The Prolific And Other Priority Offender Programme: In Search Of Collaborative Public Management

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Abstract

The purpose of the research was to assess the implementation and management of the Prolific and Priority Offender (PPO) programme, examining the barriers to and enabling factors for managing in partnership, whilst evaluating the settlement between three management models. The research provides evidence for a newer model of management, better suited to deliver on the shared outcomes government requires from its public programmes. Research has shown that although crime is multi-causal, a range of agencies separately intervene into service users’ lives. Collaborative Public Management joins up these interventions to improve crime reduction.

The research was theory driven; it proposed that partnerships would require a particular model of management. The research then went looking for Collaborative Public Management (CPM) in mandated crime partnerships with the aim to ascertain the settlement with two other management models: New Public Management (NPM) and Public Administration (PA). Three cases studies have ensued, involving interviews with eighteen managers from a range of partnership agencies, observation of ten partnership management meetings and an analysis of documentary data.

The search for CPM was successful, but there has not been a simple linear shift from one model to the next, features of PA and NPM remain but in weaker forms, revealing shifting tensions, and the overlaying of management forms resulting in the old and new interacting, creating an institutional fusion. Managers were key to successful policy implementation with a focus on performance, building capacity through resource acquisition and networking and realizing structures and knowledge processes. But competent practitioners, a low crime rate, adequate resourcing and a history of partnership were other principal variables. The result is an original piece of research, where the methodology and findings add conceptually and empirically to the current body of knowledge on public policy implementation and which advances theorizing on CPM, whilst also offering an enhanced understanding to improve management practices under partnership conditions.
Chapter 1: Introduction and overview of the thesis

Introduction

Partnerships have been promoted as a vehicle for the delivery of crime policy, particularly over the last 30 years, as it became increasingly recognized that the situations giving rise to crime lay outside the Criminal Justice System. Non-crime agencies have been drawn into service delivery as government policy accepted the need for social and situational responses to crime, which reflected its multiple aetiology. Partnerships allow for the co-ordination of expertise and the pooling of information and resources by key agencies to address cross cutting issues. Research into partnerships has demonstrated both their effectiveness (Burnett and Appleton 2004), but also their pitfalls (Huxham and Vangen 2005). The current research has been contextualised within New Labour’s story of partnership and the application of management theory.

Much partnership research has focused on partnership start-up; the research aims to focus on established partnerships. Empirical case studies of crime policy implementation and management are important because political rhetoric can be judged against empirical reality, to gain insight into different crime control processes by verifying theory and supporting and/or denying generalizations (Hallsworth 2002, p.198). The research is important, as it is timely and relevant given the partnership agenda, the pre-occupation with crime and coalition government.

The PPO programme was launched in 2004 with the aim of cutting crime by reducing the offending of the most active offenders. CDRPs, which are statutory partnerships between local authorities and the Police Force with a remit to work together to reduce crime, were given responsibility for its implementation. The programme builds on past initiatives in targeted provision, and has three strands: Prevent and Deter, Catch and Convict and Resettle and Rehabilitate. The research will focus on the latter two strands. Dawson (2005, 2007) researched early implementation of the policy, but made few comments about the programme’s management.

Management in the public realm involves mechanisms to co-ordinate activities and facilitate processes for the delivery of government purpose. The study focuses on three
models of management found in the public sector derived from the literature, which have been operationalized in order to assess how the policy has been implemented and managed. PA was the dominant model used to implement crime policy up until the 1980s and was characterized by increasing levels of specialization, bureaucratization and professionalization.

Concern about ‘big government’ and the benefits of private sector management techniques led to NPM with reforms focusing on the three E’s: economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and the opening up of the public sector to competition through the use of privatization and market like mechanisms. However, during the mid 1990s, there was criticism of fragmented service delivery, conflicting programmes and goals, narrowness in responding to need and inadequacy of supply markets. CPM offers solutions based on joined up service delivery, through cross cutting objectives and involvement of multiple stakeholders including the community.

**Aim of the thesis**

There has been no study on crime partnership management; research has focused on the more general concept of partnership working. The study therefore aims to address this important theoretical gap, to aid understanding of management in a partnership setting, whilst also assessing the settlement between three management models. Knowledge in this area is important given the government’s push for partnership and to improve the effectiveness of policy implementation and thus outcomes.

The objectives, though subject to some modification were pre-specified as the research was a CASE project with Government Office for the East Midlands (GOEM). The research aims: (1) To provide an overview of government policy on persistent and prolific offenders. (2) To assess the implementation and management of the PPO policy. (3) To examine the barriers to and enabling factors for managing in partnership. (4) To ascertain the fit between three management models.

**Overview of the chapters**
Chapter 2: This chapter will discuss the drivers behind the rise of crime partnerships as a form of service delivery, their advantages and disadvantages, as well as barriers and enabling factors linked to relevant research findings. Partnerships allow for the coordination of expertise and the pooling of information and resources by key agencies beyond the Criminal Justice System to address common problems. The targeted approach to crime reduction and then research into the PPO programme is discussed to set the study in context.

Chapter 3: This chapter identifies management practices as the mechanisms used to coordinate activities and facilitate processes. The literature review identified three management models which have been operationalized in order to assess how the PPO policy has been implemented and managed within the partnerships. A brief history and definition of the models PA, NPM and CPM are provided, before undertaking a comparative analysis on eleven key dimensions. Chapters two and three demonstrate what is already known, providing background for the empirical study.

Chapter 4: This chapter discusses the methodological issues and processes followed in undertaking the research. The pursuance of relevant literature, the development of the research questions and propositions, the construction of the conceptual framework and the typology of management dimensions. From these the questionnaire-survey, observation and interview schedules were devised. The conclusion of the fieldwork was eighteen interviews with managers and observational data from ten meetings, plus documentary data. Some data analysis was undertaken at the same time as data collection and coding was based on concept driven codes. Three case studies have been written up in a narrative style using rich description.

Chapter 5: This chapter tells the story of the implementation and management of the PPO programme in Jones Town. It begins by contextualizing Jones Town, before identifying the agencies involved in the programme. All five managers concerned were interviewed and three meetings of the monthly Joint Review Committee (JRC) attended by managers and practitioners to review the list of PPO cases were observed. The partnership is an example of CPM with managers respecting and trusting each others’ experience and judgement with no one agency dominating. There was little conflict in evidence, instead an atmosphere of willingness to work together to improve the life chances of service users and reduce their
re-offending. There was a levering in of resources via the third and private sectors and the community. At the time of writing up, all the managers had left the programme with a loss of institutional memory.

Chapter 6: This chapter replicates the structure and style of the previous chapter but tells the story of the implementation and management of the PPO programme in Smith Town. All four managers involved were interviewed and three meetings of the monthly JRC were observed. The partnership was more mixed in terms of management; the story of Smith Town’s PPO implementation is that of the CDRP off loading responsibility for the policy on to the Police Force along with partner managers. However, the partnership still demonstrated high levels of consensus among the agencies, with implementation individually focused on each PPO to reduce their re-offending, utilizing the dual methods of control and surveillance and help and support.

Chapter 7: This chapter tells the story of the implementation and management of the PPO programme via the Baker County steering group. It begins by contextualizing Baker County and then outlines the agencies involved. Managers from a variety of agencies were interviewed, based on purposive sampling. The chapter is a description and assessment of the steering group’s strategic deliberations. Performance and getting the structure right were key management concerns, balanced with the need to keep managers and resources on board. Opening up the steering group to new agencies and their managers was a strong feature, which involved networking, as well as improving knowledge management processes.

Chapter 8: This chapter compares and contrasts the findings from the three case studies and identifies enabling factors and barriers to partnership management. The data is discussed within the framework of the management dimensions, to ascertain the settlement between the management models. The search for CPM was successful, the data provides evidence for the rise of CPM, but there had not been a clear linear shift from one model to the next, features from the two other models remained, revealing shifting tensions and a picture of co-existence.

Chapter 9: This chapter revisits the aims of the research and summarizes the research process and main findings, making a case for the study’s originality and its contribution to
knowledge. The implications of the research are discussed in terms of wider dissemination and the possibility of generalizing beyond the population, before making suggestions for future study.

Moving on now to chapter two, which discusses germane crime partnership research and then the specifics of the PPO programme.
Chapter 2: Partnerships in crime

Introduction

This chapter will discuss the drivers behind the rise of crime partnerships as a form of service delivery, the advantages and disadvantages and barriers and enabling factors for effective partnership. Empirical research findings will be reviewed to draw out the salient themes on partnership and to set the PPO programme in perspective, to demonstrate where it has links with the past and where it steers a new course.

Crime in late modern communities is complex and diverse. Agencies beyond the Criminal Justice System have been drawn into service delivery as it became increasingly recognized that the situations giving rise to crime and their potential solutions, lay outside the remit of the Police Force and Probation Service. Single agencies acting in isolation cannot deal with ‘wicked issues’ (Rittel and Webber 1973) like crime alone, solutions are contingent on the actions of others and need to be joined up. Bureaucratic agencies have increasingly formed partnerships empowered through networks (Joyce 1999) to meet the needs of government, the community and service user. Partnerships have become the preferred vehicle for the delivery of crime policy initiatives, thus implying a criticism of traditional approaches, involving segmented single providers.

Partnerships allow for the pooling of resources and the co-ordination of expertise. Crawford (1998,p.170) has argued that partnerships can afford a holistic approach, which is ‘problem-focused’ rather than ‘bureaucracy-premised’, where policy recognizes the need for social and situational responses to crime, which reflects its multiple aetiology. Garland (2001) has claimed that their principal purpose is to encourage the sharing of responsibility for crime and to persuade agencies beyond the Criminal Justice System and the community to act appropriately.

Partnership definition

Partnership and network are terms usually taken to imply co-operative relationships, moving through a spectrum distinguished by levels of integration. Sullivan and Skelcher
(2002,p.42) identify networking > co-ordination > co-operation > collaboration; Alter and Hage (1993) offer a similar classification system. Crawford (1998,p.175) identifies collaboration on a continuum but articulates two ideal types. Multi-agency collaboration is when agencies come together in relation to a problem and pool their collective expertise and resources to co-operate, but where the roles and tasks of the partners remain distinct, “…as multi-agency work is grafted on to the existing practices…”

Inter-agency collaboration on the other hand entails “…relations which interpenetrate and thus affect normal internal working relations. They entail some degree of fusion and melding of relations between agencies. They involve collaboration and interdependence.” (Crawford 1998,p.175). The inter-agency model blurs boundaries as to role and function, and there is some loss of autonomy and issues of accountability can arise with the advent of new structures and responsibilities.

Perhaps the key difference between networks and partnerships is that the latter involve a greater likelihood of agreement on a set of objectives addressed through overlapping mandates and processes, to re-align resources and service delivery. McCabe et al (1997,p.1) state that partnerships are formal relationships between agencies with fixed membership and clear boundaries where as networks tend to involve informal relationships with shared interests and values, resulting in indistinct boundaries and fluid membership.

Another way of looking at partnerships is to identify the form, the visible organizational structure as distinct from the mode of governance, the web of interpersonal networked associations that support it (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998,p.313). The partnership’s structure is the conscious outcome of managerial design for collaboration (Skelcher et al 2005,p.573), where as the nexus of relationships involves practitioners as well, being the primary mechanism to achieve the required co-ordination.

Crime partnerships offer the chance to overcome the inflexibility created by agency and sectoral boundaries, to share responsibility for common service users, providing an arena in which to negotiate on resource sharing and desired outcomes, where questions of power, trust and motive are mediated and played out. The Audit Commission (1998, p.8) offers a good summary definition, partnerships:
• “are otherwise independent bodies;
• agree to co-operate to achieve a common goal;
• create a new organisational structure or process to achieve this goal, separate from their own organisations;
• plan and implement a jointly agreed programme, often with joint staff or resources;
• share relevant information; and
• pool risks and rewards.”

Partnerships can be classified on a variety of dimensions, their purpose could be strategic, operational or programme driven with their status being statutory, voluntary or public/private. Their objectives could be to add public value, gain extra resources, overcome local opposition or as a method of delivery to do something better. They can involve a mix of key stakeholders, agencies, service users and the community where control and accountability is either top-down or bottom-up. Finally, their stage can be early, mid or late with a short or long-term duration envisaged. In sum, partnerships are complex entities operating in the space between agencies with great potential, but the risk of pitfalls means they require careful management.

Drivers for the rise of crime partnerships

For much of the 20th century the Criminal Justice System was insulated from scrutiny, specialist agencies were optimistic about their role in crime reduction. However, the economic crisis of the 1970s exposed it to political enquiry. Recorded crime rates were rising (Crawford 1998a) with a declining clear up, whilst the first British Crime Survey provided evidence for crime that was under recorded by the Police Force (Hough and Mayhew 1983) with success in solving crime more the result of community information than Police Force investigation. Additionally, there was an increase in court delays and prison numbers, as well as rising costs.

Research pointed to the ineffectiveness of traditional methods; that Police Force patrols had a limited impact on deterring crime (Clarke and Hough 1984). Martinson’s (1974) ‘nothing works’ research produced a crisis of confidence in the effectiveness of rehabilitation, in purportedly showing that interventions were mostly unsuccessful in reducing offending. Furthermore, the Criminal Justice System was found to be
institutionally discriminatory (Hall 1977) and ‘Institutionalized gaps’ (Mudd 1984 in Crawford 1999, p.65) had resulted in service delivery around single issues with the Police Force operating an ideological hegemony on crime (Bottoms and Wiles 1996, p.2).

A crisis arose; system overload and a lack of collaboration meant the Criminal Justice System could not meet the demands for the efficient reduction of crime. Manning (1977) (in Crawford 1999, p.25) speaks of the rejection of the ‘impossible mandate’ of sole government responsibility for crime reduction as issues of performance, legitimacy and cost undermined confidence in the state’s ability to deliver and resulted in the search for alternative delivery mechanisms.

Cope (2001, p.4) argues that as crime policy became more complex, government recognized the need to co-ordinate the agencies sharing a common interest in it. The policy network approach reflects the view that society is multifaceted and diverse and that many partners including government are required to work together on policy problems to effect change (Rhodes 1997). The approach connects the exercise of power with political values, purpose and ends through the interpersonal interactions and meanings accorded by those involved, and helps explain differentiation in policy implementation. A joined up crime policy demands that these various decision-making sites be brought under one roof; partnership was the mechanism to achieve this.

The Cornish Report (Home Office 1965) was an early declaration of the partnership approach and recommended setting up crime prevention panels, so the Police Force could consult with the local community and share responsibility for crime prevention through community policing. However, the big shift to partnership occurred via Clarke (1980) who advocated situational crime prevention measures and a multi-agency approach which involved calculating the risk of crime and then devising the means to manage it based on design and alterations to the physical environment delivered in partnership.

For the Conservative government the appeal was evident, situational crime prevention drew on a range of agencies, so responsibility for crime could be dispersed away from the state, and the shift of emphasis from offender to offence and the promotion of individual choice and responsibility meant rehabilitation could be sidelined. The Gladstone Report (1980) published in the same era, proposed that crime prevention should be problem
orientated and project focused with a rational decision-making approach to crime problem
analysis, policy implementation and review.

All this activity culminated in 1984 in the first inter-departmental circular (Home Office
1984) promoting the need for a co-ordinated partnership approach involving the
community. A further circular ‘Crime Prevention - The Success of the Partnership
Approach’ (Home Office 1990) encouraged, but did not require the Police Force and local
authorities to develop crime partnerships, and was accompanied by a good practice booklet
that made references to using volunteers and community consultation.

The Morgan Report (Home Office 1991) became a significant document on crime
partnerships. It was positive about what had been achieved since 1984, but was critical of
the piecemeal organization and the narrow emphasis placed on crime prevention,
reinforcing the view that crime is the sole responsibility of the Police Force. The preferred
term was community safety, which implied a collaborative and problem orientated
approach with a vision of community engagement. The Morgan Report expressed concern
about the lack of core funding and that crime prevention was a peripheral activity for the
agencies involved and a core responsibility of none. It explored ways to institutionalize
multi-agency crime prevention through six key areas: structure, leadership, information,
identity, durability and resources and identified five partnership models.

The Morgan Report’s key recommendation was that local authorities should with the
Police Force be given a statutory responsibility for community safety and the resources to
encourage the spread of partnership. Local authorities were strategically placed with
sufficient leverage over diverse areas like housing, education and leisure. Furthermore,
they were crucially aligned to democratic accountability, providing permanency and
continuity for the third and private sector. However, since giving greater responsibility to
the local authorities, did not accord with the views of the government, the
recommendations were largely ignored.

Nevertheless, pockets of partnership were developed with a strong focus on situational
crime measures and some with government money; the flag ship Safer Cities Project
(Tilley 1992,1993) for example. Yet the period up to New Labour’s election in 1997 was
characterized by ad hoc partnership projects and rising crime rates.
The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act

New Labour on taking office asserted that the Conservative government had allowed crime to flourish as a result of the promotion of self-interest over society. Their approach spoke of the salience of community, concern over anti-social behaviour and the ‘political resonance of youth crime’ (Newburn and Souhami 2005, p.361), which drew on left realist criminology’s (Lea and Young 1984) concern for the impact of crime on vulnerable communities. The government’s desire to further modernize the public sector resulted in the dusting down of The Morgan Report (Home Office 1991) and the passing of the Crime and Disorder Act.

The Act placed partnership working on a statutory footing and formally ended the Police Force monopoly for crime control; Hughes et al (2002, p.124) have claimed it was “…a watershed in crime control policy...” 6 et al (2006b, p.217) have suggested that the act of legislating suggested not just the complexity of the issues, but also the power of forces against. In the absence of mandation, salience for any single agency was hard to achieve. The Act created two new partnership structures, CDRPs and Youth Offending Teams (YOTs).

376 CDRPs in England and Wales were created with a requirement for shared leadership between the local authority and the Police Force and a requirement to co-operate with the fire and police authorities, with section 115 providing for information exchange for crime prevention purposes. The Act was amended by the Police Reform Act of 2002 to incorporate Primary Care Trusts. CDRPs were required to work with education providers and the Probation Service and invite co-operation from the private and third sector and the community, with a new statutory responsibility to tackle drug misuse. If there is a local councillor for community safety, they should sit on the CDRP’s strategy group.

The Act stopped short of providing the funding proposed by The Morgan Report (Home Office 1991), however CDRPs were able to bid for funds from the £400 million Crime Reduction Programme. CDRPs were required to carry out an audit of local crime and disorder problems, consult with all sections of their community, publish three year strategies with identified priorities and performance indicators with specified time scales, and report regularly on progress against performance.
Gilling (2005,p.740) suggests the Crime Reduction Programme was a belated recognition that CDRPs needed funding to deliver, but also “…the impatience of central government to deliver on its own political promise of being tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime.” Funding tended to be contingent upon the pursuit of centralized targets prioritising higher profile volume crimes. To oversee this new partnership structure, forty-two Local Criminal Justice Boards (LCJBs) were created in 2003, bringing together the chief officers of the criminal justice agencies.

Following the 2006 CDRP review, government took steps to bring greater coherence to their performance. CDRPs were now required to undertake six monthly strategic assessments and produce annual three year rolling plans in place of the triennial audits and strategies, and to expand the remit from consult to engage through ‘face the people’ sessions, to address the government’s public confidence and reassurance agenda. The Home Office (2007bp.44) states “An effective partnership should be visible and accountable to its community for the decisions and actions it takes on their behalf.” Greater consistency was also to be achieved through a broad set of ‘hallmarks’ (Home Office 2007b), whilst not prescribing how they should be met it offered light touch regulation for good performers and intervention for under achievers.

The advantages of partnerships

The drivers for partnership are correlated to their advantages. Crime problems are multi-faceted and interdependent, constituted by a complex mix of social and situational factors and a range of citizens’ needs. The bringing together of various agencies and the community in policy implementation can lead to the accessing and sharing of resources to increase output from a given level by avoiding duplication to achieve more with less. Vigoda-Gadot (2003,p.62) asserts that no “…public agency is powerful enough to foster its strategies and policies independently. It frequently lacks sufficient knowledge, experience, motivation, technology, legitimation or other resources that foster the successful initiation and implementation of serious cutting-edge public programs.”

Burnett and Appleton (2004b,p.130) researched the setting up of the Oxford YOT; their ‘overwhelming impression’ was of an increased range of help and opportunities for young people. Commissioning involved a dual process of purchasing services from both
dedicated offender and multi-user projects. Furthermore, partnerships can benefit from the application of knowledge from a range of academic disciplines, professions and private sector practices, joint alliances for example. With the aim of addressing complex problems in an environment conducive to learning, whilst simultaneously improving responsiveness to service users. The sharing of resources and risks aims to build the partnership’s social capital.

The 1987 Kirkholt Burglary Reduction Project (Forrester et al 1998) was a successful partnership that brought together a variety of agencies to tackle burglary and repeat victim crime that led to a substantial and rapid fall. Recently victimized dwellings received upgraded security and the removal of prepayment meters. There was group work for offenders, a credit union for residents and ‘cocoon’ watching groups consisting of the immediate neighbours of recently victimized households.

Diversion projects were another example of a winning practitioner and manager led partnership innovation between the Police Force and Social Services that exploited the favourable political climate against state intervention to divert young offenders from custody. Between 1980 and 1987 there was a 52 per cent reduction in young people sentenced by the youth courts as cautioning rates rose (Pitts 2001,p.6). The Home Office (1994) (in Stanley 2001,p.97) reports that 87 per cent of those cautioned for the first time did not re-offend in two years. Yet the reduction in the number of young people entering the Criminal Justice System coincided with a 54 per cent rise in recorded offences between 1981 and 1991 (Pitts 2001,p.13). A plausible explanation for the discrepancy was a growth in the number of persistent offenders.

Another more recent partnership was the Street Crime Initiative launched in 2002 following a doubling of robberies in 2001/2002 compared to 1997/1998 with the theft of mobile phones accounting for almost one-third (HMIC 2003,p.17). Tony Blair declared a ‘national emergency’ with the message that street crime was everyone’s responsibility. Police Forces and partner agencies were set reduction targets and a 16 per cent reduction was achieved (HMIC 2003,p.9).

These examples demonstrate the value of partnership in terms of outcomes, and Cropper (1996,p.86) speaks of the creation of long-term efficiencies due to enhanced trust and
shared understanding gained between agencies, where savings on transaction costs could be reinvested. Partnerships can enable the kind of strategic guidance that is subverted by markets, whilst providing the flexibility to adapt to changing circumstances that is limited in bureaucracies. Additionally, Benyon and Edwards (1999,p.145) assert that partnership can foster ‘community governance’ a concept that aspires to a joined up and strategic response to crime, through the formulation and implementation of strategies that are local and flexible to increase legitimacy and enhance local democracy.

Finally, partnerships can offer the opportunity for agencies to gain influence in other areas of provisioning. Bidding for resources can galvanize creative thinking and break down agency stereotypes through innovative seamless services like one-stop shops. These aim to reduce the problem of numerous agencies intervening independently into the lives of service users in response to the same problem (Audit Commission 2005,p.69), as crime is related to almost every other negative indicator in society.

**The disadvantages of partnerships**

The message of the government’s partnership agenda is that working in consultation with the community, partnerships can manage crime locally. What is absent from the agenda is that problems afflicting high crime communities may not be amenable to local solutions, but require national and structural responses. The British Crime Survey (2004) (in Rogers 2006,p.138) found that 4 per cent of victims accounted for between 38 and 44 per cent of all crime reported. This social and spatial concentration harms the most vulnerable and impacts on CDRPs differentially in terms of resourcing.

Partnerships can invoke images of openness and co-operation, but established interest groups can dominate through closed systems and ‘privileged oligarchies’ (Marsh and Rhodes 1992), usurping power for their own advantage and creating barriers to new agencies. Alternatively, bargaining may risk sub optimal decision-making and the subverting of government goals; agencies may have hidden and risk aversive agendas (Agranoff 2007,p.179). Objectives may lack clarity, which can cause a lack of momentum and delay and the avoidance of tough decisions, resulting in ‘collaborative inertia’ (Huxham 1996,p.4). Mayne and Rieper (2003,p.105) believe that “…increased collaboration in no way guarantees better quality services. Indeed, collaboration in
important ways can complicate the quest for quality by introducing more layers and more complexity into the service delivery regime.”

Partnerships become self-organizing and autonomous entities (Rhodes 1997), the state lacking a sovereign position, can only indirectly and imperfectly steer, as such there can be opaqueness in who is accountable (Hood 2005,p.23) and a risk of democratic deficit if political engagement is minimized. John and Cole (2000,p.87) argue that partnership “…transfers decision-making into interpersonal relationships and…when governing becomes more informal, the patterns of democratic control become less easy to identify. Conflicts occur behind closed doors, rather than in the council chamber or in party organisation.” Hence the need for a local councillor on the CDRP strategy group.

Segmented government can be a safety measure against abuse by a co-ordinated state, where as increasing co-ordination can concentrate power. Furthermore the ‘dispersal of discipline’ thesis (Cohen 1985) refers to the boundaries between informal and formal control becoming blurred, in what Garland (2001) terms ‘responsibilization strategies’, facilitated through partnership, that expand control into new areas of social life with the risk of communities being colonized through co-option.

A further disadvantage involves the impact on other services of siphoning resources from the mainstream. Crawford (1999,p.115) has referred to the ‘socialization of criminal justice policy’ and the ‘criminalization of social policy’, where poverty, poor housing and unemployment are only seen as a problem in relation to crime and become the lever for acquiring resources. Stenson and Edward’s (2001,p.79) research found that partnership coherence, durability, commitment and morale were undermined by opportunities for self-interested competitive behaviour for resources. This eroded trust and offered the incentive for partners to exaggerate their claims to obtain resources, as stakeholders’ expectations were raised then dashed. Likewise, grant bidding, pump priming and short-term project based resourcing undermined synchronisation, limited the strategic role and encouraged an inward partnership focus rather than one focused on externalities.

HMIC (2003,p.48) identified the costs of endless streams of partnership meetings with a focus on funding rather than planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Where as managers demanding constant innovation, risk partnership burnout, before they move on
to the next challenge. Hood (2005,p.23) also asserts that partnerships can encourage the loss of specialist skills, weakening expertise as jobs become de-differentiated; Burnett and Appleton (2004b,p.138) referred to the danger of a generic YOT practitioner. Ultimately, partnerships are a resource hungry form of service delivery that require active management to address a range of issues if they are to achieve their goals.

The barriers to effective partnership

Research has identified an assortment of barriers to effective partnership. The historical division of service user needs into distinctive problems created segmented agencies, and more recently competition and commissioning has increased the number of providers, furthering fragmentation, creating gaps that need to be bridged in order to join up policy. The lack of co-terminus agency boundaries further hinders collaboration (Burnett and Appleton 2004b,p.23) and a competitive agency culture can threaten takeover or merger, as exemplified by predatory Probation Service Trusts resulting in the loss of agency autonomy, control and certainty. Conversely, a silo mentality rooted in agency autonomy can lead to a belief that the agency can go it alone and achieve its objectives, without the need to co-operate.

Over dependence on some providers in partnership can result in other agencies being marginalized with the effect that their resources and expertise are not tapped into. Phillips et al’s (2002,p.10) research into CDRPs start-up reported over reliance on the Police Force and local authorities, plausibly due to their lead agency status. Other agencies, in particular the National Health Service was reluctant to engage and the third sector had a restricted role. The HMIC (2004,p.4) report into the Persistent Offender Scheme, similarly found little engagement from the Prison Service and the schemes impact on the Crown Prosecution and Courts Service were negligible.

The HMIC (2003,p.51) report into the Street Crime Initiative found that ‘area delivery partnerships’ the mechanism used, had by passed CDRPs sidelining their audits, few of which had developed a street crime agenda. Moreover, the initiative led to a proliferation of crime partnerships, leading Sullivan and Skelcher (2002,p.20) to identify a ‘congested state’ where partnership overlap creates duplication and waste.
The settlement of interests under partnership will be influenced by the interplay of power and status and may undermine the partnership’s ethos and ability to enact its programme. Stenson and Edwards (2001, p.77) reported an orientation towards external, business interests and that the local community felt un-listened to. The local authority made the final decisions with interventions focused on easy to measure burglary reduction targets. Furthermore, the third sector challenged the targeted approach in the neighbourhoods not chosen, questioning the equity, morality and legality of targeted provision.

Government policy may require partnership, but management practices may be rooted in agency tradition, reinforcing a silo mentality if managers have no experience of partnership. 6 et al’s (2006b, p.219) research found that CDRPs were ‘strongly hierarchical’ reflecting a manager led agenda couched in partnership language. Managers without the skills necessary for partnership will act as a constraint, as the Audit Commission (1998, p.5) states “…partnership working is difficult to do well and making partnerships work effectively is one of the toughest challenges facing public sector managers.”

A further barrier is conflicting priorities and issues around information exchange. The HMIC (2003, p.15) report into the Street Crime Initiative found a lack of cross cutting objectives and problems of commitment and poor communication. For example, YOTs aimed to reduce the number of offenders going into custody, where as the expectation of the initiative was that offenders should receive a custodial sentence, and many of the offenders were youths. Phillips et al (2002, p.v) identified problems and weaknesses in setting SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed) targets; some targets were too easy, some too difficult, with a general focus on outputs rather than outcomes and with tasks not related to objectives.

Edwards and Benyon’s (2001) research found the implementation of crime policies constrained by centrally driven quantitative performance targets with some performance measures also working against partnership. Similarly, CDRPs were set objectives for vehicle crime, domestic burglary and robbery by government based on each achieving reductions compared with the top performing quartile of each family of partnerships (Phillips et al 2002). This represented a major departure from the spirit of the 1998 Act that had advocated locally determined and responsive crime priorities.
The government saw the Street Crime Initiative as a joint venture, but targets were never really ‘owned’ by the partners; robbery was felt to be too narrow a focus to engage partners (HMIC 2003,p.15). Mooney and Young (2006,p.405) criticized the initiative stating that falling crime was ignored whilst increases in street robbery counted for only 2 per cent of known crime. Any performance framework adopted needs to reflect all the agencies involved, measured through indicators that they can all influence. Otherwise those partners whose output is being measured will feel the burden of responsibility, whilst others may feel marginalized or relieved at being let off the hook.

The problem solving approach was uppermost in guidance (Home Office 1998) to CDRPs, but Phillips et al (2002,p.39) found little evidence of its use. “In devising their strategies, partners did not have time to undertake detailed analysis of the problems identified as priorities, but rather made decisions on the basis of past experience and existing knowledge of the issues.” Phillips et al (2002) further found that time pressures had made it difficult to consult hard to reach groups resulting in imperfect consultation. Tight implementation time tables and established ways of doing can be an obstacle to partnership.

Differences in budgetary cycles, accounting procedures, planning horizons and funding mechanisms are further barriers to partnership, in addition to unstable finances and resource hoarding. High transaction costs involving “Exhaustive human-relations processing” (Agranoff 2007,p.178-9), time spent building trust and time spent in meetings and other co-ordinating activities can occupy 10 to 20 per cent of a manager’s time. Resource dependency theory states that if one agency is dependent on the resources of another agency, power will reside in the dependency, thus over reliance on a single source could be an obstacle to effective partnership.

Burnett and Appleton (2004b,p.16) made reference to the risks agencies took in allocating resources to the new and untried YOTs when they needed the resources themselves; health providers struggled with what they would gain. Both HMIC (2003,p.9, 2004,p.5) reports found short-term resourcing threatened sustainability, the retention and commitment of practitioners and value for money. HMIC (2004) identified an unmanageable number of offenders not able to be prioritized within existing resources, the majority of whom had been convicted of low-level offences like shoplifting. The Audit Commission (1998,p.5)
has concluded that partnerships can only be justified when their outcomes outweigh the resources they consume.

Different values, turf protection, levels of autonomy and conflicting views about service users can put limits on a partnership. HMIC (2003,p.13) reported that, “Treatment professionals…were found to be highly resistant to allowing SC offenders to queue-jump...” but priority access to treatment was a key feature of the initiative. Changing working practices in the YOT from casework based on discretion, to systematic assessment through the ASSET tool, were less acceptable to experienced practitioners because they were used to a different assessment method. However, managers “…found that the tool generated invaluable aggregate information, added to the YOT’s database, for monitoring work and for estimating resource requirements.” (Burnett and Appleton 2004b,p.33).

Traditional ways of working and informal rules that operate in teams are often not under management control. Burnett and Appleton (2004b) found tension over some objectives and that practitioners were not passive recipients of official discourses, reframing of practice took place to fit in with policy statements, evidencing innovation and resistance. They also reported that practitioner shortages led to the appointment of unqualified staff with the burden falling on qualified practitioners to train them, and managers had to infill rather than provide practitioner supervision. Managers who do not have the time to manage are a wasted resource.

Thus a barrier to partnership is a shortage of the requisite skills. Gilling (2005,p.740) observed that government failed to appreciate “…the lack of technical capacity in many CDRP…” to undertake the audit. However, in many cases this was solved by contracting it out. The advantage gained by using external consultants was that it effectively by passed potential sticking points at the problem definition stage by a nothing ruled in, nothing ruled out approach (Phillips et al 2002). Joyce and Smith (2006,p.17) claim the action plan’s imprecision allowed consensus to broad rather than specific aims and surface integration without the need for fresh thinking, or adaptation to the activities and resources of partners, in effect they were allowed to follow their own inclinations unhindered.

Partnerships can create blurred lines of accountability; good management involves responsibility for spending taxpayers’ money. HMIC (2003,p.15) reported that the Police
Force was seen as the accountable agency not the partnership and Burnett and Appleton (2004b,p.24) reported a lack of clear lines of accountability. The YOT manager reported to the strategy group but had no line manager, where as when under Social Services he was accountable to local councillors. Phillips et al (2002) found little evidence of local political leadership, but councillors were kept informed through briefings, committees and attendance at partnership meetings. The YOT manager wanted to make the YOT more publicly accountable through openness to the media (Burnett and Appleton 2004b) but Phillips et al (2002,p.40) reported the need for careful and consistent engagement with the media to avoid damaging agency relationships and embarrassing the partnership.

Partnerships take time to evolve but government demand for rapid results does not allow time for effective mechanisms to embed (Gilling 2005,p.740). HMIC (2003) reported that lessons were not learnt from the Persistent Offender Scheme and central direction limited local determinism on the Street Crime Initiative with a fear of failure cultivating risk adverse behaviour. Tilley’s (1993) research on the Safer Cities Project also reported a key role played by ‘administrative criminologists’ who shaped the programme within limits set by the Home Office.

Finally, poor processes can be a constraint to partnership effectiveness, incompatible IT (HMIC 2003) can drain resources along with initiative overload. When the Persistent Offender Scheme was introduced it was competing with a range of other initiatives, all requiring special treatment (HMIC 2004,p.15). Managers know success takes time (Mawby and Worrall 2004,p.72) and everything cannot be a priority, but New Labour saw the slow pace of change as inertia.

**The enablers for effective partnership**

Research has identified a number of critical success factors for partnership. Tilley (1992,p.178) acknowledged the pivotal role of co-ordinators, who acted as ‘honest brokers’ in overcoming suspicion, building trust, gaining local credibility, negotiating conflict and mediating power differences to facilitate partnership. The co-ordinator created a virtuous circle “where trust leads to co-operation which leads to synergism which leads to successful outcomes which leads to resources which increases trust and so on.” As such
partnerships can act as a catalyst to further develop crime initiatives (HMIC 2003) when stakeholders can see the added value of the outcomes achieved.

A positive relationship between the co-ordinator and steering committee was deemed crucial (Tilley 1992), and the need for a strategic steering group to ensure an adequate budget for planning and to promote a sense of shared ownership and responsibility was identified by Burnett and Appleton (2004b,p.134). A clear management structure bolsters support and direction when partnerships issues are conflicting (Mawby and Worrall 2004,p.71), but ultimately success relies on agencies working together with a single purpose (HMIC 2003,p.43). Creating clarity over purpose argues HMIC (2004) could be aided by local definitions of a persistent offender and designation of appropriate numbers, facilitated through a formal referral system (Worrall et al 2002,p.291), so agencies can sign up to the agenda as they recognized it, rather than having it externally imposed.

As we have seen processes are important in partnership, HMIC (2003,p.152) recommended the early establishment of protocols to include all agencies to guide procedure. J Track, a web based system was introduced to track persistent offenders from arrest to sentence but its usefulness was reduced by the fact that only the Police Force and Crown Prosecution Service had access. Burnett and Appleton (2004b) found a willingness to learn from each other, there had been a history of partnership working and the YOT was rooted in previous practice initiatives. A past history of doing business together had offered a securer footing to move forward with the new venture.

Home Office (1998) guidance for CDRP start-up had encouraged both short-term, quick wins using situational methods and longer term social methods, which reflected the need to create a balanced approach to crime reduction, offering the variety of agencies a stake in the strategy. Phillips et al (2002) found that the action plan was not dominated by any agency and accommodated both types of approach, which they suggest might be favoured by the various partners. Good practice can be enhanced through a performance framework that reflects both national and local needs, the monitoring of diversity issues and value for money and the identification and dissemination of ‘What Works’ (HMIC 2003, 2004).

Adequate resourcing is necessary for partnership, Burnett and Appleton (2004b,p.135) claim that innovative work had been taken on at the expense of mainstreaming core YOT.
delivery, encouraged by the Youth Justice Board. The second YOT manager made a
decision not to bid for new projects unless they were ‘strategically sensible’ as a balance
needed to be struck between developing new initiatives and maintaining core services.
HMIC (2004) articulated the need for more sustainable funding streams with easier access
through a national framework to support partnership development. Managers needed to
recognize and value ‘cash and non-cash’ (Burnett and Appleton 2004b,p.15), as an
important motivator for partners to play their part, as agencies contributed different types
of resources.

Under partnership, service users will come into contact with a variety of practitioners;
Partridge (2004) (in Moore et al 2006,p.177) refers to the importance of the
practitioner/service user relationship, which requires consistency to develop trusting
relationships that can engineer change. Competent and committed practitioners and
managers with a spirit of optimism to make change happen were central to the YOT’s
dedicated administrative support, including a data analyst to assist the targeted approach,
an acknowledgment that processes need to be supported to ensure effectiveness.

Leadership and management are fundamental to partnership effectiveness. HMIC
(2003,p.35) found that Tony Blair’s leadership was crucial to driving local delivery and
Hedderman and Williams (2001,p.2) believe that leadership is ‘the factor’ that determines
whether implementation is effective having identified the qualities of imagination, stamina,
networking and dogged determination, as well as general management skills as necessary
for success.

Burnett and Appleton (2004b,p.18) claim that different managerial skills were required in
the start-up and consolidation phase of the YOT. The formative stage was largely achieved
through dynamic and charismatic leadership, a manager with vision, energy and a can do
attitude, whose excellent networking skills developed relationships and achieved much in a
short space of time. Such qualities gave prospective partners a sense of confidence that
their own investment would be worthwhile.

The second stage coincided with a change in YOT manager focusing on sustainability
(Burnett and Appleton 2004,p.134) given the identification of poor funding for core
services and a need to bed in procedures and re-engage the strategy group. The latter focused on planning, rather than just performance, and the appointment of a deputy manager to manage operational issues was a belated acknowledgement recognizing how over stretched the managers were. The undeveloped thrust of the argument is that with out the managers, the YOT would have been unable to achieve its objectives, they were essential to creating the vision, gaining the resources, co-ordinating the processes, motivating the practitioners and consolidating performance.

The targeted approach

Turning now to discuss the targeted approach to crime reduction in order to set the scene for an examination of the PPO programme. The events of the early 1990s, civil unrest, media stories of persistent offenders out of control, which culminated in 1993 in the murder of Jamie Bulger by two truanting 10 year old boys, unleashed a political storm which Pitts (2001,p.10) states“…focused national attention on the government’s capacity to fulfil the primary rationale for its very existence, the maintenance of the ‘rule of law’.”

Crime policy began to shift to a targeted approach (Moore et al 2006), with a range of factors linked to the transition: the rise in ‘administrative criminology’ (Feeley and Simon 1992), the National Intelligence Model, evidence based practice (Chapman and Hough 1998) the creation of the National Offender Management Service (NOMS) and policy transfer from America (Jones and Newburn 2007). A number of targeted and intensive schemes came into play: Drug Arrest Referral Schemes (Edmunds et al 1998), Intensive Supervision and Monitoring Schemes and Drug Treatment and Testing Orders, the forerunner of Drug Rehabilitation Requirements (DRR).

The dominant criminological view had been that youth constituted a period of transition, in which many young people engage in offending but not all go on to develop criminal careers (West and Farrington 1977). Yet the ‘No More Excuses’ White Paper (Home Office 1997) rejected the policy of diversion and stated that young offenders are no longer growing out of crime (Graham and Bowling 1995). The shift from youth to adulthood had become more difficult, characterized by exposure to greater risks for longer periods during the economic down turn of the 1980s and the reduction in funding for the agencies that structured transitions.
Furthermore, the Audit Commission (1996) pointed to the average time of four and a half months for the Youth Justice System to deal with a persistent offender from start to finish. It recommended a two pronged strategy, targeting persistent offenders to get them to change their behaviour, and discouraging those at risk from getting involved in offending in the first place. The report advocated partnerships and performance targets including statutory time limits from arrest to sentence and a focus on risk factors.

The discernable shift from a concern with overall crime rates, to a focus on persistent offenders was the result of research which established that at any one time, a small proportion of all offenders are responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime. The Home Office (2001) has suggested that 100,000 offenders commit 50 per cent of all crime with a tendency to commit the more serious offences. If this group’s offending could be reduced, it would have a sizeable impact on crime rates. However, the cohort is not stable (HMIC 2004) and Hagell and Newburn (1994) argue that youth offending is transient and not serious. Conversely, Wikstrom and Butterworth’s (2006,p.240) research on high frequency young offenders found that they did commit more serious and versatile crimes.

A fissure was identified between offences committed and those brought to justice (Home Office 2002b). ‘Narrowing the Justice Gap’ (Home Office 2002a) was introduced to remedy the situation, by plugging the gaps which resulted in offenders not being adequately processed through the Criminal Justice System. This was supported in 2003 by the launch of the Persistent Offender Scheme to target resources on a limited number of offenders. A persistent offender is “Someone who is 18 years or over and has been convicted of 6 or more recordable offences in the last 12 months.” (HMIC 2004,p.11), but the scheme also allowed for local definitions.

The regulation of targeted groups is allied to the concept of risk, which became embedded in New Labour’s crime strategy. Actuarialism (Feeley and Simon 1992) is a tool that utilizes statistics to aggregate and manage crime data, to enable partnerships to identify and profile offenders through routinized risk instruments to assess seriousness, persistence or dangerousness (Smith R 2006,p.96). This ‘new penology’ (Crawford 1998,p.256) favours the pragmatism of developmental criminology’s focus on risk factors that roots crime in the biography of the individual and aims to intervene to modify them.
West and Farrington’s (1977) study identified six risk factors that correlate most closely with persistent offending: socio-economic deprivation, poor parenting, criminal and anti-social families, low intelligence and school failure, hyperactivity attention deficit/impulsivity and anti-social behaviour. Wikstrom and Butterworth (2006, p.240-247) found that social situations and dispositions were strong predictors of risk of offending. The more risk characteristics the youths had, the higher the crime risk, as multiple risk factors can combine and cluster to produce greater risks in youths from more disadvantaged circumstances, while youths from advantaged circumstances tended to have more protective factors.

Involvement in crime is closely linked to individual characteristics and lifestyle and the interaction between the two. Individuals had different propensities to offend, affected by the level of individual self-control and the strength of social bonds. With high propensity offenders situational measures were less effective, early intervention strategies were required (Wikstrom and Butterworth 2006). However, clarity as to causal relationships is not clear cut, but the theory supports the need for social provisioning to build protective factors to buffer service users against risks.

NOMS as recommended by Carter (2003) and established by the 2003 Criminal Justice Act intended to join up the Probation and Prison Service. The model requires a single offender manager, usually a probation officer having case management responsibility through all stages of an offender’s sentence. The service user’s risk is managed at three levels: risk control through custody or a Home Detention Curfew where the risk can be eliminated for a time period; risk management through intensive supervision; and risk reduction through rehabilitation. The risk principle states that the intensity of interventions should be proportionate to the risk of offending and criminogenic need, with resources following risk, as offenders are allocated to one of four tiers, in increasing order of intensity these are: punishment, help, change and public protection (Stanley 2009, p.166).

Advances in technology allowed the Audit Commission (1993) to advocate crime pattern analysis and intelligence led policing to detect and target offenders. However, it was the Police Reform Act 2002 that ushered in the National Intelligence Model, a structured framework of researched and analyzed crime pattern data. Data analysts generate, collate and review offence and offender patterns at geographical levels to enable attention to be
focused on the identification, mapping and detection of offenders and crime hotspots and the disruption crime networks. The tasking and co-ordinating process then targets resources based on a proactive problem solving approach.

There are a number of drawbacks to the actuarialist approach. Townsley and Pease’s (2002) research found that designated offenders did not appear to contribute substantially to crime levels generally, or to the burglary rate, if nominated as burglars. However, there was a correlation between vehicle related crime and nominated offenders. At the neighbourhood level, two out of three areas failed to produce any meaningful relationship between selected offenders and crime levels. Clearly the findings have implications for the PPO programme.

Furthermore, actuarialism can generate heightened levels of crime consciousness as community attention is directed at issues that previously they were not fully aware of. As Crawford (2001,p.71) has said “Safety is relative and relational: one area’s crime sense of security and ‘place’ within the city, may be defined, in large part, in contradiction to the perception of other areas’ insecurity”. Comparison can encourage boundary disputes, divide communities and risk increasing social polarisation. Moreover, the actuarial language gives the impression of being objective, but as Smith R (2006,p.102-103) indicates, there are high rates of both false positives and negatives; certainty is not achievable, and over prediction can result in net widening and an undue focus on young people from specific class and ethnic backgrounds.

Mair (2004) (in Smith D 2006,p.83) suggests that the ‘What Works’ agenda, a commitment to evidence based policy and practice, became influential because of a unique combination of New Labour's mission to modernize and enthusiastic advocacy by key people in the Home Office and HM Inspectorate of Probation. Newman (2001,p.69) has linked the agenda to the growth in capability of the research community and an increasing emphasis on scrutiny.

The ‘What Works’ literature (McGuire and Priestley 1985) suggests that interventions should be based on an explicit model of risk factors, target criminogenic need, be responsive, have programme integrity and employ methods from cognitive behaviourism and be community based. The National Reducing Re-offending Action Plan (Home Office
identifies seven pathways to reduce re-offending: accommodation, education, training and employment, income and debt, drugs and alcohol, children and families, mental and physical health, and attitudes, thinking and behaviour. Additionally, the action plan identifies the collection of agencies with responsibility for delivering on the plan; interestingly the Police Force is not mentioned.

The government required the Probation Service to deliver ‘What Works’ group work programmes and set performance targets for completions. A New Labour slogan was ‘What counts is what works’. However, as Smith D (2006,p.79) asserts, factors other than evidence influence policymaking: resources, interest groups, traditional ways of doing things, political ideology and electoral popularity, as crime policy is ‘driven by value commitments’ (Garland 2001,p.26). The desire for easy wins, morphed the slogan into ‘What works is what can be counted.’ Programmes were rolled out with little attention to context (Pawson and Tilley 1997) and some messages from the research were ignored (Smith D 2006,p.84). ‘Stretching’ targets meant that some service users were placed on programmes even if unsuitable.

The programmes were designed to reduce crime, but for Laub et al (1998) (in Farrall and Calverley 2006,p.18) desistance is a gradual process not an act, occurring away from Criminal Justice System. Farrall and Calverley (2006,p.183) assert that the impact of most Probation Service supervision is indirect; they stress the importance of informal social control through family and community. Restorative justice is advocated as it activates the informal control of the community to reintegrate offenders by drawing on the resources of the community to repair harms.

The role of the practitioner is to complement the naturally occurring process of desistance, which requires changes in both the outlook and circumstances of service users, as advice becomes meaningful and receptive. However, desistance studies rely on self-report data as to the reasons service users give up offending and may put more emphasis on some pathways out than others. Burnett (1992) found those who were most successful in desisting had also been the most confident and optimistic about doing so.

The Prolific and Priority Offender programme
Turning now to the PPO programme, HMIC (2004) found support from all agencies involved in the Persistent Offender Scheme, for the concept of prioritizing work with persistent and prolific offenders, and the programme became a national initiative in 2004. CDRPs were given lead responsibility for co-ordinating and monitoring delivery and establishing a steering group to encompass all three strands and to ensure that representation and planning were as inclusive as possible. This was to be achieved in conjunction with the LCJBs who had responsibility for setting the overall framework (Home Office 2004c,p.8).

Some CDRPs had already developed similar projects (Blackpool Tower Project 2010) following their audits and neighbouring CDRPs could collaborate to deliver jointly, with the Police Force and Probation Service as lead partners. The aim was to cut crime, by reducing the offending of those most active offenders who persistently caused the most crime and harm locally. The government set a Public Service Agreement (PSA) to reduce crime by 15 per cent and further in high crime areas by 2007-08, by targeting the top 15-20 prolific offenders in each CDRP (HMSO 2004).

The programme moved away from a central definition and allowed for the local identification of prolific offenders with delivery based on general criteria set by the Home Office (2004b). The programme aimed to embrace local knowledge, practitioner expertise and draw on experience from previous schemes. J Track continued to be the IT system to facilitate co-coordination and emphasis was placed on a joined up approach between all agencies to implement the policy.

The programme operates on a ‘carrot and stick’ principle and has three strands. Catch and Convict actively tackles those who are already prolific, led by the Police Force, it aims to deliver a proactive intelligence led service of surveillance, investigation and charging. Rehabilitate and Resettle led by the Probation Service works with PPOs to stop their offending via priority access to interventions and fast tracking back to court if they do not rehabilitate. Prevent and Deter was divided into a strategy to prevent youths and children with no record of offending from engaging in crime, and a strategy to deter the most at risk existing offenders from graduating into the PPOs of the future. The YOTs have led on this strand, but the Youth Justice Board (2008) has argued for multi-agency governance.
A national study by Dawson (2005) evaluated the commencement of the programme but did not focus on Prevent and Deter and made few observations about the programme’s management. He found the selection process was crucial to programme success. A two stage selection procedure first generated a list of potential PPOs from Police Force intelligence, the Persistent Offender Scheme, crime audits and agency knowledge. A second stage then applied a selection matrix, reflecting local priorities. Dawson (2005, p.2-3) found that:

- PPOs were predominantly young, male and white
- had education, accommodation, drug and lifestyle problems
- were more criminally versatile, and on average began their offending careers earlier
- had on average 47 convictions, but a number did not have an extensive history.

Derby’s programme (Derby CSP 2007) also used a matrix to select PPOs and research found that it was targeting the right offenders, but recommended that the matrix be reviewed regularly to ensure that local priorities remain current and that the views of practitioners be explored. Dawson (2005,p.4) found that deselection received much less attention, but the commonest reasons were offender relocation, reduction in offending and the imposition of lengthy custodial sentences. Dawson (2005,p.5) found that PPOs received a more intensive package of interventions with a control focus, including fast tracking, surveillance, visits and enforcement with an increased use of Police Force intelligence to assess risk of re-offending.

Dawson (2005,p.6) also identified innovative practices as information sheets for service users and agencies, workshops on the programme and colour coded filing for ease of tracking, as well as the acquisition of additional funding. Practitioners told Dawson (2005,p.6) that the programme had “…considerably improved inter-agency partnership and data sharing.” and was “…a valuable method of working with the most needy offenders…” and was a “…more positive and proactive approach towards offenders.” Conversely, Erol and Miller’s (2005,p.29) PPO research in Birmingham identified a ‘massive issue’ around confidentiality and the processes to manage information exchange, especially from the Primary Care Trust.
Derby’s programme had implemented a traffic light system to prioritize PPOs and the programme was enhanced by the introduction of the premium service, first introduced under the Persistent Offender Scheme. In the community, a premium service required enhanced and bespoke interventions with a focus on drug treatment, accommodation, employment and training with strong links between the programme and providers to facilitate fast tracking (Derby CSP 2007,p.5). A premium service in custody required effective sentence planning, adequate contact between the prison and the programme and consistent service delivery following transfers (Derby CSP 2007,p.6).

The Police Force, YOTs and the Probation Service were ‘very strongly engaged’ (Dawson 2005,p.5); housing, education and employment were conspicuous by their absence. Given that 82 per cent of PPOs’ had education, training and employment needs (Dawson 2005,p.3) this poor engagement was a real issue. In Erol and Millie’s (2005) research, the third sector was involved in employment, education and training but there was scope for a more joined up approach whilst PPOs were in custody. The Derby research stated that the programme could benefit from greater input from the Crown Prosecution Service and Children and Young People’s Services, as the inclusion of prison practitioners helped PPOs introduction to the programme and improved sentence planning (Derby CSP 2007,p.6).

Easton’s (2007) PPO research in London found that limited resources, including practitioners impacted on the ability to deliver a premium service and PPOs’ needs had to be prioritized. Dawson (2005) found that less than a third of CDRPs had dedicated practitioners and only half of the programmes had co-located. Erol and Millie (2005,p.17) identified resource constraints, in particular around housing and Easton (2007) found that resources were scarce to support vulnerable tenancies or deal with rent arrears whilst service users were in prison. Service users interviewed by Dawson (2005,p.3) were aware of the ‘carrot and stick’ approach and understood the additional enforcement aspects and welcomed the additional support.

High levels of motivation and commitment to service delivery were noted by Dawson (2005) and Easton (2007,p.5-6) identified the trusting and consistent relationships developed between practitioners and PPOs and the range of interventions provided as key highlights of the programme. One programme had created a psychodynamic therapy group
and another a mentoring scheme and two had built close relationships with local prisons through the Drug Intervention Programme (DIP). A good balance between enforcement and social work was noted with a range of interventions customized to individual need.

In 2006 the PPO programme was aligned with the DIP to ensure that drug users causing the highest amounts of crime were identified and targeted more effectively. Easton (2007) found the relationship between the DIP and the PPO programme varied and was often dependent on personal relationships that had been built through the DRR teams. Similarly, the nature and extent of ‘good practice’ was mixed across programmes and practitioners.

Practitioners were discovered carrying out similar roles leading to duplication and waste, but also differences in practice were seen to negatively impact on delivery (Easton 2007), leading to the inevitable conclusion that getting the balance right is no easy task. Erol and Millie (2005, p.27) accepted some overlap would occur, but asserted that duplication should be reduced when all agencies understood the role played by each other.

The Police Force and Probation Service felt they had been ‘left to get on with it’ without adequate support from the strategic partnerships or line management (Easton 2007) and this deficient oversight was reported as hampering progress and limiting funding. Easton (2007, p.6) recommended improved links between the programme, the CDRPs and practitioners, so the latter would be better informed of changes to guidelines and managers better informed of programme needs and how they could contribute. The production and dissemination of a set of protocols documenting ‘operating principles’ could help underpin processes. Other issues identified by Dawson (2005) included the short implementation timetable, difficulties in ensuring programme ownership, uncertainty on how to bring agencies together and lack of clarity over the strands.

Dawson and Cuppleditch (2007, p.v) reported a 43 per cent reduction in offending of the entire PPO cohort when comparing the number of convictions before and after the programme. This reduction was most marked upon entry, with a reduction of 62 per cent in the first 17 months. The Derby CSP (2007) research found that 78 per cent of non-PPOs re-offended, compared to 50 per cent of the PPOs, with an estimated average re-offending time for PPOs of 315 days, which was more than double that of the non-PPOs.
However, in both studies decreases cannot be directly attributed to the programme due to methodological challenges. The methodology does not allow for an assessment of why and how the programme reduced re-offending as the programme was implemented amongst other interventions and embedded in a complex partnership architecture. Perry et al’s (2009,p.8-16) research into PPO re-offending found poor methodology in many studies, primarily due to non-comparative definitions of a PPO. They felt able to conclude that community drug treatments, therapeutic prison communities and cognitive skills training had positive effects, but found insufficient evidence to judge the success of intensive supervision.

Dawson (2005,2007) concluded that the implementation of the PPO programme had largely been successful, but made the following recommendations:

- all appropriate agencies should be involved
- transparent and defensible procedures for selection and deselection that target the most problematic service users
- co-location of key practitioners
- identify all programme costs
- seek out additional resources
- provide adequate levels of programme information
- create good practice networks.

The PPO programme diverged from the Persistent Offender Scheme with the Catch and Convict strand to involve non-statutory cases. Similarly, Prevent and Deter was innovative in dealing with children and young people at risk but not convicted. Smith (2007,p.63) sees “...a strategy of intensifying levels of control and restriction of liberty...” and the intensification of community sentences coincided with the targeted approach that continues with the PPO programme. For non-statutory cases the identification of more distal risk factors extends criminality prevention and risks widening the net of social control (Cohen 1985). Moreover, the most challenging service users with multifaceted problems may be more resistant to interventions, resulting in those less in need being targeted because they are easier to work with.
Targeting has implications in terms of labelling and available resources and consequences for communities from having targeted offenders living amongst them, Crawford’s (1999, p.158) ‘spatialization of crime’. Becker (1964) argues that labels can be so powerful that they can determine how an offender and others respond to them. Crime is the product of the interaction between offenders and agents of social control, the label can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, but Braithwaite (1980) has convincingly argued that stigmatization need not be inevitable; it depends on the nature of the programme.

The conceptual framework

Leaving the PPO programme for the time being, from an analysis of the above literature a conceptual framework was developed. Hood (1998, p.231) states “A framework is a general angle of vision, incorporating a view of what are the most crucial variables for explanation or understanding, but gives no precise account of how those variables work in any given situation.” According to Anfara and Mertz (2006, p.192), a framework offers to: “(1) Focus a study, (2) reveal and conceal meaning and understanding, (3) situate the research in a scholarly conversation and provide a vernacular, and (4) reveal its strengths and weaknesses.”

The conceptual framework generated was adapted from a model produced by Alter and Hage (1993) for their partnership research. This model was chosen because it offered a schematic representation that enabled the illustration of four key domains: context, structure, people and processes which impact on the dependent variable, policy implementation. The framework helped to define what to observe, focusing on theoretically important variables rooted in the literature to shape the research and highlight the relationships between them.
New Labour has pursued partnerships as the policy instrument of choice, an attractive concept for government because they encourage commitment from non-government resources, pluralizing crime reduction within a visible partnership infrastructure offering
an effective mechanism to deliver interventions to service users with embedded problems. Gilling (2005,p.743) has said “The promotion of partnerships has allowed government to avoid economically damaging allegations of the state over-reaching itself, and overstating its competence, whilst cleverly facilitating the corollary of this, namely, the off loading of responsibility for crime and security on to others.”

However, with crime partnerships generally and the PPO programme specifically, the state has not relinquished its role. The thrust of the literature is that public sector agencies still dominate service delivery; the private and third sector and the community have had a minimal input. The state has retained the power to define and shape the policy agenda (Newman 2001,p.82) whilst delegating responsibility to the partnerships. The evidence points as Davies (2002,p.315) claims to government “…relinquishing direct control...” but it has been unsuccessful in its attempt “…to purchase wider effective control.” Because the other sectors have not come on board.

The state has been unable to offload responsibility on to the community, the third or private sector, especially where interventions are most needed in high crime areas, namely because crime is a public good and there is a massive risk from free riders. Moreover offending behaviour is complex and often intractable and requires costly long-term early intervention strategies. If there had been new participants, it would be interesting to see if they merely augmented and extended, rather than challenged the sovereignty of the exiting local power structures (Coleman et al 2002,p.96). Yet, Gray et al’s (2003,p.240) assertion that the state has moved from overloaded to hollowed out to congested, applies in terms of the proliferation of partnerships.

The literature review highlights the implications for the PPO programme. Support for capacity building has come from previous schemes, policy entrepreneurs (Clarke 1980), and practice innovations like diversion schemes. The 1998 Act regularized the informal partnerships that existed in the crime arena and created new ones. Yet despite their mandation partnerships still had to be constructed through bargaining and negotiation in order that agencies brought their resources to the table. Over the period of New Labour a raft of circulars, evaluation reports, performance frameworks, initiatives and rhetoric have been utilized to raise performance, offer consistency in local delivery and encourage community involved, but the response has been variable.
Crime is a social construct and changes over time, Crawford (1998a,p.2) has argued that each successive crime policy “…carries deep philosophical and political assumptions, commitments to particular models of social explanation and implications for social relations.” Early crime partnerships were top-down, situationally orientated with measures to support victims and the community. The current focus is on bottom-up intensive schemes to manage targeted offenders, with a predominantly social crime focus. Many intensive schemes have been short lived, but the PPO programme is in its 5th year, with its roots in a number of professional, philosophical and political developments some of which are compatible, others of which are contradictory (Worrall et al 2002,p.288).

The review of the partnership literature and the evaluation reports on the implementation of the PPO programme has demonstrated that a number of variables are implicated in successful policy implementation through the partnership approach. The next chapter takes forward these variables to address them each within the framework of the three management models identified: PA, NPM and CPM.
Chapter 3: Management theory and models

Introduction

The art of public management is to organize and lead employees to work together productively towards the achievement of an objective. However, managers use different approaches, the aim of the research is to assess how the PPO policy has been implemented and managed. Three management models, PA, NPM and CPM have been operationalized as ‘ideal types’. The value of the models is not that they accurately describe reality, but that they assisted in problem solving and theory generation. Eleven variables have been identified to inform and direct the research, based on an assessment of their importance from the literature in chapter two, and following Yin (2003,p.137), from the researcher’s own management experience.

These variables are as follows: performance objectives, accountability, values, leadership, employment relations, community engagement, management tasks, decision-making, structure, processes and change. A strong emphasis on performance objectives, driven by government and identified through the HMIC (2003, 2004) reports was identified as was the need for accountability, in its many guises, commented on by Benyon and Edwards (1999) as partnerships veer towards autonomy. The impact of agency and professional values on service delivery in partnership was discussed by Easton (2007) and the central theme of leadership (Hedderman and Williams 2001) rose from the studies.

The role of employment relations were referenced by Gilling (2005) and community engagement has been promoted from the earliest partnership reports (Home Office 1990) and is still a central idea of New Labour. The significance of management tasks was identified by Burnett and Appleton (2004) and the complexities or not of decision-making by Phillips et al (2002). The importance of structure was acknowledged early on by The Morgan Report (Home Office 1991) and the value of processes like a knowledge infrastructure by Erol and Millie (2005). Dawson’s (2005,2007) research focused on the change achieved, but left explanatory gaps in how this was managed, the research aims to fill these gaps about management in partnership. The chapter begins with a brief history and definition of the models, before undertaking a comparative analysis on the eleven dimensions.
**Public Administration (PA)**

The first half of the 20th century saw the Criminal Justice System characterized by increasing levels of specialization and bureaucratization creating segmentation in dealing with service users. PA was the dominant model used to implement crime policy until the early 1980s, as crime control became increasingly to be the responsibility of the state with the community as recipients of service.

PA is based on the two theories of bureaucracy and the separation of politics from administration. Weber (in Gerth and Mills 1948) described bureaucracy rather than advocated it, he saw bureaucracy as technically superior to earlier ways of organizing. PA involves the application of consistent and impersonal rules with minimum discretion to attain service quality (Osborne and Brown 2005,p.54). The same decision made in the same circumstance would to lead to greater efficiency and the service user would know where they stood. Koppenjan and Klijn (2004,p.97) have argued that PA is an attempt to remove complexity and uncertainty from decision-making through a standardized response with predictable outputs.

Bozeman (1979,p.66) has claimed that PA’s rationalism has inspired confidence and optimism in policy making “It says that though the world may be complex and its problems of great magnitude, social economic and political problems may be understood and perhaps solved.” The PA model encouraged planning and social engineering through interventions that fitted with the developing Criminal Justice System. For Rhodes (1997,p.109) bureaucracy provides centralized strategic capability and hierarchy made for decision certainty with reduced control problems.

The hierarchy of command entailed for Weber (in Gerth and Mills 1948) a legal rational authority with the manager having hands on control over services with a limited span of control. Mooney’s (1930) (in Rainey 2003,p.29) ‘scalar principle’ involves a clear cut vertical line of seniority where it is clear to subordinates, who is delegating the tasks and where accountability lies. Gulick’s (1937) (in Rainey 2003,p.28) principle of homogeneity means specialized tasks are supervised by a specialist with one line manager providing unity of command.
The theory of separation states that politicians should be responsible for policy making while administrators implement it. Taylor’s (1947) scientific management argued for a one best way to organize, functionally organized agencies became the direct providers of services developing a mass production format delivering compartmentalized interventions with little involvement from other agencies or the community.

The belief that management could be systematic, fitted well with the bureaucratic skills of the administrator, the compilation of manuals applied science to administrative processes and used bureaucracy to implement it. Taylor (1947) influenced job design with task specialization; specialisms were seen to increase productivity and professionals were recruited on the basis of their knowledge, maintaining a monopoly of competence over their sphere of activity. The impersonality of service delivery meant all were to be treated in the same way. Respect for client privacy meant information was supplied to an agency for its sole purpose and was not routinely transferred across agency boundaries.

PA’s strength lay in its commitment to high ethical standards based on the public service ethics of impartiality, reliability, predictability, accessibility, probity and universalism. Du Gray (2000,p.79) has claimed that “Simply representing the public bureaucracy as an inefficient, unresponsive, outmoded or conservative form of organisation fails to take account of the crucial ethical and political role the bureaucracy may play.”

Weber (in Gerth and Mills 1948) was aware of bureaucracy’s disadvantages, in that uniform procedures can create inertia, red tape and mediocrity and stifle creativity and initiative through lack of incentives to innovate. Risk aversion was seen to encourage waste and lead to a preoccupation with uniformity and order. Moreover, no set of procedures can cover all eventualities, but rigid adherence to procedures can lead to the unanticipated consequence of a reduction in efficiency, as rules become an end in themselves. Input budgeting is the dominant resource allocation mechanism with incremental budgets to fund agencies rather than programmes. Yet PA is not good at comparing inputs to outputs and the one size fits all approach is expensive.

Weber (in Gerth and Mills 1948) was also concerned about professional superiority and the hording of knowledge. Similarly, the principle of employment for life meant it was difficult to sack employees despite incompetency, and promotion is often based on length
of service rather than merit. PA is poor at controlling agency and individual performance; rewards for good performance are no different than rewards for poor performance.

The focus on centrally co-ordinated political objectives can result in strategies that are unlikely to be sensitive to the challenges of diverse communities and do not harness practitioner innovation and ownership. Moreover, a silo mentality means that problems that straddle agency boundaries can be neglected, as agencies defend their budgets and priorities. Change can be slow moving as PA can operate as a closed system unresponsive to turbulence. Mechanisms for reconciling conflicting priorities can be weak, managers have to wrestle with poorly co-ordinated policy initiatives and service users have to navigate numerous agencies. Furthermore, the PA dichotomy between politics and administration ignores their inter-relatedness, policy implementation often requires the cooperation of others.

**New Public Management (NPM)**

NPM rests on a critique of bureaucracy as the organizing principle and offers a collection of ideas and solutions to what was perceived as the deficiencies of the PA model (Metcalfe 1993,p.173). The monopolistic structure and large size of agencies was seen to result from a failure to contain costs or check growth due to the lack of competition, absence of valid performance indicators, undue influence from trade unions and professionals leading to a decline in service standards. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) claimed centrality for their ideas and attempted to ‘reinvent’ government by applying the logic and disciplines of the market to the public sector. Different attributes have been identified by different scholars, Dunleavy and Hood (1994), Ferlie et al (2005) and Pollitt (2003), however, the most cited original reference on NPM was Hood (1991,p.4-5) whose definition included:

- ‘hands-on professional management’
- ‘explicit standards and measures of performance’
- output control
- dis-aggregation in the public sector
- competition
- private sector style soft management
- ‘disciplinary and parsimony in resource use’.
The 1970s was a time of poor economic performance, low growth and high inflation, with the state seen to be crowding out the private sector. NPM was a reform movement based on the new right school of neo-liberal thought with links to the discipline of economics and Human Resource Management (Pollitt 2003,p.32) that advocated that the public sector needed to adopt the management methods of the private sector. In 1979 the Conservatives came to power on a ticket to reduce the role of the state. Their reform package was based on the theory of public choice (Niskanen 1971) which attacked the perceived budget maximizing propensities of bureaucrats and their professional self-interest and parochialism, leading to the demonization of the public sector as profligate.

The discipline of economics offered managers some predictive capacity backed by the rational choice theory of how individuals behave and the theories of transaction costs and principal agent. The first wave of NPM reforms focused on efficiency improvements, the three E’s: economy, efficiency and effectiveness within the existing planning framework to address bureaucratic deficits. The second wave focused on opening up the public sector to competition through the use of privatization, market like mechanisms and contracting with an emphasis on performance and value for money.

Human Resource Management encouraged charismatic leadership, where the personality of the manager excited loyalty and was key to transformational change. Culture management connected practitioners and managers to their agency, created by vision and mission statements. Employment relations were re-organized, professional development and appraisal became key aspects. Management became a job requiring professional managerial skills rather than something specialists could pick up along the way (Clarke and Newman 1997).

NPM decentralized power and responsibility to the local level, managers could be trusted to be innovative and productive, if given the freedom to manage with responsibility for achieving results and accountable for the efficient use of resources. Transparent customer information, rather than public service ethics provided the incentive to maintain high ethical standards.

PA had failed to separate politics from administration argues Bogdanor (2005,p.11); NPM took up the idea through the creation of agencies fashioned at a distance from government
to lessen political control over service delivery. The Ibbs report in 1988 recommended that services “…should be semi-devolved to executive agencies headed by chief executives linked to the main departments through contract like ‘framework’ documents which would set out their tasks and responsibilities and their overall performance targets.” (Du Gray 2000,p.69). An emphasis was placed on a differentiated service delivery responsive to customers who were demanding better quality and choice, backed up by the Citizens’ Charter.

The department minister retained formal accountability for policy whilst agencies were required to manage themselves as businesses, through the identification of core competencies to rationalize agency purpose, adopting business plans and performance systems to foster a sense of corporate responsibility. Contracts had to be as tight as possible, with monitoring and compliance high on the agenda in case providers depart from purpose. Performance indicators and league tables, for comparative purpose, measure and benchmark outputs; cost centres, zero based budgets and resource accounting offered mechanisms to cost and monitor activities with regulators and inspectors to oversee the process. NPM was the glue that would hold the dispersed agencies together.

For the Conservative government the state had removed the conditions of individual responsibility producing a client mentality, destroying initiative and forms of social support. Public spending became to be seen as a drain on resources, a shift from viewing expenditure as a social investment to an unproductive cost. Privatization in the Criminal Justice System included the building of private sector prisons and escort services were contracted out. Engagement with the third sector was mandated, the Probation Service had to spend 5 per cent of its budget on contracts with the sector. Community became the metaphor for rolling back the state, and encouraging greater self-reliance as the state sought to share sovereignty for crime control through community self-provisioning like Neighbourhood Watch (Sims 2001).

During the mid 1990s there was academic (Clarke and Stewart 1997) and practitioner criticism of fragmented service delivery and the Cabinet Office (1999,p.45) reported “…incompatible systems and services which are not integrated.” Policy implementation had become more complex because of the need to negotiate with more providers alongside the perennial problem of how to co-ordinate service provision. Conflicting programmes
and goals, duplication, gaps and poor sequencing, narrowness in responding to need, inadequate supply markets and issues of transparency and legitimacy in rationed services led to policy slippage.

The focus on performance in single purpose agencies had produced unintended consequences, the dumping of problems and costs by one agency on another had with respect to crime made the problems worse (Flynn 2002,p.162). School leagues tables were seen to have a link with the rise in school exclusions and ultimately offending, agency efficiency had been privileged rather than system efficiency. Moreover, innovation can be stifled by narrow definitions of performance and for Rhodes (1997,p.101) “Fragmentation erodes accountability because sheer institutional complexity obscures who is accountable to whom and for what.”

Osborne and Gaebler (1992) and Hughes (2007) argue for NPM being a new global paradigm, Hood (1991) rejects the assertion, stating NPM lacks coherence and consistency in application. Management change he argues has been evolving in a non-linear and iterative fashion, some aspects have taken longer to bed in than others and some have been accorded a higher priority. NPM is best understood as complex and contradictory, drawn from a wide variety of sources. Agranoff and McGuire (2003), Metcalfe (1993) and Hudson (2004) all conclude that public management is different to and more complex than management in the private sector, thus as NPM ideas originated in the private sector, the model’s applicability to the public sector is questioned.

Collaborative Public Management (CPM)

With the election of New Labour in 1997 came the origins of CPM with a commitment to modernize government to make co-ordination and integration a central aspect of its reform programme. The Cabinet Office (1999,p.15) reported that “Issues like crime and social exclusion cannot be tackled on a departmental basis. An increasing separation between policy and delivery has acted as a barrier to involving in policy making those people who are responsible for delivering on the front line.” Moreover the focus of scrutiny has been on individual agency achievements, rather than on their contribution to the government’s overall strategic purpose.
There was a rediscovery that government could do something about crime, after the ‘nothing works’ era. The ‘tough on the causes of crime’ was New Labour’s social conscience demonstrated by its willingness to intervene. The ‘tough on crime’ element of the slogan endorsed a continuation of the punitive response unleashed under John Major. New Labour continued with aspects of NPM, they recognized that the Conservatives had made improvements to service delivery and that the state was too powerful, but the market was seen to encourage self-interest.

New Labour argued for more change, alongside a commitment to investing in public services and raising standards through centrally driven performance targets (Quirk 2007,p.49) with a reinvigorated community. 6 et al (1999,p.34) have said “If reinventing government was the slogan of the last century joined up government is the slogan for the early twenty first century.”

Steele (1999,p.46-47) has identified a number of New Labour’s themes. A focus on outcomes through PSAs and Local Area Agreements (LAAs), encouraging risk and innovation, learning and experimentation and having a long-term and strategic, future orientated agenda. Being open and restoring trust, and making government more personal by focusing on citizens and service users rather than providers through enlisting the community in decision-making. To do more with less and allocate money based on client groups or areas and tackle the power of professional cultures by reshaping recruitment and professional development. Providing clear leadership and responsibility through policy making units like the strategy unit, and the appointment of ministers with cross cutting portfolios with rewards for partnership. Finally, a consolidation of local structures through local strategic partnerships and the enhancement of Government Offices.

Agranoff and McGuire (2003,p.4) assert that CPM offers a collection of strategies for managing in partnership which are purposive, strategic and long-term, to exploit partnership opportunities to manage problems like crime, that cannot be reduced by single agencies alone. CPM aims to have strong ties among managers from different sectors, clear processes, inclining to transparency and encouraging community engagement (Vigoda-Gadot 2003,p.43). CPM values people not systems, fostering a common perspective across agencies and encouraging professionals to step outside their training. Tasks are de-
differentiated and multi-skilled involving less demarcation, respecting the third sector and junior practitioners.

CPM involves permeable structures where managers link across agencies where power is dispersed rather than centralized. Agranoff and McGuire (2003,p.186) claim “The same players will rarely exercise all types of power in truly co-equal settings. Instead temporary distributions of power will occur throughout the process, enabling stakeholders with differential power levels to engage in domain transformation.” A key management task is tapping into the skills, knowledge and resources of stakeholders as managers seek out collaborative opportunities and select and build critical links with partners. Adept managers know what resources are needed to achieve objectives, as manager’s shape operating context and develop ways to cope with strategic and operational complexity (Agranoff and McGuire 2003,p.158).

Problem solving is focused on choice rather than determinism around issues rather than professional capture with joint decision-making. Managing interdependencies and facilitating interaction through horizontal and vertical consultations is a core management activity. Pollitt (2003,p.68) states that joining up aims to eliminate contradictions and tensions between different policies to increase programme effectiveness. Whilst making better use of resources through reducing duplication, improving the flow of good ideas to produce synergy and integrating service delivery, so goals reinforce each other to improve outcomes.

CPM involves high activity and politically astute opportunistic behaviour as managers pursue strategies and work through adjustments at their agency boundaries (Agranoff and McGuire 2003,p.65). Along with resources, managers are the integrating mechanisms for managing in partnership. CPM aims to influence government policy, whilst not politicizing policy making. Kickert et al (1997c,p.177) assert that network theory assumes that government is just one partner among many but with Agranoff and McGuire (2003,p.43) they put government at the hub of both horizontal and vertical connections. This is due to the unique position it occupies with respect to authority and resources, but like other partners, it still has to use the skills of influence.
Bryson and Crosby (1992) claim that co-production emphasizes the fact that production and consumption are inextricably linked with collaboration between the state and citizens recognizing that situated knowledge is valuable evidence, but also a challenge to expert status. Recognition of the connectedness of crime means that collaboration is the logical solution to renew the public realm.

Criticisms of CPM are that it gives managers discretion to create territorial variation, a postcode lottery. Additionally, the targeting of communities can favour those who are network rich in the first place or stigmatize those selected. The use of generalists instead of specialists can add an extra layer of bureaucracy through the creation of gatekeepers. Sophisticated IT can pool information and issues of data confidentiality can arise with the risk that CPM could be less democratic as “...it represents a greater accumulation of state power because it brings together previously fragmented public power.” (6 et al 2002,p.59). The necessity for managers to be influential can also be seen as manipulative and possibly unethical. Finally, the third sector and community can become overwhelmed by consultation and volunteering requests and risk being incorporated into the state machine.

The next section of the chapter will use these three models to provide a comparative analysis across the eleven dimensions to see how they look and differ, in preparation for the empirical study.

**Performance objectives**

A performance measurement suite provides an organized means of defining, collecting and analyzing decisions about the achievement of an agency’s objectives. PA involves limited objectives set by politicians to attain the implementation of the formal policy. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) claim that under PA managers with their inward focus and monocultural, ‘one best way’ evade responsibility for results; it being easier to control inputs than outputs, with few incentives to look at different methods that could achieve more with less.

A shift to NPM focused outwards to results and stressed the importance of the agency setting objectives and developing indicators to reward success and address failure (Crawford 1999,p.239). Agency and individual objectives became linked through business and individual performance and development plans. Conversely, alongside this
development, a battery of performance indictors, benchmarking and national standards flowed from government, reinforced by the growth of inspection and audit (Newman 2001), challenging managers’ freedom to manage.

An internal focus, emphasizing individual and agency performance defined by unit costs and service output encourages ‘insularity and competition’ rather than ‘reciprocity and interdependence’ argues Crawford (1998a,p.183) which is necessary for managing crime. Hood (1991) acknowledges that NPM shifts resources to goal achievement but argues there is no overall improvement in service. Osborne and Gaebler (1992,p.146) concur that “What gets measured gets done” as output measurement records only part of the tasks undertaken, with some tasks taking on a greater importance than others.

However, the argument is that a focus on outputs can lead to greater identification of who is responsible for delivery. Yet Criminal Justice System outputs are not easily standardized and measurable. As Mayne (2003,p.170) states “Expectations that measurement will deliver uncontroversial proof of whether programs or organisations are performing well and what they contribute will not be realised.” This is because the outcomes that matter are the combined products of many agencies, policies and practices.

In partnership, Metcalfe (1993,p.182) asserts “…performance and effectiveness of any organization depends to a large extent on how its activities mesh with those of other organizations.” CPM focuses on long-term impact, achieved argue Koppenjan and Klijn (2004,p.163) through goal intertwinement, a key management task which aims to create a rich integrated design to bring more partners on board with innovative and appealing solutions to add public value.

Public value is then assessed according to Bardach (1998) through the extent to which citizens and service users value what is provided, whilst Agranoff (2007,p.153) believes that results should be measured by the subjective judgement of the partners; as they determine the benefits derived, along with the costs. As a responsive approach, CPM also involves re-defining goals (Mandell 1990,p.40) with an emphasis on learning rather than control (Mayne 2003,p.157) in order to respond to emergent practice (Flynn 2002,p.167). The balanced score card argues Joyce (1999,p.26) defines,”…objectives, targets, and
measures around four perspectives: financial, customer, internal business process, and learning and growth.” And would seem to be well suited to CPM.

Management is important for performance; O’Toole et al (2005,p.63) claim that, “…managerial networking outward does have consistent and positive performance results.” So widening participation can increase network density, shift power distribution and generate social capital, where success can be “…judged by the extent to which it enhances the conditions for ‘favourable’ interaction and the degree to which the network supports these processes.” (Kickert et al 1997c,p.175). CPM aims to be receptive to locality, thus “…geographical variations may be regarded as evidence of the success of responsiveness to the local population a key component of the democratic renewal and accountability agenda.” argue Rouse and Smith (2002,p.54).

CPM requires the seeking of compatible rather than common aims (Huxham and Vangen 2005,p.239) where the manager brokers outcomes (Robinson et al 2000,p.54). Alter and Hage (1993) suggest common purpose can hold partnerships together with programme rationale helping to secure co-ordination and integration. Too few targets will not keep all agencies on board, and too many will dilute effort, yet partners may have different views about how goals should be achieved. Thus successful management allows partners to maintain their own goals, whilst working towards the accomplishment of partnership ones, a win win situation, where not everyone will achieve their objectives to the same extent, but all will gain something (Kickert et al 1997c,p.175).

Performance is enhanced through synergy, and Warner and Sullivan (2004,p.175) argue for complementarity between the different resources committed; adding something new, not duplicate. Increasing partners adds diversity and potential for problem solving but also decreases the likelihood of agreement. To manage this scenario Benson (1975) suggests that effectiveness will depend upon the degree of equilibrium obtained across four dimensions: domain consensus, ideological consensus, positive evaluation and work co-ordination. CPM equates to generating a shared accountability for results, this requires that managers have done everything possible with the resources available, learnt from past experience and shown they have contributed to improved outcomes.
**Accountability**

Accountability can be seen as a principle, as well as a mechanism for work undertaken on behalf of the government and community. The Audit Commission (2005,p.33) has identified four components:

- giving account through a communication strategy involving annual reports and public events
- being held to account through business and inspection reports
- taking account through research and consultation
- offering redress through a complaints procedure.

PA emphasizes the concept of accountability through a hierarchy of managers to the minister of the department responsible for the policy. Ministerial responsibility, state Benyon and Edwards (1999,p.161) is a top up form of accountability “…in which service providers privilege the interests of elite policy-makers and funding bodies...” Gregory (2007) argues that NPM reinforces PA’s emphasis on accountability but through more sophisticated measures of performance and choice. For NPM accountability is based on the twin concepts of individual responsibility and responsiveness, where transparency is achieved through contracts, league tables, inspection reports and representing customers’ best interests.

Still, under NPM the use of QUANGOs (Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisations) have problematized relations between policy and political accountability. Du Gray (2000,p.73) argues that NPM undermines ministerial responsibility with policy failure seen as the responsibility of managers not government. Moreover, the process of outsourcing can result in companies being unwilling to publish all their business details, resulting in a lack of transparency over the costs of private jails.

For outcomes conceived jointly, where no agency can have the span of control to influence outcomes alone, accountability arrangements are more complex, risky and sometimes uncomfortable (Cabinet Office 2000,p.52). Managers do not have the unfettered ‘right to manage’ free from political meddling. CPM attempts to hold agencies to account through
sharing responsibility for performance (Metcalfe 1993,p.178) and through a search for continual improvement (Austin 2000,p.138).

Agranoff and McGuire (2003,p.189) differentiate between ‘accountability to’ as in the PA model, based in oversight and reporting and ‘accountability for’ in CPM for setting priorities, fostering democracy, system design and modification and achieving results. Ransom and Stewart (1994,p.239) state “Active citizenship implies a right to know, a right to explanation. But also a right to be involved to be heard and listened to.” Thus accountability involves a ‘bottom down’ approach, privileging the interests of service users and communities with communication through a range of channels. This links into the community engagement dimension through the requirement to give account.

Under CPM managers work with both autonomy, as in their own agency, accountable vertically to their functional line manager and with interdependence, horizontally accountable as in the matrix model with numerous and intertwining partnership interests (O’Leary and Blomgren Bingham 2009,p.264). The result could be that “…people may become more attached to the collaborative activity than to their parent organization, especially if they are seconded full-time…” argues Flynn (2002,p.165) creating dilemmas about where their accountability rests. Similarly the shift of decision-making responsibilities from government to partnership has attracted criticism for not only undermining political accountability but also representative democracy (Benyon and Edwards 1999,p.161) as the links with local government are eroded. However, joint inspection regimes are an advance on the single agency model and can minimize the deficit.

**Values**

“Values are our conception of what is ‘right or wrong’-‘good or bad’…about which ideals are desirable or worth striving for.” (Genefke 2001,p.171). Among the array of values, there is also an ordering of priorities. PA’s public service ethic has privileged the values of rationality, probity, impartiality, consistency, impersonality, equity and risk minimization. The public sector operates “…on high levels of identity based trust…” (Newman 2001,p.100) where “Public sector employees generally value the ‘public good’ contribution their work can make.” (Wallace Ingraham and Getha-Taylor 2008,p.91).
Conversely NPM stresses giving up traditional modes of attachment to professional and collegial identities (Newman 2001,p.100) to create attachment and commitment to the employer. A transformational discourse is articulated where ‘work’ is about personal fulfilment and self-realization with culture management and inspirational leaders at the centre of the process. Osborne and Gaebler (1992,p.254) assert that “…shared values and mission take the place of rules and regulations as the glue that keeps employees moving in the same direction.”

There is a desire to transcend public/private boundaries by linking personal and agency values based on enterprise, vision, competition and responsiveness. NPM refers to the importance of managers acquiring and exhibiting specific “entrepreneurial capacities and dispositions” and to be less risk averse (Du Gray 2000,p.66) in opposition to “the impersonal, procedural, hierarchical and technical organisation of the classic Weberian bureaucracy.” (Du Gray 2000,p.64).

Under NPM a corporate culture attempts to ensure that employees sing from the same hymn sheet and do not go off message. Beirne (2006, p.66) argues that, “Culture begins to blend with surveillance as employees internalize the values of the organisation…management control is exercised through worker self discipline.” It is however impossible to create a uniform agency culture, change is not a simple process subject to management control, managerial influences are contrasting and mediated and practitioners are not mere puppets to be manipulated (Parker and Bradley 2004,p.210).

CPM being pluralistic, acknowledges the value of diversity, that agencies have their own culture that is integral to their operation and that managers’ perceptions of reality are filtered through their frame of reference, where no perception is authoritative. Termeer and Koppenjan (1997,p.84) state that, “When actors communicate only with actors who have the same perceptions there is no reason to change. In such interactions perceptions are only reaffirmed. Only a confrontation with other perceptions can create the opportunity for change.”

CPM has a tolerance for risks in an open system committed to the long run, where trust is the mainstay of interpersonal relations, a means of coping with the freedom of others, and uncertainty has to be managed as part of the trust building process not just as a guard
against opportunistic behaviour. Other espoused CPM values include: mutuality, reciprocity, transparency, legitimacy and empowerment.

NPM sees good management as a neutral, technical activity, whereas as CPM sees good management as being politically astute, effective leaders use their political insights without being seen to be political (Linden 2002,p.141). Kooiman and van Vliet (1993,p.63) sum up the situation well. “Only within the context of a continuous debate between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ will it be possible to develop a coherent, up to date and flexible set of values and norms that will enable Public Managers to cope with a constant stream of dilemmas with which they necessarily will be confronted. The traditional ‘solution’ saying that this is a matter for politics, does not hold any longer, because of the dynamic, complex and diverse character of modern society.”

**Leadership**

Turning now to leadership, which can operate as a mechanism to identify, co-ordinate, integrate and maintain the specialized parts. Under the PA model leaders are authoritative and appointed in command type structures with transactional roles. John and Cole (2000,p.86) have claimed that “The quality of political leadership is essential for co-ordination and the success of the policy”. For Osborne and Gaebler (1992,p.32) NPM separates policy decisions, the steering, from service delivery, the rowing. Leaders concentrate on catalysing and facilitating change, steering requires managers who see the full picture of issues and possibilities and can balance competing demand for resources.

Peters and Waterman (1982) argue for commitment building through visionary and inspiring leadership and workplace participation to empower employees so they can put the customer first. Beirne (2006, p.64) speaks of transformational leaders who “…are charged with creating a clear vision and corresponding ‘umbrella of belief’, mining company history for suitable signals, benchmarking elements of this against admired organizations…Procedures, ritual, and ceremonies are then devised to ‘summon the collective spirit’. Corporate symbols are created and distinctive language contrived to engender feelings of identification and a shared mission.”
Under the CPM model leadership is less transformative and more facilitative and influential and involves “…the ability to see mutually enhancing connections among individuals, programs, and agencies that on the surface appear to be in different worlds. Where most people see discreteness they see commonalities of needs, of matches or exchanges of resources.” (Sarason and Lorentz 1998,p.96). Leadership involves articulating purpose and importance, the benefits of succeeding and the costs of failing. Reminding partners what they have in common and helping them to see that they can only meet the partnership’s objective through joint action, especially important when conflict threatens progress.

Under CPM partnerships are ‘leaderful, not leaderless’ offering greater resilience (Lipnack and Stamps 1994,p.18) where ‘champions’ (Linden 2002,p.85-6) natural leaders with credibility and clout make the partnership their priority. For Huxham and Vangen (2005,p.207-228) a leader needs to be able to switch between being directional and deferential to facilitate problem solving and unblock blockages. Leaders act as conduits to their agency resources, facilitate effective interfaces through designing structures and processes to make things happen, operate communication channels and manage power so all agencies benefit from involvement.

Research (HMIC 2000,p.53) has identified that good leadership involves energy, enthusiasm, commitment and visibility to deliver a clear vision and sense of purpose through effective plans incorporating targets and timescales, accountability and review. For Linden (2002,p.152) leaders have the relational skills of patience, empathy, inclusiveness and modesty providing confidence, hope and resilience, but they are also resolute and driven with a willingness to share credit for success rather than seeking personal glory.

Under CPM the leadership task is less directive, managers need to establish a trusting relationship, offering oversight to avoid co-ordination problems, whilst articulating the partnership’s objectives and building teams. Raelin (1985,p.22) believes that professionals prefer to be supervised by professionally orientated managers who have an appreciation of their role and can accommodate professional interests. Managers attempt to achieve a balance between autonomy and control through giving operational autonomy about means to practitioners whilst they set the goals, recognizing an element of conflict could arise, as managers can rarely achieve the standards demanded by professionals (Raelin 1985,p.35).
Employment relations

The PA model is aligned with professional co-ordination and stresses the indeterminacy of the social world and the complexity of social need, which requires professional intervention for the public good. PA has led to a role culture where career trajectories are predictable and stable, where agency specialization has led to a division of labour. The individual is secondary to the job, affording substitution and resulting in the claim that bureaucracies have an independent memory. Professionals are defined by the kinds of activities they undertake, controlling their expertise through qualifications, national pay rates and permanent contracts.

However, professionals have been under attack and have as a result lost some of their cultural authority in terms of prestige, deference and trust. New Labour attacked professionals for their perceived restrictive practices and reluctance to embrace change and the public has raised concerns over service quality and agencies dominated by professional decision-making (Lipsky 1980). The Hay group (2006,p.3) has argued that professionalism “…suggests dedication, expertise, service, and excellence. It can also suggest autonomy, hierarchy, elitism, jargon and protectionism…trust in someone else’s expertise is no longer a default option. We want to know why, we want a second opinion, we want it where, when and how it suits us best.”

NPM offers a view of needs transparent to their owner and a universalist movement away from education and understanding to training, skill acquisition and competencies. Osborne and Brown (2005,p.4) argue that NPM “…prioritises managerial, as opposed to professional skills…” with management becoming more visible and professional. At the same time the public sector has opened up to managers from the private and third sectors lacking substantive forms of knowledge and to lower paid, lower status employees through job enlargement as they are expected to take on supervisory responsibilities.

Under NPM unqualified practitioners have been recruited to support and replace existing practitioners; Tilley (2005a,p.272) describes a ‘mixed economy of policing’. In a competitive environment with increased flexibility of pay and conditions qualified practitioners are seen as costs, and new divisions have opened up in terms of peripheral or core and temporary or permanent with a task culture emphasized. Yet job enrichment
upgrades responsibilities, practitioners can use their creativity and exercise more control over their work environment, which can lead to higher levels of job satisfaction, lower employee turnover and higher performance (Keller 1997 in Vigoda-Gadot 2003,p.91).

PA’s pay and appraisal systems are not good at recognizing or rewarding collaboration (Cabinet Office 2000,p.13). Furthermore Steele’s (1999,p.21) research found that only 21 per cent of managers in the public sector received performance related pay, compared to 75 per cent in the private sector. The main criticisms of performance related pay are that the amounts on offer are too small to incentivize and there are problems in identifying individual contributions to outcomes, with the risk that competition and a short-term focus will threaten collaboration.

Employment relations need to be fit for partnership because as Mayne et al (2003,p.41) suggest, people are critical to success, it is they who exchange ideas through asking and giving advice, invest in or damage each others’ partnerships. For Chisholm (1989,p.189) partnership integration is supported by informal associations”…founded on and buttressed by informal conventions…” and agreements developed to reduce the uncertainty resulting from interdependence. Partnership weakens professional boundaries as jobs become more loosely defined and skills de-differentiated, encouraged through cross boundary careers, joint training and development.

Under CPM, managers attempt to balance “…professional independence with professional interdependence, to recognise the value of each member’s skills and to magnify these skills many times through the skills of other professionals.” (Engel and Gursky 2003,p.49). This is necessary because partnership involves work with the most complex of service users, where practitioner legitimacy is based on information rather than authority as ‘purposive practitioners’ (Bardach 1998) cement the partnership together.

Kanter (1994) (in Sarason and Lorentz 1998,p.122) believes that senior management must be role models for partnership, but Austin (2000,p.129) states relationships at the top of agencies are necessary but not sufficient to sustain and grow a partnership, the rest of the agency must embrace the concept. Lastly, Maddock and Morgan’s (1999) research points to the need for a ‘nurturing environment’ where there is a synergy of interests between
managers and practitioners in the partnership, especially between quality and financial objectives.

**Community engagement**

The service user under the PA model is located outside agency processes, provided with minimum information and deemed a client. Osborne and Gaebler (1992) argued that as the public sector did not get its resources directly from its customers, it had no incentive to meet customer need. Additionally, Clarke and Newman (1997,p.11) believe there was a collapse of trust in professionals, their failure to prevent re-offending coincided with an attack on the Criminal Justice System as inefficient, impersonal and discriminatory by The Women’s Movement (Heidensohn 1985) and the black community (Hall 1997).

NPM developed a clear orientation towards the concept of the customer and claimed that the public expectation of service standards had changed. The demand was for more choice, better quality and improved responsiveness, as customers became defined by their consumption patterns and the knowledge economy where heterogeneous values superseded a one size fits all model. Furthermore, the excellence literature encouraged agencies to ‘listen’ to their customers in defining their needs or wants (Peters and Waterman 1982).

NPM aims to transfer ownership, control and responsibility to families, communities and the third and private sector. Osborne and Gaebler (1992,p.66-70) assert that customer-driven systems stimulate innovation, waste less because they match supply and demand, empower customers to make choices through transparent user-friendly systems and promote equity by funding customers not agencies. Service standards, market research and complaint systems were introduced to open up agencies to scrutiny.

NPM thus focuses on models of delivery, rather than customers’ shaping services, where managers act on behalf of proxy customers defining choice, quality and responsiveness. Clarke and Newman (1997,p.117) claim that market research about customer preferences and satisfaction levels “…forms a sharp contrast with the informal and qualitative knowledge of the client, which is typically the basis of professional claims.”
New Labour came to power with an agenda to engage the community on crime, side lining the crime experts whose influence had downgraded the concerns of those most affected by high crime rates (Pitts 2001,p.39). Charles Clarke (in Rogers 2006,p.11) has said “The key to making our communities safer lies in partnerships at both national and local levels and the voluntary sector has a vital role to play in making them work. If organizations work together to encourage people to get involved in their communities, it will create safer, just and fair and tolerant society for us all.”

For New Labour, the community was seen as the site of shared values and common identity, and in the context of declining public involvement in representative democracy, government sought to encourage an active and responsible citizenship in partnership with an enabling state (Brunsdon and May 2002,p.71). A movement from customer choice under NPM to citizen voice in CPM, recognizes the intrinsic right of the community to have a say in the matters that affect them as the community has knowledge of and is implicated in crime’s definition and response. Communities are viewed as an effective resource (Gazley 2008,p.47) providing a conduit for ideas, a catalyst for change and a stake in conformity. Situated knowledge helps define crime problems by painting a picture that is recognizable to members, reflecting a bottom-up approach to understanding local crime patterns.

Community engagement requires the re-activation of the positive mechanisms of socialization and informal monitoring to act as a deterrent to crime (HM Government 2008,p.19). The approach accepts Crawford’s (1998a,p.131) assertion that “The essence of the police role in maintaining order is to reinforce the informal control mechanisms of the community itself. The police cannot, without committing extraordinary resources, provide a substitute for that informal control.” Newman (2001,p.78) suggests that New Labour blurred the boundaries between state and community recognizing existing policy networks whilst drawing in new ones.

Hancock’s (2001,p.154) research found that crime and its causes were conceptualized differently by the community and local agencies. Similarly Garland (2001) has claimed that greater awareness and synthesis of knowledge can increase legitimacy of decision-making and facilitate a more responsive policy making to local conditions, demonopolizing professional expertise. However, the central paradox of community based crime prevention
is that it is often easiest to generate where least required. Greenberg (1983) (in Skogan 1988,p.55) has argued that community co-operation is less often found in communities with high levels of crime. Wilson and Charlton (1997) argue that an important variable is the prior level of community involvement, where there are no community networks, the challenge will be greater.

Factors affecting community involvement could be individual in terms of time, knowledge, confidence, motivation or skills, societal in terms of age, class, disability, ethnic origin, gender or sexuality, environmental as in location, poverty and risk of intimidation from offenders and the partnership’s culture. Osborne and Gaebler (1992,p.72) agree that in disadvantaged communities ‘enormous leadership’ is needed, but assert that government has a responsibility to create opportunities for leaders to emerge.

Jupp (2000,p.44) argues that “…community-based organizations need some resources of their own with which to develop their own services, take risks, get some experience of implementation and negotiate genuinely joint projects.” Practitioner capacity has to be developed to enable community engagement (Diamond 2002,p.304), reserved seats could be offered on partnership boards and childcare and translators could be provided to empower the community with a number of entry points.

If support is not available too much will depend on the existence of champions who move on or burn out. Engagement could lead to responsibility without authority or simply become a public relations exercise, disseminating an image of activity, whilst managing and controlling community expectations. On the other hand incorporation may threaten community support undermining legitimacy and sustainability (Hancock 2001,p.180) with scepticism from residents as hopes raised are later sunk. Furthermore, community leaders may be unrepresentative, but in a heterogeneous community not all groups can be represented.

CPM requires managers to be clear about how and why particular forms of engagement are being undertaken, being unambiguous about outcomes whilst seeking to utilize methods set up for other purposes due to consultation overload. The distinction with NPM is fine grained, but the key difference rests on who has the power to decide, the crime expert or
the community. Finally, communities do need to understand the limits on agencies, that resources are finite.

Management tasks

O’Toole and Meier (1999, p.513-518) assert that under PA, management becomes less necessary, since hierarchy generates relatively stable systems to maintain performance. Nevertheless, the manager is viewed as the system controller and Fayol (1949) (in Child et al 2005, p.180) identified the specific tasks of general management: POSDCORB - planning, organizing, staffing, directing, co-ordinating, reporting and budgeting.

Human Resource Management is a key aspect of NPM along with financial and operational management and states that human resources give the competitive edge and that employees need to be carefully selected and developed with commitment in mind. ‘Hard’ Human Resource Management has emphasized flexibility and downsizing, leaner and fitter structures and engagement in a world of strong boundaries. ‘Soft’ Human Resource Management has emphasized for core employees at least, reduced differentials between practitioners and managers, a flattened hierarchy, relationships individualized in terms of performance appraisal, open channels of communication and weak boundaries.

NPM focuses on core business, a narrow definition of ordering agency priorities (Clarke and Newman 1997, p.78), out of which is developed strategy. Joyce (1999, p.6) has said, “Strategic management is a way of engaging people, getting their commitment, steering the organisation into the future, framing efforts at reorganising and redesigning for greater efficiency and quality...” linked to mission and vision statements. Strategic planning implies a direct link between strategy formulation and implementation and managerial control (Mandell 1990, p.30). However, Austin (2000, p.182) asserts that a partnership’s development cannot be entirely planned or fully predicted, as managers cannot control in the way the strategic management literature suggests, due to the variety and complexity of partners.

Nevertheless partnerships require active management (Huxham and Vangen 2005, p.252) because they are prone to instability due to their blurred environmental boundary and because interdependencies can be constraining (O’Toole and Meier 1999, p.513-518).
Mobilizing and marshalling resources is a key management task accomplished through a management team, an externally oriented activity aimed at creating a more viable environment. Yet partnerships can also be stabilized by their common values and objectives. Agranoff and McGuire (2001) articulate four components of CPM: activation, framing, mobilizing and synthesizing.

Activation requires managers to:

- identify and select appropriate agencies
- tap into and share their skills, knowledge and resources
- arrange, nurture, build, integrate and stabilize the partnership’s structure

Framing requires managers to:

- establish and influence operating rules
- influence prevailing values and norms
- offer new ideas

Mobilising requires managers to:

- mobilize partners
- induce and maintain partner commitment
- forge agreement on objectives
- develop ways to manage strategic and operational complexity (Agranoff and McGuire 2001,p.15).

Synthesizing requires managers to:

- create and facilitate conditions for favourable interaction
- blend partners’ views to fulfil strategy
- prevent, minimize or remove barriers to progress
- reduce complexity and uncertainty by promoting information exchange
change incentives to co-operation
develop new rules and procedures
change positions and roles of partners
help partnerships to self-organize
promote effective communication (Agranoff and McGuire 2001,p.15).

The implication of the list is that managers require not only their existing managerial skills, but need to develop an additional set more appropriate for partnership. CPM involves knowledge of how to build and maintain an effective partnership credible to all stakeholders (Provan et al 2008,p.122), where effectiveness relies on the managers’ ability to influence others in horizontal, as well as vertical relationships by building pockets of commitment both within and outside the partnership.

Vertical activities include seeking new funding from government, requesting interpretation of programme guidance or seeking technical assistance; adjustment-seeking behaviour aims to move a programme along where the rules are an impediment. Horizontal activity includes consultation and interaction with partners to highlight resources. Interestingly, Agranoff and McGuire (2003,p.88-89) found twice as much activity devoted to the vertical environment than the horizontal.

Agencies are likely to have different perspectives on crime; CPM encourages reflection, reframing and cognitive dissonance, to create a ‘common ground’ more favourable to mutual adjustment, respecting agency autonomy whilst building a joint image. A complete consensus is not the aim as “This would ignore the fact that the different perceptions, objectives and preferences parties hold are institutionally anchored and hard to change.” (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004,p.162).

Still, ‘covenanting’ refers to a management strategy aimed at improving the consistency of the decisions made by exploring and consolidating the various perceptions (Klijn and Teisman 1997,p.106). However, practitioners can interpret steering signals differently, and agencies can perceive new ideas as a threat to their vested interests and may not be keen to take up new ideas, an important explanation is lack of trust (Termeer and Koppenjan 1997,p.85). Schaap and van Twist (1997,p.66) state “Steering a network means influencing the balance of power…Actors will surrender only that much autonomy as necessary to
achieve an objective...Steering will take place through negotiation and exchange, persuasion, the forming of coalitions and strategic co-operation.”

Under CPM managers aim to create patterns of sustainable interactions and perceptions as well as formal rules which provide information about opportunities and limitations and thus insights into the institutional structure which regulates behaviour (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004,p.78). Rules constitute social practices; shared meaning allows interaction, making meaningful discussion possible whilst managers link interdependent practitioners to reduce transaction costs and increase the permeability of boundaries between agencies inspiring trust in a wide range of stakeholders.

O’Leary and Blomgren Bingham (2009,p.264) believe that managers need to be participative and authoritative, aware of the shifting issues facing partners, to understand what motivates different agencies to participate or not. Huxham and Vangen (2005,p.245) see management as a continual process of managing tensions. Thus Connelly et al’s (2008,p.17) advice that managers need to embrace, rather than deny the paradox that partnerships are both inherently appealing due to their potential benefits and unappealing due to their potential costs is a sound one.

**Decision-making**

A decision involves a choice between alternatives of which planning is part; problem solving is a more extensive activity than decision-making, a problem usually requires a decision to be made. Agenda setting under PA refers to the capacity to define what decisions need to be made and connecting the assessment of legitimate client need and the application of professional expertise. Incrementalism amounts to ‘muddling through’, managers learn as they go along, through ‘successive limited comparisons’ (Lindblom 1997,p.135). Decisions are the outcome of power relationships, where the objectives and means of achieving them are chosen simultaneously with a limit on the range of options considered, a process of constant refinement and coping with problems rather than solving them.

However, the risk with incrementalism is that it closes off options for change and can be viewed as conservative and agenda limiting, the non-included can have a problem putting
their ideas forward. Tilley (2002b,p.24) has caricatured PA’s decision-making as slow, safe and unimaginative where risk is minimized and enterprise stifled. Furthermore, over reliance on past experience, in a changing environment can be risky, it is not always true that what was done previously will be appropriate in the future. Moreover, Kooiman and van Vliet (1993,p.70) assert that equality is less applicable in a heterogeneous society where service users’ needs vary more greatly.

Agenda setting under NPM centres on decision-making that addresses agency objectives, where the deployment of resources is not made in isolation from cost implications or contribution to performance (Clarke and Newman 1997,p.64). NPM is loosely associated with rational decision-making, which offers a framework for the structured analysis of decisions to make policy more explicit (Spicker 2006,p.33) involving an:

- assessment of the environment
- identification of objectives
- consideration of alternative methods
- selection of methods guided by resource constraints
- implementation and management of policy
- evaluation feedback to reassess the environment as the process starts again.

Rational decision-making relies upon highly resourced, managerial and technical forms of knowledge and analysis, limiting and structuring participation with a reliance on experts. Additionally, the search for alternatives can be time consuming but also limited by political constraints. Koppenjan and Klijn (2004,p.161) believes that rational decision-making is at odds with the “…erratic and dynamic nature that characterises complex processes aimed at the resolution of wicked problems.”

There is the risk under NPM, that political decisions are turned into management ones, as demand is managed through rationing and targeting, portrayed as ordering. Similarly there can be tensions between practitioner discretion and managerial control, as practitioner commitment to service users compete with managers trying to contain costs and remain within budget (Exworthy and Halford 2002,p.23). What this probably amounts to is incrementalism explains decision-making, where as the rational model is prescriptive (Smith and May 1993,p.208).
In partnership it is unusual for objectives to be singular and well defined as diversity generates multiple possibilities, increasing choice. Under CPM joint decision-making allows adaption to a wide range of interests and knowledge forms, involving partially conflicting values and mutual recognition of difference, where no one agency has a monopoly on knowledge. The focus is on issues, rather than professional capture, recognizing the validity of research evidence entering the policy arena through a process of advocacy and learning during implementation.

Knowledge is built step by step, rather than in leaps and bounds as this is more likely to gain agreement, as Agranoff (2007,p.157) claims “Multiple actors representing different mandates not only overcome information and resource asymmetries, but create synergistic learning and problem solving that might not have been considered if only single entities had been involved.”

Nevertheless, the need to keep all on board can lead to “…slow and complex decision-making structures…” (Audit Commission 1998,p.22) as well as “…keeping issues off the agenda that are threatening or contrary to consensus building.” (Agranoff 2007,p.180). The hypothesis advanced in public choice theory is that collaboration to achieve joint goals will only be established under duress, resulting in the lowest common denominator, based on satisficing behaviour. However, this focuses on single, specific, short-term transactions. Axelrod’s (1984) concept of ‘the shadow of the future’ demonstrated through ‘the prisoner’s dilemma’, shows how collective gain can be maximized through repeated and multiple interactions over time, as decisions are cumulative.

Where joint decision-making causes arguments, Taket and White (2000,p.158) assert that conflict resolution needs time to establish problem definitions that are clear and acceptable to all, with an opportunity to unload feelings and have the problem arbitrated on by a non-judgmental mediator. Connelly et al (2008,p.21) identify five conflict management approaches: avoidance, accommodation, competition, compromise and collaboration. A CPM manager would in order of preference attempt to collaborate, compromise or accommodate, rather than avoid or compete with partners.

**Structure**
“Organisation design is the systematic and self conscious creation, adaption and manipulation of the organisation’s structures and resources in pursuit of organisational or individual goals or both.” (Bozeman 1979,p.130). Under PA agencies are typically monopolistic, hierarchal and long-term with a vertically integrated supply chain involving internal regulation to manage the movement of resources and services (Thompson et al 1991). Historically, bureaucratic administration and professionalism have structured the agencies within the Criminal Justice System.

NPM advocates the separation of purchaser and provider roles to create smaller, leaner, flatter decentralized mission led goal orientated agencies that are in competition with each other (Osborne and Gaebler 1992,p.131). Publicly funded agencies often with appointed chief executives, operate at arms length from government (Jenkins et al 2003,p.55) in a quasi-market linked by contracts, along vertical supply chains with multiple providers using the price mechanism.

The advantages of separation are seen as encouraging enterprise with a focus on efficiency, providing improved capacity to overcome resistance as they draw in new managers and by pass government. However, Osborne and Gaebler (1992) over simplify the policy process, it is not always clear who is steering or rowing, and the growth of QUANGOs has led to fragmentation, which in the Criminal Justice System has become a major barrier to crime management.

Networks resemble markets in been made up of numerous agencies and usually rely on choice around participation, but resemble hierarchies in that collaboration and integration are supported, plus they veer to the long-term (Thompson et al 1991). Huxham and Vangen (2005,p.128) point out that structures can be complex, there can be a hierarchy within the partnership itself, but also managers can be members of other partnerships with overlapping mandates. New Labour aimed to create a shared vision of ‘complementary functions’ through compacts between government and the third sector (Brunsdon and May 2002,p.69) as functions associated with the public sector were ceded to the third and partnerships encouraged.

Under CPM managers take responsibility for steering agencies, which are formally autonomous but functionally interdependent (Metcalfe 1993,p.179). Hedderman and
Williams (2001,p.2) report that “Partnership projects seem to work well when responsibility for setting and keeping to overall objectives is separated from responsibility for implementation...” like under the NPM model. Nevertheless, evidence on the impact of dominance versus shared control on performance is mixed (Alter and Hage 1993, Provan and Milward 1995). Child et al (2005,p.243) argue that “If partners compete for control and do not arrive at a mutually acceptable solution, this can jeopardise their relationship and inhibit its potential for realising complementaries and achieve learning.”

Although power can be derived through the centrality of an agency’s functions, agencies do not need to have an equal say, because sub-arenas structure interaction determining the division of labour, and high levels of trust lead to both partners’ needs being satisfied even if one agency is ascendant (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004,p.196). Power can be derived both from the internal web of relationships and the external linkages that partners have. The key is for managers to harness partners’ power where ever it may lie, and create a structure fit for partnership that has the ability to adapt to a changing environment.

Lastly, representation does have symbolic value and reputation is a key consideration in partnership. Senior manager engagement demonstrates trust and a willingness to invest time and energy (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004,p.198). Provan et al (2008,p.127) claim “While the role of this lead organization in a cooperative network must be legitimized by participants for the network to succeed, its legitimacy is often already established, both through its size and control of resources, and through its prior relations with network members.”

**Processes**

Processes involve a number of co-ordinated and sequenced activities to achieve a specific output or outcome. Raelin (1985,p.53) refers to formalisation as “…official procedures that prescribe appropriate response to recurrent situations…” A key feature of the PA model is standardized and prescriptive processes based on procedural trust where confidence in routines reflects the knowledge base with an element of predictive capacity.

Crime policy implementation is structured through circulars and guidelines issued via the Home Office. However, managers engage in policy making as well as implementation,
because policy cannot be detailed enough for implementation to happen without any form of decision-making. Policy needs processes that operationalize it and turn the policy into practice. As Pressman and Wildavsky (1984, p. 177) state, “When we act to implement a policy, we change it. When we vary the amount or type of resource inputs, we also intend to alter outputs…”

Dis-aggregation in the public sector uses contracts involving a principal-agent relationship, which spell out the cost and quality of what is to be provided by legal arrangement, a skilled resource intensive task. Contracting in the Criminal Justice System has involved services traditionally delivered in house, medical provision in the Prison Service for example. Agentcification and contracting has resulted in greater regulation to monitor compliance; the professions of auditing, accountancy and contract management have gained ascendancy. An ‘audit explosion’ (Power 1994) allows government to supervise performance at a distance. Auditing agencies lay claim to being the embodiment of the sceptical consumer in terms of whose interest they represent, to benchmark and improve service delivery, but also according to Crawford (2001, p. 68) to restore “…trust in organizational competence.”

Nonetheless, audit can be a blunt instrument of verification, which leaves considerable blind spots (Laming 2009), focusing attention inwards toward systems rather than outwards to outcomes and risks agency isomorphism by squeezing out diverse practice, an important source of innovation. Additionally, it transfers scarce resources from service delivery to monitoring (Good 2002, p. 51), whilst excessive checking can be de-motivating for practitioners and managers.

Legitimating activity arose during the NPM epoch, it is about being seen to be well managed. Public sector agencies have been encouraged to adopt one of the quality management schemes, whether in customer service (Charter Mark), the skills and motivation of staff (Investors in People), services and processes (ISO 9000), or the complete agency (Business Excellence Model). The private sector has also had a strong influence on public management through the use of consultants as a lever of change. Expenditure increased by a third between 2003-04 and 2005-06 a total of £2.8 billion (National Audit Office 2006, p. 5) as New Labour sought to modernize government.
Output control is important to NPM and it is possible to identify three types of quality: quality control involves sampling finished outputs by inspectors and quality assurance is an ongoing process that aims to involve those responsible for the service. However, Total Quality Management (Womack and Jones 1996) is a comprehensive and demanding continuous improvement model, which requires windows on all processes to enable everyone involved to check outputs as they flow through the agency to deliver optimum control and quality to the service user. The latter model is associated with NPM.

CPM retains a focus on market mechanisms and utilizes public private partnerships as levers of reform to breakdown divisions between the three sectors (Cabinet Office 1999,p.9). Best Value replaced compulsory competitive tendering to ensure the continuous improvement in the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of all services through a comparative performance framework. The five C’s challenge why and how a service is being provided by comparing performance across a range of indicators, consulting with local taxpayers, service users, and the business community in setting performance targets, embracing competition as a means of securing efficient and effective services, whilst also aiming to collaborate (Cabinet Office 1999,p.40).

NPM expects employees to take responsibility for self-improvement, through continuing professional development and learning opportunism (Honey and Mumford 1992). CPM stresses the need to generate and draw ideas from all partnership levels, to learn from success or failure with the aim to promote a ‘learning organisation’ (Senge 1990) exemplified by adequate learning capacity, positive partner intentions to learn together and the nurturance of novel thinking patterns.

Tacit knowledge, which is personal, intuitive and context specific has to be transformed into institutional property through specification and codification to make it explicit to travel around the ‘knowledge network’ (Child et al 2005,p.272) to enhance performance. Vertical barriers to learning include poor management commitment and an ineffective reward system. Horizontal barriers hinge on the culture of occupational specialisms and the ability to surmount cognitive and emotional barriers to change.

CPM is based on personal trust linked through the employee rather than their role. Chisholm (1989,p.195) believes that personal trust acts a lubricant to assist the acquisition
and exchange of information, making use of informal channels seen as essential to co-
ordination facilitated by mutual adjustment. Mayne et al (2003,p.34) argue that trust is
formed over time and depends on capacity and confidence, that other agencies have the
skills, resources and commitment to make and implement agreements, evidenced by a track
record and long-term view that checks against opportunistic behaviour, reduces transaction
costs and enhances predictability.

Under a CPM model, Koppenjan and Klijn (2004,p.251) argue for continuous evaluation
of management strategies, adjustments when necessary and the accepting of mistakes, but
HMIC (2000,p.89) found that “…evaluation remains the weakest and least exercised
process within partnerships.” The purpose of evaluating is to check whether intrinsic
mechanisms are working and cost effective, to bring order to complexity, to assess
collaborative relationships, to facilitate knowledge building and to inform the debate about
alternatives and authenticate performance.

Change

Change and innovation can arise from political, economic, social, technological, legal and
environmental factors (PESTLE). For example, changes in the resource base, competition
from other providers, internal structural change, failure in capability, lessons from
research, unanticipated behaviour between partners, amongst others, offering a window of
opportunity.

PA has operated well in stable conditions, where change was slow, adaptive and top-down
through legislation, circulars and policy initiatives. O’Toole and Meier (1999,p.514) claim
that“…hierarchical systems are not prone to fast responses to environmental
changes…{And} buffer shocks with a fair degree of effectiveness.” Where as partnerships
“…are more open so that buffering is less effective.”

NPM commitment to transformative change has utilized phrases like ‘the need to love
change’ and ‘thrive on chaos’ (Peters and Waterman 1982) and has helped to create a
never ending cycle of structural and procedural change for example, Business Process Re-
engineering (Hammer 1990). Managers as change agents, develop a chaotic approach to
management through the introduction of an artificial crisis, acting as catalysts they encourage and empower practitioners who respond to change with innovation.

Clarke and Newman (1997, p.36) believe that NPM has played a significant role in legitimizing change as a process rather than an event, announcing a new epoch. Transformational change is essential, far-reaching and spectacular, radically altering power relations, agency structures, processes and values. Moreover, the development of a new order, through the reinvention rhetoric involved “…the promotion of innovation to the status of a policy goal in its own right.” (Osborne and Brown 2005,p.143).

Cultural change was seen as the solution to agency problems (Beirne 2006,p.63), but the NPM model of change can leave practitioners and managers buffeted. The top-down demand for innovation was an attempt to identify efficiency savings and improve public services, but innovation implies local discretion to develop new solutions. Furthermore, innovation in the public sector is a more complicated concept, the requirements to be accountable for taxpayer’s money places constraints on enterprise and risk taking.

CPM manages change through the political negotiation approach (Pettigrew 1973) (in Osborne and Brown 2005,p. 204) a natural systems perspective that emphasizes goal complexity and informal subgroups. The aim is to micro manage political processes through identifying and influencing key stakeholders by selecting a variety of tactics to get innovation accepted. The approach acknowledges the intricacy of decision-making and uses persuasion to shape change that is sensitive and appropriate. The Cabinet Office (1999,p.56) report on ‘modernising government’ argues for ‘a culture of continuous improvement’ that incentivizes and rewards innovation through revising core competencies and developing an appraisal system that reflects collaboration.

In an era where change is perpetual Mayne (2003,p.161) suggests, “There is a need for organisations to be able to live with uncertainty and adopt planning approaches that acknowledge that much will remain unknown. They will need to ‘embrace errors’ (Michael 1993) and encourage the taking of calculated risk, rather than seeking out who to blame when things go wrong.” Managers need to intuit the future rather than predict from the past, yet this is problematic in Criminal Justice System where outcomes cannot be completely controlled and where mistakes can be costly and serious.
Buono and Bowditch (1989) (in Child et al. 2005, p.106) suggest a number of responses to managing cultural difference presented through partnership. Cultural pluralism which allows cultures to exist side by side; cultural assimilation where the positive aspects from both cultures are combined to form a new culture; cultural transfer where one partner may attempt to transfer its culture as both partners regard it as the stronger culture; and cultural resistance which ignores differences, developing a strong us and them attitude.

Hall (1995, p.246) argues that although agency culture can be pervasive and enduring, cultural differences can be managed. Culturally literate hands on managers accept that no cultural style is superior, each has its strengths and weaknesses. The higher costs of cultural difference are managed by focusing on behaviours not values, making cultural differences tangible and discussable with managers anticipating potential misunderstandings and gaining insight into partner intentions and learning to act appropriately; cultural synergy is about learning from each other. Thus under CPM Child et al. (2005, p.342) state that managers should “…harvest from the diversity of partners’ cultures while at the same time building effective bridges between them…there is a need to manage cultures so that they become forces for integration rather than division.”

**Conclusion**

This chapter has provided an overview of the three management models on the eleven dimensions, elucidating their principal features. On some dimensions the differences are fairly transparent, on others the differences are more opaque; the findings from the case studies will require careful interpretation. The dimensions have been condensed into a table which can be viewed in the next chapter. Furthermore, the expected observations on the management models have been translated into propositions, which can be seen as tentative answers to the research problem. They posit a relationship between variables reflecting the literature from which they are sourced and the following three propositions underpin the research:

P1: The partnerships will exhibit characteristics of the PA model because of the dominance by one or few hierarchical and bureaucratic public sector agencies in a mandated setting. Evidence of formal and prescribed processes, clear authority lines and limited public engagement will be in evidence.
P2: The partnerships will exhibit characteristics of the NPM model because service delivery is about crime reduction, a strategic interest of government, therefore partnerships will need to be seen to be performing in reducing crime. A robust performance management framework will be in evidence with commissioning and contracting as key features.

P3: The partnerships will exhibit characteristics of the CPM model because of the government’s modernization agenda. The model allows greater involvement of all agencies and the community in negotiating and bargaining around resources and priorities with a clear focus on improving outcomes.

The last two chapters have provided a review of the literature on crime partnerships and management theory. Crime partnerships are not a new phenomena and research has pointed to their strengths and weaknesses. However, research to date has not addressed the specific issue of how they are managed. A review of the management literature has offered up the CPM model as a new method to cope with the dual and interrelated challenges of continuous change and managing through partnership. The next chapter turns to issues of methodology and discusses how and why the research was designed and implemented in the way it was, in order to go in search of CPM.
Chapter 4: Methodology

Introduction

Methodology refers to the whole research strategy including ethics, access to the field, the political, theoretical and philosophical implications, the research instruments, data analysis, writing up and more. Methodological soundness in the construction of the research design aimed to answer the research questions by specifying how data would be identified, collected, recorded, coded, analyzed, interpreted and displayed to draw warranted inference. In discussing the what, why and the how of the research, the chapter will also address the strengths and limits of the approach pursued.

Research strategy

Research sits within a sometimes unacknowledged philosophical framework. Ontology asks what are we studying? It asks questions about the social world in terms of the nature of human behaviour and the status of social reality. Objectivism and constructionism articulate opposite ends of the spectrum. Bryman and Bell’s (2007,p.22) definition of objectivism states “…that social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors.” Constructionism asserts that “…social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors…{and} are in a constant state of revision.” (Bryman and Bell 2007,p.23).

The research was not searching for one reality, but impact based on the continuous interaction between agency and structure with derived meaning from context and complexity. An appreciation of managers underlying meanings for their behaviour and views with reference to critical events was sought, because meanings can be instrumental to actions, ideas, attitudes and motives when implementing policy. By situating the research within the constructionism paradigm the research is sharing a commitment with other researchers to a general research framework.

The philosophical position adopted concurs with Snape and Spencer (2003,p.19) who state “We emphasise the critical importance of respondents’ own interpretations of the relevant research issues and accept that their different vantage points will yield different types of understanding. But we do not feel that diverse perspectives negate the existence of an
external reality, which can be ‘captured’. Rather, we believe that the external reality is itself diverse and multifaceted.” Such diversity adds to the wealth of understanding, enabling the research to capture and convey a fuller picture of the lived experience of participants.

Epistemology asks what knowledge is important? Bryman and Bell (2007,p.16) again state, “An epistemological issue concerns the question of what is (or should be) regarded as acceptable knowledge in a discipline.” The crux hinges on what problems should be examined, what questions need asking, what needs observing and how, what counts as data and how is it to be interpreted, and lastly, what counts as a satisfactory answer (6 and Bellamy 2008). The positivist position is concerned with the revelation of truth and explanation of observed phenomena. Popper’s (1963,1968) (in Benton and Craib 2001) modified positivist methodology emphasizes objectivity and unbiased data collection in order to test hypotheses against an accessible independent social reality.

The interpretive position Verstehen seeks causal explanation but with reference to interpretive understanding of human action (Weber in Parkin 1982,p.20) and this is the epistemological position pursued where “…knowledge is constructed rather than discovered.” (Stake 1995,p.99) and where “Research is not separate from other societal subsystems, it is entwined with them. Authoritiveness is not derived from independence and internal scientific procedures.” (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004,p.37).

The research strategy combined the emphasis in interpretive epistemology on meaning from the participant’s point of view, and the importance in constructionist ontology on viewing the world as a product of intervals, rather than as something beyond them. The research aimed to capture and interpret the range and diversity of managerial practice by acknowledging multiple standpoints, the essence of qualitative research.

**Research design**

The basic plan for the study situated the researcher in the empirical world, linking the research questions to the desired data. Hakim (1987) (in Henn et al 2006,p.46) states that “Design deals primarily with aim, purpose, intentions and plans within the practical constraints of location, time, money…” The research design was primarily a case study
with an exploratory questionnaire-survey adopted in the initial phase. The research began by adopting a deductive strategy whereby theory helped define the parameters of the research, literature helped formulate the research questions and development of the propositions, with verification sought through process tracing. Yin (2003,p.19) asserts that, “Articulating ‘theory’ about what is being studied helps to operationalise case study designs and make them more explicit.”

The case study

Yin (2003,p.1) further states that “…case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on contemporary phenomenon with-in some real life context.” The case study allowed for in-depth understanding and familiarity through close and intensive analysis of the context and dynamics of three cases, rather than simply researching a series of individual participants. Moreover, it offered the ability to trace change over time to investigate causal outcomes (Yin 2003,p.123), whilst distinguishing and elucidating the unique features of each case; an idiographic approach (Gomm et al 2000).

A bottom-up approach (Hjern and Porter 1981) was adopted, focusing on the participants who interacted at the local level to account for their practices located in time and place, which were then synthesized and framed. The advantage was that it allowed limited abstraction of data and sensitivity to temporal chronology. Attention was given to the interaction between variables to deal with conjunctions, configurations and causal processes to explain variance. A ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973) linked the findings into a plausible account of their relationships producing the insights.

A grounded theory approach (Glaser and Strauss 1967) was not appropriate, the researcher had previously been immersed in the Criminal Justice System as a practitioner and then manager; knowledge could not be temporarily suspended to adopt a fully inductive approach, it was difficult to minimize any theoretical pre-conceptions. Grounded theory’s criticism of the deductive approach, is that research should be about developing new theories from the generation of new data rather than testing old ones.
The research was also part inductive. Ragin (2004) claims that a distinctive feature of case study research is the capacity to develop theory through iterative dialogue between ideas and data. Emerging theory was built by showing patterns across the case studies, whilst cross referencing the data with supporting and conflicting literature which presented the opportunity to look deeper into the findings, improving validity (Eisenhart 1989) and offering a degree of explanatory power.

The decision was made to use quantitative and qualitative methods in the case study: semi-structured interviews combined with non-participant observation and content analysis of documentary data, to overcome the problem of choice between an inductive or deductive approach. Snape and Spencer (2003,p.23) state that “Induction looks for patterns and associations derived from observations of the world; deduction generates propositions and hypotheses theoretically through a logically derived process.” The research bridged both approaches.

Some methodologists claim that the most important test of reliability is replicability, whether the same findings would be obtained if the same study were repeated with the same research design (Yin 2003,p.34). The qualitative nature of the research sits more comfortably with Denzin and Lincoln’s (1994) terminology of dependability, conformability, creditability and transferability, as proxies for replicability. They argue that case studies should be able to demonstrate through their procedures that the findings were gathered and analyzed in ways specified by the research design.

Yin (2003,p.69) recommends the use of a research protocol to verify the procedures to be followed. PhD documents served this function outlining actions and time scales; iteration was undertaken at key milestones: project approval, transfer from Mphil to PhD, third year annual monitoring between data, theory, personal experience of the researcher and research design. A database of interview recordings, transcripts, observations and documents was compiled.

All research involves trade offs; the aim of the research design was to be clear about gains and losses, by striking a balance between the virtues of accuracy, parsimony, generality and causality. The case study traded generality for accuracy and causality, breadth for depth and is less parsimonious. The advantages was its capacity to produce an iterative
dialogue between theory and empirical evidence, to accommodate change, due to access
issues, and to allow interesting leads to be followed that had not been considered at the
design stage (Ragin 2004).

Research aim, objectives and questions

The aim was to investigate the implementation and management of the PPO programme, to
generate new knowledge to improve policy implementation and management. The research
objectives were: (1) To provide an overview of government policy on persistent and
prolific offenders. (2) To assess the implementation and management of the PPO policy.
(3) To examine the barriers to, and enabling factors for managing in partnership. (4) To
ascertain the fit between three management models.

Axiology asks what questions should be asked and why? Cuba and Cocking (1997) (in
Henn et al 2006,p.226) state, “New research provides a link with the past, while at the
same time pointing to new directions for the future. This is achieved by seeking answers to
questions that have yet to be asked, and challenging answers that form the basis of current,
conventional wisdom.” A knowledge gap worthy of research was identified and pursued
with academic originality resting on two dimensions:

- There is little research into the management of crime partnerships; research tends to
  focus on partnership working, the research therefore aimed to address this
  important theoretical gap.

- The research aimed to build on the work of Dawson (2005,2007) to generate new
  primary data on enabling and inhibiting factors to managing in partnership whilst
  searching for and theorizing on CPM.

As a result, the following research questions were generated:

- What activities do managers undertake in a partnership environment?
- What activities do managers think they should undertake?
- What level of collaboration has been achieved?
- How have agencies adapted and/or integrated their working practices?
Access

As this was a CASE PhD, GOEM had collaborated with Nottingham Trent University in putting the bid together, it was assumed, wrongly, that access had been discussed and negotiated with the East Midlands CDRPs. There were difficulties at the questionnaire-survey and case study stage with lack of support from GOEM in identifying suitable participants. Relationships were not productive, primarily due to staff changes and lack of management oversight.

A further issue was that the research originally aimed to evaluate the Prevent and Deter strand, partly because Dawson (2005) had not reviewed it, and partly due to its novelty. However, investigations found that the CDRPs had delegated implementation to the YOTs, and GOEM, had few contacts with these partnerships. Furthermore, it transpired that the YOTs had not been proactive in programme implementation. These difficulties caused delays to the fieldwork and necessitated a focus on the two other strands.

The research bid suggested that CDRPs were to be selected as illustrative cases in order to reflect ones that operated in different contexts, urban/rural, socio-economic and local government structures. Gerring (2007,p.89) has identified the following case types:

- the illustrative case
- the intrinsically interesting case
- the typical case
- the extreme or pure case
- the ‘leading edge of change’ case
- the theoretically sampled case.

Over a period of two years GOEM identified four partnerships, none of which were able to engage with the research. The explanations offered were as follows: the manager at one CDRP, who herself appeared keen to participate was unable to deliver the other managers for the research. This highlights that partnerships cannot compel co-operation from managers not employed by their agency, but also that access had to be renegotiated at each entry level. Pearson et al (1992,p.52) had a similar experience“…our negotiations at
different levels in each organization reflected the ways in which policy decisions formulated at management level were renegotiated as they came to be implemented (or not) on the ground.”

A senior manager at a second partnership instructed other managers not to co-operate. At a third partnership there were so many vacancies and managerial changes that the few managers in post had little experience of the partnership. At a final partnership, working relationships were so poor that some of the key research questions would be unanswerable.

Researching collaboration requires knowledge of networks; the problem in the East Midlands was that the researcher had no history there. However, her practice knowledge enabled her to email CDRPs in a different locality, requesting co-operation. She was fortunate to receive a reply from the CDRP manager in Jones Town who introduced the detective inspector with responsibility for the PPO programme in Baker County. Gaining the support and backing of influential managers made it easier to attract others, once the detective inspector was on board, he opened doors and a snowball effect ensued, as three embedded case studies have been achieved:

- case study 1 Jones Town’s PPO programme
- case study 2 Smith Town’s PPO programme
- case study 3 Baker County’s PPO programme.

Baker County has strategic oversight of the operation of Jones and Smith Town’s programmes, by researching two cases under the same strategic lead, a literal replication was possible with a focus on how their context differed. Additionally, the duplication of data made the evidence more compelling and robust. As Lewis (2003,p.75) has stated more than one case site “…can be an effective design element, but its value lies in understanding rather than measuring difference. Case studies involve capturing multiple perspectives which are rooted in specific settings, and provide detailed understanding which is holistic and contextualised.” The case studies have intrinsic interest, as well as being examples of the most advanced members of their population.

Due to access issues and then a refinement of the research design, case selection can be better described as theory driven, sampling on the dependent variable for necessary
conditions, rather than an illustrative case selection. The research sought out successful partnerships in order to answer vital research questions. Critics have asserted that case study designs, which seek out the most successful or advanced cases of phenomena to study can prejudge outcomes as the design encourages circularity.

However, Rogowski (2004) defends such a sampling strategy on the grounds that a number of landmark studies have had significant theoretical force due to the rigour with which they were conducted. Furthermore, Dion (1998) argues that the strategy is acceptable if the purpose is to establish necessary success factors rather than sufficient ones. The findings have contributed to new theory development, however the claim was only able to be made post hoc.

Ethics

Henn et al (2006,p.31) argue that “…value freedom is a myth”, research cannot be objective and subjectivity must be acknowledged. Mies (1993,p.68) states “The postulate of value free research, of neutrality and indifference towards research objects, has to be replaced by conscious partiality, which is achieved through partial identification with the research objects.” Reflexivity is an analytical tool to aid understanding of similarities and differences between the norms of the researcher and participants and demands a willingness to explore how the researcher’s biography and role can effect knowledge construction.

The researcher had seventeen years experience working for the Probation Service and was responsible for implementing and managing the Resettle and Rehabilitate strand of a PPO programme. With the supervisory team, she chose the research design, what questions to ask, the choice of methods. Moreover she had a vested interest in the research, the attainment of a PhD. Consequently, she could not be an objective observer, interaction in the field was an explicit part of knowledge production. For example, through some of the interview replies it was obvious that she had provoked queries in the participants as they pondered a question and sought how to answer it. Participants gained the opportunity for reflection, as well as having their views validated.
The researcher’s knowledge and experience enabled her to have a more nuanced understanding of the programme’s implementation and management than if she had been researching an unfamiliar subject. It enabled her to be clear about what sort of partnership would be needed to yield answers to the research questions. Moreover she has a thorough understanding of participant roles and did not need the gatekeeper to spend time explaining them, she ‘hit the floor running’ so to speak. Furthermore, experience of the service user group meant that their biography was of little interest, which meant that she did not get distracted with personal details and was able to focus on the task in hand. Finally, where the findings did not chime with her own experience, the divergence provided a fruitful avenue to pursue and understand the difference.

However, there was also the need to avoid ‘going native’ and providing a distorted picture due to over identification with the participants; there was a need to retain a balance between insider and outsider status, to preserve analytical space and enhance ecological validity. Keeping a journal imposed a discipline through recording experiences close to the event, before the passage of time changed the researcher’s perception of them. As Coghlan and Brannick (2001) (in Henn et al 2006,p.195) state “It enables you to integrate information and experiences which, when understood, help you to understand your reasoning processes and consequent behaviour and so anticipate experiences before embarking upon them.”

Ethical codes are general principles, a framework to inform a range of events (SRA 2003). The Association’s standards were beneficial in alerting the ethical dimensions to the research, which was conducted in accordance with the ethical protocol and professional guidelines set out by Nottingham Trent University. Wiles et al (2005,p.1) suggested the “Need to provide comprehensive information about study participation to ensure consent.” Accordingly, there was an ethical obligation to inform the gatekeeper, the detective inspector about issues of informed consent and dissemination of the findings. This was achieved through an hour long interview with the CDRP manager and the detective inspector prior to field access being granted.

Oliver (2003,p.44) has referred to the situation where participants have asked to see a copy of the findings, to manage this request a report was written for the partnerships. Had participants made requests to see the transcripts, this would have been complied with, but
as no one did, they were not shared. However, the observation of the meetings was ethnographic fieldwork in a naturally occurring setting. The research process attempted to minimize the researcher’s impact through non-participation, but she selected and interpreted the data. As such she would concur with Oliver (2003,p.63) that “If we wish to attribute moral ownership of such data, then it would appear to reside with the researcher”. Fortunately, the dilemma did not arise as no one asked to see the notes.

A briefing paper was issued to all the CDRPs when the questionnaire-survey was distributed. Informed consent was gained from interview participants to ensure they knew their rights, whilst the researcher to avoid misunderstanding, shared her previous role and experience. Yin (2003,p.137) states “…you should use your own prior expert knowledge in your case study.”

The process for granting ethical approval added to the bureaucratization of the research process and reduced principles to procedures, whilst assuming risk could be specified and predicted in advance. Situated knowledge is specific and contextual, thus even when ethical approval had been granted from the ethics committee, there was the need to be aware of the possibility of emerging ethical issues. To illustrate this point, when observing the JRCs, personal details of the service users were discussed, and the researcher was concerned to ensure no such details were recorded, through a conscious effort to focus on process rather than personal content. Professional training assisted with the process of filtering the relevant raw data from the irrelevant.

Henn et al (2006,p.85) state “Confidentiality is an active attempt to remove from the research records any identifying features of the research participants, and anonymity means that those who participate in the research remain nameless.” Confidentiality and anonymity were provided by anonymizing the case sites and referring only to participant’s job titles. Data generated was stored on a password protected personal computer. No harm, physical or psychological, to participants or the research profession occurred due to the conduct of this research.

The management models and their dimensions
As the previous two chapters demonstrate, an extensive review of the existing research base was undertaken to identify the current state of knowledge (Hart 1998). Through sifting, analyzing and synthesizing the material, themes were extracted and concepts elucidated in preparation for the empirical study. A concept is a theoretical précis of the phenomena of interest to the research, in this case, PA, NPM and a newer concept of CPM, which has received less academic interest in Great Britain. Henn et al (2006,p.55) state “The operationalisation of concepts refers to the process through which indicators are developed to measure your concepts—that is, to transform them into observable phenomena.”

Measurement validity involves three distinct aspects to ensure that none of the measures used in the research introduces systematic bias into the data. Gerring (1999) understands the process of concept formation as involving three elements: intension, extension and labelling. Intension or content validity refers to measures that accurately capture and represent the dimension being measured. Extension or criterion validity refers to the range of cases seen as instances of the concept. Labelling refers to giving the concept a name to capture the intension and extension.

Operationalizing the concepts was key to designing the research, top-down qualitative analysis (6 et al 2006a). From a variety of key texts, the characteristics of the management models were specified, to offer a classification system on key dimensions of public management. The three models acted as a framing device (Hood 1998), which allowed for coarse grained general distinctions about management behaviour.

The typology generated allowed for data reduction, facilitated comparison and embedded observations to make the research process transparent. It helped make sense of the data by providing labels and concepts that were used in coding and analysis, to structure and present the data. Moreover, it helped control subjectivity through reflexive revisiting (Anfara and Mertz 2006,p.194).

Nonetheless, concept formation involved trade offs, the more precise the intention the less externally valid the concept became. Care was needed to ensure that the typology was not too reductionist by minimizing the complexity of the data or filtering out critical pieces, or too deterministic by forcing data to fit pre-determined categories. As Ritchie et al
(2003,p.252) state ‘outliers’ should not be ignored in qualitative research because the data may be of interest.

However, no typology can adequately describe all phenomena and some dimensions overlap. In real life data does not fit neatly into pre-defined categories, judgement is required as there are no rules for assessing if an operational definition is valid, the research process aims to convince the reader. There has been some loss of context through segmentation and the requirement of parsimony to cope with intricacy, but the biggest obstacle was the time spent undertaking the classification.

Late in the research process, Douglas’s (1982) grid and group framework was discovered through Professor 6 at Nottingham Trent University. This could have provided an alternative lens though which to examine the data, as it offers four cultural categories: individualist, bureaucratic, corporate and collectivist. The Neo Durkheim Institutional Theory (Peck and Dickinson 2008) has developed Douglas’s (1982) framework allowing a degree of predictability in causal relationships.

A typology of the management dimensions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Public Administration</th>
<th>New Public Management</th>
<th>Collaborative Public Management</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Performance objectives</td>
<td>Political Inputs Attainment of formal policy Few specific targets Organizational objectives</td>
<td>Managerial Outputs Economy, efficiency effectiveness Performance indicators/targets Organizational and individual objectives linked</td>
<td>Network Outcomes Added public value Cross cutting indicators/ incentives Organizational and individual objectives linked Objectives renegotiated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>To the policy Strict separation of private and public Political accountability</td>
<td>To contracts Boundaries between public, private and third sector blurred Individual/ manager accountability</td>
<td>To stakeholders Individual and organizational interests overlap Shared accountability</td>
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<td>Values</td>
<td>Public service ethic</td>
<td>Risk minimization</td>
<td>Long-term</td>
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<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Appointed leaders</td>
<td>Authoritative</td>
<td>Transactional</td>
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<td>Employment relations</td>
<td>National pay rates</td>
<td>Stable career</td>
<td>structure</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community engagement</td>
<td>Client</td>
<td>Minimum public</td>
<td>engagement</td>
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<td>Management tasks</td>
<td>System controller</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>Organizing</td>
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<td>Decision-making</td>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>Non-consultative</td>
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<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Hierarchical</td>
<td>Centralized</td>
<td>Market</td>
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<td>Vertical</td>
<td>Autonomous units</td>
<td>Diverse</td>
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<td>Rigid</td>
<td>Market like</td>
<td>Informal</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intra-agency</td>
<td>mechanisms</td>
<td>Permeable</td>
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<td>Bureaucratic</td>
<td>Principal/agent</td>
<td>boundaries</td>
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<td>Monopolistic</td>
<td>Horizontal</td>
<td>Vertical and horizontal</td>
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<td>Intra-agency</td>
<td>Inter-agency</td>
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<td>Flexible levels</td>
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<th>Processes</th>
<th>Prescribed and standardized</th>
<th>Framework</th>
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<td>Formal rules and procedures</td>
<td>documents</td>
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<td>Protocols/manuals</td>
<td>Strategic planning</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Detailed reporting</td>
<td>Contracting</td>
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<td>mechanisms</td>
<td>Privatization</td>
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<td>Circulares</td>
<td>Core business</td>
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<td>Centralized budget</td>
<td>League tables</td>
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<td>Due process</td>
<td>Excellence model</td>
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<td>Cost centers</td>
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<td>Covenants /compacts</td>
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<td>Capacity building</td>
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<td>Integrated IT</td>
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<td>Practitioner networks</td>
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<td>Reflective practice</td>
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<td>Free flow of information</td>
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<td>Pooled budget</td>
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<td>Commissioning</td>
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<th>Change</th>
<th>Structural</th>
<th>Cultural</th>
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<td>Top-down</td>
<td>Top-down</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Legislation, circulars</td>
<td>Incentives, rewards</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Slow</td>
<td>Rapid</td>
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**The research instruments**

Method refers to the range of instruments used to collect data and as policy research is complex and multi-dimensional, a mixed method approach was utilized to more fully capture the data and provide enhanced internal validity. A list of questions with their likely sources of evidence was compiled (see appendix) to help spotlight data gathering.

Brewer and Hunter (1989) (in Henn et al 2006,p.214) outline the advantages “Multi-method research tests the validity of measurements, hypothesis and theories by means of triangulated cross-method comparisons. Triangulation requires multiple sets of data speaking to the same research question from different viewpoints. The researcher infers validity from agreement between the data-sets, and invalidity from disagreement. To support these inferences, the data must be collected with truly different methods that are employed independently of one another…”

*Questionnaire-survey*
The first method chosen was a standardized research tool, a self-administered questionnaire-survey. Bryman and Bell (2007, p.56) state “Survey research comprises a cross sectional design in relation to which data are collected predominantly by questionnaire or by structured interview on more than one case...at a single point in time in order to collect a body of quantitative or quantifiable data in connection with two or more variables...Which are then examined to detect patterns of association.”

The questionnaire-survey was designed in an iterative process with the supervisory team with the aim to identify, map and describe patterns of management activity during the programme’s implementation. The choice of method was largely determined by pragmatic considerations. Firstly the method enabled familiarization with questionnaire-survey design to generate some exploratory data. Secondly, it was cheap to administer and targeted a geographically dispersed group of managers and allowed completion in the participant’s own time. Thirdly, the method should allow for the benchmarking of management activity at a particular point in time.

The rational for each questions inclusion was linked to the conceptual framework, but questions needed to be salient for the participants, as prompting or probing was not possible. Careful attention was given to designing the questionnaire-survey (Oppenheim 1996, Fink 2006) in terms of layout, to make it attractive and accessible with appropriate terminology by avoiding ambiguous, leading, double barrelled, long or general questions. A well-designed questionnaire-survey should combine open, closed and scaled questions with a limited word count (see questionnaire-survey in the appendix). There was a need for a logical order, easier questions first, more demanding ones later. Closed questions utilized a vertical format to distinguish questions from answers.

The closed questions were:

- easier to complete and process
- clarified meaning for participants by providing a set of answers
- enhanced comparability of answers.

However, the disadvantages included:
the problem of making closed answers mutually exclusive and exhaustive
forcing participants into a predetermined response
irritating participants because they could not find a category that suited their reply - there was a need to offer an 'other' category.

The open questions offered:

- greater freedom of response
- a test of participant’s knowledge.

However, the disadvantages included:

- greater effort from participants was required
- they were more complex to code.

Henn et al (2006,p.33) describe validity as “…the generation of ‘real’, ‘rich’, and ‘deep’ data.” but validity has a number of dimensions. Bryman and Bell (2007,p.42) describe ecological validity as “…concerned with the question of whether or not social scientific findings are applicable to people’s everyday, natural social setting.” For example does the research instrument capture the lived experiences of managers? Piloting of the questionnaire-survey was undertaken with previous management colleagues to test the appropriateness and adequacy of instructions, question style and content; revisions were made following feedback (Punch 2001).

The sampling frame had been specified by GOEM who were to identify two key managers in each of the 36 CDRPs to receive the questionnaire-survey. Yet, this was not achieved; instead GOEM provided a distribution list for CDRP managers. The revised strategy was to ask them to identify two managers involved in PPO implementation to complete the questionnaire-survey. However, the inaccuracy of this list was soon discovered: two partnerships had merged, named officers had retired, were on maternity or sick leave, and email addresses were wrong and telephone numbers were for district councils rather than the CDRP. It took three full days to construct a viable distribution list and the requested letter of support from GOEM arrived too late to distribute with the questionnaire-survey.
Electronic rather than postal delivery was chosen to reduce costs and because the target population appeared to suit the delivery mode (Yun and Trumbo 2000 in Bryman and Bell 2007,p.679). Moreover, a study by Cobanoglu et al (2001) (in Bryman and Bell 2007,p.679) generated an online response rate of 44 per cent to 26 per cent for postal. A briefing paper providing a synopsis of the research was prepared and disseminated via email to CDRP managers before the questionnaire-survey was distributed as an email attachment. An email reminder and the belated GOEM letter were sent three weeks later to persuade managers to take part.

Unfortunately, the CDRP managers operated as gatekeepers, denying access to the relevant managers. One CDRP manager sent an email asking people to co-operate with the research, whilst his manager sent an email saying they would not. The contact at GOEM had apparently agreed that this was ‘OK’, but this was not shared at the time. Stavenhagen (1993) (in Henn et al 2006,p.62) states that research tends to focus on the powerless that have few resources to deflect researchers, this research involved ‘studying up’ and managers exercised their power and right not to take part.

A response rate of 22 per cent was achieved; Bryman and Bell (2007,p.245) state that response rate is ‘less an issue’ with non-probability sampling. Skelcher et al (2005,p.585) relied on the partnership board chair to distribute their questionnaire-survey with a response rate of 33 per cent. Bryman (1989) (in Bryman and Bell 2007,p.245) quotes response rates in ‘respected journals’ of 21 and 25 per cent.

Was the questionnaire-survey fit for purpose? The answer hinges on its adequacy in extracting answers to specified questions. The operationalization and construction of the questionnaire-survey took longer than anticipated and challenged research skills. Great aptitude is required in the production of a good quality questionnaire-survey, it may only take twenty minutes to complete but it took over four months to design and test and even now revisions need to be made.

Managers could not seek clarification, one participant wrote “Not sure what you mean…” this threatened the validity of the research. Moreover, there were a small number of partially answered questions, possibly due to inappropriate targeting as it was impossible to ensure that the right manager completed it. The inability to construct an adequate
sampling frame compromised the data, but anonymity may have been an issue as the returned questionnaire-survey displayed email contact details.

If the research was to be repeated, clearer instructions on how to respond to questions would be given: for example “Please choose the one answer that best represents your views by placing a tick in the appropriate box” (Bryman and Bell 2007,p.250 emphasis added). Moreover, the use of vignettes, short hypothetical stories could have been used to test responses and would have strengthened the method’s appropriateness. Consequently, despite the initial plan of a separate chapter in the thesis to provide an overview of PPO implementation in a range of partnerships, this was not achieved. Salient findings from the questionnaire-survey simply informed the next stage of the research, the case study by suggesting the relevant themes to pursue.

**Interviews**

Interviews were central to the case study. A variety of questions were composed to form an interview schedule, drawing on findings from the questionnaire-survey and conversations with managers. Co-production of the interview schedule helped provide a more nuanced understanding of the issues and aimed to make the interview more relevant to the lived experiences of participants and improve the quality of the research process. An epistemological commitment to researching with other people, values experiential knowledge which springs from the quality of research relationships, and challenges the promise of positivism that truth is only found by standing outside the object of knowledge.

The interviews were generative in that new knowledge was created through the recounting of phenomena for the study. Interview schedules were constructed individually for each participant (Liddle and Gelsthorpe 1994a,p.34) allowing each manager to recount their unique experience, but in none of the interviews was the schedule adhered to rigidly. Some participants requested examples of topics to be covered before the interview took place, and this request was accommodated. The interview process was based on questioning to open up the research territory and then listening and valuing the participant’s replies. Probing through follow-up questions explored the details, designed to access meaning from the manager’s point of view and to elicit more description and explanation.
The interviewees were managers drawn from a range of agencies important to the policy’s implementation. Snowball sampling relied on the detective inspector to recommend managers for interview. All the managers involved in the Jones and Smith Town partnerships were interviewed. In Baker County, managers who were representatives of the premium service providers were purposively selected. Managers were approached by email or in person and only two declined to be interviewed; both prison governors at the Jones Town prison. However, access was gained to a prison governor at another Baker County prison through personal contacts, who was able to give a Prison Service perspective on partnership.

Opportunistic sampling is about taking advantage of unforeseen circumstances that arise during research. Interviews were conducted with a LCJB manager and a YOT manager who did not attend the Baker County meetings. Both were able to illuminate key aspects of the programme from their agency’s perspective, adding value to the findings. The managers interviewed are listed below:

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<tr>
<th>Baker County</th>
<th>Jones Town</th>
<th>Smith Town</th>
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<td>Superintendent</td>
<td>Treatment manager</td>
<td>Treatment manager</td>
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<td>DIP manager</td>
<td>Probation manager</td>
<td>Probation manager</td>
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<td>Crown Prosecution Service manager</td>
<td>Housing Support manager</td>
<td>Detective sergeant (shared role)</td>
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<td>Courts Service manager</td>
<td>Detective inspector</td>
<td>New detective inspector</td>
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<td>Community safety manager</td>
<td>Detective sergeant (shared role)</td>
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<td>CDRP manager</td>
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<td>DAT manager</td>
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<td>Prison Service governor</td>
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<td>LCJB manager</td>
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<td>YOT manager</td>
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Eighteen managers were interviewed at their place of work between October 2008 and April 2009. Each interview averaged just over an hour and was digitally recorded on an MP3 recorder. Two interviews failed to record and notes were made during the interview instead. Recording had the advantage of:
capturing the full transcript rather than having to make decisions about what to evidence
allowing more time for reflection in conducting the interview
providing space for compiling field notes about contextual factors which helped to make sense of the data
offering verification.

The advantage of using interviews is that they allowed for probing and offered a way into understanding how the partnerships were managed. They were time consuming to set up and conduct, but the participants were helpful and knowledgeable and the method was fully appropriate. However, there was always the worry about response bias, but to deal with this, the interview data was triangulated with the observation data and some interesting anomalies were discovered and are reported in chapter six.

The main drawback to interviewing was the transcribing, another student in greater need of money and with better typing skills was engaged to undertake the transcriptions. Transcripts aided the analysis as a processed and interpreted version of the raw data. Silverman (2001,p.230) states “when people’s activities are tape recorded and transcribed, the reliability of the interpretation of the transcripts may be gravely weakened by a failure to transcribe apparently trivial, but often crucial, pause and overlaps.” However, transcription methods have been devised to safeguard the peculiarity of speech and the transcriber was briefed beforehand on the need to capture hesitations and nuances, to add meaning (Silverman 2006,p.284). The transcripts were cross-referenced with the recordings, checking for accuracy which was consistently very high, despite the unfamiliarity of the material.

Non-participant observation

Non-participant observation is the direct study of behaviour and talk as it naturally occurs, a process whereby the facts become data through the recording of the behavioural patterns of participants without the researcher communicating with them. The observations were in real time, in a natural non-contrived setting thus enhancing ecological validity. The range and type of managerial behaviour was labelled, recorded and coded on a schedule devised for that purpose (see appendix). However, the research process also allowed for other
possible behaviours, to observe the unexpected. Non-participant observation relies on the skills of the researcher to recognize and interpret behaviour to achieve a comprehensive and contextualized description.

Three meetings each of Jones and Smith Town’s monthly JRC to review the list of PPO cases, each lasting three and a half hours were observed. The observations took place during the last three months of 2008 in Jones Town, and the first four months of 2009 for Smith Town, heavy snow meant that the February meeting was missed; April’s was attended instead. Four observations of the steering group were undertaken over a period of eight months, as the meetings were bi-monthly each lasting two hours from November 2008. Spatial behaviour, non-verbal body movement, where participants sat, how they interacted, as well as what they said and how, linguistics, i.e. content of speech and extra linguistics i.e. interruptions were recorded.

Gerring (2007,p.45) states the method “offers insight into intentions, the reasoning capabilities, and the information-processing procedures of the actors involved in the given setting.” The value of the method was that it offered observations over time, rather than one off sampling points and thus enabled checking of whether actions identified in one meeting were followed through as issues were revisited at the next meeting. Gomm (2000,p.109) states “unless the temporal organisation of settings is taken into account, there is a danger of error” in terms of what routinely goes on. For this reason a number of meetings were observed to grasp the intricacy of programme management. With Jones and Smith Town saturation was reached, however due to on going changes at the steering group, further observation of Baker County may have been helpful.

The method provided excellent data on managers in action in their ordinary habitat, with an opportunity to observe group dynamics and interactions, where as the interviews were individualized and contrived. The questionnaire-survey relied on self-report measures and only allowed behaviour to be inferred, this method provided data on actual management practices. As Park et al (2005) have demonstrated, questionnaire-surveys can relate poorly to actual behaviour, for example the British Social Attitude survey has documented discrepancies between what people say and what they do. Non-participant observation was a very appropriate and effective method and added value to the research process.
The primary drawback was that interesting behaviour could not be queried at the time, but some issues were followed up, in later interviews. The method was time consuming and intensive and the handwritten notes had to be typed up after the meetings. A further concern is the issue of reactivity, whether the participants altered the way they behaved because they were being observed. It is impossible to know whether this was the case or not, but multiple observations should help to reduce the risk.

*Documentary data*

Yin (2003, p.162) asserts that documentary data is required for case study research. As such policy and strategy documents, circulars and minutes from the Home Office, the Ministry of Justice, the partnership and the agencies were collected. A mix between documents produced for public consumption, posted on the Internet like the community safety plan and documents produced for the partnership itself like the premium service protocol. Primary data like the agenda, minutes, protocols, matrices, email circulation list, compiled by those involved in the events, and secondary data, crime statistics for generating the performance figures.

Documents are visible material artefacts with collective significance and they required interpretation to bring out any latent meaning; what was the purpose, what was omitted, what was taken for granted. The documents are a representation of partnership life and offer a snapshot of the partnerships’ values and how they may influence partners to act in the way they do. For example, how the various protocols like the terms of reference informed or constrained management practice. Their advantage is that they offer a route to assess these underlying assumptions and learned responses that can originate in espoused values. Furthermore, their stability means they can be reviewed repeatedly, whilst offering a different form of evidence to build greater understanding and insight.

However, their weakness was their selectivity and incompleteness. Henn et al (2006, p.105) state “Selective survival involves an editing process, which more often than not is governed by the values, perspectives, and assumptions of those who are in a position to decide what should and should not be made available to researchers.” Various documents were requested, in particular the budget and business plan but were not forthcoming, access did not appear to be blocked; a more simple explanation is that they did not exist. Partnership documents accessed are listed in the appendix.
Data coding and analysis

Gibbs (2007, p.31) asserts that coding “…is the process of identifying passages…that exemplify certain thematic ideas and giving them a label—the code. Memos are analytic thoughts about the codes and they provide clarification and direction during coding.” The gathered data was categorized, labelled and compared to structure and make sense of it, using what Gibbs (2007, p.44) calls concept driven codes guided by the research questions, conceptual framework and typology of management dimensions. Data driven codes (Gibbs 2007, p.45) emerged from the findings and were utilized where emergent themes had not been planned. Coding involved subjective choice in deciding what the content was conveying, through interpreting what had been said or observed and some data was initially assigned to multiple locations.

Nvivo 7 is useful as a data management tool for storage and retrieval. It allows the refinement and development of codes, creating sub-categories, notes in the margin, and comparison of segments. However, the decision was made not to use Nvivo 7 following discussions with other researchers, and instead data was coded utilising Microsoft word and tables. Charmaz (2008) has argued that software packages may not fit in with qualitative ideas as they may unintentionally foster an illusion that interpretive work can be reduced to a set of procedures, with fragments taking on a life of their own, irrespective of context. She argues that interpretative work is about gaining a sense of “the whole interview, the whole story, and the whole body of data”.

Data analysis offered more than evidence, it reduced and transformed large quantities of mostly qualitative data through analytical capacity, theoretical insight, critique and challenge, requiring creativity and judgment to sift the trivia from the significant. Some analysis occurred during the data collection phase, to integrate processes. The analysis necessitated comprehension about the context to synthesize data patterns, theorize explanations and abstract emergent theory relating it to established knowledge. The aim being to generate an understandable, insightful and trustworthy piece of research with the following hallmarks:

- analysis remains grounded in the raw preserved data
- emergent ideas are captured
synthesis without losing original terminology
a record of conceptualization back to the raw data
facilitate and display ordering into themes and concepts (Spencer et al 2003,p.210).

The analytic strategy was two fold. First to develop within case analysis and second a cross case analysis and synthesis. In line with Ritchie et al (2003,p.222) early data analysis produced descriptive accounts, their range and diversity staying close to the terminology used by participants, ‘emic’ analysis (Silverman 2006,p.284). More abstract ‘etic’ concepts were introduced at a later stage, a process of classificatory reduction. Eisenhardt’s (1989) suggestion of investigating data in divergent ways through dividing data by source i.e. interview versus observation, to seek corroboration was utilized to strengthen the inferences. Pattern matching logic (Yin 2003,p.116) was used to compare findings with the predicted ones from the typology of management dimensions.

The application of a common system of categories was applied across the whole data set as a means of searching and retrieving chunks of labelled data to facilitate comparison and identify patterns across the cases. A potential risk with this process is the comparing of data chunks outside the context in which they occurred. Yet, Strauss and Glaser (1967) (in Spencer et al 2003,p.204) state the breaking up and reforming of data aid analytical understanding, as coding “fractures the data, freeing the researcher from description and forcing interpretation to higher levels of abstraction.”

As the research had taken a constructionist position, triangulation did not aim to create a “…single, valid and accurate interpretation of reality…” (Gibbs 2007,p.94) but reveal new dimensions. The triangulated data improved inferential leverage as it encouraged the development of converging lines of enquiry, and successive readings of each manager’s account, built an understanding of how each partnership worked as a whole.

Gomm (2000) argues for a return to the field following data analysis to check findings hold true. A debriefing event would have allowed participants to check whether inferences drawn, corresponded with lived experience. However, Hammersley (1992) states that this procedure is a threat to validity, as checking with participants might lead to the skewing of the evidence by listening to participants after the event rather than remaining faithful to evidence collected. A report was provided to managers, but like Stake’s experience
(1995,p.116) there was little feedback after the event. Spencer et al’s (2003,p.212) modified analytical hierarchy sums up the iterative process: Raw data > Identify and sort themes > Label data by concept > Apply typologies > Detect patterns, identify clustering, refine concepts/dimensions > Develop explanations > Seek applications to wider theory.

**Interpretation and explanation**

Observation is the basis for explanation in everyday life. However, we are selective re what we see. As Gerring (2007,p.53) states “What one finds is contingent upon what one looks for, and what one looks for is to some extent contingent upon what one expects to find.” Weber (in Parkin 1982,p.20) articulated the case for using *Verstehen*, facts do not speak for themselves and definitions are provisional and negotiable. Tilley (2001,p.83) states “Reasoning, imagination and values are needed to draw conclusions...” and Stake (1995,p.102) is adamant that “Some interpretations are better than others.”

By situating the research within the constructionist paradigm it is accepted that the findings could be open to different interpretations. Case study research is particularistic, the managers and the researcher experienced things differently, giving rise to multiple realities. Moreover, the partnerships are a long-term project and the research relatively speaking was a snapshot in time. The partnerships are also dynamic and in a constant state of revision, they changed during the fieldwork, knowledge as such is indeterminate.

The data has been interpreted to make the management patterns intelligible. Weick’s (1995) theory of ‘sense-making’, a primary interpretation was helpful in encouraging the research process to rely upon the manager’s own claims using their own terminology, as they searched for what seemed appropriate, comprehensible and workable from actions and consequences to build their story of policy implementation. Secondary interpretation involved using terminology selected with reference to the wider context to categorize, describe and explain the findings.

This links into Ritchie et al’s (2003,p.253) two main types of explanation: the explicit reasons given by participants and the implicit reasons inferred by the researcher. Within these two approaches, explanations may be dispositional, entirely actor based derived from the behaviour, intentions and/or reasons of the manager, their personality, experience and
knowledge. Or institutional, attributed to contextual or structural factors, for example agency practices.

Competing theories are common in social science because the nature of the phenomena can be viewed from multiple ‘lenses’ (Anfara and Mertz 2006,p.xviii). Koppenjan and Klijn (2004,p.120) have stated that “In long-term processes, where many factors and actors influence each other, and actors consciously respond to events in their environment, causal relations are highly complex, dynamic and reciprocal. They can hardly be captured by causal schemes that create a static idea of the relation between dependent and independent variables. In reality the relations are constantly in flux, and we can see a continuous interchange between factors and process...”

Causality is complicated to establish. First it was essential to show that there is an apparent relationship between two variables, but correlation does not mean causation, there is a need to demonstrate that the distribution of values of one variable corresponded to the distribution of values of another variable. Next, it was necessary to show that the relationship was non-spurious; the variation exhibited by each variable was not affected by a common variable. Lastly, it was crucial to show that the cause preceded the effect, drawing on theory to infer the likely temporal precedence of variables (Bryman 1990 in Henn et al 2006, p.212).

To identify a cause is to say that a particular phenomenon must always be, or usually be present for another phenomenon to occur. Silverman (2006,p.295) differentiates between ‘necessary’ conditions without which a particular outcome is impossible and ‘sufficient’ conditions, which totally explain the outcome. Causes may be ‘deterministic’, ‘X causes Y, if X then Y’, or they may be ‘probabilistic’ this means that they are usually associated with particular outcomes so the presence of ‘X is more likely to lead to Y’.

Spencer et al (2003,p.215) have stated“…if human behaviour is not law like, neither is it chaotic, it displays regularities which can be identified through careful analysis.” Process tracing (Gerring 2007,p.173) was used to make sense of the disparate pieces of evidence and to adjudicate between possible explanations to elucidate difference and rule out rival explanations, until a plausible explanation for the management practice emerged. Yin (2003,p.113) has identified a number of rival explanations: poor case selection, researcher
bias, another intervention accounts for the outcome and a theory different from the original explains the result; these rivals were considered as alternative explanations to account for the findings.

The research used theory to help explain causation by specifying the causal mechanisms, the pathways from X to Y and to deal with counterfactuals. CPM provides a parsimonious explanation of the observed relations as internal validity equated to a good match between the expected observations, findings and theory. The explanation is offered with some certainty because of the strength of the evidential base and because the new knowledge is consistent with the established body of knowledge and has sufficient precision to define its scope and limits (Anfara and Mertz 2006,p.xvii).

A proximate cause is close to the effect it is intended to explain, a distal cause is sited further a field. The data supports some mechanisms being more proximate than others and working at variable speeds, influences on partnership structure were slower than on processes. It was tricky to isolate the effect of a single variable because of the interplay between different variables, thus it was not easy to differentiate between institutional and dispositional explanations as they interacted. Management theory was utilized to create satisfying explanations for the patterns of talk and behaviour; the data supports CPM playing an important part in the successful implementation of the PPO programme.

Writing-up and generalization

Golden-Biddle and Locke (1997) state that writing up qualitative data is more than rational presentation of the findings, but a story that makes contextually grounded theoretical points to a community of readers. Stake (1995,p.63) suggested giving the reader a ‘vicarious experience’ in writing up the case studies; a narrative style with rich description was adopted, taking the format of the observed meetings to tell the story of the programme’s management. The cross case chapter was comparative and theory building and concerned with the degree to which the data matched that predicted by the typology of management dimensions relying on argumentative interpretation not numeric tallies (Yin 2003,p.137).
Macro planning (Horn 2009,p.223-227) was used for chapters and micro plans for subsections and headings, with the aim to find a satisfactory balance between description and analysis. Each case offered an in-depth understanding of management practice by using chronology and thematic analysis to allow the patterns to emerge. Quotations have been used as an explanation of how something happened, but also to illustrate themes, enhance readability and understanding, and to give participants voice (Corden and Sainsbury 2006,p.2). A systematic presentation has enhanced the theoretically significant inferences, diagrams and tables developed visual representations and facilitated cross case comparisons (Miles and Huberman 1994) to display a condensed view of the data in a different format.

Inferences moves from sample to population via specifying the causal processes at work, explained by a theory, with the aim to generalize beyond the immediate study, a concept known as external validity; with warrant the measure of confidence in the inferences ability to deliver knowledge. Quantitative survey based research has been held up as the gold standard for achieving warranted inference, whilst making the claim that case studies cannot be used for generalization because sampling is not random, the N is too small, among other concerns. King et al (1994) state that case studies should aim to emulate quantitative research by increasing the number observations and reducing the number of variables. However, Brady et al (2004,p.245) state “…qualitative categorisation based on close knowledge of cases and context may in fact provide more leverage.”

However, case study researchers have themselves shunned generalization. Ward Schofield (1993,p.210) asserts that the aim is to describe and explain in detail a specific phenomenon and the patterns that exist, and not attempt to generalize beyond the population. A case study’s value lies in its ability to facilitate learning on the basis of insights that have intrinsic value of their own, what Stake (1995) calls ‘naturalistic generalization’; generalization should be analytical rather than statistical and about theoretical propositions not populations. Guba and Lincoln (1989) question the appropriateness of generalization and reject laws governing the social world. They propose the concept of ‘transferability’, which can only be assessed by comparing ‘fit’, after reading the ‘thick description’ where the burden of proof is on the reader to identify congruence between the sending and receiving context.
Gomm (2000) argues that the concepts of ‘transferability’ and ‘naturalistic generalization’ are not a substitute for generalizations. He accepts the danger of error in drawing conclusions from N=1, but states that good research design has not always been followed. Gomm (2000,p.105) further asserts that some case studies can avoid generalization because of their intrinsic nature, but most should aim for empirical generalization to improve the accuracy of everyday generalization.

Gerring (2007,p.76) asserts that a case study is “ both of something particular and of something more general.” Research on a narrow topic can have wider application, like Goffman’s (1961) classic study of institutionalization. The research has developed new theory about CPM which has general relevance to a wider class of partnerships demonstrating through “…a causal argument how general social forces take shape and produce results in specific settings.” (Walton 1992,p.122).

However, it is necessary to assess representiveness when seeking to generalize the findings by specifying the population of an inference, and the appropriate boundaries with reference to breadth, domain and scope (Lewis and Ritchie 2003,p.285). The research findings are generalizable through their theoretical insights. Understanding the difference in each case has enabled the scope and limits of generalizations to be defined as Tilley (2001,p.87) states “Identifying what is salient in the setting is crucial if transferable lessons are to be achieved.” The implementation context shaped results and there can be more than one pathway to an outcome. There have been problems with the transfer of successful crime policies, the Kirkholt Burglary Reduction Project (Forrester et al 1998) for example. Generalizing beyond the data is a creative leap; but the findings may be illustrative of management practices in non-crime partnerships.

**Conclusion**

Much partnership research has focused on partnership start-up, the research focused on established partnerships thus offering a novel perspective. The research is moreover timely and relevant given the pre-occupation with crime and the lack of research into the management of crime partnerships. Additionally, case studies of crime policy are important because political rhetoric can be judged against the empirical reality to gain
insight into different crime control processes by testing theory and supporting and/or denying generalizations.

The overall research design was sound, the methods appropriate and fit for purpose. However the questionnaire-survey suffered from an unsatisfactory sampling frame, which meant that the data generated was not robust enough to provide a general overview of programme implementation in a wider number of partnerships. Thus the data gathered was not used in the final thesis. This unanticipated situation necessitated a greater emphasis being placed on the case studies than initially planned. After initial access problems this phase went well, and a significant amount of very interesting data has been garnered which has led to three embedded case studies.

The research has generated new knowledge; the data supports the advancement of theory by progressing from partial knowledge to enhanced knowledge of CPM. Case boundaries were reconfigured by building on the work of previous researchers like Dawson (2005), by following theoretical leads and generalizing through theoretical insights (Rogowski 2004). Findings were fed back into the conceptual framework where the test of quality is in ensuring that the theoretical claims can be supported by the data.

Inference was advanced through good research design and implementation (Brady et al 2004,p.230-38): a comparative design, a perceptive conceptual framework, good operationalization of concepts, a rich knowledge of the cases and theory refinement. The contextual knowledge provided insight into the impact of cultural, economic and historical variables.

Stake (1995,p.144) states “All research is a search for patterns, for consistencies.” The research was no exception, in identifying and explaining management practice in a partnership setting. The contextually grounded data has established credibility for the analysis and plausible argument has given the data significance and validity through interpretation and explanation. The difference is in the detail and the analysis has been able to offer satisfying explanations through process tracing and understanding the context in which the policy was managed. The research design was open to being surprised and this was confirmed by the level of CPM found across the cases, which had not been expected.
We can now turn to this evidence, the next chapter reports on the implementation of the PPO programme in Jones Town.
Chapter 5: A case study of Jones Town’s PPO programme

Jones Town

Jones Town is a historical city and regional capital of Baker County with a population of 123,500, of whom 97.5 per cent are white. It is the smaller and more well established of the two cities, in a predominantly rural county. Health, education and the public sector employ 26.6 per cent of the population and 23.4 per cent are employed in hotels and restaurants with the city known for its tourism. The two largest employers are the county council and Jones Town University, a top ten university. It is a young city with 40 per cent of the population under 30 and a college of further education. Unemployment is below the national average at 2.9 per cent, but the claimant count is rising. Salary levels are lower than nationally, but the average house price is £203,800. There is a main line railway station and good motorway connections. Jones Town’s application for unitary status was granted, but has now been rescinded.

Jones Town is not a high crime city; 72 crimes are committed for every 1000 residents, and assaults, criminal damage, theft and anti-social behaviour are all down from 2008 except violent crime, which has remained unchanged. The community safety plan for 2008-2011 confirms that community concerns are more focused on anti-social behaviour than on crime with the aim to be the safest city in the region. The six themes resulting from the strategic assessment involve tackling anti-social behaviour, prejudice and hate crime, domestic violence and abuse, and serious acquisitive crime, and to reduce youth offending and the harm caused by alcohol and drugs.

Attendance

The PPO programme in Jones Town is being run alongside two smaller CDRP PPO programmes and the managers and practitioners are the same. Jones Town’s CDRP manager was long lived in his role and was willing to share the partnership’s back-story, he explained that the partnership had morphed out of the Persistent Offender Scheme.

“…[Probation Service] saw an opportunity for getting money to pay for a probation officer to do the job, with the [Police Force] they put a bid together, came
through the CDRP…there was a bit of a feeling that this wasn’t quite right. Before the money was even available for anybody else to bid…it funded the probation officer for three years…and then they mainstreamed it…health involvement came about through the DAT…buying in sectional time with CPNs…housing being sort of dragged in occasionally, there was very little contact with Crown Prosecution Service or YOT…then of course you had the PPO scheme…Prevent and Deter was seen as being the YOTs' business…”

There are five core agencies involved in the delivery of the programme. The publicly funded Police Force operates across two counties, and its mission is to protect and reassure the public, prevent and reduce crime, maintain order and bring offenders to justice. Its staffing contribution to the programme is two managers, a detective inspector and a detective sergeant and three practitioners, two police constables and a data analyst all full-time. Catch and Convict interventions maximize opportunities for intelligence gathering to target Police Force resources to disrupt offending via high visibility patrols which signal to the community their presence, whilst putting off offenders.

The publicly funded Primary Care Trust contributed the treatment manager, two treatment practitioners and a community support worker all full-time to the programme. Twenty-four PPOs started treatment in the year 2008-2009 with seven current. The treatment practitioners are involved in prescribing, drug testing and counselling. Since late 2008, the programme has invested in a range of diversionary activities, an added extra whose primary purpose is to foster social inclusion through pro-social modelling. The Primary Care Trust was felt to be the most appropriate agency to run the activities, as they had experience in such provision. As the treatment manager explained:

“…it’s public money and if any member thought that was not the right way to be doing it then we’d have to rethink…it’s ever changing…depending on need and sometimes from month to month, because you’ll have a cohort of service users that are particularly into sport or something like that...”

Provision includes badminton, gym, swimming, football, cooking and an allotment with two to four groups run each week, delivered via the community support worker. He is employed by the Primary Care Trust on their terms and conditions but with funding from the Police Force with a £4,000 budget subject to yearly renewal. “…the role is to engage
The Probation Service is also publicly funded and operates across two counties. It contributes a probation manager, a probation officer, a probation support officer, and a case administrator. The manager is responsible for three probation teams, the PPO team, the DRR team and the public protection team, but all practitioners are full-time to the programme. Rehabilitate and Resettle interventions focus on the supervision of community orders and licences, the former usually with a DRR.

The DIP is a £165 million publicly funded, national programme commissioned by the local Drug Alcohol Team (DAT) to provide customized solutions for drug misusing offenders from arrest, sentencing and prison through to treatment and post-treatment, to break the cycle of crime, drug misuse and prison. The DIP is subject to competitive tendering, the tender having been won by a third sector treatment provider in Jones Town, part funded by the Police Force. It contributed one DIP practitioner part-time to the programme with the DIP manager managing other DIP practitioners across Baker County. The DIP programme interfaces with the Primary Care Trust and aims to undertake referrals to them within five days, plus outreach work, restrictions on bail, needle exchange, drug testing and relapse prevention.

The third sector Housing Support project is part of a Jones Town registered charity. It provided a manager and two practitioners, none of who were full-time to the programme. The project drew down funding from the county and city council, the Big Lottery, charitable trusts, the Probation Service, faith organisations and individual donations to fund its work. A total of £667,000 in annual funding; 36 per cent of which is spent within the Criminal Justice System.

The Probation Service funded the manager’s post till March 2009, but as the Probation Service was facing budget cuts, it decided not to continue with its financial support. The manager was seconded from the Probation Service and decided to retire; one of the practitioners took on an acting-up role. One interpretation of this decision is that the
Probation Service is protecting core services, a narrow definition of service delivery through the re-ordering of priorities.

Over the last five years the Housing Support manager had not had to make any redundancies, but he felt 2009-2010 could be a very difficult year for the project despite operating at full capacity. Practitioners were on fixed term contracts till September 2009 and finances were secure till March 2010. Safer Baker Partnership had confirmed a £50,000 grant, a successful application had been made to a trust, and various awards had been made from anonymous sources totalling £12,500, so a replacement practitioner had been recruited. Housing Support’s success in gaining resources can be interpreted as validating its worth.

The project is unique, it services were not provided by any other agency in the programme. Its specific purpose was to promote resettlement of PPOs through supported accommodation and mentoring with twenty eight current cases; thirteen in prison and fifteen in the community. The underlying ethos emphasized the importance of secure accommodation as the base from which other problems could be tackled, the value of trusting personal relationships, service user voice and that working in partnership gave strength to individual agency effort.

The project provides benefit advice, rent deposits, tenant management and escort duties, ensuring that no PPO comes out of custody homeless. Landlords provide supported accommodation, the lettings are commercial and high risk, but the project has been able to attract and keep them, due to the level of support offered through a responsive and supportive service, where data sharing is with the consent of the service user. It is the support offered to landlords that makes the project innovative. Volunteers provide mentoring and escort duties to PPOs with the aim to harness the skills and commitment of the community to address the negative consequences of offending, but also to develop the volunteers themselves personally and professionally. However, the probation manager did express his reservations:

“…whilst I think there’s marvellous creative work going on and I’m so impressed with {Housing Support} and their energy, I think it comes at a big, big price…complexity in terms of managing services, and their funding is dubious year on year…when the
Probation Service did employ housing officers, it was just so simple, you had your housing officers on site and suddenly we’ve gone through this convoluted thing, everything contracted out, purchasing in services.”

Jones Town’s prison is publicly funded with an average of nine Jones Town PPOs held at any one time, with nineteen held in other prisons. The Prison Service contributes one probation officer part-time to the programme, paid by the Prison Service but on secondment from the Probation Service, on their terms and conditions and with responsibility for reporting and liaising on the custodial experience. The private sector has a minimal role through the private company that escorts PPOs from court to prison and through monitoring Home Detention Curfews.

The police constables, probation practitioners and DIP practitioner are co-located at the probation office with the probation manager. The detective inspector, detective sergeant and data analyst are based at Jones Town police station 5-10 minutes walk away. The detective sergeant explained this by reference to them covering three programmes operating under the Baker County steering group and not being seen to give more attention to one programme than another. The remaining practitioners are not co-located, but regularly visit the probation office which operates as a hub. The Housing Support practitioners are also 5-10 minutes walk away, the prison is five minutes walk away, but the treatment practitioners and manager are 20 minutes walk away.

In addition to the CDRP manager, the Housing Support and treatment managers have been involved in the programme from the beginning, the other managers joined at various later stages. The Jones Town programme operates through a group management structure and the prevailing view is that the arrangement has worked well. As the probation manager explained:

“...what we tended to do is either agree between ourselves who will be taking responsibility for something or sometimes we’ve actually agreed that there should be a concerted effort...I think there are benefits sometimes in small groups of people working over tensions rather than locating them in one person...managers having to work together...you do work at finding ways of building communication...addressing the
difficulties that can arise through the different cultures or professional backgrounds of the people who come from different agencies.”

Practitioners are directly managed by their agency manager and the treatment manager felt that her practitioners preferred to be supervised by a manager from the same profession. “…they have an ability to discuss their worries and concerns about whether they are compromising their own profession, in decisions that are made...” However, all practitioners were happy to take direction from the other managers. “…if my police officers went to the {JRC} and {probation manager} makes a decision, they wouldn’t have a problem with that or if its the treatment manager…” {Detective inspector}.

Much literature on partnership has stressed the leadership function (Hedderman and Williams 2001), but Peck and Dickinson (2008,p.105) state that the leadership role should not be overstated. At the JRC there was evidence of distributed leadership, power was shared and relational, because no one agency had the legitimacy, authority or knowledge to act alone, the interventions required to reduce crime were dispersed whilst responsibility to act was shared. For 6 et al (2006b) it is the complexity and uncertainty of partnership that differentiates the leadership process from that which occurs in single agencies.

Berry’s (2007,p.48) evaluation of the PPO programme in Nottingham concluded that where implementation is shared amongst managers, progress is rarely as good. The Housing Support manager was in favour of a single manager model, in order to offer better direction. As the treatment manager stated:

“…at times I think the team have just wanted one person, a team leader to do the job…it’s been wanted most when things are really difficult, relationships for some reason have been fractured…if things got dysfunctional again, then that might be a way of solving it, having a clear path of responsibility…and any one of us could have done that…and it wouldn’t matter what discipline they came from…”

The probation manager recognized this view but said “…you know you could probably very easily argue that there should be a single kind of line manager…it is compelling, very attractive, it’s clear and coherent in some ways so you can see the reasons why, but there is, almost something beneficial not to have that and to engage in other ways and I think
generally this has paid some dividends in terms of the experience in the local scheme and the staff working within it.”

There are two types of operational meetings; the monthly JRC chaired by the detective inspector to review, update and discuss PPOs’ progress in terms of interventions and compliance. A weekly meeting chaired by the detective sergeant, focuses on PPOs raising salient issues that week, from this the detective inspector is absent. The detective sergeant invites guest speakers to this meeting serving as a learning and training function, to support emergent practice. The detective sergeant attended all the meetings and thus had an excellent working knowledge of all the PPOs.

Jones Town’s CDRP manager did not attend the JRC, but one of the smaller CDRP managers did attend one, and commented that he saw his role as feeding back to his CDRP about the programme. He also volunteered the view that CDRPs should take responsibility for the programme, but the ‘reality’ was that the Police Force had usurped the role.

Crawford (1999,p.114) has argued that the Police Force have a gendered view of partnership work as ‘women’s work’, a male culture of ‘action’ had constructed gender relations and led to the over representation of women in frontline, social work positions operating outside traditional core activities. Conversely, in this partnership the detective inspector and one of the police constables were male. Similarly three of the five managers were male, as well as the DIP and treatment practitioner, prison probation officer and community support worker; everyone was white.

The probation manager asserted that the partnership agenda has moved on, and to progress your career a manager had to have partnership experience. “…it’s almost hard to think of settings to manage that aren’t multi-agency…you have to have that multi-agency perspective in mind…I think that’s probably the right thing to do.” The treatment manager concurred, “…partnership working is a massive part of my work today…and the day-to-day running, the difficulties with people, managing sickness, managing staff, etc is the other part.”

Community engagement was limited to Housing Support’s volunteers and private landlords. Community engagement could be through crime problem identification and the
sharing of community knowledge. Kemshall and Maguire’s (2001,p.252) research into Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) reported that practitioners controlled the panels with no community, local councillor, third or private sector involvement. The JRC is not open to the public and neither is there public access to the minutes. Primarily this is because PPOs’ personal details are discussed and thus it would not be appropriate.

There is no employment and training practitioner, mental health practitioner or YOT practitioner in attendance at any of the meetings. The lack of a formal interface with Prevent and Deter restricted transfer onto the adult programme but the probation officer intended to meet informally with a YOT practitioner regarding a transfer in. The probation manager explained the situation:

“…before we went over to the new steering group structure we [detective inspector and probation manager] thought we would try and pursue this element about Prevent and Deter and kind of try and tie it in more closely and we did this on a local basis and had a discussion about it and the best thing that came out of it, really was a commitment to make sure that there is a smoother transition for young offenders coming over to adult services, rather than trying to get better collaboration on the ground, and I’m putting it candidly, this is the argument that says you know, about key individuals and I think the senior manager from the YOT didn’t want to buy into it.”

If all five managers attended the JRC there would be the probation manager, the detective inspector, the detective sergeant, the treatment manager and the Housing Support manager, however, not all managers attended. The treatment manager was absent for two sessions due to maternity leave, but had a previous history of attending and her replacement attended the last meeting. The probation manager attended one meeting and when absent for a second meeting he had briefed the probation officer about the relevant issues before she attended. The Housing Support manager attended none of the meetings. The detective sergeant attended all three and the detective inspector attended one before he moved to his new position, but had a previous attendance history.

All three meetings were chaired by the Police Force, the first meeting by the detective inspector and the second two by the detective sergeant who acted up in the interim between
the departure and arrival of the new detective inspector, a seamless transition. Partnership demands commitment from managers, when they did not attend it was obvious and their commitment could be questioned, visibility is an issue. Perhaps other managers would attend more regularly if the chair was rotated, but the probation and Housing Support manager had other responsibilities, where as for the other managers the programme was their full-time job. As the probation manager explained:

“[Detective inspector and treatment manager] who I work closely with are fantastic to work with...[detective inspector] eventually had a virtual single focus on PPOs and you know you need that...[treatment manager] had, not a single focus, but the other interests that she had were directly complimentary to it, so real vested interest in actually taking that agenda forward...”

The JRC was held at Jones Town police station, in a well-equipped ground floor meeting room. The average attendance figure was thirteen: four from the Police Force, four from the Probation Service, two from Housing Support and three from the treatment providers. There was no clustering of the same practitioners sitting next to each other and although the atmosphere was business like, practitioners and managers appeared comfortable in each others’ presence and there was an informal banter amongst colleagues. The room was conveniently sited next to the canteen, so breakfast was often included with the agenda.

The PPO database listed all service users on the programme and is used to facilitate the meetings and is accessed over the Police Force network and run via a lab top on to a large white screen by the data analyst. The database is unique to the Police Force and includes basic personal information, a précis of the last four weeks worth of intelligence and a resume of programme interventions. Being only accessible at police stations meant it was difficult to hold the meetings elsewhere. The case administrator could not access her database, so she sat next to the data analyst in order to exchange information. All PPOs should have a PPO marker on the Police Force’s national computer.

The detective inspector introduced the researcher to the JRC and she briefly explained the research. The agenda, targeting matrix and the PPO list with action points decided at the previous meeting, produced to a high specification and in colour by the data analyst were handed out at the start of each JRC. There was a reading out and signing of the
information exchange protocol at the beginning of all the meetings, aimed at ensuring confidentiality of personal data, the researcher also signed it.

**PPO nominations**

Nominations were dealt with first with a two-stage assessment process for inclusion on to the programme. Referrals came from Counselling, Advice, Referral, Assessment and Through-care (CARAT) - a treatment provider in the prison and the YOT in addition to the core providers. There were six nominations over the three months.

The partnership’s guidance states “…those offenders who score highly are considered to be prolific, others who do not score highly but who represent a high risk of harm to the community and are therefore considered to be a priority are also eligible…young offenders who have committed a large amount of crime in a short space of time, when scored using the crime matrix may not score as highly as other offenders who have been committing crimes for many years. But the young offenders could be considered more prolific as their current offending is increasing.”

The detective inspector explained the programme’s mandate. “…the PPO is about two things, it’s about identifying an individual, telling them they are a PPO and giving them two choices, you either work with us and we will help you to address your health and social needs, we’ll look at training, employment and your drug use and all the rest of it. If you don’t, I’m going to bang you up…you will always get a percentage that comply, a percentage that will never comply and the vast majority in the middle…”

First, the data analyst utilizing the targeting matrix collated information on previous convictions, Police Force intelligence and number of arrests in the last twelve months to generate a matrix score. The procedure provides an audit trail to demonstrate transparency, comparability and an element of predictability. The data analyst also scanned for reported crimes that met the modus operandi of the PPOs by monitoring incoming intelligence.

Second, the JRC discussed the nomination in light of the score and partnership information, focusing on risk factors and likely benefit from the programme. Agencies pooled their information about a service user in order that a decision could be made that
they could all agree to implement. A nomination from a CARAT practitioner, the community support worker felt “…doesn’t fit the mould.” The detective sergeant asked “…are we the best scheme for him, he doesn’t meet PPO criteria or MAPPA but needs support, the client is asking for help, but there will be no licence on release…some one should take him on, but don’t know whether its us, who else is going to take him?”

The probation officer asserted that the nomination did not meet the threshold for MAPPA as he was not risky enough. “…could wait to see if he offends before a decision is made?” she said. The detective sergeant asked the police constable what he thought, he replied “…don’t agree with waiting to see if he offends, needs preventative action, as he stands he either fits the PPO scheme or he doesn’t. Could still engage with DIP even if not on the PPO scheme, what else can we offer?” The other police constable chipped in “…wait till he offends, otherwise we are taking a gamble, as we have no enforcement options.” The probation officer said “…its up to this meeting whether we take him on.”

The detective sergeant was reluctant to do nothing, but summed up the general feeling that they would not take him on at this stage, but then the treatment manager intervened. “…get him on the scheme before he is released from custody…lets take a preventative role, he’s asking for help, we should not wait for him to offend.” In response the detective sergeant said “OK… put him on, all agencies to get their visits to him and see what we can do.” A real concern was expressed about the service user falling between MAPPA and the PPO, but also which probation team he would come under. Unfortunately the probation manager was absent so was unable to assist the discussion, but a preventative stance won out.

The above conversations illustrate the tensions between, along side the co-existence of the three models of management. In discussing performance outcomes the CPM model prevailed despite there being a risk in taking on non-statutory PPOs over which the programme had no enforcement role. Data provided evidence for the managers being prepared to give these service users a chance. There was also an element of risk in taking on statutory service users who did not respond to the interventions on offer and kept offending, which boosted the programme’s crime figures. The detective sergeant said with reference to one such case “He will hammer our crime figures.” On the other hand there is the risk of playing it safe and retaining PPOs that are doing well and not offending. It may
keep performance on target but it fails to free up space for more prolific offenders who are impacting on their community.

In another example, the detective sergeant was disposed to accept a nomination on to the programme, however the probation manager was inclined to defer because he wanted to talk to a colleague before that decision was made, as he felt the JRC did not have enough information. The data analyst agreed and the detective sergeant deferred the case to the next JRC and tasked the treatment practitioner to get more information too.

None of the providers IT systems linked up, separate checking of databases is required. If partner agencies had advance notification of nominations from the data analyst, agencies would be able to access any relevant information about potential PPOs before the meeting and thus be better equipped to contribute to the discussion; deferment delayed decision-making. When a PPO was accepted on to the programme they were informed of their status and issued with programme information.

Transfers in and out could be problematic in terms of getting adequate information and getting another area to take on a PPO. An out of county programme was reluctant to take a transfer, the potential receiving Primary Care Trust stated they would take two weeks to script. Concern was expressed in the JRC about the lack of a premium service, the treatment practitioner volunteered to ring the agency again.

In another example, a PPO wanted to move to Smith Town, the data analyst indicated that the PPO would move but this was challenged by the police constable, who said the service user was giving them the ‘run around’, moving between programmes and thus not being held to account. The detective sergeant said as his father lived in Smith Town and was a ‘poor role model’ the partnership needed to plan for him to stay in Jones Town.

The DIP practitioner wanted to run a referral by his manager, as they had had issues with the service user and no one from his agency was willing to work with him as he was assessed as ‘too violent’. The detective sergeant stated that he had been discussed before and he did not meet the criteria, the probation manager agreed to check if he was MAPPA registered.
The matrix operated as an initial filtering mechanism, the score was only a guide. The key to accepting a nomination was space on the list and mediated professional discourse; practitioner knowledge and experience took precedence. The partnership used discretion to categorize, differentiate and target offenders, a process that generated norms for the selection of candidates and mapped service users in terms of their qualifying or disqualifying characteristics, but there was no centrality of risk. The matrix is formatted to review persistence and seriousness of offending, partner and CDRP priorities; but the latter two sections were rarely fully completed. Crime pattern data was available, but was not discussed at the JRC; the focus was on specific PPOs. The fact that managers did not use the aggregated data to inform practitioners of the programme overall, indicated a lack of management strategy.

The detective sergeant would defer nominations with low levels of offending like shoplifting, and expressed concern about where to ‘draw the line’. Before nominations could be accepted, there was a need to remove a PPO, this was because the list was full at 42; the detective sergeant referred to the situation as a ‘numbers game’. However, no cases were on the agenda for removal at any of the JRCs. If a PPO was stable and no longer offending, they could be considered for removal. A non-statutory PPO, on the programme since its inception, with low levels of offending was discussed with the view to removal, which was agreed, but with the option to take him back if need be.

In another example, of a non-statutory PPO who was not engaging, but equally not offending, the detective sergeant remarked “…everything is in place what more can we do? Its up to him.” The detective inspector asserted “…if we don’t take him off the list we need to do something with him.” The police constable concurred “…if people are not going to benefit they should come off, otherwise we are setting them up to fail.” The Housing Support practitioner asked “Do you think he is appropriate for the list?” The data analyst agreed “If he does not fit the brief he should come off.” The police constable accepted that the programme could not offer the PPO anymore, and the probation manager and detective sergeant believed that there was a consensus to remove him.

The concept of performance was about engaging with and providing interventions to PPOs to reduce their offending. Ultimately the partnership acknowledged little improvements, accepting that not every PPO could make big life changes. The manager’s role was to
ensure that both statutory and non-statutory PPOs were benefiting from the programme by being constructively engaged and not ‘coasting’, this can be seen as justifying resource use.

Lipsky (1980,p.166) has asserted “Whenever management undertakes to concentrate on measuring a dimension of performance workers correctly accept this as a signal of management priority.” The detective sergeant stated “…its not just about performance its about helping people…giving opportunities to offenders…” and this viewpoint was well established across the JRC. Nevertheless, qualitative indicators were difficult to measure, which explains the focus on quantitative reconviction data and the inference to quality. As Lipsky (1980,p.168) has said “the most important dimensions of service performance defy calibration.”

**PPO case review**

The list is gone through case by case. PPOs are colour coded from red, amber and green, to grey in term of risk; of the 42 PPOs, 28 were in custody (grey). The service user group is predominantly male, with one lone female, the age range is 20 to 30 and most are unemployed. The majority are recidivist property offenders with more than half having drug or alcohol related problems, ethnicity is not identified, but it is plausible to assume that most are white. This relative homogeneity made service provisioning easier than with a more diverse population.

Crime is the result of the motivation that arises out of the interplay between individual propensity and situation (Ekbolm 1996,p.47). The programme aims to intervene in the ‘proximal’ and ‘distal’ mechanisms that cause criminal events to reduce the probability of their occurrence by interrupting the ‘chain of causation’. The National Reducing Re-offending Action Plan’s (Home Office 2004a) seven pathways guided interventions, but the plan was not mentioned by name, as managers co-ordinated provision by bringing practitioners together at the JRC.

The detective inspector and sergeant are solution focused and sought out and collated partner perspectives. “Anyone have an opinion on {a PPO}?” The discussions established direction of travel, proposals for action. There is a multiplicity of decisions that need to
occur for each PPO to receive the interventions assessed as required, a pattern of complexity that was dealt with well. The sum of the agencies was greater than the parts; each agency’s intervention enabled another agency to deliver its services more effectively, thus enhancing performance.

“…they all contribute towards the same thing, we know that the longer you keep somebody in treatment, the more chance there is that you are successful, that you are going to address their health issue and if you address their health issue, you are going to address the criminality that goes with it. The same with probation, the more engagement that we get with an individual around activities, around sorting out their social issues, around the housing, the less likely they are to commit a crime.” {Detective inspector}.

The detective inspector and sergeant had sufficient legitimacy to task practitioners that they did not line manage. “With DIP coming on board, if I was honest…there were some tentative soundings well I can’t say this and I can’t say that, we’ve overcome all of that now, we know that we’re there for the common good of the individual.” For example, the detective sergeant asked the DIP practitioner to get a PPO’s vehicle registration number so a check could be made and the DIP practitioner agreed. No concerns were witnessed over data sharing as managers made efforts to ensure transparency.

“…it was raised at the {JRC} a couple of weeks ago about how the other agencies would record sensitive information {informant}. So next week we’ve got members of our intelligence team coming down to the meeting to give them an input as to where the police is coming from…” {Detective sergeant}.

Practitioners volunteered to undertake particular tasks, usually involving a liaison role. It could be claimed that knowledge work knows no hierarchy, it is either relevant to a given task or not. Knowledge was shared among practitioners, but the task often decided who was best positioned to undertake it. “…I think the team are established well enough, working relationships are good enough and we all know the individuals that we are dealing with well enough, to agree what is the best course of action for that individual, and I can’t think of one specific case where we’ve got to an argument stage…I think everyones quite open to be guided by whoever has the best knowledge about that subject area.” {Detective inspector}. 
There was a reservoir of demand for services which of necessity led to rationing interventions based on resource availability and likely PPO engagement which created minor tensions over prioritizing, as the more responsive the programme was to the needs of service users, the greater the demand. The partnership had restricted control over some inputs, for example limited funds in the residential (tier 4) treatment budget meant a PPO who had been offered a bed in December 2008 could of had the offer removed if an emergency arose, and was then unlikely to get admission before April 2009.

The detective sergeant was keen to see how they could ensure that the PPO did get the bed, pushing for priority over other service users. “**Its important to get him in there…let me know if he doesn’t get the bed on Tuesday…**” to the treatment practitioner. Professional codes stipulate that service user’ needs should be a primary focus and the partnership used creative thinking, flexible action and advocacy to access resources. This was compatible with an agency perspective as Lipsky (1980,p.73) states “The organisation hoards resources; the advocate seeks their dispersal to clients.”

There is a complementary combination of interventions based on a multi-modal package, but individualized interventions are privileged, partly because the partnership has the ability to intervene, rather than engage structurally through, say social housing provisioning. ‘Street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1980) have been criticized for unresponsive and inappropriate service delivery, but although PPOs were non-voluntary, often lacking information and in a state of dependency, this was not evident in the case study. The programme was personalized and service delivery was responsive to diversity; interventions were tailored to PPO need based on a joint assessment of what interventions were required. The aim was to offer a bespoke service whilst complying with the primary goal to reduce re-offending.

The JRC offered a clear example of the personalization agenda (Bentley and Wilsdon 2003) where public service pathways are designed around the profiles, capacities and motivations of individual service users. The JRC tried to see the service user as a whole person not just someone who is doing crime, a holistic approach. “**So, if you look at what’s best for the individual as opposed to what each individual agency wants…that’s quite positive actually…**”{Detective inspector}. Similarly standardization can only create equity if all service users’ needs are the same. Both practitioners and managers tended to focus on
maximizing the benefits to the service user, rather than the community, as such there was no tension between professional discretion and management control.

Alter and Hage (1993,p.95) have said that “If the pattern is sequential…there is little integration of tasks across boundaries because patients or clients are treated by one organisation at a time.” What was observed in the JRC, was a ‘collective pattern’ with concurrent interventions delivered through a well integrated task focused team. The detective inspector explained “…it’s an integrated service…we can identify what is best for the client and pooling our resources allows us to give far greater structure and support for the individual…”

Issues arose over where some PPOs sat in terms of team boundaries, two PPOs were also MAPPA registered, which programme should take precedence had resource implications. There are notional limits on how many cases a probation officer can supervise. A prisoner had requested admission on to the programme and was asking for voluntary drug tests, the probation officer said she would take him on as a non-statutory case as he was not to be released on licence; but the decision made in her manager’s absence had resource implications in terms of caseload numbers.

Practitioner discretion operated within a framework of goals that agencies had signed up to. Treatment practitioners stopped scripts and the probation officer moved to breach. “I’m going to recall him, he’s been abusive to staff.” Although breach and recall were governed by national standards, they were not rules simply to be followed, but to be interpreted. No procedure could cover all eventualities, not all problems could be standardized to which a formula could be applied. PPOs were not totally predictable and such unpredictability created complexity which had to be managed. An example of how the management models impacted on practice creating tensions which had to be managed in order to produce successful outcomes.

Some tasks were prescriptive and standardized, the targeting matrix, OASsy – a risk assessment and sentencing tool, structured and accredited group work. Managers constrained discretion through these standardized tools, and by specifying objectives and the use of protocols. Still, at the same time practitioners were empowered to decide, to offer flexible and diverse interventions.
Traditionally practitioners are used to working within their own agency structure where roles and tasks are perhaps more clearly defined; under partnership roles and responsibility are more negotiable. In the partnership distinct or strong professional identities are not evident; in fact there is evidence for merging and blurring of professional identities. If practitioners had not alluded to their job, it would have been difficult to guess their parent agency as a result of the conversation held. A police constable spoke very positively about a PPO. “He’s trying to change…” where as the treatment practitioner spoke strongly about enforcing a community order. As the treatment manager explained:

“...it's inter-changeable depending on the crime, who has what view and sometimes we’ve wanted to be more punitive than the police, unbelievable…people feeling threatened of their professional identity, loosing it to a whole in some way…it’s not always comfortable…to work in an environment which really needs you to be adaptable and think through things and sometimes go against your principles, it’s challenging…working with people isn’t a science, it’s an art that happens within the team...”

There is task overlap amongst practitioners, drug testing was primarily the remit of the treatment practitioners, but the probation officer, probation support officer and the community support worker all undertook testing for PPOs who were not in receipt of a script. However, distinct competencies were evident, OASsy, licence conditions, breach and recall were probation officer duties and she was responsible for brokering and sequencing interventions across the agencies.

There was no evidence of professional jealousy or ‘turf wars’; responsibility for a PPO was shared. Data supports the view that partnership allows visibility and sharing of resources, where as perhaps differentiation and specialization supports hoarding. Moreover, tasks and roles were cumulative and thus affected each other over time. There was evidence of unqualified practitioners taking on tasks previously undertaken by qualified practitioners and thus a ceding of responsibility to lower levels in the hierarchy.

Practitioners made decisions that affected life chances, granting access to resources or taking decisions on liberty, their cumulative actions generated partnership policy. As Lipsky (1980,p.84) has stated “the routines, simplifications, and low-level decision making environments of street level bureaucracies are political. Street level bureaucrats
Of all the practitioners the Housing Support practitioners have a more overtly sympathetic persuasion. For example the police constable stated “He’s treading water…” the probation support officer concurred “He’s not addressing his problems.” A Housing Support practitioner responded “He’s only eighteen and had to grow up too soon, he doesn’t want to grow up…” The police constable retorted “He’s going to have to grow up or pay the consequences.”

The probation officer felt that some agencies were taking a ‘mothering role’, feeling sorry for the service user and doing too much for him and that he needed to take more responsibility for his actions now he was 18. The detective sergeant asserted “We all need to adopt the same approach…so he doesn’t get mixed messages.” The probation manager concluded the exchange with “Keep chipping away, he sees the same faces, be there for him.” The treatment manager added further illumination:

“I do think for some people there’s been a struggle about being drawn into…the establishment…trying to control people’s behaviour in a way that is not that comfortable for drugs workers and CPNs. But I think actually that’s where management comes in, constantly looking, reflecting back and it happens every week when we discuss people, like a ping pong ball going around the room, and eventually it settles in the place that seems the best compromise for everybody. That balance is worth it, what is the point in going off independently.”

Another example highlights the solidarity between the agencies. The police constable stated that some PPOs struggle with the idea that the Police Force wants to help them. He stated that a PPO was trying to “…cut out one agency…” the Police Force, after the PPO had ‘blown up’ in front of the police constable. The detective sergeant asked “Where do we go from here?” The probation manager replied “He needs to have a warning letter for unacceptable behaviour to be presented jointly by the probation officer and police constable on probation premises.” The JRC agreed to give him a warning and the probation officer said she would prepare the letter.
Joint visits were about recognizing and valuing each agency’s contribution and demonstrated high levels of trust. When the police constable and community support worker conducted a home visit, they reported that for ‘an hour’ the mother complained about the probation officer involved with her son. The police constable felt it was important to explain and defend the Probation Service’s role, as a consequence of being in partnership he knew what that role was, both practitioners felt it was important to “…all sing from the same hymn sheet so to speak.” Cultural synthesis and optimized bonding has promoted learning and led to a team identity, the detective sergeant concurred “…certainly with the team we’ve got, it feels more like a PPO team...a team on their own, independent.”

Nash’s (1999) research focused on the changing nature of agency culture in the Police Force and Probation Service. He identified the ‘polibation officer’, as evidence of a new breed of probation officer, whose distinctive professional profile had been lost as a result of a shift of values and language towards the Police Force’s goals of ‘surveillance, control and exclusion’ and the prioritization of risk and punishment over welfare. Nash (2004,p.75) argued that the emphasis on intelligence gathering and the locating of projects in police stations meant that the Police Force had undergone less change and that the two agencies had not assumed the identity of the other.

Mawby and Worrall (2004,p.69) also found role cross over in prolific offender projects and challenges to organizational cultures. However they saw this as beneficial in the creative tension it generated between agencies, safeguarding against complacency and hubris. They found little evidence for the fully developed ‘polibation officer’, some practitioners had retained their distinctive roles and professional profiles, whilst learning from colleagues had impacted on their thinking and the way they conducted their tasks, but the cross over was intentional and beneficial.

Practitioners were a relatively stable group with limited churn, relationships were harmonious and positive; they worked together as a cohesive team with no evidence of role conflict. New practitioners and managers came into the programme, for example a probation officer and a new treatment manager, both knew other practitioners at the JRC. Jones Town is a small city with limited mobility resulting in continuity of support for the service user. Statutory practitioners were subject to permanent job contracts and national
pay rates. However, the community support worker, Housing Support and DIP practitioners were on fixed term contracts and localized pay.

Overall communication in the JRC was logical and persuasive, succinct summaries were offered, rather than waffle and antidote. There was good body language in a relaxed environment, with evidence of respect for colleagues through listening to contributions and discussing the issues in a trusting and open manner with shared terminology. A police constable used the term criminal sometimes, but client, offender, user but not customer, were used interchangeably, a variety of terms that did not seem to cause a transgression, indicating a level of maturity in the partnership.

Interactions did not generally represent narrow agency perspectives but a commitment to reaching a consensus on broad acceptable solutions involving mutual adjustment for a negotiated decision. For example, the agencies worked together to prevent a Home Detention Curfew application being successful. The detective sergeant concluded that “From every side we will say that he’s not suitable.” This shared understanding had been developed by managers, recognizing each agency had its own goals to meet, whilst contributing to the programme. The probation manager believed it was important to take your agency agenda to your partners and have it reciprocated. The managers met, sometimes bilaterally to discuss issues outside the JRC, and at the steering group and communicated by phone and email.

The Housing Support manager stated that there was a shared understanding among agencies, the aims of the programme being broadly compatible with their mandate and values allowing them to operate in partnership. Huxham and Vangen (2005,p.97) believe it is important to establish consistent and mutually reinforcing aims which can be distinguished at three levels. The partnership, the agency and the individual, “as partnerships are enacted by the individuals who represent their agencies”. They further assert that aims can be “genuine, pseudo, hidden, unintentionally unstated, or explicitly stated,” and that primary aims may be clear, but subsidiary aims may not, and that aims will interact to form a hierarchy and be subject to change. It is these aims that drive motivations and behaviours as all partners have perceptions of others. As the probation manager explained:
“...people have a good understanding about the contributions their colleagues from other agencies make to what they're doing so that there's a real good shared understanding. People have to be clear about their own role, their own professional boundaries, but there’s confidence that sometimes you can step out of the professional boundary that you are within and your colleagues know roughly when you are going to do that and would welcome it under those circumstances...”

Where a particular agency had other aims they were a subset of the shared primary aim to reduce re-offending. One of the Housing Support practitioners spoke of having ‘very different aims’ and the Housing Support manager stated that his practitioners were not criminal justice trained and had a different value base to the other practitioners. They have had to make adjustments to their practice to work in partnership, in particular on the enforceability of appointments.

At one JRC there was no Housing Support practitioners, they were both ill and their manager did not attend instead. The community support worker said “It is difficult without [Housing Support] being here today.” Their absence impacted on decision-making and demonstrated how crucial accommodation is to the programme’s functioning, the project had gained considerable influence and had increased its value over its period of operation. However, the probation officer offered a more critical voice. “They need to focus on the clients on orders...” in terms of prioritizing limited accommodation. Nevertheless, in general the public sector partners seemed to accept that Housing Support had a different value base, that the primary aim was to reduce crime, but this could be achieved through a variety of mechanisms.

The shortage of accommodation was a recurring theme, the dearth of social housing providers acted as a constraint and yet a new purpose built hostel, owned by the Ministry of Justice lay empty in Jones Town. The Housing Support manager was convinced that the project added value to the programme, but very much felt that accommodation should be mainstreamed and provided by Jones Town city council that he saw as having failed PPOs. However, as the CDRP manager said, the department had limited stock due to forced sales and a limited building programme, plus competing need in an expensive area of the country.
Access to mental health services was the other major resource theme. The JRC was struggling to get a mental health assessment on a MAPPA registered PPO, subject to an Anti-Social Behaviour Order, described as vulnerable and manipulative with poor coping skills, but also dangerous. The Housing Support practitioner stated “...he needs psychological help”. The treatment practitioner volunteered the information “...they [access and well-being team] cannot refuse a psychological assessment.” The probation officer stated the situation was ‘dreadful’ especially for PPOs on short prison sentences. The probation manager explained the current situation:

“...there’s an agenda that’s been unfolding for some time and it feels really positive and very relevant...I’m less interested about the right representative on the steering group...I’m more interested in working with people to develop badly needed services for the people that we’re working with and we have an in road to that now ...we’re looking at trying to get a jointly funded mental health post based in this office.”

Carmichael and Ward (2001) found a positive relationship between unemployment and crime, but employment or education issues rarely came up for discussion at the JRC. If such interventions were needed they were accessed through Probation Service contracts with a local provider. The diversionary activities are central to the programme and are incorporated into the PPOs’ sentence plan and are enforceable. The community support worker stated “I try to emphasize as a young man, my role is different from police/probation...offenders relax their guard, I feel I can get another perspective, a fuller picture of the offender, their needs.”

Gilling (2005,p.735) has asserted the importance of “…good knowledge and understanding of one another’s roles and responsibilities.” The treatment manager reported that “…we’ve definitely in the past had to define roles, make sure people know what really their job is, although it touches and crosses over...we’ve had a lot of learning and establishing of roles and boundaries because {DIP} work in a very different way. They have to be accessible and have less structures and safety issues than a PCT, they are street...a real access point for people...so between us we’ve run workshops...all very collaborative.”

Core providers had a sense of programme ownership and the mechanism used to secure this commitment was trust, which provides a way of coping with risk, by releasing
managers from the need for checking and equates to a value classification based on honesty and an absence of self-interested behaviour. Trust was primarily evidenced through the personal, partnership commitment checked against opportunistic behaviour, based on confidence that partners will act in predictable ways, fulfilling expectations, based on their track record. Repeated engagement built reliability and dependability and enlarged the ‘shadow of the future’ (McQuaid 2000, p. 28) to aid collaboration. There was a sharing of risks and rewards, an acceptance of different cultures and a willingness to work with rather than against difference.

However, for less engaged agencies like the Crown Prosecution Service there was the use of protocols to specify responsibility because trust was lacking. The probation manager asked the detective inspector if he could access some Crown Prosecution Service documents as the agency wanted to charge the Probation Service £100 for the privilege; this reflected a very insular approach. The detective sergeant adopted a compliance role with reference to the premium service protocol and the agency. “We need to ensure they are notifying us of PPOs making bail applications...we have an agreement with them...”

Decisions made by the Crown Prosecution Service in isolation affected a PPO’s sentence plan. For example a PPO had been charged with new offences, the detective sergeant stated “Any element of doubt and the Crown Prosecution Service won’t prosecute.” Concern was expressed that they had not got their act together ‘again’, offences were seen to be dragging on for months, ‘dribbling through the system’, missing deadline expiry times, offences are not aggregated or discontinued without consultation. If a Crown Prosecution Service practitioner attended the JRC discussions could take place about charging and discontinuation as many service users had outstanding offences.

Power to influence sentencing outcomes was via the Pre-Sentence Report prepared by the probation officer, and direct practitioner intervention in the court process. The Courts Service manager explained that magistrates are “…very much led by the probation officer...it’s very rare that the magistrates will go against what’s written in the report.” However, magistrates did not always follow the advice given, for example a PPO had breached his DRR and was due in court, the probation officer was asserting that without an order she could not work with him, but the order was revoked. The magistrates overrode
practitioner opinion, which they have the right to do, but it did not equate to joined up justice.

Sentencers cannot be told a service user is a PPO until a guilty plea has been entered or secured and the Probation Service is not allowed to reveal their status in the Pre-Sentence Report. As the Courts Service manager explained “Just because Johnny Smith has been in for seven burglaries before doesn’t mean to say that he actually did this one...you shouldn’t jump to conclusions and that’s why impartiality is key...” Yet PPO practitioners attend court to provide enhanced information to the Crown Prosecution Service, thereby indirectly advertising the service user’s status.

The detective sergeant wanted the prison probation officer to check release addresses to improve resettlement planning, but PPOs were being dispersed around the prison estate making communication problematic. The prison probation officer stated “…there are only three prisons in {Baker County} you would think they would talk to each other about transfers but there is absolutely no communication between them.” The probation manager reiterated “… there is an issue about the Prison Service that’s very important, because at any one time there is huge numbers of prolific offenders that we work with up and down the country in custody.”

The Police Force had given the most in terms of management time and commitment and had allocated more resources to the programme than other agencies. However, this did not translate into obvious power imbalances. No dominance was observed during meetings, each agency had good quality information to contribute and share. Kemshall and Maguire’s (2001,p.256) research found a sharing of information, but unlike in Jones Town, there was no integration of interventions in the delivery of the sentence plan. The probation manager’s perspective was:

“I do think I’ve been fortunate working with {detective inspector}...but there is no doubt that the police is a powerful part...I think it is fundamental to have good honest working relationships with your colleague managers...we have been fortunate to have good committed people, that wanted to work on the problems that we’ve had and where there has been a difference of opinion, are prepared to try and work through it and
certainly are prepared enough to try and respect that difference to try and engage with it rather than back away from it.”

The detective inspector and sergeant were concerned and committed and wanted to do a good job. Their style was similar, both chaired the JRC well, their leadership evidenced elements of being consultative and facilitative, neutral sometimes, at other times influencing a particular course of action. They valued contributions through effective listening and probed alternative ways of managing PPOs, drawing on all available resources to maximize interventions. The detective sergeant would then say “OK, happy with that? Right moving on...?” to progress the meeting. The managers had ‘human inclusive skills’ (Murphy 2004,p.131), listening to create rapport, gain commitment and explore compromise.

The detective sergeant was a patient and articulate partnership co-ordinator, her nurturing role attempted to cultivate and maintain positive relations, she was proactive in taking up issues to address outside the JRC. For example she would speak to a Police Force colleague about two fixed penalty notices that had been given to two PPOs for shoplifting. The decision was not consistent with how the programme was trying to manage the PPOs, but was related to issues of responsibility for flagging PPO status on the Police Force’s national computer to alert other practitioners. “…fixed penalty notices are designed for low level crime and one of the criteria on the list is ‘do not issue these to PPOs’ but I’ve spoken to [PPO development officer] and it’s still under contention who will put the markers on the system.” [Detective sergeant].

Practitioners and managers regularly talked to each other outside the JRC via telephone, email, joint visits and as a result of co-location. Management practices aimed to support collaboration through the monthly JRC and weekly meetings, protocols, agency leaflets, and the matrix. Structure and processes were linked through the web of tasks and relationships. As Roaf (2002,p.109) has claimed “The significance of the network in a coordinating structure thus centres on its role in the feedback loop. Unless all those involved with the client group can be involved important information and insights are lost.” A key management task was to formalize informal networks to share learning and develop skills. “…sharing immediately on a weekly basis, I mean that doesn’t require co-location it just requires the meeting to happen once a week…”[Probation manager].
The detective inspector made reference on a number of occasions to the need to feed information to the data analyst who acted as a co-ordinator. “I really need all the information to come back to a single point of contact.” She was a lynch pin, occupying an informal leadership role in the JRC, binding the agencies together. As Castells (2000) has asserted in the ‘information age‘ networks are key to organizing functions and processes. Bergquist et al (1995,p.38) claim that partnership offers new challenges to managers used to bureaucracies and cite Senge (1990) who “… speaks of the value of dialogue, as opposed to just discussion…when we communicate through dialogue we seek out common understandings and shared values and visions, rather than trying to win over the other party or make our point (as we do in discussion).”

The Housing Support manager stated that in managing issues that could be counter productive to collaborative working, he would discuss it first, practitioner to practitioner and if that was unsuccessful, he would meet with the respective manager to try and resolve the issue. Working relationships among managers were good and in the past it had always been possible to resolve problems. As the probation manager explained:

“…somebody comes to you about a member of staff that is from another agency that causes you great concern either allegation of boundary crossing or interpersonal difficulties…you know you need to do something about it and you want to be able to know that you can go to your colleague manager and say that we have a problem and know that you have the confidence in that person that you can share it openly, talk it through…”

After five years, culture management has achieved a well embedded partnership, obstacles have been dealt with. As the treatment manager stated “…at this point in time, there seems a real buy in from everybody…it’s a collective spirit…of openness, willingness to think about their own roles, how they can contribute…at times we have been less functional and that’s been down to people that might really struggle with other peoples’ agendas and practices and therefore not really fit into the whole team thing and it’s been really difficult to manage.”

Steele (1999,p.15) found that third sector managers were pre-occupied with resourcing issues and part of the Housing Support manager’s role was to bid for funding in order to support existing services and fund new initiatives. The constant search for funding took up
much time, commissioning costs were high and adhering to the reporting instructions and evaluation reports required by the funder took up valuable resources. Additionally, sponsors preferred to put their money into particular initiatives where they could see a visible benefit, rather than donate money that becomes part of a larger project; inevitably this resulted in small pots of money and problems in aggregating funds. However, on the positive side the Housing Support manager said he was able think more innovatively in the third sector and was less constrained by performance targets, having more freedom to develop provision.

Two different quality paradigms were noted between the inspection based standards approach and the continuous improvement approach. A commonly held manager view was that quality revolved around the delivery of a premium service, so poor engagement from non-core providers was a quality issue. The probation manager stated that some quality work had been achieved:

“…but a lot of our focus has been about quantity because a lot of our targets are process type of targets…I’ve always however been a believer in having the right kind of attitudes and values even through processes…we do have to try and see beyond where a target is trying to take us…the underpinning rational…to get away from… ‘you’ve just got to do this because’…if a manager sees that there isn’t an underpinning rational then they need to take action about it…”

The treatment manager explained the idea behind the premium service “…{it} strives to deliver a responsive service…so if you are offending you are likely to be picked up quicker and processed quicker…get back into treatment or get back into prison…limit the damage that you do to yourself and other people…being able to respond immediately to requests from probation or police or prison…more than one person involved with you at any one time…it is the cream of practice really, it should be aspired to for all service users…it is a great practice to get in to…it transfers into a level of support and supervision which is second to none…we can all work together to keep a tight hold of somebody…”

The Primary Care Trust during the research period had two vacancies that were impacting on their ability to undertake DRR assessments. The new treatment manager was new to management and was having to learn the role while continuing in a practitioner capacity
whilst the vacancies were filled. He aimed to split each of the new posts between the PPO and DRR teams. His rationale for this was to provide cover for practitioner absence; each practitioner should be familiar which each other’s caseload and would rotate attendance at the JRC. The detective sergeant raised concerns about how this would work in practice. The probation officer said that it had worked well previously and the detective sergeant appeared reassured. Of course much could depend on who is appointed and their ability to work together.

The partnership is dynamic, but succession planning was mixed. The new detective sergeant was in post before the old one left to go on maternity leave, but there were gaps filling the posts for treatment manager and detective inspector. The partnership has been vulnerable to manager changes, by summer 2009 all had left, two to retirement, two on maternity leave and one for promotion. There was a consequentional loss of institutional memory and a concern that the new probation manager may not be interested in the programme. The treatment manager described how she had planned for the transition, managing change is a key management task.

“…we had a team day with our probation colleagues where we reviewed all the things that have worked for us as a partnership and so a legacy was written down…in an ideal world whoever came in couldn’t immediately change some of the things that the team thought really worked for them, and I think whoever does take over, because it’s all internal people, will follow through…I do worry, but I also feel that structures have been in place now for a length of time, that everyone has bought into it and ultimately the role of the manager is to make yourself redundant in some way. You make it so that your team understands so much of their roles and why they’re doing it and that the processes are in place, that actually if you disappear for a while it will be OK and healthy.”

The detective inspector accepted responsibility for the programme on a day to day basis and finance was co-ordinated and signed off by him. There was no reference to higher management at the JRC and the programme has not been inspected or evaluated. The JRC and the steering group were linked through the attendance of the managers at both meetings as well as the data analyst. All the managers appeared to have sufficient authority to make the required decisions.
The detective sergeant fed back issues from the steering group to the JRC about mental health representation, changes to Police Force PPO programme boundaries and revisions to the premium service protocol by the prison governors, but the JRC agenda did not allow for regular feedback on performance and strategy. There was little talk of costs, legislation or circulars, there was a reference at one meeting to Government Office, when the detective sergeant reported changes to the way performance data would be collected, but no discussion ensued.

Traditionally, practitioners are the source of the information on which accountability is assessed. Lipsky (1980,p.164) states, “Management control systems have symbolic value providing concerned publics with reassurances that employees are accountable even if they are not.” Agency self-monitoring and inspection has a mixed history as evidenced from child protection enquiries of partnership practice (Laming 2009) and Lipsky (1980,p.159) believes that “…accountability is virtually impossible to achieve among lower-level workers who exercise high degrees of discretion, at least where qualitative aspects of the work are involved.”

However, at the JRC managers were actively involved in PPO supervision and as such were well informed. Decisions were visible, taken as a team with an opportunity to peer review; such transparent processes limited the opportunity for hidden agendas. What was clear was that managers held practitioners in high regard and were confident about their practice. Practitioners were instrumental to the JRC’s effectiveness (Bardach 1998); they were in force at the meetings and through their relationships with each other, held the programme together.

Managers and practitioners had a shared interest in achieving partnership goals but practitioners did resist managerial pressure. The probation support officer did not want a PPO taken off the list, the reasons seemed to coalesce around the fact that the PPO was a ‘success story’ and the practitioner liked working with him, it made her ‘feel good’. The probation manager challenged her as he thought the PPO should come off, but what was interesting in this exchange was that the detective sergeant as chair did not ask for a decision to be made.
A second incident involved the community support worker who had given two PPOs a joint appointment to see him. A discussion took place and the community support worker was challenged by other practitioners and the managers regarding his decision. Concern was expressed that the PPO who was more dominant, could lead the other astray. The community support worker defended his decision, but appeared flustered and was not happy about withdrawing the offer.

The probation support officer asked the community support worker if he was coming to the probation office the next day, he said he was and she replied “We will sort this out tomorrow…” and it was left at that. There did not seem to be any obvious repercussions from this incident in terms of the community support worker’s interaction with colleagues afterwards, and the probation support officer’s interventions could be interpreted as a need to save face, by passing the managers.

Managers recognized that practitioners are the primary input and the most expensive resource, their expertise with service users is part of the change process (Farrall and Calverley 2006). Still, as Johnson (1998,p.78) states “capability is not innate...changing potential into capability requires communication, training, support, and encouragement...” Individualized practitioner supervision was a key management task, the role hinged on the concept of performance, and involved coaching to change practitioner attitudes and practice, monitoring case records for national standards and advice on career development.

As the treatment manager explained:

“Supervision has been a massive part of trying to develop people’s way of thinking about other agencies...developing staff skills at working with and alongside somebody with totally different agendas...there has been one person who really has struggled with their role...they have been invited to take part in more collaborative pieces of work, that allows them to see what other agencies do...it’s giving opportunities to people to really look and learn and see and understand because a lot of it is based on not understanding...people are also entitled to their view and I think that if they come from a really strong training base and find it so hard to change then it’s probably right to move on...that’s what managers are about...staying true to what they would like the team to look like and not bend to the will of an individual whose come along and thinks you shouldn’t be doing that with them...”
Crawford (1999,p.297) has argued that conflict should be an element of partnership as it is a fundamental aspect of social life. Bergquist et al (1995,p.83) talk of the creative management of conflict where success is not about conflict avoidance but “…finding a commonly acceptable solution, since neither partner can control the common enterprise without the consent of the other.” The treatment manager gave a good example of how managers over the years have shaped what the partnership looked like:

“…we’re very used to working in isolation within agencies where our decisions are final…when you work with other agencies, it has to be a compromise based on the agendas that are around…our stance has come historically from safety…acting unsafely then we’d rather they weren’t in treatment but there have been times when we’ve had to compromise for the sake of the bigger picture and that takes constant nurturing of those values and beliefs about working together…”

On occasions there were breakdowns in communication. The Prison Service had scripted a PPO although the Primary Care Trust had asked them not to, the prison probation officer was asked to check this out and report back. The probation manager reported delays in getting drug test results from the Primary Care Trust and said that data can be compromised by a lack of detail. However, such issues did not undermine the partnership’s functioning.

Pearson et al (1992,p.56) have said that “The way in which the ‘same’ problem makes a very different impact upon the routine workloads of the various agencies means that agency personnel will often have widely divergent perceptions of various problems…” It was obvious that PPOs tell one agency one thing and another agency another and that practitioners had different viewpoints. The community support worker to treatment manager “…don’t mean to contradict but attendance has been a problem…” but the JRC enabled differing experiences to be heard.

As a successful partnership it has a dense web of interpersonal relationships that enhance learning, evidenced by willingness to share specialist knowledge and experience as well as seeking advice and suggestions. A Housing Support practitioner asked “How do people feel if we take this approach?” There was the opportunity to explore new ideas; the treatment manager suggested to the community support worker that he might wish to
utilize a new intervention package issued by the DAT. The probation officer explained the MAPPA process, the treatment manager recounted the effects of certain drugs and Housing Support practitioners explained benefit rules. The Police Force managers overlapping programme mandate meant they could exchange ideas from one to the other.

The partnership involved more than knowledge transfer, the acquisition of new skills developed a ‘community of practice’ (Wave and Lenger 1991) where tacit and systemized knowledge was applied to problems and a partnership memory constructed. As Homel et al (2004, p.68) have stated “Effective knowledge management is basic to the continuing development and evolution of effective crime reduction activity.”

The Probation Service was once criticized for poor sentence enforcement but in recent years has become good at enforcing, too good, as the Ministry of Justice is now in the process of shifting the emphasis to retention. The probation manager stated that the recent history of the Probation Service had allowed the enforcement agenda to coalesce around the PPO programme and this raised issues of how you measure success. Government Office measured performance in terms of achieving the 12 per cent re-conviction target, but the Housing Support manager used qualitative data from case studies to measure performance, for example length of stay in accommodation and rated the data as of equal importance.

For the probation manager it was time now to stand back and evaluate what had been achieved. “…it has to come back to somebody with the right skills to engage in working with people and to influence people and to constructively engage with people, we have become so concerned about processes, specialisms…that we’ve lost the overall sense about how do we overall work with a person and that’s what partnership should be about.”

55 per cent of people arrested for acquisitive crime reported having taken heroin, crack or cocaine in the previous twelve months (Home Office 2007c, p.16) and Hough (1996) found that targeting drug misusing offenders could reduce crime. The DIP manager explained how change could come about:

“…they are the revolving door clients…they’re really difficult…a client coming out of prison they’re committing crime five or six crimes a day, now the saving for them
not even doing crime for three months, is huge…if it takes 6,7,8 times before that person actually cracks it, they’re making progress every time…clicks for no rhyme or reason just that the person is in the right space at the right time and when they are, if the supports there for them it works, that time frame can be very short lived and it needs to be there for when they want it."

Little concern was evidenced from practitioners about overall partnership performance, but the performance framework had enabled managers to exercise control and direct improvement as the treatment manager revealed.

“…one point in time referrals for DRRs kind of fell to the wayside…we discovered that what was really needed by probation officers was to have a clinic at probation for us to be there with them so they had an immediate response from our workers…we set that system up and it has proved to be invaluable…that’s the role the manager would take, to discuss it with another manager to work at what’s needed…simple example of the multitude of bits of interface between the edges, a huge part that’s never measured other than by whether the thing works or doesn’t at any moment in time…”

Lipsky (1980,p141) has argued that ‘street level bureaucrats’ adopt coping skills to manage their work and change can threaten these strategies, because of this change may be resisted. In the partnership practices were conducive to change; manageable workloads, good management, competent and experienced practitioners and success provided a secure base from which change could be negotiated. Change had been incremental as the partnership adapted and matured, the community support worker’s role to improve social crime interventions and changes to the premium service protocol, a dynamic document. There was some evidence of continuing doing ‘what we have always done’; this could be interpreted as inertia or working with what works. The treatment manager voices how the partnership has matured:

“…watching how agencies have adapted to each other and having seen both sides, probation and health, there was always a kind of mutual respect of what they did but…a wariness certainly about sharing information big, big thing that’s changed…agencies have changed in their understanding of what other people do…what their part is in other
peoples’ agendas…we’ve understood that we have to be upfront with clients…and that’s become a much healthier place to work in…better in the long run for service users…”

Any other business

Time management skills were required to progress the agenda and provide the opportunity for all agencies to contribute to the discussion, skills which both Police Force managers had. The JRC is three and a half hours long, but this included the two smaller CDRP lists. The meetings are well structured with a good pace through out, but the list’s length restricted discussion of the custody cases, but the meetings did end on time for lunch. At her final meeting, days before Christmas, the researcher thanked the practitioners and managers for allowing her to observe their practice and shared a tin of chocolates, before heading off home to type up her field notes, while they were still fresh in her mind.

Conclusion

Hill and Hupe (2009) state that many implementation studies are about implementation gaps, but this case study is about successful policy implementation. Implementation can be described as successful on two counts, meeting the performance target and the added public value generated through the synergy of the managers and practitioners involved in the programme. The case is special due to its shared leadership and the levering in of resources from the private and third sector and the community and is an example of a well managed partnership. As the treatment manager concludes:

“Given the resource restrictions that we’ve had, it’s grown, it’s developed, it’s been a steady progress, but ultimately I think it’s possibly one of the best pieces of work that I have been involved in as a manager…it can be improved and has had to be over the years…it’s been a forum to find out what’s missing and communicate about the real issues for service users and try and find the right resources…”

Crime has a major impact on communities and offenders and its multiple aetiology lends itself to partnership. The partnership has enabled agencies the freedom to move beyond their traditional boundaries to offer a holistic view of the PPO and deliver more effective interventions. As the probation manager explained “…so many people that we’re working
Joyce and Smith (2006,p.19) have asserted that if the partnership is seen as a better way of working, it is more likely to lead to innovation in core service delivery and to allow integration between partners. If however, the emphasis is on the partnership as an organizational entity the partnership can be viewed as an umbrella organization. Jones Town fits the former description, the partnership was institutionalized and not an optional extra, it was key to service delivery and has laid excellent foundations on which to innovate. As Cropper (1996,p.83) states “Sustainability is a behavioural quality which connotes future persistence, continuity and continuing viability: it is both an outcome of, and a consideration in, the design and regulation of collaborative working...”

It has taken time to create a well designed, mutually respectful and trusting partnership, this has been achieved through a nurturing approach, attention to detail and the application of significant resources and personal energy. Rackham et al (1996,p.13) state “Successful partnerships have moved far beyond transactional relationships and have achieved a level of closeness...” This closeness has entailed the sharing of ideas, expertise, money and knowledge leading to a mutual recognition of the importance of each partner’s assets to achieve success which has reinforced commitment and helped balance power.

Williams (2002,p.119) cites three factors in managing collaboratively, inter-agency experience of different sectors, transdisciplinary knowledge and cognitive capability. All the managers interviewed impressed with their cognitive capability and their cross sector experience bolstered the partnership’s management. The probation manager had previously worked in a prison and the Housing Support manager had previously worked for the Probation Service, the treatment manager used to be a probation officer and the two police managers were both committed to partnership work. Furthermore, three of the managers were also involved in other partnerships and the treatment team was multi-disciplinary.

The data supports Williams (2002,p.106) assertion that individuals are key to partnership success. The partnership was lucky in having such a committed group of managers with what Roaf (2002,p.98) has identified as strong and effective inter-agency and interpersonal skills. Successful partnerships have vision “… a compelling picture of what the partnership
can achieve and specifically, how it is going to get there.” (Rackham et al 1996,p.13), and impact, which is about results. The managers’ enthusiasm had inspired confidence and encouraged the practitioners to adopt the fundamental position that PPOs needed to benefit from the programme.

The experience of boundary spanning, managers’ positive attitudes and preparedness to share power enabled them to give up some control in the interests of the programme. Managers fostered a culture of core practice based on personalized interventions to address complex multi-causal problems, through the levering in of resources from a range of providers, in collaboration with the PPOs themselves. Social crime interventions predominated supporting Wikstrom and Butterworth’s (2006) research which has demonstrated that situational measures are not effective with PPOs.

Jones Town has many clearly defined features of the CPM model: the shared leadership arrangement, joint decision-making, a pluralistic structure veering to full co-location, integrated knowledge processes and concurrent service delivery and shared management of tasks and accountability for success. However, a focus on improved outcomes in terms of performance demonstrates the tensions between the models. NPM focuses on the extrinsic target set by Government Office, where as for the managers although this target is important, managerial practice is wrapped up with intrinsic notions of success like stable accommodation. Such interventions can and do support the achievement of the performance target, but they are not explicitly measured, but clearly inform the programme’s management.

The next chapter will present the case study of Smith Town’s PPO implementation that shares similar features with Jones Town, the steering group, the Police Force managers and partial co-location of its practitioners, but lacks effective shared leadership and the Housing Support project.
Chapter 6: A case study of Smith Town’s PPO programme

Smith Town

Smith Town covers two district councils, a number of towns and a geographically dispersed rural population. The principal town operates as sub-regional centre for public administration, health care, business, culture, sport, tourism and the PPO programme. The population stands at 146,833, of whom 98.7 per cent are white. Yet the population can triple in the summer months due to holidaymakers enjoying the coast and moor. The permanent population is also increasing, with the sixty plus residents accounting for between 25 and 30 per cent of the total. The largest employer is local government but employment prospects are limited, and the economy can be described as low waged, but with high housing costs, unemployment is 2.4 per cent. The college of further education is the area’s major provider of post-16 education and training. Jones Town is fifty miles away by single track branch line or A road and many citizens commute there for work.

CDRPs have merged to create economies of scale and to increase their presence. Smith Town is a merged CDRP, but interestingly has operated as a single partnership developing plans and priorities since the 1998 Act. Smith Town has one of the lowest crime levels in the UK with the area enjoying a continual decline in crime, including violent crime, vehicle crime, house burglary and criminal damage. Despite this, many members of the community believe that crime and anti-social behaviour are on the increase. There is a level of fear disproportionate to reported levels, especially in the more remote communities and amongst the older population. The CDRP’s priorities for 2008-11 are: to reduce the impact on communities of anti-social behaviour and the harm caused by alcohol and drugs, domestic abuse, and prejudice and hate crime, and to reduce the numbers of first time entrants into the Youth Justice System and to tackle behaviour that hurts, intimidates and offends, for example PPOs.

Attendance

There are four agencies involved in the delivery of the PPO programme: the Police Force, Probation Service, Primary Care Trust and the DIP. The treatment manager stated “The PPO scheme was literally forced upon us, we didn’t ask for it, it was a scheme devised by
government who said this is called the PPO scheme, we want you to implement it in your area, off you go...there was no set standard or structure for that...the whole system developed, in a very adhoc, learn while you’re on the hoof...” Unlike the treatment manager the probation manager had not been around from its inception, but he believed that the programme had been built upon existing good partnership arrangements.

The Police Force’s staffing contribution to the programme is the two managers we met in the Jones Town study and two practitioners, one police constable and a part-time data analyst. The Probation Service’s contribution is a full-time probation officer and a part-time probation support officer and a case administrator. The manager has other responsibilities besides managing the PPO team. The Primary Care Trust contributes one full-time treatment practitioner and a community support worker, but the manager has other duties in addition to his PPO remit. The DIP contributes one 0.5 practitioner and the Prison Service contributes one probation officer part-time, shared with Jones Town.

Whilst the research was taking place six Smith Town PPOs were being held at Jones Town prison with eleven being held out of county. Original Home Office (2004) guidance suggested that the majority of PPOs should be in the community or facing imminent release from custody. In 2009, nationally 33 per cent of all PPOs were serving a custodial sentence with 82 per cent sentenced to over 12 months (Home Office and Ministry of Justice 2009,p.13). This recent guidance recommends that priority should be given to those sentenced to less than 12 months and those not subject to statutory supervision.

In addition, Addaction, a third sector alcohol provider is involved through providing counselling and group work via a part-time practitioner. One of the district councils funded an innovative scheme, the rough sleeper project, where an outreach practitioner and a homeless centre engaged PPOs who are of no fixed abode. In addition there are a small number of third sector accommodation projects all with limited short-term capacity.

The new detective inspector explained that “…accommodation has always been challenging…I think it’s absolutely fantastic that we’ve got small agencies out there that do offer this kind of service and are prepared to engage with us, because the police can’t achieve it all by themselves, even with probation we can’t, because it’s a community
responsibility, everybody wants offending to be reduced, this is recognizing who does what…”

The Probation Service has increasingly under pressure from government, offloaded tasks traditionally undertaken by them on to third sector providers. Partly as cost savings but also to concentrate resources on public protection duties with the rebranding of the Probation Service away from its social work roots of ‘advise, assist and befriend.’ The probation manager explained that the third sector agencies:

“…have developed on behalf of our service good links with the district council housing providers and they have become quite specialist really…it’s those sorts of support for the PPO scheme that is quite critical…because if someone hasn’t got a roof over their head you start from a very difficult base.”

The private sector is also involved through the private company that escorts PPOs from court to prison and through monitoring Home Detention Curfews. There is no involvement from the CDRP or YOT. The local community could be engaged through problem identification and/or volunteering, but were not. However, family members and other PPOs shared community information that was fed back into the JRC to inform decision-making. The JRC was not open to the public and there was no public access to the minutes.

However, there is scope for management innovation by involving the community, to open up areas of public discourse and to create an active citizenry (Ransom and Stewart 1994,p.253) to address government’s desire for greater community engagement on crime and to respond to issues of locality. The YOT manager spoke about how crime affects different communities. “I can think of a young man from Swansea who came down to a small village and ended up very quickly gaining an ASBO which is rare in Smith Town, we only have four at the moment…but probably for behaviour that in Swansea would be accepted, but in a small village wouldn’t be…”

The programme is accommodated as follows. The DIP practitioner is located upstairs in the same building as the Primary Care Trust with the community support worker. The probation office is literally over the road where the probation practitioners and manager and police constable are located. The police station where the monthly JRC is held is two
minutes walk away and here the data analyst is located. “...if there is a difference in perception...by being here I can iron that out really easily, if the {probation manager} has a difference of opinion to me, I don’t have to do it by email I can go across the road...I’m so close to him, I would see him most days.” {Treatment manager}.

The average attendance at the JRC was ten. Four from the Police Force, detective inspector and sergeant, police constable and data analyst; two from the Probation Service, probation officer and probation support officer, the case administrator did not attend any of the meetings. Three from the treatment providers, the treatment and DIP practitioner and the community support worker and finally the prison probation officer. All were white, except the new detective inspector and half were male. The four key managers for the programme are the detective inspector, detective sergeant, probation and treatment managers, but it is significant that the latter two have no history of attending the JRC.

“I have to confess I tend to leave that to my police colleagues to take forward and because of the nature of my role here you tend to be a few steps away from those sorts of activities really. I personally don’t go to the JRC, I delegate that to my probation officer...because I’ve got confidence in the probation officer, I leave him with his team to run the unit and I mean I dip in and dip out, I have more of a sort of strategic role certainly, more than an operational role.” {Probation manager}.

Later on in interview the probation manager asserted “I’m very much an operational manager so I have some links into the LAA...but it’s not something that I’ve got the time to take on really.” Pearson et al (1992,p.50) also found discrepancies that “…revealed significant levels of disjunction between attitudes and opinions of agency personnel towards multi-agency working, as against actual practice…” The data for both the treatment and probation managers found observed and reported behaviour not being congruent.

Non-attendance at the JRC could be seen as signalling a lack of commitment to the partnership process, in addition to creating breakages in communication and being unavailable when needed to progress issues they have responsibility for. Moreover, it means that the Police Force managers have no option but to chair the JRC. The new detective inspector made it clear that he would be held responsible if the partnership failed
to meet its performance target. Moreover, attendance would enhance their awareness of how resources are being used. For example if the probation manager was present he would observe that the probation support officer’s engagement with the JRC is poor and that her time might be better spent on other tasks.

Pearson et al’s (1992,p.64) research also “…uncovered sufficient evidence of weakness and lapses in systems of representation to suggest that a degree of formality, with agreed areas of delegated authority for participants…” were required. Formalized representation and consistent attendance was a clear desire of the detective sergeant. On appointment in December 2008 the new detective inspector stated:

“…I’ve identified the key partners, making contact to find out what their views are in terms of where the scheme is strong and where it’s weak...sometimes there is friction between partners, more often than not it’s because of a lack of understanding between what each other are doing, and sometimes there are personality issues, and certainly one of my key roles is making sure that we can still work effectively together. There will be independent agendas going on, one organization gets hit through financial difficulties, that places pressures on them and they might not be able to deliver a service...I don’t want the other partners to start taking resources away...so one of my key roles is making sure that I’ve got relationships with all the partners...but I also make sure that I facilitate their relationships as far as I reasonably can with each other.”

The probation manager commented on this new appointment. “…seamless transition really, I’m sure things will change because that’s the nature of the business but in terms of the commitment and in terms of the joined up working I don’t anticipate any difficulties on that front, and to that extent it’s not individually driven, there’s a clear commitment from the police and from ourselves…”

However the treatment manager claimed “It’s a very personality led business and the police have a higher turnover than anybody else...{detective inspector} was becoming probably an expert in the field...all that knowledge now is gone {new detective inspector} has to pick it up and to learn...that makes the job more difficult…”
The different perspectives between the two managers perhaps indicates how they have come to separate conclusions as a result of their isolationist response to partnership. Bryson and Crosby (1992, p.55) assert that leadership needs to be shared because the tasks are complex and interconnected in partnership, but both these managers appeared very agency focused. The probation manager described the treatment manager as the ‘scarlet pimpernel’ in reference to the researcher’s difficulty in tracking him down for interview, and the data raises doubts about whether both managers could be engaged more collaboratively.

The JRC took place in a well equipped and pleasant second floor meeting room at the police station overlooking the river. On entering, the researcher observed that everyone appeared to know each other, conversations were in progress, coffee and biscuits were being shared, with an atmosphere of readiness for business. The new detective inspector, as chair brought the meeting to order, it was his first JRC since his promotion from MAPPA and he chaired all three. He introduced himself and the researcher, who took a few minutes to explain the research. The communication tool used to disseminate information was identical to the one used in Jones Town and the data analyst’s role was the same, except the action points were not as detailed. The new detective inspector read out the information exchange protocol and all present signed it.

**PPO nominations**

Nominations were dealt with first, using the same matrix template as in Jones Town with the data analyst following the same routine. Not much partner information was utilized at the matrix stage; drug and/or alcohol misuse was not included, only the offences of drug supply or possession. The omission of partner information at this stage fails to reflect their core business and is thus not inclusive, creating an initial power imbalance. Coleman et al (2002, p.90) report a ‘powerful structural imperative’ resulting in a hierarchy of information, with Police Force statistical data at the top. The treatment manager commented:

> “...the police are very good with partnership work, they’re probably some of the forerunners in it, they saw many years ago that they couldn’t do the job by themselves, they needed other people to help them, but there’s a lot of feeling with the police about how
they disseminate information, they’re historically entrenched in being secretive, in case they let anything out of the bag that might alarm the public…health comes from a slightly different perspective in that the labels blew off…many years ago and the philosophy for PCT is that we have an open, transparent, robust service…”

An interesting quote, as research has pointed to treatment providers’ unwillingness to disclose information (Dawson 2005,p.5); however there was no information exchange problems witnessed in the case study.

The detective inspector looked at the positives and negatives of taking a prospective PPO on to the list, mindful of the need to address offending but conscious of the scale, as this can affect the performance target. He stated “…too many convictions will really hurt us…any indication that he is going to engage with us?” There could be the temptation to play it safe, but no nomination was refused due to offending levels. The programme was full at forty three, and the detective sergeant advised the detective inspector of the need to keep the list to forty, as this was the figure originally specified by government.

However, there did appear to be a lack of clear criteria for PPO selection and a risk that in a low crime area that lower level offenders could be drawn into the programme, a process known as ‘net-widening’ (Cohen 1985). There is a particular focus on burglary and drug offences, but there are shoplifters and some young offenders involved in anti-social behaviour that do not fit the usual profile. The detective sergeant asked “Are we getting relevant referrals from the Police Force?” The new detective inspector said he would take a look at referrals in, but the data analyst was concerned she did not get ‘swamped’ with loads of inappropriate referrals, due to the time needed to complete the matrix. Prolific or persistent offending is dynamic (Hagell and Newburn 1994) as such mechanisms need to be continually revisited to ensure maximum impact.

There appeared to be a need to balance the requirement to follow formal procedure, with the reality of a stretched data analyst and incomplete information. An out of area Police Force referral, lacked up to date intelligence, so scoring could not be compared. Moreover, the probation officer and police constable had accepted a PPO on to the list that by passed the data analyst. There were no formal repercussions from this failure to follow process except from the data analyst herself, who was not happy at being excluded. The
nomination had not been matrixed or discussed at the JRC, but the pair justified their non-adherence to process as a ‘swap’ for a PPO transferred out.

The exchange illustrates how the management models co-exist and exert pressures for differing practices, an informal approach such as this flouts procedural guidelines to speed up practice. As Pearson et al (1992,p.65) state “…more informal and fluid systems of interagency relations seem to offer a more workable basis for communication and negotiation.” The treatment manager appeared to support this informal approach. “You’ve got to be very creative because they might not necessarily score high enough to be on the list but there can be other factors that you can factor in to get them on…where they are not committing high volumes of crime but the knock on effect is phenomenal…you have got lots of leeway to do that…”

YOT transfers are an issue as there is no procedure in place to facilitate transfers from Prevent and Deter. A referral had originally come through a neighbourhood police constable due to a young person causing trouble in his village. The data analyst had collated some information, but the JRC was of the view that the Smith Town YOT manager, who was known to practitioners should attend to provide more details, as a result the nomination was deferred, delaying proceedings.

Original Prevent and Deter guidance stated the need for ‘an effective strategic join’ between the three strands (Home Office 2004b,p.7). More recent Youth Justice Board (2006,p.3) guidance states “The Prevent and Deter…strand of the PPO Scheme is critical to securing the reduction of crime and Anti Social Behaviour…and critical to a fully functioning and effective local PPO scheme…For some time, many Crime and Disorder Partnerships have struggled to identify and deliver the added value of the P and D scheme…”

The probation manager’s explanation for the situation with the YOT, hinged on the assertion that the YOT had gone through some changes, culminating in the appointment of a new manager. Yet, cultural differences were also cited, young offenders were perceived as getting off with light punishments despite high rates of offending. “...never had long enough prison sentence to allow him to get uncomfortable…” {Police constable}.
In interview the YOT manager explained “…the link with the adult list, it’s not formal…when somebody on the Prevent and Deter list is 17 and ¾…we would nominate them to the adult meeting…we’d go and we’d present them…some of the people that cause us a great deal of worry end up coming out so low on the matrix they think it’s not really worth worrying about…their emphasis is a little more punitive but not massively so. But what I’m jealous of, is that they do seem to have some resources that the meeting can deploy, they’ve got a little fund for housing…”

Non-YOT transfers within Baker County tended to go smoothly, however an out of county transfer took over a month to resolve as the receiving partnership initially refused to accept the transfer because of risk issues, although the same Police Force and Probation Service were involved. The probation officer stated “We take people from other areas…we are paid to manage the risk, so should they.” It was reported that the probation manager did not want to intervene; if he were at the meeting he would have had to defend his decision. The other programme was portrayed as parochial, not wanting outside PPOs to be transferred in, however the service user’s girlfriend was in the county and he wanted to join her. Such processes risked inertia and insularity and the JRC’s view was the need to manage risk across borders, required the LCJB, who has responsibility for both partnerships to be more hands on.

The programme requires a churn of offenders. Recent guidance suggests de-selection if the PPO has stopped offending for 6 months, moved to another area or received a significant custodial sentence. Nationally in 2009, 51 per cent of PPOs had been managed for over 2 years, 17 per cent for 3 years, 16 per cent for 4 years and 18 per cent for 5 years (Home Office and Ministry of Justice 2009,p.9). Removal from Smith Town’s programme was not an agendered item, practitioners did not nominate PPOs for removal, it was manager led.

Two possible removals were discussed but deferred for further interventions to take place. The new detective inspector asked “What would we need from him to take him off?” Data suggests that a PPO needed to do more than simply remain offence free. The new detective inspector again “How can we motivate [PPO] to constructively use his leisure time?…Have we reflected back to him that police and probation think he is doing really well?” There was a chorus of replies from around the table in the affirmative.
The new detective inspector wondered “Is he still benefiting from the scheme?” The police constable felt that the programme kept the PPO focused and did not at this stage want the PPO to come off the list. “…if you want to remove him then you can… but I am happy to keep him on.” The new detective inspector asserted the need for a planned exit strategy and it was agreed to look into employment options first, and then consider removal. The community support worker suggested using coming off the programme as a ‘carrot’ to engagement.

In the second example of a PPO who had not offended for 2 years, the new detective inspector asked “Do we still need to target him?” The community support worker stated he was stabilized, but the probation officer wanted to give him a couple more months to act as ‘a reminder’, the JRC agreed to review the case in three months time. There is some evidence that the programme is not targeting the most prolific offenders and there are issues of proportionality. The intensive management of service users with minimal offending. Moreover, those PPOs on the Catch and Convict strand are non-statutory, but they have no right to challenge their designation. PPOs are offered voluntary contact on de-selection, especially through the DIP, though take up is not high. Some PPOs have been on the list for three years, when this was raised with the probation manager he replied:

“…part of it is about how entrenched some of the offending is… sometimes I think we expect that people can change, maybe not overnight but very quickly and it ain’t like that… well fortunately we are all driven by the concept of integrity so we certainly don’t massage the figures.”

The JRC had the autonomy to decide whom to take on and off the list, unconstrained by senior management, the CDRPs or the Home Office, but data points to the need for a clear and visible referral process. Lipsky (1980) has argued that government cannot totally control the implementation process and that local discretion will result in diverse implementation involving non-uniform provision and the data supports this.

PPO case review

After nominations are dealt with each PPO on the list is reviewed to share information about what had been achieved in the last month and what action to take next. PPOs are
located in tier 4 of the NOMS banding of interventions, to receive the highest level of surveillance and control, and the most comprehensive interventions through the case management approach. This involves a probation officer co-ordinating a range of interventions that are appropriate to the service user’s needs. Health treatments also fall into four tiers:

tier 1 advice
tier 2 DIP interventions
tier 3 statutory treatments
tier 4 residential.

The programme has greater control over statutory PPOs, than non-statutory PPOs. For prospective statutory PPOs there is a tendency to favour proposing a community order with conditions, for example a DRR or condition of residence to gain more leverage. The new detective inspector stated that the programme needed to assert its authority over the PPO, ‘the stick and then the carrots’. Service delivery is responsive to the PPO as there are three levels of DRR, which shape the intensity of the involvement from agencies, but this is not alluded to at the JRC.

DRR targets are cross cutting and apply to the Primary Care Trust and the Probation Service. Still, as the treatment manager eloquently put it “…we can’t get the commencements if the police don’t go out and nick them…” As the table below demonstrates although the target for commencements was missed, the completion target was superseded for 2008-09 with 12 PPOs in tier 3 treatment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRR targets April 08-April 09</th>
<th>DRR referrals April 08-April 09</th>
<th>Actual for April 08-April 09</th>
<th>DRR targets April 09-April 10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55 commencements</td>
<td>106 referrals</td>
<td>41 commencements</td>
<td>40 commencements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 completions</td>
<td>61 attended for assessment</td>
<td>27 completions</td>
<td>17 completions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The primary concern of the JRC is the individual PPO and how agencies can work collaboratively to improve their life chances, to engage and stabilize with the eventual aim to reduce their offending and drug misuse. There was no mention at the JRC of the impact
PPO offending has on the community; the exception being the YOT case mentioned earlier.

The new detective inspector engaged practitioners by seeking their views through directly asking them for their contributions; in this way he demonstrated that he valued their perspective. Of the community support worker he asked “Do you have any involvement with [a PPO]...I am listening to what you are saying...thanks for that input...” He encouraged others to participate as he questioned and probed alternatives, the duplication of information from a variety of sources created an evidence base for decision-making. If the meeting was lacking information, decision-making was deferred, as practitioners were tasked to go out and get it.

The new detective inspector persuasively made suggestions offering a new appreciation of the issue, a reframing, introducing new ideas, alternative ways of doing to inform action planning. For example “I am thinking of a course of action...” trying to prevent an offence being committed by a PPO, adopting a proactive crime reduction role. The new detective inspector to the community support worker “What can you offer?” To the police constable “Ask him a direct question, have you been given a pasting?” A PPO had exhibited signs of a beating, but had not said as much; the Police Force needed to be seen to exercise their duty of care. The police constable replied “OK, then I'm covered.” Bryson and Crosby (1992,p.48) believe that “The framing process consists of naming and explaining the problem, opening the door to alternative solutions and suggesting outcomes.” This exchange provides a good example of the co-existence of the management models, the juxtaposition of the PA model: the need for documenting procedures with the CPM model: flexibility and creativity in problem solving.

The new detective inspector signalled available resources, to manage the temporary release of a PPO, he suggested the police constable speak to someone in the domestic violence unit. To the data analyst he said “Speak to someone in traffic who will give you the information.” A key management task was encouraging practitioners to refer to other providers, to further develop their contacts with other agencies and use substitute networks. The new detective inspector was interested in accessing fresh resources. “How do we get the CPN involved in this case?” or “How are we going to keep him clean?” He suggested that the partnership went through a PPO’s solicitor to act as a lever to try and get the PPO
involved with Addaction. “Worse thing the solicitor can say is no…is there any more we can do?”

The detective sergeant adopted a similar proactive stance in trying to access resources and establish the direction of travel, to the community support worker “Would it take things forward…can we give it a try?…can you check if we can get him on ETS [Enhanced Thinking Skills]?…have any curfew checks been done?” Interventions were not managed vertically by practitioners working individually with service users, but horizontally and concurrently, referring them on to other agencies when necessary.

There were various referrals to Connexions, Citizens Advice Bureau, Narcotics Anonymous, Sure Start and general practitioners. The new detective inspector was keen to ensure that PPOs were signed up for courses, Skills For Life was mentioned on a number of occasions and Community Pay Back for PPOs off drugs. Yet there was a six week waiting list for mental health assessments and six months for counselling, though family therapy was operating a shorter waiting list and the community support worker had brokered a referral via a general practitioner. Both Police Force managers were promoting service user engagement with a range of social crime interventions.

The Police Force managers asserted that PPOs needed to benefit from the programme. The new detective inspector was performance orientated; he spoke of having his ‘performance head on’ with a remit to move PPOs forward, to address blockages. “…need to get this case finalized and back in court, sort the paper work out…” He asked questions “Has he taken on any rehabilitative work in custody?…How do we get more control over him?” He asserted direction “It’s in our business interests to keep him focused on the family.” Practitioners also made proposals for action, especially the community support worker. “How can we steer him in the right direction?” Retaining PPOs on the programme was important to changing behaviour.

Performance management involves managing the list by making proposals to move a PPO’s colour coded status from red, amber to green. A PPO who is not offending and is working three days a week and had a positive attitude was moved to green with unanimous consent. The new detective inspector suggested moving a PPO back up to amber, the police constable was not in agreement and gave his reasons. The new detective inspector
Practitioners’ tacit knowledge of PPOs has been built up over a number of years and this knowledge and experience was used to assess risk of re-offending and the need for relevant interventions. A PPO who cancelled his appointment with his general practitioner was put up to amber with unanimous consent, the data analyst asserted that “…inconsistency of the behaviour can not support a green status.”

The new detective inspector asked whether the prison probation officer had any influence over cell allocation. He replied that there was a real problem of over crowding and did not think he could sway the process. PPOs have been shipped out of Jones Town prison to other establishments resulting in communication breakdowns and the expenditure of more resources in terms of practitioner visits. Pressure on prison beds also means that PPOs are not being moved back to their local prison before release to aid resettlement. The premium service protocol (Baker County 2008,p.6) states the need to “…avoid the movement of PPOs between prisons where rehabilitative work would be interrupted.” Such environmental constraints impacted on local delivery and managers were pretty powerless to intervene.

“One of the issues for the Prison Service is about capacity, they seem constantly to be in overpopulation pressures and that really undermines what goes on in any individual jail…if you’ve got a set of programmes that you want to deliver that can get totally disrupted by the turnover of inmates…I don’t really think that the Prison Service actually owns PPOs as being one of their priorities…security is unavoidable and everything hinges on that…for those who go into custody I…don’t think they are treated really consistently as a sort of premium service and that has implications for preparations for release…”

{Probation manager}.

Negotiations with the Prison Service had to be managed carefully. The new detective inspector asked the JRC “How do we manage the message we want to give the prison?” This involved a request to stop scripting a PPO for methadone. After a discussion it was agreed that the DIP practitioner would go through CARAT. Part of the NOMS aspiration was for a more joined up approach, but it appears to have some way to go.
A significant knowledge gap was highlighted at the JRC over practitioners’ awareness of the social workers and children involved with PPOs. Following the ‘Baby P’ case (Laming 2009) the new detective inspector was keen that practitioners ascertain this knowledge forthwith. He inferred that the partnership had been taking a risk in not covering itself regarding safeguarding issues and asserted the need to avoid mistakes by generating better links with Children and Young People’s Services. This was a good example of a manager anticipating problems and developing strategies prior to their onset (Bozeman 1979). The new detective inspector’s motivating approach encouraged practitioners to think of other ways of managing cases, pushing the boundaries of what happened before. However, there were a number of social worker vacancies leaving gaps in provision.

In relation to Children and Young People’s Services the new detective inspector asked the police constable “Can you link in with them? They need to tell him the same message re scripting.” Data would suggest that without prior working relationships, the social worker if there was one allocated, might be unwilling for a police constable to come along and tell them how to do their job. Trust is vital to partnership; with no previous history of engagement, conflict could ensue over claims to how best manage the case. Such an approach could reinforce Pearson et al’s (1992,p.56) observation of “…deeply rooted structural oppositions between state agencies working in the sphere of criminal justice, with the dominant tendency for organizations such as social services to be structurally subordinate to police led agendas.”

The new detective inspector was future oriented rather than reactive, keen to ensure that practitioners were proactive in planning for release, even if the partnership was not certain when that would be. Risk management plans are about predicting risk and managing change with sometimes unpredictable and chaotic PPOs. The new detective inspector thus encouraged scenario planning. Practitioners were expected to think of possible negative outcomes and how they would be handled if they did occur. He asked ‘what if’ questions. “What if he gets kicked out of his accommodation for not topping up his rent…how are we going to manage the transition back into the community if he’s not clean?” Such planning was ultimately about preventing re-offending and the detective sergeant also employed this strategy “…what other options do we have here?…what can we do to minimize it happening?”
The Police Force lead on intelligence, chairing the JRC and tasking practitioners, allocating work usually involved liaising with another agency. There was no evidence of practitioners being unwilling to carry out the tasks assigned to them. The new detective inspector to the prison probation officer “Could I ask you, to ask him, if he will take a voluntary drug test?” PPOs on the enhanced regime in Jones Town prison can ask for voluntary drug tests to assist with early release applications.

 “…the problem I’d have is if I turned round to {DIP practitioner} and asked him to do something and he said I can’t do that, I’ll have to speak to my manager…but the impression I’ve got so far is that everybody around that table has pretty much the power to do what they need to do, and whilst I’m still feeling my way, I’m hopefully phrasing my questions in such a way that if anybody isn’t comfortable with doing something I’ve asked them to do then they don’t feel uncomfortable with actually telling me, so at least I can find another way of resourcing it.” [New detective inspector].

Other tasks were self-allocating, agencies controlled specific decisions, processes and services, OASsy, breach and recall are undertaken by the Probation Service. The probation manager was quoted earlier stating that he let the probation officer manage, but later in the interview he contradicted himself. “I’m involved in all decisions about breach…national standards…they’re to be interpreted, and what I’m keen on is successful outcomes of orders and by that I mean not just people who get through the order but people who actually reduce their offending or reduce their harm and it’s a success for them, us and the community…” In other probation teams the manager would not get involved, it would be seen as micro managing and unacceptable to the probation officer.

Drug treatment is through the Primary Care Trust and the community support worker had sole responsibility for diversionary activities. Professional ideologies, enforced by differences in training and supervision and clear task boundaries can prevent the blurring of roles and enable practitioners to articulate their own specific identities and responsibilities. There could be a risk that specialist knowledge and skill sets become diluted if all tasks were shared. In the partnership task sharing tended to be at the lower skill level, home visits were undertaken by agencies often jointly and probation practitioners undertook drug tests. Higher level tasks like prescribing and risk management fell to qualified practitioners. As the treatment manager explained:
“Police and probation’s role is to protect the public, what we have to do is improve public health, we’re not there to protect the public, there is an element of it in our job, where if we think that somebody is going to be at risk to themselves or others, then it’s our responsibility to make sure we make a mental health call...it’s about making sure that we all know what our specific remit is, but being able to help each other out at the same time...to be aware of what other people’s agendas are and what their targets are...we can’t breach people, probation do that, that’s never our call, whether we want somebody breached or not...[equally] we will refuse to prescribe for somebody, you might not agree with that decision but you have to work with us on that...”

A clear argument was made for diversity of practitioners, but where resources did overlap, the new detective inspector stated his preference would be to involve non-PPO practitioners as “…I’m getting somebody else’s resources to do a bit of work for my team and I’m saving them a bit of work. I think it’s much more of a challenge when you have a lot of police staff on the team because you have a lot of people who can offer pretty much the same thing, bar certain elements of specialism...”

Partnership implies a willingness to give up exclusive claims to specialized knowledge and authority to ‘move out of your own professionalism’ (Huxham and Vangen 1996,p.11) to borrow ideas, to realize the potential of shared values, rooted in mutual acceptance of difference and reciprocity, the basis of inter-agency trust. “Sometimes they’ll be some crossover and I’m absolutely certain some of my police officers do things which probation officers would naturally do...it’s not a bad thing you understand each others work...” [New detective inspector]. Agencies did not support client capture or protection of ‘turf’, indicating a mature partnership where the manager’s role is to ensure task integration by practitioners working interdependently across agency boundaries guided by constant communication and feedback.

However, as the treatment manager explained there is a limit. “…when we first started this off, one of the CPNs ended up actually thinking he was a police officer. I observed him, he was very confrontational with people and this lad comes from a psychotherapeutic background and I’d never seen him work like that before but he just lost the idea of what his role was...highlighting that to somebody and saying have you seen how you are working now...he’s migrated away...he really found it difficult to not cross the
boundaries…it’s about being respectful and recognizing that without that you’ll never get
good team work…”

Negotiations were conducted in an atmosphere of willingness to work together, there was
minimal conflict of interest, communication was logical and persuasive using shared
terminology. The commitment to common purpose was demonstrated through good
rapport at the JRC with minimum levels of compromise due to the high levels of
consensus; there were no obvious power differentials in decision-making. For example, the
treatment practitioner and police constable were in total agreement on custody being the
preferred course of action for a PPO. They stated that the Crown Prosecution Service
needed to proceed to charging and get her into custody to give her a break from the
community where things were going badly. This view was not challenged by other
practitioners.

Another example was where the JRC agreed that the police constable would go to court
and liaise with the Crown Prosecution Service regarding the partnerships preferred
outcome. “We would like to see him on an order rather than get a short sentence…he’s
made a massive change in his life if you look where he came from.” {Police constable}. As
Loaf and Lloyd (in Roaf 2002,p.71) have stated “When agencies agree to collaborate over
individuals with complex difficulties, they bring their collective experience and
determinism to bear. The creative solutions, which arise, generate improvements for
everyone…” There was a consensus from all the managers that problems generally did get
satisfactorily resolved, “…I can’t see anything which is going to be insurmountable and
most things generally can be solved.” {New detective inspector}.

However, Crawford (1999,p.137) has argued that the quest for an ‘ideology of unity’ could
block creativity and learning with conflict seen as the enemy of good partnership practice.
Conflicts he claims can be dispersed from the formal arena into an informal ‘shadow
setting’ where the powerful agencies dominate and exclude the weaker ones. However, this
was not evidenced in Smith Town, some decisions by necessity were made outside the
JRC, but as decision-making was cumulative the consequences of these decisions would be
made transparent at the next JRC. The data supports a process of embedding, which has
reduced the earlier reported power differentials in partnership; there was no subverting of
agencies to a Police Force hegemony (Pearson et al 1992,p.46).
Assorted views were expressed about how to manage the range of interventions on offer. The treatment practitioner was able to disagree with the new detective inspector and the police constable stated “He won’t engage with me or probation but he will engage with [community support worker].” Alter and Hage (1993,p.190) state that conflict can be legitimate and healthy, and Chisholm (1989,p.200) believes the institutionalization of conflict leads to greater accountability as partners challenge each other. Bergquist et al (1995,p.82) assert that respect and mutual recognition for diverse views acknowledges the distinctive contribution each agency makes.

The DIP manager recounted how initially some agencies had been more difficult to work alongside. “…we have built up a good rapport and they see the benefits of what we do, they can see that crime figures are dropping, there’s more people being retained in treatment…there was a lot of cynicism within the police at the beginning…we’ve done a lot of work training all the custody staff about the benefits of actually linking in with us, because if people don’t come back into custody its less work for them, and explaining what treatment is and what its not…it takes 6-8 weeks for somebody to get scripted…now in that time they’ve still got to have it, so they’re still committing crime so when they got arrested two days later, the attitude was, see it doesn’t work…the attitude is much better now…”

The manager’s role in building the team was central to successful relationships across agency boundaries with the team seen as an entity in its own right. “…I really argued the point some years ago of retaining the title of the PPO unit because by using the term ‘unit’ you’re alluding to being a team, a group of people who are working together…I like to see healthy debate and confrontation because it’s excellent for development, I encourage opinions…whether you agree or not doesn’t matter, but we’ll make the best decision for that client and it will be a team decision and then you just move on.” {Treatment manager}.

Practitioners had discretion in their day to day decision-making, the Probation Service had discretion in how to interpret licence conditions, enforcement and recall and Police Force managers did not seem to interfere, for example the probation officer decided not to breach a PPO, but to offer bus fares as an inducement to keep appointments. The DIP manager in relation to his team stated“…my team are well trained, well motivated and trustworthy because they are in four offices and I can’t micro manage them, so they have to be
autonomous in what they do and they’re really, really keen to do the job and they’re giving a really good service to the clients…”

Some tasks are prescriptive and standardized, the matrix template, OASsy and accredited group work. However, there was little actual mention of the latter intervention, the Probation Service’s ‘love affair’ with accredited group work may have passed. Research has not shown a consistent positive effect (Stanley 2009) and there have been problems with cost over runs and poor compliance.

Talk of education, training and employment providers focused on the college of further education. A PPO had been denied access to the college following a theft allegation, which was unproven. Despite the police constable and probation officer sending three letters to the principal, the PPO’s return for the next academic year was still being denied. The detective inspector said he would facilitate a face to face meeting with the principal, as his wife was his personal assistant, a very good example of using informal networks.

The new detective inspector explained that the partnership was reliant on Probation Service contacts for employment and training; from the policing side the key question is “…is the work appropriate, do we need to make any disclosures in terms of the potential risks the individual could represent to their employer or their clients…making sure that we don’t really cock it up.”

The partnership faced a difficult judgement in securing employment for service users. There was a lack of employment options in a low wage economy and a reluctance to disclose convictions unless forced to, as the JRC felt if they did, the employer would never take the PPO on. Partnership may theoretically encourage greater risk taking but in the Criminal Justice System this has to be tempered with public protection. Moreover, PPOs in receipt of Disability Living Allowance, due to their drug use are much better off financially than those on Job Seekers Allowance and this acted as a disincentive to seek and hold down employment.

Crawford’s (1999,p.101) reported that both the Police Force and Probation Service saw crime prevention as a legitimate part of their work, but reported contested understandings of what constituted ‘appropriate preventative measures’ structured by agency roles. The
The top three causes of crime for the Police Force were lack of deterrent punishments, poor parental discipline and drug and alcohol abuse with an emphasis on the rational choice model of behaviour and a preference for situational measures and ‘sanction orientated compliance’. The Probation Service was more concerned with the social causes of crime, unemployment, poverty, substance abuse and the blocked opportunities theory of crime. Data from the case study supported a strong ethos towards social crime measures, and a subtle shift in Police Force understanding of crime.

There was no discussion of programme costs at the JRC, and Probation Service budget cuts were not expected to affect service delivery during 2009-2010, as the probation manager asserted that the PPO programme is ‘critical’ to probation practice. However, resource management did involve rationing, as demand for services can vary and be unrelated to need, moreover need can be contestable and contested. Lipsky (1980,p.125) has claimed “Confronted with complex tasks and limited resources, organisations develop work patterns to conserve the resources available.” Service delivery was based on a professional paradigm where the exercise of discretion aimed to balance the care and control dimensions of service interventions linked to a PPO’s engagement.

There has been no audit of resource availability, however practitioners were not overstretched; there was evidence for them being able to take on new tasks, other than the data analyst who made references to a heavy workload. Agencies did not appear to be in competition over scarce resources or ‘talk up’ resource constraints to enhance their claim. PPO numbers did not compromise the programme, but limited accommodation was the biggest constraining environmental factor.

The JRC generated expectations of service user behaviour and those PPOs whose re-offending is cyclical and who are unable or unwilling to work towards sentence plan objectives under Resettle and Rehabilitate, are moved to Catch and Convict, to fast track them into court and prison and out of circulation. The data analyst or police constable notified the neighbourhood team that a PPO in their locality needed monitoring.

Situational crime prevention interventions utilized for this purpose included CCTV, photographs of PPOs circulated to shops and targeted high visibility patrols acting on intelligence, surveyed and disrupted offending networks. Targeting relies on accurate and
timely profiles and HMIC (2000,p.81) have said that high visibility patrols are effective only if employed as part of an overall strategy. A significant strength of the PPO programme is the ability to activate the two strands simultaneously.

Fast tracking was the mechanism to manage PPOs’ failure to engage, the new detective inspector stated they have to be prepared for non-compliance, this displayed a pragmatic approach to collective disappointment. An emphasis on custody is certainly at the heart of the programme, half of the PPOs were in custody at any one time. Charman and Savage (2002,p.226) state if the government is committed to the idea of ‘what matters is what works’ then it is difficult to understand why prison has such a central role.

Rurality is an issue and service users’ ability with limited public transport to visit Smith Town to consume services. The community support worker attempted to access resources in the PPOs’ local area, but service users were often reliant on family to bring them to appointments. Some service users received more home visits than office visits; the usual pattern was four to five a week. There has been a general drift away from home visiting in the Probation Service, but for PPOs’ home visits offered an insight into family dynamics and the opportunity to obtain families’ contact details (Cinamon and Hoskins 2006).

The new detective inspector summarized discussions before concluding, “What do other people think?” If a decision needed to be made he sought agreement from all the practitioners. Moreover, he thanked practitioners for their contributions and praised the good work being carried out by the partnership, adopting an encouraging approach. “Great that would be fantastic…that’s positive…{CSW}, your doing some sterling work.” By recognizing good work, he was celebrating the partnership’s success, this in turn acted to motivate and inspire further good practice. Bryson and Crosby (1992,p.39-44) state that it is important to reward success and that celebrations should be held in public facilitated by leaders accentuating key values.

The new detective inspector at one JRC expressed concern that police officers outside the programme were not progressing a PPO case. “We need a conviction on this one…issue of getting the evidence sorted…to get the case to court.” The police constable also expressed concern about a colleague’s slow investigation of an outstanding charge. Non-PPO police officers do not necessary buy into the sense of urgency, the premium service that
programme practitioners were expected to display. Perhaps for them, the PPO is just one offender among many, however the programme relies on other practitioners to get the job done.

The police constable argued the need for a protocol to set out a time frame to carry out an investigation. There was an issue of Police Force rosters not being compatible with fast evidence collection and the police constable agreed to speak to the detective inspector outside the JRC, as this was an intra-agency issue. The detective inspector in interview latter said he would take this up as a matter of priority.

“…the strengths are very much the partnership side, the weaknesses I think are inside our own police mechanisms, which in principle should make it that bit more easier to sort out, we just need to get things working between our PPO officers and their links into our local policing teams…this is a strand of the PPO scheme which I’m going to be developing because there is a lot of room for improvement…making sure that crime is investigated as expeditiously as possible.”

The new detective inspector’s leadership role was to interface with the wider Police Force, to take forward concerns and with the detective sergeant to assess how the programme could link better into the tasking process, to raise the profile of the programme with their own colleagues. Hedderman and Williams (2001,p.2) suggest that successful partnership relations are dependent on ‘good intra agency communications’. The data suggested that the Police Force was willing to identify and address their shortcomings and allow on to the agenda issues not there previously.

The new detective inspector spoke of using the National Intelligence Model to improve processes. “…so one of the things that I’d be seeking to achieve is using the tasking process more efficiently…the officers are on rest days and I’d like someone to be allocated to actually undertake those enquiries…bringing the time from report to arrest closer…in terms of management support I’m reasonably confident at this point in time if I needed someone to do something I’d get it…I’ve got a mandate to reduce offending in PPOs…”

The detective sergeant’s absence from one of the meetings due to annual leave was missed in terms of her probing and questioning role. The new detective inspector referred to her as
a ‘problem solver’ with excellent working knowledge of the PPOs and good interpersonal skills to create rapport, gain commitment and explore compromise. She often chased up colleagues to get witness statements, or access forensic data, acting as a champion for the programme.

An example of working practices not being compatible with partnership was described by the treatment practitioner who expressed concern over the attitude and service provided by the general practitioner responsible for scripting. A service level agreement existed, but there was a feeling at the JRC that the individual concerned was being ‘pedantic’. The treatment practitioner had put a PPO on the appointment list for scripting but had not completed the written referral, but said she would do it before the appointment slot. The general practitioner had found this unacceptable and took the service user off the list, delaying scripting by at least a week. The detective sergeant was outraged that partnership delivery had been undermined.

The detective inspector asked “Is this a common problem?” The DIP practitioner alluded to a history of problems rather than an isolated incident, a negative attitude to drug users and lack of cover when she was on leave, for three weeks on one occasion. The institutionalized nature of the problem indicated a deep seated malaise, and the JRC felt that the problem was above the head of the treatment manager, who was not present anyway, the Primary Care Trust needed to be involved. Peters (2001,p.236) claims that the benefit of partnership is the ability to challenge deep seated ‘agency ideologies’ and the new detective inspector in interview explained how he would go about dealing with the predicament.

“...do I have any contacts that sit with that line management structure, speak to them and pose them the question, ‘who do I need to speak to?’...eventually I'll work my way around to the right person, so it can either be raised directly with the doctor or through the line management in a way in which it hopefully won’t get her back up...”

The JRC expressed concern that the general practitioner would be resistant to change given her past record. Pearson et al (1992,p.51) have asserted that tensions indicate the ‘scale of ambition’ involved in partnership whilst endeavouring to fuse different traditions and philosophies. Sullivan and Skelcher (2002,p.110) have asserted that “Barriers to building
collaborative capacity are rooted in the practices and cultures of organizations and professional groups. These can prove to be insurmountable obstacles, suggesting that in some cases there is a limit to the contribution of collaboration in achieving public policy goals. They arise because organizations are structured and managed through overt formal rules and implicit informal norms of behaviour.”

Such practices suggest the necessity for a change of general practitioner more in tune with the purpose of the programme. However, the new detective inspector stated “…it’s very easy for people to get a little bit jaded…sometimes it’s just making people aware that actually this is the overall aim behind it and sometimes it does require a significant change of mindset…” The DAT manager’s response to the situation was “The treatment system is managed by the governance framework that is owned by [Primary Care Trust] so the way that scripts are managed should be within that governance framework, if that doctor stepped out of that governance framework then that’s a problem.”

All managers agreed on the vital role played by the DIP practitioner and the community support worker. Both practitioners were seen as advocates for the service user who were able to draw them in and retain them on the programme, in part because they were seen as slightly separate to the statutory providers. As the treatment manager explained “There were people who I saw 15 years ago down in the cells, and I would see them every week and they never once wanted to engage in treatment. Then people have come via the PPO scheme, the work that these two have done with them…they’ve got them into treatment and completely changed them and that’s phenomenal.”

The DAT manager provide additional support for this assertion. “…[A DIP practitioner] who had particular success, who was kind of brilliant in bringing PPOs back into treatment when they’d fallen out, he just had tremendous credibility and it caused a problem really for the Primary Care Trust, because these were difficult clients, they were chaotic and took a lot of time, and I did wonder whether he was doing too good a job for the prescribing services, but he did it and he engaged people who were thought to be a lost cause…”

The DIP practitioner and community support worker were on fixed terms contracts, not professionally qualified and the lowest paid, but integral to the programme’s success.
Probation Service and Police Force pay was nationally determined by length of service and grade. Peters (2001,p.276) has argued in relation to public sector pay scales “…there is little opportunity either to reward adequately the more effective employees or to punish the less effective.” This was still true; performance related pay was not a feature of the conditions of employment.

Practitioners and managers had a sense of optimism that service users could change and a determination to keep trying against the odds, advocating resources for fairly unpopular service users with seconded practitioners acting as super advocates with their parent agency to lever in resources. A consensus on forced treatment has been generated as the DIP manager explained.“…quality means it’s the right support for the client, its also the right agencies working with somebody to make sure communities are safer...historically people say that’s not the right way for people to sort their lives out, they do it when they choose to, but in reality I think the statistics for people changing are about equal.”

Cases are fast tracked into a weekly breach court within seven days, whereas normally this would take three weeks. Practitioners expressed the view that the courts tended to respect their views on breach and the treatment practitioner felt the courts took a lenient approach and the Courts Service manager concurred. However, practitioners can waste time in court, waiting to be called, the courts have a tendency to defer to solicitors who appeared higher up in the ‘pecking order’. The new detective inspector agreed to liaise with the Courts Service manager to discuss this perennial issue, as he was keen to build improved relationships.

In cases of breach, the practitioners went to court and spoke directly with the court probation officer and the Crown Prosecution Service and discussed their preferred outcomes. In one case the new detective inspector stated “We need to be in court to challenge what the defendant is saying...there is a grave risk that {PPO} and his solicitor will give a sob story to the court, we need to provide the alternative story...of what {PPO} has been offered, to give the magistrates an enhanced picture.”

An example of a positive intervention in the court arena was when the probation officer intervened to fast track a case by requesting a Community Order with a DRR without an adjournment for a Pre-Sentence Report. He had being briefed by the DIP practitioner and
police constable, as the service user was already in treatment and engaged. “That’s brilliant...” exclaimed the new detective inspector.

A Pre-Sentence Report aims to provide sentencers with information about a PPO’s offending, social circumstances and risk of re-offending. It also aims to influence sentencing practice; probation officers are encouraged to argue persuasively for community disposals. Sentencers do not have to accept the proposal; they have access to sentencing guidelines and magistrates can seek advice from the clerk to the justices. Rubber stamping involved a process where by the court outcome confirmed without discussion the assessment made by the probation officer.

Managers have struggled to develop joint decision-making arrangements with the Crown Prosecution Service. They discontinued a case that the partnership wanted prosecuted; the detective sergeant tried to challenge the decision but they went ahead regardless and the court accepted the application and discharged him. This course of action was seen by the JRC to reflect the Crown Prosecution Service wanting to be seen to be independent, but also the limited time the prosecutor had to review the case, compared to the solicitor.

Quality is about having good processes that achieve speedy access to interventions so that the risk of re-offending is reduced. However as the probation manager explained“…[CPS] have had a quite difficult time over the last couple of years...the issue is trying to encourage them to speed up their processes and procedures really in raising the PPO profile, they have been short of staff...there are structural issues that make it really difficult...the whole premium service from arrest to court I don’t think moves as efficiently as it might...”

For a PPO due out from Jones Town prison on a Home Detention Curfew, it was agreed that the best way of managing the case was a transfer out to another area where his mother resided, as he had been assessed as a risk to his ex-partner due to domestic violence. Moreover, he had lost his previous rent deposit, having ‘messed up’. For the partnership, accommodation is a precious resource and practitioners needed to keep accommodation providers on their side and be selective with whom they referred. A consensus was generated that that the partnership would offer a ‘robust response’ to any request to resettle in Smith Town.
The partnership was a gatekeeper of resources and the probation manager said that accessing money for activities in the current climate was more difficult. The Police Force had funded some of the diversionary activities and the probation manager had been successful in bidding for rent deposits from local authorities.

“...next year I will go for a broader package of stuff because the local authority sees the benefits for the community about managing people appropriately who can cause a great deal of harm and distress within the community...there is a political dimension to it as well, in that some people can perceive interventions that we do as treats for offenders and you have to manage that tension...so if I come up with money for example to fund gym membership, I have to have in the back of my mind that actually that might not go down too well on the front page of the evening news...the reality is of course, that you’ve got somebody coming out of custody...they have probably worked in one of the best gymnasiums and really benefited from it, and you want to build on that in the community...” {Probation manager}.

The lack of publicity about the programme could plausibly be explained by concern over potential adverse criticism in terms of the benefits it offers PPOs. Yet as the above quote shows, managers are prepared to risk unpopularity because of commitment to the programme. The new detective inspector concurred:

“...now the overall objective of the scheme is quite simply to reduce offending...we can’t change the past...but we can influence how they choose to live their life in the future...and sometimes that will mean providing them with preferential treatment and I can very easily see how that could be seen as being unfair and yes it is, life is unfair but if we are going to reduce peoples’ offending we have to put resources into it...we’re a society that looks after each other; some people have greater needs than others...”

The probation officer and police constable have worked together over a number of years, and have an excellent and equal relationship based on shared knowledge, experience and competency and a willingness to defer to each other. However, there was evidence of the police constable’s declining influence with his Police Force colleagues. For example, a mother of a PPO was happy to talk to the programme’s police constable but would not engage with other police officers that she believed were harassing her son. The police
constable agreed that the use of three patrol cars to arrest the PPO risked harassment, especially in the area concerned, where generally you are lucky to see one patrol car.

If managers do not enforce secondments and review practitioner roles there is a risk of over identification with the partnership, at the expense of contact with and capacity to influence the parent agency, as practitioners are seen to have ‘gone native’. Practitioner churn brings new knowledge, skills and experience, but does have to be balanced against the loss of wisdom and constancy. The YOT manager explained:

“…our seconding agencies fall into two groups, police and probation always recycle their staff, a 3 or 4 year stint and then they leave and that’s bad for us in some ways because we’ve trained them, and they’re really good at what they do and then you have to start all over again with a new person. But they say they must have links with the home agency and know the current practice and part of their wider purpose is to spread the knowledge of what the YOT does through their organization. Other agencies just leave their staff here…as every year goes by they become a little bit more distant from their home agency…if all our staff were rotated regularly and had very good contacts with their home agencies then probably that would work better…it’s a particular skill for them to keep that channel open…”

There was a fostering of joint learning from previous schemes and colleagues. The new detective inspector brought his knowledge and experience from MAPPA and had undertaken some home visits with the police constable to familiarize himself with the caseload and to observe practitioners at work. The detective sergeant who was not precious with her knowledge, actively shared information to assist the new detective inspector to get up to speed. For example, she asserted that MAPPA registered offenders are not usually accepted on to the PPO programme in Baker County, although guidance did allow for it (Home Office 2005a,p.4).

Police Force managers encouraged practitioners to generate new and meaningful ideas by modifying and upgrading their learning within a different frame of reference to identify discrepancies between beliefs and action to aid continual professional development (Moon 2004). The probation manager asserted “The lower level of crime does give you capacity and ability to reflect on what you’re doing where as in a big city you’re constantly fire
fighting and you don’t have time to reflect and you just don’t have time to do all this added stuff…” Plus, the service user population is quite static and more homogeneous compared to a city which makes service delivery less complex.

At one JRC there was a discussion about Anti-Social Behaviour Orders. Each practitioner contributed what they knew so all present were better informed, and the new detective inspector stated he would seek further advice from an anti-social behaviour specialist and feedback. The more experienced or qualified practitioners aided the less experienced or unqualified. The exploration of new ideas and interventions pushed the boundaries of what had happened before and provided evidence of working practices being conducive to change. Communication was a means to come to a shared understanding and was facilitated by the Police Force database, the JRC, joint practitioner visits, informal networking, email, telephone and partial co-location, plus the managerial role in joining up.

Managers recognized that the policy has had a differential impact on agencies, as different perceptions and resources influenced the limits and possibilities of partnership. For example, successful outcomes required that mental health be on board, but managers felt the provider lacked appreciation of interdependencies, thus its plausible to argue that being in partnership made no sense to them. For the new detective inspector a key management task was to make “…sure that at every meeting everyone knows who is representing what agency, and when I look at that individual, OK they’ve brought their personal skills but also they’ve got a whole wealth of an organization behind them in terms of their resources and that’s what I’m looking at…”

Partnership requires openness and honesty towards the world outside to demonstrate accountability. Inspections or the use of consultants can be seen as a way of breaking the monopoly of knowledge, but the programme had not been evaluated. Furthermore, there was no feedback of strategic issues discussed at the steering group to the JRC. Peters (2001,p.300) believes that accountability should involve a personal obligation by the practitioner or manager to be accountable via professional standards and a public service ethos which guides performance. The data supports this happening, however, the requirement to be accountable to external bodies, like Government Office, assumes values are not enough. The willingness of the partnership to allow the research involved an
eagerness to be evaluated, but the programme ultimately lacked accountability to the community it served.

There has been no audit of PPO offending, but the police constable did have access to local crime pattern data. The new detective inspector tasked the police constable to check crime data for purse thefts in one of Smith Town’s shopping precincts to verify if a PPO with a known offence pattern had been active. However, the crime data is not presented to the JRC to set the PPO in context. There was no reference to the effect the programme had in terms of making communities safer, the focus was individualized in terms of the service user. For Ransom and Stewart (1994, p.232) “Performance assessment should be seen as dependent on public accountability-itself dependent upon public discourse.”

Policy implementation has drawn on practitioner expertise; they were experienced, knowledgeable, competent, and committed. Smith Town’s location means there are few alternative employment options; moreover the quality of the environment results in little practitioner churn. Steele (1999, p.35) states “The greatest strengths lie in the quality and commitment of people working at all levels within organisations.” The data would support this assertion.

With a new probation manager appointed in a reshuffle in April 2009, a greater level of commitment might be generated to the joint management of the programme. The treatment manager stated “I’ve met her a few times and now I will have to formally meet with her…you know making sure we’re both singing from the same song sheet and that she’s aware of our agenda, that’s my job, that’s what I’m paid to do, not just managing the service but developing the service…I don’t think she has much experience with PPOs…so she’ll be very much guided by me and it is about saying look if you’re not sure, then you need to ask…but we’ll have to meet at a middle ground and work it through.”

Each agency had its own performance targets to meet. The Probation Service must complete OASsy within five days of sentence and breach within ten days of a second failed appointment for Community Orders, for the Primary Care Trust length of stay in treatment was measured. At the JRC, performance was based on multi-dimensional criteria, success was not just about hitting the target, cascaded down from Government Office, though this
was important to managers, but concepts of settled accommodation, staying clean, a stable relationship and gaining employment were utilized in discourse to define success.

Additionally, criteria took account of the risks of working with more difficult PPOs and ‘creaming’ of those most likely to benefit from the programme was seen as legitimate. Furthermore, the same outcome for two service users may have required quite different inputs in terms of resources. Gilling (2005,p.749) has argued that cross cutting performance issues look like “…the imposition of police performance indicators…” but contemporary performance measures are more reflective of partnership.

The detective sergeant said “…{PPOs} continue to re-offend despite hard work, it takes certain types of individuals to work within the team…I think it’s the only way that you can try and break the cycle because with a lot of the individuals they go into custody, come out again and if on the second or the third time round in the cycle they still see the same individuals…it’s only through time that individuals have got to know what the scheme involves and what we’re trying to achieve and therefore have shown the better results…if you look at the amount of time and money that’s put into investigations of crime and all the agencies that are involved…I think it can be justified.”

However, unsynchronised performance measures produced gaps that can jeopardize service user supervision. The Probation Service had a time scale for recalls, but the Ministry of Justice did not. Risk management plans were undermined by the department taking 5 to 6 days to action recalls, and two weeks to confirm an address, leaving practitioners in limbo over sentence planning. Concern was also expressed about Ministry of Justice decisions to release service users on a Friday; practitioners do not work weekends, so transitional support was not available. Practice was joined up locally, but not nationally.

A manager’s role is to correct deviations in performance, the new detective inspector challenged the practice of not automatically visiting non-statutory PPOs. A service user’s script has been stopped, as she was not picking it up, she was described as ‘unmotivated’ and practitioners had lost contact with her. The new detective inspector asserted that the situation was unacceptable and contact needed to be re-established and action to this effect was agreed.
In another example of poor performance, the data analyst had followed the usual procedure and hand delivered the PPO list to the Primary Care Trust’s office, as there is no secure email link. However, this list went astray and ended up at the local hospital where a police constable returned it to the data analyst. A discussion ensured on how this could have happened, the answer hung on a new receptionist. If the treatment manager had been at the JRC, the issue could have been addressed more fully. The decision was made in his absence to stamp the envelope with the data analyst’s return address so if not delivered it could be returned more quickly. The DIP practitioner agreed to relay the JRC’s concerns back to the treatment manager. There had been a real risk of confidential information getting into the wrong hands.

A final example is of the treatment manager utilizing programme practitioners to back fill gaps in service provision also under his remit. As the detective inspector explained, “…we’ve had historical issues where the previous community support worker…has been used to fill short falls in their staffing…I’ve let it ride to a certain extent, but we’ve just employed a new person, within 2 days they’ve been pulled back, so as soon as I became aware of that I had to go to the manager and say sorry that isn’t to happen, this person is employed under this funding stream with responsibilities for X, Y and Z....”

The treatment manager had a slightly different take on practitioner substitutability, stating that on another occasion he had used the DIP practitioner to infill because “…we’re a bit stretched at the moment, we’re running a clinic here with drug testing, ‘will you come and help?’ and then he helps, that’s sharing the role.”

Turning to the concept of change, for the probation manager it was about delivering improved interventions “…looking at broader provision and being able to justify that in terms of effectiveness.” Managers recognized the need to take their agencies and partners with them, the partnership was not in the game of enforcing large scale change because small changes were more likely to generate a consensus. As Lindblom (1997,p.144) has stated “…when decisions are only incremental-closely related to known policies, it is easier for one group to anticipate the kind of moves another might make…”

The only criticism of the programme, was expressed by the treatment manager who said the targeted approach siphoned resources from the mainstream and failed to promote early
intervention with service users. “The good thing about the Drug Arrest Referral Scheme was that there was an equity of access...whether you were someone who was committing 15 burglaries a week or whether you'd just done your very first shoplifting...everybody had an option to get whatever services were being provided. Now that worked really well...{PPO} your cherry picking and...excluding the rest and I don't like that...getting them into treatment very early in their drug using history gives them a better opportunity in the future of remaining abstinent.”

The JRC decided what interventions would be offered given the resources available and there was evidence for diverse but integrated provisioning, not a one size fits all with the programme successful in meeting its 12 per cent performance target for 2008-09. Managers had built a coherent team where teamwork was very much the order of the day and where opportunities had been seized to develop the programme underpinned by successful practitioner relationships with high levels of consensus.

Any other business

Although the agenda was short and prioritized, the chair’s consultative approach, which gave practitioners plenty of time to discuss each case, resulted in the first meeting observed over running by nearly two hours; two subsequent meetings also over ran their allotted time. There were complaints on the way out that the new detective inspector needed to improve his time management skills. Certainly the researcher missed her lunch and rushed off to interview the treatment manager who as it turned out, had stood her up!

Conclusion

The story of Smith Town’s PPO programme is that of the CDRP offloading responsibility for the policy on to the Police Force along with partner managers from the Probation Service and Primary Care Trust. There was limited shared management for delivering on outcomes, evidenced by the probation and treatment managers’ poor engagement with the JRC, which resulted in the Police Force managers having no option but to lead. A mixed success in terms of partnership management.
Protocols can outline responsibilities, but formal agreement may be necessary but not sufficient. Without the Police Force managers’ commitment, skills and knowledge the partnership would not be as successful. Similarly, in Squires and Measor’s (2001, p.232) research the Police Force felt they had to take the initiative as other agencies had taken a back seat. Police Force managers had used their power productively, to activate agency capacity and draw in resources to achieve desired outcomes. The probation manager offered the following explanation for the partnership’s success.

“...individuals driving particular bits forward and the mixed team recognizing the value of what they’re doing and the strength of information sharing, of being able to move fairly quickly and police and probation following up on and visiting particular individuals...and [service users] actually recognizing themselves that police and probation can’t be played off one against the other...and that there are benefits for them in terms of entering the scheme...”

Smith Town’s effectiveness hinged on the synergy created by collating information and ideas to aid assessment, the sharing of risks and planning service delivery to ensure holistic interventions offered through triage, to tackle offending through utilizing the dual methods of monitoring and surveillance and help and support. Managers assisted practitioners in understanding how their job fitted with others, striking a balance between specialization and differentiation through co-ordinating integration. The JRC evidenced some risk discourse but the picture was mixed, interventions were individualized and tailored based on professional judgment. The institutionalized nature of the partnership, its structure and processes had enabled a level of predictability in managing PPOs.

Managers gave primary focus to encouraging a future orientation focusing on strategies for ‘going straight’ and developing practitioner resilience to managing difficult service users. Process praise was utilized well by the new detective inspector as practitioners developed their repertoire of skills, moving beyond automatic responses to problems based on prior training, as the JRC was an arena to share ideas and provide support, reducing the risk of burn out. A ‘happy team’ was created through managers building supportive relationships, seen as necessary for good performance.
The partnership had a clearly defined area of responsibility and had developed a measure of control over service users through a unified knowledge base within the JRC as the locus of decision-making about resource allocation. Knowledge creation and dissemination was good and legitimacy rested on cumulative expertise, but constructive working relationships were hampered by the general practitioner and Crown Prosecution Service. The probation manager put the partnerships success down to ‘effective targeting’ but this process could be improved. Alter and Hage (1993,p.243) found mandated partnerships serving involuntary clients were “…highly impersonal and had not compensated with equally high levels of coordination.” This conclusion cannot be said to apply to Smith Town.

In sum, Huxham’s (1993,p.603) concept of ‘collaborative advantage’ is apt “…concerned with the creation of synergy between collaborating organizations. Collaborative advantage will be achieved when something unusually creative is produced - perhaps an objective is met - that no one organization could have produced on its own and when each organization, through the collaboration, is able to achieve its own objectives better than it could alone.”

Smith Town has some clearly defined features of the CPM model of management: an institutionalized joint decision-making arena incorporating good knowledge exchange processes, a concurrent and integrated service delivery and a pluralistic structure. However, the partnership’s failure to engage with the community is at odds with the CPM model which invites all stakeholders to take part in problem definition and solution. As expressed by the probation manager there is genuine fear that the community will not accept some of the more contentious resource allocation decisions the partnership makes. This creates a tension for managers; leading to a decision not engage, an inward PA orientation where the crime experts dominate at the risk of loosing new insights, but where the benefit is the securing of a more stable operating environment.

The following chapter is a case study of Baker County’s steering group, which oversees Jones and Smith Town’s PPO programmes; it discusses the strategic side of policy implementation and its links to operational delivery.
Chapter 7: A case study of Baker County’s PPO programme

Baker County

Baker County is predominantly a rural county with a beautiful coastline and hinterland. Half the population of 750,000 live in the county’s two cities, both of which have a university. There are two unitary authorities, in addition to the two-tier structure with eight district councils and one city council. In the 2009 local elections the Conservatives took over the county council from the Liberal Democrats. Baker County was the fourth safest region in England and Wales in 2009, two places higher than the year before, with a 9 per cent drop in recorded crime. There were 62 recorded crimes committed for every 1,000 residents in 2008/09. Violent crime, car theft and criminal damage were all down, but house burglary and handling stolen goods were up.

Local strategic partnerships were launched in 2001 to provide a single overarching framework to co-ordinate service provision by reducing the number of plans local authorities had to produce. Their remit is to produce a sustainable community strategy and “…to engage key actors in the development of a vision for the area and to align the programmes of individual agencies to support its delivery.” (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002, p.22).

The Safer Baker Partnership is the mechanism to deliver on behalf of the local strategic partnership the safer and stronger communities theme of the county’s LAA. This is the agreement between those agencies that have an interest in improving service provision to the local community and the government. LAA 37 aims to tackle the most harmful offending behaviour and is measured by national indicator 30, the re-offending rate of PPOs. The government expects that on adopting a LAA it will be actively communicated to the community.

Safer Baker Partnership’s 2008/11 sustainable community strategy has seven priorities of which a safer county is one. The aim is to continue to reduce serious acquisitive crime defined as: burglary and aggravated burglary of a dwelling, robbery of business and personal property, aggravated and unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle and theft from a
motor vehicle, through a focus on drug users and PPOs in each locality. The Police Force’s community safety manager stated that the LAA was a ‘clever’ device by government, a catalyst to get agencies to collaborate. “We know we are all going to get measured so we might as well work together.” The LAA must meet the nationwide PSA 23 to make communities safer.

Baker County’s steering group oversaw the management of three PPO programmes, Jones, Smith and Taylor Town and the following diagram highlights the agencies involved.

Attendance

The steering group met in the ballroom of an old Victorian psychiatric hospital, located in the grounds of Jones Town’s hospital. The acoustics were dreadful; managers sat around
two oversized round tables linked in a figure of eight as the researcher strained to hear the conversation. Moreover, managers often arrived late, complaining they could not find spaces to park their cars. Following an introduction by the detective sergeant, the researcher explained the remit of the research and then sat back from the proceedings to complete the observation schedule.

In addition to the core agencies outlined in the previous two chapters, managers were represented from Jones Town CDRP, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Courts Service, the DAT and mental health. The remit of the Crown Prosecution Service is to prefer charges that are in the public interest and to “…support our police partners in tackling crimes that have the most effect on our communities…” (CPS 2008) and provide a prioritized premium service to PPOs.

The Courts Service’s remit is to deliver effective and efficient justice to the public via magistrate and crown courts, to reduce crime and make communities safer. Mental health provision comes under the auspices of the Primary Care Trust, but services are provided in conjunction with the third sector agency that holds the DIP contract.

DATs are partnerships combining representatives from local authority departments, the Primary Care Trust and the Probation and Prison Service. They are responsible for the implementation of the national drug strategy at the local level through the commissioning of drug services and monitoring and reporting on performance.

The Police Force, DAT, Primary Care Trust and DIP were represented at all four meetings. The Probation Service, Housing Support, CDRP, Prison Service, Courts Service, Crown Prosecution Service and mental health attended some or only one meeting. There was no representative from Smith Town CDRP, the superintendent attended the CDRP that covered his operational remit, but no other manager interviewed attended any meetings convened by her CDRP.

The detective inspector stated “I run the PPO as a stand alone national indicator, I do my own thing and I don’t go to all these meetings that the superintendents go to…” There was little input from the CDRP manager, the superintendent said “…I don’t know what {CDRP manager} brings to the table, he’s a great guy, but he’s sat there and he doesn’t actually
contribute an awful lot…people should be coming to a meeting, in my view…because they have got a contribution to make…” Berry’s (2007,p.63) research similarly reported CDRP disengagement from the programme.

Baker County had no formal boundaries; attendance was variable in terms of manager numbers and agency representation. Wilson and Charlton (1997,p.40) refer to an optimal number of 10 to 14 managers. The average number was 13 with a range from 17 to 9; any more would have reduced effectiveness by limiting interaction. All but two of the managers were from the public sector; the DIP and Housing Support managers were from the third sector.

There was no local authority representative from any department. On the housing front the picture was complicated by the number of district councils and the transfer of stock to housing associations. Limited resources due to forced sales, competing demand, the view that the crime reduction agenda sat naturally with the Police Force and Baker County’s focus on social crime methods were offered as explanations for the lack of engagement.

Neither was the YOT represented, there was a consensus that nationally Prevent and Deter had been allowed to drift in terms of accountability and performance, and locally the YOTs had been reluctant to join up with the two other strands. In interview the YOT manager explained that only recently had they activated Prevent and Deter, four years late, but no convincing reason for the delay was offered. Still change was imminent. “…I don’t think it’ll be long before the YOTs are really pulled up on it…”[LCJB manager].

There was no local councillor involvement which concurred with Liddle and Gelsthorpe’s (1994a,p.15) findings. The superintendent said that when local councillors were measured on community engagement they would perhaps take more interest in the programme. The community safety manager believed local councillors could potentially make or break a programme, as change agents shaping the course of crime initiatives and furthering accountability. In Folett’s (2006,p.107) research they had grasped the significance of the crime agenda and were not content for it to be steered solely by the Police Force.

The detective inspector stated “…perhaps we should be going to local councillors and saying by the way this is what we’re doing…but the actual work is going on.” Lowndes
and Skelcher (1998,p.325) highlight the difficulty of local councillors operating in partnerships, their legitimacy is derived from elected office, in contrast, managerial legitimacy is drawn from seniority, professional expertise, leadership capability and networking skills. An example of how the management models have different drivers for practice. The CDRP manager shed some light on the situation:

“…one councillor is on the probation board…councillors in housing will know about it…there are councillors on the CDRPs and strategic groups. I mean crime is always interesting to people…if [detective inspector] came along and did a presentation…they’d be fascinated and ask loads of questions…but they are unlikely to be aware enough of the scheme to come and ask questions.”

The business sector was also unrepresented; Crawford (1999,p.227) has pointed out that they tend to favour situational crime measures. A culture of innovation would require developing a strategy to engage with the private sector, especially given that Jones and Smith Town cover retail areas and a number of the PPOs are shoplifters; Business Improvement Districts could provide an access route in.

A necessary condition for partnership is the opportunity for attendance and interaction. A greater commitment to attend was displayed from core agency managers, less so from the peripheral ones. Power and influence are connected to presence at meetings (Huxham and Vangen 2005,p.184), but a manager’s absence could also delay moving the agenda forward. At the third meeting, the objectives could not be met due to the absence of the Prison and Probation Service and Housing Support managers. The superintendent expressed his disappointment about this and asserted that if a manager could not attend they should send a brief report, but he could not enforce this, he had no authority over them.

Partnership creates dependencies, as Huxham and Vangen (2005,p.165) state “…whilst the dependency renders individual members unable to enact the collaborative agenda on their own, typically any member has enough power to block the progress of the collaboration.” Non-core agencies like the Crown Prosecution Service and Courts Service were marginalized through non-attendance, but equally their low involvement hampered performance. The DIP manager stated that the Crown Prosecution Service was “very
important to the process” as their decision-making on case progression impacted on programme performance.

The Crown Prosecution Service manager only attended the first meeting, in interview she stated that the PPO programme had little impact on her agency and PPOs were no more important than any other case and were not dealt with more speedily. “…we kind of generally treat everything as a priority...we do have processes for PPOs but we are mindful of the fact that every victim deserves the same care.” Osborne and Brown (2005,p.170) refer to the concept of boundary maintenance, actions taken to maintain an agency’s integrity. This concept sat comfortably with the insularity of the Crown Prosecution Service and their sense that justice could not be achieved if their independence was compromised.

The DAT manager said “…people come to meetings as they get something out of it, and I guess the Crown Prosecution Service sit there thinking, do I really need to be at this meeting.” Moreover, managers can face burn out if acting alone, as isolated boundary-spanners unsupported by their agency (Noble and Jones 2006). Core agency managers appeared supported, but the Crown Prosecution Service manager plausibly was not.

She was also poorly informed about the programme, raising questions about whether she was the right manager for the partnership and she was certainly not bringing her agency with her. Sink (1996,p.106) has claimed that a key challenge in facilitating partnership is dealing with individual representatives as its people, not agencies that sit down together. The Crown Prosecution Service suffered some scapegoating due to the disinterest of the manager. “…the Crown Prosecution Service is always the difficulty.” (Taylor Town probation manager).

The DAT manager explained what he thought was now required. “…in their absence these things don’t happen and we need to present evidence to them...if targets are under pressure because of the non-action of the Crown Prosecution Service then all that needs to be part of the pitch presentation to their senior level about their involvement in the processes.”
Moving on to the Courts Service now, the detective sergeant implied, she was careful with her use of language, that they had some ‘reluctance’ to find a manager to attend the steering group and the superintendent said he did not want to ‘fan the flames’. A Courts Service manager did attend the second meeting, it transpired that the detective sergeant had been liaising informally with continuous efforts at persuasion to influence attendance.

“I was basically asked to attend the meeting by {detective sergeant} because there were some issues with the police receiving results and that was the initial communication that I had…that was my very first and I believe it to be my only meeting because they said that they don’t necessarily need me at future meetings…I suppose they appreciate that we are all very busy people…” {Courts Service manager}.

There was an issue over whether a non-core agency manager’s attendance should be by invitation only or whether they should be expected to attend regularly. The detective sergeant wanted a manager from the Courts and Crown Prosecution Service to attend on a regular basis due to ongoing issues. However, there was the message given by the superintendent about ‘dipping in and out’, having thanked the Courts Service manager for her contribution, he then said that she need not attend again unless she wanted to.

“We do play quite a significant role…it’s supposed to be joined up justice, we’re all working for the same cause…there are certain things like this that the courts don’t necessarily get involved in as much as they could do…we play an integral, key part, but it’s quite small in comparison to the other agencies and whilst we want to work with them, because of the impartiality, there are certain restrictions…” {Courts Service manager}.

It transpired that another Courts Service manager who sits on the LCJB was better placed to attend, but she lacked the capacity to do so. Resourcing partnership work at the margin of agency activity by adding tasks to existing managers workload can induce weak capacity, a plausible explanation for limited participation. “My main job is Courts Service manager, so I am paid to keep the courts going on a day to day basis, unfortunately because of all sorts of things, we just have these add on, bolt on jobs.” {Courts Service manager}.
Huxham and Vangen (1996, p.15) assert that obligations will vary depending on how closely aligned the agency’s agenda is. The Jones Town probation manager explained “…take the Prison Service governors, they have a whole range of responsibilities and PPOs is one small part...the more senior you are the more likely you are to have constraints in terms of what your doing, and I do think there is a connection there with commitment...we might be able to find at some point the manager grade there, that has a much more focused interest.”

The DAT manager in reference to the Prison Service stated “…it’s kind of required that they engage, that’s one of our levers and the other is around the benefits that are to be gained from being a good partner…” Huxham and Vangen (2005, p.122) have asserted that ignoring an agency’s lack of commitment may allow others to get on with the agenda thus reducing management complexity, but it can also deny resources, affecting performance. Overall the poorer partners appeared more parochial, focussed on their own business.

Jessop (2000, p.21) has argued that partnerships face “…problems in remaining open to the environment at the same time as securing the closure needed for effective coordination...” Locking in partners weakens opportunism and builds solidarity; a fixed membership is more likely to gain agreement to implement its agenda. Expanding membership allows wider access to the agenda and maximizes the range of options but risks destabilizing consensus requiring reassessment, further negotiation and trust building. Managers had created a complex, pluralistic and dynamic structure, which had no clear membership allowing for flexible attendance, but manager non-attendance prevented some business being completed. Another good example of how the management models’ theoretical foundations can create tensions for practice.

The commitment of senior management was important in terms of providing support and acting as role models. The prison governor explained that “…if they are a negative role model, that will cascade down, potentially through the whole line.” Fortunately for Baker County the three most senior managers, the superintendent, the DAT manager and the area health manager were engaged with a focus on performance. The equivalent grade in the Probation Service, the assistant chief probation officer however, attended none of the meetings. Nevertheless, the detective inspector explained that within the Police Force generally “…there is a lack of understanding at the strategic level, exactly what it’s trying
Leadership was central to making things happen, the detective inspector’s role appeared crucial to Baker County’s success. “I’m the only inspector on the force that’s got specific responsibility for PPOs. I like to drive it forward…in terms of the finance, the performance and the general management of the scheme…” Crawford (1998b,p.219) has stated that “Joint and negotiated decisions tie the parties into corporate policy and outcomes but often fail to identify lines of responsibility. Institutional complexity further obscures who’s accountable to whom, and for what.” However, both detective inspectors were clear that they had responsibility for national indicator 30.

The Police Force is rank orientated and the post of detective inspector carries more weight when not only negotiating with partners but also with in the Police Force. Another programme without this resource was described as ‘floundering’. A detective inspector’s gross salary is £50,000, an amount that could pay for two police constables, the resource pledged commitment. A number of managers spoke of the detective inspector as an excellent communicator, motivated, persuasive, inspiring, empowering, the right manager at the right time to drive the policy forward; a plausible explanation takes in his action oriented agency culture. However, when the partnership reached a level of effectiveness he was moved, against his wishes. The CDRP manager summed up his role:

“…he was simply able to focus on it, that was his main role…he was given responsibility to make this work across the county…he’s committed, he does what he says he’ll do and I think he brought and pushed the other partners along with him to make it happen…the other people who were around were able to follow because they had experienced the frustration of not getting things done…the previous inspector had a number of roles…”

Hedderman and Williams (2001,p.2) state “…the personal qualities and abilities of the project manager seem to be the factor, which determines whether implementation is successful.” Managers felt there was a need to ‘manipulate’ appointments to make sure the ‘right’ people were selected, those who could demonstrate their interpersonal, communicative and networking skills. The recruitment procedure for the community
support workers involved managers from a number of partner agencies sitting on the interview panel; managers believed this improved the process.

Personnel are key, the prison governor provided further amplification. “...if I left and somebody else took over then everything could change, nothings changed structurally but one person could have such a major impact positive or negative, and you can have all the systems and procedures in place in the world but if you get a couple of key individuals that move and you get someone in who brings a sort of negative approach then the whole thing is almost doomed.”

Membership was not viewed as a completed task, improving the programme required the further identification, mobilization and activation of new managers who could act as conduits to the resources of their agency to maximize the range of interventions available. In order to develop relationships with agencies without pre-existing links, managers needed to explore their different perceptions and connections (Klijn and Teisman 2000,p.96), to assess potential alignment and the benefits of partnership. Managers were obliged to be clear about what they wanted, have an understanding of other providers and how they operate and negotiate with integrity. There was a need to challenge any pre-conceived ideas and articulate the constraints Baker County operated under. The DAT manager sums it up well:

“...you need to have an awareness of the needs of other managers and you need to have an ability to align that with your own and others and it’s that sort of win win kind of thing...there’s something about the different sets of skills you need in relation to persuasion and negotiation, just kind of getting alongside people and working with them...from my experience it’s far better and easier to get things done in partnership if you have positive good relationships...how I interact with individuals is about how much I trust them or how easy they are to work with or how well they deliver...”

The process of agenda setting and problem framing resulted in an agreement that it would be helpful to have a manager from the Department of Work and Pensions attend the steering group. Currently PPOs can claim up to 12 weeks of benefit to secure their tenancies whilst in custody, but sometimes benefit payments were stopped threatening resettlement plans. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) (in Koppenjan and Klijn 2004,p.32) made
reference to ‘non-decision making’ where not all problems may be accepted, however no manager made reference to this happening.

The DAT manager and the superintendent have a good working relationship, power is evenly balanced, but the area health manager adopted a lower profile, his interaction is more limited. The superintendent is an effective chair establishing direction, clarifying options, making proposals and shaping key issues to drive the agenda forward. As the DAT manager explained:

“I really like the way {superintendent} goes about things, his style is really positive, he’s very kind of demanding of action and very focussed on what needs to happen, and holding people to account for that, but at the same time he’s very good at behind the scenes work and developing relationships and strengthening the partnerships, that sort of combination seems to work…I don’t think there’s a formalized management structure, it’s just that kind of meeting that we trust and we attend and take direction from.”

Nevertheless, there was evidence that the superintendent constrained discussion, not allowing enough time for issues to be discussed. Tight agenda management may enable more items to be addressed, but suppressed issues may surface later (Huxham and Vangen 2005,p.183). However, he did have other responsibilities and had to balance his time and commitment, but a pre-occupation with processes failed to appreciate that it is individuals who operate them. The detective sergeant challenged the superintendent’s view that processes were enough and he only appeared to accept her point, on the need for practitioners to attend court with PPOs when the new detective inspector intervened to support her, and explained the positive impact attendance could have on sentencing outcomes.

The new detective inspector and sergeant are both below him in rank but had superior operational knowledge, being involved in the programme’s day to day management. The concept of centrality is helpful here; the detective sergeant is most central to the power, she had access to senior managers, practitioners and the PPOs, her legitimacy is based on situated knowledge and a track record of championing the programme.
Another example occurred when the superintendent on opening the second meeting assumed all managers knew each other, except the new detective inspector, who had introduced himself to a number of the managers before the meeting got going; whereas there were in total, four new managers in attendance. He failed to carry out introductions thus not acknowledging the value of the individuals present. Partnership is a person to person activity where interpersonal ties are critical to success.

In interview later, the superintendent recognized that his chairing could be problematic, his ability to reflect and learn is an important management skill. “...I’m not a great meeting person...we had a {Police Force} team building day and I came out as a person who basically doesn’t engage in small talk and just wants to get and move on, which is a positive, certainly in the Police Force, but it could also be a negative, in as much as you could stifle some conversation. I sense that I probably need to say at the next meeting, is there an opportunity to cull the agenda and just sit down and look at...what is it that we want to achieve?”

Managers met formally at the Baker County meetings and informally through networking and bilateral meetings. Wilson and Charlton (1997,p.51) assert that the skill is to use informal networks to build positive relations between all managers encouraging openness and accessibility. Yet as Huxham and Vangen (2000b,p.304) state “...where the same representatives meet in several fora, they can move a partnership agenda forward in between formal meetings. Whether this is a deliberate power ploy or simply the consequence of ad hoc conversation, it can leave less connected partners…out in the cold.”

Utilizing Liddle and Gelsthorpe’s (1994b,p.8-9) terminology on forms of participation, the Police Force, Probation Service, Primary Care Trust, DIP and DAT could be described as ‘prime movers’ who took on a large share of the workload, discovered resources and allocated personnel. The CDRP and Courts Service managers could be described as ‘sleeping partners’ who offered neither vocal support nor resistance. The Crown Prosecution and Prison Service could be described as ‘supportive passengers’, who expressed support but did not always follow through.

**Governance**
Page (2008,p.150) refers to a governance structure as the institutional capacity to make joint decisions. Two years ago there was no Baker County group, but pressures for more uniform service delivery coming from Government Office and senior managers led to the amalgamation of the local steering groups. The Jones Town trinity, the probation and treatment manager and detective inspector were instrumental in its formation.

“For us, it was really following through the agenda of not wanting to be caught out, by missing the targets that were being set for us and to have a kind of voice to actually deal with that, control that and manage that. It was also about getting resources to all the different schemes...” {Jones Town probation manager}.

However, concerns were expressed about the change.”…there was a big resistance at an operational level to having a county wide strategic group...a fear maybe about local autonomy...interestingly, I think the police at different levels were interested in maintaining operational autonomy but also at a different level were interested in developing strategic coherence...” {DAT manager}.

It was acknowledged that the steering group had created more consistency across the programmes, though differences were still detectable, but the Jones Town probation manager expressed further reservations over its “...complicated structure and underdeveloped sense of direction and purpose”.

“...there’s a lot of money being invested in structures that don’t really fit and don’t really work...you see the same managers sitting round that table...15, 20 people, not unusual...all trying to weld together these different services that are being contracted out...when I go from meeting to meeting, sometimes I loose the will to live...you do get the meeting groupies, I’m one of them...the same agenda...”

The Smith Town probation manager also expressed concerns, his perspective probably explains his non-attendance, along with Smith Town’s treatment manager.“...decisions were made quicker and with more local flavour to them, the criminals here are not as prolific as the criminals in {Jones Town} so they tend to be overlooked, so I would prefer to go back to the old way...when we go to {Jones Town} we get bogged down with what is operational as opposed to what is strategic...”
Originally the steering group met from 11.30 till 1.30 every two months; the DAT’s criminal justice group met on the same day from 9.30 to 11am. The superintendent on taking over the chair in September 2008 recognized the opportunity to combine the business as some of the managers sat on both and there was an acknowledged link between alcohols, drugs and crime (Edmunds et al 1998,p.iv). The aim was to streamline the number of meetings managers attended, saving time, duplication of effort and preventing ‘partnership fatigue’ (Huxham and Vangen 2002b,p.303).

The superintendent asked if the new structure would work, the DAT manager felt it would, but he attended both anyway. The detective sergeant did not and expressed concern over the potential length of the meeting and the need to keep PPOs as a separate item on the agenda. The area health manager asserted that he would want his three treatment managers and the DIP manager to attend; he could not represent them all. However, there was no real discussion about the proposal for change, but the superintendent did envisage revisiting the new arrangement, if it did not work.

Combining the two meetings raised the issue of administration, the DAT had previously done the administration for both groups, but it was now going to sit with the Jones Town data analyst, an example of offloading on to the Police Force. The re-structuring entailed acts of symbolism and altered authority structures, but may not make the meeting more efficient or strategic or ensure compliance. Endless reorganization, trying to get the architecture right, may lead to the discovery that there is no right structure, only structures that are more or less adequate. However, the superintendent felt that the structure was still not effective.

“…you have to constantly ask the question, ‘why are we here?’…some of it becomes like an information exchange meeting as opposed to a steering group and that’s the bit I’m still wrestling with…I think we could probably do it with two or three people less… ‘does [detective sergeant] need to be there if the inspectors there?’… there’s one or two that need to understand that its a bit more performance based…professionalizing the circulation of data before…so those issues are already there…it may be the frequency that we need to look at… ‘do we do it quarterly?’…I think it’s a reasonable meeting…but I think there’s more we could do.”
However, Kickert et al (1997c,p.175) believe that “Only when there are indications that interactions within networks are systematically blocked as a result of the structural or cultural biases at the level of the network, can network structuring be considered. In that case interventions should, if possible be incremental, because of the danger of destroying existing ‘social capital’.”

Baker County’s terms of reference were reviewed on combining the meetings and managers were happy with the amendment to include the Primary Care Trust as a core partner. The premium service protocol required since 2005 also included the Primary Care Trust unlike the national one and was amended in January 2009. The terms of reference (Baker County 2009,p.1) state that the aim of Baker County is to: “To provide a forum where the relevant agencies co-ordinate their work relating to Prolific and other Priority Offenders (PPO) and drug/alcohol treatment and to provide an opportunity to develop and focus in greater detail on performance linked to Criminal Justice issues.” It further goes on to say that “Minutes should be treated as public documents unless a part of the meeting is held in closed session…service user representatives will be invited to attend meetings to report on progress and to resolve any problems arising.”

Wilson and Boyle (2004) refer to the necessity of formal terms of reference to facilitate partnership understanding, and core agencies were clear about programme purpose. The superintendent explained that shared understanding had developed through “…using the terms of reference as a good starting point…people sign up to that, you can hold them sort of to account…underneath that I think it’s an area that people sort of understand can actually have an impact…on crime…and because we’re partners and because we’ve been doing it a long time…”

Cropper (1996,p.91) has said “Attachment to collaborative efforts is both driven and constrained by prior attachment and accountabilities to reference groups and their purposes outside the immediate context of collaboration…” In managing aims, managers had been able to blend cultural differences because as the prison governor states:

“…the overall mission is quite wide ranging…everybody plays a slightly different part and not everybody plays the whole part…all have a slightly different interpretation about what their part is…there’s two strands, the one is trying to protect the public which
is about keeping prisoners in a secure environment…and the other bit is about reducing re-offending and that’s about offering them access to services to deal with their criminogenic needs…”

Good (2002,p.49) writes that prescriptive good practice advice about clearer aims is difficult to implement as “Accountabilities among partners are always multiple, inevitably complex, and often fussy. The roles and responsibilities are often both contradictory and complementary at the same time…” Yet, managers had a grip on what motivated and constrained partners, with the centrality of the reconviction target unifying partnership purpose.

The superintendent chaired three of the four meetings and asserted the primary purpose of Baker County was to “…unlock doors, identify where change was required and problem solve together.” The DAT manager agreed that the role “…was to scrutinize under performance.” There was an opportunity in the superintendent’s absence for the DAT or area health manager to chair the meeting but the opportunity was missed and the new detective inspector chaired instead.

“When we started the steering group, it was accepted that we were trying to go for a model whereby different agencies chaired it…we had a probation manager that chaired it about twice and then pulled out because they were retiring and there was a vacuum…it’s suddenly been picked up again by [superintendent]. I think it’s healthier if we go for the notion of the chair changing. I would like to see somebody from health…probation, chairing for say 12 months on a rotating basis…” [Jones Town probation manager].

The propensity for the Police Force to adopt a lead agency role was discussed in interview with the superintendent. “…you almost have to say OK I’ll do this because other people may not want to…it’s about culture…we are quite good at getting things done, its recognized by the government…we’re much more performance driven, we deal with fairly short-term challenges…anything around the crime agenda I think it’s possibly right that we’re very tight at the table and certainly pushing…maybe when it’s not necessarily in our vested interest we should sit back and disengage and let others take the lead…”

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Pearson et al (1992) identified power as central to partnership and Wilson and Charlton (1997,p.45) state “… it is the leader of the management team who has…the potential to influence the scope and direction of the partnership.” The Police Force had greater funds and the potential to dominate, but power measured through an examination of behaviour and decisions, and viewed as an aspect of social relationships, held in relation to others, defines power in terms of capacity, competence and energy, rather than power over others.

Data supported the concept of distributed leadership and interdependence due to joint ownership of processes and goals, which permitted the balancing of agency interests and encouraged cohesiveness, as managers valued each others’ contributions. The value consensus was not a legitimation of Police Force hegemony, but rotating the chair could avoid the perception that meetings are owned by one agency (Linden 2002,p.84).

Liddle and Gelsthorpe (1994a,p.21) noted the value of the ‘corporate model’ of partnership where co-ordination, decision-making and policy implementation were the responsibility of a multi-agency group rather than a lead agency. Conversely, Provan and Milward (1995) found where influence over decisions was highly concentrated in a lead agency, service user outcomes were strongest. Yet, Alter and Hage (1993,p.79) found that “…when a network is dominated by a single organisation or several large ones, it is less likely to perform successfully…” due to the costs of conflict, delay and error. The evidence is not clear cut, but control and authority can never be permanently resolved in partnership due to its dynamic nature. Bergquist et al (1995,p.37) suggest that managers should concentrate on developing their relationships with each other, and this is what managers were doing.

Managers were not all at the same level, but they did have sufficient authority to decide the business, which would indicate that the right grade of manager was involved.”…since we formed, there haven’t been any issues…we haven’t been able to bottom out ourselves…because they’ve all got a specific remit around PPOs…therefore there is no strategic pull in a different direction to say don’t do PPO.” [Detective inspector]. An opposing and exceptional view was offered by the Jones Town probation manager who said “…we’ve got plenty of examples where the chief officer can’t take strategic decisions and can’t get a resource…you’re going to need the chancellor of the exchequer, you’re going to need the secretary state for justice…”
Copies of Baker County’s strategic plan and budget were requested, but they were not forthcoming, the inference was they did not exist. Taylor Town’s probation manager claimed “…we are not very good at strategy…” and the detective sergeant stated that there used to be a business plan but it was not current. In interview the DAT manager acknowledged the need to plan.

“…we do need to be anticipating what it’s going to look like, how we’re going to resource the PPO scheme and we need to be doing that now and we need to be thinking about that alongside the other changes…like the tendering exercise.”

At the last meeting it was agreed that a business plan could facilitate performance and all agencies were asked to compile a list of priorities for the next twelve months, the new detective inspector agreed to take this forward. The plan could act as an integrating mechanism to inspire and communicate Baker County’s mission, values and objectives detailing areas of operation, resource availability and management structure to provide a framework to reconcile an agency’s own plan with the partnerships.

The co-terminus boundaries between the Crown Prosecution Service, the Police Force and Probation Service but not the Primary Care Trust were beneficial to both strategic and operational delivery. The superintendent made the decision at the first meeting to change Police Force operational boundaries to improve service provision, evidence of management practices supporting collaboration. The DIP manager was amazed at the swift nature of this decision, a laugh went around the room, “Shocked are you?” asked the superintendent.

6 et al’s (2006b,p.220) research identified county structures as the most testing for partnership. Managers concurred that the two-tier structure can act in opposition to effective partnership with districts working against each other and efforts at alignment feeling tokenistic. “…[however]...with the PPO there might be a sense in which the agencies involved all have a county wide remit…and don’t get sort of sucked down into parochial stuff…but I think it’s really messy…” [DAT manager].

Government Office acted as a field agent for government with a remit to allocate funding, oversee delivery and monitor performance through external steering. A quarterly regional
PPO forum, chaired by Government Office was attended infrequently by managers, due to a clash with the JRCs. A workshop was held recently at Jones Town prison around PPO delivery, but as the detective inspector stated:

“…I haven’t got massive contact with {Government Office}…I have very much been given a free rein about PPOs…which is great and I haven’t been constrained by my line management…I would like to think that they trusted me enough to allow me to get on with what I’m doing because they think I’m doing a good enough job. The other side of it maybe is that they haven’t got the in-depth knowledge that I’ve got to be able to challenge what I’m doing…”

The CDRP manager commented further “…unless you’ve got a problem they are not going to be interested, at the moment there are five CDRPs within {the region} that are in the top quartile for crime so those are the ones that get the attention…there was one time when we were as they said ‘bubbling under’, at the cusp of the bottom end of the top quartile and somebody rang me and said, ‘just be careful’, that’s the only time, I’ve been here eight years…”

Homel et al (2004,p.66) advocated that government adopt through Government Office a dynamic and shared approach to local delivery that acknowledges the need to distribute power and responsibility between participants in an open, nurturing and consistent process recognizing that “…power and control will shift according to the changing requirements of a developing programme…” Managers need to understand the rules of engagement, but Government Office constrained managers only in terms of the performance target, giving credence to the statement “Government will be more enabling and less directive in those areas where there is already much success and good practice while continuing to support where needed.” (Home Office 2007c,p.21).

A recurring theme was the lack of LCJB oversight of the programme. “We need someone on the board to take an interest…LCJB should own the programme.” claimed the Taylor Town probation manager. The detective sergeant complained that “…it’s all bottoms-up…” and that the LCJB should take on the governance agenda, to offer top-down direction to drive the programme forward. More exceptional was the superintendent and
DAT managers’ position; they viewed the lack of LCJB oversight as positive, allowing managers the freedom to manage with limited vertical communication downwards.

Neither the LCJB or CDRP meetings had the PPO programme as a standing item on their agendas. The LCJB sits every 6 weeks and its agenda is themed, the LCJB manager explained that “It’s on a need to know basis…[LCJB]…are really on board with them but they are also on board with a lot of other things and PPOs is just one part of their business.” Twelve months ago the LCJB had had themed sub groups, including a PPO group, but it was felt processes were ‘cumbersome’ so the groups were disbanded.

The LCJB manager explained that “…if there's a problem we kind of expect there to be a report written up to the board…if there’s a specific piece of work that needs doing, we’re quite happy to set up a task and finish group…” One such group met three times to review of the premium service protocol, she further stated “…we really invigorated this, we went through every single commitment that everybody was agreeing to, changed quite a bit of it here and there…”

The other city in Baker County not under the steering group’s remit had its PPO programme inspected during the fieldwork. The findings were briefly mentioned and the report was to be circulated, but there was no discussion. This was a missed opportunity, as partnership has been promoted as a vehicle for learning. The inspection found a lack of strategic overview from the LCJB, however the LCJB manager stated:

“…that criticism is somewhat un-founded…once we produced {the premium service protocol}…there was no real issues… ‘what’s the point in meeting for meetings sake?’…but what the board haven’t done…is a year review…that’s the next piece of work…check that everything is being adhered to…as far as we’re concerned as long as were getting what we want in terms of outcomes…its for them to lead on that…as long as they’re kept in a loop in terms of what’s going on, the board’s happy…”

The other under-engaged partnership is the CDRPs, but as the CDRP manager explained: “…the big change was the LAA…PPOs was one of the strands within the LAA…the money and the commissioning power is with the non-statutory, county [Safer Baker Partnership], technical responsibility is with the district CDRPs…it’s responsibility without
money…each of the CDRPs is nominally represented on the [Safer Baker Partnership]…but organizationally it is just a mess…from then on…my involvement has been minimal…”

Furthermore, the LCJB manager and the CDRP manager had very little insight into each others’ role and the links between the partnerships were poor. “…I have no understanding of what the LCJB does at all…I’ve never seen any evidence that they’ve sorted out any of the issues that we’ve had…[annual LCJB conference]…I went along to those a couple of times and I listen to these chief officers saying how vital it was their links with the CDRPs…I would go along the following year and hear the same and I wouldn’t have heard a word from them in the interim.” [CDRP manager].

The LCJB manager expressed near similar views about the CDRPs. The superintendent sums up the situation well. “…it's like trying to herd cats, its horrendous...you're not getting alignment...you're trying constantly to sort of harness it and deliver outcomes...the risk is that you get wasted energy, and I think there's a lot of that and I think probably where we're getting success...it’s a bit despite the structure…”

There was a consensus that LCJB were falling down on their duty with good performance letting them off the hook, simply offering a rubber stamping exercise and symbolic accountability through undertaking limited instrumental tasks. The CDRP/LCJB split was bewildering and the advent of the LAA agenda added to the puzzlement, putting the statutory partnerships out on a limb. The community safety manager believed that the LCJB should scrutinize and problem solve to improve performance, maintain and balance stakeholder relationships and ratify decisions to hold agencies to account for the premium service protocol.

The steering group was a consortium of partners, where bargaining took place over what constituted the agenda and what resources would be contributed. Co-production entailed managing outcomes as shared results through shaping context, monitoring performance, suggesting improvements, reprioritizing energies and operating a feedback mechanism. Baker County is linked downwards with Jones and Smith Town through manager attendance, where issues are drawn together and fed into the steering group. However, communication upwards to Government Office and the LCJB is minimal. The
communication infrastructure demonstrates the tension across the management models in terms of accountability, transparency and effectiveness. Lipnack and Stamps (1994,p.66) refer to ‘an architecture of complexity’ and this provides a good description of the governance arrangements.

**Criminal justice information exchange**

The steering group is administered by the Jones Town data analyst, through a range of communication tools including an Excel performance spreadsheet, the agenda and action plan minutes and a group email. The minutes shaped by the culture of the Police Force record who attended and decisions made, but not verbatim quotes, possibly to do with the Freedom of Information Act, the minutes did not fully reflect the flavour of the meetings and did not appear to be circulated to practitioners or the community.

There was a problem of getting court results as the Probation Service did not have the resources to staff the courts as they once did, and the courts were unable to provide the results instead. The Courts Service manager informed the meeting that the Bichard Report (2004) when fully implemented would allow court results to be automatically populated onto the Police Force’s national computer within 24 hours, generating improvements. For the Courts Service manager the main issue was appropriately flagged cases, but in an attempt to reduce Police Force bureaucracy, the superintendent had unilaterally made a decision to stop stamping PPO files; instead they would only be flagged on the IT system. Fortunately, the two agencies systems linked up, but responsibility for flagging was an ongoing Police Force issue, that had performance implications.

The prison governor was absent from the second meeting due to attendance at a prison meeting, although Baker County meetings are scheduled at least two months in advance. In his absence he sent the revised premium service protocol that aims to create clarity, consistency and competence of task. The revisions took in changes made to the Prison Service’s role to address information exchange problems. The detective sergeant had hoped that the prison governor would be present to discuss the ongoing issue around release planning. At the previous meeting, another prison governor was in attendance but he made it clear that Early Conditional Licences ‘are not my area’; but did agree to take it
back to the manager concerned. The detective sergeant had to be careful not to shoot the messenger.

Protocols aimed to aid integration and support collaboration through creating an appropriate interface through the institutional shaping of management practices and the delivery of quality processes. However, there are limits to control in complex programmes, guidelines for interaction are not rules and cannot express all contingencies, their needs to be scope for flexibility and creativity. Moreover, the protocol process was a stumbling block in itself, LCJB had not signed it off and the two other Baker County prisons had not seen it.

The DIP manager was concerned about continuity of care for PPOs released from prison, as the DIP was only picking up 50 per cent, despite chasing up those who dropped out of treatment, as Early Conditional Licences with problematic addresses were difficult to monitor. The prison governor with responsibility for Early Conditional Licences attended the last meeting and accepted that mechanisms were not good. PPOs had been released without informing PPO practitioners.

One of the problems related to uncertainty over release dates, the prison governor asserted there was a simple way to proceed by “Taking eighteen days off the sentence.” Additionally, a new procedure was agreed, a group email with co-ordination through the prison probation officer involving PPO practitioners address checking if prison practitioners did not have the capacity. There was an issue of resource allocation for PPO work in the Prison Service.

A further problem, surrounded community based general practitioners who did not necessarily accept the assessment of the prison doctor over scripting, leading to more issues with release planning, the DAT manager agreed to take this up. “…I think when you have less trust with somebody you’ve got to be much tighter on what specifically it is that you’re agreeing to…what you’re getting out of it and the audit trail for everything’s got to be sharp and tight…”

Information exchange problems indicated a lack of joined up practice. Dawson (2007,p.5) identified problems communicating with the Prison Service over releases and one of the
treatment managers made reference to its IT system as “…having been poor for years” and that “…the prison were woefully inadequate in keeping records”. The prison governor replied “Not sure that’s a fair description.” He sort of laughed off the comment, but it seemed inappropriate given the Primary Care Trust’s IT problems. Saying that, there were few other internal signs of conflict, issues of disagreement tended to be directed towards the Home Office, Government Office and the National Treatment Agency.

The Courts and Crown Prosecution Service had linked IT and J Track was shared between the Police Force and the Crown Prosecution Service, the Prison and Probation Service had some limited shared functions, but the Primary Care Trust was completely outside the loop. “I can’t share emails securely with health because they’re not on the GSI [government secure network]. I can send to probation, to other Police Forces…a lot of the stuff, I have to physically print out and hand it to them…I can’t do anything around that unfortunately which is a great shame.” {Detective inspector}.

Following negotiations the detective sergeant would in future attend Crown Prosecution Service case progression meetings, to share information on time scales, offences taken into consideration (TICs) and the joining up of outstanding charges. Moreover, an agreement had been reached on bail applications where by the Crown Prosecution Service would notify Jones and Smith Town directly by telephone or fax. In return the Crown Prosecution and Courts Service were to be supplied with a regularly updated list of PPOs. The new detective inspector articulated his role with respect to the Crown Prosecution Service.

“…making sure that they stand by what they signed up to do and that I make sure that our organization gives them the information that they need so that they can make the right decisions, so if there is an issue around moving charges down to TICs…we’d quite like to talk about these changes because they are really quite pertinent to this individual’s offending…each PPO that is going through the court system gets a set of supplementary evidence…having one of the team sit down with CPS…quite often they will have only seen that file five minutes ago…the solicitor has already had all night to think about what they’re going to say…we can help them get that additional footing…”

The Probation Service had third party access to the Court Service’s IT system to obtain court lists, results and orders. The Courts Service manager had been negotiating with
probation managers for them to have direct access to facilitate breaches and generally speed up processes. There was no financial implication, just an icon on Probation Service desktops.

“…local practitioners…were quite happy to do it and court staff provided training…they can realize the benefits, it’s not only helping them but it’s helping us as well…but they then had the national perspective of ‘no probation will not do it’ therefore they pulled the plug…it’s political I believe.” {Courts Service manager}.

The Courts Service manager had also instigated a new procedure to speed up the early execution of warrants to fast track PPOs and join up practice through a secure email procedure to Smith Town’s police station, enabling execution over the weekend if need be. However, the warrants office in Jones Town did not work weekends, so they would have to wait until Monday.

The superintendent in interview expressed some concern that he did not always get the full picture from partners at the meeting. “…I sense there is a bit of…you don’t need to know that, what I need to do is start holding people to account…but that will come when we move to this new contract…if we start finding through the performance stuff that there’s opportunities being missed…the management information that I get through that meeting isn’t sufficiently detailed enough…I’d like that in advance…probe that and say well OK, that’s a threat to our business what are you doing about it…”

Managers interpreted the meanings and intentions of their colleagues and shaped their attitudes and behaviours based on unwritten guidelines governing interaction, which induced regular and patterned behaviour leading to a negotiated order, in an attempt to forge solutions and move the agenda forward. There was evidence for a collective terminology where core agency managers communicated through symbols where the meanings were shared. However, irregular attendance resulted in managers not been party to this shared language. The mental health manager stated “I have a problem with the acronyms used in the meeting today…my practitioners wouldn’t understand too.” As Schaap and van Twist (1997,p.72) state “Communication with and in the network is only possible if one speaks the network language.”
However, as the DIP manager explained as a voluntary programme it was important that they provided a confidential service, therefore not all communications would be shared, unless it was pertinent to crime reduction. “…I’ve never been asked to divulge information that I wouldn’t feel comfortable doing and I would never let my workers do that and it’s never been an issue…without us keeping our confidentiality with the client, we wouldn’t see anybody…we don’t have the tools that other agencies have, we haven’t got a prescription…police have got the power of arrest, Probation Service have got the power to recall…they’ve all got very strong teeth…”

The superintendent and detective inspector when chairing did not correct jargon usage, and in fact the latter was responsible for some. There was some use of drug treatment jargon but the DAT manager did make an effort to explain it. “Does everyone know what IOMS (Integrated Offender Management Scheme) is?” This was a good interjection by the detective sergeant, sensitive to the multi-agency perspective. Gardener (1993) (in Roaf 2002,p.46) defined interpersonal intelligence as “the ability to notice and make distinctions among other individuals and, in particular, among their moods, temperaments, motivations and intentions…to act upon this knowledge…”

Legitimacy, status and reputation are important in partnership. The prison governor explained that “…a lot of what we have is built on networking…really important to finding and sourcing providers…what is really important for me is to try and make sure that [my prison] has a really good reputation for partnership work because all these organizations talk to each other and establishments have reputations in the community…so I put quite a lot of effort into making sure that we have a really inclusive environment…”

Despite the lack of joined up IT, partly explained by a decentralist government policy on procurement, data sharing was good and generally distinguished by specific, appropriate, clear and reliable information. Managers within their capability were effecting change to assist the collaborative effort, but ultimately system wide improvements were needed to fully integrate IT. Timeliness of data was an issue as cases can take time to progress through the Criminal Justice System, performance reporting was always quarterly in arrears. It is to performance that we now turn.
Performance

Three years ago the programme was not being performance managed; in response managers formulated their own framework. Despite acknowledged problems with methodology it enabled managers to track individual service user’s offending and a 21 per cent reduction in convictions were achieved. Managers had been ahead of the game in monitoring performance, the framework was felt to be a good one and there was disappointment “…that we had to move away from that, but the Home Office said you’ve got to and that’s final…” [Detective inspector]. A national framework was cascaded down by Government Office to aid benchmarking and was introduced in the 2008-09 cycle with the aim to:

1. “Reduce the proportion of adult and young offenders and prolific and other priority offenders who re-offend
2. Reduce the number of recorded convictions for the designated cohort by 12 per cent.”

The target is clearly stated on the heading of the action plan minutes. The objective had originally been higher. “…we looked at it and we just thought this is just an impossible target…I think it was the strength of the managers involved and working in a united way through their different agencies triggering responses from very senior managers that actually got the targets changed in a credible way.” [Jones Town probation manager]. Baker County had renegotiated the figure down, other areas had typically 16 to 25 per cent, it was the only programme that challenged Government Office and won.

The Audit Commission (1998,p.26) has stated that partnership and agency objectives need to be consistent. Agency process targets did underpin the partnership’s reconviction target, legitimated through the common service user group and the interweaving of goals, with a subsidiary aim of harm reduction. As the DAT manager explains:

“…there’s an appetite and a commitment to partnership and I think that PPO schemes are a simple idea that people can sign up to…they are drug treatment clients, they are probation clients, they are regular visitors to the prison and they are regular
customers of the police, we all know this and it just makes absolute perfect sense that by combining our efforts to work with them more intensively gets better outcomes…”

The 12 per cent target was achieved, but on reflection, there was some hint that renegotiating the target had backfired, as the target for 2009/10 was more stretching. The new target based on a revised formula, as explained to the steering group by the data analyst was set for the first year of three at 19 per cent, with the second and third year’s performance linked to funding, but with the PPO cohort different for each of the years. Additionally, if the target is missed for 2009/10, the under-achievement would be carried forward. Government Office had forwarded a massively complicated PowerPoint presentation to supposedly aid understanding.

The 19 per cent was again challenged by the partnership, though the main drivers were coming from the Police Force. The Smith Town probation manager explained “It’s like any other target that comes down from Government Office…they usually take a bit of persuading to adjust to them…” The detective sergeant met with Government Office to seek clarification on the new performance framework and to discuss the target, being proactive in generating a conflict of interest, but on this occasion she was unsuccessful.

Despite the sophistication of the revised formula, games can still be played, because of the way the cohort is selected and reviewed it can be manipulated to enhance performance, an example of goal displacement. The Taylor Town probation manager was critical of Government Office asserting that they are “…forcing us to play the game…by putting new PPOs on at the beginning of the programme and then taking them off…” in order to achieve the desired cohort to boost performance. A significant reduction in offending has historically been achieved at the beginning of PPO status; at the other end of the spectrum, those on the programme the longest have a reduced risk of re-offending so there is an incentive to retain them.

Reconviction data is a proxy for re-offending, a signpost not a measure. Stanley (2009,p.155) has raised concerns about the danger of using reconviction data as a sole measure of success and the detective sergeant concurs. “…it doesn’t look at types of crimes, so somebody could do in one month two robberies but 6 months later they could be down to thefts but there might be more of them, obviously the impact on everybody
involved is less for a theft than it is for a robbery…” The other problem is that it is based on aggregated figures “…now 90 per cent of my offenders could be doing really well, but if 10 per cent fly off the handle, I may not reach the target…it’s a bit too basic.” [Detective inspector].

Moreover, improved surveillance could raise detection and thus conviction levels, where as high incarceration rates reduces the pool of PPOs available to be reconvicted. The Jones Town probation manager shared his concerns. “…depending upon the forcefulness of the relationships between the key agencies…there is a danger that one part can dominate {Catch and Convict}, and there have been times when I’ve questioned are we really just about processing people more quickly through the courts and into prison.”

Additionally, there may also be a proportion of service users who would have shown improvements regardless of the programme, but interventions can draw forward the reduction and cessation of offending which for some offenders will inevitably occur. “…it’s quite a qualitative thing really…how can you prove what somebody would have been doing if you hadn’t been working with them…we collect {other data}…to try and get a more rounded picture than just the Home Office statistics…one performance measure is not necessarily reflective of how the individuals are doing…” [Detective sergeant].

The Jones Town treatment manager encapsulates the issues well. “I think there’s been a massive achievement that is almost immeasurable…the beauty is in the detail, the fact that every week probation officers, police and health workers and the voluntary sector sit down in a room and talk about this mutual client group, ten years ago we would never have thought to see it, unbelievable…I don’t know whether you’ll ever be able to untangle which part is to be upheld, you have to consider that it’s all the sum of the parts…”

Furthermore there is a problem with conflicting targets, as the new detective inspector explained. “…we get measured on the number of convictions, an offender charged with 9 offences…go against NI 30…as a scheme manager…I’d rather 2 charges and 7 TICs, but that might not necessarily be the best thing for that individual, sometimes its better to take the hit on the charges and get them a more substantial sentence…”
From April 2009 the Police Force measure will be moving from sanction detection (arrest) to offences brought to justice, described as a positive outcome, which is the measure used by the Crown Prosecution Service, reflecting a nationally recognized need to join up. However, in another area, practice was not joined up. Partners send quarterly performance returns to the data analyst who processes them before forwarding the data on to Government Office but the Crown Prosecution Service and the YOTs do not separate out PPOs for performance monitoring.

On the question of benchmarking and league tables the DAT manager who had previously worked at Government Office said “…it’s important to them and they get very excited about a lot of this stuff. We have our targets and it’s important that we meet them…but I’m not that interested in being top of the class. I’m interested in doing what we have to do to do a good job. The most useful thing for me about the comparative class thing is looking at how services are delivered in areas that are similar…”

However, the LCJB manager had a different take “…all these headline targets are published on a website…against every other area in the country and we are held publicly to account for this…these are the ones the board are like hot on because obviously its kind of embarrassing if your there in lights and we want to be the best…”

Managers at a greater distance from the programme were more concerned about benchmarking than those actually delivering the programme. Yet programme managers were motivated by the performance agenda, but they used additional and alternative indicators of achievement, resource acquisition and levels of collaboration. Common values, rooted in the public sector, a concern to make a difference for those most disadvantaged in society, conferred legitimacy on the exercise of authority and acted as an integrating mechanism to provide the basis for consensual decision-making.

Bergquist et al’s (1995,p.79) research highlighted the motives for partnership, including a desire for more fulfilling work and enjoying the partnership experience. Steele’s (1999,p.20-21) research found that recognition for doing a good job and the opportunity to develop new skills were more important than promotion and pay. The superintendent valued other managers’ contributions. “Good stuff and thanks for coming.” However, there was no reward system to recognize, sustain and remunerate partners, rewards were in terms
of reduced crime and satisfaction from doing a good job, but this indicated a failure to capitalize on success.

“How do we celebrate success…I don’t know if we do…there’s nothing kind of formalized…I think frequently we’re always looking at the next thing you know, where are the gaps, where are the problems and we do have very good performance. [Detective inspector] presided over a period of particular success…but I’m not sure how he was thanked…but I do like the idea that we kind of get together as a partnership to celebrate our success and think about where we’ve come from…” {DAT manager}.

A number of managers expressed concern regarding national priorities that do not fit the local scene. The CDRP manager said “…the instructions come out to everybody…we have to have a PPO scheme whether we need it or not…” The superintendent explained how top-down targets constrain managers by focusing on short-term targets as opposed to developing long-term solutions to problems. Rehabilitation projects take time to embed, but senior managers want quick wins. The superintendent elaborated “…I think it’s important to be held to account I really do, but…having the freedom to operate and do the right thing locally. What I have a real problem with is the one size fits all…there needs to be some latitude for managers…”

In order to manage the local drug misuse situation, the DIP manager with consent of the DAT had decided not to run with the National Treatment Agency’s target of 95 per cent of DIP service users moving into tier 3 treatment. A key management task is to correct deviations from target, managers had constructively questioned and challenged the applicability of the target and agreed to forge another way, more responsive to local need.

“…being the voice of my team…I’ve been able to influence the DAT to change targets…I think that’s a lot easier having been on the coalface…I’m fairly free and trusted to change things…they’re really hard targets to hit…because the schemes been set up to deal in areas where there’s a lot of crime, crack cocaine and heroin…if we just deal with crack cocaine and heroin clients, it would probably half the number we work with…” {DIP manager}. 
The detective inspector described how he had addressed an issue of underperformance. “...one of the things I’ve picked up on...‘well we haven’t had that individual because he does not want to work with us’...my take on it is we tackle the ones that are prevalent, whether they want to engage or not...I don’t know whether it was to increase performance or whether it was to make it easier for the staff...so I’ve been trying to change that ethos and I haven’t had any problems because I’ve been able to explain...we’ve got a responsibility to the community.” This is a good example of a manager recognizing the importance of taking practitioners with them when instituting change.

Performance and accountability are linked for managers, and accountability is multi-faceted as the DIP manager explained. “I’ve got accountability...towards the PPO scheme...the [third sector agency]...to the DAT to fulfil the contract...to government...to my team and a lot of that would be to my clients...” The Jones Town treatment manager articulated her thoughts on the issue.“...if my [treatment] colleagues were saying ‘[treatment manager] you’re right off the mark there, I’m not going to see people within two working days’, I would have to say alright and put the face of the PCT on...I’m employed by them so I do have to...but I’d go as far as I could if I thought a different decision was for the good of the partnership.”

Steele’s (1999,p.29) research found that managers felt systems for assessing performance were ‘inadequate and unsatisfactory’, but managers had innovated and fashioned a performance framework before government devised one. The DIP manager summed up the programme’s performance as follows.”...the multi-agency working is absolutely fantastic...it gives the client the opportunity to change by being able to address so many areas of their life with four agencies supporting them...”

Performance monitoring should ideally measure the whole process not just outcomes, for optimum control windows on all processes are required. Given the problems with the reconviction measure: the ratio of convictions and TICs, the issue of offence seriousness, that imprisonment reduces the pool of offenders, that targeting increases the chance of detection and that the causal links between the programme and reduced offending are not clear; a balanced scorecard approach offers a more nuanced approach to performance management.
Resources and funding

There had been no audit of PPO offending, Wilson and Charlton (1997,p.13) state “…successful partnerships are aware of their context and the impact this has on the way they must operate.” A crime mapping exercise would have situated the programme in its community, enhancing knowledge and understanding and justifying decision-making. The community safety manager stated in theory this should have been done, but in practice it was a risk to commit resources for research when there is no guarantee that outcomes identified will be funded. The figure of forty PPOs per programme was a hasty calculation as implementation was rushed due to government deadlines.

A budget is a key managerial tool to achieve the strategic plan, co-ordinate and control activities and spend. However, there is no budget identifying costs and funding sources and no talk of costs at any of the meetings. Easton (2007,p.83) recommends a dedicated budget and a finance officer to manage it. A zero based budget would allow managers to consider what they needed to deliver, and how that might be achieved with what resources, as every budget line is examined and justified. A pooled budget on the other hand could increase flexibility of fund use.

Managers were content with the level of resources, whilst acknowledging additional funding would enable the partnership to do more. However, the detective sergeant expressed concern that LAA 37 might be dropped with a subsequent loss of resources. There was a suggestion that Baker County needed to be ‘seen’ delivering, and keeping LAA co-ordinators informed of its success. Although the PPO programme had high political salience for government, a key driver to crime reduction, managers working in a low crime area probably needed to work harder to promote the programme against competing need. Bryson and Crosby (1992,p.321) have cited the risk that “As a policy becomes institutionalised advocates maybe less attentive and vocal.” The superintendent reflected on managing environmental constraints:

“...we've got capacity for the people who want to come on the scheme...a colleague went up to Hounslow and said they were only able to target 10 per cent...they're just responding, when are they going to stop and say, 'how do we actually resolve that problem'...because when you're up to your arse in crocodiles you can't. A lot of these
cities they're just so busy...some of the solutions are there...I think it’s for managers to...make that space, to slow down and reflect.”

Current Police Force funding was protected, but the DAT manager reported that there would be less money in 2010-11 for the treatment and DIP budget. The DIP manager expressed concern over his resources, he had switched some capacity away from custody suites to courts and prisons, a move away from the Drug Arrest Referral Scheme (Seeling et al 2001) to focus on benefit applications and housing, a more innovative scheme to improve the quality and range of provision.

“…the police pay a big percentage towards the DIP contract, so my main aim is to make sure that the police are happy and part of that is to be able to support the PPO scheme...part of my job is selling that to the staff, this is really important because it keeps us in business...” (DIP manager).

The Probation Service had signalled difficulties ahead in terms of workload management and with the gaining of trust status, further restructuring was anticipated. Responses could include delaying access to resources through operating a waiting list and/or restricting resources to statutory cases. Gardner (1993) (in Roaf 2002,p.42) is of the view that “It is constraints that make possible genuine achievements, including human innovation and creativity. In the absence of constraints, where all is theoretically possible, it would not be possible to make and recognise advances.” A vision not shared by Baker County managers.

Managers are concerned to access a range of services, but the two recurring themes are mental health and housing as indicated in the two earlier chapters. There is a concerned consensus about the lack of mental health provision and a desire for a formal and consistent link at the steering group to take issues forward and facilitate provision in the field. The minimum required is half a day a week from a mental health practitioner for each of the three programmes, with joint assessments operating out of the probation or treatment offices.

A series of managers had been involved in negotiations for a manager from mental health to attend the steering group. The community safety manager felt that mental health did not see PPOs as core service users, but equally he argued they were not sufficiently resourced,
but practitioners feel let down by the agency. The new detective inspector explained what he would do:

“...the first thing I’d do is find out who represents them on MAPPA because they’ve had exactly the same problems with mental health as we’re having now...so hopefully I’ll be able to identify people that have ready use for engaging with us and who have already achieved things with us and I’ll steal them.”

A mental health manager did attend the last meeting and acknowledged they had not been contributing to the programme but change was imminent. An increase in his budget would allow three practitioners to offer PPOs a primary mental health service by summer 2009. The detective sergeant suggested that the new practitioners could be linked to the JRCs, which would be an excellent way of integrating them.

There was a feeling that this was a very positive development, but the Taylor Town probation manager was anxious to manage the announcement to practitioners in case service start-up was slower than expected, an issue of managing expectations. For the mental health manager the potential value of partnership appeared to be influenced by his assessment of how effectively his agency could participate. Only when extra resources became available did he make the decision to come on board. For the partnership there was limited substitutability of assets, so this new resource was a real coup.

Various meetings about accommodation were taking place, the superintendent said that lots of good work was going on, but was not being joined up and fed back. A division of labour between managers reduced duplication of tasks, but there was a need to manage the component parts. There was evidence of managers seeking out new partners to replicate the Jones Town Housing Support project for Smith Town, resulting in an increase in housing provision by a third. Additionally, there was a sense that district councils were becoming more engaged with the programme and that was described as a big step forward.

The DAT manager spoke of “...a lack of coherence and blockages in the system...we can drive it forward...through the LAA and push the PPO housing plan.” However, the DIP manager countered that however good the co-ordination was, it would not deal with the overall shortage of accommodation; practitioners were chasing the same limited stock. The
demand on Housing Support had reached thresholds of tolerance and as Himmelman (1996,p.20) has stated “There is a clear danger that too much will be expected from smaller, localized efforts when most major societal problems result from national and international economic and political polices.”

The DAT manager informed the meeting that two new posts were to be funded at Jones Town prison with the third sector agency Addaction from the summer of 2009. The first post was for a strategic alcohol lead to link the range and diversity of prison projects “…to get better value in the system...and generate seamless links” with the community provision. The second, an operational post to work with twelve prisoners at any one time, offering structured interventions with PPOs a priority for the service. Furthermore, the DAT manager announced he would convene a meeting with treatment and probation managers to discuss a new sentencing option, the Alcohol Treatment Requirement.

One of the government’s priorities for Primary Care Trusts has been to develop a market to drive up quality and reduce costs with commissioning favoured over grant funding. The DAT was commissioning a new contract for a redesigned treatment service to better meet the needs of a larger range of service users reflecting local conditions. It was a ‘handsome’ contract that could attract a range of providers.

“…a lot of our money is locked into expensive tier four drug treatments and people don’t need to be there, we can manage people in the community more effectively and free up money to develop more structured day care programmes...we require as part of this tender process that our providers to do more of that...if you’re an offender and drug taker...that’s a full-time occupation...if you give somebody free drugs then you’ve got to occupy that time...and I’m not sure how effective we are always at doing that...”{DAT manager}.

For the superintendent the tender process offered scope to involve service users in a conversation about how resources are allocated. “...it’s really good stuff because it’s being driven by the service user as opposed to this is what we give you and if you don’t like it then piss off...I think we’re missing an opportunity, I don’t think it's necessarily the crime impact, it’s more their well-being...we’re perpetuating them on methadone...what we
should be saying is, how are we going to get you off the gear?...what do you think we can do for you?...”

The prison governor elucidated on the advantages of commissioning. “...you’ve got a clearly defined service both to the commissioner and also the provider, there’s an opportunity for different organizations to tender so it’s more transparent...there’s a fixed price and time scale so you know what you’re getting into as a provider with a degree of predictability and stability...”

The DAT had decided to offer the current providers the opportunity to bid through a closed tender because “…it’s less disruptive in terms of risk...we know them...we’re quite clear about what we want for the future...we’re been very candid and open with our providers about that...if they can’t deliver it, then we have no option but to go out to tender and invite someone else in...” [DAT manager].

The public and third sector providers due to their intersecting mandates had come together and submitted a joint bid following three years of discussions. It transpired that ‘continuity of care’ was rated above all else, so the contract was awarded to the existing suppliers. Practitioners had the automatic right to transfer across to new providers under TUPE regulations, but concern had been expressed that the DIP provider could go out of business if it lost the contract. Hancock’s (2001,p.107) research had found that agencies were “reluctant to share ideas and information” due to competitive tendering; it would appear the partnership agenda has moved on.

The Smith Town treatment manager explained the new contract would prevent practitioners getting precious over whether they were tier two or three and allow for flexible practitioner deployment. “DIP putting a bid in for tier two, PCT putting a bid in for tier three, we have to work together and if you put separate bids in, that doesn’t make for partnership working...OK we don’t want to do tier two work, but DIP want to do tier three...it’s much better to join forces and present as a single service than compete...these tier two and tier three bids overlap all the time...clients...want the best possible service they can get...”
However, a number of managers spoke of the disadvantages of commissioning, there was a view that performance eventually plateaued after an initial uplift and that providers do not always provide what they say they will provide. The superintendent had considered the possibility of a dip in performance if the treatment providers were unhappy with the new contract. The Jones Town probation manager was particularly vexed “...huge amounts of monies are spent in administration, monitoring, evaluation, tendering, commissioning and I think it’s a huge waste...”

Moreover there is a contradiction in government policy, as the prison governor explained. “…there are lots of small organizations who deliver extremely high quality services but the whole contractual process acts as a disincentive, they are too small to tender and manage contracts on that basis...larger organizations often have professional fundraisers, legal and HR departments, writing contracts it’s their bread and butter...it doesn’t create a level playing field...and sometimes it reduces the innovation...”

Moving on now to address human resources, the DIP manager reported that a practitioner had resigned over issues of commitment to the service user group and the office coordinator had resigned due to competency issues. He had moved DIP practitioners around and used agency personnel to cover, but at the time of writing up the DIP was fully staffed. He articulated his view on the importance of practitioners:

“I’ve been really lucky. I’ve got workers who’ve been there from the start, the majority, we’ve employed two new workers since I’ve been in post because we got extra funding because I went back to the DAT and said if you want me to deliver I’m going to need...they came out with some more money which was fantastic...keeping the staff has been really good and it’s probably one thing I’m most proud of, because I think it means that staff are feeling supported and that makes my job easier, much easier.”

In contrast to the DIP and the flexible deployment envisaged by the treatment contract, the detective inspector stated “I’ve got one member of staff that’s been off long-term sick and there’s nothing I can do about it...it’s a very bureaucratic organization...you can’t just pick someone up and say ‘do this do that', but it’s understanding how long that impacts going to be, what can we do to mitigate that. We haven’t had anything in the last two years since I’ve been doing it that has massively, massively impacted on performance.”
The PPO development officer was a Police Force civilian based at headquarters with the remit to populate J Track, update the Police Force’s national computer and develop the programme Police Force wide. She was observed attending the Jones Town’s JRC and the first of the Baker County meetings before being replaced by her supervisor, the community safety manager. Reading between the lines, there appeared to be issues of competency, she was criticized by the LCJB manager for not undertaking the premium service protocol review as agreed, and cases had not been flagged on the IT system leading to mistakes. The detective sergeant diplomatically said “We’re not quite there with that role at the moment, there’s a lot more potential with it…trying to develop corporate issues…providing a PPO input into the police student training…the initial forms given to PPOs {need} standardizing…”

Practitioner supervision was a primary management task, key to creating an understanding about the partnership and managing performance. The prison governor encapsulated his approach. “…providing that what is achieved at the end meets the aim, the journey can be quite variable, so what I tend to do is adopt a different style according to the different people that I manage. I try and recognize their strengths and weaknesses, so if I’ve got somebody who I’ve got complete trust in because I believe they’re signed up to my vision I can just let them get on with it because I know they understand. But there are other people who I need on a slightly tighter piece of string because I don’t necessarily have the confidence that they are going to deliver…so I try and make sure that the vision that I want to achieve is shared and understood…”

A practitioner training and development day held in June 2009 offered the opportunity to share ideas and experiences and to network to foster learning. Managers had been invited to talk about key issues, the prison governor on Early Conditional Licences and the mental health manager on the process for accessing the new resources. There was an interesting disparity between practitioners and managers when discussing how to improve programme delivery. The former focused on items directly beneficial to service users, food and clothing vouchers, a mini bus, rent and furniture grants, where as managers wanted the opportunity to review other successful PPO programmes.

“…we’ve got a…well embedded system that’s working pretty well, but there are other models out there that really as managers we could do with having a look at and
picking out good bits from one and good bits from another…the reality is it costs money and time. I’m quite lucky, I’m in a position where I could allocate some time…my colleagues would find that far more difficult, because not only have they got the PPO team they have also got other programmes and responsibilities…” {Detective inspector}.

Evidence of learning was exemplified by a combined DAT/CDRP bid to the Home Office to replicate the successful experience of PPO implementation by targeting the top fifty offenders who were problem drinkers. During the three month pilot those originally suggested for inclusion did not subsequently appear on the list. Anti-social behaviour and alcohol were identified by neighbourhood police constables as the biggest problem, rather than alcohol and crime. Moreover, practitioners were unsure how to successfully engage those targeted, given many were not facing court.

The DAT manager said lessons have been learnt, in particular the need for a generic training package for all agency practitioners on alcohol issues and the need for anger management interventions. A local university had carried out an evaluation and managers were invited to attend a seminar to disseminate the findings and inform the DAT’s commissioning strategy. A DAT bid to the Safer Baker Partnership was planned with the aim of embedding a new alcohol service through Addaction.

This project can be interpreted as an innovative project or equally as mission creep. The partnership generated new ideas but also additional responsibilities, capacity risked been spread too thinly across an expanding range of interventions beyond the original brief. Given the costs of partnership there is a strong case for parsimony in the number of initiatives launched, but the findings do support that in a low crime area, it is anti-social behaviour which is the problem.

Moreover, as the prison governor explained “…a lot of the money that becomes available is for new initiatives and it is for a trial period…and then they can’t get continuation funding…funders believe that if it seems to work, then the commissioners should mainstream it…the difficulty is that a lot of the work isn’t necessarily suitable to mainstream because whilst it delivered additionality, it’s not core business…there’s frustration in not being able to embed a really good service…”
However the DIP, does appear to have been designed to plug the gaps between the other agencies involved. “…we’re very fluid and adapt to what the scheme needs…we advocate for the client…hold their hands to a certain extent…these are people who have no education, they’ve been in care, young offender institutes, they haven’t got the skills, energy or understanding to get the things they need to function…I think that’s appreciated by the other agencies…we’ve all got different aspects of work but it’s all to the same end, the agencies compliment each other so well, the scheme wouldn’t work if any of the four agencies went out of it…” {DIP manager}.

Homel et al (2004,p.64) have stated that, “Investing to deliver means accepting the need for continuous development work.” As fieldwork came to an end, the DAT manager with support from Government Office was co-ordinating a capital bid to the Home Office to fully co-locate the Jones Town programme. The premises identified were 200 meters from the magistrates’ court and 500 meters from the crown court at the unused hostel. The bid claimed full co-location would aid performance by bridging scripts between custody and the community, enable the tackling of social exclusion through ‘client led modules’ on housing, debt and benefit, education, training and employment and family work. Plus allow managers to spend time on the front line and make better use of volunteers.

The bid expected economies in terms of support function, travel and overheads. The refurbishment was estimated at £40,000 with four months to commission and deliver from confirmation of funding, but the project would require ongoing revenue support. In order to be successful the partnership needed to promote the government’s confidence agenda, so the following was included. “…part of the work of the newly established team will be to develop relationships with local media networks to support the positive media output.” The required external focus discussed by Wilson and Charlton (1997,p.55).

The partnership has been built around the complementary competences of each agency in terms of their ‘currencies of exchange’ (Cropper 1996,p.84). Resources comprised not just money, but personnel, facilities, IT and invisible assets like power, reputation and legitimacy, not always quantifiable, but recognized and valued. Interdependence highlighted the value of partners to each other, reduced transaction costs and provided a ‘synergetic effect’ (Warner and Sullivan 2004,p.175).
Moreover managers were a key resource, they were the glue that held the partnership together, a primary integrating mechanism, as the DIP manager explained. "DIP was new three years ago and they put workers in without any management...DIP was failing because...people were working completely differently and being managed by people who didn’t know about criminal justice...so the job was created and we’re starting to hit targets...it needed to be the first job created, [not]...14 months ago because of worries about the contract...extremely short sighted...I’ve never really felt like management but I really didn’t want someone coming in from outside and having another year with it being a mess..."

Resource dependency theory (Alter and Hage 1993,p.153) claims that when resources come from a single source, that source will want to control the decisions. However, although the Police Force had contributed a greater level of funding, it was still reliant on others to carry through the mandate. The mobilization of varied resources added complexity, but diversity is the advantage sought through partnership and resource holders were more likely to share their resources if they were less scarce.

**Marketing**

Moving to the concept of marketing, Linden (2002,p.132) has claimed “In our world of information overload, even the best initiatives require skilful marketing to get attention and develop a loyal constituency.” Public relations was a returning theme and appeared to have a twin agenda, to raise the programme’s profile and as a means of accessing more resources. Some managerial differences were expressed in terms of involvement with the media, an open versus a closed approach. The Housing Support manager asserted that the programme needed to be more proactive in promoting its profile and the superintendent agreed. “…we need to be alive to media opportunities...to advertise our success to get sponsors...we are not good with the media, and the good stuff doesn’t get out there...”

However, the DIP and treatment managers were less keen due to past negative publicity. Moreover, there was a consensus that the 2008 promotion had been a lot of effort for few good news stories. Government Office had not given a steer, and concern was expressed that they may be expected to do something last minute that they were not prepared for, the superintendent agreed to liaise to assess the situation. The prospect of ‘piggy backing’ on
the 2009 national Drugs Action Week campaign was suggested, and some managers were enthusiastic.

The detective sergeant stated that the partnership needed to be clear about what it wanted to communicate. The superintendent agreed “What is the message we want to get across?” simplicity and corporateness were identified themes. A suggestion was made that a monthly profile of successful case studies could be compiled. As PPOs came off the programme their details could be passed to the community safety manager who was offering to co-ordinate the process.

Another proposal was that the marketing strategy should focus on what the programme offered PPOs rather than profiling individuals. The Taylor Town probation manager asserted “…Community Payback gets all the attention, probation does other things as well.” However, Community Payback is easier to sell as a concept because its punishment based and Casey (2008,p.6) found that the public place punishment at the heart of the Criminal Justice System.

Risk was expressed in terms of managing the marketing of the programme. There was an acknowledged moral hazard from ‘scaring’ the community, who had little knowledge of these offenders. Casey (2008,p.3) has asserted “Too often there is a sense that the public can’t be trusted to take a view on their policing and Criminal Justice System.” The DAT manager appeared to concur“…if it’s about demonstrating that we’re doing things, then that can have a counter effect on all those people who didn’t think this was an issue in the first place. ‘What! there are 120 prolific offenders in {Baker County} committing all this crime, it’s terrible’. So I think we need to be careful and clever about it…best to combine it with other things, like housing…”

In contrast, the superintendent had bought into the government’s confidence agenda, but he was also cautious. “…you've got to be careful about how you market it, because obviously the people who are involved in that process, you don’t want to overly demonize them …{however} I think it’s reassuring for the public to know that we are targeting certain people and trying to help them….”
Ransom and Stewart (1994,p.261) believe that managers have to recognize that the power of public protest is important to public discourse and that special efforts in legitimation may be required with some crime policies. Baker County did appear to be risk averse, plausibly because the costs of failure were high due to the nature of the service user group. An unanticipated consequence from the 2008 campaign was when a few months later a couple of the profiled PPOs’ committed some serious burglaries and the press had a field day. “Learned from that big time.” {Community safety manager}.

The superintendent was keen to get the CDRPs involved and they do have a responsibility through ‘face the people’ sessions, but he pointed out their ‘patchy’ and disconnected nature. The superintendent asked what marketing the partners were doing and “What can we learn from other programmes like MAPPA?” who publish a yearly report on their work. The Courts Service manager said the courts do media events with the LCJB and gave the detective sergeant the telephone number of their press officer. The detective sergeant believed the LCJB should be fronting the marketing. The LCJB manager stated in interview “…if they just want posters, bit of merchandise and they are happy to go out and maybe do a few radio and newspaper interviews…[we could] draft a press release...we’d use the police graphics which charge us cost price and we’ve got like a few thousand pounds to spare…”

A consensus did emerge that any marketing should focus less on the benefits to the PPOs themselves, but on the benefits working with PPOs has for the community from reduced crime. The prison governor stated “…need to focus on the harm it [drug misuse] does to the community.” Wilson and Charlton (1997,p.56) have argued that publicity “…does not come automatically and needs to be planned for…But actions speak louder than words, and a record of achievement is, in any case, the key to good PR.”

Agencies were asked to go away and bring ideas back to the next meeting, which they did, but no decision was made, the debate had stalled six months on from when first mentioned. The Home Office and Ministry of Justice (2009) have recommended a communication strategy based on information about what has been done to tackle problems, and the consequences for those found guilty, emphasizing the demanding nature of the programme and the change generated.
Marketing in the private sector is about creating a demand relationship between the provider and the customer but the programme does not need to create added demand. However, the concept of closeness to the customer (Peters and Waterman 1982) is relevant in terms of listening and responding. But who is the customer? Crime reduction is a public good and managers need to reconcile service user and community interests, as Casey (2008,p.9) reports, 90 per cent of the public felt they were not given enough information about offenders post sentence.

There was limited recognition of service users as stakeholders, but no utilization of the right to attend the steering group as referred to in the terms of reference. A programme brochure could aid promotion and accountability but it needs to be continually updated and reinforced. Other tactics could include creating visible signs of success through the use of logos to buttress the partnership’s presence.

The Jones Town probation manager said “…I’m struggling to think of any clear coherent ways in that I would say…[the community] have a voice in the PPO scheme.” This situation was not unusual; both Gilling (2005,p.749) and Edwards and Benyon (2001,p.169) have claimed that community engagement has been one of the least well developed features, as partnerships have struggled to develop bottom down accountability. Community engagement was seen by the managers as an additional task rather than the way business is done, having privileged crime reduction outcomes, rather than institutionalize procedures to ensure transparency and openness through public or service user engagement.

The lack of visibility and voice within the community over planning and delivery, resulted in their lack of ownership of crime problems and potential solutions. This reduced the partnership’s opportunity to learn, innovate and provide legitimacy for its actions and to add value through building social capital, promoting active citizenship and strengthening community cohesion. The challenge for managers is to close the gap between ‘geographical communities’ and ‘communities of interest’ (6 et al 2006b,p.224) and the programme.

Still, the low public profile could be a deliberate strategy; perhaps there would be more conflict in this partnership if the community were involved? Despite agency consensus, the
community may have multiple and conflicting versions of the nature of the problem and what should be done about it. As Skelcher et al (2005, p. 579) claim “The desire to secure a stable operating environment produces an imperative within the managerial discourse to constrain participation and accountability.”

The incentive for the community to get involved is to live in a safer environment, but in a low crime area concern about crime may not provide a basis for sustained individual participation. Additionally the community may lack the resources to take on the role. Even though crime in Baker County is low, the quest for safety may be insatiable. The paradox is that policies aimed at crime reduction may actually serve to increase fear of crime by highlighting peoples’ vulnerability.

The new detective inspector encapsulated the dominant view. “…there is a role for the community to play, but far wider than the programme… the community have a responsibility… particularly around restorative justice… making sure that we have a community that we all feel comfortable to live in… so if we see somebody committing a crime we’re prepared to phone up the police and go to court and do our civic responsibility…” Leave it to the crime experts in other words.

**Any other business**

The community safety manager raised the issue of IOMS though it was not an agendered item, indicating a lack of manager foresight. Five pilots had been operating since July 2008 to bring all CDRP programmes under one roof and to extend the range of provision. Although an evaluation was scheduled, the national role out was due to commence, but with no new money. The community safety manager asserted that that the PPO programme would now go into decline, as IOMS became its policy successor.

“…in principle it’s something that does seem to make sense because there’s some duplications between… MAPPA and PPOs and there’s also scope for those people that don’t fall into either camp to be managed a little bit better… I’ve already started meeting with the MAPPA manager…” [New detective inspector].
The community safety manager felt there was a political imperative to plan and innovate, to take IOMS forward. Ransom and Stewart (1994, p.261) state “…management in the public domain is entwined with the political process. If management doesn’t understand the political process it can not be effective.” The external environment was challenging the partnership’s capacity to innovate, managers needed to judge the balance between continuity and change, emerging agendas and existing priorities. Change needs vision, leadership and communication. Bergquist et al (1995, p.127) cite the need to accept change whilst acknowledging the need for continuity with managers generating broad based support for the transition. The detective sergeant stated “…we want to keep driving it forward, keep improving it and making it bigger and better all the time…”

However, there had been no contingency planning in light of the economic downturn or election. Some changes may be unexpected, but politically astute managers need to “…continually monitor pertinent developments and trends, assess organisational performance, and be prepared to initiate organisational change…” (Bryson and Crosby 1992, p.42). Conversely, Osborne and Brown (2005, p.39) argue that “…the environment is too complex and is now changing too quickly for traditional models of planned change to be effective, and top-down, planned change minimizes the learning that goes on across the organization and which could enable it to change and innovate more effectively in the future.”

Over recent years managers have had to embrace change, a learning partnership encourages continuous education and adaption at all levels and is ready to forge change rather than wait for it to be imposed. “I think anybody who has been involved around reducing re-offending knows that it’s just a manic changing process all the time, nothing stands still and once you get into that sort of frame of mind and you overcome the cultural element of that…the resistance isn’t there, because it’s almost like it’s such a natural process…it just becomes the norm…” {Prison governor}.

As managers were leaving, concern was expressed again about the venue’s poor acoustics, and it was agreed to seek out an alternative with more car parking; the researcher was the only participant on the bus. Interviews were obtained with a number of managers before she went home, to embark on the task of typing up her notes.
Conclusion

Most managers had recognized that the rational solution was to co-operate, self-interest can be defeating. The combination of a common service user group, similar institutional factors, mostly large public sector agencies, committed managers and a programme characterized by a coherent and integrated approach to crime drove the policy forward. Moreover, a clear performance framework, good processes, adequate funding and a willingness to collaborate have led to interdependence and the cementing of constructive working relationships based on trust and reciprocity.

Kickert and Koppenjan (1997,p.41) refer to the problem of free riders, agencies not joining in because they think they will benefit without having to commit resources, the Crown Prosecution Service springs to mind. Yet the case of the mental health provider indicates that some spare capacity is needed to begin to share resources. Partnership requires a particular skill set from managers, interpersonal and communication skills, and managers who want to progress their careers need to be good at networking; it is plausible that the Crown Prosecution Service manager felt under-confident on this skill set.

The policy has been developed, interpreted and translated into operational guidance having sought accommodation between government targets and the real world of managing service users with complex and embedded problems. Decision-making was safe and there was consensus on the way to proceed. The steering group is continually evolving and requires constant vigilance to make it work, an incremental but iterative process has allowed time for learning, a huge investment in people, time, energy and effort to maintain the momentum. Patience and perseverance has brought new managers on board and built a confident partnership where managers play to each others’ strengths. They have enabled the finding of solutions, encouraged collegiality and respect for each other and provided professional development to practitioners. However, the IT infrastructure has not kept pace with managerial requirements.

The lack of strategic documents made evaluation difficult, it was impossible to identify the overall budget for the programme or its running costs. Insufficient thought had been given to anticipatory planning with leadership more about hands on processes than vision and mission statements; development of the latter could help an already successful programme
improve more. Baker County served Jones and Smith Town rather than the community or senior management. The advent of the LAA agenda has sidelined the CDRPs and LCJB was under-engaged as were local councillors. Governance was not clear, raising issues about accountability for the use of public money, as the partnership was virtually autonomous with shared accountability amongst crime experts. Depending on your point of view, the lack of engagement from the CDRPs and LCJB can be conceptualized as earned autonomy or disinterest.

With policy formation happening outside the processes of representative democracy, does this create a democratic deficit? Partnerships do not accord with the doctrine of the primacy of politics, which informs the design of democratic systems and gives precedence to elected representatives in terms of articulating and resolving value choices that impact on the community. Good governance in the public domain requires transparency, public debate and local determination of priorities (6 et al 2006b,p.227). Managers need to address this area of deficiency.

Baker County has some clearly defined features of the CPM model of management: an open and pluralistic structure supports the shared leadership and joint management arrangement offering good information exchange and joint decision-making with a clear focus on performance and capacity building. However, poor engagement from the Crown Prosecution and Prison Service has resulted in a reliance on protocols rather than relationships to improve partnership engagement. However, a PA focus is at odds with the CPM suggestion of building up relationships; protocols outline responsibilities, but formal agreement is insufficient in a partnership environment where co-operation is difficult to enforce.

The penultimate chapter compares and contrasts the findings from the three case studies, identifies enabling factors and barriers to policy implementation in partnership, and reveals the nature of the settlement between the management models.
Chapter 8: Cross case analysis and synthesis

Introduction

After telling the story of the implementation and management of the PPO policy across Baker County, we move now to a cross case analysis and synthesis, to compare and contrast the three case studies, to weigh up and reflect on the patterns of management behaviour. The chapter returns to the management dimensions identified in chapter three, in order to discover the nature of the settlement between the management models of PA, NPM and CPM. To recap, the eleven dimensions are: performance objectives, accountability, values, leadership, employment relations, community engagement, management tasks, decision-making, structure, processes and change.

Furthermore, by identifying the similarities and differences in the partnerships, it is possible to draw out and examine the enabling factors and barriers for managing in a collaborative environment. The aim is to open up and scrutinize contemporary partnership management, to assess whether the enabling factors identified are congruent with the CPM model, and whether there has been a shift to CPM, as a management model more fit for partnership.

Performance objectives

The data pointed to a focus in all three partnerships on performance, a strong NPM focus. However, the performance target, cascaded down from Government Office was political. Under the PA model, government resolves the value choices involved in service delivery, the crime reduction agenda having a particular salience for them. Achieving the performance target was a dominant feature of the Baker County discussions, an extrinsic assessment that examined performance with reference to the stated goals of crime reduction. The managers synthesized the performance targets to create meaning for the practitioners who had to achieve them.

For Jones and Smith Town, performance was more than just lower reconvictions, an intrinsic evaluation was based on alternative specification criteria involving qualitative and intermediate measures. The stabilizing of service users and retaining them on the
programme, and gaining access to interventions like housing or drug treatment were used as indicators of change and success. Across the three cases there was no talk about making communities safer, a CPM outcome; focus was individualized in terms of the service user. Moreover, the performance measure assumes feasibility of control for outcomes, but Jones and Smith Town can only influence service user attitudes to offending, and despite strict monitoring and support, if PPOs choose to offend they will.

Of the three E’s, the data supported a greater focus on the concept of effectiveness in Jones and Smith Town, an output measure, through two streams; appropriate PPO targeting and ensuring that PPOs benefited from the programme. The concepts of economy and efficiency should have been a focus of Baker County’s strategic deliberations, but were not referenced. An efficiency measure is more likely to focus on inputs, but as inputs were not measured it was impossible for managers to evaluate against spend.

The findings support a clear sense of working together in the three partnerships to deliver an effective crime reduction programme, a CPM focus, with the simplicity of the policy and the shared service user group aiding implementation. The evident sense of purpose had been built on a recognition of agency interdependence, by collaborating, agencies made the achievement of their own targets dependent on the performance and effectiveness of each other. Objectives were congruent, but there remained room for disagreement on mechanisms, the purpose of marketing or the role of the LCJB in Baker County, as managers made adjustments at the margins of their practice to accommodate partners’ perspectives.

The performance target had been subject to renegotiation through Government Office, indicating that Baker County had some ability to influence government. In none of the cases was any interest shown in benchmarking, there was no competition to be ‘the best in class’. There was a strategic focus in Baker County on continual improvement, to add value to the programme through accessing new or more resources. This can be interpreted as a focus on inputs, more a PA model, but with the expressed vision of tying inputs to improved outputs, especially in terms of mental health.

The managerial role in building and developing the programme through networking and bringing in new partners and the focus on reducing re-offending, indicated a CPM model; a
successful partnership can be seen as broadening its range of partners. However, the performance of the network of relationships was important across all three cases to maintain and grow partnership capacity.

The performance target was explicitly linked to some managers’ individual performance objectives, for example in the Probation Service through their performance development plan, but was not linked to pay. Peters (2001,p.248) has claimed that ‘merit-related instruments’ act to motivate and punish managers under a NPM model. However, the data offered little evidence of incentives for partnership and Baker County had failed to capitalize on success and celebrate achievements, a PA model.

Recognizing and acting on success was most evident in Smith Town with the appointment of the new detective inspector who acknowledged and praised practitioner achievements thus fulfilling their esteem needs through praise. Murphy (2004,p.132) states that “Valuing is being able to give importance to the opinion, work and overall contribution of the different practitioners who are involved in the particular piece of work.” However, the detective inspector was also concerned to correct deviations from target with a low tolerance for poor practice.

Practitioners in Jones Town had expressed concern regarding unproductive responses from Children and Young People’s Services, however the detective inspector had made no suggestion on how to improve the situation. Interestingly, this was before ‘Baby P’ (Laming 2009), as in Smith Town, the new detective inspector provoked the following year a policy response. A policy window had created opportunities for change, timing was crucial.

The Smith Town treatment manager described his programme as the ‘jewel in the crown on partnership work’. However, this assertion appeared to be based on a historical reading of events rather than current practice. Jones Town had a more cohesive and committed shared management structure, the Housing Support provider and weekly practitioner meetings. Moreover, the data analyst in Jones Town managed Baker County’s overall performance via J Track and an Excel spreadsheet and her role stretched to attendance at the Baker County meetings and interaction with Government Office.
Peters (2001, p.167) refers to goal displacement in PA where “…rules become an end in themselves rather than a means to accomplish the goals of the agency.” The general practitioner in Smith Town was self-employed and outside the partnership management structure, the conflict with the treatment practitioner was amongst practitioners who did not possess equal status; the treatment practitioner felt devalued, but ultimately it was the service user who lost out.

The clear performance framework was an enabling factor providing structure and inducement to achievement, as was the ability to negotiate with Government Office, a limited recognition that those on the ground need a voice in target setting. There was a management consensus that “…as long as you hit the targets they’re not necessarily bothered how you get there.” [Smith Town Treatment manager]. The intersecting mandate of a shared service user group allowed goal convergence, a clear enabling factor.

Child et al (2005, p.408) have claimed that necessary conditions for success are a balanced development between partners, in the three cases, no agency raced ahead and gained more than the others, risks and benefits were shared. There was a good level of agency competency linked to three factors: capacity in terms of resources, accessibility involving a willingness to share assets, and dependability in terms of an enduring relationship (Bergquist et al 1995, p.212) that aided performance. The sum of the agencies was greater than the parts; each agency’s intervention enabled another agency to deliver its services more effectively thus contributing to performance.

Barriers that impacted on the partnerships’ ability to perform included limited social housing, across all case sites, a key factor linked to recidivism (NACRO 2006). Investment in social housing or a revenue stream to enhance the role of Housing Support across Smith Town was needed. There were deficiencies in the pathways for employment, training and education, and debt and benefit advice across the three cases, but a low wage economy and benefit regulations that deter work were structural factors that impacted on the programme’s ability to motivate service users. Little interest was evidenced from practitioners about overall partnership performance, which led to a level of insularity, especially from the community, but managers did not encourage their curiosity. Thus external constraints were the biggest barrier to further improvement on this dimension.
Accountability

A PA model indicates vertical communication upwards, but in Baker County this was limited, Government Office, the LCJB, CDRPs and local councillors appeared under-engaged with symbolic accountability. It is plausible to speculate that this can be explained by success. Alter and Hage (1993) claim where there is more trust, there is less need to monitor compliance. This could be interpreted as the NPM model, in that managers had the freedom to manage and this ‘earned autonomy’ fits well with the government’s agenda. The ability of Jones and Smith Town to take autonomous decisions on service delivery can be conceptualized as the freedom of its stakeholders to make decisions concerning the operation of the partnerships, with limited goals set by Government Office.

The limited accountability upwards was mirrored downwards, with minimal community engagement. Thus formal accountability was obscured, leaving the partnerships in a vacuum with no links to representative democracy. CPM is a political model involving accountability to the community, employees and service users. However, there was a view within Baker County that engaging with the community had more risks than benefits.

Managers could take heed of Stephenson (2008,p.7) who has asserted that collaborative excellence involves a diagnostic process that “…has the ability for self-assessment at the individual and collective level {and} facilitates external validation where necessary and provides quality assurance.” Baker County had been a forerunner in developing a framework to measure performance, which points to a desire to be accountable and the partnerships have demonstrated their openness by allowing the research; but more management activity on this dimension was required to be fully accountable.

Jones Town had no single, central authority; responsibility and accountability were shared between the core agency managers. Smith Town on the other hand, was more Police Force led but both detective inspectors felt personally accountable for the programme’s performance, concurring with the NPM model. Agranoff (2007,p.214) claims that agency autonomy is protected by turf and that forays into new territory may risk the loss of existing territory. It is plausible to speculate that if the Crown Prosecution Service shared responsibility for case progression they would loose some control and thus autonomy, this may account for their inward PA focus.
The public sector employees possessed a high degree of institutional and cultural similarity being employed by large agencies with vertical structures of accountability upwards through their managers. Data supports shared responsibility for the service user in Jones and Smith Town, though ultimately for the statutory cases the probation officer had formal responsibility. Practitioners’ accountability lay with the programme rather than their agency, but programme and agency interests overlapped.

For managers the situation was more complex. Sink (1996,p.107) has claimed that “Organisational boundary spanners who represent their agencies in activities of collaboration are truly caught in the middle between the demands and expectations of their own institutional leaders and the dynamics of the collaborative.” As the Jones Town treatment manager explained:

“Ultimately and in the past with individual cases I’ve had to fall on the side of what the PCT would feel would be the right thing to do…but you know my loyalty…firstly comes to the partnership because it comes back to the service users, what’s best for them…[if] …it’s no longer safe to work with this person we’ll have to put the face of the PCT on, where as somebody else’s agenda would be I want to keep on working with them.”

Formalized professional regulation is dependent on the maintenance of standards and codes of practice, which are governed by an independent body, social workers (NISW 1997) and general practitioners (General Medical Council) are regulated in such a manner. However, independent regulatory bodies do not govern police and probation officers and their inspectorates do not have a regulatory function in relation to codes of practice, they are concerned with audit. Quality standards therefore rely on individual responsibility with managerial oversight, a NPM trait.

There was a managerial consensus that they were not given much guidance back in 2004 on how to set up and run the programme. Moreover, the current lack of oversight has allowed managers to pursue programmes locally, an enabling factor giving the partnerships freedom to develop their own practices and not be pulled in multiple directions by competing agendas. However, it is plausible that with greater oversight more resources could be tapped into, thus poor engagement from the LCJB could be a barrier to further resource acquisition. However, core providers acknowledged each partners’ legitimate
authority to practice and there was a sense of collective programme ownership, the mechanism used to secure this commitment was trust. Collective ownership and manager legitimacy, drawn from being an appropriate representative of their agency with delegated authority to make decisions, were enabling factors.

The lack of financial reporting at Baker County led to an ineffective stewardship of public resources and an inability to demonstrate effective resource allocation, a possible barrier given the future budgetary clampdown. The role of CDRP in Jones Town was more visible than in Smith Town but overall the partnerships had developed outside of the CDRP framework, more recently as a result of the LAA agenda, creating a barrier to community accountability through that mechanism.

Values

There was a strong public service ethic emanating from all three cases indicating a PA model. Probity and impartiality were values in evidence, but vested interest and impersonality were not. In Jones and Smith Town, practitioners were on first name terms with service users, relationships were not anonymous, moving away from a PA focus, but only some managers and practitioners visibly sported their identity cards, a NPM trend. In Jones and Smith Town, consistency was less valued than a personalized holistic service, focusing on the assessed need of the service user, resulting in different levels of input in each case. There was also a sense of empowering service users to take control of their lives, a move away from a client, PA approach. However, the statutory nature of many PPOs would not allow for full consumer choice.

Risk taking was not a feature of the partnerships; especially in Jones and Smith Town, plausibly because of the nature of the service user group, it appeared important that unnecessary risks were not taken. However, there was a strong desire, once documented to minimize risk within the safeguarding agenda, the PA model is linked with prevention of risk, rather than risk taking.

Kooiman and van Vliet (1993,p.65) argue that “…where policymaking and policy implementation are interactive and can be seen as co-products of governmental agencies and their clientele groups, public managing is more and more ‘political’ in the traditional
sense.” Baker County managers did not appear to be value neutral, some expressed strong views on commissioning and the structural conditions of the housing market. However, there was no evidence of party politics. Yet decisions about resource allocation in terms of social crime interventions were political.

Nash (1999,2004) has reported that Probation Service values have drifted towards public protection and enforcement, but practitioners and managers in the three cases retained a social work ethos. In fact it appeared that Police Force values had shifted away from traditional policing based on detection and the use of custody, to a proactive partnership role based on the need for robust interventions to address offenders’ needs. A link back to the Peelian concept of policing according to Rogers (2006,p.149) where the “police are the public and that the public are the police.” Moreover, the Primary Care Trust had significantly relaxed its stance on information exchange and forced treatment as a result of partnership.

Values were less congruent in Baker County where there was some differentiation, this was accepted rather than ignored and compromise suggested there was no right answer. The situation could be explained by the partnership’s shorter duration, which meant less embedding, but also possibly because of the greater mix of managers. Cultural fragmentation was evidenced through the ambiguity and transience of non-core agencies like the Crown Prosecution and Prison Service that had not fully bought into the need for partnership, despite the premium service protocol. Cultural differences are taking time to bridge, but acknowledgment of the respective agencies issues, allowed managers to anticipate misunderstandings and take action by adjusting behaviours during interactions to suit the errant partner (Hall 1995,p.248).

Social capital had been created through agencies developing the ability to work together by sharing resources, values and objectives for mutual productive gain. This was more evident in Jones and Smith Town because they are long standing partnerships. They have been operating for five years, the result of which was two partnerships with evidence of interdependence, mutuality and reciprocity and a willingness to sustain them, a CPM focus, however this was more coherent in Jones Town.
Enabling factors were congruent values among core partners, based on high levels of trust and respect, which managers had cultivated through encouraging the free flow of information, generating a shared culture through supervision and pro-social modelling in the JRC. The partnerships’ values were not formalized through a mission statement, but managers’ expectations of practice standards. There were no entrenched agency perceptions in Jones and Smith Town, which enabled resources to be harnessed by the partnership to improve performance.

The silo mentality of the Crown Prosecution Service, and to a lesser extent the Prison Service, created barriers to further improvement. The strong desire for independence from the Crown Prosecution Service could be explained by reference to its more recent creation as an agency compared to the Probation Service and Police Force, thus it may feel less secure in its role and feared loss of turf. For the Prison Service an overriding focus on security, the ‘core day’ and over crowding meant that everything else is secondary.

Leadership

The Police Force of all the agencies had the most obvious command structure indicating the PA model and the detective sergeant referred to the superintendent as ‘sir’, which may on the surface appear deferential, but on closer inspection she was quite comfortable in challenging his perceptions and articulating her own. The chairing of Baker County was authoritative in controlling the agenda but not authoritarian, being transactional and process orientated, accepting that other managers could not be commanded.

More room for discussion could have been offered, but the superintendent was keen to progress the meeting and Wallace Ingraham and Getha-Taylor (2008,p.91) have asserted that collaboration depends on managers wanting to make it happen. However, there was a lack of strategic leadership from Baker County, partnerships do not operate in a void, anticipatory planning was limited, indicating an inward PA focus. Managers needed to be politically astute by interpreting constraints and summarizing environmental opportunities to stay ahead in the game, and this was lacking.

NPM talks about transformational leaders with inspiring vision and the detective inspector of all the managers fitted the description best. He was the right manager, at the right time,
in the right place to steer the programme forward. His personality and drive harnessed the commitment of others, he was fundamental to leading and shaping the programme, a champion to ‘front’ the product (Tennyson 1998,p.97).

Connelly et al (2008,p.21) have stated that partnerships are likely to have many leaders who emerge depending on task. The management skill is to recognize when to offer service. CPM involves mutual adjustment to match and align capabilities to the complexity of the task at hand, and managers volunteered if their skill, knowledge or experience fitted. The detective sergeant had a people orientated facilitative leadership style, a skilled communicator working behind the scenes to promote the partnership to non-core agencies, attuned to the big picture as well as the small details. The DAT manager and the superintendent were developing a shared leadership style, as they began to shape Baker County along the lines of the model offered in Jones Town.

Jones and to a lesser extent Smith Town managers, displayed a pro-social approach to leadership, modelling enthusiasm and commitment at the JRC. Chairing here was less directional or time constrained, more enabling than in Baker County. There was evidence of McGregor’s (1960) theory Y view of leadership. Traditionally power has been viewed as power over others, Agranoff and McGuire (2003,p.186) speak of empowerment based on information not authority and the power to mobilize, organize, strategize and influence. Jones and Smith Town managers’ influential leadership opened up the JRC agenda and helped practitioners think creatively and purposefully, they in turn were responsive to suggestions, creating a balance between direction and inclusivity, reflecting the CPM model. The Jones Town treatment manager offered insight into the role:

“...it’s just a very strange place to be, it isn’t immediately obvious what your role is unless you’re out there being more of a dictator type manager, if you’re heavily into your leadership being an influence it isn’t obvious because partnerships are about collaborative working environment...working together has created a really good place for clients and for staff.”

Williams (2002,p.115) believes to build and sustain effective interpersonal relationships managers need to understand themselves and their partners’ cultures through communicating and seeking knowledge. Managers across all three cases espoused
interpersonal skills and were willing to share credit for accomplishments. Lipnack and Stamps (1994,p.18) have claimed that partnerships are ‘leaderful’ not ‘leaderless’ as a result, they provide greater resilience. In Jones and Smith Town, leadership was exhibited at practitioner and manager level in making suggestions and guiding decision-making, resulting in a strong and participative team identity.

Gazley (2008,p.37) has reported that influences on managers to collaborate include personal traits like gender, professional training and education, but the policy context and partner reputation and capacity, and past experience of collaboration are influences too. Jones and Smith Town managers had previous partnership experience, the policy context was ideal for partnership and core partners had positive reputations. Managers spoke positively about their involvement summed up by the DIP manager “…the PPO scheme is probably the best scheme I’ve worked with…it’s the best multi-agency scheme…”

The chairing of the partnership meetings can be seen as more leadership than management and assisted with the creation of a positive atmosphere across all three cases. Jones Town had the most productive interpersonal relationships, the joint management structure institutionalized leadership (Austin 2000,p.125). In Smith Town the Police Force gave more leadership resource, reflecting poor engagement from the probation and treatment managers in the JRC.

Effective leadership was necessary as an integrative mechanism, a clear enabling factor with appointed and natural leaders gluing the disparate parts together. Proactive assertive managers shaped their leadership to accommodate context and purpose, accepting that there was more than one way to manage service users and practitioners, this contingent based leadership was an enabling factor. As Dixon (1997,p.66) states “…the best managers are those who do not use just one style all the time, but who recognize that during some situations they will have to exercise autocratic leadership, while during other circumstances they will be most effective by leaving people to work out their own goals and methods of operation.”

Limited strategic leadership from Baker County had resulted in the failure to engage the business sector, in particular retailers affected by shoplifting, thus displaying imperfect entrepreneurial skills and innovation. The lack of YOT engagement prevented the smooth
transition from youth to adult services, but the barrier appeared to lie more with the YOT manager. Without a fully integrated Prevent and Deter strand, the PPO programme was not as effective as it could be in managing early entry into crime. More leadership was required on the planning front, especially in the current climate to act as a defence against retrenchment.

**Employment relations**

National pay rates and permanent contracts applied to the public sector agencies, but the third sector favoured localized pay rates and fixed term contracts reflecting a clear division between the sectors’ employment practices. However, this did not impact on the ‘Communities of practice’ (Wave and Lenger 1991), a term which describes teams linked by common occupational values and participation in shared tasks. Jones and Smith Town evidenced high performance teams, generated through good levels of task alignment, a cohesive team spirit and supportive managers.

Professional training emphasizes concern for the service user and this acted to bind practitioners and managers together, despite different cultures they were united through working with disadvantaged service users. Development opportunities had been offered, work shadowing and the away day, demonstrating a commitment to joint training. Practitioners were subject to formal appraisal by their agency manager, but the JRC offered the opportunity for peer supervision and for managers who attended, to gather data to aid performance appraisal of their staff. The JRC also offered the need for affiliation as practitioners and managers enjoyed friendly interaction and support as the unity of the team is harnessed for service delivery.

The PA model is based on role specialization to attain service quality, with clarity of task to equalize consistency in service user expectations of entitlement. There has been an expansion of tasks associated with roles and a proliferation of unqualified practitioners over the last ten years. Probation officers now do their own word processing, as administrative support has declined, but at the same time have been forced to hand over some service user supervision to unqualified probation support officers.
DIP practitioners, associate prosecutors and community safety wardens have weakened boundaries with more loosely written job descriptions. Practitioners have some tasks that are specific to them, but there is overlap, but predominantly at the lower skill level. The new treatment contract aimed to increase practitioner flexibility through task de-differentiation and ‘staff switching’, this could be interpreted as job enrichment, a NPM concept, similarly it could raise issues over role clarity and accountability. However, there was no use of private sector consultants across the cases.

There has been some erosion of practitioner discretion in the Probation Service as government attempted to subordinate professionals to managerial control (Clarke et al 2000) through improved supervision, national standards and the performance agenda, a NPM focus. However, data revealed that probation practitioners in Jones and Smith Town had sufficient leeway to interpret guidelines and managers did not overly prescribe practice, though the Smith Town probation manager had a tendency to micro manage.

The good competency levels and complementary skills of the Jones and Smith Town practitioners delivered concurrently, added value and facilitated a participative style of management, as managers had confidence in practitioners who were empowered by managers’ respect for them. Practitioners had an ability to use their skills, take pride in the task and use their own initiative, this correlated with high levels of job satisfaction. There was deference to those practitioners or managers who possessed particular knowledge or experience with a willingness to share and learn from each other, indicating a CPM orientation across Jones and Smith Town in particular.

Managers were time served and had progressed through the ranks of their agency to manager level, rather than being recruited from outside their profession as professional managers, a NPM concept. This meant that they had a good understanding of their own agency culture that enhanced their legitimacy. Limited practitioner churn built and retained knowledge about service users offering continuity and depth to relationships.

Appointment in the public sector is perhaps more constrained than in the private sector, but Belbin (1981) (in Thomson 2002,p.117) states that team balance is important in terms of not only experience but also character, a well balanced team works best. There was evidence of agencies seeking managers with experience and skills of working in
partnership, but recruitment policy does not take account of existing employees’ strengths and areas for improvement when appointing.

Managers had not received any training about managing in partnership. Yet they had taken responsibility for their own self-development and were individually adapting their management practices to an environment that was increasingly about collaboration. All three partnerships were predicated on personal contacts underpinned by process management. Jones Town’s loss of its five managers has hammered its institutional memory. The emphasis in PA on procedures makes it possible to slot new people into roles, as bureaucracy is held to have an independent memory, but partnership requires interpersonal relationships that take time to build and mature.

Enabling factors were time served managers who had respect for practitioners and understood the issues practitioners faced. Task specialization enabled a division of labour, but elements of overlap offered cover for vacancies, sickness and continuity of supervision. Dedicated practitioners and the constancy and quality of the practitioner/service user relationship were critical success factors. Human resources were key to adding value, getting the right individuals with the right skill set was important. The fact that managers had a good understanding about colleagues’ contributions but were also clear about their own professional boundaries was an enabling factor.

Barriers to further effective implementation were the risk that new managers may not have the same level of commitment and enthusiasm. Jones Town in particular needs to rebuild its management base and this will take time. Inequalities in salary and conditions created disharmony in the early days of the partnership but this was not evidenced currently. However, there was some managerial concern expressed about the potential impact of the new treatment contract on the treatment and DIP providers’ motivation and performance, and this will need monitoring. Finally, the loss of human resources due to budget cuts would impact on delivery, therefore scenario planning needs to take place to rethink service provision, if this is to occur, which looks likely.
Community engagement

Jones and Smith Town were service user driven; an attitude and approach to practice, not an added extra, offering a personalized and holistic service, but choice, quality and responsiveness, was more client than customer based, given the involuntary relationship, a PA orientation. Baker County had made no effort to formally engage service users to develop the programme, despite the terms of reference. However, the superintendent had indicated a preparedness to address the need for service users to have a voice.

Excellence in service delivery is reliant on knowing your service users’ needs, as service users tend not ask for what they do not expect could be provided. Under a NPM model, satisfied customers are likely to indicate effectiveness, however, in the Criminal Justice System PPOs may not see themselves as customers, only clients. As there had been no service user evaluation, managers did not have a full picture of their requirements.

There was some feedback to sentencers through DRR court reviews and the Jones Town CDRP manager fed back to his CDRP. The DIP had produced leaflets for dissemination; the provision of which can be seen as evidence of a NPM customer orientation, to advertise service standards. Individual agencies rather than the programme had a complaints procedure. A CPM focus would judge success by engagement with the local community as customers (Kickert et al 1997b,p.8) however the institutional design of the partnerships was not embedded in the public domain.

The government wants to improve public confidence in the Criminal Justice System, but all three cases evidenced poor levels of engagement with the community. Jones Town was more involved through Housing Support’s volunteers and landlords and Baker County was toying with a marketing strategy. However, there were no public meetings to share crime concerns and no dissemination of partnership literature to inform, leading to a lack of legitimacy with the communities the partnerships served, and no dispersal of responsibility for crime, which remained with the crime experts, a PA focus.

Enabling factors include the quality service provided to PPOs, taking in a range of situational and social crime measures, and Housing Support’s role in Jones Town had brought in the community to diversify provision. The programme does address local
offending, but managers need to revisit the matrix because data pointed to some inappropriate targeting.

However, the current approach is a barrier to improving provision. An audit of PPO crime and resources is required through widening participation in the programme. Involving the community would help define success and failure by drawing on a wide range of sources to understand the various elements of the crime problem, and additionally what other resources were available to tackle it. The principle of subsidiarity means that those nearest to the problem should have a role in addressing it.

**Management tasks**

Under the PA model the manager is the system controller; there was evidence of managers organizing, advising and reporting in Jones and Smith Town, but Baker County’s strategic planning was limited with an inward rather than external focus. Under NPM, managers are first and foremost performance managers, whose neutrality imposes a rational order on chaos and offers ways of coping with complexity and uncertainty. The NPM model was witnessed more fully within Baker County through the focus on performance, the commissioning of treatment services and issues of accountability.

Different management tasks were in evidence in Jones and Smith Town and Baker County. In the former the emphasis was on supporting practitioners in managing PPOs, through achieving good levels of collaboration to avoid task duplication and ensuring referrals to interventions to enhance programme effectiveness. Managers framed, captured and synthesized ideas and commitments focusing on outcomes, through the setting and checking of quality standards, to assist decision-making. Managers helped practitioners make their point through paraphrasing and mirroring, with evidence of active listening and respect for peers. Management was more about coaching, than giving instructions, evidence of CPM.

In Baker County the manager was a network and process manager whose responsibilities were to activate and mobilize other managers and resources, to build and shape the nexus to develop capacity and monitor performance, a CPM model. The ability to set up links
was an important indication of success and managers took opportunities for mutual gain by helping partners expand their understanding of each other, a key task.

Permeable boundaries increased complexity and as Metcalfe (1993,p.186) has claimed “The inter-organisational context of public management multiplies the sources of error and underscores the importance of strengthening the interface among organisations. An inter-organisational network is only as strong as its weakest link, but often interdependence is under managed.” The new detective inspector had claimed this role for himself in facilitating the interface between the partners.

Steele’s (1999,p.18) research found that many managers felt constrained and would have welcomed more authority, however across the three cases managers did not feel inhibited, they had the freedom to manage within the target set by Government Office, reflecting the NPM concept. In Jones and Smith Town there was evidence of managers tasking practitioners, but in Baker County the superintendent did not task managers. However, tasking was not based on command, leverage was achieved through trust and reciprocity.

Partnership has become a mainstreamed activity for core agency managers, as they nurtured, maintained and grew the nexus. Strong tools such as pooled budgets, incentives, inspection and sanctions were not in evidence across the case studies, but the weak tools of persuasion, fostering learning and borrowing examples were. However, managers were interested in procedural correctness due to issues of accountability with a difficult service user group.

Effective management has enabled the programme to develop through diplomacy and negotiation, joint ownership being achieved through shared aims and constancy of purpose. Managers have assembled and integrated practitioners to fulfil the tasks required, asserting that what was needed for a successful partnership was adequate resourcing and a willingness to share them. Adroit managers had configured the necessary resources to achieve objectives by combining resources to eliminate contradictions and duplications, to create an integrated and seamless service.

The Jones Town treatment manager outlined a key management task “…if you didn’t have the structures in place then it could quickly and has in the past, if things aren’t going very
well, fall apart. So I think managers take a lead in co-ordinating that and arranging it and making sure the systems work properly and should they fail then there’s somebody to come back to, to try and tinker with that. I think what’s especially important is the interface between you and your partnership agencies, negotiating those structures and systems, what works for you both that doesn’t compromise either…”

Enabling factors were that core agency managers had the support of their own agencies to go forward and mobilize to achieve purpose. Facilitation involved setting the climate, organizing and making available the widest possible range of resources, including managers using themselves as a flexible resource and recognizing strengths and limitations. Managers used synthesizing mechanisms to lower interaction costs as they managed downwards and outwards with less management upwards.

The use of supervision was an enabling factor as managers used motivational techniques to influence practitioners in the right direction. Influencing is a key management task and is about logical and persuasive communication to generate change. It involved selling, through describing the benefits to practitioners, whilst handling their objections and creating a rapport through good working relationships, so that others are receptive and willing to consider suggestions and appreciate the value of new proposals.

There was no evidence of ‘we’ve always done it this way’ or ‘it doesn’t say that in my job description’. Managers had created good levels of co-ordination and feedback, and utilizing ideas from Human Resource Management had unlocked practitioner potential to establish a structure of practitioner roles. Managers asked divergent questions to probe experience, constructing new ideas and interpretations and had an ability to balance autonomy with interdependence.

Managing operational capacity is a straightforward process if demand is consistent and predictable, but managers cannot control the local crime rate or sentencing practice. However, in a low crime area with adequate resources, demand was managed satisfactorily through rationing and prioritizing and responding flexibly through simple adjustments to the resource base, in a way that would be far more stressful in a high crime area.
Barriers included the limited planning horizon and lack of evaluation, scenario planning was good in Jones and Smith Town but not replicated in Baker County. Murdock and Scutt (1997, p.199) state it is important to involve others in the quest for improvement because “…while we should all take responsibility for our own learning, that does not presuppose that we always know what it is that we need to learn or develop.” Furthermore, managers could develop the mission and vision of the partnerships to create an enhanced sense of identity or brand, to aid the promotion of the programme with its external constituency.

**Decision-making**

PA is the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge and is suited to predictable, familiar and routine tasks to provide for greater certainty of action. Some service user behaviour was predictable, thus Jones and Smith Town practitioners were able to enact some ready made responses based on previous experience using a repertoire of programme responses to presenting problems (Dunsire 1978).

Others problems though familiar, were not always predictable or routine. It is difficult to legislate for every contingency, thus discretion was applied requiring judgment where bottom-up policy implementation involved practitioners trying “… to work out practical ways of responding to issues…” (Spicker 2006, p.26). Their practice was then imitated, generating partnership policy with decentralized decision-making. With no separation of policy and implementation, feedback enhanced learning, a CPM orientation.

Tasks were shaped by the nature of the problem, sentence plans were based on a joint assessment of the service user’s unique situation, interventions were bespoke but integrated but limited by resource availability and co-produced through the skills and experience of the practitioners and the motivation and compliance of the service users, a NPM orientation. The approach is well placed to adapt to the gathering personalization agenda of think tanks like Demos (Bentley and Wilsdon 2003).

NPM is associated with the concept of rational decision-making, however in the JRCs decisions were built on existing information, and its duplication from a variety of data sources created an evidence base for action. This increased reliability by providing insurance against human error or agency failure with the need to keep all partners on
board, illustrated by Lindblom’s (1997) incrementalism, classic PA. Sink (1996,p.104) states that “Incremental behaviour demonstrated through successive marginal readjustments in policy making is a fact of political life because it results from a limited capacity to anticipate change and predict the future.” This is particularly the case with the service user group despite the OASsy assessment tool.

Decision-making in Jones and Smith Town avoided lowest common denominator results because the focus was not on single transactions, but rather on cumulative decision-making to build coherence; sequential acts of collaboration had led to confident partnerships with consensual decision-making. However, Lipnack and Stamps (1994,p.90) argue that being too cohesive can lead to uncritical thinking. Janis’s (1982) ‘groupthink’ where excessive integration in a cohesive group avoids difficult issues and blocks creativity, but there was no evidence for this across the cases.

Taket and White (2000,p.91) argue for ‘consent’ rather than ‘consensus’ which they assert is more dynamic and contingent, but Jones and Smith Town evidenced consensus. Where as Baker County went for consent, as a trade off to quicker decision-making or occasionally decision by lack of response. Baker County’s core agency managers used purposive opportunities to try and convince non-core agency managers that it was in their interests to collaborate, because as Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) have argued, incorporation can reduce veto points.

In Jones and Smith Town the JRCs addressed information feedback in a safe arena where knowledge was the currency. There was evidence of lateral thinking through seeking change, providing new ideas and intuitive leaps, vertical thinking was more logical, seeking judgment on ‘What Works’. There was confirmation of evidence based practice in terms of sequencing of interventions, sorting out accommodation and drug use before addressing offending behaviour and cognitive behavioural work was loosely implemented through pro-social modelling by the community support worker, rather than through accredited group work programmes, a CPM orientation.

Enabling factors were a strong and positive managerial perspective that problems could be solved. At each JRC there was a review of previous actions, evidence of effective problem solving and the ability of managers to create stable interaction patterns through
interdependency and repetition. Decisions were more visible because they were taken as a team, and this provided an opportunity to peer review decision-making; such transparent processes limited the opportunity for hidden agendas.

Other enabling factors included the sharing of perceptions that increased convergence and speeded up decision-making (Koppenjan and Klijn 2004,p.70). Implicit knowledge that is not codified is difficult to transfer to others, so it was necessary for managers to activate the less engaged practitioners, especially in Smith Town, in order that their implicit knowledge could benefit the programme. Joint decision-making was more rational than individual decision-making as it stimulated alternatives that otherwise may not have been considered, producing synergies (Agranoff and McGuire 2003,p.192). Although conflict was minimal across all three cases it was accepted that conflict could be productive.

Barriers included the lack of timely and relevant information on nominations that delayed decision-making in Jones and Smith Town. Furthermore, PPOs are a dynamic group, therefore selection criteria needs to be reassessed to ensure the programme is targeting the most prolific in each locality, and PPOs needed to be agendered for removal from the programme. In Baker County time was more limited and there was less discussion and feedback, inadequate preparation by some managers and non-attendance reduced the meeting’s effectiveness. IOMS needs to be an agendered item at Baker County, so managers can focus on how they are going to respond to the new challenge, preferably by evaluating current practice in light of future changes.

**Structure**

As PPO implementation has progressed the partnerships have become virtually autonomous bodies, allied to the NPM model. Managers have created a dual layered structure with multiple stakeholders with imperfect links between the strategic role of Baker County and the operational roles of Jones and Smith Town. Upward transmission of information from Jones and Smith Town to Baker County was better than the reverse as information was abstracted, made general and reduced in volume.

Baker County had permeable boundaries and pluralistic membership and as such can be described as an open system. Jones and Smith Town had more permanent boundaries, a
closed form of membership. Fletcher (2006, p. 87) has argued “The most difficult aspect of partnership working is to strike the right balance between remaining open and inclusive and actually getting anything done.” Fluid membership in Baker County had disrupted the meeting’s ability to achieve its aims.

The provision of services in Jones and Smith Town came from a plurality of sources, but predominantly from monopoly public sector providers, who under a PA model have divided service user needs into distinctive problems assigned to specialists. The Primary Care Trust had been subject to a greater level of competition than the other two public sector agencies and there was evidence of principal/agent split, with the DAT using market price as a mechanism, a NPM trait. There was limited private sector involvement, most noticeable in Jones Town through private landlords and across Jones and Smith Town in terms of the escort service from prison to court.

Alexander (1995, p. 285) has identified some indicators of institutionalization: stability, durability, standardization of inter-agency contacts and formalized structures. Jones and Smith Town displayed these factors, so they could be said to be institutionalized, but Baker County was less stable and durable. However, the partnerships did not have their own web sites, brand or logo and Provan et al (2008, p. 127) have argued that “In general, a network cannot fully realize its potential unless it achieves legitimacy as an entity in its own right...” The partnerships have legitimacy with the crime experts, but not with the wider community where they are in effect invisible, hence the discussion about marketing at Baker County.

The implementation structures of Jones and Smith Town were fit for purpose. However there was dissatisfaction with Baker County, some managers wanted to revert back to local steering groups to better reflect community conditions. The steering group was in a state of flux and was thus less institutionalised, reflecting issues over attendance and purpose. 6 et al (2006b, p. 227) have asserted that “While formal structures are manifestations of a commitment to collaborative activity, collaborations are fundamentally predicated on dynamic processes through which individuals and organisations negotiate mutual interests.” Smith Town’s treatment and probation managers had complained about Baker County, but they did not attend their own JRCs either, dissatisfaction was more than a complaint about structure, but a disinterest in CPM.
The push to partnership as an instrument to implement crime policy reflects the need to overcome the disadvantages inherent in both hierarchy’s and market’s reliance on separate agencies, in order to construct an integrated approach to improve outcomes. The DAT manager concurred “I think that a lot of this partnership agenda for me is about a recognition that the way the big public sector bodies, health, police etc were set up, however many years ago doesn’t fit the needs of the modern world…”

Enabling factors were that managers had invested energy in improving front line integration of structurally independent agencies. Kooiman and van Vliet (1993,p.68) argue that “Interaction and regulation are…complementary tasks…” and because the interface worked well, there was less need for regulation. The bid for a one-stop shop in Jones Town should further address the tension identified by Roaf (2002,p.42) that “…exists between society’s need for increasingly high levels of specialist professional expertise and individual consumer’s or client’s need for a holistic, accessible service.”

Further enabling factors included the fact that the core agencies had countywide remits and did not get sucked down into district level parochial goings on. Jones and Smith Town were team oriented but flouted the unity of command as practitioners reported to two managers. Line agency authority combined with a lateral informal reporting under a matrix structure, which supported collaboration. Core agencies were also positive and purposive and prepared to forsake some autonomy and identity for the sake of the partnership. Good DIP alignment and partial co-location were other success factors.

Baker County still needs to find its purpose and value, fortunately the superintendent has acknowledged this and it is being addressed before partnership fatigue sets in. Added value is thus at the local level rather than at the strategic level. A rotating chair may not change the power dynamics but it is symbolic and needs to be discussed. Fleishman (2009,p.41) has reported on the ability of agencies to achieve policy goals without getting involved, and the costs of getting involved as barriers to participation. Certainly the Crown Prosecution Service seems to believe it can go it alone, despite contrary wishes from programme managers. There is a requirement for good vertical communication between the strategic and operational, and this needs to be formalized with feedback an item on Jones and Smith Town’s JRC agenda.
Processes

Some procedures in Jones and Smith Town were standardized, the matrix, national standards and OASsy, a PA orientation, they were important in that they provided a level of consistency and impartiality. The premium service and the information exchange protocol can be described as process standards, and were designed to enhance trust by creating obligations amongst partners; however such formalization did not always result in more meaningful relationships.

As Gazley (2008,p.37) has stated “…successful outcomes requires more than statutory authority and depends on more than passive compliance.” The Ministry of Justice and Home Office issued circulars and guidance which Osborne and Brown (2005,p.90) describe as monologic communication, one-way and linear, an instrument for transmission and reception of messages, again a PA orientation.

Dialogic communication “is two-way communication that creates meanings through interaction and relationship-building between participants.” (Osborne and Brown 2005,p.90) and reflects the free flow of information through Jones and Smith Town, indicating a CPM model to create a knowledge infrastructure with a shared technical language. Where as Baker County, in trying to bring in new agencies and with issues over irregular attendance, created issues with terminology and understanding. As Austin (2000,p.144) has stated the transformation of experience into knowledge accessible to the whole partnership takes a continual investment of time and energy; CPM is inherently resource hungry compared to the other two management models.

NPM is associated with inspections, audit and benchmarking, as forms of regulation, but these methods were not referenced by Baker County managers. Cost centres existed in the Probation Service and Police Force, and knowledge management systems which utilized templates with required fields restricted practitioner discretion, making performance monitoring easier for managers, all NPM traits. Yet Baker County had got away with not identifying programme costs or generating a budget. Plausibly because the focus was on performance which was measured, where as costs were not. A clear indication of ‘What gets measured gets done’.
Across all three cases there was evidence of contracting and service level agreements, a NPM orientation. However, good relationships between the third and public sector treatment providers, could have been damaged by an open tender for the new treatment contract. Additionally, there was the issue of survival of the third sector provider, as drug money kept the sector alive (Lowndes and Skelcher 1998). The DAT subverted the demands of NPM and went for a closed tender, accepting a joint bid.

Trust is key to partnership, Mayer et al (1995) (in Sullivan and Skelcher 2002, p.102) identify three key qualifications for interpersonal trust: ability, which includes skills, expertise and knowledge; benevolence, demonstrated through altruism; and integrity, confirmed through adherence to shared rules. There were excellent levels of trust in Jones Town, reflecting dense relationships, as reciprocal encounters ebbed and flowed, but to a lesser extent in Smith Town due to the poorer level of engagement from non-Police Force managers. Baker County being newer in origin and with a wider mandate had not achieved such high levels of trust, especially with the non-core providers.

Enabling factors were that Jones and Smith Town were more than a knowledge transfer nexus, a process of assimilation had involved integrating new knowledge into existing knowledge structures. Yet they had gone further, in allowing learning to take place in situations of co-participation, mediated through social relationships. The use of power can be described as interactive and dynamic, based on networked relationships embedded in mutual interdependencies.

Managers were effective at smoothing demand in relation to the PPO list, whilst attempting to build capacity, but waiting lists did operate for Primary Care Trust interventions. High levels of institutional trust, referenced the confidence that partners placed in each other to fulfil expectations, simply by virtue of being that agency. Yet this needed to be continually reproduced especially operationally, a good reputation was a clear enabling factor.

An equilibrium between the two strands of Catch and Convict and Resettle and Rehabilitate had not been achieved in either Jones or Smith Town, an imbalance which created high rates of custody, a situation replicated nationally. Recent government guidance asks programme managers to focus on service users in the community. Managers thus need to evaluate the relationship between the two strands, to foster a programme with
less emphasis on custody with more service users on the Resettle and Rehabilitate strand. Internal communication was good across the cases but external communication is an issue for future development.

Barriers to further growth are the sustainability of third sector projects like Housing Support due to securing continuation funding. Managers had no control over budget allocation and limited opportunities to generate income. A reduction in funding due to the dropping of LAA 37 would be catastrophic. Furthermore, a focus on core business, as Probation Service cuts to Housing Support showed, can undermine relationships and thus performance and lead to a poor reputation. Lastly, though data handling was very good, despite poorly integrated IT, duplication of data inputting wastes resources, but improvements lie beyond the partnerships.

Change

Osborne and Brown (2005,p.4) differentiate between change and innovation, the former being gradual improvements to service delivery representing continuity with the past. The latter involving the introduction of ‘new elements’ in the shape of new structures, processes or people representing discontinuity with the past. In Baker County the former could be represented by changes to the protocols and structure of the steering group, whereas the latter could be evidenced by the innovative performance framework that provided a form of self-evaluation. In Jones Town innovation could be demonstrated through the leveraging in of resources from the third and private sector in terms of volunteers and housing resources, and in both Jones and Smith Town through the diversionary activities.

Change under the PA model can be demonstrated through top-down legislation, circulars and policy initiatives, as in government’s request for the premium service protocol or IOMS. Under NPM change tends to be anticipated, top-down and rapid, based on rewards and incentives. Osborne and Brown (2005,p.134) believe that senior management are the key to innovation, however Baker County lacked a future orientation. CPM is more likely to involve bottom-up change that is continuous but not rapid and experimental focusing on processes. The joint training day had offered the chance to reflect on past achievements and consider future options.
In Jones Town, managers appeared content with structure and processes, where as in Smith Town the lack of attendance from two core agency managers implied a need for change. At this stage in Jones and Smith Town much of the cultural work had already been undertaken, as these are long-term embedded partnerships. Active management had enabled different cultures to coalesce, cultural synthesis and optimised bonding had led to a team identity, an important aspect of institutional change (Newman 2001,p.32). However, a succession of new managers in Jones Town will bring fresh perspectives and of necessity, change. With secure processes the partnership is more likely to get through the transition, but people are key, managers are not easily substitutable.

Baker County had changed its structure, but there was still a level of dissatisfaction, further change was inevitable. Fluctuating attendance created a degree of instability, there was a need to balance openness with closedness in order to get through the agenda, but also access new and maintain existing resources. The partnerships were not static entities, and opportunities existed for managers to respond to change and craft the means for celebrating success, and to take time out to reflect and evaluate.

Enabling factors included a manager mindset that accepted the need to respond to external pressures, being a manager is about managing change and managers acquiesced to shifting agendas where change was viewed as normal. There is a preference for evolutionary and small scale change, building on existing practice and making adjustments at the margins in order not to upset the partnerships’ equilibrium or social capital. Managers also had the capability initiate change.

The present economic climate could undermine trust and confidence (Metcalf 1993,p.175) and create barriers, which did not exist when resources were more plentiful. There is a risk that in response to financial restraint the Probation Service in particular might seek out a lower partnership profile. With the change of government a new set of priorities may emerge which will require an active response. Partnerships are more prone to turbulence (O’Toole and Meier 1999,p.517) and in a difficult environment more management becomes essential in terms of maintenance, a failure to recognize and then act on this could impact on future performance.
Conclusion

The purpose of the chapter was to search for CPM and to identify the settlement between the management models. The hunt was successful, this newer management model’s star is rising. Evidence was strongest on the dimensions of performance, leadership and management tasks, decision-making, structure and processes. The research demonstrates a trend towards CPM, but with an ‘untidy overlap’ (Massey and Pyper 2005,p.27) with NPM and PA. However, there has not been a simple shift from one model to the next, or an outright rejection of the other two models, features of PA and NPM remain but in weaker forms as the models co-exist revealing shifting tensions on the dimensions. On the accountability dimension NPM was more ubiquitous, but on the values, employment relations, community engagement and change dimensions, PA prevailed. An institutional fusion is present, as no model captures the full complexity of the implementation process and each model has its trade offs.

The table below summarises the findings. The second column indicates which primary model on each dimension is prevailing. The third column demonstrates which secondary model has features which are identifiable on each dimension, producing elements of co-existence with the primary model, signifying levels of overlap and institutional fusion. The fourth column indicates which third model is most dis-similar on each dimension from the other two models and where there is the least evidence for the model from the findings.
Skelcher et al (2005,p.592) reported “…that institutional design for partnership governance is significantly shaped by the managerialist discourse…” and Lowndes and Skelcher (1998,p.331) reject management epochs as ‘crude periodization’. However, the data supports management practices moving away from NPM as the dominant discourse, as managers forge new ways of managing more fit for partnership. Moreover, they have accomplished this without CPM training, adapting and adopting management practices to meet the needs of a policy that requires a partnership approach due to crime’s multiple aetiology. On the basis of the research, CPM points to a new phase of management.

Moving on to look at critical success factors and barriers. Contextual enabling factors included a low crime rate, a range of resources from a variety of sources with networking important to finding and sourcing providers, and a history of partnership working. Structural factors included the range of agencies with an element of closedness from core providers, clear objectives and a shared service user group creating an overlapping domain for service delivery. In terms of processes, there was an excellent use of collaborative tools with a manageable workload supported by a lucid performance framework. On the people front, good leadership, supportive managers and a range of capable, experienced and knowledgeable practitioners led to successful policy implementation.

The primary contextual barrier hampering performance was poor community engagement, which left the partnerships with legitimacy issues in respect of the communities they serve; managers appeared to have disregarded government rhetoric on this topic. The dearth of strategy documents, left the partnerships structurally weak and in a poor position to account for costs or plan for the future. Incompatible IT hindered processes through delayed decision-making and the need to duplicate record keeping. Finally, on the personnel side, the lack of senior management engagement reduced accountability and hindered the development of strategy. A SWOT analysis offers a synopsis of the enabling factors and barriers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Threats</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Committed and experienced people with good interpersonal skills</td>
<td>Limited links with employment, training and education providers</td>
<td>Improve formal links between Baker County and Jones and Smith Town</td>
<td>Reduction in funding due to economic climate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dedicated resources from a range of sources</td>
<td>Lack of strategic documents: business plan, budget</td>
<td>The vacant hostel</td>
<td>Change in government priorities</td>
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<td>Effective operational team work</td>
<td>Poor community engagement</td>
<td>Consult with PPOs on programme development</td>
<td>Poor succession planning</td>
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<td>Personalized and holistic interventions</td>
<td>Limited engagement from non core providers</td>
<td>Celebrate success</td>
<td>Fatigue or disinterest from new managers</td>
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<td>Good information exchange</td>
<td>Limited service user accommodation</td>
<td>Communication strategy</td>
<td>Dropping of LAA 37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clear performance framework</td>
<td>Lack of LCJB/CDRP ownership</td>
<td>Involvement of the business sector</td>
<td>Rise in crime levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good DIP alignment</td>
<td>Vague criteria for PPO selection</td>
<td>Clarify YOT role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective shared leadership</td>
<td>Incompatible IT systems</td>
<td>IOMS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Excellent performance</td>
<td>Imbalance between the two strands</td>
<td>One-stop shop</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manageable crime levels</td>
<td>Deselection process</td>
<td>More focus on Rehabilitate and Resettle strand</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fast tracking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Partial co-location</td>
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The final chapter will re-sketch the themes and draw out the conclusions, whilst making a claim for the research’s originality and significance to the academic discipline of public management.
Chapter 9: Conclusions

Aims revisited

The research aimed to understand and explain the implementation and management of a government crime policy through the partnership agenda. Offending behaviour is multi-causal and crime reduction lies beyond the competency of any one agency. In recognition of this fact, there has been a pluralization of crime control, resulting in a range of agencies with a shared interest, coming together under partnership as a method of service delivery, to bring about positive outcomes.

Implementation can be about process and/or outcome, the primary concern was process with a bottom-up approach “…concerned with accurately mapping the strategies of actors concerned with the policy problem.” (Sabatier 1993,p.280). The research focused on local implementation structures, identifying variation where there are a number of actors with power dependency; whereas a top-down approach would have been more concerned with programme effectiveness.

The research aimed: (1) To provide an overview of government policy on persistent and prolific offenders. (2) To assess the implementation and management of the PPO policy. (3) To examine the barriers to, and enabling factors for managing in a partnership environment. (4) To ascertain the fit between the three management models in order to generate new knowledge that could improve policy implementation and management.

Summary of the research process

The research process began with a series of objectives generated by the supervisory team who had bid for the project’s funding. Relevant literature was then pursued to elicit themes and develop the research questions, the management models, the propositions and the conceptual framework. From these the questionnaire-survey was constructed, but without an appropriate sampling frame the method was unfortunately of limited value.

After being unsuccessful with access in the East Midlands, relevant contacts were pursued resulting in access being granted to three partnerships in Baker County. The observation and interview schedules were then devised, with the conclusion of the fieldwork being
eighteen interviews with programme managers and observational data from ten meetings, plus documentary data.

Some data analysis was undertaken at the same time as data collection, due to the use of the observation schedule where behaviours were coded based on concept driven codes. Interviews were recorded and transcribed and then coded in line with the conceptual framework. Three case studies have been written up using rich description to tell the story of PPO implementation across Baker County. A cross case analysis and synthesis has identified enabling factors and barriers to managing the policy’s implementation, and top-down qualitative analysis has identified the mix between the management models.

The case studies went well, the design was appropriate for the task set and the methods chosen supported the research process. The research journey was iterative, moving back and forward from literature, concepts, theory and data, until a thesis was produced that was original, well sign posted and a coherent and readable whole. The thesis demonstrates the achievement of the objectives and makes a claim for originality having generated new theory on CPM that could aid managers in public policy implementation.

**Summary of the main findings**

Chapter two has addressed the first aim of the thesis, providing an overview of government policy on persistent and prolific offenders, detailing a move towards targeting and intensive supervision to focus finite resources on those service users deemed to be causing the most harm to their communities. The PPO programme drew on knowledge from previous schemes and the partnership approach was mandated. However, managers were given some freedom to conceptualize the policy and develop strategies for its implementation that were responsive to local conditions.

Chapters five, six and seven focus on the current management of the policy to address the second aim. Management involved the complex task of taking responsibility for achieving the government’s performance target by collaborating with a number of autonomous but functionally interdependent agencies. The challenge of explaining PPO implementation has involved the story of how different managers and practitioners have interpreted the policy
and engaged with each other to create opportunities for added public value as implementation progressed from the general to the specific and the abstract to the concrete.

Both Jessop (2000) and Peters (2001) have expressed concern over the myriad of problems that policy implementation can befall. However, the relative simplicity of the PPO concept and the fact that the policy was formulated with a view to implementation through partnership aided its execution (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). A number of agencies were able to coalesce around the policy, with responsibility and power shared amongst the core providers. Crawford (1999) has spoken of multiple aims in crime partnerships, these partnerships had one clear overall aim to reduce reconvictions. Still there were supplementary objectives, as the various agencies had different perceptions about the crime problem, but no perception was pushed forward as the authoritative one.

In part consequence, there was no substantive issue of disagreement. Payne (2000,p.148) has commented that “Conflict often builds up around the inappropriate use of power…” but as this was not observed perhaps this accounts for the lack of conflict. Payne (2000,p.150) further states that “Conflict can be reduced by increasing resource dependency.” Resource sharing became an integrating mechanism, involving information and expertise and the managerial role in joining up, as managers actively searched for fresh resources to bolster service delivery. There was recognition that the contributions and distinctive competencies each partner made to the partnership were different but compatible, strengths were acknowledged particularly operationally.

Every agency cannot have an equal voice in the management process, but the partnerships were not colonized by one dominant partner. Jones and Smith Town fit Crawford’s (1998a) inter-agency definition as core agencies were well integrated, but in Baker County the Crown Prosecution Service and to a lesser extent the Prison Service have chosen to play a more peripheral role, despite being premium service providers. Even though the prison probation officer attended all the JRCs, the commitment at practitioner level was not replicated at a managerial level.

The partnerships were effective in meeting the performance target; Government Office played a limited role, primarily in the context of target setting. Managers recognized that improvement would be gradual as the programme impacted. There was a sense of
belonging to something successful, as success bred success. Jones Town had been more innovative than Smith Town in its shared leadership structure and levering in resources from the third and private sector. However, the community and service users had minimal voice when it came to policy making; the poor level of engagement raises issues of legitimacy, as service delivery had privileged democracy (Skelcher et al 2005).

Partnership effectiveness relied on the quality of interpersonal relationships, both formal and informal with mutual commitment though nurturance and perseverance key. Relationship intensity within the partnerships was high, but higher in Jones Town due to the weekly meetings and joint leadership. There was an open democratic style of leadership within the three cases demonstrating unity of purpose involving facilitation as well as influence.

An observed synergy of interests between managers and practitioners taking in the quality and performance dimension was noted, balancing autonomy with accountability and sharing of success. Managers and practitioners mutually supported and reinforced their colleagues, and behaved as expected under reasonably stable conditions. A task culture predominated with some boundary crossing, where tasks and roles were cumulative and affected each other over time.

Cultural management had created synthesized mores that manifested into cohesive, high performance teams with a sense of corporate identity demonstrating pride in their achievements. The high levels of identification and loyalty to the partnerships were rooted through common values around working with same disadvantaged service user group, and the alignment of working patterns. Secondment and joint training and high levels of job satisfaction created a domain consensus and bound practitioners and managers to the programme.

The partnerships were receptive to change; managers introduced innovative interventions that coalesced with existing practices as Butler and Allen (2008,p.430) state “The future evolutionary pathway is affected by that of the past.” The partnerships were able to manage complexity, under conditions of unconditional trust, seeking help was not threatening. In consequence managers were able to define their roles more broadly and step out of their profession. The concept of reputation involved a judgment about the character,
competencies, reliability, intentions and limitations of agencies and their personnel, which underpinned all relationships and were crucial to success.

The PPO programme is highly responsive with a range of integrated interventions, including social and situational crime measures, though weighted towards the social spectrum in the community. Punishment was evidenced through the use of custody, but the style was not punitive, despite government rhetoric about being tough on crime. However, managers need to review the balance between Catch and Convict and Rehabilitate and Resettle given the over reliance on custody and in light on new government guidance to engender a better symmetry between the strands.

Concurrent provision of interventions revolved around a personalized agenda of need, balanced with risk management. An intensive and extensive regulation of PPOs, widened formal control (Gray and Jenkins 2003) as coercion was an element of the engagement process (Bateman 2005). However reparation (Campbell et al 2006) was not mentioned, a further indicator demonstrating the lack of community engagement.

Managerial priority in Baker County was orientated toward shaping the partnership in terms of resource acquisition, achieving the performance target and improving knowledge management processes aiding durability and sustainability, as procedures were well documented so new employees could pick up the threads as others left. However, partnerships do not operate in a vacuum they have to be aware of externalities, but Baker County’s limited strategic focus meant that it was less well placed to navigate change due to a changing economic and political climate.

In Jones and Smith Town decision-making was joint and was preceded by convergence, adjustment and closure. Managers focused on sustaining relationships in a collaborative learning environment to support and guide practitioners to manage the stress of supervising difficult service users. Technological advancements in the processing, analyzing and sharing of information enabled data to be handled expertly and reduced the risk of poor communication, despite the lack of joined up IT.

Strategies used by the managers in Jones and Smith Town to enhance collaboration included structural factors like co-location and the JRC. Control methods involved the use
of standard operating procedures and protocols and cross cutting objectives. Practitioners and managers used informal methods, telephone calls and ad hoc meetings to share information. In Baker County, managers mobilized to form coalitions, and mutual adjustment and resource sharing were co-operative strategies, but there were no strategic methods like a pooled budget or a business plan, perhaps, due to the lack of senior management involvement.

The PPO policy originated with government, with devolved implementation to the CDRPs and supposed oversight from the LCJB and Government Office. However, as implementation progressed the partnerships become self-organizing, and virtually autonomous, as the policy was made and reinterpreted on the ground. There was a consensus that the LCJB had fallen down on their duty, with good performance letting them off the hook. The programme could be described as having ‘earned autonomy’ or ‘light tough’ regulation. Moreover, the CDRP/LCJB split was baffling and the advent of the LAA agenda added to the bewilderment, with the statutory partnerships out on a limb.

The partnerships are the product of the sum of the parts with policy implementation constituted through a combination of environmental, institutional and personal factors. Environmental factors were the role of external steering agents and the crime rate. Whereas institutional factors resulted from the effect of the structure on the actions of managers and practitioners who had produced “…a set of rules and norms that enables and constrains action, and which is itself enacted, created, sustained or transformed by action.” (Alexander 1995,p.271). The structure influenced the managers and practitioners and they influenced the structure.

Personal factors were linked to the perceptions, attitudes and actions of practitioners and managers that contributed to the concept of ‘the way we do things around here’. Managers had facilitated practitioner development through supervision and developed long-term relationships, a huge investment in people time. A universal programme has been successfully implemented, by adapting it to the distinctiveness of Baker County, and delivering on the government’s performance agenda.

The third aim was to identify enabling factors and barriers, but the research did not set out to seek universal truths or provide a blue print for other managers, as there can be no
generic way to manage, management is contextual and contingent. In reporting the critical success factors and limits, it is important to understand that social, political and economic variables structured each manager’s perception and participation in the partnerships and local context will shape the extent to which the success reported here could be replicated. Moreover, patterns identified are not always durable (Tilley 2001), the partnerships are dynamic and churn affects sustainability.

Nevertheless, the findings do offer clear insights into policy implementation. Managers can learn lessons from the case studies through assessing the fit with their own partnership to enable them to improve performance, identify strengths and weaknesses, problem solve and experiment with what worked. Active and competent managers were central to partnership performance, supporting O’Toole et al (2005) findings. Without wise but untutored managers in CPM, policy implementation would not have been so successful. The PPO policy was steered by interdependent managers who shaped implementation through adapting, adopting and resisting aspects of management theory and practice.

Enabling factors included committed and experienced people with good interpersonal and communication skills, and managers who had the freedom to cross boundaries and use their trans-disciplinary knowledge to create a vision of what the partnership could achieve through effective shared leadership. Supervision was a key management task in encouraging professional development and leadership skills were used effectively to broaden the nexus through creating a knowledge infrastructure and to access additional resources.

Success depended upon managers attaining the most suitable level of involvement from all partners because crime management is a public good; it benefits the offender, the community and the agencies themselves. Dedicated and complimentary resources from a range of sources enabled the provision of personalized and holistic interventions delivered through concurrent teamwork, where data sharing and feedback was good. A clear performance framework, good DIP alignment, fast tracking, manageable crime levels and partial co-location, all contributed to excellent performance.

Barriers to furthering the programme’s success include the vague criteria for PPO selection that needed to be re-visited to ensure the programme was targeting the most harmful local
offenders. Limited service user accommodation and poor links with employment, training and education providers were environmental constraints. Limited engagement from non-core providers left a threat from free riders, as agencies like the Crown Prosecution service benefited from the programme without committing any of their own resources.

A lack of strategic documents, a business plan and budget in particular, resulted in an inability to monitor spend and account for resources. Furthermore, poor community engagement and limited LCJB/CDRP ownership left accountability issues that need to be dealt with. Management is about change and seeking improvement, the programme could be enhanced by fully integrating the Prevent and Deter strand and adopting a commitment to working with all stakeholders, the community and service users to give the former a voice in problems that harm them, and the latter a sense of responsibility and power in their rehabilitation.

The final aim was to ascertain the settlement between the three management models in order to generate new knowledge that could improve policy implementation and management. By breaking down management practice into the eleven dimensions and articulating what each dimension would look like under each model, the research design aimed to make the process of data analysis and theorizing more transparent and robust. The research was in search of CPM, but doubts based on the researcher’s own experience of partnership and a reading of some literature (Cropper 1996, Vigoda-Gadot 2003) and a normative agenda from government raised concerns about whether evidence for CPM would be found in mandated partnerships.

However, regular patterns of management behaviour were identified and the search for CPM was successful and helped explain the programme’s implementation. Evidence for CPM was strongest on the dimensions of performance, leadership and management tasks, decision-making, structure and processes. However, there has not been a simple linear shift from one model to the next, features of the other two models remained but in weaker forms. On the accountability dimension NPM was prevalent, but on the values, employment relations, community engagement and change dimensions PA still held forth.

The settlement was not complete and no model captured the full complexity of the implementation process. The overlaying of one form of management with another resulted
in the old and new interacting. The co-existence of the models of management created tensions, for example on the dimension of community engagement and accountability. Managers are challenged by the new, but trained in the past, no manager had received CPM training; despite this, many had adapted their management practices. The success described is testament to the time and resources invested in interpersonal relations and managers knowing how to build and maintain an effective partnership that was credible to both participants and outsiders (Provan et al 2008).

However, CPM is a resource hungry form of management and Fletcher (2006,p.11) argues that partnerships “…should never be an end in themselves but a means of doing some things better…Above all partnership is not an ideology; it is a method.” CPM has enabled the PPO programme not only to do more, but also to join up interventions to manage the complexity of the nexus to address crime’s multiple aetiology.

Implications of the research

This unique management research supports CPM as a new management trend under partnership conditions and has contributed to the literature and theory in the academic discipline of public management, adding to and integrating with the existing knowledge base. As Biggs and Tang (2007,p.93) state “Cognitive growth lies not just in knowing more, but in restructuring what is already known in order to connect with new knowledge.” The research has built on the research of other scholars, Agranoff and McGuire (2003) for example, and offers new insights into management in partnership, whilst forwarding the theorizing on CPM. The Jones Town probation manager was asked to define CPM:

“I think for me it’s been about really kind of informal things like, I know I’ll get a hearing if I take a difficult tense issue up with one of my colleague managers and that there will be a will between us to try and resolve this problem…if you can do it in the most tense situations I think you can almost sort of do it in any situation.”

The prison governor offered the following account:
"I think the people, being clear about what you want, understanding the business, understanding the providers and how providers operate, operating with integrity and it’s all the people stuff, you know it’s all about being seen to be reasonable, fair, all the sorts of the good qualities that outgoing people should have…"

The search for CPM was successful, and the data points to crime partnerships having matured since the earlier research was conducted (Crawford 1998a, Phillips 2002) with managers seeking out new management practices to achieve improved outcomes. Managers now actively choose to become involved in partnership to progress their careers, rather than directed into them, as partnership becomes part of their daily experience of managing. The research demonstrates that managers have moved away from the rhetoric of NPM, as they forge new ways of managing, more suitable for partnership to deal with the intractable problem of crime.

The findings demonstrate that the most important skills for CPM are communication skills and an ability to develop and build trusting interpersonal relationships and demonstrate leadership capacity. Procedures are not sufficient for partnership they assume differences will be accommodated, where as what counts is relationships. Nevertheless, the partnerships were more than a set of relationships they had a visible architecture indicating institutionalization.

Austin’s (2000,p.144) view is that management determines a partnership’s effectiveness and Agranoff and McGuire (2003,p.160) have shown that CPM can improve the chance of good and innovative results, and they believe that as more policy decisions are decentralized, the incidence of CPM should increase. Gilling (2005,p.741) has spoken of a shift from the predominance of hierarchical, bureaucratic modes of co-ordination via markets to networks as the prevalent mode. The research confirms these trends, so is congruent with the existing literature, whilst adding to its depth and scope.

Evidence for the new management model’s ascendancy and the findings of co-existence with the other two models may well be an indication that management practices are in a period of flux. However, it would require a creative leap to generalize to a wider population, with a danger of abstraction and separation of context. Exploiting the learning to standardize best practice risks the imposition of a top-down approach and partnerships
are best conceptualized from bottom-up. The research thus aims to generalize theoretically rather than empirically.

Partnership requires managers to assemble the right resources from a range of potential partners this involves more networking, negotiating and joint decision-making. Generating and sustaining commitment to action requires the management skills of leadership and influence rather than command, and deferring to others and holding practitioners to account even though you do not line manage them. The choice of structures, processes and people are dependent on partners’ agendas and have to be negotiated; bargaining and influencing moves to a higher level as change is managed.

Improving public management is important, however, government is in danger of presenting ‘wicked issues’ like crime as solvable by partnership and better management. Good crime management has to respond to local conditions, as the data shows the partnerships have enabled the opportunity to do things differently. Having said that, however creatively managed these interventions are, some solutions are contingent on government nationally, for example the need for more social housing in a high cost area like Baker County.

Over the period of New Labour, government has continued to set the context for service provision, most recently through the LAA framework, providing a battery of performance indicators, standards, audit and inspection. Rouse and Smith (2002, p.46) have claimed “The government’s core belief has been, and remains, that by being specific about what outcomes it wants but flexible about how they should be achieved, it could free up public services to innovate and improve continuously.” This is a clear recognition that government cannot control policy implementation and that those managers on the ground need the freedom within accountability structures to respond to local need. As Peters (2001,p.233) has stated “…the true meaning of a policy is the actual policy that is implemented rather than what is written on an official piece of paper”.

Partnerships have been viewed as a means of offloading problems on to other agencies (Gilling 2005). An alternative view is that shared responsibility for crime recognizes that no one agency has the monopoly on knowledge, skill and resources. Agencies like the Police Force have been quicker to capitalize on the need for interdependence and are
adaptable and dependable partners. The Police Force in Baker County had a history of partnership working under previous managers, as such it was well positioned to respond to new challenges within the partnership agenda.

Thompson et al (1991) concur with 6 et al (2002, p.129) who state “There is for the most part, nothing special about the management skills of holistic working. Managing partnerships and integration initiatives is exactly what one would want - the application of the generic skills of management to a particular problem.” The data suggests that the difference is in the detail, subtle differences involving managers consciously adjusting their practices to take in a partner’s perception and a willingness to solve problems jointly through bargaining and negotiation for the common good.

However, for an overtly principled manager, CPM may not be a suitable management model, as it requires a willingness to put aside pre-conceived ideas and be open to new ones, with a preparedness to compromise and give up some control and autonomy. It challenges expert status and requires engagement with a wide range of stakeholders, as management becomes more complex, more visible and more demanding of skill and time. This innovative study points to the evolving nature of management, adds to the existing research base, but also develops it further, by theorizing on CPM and offering the latest evidence on managing in partnership.

**Further research**

Finally, crime is a localized activity, CPM aims to engage and empower service users and the community to gain a more nuanced understanding of need and required response. Future research could be undertaken into how to involve service users and the community in a constructive dialogue regarding service delivery. The dimension was poorly evidenced and was out of sink with the government’s community engagement and confidence agenda. Involving services users rests on two kinds of argument with different theoretical bases. The methodological argument rests on the need to improve evaluation, there are consumerist benefits to be had thorough involving service users (Bowpitt and Weinstein 2010) through identifying barriers to engagement and an analysis of what service users really need from service providers.
The second argument is political and accepts the intrinsic right of the community to have a voice in the matters that affect them. Participation could lead to a greater awareness of PPOs as more than just offenders but as citizens too, and what the partnerships are trying to achieve on the communities behalf. This involves issues of empowerment in handing over some control and could increase the legitimacy of the partnerships’ decision-making, especially in the more contested areas of resource allocation. As the Smith Town treatment manager stated:

“…the PPO scheme should be evaluated in itself, it’s about getting the people who have used the scheme in, and finding out how they think we could do better and it isn’t about giving them a question and answer sheet because you can steer it can’t you? to get the results you want, it’s about saying ‘look you’ve been involved in this service, what would have been better for you?’”

A standpoint approach aims to give voice to the service user; a focus group would aim to gain qualitative data. This would involve managers’ acknowledging that PPOs’ have their own schema, which may be different from the partnership, an alternative to the provider agenda. The benefit could lie in the acquisition of a more systematic account, rather than anecdotal practitioner reports about why some service users are deterred from engaging. Such an evaluation will cost time and money, but it is a recognition that expertise can reside in different places and at different times. This challenges professional expertise, which is often privileged, but it gives recognition to experiential knowledge, which can be marginalized. The strategy could be as follows:

- agree a framework for consultation
- use more than one service user, otherwise tokenism
- be clear about the basis for involvement and power to effect change
- provide support e.g. training expenses
- cover the ethics of involvement
- consult to obtain relevant information and identify problems still to be met
- jointly plan commissioning
- review.
The aim would be to promote an active citizenry through participation in policy making, that could aid the commissioning process and enhance service provision by making it more responsive to service user need and more accountable to the community.
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Appendices

Questions seeking answers

Key:
D - Documentary data
I - Interview
O - Observation

Questions on the environmental context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource availability and source</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has an audit of local resources available for PPO been undertaken and reviewed?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What resources - financial and non-financial, are available?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are these resources adequate?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the partnership seeks out opportunities for additional resources, how and where are new resources identified and built?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the different agencies budgets pooled?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are PPO resources deployed where they are needed most?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local community engagement</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How would you describe the community’s role with PPO?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the strategy group meeting open to the public?</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the public allowed access to the minutes?</td>
<td>D</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Volume of offenders at risk</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has an audit of local offending been undertaken and reviewed?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government policy</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What guidance have you received from National Government re PPO?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
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<tr>
<td>What role does Government Office play with reference to PPO?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What role do Local Councillors play?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does PPO feed into LAA targets focusing on Children and Young People block, Safer and Stronger Communities block and Every Child Matters outcomes?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much autonomy from National Government does the partnership have in decision-making with reference to the PPO?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
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</table>

Questions on structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agencies, engagement and closedness</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Who are the key engaged agencies?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Evidence</td>
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<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do the managers that attend the strategy group have sufficient</td>
<td>I/O</td>
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<tr>
<td>authority to commit their agencies to the decisions taken?</td>
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<tr>
<td>How do you gain the appropriate level of involvement from all</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stakeholders? For example building community capacity?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Are there any agencies, which don’t attend the strategy group that you</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>think should attend? If yes, who?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Why are some agencies not engaged in your opinion?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which agency chairs the strategy group?</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is chairing reviewed periodically and how?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How well do agencies understand others core business?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you ensure that the PPO links in with core agency</td>
<td>I/O</td>
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<tr>
<td>responsibilities?</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>How do you promote awareness of interdependence?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the last 12 months has individual membership of the strategy group</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>changed? If yes, why?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are some partners easier to work with than others? Why is this?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Mission, objectives, strategy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the CDRP mission for PPO?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the objectives for PPO?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How were the outcomes for prioritised?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think all parties are clear about the purpose of PPO?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who has power to set the agenda?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do particular agencies control specific decisions/services?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What protocols does the partnership have in place?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do the three PPO strategies link up?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you encourage a shared understanding and ownership of the PPO?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you do when the goals of the agencies are conflicting? What</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should you do?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you draw out the distinctive competences of each partner agency?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What strategies do you use do you to motivate and engage agencies to</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improve the quality of agency commitment? I.e. prisons?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Management structure**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How is the strategic and the operational linked?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is their tension between strategy and operational management?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who has overseen the implementation of the PPO?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are management practices rule bound or do you have freedom to manage?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Diversity and complexity of service delivery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How many agencies are involved in PPO service delivery?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the core services to users?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How were the particular interventions decided upon?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have all costs in delivering the PPO scheme been identified?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has a premium service been offered?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has the focus been on core service delivery or innovative services</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>requiring new funding?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is their dedicated PPO staff? Are they co located?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How has collaboration affected agencies working practices?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How are PPO cases managed?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the action plan prepared by the Offender Manager undertaken in</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consultation with all PPO agencies?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What data are used for PPO targeting?</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Questions on the people

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Diversity and autonomy of occupational specialisms</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What is the range of occupational specialisms?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a strong professional orientation in this CDRP?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are tasks undertaken specific to one profession or shared among</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>professional groups?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Skills, capability, experience, knowledge and values</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>What experience and training do you have of managing in a</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collaborative environment?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is the skill mix between professional and non-professional staff?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you deal with working practices that are counter productive to</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>collaborative work?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are tasks prescriptive and standardised or do professionals have</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>discretion in day-to-day decision-making?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are the partnerships practitioners qualified and skilled? Skills/</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>training audit?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are there any informal leaders in the partnership?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do different tasks require different leaders?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What kind of leadership works best in the partnership?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is change predicted and managed?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If there is resistance to change, what do you identify as the reasons?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have there been any unanticipated consequences that have affected</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the management of PPO? How were they dealt with?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How have you created and communicated the vision for PPO?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Management style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Management style</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

327
How would you describe your management style?  I
Where does your managerial priority and accountability lie?  I
What are the most serious difficulties you face in managing agencies?  I
What are the symptoms of conflict in this partnership? And how do you manage it?  I/O
What strategies do you use do you to motivate and engage agencies to improve the quality of agency commitment?  I/O
How do management practices identify and support innovation and reflective practice?  I/O
How do you foster learning among agencies?  I/O
Do you manage differently in a collaborative environment compared to managing in your parent agency?  I
Is the steering group able to respond flexibly to new agendas? Are you able to balance emerging issues with existing priorities?  I/O

Questions on the operational processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collaborative tools and mechanisms</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Does the available technology support collaboration?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is the data sharing that occurs most appropriate for your work?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With whom in the partnership do you have the most contact and by what means?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you create opportunities for staff to meet and share ideas?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Which communication tools are used to disseminate information?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What actions have you taken to build trust between agencies?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On what does collaborative behaviour most depend?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What are the most important skills for collaborative management?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What services have been commissioned for the PPO?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you experienced any problems with commissioning and contracting?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance framework</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How is line management arranged?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are business plan objectives cascaded down to personnel development and performance plans?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appraisal and reward system what is it rewarding?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How difficult has it been to create and sustain agreement within agencies about PPO goals?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do PPO performance targets reflect the target regimes of all participating agencies?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What do you do when the goals of the agencies are conflicting? What should you do?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does the strategy group monitor the performance of PPO?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is performance renegotiated?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you correct deviations from targets?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who is accountable for the PPO?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is quality measured?</td>
<td>I/O/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you compare yourself with other partnerships on performance i.e.</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### MSG’s?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workload management</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How is the workload allocated and managed?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How is PPO service delivery responsive to service user diversity?</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Questions on the impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy implementation</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How would you rate the level of collaboration among agencies for the PPO?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Given resource availability how would you rate the implementation of the PPO?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does this partnership add value?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If added value has not been achieved, how do you account for this?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What innovative service processes /programmes are being delivered?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How do you ensure that the risks and rewards are shared between agencies on the PPO programme?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do management practices need to change to improve the partnerships success? If yes how?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does this partnership celebrate success?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the partnership publish an annual report? Should they?</td>
<td>I/D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does the steering group link to the CDRP’s i.e. the strategic assessment/partnership plan? and the LCJB? LSP?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How does the steering group evaluate the PPO scheme? Self-assessment process?</td>
<td>I/O</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How would you define successful collaborative public management?</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Questionnaire-survey to CDRP Managers

The first section of this questionnaire-survey seeks the views of managers on managing in a collaborative environment. The second section seeks the views of managers on the implementation and management of the Prevent and Deter strand of the Prolific and Priority Offender programme. Please complete the questionnaire-survey by ticking the boxes which apply, and by adding comments where requested. The process should take less than 20 minutes. All answers will be treated as confidential, individuals and CDRPs will remain anonymous. Thank you very much for your time.

Your job title………………………………………………………………………………………..

Your parent agency………………………………………………………………………………..

Your CDRP……………………………………………………………………………………….

1. Are the following represented on the CDRP? (Please tick all boxes that apply.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Business Community</th>
<th>The Probation Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Voluntary Sector</td>
<td>Children’s Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Local Community</td>
<td>The Youth Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected Representatives with community safety brief</td>
<td>Youth Offending Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Users</td>
<td>Connexions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Criminal Justice Board</td>
<td>Employment Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Police</td>
<td>Education Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Crown Prosecution Service</td>
<td>Housing Provider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courts Representative</td>
<td>Anti-Social Behaviour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Please specify)</td>
<td>Health Provider</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Are there any agencies, which are not part of the CDRP that you think should be? If yes, who?

{ } Yes (Please specify)…………………………………………………………………………

{ } No

3. Do managers have sufficient authority to commit their agencies to the decisions taken?

{ } Yes

{ } No

{ } Some

4. In the last 12 months has individual membership of the CDRP changed?

{ } Yes

{ } No

5. Which agency chairs the CDRP strategy group? (Please specify) Is chairing reviewed periodically?
6. Do you think any one agency dominates the decision making of the CDRP? If so, which one?

{ } Yes (Please specify) ........................................................................................................
{ } No

7. Who most influences the strategic assessment? (Please rank your answers 1 to 3 with 1 being the most influential.)

{ } Senior managers
{ } Operational managers
{ } Staff
{ } Analysts
{ } The local community
{ } Other (Please specify) ........................................................................................................

8. Are working practices among the CDRP conducive to change?

{ } Always
{ } Most of the time
{ } Sometimes
{ } Rarely
{ } Never

9. Are working practices among the CDRP conducive to risk taking?

{ } Always
{ } Sometimes
{ } Never

10. How would you rate the level of collaboration among the agencies in the CDRP?

{ } Good
{ } Satisfactory
{ } Neither satisfactory or poor
{ } Poor
{ } Very poor

11. Is the current level of local community engagement with the CDRP:

{ } Good
{ } Satisfactory
{ } Neither satisfactory or poor
{ } Poor

12. In addition to core funding does the CDRP seek out opportunities for additional funding?

{ } Yes (Please specify) ........................................................................................................
13. Which of the following performance measures are used in the CDRP? (Please tick all boxes that apply.)

- CDRP league table
- Responsiveness to stakeholders
- Staff appraisals
- Performance standards and targets e.g. local crime statistics
- Self assessment/benchmark practice
- Other (Please specify)

14. Which communication tools are used to disseminate information in the CDRP? (Please tick all boxes that apply.)

- Partnership newsletter, web site
- Group email, Intranet
- Team briefs, seminars, conferences
- Public meetings-Face the People sessions
- Service user feedback
- Other (Please specify)

15. Which of the following does the CDRP have in place? (Please tick all boxes that apply.)

- Governance agreement
- Data sharing protocol
- Public engagement strategy
- Risk management strategy
- Commissioning strategy
- Service delivery standards for the Prolific and Priority Offender programme

16. Where does your managerial accountability lie? (Please rank your answers 1 to 3 with 1 being the most important.)

- To parent organisation
- To the strategy group
- To National Government
- To the local community
- To service users
- To partnership staff

17. Where does your managerial priority lie? (Please rank your answers 1 to 3 with 1 being the most important.)

- To add value through learning and innovation
- To improve efficiency e.g. accessing new resources
- To improve staff motivation and performance
- To meet performance targets
- To improve processes e.g. knowledge management
- To benefit the community and service users
18. On what does collaborative behaviour most depend? (Please rank your answers 1 to 3 with 1 being the most important.)

{ } Informal relationships
{ } Technology
{ } Leadership
{ } Culture
{ } Processes
{ } Trust

19. Which of the following are the most important skills for collaborative management? (Please rank your answers 1 to 3 with 1 being the most important.)

{ } Problem solving skills
{ } Communication skills
{ } Conflict management skills
{ } Being change orientated
{ } Ability to develop and build trust
{ } Other (Please specify) .................................................................

20. Which of the following do you most often use to motivate agencies? (Please rank your answers 1 to 3 with 1 being the most important.)

{ } Celebrate success e.g. reduced crime statistics
{ } Development through job shadowing, mentoring, coaching
{ } Use of incentives and reward e.g. performance related pay
{ } Participative management e.g. encouraging ownership, delegation
{ } Tackling the conditions that reduce motivation
{ } Other (Please specify) .................................................................

21. What are the most serious difficulties you face in managing agencies? (Please rank your answers 1 to 3 with 1 being the most important.)

{ } Inadequate data exchange, poor communication system
{ } Lack of common vision and objectives
{ } Government intervention
{ } Lack of resources e.g. competent workforce, time, excessive workload
{ } Low levels of trust
{ } Agency culture, professional values, territorial issues e.g. salary

22. Which of the following tactics do you use to manage conflict? (Please rank your answers 1 to 3 with 1 being the most important.)

{ } Agree to differ
{ } Avoidance of the issue concerned
{ } Management direction
{ } Joint problem solving
{ } A creative use of conflict can lead to innovation
{ } Referral to dispute resolution procedure

23. Which of the following coordination mechanisms do you use? (Please rank your answers 1 to 3 with 1 being the most important.)
Informal e.g. networking, coalition forming
Structural e.g. standardised procedures, co-location, information liaison officer
Strategic e.g. pooled budget, joint planning, interlocking board membership
Operational e.g. special projects, secondment, joint training
Programme e.g. circulars, cross cutting objectives, audits
Control e.g. use of incentives, sanctions, enforcement

24. How do you foster learning among agencies? (Please specify)

........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................

25. Have you developed any innovative processes?

{ } Yes (Please specify) ........................................................................................................
{ } No

26. What actions have you taken to build trust between agencies? (Please specify)

........................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................

27. Has the CDRP commissioned the following for Prevent and Deter? (Please tick all boxes that apply.)

| An audit of youth offending to ascertain the number of young people eligible locally |
| Is this reviewed every 6 months? |
| An audit of resources available for Prevent and Deter |
| Is this reviewed every 6 months? |
| Development of detailed local identification criteria |
| The setting up of service delivery mechanisms and terms of reference |

28. How much autonomy from National Government does the CDRP have in decision-making with reference to Prevent and Deter?

{ } A lot of autonomy
{ } Some autonomy
{ } Not much autonomy

29. What role does GOEM play with reference to Prevent and Deter? (Please rank your answers 1 to 3 with 1 being the most important.)

{ } To assist the achievement of PSA’s / LAA’s
{ } To facilitate benchmarking with other CDRPs
{ } To provide advice, funding, training, dissemination of best practice
{ } To develop central/local relations
{ } To encourage effective collaborative management
{ } Other (Please specify) ........................................................................................................

30. Who has overseen the implementation of Prevent and Deter? (Please tick all boxes that apply.)
31. Do Prevent and Deter performance targets reflect the target regimes of all participating agencies?

{} Yes
{} No
{} Of some agencies

32. How does the CDRP monitor the performance of Prevent and Deter?


33. What services have been commissioned for Prevent and Deter? (Please mark all boxes that apply.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education, employment, training</th>
<th>Mental health treatment and support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drug or alcohol treatment</td>
<td>Housing advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive targeting e.g. YIP/YISP</td>
<td>Early interventions e.g. Sure Start, On Track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offending behaviour programmes</td>
<td>Situational crime reduction measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentoring</td>
<td>Don’t know</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family/parenting interventions</td>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34. How does Prevent and Deter link up with the other two PPO strategies – Catch and Bring to Justice and Resettle and Rehabilitate?


35. Given resource availability how would you rate the implementation of the Prevent and Deter?

{} Good
{} Satisfactory
{} Neither satisfactory or poor
{} Poor

Thank you very much for taking the time to complete this questionnaire-survey. Your views are valued. Please return the completed questionnaire-survey to louise.geddes@ntu.ac.uk
An interview schedule

What resources - financial and non-financial, are available to the PPO partnership?

What role does GO play with reference to the PPO?

What role do local councillors play in the partnership?

Do the managers in the partnership have sufficient authority to commit their agencies to the decisions taken?

Are some partners easier to work with than others? Why is this?

How were the outcomes for the PPO prioritised?

How has collaboration affected agencies working practices?

What experience and training do you have of managing in a collaborative environment?

How do you deal with working practices that are counter productive to collaborative work?

Do different tasks require different leaders?

What kind of leadership works best in the partnership?

How would you describe your management style?

Where does your managerial priority and accountability lie?

How do you foster learning among agencies?

Is the data sharing that occurs most appropriate for your work?

Given resource availability how would you rate the implementation of the PPO programme?

What innovative service processes /programmes are being delivered?

How do you ensure that the risks and rewards are shared between agencies on the PPO programme?

Do management practices need to change to improve the partnerships success? If yes how?

Finally, is there anything else I need to understand about managing that I have not pursued with you?
The observation schedule

Management meeting:

Date:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Specific resources to support collaboration (Admin support, training, IT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cost of interventions identified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking out new actors, resources, ideas, information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources adequate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local community engagement (Problem identification, sharing of community knowledge, volunteering)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public access to the minutes/Meeting open to the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audit of local offending and resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guidance from National Government, GO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAA targets (Children and Young People block, Safer and Stronger Communities block and Every Child Matters outcomes)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key managers with sufficient authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non attendance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minutes: key objectives, decisions, action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short, prioritised agenda, room for discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review of achievements, strategic plan, budget, crime data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives for the meeting met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protocols</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 strategies linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic and operational linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common purpose/aims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Particular agencies control specific decisions, process, services)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of agencies in service delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dedicated staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>(Formal referral system, offender profiling, crime analyst)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventions (social v situational)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases reviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service delivery responsive to service user diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premium service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescriptive and standardized tasks (templates, structured interventions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks specific to one profession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task orientated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal leaders (champions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector involvement (consultants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innovative processes /programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom to manage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint decision making (solutions focused)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problem solving (rational decision making, SP, SARA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible employment conditions (generic jobs)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Agents:**
- Distinctive professional identities
- Range of occupational specialisms
- Professionals have discretion in day-to-day decision making
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adequate skills, capability, experience, knowledge</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal skills: create rapport, gain commitment, explore compromise (win/win)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategies: establish direction, targets, make proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal resources, motivate, inspire, praise, engage, value others perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foster joint learning (from previous programmes, colleagues)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrepreneurial values (risk taking)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public service values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good body language (eye contact)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questioning: probing alternatives, challenging agency perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective listening: value contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication: logical, persuasive, handle objections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arguments, resistance, conflict of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of co-operation, power imbalances (information is unequal)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Processes:**

- Key management task (system controller, performance manager, network builder)
- Collaborative tools (manuals, practitioner meetings)
- Language (shared terminology)
- Working practices conducive to change (opportunity to explore new ideas)
- Change predicted and managed (SWOT, stakeholder analysis)
- Communication tools to disseminate information
- Actions taken to build trust between agencies
- Problems with commissioning and contracting (lack of providers)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emphasis on performance / Cross cutting targets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poor performance / Correct deviations from targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability (Inspection, supervision)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality (Charter mark, Investor in People)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Workload allocation system

Impact:
Constructive working relationships good level of collaboration
Management practices support collaboration
Partnership add value
Creative synergy
Consensus seeking/negotiated decision-making, mutual adjustment
Management practices need to change to improve the partnerships success

Sketch a table plan of who sat where:

Additional information not covered by the schedule:
Documentary data

Baker County:

- Agenda
- Minutes
- Quarterly crime performance figures
- Premium service protocol
- Terms of reference
- Power point presentation on setting the 2 year crime performance target
- Baker County’s Local Area Agreement 2008-2011
- Safer Baker County’s delivery plan 2008-2011

Jones Town:

- Agenda
- Minutes
- Profiling matrix
- Jones Town’s Community Safety Partnership strategy 2005-2008
- Jones Town’s Community Safety Partnership delivery plan 2008-2011
- Information exchange protocol

Smith Town:

- Agenda
- Minutes
- Profiling matrix
- Smith Town’s Community Safety Partnership strategy 2006-2008
- Smith Town’s Community Safety Partnership delivery plan 2008-2011
- Information exchange protocol
**Compare and contrast the Conservative period with New Labour**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
<th>Differences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Growing penal estate, and a preparedness to spend resources in this area whilst keeping direct taxes stable</td>
<td>New Labour has being willing to intervene into the social fabric of the country through the social inclusion agenda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A concern with improved management of the Criminal Justice System</td>
<td>New Labour has moved to focus on outcomes rather than outputs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A critical perspective towards professionals and a willingness to use non-professional staff in their place</td>
<td>New Labour has been concerned to join – up government services - development of statutory partnerships in the Criminal Justice System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A willingness to draw the private sector into the Criminal Justice System through contracting, competition and pubic private partnerships</td>
<td>New Labour focus on the citizen rather than the customer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A willingness to use technology as a form of control: CCTV, tagging</td>
<td>New Labour concern with evidence based policy and practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An acceptance of social inequality</td>
<td>New Labour has presided over reduced crime rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growth of non-departmental government bodies</td>
<td>New Labour has ditched diversion in favour of early intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An appeal to ‘Middle England’</td>
<td>A desire to revive local democracy - return power to local government and engage the community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A concern for crime victims</td>
<td>Anti-social behaviour agenda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Levels of criminological explanation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Explanatory focus</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Illustrative theories</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Macro-society</td>
<td>To explain crime as a large scale social phenomena</td>
<td>Strain (Merton 1957) Control (Hirschi 1969) Feminist (Heidensohn 1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>To account for spatial and social variations in crime</td>
<td>Ecological (Shaw and McKay 1969) Differential opportunity (Cloward and Ohlin 1960)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Individual criminal acts</td>
<td>To analyse and account for patterns and types of crime event</td>
<td>Routine activity (Felson 1994) Rational choice (Cornish and Clarke 1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Proximate social groups</td>
<td>To understand the roles of socialization and social influence through family, school, peer group</td>
<td>Differential association (Sutherland and Cressey 1974)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Individual offenders</td>
<td>To examine intra-individual factors such as thoughts, feelings and behaviour</td>
<td>Neutralisation (Sykes and Matza 1957) Cognitive social learning (McGuire 2000) Labelling (Becker 1963) Developmental (West and Farrington 1977)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(McGuire 2000,p.32 adapted)
# Levels and types of crime interventions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>Primary</strong></th>
<th><strong>Secondary</strong></th>
<th><strong>Tertiary</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social interventions with offenders</strong></td>
<td>To prevent the onset of criminality aimed at the general population</td>
<td>Target those at risk of offending/victimization identified as a result of pre-disposing factors</td>
<td>Aimed at the already convicted/victimized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social interventions with victims</strong></td>
<td>Education and socialization Public awareness and advertising campaigns Sure start Connexions Citizenship in schools Changing perceptions of social harm Domestic violence</td>
<td>Work with those ‘at risk’ of offending Splash YIP On track Community regeneration Criminality prevention Youth programmes ASBO</td>
<td>Rehabilitation Confronting offending behaviour Aftercare Reparation Offending behaviour programmes ‘Dangerousness’ Risk management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situational interventions with offenders</strong></td>
<td>Youth clubs Education</td>
<td>Tenants and residents associations Support groups Sure Start</td>
<td>Cocoon watching groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situational interventions with victims</strong></td>
<td>Target-hardening Surveillance Opportunity reduction/removal Environmental design Neighbourhood Watch</td>
<td>Target-hardening and design measures for ‘at risk’ groups Risk prediction and Assessment Deterrence Targeted policing Guardianship and monitoring Private security companies</td>
<td>Individual deterrence MAPPA Incapacitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Situational interventions with victims</strong></td>
<td>General public awareness campaigns to encourage the taking of responsibility for their own safety</td>
<td>Focus on those at particular risk of victimization Insurance companies offering cheaper policies if right locks fitted</td>
<td>Aimed at those who have already been a victim Crime prevention officers offer advice to victims Victim support</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from Crawford’s (1998,p.19) adaption of Brantingham and Faust’s (1976) schema.
List of abbreviations

CARAT Counselling Advice Referral Assessment and Through-care
CDRP Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnership
CPM Collaborative Public Management
DIP Drug Intervention Programme
IOMS Integrated Offender Management Scheme
JRC Joint Review Conference
LAA Local Area Agreement
LCJB Local Criminal Justice Board
MAPPA Multi-Agency Public Protection Panel
MOMS National Offending Management Service
NPM New Public Management
OASsy Offender Assessment System
PA Public Administration
PSA Public Service Agreement
PPO Prolific and other Priority Offender
YOT Youth Offending Team.