Understanding re-nationalisation through the theory of obsolescing bargain and political institutions: the case of Argentina

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Sahin, H. ORCID: 0000-0003-0908-4813, 2023. Understanding re-nationalisation through the theory of obsolescing bargain and political institutions: the case of Argentina. Nottingham Law Journal, 32 (1). ISSN 0965-0660 (Forthcoming)

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Abstract

The surge in re-nationalisations of previously privatised state-owned entities across various sectors has been a major concern for multinational companies since the early 2000s, particularly those with a presence in South America. Some scholars argue that the catalyst for mass nationalisations was the political shift towards radical, populist left wing governments. However, others stress that economic factors were the main drivers of this phenomenon. This article contributes to the academic debate through a critical analysis of the Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF)’s re-nationalisation. Vernon’s obsolescing bargain theory is applied to the case, as well as a contextual analysis of the political regime and political institutions of Argentina to identify the driving force(s) which influenced the Argentinian government to re-nationalise this previously privatised company (YPF) in 2012. A framework is proposed to evaluate the role played by each of the following factors: economic nationalism, political regime, and weak political institutions. Vernon’s obsolescing bargain theory facilitates an understanding of the initial bargaining power of Argentina after YPF’s privatisation and to examine how this power balance shifted over time. The work also dedicates particular attention to how the political regime and political institutions of Argentina intervened to in facilitate YPF’s re-nationalisation.

Item Type:

Journal article

Publication Title:

Nottingham Law Journal

Creators:

Sahin, H.

Publisher:

Nottingham Law School

Date:

24 October 2023

Volume:

Number: