How do licensing regimes limit worker interests? Evidence from informal employment in Britain

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Clark, I. ORCID: 0000-0001-7698-2715, Hunter, J. ORCID: 0000-0002-5501-6718, Pickford, R. ORCID: 0000-0001-9741-6923 and Fearnall-Williams, H. ORCID: 0000-0002-4183-4840, 2020. How do licensing regimes limit worker interests? Evidence from informal employment in Britain. Economic and Industrial Democracy. ISSN 0143-831X

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X20903095

Abstract

Informalized workplaces are a growing presence in the UK, for example, hand car washes frequently house informalized low-wage, precarious workers who are paid less than the minimum wage and who experience other forms of labour market exploitation. These ‘new’ forms of work and the related informalization of work appear to challenge the embedded interplay between formal institutions and agency. Our contribution to new knowledge advances three areas of discussion. Firstly, what enables informalized workplaces to remain apparently unregulated? Secondly, in contrast to other locations why is there is no collective hybrid form of representation and resistance at car washes in the UK? Thirdly, how do licensing schemes for car washes have the potential to marginalize worker interests?

Item Type:

Journal article

Alternative Title:

Evidence from informal employment in Britain

Publication Title:

Economic and Industrial Democracy

Creators:

Clark, I., Hunter, J., Pickford, R. and Fearnall-Williams, H.

Publisher:

Sage

Date:

17 February 2020