A measure to compare matchings in marriage markets

Biermann, F.M. ORCID: 0000-0003-2594-7551, 2011. A measure to compare matchings in marriage markets. In: 16th Coalition Theory Network Workshop, Barcelona, Spain, 3-5 February 2011.

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Abstract

In matching markets the number of blocking pairs is often used as a criterion to compare matchings. We argue that this criterion is lacking an economic interpretation: In many circumstances it will neither reflect the expected extent of partner changes, nor will it capture the satisfaction of the players with the matching. As an alternative, we set up two principles which single out a particularly "disruptive" subcollection of blocking pairs. We propose to take the cardinality of that subset as a measure to compare matchings. This cardinality has an economic interpretation: the subset is a justified objection against the given matching according to a bargaining set characterization of the set of stable matchings. We prove multiple properties relevant for a workable measure of comparison.

Item Type:	Conference contribution
Description:	Submitted to FEEM-CTN Working Papers series.
Creators:	Biermann, F.M.
Date:	May 2011
Identifiers:	Number Type 1238055 Other
Divisions:	Schools > Nottingham Business School
Record created by:	Linda Sullivan
Date Added:	29 Nov 2019 11:03
Last Modified:	29 Nov 2019 11:04
URI:	https://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/38634

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