False memories and real epistemic problems

Brown, S.D. ORCID: 0000-0001-7841-3225 and Reavey, P., 2017. False memories and real epistemic problems. Culture and Psychology, 23 (2), pp. 171-185. ISSN 1354-067X

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Abstract

The dichotomy between 'truth' and 'falsity' in relation to memory is difficult to clearly sustain. The veridicality of memory is typically established by drawing on the local, normative procedures that operate in a given setting (e.g. legal, clinical, social). Since all procedures are strictly relative, all memories are technically either 'relatively falsified' or 'relatively as-yet-unfalsified'. False Memory Studies claim to be able explain the production of false memories, but do not offer criterion to effectively differentiate populations of so-called 'true' and 'false' victims. The narrative of the discovery of the 'false memories' themselves is inconsistent and demonstrates a significant level of imagination inflation and suggestibility to dominant narratives in post-war Psychology. In attending to the setting-specificity of memory, researchers may wish to consider how their work impacts on the experience-ecologies to which they contribute.

Item Type: Journal article
Publication Title: Culture and Psychology
Creators: Brown, S.D. and Reavey, P.
Publisher: Sage
Date: June 2017
Volume: 23
Number: 2
ISSN: 1354-067X
Identifiers:
NumberType
10.1177/1354067x17695764DOI
1238988Other
Divisions: Schools > Nottingham Business School
Depositing User: Linda Sullivan
Date Added: 21 Nov 2019 12:41
Last Modified: 21 Nov 2019 12:41
URI: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/38425

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