Lexicographic voting: holding parties accountable in the presence of Downsian competition

Klingelhöfer, J. ORCID: 0000-0002-6207-676X, 2015. Lexicographic voting: holding parties accountable in the presence of Downsian competition. BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 15 (4), pp. 1867-1892. ISSN 1935-1682

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Abstract

This paper combines ideas from models of electoral competition with forward-looking voters and models of electoral competition with backward-looking voters. Two political parties can commit in advance to policy platforms, but not to a maximum level of rent extraction. In the case without uncertainty, the electorate can limit rents to the same extent as in a purely backward-looking model of accountability, and the policy preferred by the voter who represents the median preferences of the electorate is implemented. In the case with uncertainty about the bliss point of the representative voter, the electorate has to accept higher rent seeking by the incumbent politician, but nonetheless retains some control over rent extraction. The policy positions of the two competing parties do not converge as they do in the case without uncertainty. I show in an example that this nonconvergence can increase the welfare of the representative voter.

Item Type: Journal article
Publication Title: BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy
Creators: Klingelhöfer, J.
Publisher: Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Date: 1 October 2015
Volume: 15
Number: 4
ISSN: 1935-1682
Identifiers:
NumberType
10.1515/bejeap-2014-0117DOI
1562895Other
Divisions: Schools > Nottingham Business School
Record created by: Linda Sullivan
Date Added: 04 Jul 2022 10:50
Last Modified: 04 Jul 2022 10:50
URI: http://irep.ntu.ac.uk/id/eprint/46553

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