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Charles Péguy is referred to by Gilles Deleuze on twenty-one occasions, spread across ten books from *Difference and Repetition* (1968) to *What is Philosophy?* (1991). Although Deleuze’s usage of Péguy is somewhat narrow, he is employed at significant locations in the analysis of repetition and events, both of which are areas of capital importance to Deleuze’s broader philosophy. In this respect, while Deleuze is not a Péguyist and ignores many of Péguy’s main contributions to thought, Péguy nevertheless plays a vital role in the formation and explanation of Deleuze’s thinking.

## I.

Born in 1873, Charles Pierre Péguy was the son of a peasant family from Orleans. His father died the year after his birth, having never fully recovered from traumas sustained in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, and Péguy was raised by his mother and grandmother. From an early age Péguy was a talented student and he won a series of scholarships that eventually led to his admission at the prestigious *École Normale Supérieure* (ENS) in 1894. An academic career beckoned, but these aspirations were dashed when he failed his agrégation in 1898. Péguy instead pursued a career in publishing, founding the journal *Les Cahiers de la Quinzaine* in 1900. Although the *Cahier* struggled financially and rarely had more than 1000 subscribers, it was nevertheless a well-known and modestly influential publication, with contributions from notable authors that included Romain Rolland, Anatole France, Georges Sorel, Jean Jaurès, Jean and Jérôme Tharaud, Julien Benda and Henri Bergson (though without his prior knowledge<sup>1</sup>). The *Cahier* frequently published controversial commentary on contemporary socio-political issues, with Péguy the serial offender, and the journal prided itself on both its independence from political parties and its willingness to publish contrary views.<sup>2</sup> The *Cahier* also served as Péguy’s personal [end of p. 120] loud-speaker, and in its pages can be found the majority of his prose writings. With the arrival of war in the summer of 1914 the *Cahiers* closed its doors and Péguy volunteered for frontline duty. He would not live much longer, falling at the Battle of the Marne in September – a key battle on the outskirts of Paris that contributed significantly to halting the German blitzkrieg.

To say that Péguy was a complicated and idiosyncratic figure would be an enormous understatement, illustrated by the seemingly contradictory causes that his name is associated with: Péguy was at once a socialist and a catholic, a Dreyfusard and a supporter of the army, an urban *avant-gardiste* and a peasant of *l’Ancienne France*, a staunch Bergsonian to the end but only of his early works. If viewed from the other direction, we could say that Péguy was none of these things, as they are conventionally understood; rather, he was a specialist in heresy who never shied from decrying the perversions of each cause as and when he perceived them.

Taking the first of these listed causes, it is said that Péguy was introduced to socialism as a teenager by the town blacksmith Boitier, who served as a male mentor for Péguy in the absence of his father.<sup>3</sup> Whilst at the ENS, which was at that time a leftist bastion, these predilections were greatly intensified. Along with fellow classmates such as Léon Blum, the young Péguy was a great admirer of Jean Jaurès and Lucien Herr (the revered socialist librarian of the ENS).<sup>4</sup> Péguy’s early work testifies to this socialist commitment: his first literary creation, the dramatic play *Jeanne d’Arc* (1897), was dedicated to all those who had fought for the establishment of ‘the universal socialist republic’, and his first academic publication was a review essay for the *Revue Socialiste*.<sup>5</sup> After quitting academia, Péguy promptly opened a socialist bookshop, investing the entirety of his recently acquired dowry. Although the bookshop was a thriving hub of socialist activity, as a commercial venture it failed completely. To stave off bankruptcy a socialist consortium including Herr and Blum raised new finances and assumed management of the shop. The new arrangement proved short-lived. Aside from operational disagreements (Péguy could not countenance his own essays being subject to review by an editorial board), it soon became clear that

Péguy's political and philosophical positions were at odds with the socialist orthodoxy. Things were brought to a head in December 1899, when the first General Congress of French Socialist Organisations banned intraparty debate in order to promote socialist unity. Adhering to **[end of p. 121]** such censorship was impossible for Péguy, and by the first week of January he had severed his ties with the Party and opened the *Cahiers*.

From the offices of the *Cahiers*, opposite the Sorbonne, Péguy launched a series of scathing critiques against prominent and powerful figures in politics and academia. High on his hit-list were the 'parliamentary socialists' that he had recently separated himself from. According to Péguy, the parliamentary socialists were guilty of betraying the collectivist cause for their own personal political gain. This behavior, Péguy thought, was clearly exemplified by the manner in which the socialist vanguard handled the Dreyfus Affair and its aftermath. In 1894 Captain Alfred Dreyfus, an officer of Jewish decent, was convicted by military court of selling official secrets to the Germans. Two years later new evidence came to light that strongly suggested the framing of Dreyfus and an attempted cover-up. For the remaining years of the century France was rocked by this scandal and the nation was divided into two camps: the largely republican and socialist Dreyfusards who campaigned for the innocence of Dreyfus, and the anti-Dreyfusards who defended the integrity of the army and generally supported the Church in its disagreements with the young Third Republic. Péguy was the most fervent of Dreyfusards, and with his socialist comrades readily engaged in street battles. According to Péguy, what they were fighting for was not merely the release of Dreyfus from captivity; to fight for Dreyfus was to fight for justice, which is to say a France that is just. Dreyfus was thus synonymous with justice, and at stake was nothing less than the fate of France, the soul of France, and its legacy as a great and just nation. Péguy's ambition, as such, was to facilitate a collective and public acknowledgement by the nation-at-large that Dreyfus was innocent, and that this innocence must be defended and proclaimed if France was to prove worthy of herself. In his words: 'Where we were concerned, the question was never whether Dreyfus was innocent or guilty. But whether people would have the courage or not have the courage to declare and to know him to be innocent.'<sup>6</sup> Péguy was therefore willing to sacrifice himself for Dreyfus, but this sacrifice, in his eyes, was made in order to save the nation, not just one man. To quote Péguy at greater length:

And we, what did we say? We said that a single injustice, a single crime, a single illegality, particularly if it were officially confirmed, particularly if it were universally, legally, nationally condoned, a **[end of p. 122]** single crime is enough to make a breach in the social compact, in the social contract, a single forfeit, a single dishonor is enough to dishonor a people. It becomes a source of infection, a poison that corrupts the whole body. What we defend is not only our honor, not only the honor of a whole people, in the present, but the historical honor of our whole race, the honor of our forefathers and children.<sup>7</sup>

Unfortunately for Péguy, France did not emerge from the Affair with her honour intact. In 1899 Dreyfus was given a second trial and again found guilty. By this time, however, the 'parliamentary socialists' were in a position to procure a presidential pardon for Dreyfus, on condition that he confess to the accused crime. This was a compromise that Dreyfus was willing to accept, but Péguy could not, for it did not deliver the required recognition of innocence. And to make matters worse, Dreyfus' release had been secured by use of a monarchical mechanism. Thus while the Dreyfusards were in one respect victorious, insofar as the freedom of Dreyfus was successfully attained, for Péguy the movement ended in failure. In fact, the Dreyfusards, in the opinion of Péguy, suffered a fate worse than defeat: their cause had been colonised, hijacked from within by paper parliamentarians and redirected towards a new aim – the attainment of political power.

The Dreyfus Affair was without question the seminal event of Péguy's life, and its impact on his thinking cannot be overstated. Indeed, it is through reflecting on this event that Péguy comes to formulate a novel theory of events. At the start of 1910 Péguy published an essay by Daniel Halévy in his *Cahier* titled "Apology for our Past". In this essay, Halévy, who was a friend of Péguy's at the time, offered a *mea culpa* for his Dreyfusard past, roughly on the grounds that their actions had endangered French unity and was thus not in the nation's best interests. Péguy felt compelled to reply and six months later published a

response, “Memories of Youth [*Notre Jeunesse*]”. One of the reasons Halévy agreed to write his essay was that he figured enough water had passed under the bridge – the Affair, in other words, was now history, and so could be treated as such: historically. But for Péguy, it was precisely this operation – the conversion of Dreyfusism from a living and breathing movement to a museum piece – that required an explanation and apology. Péguy’s response to Halévy thus does not simply consist in providing a different version of events. It most certainly does this, but more importantly, in doing so Péguy creates new categories for understanding and approaching the event: *mystique* and *politique*. [end of p. 123]

As noted above, Péguy was extremely bitter about the political compromise that deflated the Affair. The treason committed by the ‘parliamentary socialists’ was double. Firstly, they betrayed the nation by accepting a ‘temporal salvation’ of France when it was her ‘eternal salvation’ that was at stake.<sup>8</sup> Secondly, and perhaps of equal importance to Péguy personally, the ‘parliamentarians’ betrayed the true Dreyfusards by stealing their name and legacy. In “Memories of Youth” Péguy is thus desperate to distinguish between the genuine and false Dreyfusards, and he does so by employing the terms *mystique* and *politique*:

*Appearances* no doubt are on Halévy’s side; those who appear are on his side. What I mean is that if one only considers the Dreyfusists who are to the fore, in the public eye, the journalists, publicists, lecturers, candidates, parliamentarians and politicians, all those who talk about chatter and scribble and publish, the immense majority who appear on the scene, almost the whole lot hurried to take part in the Dreyfusist demagogy, and by that I mean the political demagogy that issued from the Dreyfusist *mystique*. But what I contest is that those who *appear* in history (and whom history seizes upon, in return, with such avidity) have a great importance in the depths of reality. At that depth, where the only important realities are found, I maintain that *all* the mystical Dreyfusists remained Dreyfusists, that they remained mystics, and kept their hands clean. What does it matter whether appearances, *phenomena*, whether all the officials, all those out for profit, should have abandoned, denied, betrayed and ridiculed the *mystique* in favor of the *politique*, and of the policies which issued from it, and of political demagogy? *That*, my dear Halévy, as you yourself would say, *is life*. What does it matter if they sneer at us? We alone represent something, and they do not. What does it matter if they turn us to ridicule? They themselves live through us, and only exist by virtue of our existence. Their very vanity would not exist but for us.<sup>9</sup>

In truth, Péguy is not entirely clear in this essay about what he means by *mystique* and *politique* (especially the former term). But as this quote suggests, the terms more or less correlate to the distinction between creation and capture. For Péguy, ‘everything begins as a *mystique* and ends as a *politique*’.<sup>10</sup> A *mystique* is furthermore said to be ‘organic’ and ‘alive’, in contrast to a *politique* which is ‘logical’ and ‘parasitic’. Taking the example of the Dreyfus Affair, Dreyfusism began life as a *movement* that exuded its own *mystique*. But at a certain point the *mystique* of Dreyfusism became devoured by the [end of p. 124] *politique* to which it gave birth, it became a political program, a policy that captured and tamed the *esprit* of Dreyfusism. In time this *politique* claimed the name ‘Dreyfusism’ for its own, effacing its *mystique* in the process, but this is precisely because a *politique* excels at capturing rather than creating – that is its nature, what it does. As Péguy elaborates:

It came in to profit, and, like all profiteers, came in afterward. It came in as a parasite, as a follower. It did not come to fight or to found. That is the usual historical error, the common intellectual mistake, where history is concerned: to attribute the shadow cast by the abuses of the profiteers to the virtues of the founders. The founders came first. The profiteers follow on.<sup>11</sup>

The ‘intellectual mistake’ that is being referring to here is ‘the historical optical illusion which consists in constantly transferring the present into the past, the ulterior to the anterior’.<sup>12</sup> By virtue of this illusion, it appears as though the currently recognised and victorious Dreyfusards (the ones that appear in our history books) planned the whole Affair and saw it through to glorious fruition. But these merchants of *politique* feed off the work of others; just like the temporal category of the present, they [substitute] for the real organic movement of history, with its perpetual movement from past to future, falling on the uneven fringe of the present, a hard angular shadow at each moment thrown by the present on the past,

like a shadow of the corner of the wall, of the house or gable which seems to be on the street.<sup>13</sup> Thus while history may have designated Péguy a traitor to the cause, since he did not support the ‘party of Dreyfus’, Péguy argues that it is *they* who are the traitors, since they betrayed the *mystique* of Dreyfusism in order to serve their own political and temporal ends. ‘All parties live by their *mystique* and die by their *politique*’,<sup>14</sup> which is to say that a *mystique* is what one should die for, while a *politique* is what one lives off of.<sup>15</sup>

In setting out his thoughts on the Dreyfus Affair, Péguy is clearly motivated by personal grievances: the ‘parliamentary socialists’ were extremely late in arriving to the defence of Dreyfus,<sup>16</sup> but they received much of the credit to the detriment of Péguy’s own place in history. In reflecting on how this has happened, Péguy concludes that his effacement from history can be explained by a common mistake regarding the appraisal of events – a misconception, moreover, that is ‘perhaps the greatest of intellectual illusions’: namely, the failure to distinguish between the *mystique* and *politique* of events, and, **[end of p. 125]** following, the tendency to confuse a presiding power for that which created it. ‘In all those ordeals it is the inward force, the violence of the eruption which constitutes the thing, the historical matter, rather than the matter which constitutes and imposes the ordeal.’<sup>17</sup>

At this point it is necessary to mention two other agendas that are at play in Péguy’s theory of events and reflections on the past, one religious and the other intellectual. The term *mystique*, it will have been noted, has overtly religious connotations. This is no accident. Péguy was an industrious writer, however at the end of 1907 his pen came to rest and he produced almost nothing for two years. During this hiatus Péguy revealed to a friend that he had recovered his faith,<sup>18</sup> and in 1910 Péguy re-launched himself as a Catholic poet – the persona by which he is more widely known today. This makeover was of moderate success. Although he quickly gained a new readership and came to entertain aspirations of winning the prestigious Grand Prix Littéraire of the *Académie Française*,<sup>19</sup> Péguy quickly alienated his new Catholic friends since he was unwilling to apologise for his Dreyfusard and socialist past. In fact, a good deal of his essay ‘Memories of Youth’, published shortly after his first major piece of Christian poetry, attempts to reconcile the *mystique* of Dreyfusism with the *mystique* of Christianity. The details of this union are not of great importance here, but it is useful to bear in mind that Péguy’s attitude towards Christianity and the Church is coordinate with his appraisal of Dreyfusism and the ‘party of Dreyfus’: if the Christian faith ‘appears’ to be antithetical to Dreyfusism and the Republican *mystique*, this is because it has been converted into a *politique* by the clergy. What is required is thus a rejection of Church dogma and a renewal of the Christian *mystique* – the intended purpose of his poetry.<sup>20</sup>

In this task of spiritual renewal Péguy saw himself as following the lead of Henri Bergson. As Péguy succinctly puts it in a letter to Bergson: ‘You are the one who has reopened the source of spiritual life in this country.’<sup>21</sup> Péguy first encountered Bergson in 1898 at the ENS, where Bergson briefly worked before his appointment in 1900 to the Chair of Greek and Latin Philosophy at the Collège de France. Péguy was a regular attendee of Bergson’s lectures, often in the company of Georges Sorel,<sup>22</sup> and he considered himself to be Bergsonian to the core, going so far as to suggest that he was, ‘after Bergson himself, and I would dare say almost with Bergson himself, the only Bergsonian who also knows what he’s talking about.’<sup>23</sup> The insights appropriated by Péguy from Bergson are many, but chief **[end of p. 126]** among them is the ambition of Bergsonian philosophy to confront reality directly, free of the ‘ready-made’ and inherited constructions that obscure and confine reality. Taking this lesson to heart, Péguy declares war on all those intermediary parties that inhibit such direct confrontations with reality, which is to say reality in its duration, as *mystique* and movement. From this we can start to see why Péguy’s Bergsonism is compatible with his Dreyfusism and Christian faith: it is by following Bergson and his method of intuition that Péguy seeks to elaborate a Dreyfusism and Catholicism free of the institutional powers that dictate dogma and prevent a direct communion with *mystique*.

Despite Péguy’s aspirations to become a recognised and successful Catholic poet, the placement of Bergson’s work on the Catholic Index in 1914 provoked Péguy to mount a defence of his mentor. Although Péguy was not a great admirer of Bergson’s *Creative Evolution* (1907) and had become close

friends with the self-proclaimed anti-Bergson Julien Benda, he could not stand for the ingratitude shown to Bergson by his detractors and thus set out to show them just how large their debt was. In the last six months of his life Péguy wrote two 'Notes' on Bergson, the first directed at his intellectual critics (principally Benda) and a second targeting his attackers from the Church. The second Note would go unfinished, stopped mid-sentence on account of Péguy receiving his mobilization order for the war. In considering these two essays and Péguy's other various engagements with Bergson's philosophy, it cannot be said that Péguy was the most accurate reciter of Bergson. Péguy also had a tendency to extend Bergson's ideas beyond their initial parameters, most notably applying Bergsonian notions to the level of socio-political and cultural collectives. Nonetheless, Péguy's faithfulness to the spirit (if not letter) of Bergsonism cannot be questioned – a 'filial fidelity' that Bergson himself was willing to acknowledge: "[Péguy] knew my most secret thought, such as I had never expressed it."<sup>24</sup> This Bergsonism would also play a key role in Péguy's other major and longstanding intellectual agenda – his critique of modernity and the 'modern' Republic.

Following her defeat in the War of 1870-1, France understandably engaged in some soul-searching to ascertain what caused the disaster. Amongst the reasons proffered, it was agreed by members of the young Third Republic that Germany's intellectual superiority could not be ignored as a factor.<sup>25</sup> High on the republican agenda was thus the renovation of France's educational system – a process that had been under way before the war, but was sharply accelerated by its [end of p. 127] outcome. In the early decades of the Third Republic the Napoleonic *Université* was dismantled and replaced with a new academic regime that favoured positivism, scientism and historicism in the humanities.<sup>26</sup> These transitions, which closely echoed the overhaul of the Prussian educational system following France's victory at Jena in 1806, were not easily achieved and had no shortage of opponents, none more vigorous than Péguy. Péguy was by no means opposed to the widening of educational access – he himself came from a poor family that relied upon external financial support for his education. But what Péguy objected to were the 'modern' values upon which the new system was based and the manner in which they were forcefully and dogmatically implemented by the Republic.

Between 1904 and 1907 Péguy wrote a series of essays that attacked the new 'modern' regime in French academia and politics.<sup>27</sup> Central to these essays is Péguy's critique of the twin ideals of 'progress' and 'science' – or to be more specific, the belief that modern scientific methods both vindicate and assure the inevitability of human progress. In language strikingly reminiscent of Nietzsche (though curiously unacknowledged by the author), Péguy argues in these essays that the 'modern world', far from delivering 'progress', leads to degradation and ultimately a belief in nothing.<sup>28</sup> But aside from his dim view of modernity, what further disturbed Péguy was the cosy connection that existed between Republican politicians and the new intellectual vanguard – the secular priests of the Sorbonne, as Péguy called them, which included the likes of Durkheim, Lanson, Lavis, Langlois and Seignobos. Given the frequency of regime change in France since the Revolution, the young Third Republic was naturally eager to effectuate an irreversible break with 'Old France' and ensure its long-term survival. To this end, the scientific and progressive mantra of 'modern' academia was a natural fit for the Republic and could easily be put to political use. As a result, several of the leading 'modern' academics played an active role in formulating government policies that culminated in the sharp separation of Church and State.<sup>29</sup> Surveying this process, Péguy concluded that Republicanism, in its desire to be the midwife of the 'modern world', had become a victim to its *politique* – an outcome proven by its virulent repression of Christianity and insistence upon a new scientific image of truth. Péguy's response was typical of the man: 'WE REFUSE TO ACCEPT DOGMAS FORMULATED BY THE TEACHING STATE QUITE AS MUCH AS THE DOGMAS FORMULATED BY THE CHURCH.'<sup>30</sup> Thus, as before, we can see [end of p. 128] that for Péguy the problem was located not at the level of *mystique* – of republicanism, for instance, as a creative force – but rather in the cynical appropriation of such durational movement and its replacement with a *politique* that was more than willing to use the new version of 'truth' to its advantage: 'One may never know what acts of cowardice have been motivated by the fear of not appearing sufficiently progressive.'<sup>31</sup>

## II.

Péguy appears regularly in Deleuze's œuvre. Aside from important appearances in *Difference and Repetition*, *The Logic of Sense* and *What Is Philosophy?*, Péguy is also referred to by Deleuze in his books on Francis Bacon and Foucault, the two cinema books, the essay "He Stuttered" (see *Essays Critical and Clinical*), and in two interviews: "Control and Becoming" (see *Negotiations*), and "Foucault and Prisons" (see *Two Regimes of Madness*). In all but a few minor instances, Deleuze appeals to Péguy within a discussion of either the nature of 'repetition' or the nature of 'events'. Nearly all of these references, furthermore, pertain to Péguy's essay *Clio* – a piece, published posthumously, that encapsulates the various themes discussed above. For the remainder of this chapter I will therefore give a brief introduction to Péguy's *Clio*, after which I will examine the two major uses that Deleuze makes of Péguy.

Péguy wrote two versions of *Clio* between 1909-12. The first version initially appeared under the title *Véronique: Dialogue de l'histoire et de l'âme charnelle*, while the full title of the second version (which is the only one Deleuze draws from) is *Clio: Dialogue de l'histoire et de l'âme païenne*. As these titles spell out, the essay is a dialogue between Clio, who in Greek mythology is the personification of History as a muse, and a 'carnal/pagan soul' – Péguy himself. Although the dialogues ambulate across a number of themes, the critique of modern historiography is a driving concern. As Clio laments in the opening of the first version: 'How times have changed! What has become of me? I no longer recognize myself....'<sup>32</sup> French academia, as I noted above, experienced a significant phase of transformation in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century. This was especially true of History, which underwent a process of reinvention whereby its trappings as a literary enterprise were discarded in favour of the 'scientific method'. Such a transition was hardly unprecedented – academic History in Germany, to give the most **[end of p. 129]** relevant example, had recently completed their own conversion, and the French hoped to replicate their success.<sup>33</sup> The 'modern' approach to History aimed to minimise the historian's subjective influence in deference to the objective facts. Accordingly, History was conceived as an encyclopedic endeavour in which knowledge of the past is incrementally obtained through the collective effort of impartial specialists that rigorously apply the scientific method to studies of the past, culminating in a unified depository of historical facts – the Book of History, one might call it. My description here is no doubt overly simplistic, but so too was that of many leading proponents of modern historiography. The influential Ernest Renan, for instance, had the confidence to predict in 1890 that 'In another century mankind will pretty well know everything that can be known about its past'.<sup>34</sup> The end of History to such modern enthusiasts thus appeared nigh (roughly coinciding, oddly enough, with the date later suggested by Fukuyama), and this was made possible by, on the one hand, a conceptualisation of the past as ontologically static, and on the other hand, an elevation of the historians' capabilities via a scientific methodology that afforded access to the static past.

Péguy's retort to the new regime of History in France focuses on these two aspects – the ontology of history and the method for engaging with it.<sup>35</sup> Following Bergson, Péguy argues that the past is never fully done with, but rather forms a durational continuity with the present that unfolds into the future. The image of the past as composed of static and discrete facts is thus a misleading fiction, for it fragments reality into separate pieces that do not correspond with the true nature of reality-in-duration. While 'modern' historians are busy compiling their encyclopedia, the past as a part of synthetic duration continues to move on without them:

The event follows its course. The event runs like a river, if it is still possible to use this expression, and I [the 'modern' historian] am line fishing. Whatever happens continues to happen. And I continue to be on the wrong page [...]. Thus am I, with my index cards, one who runs on foot after an automobile.<sup>36</sup>

Péguy's critique of modern historiography extends to the valorisation of 'manuscripts' and so-called 'primary sources'. Again, the problem pinpointed here by Péguy is the replacement of durational reality with a fixed artifact. When 'modern' historians engage with such manuscripts they commonly consider themselves to be engaging with history itself, but as Péguy notes, such manuscripts are more **[end of p.**

130] exactly, and nothing more than, ‘the first copy of the first edition for the recording of history’.<sup>37</sup> As Péguy goes on to say:

Will we ever know how many times and in how many languages and under how many forms the work was played before falling onto the paper, at this time, under this form, in this medium of paper? This time, that you call the first, enters into a series of countless times. It is in no way an origin, it is not a source point, it is not a creation from nothing.<sup>38</sup>

So for Péguy, as we can see, it must be remembered that the coveted manuscripts of modern historiography are not originary; rather, they are the byproduct of a creative process. They may be able to give us a snapshot of a historical event, but for this very reason they are poorly placed to convey the durational life, the *mystique*, of that event. Modern historiography, in its extreme form, is also based on an impossible dream, for it is simply not feasible to provide an exhaustive account of a historical event. If one wishes to say anything about the past, then decisions will need to be made, and they will be made based on incomplete information. The historians’ craft, therefore, is one of selection, narrativisation and distilling the whole from a part; from amongst the brute facts, a story must be woven together that is faithful to the *mystique* of the event. And when these selections and distillations are made, according to Péguy, the historian reveals herself to be an artist. If the historian was merely a transmitter of bald facts about the past, then it would be literally impossible to write a history book, since one would need a day to write the history of a second, a year to write the history of a minute, and so on.<sup>39</sup> But thankfully, so Péguy thinks, proper historians of the grand style, such as Jules Michelet for example, show us another way; they show us an *art form* of listening to the musings of Clio, so as to connect with the vitality of a historical event.

To give us a better idea of what he has in mind, Péguy unsurprisingly offers a literary example: reading. What is it that makes someone a good reader of a literary classic? Take Hugo’s *Les Châtiments*. The historicist would have us believe that in order to understand this text one must gain a detailed knowledge of French history since the Revolution, as well as before that, and Roman history while you’re at it. A familiarity with Hugo’s life and those connected to him would also be required, including what they all ate for breakfast, if that information is available, etc. And once this detail is adequately digested, then one may read *Les Châtiments* with confidence [end of p. 131] (if one is so bold). For Péguy, on the other hand, the good reader of *Les Châtiments* begins by reading *Les Châtiments*, preferably a version with no preface or editorial commentary attached, and aims to stay as close to the text as possible at all times. The good reader allows the text to breathe, to escape the suffocation of history. When this happens, the reader communes with the text, ‘enters into it’.<sup>40</sup> Engagements with the past, so the analogy goes, should occur the same way – one should commune with history and incarnate the past in the same way that a good reader collaborates with the author of a masterwork.

What a marvelous fate, and almost frightening, that so many great works, so many works of great men and of very great men, find their fulfillment, their completion, their culmination, in us, my poor friend, and our way of reading. What a frightening responsibility lies upon us.<sup>41</sup>

Such subjective tampering by the present would be anathema to the resolute historicist of the modern vintage, but without this communion, Péguy argues, historical events (as well as works of art like *Les Châtiments*) are destined to die. For as Péguy surmises from Bergson, the passing of time – or aging [*viellissement*], as Péguy terms it – is unceasing and inescapable. A best-case scenario is therefore that a past event (or artwork) is *revived* by the present: the good reader/historian reanimates the past event/work by breathing their own life into it, so as to hear it sing again in new surrounds. And when this happens, it is as if ‘Homer is new this morning, and there is nothing perhaps so old as today’s newspaper.’<sup>42</sup> The philosophy of history and reading that *Clio* offers is thus not one of revolution or reform, but resurrection; it is a theory of aging and renewal. This does not mean, it must be noted, that Péguy proposes a cyclical theory of history, and nor does he suffer from the ‘historical optical illusion’ (of transferring the present into the past). Instead, he gives us a theory that venerates creativity, and more

exactly *continual* creativity, since the inescapable fact of aging demands that yet another effort be made, and then another.

It is this attunement to creativity that attracts the interest of Deleuze. The first and most frequent context in which Deleuze refers to *Clio* concerns repetition, and in two respects: one pertaining to style and the other to ontology. Although he is not widely known today, Péguy's quality as a writer has been celebrated by many esteemed individuals over the years, including André Gide,<sup>43</sup> T. S. [end of p. 132] Eliot,<sup>44</sup> Walter Benjamin,<sup>45</sup> Michel Foucault<sup>46</sup> and Bruno Latour, who went so far as to describe Péguy as 'the greatest French prose writer and no doubt the deepest philosopher of time.'<sup>47</sup> Two features of Péguy's writing style bear mentioning for our purposes: duration and repetition. To begin with, Péguy's writing exemplifies the unraveling divergences of a Bergsonian duration. Those familiar with Péguy's œuvre will concur that his essays have a tendency to veer off course, sometimes abandoning the topic announced in the title to pursue some other interest that has organically emerged. Péguy is also willing to dispense with the conventional form of chronological narration – most notably in *Notre Patrie* (1905), where he recounts the events of a few days in the order that the various thoughts cross his mind (rather than the chronological order in which they 'actually' occurred). The aim of Péguy's writing style is thus to install us within a vital flow, a moving train of thought. He does not present the reader with perfectly formed and polished diamonds – the 'ready-made'. Rather, Péguy pulls the reader down into the depths of his thinking, where it is working, so that the reader can experience first-hand its struggle towards the surface.

The predominant linguistic mechanism that Péguy employs to enable this direct confrontation with reality in its duration is repetition. As may have been intimated from the block quotes above, Péguy writes in long sentences that proceed through the repetition and slight variation of a word or phrase. He also frequently interrupts himself mid-sentence and then recommences by repeating what he said before the interruption. As a result, the reader is forced into a position of suspense – of suspending final judgment and holding on to a provisional motif as it is expanded. Furthermore, the repeated words, being privy to the previous iterations as well as the insights of the interruption, find themselves in an increasingly enriched environment that in turn opens up new avenues for exploration and association. This technique could be well described by the terms intensification and complexification, but even better would be the term condensation, drawing from the Bergsonian example of a condensing cloud,<sup>48</sup> for this notion has the advantage of also conveying the gradual creation of a new form.

And therein lies the significance of Péguy's writing style for Deleuze's thoughts on repetition: it is through the repetition of words and phrases that Péguy opens up a space for experimentation leading to the new. Because Péguy's repetitions operate in duration, in a serial form, they highlight the differences between each iteration within the [end of p. 133] sequence, as well as what has occurred in the meantime. They also draw attention to the different milieus in which they occur and mark the transition points from one series to the next. Repetition, as such, is used as a means for engendering difference and transformation, or as Maurice Blanchot puts it, *growth through insistence*.<sup>49</sup> Deleuze makes much the same point but using different terminology. In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze describes Péguy's repetitive style as one of 'contiguity', 'in which the step-by-step creation of an internal space within words proceeds by tiny differences' (DR 22), while in his essay "He Stuttered" Deleuze nominates Péguy's writing style as an example of how to 'grow from the middle' – specifically, through the use of substantives, 'each of which defines a zone of variation until it reaches the neighborhood of another substantive, which determines another zone' (ECC 111).<sup>50</sup> And when raised within the context of *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze says of Péguy that he was able 'to invent an entire language, among the most pathological and aesthetic that one might dream of, in order to explain how a singularity is prolonged in a line of ordinary points, but also how it begins again in another singularity, how it redistributes itself in another set' (LS 53).

But Deleuze's debt to Péguy on the nature of repetition goes far beyond his writing style. As he remarks in the introduction of *Difference and Repetition*, Péguy 'makes repetition not only a power peculiar to language and thought, a superior pathos and pathology, but also the fundamental category of a philosophy of the future' (DR 5). What does Deleuze mean here by this connection of repetition and the



future? In order to show how a philosophy of repetition is at one and the same time a philosophy of the future, of engendering the future, Deleuze's opens *Difference and Repetition* by explaining how repetition, if anything, is not generality. Generality, according to Deleuze, concerns 'the qualitative order of resemblances and the quantitative order of equivalences' (DR 1). In the realm of generality, particular instantiations of a general idea can be exchanged or substituted provided that they satisfy the criteria of resemblance; the particulars resemble one another, or can be said to be equivalent, with respect to the generality that they are particularities of. A repetition, on the other hand, does not merely 'resemble' or 'equal' an original occurrence – it *repeats* it. We might be tempted to say that a repetition is the 'same' as that which it repeats, but there is one crucial difference between the two: only one is a repetition; one is 'older' than the other. For this reason, they each have a singularity that is non-exchangeable and non-substitutable. In Deleuze's words: **[end of p. 134]** 'To repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular which has no equal or equivalent' (DR 1). At this point of his explanation Deleuze makes a crucial shift: thus far repetition has been conceived of and discussed at the level of externalities, but what if such manifest repetition was animated by 'a more profound, internal repetition within the singular' (DR 1)? It is here that Deleuze calls on Péguy, citing two examples from *Clio* of this internal repetition: Federation Day in France (Bastille Day), which commemorates the storming of the Bastille in 1789, and Claude Monet's *Nymphéas*, a series of approximately 250 paintings of water lilies.

The significance of these two examples is found in their ability to illustrate a repetition of the 'unrepeatable'. Each time the French commemorate the falling of the Bastille, it is not as if the Bastille falls all over again, just like the first time. On the contrary, if the fall of the Bastille is celebrated, it is because of the *uniqueness* of this historical event. Similarly, Monet's *Nymphéas* are not simply reproductions of the first painting in the series. Rather, they are repetitions of a singularity, each of which differ in their repetition and in so doing contribute to a 'growth through insistence' and 'creation of an internal space'. This leads Deleuze to say that 'repetition interiorizes and thereby reverses itself', so that it is 'the fall of the Bastille which celebrates and repeats in advance all the Federation Days [and] Monet's first water lily which repeats all the others' (DR 1). But we must be very careful with this statement: the theory being put forward here is not one of reverse causality or retrospective realignment; it is not that the falling of the Bastille has been refashioned by the present to be a repetition in advance of Federation Day. Such an interpretation, as we know, would fall foul of the 'historical optical illusion'. Péguy's point is instead that the falling of the Bastille is an event of such significance that it demands in advance that it be commemorated in the future.<sup>51</sup> Or when Monet creates his first painting of water lilies, there is something about it that calls for further iterations, that calls forth its repetitions in advance – repetitions that do not aim to resemble, equate or clone the initial creation, but pay homage to and revitalise its legacy, like the best contemporary renditions of a jazz standard.<sup>52</sup> In short, there is a power (*puissance*) or *mystique*, internal to the initial event, that produces in advance its repetitions – a repetition raised 'to the "nth" power', or 'repetition as universality of the singular' (DR 1).

A few pages later Deleuze extends his analysis of repetition contra **[end of p. 135]** generality by setting out four 'principal propositions'. Péguy is invoked in this passage, but always in parentheses and only where a similarity can be drawn with Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, who are the guiding figures for the propositions. His influence here is thus minimal and ancillary.<sup>53</sup> Deleuze's praise of Péguy is then repeated in Chapter 2 ("Repetition for Itself"), again alongside Kierkegaard, the two of which are referred to as 'the great repeaters' (DR 95). But it is also on this occasion (and only this occasion) that Deleuze finds cause to admonish Péguy. By this stage of Chapter 2, Deleuze has just finished setting out his three syntheses of time (present, past and future). Elaborating this theory is beyond the scope of our current investigation, however by way of summation Deleuze states that 'in this final synthesis of time, the present and [past] are in turn no more than dimensions of the future: the past as condition, the present as agent' (DR 93).<sup>54</sup> Or put differently, 'The present is the repeater, the past is repetition itself, but the future is that which is repeated' (DR 94). Péguy fits this picture quite nicely due to his strong link between repetition and the future – his 'reversal' of repetition, in which repetitions call forth and are in aid of an emerging future. The past is a condition for this process and the present is the agent who repeats, who

commemorates Bastille Day as it were, but *what* is repeated is the future, insofar as it is the future repetitions of an event that are engendered in advance. Despite this favourable appraisal, however, Deleuze goes on to say that Péguy was ultimately ‘not ready to pay the necessary price’ (DR 95), and this is because when faced with a pure and passive form of time, Péguy turns away and fills this empty form with his Christian faith. As such, Péguy successfully evades the grounding of time in the repetitions of habit and/or memory, but he subsequently replaces them with a supreme foundation: God, which in turn grounds the self.

Undoubtedly, faith possesses sufficient force to undo habit and reminiscence, and with them the habitual self and the god of reminiscences, as well as the foundation and the ground of time. However, faith invites us to rediscover *once and for all* God and the self in a common resurrection. (DR 95)

Péguy may mirror Nietzsche in many ways, but he is definitely no anti-Christ.<sup>55</sup> Indeed, a central theme for Péguy’s Catholic poetry is the status and meaning of God’s incarnation as Christ. As for the inspirational hero of Péguy’s dramatic and poetic works, Joan of Arc, her importance derives from the manner in which she communes directly with God, confronts the Church and renews Christian faith. **[end of p. 136]** This tale of spiritual salvation is thus entirely contrary to Nietzsche’s conclusive finding: the eternal return, which ‘is not a faith, but the truth of faith’ (DR 95), and hence a level of repetition far surpassing Péguy’s, which eventually rediscovers the self and God (as Péguy did during his 1908-10 hiatus).

This criticism indicates the extent to which Deleuze is willing to follow Péguy’s thoughts on repetition. From this point forward, the primary purpose of Péguy for Deleuze will concern the nature of events. Deleuze, to be precise, quotes the same passage from *Clio* on six separate occasions. The first three of these (DR 189, LS 53 and 340) occur within extrapolations of the *problematic* nature of events. The passage reads as follows:

Suddenly, we felt that we were no longer the same convicts. Nothing had happened. Yet a problem in which a whole world collided, a problem without issue, in which no end could be seen, suddenly ceased to exist and we asked ourselves what we had been talking about. Instead of an ordinary solution, a found solution, this problem, this difficulty, this impossibility had just passed what seemed like a physical point of resolution. A crisis point. At the same time, the whole world had passed what seemed like a physical crisis point. There are critical points of the event just as there are critical points of temperature: points of fusion, freezing and boiling points; points of coagulation and crystallization. There are even in the case of events states of superfusion which are precipitated, crystallized or determined only by the introduction of a fragment of some future event.<sup>56</sup>

Péguy is but one of several important sources for Deleuze’s ‘problematic’ philosophy. The primary progenitor for both Péguy and Deleuze, however, is Bergson.<sup>57</sup> According to Bergson, problems do not preexist their solutions; rather, the two are co-emergent. This means that the articulation of a solution goes hand-in-hand with the articulation of the problem. So contrary to the convention of ‘finding’ solutions to ‘ready-made’ and inherited problems, Bergson contends that the task of philosophy is to find problems, not solutions, and learn how to *state* them properly, to *invent* them:

But the truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of *finding* the problem and consequently of *positing* it, even more than of solving it. For a speculative problem is solved as soon as it is properly stated. By that I mean that its solution exists then, although it may remain hidden and, so to speak, covered up: the only thing left to do is *uncover* it. But stating the problem is not simply uncovering, it is inventing. Discovery, or uncovering, has to do with what already **[end of p. 137]** exists actually or virtually; it was therefore certain to happen sooner or later. Invention gives being to what did not exist; it might never have happened. Already in mathematics and still more in metaphysics, the effort of invention consists most often in raising the problem, in creating the terms in which it will be stated.<sup>58</sup>

To pose a problem properly is thus to solve it, or more accurately *dissolve* it, and this activity is synonymous with the distillation of a problem's distinctive features – the critical and/or remarkable points that comprise a problematic constellation.

Given that Bergson is the explicit source for Péguy's problematic philosophy, it might seem slightly strange that Deleuze prefers to cite Péguy rather than Bergson himself, but the reason for this is that the above passage from *Clio* effectuates a seamless transition from 'the problem' to 'the event'. While the first half of the quote describes the dissolution of a problem and the passing of a crisis point, the second half extends this description to events – like problems, events are composed of distinctive points, or 'singularities'. Péguy's discussion of events in *Clio* also has the added advantage of positing a dualistic ontology of the event. As we've established, a major objective of Péguy's *Clio* is to elaborate a Bergsonian notion of historical duration in contrast to the dominant model of modern historiography. Péguy thus distinguishes two kinds of time, or approaches to time: one of duration, which is rich and has depth, and the flat spatialisation of time that isolates and objectifies discrete elements. When transferred to the realm of history, this dichotomy becomes, on the one hand, the durational movements and generative forces of history (*mystique*), and on the other hand that which 'appears' in history (*politique*). And in Deleuze's terminology, this distinction in turn becomes 'ideal events' or simply 'the Event', and 'real events' or 'states of affairs'. We can then say that solutions are to problems as 'real events' or 'states of affairs' are to 'ideal events' or 'the Event'. Now, there are clearly differences between these various dichotomies, and not insignificant ones. But at minimum we can agree that Péguy gives voice in *Clio* to features of the (ideal) event that will be absolutely crucial for Deleuze, including its 'problematic' nature, its distinction from and relation to states of affairs, and the manner in which transitions occur via 'critical points' from one series or set of singularities to another.

Several of these features will be at play when Deleuze returns to *Clio* at the end of his career (WP 111-13, 156-7 and N 170-1). These later usages, however, also reveal a shift in emphasis and framing. In a 1990 interview with Antonio Negri, Deleuze remarks that he [end of p. 138] 'became more and more aware of the possibility of distinguishing between becoming and history' (N 170). Other interviews from this period testify to Deleuze's growing interest in the distinction,<sup>59</sup> and it will also feature in his final book with Guattari *What is Philosophy?*. When Deleuze returns to Péguy's *Clio* in that book, it will be in aid of explaining this important dualism. Deleuze previews in his discussion with Negri how he will use Péguy in *What is Philosophy?*. In response to a question about Nietzsche's notion of the Untimely, Deleuze invokes the dualism of history and becoming, after which he says: 'History isn't experimental, it's just the set of more or less negative preconditions that make it possible to experiment with something beyond history' (N 170).<sup>60</sup> It is this remark that precipitates the entrance of Péguy's *Clio* to the conversation. We are now told that according to Péguy's *Clio*,

'there are two ways of considering events, one being to follow the course of the event, gathering how it comes about historically, how it's prepared and then decomposes in history, while the other way is to go back into the event, to take one's place in it as in a becoming, to grow both young and old in it at once, going through all its components or singularities' (N 170-1).

As with the corresponding section of *What is Philosophy?*, the guiding framework here is *experimentation*. At this stage of *What is Philosophy?* (the conclusion to Part One) Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with reinforcing their views on the experimental nature of Philosophy as a practice: 'To think is to experiment, but experimentation is always that which is in the process of coming about – the new, remarkable, and interesting that replace the appearances of truth and are more demanding than it is' (WP 111). Péguy's thoughts on the nature of events have thus been pressed into the service of describing philosophical experimentation as a process, using the dualistic terminology of history and becoming. An inspection of the relevant quotations attests to this altered emphasis. Until this point Deleuze had only ever cited the one page from *Clio*, but he now references with Guattari a five-page section. Added stress is also placed on a line from further down Deleuze's favoured page, which reads: 'nothing happened, and we are in a new people, in a new world, in a new humanity' (WP 111).<sup>61</sup> The focus here, as such, is not so much on the passing or dissolution of a problem, but rather on the facilitation and emergence of new ones – on

the ‘slight displacements [...] which entail, as Péguy says, the modification of a problem’ (WP 113). **[end of p. 139]**

Deleuze will refer to Péguy one final time in *What is Philosophy?*. This reference will reprise earlier engagements and solidify Péguy’s place in Deleuze’s philosophy as one of the two thinkers, along with Blanchot, ‘to have gone the farthest into the event’ (WP 156). The surrounding context and usage of Péguy, however, will have slightly changed once again. Unlike Deleuze’s previous quotations of *Clio*, on this occasion there is no mention of ‘problems’, whether it be the problematic nature of events or the processes of transition from one problem to another. Experimentation within the framework of becoming and history is also not explicitly mentioned. Instead, focus is placed on the nature of movements between ‘the Event’ and ‘states of affairs’. As before, the citation of different pages from *Clio* alerts us to this adjustment. Deleuze and Guattari also only paraphrase rather than quote Péguy, effectively translating *Clio* into their own conceptual terminology. Péguy’s thoughts on the nature of events are now presented as supporting Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction ‘between, on the one hand, the state of affairs through which we, ourselves, and our bodies, pass and, on the other hand, the event into which we plunge or return, that which starts again without ever having begun or ended – the immanent aternal [*l’interne!*]’ (WP 157).

Regrettably, Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion in *What is Philosophy?* of Péguy’s *interne!* is all too brief. The same can be said for its initial treatment in Deleuze’s two books on the cinema. On no less than five separate occasions across these two books Deleuze appeals to Péguy, connecting his notion of the *interne!* with the films of Dreyer, Fellini and Bresson. As with the use of Péguy in *What is Philosophy?*, Deleuze’s aim in these instances is to flesh out a dual philosophy of time and the event, whereby a distinction is drawn between the ‘historical state of things’ on the one hand, or in other words ‘the horizontal succession of presents’, and on the other hand the ‘vertical line’ that unites each of those presents with the past in its entirety – the ‘internal’ and ‘ateral’ dimension of an event, with all of its coexisting levels of depth, from within which ‘one ascends’ to the states of affairs found on the surface (MI 106 and TI 91, 243, 297). Although this gives us some sense of Deleuze’s broad objective when deploying Péguy’s *interne!*, it must be nevertheless admitted that it is not exactly clear to what Deleuze is actually referring, as the term does not appear in the passage of *Clio* that he cites (p. 230), nor in any other passage of Péguy referenced by Deleuze.

It is perhaps revealing that Deleuze’s use of Péguy in *What is Philosophy?* largely proceeds by paraphrasing and selective quo- **[end of p. 140]** tation. Péguy, for instance, did not himself advance the dualism of history and becoming in those terms. Moreover, Deleuze disregards Péguy’s obsession with ‘aging’ and the inherent Bergsonianism of *Clio* – indeed, in the two paragraphs following their final reference to Péguy, Deleuze and Guattari describe the event as a ‘dead time’ in contrast to the vitality of Bergsonian duration (WP 157-9).<sup>62</sup> And as one final example of the widening discrepancy, *Clio* may be aghast by what she has become in the ‘modern world’, but this does not mean, as Deleuze implies on several occasions, that she sees history as necessarily opposed to experimentation and becoming, or even distinct from it – after all, she *is* history, and a Bergsonian to boot. Rather, *Clio* is merely against a particular kind of history and in favour of another. This might be a minor distinction from Deleuze’s depiction, but it is nevertheless an important one, especially as far as Péguy is concerned, given his desire to rescue history from the clutches of modern historiography.<sup>63</sup> Thus while there are kernels of truth to Deleuze’s late implementations of *Clio*, such as the articulation of two forms of and engagements with time and the event, it would be equally accurate to label these uses as experimental and productive misuses of Péguy.

## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> See A. E. Pilkington, *Bergson and His Influence: A Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976), p. 30.

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<sup>2</sup> Péguy once remarked that ‘a review only continues to have life if each issue annoys at least one-fifth of its readers. Justice lies in seeing that it is not always the same fifth.’ Quoted in Roger Kimball, “Charles Péguy”, in *The New Criterion*, Nov 2001, p. 19.

<sup>3</sup> Hans A. Schmitt, *Charles Péguy: The Decline of an Idealist* (Louisiana State University Press, 1967), p. 69.

<sup>4</sup> In time Péguy’s admiration for Jaurès would undergo a spectacular reversal, culminating in a thinly veiled incitement for his assassination (an act that was indeed carried out on the eve of World War I).

<sup>5</sup> Charles Péguy, “Un économiste socialiste, M. Léon Walras”, *Revue Socialiste* XXV, 1897, pp. 174-86.

<sup>6</sup> Charles Péguy, “Memories of Youth [Notre Jeunesse]”, in Charles Péguy, *Temporal and Eternal*, trans. Alexandre Dru (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), p. 42.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 75-6.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 76-7.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 36-7. **[end of p. 141]**

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 70-1.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 69.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 69-70. Péguy’s thoughts here are clearly inspired by his reading of Bergson, and his choice of language is extremely similar to Bergson’s essay “The Possible and the Real”, which infamously elaborates Bergson’s theory of retrospective transference from the present to the past as an intellectual illusion that misrepresents the process of creation. Most interestingly, however, Péguy wrote “Memories of Youth” 10 years prior to Bergson’s “The Possible and the Real” (which was first delivered at Oxford in 1920).

<sup>14</sup> Péguy, “Memories of Youth”, p. 33.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 80.

<sup>16</sup> Jaurès only became a Dreyfusard in 1898, influenced in part by Péguy, and at the 1899 General Congress of French Socialist Organisations it was agreed to remain neutral on the issue. See Schmitt, *Charles Péguy*, p. 14.

<sup>17</sup> Péguy, “Memories of Youth”, p. 72.

<sup>18</sup> M. Adereth, *Commitment in Modern French Literature: A Brief Study of ‘Littérature Engagée’ in the works of Péguy, Aragon, and Sartre* (London: Victor Gollancz Limited, 1967), p. 68.

<sup>19</sup> The jury could not choose between Péguy and Romain Rolland, so no award was given. See Schmitt, *Charles Péguy*, p. 29.

<sup>20</sup> See Péguy, “Memories of Youth”, p. 39.

<sup>21</sup> Letter from Péguy to Bergson, March 1914, quoted in Sylvie Manuel-Barnay, “Charles Péguy and Prophecy”, in *History of European Ideas*, 40:6, p. 780.

<sup>22</sup> Schmitt, *Charles Péguy*, p. 28.

<sup>23</sup> Charles Péguy, “Note conjointe sur M. Descartes et la philosophie cartésienne”, in Charles Péguy, *Œuvres en prose complètes*, vol. 3, ed. Robert Burac (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), pp. 1282-3.

<sup>24</sup> Cited in Yvonne Servais, *Charles Péguy: The Pursuit of Salvation* (Newman Press, 1953), p. 294.

<sup>25</sup> William R Keylor, *Academy and Community: The Foundation of the French Historical Profession* (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 42-3.

<sup>26</sup> For more detail on this immensely important process, see Keylor, *Academy and Community*, pp. 17-108; see also Pim Den Boer, *History as a Profession: The Study of History in France, 1818-1914* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 175-308.

<sup>27</sup> The essays to which I am referring are “Zangwill” (1904), “Notre Patrie” (1905) and the four “Situation” essays (1906-7).

<sup>28</sup> See in particular the fourth ‘Situation’ essay, “De la situation faite au parti intellectuel dans le monde modern devant les accidents de **[end of p. 142]** la gloire temporelle”, in Charles Péguy, *Œuvres en prose complètes*, vol. 2, ed. Robert Burac (Paris: Gallimard, 1988). See also “Memories of Youth”, where Péguy describes the newly arrived

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modern world as ‘the world of those who believe in nothing, not even in atheism, who devote themselves, who sacrifice themselves to nothing. *More precisely*: the world of those without a *mystique*. And who boast of it’ (p. 7).

<sup>29</sup> See Keylor, *Academy and Community*, pp. 36-54.

<sup>30</sup> Péguy, “Memories of Youth”, p. 50, capitalisation in the original.

<sup>31</sup> Charles Péguy, “Notre Patrie”, in Péguy, *Œuvres en prose complètes*, vol. 2, p. 42.

<sup>32</sup> Charles Péguy, “Clio I”, in Péguy, *Temporal and Eternal*, p. 85. The figure of Clio first appears in Péguy’s essay “A nos amis, à nos abonnés” (1909). Other essays in which Péguy develops his critique of modern historiography include “Compte rendu de congrès” (1901), “Zangwill” (1904) and the “Situation” series (1906-7).

<sup>33</sup> See Keylor, *Academy and Community*, pp. 75-89; see also Den Boer, *History as a Profession*, pp. 175-308.

<sup>34</sup> Ernest Renan, *The Future of Science: Ideas of 1848*, trans. Albert D. Vandam (London: Chapman and Hall Limited, 1891 (1890)), p. xv.

<sup>35</sup> In the first version of the dialogue Clio is criticised by Péguy for what she has become in the ‘modern world’, however in the second version Clio has become a Bergsonian and joins with Péguy in criticising those who view her in a ‘modern’ light.

<sup>36</sup> Charles Péguy, *Clio* (Paris: Gallimard, 1932), p. 190. Translation taken from Glenn H. Roe, *The Passion of Charles Péguy: Literature, Modernity, and the Crisis of Historicism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 112.

<sup>37</sup> Péguy, *Clio*, p. 135. Translation taken from Roe, *The Passion of Charles Péguy*, p. 107.

<sup>38</sup> Péguy, *Clio*, p. 135. Translation taken from Roe, *The Passion of Charles Péguy*, p. 108.

<sup>39</sup> Péguy, *Clio*, p. 193.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 19.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 21, translation mine.

<sup>42</sup> Charles Péguy, “Note sur M. Bergson”, in Péguy, *Œuvres en prose complètes*, vol. 3, p. 1255.

<sup>43</sup> “Never has [our language] been less latin, less concise; never has it been freer or at the same time more disciplined; never has it responded more quickly to the slightest breath of the spirit. Here one finds as it was in Rabelais – quite young, in process of formation.” André Gide, Review in *La Nouvelle Revue Française*, cited in Margorie Villiers, *Charles Péguy: A Study in Integrity* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 248.

<sup>44</sup> In the opinion of T. S. Eliot, Péguy is ‘the man whom I consider the **[end of p. 143]** greatest journalist, in the best sense of the term, of my time.’ See T. S. Eliot, “Views and Reviews: Journalist of Yesterday and Today”, *The New English Weekly* (Feb 8, 1940), p. 237.

<sup>45</sup> According to Walter Benjamin, “*nothing* written has ever impressed me so very much because of how close it is to me, because of my feeling of oneness with it.’ See Walter Benjamin, “To Gerhard Scholem, Klosters, Sep 15, 1919”, in *The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin, 1910-1940*, eds. G. Scholem and T.W. Adorno, trans. M.R. and E.M. Jacobson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 147.

<sup>46</sup> See Gilles Deleuze, “Foucault and Prisons”, in TRM 281.

<sup>47</sup> Bruno Latour, “Trains of Thought: Piaget, Formalism and the Fifth Dimension”, *Common Knowledge* 6(3), 1997, p. 179.

<sup>48</sup> See Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. N.M. Paul and W.S. Palmer (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2004), p. 171. See also Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 1998), p. 5.

<sup>49</sup> According to Blanchot, Péguy’s ‘repetition is actually the indefinite return of a form that seeks to grow through insistence, through its alliance with duration, through the fact that it imposes itself and, by dint of patience and length, is drawn from something else to become more than itself.’ See Maurice Blanchot, “The Solitude of Péguy”, in Maurice Blanchot *Faux Pas* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 282. Translation taken from Roe, *The Passion of Charles Péguy*, p. 203.

<sup>50</sup> As Deleuze goes on to say in that essay: ‘In Péguy, stuttering embraces the language so well that it leaves the words intact, complete, and normal, but it uses them as if they were themselves the disjointed and decomposed members of a superhuman stuttering. Péguy is like a thwarted stutterer.’ (ECC 111)

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<sup>51</sup> Note that in French history the date of 14 July 1790 is itself known as a singular event: *Fête de la Fédération*, at which the fall of the Bastille and French unity was celebrated. Péguy takes the point one step further, suggesting that the initial storming of the Bastille was itself a festival, a celebration to mark the *culmination* of a transformation, and thus the first commemorative ceremony and the first anniversary of the storming of the Bastille: ‘the taking of the Bastille was the first *Fête de la Fédération*’ (see Péguy, *Clio*, pp. 114-15).

<sup>52</sup> Péguy rhetorically asks, which of Monet’s *Nymphéa* is the best? One might say the last, as by then Monet has perfected his technique and perhaps ‘arrived’ at what he was driving at. But Péguy nominates the first painting, because it is this one that gave rise to and called forth its repetitions. In this respect, the first one is the best ‘because [Monet] was able to do it least well’ (Péguy, *Ceuvres en prose complètes*, vol. 3, p. 126).

<sup>53</sup> Perhaps the most interesting of these references is Deleuze’s inclusion of Péguy as someone who develops ‘the opposition between the private **[end of p. 144]** thinker, the thinker-comet and bearer of repetitions, and the public professor and doctor of law, whose second-hand discourse proceeds by mediation and finds its moralising source in the generality of concepts ([...] Péguy against the Sorbonne)’ (DR 7). As we have seen, the private thinker opposed to the academy who confronts and creates the real by shunning the ready-made and repeating oneself is an apt description of Péguy.

<sup>54</sup> Translation modified (the text mistakenly has the word ‘future’ when it should be ‘past’).

<sup>55</sup> In the opinion of Bruno Latour, Péguy is the equal of Nietzsche and no less deserving of attention. As it happens, Latour attributes their contrasting receptions by academic Philosophy to the influence of Deleuze, who successfully philosophised Nietzsche (in a disciplinary/institutional sense) but on Péguy has ‘only been decisive in regard to one matter’. See Bruno Latour, “Charles Péguy: Time, Space, and le Monde Moderne”, in *New Literary History*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (Winter) 2015, pp. 43-5.

<sup>56</sup> Péguy, *Clio*, p. 269.

<sup>57</sup> Deleuze had a competitive advantage over Péguy in their respective readings of Bergson’s problematic philosophy, as Deleuze had access to Bergson’s 1934 essay “Stating of the Problems” – the essay, drawn on by Deleuze in *Bergsonism*, that most clearly lays out Bergson’s thoughts on the matter.

<sup>58</sup> Henri Bergson, “Introduction II: Stating of the Problems”, in *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. M.L. Anderson (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2007), p. 37. Note that the link between the problem and mathematics, which will feature in Deleuze’s problematic philosophy, is already present in Bergson.

<sup>59</sup> See “We Invented the Ritornello” in TRM 377-8 and “G as in Gauche” in *Gilles Deleuze: From A to Z*.

<sup>60</sup> For a separate but related analysis of how Deleuze employs Nietzsche’s notion of the Untimely, see Craig Lundy, “Deleuze’s Untimely: Uses and Abuses in the Appropriation of Nietzsche”, in *Deleuze and History*, eds. Jeffrey Bell and Claire Colebrook (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009), pp. 188-205.

<sup>61</sup> Original quotation found in Péguy, *Clio*, p. 269. Translation modified by Paul Patton, see Paul Patton, “Events, Becoming and History”, in *Deleuze and History*, p. 46.

<sup>62</sup> For a detailed examination of Péguy’s theory of aging with respect to Deleuze, see James Williams, “Ageing, Perpetual Perishing and the Event as Pure Novelty: Péguy, Whitehead and Deleuze on Time and History”, in *Deleuze and History*, pp. 142-9.

<sup>63</sup> For a full explanation of this point see Craig Lundy, *History and Becoming: Deleuze’s Philosophy of Creativity* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012). **[end of p. 145]**