refers). The scheme involved the police working with a wide variety of partners and conveniently, was subject to H.O. evaluation (Heal and Laycock, 1987). SPACE also featured as an exemplar of best practice within the Morgan Inquiry.

Police-youth engagement is used as the central theme in this analysis.

To aid identifying ‘suitable’ participants, convenience and snow-ball sampling techniques were used, particularly in relation to the pre-1998 sample, where many of the participants were retired officers. Convenience sampling was the product of such factors as difficulty accessing the population of interest, and secondly, the researcher’s aim to generate an in-depth analysis. As Maxfield and Babbie, (2007) acknowledge, a small number of successful in-depth interviews can generate a wealth of data, with emphasis given on individual accounts.

Staffordshire Police comprises a force headquarters and eleven local policing units (LPU’s). Tamworth LPU provided the local context.
A total of 88 participants took part in the study, as outlined below:

**Fig 2: Post-1998 primary data sample details**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank/title</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Number in Research</th>
<th>Interviews Completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Constable</td>
<td>ACPO - Force strategic position</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Public oversight/accountability</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC Chief Executive</td>
<td>Support to the PCC</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ch/Supt</td>
<td>Operational Policing/Partnership Boards</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supt</td>
<td>Policy portfolio leads</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership Lead</td>
<td>Force Partnership Lead coordinator</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Inspector</td>
<td>CSP (RA) member</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspector</td>
<td>LPU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeants</td>
<td>LPU</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Constables</td>
<td>LPU</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCSO's</td>
<td>LPU</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig 3: Pre-1998 primary data sample details**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Former rank/title</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Number in research</th>
<th>Interviews completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ch/Supt</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supt</td>
<td>Including the founder of the original scheme and those charged</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with its development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Number in research</th>
<th>Interviews completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ch/Inspector</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including the force SPACE coordinator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inspector</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including SPACE Carnival organiser</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sergeants</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police Constables</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support Staff</strong></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including force SPACE coordinator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RTotal</strong></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fig 4: Partners primary data sample details*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Number in research</th>
<th>Interviews completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Safety Commissioner</td>
<td>Commissioner County Council</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner of Youth Services</td>
<td>Commissioner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner 3rd sector</td>
<td>Commissioner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director Youth Services</td>
<td>County Council</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
<td>Local Authority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Safety lead</td>
<td>Local Authority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Safety Officer</td>
<td>Local Authority</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSP members</td>
<td>CSP members drawn from a range of public and voluntary sector organizations</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Performance Team | Police - County Council | 2 | 2
---|---|---|---
Total | 20 | 20

**Fig 5: Other primary data interview details**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Number in research</th>
<th>Interviews completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>James Morgan</td>
<td>Author Morgan Report 1991</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professor Gloria Laycock</td>
<td>Academic and former Director of H.O. PRSU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alan Wright</td>
<td>Academic and former staff officer to Sir Kenneth Newman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also accepted that whilst the above sample contains significant ‘key’ individuals and representatives of organizational functional responsibilities, the sample is limited both in the numbers of participants involved and in its scope, representing but one aspect (youth engagement) of police-partnership activity, within a single force area.

**Data collection, process and analysis**

In order to manage the complexity of the research, a project management approach was adopted which phased and sequenced the collection of data as follows: (1) the contemporary police setting sample; (2) the pre 1998 sample and (3) the partners sample. All interviews were digitally recorded, and a reflective diary was kept throughout the duration of the inquiry.

**Data Processing**

The researcher adopted the data process as advocated by Creswell (2003):
1. Organise and prepare the data – transcribing interviews, field notes etc.
2. Read through all the data – obtaining a general sense.
3. Apply a coding process.
4. Use the coding process to generate a description of the themes for analysis.
5. Determine how the description and themes will be presented in the narrative.
6. Make an interpretation or meaning of the data.

Note: NVivo software was initially used in order to help guide the handling of the data.

Data analysis

As previously disclosed, the researcher was a former senior police officer within Staffordshire Police, retiring in 2008. The challenge presented of bias is acknowledged and whilst the researcher sought to guard against subjectivity, it is accepted that their prior knowledge and experience will have, in part at least, informed subsequent data interpretations. However, Robson (2002: xv) encouragingly observes, that the prior knowledge and experience we bring to research and indeed develop during it ‘are an important ingredient of the research’ and are not to be denied.

Adding further to this complexity, within the world of social science, appears to be a lack of consensus as to the rules that should govern qualitative data analysis. However, Henn et al (2009:253) argue, there exists three broad approaches based upon exploratory research, explanatory research and research identifying meanings. At one end of the qualitative continuum, ‘grounded theory’, is premised upon starting with ‘a clean sheet of paper and that theory should only be developed only as and when the data has been collected’ (Robson, 2002:63). Whilst the researcher holds a great deal of sympathy for this approach, in terms of its reflexive and organic nature, in reality finds it far too vague. Rather they were persuaded with the view that researchers are inevitably influenced by the early inquiry and emergent thoughts, which inform an initial and organic conceptualizing. As Miles and Huberman (1994) poignantly identify, researchers generally tackle research questions that have an identified purpose and operate against a set of pre-determined
concepts that they wish to investigate. The challenge presented in data analysis, therefore, is to seek to honour and safeguard the principle of ‘objectivity’, guard against ‘subjectivity’, and to be constantly vigilant as to the danger presented of confirmation bias i.e. self-affirming.

Thematic analysis was adopted, a recognised and accepted method used for ‘identifying, analysing, and interpreting patterns of meanings (themes)’ Clarke and Braun (2017:297). The advantage of this method is that if permits a degree of flexibility and encourages an organic approach to coding and theme development (Holmqvist and Frisen, 2012). This is not to suggest that there is not a need for systematic procedures in the application of coding the data, but rather the flexibility permitted allows for a more organic, iterative and reflective analysis. The emphasis throughout is upon producing ‘rigorous and high-quality analysis’ (Clarke and Braun, 2017).

As discussed above, the whole issue of authenticity and validity of qualitative data is a highly debated topic (Lincon and Guba, 2000). However, all researchers are encouraged to be transparent in the steps they take in order to check for accuracy and to ensure the credibility of their findings (Creswell, 2003:195). With this in mind, the researcher, where possible, sought to triangulate data sources, used participants to check the accuracy of transcripts and qualitative findings, presented evidence that runs counter to identified themes and sought peer debriefing from their supervisory team.

Having tabled the overall research strategy adopted, it is to the researcher’s assessment of conducting the research that the discussion now turns.

The research experience

Framing of the research question and sub-objectives - Throughout, the researcher has adopted a ‘reflective’ and ‘interrogative’ process. The formulation of the thesis research question and determining the overall research strategy was established over a period of time. This research did not begin with a set question; rather it developed through inquiry.
As Agee (2009) observes, the strengths of the qualitative approach are underscored when viewed as a ‘reflective process’. A central feature of this study is the desire to assess the comparative ‘effectiveness’ of two partnership modules i.e. organic and mandated partnerships. Initially, effectiveness was to be explored with reference to crime, fear of crime data and public confidence measures, however as the inquiry progressed it became apparent that such comparative outputs measures, quite simply did not exist. Therefore, a broader conceptualisation of ‘effectiveness’ needed to be explored and is discussed in detail in Chapter Eight.

Access - Ultimately this project hinged on the researcher’s ability to gain access to a police force. Unless the authority was granted, the research in its presented format would have been untenable. The researcher was conscious that gaining authority may not be straightforward and as Brookman (1999:48) acknowledged in negotiating access to the police for her PhD research, found it to be: ‘complex, dynamic...involving contact, both formal and informal, with several different layers of hierarchy across each of the police force areas.’ Developing rapport and empathizing with participants is as much pragmatic as appropriate ethically. Culturally, the researcher was familiar with the police organization and was able to use their previous policing background to help secure access. However, the advice Bowling, cited in Westmarland (2011:170) wisely cautions as to ‘front’ people who often guard the ‘gatekeepers’ in large organizations. As a result, the researcher established a rapport with the chief constable’s staff officer in advance of making a direct approach to the chief constable.

Even when initial access has been obtained, Westmarland (2011) commenting upon Bowling’s (2010) research experiences, goes onto to suggest of this initial meeting/interview that:

‘The interview is not solely about gleaning information but is as much about relations of power: how the researcher passes the test and manages the performance’. (Westmarland, 2011:170)
Following the meeting with the chief constable, no immediate commitment was given at that time and it was clear that the chief constable wished to take internal ‘soundings’, before committing. The central issues being explored here, or at least the researcher surmises, was of ‘risk’ and ‘trust’ i.e. risk to the reputation of the force and trust that the researcher would use the information professionally. The researcher was also guided by the advice of Loftland and Loftland (1984, in Fielding, 1993:175) who suggest that in negotiating access to a research setting it is necessary to be ‘armed with connections, accounts, knowledge and courtesy.’ In hindsight these were very wise words indeed.

Balance of power - In accord with Brown’s (1996) ‘outside - insider’ categorization, the researchers experience during the course of the study was revealing. In terms of the contemporary examination of police-partnerships, the researcher, whilst not directly known by the then chief constable, had previously worked alongside the remaining executive and senior management ranks. The researcher was also aware that they had left a legacy ‘impression’ whilst serving, be it good, bad or indifferent, as perceived.

When such ‘known’ personnel were interviewed, the researcher not infrequently suffered from participants assuming the researcher’s prior knowledge, for example, respondents stating "you already know the answer to that". In these circumstances, the researcher felt it necessary to have to reset the historic relationships and underlined a position of being treated as an ‘outsider’, requiring a clarity of response. That said, both the organizational and cultural appreciation of the researcher, allowed rapport to develop and once the terms of confidentiality had been established, the ‘insider’ privilege created, in the main, deep, and certainly from the researcher’s perspective, ‘honest’ responses. Equally, the ‘insider’ knowledge was used, where required, to aid a depth of probing. Conversely, relative to the Tamworth LPU interviews, whilst the LPU commander was known to the researcher, all other participants, not so. In these circumstances, the researcher was regarded more an ‘outsider. As a result, the researcher felt a need to further underline the terms of confidentiality, which in turn aided an environment where participants felt able to both express themselves and to provide critical comment, where necessary.
The pre-1998 sample primarily consisted of retired former officers who were interviewed, in the main, in their home environments. Once again most, but not all the participants, had been known to the researcher. In these circumstances, the researcher’s primary challenge was one of keeping participants focused on the area of inquiry, rather than a broader reminiscence. In terms of the police partners interviewed, the prior standing of the researcher appeared to have little bearing, being more readily accepted as an ‘independent’ researcher, albeit the researcher’s former police connections, did on occasions help aid access.

As a matter of record, all prospective participants approached, bar one police officer and two local authority personnel, agreed to participate.

Scale of the research and data capture - The primary research, in the main, was conducted between 2014 -2017, comprising 72 face to face interviews, lasting generally between 50 minutes and one hour; one Skype interview, and two face to face focus groups - totalling 88 participants in total.

Whilst the researcher initially sought transcription service support from their university employer, he quickly determined that this somewhat sterile approach served to dislocate the transcription from the interview ‘atmosphere’ and subtleties. Additionally, transcribers, on occasions, were unable to decipher police acronyms and terminology accurately. As a result, the researcher took sole responsibility for interview transcription. This approach allowed the researcher to pick up on the subtleties of emphasis, expression that occurred during interview. Nonetheless, this was a labour intensive and time-consuming task, which had been initially under estimated:

1. Organise and prepare the data – transcribing interviews, field notes etc.
2. Read through all the data – obtaining a general sense.
3. Apply a coding process.
4. Use the coding process to generate a description of the themes for analysis.
5. Determine how the description and themes will be presented in the narrative.
6. Make an interpretation or meaning of the data.

Data processing

Cresswell’s (2003) six stage data process was strictly followed:

1. Organising the data - A filing system was adopted, both electronically and hard copy, which aided the organization of the data and also provided an electronic safeguard to data security.

2. Read through the data - After each interview the recording was transcribed. Initially I had sought some support via my employer to aid the transcription process, but I quickly determined that the transcriptions undertaken by ‘others’, (14 interviews) were frequently inaccurate and it denied me the opportunity that personal transcribing presents i.e. as part of the analytic process; stimulating reflection in the data; and attention to emerging themes (Noaks and Wincup, 2004).

3. Application of a coding process - A dilemma initially arose as to how to determine a coding process. Given the scale of the research, the researcher sought training in the NVivo software application and attempted to use technology to help aid and manage the complexity of process. However, the rigidity of this system or at least the user’s ability to use the system, was felt to restrict data interpretation. As a result, the researcher abandoned the use of NVivo and adopted an approach of reading and re-reading transcripts, allowing the issues and themes to evolve more organically and without constraint.

4. Coding process- Each script was subject to colour coding based upon both similarities of content and differences, and then these clusters of data were further grouped under draft sub-headings, which developed and matured into substantive themes over time.

5. Determination of how to present; and (6) making an interpretation of the meaning of the data, again was an organic process, involving working and re-
working, seeking to frame the issues and themes within the context of an overall theoretical architecture, aided by feedback from my supervisory team.

Note: The researcher found that the use of a reflective journal/diary proved of immense value throughout. It aided the interview process, serving as a quick guide to previous commentary and issues raised and was particularly helpful when it came to the writing up stage, in order to help formulate and identify ‘key’ issues (Westmarland 2011; Robson, 2002). It also served as the researcher’s own personal thought capture during the entire study.

Limitations of the study

It is accepted that the study is limited to only one police force area and the results obtained do not purport or indeed seek to be viewed as being generalizable. Rather, the research provided an ‘opportunity’ to empirically explore, in-depth, police-partnership activity within the context of a single case-study. However, the results obtained do now present an opportunity for future research to be compared and contrasted. Equally, the research gives voice to actors not previously heard by the academic community.

The results and analysis of the data now follows: Chapter Six, presents the pre-1998 sample framed by the Staffordshire Police Community Enterprise Scheme (SPACE) and Chapter Seven, the post-1998 sample (the contemporary policing landscape).

Note: To help validate and triangulate the primary data gathered (Green et al, 1989; Johnson and Turner, 2003) and indeed the analytical interpretation provided to it by the researcher, a further series of twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted with partner organizations who work alongside the police, including representatives of the county council, district local authorities, other public services, together with the voluntary or third sector with focus upon partners working in the field of youth provision. It was also the considered view of the researcher, that by obtaining the ‘independent’ experience and perceptions of partners who work alongside the police, the approach provides an
opportunity to aid depth of analysis but additionally creates an opportunity for the emergence of new insights and/or alternative considerations to be revealed. However, it is accepted that the partners sample is drawn from the contemporary partnership setting only, due to the research constraint of being unable to identify or access historic partner identities, albeit several participants interviewed had been in post at the time of the original SPACE scheme was still in operation.
Chapter Six: Results and Analysis - Pre-1998 Sample, Staffordshire Police Activity and Community Enterprise Scheme (SPACE) (1983-1999)

Background Information

Staffordshire comprises a resident population of 860,165 (based on 2014 data) although more recently estimated at nearer 1.3 million, and with relatively low levels of unemployment at 0.9 %, despite having previously been reliant on the traditional industries of coal mining and pottery manufacturing, both of which witnessed dramatic decline post the 1980’s (www.Staffordshireobservatory.org). Staffordshire is served by a two tier political structure, comprising Staffordshire County Council covering the vast majority of the geographic landscape, underpinned by nine local district authorities, and Stoke-on-Trent City unitary authority. In terms of political control, the county council has ebbed and flowed between Conservative and Labour Party dominance, but since 2009-to the time of writing has remained consistently Conservative; conversely Stoke-on-Trent City Council, a Labour Party stronghold.

Staffordshire Police

Staffordshire Police is a mid-size shire force, with an annual budget of £118,389 million (2016-17) and at the time of writing, is made up of 2,700 staff of which 1,400 are warranted officers, 240 Police Community Support Officers (PCSO’s) and a further 450 members of the special constabulary (www.staffordshire.org). Staffordshire Police has its headquarters at Stafford, the county town, where it hosts a number of corporate and administrative functions, including major crime investigation, operational support - traffic, human resources, criminal justice administration, training and development, to name but a few. The operational policing map is divided into two broad areas, with the county being split north and south, each area being over seen by a chief superintendent. In turn, the north and south are subdivided into eleven LPU’s, each headed by either an inspector or chief inspector and are considered the main delivery mechanism for the force. LPU’s are
coteronmous to the local authority boundaries. Each LPU is further divided into
neighbourhoods, policed by neighbourhood policing teams (NPT’s) augmented by response
teams, charged with attending to more immediate calls for service. (Please see LPU
structural map at Appendix F)

**Staffordshire Police Activity and Community Enterprise Scheme (SPACE)**

Turning to the results obtained from the pre-1998 research sample, focused upon the
Staffordshire Police Activity and Community Enterprise scheme (SPACE), a programme
providing activities for young people in Staffordshire during the school summer holiday
period, between 1983 and 1999. The overall aim of the scheme was somewhat contested,
however it principally appears to have been marketed as (1) seeking to reduce crime by
constructively occupying the time of young people through engagement provision of
organised activity during the school holiday and (2) to help improve upon police-public
relations (Heal and Laycock, 1987).

SPACE has entered the folklore of Staffordshire and is a scheme, principally associated with
the then chief constable, Charles Kelly (1977-1996). Unfortunately, Charles Kelly died in
early 2015 following a long battle against illness and was not able to be interviewed as part
of this research.

The SPACE scheme ran for sixteen consecutive years, commencing in 1983, albeit early and
discrete derivatives of the scheme can be traced back to the early 1970’s. At its height the
scheme attracted some 25,000 young people, aged between 10 and 16 years, who engaged
in recreational and leisure activities. SPACE was provided on a ‘local’ police divisional/sub-
divisional basis throughout Staffordshire, during July and August each year. The scheme
drew the attention of the H.O., for whom Heal and Laycock (1987) conducted an
evaluation. The scheme was also evaluated by Tyson (1990) a local police inspector,
sponsored by the Police Requirements Support Unit (PRSU). Equally, and of importance to
this thesis, the SPACE programme featured as one of twenty seven exemplars of national
Chapter Six: Results and Analysis – Pre-1998 sample, Staffordshire Police Activity and Community Enterprise Scheme (SPACE) (1983-1999)

‘good practice’, within the H.O. (1990) publication, ‘Partnership in Crime Prevention’, the document that James Morgan (1991) was commissioned to review the police service’s progress towards, as a central aim of his inquiry into police-partnership working at that time (Chapter Three refers).

Against this backdrop, it is somewhat ironic therefore, that within a year of the enactment of the CDA 1998, legislation designed to encourage partnership and collaboration, SPACE was formally dissolved. Additionally, youth engagement via police schools liaison officers, discussed more fully below, was also withdrawn by the force during 1999-2000.

Key findings

A summary of the analysis, reveals:

1. SPACE was, in the main, a single agency led project, representing a partnership between the police and the public, as distinct from a multi-agency partnership.
2. The precise aims of SPACE are contested, but at its core was a desire to portray policing in a positive light, thereby enhancing police legitimacy.
3. SPACE was directly linked to policing strategy, representing an approach sympathetic to community oriented or ‘soft’ policing models, as opposed to more authoritarian or ‘hard’ policing models.
4. Partnership in this instance was not an end in itself. Rather, it was a method or process used to help frame public engagement, create dialogue and to secure ‘active’ public participation.
5. The public appear to have been persuaded by the police as to the merits of SPACE and subsequently endorsed police action by volunteering in considerable numbers, as did other organizations and significantly, the business community.
6. The scheme underlines the importance and criticality of leadership. In particular, attention is drawn to the then chief constable, Charles Kelly, whose
support and ‘authority’ was pivotal to the scheme’s longevity and apparent success.

7. SPACE presents an absence of bureaucracy and was largely a scheme premised upon a very ‘localised’ implementation, which as a result, appears to have facilitated innovation and creativity.

8. No specific training was given to police officers participating in the programme. The scheme relied upon the transferability of ‘generic’ policing skills combined with officer’s ‘local’ knowledge in order to make SPACE a reality.

9. Cultural resistance did exist within sections of the force, which sought to reject the scheme as ‘not real police work’ or an unnecessary ‘operational distraction’.

10. The scheme lacked any sustained evaluation, albeit discrete reports were produced by Heal and Laycock (1987) and Tyson (1990). An absence of evaluation potentially contributed towards the scheme’s longevity, lasting as it did for sixteen years.

11. Finally, the apparent simplicity of SPACE denies an underlying complexity operating, which this analysis more fully explores.

A police-public partnership

Within the definitional paucity of the term partnership, as previously outlined (Chapter One), there is consensus that it involves two or more parties, working together, to achieve a desired outcome; for example the Audit Commission (1998:8) reference partnerships as ‘...otherwise independent bodies agreeing to cooperate to achieve a common goal’. However, the assumption appears to be that partnerships require separate bodies, entities or organizations in order to comprise a partnership. Equally within the literature, in the main, focus is given to police-partnership activities post Morgan (1991) and the CDA 1998 with its emphasis upon multi-agency and inter-agency working. As a result, the literature and broader academic community has tended to discount the ‘public’ as a partner, albeit importance is often attributed within the literature as to the need for public consultation.
But it is argued that consultation and active participation are two fundamentally different concepts; consultation being a process to seek views, whereas participation infers a greater relationship depth and activity taking place between respective parties.

Against this backdrop, and given that SPACE was profiled as an exemplar of partnership good practice within the H.O. publication *Partnership in Crime Prevention* (1990), it was somewhat surprising to find that SPACE was primarily a relationship and partnership between a single agency, namely the police and the ‘local’ public, who actively engaged with and supported the scheme. This is not to suggest that other agencies were not involved. Indeed, the education authorities gave their political backing for school buildings and playing fields to be used, albeit subject to local negotiation, and the various local authorities either part-sponsored or made respective authority provisions, for example, sports centres and swimming pools, available at heavily subsidised rates. Additionally, the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) provided assistance. However, rather than any formal strategic alliances existing, emphasis was being given to the ‘local’ and ‘negotiated’ support the police might be able to secure on the ground.

"The education authority allowed us the schools, but we had no direct dealings with them at all. The schoolteachers finished at the end of July, they were off. They didn’t show any interest in getting involved in SPACE, they didn’t want to know...we didn’t see the Head Teacher at all during the school holidays. He trusted us with that school...We would pay for breakages?" (PC)

"At Tamworth we did have a great relationship with the local authority because they were very forward thinking..., they owned the golf club, so they allowed us to go and use it. I think the Council actually funded the staff who ran the sports centre at Belgrave School... I don’t think we knew it was partnership at the time. They just wanted to help". (Sgt)
Outwardly, at least, SPACE was marketed as a youth engagement activity, intended to constructively occupy young people’s time during the school summer vacation and enable them to experience a range of sporting and leisure activities within a safe and controlled environment i.e. SPACE was ‘sold’ as a community oriented welfare initiative, rather than a crime reduction project (as later reported), which may well have aided its communication and secured public participation. As a consequence, the public appeared to align with the ‘generosity’ and social responsibility being displayed by the police, whom offered to undertake the programme, in the early years at least, as an additional and voluntary activity on their part, undertaken in officers own time. The reality of the voluntary nature of the programme is contested, and clearly changed over time to a position where the vast majority of officers assigned to SPACE did so in duty time; an issue that created considerable tension within the force. Discussed more fully below.

In terms of public support, each year volunteers were sought to help run and supervise the scheme, with adverts and opportunities through local media taken. It should also be said, that this was a period of relative innocence and naivety relative to ‘child safeguarding’ and the vetting of volunteers was minimal, consisting of a partial check against criminal records data. However, the limited scrutiny of volunteers, combined with an overall absence of bureaucracy and non-intrusion into privacy, may have aided the considerable take up of the opportunity, particularly by parents of children in the scheme. It is also of note that many of the police officers interviewed as part of this research, referenced their own partners, spouses and wider family also assisting. The notion of ‘family’ and the ease in which people could volunteer appear to have aided support. Additionally, volunteers developed a bond and ‘team’ spirit with the officers, establishing social groupings amongst themselves.

"Volunteers - usually mums whose kids were on the scheme and some very genuine members of the public who wanted to work with children, wanted to do voluntary work...And people who had a specific interest in a particular thing such as fishing and
they were the ones that would support and organize that or the canoeing for their particular area - they would lead". (Coordinator)

Each of the individual SPACE schemes, of which there were thirty-seven in total, required young people to formally register at their local police station, where an office, usually near the police station front counter, had been made available. The coordinator (nominated police officer) and a small team of public volunteers staffed the office on weekends preceding the programme’s start. All participants were required to pay a one-pound registration fee, a nominal figure that remained constant throughout the sixteen year period of SPACE. Participants were required to gain parental consent and were given a membership card that authorised them to attend activities either free of charge, or at much reduced rates. Additionally, membership provided access to special concessionary bus travel arrangements throughout the county during the period of SPACE.

The size of the schemes varied from locality to locality, some comprising 300-400 members, whereas others, for example the Hanley scheme attracted nearly 3,000.

"Registration, it was all done at the Police Station. Oh yeah, and that was the point really. To get them to come to the police station, yeah. I mean, the school liaison officers used to bring crowds of kids into the police station. Mainly to see the cells you know and the cars if you like". (Supt)

To help promote the scheme, officers attended local schools, placed articles and copy registration forms in local papers and gave media interviews to local news outlets. Indeed, the coverage and contribution given by local media was extensive, SPACE being regarded a ‘good’ news story.

"I had my own slot on the radio station for an hour from 10 to 11 every morning Monday to Friday. During the course of the program. I wasn’t talking for an hour but I was being interviewed if you like, and giving out information for an hour from 10 to
11 o’clock. What’s happening today, where and when and things like that you know”. (Supt)

Additionally, the force press office secured media coverage throughout and sourced regional outlets, including regional television.

From the evidence presented, it would tend to suggest that the social responsibility and ‘offer’ by the police, to look after and constructively occupy young people’s time during the school summer holidays, was seen as an act of ‘good’ by the public, who were willing to support the programme in large numbers; i.e. there was a moral alignment between the public and the police premised upon the needs of local ‘youth’. Equally, given that this partnership consisted of a single agency lead, namely the police, the process of communication was unfettered, the public being familiar with the police as an institution and attributed to it, at that time at least, positive value and apparent trust. Conversely, contemporary concepts of police partnership activity, channelled as they are through CSP’s, an umbrella organization representing significant multi-agency contribution, including the police, to the collective community safety agenda, might not be so clearly recognised or understood by the public. In this instance, however, there was a linear communication from a single organization that took place within a much-localised setting and framed by the concept of community.

The extent of youth participation in the programme was significant and at its peak, attracting some 25,000 young people each year (Heal and Laycock, 1987) augmented by over 1,000 public volunteers (Tyson, 1990). Such data could be interpreted as suggesting the police were able to gain the broader buy-in of the public, who entrusted their young to the police and recognised the merits of the police ‘offer’. Conversely, a more pragmatic and negative interpretation, and one which featured in certain police quarters at the time, particularly by those that felt that this was not a role for the police, was the scheme in effect represented a ‘cheap child-minding service’. Nonetheless, the media interpreted the police ‘offer’ as worthy of support. However, the question still remains, whilst the
‘goodness’ of the scheme and the need to care for young people is uncontested, was this a role for the police? This in turn raises questions as to police intentions and aims the police sought to achieve. In order to explore any police rationale, recourse to the context of policing during the 1970’s and 80’s is first required.

**Police Legitimacy**

As Chapter Two previously denoted, the late 1970’s and early 80’s had witnessed a growing crisis in policing and highlighted tensions in both the political ideologies of the ‘right’ and the ‘left’ as to the ‘crime problem’ (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2001). As previously discussed, the period also witnessed an internal police leadership dispute between those championing authoritarian or ‘hard policing’ models of policing, as opposed to community oriented models or ‘soft policing’. In this context, the urban riots of 1981 and Lord Scarman’s resultant Report (1981) marked a watershed. Police leaders frequently have recourse to the notion of ‘policing by consent’ and in these terms ‘consent’ and ‘legitimacy’ are inextricably linked; consent being an integral component of legitimacy. Scarman, acutely aware of the need for the police to retain legitimacy, concerned by growing police-public disconnect, amongst his many recommendations endorsed a requirement for greater public consultation and engagement by the police with the public (Scarman, 1981). It is against this backdrop that the SPACE scheme is situated.

"I've always firmly believed that in this country, if we believe in community policing, we believe in the support of the community in policing, because without that we can’t operate - then we have to be involved with the community. They have to part of that policing that we undertake". (Supt)

"Policing by consent is a big principle that could easily be taken for granted, so it fed into that for me personally, and then the other thing I think is about young people and their attitude to policing". (PC)
In these terms SPACE can be viewed as a community oriented project, that engaged and actively involved the community, with the aim of caring for and supporting young people, in order to enhance police standing and reputation. Therefore, the scheme sought to positively influence perceptions of young people and their parents, as to the police being viewed as a caring, responsible and supportive institution.

However, SPACE did not sit in isolation. Charles Kelly, chief constable (1977-1996), appears to have been persuaded by the endorsement of Scarman and others towards, ‘soft’ policing models and where active community engagement was to be prioritised. In addition to SPACE an ‘outward’ facing force used a number of different mechanisms to achieve public connection, including for example force sport, where various police teams participated in local leagues and officers ran local boys boxing clubs. The force also had a police brass band, big band and pop group (blue serge) all of which played at local venues and events. Police horse and dogs display teams were represented at local fetes and galas, along with a police cadet gymnastic display team. Additionally, each police station held an annual open day and a major event within the county calendar was the annual police headquarters open day, an event attracting mass audiences.

"Charles Kelly, the chief constable, was determined that it would be a wide remit so people felt that we were part of that community; we were part of that policing which took part in the community...and they understood why we were doing what we did". (Supt)

From an operational perspective, during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s officers worked in a divisional/sub-divisional structure premised upon the allocation of ‘local’ beats and a predominance for foot patrol, augmented by mobile response. Tithe police housing had existed prior to this time, with many officers living within their working locations, however, increasing pressures of demand and concepts of organizational effectiveness and efficiency (H.O. Circular 114/83- see Chapter Three) combined with a changing employment landscape, were starting to gain traction.
Equally, 1984 witnessed the National Miners’ strike impacting upon the county, where mining was a crucially important industry to many of its towns and cities. The miners sought to strike in an attempt to prevent colliery closures, industrial action led by Arthur Scargill, leader of the National Union of Miners (NUM). Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister, sought to oppose the strike and police resources throughout the UK were mobilised in order to deal flying pickets. The bitterness of the dispute is not to be underestimated, leading to violence and fragmentation within communities; all of which had to be policed.

It was also during this period that police ‘independence’ was questioned. The police were seen by many as being aligned to the Thatcher government with accusations of being ‘Maggie’s boot boys’, raised in concern to the robust nature of the police response (Newburn and Neyroud, 2008). However, it is of note, that even during the miner’s strike and the resultant resourcing pressures brought upon the force, the chief constable remained adamant that SPACE would continue throughout, further underlining an importance he attributed to the project:

"What we did was proved right. During the miners' strike we still ran SPACE and bearing in mid there were a lot of collieries in Staffordshire at that time, the miners' strike was quite a big thing here, but the miners kids came and got involved as if nothing had happened". (Supt)

Endorsing the notion of ‘local’ policing, the chief constable was to make a fundamental strategic decision very soon into the strike, refusing to allow outside forces to provide mutual aid into Staffordshire, which clearly created an additional operational strain. However, the chief constable choose to keep policing ‘local’ and in dialogue with the miners, a decision bearing testimony to a ‘community’ oriented outlook.

In furtherance of an ‘outward’ facing force, the chief constable also set up a headquarters based community involvement department, which oversaw community events, including the coordination of SPACE, together with responsibility for press liaison, crime prevention and more latterly, schools liaison. This same department undertook the publication of an
annual community involvement supplement to the chief constable’s annual report, which
detailed officers ‘voluntary’ involvement (mostly unrelated to their police duties) with
‘outside’ organizations, including for example associations with scouts, guides, sporting
clubs, school governor boards and so forth.

In summary, the partnership that was SPACE, primarily a partnership between the police
and the public, was deeply rooted in concern about threats to police legitimacy and a
desire to positively influence the police reputation and standing within the various
communities that comprise Staffordshire. Recourse to ‘community-oriented’ policing styles
and approaches were adopted and where activate engagement and non-enforcement
contact with the public was openly encouraged and valued by the organization.

A confusion of aims

Whilst this research has revealed a relatively clear position and an initial desire, at least, by
the force to use SPACE as a vehicle to enhance police-public relations, de facto police
legitimacy, the police failed to openly and clearly state and record this primary strategic
pursuit. At the same time, during the 1980’s, and running in parallel to SPACE, the H.O. had
started to pursue a more systematic research and evaluation agenda, heavily influenced by
situational crime perspectives, typically using an action research model in pursuit of a
pragmatic ‘what works’ agenda (Mayhew et al, 1976, 1979; Clarke, 1978, 1983; Clarke and
Hough, 1980; Clarke and Mayhew, 1980; amongst others). As a consequence of the H.O.
influence, a reframing of the police performance landscape started to emerge, from its
hitherto traditional position and focus upon crime and crime detection, to a greater
emphasis upon crime prevention and reduction, set within an evidence base requirement
and subsequent objective setting frameworks (Horton and Smith, 1988).

The early years of the SPACE do not appear to have been subject to formal evaluation and
it was not until 1986 and a H.O. review by Heal and Laycock (1987) that any coherent and
articulated aims of the scheme are formally recorded. It interesting to note that within the
H.O. report, SPACE was now primarily aligned to seeking: ‘To reduce crime, both in the short and longer term’, albeit set with a broader relationship context.

Whilst acknowledgement of police–public relationships is given within the report, it is very much ancillary to a primary crime prevention focus. And, it is against this backdrop that there was suspicion, amongst some research participants, that crime reduction had become a convenient hat upon which to hang SPACE and for the force to be able to seek formal acknowledgement as to the scheme’s merits and justification.

"The original aim was one thing, but once the H.O. was interested in it, this was seen then as really getting into the juvenile crime prevention reduction arena and we can hang this on that. It’s giving it more credibility". (Coordinator)

"As far as we were concerned SPACE was a success for us, but the H.O. had got into this regime where everything had to be measured and all that". (Ch/Insp)

The assertion being made here is that SPACE was repackaged or at least allowed to drift during the mid to late 1980’s into a crime reduction framing in order to gain greater appeal and profile of the H.O. and to meet a new performance requirement of policing being set centrally. This is not to suggest that there were not any crime reduction benefits or claims to be made, but rather, as a result of this new framing, the underlying and initial primary focus of SPACE i.e. to improve police–public relationships became secondary. And as a result, created confusion within the force, and as a consequence, questions arose internally as to the schemes legitimacy. Equally, the reframing of SPACE as a crime prevention programme tends in itself to stigmatize young people, inferring that the thousands of young people who participated in the programme might be responsible for crime, a position which was clearly not the case, albeit some young people perceived to be on the cusp of crime were actively encouraged and signposted to participate. Nonetheless, the overwhelming majority of participants would be deemed as law abiding.
It should also be appreciated that at the same time, police performance measurements remained immature and the systems that did exist, were in the main, capable only of collecting relatively basic crime data. As a result, the complexities of capturing public attitudes and perceptions of policing, within the ‘local’ were beyond police reach, albeit the British Crime Survey, a large scale public perception survey, now referred to as the Crime Survey for England and Wales was first undertaken in 1982, but the data largely remained at a macro level.

The criticality of leadership

The examination of the SPACE scheme reveals the qualities of leadership operating at all levels within the organization and in particular by more junior officers, whose local leadership was able to excite and inspire their communities to invest, participate and support the programme. The scheme was predicated upon a ‘local’ implementation. Equally, many of these same officers had to evidence a strength of character in resisting internal cultural challenges associated with what was to be perceived by some as “not real police work”, a subject discussed in detail below.

However, the focus of this particular critique chooses not to explore the breadth of the topic that is leadership, but rather seeks to examine the individual contribution made by three key individuals: Bill Longmore, Gerry Robinson and Charles Kelly. The original concept of the actively pursuing youth engagement within central policing activity came from inspector Bill Longmore, who served between 1957-1987 (retiring as superintendent). Building upon these foundations was detective inspector Gerry Robinson, serving between 1956-1990 (also retiring as superintendent). Finally, the chief constable, Charles Kelly (1976-1996) who became the schemes main sponsor and for whom SPACE was to become his flagship enterprise and epitaph.
The original idea

Longmore was posted to Cannock, a large mining town. He observed, "There wasn't much love lost between the people in Cannock and the police". As an Inspector, he held both seniority and authority within the police and to some extent was in position to interpret his role and contribution, influenced by his own individual belief systems and moral compass. Concerned about the negative police-public dynamic and in attempt to win favour, intuitively Longmore felt ‘compelled’ to engage local youth. He viewed engagement both a pragmatic policing response, premised upon the notion of youth as a potential "problem on the street", but also as a mechanism to reach out to the wider community, thereby aiding police-public relationships. Consequently, he established a five-a-side football competition, based at the local youth club during the summer holidays. His aim was:

"To do something in the summer holidays to try and give the kids something to do and to get to know the police a bit more and build up a relationship".

He describes the scheme as receiving “a terrific response” and of being inundated with local youth wishing to engage. Pleasing from his perspective, members of the public also wished to volunteer in support. Subsequently, and in response to demand, Longmore, in his own time, set up a football team and academy, competing in regional leagues. Originally, the team was named "Cannock Police Boys" but as Longmore jokingly alluded:

"They competed in some of the roughest areas of Birmingham and other teams thought that they were coppers sons and as a consequence upped their game!"

The name was subsequently changed to Peelers FC.

Under Longmore’s direction, the scheme grew into one of the regions’ primary footballing academies, attracting high profile managers and players from across the midland’s elite clubs in support. Ultimately, the scheme was taken over by volunteer’s public/parents and police officers that Longmore had "encouraged" to help out! In addition, each year
thereafter, the police hosted a prestigious midland wide five-a-side a competition, attracting some 400 teams.

Later, Longmore was promoted chief inspector at Stone, a market town in central Staffordshire where once again he developed the idea of actively engaging young people during the holiday period. He ran a series of recreational events, using local school sports facilities. Upon returning to Cannock upon further promotion, he continued his development of youth engagement, and in particular, instigated the development of a local BMX cycle track, securing land from the council, acquiring local builder’s merchant’s contributions and engaged volunteers to help build the venue. The track was of national standing within the world of BMX, a sport newly accepted for inclusion by the Olympic Games.

Throughout Longmore’s various exploits, significant positive media coverage followed, which served to enhance both his own reputation and standing with local communities, but also that of the police.

From small acorns

Charles Kelly was appointed deputy chief constable to the force in 1976, becoming chief constable the following year. Upon taking up post, Kelly became aware of the activities of Longmore and acknowledged his contribution of working with the young and of the positive publicity and public support he had achieved. Kelly clearly influenced by Longmore’s personal impact upon police-public relations, used the internal mechanism of the force Sports and Welfare Committee to launch a requirement for all areas of the force to undertake youth engagement activities, initially for a week, during the summer holiday period. Gerry Robinson, detective inspector, represented Leek Division on the Sports Committee and whom positively responded to the chief constable’s directive.
By his own admission, Robinson had no real sporting background but had previously been a scout leader. Robinson decided to use the scouting concept of ‘bob a job’ to design an activity card that young people could get stamped, as and when they completed an event. Robinson’s idea was to approach all the local sports clubs, associations and groups in his area who might ‘support’ or ‘facilitate’ different aspects throughout a week period during the summer. He then organised a meeting of potential contributors.

"There must have been 30-40 people who came to the police club ... Well we had the fire, the police and the ambulance were the first things we thought of! You know, they might have some spare time to organize something".

It is interesting to note Robinson’s view of the apparent ‘latent’ capacity within these public sector organizations at that time. However, he goes on to declare a wider partnership involvement based upon voluntary association and a desire to support this police lead initiative, involving for example, the local men's bowling club, the archery club, a local military camp who provided shooting facilities, the council who organised as litter pick, the cycling club, and the fire service who organised a country walk. The week’s activities culminated in a trip to Alton Towers, a leisure-entertainment venue within the Leek Division and who were willing to provide ‘free’ access in support. Each young person was required to pay a sum of one pound for the week, which was used to help subsidise bus travel to Alton Towers; transport that had been sourced locally and secured at a heavily discounted fee.

As to the relationship between the police and these various organizations, Robinson notes:

"Everybody was ever so co-operative and wanted to bend over backwards to help... It wasn’t going to cost the police anything, you know it wasn’t going to cost anybody."
Robinson’s comments relative to cost are to be viewed in the context of there being no physical transference of monies, but this is not to suggest that there were no internal costs consumed by those same organizations and businesses. However, the spirit here was one of ‘voluntary’ contribution.

To aid the management and delivery of the programme, Robinson utilised his local crime prevention officers, who came under his control. He also encouraged ‘voluntary’ support from traffic wardens and other members of police staff.

The scheme was originally branded a ‘Youth Activities Week’. Robinson recalls, whilst his colleagues were generally supportive, his detective chief inspector (DCI) was somewhat sceptical and thought it “a bloody waste of time.” However, given the overwhelming public support the week achieved in Leek with over 600 participants and degrees of variable success elsewhere in the county, the chief constable thereafter required Robinson’s template be used with the scheme growing organically, year on year between 1976-1982.

In 1983, the scheme was rebranded by the headquarters community involvement department and re-launched as SPACE (Staffordshire Police Activity and Community Enterprise) and to now embrace a four-week period during July and August. The acronym and branding of SPACE was inspired by the first Houston (USA) shuttle into space and indeed the formal launch of the SPACE coincided with the launch of the space shuttle aircraft in that same year.

Throughout the sixteen years as SPACE, was unequivocal support from the chief constable, who became personally associated with the scheme. Indeed, it was very much seen as “his baby”. And as a result, the hierarchy of the force, under Kelly's ‘leadership’ were directed to align themselves behind the programme. The chief constable required his deputy, who chaired the central headquarters SPACE committee, to personally oversee the delivery of the scheme. In turn, Divisional Commanders were directed “to make SPACE happen”. The compliant and hierarchical/disciplined nature of the service of the day, “ensured commitment” and the resources of the force were made available. As mentioned
previously, the chief constable resisted operational pressures and strain in order to support SPACE, even during the miners' strike (1984-5) and consistently prioritised the importance of SPACE throughout his tenure. The leadership and influence demonstrated by all three key individuals, namely Longmore, Robinson and Kelly was central to the development of the programme and are very associated with the apparent public support the scheme ultimately generated.

On or off duty?

SPACE had initially been staffed by officer volunteers, who were expected to undertake SPACE in their own time, albeit scheme coordinators were given 'duty time' in order to carry out their functions. However, as early as 1984 and against the backdrop of the schemes success in attracting large numbers onto the programme, the pressure for additional resources is revealed within the minutes of the central SPACE committee, chaired by the deputy chief constable:

"Much of last year's programme involved officers working in their own time. He (referring to the deputy chief constable) drew the attention of the deputy Divisional Commanders that they must ensure that operational resources are deployed to assist the scheme where necessary. It was appreciated that many officers did assist in their own time, but primarily it was police work and operational resources must be used". (Staffordshire Police, 1984, SPACE minutes unpublished)

The deputy chief constable, operating in the chief’s name, is clearly underlining at this early juncture, that SPACE was to be regarded as ‘police work’, thereby legitimizing the activity and giving his authority for ‘duty time’ police officers to be utilized. Furthermore, he is explicitly directing, such staff are to be used.

The exact amount of police/staff resources used each year is not a matter of public record, but Heal and Laycock’s (1987) analysis of the 1985 scheme reveals that 186 police officers,
56 civilian staff and 75 special constables took part in the scheme, supported by 943 members of the public and 43 Youth Training Scheme (YTS) apprentices. Tyson (1990) records of the 1989 scheme, 188 regular police officers assisted the programme, supported by almost 1,000 volunteers, 104 Youth Training Scheme apprentices and many special constables giving of their time. This is not to suggest that officers and staff also didn't support in their own time, as clearly many still did.

Whilst it is recognized that the support of the volunteers and YTS was substantial, the ‘operational’ loss of 186-188 officers for four weeks each year, primarily from uniform police patrol and response activity was felt. This situation led to tension existing between those officers who were nominated ‘on-duty’ to participate and those who remained to "do the real police work". Those left on ‘shift’ referenced feeling exposed and vulnerable, as a result of the reduced support.

Cultural resistance and internal pressures

As to whether or not such activity is part of policing and the police mandate, very much depends on one’s interpretation or definition as to what policing is. The general tenets from respondents in support of SPACE, had recourse to the concept of ‘policing by consent’ and of a need to maintain public support and organizational legitimacy. Conversely, those who viewed policing as predominantly an enforcement and response activity and particularly those not directly involved and left behind to do the “real police work”, tended to resent the additional ‘strain’ SPACE created.

"SPACE at that time was bigger than any murder incident you would work on". (PC)

"There were a lot of sceptics in the force who thought it was all a waste of time. They would only do it if they were paid but a lot of others who thought it was a good thing, would come after they had finished duty or even if they were off-duty". (Supt)
However, the externally focused force marketing continued to present the scheme with emphasis upon the voluntary nature of the police contribution; a position which misrepresented the facts. As SPACE grew, the requirement for additional ‘duty-time’ support increased. Local SPACE coordinators, officers, were charged with both designing and scoping the resources required. Resourcing bids were submitted to local management teams, who in turn instructed each shift or department to release ‘x’ number of staff be ‘written off’ in support of SPACE. To fill their quota, each shift/department sought duty-time volunteers, but where an insufficiency of volunteers existed, supervision would direct. However, the process created tension around what was really being valued by the organization. Volunteers were seen by their colleagues as "shirkers" or "skivers", wishing to "duck" the "real police work". This situation was further compounded by a frustration, felt amongst some officers at least, that the portrayal of SPACE as a solely voluntary activity was disingenuous. As a result, internal conversations became somewhat polarized between officers, dependent upon whether or not they participated in SPACE.

Additionally, and maybe not so surprisingly, schemes such as SPACE, with their emphasis on relationship building and a longer term strategic outlook, may not in themselves be in accord with elements of the police culture of which much has been written; culture being as much about attitudes and mindsets (see Skolnick, 1966; Reiner, 2011; Chan, 1997; Muir, 1977, Manning, 1977, Holdaway, 1983 amongst others). Reiner (2010) in particular articulates a typology of police culture that has as its core the characteristics of a sense of mission; action, pragmatism; isolation and solidarity. The eyes through which the cultural perspective of policing may view the world has the potential to operate at both a both a relational level when dealing with other partners, but also to value laden the priorities of the police function itself, which in turn revisits debate relative to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ policing, referred to at the start of this chapter. However, despite the internal cynicism and negativity being expressed by some sections within the force, such criticism does not appear to have leaked out into the public domain or outwardly tainted the positive
external image that the programme attracted. It is to the very tangible and public support SPACE achieved that the discussion moves.

**Local by design**

A recurring theme identified throughout the analysis is the principle of devolvement and ‘local’ interpretation; ‘local’ being central to the schemes operating processes and directly linked to the very considerable voluntary participation by community members and businesses SPACE achieved. The underlying rationale being a scheme designed ‘with’ and ‘for’ the local community and in accord with the community oriented policing outlook adopted by the force at that time i.e. a police-public ‘participative’ model at its core.

In terms of the organizational architecture and mode of delivery, each policing division, of which there was six, had a sub-divisional structure, which in turn supported thirty-seven sub-policing areas, each of which had its own SPACE coordinator. The principle activities of the coordinator are grouped into four areas: 1) overseeing all administrative requirements of the programme, including registration and marketing; 2) designing a programme of activity for the young people; 3) securing voluntary help and support; and 4) obtaining funding to support the programme. The selection of those nominated to undertake the coordinators role appears to have been a somewhat random activity but were generally officers who were identified as having a background or prior experience of working with young people; mainly of constable or sergeant rank.

In the first instance, local coordinators used their own professional contacts, networks and associations, together with other local police links, to reach out to the community for help and support. In essence, they were building not just a programme of activity for young people, but more broadly were building a voluntary partnership, comprising individuals and businesses from the area, who identified with the area/locality and the overall ethos of SPACE. SPACE was seen as a ‘good and worthy cause’ and as a consequence, members of the public, in large numbers, ‘voluntarily’ choose to participate and support. Furthermore,
the police were being endorsed as a ‘credible’, ‘trusted’ and ‘responsible’ body who would take care of their young. Equally, coordinators tended to be ‘high profile’ officers, who were well known within their respective localities and who established, beyond the requirement for engagement, a very personal relationship with ‘their’ community and young people.

A process of devolvement, autonomy and engagement

As previously mentioned, coordinators were of relative junior standing i.e. constables and sergeants. Given an absence of rank, it is noticeable that central directive was minimal, and coordinators were generally left to their own devices; entrusted to not only deliver a relevant programme, but also to secure necessary funding and support. Coordinators also acted as the local ambassadors and advocates of the scheme, establishing a very ‘personal’ relational connection with their communities. In these terms, SPACE was as much personality driven, as reliant upon process.

Indeed, there was an absence of bureaucracy and management intrusion throughout, albeit the political support of both the force executive and local management was apparent. As a consequence of this autonomy, coordinators developed an expertise and ‘authority’.

"I was known as the SPACE man! So, it was my Superintendent at the time (named), you have got to remember was a CID man; lock ‘em up, throw the key away, get them slammed up, then all of a sudden there’s this jumped up community PC who’s becoming quite an authority, because the chief constable says you will do this". (PC)

The task of securing community ‘support’, generally commenced with the formation of a small committee or working group, comprising ‘key’ individuals and organizations whom coordinators identified as being of value and would potentially aid the delivery of the programme. ‘Key’ individuals also included gaining/securing mutual support from a small
number of ‘like-minded’ police officers and staff, who had bought into the concept and the perceived merits of SPACE and with whom the coordinators could share the administrative and organizational burden.

"There was also a policewoman on restricted duties who helped from time to time in the office. Beyond that it was cajoling people to volunteer to help out in their own time. Friend and families of police officers also helped out together with members of the public; specials were coming in and helping in their own time as were members of existing police staff". (Insp)

In its early formulation, programme design was an ‘organic’ process, based upon coordinators making local contact with individuals and organizations whom they considered might be able to help. The scheme ran from Monday to Friday each week and included both daytime and evening activities. Local programmes were augmented with central force support for visits to Alton Towers, the Sun Centre at Rhyl, a train trip to York and outward-bound camps organised by the force training department. Examples of the breadth of activities included:

"We could have their [City Council] swimming pools and stadium for athletics and sport. No charge". (Supt)

"We had a cinema every Friday....shooting with the military...running and cycle races". (PC)

"We put things on in the evening and through my contacts at Radio Stoke ...we used the Town Hall for discos and pop concerts". (Supt)

As SPACE matured over time, a ‘draft’ programme template emerged each year based on the previous year’s activities and responses, which aided administration and planning. Albeit the programme was designed locally, there was a requirement for the individual scheme proposals to be approved by the SPACE central committee. However, rather than
seeing this requirement as an imposition, the coordinators, tended to view this stipulation as an opportunity for the sharing of ‘good practice’. Indeed, they were grateful for the political support from headquarters, which in turn eased any local management politics that might have arisen.

**Sponsorship and local business**

Unlike the subsequent difficulty that CSP’s have historically found in attracting both engagement and contribution from business (H.O. 2011; Gill, 2013), there is overwhelming evidence, in this instance, of ‘local’ business commitment and sponsorship.

The coordinators wrote, what they anecdotally refer to as "begging letters" to local businesses seeking voluntary contributions or alternatively personally visited them. Companies that felt able to support, either made financial contribution, offered heavily reduced rates for the services they provided or gave prizes. Larger companies, such as JCB supported the programme and were only too willing to be associated with it. JCB gave significant financial contribution but also sent its apprentices to help out as supervisors of the programme.

Overall, the ‘entrepreneurial’ skills of the officers is evident, combined with the standing the police appeared to have within communities, encouraged businesses to be associated with and supporting this perceived ‘good and worthy cause’. ‘Local’ business was happy to be cobranded and associated.

"It’s not like you’ve got a statutory duty, or you have a moral duty to buy into this - this is something that was very local at their level, they were happy to engage and they liked to be associated with it. It was their own community - it was their own kids going on it". (Coordinator)
"The money we had donated from the companies was spent on equipment, like bats, balls things to keep them going - games basically... we got some amazing deals...Basically wherever we went, we never got turned down". (PC)

However, there were also examples provided of an implied ‘obligation’ that business might feel because it was the ‘police’ doing the asking!

"All coordinators sent them some ‘begging letters’...So the funding came in and it as quite staggering really - thinking cynically a manager of a company might think we send the police some money we might get a better service! But it worked". (PC)

"Funding was a bit of a nightmare, but we were very good at knocking ticket prices down to ridiculous levels!" (Coordinator)

In addition to local businesses, the various local schemes themselves generated funds in advance of the programme each year, undertaking car boots sales, car washing, raffles, organising second-hand sales, running disco’s and so forth. These activities, whilst overseen by the local coordinator, were generally run by public volunteers and young people themselves.

It is difficult to provide an accurate assessment of the scale of the finances secured from the range of sources involved, due to an absence of record. However, Heal and Laycock (1987) note that during the 1985 scheme, income generated totalled £179,452 with an expenditure of £163,827. However, these same authors make no reference to the ‘in-kind’ services and support from local business and other organizations that was clearly secured as evidenced within this thesis.

From a broader financial perspective, there was a considerable outlay of ‘on-duty’ police resources with its resultant cost. There is, however, an absence of record once again. Given the scale of police resourcing committed, it is somewhat surprising to say the least, particularly given the external scrutiny that policing attracts, that the police financial
contribution has not been more formally commented upon within records. However, the absence of financial information appears to sit within a wider context of a general absence of bureaucracy overall, including monitoring and evaluation of the scheme (discussed more fully below).

**The SPACE Carnival**

Whilst the thirty-seven local schemes comprised the main body of SPACE, the culmination and climax of each year's activities was marked by a carnival, held at the county showground, Stafford, during late August each year. Once again local sponsorship and business involvement is clearly evident. The county showground, a quasi-commercially run organization, albeit within the county council portfolio, was a venue provided free. SPACE participants throughout the county attended, with local schemes providing transport and supervision support. The carnival was the pinnacle of SPACE, attracting 15,000 attendees each year.

The responsibility of organising the carnival rested with the traffic department. An inspector was identified as a coordinator to undertake the responsibility alongside their other operational duties. A former inspector and coordinator recalls:

"The superintendent called me and said `oh yes and we need somebody to take over running the SPACE carnival, what do you think about doing that?' . I wasn’t too keen really and I thought what the hell, I don’t know whether I really want to do that and then he said `well you are doing it!; As was the day". (Insp)

The principle of autonomy and devolvement of responsibility to allow freedom of programme design etc. remained constant, and like their divisional counterparts, the carnival coordinator accepted the absence of a budget and the need for them to self-fund, via sponsorship and income generation activities. In this instance, additional monies were able to be secured by the coordinator renting out ‘pitches’ to fair ground operators and
commercial refreshment outlets. The only stipulation headquarters made was that there was to be ‘no charge’ to the public at the point of entry to the carnival.

The process of writing "begging letters" to potential sponsors continued and unlike the local divisional schemes, broader nationally based companies were prepared to support the event including W.H.Smiths, Midland Bank, Barclays Bank, National Westminster Bank, Landrover, along with many local companies who had bought advertising space within the carnival event programme.

"Any budget had to be raised through sponsorship...some firms gave £200 or £300 and they did that on a yearly basis. They continued to do it...I suppose we have to a certain degree lost a bit of reputation haven’t we? But I think at that time, you know the police were still very well thought of...people wanted to be associated with it". (Insp)

The positive reputational portrayal of policing at that time and the nature of SPACE resulted not only in direct financial support, but also the securing of major event attractions.

"We had the Red Arrows...The parachute Red Devils...I contacted the Rover Group and they had got a link in with a guy called Swift and he used to do stunts in Rover cars...they were happy to provide his services and pay". (Insp)

The breath of voluntary support for the carnival included the army, navy, air force, fire service, ambulance - St John’s, military and local bands to name but a few. The centre arena events included, for example, a police dog demonstration, dance groups, marching band contest, police horse display, parachute team display and so forth. A series of sporting competitions and events were also held on the day with prizes and trophies being donated by local companies. The carnival was supported by national and local television celebrities including, for example Bob Carolgees and ‘Spit the Dog’ and John Caine - a
Central Television presenter (SPACE programme 1984 - unpublished). Regional television and media also extensively covered SPACE and BBC Radio Stoke were present along with other local radio stations, covering the event live throughout.

**A strategy of youth engagement**

Whilst SPACE deliberately targeted police engagement with young people, such engagement did not sit in isolation, but as has been described above, SPACE is positioned within a broader strategic context and where both community and ‘participative’ policing approaches were emphasized. Integral to this strategy was a focus upon police-public relationships and where positive involvement with young people was given prominence and value.

Prior to the formal launch of SPACE in 1983, police engagement with young people had generally been undertaken on a piecemeal basis by local area beat officers. During the late 1970’s and early 80’s some local area beat officers had independently linked into schools and had affinity with local youth clubs, but this was ad hoc and unstructured.

"Rural police officers, don’t want to say had more time but we knew an awful lot of people and used to go around to the schools...when I was doing the schools I used to go to each individual area officer - get into your local schools - it’s a mine of information". (PC)

However, against the backdrop and apparent ‘success’ and public support for SPACE, the chief constable during 1984 appointed seventeen dedicated constable school liaison positions to work within the divisional policing structure across the county. It is also interesting to note that at this time chief constables throughout England and Wales were also being encouraged by government, to engage in such activity and in 1986 the Education Act of that same year explicitly sought to foster police - school liaison. Section 18 and 19 of the Act stipulated that both head teachers and school’s governors were to:
...have regard to ...any... representations which are made... by the chief officer of police and which are connected with his (sic) responsibilities` (in Menter, 1987:68).

However, the interpretation of what police-school liaison actually looked was left to local interpretation. Within the Staffordshire context, officers were aligned, in the first instance at least, to a number of schools across the county and worked within the role on a full-time basis. Principally, the appointed officers acted as a conduit between the police and schools, liaising with students, parents and teaching staff, as and when required, but also delivered personal safety inputs within the classroom, covering such topics as bullying, ‘stranger danger’ and drug and alcohol abuse.

Initially school’s liaison officers were line managed within Division, but line management was subsequently transferred to the headquarters-based community involvement department, who now oversaw more ‘corporate’ responses to schools, albeit the officers remained locally based. The school’s liaison officers were to become central figures within the SPACE scheme and in the main, became the local SPACE coordinator.

"Police liaison officers were known by all the pupils, all the kids in the town, in the community... PC so and so used to go into school, and they knew him/her and they saw him/her when they were off duty in the town. You know, he would be shopping in the supermarket and they would know who he/she was, wouldn’t they". (Supt)

"It was unbelievable...school’s liaison officers - PC’s...They were properly selected, committed and given the training...Yes teachers can stand up and say you should do this or do that but that is a teacher pupil relationship. Someone coming in from outside has different relationship". (PC)

What can be stated with some authority, as evidenced within this research study, is that the role of the school’s liaison officers as SPACE coordinators was significant and officers
were now able to sustain and build upon relationships established and developed whilst on SPACE throughout the year. In terms of the relationship established between officers and young people whilst on SPACE, commentaries included:

"I can’t prove it. I think it breaks down boundaries. I think it’s got a common sense sort of relationship, it’s got to". (Sgt)

"They (young people) did become more aware of what policing was all about and the police did get involved with the kids and there was some sort of coming together, a gelling together". (Insp)

"The kids were brilliant - from going to driving past kids in all the rough areas, they would stop the car to stop and talk. They probably were scared of the police originally, but then that went, and they became more sociable towards you, even the kids that were off the wall". (PC)

The general positive tenets of these statements are also supported by Tyson’s 1990 review that sought to explore the feelings of the young people towards the police. Tyson reports an enhanced confidence in the young people that they would be more likely to approach the police in the future, should the need arise, as a result of having been on SPACE.

Overall, the issue being emphasized here is that SPACE, whilst being a significant investment in its own right and specifically aimed at youth engagement, needs to be viewed as sitting within a broader police strategic context that prioritized and invested in developing relations with young people as core policing business. Hitherto such activity, where it did exist within the force, had been on an ad hoc and inconsistent basis, but was now being brought centre stage by the chief constable, who sought to legitimize and mainstream the activity as "real police work".

As a matter of record, schools liaison officers remained in post until 1999/2000, when following a change of chief constable, during 1997 and a subsequent force restructure,
during 1998, witnessed the ending of the headquarters community involvement department and a refocusing of force strategy. The impact or otherwise of police schools liaison officers within the academic literature is contested territory, and is not the primary focus of this thesis (see Hopkins, Hewstone and Hantzi, 1992, amongst others).

An absence of evaluation and performance frameworks

The complexity that the study of SPACE reveals has generally been denied in its subsequent reporting, and as a consequence, there has been a tendency for the scheme to be both misunderstood and overly simplified. Fundamentally, and laying at the heart of this confusion appears to have been the inability of the force, particularly at the commencement of the scheme, to clearly articulate and openly declare the scheme’s aims and purpose. As has been outlined previously in this chapter, the strategic quest for police legitimacy and use of SPACE as a ‘participative’ mechanism in order to help engender greater public support and engagement with the police, is clearly underlined by the research participants. However, the resultant pressure emerging from the H.O.’s re-shaping of the police performance landscape during the early and mid-1980’s, with its emphasis upon evidence and impact, in a quest to identify ‘what works’, appears to have unduly influenced the reframing of SPACE. Subsequently SPACE was presented primarily as a youth crime prevention activity and where any enhancement to police-public relationships, was of secondary consideration. This situation was also compounded by a need for the force to be able to ‘justify’ the schemes existence, given its scale and the considerable resource investment made, but beyond police crime statistics there was a general absence of alternative measurement frameworks available at that time.

Against this backdrop, it is not so surprising therefore, that the H.O. evaluation of SPACE (Heal and Laycock, 1987) almost exclusively examines the scheme through the prism of the prevention of crime, encouraged by the force wishing to ‘justify’ the scheme’s existence. In their study Heal and Laycock (1987) quote the primary aim of the scheme as being ‘To reduce crime, both in the short and longer term’. Whilst their report also alludes to a police
desire to improve relationships with the young and their parents, this is very much treated as ancillary to the primary crime focus and with a total absence of any data pertaining to police-public relationships. Rather, the sole focus of the report is upon attempting to evidence any impact upon crime during the school holiday period.

The measurement of crime as a sole measure of impact for the scheme in itself is contentious, inferring as it does that young people on the scheme either commit or are likely to have committed crime. And yet the reality was that the scheme was open to all young people in the county. The framing of SPACE, primarily as a crime prevention or reduction initiative, isn't borne out by the audience the scheme ultimately attracted. In essence, the scheme was open to all young people aged between 10 and 16 years, although the probation service did ‘target’ and ‘direct’ certain groups. Equally, the police did seek to encourage young people who had come to police notice either as a result of conviction or police caution to attend, but their attendance was not mandatory and the overwhelming majority of young people on the scheme had not previously come to police notice and in the main those on the cusp of crime represented less than 10% of all attendees (Heal and Laycock, 1987).

"It was never a case of are you on the SPACE, but rather why aren't you on the SPACE scheme? Because it was open to everybody - there was no restriction". (Insp)

"The scheme wanted to attract children from troubled backgrounds and would engage. We would have funded tickets put to one side for them so they could go to Alton Towers etc without the parents having to subsidize. But as the scheme went on it attracted all and was considered by some as a very cheap form of child-minding for the well-off". (Coordinator)

However, putting to one side these concerns, an examination of the methodology to assess any potential upon crime, adopted by Heal and Laycock, is also revealing in terms of its limited and partial scrutiny. Indeed, their sole analysis was predicated upon a narrow
classification of crime, which included burglary, theft of and from motor vehicles, shop theft and criminal damage. The inference presumably being, that there is greater propensity for young people to commit these crime types as opposed to other crime types. However, no justification or explanation for this is provided within the report and from the police statistics examined. Moreover, the age of offender was not a matter of record. The police statistics were then in turn compared to those of three neighbouring forces. Heal and Laycock’s analysis highlights that recorded crime in Staffordshire did on the whole reduce in August each year between the period 1983-1985 with burglary down 10%, theft from motor vehicles 14%, theft of motor vehicles 6% up, shop theft 16% down and criminal damage 4% down. However, reductions in crime were also experienced by the comparator forces, although the rate of reduction in Staffordshire was more pronounced.

Within a ‘discussion’ section of the same report, its authors go on to postulate as to other potential factors beyond SPACE that might have potentially impacted upon recorded crime levels, which included, recognition that offending during August is nationally traditionally low when compared to other months; potential changes in police recording practices; and an absence of police from their stations during August being greater than normal. In addition, suspicion existed, within the force, that there was active encouragement being given to a manipulation of the crime figures, with crimes being “held back” for recording and therefore not therefore not being included in the August records. Nonetheless, Heal and Laycock concluded:

‘There are, however, signs of an effect on crime in Staffordshire and the results, while far from conclusive, are encouraging and warrant a further study’. (Heal and Laycock, 1987:9)

It is of note that no further study was undertaken in these terms. And, whilst no data is provided by Heal and Laycock relative to seeking to assess any impact of the scheme on police-public relations, they still felt able to declare:
'There is little doubt that the SPACE scheme is extremely successful in attracting young people in Staffordshire. It is also popular with the public and is making a positive contribution to the relations between police and public.' (Heal and Laycock, 1987:11)

A subsequent qualitative study was undertaken between 1987-1990 by Tyson (1990). Tyson, whilst still recognizing the potential of the scheme to positively impact upon crime also notes a further aim of the project and to quote Tyson directly: ‘And (maybe even more importantly)’ was to bring the whole community in closer’ (Tyson 1990:3).

Tyson’s inquiry alternatively sought to examine: 1) the views of young people towards the police on the scheme; 2) the extent SPACE was contributing to better police-public relations and 3) police officer attitudes towards the scheme. Tyson surveyed 475 young people, 259 of whom had been on the scheme and 216 whom had not; And 152 officers of which just over half had assisted in the scheme. In summary, Tyson concludes, overwhelming support was given by the young people for SPACE as a mechanism for them to better get to know the police and his survey results evidenced more positive attitudes towards the police as a result: 82% of those surveyed stating ‘they would be more willing to help the police in the future’ as a result of SPACE. From the police perspective Tyson records 70% of officers felt the scheme to be of relevance, although concern was raised as to the internal resourcing pressures the scheme created. However, less confidences was expressed by officers as to potential longer term police-public relationship benefits and only 29% indicating that ‘increased public support’ might result.

Apart from these two partial studies i.e. Heal and Laycock (1987) and Tyson (1990) no further published evaluation appears to have taken place. What is interesting to observe therefore, is that scheme lasted for sixteen years, largely in an absence of clear performance evidence, however judged? Equally, the ‘independence’ of the chief constable and his ‘authority’ to interpret the local police mandate appears to have dampened any external scrutiny and holding to account for resource utilization, despite
H.O. Circular 114/83 and greater calls for ‘efficiency and effectiveness’, witnessed during the Conservative government administration of 1979 to 1987. However, it could be argued that the absence of justification, in itself aided the longevity of the scheme and provided an environment for longer term-based initiatives to take hold. Conversely, there is also a debate to be had as to whether the resultant performance frameworks and bureaucracy of ‘accountability’ (Tilley, 2004), particularly which followed under New Labour (1987-2010) and required of CSP’s post 1998, with its emphasis upon the ‘here and now’ and evidence of ‘quick wins’, might have tended to prevent long term initiatives such as SPACE, a discussion the author will return to in Chapter Eight.

**An ending of SPACE and a change of direction**

During the mid to late 1990’s, the public sector, including the police, were facing significant government fiscal constraint, with increasing pressure for and evidencing of ‘economy’ and ‘value’ being required. Such financial pressures were also felt by other partners and agencies and as a result, their capacity to provide voluntary or uncharged services, which had previously aided the SPACE programme, were now being withdrawn or charge levied. Equally, the resourcing pressure felt by the police resulted in more critical and dissenting internal voices, with SPACE viewed by many, as having become too big and creating ‘unnecessary’ operational strain. SPACE for some officers at least, had become little more than a “glorified child minding service” for those middle class young people who were always predisposed towards more positive views of the police anyway and any claims of crime reduction by the force were at best overstated and at worst, a deliberate manipulation.

Additionally, regulation pertaining to the safeguarding children and young people, combined with growing awareness and the impact of Health and Safety legislation, particularly in light of national tragedies involving young people involved in outdoor pursuits, for example, the Lyme Bay school canoe tragedy (Independent 24th March, 1993) where supervision of young people drew scrutiny. At the same time, there was a growing
feeling within the force, that constructively occupying young people’s time during the summer holidays was now the responsibility of other agencies and organizations, particularly against the backdrop of the election in 1997 of New Labour in 1997 and a changing attitude and approach towards the crime problem. Consequently, the chief constable, Charles Kelly, reluctantly agreed for the scheme to come to an end, however the ‘formality’ of ending SPACE was to be left for the next chief constable, John Giffard, CBE, QPM, appointed in 1998.

The superintendent within the community involvement department, charged by the new chief to liaise with the local authorities with a view to them taking over the scheme, found local authorities to be suspicious of the police ‘offer’, ultimately rejecting it:

"The attitudes of the chief executive's and head of departments of the councils is that you are just trying to dump it. And that’s what we were doing. We had had enough of it and couldn't sustain it and were now trying to dump it. It was sad".

(Supt)

Upon appointment, the new chief constable was to quickly make his mark and establish a change in strategic direction, with emphasis upon crime performance and a new delivery structure framed around BCU’s and LPU’s. The disbanding of the headquarters community involvement was to swiftly follow and in 1999 schools liaison, as a function, was now aligned to the responsibility of the headquarters ‘criminal investigation department’(CID).

The then schools liaison coordinator recalls the new crime superintendent visiting his office:

"The door flings open and he [Detective Superintendent] walks in and he says ‘I've got to make cuts’. I said, ‘oh have you sir’. He said, ‘and you come under CID now’. I said ‘Do we? And he said ‘yeah, yeah, they've had amalgamations and you are mine
and I've got to make cuts. Now where would you make the cuts? ’ I thought you arrogant twat. He said, ‘because we lock people up you see!’ (PC)

In support of the schools liaison officers account, the former superintendent within community involvement also recounts a conversation with the new chief constable:

"They (schools liaison officers) were doing a dammed good job. Then all of a sudden it was stopped... the new chief said, ‘well that’s not our job, we are not teachers’. I’m sorry but it absolutely misses the point”. (Supt)

SPACE formally came to an end, running for the last time in 1999. Subsequently, a limited number of councils did seek to provide some leisure activity for local young people during the school summer holiday, but this was now being run on a commercial footing and independently from the police. It remains a matter of conjecture that had the scheme been properly evaluated for both its impact an outcome, then it might have been saved from the culling process, at that time.

**Chapter conclusion**

This results section highlights an underlying complexity of what, at first sight, may seem a relatively and basic activity, police-youth engagement. Within the academic literature, partnerships are seen as requiring two or more ‘independent’ bodies, however, contrary to this ‘generalised’ position, SPACE somewhat uniquely, presents the police and the public as the dominant bodies within a relationship. The precise aims of SPACE are contested, but at its core appears to have rested a desire by the force to portray policing in a positive light, thereby enhancing police legitimacy. In this instance, partnership became the vehicle to help create dialogue and to secure an ‘active’ public participation. SPACE can be viewed as transformational, based upon the ‘selling’ of an ideal and aspiration, framed by social responsibility. In this instance, appeals to community was one of self-interest - it was ‘their’ young.
Importantly, SPACE was directly linked to policing strategy. Strategic alignment existed between the partnership activity being undertaken and the consensual policing philosophy or ‘soft’ policing model being pursued. Fundamental to the strategy, was to place youth engagement centre stage and to deem it ‘core’ policing. The project challenged police cultural belief systems, requiring strong leadership and a very personal commitment by the chief constable.

SPACE presented an absence of bureaucracy. It is interesting to note that whilst the county’s education authorities endorsed SPACE, arrangements were generally left and negotiated at the local level. Indeed, most striking as a whole, was the lack of formal countywide inter-agency dialogue. In effect, SPACE was a series of discrete local youth activity programmes, unified under a single corporate branding. The much-localised nature of SPACE, combined with a single agency lead i.e. the police, appears to have aided communication and clarity of message.

No specific training was given to police officers participating in the programme; rather the scheme relied upon the transferability of ‘generic’ policing skills combined with officer’s ‘local’ knowledge to make SPACE a reality. Central to the scheme’s ‘success’ and in recruiting support, was the role of local SPACE coordinators, who created a very ‘personal’ relationship with ‘their’ public.

Somewhat surprisingly, given that the programme lasted sixteen years, was that SPACE failed to attract any deep or sustained evaluation, albeit it briefly attracted the attention of the H.O. (1987). Due to an absence of evaluation, evidence as to the effectiveness or otherwise of the programme is not established. However, despite such lack of evidence, within the folklore and memory of the county, SPACE remains within the public consciousness, despite ending in 1999.

In conclusion, the study and analysis of SPACE provided an opportunity to explore a ‘voluntary’ police-partnership, premised in this instance upon ‘youth engagement’, in order
to help illuminate and bring focus to the mechanics, workings and motivation of partnership working by the police, prior to the enactment of the CDA, 1998.

The study now turns to the contemporary police-partnership environment (2014-2017) within the same force.
Chapter Seven: Results and Analysis - Post-1998 Sample, Contemporary Police Partnerships (2014-17)

Staffordshire Police Overview

This results chapter focuses upon the post-1998 research sample, based upon Staffordshire Police’s involvement in partnership and youth engagement between the period 2014-2017. The research sought to embrace the force executive and headquarters perspectives, but also provides an in-depth analysis of police-partnership activities at the local level, within Tamworth LPU.

At the commencement of this research in 2011, the concept of PCC’s remained solely within the thinking of the then Conservative shadow cabinet and grew from the product of an interim report into policing the party had commissioned in 2007 (Conservative Party 2007) (Chapter Four). In November 2012 Matthew Ellis, a local Conservative politician was elected PCC for Staffordshire and in 2016 he successfully stood for re-election. Given this significant change to police governance, this chapter also encompasses an examination of the PCC’s influence and reach within police-partnerships.

Key findings

A summary of the emerging analysis more fully laid out in this chapter, reveals:

1. There exists high levels of complexity and bureaucracy associated with partnership delivery structures, that serves to ‘mystify’ partnership within specialist technical settings, thereby legitimatising the professionalization of issues and problems.

2. The separation of issues to specialist forums has, in the main, reduced police engagement with young people primarily to settings of authority and control. The formality of partnership, combined with political direction by successive governments, has encouraged the police to withdraw from the softer ‘service’
elements of its hitherto remit, including youth engagement, which previously helped aid public perception of the police and therefore, police legitimacy.

3. There has been a strengthening of the role and influence of the local authority within the crime and disorder arena, as a result of central government imposed strategic planning requirements for local authorities to coordinate ‘joint planning’, combined with an inability of the police to provide continuity of representation at the partnership table, due to frequent staff turnover. As a result, there has been movement towards Morgan’s (1991) recommendation that the local authority should be the lead agency for crime, disorder and community safely, albeit a recommendation formally rejected by successive governments.

4. There has been a growing influence of the role of the PCC within the partnership arena, and as a result, new questions of partnership governance are posed.

5. The emphasis within contemporary police-partnership activity has been to situate itself within a broader network of interconnectivity within a multi-agency framework. Greater emphasis is now given to reactive ‘joint’ service response and multi-agency delivery, rather than to proactive longer-term problem solving. Equally, there has been an appetite for the development of co-located partnership structures in order to better respond to call for service, a trend we might call the ‘operationalization of partnerships’.

6. Partnership has become an ‘assumed’ (de facto) way of working within policing and as a result, there has been an absence of consideration of its links to policing strategies and models.

7. The notion of professionalism, autonomy and individual interpretation granted of police leadership, combined with concepts of ‘operational independence’, have created a tendency for individualistic interpretations of the local policing mandate to pervade. This position, combined with the ‘discretionary’ aspects of
policing, has tended to work against the adoption of more systemised, rational and evidence-based strategy making.

8. Surprisingly, given previous academic commentary, the response of police culture to partnership working is generally warm and embracing, but the culture still remains action centred and therefore largely reactive. However, a perceived police cultural defensiveness was viewed negatively by partners.

9. Whilst structure and process are important, overwhelmingly participants referenced the requirement for a ‘quality’ of personal relationship within partnerships. However, undermining relationship building, is the inability of the police to provide consistent representation, due to organizational flux.

10. The government’s austerity measures, post-2010, have generally been absorbed by unilateral action by each of the state’s organizations, rather than seeking to work more cooperatively together. Limited evidence is presented of austerity stimulating longer-term strategic planning.

11. There remains a challenge and difficulty as to how to effectively assess individual performance of organization’s contribution and impact within partnership. However, within Staffordshire, a new direction is currently being explored. This is discussed below.

**The bureaucratization of partnership**

The CDA 1998 and subsequent legislation, combined with central policy and directives witnessed during the New Labour administration (1997-2010), led to the development for the state’s agencies to participate in joint partnership and planning activity, framed by the requirements for LAA’s and the formation of LSP’s (Chapter Four). However, post-2010 and overseen by successive governments, there has been a loosening of the previously imposed central mandate for ‘joint-planning’ and associated planning frameworks. There now exists a greater degree of autonomy, which has encouraged local interpretation and determination of need, in line with a Conservative localism agenda, albeit certain statutory requirements and responsibilities still exist i.e. local authorities are still charged with
coordinating ‘joint’ local and countywide strategic planning. Consequently, Staffordshire has reframed and stream-lined its ‘joint-planning’ activity, albeit a complex web of interconnected and thematic based partnership clusters remains.

A network diagram of the county’s partnership arrangements is appended at Appendix G.

In broad terms, there exists a hierarchy of joint-partnership planning boards, overseen by the lead Staffordshire Strategic Board (SSB) comprising as it does of the chief executives’ of both the county and district councils, chief officers of the, fire, police and probation services and their respective authority oversight, including the PCC, together with the lead representative for NHS England. This board takes a holistic and strategic overview of the county’s needs and priorities. Sitting beneath this principal board lay two key sub-boards: (1) the Local Enterprise Board, focused upon economic regeneration and representing local businesses; And (2) the Health and Wellbeing Board, overseeing direct health and social care responsibilities, but more recently includes a far wider interpretation encompassing the following thematic groupings: building resilient families, terrorism prevent work, domestic abuse, safeguarding of both adults and children and crime, disorder and community safety. Each has its own thematic board that feeds back into the primary Health and Wellbeing Board. The Health and Wellbeing Board comprises local political representatives, commissioning groups and other health professional leads and somewhat uniquely, the chief constable who negotiated a seat at the board in order to be able to seek to influence the remit of the board, as outlined above. Health and Wellbeing Boards are a product of the coalition government during 2012, who sought to ensure local authorities took a stronger role in shaping local health services, a responsibility enshrined in the Health and Social Care Act, 2012.

Specifically in relation to crime, disorder and community safety and sitting beneath the Health and Wellbeing Board is a thematic strategy group, known as the ‘Safer and Stronger Communities Steering Group’ (SSCSG) chaired by the PCC and attended by representatives
of the nine district Community Safety Partnerships (CSP’s), Stoke on Trent CSP and other strategic leads.

Directly relevant to this thesis, it is of note that whilst there is a children’s and young people’s strategic board, this is primarily concerned with child ‘safeguarding’ issues rather than any broader interpretation of the needs of young people and is not directly linked to the Safer and Stronger Communities Group, chaired by the PCC. Furthermore, an additional layer of complexity exits, in that many of these planning structures are mirrored at district and unitary authority levels and feed back into the countywide arrangements. For example, each of the local districts is required to publish a Community Safety Plan by virtue of the requirements of the CDA 1998 which feed back into the countywide Safer and Stronger Communities Group planning and consideration.

By way of example of a local community safety plan and delivery structure, the Tamworth CSP (2014-17) declares its overall aim to be: ‘To reduce crime and disorder and improve community safety in the Borough of Tamworth’. An introductory section to the plan, authored by the council chief executive highlights amongst other issues, ‘Statistics show that we have the highest proportion of young people amongst all the districts in the county which presents us as a partnership with a number of challenges’ (Tamworth CSP, 2014:2). The chief executive also seeks to celebrate the partnerships ‘declared’ contribution to reducing recorded crime over the previous 10 year period, but cautions: ‘A real challenge facing the partnership is the fact that despite this continued downturn in overall crime locally, the community’s poor perception of crime and safety are at a disproportionate high level’ (Tamworth CSP 2014:2).

The plan details the challenges facing the area and in response identifies six strategic priorities: (1) Tackling priorities pertinent to five crime hot spot areas, with emphasis on reducing crime; (2) Young people as offenders/perpetrators and victims of crime and anti-social behaviour; (3) To reduce reoffending of adults and young people; (4) Protecting
vulnerable people; (5) To reduce harm caused by substance misuse; And (6) To reduce the fear of crime and increase perceptions regarding their personal safety.

In order to oversee delivery against these priorities, ‘Task and Finish Groups’, comprising representatives of the broader partnership membership, have been constituted under each priority heading, who are charged with developing actions plans, projects and monitoring delivery against the agreed plans. The Task and Finish Group reports into the Responsible Authority Group (RAG) of the CSP which in turn, reports to the broader Tamworth Strategic Partnership.

A diagram of the Tamworth LSP/CSP structure can be found at Appendix H.

The complex bureaucracy presented of agencies and ‘professional groupings’ clustered as they are around administrative labels such as crime, health and wellbeing, safeguarding and so forth is very much in accord with Foucault’s (2011) analysis of modern administrative states. It is interesting to note that there has been a framing and organization of issues around which experts are clustered and requiring the channelling of knowledge through defined and specialist prisms. Consequently, there is a potential danger that the complexities and interconnectedness of issues and social problems might not be fully recognised and potentially lead to and indeed reinforce silo thinking. Equally, each aspect of the complex partnership web, in effect, has to justify its own existence and champion a right to exist, by evidencing ‘a need’, which in turn is then potentially further compounded by each of the parties or players having to justifying their own individual or organizational contribution.

From a police perspective, the partnership ‘invitation’ has clearly moved policing beyond the remit of the 1998 CDA and brought the police into contact and ‘influence’ of a range of partners and specialism's, which have encouraged a wider reframing of the police contribution, and as a consequence, now directly involves the police in social policy at the local level. It is also interesting to note, within the Staffordshire context at least, the growing authority of ‘health’ and of its strategic leaders within the partnership framework.
and the extent to which they now impact upon traditional areas of the police mandate. For example, crime is now viewed in hierarchical terms as subservient to ‘health’ and feeds into this overarching theme. It is also of note that the chief constable sought an invite onto the Health and Wellbeing Board, where she now holds a seat.

In summary, what is being presented here is a bureaucratization of partnership. Local authorities have been placed centre stage in terms of the organization and responsibility for the coordination of local strategic planning. Social problems and issues are labelled around which professional identities and ‘expert’ clusters have been formed. Also presented is a partnership hierarchy, with both a top down and bottom up conversation between the needs of the county and those of the local, but with explicit accountability and governance represented and a requirement for upward reporting.

**The Police and Crime Commissioners: A new form of governance and leadership**

The overall budget for Staffordshire Police (2016-17) is recorded at £179,389 million, of which £118,389 million is delegated by the PCC to the chief constable. Within the budget, the Office of the PCC (OPCC), the PCC’s administrative staff, headed by a chief executive, has a total budget of £10,285 million and the ‘commissioning’ element that the PCC can directly use within a partnership context is £3,300 million, spread across a number of budgetary heads, including a Locality Deal Fund - £1,042 million; People Power Fund- £515,000; Innovation Fund-£1,000 million, Drug Intervention- £310,000, and so forth. Partners and third sector providers/community groups bid into these funding opportunities overseen by the office of the PCC, in support of the Crime, Disorder and Community Safety agenda (www.StaffordshireOPCC.gov.org). As a result, the PCC’s voice and priorities are persuasive.

The Police, Crime and Social Responsibility Act, 2011, requires each PCC to publish a policing plan. The responsibility for coordinating the plans production, in Staffordshire, is the OPCC. The nature and context of the plan is of significance, as it is the definitive
strategic document that frames the operational police context and response. An analysis of the plan, therefore, provides the PCC’s interpretation of the police mandate.

The PCC’s plan 2013-2018 (OPCC, 2013) details four primary strategic priorities: (i) Early intervention; (ii) Supporting victims and witnesses; (iii) Managing offenders; And (iv) Public confidence. At the very outset, each of the four priorities reference a requirement for ‘partnership support’ and specifically, links the policing mandate to a broader collective public service and civic responsibility. By way of example, strategic theme (1) ‘early intervention’: emphasis is given to children and young people and recognition of the influence upon them of family, environment, education and employment. It emphasises a need for positive activity and a requirement to develop a countywide ‘Early Intervention Plan’, particularly around the concept of building resilience in families and communities. And, as a consequence, within the plan there is encouragement and indeed requirement for the states agencies and local citizenship to actively engage (OPCC 2013).

Partners cited as being crucial to aid the plans delivery include: the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), Probation Trust, NHS and Mental Health Trusts, Court and Tribunal Service, Youth Offending Service, Further Education, Job Centre Plus, town and parish councils, Staffordshire Police, Staffordshire County Council and Stoke City Council, Prisons, other blue light services and other parts of the National Offender Management Service. Recognition is also given by the PCC to governmental departments, with encouragement that they show ‘new flexibility’ in order to help secure better results for Staffordshire, albeit the term ‘new flexibility’ is not defined (OPCC 2013:6). Within the document, the PCC asserts:

“The challenge is getting the ‘whole system’ to work better for us all. Whilst there have been successes in joint-working, the opportunity to do that much wider than ever before now arises for Staffordshire and Stoke on Trent because of the PCC’s role”. (OPCC 2013:06)
Whilst there appears to be a degree of self-promotion and role justification in this latter statement, it is interesting to note the PCC’s apparent holistic view of the police remit and its perceived interconnectedness with a broader range of state functions and government departmental responsibilities, very much in accord with Morgan’s (1991) vision. However, despite the considerable investment made within the county into partnership activities and infrastructure, the same document also alludes to an underlying frustration that barriers and resistance to effective joined-up services and delivery remain:

“The evidence is that organizational silo working and lack of focus on outcomes that matter to real people, along with a tendency by some to adopt an ‘it’s always been done this way’ culture, does get in the way of more effective services serving our population better and more cost effectively”. (OPPC 2013:07)

Given that the seeds and encouragement by government for multi-agency working and partnership can be traced back to the mid 1980’s and subsequently endorsed through the CDA 1998, the problems and tensions implicit within the history of partnership, appear to be enduring. During a face-to-face interview, the PCC specifically referenced the Safer and Stronger Communities Strategy Group (previously discussed above and referenced within the Staffordshire partnership network diagram, Appendix G) which he chairs, “It’s the biggest partnership we’ve got, and it hasn’t worked”. The PCC sought to underline his frustration of an apparent inability of the state’s agencies to ‘fully’ and ‘meaningfully’ cooperate with each other and champions a need for a new form of governance.

"You cannot run services hands on from central government, you can’t, and I don’t believe you can change transformationally from Whitehall. It has to be done with people who’ve got the will, the knowledge and the determination to do it, on a local basis, but incredibly importantly, the necessary power and governance to be able to do it." (PCC)

In highlighting some of the difficulties the PCC feels he faces, he seeks to use the criminal justice system as an exemplar:
“Nobody’s really looked at it as a start to finish, as one, as one flow... What partnership means is two things, first of all, not partnerships for the sake of it and secondly, do you know what? And it might just be me, I think partnership is a poor version of proper governance. I’m talking to Gove [referring to Michael Gove, the then Justice Secretary] at the moment around taking over responsibility for policing, which I have already, but Crown Prosecutions and also the Court Service”. (PCC)

The PCC references a significant investment of £500,000 from his budget made to the Crown Prosecution Service, in order to "get them to do things differently". As a result, he claims guilty pleas at first conviction were up 17% and use of court time down by 30%. However, a recent change of chief crown prosecutor, in the PCC’s view, has somewhat undone what he, at least, regarded as progressive "collaborative" work between the two organizations and with a return to a more "silo working mentality".

“They (CPS) work in partnership with the police within the constraints they want to work in partnership. My argument is, I need the ability to change the way the system works in all three of those bodies (police, courts, CPS). The only way you can do that is to have some sort of sense of governance over the whole thing”. (PCC)

As well as issues of governance and authority, this brief example reveals the independent and often autonomous remit of public service leaders and the importance for a ‘shared’ vision by partners, together with the importance of establishing productive relationships in order for partnerships to work effectively. Equally, the example raises issues of leadership continuity and individual leadership outlook.

Prior to 2012, the chief constable was the central figure for the police, but now both the PCC and chief hold ‘seniority’ within police-partnerships. However, the influence of the PCC is reinforced by their access to financial sponsorship and contribution, whereas, in the main, the police bring professional knowledge and operational resource. The PCC also appoints the chief constable and holds them to account. Therefore, the influence of the PCC upon the strategic direction of policing is not to be underestimated and in these terms
during 2016 the PCC published his ‘Policing Vision’ for 2020 (OPCC 2016). The document articulates the strategic direction of travel for the force and in which the PCC seeks to describe the organizational transformation he feels is required of contemporary policing. The document evidences a desire for greater efficiency, supported by significant investment in new technology and need for greater connectedness between public agencies, the voluntary sector and business, citing ‘partnership and local policing’ as one of four main pillars of future reform. However, the detail of these reforms remain unpublished at this time.

From a partner’s perspective it was interesting to note frequent reference by respondents being made to the PCC and of his support staff, the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner (OPCC). Prior to the 2012 Act the police and members of the then Police Authority were the sole police representatives within partnership meeting structures. Locally the PCC and staff from the OPCC have taken a very active and visible presence within the partnership arena within the county. As a result, there was a perception shared by several respondents that the operational police had themselves become less visible within partnership:

“The PCCs office is really well represented at meetings - I fall over two or three of their staff regularly”. (County Council)

“I think their role (the police) in partnership has changed significantly since the advent of the PCC. In some respects, they are perhaps not as visible”. (County Council)

The Staffordshire PCC in particular, Matthew Ellis is seen as a charismatic and highly visible character who was keen to promote "system leadership" across the wider criminal justice "system", where previously there has been a lot of silo working, but this approached challenge had caused "rub" with certain organizational leads. Indeed, the PCC was subsequently to become one of the first PCC’s in the country to also assume formal responsibility for the Fire Service (www.The Burton Mail, 2018). Equally, the PCC has
introduced a total countywide Safety Board embracing both the county, districts and the unitary authority of Stoke-on-Trent, entitled the ‘Safer Staffordshire Board’. However, statutory the county council, district council and Stoke-on-Trent were required to retain CSP’s and this was perceived as "creating some difficulties" between the authorities’ responsibilities and those of the PCC. However, there was overwhelming support for the perceived positive impact the PCC was making in support of collaborative and partnership activity more broadly:

“The PCC is taking a very broad approach i.e. early intervention; the PCC is claiming it and wanting to engage and taking a longer-term view and some of that is driven by trying to align services across Staffordshire”. (County Council)

“Within Staffordshire the PCC has been impactful within a relatively short space of time... he has embraced the role, very keen to promote partnership”. (County Council)

Equally, distinction was being drawn between the role of the PCC and of the police themselves, a distinction primarily based upon access to partnership funding:

“The OPCC brings a new dynamic and clearly resources which can be tapped into”. (County Council)

“The money lies with the PCC - the power is with the PCC”. (District Council)

The distinction between the PCC/OPCC and the police was also framed with reference to "tension" and sometimes being "at odds" during partnership meetings:

“I see them as two connected but different audiences when I go to meetings - they have different agendas and political contexts operating. On certain things it absolutely collides”. (County Council)
“Over the past three years there has been a separate PCC plan and an operational plan and I struggle to see the correlation between the two”. (County Council)

However, it was generally felt by police partners that the PCC’s plans were ambitious and his attempts to refocus the police agenda upon prevention, early intervention and providing greater ‘joined up’ provision and partnership were being taken seriously and in this context the PCC’s role was seen as ‘key’.

A command perspective

The chief constable endorses the PCC’s need for a holistic view of partnership and as mentioned above, she sits on the county’s higher level strategic boards, attending in person.

Structurally, partnership takes a number of different forms within the force based upon the policing role/function or departmental responsibilities. The north and south geographically based chief superintendents attend, in the main, the countywide and Stoke on Trent strategic partnership boards together with the local district authority LSP’s whenever available, but this latter obligation, due to competing demands, is somewhat ad-hoc.

Sitting beneath this broad north/south geographic divide are the eleven LPU’s, each headed by either a chief inspector or inspector. The LPU ‘commanders’ oversee all local policing/neighbourhood teams and response policing in their respective localities. It is through these structures, which mirror local authority boundaries within the county, that CSP’s mandated by the CDA 1998, are framed. The LPU commander and their staff will be generally be regarded as the day to day contact with local authorities.

A personal commitment to partnership activity was described:

“Probably 30% of my time is spent working in partnerships, particularly county level partnerships such as building resilient families, family intervention projects, and safer stronger board at county level. I try and go to as many of the district
partnership events as well, such as LSP’s or equivalent. A lot of my day is either spent working in partnership in informal ways, as well as sat in meetings”. (Ch/Supt)

However, the complexity and number of the various partnership structures that exist, serves to mystify:

“There is a little bit of confusion at some of the more strategic meetings/structures about what meeting reports to what meeting, it’s quite a complicated landscape”. (Ch/Supt)

From a local perspective, Tamworth LPU is commanded by a chief inspector who has a direct responsibility for 110 staff, made up of police officers, PCSO’s and police support staff. The LPU commander works in a significantly devolved and autonomous environment and is empowered to interpret their strategic responsibilities within ‘the local context’. Albeit force policy and central direction exists, this localised approach inevitably leads to varying interpretations and differences on the ground. The LPU commander is line managed and accountable to the operational area chief superintendent.

LPU’s themselves are further divided into distinct geographic neighbourhood areas with designated neighbourhood policing teams (NPT’s) that typically comprise a neighbourhood sergeant, PC and PCSO’s assigned to each area. They patrol in the main on foot, as the visible ‘known’ local presence. NPT’s in turn are augmented and supported by the police mobile response teams, who when not engaged responding to incidents are allocated neighbourhood areas and link in the NPT’s, supporting local policing activity.

The current LPU Commander for Tamworth suggests that approx. 50% of her time is devoted directly to partnership activity and her endorsement for partnership was emphatic:
“I don’t think there is a concept of anything policing in silo now...Everything in essence in policing, should, if we do it correctly, be viewed in partnership terms and if we don't we are missing a trick”. (LPU Commander)

The LPU Commander is the visible face of policing within the CSP and represents the strategic lead for the police locally, sitting as a member of the Responsible Authorities Group (RAG), a body mandated by the CDA 1998 which has now been absorbed into a wider LSP known at the Tamworth Strategic Partnership. This broader LSP strategic framework, has a remit beyond that of community safety and includes economic, social and environmental considerations for the area. Each local authority had a statutory duty to produce a Sustainable Community Strategy (SCS); a requirement set by the New Labour Government (1987-2010) which has endured. This strategy sets the vision for their locality and is regarded as the ‘umbrella strategy’ for other strategies and plans that partners develop. Within this framework, the CSP sits alongside the Education and Skills Board, Infrastructure Delivery Board, Health and Wellbeing Board and a Troubled Families/Families First (project board). The LPU commander, in addition to her statutory role within the RAG also sits on the Health and Wellbeing Board and has an open invitation to substructures that sit under the various board governances, such as business forum, head teachers forum, licensing and so forth.

In terms of tangible corporate and central support from the force for partnership working, each of the LPU’s has a police-partnership manager usually, but not exclusively a police member of staff. Their role is to help embed a framework of partnership activity within a local area. Operationally, the post holder supports the LPU commander in community safety activities and coordination of the policing response to the CDA. In turn, a headquarters corporate partnerships manager was charged with developing central policy and guidance, a post transferred to the OPCC in 2015 and now assumes a wider portfolio for partnership engagement and indeed commissioning activities through the PCC’s grant funding responsibilities.
In overview, senior police command is heavily involved in formal partnership arrangements, with significant investment of time and to both attendance at various meetings and to the administrative reporting within the partnerships. Senior police involvement is, in the main, focused upon strategic oversight, either at the county or local level. They have a seat on the primary strategic forums where the crime agenda generally competes alongside all other aspects of societal need. It is of note that the requirements of the CDA 1998 have now largely been consumed within these broader partnership planning arrangements and no longer sit in isolation.

**Relationships**

The importance of relationships at all levels featured significantly throughout this study and in particular the relationship between the chief executives of the local authorities and the local police commander. By way of example, the chief executive at Tamworth Council has been a figure of continuity and been in post since 2006, working closely with nine LPU Commanders between 2008 and 2015. The chief executive’s reputation amongst the current and previous LPU command has been described as "visionary" and endorsed for his personal belief and ambition for greater partnership working and desire for service integration. Equally, he is said to “have taken the council and councillors with him”. The council’s senior director, community safety, is a graduate of the Scarman Centre, Leicester University with an academic background in criminology. It is of note and evidence of the close relationships between the council and the police that the chief executive chose to appoint and employ a previous local police partnerships inspector as the council’s community safety manager when the opportunity arose. The community safety manager is the ‘on the ground’ face of community safety for the council. Despite the high turnover of LPU commanders, the strategic direction set by the CSP and in particular the council leadership, has allowed a sustained coherence and limited disruption that might otherwise have occurred as a result of the lack of police continuity at senior levels.

A previous LPU commander noted of the partnership:
“It’s about the quality of relationships that had been established over a period of time...it’s a lot to do with personalities and drive and commitment and a shared vision as well”. (LPU Commander)

At the ground level, NPT officers reference a bias being given to making individual contacts and establishing and building their ‘own relationships’. As a result, liaison with a named point of contact at the council was considered to be more effective than going through more formal partnership structures:

“Each of us on our areas have built up our own relationships with the partner agencies and I can only speak for mine. Mine are brilliant - we work well together, but you can only treat as you find”. (NPT)

“Relationships are good...sometimes we hit a brick wall, but that’s down to their protocols and procedures and things”. (PCSO)

It is of note that Morgan (1991) proposed that rather than ‘joint’ responsibility for crime and disorder being held between the police and local authority, it should in fact be the local authority alone who are the ‘sole’ lead agency, given the breadth of the responsibilities contained within the local authorities remit and therefore their ability to disproportionally impact upon issues of causation of crime, disorder and community safety. Whilst this was rejected by both the Conservative government in 1991 and subsequently by New Labour, within the provisions of the CDA 1998, it is interesting to observe the power and influence of the local authority at the partnership table being enhanced by the apparent inability of the police to provide continuity and a sustained voice. In this instance, it is the local authority rather than the police who hold the CSP partnership knowledge and experience, gained as it is over time.

In relation to involvement by the county council with the police, symbolically the importance given to the relationship is acknowledged in the council’s ‘joint’ funding (50% council, 50% police) of a community safety commissioning post. The post holder was a
former senior police officer and is now considered the council’s strategic lead for safeguarding and community safety, topics which in turn feed into a range of countywide partnership structures and partnership boards. The Community Safety Commissioner facilitates a direct dialogue between the county council and the police and additionally serves as a direct link to the OPCC.

Relationships with other strategic county and city partnership leads were described as generally “good”, however relationships with ‘health’ prove problematic:

“In terms of health I’ll be honest, I’m really confused. So, every other group of partners we work with, I know exactly who they are, what they are responsible for, what they can influence, what they have authority over. Health seem to be in a constant state of change...within health there is a confusion about their own areas of responsibility”. (Ch/Supt)

As mentioned previously, Health and Wellbeing Boards were mandated by the Health and Social Care Act, 2012. The government’s intention was to transfer significant responsibilities back to local authorities as part of a ‘healthier communities’ agenda and a broadening of the public health function. The loose definition attributed the phrase ‘health and wellbeing’, has in effect required the issue of ‘health’ to be considered in local government decision making, including crime, disorder and community safety. Equally, the complexity of the NHS with its commissioning and outsourcing arrangements has provided, in itself, a variable picture, locality to locality, and as a result, ‘health’ representation at the partnership table appears to have also been fluid. It is against this backdrop of the emerging ‘health’ agenda, that a degree of confusion is being experienced and as a result, impacting upon local relationships.

Intuitively, effective partnership working is in part predicated on trust between partners and trust is generally built up by relationships established over time. Police officers interviewed appreciated the importance of relationships beyond the formality of their legislative mandate to participate in partnerships and give value to establishment of ‘good’
relationships. However, the interpersonal skills and emotional intelligence operating in order to secure effective relationships appears to be ‘assumed’ by the police organization and is not formally recognised or appreciated.

However, whilst there is clear evidence of personal commitment to partnership by police commanders, the challenge presented to the force, like the criticism made of ‘health’, is one of continuity within post. Policing all too frequently creates movement within its organization, either through promotion or perceived organizational necessity, and as a result, serves to undermine the importance of relationships. The force has tried to encourage a minimum tenure at the level of LPU command, currently set at two years, but this is not binding. Additionally, recourse to temporary or acting positions also undermines continuity.

Partners very much endorsed the importance of relationships, operating as they do at both an organizational and personal level and the police are viewed by partners, within the formal and structured arena of partnership activity as “a solid and consistent partner”, “providing active involvement and visibility at meetings”, “possessing large organizational support and resilience”, “can be relied upon”, and “demonstrating a firm commitment to partnership and multi-agency collaboration”. The police were viewed positively and seen to be adding significant value to the partnership landscape within the county. Fundamentally, the police are viewed as a ‘key’ partner in relation to crime and disorder issues and more recently as a lead organization within the broader and relatively new partnership paradigms of ‘safeguarding’ and ‘vulnerability’:

“They’ve been absolutely excellent, Staffordshire Police”. (County Council)

This is not to suggest that relationship between partners and the police was seamless and without incident, but rather to highlight a general warmth and support for the police existing and recognition as to perceived positive attributes the police bring to partnership:
“Undoubtedly we have had our ups and downs, but generally we are at a state of maturity where we can have those differences of opinion in a public forum such as the strategic partnership or in a closed doors discussion and that’s a good sign”.

(District Council)

During interviews, the importance given to the need for personal relationships by police partners was recurring, approximately two thirds. Reference was frequently made to being able to work "outside" the formalised structures of partnership and "if you need to phone just phone" type approaches, recognising the speed situations can develop and the inevitable constraint presented by "slower time, formalised partnership meeting schedules". Additionally, evidence was provided of professional support being given across organizations between respective leaderships, for example the Assistant Chief Constable meets informally, on a bi-monthly basis, with the county council and Stoke-on-Trent City Council Safeguarding leads to brief each other "on what's going on in each other's world."

Equally, the Tamworth Council Chief Executive has personally mentored several local senior police officers. This nurturing and development of relationships between organizations was considered important and as one respondent commented:

“it’s much easier to deal with things if you have got a relationship...we don’t want to be speaking to each other only when we’ve got a problem”. (County Council)

Implicit in the concept of quality of relationships is the notion of ‘trust’ and ‘mutual respect’, informed by perceived professional competence. However, what is interesting here is that such partnership development has tended to be organic and resulted not solely from the formality and ‘requiring’ of partnership, but occurred as much by those possessing an ‘attitude’ of mind which seeks to view the world in interconnected ways and looks for opportunity to reach out in order to provide enhanced levels of service and outcome. A theme discussed more fully below. But such a positive ‘attitude’ and ‘disposition’ towards partnership has not been the universally experienced by all partners in their contact with the police:
“Speaking to colleagues around the county relationships vary from district to district. A lot is down to individual personalities and who the LPU commander is and Council Chief Executive. Currently the partnership relationship here (local district) with the police is probably poor”. (District Council)

A perception also existed amongst interviewees, that certain police individuals appeared more at ease and equipped within partnership settings and working across organizations and as a result were more influential:

“[Xxx name deleted] had a very empowering and open personality which was conducive to partnership working, whereas other individuals were more defensive, more process driven who struggled with the trust, sharing data and the openness”. (District Council)

“I think there are some good police officers with good partnerships skills, but you still have a rump who think we the police can do it all on our own – there is still that mentality”. (County Council)

The qualities of openness, willingness to share, trust and collaborative outlook, framed by personality, whilst attributed to better police cooperation within partnership, were qualities also considered universally desirous of all partners:

“With some of them (police) they are very good and very easy to work with and very proactive and probably others less so. It comes down to personality and individual people in roles but that's also true of the county council, health and the voluntary sector as well.” (Voluntary sector)

However arguably, the unique personality that one brings to any position or role has greater licence and freedom to flourish and operate within policing, due to the structural positioning of the police, based upon traditions and established practices of ‘operational independence’ and ‘discretion’. In turn, the policing environment therefore fosters and
indeed encourages a position of autonomy requiring individual judgements to be made about the local police mandate and its interpretation.

**The ‘operationalization’ of partnership**

Police commitment to partnership has thus far been explored through the formality of partnership structure. However, more recent development of multi-agency co-located structures as occurred. The Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hub (MASH) deals with child protection and domestic violence issues and Integrated Offender Management Units (IOM’s) of which there are three in the county, deal with prolific and priority offenders. These structures bring together local authority, health, education, social service and police representatives, underpinned by information sharing and significantly in this instance co-location, predominantly housed within the police estate. Whilst there has been co-location, there has not been service integration; independent organizational responsibility and line management remain.

At the local level, Tamworth LPU became the first area within the force during 2013-2014 to adopt a co-located CSP ‘hub’, based at Tamworth police station and whose focus is upon giving emphasis to ‘proactive’ partnership incident response and creating more ‘immediate’ inter-agency collaboration and incident resolution. The concept was borne of local police and partnership leadership. The ‘hub’ is headed by a community safety manager (council employee) supported by a police community safety manager (police sergeant). The ‘hub’ comprises, domestic violence officers (police), neighbourhood watch/community engagement (council) street wardens (council), business crime coordinator (council) and a sub anti-social behaviour element made up of a police officer, a council representative and a council housing official. More recently the central team have been augmented by a further charity employed domestic violence worker and as a result of PCC grant funding, have recently commissioned a Drug and Alcohol Service ‘outreach worker’. The collective team and infrastructure represent considerable investment both by the council and police.
In addition to coordinating more immediate partnership ‘response’ activity, the ‘hub’ serves as a focal point for partnership workers and an opportunity to share contemporary information and operational intelligence, particularly between the council and police. The ‘hub’ also seeks to actively encourage dialogue and communication with all LPU officers and other partners, often acting as a partnership ‘drop in’ and coordinates a daily partnership briefing attended by a ‘fuller’ partnership representation. The Tamworth model has since been recognised as best practice within the force and county partnership arena and as such, each of the LPU’s (since 2015) has been required to adopt ‘partnership hubs’.

Traditionally, partnership has generally been seen to be associated with longer term proactive problem solving. However, what we might term the ‘operationalization’ of partnership, has brought ‘joint’ partnership activity to the field of more immediate and reactive service response, representing new ground and challenges for partnership. Whilst co-location has grouped different disciplines under one roof, the difficulties and complexities of seeking to integrate management structures, cultures and professional paradigms remains (an issue explored more fully, later in this thesis). In summary, the principal aim of these new and emerging arrangements appears to be upon sharing of more ‘immediate’ information, conducting ‘joint’ analysis and identification of need, in order to determine a more effective and appropriate response from state agencies.

At this juncture, having mapped out both the current organizational and structural responses to the contemporary police-partnership focus, the remainder of this chapter turns to examining the extent, if any, youth engagement has been acknowledged or accommodated within these frameworks.

**Youth engagement - an absence of strategy**

Despite the police frequently coming into contact with young people and also with police involvement in discrete elements of the broader partnership structure touching upon the issue’s directly or indirectly impacting up children and young people, the force does not
have a formal youth engagement strategy. To some extent there appears to be an over reliance upon other principal authorities such as education, youth services, social services and other specialism’s represented within the broader Staffordshire partnership to fulfil more general responsibilities to youth. As to why this might be the case, a representative of the OPCC declared a nervousness as to how the police culture views youth engagement, suggesting that within a law enforcement context police involvement with young people is viewed predominantly through ‘authority’ and ‘control’ settings, for example Youth Offending Teams, CSP’s, the Building Resilient Families Programme and so forth.

“So, what you get I suppose, is a lack of involvement really when it comes to those young people perhaps who don’t cause problems”. (OPCC)

The PCC himself, when questioned around the theme of police-youth engagement, responded "we failed dismally at that", confirming an absence of a coherent strategy:

“Yes, it’s a pipe dream. It’s not even close to being real. I mean, the one area I failed dismally on was intending to really get to grips with was youth engagement. But it’s partly been because there just simply aren’t enough hours in the day to try and prioritise. You know, policing is a lot worse than I thought it was going to be, frankly.”

The PCC referencing a lack of what he felt was broader strategic business planning processes existing.

However, the PCC has personally sponsored two specific ‘high’ profile youth initiatives, namely a police cadet scheme and a limited reintroduction of SPACE. The cadet scheme currently caters for 90 cadets, aged between 14-18 years of which, approximately a third were deliberately targeted for recruitment as a result of being deemed to be at ‘risk’ of entering the criminal justice system. The aspiration is to recruit 350 cadets over a three-year period (2015-18). The scheme is funded totally from private and business donations and supported by trained ‘volunteers’ comprising police officers, police staff, and members
of the special constabulary. Cadets undertake an initial 26-week training programme which necessitates attendance at a venue one day a week, augmented by some weekend activities. The programme includes: physical recreation, drill, skills development, community service and learning about the police. Albeit, the scheme has yet to be formally evaluated, the PCC claims:

“The success story of that at the moment, is about 27 young people who were very much heading in the wrong direction, has resulted in head teachers now saying ‘what have you done?’

The PCC’s second initiative (2015) has been to reintroduce a revised and limited ‘pilot’ SPACE scheme, within a small number of the local authority areas. The pilot scheme is run by the local authority, but with police support. However, reflecting back on the original scheme and outlining his reasoning for reintroduction of a revised SPACE, the PCC commented:

“I hadn’t quite really appreciated SPACE as a cult...Massive impact and influence on people...I did a little bit of research on it...got the partnerships team and the commissioning team in and said ‘right, I want to bring SPACE back for this year...Allocated a bit of money... and they’ve done a good job...we’ve had lots and lots of operational support from different organizations from across Staffordshire who really wanted to put their name to it.”

The PCC has since formally launched an expanded countywide SPACE programme during 2016, where the local authority are the lead, with limited police support. In these terms, the PCC’s re-launching of SPACE is seeking create a more informal and relaxed dialogue, where the police and young people can develop a greater appreciation of each other perspectives and outlooks. However, the both SPACE and the cadets are a product of autonomous action by the PCC, as opposed to be driven by any ‘agreed’ action resulting from police-partnership planning frameworks.
SPACE 2015-18

The new and revised scheme is marketed as providing free activities for 11-17 year-olds during the main school summer holiday period i.e. mid July until to the end of August and promotes itself as seeking to engage young people in ‘diversionary’ activities with an aim of ‘to reduce levels of police recorded anti-social behaviour (ASB)/youth crime and increase volunteering’ (www.staffordshirespace.uk). The new scheme primarily views young people as problematic and frames them within a criminal justice context i.e. aligning the schemes outcomes as primarily ‘seeking to reduce anti-social behaviour and youth crime’, rather than youth engagement and relationship building per se. As per the experience of the original SPACE scheme, it appears that current H.O. performance framing of seeking to ‘reduce crime’, underpins the PCC’s rationale and broader opportunities of enhancing police legitimacy through positive youth engagement have been ignored.

In January 2017, the OPCC produced an evaluation report based upon the 2016 pilot (OPCC, 2017). The report records that the scheme was funded by the PCC in the sum of £139,297.41, which was allocated to local authorities, based on ‘identified need’. Primarily this was a local authority coordinated activity who in turn commissioned services from the council, private or voluntary providers; of note, direct police presence and involvement was secondary. In total there were 12,432 ‘attendances’, of which 3,882 of attendances were reserved for ‘targeted youngsters’ or ‘locations where ASB have been identified as a specific issue’ (OPCC, 2017). It is interesting that the OPCC’s report uses the language of ‘attendances’ rather than ‘attendees’, attendances inferring recurring visits by a more limited number of attendees! (A statement in itself potentially indicating a perversity of performance culture). The report then goes on to declare that police recording of ASB had reduced by 7% when compared to the previous 12 months during the same period. Whilst the new scheme is still in its infancy, the PCC harbours ambition to further extend the scheme in subsequent years (OPCC, 2017).
Whilst the partners interviewed were generally supportive of the PCC’s SPACE plans, the re-launch sits against the backdrop of the withdrawal of countywide Youth Services, as previously commented upon above and which provided year-round activity and facilities. Equally there was also recognition that there has been a growth of the private sector provision for young people who offer a range of commercially run activities, albeit affordability for many families remained an issue. From a district council perspective there was a feeling that against this backdrop that they had to some extent “been squeezed out”, because of their own budgetary pressures. Therefore, when the PCC then made limited funds available for SPACE, a mixed reaction was received:

“The OPCC then decided they were going to fund SPACE again. They wanted to throw money at us but we didn’t have control of buildings - Youth services has gone - little notice given. We are trying to see how we can best incorporate SPACE”. (District Council Community Safety)

“Youth services withdrawal at county level - it's an emotive issue currently with losing all our local youth assets. In some respect it’s almost going back full circle to SPACE where we will have dedicated activities designed to take place over school holidays”. (District Council)

Additionally, for some at least, the ‘ghost’ and legacy of the original SPACE scheme remains, despite it formally ending in 1999. Not that the original scheme wasn't being valued, but rather, the way the police sought to transfer the scheme over to local authorities at that time created some ill feeling and unease which still endures:

“Many have a feeling that the police just dropped this on our toes when they left last time”. (District Council)

“Questions were raised here as to why the police had stopped doing it and why have we got to pick it up. And we ran and still operate summer play schemes”. (District Council)

The PCC has clearly seen a political opportunity to personally associate himself with and indeed champion and re-launch a revised SPACE scheme, but strategically where the schemes fits within overall partnership planning frameworks, if at all, remains unclear; the PCC has to some extent acted unilaterally. Against the backdrop of a withdrawal of County Youth Services and encouraged by the provision of OPCC funding to help facilitate the scheme, the PCC has been able to positively influence local authorities to participate. The revised nature of this scheme means that the local authority is the lead agency, which then in turn commissioned local youth activities, branded under the marketing umbrella SPACE. Direct police participation and involvement appears limited and primarily consists of a police/PCS0 presence at each of the venue locations, where possible. However, as to whether opportunities are or will be seized to allow the scheme to facilitate positive police youth engagement remain undocumented at this, but its targeted focus is clearly upon anti-social behaviour and crime hotspots (OPCC, 2017).

**Safer Schools Partnership**

As mentioned previously in Chapter Six, during the mid-1980’s and up until the late 1990’s, Staffordshire Police employed school’s liaison police officers to work alongside the county’s schools, but they were withdrawn in 1999. Some fifteen years later, in 2004 the Labour government of the day introduced the Safer School Partnership (SSP) to help create better relationships and support between the police and education authorities. An SSP was described as:

“A formal agreement between a school or partnership of schools and police to work together in order to keep young people safe, reduce crime and the fear of crime and improve behaviour in schools and their communities”. (H.O. 2009d:6)

However, Staffordshire Police didn't collectively take up the scheme until 2012. An in force analysis identified ‘the top ten’ priority schools (from the 68 state secondary schools within the county) based upon levels of crime, demographic and other police held data. Eight were in Stoke-on-Trent and two elsewhere in the county. The scheme sought to place a
full-time officer or PCSO aligned to each of the ten priority schools, with a view to liaising on a daily basis with staff, young people and their families. The chief inspector, project lead, notes:

“There was some nervousness from schools by the fact they had been approached; they were fearful that a full-time police officer, working with the schools would create some concerns or bad publicity...So being aware of these sensitivities, it was down to me to get out there and do some leg work with the school heads and win hearts and minds”. (Ch/Insp)

In terms of structure, school autonomy, local variation and context is appreciated:

“So you’ve ended up with ten partnerships, each of which started to look different in terms of focus and initiative...I have a bi-monthly SSP forum at which we invite SSP officers with also each schools representative... It is quite a powerful vehicle it is now. It is to be ensured not to be police-centric and police driven. Each school takes turn to host”. (Ch/Insp)

The partnership has developed beyond just the police and schools to include broader local authority support, youth services, youth offending teams, a boxing project and other agencies and organizations that provide life skills. Going forward the value and recognition is the scheme is said to be gaining traction. However, concern exists as to future funding in order to be able to expand the scheme at this time against the backdrop of government austerity measures and constrained budgets. The impact of austerity is discussed more fully below.

**Youth engagement at the LPU level**

Within the LPU structure, discrete and independent work is undertaken with schools, but such activity is left to the local discretion of LPU command and not centrally coordinated or overseen. However, senior police officers, gave universal endorsement for youth
engagement and proactive activity with young people, despite the absence of either a force or partnership strategy requiring them to do so.

“If we don’t engage with young people, we will always be applying the plaster onto the injury sustained. If we leave it to the point in which they are engaging in anti-social behaviour...We will end up reaping what we sow, generation after generation”. (Ch/Insp)

“We certainly modified our approach to things like ASB, rather than a viewing young people at fault to a more problem oriented approach with them and that often involved work with partners such as youth services to solve the problem, rather than moving it on”. (Ch/Supt)

However, an examination of the CSP for Tamworth reveals that despite acknowledging the area as having the highest percentage young people population in the county, the only reference specifically made to young people is within a key priority termed ‘Young people as offenders/perpetrators and victims of anti-social behaviour’. Youth engagement per se does not appear to feature or indeed is it encouraged. As a consequence, the emphasis of the plan is to portray young people as problematic, with resultant resources and focus being directed disproportionately towards ‘tackling violent crime, teen abuse, criminal damage, shoplifting and substance and alcohol abuse’ (Tamworth CSP 2014:7).

Originally sitting outside the community safety framework, a discrete initiative entitled ‘Turnaround’ commenced in 2012 led by the Tamworth LPU, supported by the county council and borough council. The initiative has since developed to include the community safety and learning partnerships with other organizations now involved, including the Connexions Service, Child and Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) parent support workers, and the charity Barnardo’s, amongst others. The project aims to support young people (5-18yrs), particularly those who are deemed ‘vulnerable’ or at ‘risk’, i.e. truanting, or offending, by providing ‘life skills’ education and activities. Police commitment, up until 2014, was a full-time team of six, made up of three police officers and three PCSO’s, but
due to police budgetary constraints post austerity, reduced to three, comprising one police officer and two PCSO’s. The project covers the 38 feeder schools and six secondary schools within the borough. The police element of the team work alongside teachers, psychologists, social workers, youth services and voluntary groups, working together with the identified young people and their families, where appropriate.

The importance of this police preventative activity is underlined by one of the Turnaround police members:

“I don’t think people (referring to police colleagues) realise how important that connection can be. You know, ok, people will say we don’t need it. But I think you have a better, long term effect on the young people”. (PC)

Another partnership group at Tamworth, known as the PARB (Preventing Adverse Risk-Taking Behaviours) also exits with a remit of addressing child exportation, teenage pregnancy, alcohol, drugs and anti-social behaviour, comprising broad partnership membership, including police representation. The PARB sets the agenda for local action and response. When questioned as to where the PARB fits within the Task and Finish Group structure, a community safety representative declared “You’ve found the weakness of our plan”; once again evidencing the fragility of structure.

**Youth engagement at the neighbourhood level**

In terms of direct police-youth engagement within Tamworth LPU, PC’s and PCSO’s within the NPT’s are aligned to local schools and regarded the schools initial police point of contact. However, the process is unstructured. Somewhat surprisingly, the activity rests outside the CSP framework and oversight.

“The schools will contact us if they’ve got an issue with bullying or you know they’ve got groups of children that are just fearful of the police, because a lot of parents go
“the police are bad, and going to take you away” and stuff. So, we go into the schools, do a lot of talks to the children and try and build relationships”. (PCS0)

“Well I think it’s relevant because you’re starting at the small level and it’s the respect that they build up as they see you through the school”. (PCS0)

More recently two of the PCSO’s at Tamworth have been involved in helping launch the PCC’s countywide cadet scheme at Tamworth, working with ten pupils in two schools over a six week period. This does follow a more structured and formal template of delivery provided by force headquarters, but again rests outside the community safety planning structure.

Additionally, and on a needs driven basis, NPT officers can be tasked, either by the partnership ‘hub’, Turnaround project or the Families First Project, to undertake a specific activity with a school pupil, either within or outside school. This latter activity, however, is incorporated into the community safety planning framework. In particular, positive recognition was given by NPT officers to the local multi-agency Building Resilient Families project’ Task and Finish Group’ (contained with the local Community Safety Plan). The project was described as:

“Identifying the right families that we all know will be causing problems in the future”. (PCS0)

The project is seeking to support and change lifestyles and outlooks within the family context that might in turn, it is argued, influence younger family members whilst growing up.

As to perceptions of police relationships with young people, NPT officer’s views included:

“When you’re on your patch you build up relationships, because you’ve seen them go from little and they’re growing up”. (PCS0)
“It depends on which area the town we’re in. Some of the council estates – we’re probably not the most favourable people on Earth, because we’re seen to be there in their eyes for negative reasons”. (NPT)

“We’ve got a team homeless shelter on our patch that caters for homeless teenagers from 16-21. So, we have to walk a bit of a tightrope. They’re obviously very vulnerable, so we have to be approachable but then we also have to enforce any breaches or kind of any laws that are broken”. (NPT)

In sum, what has been outlined above is an absence of overall strategy and joined-up thinking. There has been a tendency post the CDA 1998 for the police to frame young people as problematic and within a criminal justice context. Indeed the 1998 legislation proved contentious and was challenged by youth campaigners at the time as criminalising aspects of youth activity as anti-social, with resultant anti-social behaviour orders (ASBO’s) and a requirement for the police to enforce this predominantly street based activity (Chapter Five). And as a result, this situation has created a new dynamic between the police and the young. The CSP’s, formerly CDRP’s have focused the mechanism of partnership upon the ‘problem’ of youth with a disproportional enforcement and order maintenance outlook. What appears to have been forgotten by the police is their ‘responsibility’ to engage with youth and to actively involve them in policing in order to gain their support. Rather, we have a situation where in the main, policing is being imposed upon young people through enforcement as opposed to developing a service ‘with and for them’.

Overall, there is an absence of strategy and as a result youth engagement remains piecemeal. It is also of note that it has been the PCC, rather than the police themselves who has recently sought to create ‘opportunities’ for the police and young people to more productively engage i.e. though the police cadet scheme and a recent reintroduction of SPACE. However, both the PCC and the chief constable acknowledge that to date they have ‘failed’ to systematically embed the need for police-youth engagement. The very
construction of the partnership framework appears to have driven a mentality within policing that young people are the responsibility of other key agencies for example, youth services, education, social services and so forth and in doing so seeks to reinforce a view of policing focused upon its ‘enforcement’ contribution to partnership, to the detriment of its ‘service’ function, a central issue discussed more fully in Chapter Eight.

Young people and where they fit in within the countywide partnerships

At a county and strategic level, the statutory requirement of local authority provision for children and young people is clearly evident through the provision of education, health, safeguarding and care services, previously referred to above. However, the non-statutory support for young people, in the previous guise of the County Council’s Youth Services was in essence withdrawn post-2016 against the backdrop of government austerity pressures being placed upon local authorities and in this instance saw the Youth Services annual budget within Staffordshire reduced from £5 million to £500,000. The Council’s Youth Services previously catered for the provision of youth clubs, school holiday activity programmes, youth outreach work and other ancillary support, for example the provision of youth initiative bid funding allocation. Against this fiscal backdrop, the county council have subsequently ‘outsourced’ this function to the voluntary sector, Staffordshire Council of Voluntary Youth Services (SCVYS), to help coordinate and facilitate youth services across the county. SCVYS has been operating since 1982 and is an umbrella membership organization covering more than 130 independent youth and children’s organizations. Its terms of reference are: ‘To meet the needs of young people by strengthening and supporting the work of local voluntary youth organizations’ (SCVYS, 2015:02).

It is also interesting to note once again that the current fiscal imperative resulting from government austerity measures appears to be driving, in part at least, a redefining of performance outcomes i.e. a necessity for reducing service costs and framed as ‘cost benefit analysis’:
“There is a big push through us, a little bit driven by austerity, about trying to get young children out of systems. We’ve got just under 1000 kids in care and care leavers and it’s costing just under 60 million pounds a year. If you look at Stoke there is another 600 in care, which is disproportionate for the size of the city – it’s a real focus for us. We are trying to get into the root causes rather than symptoms.”

(County Council)

However, at a district level the theme of young people and their needs being met through partnership activity was at best mixed and dependent upon which organization was being asked. The youth agenda must compete with other demands and often struggles to be heard:

“If I’m honest the focus upon young people has diminished overtime. We still talk about it and it’s in the plan but the amount of resource that goes into it had reduced”. (District Council)

“As a priority, young people then is low, always has been and always will be”. (Voluntary sector)

“We do a lot around schools and community initiatives and have worked with the police on ASB and fires setting - some good results. We host community meetings here ‘play safe’ ‘safety town’ and work with local schools and the police and other agencies attend”. (Fire Service)

Where young people do feature within local district priority setting, issues are grouped under thematic headings, for example vulnerability, anti-social behaviour and encompassed with ‘troubled families’ labels. However, young people as a cross cutting theme, or indeed considerations as to the need for youth engagement more broadly, is not currently recognised within the partnership planning frameworks examined; but where such engagement does exist, it appears to be undertaken discretely by organizations acting
independently, rather than as a coordinated activity over seen by partnership governance and direction.

“There is a gap - we currently don’t have a structure to consider those broader needs. Do we need enforcement? Do we need diversion? Do we need engagement? And this is something that we are starting to recognise”. (District Council)

As to perceptions of police involvement with young people, partner responses were generally confined to examples of police ‘authority’ and ‘enforcement’ activity, with little or no acknowledgement being given to the concept of police relationship building activity premised upon concepts of police legitimacy and policing by consent:

“Operationally the police deal with a small focus upon young people and their involved in Youth Offending Teams on the criminal justice side”. (County Council)

“They are involved in Youth Offending Teams and aspects of Youth Offending Service work but maybe no strategically engaged in young people”. (Community Safety Team)

Although some acknowledgement was given to a view that the police now try and work with young people, rather than to criminalize them, showing greater flexibility in their dealing with the young and seeking to find alternative resolution to community disputes and issues raised involving the young. However, where acknowledgment was given to police and young people relationship building activity it was sometimes couched within a negative context or inference of police reluctance to do so:

“I think they want to do it, there is a desire to do it but I suppose they react in the end to where the spikes of anti-social behaviour or nuisance pop up”. (Voluntary sector)

“There is the stuff they are doing around cadets. But the cadets is being driven by the OPCC and has support from the cops to a limited degree. What I’m picking up
from the cops, however, is that they think they shouldn't be doing it, it not their responsibility, they haven't got the resources to do it”. (County Council)

In these same terms, Staffordshire Council for Voluntary Youth Services (SCVYS) attempted to directly engage the PCC back in 2014, via the Office of the PCC, offering a model and mechanism for youth engagement across the county utilising their extensive membership and access to young people, however, the offer appeared to fall on deaf ears at that time:

“I think it must be sitting on a shelf somewhere, we didn't get a response...I don't think the police recognise the resources that sit here underneath us”. (SCVYS representative)

Nonetheless, the concept of children and young people through concepts of early ‘intervention’ and ‘prevention’ are central features of the current PCC’s 2013-18 plan, which declares that the police will look to create new opportunities and activities for young people (OPCC, 2013).

**Police support and value being given to partnership**

Historically, academic commentary relative to police culture has tended to present the police as being suspicious and resentful of perceived intrusion by others into their professional specialism (see Skolnick, 1966; Chan, 1997; Muir, 1977, Manning, 1977, Holdaway, 1983 amongst others). Police culture is also portrayed as being resistant to alternative perspectives of more complex or social presentations of crime causation, neatly summarised within Reiner’s (2010) typology of police culture as ‘do-gooders’. However, this research inquiry reveals a more sympathetic analysis and appreciation.

In defining the term ‘policing in partnership’, more senior police responses tended to include holistic interpretation:

“I think it’s policing with a small p, so it's all the functions of policing, preventing crime and disorder, making our communities safer and that's a shared responsibility
with ourselves and partners. By partners, that’s not just statutory partners, that’s everyone who can contribute in our mission to keep people safe and reassured”.

(Ch/Supt)

“It’s understanding that the public service now needs to be far broader than just delivered by policing, and that the police force needs to work together with so many different agencies now, to meet community need and community expectation”. (HQ Police Staff)

Equally, a new and emerging police agenda of ‘vulnerability’, informed by factors of perceived ‘threat’, ‘harm’ and ‘risk’ and encompassing domestic violence, sex offending, child abuse, terrorism and radicalisation and ‘other’ sensitive issues, could not be delivered without partnership collaboration and support.

“Policing and partnership is recognising that the police often themselves cannot deliver what they are expected to deliver around crime reduction and community safety and protecting people and vulnerability”. (Ch/Insp)

Centrally, senior officers endorsed both the political and executive leadership of the force for their commitment to partnership and as to the high value and priority the force gives to it. However, it was also accepted that the concept is not universally understood or appreciated by all:

“The PCC absolutely values partnership and would be stunned if we were trying to deliver in isolation and not in partnership. His view is very much collaboration, shared services and shared budgets”. (Ch/Insp)

“Particularly at an operational level, partnerships really deliver. They might not always have the neatest structure, they might be a bit ad hoc, but in terms of making a difference to our communities they definitely do”. (Ch/Supt)
“In the force, there are some people that see partners needing us, whereas I would say we need partners more than they need us...Partnership is becoming more obvious now”. (Supt)

Given the portrayal by senior officers of policing being sympathetic to the need for more joined-up partnership activity, against a changing remit and ‘reach’ of policing, it was interesting to explore police attitudes at a more local level, by those officers and staff charged with partnership delivery on the ground:

“Them with us, us with them. The more information that we give, the more information we get back again, and the more I feel that we are able to address problems”. (NPT)

“Using the skills and expertise of other agencies and other organizations”. (NPT)

“The idea to me is to try and share the load, share the information and have a longer term problem solving capability amongst our partners rather than individuals working in silos”. (NPT)

“It’s about responsibility and shouldering responsibility”. (Response)

In overview, there was general endorsement for collaboration and joined-up multi-agency support and intervention, but significantly with an undertone of a need for ‘shared’ responsibility, fair and equitable distribution of workload with other agencies, and a desire to tackle longer term and underlying local problems. There was a sentiment felt that the police were disproportionally having to shoulder the responsibility. Partnership for many had become an assumed and integral way of working:

“It’s a big part of my role in all fairness, being able to liaise with likes of the Council...it’s become like second nature...without it, in my role, I’d be stuck. (PCSO)
At a local level, NPT’s act as an interface between local communities and other state agencies, arranging periodic public meetings. This is a statutory obligation placed upon the police:

`A chief officer of police must make arrangements for obtaining the views of persons within each neighbourhood in the relevant police area about crime and disorder in that neighbourhood`. (Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, section 4(1))

This same legislation also requires chief officers of police to make arrangement for:

`The holding in each neighbourhood of regular meetings between - (a) persons within that neighbourhood, and (b) police officers with responsibility for supervising or carrying out policing in that neighbourhood`. (Section 34(3))

At Tamworth, the CSP have sought to coordinate this police statutory ‘obligation’ with other agencies’ public engagement activities, branded under the Community Safety Plan consultation requirements. Agencies are invited to attend, including the local authority, highways, health and so forth, however, there was a view expressed that because other agencies were having to work around the police community engagement schedule, it had created an antagonism amongst partners and a perception that the police were dominating.

“We don’t want to be the lead agency, that’s the problem. That’s where partnerships at the moment are failing”. (Sgt)

Equally, NPT officers feel that the burden of responsibility to both ‘hear’ and ‘resolve’ local issues falls on them and that other partners can opt in or opt out to suit. By way of example:

“We’ve had an ongoing issue with youths in the street... kids playing football, riding their bikes in the street. So, our concern is how do we then sort the tolerance
issue out...Youth services said, “well we’ve got nobody; we can’t really do anything”.
We’ve then started to look at grants to see whether we can fund (PCC Fund)
diversionary tactics... But surely to goodness it shouldn’t just be us that is trying to
manage the burden”. (NPT)

Or, in relation to an on-going local problem:

“Highways are letting us down at the moment”. (PCSO)

This outlook then led on to more negative views about the effectiveness of partnership
working and a feeling that it is the police ultimately shouldering responsibility alone; in
effect, they were the ‘buck stop’:

“We are the dumping ground, aren’t we? You’ll get a phone call on Friday afternoon
at 10 to 5 saying “can you just... we’ve going home we’ll see you Monday morning.
And then they’ve left it with you!” (PCSO)

“I’d say that probably a lot more partners are over-reliant on us than we are of them.
We are the one-stop problem solving organization, unfortunately”. (NPT)

In overview, there appears to be overwhelming support and recognition for the need for
partnership and the potential advantages to be gained from doing so. As a result,
partnership, particularly involving senior management and the more community focused
elements of policing, such as NPT’s, has now become a default way of working. However,
scepticism still exists, particularly within the ‘response’ elements at the local level.
Response officers felt, in responding to more immediate calls for service, all too frequently
they attend ‘repeat’ issues, where other services, such as mental health had let them
down. Equally, response officers are not fully appreciative of their NPT colleagues whom
they feel have an ‘easier’ time of things:

“I’ve not long come over from ‘response’. I used to think that they (NPT) were all
lazy, sat around doing nothing, unproductive”. (NPT)
In summary, NPT officers gave collective endorsement for partnership co-location opportunities and the development of joint teams, but difficulties were still being experienced with organizational realignment, against the backdrop of austerity (discussed more fully below) leading to a lack of partnership engagement. Additionally, questions are raised as to the capacity of both the police and other organization's to be able to respond to the demands within the current economic climate. This is then in turn compounded by a police cultural interpretation where policing sees itself as the organization of last resort and therefore not in a position to say "no". In this context policing is perceived to be picking up the pieces left by the gaps in the system and in the failings of other organizations to cope.

**Austerity - a changing dynamic**

Whilst the force alludes to relationships between strategic organizational leaderships being generally ‘good’, a recent unilateral decision taken by the county council’s education/youth services department, against the backdrop of the government's austerity measures, serves to highlight the fragility of those relationships. The county council required of the youth services department, an overall budget reduction during the period 2015-16 from £5 million to £0.5 million. This budget head covered youth clubs, youth facilities and youth activity within the county. The chief constable evidences a frustration with the initial lack of consultation and discussion regarding impact within a broader partnership context. However, a more general concern was being expressed as to a potential "salami slicing" i.e. an equitable distribution of impact mentality being adopted by some partners in response to the challenges presented by austerity, as opposed to adopting a more strategic and joined-up countywide service plan.

Financially, Staffordshire Police have had to manage their own budgetary cuts; between 2011-15 - £32.6 million, representing a net loss of 16% in real terms (www.justiceinspectorates.gov). However, Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (2016) record, Staffordshire Police having experienced an 18% reduction in the workforce
compared to a national average of 15%, resulting in a loss of 384 police officers, 387 police staff and 25 PCSO’s. HMIC data also reveals, the cost of policing per head of population is 45 pence a day, a figure significantly lower than the national average of 55 pence per day (www.justiceinspectorates.gov).

Whist acknowledging the challenges that the budget presented, the chief constable endorsed the PCC’s view that austerity presented opportunities for both the police and public sector to ‘collectively’ reform and to create even greater collaboration and integration of provision, albeit these opportunities had yet to be fully realised. The chief constable also highlighted the changing nature of both crime and the demands being placed upon policing as a service and a requirement and need therefore for policing to be responsive to this changing landscape:

“So, my message to staff has been, we can talk about money forever and its true, we've got to save money, but we would and need to be transforming anyway”. (Chief Constable)

Austerity and financial constraint featured consistently during interviews with staff and a concern that austerity has led to partner organizations withdrawing support and assistance relative to the crime, disorder and community safety agenda that had hitherto been the case.

“It has been quite rash. Some services in particular have drawn back and have gone back in a shell of core delivery...it's a landscape that has changed”. (Ch/Insp)

The budget cut to youth services, was consistently used by the police at all levels to demonstrate the pressures being felt by other organization's and which in turn were likely to negatively impact upon police activity on the ground. A further example provided was that of reduced financing of the ambulance service that has led to a blurring of roles and responsibilities:
“What should be a very effective partnership relationship is now in tension because of reduced resources”. (Supt)

Equally, the police themselves have had to deal with a net reduction in the overall budget:

“What we had about 260 neighbourhood beat officers and about 650 response cops - we now have got 225 and 550 respectively and shrinking - although neighbourhood police officers are ring fenced. So, the capability to do the softer things, other than just cope with incident demand has gone”. (Supt)

A concern was also being expressed within the LPU, that as a result of financial pressures, emphasis was now being given locally to police response requirements and managing demand activity, at the expense of such preventative engagement and investment. These demand pressures were acknowledged by NPT:

“Because we are having fewer officers, officers are being drawn from the NPT to backfill on the Response Teams. If you can't respond...you just have anarchy”. (Response)

At the national level, the need for fiscal austerity is presented by both the government and relative to the police, by the Home Secretary, as necessary and there is belief by government, at least, that inefficiencies within the current system create opportunity to accommodate the challenge that austerity presents (Guardian Newspaper, 8th December, 2015). Such a stance is also supported by the Staffordshire PCC:

“I fundamentally and totally disagree that there's not enough money in the overall system. I just think it's really poorly spent…”

However, the reality is, despite attempts by police leadership to tease out inefficiencies, police officer and PCSO numbers have fallen within the county between 2010-2015, as identified above, and during the same period nationally by 17,000 officers and 4,587 PCSO’s, in addition to the loss of 15, 877 police support staff (H.O. 2015b). The thesis
research details how as a result of the shrinking availability of police resource the realities of austerity, despite the political rhetoric, results in operational delivery being squeezed. It is within this context that the police, together with other public services re-entrench to what they perceive to be ‘core’ or ‘critical’ business. In this instance for the police, priority and focus is being given to emergency and immediate demand and their ability to be able to ‘respond’ to it. Consequently, neighbourhood policing and resources that were previously committed to longer term problem solving activities, including CSP working, are being diverted in order to fill the void created as a result of shrinking officer numbers, particularly being felt at the ‘sharp end’ within the police ‘response’ capability.

From partners perspective they also describe a similar “re-entrenching” activity by the police locally:

“We will talk about what discretional function have we got and as to what is a statutory function and those that are discretionary usually get hit harder in the budget process. The police have been doing exactly the same as we all have for 5-6 years in order to survive”. (District Council)

“Since austerity the police have withdrawn officers from neighbourhood policing teams and work with schools. There’s just less of them and austerity means that just have to do such things. We are all having to make cuts”. (County Council)

However, what austerity does appear to have stimulated is a greater strategic focusing by public sector organizations upon their ability, either individually or collectively, to seek to reduce demand over the longer term to accommodate the shrinking public purse, often framed as seeking ‘early intervention’ and ‘prevention’. Such financial pressure appears to be aiding the police and indeed other organizations to positively seek dialogue, collaboration and co-operation where possible; the financial imperative being a common theme to all. “Cost”, “cost benefit” and “investment and return”, the language of finance, are now common within the partnership vocabulary with the financial imperative frequently viewed and presented in longer term time frameworks and across organizations
to evidence and indeed help sell a perceived course of action as being "financially mutually beneficial" to other partners:

“What we are all trying to do now is early intervention, we are all in the same game. If we can reduce cost at the high end we can put it back in at the low end”. (County Council)

“What the police are struggling with, as we all are, is that they want to reduce the demand on their core business; so what I think they are doing is encroaching into other people’s core business to try and prevent demand, so that’s why they want to be working in partnership on mental health, troubled families”. (District Council)

However, evidence of longer term shared strategic visioning between organizations wasn’t so apparent, but rather, organizations were still primarily engaged with their own internal focus and strategy making and seeking to make sense of the ‘here and now’. There was a general acceptance that currently there exists a ‘joint’ strategic planning vacuum between public sector organizations and as a result the potential for greater interrelation, collaboration and sharing between state agencies was not being fully explored despite the LSP frameworks which exists within the county that brings together the executive and public sector leadership.

"I think it's in a really key period, certainly locally. We need to avoid losing the trust and re-entrenching and we need to start planning for the future in a more longitudinal way and I don't think those conversations are going on and they should be". (District Council)

“Think we are in danger of putting too much emphasis on the here and now and not enough on the future which will come back to haunt us”. (County Council)

Fundamentally, there is an implied tension operating. The strategic changes required of public services, combined with resultant internal organizational remodelling necessary of
public sector organizational transformation, inevitably requires ‘pump priming’ or development investment which, but particularly in times of austerity, are often scarce and have to be found within the existing resource constraint:

“The problem with upstream and downstream is there is little extra resource and your forever having to take down stream to invest in upstream”. (District Council)

However, at a more tactical and immediate level, resourcing pressures are currently reflecting themselves in partnership meeting attendance and although the police were seen as “regular attendees” as opposed, for example “Health” or “Social Services”. The pressure to free up time to commit to such events was felt to becoming “increasingly difficult” for all partners, against the backdrop of shrinking budgets and a resultant shrinking workforce:

“It’s time, its commitment and we are all being cut aren't we?” (Fire Service)

Nonetheless, from a police perspective, they have a legislative ‘duty’ to protect the public from harm and therefore are ‘duty’ bound to respond to public call of need and emergency. Against this backdrop, the police ‘feel’ this fundamental requirement of policing is being overly relied upon by other organizations or at its worst being ‘exploited’ by other services and partners, who can legally withdraw elements of their provision in the knowledge that the police responsibility still exists. It is in this context that the police feel the ‘buck stops’ with them; a position creating tension within partnership.

“If you ask the police to do something, the police crack on and do it...we are the agency of last resort...and so ultimately if there is nowhere else to turn...everyone looks towards the police to provide the solution; fair or otherwise”. (Chief Constable)

However, the OPCC guard against police ‘can-do’ mind-sets:

“Sometimes the cops view of partnership is about trying to do everything that others can’t do, rather than being an assertive partner and saying ‘this is what we’re here

for’, this is our vision, this is where we want to get to, this is how we think it links with your vision and where you want to get to, and lets work at that together.

Equally, the individual organizational contribution, including the police towards partnership outcomes has traditionally proved difficult to determine and in an era of necessity to revisit resourcing considerations in light of austerity there is an inevitable temptation for all partners, including the police, to withdraw areas of provision that are not evidenced or able to be objectively justified. As the chief constable alludes:

“The truth is that there is no formal measurement of the forces effectiveness (in these terms)”. (Chief Constable)

It is to the performance consideration that this research inquiry now turns.

The changing definition of performance

Post New Labour (2010-2018), at the time of writing, the UK has witnessed a change of performance emphasis for the police, who are now subject to a single performance measurement relating to public confidence in policing services (H.O. 2010). The coalition and subsequent Conservative government sought to rid public services of the plethora of targets that had previously existed, for each of the state’s services, including the police, under the New Labour administration. However, the challenge of assessing organizational performance and relative impact, within partnership remains and such considerations are currently being explored within the force. Previous police performance frameworks were generally informed by H.O. recorded crime classifications, but new flexibilities have allowed a redefining of police performance, as exampled within the Policing Plan set by the PCC focusing upon an outcomes-based approach (OPCC, 2013).

Staffordshire Police, in line with an aspiration for greater service integration have based their head of ‘performance development’ within a county council central performance team at the council offices with a view to aiding collaboration and development between
the two organizations. Whilst there is broad access to crime, high level demographic and social context data, on a ward by ward basis, it is generally accepted within the partnership context nationally, there is currently a lack of connection between evidencing process and outcomes.

The primary data process that underpins and records the Staffordshire Police’s ‘community engagement’ is referred to as the Citizens Focus Toolkit, which has been operating since 2012, linked to the requirements of section 34 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act, 2011 (referred to above). The ‘Citizen Focus’ framework requires the police to evidence community engagement, recording and understanding what matters to communities; informing communities what has been done in consequence and lastly being held to account by communities. To evidence such engagement, ‘Community Contact Records’ (CCR’s) are required to be completed by officers and PCSO’s following public engagement, which are then transferred onto a central police data base. Following on from the collection of community concerns, local problems solving packages are compiled by police and action taken, evidenced and recorded.

Running in parallel to the Citizen Focus Toolkit, since 2008, Staffordshire Police has independently commissioned a private data collection service to undertake a large scale population satisfaction survey (1,650 residents, aged 16 years plus) entitled ‘Feel the Difference’, undertaken every six months. As a result, there now exists an historic data collection, combined with the on-going performance developmental work between the police and county council that has recently allowed this same data to be ‘filtered’ through a computer software package known as Mosaic. Mosaic enables the police held data to be divided into 16 ‘community’ types and 66 individual population types based on a range of demographic and broader social information. Significantly, Mosaic also allows the data to now be analysed down to individual post code level. As a result of this new analytical tool, locality variances of up to a 40% difference in feelings of confidence, six times more concern over anti-social behaviour, and twice as likely to fear crime are recorded.
This new and emerging data has been made available to the police, county council, some district authorities (but not all), fire and rescue and health. The data is also being made available to all county council commissioning heads. The strength of this data is that crime, anti-social behaviour and community safety can now be placed within a wider context that explores broader ‘satisfaction’ within an area, together with health and wellbeing, education, employment and performance of a range of public services. The potential and ambition here is to help inform a ‘proportionate’ police and community safety response to identified issues. From a police perspective, Feeling the Difference perception data can be reviewed, issues identified, police and partner action taken and recorded (for the police via the Citizen Focus Toolkit) and then further assessment of impact can be made against the Feeling the Difference data collection at the next sampling period. However, the head of police performance leading this initiative, still identifies cultural resistance from LPU Commanders to use this ‘soft data’ as a diagnostic tool, with focus by the police still upon police recorded crime and anti-social behaviour statistics, in isolation. To help inform the data potential, a force ‘transformational’ pilot, referenced earlier in this results section, is being undertaken at Cannock LPU together with other partners to help inform local public service responses (this work is still on-going). Importantly, the whole process is informed by public participation and engagement and has the potential to help legitimise service responses or as may be appropriate in certain circumstances, non-response.

Given the importance of performance measurement to help inform strategic planning and organizational responses, it is again surprising that this development activity is taking place in relative isolation and that an overall countywide partnership consideration isn’t being given to ‘partnership performance’. In the main, performance and assessment is being left to individual organizations to pursue. A broader discussion as to what constitutes a ‘successful’ partnership, features in Chapter Eight.

However, it is also worthy at this juncture to give consideration as to the question of an individual’s ability, as opposed to organizational, to operate effectively within partnerships. Given the significant value given to partnership working by the police, endorsed as it is in
this instance by both the PCC and chief constable, it was surprising therefore to find that no formal monitoring or assessment of an individual’s contribution and ability takes place. Indeed, Staffordshire Police no longer operates an annual appraisal (PDR’s) processes, rejecting it as an example of unnecessary ‘bureaucracy’, a decision which is of itself at odds with commentary on recognised management practice (Armstrong, 2003; Fletcher, 1997, 2001; Taylor, 2002, amongst others). The question as to how individuals are judged as being effective within partnership environments, is quite simply answered; they are not!

Examples of how officers seek to mitigate the absence of personal review included:

“Whilst I don’t get judged on my effectiveness working in partnership, I think if we made no effort with partners and didn't drive them to be effective as possible, we wouldn't be able to deliver our mission”. (Ch/Supt)

“Easy in the Local Policing Commanders’ role, because if you can’t crack partnership in the role and can’t make that work, you can’t be effective in the role by definition”. (Ch/Insp)

As a consequence, it is not so surprising therefore, to establish that no formal training is given to officers in order to allow them to be more effective within partnerships and as one officer observed:

“Partnership engagement-have I got it right in all the occasions? Of course I haven’t. There are a lot of things I look back on and cringe. I learned through that process of trial and error”. (Ch/Insp)

Despite police leadership increasingly being required to operate in politically savvy ways within collaborative and partnership environments, police training, in the main, remains inwardly focused (Adlam and Villers, 2003; NPIA, 2010; Neyroud, 2011). The College of Policing (2015) published a police leadership review, but the report is primarily predicated upon the challenges presented to the service by austerity, advances in technology and a need for national standards. The concept of police leaders having to work collaboratively in
partnership is not identified or acknowledged. Crawford and Cunningham (2015) however, draw attention to the challenges presented to police leadership within partnerships, working across various organizational boundaries, cultures and practices. Given the weight that police leadership gives to partnership working, as evidenced within this study, it is surprising to find that no training and support is offered. Equally, the absence of training is not the sole domain of police leadership, practitioners at the ground level are largely left to learn on the job and often in isolation.

**A new vision of Staffordshire that resembles the past**

Whilst the chief constable highlights a ‘here and now’ imperative of partnership response activity development as described above, she also acknowledges the need for identifying root causes of problems and a requirement of policing and other public services to "get up stream", not least of which in order to seek to mitigate the extent of demand being placed upon public services. However, the chief constable also alludes to a resistance of some officers, many of whom have yet to fully embrace partnership and the potential for service integration and delivery:

“The vast majority of cops... still see themselves as just policing and not as a model of delivery which involves partners. If we transform the way we aim to we will become more a model of delivery that is a partnership model of delivery.”

The chief constable's ambition for even greater integration is sympathetic to the PCC’s 2020 Vision, heavily influencing the recently launched internal ‘transformational change project’ within the force (referenced above), and underpinned by a desire to challenge culture, engender a more receptive and responsive outlook to ‘new ways of working’, combined with significant investment in new technology and involving shared and accessible partnership data and information. The project is in its early days and being piloted in a single LPU along with local partner agencies. However, the chief executive within the Office of the PCC (OPCC) draws attention to the work the OPCC are doing in
order help change police mind-sets and once again recognise the value and importance of
the ‘public’ as partners.

“When we talk about partnership, we mean Staffordshire focused, area based, a
development programme that involves all. So our partners would be the general
public, as well as those agencies that we work with on a natural basis...One of the
conversations that we continually have with the force is about its ability to engage
with its communities well - and I think it struggles with that concept, if I’m
completely honest”. (OPPC)

Chapter conclusion

This analysis has explored the contemporary police-partnership setting and highlights a
partnership primarily between the police, statutory organizations and other recognised
bodies. Contemporary police-partnerships operate within a highly complex network of
formalised associations and constructs, combined with a resultant bureaucracy associated
with delivery within specialist and technical settings that has served to ‘mystify’
partnership. In doing so, it has also served to legitimatise the professionalization of issues
and problems. The danger of such an approach is to view issues and problems one
dimensionally, failing to recognise the complexity and interdependencies that social
problems inevitably present. Equally in this model, there is a tendency to regard the public
as laypersons detached from the influence of the ‘professionals’.

From a police perspective, the separation of issues into specialist forums has in the main,
reduced police engagement with young people to settings of ‘authority’ and ‘control’. The
formality of partnership, combined with political direction by successive governments, has
encouraged the police to withdraw from the softer ‘service’ elements of its hitherto remit,
including youth engagement, which may have previously helped aid public perception of
the police and as a consequence, police legitimacy. Police culture, reinforced by the CDA
1998, has sought to situate young people as ‘problematic’, within a criminal justice context

and therefore disproportionately relationships with young people are seen through the prism of enforcement.

Whilst police responses to partnership were generally warm and embracing, police culture remains action centred and reactive in focus. This action centred bias, combined with the pressures presented by government fiscal austerity, serves to undermine the investments made into neighbourhood policing and longer-term problems solving activities; emphasis is being given to the ‘here and now’ rather than the ‘tomorrow. Consequently, greater regard is being given to the development of joint ‘reactive’ service response, rather than traditionally has been the case, partnership activity being associated with longer-term ‘proactive’ problem solving. A trend I refer to as the ‘operalization’ of partnership.

Emanating from this trend has been an investment by the police in co-located partnership response units, housed within the police estate, but once again where the police contribution is primarily based upon their enforcement function.

This study found that partnership is uncontested territory within policing and, in the main, has become an ‘assumed’ and ‘accepted’ way of working. However, as a result, there has been an absence of consideration of partnership with its links to policing strategies and policing models more thoroughly. It has also been interesting to note the growing influence of the role of the PCC and their ability to shape both force direction and strategy. The role of the PCC brings a new dynamic to police governance and to the governance of CSP’s. Importantly, PCC’s have been able to exert ‘influence’ over police-partnerships via control of substantial finance and grant.

The study also identifies the police organization ‘assuming’ the generic skills required of police operatives are sufficient in themselves to work effectively within partnership. There is an absence of training, support or assessment given to those officers and staff working within these environments. A further example of organizational blindness is provided by the limited regard given to the consistency of police representation at the partnership table and yet the study reveals an importance and appreciation of partner relationships,
established as they are over time. By default, one of the consequences of this situation has been a strengthening of the role and influence of the local authority within the crime, disorder and community safety arena due to the council’s more consistent partnership representation and whom, by default, have therefore become the guardians of the partnership’s learning and memory.

Equally, the role of the local authority has been strengthened due to their legislative mandate to coordinate local strategic planning. However, from the crime, disorder and community safety perspective, the emergence of ‘health’ as a dominant feature within partnership governance, particularly through the introduction of Health and Wellbeing Boards, is serving to add a further layer of complexity and potential confusion to the partnership landscape.

Finally, organizations continue to struggle with assessing joint and individual performance within partnership, resulting in an absence of an established evidence base as to the effectiveness of otherwise of partnership interventions. That said, the emergence of an exploratory performance development within Staffordshire is worthy of future review. However, in the interim and against the backdrop of lack of such an evidence-base, challenges posed of organizations by austerity has resulted in a re-entrenching to what they regard as ‘core’ activity. Consequently, whilst crime, disorder and community safety are core activities for policing, for many of the other partners they are not. Equally, opportunities to use the existing partnership frameworks in order to work strategically and jointly in order to address the collective challenges that austerity has presented, have not been taken.

The thesis now turns to the discussion.
Chapter Eight - Discussion

Partnerships are considered rational constructs. As previously discussed, they are perceived by some to present advantages for inter-agency co-operation, and within a managerialist context, are aligned to concepts of efficiency and effectiveness. The persuasive nature of this purported ‘rationality’ argument that ‘the whole is greater than the sum of its parts’, extends to no more than linguistically and intuitively persuasive concepts of “joined-up” government, “joined-up” public services, “joined-up” criminal justice and with a recognition that crime and its multifaceted causations are beyond the remit and influence of a single agency, namely the police. However, the thesis seeks to argue that the rationality for adopting any crime reduction programmes should be evidence-based.

However, in accord with the intuitive rationality agenda, partnership, as a practice, albeit, as said, simply an idea of practice that is not proven to be most effective (Berry et al, 2011) during the New Labour government period (1997-2010) came to represent new forms of governance and control (Clark, 2002). The CDA 1998 a flagship policy of New Labour, mandated the police to work in partnership with local authorities relative to crime, disorder and community safety (Chapter Four). As a result, a paradox arises and one which questions the very ‘essence’ of partnership, namely that the ‘spirit’ of partnership, if not its definition or proven efficacy, is a ‘voluntary’ activity. Indeed, outside government reach of the public services, partnerships ‘must’ be based upon ‘voluntary agreements’, underpinned where necessary by legal and contractual frameworks. It is against this backdrop that the Staffordshire case-study usefully provides a platform in which to analyse police-partnership activity within two very different operating contexts (1) organic (voluntary) and (2) mandated (involuntary). Equally, the case-study spans a period of thirty-four years i.e. from 1983 until 2017 and thereby provides a platform in which to also assess the development of police-partnership activity overseen by successive governments, including New Labour (1997-2010) the Coalition (2010-2015) and now Conservative regimes (2015 to date, 2019).
As outlined in Chapter One, in an absence of any clear theoretical framework in which to analyse partnership, insights gained from Foucault’s (2011) governmentality studies; Weber’s theory of rationalisation; Ritzer’s (2011) paper on Macdonaldization and broader issues of corporacy, for example, Pratt (1988) amongst others, prove helpful in explaining both the emergence and development of partnership within the public sector, including the police. Additionally, the political backdrop which underpins the development of police-partnership, as evidenced throughout the thesis, must feature heavily in any subsequent analysis and where the politics that is policing is in a perpetual state of flux and subservient to the political imperative of the day. Policing is political, as are police-partnerships, being themselves influenced and shaped by both political and central policy. However, policy interpretations are inevitably filtered through the lens of an organizations culture and in this instance, police culture. The analysis therefore also seeks to locate the activity that is partnership within cultural interpretations.

**Note:** References to ‘the case-study’ refer to the thesis’s primary research, unless otherwise stated.

Against the above backdrop the discussion illustrates that:

1. The history and development of both organic and mandated policing partnerships reveals an interesting interplay between policing philosophies and outlooks, the delivery of strategy, political imperatives, the question of evidence-based practice and issues of police legitimacy.

2. Strategically, the concept of partnerships has been loosely aligned to community oriented policing models, but questions remain as to the extent and role that partnership features within contemporary police thought.

3. The bureaucratization of partnership post-Morgan 1991 has created a rigidity of partnership structure, and as a result, the complexity and multifaceted nature of society’s life’s issues are being over simplified and made to fit.

4. The professionalization of partnership has in the main, restricted the partnership environment to the state’s agencies, in part the third sector, and to a lesser extent
the private sector, but as a result, has tended to ‘exclude’ the public, either as partners in their own right or as active participants.

5. Political drives to reconnect the police and public, and indeed commentary within the police academic literature, have tended to ignore the impact that the bureaucratization of partnership has had upon the role and contribution of the police within partnership. The analysis identifies a diminishing of the hitherto ‘service’ and ‘care’ functions of policing, but with an emphasis being given to ‘authority’ and ‘control’.

6. Within a managerialist context, judgements as to the efficacy of partnership prove problematic and assessments as to partnership efficiency and effectiveness are more fully explored. Against this backdrop, the ‘social processes’ operating within partnership have been under appreciated and the analysis draws attention to an importance as to the ‘quality’ of relationship established, together with issues of ‘trust’.

7. The police contribution within partnership is frequently unspoken. By adopting an appreciative analysis, the qualities and attributes that the police may ‘offer’ within partnership, particularly those of police leadership, commitment and the strategic importance of the police organization are highlighted.

8. The research evidences that police attitudes and approaches towards partnership have ‘shifted’ over time. Contrary to historic commentary on police-partnership activities, there now exits a cultural ‘warmth’ towards partnership, albeit ‘suspicion’, and on occasions, tension with partners remains.

9. Post the CDA 1998 there has been an increasing authority and leadership by local authorities, a position in accord with Morgan's (1991) original vision and a position encouraged as much by a police organizational inability to maintain a consistency of representation within partnership.

10. Finally, post-2010, and as a result of government imposed fiscal austerity measures, new questions, challenges and opportunities of partnership are presented.
Partnerships alignment to models of policing

As early as the 1970’s and 80’s, evidence of police partnership activity clearly existed, as exampled by the SPACE scheme (Chapter Six), but it is Alderson (1979) the former Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall who appears to mark the first systematic application of police partnerships; a concept he championed within the context of a broader community policing model. Integral to Alderson’s vision was a desire to shift the then dominant reactive model of policing to a more proactive, community focused and participative outlook (Alderson, 1984). However, as Chapter Two identifies, initially at least, rather than wholesale take-up of such an approach being adopted within the UK, the development of community oriented policing models took place in the USA (e.g. Lubans and Edgar, 1979; Peak and Glensor, 1996; Goldstein, 1990). From a United Kingdom perspective, the Scarman Inquiry (1981) in response to significant urban unrest added impetus to Alderson’s outlook. In turn, Sir Kenneth Newman (1983) Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police further built upon Alderson’s work, placing an emphasis upon problem solving and co-operation in the prevention of crime; an approach he branded ‘Multi-Agency’ policing. However, as previously discussed in this thesis, it is Morgan (1991) rather than Alderson or Newman who is most frequently cited in the literature as providing the foundational work for contemporary police partnerships. Moreover, earlier police partnership initiatives such as SPACE have also largely been ignored.

Chapters Two and Four evidence the seeds of police-partnership activity primarily resting within concerns for police legitimacy, particularly during the 1970’s and 80’s, a period framed by competing political discourse as to responses of law and order; and a period equally framed by internal police leadership conflict and dispute about policing styles and approaches. Simplistically, within police leadership, two polarised positions emerged, (1) ‘hard’ or ‘authoritarian’ policing and (2) ‘soft’ or ‘community’ policing; competing positions that were to be contested against a backdrop of changing political judgements as to the measurement of police ‘efficiency’. Also during this period there was a growing acceptance amongst politicians, evidenced through H.O. sponsored research, for example, Clarke and Hough (1980) and Morris and Heal, (1981) that the numbers of police officers and how those police officers were being
Chapter Eight: Discussion

used and deployed was having little apparent impact on the prevention or detection of crime. Consequently, alternative approaches to crime and crime prevention were considered.

From a theoretical perspective, and as previously discussed, ‘Situational Crime Prevention Theory’, where crime is viewed as a rationally perceived opportunity, dominated both academic and police perspectives until the late 1980’s (Chapters Two and Four refer). As a consequence, newly emerging conceptual frameworks for understanding crime prevention, commonly labelled ‘social crime prevention’ gained traction. Focus was now upon ‘community’ and ‘social responsibility’ for crime (Cornish and Clarke, 1986). In parallel, and in line with the New Public Management reform agenda (Ranson and Stewart, 1994; McLaughlin, 2007) a limited but influential number of forces within the UK, including the Metropolitan Police championed the ‘Policing by Objectives’ model (Butler, 1992) an approach premised as it was upon wholesome organizational alignment to declared objectives and which actively encouraged more strategic and problem oriented approaches and engagement with a wide stakeholder base. However, the systemised approach wasn’t universally accepted; and other police leaders were either more persuaded by Goldstein’s (1990) Problem Oriented Policing (POP) with its focus upon more local and defined problems or indeed chose to reject more proactive outlooks entirely (Ackryod and Helliwell, 1991; Weatheritt, 1986; Savage, 2007). At the same time, the determination of policing strategy clearly rested with each chief constable, whose authority to set the policing style and approach went largely unchallenged, albeit acknowledging that developing performance frameworks served to influence the adoption of more reactive and response based policing styles (Brain, 2010). As a consequence, a growing political unease arose premised upon concern as to a distancing of the police from the public (Savage, 2007). However, as mentioned above, it was the urban riots of the 1980’s that were to mark a paradigm shift in policing strategizing and the ensuing Scarman Inquiry (1981) re-emphasised an importance of the very British tradition of ‘policing by consent’, and further encouraged a greater public participation and engagement with policing. Subsequently, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (section 106) formalised the requirement for police-public consultation and in turn the CDA 1998 and resultant CSP’s, together with its associated policy guidance, appeared to underline government
belief of the criticality for communities to be able to influence the delivery of local public services, including that of policing.

In further pursuit of an enhanced police-public connection, the general tenets of police ‘community’ approaches have more recently been badged under the umbrella of Neighbourhood Policing, a legacy policy of the New Labour government (1997-2010) first introduced in 2007; a programme which also became associated with police reform (Quinton and Morris, 2008). New Labour was seeking to address a growing unease as to the state of police-public relationships and in support, via the Police Reform Act 2002, legislated for the introduction of Police Community Support Officers (PCSO’s) (Savage, 2007). Subsequently, a National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) was piloted (2003-2005), which in turn informed the national roll out of the Neighbourhood Policing Programme in 2008 (Innes, 2005; Barker, 2013). Neighbourhood Policing stipulated amongst other considerations, the identification of local neighbourhoods, public advertisement of officers assigned to those neighbourhoods, community engagement and the application of targeted policing and problem solving (Hughes and Rowe 2007). The programme has also generally been viewed as the primary aspect of police delivery most commonly associated with police partnership activity (O’Neill, 2014). However in itself, this position infers a narrow definition of Neighbourhood Policing as being the sole domain of neighbourhood based officers/PCSO’s, a position often reinforced in the broader literature (Longstaff et al, 2015) but the author of this thesis would argue that a more holistic interpretation of the model would seek to frame Neighbourhood Policing as ‘involving’ all aspects of the policing function, including response and investigation, rather than just being confined to the ideology of the local ‘beat’ officer and PCSO’s. Equally, and as the case-study has revealed, contemporary police partnership activity has connectivity with both criminal investigation and response functions of policing in their own right, via for example, such mechanisms as co-located Multi-Agency Safe Guarding Hub’s (MASH’s) and Integrated Offender Management Unit’s (IMU’s) (Chapter Seven). And post the early 2000’s, there has been considerable police-public sector contracting and collaboration, encouraged by successive
governments and more recently framed against the backdrop of the government’s fiscal austerity policy (HMIC, 2013).

What can clearly be deduced from the above chronology of events, spanning as they do over some forty years, is a desire by both H.O. and successive governments to create an ‘improved’ police-public connection; an enduring agenda more recently evidenced by publication of the 2010 Policing White Paper poignantly, ‘Reconnecting Police and the People’ (H.O. 2010). Indeed, the subsequent advancement of PCC’s in 2012 represents further testimony of a desire by government in exploring public representation within policing (Chapter Seven).

In contrast, despite government intentions to broker greater police-public connectivity, the concept of partnership has been only loosely been aligned to community policing models (Gilling, 1999) together with limited aspects of operational strategy, albeit police-public consultation/engagement and elements of problem solving are implicit within the Neighbourhood Policing model. However, the development of partnership activity in the main, within the case-study area at least, views partnership more in terms of a process, involving multi-agency working and other ‘professional’ settings and where, despite the rhetoric, the public are generally excluded. Equally, within the national landscape, police leadership appears to have remained silent on articulating strategy and directly relevant to this thesis, detailing the relevance of partnership within it. In the main, police leadership has acquiesced to political imperative and central direction setting. In brief, there has been an absence of police leadership. As a result, the author would argue that policing strategy has become little more than a patchwork of independent ideas and initiatives overlaid with centrally imposed directives rather than being considered more holistically and being police led.

More recently, rather than individual police visionaries emerging, the role of contesting political direction setting has been left to the collective voice of the National Police Chiefs Council (NPCC) in collaboration with the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC). These organizations felt compelled during 2017 to publish a ‘Policing Vision 2025’ document, appearing as much a publication in response to service wide concerns as to government
austerity measures; the Vision, representing an opportunity for policing to more clearly articulate its concerns over the changing nature and complexity of demand on government in an attempt to better present its case for increased investment (NPCC, 2017). However, the document makes only indirect reference to partnerships, encouraging opportunity for a greater ‘joined-up business delivery’ with other public services, against a backdrop of fiscal austerity and perceived organizational efficiency (NPCC, 2017). Fundamentally however, the ‘vision’ remains light on detail, with no clear overall policing model or approach being identified, albeit the rhetoric of a British policing module is championed ‘...with its tangible link between citizens and the police .... Envided all over the world’ (NPCC, 2017:7). However, the somewhat ethereal concept of a ‘British Model’, premised upon ‘public consent’ and secured through a form of social contract remains uncertain, ill-defined and as Simey (1984) alludes, public consent to be policed is of little meaning unless the terms of the consent are clearly understood. Even if the broad tenets of consensual policing are accepted, the ‘vision’ does not answer the question as to how policing is to be practically delivered?

Where partnership/collaborative working does appear to have a consistent application and consensus within contemporary police thinking pertains to concepts of intelligence led/or knowledge-based models and approaches, where data acquisition and sharing are fundamental; the collaborative benefits of sharing data being clear to all. Intelligence led approaches were first championed by the Audit Commission (1993) and later supported by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC, 1997). Subsequently, UK policing itself (National Crime Intelligence Service) developed a National Intelligence Model (NIM) aimed at providing national standardisation of intelligence-related structures, process and practices (H.O. 2001). The NIM, essentially a business process, is built around analytical, intelligence, knowledge and system ‘products’ underpinned by tasking and coordinating groups; and via the National Policing Plan 2004 was centrally required to be adopted by all forces by 2004 (Flood, 2004; Maguire, 2006). However, whilst NIM presents an opportunity to be used as a broader strategic business planning tool, not unlike the Policing by Objectives (PBO) model (Edgar and Lubens, 1979), the reality in application has largely been restricted to the narrow definitions of crime and offender...
targeting (Maguire and John, 2006; Maguire, 2008). Nonetheless, the H.O. and government were clearly influenced by the rationality, evidence-based and ‘discipline’ required of the NIM, and as a result, obligated CSP’s via the Crime and Disorder (Prescribed Information) Regulations, 2007 to adopt the NIM as part of their own business planning cycle, although there is scant commentary within the literature as to its application and impact (H.O. 2006; John et al., 2006; John and Maguire, 2007). However, more broadly Harfield (2008:2) champions intelligence led approaches as engendering greater strategic and future oriented outlooks within a ‘continuum of community safety, public protection and national security’. And Kirby and McPherson (2004) support the universality of the NIM and raise potential for its integration into problem solving approaches.

In summary, seeking to determine where partnership fits within contemporary policing strategies proves messy. There is a lack of clarity and indeed consensus within the policing literature as to the actual meanings of the terms “strategy”, "philosophy", "models" and “approaches”; terms often used interchangeably. However, what one can deduce is a centrality and importance attributed to belief systems, both politically held and within police leadership, as to interpretations attributed to the role and function of policing within a modern democracy; interpretations which ultimately frame the practical application of policing on the ground. Within the current political climate that espouses a desire for an ‘improved’ police-public connection, community-oriented models and processes that may encourage both public and partner agency involvement and participation in the act of policing (e.g. partnerships) would appear to be aligned.

Whilst neighbourhood policing implicitly encourages elements of partnership activity, equally other policing models, for example, Problem Oriented Policing and Intelligence Led Policing and indeed partnership itself can either be considered in holistic and strategic terms or alternatively reduced to the function of process. Interestingly, Tilley (2007:389) suggests that if such models are taken to describe ‘overall ways of conceiving of and of doing policing’ then it is difficult to see how they can work together’ but he also acknowledges that policing is a ‘complex social institution with many functions’. Conversely, Hale et al (2005) adopt a contrary position and
argue that different policing ‘styles’ can complement each other, noting there is a danger that they might also create ‘divergent demands’, both operationally and upon resourcing. The services somewhat nebulous Policing Vision 2025, scant on detail, further suggests a lack of tangible consensus within police leadership as to an agreed policing ‘style’, ‘model’ or ‘approach’ and as a result remains the determination of the individual force leadership, be it chief constable or increasingly the influence of the PCC, whilst still having to remain responsive to latest direction setting by the government of the day.

What is clear to the author however, is the potential rule of thumb universality offered by partnerships to models and approaches to policing and its potential to help inform all aspects of the policing process i.e. strategic planning, aiding the management of demand, enhancing intelligence, supporting data gathering and analysis, widening tactical options, helping to engage the public, as well as potentially supporting the police and partner organization’s resourcing coordination, action and response. Policing is interwoven with the broader societal social function and therefore policing’s connectivity with ‘others’ through the mechanism of partnership is without boundary. This appreciative stance is not to champion or to suggest that partnerships inevitably lead to better outcomes, but merely to highlight the existing potential for partnership to help inform all aspects of the policing process. However, the politicization of partnership overseen by the New Labour government (1997-2010), sought to create new forms of accountability and ‘control’ through a bureaucratization of partnership which in consequence, the author would argue, currently frames a limitation as to the possibilities that partnership presents. It is to the bureaucratization of partnership that the discussion now turns.

**Bureaucratization**

Concepts of bureaucratization, managerialism and performance are inextricably linked. As mentioned above, the origin of formalised police partnership structures and indeed their associated bureaucracy can be traced back and very much attributed to the influence of Morgan (1991) and the resultant Crime and Disorder, Act 1998 (see Chapter Three). Morgan, himself a management consultant, maybe not so surprisingly therefore sought to frame police-
partnership within a managerial context, evidenced by recourse within his famous ‘Morgan Report’ to ‘strategy’, ‘impact assessments’, ‘central coordination’, ‘administrative support’, ‘funding’ and so forth. From such a paradigm there exists an implicit ‘rationality’ towards structure, corporacy, sameness and hence Morgan's vision of a single national model of police-partnership. Equally, it must be remembered, Morgan was writing at a time when ‘Situational Crime Prevention’ had gained a growing appreciation, as discussed above, an approach which endorses a rational outlook (Laycock and Pease, 1985; Gladstone, 1980 amongst others). In parallel, the advent of New Public Management made public services, including the police subject to increased levels of bureaucracy in line with government’s desire for public services to better demonstrate efficiency and effectiveness and increasingly fiscal accountability (Greener, 2009; Flynn, 1990; Pollitt, 1993, 2000).

In this context, it has been interesting to note the degree of escalation of bureaucracy within the case-study examined in this thesis between the partnership that was SPACE (1983-1999) compared with that experienced within the contemporary partnership setting (2014-17), relative to young people. In brief, this research originally reveals an apparent simplicity and general absence of bureaucracy operating in the pre-1998 partnership SPACE.

SPACE required ‘active’ public engagement and participation i.e. more than simple dialogue, albeit Gelthorpe’s (1985) model of a continuum of partnership working recognises at its most informal arrangement a communication ‘only’ model. However, Gelthorpe’s typology is focused upon the notion of organizations as partners and fails to consider the wider public in these same terms. Implicit in the SPACE scheme, partnership served as the mechanism used to help frame public engagement, to create dialogue and to secure ‘active’ public participation; an approach sympathetic to more community oriented or ‘soft’ policing models, as discussed above. Equally of note is that SPACE was a single agency led project, representing a direct relationship between the police and the public, as distinct from a multi-agency connection; this was a police-public ‘partnership’. The apparent simplicity of the scheme necessitated only limited bureaucracy structured by way of central force coordination and branding and where the ‘local’ was the principal delivery model, a model designed to help facilitate ‘community’ engagement.
Conversely, an examination of contemporary policing (2014-17) witnesses partnership embedded within highly complex and bureaucratic multi-agency delivery structures (Appendix G). Such a position accords with Foucault’s (2011) discourse on governmentality, with the creation of administrative systems as part of the state’s apparatus, supported by complex bureaucracies. As a result, ‘knowledge’ is aligned to power. In this instance, the bureaucratization of partnership has created narrow definitions of problems categorizations for example anti-social behaviour, drugs and alcohol, youth offending, health and well-being and so forth which serve to ‘mystify’ partnership within specialist technical settings, thereby legitimising the professionalization of issues and problems. The complexity and multifaceted nature of social issues are reduced to identifiable labels of convenience, which struggle to either recognise or accommodate connectivity between them. In consequence, the partnership arena has become the domain of specialist expertise, protected by its own ‘professional’ language and technical understanding. Rose and Miller’s (1992) analysis of neo-liberalism serves as a useful comparator, similarly identifying experts forming nodes around which issues and explanations can be organised. In such environments, and maybe not so surprisingly therefore, the pursuit of organizational or group self-interest through claims to specialist expertise is likely to occur (Cohen, 1985). Equally, Weber’s theory of rationalisation (Allan, 2009; Calhoun, 2007) resonates given the power and strength attached to these largely centrally imposed partnership frameworks. As a result, the public’s authority, influence and engagement become secondary to that of professional identities and agendas i.e. the partnership framework becomes the dominant authority. In consequence, partnership considerations are disproportionately viewed by the police, in organizational terms as working with other agencies and having ‘informed’ professional conversations, rather than viewing their direct activities with the public within a partnership framework or context.

The author argues that the professionalization of partnership, restricted as it is to largely the state’s agencies or other organizational representation, has tended to ‘exclude’ the public either as recognisable partners or active participants, reducing the public’s role to that of consultee only. This is not to suggest that the multi-agency working isn’t encouraged by the public, indeed
Charlton et al (2011) acknowledge public support for multi-agency working but found, specifically in relation to CSP’s, public connection and understanding of their contribution was low, further evidencing a disconnect. Additionally, the apparent rigidity of contemporary partnership structures creates a fundamental dichotomy: a) should the partnership structure be designed around the problem an organization or organizations seek to resolve? Or b) is the problem made to ‘fit’ within an existing partnership framework? In this regard, clear distinction can be drawn between organic and mandated partnerships. Organic partnerships have complete freedom to construct the partnership around the problem, whereas mandated partnerships are constrained by the terms of the legislation, central policy oversight and direction setting.

**Performance assessment**

Within this professionalized and managerialist context fundamental tensions exists between: (1) the pressures upon each agency to meet its ‘core’ targets; and (2) at the same time having to deliver a partnership contribution. Partnership working is shaped by structural, cultural and social factors. Evidencing accountability and effectiveness within this complexity proves difficult. It is of note that within the literature that there is very little evidence linking partnership working to improved outcomes, in part at least because of the methodological challenges presented within such a complex setting (Berry et al, 2011; Cook et al, 2015). Against the above backdrop, the case-study revealed that SPACE, albeit subject to H.O. evaluation (1987), struggled to evidence its effectiveness in terms of crime reduction, not least due to a lack of clarity as to the scheme’s overall aims.

A small-scale survey conducted by Tyson (1990), sponsored by the H.O’s Police Research Support Unit (PRSU), provides limited evidence of young people’s attitudes changing more positively towards the police during the scheme which according to many respondents was the schemes primary purpose. However, suspicion is raised that the presentation of the scheme was subsequently ‘manipulated’ by the host force to fit a revised H.O. performance agenda i.e. a new requirement to demonstrate ‘outputs’ of crime reduction. That said, it is also accepted that at that time there existed an immaturity of performance frameworks and limited technology.
However, what is not disputed is that during the period of SPACE youth engagement, the central theme of this analysis, was being prioritised by the force and supported with considerable resource alignment (Chapter Six).

Conversely, within the force’s contemporary police strategy and more specifically police-partnership working arena, the label ‘youth engagement’ as an activity is not formally recognised, albeit there are examples of discrete programmes of work clearly being undertaken within the force that would fit the heading. Rather, an alternative picture emerges where young people have been problematized within partnership constructs framed around problem labels, for example, ‘anti-social behaviour’, ‘drugs’, ‘alcohol and violence’, ‘youth offending’, ‘child sexual exploitation’, ‘safeguarding’ and so forth. Consequently, police contributions within partnership are disproportionally focused upon on crime and enforcement i.e. authority and control. Equally, it is acknowledged there is no ‘formal’ youth engagement strategy operating within the force, a position itself somewhat surprising given the extent young people ‘occupy’ of police activity, be it via young people’s vulnerabilities, welfare, safeguarding or as victims or offenders (Evans, 2011; McCarthy, 2011, 2014; Ministry of Justice, 2016; Roe and Ash, 2006; amongst others). As a further consequence of an absence of an overall ‘youth engagement strategy’, more positive activity with young people by the police, premised upon relationship building, is not formally recognised or integrated into partnership frameworks and has in the main been left to Local Police Unit (LPU) discretion. However, the recent intervention of the PCC has led to the introduction of a force wide police cadet scheme (2014) and a re-launch of a revised SPACE scheme (2015), with an ongoing recognition of the need to more positively engage young people, but once again the position is one of discrete activity and sitting outside of any strategic or formal police-partnership frameworks (Chapter Seven).

Performance - a moving target

The context of measuring police performance and overall contribution however sits within a wider debate. Chapter Four provides an overview of the development of a performance culture within policing and demonstrates how performance by successive governments, post the 1970s
and early 1980’s, has been central to national government efforts to improve police efficiency. In brief, the Thatcher led government (1979-1990) introduced national objective setting. Subsequently New Labour (1997-2010) reframed crime within its social context and as a result sought to drive elements of target setting through the mechanism of CDRP’s, albeit police effectiveness was broadened within this context to also include time patrolling, and public engagement activity (Drake and Simper, 2001). However, policing was still made subject to its own performance regime, and in 2004 the Policing Performance Assessment Framework (PPAF) was introduced based upon by economic modelling principles and Activity Based Coasting (ABC) in particular (Golding and Savage, 2008). Subsequently, in recognition of the increasing police requirement to work in partnership, a new performance framework was introduced during 2009, which sought to simplify and align the performance frameworks of policing and community safety entitled the Assessment of Policing and Community Safety (APACS) (H.O. 2007d). Notably, however, in 2010 the newly elected Conservative led coalition government, as part of a ‘slate clearing’ exercise, rejected APACS and all other perceived New Labour bureaucracies, resulting in the police being made subject to a single performance indicator relating to public confidence in policing services (H.O. 2010) (For a fuller analysis see Chapter Four).

Against this backdrop, Maillard and Savage (2018) explore whether the shifts in political orientation of performance have led to a more advanced police performance models being adopted. Their case-study analysis concluded that traditional short-term target setting and longer term problem solving and quality of process measures now co-exist within a ‘contradictory framework’; a position reflective of the target setting regime of New Labour and indeed police cultural sympathy towards ‘quick wins’, existing alongside more advanced and longer term focused performance regimes. In these terms, the case-study analysis reveals that post-2010 there has been a noticeable shift to ‘outcome’ based objectives operating at all levels within the county’s strategic partnerships structures and similarly an approach endorsed by the current PCC. In parallel, experimental developmental work being undertaken jointly by the police and county council is seeking to more directly connect processes and activity on the
ground to outcomes. Chapter Seven more fully discusses the detail of this potentially ground-breaking work. However, it is also of note that such development is taking place in relative isolation rather than within a broader strategic context within the county and its potential has yet to be fully realised within the operational police setting. At a national level, the current momentum behind Evidence-Based Policing (EBP) may also be aiding the development of police performance regimes, although the Evidence-Based Policing Programme remains contested territory (Lum and Kaper, 2017; Lumsden and Good, 2016; Maillard and Savage, 2018; Martin and Mazerolle, 2016; Sherman 2013; Tilley, 2009).

**Austerity - reframing efficiency**

Post New Labour (2010 to date) partnership is increasingly considered by both the H.O. and HMIC to represent police organizational efficiency and as a result there has been active encouragement for inter-force collaborations, public sector ‘joint-working’ and increasingly collaboration with the private sector. However, effectiveness in these terms is viewed more narrowly and against the backdrop of austerity pressures upon public services to reduce or streamline organizational costs (HMIC, 2011; 2012a; 2012b; 2013). In such an environment one might have anticipated this situation to serve as a catalyst, driving public sector organization’s towards longer term collaborative and strategic outlooks, but the case-study suggests an alternative position, namely a re-entrenching by organizations to their ‘core’ and primary organizational function i.e. shrinking budgets equals shrinking scope of provision. Issues of crime and disorder, clearly a ‘core’ activity for policing, might not be so prioritised by other agencies. However, where common agreement does exist between public sector organizations, including the police, it is upon a perceived need to be able to reduce demand to better cope within a continuing environment of fiscal constraint. In these same terms it interesting to observe a reactive ‘here and now’ interpretation and emphasis given to demand rather than alternatively viewing demand within longer term strategic problem solving and preventative contexts. In consequence, police-partnership activity has tended to have developed and to be police led along more pragmatic and reactive lines through such structures as the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH’s) and Integrated Offender Management Units (IOM’s); a
development I have termed the ‘operalization’ of partnership (see Chapter Seven). Such approaches have been endorsed as representing organizational efficiency by the H.O. Police and Probation inspectorates, together with other regimes charged with the safeguarding and public protection agendas (H.O. 2014; HMIP and HMIC, 2014). However, the public sector partnership constructs and partnership frameworks originally devised under New Labour and subsequently endorsed by successive governments remain. Within this environment, the broader debate of seeking to establish the efficacy of partnerships continues.

**Conceptualising effectiveness**

Commentary restricted solely to the constructs of ‘performance’ and ‘efficiency’ only in part address the question as to ‘how’ partnership ‘effectiveness’ might be assessed; Once again within the literature this represents a contested area. For example, the H.O. (2007) CDRP Reform Programme sought to introduce national minimum standards for all CDRP’s, subsequently referred to as CSP’s in England and Wales, based upon what the H.O. considered the six ‘hallmarks’ of an ‘effective’ partnership, namely: (1) empowered and effective leadership; (2) intelligence-led business processes; (3) effective and responsive delivery structures; (4) community engagement; (5) visible and constructive accountability; and (6) appropriate skills and knowledge (H.O. 2007). Alternatively, McCarthy and O’Neill (2014) in seeking to determine ‘effectiveness’ draw focus upon the need for trust, style, identity and operation, together with managing diversity within partnerships. Conversely, Berry et al (2011) in describing the ‘mechanisms’ of effective police partnership working cite: a shared vision; clarity of the problems to be addressed; knowledge of working in partnership; planning implementation and evaluation processes and data sharing, amongst others. Beyond the policing literature there is a plentiful supply of diverse and sometimes competing commentary as to what aids partnership effectiveness, for example Cook (2015) highlight the following ‘influences’ that impact upon effectiveness: motivation for establishing the partnership; the influence of central government; hierarchical versus collaborative organizational form; links between strategic and operational levels; engagement of the third sector; and the use of power within partnerships. Whilst Dowling et al (2004) describe successful partnerships as displaying a
level of engagement and commitment; agreement about their purpose; trust, reciprocity and respect between partners; have favourable environments operating; satisfactory accountability arrangements existing and adequate leadership and management.

Whilst there is no universal consensus, many recurring themes can be identified and grouped around three distinct but interconnected areas: (1) the key processes involved; (2) the context in which the partnership exists; and (3) the operating environment and climate. The below chart seeks to outline key components under each of the three groupings, the author accepting that the list is not exhaustive.

**Fig 6: Conceptualising effectiveness key components**

| Process                                                                 | Context                                           | Environment/Climate                               |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------|                                                  |                                                  |
| Agreement as to why the partnership exists - shared vision and purpose  | Suitable and compatible institutional and interagency activity | Culture, outlook and attitudes of the organizations and individuals involved |
| Strategic and business planning processes, including performance frameworks, monitoring and evaluation | Mandated or voluntary partnership | Quality of relationships established - trust, openness, respect, reciprocity |
| Clear identification and articulation of the problem or issue(s) to be addressed | Strategic organizational but collaborative leadership | Degree of empowered and effective leadership, management |
| Appropriate governance and accountability arrangements                  | Political environment, both national and local   | Skills, knowledge, requisite abilities of personnel |
| Effective and responsive delivery structures that link strategic and operational activity | Degree of organizational commitment | Degree of personal commitment                     |
| Data sharing, data                                                      | Resources and finance                            | Availability of relevant                          |
Interestingly, in terms of what constitutes effectiveness, the literature disproportionately focuses upon issues of ‘process’, with only limited attention paid to the elements of context, environment, outcome and impact, and yet as this thesis has identified, the complexity that is partnership is heavily influenced by both contextual and environmental factors; topics discussed more fully below.

The case-study endorses many of the aspects identified under the ‘process’ and ‘context’ headings above, and in particular, emphasis is given to the: importance of leadership; requirement for strategic alignment between police operational strategies and partnership objectives and structures; necessity for ‘appropriate’ performance frameworks; appropriate governance and accountability and the need for sufficiency of resource. However, more directly the case-study highlights a critical importance being attributed to the ‘quality’ of personal relationships between partners and to issues of ‘trust’; the two being inextricably linked (Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Tyler, 2010). Partnership viewed in these terms is as much about the ‘social process’ operating and where the degree of commitment and trust can be a determinant of both personal and outcome performance (Palmatier et al., 2007 cited in Barro-Mendez et al., 2016). In this context police relationships operate at all levels, from the strategic activities of the PCC, chief officers and senior police commanders, to the operational activity and on the ground within the Local Police Unit (LPU) setting; where in particular within the community safety arena, the quality of relationship existing between the LPU commander and the local authority chief executive was the major determinate of commitment given to partnership activity within their respective organizations.
A quality of relationship

The thesis’s primary research indicates that the ‘quality’ of relationship is subject to several variables but at its core lies an ‘attitude’ or ‘mind-set’ of the individual involved. The ‘positive’ police-partnership mind-set seeks to view the world in interconnected ways and actively looks for connection and collaborative opportunity, and from a policing standpoint, a mind-set which acknowledges policing as part of a broader social process within the state’s apparatus. Underpinning these ‘attitudes’ or ‘mind-set’ is the individual’s level of:

1. Professional competence;
2. Interpersonal skills, for example, empathy, care, communication;
3. Requisite ‘collaborative’ skills, for example, negotiating, influencing, mediation;
4. Emotional intelligence, ability to be politically savvy and self-aware (see Goldman, 1998).

However, the primary research further identifies such personal qualities and outlooks are not universally held, nor are they organizationally systemic; rather they are dependent upon the individual ‘personality’ involved. To add to the variability of the individual police ‘personality’ the above situation is then overlaid by an apparent police organizational dysfunction which:

1. Creates a frequency of personnel movement; the organization failing to appreciate that a stability and continuity in post potentially aids the opportunity for enhanced partnership relations, and de facto ‘trust’, trust being built up over time (Morgan and Hunt, 1994);
2. Fails to provide any specific and relevant training, development and support to those charged with working within partnership landscapes; and
3. Whilst the relative position of autonomous police leadership, operating as it does throughout the organization, in itself possesses many organizational and operational
advantages, it inevitably leads to diverse and individual interpretations of the local police mandate, and combined with the elements of 1) and 2) above creates a significant ‘instability’ within partnerships.

In overview, the ‘quality’ of relationship established is influenced by the officer/staff members time in post; their individual interpretation of the police mandate, overall attitude towards partnership, combined with the level of requisite skill possessed. However, the lack of organizational appreciation and awareness as to the complexities operating creates a situation where the majority of police personnel engaged in partnership activity receive little or no direct support and are generally left to their own self-sufficiency, ‘learning on the job’. The consequence to this is that the situation requires high degrees of ‘understanding’ and indeed ‘accommodation’ by partners but is likely to create a position that negatively impacts upon the quality of relationship established, particularly in the short term, and as a result, potentially affects the overall effectiveness of the partnership. Despite the rhetoric as to the importance of police-partnership activity, police internal organizational systems are not fully aligned. Additionally, within the case-study area at least, no formal assessment or appraisal is attributed to police personnel working within such settings, an action in itself potentially serving to undermine the value and importance given to partnership. This is not to suggest that such organizational dysfunction and lack of appreciation as to the complexities and social processes operating within partnership remains the sole domain of policing, see for example, Cameron and Lart, 2003; Dickinson and Glasby, 2010; Williams and Sullivan, 2010 amongst others, relative to health and social care.

However, beyond discussion as to the structural and social processes which may contribute towards notions of ‘effectiveness’, within the police-partnership literature there is scarce commentary on what it is that the police might positively ‘offer’ within partnership, and which may aid overall effectiveness.
The police offer

The case-study identifies that the perceived strengths of the police contribution can be grouped into three main areas:

1. The police as a strategically important organization;
2. The influence of police leadership; and
3. Police commitment, resourcing and responsiveness.

It should be said that such strengths reside within the context of the police organizational culture and like all strengths may be overdone. Both positive and negative considerations are discussed below:

The police as a strategically important organization

The constitutional position of the police creates a position of authority, power and influence; the police being seen as representative of a state’s legitimacy (Loader and Mulcahy, 2003). Within the partnership arena, the police are viewed as a senior and ‘powerful’ organization who, either by virtue of statute or invitation, have a consistent place at strategic public sector partnership forums. Within such environments police signatory, endorsement, sponsorship and support are viewed positively by partners as adding perceived credibility and legitimacy to partnership. In marketing terms, co-branding with the police organization is generally a desired commodity and actively sought. Pragmatically, the police are viewed by partners as an influential organization relative to their enforcement capability, access to funds, resourcing, data, extensive networks, communication reach and privileged access capabilities (Van Staden et al., 2010).

The converse position to this more appreciative account cautions against the police using their power to pursue organizational self-interest (Crawford and Cunningham, 2015; Hughes and Rowe, 2007). However, as the thesis case-study analysis reveals, there exists a contradictory position to notions of power where the police view themselves as "an agency of last resort", an
organization which can’t say “no”, and as a result of perceived deficiencies in other public sector provision, an organization "left filling in the gaps" i.e. an organization largely without political voice. Culturally such internal feelings of ‘helplessness’ and ‘isolation’ resonate with both Skolnick’s (1966) and Reiner’s (2010) typologies of police culture. Nonetheless, despite police claims to relative powerlessness, the police are a significant organization, particularly within the crime and disorder, safeguarding and public protection and security arenas, and not unlike other major organization’s working within partnership, are not immune from using their ‘power’ coercively (Blagg et al, 1988; Murphy and Lutze, 2009; Sampson et al, 1988; Secker and Hill, 2001).

**Police leadership**

In combination to the organizational power and authority of the police, the police are the senior civil state service charged with leading and coordinating responses to civil emergency, disaster or disobedience. Consequently, police leadership is accustomed to taking centre stage, particularly in times of crisis but where emphasis is upon ‘command’ and ‘control’. As a result, there is an ‘in-built’ organizational confidence and expectation in leading (Adlam and Villiers, 2003). Such confidence is also culturally informed by a police occupational culture with leaning towards action centred, pragmatism, a “can do” attitude, emphasising a reactive capability and outlook and operating within an environment which by necessity frequently demands a speed of decision making (Skolnick, 1966; Chan, 1997; Muir, 1977, Manning, 1977, Holdaway, 1983; Reiner, 2010; amongst others). Within a partnership context such attributes can be used positively to aid clarity of thought, project initiation and start up, adding momentum, risk taking, achieving quick wins and so forth. Conversely, police leadership traits can present themselves as ‘heroic’, domineering and as Holdaway (1983, cited in O’Neill, 2014) observes, a wishing to ‘take charge’. These same cultural predispositions however, can create tension and frustration within partnership, and where the police may struggle to accommodate slower time decision making processes, resist a wider analysis and theoretical appreciation of issues and lack cultural awareness, appreciation and tolerance towards other organizational paradigms; positions at odds to the subtleties and requirements of more collaborative settings (Archer and Cameron,
2009) and potentially resulting in both organizational and or personal relationships being ‘damaged’ and/or barriers being presented. Additionally, the notion of police professionalism, autonomy and individual interpretation granted of police leadership, combined with concepts of ‘operational independence’, appear to have created a tendency within policing for individualistic interpretations of the local policing mandate to pervade. This position combined with the ‘discretionary’ aspects of policing have tended to work against the adoption of more systemised, rational and evidenced-based strategy making, particularly at the local level and in this instance pertaining to partnership (Chapter Seven).

Masking clarity as to whom and what now represents police leadership, a relatively new dynamic has been the introduction of PCC post-2012, a position which has created a degree of confusion amongst partners as to whom is to be regarded the ‘lead’ influence within policing; partners clearly perceiving the PCC and the police to be different entities. Pragmatically (within the case-study) the PCC and their staff are seen as the ones holding the fiscal purse and representing opportunities to access considerable funds held by the PCC, whilst regarding the police more in terms of their tangible day to day operational and deployment capabilities. A fuller commentary relative to the role and impact of PCC’s within the partnership landscape can be found within Chapter Four.

**Police commitment, resourcing and responsiveness**

Contrary to previous commentary of more negative police attitudes toward partnership working (Bullock et al., 2006; Gilling, 1997; Pearson et al., 1992) the case-study analysis accords with the findings of O’Neill (2014) suggesting a more sympathetic and appreciative understanding and requirement for police partnership activity than has previously been recorded. Within the case-study the chief constables very personal support and commitment to partnership activity cascades throughout the organization, where hierarchical direction setting within a disciplined and compliant organizational framework ensures high degrees of internal alignment. The hierarchy of the various countywide partnership frameworks is mirrored by ‘appropriate’ level police representation, determined by rank, role and function. Partners ‘strongly’ endorse police...
commitment, a view equally echoed by (Foster, 2002), reflecting a desire for the police to want to get involved, a willingness to share data, an ability to commit resources, regular attendees at meetings, and keen to try new and experimental approaches i.e. not risk averse. Additionally, the devolved and autonomous nature of police command facilitated decisive and responsive local decision making.

However, despite police commitment, there was only limited evidence presented of partnerships being used to develop a culture of mutual learning, with reference by partners to a police "organizational defensiveness". Whilst the police willingly share tangible resource and data, the cultural mind-set of the police, oriented towards organizational protective behaviour and notions of ‘solidarity’ remain (Cockcroft, 2013; Crank, 2015; Reiner, 2010 amongst others) and inhibits the opportunity presented by partnership for shared and mutual learning, both at an organizational and individual level.

**The Local Authority - an increasingly influential authority**

It is of note that a more ‘appreciative’ understanding of police attitudes towards partnership is in stark contrast to the early analysis of the implementation of the CDA 1998, which drew focus upon a police resistance to the ‘letting go’ of their hitherto monopoly of crime (Foster, 2002). Such a resistance accords with the central tenets of police culture, displaying amongst other characteristics, ‘suspicion’, ‘cynicism’ and ‘solidarity’ and which in combination creates organizationally protectionist outlooks, as described above. However, there equally appeared to be reluctance by local authorities, particularly local authority political membership, to the ‘taking up’ of their new responsibilities. Indeed section 17 of the Act required local authorities to have ‘due regard’ in relation to crime and disorder in all its considerations, but as Moss and Pease (1999) and Moss and Stephens (2006) observed, Section 17 was either initially underestimated or indeed ignored by many local authorities. The CDA clearly represented a structural and procedural response to crime reduction and disorder reduction. To what extent, however, the complexities of partnership working were fully recognised or alternatively simply ignored, together with the fundamental challenges presented of cultural and organizational
reformation required of ‘partnership working’, for both the police and local authority, remained at best uncertain. For a fuller discussion relating to the early impact and implementation of the CDA see Chapter Four.

In contrast, an examination of the contemporary police setting (2014-2017) reveals a changing environment and where there exists a general ‘warmth’ and ‘understanding’ by the police for joint-working, particularly with other state agencies. The case-study identifies that policing has come to terms with the view that the police alone cannot deal with crime and that beyond measures of police authority and control, more holistic and socially constructed solutions to crime are required. Equally, there is a sense of ‘relief’ that the burden of responsibility is now being shared and that government oversight and inspection is caste beyond the police alone. However, despite the apparent ‘warmth’, when partnership is examined through the prism of police culture, police pragmatism still prioritises ‘quick wins’ together with the ‘here and now’, and as a result, leads to a police frustration towards ‘others, over perceived inactivity, protracted decision making processes and longer-term outlooks. Nonetheless, the bias has ‘shifted’ towards a more sympathetic appreciation and recognition of the possibilities that partnership may represent.

At the same time, the power and influence of the local authority has grown, not least due the inability of the police to achieve a consistency of representation within partnership when balanced against the relative stability that exists within local government. As a result, it is the local authority who now hold the longer-term corporate knowledge of partnership and who have gained requisite experience over time. Equally, post the 1998 Act, subsequent legislation has given local authorities greater gravitas in terms of its coordination responsibilities for a broader local strategic planning, within which crime and disorder becomes subservient. Somewhat ironically, the concept of the local authority being the lead agency is a moot point given Morgan’s (1991) initial recommendation was for the local authority to be regarded the ‘lead’ agency for crime and disorder (given the authority's breadth of scope) but the recommendation was rejected by the government of the day (Chapter Three).
Government austerity measures, as discussed above, have impacted upon ‘all’ public services, and significant challenges have been faced by local authorities in these terms and which have clearly impacted upon their ability to be able to provide the breadth and depth of provision when compared to the pre 2010 situation. By default, local authorities have since been ‘encouraged’ to engage more fully with the voluntary sector and who now have a more prominent position and voice within partnership relative to youth service provision.

Nonetheless, despite the financial pressures currently experienced within local government, their ‘lead’ coordination and strategic planning duties remain and therefore their sphere of influence continues.

**Chapter conclusion**

The history and development of both organic and mandated policing partnerships resides within loose concepts of community policing and underpinned by issues of police legitimacy. Since 2007, government interceding’s have shaped a community policing emphasis, labelled Neighbourhood Policing, as part of a wider police delivery. However, the author would argue that rather than a single and definitive and holistic ‘British’ model of policing, there exists a spectrum of approaches or models along a continuum; authoritative and enforcement standpoints at one end of the continuum and more consensual and community-oriented perspectives at the other, and where partnership more readily aligns to consensual outlooks. Inevitably the localised template of British policing creates space for interpretations of the policing mandate by forty-three independently minded chief constables, albeit all are subject to ‘followship’ of central government policy making and direction setting. The chief constable’s personal belief systems direct and guide their chosen policing approach, with no universal agreement amongst chief officers existing other than recourse to a British tradition of ‘policing by consent’. However, and somewhat at odds to this underpinning, the thesis research identifies that the professionalization of partnership has tended to restrict public involvement and participation in policing. Equally, the rigidity of partnership structure results in the complexity and multifaceted nature of society’s life’s issues being over simplified and made to fit professional identities and labelling of problems. The same structural rigidity also serves to limit
the police contribution within partnership to largely one of authority and control. As a result, the author argues, there has been a diminishing of the ‘service’ and ‘care’ function of policing, aspects interwoven and integral to informing public perception, connectivity and in turn notions of public consent.

Attempting to prove the efficacy of partnership proves problematic; judgements as to partnership efficiency and effectiveness operate both within political contexts and without firm definition. Success therefore is a moveable feast and dependent upon the criteria chosen, be it judged on the processes adopted, the quality of relationships that exist or the outcomes achieved, each producing different results for different audiences or stakeholders. Simply put, there is no standardised or universal evaluative framework in which to judge success and different values and weightings are attached, dependent on one’s outlook or frame of reference. However, this thesis research draws attention to the importance of the ‘social processes’ operating within partnerships, an area which has been given little prior attention within the policing literature. The literature also remains ‘light’ on a more ‘appreciative’ analysis of what it is that the police themselves may bring and ‘offer’ within partnership and in these terms the research draws particular attention to the strategic importance of the police organizations constitutional position and standing amongst partners, police leadership, together with police commitment, resourcing and organizational responsiveness.

Any interpretation of partnership within policing ultimately sits within a broader cultural context and the thesis research, whilst evidencing a positive cultural ‘shift’ towards more optimistic outlooks and attitudes towards partnership, highlights the classical themes of police culture enduring, and in particular ‘suspicion’ and ‘pragmatism’, cultural traits which ultimately inform both police and partner experiences. Equally, the research identifies that the police organization fails to appreciate the complexities and requisite skills associated with working collaboratively and as a result of either ignorance or professional incompetence of its personnel can create tension with ‘others’, potentially impacting upon both the quality of relationships established and outcomes achieved within partnerships.
Finally, post-2010, government austerity measures have presented new questions of partnership, and albeit driven by financial imperative, a new framing of partnership and opportunity for joint working exists. An optimistic interpretation would suggest that as a result of the ‘necessitated’ change within the public sector finance, a new and mutual incentive for collaborative activity now exist, creating new possibilities and opportunities for joined-up and integrated strategic outlooks. However, a critically rational evidence-based interpretation, which the thesis case-study research supports, suggests that such opportunities have yet to be realised, and alternatively, priority is being given to individual organizational ‘survival’. As a result, there is a re-entrenching to perceived ‘core’ activity and, where that exists, a heightened introspective organizational bias which serves to undermine the opportunity and possibilities that partnership might present.

The thesis conclusion now follows.
Chapter Nine: Conclusion and Recommendations

What has been found - and why does it matter?

The primary objective of the thesis is to make an original and significant contribution to academic knowledge about police involvement in partnerships with key statutory organizations and other bodies, at both a strategic and operational level, before and after implementation of the Crime and Disorder 1998. In order to answer the central question: "Are organic police-partnerships more effective than mandated police-partnerships?" an in-depth case-study provided the context in which to explore the comparative analysis.

In overview, the research has permitted: (1) an examination and detailing of the history and development of police-partnerships, a history previously unrecorded in the literature; (2) an exploration of such activity to policing models and strategy; (3) an examination of the ‘impact’ of partnership upon policing practice and attitudes towards crime over time; and (4) the identification of the complex processes involved in partnership and inter-agency collaboration, building upon existing typologies and therefore having potential to impact upon future practice (see below).

The thesis identifies that the very concept of partnership continues to challenge academics and, within the public sector environment at least, has become a somewhat nebulous term meaning all things to all people (Chapter One). Equally, partnerships come in many forms and with varying degrees of organizational connection (Liddle and Gelsthropre, 1994). Police-partnerships have generally been portrayed within a crime prevention context (Gilling, 1997; Laycock, 2005; Tilley, 2005 amongst others) and yet, as this thesis has originally identified, there exists a much early history premised upon government perceptions of a growing police-public disconnect and concerns as to police legitimacy. Additionally, police-partnerships, particularly during the late 1970’s and 80’s, sit within a broader political context framed by the politicization of policing and the contested politics of an authoritarian 'right’ and communitarian ‘left’. Ultimately, and as the author has previously argued (Chapters One and Four), policing polices the consequences of
social policy and as a result brings the police into the harsh realities and contradictions that political policies inevitably create on the ground. The history and development of police-partnerships serves testimony to the influence of politics in policing. As Reiner (2010) rightly observed, policing and politics are inextricably linked.

Central to this inquiry has been the influence of James Morgan, author of the infamous Morgan Report, 1991.

Uniquely, the thesis contains the first ever formal interview with Morgan, at least to the knowledge of the author, conducted on record (Chapter Three). Somewhat ironically, Morgan's Report was originally commissioned by the then Thatcher led Conservative government, but generally regarded as the foundational research and policy rationale that underpinned New Labour’s flag ship CDA (Crawford, 1998; Gilling, 2007) and its importance to the thesis inquiry cannot be overstated. Surprisingly therefore, during interview, Morgan revealed that he was never actually consulted by the Labour Party and its subsequent influence upon the CDA was not an issue with which he was directly involved. A statement, arguably, of significant historic importance within the field.

Much of the academic literature, for example Edwards and Hughes, 2002; Byrne and Pease, 2007; McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014 amongst others, infer that the Morgan Report (1991) and the CDA lay the foundation for police-partnership working, but as this thesis has identified, this is an inaccurate portrayal. Police-partnerships clearly existed before 1998 and indeed the terms of the Morgan Report itself were to review the ‘existing’ police-partnership practice at that time. Additionally, the thesis’s author argues that the Morgan Report failed to evidence the efficacy of partnership, again a concept frequently misrepresented within the literature. However, what Morgan did achieve was to provide a national framework of police-partnership working and a defined bureaucracy, which has endured, and indeed been subsequently expanded upon, now sitting within a broader collective local public service strategy making, coordination and collaboration.
Post Morgan, it is the contention of the thesis that the CDA and subsequent developments led partnerships to become ‘professionalized’, consisting as they do primarily of state agencies, and as a consequence, the author argues, the role of the public has largely been reduced to that of consultee i.e. the complete antitheses of the historic origins of police-partnership practice, which situated police-partnerships in more holistic terms (Chapter Two). Police partnerships were originally being aligned to notions of ‘social contract’, ‘community’, and public ‘participation’ (Chapter Eight). The underlining issue and concern being raised here pertains to the police-public relationship and ultimately issues of police legitimacy. In combination, the withdrawal of the police service function (discussed below), combined with greater focus upon enforcement activity (H.O. 2010) and failure to recognise the potential public contribution to engage and indeed participate in local solutions, in itself is likely to create police-public fracture.

Rather than contemporary police-partnerships being viewed as the mechanism in order to create a greater police-public connection, in their current form, they may be creating new barriers. Equally, the professionalization of partnerships has gone hand in hand with enhanced levels of bureaucratization, an aspect particularly witnessed during the New Labour administration (1997-2010) and there now exists a complex web of professional clustering’s formed around pre-defined labelling of problems. In these terms, the works of Foucault, 2011; Rose and Miller, 1992; Cohen, 1985, Allan, 2009 and Calhoun, 2007, amongst others is endorsed.

Driven by the political ideology of New Labour’s communitarian agenda (Hughes and Edwards, 2002; Evans, 2011) the CDA sought to systemise police-partnerships within a national structure and subsequently aligned to the Neighbourhood Policing programme (Hughes and Rowe, 2007; Innes, 2005). However, an examination of existing frameworks reveals a patchwork of policing models, initiatives and policing outlooks adopted, with no single or holistic approach being identifiable or within which partnership is located. Against this backdrop, the thesis contends that partnerships, particularly with other public sector organizations, that despite lacking an evidence-base, partnership has become an ‘accepted’ way of working within policing, an
orthodoxy, no longer questioned nor strategically linked to policing models more directly (Chapter Eight).

Post-2010, Conservative Party ideology, with its focus upon localism and neoliberalist underpinning (Harvey, 2005) has not in practice led to a deconstruction of the partnership structures. Processes formerly established under the New Labour government regime endure (Chapter Four), albeit central reporting requirements, have in the main, ceased to operate under a greater localised ‘freedom’. At the same time, government fiscal austerity measures (2010-2018) have dominated public service focus and whilst a common agenda between public services of seeking to reduce demand is shared, within the case-study area at least, the primary research identifies that greater ‘freedoms’ have not led to a greater integration of strategic planning processes between public sector organizations. Rather, emphasis has been placed upon independent and organizationally inward focus, in an attempt to rationalise tight fiscal constraint. As a result, the author would argue, opportunities for a greater synergy and joint planning between state organizations are currently being missed.

Equally, successive government’s post-2010 have come to view partnership and collaborative activity more in terms of a ‘process’, a process offering, in part, at least an antidote to perceived police organizational inefficiencies; creating a debate which serves to distract from the realities of a shrinking public purse. Significantly, the thesis’s primary research evidences a re-entrenching to ‘core’ organizational activity by partners in order to manage significant budgetary deficit. The danger being presented here is that as a result of austerity, the separation of function relative to crime and disorder that existed between public sector organizations pre-1998, is in danger of being recreated as organizations become increasingly ‘inwardly’ focused (Chapter Four).

Within the contemporary setting, the thesis contends that ‘partnership’ has been repackaged to represent multi-agency working and inter-organizational collaboration. In this instance, the case-study evidences that the development of police-partnership working more recently has focused itself from longer term outlooks to a greater emphasis upon the ‘here and now’, with
the development of joint-agency response through co-located structures, for example the Multi-Agency Safeguarding Hubs (MASH’s) and Integrated Offender Management Units (IOM’s); a trend we may call the ‘operalization’ of partnership (Chapter Seven). Additionally, partnership development now encroaches upon police-private contractual arrangements and inter-force collaborations (Chapter Seven). Consequently, the thesis argues that police involvement in partnerships is greater than is generally portrayed within the current literature, which disproportionately focuses police-partnerships linked to neighbourhood policing in isolation (O’Neill, 2014).

The case-study research witnesses two very different models of partnership working i.e. (1) the SPACE programme, pre-1998, representing an organic partnership model and (2) the post-1998 mandatory Crime and Disorder partnerships, which whilst still existing have since been consumed within wider countywide partnership structures.

SPACE was predominantly a police-public partnership, delivered via the existing local policing delivery structures, supported by considerable force resourcing and sponsored by the very ‘personal’ leadership of the then chief constable. In consequence, the police owned the process, they had direct control, combined with the chief constable’s commitment and ‘authority’, ensured strategy and operational delivery were aligned (Chapter Six). Conversely, the contemporary setting reveals a highly complex network of hierarchical partnership structures, where local arrangements feed into broader countywide templates and oversight, with a requirement for ‘upward’ reporting. In essence, there is a hierarchy of partnership within which the CSP’s are consumed. The police organization is heavily represented within these bureaucratic arrangements and significant time is devoted to meeting attendance, particularly by more senior police representatives (Chapter Seven).

Within a police cultural context, the research identifies that the police have come to terms with losing their pre-1998 monopoly on crime, with a ‘letting go’, as required by the CDA. Consequently, there has been a growing recognition by the police as to the relationship between crime and broader social policy, and as a consequence an acceptance of the
responsibility of crime laying beyond the police alone. Contrary to the previous views of a police cultural negativity towards partners (Bullock et al, 2016; Gilling, 1997; Pearson et al., 1992) the experience of working in partnership, particularly post-1998, witnesses police attitudes changing overtime and where now exists a more appreciative and sympathetic understanding. At the same time, it has been interesting to identify a growing standing of local authorities. Poignantly, Morgan, 1991 recommended that local authorities should be the lead agency relative to crime and disorder, a recommendation rejected by government. However, within the case-study area at least, the local authority has become the dominant and consistent partnership lead for all planning and coordination; a situation partly due to the role and experience of the of the local authority, but equally due to an inability of the police organization to provide a consistency of police representation within partnerships, due to ‘fluid’ internal organizational movement (Chapters Seven).

Significantly, the research reveals that post-1998 the formality of partnership, combined with political direction by successive governments, has encouraged the police to withdraw from the softer ‘service’ and ‘care’ elements of its hitherto remit, including youth engagement, the central theme of this analysis. Police culture, reinforced by the CDA, has sought to situate young people as problematic and within a criminal justice context, therefore, disproportionately relationships with young people are seen through the prism of enforcement. The case-study reveals that force does not possess a formalised youth engagement strategy, albeit ad hoc projects and events with young people did take place, but these were not universally adopted throughout and sit outside any partnership or other strategic planning frameworks.

Something that the author did not foresee at the start of this research project was the introduction of the role of PCC’s, a product of Conservative Party policy, although legislated for under the then Conservative led Coalition Government in 2011. Whilst there is a growing body of knowledge and emergent literature pertaining to the role, for example Joyce, 2011; Raine and Keasey, 2012; Sampson, 2012; Mawby and Smith, 2013; Davies, 2014; Lister and Rowe, 2015 amongst others, such work has primarily focused upon the perceived further politicization of policing, or alternatively its democratisation, together with wider issues of police governance.
Little, if any, previous commentary has to date been devoted to PCC’s involvement within the police-partnership arena. As the research highlights, in addition to PCC’s community safety planning authority, PCC’s now have access to and responsibility for significant financial grant that generates a profile and voice within police-partnerships. The research identifies that whilst the influence’ of PCC’s is persuasive, the role ultimately lacks authority within partnerships. As a result, new questions of partnership governance arise (Chapter Four).

More recently the PCC within Staffordshire, acting unilaterally, has introduced a countywide youth police cadet programme and in 2016 a revised SPACE (pilot) scheme. The revised SPACE scheme passports PCC grant to local authorities in order for the local authorities and their partners to conduct school holiday youth provision, with only limited direct police involvement. However, once again this is being seen as a youth crime prevention initiative, continuing to frame young people as problematic. Equally, these relatively new and developmental contributions sit outside any formal police-partnership frameworks or broader strategic planning considerations. More broadly and beyond the PCC’s recent initiatives, the research identifies an absence of policy and appreciation by the police of the potential importance of establishing a positive police connection with young people, either within or outside police-partnerships.

As stated above, whilst successive governments have sought not to change the general arrangements for police-partnerships framed by the CDA 1998, the budgetary influence of PCC’s, combined with the challenge presented by austerity to the public services has led to a new and fundamental dynamic operating within partnerships; a dynamic I term the ‘localised-reorientation’ of partnership (Chapter Seven).

Fundamentally, attempting to prove the efficacy of partnership proves problematic and as the thesis identified, judgements as to partnership efficiency and effectiveness operate within both political contexts and without firm definition; a position in itself serving to mitigate against the lack of an existing evidence-base (Maillard and Savage, 2018). Alternatively, in seeking to conceptualize partnership ‘effectiveness’, the academic literature disproportionately focuses
upon issues of bureaucracy and systems process, with recourse for example to strategy, project management, performance monitoring and so forth (H.O. 2007). And yet, the thesis’s primary research also highlights the centrality of the ‘social processes’ that operate within partnerships, and in particular, the research attributes an importance to the ‘quality’ of relationships established. Notably, the case-study analysis identifies that the quality of relationship established in turn impacts upon the level of commitment and business activity observed, and that the resultant ‘trust’, established as it is overtime, encourages an honesty of conversation that might not otherwise occur.

Aided by the thesis’s primary research findings, the author has sought to synthesise the literature in order to uniquely offer a ‘high-level’ partnership effectiveness ‘assessment framework’, comprising, three core elements: (1) Partnership processes (bureaucracy of practice); (2) Partnership context (organizational alignment); And 3) Partnership environment/climate (environment attitude) (Chapter Eight refers more fully). It is accepted that at this stage the model remains a conceptual outline only, nonetheless, the identification of the three elements or pillars of partnerships, together with their broad content, lay foundation for further development and refinement.

Whilst the efficacy of either organic (pre-1998) or mandatory (post-1998) partnerships could not be established in this instance, the thesis’s primary research did permit a comparative analysis between the two distinct partnership models, using the comparative theme of ‘youth engagement’ (Chapter’s Six and Seven). The stark comparative is described below.

**Fig 7: Comparative analysis framework**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organic partnership</th>
<th>Mandatory partnership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Member/organization’s volunteer</td>
<td>Involuntary/forced membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primarily a police-public partnership (un-professionalized)</td>
<td>Police-multi-agency partnership (professionalized)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No central policy or oversight and therefore</td>
<td>Central policy and oversight providing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>no constraint</td>
<td>thereby providing constraint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunity to be creative without restriction</td>
<td>Creativity limited by the terms of legislation, central policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership designed around the problem or issue</td>
<td>Problem or issue made to fit within the mandated arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth engagement central and directly linked to the established partnership</td>
<td>Youth engagement ad hoc and not linked to partnership frameworks. Rather young people's issues have been problematized within complex partnership structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic and operational activity aligned</td>
<td>Strategic and operational activity not aligned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited levels of bureaucracy</td>
<td>Significant levels of bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership primarily in support of the service and care functions of policing</td>
<td>Partnership primarily focused upon authority and control functions of policing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited performance monitoring and evaluation</td>
<td>Increased performance scrutiny, albeit changeable performance frameworks, and where individual organizational contribution to declared outcomes is not evidenced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police resources aligned to the partnership and voluntary police contribution encouraged</td>
<td>Police resources compete across a number of partnership fronts and sub-themes. No voluntary police contribution evidenced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single or lead organization provides a relative simplicity of governance.</td>
<td>Complex hierarchical bureaucratic structures, mask the effectiveness of governance arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single or lead organization aids external/public communication</td>
<td>The complexity of structure challenges external/public communication and partnership identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In summary, the above analysis highlights two ‘ideal types’ of partnership interpretation, portrayed as they are in binary terms. In reality, application on the ground may be more muddled. Nonetheless, the analysis serves to underline the complexity that is partnership and highlights an extensive range of interdependencies, variables and subtleties operating, not least
of which is the variable of the individual participants involved and their respective outlooks. Buy-in and engagement, both organizationally and by individual representatives can have profound impact.

Fundamentally, the research reveals that central to the setting of the partnership ‘atmosphere’ (climate/environment) referred to above, rests the degree of strategic alignment that exists between the partnership aims and those of the individual participating organizations. The greater the alignment, the higher the probability of securing both organizational and personal commitment. In turn, this ‘key’ element is likely to impact upon the social processes operating and in particular, the quality of relationship established i.e. do participants view the partnership as ‘worthy’ of personal investment of time and of resource? However, the primary research reveals that the ‘authority’ and ‘power’ of the ‘formal’ partnership frameworks and associated bureaucracy dominate and to which individual organizational strategy and thinking have become subservient. In parallel, the author argues that central political direction setting has shaped and encouraged greater police multi-agency collaboration but this has largely been driven by individual thematic priority, often in response to crisis, for example, child protection, hate crime and so forth, rather than through a more holistic and service-wide consideration. In response, policing has been ‘pushed’ and ‘pulled’ in a number of different and sometimes competing directions, and against the backdrop of a finite resource envelope.

Determining the ‘effectiveness’ of partnership remains contested territory and ultimately is informed by the lens or paradigm through which an audience asks the question; notions of success are variable dependent upon one’s outlook (Cook, 2015; McCarthy and O’Neill, 2014). However, in terms of tangible generic operating practice, the primary research (Chapters Six and Seven) endorsed a particular importance of components, previously aligned to ‘effective’ practice (H.O. 2007) namely: committed leadership; strategic alignment between an organizations operational strategies with those of the partnership structures and objectives sought; appropriate governance and accountability; appropriate performance frameworks; And additionally, a sufficiency of resource and quality of relationships established.
Finally, and as discussed in Chapter Eight, the thesis research identifies that partnership rather than being viewed solely as a physical construct may be as much an ‘attitude of mind’. Individuals sympathetic to the ‘possibilities’ that partnership present tended to view the world in interconnected ways, proactively seeking opportunity in which to connect and exhibiting a willingness to share and learn from others. This was not an attribute or skill taught but rather was framed by the individuals/officers’ personal outlook and interpretation of the police mandate. In this context, partnerships have the possibility to operate at all levels within the police and other organizations, but challenges leadership of the state’s services, requiring an ability to both lead and to work across organizational barriers, cultures and silo functionality.

**Research limitations**

From the researcher’s perspective, this doctoral research has operated at two levels: 1) a desire by the researcher to more fully understand police-partnership activity, having previously worked in such environments; and 2) the inquiry aiding the transformational journey of its author, helping to support the professional development of the aspiring academic.

It is accepted that the study is limited, focused as it is upon a single police force area, and the results obtained do not purport or indeed seek to be viewed as generalizable. Rather, the research provided an ‘opportunity’ to empirically explore in-depth police-partnership activity within a case-study setting. That said, the research results presented do provide opportunity for future research to be compared and contrasted with. Importantly, the research also gives voice to actors not previously heard by the academic community.

Additionally, during the research inquiry, a number of emergent lines of further enquiry were identified, together with potential policy considerations, which are detailed below.

**Further research opportunities:**

1. Staffordshire Police performance development project
Assessing partnership performance and impact, as evidenced by the thesis inquiry proves troublesome. However, the case-study unearthed a potentially ground-breaking performance initiative being developed in the host force Staffordshire, together with the county council (Chapter Seven). A breadth of information gathered over a number of years and now aided by new software capabilities permits a triangulation of data that was hitherto unavailable. As a consequence, it is becoming increasing possible to be able to make assessments as to the impact of partnership and individual organizational interventions within localities. Potentially this breakthrough may provide a solution to be able to determine the illusive question as to the efficacy of partnership.

**Recommendation 1:** By 1.6.20 to have conducted an independent an in-depth evaluation of the Staffordshire Police and Staffordshire County Council performance project in order to determine partnership versus individual organizational impact within localities.

At the time of writing the author is involved in on-going dialogue with Staffordshire Police to determine the scale, scope and terms of the research.

2. Performance assessment framework

The author has sought to synthesise current academic literature, aided by the thesis primary research findings in order to define the high-level outline of a potential partnership assessment framework. Opportunity exists to further build upon this initial work in order to provide a more tangible and detailed assessment criteria.

**Recommendation 2:** By 1.6.20 to have produced/published a detailed partnership assessment framework in order to provide a tangible support to those practically involved in partnerships. The medium of publication will be both academic and professional journals.

3. Application of the National Intelligence Model within Community Safety Partnerships

The thesis highlights a significant gap in the literature pertaining to the application of the NIM within CSP’s. CSP’s by virtue of the Crime and Disorder (Prescribed Information) Regulations,
2007 were required to use this police designed business planning tool. Given the time lapse since the Regulation’s implementation, it is of some surprise to the author that no previous academic commentary can be found as to application of the NIM within this context.

**Recommendation 3.** By 1.1.21 to have undertaken and published a peer review article premised upon a case-study review of the application of the NIM within CSP’s.

4. Partnership governance and the role of the Police and Crime Commissioner

Post the CDA 1998 police-partnerships have witnessed a proliferation of expanded activity that encompasses a range of multi-agency working, organizational collaborations and contractual engagement with private sector providers. As a result, the proximity of current police governance arrangements become more distant and new questions are posed. In particular, the role of the PCC creates a new governance dynamic and ‘influence’. Whilst the thesis has sought to highlight the PCC’s role within partnerships, current literature disproportionately focuses upon the PCC’s constitutional position only.

**Recommendation 4: By 1.12.21 to have conducted primary research critically reviewing the impact of PCC’s within police-partnerships settings and produced a peer reviewed journal article.**

**Future policy considerations - Staffordshire Police**

1. Partnership audit

The thesis highlights an absence of a clear and definitive strategic situating of partnership within overall policing strategy. Post-1998, there has been a proliferation of police-partnership involvement and as previously identified, partnerships now take many forms. The organic nature of partnership development has seen an incremental overlaying of partnership structures without a comprehensive stock-take of their cumulative effects upon either the organizations involved or indeed as to the outcomes they have achieved and at what cost, particularly against the backdrop of current fiscal austerity.
**Policy consideration 1:** OPCC to conduct an audit of police-partnership activity to establish the full extent of the activity operating within Staffordshire Police.

2. Police-Youth engagement

This thesis highlights that police-partnership constructions, particularly CSP’s, have caused the police in their relationship with young people to disproportionately focus upon enforcement activity at the expense of youth engagement and relationship building. Partnership in this instance has constrained the police connection with young people. Consequently, there exists a concern that young people's future relationship and trust in the police may be negatively impacted upon.

**Policy consideration 2:** Opportunity exists for Staffordshire Police and their partners to more formally consider the police relationship with young people and to consider the benefits of developing a defined police-youth engagement strategy.

Nationally, the National Police Chief Constables Council, whilst having a range of portfolios with respective ACPO policy leads, currently fails to recognise young people in policy terms. It is hoped that through the on-going dialogue with Staffordshire Police that consideration of young people may be formally recognised both locally and nationally.

3. Training and development.

The thesis’s primary research identifies that the complexity that is partnership is denied in police internal operating practices and personnel engaged in partnership work, in the main, rely upon their ‘generic’ policing skills, without recourse to any formal training or support.

**Policy consideration 3:** To consider the provision of partnership development training for police personnel and indeed other partner staff engaged in partnership activity.

Training can be tailored to role and function. Equally, there exits opportunity for partnership training to be delivered within inter-organizational teams and delivered internally or externally.
The training curriculum, by way of example, might include: partnership philosophy and context; organizational culture and impact within partnerships; organizational awareness; partnership terms of reference; negotiating and influencing; decision making; problem-solving; project management, bid writing/business-case development, amongst others. Training to be evaluated in order to assess effectiveness/impact.

Implications of findings

The author is maintaining an on-going dialogue and research connection with Staffordshire Police. References to recommendations and policy considerations above, sit within this on-going dialogue. Additionally, it is the author’s intention to produce a series of peer reviewed academic articles for wider publication.

Despite the thesis examining the concept of partnerships through the prism of policing, partnerships, particularly involving public sector organizations, share common ground in terms of the context in which they operate, and, therefore, it is also important to highlight the applicability of the broader thesis’s findings potentially extending beyond policing. That said, the researcher believes that the research in particular has a direct value to those currently engaged in police-partnership activity at both a strategic and operational level.

Finally, as mentioned previously, the original literary and qualitative research underpinning this thesis has been as much a journey of self-exploration, with the author wishing to personally reconcile and indeed better understand their own ‘confusion’ and experiences as a former senior police officer working within police-partnership settings (1979-2008). Having now undertaken this research inquiry, the author is reminded of Tilley’s (2005:09) profound words, ‘Partnership...raises substantial and knotty theoretical and empirical research questions for students of crime and crime prevention.’ He was surely right!
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Appendices

Appendix A - Research ethics applications

NOTTINGHAM TRENT UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

BLSS/College REC Form

APPLICATION FORM FOR ETHICAL APPROVAL OF A RESEARCH PROJECT

For use by members of academic staff and doctoral students

Who should use this form?

You should use this form if you are a member of academic staff or a research degree student (including the DBA or ProfD). If you are a student on a taught masters or undergraduate programme, you should use Form BLSS/School REC.

If you are a PhD student you should normally have received Project Approval before you apply for ethical approval. If there is a problem with this seek advice from your PhD supervisor. Please note, that if following your application for project approval you find that you need to revise your research plans such that this ethics application no longer covers all aspects of your intended project, you will need to submit a revised application for ethical approval.

Can I begin work before the project is ethically approved?

NO primary data collection can begin until a favourable ethical opinion is received from the College Research Ethics Committee or from an external REC, or, alternatively, you have established that your project does not need ethical approval. Collecting primary data in the absence of ethical approval, or in the face of an adverse ethical opinion, may constitute a disciplinary offence.

If, after receiving ethical approval, you change your project such that the information provided in this form no longer holds, the approval will automatically become void, and you should re-apply for ethical approval.

Is there any help available to complete this form?

Yes. Guidance on filling in this form can be found in Guidance Note BLSS/Ethics 01. This document can be found in the ethics section of the University’s Research Intranet.

In this site, you will also find documents dealing with specific issues in research ethics, and also some examples of participant information sheets and consent forms.
Further advice is available through the College Research Support Office. Please email Sandra.Odell@ntu.ac.uk

1. Information about the project

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of Project: “Are organic police partnerships more effective than mandated police partnerships.” (Part-time student; PhD Research Project)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Name of Principal Investigator (PI)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicholas Howe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Names of co-investigators (CIs) (If any of the CIs are not employed at NTU, please give the name of their organisation):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many additional research staff will be employed on the project?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please give their names (if known) and their organisational affiliation:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project start date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered 1st October, 2011 for Mphil with possibility of transfer to PhD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Degree Project Approval (RD1PA) Granted 10th December, 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimated end date of the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final date of PhD Submission – September 2019. However submission is anticipated by September 2017.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is funding the project?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PhD Fees being paid by University of Derby

Has funding been confirmed?
Yes

(For research degree students only) Have you applied for and received project approval?
Yes
If so, please give date of approval: 10th December, 2012

(For research degree students only) please provide the name of your Director of Studies
Dr. Mike Sutton

Which learned society’s code of ethical practice is most relevant to your project? (for example, the Social Research Association, the British Psychological Society, the Socio-legal Studies Association)

The Social Research Association; The British Society of Criminology and The British Sociological Association.

### 2. Does this project need ethical approval?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does the project involve collecting and/or analysing primary or unpublished data from, or about, living human beings?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Does it involve collecting or analysing primary or unpublished data about people who have recently died, other than data that are already in the public domain? | | ✓ |

| Does it involve collecting or analysing primary or unpublished data about or from organisations or agencies of any kind, other than data that are already in the public domain? | ✓ | |
If the answer to all the above questions is NO, you do not need to submit your project for ethical approval. You should sign the Declaration at the end of the form, and keep a copy for your own records. Doctoral students must ask their Director of Studies to countersign the declaration, and they should keep a copy, too.

If the answer to any of the above questions is Yes, please proceed to Section 3 below.

3. **Does the project require Criminal Records Bureau checks?**

Please refer to Guidance Note BLSS/Ethics 06.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does it involve research with non-human vertebrates in their natural settings or behavioural work involving invertebrate species not covered by the Animals Scientific Procedures Act (1986).</th>
<th>☑</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If the answer to all the above questions is NO, you do not need to submit your project for ethical approval. You should sign the Declaration at the end of the form, and keep a copy for your own records. Doctoral students must ask their Director of Studies to countersign the declaration, and they should keep a copy, too.

If the answer to any of the above questions is Yes, please proceed to Section 3 below.

3. **Does the project require Criminal Records Bureau checks?**

Please refer to Guidance Note BLSS/Ethics 06.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team with children or young people under 18 years of age?</th>
<th>☑</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the project involve direct contact by any member of the research team with adults with learning difficulties; adults who are infirm or physically disabled; adults who are resident in social care or medical establishments; or adults</td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

1 The Animals Scientific Procedures Act (1986) was amended in 1993. As a result the common octopus (*Octopus vulgaris*), as an invertebrate species, is now covered by the act.
in the custody of the criminal justice system?

Has a CRB check been stipulated as a condition of access to any source of data required for the project

Yes

If you have answered Yes to any of these questions, please explain the nature of the contact required by the project, and the circumstances in which it will be made.

4. Is this project liable to scrutiny by external ethical review arrangements?

| Has a favourable ethical opinion been given for this project by an NHS or social care research ethics committee, or by any other external research ethics committee? | Yes | No | ☑ |
| Will this project be submitted for ethical approval to an NHS or social care committee or any other external research ethics committee? | ☑ |

If the answer to either of these questions is YES, please sign the declaration at the end of the form, and send a copy to the Research Office. Doctoral students must ask their Director of Studies to countersign the form before submitting it.

Note - if you are applying to an NHS or Social Care REC, you are advised to consult Guidance Note BLSS/ Ethics 03

If the answer to both these questions is NO, please proceed to Section 5.

5. About the project

If the information required below is provided in a succinct form in a previous document, such as your application for external funding or for approval of a PhD project you may submit this document (or preferably the relevant section from it) either in whole or partial answer to the questions below.

(i) What are the aims and objectives of the project?

Aims
This research aims to provide original and significant contribution to academic knowledge about police involvement in partnerships with other key statutory organisations at both a strategic and operational level, before and after the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998; legislation which mandated Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRP’s). In order to achieve this overarching aim, the following sub-aims/objectives have been identified:

To research the history and development of both informal and formal policing partnerships and to seek to identify the potential strategic relationship between such partnerships and various models of policing.

1. To undertake an in-depth case study of an English police force currently engaged in partnership activity and to compare and contrast its partnership activity pre and post the implementation of the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998; in order to seek to assess whether or not legislative/mandated partnerships have proved more or less effective in helping to reduce crime, impacting upon public perception of crime/fear of crime and in developing confidence in the policing, than partnerships, prior to the 1998 Act and, if so, why.

2. Within the case study police force area, to (a) identify and understand the impact that partnership activity has had on police behaviours and attitudes towards crime and the notion of its official ownership, as a result of the change of responsibility under the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 for key statutory partners to be held accountable for crime and community safety, rather than the police alone, as being part of the ‘Responsible Authority’ under the Act; and (b) to examine the structural and resourcing responses of the police in order to support such partnership activity.

3. To uncover the complex processes involved in partnership and inter-agency collaboration, with a view to identifying key components of successful partnership working with an aim to critically examine and possibly improve upon existing typologies.

Briefly describe the principal methods, the sources of data or evidence to be used and the number and type of research participants who will be recruited to the project

Method

Against the backdrop of the absence of significant previous studies on the topic, primary research is proposed. The fundamental benefit of this approach is that it will provide original data and lead to new contributions to knowledge.

This research is premised upon a mixed methods approach. On completion of a detailed literature review to explore the aims outlined above, the use of case study will provide the context in which all issues will be examined. Case study has been chosen as a result of such factors as: the research time frame involved; to allow contrast and comparison of data.
within limited variables; and importantly to allow for an in-depth analysis of the complexities that the topic of partnerships presents. Case studies typically rely on multiple methods to allow for triangulation of data that aids reliability and consistency and in this regard recourse will be made to documentary analysis of official records/reports and to the keeping of a reflective journal by the researcher. That said, within this methodological framework, an element of pragmatism may be required as it is not known at this stage what other data and opportunities might present themselves (Robson, 2002).

Principally semi-structured interviews of past and present police partnership members will be used in order for their experiences and the meanings they give to them to be understood rather than relying on documented history, ‘orthodox accounts’ or trace histories (Bloch cited in Brookman et al 1999:131) which may not provide an impartial or objective account or fully address the issues that this research is seeking to explore.

It is anticipated that approximately 20 respondent’s pre-1998 partnerships and 20 respondents post-1998 will be interviewed, identified through convenience sampling. This will be combined with a further sample of 20 contemporary police partners.

Recourse to convenience sampling and the sample size is premised upon the need to identify key informants, whose strategic significance in terms of partnership operation is deemed critical to the research.

As part of a mixed methods approach, interviews will be conducted both individually and via the use of focus groups (Kitzinger and Barber, 1999). Focus groups will be used solely in relation to current practitioners, in order to help gain an initial overview.

The case study will be premised upon Staffordshire Police and the interview sample will be drawn from its current and past employees. In terms of authority, access and support for the research I have secured written confirmation to this effect from the Chief Constable of Staffordshire Police, Mr. Michael Cunningham, dated 25th July, 2012

(ii) What research instrument(s) will be used to collect data?

If you are using an externally validated scale, please specify

If you are not using an externally validated scale, please attach a copy of the research instrument you will use to collect data (for example, a measurement scale, questionnaire, interview schedule, observation protocol for ethnographic work, or, in the case, of unstructured data collection, a topic list).

**Interview Design**

A semi-structured interview has been prepared, informed by a review of the literature and against the backdrop of the identified aims of the research. It is the researcher’s intention to pilot the interviews schedule with between two and four potential respondents, which will allow any revisions identified to be made. Now that authorized access has been
obtained, the researcher will regularly liaise with a named point of contact appointed by the Force to seek to develop relationships and help facilitate the collection of data.

**Data Collection (12 – 48 months)**

Following ethical approval, the researcher will seek to identify the relevant sample group, particularly pre-1998 and seek to obtain their individual consent to take part in an interview in order to obtain their oral histories and experiences. Liaison with Staffordshire Police will be maintained and identification of officers and staff currently engaged in relevant partnership activity will be sought. Each potential respondent will be approached to voluntary participate and interviews will be conducted at the officers/staffs convenience.

**Analysis of Data (14-52 months)**

The qualitative data obtained will be analyzed to test pre-determined hypotheses. Unlike the blank canvass approach advocated by Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) Miles and Huberman, 1994 (cited in Henn et al, 2009: 259) identify, that in general research questions have an identified purpose and generally a set of pre-determined concepts that the researcher wishes to investigate. The declaration of such hypotheses allows emerging data comparison, in order to confirm or refute them. Equally new hypotheses can be identified where they have been refuted or current ones can be refined. Such an approach is more in line with the analytic induction method of analysis (Kaplan, 1964).

**Semi Structured Interview Schedule**

**6. Confidentiality, security and retention of research data**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are there any reasons why you cannot guarantee the full security and confidentiality of any personal or confidential data collected for the project?</td>
<td></td>
<td>☑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a significant possibility that any of your participants, or people associated with them, could be directly or indirectly identified in the outputs from this project?</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a significant possibility that confidential information could be traced back to a specific organisation or agency as a result of the way you write up the results of the project?</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Will any members of the project team retain any personal or confidential data at the end of the project, other than in fully anonymised form? | ✔
---|---
If the answer to all these questions is No, please explain briefly how you will ensure the confidentiality and security of your research data, both during and after the project.

If the answer to any of these questions is YES, please explain:

- why it is necessary for the research to be conducted in the way you propose, such that the usual standards of confidentiality and security cannot be respected
- what steps will you take to maximise confidentiality and security, within the constraints imposed by the research design
- what steps you will take to ensure that participants understand and consent to the implications of these constraints?

7. **Informed consent**

Please see Guidance Note BLSS/Ethics 02 for examples of model participant information sheets and participant consent forms, together with advice on how to use them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Will all participants be fully informed why the project is being conducted and what their participation will involve, and will this information be given before the project begins?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>✔</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will every participant be asked to give written consent to participating in the project, before it begins?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will all participants be fully informed about what data will be collected, and what will done with these data during and after the project?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will explicit consent be sought for audio, video or photographic recording of participants?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Will every participant understand what rights they have not to take part, and/or to withdraw themselves and their data from the project if they do take part? Will they also understand that they do not need to give you reasons for exercising these rights and that there will be no repercussions as a result?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If the project involves deceiving, or covert observation of, participants, will you debrief them at the earliest possible opportunity?

N/A

If the answer to all the above questions is YES, please explain briefly how you will implement your answers. You are advised to attach copies of your participant information sheet and consent form as evidence of your plans.

If the answer to any of the above questions is NO, please explain:

- why it is academically necessary for the project to be conducted in a way that will not allow all participants the opportunity to exercise fully-informed consent
- and how you propose to address the ethical issues arising from the absence of transparency.

You are advised to attach copies of your participant information sheet and consent form as evidence of your plans.

8. Risk of harm

(If there is any possibility that the project involves significant risks to researchers, you are advised to consult Guidance Note BLSS/Ethics 04 on the assessment and management of risk, and to submit a risk assessment form to the relevant authority).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is there any significant risk that your project may lead to:</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical harm to participants or researchers?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significant psychological or emotional distress to participants</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Harm to the reputation of participants, or their employers, or of any other persons or organisations?  ✔

If the answer to any of these questions is YES, please explain:

- the nature of the risks involved, and why it is academically necessary for the project to incur them
- how you propose to mitigate them
- the arrangements by which you will ensure that participants understand and consent to these risks
- any arrangements you will make to refer participants to sources of help, if they are seriously distressed or harmed as a result of taking part in the project
- your arrangements for recording and reporting any adverse consequences of the research

9. Risk of disclosure of harm or potential harm

If the project is likely to involve work with children, or the discovery of physical or mental abuse of children, you should consult the Nottingham Trent University Policy on Child Protection (available in the BLSS Ethics Toolkit) before completing this section of the form.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is there a significant risk that the project will lead participants to disclose evidence of previous criminal offences, or their intention to commit criminal offences?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a significant risk that the project will lead participants to disclose evidence that children or vulnerable adults are being harmed, or are at risk of harm?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a significant risk that the project will lead participants to disclose evidence of serious risk of other types of harm?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the answer to either question is YES, please explain:

- why it is academically necessary for these risks to be incurred
- what actions you would take, if such disclosures were to occur
- whether you will take advice before taking these actions, and from whom
- what information you will give participants about the possible consequences of disclosing information about criminal or serious risk of harm
### 10. Payment of participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you intend to offer participants cash payments or any other kind of inducements or compensation for taking part in your project?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there any significant possibility that such inducements will cause participants to consent to risks that they might not otherwise find acceptable?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there any significant possibility that the prospect of payment or other rewards will systematically skew the data provided by participants in any way?</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will you inform participants that accepting compensation or inducements does not negate their right to withdraw from the project?</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the answer to any of these questions is YES, please explain:

- the nature of the inducements or the amount of the payments that will be offered
- the reasons why it is necessary to offer them
- why you consider that they are ethically and methodologically acceptable

### 11. Capacity to give valid consent

Please note that, from October 2007, research involving people who are mentally incapacitated and cannot give valid consent must be cleared through the NHS research ethics procedures, not through a University REC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you propose to recruit any participants from the following groups?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 18 years of age</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
People with learning difficulties ☑

People with communication difficulties, including difficulties arising from limited facility with the English language ☑

Very elderly or infirm people ☑

People with mental health problems or other medical problems that may impair their cognitive abilities ☑

Any other people who may not be able fully to understand the nature of the research and the implications for them of participating in it ☑

12. Is participation genuinely voluntary?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Are you proposing to recruit participants from the following groups?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employees or students of NTU or of organisation(s) that are formal collaborators in the project</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees recruited through other business, voluntary or public sector organisations</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pupils or students recruited through educational institutions</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clients recruited through voluntary or public services</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People living in residential communities or institutions</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who are in-patients in a hospital or other medical establishment</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People recruited by virtue of their employment in the police or armed services</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People being detained or sanctioned in the criminal justice system</td>
<td>☑</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Other people who may not feel empowered to refuse to participate in the research | ✅

If you have answered YES to any of these questions, please explain how your participants will be recruited, and what steps you will take to ensure that their participation in this project is genuinely voluntary.

13. Online and Internet Research

If you intend to conduct any part of your project online, please consult Guidance Note BLSS/Ethics 05 before completing this section.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Will any part of your project involve collecting data by means of electronic media, such as the internet or email?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a significant possibility that the project will encourage children under 18 to access inappropriate websites, or correspond with people who pose risk of harm?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a significant possibility that the project will cause participants to become distressed or harmed, in ways that may not be apparent to the researcher(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td>✅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will the project incur any other risks that arise specifically from the use of electronic media?</td>
<td></td>
<td>✅</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the answer to any of these questions is YES, please explain:

- why you propose to use electronic media
- how you propose to address the risks associated with online/internet research, especially those flagged above (if relevant)

Please ensure, too, that your answers to other questions in this form address these questions in ways that are relevant to online research.

Other ethical risks
Are there any other ethical issues or risks of harm raised by your project that have not been covered by previous questions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>✗</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you have answered YES, please explain:

- the nature of these issues and risks
- why you need to incur them,
- and how you propose to deal with them

15. Research with non-human vertebrates in their natural settings or behavioural work involving invertebrate species not covered by the Animals Scientific Procedures Act (1986).²

Section N/A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Will any part of your project involve the study of animals in their natural habitat?

Will your project involve the recording of behaviour of animals in a non-natural setting that is outside of the control of the researcher?

Will your field work involve any direct intervention other than recording the behaviour of the animals available for observation?

Is the species you plan to research endangered, locally rare or

² The Animals Scientific Procedures Act (1986) was amended in 1993. As a result the common octopus (*Octopus vulgaris*), as an invertebrate species, is now covered by the act.
### Appendices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>part of sensitive ecosystem protected by legislation?</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Is there any significant possibility that the welfare of the target species or those sharing the local environment/habitat will be detrimentally affected?</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there any significant possibility that the habitat of the animals will be damaged by the project, such that their health and survival will be endangered?</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Will project work involve intervention work in a non-natural setting in relation to invertebrate species other than <em>Octopus vulgaris</em>?</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you have answered Yes to any of these questions, please explain:

- the reasons for conducting the project in the way you propose, and the academic benefits that will flow from it
- the nature of the risks to the animals and their habitat
- how you propose to mitigate these risks

### Principal Investigator’s Declaration

Please tick all the boxes relevant to your project, and sign this form. Doctoral students must ask their Director of Studies to countersign it before it is submitted.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>I believe that this project does not require the approval of a research ethics committee. I have completed Sections 1-2 and kept a copy for my own records</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I request that this project is exempt from review by the College Research Ethics Committee, because it will be, or has been, reviewed by an external REC. I have completed Sections 1-4 and attach/will attach a copy of the favourable ethical review issued by the external REC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please give the name of the external REC here</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I request a statement of ethical approval from the College of BLSS Research Ethics Committee, and confirm that I have answered all relevant questions in this</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>form honestly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I confirm that I will carry out the project in the ways described above, and that I will request a fresh ethical approval if the project subsequently changes in ways that materially affect the information I have given in this form</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I confirm that I have read and agree to abide by the code of research ethics issued by the relevant national learned society, and that I have ensured that all members of my research team (if any) also do so</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I confirm that I have read and agree to abide by the University’s Research Governance Framework, and that I have ensured that those members of my research team (if any) who are employees of Nottingham Trent University also do so</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Signed: Nicholas Howe - (Principal Investigator and Doctoral student)

Date: 5th March, 2013

I have read this form, and confirm that it covers all the ethical issues raised by this project fully and frankly. I also confirm that these issues have been discussed with the candidate, and will continue to be reviewed in the course of supervision.

Countersigned Dr Mike Sutton (Director of Studies)

Date 25th March, 2013
Appendix B - Participant Information Sheet

Policing in Partnership Study

Thank you for agreeing to consider participating in this research project. Before you decide whether to grant me an interview, it is important that you understand the reason why this research is being carried out and importantly what your participation will involve. I would be grateful if you would carefully read the information below and please feel at liberty to discuss it with your colleagues and any other people if you wish. It is important that you feel entirely comfortable with the research prior to giving any agreement to participate, so if any of the information is unclear to you or you wish to clarify any of its details, then please feel free to contact me prior to deciding whether or not to take part.

Research Independence

The study is being undertaken independently by Nick Howe who is employed as a Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Derby. The study will form part of Nick’s PhD studies which are being undertaken at Nottingham Trent University. The research is being supervised by Dr Michael Sutton at Nottingham Trent University, whose contact details are appended below.

What is the research study about?

Research question: ‘Are organic police partnerships more effective than mandated police partnerships? ‘ This research project commenced on 1st October, 2011, and will run until the end of September, 2018.

The research is being conducted to discover to what extent, if any the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 has had upon the way in which the police work with other partners. Specifically the research is seeking to compare and contrast police partnership activity pre and post 1998 in Staffordshire and in particular around the theme of police engagement with young people. In terms of pre-1998, I will principally be looking at the youth diversionary scheme called Staffordshire Police and Community Enterprise (S.P.A.C.E.) that ran between 1983-1999, and comparing this with the ‘current day’ partnership activities that the Force engages in relative to young people.

How will the research be conducted?

The main method of gathering information will be via interviews of key personnel who have, or have had, an involvement with police partnership activity. I will be interviewing approximately 40 people overall and intend to use two interviews schedules, one designed for people engaged with S.P.A.C.E and another for those engaged in contemporary partnership activities.
I will also be studying background documents about the development of partnerships in Staffordshire, so that I understand the local context.

**Why have I been asked to participate?**

I am asking you to take part in an interview, because my research to date has highlighted your potential involvement in the SPACE scheme or alternatively your name has been put forward to me by Deb Wilne, Chief Constable’s Staff Officer as potentially being involved in contemporary partnership activity.

**Do I have to take part?**

No. The decision to take part is entirely your own and there is no requirement for you to take part. For those currently employed by the Police I have your manager’s permission to approach you, but you are free to take part or not, as you choose. Your manager will not be told if you decline.

If you do choose to take part you will be asked to sign a consent form to show that you have agreed to participate. You have the right to withdraw from the study at any point, up until 12 months after your interview and you are not required to provide a reason. If you choose to withdraw, then any answers you may have given at that point will not be used in the research.

**What do you want me to do?**

I would like you to take part in an interview (one to one) or in a group setting (approx 5 people). The interview will last approximately one hour and will take place either in your workplace or at a location of your choosing and at a time convenient to yourself. The broad topics/questions to be covered are set out on the attached sheet. There will be plenty of scope for discussing local issues.

I will ask for your written permission to digitally voice record the interview, to ensure that the information you give is accurately gathered.

**What happens to the information that I provide?**

The digital record of your interview will be transcribed and the digital recording will be immediately destroyed; I will then analyse the information and feed it into the results. All information you provide will only be accessible by the researcher, named above. Data is not being used in any way which is, or is likely to, cause distress to anyone. All data obtained will be electronically stored on a password/encrypted computer that only the researcher will have access to. Hard copies of research notes will be kept in a locked filing cabinet. At the conclusion of the study, all personal information and data will be destroyed in accordance with the Data Protection Act, 1998.
Please note however, that the digital recordings will be made available to the university’s contracted transcription service, who will transcribe the digital recordings whilst supervised by university staff at the University of Derby’s Kedleston Road site. The transcriber(s) will be subject to the University regulations and conditions pertaining to transcription employment and explicitly reminded of their responsibilities under the Data Protection Act 1998. Signed contracts to this effect will also be retained as a matter of record by the University of Derby.

Confidentiality and Anonymity

In terms of confidentiality, all identifying features of the research participants will be removed and all data obtained will be held in confidence and kept from public consumption. In terms of anonymity, pseudonyms will be used in an attempt to make every effort to ensure that the identity of participants is safeguarded. The identity of the participants will not be revealed and no responses given will be attributed to any individual.

Study Publication

This study is due to be completed and submitted by 30th September, 2018. The completed research report will be submitted to Nottingham Trent University in support of a PhD submission but will not contain the names or identities of any of the research participants. I would also like to use the study to publish academic papers in due course and again all identities of participants will remain anonymous. Should you wish to have access to the final publication or to subsequent published academic papers, then copies will be made available for you.

What if I have any more questions?

If you have any more questions, then please feel free to contact either me or my supervisor and we will be only too willing to respond.

Contact Information

Researcher – Nick Howe
Email – n.howe@derby.ac.uk
Tel: 07786 998894 (m) 01332 593689 (w)

Supervisor – Dr Michael Sutton
Email – michael.sutton@ntu.ac.uk
Tel: 0115 8485561(w)
Appendix C - Participant Consent Form

Study title: - Policing in Partnership

Name of Researcher: Nick Howe

1. I confirm that I have read the cover letter and fully understand what is expected of me during this study. I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the study and these have been answered adequately.

2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I have the right to withdraw at any point, prior to (12 months – date to be inserted) without it being necessary to provide a reason and without any implications for my legal rights.

3. I give my permission for the interview to be digitally voice recorded on the understanding that the recording will be destroyed as soon as it has been transcribed.

4. I agree to take part in the study.

Date: ________________________

Name of Participant: ___________________ Signature: _______________________

Name of Researcher: ___________________ Signature: _______________________

________________________________________________________________________
Appendix D - Participant Debriefing Information

Once again I would like to take the opportunity to thank you for taking part in this research study.

Data Protection is taken very seriously and all your personal data including your email address will be kept safely, securely and will not be given to any third parties.

You are reminded of your right to withdraw from the research at any point, during the next 12 months by contacting me – details published below. You do not have to give a reason for seeking to withdraw from the research. Should you withdraw then all data and responses relative to you will be removed from the research and destroyed.

This study is due to be completed and submitted by 30th September, 2018. The completed research report will not contain the names or identities of any of the research participants. The researcher would also like to use the study to publish academic papers in due course and again all identities of participants will remain anonymous. Should you wish to have access to the final publication, then a copy will be made available for you.

In the meantime, if you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.

Nick Howe

University of Derby

n.howe@derby.ac.uk

07786 998894(m)

01332 593689(w)
Appendices

Appendix E - Interview Schedules

Interview Schedule - (Sample - Post 1998)

1) What does the phrase `policing in partnership` mean to you?
2) How would you describe your role and function?
3) How would you describe the relevance, if any of being in engagement with young people with that of policing?
4) What types of young people do you/your department engage with and why?
5) What other partners do you have relationships with that are directly relevant to your work with young people?
6) How do you think that these `other partners` view the police and the work that you do?
7) In general terms, how would you describe the relationship between young people and the police?
8) How would you describe the relationship between you and the young people that you/your department come into contact with during your role?
9) How is your effectiveness in your role measured?
10) Does your department have broader performance criteria to which they are held to account?
11) In your opinion, what value, if any does the Force give to engagement with such activity?
12) What do your colleagues who perform other functions in the force, think about the work that you do?
13) What are your views on police-partnership work more broadly?
14) Have you ever heard of the S.P.A.C.E scheme? If so, what have you heard about it?
15) In your judgement, would such a scheme be relevant for the police to be engaged in today?
Interview Schedule - (Sample - Pre-1998)

1) What does the phrase `policing in partnership` mean to you?

2) How would you describe your experiences of working within the SPACE Scheme?

3) How would you describe the relevance, if any of being involved with such activity with that of policing?

4) How was the scheme marketed/advertised? What types of young people attended the scheme?

5) To your knowledge, what other partners were involved in the scheme and what relationships did you have with these partners?

6) What was your impression of how these other partners viewed the scheme?

7) What was the relationship like between the police and young people on the scheme?

8) Were you aware of any performance regimes that sought to measure the schemes success?

9) What help and support were you given to undertake SPACE?

10) In your opinion, what value, if any did the Force give to engagement with such activity?

11) What did your colleagues think about your involvement in SPACE?

12) What are your views on police-partnership work more broadly?
Interview Schedule Partners

1) What is your role, function and responsibilities relative to partnership activity?

2) To what extent, do you have any involvement with the police in this regard?

3) Under the Crime and Disorder Act, 1998 there was a ‘shared’ responsibility for community safety and where Local Authorities are considered key - how in your experience has this statutory responsibility been embraced?

4) How would you describe the police as partners?

5) What strengths do you think that the police bring to partnership?

6) What development areas to you think exist for the police to be more effective partners?

7) To what extent, if any has police involvement and engagement with partnership activity changed over time?

8) Where does the theme of young people fit within local priority settings?

9) In your opinion what value do you think Staffordshire Police gives to youth engagement?

10) Do you think that the role of the PCC (introduced in 2012) has influenced police activity within the partnership arena?

11) Have you ever heard of the S.P.A.C.E. scheme? If so, what have you heard about it?

12) In your judgment, would such a scheme be relevant for the police to be engaged in today?

13) What are your views on police-partnership more broadly?
Appendix F - Staffordshire Local Policing Unit Map
Appendix G - Contemporary partnership landscape network
Appendix H - Tamworth strategic partnership landscape network

- Staffordshire Health & Well-being Board
- Children Centre’s Management Advisory Group
- Tamworth Health & Wellbeing Board
- Community Safety Partnership
- Turnaround
- PARB
- Staffordshire Strategic Partnership
- Tamworth Education and Skills Board
- Greater Birmingham and Solihull Local Enterprise Partnership
- Business Enterprise Partnership
- Destination Staffordshire
- Staffordshire & Stoke Local Enterprise Partnership
- Task & Finish Groups